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JV9 *93 ri3, Ia 30 



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VOLUME XLVII: Numbers 1201-1227 

July 2-December 31, 1962 



Issue Number Date 

of Issue 




2, 1962 

1- 44 



9, 1962 

45- 88 



16, 1962 

89- 128 



23, 1962 

129- 168 



30, 1962 

169- 204 



6, 1962 

205- 240 



13, 1962 

241- 276 



20, 1962 

277- 312 



27, 1962 

313- 340 



3. 1962 

341- 368 



10, 1962 

369- 400 



17, 1962 

401- 440 



24, 1962 

441- 472 



1, 1962 

473- 508 



8, 1962 

509- 544 



15, 1962 

545- 588 



22, 1962 

589- 632 



29, 1962 

633- 672 



5, 1962 

673- 712 



12, 1962 

713- 756 



19, 1962 

757- 800 



26, 1962 

801- 828 



3, 1962 

829- 864 



10, 1962 

865- 904 



17, 1962 

905- 948 



24, 1962 

949- 984 



31, 1962 


^S3 J ^"30 
JUM 9 1964 

Note: The listing of individual treaties, agree- 
ments, etc., under the country by subject has 
been discontinued. For detailed information on 
current treaty actions see subject matter of treaty. 


Publication 7520 

Released July 1963 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Oovernment Printing ( 
Washington 26, D.C. - Price 2S cents 


Volume XLVII: Numbers 1201-1227, July 2-December 31, 1962 

Abdirascid Ali Scermarche, 918 

Abel, Elie, 54 

ACDA. See Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

Acheson, Dean G., 909, 1000 

Adams, John Quincy, 488, 908 

Adams Family (Martin), 487 

Adenauer, Konrad, 836 

Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board, 660 

Advertising material and commercial samples, interna- 
tional convention (1952) to facilitate importation of, 
current actions: Congo ( Leopold ville), 237; Guinea, 

Advisory Commission on International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, U.S., 486 

Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency, 7, 328 

Advisory Council on African Affairs, formation of, 24 

AEC. See Atomic Energy Commission 

Aeronautics and Space Administration, National. See 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Afghanistan, treaties, agreements, etc., 630, 946 

Africa {see also individual countries) : 
Advisory Council on African Affairs, established, 24 
Common Market, 940 

Communism in, status of (Cleveland), 877 
Economic development : 
Priorities and potential : Bowles, 1004 ; Williams, 691 
Problems of: Blumenthal, 616; Bowles, 208; Good, 

Education in, need for and U.S. aid: Battle, 113, 697; 
Fredericks, 333 ; Williams, 812 

EEC, relationship with: Blumenthal, 780; Schaetzel, 
79 ; Weiss, 444, 446 

Europeans in, future of : Good, 886 ; Williams, 104 

Food-for-peace program in (Williams), 459 

Pan-African unity (Good). 885 

Soviet propaganda (Stevenson), 151 

Struggle for freedom in, problems of (Good), 882 

Students in Communist countries, treatment of (Ro- 
wan), 217 

Tropical Africa : 
Economic development and trade problems (Blumen- 
thal), 616 
Private investment opportunities in (Williams), 613 

U.S. Investment in (Rusk), 687 

U.S. position and aid : Bowles, 1002 ; Department, 961 ; 
Rusk, 520, 999 ; Williams, 690 

Visit of Assistant Secretary Williams to Europe to 
discuss, 133 

Index, July fo December 7962 

Agency for International Development: 
Administrator, appointment (Bell), 945 
African education, aid to (Fiedericks), 334, 335, 337 
Counterpart deposits required for certain AID-financed 
commodities, waiver of, agreement with Spain re, 

Deputy Administrator for Administration, confirmation 
(Brennan), 397 

Grant to Dominican Republic, 958 

Investment Guaranty Program. See Investment Guar- 
anty Program 

Korean program, report on progress (Fowler), 888 

Reorganization of (Fredericks), 333 

Training programs (Battle), 113 
Agricultural surpluses, U.S., use in overseas programs : 

Agreements with: Austria, 200; Bolivia, 274, 1026; 
Brazil, 797; Burma, 862; Ceylon, 274; Chile, 710, 
1026 ; China, 86, 200, .505, 946 ; Colombia, 200 ; Congo 
(L6opoldville), 40, 542, 630, 982; Ethiopia, 398; 
Guinea, 200; Iceland, 505; India, 982; Indonesia, 
274 ; Israel, 585, 710, 982 ; Korea, 86, 902 ; Mexico, 
137, 505 ; Morocco, 585 ; Pakistan, 1026 ; Paraguay, 
982 ; Peru, 200 ; Tunisia, 585 ; Turkey, 201, 710, 982 ; 
U.A.R., 505, 670 ; Venezuela, 86 ; Viet-Nam, 86, 238, 
982 ; Yugoslavia, 1026 

Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act 
(1954), Executive order re administration of, 222 

Barter program, recommended changes approved, 5()4 

EEC common agricultural policy, effect of: Ball, 324, 
1017; Blumenthal, 843; GATT views, 940, 941; 
Rusk, 177 ; Schaetzel, 352 ; Tyler, 1010 ; Weiss, 445, 

Food-for-peace program. See Food-for-peace program 

Role in economic development : Blumenthal, 845 ; Free- 
man, 536 ; McGovern, 256 ; Williams, 460 

Trade Expansion Act, provision re : Johnson, 611 ; 
Weiss, 848, 849 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act 

(1954), Executive order re administration, 222 
Agriculture (see also Agricultural surpluses) : 

Commodity trade. See Commodity trade 

Communist failures in: Blumenthal, 843; Cleveland, 
879; Galbraith, 16; Johnson, 281; Rostow, 680; 
Rusk, 347 

Congo, status of (Cleveland), 23 

Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N., 752 

Latin America, developments in (Martin) , 955 

Mexico, program for development (Kennedy), 137 

OECD Ministers of, meeting of, text of joint statement, 
943, 944, 945 


Agriculture — Continued 

Pacific Islands trust territory (Goding) , 268 

Pakistan, U.S. proposals to improve (Kennedy), 561 

Soviet agricultural group, visit to U.S., 380 

Western and Marxian systems, comparison of (Gal- 
braith), 15 

U.S. system (Kennedy), 752 
AID. See Agency for International Development 
Air transport. See Aviation 
Al-Ahdab, Ibrahim, 380 

Albania, Sino and Soviet policies toward (Hilsman), 809 
Alemann, Roberto T., 63 
Algeria : 

Developments in: Rusk, 175, 177, 185; Williams, 105 

Food-for-peace program in, 461 

Independence, congratulations on (Kennedy), 135 

New government, U.S. recognition of, 560 

Prime Minister, discussions with President Kennedy, 

U.N. membership (Stevenson), 627 
U.S. Ambassador, appointment, 945 
WHO, constitution of, 1025 
Alianza para el Progreso. See Alliance for Progress 
Allen, George V., 708 
Alessandri Rodriguez, Jorge, 991 
Alliance for Progress : 

Achievements, objectives, and progress: Ball, (J46; 
Blumenthal, 777, 842 ; Chayes, 192 ; Hamilton, 553 ; 
Mann, 772; Martin, 951 
Chile-U.S. views and support, 991 

1st annual review of, lA-ECOSOC Ministerial Repre- 
sentatives, 897 
Honduran-U.S. discussion, 958 
Legal aspects of (Chayes), 192 
Panama-U.S. support, 82 
Public health program (Martin), 120 
Standards and priorities for (Bowles) , 285 
U.S. appropriations and contributions for, 522, 523, 898, 
900, 958 
Allis, William P., 39 
Al-Sanusi, Hasan al-Rida, 689 
Alsogaray, Alvaro, 253 

American Republics (see also Latin America, inifividiial 

countries, and Organization of American States) : 

Foreign Ministers, meetings of. See Foreign Ministers 

Foreign Relations volume on, released, 1026 

American States, Organization of. See Organization of 

American States 
Amistad Dam, 137 
Angola, 887 
Antarctica treaty: 

Current action on : Czechoslovakia, 40 
Recommendations relating to furtherance of principles 
and objectives of, current actions: Argentina, 
Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Soviet Union, U.K., 
U.S., 40 
2d consultative meeting, U.S. delegation to, 236 
Anthony. U.S.S., 670 

Apartheid, Republic of South Africa policy, U.S. views 
(Plimpton), 791 


Arab-Israeli di-spute (Rusk), 997 
Archbishop Makarios, 103 
Argentina : 

Agriculture output, increase in, 854 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 63 
Development program, U.S. -Argentine review progress 

on, 135, 253 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40. 85, 200, 237, 274, 437, 669^ 

U.S. science attach^, appointment, 902 
U.S. sugar quota, allocation of, 254 
Armaments (see also Disarmament, Military equipment, 
Missiles, and. Nuclear weapons) : 
Control and reduction of, U.S. position, 3, 154, 871 
Development of, problem of (Rusk), 3 
Policy, relationship to disarmament (McNamara), 549 
Race, dangers of and need to halt: Rusk, 345, 869; 

Stevenson, 514 
Supply : 

NATO. iSee under North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
Soviet supply to Cuba. See Cuban crisis 
U.S. proposals to reduce risk of war, 1019 
Armed forces : 
Belgium, in Rwanda and Burundi, withdrawal of (Yost 

and resolution ) , 162, 163, 164 
Foreign forces in Germany : 
NATO status-of-forces agreements, current actions: 
Germany, 166; Netherlands, 504; U.K., 200; U.S., 

Rights and obligations of, agreement re, France, U.K., 
In Laos: 

ICC investigation (White), 648 
Withdrawal of (Rusk), 173; protocol on, 261 
Levels of, coordination of policy re, Executive order, 384 

Force goals (Rusk), 994 
Strengthening (McNamara), 68 
Reduction of: U.S. proposal (Rusk), 871 
Role in economic development programs (Rusk), 644 
Soviet Union, in Cuba. Sec Cuban crisis 
U.N. : 

In the Congo (aeveland), 20 
Legal authority of (Chayes), 32 
Role and problems of (Cleveland), 92 
U.S. proposals to reduce risk of war, 1019 
Western forces in Berlin, question of reduction (Rusk), 
Armed forces, U.S. : 

Aircraft, alleged violation of Soviet airspace (Ken- 
nedy, Khrushchev), 449, 744, 746 
Cuban crisis, alerting of U.S. forces (Kennedy), 718 

Executive order, 719 
In Korea, negotiations resumed on status-of-forces 

agreement on, 451 
Military missions, agreements with, Argentina, 200 

Panama, 946 
Status of (Rusk), 344 
Strategy for limited wars (Johnson), 280 
Strengthening (McNamara), 549 

Department of Sfafe Bulletin 




Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Executive order 

on coordination of disarmament policy, 383 
Army missions, agreements with : Argentina, 200 ; 

Panama, 946 
Arosemena Monroy, Carlos Julio, 251 
Arrest, detention, and exile, art)itrary, U.N. study re 

(Tree), 303 
Ascension Island, 505 
Aslienheim, Neville Noel, 751 

Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia {see also Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization and individual countries) : 
Aid program in (Rusk), 520 

Australia-U.S. discussions on developments in ( Ken- 
nedy -Menzies), 116 
Communism in, decline of (Cleveland), 877 
Development problems (Bowles), 208 
Teacher needs of (Battle), 697 
U.S. and Japanese role in (Johnson), 279 
U.S. policy : Rostow, 676 ;, 55 
U.S. investment in (Rusk), 687 
Atlantic, tropical, synoptic survey of proposed, 124 
Atlantic alliance. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Atlantic Community (see also Atlantic partnership and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization) : 
Ferment and discussion in ( Rusk ) , 54, 57, 96 
U.S. support and position : Gardner, 436 ; Rusk, 182 ; 
Stevenson, 231 
Atlantic partnership : 

Definition and elements of (Tyler), 1008 
Development of and progress through : Ball, 550, 645 ; 
Bundy, 601; Kennedy, 131; Rusk, 345; Schaetzel, 
353, 661 ; Weiss, 444 
Atmospheric nuclear tests : 
Indian request for cessation of, U.S. views, 626 
Pacific test series, conclusion of (Kennedy), 806 
U.K.-U.S. proposal banning: Dean, 406; Kennedy-Mac- 
millan, 403 ; Stevenson, 639 ; text of, 415 
Atmospheric Sciences and Hydrology, Committee on Inter- 
national Planning In, .500 
Atomic energy, mutual defense uses of, agreement for 

cooperation with Belgium, 505 
Atomic energy, peaceful uses of (see also Atomic Energy 
Agency, International) : 
Agreements for cooperation with : Argentina, 85, 274 ; 
Brazil, 310; Canada, 237; China. 237; EEC, 237; 
France, 86, 366 ; Germany, 166, 310, 338 : Israel. 86, 
200 ; Portugal, 274 ; South Africa, 41, 398 ; Sweden, 
237, 469 ; Thailand, 366 
IAEA safeguards system : Cleveland, 967 ; Smyth, 969 
U.S. program and efforts ( Seaborg) , 622 
Atomic Energy Agency, International : 

Activities and role of and U.S. participation ; Cleveland, 

326, 966 ; Seaborg, 625 
Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward, report ( ex- 
cerpt), 7, 328 
General conference of, U.S. representative to, confirma- 
tion, 584 
State Department adviser on, appointment, 945 
Statute of, current actions ; Liberia, 669 ; Saudi Arabia, 
1025; amendment of art. VI.A.3, Austria, .541 ; Bul- 
garia, 584; Burma, 338; Byelorussian S.S.R., 797; 

Index, July to December J 962 

Atomic Energy Agency, International — Continued 
Statute of — Continued 

Cambodia, 309 ; Ceylon, 125 ; China, 309 ; Cuba, 669 ; 
Ecuador, 584; El Salvador, 797; Iceland, 365; 
Indonesia, 826 ; Iraq, 584 ; Monaco, .504 ; Morocco, 
584; Netherlands, 504; New Zealand, 309; Nica- 
ragua, 669 ; Pakistan, 365 ; Paraguay, 437 ; Philip- 
pines, 309; Poland, 125; Portugal, 338; Rumania, 
541 ; Saudi Arabia, 1025; Soviet Union, 309; Sudan, 
Surinam. 504; Switzerland, 237; U.A.R., 469; 
Ukrainian S.S.R., 797 : A^iet-Nam, 541 
Atomic Energy Commission, U.S., 623, 624 
Atomic radiation, U.N. scientific committee report on 

(Plimpton), 859 
Auditory and visual materials of an educational, scien- 
tific, and cultural character, agreement and protocol 
for facilitating international circulation of, current 
actions ; Brazil, 669 ; Malagasy, 165 
Australia : 

EEC, U.K. proposed membership, views on (Schaetzel), 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 200, 504, 669, 1026 
U.S.-Australia relations, discussions ( Kennedy-Men- 
zies), 116 
Au.stria : 

Former persecutees, fund for and claims of, 566, 971 
Tariff concessions under GATT, effective date, 118 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 165, 200, 2.37, 274, 309, 338, 

541, 826, 862, 902, 982 
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation. 710 
Aviation : 

Air transport : 

International, Warsaw convention and Hague protocol 

re liability of carriers, U.S. views (Halaby, Rusk), 


U.S. negotiations with: Chile, 2.54; Iceland, 771; 

Senegal, 816 ; U.A.R., 69 

Aircraft, U.S., Soviet charges of violations of airspace, 

U.S. replies, 449, 744, 746 
Civil Aviation Organization, International, 40, 274, 365, 

629, 754 
Interagency Group on International Aviation, 362 
Treaties, agreements, etc., current actions on : 

Air transport, U.S. agreements with : New Zealand, 

200 ; Paraguay, 469 ; Trinidad and Tobago, 862 
Aircraft, imported, agreement with Switzerland for 
reciprocal acceptance of certificates of airworthi- 
ness for, 982 
Aircraft, international recognition of rights in, con- 
vention (1948) on: Mali. 200; Mauritania, 365 
Carriage by air, convention (1929) for unification of 
certain rules re: Austria, 826; Cameroon, 541; 
Congo (Brazzaville), 273; Dahomey, .541; Guinea, 
541 ; Ivory Coast, 273 ; Korea, North, 541 ; Lebanon, 
273; Malagasy, 826; Mali, 541; Mauritania, 826; 
Mongolia, 273; Niger, 273; Upper Volta, 541 
Protocol amending : Cameroon, 541 ; Congo ( Brazza- 
ville), 274; Dahomey. 541; Ivory Coast, 274; 
Malagasy, 826 ; Mali, 826 : Niger, 274 ; Pakistan, 


Aviation — Continued 

Treaties, agreements, etc. — Continued 

Civil aviation, international, convention (l!>i4) on: 
Current action, Chad, 165 

Protocol amending art. 50(a) re ICAO Council 
membership : Austria, 274 ; Central African Re- 
imblic, Ceylon, 40 ; China, 754 ; Congo ( Brazza- 
ville), 40; Cyprus, 7.54; Denmark, 40; Germany, 
754 ; Ghana, 40 ; Japan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 365 ; 
Libya, 754 ; Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
40 ; Panama, 365 ; Poland, Portugal, Sierra Leone, 
Sudan, Svritzerland, 40; Syrian Arab Republic, 
365 ; U.S., 629 ; Viet-Nam, 40 
Protocol amending arts, on sessions of ICAO As- 
sembly: Central African Republic, Congo (Braz- 
zaville), Congo (L^opoldville), Nicaragua, Po- 
land, 754 
U.K. aircraft, agreement re use of Wideawake air- 
field in Ascension Island, 505 
Ayub Khan, 561 

Balance of payments : 

Europe, status of (Weiss), 446, 447 

IMF role. See Monetary Fund, International 

U.S. problem : 

Foreign trade, role in (Ball), 1014 
Japan-U.S. review of, text of communique, 960 
Need for cooperation re (Kennedy) , 574 
Status of (Blumenthal), 841 
Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 691 

Ball, George W., addresses, remarks, and statements : 
Cuba, trade relations with, 591 

Foreign trade, role in balance-of -payments problem. 1014 
IBRD, role and tasks of, 575 
Lawyers and diplomats, 987 
NATO, implications of Cuban crisis, 831 
Reality of change, 8 
Trade Expansion Act, 321 
U.N., proposed loan to, 144 
Western European-U.S. partnership, 550 
Western Hemisphere cooperation and solidarity, 645 
Balloon flights, equatorial, agreement with India for joint 

program for research purposes, 862 
Harnett, Robert W., 919 
Battle, Lucius D. : 

Addresses and remarks : 

Cultural and educational affairs, role in foreign af- 
fairs, 73 
Educational and cultural exchange programs, 110, 421 
UNESCO, program and budget, 695, 935 
Confirmation as representative to UNESCO conference, 

Request for study of cultural presentations program, 
Belgium : 

Congo, U.N. plan for reunification, Belgian supi)ort, 419, 

Peace volunteers for developing countries, 855 
Rwanda and Burundi, willingness to aid and withdrawal 

of troops (Yost), 161, 162, 163, 164 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 85, 125, 438, 505, 669, 
709, 826, 902, 982 


Bell, David E., 945 
Bemis, Samuel Flagg, 492 
Ben Bella, Ahmed, 560, 689 
Benjamin, Curtis G., 666 
Berlin : 

Access routes to, question of internationalization on 

(Rusk), 174 

Contrast between East and West Berlin (Bundy), 604 
Future and role of (Rostow), 681 
Interdepartmental Berlin Task Force, 542 
Negotiations and consultations on : 

German-U.S. discussions (Adenauer, Kennedy), 837 
Soviet Union-U.S., question of: Rusk, 56, 172, 173, 174, 

180, 181, 996 ; U.S. and Soviet notes, 417, 558 
U.K.-U.S. discussions (Home, Kennedy), 600 
With allies (Rusk), 54 
Tensions and incidents in, U.S. and Soviet exchanges 

on, 97, 319, 378, 417, 448, 558 
Troops in : 

Question of reduction of (Rusk) , 181 
Soviet proposal re (Rusk), 174 
U.S. and Western commitments and rights in : Manning, 
188; Rostow, 677, 680; Rusk, 344, 911; Western 
statement, 377 
West Berlin, symbol of freedom and U.S. support 
(Rusk), 96 
Bicycles, lightweight, proposed legislation re tariff classi- 
fication for, disapproval (Kennedy), 889 
Bill of Rights Day, 923 
Bingham, Jonathan B., 247, 299, 537, 930 
Black, Eugene, 573, 581 
Blagonravov, A. A., 962, 963 
Blumenthal, W. Michael, 234, 616, 777, 840, 981 
Board of Foreign Scholarships, election of chairman, 600 
Bohlen, Charles E., 469 

Bolivia, treaties, agreements, etc., 165, 274, 1026 
Book Programs, International, Government Advisory 

Committee on, establishment and members, 666 
Bowles, Chester: 

Addresses and message : 
Africa, 1002 

Alliance for Progress, 285 
Foreign aid program, basic principles of, 207 
Frontiers that divide free world and Communist 

world, 47 
Latin America, new deal for, 330 
Visit to Colombia, 253 
Boyd, Alan S., 360 
Brazil : 

Northeast area, U.S. -Brazil survey of needs of, 857 
Nuclear test-ban position, 407 
Student leaders, visit to U.S., 112, 289 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 125, 237, 310, 669, 797 
Visit of President Kennedy: 
Plans for (Rusk), 175, 176 
Postpf)ned, 747 
Water and sanitation services (Martin), 123 
Brennan, Bernard T., 397 

British Commonwealth of Nations, EEC implications for 
(Schaetzel), 662 

Department of State Bulletin IgJej 

British Honduras, 438 

Broadcasting agreement, North American regional, and 

final protocol, current action, U.K., 826 
Brown, Frederick W., 902 
Bruce, Robert, 201 

Bulgaria, treaties, agreements, etc., 584, 669 
Bundy, McGeorge, 601 
Burma : 

Nuclear test ban position, 408 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 274, 338, 862 
Burundi : 

Immigration quota established for, 752 

Independence : 

General Assembly resolution, text, 164 
U.S. support and congratulations: Kennedy, 134; 
Yost, 159 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 630, 797, 901 

U.N. membership application. Security Council action 
(Yost), 296 

U.S. Embassy, proposed establishment, 201 

U.S. Minister, appointment, 826 
Business Council for International Understanding, 856 
Bustamante, Alexander, 116 
Butterworth, W. Walton, 630 
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 797 

Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee, 356 
Calendar of international conferences and meetings {see 
also subject), 28, 119, 223, 295, 357, 437, 501, 571, 704, 
784, 851, 928 
Cambodia : 
Neutrality and territorial integrity, U.S. reply to re- 
quest by (Kennedy, Sihanouk ), 456 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 125, 237, 274, 309, 338, 669, 

709, 1025 
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 201 
Cameroon, treaties, agreements, etc., 542, 630, 669, 862 
Canada : 

International Joint Commission, 141 
Overseas volunteers, 856 

Softwood lumber industry, problems of, U.S.-Oanadian 
discussions: joint statements, 464, 702; U.S. dele- 
gation, 355, 702 
Trade with : 

Cuba (Ball), 592 

EEC (Schaetzel), 352 

U.S. : Ball, 325 ; Schaetzel, 351 

GATT discussion of Canadian restrictions, 940 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 237, 255, 274, 629, 669, 797, 

U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 630 
U.S. investment in (Rusk), 686 

World trade, expansion of, exchange of views with 
U.S. re, 749 
Canal Zone, 82 
Capitalism : 

Definition and importance (Mann), 776 
Foreign views of (Jones), 767 
Captive Nations Week, 1962, proclamation, 222 
Carnegie Corporation, 336 

Central African Republic, treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 
669, 709, 754, 797, 862, 901 

Central America {see also individual countries) : 
Common market in, established, 956 
Economic integration, progress toward, 898 
Meeting of chiefs of state with President Kennedy, 

proposed, 450 
Pan American Highway, opening of, 288, 647 
Ceylon : 

Population problem (Bamett), 921 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 85, 125, 274, 982 
Chad, 165 

Chamberlain, John, 774 
Charlotte, Grand Duchess, 748 
Charter of the United Nations. See United Nations 

Chayes, Abram, 30, 192, 763 
Chiari, Roberto F., 81 

Child feeding program, agreement with Italy re, 505 
Chile : 

Air transport, consultations with U.S., 254 
Domestic peace corps program, 856 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 166, 710, 1025, 1026 
U.S.-Chilean relations (Alessandri, Kennedy), 991 
China, Communist (see also Communism and Sino-Soviet 
bloc) : 
Aggression against India : Hilsman, 807, 809 ; Kennedy, 

783; Rusk, 177, 915, 1000; Stevenson, 787 

Agriculture and economic policies, failure of: Blumen- 

thal, 843; Cleveland, 879; Galbraith, 16; Johnson, 

281 ; Rostow, 679, 680 ; Rusk, 55, 548 ; Stevenson, 790 

Doctrinal dispute with Soviet Union: Hilsman, 807; 

Rusk, 915, 999, 1000 
Nuclear test ban treaty, question of participation in 

(Rusk), 914 
Population problem (Bamett), 921 
Quemoy and Matsu, threat to (Rusk), 178, 180 
Soviet aid, cutback in (Hilsman), 809 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 274 

U.N. representation, U.N. rejects Soviet proposal 
(Stevenson), 786 
China, question of U.S. policy (Rusk), 178 
China, Republic of : 

Support of U.N. ( Stevenson) , 789 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 200, 237, 309, 438, 505, 
754, 946 
Civil aviation. See Aviation 
Civil Aviation Organization, International : 

Assembly of, U.S. delegation to 14th session, 360 
International civil aviation convention provisions re 
Assembly and Council of. See Aviation : Treaties, 
agreements, etc. 
Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting, 2d, U.S. dele- 
gation to, 583 
Claims : 
Austrian persecutees, fund for and acceptance of appli- 
cations, 566, 971 
Philippine war damage bill, congressional action 

(Kennedy), 294 
To real estate in Windward Islands, information on 

registration of, 332 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, progress in set- 
tlement (Goding), 272, 273 
U.S. against Greece, negotiations for settlement, 702 

Index, July to December 1962 


Clark, Bob, 179 

Clarke, Ellis Emmanuel Innocent, 770 
Cleveland. Harlan : 
Addresses and remarks : 
A most dangerous time, 875 
Congo developments, 18 
IAEA, 326, 966 
Power and diplomacy, 759 
Third party in world affairs, 91 
UNESCO and international organizations, 698 
United Nations, role of, 482 
Visit to Europe to discuss U.N. affairs, 133 
Cleveland, International Program, 422, 423 
Codacci-Pisanelli, Giuseppe, 783 
Coffee : 

International agreement on : 
lA-ECOSOC repre-sentatives, comment, 898 
Senate approval requested (Kennedy), 668 
U.N. conference, 234 

U.S. position and support: Blumenthal, 234, 619, 
781 ; Stevenson, 667 
Trade in, importance of (Stevenson), 229 
Cold war : 
African attitude and role (Good), 886 
Communist views (Morgan), 653 
Imi)ermanence of (Ball), 8, 991 
Scope of (Stevenson), 729 
Status of (Rostow), 675 
Thaw in, prospects for (Cleveland) , 880 
Collective security {see also Mutual defense) : 
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. See Southeast 

Asia Treaty Organization 
Europe. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Near and Middle East. See Central Treaty Organiza- 
Western Hemisphere (see also Organization of Ameri- 
can States), Rio Treaty provision, 764 
Colombia : 
Economic and social development program, accomplish- 
ments (Bowles), 285 
Social workers, training of, 855 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 310, 797 
Visit of Pre.sident's Special Representative (Bowles), 
Colonialism {see also Self-determination and Trust 
territories) : 
Afro-Asian U.N. bloc policy, U.S. views (Gardner), 434 
Decline of : BaU, 9, 991 ; Stevenson, 299, 516 
Neocolonialism, African views (Good), 883 
Soviet position : Bingham, 931 ; Johnson, 476 
U.N. special committee on the implementation of the 
granting of indei)endence to colonial countries and 
peoples, report of (Bingham), 930 
U.S. policy (Bingham), 930 
Colorado River salinity problem, 137 
Commerce, De[)artment of, 139, 611 
Commercial treaties. Sec Trade : Treaties 
Committee of 17, 9.30 

Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, rei>ort of, 971 
Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World, 
established, 1007 

Commodity trade problems {see also Agricultural 
surpluses and individual commodity) : 
Africa, tropical (Blumenthal), 616 

Efforts to resolve and U.S. position : Arosemena, 
Kennedy, 252; Ball, 580; Blumenthal, 234, 618, 843; 
Rusk, 685 ; Schaetzel, 79, 81 ; Stevenson, 229 
Latin America, efforts to solve (Blumenthal), 779 
Tropical products, legislation re modification of import 
restrictions on, 656 
Common markets. Sec name of market 
Communications {see also Radio and Telecommunica- 
tions) : 
Military emergencies, U.S. proposal in plans for reduc- 
ing risk of war, 1024 
Rapid and relial)le between governments, importance 

of (Rusk), 872 

Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (Kennedy), 

Experimental, cooperative testing of, agreements 

with : Italy, 902 ; Japan, 902 
Foreign policy a.spects of : Johnson, 567 ; Rusk, 315 
Soviet-U.S. agreement for cooperation re, 964 
Telstar, success of, 178, 191, 348 
Communism (see also China, Commimist; Cuba; Ger- 
many, East; Sino-Soviet bloc; and Soviet Unions* 
Aggression and subversive activities : 
Cuba. See Cuban crisis 
Methods of : Morgan, 652 ; Rusk, 42 
Review of (Rostow) , 679 
U.S. determination to deter (Rusk), 683 
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam 
Attractiveness of, decline in (Cleveland), 759, 877, 878 
Capitalism, theory on downfall of, refuting (Rusk), 684 
Cold war. See Cold war 
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, 810 
Crisis and problems of : Manning, 188 ; Johnson, 281 ; 

Rostow, 556, 680 ; Rowan, 216 ; Rusk, 347, 548 
Economic development, comparison of Marxian and 

Western systems for : Galbraith, 13 ; Rusk, 912 
Free world struggle and competition : Bowles, 47, 50 ; 
Kennedy, 525: Manning, 187; Rusk, 142, 688 
Guerrilla warfare : Hilsman, 526 ; Johnson, 478 

Ideology. Sovlet-Sino dispute : Ball, 991 ; Hilsman, 807 ; 

Rusk, 915, 999, 1000 
Objectives and policies : Johnson, 477 ; Rostow, 555 ; 

Rusk, 547, 548 
Peaceful coexistence policy : Gardner, 429 ; Gore, 973 ; 

Morgan, 651 ;, 548 
Treaty law, doctrinal emphasis on (Gore), 975 
Compulsory settlement of disputes, optional protocol of 
signature concerning, current action : Madagascar, 585 
Conferences and organizations, international (see also 
subject), calendar of meetings, 28, 119, 223, 295, 357, 
437, 501, 571, 704, 784, 851, 928 
Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville), treaties, agreements, 
etc., 40. 165, 273, 542, 630, 669, 754, 862, 902, 945, 946 
Congo, Republic of the (L^opoldville) : 
Economic problems in : Bowles, 10O5 ; Cleveland, 22 
European-African relations in (Williams), 107 
Import program, U.S. aid, 140, 771 


Deparlment of Slate Bulletin 

Congo, Republic of the (L^opoldville) — Continued 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 165, 200, 237, 365, 542, 

630, 754, 982 
U.N. operation in : 
Financing of, ICJ opinion re assessments for, 246, 432 
Nation-building operation (Cleveland), 20 
Peacekeeping force in (Cleveland) , 20 
Size of (Cleveland), 92 
Soviet position (Stevenson), 554 

U.S. support and views: Bingham, 248; Cleveland, 
485 ; Gardner, 428 ; Rostow, 677 
U.N. plan for reintegration of Katanga Province : 
Belgium-U.S. support (Kennedy, Spaak),917 
Federal constitution, proposed : 
Belgian support, 419 
Powers under (Williams), 420 
U.K. support, 419 

U.S. position and support : Department, 291, 379 ; 
Williams, 418 
Objectives of (Williams), 805 
Progress in implementing : William.?, 805 ; visit to 

assess (McGhee), 564 
U.S. position and support : Bowles, 1(X)5 ; Cleveland, 
23; Department, 214; Kennedy-Home, 600; Rusk, 
57, 997 ; Williams, 903 
Congress, U.S.: 
Documents relating to foreign policy, lists of, 84, 153, 
325, 356, 386, 468, .500, .533, 570, 621, 654, 816, 927, 
Foreign Service Officers assigned as interns. Depart- 
ment program, 506 
Joint resolution on Cuban situation, 597 
Legislation : 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 ( Kennedy ), 291 
Migration and refugee assistance (Kennedy), 153 
Pacific Islands trust territory, authorizing increase in 

funds for administration, 272 
Satellite communications system : Johnson, 568 ; Ken- 
nedy, 467 ; Rusk, 315 
Trade Expansion Act. See Trade Expansion Act 
Legislation, proposed : 
Bicycles, lightweight, tariff classification for. Presi- 
dent's disapproval, 889 
IMF, supplemental appropriation requested for, 152 
Loan to U.N. : Ball, 144 ; Bingham, 250 ; Rusk, 142, 

178; Stevenson, 149, 512 
Philippine war damage bill (Kennedy), 294 
Rickert and Laan, Inc., relief for. President with- 
holds approval of, 703 
Sugar, quotas and subsidy for (Johnson) , 83 
Senate approval requested for : 
Coffee agreement, international (Kennedy), 668 
Friendship treaty with Luxembourg (Trezise), 467 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations : 
Authority granted to inspect foreign representatives' 

tax returns. Executive order, 924 
Hearings on international wheat agreement (1962), 
Senate restrictions on foreign aid program: McGhee, 
102; Rowan, 71; Rusk, 25, 57 

Index, July to December 7962 

Conservation of living re.sources of the high seas, conven- 
tion (1958) on, current action, Madagascar, 585 
Constitution, U.S., treaty power under, 38 
Contiguous zone and territorial sea, convention (1958) on, 

current actions: Bulgaria, 669; Malagasy, 585 
Continental shelf, convention (1958) on the, current 

actions: Bulgaria, 669; Poland, 309 
Contingency fund, appropriation for (Rusk), 523 
Coppock, Joseph D., 371 

Copyright convention (19.52), universal, and protocols 1, 
2, and 3, current actions : Norway, 797 ; Panama, 365 
Costa Rica : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 138 
Central American Common Market, membership in, 956 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 438, .505, 542 
Water and sewerage service, 123 
Cotton textiles : 

Italian, velveteen exports to U.S., agreement limiting, 

463, 754 
Japanese exports to U.S., suspension of, 386 
Long-term arrangements (1961) re trade in : 
Administration of. Executive order re, 626 
Current actions : Austria, 826 ; Belgium, 669 ; Canada, 
629; Denmark, 669; France, 945; Germany, Hong 
Kong, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, 669; Luxem- 
bourg, 945; Netherlands, Norway, 669; Pakistan, 
862; Portugal, 826; Spain, Sweden, 669; U.A.R., 
669; U.K., U.S., 629 
Objectives of (Blumenthal), 780 
U.S. industry, elimination of adverse price cost differ- 
ential sought (Kennedy), 463 
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, Communist, 810 
Counterpart funds, deposits required for AID-flnanced 
commodities, agreement with Spain re waiver of, 86 
Covmterpart settlement agreement with Austria, 309 
Coups d'etat, OAS consideration of, U.S. position (Mor- 
rison), 539 
Court of Justice, International. See International Court 

of Justice 
Creel, Robert C, 542 

Communist takeover of (Stevenson), 729 

Economy, status of ( Ball ) , 591 

Fishing port in, agreement with Soviet Union re, U.S. 

views : Rusk, 595 ; White, 560 
Government, hemispheric views on (Rusk) , 998 
Refugees and exiles, question of U.S. support (Rusk), 

596, 597 
Self -exclusion from inter-American system (Steven- 
son), 731 
Soviet military buildup and introduction of offensive 

weapons in. See Cuban crisis 
Sugar quota, U.S. (Johnson), 83 

Travel of U.S. citizens to, special endorsement of pass- 
ports needed, 1001 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 438, 669, 797 
U.N. Mission at New York, illegal actions of members 

of, 835 
U.S. policy toward (Kennedy), 481, 718 


Cuban crisis : 

Addresses, correspondence, remarks, and statements: 
Adenauer, Kennedy, 837; BaU,.591, G47, 831, 988; 
Chayes, 763 ; Cleveland, 759, 701,. 881j Department, 
560, 747 ; Hilsman, 807 ; Home, Kennedy, 600 ; Ken- 
nedy, 450, 4ai, 715, 737, 740, 743, 745, 762, 783, 874 ; 
Khrushchev, 741, 743 ; Rostow, 677 ; Rusk, 174, 595, 
643, 720, 867, 909, 914, 993, 995, 996j 997, 998, 1000, 
1001 ; Stevenson, 582, 706, 723 ; Thant, 740 ; White 
House, 740, 741 
Attack in Western Hemisphere, Soviet Union responsi- 
bility for (Kennedy), 718 
Buildup in by Soviet Union of offensive weapons, bases, 
and forces : 
Addresses, remarks, and statements: Ball, 594; 
Kennedy, 450, 481, 715; Rusk, 595, 720, 1000; 
Stevenson, 707, 708, 723, 731, 738, 739 
Continued Soviet buildup (White House), 740, 741 
Interdiction of deliveries of : 

Establishment: Chayes, 763; Kennedy, 717, 743; 
Rusk, 721, 993; Stevenson, 734, 735; OAS sup- 
port, 599, 643, 721, 722; proclamation, 717 
Removal of: Kennedy, 743, 874; proclamation, 918 
Soviet position, 734, 741 
Suspension of, Secretary-General's proposal and 

U.S. reply, 737, 740 
System for clearance of, 747 
Soviet contradictious re : Kennedy, 715 ; Rusk, 720, 

996; Stevenson, 732, 734 
Reports to Nation (Kennedy), 715, 762 
Withdrawal and dismantling of: 

Call for: OAS resolution, 723; U.S. request, Ken- 
nedy, 718, Rusk. 722, Stevenson, 724, 733; text 
of proposal in Security Council, 724 
Communist China's views (Hilsman), 807 
International verification of: Soviet position, 742, 
744 ; U.S. position, Kennedy, 743, 745, Rusk, 996, 
Stevenson, 733, White House, 741 
Reports on progress : Kennedy, 762, 874 ; Rusk, 996, 
Communications during, importance of (Rusk), 910 
Council of OAS, meeting : 
Call for (Kennedy), 718 

U.S. proposed action (Rusk), 720; text of resolution, 
Economic and trade controls : Ball, 591 ; Foreign Minis- 
ters communique, 599; Rusk, 1000; Stevenson 
Foreign Ministers of American Republics, meeting on. 

See Foreign Ministers 
Free world problem (Rusk) , r>98 
Guantanamo Naval Base, reinforcement of (Kennedy), 

General Assembly consideration of Cuban charges 

against U.S., U.S. replies (Stevenson), 582, 706 
Gennan-U.S. discussions (Adenauer, Kennedy), 837 
Honduran-U.S. discussions (Villeda Morales, Kennedy), 

Hemispheric solidarity : Foreign Ministers communique, 

598; OAS resolution, 720; Rusk, 595, 596 
Impact and lessons of: Cleveland, 881; Rusk, 911, 914 

Cuban crisis — Continued 
Military, U.S.-Soviet, role in relation to negotia- 
tions (Rusk), 598 
Secretary-General's efforts, 737, 740 
Security Council hearing of U.S. charges of threat to 
peace : 
Draft resolution, U.S., 724 

Request for meeting: Kennedy, 718; Stevenson, 724 
Soviet reaction and position (Stevenson), 735, 738, 

U.S. charges and proposed action: Rusk, 722; 
Stevenson, 723 
Subversive and aggressive activities in Western 
Hemisphere : 
Foreign Ministers communique, 599 
OAS concern and efforts: resolution, 722; Rusk, 174, 

U.S. position: congressional resolution, 597; Ken- 
nedy, 718 ; Stevenson, 582, 706 
U.K.-U.S. discussions (Home, Kennedy), 600 
U.S. Armed Forces, Executive order re active duty of 

reserves and extension of enlistment periods, 719 
U.S. position : 

Addresses and statements : Ball, 831 ; Kennedy, 450, 
481 : Rostow, 677 ; Rusk, 720 ; Stevenson, 708 
Background of (Rusk), 720, 909 
Bipartisan support for (Rusk), 597 
Congressional joint resolution, .597 
Formulation and execution of (Ball), 988 
Legal case for ( Chayes) , 763 
Preserving secrecy on (Rusk), 995, 996 
United Nations role (Cleveland), 761 
Cultural relations and programs (see also Educational 
exchange anil Exchange of persons) : 
Book progrtims, advisory committee on, (566 
Cultural presentations program: Battle, 76, 112, 423: 

study of, 486 
Exchange Act of 1961, 76, 138 
Role and goal of (Battle), 73, 110 
Treaties, agreements, etc. : 

Cultural agreement with U.A.R., 41 
Educational, scientific, and cultural materials, agree- 
ment and protocol on importation of, current ac- 
tions: Congo (L^opoldrille), 40; Gabon, 709; 
Malagasy, 165; New Zealand, 309 
Visual and auditory materials of an educational, sci- 
entific and cultural character, agreement and 
protocol for facilitating international circulation of, 
current actions : Brazil, 669 ; Malagasy, 165 
With Communist countries (Bowles), 52, 53 
Customs (see also Tariff policy) : 

Commercial samples and advertising material, con- 
vention (19i>2) to facilitate imi)ortation, current 
actions: Congo (L^opoldville), 237; Guinea, 40 
Private road vehicles, convention (1954) on temporary 
importation of, current actions : Central African 
Republic, 901; Ecuador, 669; Finland, 273; New 
Zealand, 629 
Touring, convention (1954) concerning customs facili- 
ties for, current actions : Central African Republic, 
862 ; Ecuador, 669 ; Finland, 826 ; New Zealand, 629 

Department of State BuHetin 


IBRD membership, 361 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 274, 398, 437, 585, 754 

Vice President Johnson to visit, 320 

Visit of Archbishop Mal^arios to U.S., 103 
Czechoslovakia : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 505, 669 

U.N. members financial obligations, views on (Chayes), 

U.S. Ambassador, appointment, 862 

War propaganda, proposed resolution on (Gore), 974 

Dahomey, treaties, agreements, etc., 120, 365, 542, 669, 862 

Dale, William B., 795 

Dean, Arthur H., 387, 404, 504, 817 

Debts (see also Claims), Greek, to U.S., negotiations for 

settlement, 702 
Defense {see also Collective security. Military bases, 
Mutual defense, and National defense) : 
Asia, U.S. efforts in (Johnson), 280 
Internal defense and .security : 
Agreements re furnishing articles and services for : 

Costa Rica, 505 ; Panama, 126 
FSI seminar on problems of, 41 
Patent rights and technical information for defense pur- 
poses, agreement with Sweden for interchange of, 
Defense College, Inter-American, 642 
De Gaulle, Charles, 183 
De Mauny, Erik, 348 
Deming, Olcott H., 670 
Denmark : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 237, 505, 669, 709, 826 
Volunteer program for aid to developing countries, 855 
Department of Commerce, 139, 611 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 139 
Department of State. See State Department 
Development Assistance Committee (OECD) : 
10th meeting of, communique and resolution, 395 
Work of and U.S. support (Schaetzel) , 80 
Development Association, International : 

Articles of agreement, current actions : Argentina, 437 ; 
Kuwait, 504 ; Senegal, Somali Republic, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Togo, 437 
Board of Governors meeting, 573 
Credit policy (Stevenson), 230 
Expansion of, proposed (Ball), 577 
Diefenbaker, John G., 749 
Dillon, Douglas, 583 
Diplomatic relations and recognition : 
Changing nature (^Rostow), 61 
Conduct at summit (Rusk), 913 

Importance to national security efforts (Cleveland), 759 
Lawyers, role in (Ball), 987 

Preventive diplomacy, definition of (Morgan), 27 
Privileges and immunities for missions, 6.54, 977 
Race discrimination problem, effect on (Rusk), 912 
Recognition : 
Algeria, 560 

Peru, suspension of, 312 ; resumption of, 348 
Study and conduct of (Kohler), 381 
Tedium of (Rusk), 911 

Diplomatic relations and recognition — Continued 
U.N. role : Gardner, 427, 428 ; Stevenson, 514 
Vienna convention and protocol, current actions: 
Ghana, 237 ; Ivory Coast, 826 ; Liberia, 40 ; Mauri- 
tania, 398, 469 ; Sierra Leone, 542 ; Tanganyika, 981 
Diplomatic representatives abroad. See Foreign Service 
Diplomatic representatives in the U.S. : 

Presentation of credentials : Argentina, 63 ; Costa Rica, 
138; Jamaica, 751; Jordan, 961; Lebanon, 380; 
Malaya, 258; Niger, 961; Somali, 190; Spain, 63; 
Turkey, 258 
U.N. Missions : 

Cuban, illegal actions of members of, 835 
Soviet, U.S. requests withdrawal of 2 employees for 
espionage, 559 
Visas, reciprocal issuance of, agreement with Rumania 
re, 86 
Dirksen, Everett M., 25ji 

Disarmament (see also Armaments, Nuclear weapons, 
and Outer space) : 
Arms policy, relationship between (McNamara), 549 
Complete and general disarmament : 
'•'' Soviet and Western programs, review of, 156 
U.S. position : Rusk, 6 ; Stevenson, 640 
C>iban crisis, impact on (Rusk), 914 
18-Nation Committee, conference at Geneva. See 

Eigh teen-Nation Committee 
Soviet position: Dean, 393; Johnson, 281;, 4 
Treaty, need for action on (Rusk) , 243 
U.N. role (Stevenson), 515 
U.S. position and efforts : 

Foster, 108 ; Kennedy, 746 ; Rusk, 3, 345, 870 ; Steven- 
son, 640 
Procedures for coordination of, established. Execu- 
tive order, 383 
Disarmament agency, U.S., 383 
Discrimination. See Racial relations 

Disputes, compulsory settlement of, optional protocol of 
signature concerning, current action : Madagascar, 585 
Djibo, Yacouba, 701 
Dobrynin, Anatoliy, 171, 176 

Documents on Oerman Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series 
D. Volume XII, The War Years, February 1-June 22, 
191,1, released, 798 
Dollar, U.S., status of (Kennedy), 573 
Dominican Republic : 

IBRD membership, readmittance, 361 

Political developments in (Martin) , 957 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 398, 669, 709, 754, 826, 902, 

U.S. aid, 215, 958 
U.S. sugar quota, allocation of, 254 
Dorticos Torrado, Osvaldo, 706 
Double taxation on income, convention for avoidance of 

with Japan (1954), protocol amending, 366, 397 
Drugs, narcotic: 

Manufacture and distribution of : 

1931 convention limiting and regulating, current ac- 
tions : Central African Republic, 754 ; Congo (Braz- 
zaville), 945; Congo ( Leopold ville), 200; Guinea, 
40; Togo, 200 

Index, July fo December J 962 


Drugs, narcotic — Continued 
Manufacture and distribution of — Continued 

Protocol (1931) bringing under international control 
drugs outside scoi)e of 1931 convention, current ac- 
tions: Central African Republic, 709; Congo (Braz- 
zaville), iU'); Congo ( Leopold ville), 585; Ecuador, 
709 ; Togo, 669 
Opium, protocol (1953) regulating production, trade, 
and use of, current actions: Congo (Brazzaville), 
91.5; Congo ( Leopold ville), 200 
Opium and other drugs, convention (1912) for suppres- 
sion of abuse of, current actions : Central African 
Republic, 7i>4; Congo (Brazzaville), 002; Congo 
(I^opoldville), 200 
Traffic in, eradication of, Mexican-U.S. supiwrt, 136 
Dryden, Hugh, 962, 963 
Dumont, Donald, 826 

Earthquake, Iran, U.S. aid, 458 

Economic Affairs and Trade, Joint U.S.-Japan Committee 

Economic and Social Council, Inter-American. See Inter- 
American Economic and Social Council 
Economic and Social Council, U.N. : 
Documents, lists of, 309, 466, 584, 796 
Enlargement of, U.S. support: Plimpton, .537; Steven- 
son, 513 
U.N. conference on trade and development, proposed 
by (Stevenson), 517 
Economic and social development (see also Economic and 
technical aid. Foreign aid programs, and Less de- 
veloped countries) : 
Africa. See tinder Africa 
Armed forces, role in ( Rusk ) , 644 
Asia : Bowles, 208 ; Johnson, 282 
DAC role, 80, 395 
Education, importance to: Battle, 114, 230; Fredericks, 

333, 337 ; Stevenson, 227 
Financing of : Ball. 577 ; Stevenson, 229, 230 
FSI seminar on problems of, 41 

Human factor in, importance (Stevenson), 226, 227 
IBRD role (Ball), 576 
Latin America. See Alliance for Progress 
Middle-level manpower, role in, conference on : 
Importance of (Kennedy), 465 
Summary report on. 8.53 
U.S. delegation, 628 
Pacific Islands trust territory (Coding), 266 
Programs of and U.S. cooi>eration : Argentina, 135 ; 
Chile, 9!)2; Congo ( Leopold ville ) , 22; Cyprus, 103; 
Dominican Republic, 215; Ecuador, 2.52; Germany, 
.563; Mexico, 1.36 
Population growth, effect on (Bamett), 919 
Sino-Soviet bloc. See vnder Sino-Soviet bloc 
U.N. role and efforts: Bingham, 248; Cleveland, 94; 
Gardner, 427; Kennedy, 294; Stevenson, 151, 225, 
U.S. experience, review of (Mann), 772 


Economic and technical aid to foreign countries (see also 
Agency for International Development, Agricultural 
surpluses. Alliance for Progress, Economic and social ii ' 
development. Foreign aid programs, Inter-American 
Development Bank, International Bank, International 
Development Association, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, and United Nations : 
Technical assistance programs) : 
Advisory committee, established, 1007 
Aid to: Afghanistan, 946; Africa, 617, 092; Colombia, 
253, 310 ; Costa Rica, 438, 542 ; Dominican Republic, 
958; Greece, 100, 102; Japan, 505; Nicaragua, 86; 
Pakistan, 366 ; Ryukyu Islands. 770 ; Viet-Nam, 86, 
Basic concepts of: Bowles, 286; Johnson, 282 
IAEA program (Smyth), 969 
To Peru, suspended, 214 
U.S. position (Johnson), 479 
Economic Commission for Africa, U.N., conference of 
African states on the development of education in 
Africa, 3.33, 335, 814 
Economic Cooperation and Development, Organization for. 
See Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Economic policy and relations, U.S. [see also individual 
eonntries) : 
Domestic economy : 

Common market, effect on (Johnson), 478 
Diversion to armaments production (Rusk), 5 
Foreign aid program, effect on (Hamilton), .552 
Need for expansion of (Rusk), 684 
Status of : Blumenthal, 841 ; Kennedy, 575 
Foreign economic policy: 
Balance-of-payments problem. See Balance of pay- 
Effect on national security (Coppock), 371 
Changes in (Schaetzel), 80 
Foreign aid program. Sec Foreign aid 
Principal tenets of (Mann), 772 
Tariff policy. See Tariff policy, U.S. 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. See Trade Expansion 

World economic situation, relationship to (Blumen- 
thal), 840 
Interdependence of Atlantic economies : Ball, 322 ; 
Schaetzel, 661 
Ecuador : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 274, 398, 584, 669, 709, 826 
U.S. relations (Arosemena, Kenno<ly), 251 
Education (see also Cultural relations and programs. 
Educational exchange, and Exchange of i)ersons) : 
Africa : Battle, 113, 697 ; Fredericks, 3.33 ; Williams, 812 
Agriculture, need for investment in, 945 
Congo, problems of (Cleveland), 23 
Economic return from, measurement of. 8.54 
Foreign students in Japan (Johnson), 283 
Health, purpose of (Martin), 122 
Hong Kong. U.S. aid. 141 
Importance of : Battle, 75, 938 ; Rowan, 70 ; Stevenson, 

Institute of science and technology, international, NATO 
report recommending establishment, released, 896 

Department of State Bulletin 

Education — Coutimied 
Latin America, progress in (Martin) , 956 
Nuclear science, AEC program (Seaborg), 624 
Pacific Islands trust territory, improvements (Coding), 

UNESCO, need for increased emphasis on (Battle, 

Cleveland), 695, 698, 699 
Women, progress in (Tillett), 198 
Educational, scientific, and cultural materials, agreements 
re importation and circulation of. current actions : 

1949 agreement : Brazil, 669 ; Malagasy, 165 

1950 agreement: Congo ( Leopold ville), 40; Gabon, 709; 
Malagasy, 165 ; New Zealand, 309 

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, U.N. : 
Conference of African states on the development of 

education in Africa, 333, 335, 814 
Congo education, aid to (Cleveland) , 23 
General Conference, U.S. representatives to 12th session 

of, confirmation, 708 
Programs of and U.S. policy toward : Battle, 695, 935 ; 
Cleveland, 698 
Educational exchange program, international (.see also 
Cultural relations, Education, and Exchange of 
persons) : 
African program (Fredericks), 335 

Agreements with: Germany, 221, 923, 946; Israel, 237 
Board of Foreign Scholarships, election of chairman, 

Foreign students, leaders, and specialists programs 

(Battle), 111 
Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 

1961. 76, 138 
Role in foreign affairs (Battle), 73 
U.S. program and efforts (Battle), 422 
EEC. See European Economic Community 
Egypt. See United Arab Republic 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee: 

Disarmament treaty, U.S. call for action on (Rusk), 

Establishment of ( Kennedy ) , 293 
Geneva conference of : 
Consideration of nuclear test ban : 

General Assembly resolution requesting conclusion 

of treaty, 825 
New U.K.-U.S. draft treaty proposals : 

Statements: Dean, 387, 404; MacMillan. Ken- 
nedy, 403 
Texts of, 411, 415 
Negotiations : 

Resumption of (Kennedy) , 233 
Summary of (ACDA), 1.54 

U.S. position and efforts: Dean, 387; Rush, 4, 7, 
171, 176, 181, 870, 871 
Reconvening of: 

General Assembly resolution requesting, 825 
Hope for progress (Kennedy), 917 
U.S. working paper on measures to reduce risk of war, 
presented, 1019 
Ellender, AUen J., 961,999 
El Salvador : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 196, 200, 797 
Water and sewerage service, 123 

Index, July to December 7962 

Emergency Force in the Middle East, U.N., financing of 

(Gardner), 432 
Erhardt, Ludwig, 773 
Escape-clause action, provision of Trade Expansion Act 

re, 659 
Establishment, friendship, and navigation, treaty and pro- 
tocol with Luxembourg, 467, 542, 862 
Ethiopia, treaties, agreements, etc., 366, 398 
Europe (see also Euroiiean headings, individual countries, 
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization) : 
Africa : 

Aid to : Ball 580 ; Williams, 692 

Future of Europeans in: Bowles, 1003; Good, 887; 

Williams, 104. 093 
Views on self-determination for (Bowles), 1003 
Changes in ( Ball ) , 9 

Communism in, decline of (Cleveland), 877 
Eastern Europe, Soviet suppres.sion in (Stevenson), 

Economic development and problems ( see also European 
Economic Community) : Blumenthal, 840; Mc- 
Namara, 64; OECD review, 979; Rusk, 345, 995 
Neutral nations, role in (Rusk), 56 
Nuclear deterrent for, question of (Ball) , 835 
Problems confronting (Rostow), 678 
U.S. investment in (Rusk), 686 
Unification of : 
Development of and U.S. position : Ball, 9, 321, 322, 
550, 833; Kennedy, 132; Rostow, 678; Rusk, 182; 
Schaetzel, 77, 351, 354, 355, 562, 662 
Relationship to Atlantic partnership (Tyler), 1008 
Role of De Gaulle (Rusk), 183 
Visit of U.S. officials to : 

Assistant Secretary Cleveland, 133 
Assistant Secretary Williams, 133 
Secretary Rusk, 54, 96 
Western Europe: 

Market for U.S. agricultural exports, importance 

(Rusk), 177 
Trade with Cuba (BaU), 592 
U.K. role in (Rusk), 56 
U.S. relations, changes in (Manning), 189 
European Atomic Energy Community, U.S. cooperation 

(Seaborg), 624 
European Communities, U.S. representative to, confirma- 
tion, 710 
European Economic Community : 
Common agricultural policy: Ball, 324, 1017; Blumen- 
thal, 843; GATT views, 940, 941; Rusk, 177; 
Schaetzel, 352; Tyler, 1010; Weiss, 445, 446 
Communist bloc unity, EEC effect on (Rusk), 183 
Duty-free access of African products (Blumenthal), 

Economic aid to Africa, 692 

Establishment, progress, and significance of, U.S. views : 
Ball, 551; Johnson, 478, 605; Schaetzel, 77, 350, 
562, 661 ; Weiss, 443 
GATT discussion of, 940 
Growth rate in (Blumenthal), 841 

Latin America, problem of relations between (Blumen- 
thal), 780 


European Economic Community — Continued 
Organizations and institutions of, 443, 444 
Patent system, proposed (Trezise), 025 
Soviet views on, 56, 350, 562 
Trade : 

Need for liberal trade policy (Stevenson), 231 
Tariff rates, changes in (Johnson), 608 
Prospects for and problems of: Ball, 322, 1016; 
Johnson, 607; Rusk, 58; Schaetzel, 502, 665; 
1-^lcr, 1010 
U.S. legislation authorizing negotiations on, 6.'>6, 847 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 237, 709, 826 
U.K., negotiations for accession: Rusk, 50; Schaetzel, 
350, 662 ; Tyler, 1011 
Implications for: Australia, 117; New Zealand, 116 
U.S. investment in : Johnson, 609 ; Rusk, 686 
European Investment Bank, 607 
European Social Fund, 607 
Evans, John W., 504 
Evian Accords, 105 

Examination, Foreign Service, announced, 126 
Exchange of persons program (see also Educational 
exchange) : 
Leaders and specialists program (Battle), 423 
Role and goal of (Battle), 110 
Soviet-U.S. exchange i^rogram : 

Soviet agricultural group, visit to U.S., 380 
U.S. travel restrictions re, lifted, 191 
Executive orders : 

Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 

1954, administration of (11036), 222 
Armed forces, assigning of authority during Cuban 
crisis, on calling up reserve to active duty, and 
extending periods of enlistments (11058), 719 
Communication of restricted data by State Department, 

authorizing (11057), 751 
Cotton textiles, administration of long-term arrange- 
ment re trade in (11052), 626 
Disarmament policy, procedures for coordination of 

(11044), .383 
Fishery groups, designation as public international or- 
ganizations (11059), 796 
Gold coins, ban on holding by citizens abroad (11037), 

Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, 

administration of (11034), 138 
Peace Corps, continuance and administration of 

(11041), 320 
Inspection of tax returns of foreign representatives by 
Senate committee (11065), 924 
Executive Stockpile Committee, 564 
Exhibit, U.X. Charter, 783 
Exile, arrest, and detention, arbitrary, U.N. study re 

(Tree), 303 
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, U.N., U.S. 

contribution pledged, 794 
Exports (see also Imports and Trade) : 

Agriculture products to Europe, factors affecting (Ball) 

Italiim velveteen to U.S., agreement limiting, 463, 754 


Exports — Continued ' 

Japanese cotton textiles to U.S., suspension of, an- 
nounced, 386 fish to U.S., agreement re sanitary practices 

and controls on, 754, 797 
Latin America : 

Problems re: lA-ECOSOC report, 899; Martin, 953, 

Volume of, 780 

Expansion of, efforts for: Johnson, 610; Rusk, 684 
Role of Chiefs of Mission (Rusk) , 682 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. See Trade Expansion 
Expropriation, U.S. position : Chayes, 195 ; Rusk, 687 
Extradition treaty and convention : Brazil, 125 ; Israel, 

Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference, 569 

Facio Segreda, Gonzalo, 138 

FAO. See Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N. 
Far East (see also Asia and individual countries), refu- 
gee program, aid to Hong Kong, 141 
Faysal, Crown Prince, 641 
Fechter, Peter, 378, 379 
Ferguson, John H., 397 
Finance Corporation, International : 
Articles of agreement, current actions : Cyprus, 437 ; 
Morocco, 469 : Saudi Arabia, 542 ; Senegal, Somali, 
Syrian Arab Republic, 437 ; Tanganyika, Togo, 542 ; 
Tunisia, 437 
Board of Governors meeting, 573 
Financial transactions, international, effect on national 

security (Coppock), 375 
Finland, treaties, agreements, etc., 237, 273, 669, 826, 862, 

Fish and 

Fisheries commissions, designation as public interna- 
tional organizations. Executive order, 796 
Fishing and conservation of living resources of the 
high seas, convention (1958) on, current action: 
Madagascar, 585 
Fishing port, Cuban, agreement with Soviet Union re, 
U.S. views : Rusk, 595 ; Stevenson, 707 ; White, 560 
Gulf of Guinea, investigation of fisheries in, 125 
Japan, exports to U.S., agreement re sanitary practices 
and controls on, 754, 797 
Flags, U.S. and Panamanian, arrangements re flying of 

(Ball), 648 
Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N., 752 
Food-for-peace program : 
Accomplishments and value: Freeman, 535; Kennedy, 

258, 753 ; McGovern, 256 ; WiUiams, 459 
Director, resignation, 256 
Food program, world, U.S. pledges sui)port and coopera- 
tion (Freeman), 534 
Ford Foundation, 336 

Foreign Affairs Personnel, Committee on, 971 
Foreign aid programs (see also Agency for International 
Development, Economic and technical aid, and Peace 
Corps) : 

Deparfmenf of Sfofe Bulletin 

Foreign aid programs — Continued 
Appropriations for, requests for restoration of cut in : 

Kennedy, 518 ; Rusk, 518 
Basic principles : Bowles, 207 ; Rostow, 678 
Expenditures for: Kennedy, 574; Rusk, 873 
Importance and purpose of : Hamilton, 551 ; Kennedy, 

291, 525 
Improvements in (Rusk), 521 
National security implications (Coppock), 375 
Procurement policy, determination on amended, 292 
Review of, advisory committee formed for, 1007 
Senate restrictions on : McGhee, 102 ; Rusk, 25, 57, 184 ; 

Rowan, 71 
U.S.-German discussions re, joint communique, 563 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, signing of (Kennedy), 

Foreign economic policy. See under Economic policy 
Foreign Ministers of American Republics, meeting on 
Cuban crisis : 
Informal meeting: 
Invitations for, 541 
Reason for (Rusk), 596 
Results of : Ball, 647 ; Rusk, 643 ; Stevenson, 707 
Text of communique, 598 
Foreign policy, U.S. : 

Briefing conferences on, 533, 838 

Communications, importance to (Rowan), 216 

Conduct in a democracy (Bowles), 47 

Congressional documents relating to. See under 

Evidence of maturity in (Cleveland), 881 
Goals and strategy : Ball, 988 ; Hamilton, 551 ; Rostow, 

555 ; Rusk, 548, 683 ; Stevenson, 553 
Legislation. See under Congress 
Need for well-informed public (Rowan), 70 
"No win" policy, refuting : Manning, 189 ; Rusk, 343 
Relationship of to : 
Adams family (Martin), 487 
Aid program (Rusk), 519 
Monroe Doctrine (Martin), 495 

Satellite communications system : Gardner, 496 ; 
Johnson 567; Rusk, 315 
Rigid and maneuverable approaches to (Bowles), 48 
Role of U.S. citizens in (Rusk), 867, 913 
Scope and problems of: Ball, 987; Manning, 185; 

Morgan, 27 ; Rostow, 61 
Soviet policies, reactions to (Stevenson), 728 
U.N. role: Ball, 144; Gardner, 425; Stevenson, 150 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 19il, Volume VII, 

The American Repuhlics, released, 1026 
Foreign Service {see also State Department) : 
Ambassadors, and Ministers : 
Appointments and confirmations, 201, 397, 469, 542, 

630, 710, 826, 862, 945 
Role in trade expansion program (Rvisk), 682 
Assistant naval attach^, Soviet detention of, U.S. 

protests, 653 
Congress, FSO's assigned as interns, 506 
Consulates general : 
Appointment of consul general at Salisbury, 86 

Index, July to December 7962 

Foreign Service — Continued 
Consulates general — Continued 
Raised to Embassy status : Algiers, 560 ; Kampala, 
Embassies established at : Burundi, 201 ; Rwanda, 201 
Examination announced, 126 
Labor attach^, appointment to The Hague, 710 
Minority groups, need for more representation in (Wil- 
liams), 815 
Ohioans in, percentage of, 382 
Science attaches : appointments to, Buenos Aires, 902 ; 

Karachi, Tel Aviv, 542; expansion of, 506 
Selection Boards, 16th, meeting and members of, 630 
Foreign Service Institute: 
Orientation course for wives and dependents of per- 
sonnel assigned overseas, announced, 902 
Seminar on problems of development and internal de- 
fense, inauguration of, 41 
Foreign Student Advisers, National Association of, 114 
Foreign students, programs for and aid to: Battle, 111, 

422 ; Fredericks, 336 
Fort McNair, 642 
Foster, William C, 108 
Prance : 

Algerian situation, settlement of (Stevenson), 627 

Berlin situation. See Berlin 

Economic aid to Africa, 692 

Guinea, relations between (Bowles), 1003 

Nuclear tests (Dean), 392 

Nuclear weapon information, question of demand from 

U.S. (Rusk), 54 
Restrictions on U.S. exports, GATT discussion, 939 
Saar dispute with Germany (Chayes), 35 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 86, 237, 274, 366, 438, 669, 

709, 826, 945, 1025 
U.N., financial obligations of members and raising 

U.N. armed force, views on (Chayes), 32, 37, 38 
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 469 
West Africa, role in (Williams), 105 
Frank, Isaiah, 42 
Franklin, Benjamin, 908 
Fredericks, .1. Wayne, 333 
Freedman, Max, 56 
Freedom : 

Maintenance of, proposals for (Ball) , 10 
Worldwide efforts for (Rusk) , 343 
Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign, 752 
Freedom of information, developments in field of (Tree), 

Freeman, Orville L., 534 
Friendship, establishment, and navigation, treaty and 

protocol with Luxembourg, 467, 542, 862 
Frost, Robert, 625 
Fulbright-Hays Act, 76 

Gabon, treaties, agieements. etc., 669, 7( 

Galbraith, John Kenneth, 13 

Galvao, Enrico, 177 

Gandhi Peace Foundation, 626 

Gardner, Richard N., 425, 496 

Garrigues y Diaz-Canabate, Antonio, 63 



GATT. See Tariffs and trade, geueral agreement on 

Gaza Strip, 92 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; Analysis of 

United States Neifotiatinns, vol. Ill, published, 274 
General Assembly, U.N. : 

Assessments for Congo and Middle East operations, 

ICJ affirms binding force of, 216 
Documents, lists of, 308, 332, 436, 466, 584, 934 
16th session : 

Accomplishments of ( Cleveland ) , 483 

Rwanda and Burundi, independence and aid to : text 

of resolution, l(>i ; Yost, 1.59 
Southern Rhodesia question, recommendation of 
(Bingham, Stevenson), 297; resolution, 301n 
17th session : 

Admission of new memhers : Algeria. 628« : Burundi, 
Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, 503n ; 
Uganda, 706« 
Agenda : 

Hungary, question of, U.S. request for inscription 

on, 394, 709 
Provisional agenda, 306 
Supplementary items for, 466 
Cuban charges against U.S. in, U.S. replies (Steven- 
son), 582, 706 
Nuclear tests, suspension of, consideration of (Dean), 

Problems confronting : Cleveland, 482 : Stevenson, 511 
Resolutions : 
As force of law, question of (Gore), 974, 977 
(Nuclear weapons tests, cessation of, 824 
U.S. representatives, confirmation, 504 
Voting procedure in: Bingham, 251; Gardner. 433; 
Stevenson, 152 
Geneva disarmament conference (1962). See Eighteen- 
nation disarmament committee : Geneva conference 
Genocide, convention (1948) on prevention and punish- 
ment of the crime of, current action. Congo (Wo- 
poldville), 165 
Geomagnetic survey, world, U.S.-Soviet agreement for 

cooperation in, 963 
Geren, Paul Francis, 86 
Germany : 

Documents on German Foreign Policy, J918-19/,5, Series 
D, Volume XII, The War Years, February l^une 
22, 1941, released, 798 
Reunification of, U.S. position (Rostow), GSl 
Saar dispute with France (Chayes) , 35 
Germany, East {see also Berlin), views on EEC (Schaet- 

zel), 350 
Germany, Federal Republic of: 
Aid programs, .563, 692, 8.55 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 486 
Berlin. See Berlin 
Educational exchanges with U.S., 10th anniversary 

(Rusk), 221 
Foreign forces in, agreements re rights and obligations, 
current actions : France, 274 ; Germany, 166 ; Neth- 
■ Tland.s, 504; U.K., 274 


Germany — Continued 

Treaties, agreements, etc.. 40, 166, 200, 237, 274, 310, 
338, 504, 505, 669, 670, 709, 754, 826, 862, 923, 946 

U.S. -German relations (Adenauer, Kennedy), 836 
Ghana : 

Education in (Williams), 812, 813 

Europeans' role in (Williams), 105 

Foreign investment, effort to attract (Williams), 614 

GATT discussion of trade agreement with Upper Volta, 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 237, 469, 826 
Gold, U.S. holdings, value of (Kennedy), 574 
Gold coins, order bans holding by citizens abroad, 292 
Ghosh, D., 4.52 
Goding, M. Wilfred, 264 
Gomez Abad, Jos6, 836 
Good, Robert C, 882 
Gore, Albert, 504, 972 
Goulart, Joao Belchior, 748 
Government Advisory Committee on International Book 

Programs, establishment and members, 666 
Grand Duchess Charlotte, 748 

Grants, development, appropriation for (Rusk), 523 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission, 796 
Greece : 

EPX', association with, GATT discussion, 940 

Prewar debts to U.S., negotiations for settlement, 702 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 41, 86, 669, 1025 

U.S.-Greek relations (McGhee).99 

Vice President .Johnson to visit 320 
Gromyko, Andrei A., 173, 180 
Guantanamo Naval Base, evacuation of dependents from 

and reinforcement of (Kennedy) , 718 
Guam, travel to and U.S. policy for, 384 
Guatemala, treaties, agreements, etc., 505, 542 
Guerrilla warfare : Hilsman, 526 ; Johnson, 478 
Guinea : 

Agricultural commodities, U.S. sales, 460 

Nonalinement policy (Williams), 691 

Relations with France (Bowles), 1003 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 200, 398, 469, 542, 669, 
862, 946, 1025 

Hague protocol amending Warsaw convention re liability 
of carriers in international air transport, U.S. views 
(Halaby, Rusk), 363 

Haiti : 
Tariff concessions under GATT, effective date, 117 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 82, 237, 669, 1025 

Halaby, N. E., 363 

Halibut Commission, International Pacific, 796 

UaUstein, Walter, 777, 1015 

Hamilton, Fowler, 551, 888 

Harriman, W. Averell, 263 

Hasan al-Rida al-Sanusi, Crown Prince, 349 

Hazlitt Henry, 774 

Health, Education, and Welfare, Department of, 139 

Health and sanitation : 
Congo, status (Cleveland). 2L' 

Department of State Bulletin W«, 

Health and sanitation — Continued 
Latin America : 
Alliance for Progress program (Martin), 120 
Developments (Martin), 956 
Pan American Health Organization, 122 
U.S. delegation to conference on, 359 
Pacific Islands trust territor.y (Coding), 271 
WHO. See World Healti Organization 
Hensley, Stewart, 55 
Herter, Christian A., 846 

High seas, convention (1958) on, current actions: Bul- 
garia, 669; Poland, 309: U.S., 862 
Highway, Pan American, 288, 647 
Highway Congress. Pan American. See Pan American 

Highway Congress 
Hillenbrand, Martin J., 542 
Hilsman, Roger, 526 

Holy See, The, treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 902 
Home, Lord, 600 
Honduras : 
National peace corps program, 855 
U.S.-Honduran relations. 958 

U.S. Peace Corps program, agreement establishing, 438 
Water and sewerage service, 123 
Hong Kong : 

Technical College, U.S. aid, 141 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 669, 826 
Horsey, Outerbridge, 862 
Horton, Mrs. Mildred M., 708 
Housing : 

Latin America, progress under Alliance for Progress 

(Martin), 956 
Refugee, construction of, agreement with Austria re, 2(X) 
Human rights ( see also Racial relations) : 
Human Rights Day, 923 

U.N. advisory services in field of: Tillett, 199; Tree, 301 
U.N. Commission on, review of 18th session of (Tree), 
Hungary : 

Question of, U.S. request for inscription as item on 

General Assembly agenda, 394, 709 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 469, 669 
Hydrology and Atmospheric Sciences, Committee on In- 
ternational Planning in, 500 

IAEA. See Atomic Energy Agency, International 
lA-ECOSOC. See Inter-American Economic and Social 

IBRD. See International Bank for Recon.struction and 

Iceland : 

Air transport services, discussions with U.S., 771 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 365, 505, 669 
ICJ. See International Court of Justice 
IDA. See Development Association, International 
IFC. See Finance Corporation. International 
IJC. See International Joint Commission (U.S.-Canada) 
IMF. See Monetary Fund, International 
Immigration : 

National security, relationship between (Coppock), 374 

Index, July /o December 1962 

I mmigration — Continued 

Quotas established for Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, 
Tanganyika, Trinidad and Tobago, and Western 
Samoa, proclamation, 752 
Imports (see also Customs; Exports; Tariff policy, U.S.; 
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on ; and Trade) : 
Coin purses. President's decision re, 703 
Congo program, U.S. aid, 140, 771 
Country of origin, marking duties policy re, 703 
Cuban, volume of (Ball) , 593 
Low-cost imports, problem of and efforts to resolve 

(Schaetzel), 80 
Need to increase (Rusk) , 685 

Relief for domestic producers and employees effected 

by Trade Expansion Act program (Weiss), 849, 850 

Restrictions on, problem of and U.S. position, 621, 9.39, 

Treaties, agreements, etc., current actions ; 

Aircraft, agreement with Switzerland for reciprocal 
acceptance of certificates of airworthiness for, 982 
Commercial samples and advertising material, inter- 
national convention (1952) to facilitate: Congo 
(L^opoldville), 237; Guinea, 40 
Cotton velveteen fabrics from Italy, agreement re, 

463, 754 
Educational, scientific, and cultural materials, agree- 
ment (1950) and protocol on importation of: Congo 
( Leopold ville), 40: Gabon, 709; Malagasy, 165; 
New Zealand, 309 
Private road vehicles, customs convention (1954) on 
temporary importation of : Central African Repub- 
lic, 901 : Ecuador, 669 ; Finland, 273 ; New Zealand, 
Visual and auditory materials of an educational, 
scientific and cultural character, agreement (1959) 
and protocol to facilitate international circulation 
of: Brazil, 669; Malagasy, 165 
Income tax : 

Double taxation on income, convention (19.54) with 
Japan for avoidance of, protocol amending 366, 397 
Returns of representatives of foreign governments re 
nondiplomatic activities. Senate committee granted 
authority to inspect (Executive order), 024 
India : 
Communist China, aggression in : 
Soviet position (Hilsman), 807, 809 
U.S. views: Kennedy, 783; Rusk, 177, 915, 1000; 
Stevenson, 787 
Development in, progress of (Bowles), 207 
Dispute with Pakistan on Kashmir, U.S. views re, 92, 

918, 998 
Nuclear test-ban position, 408, 626 
Population problem (Barnett), 921 
Tariff concessions under GATT, effective date, 117 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 82, 85, 86, 125, 274, 669, 862, 

982. 1025 
U.S. aid, 184, 837, 874 

U.S. relations with : Rowan, 218 ; Rusk, 178 
ludone.sia : 
Dispute with the Netherlands over West New Guinea, 
92, 174, 349, 768, 769 


Indonesia — Coutinued 
Independence, congratulations on 17th anniversary 

(Kennedy), 349 
Treaties, agreeements. etc.. 274. 437, 826. 802. 1025 
U.S. relations (Jones), 7G(i 
Industrial property, protection of : 

Convention (1934) for, current action, Hungary, 200 
Patent system, proposed international (Trezise), 925 
Information aetivitie.s and programs (sec also Publica- 
tions and United States Information Agency) : 
Atomic radiation, U.N. committee report (Plimpton), 

Economic, exchange of, relationship to national security 

(Coppock), 375 
Foreign affairs, importance of and need for increase 

in: Bowles, 213; Manning, 189; Rowan, 216 
Freedom of, developments in field of (Tree), 304 
Media guaranty program, agreement witli Guinea, 946 
Information Agency, U.S. See United States Information 

Inheritance law, equal rights for women under (Tlllett), 

Institute of science and technology, international, NATO 

report recommending establishment, released. 89G 
Interagency Group on International Aviation, 362 
Interagency Textile Administrative Committee, 356 
Interagency Trade Organization, legislation establishing. 

Inter-American Association of Sanitary Engineering. 121, 

Inter-American Conference, 11th, preparations, 253 
Inter-American Defense College. 642 
Inter- American Economic and Social Council : 

Commodity trade problems, role in resolving (Blumen- 

thal), 781 
Ministerial meeting : 

1st annual review of Alliance for Progress, 897 
U.S. delegation to, 583 
Inter- American system (see also Organization of Ameri- 
can States) : 
Chilean-U.S. support (Alessandri, Kennedy), 992, 993 
Cuban exclusion from (Stevenson), 706 
Mexican-U.S. support (Kennedy, L6pez Mateos), 135. 

Proposal for (Martin), 491 
Soviet attack on ( Stevenson ) , 731 
Review of (Ball), 645 
U.S. contribution to (Rusk), 642 
Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission, 796 
Interdepartmental Berlin Task Force, 542 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, 
convention on, current actions : Morocco, Spain, 505 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, 124 
International Atomic Energy Agency. See Atomic Energy 

Agency, International 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development : 
Articles of agreement, current actions : Kuwait, 504 ; 
Senegal, 437; Sierra Leone, 504; Somali, 437; 
Tanganyika, 504 ; Togo, 309 
Board of Governors meeting, .573 
Financial statements of, 361, 825 
Role and tasks of ( Ball ) , 575 

International Commission for Supervision and Control 

in Laos, 109, 261, G48 
International Court of Justice : 

Statute of, current actions: Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, 

Trinidad and Tobago, 630 
U.N. assessments for peacekeeping operations, advisory 
opinion on: Chayes, 30; Department, 246; Steven- 
son, 513 
International Development Association. See Develop- 
ment Association, International 
International Finance Corporation. See Finance Corpo- 
ration, International 
International Joint Commission (U.S.-Canada), 141 
International law (see also International Court) : 
Cuban crisis, legality of U.S. action (Chayes), 763 
Principles for friendly relations among states (Gore), 

Progressive development of (Gore), 976 
Sources of (Cleveland), 18 

Space communications, law applicable to (Rusk), 318 
World community under (Stevenson), 554 
International Monetary Fund. See Monetary Fund, 

International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon 
Tests, September 1961-September 1962, released, 636 
International organizations (see also subject) : 
Calendar of meetings, 28, 119, 223, 295, 357, 437, 501, 

571, 704, 784, 851, 928 
Japanese participation (Johnson), 283 
Public, fishery groups designation as, (Executive or- 
der), 796 
Regional groupings, relationship between (Schaetzel), 

Relation to practice of international law (Cleveland), 

U.S. policy toward and support (Cleveland), 698, 966 
Works of, application of 1952 universal copyright con- 
vention to, protocol 2, current actions : Norway, 797 ; 
Panama, 365 
International Pacific Halibut Commission, 796 
International Telecommunication Union, 497, 569 
International tensions, effect on disarmament negotia- 
tions (Rusk), 244 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, 51st conference : 
Resolution on threats to world peace, 783 
U.S. delegation to, 600 
Investment Bank, European, 607 
Investment Guaranty Program : 
Africa, extent of (Williams), 615 
Agreements with: Colombia, 797; Congo (Brazzaville), 

630 ; Ethiopia, 366 ; Guatemala, 505 
Appropriation for ( Rusk ) , 522 
Budget for, proposed increase in, 32S 
Expansion of (Rusk), 687 
Purpose of (Chayes), 195 
Investment of private capital abroad : 
Africa, tropical, opportunities in (Williams), 613 
Europe, 447, 609 

IBRD, efforts to promote (Ball), 579 
Latin America, 842, 899. 901, 954 
National security implications (Coppock), 375 
Protection of. See Investment guaranty program 


Department of State Bulletin 

Investment of private capital abroad — Continued 

U.S. efforts to promote and legal problems of : Chayes, 
194 ; Rusk, 686 ; Stevenson, 231 

Earthquake, U.S. aid, 458 

Vice President Johnson to visit, 320 
Iraq, IAEA statute, amendment of, 584 
Ireland : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 237, 669, 797 

U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 201 

Visit of Secretary Rusk, proposed, 961, 995 
Israel : 

Dispute with Arab states (Rusk) , 997 

Tariff concessions under GATT, 118 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 86, 200, 237, 469, 585, 669, 
670, 709, 710, 826, 902, 982, 1012, 1025 

U.S. science attach^, appointment, 542 

Volunteer agricultural training corps, 856 

Restrictions on U.S. exports, liberalization of, 939 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 237, 463, 505, 542, 669, 709, 
754, 826, 862, 902 

Vice President Johnson to visit, 320 
ITU. See International Telecommunication Union 
Ivory Coast : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 273, 365, 542, 669, 826 

U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 710 

Jamaica : 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 751 
Human skills in development, proposal re planning 

investment in, 859 
Immigration quota established for, 752 
National Voluntary Service, 856 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 237, 469, 630 
U.N. membership for (Stevenson), 503 
Visit of Premier to U.S., 116 
Japan : 
Asia, Japanese role and aid in ( Johnson ) , 282 
Economic growth (Blumenthal), 841 
EEC, relationship between, 352, 664 
GATT, full application to, discussions re, 942 
GATT, tariff concessions under, effective date, 117 
Junior experts program for aid to developing coun- 
tries, 856 
Population problem of (Barnett) , 920, 922 
Ryukyu Islands, discussions with U.S. on aid to, 770 
Trade : 
Cuba (Ball), 592 

Cotton textiles, suspension of exports to U.S., 

announced, 386 
Joint U.S. -Japan Committee on Trade and Economic 

Affairs, 2d meeting, 839, 959 
Volume and importance (Ball), 325 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 365, 366, 397, 469, 505, 

669, 670, 754, 797, 826, 862, 902, 982 
U.S. policy (Rostow), 678 
Jefferson, Thomas, 908 

John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American 
Foreign Policy, 492 

Johnson, G. Griffith : 

Addresses and statements : 
Communications satellites, 567 
EEC, 605 

International wheat agreement, 118 
Sugar legislation, proposed, 83 
Appointed chairman of U.S. delegations to : 
GATT Contracting Parties, 20th session, 753 
Softwood lumber industry discussions with Canada, 

Johnson, Lyndon B., 320, 628, 853 

Johnson, U. Alexis, 279, 475 

Joint Commission, International (U.S.-Canada), 141 

Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Eco- 
nomic Affairs, 2d meeting of, 839, 959 

Jones, Howard P., 766 

Jones, J. Wesley, 945 

Jordan, Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 961 

Journalism, coverage of foreign affairs (Manning), 185 

Jum'a, Sa'ad, 961 

Kashmir dispute, U.S. views re, 92, 918, 998 
Katanga. See under Congo, Republic of the 
Kayibanda, Gregoire, 533 
Kayira, Legson, 812 
Keldysh, M. V., 965 
Kennedy. John F. : 
Addresses, remarks, and statements : 

Algeria, congratulations on independence, 135 

Atlantic partnership, 131 

Brazilian students, replies to questions of, 289 

Coffee agreement, international, 668 

Communications Satellites Act, 467 

Congo, reunification of, support of U.N. plan, 917 

Cotton textile industry, efforts to eliminate inequities 

in, 463 
Cuban crisis, 4.o0. 481, 715, 737, 762, 783, 874 
18-nation disarmament conference, 233, 917 
Foreign aid program : appropriations, 518 ; impor- 
tance, 525 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, 291 
Guam and Pacific trust teritory, travel to, relaxation 

of controls on, 385 
India, U.S. mission to study aid needs, 874 
Laos, peaceful settlement in, agreement for, 259 
Mexico, agricultural development program, 137 
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, 153 
Nuclear test-ban treaty : 

New U.K.-U.S. proposals, 403 

Review of U.S. position re, 283 

Target date for, 417 
Nuclear weapons tests : 

Conclusion of U.S. atmospheric test series, 806 

U.S. position on cessation of, 626 
Pacific Islands trust territory, 272, 385 
Soviet military buildup in Cuba, U.S. action, report to 

Nation, 715 
Telstar communications satellite, 191 
Trade Expansion Act, 525, 655 
U.S. dollar, status of, 573 
World Food Congress, 752 

Index, July to December 1962 


itulations on assum- 

Kennedy, John F. — Continued 
Correspondence and messages : 
Algerian Prime Minister, oongr 

ing office, 560 
Brazil, postponing visit to, 747 
Burundi, congratulations on independence, 134 
Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity, 456 
Cuban crisis, 737, 740, 743, 745, 783 
Cyprus-U.S. cooperation and objectives, 103 
Food-for-peace program, resignation of director, 258 

procurement policy, amendment 
)n on. 292 

Foreign aid 

Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, postponing visit to 
U.S., 748 

Indonesia, congratulations on 17th anniversary of 
independence, 349 

Iranian earthquake, U.S. concern and aid. 458 

Lao coalition government, formation of, 12 

Lightweight bicycles, disapproval of legislation re 
tariff classification for, 889 

Mesican-U.S. relations, 135 

Pakistan agi-iculture, U.S. scientific report on im- 
proving, 561 

Philippine-American friendship, 138 

Rwandan-U.S. relations, 134, 533 

Sino-Indian conflict. U.S. deplores aggression, 783 

Space flight of Commander Schirra, exchange of 
messages with Premier Khrushchev, 701 

Tanganyika, U.S. friendship and support, 1007 

Threats to world peace, to Inter-Parliamentary 
Union, 783 

Trade, world, exchange of views with Can.adian 
Prime Minister on, 749 

Uganda, congratulations on independence, 641 

UNESCO, 12th session of general conference of, 935 
Correspondence to Congress : 

Relief of Rickert and Laan, Inc., disapproval of pro- 
posed legislation, 703 

Tariff classification for lightweight bicycles, dis- 
approval of proposed legislation, 889 

U.N., U.S. participation in, transmittal of annual 
report, 293 
Decision on self-closing coin purses, concerning imports 

of, 703 
Executive orders. See Executive orders 
Meetings with Heads of State and officials of, remarks 
and joint communiques and statements: Algeria, 
f«9: Belgium, 917: Brazilian students, 289; Chile, 
tl91 : Ecuador. 251 ; Gandhi Peace Foundation, 626 ; 
Germany, 836 ; Honduras, 95S : 1>.tos. 284 : Libya, 
689; New Zealand, 116; Pakistan, 561; Panama, 
81 ; Rwanda, r,?,?j ; Saudi Arabia, 641 ; Somalia, 918 ; 
U.K., 600 
Proclamations. See Proclamations 
Visits to: 

Brazil, plans for, 17l'>. 176 : postponed, 747 

Central America and Panama, proposed, 450 

Mexico, joint communique, 135 
Kennedy, Robert F., 666 
Kenya : 

Developments in (Williams). 106. 107 
Food-for-peace program in, 460, 462 

Khan, Ayub, 561 
Khemisti, Mohammed, 560 
Khrushchev, Nikita S. : 

Communist China attacks on (Hilsman), 810, 811 
Cuban crisis, U.S. call for end to threat to peace re 

(Kennedy), 718 
Peaceful coexistence policy (Morgan), 651 
Statement and messages : 

Cuban crisis, proposals for resolving, 741, 743 
Lao coalition government, formation of, 12 
Nuclear war, effects of, 808 

Space flight of Commander .Schirra, congratulations 
on, 701 
Klutznick, Philip M., 794 
Knappstein, Karl Heinrich, 486 
Kohler, Toy D., 381, .397 
Korea, north, 542 
Korea, Republic of : 
Communist aggression against (Stevenson), 788 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 200, 237, 309, 338, 669, 902 
U.S. aid program, reixirt on progress (Hamilton), 888 
U.S. armed forces in, negotiations resumed on status-of- 
forces agreement on, 451 
Kotschnig, Walter M., 70S, 710 
Kuwait, treaties, agreements, etc., 365, 504, 669, 982 

Coalition government, formation of. Soviet and U.S. 

views, 12, 55 
Foreign forces in : 
Communist forces, question of diversion to Thailand 

and Viet-Nam, 172, 180 
Withdrawal of : 
Need for, 173, 600 
Violations re, 648 
Geneva conference on, progress of (Rusk), 171 
IBRD membership, 361 

Neutrality and independence of, declaration and pro- 
tocol on : 
Current actions, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Commu- 
nist China, France, India, Poland, Thailand, Soviet 
Union, U.K., U.S., Viet-Nam, 274 
Meeting for signing of (Rusk), 173, 180 
Texts, 259, 261 

U.S. views: Harriman, 263; Kennedy, 259; Rusk, 344 
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 201 
U.S. relations and position: joint communique, 284; 
Rostow, 676; Rusk, 55, 171, 172. 173, 180, 344 
Labor : 

Attache, appointment to The Hague, 710 
Middle-level mani)ower conference : 

Importance of : Kennedy, 465 ; Rusk, 62S 
Summary report on, 853 
U.S. delegation, 628 
Ladd, David L., 927 
Land reform : 

Latin America, status of (Martin), 955 
Mexico (Kennedy), 137 
Land-grant colleges, centennial anniversary (Battle), 113 
Latin America {see also Central America, Inter-American. 
Organization of American States. Pan-American, atid 
individunl countries) : 


Departmenl ot State Bulletin 

Latin America — Continued 
Armed forces, increased role in economic development 

programs (Rusk), 644 
Collective security efforts (Ball), 646 
Communism in, status of (Cleveland), 878 
Economic and social development (see also Alliance for 
Progress), problems re: Ball, 646; Blumenthal, 779, 
842; Bowles, 208, 209; Manning, 187; Martin, 952 
Economic integration, progress toward, 898, 899 
Investment guaranty program in (Rusk) , 687 
Nonintervention in and Monroe Doctrine for (Martin), 

490, 492 
Political developments in (Martin), 957 
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention 
of, final protocol, and regulations of execution, 
current action, Mexico, 505 
Trade problems: Blumenthal, 779; Martin, 952 
U.S. investment in (Rusk), 687 
U.S. policy and aid: Bowles, 330; Rusk, 520 
Latin American Free Trade Association, 898 
Lausche, Frank J., 25w 
Law, international. See International law 
Law of the sea (see also Safety of life at sea), conven- 
tions on, current actions : 309, 585, 669, 862 
Lawyers and diplomats (Ball), 987 
Leaders and specialists, foreign, programs for (Battle), 

League of Nations, 35 
Lebanon : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 380 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 273, 365 
Leddy, John M., 630, 826 
Legal Committee, U.N., 972 
Leonhart, William, 397 

Less developed countries (see also Newly independent 
countries) : 
Categories of (Bowles), 210 
Commodity trade problems. See Commodity trade 

Communist offensive in, status of (Rostow), 679, (580 
Economic development. See Economic and technical 

aid and Economic and social development 
EEC, relationship between, implications and problems: 

Schaetzel, 77, 352 ; Tyler, 1011 ; Weiss, 446 
Economic situation and outlook (Blumenthal), 841 
Exports, importance and need for expansion of: Ball, 
580; GATT views, 941; Rusk, 685; Schaetzel, 79 
Japanese aid, 282, 283 

OECD trade and aid, coordination of, 980 
Policymaker's views (Rostow), 452 
Poverty in, causes of (Galbraith), 14 
Progress within (Rusk), 346 

Revolution of freedom : Hamilton, 551 ; Rusk, 548 
U.S. role and policies: Johnson. 479; RiLsk, 42, 683; 
Schaetzel, 81 
Liberia : 

Flag vessels, controls on voyages to Cuba, 746 

IBRD membership, 361 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 669 

U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 201 

U.S. sales of agricultural commodities, 461 

Index, July to December 1962 

Libya : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 754, 946 
Visit of Crown Prince to U.S., 349, 689 
Lippmann, Walter, cited, 10 
Lithuania, 35 

Load line convention (19,30), international, current ac- 
tions: Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, 
Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, 542 
Loans, U.N. See International Bank 
Loans, U.S. development: Hamilton, .552; Rusk, .522 
Lumber industry, softwood, U.S.-Canadian discussions on 
problems of: joint statements, 464, 702; U.S. delega- 
tion, 355, 702 
Luxembourg : 

Grand Duches.s, visit to U.S. postponed, 748 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 237, 542, 709, 826, 862, 945 
U.S. Ambassador, appointment, 826 

Macmillan, Harold, 403 

Madagascar. See Malagasy Republic 

Madison, James, 773 

Makarios, Archbishop, 103 

Malagasy Republic, treaties, agreements, etc., 165, 273, 
542, 585, 629, 669, 826, 862 

Malaya : 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 258 
Convention on safety of life at sea, amendment of, 669 

Mali, treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 542, 826 

Manbey, David J. S., 201 

Mann, Thomas C, 772 

Manning, Robert J., 185 

Mansfield, Mike, 25m, 55 

Maritime Consultative Organization, Intergovernmental, 
convention on, current actions : Jlorocco, Spain, 505 

Marriage, convention (1962) on consent to, minimum age 
for, and registration of, current actions: Chile, 
France, Guinea, Israel, Netherlands, Sweden, U.S., 
Yugoslavia, 1025 

Marshall, George C, 90S 

Marshall, John Ross, 116 

Martin, Edwin M., 120, 487, 951 

Massachusetts, effect of EEC on (Johnson) , 607 

Matsu and Quemoy, Communist threat to (Rusk), 178, 180 

Maxwell, Arthur E., 125 

Mauritania, treaties, agreements, etc., 365, 398, 469, 542, 
669, 826, 862 

Mauritius, population problem, 920, 922 

McClintock, Robert, 236 

McCloskey, Matthew H., 201 

McCiiUoch V. Maryland, 39 

McGhee, George C, 99, 564 

McGovern, George, 2.56 

McKitterick, Nathaniel M., 710 

McNamara, Robert S., 64, 548 

Meagher, John P., 201 

Medicare, 219 

Menemencioglu, Turgut, 258 

Menon, Krishna, 408 

Menzies, Robert Gordon, 116 

Meteorological Organization, World. See World Meteor- 
ological Organization 




Meteorological program, cooperative, agreements with: 
Dominican Republic, 902 ; Mexico, 366 ; Soviet Union, 
Mexico : 
Nuclear test-ban position, 407, 409 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 366, 505 
U.S.-Mexican relations (Kennedy, Lipez Mateos), 135 
Micunovic, Veljko, 770 
Middle East. See Near and Middle East 
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1062, 153 
MiUtary assistance (see also Military equipment, 
tary missions, and Mutual defense) : 
Advisory committee on, establishment, 1007 
Agreements with: Dahomey, 126; Guatemala, 

Honduras, 826 ; India, 837 ; Niger, 126 
Appropriation for (Rusk), 522, 524 

Number of countries requesting from U.S. (Rusk), 870 
Role in economic development programs (Rusk), 644 
Military bases, overseas : 
Guantanamo Naval Base, 718 

NATO and Soviet, comparison of (Stevenson), 731 
Negotiations with Soviet Union re, question of effect of 

Cuban crisis on (Rusk), 598 
Soviet views and proposals re, 742 
Military equipment, materials, and services, agreements 
re with: Germany, 40; Guatemala, 542; India, 862; 
Senegal, 310 ; Turkey, 1026 
Military establishment, U.S. : 
Purpose of (Rusk), 344 
Strengthening, efforts to (McNamara), .548 
Military missions : 
Army mission agreements with : Argentina, 200 ; 

Panama, 946 
Exchange of, U.S. proposals for reducing risk of war, 
Military policy, U.S.: Ball, 10; Johnson, 477; McNamara, 

66 ; Rostow, 60 
Miner, Robert G., 710 

Bases, NATO and Soviet, comparison of (Stevenson), 
731, 735 

Cuba, Soviet supply to. Sec Cuban crisis 

Guided, agreement with Dominican Republic for con- 
tinued use of long-range proving ground for test- 
ing of, 398 

Intercontinental ballistic (Minuteman), increase in 
(McNamara), 549 

Soviet program (Rostow), 679 

U.S. supply to U.K., question of (Rusk) , 1001 
Monaco, treaties, agreements, etc., 504, 609, 902 
Monetary Fund, International : 

Articles of agreement, current actions: Kuwait, 504; 
Senegal, 437; Sierra Leone, 504; Somali, 437; 
Tanganyika, 504 ; Togo, 309 

Board of Governors meeting, 573 

General borrowing arrangements, U.S. adherence, an- 
nounced, 795 

Role of (Blumenthal), 841 

Special fund for balance-of-paynients problems, supple- 
mental appropriation requested, 152 

U.S. executive director, appointed, 795 


Money orders, international, exchange of, agreement with 

Thailand, 398 
Mongolia, People's Republic of : 

Membership on Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 273 
Monroe Doctrine, 490, 492 

Montero de G6mez, Elsa, 836 ' 

Morgan, George A., 26, 649 
Morocco : 

Economic development, U.S. aid, 4(50 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 469, 505, 584, 585, 669, 1025 
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 397 
Morrison, deLesseps S., 539 
Morrow, John H., 708 

Most-favored-nation principle, exceptions to, 658 
Mozambique, white population in (Good), 887 
Mussolini, Benito, 72 
Mutual defense assistance agreements : 

Atomic energy for, agreement with Belgium for coopera- 
tion, 505 
Belgium, amending annex B of 19.50 agreement, 982 
Japan, agreement re Japanese contributions under 1954 

agreement, 797 
Military equipment, materials, and services, agreements 
re with : Germany, 40 ; Guatemala, 542 ; India, 862 ; 
Senegal, 310; Turkey, 1026 
Norway, agreement amending annex C of 1950 agree- 
ment, 469 
Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, 

76, 138 
Mutuc, Amelito R., 770 
Myrdal, Mrs., 407 

Narcotic drugs. See Drugs 

NASA. See National Aeronautics and Space Adminis- 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration : 

Communications satellite program (Johnson), 570 

International workshop, spon.sored by (Gardner), 498 
National Association of Foreign Student Advisers, 114 
National Council for Community Services to International 

Visitors, 111, 114 
National defense and security : 

Budget and expenditures for: McNamara, .549; Rusk, 
872 ; Schaetzel, 353 

Foreign economic policy, relationship (Coppock), 371 

Strategy, problems of (Ball), 834 

Through strength (McNamara, Rusk), 548 

U.S. policy (McNamara), 550 
National Security Council, role in Cuban crisis (Ball), 

Nationalism : 

Role in changing world (Johnson), 476 

Soviet Union (Morgan), 649 
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Naval vessels. See Ships 

Navigation, establishment, and friendship, treaty with 
Luxembourg, 467, 542, 862 

Deparfment of Sfafe Bulletin 

Near and Middle East (see also individual countries) : 

Arab-Israeli dispute (Kusk), 997 

Communism in, decline of (Cleveland), 877 

U.N. role in (Cleveland), 92, 484 
Neocolonialism, African views (Good), 883 
Nepal : 

IBRD membership, 361 

Peace Corps program, agreement with U.S. establish- 
ing, 469 
Netherlands : 

Dispute with Indonesia over AVest New Guinea, 92, 174, 
349, 768, 769 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 85, 2(X), 438, 469, 504, 
669, 709, 826, 1025 

U.S. labor attach^, appointment, 710 
Netherlands Antilles, Windward Islands, registering 

claims to real estate on, 332 
Neutrality : 

African ( Williams ), 691 

Cambodian request for U.S. guarantee, U.S. reply 
(Kennedy, Sihanouk), 4.56 

Bole in Europe (Rusk) , 56 

U.S. policy (Rusk). 915 
New Guinea, West, Indonesian-Netherlands dispute, 92, 

174, 349, 768, 769 
New Zealand : 

Trade problems, discussion with U.S. re, 116 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 41, 200, 237, 309, 361, 629, 
669, 709, 826, 1025 

Volunteer Service Abroad, 855 
Newly independent countries {see also Less developed 
countries) : 

Challenge of (McNamara), 65 

Communist and free world competition (Bowles), 51 

Forces of change in (Morgan), 26 

Independence and self-respect, maintaining (Ball), 10 

Political influence of (Cleveland), 760 

U.N. aid and role : Ball, 146 ; Stevenson, 516, 554 
Nicaragua, treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 237, 669, 754 
Niger : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 961 

Good-will mission to Washington, announced, 701 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 126, 273, 542, 862 
Nigeria : 

Atmospheric nuclear test-ban position, 408 

Education in (Williams), 812, 813 

Europeans, role in (Williams), 105 

Foreign investment, effort to attract (Williams), 614 

Nonalinement policy (Williams), 691 

U.S. consulates established at Ibadan and Enugu, 201 

Wheat agreement ( 1962) , international, 237 
Nondiplomatic activities of representatives of foreign 
governments, tax returns of, authority for inspection 
of (Executive order), 924 
Nonpredetermination policy {see also Self-determination), 

U.S. (Rowan), 750 
Non-self-governing territories : 

Progress toward independence (Bingham), 931 

Southern Rhodesia (Bingham, Stevenson), 297 

South- West Africa ( Plimpton ), .537 

Trust Territory of Pacific Islands, 264, 272, 3»4 

North American regional broadcasting agreement and 

final protocol, current action : U.K., 826 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization : 
Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs, 

appointment, 39 
Bases in Turkey, Soviet proposal for removal 

(Khrushchev), 742 
Conventional armed forces, strengthening: Ball, 834; 

McNamara, 68 
Cuban crisis, implications and interest: (Ball), 592, 

593, 831, 988 
Ferment and consultation in (Rusk), 57, 345 
Institute of science and technology, release of report 

recommending establishment, 896 
Military policy : 

Interdependence in (Schaetzel), (J61 
Need for consultations and reappraisal (Schaetzel), 
Ministerial meeting, Paris, consultations of (Rusk), 

994, 1001 
Missile bases, comparison with Soviet bases in Cuba 

(Stevenson), 731, 735 
Nonaggression pact with Warsaw Pact countries, 

question of, 741, 742, 743, 744, 998 
Nuclear deterrent for, question of: Ball, 835; Bundy, 
604 ; McNamara, 67 ; Rusk, 994, 999 ; Schaetzel, 353 
Progress and achievements (Ball), 832 
Role in U.S. policy and U.S. position: Ball, 146; Bundy, 
602 ; McNamara, 66, 549 ; Schaetzel, 77 ; Stevenson, 
Status of forces in Germany, agreements re, current 
actions: France, 274; Germany, 166; Netherlands, 
504 ; U.K., 200 ; U.S., 166 
U.N. Afro-Asian bloc, effect of U.S. support (Gardner), 

U.S.-German support (Adenauer, Kennedy), 837 
Visit of Secretary Rusk for consultations (, 96 
Norway : 

"Fredskorps," S't-i 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 200, 237, 469, 50.5, 669, 
709, 797, 826 
NS Savannah, 41 
Nubian monuments, 937 

Nuclear energy. See Atomic energy and Nuclear lieadings 
Nuclear test-ban treaty, proposals for : 

Communist China, question of participation (Rusk), 914 
General Assembly resolution calling for agreement, 824 
Need for, U.K.-U.S. statement, 600 
New U.K-U.S. proposals (Dean), 387, 818 
Ban on tests in all environments : 

Dean, 404; Kennedy-Macmillan, 403; Stevenson, 

Text, 411 
Ban on tests in atmosphere, underwater, and in outer 
space : 
Dean, 400 ; Kennedy-Macmillan, 403 ; Stevenson, 639 
Text, 415 
Treaties, cutoff date for, Soviet proposal (Kennedy), 
Nuclear weapons : 

Communist China, efforts to develop (Hilsman), 809 
Effect on use of force (Cleveland) , 760 

Index, July to December 1962 



Nuclear weapons — Contiuued 

Information, distribution of, U.S. position (Rusk), 'A 

NATO nuclear deterrent, question of: Ball, 835; Bundy, 

604 ; McNamara, 07 ; Rusk, 994, 999 ; Schaetzel, 353 

Proliferation of, U.S. position re: Rusk, 5; Stevenson, 

Soviet withdrawal from Cuba (Kennedy) , 874 
Tests. See Nuclear weapons tests 

U.S. suiJeriority in, maintaining: Johnson, 280; Mc- 
Namara, 549 
U.K., que.stion of U.S. supply to (Rusk) , 1001 
Nuclear weapons tests : 
Cessation of : 

Indian position, U.S. views, 626 
Inspection and control of : 

Espionage, Soviet charge re, refuting (Stevenson), 

Need for : Rusk, 345, 870 ; Stevenson, 638 
U.S. position and proposals: Dean, 388, 390. 404, 
405, 818; Department, 234; Kennedy, 283; Rusk, 
176 ; texts of proposals, 411, 413 
Negotiations for : 

Eighteen-Nation Committee on 
Eighteen-Nation Committee 
Review of (Stevenson), 6.36 
Publication on, released, 636n 
Soviet position: Dean, 388, 392, 822; Plimpton, 859; 

Stevenson, 636 
U.S. position and proposals: Dean, 409, 817, 822, 823; 
Department, 806; Kennedy, 806; Plimpton, 859; 
Stevenson, 515, 635, 639, 640 ; White, 175 
Detection and identification of: 

Soviet alleged equipment for (Rusk) , 914 
Vela tests, effect on: Department, 234; Rusk, 176, 
181, 182 
Megaton yield from, comparison of U.S. and Soviet 

(Stevenson), 516 
Soviet : 
Atmospheric test series, announced intention to end, 

U.S. views, 806 
New series of tests : Department, 245, 284 ; Rusk, 244 ; 
White, 175 

Atmospheric test series in Pacific, conclusion of (Ken- 
nedy), 806 
Resumption of, decision on (Rusk), 6 
Soviet statement re, U.S. reply (Rusk, White), 175 

OAS. See Organization of American States 

Obote, A. Milton, 770 

Oceanography, synoptic survey of tropical Atlantic pro- 
posed, 124 

OECD. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and 

Ohio, 381 

Ohira, Masayoshi, 959 

Oil, pollution of sea by, international convention (19.54) 
for prevention of: Australia, 5(H; Netherland.s 
Antilles, 469 

Olds, Herbert V., 201 

Ong Yoke Lin, 258 

ONUC. See Congo, Republic of the: U.N. operation in 


Opium. See under Drugs 

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development : 
Contribution for economic aid, U.S. recommendation, 231 
Development Assistance Committee, 80, 395 
Goals of (Ball), 551 
Ministerial Council, meeting at Paris : 
Resolution on trade and aid, 980 
Text of communique, 979 
Ministers of Agriculture, meeting of, text of joint state- 
ment, 942 
Trade restrictions, efforts for reduction of : Johnson, 

611 ; Schaetzel, 665 
U.S. representative, appointment and confirmation, 630, 

U.S.-European cooperation in (Schaetzel), 78 
Organization of American States : 

Consideration of coups d'etat regimes, U.S. proposal re 

(Morrison), 539 
Council, meeting on Cuban crisis : 
Call for, U.S. (Kennedy), 718 
Recommended action : 
Text of resolution, 722 

U.S. views and proposal : Chayes, 764 ; Rusk, 720 
Orrick, William H., Jr., 201 
Ottawa preference system, 350 
Outer space (see also Satellites, earth) : 

Flight of Commander Schirra, exchange of messages 

( Kennedy, Khrushchev ) , 701 
Nuclear tests in, U.K.-U.S. draft treaty banning. Dean, 
406 ; Kennedy-Maemillan, 403 ; Stevenson, 639 ; text 
of, 415 
Peaceful uses of, international cooperation in : 
U.N. efforts (Kennedy), 294 

U.S. proposals and views: Gardner, 496; Rusk 348 
Prevention of use for military purposes, need for 

(Rusk), 5 
Soviet-U.S. agreement for cooperation in, correspond- 
ence and statement, 962 ; text, 963 

P.L. 480. See Agricultural Trade Development and As- 
sistance Act 
Pacific Commission, South, agreement establishing, 505 
Pacific conference, south, U.S. observer delegation to 5th 

session of, 236 
Pacific Halibut Commission, International, 796 
Pacific Islands, Trust Territory of the: 
Controls on travel to, relaxation of, 384 
Funds for, increase authorized (Kennedy), 272 
U.S. administration, report on (Coding), 264 
Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting, 2d (ICAO), 

U.S. delegation to, 583 
Padilla Nervo, 409 
Pahlavi. Mohammad Reza Shah, 458 
Pakistan : 

Dispute with India over Kashmir, U.S. views, 92, 918, 

President, visit to U.S., .561 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 274, 365, 366, 542, 669, 

862, 1026 
U.S. aid to India. U.S. assurances to re, 837, 874 
U.S. relations with ( Rusk), 177, 178 

Department of State Bulletin 

Pakistan — Continued 

U.S. science attach^, appointment, 542 

West Pakistan, problems of waterlogging and salinity 
in, U.S. scientific report on (Kennedy), 561 
Palestine, partition of (Chayes), 36 
Palestine, U.N. Conciliation Commission for, 485 
Pan American Health Organization, 122 
Pan American Highway, 288, 647 
Pan American Highway Congress, 9th : 

Organizing Committee, U.S. members, 629 

Plans for, 125 

Technical papers for, instructions re, 464 
Pan American Railway Congress Association, U.S. Na- 
tional Commission in, appointment of members, 296 
Pan American Sanitary Conference, 16th, U.S. delegation, 

Pan- African unity (Good), 885 
Panama : 

Darien area, survey of, U.S. aid, 647 

Participation in meeting of President Kennedy with 
chiefs of state of Central America, announced, 450 

Ship.s, use in Cuban trade, restrictions instituted, 746 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 126, 365, 669, 946 

U.S. relations with: Ball, 648; Chiari, Kennedy, 81 
Panama, Congress of, 491 
Panama Canal, 81, 648 

Panel of Experts, lA-ECOSOC, activities of, 898 
Paraguay, treaties, agreements, etc., 437, 469, 670, 982 

Validation for travel to Cuba, announcement re, 1001 
Visa fees, agreement with Belgium re waiver of, 85 

Patents : 
Proposed international patent system, U.S. views 

(Trezise), 925 
Rights and technical information for defense purposes, 
agreement with Sweden re interchange of, 670 

Paul-Boncour, M., 35 

Maintenance of, proposals for (Ball), 10 
Need for Communist decision for (Rusk), 868 
Through perseverance : Rostow, 5-55 : Rusk, 548 
U.N. role and efforts (Cleveland), 91 

Peace Corps : 

Continuance and administration of. Executive order 

Middle-level manpower conference, sponsored by, 465, 

628, 853 
Programs : 

Africa, 334, 1006 

Agreements for establishment : Afghanistan, 630 ; 
Bolivia, 166; British Honduras, 438; Cameroon, 
630 ; Ceylon, 982 ; Chile, 710 ; Cyprus, 585 ; Ecuador, 
398 ; Gabon, 710 ; Honduras, 438 ; Nepal, 469 ; North 
Borneo, 826; Pakistan, 274; Peru, 505; Sarawak, 
826 ; Togo, 542 : Turkey, 630 
Role and merit of (Johnson) , 480 
Peace corps programs, foreign, establishment of, 855 
Peaceful coexistence : 

Communist definition (Rusk), 548 
Soviet policy : Gardner, 429 ; Morgan, 651 
U.S. views re (Gore), 973 
Pelaez, Emmanuel, 109, 853 

Persecutees, Austrian, claims and fund for, 566, 971 

Personnel far the New Diplomacy, 971 


Political developments in ( Martin) , 957 
School lunch program in (McGovern) , 257 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 200, 237, 505 
U.S. diplomatic relations with : 
Suspension of, 213 
Resumption of, 348 
U.S. Ambassador, appointment, 845 
Water and sanitation projects, 123 
Petroleum. See Oil 
Philippines : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 770 

Philippine- American friendship (Kennedy), 138 

Training center for community development workers, 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 309, 542, 669 
Visit of Vice President to U.S., 109 

War damage bill, congressional action on (Kennedy), 
Plimpton, Francis T.P., 504, 536, 791, 859 
Plunkett, Margaret L., 710 
Poland : 

Agriculture system in (Galbraith), 16 
Dispute with Lithuania over Vilna (Chayes), 35 
Trade and aid to, U.S. restrictions on 25, 71, 686 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 125, 274, 309, 669, 754 
Polaris submarine program, 549 
Political rights : 

Discrimination in field of, U.N. study (Tree), 303 
For women, progress in (Tillett), 198 
Pollution of sea by oil, international convention (1954) 
for prevention of, current actions : Australia, 504 ; 
Netherlands Antilles, 469 
Population growth, problems of: Harnett, 919; Martin, 

120 ; McNamara, 65 
Porter, William J., 945 

Portugal : 

Tariff concessions under GATT, effective date, 118 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 85, 166, 274, 338, 438, 
669, 709, 826, 862 
Postal convention (1957), universal, with final protocol, 
annex, regulations of execution and provisions re 
airmail, current actions: Ecuador, Cyprus, 274 
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention of, 
final protocal, and regulations of execution, current 
action, Mexico, 505 
Press, the, function of ( Rowan ) , 218 
Press Conference U.S.A. (VOA),53 
Proclamations by the President : 

Bill of Rights Day and Human Rights Day (3508), 

Captive Nations Week, 1962 (3482), 222 
Cuba, interdiction of delivery of offensive weapons to 

(3.504), 717; terminating (3.507), 918 
GATT, tariff concessions under and accessions to, 

signing of (3479), 117 
General Pulaski's Memorial Day, 1962 (3490), 486 
Immigration quotas for Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, 
Tanganyika, Trinidad and Tobago, and Western 
Samoa (3503), 752 

Index, July fo December 7962 


I'roclaiiiations by the President— Continued 
Sugar quota, allocation (3485), 254 
Trade agreement with El Salvador (3480), 196 
Procurement policy, foreign aid, amended, 202 
I'rokhorov, Eugeni M., 559 
Propaganda : 

Soviet, in Africa (Stevenson), 151 

War, cessation of, 18-Nation Committee on Disarma- 
ment discussions, 157; Czech proposal prohibiting 
(Gore), 974 
Public health. Sec Health 
Publications : 

Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, report 

Personnel for the Netc Diplomacy, 971 
Congressional documents relating to foreign policy, lists 
of, 84, 153, 325, 356, 386, 468, 533, 570, 621, 654, 
816, 927, 1018 
Obscene publications, agreement (1910) re repression 
of circulation of, current actions: Congo ( Leo- 
pold ville), Sierra Leone, 3(>5 
State Department : 
Docnmvnts on German Foreign Policy, 1918-191,5, 
Series D, Volume XII, The War Years, February 1- 
June 22, 191,1, released, 798 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941. Volume 

VII, The American Republics, released, 1026 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Analysis 
of United States Negotiations, vol. Ill, published, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, Report of the 
Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward, 
released, 7, 328 
International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon 
Tests, September 1961-September 1962, released, 
Recent releases, Usts of, 201, 310, 338, 366, 470, 586, 

798, 946, 1026 
The Seed of Nations, proposed booklet, 114 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1961, released, 
United Nations: 

Lists of current documents. 308, 332, 436, 466, 584, 

796, 8.59, 934 
Status of women, demand for, 199 
UNESCO, U.S. views on (Battle), 697 
Pulaski, Gen., Memorial Day for, 486 
Punta del Este, Charter of, 136 
Pysin, Konstantin Georgiyevich, 380 

Quemoy and Matsu. threat to (Rusk), 178, 180 

Racial relations : 

Developments in (Manning), 187 

Europeans in Africa, developments in (Williams). 104 

Southern Africa, U.S. position : Bingham, .537 ; Good, 

886 ; Plimpton, 791 
Soviet propaganda re (Morgan), 652 
U.N. Human Rights Commission discussion (Tree), 303 
U.S. problem, effect on diplomatic relations (Rusk), 912 

Radiation, atomic: 

U.K.-U.S. proposal for reduction (Dean), 407 
U.N. committee report on (Plimpton) , 8.59 

Radio : 

Frequencies, agreement with Canada re coordination 

and use of, 797 
ITU Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference^ 

North American regional broadcasting agreement 

(1950), current action, U.K., 826 
Radio regulations (1959), with appendixes annexed to 
international telecommunication convention (1959), 
current actions: Austria, 902; India, 85; Korea, 
338 ; Monaco, 902 ; U.K., 585 ; Vatican City, 902 
Radioactive fallout: 

U.K.-U.S. proposal for reduction (Dean), 407 
U.N. committee report ( Plimpton ) , 859 
Radioactivity in upper atmosphere, sampling by balloons 
of, agreement with Australia extending 1961 
agreement re, 1026 
Radioisotopes, use in medical research (Seaborg), 623 
Railway Congress Association, Pan American, appoint- 
ment of members to U.S. National Commission in, 
Red Cross, Swedish, 237 

Red Sea, international agreement re maintenance of cer- 
tain lights in, current actions: Denmark, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, U.K., U.S., 505 
Redeen, Robert L., 53 
Refugees and displaced persons : 
Austria, former persecutees. claims of and funds for, 

566, 971 
Cuban, U.S. support (Rusk), .596, 597 
Housing construction in Austria, agreement re use of 

counterpart from grant of com, 200 
Hong Kong, U.S. aid, 141 
Palestine, status of (Cleveland), 485 
U.S. continued assistance for, legislation authorizing, 

Watutsi, acceptance by the Congo (Cleveland), 23 
Works of, application of universal copyright conven- 
tion to, protocol 1, current actions: Norway, 797; 
Panama, 365 
Reilly, .John Francis, 338 

Religious rights and practices, principles on freedom and 
nondiscrimination in. Human Rights Commission 
recommendation on (Tree). 301 
Rhetts. Charles E., 201 
Rhodesia and Nysaland, Federation of: 
Developments in (Williams). 106, 107 
Southern Rhodesia, problem of, General Assembly 

consideration (Bingham. Stevenson), 297 
U.S. consul general, appointment, 86 
Wheat agreement (1962), international, 237 
White population in (Good), 8,86 
Richelieu River-Lake Champlain Waterway, 141 
Rickert and Laan, Incorporated, 703 
Riddleberger. James W., 710 
Rio Treaty, 764 
Rivkin, William R., 826 

Road trafiBc, convention (1949) on, current actions: Cen- 
tral African Republic, 797; Congo (Brazzaville), 165; 
Cvprus, 398, 469 ; Hungary. 469 ; Ireland, 237 ; Mala- 
gasy, 273; Senegal, 398, 469; Thailand, 584; Togo, 
669 ; Venezuela, 398 

bit DM 


Department of State Bulletin 

Boad vehicles, private, customs convention (1!>54) on 
temporary importation of, current actions : Central 
African Republic, 901; Ecuador, 669; Finland, 273; 
New Zealand, 629 
Bobbins, Allan, 585 
Bobertson, A. Willis, 660 
Bockefeller Foundation, 336 
RoUefson, Ragnar, 505 
Rostow, Walt W., 59, 178, 452, 555, 675, 853 
Eountree, William M., 201 
Bowan, Carl T., 70, 216, 750 
Rumania, treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 541 
Busk, Dean : 

Addresses, remarks, and statements : 
Agricultural exports, 177 
Algeria : 

Developments in, 177, 185 
U.S. relations, 175 
American business, role in foreign policy objectives, 

Arab-Israeli dispute, negotiations re, 997 
Atlantic community, 54 
Berlin, West, 96 
Berlin situation, 54, 56, 172, 173, 174, 180, 181, 344, 

911, 996 
Book program, international, 666 
Brazil, President's proposed trip to, 175, 176 
China, U.S. policy, 178 
China, Communist : 

Aggression against India. 177, 915, 1000 
Doctrinal dispute with Soviet Union, 915, 999, 1000 
Economic failures, 55, 548 

Nuclear test-ban treaty, question of participation, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, report of, 

Congo situation, 57, 997 
Cuba. See Cuba and Cuban crisis 
Diplomacy, tedium of, 911 
Disarmament policy and efforts, 3, 171, 243, 345, 870, 

Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador, meeting with, 171, 176 
Economic development, comparison of U.S. and Com- 
munist, 912 
18-nation committee on disarmament, conference of, 

171, 176, 181, 243, 871 
European Economic Community, 56, 58, 177, 183, 686 
European economic problems, consultations on, 995 
European visit, departure statement, 96 
Foreign aid program : 
Appropriations, request restoration of cut in, 518 
Senate restrictions on, 25, 57, 184 
Foreign Ministers, inter-American, informal meeting 

of, 643 
Foreign policy: 
Goals, 547 

Role of citizens and private business in, 683, 867, 
Freedom, struggle for, 343 

FSI seminar on problems of development and inter- 
nal defense, 41 

l/ndex, Jo/y fo December 1962 

Rusk, Dean — Continued 
Addresses, remarks, and statements — Continued 
Galvao, Enrico, question of entering U.S., 177 
Germany, educational exchange with, 221 
Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador, question of meeting 

with, 173, 180 
Human skills in development, conference on, 628 
India : 

Communist aggression against, 177, 915, 1000 

U.S. relations with, 178 
Ireland, proposed visit to, 995 
Kashmir dispute, 998 
Laos situation, 65, 171, 172, 173, 180, 344 
Latin America, economic and social development, 643 

Consultations and ferment in, 57, 96, 345 

Ministerial meeting, Paris, 994, 1001 

Nuclear deterrent for, 999 

Warsaw Pact, question of nonaggression pact with, 
Neutral nations, 56, 915 
North Atlantic partnership and European unity, 182, 

Nuclear tests and test-ban treaty, 175, 914 
Nuclear weapon information, distribution of, 54 
Pakistan-U.S. relations, 177 
Quemoy and Matsu, threat to, 178, 180 
Ryukyu Islands, Japan-U.S. discussions on aid to, 770 
Satellite communications system, 315 
SEATO, 8th anniversary of, 451 
Secretaries of State, illustrious, 908 
Secretary of State, appointment as, 907 
Senator Ellender's statements on Africa, 999 
Southeast Asia, U.S. policy, 55 
Soviet Union : 

Doctrinal dispute with Communist China, 915, 999, 

Negotiating with, 996, 1001 

Obsession with secrecy, 182, 245 

Space accomplishments, 348 
Space efforts, U.S., 348 
Summit diplomacy, 913 
Telstar, effect of, 178 

Thompson, Llewellyn, question of duties, 176 

Acheson statement on role as independent power, 

Role in Western Europe, 55 

U.S. relationship, 1000 

Loan to, proposed, 142, 178 

Kole in world affairs, 59 
U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Af- 
fairs, 2d meeting of, 969 
Vela tests, results of, 176, 181, 182 
Viet-Nam, situation in. 179, 180 

Washington Senators baseball team, support of, 598 
West New Guinea dispute, 174 
Biographic sketch of (Redeen ) , 53 
Correspondence : 

Algerian Foreign Minister, congratulations on assum- 
ing office, 560 


Kusk, Dean — Continued 
Correspondence — Continued 

Aviation, liability of international carriers, trans- 
mittal of IGIA recommendations to Congress, 362 
Chiefs of Mission, role in trade expansion program, 

Venezuela, role in Cuban crisis, 993 
News conferences, transcripts of, 171, 994 
Radio and TV interviews, transcripts of, 53, 179, 348, 

695, 907 
Visits to : 

Ireland, proposed, announced, 901 
Russell, Francis H., 542 
Russia. See Soviet Union 
Rutherfurd, Jay, 86 
Rwanda : 

Immigration quota established for, 752 
Independence : 

Congratulations on (Kennedy), 134 
XJ.N. consideration (Yost and resolution), 159 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 630, 1025 
U.N. membership, 296, 630 
U.S. Embassy, establishment, 201 
U.S. relations (Kayibanda, Kennedy), 533 
Ryerson, Knowles A., 2.36 

Ryukyu Islands, U.S.-Japanese discussions on aid to 
(Rusk), 770 

Saar dispute, 35 

Safety of life at sea, conventions on, current actions : 
1948 convention : Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory 
Coast,, Jlauritania, Niger, Senegal, 
Somali, 862 
Amendment of regulation 30, chapter III : Australia, 
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Canada, Central African Republic, Dahomey, Den- 
mark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Gabon, 
Germany, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, 
Korea, Kuwait, Malagasy, Malaya. Mauritania. 
Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragim, Norway, Pakistan, Panama. Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Senegal, Somali, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.A.R., 
U.S.S.R., U.S., Venezuela, Viet-Nam, Yugoslavia, 669 
1960 convention : Malagasy, 629 ; Morocco, 1025 ; Peru, 
338 ; U.S., 165, 309 

Sahlou, Peter, 389 

Salinity of Colorado River, U.S.-Mexican discussion, 137 

Samoa. See Western Samoa 

Sanitation. See Health and sanitation 

Santiestebfln Casanova, Roberto, 836 

Satellites, earth (see also Outer space) : 

Communications satellites. See Communications : 

Development and use of, international cooperation pro- 
posed for (Gardner), 496 
Scientific experiments re launching of into equatorial 
orbit, agreement with Italy for cooperation in, 542 


Satellites, earth — Continued 
Tracking station, agreement with Argentina re, 237 
U.S.-Soviet agreement for joint experimental satelli 
in outer space, 962 
Saudi Arabia : 
Crown Prince, talks with President Keimedy, 641 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 542, 1025 
Savannah, NS, 946 
Scali, John, 179, 595 
Schaetzel, J. Robert, 77, 350, 562, 661 
Scheel, Walter, 563 
Schirra, Walter, 701 
Schoenbrun, David, 907 
Scholarships, Board of Foreign, 600 
School lunch program (McGovem), 257 
Schwartz, Abba P., 542 
Science (see also Atomic energy. Nuclear weapons, Outer 
space, and Satellites) : 
Attach^ program : 
Appointments to: Buenos Aires, 902; Karachi, 542 

Tel Aviv, 542 
Expansion of, 506 
Challenge of (McNamara), 65 
Institute of science and technology, international, NATO 

report recommending establishment, released, 896 
NATO science program, 40 
Open scientific community, progress toward (Seaborg) 

Research : 

Disarmament, ACDA functions, 384 
UNESCO program (Battle), 697 
Soviet double standard re ( Dean ) , 822, 823 
Scientific, educational, and cultural materials, agreements 

re. See under Cultural relations 
Scientific commission, international, for control of ban 

nuclear tests, U.K.-U.S. proposal, 405, 411 
Seaborg, Glenn T., 584, 622 

SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. See under 

United Nations 
Secretary of State: 
Apix>intment as (Rusk), 907 
Essential qualities of ( Rusk) , 909 
Illustrious predecessors (Rusk), 908 
Peace Corps, administration of, delegation of functions 

to re, 329 
Travel of, problem of (Rusk), 914 
Security Council, U.N. : 
Cuban crisis, meeting on. See under Cuban crisis 
Documents, lists of, 332, 436, 584 
Enlargement of, U.S. support for: Plimpton, 537 

Stevenson, 513 
Peacekeeping role of, decline in (Chayes), 765 
Right and method of raising armed forces (Chayes) 

150; i 


U.X. membership applications, recommendations on: 
Algeria, 627; Burundi and Rwanda. 296; Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago, 503 ; Uganda, 705 
Veto power : Bingham, 250 ; Stevenson, 150 
The Seed of Nations, 114 
Selection Boards, Foreign Service, 16th, meeting andl jjj" 
members of, 630 

Department of State Bulletin 


Self-determination : 
Europeans in Africa, views on (Bowles), 1002 
U.S. position and support: Bingham, 931, 932; Rowan, 
750 ; Stevenson, 790 ; Williams, 108, 691 
Senegal : 
Civil aviation, talks with U.S. re, 816 
Europeans, role in (Williams), 105 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 310, 398, 437, 669, 862 
Shellfish, sanitation standards for, agreement with Japan, 

754, 797 
Ships and shipping : 
To Cuba. See under Cuban crisis 
Richelieu River-Lake Champlain Waterway proposal, 

Treaties, agreements, etc., current actions : 
IMCO, convention on : Morocco, Spain, 505 
Load line convention, international : Cameroon, Congo 
(Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, 
Mauritania, Niger, 542 
Oil pollution convention, international : Australia, 

504; Netherlands Antilles, 469 
Red Sea, international agreement re maintenance of 
certain lights in : Denmark, Germany, Italy, Neth- 
erlands, Norway, Sweden, U.K., U.S., 505 
Safety of life at sea. See Safety of life at sea 
U.S. naval ves-sels: 

Loan of, agreements with: Brazil, 237; China, 438; 
Germany, 670 ; Japan, 469 ; New Zealand, 41 ; 
Portugal. 438 ; Spain, 166 
Transfer to the Philippines, agreement re, .542 
Use of ports and territorial waters, agreements 
with : Germany, 946 ; Greece, 41 
Welland Canal, suspension of tolls on, agreement 
with Canada, re, 274 
Sidikou, Abdou, 961 

Sierra Leone, treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 365, 504, 542 
Sieverts, Frank A., 542 
Sihanouk, Norodom, 456 

Sino-Soviet bloc (see also Communism a^id individual 
countries) : 
Communications with, maintaining (Ball), 10 
Cuban trade (Ball), 591, 593, 594 
Drive for world domination (McNamara), 65 
Economic assistance, volume of : Hilsman, 809 ; Johnson, 

Economic development : 
Decline in (Cleveland), 878 

Western system, comparison with : Galbraith, 13 ; 
Rusk, 688, 912 
Exports, U.S. marking duties policy re (Kennedy), 703 
Free world relations with (Bowles) , 49 
Problems of and unrest in : Ball, 11 ; Blumenthal, 
843 ; Hilsman, 807 ; Johnson, 477 ; Rusk. .548 
Slavery, convention (1926) on and protocol (19.53) 
amending, current actions : Central African Repblie, 
754; Congo (Brazzaville), 945; Guinea, 398, 469; 
Togo, 629 
Slavery, white slave traffic, agreement (1904) for repres- 
sion of, current actions : Central African Republic, 
754; Congo (Brazzaville), 846; Dahomey, Ivory 
Coast, Sierra Leone, 365 

Index, July fo December 1962 

Smith, Claude H., 583 

Smith, Merriman, 547 

Smith, Raymond D., 653 

Smith, Robert P., 201 

Smyth, Henry deWolf. 7, 945, 966, 968 

Snowdon, Henry T., 69 

Social and economic development. See Economic and 

social development 
Social Fund, European, 607 

Social Progress Trust P'und, Latin American, 898 
Solaru, A. A., 233 
Somali Republic: 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 190 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 437, 669, 862 
U.S.-SomaU relations, 918 
South Africa, Republic of : 
Apartheid policy (Plimpton), 791 
European- African relations in (Williams), 107 
South- West Africa, policies in (Plimpton), 537 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 41, 85, 200, 398, 669, 709 
U.N. members' financial obligations, views on (Chayes), 

White population in, size of, (Good) , 887 
South and Southeast Asia. See Asia and individual 

South Pacific Commission, 105 
South Pacific conference, U.S. observer delegation to 5th 

session of, 236 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization : 
Eighth anniversary of (Rusk), 451 
Informal meeting of, statement by, 563 
Laos situation, question of SBATO role (Rusk), 173 
South-West Africa, 537 
Souvanna Phouma, Prince, 284 

Soviet Union (see also Communism and Sino-Soviet bloc) : 
Agriculture in (Galbraith), 16 
Aid program blunders (Rowan), 217 
Airspace, charges of violations by U.S. aircraft, U.S. 

and Soviet exchanges re, 449, 744, 746 
Atlantic partnership, question of Soviet membership 

(Rusk), 183 
Berlin situation. See Berlin 
China, Communist : 

Doctrinal dispute with : Hilsman, 807 ; Kennedy, 783 ; 

Rusk, 915, 999, 1000 
Soviet aid to, cutback in (Hilsman), 809 
U.N. membership for, Soviet support (Stevenson), 
Colonialism : 

Soviet practices (Bingham), 931 
Views on ( Johnson ) , 476 
Cuban crisis. See Cuban crisis 
Cultural exchange with (Bowles), 52, 53 
Developments in and fortunes of (Cleveland), 876, 879 
Disarmament. Sec Disarmament and Eighteen-Nation 

Disarmament Committee 
Economic competition with free world (Bowles), 49, 53 
Economic situation : Blumenthal, 843 ; Rostow, 680 
EEC, Soviet views and concern: Rusk, 56; Schaetzel, 

350, 562 
Foreign policy and ideology : Morgan, 649 ; Rostow, 679, 
680; Stevenson, 726 


Soviet Union — Continued 
Hungary, Soviet troops In (Yost), 709 
IAEA, Soviet participation (Cleveland), 327 
International agreements, Soviet record re (Stevenson), 

Minister of Agriculture, visit to U.S., 380 
Missiles program (Rostow),679 
Negotiating with, question of ( Rusk) , 996, 1001 
Nonpredetermination of peoples in, U.S. views 

(Rowan), 750 
Nuclear science, U.S.-Soviet cooperation (Seaborg), 623 
Nuclear weapons and tests. See Nuclear headings 
Obsession with secrecy (Rusk), 182, 245 
Outer space : 

Agreement with U.S. on peaceful uses, 902, 963 
Soviet accomplishments, 348 
U.S.-Soviet cooperation (Gardner), 498 
Peaceful coexistence policy, 429, 548, 651, 973 
Propaganda in Africa (Stevenson), 151 
Science, Soviet double standard re (Dean), 822, 823 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 237, 274, 309, 669 
U.N. committee of 17, obstruction in (Bingham), 933 
U.N. mission employees, U.S. requests withdrawal of 

2 for espionage activities, 559 
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 397 
U.S.-Soviet relations : 

Cuban crisis, U.S. policy toward Soviet Union (Ken- 
nedy), 718 
U.N. role (Cleveland), 94 
U.S. assistant naval attach^, illegal detention of, U.S. 

protests, 653 
U.S. travel restrictions on tourists and exchangees, 
lifted, 191 
United Nations : 
Armed forces, Soviet views on (Chayes), 33, 34 
Policy toward and lack of support: Gardner, 430; 
Rusk, 143 ; Stevenson, 727 
Use of veto power in Security Council: Bingham, 250; 
Stevenson, 150 
Spaak, Paul-Henri, 917 
Space. See Outer space 
Spain : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 63 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 166, 237, 505, 669, 902, 946 

Special committee on the implementation of the granting 

of independence to colonial countries and peoples, 930 

Special Fund, U.N., U.S. contribution pledged, 794 

Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 657, 846, 

Specialists and leaders, foreign, programs for (Battle), 

Specialized agencies, U.N., U.S. position (Cleveland), 698, 

699, 700 
Sprouse, Philip D., 201 
Stalnaker, John M., 600 

State Department (»ee also Agency for International De- 
velopment, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
Foreign Service, and Peace Corps) : 
Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Af- 
fairs, confirmation (Schwartz), 542 
Advisory Council on African Affairs, formation of, 24 


State Department — Continued 
Appointments and designations, 42, 86, 338, 505, 542, 585, 

710, 945 
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, con< 

firmation (Tyler), 397 
Communication of restricted data by. Executive ordei 

authorizing, 751 
Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, conflrmE' 

tion (Orrick), 201 
Economic problems confronting and methods of dealing 

with (Coppock),372 
Exchange Act of 1961, delegation of functions to re, 138 
Foreign policy briefing conferences, 533, 838 
Information on foreign affairs, efforts to expand 

(Manning), 190 
International Economic and Social Affairs, Office of, re- 
organization of, 710 
"No win" policy, refutation of : Manning, 189 ; Rusk, 343) 
OflSce of International Scientific Affairs, establishment, 

Office of Security, transferred to Office of Deputy Under 

Secretary for Administration, 338 
Peace Corps, Executive order re administration of, 329' 
Special Assistant for International Business, office 

established, 585, 688 
Student exchange programs ( Battle) , 111 
Thompson, Ambassador, duties in (Rusk), 176 
Visas procedures, improved, 565 
Stateless persons and refugees, protocol 1 concerning ap- 
plication of universal copyright convention to works 
of, current actions : Norway, 797 ; Panama, 365 
Status of forces in Germany, multilateral agreements re, 
current actions : France, 274 ; Germany, 166 ; Nether- 
land.s, 504 ; U.K., 274 ; U.S., 166 
Stevenson, Adlai B. : 
Addresses, remarks, and statements : 
Algerian situation, settlement of, 627 
Chinese representation in the U.N., question of, 786 
Cuban crisis, 582, 706, 723 

General Assembly, 17th, tasks confronting, 511 
Nuclear tests, U.S. position, 635 
Southern Rhodesia, 297 
Soviet-U.S. agreement on peaceful uses of outer 

space, 962 
United Nations : 

Development decade, 225 
Loan to, proposed, 144 

Membership applications of Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago, 503 
U Thant, 929 

World community under law, 553 
Confirmation as U.S. representative to 17th General 

Assembly, 504 
Letters and message : 
Cuban crisis, request for Security Council meeting, 

Hungarian question, request for inscription on Gen- 
eral Assembly agenda, 394 
U.N., anniversary of, 782 
Role in Cuban crisis (Rusk) , 995, 996 

Department of State Bulletin 





r.s. SI 



strategic materials, stockpiles of : 

Acquisition by barter program, changes in, 564 
Tin, discussions and decisions re, 255, 386, 3012 
Stravinsky, Igor, 74 
Students, foreign : 
African students in U.S., need to improve contacts and 

experience (Williams), 816 
Exchange programs (Battle), 111 
Sudan : 

Economic potential (Bowles), 1005 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 504 
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 201 
Sugar : 
International sugar agreement (1958), current actions: 
Jamaica, 469; Trinidad and Tobago, 669; Uganda, 
U.S. sugar trade : 
Embargo on trade with Cuba, effect of (Ball), 592 
Proclamation allocating quotas for Argentina and 

Dominican Republic, 254 
Quotas and subsidy for, proposed legislation (John- 
son), 83 
Sullivan, Richard J., 629 
Summit diplomacy (Rusk), 913 

Supporting assistance, appropriation for (Rusk), 523 
Surinam, amendment of art. VI.A.3 of statute of IAEA, 

Swan Island, 958 
Sweden : 

Nuclear test-ban position, 407 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 125, 237, 469, 505, 669, 670, 
862, 946, 982, 1025 
Switzerland, treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 237, 469, 669, 

826, 982, 1025 
Syrian Arab Republic : 
IBRD membership, 361 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 365, 437, 505 

Taiwan {see also China, Republic of). Communist policy 

(Stevenson), 788 
Tanganyika : 

Europeans, role in (Williams), 106 
Food-for-peace program in, 460, 462 
Immigration quota established for, 752 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 504, 542, .585, 981 
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 397 
U.S. friendship and support (Kennedy), 1007 
Tariff Classification Act of 1962, new schedules under, 

effective date for, proposed, 25; postponed, 965 
Tariff Commission, U.S., 462, 657, 848 

Tariff policy, U.S. (see also Customs ; Economic policy and 
relations; Tariffs and trade, general agreement on; 
and Trade) : 
Bicycles, lightweight, proposed legislation re tariff 

classification for, disapproval (Kennedy), 889 
Cotton. See Cotton 

European Economic Community, problem of. See Euro- 
pean Economic Community 
Marking duties policy, 703 

Reduction of, industry, firms, or workers hurt by, legis- 
lation providing adjustments for, 658 

Tariff policy, U.S. — Continued 

Tariff Classification Act of 1962, 25, 965 
Toweling of flax, hemp, or ramie, decision against re- 
opening escape-clause action on imports, 462 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. See Trade Expansion 

Act of 1962 
U.K., schedule of compensatory concessions to, 1013 
Watch movements, decision against reopening escape- 
clause action on imports, 462 
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on : 
Agreements, declarations, proces-verbal, and protocols : 
Accessions to, current actions on : 

Argentina, provisional : Argentina, 669 ; Japan, 

Sweden, 862 
Cambodia : Austria, 237 ; Belgium, 709 ; Denmark, 
2.37; Dominican Republic, 709; EEC, Finland, 
France, Germany, 237 ; Haiti, India, Israel, 1025 ; 
Italy, Luxembourg, 237 ; Netherlands, 709 ; New 
Zealand, 1025; Norway, Peru, Sweden, 237; 
Turkey, 709; U.S., 125 
Israel : Belgium, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
EEC, France, Germany, Ghana, 826 ; Israel, 669 ; 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, 826 ; Portugal, 85 
Japan : Israel, 669 ; Portugal, 85 
Portugal : Austria, 862 ; Belgium, Denmark, Domin- 
ican Republic, EEC, 709; Finland. 862; France, 
Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether- 
lands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, 709 
Switzerland, provisional: Austria, 237; Ceylon, 85; 
Ghana, Germany, 469; Haiti, 237; India, Indo- 
nesia, 1025; Israel, 469; Netherlands, 85; Nic- 
aragua, 237 ; Peru, South Africa, 85 
Tunisia, provisional : Ceylon, Netherlands, 85 
Article XVI :4, declarations re provisions of, current 

actions : Austria, 338 ; Germany, 862 
Brazil, new schedule III, protocol on establishment, 
current actions : Dominican Republic, 754 ; Israel, 
670 ; Portugal, 166 
Cotton textiles, long-term arrangements re trade in: 

See under Cotton textiles 
French text, protocol of rectification to, current 

actions : Israel, 670 ; Portugal, 85 
Geneva tariff conference (1960-61) : 

Interim agreements with : India, 82, 86, 117 ; Haiti, 

82, 117 ; Japan, 117 ; U.K., 1012 
Protocol embodying results of, current actions: 
Austria, Canada, Dominican Republic, Finland, 
982 ; Haiti, 1025 ; Japan, 982 ; New Zealand, 1025 ; 
Sweden, Switzerland, U.S., 982 
Publication on, released, 274 
Organizational amendments to, protocol of, current 

actions: Chile, 166; Israel, 670; Portugal, 166 
Part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol and 
procte-verbal re, current actions: Chile, 166; Israel, 
670 ; Portugal, 166 
Preamble and parts II and III, protocol amending, 
current actions: Chile, 166; Israel, 670; Portugal, 
85, 166 
Provisional application of, protocol of, current 
action, J'amaica, 237 

Index, July to December 7962 

Tariffs and trade, general agreement on — Continued 
Agreements — Continued 
Rectifications and modifications to texts of seliedules, 
current actions : 
4th protocol : Israel, 670; Portugal, 166 
5th-7th protocols : Dominican Republic, 754 ; Israel, 

670 ; Portugal, 166 
8th-9th protocols : Dominican Republic, 754 ; Haiti, 
1025 ; Israel, 670 ; Portugal, 166 ; Turkey, 709, 710 
Supplementary concessions to, 3d-8th protocols of, 

current actions: Israel, 670; Portugal, 85 
U.S. agreements supplementary to, current actions : 
Belgium, 43S; France, 438; Netherlands, 438 
Contracting Parties: 

Admission of, Trinidad and Tobago and Uganda, 

862, 941 
Meeting on revised U.S. tariff schedules, U.S. 

delegation, 504 
Ministerial meeting on expansion of trade, Canada- 

U.S. proposal for, 749 
20th session of : 

Summary of decisions, 939 
U.S. delegation, 753 
Objectives of (Johnson), 611 
Role in trade negotiations ( Sehaetzel) , 665 
Taxation : 
Double taxation on income, protocol amending con- 
vention (1954) with Japan for avoidance, 366, 
Latin America, progress in administration of programs 

in (Martin), 9.55 
Panama, U.S. aid to improve collections, 82 
Receipts, use for economic development (Sehaetzel), 81 
Tax returns of foreign representatives in U.S., au- 
thority granted to Senate committee to inspect. 
Executive order, 924 
Technical aid to foreign countries. See Economic and 

technical aid 
Technical Assistance, U.N. Expanded Program of, U.S. 

contribution pledged, 794 
Technical cooperation program, agreement with Afghani- 
stan extending 19.53 agreement, (H6 
Technical information and patent rights for defense pur- 
poses, agreement with Sweden for interchange of, 
Telecommunication (.tec also Communications and Radio) 
convention (19.59), international: 
Current actions: Austria. 165; Belgium, 902; Czecho- 
slovakia, .505: Ireland. 797: Mexico, 85; Somali, 
669 ; Syrian Arab Republic, 505 
Radio regulations annexed to: Austria. 902; India, 85; 
Korea, 338 ; Monaco, 902 ; U.K., .585 ; Vatican City, 
Telecommunication Union, International, 497, 569 
Tolstar communication.s satellite, 178, 191, 348 
Territorial sea and contiguous zone, convention (1958) 

on, current actions: Bulgaria, 669; Malagasy. 585 
Terry. Luther, 3.59 

Textile Administrative Committee, Interagency, 3.56 
Textiles : 

Cotton. See Cotton textiles 

Wool, proposed meeting on trade problems, 356 

Thailand, treaties, agreements, etc., 274, 366, 398 

Thant, U., 418, 740, 929 

Thatcher Ferry Bridge, 645« 

Thompson, Llewellyn E., 176, 630 

Tibet, Communist violation of human rights in 

(Stevenson), 788 
Tillett, Mrs. Gladys A., 197 
Tin, disposal of surplus stockpiles of : 
Decision and procedure re, 386 
International discussions on, 25.5, 1012 
Tin Council, International, 255, 1012 
Tinker, John M., 542 
Tobago. See Trinidad and Tobago 

Europeans, role in (Williams), 105 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 309, 437, 542, 629, 699 
Tourf, S6kou, 691 
Toweling of flax, hemp, or ramie, decision against 

reopening escape-clause action on imports, 462 
Tracking station, satellite, agreement with Argentina re, 

Trade (see also Agricultural surpluses. Customs, Eco- 
nomic policy. Exports, Imports, and Tariff policy) : 
Balance-of -payments problem. See Balance of payments 
Commodities. See Commodity trade and individual 

Congo, problems in (Cleveland), 22 

Cuba. See Cuban crisis : Economic and trade controls 
EEC. See European Economic Community 
Expansion of, efforts for : 

Address and statements : Blumenthal, 620 ; Johnson, 
283; Kennedy, 525; Rusk, 684; SchaeUel, 80; 
Stevenson, 229 
Canada-U.S. exchange of view.s re, 749 
Chiefs of Mission, role of (Rusk), 682 
Mexiean-U.S. .support, 136 

OECD, role and efforts for expansion. See Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations of the 

U.S., 657, 846, 1018 
Trade centers and missions abroad, U.S. program 

(Johnson), 611 
Trade Expansion Act. See Trade Expansion Act 
Foreign trade policy, effect on national security (Cop- 
pock), 376 
Japan. See under Japan 
Latin America, problems of: Blumenthal, 779; Martin, 

Most-favored-nation principle, exceptions to, 658 
New Zealand, trade problems of, discussions on, 116 
Treaties, agreements, etc. : 

Commercial samples and advertising material, inter- 
national convention (1952) to facilitate importa- 
tion of, current actions: Congo ( Leopold ville), 237 ; 
Guinea, 40 
Cotton textiles, arrangements re. See Cotton textiles 
GATT. See Tariffs and trade, general agreement on 
Friendship, establishment, and navigation, with Lux- 
embourg, 467, 542, 862 
Trade agreements. Sec Trade agreements 


Department of State Bulletin 

Trade agreements : 

New legislation authorizing negotiation, 656 

Belgium, terminating 1935 and 1947 agreements, 438 
Cuba, terminating 1902, 1934, 1939, and 1941 agree- 
ments, 438 
EI Salvador, terminating portions of 1937 agree- 
ment, l'.)6, 200 
France, terminating 1936 agreement, 438 
Netherlands, terminating 1935 and 1947 agreements, 

Paraguay, extending 1946 agreement, 670 

Compensatory concessions to, 1012 
Terminating 1938 and 1947 agreements, 438 
Trade and Economic Affairs, Joint U.S.-Japan Committee, 

839, 959 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 : 

Latin America, benefits for (Ball), 645 
Legislation : 

Remarks on signing (Kennedy), 655 
Summary of, 656 
Provisions of: 

Assistance to industry, firms, or workers, 658 

Tariff adjustment, 658 

Trade agreements, authority for, 656 ; negotiation of, 

657, 658 
Tropical agriculture, 580, 620, 656 
Significance and objectives of : Ball, 321 ; Coppock, 377 ; 
Johnson, 610; Schaetzel, 352, 563; Tyler, 1010; 
Weiss, 445, 847 
Travel : 

Effect on national security (Coppock) , 375 
Guam and Pacific trust territory, U.S. controls on lib- 
eralized, 384 
Private road vehicles, customs convention (1954) on 
temporary importation of, current actions : Central 
African Republic, 901 ; Ecuador, 669 ; Finland, 273 ; 
New Zealand, 629 
Road traffic, convention (1949) on current actions: 
Central African Republic, 797; Congo (Brazza- 
ville), 165; Cyprus, 398, 469; Hungary, 469; Indo- 
nesia, 826; Ireland. 237; Malagasy, 273; Senegal, 
398, 469; Thailand, 584; Togo, 669; Venezuela, 398 
To Cuba, special endorsement of passport needed, 1001 
To U.S. : 

Facilitation of, improved visa procedures for, 565 
Soviet visitors, restrictions on lifted, 191 
Touring, convention (1954) concerning customs facil- 
ities for, current actions : Central African Repub- 
lic, 862 ; Ecuador, 669 ; Finland, 826 ; New Zealand, 
Treaties, agreements, etc., international (for individual 
treaty, see suhject) : 
As law. Communist doctrinal emphasis (Gore), 975 
Current actions on, 40, 85, 125, 165, 200, 237, 273, 309, 
338, 365, 398, 437, 469, .504, 541, 584, 629, 669, 709, 
754, 797, 862, 901, 945, 981, 1025 
Soviet record re (Stevenson), 727 
Tree, Mrs. Marietta, 301 
Trent, Mary Vance, 902 
Trezise, Philip H., 467, 925 

Trieste case, 36 
Trinidad and Tobago : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 770 

Immigration quota established for, 752 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 630, 669, 862 

U.N. membership (Stevenson), 503 

U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 710 
Truman Doctrine, 100 

Trust territories, U.N. (see also Non-self-governing ter- 
ritories). Pacific Islands, 264, 272, 384 
Trusteeship Council, U.N. : 

Documents, lists of, 796, 859 

Operations and accomplishments: Bingham, 249; 
Stevenson, 151 
Tuna Commission, Inter-American Tropical, 796 
Tunisia : 

IDconomic development, U.S. aid, 461 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 437, 585 

U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 542 
Turkey : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 258 

NATO bases in, Soviet proposal re, 742 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 201, 630, 669, 709, 710, 982, 

Vice President Johnson to visit, 320 
Turner, Francis C, 629 
Tuthill, John W., 710 
Tyler, William R., 397, 1008 

U Thant, 418, 740, 929 

U.A.R. See United Arab Republic 

U.S.S. Anthony, 670 

U.S.S. Canopus, 542 

U.S.S.R. See Soviet Union 

Uganda : 

Consulate general at Kampala, raised to Embassy sta- 
tus, 670 

Developments in (Williams), 106 

Independence, congratulations on (Kennedy), 641 

Prime Minister, visit to U.S., 770 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 826, 862 

U.N. membership (Stevenson), 705 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, amendment to statute 

of IAEA, 797 
Ulbricht, Walter, 350 
UNESCO. See Educational, Scientific and Cultural 

Organization, U.N. 
Unger, Leonard, 201 
United Arab Republic : 

Atmospheric test-ban position, 408 

Civil aviation consultations with U.S., 69 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 41, 237, 469, 505, 669, 670, 797 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet Union 
United Kingdom : 

African territories, aid and role in, 106, 692, 693, 931 

Berlin situation. See Berlin 

British Foreign Secretary, meeting with President Ken- 
nedy, 600 

Congo, U.N. plan for reunification, U.K. support, 419 

Domestic economy, status of (Blumenthal), 841 

EEC membership, negotiations on. See under Euro- 
pean Economic Community 

Index, July to December 1962 


United Kingdom — Coutiuued 

Nuclear deterrent for, question of (Rusk), 1001 

Role as independent power (Rusk) , 1000 

Role in Western Europe (Rusk), 56 

Southern Rhodesia question, General Assembly consid- 
eration (Bingham, Stevenson), 297 

Trade with U.S., schedule of U.S. compensatory con- 
cessions, 1012, 1013 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 200, 201, 237, 274, 438, 
505, 585, 629, 826 

U.N. members' financial obligations, views on (Chayes), 

U.S. investment in ( Rusk ) , 686 

U.S.-U.K. relationship (Rusk), 1000 

Visit of Assistant Secretary Cleveland, 133 

Volunteer Service Overseas program, 856 
United Nations: 

Accomplishments and problems of : Cleveland, 482, 485 ; 
Stevenson, 512, 782 

Obilean-U.S. support, 993 

Chinese representation question (Stevenson), 786 

Coffee conference, 234 

Cuban permanent mission to. U.S. members of 
illegal actions, 835 

Decade of Development: 

Needs of and proposals re (Stevenson), 225 
UNESCO role ( Battle) , 935 

Diplomatic role of ( Stevenson) , 514 

Disarmament. See Eighteen-Xation Disarmament 

Documents, lists of, 3.32. 436. 466. 584, 796. 859. 934 

Financing of : 

Assessment of member nations for peacekeeping 
operations, ICJ opinion re binding force of, 246, 
513 ; legal authority for ( Chayes) , 30 
Bond issue for operations in the Congo and the Mid- 
dle East. House action re (Rusk), 178; need for 
U.S. support and purchase, Ball, 144; Bingham, 
250 ; Rusk, 142 ; Stevenson, 149, 512 
Budget, U.S. share and contributions: Bingham, 249; 

Gardner, 431, 432 
Secretary-General's proposal re, U.S. support (Gard- 
ner), 432 

General Assembly. Sec General Assembly, U.N. 

Legal Committee of, 972 

Membership, admission to: Algeria, 628n; Burundi, 
Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, 503n ; 
Uganda, 706m. 

Mexican-U.S. support, 136 

Peace force, legal authority for raising and linancing 
(Chayes), 32 

Peacekeeping operations (sec alio Congo (Wopold- 
ville) : Cleveland, 92, 484 ; Gardner. 435 

Regional groupings, relationship to (Schaetzel), 663 

Role in foreign affairs ; Ball, 144 ; Cleveland, 91, 762 ; 

Rusk, 59 ; Stevenson, 150, 5!>4 
Satellite communications sy.stem, U.N. role (Johnson), 

Secretary-General, OflBce of : 
Plan for the Congo ( Williams) , 418 
Role of (Gardner). 428 

United Nations — Continued 
Secretary-General, Office of — Continued 
Strengthening (Stevenson), 513 

U Tliant appointment to full term (Stevenson), 929 
Security Council. See Security Council, U.N. 
Soviet mission to, U.S. requests withdrawal of 2 em- 
ployees for espionage activities, 559 
Soviet policy toward : Gardner, 430 ; Rusk, 143 ; Steven- 
son, 727 
Special Fund, U.S. pledge, 794 
Specialized agencies (see also name of aijcncy), U.S. 

position (Cleveland), 698, 699, 700 
Technical assistance programs : 

Role and scope of : Cleveland, 95 ; Stevenson, 151 
Trade and development, proposed conference, 517 
U.S. support, 227, 794 
U.S. relations with : 

Criticisms of, evaluation of (Gardner), 430 
U.S. participation and support: Bingham, 247; Cleve- 
land, 699, 700, 761 ; Kennedy, 293 
Value to U.S. interests (Gardner), 425 
United Nations Week, 782 

Visit of Assistant Secretary Cleveland to Europe for 
discussions re, 133 
United Nations Charter: 

Current actions on : Burundi. Jamaica, Rwanda, Trini- 
dad and Tobago, 630 
Exhibit of, 783 

Importance of (Kennedy), 2&4 

Provisions re raising armed forces and financial obliga- 
tions of members (Chayes) , 30, 31, 33 
Regional organization's peacekeeping actions, approval 

of (Chayes), 764 
Review of, U.S. views on convening conference on 

(Plimpton), ,536 
U.S. commitment to (Stevenson), 725 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 18th ses- 
sion, review (Tree), 301 
United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, 

16th session of, report (Tillett), 197 
United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, 485 
United Nations Economic and Social Council. See Eco- 
nomic and Social Council, U.N. 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 333, 335, 

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or- 
ganization. See Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, U.N. 
United Nations Operation in the Congo. See under Congo, 

Republic of the (L^opoldville) 
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of 

Atomic Radiation, report of (Plimpton), 859 
United Nations Trustee.ship Council. See Trusteeship 

Council, U.N. 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 

See Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. 
United States citizens and nationals : 
Claims. See Claims 
Cuba, warning re travel to. 1001 
Role in foreign policy (Rusk) . SO", 913 
U.N. employees ( Bingham), 247 

Department of State Bulletin 

nited States Informatiou Agency : 

African operations ( Fredericks ), 337 

Exchange Act of 1961, delegation of functions to re, 

nited States National Commission in the Pan American 
Railway Congress Association, appointment of mem- 
bers, 296 
niversal copyright convention (1952) and protocols 1, 2, 

and 3, current actions : Norway, 797 ; Panama, 365 
pper Volta : 

Convention for unification of certain rules re interna- 
tional transport by air, 541 
Europeans, role in (Williams), 105 
Trade with Ghana, GATT discussion, 940 
SIA. See United States Information Agency 

atican City, treaties, agreements, etc., 200, 902 

jla tests, assessment of results of: Department, 234; 

Kennedy, 284 ; Rusk, 176, 181, 182 
snezuela : 

Cuban crisis, appreciation for action by (Rusk), 993 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 398, 669 
etc power in the Security Council: Bingham, 250; 

Stevenson, 150 
ienna convention on diplomatic relations with optional 
protocol, current actions : Ghana, 237 ; Ivory Coast, 
826 ; Liberia, 40 ; Mauritania, 398, 469 ; Sierra Leone, 
542 ; Tanganyika, 981 
iet-Nam : 

Communist aggression and subversion : 
Chinese Communist support (Stevenson), 788 
Control Commission, report on, U.S. views, 109 
Guerrilla warfare in, combatting (Hilsman), 526 
Progress on settlement (Rusk), 179 
U.S. views and aid: Johnson, 480; Rostow, 676 
Peace in Laos, question of Communist diversion of 

forces (Rusk), 180 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 86, 238, 274, 541, 669, 982 
iet-Nam, International Control Commission for, report 

of, U.S. views on, 109 
iet-Nam, north: 
Aggression against Republic of Viet-Nam. See Viet- 

Declaration on neutrality of Laos, and protocol, 274 
illeda Morales, Ramon, 958 
isas : 
Nonimmigrant visitor, waiver of personal appearance 

for applicants, 565 
Passport visa fees, agreement with Belgium re waiver 

of, 85 
Reciprocal issuance of, agreement with Rumania re, 86 
isual and auditory materials of an educational, scien- 
tific, and cultural character, agreement (1949) and 
protocol for facilitating international circulation of, 
current actions: Brazil, 669; Malagasy, 165 
'oice of America, 53 
oluntary agencies, distribution of surplus agricultural 

commodities, 461 
'yrodov, Ivan T., 559 

idex, July to December T962 

Wages, equal pay for equal work for women, U.N. discus- 
sions (Tillett),197 

Accidental, danger of and proposals to prevent (Rusk), 

5, 872 
Guerrilla warfare: Hilsman, 526; Johnson, 478 
Limited, deterring and defending against (Johnson), 280 
Measures to reduce risk of, U.S. working paper on, 1019 
Propaganda, Czech proposal prohibiting (Gore), 974; 
18-Nation Committee on Disarmament discussions 
re cessation, 157 
Purpose and use of, change in (Ball) , 10 
War damage bill, Philippine (Kennedy), 294 
War documents, German, volume on, released, 798 
Warren, J. H., 942 

Warsaw convention, re liability of carriers In interna- 
tional air transport, U.S. views (Halaby, Rusk), 362 
Warsaw Pact, question of nonaggression treaty with 

NATO, 741, 742, 743, 744, 998 
Watch movements, decision against reopening escape- 
clause action on imports, 462 
Weather: — " 

Meteorological program in Mexico, agreement amend- 
ing 1957 agreement, 366 
Research : 

Agreements with : India, 862 ; Soviet Union, 963 
International research and servicing programs, WHO 
report on (Gardner), 497 
WMO. See World Meteorological Organization 
Webb, James E., 965 
Webber, Robert T., 542 
Weiss, Leonard, 443, 847 
Wetland Canal, agreement with Canada re suspension of 

tolls, 255, 274 
West Irian. See West New Guinea 
West New Guinea, Indonesian-Netherlands dispute over, 

92, 174, 349, 768, 769 
Western Europe. See Europe : Western Europe 
Western Samoa : 

Immigration quota established for, 752 
WHO, constitution of, 125 
Western world, question of U.S. leadership (Rusk), 183 
Whaling convention (1946), international, amendment to 

paragraph 5 of schedule of, entry into force, 945 
Wheat agreement (1962) , international : 
Current actions : 
Entry into force, 238 

Argentina, Australia, Austria, 200; Belgium, 125; 
Brazil, 237; Cuba, 200, 797; Germany, 200; India, 
125 ; Indonesia, 438 ; Ireland, 237 ; Israel, 237, 902 ; 
Italy, 237 ; Korea, 200, 237 ; Nigeria, 237 ; Norway, 
200; Philippines, 200; Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
237; Saudi Arabia, 200; South Africa, 200; Soviet 
Union, 237 ; Spain, 237, 902, 946 ; Sweden, 125, 946 ; 
Switzerland, 237, 826 ; U.A.R., 237, 797 ; U.K., U.S., 
237 ; Vatican City, 200 
U.S. continued participation, requested (Johnson), 118 
White, Lincoln, 175, 560, 648 

White slave traffic, agreement (1904) for repression of, 
current actions : Central African Republic, 754 ; 
Congo (Brazzaville), 946; Dahomey, Ivory Coast, 
Sierra Leone, 365 


Whitton, Rex M., 125 

WHO. See World Health Organization 

Wideawake airfield, 505 

Williams, G. Menuen : 

Addresses, remarks, and statements : 
Africa : 
Future development, 690 
Europeans in Africa, future of, lOi 
Need for education in and U.S. aid, 812 
Tropical, private investment opportunities in, 613 
Congo situation, developments, 418, 803 
Food-for-peaee program and Africa, 459 
Visit to Euroiie, 133 
Windward Islands, claims to real estate in, registering 

of, 332 
Wine, James, 710 

WMO. See World Meteorological Organization 
Women : 

Education in Africa (Fredericks), 337 
Status of, progress report on U.N. efforts (Tillett), 197 
Wool, U.S. proposes meeting on trade problems, 356 
Wool Study Group, International : 

Management Committee, U.S. proposal for meeting of, 

7th session, U.S. delegation to, 981 
World Bank. See International Bank 
World Court. See International Court of Justice 
World Food Congress, U.S. to be host nation for, 752 

World Food Program, U.S. pledges supjwrt and coopen 

tion (Freeman), 534 
World Health Organization, constitution (1946) of, cu; 
rent actions : Algeria, 1025 ; Burundi, 901 ; Mongol 
40 ; Rwanda, 1025 ; Western Samoa, 125 
World Meteorological Organization : 

Background and objectives (Gardner), 497 
Convention (1947) of, current actions: Burundi, 797 

Kuwait, 982 ; Tanganyika, 585 
Radioactive fallout, plan for measurement of (Plimp 
ton), 861 
World opinion, effect of U.N. debates on (Gardner), 42i 
World Peace Assembly, Accra, 108 

Yost, Charles W., 159, 296, 709 
Yugoslavia : 

Agriculture system (Galbraith), 16 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 770 
Defection from Soviet bloc ( McGhee) , 101 
Trade relations with West (Rusk) , 58 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 669, 1025, 1026 
U.S. aid: 

Results of (Bowles), 50 

Senate restrictions on, question of: McGhee, 102 
Rowan, 71 ; Rusk, 25, 184, 686 

Zorin, Valerian, 392, 962 




;kly record 
ted states 


Vol. XLVl^ No^20fi>- \ July 2, 1962 

\ '^ ^ ^ 

^^ ^ -^ 
■ x < "^ 

by Secretary Rusk 3 

THE REALITY OF CHANGE • by Under Secretary Ball 8 



John Kenneth Galbraith 13 

GOOD CASE IN THE CONGO • by Assistant Sec- 
retary Cleveland 18 

DEVELOPMENT AND CRISIS e by George A. Morgan . 26 


THE UNITED NATIONS • Statement by Abram 
Chayes, Legal Adviser 30 

For index see inside back cover 


Vol. XLVII, No. 1201 • Publication 7397 
July 2, 1962 

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I Disarmament and Arms Control 

Address iy Secretary Riisk ' 

My purpose tonight is to review with you the 
principles and objectives which guide United 
States policy on disarmament and arms control — 
what we are trying to accomplish at the disarma- 
ment conference in Geneva, the obstacles we face, 
why it is so important to persevere, and the pros- 
pects of progress. 

At the very outset you have a right to ask 
whether disarmament is anything more than a 
will-o'-the-wisp that statesmen have pursued over 
the decades, even centuries, with lack of success. 
Are disarmament negotiations anything more than 
a charade or, as someone has suggested, a ritual 
dance of the goony birds ? In other words, is dis- 
armament a serious matter for constructive state- 

Certainly few areas of international negotiation 
have had thus far a more unproductive history. 
Millions of words have been expended, thousands 
of pages of verbatim records have been printed in 
Geneva, New York, and in other centers of inter- 
national diplomacy, before and since the begin- 
ning of the nuclear age. It is sad to reflect that 
one of the greatest opportunities of all time was 
frustrated by Soviet rejection of the truly radical 
moves for peace advanced by the West at the end 
of World War II. Beginning with the Trmnan- 
Attlee-King declaration of November 1945,- the 
West has taken one initiative after another to 
launch us on the road to disarmament. In the 
Baruch plan ^ we took a supreme and unparalleled 
initiative. Kather than make ourselves and the 

' Made before the New Hampshire Council on World 
Affairs at Concord, N. H., on June 16 (press release 390 
<lnted JunelS). 

- For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 18, 1945, p. 781. 

" For a statement by Bernard M. Baruch at the opening 
session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission 
on June 14, 1»46, see md., June 23, 1946, p. 1057. 

whole world slaves to the nuclear destruction 
which a terrible war had forced us to invent, we 
offered to turn over to the community of nations 
our monopoly of nuclear power, to make sure that 
nuclear energy should be used peacefully under in- 
ternational ownership and control. We made that 
proposal 16 years ago last Thursday. Out of it 
developed a United Nations plan. Tragically, it 
was blocked by the Soviet Union. Ever since, the 
world has been trying — so far vainly — to recap- 
ture that turning point of history. 

Pace of Weapons Development 

The fundamental conviction of the United 
States is that the awesome nature of modem arma- 
ments and of the war which would be fought with 
these armaments is such that no responsible na- 
tion can regard the problem of disarmament and 
arms control with anything less than the deepest 
seriousness. We live today with a paradox: Al- 
though the nations of the world are pouring more 
and more resources and skills into improving 
armaments, they are, on balance, enjoying less and 
less security. The pace of weapons development 
since World War II has quickened exponentially. 
Weapons costs continue their upward spiral. As 
someone has grimly observed of modern weapons : 
"If it works, it's obsolete." 

Let me illustrate. A key present problem is: 
How do you defend against missiles with nuclear 
warheads, traveling at 12,000 miles an hour ? Some 
scientists say this problem is insoluble. Others say 
not and that the stakes are so large you must not 
say it is insoluble until you give it a full try; 
therefore the investment of vast talent and billions 
of dollars. Suppose you succeed. Then the prob- 
lem becomes : How do you develop a missile system 
that will penetrate such a defense? If you suc- 

Ju/y 2, J 962 

ceed in tliat, how do you develop a defense system 
that will take care of that much more elaborate 
missile system ? And so both sides go on and on, 
using huge resources at a level of teclmical require- 
ment which is already pressing the ceiling of the 
mind of man. And all the time each side lives 
under the risk that the other side will make a 
significant breakthrough, injecting new elements 
of instability into the world situation. 

Command and Control Problems 

The command and control problems associated 
with the weapons in today's arsenals, particularly 
missiles, are already extraordinarily complex. The 
possibilities of war by accident, miscalculation, or 
human failure grow as these weapons increase and 
proliferate to a widening circle of nations. 

This is a situation that modern man must view 
with becoming gravity. Historically, the purpose 
of our maintaining a Military Establishment has 
been to preserve and protect our national security. 
This will continue to be necessary in the absence 
of safeguarded disarmament. But it behooves us, 
at the same time, to draw upon every effort of will 
and imagination to find an alternative system 
which will preserve and enhance the national se- 
curity of the United States, along with that of 
other nations, and which involves less danger and 
less instability. This is a major challenge of our 

This is the standpoint from which the United 
States approaches disarmament and arms control. 
We believe that disarmament negotiations should 
be pursued not as propaganda, nor as a game in 
which the nations seek to secure some advantage 
over one another, but as a serious effort stemming 
from a shared conviction that a continued arms 
race is not the answer in the search for national 
and international security in a nuclear age. 

Soviet Obsession With Secrecy 

The United States entered the Geneva negotia- 
tions which began last March with a resolve to 
explore any pathway which might lead to prog- 
ress. Upon our initiative eight new members- 
Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Sweden, and the United Arab Republic — were 
added to these negotiations in the hopes that their 
influence would help find ways to break the dead- 
locks which had beset us in the past. The partici- 
pation of these new members has been useful. 

They have let it be known they are more im- 
pressed by serious negotiation than by cold-war 
sallies. And yet, despite their presence, we have 
found ourselves facing once more the same im- 
passe which we have confronted before : the ques- 
tion of inspection. 

More than any other single factor, the attitude 
of the Soviet Union on the problem of inspection 
and control has been responsible for the failure to 
report any significant progress in the quest for 
disarmament. The Soviet Union has charged that 
inspection is tantamount to "espionage." 

In the negotiations on banning atomic tests 
the British and we went to great lengths to meet 
the Soviet obsession with secrecy. Under the 
U.S.-U.K. draft treaty,^ control posts would be 
immobile units with fixed boundaries. No site 
would be chosen for a control post in the U.S.S.R. 
without the specific consent of the Soviet Gov- 
ernment. Within the post, one-third of the tech- 
nical staff and all of the auxiliary staff would 
have been Soviet nationals, nominated by the 
Soviet Government. In these circumstances 
nothing taking place at the post could remain 
unknown to the Soviet Government. 

The procedures for conducting on-site inspec- 
tion were equally circumscribed with protection 
against misuse for espionage. The area to be in- 
spected would be predetermined on the basis of 
objective seismographic recordings. There would 
have been no random selection of the geographic 
site. To get to the site the teams would have to 
use transport provided by the Soviet Government. 
In addition the Soviets would be able to assign as 
many observers as they wished to check on the ac- 
tivities of the inspection team. Finally, it is note- 
worthy that, under the U.S.-U.K. proposals, less 
than one part in 2,000 of Soviet territory would 
be subject to human inspection in any one year. 

And yet the Soviet Union persists in calling all 
of this "espionage." 

But this is not the only Soviet position which 
has blocked progress in this vital question. In the 
general disarmament negotiations the Soviets 
have taken the untenable position that inspection 
in the disarmament process can be applied only 
to the arms actually destroyed and not to provide 
assurance that agreed levels are not exceeded. 

The United States cannot accept a disarmament 
agreement which, in the words of Aristide Briand, 

* For text, see ibid., June 5, 1961, p. 870. 

Department of State BuUetin 


could leave us dupes or victims. We ask nothing 
of the Soviet Union which we ourselves are not 
willing to accord the Soviet Union. But if we 
were willing to rely on good faith alone, disarma- 
ment would not be necessary. Until there is a 
change of Soviet attitude on this question, the 
prospects for disarmament are not bright. Uni- 
lateral disarmament is a completely unacceptable 
alternative, since this is a guarantee of surrender. 

U.S. Proposes Progressive Zonal Inspection 

In the negotiations in Geneva the United States 
has made a major new proposal ° for solving the 
impasse created by Soviet opposition to inspection 
and control. 

Our proposal for progressive zonal inspection 
should meet every legitimate objection that the 
Soviet Union could have to inspection. This pro- 
posal relates the amount of inspection to the 
amount of disarmament which takes place, while 
still providing an acceptable measure of assurance 
that agreements reached are being lived uj) to. 

Let me describe quite briefly and in broad out- 
line how this proposal would work. According 
to our inspection proposals, a country — either the 
United States or the U.S.S.K. — would divide its 
territory into an agreed number of zones of more 
or less equal military significance. At specified 
time periods dui-ing the disarmament process, say 
at the end of each successive step, an agreed num- 
ber of zones would be selected for inspection by 
the other side. At the beginning, therefore, there 
would not be extensive intrusion by the inspectors 
into the territoi-y of any state. The percentage 
of a state's territory subject to inspection would, 
of course, increase with each step, and we would 
envisage that the amount would, roughly, parallel 
the amount of disarmament. In a sense this 
would be a form of sampling, which, when com- 
bined with inspection of declared production fa- 
cilities and of the armaments destroyed in each 
step, would give satisfactory assurance of com- 

This imaginative new concept should have 
opened new pathways to success in the disarma- 
ment negotiations. We still hope that this ap- 

■^ For text of an "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty 
on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful 
World," which was submitted to the 18-nation Committee 
on Disarmament at Geneva by the U.S. delegation on 
Apr. 18, 1962, see ibid., May 7, 1962, p. 747. 

«Ne' July 2, 1962 

proach will be acceptable to the Soviet Union. 
Only one breakthrough is required: The Soviet 
Union must realize that it cannot eat the cake of 
disarmament and keep the cake of secrecy. The 
choice is clear. It is our hope that the Soviets 
will come to realize that secrecy is a dangerous 
anachronism in a nuclear age. 

The United States and its free-world partners 
do, I believe, have a common interest with the 
Soviet Union, in that both sides desire to preserve 
their mutual security against the dangers of the 
arms race. I hope this common interest will be- 
come increasingly apparent in the period ahead. 

Dangers Common to East and West 

There are four specific dangers which the East 
and West now share which could be the basis for 
early action in the disarmament field, while we 
continue the more complex negotiations relating 
to general disarmament. 

First, there is the danger which arises from the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons under the con- 
trol of an increasing number of individual na- 
tions. As more and more nations come to possess 
their own nuclear stockpiles, tlie danger of a nu- 
clear conflagration also increases. 

Secondly, there is the danger of outbreak of 
war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of 
communications. This danger grows as modern 
weapons become more complex, command and con- 
trol difficulties increase, and the premiimi is on 
ever- faster reaction. 

Thirdly, there is an increasing danger that 
outer space will become man's newest battlefield. 
Steps must be taken at this early stage to keep 
outer space from being seeded with vehicles carry- 
ing weapons of mass destruction, further reduc- 
ing the security of all of the inhabitants of our 
planet. This is preventive disarmament, for 
such nuclear weapons are not now deployed in 

Fourthly, there is the danger that mounting 
proportions of our national resources, skill, and 
treasure will have to be diverted to the business 
of developing newer and newer armaments. 
Neither the United States nor the U.S.S.K. has so 
many schools, hospitals, and highways — or so 
many scientists, engineers, scholars, and artists — 
that we could not put to better use the funds and 
energies and talents which go to make our war- 
ships and tanks and missiles. 

Tliese are four areas of potential coimnon in- 
terest that are tangible and real. Disarmament 
negotiations should build upon these areas of in- 
terest and achieve concrete agreements which can 
lessen the dangers that they pose. 

U.S. Continues Quest for Agreement 

The United States has offered specific proposals 
for such concrete action. We will continue to 
negotiate and to seek eifective ways, consistent 
with our security and that of the nations which 
associate with us in mutual defense, to turn down- 
ward the competition m armaments. 

On April 18 of this year in Geneva the United 
States presented a major new proposal — an out- 
line of basic provisions of a treaty on general 
and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. 
This plan is a detailed and specific blueprint for 
disarmament and security. 

This program has been presented for negotia- 
tion — not as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. We 
believe it is a good basis for negotiation. I have 
already spoken of the new inspection feature of 
this program. 

This plan, if put into effect, would contain and 
reduce the nuclear threat. 

It would reverse the upward spiral of destruc- 
tive capability which, if unchecked, could by 1966 
be double what it is today. 

It would quickly reverse the trend toward dif- 
fusion of nuclear weapons capability to additional 

It would put into effect measures to reduce the 
risk of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise 

It would insure that general and complete dis- 
armament is matched by the strengthening of the 
world's institutions for keeping the peace, else 
there could be no safety in general disarmament. 

At Geneva we seek the widest possible area of 
agreement on a general disarmament program. 
Our goal, of course, is agreement upon the entire 
process, but we recognize that this will take time. 
We would hope, therefore, that, in addition to 
early action in the fields of the four danger areas 
I mentioned earlier, we and the Soviet Union 
could agree upon balanced measures that could 
start the disarmament process while we continue 
negotiations on some of the more difficult problems 
that arise in connection with the later phases of a 
general disarmament program. 

We continue to hope for a treaty banning nu- 
clear weapons tests. President Kennedy has said 
that he has had no greater disappointment since 
he assumed office than the failure to achieve a test 
ban agreement. Such an agreement inevitably 
would impro^'e the prospects for success in broader 
disarmament efforts. It would also end one sig- 
nificant element in the arms race and help to pre- 
vent the spreading of nuclear weapons among 
more and more nations. 

The Soviet resumption of nuclear weapons tests 
last fall left the United States with no option but 
to resume testing." The decision was undertaken 
only after the most soul-searching examination, 
for the President views with great concern the fur- 
ther acceleration of the competition in developing 
newer and more destructive weapons. However, in 
the absence of a safeguarded agreement, we could 
not hold back further in the face of tmacceptable 
military risks for the United States and the entire 
free world. 

Need To Negotiate in Good Faith 

The United States will not abandon its quest for 
a safeguarded agreement which will put an end 
to nuclear weapons testing for all time. Under 
the pressure of world opinion and with an awaken- 
ing to the need for responsible statesmanship, we 
hope the Soviet Union will turn from its present 
negative posture and agree to resiune negotiations 
for an effective test ban agreement. 

We are preparing to go up and down the range 
of negotiation, seeking agi'eement wherever pos- 
sible. And we are determined to make only tliose 
proposals which we ourselves are prejjarcd to live 
with. It is important that these negotiations be 
conducted in good faith and not as propaganda 

Let me say in passing that many other coun- 
tries could well think about this. Everybody is 
happy to vote for disarmament resolutions in the 
United Nations — for those which seem partic- 
ularly applicable to the great powers. But not aU 
the nations which vote for them show the same 
interest in curbing their own arms races with their 
neighbors — or in settling the disputes which give 
rise to these other arms races. I'd like to see a 
United Nations meeting in which it would be out 
of order for any delegate to say what somebody 

" For an address by President Kennedy on nuclear test- 
ing and disarmament, see ibid., Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443. 

Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin 

I '0 

11)8 D 





liMiJ n 
I mM 


I ■iWlittl 
2 In 111 I 

in "din? 

II Mill 


fa I 
w! Til 
km is I 







Isc ought to do about disarmament, in which each 
ould state quite simply what he is prepared to 
oiitribute to disarmament. 

The United States wants disarmament. We 
avo set forth comprehensive proposals for achiev- 
\g disarmament. We believe that disarmament 
a balanced steps would increase the security of 
ho whole world, including ourselves. 

We will insist, however, that disarmament take 
ihxce in a peaceful world. If we are to be real- 
stic, we must not expect that in the near future 
nch a "peaceful world" will mean a world with- 
ut rivalries. But it must mean a world where 
(^mpetition between systems is conducted within 
round rules which preclude the use of force to 
mpose change. If the Soviet Union and other 
'ommunist states wish general disarmament, and 
hrough it the removal of the present terrible 
(angers of the arms race, they must be prepared 

await the verdict of history — and of peoples — 
s to the merits of political systems; that verdict 
iiust not be imposed. If there is to be agreement 
hat we will both await that verdict and that we 
re going to gain control of the arms race, then 
re must be prepared to work together to better 
:eep the peace. 

Vhere Disarmament Negotiations Stand 

"Where do the disarmament negotiations stand 
low ? The negotiations at Geneva have been tem- 
lorarily recessed for a month. Up to now there 
las been no major progress. However, the con- 
ference is to be resimied on July 16. 

Despite the discouraging history of disarma- 
nent negotiations, we cannot give up hope. The 
)l)jective is too important. We intend to keep 
m pressing. We are moderately optimistic that 
n time other states, including the Soviet Union, 
will come to see that an unrestrained arms race 
poses a threat which requires all of us to change 
raditional modes of thinking and to cooperate in 

1 he prevention of a great war. 

There is some basis for hope, although our 
hopes may remain, for a time, greater than our 
realistic expectations. For the first time we have 
„j„jjbeen able to identify some of the main problems 
Jpjin talks with the Soviet Union. The joint state- 
""ment of agreed principles^ worked out last sum- 
mer by Mr. [John J.] McCloy and the Soviet dele- 
gate, Mr. [Valerian A.] Zorin, have been accepted 

as the basis of the Geneva negotiations. While 
these eight principles are quite general, they have 
made it possible to begin discussion with a more 
nearly common language. 

By contrast with past performance, the manner 
of work of the present conference has been en- 
couraging. The atmosphere is businesslike, with 
somewhat less polemics than usual. The eight new 
members, chosen to represent the other geographi- 
cal areas of the world, are making a responsible 
contribution. The management of the conference 
by the United States and Soviet cochairmen and 
the practice of holding informal meetings have 
also substantially reduced well-known tendencies 
toward propaganda abuses. 

We cannot underestimate the obstacles created 
by international distrust. We cannot give way to 
wishful thinking nor overlook the frustrations of 
the past. Tliis time, however, I think we are 
farther along the road by virtue of common recog- 
nition of the specifics of danger and the creation 
of a more effective forum for discussion. 

The road to disarmament and arms control is a 
long and hard one at best. Negotiations must be 
pursued uninterruptedly, patiently, and persist- 
ently. We must mobilize all of our efforts, re- 
sources, and imagination to explore new ap- 
proaches. Above all, we must not allow ourselves 
to become discouraged or to abandon a worthwhile 
objective because its achievement does not seem to 
be in sight. 

I decline to conclude that what man has in- 
vented he cannot control. 

Department Releases Report 
on U.S. Policy Toward IAEA 

The Department of State announced on June 1 
(press release 353) the release of the "Report of 
the Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward 
the International Atomic Energy Agency."^ 

The report, dated May 19, was prepared by a 
committee led by Henry D. Smyth, U.S. Repre- 
sentative to the LA.EA, and was submitted to Har- 
lan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organization Affairs, as part of a 
systematic reappraisal of U.S. participation in 
international organizations. 

' For text, see ibid., Oct. 9, 1961, 

July 2, J 962 

' Copies of the report are available upon request from 
the Office of Public Services, Department of State, Wash- 
ington 25, D.C. 

The Reality of Change 

hy Under Secretary Ball ' 

Sixteen years ago last March Mr. Winston 
Churchill, a statesman with a gift of prophecy, 
made an historic speech at an institution of higher 
learning a thousand miles west of here at Fulton, 
Missouri. That speech will be long remembered 
for one phrase of sonorous finality which sent a 
shudder throughout the Western World: "From 
Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic," 
said Mr. Churchill, "an iron curtain has descended 
across the Continent." 

That speech caught us unprepared. During the 
6 months from V-J Day to the time of the Fulton 
speech we Americans had concentrated on getting 
back to normal. But imder the shock treatment 
of Churchill's portentous words we were brought 
face to face with tlie harsh realization that post- 
war life was not going to be the easy enjoyment 
of an easy peace. The Iron Curtain had indeed 
dropped down to form a cage that now encloses 
one-third of the world's population. From that 
day on the United States was to live in an at- 
mosphere of the cold war. 

I mention these events on this auspicious June 
morning not just to recall the atmosphere of those 
early postwar days but rather to emphasize that 
the cold war, as we know it, is a phenomenon only 
a little more than a decade and a half old. Yet 
to you, who are completing your academic studies 
this day in 1962, it has existed for a lifetime. You 
have lived all but the years of early childhood — 
all your truly sentient years — with the reality of 
the cold war. You have, in fact, known nothing 

You have lived all your lives with the brooding 
awareness that the leaders of the Communist bloc 

' Address made at commencement exercises at Adelphi 
College, Garden City, N.Y., on June 13 (press release 386). 


*. ^'' 



are bent, as Winston Churchill pointed out 
years ago, on "the indefinite expansion of thei . 
power and doctrines." Wliat is more, you hav ( ',. 
learned to accept the awful knowledge that th I ' '• 
United States and the Soviet Union each posses | '^ 
the ability to mcinerate most of the Norther "■ 

Fluidity of World Politics I 

Yet if you have known from childhood what m; 
generation learned only later in life — and thei 
with shocked surjjrise — that the world is torn b; 
a fierce ideological struggle and a bitter powe 
contest, there is one characteristic of the age of th' 
cold war that you should take particularly to heart 
This is not a static age; it is an age in which grea 
forces are at work, an age moving with a rapidity 
unparalleled in history. 

It is a curious and regrettable fact that wt 
Americans, who had our national beginning ii 
revolution, in a violent leap from colonialism t( 
independence, should tend today to underrate th» 
speed and magnitude of change in the shape anc 
structure of world politics. This is not true, od 
course, of technological progress. Your genera- 
tion has taken the giant step from science fictior 
to the science laboratory with grace and ease. Yot 
have not felt disturbed or affronted by the seem-t 
ingly preposterous idea that within a decade mar 
may fly to the moon and back, or that within tlie 
same period we may regularly cross the Atlantic 
in 2 or 3 hours. 

But I challenge you to show the same ability tc: 
recognize change in our political and economic 
affairs. For what is the real lesson of our post 
war history ? It is that world power relationships 

are in a great historic period of fluidity, of shift %ta! 

Deparfmenf of Slate Bulletin 


ind movement, and that we cannot make rational 
plans either as a nation or as individuals on the 
issumption that the world will remain as it is 
:oday. You who are the generation of the cold 
ivar must, I think, accept the probability that, 
ivhile the cold war is likely to continue for a con- 
iiderable period into the foreseeable future, even 
t will not be permanent. 

>evelopments Since World War II 

Consider for a moment what has already oc- 
curred in your own lifetime. Better yet, consider 
hat brief decade and a half since World War II. 

First has come the erection of the Iron Curtain. 

Secondly, and quite as important, over the whole 
)f the free world — that two-thirds of the world's 
copulation not behind the Iron Curtain — the great 
olonial systems have been almost entirely liqui- 
lated or are on their way to liquidation. When 
QV generation was graduating from the universi- 
ies, the world was still divided between a rela- 
ively small number of industrialized nations that 
njoyed autonomy, if not freedom, and most of the 
est of the earth's surface that was subject to some 
orm of colonialism. Today the division is of 
uite a different kind. Out of the old colonial 
ystems has come a great flowering of small na- 
ions. Born weak and sometimes prematurely, 
hey are, almost all of them, economically under- 
leveloped. Diverse in character, they still share 
'ne conmion quality — the determination to estab- 
ish and maintain their national identities and to 
pply, within their own societies, the tools and 
pchniques that modem technology has provided. 

Third, in spite of the forebodings of political 
'ussandras, the shattering of the old colonial 
tinctures did not mean the disappearance or even 
he weakening of the major European colonial 
)Owers. Instead, those powers turned their efforts 
o the construction of a whole new European sys- 
em — the European Economic Community, which 
3 on the way toward expansion to include the 
Jnited Kingdom. This process of pooling re- 
ources and strength in a new European unity has 
enerated prodigious energies that have already 
!!insformed the economic map of Europe and are 
eginning to transform the political map as well. 
Fourth, the coming into being of a Europe ca- 
iable of speaking with one voice on a broader and 
reader spectrum of subject matter has given new 
, Aj'j aapetus to the creation of an effective Atlantic 

,*i. '"'y 2, 1962 


partnership. Not only has the United States com- 
mitted military might to Europe under the NATO 
arrangements — a commitment unthinkable before 
the Second World War — but America and Europe 
together are forging new instnmients for coopera- 
tion over a wide spectrum of economic matters. 

The speed of these developments, moving con- 
currently, has tended to obscure their magnitude. 
Who could have imagined in 1945, when the 
United Nations was created, that in a little over 
16 years it would have not 51 members but 104? 

And wouldn't it have seemed equally as fan- 
tastic 16 years ago, when Western Europe was 
all bricks and rubble, that it could be rebuilt, re- 
shaped, transformed so profoundly in spirit that 
France and Germany, ancient enemies, would be 
drawn by their own free will into a community 
more cohesive than any ever produced by the con- 
querors of the past ? 

But if so much can happen in 16 years, what 
can the next 16 years bring forth ? 

Free Will the Credo of Free Men 

In seeking to answer that question, or at least 
to prepare ourselves for the answer that only time 
can provide, we in the free world must stay fii-mly 
committed to the idea of progress. We must never 
lose faith that freedom and truth are stronger than 
tyranny and deception and that the values which 
are the foundation of our free society will in the 
long run prevail. This is the only acceptable 
working hypothesis for free men today : We are 
on the side of history, and the trends are running 
our way. President Kennedy stated this thesis 
with great eloquence when he said at Berkeley 
last March : ^ 

No one who examines the modern world can doubt that 
the great currents of history are carrying the world away 
from the monolithic idea toward the pluralistic idea — 
away from communism and toward national independence 
and freedom. No one can doubt that the wave of the 
future is not the conquest of the world by a single dog- 
matic creed but the liberation of the diverse energies of 
free nations and free men. 

But if I recommend optimism as a postulate for 
action, I do not suggest for a moment that the 
trends will move to our ultimate benefit unless we 
take pains to see that they do. Free will, not his- 
torical determinism, is the credo of free men. And 
if we are to live and flourish in this world — or even 

' Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 615. 

if we are to live at all — it will be by the effective 
employment of our material resources and the ex- 
ercise of courage, energy, and imagination. 

Shaping Forces of Freedom 

We are going to have to face tlie fact that we 
live in a subtle and intricate world. By the very 
nature of nuclear forces today we are denied the 
classical arbitrament of major war. The gi-ound 
rules have changed irrevocably. Mr. Walter Lipp- 
mann has made this crystal clear : 

Always, in the past, war and the threat of war, whether 
aggressive or defensive, were usable instruments. They 
were usable instruments in the sense that nations pould 
go to war for their national purposes. Nations could 
transform themselves from petty states to great powers 
by means of war. They could enlarge their territories, 
acqviire profitable colonies, change the religion of a van- 
quished population, all by means of war. War was the 
instrument with which the social, political, and legal 
systems of large areas were changed. . . . The reason 
for that was that the old wars could be won. 

But as President Kennedy has pointed out, in 
a nuclear war no one can be the winner. 

AVe need, therefore, a fresh formulation of the 
central question that confronts us. How do we 
bring about the maintenance and expansion of 
freedom and of all of those values that we hold 
most dear without creating conditions that may 
trigger a nuclear war ? 

How, in other words, do we shape and channel 
the great forces that can run our way in order 
to insure that they, in fact, do so ? 

The Simple Approach: Incantation 

There are at least two approaches to the prob- 
lem — one simple, one complex. 

The simple approach has not merely historic but 
prehistoric roots. In primitive societies men 
sought to appease or deflect the forces of nature 
by magic words. And there are those still among 
us today who feel that the massive and mysterious 
forces confronting the free world can best be dealt 
with through incantation. All will be well, they 
argue, if we adopt what they refer to as a "win" 
rather than a "no win" policy. In fact they seem 
to assume that if only we utter words such as 
"victory" often enough and with sufficient belli- 
cosity, the Iron Curtain will crumble like the walls 
of Jericho. 

As advertised, this policy has certain attractive 
features. Not only is it simple, but it is easy. If 

we put our faith in incantation, we need not make 
hard decisions or face difficult tasks. If all that 
is needed is tough words, there is no reason, for 
example, why we should assist the less developed 
countries on their way toward independence — and 
most of the proponents of tliis policy are opposed' 
to foreign aid. There is no reason why we should 
ti-y to assist the forces of change within the Com- 
munist countries — and they, therefore, oppose all 
programs designed to encourage the slow erosioni 
of the Iron Curtain. 

A More Mature i 

Realistic Solution 

But I doubt that you, who have known all your 
lives about the cold war and who are completing 
your studies in this year of tension and turbulence, 
are going to swallow the idea that peace and free- 
dom can be gotten for you wholesale. It has never 
happened before, and it will not happen now. And 
so I propose that we look for a moment at the 
elements of a more mature and realistic solution. 
Those elements are, I think, not hard to identify. 

First, we must at all times have ample military 
strength. Today this means more than maintain- 
ing adequate force levels for our armed services; 
it also means keeping ahead in the teclmological' 
contest. We dare not relax our military posture 
so long as the Communist powers refuse to accept 
those essential, though small, qualifications of their 
obsessive secrecy that will make possible arms re- 
ductions on a basis which secures world safety- 
amis reductions with adequate inspection. 

Second, we must promote and mobilize the 
strength and resources of the major industrialized! 
powers of the free world by perfecting an Atlantic 
partnership with a united Europe and by tighten- 
ing our bonds with Japan. 

Third, we must, in concert with the other major 
industrialized nations, continue to assist the newly 
emerging countries to attain that measure of 
strength that will permit them to secure their in- 
dependence and self-respect and thus attain the 
ability to resist the pressures and temptations 
from the Communist bloc. 

Fourth, we must contmue to maintain adequate 
communications with the nations that oppose us, 
not only in order to detect and develop any possi- 
bility of agreement, even in minor areas of tension, 
but also to avoid the accidental triggering of con- 
flict through mistake or confusion. 

Department of Slafe Bulletin 


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Creating Effective Poles of Attraction 

All of this, you may say, is purely defensive. 
It is an expression of a passive policy, a policy of 
containment — a kind of "Fortress Free World"' 
policy that will not generate the affirmative pres- 
sure on the Communist power centers necessary to 
insure the victory of the free world. 

This argument, I think, misses the point, in part 
because it denies the reality of change. By so do- 
ing, it denies the nature of the world today, in 
wliich great fluid forces are in motion. 

How do we influence these forces at work behind 
the Iron Curtam? First, by creating effective 
poles of attraction. Already the Soviet Union has 
sho^vn its concern at being outstripped and out- 
distanced by the material success of the free 
world — by the goods we can bring to the people. 
The Berlin wall is a dramatic demonstration of 
that concern. The Communists could not tolerate 
;iccess to a prosperous West Berlin that stood as 
a symbolic rebuke to their own economic inade- 
quacy. Their anxiety to destroy this symbol lias 
been, to a considerable extent, the impellmg cause 
for the efforts they have made to impose an altered 
status on tliat valiant city. 

Already there are increasing signs that the So- 
viet Govei-nment is paying the West the compli- 
ment of imitation. They have adopted much of 
idy 3ur industrial technology and our managerial tech- 
j,jj5^ tiiques. And isn't it quite significant that a few 
days ago the Kremlm felt compelled to resort to 
the free-market mechanism as a regulator between 
the supply of domestic goods available for con- 
sumers and the volume of money in circulation'^ 


Technology May Prove the Key to Peace 

The Communist states have their insecurities; 
they cannot face the disclosures of free compari- 
son — and they are right. Obsession with secrecy, 
lire with the hermetically sealed society, is more than 
a heritage of czarist Russia; it is the function 
of palpable weakness. 

Yet it seems clear enough that, over the course 
of the next few years, the bloc countries will find 
secrecy a wasting asset. As the societies of the 
bloc countries become less tightly encysted, as 
they are subjected to the transforming properties 
of light and air, tliey will grow progressively 
more accessible to the influence of free ideas — 
ideas that are likely to blunt their aggressive pur- 

ykf» July 2, 7962 

poses and to render them easier companions in a 
world community. 

Already there is the initial promise of an awak- 
ening spirit of interest and inquiry. New genera- 
tions are moving toward power in the bloc coun- 
tries. Students are beginning to behave in the 
traditional manner of students, to display curios- 
ity and impatience as they become aware that 
there may be an available alternative to a system 
that is intellectually confining. Quite obviously 
we must redouble our efforts to give credibility to 
that alternative, to add yeast to the intellectual 
ferment now in process by all the techniques avail- 
able for letting light and air through the Iron 
Curtain — limited programs of teclmical and even 
capital assistance, increased student and cultural 
exchanges, improved programs of information. 

For as the new generation comes increasingly 
to realize that the alternative to the system they 
know is not disintegrating but is growing stronger 
and offering more and more benefits to its people, 
the forces for change within the structure of the 
bloc will be fortified by other forces moving in the 
same direction. 

Perhaps it is not too much to hope that the very 
technology which threatens the whole Northern 
Hemisphere with the danger of incineration will 
in the long run prove a key to peace. Tliis para- 
dox is not as bizarre as it sounds. The vaulting 
pace of that technology is imposing obsolescence 
at an accelerating rate on existing systems of 
armament, while the fantastic increase in the cost 
of each new generation of weapons is consuming 
an ever greedier share of the economic resources 
of the bloc. Is it not likely, therefore, that at 
some point the Communist power will be forced 
to make the hard choice between insistent demands 
for a better standard of living and the spiraling 
costs of an unending arms race? And is it not 
possible that at such time this conflict of pressures 
may be resolved in favor of effective progress 
toward stability and even disarmament? 

A World of Unlimited Promise 

But let me return again to the theme with which 
I began these observations to you today. The 
years ahead will be difficult, confused, and filled 
with problems. To expect otherwise is to ignore 
the natui-e of a world in flux. It will be no age 
for the indolent or fainthearted. Neither you 
nor I nor any of us can assume that our own 


institutions will survive unless we fight for them. 
But at the same time neither you nor I should ac- 
cept the idea that the cold war is a permanent and 
immutable aspect of life and that we can never 
have done with it. 

For if we are firm enough and strong enough, if 
we have the wit and the diligence, and, above all, 
if we have the maturity and forbearance, the will 
and the courago to refuse to be deflected from our 
main objectives of building a strong, free world, 
not only should we survive but we should look for- 
ward to a future far brighter than any we have 
been entitled to expect before. 

With strong nerves and a hospitable attitude 
toward new ideas we should make out all right, 
provided we prove able to adjust to the shape and 
form of a world that is changing more rapidly 
than any of us realize — a world filled with dangers 
but, more than that, a world filled with unlimited 
promise if we so comport ourselves as to deserve it. 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Views 
on Formation of Lao Government 

Following is an exchange of messages between 
President Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrrishchev, 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
U.S.S.E., regarding the announcement on June U 
that a coalition government had been formed in. 

President Kennedy to Chairman Klirushchev 

White House press release dated June 13 

June 12, 1962 
Dear Mr. Chairman: I share your view that 
the reports from Laos are very encouraging. The 
formation of this government of national union 
under Prince Souvanna Phouma marks a mile- 
stone in the sustained efforts which have been put 
forward toward this end, especially since our 
meeting in Vienna.^ 

It is of equal importance that we should now 
press forward, with our associates in the Geneva 
Conference,^ to complete these agreements and to 
work closely together in their execution. We must 

' For text of a joint communique released at Vienna 
on June 4, 1961, see Bulletin of June 26, 1961, p. 999. 
•For background, see ihid., July 10, 1961, p. 85. 


continue also to do our best to persuade all con- 
cerned in Laos to work together to this same end. 
It is very important that no untoward actions 
anywhere be allowed to disrupt the progress 
which has been made. 

I agree that continued progress in the settle- 
ment of the Laotian problem can be most helpful 
in leading toward the resolution of other inter- 
national difficulties. If together we can help in 
the establislunent of an independent and neutral 
Laos, securely sustained in this status through 
time, this accomplishment will surely have a sig- 
nificant and positive effect far beyond the borders 
of Laos. You can count on the continued and 
energetic efforts of the Government of the United 
States toward this end. 

John F. Kennedy 

Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy 

June 12, 1962 

Dkar Me. PBEsroENT : Good news has come from Laos. 
As a result of tlie successful completion of negotiations 
involving the three political forces of Laos, it has been 
possible to form a coalition government of national unity 
headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma. Without question, 
this act may become the pivotal event both in the life of 
the Laotian people themselves and in the cause of 
strengthening peace in southeast Asia. 

Formation of a coalition government of national unity 
in Laos opens the way toward completing in the near 
future the work done at the Geneva conference toward 
a peaceful settlement of the Laotian problem and giving 
life to the agreements worked out at that conference, 
which constitute a good basis for the development of Laos 
as a neutral and independent state. 

The example of Laos indicates that, provided there is a 
desire to resolve diflScult international problems on the 
basis of cooperation with mutual account of regard for 
the interests of all sides, such cooperation bears fruit. 
At the same time, tie results achieved in the settlement of 
the Laotian problem strengthen the conviction that suc- 
cess in solving other international problems which now 
divide states and create tension in the world can be 
achieved on the same road as well. 

As for the Soviet Government, it has always adhered, 
as it does now, to this line, which in present conditions 
is the only correct policy in international affairs in ac- 
cordance with the interests of peace. 

I avail myself of the occasion to express satisfaction 
over the fact that the mutual understanding we achieved 
while meeting in Vienna last June on the support of a 
neutral and independent Laos is beginning to be trans- 
lated into life. 

Respectfully yours, 

N. Khbushchev 

Department of State Bulletin 

Economic Development: Rival Systems and Comparative Advantage 

iy John Kenneth Galbraith 
Ainbassador to India ^ 

One of the well-observed features of economic 
development in the 20th century is the need to 
choose between two broad political and economic 
designs. This choice, one from which developing 
nations of the 18th and 19th centuries were con- 
veniently exempt, is between Western constitu- 
tional organization on the one hand and Marxian 
and neo-Marxian polity and economic organiza- 
tion on the other. 

These are not, as everyone knows, homogeneous 
alternatives. Wide differences separate a state 
such as Poland, where the agriculture, and hence 
close to half the economy, remains in private hands 
and subject to market influences, from the far 
more completely socialized economy of the Chinese 
mainland. There are similar distinctions between 
the non-Marxian economies, which, in this case, 
are enlarged by terminological preference and 
political semantics. In Scandinavia, the United 
Kingdom and modern India the word "socialism" 
is politically evocative. As a result politicians try 
to find as much of it as possible. In the United 
States, steps that would elsewhere be identified 
with socialist enlightenment — social security, agri- 
cultural price guarantees, even the public develop- 
ment of public power sites — are firmly for the pur- 
pose of making private enterprise function better. 

Also one must be cautious in speaking of a 
"choice" between the two designs. Geography 
and the proximity of military power have had 
much to do with the decision. Had Poland, to 
select a country not unaccustomed to movement, 
lieen radically relocated after World War II to 
a]iproximately the position of Paraguay, her sub- 
sefjuent economic and political history would have 

'Address made before the Commonwealth Club, San 
•>anclsco, Calif., on June 4 (press release 355). 

been rather different. Individuals do commit 
themselves as a matter of free choice to a Marxian 
political and economic design. But nations have 
rarely done so in the normal course of imman- 
aged elections — a reluctance, incidentally, which 
was foreseen by both Marx and Lenin. 

Nevertheless these broad alternatives exist. My 
purpose is to weigh their advantages and disadvan- 
tages from the standpoint of the developing coun- 
try. I am aware that an American ambassador 
will not be considered by everyone a wholly im- 
partial judge. And even in this liberal and sophis- 
ticated gathering there would doubtless be eye- 
brow-lifting if my evidence were to lead me to 
the wrong conclusion. 

But the choice merits serious assessment. Much 
of the present literature consists of declarations 
of superiority by one side or the other. We share 
with the Commimists a strong faith in the value 
of robust assertion. Were the advantage all on 
our side, we would have little reason to worry. 
But we do worry, and it might be well, accord- 
ingly, for us to have a moderately imemotional 
appraisal of what we have to offer the developing 
nations as compared with the Communists. 

The Goal of Developing Countries 

The goal of the developing country can be 
quickly stated : It is to bring itself as rapidly as 
possible into the 20th century and with the ap- 
paratus of individual and group well-being — 
food, clothing, education, health services, housing, 
entertainment, and automobiles — which is as- 
sociated in every mind, urban and rural, bour- 
geois and Bolshevist, with 20th-century existence. 
Here and there are some that demur. But in my 
observation the most monastic Christian, the most 

iii\Y 2, 7962 


contemplative Buddhist, and the most devout 
Gandhian cannot be considered completely secure 
against the charms of the bicycle, motor scooter, 
or transistor radio. 

The things associated with modern civilization 
are now denied by backwardness and poverty. 
The task of the two systems is to overcome this 
poverty. The causes of poverty, in turn, are not 
simple — although the problem has suffered pro- 
digiously from oversimplification. One cause, 
clearly, is an oppressive social structui'e which 
channels return from the many to the few and 
which denies the individual the natural reward 
of his efforts at self-improvement. Another is a 
feeble, nonexistent, or corrupt apparatus of pub- 
lic administration which denies to the counti-y the 
things — law and order, education, investment in 
roads, power, manufacturing — which are possible 
only where there is effective public authority. Or 
poverty may be itself a cause of poverty ; it denies 
the country capital for investment, revenues for 
education, or purchasing power for consumer 
products which, in turn, are an incentive to effort. 
Thus poverty jjerpetuates itself. Such are the 
fundamentals that both systems must attack. It 
is unlikely that the same causes operate in the 
same form and with the same intensity in any two 
cases. An effective attack, therefore, requires not 
only efficient remedies but effective diagnosis of 
the condition to be cured. 

Both systems agree on a number of important 
points. It is common ground that a shortage of 
capital is a likely cause of stagnation. Both agree 
on the need for a massive volume of investment 
to initiate and stimulate not only economic but 
social advance. There is agreement also that this 
investment should be in accordance with a care- 
fully conceived plan. (Here we have paid the 
Soviets the compliment of appropriating an im- 
portant i dea. ) There is increasing agreement that 
a principal object of this investment must be in 
the educational and cultural improvement of 
people themselves. The visitor to the more re- 
mote parts of Soviet Asia is immediately im- 
pressed by the volume of resources going into 
schools, colleges, adult education programs, and 
other forms of cultural extension as part of the 
attack on the traditional backwardness of these 
areas. If, in the years following World War II, 
we thought too much of investment in terms of 
physical capital and too little of the importance 


of a literate and educated populace, this is an 
error we are now correcting. 

There are, however — and this will doubtless 
come as a relief — important differences between 
the two approaches, and these are vital. The first 
lies in the diagnosis of the causes of poverty and 
the related remedy. The second difference is in 
the way develoiiment is organized. The third is 
in the political and constitutional environment of 
development. Let me take up each of these dif- 
ferences in tuni. 

Diagnosing the Causes of Poverty 

In the Marxian view poverty is principally 
caused by institutions which chain the country to 
its past^ — which hold it in colonial subjection, 
whicli exploit and subjugate the masses and deny 
them the reward of their labor, which make gov- 
ernment not the efficient servant of the many but 
the corrupt hancbnaiden of the few. 

In the predominant Western view the poor are 
the victims of their poverty. All societies have 
capacity for growth; the poor society lacks the 
resources to invest in growth. Having less than 
enough for its current needs for food, clothing, 
and shelter, it has nothing for investment in edu- 
cation, improved agi'iculture, transportation, pub- 
lic utilities, or industrial enterprise. 

Each of these views leads naturally to a pre- 
scription. If institutions hold a country to its 
past, the answer is the elimination of these insti- 
tutions. If the problem is the self-perpetuating 
character of privation, the answer is to provide 
the catalyzing resources — specifically, economic 
aid and assistance in its use — which the country 
cannot supply to itself. 

This is the first difference. The Marxian em- 
phasis is on the institutions that inhibit progress 
and the need to eliminate them. Our emphasis is 
on the self-perpetuating character of poverty and 
the catalyzing role of aid. It will be noted that 
each system has a cause and remedy that is not 
without convenience to itself. The Soviets, at 
least until recently, were short of capital. They 
had a revolution wliich could be exported at mod- 
erate expense. Accordingly it was convenient to 
associate backwardness with colonialism, feudal- 
ism, and repressive capitalism, all of which could 
be eliminated by revolution. By contrast, we had 
capital. This we could expoi't with greater ease 
than comprehensive social change. 

Department of State Bvllefin 




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The second difference is in the way development 

organized. Although there is room for some na- 
tional preference, and heresy cannot be entirely 

minated, the Marxian commitment is still to 
4ate ownership of the means of production — of 
land, capital plant, and natural resources. Private 
jwnership of productive resources and their use 
for private gain is one of the retarding institutions. 
Its elimination leaves the state in possession and 
tliis continues. Incentives to individual and group 
effort are strongly supported. But incentives 
which use the device of property ownership to 
?ombine reward for individual effort with reward 
for management of property are excluded in prin- 
■ijile and in large measure in practice. 

Tlie non-Marxian design for organizing develop- 
ment is not so easily characterized. In the past 
many countries — Japan, Germany, Canada, and to 
a remarkable degi-ee also the United States — have 
made state ownership of canals, turnpikes, rail- 
roads, electric power and other utilities, and even 
■;teel mills the fulcrum of development policy. 
India, Egypt, and some South American comitries 
ire taking the same course today. However, the 
main and indeed overwhelming reliance in non- 
Marxian development, both in agriculture and in- 
dustry, is on private ownership of productive 
plant. This is time of countries, such as India, 
which choose to describe themselves as socialist. 

Western Advantage in Providing Capital 

Tlie foregoing differences are sufficiently sharp 
so that we can relate them to results. And in East- 
ern Europe and China, not to mention the much 
older case of the Soviet Union, there is now an am- 
l)le experience of Marxian development on which 
to draw. 

Two major advantages lie with the Western or 
non-Marxian alternatives. There is, we have 
anciently been advised, a certain physical difficulty 
in extracting blood from a stone. This, however, 
is comparatively easy as compared with getting 
savings out of a poor society. Wlien people do not 
have enough to eat, they are loathe to forgo any 
part of their meal in order to eat better in the 
future. Pleas on behalf of children and grand- 
children leave the man of simple, uncomplicated 
intelligence immoved; he reflects that starvation 
will prevent his having children and, fro tanto, 
grandchildren as well. But Marxian no less than 
non-Marxian societies must have savings; without 

Ju/y 2, 7 962 

them there can be no growth. Accordingly, the 
Western pattern of development, with its prospect 
of assistance from outside the counti-y, eases one of 
the most painful problems of development. This 
is why economic aid has become such an important 
feature of Western foreign policy. It is the proc- 
ess by wliich savings are transferred from coun- 
tries where saving is comparatively unpainful to 
those where it is vei-y painful. It exploits one of 
the major advantages of our system. 

The Communist countries are not without re- 
sources in this respect. The Soviet Union, though 
its capacity has been far less than ours, has spared 
some savings for other countries. Commimist eco- 
nomic and political organization deals more effec- 
tively — or ruthlessly — with unproductive and 
excessively luxurious consumption, of which there 
is always some and may be much in the poor coun- 
try. And Commimist organization can, within 
limits, squeeze blood from its turnip. The jjenalty 
is the pam, and this cannot be avoided. The riot- 
ing in Poland in 1956 which brought Mr. Gomulka 
to power was occasioned in large measure by the 
enforcement of a rate of saving that was too grim 
for the people to bear. These last years on the 
Chinese mainland have evidently been ones of seri- 
ous trouble and tension. Part of the problem is 
inherent in socialist organization of agi-iculture to 
which I wiU advert in a moment. But some has 
certainly been the consequence of squeezing a large 
volume of savings out of a very poor population. 

The larger consequence is that Marxian develop- 
ment risks the alienation of the people as non- 
Marxian development does not. It seems doubtful 
if a majority of the Chinese people are very 
pleased with their government and would vote for 
it m an uninhibited poll. By contrast, in India, 
after a decade of development, there has been an 
overwhelming vote for the government that led 
the task. If the Indian Government had to sub- 
tract the $7.3 billions it has received from the 
West in overseas loans and grants since indejwnd- 
ence from the meager incomes — an average of 
about $70 per year — of its own people, its popu- 
larity might well have suffered. We see in India, 
in remarkably clear relief, the advantages of the 
Western design in providing capital. 

Western Advantage in Agriculture 

The second and equally substantial advantage of 
Western development is in the matter of agricul- 
ture. Industry, on the record at least, is fairly 

tolerant as to forms of organization. American 
industry works well mider private ownership. 
Even the most reluctant among us must agree that 
the Soviets have made considerable progress with 
socialism. So no decisive contrast can be regis- 
tered here. But the undeveloped country is, by 
definition, a pastoral or agrarian community. The 
agricultural policy is, accordingly, vital. And it 
is far from clear, as a practical matter, whether it 
is possible to socialize a small-scale, densely popu- 
lated, peasant agriculture. Even in the Soviet 
Union the agricultural problem has not been wholly 
solved. And here, at least, there is no serious talk 
of catching up. Each year we insouciantly extend 
our advantage in manhour productivity without 
effort and somewhat to our regret. Outside the 
Soviet Union, agriculture has been even more of 
a problem. Poland and Yugoslavia have had to 
revert to private ownership. In China, by all ex- 
ternal evidence, the effort to socialize agriculture 
has brought a serious crisis. Certainly it has 
forced her to turn to the West for the largest food 
imports in history. 

There are good reasons for this failure. Farm- 
ers, when they are small and numerous, cannot be 
brought unwillingly into a state-run system of 
agriculture for they can defeat any system that is 
available for their control. The employees of a 
factory, like the men of an army, are subject to 
external discipline. Failure in performance can 
be detected, judged, and penalized. (The same rule 
holds for certain types of plantation agriculture.) 
A scattered peasantry, carrying on the diverse 
tasks of crop and especially of livestock husbandry 
cannot be so regimented. As a consequence, pro- 
ductivity falls off. Working for others, the farmer 
works at the minimum rather than the maximum, 
and the difference between the two is enormous. 
He can be made to work at the maximmn by giving 
him land to work and rewarding him with the 
fruits of his labor or some substantial share to 
consimie or exchange as he wishes. But this is to 
restore individual proprietorship — private capital- 
ism — which its doctrine excludes. 

One day the Marxian economies may succeed 
in socializing agriculture — no effort is being 
spared. And the ability of the small man in agri- 
culture to sabotage a system he dislikes or which 
treats him badly is not confined to communism. It 
is the reason for the low productivity and back- 
wardness of the latifundia of Latin America and 


the feudal domains of the Middle East. But tht 
fact that it accepts independent agricultural pro 
prietorsliip is the second clear advantage of West- 
ern development. 

I. Aniie 





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7« tkt 

Eliminating Retarding Institutions 

I come now to a disadvantage of Western d 
velopment. The Marxian alternative, I ha^ 
noted, emphasizes the destruction of the bond: 
that tie the economy to the past. Our emphasi 
is on capital, education, technical assistance, and I 
the other instruments that allow of change. Unti] 
recently, at least, we have been tempted to suppose I 
that any society is a platform on which, given | 
these missing elements, development can be built. I 

In fact, institutions do chain economies to the I 
past, and the breaking of these chains is essential ' 
for progress. The promise that this will be done 
is a valid and an appealing part of the Marxian 
case. There is no chance of agricultural develop- 
ment in the underdeveloped and hence agricul- 
tural coimtry under systems of absentee landlord- 
ism, with the workers or sharecroppers confined 
by law and tradition to a minor share of a meagei 
product. And feudal systems of farming extend 
their corrupting influence to government, to the 
provision of public sinecures to those who lack a 
claim on the land, to the milking of middle-class 
and industrial enterprise, and to the destruction of 
incentives and the morale of the society itself. 1 "I'lfsyi 
"In our country," a South American guide once 
told me, "those who do the least get the most. I 
hear that in the United States it is the other way 
around. It's a better system." Progress does re- 
quire the radical elimination of retarding institu- 
tions. If elimination can be had from no other 
source, the Marxian alternative will sooner or 
later be tried. The revolution they offer here, we 
should remind ourselves, is less the Russian Rev- 
olution than the French Revolution. 

Ming Us 



vary ii 
jniil ai 

Political Environment 

I come now to the final point of comparison — 
one, unfortunately, which has been much damaged 
by bad rhetoric. From the earliest days of their 
development, personal liberty, equal justice imder 
law, and constitutional government have been im- 
portant to Englislimen and to Americans. They 
haven't been the concern of everyone, but we have 
never supposed they were the fad of the esoteric 
and privileged minority. 

Department of State Bulletin 

'™. of a slight minority and -where the apparatus of 
*1 government serves principally to reinforce such 
, ■ privilege, aid is not of much use. It will also 

And so it is in the undeveloped country today. 
The Andean Indian and the landless worker in 
the Indian village do have a preoccupying concern 
with keeping themselves fed. But the general 
yearning for the dignity of democratic and con- 
stitutional government is very great. No people 
who live under a dictatorship ever feel themselves 
to be first-class citizens. 

There can be little question that most people 
believe that liberty and constitutional process are 
safer with the Western than with the Marxian 
alternative. We haven't, in my view, made as 
much of tliis advantage as we might. But the 
Communists are under the considerable handicap 
that their alternative involves a step into the dark. 
And while the details are obscure, most people 
know that it does not involve free selection of 
rulers by the governed, habeas corpus, equal justice 
under law, and a voluntary return to other eco- 
nomic arrangements should the experiment prove 

Making Use of the Advantages 

On first assessment, then, the advantage of 
the non-Marxian alternative for the developing 
country is considerable. It promises at least a 
partial avoidance of the pain that for the poor 
country is inherent in finding savings for invest- 
ment and growth. It promises an acceptable and 
viable system of agriculture rather than a certain 
unpalatable and possibly unworkable one. And 
it offers personal liberty and constitutional proc- 
ess. Against this the Marxian alternative prom- 
ises a more rigorous attack on the institutions — ■ 
the unproductive claims on revenue and especially 
the feudal control of land — wliich exclude change. 

But this is not a game where one can count the 
cards and decide the wimier. Some cards count 
for more than others, and there is the unfortunate 
possibility that some good cards will not get 

The Marxian promise can be decisive. That is 
l)ecause the things we offer are only effective and 
attractive after the retarding institutions are 
eliminated. In a coimtry where land and other 
are held by and operated for the benefit 

benefit not the many but the few. Our promise 
of independent proprietorship is obviously nulli- 
fied so long as land remains in the hands of the 
few. And personal liberty and constitutional gov- 
ermnent have little meaning in countries where 
government is of the privileged for the rich. 

We must, in short, meet the Marxian promise of 
reform of retarding institutions. We cannot or- 
ganize revolution. We can place our influence 
solidly on the side of reform. Having done this, 
our cards give us a clear advantage. To be sure, 
we must play them. We must make good with 
aid on our promise of a less painful savings and 
investment process. We must give firm support 
to the small farmer. We must be clear in our 
commitment to constitutional process and personal 
liberty. We cannot suppose that these are wanted 
only by people of Anglo-Saxon origin of good in- 
come. And we must not excuse dictatorship on 
grounds of anticommunism or convenience in the 
absence of visible alternatives. The price of do- 
ing so, as we have so painfully learned, is disaster 
magnified by postponement. 

These are highly practical matters. If there 
are no advantages in our alternative, it won't be 
chosen. The first resort to the Marxian alter- 
native in this hemisphere was in a country where 
the concentration of wealth and land ownership 
was extreme, where these had extended a corrupt- 
ing influence to other economic life and to govern- 
ment, and where dictatorship had been endemic. 
Tills being the experience with the Western alter- 
native, it was not remarkable that so many were 
so little perturbed by the alternative. India, in 
face of formidable difficulties, is firmly committed 
to development on the Western model. That is 
because already in British India and over the 
whole counti-y at the time of independence there 
was a strong attack on retarding institutions — 
especially on the feudal claims of princes, zamin- 
dars and great landlords, and govermnent which 
was an extension of this landed power; because a 
substantial measure of peasant ownership had re- 
placed the old system; because aid from outside 
eased the problem of supply capital ; and because 
people felt secure in the i^rotection of constitu- 
tional guarantees and representative government. 

The lesson is clear. The advantages are with 
us. We must, however, have confidence in them 
and exploit them to the full. 

i\i\y 1, J 962 


Good Case in the Congo 

hy Harlan Cleveland 

Assistant Secretary for Intei'national Organization Affairs ^ 

The Sources of International Law 

Often the first, and at least the second, chapter 
of any textbook on international law is entitled 
"Sources of International Law." Despite fierce 
disagreements on other matters, most of the au- 
thors of these books are prepared to include even 
the controversial sources in this chaptei-, and thus 
most of the chapters read alike. They may even 
contam similar subheads such as "Treaties as a 
Source of International Law," "International Cus- 
tom as a Source of International Law," or "The 
General Principles of Law as a Source of Inter- 
national Law." 

I believe there is a different — and in our day 
more useful — way of approaching the sources of 
international law. The law is one thing but the cir- 
cmnstances that lead to its application are another, 
and, regardless of what law we are talking about, 
these circumstances have much in common. 

• In our own past a politician named Marbury 
is appointed to the bench by a lameduck adminis- 
tration. He fights for his job against the new 
party in power — and the course of American his- 
tory is drastically changed by the doctrine of 
judicial review. 

• On tlie international scene the rumrunning 
career of Boatswain Leon Mainguy comes to a 
watery end as he and the ship Ihn Alon-e are sunk 
on the high seas by the gims of a pursuing Coast 
Guard cutter. Out of the resulting litigation 
comes a new doctrine in international law. 

• Or consider the hard luck and poor judgment 
that led the celebrated Demoiselle V. to choose 
Monsieur D. as a lover. She is left pregnant, un- 

' Address made before the U.N. League of Lawyers at 
Washington, D.C., on May 29 (press release 343) . 

supported, and a losing plaintiff in a Geneva court. 
Her troubles, however, produce some significant 
law on the status of a delegate to an international 

• A Swedish count is murdered in Palestine. 
His name leads what is to become the long honor 
roll of United Nations dead. In the aftermath the 
LTnited Nations emerges with recognized rights as 
an international personality. 

The sources of international law in these famil- 
iar cases are violence and conflict followed by an 
organized effort to overcome and resolve them. 
The court decisions, the literature, the impact of 
practice, if not precedent, and the experience in 
fitting doctrine to reality — all these are essential, 
but the source lies in the action that began the 
chain of events. 

Except for Count Bernadotte, the cases men- 
tioned involve someone or some state against some- 
one else or some other state. 

In the modern world, however, such adversary 
proceedings based on the old questions of the 
rights and obligations of states appear to be at- 
tracting less attention in the search for world 
peace. In their place we are becoming concerned 
with the peacekeeping and peacemaking capacities 
of international organizations. Modern interna- 
tional law is more and more the practice of inter- 
national organizations. 

In this new and uncertain approach to world 
order, theory has not kept pace with practice. 
There exists an urgent need for law, literature, 
and the rest. The sources of these are similar to 
the sources of the weighty law on the rights and 
obligations of nations : They are violence and con- 
flict, followed by organized effort to resolve them. 
Assuming this is so, everyone concerned with the 

Deporfmenf of Sfofe BuHetin 

development of world order might keep his eye 
on events like these. 

• A refugee from a United Nations trust terri- 
tory is settled by the United Nations peacekeeping 
force in a neighboring country. He plans to re- 
turn home when his own country becomes inde- 
pendent but is worried about persecution by a 
majority group. 

• A combat-hardened commander and his 
troops are sent on a U.N. peacekeeping mission. 
They are threatened by rebellious and rival gov- 
ernments in tJieir work but must function on the 
unfamiliar theory that there is no enemy. 

• A petty smuggler is apprehended by United 
Nations soldiers who, imcertain of their authority 
and the effect of their action on their mission, 
bring the matter before their brigadier general 
for disposition. 

• Small farmers, unable to take their crops to 
market, appeal to the commander of a U.N. peace- 
keeping contingent for trucking services. The 
commander decides to establish rates and regula- 
tions for the use of his vehicles. 

• The International Court of Justice is asked 
for an opinion on a phrase in the U.N. Charter 
about expenses of the Organization and considers 
lecjuests to reacli beyond the expenses to the legal 
liases of the actions that were so expensive. 

Out of these and other situations a pattern of 
a new law for international peacekeeping is emerg- 
ing. Writers have often contrasted the law of 
nations with the law of the jungle. In a perverse 
way we may now be learning some important 
things about international order in an equatorial 

The United Nations Operation in the Congo 
[UNOC] is, except for the postwar UNRRA 
[United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Ad- 
ministration] program in Chma, the largest and 
most complex international undertaking ever car- 
ried on in an under-developed country. The Congo 
is underdeveloped, not in resources, mining, or 
urbanism, but emphatically so in organization, 
administrative leadership, and technical expertise 
in every field. 

It is clear that the task facing the Congolese 
leaders, of making a nation out of the Congo, 
will be long and tough. There are no easy an- 
swers, no quick solutions. But much can be done 
to get going, even while the "Katanga problem" is 
being worked out. And when it is, the prospects 

July 2, J 962 

for rapid self-sustaining growth are limited only 
by the speed with which tecluiicians and adminis- 
trators can be trained and the institutions of mod- 
ernization can be built. Outside help will be 
needed, but it should have to be on a large scale 
only for the first 2 or 3 years — once political and 
military problems give way to institution building. 

State of the Congo 

During the past year the world has watched 
and debated the alternating tendencies of Katanga 
to secede from the Congo and to negotiate for an 
acceptable place as part of a unified Congo. Mean- 
while, mostly below the surface of public con- 
sciousness, the situation in the rest of the Congo 
has been changing too — and decidedly for the 

A year ago Stanleyville province was claiming 
to harbor the only true national regime, recognized 
by several African nations and Soviet bloc coun- 
tries. A military blockade had closed the main- 
stay of internal trade between Leopoldville and 
the eastern provinces. The leader of that regime 
is now under detention ; most of its parliamentary 
supporters have abandoned him; and the diplo- 
matic representatives it had attracted are now in 
Leopoldville, still inclined to make trouble but in a 
far less advantageous position to do so. 

A year ago the President of Kasai, Albert Ka- 
lonji, had declared his independence. Today Ka- 
lonji is under detention by the Central Govern- 
ment, and Kasai has renounced its secession. 

A year ago the Stanleyville regime was the 
prime influence in the easternmost province of 
Kivu. Even 4 or 5 months ago Kivu was regarded 
as a dangerous place for foreigners, the scene 
of imchecked tribal rivalries and of brutal mas- 
sacres by wandering bands of undisciplined sol- 
diers. In my recent study of the U.N. Operation in 
the Congo, I traveled by car in both the northern 
and southern sections of Kivu, without incident. 
U.N. patrols, provincial police, and Congolese 
Army imits all are working successfully to calm 
things down. Kindu, the place where the 13 Ital- 
ian air crew members were murdered, is under ef- 
fective discipline now. 

A year ago there was no Central Government 
in the Congo. Even today the Government con- 
sists of a few trained leaders who face an ap- 
palling range of problems that would look in- 
soluble if they had not been faced successfully by 


other new leadere in other new nations during the 
past 15 years. But there is a Parliament; it has 
chosen a Prime Minister, who has formed a govern- 
ment; he and liis colleagues can learn to govern, 
with much help from the outside, if they do not let 
themselves be paralyzed by the preoccupation witli 

In short, the process of fragmentation of the 
country into separate hostile units was in full 
swing a year ago; the Central Government was 
limited in its jurisdiction to portions of three of 
the countiy's six provinces. Progress has now 
been made in reversing the process : Outside the 
Katanga, the once hostile armies are all basically 
responsible to the Central Government, the mili- 
taiy blockade on the Congo River has been lifted, 
and a parliamentary form of government has been 
restored under Prime Minister [Cyrille] Adoula. 

The U.N. Peacekeeping Operation 

A major sliare of the credit for the improved 
outlook goes to two closely related field staffs — the 
U-N. peacekeeping force and the U.N. nation- 
building operation. The peacekeeping side of the 
U.N. Operation consists of about 13,700 combat 
troops from 10 countries, plus 3,640 supporting 
troops from 18 countries. Forty percent of the 
remaining U.N. troops are now Indians, con- 
centrated almost entirely in Katanga Province; 
the other main units are Nigerians in the Leopold- 
ville area, Ethiopians in Stanleyville and around 
Kindu, and a Malayan brigade in Kivu. 

The lessons these units are learning in the Congo 
may prove to be very important in the future 
growth of international peacekeeping machinery. 
For example : 

• The supply problems are extraordinarily 
complex, with several different kinds of rifles, 40- 
odd different types of vehicles, three different 
types of fighter aircraft, and four different ration 
scales for troops from various parts of the world. 
Standardization of weapons and supplies for U.N. 
forces should have a high priority in U.N. 

• A peacekeeping force needs to rethink many 
of the most basic precepts that apply to other 
types of military missions. Peacekeepers cannot 
select a putative "enemy" and conduct training 
maneuvers against him ; indeed, one of the major 
objectives of special indoctrination for U.N. troops 
is to prevent them from thinking of the civilian 

population that surrounds them as "the enemy." 
Moreover, the smallest incident in the life of a 
minor patrol may readily become a major political 
issue. As the Brigadier General commanding the 
Malayan brigade explained it to us, "In a regular 
war I would be commanding a brigade ; here I have 
to command each platoon." 

• A peacekeeping force in an underdeveloped 
area is drawn deeply into the civil life of the com- 
munity. Local U.N. units find themselves pro- 
viding leadership, supplies, and transportation to 
local governments and even private firms, in a 
pattern strikingly reminiscent of military govern- 
ment in postwar Italy and Japan. (Force Head- 
quarters has even had to develop a scale of charges 
by which private firms can be billed for hauling 
goods to market in U.N. trucks. ) The danger is, of 
course, that temporary peacekeeping units can too 
easily become an indispensable prop to the civilian 

The U.N. as Nation Builder 

On the nation-building side of its dual person- 
ality, the United Nations Operation in the Congo 
has about 420 civilian technicians and adminis- 
trators, tlie bulk of them based in Leopoldville but 
some stationed in each provincial capital and other 
main centers of population. In Kindu, for ex- 
ample, there is one U.N. representative, an Egyp- 
tian, and a male secretary ; in Bukavu, the capital 
of Kivu Province, there is a staff of several U.N. 
officials, with locally hired clerks, headed by a dy- 
namic Argentine. This group provides adminis- 
trative support for a wide variety of special 
activities (such as refugee operations, public 
works, mining research, housing aid. and the like) 
which are carried on by technical specialists com- 
muting from Leopoldville and local administrators 
at the project sites. 

If the sample we observed in Kivu Province is 
any indication, the U.N. civilian field operation is 
both effective and enthusiastic. It serves as the 
link between the U.N. peacekeeping forces and the 
local government, props up and helps the inexperi- 
enced local authorities. 

Altogether the U.N. civilian presence is more 
actively present in the provincial towns, more ef- 
fective in pacifying the countryside, and more 
energetic in injecting some life into the local econ- 
omy than is generally realized outside the Congo. 

The bulk of UNOC's civilian operation, how- 


Department of State Bulletin 

I'ver, is directed at and located in the ministries 
and offices of the Central Government in Leo- 
poldville. Dozens of U.N. technical people ax'e not 
only physically present in the ministries they are 
suppo.sed to advise but are active in day-to-day 
operations though this trend has not gone as far 
as it probably will have to go in order to be fully 
effective. The chief central banking adviser is an 
Italian memter of the UNOC staff who would be 
ail ornament to any nation's fiscal authority; the 
cliief economic adviser to the Prime Minister is a 
lirst-rate Lebanese economist who is on loan to the 
U.X. from a post as professor of economics at the 
American University of Beirut. The presence of 
foreigners inside government operations is famil- 
iar from postwar experience in other countries 
where external agencies have been deeply involved 
<jn a very large scale in the workings of every de- 
partment of a government stniggling to govern 
in very adverse circumstances. Considering U.N. 
personnel and Belgian advisers, the trend has gone 
quite far in the Congo. 

The civilian operations staff of the United Na- 
tions in the Congo is managed by a dozen technical 
administratoi's, who foi-m a Consultative Group 
around the U.N. Chief of Civilian Operations. 
The Consultative Group consists in part of rep- 
resentatives sent to the Congo by the several spe- 
cialized agencies of the U.N. The UNESCO chief, 
an Italian educator, has dozens of UNESCO-re- 
ci'uited teachers in various parts of the country. 
A Haitian physician is the WHO representative ; 
he jDresides over an extraordinary program into 
which the World Health Organization poured 
some of its best personnel 2 years ago and for 
which it has since done some very astute world- 
wide recruiting. 

There are staffs also from the Food and Agri- 
culture Organization in Kome, the International 
Labor Organization, the International Telecom- 
munication Union, and the World Meteorological 
Organization from Geneva, and experts in public 
works, mining, transportation, legal systems, and 
housing, welfare, and relief operations, all re- 
cruited by U.N. Headquarters in New York. The 
chief administrative officer, a Pakistani, efficiently 
manages the immensely complicated task of pro- 
viding administrative support to civil and military 
operations alike. 

Unlike the technical aid rendered by the "U.N. 
family" of agencies in other underdeveloped coun- 
tries as specialized contributions, the civilian op- 

July 2, 7962 

eration in the Congo is managed as a single imit. 
The field staff is subject to common administrative 
arrangements and for all purposes uses funds from 
the same pot— the U.N. Economic Fund for the 
Congo, supplemented by our P.L. 480 food im- 
ports, the local currency counterpart of which is 
placed in a special account under UNOC control. 
Only the representative of the High Commissioner 
for Eefugees and his associates, experts from the 
League of Eed Cross Societies and several reli- 
gious voluntaiy agencies, are not under the um- 
brella of UNOC as such, and even they are partly 
dependent on the UNOC field stations for admin- 
istrative support, transportation, and political 
liaison with the local authorities. 

We met with the Consultative Group for a fruit- 
ful 4 hours one afternoon. With three or four ex- 
ceptions the members are individually first-rate, 
combining competence with dedication to an ex- 
tent that compares with the best of our own U.S. 
aid missions during the past 14 years. 

The civil operations of the U.N., then, appear to 
be well staffed on the whole. There is good co- 
operation between the civil and military personnel 
in UNOC headquarters and in the field; the chain 
of command between Leopoldville and the UNOC 
representatives in the provinces seems to work 
well. The United States Embassy has an easy and 
intimate relationship with the UNOC headquar- 

But there are serious problems. One is the lack 
of an overall plan — the result of a natural reluc- 
tance to plan very far ahead in so fluid and un- 
predictable a situation. Lacking a careful plan, 
the individual U.N. officials responsible for worry- 
ing about individual sectors of the economy tend 
to conduct highly compartmentalized programs. 
The result is too much like a shopping list of 
projects and too little like a plan for the Congo's 
future with careful attention to priorities. 

The result of this system appears to be some- 
thing for every sector, but a relative overemphasis 
is on the needs of people in Leopoldville province 
and a relative underemphasis on those sectors of 
the economy (like road transport and secondary 
education) which are bottlenecks in the revival 
and expansion of the economy as a whole. I was 
pleased to learn last week, however, that the Con- 
golese Government, in agreement with the U.N., 
has earmarked $8 million of U.S. aid for immedi- 
ate imports of trucks and spare parts. 

To plan priorities for the Congo's development, 
and to pull together all forms of external aid, it 
seems clear that some form of coordinating device 
in Leopoldville is a must. Both from the Congo- 
lese point of view and from ours it is essential that 
all external aid continue to be covered by the mn- 
brella of the United Nations. 

The Economic Problem 

The economic problem which the United Na- 
tions and its contributing members face in the 
Congo is an enormous one. So far only stopgap 
measures have been taken by the Government and 
the U.N. — or have indeed been possible. These 
measures have prevented a complete breakdown 
in the economy and have helped to revive a mini- 
mum of activity in public health and sanitation, 
secondary and vocational education, government 
administration, transportation, and work relief. 

But despite the country's natural riches and the 
U.N.'s efforts to create a strong Congo adminis- 
trative apparatus, it has been difficult to carry out 
any consistent economic program, not only because 
we still do not have an integrated Congo but sim- 
ply because all the classic symptoms of under- 
development are present, including large numbers 
of untrained Congolese organized into more than 
two dozen ministries. 

The difficult economic problems inherited by the 
Adoula government have been compoimded by the 
course of events and the curse of nature. The dis- 
location of production in the interior of the coun- 
try arising from political unrest was aggravated 
by the destruction to farmlands and the damage 
to urban areas caused by a most serious flood of 
the Congo River. Inflationary pressures, in turn, 
have been intensified by civil unrest. 

Since independence, revenues of the Central 
Government have covered only a small portion of 
expenditures, the balance in large part having been 
covered by advances from the monetary council, 
which acts as a central bank. Stabilization meas- 
ures agreed between the Central Government and 
the U.N. in June 19G1 have been delayed; some 
progress is promised by the preparation early in 
1962 of a first rough national budget (not yet ap- 
proved by the Congolese Parliament) and the 
formulation of an austerity program. 

Export performance in the first quarter of the 
year was not encouraging. Although production 

on the major plantations appears to be well main- 
tained, the dislocation of farm production by small 
farmers was reflected in sharply reduced export 
figures for cotton and coffee. Smuggling of goods 
across the borders is a growing problem; clearly 
the ratio of one to three between official and free 
exchange rates for the Congolese franc is a tempt- 
ing incentive to smuggling. Arrivals of goods fi- 
nanced from American-tied aid and through P.L. 
480 during the past few months played an in- 
dispensable part in sustaining industrial produc- 
tion and in maintaining the health and diet of 
the country. 

But all this has been maintenance, not develop- 
ment. Here are some typical indications of the 
present parlous state of affairs. 

(a) Clandestine Trade. Clandestine trade due 
to the difference in value of the Congolese franc 
internally and externally has resulted in a sharp 
drop in foreign exchange earnings. The Gov- 
ermnent's administrative weaknesses make it dif- 
ficult to bring smuggling vmder control, but con- 
trol measures such as better bookkeeping records 
of Government operations, payment by postal 
check, and various incentive devices are being ac- 
tively considered by the Government and its U.N. 
advisers, and a special Finance Brigade is being 
formed with U.N. cooperation to improve customs 

(b) Deficit Spending. Deficit spending has 
reached an extremely dangerous level. The Cen- 
tral Government deficit, which amounts to about 
80 percent of budget expenditures, is being fi- 
nanced by issuance of new paper money. Net 
foreign exchange resources are presently only 
about $5 million, or enough to finance the current 
payments deficit for less than a month. A run- 
away inflation is prevented not by Government 
controls but by the large amounts of Congolese 
currency hoarded by individuals. 

(c) Public Health. In the public-health sector 
only the minimal medical facilities will be avail- 
able to the Congolese for at least the next 5 years, 
and these will have to be provided largely by non- 
Congolese. Only about 30 well-trained Congo- 
lese doctors can be expected from the limited 
nmnber of medical students presently in the pipe- 
line. The impressive WHO operation, which has 
150 French-speaking doctors strategically placed 
around the country, is not just the backbone but 

Department of State Bulletin 

practically the whole corpus of tlie nation's health 

(d) Education. The educational system is be- 
ing revamped by UNESCO, in concert with the 
Ministry of Education, in order to bring about 
better distribution of students in the primary and 
secondary schools. Of the 1,500,000 students in 
primary schools, about one-half are in the first 
two grades ; only a couple of hundred gi-aduates 
of secondary schools will be produced at the top of 
the educational pyramid this year. Some 2,200 
teachers from abroad are needed for 1963, and this 
figure cannot be met. There are 1,500 teachers 
(1,200 of whom are Belgians) plus 150 recruited 
by UNESCO. The latter are not likely to renew 
their contracts unless they are guaranteed trans- 
ferability of earnings. The Belgians are guaran- 
teed transfer of 40 percent of their earnings ; most 
of them can therefore be expected to remain while 
security conditions permit. 

(e) Mining. Mining production has suffered 
severely from the breakdown in law and order; 
improvement in this regard offers prospects for 
big production increases in provinces outside the 
Katanga. U.N. teclinicians are working with the 

■ Ministry of Mines to refonn mining legislation. 

(/) Puhlic Works. Congo River floods have 
- hampered U.N. public works programs. With the 
expected arrival of a few additional U.N. tech- 
nicians it is hoped that the increase in employment 
reflected in April figures will be further increased. 
There is need to speed up negotiation of agree- 
ments between the U.N. and the Ministry. 

(g) Agriculture. Big plantation agriculture 
is at the 1959 level, but small farm production is 
vanisliing largely because there are no incentive 
goods available to the small farmer. The present 
outlook is for further decline in food crops during 
the next year. 

(h) Judicial System. There is no established 
judicial system in the Congo ; there are two grad- 
uate lawyers, one of whom works for the U.N., 
and not one qualified magistrate. The U.N. is 
actively trying to build a judicial system; a first 
' group of European judges was appointed by the 
ijeodL Central Government last month. 
Conso-I (^) Labor. The ILO is helping to strengthen 
the administrative structure of the Ministry of 
Labor and to train native labor inspectors who 
are needed to fill the void resulting from the mass 
exodus of Belgians after independence. A trade 
scliool training program has been initiated, and 

social legislation is being completely revised in 
the hopes that serious labor difficulties can be 

(j) Transportation. Everywhere in the Congo, 
transportation is clearly the prime bottleneck. The 
Congo transport system was originally designed 
to meet large-producer export requirements; the 
emphasis therefore was on water and rail systems. 
The number of private vehicles is down to 50 per- 
cent since there is accelerated depreciation due 
to lack of maintenance and spare parts, and roads 
are badly in need of repair or are lacking 

(k) Refugees. The Congo is, curiously, enough 
of a going concern to provide a haven for refugees 
from even more troubled spots nearby. For ex- 
ample, relief supplies are being provided to 60,000 
Watutsi refugees from Kuanda-Urundi, and many 
of them are being resettled in unmhabited, but 
fertile, reaches of Kivu Province. The program is 
sensible, and no semipermanent camps are being 
created. Individual pieces of land are granted to 
heads of families, seeds provided ; and, after a few 
months' grace period to get their first crop har- 
vested, the refugees are on their own. 

Katanga and the Other Provinces 

The Congolese Government is heavily dependent 
on outside assistance and foreign advisers; so are 
the provincial governments, including Katanga. 
This will be true for a number of years to come. 
The Central Government is very centralized in 
theoiy, but, in fact, the provinces have a good deal 
of autonomy. Like provinces in some other coun- 
tries, the provincial governments in the Congo 
are inclined to ask not what they can do for the 
Central Government but what can it do for them. 
There are no insuperable problems en principe 
(the most used phrase in the Congo) ; the largely 
untapped resources of the Congo, and its relative 
lack of population pressure, are a great potential 
asset. But much more training, organization, 
leadership, and drive will be required in every field 
if the Congo is to become in fact the stable and 
progressive nation its well-wishers would like to 
see developing in the heart of Africa. 

The key to the situation continues to be an in- 
tegrated Congo. Katanga's resources are needed 
for the rapid development of the whole of the 
Congo; and, more important yet, it seems clear 

Ju/y 2, J 962 


that no moderate political leadership can survive 
in the national government until and unless it 
demonstrates its capacity to deal successfully with 
the problem of the Katanga secession. 

These considerations underline the importance 
of a speedy conclusion to the Adoula-Tshombe 
[Moise Tshombe, President of Katanga Province] 
talks and have led the United Nations to play a 
mediatory role in the current phase of these talks. 
But the same considerations also suggest that there 
is much to be done regardless of those negotiations, 
or before they are brought to a useful end. The 
Congolese and the United Nations can now move 
ahead more rapidly in establishing the minimiun 
conditions of economic growth : the training of ad- 
ministrators and teclmicians, the retraining of the 
national army, the improvement of transportation, 
the development of workable relations between 
central and provincial authorities. 

Organizing for the Longer Pull 

Tlie Congo has reached a watershed, and we 
must move from stopgap interim measures to more 
long-range steps designed to get the Congolese to 
take over as quickly as possible. 

The magnitude of the problem is such that the 
United Nations may need to name a special officer 
to manage, with a full-time staff, all aspects of the 
Congo operation. He should have a staff ade- 
quate to backstop the major technical assistance 
and economic aid coordination job which the U.N. 
will be doing for some time, perhaps for several 
years to come. The ad hoc management of this un- 
precedented enterprise directly in the Secretary- 
General's office was probably advantageous at the 
beginning ; but for the longer pull the Secretary- 
General's office should not be so burdened with 
the Congo that it becomes immobilized for effective 
and imaginative handling of other crises and any 
needed executive operations. 

The U.N. has some 420 administrators and tech- 
nicians in the Congo and is financing most of the 
Congo's imports out of the U.N. Economic Fund 
for the Congo. The United States has a few bi- 
lateral projects (including assistance to Lovanium 
University and the National Institute of Law and 
Administration) and also a bilateral program of 
P.L. 480 supplies, some of which are used for direct 
relief while some are sold and the counterpart de- 
posited in a fund under the control of UNOC. 
The Belgian Government pays one-third of the 

salary of some 2,400 Belgian advisers and techni- 
cians. The European Economic Community is 
considering a contribution in the form of imports 
from Europe. Other bilateral aid programs will 
be available to assist in the Congo's economic de- 
velopment. Assuming it settles down politically, 
the Congo will increasingly be drawn into African 
regional arrangements, including the U.N. Eco- 
nomic Commission for Africa and perhaps the 
Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa 
South of the Sahara (CCTA). 

The Congolese Government needs a strong sys- 
tem of planning and coordination, to relate all 
these sources of external assistance to a rational 
plan. It seems necessary, and is probably accept- 
able to all the several parties at interest, to estab- 
lish an effective coordinating device in Leopold- 
ville for external aid. In addition to developing 
within the Congolese Government a plan of cam- 
paign and trying to relate all aid to that plan, 
this body should comprise a strong and knowledge- 
able coordinating office for all technical and eco- 
nomic aid from abroad. 

IjlBS 11 

Jie 1' 
Prof, I 




lions, a 

By these devices, and others, the practice of the 
United Nations in the Congo can mutate from a 
brilliant improvisation to a carefully planned ex- 
ercise in nation building. 

But who is recording the U.N.'s experience ia 
the Congo ? 

If a main source of international law is now the 
practice of international organizations, perhaps 
the first step in writing the next textbook should 
not be to read what everybody else has written on 
the subject but to capture and codify the experi- 
ence we are having every day as a participant in 
the U.N.'s trials and errors in the Congo. 

Why don't you hold your next meeting in Lco- 
poldville ? 

Council To Advise Department 
on U.S. Activities in Africa 

Formation of an Advisory Council on African 
Affairs comprising prominent educators, business- 
men, labor leaders, and professional people to con- 
sult with officials of the Department of State about 
U.S. activities in Africa was announced by G. 
Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretai-y for Afri- 
can Affairs, on June 11 (press release 384). 

Department of State Bulletin 


a (aril 




M [ 



lew if; 




, ^ The Advisory Council will meet with Mr. Wil- 
■■liams and other higli officials in Washington on 
'''*" June 13 and 14 to discuss its future program. 
Prof. D. Vemon McKay of the Johns Hop- 
kins University has been serving as chairman pro 
tempore of the steering committee. 

Mr. Williams said the Council's membership 
\vould provide the Department of State with an 
opportunity to utilize the backgi'ound knowledge 
iiiid resources of nongovernmental experts in Afri- 
can affairs who are engaged in American univer- 
sities, foundations, missionaiy organizations, labor 
unions, and business.^ 



U.S. Intends To Place New Tariff 
Schedules in Effect January 1 

I'n>.js release 394 dated June 15 

The United States intends to place the revised 
' '.S. tariff schedules provided for in the Tariff 
; lassification Act of 1962 into effect on January 
1, 1963, and is now undertaking the necessaiy 
international procedures, the Department of State 
innounced on Jime 15. 

The new act makes it possible for the United 
■States to respect its trade-agreement obligations 
ly negotiating with other countries over the con- 
version of their present concessions to the lan- 
j:uage of the new schedules. The new schedules 
will not go into effect until the necessary steps in 
[his direction have been taken. 

The United States recently obtained from the 
Council of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 

esperi Trade (GATT) a decision under which the neces- 

sary consultations and negotiations with GATT 
30untries can begin promptly. Consultations are 
ilso being initiated with countries with which the 
United States has bilateral trade agreements. 
The United States also informed the GATT Coun- 
3il of its intention to request a waiver at the 20th 
ion of the GATT this fall, so that the new 
tariff schedules can be put into effect on January 
I even if the negotiations have not been completed 
Dy that date. 

The Tariff Classification Act of 1962 was passed 
by the Congress and signed by the President ^ on 

For names of the members of tie Advisory Council, 
see Department of State press release 384 dated June 11. 
' For a statement by President Kennedy, see Bulletin 
)f June 25, 1962, p. 1038. 

July 2, 1962 

May 24. The new schedules provided for by the 
Tariff Classification Act will replace the schedules 
in the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. They ware 
l^repared by the United States Tariff Commission 
imder the authority of the Customs Simplification 
Act of 1954 and do not result in any general 
change in the level of United States tariff's. The 
implementation of the new schedules will be a 
major step forward in the simplification of the 
United States customs laws. 

Secretary Deplores Restrictions 
by Senate on Foreign Aid 

Statement hy Secretary Rush ^ 

I consider most unfortunate the action taken 
by the Senate today [June 6] = to prohibit any 
type of aid, including sales of foodstuffs for local 
currency, to Poland and Yugoslavia. 

The adoption of the Lausche amendment will 
give the impression abroad that we are perma- 
nently writing off to Soviet domination the mil- 
lions of people who still yearn for freedom. It 
would, for example, penalize the people of Poland 
by denying them food and force them into total 
dependence on the Soviets. Furthermore, the 
amendment would deprive the President of the 
discretion which he needs in an explosive world.^ 

^ Released to news correspondents on June G. 

- On June 6 the Senate adopted an amendment to S. 
2996 offered by Senator Frank J. Lausche, as follows : 

"(g) No assistance shall be furnished under this Act 
and no commodities may be sold or given under the Agri- 
cultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 
as amended, to any country known to be dominated by 
communism or Marxism. This restriction may not be 
waived pursuant to any authority contained in this Act." 

' On June 7 the Senate adopted the following amendment 
offered by Senators Mike Mansfield and Everett M. Dirk- 
sen, which permits provision of surplus agricultural 
products : 

"(h) Nothing contained in subsection (g) shall be 
deemed to prohibit assistance under the provisions of the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 
1954. as amended, if prior to furnishing such assistance 
the President finds (1) that a recipient country is not 
participating directly or indirectly in any policy or pro- 
gram for the Communist conquest of the world, and (2) 
that such recipient country is not controlled by any coun- 
try promoting the Communist conquest of the world, and 
(3) that the furnishing of such assistance is in the inter- 
est of the national security of the United States, and (4) 
that the President notifies the Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of his 
intention to furnish such assistance." 


Development and Crisis 

iy George A. Morgan 

Director^ Foreign Service IiisUUde ^ 

Years ago we fought to make the world safe for 
democracy. Two generations later it is still not 
safe, and we have long since realized that we live 
not in an interval but in an age of crisis. 

The chief addition of recent years is that crises 
have become as frequent as morning broadcasts, 
like Alice's oysters — 

And thick and fast they came at last, 
And more, and more, and more. . . . 

Our skill in handling crises can never hope to equal 
the "Walrus and the Carpenter eating oysters, but 
it would be a pity if we did not learn substantial 
improvement from such plentiful experience. I 
think we have, and shall do more. 

The keys to progress here are understanding, 
anticipation, and control. 

Understanding the Crises 

How understand the crises of our day? 

One of the most striking features of their inci- 
dence is the way they cluster in that vast segment 
of human geography which we call the newly de- 
veloping areas — "newly" because the rest of us are 
still growing too, we hope. Apart from Berlin — 
a very special case — almost any international crisis 
you can name in recent years concerned such an 
area. Laos, Cuba, Algeria, the Congo leap to 
mind; also Suez, Kaslimir, Viet-Nam, Guatemala, 
Angola, and a hundred more. 

Merely reeling off these names is enough to re- 
mind us how suj>erficial the headline approach to 
crises must be. Although Laos, for instance, has 
been a crisis area for some years, there were times 
when the volcano erupted, times when it slept, and 
each eruption had a unique pattern of rumblings, 
blast, and fallout. 

The newly developing areas themselves are by 
no means a uniform mass with identical problems. 
Rather they embrace a marvelous spectrum of 
liuman life, extending from Stone Age cultures in 
New Guinea to the ancient civilizations of China 
and India. 

"Wliy the common denominator of crisis 

' Address made before the United Press International 
Broadcasters Association of Virginia at Virginia Beach, 
Va., on June 9 (press release 372 dated .Tune 8). 

The basic reason lies in the common predicament 
of these peoples. However various, they are 
caught up in the great tide of cultural change by 
which all the families of man are being drawn 
toward the single world civilization of the future. 

A prime mover in this process is Western tech- 
nology, with its fruits of mass production and 
communication which are as irresistible as Eve's 
apple. Around the globe, societies settled for cen- 
turies in their own ways of living are being un- 
settled with modernity and reaching for more. 
They are in a hurry, too. It is striking how often 
our African friends tell us, "We've got to catch 
up with you in 10 years." 

Technology does not live by itself. It involves 
not only new ideas but new modes of organized 
human action. Back before the war the press re- 
ported that a chief export to one of the Buddhist 
countries was electric motors to run prayer wheels. 
However eternal the object of men's prayers, their 
temporal expression was again bringing revolu- 
tion, as so often in history. 

A second prime mover in modernizing tradi- 
tional societies is the desire to develop means of 
enjoying the fruits of teclmology and the status 
that goes with it : to have something and be some- 
thing in the modern world. Since the sovereign 
nation-state has been the political form of the in- 
dustrial era, "being something" means being an 
independent nation — even for peoples that have 
not hitherto been either independent or a nation. 
So a special kind of nationalism has spread like 
wildfire throughout most of the less developed 

These two prime movers — technology and na- 
tionalism — would by themselves be enough to ex- 
plain why the growing pains of development so 
frequently break out in crises — sometimes inter- 
nal, sometimes involving neighbors or excolonial 
powers. For customary patterns of living are 
strained and eroded in countless ways by these 
forces, and social demands are generated with 
which old elites are unable to cope. The electricity 
which turns prayer wheels can also turn hi-fi twist. 

But there is a third force, not so much a prime 
mover as a parasite of the modernization process, 
which seeks to divert the process and its crises to 
alien ends. That is the force of organized com- 
munism. Inside the older industrialized countries 
of the free world it is no longer the threat it once 
was, but in the newly developing areas there are 
plenty of maladjustments and misunderstandings 

Department of Sfafe Bulletin 

- oil which it feeds. Thus it is able to precipitate 
' an some crises and make many others worse. For ex- 
?elj ample, it precipitated insurgency in Viet-Nam 
br, and it aggravated the Congo situation. Its readi- 
itiirt iness to exploit political confusion, as in Laos, or 
' ^[uarrels between neighbors, as in New Guinea, is 
uiiy problems of internal defense are peculiarly 
irgent for the modernizing nations. 

The three forces I have described — technology, 
nationalism, and commimism — are by no means a 
■omplete list even of the main factors at work in 
ontemporary crises, and of course each crisis has 
t s own peculiar origins. But they illustrate points 
if view that may lend perspective to the daily 
ujv^ '.vents that prey on the anxieties of your listeners. 

keeping Ahead of Events 

As we learn to understand crises better, we get 
I sounder basis for anticipating them. The exact 
;hape and date of a particular crisis is virtually 
inpredictable, like any other unique historical 
nent. But we can observe trends and situations 
liat are likely to produce crises, and sharpen our 
yes and ears to detect a rising storm. 

Anticipation is foresight plus ; it is forehanded 
iction. That is what we mean by keeping ahead 
if events. To do so infallibly is reserved for 
livine Providence. Yet ordinary mortals, where 
hey see signs of trouble, can think out ahead of 
ime some of the more visible dimensions of the 
iroblem and thus be the better prepared when it 
■omes, even though it seldom arrives just in the 
.vay expected. There were faults in the Lebanon 
operation which we have since learned to correct, 
)ut the main point is that it succeeded, and this 
.vas due in no small measure to the planning on 
.vhich it was based. 

Planning is only one Icind of forehanded action. 
Other kinds include logistic preparation — which 
Kis its importance in civil as well as military af- 
fairs — and preventive or ameliorative measures. 
'Preventive diplomacy," a favorite term of Secre- 
aiy Rusk coined by analogy with "preventive 
iiedicine," is an established practice which has 

itterly acquired a methodology and is now con- 
sciously cultivated as an art. Better than coping 
ivith crises is managing so that they do not occur 
n the first place. 

That is far easier said than done, and such are 

he mysteries of historical causation that it is 

lu/y 2, 7 962 

seldom easy to demonstrate the fact even when we 
think it has been done. Everybody knows about 
the Berlin problems of recent years, but enormous 
pains liave been taken to prevent far worse ones. 
I believe those pains have been eminently success- 
ful, but I could prove it conclusively only by play- 
ing history over again to see what would happen 
if those efforts had not been made — which is 

That is too bad, because in an age of crisis the 
public gets deluged witli bad news of what has 
happened, while largely ignorant of the bad news 
that did not happen — partly due to our own eilorts. 
The obvious retort is that what did not happen is 
not news, but that is only partially true. Perhaps 
it is because we Americans have a hair-shirt com- 
plex, but good news that fails to happen somehow 
has a magic attraction for the headlines. 

I know of few problems that seem to me more 
serious for responsible journalism today. A deep 
and potentially ominous anxiety neurosis has been 
engendered in the American people because it is so 
difficult to present a balanced picture of daily 
events — and just in a period when the country 
needs stout hearts and steady nerves. I do not 
claim to have the answer, but I believe the unremit- 
ting search for it is worthy of the finest talents 
of your profession and mine. 

I too would be presenting an unbalanced view if 
I spoke only of preventive diplomacy here. Crises 
bring opportunities as well as troubles. Prepar- 
ing to make the most of them is equally a part of 
the job of anticipation. It was in the crisis follow- 
ing Trujillo's death that we seized and won the 
opportunity to help the Dominican Eepublic, 
badly crippled by years of despotism, find its way 
toward healthy freedom. 

Controlling the Instruments of Action 

As we understand and anticipate better, we im- 
prove our stance for tackling the third factor of 
progress in the field of crisis handling: control. 
This may seem a paradox because a crisis might be 
defined as a situation out of control. But to speak 
of our really controlling almost any international 
situation is a misnomer. Providence controls, 
men and nations only navigate, the stream of 

Wliat I am talking about here is control of our- 
selves and our instruments of action. As we per- 


feet it we increase our effectiveness in navigating 
crises that are upon us. 

Controlling ourselves is more than individual 
self-control, though perhaps we still have some- 
thing to learn from sages as well as psychologists 
on this point. It is particularly group self-control. 

In foreign affairs, as you well know from your 
profession, speech is a form of action. Getting 
any group that is handling a problem, here or 
abroad, to control relevant acts of communication 
intelligently is one of the thorniest tasks of leader- 
ship. Yet I think we have learned better in recent 
years to talk as a team where teamwork is im- 
portant. There is also wider appreciation of the 
fact that silence on occasion can be more effective 
than talk. 

Other instruments range from the mightiest to 
the subtlest in the human repertory. Their re- 
quirements become daily more complex, their com- 
bined potential more varied. The orchestration of 

these instruments is a never-ending enterprise of 
research, of experience, and of training. 

The latest experiment in such training begins 2 
days from now at the Foreign Sei-vice Institute.^ 
During 5 intensive weeks, teams of senior officers 
will train together to tackle the problems of devel- 
opment and internal defense involving our rela- 
tions with the countries they are to serve in. Thus 
they will be preparing to understand, anticipate, 
and navigate their share of crises. 

Crises are not the whole story or indeed the main 
story of foreign affairs even in this time of 
troubles. The rise of the Common Market and the 
gathering headway of the President's trade pro- 
gram are more central to the majestic march of 
history. But crises are going to be with us for a 
long time and, as President Kennedy's first book 
concludes, "It's the system that functions in the 
pinches that survives." 


Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings 

Rome July 

Amsterdam July 

Mexico, D.F July 

Geneva July 


Scheduled July Through September 1962 

NATO European Radio Frequency Agency 

U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Rapporteurs on Braking 
Pan American Highway Congress: Permanent Executive Cor 


25th International Conference on Public Education 

FAO World Meeting on the Biology of Tuna and Tuna-Like La Jolla, Calif 


International Whaling Commission: 14th Meeting London July 

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 34th Session Geneva July 

OECD Maritime Committee Paris July 

OECD Pulp and Paper Committee Paris July 

WMO Commission for Agricultural Meteorology: 3d Session . . . Toronto July 

United Nations Coffee Conference New York July 

OECD Agriculture Committee Paris July 

Council of Europe: Committee of Experts on Patents Strasbourg July 

Antarctic Treaty: 2d Consultative Meeting Under Article IX . . . Buenos Aires July 

South Pacific Commission: 23d Session Pago Pago July 

South Pacific Conference: 5th Session Pago Pago July 

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party on Costs of Paris July 

Production and Prices. 

' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, June 18, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CENTO, 
Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission 
for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; lA-ECOSOC, Inter- American Economic and 
Social Council; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, 
International Labor Organization; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations: UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 


Department of State Bulletin 

7th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America 

OECD Development Assistance Committee: Ministerial Meeting . 
UNESCO International Educational Building Conference .... 

6th FAO Regional Conference for the Near East 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working 

Group on Data Exchange. 

IBE Council: 28th Session 

UNESCO Conference on Education in Latin America 

U.N. ECOSOC Conference on the International Map of the World . 
UNESCO African Regional Meeting on Copyright Matters Relative 

to Newly Independent States. 
UNESCO "Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working 

Group on Fi.xed Stations. 
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission; Interim 


12th World's Poultry Congress 

U.N. ECAFE Ad Hoc Committee on Asian Institute of Economic 


16th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival 

lA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at the Expert Level . . 
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. 

ICAO Assembly: 14th Session 

UNESCO Meeting of Experts on General Secondary Education in 

Arab States. 

13th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art 

ICAO Legal Committee: 14th Session 

FAO Poplar Commission: 11th Session 

FAO Poplar Commission: 8th Session of Working Party on Utili- 
zation and Exploitation. 
FAO Poplar Commission: 4th Session of Working Party on Poplar 

Rio de Janeiro July 23- 

Paris July 25- 

London July 25- 

Lebanon July 30- 

Washington July 30- 

Geneva July 

Bogotd July 

Bonn Aug. 3- 

Brazzaville Aug. 6- 

Paris Aug. 6- 

Honolulu Aug. 13- 

Sydney Aug. 13- 

Bangkok Aug. 14- 

Edinburgh Aug. 19- 

M6xico, D. F Aug. 20- 

Geneva Aug. 20- 

Rome Aug. 21- 

Tunis Aug. 23- 

Venice Aug. 25- 

Rome Aug. 28- 

Belgrade and Zagreb Aug. 28- 

Belgrade and Zagreb Aug. 28- 

Belgrade and Zagreb Aug. 28- 

FAO International Rice Commission: Working Party on Engi- Kuala Lumpur Aug. 29- 

neering Aspects of Rice Production, Storage, and Processing. 

Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board Mexico, D. F August 

U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 3d Bangkok August 

U.N. ECOSOC Technical Conference on Travel 

2d U.N. ECAFE Symposium on Development of Petroleum Re- 
sources of Asia and the Far East. 

U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 2d Meeting on 
Farm Rationalization. 

16th International Dairy Congress 

U.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on Higher Education in 

lA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at the Ministerial 

FAO International Rice Commission: 8th Session 

U.N. ECE Working Party on Mechanization of Agriculture . . . 

U.N. ECE Group of Experts To Study Certain Technical Railway 

UNESCO Executive Board: 62d Session 

IAEA General Conference: 6th Regular Session 

U.N. ECE Coal Committee 

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter- 
national Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, 
International Development Association: Annual Meetings of 
Boards of Governors. 

ILO Metal Trades Committee: 7th Session 

U.N. ECE Committee on Development of Trade and East/West 
Trade Consultations. 

U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Community Facilities in Relation to 
Housing and Working Party on Housing and Building Materials. 

U.N. General Assembly: 17th Session 

International Criminal Police Organization: 31st General Assembly. 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 2d 

UPU Executive and Liaison Committee 

GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions 

2d ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting 

U.N. ECE Committee on Electric Power: 21st Session 

U.N. ECE Working Party on Rural Electrification 

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: Symposium 
on Exploitation and Regulation of Fisheries for Crustacea. 

U.N. ECE Steel Committee 

Caribbean Organization Council: 3d Meeting. 

CENTO Scientific Council (preceded by scientific symposium) . . 

Rome August or 

Tehran Sept. 1- 


Copenhagen Sept. 3- 

Geneva Sept. 3- 

Tananarive Sept. 3- 

M^xico, D. F Sept. 7- 

Kuala Lumpur Sept. 10- 

Geneva Sept. 10- 

Geneva Sept. 10- 

Paris Sept. 10- 

Vienna Sept. 17- 

Geneva Sept. 17- 

Washington Sept. 17- 

Geneva Sept. 17- 

Geneva Sept. 17- 

New Delhi Sept. 17- 

New York Sept. 18- 

Madrid Sept. 19- 

Paris Sept. 20- 

Bern Sept. 21- 

Geneva Sept. 24- 

(undetermined) Sept. 25- 

Geneva Sept. 25- 

Geneva Sept. 25- 

Copenhagen Sept. 28- 

Geneva Sept. 27- 

Paramaribo, Dutch Guiana . . September 

Istanbul September 

July 2, J 962 

The Financial Obligations of Members of the United Nations 

Statement hy Ahram Chayes 
Legal Adviser'^ 

May it please the Court: The issue before the 
Court is whether the United Nations has legal au- 
thority to raise fimds for the accomplisliment of 
its paramount purpose, tlie maintenance of inter- 
national peace and security. 

It has been rightly said here that the question 
upon which the General Assembly has asked your 
advice ^ is a precise and limited one. Neveitheless, 
its answer requires a consideration of fundamental 
questions of tlie distribution of powers within the 
United Nations. It has profoimd implications for 
the capacity of the Organization to survive and 
to realize its aims. In the view of the Government 
of the United States, no more important question 
has ever been before the International Court. 

The importance of the case is witnessed by the 
number of Governments that have taken advan- 
tage of the opportunity imder the Statute of the 
Court to submit views in writing and orally on the 
questions at issue. The Court has had the benefit 
of written statements on both sides of the question 
from 18 Governments and has, in the last 10 days, 
heard oral arguments, also, I am glad to say, on 
both sides of the question, from 8 Governments. 

At this stage, there is little to be added by way of 
detailed exegesis to what distinguished counsel 
have already said. Certain remarks have been 
made in the course of the argument before you call- 
ing into question the conduct and the good faith 
of Governments represented here (including my 
own ) and of some that are not. I reject those re- 
marks, but I do not propose to respond to them. 
This is not a place where political recriminations, 

' Made before the International Court of Justice at The 
Hague on May 21. 
•U.N. doc. A/RES/1731 (XVI). 

unfortunately common in other forums, should 
properly be rehashed. And such remarks are, of 
coui'se, wholly irrelevant to the issues in this case. 
"VVliat may be useful now is to restate the essential 
structure of the case for an affirmative answer to 
the Assembly's question, and to respond to the 
major thrusts that have been made against that 

The argument for an affirmative answer is 
straightforward. There is only one Article in the 
Charter dealing with financial obligations of Mem- 
bers, Article 17, paragraph 2. It provides : "The 
expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the 
Members as apportioned by the General As- 
sembly". It vests in the Organization the power, 
by resolution of the General Assembly apportion- 
ing and assessing expenses, to require Member 
States to pay charges lawfully incurred. This is 
the meaning, and the whole meaning, of Article 17. 
It is the plain meaning of the text; it coincides 
with the intention of the f ramere of the Charter 
evidenced in the preparatoi-y work ; it is reinforced 
by the imbroken practice of the Organization 
under the Charter. It reflects, as a Committee of 
Jurists said in construing the parallel Article of 
the League of Nations Covenant, "the general 
principle, a prmciple applicable to all associations, 
that legally incurred expenses of an association 
must be borne by all its Members in common". 
{C out r Hut ion of the State of Salvador to the Ex- 
penses of the League, A. 128.1922.V., p. 193.) 

The contention has been advanced that the term 
"expenses", despite its generality, must be read to 
mean some expenses rather than all expenses, "ad- 
ministrative" expenses as opposed to "operational" 
expenses, "normal" expenses in contrast with "ex- 

Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin 

traordinary" expenses. These distinctions camiot 
be sustained. They are without support in tlie 
text of the Charter, in tlie San Francisco discus- 
sions, or in the experience of the United Nations. 
They cannot be applied coherently in practice. 
If adopted, they would lead to doubt and confusion 
about the financial obligations of Members, a field 
in which, more than most, clarity and ceitainty 
are needed for the effective functioning of the 
Organization. These points have been developed 
persuasively and in detail by others. May I sim- 
ply add to the references already before the Court 
the Note of the Controller in the dossier prepared 
by the Secretary-General. This Note shows, 
among other things, that the Working Capital 
Fmad of the United Nations, though not a part 
of the "regular" budget and though used to meet 
"extraordinaiy" expenditures, notably those for 
peacekeeping "operations", has been consistently 
provided for by assessment against the Members 
under Article 17. {Note hy the Controller on 
Budgetary and Financial Practice of the United 
Nations, pp. 9-10, 25.) 

The meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, then, is 
this: The United Nations has the power, by reso- 
lution of the General Assembly apportioning and 
assessing expenses, to require the Member States 
to pay for expenditures lawfully made. I think 
there can be no doubt that that power was exer- 
cised in the resolutions lev'ying assessments to 
cover the expenditures for the Middle East and 
Congo Forces. It is true that, on occasion, these 
expenditures were characterized as "extraordi- 
nary", that assessments to cover them were not 
made in the regular budget, that they were charged 
against an ad hoc or special account. On the basis 
of these factors, it has been suggested to the Court 
that the General Assembly was not acting to im- 
pose the obligation of payment upon IMember 
States for the assessments made in the resolutions. 

Direct expressions to the contrary are many 
and weighty and have been cited to the Court. 
But put these aside. Read the financing resolu- 
tions together, one after the other. Read espe- 
cially the operative portions rather than the pre- 
ambular material. Consider the form in which 
they are stated, the sharpness of the distinction 
they make between the voluntary contributions 
they solicit and the assessments they exact. See 
the concern they show for the burden upon poorer 
Members caused by the financial obligations im- 
posed. All this is utterly at odds with the notion 

that the Assembly did not intend to exercise its 
power to mipose binding assessments. On tlie 
other hand, all of the circumstances adduced in 
support of that notion can be, and have been, ex- 
plained in terms that are fully consistent with 
the intention of the Assembly to exercise its power 
to bind. 

If the Assembly has power imder Article 17 to 
impose bindmg financial obligations for all ex- 
penditures lawfully mcurred, and if it is granted 
that the Assembly intended to exercise that power, 
then the only argmnent that remains against the 
binding character of the assessments is that they 
were not levied to cover expenditures lawfully 

A review of the written and oral arguments for 
a negative answer to the question before the Court 
reveals that the main thrust of these submissions 
is indeed directed at the legality of the expendi- 
tures themselves; the legality, that is, of the ac- 
tivities giving rise to them. 

To what extent, if any, is this question of law- 
fulness open, assuming, as I think everyone does, 
that there is no doubt about the formal regularity 
of the assessing resolutions ? 

A number of my colleagues have taken the posi- 
tion that the Court need not and should not in- 
quire into the validity of the underlying resolu- 
tions establishing and regulating the Congo and 
Middle East Forces, except, perhaps, to assure 
itself that these resolutions are not "manifestly 
invalid". They point to the language of the reso- 
lution putting the question to the Court, and to 
the debates preceding its adoption, as showing an 
intention that the Court's inquiry should confine 
itself to the legal effect of the assessing resolu- 
tions alone. 

The United States is in full agreement with this 
position. Certainly, the Assembly had no desire 
to cast doubt on the validity of its own actions 
over a five year period. The Court can, in my 
view, decide this case without an investigation into 
the power of the Assembly and the Security 
Council, under the Cliarter, to adopt the resolu- 
tions establishing and governing the Congo and 
Middle East Forces. If it can do so, it is bound 
to do so, both by the terms of the resolution put- 
ting the question and on general principles of 
constitutional adjudication which prescribe that 
issues of constitutional power should be passed 
upon only when that is essential to the decision 
of the case. 

Ju/y 2, 7962 


The first way by which to avoid considering the 
validity of the underlying resolutions is simply 
to assume that they are valid. The Assembly 
has the right to define its question as it cliooses, 
so long as the limitation does not stultify the 
Court's processes. If it does not wish its actions 
called in question, it may ask the Court, to con- 
sider the effect of the assessing resolutions on the 
assumption that the underlying resolutions are 
valid. The Court should accept that assimiption, 
at least where it does not do violence to common 
sense or to the Court's own sense of the require- 
ments of adjudication. In this case, the assmnp- 
tion of validity is far from being absurd or far- 
fetched or patently untenable. Quite the reverse. 
It is the argument against validity which is fine- 
spun, and relies on subtle and attenuated argu- 
mentation, elaborating limitations, supposedly 
implied or inherent, upon powers expressly 
granted. In these circumstances, the Court need 
not review the Assembly's own considered judg- 
ment that its actions were lawful, a judgment ex- 
pressed initially when the forces were constituted, 
a judgment reiterated as questions of their mis- 
sion or financial support came before the Assem- 
bly, and a judgment stated finally by the precision 
with which the Assembly formulated its question 
to the Court. 

Secondly, in a sense, the question of validity is 
logically irrelevant to the decision the Court must 
make. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that 
this Court, or some other authoritative organ, 
were now to determine that the resolutions estab- 
lishing UNEF [United Nations Emergency 
Forces] and ONUC [Organisation des Nations 
Unies au Congo] were "unconstitutional". The 
decision could not erase the fact that UNEF and 
ONUC had existed. They existed by virtue of 
resolutions adopted without dissenting votes. 
These resolutions are themselves interpretations of 
the Charter holding that the actions taken are 
within the powers granted to the organ adopting 
the resolution. Until they are authoritatively set 
aside, persons or States dealing with the Organ- 
ization in respect of matters covered by the resolu- 
tions were entitled to regard them as valid and 
effective, at least in the absence of an important 
irregularity in the procedure by which they were 
adopted or a substantive invalidity so patent as 
to amount to a manifest usurpation. If, acting 
pursuant to such resolutions, the Secretary- 
General entered into obligations committing the 


United Nations to pay for goods or services fur- 
nished by Member States or private persons, those 
obligations are binding in law upon the United 
Nations as an organization. It was legally 
obliged to repay them. And this Court has said, 
as to expenditures arising out of "obligations al- 
ready incurred by the Organization" : 

. . . the General Assembly has no alternative but tc 
honour these engagements. 



tljitll w 

as espr 

I refer to the case The Effect of Atoards of Com- 
pensation Made hy the United Nations AdmirirM^fm. 
istrative Tribunal, I.C.J. Reports 1954, pp. 47, 59.1.((l»Fii 

On this line of reasoning, I believe the Court I ' 
may give an affirmative answer to the question 
put to it by the General Assembly without exam- , , ^ 
ining the substantive validity of the resolutionsJfi: 
by which the Congo and Middle East Forces were! , , ,.^ 
created, at least insofar as those assessments are 1 ".'. 
required to cover existing contractual obligations ; - 
of the Organization to pay money for goods and ! ^ , 
services furnished. Since the United Nations Jt^ 
deficit is estimated at $170 million as of 30 Junef 

1962, while the arrearages on assessments levied 
under the resolutions before the Court are at most 
only $150 million, this analysis would lead to 
an affirmative answer as to all past assessinj 

As I understand them, the submissions of the 
Governments of the Netherlands, the United King- 
dom and Ireland upon this point do not differ sub- 
stantially from the arguments I have just made. 

Let me repeat. In the words of the Attorney- 
General of Ireland, 

. . . the Court is not compelled to concern Itself wlthi 
the question of validity and can answer the question oni 
which advice is sought without investigating this issue. 

I submit that it should do so. 

But if the Court itself should conclude that it 
must examine the validity of the underlying reso- 
lutions in order to arrive at an answer to the ques- 
tion put by the Assembly, then, in my view, the 
resolution putting the question does not preclude 
such an inquiry. The written statement of the 
Government of France seems to say otherwise : I 
quote from page 74 of the booklet of printed 
statements — 

... the question put to the Court does not enable the 
latter to give a clear-cut opinion on the juridical basis for 
the financial obligations of Member States or on the United 
Nations constitutional problems underlying them. 



'm. F 


siKteJ a 

properly 1 




'? tit tell 

Department of State Bo//ef/n iJulyj 

^Vnd the statement concludes, at pages 78-79 : 

To sum up, the Government of the French Republic con- 
uders that the circumstances in which the Court has been 
■onsulted are not such as to malje it possible to obtain 
he legal opinion which is considered necessary. 

This, in my submission, cannot be so. The As- 
sembly wanted advice on its question. It did not 
nean to put to the Court a question which it could 
lot answer, or to place conditions upon the Court 
ivhich would prevent it from answering. This 
.vas expressly stated in the debates before the 
idoption of the resolution. The representative 
)f the United States said in the Fifth Committee 
•onsideration of the resolution — and I quote now 
from the Official Records, General Assembly, 16th 
Session, Fifth Committee, 879th Meeting, pp. 
292-293 : 

It was the sponsors' intention that the Court should con- 
iflcr the question exhaustively and in all its aspects. 

Tlie representative of the United Kingdom 
idded in Plenary Session of the Assembly — again 
[ quote from the 16th Session of the General 
Vssembly, Provmonal Verbatim Record, 1086 
:^lenary Meeting, A/PV 1086, at page 62 : 

. . . the International Court, in considering the ques- 
ion which was formulated in the draft resolution recom- 
nended by the Fifth Committee, will undoubtedly be able 
o take into consideration all relative provisions of the 
'barter. Furthermore, it will of course be open, under 
ho Statute of the Court, to any Member State that wishes 
o do so to submit to the Court its views on the conformity 
vith the Charter of the decisions taken in regard to the 
'xpenditures referred to in the draft resolution. . . . 

On this basis, the Assembly accepted the resolu- 
ion as reported from the Fifth Committee and 
rejected a French amendment that would have 
broadened the statement of the question. 

From this it follows that, if the Court should 
differ with the views, advanced by the Govem- 
Tients of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Ireland and others, that the issues can 
properly be limited so as to avoid passing upon the 
i'alidity of the underlying resolutions, then it is 
free to inquire into these broader questions. 

Now may I digress here for a moment to deal 
n-ith another challenge to the Court's competence. 
The South African Government contends that, and 
h[ quote from page 216 of the printed volume : 

ijHetl ... the whole question submitted for an advisory 
[^jjsfj opinion could only be answered if the Court is fully 
ijjjiti informed as to the causa of the expenditures authorized 
3y the relative General Assembly resolutions. 

julleli lo/y 2, J 962 

The short answer to this is that the question put to 
the Court deals only with "expenditures author- 
ised in the General Assembly resolutions . . .". 
Those resolutions cannot be taken to have author- 
ised expenditures for activities outside the terms 
of the basic resolutions establishing and govern- 
ing the forces. 

Since there may be circumstances in which the 
validity of the underlying resolutions might be 
considered by this Court, and since certain govern- 
ments have argued the matter at length, let me 
address myself to their principal contentions. 

These are two. According to the first, the 
United Nations is debarred from organizing any 
international force, except by the means provided 
in Article 43 of the Charter — that is, special agree- 
ments negotiated "on the initiative of the Security 
Council" to be "concluded between the Security 
Council and Members ... or groups of Mem- 
bers". And the United Nations may not deploy 
any international force except as provided in Ar- 
ticles M through 48 of the Charter ; that is, at the 
direction of the Security Council and with the as- 
sistance of the Military Staff Committee. 

The second argument is that, even if the United 
Nations can raise an international force apart from 
Article 43 by voluntary contribution of troops and 
equipment, it must limit itself to voluntary finan- 
cial contributions to support such a force. 

Let me take up each of these arguments in turn. 

The statement of the Government of the Czecho- 
slovak Socialist Republic says : 

The pertinent provisions of the Charter, in particular 
Articles 43 and 48, provide the basis for assistance to be 
made available by Member States in all operations taken 
in the name of the Organization. . . . 

Any other way of undertaking actions by the Organiza- 
tion with the use of armed forces goes beyond the prin- 
ciples of international co-operation in the efforts for the 
preservation of peace and security, enunciated by the 
United Nations Charter, and can in no way establish 
legal obligations binding the Member States under Article 
2, paragraphs 2 and 5, of the Charter. 
(That is at p. 123 of the printed booklet.) 

In the statement of the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Eepublics the same point 
is made : 

. . . Chapter VII of the Charter envisaged that it was 
the Security Council alone and not the General Assembly 
that may set up international armed forces and take such 
action as might be necessary to maintain or restore inter- 
national peace and security, including the use of such 
armed forces. 
(That is at p. 4 of the Soviet statement.) 

Thus, according to the Soviet Union, the Middle 
East Force, authorized by the General Assembly, 
was unlawful db initio. The United Nations oper- 
ations in the Congo, although authorized by the 
Security Council, are also invalid, it says, because 
the procedural provisions of Articles 43 and 48 
were not complied with. 

The text of Article 43 demonstrates that these 
assertions are imsound. On its face, the Article 
merely establishes a procedure by which Mem- 
bers are, and I quote : 

... to make available to the Security Council, on its 
call . . . armed forces, assistance, and facilities . . . 
necessary for the purix>se of maintaining international 
peace and security. 

With the implementation of that procedure, the 
Security Council would not ^ave to depend on 
volunteers, but could have required that military 
force be furnished to it. There is no suggestion 
in the text of the Article that it provides the ex- 
clusive method for raising armed forces. On the 
contrary, it addresses itself to a very special case, 
the use of armed forces without the contemporane- 
ous consent of the Member State furnishing them. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the context in 
which Article 43 is placed in the Charter. The 
subject-matter of Chapter VII is "Action With 
Eespect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of (he 
Peace, and Acts of Aggression". Article 39 opens 
the Chapter by providing that the Security Coun- 
cil shall determine the existence of such events and 
shall make recommendations or take decisions to 
deal with them. Article 40 describes provisional 
measures; Article 41 provides for sanctions short 
of the use of force. Only when lesser measures 
are considered inadequate may the Security Coun- 
cil take action by military force "as may be neces- 
sary to maintain or restore international peace 
and security". What action is contemplated? I 
quote the Article : 

. . . demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by 
air, sea, or land forces. . . . 

— that is, the commitment of U.N. military forces 
to battle. 

It was to provide forces that could be requisi- 
tioned for this purpose, for military hostilities, 
that agreements under Article 43 were contem- 
plated. Because such forces were subject to being 
committed to action by mandatory decision of the 
Security Council, an advance agreement ratified 
according to the constitutional processes of the 
Member States was required. 


All this is underscored by the subsequent pro- 
visions of the Charter. According to Article 44,. 
when the Security Council "has decided to use! **'" 
force" it must invite participation in its delibera- 
tions by a Member before summoning its armed 
forces under an Article 43 agreement. Article 45. 

deals with "urgent military measures" ; Article 46 W^"^" 

with "plans for the application of armed force" 
Ai'ticle 47 provides for a Military Staff Conunit 
tee, responsible for "strategic direction of any 
armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security 
Council", under Article 43; and, finally, Article 
48 provides that the Security Council shall desig- 
nate the Member States to take "action" requirec 
to carry out its "decisions". 

Thus it is seen that the purpose of Chapter VI]( '* f 
is to provide for the most far-reaching of the re 
sponsibilities entrusted to the United Nations— 
that of taking decisions binding on the Members 
to bring international force to bear, through active jirier 
military hostilities if need be, against the will o 
the aggressor — indeed, to break his will. 

The occasions for the exercise of such powers 
will be rare — they will be moments of supreme 
crisis. Given the magnitude of the powers en- 
visioned, it was appropriate that they be sur- 
rounded with the elaborate procedural safeguards 
of Chapter VII : Security Council veto, the neces- 
sity of prior special agreements ratified by Mem- 
ber States, provisions for qualified membership in 
the Security Council, and a requirement for the 
exhaustion of lesser remedies. All these restric' 
tions and safeguards are unnecessary for the more 
usual range of peace-keeping activities authorized 
by Articles 11 and 24, even when the instrumen 
tality employed may be men of the armed forces 
of Member nations. 

Activities outside the purview of Chapter VII 
involve no "action" to carry out "decisions" bind- 
ing on Member States. I use those terms "action' 
and "decision" in the special sense they have in 
Chapter VII. The States concerned, when action 
is taken outside Chapter VII, would have to con- 
sent to those activities in each particular case, 
either by supplying forces or by admitting them to 
their territory. This safeguard of contempora- 
neous consent is adequate to the case. 

The special and unique possibility provided in 
Chapter VII for taking binding decisions for 
action, including military action, against an ag- 
gressor was thought to be the salient advantage 
correcting the salient weakness that had doomed 

Department of State Bulletin 








P<i a S 

w. Tki 
;l Bittl 


Sit tie 

IK 10 pi 

k 11, 

I? broil 


I he League of Nations to ineffectiveness. Speak- 
i ng in Plenary Session at San Francisco, the Rap- 
porteur of the Committee on Enforcement Meas- 
ures, M. Paul-Boncour, made this clear (and I 
quote at some length from his statement, which is 
t.) be found in Vol. I of UNCIO [United Nations 
(Conference on International Organization, Docu- 
ments'] at p. 688. The emphasis in the quotation 
is the Rapporteur's) : 

When everything possible has been done to maintain 
[leace, if the aggressor i)ersists in his purpose, there is 
Duly one way to oppose him, and that is by force. But 
the Covenant of the League merely provided for the rec- 
ommendation of military sanctions involving air, sea, or 
land forces, and consequently left the nations the option 
of backing out. 

Today this flaw has been eliminated. In the Charter 
sanctioned by this plenary assembly . . . the obligation 
for all Member States to help in suppressing aggression 
is plainly established. An international force is to be 
formed and placed at the disposal of the Security Coimcil 
in order to insure respect for its decisions. This force 
will consist of national contingents arranged for in ad- 
vance by special agreements negotiated on the initiative 
3f the Security Council. These special agreements will 
letermine the composition of this force, its strength, de- 
cree of preparedness, and location. If called upon to do 
30 by the Security Council, the entire force will march 
igainst a State convicted of aggression. In accordance 
with the provisions for enforcement as laid down by the 
Security Council. 

In the event, of course, it has not turned out that 
way. The Security Council has never taken a 
binding decision to use force under Article 42 and 
has never negotiated an agreement under Article 
i3. But the Charter meant to add to and reinforce 
the peace-keeping powers of the League, not to 
subtract from them. There was no desire to with- 
draw the power of recommendation of military 
sanctions involving land, sea or air forces. There 
was no purpose to shackle these other peace-keep- 
ing enterprises with limitations and restrictions 
designed solely for the terrible eventuality of a 
war against aggression. It was San Francisco's 
intention to eliminate the "option of backing out" 
that M. Paul-Boncour described in the League 
Covenant, not the option of coming in. 

Now, I should like to recall to the Court that 
voluntary peace-keeping operations not unlike 
those here under consideration were undertaken 
by the League of Nations from its earliest days. 

In 1920, a dispute involving considerable fight- 
ing broke out between Poland and Lithuania over 
possession of the city of Vilna. The League Coun- 
cil proposed, and Lithuania and Poland agreed, 

iuly 2, J 962 

that the inhabitants of Vilna and its province 
should themselves decide whether to belong to 
Poland or to Lithuania. The vote was to be or- 
ganized by the League. Polish troops, which had 
occupied Vilna, were to be replaced by an inter- 
national force acting under the orders of the 
League Coiuicil. A number of Members of the 
League were invited to contribute a company each 
to the proposed international force and nine coun- 
tries agreed. The international force, consisting 
of some 1,500 men, did not actually enter upon 
the disputed territory, but preparations for its or- 
ganization and dispatch were far advanced and 
considerable expenses were incurred on the 
strength of the Council's resolutions. I should say 
that the reason the force did not enter upon the 
disputed territory was the objection of a neigh- 
boring nation — a factor not present in the Middle 
East and Congo operations. How were the ex- 
penses incurred in the preparation of the force 
borne? The budget submitted to the League As- 
sembly indicates that the expenses of the force, 
in the amount of 422,260 gold francs, were borne 
not by the States contributing the troops, but by 
the League. (Chapter 3 of the Budget for 1924, 
League of Nations Docimient A.4(2).1923.X., at 
page 6^ Item: "Reimbursement of expenses in- 
curred by Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 1920 
for the establislunent of an international force 
for the conducting of the proposed plebiscite in 

The histoiy of the League of Nations also pro- 
vides an example of a voluntary international 
force that was not only proposed and incurred 
expenses, but actually discharged its duties in full. 
You will recall that in 1935 a plebiscite was held 
to determine whether or not the Saar should rejoin 
Germany. The League Council decided that an 
international force was needed to ensure order dur- 
ing the plebiscite period. Accordingly, at the end 
of 1934, an International Force of 3,300 men was 
established. Its entry into the Saar was with the 
agreement of the Governments of Germany and 
France. Contingents were voluntarily contributed 
by Britain, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands. 
These facts appear from the resolution of the 
League Council of 8 December 1934. {Official 
Journal, 1934, p. 1730.) Like the Council resolu- 
tion establishing the Vilna force, this resolution 
made no reference to the sole article of the Cove- 
nant, Article 16, that provided for recommenda- 
tions on the use of armed force. The resolutions 


in both cases were of course approved unanimously 
by the Council Members. The expenses of the 
Saar force, over and above the normal costs of the 
troops already provided for in the national budgets 
of the Governments contributing them, were not 
met by those Governments, but were charged to 
the fund for expenditure in connection with the 
plebiscite. (/6ic?., pp. 1762-63, 1841-42.) The in- 
ternational force for the Saar performed its duties 
with conspicuous success. 

The possibility of voluntary contribution of 
military force was not only sanctioned by the prac- 
tice of the League, it was recognized in discussions 
of the United Nations almost from the beginning. 
You will recall the construction of the Charter put 
forward by the Secretary-General in the Trieste 
case in 1947, already read to the Court by M. 
Cadieux. ( Security Council, Official Records, 2nd 
year, 91st Meeting, pp. 44-45.) There the Secre- 
tary-General maintained that, in the light of its 
broad responsibilities imder Article 24, the Secu- 
rity Council was not restricted to powers specifi- 
cally enumerated in the Charter. The Council, 
acting on this construction, accepted the Trieste 
instnunents there in question by a vote of 10-0 
with one abstention, on the understanding, as ex- 
pressed by the Secretary-General, that the powers 
enumerated in the Charter, and I quote : 

... do not vest the Council with siilBcient authority to 
undertake the responsibilities imposed by the instruments 
in question. 

Thus the Council must have acted on the view of 
its implied powers set forth by the Secretary- 

A year later, when the Palestine partition plan 
was under discussion, the Secretary-General ex- 
plicitly applied this view of the Security Council's 
powers to the question of raising armed forces. I 
refer to a working paper prepared by the Secre- 
tariat for the United Nations Palestine Commis- 
sion covering, among other things, the question of 
providing an international force to implement the 
partition plan. In it, the Secretary-General ad- 
dressed this issue : 

Under what conditions the Security Council may employ 
an international armed force. 

The paper recognizes that : 

The Security Council might employ an international 
force in the Palestine case ... in virtue of Article 42 of 
the Charter. . . . 

To do so, it says, the Council should find as a pre- 
condition "the existence in Palestine of a threat to 
the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggres- 
sion." But it could also raise an international 
force apart from Chapter VII. The General As- 
sembly "had requested the Security Council, inter 
alia, to take necessary measures as provided for in 
the plan for its implementation." And this aspect 
of the Assembly's resolution, taken in conjunction 
with Article 24 of the Charter, would authorize the 
recruitment of an anned force. The Secretary- 
General concluded, and referred expressly to the 
interpretation in the Trieste case, that this course 
would be followed by the Security Council only 
"after previously having reached the conclusion 
that no threat to the peace, breach of the peace or 
act of aggression had occurred" — that is to say, 
when the necessary precondition for action under 
Chapter VII was absent. "An international armed, 
force set up on this basis", said the Secretary-Gen- 
eral, "would not be one in the sense of Chapter VII 
of the Charter. It would have the character of an 
international police force for the maintenance of 
law and order in a territory for which the interna- 
tional society is still responsible." (The document 
is A.AC.21/13, 9 February 1948, pp. 8-11.) 

Again, in 1948, after the assassination of Count 
Bernadotte, the Secretary-General proposed the 
establishment of a United Nations Guard. The 
Guard was to be directly recruited and equipped 
by the Secretary-General, was to serve under his 
instructions, and was to be financed out of the 
regular United Nations budget. Although the 
United Nations Guard itself did not materialize, 
the United Nations Field Service, so recruited, so 
directed, and so financed, was derived from this 
conception. It is in action today with UNEF 
and ONUC, as well as on other U.N. missions. 

Finally, the Uniting for Peace Eesolution,* 
adopted in 1950 by a vote of 52-5, with 2 absten- 
tions, foresaw the establishment of international 
forces on a voluntary basis and outside the scope 
of Article 43. Indeed agreement on a procedure 
for establishing such forces was one of the prime 
purposes motivating that resolution. 

In all this, I have the feeling I have been be- 
labouring the obvious. For certainly a sovereign 
state may volunteer its armed forces for any pur- 
pose whatever, so long as it does not trench upon 
the right of any other sovereign and so long as it 

For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823. 

Department of State Bulletin 

obtains the consent of those through or upon 
whose territory the forces operate. A State, or 
group of States, would be free, if the necessary 
consents were obtained, to use its forces to main- 
tain the peace, as the Middle East and Congo 
Forces are now being used. The United Nations 
Charter does not limit that right. And surely 
what States might band together to do outside the 
[Jnited Nations, it is not forbidden that they do 
through the mechanism of that Organization 
whose primai7 purpose is the maintenance of in- 
ternational peace and security. 

I shall not devote much time to the question 
whether, once we are satisfied that the procedures 
jf Article 43 are not themselves exclusive, the Se- 
curity Council nevertheless has the sole right to 
naintain armed forces for peace-keeping opera- 
ions to the exclusion of the General Assembly. 
The Charter provisions are plain. The Security 
Council's responsibility for the maintenance of 
i| peace and security is "primary", not exclusive. 
The General Assembly, under Articles 10 and 11, 
las full authority to make recommendations on 
questions relating to the maintenance of intema- 
:ional peace and security. There are only two 
exceptions. It may not consider such questions 
(vhile the Security Council is itself so engaged and 
it must refer to the Council those questions on 
ivhich "action" is required — that is to say, action 
pursuant to decisions binding the Members, which 
the Security Council alone can take. Neither of 
these exceptions applies to recommendations for 
the contribution of forces and for their use with 
the consent of the States concerned, where, as 
with ITNEF, the Security Council is not seized of 
the matter at the time the resolution is adopted. 

For the establislmient of an armed force at the 
call of the Security Council, in accordance with 
its binding decisions, Article 43 provides the only 
procedure, true. But the Court will search the 
Charter in vain to find any prohibition against 
voluntary use of armed force upon the recom- 
mendation of either the Council or the Assembly, 
and with the consent or at the request of nations 
whose security is threatened. And the Court will 
be slow to rule that, in adding to the arsenal of 
powers available to the United Nations the su- 
preme power to order mandatory application of 
military force, the framers of the Charter with- 
drew or restricted well-known powers of a lesser 
character based on the consent of all interested 

Ju/y 2, 7962 

This leads us to the second argument against the 
validity of the imderlying resolutions of the Gen- 
eral Assembly and the Security Council establish- 
ing the forces in question — an argument, on the 
surface, less sweeping than the one we have just 
considered. The argument grants that the United 
Nations could, either through the Security Council 
or the General Assembly, recommend that Member 
States contribute forces for the use of the Organ- 
ization. But how, it asks, can the Organization 
compel a Member to pay for the expenses of forces 
that it could not compel that Member to contrib- 
ute? Voluntary forces, it concludes, must be 
financed by voluntary contributions. 

This is basically the argument put forth in the 
letter to the Court from the Government of the 
French Republic. Quoting its representative in 
the General Assembly debate on the Advisory 
Opinion Resolution, the letter says : 

Firstly, the General Assembly has not the right, merely 
by voting on a budget, to extend the competence of the 
United Nations ; . . . . 

Secondly, in the case of any United Nations organ, the 
power to make recommendations to Member States is not 
sufficient to impose upon them any form of obligation. 

Thirdly, the legal power to make recommendations to 
Member States does not include permission to create, by 
the circuitous method of a direction addressed to the Sec- 
retary General . . . any obligations for the States, 
(p. 75) 

But the argument proves too much. Carried to 
its logical conclusion, it would mean that the Or- 
ganization could not compel its Members to pay 
for anything, except expenditures flowing from 
binding decisions of the Security Council. With 
the exception of such decisions, all actions of the 
Organization are either recommendations to the 
Member States or directions to the Secretary- 
General or other subsidiary organs; and, in the 
French view, these cannot give rise to binding 
financial obligations. The French submission 
recognizes that such a conclusion is untenable. 
Thus, it is led to assert the distinction between ad- 
ministrative and operational expenses which, as 
appears elsewhere, is unwarranted in the language 
or history of the Charter and would be unworkable 
in practice. 

More fundamentally, in my view, the French 
argument puts the case the wrong way. The 
United Nations can pay for what it is empowered 
to do. If it can accept volunteers, it can defray 
the financial obligations generated by the activities 
of those volunteers. 


In the case IjKjfore the Court, the fact that the 
United Nations coiild not compel Members to con- 
tribute contingents to an international force is 
beside the point. It was not obliged to appeal to 
States for such contingents. This was a conveni- 
ent way to proceed, but not the only way. The 
Assembly might have chosen to raise the force by 
direct recruitment. To do so, it might have 
needed the consent of individual States to pursue 
recruiting activities on their soil, or with respect to 
tlieir nationals; and it would have needed the con- 
sent of the States on whose soil the recruits were 
to be housed, trained or used. But if those con- 
sents were obtained, it is hard to see what would 
prohibit the Organization from raising such a 
force and, if it did so, from paying for it by assess- 
ment. Indeed, just this process was contemplated 
for the establishment of the proposed United Na- 
tions Guard to which I have referred. 

Member States do not find their protection 
against such action — if protection is needed— in 
legal strictures of the Charter, but in the political 
requirement of a two-thirds majority in the Gen- 
eral Assembly both to initiate the action and to 
make the necessary financial arrangements. If 
these majorities can be mustered ; if the activities 
engaged in are immediately related to the expi-ess 
purposes of the United Nations; if they are ap- 
proved in due course according to the regular 
procedures of one of its organs having competence 
over the subject matter; if they do not contravene 
any prohibition of the Charter nor invade the sov- 
ereign powers of individual States — if conditions 
such as these are satisfied, I can perceive no reason 
wliy the United Nations should be prohibited from 
levying assessments to pay for goods and services 
needed for those activities. The goods and serv- 
ices may be furnished by States Members. Often 
they will be furnished by private agencies or indi- 
viduals. In neither case could the United Nations 
require that they be made available. But I do not 
see why, in either case, this should militate against 
the Organization's power to raise money by assess- 
ment to pay for them. 

Thus, in my view, the French argimient falls to 
the ground. It may have a certain plausibility to 
say tliat, if the Organization cannot compel a State 
to contribute forces, it cannot compel it to pay for 
forces contributed by others. But it would be 
equally plausible and equally erroneous to say 
that, since a national Government cannot compel 

one of its citizens to work on a dam, it cannot tax 
him to pay for the work of others. 

If any inquiry at all is to be permitted into 
the validity of the underlying resolutions estab- 
lishing UNEF and ONUC, it must be directed to 
the substantive question : what can the United Na- 
tions do ? "\^niat it can do, it can finance under the 
provisions of Article 17. 

Mr. President, Members of the Court: The 
framers of the Charter and the people of the na- 
tions adopting it resolved together "to save suc- 
ceeding generations from tlie scourge of war". 
They named the first object of their efforts: to 
maintain international peace and security. This 
Court in deciding this case will also decide, in 
large measure, whether they succeeded. 

Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said in a 
great case on the treaty power under tlie United 
States Constitution : 

. . . when we are dealing with words that also are a 
constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, 
we must realize that they have called into life a being 
the development of which could not have been foreseen 
completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was 
enough for them to realize or to hope that they had 
created an organism ; . . . . The case before us must be 
considered in the light of our whole experience and not 
merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. . . . 
(Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 430, 433 (1920). 

The question before the Court must be addressed 
in the light of the whole experience of the United 
Nations Organization. What is that experience? 

The innovation of the Charter, the power of the 
Organization acting through the Security Council 
to compel the contribution of military forces for 
military action against aggressors, this innova- 
tion was stillborn. If it had been the only method 
available to the Organization for using armed 
forces to meet threats to the peace, it may be said 
with some confidence that the woret of such threats 
would have remained unmet, and the Organiza- 
tion might now be in the same state as was the 
League of Nations fifteen years after its establish- 

Instead, however, a power that was available to 
the League, the power to take voluntary collective 
measures using troops of Member States as instru- 
ments in appropriate cases, that power took on a 
new vitality in dealing with the kind of threats 
to the peace we have had in the post-war world. 
By discriminating but imaginative use of this 
power, through 15 years and under 3 Secretaries- 

Department of Sfate Bulletin 

General, the Organization has been able to carry 
out its first purpose, to keep the peace. In Pales- 
tine and Kashmir, on the Gaza strip, in Lebanon, 
and now in the Congo, armed contingents con- 
tributed vohmtarily by their own Governments 
and acting with the consent of all States concerned 
have operated successfully under the flag and the 
command of the United Nations to safeguard in- 
ternational peace and security. In Korea, a 
United Nations force of national contingents, 
furnished without the compulsion of a Security 
Council decision, fought successfully to restore the 
situation as it existed before hostilities began. 

The Court is asked to ignore this liistoiy, to 
strike down the one method by which experience 
has shown the United Nations can effectively sum- 
mon military forces to deal with threats of aggres- 
sion and breaches of the peace. The Soviet 
argument would reject this method out of hand. 
It would confine the Organization exclusively to 
tlie Chapter VII procedures which experience so 
far has shown to be sterile and useless. The 
French submission would accomplish the same re- 
sult, not by prohibiting entirely the establishment 
and operation of United Nations forces outside 
the purview of Chapter VII, but by cutting off 
the possibility of financing such forces through 
assessments under Article 17. I said a moment 
ago that what the United Nations can do, it can 
pay for. The converse is also true — what it cannot 
pay for, it cannot do. The French position, 
equally with the Soviet, would bring to an end the 
use of United Nations forces for peace-keeping 

Mr. President, Members of the Court, if I may 
be permitted to refer again to the court I know 
best, the Supreme Court of my own country, it is, 
like this one, a custodian of a great charter grant- 
ing and allocatmg political power to be exercised 
in pursuit of large purposes. 

One of the early historic cases to come before 
that Court was McCulloch v. Maryland. That 
case too concerned the fiscal power granted by the 
Constitution to the entity which it had created. 
The question was whether the Federal Govern- 
ment had power to incorporate a central bank — 
to establish a subsidiary organ — when neither the 
power to incorporate nor the power to engage in 
banking were expressly granted in the words of the 

Chief Justice Marshall, the first great Chief 

Ju/y 2, 7 962 

Justice, wrote the decision in that case. He said : 

A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the 
subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and 
of all the means by which they may be carried into exe- 
cution, would iiartake of the prolixity of a legal code, and 
could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It 
would, probably, never be understood by the public. Its 
nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines 
should be marked, its important objects designated, and 
the minor ingredients which compose those objects, be 
deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. . . . 
In considering this question, then, we must never forget, 
that it is a constitution we are expounding. (3 Wheaton 
406 (1819).) 

This injmiction — we must never forget it is a 
constitution we are expounding — is classic in 
American jurisprudence. It is, mdeed, as the At- 
torney-General of Ireland remarked the other day, 
a general principle of law recognized by civilized 
nations. The principle found expression in the 
jurisprudence of this Court when it said : 

Under international law, the Organization mast be 
deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly 
provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by neces- 
sary implication as being essential to the performance of 
its duties. (Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Serv- 
ice of the United Nations, I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp. 174, 

The Court needs no reminder that it is dealing 
with a constitutive instrument, regulating, within 
its scope, important relations among men and na- 
tions, meant to endure for many years, designed 
to promote great ends and intended to grant 
powers adequate to serve the purposes for which 
it was established. The constitution we are ex- 
pounding here must contain within it the author- 
ity to momit and support the actions by which, in 
the years since its adoption, the United Nations 
has successfully defended a precarious peace. 

It remains only to thank you, Mr. President, 
and Members of the Court, for myself and, if I 
may, on behalf of my colleagues, for the patience 
and courtesy with which you have heard us. 

William P. Allis Appointed 
to NATO Science Post 

The Department of State announced on June 14 
(press release 390) that William P. Allis, profes- 
sor of physics at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, has been appointed by the Secretary 


General of the North AtLantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion as Assistant Secretary General for Scientific 
Affairs to succeed William A. Nierenberg. Dr. 
Allis will assume his new post July 15. 

The Assistant Secretary General for Scientific 
Affairs is concerned with NATO's science pro- 
gram, which originated from the decision taken 
by the NATO Heads of Government in December 
1957^ and which has helped promote increased 
scientific cooperation among NATO coimtries. 
Under the guidance of a distinguished group of 
scientists who comprise the NATO Science 
Committee, a program of science fellowships has 
permitted over 1,000 students to pursue their 
studies and research, funds have been made avail- 
able to sponsor 67 advanced study institutes on 
scientific subjects, and a program of research 
grants has encouraged approximately 100 coop- 
erative scientific projects among NATO countries. 
Included among the latter is a program in ocean- 
ographic research in the Shetland-Faeroes and 
Gibraltar Straits areas. Further activities, in- 
cluding meteorological research, are being planned 
by the NATO Science Conmiittee, of which Dr. 
Allis will be the chairman. 

Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the - 
Convention on International Civil Aviation to increase . „ 
membership of the Council from 21 to 27. Approved byi j'"^ 


Current Actions 



The Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington December 1, 
1959. Entered into force June 23, 1961. TIAS 47S0. 
Accession, deposited: Czecho.slovakia, June 14, 1962. 
Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the prin- 
ciples and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. Adopted at 
the First Consultative Meeting at Canberra July 10-21, 
1961. Enters into force upon approval of all the parties 
whose representatives were entitled to participate in 
that meeting. 

Notifications of approval: Argentina, October 13, 1961; 
Australia, October 6, 1961; Belgium, February 16, 
1962 ; Chile, April 19, 1962 ; France, March 6, 1962 ; 
Japan, February 21, 1962; New Zealand, October 17, 
1961; Norway, March 9, 1962; South Africa, May 7, 
19G2 ; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 8, 
1962; United Kingdom, December 1, 1961; United 
States, December 12, 1961. 
Entered into force: April 19, 1962. 

the ICAO As.sembly at Montreal June 21, 1961 
Ratifications deposited: Central African Republic, May 

22, 1962; Ceylon, May 28, 1962; Congo (Brazzaville) 
May 26, 1962 ; Denmark, May 15, 1962 ; Ghana, April 
16, 1962; Netherlands, May 8, 1962; New Zealandi 
May 14, 1962 ; Pakistan, April 30, 1962 ; Poland, May 

23, 1962 ; Portugal, May 29, 1962 ; Sierra Leone, May 
1.5, 1962 ; Sudan, May 31, 1962 ; Switzerland, May 22, 
1962 ; Viet-Nam, April 16, 1962. 

Cultural Relations 

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, 
and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake 
Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 
21, 1952.=^ 

Notification that it considers itself bound: Congo 
(L^opoldvUle), May 3, 1962. 


International convention to facilitate the importation of 
commercial samples and advertising material. Done at 
Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force Novem- 
ber 20, 1955; for the United States October 17, 1957. 
TIAS 3920. 
Accession deposited: Guinea, May 8, 1962 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961. Open for signature at Vienna 
until October 31, 1961. and at United Nations Head- 
quarters, New York, until March 31, 1962.' 
Ratification deposited: Liberia, May 15, 1962. 


Constitution of the World Health Organization. Opened 
for signature at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into 
force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808. 
Acceptance deposited: Mongolia, April 18, 1962. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating 
the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat. 
2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Geneva July 13, 1931. 
Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543. 
Notification received that it considers itself hound: 
Guinea, April 26, 1962. 


Protocol for accession of Israel to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962. 
Ratification deposited: Israel, June 5, 1962. 
Enters into force: July 5, 1962. 

Congo (Leopoldville) 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree- 
ment of November IS, 1961 (TIAS 4925). Effected by 
exchange of notes at Ij^opoldville May 4 and 11, 1962. 
Entered into force May 11, 1962. 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Agreement relating to the disposition of equipment and 
materials furnished to the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many on a grant basis under the mutual defense as- 

BKueBt rel 


Signed all 
ttived to! 
(ouplieii ! 



'Bulletin of Jan. 6, 19.58, p. 12. 

' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 


Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 


otlier res 

ol State 
le first 
ttd oti 

of tie! 
ties for 

sistance agreement of June 30, 1955 (TIAS 3443). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn May 25, 1962. 
ol fk Entered into force May 25, 1962. * 




Agreement concerning the use of Greel£ ports and terri- 
torial waters by the NS Savannah. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Athens April 23 and 24, 1962. 
Entered into force April 24, 1962. 

New Zealand 

Agreement relating to the loan of a United States naval 
vessel to New Zealand. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington June 8, 1962. Entered into force June 8, 

South Africa 

Amendment to the agreement of July 8, 1957 (TIAS 3885) , 
for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. 
Signed at Washington June 12, 1962. Enters into force 
on the date on which each Government shall have re- 
ceived from the other written notification that it has 
complied with all statutory and constitutional require- 
ments for entry into force. 

(United Arab Republic 

Cultural agreement. Signed at Cairo May 21, 1962. En- 
tered into force May 21, 1962. 


IFSI Begins Seminars on Problems 
(Of Development and Internal Defense 


Press release 380 dated June 10 

The Department of State, in cooperation with 
other responsible agencies of the Government, is 
inaugurating a series of seminars on "Problems of 
Development and Internal Defense." This will be 
a 5-week seminar course given by the Department 
of State's Foreign Service Institute. Members of 
the first seminar will be senior State Department 
and other civilian and military officers who will 
assume positions of responsibility m developing 
countries. Secretary Rusk will address the open- 
ing session on June 11. 

The seminar demonstrates the United States' 
determination to assist the less developed countries 
of the free world in developing balanced capabili- 
ties for the total defense of their societies against 
internal as well as external threats. It reflects a 
growing realization that Communist-inspired sub- 

July 2, 7962 

version and insurgency represent as great a menace 
to developing societies as direct aggression across 
international borders. For these reasons the semi- 
nars will stress practical ways in which the United 
States can most effectively assist countries in de- 
fending themselves. 

The seminar will be organized along lines of the 
"country team" concept. This emphasizes that in 
their programs and activities the various elements 
of the U.S. Embassies, AID Missions, and Military 
Assistance Groups abroad work together under 
direction of the ambassador. Seminar participants 
will be divided into discussion groups framed along 
such "country team" lines. The seminar, there- 
fore, covers new ground in that it provides its 
members with an opportunity jointly to discuss 
and consider combined approaches to problems 
they will be facing in areas in which they are 
scheduled to serve. 

The first 2 weeks of each seminar will be the 
same for all members. Lectures, given by a dis- 
tinguished team from the academic world, headed 
by Prof. Max Millikan of MIT, will emphasize the 
dynamics of development. These lectures, supple- 
mented by intensive reading assignments, will 
cover such subjects as the structures of emerging 
societies, stages of economic growth, agricultural 
and commodity development, and the psychologi- 
cal and social effects of change. 

Civilian and military officers of the Government 
will conduct the final 3 weeks of each seminar, dur- 
ing which time the emphasis will be on sjjecific 
areas and problems of internal defense. 

Between 60 and 60 senior officers will attend tlie 
first seminar. The program will be repeated at 
regular intervals thereafter, with the expectation 
of training approximately 500 officials during the 
first year of operation. 


Press release 381 dated June 11 

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome this 
distinguished group of senior officers from the 
various agencies of our Government to a challeng- 
ing adventure on a new frontier of American for- 
eign policy. I can think of no areas as important 
as this to U.S. foreign policy, nor can I recall any 
course or seminar in the government educational 
system or the academic world so directly pointed 
at the struggle, in that vast portion of the earth's 


territory and poi^ulation Iniown as the less devel- 
oped world, between the forces of democracy and 
freedom on the one hand and totalitarianism and 
despotism on the other. 

Wliat we as the United States are seeking in the 
less developed world is not economic development 
for its own sake, nor the building of military 
forces as an end in itself, nor the creation of so- 
cieties that are facsimiles of our own, but rather 
the use of our resources to assist new nations to 
remain free to determine their own future destiny 
and to build the kind of society that can maintain 
itself, develop in step with the modern world, and, 
above all, remain free from domination or control 
by an alien tyranny. Our interests do not require 
satellites, colonies, political obedience, or ideo- 
logical subservience. We want these countries to 
develop in their own way and at their own pace 
into members of a free community of independent 

Our strategy is therefore twofold and interact- 
ing: "We must encourage the less developed coun- 
tries to move forward on their own as smoothly 
as possible, and we must simultaneously assist 
them against the threat of subversion. 

The successful implementation of this strategy 
requires new insights and techniques. We must 
become guardians of the development process 
rather than custodians of the status quo. We must 
be ;?ro-modernization as well as an^z-Communist. 
Our programs and resources must reach and affect 
the well-being of the whole society rather than a 
privileged class alone. We must coordinate our 
military assistance and economic aid programs so 
that they reinforce each other in a way that enables 
local governments to defend themselves from the 
enemy within. 

Wo therefore hope this seminar will provide you 
with new insights into the developmental process 
and the problems of the less developed world so 
that you can help us diagnose its ills and help us 
prepare the remedy. 

Another important purpose of this seminar is to 
familiarize you with the totality of political, mili- 
tary, economic, social, and psychological re- 
sponses — both our own and those of the country 
we are helping — which are necessary to defeat 

Communist-inspired indirect aggression, from sub 
version up through the spectrimi of violence to out- 
right insurgency and guerrilla warfare. Our na- 
tional purposes will be served if you emerge from 
this seminar with a clearer idea of how the unique 
and indispensable capabilities of each of your 
agencies can interact with greater impact. That 
is why this seminar is subtitled "The Country 
Team Seminar." From it, we hope you will de- 
velop a unique appreciation of the measures that 
are needed to strengthen and fortify the weak 
spots in vulnerable societies. 

This seminar responds to the President's desire 
that we develop and employ a wider range of pro- 
grams and capabilities to anticipate, prevent, and 
counter subversion in the underdeveloped world. 
Klirushchev's January 6, 1961, speech and the 
post-Korean Communist record attest to com- 
munism's hopes for a strategy of indirect ag- 
gression. When you complete this seminar you 
will be better qualified to understand the com- 
plexities of assisting governments that want to 
stay free from falling prey to the Communist 

The structural weakness, social cleavages, and 
growing pains of less developed countries consti- 
tute particular points of vulnerability which the 
Communists seek to exploit so that they may di- 
vert the desire for reform and development to 
their own ends. 

As participants in the first seminar, you gentle- 
men, in collaboration with a distinguished faculty, 
are striking out on a new frontier and will be con- 
structing a course for your successors. This semi- 
nar is as advanced a course as we have ever given 
in the Foreign Service Institute and is truly an 
interdepartmental endeavor. You are fortunate 
to be taking it, and we in turn will be fortunate 
in being able to utilize and apply the insights and 
experience you gain from it. The best of luck to 


Isaiah Frank as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Eco- 
nomic Affairs, effective June 10. (For biographic details, 
see Department of State press release 382 dated June 

Department of State Bulletin 

July 2, 1962 


Africa. Council To Advise Department on U.S. 

Activities in Africa 24 

Atomic Energy 

Department Releases Report on U.S. Policy To- 
ward IAEA 7 

Disarmament and Arms Control (Rusk) .... 3 

Communism. Economic Development: Rival Sys- 
tems and Comparative Advantage (Galbraith) . 13 

Congo (Leopoldville) . Good Case In the Congo 

(Cleveland) 18 

Congress. Secretary Deplores Restrictions by Sen- 
ate on Foreign Aid (Rusk) 25 

Department and Foreign Service 

Designations (Frank) 42 

FSI Begins Seminars on Problems of Development 

and Internal Defense (Rusk) 41 

Diplomacy. Development and Crisis (Morgan) . . 26 
Disarmament. Disarmament and Arms Control 

(Rusk) 3 

Economic Affairs 

Frank designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Economic Affairs 42 

The Reality of Change (Ball) 8 

U.S. Intends To Place New Tariff Schedules in 
Effect January 1 25 

Foreign Aid 

Economic Development: Rival Systems and Com- 
parative Advantage (Galbraith) 13 

FSI Begins Seminars on Problems of Development 

and Internal Defense (Rusk) 41 

Secretary Deplores Restrictions by Senate on For- 
eign Aid (Rusk) 25 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Calendar of International Conferences and Meet- 
ings 28 

Department Releases Report on U.S. Policy To- 
ward IAEA 7 

Laos. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Views on 
Formation of Lao Government (Kennedy, 
Khrushchev) 12 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. William P. 

Allis Appointed to NATO Science Post .... 39 

Poland. Secretary Deplores Restrictions by Sen- 
ate on Foreign Aid (Rusk) 25 

Presidential Documents. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Ex- 
change Views on Formation of Lao Government . 12 

Publications. Department Releases Report on U.S. 
Policy Toward IAEA 7 

Science. William P. Allis Appointed to NATO 

Science Post 39 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 40 


The Reality of Change (Ball) 8 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Views on Formation of 

Lao Government (Kennedy, Khrushchev) ... 12 

United Nations 

The Financial Obligations of Members of the United 

Nations (Chayes) 30 

Good Case in the Congo (Cleveland) 18 

3 X Vol. XLVII, No. 1201 

Yugoslavia. Secretary Deplores Restrictions by 

Senate on Foreign Aid (Rusk) 25 

Name Index 

Allis, William P 39 

BaU, George W 8 

Chayes, Abram 30 

Cleveland, Harlan 18 

Frank, Isaiah 42 

Galbraith, John Kenneth 13 

Kennedy, President 12 

Khrushchev, Nikita S 12 

Morgan, George A 26 

Rusk, Secretary 3,25,41 

*377 6/11 

*378 6/11 

*379 6/11 

381 6/11 

♦382 6/11 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 11-17 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of 
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. 

Releases issued prior to June 11 which appear in 
this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 343 of May 29 ; 
353 of June 1 ; 355 of June 4 ; 372 of June 8 ; and 
380 of June 10. 
No. Date Subject 

Cultural exchange (Poland). 

Visit of Australian Prime Minister. 

U.S. participation in international 

Rusk : remarks at FSI seminar. 
Frank designated Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Economic Affairs (bio- 
graphic details). 
Woodward : University of the Pacific. 
Advisory Council on African Affairs 

Rusk : VOA interview. 
Ball : "The Reality of Change." 
Battle sworn in as Ambassador to 

Australia (biographic details). 
Program for visit of Australian Prime 

Kirk sworn in as Ambassador to China 
(biographic details). 
390 6/14 Allis appointed NATO Assistant Sec- 
retary General for Scientific Affairs 
(biographic details). 
*391 6/15 Williams: "The New Frontier of 

*392 6/14 Lindley: Montgomery County Council 

of PTA's (excerpt). 
t393 6/15 Working Group on Oceanographic In- 
vestigations of Tropical Atlantic 
394 6/15 Revised tariff schedules to go into 
effect Jan. 1, 1963. 
Cultural exchange (India). 
Rusk : New Hampshire Council on 

World Affairs. 
Geren appointed consul general at 
Salisbury, Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland (biographic details). 
*399 6/15 U.S. participation in international 

*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 






*397 6/1.- 





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?upL:i;,tLT.d.-;it ot Ducunients 
Vol. XLVII, No. 1202 JUL 2 6 1962 July9, 1962 


WORLD FROM OUR OWN • by Chester Bowles . . 47 
IDEAS AND ACTION • by Walt W. Rostow, Counselor . 59 


Secretary Battle 73 


by Carl T. Rowan 70 


J. Robert Schaetzel 77 


ATLANTIC COMMUNITY • by Secretary of Defense 
Robert S. MclSaniara 64 

For index see inside back cover 


Vol. XLVII, No. 1202 • Publication 7401 
July 9, 1962 

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Three Frontiers That Divide the Communist World From Our Own 

iy Chester Bowles ' 

Is it possible for a freewheeling democracy of 
180 million people such as ours to develop, sup- 
port, and sustain an effective foreign policy in 
today's complicated world ? 

More than a centuiy ago De Tocqueville, in 
referring to a world of far simpler dimensions, ex- 
pressed gi-ave doubts about the capacity of demo- 
cratic governments successfully to conduct their 
foreign affairs. This critical area of public pol- 
icy, he argued, called for qualities more readily 
associated with an aristocracy than with the repre- 
sentative government of a democratic people. 

Many Americans concerned with the conduct of 
United States foreign policy in our modem age 
have had similar forebodings. They point to the 
extraordinary complexity of the problems which 
■we face, to the need for quick reactions and prompt 
decisions. They stress that the issues with which 
the Government has to deal are often concerned 
with remote and unfamiliar areas. 

If the Government allows its policies to be 
shaped by narrow congressional and public pres- 
sures, it may act unwisely. If it takes action con- 
trary to these pressures, it loses popular support 
and understanding. If it muddles toward a com- 
promise position, it satisfies neither our national 
interests abroad nor public and congressional 
opinion at home. 

The only rational solution, such critics assert, 
would be to delegate most foreign policy decisions 
to specially trained experts who would be free 
from the illogical short-term swings of democratic 

^ Address made at the Nebraska Center for Continuing 
Education, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebr., on 
June 21 (press release 405 dated June 20). Mr. Bowles 
is the President's Special Representative and Adviser on 
African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs. 

July 9, 7962 

public opinion. The skill with which the elite in 
the British Foreign Office is said to have guided 
Britain's foreign policy through the long centui-y 
of peace prior to the outbreak of World War I 
is offered as an illustration of the wisdom of this 

Since these critics realize that our Congress is 
unlikely to abdicate its own well-established role 
in the making of United States foreign policy, 
they are pessimistic about the future. In our re- 
lations with the world they believe that confusion, 
divisiveness, frustration, and general ineffective- 
ness are likely to be the order of the day. 

Now no one who has been near the center of 
the decisionmaking process in Washington will 
lightly brvish their worries aside. There have 
been instances, some of them very recent, where a 
congressional majority has acted in ways which 
have been embarrassing and deeply damaging to 
the administration's foreign policy objectives. 

Yet it does not follow that a democracy is un- 
able effectively to conduct its relations with the 
rest of the world. Indeed there is ample evidence 
to the contrary. Our brilliant response to the 
critical situation which faced us in Europe follow- 
ing World War II, for example, justifies a large 
measure of confidence in our ability to devise 
imprecedented policies, secure widespread public 
and congressional support, and administer these 
policies with boldness and political skill. 

Moreover, in England's own case, it is worth 
pointing out that the Oxford-Cambridge elite 
which directed Britain's foreign policy in the 19th 
century did not work in hermetically sealed 
chambers, cut off from the winds of public opinion. 
On the contrary, it operated within the framework 
of a remarkably consistent public consensus on 


foreign policy which had developed in England 
over a period of years. This consensus had grown 
from the practical experiences of several genera- 
tions of Englishmen and reflected a broadly based 
agreement about what constituted British national 
interests and how those interests could best be 
advanced and defended. 

This is not to say that certain foreign policy 
questions were not, on occasion, debated with 
vehemence in the House of Commons, Hyde Park, 
and elsewhere. Yet, generally speaking, any 
British government that acted witliin the broad 
consensus of British national interests could oper- 
ate boldly and affirmatively with the assurance of 
public support. 

Various Schools of Thought on U.S. Foreign Policy 

But what about the United States? Does a 
national consensus on foreign policy exist in 
America today ? 

On several basic subjects I think that the answer 
is yes. For instance, there are few Americans in 
1962 who do not accept the need for powerfiil 
armed forces. At the same time, it is generally 
understood that nuclear weapons have brought an 
utterly new dimension into military conflict and 
that any war can quickly become an exercise in 
mutual total destruction. 

Furthermore, moi-e and more Americans appre- 
ciate the importance of the 'political and economic 
forces which in less than 20 years have so dramat- 
ically reshaped the maps of Asia and Africa and 
altered the lives of millions of lumian beings. 

The "great debate" of the early 1940's — the 
debate between so-called isolationism and inter- 
ventionism — ^lias ceased to be a serious political 
issue. Almost without exception, the American 
people are now committed to United States partic- 
ipation in world affairs. The question we argue 
is not "whether" but "how." How can the United 
States most effectively play a role in the world 
arena so as to achieve the objectives we all share 
of peace, freedom, and prosperity ? 

On this key question American opinion divides 
into four identifiable categories, two of which we 
can dismiss with a brief comment. 

I refer to a limited number of trigger-happy 
extremists at one end of the spectrum, who seem to 
argue that issues between the Communists and the 
non-Communists can be solved only by war, and 
to the men of good will, at the other end, who are 


persuaded that the solution to world tensions lies ■ , 
in vai-ying techniques of unilateral disarmament. W j 

Ninety percent of vis, however, fall into one or "" 
anotlier of two much larger groups, each honestly 
and deeply committed to a peaceful, more orderly 
world, each aware that no panaceas are available 
to us, but with widely differing views on how the *ff .' 

United States can best achieve its objectives. 

Maximum Rigidity vs. Maximum Maneuverability 

The first of these two principal groups may be 
described as advocates of a policy of "maximum 
rigidity," the second as advocates of "maximum 
maneuverability." Let us explore the differences 
between them. 

Those who believe in the maximum-rigidity ap 
proach hold, in essence, to the old aphorism that 
he who is not wholly with us is against us. They 
believe that the lines of conflict everywhere must 
be tightly drawn, that there can be no basis for 
compromise with our adversaries, and that even- 
tually either the Communist side or the capitalist 
side must emerge as the dominant world force. 

The application of this maximum-rigidity ap- 
proach to the practical questions of foreign policy 
is illustrated by the recent action of a majority 
in the United States Senate when it first voted to 
reduce our support for democratic India and then 
to eliminate United States assistance to Poland 
and Yugoslavia.^ 

The advocates of maximum rigidity are confi- 
dent that their proposed policies will not result in 
war. However, in my view, their approach is 
defeatist, negative, and shortsighted. It abdicates 
the initiative to the Communists and resigns us to 
a permanent conflict on all fronts — military, eco- 
nomic, and political. 

Now let us briefly consider the alternative policy 
of maximum maneuverability. 

The advocates of tliis approach believe that the 
dividing lines between the Communist world and 
our own should not be considered immutable and 
unchanging. Our policies should be geared to take 
every advantage of the restless ferment which has 
already created changes witliin the Communist 
world and which is bound to create more. 

This approach rejects the concept of nuclear 
brinkmanship in the name of "liberation." It 
thinks of power not only in terms of military 


lat tlieir 

pople lii 


For background, see Bulletin of July 2, 19C2, p. 25. 

D&pax\mGi\\ of Sfofe Bulletin 

weapons and industrial capacity but in terms of 
people and the ideas that move them. It under- 

»*!» stands and acts upon the yearnings of people 
throughout the world for decency, dignity, and 
tranquillity. It refuses to write off the millions 
who live in Eastern Europe as "Communists" 

noivtln simply because they have been forced to live under 
Communist rule. It seeks constantly to assure 
them that they are neither deserted nor forgotten, 
that their future is not hopeless, that the evolu- 
tionary forces of freedom and dignity are still on 
their side and growing stronger year by year. 

Anyone who has recently visited a country like 
Poland can testify to the way faces light up when 
people discover that their visitor is from tlie 
United States. By their own courage and determi- 
nation they have resisted the heavy hand of Soviet- 
style collectivization. Now the warmth of their 
welcome testifies to their profoimd faith that the 
forces of freedom will ultimately transcend man- 
made political barriers. 

And, I may add, such welcomes are by no means 
reserved for Democrats. Three years ago Richard 
Nixon was greeted in Warsaw by hundreds of 
thousands of cheering citizens.^ 

The Three Frontiers 

Now let us consider the difference between these 
two approaches — one of rigidity, the other of ma- 
neuverability — in terms of the three frontiers that 
lie between Communist interests and our own — 
military, economic, and cultural. 

Along the military frontier, the two worlds are 
at swords' points. 

On the economic frontier, they compete. 

On the cultural frontier, they communicate. 

Although the significance of these thi-ee fron- 
tiers varies greatly, the advocates of a maximum- 
rigidity approach would ignore these differences. 
In their view each frontier is a barrier to be rigidly 
held, not simply against tanks but against trade, 
aid, people, and ideas. 

The advocates of the maximum-maneuverability 
approach, in sharp disagreement, believe that the 
differences among these three frontiers are the de- 
cisive key to an effective foreign policy in the 
nuclear age. 

With this in mind, let us consider the three fron- 
tiers more carefully. 

' For backgi 
rfelifl J"/y 9, 7962 

ound, see ibid., Aug. 24, 1959, p. 270. 

The Military Frontier 

From the Baltic to the Bosphoi-us, along the 
line of the Iron Curtain, Soviet and NATO troops, 
guns, and planes confront each other across a bar- 
rier of barbed wire, watchtowers, and mined areas. 

Through CENTO [Central Treaty Organiza- 
tion], SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organ- 
ization], and a variety of other bilateral and 
multilateral military pacts, the military barrier 
continues on to the South China Sea. 

Looming behind all the arms, overshadowing all 
the alliances, stands the terrible power of nuclear 
destruction. Each side has the military capacity 
to blow the other off the face of the earth. Who- 
ever attempts to change or crack this military 
frontier risks world war III. In Korea we made 
this clear, and, in another way, so did the Russians 
in Hmigai-y. 

The Economic Frontier 

Let us now consider the economic frontier. 

Here, in contrast to the militai-y frontier, we 
have room for maneuver. Here the competition 
between East and West can be given a new evolu- 
tionary dimension. Here our interests are best 
served by maximum flexibility. 

This is an area ready made for the shifting 
tactics, for the improvisations and boldness which 
reflect America at her purposeful best. To for- 
go this advantage by freezing the economic fron- 
tier as well as the military frontier, as the advo- 
cates of maximum rigidity would have us do, 
strikes me as total folly. 

At present, competition along the economic 
frontier is taking place on three major fronts. 

Competition in EconoTnic Expansion 

The first of these is the competition in regard 
to economic expansion between the most developed 
parts of each world — the Soviet Union, on the 
one hand, and the Atlantic Powers on the other. 

Since World War II Soviet industry has grown 
remarkably. Its technological achievements have 
commanded worldwide admiration. Recently the 
Russian people have begun gradually to taste the 
fruits of rising living standards, with Mr. Khru- 
shchev's promise of even more consumer goods 
lying alluringly ahead. 

Yet the advantage in the long haul lies with the 
non-Communist world. The impressive accom- 
plisliments of the Soviet economy have been more 

than matched by the rapid development of West- 
em Europe. Given a vigorous shove by the Mar- 
shall Plan, Western Europe's economy is now 
growing by leaps and bounds, far faster indeed 
than that of the United States. 

A dramatic result has been the emergence of the 
European Common Market, embracing 350 million 
of the world's most higlily skilled people. The 
very existence of this vast political and economic 
combination flies in the face of the Marxist-Len- 
inist assumption that competition for markets 
would make cooperation among capitalistic na- 
tions impossible. 

Competition for Economic Independence 

To make matters worse from the Soviet view, 
the success of the Common Market in Western 
Europe has already been exerting a powerful pull 
on the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. Here 
again a United States policy of maximum maneu- 
verability can pay maximum dividends — and in- 
deed already has done so. 

Let us consider an example wliich has caused 
some particularly sharp debate between the advo- 
cates of the two differing schools of foreign af- 
fairs — Yugoslavia. 

I believe that our aid to the Yugoslav Govern- 
ment in the last 14 years has been an imaginative, 
courageous, and successful example of the doctrine 
of maximum maneuverability. For this I believe 
that both Democrats and Republicans can and 
should take full credit. 

The advocates of maximum rigidity vigorously 
disagree. Wliat then are the facts ? 

First of all, let us briefly consider the conditions 
which existed in the winter of 1948, when the 
Yugoslav aid program was first proposed. 

At that time the Greek civil war was in full 
swing, with Soviet-directed Commimist guen-illas 
based in southern Yugoslavia carrying on an all- 
out war to destroy Greek democracy. In Italy an 
election campaign was in progress which, because 
of widespread poverty, war weariness, and frustra- 
tion, many ol)servers feared would result in the first 
genuine Communist victory in the history of free 
elections. On the other side of the world a sweep- 
ing victory for the Communists in the Chinese 
civil war appeared imminent. 

Thus in the winter of 1948 we were faced with 
the prospect of Communist military victory in 
Greece, the election of a Communist government 


in Italy, and the establishment of a monolithic ^^'^ 


Communist empire stretching all the way fronc i' 
the borders of France to the Sea of Japan. Th« 5ie«^; 
impact that we might expect from such an arraj 
of Communist successes on the war-devastated na- 
tions of Europe and the newly liberated nations 
of Asia was impossible to exaggerate. 

At that precise moment in history Tito's long' «i*"' 
smoldering disagreements with Stalin suddenly ^"'^'"' 
broke into the open. Yugoslavia announced its 
independence of Soviet control and appealed to u 
for assistance. The United States Govemment sis'*. 
was faced with a dilemma of the most decisivels**''^"' 

During the war the Yugoslavs had fought I'"'' ^^' 
bravely under the leadership of Tito against the ^^'^ 
Nazis, pinning down more than 30 German divi- 
sions. If these German divisions had been avail- 
able to oppose the American landings on the 
French coast in June 1944, casualties would have 
been far heavier and the result less certain. 

However, since the war Yugoslavia had been 
one of the most belligerent members of the Com- 
munist bloc. Only a year earlier Yugoslavs had 
shot down an American plane charged with flying 
over Yugoslav territory. A tight, iron-fisted dic- 
tatorship was in full control. There had been con- 
siderable persecution of members of the Church. 

Against this background President Truman 
called a meeting with congressional leaders, 
headed by Eepublican Senator Arthur Vanden- 
berg of Michigan. Mr. Truman pointed out that, 
in view of Tito's antagonism in recent years, it 
would be difficult to get the American people to 
understand the wisdom of American support for 
Communist Yugoslavia. Yet if we failed to sup- 
port Tito in this first break in the Communist em- 
pire, we would lose an liistoric opportunity. 

Leaders of both parties agreed that American 
interests would best be served by support for the 
Yugoslav Government in its efforts to remain out- 
side the Stalinist orbit. Substantial shipments of 
military and economic equipment were soon on 
their way. 

By any standard this bold move must be judged 
a success. The democratic forces in Italy, encour- 
aged by the defection of Yugoslavia, won a deci- 
sive victory at the polls; the Communist guerrillas 
in Greece, deprived of a base for operations in 
Yugoslavia, were gradually worn down and over- 
come ; and new pressures were opened up within 


led) I 

Irate m 
mil large 
jreatly i 
01 tiled 
on tie e 
list ilk 
split, bii 
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meit to 
stand 11' 
been in 

Department of State Bulletin 

July 9 

™«lli the Commiuiist world as the most belligerent of 
bhe "satellites" suddenly cut its ties with the 

■? frt 

^»' liKremlin. 

^irn] Immediately following the election in 1952, 

'"e<l«i President Eisenhower restated American policy 

"Jlio! toward Yugoslavia in the same terms as those laid 

down by President Triunan. The policy has been 

continued to this day. 

Now here is the essential point : Neither Harry 

Wdil Truman nor D wight Eisenhower nor Jolin F. 
Kennedy ever suggested that U.S. economic as- 
sistance to Yugoslavia would persuade Tito to 
switch sides. What they did say — and on this all 
three Presidents were everlastingly right — was 

foiiflJthat U.S. assistance would enable Yugoslavia to 

instill maintain its independence. 

The Yugoslavs may still vote quite frequently 
with the U.S.S.R. in the United Nations, and their 
leaders may make speeches that are critical of us. 
Yet their freedom to make their own basic choices 
has been established, and the record shows that by 
and large they have exercised that freedom. 

In the economic field they have abandoned 
Soviet-type collectives and have established the 
peasant's right to his own farm. They have also 
greatly modified Coimnunist dogma in regai'd to 
industrial development. Seventy percent of their 
trade is now with the non-Communist nations. 

In the political field they have opposed the 
U.S.S.R. in the U.N. on the question of a single 
Secretary-General versus the so-called "troika," 
on the financing of U.N. forces in the Congo, and 
on the explosion of the 50-megaton H-bonib last 

Not only has the total strength of the Commu- 
nist bloc vis-a-vis the West been weakened by this 
split, but even more important, the Yugoslav ex- 
ample has given indirect but strong encourage- 
ment to independent non-Communist nations to 
stand up to Soviet blandisliments. 

Now right here is the political crux of the mat- 
ter: If the advocates of maximmn rigidity had 
been in control of American jjolicy in 19-18, or at 
any stage since then, they would have closed this 
economic frontier and cut Yugoslavia off from 
American help. Economic and political pressures 
would then have developed to bring Tito back 
into the Soviet fold. Straight across the world 
people striving to break loose from Communist 
rule would have been disheartened and embittered. 
America, they would have charged, had abandoned 


July 9, 7962 

Competition for Economic Progress in New 

The third battleground along the economic fron- 
tier between East and West may be the most im- 
portant of all : the new and emerging nations of 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 

Here the advocates of maximmn rigidity would 
give help and sujiport only to those nations whose 
leaders think as we do ; the unalined and the neu- 
tral nations would be left to shift for themselves. 

Tlie advocates of maximum maneuverability see 
the situation in far less dogmatic terms. Again, 
let us consider the facts. These new developing 
nations are wrestling with awesome problems of 
illiteracy, ill health, poverty, and injustice. Un- 
less their people can be convinced that reasonable 
progress is being made toward the elimination of 
these evils, orderly political growth will be 

United States efforts to support this develop- 
ment process have often been complicated by the 
cantankerous political attitudes of Asian, African, 
and Latin American leaders, who have been em- 
bittered by their own past contacts with the eco- 
nomically privileged and — in many cases — race- 
conscious colonial nations of the West. Wlien 
these Afro-Asian spokesmen attack the United 
States policies in the United Nations and else- 
where, editorial writers chastise them as "ungrate- 
ful Commimist dupes" and Members of Congress 
rise to demand that our aid programs to such 
"uncooperative" nations be terminated herewith. 

Although reactions of tliis kind are understand- 
able in terms of our own emotions, they will not 
cause the complexities of our present world to 
disappear. Moreover, they overlook not only the 
deep-seated and often irrational attitudes to which 
I have referred but also the political purpose and 
role of economic assistance as an instrument of 
United States national policy. 

Let us consider this latter point as the advocates 
of maximum maneuverability see it. 

A key Coimnunist objective is control of the 
resources and markets of Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America, on which the industrialized nations of 
the West are heavily dependent. It is our task to 
see that this effort fails and that the developing 
nations not only assure their own freedom but also 
achieve an increasing measure of political stability 
and economic progress. If we conduct oui-selves 
with restraint and good judgment and maintain 
an open economic frontier, the longi-un advantage 


in this contest lies heavily on the side of freedom. 

However difficult tliey may sometimes appear to 
be, the new nations have no desire to exchange 
British, French, Belgian, and Dutch rule, from 
wliicli many of them have recently emerged, for 
the far more ruthless domination of the Russians. 
Moreover, their own cultures are diverse, and this 
diversity is deeply rooted. As the Kremlin strat- 
egists have discovered, these indigenous counter- 
forces provide formidable barriers to the Leninist 
vision of a Soviet-dominated world. 

Advocates of maximum maneuverability believe 
that a flexible, well-administered, sensitive eco- 
nomic assistance progi-am can become a vitally 
important tactical instrument in further strength- 
ening these barriers. They stress, however, that 
both the objectives and limitations of this effort 
must be clearly understood. 

Our objective is not to control the utterances and 
policies of tlic developing nations, to win a global 
popularity contest with the U.S.S.R., or to pur- 
chase votes in the United Nations. Governments 
that can be "bought" with American dollars, they 
assert, can no more be counted on to stay bouffht 
than can individuals purchased in the same 
mnnner. Nor can nations as wealthy as ours ex- 
pect to be loved by those which are less f ortimate ; 
the best we can expect on that score is respect. 

The true objectives of our aid program, say the 
advocates of gi-eater maneuverability, are twofold : 
first, to increase economic progi-ess in the develop- 
ing nations; and second, to do so in such a way 
that broader participation will be encouraged 
among the people and every family be given an 
increasing personal stake in national independ- 

The economic frontier between the Communist 
world and our own is thus a complex one. By 
keeping this frontier open, in line with the policy 
of maximum maneuverability, we have been mak- 
ing steady progress. 

The Cultural Frontier 

"WHiat now of the third frontier between East 
and West— the cultural frontier? 

Here again, with the exception of radio propa- 
ganda, the maximum-rigidity school would adopt 
a rigid line identical to the military line, while 
the maximum-maneuverability school favors flexi- 
bility and initiative. "Wliich is the wiser course? 

This is the one frontier where we Americans can 


actually communicate with the Russians. Sinct f*"'" 
the Geneva conference of 1955, there has been f ""*' , „ 


steady flow of scholars, students, artists, musi; 
cians, farmers, and scientists between the Soviet 
world and the Western world. This two-waj 
exchange has already had a decided eflfect, it 
to me, in gradually establishing people-to-people 
understanding and in giving the citizens of 
world a clearer appreciation of the other. 

In the field of music, art, and even in exchange 
students the cultural frontier has been pushed P"^"J 
back far beyond the Iron Curtain. 

Among men of science, communication and 
even cooperation has been particularly vigorous^ 
The International Geophysical Year, agreement 
on exploration of Antarctica, and the current* 
negotiations on joint efforts in outer space are only 
a few of these mutual undertakings across the 
cultural frontier. 

To those who subscribe to the philosophy oft 
maximum rigidity, this flow of communication 
across the cultural frontier seems dangerous and 
inunoral. In my opinion it is a most hopeful 
phenomenon. Wliy should we, a free people, be 
afraid of ideas? It is the Communists who 
should fear them. 

Moreover, if the barriers that separate East and 
West are ever to crumble, they will do so, I am 
convinced, only in proportion to the understand 
ing which has slowly and painfully been culti- 
vated on each side of the military frontier. 

To some extent we are all the prisoners of 
stereotypes ; we see each other in terms of distorted 
and oversimplified images. Wider communica- 
tion in the realm of ideas, of the arts, and of 
science can help refashion these false images. 
And by seeing more clearly we may act more 


indEtrial ! 

prospects J] 

kteJ socie 
sterile rig 
iDt ptovi 
In the me 

I ml 
eiini polii 

tweei till 
are tkt 
almost t 

A Glance Into the Future 

I would like to conclude my remarks today by 
a glance into the future. Are there signs of any 
changes along the three frontiers which divide the 
Soviet world from our own ? 

On the military frontier, the prospects for any 
fundamental change right now appear remote. 
Yet here, as elsewhere, our position is strong. 

Rvissian deadlines have come and gone, but West 
Berlin still stands as a shining example of the 
detennination of free men to defend their free- 
dom. In the last 2 years our military power has 

Department of Stale Bulletin 

their div 
a frame 
critic t 
these pi 

the mi] 
Asia a 

July 9, 

''''*• Sin become vastly better balanced, more mobile, and 
■''^lifeii nore effective in defending the military frontier. 
"Ss, njj Here the primary question which hangs over us 
"*Soti ts arms control. Wlien will the Soviet leaders 
■'- l'«iii some to see that the secrecy to which they so 
^"litseei desperately cling and which now makes agi-eement 
'^■'•'•peop impossible is a wasting asset? "Wlien will they 
ft* of en realize that promises of a better life which they 
■'■ aave made to their people cannot possibly be ful- 
iKcbiij filled with 24 percent of their gross national 
*" \mk product assigned to defense and space exploration ? 
iWTien will they recognize the folly of a continu- 
ation an ing, escalating contest between the two greatest 
fiforej industrial powers of all time to see which can 
'^Snm develop the greatest capacity to destroy? 

On the economic and cultural frontiers the 
eareoiil prospects appear promising. The non-Communist 
world is poised on the threshold of more rapid 
economic gi'owth than ever before. 

As we build a more prosperous, more interre- 
lated society of free men, the Soviets will be 
forced, it seems to me, to modify even further the 
sterile rigidities of their own system. Indeed 
Marxism in today's fast-changing world is gradu- 
ally proving itself irrelevant as a practical for- 
mula for economic growth or for political control. 
In the meantime, the burgeoning flow of ideas and 
people across the cultural frontier opens up minds, 
undercuts dogma, and encourages diversity. 

I conclude then as I began, with a plea for 
maximum maneuverability in United States for- 
eign policy. Contrary to the advocates of maxi- 
mum rigidity, there is not just one frontier be- 
tween the Communist world and our own; there 
are three. And two of these frontiers offer us 
almost unlimited opportimities for affirmative 
economic and political actions. 

Americans have always prided themselves in 
their diversity, their eagerness to experiment, their 
adaptability to new situations, and their imagina- 
tion in devising new courses of action. Within 
a framework of unflinching dedication to demo- 
cratic principles, we have grown strong here in 
America because we have always been willing to 
try new ways. There is no reason to abandon 
these principles in our relations with the rest of 

Let us, therefore, seize the economic initiative, 
expand the flow of ideas, give encouragement to 
the millions who are forced to live under com- 
munism, and assist the struggling new nations of 
Asia and Africa — even though they attempt to 

loross til 

m m 
wple, Ij 
* will 

last am 
10, 1 an 
n culti- 

md of 

July 9, 7962 

stand aloof from the cold-war struggle. Did not 
our own young, developing ^\jnerica follow a sim- 
ilar policy of nonalinement for more than 100 
years ? 

My answer to the question with which I began — 
whether a democratic people can create a foreign 
policy adequate to deal with the complexities of 
today's world — is a confident yes. And the reason 
for my confidence is precisely because we are a 
free people. 

Secretary Rusk Interviewed 
on "Press Conference U.S.A." 

Following is the transcript of an interview with 
Secretary Rush on the Voice of America''s "Press 
Conference U.S.A." on June 12. 

Press release 385 dated June 12 

Roiert L. Redeen, Voice of America: Ladies 
and gentlemen, this week's guest is the Honorable 
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State in President Ken- 
nedy's Cabinet. 

Born in the State of Georgia, Secretary Rusk 
was graduated with a bachelor of arts degree from 
Davidson College, North Carolina, where he was 
Phi Beta Kappa. Later Mr. Rusk studied as a 
Rhodes Scholar at Oxford and briefly at the Uni- 
versity of Berlin. He was associate professor of 
government and dean of faculty at Mills College 
in Oakland, California. 

In the Army, Secretary Rusk was discharged 
with the rank of colonel, having taken part in two 
campaigns in Burma, rising to Deputy Cliief of 
Staff for that theater of operations. He began liis 
career in the State Department in 1946. High- 
lights in that career include posts as the first As- 
sistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs, as 
Deputy Under Secretary, and as Assistant Secre- 
tary for Far Eastern Affairs. He continued in 
the last-named position until 1952, when he left 
the State Department to become president of the 
Rockefeller Foundation in New York City. It 
was from that organization that he was called by 
President Kennedy 8 years later to accept the 
position as Secretary of State. 

To question Secretary Rusk on the current situa- 
tion in foreign affairs we have invited three Wash- 
ington reporters to join us. They are Max Freed- 
man of the Manchester Guardian, Stewart Hensley 


of United Press International, and Elie Abel of 
the National Broadcasting Company. 
For the first question, Mr. Abel. 

Discussions Among Atlantic Partners 

Mr. Ahel: Mr. Secretary, you are off to Europe, 
I believe, in a few days, perhaps in refutation of 
your original hope that you would spend most of 
your time in Washington. I wonder, though, what 
takes you to Europe at this time and why are you 
going and what do you expect to get out of this 
voyage ? 

Secretary RttsTc: I think it has been obvious to 
all of us that there is a considerable ferment of 
discussion among the capitals of the Atlantic com- 
munity, of the NATO countries, but I think it's 
very important for us to understand just what this 
ferment is and what it is not. 

I think it's fair to say that the Atlantic com- 
munity is moving into new chapters in its history. 
Back in the late forties the NATO military de- 
fense alliance was built up, under which its mem- 
bers undertook a deep commitment to act together 
in the mutual defense of the NATO area. The 
Marshall Plan set about the economic rebuilding 
of war-torn Western Europe. 

Now, in those major central tasks of the Atlantic 
community over these years there has not been any 
disagreement in any discussion in these more re- 
cent months. What is happening is that we are 
moving into fresher chapters. We have Common 
Market discussions, which open the way for a new 
vitality, an increased partnership on the other side 
of the Atlantic, accompanied by major proposals 
by President Kennedy for trade legislation^ in 
this country, which brings a quarter century of 
reciprocal trade agreements to an end in this coun- 
try, with a fresh approach. 

We have some problems affecting the strategy 
of NATO in the light of new weapons systems and 
new military situations. And we have, perhaps 
most important of all, important questions relat- 
ing the North Atlantic community to other parts 
of the world and particularly to the developing 
countries. So if there is lively discussion reported 
in the press, this is an accurate report. If there 
are things that need talking out, this is correct. 
But it is going on in the exhilaration of new pos- 

' For text of the President's message to Congress on 
trade, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 19C2, p. 231. 

sibilities in the Western World and not through 
any disarray among the commitments which have 
been standing for many years, in which we act 
together on basic interests. 

Mr. Ahel: Mr. Secretary, we have for some 
years now, under law, been sharing part of our 
nuclear know-how with the British. The French 
have complained that they are left outside. Wliat 
is our answer to President de Gaulle's demand 
today for nuclear sharing? 

Secretary Rush: Well, in the first place, we have 
not had any demand from President de Gaulle for 
nuclear sharing. But in any event, we and Britain 
were wartime partners in the initiation of the 
work on these weapons. That partnership went 
back many years, although it was reconfirmed, I 
think, in 1958. We have felt that we ought not 
ourselves to take part in adding to the number of 
nations that have national nuclear capabilities. 

To look ahead down the trail of possible dis- 
armament in this field, to look ahead to the means 
by which these terrible weapons might somehow 
be brought under control, we feel that the multi- 
plication of governments who have such weapons 
is not something to which we ought to make a 
direct contribution. We would much prefer to 
obtain agreements which would, for example, pro- 
hibit nuclear testing in the weapons field, to com- 
mit nuclear power to peaceful purposes, and to do 
eveiything that we can to prevent the indefinite 
enlargement and expansion of a nuclear arms race 
in this present world situation. 

Talks on Berlin Problem 

Mr. Ahel: Let me take you on to what I believe 
is your second stopping place — Germany. There 
have been some fairly open disagreements be- 
tween us and our West German allies on how best 
to proceed with this Berlin problem. Could you 
fill us in, sir, on where does that stand today, to 
what degree are we still in disagreement, and do 
you expect to resolve this matter in your talks with 
Chancellor Adenauer ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, in our discussions with 
the Soviet Union we have kept our friends in Ger- 
many fully informed on discussions. And 
we have talked with the Eussians on the basis of 
known agreements on underlj'ing policy as far as 
the West is concerned. Now, we have on occasion 
discussed with our allies certain ideas, and they 
have in turn raised certain ideas with us. Some of 

Department of Sfofe Bulletin 

those are mvolved in, say, contingency planning. 
Others are looking toward the possibility of mat- 
ters which we might discuss with the Russians. 

But these are incidental details in discussions in 
which the West is in broad agreement on what our 
vital interests are and on the necessity for sustain- 
ing and defending those vital interests. I don't 
expect any difficulties in our discussions with our 
allies over the Berlin question. There is, as you 
know, some difference of view in Paris as to pro- 
cedure and tactics, but that itself does not reflect 
a basic difference on the imderlying policies. 

Mr. Redeen: Mr. Hensley. 

U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia 

Mr. Hensley: Mr. Secretary, shifting to another 
part of the world, Senator [Mike] Mansfield re- 
cently—one of the administration leaders — has 
criticized our policy in Southeast Asia in a speech 
declaring that he doubts its effectiveness and be- 
lieves it should all be reviewed. I think, in his 
words, it has not created the stability which might 
have been hoped for. Do you care to address 
yourself to that criticism ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, you referred to Senator 
Mansfield as the administration leader. I think 
in this statement he was speaking for himself and 
not for the administration, despite the fact that 
he is Majority Leader in the Senate, and a very 
distinguished one. 

We do not see in Southeast Asia the kind of 
stability that we might have hoped for after the 
last 15 years of serious attention and effort since 
World War II. But I believe myself that the 
security and stability and freedom of Southeast 
Asia is of great importance to the rest of the 
free world and particularly to the United States. 

We have just had indications that the negotia- 
tions among the three princes to form a coalition 
government in Laos may have succeeded in com- 
ing to an agreement. ^ This will be the first in a 
number of steps which will have to be taken before 
we will know with assurance that Laos can become 
a neutral and independent country. 

Such proposals will have to go to the King and 
to the Parliament for ratification. Presumably a 
Laotian delegation will then go to Geneva, and 
those tentiitive agreements will be put in final 
form. Those agreements have in them some im- 

portant safeguards for the neutrality and inde- 
pendence of Laos and the security of Laos' neigh- 
bors against infiltration through Laos if by any 
chance that should be tempting to anyone. 

So we, as you know, made a major commitment 
of effort to help the South Vietnamese in their 
struggle against the guerrillas, and we have re- 
inforced Thailand.^ I would say our policy is to 
give these free coimtries of Southeast Asia every 
reasonable assistance and to take our security com- 
mitments there with great seriousness. 

Mr. Hensley: With respect to Laos, Mr. Secre- 
tary, now that there is reported to be an agree- 
ment, the question arises concerning U.S. aid. I 
believe in recent months you have withlield the 
subsidy of $3 million a month to the Laos Govern- 
ment. Is that possibly to be resumed shortly if 
the agreement proves binding ? Can you give us 
any timetable or any idea on that ? 

Secretary Rusk : I think if it's evident that the 
parties in Laos have settled down seriously to the 
problem of trying to construct a coalition govern- 
ment which would be neutral in character and 
would strive for the independence of that country, 
I would think that aid arrangements that are satis- 
factory would be worked out. But since I do not 
have official word from the spot, I would not want 
to make a flat commitment on this point today. 

Mr. Hensley: How do you view the possible 
future operations of the Chinese in that area ? We 
hear more of their hunger troubles, their indus- 
trial troubles, and others. Are these liable to 
lead them into any further adventurism down 
there which might have to be encountered ? 

Secretary Rusk : I think the Chinese must know 
that, if they move into Southeast Asia or under- 
take adventures in that area, they not only would 
find that the peoples of Southeast Asia would re- 
sist such moves, as they have historically, but that 
the peoples of Southeast Asia would have the 
strongest possible support from the peoples of 
other countries. 

No, the distressing economic problems on the 
mainland of China are not likely to be solved by 
foreign adventure. They have to be solved on 
the mainland with a revision of their productivity 
capacities, better employment of their manpower, 
better organization of their distribution systems; 

/&(f7., July 2, 1962, p. 12. 

' For background, see ibid.. June 4, 1962. p. 904. 

July 9, 7962 

otherwise I don't see how the problems of feeding 
C50 million people can be solved. 
Mr. Redeen: Mr. Freedman? 

Britain's Role in Western Europe 

Mr. Freedman: Mr. Secretary, everyone knows 
that the United States doesn't want to intervene to 
influence the decision on British membership in 
the Common Market. But in the context of gen- 
eral principles, can you tell us what advantages to 
the free world would flow from British member- 
ship in the Common Market? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think over the years 
the United States has hoped that Europe would be 
a strong center of free peoples committed to not 
only the security and freedom of Europe but also 
to the support of the cause of freedom in other 
parts of the world. We believe that it would be a 
great thing if the solidarity could be achieved in 
Europe which would make it possible to say after 
several centuries that we can now be assured that 
war, for example, would not occur through differ- 
ences that happen within Western Europe. 

We believe that Britain's role in Western 
Europe could be very important and that that com- 
bination of ideas, of economic and military power, 
of leadership, would give that kind of Europe a 
very great role to play, and that, in partnership 
with us in the Atlantic community, that side of 
the Atlantic would greatly strengthen the cause 
of the entire free world. 

We do not, as you Imow, Mr. Freedman, think 
that it is for us to try to offer any plan of our own 
or any blueprint as to the details of how Europe 
might move. But we have for many years en- 
couraged the idea of a politically unified Europe 
and a Europe that could bring its total economic 
impact to bear upon the common problems of tlie 
free world. 

Soviet Criticism of Common Market 

Mr. Freedman: How do you evaluate Russia's 
recent criticism of the Common Market ? "Wliy is 
she doing it ? 

Secretary Rusk: I suppose that they must real- 
ize that the economic vigor of Western Europe 
poses both some practical and some theoretical 
jiroblems for them. The idea that close associa- 
tion among the industrialized countries of West- 
ern Europe is an unnatural one arises from, I 

think, Marxist doctrine, and it's a little uncom- 
fortable for them to have the facts show that that 
doctrine is wrong. 

Our own experience has been, as you know, that 
as countries develop vigorous industrial societies 
they tend to trade with each other more. We sell 
machine tools to Europe. We buy machine tools 
from Europe. It's in the nature of free trade 
among free societies that that should happen. 1 
think also that the element of competition arises, 
not so much in direct economic warfare — anything 
of that sort — but rather in terms of the compari- 
son of economic performance within the free socie- 
ties on the one side and the Communist bloc on the 

When you look at some of the economic problems 
that are obvious, from East Gennany all the way 
through to North Viet-Nam, there are some seri- 
ous economic problems in the Communist world. 
"Wlien the West is moving toward more and more 
vital production, toward rapid increase in stand- 
ards of living, toward closer and closer economic 
cooperation, this is distressing from the point of 
view of doctrine and distressing from the point of 
view of competition. 

Mr. Freedman: Again without asking for a 
blueprint, Mr. Secretary, what role do you see the 
neutral states playing in free Europe ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I would not want at this 
stage to go mto any details on that, as you antici- 
pated. I do think that there are some practical 
trading relationships and problems that have to be 
worked out on a practical trading basis and that 
there are many forms of political cooperation 
which would be possible without injuring the 
broad status of neutrality as it is normally 

As far as we are concerned, we would be reluc- 
tant to see Europe — Western Europe — grow in 
such a way as to dilute in a significant way the 
political commitments of the Treaty of Rome or of 
the NATO commitments. 

Mr. Redeen: Mr. Abel? 

Mr. Abel: Since last September, Mr. Secretary, 
you have been engaged in an on-again, off-again 
dialog with the Soviet Union on the Berlin ques- 
tion. Can we take it that your latest discussions 
with Mr. Dobrynin [Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy 
F. Dobrynin] are on the shelf until you return 
from Europe, or do you expect to see him before 
you leave ? 

Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Rusk : There is no date set at the mo- 
ment for a further talk with Mr. Dobrynin. I 
would not want to say whether I would see him 
again before I leave for Europe. After all, that 
is about a week off yet. 

Mr. Redeen: Mr. Hensley ? 

Mr. Hensley: Mr. Secretary, to go to another 
continent — in Africa we continue to support the 
action of the United Nations there, and the Prime 
Minister, Mr. Adoula [Cyrille Adoula, Prime 
Minister of the Republic of the Congo], continues 
to secure the cooperation and integration of Mr. 
[Moise] Tshombe's Katanga. I'm wondering what 
the prospects for success there appear to you to be, 
and what would be your guess as to how long Mr. 
Adoula can last as head of that government unless 
there is some progress on getting Katanga into 
the Central Govei-nment ? 

Secretary Rush: Well, Mr. Hensley, as I hope 
you know, I try not to avoid questions any more 
than necessary. At the moment there are discus- 
sions going on between Mr. Adoula and Mr. 
Tshombe. We have been somewhat encouraged 
by the progress made in those talks thus far. But 
there are a considerable number of issues to be 
worked out, having to do with responsibilities for 
law and order, certain economic problems, con- 
stitutional questions. I think I had better say at 
this point that we think that it is important that 
these two men agree on the future integration of 
Katanga in the Congo. We think that there has 
been some indication in recent days that they are 
making headway in their talks, and we certainly 
wish them well in bringing these talks to a suc- 
cessful conclusion. 

Mr. Redeen : Mr. Freedman ? 

Indications of Free-World Strengtii and Growtli 

Mr. Freedman: Mr. Secretary, in your opening 
statement you referred to the fennent of discus- 
sion now taking place in the free world. I would 
like to ask if I am correct in assiuning that you 
regard these problems as being the result of 
strength rather than weakness in the free world ? 

Secretary Rusk : I would say not only strength, 
Mr. Freedman, but they are the result of forward 
motion. I mean, for example, a year ago in April 
at the spring meeting of NATO in Oslo,* we talked 
about the importance to the alliance of much more 

' For background, see ibid.. May 29, 1961, p. 
July 9, 7962 

vigorous and comprehensive political discussion 
within NATO on world problems. Now, obvi- 
ously, the more subjects we talk about, and partic- 
ularly the more we talk about matters which range 
beyond the immediate, say, defense needs of 
NATO itself, the more opportunity there is for 
the differences of view and national interest and 
the position of the different members to come to 
the fore. 

By deliberately inviting — by deliberately stimu- 
lating much more effective consultation, we ac- 
cepted the inevitability that differences of inter- 
est and view would make themselves apparent. 
Now, this is a situation in which people in govern- 
ment find themselves at something of a disadvan- 
tage because — and this is not a criticism ; this is 
in the nature of all of us — agreement and solidar- 
ity are not headline news. So these are in a sense 
family discussions, family quarrels, on minor 
points. They don't bear upon tlie elementary com- 
mitments of members of NATO to each other for 
defense purposes. They don't bear upon our gen- 
eral commitment to free societies or to the really 
major or overriding issues which arise from time 
to time. 

The Atlantic alliance is moving into new periods 
of significance. Certainly in Western Europe the 
discussions over the Common Market and politi- 
cal developments there are of the gi-eatest impor- 
tance. They are growing toward a new future. 
But they are not on the basis of any disrepair or 
any shattering of the common commitments we 
have undertaken to each other with respect to the 
past and on which we rest solidly as a free com- 
munity of strong nations at the present time. I 
would say strength plus growth gives rise to this 
ferment that I mentioned. 

Mr. Redeen: Mr. Abel ? 

Foreign Aid Legislation 

Mr. Ahel: Mr. Secretary, in light of the divided 
councils that become more and more apparent 
within the Soviet bloc, which seems to be becoming 
less and less of a bloc, I wonder to what degree do 
you feel that the Senate may or may not have 
been helpful to the administration in forbidding 
economic aid to any country that is Communist- 
or Marxist-dominated. 

Secretary Rusk: Well, on the day when an 
amendment to that effect was first passed, in very 
severe and limiting terms, I said with a certain 


amount of diplomatic understatement that I 
thought that action was unfortunate.'' I thought 
it was unwise, because we do need the flexibility 
to keep in contact with certain of these countries 
who want to be in contact with us — countries 
whose people have considered themselves to be a 
part of the general tradition of Western civiliza- 
tion for centuries, who feel a nostalgia to restore 
those relationships, whether in science, scholar- 
ship, or in trade, or what not. 

Yugoslavia has veiy important trade interests 
with the "West. She is a member of the OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment] . We think that there are many people 
there who would like to see relations with the West 
maintained on a friendly and sound basis, and we 
feel that the United States ought to be in a posi- 
tion to take its part in maintaining those rela- 

Mr. Abel: I wonder how troublesome you may 
find it, sir, to operate within the language of this 
law, as now amended, unless it should be changed 
again ? I'm thinking particularly of the wording 
about ilarxist-dominated or Commimist-domi- 
nated countries. Up to now people have been talk- 
ing about Yugoslavia and Poland. But it does 
seem to me that there are perhaps some countries 
outside of Eastern Europe which can, by some- 
one's definition, be considered Marxist-dominated 
or -oriented. Do you soe a problem there, for ex- 
ample, with Guinea or Ghana ? 

Secretary Rusk : Well, Mr. Abel, a friend once 
advised a predecessor of mine to bear in mind that 
the future comes one day at a time. 

Now, on this particular question, I would think 
first that I would want to see what language 
actually resulted from the action of the Congress 
and give it careful examination against the legis- 
lative record of the bill itself. I do not believe 
that it has been the intention of the Congress to 
restrict us in dealings with covmtries in all parts 
of the world who may have annoimced that they 
were Socialist in orientation or have some other 
orientation that by some language could be in- 
terpreted as Marxist. I think we know that what's 
being talked about is those who are part of and 
contributing to an international Communist con- 
spiracy against the independence and freedom of 

Mr. Redeen : Mr. Hcnsley ? 

U.S. Relationship to Common Market 

Mr. Eensley : Mr. Secretary, with respect to the 
relationship of the United States to the Common 
Market, a few days ago the Common Market na- 
tions increased duties on six American products 
in retaliation for the President's action m raising 
tariffs on carpets and glass," wliich struck, I be- 
lieve, in part at the Belgians. Is this sort of thing 
a foretaste of the kind of cconoinic warfare we 
are going to have with the Common Market, or 
is this the sort of thing which the President hopes 
to deal with within the framework of the pro- 
posed trade act ? 

Secretai^ Rusk : Well, the action which we took 
with respect to glass and carpets was taken under 
an option, under which we had to give certain 
protection to some industries in our own country 
who were in a severe situation and where unem- 
ployment was an important factor. When we took 
that action, one of the options which they had 
across the Atlantic was to retaliate or to permit us 
to offer a compensatory package of concessions on 
our side. 

We presented a compensatory package which 
we thought would help them in this situation and 
which was, I think, our obligation to do. But 
unfoi-tunately, under the limitations under which 
we now operate in the trade field, we ran out of 
legislative authority in building up such a pack- 
age. That is, the compensation we could offer 
was not adequate in terms of the trading injuries 
presumably that were inflicted by our action on 
glass and carpets. 

This underlines the importance of the passage 
of the trade bill which President Kennedy has 
asked from the Congress. We were not able to 
offer sufficient compensation. We regretted, obvi- 
ously, the action taken across the Atlantic, but I 
do think that this is not a forerunner of the kind 
of problem which will arise when the Common 
Market and our new trade legislation confront 
each other. Indeed, it's a sample of the kind of 
problem we would hope to avoid through the new 
arrangements that will come into being on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 

Mr. Redeen: ]\Ir. Freedman, do you have a 
quick, final question ? 

Mr. Freedman: Yes. The role of the U.N. in 

■ Ihid.. July 2, 10C2, p. 25. 

•For a White House announcement, see ihid., Apr. 16, 
1962, p. 649. 

Department of Stale Bulletin 

world affairs — do you tlimk it's improving? 

Secretary Rusk: I think it's extremely impor- 
tant and must become more important, and that 
we should not oui-selves become discouraged be- 
cause at times they seem to be in a little bit of 
disarray in debates among 104 nations, because 
we share so many conmion commitments among 
the members there. I think there is a great op- 
portunity for us to demonstrate that the long- 
term foreign policy of the United States is not 
only that that is sketched out in the opening part 
of the Charter of the United Nations but is con- 

sistent with the long-term commitments and the 
foreign policies of most other people in most other 
parts of the world. 

Mr. Redeen: Thank you, Secretary Rusk. This 
week's guest on "Press Conference U.S.A." was 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Asking him ques- 
tions were three Washington reportei-s, Stewart 
Hensley of United Press International, Elie Abel 
of the National Broadcasting Company, and Max 
Freedman of the Manchester Guardian. 

This is Robert L. Redeen, Voice of America, 

Ideas and Action 

hy Walt W. Rostoio 

Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council'^ 

Commencements are by tradition a time when 
one generation talks to another. They are per- 
haps particularly significant for the older genera- 
tion : From here on out you will be doing more of 
the talking and we the listening. We like to get 
our last licks in before you leave the ranks of 
studenthood and join us as working colleagues. 

Let me begin by telling you a bit about my 
generation. Many of us who now work in Wash- 
ington were too yoimg to have been caught up in 
the challenge of the depression years and the New 
Deal period. We were formed by the Second 
World War; after 1945 we were drawn to a con- 
tinuing concern with the problems of this nation's 
position on the world scene. Along with many 
others of my age, my professional life has been a 
counterpoint between the world of ideas and the 
world of public policy. In my case, the emphasis 
has been on military and foreign policy. Of the 
years since 1940, for example, I spent 9 in jjublic 
service, 13 in universities, with a good portion of 
the latter involving consultation in Washington. 
The proportions are quite typical. Those of us 

* Address made at commencement exercises at the Car- 
negie Institute of Teclinology, Pittsburgh, Pa., on June 11 
(press release 367 dated June 7). 

now in our forties, then, are in a sense children of 
the era that began with the fall of Paris at about 
this time of year in 1940 and that has continued 
through the two decades of world responsibility 
for the United States which followed that tragic 
June day. 

Today I propose to discuss with you this double 
prism on the world scene wliich many of us de- 
veloped almost pragmatically while you were in 
the process of being born, being acculturated, and 
(through various vicissitudes) being projected 
toward the cap and gown which you wear this 
morning. My topic, then, is the interplay of 
ideas and action in modern America. 

I am by profession an historian and an econo- 
mist ; so my theoretical prism is that of the social 
scientist. The intellectual problems to which the 
social scientist has addressed himself over the 
past 20 years have been shaped by America's 
emerging world role to a degree which matches 
the extent to which science and engineering have 
been drawn into the challenges of weaponry and 

For this, neither the social scientist nor the 
natural scientist need apologize. We have not for- 
saken the long tradition of Western intellectual 
life. Many of the fundamental theoretical 

Jo/y 9, J 962 


achievenieiits of the natural sciences have resulted 
from efforts to solve practical problems — from the 
flow of the Nile in the ancient world to the re- 
quirements of navigation in the 15th and 16th 
centuries, down to the contemporary struggle to 
understand and to defeat the viruses. 

In the social sciences — from Aristotle to 
Keynes — most of the great theoretical works have 
also been, in part, pamphlets for the times. 

This is not to say that all natural scientists 
should attempt to solve engineering or medical 
problems, or that all fruitful work in the social 
sciences should incorporate recommendations for 
public policy. The world of ideas is a spacious 
world. It has place within it for all manner of 
talents and tastes : for those who find satisfaction 
ordering narrow areas of fact, as well as for those 
who are concerned with the "grand design"; for 
those who find in the world of ideas a pure, es- 
thetic satisfaction, as well as those who strain to 
extract from it practical lessons for the society of 
which they are a part and the human beings with 
whom they share a generation. 

Moreover, the world of science, whatever its 
relevance to the affairs of the day, should have a 
continuity and pride of its own — to a degree with- 
drawn, protected, and, if necessary, defiant of the 
active world. In the end, however, a rude prag- 
matism shapes the content of intellectual life, and, 
in turn, the behavior of practical men is governed 
by the abstractions which men of ideas have 
created in an effort to give a degree of order to 
the world of human beings and things about them. 

As Santayana said : 

Practical men may not notice it, but in fact liuman dis- 
course is intrinsically addressed not to natural existing 
things but to ideal essences, poetic or logical terms which 
thought may define and play with. When fortune or 
necessity diverts our attention from this congenial sport 
to crude facts and pressing issues, we turn our frail poetic 
ideas into symbols for those terrible irruptive things. In 
that paper money of our own stamping, the legal tender 
of the mind, we are obliged to reckon all the movements 
and values of the world. 

"We live at a time when the fate of our society — 
its ability to understand and control its environ- 
ment, indeed its ability to survive — is closely 
linked to the relationship which Santayana de- 
scribed. In the most practical and concrete sense, 
our ability to bring to bear on the "crude facts 
and pressing issues" the appropriate "legal tender 
of the mind" will determine whether our kind of 

society can maintain for itself a world environ- 
ment which will permit it to continue to develop 
in continuity with our historic past. It was one 
thing to build a humane democracy on an empty 
continent, protected from the struggles for world 
power; it is a quite different matter to maintain it 
in a world of nuclear weapons and missiles at a 
time when the protection of the whole free world 
against the dour and purposeful thrust of the 
Communist bloc comes instantly to rest on the 
American people. 

Intellectual Content of Military Policy 

The linkage between ideas and action is most 
obvious, of course, in the maldng of military 
policy and in contriving the instruments which 
will make it effective in a world of modern science 
and technology. The competitive arms race in 
which we are engaged reaches out into every field 
of science and engineering. The era of missiles 
and nuclear weapons has shaped — where it has 
not dominated — physics, electronics, chemistry, 
and the development of materials, as well as many 
other fields from meteorology to oceanography. 

But more is involved here than merely the con- 
struction in good time of the appropriate weapons 
and forces required to deter aggression. The pro- 
tection of the frontiers of freedom in ways which 
minimize the likelihood of a nuclear war is a most 
searching political and psychological — as well as 
scientific, engineering, and production — enter- 
prise. We are engaged in a relentless struggle 
with the Communist powers in which our strength 
and theirs, our vital interests and theirs, our 
diplomacy and theirs, the viability of free-world 
societies and theirs, are endlessly at play. 

There is hardly a diplomatic relationship we 
conduct in the world, or move that we make, that 
does not involve within it the question : Does the 
United States have the capacity and the will to use 
military force to back its play ? 

For that reason there is no posture which is 
more likely to lead to nuclear war than the notion 
that nuclear war is imthinkable. If nuclear war 
were unthinkable, there would be no limit to the 
temptations of those who are committed to the 
dangerous but illusory idea that world power 
is an attainable goal ; and if they were thus led to 
overplay their hand, we would have to react late 
and convulsively. 

At every stage, then, the protection of the free 

Department of Slate Butletin 

world from aggression by means which minimize 
the likelihood of nuclear war is a searching test 
of the capacity of our society not merely to de- 
velop the right kind of weapons in the right se- 
quence but of the ability of our society and its 
allies and friends so to conduct themselves as to 
make aggression in any form unattractive and to 
deal with aggression when it occurs in ways which 
minimize the likelihood that the ultimate sanction 
of nuclear strength would have to be invoked. 

This is a subtle and difficult business. But those 
who bear responsibility in our Government and, 
in the end, all of our people must understand its 
dimensions and accept it with coolness and poise. 
It requires an effort of imagination, an ability to 
translate hypothetical future situations into cur- 
rent action — into things as palpable as a new mis- 
sile or an outgomg cable. We must live with ab- 
stract projections into the future as if they were 
today's headlines, for the lead times of modern 
technology and modem communications give little 
time to learn on the job. 

This task requires a frame of mind very dif- 
ferent from Tocqueville's vision of Americans as 
simple empiricists immersing themselves in the 
palpable immediate tasks of organizing a conti- 
nental society and making it work. In military 
affairs we have historically been unprepared when 
conflict began, only then turning to the task of 
learning what the war was about, what it required 
of men and of arms. In the First and Second 
"World Wars our power was only coming to a 
peak as the wars came to an end. Time, distance, 
and allies made this a possible posture for the 
United States, although costly to the world at 
large and to oui-selves. The relevant time is now 
reduced to hours, if not minutes; distance has 
shrunk so that we now stand in the front line; 
and there are no allies to buy us time to mobilize 
and to learn. We must, therefore, steadily be- 
have in ways which pei'suade a potential enemy 
that war is unprofitable; and, as a result, the in- 
tellectual content of military policy — the role of 
ideas and of the ability to act on ideas — becomes 
critical. And this is, of course, equally the case 
with that aspect of military policy which consists 
of the field of arms control and disarmament, for, 
if we are to make progress in this area — as we must 
over the long pull — it will come about not from 
wishful hopes but from hardheaded creation, in- 
volving scientific, military, and political thought, 

July 9, 7962 

644916 — 62 3 

combined, at last, with a Soviet acceptance of ef- 
fective international inspection. 

"We Must Understand the Minds of Many Peoples" 

Wliat is ti'ue of military and arms control policy 
is true in a different way of our relations with the 
various regions and peoples of the globe. 

The interests of nations are now so sensitively 
interwoven and communications are so quick and 
ample that conventional diplomacy no longer de- 
scribes how tlie world works. Our allies in 
Europe, for example, who depend on our military 
strength for their security and will do so for the 
foreseeable future, are as sensitive to the inoods 
and nuances of American politics as any Ameri- 
can. An ambiguous phrase, a misinterpreted back- 
ground conference, an imagined line of policy 
deduced from some action we take — these produce 
reactions which are much more like the inter- 
play of politics within a given nation than the 
formal discourse of classic diplomacy. 

More than that, we are caught up with our 
European friends — and also with Japan and the 
countries of the British Commonwealth — in a 
period of extraordinary structural change in the 
world's arrangements. Everywhere old relation- 
ships are changing and new ones are being forged. 
Eveiywhere nations are redefining where they 
stand on the world scene, what their relations to 
their neighbors and to the whole community of 
nations will be. The changes involved in the 
British entry into the Common Market and the 
forging of a new transatlantic partnership go 
deep into the history of each nation concerned, to 
their view of themselves and of the futm-e. For 
Americans to play a constructive role in this ex- 
citing new phase of history requires of us a sym- 
pathetic knowledge of other people's histoiy, of 
their perspectives, their fears, and their ambitions 
more profound than any required of us in the past. 
We cannot rely here — any more than we can in 
military policy — on simple, pragmatic learning 
on the job or a projection to others of attitudes 
instinctive to us. We must reach out and under- 
stand the minds of many peoples if this great job 
of architecture, in which we are engaged with our 
friends, is to be sovmd and stand the tests and 
strains of time. 

Even more difficult, perhaps, is the task of creat- 
ing and bringing to bear the ideas and actions 
which will relate us to the nations, mainly in the 


southern half of the globe, which are now caught 
up in the adventure of modernizing their socie- 
ties — nations new and old, in Asia, the Middle 
East,, Africa, and Latin America. They are in 
stages of development which we knew in our own 
experience only a century or more ago. Moreover, 
they are learning how to organize themselves for 
growth and beginning to grow in settings very 
different from early 19th-century America. Not 
only do they lack the special blessing that we 
had — of much good land and relatively few 
people— but they come to these tasks out of his- 
torical and cultural settings very different from 
that of the United States. 

Nevertheless, if we are to maintain for our own 
society a world environment which will permit us 
to develop in continuity with our past, we must 
understand these distant societies and understand 
them with sufficient insight and sympathy so that 
we can work in partnership with the men and 
women, as well as the governments, they contain. 

This is a difficult job. It requires that we de- 
velop concepts of economic, social, and political 
development which transcend our own experience 
and embrace their problems. 

But it is not an impossible job, and it is made 
easier because, in the end, we Americans cannot 
resist supporting the disadvantaged and we find 
it difficult to keep out of great constructive ven- 
tures. It is made easier, also, because behind the 
particular problems of the new nations and the 
special settings in which they occur are universal 
and recognizable human impulses — for the dignity 
of their nations and the welfare of their children. 

Nevertheless, to formulate and execute policies 
which will link the more developed and less devel- 
oped nations of the free world requires of us a 
marriage of ideas and action as challenging as that 
required to conduct a rational military policy in a 
world of nuclear weapons. 

Historical Processes of Peaceful Change 

But that is not all. If the great struggle in 
which we are engaged on the world scene is to be 
resolved without war, it must be resolved on the 
basis of historical processes of peaceful change. 
Earely in history has any group of men more 
plainly articulated their hostile objectives than the 
Communist leadership in stating their intentions 
toward the free world. If we are not prepared for 

any form of aggression — from nuclear war to 
guerrillas in the rice paddies — it is not the fault 
of our opponents. On the other hand, it is not 
enough for us to regard them merely as a hostile 
force. History has not stopped witliin the Com- 
munist bloc. There are forces at work making for 
change. Moreover, the simple vision of Marx and 
Ijenin did not prepare the Communist leadership 
for a world of nuclear weapons and of resurgent 
nationalism on both sides of the Iron Curtain, or 
for a system of democratic capitalism which has 
exhibited a remarkable resilience and capacity for 
adaptation. Nor did it prepare them to grow food 
efficiently or to cope with generations of the young 
who, looking about in the dim, bureaucratic world 
of a police state, set aside the slogans, examine the 
world about them as it really is, and commit them- 
selves to the search for answers to the oldest and 
most basic human questions — the meaning of life 
and how the integrity and uniqueness of the in- 
dividual should find expression in a complex 

And so there is thrust on us not merely the re- 
quirement of defending a free-world community 
in an age of modem technology, not merely the 
task of weaving together its more developed and 
less developed regions, but also the need to under- 
stand with insight the forces at work in Com- 
munist societies and the duty to encourage the 
development of areas — even limited areas — of 
overlapping interest. 

In the end, then, the making of public policy in 
the times in which we live is a most searching 
task in engineering. "We must bring to bear on our 
environment in a unified way all that both the 
natural and social sciences can teach us; and we 
must do so in settings which cannot be read out 
automatically from either the social or technologi- 
cal life of contemporary America. 

It is a fair question to ask whether the intel- 
lectual and philosophical traditions of our nation 
and its educational institutions are capable of pro- 
ducing men who can cope with this searching 
test — who can both generate the appropriate ideas 
and put them into action. I believe, quite soberly, 
that we have cause for confidence. Just as a cen- 
tury ago in the Morrill Act we launched a set of 
institutions which could serve our society at a 
time when we needed improved agricultural tech- 
nology, railway, mining, and industrial engineers, 
our contemporary institutions have responded in 

Department of State Bulletin 

a remarkable way to the current requirements of 
our society. 

But whatever new intellectual and operational 
virtuosity we develop, it is essential that we retain 
certain old American virtues: above all the con- 
viction that, within limits, the future can be 
shaped, that problems can be solved, and tliat, 
with strength, patience, and insight, the long tra- 
dition of which we are a pai-t shall continue to be 
the mainstream of human history, to be joined by 
non- Western streams which essentially share its 
humane ethic. 

Our nation was born out of a commitment to 
ideas — incorporated in the Declaration of Inde- 
pendence and the Constitution — which transcend 
our own borders. There has never been a time, 
not even at the height of the Second World War, 
when this commitment has been more real or re- 
quired of us more loyalty. 

Continuity and Progress 

Now, if I may, a final word. This is the first 
commencement speech I've made since I graduated 
from New Haven High School in 1932. I am 
conscious of the tradition that what is said on 
such occasions should incoiporate a measure of 
advice, as you go forth to the next stage of your 
careers. On the other hand, I am by profession a 
teacher. And a teacher knows some things better 
than most. He knows that in personal matters 
advice, especially advice on a broadside basis, is of 
little help. We each make our way — and our mis- 
takes — on our own. He knows that in the realm 
of ideas the young climb easily on our shoulders — 
absorbing quickly what we have created — and they 
move easily beyond; and this sense of continuity 
and progress in the world of ideas, through con- 
tact with students, is, I can tell you, the gloiy of 
being a teacher. 

And much the same is true in public policy. We 
who now bear a measure of responsibility in 
Washington are building on all those who have 
gone before. Whei'e we hav^e moved correctly, we 
have learned from past successes and failures. Our 
job is to do the best we can, in our time. Your job 
will be to bring to bear the fruits of your own 
study and your own quite different experience, 
when your time comes. The last thing in the world 
you now need is for me to tell you what you should 
think and do. 

But I would say this. There are those, viewing 
the tensions and weapons of our times, the envi- 
ronment of revolution in the world about us, who 
hanker for quieter days, who look with nostalgia 
to a past when the world environment of our 
society was less dangerous and the challenges to 
us less severe. I put it to you that these are great 
times. We are the trustees of the principles of 
national independence and human freedom all 
over the globe; and, given our history, this is a 
proud and natural responsibility. 

We are challenged — as controller of the greatest 
military force the world has ever seen — to see this 
planet safely through these times until the day 
when nuclear weapons are brought under effective 
international discipline and control. 

We are challenged at home to maintain and 
develop this society as a solid base for our world 
position, and this challenge comes to rest on our 
scientists and engineers, our business and labor 
leaders, our school boards — in fact, it comes to 
rest on every citizen. 

It was never promised to man that life would be 
without risk, and we Americans have achieved 
nothing on this continent without effort and 
danger. As you move out from this place to as- 
sume responsibility in our society, you do so know- 
ing that, as individuals and Americans, there are 
tasks ahead which will challenge your unique 
capacities to the limit. 

Letters of Credence 


Tlie newly appointed Ambassador of Argentina, 
Roberto T. Alemann, presented his credentials to 
President Kennedy on Jmie 19. For texts of the 
Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, 
see Department of State press release 401 dated 
June 19. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Spain, 
Antonio Garrigues y Diaz-Canabate, presented 
his credentials to President Kennedy on June 20. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release 404 dated June 20. 

Jo/y 9, 1962 


Defense Arrangements of the North Atlantic Community 

hy Robert S. McNmnara 
Secretary of Defense ^ 

I am glad to be home, and I am particularly 
glad to be here for a university occasion. For this 
university gives meaning and focus to life in Ann 
Arbor — even for those wlio are not privileged to be 
associated witli it directly — as the academic com- 
munity serves to clarify the objectives and focus 
the energies of the free world. 

President Kennedy aptly described the function 
of the miiversity when he said : - 

The pursuit of knowledge . . . rests ... on the idea 
of a world based on diversity, self-determination, and 
freedom. And that is the kind of world to which we 
Americans, as a nation, are committed by the principles 
upon which the great Republic was founded. 

As men conduct the pursuit of knowledge, they create a 
world which freely unites national diversity and inter- 
national partnership. 

Commencement orators like to point to the fact 
that what we celebrate here is not an end but a 
beginning. I prefer to take my text from another 
aspect of the occasion wltich we are observing 

The ancient formula for the award of academic 
degrees admits you into a long-established com- 
munity, whether it be the fellowship of educated 
men, or the ancient and honorable company of 
scholars, of which you are the newest members. 
This community embodies the highest ideals of the 
free world. Its membership includes people of 
every race, color, and creed. They share a com- 
mon language, the language of ideas. They are 
dedicated to the fullest possible development of the 

' Address made at commencement exercises at the Uni- 
versity of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., on June 16 (De- 
partment of Defense press release). 

' Bulletin of Apr. 16, 19C2, p. 615. 

individual human potential. And the only re- 
quirement for admission is a demonstrated capac- 
ity for and commitment to the use of one's powers 
of reason. 

What I want to talk to you about here today are 
some of the concrete problems of maintaining a 
free community in the world today. I want to 
talk to you particidarly about the problems of the 
community that bind together the United States 
and the countries of Western Europe. 

The Lessons of Europe 

Europe is the source of many of our traditions. 
One of these is the tradition of the university, 
which we can trace back to the groves of Academe, 
on the same site where only a few weeks ago the 
foreign ministers and ministers of defense of the 
European nations and the United States met to 
discuss their common problems.^ 

I need scarcely remind you that Europe is one 
of the great sources of the American idea of free- 
dom and that it was the European philosophers of 
the 17th and 18th centuries who shaped the think- 
ing of our own Founding Fathers. For all of us, 
Europe has been our teacher since we first learned 
to read. 

One of the most impressive lessons that Europe 
has provided us recently is the lesson of her re- 
vival from the ashes of destruction at the end of 
the Second World War. The national economies 
of Europe were almost at a standstill 15 years ago. 
Their capital plant was largely destroyed, either 
directly by bombing or indirectly by years of 
neglect and patchwork repair. The people were 

'/^i(f., May 28, 19G2, p. 861. 


Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bu/fefin 

exhausted by 6 years of war, and a large part of 
the most productive age group had been wiped 
out. Yet in the last 10 years they have managed 
to increase the production of steel and electricity 
by over 130 percent each, and tliis has been typical 
of the recovery pattern. 

The pump-priming help of the American 
Marshall Plan came at a crucial time in the process 
of European recovery. But the genius of the plan, 
as envisaged by men like George Marshall and 
Harry Truman, was to help the Europeans help 

At the same time that the nations of Europe 
were rebuilding at home, they were going through 
the difficult and often painful process of reestab- 
lishing their relationships with the peoples of 
Africa and Asia, no longer as a master and serv- 
ant but as members of the human race, all equally 
entitled to develop their individual capabilities. 
This process of change is by no means complete, 
and there are still difficult times ahead. But the 
joint achievement of Europe and its former colo- 
nies in revising their relations with each other 
is at least as impressive as the economic recovery 
of Europe itself. 

What may be the greatest postwar European 
achievement is still in the making. The nations 
of Europe have begun to level the outmoded bar- 
riers that confined their individual economies 
within national boundaries. As Jean Monnet, the 
principal architect of the new Europe puts it. 

An entirely new situation has been created in the world, 
simply by adding six countries together. It's not an addi- 
tion ; in fact, it's a multiplication. Xou multiply the 
capabilities of the countries you unite. A dynamic proc- 
ess is beginning that is changing the face of Europe and 
the role of Europeans in the world. 

The making of Europe has only begun, and in- 
deed it is perhaps at its most critical stage. But 
we should not overlook the fact that French coal 
and German steel now move freely across the 
Continent, and that German refrigerators and 
Italian shoes are being sold increasingly without 
restriction in Belgian department stores. 

Challenges Confronting the Free World 

All of these achievements have been accom- 
plished under pressure from titanic forces which 
make a rational organization of hmnan society in- 
creasingly difficult both for the Europeans and for 

ourselves. Let me mention some of these forces. 

We are confronted with a population explosion 
resulting from our own success in coping widi 
disease and abnormalities and by now threatening 
to double the earth's population by the end of tliis 
century. Unless we can control this explosion in 
the poor and resource-limited coimtries, the effects 
of economic growth may be canceled out by popu- 
lation growth, and unsatisfied rising expectations, 
particularly m the yoimger nations, may upset the 
delicate balance of political stability. 

We are borne along by the acceleratmg pace of 
science and tecluiology. In this comitry alone, 
new inventions are patented at a rate of 50,000 a 
year. Our population of scientists and engineers 
has increased by more than 40 percent in tlie last 
8 years. In fact, 80 percent of all scientists and 
engineers who have lived throughout histoiy are 
alive today. 

We are faced with an extraordinary increase in 
the num.ber of national states. Since World War 
II, 35 new nations have been formed. Each new 
nation expresses the natural desire for self-deter- 
mination and self-government. But their num- 
bers complicate the problem of international 
diplomacy at the same time that military and 
economic developments increase our interdepend- 
ence. Every nation is more and more directly 
affected by the internal situation of its neighbors, 
and the globe has shrunk to the point where we 
are all each other's neighbors. 

Lastly, we live in the shadow of the Sino-Soviet 
drive for world domination — surely not the only 
shadow on the world today, but one of the longest 
and deepest. By itself it represents the most seri- 
ous military force this nation has ever faced; by 
its exploitation of the entire world's troubles, it 
is a threat of a kind that is as new to the world 
as the rising technologies and populations and na- 
tional sovereignties themselves. 

In the face of all these challenges, the ultimate 
objective of the free world is to establish a system 
of peaceful world order, based on the dignity of 
the individual and dedicated to the free develop- 
ment of each man's capacities. The members of 
the North Atlantic community — the Europeans 
and ourselves — bear a special responsibility to help 
achieve this objective. This responsibility derives 
from the strength of our internal institutions and 
the wealth of our material resources. 

July 9, 7962 

The Military Power Base 

But we cannot hope to move toward our ob- 
jective unless we move from strength. Part of 
that strength must be military strength. But I 
want to emphasize that we see our military 
strength, not as the means of achieving the kind 
of world we seek, but as a shield to prevent any 
other nation from using its military strength, 
either directly or through threats and intimida- 
tion, to frustrate tlie aspirations we share with all 
the free peoples of the world. The aggressive use 
of military strength is foreign to the best tradi- 
tions of the United States. And, as the President 
]>ointed out last week," "the basic problems facing 
the world today are not susceptible of a final 
military solution." 

Wliat the militai-y component of our national 
power must do, and what we must see that it is 
capable of doing, is to assure to the peoples of the 
free world the freedom to choose their own course 
of development. 

Yet the nature and extent of the military power 
base needed to meet the entire spectrum of chal- 
lenges confronting the free world is beyond the 
capacity of any single nation to provide. Since 
our own security cannot be separated from the 
security of the rest of the free world, we neces- 
sarily rely on a series of alliances, the most im- 
portant of which is the North Atlantic Treaty 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NATO was born in 1949 out of the confronta- 
tion with the Soviet Union that ensued from the 
breakdown in relations between the former war- 
time allies. The Soviet Union had absorbed the 
states of Eastern Europe into its own political 
framework, most dramatically with the Czecho- 
slovakian coup of 1948. It had been fomenting 
insurrection in Greece, menacing Turkey, and en- 
couraging the Communist parties in Western 
Eui-ope to seize power in the wake of postwar 
economic disorder. The shai-pest threat to Europe 
came with the first Berlin crisis, when the Russians 
attempted to blockade the western sectors of the 
city. Our response was immediate and positive. 
President Truman ordered an airlift for the iso- 

For text of remarks made by President Kennedy at 
the United States Military Academy, West Point, N.T., 
on June 6, see White Ilonse press release dated June 6. 

lated population of West Berlin which, in time, 
denied the Soviets their prize. The Marshall 
Plan, then in full swing, was assisting the eco- 
nomic recovery of the Western European nations. 
The Truman Doctrine had brought our weight to 
bear in Greece and Turkey to prevent the erosion 
of their independence. 

But Western statesmen concluded that it would 
be necessary to secure the strength and growth of 
the North Atlantic community with a more perma- 
nent arrangement for its defense. The effective 
defense of Western Europe could not really be 
accomplished without a commitment of the United 
States to that defense for the long term. We 
made this commitment without hesitation. 
Arthur Vandenberg, one of the chief architects 
of NATO, expressed the rationale of the organiza- 
tion in the Senate debate preceding passage of the 

. . . this is the logical evolution of one of our greatest 
American idioms, "united we stand, divided we fall." 

The North Atlantic alliance is a unique aline- 
ment of governments. The provision for the com- 
mon defense of the members has led to a remark- 
able degree of military collaboration and diplo- 
matic consultation for a peacetime coalition. The 
growth of the alliance organization has accelerated 
as the task of defending the treaty area has in- 
creased in scope, size, and complexity. NATO 
has had its stresses and strains, but it has 
weathered them all. 

Today NATO is involved in a niunber of con- 
troversies, which must be resolved by achieving a 
consensus within the organization in order to pre- 
serve its strength and unity. The question has 
arisen whether Senator Vandenberg's assertion is 
as true today as it was when he made it 13 years 
ago. Three argimients have raised this question 
most sharply: 

It has been argued that the very success of 
Western European economic development reduces 
Europe's need to rely on the United States to 
share in its defenses. 

It has been argued that the increasing vulner- 
ability of the United States to nuclear attack 
makes us less willing as a partner in the defense 
of Europe and hence less effective in deterring 
such an attack. 

It has been argued that nuclear capabilities are 
alone relevant in the face of the growing nuclear 
threat and that independent national nuclear 

Deparlmenf of State Bulletin 

forces are sufficient to protect the nations of 

I believe that all of these argiunents are mis- 
taken. I think it is worth while to expose the 
U.S. views on these issues as we have presented 
them to our allies. In our view, the effect of the 
new factors in the situation, both economic and 
militai-y, has been to increase the interdependence 
of national security interests on both sides of the 
Atlantic and to enhance the need for the closest 
coordination of our efforts. 

Nuclear Strategy 

A central military issue facing NATO today is 
the role of nuclear strategy. Four facts seem to 
us to dominate consideration of that role. All of 
them point in the direction of increased integra- 
tion to achieve our common defense. First, the 
alliance has overall nuclear strength adequate to 
any challenge confronting it. Second, this 
strength not only minimizes the likelihood of 
major nuclear war but makes possible a strategy 
designed to preserve the fabric of our societies if 
war should occur. Third, damage to the civil soci- 
eties of the alliance resulting from nuclear war- 
fare could be very gi-ave. Foiu'th, improved non- 
nuclear forces, well within alliance resources, 
could enhance deterrence of any aggressive moves 
short of direct, all-out attack on Western Europe. 

Let us look at the situation today. First, given 
the current balance of nuclear power, which we 
confidently expect to maintain in the years ahead, 
a surprise nuclear attack is simply not a rational 
act for any enemy. Nor would it be rational for 
an enemy to take the initiative in the use of 
nuclear weapons as an outgrowth of a limited 
engagement in Europe or elsewhere. I think we 
are entitled to conclude that either of these actions 
has been made highly imlikely. 

Second, and equally important, the mere fact 
that no nation could rationally take steps leading 
to a nuclear war does not guarantee that a nuclear 
war cannot take place. Not only do nations some- 
times act in ways that are hard to explain on a 
rational basis, but even when acting in a "rational" 
way they sometimes, indeed disturbingly often, act 
on the basis of misunderstandings of the true facts 
of a situation. They misjudge the way others will 
react and the way othei-s will interpret what they 
are doing. 

We must hope— indeed I think we have good 

July 9, 1962 

reason to hope — that all sides will understand this 
danger and will refrain from steps that even raise 
the possibility of such a mutually disasti'ous mis- 
understanding. We have taken imilateral steps 
to reduce the like! ihood of such an occurrence. We 
look forward to the prospect that through arms 
control the actual use of these tei-rible weapons 
may be completely avoided. It is a problem not 
just for us in the West but for all nations that are 
involved in this struggle we call the cold war. 

For our part we feel we and our NATO allies 
must frame our strategy with this terrible con- 
tingency, however remote, in mind. Simply ignor- 
ing the problem is not going to make it go away. 

The United States has come to the conclusion 
that, to the extent feasible, basic militai-y strategy 
in a possible general nuclear war should be ap- 
proached in much the same way that more conven- 
tional military operations have been regarded in 
the past. That is to say, principal military objec- 
tives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from 
a major attack on the alliance, should be the de- 
struction of the enemy's military forces, not of his 
civilian population. 

The veiy strength and nature of the alliance 
forces make it possible for us to retain, even m 
the face of a massive surprise attack, sufficient re- 
serve striking power to destroy an enemy society 
if driven to it. In other words, we are giving a 
possible opponent the strongest imaginable incen- 
tive to refrain from striking our own cities. 

The strength that makes these contributions to 
deterrence and to the hope of deterring attack 
upon civil societies even in wartime does not come 
cheap. We are confident that our current nuclear 
programs are adequate and will continue to be 
adequate for as far into the future as we can rea- 
sonably foresee. During the coming fiscal year 
the United States plans to spend close to $15 billion 
on its nuclear weapons to assure their adequacy. 
For what this money buys, there is no substitute. 

In particular, relatively weak national nuclear 
forces with enemy cities as their targets are not 
likely to be sufficient to perform even the function 
of deterrence. If they are small, and perhaps 
vulnerable on the ground or in the air, or inaccur- 
ate, a major antagonist can take a variety of meas- 
ures to counter them. Indeed, if a major an- 
tagonist came to believe there was a substantial 
likelihood of its being used independently, this 
force would be inviting a preemptive first strike 


against it. In the event of war, the use of such a 
force against tlie cities of a major nuclear power 
would be tantamount to suicide, whereas its em- 
ploj'ment against significant military targets 
would have a negligible effect on the outcome of the 
conflict. Meanwhile the creation of a single addi- 
tional national nuclear force encourages the pro- 
liferation of nuclear power with all of its at- 
tendant dangers. 

In short, then, limited nuclear capabilities, oper- 
ating independently, are dangerous, expensive, 
prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as 
a deterrent. Clearly, the United States nuclear 
contribution to the alliance is neither obsolete nor 

Importance of Central Control 

At the same time, the general strategy I have 
summarized magnifies the importance of unity of 
planning, concentration of executive authority, 
and central direction. There must not be compet- 
ing and conflicting strategies to meet the contin- 
gency of nuclear war. We are convinced that a 
general nuclear war target system is indivisible 
and if, despite all our efforts, nuclear war should 
occur, our best hope lies in conducting a centrally 
controlled campaign against all of the enemy's 
vital nuclear capabilities, while retaming reserve 
forces, all centrally controlled. 

We know that the same forces which are tar- 
geted on ourselves are also targeted on our allies. 
Our o\vn strategic retaliatory forces are prepared 
to respond against these forces, wherever they are 
and whatever their targets. This mission is as- 
signed not only in fulfillment of our treaty com- 
mitments but also becuuse the character of nuclear 
war compels it. More specifically, the United 
States is as much concerned with that portion of 
Soviet nuclear striking power that can reach 
Western Europe as with that portion that also 
can reach the United States. In short, we have 
undertaken the nuclear defense of NATO on a 
global basis. This will continue to be our objec- 
tive. In the execution of this mission, the weapons 
in the European theater are only one resource 
among many. 

There is, for example, the Polaris force, which 
we have been substantially increasing and which, 
because of its specially invulnerable nature, is 
peculiarly well suited to serve as a strategic re- 
serve force. We have already annoimced the com- 


mitment of five of these ships, fully operational, '"'"'■^ 
to the NATO Command. ''"'" 

This sort of commitment has a corollary for the^ 
alliance as a whole. We want and need a greater' 
degree of alliance participation in formulating 
nuclear weapons policy to the greatest extent pos-' 
sible. We would all find it intolerable to contem- 
plate having only a part of the strategic force 
launched in isolation from our main striking 

We shall continue to maintain powerful nuclear 
forces for the alliance as a whole. As the Presi- 
dent has said,^ 

Only through such strength can we be certain of de- 
terring a nuclear strike, or an overwhelming ground at- 
tack, upon our forces and allies. 

But let us be quite clear about what we are say- 
ing and what we would have to face if the deter- 
rent should fail. This is the almost certain pros- 
pect that, despite our nuclear strength, all of us 
would suffer deeply in the event of major nuclear 

We accept our share of this responsibility within 
the alliance. And we believe that the combination 
of our nuclear strength and a strategy of controlled 
response gives us some hope of minimizing damage 
in the event that we have to fulfill our pledge. 
But I must point out that we do not regard this 
as a desirable prospect, nor do we believe that the 
alliance should depend solely on our nuclear power 
to deter actions not involving a massive commit- 
ment of any hostile force. Surely an alliance with 
the wealth, talent, and experience that we possess 
can find a better way than extreme reliance on 
nuclear weapons to meet our common threat. We 
do not believe that if the formula E=MC' had not 
been discovered, we should all be Communist 
slaves. On this question I can see no valid reason 
for a fundamental difference of view on the two 
sides of the Atlantic. 

inns tlii 

lure ad 
years li 

lave It 
BOW an 
to imp 



Strengthening NATO's Nonnuclear Power 

With the alliance possessing the strength and 
the strategy I have described, it is most unlikely 
that any power will launch a nuclear attack on 
NATO. For the kinds of conflicts, both political 
and military, most likely to arise in the NATO 
area, our capabilities for response must not be 
limited to nuclear weapons alone. The Soviets 
have superiority in nonnuclear forces in Europe 

' Bulletin of Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443. 

Depattmenf of State Bullef'in 


today. But that superiority is by no means over- 
wlielming. Collectively, the alliance has the po- 
tential for a successful defense against such forces. 
In manpower alone, NATO has more men under 
arms than the Soviet Union and its European 
satellites. "VVe have already shown our willingness 
to contribute through our divisions now in place 
on European soil. In order to defend the popula- 
tions of the NATO countries and to meet our treaty 
obligations, we have put in hand a series of meas- 
ures to strengthen our nonnuclear power. We 
have added $10 billion for this purpose to the 
previously planned level of expenditures for fiscal 
years 1962 and 1963. To tide us over while new 
permanent strength was being created, we called 
up 158,000 reservists. We will be releasing them 
this summer, but only because in the meantime we 
have built up on an enduring basis more added 
strength than the callup temporarily gave us. The 
number of U.S. combat-ready divisions has been 
increased from 11 to 16. Stockpiled in Europe 
now are full sets of equipment for two additional 
divisions ; the men of these divisions can be rapidly 
moved to Europe by air. 

We expect that our allies will also undertake to 
strengthen further their nonnuclear forces and 
to improve the quality and staying power of these 
forces. These achievements will complement our 
deterrent strength. With improvements in alli- 
ance ground-force strength and staying power, 
improved nonnuclear air capabilities, and better 
equipped and trained reserve forces, we can be 
assured that no deficiency exists in the NATO de- 
fense of this vital region and that no aggression, 
small or large, can succeed. 

Military Security, a Base for Free-World Strength 

I have described very briefly the United States 
views on the role of nuclear forces in the strategy 
of the alliance. I have pointed out that the alli- 
ance necessarily depends, for the deterrence of 
general nuclear war, on the powerful and well- 
protected nuclear forces of the United States, 
which are necessarily committed to respond to 
enemy nuclear strikes wherever they may be made. 
At the same time I have indicated the need for 
substantial nonnuclear forces within the alliance 
to deal with situations where a nuclear response 
may be inappropriate or simply not believable. 
Throughout I have emphasized that we in the al- 
liance all need each other. 

July 9, 1962 

I want to remind you also that the security pro- 
vided by military strength is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for the achievement of our 
foreign policy goals, including our goals in the 
field of arms control and disarmament. Military 
security provides a base on which we can build 
free-world strength through the economic ad- 
vances and political reforms which are the object 
of the Presidents programs, like the Alliance for 
Progress and the trade expansion legislation. 
Only in a peaceful world can we give full scope 
to the individual potential, which is for us the 
ultimate value. 

A distinguished European visited the United 
States last month as a guest of the President. 
Andre Malraux, French Minister of State for 
Cultural Affairs, is an eminent novelist and critic. 
He led an archeological expedition to Cambodia 
and fought in the Spanish Civil War and the 
French Resistance Movement. Malraux paid a 
moving tribute to our nation when he said : 

The only nation that has waged war but not worshipped 
it, that has won the greatest power in the world but not 
sought it, that has wrought the greatest weapon of death 
but has not wished to wield it ... . May it inspire men 
with dreams worthy of its action. 

The community of learning to which you have 
been admitted carries with it great privileges. It 
also carries great responsibilities. And perhaps 
the greatest of these is to help insure the wise use 
of our national power. Let me parajjlirase Mal- 
raux : May your dreams be worthy of action and 
your actions be shaped by your dreams. 

U.S. and U.A.R. Hold Air Talks 

Press release 406 dated June 21 

Delegations of the United States and the United 
Arab Republic initiated civil aviation consul- 
tations at Washington on June 19, 1962. The 
delegations are discussing various air transport 
problems in accordance with the bilateral air 
transport agreement of 1946.^ 

The chairman of the United Arab Republic dele- 
gation is Gen. Ahmad Abdel-Hamid Self, Director 
General of Civil Aviation, Ministry of War. The 
United States delegation is headed by Henry T. 
Snowdon, Chief, Aviation Division, Department 
of State. 

' 61 Stat. 3825 ; Treaties 
Series 3884. 

md Other International Acts 


Splendid Slaves and Reasoning Savages 

hy Carl T. Rowan 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Puhlic Affairs ' 

I say with deep sincerity that I am pleased to 
speak here toniglit — and not simply because your 
invitation has afforded me another oi^portimity 
to enjoy the summer delights of IMinnesota. I am 
pleased because this graduation ceremony and the 
thousands more like it that are taking place around 
the Nation are so vitally important to the State 
Department and the work it seeks to do. 

For that reason I shall not give what you may 
consider a "typical" commencement speech. I 
know that this is a warm evening and that those 
robes are not air-conditioned ; still I intend to speak 
on a foreign policy matter of great seriousness. If 
the dread specter of boredom has arisen, let me 
assure you that I shall discuss a mattar that di- 
rectly involves you; it bears on the question of 
whether you move on to work or war, to college or 
militaiT camp. So I am confident that you will 
find the subject fitting for this occasion. 

Let me begin by citing a few words written by 
Joseph Addison in The Spectator more than 250 
years ago: 

Education is a companion which no misfortune can 
depress, no crime can destro.v, no enemy can alienate, no 
despotism can enslave. At home a friend, abroad an 
introduction, in solitude a solace, and in society an orna- 
ment. It chastens vice, it guides virtue, it gives, at once, 
grace and government to genius. Without it, what is 
mankind? A splendid slave, a reasoned savage. 

We have had two and a half centuries to learn 
the wisdom of that remark, and we know today as 
perhaps never before that a well-educated citi- 
zenry is the first and last line of defense of a free 
society. But we do not always understand the 
practical, issue-by-issue ways in which the wisdom. 

'Address made at commencement exercises at Owa- 
tonna High School, Owatonna, Minn., on June 7 (press 
i; as-delivered text). 

or lack of wisdom, of the public bears directly on 
the question of national survival. This is what 
I want to discuss. 

I must begin by emphasizing that this is a long 
and complex struggle that our country is in. 

In the fierce battles of the past our security 
depended primarily on the military shrewdness of 
the Cbmniander in Chief and of the generals in 
the field. 

The Congress and the American public obviously 
had strong feelings and a passionate interest in 
the outcome of these wars, but none seemed to feel 
qualified to try to alter the strategy of our mili- 
tary planners at Anzio or Salerno or Tarawa or 
Okinawa. However high emotions may have risen 
against the Japanese or the Nazis, there was no 
room for pure emotion in the war rooms where 
long-trained, dedicated men planned the intri- 
cate details of attack and comiterattack. 

While the countiy's survival is as much at stake 
today as it was durhig any shooting war, the 
struggle is not primarily militaiy. 

As the President said to the graduating class at 
West Point Wednesday [June 6] : - 

. . . the basic problems facing the world today are not 
susceptible of a final military solution. While we will 
long require the services and admire the dedication and 
commitment of the fighting men of this country, neither 
our strategy nor our psychology as a nation, and certainly 
not our economy, must become permanently dependent 
upon an ever-increasing Military Establishment. 

Our forces, therefore, must fulfill a broader role, as 
a complement to our diplomacy, as an arm of our diplo- 
macy, as a deterrent to our adversarie.s, and as a symbol 
to our allies of our determination to support them. 

The great battles of today are diplomatic. Our 

For text, see White House press release dated June 6. 
Department of State Bulletin 

key planners are civilians rather than generals 
and colonels and corporals. They are using in- 
tellectual maneuvers rather than the techniques 
of beach invasions and bombing runs. We are in 
a long intellectual struggle to prove that we know 
more about human nature and the aspirations of 
mankind than do the tyrannical leaders of the 
Sino-Soviet bloc. 

A difficult thing for our open society, with its 
checks and balances, is the fact that while Con- 
gressmen and editors and housewives and college 
students never pretended to have the military wis- 
dom to overrule an Eisenhower or Omar Bradley, 
these groups eagerly declare their shrewdness in 
the field of diplomacy. They do not hesitate to 
try to alter the strategy of battle in today's grim 
ideological contest. 

Views on Aid to Poland and Yugoslavia 

I refer specifically to yesterday's [June 6] ac- 
tion in which the Senate voted to bar any foreign 
aid to any country "known to be dominated by 
communism or Marxism." ^ 

Let me make it clear that under our form of 
government the Congress holds the purse strings 
and has every right to influence policy by tighten- 
ing or loosening those strings. That is what the 
Senate seeks to do with regard to our foreign 
policy where Yugoslavia and Poland are con- 

But it seems to me that our society faces a fun- 
damental question of wisdom here. To what ex- 
tent should Congressmen alter or sharj^ly change 
strategy in a life-and-death struggle involving 
matters on which many Congressmen can never be 
as well informed as the President, the Secretary 
of State, the diplomats intimately involved in that 
struggle ? 

Far be it from me to try to limit the swath cut 
by Congress. They represent the people. I can 
do no more than express one man's views to the 
people. The Senate action yesterday may be 
welcomed by those eager to show again and again 
their aversion to communism. But the questions 
more f arsighted Americans must ask are : 

"Does this display of contempt for communism 

' For a statement made by Secretary Rusk on June 6 
and texts of Senate amendments to the foreign aid bill, 
see Bulletin of July 2, 1962, p. 25. 

July 9, 1962 

in Yugoslavia and Poland really hurt the Com- 
munists we want to hurt ?" 

"Does this action really serve the interest of our 
nation and of our children ?" 

"Does it retard the spread of Sino-Soviet dom- 
ination of peoples we wish to be independent?" 

Obviously these are questions where men of 
honesty and integrity can come to different con- 
clusions. My conclusion is that the answer to each 
question is no — that a flat ban on aid to Poland 
or Yugoslavia or what some may label "Marxist 
countries" does not serve our national interest. 

In fact such a ban would very likely frustrate 
our diplomatic strategists in their efforts to 
achieve one of our fundamental goals : that is, to 
help peoples of other countries to achieve inde- 
pendence of the Soviet Union and to get these 
countries to refrain from assisting in Conmiunist 
efforts to subvert other countries. 

Reasons for U.S. Aid to Yugoslavia 

Wlien Yugoslavia cast off the yoke of total 
Soviet domination 14 years ago, we granted assist- 
ance without hesitation. We had no illusions 
about the fact that Yugoslavia's leaders were Com- 
mmiist, that her economic policies differed from 
ours, that her standards of freedom — of the press, 
of speech, and of the individual— were far short of 
what we consider proper. But we felt it was in 
our national interest and the interest of human 
freedom to help Yugoslavia to stand outside the 
bloc, a significant break in the Commimist mono- 

Yugoslav communism could be tolerated if it did 
not try to force itself on Yugoslavia's neighbors or 
on us — a policy point that President Kennedy 
spelled out eloquently in his interview with Soviet 
editor Adzhubei.* Beyond that, we could hope 
that in time a Yugoslav people who had mustered 
the courage to throw off Soviet domination might 
shake off the other trappings of Communist dicta- 
torship. We coidd hope — remembering that this 
struggle between two ideologies backed by unprece- 
dented military power is likely to be a long one and 
that some patience is required, even if we cannot 
consider it a virtue. 

'President Kennedy was interviewed by 
Adzhubel, editor of Izvestia, at Hyannis Port, Mass., on 
Nov. 25, 1961. 

Three administr;itioiis, including the Republi- 
cans for 8 years, agreed that aid to Yugoslavia 
was clearly in our interest. Officials in the State 
Department, well-trained and dedicated Ameri- 
cans who liave watched Yugoslav de^'elopments 
day after day, concluded that beyond doubt our 
helping this country to retain its independence 
lias been an advantage to the free, non-Conmiunist 

Yugoslavia has remained aloof from the ag- 
gressions and subvei-sions practiced by the rest of 
the Communist bloc. 

Her U.X. votes have reflected an independence 
of the Sino-Soviet bloc on several key issues. 

True, there have been actions and statements by 
leaders of both Yugoslavia and Poland which 
liave irritated and exasperated United States 
leaders. But our policymakers accept the cer- 
tainty that if our system triumphs and we help 
to establisli a world of free choice — a woi'ld of 
truly independent nations, free to express the will 
of their peoples — we shall have to live with occa- 
sional irritating and exasperating speeches and 

After all, our stanchest, most non-Commimist 
allies have provided more than a little irritation 
and exasperation for us over the years. And I am 
sure some of our oldest allies occasionally rue the 
day the British let us float off into independence, 
for we, too, can be exasperating. 

It seems to me that Americans must ask them- 
selves: "WHiat do we expect to gain by restricting 
flexibility on aid to Yugoslavia or Poland or other 
nations which speak in terms of Marxism or com- 
munism but have shown that they desire to stay 
free of Soviet imperialism? 

Do Americans really believe that such restric- 
tions will force these nations to march meekly into 
our camp so as to induce us to continue our 

Not only is this not likely to happen, but to give 
even the impression that we want it belies all that 
this country stands for. We have said again and 
again that we don't want satellites, even if we 
could buy them with aid. Satellite-ism is the 
Communist way, is the way of slavery. Funda- 
mental to our whole position is the principle of 
"consent of the governed." We want nations to be 
free enough and strong enough and secure enough 
to express freely their independence just as any 
American citizen does — even though these nations 


may sometimes be wrong, just as we permit our 
free citizens to be wrong. 

We tolerate error as long as those who err do 
not try to force their misguided ways on tlie rest 
of us, as long as their errors are not detrimental 
to the freedoms of the rest of society. 

As Secretary Rusk pointed out last night [June 
6], the only meaningful result of a flat ban on aid 
to Yugoslavia and Poland very likely would be to 
endanger tlie independence tliese coimtries now 
enjoy, and such freedom as their peoples have 
managed to achieve. The ban probably would push 
these countries back under Communist bloc domi- 

Value of Education in a Democracy 

Some of you may wonder what Yugoslavia and 
Poland and yesterday's Senate vote have got to 
do with 200 high school graduates and some 4,000 
of their relatives and friends in a southern Minne- 
sota community. 

I have said all this to say that this dispute over 
aid to Yugoslavia and Poland illustrates the cru- 
cial value of a good system of mass education in 
a democracy. It illustrates the need for us to in- 
sure that every youngster here who has the in- 
tellectual equipment is pushed on to higher edu- 

If this great world struggle is settled in war — 
God forbid ! — we shall be grateful to the schools 
that have produced the brainpower that has given 
this nation not only shrewd military tacticians but 
an awesome arsenal of power. But if the strug- 
gle is decided in the field of intellect and diplo- 
macy, we shall need the wisest, best educated 
public imaginable. 

The recent vote on the aid bill indicates to me 
that a President or a Secretary of State can 
hardly be expected to wage a war of intellect and 
diplomacy that goes far bej'ond the intellect and 
diplomatic skills of Congress and the public. But 
this is democracy. And this is sometimes re- 
ferred to as our countiy's great weakness. The 
Communists clearly — like tyrants of past eras — 
regard it as our weakness. 

I recall that in 1928, a decade or so before he 
joined Hitler in a futile attempt to crush de- 
mocracy, Benito ^Mussolini said : 

Democracy Is talking itself to death. The people do 
not know what they want; they do not know what is 
the best for them. There Is too much foolishness, too 

Department of Slafe Bulletin 

much lost motion. I have stopped the talk and the non- 
sense. I am a man of action. Democracy is beautiful 
in theory ; in practice it is a fallacy. You in America 
will see that some day. 

I say not only to you gi-aduates but to all who 
assemble here in pride at what you have accom- 
plished that in the long and difficult days of the 
cold war you shall have to prove that the people 
of a democracy do know what they want — that 
democracy can be beautiful in practice as well as 
theory. A good starting point would be for all 
of us to realize that we cannot in one moment of 
passion demand U.S. military action to help a 
Himgarian Commmiist leader, Imre Nagy, pull 
his countrymen free of Soviet domination, then 
in a later moment of frustration ban all assistance 
to a Yugoslav Communist leader who achieved 
what Nagy could not. 

Cultural and Educational Affairs in International Relations 

hy Lucius D. Battle 

Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs ^ 

It is this kind of glaring inconsistency that 
keeps dictators and would-be tyrants believing 
that the peoples of a democracy don't know what 
they want. 

Yes, as I said, we face a complex struggle, and 
there are no easy, sure-fire answers. But that is 
what makes a real challenge to intellect. 

That is why I welcome you graduates as brave 
new soldiers in a struggle of reason. You have 
taken a big stride toward getting the education 
that Addison called "a companion which no mis- 
fortune can depress, no crime can destroy, no 
enemy can alienate, no despotism can enslave." 

Go forth, yotmg people — and you go with my 
wish that none of you will join the ranks of what 
Addison called splendid slaves and reasoned 

I am delighted to be back in Williamsburg and 
particularly as the guest of the College of William 
and Mary. I am not exactly a stranger to these 
parts, nor am I a stranger to the class of 1962. I 
have sat with many of you in some of your classes. 
It has been my pleasure to have spoken to your 
clubs and to have faced the challenge of your 
debates and bull sessions. In a way I consider 
myself a member of your class, for your period in 
Williamsburg and my own overlapped in large 
measure. I find it all the more pleasing, therefore, 
to think that my new occupation, as the State 
Department officer responsible for educational and 
cultural affairs in the conduct of the international 
relations of the United States, permits me to 
return to this cherished spot and to address the 
latest graduates of this ancient college. 

Actually, as you well know, the two communi- 

^ Address made at commencement exercises at the Col- 
lege of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va., on June 
10 (press release 376 date June 8) . 

inly 9, 7962 

ties of Williamsburg, the two great institutions of 
our city, the college and the Eestoration, are 
dedicated to the same idea: the conservation and 
the interpretation of what is precious in our 
heritage. As historians, we all subscribe to 
Eanke's celebrated dictum : It is the historian's job 
to find out and to record "the way it really hap- 
pened." It is a difficult task, but we strive, with 
all the care and precision of which we are capable, 
to find out what really happened at Gettysburg 
or Versailles, what meaning Plato or Shakespeare 
or Jefferson intended, or how to re-create the 
Governor's Palace so that any visitor can imagine 
vividly how the Palace's inhabitants lived among 
its grandeurs. 

We do these things not just because we are 
antiquarians, loving the past for its own sake, but 
because we know that the past is truly an aspect 
of the present. As the famous inscription over 
our National Archives in Washington says, "What 
Is Past Is Prologue," and only those who truly 
know the past are able to apply its lessons to the 


building of the future. Besides, the more one 
learns about "the way it really happened," the 
better one understands that the past is not so 
different from the present as those imagine who 
know only the present. 

The more one applies oneself to learning to know 
a monument of the human intellect — whether it 
is a play, or a painting, or a building — the more 
one shares the experience of the readers or the 
spectators for whom the monument was first 
created. The Greeks who saw Sophocles' Oedipus 
Rex for the first time, and trembled at the power 
of that majestic and appalling tragedy, responded 
to it with the same immediacy of feeling that the 
Elizabethans brought to Hamlet or that we bring 
to a modern tragedy or to Igor Stravinslrv's great 
opera based on Oedipus. All great art is modern 
for the spectator who is able to understand it. 

Art is universal, not only in time but also in 
space. Last winter Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
presented a medal to Igor Stravinsky on behalf of 
the Department. On that occasion. Secretary 
Rusk said that Mr. Stravinsky, an American citi- 
zen since 1945, had, with his music, "enriched his 
nation and the world," that he was "a part of that 
broader community of man" which "no nation, no 
tongue, no tradition" could claim "strictly for 
itself." And Secretary Rusk concluded by hailing 
the "great international communities of the mind 
and spirit, in science, in music, in the arts, in 

A Basis for International Communication 

These "great international communities," which 
transcend all barriers of geography and language, 
hold out a promise of establishing a basis for true 
international communication. For the universal- 
ity of art is not merely a phrase — it is a true and 
meaningful concept that is constantly seeking and 
finding new terms of expression. You have all 
probably read with pleasure the accounts of Mr. 
Benny Goodman's triumphant progress through 
the Soviet Union. The crowds that cheer Mr. 
Goodman playing "Meadowlands" — like those 
that cheered the Boston Symphony or Porgy and 
Bess several years ago — obviously are finding 
through music a channel of communication with 
the United States that is remarkably effective. 
The message conveyed is a simple one: These 
talented American performers offer living evi- 
dence that they come from a coimtry in which art 


and a truly indigenous American art is cherished 
and fostered. Where devotion to the arts exists, 
there exists also a basis for communication and 
understanding. This logic seems simple in the ex- 
treme, but it is nonetheless valid, and it holds out 
a hope that we cannot and must not ignore. 

We are reminded constantly of the difficulty of 
sharing our thoughts with others. Even when we 
speak the same language, we do not necessarily 
attach the same meanings to the words we use. 
How much more vexed the problem becomes when 
it is two institutions — or two governments — that 
are trying to carry on a dialog. The traditional 
means of establishing a relationship between two 
countries, for purposes of negotiation, is the dip- 
lomatic mission, headed by an ambassador and 
consisting of professional diplomats. We have 
learned that the existence of such institutions does 
not guarantee that a helpful dialog will take place 
between the representatives of the two countries 
concerned. And we persevere, despite all dis- 
appointments, because we must, hoping that pa- 
tience and determination will find a way to right 
reason. Success is often our reward when perse- 
verance produces some achievement such as the 
Austrian Treaty. But the difficulty remains. 

When we come to communication between peo- 
ple, however, we want more than a formal dialog. 
It is for this reason that our Government's pro- 
grams in education and the arts have come to play 
a more and more significant role in contributing 
to the attainment of United States foreign policy 
objectives, often producing results that cannot be 
achieved in any other way. For they provide 
direct access to people — people who are glad to ac- 
cept what they purvey as an illumination of the 
quality of our lives and an enrichment of their 
own. Their reach is therefore wide, extending to 
friendly and unfriendly nations alike, in both 
highly developed and less developed areas. 

Among these programs are the familiar Ful- 
bright exchanges of students, teachers, and pro- 
fessors. There are also programs in wliich other 
leaders in America's educational, cultural, and 
professional life — American specialists, we call 
them — are sent abroad for varying periods of time 
as teachers and lecturers. Similarly, foreign lead- 
ers in many fields are brought to this country. 

These programs contribute to economic and so- 
cial development. But their first concern is with 
the intellectual and spiritual aspects of life, wliich 

Department of Sfo/e Bulletin 

are a free society's greatest concern. They pro- 
vide an avenue for sustained and fruitful com- 
munication across national borders even while 
conventional channels of diplomatic intercourse 
are choked by controversy. In the long run, they 
•can create a worldwide common market of ideas, 
cultural attainments, and human discourse. And, 
as a matter of immediate practical bearing on the 
■day-to-day operation of programs carried out by 
the Department of State, the Agency for Inter- 
national Development, and the United States In- 
formation Agency, they can reinforce and make 
more productive a wide range of other Govern- 
ment activities. By rising above ideological dif- 
ferences, education and the arts make possible in- 
tuitive contacts that can ripen into mutual trust 
and understanding and enduring friendship. The 
imiversality of the arts and sciences — the ideal 
which this college has nurtured for almost three 
centuries — is the truest way of developing in all 
peoples a world outlook, a profound recognition 
that the life of the individual and of his commu- 
nity is intimately and richly involved in the life of 
the nation and of the world. 

The involvement of our Government in educa- 
tional and cultural affairs is of relatively recent 
date. That we have gone so fast and so far is a 
tribute to the educational and cultural strength of 
the Nation. It is the vast and varied resources of 
our colleges and miiversities, unparalleled in the 
world, that make foreign students and scholars 
want to come here and make possible the qualified 
company that we are able to send abroad. 

America's faith in education as the great force 
that can transform and elevate human institutions 
was expressed in the founding of our first two 
colleges, in the major Southern and Northern colo- 
nies of the New World. In Virginia, construction 
of a college — now the College of William and 
Mary — was begun as early as 1619 at the city of 
Henrico, 10 miles south of Richmond. The effort 
did not come to fruition until 1693, by whicli time 
another institution at Cambridge, in the Massa- 
chusetts Bay Colony, was a ripe 57 years old. The 
founders of Harvard College have left us a moving 
statement of their objective. Wliile I hesitate to 
quote a rival in the honors for antiquity, I think it 
worth noting. It went as follows : 

After God had carried us safe to New-England, and wee 
had builded our houses, provided necessaries for our liveli- 
hood, rear'd convenient places for Gods worship and set- 
tled the Civill Government; one of the next things vce 

July 9, 7962 

longed for, and looked after was to advance Learning and 
perpetuate it to Posterity. . . . 

In the following century one of the most dis- 
tinguished graduates of the College of William 
and Mary drew up a memorable plan for the es- 
tablislmient of a new university at Charlottesville, 
in Virginia, as part of a great educational system 
for the Commonwealth. Thomas Jefferson, who 
surely ranks with the greatest scholars produced 
in America by this or any other college, was deeply 
concenied about education and considered his ef- 
forts to shape it and give it direction the most 
important work of his life ; you will remember that 
he asked to be described on his tombstone at Monti- 
cello as "father of the University of Virginia." 

Emergence of New Nations 

Thomas Jefferson, were he alive today, would 
vmdoubtedly find two familiar points of reference 
in the world of 1962. One, I am confident, would 
be Williamsburg itself. The other would be the 
emergence of new nations from colonial empires. 
Since most of you of the class of 1962 were fresh- 
men in high school, 27 independent states have 
come into existence, increasing the total number 
on this globe from 87 to 114. Twenty-four of tlie 
27 new nations are in Africa, where a whole con- 
tinent has come alive. Jefferson would hardly 
have been astonished by such a development; he 
had seen the beginnings of it in Latin America in 
his lifetime and, indeed, had contributed to its 
philosophical and political direction. The magni- 
tude is enormous, of course, but the principles 
have not changed, and our nation, today as earlier, 
serves as a guide and beacon for the newly liber- 
ated countries of the world. I am not sure that 
as many constitutions for new countries have been 
written here as legend says have been written in 
the British Museum ; but I am confident that the 
Constitution of the United States has been the 
major influence in the drafting of these instru- 
ments, whether here or abroad. 

In this vast convulsion the need for educated 
leaders has been predictably great. Similarly, our 
need for informed and well-trained specialists in 
the social, political, and economic aspects of the 
new nations — and, indeed, of every nation hi the 
world — has grown with our desire to assist them 
to make their way in the world. 

Under the Fulbright and Smith-Mmidt pro- 
grams, which were recodified and expanded in 


scope last year in the Mutual Educational and Cul- 
tural Exchange Act of 1961, known as the Ful- 
bright-Hays Act, a large number of American 
students, research scholars, and lecturers go abroad 
every year. This is hardly news to you, I am sure. 
Some of you will doubtless be going abroad next 
summer or fall under these programs, and your 
lives and professional careers will be permanently 
enriched by this opportunity to study and work 
abroad. Some of you will, as a consequence, be- 
come interested in making a career in international 
service for your Government and will consider 
joining the Foreign Service, or the Peace Corps, 
or the United States Information Service, or tlie 
Agency for International Development, depending 
on the nature of your particular interest. 

It is well for us to remember that, in the de- 
veloping educational relations between the United 
States and other countries, the street decidedly 
runs both ways. We are proud to be able to give 
what we can to our visitors and grateful to them 
for giving vis new knowledge and deeper under- 
standing of other peoples and countries. We also 
gain immeasurably in this knowledge and imder- 
standing as our students and scholars return to 
the United States from their study and work 

Another major activity in the realm of inter- 
national educational and cultural affairs is the 
Cultural Presentations Program, under which 
American performing artists are sent abroad on 
tours to demonstrate the cultural interests and 
achievements of the American people. There has 
been great variety in the program, from the Juil- 
liard String Quartet to Louis Armstrong, from 
Hal Holbrook as Mark Twain to a full-scale 
theatrical company, from the New York City Bal- 
let to the Baird Marionettes. Until now, this pro- 
gram has been devoted exclusively to sending our 
own artists abroad, but, with the expanded legis- 
lative authority given to the Department last year 
under the Fulbright-Hays Act, we hope to be able 
soon to establish a program of bringing foreign 
performing artists to this country. 

The meaning of the Fulbright-Hays Act was 
eloquently expressed by President Kennedy when 
ho signed the act on September 21, 1961. "This 
ceremony," he said, "has historic significance be- 
cause it marks full recognition by the Congress of 
the importance of a more comprehensive program 


of educational and cultural activities as a com 
ponent of our foreign relations." No one, in fact 
has more vigorously championed the role of edul 
cation and the arts in our foreign relations thai' 
the President. One month after his inauguratior 
he said: "There is no better way of helping th<i 
new nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asis: 
in their present pursuit of freedom and better liv 
ing conditions than by assisting them to develof 
their human resources through education. Like 
wise there is no better way to strengthen our bondi 
of imderstanding and friendship with older na 
tions than through educational and cultural inter 
change." On August 1, 1961, the Presiden 
marked the 15th anniversary of the historic Ful 
bright Act by saying : 

As a result of this program, which permits this as* iittw 
change of representative scholars, students, educators* j((]yr 
artists, from our country to countries around the world 
and from their countries to our country, as a result o 
this program and the related Smith-Mundt program, ove 
50,000 people have been permitted to come to a greate 
understanding of the benefits of our culture and civiliza 
tion, and the cultures and the civilization of other coun 
tries. This program has been most important in betterini 
the relations of the United States with other parts of th 
world. It has been a major constructive step on the : 
to peace. 

We are justly proud of the good work that ha 
been done in this field by our country — whicl 
means by our Government, our colleges and uni 
versities, our civic organizations, our citizens 
And now, you of the class of 1962, who have prof 
ited by the great resources of this college for th 
past 4 years, are on the way to making your owi 
contribution in your own best way to your natior 
and your time. 

As a people we are, in all truth, the sum of oui 
parts. The totality of our individual acts, oui 
day-to-day deeds and activities, make up the pic 
ture we offer the world. A new total diplomacy 
has therefore become essential in foreign policy 
This embraces our heritage, our art, our educa 
tion, our culture, reflecting the riclmess anc 
variety we have in these fields. 

These elements are vital, I believe, in the ne-n 
total diplomacy. In this realm we may seek hope- 
fully for universality, for international compre 
hension. On these things, as much as perhaps or 
anything else, the eventual peace of mankind rests 

Departmenf of Sfofe Bullefir. 







slip is 


liter I 
tie sec 

's a ton 

ions till 

y? The North Atlantic Partnership and the Less Developed Areas 

letter li 
) derelo 
n. Lilt 
iHer HI 

5y </• Robert Schaetzel 

Of the many myths with which those who have 
responsibility for foreign affairs must deal, then 
are two of immediate concern to those who are di- 
^'^JJ rectly responsible for Asian affairs. The first is 
the false dilemma that America must make a choice 
between its commitment to a partnership between 
the United States and Western Europe — tlie con- 
cept of a North Atlantic partnership — and a policy 
of United States support for the aspirations and 
U economic growth of the less developed comitries of 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The second 
myth is that the growth and the enlargement of 
the European Economic Community (the Common 
Market, as it is frequently called) would be harm- 
ful to the interests of Asia and these other con- 
tinents. Perhaps the best way to exorcise these 
myths will be to examine our actual views and 
policies concerning the relationship of the en- 
larged Common Market to our own interests and 
to the interests of the rest of the world. 

We all know that a strong and united Europe 
within the framework of close Atlantic partner- 
ship is — and has been since the conception of the 
Marshall Plan — a fundamental objective of 
American policy. Wliy is this so ? 

First, there can be no security in tlie world un- 
less there is an effective relationship, within the 
framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation, whereby the defensive capabilities of 
Europe and the United States are harnessed to 
deter Coimnunist aggression in Europe or else- 
where in the woi'ld. I need hardly point out that 
the security which stems from this relationship is 
of equal importance to the countries of the North 
Atlantic and to those of the rest of the world. 

Second, a stable and prosperous Europe is indis- 
pensable to the continued growth and prosperity 

July 9, 1962 

of the United States. This is our major market. 
The intimate interrelationship of the free-world 
financial system is dependent upon the economic 
base of the Atlantic area. We are now in a period 
of world history where the United States cannot 
remain strong and prosperous without strength 
and growth in Europe, just as European prosperity 
is dependent to a considerable extent on the health 
of the American economy. 

Third, as the world's major trading center, 
Europe is and will remain the major market for 
the less developed comitries and also will be in- 
creasingly a source of the capital which the de- 
velopment process demands. 

Security, the health of the United States econ- 
omy, and United States ability to behave 
responsibly and effectively in international, com- 
mercial, and financial affairs — these are all reasons 
why a strong and united Western Europe is funda- 
mental to the achievement of America's major 
foreign policy objectives. 

The New Europe 

While there has been consistent bipartisan sup- 
port of European unification by three American 
administrations, including both the Congress and 
the executive branch, lately a new element has been 
introduced. This is the application of the United 
Kingdom for full membership in the Common 
Market. Assuming the success of the intricate 

• Mr. Schaetzel is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Atlantic Affairs. The above 
article is based upon remarks he made at a 
Far East Regional Operations Conference at 
Baguio, Philippines, on March H, 1962. 

negotiations required to make British membership 
an actuality, the Common Market will be composed 
of a population exceeding that of the United States 
and rivaling our economic capacitj'. The United 
States and the European Common Market together 
account for 90 percent of free-world trade in in- 
dustrial goods and almost 90 percent of free-world 
industrial production. The implications of this 
concentration of strength — for the international 
Communist movement, for the countries outside 
the North Atlantic, and for the United States it- 
self — are readily apparent. 

Any fairminded appraisal of European devel- 
opments must take into account that there are 
latent dangers in the emergence of a strong, 
affluent, self-confident, and united Europe. There 
will undoubtedly be elements in Europe attracted 
to policies of autarky, elements content to pursue 
the good life — the easy satisfaction of pent-up 
demands for goods and services. Second, with 
the transformation of the 19th-century empire 
system into a world community of national states 
there are those in Europe who may be content to 
see a united Europe meet its international obliga- 
tions through the Euro-African relationship, for- 
getful of the rest of the world or assiuning that 
other regions will be looked after by the United 
States. Third, there is woriy about the develop- 
ment of the so-called "third force" attitude, the 
assumption that the new Europe might be at- 
tracted to the pursuit of independent security ob- 
jectives or even to playing the role of a balance 
between the East and the West. 

It is well to state these fears and to recognize 
that they do exist. In fact the evidence is that a 
united Europe will display a deeper and stronger 
sense of responsibility for the defense of freedom 
than would have been possible under the previous 
pattern of weak, independent national states. The 
neutralism which we heard talk of a decade ago 
was an expression of weakness, not of strength. 
This is not to say that there will not be disagree- 
ments between ourselves and the new Europe but 
rather that these disagreements will be within the 
framework of an Atlantic power center committed 
to the same enlightened security and economic 

The situation confronting the United States, 
therefore, has these characteristics: We wish to 
continue encouraging the process of unification 
and strength. At the same time we wish to make 


sure that Europe and the ITnited States work in 
close and constructive harmony. Finally, we want 
this partnership to have an outward orientation. 
Thus we have been engaged in a delicate maneuver 
whereby we have consciously moved closer toward 
Europe as Europe itself unifies. 

One institutional means of accomplishing this 
has been the creation of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development and par- 
ticularly Amei-ica's full membership in this body, 
which means that we take full part in the process 
of economic cooperation established among Euro- 
pean countries since World War II. We are mov- 
ing toward closer coordination of our monetary 
policies with those of Europe. We have begun 
frank discussions and reviews of our domestic eco- 
nomic policies, recognizing that unless we are all 
committed to policies of adequate growth, distor- 
tions and imbalances can play havoc with our 
international economic relations. Another funda- 
mental objective has been to employ the OECD 
as a means of involving Europe in the global com- 
mitments which are inescapably ours and which 
we believe to be equally inescapably those of 

Trade Expansion Program 

In addition to this institutional framework, we 
have taken a series of steps designed to assure that 
the new Europe will assume fully the world re- 
sponsibilities which should properly belong to the 
enlarged Common Market. The first and most 
important step is the President's trade expansion 
program.^ As you know, the cutting edge of this 
program is to give the President the tools to 
negotiate a general and substantial reduction of 
the common external tariff. Naturally, one of the 
principal purposes of this program is to serve 
the immediate self-interest of the United States 
economy by assuring the access of our goods to 
the great market of Eui-ope. But it is an equally 
important objective to preserve and reaffirm Eu- 
rope's commitment to the most-favoi-ed-nation 
principle. In other words, we contemplate that 
the negotiations between ourselves and the Com- 
mon Market will reduce the tariff barriers sur- 
rounding the great common markets of both 
Europe and the United States to minimal levels 

iiJ tins' 

proved at' 
if tlie i5t 
m > P" 
iioos on 
lates to 
mrilT i 
of All 
result in 
the EEC 
tern ws 
United 1 
ill of .^ 
tlie ate 

est of 01 
to opei 
tie Ion 

' For text of the President's message to Congress on 
trade, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231. 

Department of State Bulletin 

July 9, 

Tiifl thus open these markets more widely to the 
(roods of the less developed countries. 

Finding Markets for the Less Developed Areas 

Tlie second step is an effort, to promote im- 
proved access to markets in industrial comitries 
fdi- the products of the less developed countries 
if the world. Fmancial aid and assistance are 
meaningless unless steps are taken to find markets 
for their exports. We must therefore set in mo- 
;ion a program which, over time, will eliminate 
yr reduce tariffs, taxes, and other artificial restric- 
l;ions on the import of the products of these 

Our most important initiative in this area re- 
lates to tropical products and has arisen pri- 
marily from a concern that the association with 
the EEC of the French overseas territories — most 

ion of 

til m of which have now become sovereign states — could 
result in a permanent preferential area related to 
the EEC which would seriously disrupt existing 
patterns of trade in tropical products. This con- 
3ern was greatly increased by the decision of the 
United Kingdom to seek membership in the EEC, 
which foreshadowed a broadening and consolida- 
tion of preferences with the result that essentially 
all of Africa would enjoy a special preferential 
arrangement with Europe. This would be dis- 
criminatoi-y against similar produce from other 
tropical areas of the world and would frustrate 
the attempt to improve the market outlook for 
tliose basic commodities — such as coffee, cocoa, 
and tea — the sale of which is so important to Latin 
America and Asia as well as Africa. 

Instead of a preferential area setting the inter- 
est of one producing area against another, we have 
suggested that the EEC, the U.K., and the United 
States join in efforts to place world trade in key 
tropical commodities on a basis of nondiscrimina- 
tory free access that will recognize the worldwide 
nature of the problems. If we can together agree 
to open our markets to the primary products of 
less developed countries on a basis of nondiscrimi- 
nation, we will set in motion a process that will in 
the long run create a healthy world trading envi- 
ronment in which the less developed countries can 
develop their production for world markets. 

Obviously this cannot be achieved overniglit. 
The shift to nondiscriminatory trade with the 
less developed nations will require transitional 
arrangements, compensatory mechanisms that will 


July 9, 1962 

ease the adjustment to nondiscriminatory trade 
for nations now receiving preferences, and assist- 
ance on the achievement of sound long-term de- 
velopment plans. The fact that these charac- 
teristics — compensatoi-y arrangements for lessened 
preferences and long-term development assist- 
ance — are features of the new arrangements being 
negotiated between the EEC and the associated 
African comitries augurs well for the ultimate 
achievement of our goal. For our part, we are 
seeking improved authority in the President's 
trade expansion program for the elimination or 
reduction of our tariffs affecting the traditional 
and potential exports of the less developed coun- 
tries, and we are developing further proposals 
which we hope will facilitate global solutions of 
the special problems of tropical products. 

Commodity Stabilization 

The third step is in the broad field of commodity 
stabilization. This is a highly complicated and 
difficult problem in which solutions, if they are to 
be found at all, must be tailored to individual 
commodities. Plans for the negotiation of a 
longer term international coffee agreement are the 
most advanced, but we also are seriously con- 
sidering the desirability of participating in other 
commodity stabilization arrangements. 

All of our experience has emphasized the ex- 
treme difficulty of negotiating commodity agree- 
ments. Not only must they take into account the 
interests of the producers and consumers, but they 
also call for a prediction of what the future mar- 
ket will be — placing demands on the art of eco- 
nomics which this art has not shown itself fully 
competent to meet. There should be no mismider- 
standing about the contribution one can reason- 
ably expect from even the most successfully ne- 
gotiated commodity stabilization agreements. 
These are no panaceas. Such agreements at best 
place a temporary floor under prices— they pro- 
vide a breathing space. Unless other steps are 
taken — encouragement of new uses for the com- 
modities, diversification of economies to transfer 
resources to more attractive pursuits— the inherent 
instability of commodity arrangements will come 
into play and further distress will lie ahead. In 
short, there must be an intimate relationship be- 
tween such stabilization arrangements and the 
entire process of economic development, including 
our aid efforts. 


There is one essential point that should be made 
in this connection. Not only the United States 
but many of the European nations, Canada, and 
Australia are generally favorable to eifoxts to al- 
leviate international commodity problems and are 
willing to consider international commodity ar- 
rangements in this connection. The problem is 
not, therefore, one of doctrinaire resistance to the 
search for arrangements wliich would bring some 
order into these important markets. The most 
serious obstacles will be those inherent in the na- 
ture of the production and trade of commodities 
and the difficulty of working out mutually satis- 
factory agreements between producers and 

We are also studying, with the participation of 
important European countries, the jDossibilities for 
more general techniques for dealing with instabil- 
ity in primary commodity trade. One of the pos- 
sible techniques is that of compensatory financing, 
i.e. international financial assistance of some kind 
to smooth out the fluctuations in export earnings 
of countries hea%aly dependent on primary 

Dealing With Low-Cost Imports 

The fourth step is that of dealing with low-cost 
imports. This is perhaps the toughest problem 
of all. Most of what we know about this problem 
is discouraging. In all of the advanced countries 
there exists deep-seated and politically potent re- 
sistance to the acceptance of manufactured goods 
from the low-wage countries. Both the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the OECD 
are concerned with this matter, and it is our judg- 
ment that we should exploit every opportunity to 
see that the advanced countries face the issues that 
exist here and continue the search for solutions. 
The short- and long-term textile agreements repre- 
sent one method of dealing with the problem. It 
is probably not applicable to other commodities. 
Nonetheless, two principles are set forth in these 
agreements which are important for the future. 
One is that the advanced countries have accepted a 
responsibility to provide continuing and gradually 
growing access to their markets for the goods of 
the low-cost producing states. The second princi- 
ple is that the less developed countries should 
assume some responsibility for restraint. In short, 
the low-cost producing states should be conscious 
of the consequences of actions Miiich would be 


Development Assistance Committee 

Tlie fiftli step is the Development Assistance 
Committee of the OECD. We have recently taken 
an administrative step in Washington to transfer 
the backstopping of the DAC from the traditional 
Departmental staff to the Agency for Inter- 
national Development. The theory here is that 
our participation in the DAC will only be effective 
if our own development people look upon this as 
a major instrument for international action. 

The DAC itself has already made substantial 
progress. It should become an indispensable 
instrument for increasing the amounts of aid 
coming from the participating states, for im- 
proving the terms of such assistance, and for 
achieving better coordination of their combined 
aid efforts. It should also help to minimize situ- 
ations in which one donor nation "picks off all the 
cream" — taking the sound, self-liquidating proj- 
ects — while others assume the burden of essential 
development projects that are often economically 
unattractive. A further beneficial effect will flow 
from DAC activities : The Atlantic nations will be 
demonstrating, through tangible assistance efforts, 
that their sense of responsibility runs to all the 
less developed countries — to Latin America and 
Asia, as well as to Africa. 

We are presently engaged in a major effort to 
select one or several countries in each region of the 
world with the objective of developing DAC co- 
ordinating teams (or consortia). This would en- 
courage the process whereby Europe and the 
United States can share responsibility in limited 
but traditional political relationships. Starting 
in May this year the DAC is embarking on a pro- 
gram of annual reviews of member countries' aid 
programs and policies with a view to recommend- 
ing ways of improving their effectiveness. The 
establishment of a development center to promote 
the exchange of experience among institutions con- 
cerned with development is also currently under 

Changes in U.S. Foreign Economic Policies 

There is a final point which should be clearly 
understood : the fact that the United States is now 
well embarked upon fundamental changes in its 
foreign economic policies. 

First, the President's trade expansion progi'am 
embodies the principle of free trade in industrial 
goods, even though tliis principle is narrowly de- 

Department of State Bulletin 

fined and limited in application. Bnt this is tlie 
first time since 1789 that tlie Go\-ernment of the 
United States has souglit seriously to adopt this 

Second, we now look upon international com- 
modity arrangements not as a necessary evil to be 
accepted only in the most desperate circumstances 
but as an approach which shoiJd be realistically 
and energetically explored as a means of dealing 
with one of the most difficult and far-ranging 
problems of the free world economy. Upon this, 
and in the field of temperate agriculture, the major 
producing countries of the West are close to agree- 
ment in principle, but the growing surpluses of 
these goods and the technological capability of 
grinding out even greater surpluses can be man- 
aged only through international arrangements 
which will contain provisions for the control of 
production surpluses and exports. 

Third, we have reached the point where the 
allocation of resources through taxation for 
purposes of economic development abroad has be- 
come accepted as a permanent part of the respon- 
sibility of the United States, and this concept is 
steadily gaining acceptance in the other affluent 
nations of the world. 

In conclusion let me say that we see these var- 
ious trends in Western Europe, and the emerg- 
ing lines of the United States relationships with 
the new Europe, as presenting us both with great 
opportimities and with serious problems which 
must be solved. One major objective of our strat- 
egy is to provide a firm and realistic basis for 
helping the less developed countries realize their 
own aspirations. In sum, we have a grand strat- 
egy whereby we hope to increase the security of 
the free world and to assure its economic stability 
and growth by providing both capital and markets 
to the less developed countries. The value and 
importance of this strategy to the less developed 
countries is not immediately apparent, but, as the 
above explanation of the rationale of our Euro- 
pean policy and its relation to our overall strat- 
egy demonstrates, it has real significance and value 
for them — indeed, the policy is essential to the 
fulfillment of their development aspirations. 
There can be little question that 1962 and 1963 
are the years during which we and the Western 
Europeans will be making decisions that will set 
the pattern of the free-world economy for decades 
to come. 

July 9, 1962 

President Chiari of Panama Holds 
Talks With President Kennedy 

Roberto F. Chiari, President of the Republic of 
Panama, visited the United States June 11-16; 
he was in Washington June 12-H. Following is 
the text of a jaint communique released on June 
13 at the conclusion of talks between President 
Kennedy and President Chiari. 

White House press release dated June 13 

The meetings of the President of the Republic 
of Panama and the President of the United States 
of America during the past two days have been 
marked by a spirit of frankness, understanding 
and sincere friendship. During their talks the two 
Presidents discussed general relations and exist- 
ing treaties between their two countries, their mu- 
tual interests in the Panama Canal, and topics 
of world-wide and hemispheric concern. They 
emphasized the close and friendly ties on which 
has been established a mutually advantageous as- 
sociation through partnership in the Panama 
Canal enterprise. On the conclusion of these talks, 
they agreed to publish the following joint 

They reaffinn the traditional friendship be- 
tween Panama and the United States — a friend- 
sliip based on their common devotion to the ideals 
of representative democracy, and to their deter- 
mination that both nations should work as equal 
partners in the cause of peace, freedom, economic 
progress and social justice. 

The Presidents recognize that their two coun- 
tries are bound together by a special relationship 
arising from the location and operation of the 
Panama Canal, which has played such an im- 
portant part in the history of both their countries. 

The President of Panama and the President of 
the United States agreed upon the principle that 
when two friendly nations are bound by treaty 
provisions which are not fully satisfactoiy to one 
of the parties, arrangements should be made to 
permit both nations to discuss these points of dis- 
satisfaction. Accordingly, the Presidents have 
agreed to appoint high level representatives to 
cari-y on such discussions. These representatives 
will start their work promptly. 

As to some of these problems, it was agreed that 
a basis for their solution can now be stated. Ac- 
cordingly, the two Presidents further agreed to 


instruct their representatives to develop measures 
to assist the Republic of Panama to take ad- 
vantage of the commercial opportunities avail- 
able througli increased participation by Pana- 
manian private enterprises in the market offered 
by the Canal Zone, and to solve such labor ques- 
tions in the Canal Zone as equal employment op- 
portunities, wage matters and social security 

They also agreed that their representatives will 
arrange for the flying of Panamanian flags in an 
appropriate way m the Canal Zone. 

In order to support the efforts of the Govern- 
ment of Panama to improve tax collections in 
•order to meet better the needs of the people of 
Panama, President Kennedy agreed in principle 
to instruct his representatives to work out in con- 
junction with the Panamanian representatives 
arrangements under which tlie U.S. Government 
will withhold the income taxes of those Panama- 
nian and non-United States citizen employees in 
the Zone who are liable for such taxes under exist- 
ing treaties and the Panamanian income tax law. 

The President of Panama mentioned a number 
of other practical problems in relations between 
the two countries of current concern to his Gov- 
ernment including the need of Panama for pier 
facilities and the two Presidents agreed that their 
representatives would over the coming months 
discuss these problems as well as others that may 

The Presidents reaffirmed their adherence to 
the principles and commitments of the Charter 
of Punta del Este.^ They agreed on the need to 
execute rapidly all steps necessary to make the 
Alliance for Progress effective; they recognized 
that the Alliance is a joint effort calling for 
development programming for effective use of na- 
tional as well as external resources, institutional 
reforms, tax reforms, vigorous application of 
existing laws, and a just distribution of the fruits 
of national development to all sectors of the 

Tlie two Presidents declared that political 
democracy, national independence and the self- 
determination of peoples are the political prin- 
ciples which shape the national policies of Panama 
and the United States. Both countries are joined 
in a hemisphere- wide effort to accelerate economic 
progress and social justice. 

In conclusion the two Presidents expressed their 
gratification at this opportunity to exchange views 
and to strengthen the friendly and mutually bene- 
ficial relationship which has long existed between 
Panama and the United States. Their meeting 
was a demonstration of the understanding and 
reciprocal cooperation of the two countries and 
strengthened the bonds of common interests and 
fi-iendship between their respective peoples. 

U.S. Signs Trade Agreements 
With India and Haiti 

The Department of State announced on June 21 
(press release 412) that the United States had on 
June 15 signed a trade agreement with India for 
the exchange of new tariff concessions. On the 
same date the Department released the text of 
an interim trade agreement signed with Haiti on 
June 7.^ The negotiations were part of the 1960- 
61 Geneva tariff conference under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.^ 

In the trade agreement with India the United 
States granted new concessions on 29 items cover- 
ing imports from India amounting to $51.3 million 
in 1960. A portion of these imports consists of 
items on which there is no U.S. duty, and the con- 
cession merely binds this duty-free status. Some 
of the more important items which fall in this 
category are lemon grass oil and mica films and 

In exchange for these concessions India granted 
the United States new concessions on 26 items 
covering imports from the United States amount- 
ing to $-±3.6 million in the last year for which im- 
port statistics are available. It is anticipated 
that trade in a number of these commodities will 
expand as a result of the tariff concessions and of 
India's economic development program. 

Further details concerning the concessions nego- 
tiated will be issued in the near future as a supple- 
ment to previous publications analyzing the re- 
sults of the Geneva tariff conference. Most of tlie 
U.S. concessions will become effective in two stages, 
the first on July 1. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1JH51, p. 40.S. 

' For texts of the agreements with India and Haiti, 
including schedules of tariff concessions, see Department 
of State press release 412 dated June 21. Press release 
412 also includes texts of agreements rectifying the U.S. 
schedules to the interim agreements of Mar. 5, 1962, with 
Peru and Switzerland. 

' For bacliground, see Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 561. 

Department of State Bulletin 


wriesai IDepartment Presents Views 



;. Ontk 
lie test oi 
i Haiti 
le Geaeral 

the United 
toasiits ol 
id tie con- 
tiis, Somt 
all ii tkii 
, films ani 

iia granted 
: il items 
>3 amoimt- 
wliicli im- 

s a supple- 
lost of tie 

and Haiti 

log tie W 


on New Sugar Legislation 

Statement hy C. Griffith Johnson 
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee : 
I appreciate this opportunity to present to you the 
views of the Department of State on the proposals 
for new sugar legislation. I want to be clear at 
the beginning that we support the bill proposed 
by the President and vigorously oppose the pro- 
visions of H.R. 12154 as passed by the House 
which relate to foreign imports. It is our firm 
belief that these provisions are contrary to the for- 
eign policy interests of the United States. 

Our first objection is to the emasculation of the 
former Cuban quota. The President's bill, after 
taking into consideration increases in domestic 
quotas, establishes the former Cuban quota at 
2.65 million tons. The House bill further reduces 
this quantity to 1.5 million tons by allocating 1.1 
million tons to 25 other foreign countries. The 
Department of State considers it of critical im- 
portance that the former Cuban quota not be re- 
duced below the 2.65-million-ton figure. 

We must look forward to the day when Cuba 
returns to the family of Western nations. We 
must provide all the inducement we can to have 
this event occur as soon as possible. By reducing 
Cuba's potential opportimity to trade with the 
United States, we would only strengthen Castro's 
position in Cuba and discourage those forces op- 
posed to him. The reduction contained in the 
House bill would serve to support Castro's con- 
tention that Cuba's future lies with the Commu- 
nist bloc. To repeat, therefore, I strongly urge 
that the former Cuban quota not be scattered 
piecemeal to a large niunber of foreign countries 
but retained intact as an open invitation for Cuba 
to return to the West. 

The second point I wish to emphasize is the 
importance of the concept contained in the Presi- 

^Made before the Senate Committee on Finance on 
June 20 ( press release 407 ) . 

Jufy 9, 7962 

dent's bill of maintaining the f onner Cuban quota 
on a global basis without premiums— and of re- 
jecting the provisions of the House bill, which 
establishes new quota allotments. These quotas 
would be substantially increased by the House 
bill. Fourteen new coimtries would be given basic 
quotas. The vested interests thus created would 
prove difficult if not impossible to withdraw later 
without a severe impact on our relations with these 
countries. It is our position that the former 
Cuban quota, after allowing for the increases in 
domestic quotas, should be put entirely on a global 
basis. That is, it shoidd be made available to all 
friendly countries on a nondiscriminatoi-y first- 
come, first-served basis. It is only in this way that 
the door can be held open for Cuba to regain on a 
freely competitive basis its former position in the 
United States market. 

As an integral part of a global quota system, 
we recommend that we stop paying foreign sup- 
pliers a premium price for sugar imported mto the 
United States. The President's bill proposes that 
the present basic quotas of foreign countries be 
retained at their present levels. The premium 
price paid on the former Cuban quota would and 
slionld be eliminated immediately. With the ex- 
ception of the Philippines, the premium price now 
paid to other foreign countries would be reduced 
gradually over a 5-year period. The premium 
price should be removed on the former Cuban 
quota and eliminated gradually on other basic 
quotas by imposing a fee which would be approxi- 
mately equal to the amount by whicli our domestic 
sugar price exceeds tlie foreign market price for 
sugar. This fee would eliminate substantially all 
the subsidy or price incentive which now stimu- 
lates the foreign countries to struggle so desper- 
ately for a sugar quota in the United States mar- 
ket and which arouses such high emotions and 

There is no justification for continuing to sub- 
sidize foreign sugar producers in order to assure 
adequate sugar supplies. The United States is 
heavily dependent upon foreign sources for a wide 
range of industrial raw materials and foodstuffs, 
yet has not found it necessary to subsidize foreign 
production to assure that our import requirements 
are met. 

Interruption of the sugar trade with Cuba pro- 
vides an opportunity to put an end to an import 
subsidy system which no longer serves its original 

purpose. Cuba liad a sigiiilicant economic inter- 
est in the price premium, as its quota was over 
3 million tons. Aside from the Philippines, -where 
■we are bound by treaty to accord special treatment 
to sugar imports, the vested interests of all other 
countries — 14 in number— amount to only 280,000 
tons, and the total quota premium to these 14 
countries in the last normal year — 1959 — was 
worth about $13 million. If tliis premium were 
to be phased out over a 5-year period, these coiui- 
tries should be able to adjust to this small change 
in their export earnings without serious difficulty. 

We have aid programs today to direct resources 
on the basis of need. Aid through a sugar pro- 
gram does not assure that resources are going to 
the right places or in the right amounts. In the 
absence of any objective standards that can be 
consistently applied, quotas must be doled out on 
a basis that need bear little relation to needs or 
to efficiency in production. The temporary allo- 
cations made over the past 2 years to replace 
Cuban supplies have encouraged sugar expansion 
in some countries, not because of any inadequacy 
of world sugar supplies but solely in anticipation 
of receiving permanent quotas in the United 
States for premium-priced sugar. 

The need to allocate valuable quota privileges 
among competing foreign claimants creates polit- 
ical problems of the most difficult kind. Virtu- 
ally every cane-sugar producing country in the 
world and many of the beet-sugar producing 
countries in Western Europe are seeking quotas. 
In presenting and carrying out a long-term sugar 
policy, the administration should not have to take 
a position favoring some friendly countries over 
others. We make no friends in this process. Even 
those who receive a quota complain of its inade- 
quacy and criticize us for favoring others with 
larger quotas. Ah-eady complaints are coming in 
from foreign countries complaining about the 
quota provisions of the House bill. A global quota 
system would eliminate the necessity for choosing 
among the numerous claimants for the Cuban 

We are also gravely disturbed by the provisions 
of II.R. 12154 which completely eliminate the 
refined-sugar quota, amounting to 375,000 tons, 
which formerly was assigned to Cuba. The exec- 
utive branch, after discussions with domestic sugar 
interests, proposed a reduction to 250,000 tons. 
We believe this quantity, which at best is only a 


token amount compared to our total imports ofj 
raw sugar, sliould be permitted to enter the United 
Stales in refined form. A complete elimination 
of the opportunity to sell even small quantities 
of refined sugar to the United States would be 
indefensible in the eyes of those countries which 
look forward to some diversification in their trade 
with the United States. 

Further, the Department of State considers that 
the provisions of section 12 of H.R. 12154 repre- 
sent an undesirable use of our power to allocate 
import quotas to affect the behavior of other gov- 
ernments. However, with the elimination of the 
premium quota concept, as proposed in the Presi- 
dent's bill, the provisions of section 12 would auto- 
matically lose their effectiveness. Even so, the 
inclusion of coercive provisions of this kind in 
this legislation is, in the Department's view, un- 
wise and unwarranted. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

87th Congress, 2d Session 

Special Report on Latin America: United States Activi- 
ties in Mexico, Panama, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, 
and Venezuela. Report submitted by Senators John L. 
McClellan, Mike Mansfield, Margaret Chase Smith, 
Henry Dworshak, Alan Bible, and Roman L. Hruska. 
February 16, 1962. 62 pp. 

Bretton Woods Agreements Act Amendment. Hearings 
before the House Banking and Currency Committee on 
H.R. 10162, a bill to amend the act to authorize the 
U.S. to participate in loans to the International Mone- 
tary Fund to strengthen the International monetary 
system. February 27-28, 1062. 165 pp. 

Supplemental Report on Tariff Negotiations at the 
1960-62 Tariff Conference. Message from the President 
transmitting a report in compliance with section 4(a) 
of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. H. 
Doc. 357. March 7, 1962. 4 pp. 

Trade Agreements With the European Economic Commu- 
nity, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Sweden. Mes- 
sage from the President transmitting copies of the trade 
agreements including schedules signed on March 5 and 
7, and reporting actions taken with respect to peril 
points. H. Doc. 358. March 7, 1962. 242 pp. 

Review of Operations of the Arms Control and Disarma- 
ment Agency. Hearing before a subcommittee of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. March 8, 1962. 
82 pp. 

Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Hearings before the House 
Ways and Means Committee on H.R. 9900, a bill to pro- 
mote the general welfare, foreign policy, and security 
of the United States through international trade agree- 
ments and through adjustment assistance to domestic 
industry, agriculture, and labor, and for other purposes. 
Parts 1-4. March 12-April 11, 1962. 2.793 pp. 

Peace Corps Act Amendments. Hearings before the Sen- 
ate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 2935. March 
13-19, 1962. 115 pp. 


Irtjiitifs 01 

»'! a 

t,;;ua ff' 


iurl by 1 
BitOJ fl 



Department of State Bulletin 









teeon Current Actions 


'^oreisn Assistance Act of 19G2. Hearings before tlie 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on a draft bill to 
aiiiend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
;i mended, and for other purposes. Parts 1-5. March 
]+-April 16, 1962. 1,020 pp. 

survey of Trade Relations Between the United States and 
Common Market Nations. Compiled by Senator Ken- 
neth B. Keating. S. Doc. 81. March 19, 1962. 54 pp. 

Vc tivities of the Development and Resources Corporation 
ill Iran. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. March 20, 1962. 35 pp. 

Juba's Expropriation of U.S.-owned Nickel Plant at 
Nicaro, Cuba. Twelfth report by the House Govern- 
ment Operations Committee. H. Rept. 1478. March 22, 
1962. 12 pp. 

'.retton Woods Agreements Act. Report to accompany 
U.K. 10162. H. Rept. 1484. March 22, 1962. 20 pp. 

vegulation of Textile Imports. Report to accompany 
H.R. 10788. H. Rept. 1511. March 27, 1962. 5 pp. 

:iatin America and United States Policies. Report of 
Senator Mike Mansfield on a study mission to Latin 
America. S. Doc. 82. March 29, 1962. 85 pp. 

Overseas Military Information Programs. Thirteenth re- 
port by House Government Operations Committee. H. 
Rept. 1549. March 30, 1962. 144 pp. 

iretton Woods Agreements Act Amendment. Hearings 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
H.R. 10162. March 30-April 3, 1962. 74 pp. 

CarifC Classification Act of 1962. Report to accompany 
H.R. 10607. S. Rept. 1317. April 2, 1962. 12 pp. 

rrading With the Enemy Act. Report of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommittee To 
Examine and Review the Administration of the Trading 
With the Enemy Act and the War Claims Act of IMS, 
together with individual views. S. Rept. 1.363. April 
27, 1962. 8 pp. 




International telecommunication convention with six 
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered 
into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United States Octo- 
ber 23, 1961. TIAS 4892. 
Ratification, deposited: Mexico, May 4, 1962. 

(Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the inter- 
national telecommunication convention, 1959 (TIAS 
4892). Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered 
into force May 1, 1961 ; for the United States October 
23, 1961. TIAS 4893. 
Notification of approval: India, May 8, 1962. 


Proc^s-verbal extending and amending declaration of 
November 22, 19.58 (TIAS 4461), on provisional acces- 
sion of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 
8, 1961. Entered into force December 31, 1961 ; for the 
United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957. 
Acceptances deposited: Ceylon, May 3, 1962; Nether- 
lands, May 22, 1962; Peru, May 15, 1962; South 
Africa. May 3, 1962. 

Proc^s-verbal extending declaration of November 12, 1959 

(TIAS 4498), on provisional accession of Tunisia to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at 
Geneva December 9, 1961. Entered into force January 
S, 1962; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 

Portugal accepted the following instruments pursuant to 
its acceptance of the protocol of accession to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade April 6, 1962: 

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to 
annexes and texts of schedules to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 7, 
1955. Entered into force January 23, 1959. TIAS 4186. 

Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at 
Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7, 
1957. TIAS 3930. 

Protocol of terms of accession of Japan to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
June 7, 1955. Entered into force September 10, 1955. 
TIAS 3483. 

Protocol of rectification to French text of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
June 15, 1955. Entered into force October 24, 1956. 
TIAS 3677. 

Third protocol of supplementary concessions to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Denmark and 
Federal Republic of Germany). Done at Geneva July 
15, 1955. Entered into force September 19, 1956. TIAS 

Fourth protocol of supplementary concessions to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Federal Republic 
of Germany and Norway). Done at Geneva July 15, 
1955. Entered into force September 19, 1956. TIAS 

Fifth protocol of supplementary concessions to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Federal Republic 
of Germany and Sweden). Done at Geneva July 15, 
1955. Entered into force September 19, 1950. TIAS 

Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
May 23, 1956. Entered into force for the United States 
June 30, 1956. TIAS 3591. 

Seventh protocol of supplementary concessions to the 
General Agi-eement on Tariffs and Trade (Austria and 
Federal Republic of Germany). Done at Bonn Feb- 
ruary 19, 1957. Entered into force September 1, 1958. 
TIAS 4324. 

Eighth protocol of supplementary concessions to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Cuba and the 
United States). Done at Habana June 20, 1957. 
Entered into force June 29, 1957. TIAS 38S2. 



Agreement for cooperation concerning civil of atomic 
energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. Enters 
into force on the day on which each Government shall 
have received from the other written notification that it 
has complied with all statutory and constitutional re- 
quirements for entry into force. 


Agreement relating to the waiver of passport visa fees. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels March 27 
and November 23, 1940, and January 17 and February 
3, 1947. Entered into force February 17, 1947. TIAS 

Terminated: June 22, 1962 (replaced by the agreement 
of May 3 and 23, 1962). 

iu\Y 9, 7962 



Agr€>ement amending the agricultural commodities agree- 
ment of April 27, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5010). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei June 9, 1962. 
Entered into force June 9, 1962. 


Amendment to the agreement of June 19, 1956, as amende<l 
(TIAS 36S9, 38S3, 4313, and 4694), concerning civil 
uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 
1962. Enters into force on the day on which each Gov- 
ernment shall have received from the other written 
notification that it has complied with all statutory and 
constitutional requirements for entry into force. 


Amendment to the agreement of August 4, 1955, as 
amended (TIAS 3310 and 4837), concerning civil uses 
of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. 
Enters into force on the date on which each Govern- 
ment shall have received from the other written noti- 
fication that it has complied with all statutory and 
constitutional requirements for entry into force. 


Interim agreement relating to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva June 15, 1962. 


Amendment to the agreement of July 12, 1955, as amended 
(TIAS 3311, 4407, and 4507), concerning civil uses of 
atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. 
Enters into force on the day on which each Govern- 
ment shall have received from the other written notifi- 
cation that it has complied with all statutory and con- 
stitutional requirements for entry into force. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree- 
ment of March 2, 1962 (TIAS 4969). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Seoul June 12, 1962. Entered into 
force June 12, 1962. 


General agreement for economic, technical, and related 
assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua 
March 30, 1962. 
Entered into force: May 14, 1962. 

General agreement for technical cooperation, as amended. 
Signed at Managua December 23, 1950. Entered into 
force December 23, 19.50. TIAS 2168 and 2643. 
Terminated: May 14, 1962 (replaced by agreement of 
March 30, 1962, «»pra). 


Agreement relating to the reciprocal i.ssuance of visas to 
diplomatic and nondiplomatic personnel. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Bucharest April 20 and May 14 
and 26. 1962. Entered into force May 26, 1962. 


Agreement relating to the waiver of counterpart deposits 
required for certain categories of AID-flnanced com- 
modities. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid 
May 7 and 22, 1962. Entered into force May 22, 1962. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree- 
ment of May 17, 1962. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington June 18, 1962. Entered into force June 
18, 19G2. 


Agreement amending paragraph 2, section 1, of the annex 
to the economic cooperation agreement of September 7, 
1951 (TIAS 2346). Effected by exchange of notes at 


Saigon June 7, 1962. Entered Into force June 7, 1962.|| ■' 
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-' || 
ment of December 27, 1961, as amended (TIAS 492CJ jj ,,i(jnPrii 
and 5048). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon* r i 
June 7, 1962. Entered into force June 7, 1962. i I ■:"'«" 


Paul Francis Geren as consul general, Salisbury, Fed- 
eration of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, effective June 10. 
(For biographic details, see Department of State press 
release 397 dated June 15.) 


Jay Eutherfurd as New York representative of the 
OflBce of the Chief of Protocol, effective June 10. (For 
biographic details, see Department of State press release 
413 dated June 22.) 


Cliecli List of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 18-24 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. 
Releases issued prior to June 18 which appear in 
this issue of the Bulij;tin are Nos. 367 and 368 of 
June 7 ; 376 of Jime 8 ; and 385 of June 12. 
No. Date Sabject 

1398 6/18 Rusk : departure statement. 
*400 6/19 Cleveland : "The Development Decade" 
6/19 Argentina credentials (rewrite). 
6/20 Welcoming ceremonies for State, AID, 
and USIA student employees. 
♦403 6/19 Visit of President-elect Valencia of 

404 6/20 Spain credentials (rewrite). 

405 6/20 Bowles : Lincoln, Nebr. 

406 6/21 U.S.-U.A.R. aviation consultations. 

407 6/20 C. Griffith Johnson : hearings on sugar 

legislation, H.R. 12154. 

•408 6/20 Lindley: "The Current World Situa- 
tion" (excerpts). 

t409 6/21 Visit of Vice President Pelaez of Phil- 
ippines (rewrite). 

t410 6/22 Visit of Premier Bustamante of Ja- 
maica (rewrite). 
412 6/21 U.S.-India trade agreement (rewrite). 

♦413 6/22 Rutherfurd designated N.Y. represent- 
ative of Office of Chief of Protocol 
(biographic details ) . 


IBS aid i 
MHoniic ! 

IStiOB |] 
le Nortl 

*Xot printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


m. ■ 





oreifB i 
He Sort 



Ejiti, I 

and Hi 
Mia, 1 


Department of Stale Bulletin 

July 9, 1962 


e X 

Vol. XLVII, No. 1202 

American Principles. Ideas and Action (Rostow) 

Argentina. Letters of Credence (Aleniann) . . 

Atomic Energy. Defense Arrangements of the 
North Atlantic Community (McNamara) . 

Aviation. U.S. and U.A.R. Hold Air Talks . . 

Communism. Three Frontiers That Divide the 
Communist World From Our Own (Bowles) 


Coiifiressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Department Presents Views on New Sugar Legis- 
lation (Johnson) 

Department and Foreign Service 

Appointments (Geren) 

Designations (Rutherfurd) 


((leas and Action (Rostow) 

Three Frontiers That Divide the Communist World 
From Our Own (Bowles) 

Economic Affairs 
a-| Department Presents Views on New Sugar Legis- 
lation (Johnson) 

The North Atlantic Partnership and the Less De- 
veloped Areas (Schaetzel) 

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Press Conference 

J.S. Signs Trade Agreements With India and Haiti . 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Cultural and 
Educational Affairs in International Relations 


The North Atlantic Partnership and the Less De- 
veloped Areas (Schaetzel) 

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Press Conference 

Foreign Aid 

The North Atlantic Partnership and the Less De- 
veloped Areas (Schaetzel) 

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Press Conference 

Splendid Slaves and Reasoning Savages (Rowan) . 

Baiti. U.S. Signs Trade Agreements With India 
and Haiti 

India. U.S. Signs Trade Agreements With India 
and Haiti 

Laos. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Press Con- 
ference U.S.A." 

Military Affairs. Defense Arrangements of the 

North Atlantic Community (McNamara) ... 64 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Defense Ar- 
rangements of the North Atlantic Community 

(McNamara) 64 

Panama. President Chiari of Panama Holds Talks 
With President Kennedy (text of joint com- 
munique) 81 

Poland. Splendid Slaves and Reasoning Savages 

(Rowan) 70 

Presidential Documents. President Chiari of Pan- 
ama Holds Talks With President Kennedy ... 81 

Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation of. Geren 

appointed consul general, Salisbury 8S 

Spain. Letters of Credence (Garrigues y Diaz- 

Canabate) 63 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 85 

U.S. and U.A.R. Hold Air Talks 69 

U.S. Signs Trade Agreements With India and Haiti . 82 

United Arab Republic. U.S. and U.A.R. Hold Air 

Talks 69 


Si^lendid Slaves and Reasoning Savages (Rowan). 70 

Three Frontiers That Divide the Communist World 

From Our Own (Bowles) 47 

Name Index 

Abel, Elie 53 

Alemann, Roberto T 63 

Battle, Lucius D 73 

Bowles, Chester 47 

Chiari, Roberto F 81 

Freedman, Max 53 

Garrigues y Diaz-Canabate, Antonio 63 

Geren, Paul Francis 86 

Hensley, Stewart 53 

Johnson, C. Griffith 83 

Kennedy, President 81 

McNamara, Robert S (54 

Redeen, Robert L 53 

Rostow, Walt W 59 

Rowan, Carl T 70 

Rusk, Secretary 53 

Rutherfurd, Jay 86 

Schaetzel, J. Robert 7T 





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United Nations documents, and legis- 
lative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 

The Third Man in International Politics 

by Harlan Cleveland 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^ 

People of good will in this country, as in many 
other countries, have been prominent in the so- 
called peace movements. They have walked up 
and down m front of the Wliite House carrying 
placards on long poles. They have delivered — or 
tried to deliver — petitions to the Soviet Embassy 
a few blocks away on 16th Street. They have 
invited arrest by swimming out to Polaris sub- 
marines off New London. They go to rallies and 
distribute handbills and write editorials and make 
campus speeches and join in protest marches. 

Sometimes the intoxication of pure ideals rather 
interferes with the clarity of vision : As the wife 
said to her husband at the cocktail party, "Dar- 
ling, don't you think you ought to stop drinking? 
Your face is already beginning to get blurred." 

For the most part, we think of the peace march- 
ers as welcome evidence that we live in an open 
society in which baiting the authorities has not 
lost its zest — because the authorities are sufficiently 
secure in their jobs to be tolerant, or even to bait 
the baiters in return. Not long ago an eminent 
scientist joined students and others demonstrating 
in front of the Wliite House to protest American 
nuclear policy — until he had to leave to go in to 
dinner with the President and the First Lady. 
Such are the rewards of freedom. 

Above all, the peace movements prove that 
Americans sometimes lose their way but never 
lose their idealism. If they did, this would no 
longer be the nation our predecessors fashioned 

^Address made before the General Federation of 
Women's Clubs at Washington, D.C., on June 29 (press 

July 16, 1962 

out of a wilderness and built into the world's 
preeminent power. 

But pure ideals become powerful engines only 
when fueled with some definite notion of how to 
get from A to B on the way to Z. Slogans, 
cliches, banners, and parades are fim. But an 
abstract love of humanity is no substitute for a 
practical interest in the tecliniques and procedures 
and institutions of peaceful and constructive liv- 
ing. G. K. Chesterton seemed to have this in 
mind when he wrote his poem about "The World 
State" : 

Oh, how I love Humanity, 

With love so pure and pringlish. 
And how^ I hate the horrid French, 

Who never will be English. 
The international idea, 

The largest and the clearest, 
Is welding all the nations nove. 

Except the one that's nearest. 
This compromise has long been knowB, 

This scheme of partial pardons, 
In ethical societies 

And small suburban gardens — 
The villas and the chapels where 

I learned with little labor 
The way to love my fellow man 

And hate my next-door neighbor. 

Chesterton is saying that world peace begins 
with peaceful relations across the next fence and 
over the adjoining frontier. Indeed it does. But 
note that peaceful commimities have mles and 
systems and organizations for keeping the peace, 
for settling disputes, for treating all the ills of 
society, and for doing the community's essential 
business. A police force, a judicial system, a 


labor-management arbitration board, a juvenile 
delinquency center, a social welfare agency, a real 
estate board, a research center — these and many 
other kinds of institutions make peaceful living 
possible in local communities. They do not de- 
pend on placards and parades but on rules, tech- 
niques, resources, and management. In short, 
they are operational. 

Is it reasonable to think that the practice of 
peace could be less operational in world affairs 
than community affairs? Can anyone seriously 
think that good intentions and high ideals are 
substitutes for nation-building and peacekeeping 
machinery abroad, any more than they are at 
home ? 

Making the Peacekeeping IVIachinery Operational 

We who deal with world affairs can now re- 
port that, after some centuries of sentimental talk, 
the task of making and keeping peace is really 
moving from the hortatory to the operational 
stage — which means it is being embodied in or- 
ganizations and not merely in manifestos. 

Two kinds of peace machinery are developing — 
machinery for the settlement of international dis- 
putes, and macliinery to help modernize the so- 
cieties in which half the population of the free 
world happens to live. Those who work for and 
with the organizations that manage this ma- 
chinery are operationally involved in the practice 
of peace — and so is everyone who lends them ef- 
fective support. 

As the practice of peace moves from oratory to 
operations, we have begun to learn some quite im- 
portant things about the business. This should 
surprise no one, since human beings have been 
learning by doing since time began. And per- 
haps the most important lesson that emerges from 
our brief experience with operational peacekeep- 
ing is the least surprising thing of all. This is the 
often essential role of an international third party 
in restoring the peace, settling disputes, and su- 
pervising change in such a way that it does not 
produce violence. 

In world affairs the third party may be an 
international forum, or a system of mediation, 
or a team of supervisors, or a police force, or an 
individual shuttling silently and anonymously 
from one disputant to another trying to find a 
basis for getting them together. So let's just talk 
about the third man in world affairs. An effec- 


tive third man in world affairs, like an effective 
third man in smaller communities, must, of course, 
be committed to a set of principles to which he 
owes his total loyalty. His single-minded pur- 
pose must be to carry out the instructions given, 
him by the community he serves — in this case]^ 
the preservation of peace in the world community. 

Our third man in world affairs need not neces- 
sarily be the United Nations; indeed the Charter 
of the United Nations instructs the world com- 
munity to first try to settle its disputes directly 
or within a regional community before coming 
to the United Nations at all. But in the case of 
the most dangerous and intractable disputes the 
United Nations, in practice, usually is the third 

A quick glance around the world will suggest 
how active and operational the United Nations 
has become as a third man in world affairs — 
charged by the charter with the job of saving 
"succeeding generations from the scourge of war." 

In the Middle East, a United Nations team of 
truce supervisors has been on the job for 14 years, 
ready to show up on a moment's notice if fighting 
breaks out again. During a recent incident on 
the shores of the Sea of Galilee, that team showed 
up in the middle of tlie night and an action which 
started at midnight had been brought to a cease- 
fire by 7 :30 a.m. 

Down in the Gaza Strip and at the mouth of 
the Gulf of Aqaba, the United Nations Emergency 
Force keeps up a ceaseless, 24-hour patrol by foot, 
jeep, and small aircraft— a peace watch now in 
its sixth year. 

In Korea United Nations machinery is still on 
the armistice line negotiated 9 years ago. 

In West New Guinea hostilities sputter between 
Indonesian parachutists and Dutch patrols — whUe 
a U.N. moderator (who happens to be an Ameri- 
can) works to bring the parties back to the ne- 
gotiating table. 

In Kashmir U.N. observers ti-y to preserve a 12- 
year-old truce despite the remaining bitterness 
displayed just last week as the Security Council 
sought unsuccessfully to break a stalemate between 
the disputants. 

In the Congo an international mission of 17,000 
soldiers and 420 civilian advisers is trying to raise 
up a Congo nation while preventing civil war and 
mediating the constitutional issues that are in 

Department of State Bulletin 


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Variety of Peacekeeping Tools 

This list includes only the third-party peace- 
keeping machinery that is on the ground today 
and still operational — even though some of it has 
been there so long that most people have forgotten 
about it. In addition the United Nations played 
a third-party role when the Soviets remained in 
northern Iran after the end of World War II; 
when the Dutch and Indonesians were fighting in 
the Far East; when the Communist nations spon- 
sored and supplied an insurrection in Greece ; when 
Lebanon and then Jordan entered complaints 
against the United Arab Republic; when Thai- 
land and Cambodia threatened to go to war to 
settle sovereignty over a temple on their border; 
and in several other incipient disputes which never 
made the headlines precisely because they did not 
lead to war or open threat of war. 

You will note that this catalog of crises includes 
different kinds of disputes — in some cases conflicts 
between hostile neighbors, in others hostilities 
arising from colonialism or its aftermath, and in 
still others insurrection or subversion of Com- 
munist inspiration. 

To deal with these different kinds of disputes — 
land the erratic courses they sometimes run — the 
United Nations has quite a spectmm of tools for 
its third-party function of practicing peace. These 
range from the general and sometimes tenuous 
commitment to the charter, at one end of the spec- 
trum, to specific flesh-and-blood-plus-hardware 
forces which fought in Korea, took over from the 
belligerents in the Middle East, and stopped a 
civil war in the Congo. In between these extremes 
there are debates before the Security Council and 
the General Assembly ; there is machinery for fact- 
finding, mediation, and conciliation ; there is poli- 
tical and public pressure organized by members ; 
and there are teams of truce supervisors to guard 
against violations of armistice agreements. 

In the practice of peace we not only liave come 
to realize the essential role of the third party but 
have learned some technical and practical things 
about the job. We have learned, for example, the 
need for common training of officers who will work 
together in a force for peace, and the importance 
of establishing some standard kinds of equipment 
and weaponing for units that are assembled on 
short notice for U.N. service. 

We have learned that the essential role of a 
peacekeeping force, the mind-set and attitude 

July 16, 1962 

toward his job of every soldier, has to be funda- 
mentally different from that of a traditional mili- 
tary mission. For a peace force, every move is 
highly charged with political content. In a peace 
force, the troops carry guns but have no enemies. 

Another thing we have learned is that no stand- 
ing force — as originally conceived in the early 
days of the United Nations — would be quite ap- 
propriate for any given policing action. In each 
of the eight major police-force jobs the United 
Nations has carried out, the problems and the areas 
were sufficiently different so that a different mix 
of training, skills, nationalities, and weapons was 
called for. Incidentally, it may surprise some of 
us who hear so much about the failure of members 
to carry out their obligations to the U.N. that 54 
countries have contributed personnel to U.N. 
peacekeeping missions, including 15 nations which 
did not exist as nations prior to World War II. 

Speaking of technical points, it is worth noting 
in passing that the march of science has advanced 
the technology available to the peacekeepers as 
well as the weaponmakers. 

Not so very long ago a nation in some remote 
comer of the world could start an aggression, and 
months could pass before the rest of the world 
caught up with what was going on. As the world 
shrank, so did the time available for impublicized 
military operations. Today, with nearly instan- 
taneous communications around the world, it is 
almost impossible to hide an aggression for more 
than a few hours. Breaches of the peace can now 
be kept under the klieg lights of international ob- 
servation — if some agent of the world community 
is there, able and willing to switch on the lights. 

Meanwhile fast transport is available to move 
agents of peace and order with great speed to any 
spot on earth. Within less than 24 hours after 
a cease-fire was reached at the time of Suez, the 
U.N. recruited and transported its first contingent 
from Sweden to the banks of the Suez Canal. 
U.N. troops from Tunisia were on the ground in 
the Congo in less than a day after the Security 
Council replied to the call for help in Leopold- 
ville. And from that day to this, U.N. troops 
have been transported in and out of the Congo 
by the greatest continuous airlift in peacetime 
history — carried out with superb efficiency and a 
perfect safety record by the U.S. Air Force. 

We cannot leave the discussion of the U.N.'s 
third-party role in the practice of peace without 


dealinj? with the question that must be in the 
minds of many of you. "WHiat about the really 
big conflict going on in the vrorld ? What about 
the conflict between the United States and the 
Soviet Union? 

Almost everyone is fond of pointing out that 
the United Nations has not been able to reconcile 
the superpowers within the councils of the United 
Nations and in line with the charter which they 
both undertook to honor. This is all too true. 
But the United Nations has, on important oc- 
casions, done the next best thing : It has stepped 
in the middle and prevented the big powers from 
confronting each other under extremely dangerous 
circumstances. You will remember that during 
the series of Middle Eastern crises there were 
threats of Eussian "volunteers." Missiles were 
rattled and there were ugly noises of impending 
disaster — until the United Nations stepped be- 
tween the belligerents. You also taiow, of course, 
that when the United Nations arrived on the 
scene in the Congo, the Soviet Union had recog- 
nized the .secessionist government of Antoine 
Gizenga and was moving in to support him. Ob- 
viously the United States could not have sat by 
while a Soviet-sup^jorted government took over 
in the heart of Africa — and just as obviously di- 
rect intervention by hostile nuclear powers could 
have been fatal to the peace of the world. The 
important thing to keep in mind, of course, is that 
intervention by the world community served the 
interests of the United States and did not serve 
the interests of the Soviet Union. 

Supervising Peaceful Change 

The essential role of the third man in world 
affairs is not limited to restoring breaches of the 
peace and settling disputes which have broken 
into the open. There is the almost equally critical 
job of supervising peaceful change. The simple 
fact of the matter is that the postwar world has 
seen the most convulsive political transformation 
of all time. I need only mention that the map of 
the world as of today shows 54 sovereign and 
independent nations which were not sovereign or 
independent a mere decade and a half ago. On 
Sunday [July 1] morning an up-to-date map will 
have to show two more [Burundi and Rwanda] — 
the eighth and ninth nations to become independ- 
ent under the direct responsibility of tlie United 
Nations Trusteeship Council. 

The natural resentment between peoples which 
inevitably has made decolonization an emotional 
exercise might well have exploded from emotion 
to passion, and from resentment to conflict, with- 
out the moderating influence and the conciliation 
machinery of the United Nations. 

Working for Economic and Social Progress 

But the practice of peace must deal with poten- 

tial as well as active conflict — as economic andi 
social agencies within peaceful communities deal 
with injustice and concern themselves with the 
human condition to keep the community peaceful 

In this age of scientific marvels and unheard-of 
standards of living in North America and Europe, 
there are about li/4 billion people in some 100 
countries and territories of the free world with 
annual incomes of less than $200, with life ex 
pectancies of less than 40 years, without enough 
food to do a decent day's work, and with less than 
an even chance of ever learning to read or to write. 
Even if we put aside tlie question of justice and 
humanitarian concern, it is manifestly a matter of 
great concern to the national interest of the United 
States that these people be helped in their effort 
to get started down the long road to acceptable 
standards for human life — because the political 
stability of the world depends upon it and because 
our security is threatened when stability breaks 
down. This, of course, is the self-interest which 
lies behind our own foreign aid progi-ams. 

Dreams of economic and social progress, of 
equitable distribution of wealth, of equal shares 
of dignity, of mass literacy and decent standards 
of health and housing — these are as old as civi- 
lized man. Our capacity to dream such dreams U.\', 
is indeed what we mean by referring to ourselves 
as civilized. But it is only in my time, and yours, 
that it has been technologically possible to trans- 
form these antique reveries into action in the here 
and now. 

Once the dreams are converted into action, we 
find that the task adds up to nothing less than 
nation building. And when nation-building pro 
grams become operational we begin to learn some 


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lessons, as we do when the dream of peace moves j-^ilmjij 
into operations to keep the peace. 

We leani, for example, that the development 
process is an organic whole, not a mere collection 
of meritorious projects. 

We learn that a few miles of road in the wilder 

Department of Stale Bulletin 



H Sat 

J"iy 16, 

uess, a lonely health center, a country schoolhouse, 
a cleanup campaign in one village, do not add up 
to a development process. 

We Imow that tecluiicians who leave institu- 
tions behind are good tecluiicians and tecluiicians 
who just leave tecluiiques behind are bad techni- 
cians — even if they are fairly dripping with cul- 
tural empathy. 

We learn that it is much harder to grow people 
than it is to grow anything else — and much more 
important, too. 

We learn that people are interested in produc- 
ing more only if they feel they will get a fair share 
of what they produce. 

We learn that it isn't good enough to tackle the 
fii-st year of an aid program over and over again, 
that we have to get on with the 2d and 5th and 
10th and 20th years. 

We even learn that it isn't good enough to tackle 
20-year tasks with 5-year plans staffed with 2-year 
personnel working with 1-year appropriations. 

These lessons are applicable to anybody's aid 
program — American, British, Swedish, Israeli — 
and to international programs as well. But the 
third man in world affairs has a special role in 
the nation-building aspect of the practice of peace. 
Tlie United Nations can draw on technical and 
other resources from many nations; and it can 
perform services which many of the sensitive new 
nations are not willing to accept from either side 
of the cold-war barricades. 

It is already quite an effort, by any measure 
you want to use. We mostly read in the news- 
papers about political crises in the United 
Nations — but Paul Hoffman [Managing Director, 
U.N. Special Fund] is fond of pointing out that, 
of 18,000 people working directly for the U.N. 
family of agencies, 15,700 are working at the tasks 
of economic and social development. 

This 'year the United Nations will have several 
thousand tecluiicians and experts working at 
nation building in 125 countries and territories. 
(To a remarkable extent this exchange of expert- 
ness is a two-way street : Chile, for example, re- 
ceived 63 U.N. experts last year but contributed 
48; India received 135 but contributed 113; Egypt 
received 68 but contributed 45.) 

The United Nations has four regional economic 
commissions with full-time staffs working in Gen- 
eva, Santiago, Addis Ababa, and Bangkok. Its 
Children's Fund has 25 offices around the world. 

July 16, 7962 

There are now Resident Eepresentatives of the 
United Nations in 55 nations. And during the 
past several years the United Nations has agreed 
to help establish nearly a hundred training insti- 
tutes throughout the less developed world to 
introduce new leaders and tecluiicians to the 
mysteries and excitement of nation building. 

Potential Capacity of the U.N. 

In this review of the role of the third man in 
world affairs — as it is played by the United Na- 
tions — I have talked mainly about successes of 
operations wliich have worked or are working to 
maintain the peace, to supervise peaceful change, 
and to transform traditional societies into mod- 
ern states designed for membership in the world 
commimity in the second half of the 20th century. 
As anyone knows who reads the morning news- 
papers, the third man does not always succeed — 
because he is far from perfect. 

I should therefore like to recall quickly that 
the practice of peace has become operational only 
within the past decade and a half ; that like every 
other kind of human endeavor one leams by doing 
and by making mistakes ; that the United Nations 
has inherited the quarrels of the centuries and 
deals only with the most difficult of all disputes; 
and that the process of modernization is a mystery 
which has been explored in a serious fashion for 
not more than a few odd years. 

There are communities in this country which 
antedate the Revolution and which today are 
struggling with problems of urban blight, juve- 
nile delinquency, and assorted acts of violence. 
There are States in this Union which were among 
the original colonies and wliich to this day have 
not made good on the human liberties supposed 
to be guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. After 
going on 200 years of operation tlie Federal Gov- 
ermnent has enough unsolved problems on its 
hands to keep the Congress in session overtime 
even in an election year. 

Compared with other institutions established to 
protect peace, foster progress, and spread justice, 
it is small wonder, then, if the United Nations 
after 16 years has not set eveiytliing right in the 
world. Indeed it has not. But it's the only third 
party in the world community with the potential 
capacity to learn how to practice peace well 
enough to some day make possible a secure system 
of world order. 


Secretary Rusk Holds Talks 
With European Leaders 

Departure StateTuent, June 18 

Press release 398 dated June 18 

I am leaving tonight [June 18] at midnight for 
about 10 days in six major European cities. 

The Atlantic community is entering a new 
period of creative activity. Many of the things 
for wliich it has struggled have been attained, and 
now fresh chapters and fresh opportunities are 
opening up for it. 

A great deal has happened since NATO first 
came into being, since the Marshall Plan first 
helped Europe move toward full economic recov- 
eiy and the reconstruction of war damage. Wliat 
has not changed are the basic beliefs held in com- 
mon by the nations forming this great community 
and their fundamental commitments to each other. 
These remain solid and whole. There are no 
cracks in the basement of this great edifice of the 
Atlantic community. What we are talking about 
is how to add another story on tliis great structure. 
There is a f ennent in the Atlantic community, and 
I think in some quarters it has been mistakenly 
interpreted. It is not a discussion of the funda- 
mentals on which we all agree; those don't need 
discussion at tliis time — we have complete agree- 
ment on those. 

It is, rather, a lively examination in all direc- 
tions of what is next to be done — the new steps — 
for example, the enlargement of the Common 
Market, through the discussions now going on be- 
tween the Six ^ and the United Kingdom. There 
are some strategic questions which Secretary [of 
Defense Robert S.] McNamara discussed in a very 
important speech made this past weekend.^ And 
there are the great problems of relating the At- 
lantic community to the so-called underdeveloped 
parts of the world. 

These are all great new developments, and it is 
not, I tliink, unexpected that there is lively dis- 
cussion among us at tliis present time, such as the 
discussion which took place over the European 
Defense Community a few years ago, or, indeed. 

back in the forties, when NATO was first being 

So I hope that this very quick 10-day trip, which 
will extend the discussions which were begun at the 
NATO meeting in Athens,^ will lead to a further 
consolidation of this great alliance and draw us 
together in the great tasks of the future. 

West Berlin, Symbol of Freedom 

Statement by Secretary Rusk ^ 

Mayor [Willy] Brandt, President Bach [Otto 
Bach, President of the Berlin House of Repre- 
sentatives], Members of the Senate, honored 
guests: I wish to thank you, Mayor Brandt, for 
your kind words of welcome and for extending to 
me the honor of signing the Golden Book of the 
City of Berlin. I consider it a privilege to add my 
name alongside those of the many distinguished 
men and women who have visited here. 

Many thoughts come to the mind of a visitor 
to this great city. I think firet of West Berlin 
as a symbol — a symbol which has caught the imag- 
ination of the world and deeply moved the minds 
and feelings of men. As a symbol of free men's 
will to be free, of their capacity to rise to the chal- 
lenge which history has imposed upon them. West 
Berlin has played a vibrant role. 

This symbolic West Berlin is the city which the 
world knows best. But West Berlin is more than 
a symbol ; it is also a living reality of 2^/4 million 
people. To appreciate this fully one must come 
to the city itself, as I have come; one must see, as 
I have seen, the wall which divides the city — a 
wall which is an affront to human dignity. 

In a more positive sense, there is also the living 
reality of West Berlin as a thriving center of eco- 
nomic and cultural activity. Even the fleeting 
glances which I obtained were enough to corrob- 
orate the fact that reconstruction here has been 
linked to creative imagination in architecture and 
in city plannmg. 

Among the realities of West Berlin is that it is 
a city imder pressure. I shall not weary you with 
a recital of the events since November 1958, of 
which you are aU too much aware. You have been 

^ The six members of the Common Market are Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Nether- 

' For text, see Bulletin of July 9, 1962, p. 64. 


' For background, see ihid.. May 28, 1962, p. 861. 
'Made on the occasion of the signing of the Golden 
Book of the City of Berlin on June 21. 

Department of State Bulletin 

living them. But we Americans are shoulder to 
shoulder with you — for the sake of your own free- 
dom. But it does not stop there. As President 
Kennedy said in his report to the American people 
on July 25, 1961,^ 

... the fulfillment of our pledge to that city is 
essential to the morale and security of Western Germany, 
to the unity of Western Europe, and to the faith of the 
entire free world. 

It is not unrealistic to add a note of hope. The 
free world has resources which become increas- 
ingly evident in a time of trial. Berlin continues 
to prosper; its citizenry remains resolute and 
forward-looking. I should like to think that peace 
and our vital mterests can both be sustained. In 
a nuclear age, this would mark a victory for 
reason. Bearing this in mind, I continue ready to 
explore further with the Soviet Union whether a 
basis for negotiations exists. To do less would be 
a dereliction of my duty to the American people 
and to the people of West Berlin. 

I am certain of this : The friendship and mutual 
respect which has characterized our relationships 
over the years will endure. I can also assure you 
that you will have no cause to doubt our determi- 
nation to honor our pledge to protect your free- 
dom and to insure your continued ties with the 
rest of the free world. 

U.S. Urges Soviets To Halt Border 
Firings at Berlin 

Following is an exchange of notes ietween the 
United States and the Soviet Union on the subject 
of recent incidents in Berlin. 


Press release 411 of June 25 

In a Note transmitted on June 7 to the Embassy 
of the United States of America at Moscow, the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Ee- 
publics made known to the United States Govern- 
ment its view regarding certain incidents that took 
place recently in Berlin. 

The United States Government wishes to call 
the attention of the Government of the Union of 

• Bulletin of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267. 

'Delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
U.S.S.R. on June 25 by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow. 

July 16, 7962 

Soviet Socialist Republics to the fact that the 
present difficulties in Berlin are due exclusively 
to the illegal and inhumane action of the East 
Berlin authorities, who, with the full consent of 
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Eepublics, found no other means of opposing free 
movement inside Berlin except by erecting a wall 
on August 13, 1961, to divide the city. 

The United States Government shares the ap- 
parent concern of the Soviet Government at the 
increasing number of these incidents. It is clear, 
however, that the Soviet Government has been 
misled as to the facts and causes of the incidents 
which its Note describes. The Soviet Note com- 
plains of the death on May 23 of Corporal Goer- 
ing. The Soviet Government should be aware 
that he and his compainion received their injuries 
at the very moment that they, acting in accordance 
with their official orders, were firing at and per- 
manently crippling a 15-year old refugee boy who 
had already reached West Berlin by swimming 
the Humboldt Hafen. 

The Soviet Note cites an exchange of shots 
across the boundary between East and West Berlin 
on May 27 as the responsibility of West Berlin 
authorities. The facts, however, are that East 
Berlin guards, after shooting to death a would-be 
refugee while he was still in the Soviet Sector near 
the boundary, fired a fusillade of bullets at West 
Berlin police and customs officials when tliey ar- 
rived at a point in the Western Sector opposite the 
scene of the shooting. 

In these cases, as in all such cases, the East 
Berlin guards fired first. They fired into West 
Berlin and this fire was returned by West Berlin 
police in the one case to save the life of the help- 
less boy, and in the other case to save themselves 
from unprovoked attack. 

Moreover, in the period May 8 to June 11, there 
were four separate cases in which East Berlin or 
East Gei-man guards deliberately fired into West 
Berlin. Three persons, all juveniles and one a 
girl, were wounded in these incidents. In the 
same period there were four separate incursions 
by armed East German or East Berlin personnel 
into West Berlin, three separate incidents involv- 
ing the kidnapping of four individuals from West 
Berlin, and at least 10 separate incidents involv- 
ing attacks upon West Berlin police or citizens by 
East Berlin or East German guards throwing 
bottles or smoke grenades or firing blank car- 


tridges, tear gas shells or slingshots loaded with 
scrap iron. 

The Soviet Note mentions various other inci- 
dents, the facts aliout which are quite difl'erent 
from those described by the Soviet Government. 
In no case is there cause for recrimination by the 
Soviet Government against the Governments of 
the Three Western Powers. Some of the incidents 
in question occurred in the proximity of the wall. 
It is significant that before August 13, 1961, the 
sector boundan- between East and West Berlin 
was free from violence. For more than 16 years 
there was a constant flow of persons from East t« 
West and West to East. There is in fact no doubt 
whatsoever that the violent incidents to which the 
Soviet Note draws attention are the direct conse- 
quences of the decision to cut off the free move- 
ment of persons within Berlin. 

The facts set out above show the manner in 
which the East German and the East Berlin 
guards, acting in violation of all accepted rules of 
international behaviour, have killed defenseless 
people attempting to fle« from behind the wall. 
It is inevitable that actions of this sort should in- 
crease still further the tension created by the divi- 
sion of the city. The competent authorities in 
West Berlin have instructions to do everything in 
their power to avoid aggravating the situation. 
However, it goes without saying that the United 
States Government supports the measures taken 
to prevent the murder of refugees and danger to 
West Berlin resulting from shots from across the 
sector boundaries, and any actions of this type 
will in future, as has been the case hitherto, call 
forth the appropriate counter action. 

The United States Government welcomes the 
recognition by the Soviet Government in despatch- 
ing its Note of June 7 of its continuing responsi- 
bility, together with the Three Powers, for Berlin. 
The United States Government trusts that the 
Soviet authorities will take the necessary steps to 
ensure that such firing by East Berlin and East 
German guards is halted forthwith. 

The United States Government also welcomes 
the Soviet Government's expression of concern at 
the incidents and is desirous of contributing 
toward any action that would improve the situa- 
tion in Berlin. The United States Government 
considers that these questions might be examined, 
preferably in Berlin by representatives of the 
Governments of tlie United States, the United 

Kingdom, France and the Union of Soviet Social- 
ist Republics, with a view to avoiding, by all ap- 
propriate methods, the recuri'ence of such inci- 
dents, in particular by seeking means to facilitate 
the movement of persons and goods within Berlin. 


Unofficial Translation 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., upon 
the instructions of the Soviet Government, has the honor 
to state the following. 

During the last ten days in May, a series of dangerous 
provocations has taken place by the West Berlin police, 
as well as Fascistic elements, from "West Berlin toward 
the area of Scharnhorststrasse on the border of the Brit- 
ish Occupation Sector in West Berlin. West Berlin 
police fired upon a detail of GDR border police, killing 
Unteroffizier Goehring and seriously wounding another 
worker of the border police. At the moment of firing, 
both border guards were at a distance of more than forty 
meters from the border, within the territory of the 
capital of the German Democratic Republic. British 
military police were brought up to the scene of the inci- 
dent during this provocation with the aim of supporting 
the West Berlin police. On May 24, at 2025 hours, in 
the Tiergarten area, a grenade was thrown on to GDR 
territory from a military automobile travelling through 
the British Sector. On the night of May 25-26, explo- 
sions aimed at destroying GDR border structures were 
carried out by criminal elements from West Berlin in 
two places: in the Eberewaldstrasse area and Gleim- 
strasse. Another attempt to carry out an explosion was 
undertaken on the same night on Schwedterstrasse. On 
May 27 West Berlin police from the British Sector again 
opened fire on GDR border guards during the latter's 
fulfillment of their duty in guarding the state border of 
the Republic. Simultaneously, openly hostile attacks on 
Soviet organizations located in West Berlin also cannot 
be disregarded. Thus, on the night of May 24-25, Fa- 
scistic elements damaged the show-window of the infor- 
mation section of the VAO (All-Union Stock Company) 
"Intourist" in West Berlin, organized a hostile demon- 
stration near the building of "Intourist", and shouted 
threats at the Soviet employees. All these provocations, 
which have recently acquired the character of openly 
aggressive acts, have an undoubtedly premeditated char- 
acter. They are manifestly directed and organized by 
those who are attempting to evoke serious exacerbation 
of the situation in West Berlin. It is noteworthy that 
the West Berlin authorities not only approve the criminal 
and provocative attacks on the border of the GDR, but 
openly call for further dangerous subversive acts against 
peace and tranquillity in this area. One cannot, in par- 
ticular, ignore the openly instigative statement of Ma.vor 
[Willy] Brandt that explosions of bombs on the border 
of the GDR with West Berlin are a "warning", as well 
as that the Western Powers should be prepared, in the 
future "to make greater and perhaps terrible sacrifices." 
Having faile<l in their intentions to use West Berlin as 


Deparfment of Sfofe Bulletin 

a front city and base for subversive activity against the 
ODR, the Soviet Union, and other Socialist States, and 
devoid of a sense of responsibility, the West Berlin 
authorities and those who stand behind them have re»- 
newed along the border line openly instigatlve propa- 
ganda against the GDR, promising "support by covering 
fire" to those who would violate its border. It is com- 
phtely obvious that such acts could not take place at 
• ill if American and other occupation organs in West 
UtTlin did not connive with the provocateurs and if 
they understood what provocative activity of this sort 
could lead to. Increasing attempts of revanchists and 
militarists in West Berlin confirm once again how urgent 
has become the task of normalizing the situation in West 
Berlin and eliminating the occupation regime there. 
The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state 

that it will not take the position of an indifferent observer 
and, if need be, may be forced to take appropriate meas- 
ures in order to fulfill its obligations toward the German 
Democratic Republic. Allied with the U.S.S.R., it can- 
not permit West Berlin to continue to be used by re- 
vanchist and militaristic circles for purposes inimical to 
the cause of peace and to remain one of the dangerous 
sources of tension in the center of Europe. The Soviet 
Government expects that the Government of the U.S.A. 
will take necessary measures to assure the impermissi- 
bility of dangerous provocations from West Berlin toward 
the GDR. The Soviet Government declares that the re- 
sponsibility for all possible consequences of such acts, 
should they be continued, will lie on the occupation au- 
thorities in West Berlin and on the three occupation 

IFifteen Years of Greek-American Partnership 

Jy Under Secretary McGhee '• 

I am greatly honored by the opportunity to 
address such a distinguished group of leaders of 
the Greek Orthodox Church assembled here from 
both North and South America. It is particularly 
fitting for us to commemorate this evening the 15th 
anniversary of the Truman Doctrine, which 
linked inextricably the destiny of our country with 
that of Greece. 

It is also a pleasure to speak before the citizens 
of the great State of Massachusetts here in the city 
of Boston, which is proudly known throughout the 
United States as the "Athens of America." 

The ties between Greece and Boston are indeed 
many. In 1958 one of the world's largest ships, 
which was launched at Fore River shipyard in 
Quincy, Massachusetts, was named Princess 
Sophie. Her Majesty Queen Frederika and her 
daughter, the Princess for whom the vessel was 
named, took part in the christening ceremonies. 

I am told that there are more than 85,000 Mas- 
sachusetts citizens of Greek origin. The Greek 

" Address made before the 16th biennial ecclesiastical 
congress of the Greek Archdiocese of North and South 
America at Boston, Mass., on June 26 (press release 418). 

Ju/y 76, 7962 

diocese of Boston has more than 50 churches, and 
they are well attended and supported. 

Greek Independence Day on March 25 is regu- 
larly observed in Boston. In 1961, on the 140th 
anniversary, some 3,000 persons jammed the audi- 
torium of the Greek Theological School, in the 
town of Brookline, wltere President Kennedy was 
born. They came to recall the story of the hard 
fight for freedom, to express thanks for the great 
achievements and the great promise of modem 
Greece, and to join Archbishop lakovos of North 
and South America in a solemn oatli to defend 
liberty, whenever and wherever endangered. 

Even those Bostonians who are not of Greek 
ancestry feel the right to cheer for Greek inde- 
pendence. The revolution that led to Greek free- 
dom in 1821 was, as you may know, substantially 
supported by Boston citizens. Colonel Jonathan 
Miller and Doctor Samuel Gridley Howe, both of 
Boston, went to Greece to join the revolutionary 
forces. Professor Edward Everett of Harvard 
University and America's great statesman, Daniel 
Webster, carried the cause of Greece to the Ameri- 
can people. 


But the links between our country and Greece are 
not limited to tlie State of Massachusetts. They 
are nationwide. There are many parallels be- 
tween America and Greece. The Greek people are 
a democratic and virtually a classless society, as 
are the people in our nation. Fi'eedom of 
thousiht, freedom of religion, freedom of speech — 
these cherished principles are of the very essence 
both of the Greek and American spirit. Greece 
has been enriched by the blended cultural herit- 
ages of many lands — as America has been — and 
this has kept both countries strong and creative 
and perpetually young. 

The record of the Greeks as champions of lib- 
erty is longer than ours. But since the birth of 
the United States, our sons have fought side by 
side in both world wars and in Korea. We share 
the special alliance of NATO— the shield of the 
free world. Despite her internal problems of re- 
covery and readjustment from her wounds during 
the last war, Greece plays an important role in 

The Truman Doctrine 

The relations between our coimtries have, how- 
ever, been influenced more than any other one fac- 
tor by the Truman Doctrine. I am proud to quote 
President Kennedy's words, released on March 12 
in commemoration of its 15th anniversary : 

We observe today the 1.5th anniversary of President 
Truman's historic announcement of the purpose of the 
United States to help the Greek people defend their free- 
dom. This announcement, with the support of the Con- 
gress and the American people, was translated into action. 
And that action followed on a great tradition of ideals 
common to Greeks and Americans. 

. . . The danger to Greece was overcome, primarily be- 
cause of the national determination of the Greek people 
to restore their freedom and democracy. . . . 

Today, we are joined together in an effort to strengthen 
the cultural and spiritual ties we share, and for our part 
we pledge our loyalty to our faithful and gallant Greek 
friends. . . . 

The whole free world has followed with admi- 
ration the great effort the Greek people have made 
over these 15 years, not only to restore their coun- 
try from the ravages of the recent war but to meet 
and crush the legions of Commimist tyranny. It 
is well to recall the background of our Govern- 
ment's decision to assist Greece, made under the 
leadership of President Trmnan and rightly 
called the Truman Doctrine. I am proud to have 


been able to play a part in carrying out this 

In the fall of 1946 Greece was in desperate 
straits. She had almost no funds to maintain her 
Government, feed her people, and fight the threat 
of a Communist-directed guerrilla war. All of 
her major ports were destroyed, as were 90 per- 
cent of her railroads. Only 138 ships of all kinds 
were left in the Greek commercial fleet, which be- 
fore the war numbered 577 merchant ships and 
733 caiques. National income was 41 percent and 
industrial production 35 percent of prewar rates. 
The country's economy was being engulfed by 

Feeding upon this misery was a Communist- 
directed conspiracy which aimed at establishing 
a Communist dictatorship in Greece. In the offi- 
cial words of the Greek Communist Party the aim 
of the Communist conspirators was to place 
Greece "under the warm aegis of the Soviet Union 
like the other people's democracies." Stripped of 
verbiage, this meant that Greece would be a Soviet 
satellite like Bulgaria and Hungary. The Com- 
munist guerrillas, in the fall of 1946, had the 
capability to carry out this threat unless Greece 
received outside assistance. 

As Greece's situation became more desperate, 
her means for handling it were diminishing. The 
relief provided by the United Nations Relief and 
Eehabilitation Administration ended in Decem- 
ber 1946. The military and economic assistance 
provided by the British was inadequate, and the 
British had advised us they would not be able to 
continue their aid any longer. 

The decision to aid Greece was squarely up to 
the United States. We had a lively awareness of 
the critical situation in Greece and knew what the 
collapse of Greece would mean to the free world. 
In Greece it was evident that the Communist guer- 
rilla movement was being supplied from across 
the borders of the Communist-controlled countries 
to the north — an activity which was obviously 
directed by the Soviet Union. 

The decision to provide assistance to Greece in- 
volved a basic change in American foreign policy. 
This policy, best known as the Truman Doctrine 
and enunciated in March 1947, was the American 
Government's response to Soviet expansionism, 
not only in Greece but also in other areas of the 

Department of State Bulletin 

In his historic speech to the Congress^ President 
Truman laid down the general principles that he 
felt should guide American policy. He said : 

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States 
to support free peoples who are resisting attempted sub- 
jugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. 

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out 
their own destinies in their own way. 

I believe that our help should be primarily through 
economic and financial aid which is essential to economic 
stability and orderly political processes. 

In the meantime, the Greek situation was, in 
fact, deteriorating fast. For the third time in 5 
years the Communists were trying to seize power. 
This time they were in a stronger position, pri- 
marily because of the large supplies of Soviet 
equipment they received from Communist coun- 
tries to the north. 

This Communist guerrilla superiority in weap- 
ons was lost with the arrival of large quantities of 
American equipment under the Greek aid program. 
American military advisers, headed by General 
James A. Van Fleet, soon arrived to help in the 
Greek national army's training program. As in 
Viet-Nam today, American troops worked closely 
with national forces both in training camps and in 
the field, sharing the hardships and, on many 
occasions, exposing themselves to enemy gimfire. 

The Greek Army's new weapons and its im- 
proved training began to have their effect in the 
spring of 1948, when an offensive was mounted in 
central Greece supported by naval vessels in the 
Gulf of Corinth. This offensive was successful in 
its attempt to secure the "waistline" of Greece for 
the Government forces, thereby hampering com- 
munications between rebel forces in the north and 
the Peloponnesus. By the end of the year the 
Peloponnesus campaign was over. Meanwhile, in 
the north, the national government forces opened 
up major offensives in the Granamos and Vitsi 

importance of Events in Yugoslavia 

It was at this time that the valiant Greek efforts 
to bring stability and peace to their country were 
helped dramatically by events in Yugoslavia, 
which constituted a real windfall not only to 
Greece but to the entire Western World. I refer, 
of course, to the break between Tito and Stalin. 

" For background, see Bulletin of Mar. 23, 1947, p. 534. 
July 16, 1962 

This led to the withdrawal of Yugoslav support 
for the Soviet-inspired guerrilla activity in Greece. 
By July 1949, when it had become clear to Tito 
that he could not resolve his differences with the 
Kremlin — except on Stalin's own terms— the 
Yugoslav border was closed to the insurgents. 

This was the first and most impressive demon- 
stration to the West that the forces of 
were still powerful within the Communist em- 
pire — that indeed they could cause a Communist 
state to break away from Soviet control. The 
West was quick to recognize the importance of the 
events in Yugoslavia. Understanding and help 
went to Yugoslavia in what quickly became a cru- 
cial struggle by the Yugoslavs for their national 
sovereignty and independence. The results of the 
policies adopted by the United States — and by 
our friends and allies in Western Europe— are, of 
course, well known. 

We know that the events of 1948 did not solve all 
of the problems of southeastern Europe. We know 
that we here in America have held views quite 
different from those of the Yugoslav leaders on 
many issues. But we also know that the Yugo- 
slavs did gain their independence from the bloc. 
The new system developed in Yugoslavia, al- 
though not like ours, is different from that in the 
Soviet Union. Kelations returned to normal 
across every one of Yugoslavia's frontiers with our 
free-world friends. Albania was geographically 
cut off from the bloc and was thus also able, more 
than a decade later, to defy the authority of 

We and the entire Western World have contin- 
ued to benefit from the gains made in this area 
during the past 14 years. Changes in the Yugo- 
slav system have become institutionalized. Less 
than one-third of the trade of Yugoslavia is with 
the Soviet Union. The contacts and bonds be- 
tween the Yugoslav people and the West continue 
to grow, and the strategic use of that important 
Balkan country continues to be denied to the 
Soviet Union. 

Until 1948 the guerrilla action in Greece had 
been immeasurably helped by the safe haven made 
available in the Communist countries to their 
north. They provided rest, supplies, and con- 
venient escape from the pressure of Greek security 
forces. This advantage was largely lost to the 
international Communist effort when the most 


iinpoi-tant of Greece's three Communist neighbors 
broke away from the Soviet bloc. Stalin con- 
tinued support for the rebels through Albania 
and Bulgaria, but the reduced opportunities for 
so doing and the increasing successes of the loyal 
Greek forces soon forced him to abandon his 
faltering adventure. The defection of Yugo- 
slavia had insured and speeded the tipping of the 

The new strength of the Greek national armed 
forces, combined with developments in Yugo- 
slavia, presaged the end of the civil war. The 
Greek Army mounted a final offensive in the north 
during the late summer of 1949. On October 16, 
1949, the rebel radio announced that rebel troops 
had ceased operations. The third attempt by the 
Communists to take Greece by force had failed. 

The Greek nation then faced the tremendous 
task of reconstruction and of creating a better life 
for the Greek people. You are all familiar with 
the success of this effort. Modem Greece has 
passed prewar levels and is making rapid strides in 
its further economic development. We in 
America have no doubt that Greece will succeed in 
achieving its goal. 

In the past, U.S. aid has been significant in the 
defense and development of Greece ; in fact, since 
the inception of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, 
U.S. aid has amounted to about $31A billion. The 
United States fully intends to continue its assist- 
ance to Greece. Grant aid will be terminated at 
the end of this fiscal year, in light of our policy on 
a worldwide basis, but other programs will con- 
tinue or be expanded. We will continue to give 
Greece militaiy equipment, and we will continite 
our Food-for-Peace program. We will extend to 
Greece long-term, low-interest loans for develop- 
ment projects, and we will seek ways, in coopera- 
tion with our other European allies, to help Greece 
obtain assistance from other friendly nations. 

U.S. Investment in Freedom of Southeast Europe 

There is, however, grave danger that demands 
for changes in United States policy toward Yugo- 
slavia, wliich have been reflected in recent actions 
by the Congress^ will seriously jeopardize the 
progress that has been made, not just in Yugo- 
slavia but in all southeastern Europe. 

Curtailment of United States trade and aid 
to Yugoslavia cannot fail to convey to the Yugo- 

' For backKTOund, see ihid., July 2, 1962, p. 

slav Government, as it moves into another crucial '' .. 
phase in its relations with the Soviet bloc, that 
there seem to be no possibilities in United States- 
Yugoslav relations for a favorable alternative to 
reassociation with the Soviet bloc or complete eco- 
nomic and political isolation in Europe. Those 
Yugoslav elements favoring a pro-Western cou 
will surely be discouraged if it is made clear to 
them in this dramatic way that the United States* 
no longer has an interest in their welfare or an 
interest in helping the Yugoslavs to sustain their 
national independence. 

In that case, U.S. influence in Yugoslavia would f *™'" 
diminish. Bitterness and resentment at all levela 
of Yugoslav life might provide an emotional drive 
that would force the Yugoslavs back into a close 
and dependent relationship with the Soviet bloc. 
Yugoslavia's efforts to move away from Soviet 
orthodoxy and absolutism, to open itself to the 
outside world, to demonstrate that the Yugoslav 
system of organization of the state and the econ 
omy can produce more beneficial results than rigid 
adherence to blind orthodoxy, would then have 
been in vain. 

While striving to improve its commercial rela- 
tions with the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet Eastern 
European bloc, Yugoslavia has indicated that it 
wishes to do all in its power to maintain its inde- 
pendence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Should 
Yugoslavia, because of a lack of alternatives, be 
forced back mto the Soviet bloc, the damage would 
be serious to the interests of the free world. The 
results of the successful policies of 14 years pursued 
under three different administrations would be 

Soviet power would again be reestablished on the 
Adriatic, and Austria's southern flank would 
again be under Soviet threat. Moscow would be 
sitting once more side by side with Albania and 
Bulgaria on Greece's northern frontiers, poten- 
tially menacing Greek hopes for political and eco- 
nomic stability. And Moscow's power would be 
felt strongly in Italy, which has the largest Com- 
munist Party in the Western World. 

Since 1949 the United States has made a very 
substantial investment in rolling back Soviet 
power from the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. 
Over $9 billion has gone in economic and military 
assistance to Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. 
To abandon our investment in Yugoslavia at this 
time cannot fail to result in a major Soviet wind- 

Department of State Bulletin 

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fall in southeastern Europe. All of our other 
o;ains in this area would be jeopardized. Soviet 
pressure on Greece and Turkey would increase, 
and Moscow's long dream of influence and control 
in the Mediterranean would be closer to 

I do not believe that the American people, with 
these facts before them, would wish to reverse a 
bipartisan policy of 14 years under three Presi- 
dents, a policy which has so clearly produced 
major benefits for the free world in its struggle 
against communism. It is not just the friends of 
Greece or the friends of Turkey or the friends of 
Yugoslavia who are concerned here. Equally 
concerned are all who have a stake in preserving 
the area of freedom created in southeast Europe. 
It is our sincere desire that all of these countries, 
including the valiant Greek nation which has been 
the subject of our particular consideration this 
evening, will be able to continue to work out their 
own destinies in freedom. 

U.S. and Cyprus Reaffirm 
Common Objectives 

Following h an exchange of messages between 
President Kennedy and Arclibishop Makarlos, 
President of the Republic of Cyprus, at the con- 
clusion of President Makarios'' visit to the United 

White House press release dated June 17 

President Kennedy to President Makarios 

June 13, 1962 
Your Beatitude: Your visit here has been a 
source of great pleasure to me and to the people 
of the United States. It has given us a new ap- 
preciation of the challenges you and the Cypriot 
people face in building a stable counti-y with ex- 
panding opportunities to lead richer and fuller 
lives. Our discussions have enabled us better to 
understand each other's problems, and have under- 
scored the fact that we have many common ob- 

I am happy to reassure you of my Government's 
intent to help with the implementation of your 
program of economic development, and I look 

' For text of a joint communique released at Washing- 
ton on June 6, see Bulletin of June 25, 1962, p. 1011. 

Ju/y 76, J 962 

forward to the prospect of increasingly effective 
cooperation following your return. 

May God grant you a safe journey, and a happy 
and prosperous future for you and the people of 

John F. Kennedy 

President Makarios to President Kennedy 

June 15, 1962 
The White House 

I thank you most cordially for your kind mes- 
sage of farewell. On leaving the United States, 
today, I wish to express to you, Mr. President, my 
very deep appreciation and gratitude for the 
generous hospitality extended to me during my 
stay in your great country. I take with me un- 
forgettable memories. I have been extremely 
touched by your kind feelings towards me, your 
deep interest in the people of Cyprus and their 
future, your imderstanding and sincere friend- 

My personal contact with you afforded me the 
opportunity to confirm once again my conviction 
that in your person the noble American people 
have found a great and inspired leader and a 
devoted champion of the cause of world peace and 
the happiness of mankind. I pray to God that 
your service to your great nation and humanity 
may be rewarded by crowning success. 

I am returning to my country very much re- 
assured and encoui-aged for the future and fully 
convinced that our meetings have greatly con- 
tributed to the further strengthening of the bonds 
of friendship that already tie our two peoples 
closely together through the belief in common 
ideals and by their connnon heritage. I am look- 
ing forward with particular gratification to a 
closer cooperation between our two countries. 

I take this opportunity to extend to you a cor- 
dial invitation on behalf of the people of Cyprus 
and myself to visit our country as my guest at 
any time convenient to you. We shall consider it 
a great privilege and honour to welcome you in 

With my best wishes for your personal well- 
being and the prosperity of the American people, 
and may God be always with you. 
Archbishop Makarios 
President of the Republic of Cyprus 

The Future of the European in Africa 

hy G. Mennen Williams 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs'^ 

During the past year and a half, most of my 
public speaking on Africa has been concerned with 
the problems and the prospects of the indigenous 
Africans as they guide their new and emerging 
nations onto the world stage. Today I would like 
to change this focus and concentrate on the prob- 
lems and prospects of another segment of African 
society — the people in Africa of European origin. 

The future of the European in Africa is one of 
the most hotly debated questions in that continent. 
I have followed this question with great interest, 
and it is my considered judgment that favorable 
possibilities exist which can permit Europeans to 
live harmoniously in the Africa of the future. 
There has been a tendency to view the transfer of 
power from European governments to new Af- 
rican states as a settlement on African terms. In 
reality there has been considerable accommodation 
by both Africans and Europeans in working out 
the future of Africa, and the contributions to the 
total welfare that Europeans can yet make — in 
concert with or as parts of African governments — 
give hope for true interracial societies in Africa. 
Of course, the day when Europeans can live in 
Africa as a superior and specially privileged class 
is gone. However, the future for Europeans who 
become citizens of the new African states, enjoy- 
ing equal rights and privileges with all other cit- 
izens, certainly looks bright. 

The problems of African-European relation- 
ships have deep roots. Aside from the Portuguese 
areas and North Africa, for several hundred years 
prior to the 19th century the European contacts 

Address made before the Detroit Forum at Detroit, 
Mich., on June 28 (press release 424 dated June 27; as- 
delivered text). 

of most Africans were limited to slavers, mission- 
aries, hunters, and traders. With the exception 
of South Africa, where European settlement had 
begun earlier, the great influx of Europeans into 
Africa started in the last quarter of the 19th cen- 
tury — the period of the "great scramble," during 
which the nations of Europe divided Africa at the 
conference table. 

Following three-quarters of a century of Euro- 
pean dominance, the tide began to reverse itself 
early in the 1950's. Since that time, 25 African 
nations have achieved independence, and several 
more will attain that status this year. As a result 
of this development there has been a radical change 
in the character of modern African-European re- 
lationships from those that existed during colonial 

For many reasons the patterns of African- 
European relations developed differently in vari- 
ous sections of Africa. Perhaps the principal dif- 
ference was between those areas of Africa where 
Europeans settled in large numbers and those 
areas where they did not. There were also differ- 
ences among the colonial policies of the various 
European powers. 

The European-settled areas are located prin- 
cipally in North, East, and South Africa. Even 
within these areas, however, there are significant 
differences in African-European relations. There 
are some 5 million Europeans settled among ap- 
proximately 65 million Africans in these areas — 
a ratio of 1 to 13 — and, not surprisingly, these are 
the areas which have had or are now experiencing 
the greatest difficulties in African-European 

In West and West Central Africa, on the other 
hand, there was no large European settler group, 

Deparfmen/ of S/ofe Bulletin 

and today there are only about 220,000 Europeans 
in an African population of 80 million — a ratio 
of 1 to 350. For the most part African-European 
relationships in these areas have had less friction 
in the transition to African independence. 

The proportion of Eui-opeans to Africans is only 
one factor affecting relations between the two 
groups, however. There also are such variables 
as racial discrimination on the part of the Euro- 
peans; the Europeans' feeling of being perma- 
nently settled or having definite roots in Africa; 
the opportunities for economic, political, and social 
advancement made available to Africans ; and the 
willingness of the Europeans to cooperate with 
the new African governments, which is the crux 
of most of the unresolved questions in Africa 

African-European Relations in West Africa 

West Africa — where nearly all its territories are 
independent — is the area where relations between 
Africans and Europeans are the most friendly. 
This is due in large measure to the fact that there 
was no large settlement of Europeans in this part 
of the world. It is not uncommon, therefore, to 
find Europeans serving in the security forces of 
the new West African governments, and former 
European civil servants and technicians have ad- 
justed to their new status of advisers in many West 
African ministries. In fact, advertisements for 
specialists of many kinds desired by West Af- 
rican countries can frequently be foiuid in British 
and French journals. 

For example, several Europeans are employed in 
very responsible capacities in the Nigerian Gov- 
ernment. Among those holding positions of great 
trust are K. P. Fenton, Governor of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria ; E. A. Clarke, Permanent Secre- 
tary in the Ministry of Finance; and J. E. Hodge, 
who is succeeding another Englishman, Sir Kerr 
Bovell, as Inspector-General of Federal Police. 

In the independent Republic of Togo, a French 
judge, Jean Laloum, was requested to remain in 
the country and is now President of the Court of 
Appeals. Another Frenchman, Georges Widmer, 
a former provincial administrator, is a regional 
inspector, supervising the administration of sev- 
eral provinces. 

In Ghana, the chief executive of the Volta River 
Authority is a Canadian, Frank Dobson; and 

Conor Cruise O'Brien of Ireland, the former head 
of the U.N. Operation in the Congo at Elisabeth- 
ville, becomes vice chancellor of the University of 
Ghana in September. 

Another significant example is found in Senegal, 
where Andre Peytavin, a Frenchman who opted 
for Senegalese citizenship, is Minister of Finance. 

In Upper Volta, President Maurice Yameogo 
has appointed Xavier Althuser, a French eco- 
nomic cooperation official, as his financial adviser. 

In other West and Equatorial African coun- 
tries, French advisei-s and technicians have been 
asked to remain after independence to help Af- 
ricans as advisers in various fields. They have 
the major role of coordinating, staffing, and devel- 
oping the University of Dakar and institutions of 
higher learning now being established in Abidjan 
and Brazzaville. They continue to serve as school- 
teachers in many countries. And it is reassuring 
to note the integration of French youth in the 

Indicative of this atmosphere in West Africa, 
a European recently was elected to local govern- 
mental office in a Nigerian election. This is sig- 
nificant because he ran as an independent without 
the backing of a national political organization 
and had to base his candidacy solely on his ability 
to serve the interests of his African neighbors. 

Some friction does arise, however, in certain 
West Afi'ican countries in the economic field, 
where an aspiring African small-business class re- 
sents the control of much of the area's economic 
life by overseas interests. Nevertheless, many of 
the West African governments feel that foreign 
investors can do much to help their countries move 
forward rapidly, and many are actively seeking 
further private foreign capital to accelerate such 

In much of independent West Africa, there are 
more European and American i:)rivate business- 
men working with the new African governments 
in the economic development of their countries 
than there were before independence. 

Tlie Future of Algeria 

In North Africa there are rising expectations 
that the end of the long struggle in Algeria is in 
sight and that this will permit the entire North 
African area to move forward in peace. The 
Evian Accords, signed on March 19 of this year 

July 76, 1962 



by France and the National Liberation Front 
(FLN) of Algeria, paved the way for the emer- 
gence of a new Algeria. 

These accords bear witness to the statesmanship 
of the French Government under President de 
Gaulle and to the political maturity of the FLN 
leadership. In them are contained the essential 
ingredients of a bright future for Algeria — a foun- 
dation for cooperation between the African and 
European communities in Algeria and a basis for 
cooperation between Algeria and France. 

These accords offer a bridge between the two 
communities and give them an opportunity to live 
peacefully together in the new Algeria. This is 
borne out in a recent Provisional Algerian Gov- 
ernment broadcast to the French people of Al- 
geria, which said : 

The Algerian people today extend a hand to you and, 
without passion, make you an offer to associate yourselves 
with its effort to build. The Evian agreements are the 
charter of your future in Algeria. Study them and you 
will see that they leave you all your chances, that they 
permit you to live in Algeria as free men with security 
and dignity. . . . For three years, while keeping your 
French citizenship, you will be able to exercise Algerian 
civic rights — to vote, run for office, and live in complete 
equality with all Algerian citizens. These three years 
will certainly enable you to get used to new realities and 
to choose and to let your children choose (between French 
and Algerian citizenship) under conditions of peace and 

In a few days the people of Algeria will deter- 
mine their own future, and it is expected that 
they will choose to become independent. In the 
past there have been strong economic ties between 
France and Algeria. These ties have been im- 
portant in many ways to both the French and 
Algerian people. It is gratifying that French 
and Algerian leaders have worked out a basis for 
future cooperation. Such a development would 
be of benefit to both communities and would be a 
favorable factor in the peaceful progress of an 
independent Algeria. And this, in turn, would 
contribute to the stability of the entire North 
African region, which has been disturbed for 
some time by the Algerian situation. 

British Areas of East Africa 

In eastern and southern Africa, the numbers 
and permanency of European settlement in the 
temperate highlands have complicated the emer- 

gence of African nations. Certainly there is every 
reason to hope that the areas under British ad- 
ministration will shortly and peaceably achieve 
independence. The chances are good that this 
will be achieved with workable interracial 

In spite of certain setbacks we have already 
seen development in this direction in newly in- 
dependent Tanganyika, which formerly was 
British-administered. Derek Bryceson, an Eng- 
lishman, has the special distinction of having been 
chosen to head several Tanganyikan ministries by 
the African nationalist leadership and is currently 
Minister of Agriculture. 

In East African areas still British-admin- 
istered, Uganda, which has had sharp tribal dif- 
ferences as well as complications with Asian 
settlers, is scheduled for independence on October 
9 of this year. Kenya, which is facing its Euro- 
pean settler problems squarely, has recently 
achieved internal self-government and is pre- 
paring for independence. In the Federation of 
Ehodesia and Nyasaland, there has been progress 
toward tlie election of legislatures under revised 
constitutions which provide for an ever-increasing 
role for the African majority. This progress is 
being made in the face of difficulties in maintain- 
ing the Federation, some of which are caused by 
European settler recalcitrance in South Rhodesia. 

The people of these areas are engaged not only 
in the vital process of constitutional transition 
but of accommodation between races as well. 
These problems of transition and accommodation 
are questions that must be resolved primarily by 
the peoples and governments concerned. Solutions 
to these important problems are not simple be- 
cause there are some who feel the process is going 
too fast and others who feel that it is going too 
slowly. Nearly all factions are making some 
progress toward the commendable goals of self- 
government by all the people and of interracial 
societies. Although the speed at which these goals 
are being attained may be disputed, there is serious 
intent by almost all to get on with the job. 

It is the genuine hope of the United States that 
this political and social progress can be made 
without reference to the race of individual citi- 
zens and, certainly, without derogation of the full 
rights of any element of the population. Cer- 
tainly this is the hopeful pattern being projected 
thus far by an independent Tanganyika. 


Department of State Bulletin 

In other areas of East Africa additional ex- 
amples of progress in European-African rela- 
tions can be found. 

In Kenya the Minister of Land Settlement and 
Water Development in the present African na- 
tionalist government is an Englishman, Bi-uce 
McKenzie. Mr. McKenzie is an established mem- 
ber of the Kenya African National Union, the 
party of Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya, which 
seeks universal suft'rage and independence at the 
earliest possible opportunity. He is also an elected 
member of the Kenya Legislative Council, and 
the majority of his supporters are Africans. 

In Southern Ehodesia the former Prime Min- 
ister and founder of tlie New Africa Party is Gar- 
field Todd, an English rancher. Mr. Todd's party 
supports the aims of the African nationalists rep- 
resented by the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union 
of Joshua Nkomo, and he recently testified before 
the United Nations Special Committee of 17 in 
support of the decolonization goals of that group. 

Another European, Colin Cameron, is Nyasa- 
land's Minister of Works and Transport in the 
nationalist government of Dr. Hastings Banda, 
who heads the Malawi Congress Party, the prin- 
cipal African party in Nyasaland. Although an 
independent, Mr. Cameron was elected with 
Malawi Congress Party support. 

Sir Stuart Gore-Browne, a European landowner 
and a longtime supporter of African political 
goals in Northern Rhodesia, recently joined Ken- 
neth Kaunda, the principal African nationalist 
political leader and head of the United Nationalist 
Independence Party, in testifying on behalf of 
African objectives before the U.N. Committee 
of 17. 

All of these are examples of sound multiracial 
cooperation emerging in the British areas of East 

The Problems of South Africa 

Farther south, however, there are some doubts 
that harmonious progress is possible. Last year, 
for example, a contingent of South African re- 
porters met me at the airport in Basutoland, and 
one of the first questions was : "Do you think the 
white man is expendable as far as American policy 
is concerned?" I, of course, replied: "That's a 
foolish question. The United States doesn't think 
any person is expendable, whatever his race." 

Following the news conference, however, another 
newspaperman came over to me and said : "That 
wasn't a foolish question." I asked him what he 
meant, and he said: "Well, I'll tell you. Every 
nationalist in Africa — that is, West Africa and 
on down — is a Communist, and eveiy one of them 
wants to come down and murder every white 

When I returned to the Commissioner's house, 
I asked him if this was a typical attitude in that 
part of the world. He said : "It's not typical — 
it's the most exaggerated I've heard. But there 
is a feeling down here that all these nationalists 
certainly are troublesome, that they may be Com- 
mmiists, and that they may have this kind of 
genocide in mind." 

This is a kind of induced atmosphere that may 
be understandable but one that I believe is highly 
inaccurate. The people who feel this way forget 
that 24 of the 25 African countries that have 
achieved independence in the last dozen years 
have made the transition peacefully. 

Even in the Congo, where there were attacks 
against Europeans in the early days of independ- 
ence, animosity has subsided and thousands of 
Belgians are returning to the Congo to work. 
Wlien I was in Stanleyville in the Congo's Ori- 
entale Province recently, I encomitered a greatly 
relaxed atmosphere between Europeans and Con- 
golese in this area where anti-European feelings 
ran high in 1960 and 1961. Wliile there, General 
Victor Lundula, the military head of the Province, 
told me how he personally had saved the lives of 
some Europeans during the fighting and men- 
tioned how desirable it was to bring in more Euro- 
pean teclinicians to get the Congolese economy 
moving. It was in Stanleyville, also, where Pro- 
vincial President Simon Losala gave a luncheon 
for our party, and a large number of Europeans 
were there and on good terms with the Congolese. 

The Europeans who feel the Africans have an 
antiwhite attitude are misguided, as far as I'm 
concerned. In fact, there is so little animosity 
among Africans that I am always pleasantly sur- 
prised on my visits to Africa. Nevertheless, 
among those Europeans who have denied equality 
to Africans the feeling that the Africans will 
seek vengeance is strong. 

We in the United States, of course, should be 
humbly aware that we have yet to achieve the 
full promise of equality for all Americans. This 

July 16, 1962 


fact is something we must i-emember in our deal- 
ings -with those Europeans in Africa who oppose 
giving equal rights to Africans. However, it is 
tlie law of the land in our country that all Ameri- 
cans shall have equal rights, and it is the vigorous 
policy of our administration that this goal shall 
be achieved. 

American foreign policy is based on a set of 
principles to which we hold most seriously. Self- 
determination is one of these principles. In fact, 
it is a universally recognized principle which as- 
serts the right of people to determine the kind 
of government under which they want to live. 
It is the principle underlying change without vio- 
lence in stable democratic societies. 

Where this principle is denied in Africa today, 
where preparations for inevitable change have 
not yet begun, the hour is dangerously late. But 
even in those areas determined reform, coupled 
with genuine good will, may find success. 

Certainly this is the prayer of Americans for 
all the peoples of South Africa, where the sejiarate 
development of races has set its face against the 
course of histoiy. Our hope is that we can be of 
assistance in ameliorating this situation in which 
Africans are denied their desire to participate in 
the fundamental tenets of Western civilization 
and of the free world — tenets which include 
equality before God and political self-determina- 
tion. Fortunately a growing number of Euro- 
peans in South Africa question tliis extreme 
political direction, as their strong opposition to 
the new South African sabotage bill has shown. 
A former Chief Justice of the South African 
Supreme Court said the bill violates the rule of 
law and empowers a Minister to restrict an indi- 
vidual's freedom and even his means of livelihood 
without that individual having an opportunity to 
be heard in his own defense or having the right 
of appeal to the courts. 

From this discussion today it is obvious that 
there are many problems to be resolved in Afri- 
can-European relationships before true harmony 
can be achieved on that continent. Nevertheless 
I am convinced tliat on a continent- wide basis 
there are sufficient indications of progress to per- 
mit modest hope to be expressed for the future 
of such relations — provided that both the Afri- 
cans and the Europeans get on with the job that 
must be done. The hour is late, however, and I 
am fully aware that such hope could be left un- 

fulfilled if the present rate of progress is not car- 
ried forward rapidly. 

Certainly the United States has a great interest 
in the development of good relations between the 
indigenous Africans and the Africans of Euro- 
pean origin. Some of the latter now are third- 
and fourth-generation Africans, and they are very 
anxious for a peaceful resolution of their con- 
tinent's problems. The indigenous Africans, for 
their part, are anxious to get on with the tasks of 
nation building. 

The essential questions in obtaining a peaceful 
resolution of Africa's problems will have to be 
decided by the African and European communi- 
ties themselves, of course, but our policy in Africa 
is to assist in the attainment of harmony among 
all the continent's peoples in whatever ways we 

World Peace Assembly, Accra 

The World Peace Assernbly met at Accra, 
Ghana, June 21-28. Following is the text of a 
message from William C. Foster, Director of the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
read to the Assembly on June 25 hy James J. 

The success of the Accra Assembly will be 
measured by its individual response to the question 
posed to all mankind by the threat of nuclear war. 
The question is whether human statecraft is capa- 
ble of achieving general and complete disarma- 
ment in a peaceful world. And the response, in 
my judgment, must be the acceptance of the idea 
that the nations will have to clxange the established 
patterns of their affairs in order ultimately to have 
disannament. It is largely because of failure to 
face this issue that the shadow of disarmament, 
not the substance, has been in the ascendancy in 
international debate. 

Disarmament means that world stability must 
1)6 insured by some means other than military 
power. In a disarmed world, disputes can no 
longer be settled by strength of arms; they must 
be settled instead by international arbitrament. 

Disarmament means that policies of state 
secrecy must disappear. All activities having a 
military potential must be subjected to the scrutiny 
of international observers. 


Department of State Bulletin 

These ai-e startling changes, and they may sound 
unpleasant to many people. But acceptance of 
these notions is implicit in the acceptance of a 
world without the bomb. 

We, in the United States, accept the fact that 
drastic changes in international relationships must 
accompany general and complete disarmament. 
But central in our thinking is the idea that a wide 
measure of agreement can be negotiated and put 
into effect without waiting for a world from which 
all political, military, and tecluiical problems have 
been banished. Implementation of disarmament 
measures would then proceed without interruption 
until the goal of a disarmed world had been at- 
tained. Upon these premises we have constructed 
an outline of provisions for a treaty on general 
and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.^ 

Even in the first stage of our plan, many of the 
measures which the Accra Assembly is to discuss 
would have been accomplished. I hope the Accra 
Assembly will think that the United States ap- 
proach to disarmament is promising and realistic. 
It is a plan which will work even in the absence 
of miracles. We would welcome objective analysis 
of our plan and the plans of others since this is 
now needed more than ever to replace slogans and 
preconceived ideas. 

In tlie United States we have created a special 
disarmament agency within the Government, and 
we seek to mobilize our best resources, both public 
and private, to concentrate on this problem. We 
value private international conferences where peo- 
ple can discuss and dissect ideas without inhibition 
or limitation. I hope the Accra Assembly will 
produce an intellectual ferment and that new and 
constructive concepts will emerge from it. We 
would welcome this most lieartily for, of the affaii-s 
with which governments are concerned, disarma- 
ment is a subject which causes them to feel fre- 
quently and deeply the need for greater wisdom. 

Vice President of Philippines 
Visits Washington 

The Department of State announced on June 21 
(press release 409) the acceptance by Vice Presi- 
dent Emmanuel Pelaez of the Philippines of an 
invitation from the Acting Secretary of State to 
visit Washington Jmie 25-27. 

Vice President Pelaez, who is concurrently Sec- 
retary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, is 
visiting the United States informally in connec- 
tion with the inauguration of Philippine Airlines 
jet service to San Francisco. ■\'\niile he was in 
Washing-ton he met with several high Govern- 
ment officials and was received by President Ken- 
nedy at the White House on June 26. 

U.S. Comments on Report of Control 
Commission for Viet-Nam 

Department Statement ' 

The report just issued by the International Con- 
trol Commission for Viet-Nam - demonstrates 
that the Communist North Vietnamese are en- 
gaged in a campaign of aggression and subversion 
aimed at the violent overthrow of the Government 
of South Viet-Nam. It indicates clearly that the 
hostilities in Viet-Nam, which in the first 5 months 
of this year alone resulted in the death of more 
than 9,000 people, are planned, caused, and led 
by the Connnunist authorities in North Viet-Nam. 
These are the conclusions of the Commission's 
Legal Committee: 

. . . there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed 
personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been 
.sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South 
with the object of supporting, organising and carrying out 
hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against 
the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the 
South. . . . there is evidence to .show that the PAVN 
[People's Army of Viet-Nam] has allowed the Zone in 
the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and sup- 
porting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed 
at the overthrow of the Administration in the South. 

The Connnission accepted these conclusions of 
the Legal Committee that there was sufficient evi- 
dence to show "beyond reasonable doubt" that the 
authorities in Communist North Viet-Nam com- 
mitted these violations. The Commission also 
cited the Republic of Viet-Nam for its activities 
in importing military equipment and personnel 
above the limits imposed by the 1954 Geneva 
Accords.^ The report clearly demonstrates, how- 
ever, that these actions were taken by South Viet- 

For text, see Bulletin of May 7, 1962, p. 747. 

itjly 76, 1962 

^ Read to news correspondents on June 25 by Lincoln 
White, Director, Office of News. 

^ Not printed here. 

'For texts, see American Foreign Policy 1950-1955: 
Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State publication 
6446, p. 750. 


Nam as part of its effort to defend itself against 
aggression and subversion from the Nortli. In 
December of last year President Diem requested 
increased military assistance from the United 
States. We have responded to this request.^ 

President Diem and President Kennedy have 
both stated that they look forward to the discon- 
tinuance of the present level of military assistance 

when the Communist North Vietnamese halt their (j*'''° 
campaign to destroy the Eepublic of Viet-Nam. 1 *'■' ' 
The report of tlie International Control Commis- "I 
sion takes note of this position. The United States, 
welcomes the Commission's report and recom- 
mends it for world attention. We hope that the 
Commission will continue its efforts to restore 
peace in Viet-Nam. 

The Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs of the United States: 
Their Role in Foreign Relations 

hy Lucius D. Battle 

Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs ^ 

Like the nations of the world — new and old — 
I suppose government officials span the spectrum 
of development. Some have been on the job long 
enough to be fully developed — in the particular 
situations tliey are called upon to administer; 
others, like myself, are newly come to their pres- 
ent responsibilities and hence are, in the language 
of development, "newly developing." All of us — 
to use Ambassador Galbraith's metaphor for na- 
tions in their various stages of growth — are like 
"beads being moved along on a string," being 
pushed farther along by experience and the re- 
sponsibilities of office just as countries move far- 
ther along the line of development as they acquire 
additional experience and greater national ma- 

This comment will suggest one reason why, after 
only a few weeks in office, I do not feel disposed 
to make lengthy or ringing pronouncements. In- 

' For texts of an exchange of messages between Presi- 
dent Kennedy and President Ngo Dlnh Diem, see Btn.- 
LETiN of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 13. 

'Address made before a national conference on the 
international training iirograms of the Agency for Inter- 
national Development at Washington, D.C., on June 26 
(press release 417). 

stead I intend, hopeftilly, to stick to my subject, 
"The Educational and Cultural Exchange Pro- 
grams of the United States," to which I have 
added "Their Role in Foreign Relations." Play- 
ing an effective role in our foreign relations is 
of course the end purpose of all our international 

I am grateful for the invitation to be here, to 
discuss with you some of the opportunities these 
programs present to us in Washington, to people 
in 120 countries of the world with which we have 
exchange agreements, and to you in literally hun- 
dreds of communities across the United States. 
And so I propose to present some first impressions 
of principal program activities and relationships 
in this great enterprise of providing purposeful 
exchanges in an environment of continuing inter- 
national change. 

You are attending this conference primarily be- 
cause of your interest in the participant training 
program of AID. Your meetings have not been 
oriented primarily to the international political 
crises that occupy so much of the time and energy 
of diplomats. I am, however, reminded of a 
phrase that former Secretary of State Acheson 
used some years ago to describe the number of 


Department of State Bulletin 

methods needed to conduct effectively our relations 
with the people of other countries. The phrase is 
"total diplomacy." 

The Government's exchange programs provide 
an example of what he meant because, aside from 
diplomatic negotiation and economic and militaiy 
cooperation, they constitute a further facet of our 
foreign relations — a facet that involves the move- 
ment of people for purposes of education, training, 
observation, and research and vrith essential sup- 
porting activities by citizens and community 
groups for foreign visitors coming to this country. 

Within this aspect of our diplomacy — the ex- 
change of persons^we of course have a great di- 
versity of plans and programs. You have been 
well briefed on the aims and methods of AID's 
participant training program. My first function, 
therefore, is to outline briefly the character and 
scope of the educational and cultural exchange 
programs of the Department of State. Wliile 
other agencies have exchange activities, State and 
AID represent the great bulk of the exchanges 
that look to local communities and individual citi- 
zens for vital assistance and support. 

Oepartment of State Programs 

The largest category of exchanges in the Depart- 
ment's program is students. There were about 
9,000 individuals in the Department's total ex- 
change-of-persons program this last academic 
year; of these almost half, some 4,000, were stu- 
dents — both American students going abroad and 
foreign students coming here. 

Since our primary interest today is the foreign 
visitor, let me mention briefly three points of spe- 
cial interest about foreign students. The first is 
that only some 3,000 foreign students — about 5 
percent of the estimated 58,000 foreign students in 
the United States this last academic year — were 
grantees under the Department's own programs. 
With comparable AID grantees, the total of for- 
eign students here under Government grants does 
not exceed 10 percent. 

This leads to the second point I want to make, 
namely, our relationship to the other 90 percent. 
The Government, like your own organizations, 
feels a concern that all foreign students, regardless 
of how they came here, find the best total experi- 
ence that can be made available to them. Both 
humanitarian purpose and national interest coin- 
cide on this point. 

Ju/y 16, 1962 

In accordance with the authorizations of the 
new Fulbright-Hays Act for services to all foreign 
students, and in line with the importance at- 
tached to the whole question of foreign students 
by President Kennedy's administration, we have 
been taking steps to stimulate greater private sup- 
port activities for foreign students and to broaden 
government's own participation. We cannot as- 
sume fixed financial support for all foreign stu- 
dents, but in every feasible way we want to help 
improve the quality of the total experience they 
have here. This means, for example, a series of 
efforts to help more foreign students find summer 
jobs or other useful summer experience, and I am 
glad to report that, through both private and gov- 
ernmental activity, we have made real gains on 
this problem this year. Before another year is 
out we hope there will be other substantial gains 
in improving and expanding procedures for selec- 
tion, orientation, and counseling, both overseas and 

Another point about the foreign students who 
come here under Department grants is that they 
are, for the most part, graduate students. About 
85 percent of our foreign-student grant funds are 
"invested," so to speak, on the graduate level. 

A second principal category in the State Depart- 
ment program is, of course, foreign leaders and 
specialists. This program had its origins in the 
late thirties. Following World War II it took a 
major advancement in numbers because of the in- 
crease in German, Austrian, and Japanese grant- 
ees. As a historical footnote, the numbers of those 
grantees, and of those coming under the technical 
training programs of predecessor agencies of AID, 
led many American communities to realize the 
need for further organization if they were to as- 
sist adequately the Government's program of ac- 
quainting such visitors with American life and 
institutions by firsthand observation. And as 
councils and other groups assisting with foreign 
leader and specialist grantees exchanged experi- 
ences, they saw the need for national coordinating 
services which has brought into being the cospon- 
sor of this conference, COSERV [National Coun- 
cil for Community Services to International 

During this last academic year some 2,300 for- 
eign leaders and specialists, including student 
leaders traveling in groups, were brought to this 
country by the Department for short-term, aver- 

aging about 60-day, visits. A word about the 
basic thinking beliind this program will throw 
light on the programing arranged for these visi- 
tors after they get here. The people who occupy 
leadership or specialist roles in their own countries 
are usually active people ; they have busy careers, 
special interests, and curiosity. They usually have 
well-defined professional or career interests. 
Their programing here is, therefore, built around 
the core of these interests. The range of counter- 
part relationships set up in this country must be 
as broad as the careers represented and may in- 
clude supreme court justices, editors and publish- 
ers, heads of labor unions, government officials, 
university presidents, leaders of women's organi- 
zations, and representatives of the creative arts, 
among others. 

The aim in the invitations to foreign leaders and 
specialists is to bring to this countiy the "philo- 
sophical traveler," in George Santayana's mem- 
orable phrase — those who possess, as he said, 
"fixed interests and faculties, to be sei-ved by 

From their visits here these "philosophical 
travelers" gain new insights into, and understand- 
ing of, American life and institutions. A leader 
in women's activities in the Republic of Togo — 
and also Assistant Director of the Ministiy of 
Finance and Economic Affairs — was a recent 
grantee. She obsen-ed women at work here in a 
variety of fields, in schools and welfare institu- 
tions and civic activities, among others. Her 
visit was concentrated largely in small towns and 
rural areas since Togo is predominantly agricul- 
tural. Before leaving she spoke of the "sense of 
solidarity" women have in this country toward 
civic activities and her desire to encourage this 
sense in her own country. 

Because of the excellent cooperation of private 
organizations of all kinds, the experience of for- 
eign visitors can be rich and varied. An example 
from a wide variety was the visit of two news- 
paper editors from India to Emporia, Kansas, 
where William Allen "Wliite had made the Em- 
poria Gazette a bellwether of American small- 
town life and thought. TV. L. White, who suc- 
ceeded his father as editor and publisher, reported 
their experience in an article in the Reader's Di- 
gest in which he described the kind of "close 
view" they had "of an average American small 
town — not rich, and not poor." 

Foreign leaders are also invited in groups, ac- 
cording to professional interest, as well as indi- 
vidually. Likewise, leader groups of college stu- 
dents are brought to this counti-y. Early next 
month, for example, 70 students from the Univer- 
sity of Sao Paulo in Brazil will arrive for 3 weeks 
in this country. Ten days will be spent in a 
seminar at Harvard on American economic and 
political institutions. They will then be guests in 
private homes in New England and make a few 
days' stop in Washington before returning to 

But it is like cariying coals to Newcastle to dis- 
cuss foreign leader /specialist activities of the De- 
partment at any great length to this audience. 
Many of you could cite book, chapter, and verse 
from your own personal experience with grantees. 
I have discussed leader/specialist activities pri- 
marily to provide general background for some 
later remarks in which I want to try to relate the 
aims and purposes of the principal AID and 
State programs. 

Both of these principal categories I have just 
discussed — foreign leaders and specialists and 
foreign students — are import categories. There 
are ea-port categories we should at least note 
briefly: Students, scholars, teachers, professors, 
and American specialists have been going abroad 
under the Fulbright Act of 1946 and the Smith- 
Mimdt Act of 1948, just as these acts have en- 
abled us to bring in students and leader/specialists 
from abroad. Our import and export authoriza- 
tions now arise under the Fulbright-Hays Act 
(the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange 
Act of 1961), which was passed overwhelmingly 
by both Houses of Congress last summer and 
which codifies and enlarges the authorizations 
previously available. 

There is one further export category that ought 
to be made a part of this record. It is the cate- 
gory we call cultural presentations, a program 
under which American performing artists are sent 
abroad on tours to demonstrate the cultural inter- 
ests and achievements of the American people. 
There has been great variety in the program, from 
the Juilliard String Quartet to Louis Armstrong, 
from Hal Holbrook as Mark Twain to a full-scale 
theatrical company, from the New York City 
Ballet to the Baird Marionettes. Until now, this 
program has been devoted exclusively to sending 
our own artists abroad, but, with the expanded 

Deporfmenf of Sfofe Butletin 

legislative authority given to the Department 
under the new Fulbright-Hays Act, we hope to be 
able soon to begin to give limited assistance in 
bringing foreign artists to this country for non- 
profit performances, principally for university 
and other academic audiences. This would pro- 
vide a further opportimity for citizen and com- 
munity participation. 

Relationships in U.S. Exchange Programs 

The programs we have been discussing — those 
of AID and of State — came into existence at dif- 
ferent times and to sen-e different needs. But 
they are interrelated at several points and mutu- 
ally reinforcing. All are fundamentally directed 
to a great aim of U.S. foreign policy: to help 
create the conditions for what President Kennedy 
has called "a free and diverse world" — rather than 
a rigid, monolithic world. 

Diversity in exchange programs is necessary if 
we are to deal effectively with diverse peoples and 
their varied interests and needs in their different 
stages of development. State, for example, has 
its primary exchange focus on "mutual mider- 
standing." In the new Fulbright-Hays Act the 
fundamental purpose is "to increase mutual 
understanding between the people of the United 
States and the people of other countries by means 
of educational and cultural exchange. . . ." 

The act sets forth these further purposes : 

... to strengthen the ties which unite us with other 
nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural 
Interests, developments, and achievements of the people 
of the United States and other nations, and the contribu- 
tions being made toward a peaceful and more fruitful life 
for people throughout the world ; to promote international 
cooperation for educational and cultural advancement; 
and thus to assist in the development of friendly, 
sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United 
States and the other countries of the world. 

aid's programs, as you have heard from others 
durmg this conference, contribute directly and 
effectively to mutual understanding, but their 
essential authorization goes to a different point. 
In the Act for International Development of 1961 
strong emphasis was given to the concept of 
human resource development through "programs 
of technical cooperation." The AID focus is first, 
and properly, on economic and social develop- 
ment, with human resource development a major 
and growing component of this effort. "The de- 

Ju// 16, 1962 

velopment of human resources is a prime objec- 
tive of the Agency for International Develop- 
ment," Mr. Hamilton [Fowler Hamilton, AID 
Administrator] has said. "Social and economic 
growth in any country depends in large measure 
upon the existence of effective teclmical and 
managerial skills in various fields of organized 
endeavor, public and private. . . ." 

AID participant training grantees are here, 
first of all, for teclmical training on a project- 
oriented basis but are also enabled and encouraged 
to obtain a better understanding of American 
institutions and culture as a part of their "pro- 
graming" while they are here. Here is one ex- 
ample of how the aims of AID coincide with 
our own. 

Both AID and State cover a wide age range. 
In its academic grants AID begins at the prepara- 
tory school level, and in its support of the 
ASPAU program for African students — the 
African Scholarship Program of American Uni- 
versities — undergirds the general academic train- 
ing of highly selected undergraduate students. 
On the participant training level, the average age 
is about 30. The State programs cover the range 
from students to national leaders of senior rank. 

The underlying, unifying idea in all our ap- 
proaches — both governmental and nongovern- 
mental — is that in diversity there is strength. 
We depend on diversity, on the contributions to 
our national life that come from all elements of 
our varied society. It marks our training pro- 
grams and exchanges which must be directed to- 
ward highly developed countries, toward those 
just achieving industrialization, and toward 
others where this badge of modernity is not yet 
being worn. Different kinds of training and edu- 
cation are therefore required. And public sup- 
port for this varied effort must necessarily rest on 
a broad and diverse base. 

In calling this meeting AID has testified amply 
to its own faith in this general proposition. Here 
at this conference, for example, we have repre- 
sentatives of the land-grant colleges and State uni- 
versities — those great centers of training and en- 
lightenment which had their common origin a 
century ago in the farsighted act which the son of 
a Vermont blacksmith-farmer. Senator Justin 
Morrill, brought into being. We know it as the 
Morrill Act of 1862; the centennial anniversary 
date comes in just a few days from now. We are 


all, I think, even more aware than before of the 
dynamic role these institutions play not only, as in 
their founding years, in practical service to their 
State and regional conununities, but now in varied 
services to an international constituency all across 
the world. 

Then, we have here the compai-atively youthful 
COSERV group, cosponsor of this conference, 
which only in May, under the leadership of Mrs. 
Charles N. Bang of the Cleveland World Affaii-s 
Council, completed its first indej^endent regional 
conference. We all look confidently ahead to the 
growing benefits to come from this Council's co- 
ordinating work on behalf of some 75 individual 
community oi-ganizations in 65 cities, from Hono- 
lulu to New York and from Miami to Seattle. 

The National Association of Foreign Student 
Advisers is another great source of strength for 
the exchange effort. Its members are directly in- 
volved in personal problems on more than 1,200 
college and university campuses of the Nation, 
and they also keep closely attuned to new national 
needs and policies. NAFSA brings unique ex- 
perience and service and dedication to the needs 
of our growing numbers of foreign student 

Many other organizations represented here, as 
well as other parts of the academic community, 
government, industry, and labor — all sectors, pub- 
lic and private — provide additional centers of 
strength. As a result, we have in this combination 
of strengths a new affirmation of the traditional 
American faith in diversity — in different kinds of 
organizations and individuals coming together 
voluntarily to build unified strength for a common 

This conference has afforded us all a chance to 
see the identities and complementarities of interest 
of private organizations, individuals, and govern- 
ment. And it has given us in government the op- 
portunity to express our great sense of dependence 
on the voluntary service of diverse private groups 
and private citizens, and our deep gratitude to you 
for it. 

Our interlocking interests are leading to the 
preparation of a booklet we hope to have avail- 
able by early fall. The Department does not have, 
by its very nature, as many publications of an 
instructive type as do some other government 
agencies with special constituencies — with publi- 
cations, for example, such as seed-testing manuals 


or on how to start a small business. I have often 
wished we might do something of the kind. I am 
now able to say that we will have a booklet that 
will meet the general specification. It is a sort of 
seed manual, in a sense. It is a booklet on The 
Seed of Nations — a phrase the President used in 
a talk to foreign students at the Wliite House — 
and it deals with foreign students and what Amer- 
ican communities and organizations and families 
are doing, and can do, to help them. For they are 
"the seed of nations" and our citizens have the 
great opportunity of being their hosts and their 
friends. Many of you know well the role of host 
and friend to foreign students. 

National and International Goals 

The goals we seek through exchanges are as 
varied as the situations they are designed to meet. 
Exchanges as a means of reaching these goals are 
concerned with developed and developing nations, 
both friendly and unfriendly. They deal with 
people. As such they are directed to individiuils 
in all varieties of human, professional, social, po- 
litical, and economic contexts. They relate to all 
the factors that contribute to nation building and 
mutual understanding. These include, for exam- 
ple, human resource development and the preser- 
vation of indigenous national cultures. 

Human resource development, the growth of in- 
dividuals through training and education, has be- 
come a major new national and international goal 
in recent years. It has likewise become a major 
new field of academic study. Economists have 
been giving increasing attention to such mattera 
as the "capital value of man" and the yield on in- 
vestment in human resources. 

"Development," once of limited meaning, has 
in the last few years been expanded to embrace 
human resource development, which lies at the 
base of economic and social growth. AID has 
pointed out that the "human resources gap" varies 
from comitry to country in the light of a nation's 
objectives and development goals. If human re- 
source development plans are to meet individual 
country situations, they must be flexible. Indi- 
vidual country planning is therefore being given 
strong emphasis in the Government. This effort 
to relate exchange programs to particular needs 
and priorities and objectives of individual coun- 
tries, and integratmg them with other relevant 
activities, is leading to closer collaboration in the 

Department of State Bulletin 

exchanges of AID, State, and other agencies, pub- 
lic and private. 

There is need for mutually reinforcing efforts, 
too, in preserving national cultures in nations on 
the road to industrialization. This is a vitally 
important aspect of nation building. The impact 
of modernization will mean changes, but the 
changes need to be adaptations of old cultural 
patterns, old value systems, and historic symbols 
so that these social moormgs will not be swept 
away. Everythmg feasible must be done to pre- 
sei-ve the indigenous arts, the national monuments, 
and other great symbols of a society's traditions. 
A common language, common etlinic origins, and 
common geography may not make a nation. 
There are cultural experiences and traditions, 
usually expressed in the plastic arts or in dance or 
music, that may really be the social bondmg that 
holds a people together. We must therefore think 
in terms of helping to safeguard these indigenous 
arts as an early and essential part of any coimtry 
plan. Fortunately, the cultural roots of most na- 
tions lie deep. For example. Secretary of State 
Rusk has recently pointed to the loyalty of the 
peoples of Eastern Europe to their national cul- 
tures and to their sense of nationhood." 

The goals we seek were illuminated a few weeks 
ago at the University of California in Berkeley, 
where President Kennedy spoke on the role of the 
university in the building of world order.^ 
". . . the pursuit of knowledge itself implies," he 
said, "a world where men are free to follow out 
the logic of their own ideas. ... It implies, I 
believe, the kind of world which is emerging be- 
fore our eyes — the world produced by the revolu- 
tion of national independence wliich is today, and 
has been since 1945, sweeping across the face of the 

"No one can doubt," he continued, "that the 
wave of the future is not the conquest of the world 
by a single dogmatic creed but the liberation of the 
diverse energies of free nations and free men." 

We look hopefully forward to "a free and di- 
verse world"- — toward a "more flexible world 
order," as the President has described it. We 
know that, as we press forward toward this goal, 
the role of education and training becomes ever 
more important to this kind of world. 

' Bui-LETiN of Jan. 15, 1962, p. 
'Ibid., Apr. 16, 1962, p. 615. 

July 16, J 962 

The conduct of educational and cultural ex- 
changes and training programs gives strong sup- 
port to the broad national aim of building, with 
other peoples, a community of independent na- 
tions. In the underdeveloped areas in the south- 
ern half of the world, for example, we can 
encourage the emergence — from all the feiment of 
modernization — of a genuine community of inde- 
pendent nations. We can help them modernize, 
not in our image but in the image they themselves 
formulate out of their own unique histories, cul- 
tures, aspirations, and observations of other cul- 
tures and societies. 

Perhaps the principal fact that distinguishes 
the United States from the Communist world, with 
respect to the less developed countries, is that our 
aspirations for these countries largely coincide 
with their aspirations for themselves. Our politi- 
cal aims, then, are for a world in which their, and 
our, aspirations can be realized. This cannot be 
a rigid, monolithic world. It can only be a free 
and diverse world. 

The need for the services you provide — for par- 
ticipant trainees, foreign leaders and specialists, 
and the like, as well as foi-eign students — can be 
expected to rise in the years ahead as the numbers 
of such visitors increase. We will need more hands 
and heads to do the job. We will need to look at 
our procedures as still developing. The attention 
and help that may be suited to the needs of a 
visitor from a Western society may fail to meet 
some of the needs of those now coming in increas- 
ing numbers from the non-Western world. We 
have by no means yet found all the best ways to 
help the foreign student or trainee or leader or 
specialist realize the maximum value from his 
experience in this country. 

Here is an area for almost unlimited initiative 
and imagination on the part of individual volun- 
teers and groups who share a concern for the 
foreign visitor. Your experience, evolving out of 
thoughtful service in a variety of forms, can help 
those in other communities — and those of us in 
government — toward more useful planning and 
action. The experience some community groups 
have had iii providing training sessions for host 
families, for example, should be widely shared. 

In this brief time I have only tried to touch some 
of the higlilights which this subject and this oc- 
casion suggest. I am confident the pattern of 
diversity will serve well to meet the increasing de- 


mands of the years ahead. With your continuing 
imaginative and generous help — and, hopefully, 
your growing numbers — our varied programs, 
public and private, for bringing foreign visitors 
to this countiy can be increasingly important fac- 
tors in the "total diplomacy" our times require. 

Premier of Jamaica 
Visits Washington 

The Department of State amiounced on June 
22 (press release 410) that Sir Alexander 
Bustamante, Premier of Jamaica, would arrive at 
Washington on June 27 to call on President 
Kennedy and to meet with other officials of the 
U.S. Government. Sir Alexander, with other 
members of his government, is on his way to 
London for talks with British authorities. Ja- 
maica will receive its independence from the 
United Kingdom on August 6, 1962. 

President Kennedy and IVSr. Marshall 
Discuss New Zealand Trade Problems 

Following is a joint statement issued hy Presi- 
dent Kennedy and John Ross Marshall, Deputy 
Pnme Minister and Minister for Trade of New 
Zealand, at the conclusion of discussions held at 
Washington on June 15. 

White House press release dated June 16 

The Deputy Prime Minister reviewed his recent 
discussions in England and on the Continent rela- 
tive to the possible entry of the United Kingdom 
into the European Common Market. The Deputy 
Prime Minister emphasized New Zealand's de- 
pendence on the United Kingdom market for her 
export trade which is primarily based on tem- 
perate agricultural products. He mentioned the 
assurances he had received in the United Kingdom 
that New Zealand's position would be a matter of 
special concern to the British Government in con- 
sidering arrangements for possible entry into the 
European Common Market. Mr. Marshall ex- 
plained why New Zealand wished to see Com- 
monwealth preferences retained; he emphasized, 
however, that for New Zealand, the issue of para- 
mount importance was market outlets for its 
products in the United Kingdom, or in an en- 


larged European Community, comparable to what; 
it now enjoyed, with the opportunity for growth 
as the market expanded. 

The President and the Deputy Prime Minister 
agreed upon the desirability of European unity 
as well as the importance of liberalizing world 
trade. The President described the trade expan- 
sion legislation now pending before the United 
States Congi-ess, explaining that with the passage 
of this legislation he expected a general expansion 
of trade among the nations of the fi-ee world. The 
special problems of New Zealand trade were 
recognized with understanding. The President 
and Mr. Marsliall agreed tliat regular consulta- 
tions between their two coimtries on matters of 
trade should continue. 

Also participating in the discussions in Wash- 
ington were for New Zealand, Ambassador G. R. 
Laking and Mr. Foss Shanahan, Deputy Secre- 
tary, Department of External Affairs, and for the 
United States, Secretary of State Dean Eusk, 
Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges, Under 
Secretary of Agriculture Charles Murphy, Under 
Secretary of State George Ball and Assistant 
Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman. 

President and Prime Minister Menzies 
Review U.S.-Australia Relations 

Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies of Aus- 
tralia made an informal visit to Washington 
June 17-20 and met with President Kennedy, 
Secretary of State Rusk, and other high Govern- 
ment officials. Following is the text of a joint 
communique released hy the White House on June 
20 after meetings between President Kennedy and 
Mr. Menzies. 

White House press release dated June 20 

The President and the Prime Minister expressed 
gratification at the opportunity presented by the 
Prime Minister's visit for furthering their per- 
sonal as well as official friendship symbolizing the 
cordiality of relations between the American and 
Australian people. 

The President and the Prime Minister discussed 
the question of peace in Southeast Asia. The 
President noted with satisfaction Australia's ac- 
tive interest in supporting the stiaiggle of tlie 
Government of Vietnam against subversion and 

Department of State Bulletin 

aggression organized and directed from abroad. 
Both leaders looked forward to the effective 
realization of the Geneva Accords assuring the 
independence and neutrality of Laos. 

The President and the Prime Minister agreed 
tliat a peaceful solution of the "West New Guinea 
dispute would be in the best interests of all con- 
cerned, and they recognized that the efforts of the 
Acting Secretary General of the United Nations, 
U Thant, and his representative, Ambassador 
Ellsworth Bunker, had provided the atmosphere 
ue wen for the achievement of a significant contribution 
resideiil to the cause of peaceful settlement of international 

Both the President and the Prime Minister 
agreed on the desirability of maintaining the ex- 
cellent record of Australian-American security 
consultation and coordination through the 
ANZUS and SEATO Treaties. 

President Kennedy expressed his strong belief 
in the importance of the Commonwealth as a 
source of stability and strength for the Free 
World. At the same time both leaders recognized 
that European unity could contribute substantially 
to the strength of the Free World. 

They reviewed therefore the implications for 
the trade of their two nations of the possible ac- 
cession of the United Kingdom to the European 
Economic Community. 

It was agreed that in this event the United 
States and Australia would, as great suppliers to 
Britain and Europe, face problems in endeavoring 
to maintain and expand access for their goods. 

The Prime Minister offered the view that it 
would be a grave misfortune if, after the negotia- 
\^[j^^ tions, it turned out that the conditions laid down 
for Britain's entry were unacceptable to Common- 
wealth countries on the ground that they damaged 
Commonwealth trade and expansion. 

The President and the Prime Minister took note 
of the fact that with respect to certain articles and 
commodities Australia's historic terms of access 
are different from those of the United States. 
They recognized, however, that Australia com- 
peted with the United States in the United King- 
dom market with respect to only a relatively small 
number of these items— though the items them- 
selves are by no means of small importance. They 
agreed that with respect to these items technical 



discussions would be held between the two Gov- 
ernments in an effort to reconcile the trading in- 
terests of both nations. 

With respect to the great bulk of articles and 
commodities they noted that, as non-members of 
the European Economic Community, their coun- 
tries faced essentially the same problems, and they 
joined in hoping that the Community would pur- 
sue liberal trading policies. President Kennedy 
pointed out that under the Trade Expansion legis- 
lation now pending before the Congress the United 
States Government might be able, through re- 
ciprocal agreements, to bring about a general re- 
duction of trade barriers for the benefit of all. 
Moreover, both leaders agreed that, with respect 
to a number of key primary products, the prob- 
lems raised by the expansion of the Common Mar- 
ket might best be solved through international 

During the course of their interviews the Presi- 
dent expressed his warm interest in Australia and 
his understanding of Australian needs in terms 
of development and growth, recognizing the prob- 
lems of particular regions as well as industries. 
Both he and the Prime Minister were agreed that 
the problems arising out o""f Britain's proposed 
entry should be approached not on any basis of 
theory or the use of particular words but upon 
a practical basis examining commodities one by 
one, having in mind the protection of the interests 
of both countries. 

As a result of their discussions the President and 
the Prime Minister were encouraged to believe 
that satisfactory solutions will be found to these 
problems faced by their two countries. 

President Sets Effective Dates 
on Various Trade Agreements 

The Wliite House announced on June 21 that 
on June 20 President Kennedy signed a proclama- 
tion ^ to give effect on July 1, 1962, to the U.S. 
concessions in three interim trade agreements 
negotiated at the 1960-61 tariff conference under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, ad- 
ditional to the agreements proclaimed by Procla- 
mation 3468 of April 30, 1962.= These are agree- 
ments with Haiti, India, and Japan. Also 

' For background, see Bxtlletin of June 25, 1962, p. 1039. 
July 16, 7962 

'No. 3479; for text, see 27 Fed. Reg. 5929 or White 
House press release dated June 21. 
= 27 Fed. Reg. 4235. 

included in tlie proclamation are protocols for the 
accession of Israel and Portugal to the General 
Agreement, which contain schedules of U.S. con- 
cessions identical with the concessions in the U.S. 
schedules to the interim agreements with these two 
countries and which on July 5, 1962, and on July 1, 
1962, respectively, will supersede the latter. 

The President on June 20 notified the Secretary 
of the Treasury ^ that the effective date of the 
United States concessions in the interim agree- 

ments, other than those with Austria and Portu- 
gal, proclaimed by the proclamation of April 

1962, would be July 1, 1962. No notification wast »" 

given as to the interim agreement with Portugal 
because the U.S. schedule to the protocol for the 
accession of Portugal will take effect on July 1, 
1962. The concessions in the U.S. schedule to the 
interim agreement with Austria will take effect on 
that date only if Austria has by then ratified the 


iters sif 

llJliOJ '» 


Department Supports Participation 
in international Wlieat Agreement 

Statement by G. Griffith Joluismi 
Assistant Secretary for Ecoru)mic Affairs ^ 

My name is G. Griffith Johnson and I am Assist- 
ant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. I 
appear before you today in support of the contin- 
ued participation of the United States in the In- 
ternational Wheat Agreement. 

In view of the fact that the transmittal letter 
from the President, dated June 5, 1962, was ac- 
companied by other documents covering the agree- 
ment in some detail," my remarks today will be 

As you are aware, the 1962 International ^Vlieat 
Agreement will enter into force on July 16, 1962, 
with respect to the administrative provisions, and 
operationally on August 1, 1962, provided that by 
that date governments holding not less than two- 
thirds of the votes of exporting countries and not 
less than two-thirds of the votes of importing 
countries have accepted or acceded to the agree- 

For text of notification, see White House press release 
ilated .Tune 21. 

' Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions on June 26 (press release 415). 

' S. Ex. D, 87th Cong., 2d sess. 


The first postwar International Wheat Agree- 
ment came into force in 1949 and was renewed, 
with certain modifications, in 1953, 1956, and 1959. 
The 1962 agreement provides for a further 3-year 
extension. Essentially the same as the 1959 agree- 
ment, it incorporates certain refinements and mod- 
ifications adopted at the recently concluded negoti- 
ating conference, which, we believe, will improve 
the agreement and render it more effective. 

Although it is clear that agreements such as 
this do not represent a complete solution to the 
problems confronting those countries most con- 
cerned with international trade in wheat, it is fair 
to say that past agreements have resulted in a 
degree of market stability which would not have 
been possible in their absence. In addition meet- 
ings of the Wheat Council, which administers the 
agreement, provide a very useful forum where ex- 
porting and importing countries alike may review 
and discuss their difficulties. Such meetings have 
been of particular value to the United States in 
connection with this country's disposal and market 
development programs by providing an interna- 
tional forum in which not only competing export- 
ers participate but also the importing countries 
which benefit directly from the special programs 
of the United States. 

Finally, continued participation of the United 
States in the International Wlieat Agreement is 
fully consistent with the policy of the adminis- 

Department of State Bulletin 



I Com 
IX. Com 







^"k 16, 

ration to promote greater international coopera- 
ion in the commodity field. It is also desirable 
hat this Government give full support to those 
igreements which, by providing a framework 
vitliin which trade may take place under inter- 
lationally agreed rules and within a price range 
onsidered to be fair and equitable by both pro- 
lucers and consumers, contribute to the financial 
nd political stability of many countries heavily 

dependent on world trade in a few basic commod- 

The Department of State believes that it would 
be to the advantage of the United States, both from 
the standpoint of its domestic interests and from 
the standpoint of its foreign relations, to continue 
our participation in this agreement and recom- 
mends its favorable consideration by the 


Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings 


djourned During June 1962 

.N. General Assembly: 16th Session. 

rU Administrative Council: 17th Session 

NESCO Executive Board: 61st Session 

.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 17th Session . . 
iternational Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Commission: Standing 
Committee on Research and Statistics, 
iternational Lead and Zinc Study Group: 6th Session (lesumed) . 

VICO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stabihty 

JO Governing Body: 152d Session 

iternational Rubber Study Group: 16th Meeting 

.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Technical 

.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Legal Sub- 

iternational North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Working Parties 
on Oceanography of the Subarctic Waters of the North Pacific and 
Offshore Distribution of Salmon. 

,N. ECAFE Railway Subcommittee and Working Party of Railway 
Signaling and Operating OfRcials. 

MO Executive Committee: 14th Session 

NICEF Program Committee 

AIGH Directing Council: 6th Meeting 

ATO Science Committee 

N. ECE Housing Committee: 23d Session 

lANC Permanent International Commission: Annual Meeting . . 

ATT Special Group on Trade in Tropical Products 

iternational Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 
112th Meeting. 

NICEF Executive Board 

ECD Trade Committee 

ECD Development Assistance Committee: Annual Review Meet- 

New York Sept. 19, 1961- 

June 28 

Geneva May 5- June 9 

Paris May 8-June 1 

Geneva May 14-June 1 

Moscow May 24-June 9 

Geneva May 28- June 1 

London May 28-June 1 

Geneva May 28-June 2 

Washington May 28-June 6 

Geneva May 28-June 13 

Geneva . 
Tokvo . 

May 28-June 20 
May 28-June 30 

Melbourne May 29- June 6 

Geneva May 29- June 19 

New York May 31-June 1 

Mexico, D.F June 1-9 

Paris June 4-5 

Geneva June 4-7 

Brussels June 4-8 

Geneva June 4-8 

Moscow June 4-9 

New York June 4-12 

Paris June 5-6 

Paris June 5-8 and 

June 19-21 

Prepared in the Office of International Conferences June 26, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR, 
omit^ consultatif international des radio communications; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; 
CE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organi- 
ition; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ILO, Interna- 
onal Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Tele- 
immunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation 
nd Development; PAIGH, Pan American Institute of Geography and History; PIANC, Permanent International 
ssociation of Navigation Congresses; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
ultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 

jly 76, 7962 119 

Calendar off International Confferences and Meetings— Continued 

Adjourned During June 19G2 — Continued 

International Labor Conference: 46th Session 

13th International Film Festival 

Permanent Bureau of the International (Paris) Union for the Pro- 
tection of Industrial Property: Working Group on Questions of 

IAEA Board of Governors 

U.N. ECE Working Party on Standardization of Perishable Food- 

FAO Group on Grains: 7th Ses.sion 

ITU CCIR Study Group X (Broadcasting), Study Group XI (Tele- 
vision), and Study Group XII (Tropical Broadcasting). 

NATO Industrial Planning Committee 

OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel .... 

OECD Oil Committee 

OECD Economic Policy Committee 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working 
Group on the Tropical Atlantic Oceanographic Investigations. 

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance 
of Payments). 

NATO Petroleum Planning Committee 

International Whaling Commission: Ad Hoc Scientific Committee . 


Karlovy- Vary, Czechoslovakia 

Vienna . 


Bad Kreuznach, Germany 






June 6-27 
June 9-24 
June 10-16 

June 12-19 
June 12-21 

June 12-21 
June 13-29 

June 14-15 
June 18-20 
June 19-20 
June 20-21 
June 20-22 

Paris June 21-22 

Paris . . 

June 21-22 
June 25-29 

in Session as of June 30, 1962 

5th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations Geneva . 

International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Geneva 


Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament Geneva 

(recessed June 15 until July 16). 

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 29th Session New York 

12th International Film Festival Berlin . . 

Sept. 1, 1960- 
May 16, 1961- 

Mar. 14, 1962- 

May 31- 
June 22- 

Bit it 
re, A 

utioiis ; 
icfce I 
series i 



role for 
water si 
luHic 1 

of death 
ows tr] 
taier, ij 

lea Mi 

J«'y 16, 

The Public Health Program of the Alliance for Progress 

by Edwin M. Martin 

Secretary for Inter- American Affairs ' 

The nations of this hemisphere have made it 
strikingly clear that they are determined to con- 
centrate on the problems of health in the decade 
of the sixties. In the last two decades, scientific 
advances and effective cooperation have enabled 
the American Republics to make enormous im- 
provements in the health of their peoples, and all 
our populations, including that of the United 
States, are growing with great rapidity. This 
population explosion, as it is often called, is dra- 

' Address made before the Eighth Congress of the Inter- 
American Association of Sanitary Kngineering at 'Wash- 
ington, D.C., on June 11. 


matic evidence of the enormous advances in healtl 
which have made it possible for more men to livi 
a longer span of years. It also creates its owi 

In planning for the future, for example, w( 
must appreciate that in 1980 the geographic dis 
tribution of population in the Axnericas will prob- 
ably differ from that we know at the present time 
A larger percent wiU be living in Middle anc 
South America. Thus, in estimating health needs 
and planning health programs, we must think ir 
terms of a Latin American population which maj 
exceed by 80 million the combined population oi 

Department of State Bulletin 

the United States and Canada. This rapidly 
^rowing population already needs and will con- 
tinue to need expanding resources both of facili- 
ties and manpower to provide adequate health 

But it is not enough for a man simply to sur- 
vive. A man also desires to produce, to think 
md to create, to teach and to learn, to enjoy good 
lealth and to seek opportunity to improve himself 
uid his family. At Punta del Este the American 
aations recognized this truth and declared their 
intention to "strengthen our human potential." ^ 
We intend, they said, to seek to improve individ- 
lal and public health as a means of increasing 
■^ ibility to learn and to produce and enjoy. To 
ichieve these goals, the American nations stated 
the Charter of Punta del Este, we must take 
I series of important steps: 

Provide adequate potable water supply and sew- 
ige disposal for not less than 70 percent of the 
irban and 50 percent of the rural population ; 

Reduce the present mortality rate among chil- 
iren under 5 years of age by at least one-half by 
jontrolling the more serious communicable dis- 
jases, according to their importance as causes of 
sickness, disability, and death ; 

Eradicate those illnesses, especially malaria, for 
(vhich effective prevention techniques are known ; 

Improve nutrition ; 

Train medical and health personnel; improve 
aasio health services at national and local levels, 
md intensify scientific research. 

The task ahead is enormous. So is the potential 
role for the sanitary engineer. Sanitary works, 
water supply, and pollution control are absolute 
Qecessities to the attainment of a high level of 
public health, the essential underpinning for 
human progress. 

In many areas of the Americas the major causes 
jls oi death today are the diarrheal diseases, related 
to the kind of environmental factors sanitary engi- 
neers try to change. Lack of readily available 
water, in ample quantity and of good quality, 
y ranks high as an overall health problem in many 
of the coxmtries in Middle and South America and 
is the foremost environmental sanitation problem. 
i We have just had this fact dramatized for us by 


For texts of the Declaration to the Peoples of Amer- 
ica and the Charter of Punta del Este, see Bulletin 
of Sept. 11, 1961, pp. 462 and 463. 

July 76, 7962 

the epidemic of gastroenteritis which caused so 
many deaths during the last 2 weeks in Honduras. 
Fortunately the U.S. Navy was able to rush teams 
of doctors with medicines and chemicals into the 
area, and the situation now seems to be under 

I have been told that, on the basis of expected 
increases in population in urban areas, present 
rates of construction of urban waterworks must 
be substantially increased or there will hardly be 
a large city capable of furnishing all its inhabit- 
ants with an adequate and reliable water supply. 
Today a considerable proportion already lacks 
readily accessible water, wnth the result that the 
incidence of gastrointestinal disease is high, hy- 
gienic conditions are unfavorable, industrial de- 
velopment is hampered, and social problems de- 
velop. Taking rural and urban needs together, 
unless rates of construction are increased sub- 
stantially, it is estimated that by 1980 there may 
be more than 150 million persons without water 
service in Middle America and South America. 

Public Health Pioneers 

The Alliance for Progress has been formed to 
attack this among other problems. I am sure that 
the nations of the hemisphere that are joined in 
the alliance will be looking to the members of 
the Inter- American Association of Sanitary Engi- 
neering for guidance in dealing with it. 

In the field of health and sanitation, the Alliance 
for Progress enjoys special advantages, compared 
with the tasks at hand in other fields. It has a 
real headstart, represented by you here at this 
meeting, by your organization, by the Pan Ameri- 
can Health Bureau, and by the constructive ex- 
perience you have had working together, achiev- 
ing victories on many fronts in the past. 

Some of you have been in this work for a long 
time and have contributed much to the great ad- 
vances which already have been made. You have 
been pioneers in cooperation on the inter- American 
health frontier. Some of your work, and some 
of the advances, have undoubtedly contributed 
materially to shaping the objectives and pinpoint- 
ing the targets of the Alliance for Progress. But 
you have done much more. The lessons learned 
and taught by the sanitary engineers of the Amer- 
ican Republics have also been pressed into service 
on the health frontiers of the world. To cite only 


one example: The world campaign to eradicate 
malaria had its inspiration in this hemisphere. 

Nor should we forget that the Pan American 
Health Organization, the intergovernmental 
health agency for the Americas, is the oldest inter- 
national health organization in existence. It is 
still the largest specialized agency of the Organi- 
zation of American States. Its relative size and 
its age show the importance which the member 
nations have long attached to the improvement of 
the health of their peoples, for the PAHO has 
f mictioned here in Washington since its founding 
in 1902. The PAHO has long been and is now 
a living fulfillment of the highest ideals common 
to the peoples of the Americas, ideals of genuine 
neighborliness through mutual service, teamwork, 
and understanding. 

These ideals are the motive force of the Organi- 
zation of American States as a whole. You see 
them in evidence in political, economic, social, 
cultural, and other kinds of cooperation. They 
are eloquently expressed in the Charter of Punta 
del Este, but over the years they have been ful- 
filled most dramatically in the field of cooperation 
in health as practiced through the PAHO and 
through the dedicated efforts of many of you 
jjresent today at this Eighth Congress of the Inter- 
American Association of Sanitary Engineering. 

Medicine still speaks the most universal lan- 
guage. In part this is because frontier walls do 
not exclude disease. Bacteria ignore national 
boundaries, and mosquitoes carry no passports. 
But there is another reason. All barriers tend to 
fall before mutual dedication and service in the 
interest of human life. We and our good neigh- 
bors may speak English, Spanish, Portuguese, or 
French, but our physicians speak a coimnon 
tongue. So do our nurses, dentists, pharmacists, 
therapists, sanitary engineers, and the other spe- 
cialists whose lives are devoted to the well-being 
of men. women, and children. It is the uni^^ersal 
language of deeds and actions that lieal. 

The more than 242,000 physicians of northern 
America and the more than 100,000 physicians of 
Latin America are the frontline fighters in a "hot 
war" in which all hmnanity is on tlie same side. 
This is a "hot war" for life and against death; foi- 
well-being and against misery; for hope and 
against despair; for opportunity and against de- 
feat. In this war against disease many battles 
remain to be fought. 

I would like to suggest that our strategic plansji 
for tlie sixties, and the keynote of this conference, iiis"^" 
might be drawn from an old story of my father's, jit''"'® 
It is the story of a Vermont farmer who is being I" *! 
interviewed by a young college-educated farm i'l"'^"'^ 

j provide 

agent. The young man points out how inefficient 
the farmer's inethods and equipment are and tells 
him he could farm better if he would only study 
modem agricultural methods. The farmer is 
scornful and says: "Shucks, son, why should I 
study? I already know how to farm a lot better 
than I'm doing." 

I suggest we concentrate, in this same spirit, 
on using and applying the things we know abouti '''""'"•^ 
health, and especially on giving more people thai ^^^^^ 
benefit of our knowledge. 

Three things are necessary to do this : education, 
money, and good administration. 



Bill it is 

'regress, a 
oiijUy tt 
rata inter 
te overs 
jr;er pei 
lealtli fie 

Expansion of Health Education 

Education has at least three tasks to perform 
First, it must teach the elementary requirements of 
individual health in primary school, along withi 
the alphabet. The time and money we spend on 
water and sanitation programs will be wasted if Eflernal 
the masses of the people fail to understand what lo^iblet 
we are doing and why they must cooperate in their Wopm 
daily routines to keep their water and surround- 
ings clean and sanitary. 

Second, at all school levels it is important to 
develop a sense of the importance of public and 
private health and of personal obligation to con- 
tribute to the welfare of the individual and of the 
conunmiity, so that citizens will support actions 
required to provide health services. These ac- 
tions include paying taxes for health purposes and, 
wherever possible, the cost of individual health 

Third and last, we must supplement such mini- 
mum health and scientific training in school cur- 
ricula with opportunities for students from all 
walks of life to become doctors, sanitary engi- 
neers, and pharmacists and to enter the other pro- 
fessions whose ranks so badly need expanding if 
our goals are to be achieved. 

Financing Public Health Programs 

i\ronpy is essential. Public liealtli progi-ams 
are expensive. To the maximum extent prac- 

Deparlment of State Bulletin 

local cost 
rials, wlii 
The a( 
largely d 
ciai plan 

bring in 
vital to ( 


But for 
are a do 

July |( 


I cable, sei-vices such as water and sewerage facil- 
ties need to be put on a self-sustaining basis, with 
Ach household paying its share. 
In many cases capital investments and tech- 
ical training can be fuianced by foreign grants 
nd low-cost loans. A substantial portion of the 
liitJjid provided by the United States under the Al- 
"J aii«iance for Progress is going and will go for these 
urposes. The Inter- American Development 
?ank and the International Bank for Keconstruc- 
ion and Development will also continue to be 
ources of capital for them. 
But it is of the greatest importance to recognize 
watojhat many requirements of complete public health 
opietli urograms camiot be met from outside sources, 
rhose volume cannot and never was intended to 
leet all the needs. The plans of the Alliance for 
'rogress, as developed at Punta del Este, assumed 
oughly that about 20 percent of the capital in- 
estments required to carry them out would come 
rom abroad, while 80 percent would be provided 
rom internal public and private savings. Within 
ihis overall pattern we might expect an even 
arger percentage of capital for programs in the 
lealth field to be raised from internal sources. 
External funds should he reserved as much as 
)ossible to pay for the foreign exchange costs of 
levelopment, which only they can do, leaving local 
urrency costs to be met from domestic budgets. 
\. high percentage of health expenditures involves 
ocal costs for labor and for construction mate- 
ials, which are usually available locally. 

The achievement of your goals will be vei-y 
largely dependent on how well your governments 
landle their finances. Is there a budget or finan- 
cial plan? Is it carried out? Are expenditures 
carefully checked and audited ? Is tax collection 
fficient? Are tax laws enforced vigorously and 
reasonable penalties imposed? Is the tax struc- 
ture properly related to incomes? Are there 
nuisance taxes which cost more to collect than they 
bring in? The answers to these questions are 
vital to each one of you and to the cause that you 
are making your life work. Sound fiscal manage- 
ment is not someone else's business but in a special 
personal way your own. A great deal of progress 
is being made in Latin America on this front. 
But for evei-y new step which has been taken there 
are a dozen "vmder study." They need to be taken 
off the shelf of contemplation and put into action. 


1? wii 
leal M 
Med il 
(I irliat 

(ant to 
lie jn( 
: of the 

July 16, 1962 

Importance of Good Administration 

Lastly, a word about administration. Once you 
get your hands on money, it is, of course, of great 
importance to get maximum value out of it. Im- 
portant progress has been made recently in this 
regard, largely in the direction of setting up 
autonomous or semi autonomous administrative 

In Brazil a Special Health Service Foundation 
has been charged with coordinating all organiza- 
tions that construct and operate water and sanita- 
tion services, and with supervising the technical, 
administrative, and financial aspects of such 

In Costa Rica a National Water and Sewerage 
System Service was established in 1961. This 
semiautonomous agency now administers and su- 
pei-vises all technical, administrative, and financial 
aspects of those services and sets the rates. After 
the Sei-vice was established the Agency for Inter- 
national Development lent $3.5 million and the 
Export-Import Bank lent $4.5 million to expand 
the water supply system of San Jose and the sur- 
rounding areas. 

In El Salvador an autonomous agency, the Na- 
tional Authority for Water Supply and Sewage 
Disposal (ANDA) was established to carry out 
projects in urban and rural communities. Author- 
ity was consolidated in the ANDA for budgeting, 
financing, planning, engineering, and administer- 
ing municipal systems. In 1961 the Inter- Ameri- 
canDevelopment Bank made a loan of $4.8 million 
to ANDA for improvement of urban water sup- 
plies and sewer systems. 

In Honduras the National Autonomous Water 
Supply and Sewerage Service (SANAA) was 
created in April 1961. The Government has 
drafted an emergency plan for the construction of 
38 water supply systems in niral coimnunities. 
The Service will also administer water projects to 
be constructed for Tegucigalpa with fluids of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and 

In Peiix a National Sanitary Works Corporation 
is being organized to plan, construct, maintain, 
and operate facilities throughout Peru. Major 
water supply and sanitation projects are now being 
undertaken in Lima and Arequipa. 

I don't wish to suggest that an autonomous na- 
tional body is always the best way to provide these 


technical services on the most efficient possible 
basis. However, freedom from direct political 
manipulation is often an important consideration. 

Role of the Sanitary Engineer 

The discussions of the Eighth Congress of the 
Inter-American Association of Sanitary Engi- 
neering can have an enormous and constructive 
influence in insuring that this phase of the Alli- 
ance for Progress is can-ied out at the pace and in 
the manner required to improve the health of the 
expanding populations of the American Republics 
in this decade. The influence of the Association's 
members may be exercised not only in drawing up 
plans and designs for the construction of facilities 
but also in pressing for effective administration 
and, wherever possible, the establishment of rates 
which will make these vital projects and services 
self-supporting. The successful operation of one 
self-supporting project improves the prospects of 
meeting other needs. 

You are also in a central position to promote 
wider public understanding of the need for proper 
health programs and thereby to inci'ease the sup- 
port from all sectors of the population which is 
essential to their success. You can, better than 
any other group, make clear their contribution to a 
better personal life. You can make people see 
how much more a healthy child can learn and re- 
tain than an unhealthy one. You can explain how 
much more efficient a healthy work force is than 
one plagued by absenteeism and lethargic work- 
ers. To reduce labor costs by making workers 
more efficient is a major step toward making Latin 
America more independent of outside sources of 
manufactured goods, as well, of course, as a great 
inducement for your private capital to invest at 
home rather than abroad. Foreign private capi- 
tal inevitably follows the lead of your own. 

I would like to make one last point. I can 
think of no one of the many aspects of the Alli- 
ance for Progress that so typifies the central pur- 
pose and spirit of the alliance as the public health 
program, for our main objective is to better the 
lives of all the peoples of all the Americas without 
distinction. Mosquitoes, bacteria, and viruses are 
not only unaware of national boundaries, as I 
have said, but they cannot distinguish a white 
skin from a brown or black one. They will never 
know how much money their next victim has or 
what his social status may be. They move from 


one to another without prejudice or respect fo! 
their betters. Hence a minimum level of publi 
health services must be provided for all, regards 
less of color or class or ability to pay, not onl;| 
because it is the purpose of the alliance to hel]| 
all but because we must do so if we are to hel] 
any. In this sense public health is, of course, no 
basically any different from other fields, but ii 
its case the point — the need to help all, not only i 
few — is more visible, more readily comprehended 
Improved opportunities and tools are becom 
ing available under the Alliance for Progress 
They are opportunities which the members of thii 
outstanding professional association have 
seeking for years. I am sure you will know hovi 
to make the most of them. 

Plans IVIade for Synoptic Survey 
of TropicaS Atlantic 

Press release 419 dated June 26 

The first working group of the Intergovern' 
mental Oceanographic Conxmission met in Wash- 
ington at the National Oceanographic DatE 
Center June 20-22 to draw up plans for an inter- 
national cooperative investigation of the tropical 
Atlantic which will begin m February 1963.^ 

Such an international cooperative project in 
synoptic oceanography is a bold new venture ir 
the field of oceanography, and its successful 
completion will require participation of ships and 
scientists from many nations. In a synoptic 
survey simultaneous instrument readings are taken 
from a number of ships to give what one might 
consider as a photograph of the surface and sub- 
surface conditions of the ocean. Ships from eight ijuili 
nations and scientists from additional nations are 
expected to participate in the project, which will 
be the first international cooperative effort 
tiated under the auspices of the Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission. 

The Commission was formed within UNESCO P"*"' 
and held its first session last October in Paris. 
The United States called this first working group 
together under a resolution adopted by the Com- 
mission authorizing member governments to 
convene working groups to draw up comprehen- 

:,( pljjS 

iir E. 

Lwcy f( 
to fin 
mial ! 
lirrey, t! 
on, and t 
iHic of 
lie meet 
ipaiii, I] 
He n 




' For an announcement of the meeting and the names 
of the U.S. representatives, see Department of State 
press release 393 dated June 15. 

Department of State Bulletin 

lied to 

■' is ai 

low to 

ive plans for such cooperative oceanographic 

The working group, under the chairmanship of 
Lrthur E. Maxwell of the Office of Naval Ee- 
earch, drew up plans for a multiship synoptic 
ceanographic investigation in the tropical At- 
intic from South America to Africa. The fish- 
ries investigation in the Gulf of Guinea under 
he Commission for Technical Cooperation in 
Lfrica will be part of the overall project. The 
Lgency for International Development is plan- 
ing to finance part of this fisheries investigation. 
The United States will contribute five ships to 
le investigation, representing the Bureau of Com- 
lercial Fisheries, the U.S. Coast and Geodetic 
urvey, the Woods Hole Oceanograjihic Institu- 
Lon, and the Agricultural and Mechanical College 
f Texas. Two fisheries research vessels and a 
irge oceanographic vessel from the U.S.S.R. will 
articipate. Other ships will be from Argentma, 
Jrazil, France, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and the Re- 
ublic of Congo (Brazzaville). 
Other representatives or observers present at 

rgoTem ae meeting were from Canada, Chile, China, 
^asli i-ermany, Italy, Korea, Morocco, Sierra Leone, 

K Dil ipain, Uruguay, and the Food and Agriculture 
(rganization of the United Nations. 
The working group recommended that each 
articipating member country name a representa- 

ojett ii ve to a coordination group, which will nominate 
n international coordinator of the project to the 
ext Cominission meeting m September. Mean- 
hile, Vernon E. Brock, Director of the Bureau 
f Commercial Fisheries Laboratory in Washing- 

retabii m, will continue as coordinator. 


niiii linth Pan American Highway Congress 
J" "o Meet at WasFiington in May 1963 


The Department of State announced on June 26 
press release 421) the creation of an organizing 
ommittee to make plans for the Ninth Pan Amer- 
!an Highway Congress. The Congress is sched- 
led to be held at Washington, D.C., May 6-18, 
'JG3, with the United States as host govenunent. 
t is anticipated that there will be over 1,000 
artici pants. 

Eex M. Wliitton, Federal Highway Adminis- 
itfslrator, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of 
)ommerce, has been designated chairman of the 



organizing committee. The vice chairmen are 
Alfred E. Johnson, Executive Secretary, Ameri- 
can Association of State Highway Officials; 
D. Grant Mickle, Deputy Federal Highway Ad- 
ministrator, Bureau of Public Roads; and Gerald 
W. Russell, Officer in Charge, Transportation and 
Communications, Bureau of Inter-American Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Walter Kurylo, of 
the Bureau of Public Roads, has been designated 
as executive secretary.^ 


Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at 
Vienna October 4, 1961.^ 

Acceptances deposited: Ceylon, June 29, 1962; Poland, 
June 27, 1962. 


Constitution of the World Health Organization, as 
amended. Opened for signature at New York July 22, 
1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808 and 
Acceptance deposited: Western Samoa, May 16, 1962. 


Protocol for accession of Cambodia to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 
1962. Enters into force on 30th day following date of 
acceptance by signature or otherwise for any contracting 
party or the European Economic Community. Entry 
into force for any party shall not be earlier than for 
Signature: United States, June 22, 1962. 


International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature 
at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962 = 
notification received of undertaking to seek acceptance: 

Sweden, June 6, 1962. 
Notification received of undertaking to seek accession: 

Belgium, June 27, 1962. 
Acceptance deposited: India, June 29, 1962. 


Additional protocol to the extradition treaty of January 
1.3, 1961. Signed at Rio de Janeiro June 18, 1962. 
Enters into force upon the same date as the treaty. 

o/y 76, J 962 

" For names of the public members and other Govern- 
ment officials serving on the committee, see Department of 
State press release 421 dated Jvme 26. 

" Not in force. 



Military assistance agreement. Effected by exchange of 
notes" at Cotonou June 5 and 13, 1962. Entered into 
force June 13, 1962. 

lange of 


Military assistance agreement. Effected by excl 
notes at Niamey May 22 and June 14, 1962. 
into force June 14, 1962. 


Agreement relating to the furnishing of defense articles 
and services to Panama for purpose of contributing to 
its internal security. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Panamd March 26 and May 23, 1962. Entered into force 
May 23, 1962. 


Foreign Service Examination 
To Be Held September 8, 1962 

Press release 428 dated June 30 

The Department of State announced on June 30 that 
the next annual Foreign Service officer written examina- 
tion will be held on September 8, 1962, in some 60 cities 
throughout the United States and at diplomatic and 
consular posts abroad. 

Applications for designation to take the entrance exam- 
ination may be obtained from the Board of Examiners 
for the Foreign Service, Department of State, Washing- 
ton 25, D.C. The completed application must be received 
by the Board not later than midnight, July 23. 

Candidates are eligible to take the examination if they 
are between the ages of 21 and 31 years and have been 
American citizens for 9 years as of July 1, 1962. Can- 
didates who are 20 years of age may take the examina- 
tion if they have completed their junior year of college. 
Initial salaries are scaled to the officer's qualifications, 
experience, and age and usually range from $5,62.5 to 
$6,755 per annum, plus allowances and other benefits. 
The Foreign Service of the United States is a career 
professional corps of men and women who are specially 
selected and trained to carry out the foreign policy of 
our country in day-to-day relations with other countries. 
The memt)ers of the Foreign Service serve in Washington, 
in New York with the U.S. delegation to the United Na- 
tions, and as our representatives at some 300 posts 

Wherever Foreign Service personnel are, whatever they 
do, they have but one function : to protect and promote 
the welfare and interests of the United States and of 
the American people. All their many duties are in one 
way or another an extension of this fimction. 

The written examination will be held in Civil Service 
examination centers in the following cities: Agana, 
Guam; Albuquerque, N. Mex. ; Atlanta, Ga. ; Augusta, 
Maine ; Austin, Tex. ; Balboa Heights, C.Z. ; Baltimore, 


Md. ; Bismarck, N. Dak.; Boise, Idaho; Boston, Mass. JvlM" 

Buffalo, N.Y. ; Charleston, W. Va. ; Charlotte ArnaU* 

V.I. ; Cheyenne, Wyo. ; Chicago, 111. ; Cincinnati, Ohio lia ^ 

Cleveland, Ohio; Columbia, S.C. ; Columbus, Ohio; Dal 

las, Tex. ; Denver, Colo. ; Des Moines, Iowa ; Detroiii §0\» 

Mich.; El Paso, Tex.; Fairbanks, Alaska; Grand Forks, 
N. Dak.; Hartford, Conn.; Helena, Mont.; Honoluli 
Hawaii; Indianapolis, Ind. ; Jackson, Miss.; Jacksori^iii Pu 
ville, Fla. ; Juneau, Alaska; Kansas City, Kans. ; Littl 
Rock, Ark.; Los Angeles, Calif.; Louisville, Ky. ; Mad; 
son. Wis. ; Manchester, N.H. ; Miami, Fla. ; Montgon 
ery, Ala. ; Montpelier. Vt. ; Nashville, Tenn. ; New Orleans 
La.; New Tork, N.Y. ; Oklahoma City, Okla. ; OmahJ 
Nebr. ; Philadelphia, Pa. ; Phoenix, Ariz. ; Pierre, S. Dak, 
Pittsburgh, Pa.; Portland, Oreg. ; Providence, R.I, 
Raleigh, N.C. ; Reno, Nev. ; Richmond, Va. ; Sacrament* 
Calif. ; St. Louis, Mo. ; St. Paul, Minn. ; Salt Lake Citj 
Utah; San Francisco, Calif.; San Juan, P.R. ; Seattl« 
Wash. ; Spokane, Wash. ; Springfield, 111. ; Syracuse, N.Y 
Tampa, Fla. ; Trenton, N.J. ; Washington, D.C. ; Wilminfj 
ton, Del. ; and Worcester, Mass. 


Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases, June 25-Juiy 1 

Press releases may l)e obtained from the Office of 
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. 

Releases issued prior to June 25 which appear in 
this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 398 of June 18, 
409 of June 21, and 410 of June 22. 

Note to U.S.S.R. on incidents at Berlin. 

Visit of Vice President Pelaez of the 

Johnson : International Wheat Agree- 
ment, 1962. 

U.S. participation in international 

Battle : "The Educational and Cultural 
Exchange Programs of the United 
States : Their Role in Foreign Rela- 

McGhee: "Fifteen Years of Greek- 
American Partnership." 

Working group of Intergovernmental 
Oceanograpliic Commission. 

Duke : General Federation of Women's 

Organizing committee for Ninth Pan 
American Highway Congress (re- 

Martin : "Transformation by Educa- 

Louchheim: General Federation of 
Women's Clubs. 

Williams : "The Future of the Euro- 
pean in Africa." 

Stevenson : U.N. loan legislation. 

Embassies to be established in Burundi 
and Rwanda (rewrite). 

Cleveland: "The Third Man in Inter- 
national Politics." 

Foreign Service officer examination. 

Congo import program. 

'Not printed. 

tUeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


6/25 I 
6/25 A 


6/26 J 


6/25 \ 


6/26 ] 


6/26 1 








6/27 : 















nil Colli 


11(1 , , 

pe, S( 

ittas ( 





Department of State Bulletin 

ulv 16, 1962 



Vol. XLVII, No. 1203 

frica. The Future of the European in Africa 

(Williams) 104 

jrriculture. Department Supports Participation in 
International Wheat Agreement (Johnson) . . 118 
merican Republics 
inth Pan American Highway Congress To Meet 

:it Washington in May 1963 125 

lip Public Health Program of the Alliance for 

IVugress (Martin) 120 

ustralia. President and Prime Minister Menzies 
Review U.S. -Australia Relations (text of joint 

communique) 116 

)ngress. Department Supports Participation in 
International Wheat Agreement (Johnson) . . 118 
prus. U.S. and Cyprus Reaffirm Common Objec- 
tives (Kennedy, Makarios) 103 

partment and Foreign Service. Foreign Service 
iti|Examination To Be Held September 8, 1962 . 126 
sarmament. World Peace Assembly, Accra ( Fos- 
ter) 108 

:onomic Affairs 

esident and Prime Minister Menzies Review 

D.S.-Australia Relations (text of joint commu- 

lique) 116 

esident Kennedy and Mr. Marshall Discuss New 
Zealand Trade Problems (text of joint state- 

uent) 116 

esident Sets Effective Dates on Various Trade 

Agreements 117 

3retary Rusk Holds Talks With European 

eaders (Rusk) 96 

ucational and Cultural Affairs. The Educational 
ind Cultural Exchange Programs of the United 
states: Their Role in Foreign Relations (Bat- 

le) 110 

rope. Secretary Rusk Holds Talks With Euro- 

>ean Leaders (Rusk) 96 

reign Aid 

e Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs 

)f the United States : Their Role in Foreign Re- 

ations (Battle) 110 

teen Years of Greek-American Partnership 

McGhee) 99 


. Urges Soviets To Halt Border Firings at Berlin 

exchange of notes) 97 

ist Berlin, Symbol of Freedom (Rusk) .... 96 

Fifteen Tears of Greek- American Partner- 
hip (McGhee) 99 

ilth, Education, and Welfare. The Public Health 
rogram of the Alliance for Progress (Martin) . 120 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Calendar of International Conferences and Meet- 
ings 119 

Ninth Pan American Highway Congress To Meet 
at Washington in May 1963 12.5 

Plans Made for Synoptic Survey of Tropical 

Atlantic 124 

The PubUc Health Program of the Alliance for 

Progress (Martin) 120 

World Peace Assembly, Accra (Foster) .... 108 

Jamaica. Premier of Jamaica Visits Washington . 116 

New Zealand. President Kennedy and Mr. Marshall 
Discuss New Zealand Trade Problems (text of 
joint statement) 116 

Philippines. Vice President of Philippines Visits 
Washington 109 

Presidential Documents 

President Kennedy and Mr. Marshall Discuss New 

Zealand Trade Problems 116 

President and Prime Minister Menzies Review 

U.S.-Australia Relations 116 

U.S. and Cyprus Reaffirm Common Objectives . . 103 

Science. Plans Made for Synoptic Survey of Trop- 
ical Atlantic 124 

Treaty Information 

Curent Actions 125 

Department Supports Participation in International 

Wheat Agreement (Johnson) 118 

U.S.S.R. U.S. Urges Soviets To Halt Border Firings 

at Berlin (exchange of notes) 97 

United Nations. The Third Man in International 

Politics (Cleveland) 91 

Viet-Nam. U.S. Comments on Report of Control 

Commission for Viet-Nam 109 

Yugoslavia. Fifteen Years of Greek-American 

Partnership (McGhee) 99 

Name Index 

Battle, Lucius D 110 

Bustamante, Sir Alexander 116 

Cleveland, Harlan 91 

Foster, William C 108 

Johnson, G. Griffith 118 

Kennedy, President 103, 116 

Makarios, President 103 

Marshall, John Ross 116 

Martin, Edwin M 120 

McGhee, George C 99 

Menzies, Robert Gordon 116 

Pelaez, Emmanuel 109 

Rusk, Secretary 96 

Williams, G. Mennen 104 






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Highlights of 

The first portion of this 38-page bacliground summary sets 
forth the basic objectives and fundamental policies of U.S. 
foreign relations as they were stated by President Kennedy, 
Vice President Johnson, and Secretai-y of State Eusk during 
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Vol. XLVII, No. 1204 

23, 1962 


Address by President Kennedy 131 

Communique and Statement by President Kennedy. , . 135 

TION • Statements by Secretary Rusk, Acting Secre- 
tary Ball, and Ambassador Stevenson 142 


ments by Charles W. Yost and Text of Resolution 159 

mary of Developments at the Conference of the 18-Nation 
Committee on Disarmament 154 

For index see inside back cover 


Vol. XLVII. No. 1204 . Publication 7412 

July 23, 1962 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
or STiTE BtJLLETm as the source will be 
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed in the 
Hesderi' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Public Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
and interested agencies of the 
Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. Tlie BULLETIN includes se- 
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Department, and statements and ad- 
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the Secretary of State and other 
officers of tlie Department, as well as 
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he Goal of an Atlantic Partnership 

Address by President Kennedy ' 

It is a high honor for any citizen of the great 
Eepublic to speak at this hall of independence on 
this day of independence. To speak, as President 
of the United States, to the chief executives of our 
50 States is both an opportunity and an obligation. 
The necessity for comity between the National 
Government and the several States is an indelible 
of our history. 

Because our system is designed to encourage 
both differences and dissent — because its checks 
and balances are designed to preserve the rights 
of the individual and the locality against preemi- 
nent central authority — you and I both recognize 
how dependent we are, one upon the other, for the 
successful operation of our unique and happy 
form of government. Our system and our free- 
dom permit the legislative to be pitted upon oc- 
casions against the Executive, the State against 
the Federal Government, the city against the coun- 
tryside, the party against party, interest against 
interest, all in competition or in contention one 
with another. Our task — your task in the state- 
house and my task in the White House — is to 
weave from all these tangled threads a fabric of 
law and progress. Others may confine themselves 
to debate, discussion, and that ultimate luxury — 
free advice. Our responsibility is one of decision, 
for to govern is to choose. 

Thus, in a very real sense you and I are the 
executors of the testament handed down by those 

' Made at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pa., on 
July 4 (White House press release (Philadelphia, Pa.) ; 
as-delivered text). The audience included the members 
of the Conference of Governors. 

iu\yt 23, 7962 

who gathered in this historic hall 186 years ago 
today. For they gathered to affix their names to 
a document which was above all else a docmment 
not of rhetoric but a bold decision. It was, it is 
true, a document of protest, but protests had been 
made before. It set forth their grievances with 
eloquence, but such eloquence had been heard be- 
fore. But what distinguished this paper from all 
the others was the final, irrevocable decision that 
it took to assert the independence of free States in 
place of colonies and to commit to that goal their 
lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor. 

Today, 186 years later, that Declaration — whose 
yellowing parcliment and fading, almost illegible 
Imes I saw in the past week in the National Ar- 
chives in Washington — is still a revolutionary 
document. To read it today is to hear a trumpet 
call. For that Declaration unleashed not merely 
a revolution against the British but a revolution 
in human affairs. Its authors were highly con- 
scious of its worldwide implications, and George 
Washington declared that liberty and self- 
government were, in his words, "finally staked on 
the experiment intrusted to the hands of the 
American people." 

This prophecy has been borne out for 186 years. 
This doctrine of national independence has 
shaken the globe, and it remains the most power- 
ful force anywhere in the world today. There 
are those struggling to eke out a bare existence in 
a barren land who have never heard of free enter- 
prise but who cherish the idea of independence. 
There are those who are grappling with over- 


powering problems of illiteracy and ill health and 
who are ill equipped to hold free elections, but 
they are determined to hold fast to their national 
independence. Even those unwilling or unable 
to take part in any struggle between East and 
West are strongly on the side of their own na- 
tional independence. If there is a single issue 
in the world today which divides the world, it is 
independence — the independence of Berlin or 
Laos or Viet-Nam, the longing for independence 
behind the Iron Curtain, the peaceful transition 
to independence in those newly emerging areas 
whose troubles some hope to exploit. 

The theory of independence — as old as man 
himself — was not invented in this hall, but it was 
in this hall that the theory became a practice — 
that the word went out to all the world that "The 
God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same 

And today tliis nation — conceived in revolution, 
nurtured in liberty, matured in independence — 
has no intention of abdicating its leadership in 
that worldwide movement for independence to 
any nation or society committed to systematic 
human suppression. 

Spirit of European Unity 

As apt and applicable as tliis historic Declara- 
tion of Independence is today, we would do well 
to honor that other historic document drafted in 
this hall — the Constitution of the United States— 
for it stressed not independence but interdepend- 
ence, not the individual liberty of one but the 
indivisible liberty of all. 

In most of the old colonial world the struggle 
for independence is coming to an end. Even in 
areas behind the Curtain, that wliich Jefferson 
called "the disease of liberty" still appears to be 
infectious. With the passing of ancient empires, 
today less than 2 percent of the world's popula- 
tion lives in territories officially termed "depend- 
ent." As this effort for independence, inspired 
by the spirit of the American Declaration of 
Independence, now approaches a successful 
close, a great new efloi-t — for interdependence — is 
transforming the world about us. And the spirit 
of tliat new effort is the same spirit which gave 
birth to the American Constitution. 

That spirit is today most clearly seen across the 

Atlantic Ocean. The nations of Western Europe, 
long divided by feuds more bitter than any which 
existed among the Thirteen Colonies, are joining 
togetlier, seeking, as our forefathers sought, to 
find freedom in diversity and unity in strength. 

The United States looks on this vast new enter- 
prise with hope and admiration. We do not re- 
gard a strong and united Europe as a rival but 
as a partner. To aid its progress has been the 
basic objective of our foreign policy for 17 years. 
We believe that a united Europe will be capable 
of playing a greater role in the common defense, 
of responding more generously to the needs of 
poorer nations, of joining with the United States 
and othei'S in lowering trade barriers, resolving 
problems of currency and conmiodities, and de- 
veloping coordinated policies in all other eco- 
nomic, diplomatic, and political areas. We see in 
such a Europe a partner with whom we could deal 
on a basis of full equality in all the great and 
burdensome tasks of building and defending a 
community of free nations. 

It would be premature at this time to do more 
than to indicate the high regard with which we 
view the formation of this partnership. The first 
order of business is for our European friends to 
go forward in forming the more perfect union 
which will some day make this partnership 

U.S. Ready for a "Declaration of Interdependence" 

A gi-eat new edifice is not built overnight. It 
was 11 years from the Declaration of Independ- 
ence to the writing of the Constitution. The con- 
struction of workable Federal institutions required 
still anotlier generation. The greatest works of 
our nation's founders lay not in documents and 
declarations but in creative, determined action. 
The building of the new house of Europe has fol- 
lowed this same practical and purposeful course. 
Building the Atlantic partnership will not be 
cheaply or easily finished. 

But I will say here and now on this day of 
independence that the United States will be ready 
for a "Declaration of Interdependence," tJiat we 
will be prepared to discuss with a United Europe 
the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic 
partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership be- 
tween the new union now emerging in Europe and 



Jew Tor 


Department of State Bulletin 

the old American Union founded here 175 years 

All this will not be completed in a year, but let 
the world know it is our goal. 

In urging the adoption of the United States 
Constitution, Alexander Hamilton told his fellow 
New Yorkers to "think continentally." Today 
Americans must learn to think intercontinentally. 

Acting on our own by ourselves, we cannot 
establish justice throughout the world. We can- 
not insure its domestic tranquillity, or provide for 
its common defense, or promote its general wel- 
fare, or secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves 
and our posterity. But joined with other free 
nations, we can do all this and more. We can 
assist the developing nations to throw off the yoke 
of poverty. We can balance our worldwide trade 
and payments at the highest possible level of 
growth. We can mount a deterrent powerful 
enough to deter any aggression, and ultimately we 
can help achieve a world of law and free choice, 
banishing the workl of war and coercion. 

For the Atlantic partnership of which I speak 
would not look inward only, preoccupied with its 
own welfare and advancement. It must look out- 
ward to cooperate with all nations in meeting their 
common concern. It would serve as a nucleus for 
the eventual union of all free men — those who are 
now free and those who are avowing that some 
day they will be free. 

On Washington's birthday in 1861, standing 
right there. President-elect Abraham Lincoln 
spoke at this hall on his way to the Nation's 
Capital. And he paid a brief and eloquent tribute 
to the men who wrote, and fought for, and who 
died for, the Declaration of Independence. Its 
essence, he said, was its promise not only of liberty 
"to the people of this country, but hope to the 
world .... (hope) that in due time the weights 
would be lifted from the shoulders of all men, and 
that all should have an equal chance." 

On this 4th day of July 1962, we who are 
gathered at this same hall, entrusted with the 
fate and future of our States and Nation, declare 
now our vow to do our part to lift the weights 
from the shoulders of all, to join other men and 
nations in preserving both peace and freedom, and 
to regard any threat to the peace or freedom of 
one as a threat to the peace and freedom of all. 
"And for the support of this Declaration, with a 

July 23, 1962 

firm reliance on the Protection of Divine Provi- 
dence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, 
our Fortunes and our sacred Honor." 

Assistant Secretary Cleveland Visits 
Europe To Discuss U.N. Affairs 

The Department of State announced on July 
7 (press release 445) that Harlan Cleveland, As- 
sistant Secretary for Internationa] Organization 
Affairs, would leave for Europe on July 8 for a 
series of consultations on United Nations affairs. 
He will be accompanied by Joseph J. Sisco, Direc- 
tor of the State Department's Office of United 
Nations Political, Security, and Dependent Area 
Affairs, and Richard F. Pedersen, Chief of the 
Political Section, U.S. Mission to the United 

In Paris July 11-12 Mr. Cleveland will meet 
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Coimcil for discussions of current LT.N. activities 
and subjects expected to come up at the next LT.N. 
General Assembly, which opens in September. 

Mr. Cleveland will be in London on July 9 
and 10 for joint discussions with United Kingdom 
officials. A similar meeting was held in Wash- 
ington in January 1962 ^ in preparation for the 
resumed session of the just-concluded 16th U.N. 
General Assembly. 

Mr. Cleveland also will meet with represent- 
atives of member nations and secretariat officials 
of the international organizations with head- 
quarters in Geneva July 13-16. He will return 
to the United States July 17. 

Assistant Secretary Williams Confers 
With European Leaders on Africa 

The Department of State announced on July 6 
(press release 442) that G. Mennen Williams, 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, would 
depart July 8 for Europe to consult with officials 
of five governments with interests in the African 

Mr. Williams has made four trips to Africa, but 
this will be his first visit to Europe as a State De- 
partment official. During his talks with govem- 

' For an announcement of the meeting, see Btjixetin of 
Jan. 22, 1962, p. 140. 


mental leadere, problems of mutual interest in 
Africa will be discussed. Mr. Williams will be 
accompanied on his trip by his special assistant, 
Martin F. Herz. 

Mr. Williams' schedule follows : Paris, July 9- 
11; Bonn, July 12-14; London, July 15-17; Brus- 
sels, July 18-19 ; Rome, July 20. 

U.S. Congratulates Burundi 
and Rwanda on Independence 

Following are tenets of messages from President 
Kennedy to Mwami Mwambutsa IV of the King- 
dom of Burundi and President Gregoire Kayi- 
banda of the Republic; of Rwanda. The U.N. 
Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi became the two 
independent states of Burundi and Rwanda on 
July 1} 


White HoDse press release (Mi^xlco, D.F.) dated June 30 

June 28, 1962 

Your Majesty : It gives me the greatest pleas- 
ure to extend to Your Majesty, and to the govern- 
ment and people of the kingdom of Burundi, the 
congratulations of the government and the people 
of the United States on the attainment of inde- 
pendence by Burundi. 

We in the United States have watched with in- 
terest the transition of Buinindi from its status 
as a U.N. Trust Territory to independence as a 
sovereign state. We know that your people, like 
ours, cherish individual liberty and national inde- 
pendence. Therefore, we share with the people of 
Bunmdi the knowledge that these goals are 
achieved and can be maintained only at the cost of 
unremitting labor and sacrifice. 

Americans also share with the people of Burundi 
a profound respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter. We look forward to your par- 
ticipation in world councils as befits a sovereign 

The people of the United States of Ajnerica will 
work to strengthen the bonds of friendship be- 
tween our two countries. We anticipate a future 

See p. ] 


in \vhich our two peoples shall work together in 
the cause of freedom, dignity and peace. 

John F. Kennedy 

His Majesty 

Mwami Mwambutsa IV, 

Uswnbura, Burundi. 


White House press release (Mexico. D.F.) dated June ^0 

June 28, 1962 

Dear Mr. President: I wish to extend to you, 
your Government, and the people of the Republic 
of Rwanda, on the occasion of Rwanda's accession 
to independence, the congratulations and warm 
wishes of the people of the United States. 

We in the United States have observed with 
great interest the transition of Rwanda from its 
status as a U.N. Trust Territory to sovereign inde- 
pendence. We are confident that the spirit of 
cooperation which has brought about this wonder- 
ful day will condition the Republic of Rwanda's 
future relationships with all who hold freedom 

In extending the congratulations of my coim- 
try, I speak for a people who cherish individual 
liberty and independence and who have made 
great sacrifices so that these principles may endure, 
and who share with the people of Rwanda a pro- 
found respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter. 

I look forward to the establishment of the most 
cordial relations between our two countries, and 
all Americans stand ready to work with the people 
of Rwanda to reach the goals we all share of peace, 
enlightenment and material well-being. I am 
confident that in the future our two countries will 
be as one in safeguarding the greatest bond be- 
tween us — our common belief in a free and demo- 
cratic way of life. 

John F. ICennedy 

His Excellency 

Gregoire Ivayibanda, 

President of the Republic of Rwanda, 


Department of Sfate Bulletin 





« o: 

is 01 








sident Congratulates Algeria 
)n Achievement of Independence 

<tatement iy President Kennedy 

Vhitp House press release dated July 3 

This moment of national independence for the 
Vlgei'ian people is both a solemn occasion and one 
)f great joy. Tlie entire world shares in this ini- 
)ortant step toward fuller realization of the dig- 
lity of man. 

I am proud that it falls to me as the President 
>f the people of the United States to voice on their 
)ehalf the profound satisfaction we feel that the 
aiise of freedom of choice among peoples has 
uniu triumphed. 
We Americans, who at this time are celebrating 
he annivereary of our own independence — a free- 
iom achieved only after gi-eat difficulties and much 
iloodshed — feel with you the surge of pride and 
atisfaction that is yours today on this momentous 

We congratulate your leaders and their French 
oUeagues on the wise statesmanship, patience, and 
lepth of vision they showed in paving the way for 
his historic event. 

As one who has been interested in the future of 

he Algerian people for many years, it is with 

niji)( pecial pride that I extend the good wishes of the 

,fe^ bnerican people to the people of Algeria. In the 

,p[^ ioming days we wish to strengthen and multiply 

M he American bonds of friendship with the Gov- 

irnment and people of Algeria. We look forward 

o worldng together with you in the cause of f ree- 

jjj lorn, peace, and human welfare. 


Jnited States and Argentina Review 
Progress on Development Program 

?resB release JSl dated July 

The Department of State annoimced on July 2 
hat U.S. representatives have been holding highly 
»nstructive meetings with officials of the National 
development Council of Argentina to review and 
liscuss the progress which has been attained by 
Argentina toward formulation of a national de- 
'•elopment program within the framework of the 
:!harter of Punta del Este. The U.S. officials 
ndicated their satisfaction with the start wluch 
Argentina has made toward that objective, as re- 

flected in a preliminary development program 
embodied in a compilation of fundamental data 
and analyses pertaining to the Argentine economy. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the strengthen- 
ing of agriculture, infrastructure, and basic indus- 
tries, and the promotion of exports. 

Discussions are continuing regarding the financ- 
ing of specific development projects within the 
framework of the development program. 

Presidents'of U.S. and Mexico 
Reaffirm Traditional Friendship 

President and Mrs. Kennedy made a state visit 
to Meanco City June £9-30. Folloioing is the text 
of a joint communique issued by President Ken- 
nedy and President Lopez Mateos of Mexico at 
the close of their talks, together with a statement 
made by Mr. Kennedy on June 30 at the signing 
of an agricultural credit agreement between the 
United States and Mexico. 


White House press release (Mexico, D.F.) dated June 30 

President Adolfo Lopez Mateos and President 
John F. Kennedy have held a series of conversa- 
tions which mark a new era of understanding and 
friendship between Mexico and the United States. 

Both Presidents reaffirmed the dedication of 
their countries to the ideals of individual liberty 
and personal dignity which constitute the foimda- 
tion of a civilization which they share in common. 
In consonance with their dedication to these ideals 
and acting always as sovereign and independent 
countries, which decide their own policies and their 
own courses of action, they propose to respect and 
maintain the principles of non-intervention — 
whether this intervention may come from a con- 
tinental or extra-continental state — and of self- 
determination of peoples. Therefore they are 
resolved to uphold these principles in the interna- 
tional organizations to which they belong, to de- 
fend and strengthen the democratic institutions 
which their peoples, in the exercise of their sov- 
ereign rights, have constructed, and to oppose 
totalitarian institutions and activities which are 
incompatible with the democratic principles they 

lIWi" j ti 

\i\y 23, 7962 

Both Presidents fully accept the responsibility 
of every sovereign nation to form its own policies, 
without outside dictation or coercion. They also 
recognize that the Republics of the Hemisphere 
share tlie commitment they have freely accepted, 
in accordance with the Inter- American Treaty of 
Eeciprocal Assistance and the Charter of the 
Organization of American States to defend 
the Continent, and to foster the fundamental 
democratic values. This principle of common 
responsibility, without impairment of national in- 
dependence, is the cornerstone of the Organization 
of American States. 

Another dimension of this principle was ex- 
pressed at the Punta del Este Conference in 
August of 1961. The two Presidents reaffirm their 
support of the Charter of Punta del Este^ and 
of the program of accelerated social and economic 
progress which that Charter embodies. In fact, 
Mexico and the United States, together with the 
other countries of the Inter- American system, are 
closely associated in a vast endeavor, without prec- 
edent, to promote the well-being of all the inhabi- 
tants of the Hemisphere. 

President Kennedy recognized that the funda- 
mental goal of the Mexican Revolution is the same 
as that of the Alliance for Progress — social justice 
and economic progress within the framework of 
individual freedom and political liberty. 

The two Presidents also discussed the economic 
and social development program of Mexico. 
President Kennedy reaffirmed his country's com- 
mitment made in the Cliarter of Punta del Este, 
to continue to cooperate with the Government of 
Mexico in the endeavor which it and the Mexican 
people are carrying out to accelerate the economic 
and social well-being of all the inhabitants of the 
Republic. The two Presidents agreed that the 
Alliance for Progress is essentially a program of 
mutual cooperation, in which the greater effort 
should come primarily from the nation which is 
seeking its development. Mexico and the United 
States arc determined, so far as they are con- 
cerned, to continue such effort until hunger, 
poverty, illiteracy and social injustice have been 
eliminated from tliis Hemisphere. 

Tlie two Chiefs of State concurred in the need 
of intensifying the efforts which are being made 
through the various international organizations 

including the United Nations, the Inter- America 
system, and the European economic communit 'J[p(x 

to achieve expanding levels of trade, with 
attention to the elimination of discriminatory 
restrictive practices against exports of basic con 
modities from Latin America. They agreed tha 
it is indispensable that a broadened and mor 
stable market should be provided in order to im 
prove the income of the exporting countries. 

dical p 

such income, workers and farmei's should have a) j.j(,rvoft 

equitable share to pennit increases in their level 
of living. Cotton, coffee, sugar and metals wer 
the subject of special discussion. 

The two Presidents discussed the importance o 
achieving higher rates of economic growth in thei 
respective countries. They agreed that govern 
ment has an essential role in stimulating and sup 
plementing the efforts of private enterprise fo 
attaining this objective, especially through sounc 
economic and fiscal policies. Both President 
agreed that inflation and financial instability havi 
an adverse effect on economic development an( 
the level of living of the general public 
dent Lopez Mateos expressed the continued deter 
mination of his Government to pursue policies 
which would promote financial stability and eco- 
nomic growth and President Kennedy promisee 
the cooperation of his Government toward thaf 

Tlie two Heads of State exchanged views on the 
importance of the United Nations in promoting 
international understanding and peace and in en 
couraging economic and social progress. They 
decided, in consequence, that their Governments 
should consult each other with the view of co- 
operating even more closely in all matters which 
maintain and strengthen the purposes and prin- 
ciples of the San Francisco Charter. 

Both Presidents expressed the strong desire 
that, within the scope of the United Nations 
and particularly at Geneva, negotiations should 
continue for general disarmament as well as for 
the termination of nuclear tests, both based upon 
effective means of control.^ 

Both Heads of State feel gratified by the manner 
in which their Governments are collaborating in 
the eradication of illegal drug traffic, and agreed 
to redouble their efforts and their cooperation to 
put an end to this criminal activity. 

tlie sci 
nteR HI 
to reach 
arliest | 
tie recur 
ments si 
iiuted i 

today i 

It is 
is mil 
of tie 
goals I 

■ For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, 

' For background, see p. 154. 

Department of State Bulletin 

„,„„.^^ and 


The two Presidents reviewed the progress of 
the joint undertaking of their countries in con- 
structing the Amistad Dam and Reservoir Project 
and expressed satisfaction that this project is pro- 
ding on schedule. 
mi'W '^^ ^■^'^ Presidents discussed the problem of 
Chamizal. They agreed to instruct their execu- 
tive agencies to recommend a complete solution to 
this problem whicli, without prejudice to their 
juridical position, takes into accoimt the entire 
history of this tract. 

In relation to the problem of salinity of the 
waters of the Colorado River,^ the two Presidents 
■ discussed the studies which have been conducted 
by the scientists of the two countries. The two 
Presidents noted that water which the United 
States plans to release during the winter of 1962- 
63 for river regulation and such other measures 
as may be immediately feasible should have the 
beneficial effect of reducing the salinity of the 
waters until October, 1963. They expressed their 
determination, with the scientific studies as a basis, 
to reach a permanent and effective solution at the 
earliest possible time with the aim of preventing 
the recurrence of this problem after October, 1963. 

The Presidents finished their conversations by 
emphasizing their determination that whatever 
temporary difficulties may at times arise between 
Mexico and the United States, the two Govern- 
ments should resolve them in a spirit of close 
friendship, inasmuch as they are fundamentally 
united in defense of those values of liberty and 
personal dignity which their revolutionary an- 
cestors struggled to establish. 

OB ti 



White House press release (Mteico, D.F.) dated June 30 

The agricultural credit agreement we sign here 
today is an historic step forward in cooperation 
between our two countries under the Aliama para 
el Progreso. 

It is especially significant that this agreement 
is in the field of agriculture. For improvement 
of the life of the campesino is one of the central 
goals of the Mexican revolution — and a major 
part of the Alliance for Progress. Here in Mexico 
you have carried forward the largest and most 
impressive land reform program in the entire his- 

" For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 650. 
July 23, 1962 

tory of the hemisphere. Since the beginning of 
your revolution more than 133 million acres of 
land have been distributed to almost 2 million 
people. And never has this program been more 
vigorously administered than during the last 3 
years, when the government of Lopez Mateos dis- 
tributed 24 million acres to hundreds of thousands 
of cam.pesinos. 

The tangible results of your land reform can 
be witnessed in the 223 percent rise in agricultural 
output over the last two decades — a rise which has 
made Mexico virtually self-sufficient in foodstuffs 
and a major exporter of agricultural products. 
It can be seen too in the new hope which your 
revolution has brought to all those who work the 
land — the hope and expectation that they and 
their children will have ever-widening oppor- 
tunities for education, health, and a rising stand- 
ard of living. 

But if much has been done, much remains to 
be done. Farmers who own their own land need 
credit and technical assistance so that productivity 
and income can be raised. Land tenure must be 
made increasingly secure and agricultural units 
made economically stronger. New research pro- 
grams and new marketing systems must help bring 
a new life to those who live on the land. 

All these things — and much more — are part of 
your impressive agricultural development pro- 
gram. And I am glad that through today's agree- 
ment we will be able to assist you in this most 
important effort. Tliis $20 million loan will be 
added to your present agricultural credit pro- 
gram — a program designed to help the small 
farmer buy equipment, improve irrigation, in- 
crease storage, and gain access to those resources 
he so desperately needs to improve his income and 
raise the productivity of tlie land. 

Today's agreement is another tangible re- 
affirmation of my country's unyielding and con- 
tinuing commitment to work with the Mexican 
Government in its vast development effort to pro- 
vide more jobs for its workers, a better life for its 
farmers, and to help Mexico rise to its inevitable 
high rank among the industrialized nations of the 

And I hope also that this signing will be heeded 
beyond your borders and our hemisphere. For — 
as j'our own Mexican revolution has so vividly 
demonstrated — until all the campesinos of this 
hemisphere have the opportunity to own the land 


they till, until they are given the resources to till 
that land productively, until every rural family 
has an opportunity for health and a decent income, 
and education for its children — until that day the 
peaceful revolution of the Americas will not be 

Letters of Credence 

Costa Rica 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Costa 
Rica, Gonzalo Facio Segreda, presented his cre- 
dentials to President Kennedy on July 6. For 
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi- 
dent's reply, see Department of State press release 
443 dated July 6. 

Philippine-American Friendsliip' Day 

Following is the text of a message from Presi- 
dent Kennedy to President Diosdado Macapagal 
of the Philippines. 

White House press release dated July 3 

July 3, 1962 
The observance of July Fourtli as Philippine- 
American Friendship Day profoundly honors 
every American. 

In an imparalleled way, the Philippines has 
given expression to the spirit of our sixty-four 
years of partnership in democracy for the mutual 
benefit of our people and our beloved nations. 
I join the people of the United States in extend- 
ing to the Philippines our warmest best wishes. 
Together, dedicated in our freedoms, ideals, and 
our mutual respect and regard, we shall be stronger 
in our efforts toward a world of justice, peace and 

John F. Kennedy 

President Delegates Functions 
Under Exchange Act of 1961 


Administeation of the Mutual Educationai, and 

Cultural Exchange Act op 1961 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual 

Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Public 

'No. 11034; 27 Fed. Reg. 0071 (White House press re- 
ise dated June 26). 

Law 87-256 ; 75 Stat. 527 ; hereinafter referred to as tt 
Act), and as President of the United States, I find thj 
the delegations set forth in this order are in the interei 
of the purposes expressed in the said Act and the efflciei 
administration of the programs undertaken pursuant 
that Act and determine that the delegates specified in th 
order are appropriate and I hereby order as follows: 

Section 1. Department of State, (a) The followin 
functions conferred upon the President by the Act ar 
hereby delegated to the Secretary of State : 

(1) The functions so conferred by Sections 102(a) (1) 
102(a) (2) (i), (ii) and (iv), 102(b)(3), (5) and (9) 
103, 104(e)(3), and 105(d)(1) and (e) of the Act. 

(2) The functions so conferred by Sections 102(a) (2 
(iii) and (h)(1). (2), (4), (7) and (8) of the Act (tht 
provisions of Section 2(a) of this order notwithstanding) 

(3) The functions so conferred by Section 102(a) (3 
of the Act to the extent that they pertain to liquidatioj 
of affairs respecting the Universal and Internationaj 
Exhibition of Brussels, 1958. 

(4) The functions so conferred by Sections 104(d) anc 
(e) (4) and 108(c) and (d) of the Act to the extent thai 
they pertain to the functions delegated by the foregoing j jji 


^ lie it' 

1,1 » 
tuiiei SI 


mil 108(1 


provisions of this section 

(5) The function so conferred by Section 104(e) (1) oJ 
the Act of prescribing rates for per diem in lieu of 
sistence ; but in carrying out the said function as it relates 
to functions herein delegated to the Director of the United 
States Information Agency or the Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, the Secretary of State shall con- 
sult with them. 

(b) The Secretary of State, in collaboration with the 
Director of the United States Information Agency, the 
Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Health, Ed- 
ucation, and Welfare with respect to the functions dele- 
gate<l by Sections 2, 3, and 4, respectively, of this order, 
shall prepare and transmit to the President the reports 
which the President is required to submit to the Congress 
by Section lOS(b) of the Act. 

(c) With respect to the carrying out of functions under 
Section 102(a) (2) (ii) of the Act hereinabove delegated 
to the Secretary of State, the Director of the United 
States Information Agency shall participate in the plan- 
ning of cultural and other attractions. Such participa- 
tion shall include consultation in connection with (1) the 
selection and scheduling of such attractions, and (2) the 
designation of the areas where the attractions will be 

Sec. 2. United States Information Agency. Subject to 
the provisions of Section G of this order, the following 
functions conferred upon the President by the Act are 
hereby delegated to the Director of the United States 
Information Agency : 

(a) The functions so conferred by Sections 102(a) 
(2) (iii) and (b)(1); Section 102(b)(2) to the extent 
that it authorizes the type of centers now supported by 
the United States Information Agency abroad and desig- 
nated as binational, community, or student centers; 
Section 102(b) (4) exclusive of professorships and lecture- 
ships ; and Sections 102(b)(7) and (8) of the Act; all 

Department of State Bulletin 

I if the foregoing notwithstanding the provisions of Sec- 
tion 1(a) (2) of this order. 

(b) The functions so conferred by Section 104(e)(4) 
of the Act (the provisions of Sections 1(a) (4) and 3(b) 
of this order notwithstanding). 

(c) The functions so conferred by Section 102(a)(3) 
of the Act to the extent that they are in respect of fairs, 
expositions, and demonstrations held outside of the 
United States, but exclusive of the functions delegated 
by the provisions of Section 1(a)(3) of this order. 

(d) The functions so conferred by Sections 104(d) 
and 108(c) and (d) of the Act to the extent that they 
pertain to the functions delegated by the foregoing provi- 
sions of this section. 

Sec. 3. Department of Commerce. Subject to the pro- 
visions of Section 6 of this order, the following functions 
conferred upon the President by the Act are hereby dele- 
gated to the Secretary of Commerce : 

(a) The functions so conferred by Section 102(a)(3) 
of the Act to the extent that they are in respect of fairs, 
expositions, and demonstrations held in the United States. 

(b) The functions so conferred by Sections 104(e)(4) 
and 108(c) of the Act to the extent that they pertain 
to the functions delegated by the foregoing provisions 
of this section. 

Sec. 4. Department of Health, Education, and Wel- 
fare. Subject to the provisions of Section 6 of this order, 
the functions conferred upon the President by Section 
102(b) (6) of the Act are hereby delegated to the Secre- 
tary of Health, Education, and Welfare. 

Sec. 5. Certain incidental matters, (a) In respect of 
functions hereinabove delegated to them, there is hereby 
delegated to the Secretary of State, the Director of the 
United States Information Agency, the Secretary of Com- 
merce, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, respectively : 

(1) The authority conferred npon the President by 
Sections 105(d)(2) and (f) and 106(d) and (f) of the 

(2) Subject to the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c) 
of this order, the authority conferred upon the President 
by Section 104 (b ) of the Act to employ personnel. 

(b) The employment, by any department or other exec- 
utive agency under Section 5(a)(2) of this order, of 
any of the not to exceed ten persons who may be com- 
pensated without regard to the Classification Act of 1949 
under Section 104(b) of the Act shall require prior au- 
thorization by the Secretary of State concurred in by the 
Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 

(c) Persons employed or assigned by a department 
or other executive agency for the purpose of performing 
functions under the Act outside the United States shall 
be entitled, except in cases in which the period of em- 
ployment or assignment exceeds thirty months, to the 
same benefits as are provided by Section 528 of the 
Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended (22 U.S.C. 
928), for persons appointed to the Foreign Service Re- 
serve. In cases in which the period of employment or 
assignment exceeds thirty months, persons so employed 
or assigned shall be entitled to such benefits if agreed 

by the agency in which such benefits may be exercised. 

(d) Pursuant to Section 104(f) of the Act, Executive 
Order No. 10450 of April 27, 1953 (18 P.R. 2489) Is hereby 
established as the standards and procedures for the em- 
ployment or assignment to duties of persons under the Act. 

(e) Any officer to whom functions vested in the Presi- 
dent by the Act are hereinabove delegated may (1) allo- 
cate to any other officer of the executive branch of the 
Government any funds appropriated or otherwise made 
available for the functions so delegated to him as he may 
deem appropriate for the best carrying out of the func- 
tions and (2) make available, for use in connection with 
any funds so allocated by him, any authority he has 
under this order. 

Sec. 6. Policy guidance. In order to assure appropri- 
ate coordination of programs, and talking into account 
the statutory functions of the departments and other 
executive agencies concerned, the Secretary of State shall 
exercise primary responsibility for Government-wide 
leadership and policy guidance with regard to interna- 
tional educational and cultural affairs. 

Sec. 7. Functions reserved to the President, (a) There 
are hereby excluded from the functions delegated by the 
provisions of this order the functions conferred upon 
the President with re.spect to (1) the delegation of pow- 
ers under Section 104(a) of the Act, (2) the establish- 
ment of standards and procedures for the investigation 
of personnel under Section 104(f) of the Act, (3) the 
transfer of appropriations under Section 105(c) of the 
Act, (4) the appointment of members of the Board of 
Foreign Scholarships under Section 106(a)(1) of the 
Act, (5) the appointment of members, the designation 
of a chairman, and the receipt of recommendations of 
the United States Advisory Commission on International 
Educational and Cultural Affairs under Section 106(b) 
of the Act, (6) the waiver of provisions of law or limi- 
tations of authority under Section 108(a) of the Act, and 
(7) the submission of annual reports to the Congress 
under Section 108(b) of the Act. 

(b) Notwithstanding the delegations made by this 
order, the President may in his discretion exercise any 
function comprehended by such delegations. 

Sec. 8. Waivers, (a) It is hereby determined that 
the performance by any department or other executive 
agency of functions authorized by Sections 102(a)(2) 
and 102(a) (3) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 2452(a) (2) and (3) ) 
without regard to prohibitions and limitations of author- 
ity contained in the following-specified provisions of law 
Is in furtherance of the purposes of the Act : 

(1) Section 15 of the Administrative Expenses Act of 
1946 (c. 744, August 2, 1946; 60 Stat. 810), as amended 
(5 U.S.C. 55a) (experts and consultants) ; but the com- 
pensation paid individuals in pursuance of this paragraph 
shall not exceed the rate of ?100.00 per diem. 

(2) Section 16(a) of the Administrative Expenses Act 
of 1946 (e. 744, August 2, 1946; 60 Stat. 810; 5 U.S.C. 78) 
to the extent that it pertains to hiring automobiles and 

(3) Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended 
(31 U.S.C. 529) (advance of funds). 

(4) Section 322 of the Act of June 30, 1932, c. 314, 47 
Stat. 412 (40 U.S.C. 278a) (maximum charges). 

July 23, 1962 


(5) Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as amended 
(41 U.S.C. 5) (competitive bids). 

(6) Section 3710 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 8) 
/opening of bids). 

<7) Section 2 of the Act of March 3, 1933, c. 212, 47 
Stat. 1520 (41 U.S.C. 10a) (Buy American Act). 

(8) Section 3735 of the Revi.sed Statutes (41 U.S.C. 13) 
(contracts limited to one year). 

(9) Sections 302-305 of the Federal Property and Ad- 
ministrative Services Act of 1949 (June 30, 1949, c. 288, 
63 Stat. 393 et seq.), as amended (41 U.S.C. 252-255) 
(competitive bids; negotiated contracts; advances). 

(10) Section 87 of the Act of January 12, 1895, c. 23, 
28 Stat. 622, and the second proviso of Section 11 of the 
Act of March 1, 1919, c. 86, 40 Stat. 1270, as amended 
(44 U.S.C. Ill) to the extent that they pertain to print- 
ing by the Government Printing Otiice. 

(11) Section 1 of the Act of June 20, 1878, c. 359, 20 
Stat. 216. as amended (44 U.S.C. 322) (advertising). 

(12) Section 3828 of the Revised Statutes (44 U.S.C. 
324) (advertising). 

(13) Section 901(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 
(June 29, 1936, c. 858, 49 Stat. 2015, as amended; 46 
U.S.C. 1241(a) ) (official travel overseas of United States 
officers and employees, and transportation of their per- 
sonal effects, on ships registered under the laws of the 
United States). 

(14) Any provision of law or limitation of authority 
to the extent that such provision or limitation would limit 
or prohibit construction of buildings by the United States 
on property not owned by it. 

(b) It is directed (1) that all waivers of statutes and 
limitations of authority effected by the foregoing provi- 
sions of this section shall be utilized in a prudent manner 
and as sparingly as may be practical, and (2) that suit- 
able steps shall be taken by the administrative agencies 
concerned to insure that result, including, as may be ap- 
propriate, the Imposition of administrative limitations in 
lieu of waived statutory requirements and limitations of 

Sec. 9. Definition. As used in this order, the word 
'•function" or "function.s" Includes any duty, obligation, 
power, authority, responsibility, right, privilege, dis- 
cretion, or activity. 

Sec. 10. References to orders and acts. Except as may 
for any reason be inappropriate : 

fa) References in this order to the Act or any pro- 
vision of the Act shall be deemed to include references 
thereto as amended from time to time. 

(b) References in this order to any prior Executive 
order not superseded by this order shall be deemed to 
include references thereto as amended from time to time. 

Sec. 11. Prior directives and actions, (a) This order 
supersedes Executive Order No. 10716 of June 17, 1957, 
and J^xecutive Order No. 10912 of January 18, 1961. Ex- 
cept to the extent that they may be inconsistent with law 
or with this order, other directives, regulations, and 
actions relating to the functions delegated by this order 
and in force immediately prior to the issuance of this 
order shall remain in effect until amended, modified, or 
revoked by appropriate authority. 

(b) This order shall neither limit nor be limited by 
Executive Order No. 11014 of April 17, 1962. 

(c) To the extent not heretofore superseded, there are 
hei-eby superseded the provisions of the letters of the 
President to the Director of the United States Informa- 
tion Agency dated August 16, 1955, and August 21, 1956 
(22 F.R. 101-103). 

Sec. 12. Effective date. The provisions of this order 
shall be effective immediately. 


The White House, 
June 25, 196Z. 

U.S. Offers Grant of $10 Miliion 
for Congo Import Program 

Deparfinent Statement 

Press release 433 dated June 28 

The United States Govermnent has offered to 
the United Nations for the Congolese Government 
a grant of $10 million for imports. This latest 
grant will bring our aid to the Congo impoi-t pro- 
gram during the past year to $51 million, apart 
from Food-for- Peace shipments at an annual rate 
of over $10 million. 

The Congo is faced with a shortage of foreign 
exchange, a situation greatly aggravated by the 
continuing loss of foreign exchange revenues from 
Katanga. There have been serious floods during 
the past year which disrupted communications and 
agricultural production. Transportation has suf- 
fered from deterioration of equipment and short- 
ages of spare parts. Normal exports have declined 
substantially as a consequence of these difficulties. 

A considerable effort has been undertaken by the 
United Nations in Leopoldville to improve the 
staffing of the public administration; to expand 
technical aid , especially with regard to public 
finance and monetary management; to provide 
public works programs and unemployment relief ; 
and to improve transportation and conununica- 
tions. For example, $8 million of the $18 million 
provided by the United States in April and May 
has been allotted by the Government of the Congo 
for the purchase of American vehicles and spare 

The task of rehabilitation will be greatly facili- 
tated by the restoration of national miity. We 
earnestly hope that the negotiations now in prog- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ress between the Central Government and Mr. 
Tshombe [Moise Tsliombe, President of Katanga 
Province] ^l'ill result in the reintegration of the 
Katanga. The work of constructive planning for 
economic growth could then be based on tlie total 
resources of the country, and the private sector 
should be able once again to play a major role in 
the Congo's development. 

The United States Government, in cooperation 
with the other nations which are attempting to 
help the Congolese to build their new state, is 
ready to consider the best means of providing fi- 
nancial support for a longer range economic 

U.S. Grants Funds to Hong Kong 
for School Building Project 

Press release 434 dated July 3 

Secretary Rusk announced on July 3 that a grant 
of $250,000 has been made to the Hong Kong 
Government to provide for the construction and 
equipping of a new building for the Hong Kong 
Technical College. 

In announcing the grant the Secretary said, 

"Responsive to the statement made some days 
ago by the Colonial Secretary outlining areas 
where otfei-s of outside assistance would Ije most 
welcome to meet some of the extraordinary ex- 
penses facing the Colonial Government in coping 
with the problems created by a population swollen 
by more than a million immigrants in the past 12 
years, the U.S. Government is making a grant to 
meet the major costs of one of the projects upon 
which the Hong Kong authorities place a high 
priority. A grant of $250,000 through the De- 
partment's Far East refugee program will pro- 
vide sorely needed new facilities for the Hong 
Kong Technical College, which is presently giv- 
ing highly useful training to 950 day students and 
7,100 evening students, many of whom are from 
the refugee population." 

The U.S. contribution will provide for building 
a new workshop block to include machine shop, 
bench fitting, welding, sheet metal, carpentry, 
painting, bricklaying and masonry, plumbing, 
plastering, electrical installation, and machine and 
transformer repair. These are among the most 
critical technical training requirements to meet the 
increasing manpower needs resulting fi-om con- 
tinuing massive public and private building pro- 

My 23, 1962 

grams in the colony. The gift is part of the con- 
tuiuing assistance program furnished since 1954 
under the Far East refugee progvnm and in the 
amount of $1.1 million during 1DC2. The bulk 
of the funds are ordinarily channeled through the 
programs and services of accredited American and 
international agencies working in Hong Kong and 

The Secretary connnented further, "It is our 
hope that this grant to the Colonial Government 
will reassure it of our continued admiration of 
the magnificent job which it is doing in behalf of 
the refugees who now constitute over a third of 
the colony's population. It is our hope, too, that 
the refugees who have come to Hong Kong will 
be reassured of the deep and abiding interest which 
the American Government and people have for 
them and for all refugees who have had to leave 
their homes and seek freedom and a new life in a 
new land." 

United States and Canada Refer 
Waterway Proposal to IJC 

Press release 437 dated July 5 

The Department of State announced on July 5 
that the United States and Canada have agreed 
upon the text of a joint reference to the Interna- 
tional Joint Commission, United States and Can- 
ada, concerning the Richelieu River-Lake Cham- 
plain Waterway. The Governments in similar 
letters on July 5, 1962,^ requested the Commission 
to conduct a study on the feasibility of improving 
the existing waterway or developing other routes 
for a waterway from the St. Lawrence River in 
Canada through Lake Champlain to the Hudson 
River at Albany, N.Y. 

The Commission was specifically requested to 
conduct a study on whether improvement or de- 
velopment of the waterway would be feasible and 
economically advantageous and, if so, witli what 
governing dimensions. The Cormnission was 
further asked to make an appraisal of tlie costs 
and the value to the two countries of any such 
projects. The Govei-nments requested the Com- 
mission, in making its examination and report, to 
bear in mind the eifects which any such projects 
would have on conservation, recreation, and other 
beneficial uses. 

Not printed here. 


Department Supports U.N. Loan Legislation 

Following are texts of statements made by 
Seci^etary Rusk, Acting Secreta'n/ Ball, and U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations Adlai E. 
Stevenson before the Uoum Committee on For- 
eign Ajfairs during hearings on the U.N. loan 


rrcsa release 435 dated July 3 

As you know, I have been in Europe talking 
with our allies about the Atlantic alliance. Eu- 
rope is a land of great creativeness, great prom- 
ise, great ferment. In evei-y country I have tried, 
with our European friends, to stress our basic 
unity. But we have also been talking realisti- 
cally about differences — trying to identify the 
points of actual difference, to leani how to deal 
with them, and to keep them from infecting the 
relationship between the Atlantic partnership 
and the rest of the world. 

Before discussing some of these points with you 
in executive session, I want to say just a word 
about the legislation you have been considering 
in public hearings, the proposal to give the Presi- 
dent authority to make loans to the United Na- 
tions. The United Nations is the framework in 
wliich we seek a workable relationship with all 
nations, including those outside the close partner- 
ship of close allies. Our interest in the newly 
developing areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America — many of them newly independent, some 
of them feeling "uncommitted" in the rivalries 
of the great powers — is in their independence, 
their freedom, their chance to meet their own aspi- 
rations for their own futures. Some of them call 
themselves neutral. But they are not caught up 
as innocent bystanders in a great struggle between 
Washington and Moscow. They are themselves 
the issue — these peoples and their future. 

The great world struggle we keep talking about 

is between two concepts of the future world 
order: the picture of world revolution offered by 
the Communist countries and the more revolution- 
ary and far more attractive picture sketched out 
in the Charter of the United Nations, especially 
in its opening sections. On that issue there can 
be no neutrality for independent nations. 

The issue is between those who want an authori- 
tarian world and those who want a world order 
in which independent societies with free institu- 
tions cooperate with each other by consent. The 
Communists have announced and are pursuing a 
doctrine that is simply incompatible with the 
U.N. Charter. As a matter of "scientific" predic- 
tion, they have proclaimed that their kind of 
world is bound to come into being. 

But their doctrine lias largely been rejected 
by the peoples of the world. Forty-four coun- 
tries have become independent since 1945 — two of 
them only yesterday [Burundi and Rwanda] — 
and not a single one has joined up with the bloc 
against the charter. Wlienever, in the United 
Nations, this ultimate question of communism 
versus the charter is posed, it turns out that there 
are not any neutrals on this subject. The issue 
was posed when the Soviets tried to substitute a 
three-man "troika" for a single Secretary-General 
after the death of Dag Hammarskjold. For this 
proposition, the Soviets have failed to recruit a 
single vote outside the Communist bloc itself. 

The U.N. Financial Crisis 

The United Nations is in a financial crisis today 
because the great majority of its members, includ- 
ing the United States, have combined to make 
the charter operational, to put the United Nations 
as an operating organization into situations that 
threaten, if they are not calmed down, to break 
out in little wars which spread all too easily and 
rapidly into big wars. 

Tlie United Nations works hardest at keeping 


Department of State Bulletin 

tho peace in the most intractable situations, those 
which have defied settlement through bilateral 
diplomacy or within regional groupings. The 
U.N.'s operations are therefore bound to seem dif- 
ficult at best. The problems it tackles sometimes 
seem in the short run insoluble. The Middle 
E;ist, Kaslimir, and West New Guinea have been 
active objectives of U.N. concern for more than 
a dozen years now. The international peace 
watch in tho Gaza Strip has been there for 6 years. 
And in the Congo, where the largest international 
o{)i' ration has been momited, we are not yet out 
of the woods. 

The stubbornness of these most difiicult peace- 
making tasks is frustrating — for the peoples con- 
cerned, for the U.N. membership at large, and 
perhaps especially for the American people, who 
[lave set great store by the U.N. Charter as a 
;ymbol of the peaceful world order that is the 
ultimate objective of all American defense and 
foreign policies. 

A part of this frustration is a feeling that we 
are doing too much and that the rest of the world 
community is doing too little to make peace op- 
jrational. And it is true that some members of 
:;he free world are not yet living up to their obli- 
gations and are far behind in their payments for 
the Middle East and Congo operations. It is true 
that the Soviets — because they do not yet believe 
in the charter they signed — do not think these op- 
erations serve Soviet national interests or the in- 
terests of the world Communist movement. With 
tliis judgment I think we can agree. 

An international enterprise must first of all be 
international ; it is not for the United States to 
carry the full load. In your hearings the commit- 
tee has naturally examined the delinquencies and 
arrearages of many U.N. members. But it is 
worth remembering also that : 

Virtually all countries do pay — not always 
promptly — their share of the U.N.'s regidar 

Without benefit of our example and our leader- 
ship, 12 countries have already purchased nearly 
$26 million worth of U.N. bonds and 29 more have 
publicly announced their intention to purchase 
an additional $41 million. 

To staff the U.N.'s various peacekeeping mis- 
sions, 54 different countries have contributed per- 
sonnel to serve in the world's danger zones. Fif- 
teen of these are nations which didn't even exist 
as nations before the Second World War. 

July 23, 7962 

And in the U.N.'s nation-building role 75 coun- 
tries are contributing teclinicians to work in 125 
different countries and territories this very year. 

A'Crucial Decision 

So the United Nations is an international en- 
terprise — it just is not universal as yet. It cannot 
be imiversal until all the free countries see the 
value to them of an international peacemaking 
capability. As long as the Soviets see their na- 
tional interests as world disruption rather than 
world development, as long as they believe — cor- 
rectly — that U.N. operations cut across their de- 
signs for world domination, we can hardly expect 
the Communists to approach the financing of the 
United Nations with great enthusiasm. But we 
certainly should not measure our national interests 
by theirs. We certainly should not say, because 
the Soviets are not doing their part to develop a 
civilized world order, we will also refuse to do our 
part. It would be a great bonanza, indeed, for the 
Soviets if their refusal to pay for world order 
were to persuade Americans to do likewise. It 
would be a great and dreadful irony if Soviet at- 
tempts to frustrate the U.N. made Americans feel 
so frustrated with their own efforts to build a 
world organization that we quit ti-ying. 

Starting yesterday, the peacekeeping operations 
of the United Nations can be carried on only with 
funds loaned to the United Nations by govern- 
ments under the arrangements adopted by the 
General Assembly last winter. More than one- 
half of the U.N.'s membership has already made 
the decision we are now debating — to participate 
in this stopgap financing scheme. But the crucial 
decision now rests with the U.S. House of Kepre- 

The legislation before you will give that com- 
munity a short breathing space during which it 
has to develop and adopt a permanent system of 
financing, one that spreads the responsibility to all 
the members but does not place the future of the 
United Nations in the hands of those who would 
wreck it rather than build it. 

To them — to the Soviet Union and its inarticu- 
late and subordinated friends — we then can say: 
In company with all peoples who want to be inde- 
pendent we are helping to build broad mstitutions 
for peacekeeping and nation building. We hope 
you will cooperate in this effort — because the alter- 
natives are too dangerous, too fruitless. Come and 
join the United Nations — this charter that you 


signed. You speak of revolution — put your hands 
to the most revolutionary force you have at your 
disposal: a simple decision to live at peace with 
the rest of the world. 

Meanwhile, for our part, let us demonstrate with 
a U.N. loan that we can overcome the frustrations 
that are alwaj'S the leader's lot and write another 
cliaptcr in the consistent and bipartisan support 
of the United States for the United Nations. 


I appear today in support of legislation author- 
izing the appropriation of up to $100 million for 
use as a loan to assist in financing the United 
Nations peace-and-security operations. 

Costs of U.N. Peacekeeping Activities 

The President has succinctly summarized the 
problem before us in his message to the Congress 
on January 30, 1962,^ when he said : 

The United N.ations is faced with a financial crisis due 
largely to extraordinary expenditures which it incurred 
in fulfilling the pledges in its charter to secure peace, 
progress, and human rights. I regard it as vital to the 
interests of our country and to the maintenance of peace 
that the capacity of the United Nations to act for peace 
not be inhibited by a lack of financial resources. 

Up to now, the United Nations has tried to meet 
the cost of its extraordinary peacekeeping activi- 
ties — in the Middle East and in the Congo — by 
special assessments levied on all members. These 
special assessments have been ranning at a rate of 
about $140 million a year, or approximately dou- 
ble the size of the regular assessments for the 
ordinary budget. 

The United States and many other countries 
have paid their special assessments — indeed, the 
United States has made substantial voluntary con- 
tributions — but some nations are delinquent. 
Some claim that they are financially unable to 
carry the hea\'y added burden; others are out of 
sympathy with the operation; and still others 
deny their legal obligation to pay their share of 
the costs. In spite of the accumulation of unpaid 
assessments the United Nations has been able 
to meet its expenditures, but only by drawing down 
its working capital, by internal borrowing opera- 
tions, and by deferring payment on some of the 

' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 26, 1962, p. 311. 

peacekeeping expenses it has incurred. Today, 
with an estimated deficit of about $137 million,! 
the United Nations has exhausted its ability to|' 
finance itself by these methods. | 

To put its aifairs on a sounder basis the United 
Nations has adopted an interim financial plan. 
Tliis plan includes, as its principal elements, a 
systematic program for collecting arrearages and 
a bond issue of $200 million payable in 25 years 
at 2 percent interest. It is envisaged that the 
United States would provide up to one-half of this 
financing needed to continue peacekeeping opera- 
tions that have well served the national interest 
of this comitry. 

I shall speak further about this financial plan 
in a moment, but first I propose that we look 
briefly at the usefulness of the United Nations to 
the United States. 

U.N. an Essential Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy 

The United Nations is an imperfect organiza- 
tion in an imperfect world. It has its obvious lim- 
itations, its manifest problems. Nevertheless, it 
remains an essential instrument of United States 
foreign policy — just as it is an instrument of the 
foreign policy of every other member state. 

The United Nations is not, of course, the only 
foreign policy instrument available to us, nor is 
it usable at all in many situations that arise in our 
relations with other nations. Yet it has served 
in the past, and it must continue to serve in the 
future, as a major mechanism through which we 
seek to maintain the peace and advance the cause of 

U.N. Frustrated in Original Objective 

As the one major global institution, the United 
Nations, directly and through its specialized agen- 
cies, engages in many different kinds of activities. 
Not all of these activities are of the same impor- 
tance, but unfortunately this fact is not always 
recognized. All too often, in discussing the 
United Nations, we neglect to separate the es- 
sential from the merely useful. This has, I think, 
contributed to much of the misunderstanding and 
confusion that have characterized recent discus- 
sions of this vital subject. 

Wliat are the principal functions the United 
Nations performs today ? Quite clearly, they are 
not those tliat mainly preoccupied the delegates 
at San Francisco in 194.5, when the cliarter was 

Department of State Bulletin 

being drafted. The assumption — or at least the 
liope — which inspired the draftars of that docu- 
ment was that the gi-eat powers, allied in World 
War II, would be able to live in relative harmony 
and could cooperate in policing the postwar 
world. They could settle whatever differences 
ai-ose among them within the forum of the Secu- 
rity Council. 

As we know all too well, the effort to fashion 
one world with one treaty hardly lasted through 
the first General Assembly. The Soviet Union 
disclosed quite quickly that its purposes were not 
those of the United Nations Charter. Over the 
next 4 years the Iron Curtain dropped down to 
form a cage around one-third of the world's popu- 
lation — living on the great land mass that 
stretches from the Brandenburg Gate to the 
Yellow Sea. 

The United Nations was thus frustrated in its 
original objective of serving as a forum for re- 
conciling differences among the great powers. 
This has not, however, destroyed its usefulness^ 
indeed, its indispensability. 

Instead, the United Nations has found its post- 
war destiny in quite different but no less effective 

Preventing Confrontation of Great Powers 

I should like this morning to emphasize two of 
the most important roles that the United Nations 
has played — two roles that have rendered it an 
essential instnmient of American foreign policy. 

The first of these roles has been to prevent the 
confrontation of the great powers under circum- 
stances that could lead to a nuclear conflict. If 
the United Nations has been unable to fulfill its 
original purpose of bringing the great powers to- 
gether, it has at least succeeded, in significant in- 
stances, in keeping them apart. By bringing 
about the settlement of conflicts through consulta- 
tion and debate and by interposing itself as an 
agency to keep the peace in areas where chaos 
might otherwise invite great-power intervention, 
it has served a vital purpose in avoiding situations 
that might otherwise have produced a major war. 

The U.N. was scarcely organized before it was 
involved in the difScult and dangerous business of 
peacekeeping — in Iran, Greece, Indonesia, and 
Kashmir. Since then it has played a part in 
stopping aggression, threatened aggression, or 
civil war in Palestine, Korea, at Suez, and in the 

July 23, 1962 

647061—62 3 

Congo. In all of these conflicts the great powers 
had interests. In the absence of the U.N. they 
would in all likelihood have intervened to defend 
those interests. Intervention by both sides could 
have led to a dangerous confrontation. 

The most recent — and perhaps most spectacu- 
lar — of the trouble spots in which the U.N. has 
acted to prevent great-power confrontation is, of 
course, the Congo. Here the U.N. — with full 
United States support — interposed itself in the 
nick of time. The Soviet Union was already mov- 
ing in, and we could never have stood by while it 
set up shop in the heart of Africa. The inter- 
vention of the U.N. prevented the chaos that could 
well have turned the Congo into another Korea. 
Today it is doing its best to bring about the condi- 
tions under which an integrated Congo Eepublic 
can work its way toward stability and peace. 

I would suggest therefore that, in thinking 
about the Congo and about other areas where the 
United Nations is brought in to keep the peace, 
we should ask ourselves tliis question : From the 
point of view of our national security, would it 
have been better to send in the American Marines 
or to act witli others to send in the United Nations 
in the name of the world conununity ? 

Obviously, the U.N. cannot keep the peace with- 
out expense. Today it has more than 20,000 men 
in the field, patrolling the truce lines in the Middle 
East and keeping the lid on the Congo. This is 
manifestly the work of an executive agency of 
considerable capacity and skill, capable of per- 
forming ^Jragmatic tasks — such as mobilizing, 
transporting, commanding, and supplying sub- 
stantial forces in the field when an emergency 

Assisting the New Nations 

The U.N. has played a second role of vital im- 
portance by serving as a forum in which the in- 
dustrial societies and the less developed nations 
can be brought together. This is an accomplish- 
ment of great significance, particularly when con- 
sidered in the light of the revolution that has 
occurred since the end of World War II. In this 
brief period one-third of the world has made the 
eventful passage from colonial status to some form 
of national independence. Almost 50 new states 
have come into being ; a dozen more are actively in 
the making. 

This transformation, involving the breakup of 


the great European empires, meant the collapse 
of a longstanding system of world order. It 
meant the sudden rupture of old ties, the sudden 
emergence of new states, and the sudden libera- 
tion of a billion people from colonial dependence. 
The world has never known a comparable political 

Yet this revolution, this rapid transformation 
from dependence to independent nationhood of a 
billion people, has for the most part been achieved 
in a peaceful and orderly mamier and in a fan- 
tastically short time — and largely because of the 
existence of the United Nations. Adrift from 
their previous associations, these new countries 
found in the United Nations an organization that 
gave them status on the world scene and a political 
system in which they could have a full sense of 
participation with older, advanced countries. 
They found there, too, a family of technical or- 
ganizations whose international staffs could help 
conceive and carry out the development plans 
which these people now expect their governments 
to pursue. 

Even had it done nothing else, the U.N. has 
fully justified its existence by its central role in 
the complex business of assisting almost 50 new 
states to make the perilous voyage from depend- 
ence to sovereignty — a transition accompanied by 
speeches rather than by shooting. This is, I think, 
one of the striking achievements of our time. 

A School of Political Responsibility 

Sometimes we are irritated by the performance 
of certain of these newer nations in the United 
Nations and its General Assembly, and this irrita- 
tion tends to be transferred to the U.N. itself. In 
assessing their attitudes and actions, however, we 
should realize that in the eyes of the new nations 
the U.N. has a very special significance. The im- 
mediate and natural ambition of every new nation 
is to establish its national identity. Membership 
in the United Nations has served this purpose; it 
lias become the badge of independence, the creden- 
tial of sovereignty, the symbol of nationhood, and 
the passport of the 20tli century. "V\1ien the dele- 
gation of a new nation is seated in the U.N., it has 
arrived ; it can look the world in the eye and speak 
its piece. And even if that piece may on occasion 
be discordant to our ears, the fact that it can be 
spoken has helped to stabilize the postwar period. 


Yet the U.N. is more than a place for letting off 
steam; it is also a school of political responsibility. 
While some of its members may represent closiil 
societies, it is itself an open society. The General 
Assembly is staged for all the world to see, and 
performing upon that stage sometimes — though 
not always — helps turn demagogs into statesmen. 
IIow else can one explain the fact that at the last 
General Assembly the most "anticolonial" mem- 
bers of the United Nations decisively rejected a 
Soviet resolution calling for independence of all 
remaining dependent areas by 1962 ? They spon- 
sored instead moderate and sensible resolutions for 
which we and most of our European friends could 
vote without reservation. 

Reliance on Both U.N. and Regional Organizations 

Because it can paradoxically perform (he task 
of bringing some nations together and keeping 
otlier nations apart, the United Nations is indeed 
a unique instrument of policy. 

But if the United Nations is an instnmient of 
United States policy, it is only one of many in- 
struments available to us. It is one of tlie tasks 
of the Secretary of State and the State Depart- 
ment, when confronted with a particular problem, 
to select and utilize that instrument most appro- 
priate for the pui-pose. 

Clarity in undei-standing this task helps resolve 
the contradiction some people seem to find in 
American foreign policy, a contradiction between 
our reliance on the institutions of the Atlantic 
community and our participation in the United 

No such contradiction exists in fact. The found- 
ers of the United Nations recognized the necessity 
for regional institutions and explicitly provided 
for them in the charter. Indeed the charter calls 
upon members to seek settlement of disputes 
within the framework of regional agencies or ar- 
rangements before bringing them to the U.N. 

In practice we use the various institutions to 
which we belong for quite different purposes. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is, of 
course, the backbone of our military defense of 
the free world against the Communist bloc. 
Through our own massive force and through 
NATO we maintain the armed strength that is the 
principal deterrent to Communist aggression. 
But just as the U.N.'s capabilities are limited, so 
are NATO's. Quite clearly NxVTO could not have 

Department of State Bulletin 

intervened in the Congo to restore order when 
Belgium withdrew. Only a world organization 
could have done so without arousing anticolonial- 
ist reactions. 

It is true that the United Nations cannot, by 
itself, maintain the peace between the major 
powers. It is equally true that NATO was not 
qualified to supervise the peaceful change from 
colonialism to independence. Their roles are dif- 
ferent and distinct. Each is essential, and there- 
fore we support each for different reasons. 

The same observation can be made with regard 
to the OECD— the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development^ — which came into 
being last September. Tlie Organization of 
American States, as another example, gi^-es insti- 
tutional form to the American system. A.nd the 
Alliance for Progress provides for a massive co- 
operative effort between the United States and 
Latin America. 

Each constitutes a different instrument to serve 
the diverse purposes of our foreign policy. 

Three Major Accounts in U.N. Budget 

But I am here this morning because the con- 
tinued use of the United Nations as an instru- 
ment of policy is in danger. It is threatened by 
a financial crisis. The time has passed when 
short-tei-m palliatives will permit it to meet its 
outstanding obligations. 'What is necessai-y is the 
opportunity to put its financial house in order. 
Tliis is possible through an interim progi-am, in- 
volving long-term borrowing, together with ex- 
l^ected authoritj' to enforce collection of delinquent 

The U.N. budget now has three major accounts. 
What has been tenned the "regular" budget, under 
which all members are assessed according to an 
agreed formula, meets the normal costs of oper- 
ating the Organization, such as the expenses of 
the Secretariat, costs of annual meetings, and ex- 
penses of regional commissions. It includes some 
of the lesser peacekeeping expenditures, such as 
the truce supervision activities in Palestine and 
Kashmir. This account for the current fiscal year 
totals $74 million before credits. The payment 
record has been good. For 1961 and prior years 
only $5.6 million remains unpaid. 

To meet the much larger peacekeeping expenses 
of the United Nations Emergency Force and the 
Congo, the United Nations, for reasons of ac- 

counting convenience, established two special ac- 
counts: the s^iecial account for the Emergency 
Force in the Middle East, starting in 1956, and 
the ad hoc account for the Congo operations, start- 
ing in 1960. Assessments in both accounts have 
to date totaled over $330 million. The problem, 
however, is that an-earages in both acxjounts for 
1961 and prior years total about $77 million, since 
many nations either claim to be unable or are 
unwilling to pay their shares. In the aggregate, 
for both regular and special assessments, the U.N. 
now has arrearages due from many members of 
about $82 million in addition to current-year 

Article 19 of the charter provides that a mem- 
ber of the United Nations which is in arrears in 
the payment of its financial contributions to the 
Organization "shall have no vote in the General 
Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or 
exceeds the amount of the contributions due fi'om 
it for the preceding two full yeare." 

Certain members, however, have questioned 
whether the assessments for peacekeeping oper- 
ations in the Middle East and the Congo con- 
stitute "ex])enses of the Organization" within the 
meaning of the charter and, consequently, whether 
they are binding on all members. They contend 
that the sanction provided in article 19, namely, 
loss of vote in the General Assembly, cannot be 
invoked for failure to pay these assessments. 

The Genera] Assembly requested an advisory 
opinion f i-om the International Court of Justice ' 
to determine whether the Middle East and Congo 
assessments are "expenses of the Organization" 
within the meaning of the charter and thus bind- 
ing on all the members. The United States be- 
lieves they are and has so argued before the 
Coui-t.^ If the Court so rules and the General 
Assembly gives effect to this advisoiy opinion, the 
United Nations should be in a position to enforce 
collection of all delinquent accounts by applica- 
tion of the mandatory provision of article 19 
which I descrilied a moment ago. 

How Loan Would Be Spent 

Even the full collection of arrearages will not 
resolve all of the United Nations financing prob- 
lems. The problem of the financing of ad hoc 

' U.N. doc. A/RBS/1731 ( X VI ) . 

' For a statement made by Abram Chayes, Legal Ad- 
viser, on May 21, see Bulletin of July 2, 1962, p. 30. 

Jo/y 23, 1962 

peacekeeping operations in the future will still 
remain. Therefore the U.N. General Assembly 
has approveei the $200 million borrowing pro- 
gram as an essential step in bringing order into 
its finances. Eepayments of principal and inter- 
est on their borrowings would be budgeted by the 
United Nations as part of the "regular" budget. 
They would be reflected in the annual assessments 
of the members. 

It may be recalled that there was some dispute 
in the Senate hearings over precisely how the 
proceeds of this borrowing would be spent. I 
wish to be perfectly candid with you so that 
there will be no misiuiderstanding. Teclinically, 
the proceeds may be used by the U.N. Secretary- 
General to meet any past or future U.N. obliga- 
tions. In practice they will be used for two pur- 
poses. A part will be used to help pay the most 
urgent of the existing indebtedness of the United 
Nations. The balance will be used to defray the 
costs of peacekeeping operations after July 1, 19G2. 

We cannot be wholly certain of the proportion 
in which the proceeds will be allocated between 
these two purposes, because that depends on how 
successful the United Nations is in collecting ar- 
rearages and on the magnitude of continuing 
United Nations peacekeeping expenditures. Re- 
gardless of the precise way in which the money is 
allocated, the United Nations needs the entire $200 
million. As has been stated, the costs of main- 
taining UNEF and ONUC [U.N. Operation in 
the Congo] now amount to roughly $140 million 
a year. 

The administration has requested authority to 
enable the United States to provide up to $100 
million of this financing. The administration 
initially proposed that this be achieved through 
the purchase of U.N. bonds and submitted a bill 
for this purpose. The Senate passed, by a vote of 
70 to 22, a substitute measure authorizing an ap- 
propriation to the President of $100 million for 
the purpose of making loans to the U.N. The Sen- 
ate bill (S. 2768) also provides that the loan is 
not to be used to relieve U.N. members of their 
obligations to pay arrearages and shall not exceed 
by more than $25 million the amount of loans 
made or agreed to be made by other nations. To 
date, 39 nations have pledged a total of $65.7 mil- 
lion of bonds and another 22 countries have an- 
nounced an intention to buy undetermined 
amounts. Furthermore, the Senate bill indicates 

that the United States is to deduct each year from 
its U.N. assessments the amount the U.N. owes this 
country for repayment of principal and interest on 
the loan. Finally, the bill states that this loan is 
not to be considered a precedent for future large- 
scale borrowing. 

The administration has endorsed the Senate bill 
and commends it to the consideration of this com- 
mittee. We find that it substantially achieves the 
objectives embodied in the administration's origi- 
nal proposal, introduced into the House of Repre- 
sentatives by Chairman [Thomas E.] Morgan as 
H.R. 9982. 

Proposal Considered Practical and Sound 

The proposal before this committee has been 
studied by financial experts, including the Presi- 
dent of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, Mr. Eugene R. Black. Mr. 
Black stated in a letter to Senator John Spark- 
man that he had told the Secretary-General : 

... I thought the idea was a sound one, that It would 
have my full support and that In a personal capacity I 
would be happy to do whatever I could to assist in the 
implementation of the proposal and in the sale of the 

The proposal has been found to be practicable 
and financially sound. The indebtedness would 
be serviced out of the regularly assessed budget. 
No one has questioned the binding character of 
those regular assessments. The annual level of 
debt service would be reasonable. 

Fourteen years ago the U.N. needed funds to 
construct its headquarters. The Congress author- 
ized a loan to the U.N. of the entire $65 million 
required, repayable over 34 years without any in- 
terest. Today the U.N. needs $200 million for a 
much more important purpose — keeping the peace 
and preventing the big powers from confronting 
each other in power vacuums in such troubled 
spots as the Congo and the Middle East. The U.N. 
is offering 25-year bonds at 2 percent interest. 
Other countries have already agreed to take 33 
percent of the issue. We are asking the Congress 
to authorize a United States loan for not more 
than 50 percent of the U.N.'s needs. 

Because it does things we want to see done, the 
United Nations serves the national interests of 
the United States. By approving the proposal be- 
fore you, the Congress can help assure the con- 
tinued availability of the U.N. as an effective in- 


Department of Slate Bulletin 

strument for advancing American interests 
tliroughout the world. 


Press release 425 dated June 28 

The question before this committee is whether 
the United States shall lend $100 million to the 
United Nations to help relieve the financial crisis 
in the world organization and make possible the 
continuation of peacekeeping activities which are 
in the national interest of the United States. 

The Senate, by a bipartisan vote of 70-22, has 
approved S. 2768, authorizing the appropriation 
to the President of up to $100 million for such 
a loan. The bill provides that the loan is not to 
be used to relieve U.N. members of arrearages and 
shall not exceed by more than $25 million the loans 
made or agreed to be made by other countries. 
Further, the United States is to deduct each year 
from its U.N. assessments the amount the U.N. 
owes this country for principal and interest on 
the loan. Finally, the bill states that the loan 
shall not be considered a precedent for future 
large-scale borrowing. 

The administration has endorsed the Senate bill 
and commends it to this committee. 

It seems to me that the proposed loan raises 
what are really two questions. First of all is a 
question of financial policy : Is the method of fi- 
nancing that has been proposed a sound method ? 
Second is the more basic question of foreign pol- 
icy : Is the purpose for which the money is to be 
used a sound purpose ? 

Financial Problems of Peacekeeping Operations 

As to the financial question, the committee has 
before it a wealth of facts and figures, and two of 
my colleagues, Ambassador [Francis T. P.] 
Plimpton and Assistant Secretary [Harlan] 
Cleveland, will testify as to the financial aspects. 
I should say that I have considered this matter 
long and carefully with my associates in the 
United States Mission to the United Nations and 
in the Department of State, and I am convinced 
that the method proposed by President Kennedy, 
and approved with certain amendments by the 
Senate, is sound. Indeed, I think there is no alter- 
native method available to us at this time. 

The United Nations financial difficulties do not 
arise from its ordinary operations. Its regular 

budget, to which the United States now contrib- 
utes 32.02 percent, as compared with 39.89 per- 
cent in 1946, is in good shape, and the arrears are 

However, the major United Nations peacekeep- 
ing operations have caused financing problems not 
found in the regular budget. 

In fact, the Congo peacekeepmg operation and 
the smaller United Nations Emergency Force in 
the Middle East, taken together, imposed on the 
members of the U.N. assessments far larger than 
the regular budget of the United Nations itself. 
Many member states fell behind in their payments 
for these special operations. Others, including 
the members of the Soviet bloc, refused to pay at 
all because they felt the United Nations actions 
cut across their own objectives. Questions were 
raised by some countries as to whether the assess- 
ments for these operations are legally binding. 

It happens that these actions do suit the poli- 
cies and interests of the United States because 
they serve the cause of peace and stability and 
protect emerging nations from outside pressure 
in two very critical areas of the world. Because 
of that the United States has not only paid its 
own assessed share for these activities. To help 
keep these U.N. forces in the field, we have gone 
further and made volimtary contributions which, 
taken together with assessments, have meant that 
we contribute about 471/2 percent of the budgeted 
costs for peace-and-security operations. 

Let me only add that these volimtary contribu- 
tions were not designed, and have not served, to 
reduce the amomits that are due from and payable 
by the Soviet Union or from any other delinquent 

These financing measures were obviously not a 
permanent solution. They did not bring in 
enough cash, and they were too dependent on vol- 
untary contributions. Last year the General 
Assembly adopted a more businesslike financial 
plan, one result of which is the bill now before 
this committee. 

The first part of this financial plan is an ener- 
getic effort to collect arrearages. To clear up any 
legal doubts the General Assembly last fall asked 
the International Court of Justice for an advisory 
opinion as to whether assessments for UNEF and 
Congo operations are legally binding. If the 
Court's reply is in the affirmative, this will 
threaten the more seriously delinquent states with 
the loss of their votes in the General Assembly. 

Ju/y 23, J 962 

The Court has already received both written and 
oral argument on this question from the United 
States and several other countries and is expected 
to hand down its advisory opinion later this 

The new financial plan also calls for loans by 
governments, in the form of 25-year bond obliga- 
tions, in the amount of $200 million. It assures 
repayment of both principal and interest by pro- 
viding that these expenses will be included in the 
regular U.N. budget, to which all member states 
regularly contribute in accordance with their reg- 
ular assessment percentages. 

This means that the United States will be con- 
tributing only its regular assessed percentage of 
32.02 percent toward the repayment of these gov- 
ernmental loans, which will be used in large part 
to finance the cost of the Congo and Middle East 

At this date, 39 states have already purchased 
or formally pledged the purchase of $6.5,701,175 
of United Nations bonds. Twenty-two others have 
definitely .said they intend to make purchases. 
Twenty-nine others, including the United States, 
are now considering the action they will take. 

The present financing plan adopted last fall by 
the General Assembly is itself an interim solu- 
tion to a continuing problem. The Senate has 
wisely insisted, as indeed the General Assembly 
did also, that this long-term loan arrangement not 
be a precedent for future U.N. financing. 

Once the ICJ opinion has been handed down 
and has been acted upon by the General Assembly, 
and its effect assessed, we will be in a position to 
explore concrete plans for more permanent finan- 
cial support for the U.N. peacekeeping opera- 
tions — operations which I firmly believe are in 
our national interest. 

I believe that the loan bill as passed by the 
Senate provides both a practical and a reasonable 
way for the United States to do its share this 
year in support of the U.N.'s ongoing peace and 
security operations. The bill would enable us to 
do this — and to do it on terms more favorable than 
have prevailed in the pa!5t. 

The Basic Question Is of Ends, Not Means 

But the financial a.spect of the problem is only 
one of the questions before us — and the lesser one 
at that. For the financial question is one of means : 
the basic question is of ends — specifically whether. 


and how, the United Nations serves the national 
interest of the United States. 

The United Nations Charter sets forth certain 
basic commitments by all the members: to settle 
their disputes peacefully, to act collectively against 
aggression, to work together for economic and 
social progress, to promote the enjoyment of hu- 
man rights, and to help dependent peoples pre- 
pare themselves for self-government and nation- 

I believe Americans should feel a certain family 
pride in the knowledge that the ideals of the 
United Nations stem chiefly from our own tradi- 
tion. The same belief in the equality of all men 
before God and before the law, and in the dignity 
and freedom of the individual, on which the Amer- 
ican nation was founded in 1776 also underlay the 
launching of the United Nations 170 years later. 
And a part of the drama of our time is the attempt 
to apply that belief — not only here in the Western 
World where it began, but worldwide; not only in 
conditions of peace, but in times of danger and 

The United Nations has none of the real attri- 
butes of government : It cannot impose direct taxes 
or arrest individuals or draft .soldiers. Except in 
cases of aggression, it lacks even the legal power, 
let alone the actual capacity, to enter a countrj' 
against the will of that country's government. 
Its motive force must be provided by its members. 

Ever since the foimding of the United Nations 
the greatest threat to the achievement of its pur- 
poses has been the hostile attitude of the Soviet 
Union. But from the lieginning the U.N. has 
established a pattern of defeating Soviet pro- 
posals — and that pattern holds good today. 

It is instructive to compare the relative influence 
on United Nations affairs of the United States and 
tlie Soviet Union. Any factual comparison shows 
that it has been not the Soviet Union but the 
United States that has exerted the greatest influ- 
ence in the U.N. This contrast appears through- 
out the United Nations. 

In the Security Council the Soviet Union, un- 
able to prevent adverse majority votes, has re- 
sorted to the veto 100 times. The United States 
has never felt the need to use its veto power. 

The General Assembly has proved repeatedly, 
most recently in tlie Congo case, that it can act 
when the Council is tied up by the veto. And the 
Soviet Union has never been able to organize a 

Deparfmenf of Sfate Butletin 


majority, or anything approaching a majority, of 
the General Assembly against the United States 
(in any important matter. Last winter, for ex- 
ample, Communist charges against the United 
States of aggressive designs against Cuba did not 
muster a single vote outside tlie Communist 

The Soviets have tried, and failed again, to par- 
alyze the Secretariat, since they could not control 
it either. 

Peaceful March to Independence 

The greatest change which has taken place in the 
United Nations in the past 7 years is the enlarge- 
ment of the membership — from the half a hundred 
that signed the charter in 1945 to the 104 members 
of today. 

This change was brought about by historical 
causes inherent in Western civilization ; it was not 
brought about by Communist pressure. The Com- 
munists have mistakenly thought that they could 
ride to power on the independence movement, but 
more and more their hopes have been frustrated. 
The reason is clear : The new nations have no wish 
to emerge from one colonial system merely to enter 
another. That is why none of the 42 nations born 
since World War II have chosen communism as 
a way of government. 

The United Nations has made many contribu- 
tions to the peaceful march to independence. 
Some of its woi'k has been so quiet that few people 
except specialists know of it. Since 1945 the 
Trusteeship Council has overseen the process by 
which the peoples of seven trust territories have 
become citizens of independent nations. An eighth 
will follow next week. In several of these cases 
the United Nations held plebiscites to detennine 
the will of the people. In every case thus far the 
transition has been entirely peaceful. 

Since 1950 the United Nations, drawing on re- 
sources and specialists of many countries, has 
played an increasing part in helping the new na- 
tions build the foundations of modern societies — 
and thus the foundations of political stability. 
The United Nations Expanded Program of Tech- 
nical Assistance, the growing Special Fund with 
its training centers and preinvestment surveys, 
the investments of the World Bank and the Inter- 
national Development Association — these and 
other services are available to aid in the urgent 
tasks of nation building. Four-fifths of the staffs 

July 23, 7962 

of the United Nations Secretariat and the spe- 
cialized agencies are engaged in such nonpolitical 
functions as these. The new nations themselves 
put a very high value on this impartial source of 
aid and counsel, insulated as it is from the cold 
war but maintaining rigorous technical standards. 
This role is clearly in the national interest of the 
United States, for the U.N. is supplementing and 
complementing what we and our European allies 
are doing on our own to create an expanding econ- 
omy in the less de\'eloped areas of the world. 

U.N. an Agent of Peace 

The U.N.'s actions in the field of international 
peace and security equally serve our interest. 
Iran, Greece, Indonesia, Kashmir, Palestine, 
Korea, Suez, Lebanon, Congo — through all those 
actions since 1946 the U.N. has developed a capac- 
ity to uphold the independence of small nations 
under attack and to keep quarreling neighbors 
from mutual destruction. It has been the agent 
of peace — not the peace of conquest and surrender 
but the peace of mutual toleration. 

As a world power the United States must de- 
fend its interests and pursue its goals through a 
variety of institutions which serve quite different 
national purposes. NATO, for example, was 
formed not to preserve colonies but to defend 
Europe and the Atlantic community against ag- 
gression by the Soviet Union. We look to it, not 
to the U.N., to perform that vital function. Con- 
versely, we look to the United Nations, not NATO, 
to shield small and weak nations in Africa and 
the Middle East and Asia and to provide a com- 
munity in which they can feel a measure of 
security and equality and of comity with their 
former rulers. 

I find it impressive that the United States, dur- 
ing the last session of the General Assembly, 
voted with the majority of its NATO allies on all 
of the 41 key rollcall votes — including a score of 
important colonial issues. Of all the members of 
NATO, in fact, we were the only one to side 
with the NATO majority in all of these votes. 

If there were no U.N., and as a result Africa 
were to move from the old empire of the West 
into a new empire of communism, then NATO 
would be outflanked and the security of the United 
States and the whole Atlantic community would 
be drastically undermined. 

Note that in 1961 Soviet propaganda broadcasts 
to Africa attacked not only NATO but also the 


United Nations, day in and day out, as a sinister 
tool of "Western imperialism." 

Wliy should the Soviets talk to Africa in that 
way about the U.N.? Not because the U.N. is a 
Western institution but because the U.N. as a uni- 
versal organization is an obstacle to the parochial 
designs of the Communists. Increasingly the 
U.N. is becoming a bridge between the ad- 
vanced nations of the West and the emerging na- 
tions of postcolonial Africa. The Russians have 
been trying to undermine the U.N. bridge at the 
African end. Thus far they have had little or 
no success. I just liope we won't do their work 
for them by undermining it at the Western end, 
because that bridge is one of the great elements 
in this country's security. 

We have heard fears expressed that the United 
Nations might be perverted to serve Soviet pur- 
poses in this situation : namely, to unite the Soviet 
bloc with Africa and Asia in a majority against 
the West under the banner of extreme anticolonial- 
ism. But in practice this has not happened. Usu- 
ally when the Soviets have proposed extreme 
anti-Western resolutions on colonial issues, such 
as Angola or the Congo, they have found little sup- 
port among the Afro-Asian members. I believe 
this will continue so long as our diplomacy is ac- 
tive and our policies are in harmony with the 
legitimate aspirations of the African and Asian 
countries for independence and development. 

It is true that the one-nation, one-vote rule in 
the General Assembly is illogical in some respects. 
But this same principle of sovereign equality ap- 
plies without fatal results in many national legis- 
latures. It is certainly more of a problem to them 
than it is to the U.N. General Assembly, which has 
no legislative power except, to a limited extent, on 
its own budget and finances. 

Moreover, the members in the General Assembly 
may have equal votes, but they are far from having 
equal influence. Dag Hammarskjold made this 
point 5 years ago in his annual report to the Gen- 
eral Assembly. These are his words : 

The criticism of "one nation, one vote", irrespective of 
size or strength, as constituting an obstacle to arriving 
at just and representative solutions, tends to exaggerate 
the problem. The General Assembly is not a parliament 
of elected individual members ; It is a diplomatic meeting 
in which the delegates of member states represent govern- 
mental policies and these policies are subject to all the 
Influences that would prevail In international life in any 
case. . . . 

Value of U.N. to U.S. 

I would sum up in this way. The United States i 
is not all-powerful at the U.N. any more than we 
are all-powerful in the world. But even though 
the numerical majority has shifted from the Wesi 
to Africa and Asia, our position in the United 
Nations is still preeminent. Therefore, the value 
of the United Nations to our interests depends to 
a great extent on what we make of it. 

Sometimes we hear the suggestion that the 
United States should give less emphasis to the 
United Nations because — so the argument runs — 
the U.N. is not a dependable basis for our security 
against hostile forces. 

This argument misses the point. This country 
does not rely on the United Nations to do anything 
which some other instrumentality can do better. 
The greatest achievements of the United Nations 
for peace and security — Suez, Lebanon, the Congo, 
and all the rest — have been achievements for which 
no really valid alternative means existed. 

And if we consider their cost — as you do in this 
committee this week — I think it is clear that the 
cost to the United States of U.N. operations in 
the Congo and the IVIiddle East is very modest 
indeed compared to the cost we would have had to 
bear, both in dollars and in lives, if our own armed 
forces instead of U.N. forces were engaged in 
keeping the peace. 

History does not always ask questions of us in 
the form or at the time we would have chosen. 
Yet we must answer. Today, in the United Na- 
tions financial crisis, history is asking whether 
the United States wants, or does not want, an ef- 
fective United Nations; whether the United 
States will continue to play, or will no longer play, 
the great part in the U.N.'s affairs that befits our 
power and our responsibility for the survival and 
growth of freedom. 

I do not like to think what would happen if the 
United States said no to that question. 

President Requests Supplemental 
Appropriation for IMF Loans 

White House press release dated June 25 

The President asked Congress on June 25 for a 
supplemental appropriation of $2 billion for the 
fiscal year 1963 for loans to the International 
Monetary Fund, as authorized by tlie act of June 
19, 1962. 


Deparfment of Sfate Bulletin 

This request is to allow the United States to ad- 
here to the decision of the executive directors of 
the International Monetary Fund of January 5, 
1962, to establish a special standby borrowing ar- 
rangement for industrialized countries with bal- 
ance-of-payinents problems. The special fund will 
have 10 contributors and will provide loans in 
foreign currencies to member countries with bal- 
ance-of-payments difficulties. 

No expenditure is foreseen from this appropria- 
tion, as the supply of doUai-s in the Fund is pres- 
ently ample, and under the new arrangement no 
country with balance-of-payments problems of its 
own could be required to make a loan. The sj^ecial 
fund is primarily designed to increase the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund's supply of the currencies 
of Western Europe, Japan, and Canada. 

The $2 billion requested on June 25 was included 
in the 1963 budget as a 1962 item for separate 
transmittal on the assumption that the authoriz- 
ing legislation would have become law earlier in 
the year. It now seems apparent that the appro- 
priation will be enacted in the fiscal year 1963, 
and the request is being shifted to that year. 

President Signs Migration 
and Refugee Assistance Act 

Statement hy President Kennedy^ June ^8 

White House press release dated June 28 

I am gratified that the Congress has acted affirm- 
atively on my request of July 21, 1961, by enact- 
ing H.R. 8291, the "Migration and Refugee As- 
sistance Act of 1962." 

I am personally grateful to the chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator 
J. W. Fulbright, and to the chairman of Subcom- 
mittee No. 1 of the House Judiciary Committee, 
Representative Francis E. Walter, for their efforts 
in securing the passage of this legislation. With 
this expression of approval for the administra- 
tion's proposals to continue our assistance to refu- 
gees, the American people will be assured that this 
Government's leadership will be maintained in 
the great humanitarian endeavor of helping the 
world's stateless and homeless people. In con- 
tinuing this endeavor, we will be carrying forward 
a great American tradition which is as well 
known as the generosity of our people in coming 
to the aid of those in need. 

i\i\y 23, 1962 

The Congress is to be congratulated for its ac- 
tion in providing the necessary authorization. I 
am confident it will be equally responsive to the 
appropriation requests which will be submitted to 
implement the programs which it has endorsed in 
this bill. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

87th Congress, 2d Session 

Foreign Service Buildings Act Amendments, 1962. Hear- 
ings before tlie Subcommittee on State Department 
Organization and Foreign Operations of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs on draft legislation to 
amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926, to 
authorize additional appropriations, and for other pur- 
poses. January 30-May 15, 1962. 188 pp. 

Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies. 
Hearings before the Special Preparedness Subcommittee 
of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Part 2. 
February 1-28, 1962. 534 pp. 

United States Information Agency Operations in Africa. 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. February 7, 
1962. 22 pp. 

Study Mission to South America, November-December 

1961. Report of Senators Gale W. McGee, Frank E. 
Moss, Clair Engle, and Stephen M. Young to the Senate 
Committees on Appropriations, Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Agriculture and Forestry, and Armed Services. 
S. Doc. 91. February 1.3, 1962, 17 pp. 

Commingling of United States and Communist Foreign 
Aid. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Government Operations. March 15-May 
11,1962. 265 pp. 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. Hearings before the Sen- 
ate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 2996, to amend 
further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 
and for other purposes. April 5-18, 1962. 643 pp. 

Fifteenth Semiannual Report on Activities Carried on 
Under Public Law 480. 83d Congress. Me.ssage from 
the President transmitting the report outlining opera- 
tions under the act during the period July 1-December 
31, 1961. H. Doe. 385. April 9, 1962. 101 pp. 

Cuban Refugee Problem. Report of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee made by its Subcommittee To Investigate 
Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees. S. 
Rept. 1328. April 11, 1962. 8 pp. 

Report on Audit of Saint Lawrence Seaway Development 
Cori'oration, July 1, 1959, Through December 31, 1960. 
Letter from the Comptroller General of the United 
States transmitting the report. H. Doc. 389. April 16, 

1962. 77 pp. 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. Hearings before the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part VI. April 
17-18, 1962, and appendix. Ill pp. 

Amending the Act Entitled "An Act To Provide Better 
Facilities for the Enforcement of the Customs and Im- 
migration Laws," To Increase the Amounts Authorized 
To Be Expended. Report to accompany S. 2806. S. 
Rept. 1366. April 27, 1962. 8 pp. 

Seventh NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. Report of 
the House delegation to the conference held at Paris 
November 13-18, 1961. H. Rept. 1637. April 30, 1962. 
23 pp. 

Extension of Export Control Act — 1962. Hearing before 
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 
3161. May 2, 1962. 33 pp. 



Arms Control and Disarmament 


June 25, 1962 

Up to now, there has been no substantial prog- 
ress toward agreement at the 18-nation disarm- 
ament conference on any arms control or 
disarmament measures. 

Progress, however, cannot be expected to come 
quickly in this field because the distrust on both 
sides is very deep. Yet the awesome nature of 
modern armaments is such that the United States 
must continue to press for the greater security 
that could come to all nations from effectively 
verified arms control and disarmament agree- 
ments. Although more and more resources are 
directed toward improving armaments, nations 
are, on balance, enjoying less and less security. 

The United States remains hopeful that in time 
other nations, including the Soviet Union, will 
come to see that an unrestrained arms race poses 
a greater threat to their security than disarma- 
ment under effective control. Moreover, there are 
various measures short of disarmament which may 
be negotiable in the not-too-distant future. 
These include agreements to limit the danger of 
war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of com- 
munication, to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons, and to ban nuclear weapon tests. 

The 18-Nation Committee is the best forum for 
disarmament negotiations which has been utilized 
since World War II. The eight new members, 
chosen to represent geographical areas of the 
world not represented by the NATO and Warsaw 
Pact powers, are making a responsible contribu- 
tion to the deliberations. Moreover, as cochair- 

men of the conference, the United States and 
Soviet representatives have full opportunity to 
meet together to exchange views and conduct ne- 
gotiations under circumstances in which polemics 
serve no useful purpose. 

The conference has provided the United States 
with an unusual opportunity to communicate its 
views to the other nations present and to demon- 
strate its own sincere desire for meaningful dis- 
armament agreement. In United Nations debates 
and in speeches elsewhere, the Soviets have 
sometimes used disarmament as a propaganda 
weapon against the United States. Because the 
time for debate was limited, or the forum not 
conducive to probing analysis, the Soviet approach 
has not always been successfully revealed in its 
true light. 

In this conference, however, adequate oppor- 
tunity is provided for full analysis and debate. 
As a result, the Soviet participation has often 
been revealed as superficial and propagandistic. 
In contrast, U.S. participation has been construc- 
tive and conscientious, as illustrated by the United 
States disarmament plan submitted on April 18, 
1962= — the most detailed and comprehensive 
plan put forward by any country at any disar- 
mament conference. 

Even if no agreement is I'eached in the near 
future, the conference offers useful opportunities 
to advance United States interests by communi- 
cating our point of view to other nations, by dem- 
onstrating that disarmament is a complicated task 
which cannot be achieved by sweeping and propa- 

' Prepared in the office of the Public Affairs Adviser, 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 

■ For text of an "Outline of Basic Provisions of a 
Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peace- 
ful World," see Bulletin of May 7, 1962, p. 747. 

Departmeni of Sfofe BuUei'in 

gandistic proposals, by establishing the common 
interests of all nations in turning down the arras 
race, and by defining the issues properly so that 
practical steps can be taken toward their resolu- 
tion. The subject of arms control and disarma- 
ment is so urgent and unportant a subject that 
continuing international discussion of it is inevi- 
table and the United States believes that the 
noirotiations at Geneva offer one of the best avail- 
able methods of prevailing upon the Soviet Union 
to accept its responsibility to heed the conscience 
and aspirations of the world community for genu- 
ine peace and security through safeguarded dis- 
ai'Miament agreements. 

A detailed summaiy of the first 3 months of 
negotiations is set forth below. 

Genesis of the Conference 

Following the walkout on June 27, 1960, of the 
Soviet Union and its four allies from the Geneva 
10-nation disarmament conference^ (made up of 
representatives from the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, the U.S.S.R., 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania), 
the United States actively pursued efforts to re- 
sume negotiations on disarmament in the firm 
belief that it was one of the most pressing unre- 
solved matters in the international field. 

However, although efforts were made during the 
remainder of 1960 and early in 1961 — particularly 
at the 15th United Nations General Assembly ses- 
sion — to renew negotiations, little headway was 
evident until June 1961, when bilateral discussions 
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. began in Wash- 
ington, D.C.* These discussions, which were later 
continued in Moscow and New York, were under- 
taken to achieve two objectives: agreement on the 
composition of a new disarmament committee ; and 
estalblishment of a framework of principles which 
could govern the resiunption of negotiations on 

On September 20, 1961, the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. agreed on a Joint Statement of Princi- 
ples '^ to guide future negotiations. The state- 
ment, in setting forth general and complete 
disarmament as a goal, recognized both the need 
for international peacekeeping machinery to ac- 
company advances toward acliieving general and 

' IfiM., .Tuly 18, 1960, p. 88. 
* Ibid., .Tuly 10, 1961, p. 57. 
° For text, see ibid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 

July 23, ?962 

complete disarmament and the possibility of de- 
ciding upon and carrying out initial disarmament 
measures even before agreement on an entire 
disarmament pi-ogram. The necessity for ade- 
quate control was also recognized, although the 
U.S.S.R. refused to accept the U.S. position that 
verification procedures should apply not only to 
forces and ai-maments disbanded or destroyed but 
also to the agi-eed levels of retained forces and 

Agreement on the composition of a negotiating 
forum followed on December 13, when the U.S. 
and U.S.S.R. agreed to invite to the membership 
of the former 10-Nation Committee on Disarma- 
ment Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic. 

These two agreements were welcomed by the 
16th session of the United Nations General As- 
sembly, which called upon the Committee to under- 
take negotiations "as a matter of the utmost 
urgency" and to report back to the United Nations 
Disarmament Commission by June 1, 1962.^ 

In response to this, the 18-Nation Committee 
began its sessions in Geneva on March 14, 1962.' 

The Structure of the Conference 

The structure of this conference is unique when 
viewed in the light of previous post World War 
II disannament conferences. To expedite the vast 
and complex task before it the conference estab- 
lished three separate forums. . 

Plenary meetings of the conference are confined 
to efforts aimed at resolving the primary task of 
developing a treaty on general and complete dis- 
armament. To deal with certain individual meas- 
ures which need not await agreement on a total 
disarmament program and which might serve to 
lessen international tensions, the conference 
created a Committee of the Wliole. 

Finally, to provide for a continuation of nego- 
tiations on the controlled cessation of nuclear 
weapon testing, the conference established a sub- 
committee consisting of the three nuclear powers— 
the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. These three nations 
had been engaged in negotiations on this matter 
since 1958. 

The conference has also devised two other inno- 
vations : First, it designated the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 
as permanent cochairmen of the conference — 

U.N. doc. A/RES/1722 (XVI). 
Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 531. 

this in addition to rotation of the chair on a daily 
basis among all members of the Committee — to 
provide continuity in the work of tlie conference. 
And, second, to permit such free-ranging discus- 
sions as might be desired on some or a number of 
specific problems, the conference instituted the 
procedure of informal sessions when deemed use- 
ful. This, in effect, permits all delegates to dis- 
cuss matters on an off-the-record basis, since no ver- 
batim records of these sessions are maintained. 

Although the plenary, the Committee of the 
Whole, and the test-ban subcommittee are the only 
f onnns thus far established by the 18-Nation Com- 
mittee, it is possible that as the conference pro- 
ceeds additional subcommittees may be established 
to facilitate its work as discussions become more 
detailed and specific disarmament measures are 
explored in greater depth. 

Documents and Proposals Before the Conference 

The plenary meetings of the conference have 
been centered on two basic documents : 

The United States' "Outline of Basic Provi- 
sions of a Treaty on General and Complete Dis- 
armament in a Peaceful World" and the Soviet 
Union's "Treaty on General and Complete Dis- 
armament Under Strict International Control." 
Although both documents are similar in that they 
propose a three-stage program for the reduction 
and eventual elimination of national military es- 
tablishments, there is a considerable difference in 
the approach of the two plans toward this 

The U.S. program is designed to permit the na- 
tions of the world to stop the arms race at an 
agreed time, to freeze the military situation as it 
then appears, and then to shrink military estab- 
lishments to zero. The aim in this would be to 
keep the relative military positions of the parties 
as closely as possible to what they were at the 
beginning by cutting all armaments and armed 
forces by approximately one-third of the initial 
size in each of the program's three stages. At the 
same time, it emphasizes the development of peace- 
keeping machinery to insure that, as national anns 
are scaled down and eventually eliminated, inter- 
national peace and security will be fully and fairly 

The Soviet Union's program, on the other hand, 
in its three stages, places its emphasis on reduc- 
ing selected categories of armaments in tlie claim 


that the threat or danger of nuclear war is di- 
rectly linked to the presence of those categories 
of armaments in national arsenals. It seeks the' 
elimination of all nuclear- weapons carriers in thei ijlj'* 

lation of 
dear. I 



first stage and the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons during the second stage. Eeductions ofl 
otlier arms and armed foi'ces are to take place dur- 
ing each of the three stages to assure their total 
elimination by the end of stage three. The So- 
viet plan also advocates reliance upon a strength- 
ened United Nations to keep the peace during tateloi^ 
and after the disarmament process. 

In the plenary sessions, the delegations are at- 
tempting to meld these two plans into one treaty 
which would be the product of the conference. 
Although no substantive differences have yet been 
overcome, the conference has worked out an almost 
fully agreed initial di-aft preamble to the treaty. 
At present it is engaged in a similar effort to 
draft common language setting forth the treaty's 
general introductory provisions 

As concerns the disarmament measures per se, a 
number of the plenary sessions have been devoted 
to an exposition by the Western and Soviet bloc 
members of the merits of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 
programs. As these discussions have proceeded, 
certain major differences have come clearly to the 
foreground. And it is these differences that the 
conference will have to resolve if it is to proceed 
to draft provisions for the first and then subse- 
quent stages of the treaty. 

Key among these is the matter of a 100-percent 
cut in nuclear deliveiy vehicles as proposed in 
the first stage of the Soviet plan as opposed to 
the 30 percent cut in this and other armaments 
as proposed in the first stage of the U.S. program. 
The United States believes that total elimination 
of delivery vehicles in the first stage is not only 
impractical because of the difficulties of control 
and implementation but would also cause a grave 
strategic imbalance in the world, which the more 
gradual across-the-board reductions of the Ameri- 
can plan would avoid. Moreover, although the 
Soviet bloc nations believe the elimination of de- 
livery vehicles would virtually overcome the 
threat of nuclear war, the Western nations con- 
sider that this threat will continue to exist under 
the Soviet program since, unlike the U.S. pro- 
gram, no provision is made in the first stage in the 
field of actual nuclear disarmament. 

The time period for the carrying out of dis- 
armament measures also looms as a problem- 

Ike Sov 

ik Sov 
period i 
(•year ! 
sich a i 

m dii 

over ar 
lions t( 

11(1 ir 

tions i 
in tie 

Department of State Bulletin 


Tlio U.S. program has not fixed an overall time 
period for the implementation of general and 
complete disarmament in the belief that this can 
only be determined when certain unknown fac- 
tors — transition period between stages, implemen- 
tation of verification arrangements, etc. — become 
clear. The United States has set a 6-year time 
jieriod for the first two stages, however, but 
has emphasized that this is an estimate and that 
in fact the completion of these two stages could 
take longer or, indeed, a shorter period of time. 
The Soviet plan, on the other hand, sets a 4-year 
time period for completion of the total program, 
loughly allotting 15 months for the carrying out 
of the measures in each of its three stages. Wliile 
the Soviet bloc nations believe the U.S. time 
'm period is too long, the Western nations feel the 
4-year period is too short a time to implement 
such a far-reaching progi'am in view of the great 
international changes which will accompany such 
disarmament as well as the vast technical prob- 
lems involved. 

A further point of difference is the important 
matter of control or verification. In the view of 
the Western nations, the Soviet position of control 
over disarmament would forgo the essential need 
to know, in addition to what has been destroyed, 
whether levels are being adhered to and also 
whether any weapons have been secretly hidden. 
The Soviet bloc nations claim that this is control 
over armaments and would mean Western espio- 
inside the U.S.S.R. The Western iiations 
feel this attitude reflects an unwillingness on the 
part of the Soviet Union and the other bloc na- 
tions to recognize that i-easonable controls are nec- 
essary in the absence of confidence between East 
and West that each side will honestly fulfill its 
disarmament obligations. 

Finally, there is the question of peacekeeping 
machinery. Both plans make some provision for 
this, but in the U.S. plan the emphasis and obliga- 
tions in this area are considerably greater than 
in the Soviet plan. This stems from a different 
philosophy on the part of East and West. The 
Western nations believe that disarmament by and 
of itself will not usher in a jDeaceful world, and 
therefore, as national armaments are scaled down, 
international institutions, including a United Na- 
tions peace force, must be gradually strengthened 
to insure the security of all nations. The Soviet 
bloc nations contend that disarmament and peace 

July 23, 1962 

are synonymous, and therefore the United Nations, 
along with a peace force consisting of only na- 
tional contingents operating under a three-bloc 
type command and used only if no permanent 
member of the Security Council vetoes its employ- 
ment, will suffice. 

The Committee of the Whole has before it pro- 
posals for the consideration of the following 
items: the cessation of war propaganda; cutoff of 
production of fissionable materials for use in 
weapons; reduction of the risks of war by surprise 
attack, miscalculation, or failure of communica- 
tions; measures to insure that outer space wDl be 
used for peaceful purposes only ; establishment of 
nuclear-free zones; measures to prevent further 
dissemmation of nuclear weapons; and conclusion 
of a nonaggression pact between the NATO coim- 
ti'ies and the countries of the Warsaw Treaty. 

Discussions within the committee have been cen- 
tered on the cessation of war propaganda. The 
cochainnen were asked to consider the proposal 
for a declaration against war propaganda. Ne- 
gotiations between them lasted 6 weeks and culmi- 
nated in an agreed text, approved by both Govern- 
ments. This was presented jointly by the U.S. 
and U.S.S.E. to the Committee of the Whole on 
]\Iay 25, where it was unanimously approved by 
the committee and referred to the plenary for 
"definitive action." '\'\nien the conference met May 
29 to take final action on the declaration, the So- 
viet Union submitted amendments to the text it 
had fully approved as binding on its Government 
4 days earlier which completely changed the char- 
acter of the agreed-upon declaration. Among 
other things, the Soviet amendments called for 
enactment of laws making any form of war propa- 
ganda a criminal offense, a provision which the 
United States had rejected previously as contrary 
to freedom of speech and the press guaranteed by 
the American Constitution. The United States 
declared the Soviet amendments to be unaccepta- 
ble and in view of their abrupt about-face stated 
that it would not be fruitful to reopen negotia- 
tions on war propaganda at this time. 

The United States and the other Western na- 
tions have urged that the committee take up as its 
next item one of the proposed measures which 
would involve at least some degree of disarmament 
or of reduction of the risk of war, such as cutoff 
of the production of fissionable materials for use 
in weapons, measures to reduce the risk of war by 
surprise attack, miscalculation, or failure of com- 


munications, or measures to prevent the placing 
into orbit of weapons of mass destiniction. 

The Soviet Union insisted on consideration by 
the Committee of the Whole of a second item it 
favors, namely, measures to prevent the further 
dissemination of nuclear weapons. The United 
States suggested, in a compromise move, that con- 
siderntion be given concurrently to its item of 
reducing the possibility of war by surprise attack, 
miscalculation, or failure of communications and 
the Soviet item on the establishment of nuclear- 
free zones in various parts of the globe. The So- 
viet Union did not accept this proposition and 
sought to block discussion of any item advanced 
by the West. The discussion in the committee then 
pressed for a proposal submitted by the United 
Arab Republic whicli would leave to the commit- 
tee the determination of priority items after the 
committee had heard the views of both the U.S. 
and U.S.S.R. as to why each favored discussion 
of their respective items. The Soviet Union's 
acceptance of this procedure, which permits dis- 
cussion of new topics within the committee, was 
welcomed by the United States, for it believes that 
agreement on one or some of the items it has re- 
quested be considered could lead to an early reduc- 
tion of the present levels of international tension, 
thereby paving the way for broader agreements in 
the disarmament field. It has led to discussion 
within the committee both on measures to reduce 
the possibility of war by accident and measures 
to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. 

The Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discon- 
tinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests has been con- 
cerned with three proposals. 

At the subcommittee's initial session, the three 
nuclear powers focused their attention on the U.S.- 
U.K. position as set forth in their April 18, 1961, 
treaty,* and the Soviet proposal of November 28, 
1961. In essence the U.S.-U.K. draft treaty called 
for the establishment of an international system of 
internationally built and operated control posts, 
an international system of inspection — including 
the right of conducting a limited number of on- 
site inspections of unidentified events — and an 
international control commission to supervise ver- 
ification arrangements which were to be aimed at 
insuring the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests 
in all environments. The Soviet proposal called 

for the exclusive use of existing national detectioD 
equipment to police a test ban in the atmosphere, 
under water, and in outer space with an unpolice(^ 
moratorium on undergi'ound tests pending the, 
development of a control system for general and 
complete disarmament. 

Given the wide gap between the two sides on 
this matter, the eight new delegations, in an eilort 
to avoid the impasse which threatened to develop 
in the three-power subcommittee, submitted, or 
April 16, 1962, a joint memorandum ° containing 
ideas and suggestions which they commended tc 
the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. for consideration, 
The memorandum suggested "establishing by 
agreement a system for continuous observatioDi 
and effective control on a purely scientific andl 
non-political basis" and outlined in broad terms 
the principles on which such a system should be 

Shortly after its introduction the Soviet Union, 
interpreting these principles in such a manner as 
to make them appear similar to its November 2& 
proposal, formally announced that it had "ac- 
cepted" the memorandum as a new basis for ne- 
gotiation. The U.S. and U.K. also accepted the 
memorandum as a basis for negotiation but made 
it clear that in so doing they were not prepared' 
to consider it as the exclusive basis for negotiar 
tion. As the United States understands the 
document, the eight cosponsors suggested reliances 
both on national detection networks and on new 
stations to be joined together in one international 
agreed system. This system would be subject to 
supervision by the new international commission. 
Such a commission would be responsible for assess- 
ing the nature of suspicious events (which might 
be nuclear explosions) and also for obliging 
parties to the treaty to permit on-site inspections 
in those cases where this was deemed essential. 

Although the memorandum was introduced in 
an effort to make further progress toward a con- 
trolled test ban, the Soviet Union, by demanding 
that it be accepted as a basis for negotiation with- 
in the narrow limits of its interpretation (total 
reliance on national detection systems, an almost 
powerless international scientific commission, and 
inspection by "invitation" of the suspect country 
only) has blocked for the moment any opportunity 
for joint three-power exploration of the memo- 
randum's provisions. 

' For text, seeifciV/., .Tunc n. 1!(0], p. 870. 

' U.N. doc. ENDC/28. 

Department of S/ofe Bulletin 


M, I 

Mj, in 


and at 


Major Differences Remain 

The 18-nation conference has completed 13 
weeks of intensive deliberations. For the most 
part, the discussions during this period have been 
conducted in a businesslike manner. There is no 
doubt that the constructive contributions being 
made by the eight new nations in these delibera- 
tions have had a positive effect in creating and, 
in general, sustaining this desirable attitude. 

On May 31, 1962, the cochairmen, at the request 
of the conference, transmitted an interim progress 
report'" to the United Nations, covering the 
period from March 14 to June 1, 1962. The con- 
ference then agreed to recess from June 15 to July 
16, 1962, in response to the desires of some of the 
delegations to have time for reflection and consul- 

tation with their governments. 

It is clear that when the conference resumes its 
deliberations and moves further into the substan- 
tive aspects of the disarmament problem, it will 
be faced with great difficulties. In all three 
areas, i.e. general and complete disarmament, in- 
dividual measures, and the nuclear testing ques- 
tion, major differences exist between the positions 
of the Allied and the Communist nations. This 
means that, if the conference is to achieve even a 
limited degree of success, a genuine spirit of co- 
operation coupled with a sustained and honest 
search for fair and practical solutions will be 
required. The United States, for its part, re- 
mains determined to contribute to the work of the 
conference in just this manner. 

U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on Independence for Rwanda and Burundi 

Following are statements made iy Charles W. 
Yost, U.S. Representative to the General Assem- 
bly, in Committee IV (Trusteeship) and in ple- 
nary session, together with the text of a resolution 
adopted hy the General Assembly on June 27. 


U.S. delegation press release 4011 

Madam Chairman [Miss Angle E. Brooks of 
Liberia] : I should like to begin by expressing the 
appreciation of my delegation for your work as 
chairman of the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi 
and for the work of your fellow commissioners. 
We particularly appreciate the tireless efforts the 
Commission devoted to assisting the Governments 
of Rwanda and Burundi in finding the grounds 
on which unity in a number of fields could be 
realized, and we commend the Commission, as 
we also do the two Governments, for the economic 
and administrative agreements finally concluded. 
The report of the Commission' is long and de- 
tailed and contains, I am convinced, the principal 
elements of importance and interest to the . 

° U.N. doc. DC/288. 

' U.N. doc. A/5126 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1. 

July 23, 1962 

bly for its current consideration of Ruanda- 
Urundi. We are not in full agreement with all 
the interpretations, views, and conclusions con- 
tained in the report, but we recognize the difficulty 
of the task which the Commission faced and we 
have given full weight to the report in reaching 
our own views and conclusions. 

The position of the Administering Authority, 
as set forth on several occasions, in such detail 
and with a clarity seldom heard in these halls, by 
the distinguished Foreign Minister of Belgium 
[Paul-Henri Spaak], has also played a strong 
part in influencing our conclusions. I might add 
that in the view of my delegation the precision 
and honesty with which the Foreign Minister of 
Belgium has presented the position of his Gov- 
ernment so early in the debate has served notably 
to advance our work and dispel misunderstand- 
ings. We have listened also with attention and 
weighed carefully the views of the representatives 
of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, who 
have demonstrated great patience in replying to 
the complex and difficult questions put to them. 

In our view one basic point is completely clear. 
Both Rwanda and Burundi should achieve their 
separate sovereign independence on the 1st of 
July, and to this end this Assembly should decide 


to formally terminate the Ruanda-Urundi trustee- 
ship agreement as of that date. This is the fer- 
vent desire of the Governments of Rwanda and 
Burundi, a desire supported by the recommenda- 
tions of tlie Administering Authority and of the 

In supporting the concept that both states 
should achieve their independence on the 1st of 
July we do not for a minute believe or even imply 
Rwanda or Burundi are acceding to independence 
in easy circumstances. No; the peoples of Bu- 
rundi and the peoples of Rwanda face many 
difficult months — even years — ahead. Both new 
comitries will be beset with difficulties of every 
possible sort that newly independent countries 
have faced since the dawn of history. Some of 
the problems in Rwanda and Burundi are partic- 
ularly acute, but, like others before them, with 
perseverance, hard work, both internal and exter- 
nal cooperation, we trust they will end by sur- 
mounting these obstacles and by establishing the 
permanence and reality of their independence to 
tlieir own satisfaction. 

It is, however, useful for us, because of the spe- 
cial interest and responsibility the United Na- 
tions has in the independence of the Trust Terri- 
tory of Ruanda-Urundi, to be frank about the 
difficulties which we anticipate these two countries 
will face as newly independent nations and about 
the responsibility of the United Nations in this 
regard. After all, our responsibility as reiterated 
in Resolution 1743 is to insure that the territory 
accedes to independence under the most favorable 
conditions. If we, the United Nations and all its 
members, take action now which renders more 
difficult after independence the maintenance of 
political stability or of economic viability in 
Rwanda or Burundi, we shall assimie a very grave 
responsibility. If we attempt to limit the free ex- 
ercise of sovereignty by the two Governments after 
independence, we shall also assume a very grave 
responsibility. Indeed, our moral, if not our 
legal, responsibility does not come to an end on 
the 1st of July. Though the Governments of 
Rwanda and Burundi become masters of their own 
house on that date, we must do our part, both now 
and thereafter, to assist them in establishing the 
best possible conditions for the exercise of what 
they have described as effective and viable inde- 
pendence. Our obligation is not merely to set 
them adrift under conditions which may seem de- 


sirable and appropriate to us but to grant them 
the full, untrammeled independence and the sym- 
pathetic cooperation which we membei-s of the 
United Nations insist upon for ourselves. 

Problems Facing Rwanda and Burundi 

In our view these two new nations will encoimter 
serious difficulties, particularly in three fields: in 
the technical aspects of government administra- 
tion, in economic and budgetary viability, and in 
the maintenance of law and order. In the first of 
these areas, that is, government administration, 
the report of the Commission notes a critical 
shortage of experienced indigenous persons train- 
ed in the mechanisms of govenunent administra- 
tion. Paragraphs 275 through 284 of the Com- 
mission's report deal with this problem in some 
detail. The Commission suggests that a minimum 
of 350 to 400 foreign technicians or experts 
would be essential in the year 1962 to keep admin- 
istrative services in operation. From other 
information contained in the report, it can be 
further deduced that this requirement will not be 
noticeably reduced until the year 1964. 

The economic problems which Rwanda and 
Burundi must be prepared to face are set forth 
with commendable clarity and simplicity in the 
report of the Commission and have been brought 
into even sharper focus by the statement made by 
the vice chairman of the Commission [Ernest 
Gassou] on the 13th of June. The Foreign Minis- 
ter of Belgium has also drawn our attention to 
economic and budgetary difficulties. The back- 
ground and cause of these difficulties are covered 
in the report, and I would only remind the com- 
mittee that the budget deficit for the current year 
is approximately $3 million, each, for Burundi 
and Rwanda. This is without comiting the cost of 
the teclanical assistance now being provide-d by 
Belgium. It is safe, I think, to conclude that an 
annual deficit of this nature can be anticipated for 
several years. Mr. Gassou further suggested that 
the two states together would require approxi- 
mately $10 million per year for development of 
essential branches of their economies during the 
coming years. It would not appear that any con- 
siderable proportion of this amoimt could be ob- 
tained from internal sources. If you add to the 
above figure the cost of the present level of Bel- 
gian technical and other assistance, you arrive at 
a figure in the neighborhood of $20 million an- 

Department of Sfafe Bullefin 

mially of external aid i-equired by the two 

With regard to maintaining law and order, tlie 
problems stem in part from the embryonic stage 
of development of the national forces in both 
Ewanda and Burundi as noted by the Commission 
in its report. For our part we are concerned 
about their ability to deal with serious disorders, 
if they should imhappily occur. In Rwanda 
the task facing those charged with the responsi- 
bility of maintaining law and order is made per- 
haps potentially more difScult by political factors 
which are also covered in considerable detail in 
the report of the Commission. 

Wliile for analytical and assistance purposes we 
can treat the major difficulties these two new na- 
tions will face in three categories — government 
administration, economic and budgetary deficits, 
and the maintenance of law and order — we should 
not be deceived, nor should the Governments them- 
selves, into believing that these difficulties can be 
overcome without relationship to each other. Un- 
fortunately that is seldom the case. Difficulties 
in administration breed difficulties in economic 
fields and vice versa. Difficulties in maintaining 
law and order create difficulties in administration 
and economic fields. Specifically, if public secu- 
rity is imcertain in either Rwanda or Burundi, 
technicians, whether provided by the Government 
of Belgium, by the United Nations, or by whom- 
ever, will not remain in the country no matter 
what the United Nations or the Government of 
Belgium may say or do. Commensurately, the 
absence or departure of technicians will greatly 
reduce the amount and effectiveness of the exter- 
nal economic assistance which can be usefully 
applied. Money is useless unless the technical 
expertise to put it to work is present. The As- 
sembly, in searching for the formula which will 
insure accession to independence under the most 
favorable conditions, must consider all these fac- 
tors together and bear in mind that any proposed 
solution for difficulties in one field must be care- 
fully studied for its interactions in other fields. 

Who then is and will be responsible for what? 
What are the responsibilities of the Governments 
of Rwanda and Burimdi, of the Administering 
Authority, of this organization ? 

The first part of the answer to this question is 
clear. We are about to approve the granting of 
independence to Rwanda and Burundi on July 1. 

July 23, J 962 

After that date all direct responsibility for the 
situation there devolves from Belgimn and from 
the United Nations onto the Governments of 
Rwanda and Burundi. It is they who will be re- 
sponsible for everything. They will be responsi- 
ble to their people for the administration of their 
countries, for economic development of their coun- 
tries, and for the maintenance of law and order. 
They will be responsible to the world community 
of nations for the preservation of human rights 
and adherence to the principles of international 
peace and security. 

I am sure that the Governments have carefully 
weighed in hours of difficvdt appraisal their own 
capacities and means for fulfilling these responsi- 
bilities. They have declared themselves capable 
of fulfilling these responsibilities, and we will 
look to them to fulfill them. 

This does not, or course, mean that they need to 
be left unassisted in this task. They have in fact 
already made clear their desire and readiness to 
have varying degrees of external assistance. 
What assistance is the international community 
and its members clearly prepared at this moment 
to provide ? 

Belgium's Willingness To Provide Assistance 

In this respect we believe the General Assem- 
bly should take special note of the willingness 
of the Government of Belgium to recognize a con- 
tinuing responsibility toward providing an inde- 
pendent Rwanda and Burundi with extensive aid. 
According to the declaration of the distinguished 
Foreign Minister, Belgium is prepared to provide 
without conditions technicians and advisere, eco- 
nomic assistance, and assistance in the field of 
maintenance of law and order, not only now but 
after independence. In offering tliis assistance 
Belgium has shown sympathy for the apprehen- 
sions of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi 
concerning their future sovereignty and has in this 
spirit made several proposals aimed at assuaging 
these concerns and guaranteeing this sovereignty. 
It has made perfectly clear that its aid is offered 
without conditions of any kind. 

As of the moment I am not aware of any other 
aid having been offered to Rwanda and Burundi. 
It is to be hoped that the United Nations will pro- 
vide generous technical assistance, but it is obvious 
that it cannot be expected to do so overnight. 
There is no present indication, moreover, that it 


can provide ecoiioniic and budgetary aid in 
the amounts urgently rexjuired by tlie two 

In this connection we cannot close our eyes to 
tlie fact that teclinicians, Belgian or otherwise, 
will remain in or come to Rwanda and Burundi 
only if they are convinced acceptable conditions 
of public security will exist. We may wish they 
were indifferent to this consideration, but unfor- 
tunately they are not. We welcome the willing- 
ness of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi 
to assume the responsibility for maintaining law 
and order, but we wish to be certain that they are 
not denied, by our action, any assistance in this 
respect they consider it desirable to seek and 

This brings us to the hotly debated question of 
the withdrawal of Belgian troops. The Foreign 
Minister of Belgium has made it entirely clear 
that he would consider retaining troops in 
Rwanda and Burundi after independence only if 
one or both of the two Governments should re- 
quest him to do so. There can therefore be abso- 
lutely no question of constraint, of foreign troops 
remaining against the will of the Governments 

However, my delegation finds itself puzzled by 
the implication in some of the questions which 
have been posed in this committee that it is incom- 
patible with the independence of a state tliat there 
should be foreign troops, even a single foreign 
soldier, on its soil. It is, for example, entirely 
normal for states to ask for foreign military 
missions to organize and train their forces or to 
instruct in the use of foreign military equipment 
which the state has purchased. This is an en- 
tirely proper arrangement, and many states rep- 
resented in this committee liave taken advantage 
of it. Other mutually agreeable arrangements 
for the temporary presence of the troops of one 
state in the territory of another are also common 
international practice. To deny to Rwanda or 
Bunmdi the right to make similar arrangements, 
if they so desire, would be an infringement on the 
exercise of their sovereignty of which the United 
Nations would certainly not, we believe, wish to 
be guilty. We for our part believe that the two 
Governments should, in this as in other respects, 
be left free to make such arrangements as they 
believe desirable for the training of their armed 
forces, for the reinforcement of public security 


in their territories, and for extending such assur- jj'' 
ances as may be necessary and appropriate to for- 
eign technicians in order that their services may lis*-* 
be maintained. 

Roles of the United Nations 

This brings us, I think, to examine the roles 
that the United Nations itself can and cannot play 
in this difficult situation. Firet, let me deal with 
the negative side. The United Nations at this 
juncture, either as regards fiiiances or otlier re- 
sources, is not in a position to provide the eco- 
nomic, technical, or military assistance required 
by the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi. 
We, tlie United Nations, cannot offer the assist- 
ance which has been offered by the Government 
of Belgium. What then can we and should we 
do? The United Nations can and should within 
existing programs supplement the economic and 
technical and military assistance provided by 
Belgium. In this connection, I would add, the 
United States for its part does not favor the estab- 
lisliment of a special fund for Rwanda and Bu- 
rundi. We would expect that costs incurred by 
the United Nations would be financed from the 
budget for 1962 or, if neceasary, under the pro- 
visions of Resolution 1735 covering unforeseen 
and extraordinary expenses for tlie financial year 
of 1962. 

Second, the United Nations can and should pro- 
vide the assistance of advice and coordination to 
the Goveniments of Belgium, of Rwanda, and of 
Burundi, and to any other governments that may 
be concerned in making the agreements for the 
application of assistance and in establishing the 
conditions of cooperation which will accrue the 
most benefits to the Governments and peoples of 
Rwanda and Burundi. Specific forms of such as- 
sistance have been suggested in the report of the 
Commission, by the representatives of Belgium, 
and by the representatives of the Governments of 
Rwanda and Burundi. And, as time goes on, no 
doubt other useful functions for the United Na- 
tions will arise. 

In the view of the United States delegation 
these United Nations roles can best be carried out 
through the instrumentality of a representative or 
representatives of the Secretary-General in 
Rwanda and Burundi, and we endorse what we 
undcretand to be his intention to dispatch such 
representatives if the two Governments agree to 
such arrangements. 

Department of Sfafe Bulletin 


i«oiic I 
i i su 

fim by 

KM, w 

if Seen 


U.S. Recommendations 

It seems to us then the resolution we adopt at 
this session of the Assembly should welcome the 
in'cession to independence of the new and so^'creign 
nations of Ewanda and Burundi through the ter- 
mination of the trust agreement on Juty 1 of this 
year and of course invite these two new nations to 
apply for membership in this organization. It 
slinuld recognize the needs of both countries for 
cionomic and technical assistance and encourage 
thf Government of Belgium to continue to pro- 
vide a substantial part of this assistance. We 
would also hope the resolution might call for pro- 
vision by the United Nations of technical, eco- 
nomic, and other forms of assistance such as can 
be provided within the limitations of existing pro- 
grams, funds, and resources. It should encourage 
the Secretary-General to name a representative 
whose functions would be, without prejudice to the 
sovereignty of tlie Governments, to render appro- 
priate assistance in the provision and coordination 
of technical, economic, and other forms of assist- 
ance for Rwanda and Bunmdi, to advise the Gov- 
ernments of Belgium, Rwanda, and Burundi and 
perform such other functions as these Govern- 
ments might request. It should provide for the 
training of local forces and the disposition of Bel- 
gian troops in accordance with the wishes of the 
local Govennnents. If any such troops remain 
temporarily, it would necessarily be in accordance 
with the wislies of the Government or Govern- 
ments concerned and with the approval of the rep- 
resentative of the Secretary-General. However, in 
drafting such a resolution we must guard against 
imposing conditions on the Governments of 
Rwanda or Burundi which might, in effect, preju- 
dice their sovereign right of action after 

Finally, because of a special responsibility this 
organization must have toward its former trust 
territories Avhen these accede to independence, a 
responsibility stressed not only in the Commis- 
sion's report but by almost every speaker who 
has addressed us, we should, I think, if the pro- 
visions we adopt at this session should prove in- 
adequate in assisting and creating conditions 
necessary for building a firm and real independ- 
ence, be prepared, if events should unhappily re- 
quire, to consider the situation again in the light 
of those events. In short, I am convinced that 
our responsibilities toward Rwanda and Burundi 
do not necessarily end with the simple passage of 
a resolution at this session. 

July 23, 1962 

These, Madam Chairman, are the conclusions 
and reconimendations of the United States. I 
have attempted to present them clearly and pre- 
cisely in hopes that by so doing I could assist and 
speed our work, which is already clearly behind 
the needs of the situation and risks placing us in 
the position of arriving at the 1st of July without 
having made a decision. I should like to say that 
I and my delegation are prepared to sit down and 
meet with other delegations and contribute in any 
way which may be deemed desirable to the pre- 
paration of a resolution which the committee 
might consider simultaneously with the general 
debate. The sooner all members of the committee 
interested in this problem can work out and table 
a resolution which can secure very wide and gen- 
eral support, the sooner can we give our friends 
from Rwanda and Burundi the firm assurance that 
they will obtain their independence on July 1, that 
it is the firm intention of all of us that, as they 
have requested, their independence shall be total, 
unconditional, and viable, and that, finally, effec- 
tive aid and cooperation by the United Nations 
and its members after independence is assured. 


U.S. delegation press release 4019 

The United States Government will vote for the 
resolution adopted by the Fourth Committee yes- 
terday^ on the future of Ruanda-Urundi. We 
pay tribute to the conciliatoi-y spirit of many dele- 
gations, which made possible the adoption of a 
comprehensive resolution ending the tiiisteeship 
and according independence to Rwanda and 

However, our support for this resolution is not 
unqualified. Yesterday in the Fourth Committee 
we abstained on paragraph 3 because we did not 
feel that it met the needs of the situation. On 
the contrary, we felt that this paragraph, which 
deals with a matter of great delicacy and great im- 
portance, is unclear and too doctrinaire in its for- 
mulation. Specifically, the paragraph calls for 
the completion of the evacuation and withdrawal 
of Belgian troops now stationed in both countries 
by the 1st of August. Fortunately, at the same 
time, the paragraph says in effecf, but not ex- 
plicitly, that the Governments of Rwanda and 
Burundi have the sovereign right to make ar- 

U.N. doc. A/C.4/L.740/Rev. 1. 

rangements with Belgium wliereby the with- 
drawal could be delayed bej-ond the 1st of Augiist 
if those Governments so desired. 

The next weeks and months will be most critical 
for Rwanda and Bunmdi. During this period 
these two countries must continue to rely for their 
economic stability almost exclusively on Belgian 
assistance. No one else has offered to provide as- 
sistance in any way commensurate with the 
amounts required to meet the budgetary, technical, 
and development needs of the two countries. 
Tlierefore, in the view of my delegation, the As- 
.sembly has a particular responsibility not to adopt 
language which by its equivocal nature could 
create unrest or alarm among any segment of the 
population and thus jeopardize the effective ap- 
plication of Belgian assistance or, for that matter, 
other assistance. Unfortunately, we see just these 
dangers in the wording of operative paragraph 3 
and feel that the partisans of the formula set forth 
therein are taking a serious responsibility in the 
light of the situation in the territory. 

Therefore the United States cannot associate 
itself with the wording of this paragraph and if 
it should be put to a vote separately would again 
abstain on all parts of the paragraph. Needless 
to say, we shall vote against the Soviet amend- 
ment,^ which, if adopted, would, in our view, make 
the paragraph entirely unworkable. 

However, we shall vote for tlie resolution as a 
whole. In doing so, I wish to make it abundantly 
clear that we welcome and support wholeheartedly 
the independence of Rwanda and Burundi. We 
welcome the provisions of the resolution which 
make for economic and technical assistance to the 
two new nations. And we are particularly grati- 
fied that the resolution includes an active role for 
the Seci'etary-General because we believe that the 
United Nations assistance to these new nations 
can be^t be carried out through the Secretary- 
General. Despite our misgivings about para- 
graph 3, we are able to support the resolution only 
because the Fourth Committee was categorically 
assured by a substantial number of the cosponsors 
of this resolution — and tliis assurance was repeated 
here this morning — that it was their clear inten- 
tion and conviction that after independence the 
Governments of Rwanda and Burundi would 
without any doubt whatsoever enjoy the sovereign 


The General Asscmhlp, 

Recalling its resolution 1T43 (XVI) of 23 February 
1962 and the other resolutions on the question of the fu- 
ture of Ruanda-Urundi, as well as its resolution 63 (I) of 
13 December 1946, 

Having considered the report of the United Nationa- 
Commission for Ruanda-Urundi appointed under para- 
graph 2 of resolution 1743 (XVI), 

Nothig that the efforts to maintain the unity of Ruanda- 
Urundi did not succeed. 

Welcoming the Agreement on Economic Union concluded 
between the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi at the 
Conference at Addis Ababa held under the au.spices of 
the Commission, 

Taking into account the fact that the bulk of the Ad- 
ministering Authority's forces still remain in the Terrl 
tory notwithstanding the objective, stated in paragraph 
3 (e) of resolution 1743 (XVI), of securing the rapid 
withdrawal of Belgian military and paramilitary forces 
before independence. 

Expressing its satisfaction at the favourable trends 
towards reconciliation noted by the Commission in its 
report, in particular, in Rwanda, the participation 
the Government of two members of the Opposition, 

Having heard the representatives of the Governments 
of Rwanda and Burundi and the petitioners. 

Recalling the Declaration nu the granting of independ 
enee to colonial countries and peoples embodied in reso- 
lution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 

Taking note of the desire of the Governments of 
Rwanda and Burundi to attain independence as separate 
States on 1 July 1962, the date envisaged in paragraph 7 
of resolution 1743 (XVI), 

Taking into account the declaration by the Government 
of Burundi that from the date of the proclamation of 
independence it will not agree to the presence of foreign 
troops on its soil, and the declaration by the Government 
of Rwanda that the termination of the Trusteeship Agree- 
ment will make illegal the presence of Belgian troops in 
the territory of the Republic, 


p » »i 

iliilS C 



J m> 

iiJ evict 


I fell 


Iflsian 1 
(l| T( 



III Bun 
Ike need 
ion, tot 
ii) Ti 
1(1 T( 

•U.N. doc. A/Iv.388; rejected on June 27 by a vote of 
24 to 46, with 33 abstentions. The Soviet draft amend- 
ment called for evacuation of Belgian forces by July 1. 


•U.N. doe. A/RES/1746(XVI) ; adopted in plenary on 
June 27 by a vote of 93 to 0, with 10 abstentions ( Soviet 

Department of Stafe Bullefin 




Noting the declaration of the Admiuistering Authority 
that it will withdraw its forces from Rwanda and Burundi 
in accordance with the wishes of the General Assembly 
and the Governments concerned, 

Recalling that after Independence Rwanda and Burundi 
will enjoy sovereign rights, 

Bearing in mind the needs which will confront Rwanda 
I :iiid Burundi in all fields when they accede to independ- 

Recalling its resolution 1415 (XIV) of 5 December 
1959 on assistance to territories emerging from a trust 
status and to newly independent States, 

1. Expresses its warm appreciation to the United 
XatioDS Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, 19G2, for the 
way it has performed Its tasks ; 

2. Decides, in agreement with the Administering 
Viiiliority, to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement of 
I'l December 1946 in respect of Ruanda-Urundi on 1 July 
L9(;2, on which date Rwanda and Burundi shall emerge 
IS two independent and sovereign States ; 

3. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw 
ind evacuate its forces still remaining in Rwanda and 
Burundi, and that, as of 1 July 19G2, the Belgian troops 
n process of evacuation will no longer have any role to 
5lay and that the evacuation must be completed by 
L August 1962, without prejudice to the sovereign rights 
)f Rwanda and Burundi ; 

4. Requests the Secretary-General to send immediately 

Rwanda and Burundi a representative together with 

1 team of experts whose functions shall be : 

(a) To supervise the withdrawal and evacuation of 
Belgian forces in accordance with this resolution : 

6) To help the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi 
secure the implementation of the Agreement on Eco- 
iiimic Union reached between the Governments of Rwanda 
aid Burundi at Addis Ababa on 19 April 1962 ; 

(c) To study, in consultation with the Governments 
;oncerned and in the light of the recommendations made 

jjjj, )y the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, 
he need for technical and economic assistance in Rwanda 
ind Burundi, so as to enable the Secretary-General to 
lubmit a report thereon, together with his recommenda- 
;ion, to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session ; 

(d) To assist the Governments of Rwanda and Bu- 
•undi, at their request, in the organization of their admin- 
strative cadres and other related matters ; 

(e) To assist the Governments of Rwanda and Bu- 
■undi, at their request, in the development and training 
)f internal security forces ; 

5. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in accordance with 
he provisions of paragraph 1 of General Assembly reso- 
ution 1735 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 on unforeseen 
ind extraordinary expenses for the financial year 1962, 
o enter into commitments not exceeding $2 million for 
he purpose of such emergency measures as may be 
equired to ensure the continuation of essential services 
n the two countries, pending the consideration by the 
Jeneral Assembly of the report of the Secretary-General 
ef erred to in paragraph 4(c) above; 

6. Requests the United Nations Special Fund, the 
Technical Assistance Board and other United Nations 

My 23, 7962 

bodies, as well as the specialized agencies, to give special 
consideration to the needs of Rwanda and Burundi ; 

7. Expresses the hope that all Member States of the 
United Nations would render such technical and economic 
assistance as they can to the new States of Rwanda and 
Burundi ; 

8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Gen- 
eral Assembly at its seventeenth session on the implemen- 
tation of this resolution ; 

9. Recommends that, after the proclamation of inde- 
pendence on 1 July 1962, Rwanda and Burundi should 
be admitted as Members of the United Nations under 
Article 4 of the Charter. 


Current Actions 


Automotive Traffic 

Convention on road traflic, with annexes. Done at Geneva 
September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. 
TIAS 2487. 
Accession deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), May 15, 1962. 

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 
1»47. TIAS 1591. 
Adhe7-ence deposited: Chad, July 3, 1962. 

Cultural Relations 

Agreement for facilitating the international circulation 
of visual and auditory materials of an educational, 
scientific, and cultural character, and protocol. Done 
at Lake Success July 15, 1949. Entered into force 
August 12, 1954.' 
Acceptance deposited: Madagascar, May 23, 1962. 

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, 
and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake 
Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 
Acceptance deposited: Madagascar, May 23, 1962. 


Convention on the prevention and punishment of the 
crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948. 
Entered into force January 12, 1951.' 

Notification received that it considers itself bound: 
Congo ( Leopold ville). May 31, 1962. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. 
Done at London June 17, 1960.- 
Ratified by the President: May 11, 1962. 


International telecommunication convention with six an- 
nexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered 
into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United States October 
23, 1961. TIAS 4892. 
Ratification deposited: Austria, May 29, 1962. 

' Not in force for the United States. 
■ Not in force. 



Portugal accepted the folloiving instruments pursuant to 
its acceptance of the protocol of accession to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade April 6, 1962: 

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done 
at Geneva March 10, 1955." 

Proces-verbal of rectification concerning protocol amend- 
ing part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol amend- 
ing preamble and parts II and III, and protocol of 
organizational amendments to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 
1955. Section B entered into force October 7, 1957. 

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts 
of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.' 

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts 
of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.^ 

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to 
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.- 

Protocol relating to negotiations for establishment of new 
schedule III— Brazil— to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts 
of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 1959." 

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts 
of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959." 

Chile deposited notification recognizing signature as bind- 
ing irith respect to the following June 7 1962: 

Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation, 
with annex. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.' 

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
March 10, 1955.= 

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done 
at Geneva March 10, 1955." 

Protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done 
at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force Octo- 
ber 7, 1957. TIAS 3930. 



Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps 
program in Bolivia. Effected by exchange of notes at 
La Paz June 19, 19C2. Entered into force June 19, 1962. 


Agreement regarding the application to persons on leave 
of certain articles of the agreement of June 19, 1951, 
between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty re- 
garding the status of their forces (TIAS 2846), and 
the agreement of August 3, 1959, to supplement the 
NATO status-of-forces agreement with respect to for- 
eign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many. Signed at Bonn August 3, 19.59. Enters into 
force on the same date as the supplementary agree- 
ment of August 3, 19.59. 
Ratified hy the Federal Rcpuhlic of Oermany: June 4, 

Ratifications exchanged: June 13, 1962. 

Agreement on the settlement of disputes arising out of 
direct procurement, entered into pursuant to article 44 
of the agreement of August 3, 1959, to supplement the 
•NATO status-of-forces agreement with respect to for- 

' Not in force. 

eign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Ger 
many. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959. Enters int« 
force on the same date as the supplementary agreement 
of August 3, 1959. 
Ratified by the Federal Republic of Germany: June 4 

Ratifications exchanged: June 13, 1902. 

Amendment to the agreement of June 28, 1957 (TIAJ 
3874), for cooperation, on behalf of Berlin, concern 
ing civil uses of atomic energy, with annex. Signed 
Washington June 29, 1962. Enters into force on th< 
date on which each Government advises the other ii 
writing that it has complied with all statutory am 
constitutional requirements for entry into force. 

Amendment to the agreement of July .3, 1957, as amende<' 
(TIAS 3S77 and 4314), for cooperation concerning 
civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washingtoi 
July 5, 1962. Enters into force on the date on whicl 
each Government receives from the other written noti 
fication that it has complied with all statutory 
constitutional requirements for entry into force. 


Agreement amending the agreement of March 9, 195' 
(TIAS 3789), relating to the loan of certain nava 
vessels to Spain. Effected by exchange of notes 
Madrid June 19, 1962. Entered into force June 18 

iioiiic El 




Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 2-8 

Press releases may be obtained from the Ofl5ce 

of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. 

Releases issued prior to July 2 which appear in 

this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 425 and 433 of 

June 28. 


U.S. participation in international 

Coerr sworn in as Ambassador to Uru- 
guay (biographic details). 

Meetings with Argentina on Alliance 
for Progress. 

Consulates opened at Ibadan and 
Enugu, Nigeria (rewrite). 

U.S. contribution to Hong Kong school 

Rusli : U.N. loan legislation. 

Chayes : State Junior Bar, San Antonio, 

Richelieu River-Lake Champlaln water- 
way proposal. 

Sprouse sworn in as Ambassador to 
Cambodia (biographic details). 

Ball: interview. Radio Free Berlin- 
North German Radio. 

Orrick sworn in as Deputy Under Sec- 
retary for Administration (biographic 

Abolition of closed areas for Soviet 

Williams' visit to Europe (rewrite). 

Costa Rica credentials (rewrite). 

Wehmeyer awarded Princeton Fellow- 
ship in Public Affairs. 

Cleveland's visit to Europe (rewrite). 























*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


nay Pp 

(onjo (I 


Rasl, I 
Act (E 


He Goal 




laies : 

ma I 
He Coal 
A Sat 
tetd s 

Department of State Bulletir 

July 23, 1962 


Vol. XLVII, No. 1204 

Africa. Assistant Secretary Williams Confers 

With European Leaders on Africa 

Algeria. President Congratulates Algeria on 
Achievement of Independence (Kennedy) . . . 
American Principles. The Goal of an Atlantic 

Partnership (Kennedy) 

Argentina. United States and Argentina Review 

Progress on Development Program 

j(|Atomic Energy. Arms Control and Disarmament: 
A Summary of Developments at the Conference 
of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . 
lotl Burundi 

D.S. Congratulates Burundi and Rwanda on Inde- 

I)endeuce (Kennedy) 

D.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on Independence for 
Rwanda and Burundi (Tost and text of resolu- 

Canada. United States and Canada Refer Water- 
way Proposal to IJC 

:ongo (Leopoldville). U.S. Offers Grant of $10 

Million for Congo Import Program 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 


Jepartment Supports U.N. Loan Legislation (Ball, 

Rusk, Stevenson) 

resident Requests Supplemental Appropriation 

for IMP Loans 

resident Signs Migration and Refugee Assistance 

Act (Kennedy) 

]osta Rica. Letters of Credence (Facio Segreda, 


Economic Affairs 

The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership (Kennedy) . . 
resident Requests Supplemental Appropriation for 

IMF Loans 

Jnited States and Canada Refer Waterway Pro- 
posal to IJC 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. President Dele- 
gates Functions Under Exchange Act of 1961 

(text of Executive order) 


Assistant Secretary Cleveland Visits Europe To 

Discuss U.N. Affairs 

i.ssistant Secretary Williams Confers With Euro- 
pean Leaders on Africa 

S,c. rheGoalof an Atlantic Partnership (Kennedy) . . 
P"' Oisarmament. Arms Control and Disarmament: 
A Summary of Developments at the Conference 
of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . 
foreign Aid 

'residents of U.S. and Mexico Reaffirm Traditional 
Friendship (Kennedy, text of joint communique) . 
Jnited States and Argentina Review Progress on 

Development Program 

J.S. Offers Grant of $10 Million for Congo Import 



Program . 





Hong Kong. U.S. Grants Funds to Hong Kong for 

School Building Project 141 

International Organizations and Conferences 
Arms Control and Disarmament: A Summary of 
Developments at the Conference of the 18-Nation 

Committee on Disarmament 154 

President Requests Supplemental Appropriation for 

IMP Loans 152 

Mexico. Presidents of U.S. and Mexico Reaffirm 
Traditional Friendship (Kennedy, text of joint 

communique) 135 

Philippines. Philippine-American Friendship Day 

(Kennedy) 138 

Presidential Documents 

The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership 131 

Philippine-American Friendship Day 138 

President Congratulates Algeria on Achievement 

of Independence 135 

President Delegates Functions Under Exchange 

Act of 1961 138 

President Signs Migration and Refugee Assistance 

Act 153 

Presidents of U.S. and Mexico Reaffirm Traditional 

Friendship 135 

U.S. Congratulates Burundi and Rwanda on Inde- 
pendence 134 


President Signs Migration and Refugee Assistance 

Act (Kennedy) 153 

U.S. Grants Funds to Hong Kong for School Build- 
ing Project 141 


U.S. Congratulates Burundi and Rwanda on Inde- 
pendence (Kennedy) 134 

U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on Independence for 
Rwanda and Burundi (Tost and text of reso- 
lution) 159 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 165 

United Nations 

Assistant Secretary Cleveland Visits Europe To 

Discuss U.N. Affairs 133 

Department Supports U.N. Loan Legislation (Ball, 

Rusk, Stevenson) 142 

U.S. Offers Grant of $10 Million for Congo Import 

Program 140 

U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on Independence for 
Rwanda and Burundi (Tost and text of reso- 
lution) 159 

Name Index 

Ball, George W 144 

Cleveland, Harlan 133 

Facio Segreda, Gonzalo 138 

Kennedy, President .... 131,134,135,137,138,153 

Lopez Mateos, Adolfo 135 

Rusk, Secretary 142 

Stevenson, Adlai E 149 

Williams, G. Mennen 133 

Tost, Charles W 159 






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The first portion of this 38-page background summary sets 
forth the basic objectives and fundamental policies of U.S. 
foreign relations as they were stated by President Kennedy, 
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Vol. XLVII, No. 1205 V^!;_..^uly 30, 1962 


JULY 12 171 



RESS • by Abrain Chayes, Legal Adviser 192 


ant Secretary Manning 135 


WOMEN • Article by Gladys A. Tillett 197 

For index see inside back cover 


Vol. XLVII, No. 1205 • Publication 7414 

July 30, 1962 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.C. 


62 Issues, domestic $8.50, foreign $12.25 

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Use of funds for printing of this publica- 
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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
OF State Bulletin as the source will be 
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed In the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a ireekly publication issued by t/i« 
Office of Public Services, Bureau of 
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and interested agencies of the 
Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the 
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Service. The BULLETIN includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by the White House and the 
Department, and statements ami ad- 
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the Secretary of State and other 
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special articles on various plutses of 
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Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 12 

ess release 456 dated July 13 

Secretary Rush: I liave no formal statement 
Dday, but I would like to make a comment on two 
r three things that are ahead of us in the next 
3w days and weeks before we take your questions. 
Ambassador [Arthur H.] Dean left yesterday to 
o back to Geneva for the resumption of the dis- 
rmament conference next Monday [July 16]. 
Te hope very much that that conference will be 
ble to make some headway. It has made very 
ttle thus far.^ You will have observed that Mr. 
Hirushchev in his speech to the so-called Peace 
ongress in Moscow spent a good deal of time on 
isarmament. In it he said a great many things 
ith which we could not agree. But he did point 
) the dangers of a thermonuclear war, and he 
attention to the massive resources wliich are 
eing diverted from peaceful purposes to the arms 

We believe that both the Soviet Union and the 
Fnited States as well as many other countries have 

very serious interest in bringing this arms race 
) an end. That is in terms of an objective anal- 

s of the national interests of these countries. 

rtainly we in the United States, as advanced 
ionomically and as prosperous as we are, have an 
lormous number of unfinished tasks to which we 
lould like to commit such resources. 

We regretted that Mr. Khrushchev again seemed 
) confuse international inspection in connection 
ith disarmament with espionage. That is a 

ajor obstacle which has to be overcome, because it 

difficult to see how we can take the road toward 
isarmament without effective assurances that the 
jreements are being in fact kept. 

But Ambassador Dean will be there for serious 

gotiations, and we hope somehow that we can 
nd a way to get started on this process of turning 
own the arms race. It is not easy to make any 

For backi?round, see Buxletin of July 23, 1962, p. 154. 
;// 30, 1962 

predictions about how that will go, but we shall 
certainly do our part in that discussion. 

At the same time there is now going on in Ge- 
neva the conference on Laos. The indications are 
that the provisional agreement reached last au- 
tumn will now find acceptance by the members of 
the conference. This will be the third in a series 
of steps looking toward an ending of that problem 
there and the establishment of a neutral and in- 
dependent country in Laos. The first was the 
cease-fire;^ the second was the formation of a 
coalition government ; ^ the third would be this 
international agreement. These are three of a 
series of steps. The remaining steps would in- 
volve the actual carrying out of these agreements 
and commitments. It will take some weeks and 
months before those can in fact be put into effect. 
But it will be our hope that these arrangements 
would be loyally supported on all sides and that 
in fact that country can be left alone to work out 
its own future along peaceful lines. 

At 4 o'clock this afternoon I will be seeing Am- 
bassador Dobrynin [Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy 
Dobrynin] for the first time since the middle of 
last month. I will have a chance to take up with 
him again the conversations we have been having 
on Berlin and will probably get into some ques- 
tions concerning disarmament. We have seen 
statements made recently from Moscow on the sub- 
ject of Germany and Berlin. The important 
thing there is that the vital interests of the West- 
em Powers, the vital interests of the people of 
West Berlin, be acknowledged and that whatever 
arrangements are to be reached are reached on the 
basis of recognition of those vital interests. 

Now I will take your questions. 

' On May 12, 1961, the International Control Commission 
reported that It was satisfied that a general de facto 
cease-fire existed in Laos. 

' Bulletin of July 2, 1962, p. 12. 


Moscow Statements on Berlin 

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to these recent 
Moscow statements on Berlin, we had Khru- 
shchev's speech Tuesday, and just this afternoon 
TASS put out a long statement. They seemed to 
he stepping up their public pressure on the sub- 
ject and increasing the threats to make a separate 
peace treaty. Does this indicate to you that we are 
in for an ino'eased crisis there now, or tvhat is 
you/r feeling on this subject? 

A. Well, one can't predict what is in the other 
side's mind at any particular point on a matter of 
this sort. Perhaps I might know more about that, 
say, around 5 o'clock this afternoon. But it has 
been very clear all along that the Western position 
on what we have referred to repeatedly as our vital 
interests is very simple, very firm, and the problem 
is, if there are disagreements, handling those dis- 
agreements without a major crisis. But that is 
not somethmg wliich can be decided by one side 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Moscow statement said 
that the Department did not show a proper ap- 
preciation of Mr. Khrushchev's suggestion that 
tlie smaller Allied troops replace those of the 
American and British and French Governments. 
It said that Mr. Khrushchev'' s suggestion was a 
serious one toioard meeting the Western position. 
Do you agree? 

A. Well, for some time the problem has been 
that the other side seems not to want to talk about 
a great many things which are of interest to us — 
the pei-manent peace settlement for Germany as 
a whole, for example, or arrangements with re- 
spect to Berlin as a whole — because they have 
simply said that certain matters are just not dis- 
cussable. Now, if the only thing that is to be 
discussed is Western interests — vital interests, the 
Western position — and the only purpose of such 
discussion is seriously to reduce or to eliminate 
Western positions, then there is no basis for serious 
negotiations in that direction. This is not imusual. 
This has been a part of the picture from the 
beginning. Yes, sir ? 

Q. Mr. Secretary, according to recent reports, 
the number of West Berliners and West Germans, 
including women and childi'en, who have been 
arrested by Communist PeopWs Police while 
traveling on the Autobahn lias increased. Do you 
regard this as a threat against free access to the 


city, and are you prepared to take the subject m^I 
with Mr. Dobryninf 

A. Well, quite fi'ankly — I am sori-y to have t(t 
say this — I don't have recent information on thin 
kind of point. We have been following the Auto 
bahn situation carefully, but quite frankly I an 
just not informed on the particular point tha> 
you make. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mayor Brandt {^Mayor Wilh 
Brandt of Berlin'] has said that he is hopeful tha 
in the talk you have with Ambassador Dobrynii 
there will be discussion of means of encouraging 
greater traffic bettoeen East and West Berlin h 
pass provisions for families and similar arrange 
ments. Do you intend to go into that matter? 

A. As you will recall, we sent the Soviets a note 
not long ago in which we proposed that the respon 
sible authorities in Berlin arrange for talks to tr; 
to reduce the tension in Berlin itself. We have no 
had an answer to that note, but this M'ill be amon, 
the things that seem to us the responsible authori 
ties there could discuss with each other, to se 
whether there were not measures that could b 
taken to reduce the sense of tension in Berli: 

The Laos Agreements 

Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard to the Laos at 
cords, how will they affect, let us say in the 
6 months, the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Tch(ilf^\t^ri 
pone area and the Soviet airlift through Tchep> 
to Viet- Nam? 

A. Well, the agreement itself and the undei 
takings of the Laotian Government clearly provid 
that Laos is not to be used as a channel of con 
munication or pathway into neighboring countrie: 
The two cochairmen would have a responsibilit kl tk 

for enforcing such an arrangement. The IC< 

[International Control Commission] would havi kt-tk 
certain responsibilities with respect to it, an(| 
of course, neighboring countries themselvfi 
would have immediate opportunity to discovf 
whether those provisions were being carried oui 
We, I think, would have no great difficulty in dii 
covering whether there would continue to be in 
trusions into South Viet-Nam or across the Mi 
kong into Thailand after these agreements wei( 

' For text of 
1962, p. 97. 

U.S. note of June 25, see ibid., July 1 

Department of Sfafe Bulleti 




fi are' 

reign i 
aJ witt 

rikt, I 

A, It 

foreign i 
k A 






laotiaii ( 

It ho 

%ii|i|nto effect. So I think that we will know fairly 

m whether tliat part of the agreement and the 

greements themselves are being faithfully carried 


Q. To follow up on that question, are the Rus- 
sians and the British agreed on the methods they 
oill fursne to check on such things as the Tche- 
•>one area, tuhich, of course, involves the with- 
Irawal of foreign troops? 

A. As far as the airlift is concerned, as far as 
'oreign military personnel are concerned, the 
Lgreement provides that all foreign military per- 
;onnel would be withdrawn from Laos, and the ar- 
angements for anything like aid with the Laotian 
[jrovernment woidd be worked out internationally 
nd with full knowledge of all parties, so that I 
hink that that itself would cut across the possibil- 
ty of a continuation of infiltrated supplies into 
leighboring countries out of Laos. 





Mr. Secretary, is it definite now that you and 
Ir. Gromyho [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. 
romyko^ loill he meeting in Geneva on this Laos 
natter, and then do you expect to have Berlin 

A. It is my understanding that a date will 
hortly be fixed, and might be fixed at any time 
f;,,, low, for the formal conclusion of the present con- 
erence there, and it is anticipated that foreign 
ninisters would go there for a veiy brief signing 
eremony. If I go, as I would expect to for that 
mrpose, I would suppose I will also see the other 
. , oreign ministers, including Mr. Gromyko, and 
I ■ hat other questions would come up in those 
lloho -iscussions. 

coiinlii Q. Mr. Secretary, the Laotians have indicated 
pM hat they donH want protection of SEATO 
TkK Southeast Asia Treaty Organization'] in the fu- 
roiiMk ure — the neto government. Under what au- 
hority in that case would the United States act if 
tlieiMli { felt that things were going wrong in Laos? 

A. Under the SEATO arrangements, the pro- 

ocol would apply only on the request of the gov- 


"''?"' . rnment of one of the protocol states, so that if the 
'" iaotian Government announces that it does not 
'xpect to call upon that protection, there is no 
'"*'' " (articular problem from the point of view of the 
aw of the matter or the arrangements concerned. 
Jut I wouldn't want now to anticipate the 

culty that you have mentioned because we are go- 
ing to approach this in terms that the parties will 
be carrying out their commitments, and if this 
does not happen, then, of course, the agreement 
would become unhinged. I mean you would have 
a fresh situation to consider. We are not ap- 
proaching it in the expectation that this will be the 

Positions on Berlin 

Q. Mr. Secretary, reviewing your remarks about 
Berlin, some things which on the face of it are not 
news, if they are not spoken abotit for many 
months, appear to us to he nexos. We have been 
given to understand that in recent months the talk 
has been about access and getting Soviet acknowl- 
edgement of the legitimacy of our vital interests in 
West Berlin. You have now reintroduced the ele- 
ments of an all-German settlement and of a Ber- 
lin accord that involves all of Berlin. Is this 
perhaps an interesting outcome of your recent 
European trip? 

A. No, I didn't intend to make all that much 
news with that remark. I was reflecting on the 
general attitude of the West over a considerable 
period of time. The other side, for example, uses 
this expression, "drawing a line under World War 
II." Well, the West has been trying to draw a 
line under World War II for a very long time in 
Germany and trying to find a permanent satis- 
factory Gei-man settlement which would bring 
peace to central Europe. But that has not been 
pursued because, as you will recall, I did say that 
was the kind of thing that the other side has not 
been willing to discuss. They say, "This is not 
discussable. Now let's talk about your position 
here in West Berlin." 

Q. Is it fair, then, to conclude that if any accom^ 
modation at this stage were to go to the lengths 
of challenging the occupation basis of our right to 
be in Berlin, then you would want to talk about all 
World War II? 

A. I think that it would be difficult to be precise 
about what aspects of this might be talked about 
simply because it has ranged all the way, at times, 
to a permanent satisfactoi-y total solution for a 
German peace settlement. We have talked about 
the de facto situation. It is a fact that we are in 
West Berlin and have access to it. We have talked 
some about how you manage a disagreement in 

case you can't get agreement on any other basis. 
But I would not want to be precise about exactly 
how the next talk or two might shape up or how 
the subjects would fall into place. I was just 
pointing out that there is a tendency on the other 
side to say these things are not to be talked about, 
these things are to be talked about, and usually 
it is an attempt to diminish or eliminate our own 
vital interests that they would like to discuss — 
only certain things of their choice. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the troop proposal jmt 
forward now publicly hy Mr. Khrushchev provide 
any sort of a topic that can he talked about in these 

A. I would think not in that form. After all, 
as yoii know, a year ago he proposed that Soviet 
and "Western troops share responsibilities for West 
Berlin.'^ This is a variant of that, and I think they 
have known this is not acceptable to the West for 
some time. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask a related question 
here? I don't recall your exact loords, but back 
here earlier you said that if all they were willing to 
talk about was the diminution or elimination of the 
United States basic position in West Berlin, there 
really was not very much to talk about. Have you 
reached that point in you/r talks now, do you think? 

A. No, I think both sides still believe, as they 
have for some time, that maintaining contacts on 
these issues is itself important, even though there 
has been no clear view as to how they might lead to 
a satisfactory conclusion. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you still sticking to your 
position that there is no sense talking about inter- 
nationalization of access routes to Berlin until the 
Soviets acknowledge the Western right to remain 
in West Berlin? 

A. Well, the situation on that is that one could 
talk about a variety of things, but if they are 
linked to an unacceptable point, such as the one 
you mentioned, then you could create misunder- 
standings by seeming to pick up that particular 
idea of international access and talking about it in 
isolation. Of course we have talked about it, as 
you know. Over the past months we have gone 
into the possibilities of international access.® But 

" For background, see ihid., Aug. 7, 1961, p. 22.3. 
° For a Department statement of Mar. 3, 1962, see ibid., 
Mar. 19, 1962, p. 463. 

then, when the question comes up as to access ti fc'^* 
what — then we get into the same central questioij U'^'^ 
again. So that there does not seem thus far to bi . 
vei-y much real advance on any discussion of inter 
national access arrangements. V' •'" 

West New Guinea Dispute 

Q. Mr. Secretary, after a lapse of severa 
months, the envoys of the Netherlands and Indo\ 


lave c( 
sts ani 

nesia are meeting near here today to try and worn ,{ 
out a peaceful settlement of the Neio Guinea di& 
pute. Can you say, sir, how this situation appeal 
to you, xohether or not the United States cart"^ 
through its influence, help bring this peaceful s 
lution about, or is it all in the hands of the t/wo? 

A. I would think that that problem is really i 
the hands of the two Governments, assisted b 
Ambassador Bunker at the present stage.'' Ak 
some point those negotiations may shift from thi 
phase to the United Nations and jDerhaps a mor 
formal negotiation. But the two Government 
have agreed upon a framework within which theglecds i 
talks could go forward, and they are now havin uorec 
their representatives meet here for the pm-pose o point, 
exploring it further. We do hope they have a sue „ , 
cessf ul outcome, but this is basically a matter noil 
for the two Governments. \ ,, 

Mr. Secretary, in the House of Representokmm 
tives yesterday the chairman of the Subcomm,itte\ mm 
on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreig'^mtto, 
fairs Committee, Mr. [Arjnistead /.] Seldeii\M^ 
said the Government of Cuba ivas introducin<{ fy^ 
arms and subversive activities into at least 10 o| fuj^ 

the 20 Latin American nations. Is this a matta 

A, I 


test bii 


on which our Government has considered goin^ 
again to the OAS {Organization of America-: 
States'] for any collective action on the Cuba'f 


A. This is the type of problem — and I don' 
know in what time span Mr. Selden was speak 
ing — but this is the type of problem Avhich th 
special secui'ity committee, the so-called Vigilancj . 
Committee, of the OAS is looking into with greai ' 
urgency. The OAS at Punta del Este did agre 
to interrupt illicit traffic and trade in arms be 
tween Cuba and the rest of the hemisphere. S' 

' For text of proposals made by Ellswortb Bunker fo 
the settlement of the West New Guinea problem, see iUdi 23,1862 
June 25, ]!)62, p. 1039. 

Department of Sfofe Bullelh U 

his is something \yliich all of the governments of 
;he hemisphere are following veiy closely. 


Q. Mr. Secretary^ speaking about another OAS 
Organisation de Varmee secrete^, covM you tell 
IS, sir, is there soviething which holds up our rec- 
ognition of the Algerian Government? 
If^ A. Well, there is nothing on our side which 
l),„ lolds up further action in this regard. We have 
ecognized the independence of Algeria as a state.* 
\A'e are prepared to transform our consulate gen- 
'lal there into an embassy and to appoint a 
Charge. But the problem has been an micertainty 
)n the part of the responsible Algerian authorities 
is to how they would want foreign governments to 
jroceed in this matter. As far as we are con- 
cerned, we are ready to proceed at any time. Mean- 
vhile our official representatives are there and do 
lave contacts with the local authorities and are 
n a position to act in support of American inter- 
ests and to take care of American citizens whose 
'l" leeds might arise. But this is a matter which is 
m T;iore on the Algerian side than on our side at this 

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you. It is nice to he 
recognized. Yesterday Khrushchev denounced 
our high-level blast or nuclear tests as a crime 
a§iga!nst humanity. Would you tell us lohy some- 
milt one in authority of this Government hasnH pointed 
OKI out to Mr. Khrushchev and the world that, during 
'ii' the Russian tests, they engaged in high-level tests. 
™ There was at least one that was some 200 iniles. 
Why this silence? 

A. I was not aware that we had been silent. 

\ We have made a statement on the subject, and we 

tave talked at every opportunity about how this 

test business can be brought to an end. It may 

be that what we have said has not gotten around, 

(io> but we have said some things on the subject. 

Q. Well, would you say you have made a state- 
ment in connection loith Khrushchev''s denuncia- 
?'" tion of our high-level test? 

A. Yes, I wonder if I could ask my colleague to 
furnish you with that statement.^ 
^, i Q.I would appreciate it. 



For a statement 
23, 1962, p. 135. 
" See next column. 

President Kennedy, see iMd., July 

Department Comments on Soviet 
Statements on U.S. Nuclear Tests 

statement iy Lincoln White 
Director, Office of News ^ 

I would like to discuss the statements, not only 
by Mr. Khrushchev but by other Soviet spokesmen, 
of outrage at the high-altitude nuclear test con- 
ducted by the United States yesterday. 

These statements reflect a hypocrisy which cannot 
be let pass without notice. It is necessary to point 
out once more that the Soviet Union is responsible 
for the fact that nuclear testing has been put back 
into the arms race. This responsibility rests with 
the Soviet Union, as the result of its unexpected 
and massive series of tests launched last September. 
These Soviet tests, of course, included the largest 
nuclear weapon ever detonated, of approximately 
58 megatons. 

High-altitude tests were also conducted. One 
of these was considerably more than 100 miles in 
altitude. These high-altitude tests, conducted at 
several different altitudes, were probably the most 
significant tests, from the jwint of view of United 
States security. 

As a result of these high-altitude tests, the possi- 
bility existed that the Soviet Union gained con- 
siderable knowledge of the effects of such tests. 
Thus the United States decision to undertake a 
limited series of tests, including certain high-alti- 
tude tests, was a decision of necessity. 

In his statement of March 2 " of this year, the 
President emphasized that the foremost aim of the 
United States is "the control of force, not the 
pursuit of force, in a world made safe for mankind." 
An effective nuclear test ban treaty would be a 
momentous step in this direction, and a step the 
United States has attempted to persuade the Soviet 
Union to take for a number of years. 

The United States is continuing this effort, the 
success of which requires only Soviet readiness to 
accept the minimum required control and verifica- 
tion arrangements. 

Read to news correspondents on July 10. 
• For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 19, 1962, p. 44.3. 

A. Thank you very much. 

Q. I havenH seen it anywhere. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give its some of your 
views about the situation in Brazil noio and xohat 
the status of the President's trip might he? 

A. As far as the trip is concerned, Mr. Salinger 
["V\niite House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger] 
is down there and is going ahead with the anticipa- 

Ijlleii Ju/y 20, J 962 

toiy planning for that visit. As you know, Brazil 
has been taking some time in foi-ming a new gov- 
ernment. I would not want to comment on the 
internal aspects of their government, but we, of 
course, would be much interested in the outcome. 
The planning for the trip is going ahead. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you tell us what Am- 
hassador [Lleioellyn E.] Thompson will he doing 
when he comes hack to Washington? Are you 
going to have two Soviet expert specialists? 

A. He will come back for duty in the Depart- 
ment, but I think perhaps, since he has a well- 
deserved leave coming to him this summer, I per- 
haps might hold off the announcement of that until 
he is nearer the job. He will be in the Department. 

Geneva Disarmament Talks 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said in your early re- 
marks that you expected to take up some disarma- 
Tnent mutters with Amhassador Dohrynin. Are 
these matters that will he coming up at Geneva? 
Are they questions of substance that you want to 
take up with him? 

A. I would like to have some discussion with 
him about the disarmament situation in anticipa- 
tion of the opening of the disarmament confer- 
ence — reopening of the disarmament conference — 
next Monday, but I don't think there is anything 
new or surprising that will be coming up in that 
regard. I just want to explore the possibility as 
to whether they might not, in recognition of both 
the dangers and the costs of the arms race, find 
some way to take some steps to get on with 

Q. In tlmt regard, Mr. Secretary, do you helieve 
it likely that the recent United States underground 
emperiments may lead to some significant modifi- 
cations in the U.S. proposals as they are presented 
at Geneva? 

A. The so-called Vela tests which were laid on 
for the purpose of investigating the possibilities of 
instrumental detection and identification of under- 
ground events have produced some, I think, quite 
interesting data. That information has not yet 
been fully developed to all of its implications and 
conclusions, but there are some promising signs 
that instrumentation can do a somewhat better 
job than was earlier supposed. This is one of the 
positive results of the Vela tests — tests, by the 


way, to which the Soviet have been invited but 
which they have rejected. i 

I do want to point out that, so far as what haa 
been said and what I myself know, tliis will not! 
bring about, or cannot bring about at this stage,i 
a comi:)lete substitution of instrumentation for: 
control posts inside large countries such as the^ 
Soviet Union or the United States or a number of 
on-site inspections. It may greatly simplify the 
problem, but it does not eliminate such arrange- 
ments so far as we can tell. If the other side 
objects on principle to any control posts or any on- 
site inspections, then we still have a very large 
problem. The experiments themselves may help, 
but whether it will close the gap depends on 
whether the gap is between anything and zero, be- 
cause in terms of on-site inspections, so far it has^ W 




wiih eaf 
Kits h 
loiicli If 


been indicated that they would be rejected by the 
other side. 

Q. To follow that up, toould it he correct then to 
draw the conclusion from that that with the 
prospect of so7ne improved scientific detection 
velopment the United States helieves there is r 
the opportunity to take a new look at this prohlem 
and try to hring the Soviets and the U.S. position 
closer together? 

A. I think the first thing will be to liave a com- 
plete and thorough examination of what the datai 
means in terms of inspection and then to see what 
that, in turn, means in tei-ms of our standing pro- 
posals. It is too early yet to say whether this 
would mean any significant change in our pro- 
posals, but the announcement by the Department 
of Defense [July 7] indicated that we were very 
much encouraged that instrmnental means have 
been impi-oved to sort out the difference between 
earthquakes and nuclear explosions within certain 
ranges and under certain conditions. But there 
are still a good many technical problems that have 
to be ironed out before we can be sure what that 
would mean actually in terms of disarmament 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the situation in 
Brazil is any consideration heing given to post- 
poning President Kennedy's trip until a more 
favorable titne? 

A. As I indicated, Mr. Salinger is there to go 
ahead with the planning, and that is a contingency 
I wouldn't be able to get into at this point. 

Department of State Bulletin 


the pa 
aire t 




in il 





Q. Sir, can you tell us if our Government is 
making any effort to hring the two sides together 
in Algeria noiv, on the spot, ivith the arrival of 
Mr. Ben Bella in Algeria? 

A. I think the sides are very much in touch 
with each other, and quite a number of govern- 
ments have attempted to be sure that they are in 
touch with each other, and I don't think that we 
are needed for that purpose. 

Importance of U.S. Agricultural Exports 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you recently returned from 
the Common Market area, and I wondered if you 
would have any thoughts on the matter of how 
our agricultural exports might he affected hy 
Great Britain joining the Common Market? 

A. Well, this is a question in which we have a 
very great deal of interest and about which we 
have talked to all of the governments involved in 
the past several months. We do feel it vei-y im- 
portant that there be a substantial opportunity 
for American agricultural exports to Western Eu- 
rope. It is one of our most important markets. 
And our ability to maintain a substantial export 
surplus over imports is vitally important to us if 
we are to continue to bear the defense and aid 
burdens which we are carrying outside the United 

So we are in regular contact with the Common 
Market members and the U.K. and others to in- 
sure that American agricultural products have an 
adequate market in Western Europe. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Brazil brings to mind Cap- 
tain Enrico Galvao, of Santa Maria fame. I have 
heard that he has ieen invited to testify at a U.N. 
session of some sort on Portuguese matters, and 
in the past we have heen somewhat reluctant to 
let him come through here. Will loe permit him 
to appear? 

A. That is a matter that I understand is being 
discussed with the committee at the U.N. and the 
U.N. Secretariat. There are some legal problems 
tliere. We have a headquarters agreement with 
the United Nations with respect to travel to and 
from the headquarters. But, on the other hand, 
we do have some laws of our own which govern 
and have to do with people entering this coimtry. 
And, as you know, in the personal history of Mr. 
Galvao in the episode of the Santa Maria and 

Jo/y ZQ. 7 962 

others — ^his legal position in many countries is not 
very strong. So that I don't know what the final 
answer is going to be. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment, sir, on 
the India-China border dispute and how rmwh of 
a threat that might he to the security in the area? 

A. Well, we have been trying to follow that 
closely. There are some maneuvers on the north- 
ern frontier that India considers a threat to its 
security. We of course sympathize with the In- 
dian view that the integrity of its northern fron- 
tier be assured, but these episodes or the small de- 
ployments are in very difficult country, remote 
country, at great altitudes. It is a little hard to 
have exact information there, but we are following 
it and I don't think there is anything much I could 
say about it today. 

Relations With Pakistan 

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask a question about our 
relations with Pakistan? A couple of months ago 
President Ayub in an intervieio said if fnends in 
that area did not get everything they wanted, 
they might have to turn to other sources. Then a 
month ago when the nexo government %oas formed. 
Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali said he wanted 
to have the closest possible relations with Commu- 
nist China, and Tuesday, AyuVs brother, who is a 
so-called progressive in the Parliament, said the 
United States and Britain were to blame for every - 
tiling that had gone wrong for Pakistan since her 
independence and the United States had been 
guilty of continual meddling. Are our relations 
xoith Pakistan actually deteriorating as fast as 
those statements would indicate? 

A. I would think not. I would not attach too 
much importance to the statement made by an 
individual member of the Parliament, even though 
he may be closely related to the President of the 
country. We are in regular contact with Paki- 
stan about a great many subjects, and I think that 
my discussions in the CENTO [Central Treaty 
Organization] meeting,^" for example, in London 
with their representatives there indicate that our 
relations are in good order. Now, we are going to 
have some problems with any comitry that itself 
has problems with its neighbors. For example, 
we have been hoping that Pakistan and Afghani- 

" For background, see Bulletin of May 28, 1962, p. 

Stan could work out a solution of the transit and 
traffic problem from Pakistani ports up to Afghan- 
istan. And where two friends of ours, such as 
Pakistan and India, have problems between them- 
selves, that inevitably imposes some strains on 
relations with both, but in general I would say 
tliat our relations with Pakistan are in good order. 

U.N. Bond Legislation 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the House action on the 
U.N. bond issue sticks, how does the United States 
intend to make good its substantial obligations? '^ 

A. Well, I hope very much and would expect 
that the Congress would find some way to adjust 
that action that was taken on amencbnent yester- 
day,'^ because the effect of it would be to give to 
any one of the 104 members of the United Nations 
a veto on our ability to buy United Nations bonds. 
Now, the membership of the United Nations have 
either bouglit or subscribed up to about $70 million 
worth of bonds already. We are supporting the 
U.N. in its effort to collect arrearages of assess- 
ments. We argued the case before the World 
Court '^ in favor of the compulsory character of 
these assessments for the Congo, for example. We 
expect a decision from the Court at almost any 
time, but we do not believe that the mere fact that 
some one member is in arreai-s sliould prevent the 
United States from moving ahead in support of a 
critically necessary action of the United Nations 
in a matter as important as the Congo. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you figure Telstar may help 
you solve sotne of yow foreign folicy froblems? 

A. I think we were all very pleased and excited 
by this remarkable technical achievement. I don't 
want to sound old-fashioned, but I am not always 
sure that the speeding up of communications helps 
us too much in the foreign policy business, partic- 
ularly if it simply speeds up the pace of events. 
However, we will have to adjust to that because 
that is inevitable. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Juis the immediate threat to 
Matsu and Quemoy subsided? 

" For statements by Secretary Rusk, Acting Secretary 
Hall, and Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, see iMi., July 
23, 1962, p. 142. 

" The House on July 11 adopteti an amendment to the 
foreign aid auUiorization bill to withhold U.S. funds from 
the United Nations until all member nations are current in 
dues and assessments. 

" Bulletin of July 2, 19C2, p. 30. 

A. I think there is nothing that I could add to 
what has been said in the last 2 or 3 weeks on that 
subject. There is nothing particularly new on 


India and Pakistan 

Q. Mr. Secretai^j, in our relations with India 
and Pakistan it has been assumed for a long time 
that, as we improve relations with one, inevitably 
relations with the other would worsen. Now we 
seem to be deteriorating on both fronts. Row do 
you explain that? 

A. Well, that is likely to be the impression at a 
time when the two themselves seem to be having 
sharp tensions in their relations with each other. 
But, as I have indicated before, in the case of 
Pakistan we worked with them very closely on a 
considerable number of matters, and in the case 
of India we and they both have supported the 
U.N. in the Congo. They have been helpful in 
the action of their chairman on the ICC in Viet- 
Nam, and we and they have worked together very 
closely on matters affecting the general structure 
of tlie financing of the United Nations, for ex- 
ample. There are many, many points of coopera- 
tion, even though in the case of important coun- 
tries such as Pakistan and India there will be 
times when there are particular points of 

Q. On Quemoy and Matsu is it fair to say that 
the CoTTimunist buildup has reached a kind of 
plateau, that it is not continuing and not 

A. We have had little indications of any further 
move in that direction. It seems to be about where 
it was about 2 or 3 weeks ago. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, press reports in recent weeks 
have called world attention to a policy planning 
paper prepared under the supervision of Mr. Ros- 
toio {Walt W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman 
of the Policy Planning Council]. Some of these 
reports led to think that Mr. Rostow is advocating 
a two-China policy — membership for Red China 
in the United Nations and recognition of Red 
China by the United States. Would you care to 
comment on this? 

A. Well, one of the difficulties about the knowl- 
edge of the existence of a paper which can't be 



Department of State Bulletin 

made known is that everybody can tend to read 
into the paper things that are not thei'e. I be- 
lieve most of those questions will be clarified if 
the Senate decides to release Mr. Kostow's testi- 
mony before the committee. I do not want, any 
more than my colleagues did before the Senate 
committee, to get into the question of the content 
of that paper, but I think those points could be 
easily clarified by a release of his testimony before 
the Senate committee. 

Secretary Rusk Interviewed 
on "Issues and Answers'' 

Following is the transcript of an interview of 
Secretary Rusk on the American Broadcasting 
Gompany''8 network television program '^Issues 
and Answers" on July 8. 

Press release 450 dated July 10 

The Announcer: From Washington, D.C., the 
American Broadcasting Company brings you 
"Issues and Answers." 

With the answers to the critical international 
issues facing this country, the Secretary of State, 
the Honorable Dean Eusk. 

Secretai-y Rusk, here are the issues. 

Question: Is confusion and bickering under- 
mining the war against the Communists in Viet- 

Question: Is Red China going to attack Quemoy 
and aiatsu ? 

Question: Has there been any progress in get- 
ting the Berlin talks off dead center ? 

Question: Are we getting ready to make new 
concessions to the Russians to get a nuclear test 

The Announcer: Now for the answers from the 
,,i i Secretary of State, recently returned fi'om a 10- 
day trip to five European capitals. To explore 
the issues are ABC correspondent Bob Clark and 
with the first question ABC State Department 
correspondent John Scali. 

The War in Viet-Nam 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, there are reports that 
the war to defeat the Communists in Viet-Nam 
isn't going too well, that the American military 
idvisers there are unhappy at alleged confusion 
ill (he command structure, and that things are not 
IS I hey should be. 

Secretary Rusk: Mr. Scali, I have seen the re- 
ports in the last day or so to which you refer. I 
also recall during World War II that I served 
from the company commander of infantry all the 
way to war plans on the General Staff and know 
that you can get almost any story that you want to 
out of a situation like this. 

The war in Viet-Nam is a dirty, untidy, dis- 
agreeable war. But the main fact is that the 
Vietnamese armed forces are on the initiative. 
They are out aggressively nmning down these 
guerrillas. The guerrilla incidents are dropping 
in number. There has been a considerable im- 
provement in such things as command structure, 
mobility, supply, intelligence — all of the elements 
which are so important in this kind of guerrilla 

Now there always is more to be done, and un- 
doubtedly this kind of warfare is frustrating to 
those who are taking part in it because the enemy 
is unseen. He strikes without warning or notice. 
And when you strike back at him, frequently he 
isn't there. But the important thing is that the 
South Vietnamese army is taking the initiativfi, 
they are reducing the incidents, and I think they 
are on the move. 

Mr. Scali : Then you don't see any evidence of 
confusion in command structure which is hurting 

Secretary Rusk : I think there have been some 
important steps taken to eliminate some of the 
confusion that existed. I think the coordination 
between the support which we are givuig to the 
South Vietnamese forces and the South Vietnam- 
ese command itself has to be worked on steadily, 
but I think these things are being ironed out un- 
der the very skillful direction of General Harkins 
[Paul Harkins, Commanding General, Military 
Advisory Command, Viet-Nam] and his men, and 
I am confident that this is not the problem. The 
problem is the very nature of the guerrilla war- 
fare itself. 

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied that 
South Viet-Nam's President Diem is doing enough 
to mobilize public support among his own people 
for this fight against the Communists? 

Secretary Rusk : Well, I think he has been doing 
a great deal more than say a year or two years ago, 
but I think I would never in a situation of this 
sort be willing to use the word "enough," because 
there is always more to be done. I think he has 

iuly 30, 1962 


been making some veiy substantial lieadway in 
this, but it is tlie unfinished business that always 
ought to be oiir first concern and it is the next step 
that ought to be at the top of our minds. 

Mr. Clark: Now that the war is over in Laos, 
there is some fear this will release some 10,000 
Communists to fight in North Viet-Nam. Are we 
doing anything to provide safeguards that this 
doesn't happen? 

Secretary Rush: Well, I understand in the ten- 
tative — the outlined — Geneva agreement which is 
now being worked on at the conference on Laos 
thei-e will be a specific understanding that Laos 
would not itself be a pathway for supplies or guer- 
rillas or leadership into any of the neighboring 
countries. This will be an obligation on the part 
of the Laotian Government. The two cochairmen 
would accept responsibilities for enforcing it. 
The International Control Commission would have 
obligations to keep an eye on it, and of course in 
South Viet-Nam itself there is intelligence and 
other means for determining whether or not this 
in fact is being carried out. 

I would say if in fact any of these Communist 
forces moved through Laos or from Laos into 
South Viet-Nam that would greatly exaggerate 
the crisis and we would have a great deal to say 
and do about what would result from that situa- 
tion. But it is not contemplated that this could 
occur under existing agreements. 

Mr. Scall: Mr. Secretary, have you been able to 
determine whether ISIoscow or Peiping exerts the 
most influence on the Laotian Communists and on 
the Communists from North Viet-Nam? 

Secretary Rusk: No, I wouldn't be able to assess 
the relative influence of those two capitals on the 
situation. There have been moments when I have 
had the impression that perhaps they did not see 
eveiy particular point in the same terms, or see eye 
to eye on them, but I wouldn't tiy to say at this 
point which had the larger influence at the moment. 

Communist Buildup Opposite Quemoy 

Mr. Scall: Mr. Secretary, on another Far East 
problem, as you well know there has been a buildup 
of Communist forces opposite Quemoy. Do we 
detect any sign that this could be a prelude to an 
attack on either Quemoy or Matsu? 

Secretary Ritsk: It is always a little dangerous 
to try to say exactly what is in the mind of some- 


one on the other side, on the mainland for example. 
There seems to have been some reinforcement of 
the areas adjacent to Formosa, but there are sev-, 
eral possible explanations, including precautionary 
measures in view of some of the speeches and talk 
that has been coming out of Formosa. Another 
might be the disturbances which have been associ- 
ated with food shortages and floods in that part of 
mainland China. There are some indications that 
perhaps the Commimist discipline in that area has 
not been as tight as they had expected it to be. But 
I would think at the moment the indications do not : 
point to a major attack on the offshore islands or 
on Formosa. 

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, we have said of course 
we would defend Quemoy and Matsu against any 
attack tliat would appear to be an invasion against 
Formosa. Could you conceive of an attack on 
these two islands against the backdrop of the pres- 
ent military buildup that we would not regard as 
an attack upon Formosa ? 

Secretary Rtisk: I think this is a matter on 
which the President would have to make a judg- 
ment, and I would not myself want to speculate 
about the circmnstances under which that judg- 
ment would be made. I do not think it would be 
well for me to go into that today. 

Mr. Scali: Do you plan to fly personally to 
Geneva to sign the Laotian peace settlement that 
seems to be about to be drafted ? 

Secretary Rusk: If there is a prompt and satis- 
factory settlement worked out there, there is some 
likelihood the foreign ministers would come over 
very briefly for the purpose of signing the agree- 
ment, but that is still in the offing and no final 
decision has been made on that. 

Talks on Berlin 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Gromyko [Andrei A. Gromyko, 
Soviet Foreign Minister] will apparently be there 
for the Soviet Union. Would you take advantage 
of his presence while he is there to discuss Berlin 
and perhaps disarmament? 

Secretary Rusk: I think if Mr. Gromyko and I 
and the other Western foreigii ministers found 
ourselves in the same city that we undoubtedly will 
have some talks on a good many subjects, including 
Bei'lin and disarmament. 

Mr. Clark: Mr. Khrushchev, as you know, has 
said this week there has been some progress on 
Berlin. Do j'ou agree there has been? 

Department of State Bulletin 





it t 


riff of 




trade I 


Secretary Rusk: There have been a number of 
ideas exchanged back and forth between the West 
ami the Soviet Union. I think perhaps the sense 
(if immediate crisis has been put to one side in the 
interests of a sober discussion of the underlying 
issues. I think there are some questions, perhaps 
111' a subsidiary character, upon which it would not 
1 ic 1 00 difficult to get agreement if there were agree- 
iiR'iit on the central issues, but our concern is that 
on the central issues of the vital interests of the 
AA'est we have not made satisfactory progress. So 
I do not at tlie moment see what, in the jargon of 
onr trade, we call a satisfactory basis for 

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, you liave said several 
I imes that we are in Berlin and we intend to stay. 
Does this mean that we woukl not negotiate any 
reduction in the Allied troop force in Berlin? 

Secretary Rusk : The question of the numbers of 
Allied forces in Berlin has never come up, and 
actually I don't believe that is the issue because 
till' numbers there are relatively small. They have 
11(1 overall military significance from the point of 
\ ii'w of the vei-y large number of Eussian forces, 
f (ir example, in East Germany. The issue is really 
thi^' presence of Western forces and our presence 
ill 1 ierlin and access to it. So the numbers of forces 
is not really a problem. 

Mr. Clark: Do you believe the Eussians would 
re'^ard it as progress toward settlement if we re- 
duced the Allied complement in Berlin ? 

Secretary Rusk: That is no impression that I 
have had, and in any event I don't believe that is 
a fruitful path to go down. I think the issue there 
is who is to be responsible and what are the vital 
interests of the respective parties. We could not 
trade out things of that sort in any great detail. 

Geneva Disarmament Talks 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretaiy, disarmament talks 
with the Soviet Union will resume in Geneva 
in exactly 8 days.^ Do you see a real hope for 
progress imtil the Soviets cari-y out this series of 
atmospheric tests that they say they are preparing ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I have seen their state- 
ments on this subject. I think that we ought to 
continue to work at this disarmament problem 
beginning again today just as we have over the last 
several months to try to find out wliere we can 

For backgroun(J, see Botxetin of July 23, 1962, p. 154. 

make some advance. We don't believe ourselves 
that this is a matter that the Soviets will in- 
definitely brush aside because they have a basic 
interest as do tlie rest of us in trying to find some 
way to bring this arms race to a close and begin 
to turn this arms race downward. 

Now we will go back to Geneva to do our best 
to fuid any way in which we can get started on 
actual physical disarmament, or any progress 
whatever on such an important thing as nuclear 
testing. One of the great problems thus far has; 
been that the Soviet obsession with secrecy has 
made it very difficult to take any steps which would 
have the proper safeguards so that all signatories 
to any such agreement could be reasonably cer- 
tain that the other side was carrying out the agree- 
ment. I think once we get across that kind of 
hurdle then we might begin to make some real 
headway. But as far as we are concerned we have 
been trying for months, indeed since March of last 
year, to make some headway in this. We have 
been trying right through our own test series. We 
will continue to try and hope vei-y much that some 
breakthrough will come at some stage when the 
common interests of both sides in limiting this 
arms race can be aclmowledged and we can get 
some agreement on the basis of that. 

Mr. Scali : The Defense Department made pub- 
lic a report yesterday that showed that a series of 
tests we had conducted had made some important 
progress in better detecting underground nuclear 
explosions. Do you think that this continuing 
series of experiments, if they proved to be success- 
ful, could open up the way for us to reduce the 
amount of inspection we believe necessary on So- 
viet soil ? 

Secretary Rusk: Those tests, of course, have 
been of veiy gi-eat interest to us in the Department 
of State and in the Disannament Agency. They 
are a result of a A^ery intensive and elaborate effort 
made to accomplish just what you have indicated, 
to find more effective ways of detecting testing. 
The results of these tests have not been fully eval- 
uated, and the possible developments out of these 
tests have not been looked at thoroughly. That 
is being done with great urgency. But I want to 
emphasize that so far as we can now tell it is still 
not possible to do all of this from long-distance 
instrumentation. Even under the best of the re- 
sults that we have had so far, some control stations 
and some on-site inspection would in any event be 

Jo/y 30, 1962 


Now, so long as the Soviet Union is Scaying 
adamantly, "No control posts" and "No on-site in- 
spection," then we are still back where we were. 
But nevertheless we feel if something could come 
out of these Vela tests in the way of instrumenta- 
tion which would give us assurance so we could re- 
duce the kind of inspection which would, in the 
fii-st place, be expensive and, secondly, would cause 
irritation and nervousness in such fields as espi- 
onage, this would be of great advantage. But 
nevertheless it still turns on whether the Soviet 
Union is willing to give reasonable assurances 
that any agreement is in fact being carried out. 

Mr. Scali : Do you think that the Soviets really 
are afraid of "espionage" that could be provided 
for under any inspection teams or detection sta- 
tions, or do you think this is an excuse for just 
saying no? 

'Secretary Rush : Well, in purely rational terms 
I would think that this obsession with secrecy has 
been carried much too far. For example, in the 
last session of the Geneva disarmament conference, 
we and the British put to them control and inspec- 
tion procedures which would involve having a 
look— international inspectors having a look— at 
less than l/2000th of Soviet territory in any single 
year. From the point of view of espionage it 
seemed to us that completely eliminated that prob- 
lem, but nevertheless Russia— and when I say 
"Russia" I mean Russia historically, long before 
the Communist Revolution— seems to have had 
this obsession with secrecy with respect to the for- 
eigner. And I can't say that this is not genuine 
on their side. All I can say is I think we have 
done everything humanly possible to remove this 
problem from the conversation. I must say that 
I have been disappointed and even a little sur- 
prised that they were not able, in the interests of 
turning this arms race downward, to accept these 
minimum assurances of security that were in our 
latest proposals in Geneva. 

North Atlantic Partnership 

Mr. CUrh: On a different subject, Mr. Secre- 
tary, President Kennedy has created a lot of com- 
ment around the world this week with his Fourth 
of July speech ^ calling for a partnership with Eu- 
rope. Can you give us some specifics as to what 
form this partnership might take ? 

' For text, see ihid.. p. 131. 


Secretary Rusk: Mr. Clark, it is not easy for me 
at this point to add very much to the President's 
excellent July Fourth speech or to what he said 
in his press conference last Thursday [July 5]. 
I think the great historical trend here is toward 
North Atlantic solidarity . 

Now, insofar as next steps are concerned, the 
next step, as the President pointed out, is in Eu- 
rope : the Common Market negotiations with the 
United Kingdom and some others; the detennina- 
tion by the Europeans as to what kind of Europe 
they want to organize. As far as we are con- 
cerned, we would welcome a Europe which is as 
unified and as solidified as the European traffic 
will bear, as they themselves could manage. 

The idea that we have some jealousy or some re- 
sistance or some resentment of the arrival on the 
world scene of a vigorous and strong and confi- 
dent and self-asserted Europe is just nonsense. 
This has been an object of American policy since 
1945. So the next chapter is to be written in Eu- 
rope. Then when they make their own determi- 
nations about what kind of Europe they want for 
themselves, then we, within the framework of 
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and 
OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development], and with trade negotiations 
which we hope will be authorized under the Presi- 
dent's proposals to the Congress, then we will talk 
out with the Europeans that Europe, how we and 
they can work very closely together. Because we 
have the same commitments, we are determined to 
work together. We have the same interests as 
far as the other parts of the world are concerned. 

The President emphasized that this North At- 
lantic Community as we see it is not a "rich man's 
club," I think were the words he used. It was 
outward-looking into all parts of the world — aid 
to underdeveloped countries, special relationships 
to countries all over the globe in the interests of 
this great free world of which we are a part. 

Now we have existing machinery which will per- 
mit us to go a very long way toward building fur- 
ther the partnership between the United States 
and Western Europe. Again, NATO and OECD 
gives us a great latitude with full support of con- 
gressional and political leaders in the country. It 
is for the longer range to consider whether there 
are still more formal steps which ought to be 

Mr. Srali: Mr. Secretary, do you think this au- 

Deparlmeni of Sfofe Bu//ef/n 

tomatically means there will be a reduction in the 
amount of American leadership and influence that 
we can exert in the Western World ? 

Secretary Rush: "Wlien you look back to 1947 
and 1948, when we, who had been unscathed, by 
and large, by the war, were about the only free 
country that could move with great effect in many 
parts of the world, when we were behind the Mar- 
shall Plan, when NATO defenses depended 
critically upon the United States, that period is 
fortunately not with us any longer. We have 
strong partners, strong allies, those who can help 
carry these burdens, and this is something that we 

Now in that sense the relative responsibilities 
of the United States may decline somewhat, but 
the total effect of this free-world partnership will 
increase and gi"ow. So you can't really put this 
just in terms of our national position. It is in 
our national interest that Europe take up the his- 
torical burden of the great story of freedom, which 
Europe has borne over the centuries with great 
effect — take it up and move it forward. We will 
be with them moving it forward, and in this joint 
interest we will have an effect, I think, on the 
shaping of history that will make an enormous 

Mr. Clarh : Do you think it is in our national in- 
terest, Mr. Secretary, that General de Gaulle is 
exerting his own strong views on many Western 
problems in Europe ? 

Secretary Rusk : Oh, I think General de Gaulle 
has made a historic contribution to France and 
to the Western World in what he has done from 
1942 onward. I think it is important for him to 
speak out on the issues that he feels strongly about 
because that is a part of the context within which 
this unified Europe will grow. And I think the 
joint commmiique which he and Chancellor Ade- 
nauer put out after their meeting showed that 
they are thinking in terms of a strong and vig- 
orous Europe in which Germany and France 
would, of course, play an important role. No, I 
think we are imder great obligation to General 
de Gaulle. 

Mr. Clark: Don't you think General de Gaulle 
to a degree has succeeded in wresting the leader- 
ship of the Western World away from the United 
States, to a degree ? 

Secretary Rusk : I wouldn't put it in those terms, 
because what is involved here really is how we and 

Europe best move together within the North At- 
lantic Community. I think General de Gaulle 
recognizes the fundamental importance of the clos- 
est possible cooperation between the United States 
and Western Europe. I have had no reason to 
think that there is any doubt in his mind about 
the fundamental importance of this great com- 
munity solidarity. 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, do you think it is 
possible that some day this Atlantic partnership 
might include the Soviet Union and the Eastern 
European coimtries? If I remember correctly, 
General de Gaulle has spoken of a imion stretching 
from the Atlantic all the way to the Urals. 

Secretary Rusk: Well, General de Gaulle, I 
think, was speaking, perhaps, in long-range his- 
torical tei-ms on that point. 

If the Soviet Union — their leaders — should ever 
decide to give first priority to the national interests 
of Eussia and to the deep and known interests of 
the Soviet — of the Kussian — people, then over 
time, over decades, I think things could be worked 
out to where thei-e could be much more of a normal 
relation between East and West. But this is going 
to require some major decisions across the Iron 
Curtain and some basic changes in their system 
and their attitude. So long as they are pursuing 
the basic doctrine of world revolution, so long as 
they are saying it is this kind of world rather than 
the type of world anticipated in the United Na- 
tions Charter, then tliere are the deep misgivings 
and there are deep crises ahead of us. 

Mr. Clarh: Is there a danger at the moment that 
we are moving in the other direction, that the Com- 
mon Market is driving such dissident Commu- 
nist countries as Yugoslavia closer to Moscow ? 

Secretary Rusk: No, tliis would, I think, depend 
upon the basis on which the Common Market works 
out its trade relations with other countries. Un- 
fortunately for this present period, when the Com- 
mon Market-U.K. discussions are going forward, 
it isn't possible for them to say clearly and specifi- 
cally what their attitude is going to be toward a 
number of other countries. But as we made it 
clear m our discussions with the Congress in con- 
nection with President Kennedy's trade proposals, 
we see our own negotiations with the Common 
Market moving in the direction of a common 
lowering of tariffs between that Common Market 
and our own common market on a most-favored- 
nation basis. We don't want Latin America, 

Jofy 30, 1962 


Japan, and other countries to be squeezed out of 
the tradhig opportunities in these two great 
trading centers. And I would very much hope 
that some of these countries in eastern and south- 
eastern Europe, such as Yugoslavia and Poland, 
would have easy and free access to the trading 
relationships with the West because there is no 
question about it at all that the peoples of those 
two countries have a deep affinity for Western ties. 
They have a nostalgia toward a restoration of 
these great traditional ties with the Western 
civilization. And that is all in the interests of 
the future of freedom for these doors to be kept 

Question of Aid to Yugoslavia and India 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Seci'etary, as you well know, aid 
to both Yugoslavia and India suddenly has become 
a controversial item in Congress, and I think the 
House is about to act perhaps this week on it. 

Would you consider it a diplomatic disaster, 
let's say, for the admiiiistration if the President's 
hands were to be tied by Congress to the point 
where no aid was possible to India and 
Yugoslavia ? 

Secretary Rush: I think it would be calamitous, 
Mr. Scali, if the President's freedom of action was 
inhibited by law in these two matters. The ques- 
tion is not, in the case of Yugoslavia, whether we 
are for or against communism. Yugoslavia has a 
Communist government, but it is independent of 
the Soviet Union. It is not a part of this interna- 
tional conspiracy against the free world. And we 
feel that it is very important that the door be left 
open. Now this isn't even a matter of the quantity 
of trade. This past year we have had very little 
aid as far as we are concerned to Yugoslavia, out- 
side of the Food-for-Peace Program and a little 
teclmical assistance, and that is about all. But it 
is very important that the President be free to 
leave the door open so that if and as normal and 
close relations become possible between Yugo- 
slavia and the West we can continue our general 
program of assisting Yugoslavia in maintaining 
its independence. 

This has been the attitude of President Truman, 
President Eisenhower, and President Kennedy, 
and I think it is very important that the Congress 
leave him that freedom of action. 

Insofar as India is concerned, there have been 
iiTitations between us and India in the last several 


months. Two great countries in opposite parts of 
the world with different positions, different prob- 
lems, are bound to have particular points in which 
they are in disagreement, and sometimes they dis- 
agree rather sharply. 

But the point is, here is a country of 450 million 
people which is the largest constitutional democ- 
racy in the world, that the world has ever seen. 
More people going to the polls in free, orderly elec- 
tions than we have ever seen anywhere, with basic 
commitments with which we are familiar, basic 
conomitments that they borrowed in part from the 
same people from whom we borrowed them, 
namely the British, Anglo-Saxon tradition of con- 
stitutional government. They have maintained 
that democracy in the face of some great difficul- 
ties : 450 million people, adding about 10 million a 
year ; an average income of about $70 per capita ; 
25 percent of them are illiterate ; a dozen or more 
major languages throughout the country; no com- 
mon language throughout the country. And yet 
they have made a constitutional system work along 
democratic lines. 

Now we have disagi-eed with them and they with 
us on certain issues like Goa, Kashmir, and nuclear 
testing, but we and they both have joined to 
support the United Nations in the Congo. They 
and we joined to defend the United Nations 
against the troika attack by the Soviet Union. 
The Indian chairman of the Control Commission 
in South Viet-Nam joined with his Canadian col- 
league to call attention to the fact that it was the 
North Vietnamese intrusion into South Viet-Nam 
that had stimulated this fighting in the last 2 

Now we will disagree on certain subjects. There 
is no reason why we shouldn't. India is not a 
satellite of ours, and we are not a satellite of India, 
and we are great countries with vital interests all 
over the world. So we will have our differences, 
but we also have great common commitments that 
are important and it would be a great mistake, I 
think, if we did not take an active, even if only 
a small, part in the Indian development program. 

I don't think people realize, Mr. Scali, for ex- 
ample, that in the Indian third 5-year plan more 
than $24 billion of investment are going to be 
needed for that plan. More than $20 billion of 
that will come from India itself, and less than $5 
billion will come from outside resources, and we 
and other friendly countries in the West are pro- 

Deparfmenf of Sfate Bulletin 

\ iding a substantial amount of that, but we are 
only providing as much as others in the West 
themselves pz'ovide. 

Our investment there, while it is large in actual 
terms, is relatively small in Indian terms. 

So these are the gi'eat historical stakes that we 
liave — that there be in Asia, that there be in the 
subcontinent, this strong constitutional democracy. 


Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, one quick question on 
Algeria. Now that peace has come to Algeria, 
there seems to be a power stmggle going on there 
among the Moslem leadership. Are we supporting 
either faction ? 

Journalism and Foreign Affairs 

iy Robert J . Manning 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairi 

By pure coincidence, a few days before coming 
here I rediscovered a somewhat obscure work by 
a onetime inhabitant of these parts, Mark Twain. 
In his story Report From Paradise, he tells of the 
difficulty old Captain Stormfield encountered after 
he frivolously wandered off course on his way to 
Heaven and thereby arrived at a golden gate some 
billion leagues away from the one through which 
late inhabitants of our planet were accustomed to 

The gatekeepers were not at all familiar with 
the type of creature who appeared impatiently be- 
fore them and were only puzzled when the captain 
tried to explain whence he had come. "California" 
meant nothing to them. Neither did "Earth." 
Nor even the solar sj'stem the newcomer described 
to them. Finally an attendant, riding a balloon, 
took off on a study of a map somewhat larger 
than the State of Ehode Island and, after 2 days 

Secretary Busk: We are not supporting any of 
of the factions in Algeria at the present time. The 
provisional executive there has been accorded re- 
sponsibility for government. We are discussing 
with them the question of the precise recognition 
of government in the usual way when arrange- 
ments can be worked out. But we do hope that 
the agony of the last 7 or 8 years can come to an 
end and these people can settle down to pick up 
the responsibilities for their independence. 

Mr. Scali: Sir. Secretary, we want to thank you 
very much for being with us today on "Issues and 

Secretary Rusk: Thank you very much, ]Mr. 

^Address made before the New York State Society of 
Newspaper Editors at Painted Post, N.T., on July 9 (press 
release 446). 

Ju/y 30, 1962 

647637—62 3 

of exploration with telescope and magnifying 
glass, hastened down with the report, "IVe found 
the place the gentleman comes from. It's the tiny 
planet we call The Wart." 

We can probably stand more of the sort of 
putting us in place that Mark Twain delighted in. 
But ours is a generally humorless age — perhaps 
too much so — and our sense of the smallness and 
transitoriness of human life is on most days over- 
whelmed by the sense of hugeness and the com- 
plexity of the traps and the obligations that harass 
us, as individuals and as a society, in our pursuit 
of life, liberty, and what passes for happiness. 

In the higher scheme of things the planet may 
indeed be only a wart. But it is our wart. And 
it is for us Americans probably more than any of 
its 2 billion inhabitants to determine what is to 
become of it, to influence the shape of its life today 
and its life for some time to come. 

We can truly contend with this only if we place 
against Twain's sardonicism of half a century ago 
the faith expressed a dozen years ago by the late 


William Faulkner when, in his Nobel prize ac- 
ceptance address, he said : 

I decline to accept the end of man. It is easy enougli 
to say that man is immortal simply because he will en- 
dure. ... I believe that man will not merely endure : he 
will prevail. 

It has become customary in this day of nuclear 
hazard to punctuate that moving credo with a ques- 
tion mark. Indeed, the facts of science and de- 
structive power are such as to intrude that 
question mark even into the unconscious of those 
who refuse consciously to question Faulkner's 

It is an intolerable doubt, and there is no more 
justified goal in public life today than the desire 
of men to exorcise that doubt in ways that leave 
mankind not only to prevail but to prevail with 
the freedom of consent, the freedom of action, and 
the freedom of mind that are the reasons why pre- 
vailing is wortli the battle. 

Foreign Relations, Part of Mainstream of Life 

This, for all the complications of diplomacy, of 
economics, of military strategies, is what foreign 
policy is all about. Foreign relations — our life as 
a nation and people with other nations and peo- 
ples — have become an inseparable part of the 
mainstream of life on this globe. It is a stream in 
which this nation, as the richest, most powerful, 
and, if you will, the most idealistic, must exert 
a dominant current. This sense of obligation lies 
close to the frastration that is reflected today in 
many elements of American life, including the 
news and editorial pages of many of your news- 

It all seemed so simple back in the days when 
this country had one crisis at a time on its slate 
and could look at the world as Thoreau looked at 
his small world around Concord : "Why is it that 
everywhere I go, people follow and paw me with 
their dirty institutions?" 

As recently as the late war years, when I was 
covering the Department of State as a United 
Press correspondent, the reporting of foreign re- 
lations was a relatively easy and amiable jjursuit. 
We would gather each day around the desk of 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull for an informal 
news conference. The issues at hand were few. 
Most of the time, the Secretary would listen po- 
litely to a question and reply, "You may .say that 
tlie matter is under constant study." 


We could make off for our telephones and dic- 
tate into the day's torrent of words our one or two 
reports on the progress — or retrogression — of the 
comity of nations. Mr. Hull would return to the 
contemplation of the few score or at most few 
hundred cables or reports that represented the 
day's State Department traffic. 

Somehow the newspaper mechanism that had 
served for a half a century or more seemed still 
sufficient. Those days' fragments of how the one 
or two crises were progressing would be sufficient 
to apprise even the busiest man of, roughly, how 
affairs were going. He would be able to remem- 
ber this day's fragments and fit them together with 
tomorrow's and the next day's with some degree of 
confidence that he sensed the way the world was. 

That he perhaps did not completely sense it was 
due to the phenomenon that was then beginning to 
grip and to contort the understanding and the re- 
porting of, as well as the conduct of, international 
relations in the postwar era — a phenomenon that 
has as much bearing on American journalism today 
as on government and diplomacy. 

Today foreign policy reaches into every Amer- 
ican home. Not just on April 15th, when every 
taxpayer faces up to his part of the bill (though 
it can be said that if there is to be any major drop 
in the tax burden on the American people it would 
come through developments in the world around 
us). But it affects every home that has to turn 
out young people for military service — we have 
more than 1 million Americans stationed outside 
the continental limits in defense of the free in- 
stitutions which are vital to the future of this 
country. Wherever there are jobs that depend 
upon or are affected by trade, there are homes di- 
rectly affected by foreign policy. Our overseas 
economic commitments are such that we require a 
favorable gap of more than $5 billion between our 
exports and our imports merely to stay even on 
the books. 

World of Crisis and Revolution 

Look at the global map of the moment. Where 
you lay a finger you fuid a crisis — in Berlin, the 
Congo, Viet-Nam, West New Guinea, to name only 
a few. It is a world, too, of revolution — the revo- 
lution that simmers across most of the South 
American Continent and which will be violent or 
will be peaceful depending in great part on our 
ability to help the good elements to prevail in 

Department of State Bulletin 

I, a I in America before the bad elements gain the 
upper liand. Look only at a few statistics about 
conditions south of our border to recognize the 
enormity — and the immediacy — of this problem. 

With a population of 200 million, Latin Amer- 
ica lias a gross product of $62 billion— less than 
*;;((() per capita (and in all but six countries the 
tigure is less than $200 per capita). Roughly 90 
percent of the land belongs to 10 percent of the 
owners. In Peru 1.6 percent of the landowners 
control 76.2 percent of the cultivated farmland; 
in Chile 2.2 percent control 73.2 percent. There 
are 50 million underprivileged adults. Of not 
quite 40 million children of school age, 11.2 mil- 
lion are not in school. With the school population 
increasing at a rate of 1.1 million a year, it would 
require 27,500 new schoolrooms and 30,000 new 
teachers each year merely to take care of the annual 
increase — without making any provision for the 
11.2 without schools. 

Similarly, revolution pulsates through South- 
east Asia and Africa— a kind of revolution also in 
our relations with a revitalized W^estern Europe, 
revolution in the exploration of the universe, and 
dangerous revolution in man's knowledge of the 
power to demolish himself and his works. 

In most of the trouble areas a sudden turn in 
events, a small miscalculation, or an arbitrary na- 
tional act, could touch off violence or war. Even 
the smallest of those conflicts could be the fuse to 
bigger war. 

In the relatively brief time since the casual con- 
claves of newsmen around Cordell Hull's desk we 
have seen the liquidation of colonial empires. We 
have doubled the membership of the United Na- 
tions and now have diplomatic relations with more 
than 100 countries — dozens more governments with 
which to come into conflict or common purpose in 
a multitude of exacting instances. 

We have in this brief period come into the time 
of adjustment between the white and nonwhite 
races. For three centuries, because of the political 
and economic and militaiy explosion of W^estern 
Europe, the white race has held a very special po- 
sition in the world. That fact is changing, and 
the minority white race has in front of it the great 
process of a realinement and normalization of re- 
lationships among human beings, among national 
states, among cultures and regions — a normaliza- 
tion which we must hope to shape into one that 
will be tolerable, safe, and acceptable for much 
time to come. 

July 30, 1962 

It would be difficult enough for the men dealing 
with this world — or those writing about it — if 
the job before us were simply to cope with and con- 
tain the turbulence. The task far surpasses that. 
The job is not only to maintain the peace, to pro- 
tect and promote the national interest, and to keep 
tlie turbulence under control, but actually to build 
amid the turbulence — to build new economic and 
social institutions, to build new chamiels through 
which the riches of the world can be more widely 
distributed and the injustices erased, to transform 
a climate of fear into an atmosphere of trust and 

No corps of engineers sets out to build a huge 
dam without first diverting the course of the river, 
so that strong foundations may first be laid. Yet 
those who would build the new world must do their 
rebuilding amid the very torrent of events. 

There may be many differences of opinion in 
this country about when, where, and how the build- 
ing ought to be done, but I cannot believe that 
there is any doubt that it has to be done. The sim- 
ple fact is that if we don't try, others will — to the 
detriment not merely of American ideals but also 
to the detriment of American national interest. 

I have not even mentioned yet, in this recital of 
the complications that war against coherence and 
continuity in foreign policy, the two most domi- 
nant elements of all. First, of course, is the basic 
conflict between communism and the Western 
World; second is the growing phenomenon of 
Western Europe. 

Conflict Between Communism and Western World 

The first remains the central preoccupation — 
the most threatening, the most dangerous, and the 
most taxing on the patience and ingenuity of those 
in the West who would And ways to prevail with- 
out nuclear war. It is a preoccupation in which 
strong certainties must mingle with gi-eat uncer- 
tainties: the cei-tainty, for example, that Soviet 
communism is not just a doctrine but also a global 
program of action — a progi-ani by men who desire 
their system to prevail over the world and who in 
most cases are most likely convinced that, in time, 
it will; the uncertainty, for example, about 
whether the West is indeed willing to shoulder 
the burdens that must be carried for many years 
to come if the Commimists' conviction is to be 
l)roved false. 

The so-called cold war has itself become in- 

tensely more complex and subtle in recent j'ears. 
With Stalin's death, Mr. Khrushchev turned to a 
broader spectriun of tools and instruments for 
supporting Soviet policy — a more sophisticated 
and more subtle policy. He has entered into the 
fields of military, economic, and social assistance 
outside the Communist bloc. He has given great 
emphasis to the doctrine of so-called peaceful 
coexistence and taken over a great many good 
"Western words for Communist purpose. 

These changes alone have had a bearing on our 
dealings with our own allies and with the neutrals 
and newly freed countries. They have made it 
necessary for us to reexamine many of our earlier 
cold-war assumptions and reflexes and cliches. It 
is a reexamination that I sometimes feel has gone 
further among diplomats and government officials 
than among some journalists. 

With all this more sophisticated Communist 
effort, has come intensified Communist reliance on 
what Klimshchev calls "justified wars of libera- 
tion," the kind of violent subversion and guerrilla 
warfare that is giving us so much difficulty in 
Southeast Asia — and might have taken fire by now 
in the Congo if it were not for brilliant, if still 
incomplete, diplomacy by the United States and 
the United Nations. "( I should add with reference 
to the Congo a cautionary note : The possibilities 
of serious trouble there, between the U.N. and the 
Congo Eepublic on the one hand and the Province 
of Katanga on the other, are not by any means 
ended. We cannot be sure that even the next few 
days will not bring fresh trouble there.) 

But all this has been accompanied, too, by diffi- 
culties within the Communist woi'ld. The Com- 
munists' own difficulties in agriculture, the obvious 
failures in East Germany memorialized by the 
Berlin wall, attest to this. The doctrinal debate 
between Moscow and Peiping has tended to pro- 
mote differences between Communist leaders and 
to throw confusion into what has been a certain 
intellectual attraction to conamunism in some non- 
Communist places. 

The more they run into difficulties, the more the 
Commimists have major decisions to make. The 
more it becomes apparent that they are not making 
headway, the more they can be expected to move 
toward their own version of what has been called 
••an agonizing reappraisal." Obviously, here is 
opportunity for us — but more hazard, too. We 
cannot be sure at the moment how any of these 


difficulties, or the smn of them, will afl'ect the 
Communist posture in the world or whether in the 
long rmi they might tend to separate the dogma 
from the program of action. 

Where we have the one direct confrontation with 
the Soviet Union — the nose-to-nose confrontation 
in Berlin — we have both an obligation and an 
opportunity. The obligation is naturally to the 
vital Western interest in maintaining its presence 
in, and free access to. West Berlin. The oppor- 
tunity is to maintain, through that crisis, a channel 
of contact with the Soviet Union — responsible 
contact that dramatizes the danger if this prob- 
lem, this potential casus helli, goes out of control. 
The fact that our vital interests in West Berlin are 
jiot negotiable should by now be clear to Moscow. 
That the talks between us have not yet produced 
any basis for negotiation does not reduce in any 
appreciable way the wisdom of keeping open the 
channel of contact over the most dangerous issue 
we face at this moment. 

Old Simplicities Outmoded 

One of the most trying aspects of this Berlin 
confrontation, as viewed from a journalist's posi- 
tion, is that it, like so many of the matters we have 
touched on tonight, no longer lends itself to the 
daily recital of blacks and whites, of forward or 
backward steps, that make up the core of the con- 
ventional news story. 

The same can be said of the developing big 
story of Western Europe and our ultimate rela- 
tionship with it. Many chapters lie ahead — the 
most immediate being the negotiations concerning 
Britain's entry into the Common Market — before 
we know the shape of the Europe with whom we 
on this side of the Atlantic will hope to join in the 
"declaration of interdependence" proposed earlier 
this month by President Kennedy .= 

Here again, the old sunplicities and reflexes we 
have been applying — in government and in jour- 
nalism — have been altered or outmoded. The 
Western Europe of our recent postwar image, 
weak and threatened, suppliant for our aid and 
nakedly reliant on U.S. military power, is gone. 
Western Europe has grown up again, and its new- 
found strength and ambition demand of us quite 
different acts and emotions. Still another part of 
the old cliche is gone: The young, too-idealistic 

= lUu.ETi.v of July 23, 1962, p. 131. 

Department of State Bulletin 

Viuerica of World War I days, the youthfully 
iisillusioned America of between the wars, both 
lave gone. We are big boys now — very big indeed. 
[ am struck by a phrase used by Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk to describe what has happened to the 
Ajnerica that has become possessor of the frightful 
night of the nuclear weapon. Owning it and re- 
jecting on the terrible burdens of choice and de- 
•isions it entails — decisions related to the basic 
inestion, what is the end of man? — has made us, 
le says, as old as Methuselah. 
isibli Perhaps the maturity is not all that evident to 
prol) jur friends, and perhaps it escapes those who have 
lot yet the full inkling of how this power in fact 
nhibits rather than enhances its owners' freedom 
jf action. But it is a fact, and this, too, lies close 
;o the frustration I referred to a few minutes ago. 
I am not attempting here to solicit special mercy 
for government (though I do believe on the basis 
)f a few months' experience that for its admitted 
fallibilitj' it is doing a remarkable job of assessing 
ind mounting the opportunities open to this 
lation). Nor do I care here to take on the mut- 
:«rings of "no win" policy that have filled the air 
in recent months. Of course we want to win, and 
all the efforts, big and small, of our foreign and 
defense policies are directed at this central aim. 
We want to win without grievous damage to the 
tiuman race, including ourselves. If the "no win" 
critics grant, as they seem to, that the Communists 
somehow can without a nuclear war take over the 
world while we aren't jjaying attention, or caring, 
they surely must have sufficient faith in America 
and Western concepts to concede that we, too, can 
find the way to prevail without reverting to 

Schizophrenic Coverage of Foreign Affairs 

The point I have been working toward — with- 
out, I trust, overdrawing on your patience — is to 
say a few words about how all this seems to relate 
to journalism. If I may, I speak to you as a 
journalist, one who has been a journalist all his 
adult life and happens for the moment to be work- 
ing in government, a job that keeps me as close to 
important journalism and its raw material as my 
past assignments as a reporter or editoi'. Given 
that permission, I may take advantage of it to 
the extent of saying some things that may not be 
altogether pleasing. 

I offer not a declarative sentence but a question, 

July 30, 1962 

one that is a fair question for this time and this 
audience: Has our journalism altogether caught 
up with the events and complexities of the world 
it seeks to reflect and to explain ? Has journalism, 
in its techniques, its assessments, its ways of pres- 
entation, its judgment of what is new (as against 
what is news) changed as much in the jDast half 
century as the volume and nature of foreign 
affairs ? 

I find a curious sort of split personality within 
the newspaper fraternity on the question of for- 
eign affairs coverage. There is much complaining 
these days that the Government does not ade- 
quately inform the public of the nature and the 
rudiments of foreign policy and the issues requir- 
ing choice by the public as a whole. I am in- 
clined to agree with much of this criticism — and 
feel that one of the challenging features of my 
sort of job in government is to find ways for im- 

There is much criticism to the effect that the 
Government is too parsimonious with information, 
that the full facts are not revealed, or revealed so 
gradually as to obscure the full meaning. I'm not 
inclined to quarrel with this criticism, either. 
Even the most publicly oriented bureaucracy is 
neither empowered nor qualified in a democracy to 
set itself up as the judge of what tlie people should 
or should not know. 

Yet there is within government a built-in tend- 
ency toward what might be called a "Parkinson's 
law on information": Wliat you don't tell can't 
hurt you. There is a natural tendency in any 
bureaucracy to shield its misjudgments and its 
mistakes. I would not presume to claim that this 
part of Parkinson's law has been suddenly re- 
scinded in Washington. I would say quite flatly, 
however, that in the top reaches of tliis Govern- 
ment there is a full recognition of the dangers of 
this tendency to the full operation of the demo- 
cratic process and there is full and active recogni- 
tion of the fact that what the public needs and 
must get is not less information but more. 

There is where the schizophrenia seems to me to 
intrude itself. In instance after instance you will 
find editors and publishers who insist on the one 
hand that there must be a greater flow of informa- 
tion but say on the other that the reading public 
really doesn't want to read all that guff about for- 
eign affairs. I think many of you will agree that 
the proportion and the placement devoted to more 


than spot-news coverage of foreign affairs in 
many newspapers reflects this somewhat negative 
view of the public interest. 

Which is it: The public needs and wants to 
laiow more, or the public doesn't? I think the 
facts contradict those editors who see a minimal 
interest in foreign affairs. Only 4 years ago, ap- 
proximately 40,000 letters on foreign policy ques- 
tions came to the Department of State for replies. 
Last year the total was 180,000. This year it v/ill 
surpass 200,000. Requests for speeches by Ameri- 
can diplomats and other foreign policy officers are 
running twice those of last year. 

Beginning last year, the Department began a 
program of foreign policy briefing conferences in 
Washington and around the country. The re- 
sponse to those has been such as to cause us to 
draw plans for twice as many this year. 

It is noteworthy that these channels of com- 
munication have little or nothing to do with the 
press. Is there not an inference here? If the 
public were getting what it wanted from the press, 
would these extrajournalistic measures be nec- 

I am aware that, in the matter of volume alone, 
much of the picture implied here can be refuted. 
Is it perhaps not a matter of volume but of the 
kind of reporting and writing about foreign af- 
fairs that is at issue ? 

From my new vantage point, I have come closer 
to a conviction that had begim to be nurtured well 
before I even knew that I might be working on 
the government side of the information profession. 
From this vantage point it often seems that in 
today's conditions both government and public 
are too often the captives of the spot-news report, 
the daily headline, the miuute-to-minute news bul- 
letins, the smartly written but not very deep 
weekly commentaries that tell us too simply and 
too certainly the momentary dope on each of the 
dozen or more crises that grip us at the moment. 
The profusion of material is great, for which we 
should be grateful. Communications' speed is 
only a little short of instantaneous, and for this, 
too, I suppose we should be thankful. But the 
question persists: Has joui-nalism and its allied 
crafts moved sufficiently beyond the techniques of 
a past generation? Is it not worth wondering 
whether, even in the best hands, the day's or the 
week's news does not represent fragments? I'he 
reader is left to try, if he can, to fit today's pieces 


of a dozen big problems into what he can remem- 
ber of yesterday's fragments and those of the day 
before. Even in the best of reportorial hands, it 
is possible that this fragment of the Congo situa- 
tion or that fragment of the Laos problem tacked 
to an arbitrary deadline can be something of a 

And what fragments are important anyway? 
I am astonished — perhaps the word should be "ap- 
palled" — at the number of reportorial manhours 
that can be spent in Washington today in a search, 
say, for first mention of the name of a prospective 
new ambassador. What is so important about 
getting that first at the sacrifice of hours that could 
be devoted to pulling together a sharp assessment 
of the long-term results, good or bad, of U.S. aid 
to Poland, which has been receiving American aid, 
or in Czechoslovakia, which has not ? 

Is there perhaps some merit in the advice given 
recently to a group of editors by Pope John in 
Rome? With all the complications and ramifica- 
tions of even the smallest mternational event to- 
day, he wondered, should not more editors culti- 
vate a "discipline of waiting," for, he added, 
"nothing is more capable of rendering good senti- 
ments sterile than an avalanche of news used 
indiscriminately. . . ." 

I would be disappointed and, I submit, mis- 
understood if I were to leave you with the impres- 
sion that I speak here as a carper or querulous 
critic. Nothing could be more wrong. I have 
raised no questions that have not been raised by 
many reporters and editors. It is as a journaMst 
that I speak, and with pride that I have had the 
opportunity to talk of these things with a candor 
that is the best way I know of expressing the es- 
teem and the devotion that is due to an institution 
as indispensable to democracy as hydrogen or oxy- 
gen to water. It takes only a brief squint at the 
past to show that today's journalism in America 
is better than yesterday's. There is nothing 
wrong, I think you will agree, to hope with some 
confidence that it is not nearly as good as to 

Letters of Credence 

Somali Republic 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Somali 
Republic, Omar Mohallim Mohamed, presented 
his credentials to President Kennedy on July 13. 

Department of Sfofe Bulletin 

I'or text of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release 455 dated July 13. 

President Hails Successful 
Operation of Telstar 

P' Statement hy President Kennedy 

White House press release dated July 11 

The successful firing and subsequent operation 
of the Telstar coinmunications satellite is an out- 
standing example of the way in which government 
and business can cooperate in a most important 
field of human endeavor. The achievement of the 
communications satellite, while only a prelude, 
already throws open to us the vision of an era of 
international communications. There is no more 
important field at the present time than commimi- 
cations, and we must grasp the advantages pre- 
sented to us by the coinmunications satellite to use 
this meclium wisely and effectively to insure 
greater understanding among the peoples of the 

U.S. Lifts Travel Curbs on Soviet 
Tourists and Exchange Visitors 

Press release 441 dated July 6 


In a note handed on July 6 to Soviet Ambassador 
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin at "Washington by Under 
Secretary Ball the United States informed the 
Soviet Government that it was eliminating the 
retaliatory system of closed areas so far as they 
apply to Soviet tourists and to other Soviet citizens 
visiting the United States within the framework 
of the exchanges agreement. The step was taken 
as a contribution toward the successful fulfill- 
ment of the new agreement on exchanges in scien- 
tific, technical, educational, cultural, and other 
fields concluded on March 8, 1962.^ The United 
States note expressed the hope that the Soviet 
Government would take similar action in the inter- 
ests of the exchanges program. The note also 

For a statement by Charles E. Bohlen and text of a 
joint communique, see Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 652. 

July 30, 7 962 

reiterated the United States desire for complete 
and mutual abolition of all travel restrictions and 
renewed the United States proposal that repre- 
sentatives of the two Governments meet to discuss 
the question. 

The closed-area system which was inaugurated 
in 1955 in response to longstanding Soviet restric- 
tions will continue to apply to other Soviet cit- 
izens in the United States, including personnel 
assigned to the Soviet Embassy and tlie Soviet 
Mission to the United Nations. Although the 
closed-area system will no longer cover Soviet 
visitors coming to the United States within the 
framework of the exchanges agreement, their 
itmeraries, as in the past, will be worked out by 
the Department's Soviet and Eastern European 
Exchanges Staff. Itineraries given comparable 
American groups by the Soviet authorities will 
likewise continue to be borne in mind in the de- 
termination of the itineraries for Soviet visitors. 


The Secretary of State presents his compliments to 
His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the notes 
of January 6, 1961,^ November 11, 1957,' and January 3, 
1955,* which established regulations concerning travel by 
Soviet citizens in the United States comparable to those 
previously imposed by the Soviet Government on the 
movement of citizens of the United States in the Soviet 

The Government of the United States regrets that the 
Soviet Government has not acted on the United States 
proposal in the note of January 6, 1961, that representa- 
tives of the two Governments meet at an early date to 
discuss the abolition or reduction of travel restrictions. 
The Government of the United States continues to believe 
that the closed area system, first instituted by the Soviet 
Government, is not conducive to improved relations be- 
tween the two countries. 

Several months ago a new exchanges agreement was 
signed. Like its predecessors it contained an expression 
of hope that the contemplated exchanges would con- 
tribute significantly to the betterment of relations be- 
tween the two countries, thereby contributing to a 
lessening of international tension. The continued exist- 
ence of travel restrictions works in the contrary direction. 
The Government of the United States has, therefore, de- 
cided to eliminate its system of closed areas so far as they 
apply to Soviet tourists and to other Soviet citizens visit- 
ing the United States within the framework of the ex- 

' For text, see md., Jan. 23, 1961, p. 119. 
' For text, see ibid., Dec. 9, 1957, p. 934. 
' For text, see Hid., Jan. 31, 1955, p. 193. 


changes program. The Governmeut of the United Slates 
wishes to express the hope that the Soviet Government 
will consider also making a contribution to the aims of 
better mutual understanding and of broadening of co- 
operation between the peoples of the two countries which 
are envisaged in the exchanges agreement. 

The existing notification and closed zone regulations 
will continue to apply to all other Soviet citizens in the 
United States, in accordance with the notes of January 
6, 1961, November 11, 1957, and January 3, 195."). In 
addition, the notification system presently applied to 
long-term visitors will he retained. 

The Government of the United States reiterates once 
again its desire for complete and mutual abolition of all 
travel restrictions. In the absence of a corresponding 
interest on the part of the Soviet Government, however, 
it is also prepared on a reciprocal basis to reduce the 
remaining travel restrictions as a whole or, alternatively, 
to reduce or abolish them for individual categories of 
Soviet citizens. The Government of the United States 
renews, therefore, its proposal of January 6, 1961, that 
this question be discussed at an early date. 
Depaktment of State, 

The Lawyer and the Alliance for Progress 

ty Abram Chayes 
Legal Adviser ^ 

I was delighted when your chairman suggested 
that I talk to you about the Alliance for Progress. 
No time or place could be more appro^jriate for 
such a talk. Here is a conception gigantic enough 
to capture the imagination even of Texans. And 
the President's visit to Mexico last weekend ^ re- 
vealed again — as yours will next week — the im- 
portance and the potency of the phrase Al'umza 
fara el Progreso. 

But what is the alliance? Is it anything more 
than a catchy, high-sovmding phrase? I think it 
is much more than that. But like so many goals 
to which man has set his heart and strength, only 
time and history will tell whether it has reality. 
The alliance is our name for a vast cooperative 
effort by the peoples of the Western Hemisphere 
and their governments to lift a continent bodily, 
and within a decade, into the world of the 20th 

The alliance represents for us a challenge and 
an opportunity. But the obverse of challenge 
and opportunity is danger. And there is no ques- 
tion that in the Latin America of a year ago the 
conditions of life for the mass of people foretold 
danger. That danger persists today. 

' Address made before the State Junior Bar of Texas 
at San Antonio, Tex., on July 5 (press release 436). 
* See BtTLLETiN of July 23, 1962, p. 135. 

Hunger and dietary deficienc