Skip to main content

Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

See other formats



^^^L"^-' ^ 

Vol. XLVII, No. 1214 October 1, 1962 



by Deputy Under Secretary Johnson 475 


by Assistant Secretary Cleveland 482 


U.S. FOREIGN POLICY • by Ridmrd iV. Gardner . . 496 


STATE • by Assistant Secretary Martin 487 




For index see inside back cover 


Vol. XLVII, No. 1214 • Publication 7431 
October 1,1962 


For BBle by tbe Superintendent ot Docnments 

U.S. OoTemment Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.O. 


82 iBsneB, domestic e.M, foreign $12.25 

Single oop7, 25 cents 

Use of funds for printing ot this publica- 
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau 
of the Budget (January 19, 1961). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation ot the Dbpaetment 
o» Stite Bulletin as tbe source will be 
appreciated. Tbe Bdlleiin is Indexed In the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
and interested agencies of the 
Government icith information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and tlie Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by tlie IThite House and the 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses made by tJve President and by 
the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various ptmses of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which tlie United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and legis- 
lative material in the field of inter- 
natiorml relations are listed currently. 

ow To Combat Communist Goals 

hy U. Alexis Johnson 

Deputy Hinder Secretary for Political Ajf airs ^ 

I appreciate your courtesy in asking me to join 
ith you this evening, for all of us involved in f or- 
^ affairs are well aware of the helpful interest 
at tlie Junior Chamber of Commerce has taken 

the matters exemplified by this Institute, wliile 
5o carrying out the constructive work in which 
lU have long engaged within this country. 
All of us who are in this business realize that 
r foreign policy can be no stronger than the 
pport that lies behind it in the country as a 
liole. With no home and no person in our coun- 
y more than 30 minutes away from potential in- 
neration, foreign policy is very much the business 
' all of us, and the subject on which I was asked 

speak this evening, "How To Combat Commu- 
st Goals," is indeed veiy well chosen. 
I sympathize with persons such as yourselves 
ho are properly and of necessity engrossed in 
)ur daily business, community, and family af- 
lirs and yet want to take an informed interest 

this business of foreign affairs. It is a terribly 
•mplicated business and becoming more so each 
ly; yet the time you are able to devote to it is 

cessarily very limited. You read this headline 
day and tomorrow you read another, and you 
3 not know what or whom to believe. This leads 
I confusion and confusion often leads to anger, 
et we all know that anger does not produce co- 
irent thinking. 

When I am away from the daily and hourly flow 
I information in Washington and dependent for 
y information on headlines, with usually very 
cief articles, it has often occurred to me that the 

'Address made before the Middle Atlantic Institute of 
le Junior Chamber of Commerce at Washington, D.O., on 
3pt. 15 (press release 557 dated Sept. 14) . 

cfofaer 7, J 962 

picture one gets of foreign affairs solely from such 
sources must be very like the picture that the 
proverbial man from Mars would get of one of our 
cities if he were entirely dependent upon the local 
press for his information. I say this in no sense 
as critical of the press, radio, or television foreign 
news coverage but rather to point out that it is 
inlierent in the situation. Just as in your cities 
it is not the 999 people soberly going about their 
accustomed tasks teaching school, constructing a 
building, ministering to the ill, manufacturing 
useful things, and so on, that ordinarily make the 
news, but rather the 1,000th who makes news by 
committing a crime or creating trouble of some 
kind. We know our own communities well 
enough to know that the one is not typical of the 
other 999, but we do not have the same background 
when it comes to foreign matters and are tlius more 
apt to take the headline as typical of the whole. 

My point is not that there is not trouble in the 
world around us, for there is indeed trouble, but 
rather that we need to look not only at the trouble 
but also at the tremendous amount of constructive 
work going on in order to have a proper picture 
of the situation in which we find ourselves. 

You can be sure that there are none who better 
appreciate that the world we live in is rapidly 
changing than those of us in the State Depart- 
ment who have seen this transformation take 
place. If you will pardon a personal note, when I 
joined the Foreign Service in 1935 there was a 
total of 665 officers serving in Washington and in 
the 61 coimtries with which we maintained diplo- 
matic relations. In an average country abroad 
there were usually not more than five or six of us, 
including the ambassador, and we were usually 
the only official Americans in the country. In a 


busy month the State Department might handle 
something around 2,000 telegrams. Today there 
are almost 700,000 official American civilians 
abroad, phis about another million military per- 
sonnel, and in the State Department alone we 
handle more telegrams in a day than we formerly 
handled in a month. In just a small way this is 
uepresentative of the change that has taken place 
in the impact of the woi'ld on these United States 
and our impact on the world. 

The Development of Nationalism 

During this period two other great forces have 
had and are having their impact on the world. 
One is veiy apparent to all of us— communism. 
(I deliberately do not add the adjective "interna- 
tional," "Soviet," or "Cliinese" as I want later 
to return to this question.) The other great force, 
of which we are less aware but which may in the 
long run prove to be at least of equal importance, 
is the development of nationalism among that more 
than half of the world's population that prior to 
the Second World War was under various forms 
of colonialism. If we are to understand and deal 
with the former, it is equally important that we 
also understand and deal with the latter. 

Few probably realize tliat in the 17 short years 
since the end of the Second World War 45 new 
free states have been formed and more are still 
on the way. These range from the great state of 
India, with its more than 450 million people, and 
Indonesia, with its almost 100 million, to the 
smaller states of Africa. In total population they 
far exceed ourselves. Western Europe, and the 
Soviet Union combined. Many of these states 
have gone through or are going through what we 
may at times regard as aberrations. However, 
they also present aberrations when looked at from 

You will recall that Moscow has pressed might- 
ily on this subject of colonialism by others on two 
premises. One was that being forced to give up 
its colonies would weaken the West, and the sec- 
ond was that the former colonies would embrace 
communism and thus pass to the control of Mos- 
cow. However, this has just not happened. No 
single one of these 45 new states has chosen com- 
munism for itself. (I do not include in tliis figure 
Nortli Viet-Nam and North Korea, which bor- 
dered on Communist states and were within the 
grip of Communist armies.) At times some of 







these 45 states have appeared to liover on the brinl "* 
and Moscow has made major investments to brin *"' 
them to that brinlc, but fierce national pride hs '"' 
asserted itself and they have clambered back ui 
the slippery slope 

There is a fundamental truth here in which w 
can take comfort, although it should not cause i 
to relapse into any form of complacency. Th 
truth is that our national well-being, in fact tl: 
fundamental philosophy at the base of our nation! 
life, does not require that foreign countries be oi 
satellites or dependencies or be formed in ar 
single image of ourselves. Diversity and tole 
ance of diversity are a fundamental part of oi 
own life and the way we look at the world. As tl 
President has stated it,- our goal is: 

... a i)eaceful world community of free and Indepen 
ent states, free to choose their own future and their ov 
system so long as it does not threaten the freedom 

Some may choose forms and ways we would not choc 
for ourselves, but it is not for us that they are choosii 
We can welcome diversity — the Communists cannot. F 
we offer a world of choice — they offer the world 

We are naturally flattered and pleased wh 
someone seeks to pattern his social, political, 
economic institutions upon ours, for properly ^ 
feel that those institutions have served us we 
However, we recognize that other peoples with d; 
ferent cultural backgrovinds and different natur 
environments will probably evolve differing ins! 
tutions. To have stability, these political instit 
tions must in some form have what our Declar 
tion of Independence so aptly termed "the conse 
of the governed." The old Chinese term for it w 
the "mandate of Heaven." Even with the politic 
genius of our ancestors, it took many years and 
great Civil War to establish our own pattern. '. 
many ways the process is never finished and co 
tinues with each session of the Congress and t 
Supreme Court. 

Understandably, most of these new countries |j 
and, for that matter, many older ones — are goi 
tlirough the same process, often with much h jy 
with which to work and always under the gre 
contending forces and pressures of this mode 
world. We can sympathize with and understa; 
this process. Wliile it is annoying and often fri 
trating when these countries do not look at t 
world outside of them through the same glasses 












' Bulletin of Jan. 29, 19C2, p. 159. 

Department of Stale Bulle i 


urselves, the thing that is of vital national im- 
n ortance to us is that these countries not become 
iibservient to a power hostile to ourselves. 
ck I lappily, these countries are also seeking to avoid 
abservience to anyone, and thus we have a soimd 
asis for mutual cooperation based on the sound 
rounds of mutual self-interest. We, of course, 
ill also always value allies willing to associate 
[lemselves with us for common ends. 

ationalism and Communism Incompatible 

The position of the Soviet Union is vastly dif- 

rent. The Soviet Communist system cannot 
jlerate material differences of diversity, although 
iictically it may appear to do so for temporary 
eriods. This demand for conformity, not only 
Q a domestic but also an international plane, 
rises not just from the personal characteristics 
f Soviet leaders but rather more fundamentally 
lif« rem the very imperatives of the system itself. 

This is not solely a matter of ideology, im- 
ortant tliough that is, but arises from the practi- 
al requirements of the system. Communism re- 
uires a controlled and directed economy down 
) its most minute details. In my service in a 
Communist country I was increasingly impressed 
Tith the fact that production and consumption 
aust be regulated and controlled by a central au- 
^ hority because there are not built into the system 
hose automatic controls with which we are so 
amiliar. This central control of the resources 
joing into production includes, most importantly, 
he human resource — that is, people. To the de- 
cree that such control is effective — that is, people 
an be made to respond to it — the system can op- 
rate. "Wlien people do not respond to it, the 
ystem is endangered. 

The same is true on the international scale. 
fOomfortably to fit into the Soviet scheme of 
hings, other states must be responsive and dis- 
iplined to Soviet control both in the economic 
md political context, for one cannot be divorced 
LTom the other. This is increasingly being recog- 
lized not only in free countries but also within 
he Communist countries themselves. It faces 
iommunism with a fundamental challenge for 
ivhich it by no means has found an answer. My 
)wn conviction is that it cannot find an answer 
md remain the communism that we have known. 

In part this is demonstrated by the fact that 
we can even today no longer speak of a "Com- 

Ocfofaer 7, 7962 

munist bloc" in the same way as we did 10 years 
ago in the sense of a solid group of countries cen- 
trally directed and controlled in all things by 
Moscow. We need now to differentiate from the 
original Soviet Communist model, each in its sep- 
arate way, the variants of communism found in 
Yugoslavia, Red China, Poland, and Albania. 
Thus, even in the orbit of communism, nationalism 
is asserting itself. The bitterness of even the pub- 
lic debate within the Communist world is witness 
to the difEculty that the doctrine is having in try- 
ing to adapt itself to the realities of the interna- 
tional scene. 

I have hastily sketched over some of this back- 
ground as I feel that it is important to understand- 
ing the world in which we are living. In doing 
so, I hope that my remarks will not be interpreted 
in any sense as implying that we can be complacent 
or that I am attempting to gloss over the prob- 
lems we will continue to face, for this is far from 
my thought. Rather, what I have attempted to 
show is that there are at work in the world many 
different forces. While we can, to a degree, hope 
to influence some of these forces, we cannot expect 
to control them. To seek to do so would be to fall 
into the Soviet error. Plowever, what I have tried 
to demonstrate is that we need not fear these forces 
of nationalism but rather can welcome them as 
being compatible with our own tradition and in- 
compatible with Communist doctrine. We should 
take confidence in this, as it again demonstrates 
that our own tradition is still more closely attuned 
to the universal aspirations of mankind than any 
other system yet devised. It is important that 
we remain true to this tradition. 

Thus we have in the world today three great 
forces: the aggressive forces of communism, the 
assertive nationalism of the newly developing 
countries, and the great democratic tradition of 
this country and Western Europe. "What are we 
doing about it, and, specifically, what can you do 
about it? 

Defeating Communist Insurgency 

Only a few brief words on the military aspects. 
In the first place it is obvious that all else would 
count for little if the Soviet Union were to achieve 
a decisive military superiority over us. This it 
has not done. Simply let me say that we have 
sound grounds for confidence that, no matter what 
degree of surprise the Soviets might acliieve in an 


attack on the United States, we could still also 
inflict crippling devastation on the Soviet Union. 
Soviet recognition of this fact is our best deter- 
rence against general war. However, this is not 
a static situation but rather one that will continue 
to call for the best of brains and much of our 
treasure. It would be simple and easy to bring 
about a situation in which both countries would 
be devastated. To use this power wisely and well 
so as to promote our interests without bringing 
about such a result calls for a high degree of 
sophistication and steady nerves. At the same 
time we are seeking in the disarmament negotia- 
tions to halt and if possible to turn downward this 
ever-increasing spiral of terror. 

With the standoff in nuclear power and inability 
of the Communists to win allegiance by open 
means, we will probably continue to face situations 
such as that in South Viet-Nam, where the Com- 
munists seek to impose their control by insurgency 
or guerrilla warfare. This type of warfare is, of 
course, nothing new. In 1948 five Communist-led 
revolutions were underway in Asia, in addition to 
the civil war in China. These were in Indonesia, 
Bunna, Malaya, the Philippines, and what was 
then called French Indochina. There was also a 
major push by the Communist Party in India. 
Except in North Viet-Nam, where they were able 
to capture the nationalist movement, the Commu- 
nists were defeated in all of these efforts, as they 
were also defeated in Greece. They were, of 
course, successful in China, as subsequently they 
were successful in Cuba. I will not attempt this 
evening to go into the circumstances that led to 
their success in these latter two countries. 

My point is that Communist insurgency can be 
defeated. It usually has been, and I am confident 
it will be defeated in South Viet-Nam. However, 
in each rase where it has been defeated it has been 
primarily by the forces of nationalism within the 
country. We can assist and advise, as we are 
doing in South Viet-Nam, but we do not and 
should not wage "American wars" against insur- 
gent forces. In our concern with the ever- 
increasing complexity of general warfare, we had 
perhaps neglected our capabilities of assisting 
countries facing this type of threat in which 
muzzle-loading rifles and even crossbows are more 
important than supersonic jet fighters. This type 
of warfare calls for a true blend of political, eco- 
nomic, and military measures. Quiet organiza- 



iion 10 

llies » 
stead 0' 

tional and training steps have been taken by tk flat 
administration both in Washington and the fiel liaB 
to improve our ability to assist in meeting the! hat of 

Terms of the Economic Struggle 

There remain the terms of the economic struggl« ,ji,51a 
I know that this is a field in which you have 
particular interest. Many of you in this room th; 
evening will have a direct and personal part t 
play in this process. There are several facets t 
this matter. First, and most important, is how w 
Americans continue to progress in resolving oi 
own economic problems such as assuring a decer j[j,.|ijt, 
income for the perhaps 10 percent of our populi 
tion who have an income below decent subsisten* 
standards ; what we are able to do about those ( 
our working population who are without jobe .„ 
wl^at we are able to do about the fact that the pe L 
centage growth of our gross national product hi 
declined. While I full well realize that the dec 
sions of government will play an important pa 
in this, the ultimate decisions on this will be ma( 
by the individual decisions of those sitting in th 
room and your business colleagues everywhere : 
this country. This is not just a question of pr 
senting to the world a picture of a vigorou 
healthy economy with the leadership and prestij 
this naturally gives but also the very practical ar 
immediate jsroblem of our ability to maintain o\ 
military and economic posture overseas. 

Closely related to tliis question of econom 
vigor and growth is the type of relationship v 
develop with the European Common Market ar 
the other industrialized free nations of the wor 
such as Japan, Australia, and Canada. 

I am sure that I need not argue with this grou 
the degree to which the size of the "common ma 
ket*' we have enjoyed among our States has co) 
tributed to our own economic well-being ar 
growth. This is so self-evident that it is no longi 
a subject of discussion. Although, as populatic 
patterns shift and economic patterns change, har( 
ships are inflicted upon individual industries ar 
employees, particularly those unable or unwillir 
to move with changing times, we recognize this ! 
an inevitable j^rice to be paid for progi'ess thi 
benefits the whole. 

I know that you are aware of the formation ( 
the European Common Market, whicli will prol 
ably be joined shortly bj- the United Kingdor 

Department of State Bullet 



of Ik 
tries i 








?hat market will comprise a popiilation larger 
Ihan our own and, incidentally, also larger than 
hat of the Soviet Union. It will comprise an 
iconomy that is growing faster than our own and 
n some ways is already superior to our own. For 
xample, except in a few isolated pockets, un- 
mployment is virtually nonexistent in the Com- 
^ aon Market area. As Under Secretary Ball stated 
" Bst November,^ we are truly on the "threshold of 
« new trading world" that will affect every busi- 
lessman and manufacturer in this country. The 
)rogress of the Trade Expansion Act through the 
jongress gives promise that this country will be 
ible to enter into a relationship with the Common 
*Iarket and the other industrialized free countries 
,hat will give entirely new vigor and a new dimen- 
iion to the economies of the free world. Inci- 
lentally, it is also giving a direct lie to the so-called 
icientific theories of Marxism-Leninism on the 
iconomic and political development of relations 
between capitalist states. Instead of decaying, 
hese economies are showing renewed vigor. In- 
stead of withering when deprived of their colonial 
Dossessions, these countries are showing new 
mergy. Instead of fighting among themselves, 
:hese coimtries are submerging old rivalries and 
nationalisms into a greater good for all. 





Aidjto Underdeveloped]Countries 

Not less important than the development of our 
own economy and that of the other free industrial- 
ized comitries is the development of the economy 
of the newly independent and underdeveloped 
countries. These terms are, of course, not synony- 
mous, as there are many long-independent coun- 
tries such as those in Latin America that are 
imderdeveloped in the sense of providing a decent 
standard of life for the greater part of their 

"While it is often said that we must assist these 
countries in their efforts to develop themselves in 
order to prevent their going Communist, in my 
own opinion this oversimplifies the matter. 
Poverty in itself does not give rise to instability 
and disorder — fertile ground in which the Com- 
munists can work. As a matter of fact, Cuba had 
one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin 
America. What does give rise to instability and 
disorder is a sense of unjustified inequality as be- 

' IMd., Nov. 20, 1961, p. 831. 

Ocfober 7, 7962 

tween people within the same country and as 
between countries. 

This question of development is, of course, a 
peculiarly difficult one which we by no means have 
the time to discuss this evening. "VVliy does one 
comitry develop while another does not? It is 
clearly not a question of race — witness the devel- 
opment of Japan. Wliile climate may have its 
influence, vigorous civilizations have flourished in 
the tropics. There is clearly much that we do not 

However, one thing is clear. There is today no 
comitry and no people who are content with the 
old patterns and who are not seeking to better 
themselves. This desire is, of course, the first step 
toward progress. If communism had never 
existed, we would still have a big stake in this 
process, for it is only as it is achieved in some 
degree that we can look forward to that orderly 
and stable world which is the goal of our national 
policy. From a narrow economic point of view, 
we also have a big stake, for we can only sell to 
people who can afford to buy. For example, we 
sold more to Japan last year than we sold to all 
of the continent of Africa. (Incidentally, we also 
sold almost twice as much to Japan as we bought 
from her.) 

"VVliat we can do about this question of develop- 
ment is relatively limited, for the thi-ust and re- 
sources must come primarily from within the 
country itself. What we as a government can 
and are seeking to do is to supply the marginal 
increment without which the country's own plans 
would not be successful. There is also an even 
greater role for private investment, for just as we 
were heavily dependent on European capital for 
our own development — in fact we remained a 
capital-importing country up to the First World 
War — these countries will long be heavily depend- 
ent on capital imports. In this connection it has 
been my observation that, particularly in some of 
the smaller countries, the needs and opportunities 
are much more suitable for the individual or 
smaller company than for our larger industrial 

I am sure we all agree that, just in self-interest 
economic terms, our postwar assistance to Europe 
and Japan has repaid us manyfold. However, 
our assistance to the underdeveloped countries 
operates more slowly and unevenly, and the results 
are less dramatic to see. It is here in particular 


that the great constructive accomplishments tend 
to be overshadowed by the occasional inevitable 
incident of mismanagement — or, perhaps in the 
view of some, niisjudgment — that makes the 

If you will again pardon the personal note, I 
served for some years in a country in which we 
had a modest assistance program. I, of course, 
closely followed the program and frequently vis- 
ited the various projects and our personnel who 
were working on various teclmical assistance mis- 
sions. Of course, some did better than others, 
but there was no American and no project in which 
I could not take pride as an American, in which 
I did not feel that our funds were being spent 
wisely and well. I always urged on my visitors 
that they get out and see for themselves. We were 
at one time criticized for cooperating with the 
local government in a road project that, accord- 
ing to the allegations, "started nowhere" and 
"ended nowhere." As the road was completed, 
one of our teclmicians discovered that a variety of 
corn was well suited to the previously undeveloped 
territory through which the road passed. "Within 
a few years corn became the fourth ranking ex- 
port from the country, thus contributing not only 
to the prosperity of the country but also to its 
ability to increase its imports from the United 
States. Incidentally, that road and an associated 
airfield recently made possible a quick deployment 
of U.S. troops to that country. 

In other areas, such as South Viet-Nam at the 
present time, it is necessary for us to concentrate 
what economic assistance we are able to give on 
helping the local government meet its immediate 
problem of fighting a civil war inspired and sup- 
ported from the outside. This reduces what both 
we and the South Vietnamese Government are able 
to do for its long-term economic development. 
Yet production has been increasing, more rice is 
being raised, villagers are for the first time re- 
ceiving medical care and education, more roads 
are being built, and evei-y village is being given a 
means of communication. I feel that this makes 
military, economic, and political sense. The costs 
of not making the effort would certainly be in- 
calculably greater. 

Thus, it has never seemed to me that we should 
think of this program, 90 percent or more of which 
is in any event spent for goods in the United States 
or services of American citizens, as a "giveaway" 


program but rather as an investment in the future 
of the kind of world we would like to see. In- 
cidentally, the total amount being requested this 
year for the foreign assistance program is less than 
4 percent of our national budget and, if military 
assistance is added, slightly over 5 percent of the 

However, we no longer are alone in this field, 
for the countries of Europe and Japan, as well as 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, have also 
perceived that they have a common interest in thia 
problem. These countries have rapidly been in- 
creasing their economic assistance to the under- 
developed states and, in 1961, gave a total of 
approximately $2.6 billion as compared with $3.4 
billion for the United States. Some of these coim- 
tries devote a larger share of their gross national 
product to foreign aid than does the United States 


The Peace Corps 


I should not close on this subject of our cooper 
ation in international development without men 
tioning the Peace Corps. As one who has lon^ 
worked abroad and seen ideas — and some migh 
be called "gimmicks" — come and go, I franklj 
had some skepticism when, while still abroad, ] 
first heard of the project. I felt that the idea hac 
much merit, but I was concerned as to how it mighi 
be carried out and what the response might be botl 
at home and abroad. In matters of this kind it if 
very difficult to strike the right note between pa 
tronizing condescension toward a foreign people— 
which understandably always gives rise to resent 
ments — and convincing a foreign people of a gen 
nine willingness to be helpful. My fears havt 
long since been dispelled by the quality of th( 
Peace Corps leadership and its personnel abroad 
I know of nothing we have done in recent year; 
that has been more eagerly received or which 1 
feel will pay bigger dividends. To my mind, noi 
the least of the dividends will be the experienc* 
and understanding in depth of foreign people; 
that the members of the Peace Corps will brinf fept 
back to this country. 

These then are some of the facts, as I see them 
of the world in which we live and of what we are 
attempting to do about them. What conclusion; 
can we draw? We certainly cannot promise anj 
quiciv or easy victory for freedom over com 
munism. We are living in a world in wliich w 
are faced b)' powerful enemies. AVe would not be 



10 tk 














Department of State Bulletin^ 

iVinerican if we did not feel frustrated by the un- 
certainties tliat we see around us. Yet we are 
living in a world of change — sometimes fearfully 
■apid change. It is not for us to fear change. 
We can have confidence that those ideals for which 
we stand are more closely attuned to the universal 
xspirations of mankind than any other system yet 
devised. The sterility of the Communist doctrine 
is increasingly being exposed. As Secretary Rusk 
iIj has said : * 

Successful societies do not have to build walls and 
string barbed wire against their own people. The Berlin 
wall ... is a monument to failure— the failure of a "com- 
Detitive coexistence" that dared not compete. 

What is required of us? That we remain true 
:o those concepts that have made us great, faith- 
ful to those ideals that have made us good; and 
that we carry on in concert with other free men 
.he great unfinished business of building the kind 
)f world of order and peace sought by all men 
if good will. 

President States U.S. Policy 
Toward Cuba 

Statement by President Kennedy'^ 

There has been a great deal of talk on the 
situation in Cuba in recent days both in the Com- 
munist camp and in our own, and I would like to 
take this opportunity to set the matter in perspec- 

In the first place it is Mr. Castro and his sup- 
porters who are in trouble. In the last year his 
regime has been increasingly isolated from this 
hemisphere. His name no longer inspires the 
same fear or following in other Latin American 
countries. He has been condemned by the OAS 
[Organization of American States],^ excluded 
from the Inter-American Defense Board,^ and 
kept out of the [Latin American] Free Trade 
Association. By his own monumental eco- 
nomic mismanagement, supplemented by our re- 

' IMd., Sept. 3, 1062, p. 343. 

' Read by the President at his news conference on Sept. 

' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962, pp. 267 
and 270. 

'Ibid., p. 2S1. 

October 1, 1962 

fusal to trade with him,* his economy has crumbled 
and his pledges for economic progress have been 
discarded, along with his pledges for political 
freedom. His industries are stagnating, his har- 
vests are declining, his own followers are begin- 
ning to see that their revolution has been betrayed. 

So it is not surprising that in a frantic effort 
to bolster his regime he should try to arouse the 
Cuban people by charges of an imminent Ameri- 
can invasion and commit himself still further to 
a Soviet takeover in the hope of preventing his 
own collapse. 

Ever since communism moved into Cuba in 
1958, Soviet technical and military personnel have 
moved steadily onto the island in increasing num- 
bers at the invitation of the Cuban government. 
Now that movement has been increased. It is 
under our most careful surveillance. But I will 
repeat the conclusion that I reported last week,^ 
that these new shipments do not constitute a seri- 
ous threat to any other part of this hemisphere. 

If the LTnited States ever should find it neces- 
sary to take military action against communism in 
Cuba, all of Castro's Communist-supplied weap- 
ons and technicians would not change the result or 
significantly extend the time required to achieve 
that result. 

However, unilateral military mtervention on 
the part of the United States cannot currently be 
either required or justified, and it is regrettable 
that loose talk about such action in this country 
might serve to give a thin color of legitimacy to 
the Communist pretense that such a threat exists. 
But let me make this clear once again : If at any 
time the Communist buildup in Cuba were to en- 
danger or interfere with our security in any way, 
including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to 
the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities 
at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citi- 
zens in this country, or if Cuba should ever at- 
tempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or 
the threat of force against any nation in this 
hemisphere, or become an offensive military base 
of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then 
this country will do whatever must be done to 
protect its own security and tliat of its allies. 

We shall be alert to, and fully capable of deal- 
ing swiftly with, any such development. As 

' Ibid., p. 283. 

° Ibid., Sept. 24, 1962, p. 450. 


President and Commander in Chief I have full 
authority now tx) take such action, and I have 
asked the Congress to authorize me to call up re- 
serve forces should this or any other crisis make 
it necessary. 

In the meantime we intend to do everything 
within our power to prevent such a threat from 
coming into existence. Our friends in Latin 
America must realize the consequences such devel- 
opments hold out for their own peace and free- 
dom, and we shall be making further proposals to 
them. Our friends in NATO must realize the 
implications of their ships' engaging in the Cuban 

We shall continue to work with Cuban refugee 
leaders who are dedicated as we are to that na- 

tion's future return to freedom. We shall con- jj,] 
tinue to keep the American people and the jjti 
Congress fully informed. We shall increase our f 
surveillance of the whole Caribbean area. We 
shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this jdu 

With this in mmd, while I recognize that rash diid 
talk is cheap, particularly on the part of those who 
did not have the responsibilitj', I would hope that 
the future record will show that the only people 
talking about a war and invasion at this time are 
the Communist spokesmen in Moscow and Habana. 
and that the American people, defending as we dc 
so much of the free world, will in this nuclear age 
as they have in the past, keep both their nerve anc 
their head. 




Realism, Responsibility, and Respect — Three R's for the United Nations 

by Uarlan Cleveland 

Assistant Secretary for International Organisation Affairs'^ 

On Tuesday next, as the 17th U.N. General As- 
sembly begins its work, the U.N. goes into its 18th 
year of operation. Seventeen, going on eighteen, 
is a wonderful age. We know that from reread- 
ing Booth Tarkington, even if all we can remember 
ourselves is how hard it seemed to be to grow up 
convincingly, with all those adults looking on and 
criticizing. We know as parents that 17 is also 
an exasperating age — not so bad as 14 or 15, per- 
haps, but still full of uncertainties. Yet as all 
almost-eighteeners know, 17 is an age of great 
glory. The awkwardness of early adolescence is 
being left behind; the mind and spirit make new 
discoveries; more and more freedom is being 
achieved, with greater and greater measures of 
responsibility ; and adventure lies in wait behind 
every door. 

Like all yoimg things the U.N. is still grow- 
ing — in size, in strength, and, we hope, in wisdom. 
As Adlai Stevenson has said, the U.N. was built 
for trouble and thrives on trouble. And all of 

' Address made before the American Association for the 
United Nations at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 16 (press 
release 561 dated Sept. 15). 


its members have been learning some of the fact 
of life — about money and finance; about the re 
lationships between calling tunes and payin; 
pipers; about reputation, especially the reputa 
tion of those who cry "wolf" too often ; and abou 
the difference between wanting something badl; 
and working for it hard. 

The U.N. is even old enough now to get int 
politics, the domestic politics of the member cour 
tries. In our case the dramatic events in th 
Congo brought out that most natural of America 
cultural traits: the desire to choose sides whe 
we see a fight going on. The interest in th 
Congo's civil disturbance became an America 
problem when Congress, and the people at larg 
tlirough polls and letters to Washington, ha 
to decide whether to buy $100 million worth c 
U.N. bonds. You can all feel pride and a stak 
in the American response to the first real "oris: 
of confidence" over U.S. policy in the U.N. Bot 
in the Senate, by 70 to 22, and in the House c 
Representatives, by a vote of 256 to 134, America 
political leadership has responded to a deep coi 
viction widely shared by most Americans: thf 

Department of State Bulfeli 




re a 


On I 
five ,1! 

Q-, f 

fe'' a 




the United Nations is never perfect, often frus- 
trating, but always essential. 

Wliatever wisdom and strength the Organiza- 
don has acquired so far are going to be needed 

the period just ahead. 

On the agenda of the 17th General Assembly, 
'"|Vhich starts on Tuesday, some 90 major and minor 
items have been inscribed.^ And there will be 
more to come, making more than 100 in all. 

The subjects range from A to Z, from atomic 
mergy to the future of Zanzibar, and include 
matters as far apart as weather satellites and So- 
/iet satellites, as closely comiected as nuclear test- 
ng and disarmament. And, for many of the 
;ontroversial subjects, the U.N. is about the 
mly place where they can be settled. 

Now you take 100 agenda items and multiply 
hem by 104 nations and you will end up with a 
igure of more than 10,000 — 10,000 foreign policy 
lecisions to be made, even if you assume only one 
lecision per item, and there are quite often several 
'otes on amendments as well. 

The task of the U.S. delegation is simple: 
nerely to make sure that those 10,000 decisions 
ire compatible with the U.S. national interest. 

iecord of the "Sensible Sixteenth" 

On this date a year ago. Dag Hammarskjold was 
11 the Congo working for peace. Two days later, 
m the 18th, he was dead. Last year there was 
!ome question as to whether the U.N. would sur- 
rive as an action agency for peace or whether it 
ivould be limited to what Hammarskjold called 
I permanent diplomatic conference — which is 
iiiti s^hat the Soviets and the hard-core minority of 
CF.N. foes in every countiy would like it to be. 
Some predicted the imminent victory for the 
troika," the three-headed-monster theory of U.N. 
administration. Others spoke gloomily of an 
unholy alliance between the so-called "Afro- Asian 
bloc" and the Soviets. Tlie theory was that an 
are lUeged identity of interest between the Eussians 
liai and the newly independent nations on anti- 
jolonialism would end up with identity of in- 
terest on all U.N. matters. 

A year ago the Soviets seemed to have the 
initiative in disarmament discussions. There 
seemed to be a dearth of fresh ideas in the U.N.'s 
3Conomic and social development work. The 

future of the U.N. Operation in the Congo was in 
serious doubt. 

With the death of Hammarskjold, some of our 
favorite dispensers of doom for democracy, im- 
consciously reflecting the Communists' line that 
they are bound to win and democracy is bound to 
lose, started lamenting overtime. The U.N., which 
is rooted in a democratic charter, couldia't survive, 
they said. Reasons for its early burial sprouted 
from the columns of commentators like mush- 
rooms after summer rain. To write "U.N. — Ee- 
quiescat in Pace''' became an easy way to gain a 
reputation as a deep thinker about world affairs. 

But the patient was tougher than he looked. 
Tlie fog burned off, and sunshine and fresh air 
helped speed the recovery. The "troika" never 
materialized. U Tliant was appointed Acting 
Secretary-General by unanimoiis vote. The close 
connection between the Soviet bloc and the Afri- 
cans and Asians was hardly noticeable when the 
constitutional crunch came, and the Office of 
Secretary- General got through the 7-week crisis 
unimpaired, with imdiminished prestige. 

And during the year 1961-62 the U.N. became 
more and more the kind of active, operational in- 
stitution which the U.S. interest requires and not 
merely a launching pad for propaganda favored 
by the Soviets. 

Look at the record: new initiatives in outer 
space, in economic development, in disarmament, 
in the financing of peacekeeping operations; re- 
sponsible actions on colonialism, with two new 
nations — Rwanda and Burundi — helped into 
existence without the strife which accompanied in- 
dependence in the Congo; the proposal to admit 
Red China turned back by a convincing vote ; and 
the propaganda ploys of the Cubans revealed 
clearly for all the world to see, to yawn at, and 
then reject. 

Much of the consti-uctive nature of the 16th 
General Assembly — the "sensible Sixteenth" — is 
the result of President Kennedy's own initiative, 
his own belief in the importance of the Organiza- 
tion to the United States and to the proposals set 
forth in his U.N. speech of almost a year ago.^ 

Problems of the 17th General Assembly 

The problems of last year are not those of this 
year, even though they may be covered by the same 
tired words on the U.N. agenda. It is one thing to 

^ For the provisional agenda, see Buixetin of Aug. 20, 
1962, p. 306, and Sept. 24, 1962, p. 466. 

lOcfofaer 7, 7962 

'lUd., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619. 


step on the starter. It is another thing to step on 
the gas. Many of the problems hist year were 
tliose of getting started. Our major problem this 
year is to keep going, to strengthen the U.N. as an 
institution, emphasizing and backing its construc- 
tive activities and protecting the U.N. both from 
Soviet attack and from internal erosion. 

At the U.N. "school of parliamentary diplo- 
macy," the three R's this season will be Eealism, 
Responsibility, and Respect, in that order. 
Realism comes first. It will lead to responsibility, 
and responsibility to respect. It is not enough to 
be warmhearted about the U.N. and to feel deeply 
about its importance. We must also be coolheaded 
and view each proposal, each resolution, each vote, 
not only on the basis of its own merits but also on 
the realistic basis of its actual effects on the future 
of the U.N. itself. 

If the General Assembly gets the reputation of 
an organization whose main job is passing large, 
shining resolutions whose only discernible merit 
consists of the sj-mbolism of protest, then its grow- 
ing power will be reduced — which would be bad 
for every country that is glad to be equal with 
every other country as a member of the General 

The General Assembly is not an outdoor protest 
rally but an indoor deliberative assembly. The 
U.N. should not be placed in the position of "reso- 
luting" about matters it can't do much of anything 

Now there are going to be many temptations. 
It is easy to work up a good head of steam about 
certain aspects of colonialism, about disarmament, 
about nuclear testing, about the uses of outer 
space, about economic development, and about 
peacekeeping. These are all large, obvious, and 
sometimes emotion-packed issues. They are com- 
pounded of all-but-universal hopes and fears, of 
grievances old and new, of the festering sores of 
thwarted ambitions, the need for status, and a 
great desire for peace. 

Therefore it will be tempting to pass resolutions 
deploring, or even condemning, bad things and 
encouraging good things. It is not too difficult to 
pile up substantial majorities in favor of such 
purely hortatory resolutions. 

But the real problems are not to be got at by 
such means. The real problems in connection with 
any question are: Wliat can the U.N. do about it? 
and, if there are substantial costs involved, how 
will the job get paid for? 


Financing Peaceiteeping Operations 

We are faced with this second problem right 
now in respect to financing peacekeeping opera- 
tions, particularly those in the Congo. The U.N. 
bond issue, Mhich is so much in the news these 
days, is only a stopgap arrangement: to pay for 
peacekeeping costs from June 30 last until such 
time as better arrangements can be worked out. 
Finding a responsible solution to this problem is 
one of the major jobs of this General Assembly. 

Up until last Jmie 30 we had an unsatisfactory 
system of assessments — which some U.N. mem- 
bers refused to pay, even at reduced rates — plus 
voluntary contributions — which ended up with 
the U.S. the only nation to make a volimtary con- 
tribution of money to help the U.N. carry on the 
military operations in the Congo. 

As a starter, the International Court of Justice' 
has declared costs incurred by the U.N. in carry- 
ing out approved programs to be "expenses of the 
organization" within the meaning of the U.N. 
Charter and assessments levied upon the members 
to pay for such U.N. actions to be bindmg.'' As 
a consequence of this opinion, nonpayment of such 
assessments may bring a country up against article 
19 and result in that country's being deprived ol 
the right to vote in the General Assembly. 

The next step is for the General Assembly tc 
adopt the advisory opinion of the Internationa] 
Court and thus establish once and for all unsever- 
able relationship between fine resolutions and fi- 
nancial responsibility. This will be one of the 
big jobs ahead. Related to it is the job of making 
a vigorous effort to collect the long-overdue assess 
ments from delinquent members. 

Peacekeeping Takes Many Forms 

Now the U.N.'s peacekeeping activities don't al 
have to be so large and so visible as its operation: 
in the Congo or the Middle East. Sometimes ! 
small patrol will do the trick. Perhaps only j 
civilian contingent to investigate and report 
Perhaps only one man to mediate and conciliate. 

Again, it is really not so much a question o 
novelty, of untried, untested, unproved ways o 
acting to keep the peace. Over the years quit 
a good many different methods have been devised 
each one to meet the needs of a particular set o 



























* For a Department statement concerning the Court 
opinion, see ibid., Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246. 

Deparfmenf of Sfate Bullefh 

cat SOI 



M a' 


In 1946 Iran complained that Soviet troops were 
illegally on its territory. The Soviets withdrew 
their ti'oops when the Security Council called for 

In the same year a Greek complamt about for- 
eign aid to its rebel guerrillas led to a U.N. Peace 
Observation Commission which helped the Greek 
Government stabilize the coimtry. 

In 1948 the British mandate expired in Pales- 
tine. In the wake of the partition of Palestine 
that followed, U.N. truce supervisors have helped 
keep a taut and precarious peace for 14 years. 

Since 1948 fierce fighting has been replaced in 
Kashmir by a cease-fire monitored by United Na- 
tions observei-s. 

In 1950 the Republic of Korea was invaded and 
a large armed force under U.N. command was 
organized to repel the invasion. Many Americans 
saw service with that force, and 54,246 of them 
were killed, successfully defending the charter's 
central principle that in a civilized world nations 
should band together to stop aggression. 

In 1956 the U.N. arranged a cease-fire when 
fighting erupted in Sinai and over the Suez Canal. 
In a few days a U.N. Emergency Force was on 
guard in the danger spots. It is still there after 
6 years, and the peace is still being kept. 

In 1958 a special session of the General Assem- 
bly sent a U.N. observer group to Lebanon in 
answer to Lebanon's comi^laint that foreign infil- 
trators were assisting efforts to overturn the gov- 
ernment. Conditions were then stabilized. Elec- 
tions were then held, and the tlireat to orderly 
government evaporated. 

In 1960 the United Nations was called upon by 
the Government of the Congo to prevent a break- 
down of its newly established independence. Two 
years after the start of the U.N. Operation in the 
Congo that nation has a parliament, a government, 
and the beginnings of federal order. 

In 1961 the Assembly renewed the Palestine 
Conciliation Commission and urged it to work 
out some destiny for the Palestine refugees that 
would in time remove them as a dangerous source 
of friction in the Middle East and a cancerous 
sore on the conscience of the world community. 
A Special Eepresentative of the United Nations is 
hard at work now under this mandate. 

Tliis year a U.N. Special Representative helped 
avert a war over the future of West New Guinea 
by helping the Dutch and the Indonesians to agree 

October 1, 1962 

on a U.N.-supervised future for the territory and 
its Papuan inhabitants.^ 

As you can see, peacekeeping takes many forms. 
We are going to make strong efforts to get the 
U.N.'s peacekeeping to become moi-e operational. 

And the way for us all to do this — in General 
Assembly debate and also in discussing the U.N. 
in our own living rooms — is to look beyond desir- 
able ends to practical means, to ask how as well 
as what. The key questions to ask about every 
one of the hundred subjects are: First, what 
should the U.N. as an organization do about the 
matter? and second, how will the action we all 
take affect the strength, the support, and the in- 
tegrity of the U.N. as an organization ? 

U.N. Is Coming of Age 

Wlien we were very young we used to cry for 
the moon and not understand the perversities of 
fate which denied us this much-desired ornament. 
Later, we saw the problems of the imiverse in 
terms of naked absolutes : Every proposition was 
judged in terms of good or bad, white or black, 
for or against. There was nothing in between, 
or outside. There was no room for tolerance, for 
negotiation ; and there was no time to wait. 

Later on, as we grew up, the euphoria of rose- 
colored romance gave way to the practical affairs 
of living. The world became less and less a place 
of knights-at-arms, smoke-snorting dragons, and 
fair ladies to be rescued, and more and more a 
place of problems waiting to be solved in prag- 
matic fashion one way or another; and with the 
attaimnent of adult status we were called on to 
help find these solutions, not only to talk, to de- 
bate, or to highly resolve. 

Now, at the threshold of maturity, the U.N. is 
coming of age in politics and in operations. It 
faces an almost incredible variety of fascinating 
and important problems — fascinating because 
they are complex, important because they are the 
stuff of our destiny. It is equipped with some 
of the tecliniques and the tools it needs so that 
it can serve our interests, and the interests of other 
nations, in peacekeepmg and nation building. 
Fifty-five thousand people, spending more than 
half a billion dollars of the world's money, is no 
mean effort for a 17-year-old organization. It 
has the experience to move in on international dis- 

'For backgroiuid, see Hid., June 25, 1962, p. 1039, and 
Sept. 3, 1962, p. 349. 


putes and to provide the way for 75 countries 
to help 125 developing areas to constitute the 
kinds of institutions they need to govern them- 
selves and better their life and their prospects for 
the future. 

In all of this wondrous work, culminating as it 
does in a General Assembly of the U.N., a real- 
istic approach leading to responsible action will 
bring respect and widen the support of the U.N. 

Letters of Credence 

Federal Republic of Germany 

The newl}' appointed Ambassador of the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany, Karl Heinrich Knapp- 
stein, presented his credentials to President 
Kennedy on September 14. For texts of the Am- 
bassador's remarks and the President's reply, see 
Department of State press release 553 dated Sep- 
tember 14. 

Advisory Committee To Study 
Cultural Presentations Program 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 14 (press release 551) that the Assistant 
Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
Lucius D. Battle, had requested the U.S. Advisory 
Commission on International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs to undertake a special examina- 
tion of the Department's cultural presentations 
program. Dr. Jolin W. Gardner, president of the 
Carnegie Corporation of New York and cliairman 
of the Commission, has agreed to direct the study. 

The primary aim of the examination is to assure 
that the United States achieve maximum benefits 
from the sending abroad of American performers 
in music, drama, the dance, and sports. The Ad- 
visory Commission was requested to consider the 
following : 

1. Opportimities for new approaches in this 

2. Fuller utilization of nonprofessional groups 
as well as means of drawing upon the best avail- 
able professional talent; and 

3. Organization and procedures for screening, 
selection, contracting, tour management, and over- 
all admmistration. 

For its review the Commission will enlist the' 
services of authorities both inside and outside thei 

General Pulaski's Memorial Day, 1962 


Whereas Casimir Pulaski, a young Polish patriot and' 
lifelong fighter against tyranny, volunteered in the Con- 
tinental Army during the American Revolution, fought 
with bravery, provided the struggling new nation with 
brilliant military leadership, was made a brigadier gen- 
eral by Congress, and formed his own famed Pulaski'S' 
Legion ; and 

Whekeas this year marks the one hundred and eighty- 
third anniversary of his death on October 11, 1779, at 
Savannah, Georgia, where he received mortal wounds 
while leading a cavalry charge in the battle to recapture 
that city ; and 

Whebeas the American people feel deep g^ratitude to 
General Pulaski and to his countrymen and the many 
other foreign patriots who joined in and fought for the 
cause of our freedom ; and 

Whereas General Pulaski's distinguished dedication to 
the cause of liberty will always serve as an inspiration to 
all peoples in their struggle for national freedom : 

Now, THEREFORE, I, JoHN F. KENNEDY, President of the 
United States of America, do hereby designate Thursday, 
October 11, 1962, as General Pulaski's Memorial Day ; 
and I direct the appropriate officials of the Federal Gov- 
ernment to display the flag of the United States on all 
Government buildings on that day. 

I also invite the jieople of the United States to observe 
the day with appropriate ceremonies in honor of the 
memory of General Pulaski and the high Ideals for which 
he sacrificed his life. 

In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
and caused the Seal of the United States of America to 
be aflixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this tenth day of 

September in the year of our Lord nineteen 

[seal] hundred and sixty-two and of the Independence 

of the United States of America the one hundred 

and eighty-seventh. 

The Ac 


more to 
ican fc 

By the President: 
Dean Rdsk, 
Secretary o/ State. 

/fL^ L^ 

'■ No. 3490 ; 27 Fed. Reg. 9201. 


Oeparfmenf of State Bulletin 

lb last 



A St 











he Adams Family and the Department of State 

iy Edwin M. Martin 

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ■ 


The step from the Department of State into 
his quiet old residence is not as drastic a change 
n atmosphere as it might seem. Both tlie De- 
partment and this home were long the natural 
labitats of the Adams family, and both bear 
itrongly the imprint of its collective personality. 
Tlie Adams family has probably contributed 
nore to the development and execution of Amer- 
can foreign policy than any other American 
"amily. Historians have called it the most dis- 
inguished in the United States, and I would be 
he last to argue with this judgment. 

President Kennedy opened his book Profiles in 
lourage with the story of Jolm Quincy Adams, 
tvho willingly risked his public career by submerg- 
jig not only personal but regional interests to the 
lational good. His conscience told him that "pri- 
^'ate interest must not be put in opposition to the 
Dublic good." As the President has written: 
'John Quincy maintained the unflinching and 
nflexible bearing which became his Puritan 

A strong case can be made in support of the 
:hesis that the Adams family shaped the State 
Department's conscience. It is essentially a Puri- 
tan conscience, with its nucleus the conviction that 
the Nation's interests must always come first, that 
duty must come before gain at both the personal 
ind the public levels. Because the Department 
of State is made up of human beings, I make no 
claim that it has always lived up to the dictates 
of this conscience, nor do I say that the Depart- 
ment has always been infallible in judging how the 
Nation's interests are best served. However, their 
collective Puritan conscience has helped our Sec- 
retaries of State, our diplomats, our Foreign 

^ Address made at the Adams Home Historical Site, 
Quincy, Mass., on Sept. 7 (press release 543). 

Ocfober T, 7962 

Service oiBcers, and our Departmental policy- 
makers over tlie years to stand up under abuse, 
demagogy, regional and partisan pressures, and 
personal attacks while they pursued what they 
saw as the country's best interests. 

I have been invited here to speak of the Adams 
family in the State Department. The subject is 
an historical amateur's paradise. Source material 
is so abundant that, if a sjieaker cliooses, he need 
only string together a long list of quotations and 
references to provide a thrilling and inspiring 
talk. I intend to strike only a few highlights. It 
should be clear to anj^one who has followed politi- 
cal developments in my area of the world over 
the past couple of months that I have not had 
much time to become even an amateur expert on 
the activities of the most active and prolific Adams 
family. This speech owes a great deal, therefore, 
to the knowledge and energy of a number of my 
colleagues in the Department of State. 

Jolin Adams, founder of the family as we think 
of it, put his clear mind and relentless honesty to 
the service of his counti-y. These qualities, which 
he passed on to his son and which cheated both of 
popularity and large followings, strangely enough 
make both appear, in retrospect, among the most 
flexible and farsighted of the Founding Fathers. 
Incapable of following a "party line" for the sake 
of votes and applause, John and Jolm Quincy 
Adams placed on the record reservations about 
popular dogmas of their day that must have made 
their contemporaries uncomfortable but that 
make us look back on them admiringly. 

In his May 16, 1797, message to Congress as 
President, for example, John Adams advised 
against too narrow an interpretation of the prin- 
ciple of noninvolvement in the political systems 
of Europe. Noninvolvement had already become, 
and was long to remain, a cornerstone of national 


policy, but he warned that we should not turn 
our back on those systems, nor ignore "the cur- 
rent chain of events." He p)ointed out that, 
whether we liked it or not, our mere existence 
caused us to be taken into account by the European 
powers as a "weight in the balance of power." "It 
is a natural policy for a nation that studies to be 
neutral," he said, "to consult with other nations 
engaged in the same strides and jjursuits at the 
same time." 

In writing to Jefferson about the American 
Revolution, John Adams said it was not to be con- 
fused with the Revolutionary War. This, he 
pointed out, "was only an effect and consequence 
of it. The revolution was in the minds of the 
people, and this was effected from 1760 to 1775, 
in the course of fifteen years, before a drop of 
blood was shed at Lexington." 

Those who are inclined today to look on revolu- 
tions and upheavals anywhere in the world as the 
results of simple causes, of someone's immediately 
preceding actions or inactions, might do well to 
think hard on those words, and to begin looking 
deeper for the causes of today's events. 

Another Adams — Charles Francis — in the third 
generation brought a perfectly balanced mind to 
act in his country's interest at a time, it has been 
aptly said, when the world was by no means per- 
fectly balanced. As our Minister to London dur- 
ing the Civil War, when British official sympa- 
thies were definitely against the Union, he handled 
our relations with firmness and tact. His firmness 
was in the best family tradition, but tact was a 
novel quality in an Adams. His father and grand- 
father were noted for their lack of it and were 
the first to admit it. Among Charles Francis 
Adams' less remembered services is one for which 
those of us who are concerned with Latin Amer- 
ica may be especially grateful — his speeding of 
Great Britain's disassociation with the French ef- 
fort to convert Mexico into a French satellite, by 
making clear in England the Lincoln administra- 
tion's "cordial good wislies for the safety, welfare 
and stability of the republic system of govern- 
ment" in Mexico and its solid support for Juarez. 

In the fourth generation we see the famed 
Adams individualism in full sway. Brooks 
Adams is widely credited with having been the 
"unofficial philosopher" of the Theodore Roosevelt 
administration and with spurring it to ever wider 
bounds of empire and militarj' glory. Meanwliile, 


his brother Henry looked on these activities as 
jingoism and declared that Roosevelt's mind had 
gone to pieces. It was Henry, during his brief 
association with our Foreign Service as his father 
Charles Francis' secretary in London, who, at 24, 
showed how mucli he shared his family's extraor- 
dinary vision. On hearing how the Merrimac had 
proved the superiority of ironclads over wooden 
warships, he wrote his brother tliat he foresaw 
the United States "left to a career that is positively 
unlimited except for the powers of the imagina- 
tion," and that "for England, there is still great- 
ness and safety, if she will draw her colonies 
around her, and turn her hegemony into a confed- 
eration of British nations." 

John Quincy Adams 

The entire Adams family has always interested 
me. At this moment in my life, however, I am 
Assistant Secretai-y of State for Inter- American 
Affairs and admit to having acquired a temporary 
occupational bias. The Adams who was not only 
our sixth President but probably the greatest di- 
plomatist and Secretary of State in the history of 
our country, the one who laid the foundation for 
our Western Hemisphere policies — John Quincy 
Adams — is the one who at present interests me 
most. With your permission, therefore, I intend 
to return to the second Adams generation and to 
concentrate on it. 

After reviewing Jolm Quincy Adams' life, I am 
left with mixed emotions by only one of his official 
acts. When he took office as Secretary of State, 
145 years ago this month (September 22, 1817, to 
be exact), he set an awesome precedent. He initi- 
ated the first of what someone has estimated to be 
545 reorganizations in the State Department ! I 
have not stopped to count how many of these have 
been during my years of service but am imder the 
impression tlaat I must have lived through a large 
percentage of them. Wlien you consider that the 
first reorganization began with the establishment 
of a filing sj'stom, because there had been none 
before, you liave some idea of how simple life must 
have been in Washington in those days. The Cap- 
ital was then nothing more than a village, with 

This fortrait by Jean-Baptiste-Adolphe Gibert 
is from the Departmenfs collection; it hangs in 
tlie inner corridor of the Secretanfs suite. 

Deparfment of Sfafe Bullefin 


1 767-1848 

658320—62 3 

summers as infernally hot as they are now, though 
without the additional annoyance of aircondition- 
iiig, and the diplomatic corps avoided assignments 
there like the plague. When John Quincy Adams 
headed the State Department, the diplomatic cori)S 
consisted of the representatives of nine European 
countries, only four of them — those of France. 
Great Britain, Russia, and Spain — with the rank 
of Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraor- 
dinary. Even after we recognized the new Latin 
American Republics, during Adams' Secretary- 
ship, the total number of chiefs of mission rose 
only to 15. The staff of the Department of State 
proper was 12. How simple and peaceful that 
sounds today, when 106 embassies and legations 
are represented in Washington and the Depart- 
ment's staff runs over 5,000 ! 

We have all heard how John Quincy Adams 
used to go for long swims, naked in tlie Potomac, 
with his valet and sometimes a friend, and how 
once he was nearly drowned. The picture is bu- 
colic and appealing — especially to those of us who 
regret the Potomac today is too dirty to swim in. 
Yet life was never simple and peaceful very long 
for any Adams. John Quincy's sense of duty and 
his visions for the future of his countiy dogged 
him night and day. He may have had few dip- 
lomats to see, but he had knotty problems to work 
out with them, especially, for example, with the 
man he called the "wily Don," the Spanish Min- 
ister Luis de Onis (direct ancestor, by the way, 
of Juan de Onis, the New York Timex correspond- 
ent in Rio). It was with him that he negotiated 
the transcontinental treaty of 1819 with Spain 
that gave us clear title to the Floridas and further 
defined the boundaries of the Louisiana Pur- 
chase — the treaty he himself considered the single 
most important achie^■ement of his life. I am 
always struck, when i-eading about its negotiation, 
by the stubborn way Adams pitted himself not 
only against the Spanish Minister but against his 
fellow Cabinet members and against President 
Monroe himself, holding out for concessions that 
were compatible witli his great |>ersonal vision of 
the United States as a nation stretched to conti- 
nental limits. It took great vision to sit in a 
sparsely settled village, deep in mud or shrouded 
in clouds of dust, and picture a day when the coun- 
try would be so thickly populated that it must 
stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 

The Adamses were always ahead of their time. 
Take our undei"standing of the meaning of inde- 
pendence, which is part of their legacy to us. They 
insisted it meant freedom from domination of any 
kind, positive exercise of one's own judgment, de- 
velopment of one's own abilities. They were con- 
vinced that the independence of the nation and 
that of the individual are insepai"able. They rec- 
ognized from the beginning that national inde- 
pendence cannot have full meaning unless the 
political and commercial systems of the nations of 
the world permit new countries — as the United 
States was then— to develop their potentialities 
by trade and by enjoying friendly political rela- 
tions in a world setting. John Quincy Adams, 
especially, stressed that nations are not fully inde- 
l>endent if they are not permitted, in the world 
community, to enjoy the same rights as other na- 
tions. These concepts, I submit, lead in a straight 
line to the position the United States maintains 
today in the Organization of American States and 
in the United Nations. 

Adams' Posture Toward American Republics 

John Quincy Adams' posture toward the new 
American Republics of his day is curious and 
characteristic of the man. He had his marked 
prejudices, among them private doubts whether 
the peoples of Latin America had habits of 
thought and the spirit of freedom that would lead 
them to set up free and liberal institutions. He 
saw differences between our Revolutionary War 
and theirs, believing that, whereas ours was waged 
to defend individual liberty and was based on the 
principle of the social compact, theirs were forced 
on them by the weakness of Spain and by the 
breakdown of the governing fabric. Neverthe- 
less, he pleaded the cause of their right to recog- 
nition as independent nations. On the other 
hand, because he believed that by temperament, 
background, and nature they were not a part of 
the "American political system" as he understood 
it, he resisted all pressures to involve the United 
States in their struggle for independence. In 
order not to prejudice a happy conclusion of the 
transcontinental treaty with Spain, he delayed 
granting recognition to the new Republics. Yet 
he let it be known clearly to European powers 
that we would "join in no plan of pacification 


Department of Sfafe Bulletin 

founded on any other basis than that of the entire 
independence of the South Americans."' 

Because he believed it important to maintaining 
the independence of the United States, he took 
steps to encourage the new American Republics 
to establish political systems compatible with that 
of the United States, that is to say, systems based 
on "the sovereignty of the people and the un- 
alienable rights of man." He saw it as his duty 
to help those nations to form part of an inter- 
national — or at least an inter-American — eco- 
nomic system built on the principle of equal 
rights among nations and freedom from economic 
domination of one nation by another. To these 
ends, he insisted on developing trade with Latin 
America on a basis of equal rights, with no dis- 
crimination or exclusive privileges, and on apply- 
ing the principle of reciprocity. In so doing, I 
might point out, he was following in the footsteps 
of his father, who had incorporated both the equal 
rights and reciprocity principles in a draft treaty 
he submitted to the Continental Congress only a 
few weeks after the Declaration of Independence 
was signed. 

John Quincy Adams was one of the stanchest 
supporters, even one of the formulators, of the 
doctrine of nonintervention. Yet he saw no con- 
tradiction between this doctrine and his instruc- 
tions to our Ministers in Buenos Aires and 
Bogota to urge on the Latin American Republics 
the adoption of governments by popular represen- 
tation and periodical election, assuring the enjoy- 
ment of equal rights, and to press them "to put 
down the remnant of ecclesiastical domination, to 
curb the arbitrary dispositions of military power, 
to establish a truly representative government, 
personal security, and the freedom of the press." 
The efforts he urged the United States Ministers 
to make were meant to assure the new countries 
the strength and stability they needed to stay in- 
dependent and to help them resist the intervention 
of despotic governments which could be expected 
to try to keep the new Latin American nations 
from developing true independence. By "true in- 
dependence" he meant, as he has written, not only 
enjoyment of the rights that cannot be denied 
emergent states but a status that would make it 
possible for them "to observe the ordinary rules 
of the laws of nations in their intercourse with 
the civilized world." 

October I, J 962 

Emergence of Pan-Americanism 

During his service as Secretary of State under 
Monroe, Jolm Quincy Adams was confronted with 
the first emergence of the idea of pan- Americanism 
at the initiative of Bolivar, who set great hopes 
in his proposed Congress of Panama, to which he 
invited the United States to send delegates. 
Again, in facing a new situation which apparently 
ran counter to the principle of noninvolvement 
and to isolationist feeling which he and the coun- 
try' upheld, we see in Adams an intellectual flexi- 
bility and a foresight far in advance of his times. 

After considerable preliminary discussion and 
diplomatic interchange, Colombia couched its invi- 
tation to the United States in terms that gave 
Adams room for maneuver. The invitation was 
to "participate in an international congress for 
the purpose of regulating the problems of peace 
and war." Shortly after it was received, John 
Quincy Adams became President, and, in his first 
amiual message to Congress, he announced that 
he would send ministers to the Panama meeting. 
He met strong opposition but argued his case in 
a message to the House that is considered one of 
the most important of his career. Times, he said, 
had changed since Washington had warned 
agamst entangling alliances — as Washington him- 
self had foreseen they might — and the United 
States had a clear interest in closer relations with 
the countries of Latin America. He won his 
point, and the instructions that he and Henry 
Clay drew up for the American delegates to the 
Panama Congress contained many of the princi- 
ples of the inter- American system as we know it 
today, including the doctrine of nonintervention. 

As it turned out, the American delegates never 
did reach the Congress. One died en route, and 
the other ended up in Mexico instead. Adams 
wrote the whole matter off as a diplomatic fiasco. 
He could not know that Bolivar's first effort to 
bring about inter-American cooperation would 
eventually bear fruit and that a more successful 
effort would be made in Washmgton itself in 1889. 
However, the basically friendly attitude toward 
closer relations with Latin America than with 
Europe that Adams voiced no doubt contributed 
importantly to the evolution of United States 
thinking on the subject of inter- American rela- 
tions and to the development of an association of 
American nations — the OAS [Organization of 


American States] — that mirrors with remarkable 
lidelity Adams' own standards of desirable rela- 
tions among free nations. 

The Monroe Doctrine 

Most authorities agree that John Quincy 
Adams' claim to fame rests largely on his policy 
of recognition of the former Spanish colonies and 
on his share in formulating the Monroe Doctrine. 

The Monroe Doctrine, as you are all aware, has 
again come into the news, as it does recurrently. 
It is interestmg, therefore, to consider John 
Quincy Adams' views on this topic. They are 
highly pertinent. I have had good reason to 
marvel, in recent weeks, at the persistence of his 
memory and of his influence. His name has been 
spoken time and agam as the date for our meeting 
here approached — a circumstance that you will 
agree added to my already considerable interest in 
taking part in today's ceremonies. I have found 
myself musing more than once how he would look 
on our hemispheric problems today, particularly 
in the light of a statement he made at the time 
when he faced opposition to sending delegates to 
the Congress of Panama and was asked whether 
his plans to do so did not conflict with the basic 
United States policy of avoiding entangling 

"I do not recollect,"' he said, "any change in 
polic}'; but there has been a great change in 

We might usefully take a few minutes to ex- 
amine the Monroe Doctrine, its content, its ante- 
cedents, and the interpretations with which it has 
been interlarded. 

Samuel Flagg Bemis, in his excellent book Jolin 
Quincy Adams and the Foimdatlons of American 
Foreign Policy, gives James Monroe full credit 
for assuming responsibility for voicing the doc- 
trine and for pronouncing it to the world m a 
message to Congress, rather than through diplo- 
matic channels, quietly, as Adams would have 
preferred. As to its authorship, however, Bemis 

If we mean divining, sensing, seizing, ndapting and 
combining, a.X just the right moment in histor.v, all this 
nationnl and continental feeling and expierience into "a 
combined system of policy" for the United States, then 
John Quincy Adams more than any other single jierson 
helped to formulate the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. 

We need to keep in mind the background 
against which the Monroe Doctrine was pro- 


nounced. To oversimplify for the sake of brevity : 
The Holy Alliance in Europe was bent on sup- 
pressing all resurgence of the principles of the 
French Eevolution. The Spanish colonies in 
America were in revolt, and we had recognized 
the independence of several, while mamtaining 
neutrality toward those that were still in conflict 
with Spain. France had just helped to restore 
absolute powers to Ferdinand VII in Spain, and 
England feared that, in exchange, France might 
obtain cession of Spanish claims over some of its 
revolted possessions in the Americas, especially 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, too close for comfort to 
Jamaica and other British possessions. England 
made overtures to our Minister in London to join 
in at least parallel warnings to the Holy Alliance 
powers that we would not permit intervention in 
Latin America by others than Spain. News of 
this approach reached Washington and was fol- 
lowed by notification from Russia that the czar 
intended to restore "tranquillity" to all parts of 
the world, expressly including Latin America. 
Communications being what they then were, we 
did not learn that England's fears had been 
quieted by private assurances from France that 
it had no designs on Latui America. A sense of 
crisis ran so high in our governing circles that 
Monroe, with the support not only of his Cabinet 
but of Jefferson and Madison, two of the archi- 
tects of nonentanglement, was ready to jettison 
the nonentanglement principle and act with 
England in preventing European intervention in 
the former Spanish colonies. Adams, as a good 
Secretary of State, would have preferred to serve 
notice on the Allied Powers through normal dip- 
lomatic channels. Monroe decided to give notice 
publicly, in his annual message to Congress of 
December 1823, but agreed to hew to the nonen- 
tanglement policy on which his Secretary of State 
insisted and left out much of the belligerent 
language he had originally intended to use. 

In substance, the part of his 1823 message to 
Congress that later became known as the Monroe 
Doctrine can be broken down into three prin- 
ciples: noncolonization, abstention, and "hands 
off the New World."' The first, autliorship of 
which Adams eventually acknowledged and which 
he always considered the most significant part of 
the doctrine, stated that the American continents 
were no longer to be considered subjects for future 
colonization by any European power. The 
second — abstention — reaffirmed at Adams" in- 

Uepat\meni of Sfafe Bulletin 

sistence the nonentanglement dogma of the Found- 
ing Fathers, asserting that the United States 
would abstain from wars of the European powers 
in matters that concerned themselves and that: 
"It is only when our rights are invaded or seri- 
ously menaced that we resent injuries or make 
preparation for our defense." The "hands off the 
New World" principle reads : 

We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable re- 
lations existing between the United States and those 
powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on 
their part to extend their system to any portion of this 
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. . . . 
we could not view any interposition for the purpose of 
oppressing them [the independent states of the New 
World], or controlling in any other manner their destiny, 
by any European power in any other light than as the 
manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the 
United States. 

Adams himself looked on this as a corollary to 
the principle of noncolonization and therefore 
secondary, although, as we know, it has become 
the heart of the doctrine. The abstention princi- 
ple was jettisoned so long ago that few now 
remember it formed part and parcel of it. 

The adherence to the view that policies, as well 
as the means for implementing them, must be 
adapted to current circumstances is well illus- 
trated in the final sentence of the paragraph from 
which the above quotes are taken. It reads : 

In the war between those new Governments and Spain 
we declared our neutrality at the time of their recog- 
nition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue 
to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the 
judgment of the competent authorities of this Govern- 
ment, shall make a corresponding change on the part 
of the United States indispensable to their security. 

To understand the original meaning of the doc- 
trine it is important to examine the clarifying 
documents to be found in diplomatic and official 
papers of the time. Adams was responsible for 
the bulk of these, though he always worked closely 
and loyally with his President, Monroe. He went 
out of his way to make clear that the doctrine was 
unilateral and that it rested on a "selfish" national 
point of view — although he did not close the door 
to cooperation with others in implementing it. 
He also clarified that the United States recognized 
the rights of other nations to establish and modify 
their own governments according to their own 
judgments. He made it clear that the no-transfer 
policy, voiced as far back as 1811, was to be con- 
sidered part and parcel of the general policy 
pronounced in Monroe's message and that the 

October J, 7962 

United States would not look with indifference on 
"forceable interposition" by European powers 
other than Spain, either to restore Spain's domi- 
nation, to establish monarchies in its former 
colonies, or to transfer them to other European 
powers. Adams, Monroe, and the Cabinet went 
out of their way to leave to Congress entire re- 
sponsibility for any possible joint action with 
Great Britain in support of the "cause of human 
freedom" and that of Latin American inde- 

Evolution of Monroe Doctrine Concept 

It may be useful to review briefly the subsequent 
evolution of public thinking and official interpre- 
tation of the Monroe Doctrine concept. Emphasis 
shifted and changed considerably over the years. 
Originally, the doctrine was essentially a political 
policy to meet a specific threat. After its pro- 
nouncement. United States interest in Latin 
America was for a long time largely negative, 
aimed at preventing European military or politi- 
cal interference in the New World. Polk was the 
first, I believe, to bring the Monroe Doctrine into 
play when, in a message to Congress in 1845, he 
appealed to it in connection with the Oregon 
Territory controversy, and asked Congress, on its 
basis, to end joint occupation of that territory 
with the British. Polk also made it clear, in 1848, 
that (much, in fact, as Adams had believed), al- 
though under the doctrine the United States as- 
sured the Latin American Eepublics protection 
against European imperialisms, the United States 
did not consider it a self-denying ordinance that 
would prevent our country from fulfilling its 
manifest destiny. Also in 1848 the doctrine was 
invoked, successfully, when we protested British 
seizure of territory in Nicaragua. 

Wlien Napoleon III set Maximilian on the 
throne of Mexico, the House of ReiDresentatives, 
in 1861, passed a resolution refusing to recognize 
any government erected on the ruins of any re- 
publican government in America. 

Under Garfield, Secretary of State Blaine 
thought the doctrine might be used as an effective 
instrument for welding closer commercial ties be- 
tween the United States and Latin America. 
Although in other ways he was somewhat high- 
handed in dealing with Latin American nations, 
he deserved much credit for advancing the trend 
toward pan-Americanism and presided over the 


first pan- American congress in Washington in 

Under Cleveland, in 1895, the doctrine was in- 
voked when Britain refused to submit to arbitra- 
tion its dispute witli Venezuela over the boundary 
of British Guiana. The United States position 
took Britain by surprise, made it reconsider a 
dispute which could turn the United States into 
an enemy and agree to international arbitration. 
The doctrine thus gained new prestige and inci- 
dentally caused Great Britain thereafter to culti- 
vate closer relations with the United States. 

During the Spanish American War we aban- 
doned the policy of neutrality toward struggles 
between Spain and her colonies and definitely 
sided with Cuba. 

When, in 1902, the British, Germans, and 
Italians blockaded Venezuela to force payment of 
debts to their nationals, and the Germans refused 
to withdraw their warships after Venezuela 
agreed to go to arbitration, Theodore Roosevelt, 
invoking the doctrine, alerted the Fleet and gave 
Germany 48 hours to accept arbitration. Germany 
did. Theodore Roosevelt gave the doctrine much 
of the meaning that it has for many persons today. 
He told Congress in 1904 that United States ad- 
herence to the Monroe Doctrine might force us, 
however reluctantly, to exercise international 
police power in the hemisphere. He justified 
plans to set up a fiscal protectorate of the hemi- 
sphere as a "practical test of the efficiency of the 
United States in maintaining the Monroe Doc- 
trine," therefore adding to the doctrine's original 
content what might be called the "protectorate 
policy." This constituted a complete swing away 
from noninterference. Wlien he found that his 
policies had developed strong resentments in Latin 
America, Roosevelt told Congress in 1905 that 
under no circumstances would the United States 
use the doctrine as a cloak for territorial 

Finally, Wilson, in 1919, succeeded in incorpo- 
rating in the World War I peace treaty explicit 
recognition of the Monroe Doctrine. 

Multilateral Expressions of Doctrine's Principles 

The evolution of feelings toward tlie doctrine 
are also worth noting. In the United States, it 
has always been immensely popular. In Great 
Britain the initial press reaction was good, until 
official circles showed their displeiisui'e at the non- 


colonization principle and reflected their feeling 
that pronouncement of the doctrine had been a 
diplomatic defeat for England, detracting from 
its posture as sole defender of Latin America from 
European intervention. Our own statesmen and 
diplomats kej^t the Latin American capitals 
closely informed about the facts. 

European and Latin American liberals were de- 
lighted by the doctrine's warmly republican senti- 
ments. However, the Latin Americans trusted the 
British Navy more than our ideals and good in- 
tentions and showed it by maintaining closer ties 
with England. Latin American conservatives, 
pro-British elements, and those with monarchical 
leanings disliked the doctrine from the beginning. 
Doubts about what it meant for Latin America 
were stimulated when we declined Cliilean, 
Colombian, and Brazilian overtures for actual al- 
liance and requests from Mexico and from the 
United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata for assur- 
ances that we would provide contingent assistance 
for enforcing the doctrine's principles. Actually, 
•Tohn Quincy Adams was faithful to his principles 
in turning down these overtures, because they were 
intended to get the United States involved in the 
existing wars between the countries concerned and 
Spain — in which we had declared ourselves neu- 
trals — and, in the case of the La Plata Provinces, 
in their war with Brazil. The Mexican War and 
Polk's position stirred Latin American cynicism 
toward the doctrine. Finally, Theodore Roose- 
velt's injection of the "protectorate policy" into 
the doctrine stirred up much resentment among 
Latin American countries, especially those that 
considered themselves mature and sophisticated 
in international alTairs and fully as capable as the 
United States to share in guaranteeing the hemi- 
sphere's safety. 

Adherence by the inter- American sj'stem to the 
principles of the Monroe Doctrine is a matter of 
record. The hemisphere foreign ministers warned 
the European powers at Panamii in 1939 not to 
bring their conflict into American waters. They 
championed at Habana in 1940 the no-transfer 
policy, at a time when there was real danger 
that Hitler's Germany might seek cession of 
American colonies and possessions from countries 
it had overrun. In 1942 at Rio they set up a Neu- 
trality Coiumittee concerned primarily with pro- 
tection of the Caribbean, which later gave rise to 
the Inter-American Defense Agreement. Tlie Rio 
Treaty of 1947 endorsed the principle that an at- 

Deparfment of Sfofe Bulletin 




Km 1 

tack from outside the hemisphere on any American 
state endangered all. The OAS charter,^ in 1948, 
provided for multilateral action to assure the 
safety of the hemisphere, and the Caracas resolu- 
tion^ of the Tenth Inter-American Conference, 
in 1954, stated that an attempt by an extraneous 
power to impose its ideology on an American state 
constituted a menace to all, as much as an attempt 
at military takeover. 

In these multilateral expressions of the prin- 
ciples of the Monroe Doctrine, for -vvhich he was 
so largely responsible, we can see realization of 
one of John Quincy Adams' hopes; that the na- 
tions of Latin America might develop institutions 
compatible with his cherished "American political 
system." We can see also in the close consultation 
that has characterized our intimate association 
svith the inter- American system an outgrowth of 
John Adams' policy of consultation with other 
countries on mutual interests and objectives. Of 
ill of these developments, I am sure John Quincy 
jvould approve. 

Keystone of U.S. Foreign Policy 

On the other hand, given John Quincy Adams' 
overriding concern with his own country's in- 
terests and his determination to always maintain 
freedom of action to serve those interests with 
maximum effectiveness, I am inclined to believe 
that, while seeing with satisfaction multilateral- 
ization of the noncolonization and "hands off the 
New World" principles of the Monroe Doctrine, 
he would have zealously sustained the unilateral 
nature of the doctrine itself, as a keystone of 
United States policy and as a reserve arm avail- 
able if and when multilateral instruments should 
fail or break down. He would, I feel certain, 
have applauded President Kennedy's words when, 
on April 20, 1961, he told the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors at the National Press Club in 
Washington : ^ 

Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine 
)! noninterference merely conceals or excuses a policy of 
lonaction — if the nations of this hemisphere should fail 
;o meet their commitments against outside Communist 
penetration — then I want it clearly understood that this 
government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obli- 
jations, which are to the security of our Nation. 

^ For text, see Bulletin of May 23, 1948, p. 666. 
' For text, see ibid., Apr. 26,1954, p. 638. 
* Ihid., May 8, 1961, p. 659. 

Dcfober 1, 1962 

As for the various interpretations with which 
the doctrine has been interlarded over the years, 
I think the clue to what John Quincy Adams 
would think of them lies in his remark about not 
being aware that policy had changed but that 
circumstances change. He would no doubt ex- 
amine the situation today, were he with us, in the 
light of his knowledge and understanding of na- 
tions and peoples. He would also look at it in 
the light of the present United States role as 
leader of the free world in a global struggle 
against the dark forces of world communism, 
armed by modern science with weapons of almost 
incomprehensible destructiveness. He would 
show his characteristic realism, with the interests 
of his country always foremost in his mind. And 
let it be remembered that his interpretation of the 
interests of his country was never dictated by mass 
sentiment, that it was never provincial or myopic, 
but very broad and farsighted. One thing I 
rather suspect is that he still would stick to his 
opinion that the noncolonization principle was 
the most important contained m the doctrine. 
Only, with changing times, he would probably 
translate the principle today in terms of coloniza- 
tion by subversion and demagogy. 

But I am not here to redefine the Monroe Doc- 
trine, only to point out the great tradition the 
Adams family has handed down to us, of thinking 
constructively and deeply on all problems as they 
jn-esent themselves, with our nation's welfare 
foremost in our minds. 

Productiveness of Dissatisfaction 

I commend to all here, to all Americans, one 
other tradition handed down by John and John 
Quincy Adams. This is the dissatisfaction they 
constantly felt and expressed with their own 
achievement. As President Kennedy has pointed 
out, this dissatisfaction explains the great contri- 
bution that John Quuicy Adams and his succes- 
sors have made to our country. The productive- 
ness of dissatisfaction was implicit in the words 
of our present Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, 
when, addressing the School of Advanced Inter- 
national Studies of Jolms Hopkins University in 
Washington last April on "The Alliance for 
Progress in the Context of World Affairs," he 
said : ^ 

'Ibid., May 14, 1962, p. 787. 


We are dedicating ourselves to a decade of impatience. 
That is the meaning of the Alliance for Progress. Now 
it is customary for free men to take their deepest common 
commitments for granted and to exaggerate the impor- 
tance of their marginal differences. One of our problems 
therefore within the family of the hemisphere is to dis- 
cover how to combine urgency — desperate urgency- — with 
a kind of common feeling which will preserve the unity 
and fellowship of this hemisphere. 

As a summing vip, I can find no better words 
than those of John Adams : 

I always consider the settlement of America with 
Reverence and Wonder, as the Opening of a grand scene 
and Design In Providence, for the Illumination of the 
Ignorant and the Emancipation of the slavish Part of 
Mankind all over the Earth. 

As a final personal word, may I say that I was 

bom with enough Puritan blood in my veins to? 
seek instinctively to find in any serious effort aijjjdl 
lesson or moral for future guidance. Any study 
of the lives of the great members of the Adams 
family makes me wonder how we can better adapt 
our system to men of their stamp, capable of 
making the outstanding contribution to our nation 
and to history that they made. They were tact- 
less, difficult, sharp-cornered individuals with very 
strong minds of their own. Does the multiplicity 
and complexity of our problems require a huge and 
impersonal bureaucracy which is not compatible 
with, let alone able to push up to deservedly tof 
responsibilities, men of this individualistic stamp '<. 
Have we no need for leaders of the Adams mole 
today ? I thmk we do. 


Outer Space, the Atmospheric Sciences, and U.S. Foreign Policy 

Statement hy Richard N. Gardner 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Internation/il Organization Affairs'^ 

The Department of State is pleased to be in- 
vited to make a statement before this subcom- 
mittee on the relationship of the U.S. meteoro- 
logical satellite program to our foreign relations 
with other cotmtries. United States leadership 
in the launching of Tiros I through V has fired 
the imagination of people throughout the world 
with respect to the possibilities of further de- 
velopments relating to weather forecasting and the 
atmosijheric sciences on a global scale. 

The meteorological satellites are a leading ex- 
ample of how outer space can be used to benefit 
mankind. Under both the Eisenliower and Ken- 

' Made before the subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Science and Astronautics on Sept. 11 (press release 


nedy administrations, sjjecial attention has bee 
given to this aspect of outer space. 

In his state of the Union message of Januar 
30, 1961,- President Kennedy extended an invitE 
tion to other countries to jom with the Unite 
States in invoking "the wonders of science ir 
stead of its terrors." "Specifically," he said, " 
now invite all nations — including tlie Sovit 
Union — to join with us in developing a weatht 
prediction program, in a new communicatioi 
satellite program, and in preiDaration for probin 
the distant planets of Mars and Venus, probi 
which may someday unlock the deepest secrets ( 
the universe." 

' For text, see Bdi-letin of Feb. 13, 19C1, p. 207. 

Department of State Bulleti 


^^" On September 25, 1961, President Kennedy 
' laid before the United Nations a four-point pro- 
-am of space cooperation under United Nations 
luspices.' Tlie program called for a regime of 
law and order in outer space; the promotion of 
scientific cooperation and the exchange of infor- 
mation; a worldwide undertaking in weather 
forecasting and weather research; and interna- 
tional cooperation in the establishment of a global 
system of communication satellites. 

A resolution embodying the President's pro- 
gram was unanimously approved by the U.N. 
"' General Assembly on December 20.^ This resolu- 
tion emphasized the four principal areas of space 
cooperation outlined by the President : 

1. It urged a program of space cooperation on 
the basis of two basic principles : (a) International 
law, including the Charter of the United Nations, 
applies to outer space and celestial bodies; and (b) 
outer space and celestial bodies are free for ex- 
ploration and use by all states in conformity with 
international law and are not subject to national 

2. It established a public registry by the U.N. 
Secretary-General of all objects launched by states 
into orbit or beyond and called for the exchange of 
scientific and technical information. 

3. It noted that the International Telecommu- 
nication Union plans to call a special conference 
in 1963 to make allocations of radio frequency 
bands for outer space activities and proposed that 
the ITU consider other aspects of space commu- 
nication in which international cooperation will 
be required. 

4. It proposed that the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) undertake studies on the 
means of developing existing weatlier forecasting 
capabilities and advancing atmospheric science 
and technology. 

Tlie WAIO, which has been asked to take lead- 
ership in this field, is, as you know, one of the spe- 
cialized agencies in the United Nations system, 
having 113 members. Its Secretary-General is 
a British national, David Arthur Davies. The 
convention of the WMO was drawn up by a con- 
ference of directors of the International Meteoro- 
logical Organization, an international nongovern- 
mental organization founded at Utrecht, the 
Netherlands, in 1878. The convention came into 





' For text, see ibid., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619. 
* For text, see ibid., Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185. 

Ocfober 7, 7962 

effect in 1950, and the organization was established 
at its First Congress on April 4, 1951. 

The basic objective of the WMO is to coordi- 
nate, standardize, and improve world meteorologi- 
cal activities and to encourage an efficient exchange 
of meteorological information between countries. 
The United States was assessed 19.03 percent on a 
budget of $666,179 for the calendar year 1961. 
The WMO Congress convenes once every 4 years ; 
the next Congress convenes on April 1, 1963, in 
Geneva. An executive committee meets every 
year. Dr. F. W. Keichelderfer, Chief of the U.S. 
Weather Bureau, is a member of this committee. 

The U.N. resolution called upon the WMO to 
prepare an initial report in consultation with 
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scien- 
tific and Cultural Organization) and the scientific 
community on two possible programs. The first 
is an international weather service program — a 
global network to receive, process, and transmit 
meteorological information from weather satellites 
as well as earth-based instruments. The second is 
an international research program to yield infor- 
mation essential for improved weather prediction 
and perhaps eventually weather control. 

WMO Proposals 

Following passage of the General Assembly res- 
olution on December 20, 1961, the WMO invited 
the United States and the Soviet Union to send 
experts to Geneva to help develop these proposals 
for cooperation. In response to this invitation, 
Dr. Harry Wexler, Director of Meteorological Ke- 
search of the U.S. Weather Bureau, and Dr. V. A. 
Bugaev, Director of the Soviet Central Weather 
Forecasting Institute, were made available, and 
they produced a first draft which, with some mod- 
ifications, was approved by the WMO's executive 
committee in June. This report will be consid- 
ered by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space in its meeting this week and later 
by the U.N. General Assembly. The WMO quad- 
rennial Congress of government representatives to 
be held in April 1963 will also give extensive con- 
sideration to this subject. 

In the field of weather forecasting, the WMO 
proposes a system of satellites and conventional 
observations called the "World Weather Watch," 
which would bring improved weather services to 
every country of the world. First steps in the 
execution of this program would include the estab- 


lisliinont of three world weather centers for the 
collection and dissemination of data in Washing- 
ton, Moscow, and a city in the Southern Hemi- 
sphere ; the establishment of regional centers ; and 
the filling of existing gaps in the network of 
gronnd and ship observatories in order to estab- 
lish global weather coverage. 

The improved weather services this program 
is designed to develop could lead to substantial 
economic benefits in the United States and other 
countries. They hold special promise for coun- 
tries in the tropics and Southern Hemisphere, 
where vast uninhabited and ocean areas cannot 
be covered by conventional tecliniques. 

More accurate prediction of storms, floods, rain- 
fall, and droughts will bring major savings in life 
and property. Significant increases in farm pro- 
duction will be made possible as the nature and 
timing of crop planting are adjusted to take ac- 
count of future weather patterns. Fuels can be 
more effectively distributed where needed. All 
forms of transportation will benefit — air, sea, and 

The research aspects of cooperation in the 
weather field may be no less significant than the 
service aspects. Increased knowledge of the 
atmosphere may lead to new solutions to air pollu- 
tion above our cities. Eventually it may help us 
to break up dangerous storms and achieve some 
control over climate and rainfall. In the words 
of the WMO report, "It is not unrealistic to expect 
that mankind will eventually have the power to 
influence weather and even climate on a large 
scale." By encouraging cooperation now we may 
reduce the risk that this power will eventuallj' be 
used by one nation to achieve selfish military or 
economic advantage at the expense of others. 

The "WTMO report outlines in a preliminary 
fashion the possibilities for research in the weather 
field. The challenge to the United Nations in the 
months ahead is to find ways to encourage the 
necessary cooperation among nations in research, 
in the training of weather experts, in the tracking 
of weather satellites, and in the exchange of 
weather information. 

U.S.-Soviet Discussions 

I would like to call attention to a related devel- 
opment in this field. President Kennedy in his 
letter of March 7, 1962, to Chairman Khrushchev,' 

on possible areas of space cooperation, obsei*ved: 

Perhaps we could render no greater service to mankind 
through our space programs than by the joint establish- 
ment of an early operational weather satellite system. 
Such a system would be designed to provide global weather 
data for prompt use by any nation. To initiate this serv- 
ice, I projjose that the United States and the Soviet Union 
each launch a satellite to photograph cloud cover and 
provide other agreed meteorological services for all 

In reply, Chairman Khrushchev in a letter to 
President Kennedy on March 20 ^ stated : 

It is difl3cult to overestimate the benefit which could be 
brought to mankind b.v organizing a world weather obser- 
vation service with the aid of artificial earth satellites. 
Precise and timely weather forecasts will be another 
important step along the way to man's conquering of 
nature, will help him still more successfully to cope with 
natural calamities and open up new prospects for im- 
proving the well-being of mankind. Let us cooperate in 
this field, too. 

As a followup of this exchange of corre- 
spondence, bilateral conversations were held be- 
tween Hugh Dryden, Deputy Director of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
and Anatoli Blagonravov of the Soviet Academy 
of Sciences during the March and June meetings 
of the Outer Space Committee in New York and 
Geneva.' They discussed the possibilities of co- 
operation in meteorology, a world magnetic sur- 
vey, and satellite telecommunications, and for- 
warded recommendations to their governments 
Plans were discussed for the gradiial increase ir 
the exchange of data from weather satellites dur 
ing the next few years, looking toward eventua 
coordinated launchings of meteorological satel- 
lites with rapid dissemination of data to othei 
states in accord with the general recommendationt 
of the •\VMO. 

The United States has a considerable program 
of cooperation with other countries in the ex 
change of meteorological information. Twenty 
seven countries are already cooperating in thej 
Tiros program, and it is expected that even more 
countries will participate in later versions of Tirot 
which will be able to photograph cloud cover over 
more countries. 

Twenty-six countries attended an Internationa' 
meteorological satellite workshop sponsored by the 







" For text, see ibid., Apr. 2, 1962, p. 536. 

° Not printed here. 

' For text of a statement made before the Committee bji 
U.S. Representative Francis T. P. Plimpton on Mar. ISi 
see BtJiiETiN of May 14, 1962, p. 809. 

Deporfmenf of Stafe Bulletir 










National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
and the Weather Bureau in Washington from No- 
vember 13 to 22, 1961. The workshop included rep- 
resentatives from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Re- 
public of China, Denmark, Dutch West Indies, El 
Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Honduras, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, 
Eepublic of South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad, 
United Arab Republic, and United Kingdom. 

This worksliop was significant in that the repre- 
sentatives of foreign meteorological services re- 
ceived instruction in the techniques of utilizing 
satellite-produced data. The weather services of 
the cooperating countries were accordingly placed 
in a better position to utilize information gained 
from satellites in their own conventional weather 
forecasting and analyzing services. 

Meteorological sounding rockets are also being 
utilized as an important tool for research in 
meteorology. NASA has cooperated with govern- 
ment agencies in Italy, Japan, Pakistan, and 
Sweden in sounding-rocket programs, and in the 
near future a group of countries will conduct 
sounding-rocket programs in the Indian Ocean 
area to determine the causes for weather patterns 
in that region. 

How Meteorological Program Serves U.S. Interest 

It is clear from this review that the progress 
of cooperation in space meteorology, as in other 
areas of space cooperation, serves the national in- 
terest of the United States in a nmnber of ways : 

In the fi?'st place, they provide a way, despite 
political differences, to exploit the enormous 
possibilities which the space age opens for all man- 
kind. This approach is not based on faith or on 
a fuzzy idealism. We recognize that the deep 
political differences of our time place an upper 
limit on cooperation. But we hope in the fore- 
seeable future to develop cooperative projects with 
the Soviet Union, if not in the form of joint ven- 
tures, at least in the coordination of activities. 

It is in the interest of all countries, whatever 
their ideology, that worldwide weather services be 
developed. Recent meetings have emphasized this 
common interest to Soviet scientists and technical 
experts. While the U.N. and its specialized agen- 
cies are not the only institutions to promote co- 
operation, they do help to stimulate affirmative 
Soviet actions and fit U.S.-Soviet cooperation in- 

Ocfober I, 1962 

to a broader framework which recognizes the inter- 
ests of other countries. 

In the second place, U.N. and bilateral programs 
can help widen and deepen cooperation on a free- 
world basis even if universal participation is not 
achieved. The assistance of many nations is 
needed if our national space program is to be 
successfully carried on. In weather and com- 
mimications, for example, the teclmology of the 
United States can yield dividends to ourselves and 
others only if many nations join in allocating radio 
frequencies, in tracking and communicating with 
space vehicles, and in placing necessary ground 
installations on their territories. 

A good start has already been made in bilateral 
cooperation through the activities of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, which has 
cooperative ventures with some 40 countries in- 
volving tracking stations, exchanges of personnel, 
and joint space experiments. For certain countries 
and for certain activities, however, cooperative 
projects may be easier of achievement if they are 
multilateral and bear United Nations endorsement. 

In the third place, the program of space coopera- 
tion has deep significance for the U.N. itself. The 
United Nations and specialized agencies will have 
new responsibilities for promoting scientific co- 
operation and information exchange and for assist- 
ing in the development of worldwide weather and 
communications services. Such activities cannot 
fail to strengthen the United Nations as a force 
for peace by binding its members together through 
ties of common interest. This is particularly true 
of the developing countries, which stand to derive 
some of the greatest benefits. 

Looking toward the future, we hope to continue 
the cooperative ventures now underway. The 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
is now meeting in New York to examine the first 
report of the WMO covering weather forecasting 
and research. The U.N. General Assembly will 
then consider this report. The WMO Congress 
next April will prepare further recommendations 
on this subject. We look forward to further 
meetings with the Soviet Union in this field. Our 
bilateral programs through NASA will no doubt 
continue to reach more comitries. 

A special committee of the National Academy 
of Sciences has been constituted to prepare recom- 
mendations on the atmospheric sciences and hy- 
drology. The title of this committee is the Com- 


mittee on International Planning in Atmospheric 
Sciences and Hydrology (CIPASH). It is pre- 
paring recommendations on the scientific aspects 
of these programs. At the same time we have 
established an interagency committee under the 
chairmansliip of Mr. J. Herbert Hollomon, Assist- 
ant Secretary of Commerce for Science and 
Technology', ■which includes representatives of the 
Department of State, the Department of Com- 
merce, the National Science Foundation, NASA, 
and the Office of Science and Technology to con- 
sider the recommendations of CIPASH and to 
prepare a government policy position on these 

In conclusion, it is the view of the Department 
of State that the meteorological satellite program 
is important in our relations with other countries 
and that we should actively continue to follow up 
on the initiative and leadership we have already 
taken in this activity. Our willingness to share 
the information received through the Tiros satel- 
lites with other countries has resulted in foreign 
cooperation of practical importance to our own 
efforts as well as good will for the United States. 
Full support should be given to the weather satel- 
lite program by the United States nationally as 
well as internationally. Here is a program in the 
peaceful uses of outer space which is not only im- 
portant to us nationally, for economic and social 
reasons, but in addition is recognized as vitally 
important to the daily needs of people in all coun- 
tries. It is a program in which we need the par- 
ticipation of all countries because we cannot do 
this task alone effectively. It is an extraordinary 
example of the need for international cooperation 
in the peaceful uses of outer space. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

87th Congress, 2d Session 

Study of Nondiplomatic Activities of Foreign Govern- 
ments. Report to accompany S. Res. 362. S. Rept. 1708. 
July 11, 19G2. 3 pp. 

Importation of Certain Articles for Religious Purposes. 
Report to accompany H.R. 4449. S. Rept. 1719. July 
11, 1962. 3 pp. 

Conservation of Tropical Tuna. Report to accompany S. 
2568. S. Rept. 1737. July 16, 1962. 18 pp. 

Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the 
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 
Fiscal Year 1963. Report to accompany H.R. 12580. 
H. Rept. 1996. July 17, 1962. 43 pp. 

Amending Section 632 of Title 38, United States Code, To 
Provide for an Extension of the Program of Grants-ln- 
Aid to the Republic of the Philippines for the Hospitali- 
zation of Certain Veterans. Report to accompany S. 
3373. S. Rept. 1745. July 19, 1962. 6 pp. 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. Conference report to 
accompany S. 2996. S. Rept. 2008. July 20, 1962. 

Economic Developments in South America. Report of the 
Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relation- 
ships of the Joint Economic Committee. July 20, 1962. 
12 pp. [Joint Committee print] 

Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Hearings before the Senate 
Finance Committee on H.R. 11970, an act to promote 
the general welfare, foreign policy, and security of the 
United States through International trade agreements 
and through adjustment assistance to domestic industry, 
agriculture, and labor, and for other purposes. Part 
1, July 23-26, 1962, 508 pp. ; Part 2, July 3(>-August 6, 
1962, 527 pp. ; Part 3, August 7-10, 1962, 605 pp. ; Part 4, 
August 13-16, 1962, 641 pp. 

Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Canada-United Statesi 
Interparliamentary Group, February 28-March 4, 1962, 
Ottawa, Canada. Prepared by Cornelius E. Gallagher, 
chairman of the House of Representatives delegation. 
H. Rept. 2034. July 25, 1962. 19 pp. 

National Bank Branches in Foreign Countries. Report to 
accompany S. 1771. H. Rept. 2047. July 27, 1962. 7 pp. 

Assuring Payment of Just Compensation for the Use and 
Occupancy of Certain Lands on Kwajalein and Dalap 
Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report 
to accompany H.R. 11952. H. Rept. 2051. July 30, 
1962. 18 pp. 

Providing for the Settlement of Claims of Certain Resi- 
dents of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 
Report to accompany H.R. 12078. H. Rept. 2059. 
July 30, 1962. 5 pp. 

Nondiplomatic Activities of Representatives of Foreign "C'Ci 
Governments. A preliminary study prepared by the }j^[|^'j 
staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
July 1962. 14 pp. [Committee print] 

Implementation of the Himiphrey Amendment to the' 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Prepared by the 
Agency for International Development. S. Doc. 112, 
July 1962. 37 pp. 

International Wheat Agreement Act Extension. Report 
to accompany S. 3574. S. Rept. 1801. August 2, 1962, 
10 pp. 

Communications Satellite Act of 1962. Hearings before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on H.R. 11040. 
an act for the establishment, ownership, operation, and 
regulation of a commercial communications satellite 
system, and for other purposes. August 3-9, 1962 
456 pp. 

Higher Interest Rates on Time Deposits of ForeigE 
Governments. Report of the House Banking and Cur- 
rencv Committee, together with individual views, on 
H.R. 12080. H. Rept. 2162. August 9. 1962. 10 pp. 

United Nations Loan. Report to accompany S. 2768. H 
Rept. 2176. August 10, 1962. 22 pp. 

Philippine War Dam.age Claims. Report to accompany 
H.R. 11721. S. Rept. 18,S2. August 16. 1962. 8 pp. 

Films Recording Mrs. .John F. Kennedy's Visit to Indi£ 
and Pakistan. Report to accompany S. Con. Res. 84 
S. Rept. 1883. August 16, 1962. 5 pp. 

International Wheat Agreement Act Extension. Repor 
to accompany S. 3574. H. Rept. 2246. August 16 
1962. 4 pp. 





of Si 









• : 





. LiaWi 
Council ( 


lems I; 




Department of State Bulletir Jtiuj 




«le« fo 



Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings 

icheduled October Through December 1962 

A-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at Expert Level .... Mexico, D. F Oct. 1- 

LO Meeting of Experts on the Assessment of Manpower Require- Geneva Oct. 1- 

ments for Economic Development, 

nternational Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 50th Statutory Copenhagen Oct. 1- 


TU Special Working Group on Radio Regulations Revision .... Geneva Oct. 1- 

la^J.N. ECE Ad Hoc Working Party on Standardization of Conditions Geneva Oct. 1- 

of Sale of Potatoes. 

P#J.N. ECE Timber Committee: 20th Session Geneva Oct. 1- 

0th ILO International Conference of Labor Statisticians Geneva Oct. 2- 

J.N. EGA Seminar on Administrative Problems in African Countries . Addis Ababa Oct. 2- 

!)aribbean Organization Council: 3d Meeting Paramaribo, Dutch Guiana . . Oct. 3- 

U J.N. ECAFE Seminar on Chemicals and Allied Industries Bangkok Oct. 3- 

M J.N. Scientific Advisory Committee Vienna or Geneva Oct. 4- 

;lif AEA Symposium on Treatment and Storage of High-Level Radio- Vienna Oct. 8- 

active Wastes. 

i'AO Regional Conference for Europe (undetermined) Oct. 8- 

MCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement London Oct. 8- 

"JATO Science Committee Paris Oct. 8- 

5ATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade .... Geneva Oct. 8- 

5ATT Committee II on Expansion of International Trade .... Geneva Oct. 8- 

J.N. ECE Working Party on Simplification and Standardization of Geneva Oct. 8- 

Export Documents. 

Vorld Power Conference: 6th Plenary Meeting Melbourne Oct. 9- 

^eace Corps: International Conference on Middle-Level Manpower, San Juan Oct. 10- 

Volunteer Services, and Their Role in Social and Economic 


J.N. ECE Working Party on Transport Costs Geneva Oct. 10- 

='A0 Council: 39th Session Rome Oct. 15- 

LO Meeting of Consultants on Indigenous and Tribal Populations . Geneva Oct. 15- 

^MO Regional Association II (Asia): 3d Session Bangkok Oct. 15- 

jATT Working Party on Accession of United Arab Repubhc . . . Geneva . ^ Oct. 15- 

J.N. ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Plan- Bangkok Oct. 15- 

ning: 7th Session. 

J.N. ECE Group of Experts on Standardization of Fruit Juices . . Geneva Oct. 15- 

J.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 10th Session . . . Geneva Oct. 15- 

Jnited Nations Pledging Conference New York Oct. 16- 

MCO Council: 7th Session London Oct. 17- 

J.N. ECE Working Party of Experts on Statistical Information . . Geneva Oct. 17- 

)ECD Development Assistance Committee: Annual Review Meeting. Paris Oct. 18- 

.\-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at Ministerial Level . . M&ico, D.F Oct. 20- 

AEA Intergovernmental Committee on Draft Convention on Civil Vienna Oct. 22- 

Liability, Land-Based Facilities: 2d Meeting. 

CAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel: 2d Meeting Montreal Oct. 22- 

)ECD Oil Committee Paris Oct. 22- 

MCO Working Group on Facilitation of International Travel and London Oct. 22- 


CifJouncil of Representatives to the G ATT Contracting Parties . . . Geneva Oct. 22- 

J.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Group of Experts on Prob- Geneva Oct. 22- 

lems Involved in Establishing a Unified System of Inland Water- 
ways of International Concern in Europe. 

Executive Committee of the Program of the U.N. High Commissioner Geneva Oct. 22- 

for Refugees: 8th Session. 




y, 'Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Sept. 17, 19G2. Following is a list of abbreviations: EGA, 

" Jconomic Commission for Africa ; ECAFE, Ecouomie Commission for Asia and the Far East ; ECE, Economic 

Commission for Europe: ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAD, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, 

'"JJJeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency: lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American 

Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Com- 

uittee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 

ultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; 

)ECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations 

Qducational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health 

)rganization ; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 

)cfober 1, 1962 501 

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued 

Scheduled October Through December 1962 — Continued 

G ATT Contracting Parties: 20th Session Geneva Oct. 23- 

OECD Maritime Transport Committee: Working Party Paris Oct. 24- 

ILO Governing Body: 153d Session (and its committees) Geneva Oct. 24- 

Inter-Parliamentary Union: 51st Conference Brasilia Oct. 24- 

ICAO Limited Middle East-Southeast Asia Regional Air Navigation Paris Oct. 25- 

Meeting (in conjunction with WMO). 

U.N. EC AFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 3d Session . Bangkok Oct. 25- 

UNESCO Executive Board: 63d Session Paris Oct. 25- 

OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee Paris Oct. 29- 

FAO/UNICEF Policy Committee Rome Oct. 29- 

International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 9th Meeting . . Seattle Oct. 29- 

U.N. EGA Eastern African Transport Conference Addis Ababa Oct. 29- 

Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in Sydney Oct. 30- 

South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 14th Meeting. 

U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Rail Geneva Oct. 31- C{(| 


FAO Group on Citrus Fruits: 3d Session Rome October jl(|f 

FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 10th Meeting Seoul October 

FAO 1963 World Food Congress Preparatory Committee: 2d Session. Rome October 

GATT Working Party on Television Programs Geneva October or 


FAO Regional Conference for Africa: 2d Session Tunisia Nov. 1- 

IMCO Working Group of Experts on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by London Nov. 5- 


ICEM Executive Committee: 20th Session Geneva Nov. 5- 

WMO Regional Association V (Southwest Pacific): 3d Session . . . Noumea Nov. 5- W 

4th Inter-American Statistical Conference Washington Nov. 5- 

Inter-Amerioan Statistical Institute: Committee on Improvement of Washington Nov. 5- 

National Statistics. ^^jjj 

ITU Meeting of Communication Experts Washington Nov. 5- 

U.N. ECE Meeting of Senior Economic Advisers Geneva Nov. 5- 

U.N. ECAFE Inland Waterways Subcommittee Bangkok Nov. 6- tjU, 

UNESCO General Conference:" 12th Session Paris Nov. 9- ^ . 

ICEM Council: 17th Session Geneva Nov. 12- tropi 

ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for Printing and Allied Trades . . Geneva Nov. 12- 

3d U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Problems of Methodology Geneva Nov. 12- 

of Agricultural Problems. 

ICAO Aerodromes and Ground Aids Division: 7th Session .... Montreal Nov. 13- 

IMCO Working Group on Facilitation of International Travel and London Nov. 13- 


7th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America Rio de Janeiro Nov. 19- 

North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: Scientific Committee Washington Nov. 19- 

ILO Advisory Committee of the International Institute for Labor Geneva Nov. 19- 


2d Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference Cartagena, Colombia .... Nov. 20- 

5th U.N. ECAFE Regional Conference on Water Resources Develop- Bangkok Nov. 20- 


FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 8th Session Santiago Nov. 22- 

ILO Committee of Social Security Experts Geneva Nov. 26- 

North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 6th Meeting Washington Nov. 26- 

ILO Asian Regional Conference: 5th Session Melbourne Nov. 26- 

U.N. ECE Working Party on Housing and Building Statistics . . . Geneva Nov. 26- 

U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on Inter- Geneva Nov. 26- 

national Pa.ssenger Transport Services by Road. 

U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Road Geneva Nov. 26- 


OECD Ministerial Meeting Paris Nov. 27- 

NATO Medical Committee Paris Nov. 27- 

U.N. EC.\FE Working Party of Senior Geologists: 5th Session . . . Bangkok Nov. 27- 

U.N. ECE Gas Committee: 9th Session Geneva Nov. 28- 

South Pacific Commission: 24th Session Nouni<>a November 

U.N. EC.A,FE Electric Power Subcommittee Bangkok November 

International Wheat Council: 36th Session London November 

International Wool Study Group: 7th Meeting London November 

U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Mineral Resources Development: 5th Bangkok Dec. 3- 


U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee: Bangkok Dec. 3- 

11th So.ssion. 

WHO Seminar on Health Statistics Bangkok Dec. 3- 

FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: llth Rome Dec. 5- 


U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 14th Session . . . Geneva Dec. 10- 

502 Department of State Bulleti 


a dti: 








ILO Committee of Experts on Determination of States of Chief 

Industrial Importance. 
ILO Committee on Conditions of Work in the Fishing Industry. . . 

U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Urban Community Development 

U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems 

FAO/ECAFE Ad Hoc Meeting on Jute 

U.N. ECE Subcommittee on Inland Water Transport 

OECD Maritime Transport Committee 

UNESCO Executive Board: 64th Session 

U.N. ECE Coal Committee and Coal Trade Subcommittee 

U.N. ECE Housing Committee (and working parties) 

NATO Ministerial Council 

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 34th Session (resumed) .... 

U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Energy in Europe 

U.N. ECOSOC Regional Cartographic Conference for Africa .... 

Geneva Dec. 10- 

Geneva Dec. 10- 

Dacca, Pakistan Dec. 10- 

Geneva Dec. 10- 

Bangkok Dec. 12- 

Geneva Dec. 12- 

Paris Dec. 13- 

Paris Dec. 13- 

Geneva Dec. 17- 

Geneva Dec. 17- 

Paris December 

New York December 

Geneva December 

(undetermined) December 

Security Council Recommends U.N. 
Admit Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago 

Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson 

U.S. Representative in the Secunty Council ^ 

Often in the past several years we have liad the 
happy opportunity of voting to recommend the 
admission of new states from Africa and from 
Asia. Today we consider the applications of these 
newly independent nations of the Western Hemi- 
sphere : Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago — two 
tropical and beautiful islands in the sun which 
are affectionately known to many of my country- 
men and, I am glad to say, to me personally. 

I have had the good fortune to witness the re- 
markable development of Jamaica during many 
happy holidays over many years, and even made a 
speech in Kingston at the celebration of the 300th 
anniversary of the founduig of the British colony 
in Jamaica, which, I suspect, must be the first time 
a citizen of the United States ever celebrated the 
founding of a British colony in North America. 
And I have also visited Trinidad on many occa- 
sions over more than 20 years in war and peace, 
and I have the happiest memories of meetings with 
the talented and vigorous Prime Minister, Dr. 
Eric Williams, and his colleagues. I welcome 
here today on behalf of my country Mr. Alex 
Clark, the new Ambassador of Trinidad and To- 
bago to the United Nations and to the United 

Jamaica, as has been pointed out, became inde- 
pendent on August 6; Trinidad and Tobago on 
August 31. The United States was privileged to 
participate in the independence celebrations of 

'Made in the Security Council on Sept. 12 (U.S./U.N. 
press release 4037). 

Ocfober J, J 962 

both countries, which in each instance marked the 
end of a long colonial association with the United 
Kingdom — and the beginning of a new one as 
independent members of the Commonwealth. 

Both these new nations and the United King- 
dom, it seems to us, deserve the highest praise for 
the careful, deliberate planning which prepared 
the way for independence. Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago enter the family of nations equipped 
with mature and robust political institutions 
which should serve them well. 

I would like on behalf of the United States to 
convey sincere congratulations to Sir Alexander 
Bustamante, the Prime Minister of Jamaica, 
whose long and distinguished career has now been 
crowned with his country's highest office, an emi- 
nent world reputation, and, most joyous of all, the 
blessings of matrimony. 

Dr. Eric Williams, the Prime Minister of Trini- 
dad and Tobago, is similarly renowned as a cham- 
pion of his people and of his coimtry. His great 
energy and devotion have provided stanch leader- 
ship and inspiration to his countrymen at a cru- 
cial time. To him, also, I am happy to extend 
the congratulations of my Government and the 
people of this coimtry. 

Mr. President, the United States welcomes the 
applications of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
and looks forward to close association with their 
representatives here. We shall support both of 
the resolutions - submitted by the United King- 
dom and Ghana here this afternoon. 

" U.N. docs. S/5164 and S/5165 ; the Council on Sept. 12 
unanimously recommended that Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago be admitted to membership in the United 
Nations. On Sept. 18 the U.N. General Assembly admitted 
by acclamation Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Burundi, 
and Rwanda. (For text of a U.S. statement In the 
Security Council on July 26 on the applications of Burundi 
and Rwanda, see Bulletin of Aug. 20, 1962, p. 206.) 


Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation 
to 17th U.N. General Assembly 

The Senate on September 10 confirmed the fol- 
lowing to be members of the U.S. delegation to 
the 17th session of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations: 

Adlai E. Stevenson 
Francis T. P. Plimpton 
Albert E. Gore ' 
Gordon Allott ' 
Arthur H. Dean ^ 

Alternate Representatives 

Charles W. Yost 

Philip M. Klutznick 

Jonathan B. Bingham 

Carl T. Rowan ' 

Mrs. Marietta P. Tree ' 

For biographic details, see Department of State 
press release 526 dated August 28. 

United States Delegations 
to International Conferences 

Meeting of GATT Contracting Parties 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 14 (press release 555) that a U.S. delega- 
tion would begin consultations with the contract- 
ing parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade at Geneva on September 24. The pur- 
pose of these consultations is to conform U.S. 
GATT schedules to the revised U.S. tariff sched- 
ules authorized by the Tariff Classification Act of 

John W. Evans, Minister for Economic Affairs, 
U.S. Mission, Geneva, is chairman of the delega- 
tion. The other delegates are : 

L. Bruce Gates, U.S. Tariff Commission 
Marion E. Eggleton, Department of Agriculture 
William T. Hart, U.S. Tariff Commission 
James AV. Ilowell, U.S. Tariff Commission 
Paul Kaplowitz, U.S. Tariff Commission 
Albert H. Small, Department of State 
George White, Department of Commerce 

* To serve no longer than Dec. 31, 1962. 

Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done 
at Vienna October 4, 1961.' 
Acceptances deposited: Netherlands (including Surinam 

and Netherlands Antilles), September 10, 1962; 

Monaco and Sudan, September 11, 19C2. 


Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. 
Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. 
Entered into force December 27. 194.5. TIAS 1501. 
Siffnaturcs and acceptances: Kuwait, September 13, 

1962 ; Sierra Leone and Tanganyika, September 10, 

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Re- 
construction and Development. Opened for .signature 
at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force 
December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. 
Signatures and acceptances: Kuwait, September 13, 

1962 ; Sierra Leone and Tanganyika, September 10, 

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Cor- 
poration, as amended. Done at Washington May 25, 
1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620 
and 4894. 
Signature and acceptance: Kuwait, September 13, 

Articles of agreement of the International Development 
Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960. 
Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607. 
Signature and acceptance: Kuwait, September 13, 



Agreement to supplement the agreement between the 
parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the 
status of their forces, si.yued at London June 19, 1951 
(TIAS 2^6), with respect to foreign forces stationed 
in the Federal Republic of Germany, and protocol of 
signature. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.' 
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, September 10, 1962. 

Agreement to implement paragraph 5 of article 45 of the 
agreement of August 3, 1959, to supplement the agree- 
ment between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty 
regarding the status of their forces with respect to for- 
eign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many. Signed at Bonn August 3. 19.59.' 
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, September 10, 1962. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pollutior 
of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at Londor 
May 12, 19.54." Entered into force July 26, 1958; foi 
the" United States December 8. 1961. 
Acceptance deposited: Australia, August 29, 1962. 

' Not in force. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Postal Services 

Convention of the Postal Union of the Americas and 
Spain, tinal protocol, and regulations of execution. 
Signed at Buenos Aires October 14, 1960 ; entered into 
force for the United States March 1, 1961. TIAS 4871. 
Ratification deposited: Mexico, June 4, 1962. 

ed Sea Lights 

International agreement regarding the maintenance of 
certain lishts in the Red Sea. Open for signature at 
London February 20 to August 19, 1962.' 
Signatures: Denmark, Augusts, 1962; Federal Republic 
of Germany,^ Italy,^ August 14, 1962; Netherlands," 
August 16, 1962 ; Norway," August 17, 1962 ; Sweden, 
August 2, 1962 ; United Kingdom, February 20, 1962 ; 
United States," March 2, 1962. 




Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta- 
tive Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948. 
Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044. 
Acceptances deposited: Morocco (with declaration), 

July 30, 1962; Spain (with reservation), January 23, 


touth Pacific Commission 

Agreement establishing the South Pacific Commission. 
Signed at Canberra February 6, 1947. Entered into 
force July 29, 1948. 

Notification of withdrawal: Netherlands, August 20, 
1962, effective December 31, 1962. 



International telecommunication convention with six an- 
nexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered 
into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United States Oc- 
tober 23, 1961. TIAS 4892. 

Ratification deposited: Czechoslovakia, August 1, 1962." 
Accession deposited: Syrian Arab Republic, August 24, 



Agreement for cooperation on the use of atomic energy 
for mutual defense purposes. Signed at Brussels 
May 17, 1962. 
Entered into force: September 5, 1962. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7 U.S.C. 
1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Taipei 
August 31, 1962. Entered into force August 31, 1962. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement relating to the furnishing of defense articles 
and services to Costa Rica for the purpose of contrib- 
uting to its internal security. Effected by exchange of 
notes at San Josi5 May 21 and June 18, 1962. Entered 
into force June 18, 1962. 


Agreement providing for investment guaranties. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Guatemala August 9, 1960. 
Entered into force: August 29, 1962. 

" Subject to acceptance. 

° With reservations contained in final protocol. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree- 
ment of May 3, 1958, as supplemented and amended 
(TIAS 4027, 4065, and 4870). Effected by exchange of 
notes at Reykjavik August 20, 1962. Entered into force 
August 20, 1962. 


Agreement relating to the improvement of the child feed- 
ing program carried out by the Amministrazione per 
le Attivita. Assisteuziali Italiane ed Internazionali 
(AAI). Effected by exchange of notes at Rome August 
28, 1962. Entered into force August 28, 1962. 


Agreement regarding the settlement of postwar economic 
assistance and exchange of notes. Signed at Tokyo 
January 9, 1962. 
Entered into force: September 11, 1962. 


Agreement concerning the closeout of the collection ac- 
counts of the agricultural commodities agreement of 
October 23, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3935, 4070, 4129, 
and 4178). Effected by exchange of notes at Mfeico 
July 6, 1961, and August 9, 1962. Entered into force 
August 9, 1962. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps 
program in Peru. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Lima January 25, 1962. Entered into force January 25, 

United Arab Republic 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree- 
ment of February 10, 1962, as amended (TIAS 4947, 
4991, and 5070). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Cairo September 1, 1962. Entered into force Septem- 
ber 1, 1962. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement relating to the use of the airfield at Wide- 
awake in Ascension Island by aircraft of the Royal 
Air Force. Effected by exchange of notes at Washing- 
ton August 29, 1962. Entered into force August 29, 


Dr. Roliefson To Head New Office 
of International Scientific Affairs 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 14 (press release 548 dated September 11) 
the appointment of Professor Ragnar Roliefson 
as Director of International Scientific Affairs. 
Dr. Roliefson will be designated a principal of- 
ficer of the Department and will also act as the 

Ocfofaer I, 7962 


adviser to tlie Secretary of State and other De- 
partment oflicers on scientific and teclinological 

Dr. Kollefson will head a newly organized 
Office of International Scientific Affairs. The 
establislmient of this new Office is in response to 
the Department's recognized need for strengthen- 
ing the role of science in foreign policy. The 
primary functions of the Office of International 
Scientific Affairs will be to bring to bear the im- 
pact of science and teclinology in foreign policy 
development and decisionmaking, and to provide 
advice and guidance to the Department, other 
Government organizations, and the science com- 
munity on matters concerning science and technol- 
ogy in foreign affairs. 

The new Office will absorb the functions pre- 
viously carried out under Dr. Walter G. "VVliitman, 
who joined the Department on Labor Day 1960 
as Science Adviser. During Dr. 'Wliitman's ten- 
ure the Science Adviser's functions were expanded 
to include also the peaceful uses of outer space and 
atomic energy, which had previously been handled 
by a separate office. The number of science 
attaches serving at overseas posts has increased to 
17, and today the following posts have one or two 
attaches: London (2), Paris (2), Bonn (2), Stock- 
holm (2), Rome (2), New Delhi (2), Tokyo (2), 
Buenos Aires (1), Bern (1), and Rio de Janeiro 
(1). The post at Rio is a regional office for Latin 
America with science representation from the Na- 
tional Institutes of Health, the National Science 
Foundation, and the Department of Defense. 

Six New FSO's Assigned as Interns 
in Congressional Offices 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 10 (press release 546) that a new program 
to develop a closer working relationship with the 
Congress had been initiated with the assignment of 
six new members of the Foreign Service to work 
as interns in key congressional offices as pail of 
their career orientation program. 

The young diplomats are being placed in some 
of the principal centers of influence on Capitol 
Hill : the offices of Senate Majority and Minority 
Leaders Mansfield and Dirksen; House Majority 
Leader Albert; the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee ; 

and Representative Frances Bolton, a ranking 
member of the latter committee. 

The interns are being assigned to work and not 
just be observers in the congi'essional offices. They 
are all new arrivals in the diplomatic service and 
come equipped with a variety of backgrounds and 
skills. Collectively they speak French, German, 
Spanish, Arabic, and Russian. They include a 
former farm manager, senatorial assistant, divin- 
ity student, and USIA exhibit guide. 

As a trial run for the new program, the group 
will work in the various offices for a week, but the 
State Department plans to expand the program 
later to a month's assignment for new Foreign 
Service officers and include a wide range of con- 
gi'essional offices.' 

' For a list of the six officers in the first group, see 
Department of State press release 546 dated Sept. 10. 

Check List of Department of|State 
Press Releases: September 10-16 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. 

Release Issued prior to September 10 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 543 of 
September 7. 


U.S. participation in international con- 

FSO's assigned to congressional offices 

Gardner : House Subcommittee on 
Science and A.stronautics. 

Rollefson appointed Director of Inter- 
national Scientific Affairs (rewrite). 

International teacher development 

U.S. objectives in Eastern Europe (ex- 
cerpts from Tyler testimony ) . 

Study of cultural presentations pro- 
gram (rewrite). 

U.N. Day concert. 

Germany credentials (rewrite). 

Russell sworn in as Ambassador to 
Tunisia (biographic details). 

Delegation to GATT meeting (re- 

Cultural exchange (Japan). 

U. Alexis Johnson : "How To Combat 
Communist Goals." 

Hilsman : "A Report on South Viet- 

Bowles : "Toward a New 'ReaUsm' in 
American Foreign Policy." 

Bowles: "The Face We Show to the 
World" (excerpts). 

Cleveland : "Realism, Responsibility, 
and Respect." 

•Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 




9/10 1 


9/10 ] 


9/11 ( 


9/11 ] 


9/13 ] 






















Departmenf of State Bulletin 

)ctober 1, 1962 

American Principles. The Adams Family and the 
Department of State (Martin) 

American Republics. The Adams Family ajid the 
Department of State (Martin) 

'ommunisRi. How To Combat Communist Goals 

ingress, The 

congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 


)uter Space, the Atmospheric Sciences, and U.S. 

Foreign Policy (Gardner) 

!ix New FSO's Assigned as Interns in Congressional 


3uba. President States U.S. Policy Toward Cuba . 

)epartment and Foreign Service 

)r. Rollefson To Head New Office of International 
Scientific Affairs 

Ilx New FSO's Assigned as Interns in Congres- 
sional Offices 

Economic Affairs 

low To Combat Communist Goals (Johnson) . . . 
leeting of GATT Contracting Parties (delegation) . 

iducational and Cultural Affairs. Advisory Com- 
mittee To Study Cultural Presentations Program . 

'oreign Aid. How To Combat Communist Goals 

iermany. Letters of Credence (Knappstein) . . 

nternational Organizations and Conferences 

Jalendar of International Conferences and Meet- 

leetlng of GATT Contracting Parties (delegation) . 

amaica. Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit 
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago (Stevenson) . . . 

'eland. General Pulaski's Memorial Day, 1962 
(text of proclamation) 

Index Vol. XLVII, No. 1214 

Presidential Documents 

487 General Pulaski's Memorial Day, 1962 486 

President States U.S. Policy Toward Cuba .... 481 
4g7 Science 

Outer Space, the Atmospheric Sciences, and U.S. 

Foreign Policy (Gardner) 496 

Dr. Rollefson To Head New Office of International 

Scientific Affairs 505 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 504 

Trinidad and Tobago. Security Council Recom- 
mends U.N. Admit Jamaica, Trinidad and To- 
bago (Stevenson) 503 

KQg United Nations 

Outer Space, the Atmospheric Sciences, and U.S. 

481 Foreign Policy (Gardner) 496 

Realism, Responsibility, and Resi)ect — Three R's 

for the United Nations (Cleveland) 482 

505 Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Jamaica, 

Trinidad and Tobago (Stevenson) 503 

506 Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 17th U.N. Gen- 

eral Assembly 504 

475 Name Index 

504 Allott, Gordon 504 

Bingham, Jonathan B 504 

4gg Cleveland, Harlan 482 

Dean, Arthur H 504 

Gardner, Richard N 496 

^''■5 Gore, Albert E 504 

486 Johnson, U. Alexis 475 

Kennedy, President 481, 486 

Klutznlck, Philip M 504 

Knappsteln, Karl Heinrich 486 

501 Martin, Edwin M 487 

504 Plimpton, Francis T. P 504 

Rollefson, Ragnar 505 

503 Rowan, Carl T 504 

Stevenson, Adlai E 503,504 

Tree, Mrs. Marietta P 504 

486 Yost, Charles W 504 



.1 1 cD ^ I /A . 

Government Printing Office 


Washington 25, D.C. 













This 4:10-page volume, consisting of a narrative summary with 
annex followed by a collection of docmnents, presents the record of 
inter-American efforts during 1959 and 1960 to relieve international 
tensions in the Hemisphere and to lay the foundation for a new 
cooperative program of social progress and economic development in 
Latin America. In this 2-year period three Meetings of Consultation 
of IMinisters of Foreign Affairs were held under the auspices of the 
Organization of American States (O AS)— the fifth, sixth, and 
seventh such meetings in the series inaugurated in 1939 to consider 
urgent problems affecting the peace and security of the Hemisphere. 
Two meetings of a special committee of the Council of the OAS to 
study the formulation of new measures for economic cooperation 
(known as the "Committee of 21") were held during the period. 

The documents support and amplify the record of events sum- 
marized m the narrative. They consist principally of resolutions, 
statements, committee reports, and other records of the Council of the 
OAS and of the several meetings mentioned above, supplemented by 
documents of the U.N. Security Council and statements of U.S. and 
Soviet officials. 

Publication 7409 


Order Form 

To: SapL of Documents 
Govt. Printing Office 
Washington 25, D.C. 

Enclosed find: 


Ccash, check, or money 
order payable to 
Supt. of Docs.) 

Please send me copies of Inter-American Efforts To Relieve International 

Tensions in tlie Western Hemisphere, 1959-1960 


Street Address: 

City, Zone, and State: 





>^^^^ \K:^0 

October 8, 1962 


Statement by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 511 

FUNDS 518 

A REPORT ON SOUTH VIET-NAM • by Roger Hilsman . 526 


WORLD FOOD PROGRAM • Statement by Secretary 

of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman 534 


For index see inside back cover 

Vol. XLVII, No. 1215 • Publication 7433 
October 8, 1962 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.C. 


62 issues, domestic $8.50, foreign $12.2S 

Single copy, 25 cents 

TJse of funds tor printing of this publica- 
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau 
of the Budget (January 19, 1961). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyriphied and items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
or State Bdlletin as the source »-ill be 
appreciated. The Bulletin is Indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
and interested agencies of the 
Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by the White House and the 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various pluises of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral interruitional interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and legis- 
lative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 

'The Tasks of the General Assembly: Peaceful Settlement, 
Nonviolent Change, and a War Against Want 

Statement hy Adlal E. Stevenson 

U.S. Representative to the General Assemhly ' 

I should like to begin by reaffirming, as em- 
phatically as I can, the high significance which 
the Government of the United States attaches to 
the work of the United Nations. My Government 
is more than ever convinced that the success or 
failure of this organization could well mean the 
difference between world order and world anarchy. 
We believe that the work that lies before this I7th 
General Assembly is serious — and that it is also 

First let me, on behalf of my Government and 
oi the city of New York, welcome the delegates 
to this historic Assembly. We congratulate you, 
Mr. President [Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, of 
Pakistan], on your election as President of the 
I7th General Assembly. You assume a place of 
honor among the world leaders who have been 
ehosen to preside over the forum of the world in a 
time of peril and promise — a place which your 
talents and attainments can only further exalt. 

And I also warmly welcome the addition to our 
membership of Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, 
Rwanda, and Burundi — four new nations from 
sunny lands blessed with tropic beauty that I have 
[lad the good fortune to visit and admire. 

But I welcome most of all the opportunity this 
session gives us to consider as a body the direction 
n which our affairs are moving and the action 
leeded to bring us closer to the world we seek, 
I world of justice, freedom, and peace. 
I A year ago we met at a time of doubt and 
langer. In the 12 months since, much has taken 
olace to justify a measure of fresh hope for the 

^Made in plenary session on Sept. 20 (U.S. delegation 
>ress release 4043; as-delivered text). 

October 8, J 962 

— A long, bitter war in Algeria has come to a 
close ; 

— A threatened conflict between two of our mem- 
bers in the southwest Pacific has yielded to peace- 
ful settlement — through statesmanship on their 
part and slcillful conciliation by the United 
Nations ; 

— In Laos, civil war, abetted by foreign inter- 
vention, has been replaced by a cease-fire and an 
independent government under international 
guarantees ; 

— In the Congo, where the U.N. has played such 
a decisive part, war and threat of war seems to 
be yielding to new hopes for the peaceful re- 
integration of Katanga into the new Congo state 
and to the Secretary-General's vigorous efforts, 
with our support and that of the great majority 
of the members, to get early implementation of the 
United Nations' reconciliation plan; 

— Disarmament negotiations, with the en- 
couragement of the General Assembly, have re- 
sumed in a new forum with nonnuclear powers 
playing a useful and constructive role ; 

— We have begim, under United Nations aus- 
pices, a search for cooperation in the development 
of outer space in the interests not of any one 
nation but of humanity; 

— We have begun, too, an intensification of the 
drive against poverty under the United Nations 
Decade of Development. 

These are all legitimate sources of gratification, 
and there are others. But we would be decei^ang 
ourselves if we looked on the bright side alone. 
We still — all of us — continue to live in a dark and 
precarious world. 

— The crisis in Berlin has not exploded into 
war; but the pressures and harassments against 


West Berlin continue to rank as a most ominous 
threat to the peace of the woi-kl ; 

— The government of Cuba, with moral and ma- 
terial support from outside, carries on a campaign 
of subversion and vituperation against its neigh- 
bors in the Western Hemisphere ; 

— Unprovoked aggression from North Viet- 
Nam continues to tlireaten the freedom and inde- 
pendence of the Republic of Viet-Nam and to 
menace the peace in Southeast Asia; 

— The Cliinese Communists continue their policy 
of provocation, their acts of force and subversion ; 

— The threat of conflict still smolders in the 
Middle East, damped down but not quenched by 
the peacekeeping machinery of the United Na- 
tions ; 

— Disputes involving members of our orga- 
nization continue unresolved on every continent; 

— The continued repression of the peoples of 
Eastern Europe remains an underlying danger to 

—The concluding stage of the worldwide move- 
ment toward national independence elsewhere is 
complicated by issues which, though transient and 
manageable, could become explosive if cool heads 
do not prevail over hot tempers ; 

— The prevalence of poverty in great areas of 
the world remains a source of moral frustration 
and political danger ; 

— And, most ominous of all, the suicidal arms 
race continues unabated. 

These situations raise serious dangers to the 
peace of the world. 

It was to deal with such dangers to the peace 
that half the states in this Assembly hall estab- 
lished the United Nations 17 years ago — and that 
the other half have adhered to the charter in the 
years since. 

That charter issued a lofty challenge to man- 
kind. It cannot be claimed that in these 17 years 
the United Nations has established a reign of 
peace on earth. But the record of our organiza- 
tion in meeting specific challenges to the peace is 
nonetheless impressive. In these years the United 
Nations, whether through the Security Council or 
the General Assembly, through conciliation or 
cease-fire, through peace observation or truce 
supervision or direct military action, has helped 
avert or end hostilities in Iran, in Greece, in the 
Middle East, in Kashmir, in Indonesia, in Korea, 
at Suez, in Lebanon, in the Congo, and now in 
West New Guinea. 


If the United Nations has not succeeded in 
bringing the great powers together, it has often 
succeeded in keeping them apart — in places where 
face-to-face confrontation might have changed 
difficult situations into impossible situations. 

If the United Nations has not succeeded in 
settling all international disputes, it has prepared 
the way for the peaceful evolution of an interna- 
tional order. In that process the U.N. has not 
made the fatal error of trj'ing to freeze the move- 
ment of history. It has not sought peace at thet 
expense of needed change. And we must be- 
equally sure that, in a world as volatile as our 
own, change is not sought at the expense of peace, 
which is needed above all. 

Strengthening the U.N. Structure 

The record of accomplishment is formidable; 
but the movement of history is more peremptory 
than ever, and today's challenges of peace and of 
progress are tlierefore more urgent than ever. 
To meet these challenges, we need not just a strong 
but a still stronger United Nations. The most im 
portant general issue before this Assembly is tc 
get on with the business of steadily improving oui 
organization so that it can deal ever more ener- 
getically, efficiently, and promptly with the dan 
gers to peace and the obstacles to progress. 

This is the essence, this is the heart, this is the 
day-to-day stuff of our duty in this Assembly as 
we see it: to build mightier mansions, to keep 
strengthening the United Nations. The worth 
and the loyalty of the members will be tested by 
this standard : Do their actions, do their proposals, 
strengthen or weaken our organization? 

Strengthening the United Nations involves 
questions both of structure and of strategy. 

So far as structure is concerned, a first necessity 
is to set the U.N. on a sound financial basis. Oui 
organization has today a deficit of more than $15C 
million — brought about largely by defaults oi 
delays in pajonents for peacekeeping operations 
which have proved as expensive as they were 

The emergency plan to meet this deficit through 
the sale of bonds is good as a stopgap. As a re- 
sult of action by our Congress,- the United States 
Government will be in a position to lend the U.N, 

' For statements made by Secretary Rusk, Acting Sec 
retary Ball, and Ambas.sador Stevenson during hearing? 
on the U.N. loan legislation, see Bulletin of July 23, 1962, 
p. 142. 

Department of State Bulletin 



lialf of what it will borrow under this plan. Other 
nations already have pledged $73 million. We 
liope — and that's a mild word for it ! — that these 
states, along with nations still unpledged, will 
bring the total pledged to $100 million. My Gov- 
ernment can then use its full authority to match 
that sum. 

But this is a palliative ; it is not a solution. The 
current deficit is a symptom of a deeper prob- 
lem — a problem created by the inaction of too 
many of the governments in this Assembly hall. 
One can understand past reasons for reluctance 
to accept collective financial responsibility for 
U.N". actions. Some states, for example, doubted 
whether the General Assembly could legally make 
a binding assessment for the U.N.'s peacekeeping 
expenses. But any legal uncertainties have now 
been cleared up by the recent opinion of the Inter- 
national Court of Justice.^ 

This Assembly now faces the compelling obliga- 
tion of aiBrming a policy of collective financial 
responsibility for actions of the United Nations. 
I believe that this session of the Assembly should 
accept and act upon the advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice as past Assemblies 
invariably have accepted and acted upon other 
advisoiy opinions. The financial integrity and 
independence of the U.N. are at stake. But some- 
thing even more important is at stake — the rule 
of law. The Court has ruled on the law; it re- 
mains to this Assembly to manifest at once its 
respect and its compliance by converting the law 
into policy. 

I believe that this Assembly must also devise a 
financing plan for future peacekeeping operations 
to take efi'ect when the proceeds from tlie bond 
issue are exhausted. The details of such a plan 
are open to discussion. But whatever the charac- 
ter of the plan, it should require that every mem- 
ber meet its obligations when an assessment is 
duly voted. 

We hope this Assembly will work out a program 
which will finance operations authorized by itself 
or by the Security Council. Otherwise we doom 
our organization to impotence. We cannot expect 
the United Nations to survive from day to day 
by passing a cup like a beggar in the street. 

' For a statement made by Abram Chayes, Legal Ad- 
viser of the Department of State, before the Court on 
May 21, see ihid., July 2, 1962, p. 30; for a Department 
statement concerning the Court's opinion, see ibiil., Aug. 
13, 1962. p. 246. 

October 8, 1962 

There are other problems of structure in addi- 
tion to finance. No one knows better than we 
in this hall the need to streamlme the procedures 
of this greatly expanded organization so that it 
can deal efficiently with the complex business 
which crowds our long agenda. 

We must enlarge the Security Council and the 
Economic and Social Council to assure fair repre- 
sentation to every region of the earth. 

We must review the rules and practices of our 
international civil service, particularly in the rela- 
tion of member states to the Secretariat, so that 
the staff of the U.N. remains "exclusively inter- 
national," as the charter stipulates. 

We also must elect unconditionally a Secretary- 
General for a full term of office. After the tragic 
death of Dag Hammarskjold last year, the Assem- 
bly went through a protracted but instructive con- 
stitutional crisis. We resolved this crisis by 
vindicating — overwhelmingly and I trust perma- 
nently — the integrity of the office of Secretary- 
General as established by the charter. We then 
selected unanimously as Acting Secretary-General 
a diplomat of extraordinary personal qualities, 
who has served this organization well in a time 
of transition and uncertainty. 

Our responsibility in this Assembly is to make 
sure that this important office is as well filled in 
the next 5 years as it has been in the past — and 
that he who holds the office retains the full freedom 
and authority provided under the charter. 

Patient, Quiet Diplomacy Needed 

But the solution of all the problems of organiza- 
tion would still leave unsolved the question of how 
we use the machinery we have devised. I take it 
that our essential purpose is to find practical 
means of fulfilling the intentions of the charter. 
But I sometimes wonder whether the means 
adopted are always the best way to achieve the 
ends desired. 

I am well aware of the frustration, temptations, 
and conflicts in any parliamentary democracy, but 
it happens to be tlie best system ever invented to 
protect and reconcile all interests in the conduct 
of public affairs. Given the inherent complexities 
of this form of organization, given the gravity of 
the matters with which we deal, given the youth 
of the United Nations, given its extremely rapid 
growth, it must be said that the General Assembly, 
with few exceptions, has conducted itself with 


surprising responsibility and maturity. 

Our plain duty now is to perform our business 
in such a way as to make tliis Assembly even more 
responsible, more mature — and therefore more 

It is clear that the business of this Assembly 
cannot be conducted effectively in the manner of 
a protest demonstration in a public square. It is 
clear that the influence of this Assembly cannot 
grow if the quality of its debate is debased by 
propaeranda or by speeches designed not to f urtlier 
the business before the house but to gratify emo- 
tions back home. 

Indignation and outrage have been powerful 
enemies of injustice since the beginning of liis- 
tory. It would be surprising if they had no place 
in the proceedings of the United Nations. But the 
test of resolutions presented to this Assembly must 
surely be whether they promise to bring us closer 
to rational solutions of real problems and thereby 
closer to justice. 

For example, I think we must all beware of the 
resolution which invokes high principle in sup- 
port of unrealistic action and does nothing to ad- 
vance a practical solution. If this became com- 
mon practice, we would risk destroying the 
influence of our organization, for the value of its 
recommendations would depreciate like inflated 

In the United Nations all members, large and 
small, are juridically equal. That is why it is so 
often called the hope of the world. That is why 
it is the great guardian of the interests of smaller 
states. And that is also why, as the Assembly 
grows in numbers, we must match its size by its 
sense of relevance and its sense of I'esponsibility. 

We must also recognize, I think, that open de- 
bate imder the TV cameras is not always conducive 
to the moderation and restraint essential when 
proud and sovereign states are in dispute. Nor 
is the Assembly the only means through wliich 
our organization achieves its purposes. We saw a 
year ago tliat this Assembly could not agree on 
how to settle the dispute over West New Guinea. 
We know today how much the U.N. has been able 
to accomplish in composing this dispute by enter- 
ing it as a quiet third partner.^ 

I believe that there will be many opportunities 
for the U.N. to serve as a "third man" in world 

affairs: as the objective factfinder, the impartial 
"presence," the policeman on the beat, the instru' 
ment of quiet diplomacy. On some issues befortt li 
us even today, for example, the U.N. might ap-; 
point a rapporteur to ascertain the facts and ana- 
lyze the problems and thereby facilitate sounc: 
decisions by the General Assembly. 

Nothing is more important to all of us than a 
sustained and systematic attack on the conflicts, 
which threaten the peace. Our world is now a 
crowded house, our planet a single powder keg; 
We believe that all nations must stay their hand; 
in pursuit of national ambitions involving conflici 
with others imtil the world community has had i 
chance to fijid solutions through jaatient and quiei 
diplomatic effort. 

The point here is not to oppose or to postpont 
desirable change; the point is not to stall or t( 
evade needed action. On the contrary, the poim 
is precisely to select the most effective teclmique— 
to search out the most relevant formula — to insuri 
that change can in fact take place, that action can 
in fact be taken to secure the peace of the worlc 
and strengthen the United Nations. 

There is work enough to do — and tools enouglH It 
to do it. Let us resolve to set about it in an orderlj 
fashion; let us use and combine our tools anc 
techniques for a period of active, inventive dipla 
macy ; let us, in this I7tli General Assembly, aspire 
to the highest forms of political art and usher ir 
a time of peaceful solutions of conflict — of peace 
ful passage through the vast transformation: 
which contemporary history demands. 

* For background, see ihid., June 25, 1962, p. 1039, and 
Sept. 3, 19G2, p. 349. 


Prodigal Arms Race a Deadly Folly 

Tlie path to peace lies through thickets of con 
flict. And the biggest obstacle in the path, thi 
most overwhelming danger of all, is the onnishinf 
arms race. Every day it gathers momentum ai 
the nuclear powers and others, large and small 
enlarge their arsenals. Some of us continue t( 
invent and test frightful new weapons. We fee 
obliged to do this for the sake of our separati 
national interests — at a time in history when th< 
national interest of all nations, tliose with nucleai 
weapons and those without, demands not the ex 
pansion but the abolition of the power to wag( 

Let me be as clear and simple as I can : Tlii; 
prodigal arms race is dangerous and deadly folly 
Here in the United States we want to save, no) 
destroj', our fellow man. We want to devote thf 

Deparlment of Stale Bulletin 

nil resources now swallowed up by this insatiable 
itti monster to the unfinished tasks of our own society. 
f« And we want to devote these I'esources to giving 
every soul on this earth a chance for a better life. 

Yet the arms race goes on. It goes on because 
no nation, confronted by hostile nations, can 
neglect its defenses. No great power can risk 
unilateral disarmament. There is one way — and 
one way only — out of this intolerable dilemma: 
that is, a system of complete and general disann- 
:^ ament under which all nations progressively tear 
down — in plain view of the international com- 
tnmiity and with suitable safeguards — their own 
capacity to wage war. 

A great achievement of our last session was to 
endorse an agreement on a set of principles for 
general and complete disarmament in a peaceful 
world.'^ But while we have made some progi'ess, 
we have not made enough progress toward trans- 
lating these agreed principles into an agreed 
plan — to move by mutual actions in rapid stages 
toward total disarmament and effective interna- 
tional peacekeeping. 

The United States has proposed such a plan. 
It has submitted its proposals to this Assembly 
and to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference 
at Geneva.*' 

But, just as it takes at least two to make an 
arms race, it takes at least two to stop an arms 
race. No one in his senses would expect one side 
to abandon the means of self-defense unless it 
knew for sure that the other side was giving up its 
arms as well. This means that practical verifica- 
tion is the essence of any workable agreement on 
general disarmament. 

It need not be total verification. We have 
demonstrated again and again during long nego- 
tiations that we are prepared to take certain risks 
to lessen the chance of an intensified arms race. 
But we are not prepared to risk our survival. If 
other nations permit — as we have agreed to do — 
the degree of international inspection teclmically 
required for mutual security, we can end the arms 
race. But we cannot stake our national existence 
on blind trust — especially on blind trust in a great 
and powerful nation which repeatedly declares its 
fundamental hostility to the basic values of our 
free society. 






^ For text, see Hid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589. 

' For a statement made by President Kennedy on Apr. 
18 and text of an outline of a treaty on general and com- 
plete disarmament, see ibid., May 7, 1962, p. 7-17. 

October 8, 7962 

The issue is plain. The price of general disar- 
mament is mutual security within the framework 
of the United Nations. Because such security 
would be international inspection, it could have no 
conceivable comiection with espionage. Is inspec- 
tion by a United Nations agency too high a price 
to pay for the safety, perhaps survival, of man- 
kind? Can any society value its secrecy more 
than everyone's safety — especially a society which 
avows itself the model toward which all other 
societies must irresistibly evolve? 

Mr. President, I put this issue in all gravity. I 
ask the members of this Assembly to join the 
peoples of the world in demanding a program of 
general disarmament which stands a chance of 
ending the arms race. 

Once again, the answer to this issue is not to be 
found in exhortation or emotionalism. It is not 
to be found by passing virtuous resolutions which 
proclaim noble ends without realistic means. It 
is to be found only in remorseless effort to solve the 
infinitely complicated problems of disarmament. 
We believe that serious negotiations in Geneva will 
bring us closer to our goal, and I hope the discus- 
sions there will continue to have the prayerful 
and wholehearted support of this Assembly. 

Here in New York the Assembly can insist on 
the indispensable condition of world disarmament : 
assurance that agreements made are agreements 

Hope for Progress in Banning Nuclear Tests 

But there is a situation even more immediate 
and more hopeful than general disarmament. I 
refer to the testing of nuclear weapons. If we see 
in this a more acute problem, let me suggest that 
it is also more manageable — and therefore offers 
brighter hopes for early progress. 

For nearly 4 years the nuclear powers, includ- 
ing my country, have been locked in negotiation 
for a reliable and permanent ban on the testing of 
nuclear weapons. From such a ban woidd come 
a barrier to the spread of such weapons; and there 
would come an end to this new source of radiation 
in the human environment, and a great step toward 
the comprehensive disarmament treaty we so 
earnestly seek. 

As is plain from the draft treaties tabled in 
Geneva,' the United States Government is pre- 
pared to stop the testing of all nuclear weapons, 

' For texts, see ibid., Sept. 17, 1962, pp. 411 and 415. 


provided only that others are prepared to assume 
the obligation to do the same. Testing in the 
atmosphere, in the oceans, and in space causes 
radiation. Testing underground does not. We are 
prepared to stop testing, even without any inter- 
national verification, in the atmosphere, in the 
oceans, and in space because we have national 
means of detecting testing by others. And we are 
prepared to stop testing underground — where we 
don't have our own means of verification — pro- 
vided an international system is created to assure 
that others are doing the same. 

It may be interesting to you to know that since 
1945, when it began, the United States has ex- 
ploded nuclear devices with a total yield of about 
140 megatons. Since 1949, when it began, the 
U.S.S.R., so far as we can tell by distant instru- 
mentation, has exploded devices with a total 
yield of approximately 250 megatons. Since the 
U.S.S.E. broke tlie moratorium last fall its ex- 
plosions have yielded 200 megatons — those which 
the United States was then compelled to under- 
take, only 25 megatons. 

I repeat, we want to cease testing nuclear weap- 
ons. If other nuclear powers are also willing to 
make an agreement to cease, the testing will cease. 
But let there be no doubt about it— the United 
States prefers a comprehensive treaty banning all 
tests in all environments for all times. On this 
transcendent issue we in the United States are in 
dead earnest. And I conclude with the thanks of 
my Government to the eight nonalined nations 
for their helpful and constructive efforts to bring 
about agreement at Geneva. 

The Long Labor of Nationhood 

The objective of peace is inseparably inter- 
twined with the objective of progress. As we 
improve our organization's capacity to keep the 
peace, we also strengthen the United Nations for 
its other essential tasks: to help build nations 
in dignity and freedom, to help liberate humanity 
from centuries-old bonds of want and squalor. 
And as we build healthy modem societies, we knit 
stronger the fabric of peace; we reduce the chance 
that misery and failure will explode into conflict. 
Thus are peacekeeping and nation building two 
sides of the U.N. coin. 

We wlio have attended these General Assemblies 
of the United Nations have been witnesses of a 
great historic transformation. In the years since 
1945— and with the support of this Assembly- 




we have seen the age of classical colonialism movi 
toward an end. In these years 46 nations — near]; 
half the present membership of this organization- 
have gained their independence. This has repre 
sented a revolutionary change in the structure o 
international relations and international powei 

It has been a change, I need hardly say, whicl 
has been enthusiastically welcomed in the Unitei 
States. As the first modern state to win freedon 
from colonialism, we have been proud to hel] 
other states begin that most precious and difficul 
of adventures — the adventure in self-government 
We count no task more important than assisting 
those everywhere, in the older colonial areas an( 
elsewhere, to self-determination. 

This task will engage this Assembly in grav 
and determined deliberations in the months ahead 
In no part of the world has the movement towar( 
national independence attained more spectacula 
results in the last 3 years than in Africa. In n( 
part of the world is it more important to mak 
further progress in solving the remaining issue '" 
of classical colonialism on the basis of genuim 
self-determination. For many months the Spe 
cial Committee of 17 on colonialism has addressee 
itself to these issues. We hope that the Committei 
will be able to conduct its work in the future h 
an atmosphere undistracted by the emotions o: 
the cold war which affected its work this year— 
in an atmosphere where states old and new car 
work together to help bring into existence in lands 
not yet free the conditions essential for successf u 

For a nation is not created by a stroke of f 
pen. A declaration of political independence ii 
a beginning, not a conclusion. Nothing mon 
discredits the great historic transformation of out 
epoch than for newly independent states to fall 
into chaos and become an international problem oi 
an international danger. The long labor oi 
nationhood requires the reality as well as the rhet 
oric of independence: It requires an emerging 
national will capable of the political wisdom, the 
administrative vigor, the economic energy, and the 
moral discipline necessary to convert the promise 
of national independence into a free and produc- 
tive life for its people. The interest of my Gov 
ernment and of the world lies not in the mere 
multiplication of nations but in the multiplica 
tion of nations where peoples are free and have 
the strength to survive and to grow and to con 
tribute to the A-itality of the international order 
in the world community. 

Department of State Bulletin 





Tools for Self-Development 

leatl Nation building tlius has its political dimension, 
ion. }Ut national independence has its social and eco- 
tfpn Qomic and moral dimensions as well. That is 
jTei why I hope that this Assembly will devote its 
lowe attention to tlie next great item on the agenda 
ilii( sf nation building: that is, helping the new na- 
tions fashion the tools to cany out their tasks of 

Never has a time been more propitious for the 
uccessful discharge of these tasks. If the 
niracles of science have given mankind new power 
;o destroy, they have also given mankind new 
DOwer to create. The challenge which confronts 
IS is to turn the miracles of science to the service 
)f man — and of man the laborer on this earth, 
IS well as man the explorer of the imiverse beyond. 
We have a right, I think, to congratulate the 
iommittee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on 
ts progress toward international scientific and 
echnical cooperation, progress which holds high 
promise for both peace and the advancement of 
mowledge. But what does it profit if a few men 
)rbit the earth while below them millions are 
itarving ? "Wliat is the point of our technological 
jltd jrowess if it can launch men into space but can- 
lot lift them from the swamps of poverty? 

To set out consciously to abolish poverty as the 
Drevailing condition of humanity is as formidable 
fii! I task as man ever set himself, and I would ask 
70u not to imderestimate its difficulties. 

But if the task is enormously comi:)lex, it can 
ilso be deeply fulfilling. I am proud that my own 
;ountry pioneered in offering a helping hand to 
ii lations prepared to start along the road toward 
nfelf-sustaining growth. I am gratified too that 
o many of the other industrially developed na- 
ions have followed suit. It is heartening that 
or groups of nations are beginning to work out their 
sconomic destinies in common through reefional 
)rganizations and coordinating their assistance to 
;he emerging nations. 

Over the years the U.N. itself has established an 
mpressive range of technical institutions geared 
.o the job of helping the less developed nations 
o modernize their economies. The United Na- 
tions family of agencies is the source of new and 
ixciting projects: A World Food Program is just 
jetting under way ; ^ the Board of Governors of 
-he World Bank is calling right now for recom- 








' See p. 5^4. 
Dcfober 8, 1962 

mendations on the expansion of capital for the 
International Development Association; an un- 
precedented conference on the application of sci- 
ence and technology to the problems of develop- 
ment will be held in Geneva early next year. 

Other projects and programs attest to the grow- 
ing maturity, the expanding scope, and the rising 
operational capacity of the U.N. family of agen- 
cies. This is all to the good. 

The challenge before us now is to make our 
U.N. agencies better with each passing year — to 
endow them with sound procedures and adequate 
resources; to staff them with disinterested and 
expert talent ; to improve their planning and pro- 
graming and administration and coordination ; to 
see that they meet the needs of realistic develop- 
ment in the new nations; to integrate them with 
the other forms of development assistance, na- 
tional, regional, and international, presently go- 
ing to the emerging nations; and thereby to insure 
that development aid will be applied everywhere 
on a cooperative rather than a competitive basis. 
We need to produce a closer harmony from the 
orchestra of aid instruments already available 
to ns. 

The full promise of development cannot be 
achieved within national boundaries. To stimu- 
late general prosperity we must remove the bar- 
riers which block the free flow of men, money, and 
goods across national frontiers. 

We have seen the extraordinary burst of eco- 
nomic activity which has attended the evolution 
of the European Common Market — one of the 
great adventures in creative statesmanship of our 
age. Groups of countries in other parts of the 
world are also seeking ways to build regional 
economies which in turn can further thrive on 
expanded woi-ld trade. 

It is essential, of course, that such groupings 
should offer to nonmembers the fullest possible ad- 
vantage of the larger market. We know now that 
one nation cannot buy its prosperity by limiting 
the prosperity of others. 

An expanding world trade, built on the scaffold- 
ing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, rests in turn on that further social progress, 
that larger freedom, that broader structure of in- 
ternational peace which it is the purpose of the 
United Nations to secure. That is why the United 
States was pleased to join with its fellow members 
of the Economic and Social Council in the unani- 
mous call for a United Nations Conference on 


Trade and Development. We will do everything 
we can to help this conference succeed. 

We need to move, under the challenge of the 
Decade of Development, toward a clearer strategy 
of development, toward a better sense of priorities, 
toward a sharper division of labor among the vari- 
ous aid institutions, and toward a keener apiireci- 
ation that the economic and social development of 
a country is not the result only of outside capital 
and assistance but of political leadership, institu- 
tional growth, economic and social reform, and 
national will. 

Here, then, are our twin tasks: to replace stri- 
dent politics with quiet but determined diplomacy, 
and to replace the arms race, as the President said 
last year,® with a peace race — with a creative race 
in the production and exchange of goods and the 
elevation of living standards. 

These tasks are not new — nor will they be fin- 
ished before we adjourn. But before we adjourn 
I trust that tlie iTtli General Assembly will ener- 
getically get on with the job of peaceful settle- 
ment, of nonviolent change, and of war against 
human want. 

As the custodians of the history of our times, 
we can do no less. To the discharge of thesa 
responsibilities my own Government pledges itsi 
firm and unswerving support. Animated by the 
ideals of the charter and by our obligations to oun 
fellow men we, the members of this Assembly, 
cannot adjourn our deliberations without provid- 
ing the world tangible evidence of our devotioni 
to peace and justice. This tangible evidence, Mr. 
President, can lie only in our decisions and deeds' 
in the months ahead. 

President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk Urge Restoration 
of Foreign Aid Funds 

Following is a series of statements made hy 
President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk regarding 
a cut in foreign aid funds recommended iy the 
House Afpro-priations Committee. 


White House press release dated September 19 

The drastic cut in foreign aid funds recom- 
mended by the House Appropriations Committee 
poses a threat to free- world security. 

It makes no sense at all to make siseeches against 
the spread of communism, to deplore mstability 
in Latin America and Asia, to call for an increase 
in American prestige and an initiative in Eastern 
Europe — and then vote to cut back the Alliance 
for Progress, to hamper the Peace Corps, to re- 
pudiate our long-term commitments of last year, 
and to undermine the efforts of those who are 
seeking to stave off chaos and communism in the 

increasingly meant trade, sales, and jobs in this 
country, and reform, progress, and new hope in 
the developing countries 

The aid program is just as important as any 
military spending we do abroad. You cannot 
separate guns from roads and schools when it 
comes to resisting Communist subversion in luider 
developed coimtries. This is a lesson we have 
learned clearly in South Viet-Nam and elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia. To mutilate the aid program 
in tliis massive fashion would be to damage the 
national security of the United States, 

I cannot believe that those in both parties who 
have consistently voted in the course of three ad 

ministrations to ftdfill this nation's obligations of 'ff 
leadership will permit this irresponsible action toi 
go uncorrected 

most vital areas of the world. 

Foreign aid has 

• For an address by President Kennedy before the 16th 
General Assembly on Sept. 25, 19C1, see Bulletin of 
Oct 16, 1961, p. 619. 



Press release 571 dated September 19 

I am deeply concerned about the effects which 
the cuts now proposed in foreign assistance ap- 
propriations will have upon our foreign policy 
and our national securitv. We are engaged in 

Department of State Bulletin q 


every continent in a gi-eat struggle between the 
forces of freedom and those who would destroy 
freedom. The funds we are requesting are only 
1 percent more than were actually appropriated 
for foreign assistance and the Alliance for Prog- 
ress in the last fiscal year. Tlie sum amounts to 
about 10 percent of our defense budget — but is a 
crucial part of our defense. The cuts now being 
considered — the heaviest ever made by an Appro- 
priations Committee — will represent a significant 
reduction at a time wlien a million American men 
are outside the U.S. to defend freedom, and when 
crises such as Berlin and Cuba indicate that we 
face weeks and months of demanding effort. 

It seems to me that we can well afford our in- 
APstment in foreign assistance to win this struggle 
for freedom, without war if possible, and to sup- 
port and reinforce our men in uniform who are 
standing guard in foreign places. We have seen 
in Cuba, and in other places, how difficult it is to 
restore freedom once it has been extinguished by 
the grip of Marxist-Leninist totalitarianism. We 
cannot let that happen in coimtries that stand, 
with us, in their determination to keep their free- 
dom. If a citizen wishes to "do something" at 
this time of crisis, he can do it by supporting the 
President on this matter. 

A reduction of $475 million in development 
lending would cripple our effort to transfer aid 
from grants to dollar-repayable loans. This 
is not a giveaway but an investment in our own 
future. Such a deep cut would reverse the clear 
intent of Congress to support long-term commit- 
ment on a loan basis. 

We have ourselves reduced supporting assist- 
ance and direct budgetarj^ grants as a form of aid. 
But the cut now being contemplated would make 
it extremely difficult for us to give the minimum 
necessary support to countries who are on the front 
lines in the Pacific and in the Middle East, and 
who are carrying military budgets on behalf of 
our mutual security beyond the possibilities of 
their own resources. We cannot at this junc- 
ture risk a weakening in such places as Korea, Na- 
tionalist China, Viet-Nam, and Turkey. 

It is critically important that we not cut the 
requested appropriation for the Alliance for 
Progress. The struggle for freedom must go on 
idi here in our own hemisphere, where free institu- 
ip tions are being directly challenged in and through 
icj Cuba. It would be difffcult for the hemisphere 
iJ to understand that we and they are, and ought to 

liii Ocfober 8, 7962 


be, deeply concerned about this struggle if we re- 
duced the $600 million requested for the Alliance 
for Progress. 

I strongly urge the House of Kepresentatives 
not to cripple this bipartisan effort at a time when 
the cause of freedom requires so much of us. 


Press release 576 dated September 21 

I am grateful for your invitation to meet with 
you to discuss the appropriations requested by the 
President for the foi'eign aid program for fiscal 
year 1963. You have heard extensive testimony 
on this program over the past several weeks by 
many experts. Since their testimony the aid ap- 
propriation has been drastically cut by the House. 
The President has declared these cuts pose "a 
threat to free-world security" — that "to mutilate 
the aid program in this massive fashion would be 
to damage the national security of the United 
States." 1 

Perhaps the most helpful contribution I can 
make to your consideration is to discuss with you 
the role which I believe our aid program has 
in our foreign policy and why I believe these 
appropriations are needed in the full amounts 

The Significance of Our Aid Program 

It is imperative that we understand our foreign 
aid program in its true character. It is vital to 
the security and welfare of our countiy. It is a 
crucial part of our defense. It reinforces our men 
in uniform who are standing guard in many for- 
eign places. It is one of the great bulwarks of 
freedom in the world. It is central to the achieve- 
ment of our greatest national objective. This ob- 
jective is nothing less than to see established, in the 
President's words, a "world community of free and 
independent states, free to choose their own future 
and their own system so long as it does not threaten 
the freedom of others." ^ 

We are in an historic struggle to achieve this 
objective. The central opponent in this struggle 
is Communist imperialism. Its goals cannot be 
reconciled with our own — nor are they shared, as 

' See p. 518. 

' Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159. 


ours are, by most nations and peoples throughout 
the world. 

This is a sti-uggle in which we cannot afford to 
tire or falter. It is a struggle that we must win. 
It is essential to realize that the "we" are the 
great body of mankind. The victory we seek is 
a victory for all mankind — a victory for freedom. 

Such a victory is not a simple matter. To be 
genuine it must embrace the independence of na- 
tions and the freedom of peoples. To be complete 
it must provide for the peaceful settlement of dis- 
putes, for progress toward the rule of law among 
nations, for attainment of a world free from ag- 
gression. To be worthy, it must allow the peoples 
in all nations to establish governments deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the gov- 
erned; it must secure the personal freedoms essen- 
tial for the dignity of man; it must give oppor- 
tunity for economic progress and the growth of 
social justice. 

This victory is one for which our foreign aid 
program is designed and must be perfected. That 
program provides, as nothing else can, our con- 
tribution to the hopes for stability and progress 
for the peoples of the free world. It is indispen- 
sable to victory of the kind we seek. 

This struggle is not a new one. Our aid pro- 
gram has already had a great role in the successes 
we have thus far achieved. This committee has 
participated in and is familiar with each of those 
successes. You made possible the achievements 
of the Marshall Plan, which saved Europe from 
chaos, helped it regain its political balance, and 
laid the basis for the development of its present 
economic strength. You provided for the assist- 
ance which saved Greece and Turkey and which 
helped turn back the Communist aggression 
against Korea and Taiwan and which has sup- 
ported resistance to the internal and external Com- 
munist pressures against Laos and Viet-Nam. 
This same assistance, we sometimes forget, also 
made it possible for the people of the Philippines 
to presen-e their freedom against insurrection in- 
spired from abroad. 

In fact, the fight against Communist imperial- 
ism in many forms has been carried on with deter- 
mination since the end of "World War II, and the 
foreign assistance you have provided has made 
the defense of freedom possible. 

Yet there is another aspect of our struggle for 
victory which is of equal or even greater impor- 

tance and in wliich our aid program is tlie most 
effective tool available to us: That is the fight 
against ignorance, poverty, and disease, and 
against social injustice long endured — but no 
longer endurable — by a third or more of the 
world's population on four continents. 

Victory in this struggle lies mainly in the hands 
of these peoples themselves, for nothing can sub- 
stitute for their own energy, detennmation, and 
sacrifice. But our aid — joined now in rising 
amounts by the allies whose recovery we have pre- 
viously aided — can provide the margin of capital 
and technical skill to make success possible. 

Our aid program will continue to build upon the 
accomplislnnents of the past. Funds you voted 
last year have made a vital contribution to the 
conduct of foreign policy. In the Far East they 
have furnished the necessary economic and mili- 
tary strength to enable the people of Korea and 
of Taiwan to maintain their fi'eedom and continue 
their internal progress, despite the overhanging 
threat of massive Communist forces. In particu- 
lar, this year, aid funds have made possible the 
defense of Viet-Nam against the renewed attacks 
of a cruel form of aggression. 

Elsewhere in Asia, aid funds have helped Paki- 
stan and India to show the half billions of their 
own people, and the world at large, that progress 
can be made by the great masses under conditions 
of freedom — while the tragedy of the people of 
China under communism continues to appall the 

In Africa 28 new nations have sprmig into 
being since the war, 22 of them since the beginning 
of 1960, and more are expected. Loans and grants 
from the funds you have voted are enabling the 
people of those nations to proceed from the base 
of their political independence to develop the fun- 
damental administrative and technical skills 
needed to start the long task of developing effec- 
tive governments, of creating a more productive 
agriculture and industry, and of advancing the 
social welfare of their peoples. In one such na- 
tion, the Congo, delays in achieving national co- 
hesion have temporarily delayed progress and 
have created a situation of potentially explosive 
danger. Our aid, provided to the United Nations, 
has helped make it possible to prevent the impend- 
ing explosion and to move gradually toward the 
creation of stable government. 

In Latin America, under the Charter of Punta 


Department of State Bulletin 

del Este ^ and the Alliance for Progress, our aid 
and the assurance of its future availability is 
already commencing the gigantic task of setting 
in motion a continental movement of progress by 
rapid evolution rather than by violent revolution. 

Improvements in the Aid Program 

I said earlier that our aid program must be per- 
fected. Efforts toward its improvement have been 
the principal objective of the past year. There 
are a few fundamental propositions on which we 
are building and, I believe, must continue to 

First, the adtninistraiion of the program must 
be simple and flexible, thoughtful in planning, 
rapid in response, economical in performance, and 
persistent in improvement. Those who aid and 
those who are aided must realize it is the Ameri- 
can taxpayer dollars we are spending. 

We have established and staffed the AID 
[Agency for International Development] in this 
spirit. We believe that with its new leadership 
and new organization, which give tlie individual 
covmtry programs the emphasis they require, it 
will become a more effective administrative 

Second, we and those we aid must act upon the 
fundamental principle that the maximum of our 
help can equal only a small part of their own self- 
help. Their progress must depend, as I said 
earlier, upon themselves. Yet our aid, used wisely, 
can become the indispensable stimulus to progress. 

Self-help is already real and is increasing. In 
Latin America, particularly, the nations firmly 
committed themselves at Punta del Este to a pro- 
gram of self-help and mutual appraisal. Despite 
the understandably slow and sometimes reluctant 
beginnings, there is genuine forward motion. 

Third, planning on the basis of priorities is 
fundamental to the economical use of their and 
our resources. Planning, to be most effective, must 
be for the long term, if one stage of progress is to 
be built upon another. The assurance of continued 
assistance made possible by the long-term com- 
mitment authority in the legislation adopted last 
year is one of the greatest encouragements to such 
planning. Even so, it is a difficult matter for 
countries which are limited in the skills and ex- 

" For text, see ihicC., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463. 
October 8, 1962 

perience of progress. We must provide both help 
and patience. 

Despite this difficulty, much progress has al- 
ready been made in long-term planning. Latin 
American nations have submitted plans to the 
Organization of American States for review. 
Others are developing theirs. In Africa, Nigeria 
and Tunisia ai-e leading the way in developing 
realistic plans. India and Pakistan of course al- 
ready have well-prepared plans, while other 
countries show promising progress. 

Fourth, human resources count above all. No 
country is stronger than its people, as their poten- 
tial is realized through education. Education 
must be the focus of assistance in many of the 
aided countries — particularly the newer ones — 
and must be directed at advancing every level of 
their society, from the farmer and the mechanic 
to the most highly skilled managerial and govern- 
mental officials. I believe strongly that the prin- 
ciples and methods of broad public education de- 
veloped so successfully by our land-grant colleges 
in the century of their growth can be adapted with 
equal benefit to many nations. 

Fifth, many nations can help in this process of 
aid. We cannot and should not carry this burden 
alone. We are therefore greatly encouraged by 
the increasing part played by the other developed 
nations — particularly those which we aided in the 
years after the war. As has been testified already, 
several countries — Germany, the United Kingdom, 
France, Belgium, Canada, and Japan — ^have es- 
tablished new governmental units to administer 
this aid program. We are working closely with 
those nations and otliers, both directly and 
through international bodies, to increase their par- 
ticipation and to assure that all aid from all 
sources is used to attain the maximum benefit. 

The principal aiding nations have in fact in- 
creased their aid by nearly a quarter in the last 
year. In proportion to their gross national prod- 
uct their aid now is comparable with our own. 
Their improved performance in grants and long- 
term loans has been particularly notable. 

We have joined with the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund to create consortia 
for the support of soimd development plans. We 
are also working with the Development Assistance 
Committee of the OECD [Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development] to coordi- 


nate the provision of technical and capital assist- 
ance. We are in most cases the leader in these 
cooperative efforts, and it is imperative to the 
effectiveness of our leadership in obtaining the 
support of others that it not be weakened. 

Sixth, the developing nations are doing more 
and more to provide help to each other by exchange 
of technical assistance, by the pooling of educa- 
tional and other social institutions, by student ex- 
change, and by regional planning and contribution 
of industrial, agricultural, and other facilities. 

The Program for Fiscal Year 1963 

The aid program for which the President has re- 
quested funds for fiscal year 1963 is based on the 
principles I have discussed. The sums requested 
and the pui-poses for which they are requested are 
in conformity with policies established under the 
authorizing legislation enacted by the Congress. 
It is important to realize that the funds now re- 
quested for fiscal year 1963 are almost identical 
in amount with the sums appropriated last- year to 
be available for fiscal year 1962. Indeed, it is 
only some 3 percent more tlian was appropriated 
for fiscal year 1961 — if the Alliance for Progress, 
which did not then exist, is excluded. Here are 
the figures : 

(In $ millions) 

FY 1961 FY 191)2 FY 1963 

MlUtary and economic aid $3, 831 $3, 915 $3, 972 

Alliance for Progress 600 600 

$4, rA5 $4, 572 
Investment guaranty (re- 
serves) (26) (104) 180 

$4, 752 

As this table shows, the simi requested for the 
regular military and economic aid programs for 
fiscal year 1963 is about 1 percent more than was 
appropriated for last year and 3 percent more than 
the year before. The total program for fiscal year 
1963. including the Alliance for Progress, is sub- 
stantially identical with last year. The principal 
increase is in the additional sum requested to pro- 
vide guaranties to attract private investment. 
This increase is the wisest kind of economy since 
it will make possible investments of over $600 
million in private enterprise which will stimulate 
economic growth. 

I cite these figures for two purposes. First, to 
emphasize that the program proposed for next 
year is substantially identical in scope with that 


already miderway. Second, to point out, as I 
must stress most emphatically, that the sums re- 
quested by the President for next year are de- 
signed to continue existing 2:)olicies and that any 
reduction in the sums requested will compel a 
change in policy in the face of the fact that the 
substantive legislation enacted this year firmly 
continues the policies established in the legislation 
last year. 

The destructive effect of the cuts made by the 
House, if not restored, can be seen in each of the 
categories of the program. 

Development Lending 

The President has asked for an appropriation 
of $1,250 million for development lending. This 
is pursuant to an authorization approved last year 
of $1,500 million. Additional funds for lending 
purposes are also being asked, as they were last 
year, for the Alliance for Progress, to which I 
shall return in a moment. We intend to concen- 
trate these new development lending funds in 
countries which have soimd development plans or 
have individual projects which can contribute ef- 
fectively to national growth. One half of these 
development lending funds will be needed to carry 
forwai'd long-range commitments already made 
in India, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Tanganyika. We 
intend to follow the principles I have already 
stated and to focus our loan funds upon projects 
and programs which will make a major contribu- 
tion to forward progress. Development lending, 
calling for repayment in dollars, remains the 
fundamental instrument in the long-range prog- 
ress of tlie underdeveloped nations, and the full 
amount requested by the President will be needed 
to be joined with contributions of other nations 
for this purpose. Congress plainly set out in the 
authorizing legislation that emphasis should be 
increasingly placed on loans rather than grants. 
This is the policy underlying the President's re- 
quest for a small increase over last year's appro- 
priation. Yet the House figure of $775 million 
is about one-third below the sum appropriated 
and committed for development loans in fiscal year 
1 962. It is $475 million— or 38 percent— below the 
smn requested and which can be wisely used in 
fiscal year 1963. Unless it is restored to the level 
of the President's request, our ability to carry 
forward this central policy will be seriously 

Department of State Bulletin 

UUance for Progress 

The most important change provided in the 
'Bcently enacted authorization bill is the long-term 
luthority for Latin America. The appropriation 
equested for this purpose for fiscal year 1963 
imounts to $600 million in grants and loans. We 
tsked the Congress for this change in order that 
his important aspect of the aid program could 
)e consolidated within the AID legislation rather 
han having — as in the past — a separate appro- 
)riation act to carry out the objective of Punta 
lei Este and the Act of Bogota. As I have men- 
ioned earlier, the problems we face in this pro- 
gram are huge. We are not dealing here with 
lew nations but with countries long independent 
fhich have already provided themselves with 
Quch of the political, economic, social, and admin- 
strative substructure of development. The 
hanges necessaiy to move more rapidly with de- 
-elopment will create tensions with certain estab- 
ished interests but are necessary to avoid more 
adical change through violent revolution. These 
mids are needed to help make possible necessary 
)rogress by peaceful means. 

I hardly thinlc it is necessary for me to state in 
letail why it is important that we go forward in 
jatin America as rapidly as the many difficult 
echnical and organizational problems will allow. 
The House figure of $525 million will not make 
his possible. It will weaken the force of our call 
o the governments and peoples of this hemisphere 
o defend the freedom of our own continents. It 
vill subject the security of the nation, and indeed 
)f the hemisphere, to risks which are both imwise 
md uimecessary. 

Development Grants 

For areas other than Latin America, we ask an 
ippropriation of $300 million for fiscal year 1963. 
These funds are primarily to provide for the de- 
i^elopment of human capacities, which are so fun- 
iamental to progress in the new nations. They 
ivill help provide advances in education and tech- 
lical training, improvement in health conditions, 
;he development of public administration officials, 
md the creation, improvement, and expansion of 
effective institutional structures and practices con- 
.ributing to economic and social growth. Such 
^ants will also be used to help formulate effective 
plans for general development. These are among 
;he most crucially needed of the funds in the bill, 

I October 8, 7962 

and the sum authorized for appropriation and 
now requested is below the President's estimate of 
need. It is substantially identical with the actual 
appropriation last year. The House cut to $225 
million would strike directly at the newest and 
weakest of the nations receiving our help — those 
which most desperately need assistance in creating 
the fundamental institutions of free nations. To 
weaken them is to encourage instability which can 
directly impair our own interests. 

Supporting Assistance 

In this Decade of Development we intend to 
concentrate our economic aid on development. 
However, our goals require that we also continue 
assistance to support allied and friendly countries 
struggling to maintam their independence under 
heavy financial burdens. Most of these countries 
are on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The 
$415 million for supporting assistance now re- 
quested is substantially below the sum originally 
asked by the President. It is nearly a third be- 
low the request last year and below the $425 
million actually appropriated last year. Three- 
quarters of it will go to four countries : Viet-Nam, 
Laos, Korea, and Turkey. As you know, we are 
ending this type of assistance, country by country, 
as soon as it is possible in each case, and are pro- 
viding needed further assistance through repay- 
able development loans. Our supporting assist- 
ance is still vital, however, to maintain political 
stability and defensive capacity in a number of 
countries, and the funds required are the practical 
minimum for that purpose. The House figure of 
$350 million is far below the minimum for essen- 
tial needs. It is a dangerous and costly economy 
which will simply delay the time when we can 
expect to bring countries still in need of support- 
ing assistance to the point that they can be trans- 
ferred to loans. 

Contingency Fimd 

This part of the President's appropriation re- 
quest provides the essential element of flexibility 
in a complex program which must be administered 
in a complex and rapidly changing world. It 
deserves particular emphasis. We believed that 
the $400 million originally requested by the Presi- 
dent was not too much for a reserve against the 
contingencies which will inevitably occur during 
the coming fiscal year. The needs which have 
arisen during the past year have fully demon- 


strated the essentiality of having this reserve for 
the future. The contingency fund tliis year made 
it possible for the United States to support a free 
government in the Dominican Republic. It has 
provided the flexibility to give the assistance 
needed by Viet-Nam to meet the sudden in- 
crease in violence there. It provided assistance to 
strengthen our NATO ally, Greece, during the 
Berlin buildup. I must tell you most em- 
phatically that there is nothing in the world situ- 
ation to indicate that a sum less than the $300 
million now requested would be adequate or safe. 

Military Assistance 

Secretai7 [of Defense Eobeit S.] McNamara, 
General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer, and others have 
discussed the military assistance request with you 
already. I can only emphasize what they have 
told you of its essential role in our own military 
defense. I will say only that it is essential to the 
victory of freedom we are determined to achieve. 
It is an integral part of our worldwide security 
system. It is the principal means by which we 
help sustain that system and the strength and will 
of free nations. Without this program and the 
confidence which it has given the peoples of na- 
tion after nation who have seen their own security 
forces grow and strengthen through the arms and 
training we have supplied, the structure of free 
and independent nations would in all likelihood 
have collapsed long ago. 

The military assistance program continues to 
provide certain equipment to the strength of 
NATO, although this contribution is rapidly di- 
minishing as the strength and capacity of NATO 
countries increase. It strengthens our first line 
of defense by helping nations on the periphery of 
the Sino-Soviet bloc to support forces prepared to 
defend their own freedom on their own soil. It 
provides the equipment and the training to help 
other nations remain firm and free in the face of 
insurrection fomented and aided from outside. 
It makes possible the success of the struggle to 
counter the subversion and insurrection carried 
on by guerrilla warfare, so evident a part in the 
Communist plan for conquest. 

Our military aid now also serves the purposes 
of economic growth. We have initiated civic ac- 
tion programs in several countries. They are 
receiving increased emphasis, and local military 
forces assisted by us are participating in such pub- 
lic works a^ road building, commimications, and 


otlier community development projects which add 
to the general welfare of the people. 

The $1,500 million the President requests for' 
military equipment and training is $.'585 million; 
less than was asked last year and $200 million less 
than was in fact authorized for this year. It is 
$100 million less than was actually appropriated 
last year. It has been reduced to the minimum 
essential to maintain the defenses of freedom. 
Any further reduction will compel a weakening 
of the strength and resolution of some free nation 
somewhere which could lead to disaster. 

The sharp reduction — $7 million — in the sum 
requested for administration of the program can 
have costly effects far greater than the apparent 
saving. In our aid program, not only are we en- 
gaged in the expenditures of very significant sums, 
but the wisdom with which we use them can have 
effects on the future of our nation far beyond the 
immediate value of the funds involved. The ad- 
ministrative funds requested are needed to em- 
ploy the most capable personnel to man the most 
effective organization we can devise. We cannot 
do this with the reduced funds recommended. The 
$3.1 million for the Department of State is to 
back up NATO and the OECD, which is the prin- 
cipal agency through which we work to increase 
the participation of our allies in providing 
funds for development. The reduction of $0.4 
million in the administration funds for the State 
Department, though small in amount, would be 
costly in effect. 

One matter of substantive legislation is partic- 
ularly important. I understand that section 109 
of the appropriation bill as recommended would 
undo the work of the Congress only a few weeks 
ago in the foreign aid authorizing legislation to 
give the President authority, under certain cir- 
cumstances carefully spelled out in the law, to 
provide aid to such nations as Yugoslavia and 
Poland. This matter has been extensively dis- 
cussed in the Congress, and I shall not, therefore, 
repeat the reasons why it is of the highest impor- 
tance that the authority pro\aded by the Congress 
in the authorizing legislation be continued. 


I spoke at the beginning of the historic struggle 
we are in and of the victory we must win — the vic- 
tory for freedom, for the independence of nations, 
for man's self-government, for human dignity, for 

Department of State BuHetin 

the opportunity for economic progress and the 
growth of social justice. One of the key issues will 
be whether the people of the newly developing 
nations, a third of humanity, will be able to work 
out their social and economic progress with the 
help of the free nations — or whether, in despera- 
tion for want of that help, they will turn to the 
illusion of progress by totalitarian means and be 
lost to freedom. 

Victory for freedom can be won only by our 
best efforts — by vigor, determination, and persist- 
ence. Slackening on our part, will only prolong 
the contest, increase its cost, and endanger the out- 
come. A drastic reduction of fimds is a false and 
costly economy. Our expenditures for our domes- 
tic defense progi-am are running at the rate of 
$50 billion a year. These enormous expenditures 
are vital for the preservation of the peace and the 
security of our nation. Yet it is the aid program — 
for which the President is asking less than one- 
tenth the annual defense appropriation — which is 
the central element in helping to win the kind of 
victory we are seeking. Failure to wage the peace 
as effectively as we can puts off the day of suc- 
cess — and continues the period of our tenfold costs 
of military expenditures. 

Our aid program has served our ends well in the 
past — yet it has never been more needed in the 
cause of freedom. It has never been more im- 
portant that we carry it forward with all the 
energy, the will, and the resources its great pur- 
poses deserve. 

Trade and Foreign Aid 

Remarks hy President Kennedy ^ 

The United States faces two challenges and two 
opportunities. One is the Common Market, where 
we are going to have, instead of a number of dif- 
ferent countries to ti-ade with in Europe, one great 
unit. This can be a most powerful and prosperous 
and steadily growing economy which can bring 
the greatest results and strength to the United 
States and the entire free world. 

The new trade bill will give us the opportunity 

' Made on the Columbia Broadcasting System network 
program "Washington Report" on Sept. 23 (White House 
press release). 

to negotiate with this Common Market, so that 
our goods, our agricultural production, our ma- 
chines, and all the rest can move successfully into 
this growing European market. It can mean a 
good deal to the prosperity of the United States. 

Tlie other great challenge, of course, we face is 
the problem of resisting the Communist advance 
wMch concentrates its attention and energy par- 
ticularly on the poorer areas of the world, Asia, 
Africa, Latin America, where millions and hun- 
dreds of millions of people live without adequate 
food, without shelter, without education, without 
a chance. And the Communists move among them 
and say, "Come with us." 

Now, we have been able to hold this line against 
this internal subversion by the Communists, as 
well as the external threat of military invasion, 
because for many years the United States has as- 
sisted these countries in meeting their own prob- 
lems. We are assisting the people of Viet-Nam. 
We are assisting countries in Latin America which 
are faced with staggering problems. If we stop 
helping them, they stand upon the razor edge to- 
day. If we stop helping them, they will become 
ripe for internal subversion and a Communist 
takeover. We have seen very recently, as well as 
in the days since World War II, how difficult it 
is to eject a Communist regime once it gets its 
police power and controls the country. The best 
way, the cheapest way, the safest way, the most 
reliable way, is to help them help themselves main- 
tain their freedom. The United States has done 
this. We did it in Europe. We have done it 
around the world. And it is only a fraction of 
what we spend each year for our own military 
forces. But it is a front line, and if we can ke«p 
these countries free, then we can keep the peace 
and keep our own freedom. 

That is what this aid fight is all about, and I 
am hopeful that the LTnited States and the 
increasingly prosperous countries of Western 
Europe will meet their responsibilities. In this 
way we can defeat communism. This is the way 
to victory. And I hope that however fatigued we 
may get with this program or carrying these bur- 
dens — the Communists are not tired, and we must 
not be tired, because we can win tlus way. So 
that is why, David [Schoenbrun], we are working 
as hard as we are to get this progi-am and the 
trade bill through. 



A Report on South Viet-Nam 

hy Roger Eilsman, 

Director of Intelligence and Research ' 

In the period when Mr. Acheson was Secretary 
of State and General Marshall was Secretary of 
Defense, it is said that the two men had a special 
understanding. Whenever anyone said, "This is 
a purely military problem," or "This is a purely 
political or diplomatic problem,'' then whoever 
said it had to leave the room. 

In South Viet-Nam we are confronted with an 
extraordinary example of the way military deci- 
sion and action are interdependent with many 
otlier decisions and enterprises. The war there is 
a guerrilla war, and the successful means of coun- 
tering guerrilla war are as much political as mili- 
tary, for the longrim task is nation building. 

This guerrilla war is a form of hidden Com- 
munist aggression, an internal war, if you will. 
As President Kennedy has said,'' 

. . . their aggression is more often concealed than 
open. They have fired no missiles; and their troops are 
seldom seen. They send arms, agitators, aid, technicians, 
and propaganda to every troubled area. But where fight- 
ing is required, it is usually done by others — by guerril- 
las striking at night, by assassins striking alone — 
assassins who have taken the lives of 4,000 civil oflScers 
in the last 12 months in Viet-Nam alone — by subversives 
and saboteurs and insurrectionists, who in some cases 
control whole areas Inside of independent nations. 

This war in the shadows may well be one of the 
most decisive battles of our time. My subject is 
a report on one of these shadow wars, the one 
in South Viet-Nam, and I would like to start by 
giving you my outline: There is a guerrilla war in 

* Address made before the American Hospital Associa- 
tion at Chicago, 111., on Sept. 18 (press release 558 dated 
Sept 15). 

» Bulletin of June 12, 1901, p. 903. 


South Viet-Nam; so I would like, first, to say 
something about guerrilla warfare in general — the 
conditions in wliich it arises and a strategic con- 
cept for fighting against it. Second, I would like 
to tell you how these ideas are being applied in 
South Viet-Nam. And, finally, I'd like to give 
you a report on how things are going there in 
South Viet-Nam. 

Circumstances Behind Guerrilla Warfare 

There is something about guerrilla warfare 
which gives rise to legends. It is part of the op- 
eration, in fact, to see that the enemy is full of 
rumors which keep him in the dark as to facts. 
But in appraising the uses of guerrilla tactics we 
should certainly try to separate legends from 
realities. So it seems useful to begui with the 
elementary observation that guerrilla warfare is 
possible only in two very special sets of circum- 
stances : 

The first is when the main body of the enemy is 
otherwise engaged. "When France was occupied 
by the Germans in World War II, virtually the 
entire population hated the Nazis. There was a 
well-organized and -supplied guerrilla move- 
ment — the Maquis. But so long as the German 
armies had nothing else to do, the French guerril- 
las could not be effective. There were many in- 
dividual acts of sabotage and violence, but not 
much else. At any time that a small guerrilla 
band attacked, the Germans could counter with 
overwhelming force. 

But after D-day, when the Grerman divisions 
were fully engaged in fighting the Allies, the 
Maquis became a formidable and effective force. 

Department of State Bulletin 

The second set of circumstances is now the more 
usual setting for guerrillas when they operate in 
the emerging, still-developing countries of the 
world. In much of the world today, the different 
communities that make up what we think of as 
nation-states are isolated from the central gov- 
ernment — isolated by lack of commimications or 
by the terrain, as in mountains, islands, or the 
desert, but more importantly isolated in a psy- 
chological and political sense. 

The basic situation in many underdeveloped 
areas is that the villages are turned inward on 
themselves. The people are living there as they 
have for hundreds of years, with few ties to their 
government. They appear rarely to have strong 
political convictions one way or another. In my 
personal experience in Southeast Asia during 
"World War II, where a few of us in the OSS 
were sent behind the enemy lines to organize bands 
of guerrillas against the Japanese, it seemed to us 
that perhaps 10 }>ercent of the people had some 
sympathies for our side and perhaps 10 percent 
had some sympathies for the Japanese. But 80 
percent of the populace did not have much aware- 
ness of the stniggle being fought out in their 
country. ]\Iuch less did they have ideological con- 
victions. Even with white faces we recruited a 
guerrilla force that was larger in numbers than 
the Communist guerrilla force in South Viet- 
Xam today. 

My point is that in these underdeveloped, but 
at the same time ancient, cultures the villagers 
are isolated from each other and from the central 
government in a way that we in the "West are not 
equipped by our experience to understand. The 
villagers are turned inward on themselves and 
identify not with the nation but often only witli 
their family, clan, and village. 

Let me illustrate my point. 

Eecently some friends of mine made a tour of 
the border areas of such a country. They visited 
40 villages. In 10 of these villages no one had 
ever seen a government official of any kind — 
neither the district chief nor the province chief, 
much less a representative of the national gov- 
enmient. Tliey also visited a town, where one 
would expect the people to be better informed than 
those in the villages. There they talked to a shop- 
keeper, and one would expect a shopkeeper to be 
better informed than, say, a laborer. They asked 
tlic shopkeeper who the king of the country was. 

and he proudly named him and pointed to a pic- 
ture on the wall — which had, incidentally, been 
furnished by the United States Information 
Service. He was asked who the Prime Minister 
was, however, and inexplicably named not the 
Prime Minister of his own comitry but the Prime 
Minister of a nearby country. It seems that the 
nearby country had radio broadcasts which he 
could pick up on his transistor radio, and he nat- 
urally assumed that since he could hear the broad- 
cast the country must be his own. 

"What happens when a village with people as 
isolated as these is visited by a tough band of 
armed marauders? The villagers are unarmed, 
and the guerrillas are armed. It is not surprising 
that the villages give or sell the guerrillas rice. 
It is not surprising that the guerrillas can recruit 
a few young men to join their guerrilla band with 
promises of adventure and good things to come. 
In siich circumstances the people do not have to 
be "against" the government for a guerrilla unit 
to thrive. The people do not have to "support" 
the guerrillas for a guerrilla movement to thrive. 

(Any comparison with our own world must be 
farfetched, but one may ask whether the citizens 
of Chicago "supported" the gangs which flour- 
ished in the twenties? The shopkeeper who was 
hit by the "protection" racket did not "support" 
the gangs, but he often had no choice but to go 
along with them. Government jirotection seemed 
far away, and the threat from the hoodlums was 
close by. The same is true in the underdeveloped 
areas of the world, where the villages are not only 
isolated but also both unarmed and unprotected.) 

Tying the Villages Into the National Fabric 

Against this background, I would suggest two 
principles as a strategic concept for countering 
guerrilla warfare in the luiderdeveloj^ed regions of 
the world. 

The first principle is that fighting a guerrilla 
war in an underdeveloped nation requires as much 
political and ci^nc action as it does militai-y action. 
President Roosevelt once said that "Dr. New 
Deal" had been succeeded by "Dr. "Win the "War," 
but in guerrilla wars in underdeveloped nations 
both "doctors" are needed. Militarj' action and 
a social new deal have to proceed together. The 
isolated villages must be tied into the governmen- 
tal structure — at district, province, and ultimately 
the national level. The goal is to create a net- 


Department of Sfofe Bulletin 

work in which information about the needs of the 
yillagers can flow upward and government serv- 
ices can flow downward. 

This flow of services from the government must 
go all the way across the board — feeder roads so 
that the villagers can get their products to mar- 
ket; radios and radio stations so that their minds 
can be opened up to the outside world ; food from 
a prosperous part of the country when famine 
strikes in another part of the country ; education 
for the young; books and magazines for the old 
so that they will not lose their literacy for lack 
of somethuig to read, as so often happens; and 
medical services. 

I know that it is familiar to those of you in this 
audience, but it is not familiar to most Americans, 
just how heavy some of the ancient but now con- 
trollable scourges of mankind bear down on most 
of the peoples of the world. In parts of Thailand, 
80 percent of the people are infested with liver 
fluke. Hookworm debilitates the populations in 
much of Asia. The World Health Organization, 
our own AID programs, and the efforts of many 
of these countries in their own behalf have made 
lenormous strides in controlling malaria. But 
countless millions of people are afflicted with con- 
trollable diseases against which no progress has 
really been attempted. 

You in this room could list these diseases and 
their consequences much better than I. But let 
me make two points. 

The first is that controlling many of these dis- 
eases is not only a question of hospitals, X-ray 
equipment, and a high proportion of doctors to 
total population. Much can be done by teaching 
the villagers the elementary facts about sanitation, 
by medical technicians trained to deal with one or 
two particular diseases, and by an adequate sup- 
ply of modern drugs. 

The second point is that it is often these one 
or two endemic, but controllable, diseases that 
stand in the way of economic progress and de- 
velopment and hence contribute greatly to Com- 
mimist opportunities for subversion and aggres- 
sion by guerrilla warfare. 

To sum up this first principle — that the villages 
must be tied into the governmental and national 
fabric — let me say that it is well for us to remem- 
ber that in these parts of the world it is a revolu- 
tionary idea that the people of a country can 
expect their government to help them or protect 

Ocfober 8, 7962 

them. They have never asked what their country 
can do for them, much less what they can do for 
their country. Indeed, there are millions of peo- 
ple who do not know what a country or govern- 
ment is. If you are looking for a revolutionary 
appeal to excite and inspire these people, it is the 
simple concept that government exists to serve 
and protect them. 

Miritary Operations To Achieve Political Ends 

My second principle concerns the military side 
of fighting guerrillas, but in a peculiarly political 
way. The principle is that, in fighting guerrillas, 
military operations must be so conducted as to 
achieve political ends. Stated another way, the 
principle would be that to fight guerrillas you 
must adopt the tactics of the guerrilla himself. 

Orthodox military tactics are aimed at taking 
and holding territory. Military formations de- 
signed for these purposes are large and slower 
moving. The guerrilla, on the other hand, does 
not aim to take territory but to win recruits and 
alienate the people from their government. The 
guerrilla's purpose is well served when large mili- 
tary formations sweep the coimtryside, for this 
tends to make life difficult for the villagers and, 
hence, to make the villagers turn against their 
government. Thus, for political reasons the mili- 
tary tactics used against guerrillas should be those 
of the guerrilla himself — small roving units con- 
stantly patroling and ambushing. 

Finally, these tactics should be designed to cut 
the lines of communication between the guerrilla 
and the thousands of villages to which he goes 
for food and recruits. 

You have heard of the so-called strategic ham- 
lets and villages that are now being built in South 
Viet-Nam. This is a concept that was developed 
in Malaya during the Communist guerrilla war 
there and is now being applied in South Viet-Nam. 

You remember my earlier point that in under- 
developed areas the villagers are not necessarily 
proguerrilla. But unless there is some way of 
protecting them from marauding guerrilla bands 
they will be obliged to give or to sell food to the 
guerrilla and to listen to his propaganda. 

One purpose of the strategic village is to give 
villages this protection^or, rather, to help the 
villager to protect himself. Without arms or pro- 
tection the villager cannot refuse to give or sell 
his rice to the Communists, for fear of retalia- 


tion. Without protection the villager is afraid to 
pass on infoi-mation about the Communist guer- 
rillas to the government. 

A second purpose of the strategic village is to 
control the movement of people and supplies. 
Identity cards are issued, and curfews are imposed. 
Thus anyone on the roads and trails at night can 
be assumed to be a Communist. 

Through the use of identity cards and intelli- 
gence from the people the small group of hard- 
core Communists in a village of several hmidred 
people can be identified and arrested. The barbed 
■wire and curfews deny the guerrillas easy access to 
the villages. If the guerrillas need rice, they must 
attack a defended village. Thus the whole war is 
turned around. Instead of the government forces 
chasing the Commimists and falling into ambush, 
the Communists must attack the villages and so 
fall into ambushes themselves. 

It should be stressed that the strategic hamlets 
are not concentration camps. The purpose is to 
keep the guerrillas out of the villages rather than 
keep the villagers in. Inevitably, of course, when 
one throws a barbed wire fence around a village 
there is a degree of regimentation. But this is a 
type of war, and some form of regimentation can- 
not be avoided. There is a parallel in our own 
history. The early settlements of America had 
stockades around them, and life went on behind 
the stockades for a long time. Our ancestors did 
not like the rule that everyone had to be inside the 
stockade at sundown. They did not like to bring 
up their children in such an atmosphere, but they 
built the stockades as a first step toward a way of 
life in which stockades were no longer necessary. 

Now let us see how the South Vietnamese Gov- 
ernment is applying these principles against the 
Communist guerrillas. 

The Enemy Situation 

There are 15,000-20,000 liard-core, full-time 
Communist guerrillas in South Viet-Nam and 
many thousands more sympathizers, part-time 
Communist guerrillas, and political and propa- 
ganda agents. 

South Viet-Nam is a nation of about 14 million ; 
so this does not represent a mass movement. But 
in an underdeveloped country with poor commu- 
nications, with mountains and jungles, terrorists 
and subversive agents in these numbers can cause 
much damage. 


The major concentrations of the Commimist 
guerrillas — who are commonly called the Viet 
Cong — are in the mountains near the Laotian 
border in the north; in the moimtains extending 
eastward toward the coast in the central region of 
South Viet-Nam and southward toward Saigon; 
and in the Mekong River delta area, including the 
Plain of Reeds, west and south of Saigon. 

The Communists try to maintain the fiction that 
this is a civil war arising spontaneously from 
within South Viet-Nam. This is not true. The 
Communists in North Viet-Nam are directing this 
guerrilla movement. For years they have been 
sending in trained men to be the cadre for the 
Communist Viet Cong battalions. These trained 
men slip into South Viet-Nam over various over- 
land infiltration routes that lead from North Viet- 
Nam through mountains and jungles and by junk 
landings along the South Vietnamese coastline. 
And let me make this clear: By using these infil- 
tration routes and conducting a guerrilla war the 
Communists are committing aggi'ession. The 
giierrilla movement in South Viet-Nam is directed 
from outside by an enemy nation. It is interfer- 
ence by military force in the affairs of another 

Wliat comes over these infiltration routes? The 
answer is, largely, trained men. These are jungle 
trails — not roads — and the men must walk. They 
can cari-y food for their journey. They can carry 
arms and ammunition. They can carry medical 
supplies. They can carry money. And they can 
carry certain specialized equipment, such as radios 
and perhaps some light automatic weapons. 

The food for the guerrillas in South Viet-Nam 
must be obtained in South Viet-Nam itself. 
Moreover, by hitting army, security, and police 
units suddenly and in superior force, the guer- 
rillas are able to assure themselves a local supply 
of arms and ammunition and reduce their depend- 
ence on long supply lines from the north. This is 
demonstrated by analyzing the equipment cap- 
tured from the Commmiist Viet Cong. The arms 
captured from the Communists are old weapons 
left over from the days when Viet-Nam was a 
French colony, those that tlie Communists have 
captured from the South Vietnamese forces, or 
liomemade guns, mines, grenades, and even cross- 
bows with poison arrows. 

Thiis there are two lines of supply for the Com- 
munist Viet Cong. The first is the infiltration 

Department of State Bulletin 


routes which supply largely trained men — officers 
and noncommissioned officers — and specialized 
equipment and supplies. The second is the hun- 
, dreds of jungle trails leading into thousands of 
South Vietnamese villages, like spokes on a wheel. 
It is from these villages that the Communists get 
fi>od, recruits, and the raw materials from which 
t ( ) manufacture arms and ammunition. As I said 
liefore, the villagers do not necessarily support the 
Communists, but when the Commmiists have ac- 
cess to the villages they can obtain the supplies by 
both intimidation and purchase. 

Objectives of South Vietnamese Program 

This, then, is the enemy situation. The South 
Vietnamese program for dealing with this situa- 
ion has three objectives : 

The first is to strengthen the regular army and 
security forces and increase their mobility. Here 
Qnited States aid is vital, and the vigorous pro- 
gram instituted by Secretary of Defense McNa- 
nara has been having magiiificent results. As 
YOU have read in the papers, the United States has 
furnished arms and equipment and, most im- 
portantly, helicopters, which give the regular 
South Vietnamese army lightning mobility to re- 
nforce people attacked by the Communists and 
;o seek out and pursue the Communists in the 
nountains and jvmgles. 

The second objective of the progi'am is to cut 
;he infiltration routes. 

The Geneva agreements neutralizing Laos^ 
specify that the territory of Laos shall not be used 
for these purposes. Wliether the North Viet- 
aamese will keep their word remains to be 
seen. But in any case the South Vietnamese 
ire not powerless. As you can see from a glance 
it a map, these infiltration routes must in some 
ustances wind their way for long distances inside 
South Viet-Nam before reaching the areas of Viet 
Oong concentration, and the South Vietnamese are 
;aldng measures to cut these routes inside South 
7iet-Nam itself. 

An im^Dortant part of the measures to cut the 
nfiltration routes is the recent decision to arm 
;he montagnards. These montagnards are the 
noimtain peoples of South Viet-Nam — hardy, 
courageous men. Recently thousands of the mon- 
agnards have fled into the lowlands to get away 
Tom the Viet Cong, whose modern arms were too 

' For text, see iUd., Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259. 
Scfober 8, 7962 

much for the only weapons the montagnards had — 
spears, and bows and arrows. 

The South Vietnamese Government decided to 
equip the montagnards with modern weapons fur- 
nished by the United States. The montagnards 
are trained in the use of these weapons and sent 
back into their home territories to establish stra- 
tegic villages of their own in the moimtains 
through which the infiltration routes pass. Our 
special forces training officers estimate that about 
23,000 square miles are already under the m,on- 
tagnards' protection and that in 4 months the total 
may be 40,000 square miles. According to reports, 
7,000 montagnards have already been trained and 
given weapons and another 3,000 are beginning the 

The third objective of the South Vietnamese 
plan is the strategic- village program I have men- 
tioned, which is designed to cut the major routes 
of supply and deny Communist access to thousands 
of unprotected villages. This program calls for 
putting defenses around existing villages — barbed 
wire, watchtowers, and ditches filled with bamboo 
spikes and booby traps. It calls for giving each 
village a radio which the villages can use to call 
for reinforcements by helicopter if they are at- 
tacked by a Viet Cong force too large for them to 
handle. It calls for arms for the villagers to use 
themselves when attacked. 

There is one misconception about this program 
I would like to correct. These plans, unlike those 
in Malaya, do not call for relocating villages ex- 
cept in rare circumstances. In general, the de- 
fenses are to be put around existing villages. Al- 
though there are one or two places in heavily 
penetrated regions where villages have actually 
had to be regrouped, these are the exception, not 
the rule. 

The strategic villages will provide protection. 
At the same time, the South Vietnamese plan to 
tise the strategic-village idea as a way to tie the 
villagers mto the governmental structure and to 
provide the villages with government services — 
health, education, agricultural services, police pro- 
tection, and good village administration. 

South Vietnamese Government plans call for 
civic-action teams sent by the provincial and na- 
tional governments which will not only help the 
villagers in setting up their defenses but will also 
expand the political, social, and economic base for 
integrating of the villages into the national fabric. 
For example, these teams include a medical tech- 


nician, a school teacher, an agricultural credit 
representative, a public information representa- 
tive, two or three public administration advisers, 
and a youth activities representative, as well as a 
police adviser, a civil guard liaison officer to man 
the radio that calls for reinforcements if attacked, 
and a squad of soldiers to issue weapons to the 
villagers and provide training in their use. 

When this program is completed, in addition 
to the protection afforded, the South Vietnamese 
should have a much improved structure that will 
permit information about the needs of the vil- 
lagers to go up the ladder of government and 
services to meet their needs to come down. 

On the military side, it will proAride a hedgehog 
of defended villages — zones of defended villages 
which will act as a meat grinder when the Com- 
munist guerrillas venture into them. Each of the 
villages will have its own self-defense corps to 
resist attack. In the empty spaces between the 
villages, civil guard imits will patrol and lay am- 
bush during curfew hours. If the Viet Cong come 
into the zone, they are very likely to run into a 
civil guard ambush. Even if the Viet Cong do 
not run into an ambush, sooner or later they will 
run out of food and be forced to attack a strategic 
village. Thus the guerrilla is forced to attack 
instead of being chased. The guerrilla is am- 
bushed rather than ambushing. 

Results of Program Are Encouraging 

This, then, is th& theory and the program for 
putting theory into practice. The final question 
is, how is it working out in South Viet-Nam ? 

So far we have grounds for guarded optimism. 

Vigorous support from Secretary McNamara 
and the Department of Defense has given the 
South Vietnamese army new confidence. It is 
attacking the Viet Cong and has been having 
gratifying success. 

Over 2,000 strategic hamlets have been built, 
and 1,000 of these are now equipped with radios 
as a result of United States aid. Not all of these 
strategic villages are perfect. Some do not have 
enough arms and equipment. In some places, too, 
there has not yet been enough money to pay the 
villagers for the time they have spent on building 
the village defenses, and inevitably in some vil- 
lages there is some resentment. On the other 
hand, the early returns seem to indicate that the 
villagers' morale and their attitude toward their 



government are much better than some press re^ 
ports might lead us to believe. 

There have been some very positive press state- 
ments that the Government of South Viet-Nam isi 
unpopular with the villagers. But how can one ", 
generalize about the attitude of some 12 million 
villagers? There are no Galluj^ polls. I myseli 
do not know the answer to this question, and J 
doubt seriously that anyone does. I can, however, 
give you a few hard facts that may be at least 
straws in the wind. 

First, one would expect that if the villagers 
were anti-Government and pro- Viet Cong thej 
would defect to the Communists when they wen* *' 
given arms. Of the villages that have been armec 
so far, I know of none that has gone over to th( 
Communist side. 

Second, if the villagers were merely indifferent 
to their Government they would sell their arms t( 
the Communists — and the Communists have of- 
fered very high prices for these arms. But of thf 
villages that have been armed so far, I know oJ 
none where the arms have been sold to the Com- 

In fact, the villages have used their arms tv 
fghf the Communists. Of the villages that hav< 
been armed so far, only a few as yet have beer 
attacked, but all of them have fought when at- 
tacked and fought well. Only five of the village 
radios have been lost as a result of Viet Conj 
action, and we really expected the rate to be mucl 
higher. More than this, in the last few weeks i 
high percentage of the Viet Cong killed hav( 
been killed by villagers resisting Viet Cong attack 

Let us take one week as an example. During 
one week in August, over 600 Viet Cong wert 
killed as against less than 100 killed among th( 
pro-Government forces. And of these 600 Viet 
Cong killed, two-thirds were killed not by th« 
South Vietnamese regular army but by villagen 
armed through the strategic-village program 
This, I think, is an encouraging indication of the 
attitudes of the villagers. 

In sum then, although the plans are just begin- 
ning to be implemented the results are encourag- 
ing. The defection rate of the Viet Cong has ^ 
risen, and the recruitment rate has gone down. 
Just in the last 2 months there are areas of South H 
Viet-Nam that are now safe that only last spring * 
could not be entered without a company of armed 

Department of State BuUetin 5* 











There is a long way to go. It took 7 years to 
(liminate guerrillas in Malaya. It may take less 
han this in Viet-Nam, or it may take more, but 
'. think we have reason to feel confident that in the 
nd the South Vietnamese — with our help — will 

oreign Policy Conference To Be Held 
or Editors and Broadcasters 

'ress release, 574 dated September 21 

Invitations are being extended this week by 
secretary Rusk to editors and commentators of 
he press and the broadcasting industry through- 
ut the country to attend a national foreign policy 
onference being held on October 15 and 16, 1962, 
t the Department of State. 

President Kennedy, Secretary Rusk, and a num- 
er of other principal officers of the Government 
nil speak to the group on current and long-range 
3sues related to foreign policy. 

The conference will be the fifth in a series of 
ational meetings for media representatives held 
1 Washington during the past 18 months to as- 
ist the Department's effort in making available 
tiformation on U.S. foreign relations to the 
Lmerican public to the greatest extent possible. 

The theme of the conference will be "Five 
loals of U.S. Foreign Policy." 


'resident Kennedy Holds Talks 
ith President of Rwanda 



" Following is the text of a joint communique 5y 
^resident Kennedy and Gregoire Kayibanda, 
'resident of Rwanda, issued at the close of a dis- 
ussion they held at Washington on September 


rhite House press release dated September 19 

His Excellency Gregoire Kayibanda, President 
f the Republic of Rwanda, conferred today with 
he President about the future of United States- 
Iwandan relations and about general problems 
J, eing faced by the Rwandan Government follow- 
jl tig its entry into the family of nations as an inde- 
endent country last July 1. 

President Kayibanda and the President ex- 
tressed the mutual determination of their two 



>cfober 8, J 962 

Governments to maintain and foster the cordial 
relationship which has emerged between the two 
countries since the attainment of independence by 

President Kayibanda spoke of his determination 
to maintain and strengthen the independence and 
internal development of his country. He was 
particularly appreciative of the demonstrated 
sympathy for and interest in the manifold prob- 
lems now being faced by his country on the part 
of the United States Government, of the friendly 
welcome which he and his ministers have received 
on all sides during this, his first visit to the United 

The President confirmed the determination of 
the United States to support the efforts of the 
Government of Rwanda to meet and overcome the 
myriad problems faced by all new nations. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

87th Congress, 2d Session 

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Hearing before the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. April 10, 1962. 
148 pp. 

Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies. 
Hearings before the Special Preparedness Subcommittee 
of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Part 5. 
April 16-May 14, 1962. 606 pp. 

Foreign Air Transportation. Hearing before a subcom- 
mittee of the House Committee on Interstate and For- 
eign Commerce on H.R. 7309, H.R. 10655, and H.R. 
10657. June 12, 1962. 69 pp. 

Philippine War Damage Claims. Hearings before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 2380 and 
S. 3329. June 12 and 21, 1962. 63 pp. 

Soviet Oil in East-West Trade. Hearing before the Sub- 
committee To Investigate the Administration of the 
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws 
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Testimony 
of Samuel Nakasian. July 3, 1962. 141 pp. 

Foreign Radio Stations. Hearing before the House Com- 
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 
11732. August 2, 1962. 36 pp. 

Amendments to the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926. 
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Re- 
lations. August 2 and 21, 1962. 102 pp. 

Communications Satellite Act of 1962. Minority views on 
H.R. 11040. S. Rept. 1873, part 2. August 10, 1962. 
6 pp. 

Sixteenth Semiannual Report of Activities Carried on 
Under Public 480, S3d Congress. Message from the 
President transmitting the report on operations during 
the period January 1 through June 30, 1962. H. Doc. 
526. August 20, 1962. 95 pp. 

Amendment to the Communications Act of 1934. Report 
to accompany H.R. 11732. H. Rept. 2248. August 20, 
1962. 9 pp. 

Awards Under the Japanese-American Evacuation Claims 
Act of 1948. Report to accompany H.R. 12719. H. Rept. 
2254. August 20, 1962. 4 pp. 







U.S. Pledges Resources and Cooperation 
in World Food Program 

Statement hy Orville L. Freeman 
Secretary of Agriculture ^ 

This is a momentous occasion. I appreciate 
deeply the privilege of taking part. 

Here today the United States is joining with 
many other nations in a new combined attack on 
hunger. My country and yours are pledging re- 
sources — and enthusiasm — in a cooperative effort 
to improve utilization of the world's food supplies. 
We are truty serving mankind in implementing 
this new multinational World Food Program.^ 
At the same time we are taking another important 
step toward the goals of the United Nations Devel- 
opment Decade.^ 

We all Imow and appreciate the tremendous 
seriousness of the problem that faces us. It can 
be stated simply. In some countries food sup- 
plies are abundant. In others, accounting for over 
half of the world's population, people are un- 
dernourished or malnourished. These contrasts 
cannot be permitted to continue indefinitely. 
Most of the food-deficit countries of the world are 
politically independent or are in the process of 
gaining their independence. With independence 
has come impatience — impatience not only with a 
generally unsatisfactory standard of living but 
especially with a lack of the fundamental needs of 
life, above all, food. 

In a very real sense there is no surplus of food 
anywhere as long as food can be sent to those who 
do not have enough to eat. To me, it is a moral 
imperative that we make maximum effective use 
of our God-given abundance. The World Food 
Program will help us do that. Today we serve 
notice, as we pledge resources and cooperation, 

' Made to the pledtring conference of the U.N./FAO 
"World Food Program Conference at New York, N.T., on 
Sept. 5 (U.S./U.N. press release 4032). 

' For background, see BtTLij:TiN of Jan. 22, 19C2, p. 150. 

• For background, see ihUl., Aug. 6, 19C2, p. 225. 


that we stand together in the fight to banish hungei 
from the world. It can be done. 

Tlie hunger problem that faces us continues t( 
be formidable. Although 1962 food productior 
figures are not yet available, the United States De 
partment of Agriculture has received enough in 
formation to indicate the world food picture ii 
1963 will be about the same as in recent years. 

On the basis of our early reports there is enougl 
food in the economically developed countries t( 
provide adequate diets. Production levels in th( 
United States, Canada, and Australia will be fa: 
above the world average. Other industrializec 
nations, largely in the temperate northern areas^ 
will either produce enough food to meet needs o 
will be able to purchase additional supplies abroad 

However, for millions of people, mainly in th'i 
less developed countries of the semitropica 
and tropical areas, chronic malnutrition — evei 
hunger — will continue to be a grim fact of daib 
life. In these countries gradual gains in foo( 
production too often are canceled out by rapic 
gains in population. 

"Wlien we speak of hunger, we must also speak o 
its causes. Food deficits have many causes 
Among them are land resources, climatic con 
ditions, farm techniques, population trends, trad" 
policies. A very important cause of food deficit 
is economic underdevelopment — in other words 
poverty. The World Food Program will help ut 
attack hunger directly, and it will also enable u 
to buy some of the time needed to promote tin 
economic growth projects which, in the final analy 
sis, are the only cure for poverty. 

Development of the Program 

The World Food Program is frankly experl 
mental. It will, for the first time, provide fooo 
surpluses for economic development through tb 
United Nations system. 

The new program will start off on a modes 
scale. It will supplement, not replace, the bi 
lateral food-aid programs already being carrie( 

Department of State Bullelh 






The I 









on by individual countries, including the Food- 
for-Peace Program of the United States. Let us 
not be concerned, however, about the modest 
initial size of the operation. It can grow — and I 
think that it will grow — because it is based on a 
sound premise. It is predicated on the idea that a 
problem that is international in scope and impact 
needs to be approached through the joint effort of 

Development of the program thus far is a tribute 
to many minds and hands, and we of the United 
States are proud to be associated in its develop- 

I am pleased to recall that we were one of the 
sponsors of the resolution approved by the General 
Assembly in October I960.* That resolution, 
among other things, called for a study of how food 
surpluses might be distributed under international 
auspices. The Director General of FAO [Food 
and Agriculture Organization] early in 1961 pre- 
pared a challenging report, Development Through 
Food^ whicli placed strong emphasis on the role 
of food in promoting economic growth. The Di- 
rector General's ideas were transmitted by the 
United Nations Secretary-General to the Economic 
and Social Council. A multilateral approach to 
food distribution was considered in various meet- 
ings of the FAO and the United Nations in 1961. 

It was my privilege to address the FAO Con- 
ference at Eome in November 1961 and pledge the 
strong support of tlie United States to establish- 
ment of a World Food Program. I followed with 
keen personal satisfaction other steps of the FAO 
and the U.N. to establish this program. I am 
very happy to be here today — to take part in this 
pledging ceremony — to help give reality to what 
was only an idea less than a year ago. 

The U.S. Contribution 

The United States is pleased to offer food, cash 
assistance, and ocean transportation services to 
the World Food Program — to join other members 
of the United Nations and the Food and Agricul- 
ture Organization in this great cooperative effort. 
The United States herewith pledges $40 million 
in commodities and an additional $10 million in 
cash and ocean transportation services on United 
States vessels. This is the American contribution 

* For text, see iUA., Nov. 21, 1960, p. 800. 
^ U.N. doc. E/3462. 

Ocfober 8, T962 

to the total of $100 million for all countries taking 
part in this experimental program. 

The United States contribution of commodities 
and transportation services will be made through 
the Public Law 480 program, while the cash con- 
tribution will come from the United States foreign 
assistance program. In view of our internal pro- 
cedures for annual appropriations we are planning 
that the cash contribution be provided from the 
appropriations of 3 years separately, beginning 
with the one now before the United States 

Our contribution of services is designed to cover 
ocean freight costs on United States vessels for 
half our commodity contributions. We estimate 
that the value at world market rates of this ocean 
freight will be approximately $4 million. Our 
cash contribution is subject to appropriations in 
this and the next 2 years and to the condition that 
our cash contribution does not exceed 40 percent 
of the total cash contributed from all countries. 
Furthermore, if the world market value of our 
shipping contribution should rise above $4 million, 
our cash contribution of $6 million could decrease, 
but not below $5 million. 

United States food supplies available for this 
program are sufficiently large as not to require 
designation of a specific quantity of each com- 
modity. Therefore we are only naming the com- 
modities. The quantities are to be worked out 
with the Executive Director of the program on 
the basis of project requirements and availabili- 
ties, in accordance with applicable United States 
laws and regulations. 

The full $100 million maximum originally pro- 
posed for this program seems to be almost in sight 
today. A few countries, we understand, have not 
been able to finalize their arrangements for 
pledging their contributions today. However, 
there are indications that these countries will also 
be able soon to make pledges which will raise the 
total to the maximum authorized by the basic 
resolutions. Every bit helps, and even the small- 
est contributions will be important both as they 
meet hmnan needs and also as they symbolize sup- 
port in the ideal of working together to banish 
hunger and malnutrition. 

Permit me to repeat again that the new World 
Food Program will supplement, not replace, the 
existing Food-for-Peace Program of the United 
States. In our view, that operation also is essen- 


tial in any campaign to ease world hunger. It 
might be noted that, through Food-for-Peace, 
U.S. farm products are supplementing the food 
resources of over 100 countries having a combined 
population of over 1.3 billion. In the 8-year 
period, 1955-62, Food-for-Peace shipments had 
a total value of $11.2 billion. 

Using Food To Promote Economic Development 

Food-for-Peace has proved that food can be 
used to promote economic development. It is 
helping the underdeveloped countries improve 
their irrigation, reclamation, and reforestation 
projects ; for improvement of railroads, highways, 
and bridges; for construction of electric power 
generating facilities; for building new hospitals, 
clinics, and schools. 

How far we — the nations here assembled — can 
go in solving the world's food problems per- 
manently will depend on how much we can pro- 
mote economic growth. Economic growth can 
bring expansion of fertilizer production in the 
Far East, Africa, and Latin America. It can 
bring expansion of irrigation, of flood control, 
of farm-to-market roads, of food storing and 
processing facilities. Economic growth can pro- 
vide productive employment for the workers 
of the underdeveloped countries. With jobs, 
workers can buy the food they need for themselves 
and their families. 

The World Food Program, as I mentioned 
earlier, is experimental. The Director General 
of FAO, Dr. [B.E.] Sen, has commented, "The 
program is an effort to try out various alternative 
procedures all along the line," including the pro- 
vision of food for emergency needs, preschool and 
school feeding, and projects for economic and so- 
cial development. The program calls for a full 
review of how each project is currently working 
out in practice and a final review after the project 
is completed. 

Participation in a program means identification 
with and sympathy for the program's objectives. 
This, I feel, is one of the major benefits that will 
be derived. The enthusiasm of participation by 
a large number of member nations is invaluable. 
This enthusiasm is felt even when a nation is 
able to make only a limited contribution. 

The program gives many small countries a 
means of making their force felt in the war against 
hunger. The program, in other words, provides 
for a "team" on which many countries, large and 

small, may play. The United States, I can assure 
you, wants the team to have as many members as 
possible. j 

We owe a debt of gratitude to the countries i 
which have served on the intergovernmental com- 
mittee to develop the arrangements and proce- 
dures for the operation of this program. Long 
hours and diligent work have been required of 
both FAO and U.N. staff members. An effective 
job has been done. The United States endorses 
precautions to safeguard the agricultural econo- 
mies of recipient countries and the agricultural 
markets of other countries in accordance with 
agi'eed FAO principles. 

I want to pay tribute to the Executive Director 
[Addeke Hendrik Boerma]. I have been im- 
pressed by the unanimous support he received in 
the inter governmental committee. The strong be- 
ginning he has made augurs well for effective 
leadership over the 3-year experimental period. 

Let me say, in conclusion, that we have wrought 
well here today. Our World Food Program is 
dedicated to the benefit of mankind; its approach 
is positive and constructive. Hunger is a prob- 
lem that won't be solved this year, or the next, or 
the next. But the problem has been recognized. 
Progress is being made. One day, I am confident, 
hunger will be banished from the earth. 

Continuation of Charter Review 
Committee Recommended to G.A. 

Statement iy Francis T. P. Plimpton'^ 

This Committee is meeting on the fourth occa- 
sion since its initial meeting in 1957, charged with 
the task of determining whether there have been 
changes in the international climate which would 
now warrant the setting of a time and a place for 
the holding of a general conference to review the 
charter. At its previous meetings just prior to 
the 12th, 14th, and 16th sessions of the General 
Assembly, this Committee in each instance reached 
the melancholy conclusion that the time was not 
propitious for a constructive review of the charter. 

Although a large number of the members of 
the United Nations see value in a conference which 

' Made in the Committee on Arrangements for a Con- 
ference for the Purpose of Reviewing the Charter on 
Sept. 5 (U.S./U.N. press release 403.3). Mr. Plimpton 
is Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations. 


Department of State Bulletin 



* vould permit a discussion and analysis of the 

* bharter in the light of the history of the United 
N'ations since 19-±5, we thinli it is generally under- 
stood that such a conference must be based on gen- 
>ral agreement as to its objectives. 

Debates, not only in this Committee at previous 
nestings but also in connection with more recent 
.Jiiscussion of other items on the agenda of United 
. Nations organs, indicate that such general agree- 
Inent does not exist. As an example, the distin- 
^ished representative of the Soviet Union has 
wrought into this debate the irrelevant issue of 
hinese representation, an issue which was deter- 
nined by the General Assembly only 9 months 
,go.^ In light of this state of affairs and the un- 
fortunate lack of improvement in the interna- 
iional situation since the meeting of the Committee 
I year ago, we do not think that the Committee 
should now set a time and place for a charter re- 
iew conference. 

I wish to make it clear that the United States 
continues, as it has in the past, to support the con- 
'ening of a review conference whenever a sub- 
tantial majority of the members of this organiza- 
ion believe that the time is propitious. However, 
Ihe prospects are not favorable. In these circum- 
'^tances we would support a recommendation by the 
Committee to the General Assembly that the time 
)f the next meeting of this Committee be fixed by 
he President of the General Assembly in consul- 
;ation with the Secretary-General. Or, if the 
najority of this Conamittee feels that it should 
neet again at a specified time, we would of course 
38 glad to support such a decision. 

There are certain amendments to the charter 
ivhich in our opinion are advisable and which 
leed not await the holding of the general review 
conference. Thus, the United States has vigor- 
ously supported and does vigorously support an 
mlargement of the Security Council and the Eco- 
lomic and Social Council to take into account the 
expansion in the membership of the United Na- 
tions. We entirely agree with the distinguished 
representative of Ghana that differences of opin- 
ion as to the representation of China should not 
prevent consideration of amendments to that ef- 
fect. Furthermore, amendments to tliat effect 
need not await the general review conference, and 
;he United States would welcome amendments to 
ihat effect and would be prepared to consider other 
desirable amendments to the charter, all without 

reference to a general review conference. It 
seems to us that there is a clear distinction be- 
tween, on the one hand, a general review confer- 
ence, which under present conditions does not 
seem practicable, and, on the other hand, the pro- 
posal of specified amendments of the charter I 
have referred to, which, as I have said, the United 
States would warmly welcome and vigorously 

In the meantime the United States will continue 
to support all efforts to develop the existing mech- 
anisms and procedures of the United Nations and 
to encourage the growth of new instrumentalities 
within the framework of the present charter.^ 

U.S. Favors Conciliation, Persuasion 
in^South-West Africa Question 

Statement &y Jonathan B. Binglutm 

U.S. Representative in the Trusteeship Council^ 

Unlike the other problems which have been con- 
sidered by this Committee, most of which had 
never before been discussed in detail in any United 
Nations body, the problem of South-West Africa 
has been discussed at great length in various 
bodies of the United Nations since the founding 
of this organization. For this reason, and in order 
to save the time of this Committee, I do not jiro- 
pose now to restate in any detail the views of my 
delegation on the problem of South-West Africa 
in general. I would simply like to refer briefly to 
a speech I made in the Fourth Committee of the 
General Assembly on March 13, 1961.= At that 
time I stated that "the policy of apartheid is re- 
pugnant to us in the United States of America" 
and went on to say, "It is particularly deplorable 
that such a policy should be exercised in an area 
such as the Territory of South-West Africa, where 
the administering authority has international ob- 
ligations, even though it refuses to recognize those 

' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 15, 1002, p. lOS. 
October 8, 7962 

' On Sept. 5 the Committee agreed to submit to the 
17th session of the U.N. General Assembly a report includ- 
ing a draft resolution inviting the Committee to meet 
not later than July 196.3 and to report, with recommen- 
dations, to the ISth General Assembly. 

^Made on Sept. 6 (U.S./U.N. press release 4034) in the 
Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the 
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 

^ Bulletin of Apr. 17, 1961, p. 569. 


It is clear from the recent report of the Special 
Committee on South-West Africa, and from other 
sources, that the apiilication of apartheid has not 
in any way been alleviated in South-West Africa 
and that if anything it has been intensified. The 
views of my delegation on that subject remain the 
same as they were in March of 1961. We remain, 
as we were then, deeply distressed at the failure of 
the Government of South Africa to recognize its 
international obligations with regard to the Terri- 
tory of South- West Africa and to indicate that it 
intends to move in the direction of recognizing the 
right of the people of South- West Africa to deter- 
mine their own political future. 

The question before us at this time is, what can 
the United Nations — or more precisely what can 
this Committee — do to help the people of South- 
West Africa realize their aspirations? 

In considering this question it would seem 
natural to consider first of all wliether we have at 
hand any promising avenues of possible activity. 

In this connection I would like to refer first of 
all to the proceeding brought in the International 
Court of Justice against the Government of South 
Africa by the states of Ethiopia and Liberia. 
Wlien that action was initiated, it was welcomed 
as a most constructive endeavor by the great ma- 
jority of the member states of the United Nations. 
We still regard it as such, although many dele- 
gations seem to have lost interest in it, perhaps 
because judicial processes take some time. In our 
view no action should be taken by this Committee 
or by the General Assembly which might jeop- 
ardize the basis for the proceeding or otherwise 
adversely affect its usefulness. Thus we em- 
phatically agree with the statement made the 
other day by the distinguished representative of 
Ethiopia [Tesfaye Gebre-Egzy] that any move 
now toward cancellation of the mandate should 
be given the most careful consideration and study. 

There is also an avenue of approach to the 
Government of South Africa consisting of com- 
munication and the opportunity for persuasion. 
!My delegation found it encouraging that the Gov- 
ernment of South Africa should have invited the 
chairman [Victorio D. Carpio] and vice chair- 
man [.'^alvador INfartinez de Alva] of the Com- 
mittee on South-West Africa to make a visit to 
South-West Africa, even though on a limited 
basis. That invitation was the first gesture which 
the Government of South Africa had made in a 
long time toward recognizing, at least in a de 






facto way, the legitimate interest of the United ion't 
Nations in the affairs of South-West AfricaJffitfsi 
Wliile one cannot say that the Government oJ 
South Africa has been much influenced over the 
years by the opinion of the great majority of thti 
member states of the United Nations with respecv 
to its administration of South-West Africa, allleeu^f 
least the invitation issued to the chainnan anoreslo 
vice chairman of the Committee on South-Wesi ipera' 
Africa suggested that the Government of South if 
Africa does have an interest in that opinion 
Otherwise it would not have made this effort 
through a personal visit by two United Nationii lecki 
officials — to clear up what it considered to be cer 
tain misconceptions about the situation in thi 

At this point I would like to refer to the presi 
release issued on May 26, 1962, by the Office o: 
Public Information, press release GA/2501. T 
contains the text of what is now sometimes re 
ferred to as the "alleged joint communique.' 
"\\niile many things about this statement ari< lation 
unclear, there is one fact which is clear and wliicli Itf 
seems to be frequently overlooked. This is thaplif 
the distinguished vice chairman of the Commit 
tee. Ambassador Martinez de Alva of Mexico, con 
tinues to affirm that the communique was issuec 
with his approval and that it represents his views 
To that extent, while we quite understand tha' 
the commimique was not authorized by the Com 
mittee on South-West Africa as such, we believi- 
that the document, as a statement of the conclu 
sions reached at least as between the vice chair 
man of the Committee and the Government ol* 
South Africa, following the visit to the territory 
is a document wliich we cannot ignore and which 
is indeed of considerable interest. 

My particular reason for raising this controver- 
sial question at this time is to call attention tc 
the very last sentence of the so-called joint com- 
munique. This sentence read as follows : "Otheij ' ' 
matters were raised and after discussion were 
noted for further consideration." From this sen- 
tence we may conclude that the Government ofijseiii 


South Afi-ica is prepared to carry forward 
the kind of political contact, communication^ 
and dialog witli representatives of the TTnited J" 
Nations that was inaugurated by its invitation tc 
the chairman and vice chairman to visit the^ji 
territory and by their acceptance of that invita- 

In a situation such as we are confronted with w 

Department oi State Bulletin 













i >outh-West Africa, in which the clearly expressed 
"it lews of the great majority of member states of 
he United Nations have for so long been dis- 
II egarded by the Government of South Africa and 
tl n which the efforts of the United Nations to 
P8 ,chieve any improvement of the situation have 
leen so consistently frustrated, it seems to us that 
an re should seize upon any indication of a more co- 
l's >perative and forthcoming attitude on the part 
f the Government of South Africa and attempt 
o go on from there. Certainly it would not be 
vise, in our view, for the United Nations to cut 
he channel of communication and contact which 
las been established. Rather, a more fruitful 
ipproach would be to expand this contact. 
Certainly it does not seem to us beyond the 
ealm of possibility that, properly handled, the 
nitiatives begun this spring could result in the 
stablislnnent of the type of United Nations 
presence in the mandated territory such as is 
ecommended in the conclusions and recommen- 
lations of the Committee on South- West Africa. 
It follows from these considerations that we do 
lot believe the time has come when the efforts to 
mprove the situation through communication and 
persuasion should be abandoned in favor of co- 
rcive alternatives of dubious effectiveness. 

J.S. States Position on OAS 
Consideration of Coups d'Etat 

Statement hy deLesseps S. Morrison ^ 

Very briefly I want to make a few observations 
m the revised text of the resohition presented by 
ny delegation.^ 

' Made before a meeting of the Council of the Orga- 
lization of American States on Aug. 22 (press release 
•15). Ambassador Morrison Is U.S. Representative on 
;he OAS Council. 

The U.S. draft resolution contemplated the desirability 
^Bfjf holding a meeting of foreign ministers to consider the 
eneral problem of regimes arising from coups d'etat. It 
left the convocation date and site of the meeting to be 
iecided subsequently by the governments in the light of 
general trends in the hemisphere which aiSect the effec- 
ive exercise of representative democracy. The U.S. pro- 
posal asked governments to give priority attention to the 
general problem of coups d'etat and requested the COAS 
committee studying the problem to revise and complement 
its studies in preparation for a meeting of foreign min- 
isters or the 11th Inter-American Conference, whichever 
met first. 

ifii October 8, J 962 


Concerning the legal effect of the proposed U.S. 
resolution, as my delegation indicated in the meet- 
ing of the General Committee, article 39 of the 
charter sets forth two criteria for the actual con- 
vocation of a meeting : one that the matter be of 
"common interest," and the other that it be "ur- 
gent." Paragraph 1 of our proposed resolution 
is intended to make clear that the criterion of 
"common interest" is fully satisfied. At the same 
time paragraph 2 indicates that in our view the 
criterion of "urgency" is not yet fully met and 
that therefore in accordance with the charter the 
convocation of a meeting is left to the later deci- 
sion of the governments in the light of develop- 
ments which might make the matter of sufficient 
urgency. Thus the proposed resolution falls 
squarely within the letter and spirit of article 39. 

Concerning the purpose and scope of the resolu- 
tion, I want to repeat that it is not directed at any 
specific situation. It is an expression of concern 
over a general problem which necessarily affects 
all our countries in our pursuit of common objec- 
tives through cooperative programs. The resolu- 
tion, I believe, reflects a full recognition of the fact 
that the problem is complex and delicate and, 
therefore, we should not rush into it unprepared. 
At the same time it reflects another, equally im- 
portant fact: that in this hemisphere we have 
developed a community of mutual interests which 
gives our regional grouping a unique character. 
This community of interests has two facets. One 
is our interdependence as member states of the 
inter-American system. This interdependence 
has its roots in geography and history and today 
covers a broad range of activities in the political, 
economic, social, and cultural fields. The other is 
the interdependence of the objectives which we 
pursue. For example, we know that we cannot 
forge ahead in strengthening the practice of rep- 
resentative democracy without corresponding 
progress in economic development and social jus- 
tice and vice versa. The range of our common 
interests is never static, but constantly increasing, 
developing, and drawing us into closer inter- 

This process of interdependence has come into 
sharp focus during the past year as we grapple 
with problems of economic and social development 
under the Alliance for Progress. I am sure we all 
recognize that as we work together to solve these 
problems, we will also be creating more propitious 
conditions for a more effective exercise in repre- 


sentative democracy. The strengthening of de- 
mocracy in turn will improve the climate for the 
material progress we seek. What would be dis- 
turbing to all of us would be a retrogression in 
tlie practice of democracy at a time when the 
hemisphere is making real advances on the eco- 
nomic front. This is a matter which necessarily 
concerns us all. And this concern is reflected in 
the resolution. 

I know that several governments are preoccu- 
pied that the principle of nonintervention might 
somehow be compromised and weakened through 
this resolution. My Government sees no danger 
of this. It is as legitimate to be concerned about 
the practice of democracy in our hemisphere as it 
is about the levels of public education, health, in- 
dustrialization, and trade. Many experts have 
contended that politics and economics are inter- 
woven and cannot as a practical m.atter be sepa- 
rated. Both are concerned with the business of 
the people, and we believe that we should not apply 
a double standard. If our governments can 
gather around a conference table to discuss how 
to improve economic and social conditions, there is 
every reason why they should also be able to meet 
at the proper time and under the right circum- 
stances to consider the condition of the democratic 
process in the hemisphere and means to improve it. 
To argue that this constitutes unwarranted in- 
tervention in internal affairs proscribed by inter- 
American treaties seems to my Government both to 
mistake the proper meaning of the term "interven- 
tion" and to misread the precedents which the 
OAS itself has created. The general subject of 
nondemocratic governments has been many times 
discussed at meetings of foreign ministers and 
inter- American conferences, and many resolutions 
have been passed. It was discussed in Bogota in 
1948. One of the two topics on the agenda of the 
Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959 (the 
other being tension in the Caribbean area) reads 
in part as follows : 

Effective exorcise of representative democracy and re- 
spect for human rights, including: ... b. Procedures 
that will make it possible to measure compliance with two 
fundamental principles of American international law: 
the effective exercise of representative democracy and 
respect for h\iman rights ; and measures that should be 
taken in cases of noncompliance with those principles. 

At that meeting the powers of the lAPC [Inter- 
American Peace Committee] were extended by 
Resolution IV to include a study of this topic, and 


paragraph 2 of that resolution specifically stat 

In the performance of its duties the Committee [lAPClj 
may, at the request of governments or on its own iniasijl 
tive, take action in regard to the subject matter referre 
to in paragraph 1 [the subject matter I just quoted], it 
action in either case being subject to the express consen 
of the States to investigations that are to be made in thei 
respective territories. 

Item 7 of the agenda of the 11th Inter-Americai 
Conference, yet to be held, is worded as followsj 
"Representative Democracy: Principles am 
Powers; Machinery, Measures, and Procedui 
for its Effective Exercise and for the Isolation o 
Dictatorial Regimes, without Violating the Prin 
ciple of Nonintervention." 

My Government finds it difficult to be persuader 
that it was proper to discuss these principles an 

tte Or| 




previous meetings and it is appropriate to discuL 

„ . »• J OtUDt SI 

them at the future inter-American conterence(|_ 
but that it is inappropriate to consider the possi 
bility of discussing them at another meeting o« 
foreign ministers 

In such an eventual meeting of foreign minis* 

m\ to! 



ters, which the U.S. resolution envisages as pos 
sible, there need be no question of accused or ac ^ ^ 
cuser, any more than there was several weeks ag( '""^'' 
in this Council when, at the request of Costa Rica '" 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru 
this very Council discussed a specific piece of U.S 
legislation. Moreover, the debate and study o? 
U.S. sugar legislation was held even before oui 
internal legislative process had been completed 
It was held at the very time that the matter was- 
under consideration by the U.S. Congress. In^ 
deed the proposal presented by the five countries 
would not have had its desired effect at any othei 
time. With the exception of one delegation, nc 
arguments were then raised about intervention 
My delegation cooperated in the debate and action 
this Council unanimously took at that time, recog- 
nizing that our relations are interdependent and 
that there is a need to cooperate in matters of 
mutual interest if we are to strengthen our own 
countries and thereby our hemispheric system. 
Can it be persuasively argued that the principle; 
of nonintervention permits the discussion of a( 
specific piece of legislation during the time it isi 
in the orderly constitutional process of considera- 
tion by a domestic legislature but that the same 
principle forbids the possibility of discussing the* 
general problem of forcible and unconstitutional 
seizure of power in our countries, whicli are all 



My ar 







ters of 

last w( 







Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin 


)mmitted by treaties to the practice of 



The proposed resolution which we are present- 
.g is thus squarely within the spirit and letter of 
le inter-American system and of precedent. It 

a step, if only a modest one, on the road to 
olitical cooperation. In this context paragraph 
of the proposed resolution, the most misunder- 
ood and the most innocuous, finds its place, 
his paragraph seeks to add nothing to the au- 
lority of existing organs and proposes no action 
the Organization. It merely calls attention 
) existing facilities which have already been used 
y several countries and which may prove of util- 
y in other cases, provided the governments on 
leir own volition desire to make use of them. 

The entire resolution, then, is a modest but im- 
ortant signpost on the road of mutual coopera- 
lon in matters of common interest, the pursuance 
the democratic process — a road we must all 
ravel together if we are to reach our common 

In the view of my Government, aside from the 
^ave peril of Communist subversion the great 
anger facing the countries of America today is 
ot a threat to our independence through inter- 
ention but our possible failure to realize and act 
ully and jointly upon the challenging truth of 
>ur zTi^erdependence. It is in this spirit that my 
jovemment presents the revised draft. 

In concluding this explanation of the draft res- 
>lution, Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like 
make a procedural suggestion. "We are most 

;!1, 5 

i^;, fateful to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the mem- 
)ers of the Council for the opportunity afforded 
ast week to hold informal consultations on the 
J.S. proposal in the General Committee. The 
.houghtful and constructive observations made by 
leveral delegations are reflected in the present text, 
rom recent conversations with several delega- 
ions, it appears that a continuation of this infor- 
nal exchange of views would be an added 
lontribution to our mutual understanding and 
would no doubt result in further improvements in 

ip'^ ;he text. Moreover, certain delegations have in- 
iicated a desire for additional time to obtain 
exact instructions. 
My delegation proposes, therefore, that instead 

;ffi of voting or engaging in extensive formal debate 

:t3 on the proposal in this Council, the chairman 
convoke a further meeting of the General Com- 
mittee to deal with the matter. 


Foreign IVIinisters of American 
Republics To Meet Informally 

Department /Statement 

Press release 566 dated September 18 

The Foreign Ministers of the American Re- 
publics have been generally receptive to the 
suggestion which Secretary Rusk made on 
September 5, through the Latin American ambas- 
sadors in Washington, that they hold an informal 
meeting to exchange views on subjects of mutual 

On the basis of the Secretary's consultations 
with his colleagues, and taking into account the 
wishes and convenience of tlie largest number, the 
Secretary has issued invitations to them to meet 
informally in Washington on October 2 and 3. 
The Secretary hopes that the dates chosen will 
make it possible for most of his colleagues to come. 
In addition to the Foreign Ministers, the Secretary 
General of the OAS [Organization of American 
States] has been invited to attend. 

The meeting will be informal. It will provide 
the opportunity to exchange views. The sessions 
will be closed. There will be no formal agenda, 
voting, official minutes, or resolutions. We expect 
that the situation in Cuba and other subjects of 
mutual interest will be discussed. 


Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done 
at Vienna October 4, 1961. ' 
Acceptances deposited: Austria, September 17, 1962; 

Rumania, September 18, 1962; Viet-Nam, September 

19, 1962. 


Convention for unification of certain rules relating to 
international transportation by air and additional pro- 
tocol. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into 
force February 13, 1933. 49 Stat. 3000. 

' Not in force. 

October 8, 7962 


Adherenccs deposited: Guinea, September 28, 19C1 ; 
People's Democratic Republic of Korea, March 1, 
1961 ; ' Mali, January 26, 1961 ; Upper Volta, Decem- 
ber 9, 1961. 
'Notifications received that they consider themselves 
hound: Cameroon, August 21, 1961; Dahomey, Jan- 
uary 9, 1962. 
Protocol to amend the convention for uniflcatlon of cer- 
tain rules relating to international carriage by air 
signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000). 
Done at The Hague September 28, 1955.' 
Ratification deposited: Pakistan, January 16, 1961. 
Notifications received that they consider themselves 
hound: Cameroon, August 21, 1961; Dahomey, Jan- 
uary 9, 1962. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961.' 
Accession deposited: Sierra Leone, August 13, 1962. 


Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corpo- 
ration, as amended. Done at Washington May 25, 
1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620 and 
Signatures and acceptances: Saudi Arabia, September 

19, 1962 ; Sierra Leone and Tanganyika, September 

10, 1962 ; Togo, September 4, 1962. 


International load line convention. Signed at London 
July 5, 1930. Entered into force January 1, 1933. 47 
Stat. 2228. 

Notifications received that they consider themselves 
hound: Cameroon, Congo Republic (Brazzaville), 
Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mauri- 
tania, Niger, September 17, 1962. 


Congo (Leopoldville> 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree- 
ment of November 18, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4925 
and 5069). Effected by exchange of notes at L(5opold- 
ville May 23 and June 8, 1962. Entered into force 
June S, 1962. 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree- 
ment of November 18, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4925 
and 5069). Effected by exchange of notes at L^opold- 
ville July 27, 1962. Entered into force July 27, 1962. 

Costa Rica 

General agreement for economic, technical, and related 
assistance. Signed at San Jos6 December 22, 1961. 
Entered into force: September 7, 1962. 


Agreement relating to the furnishing of defense articles 
and services to Guatemala for the purpose of contribut- 
ing to its internal security. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Guatemala May 25 and August 2, 1962. Entered 
into force August 2, 1962. 

' Not in force. 

' The Government of the United States does not recog- 
nize the so-called People's Democratic Republic of Korea 
as a state, and, therefore, it regards the adherence to the 
convention by the so-called People's Democratic Republic 
of Korea as being without legal effect and attaches no 
significance thereto. 



Agreement concerning cooperation in a scientific experi- 
ment for the purjJose of launching a scientific satellitai^dHirt 
into an equatorial orbit. Effected by exchange of notes Ljjiv 
at Rome September 5, 1962. Entered into force Sep 
tember 5, 1962. 

f ■ .1 



Treaty of friendship, establishment, and navigation! 
Signed at Luxembourg February 23, 1962.' 
Ratification advised hy the Senate: September 19, 1962i 


Agreement for the transfer to the Philippines of all right |^, 
title, and interest which the United States may havj 
in and to the former U.S.S. Canopus. Effected by ex<l 
change of notes at Manila May 29 and August 21, 19621 iparlmei 
Entered into force August 21, 1962. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps 
program. Effected by exchange of notes at Lomf 
August 1 and September 5, 1962. Entered into force 
September 5, 1962. 






to Assis 



The Senate on September 10 confirmed Francis H. 
Russell to be Ambassador to the Republic of Tunisia. 
(For biographic details, see Department of State press 
release 554 dated September 14.) 

The Senate on September 11 confirmed Abba P. 
Schwartz to be Administrator, Bureau of Security and 
Consular Affairs, Department of State. (For biographic 
detaUs, see White House press release dated August 29.) 


oreisn i 


r:!'!«n I 
'ar an 


r.5. S 

srael. ' 

tioa (; 




of Ry 

tade a' 

Robert C. Creel as Director of the Office of Germatt 
Affairs, effective August 5. 

Martin J. Hillenbrand as Special Assistant to thekjjiiijj 
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs and as Head JF( 
of the Interdepartmental Berlin Task Force, effective 
September 16. (For biographic details, see Department F*wts 
of State press release 469 dated July 21.) ^^"^ 





Frank A. Sieverts as Special Assistant to the Assistant 
Secretary for Public Affairs, effective September 12. ( For 
biographic details, see Department of State press releasefcmi , 
564 dated September 18.) 

John M. Tinker as science attach^ at Karachi, Pakistan, 
effective September 17. (For biographic details, see De-lr[„|. 
partment of State press release 568 dated September 19.) 

Robert T. Webber as science attach^ at Tel Aviv, Israel, 
effective Sejrtember 17. (For biographic details, see De- 
partment of State press release 569 dated September 19.; 

Department of State Bulletin 









ctober 8, 1962 

,,(^riculture. U.S. Pledges Resources and Coopera- 
tion in World Food Program (Freeman) . 

merican Republics 

Dreign Ministers of American Republics To Meet 


.S. States Position on OAS Consideration of Coups 
d'Etat (Morrison, text of resolution) 


ingressional Documents Relating to Foreign 


resident Kennedy and Secretary Rusk Urge Resto- 
ration of Foreign Aid Funds (Kennedy, Rusk) . 

epartment and Foreign Service 

ppointments (Sie verts. Tinker, Webber) . . . . 

onfirmations (Russell, Schwartz) 

esiguations (Creel, Hillenbrand) 

conomic Affairs. Trade and Foreign Aid (Ken- 

urope. Hillenbrand designated Special Assistant 
to Assistant Secretary for European Affairs . . 

oreign Aid 

resident Kennedy and Secretary Rusk Urge Resto- 
ration of Foreign Aid Funds (Kennedy, Rusk) . 
rade and Foreign Aid (Kennedy) 


reel designated Director, Office of German Affairs . 
illenbrand designated Head of Interdepartmental 
Berlin Task Force 




nternational Organizations and Conferences. 

U.S. States Position on OAS Consideration of 
Coups d'Etat (Morrison, text of resolution) . . 

srael. Webber appointed science attach^ .... 

ron-Self-Governing Territories. U.S. Favors Con- 
ciliation, Persuasion in South-West Africa Ques- 
tion (Bingham) 

akistan. Tinker appointed science attach^ . . . 

residential Documents 

'resident Kennedy and Secretary Rusk Urge Resto- 
ration of Foreign Aid Funds 

resident Kennedy Holds Talks With President 
of Rwanda 

"rade and Foreign Aid 

''fublic Aflfairs 

oreign Policy Conference To Be Held for Editors 

and Broadcasters 

lieverts appointed special assistant to Assistant 

Iwanda. President Kennedy Holds Talks With 
President of Rwanda (text of joint communique) . 


^inker appointed science attach^, Karachi .... 
f I V^ebber appointed science attach^, Tel Aviv . . . 

south Africa, Republic of. U.S. Favors Conciliation. 
Persuasion in South- West Africa Question (Bing- 

De Treaty Information. Current Actions 

'*' Tunisia. Russell confirmed as Ambassador . . . 
*' Jnited Nations 

Continuation of Charter Review Committee Rec- 
ommended to G.A. (Plimpton) 

The Tasks of the General Assembly : Peaceful Set- 
tlement, Nonviolent Change, and a War Against 
Want (Stevenson) 





















e X 

Vol. XLVII, No. 1215 

U.S. Favors Conciliation, Persuasion in South-West 

Africa Question (Bingham) 537 

U.S. Pledges Resources and Cooperation in World 

Food Program (Freeman) 534 

Viet-Nam. A Report on South Viet-Nam (Hils- 

man) 526 

Name Index 

Bingham, Jonathan B 537 

Creel, Robert C 542 

Freeman, Orville L 534 

Hillenbrand, Martin J 542 

Hilsman, Roger 526 

Kayibanda, Gregoire 533 

Kennedy, President 518, 525, 533 

Morrison, deLesseps S 539 

Plimpton, Francis T. P 536 

Rusk, Secretary 518 

Russell, Francis H 542 

Schwartz, Abba P 542 

Sieverts, Frank A 542 

Stevenson, Adlai E 511 

Tinker, John M 542 

Webber, Robert T 542 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 17-23 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of 
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. 

Releases issued prior to September 17 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 515 of 
August 22 and 558 of September 15. 


U.S. participation in international con- 

Ball : 17th annual meeting of IBRD. 

Sieverts appointed Special Assistant 
to Assistant Secretary for Public 
Affairs (biographic details). 

Itinerary for visit of President of 

Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Amer- 
ican Republics. 

Delegation to lA-ECOSOC (rewrite). 

Tinker sworn in as science attach^ at 
Karachi (biographic details). 

Webber sworn in as science attach^ 
at Tel Aviv (biographic details). 

Delegation to IAEA. 

Rusk : foreign aid bill. 

Delegation to ICAO Pacific Regional 
Air Navigation Meeting (rewrite). 

Itinerary for visit of President of 

Foreign policy conference for editors 
and broadcasters. 

Rusk : foreign aid bill. 

Schaetzel : "The European Common 
Market and the Trade Expansion 

Transcript of briefing : "Five Goals of 
U.S. Foreign Policy." 

♦Not printed. 

fHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 































united sjtates 
Government Printing Office 


Washington 25, D.C. 






This revised folder, released August 1962, briefly describes the U.S. position 
on the United Nations, the six principal organs of the UN, and some of the 
activities and accomplishments. A list of the member nations as of June 30, 1962, 
is included. 
Publication 7407 10 cents 




U.S. Trade Policy in Brief 

Among the questions answered in this 40-page illustrated booklet are the 
following : 

How important is foreign trade to the United States? 
How important is the United States to foreign trade? 

How do the Communists use foreign trade to expand world communism? 
Why is expanding foreign trade essential today? 

What special trade challenge does Western Europe pose for the United 
States today? 
Publication 7402 25 cents 


The U.S. balance of payments is the financial record of transactions which take 
place between the United States and the rest of the world during a particular 
period of time. 

This recently released 19-page pamphlet explains the current U.S. balance-of- 
payments situation and the measures proposed to eliminate the remaining 
"basic" deficit. 
Publication 7392 15 cents 

Order Form 

To: Supt. of Documents 
Govt. Printing Office 
Washingten 25, D.C. 

Please send me copies of: 





Enclosed find: 

Street Address: -_ 


City, Zone, and State: __ _ __ _ 

{cagh, check, or money 
order payable to 
Supt, of Docs.) 






Vol. XLYII, No. 1216 

October 15, 1962 


Briefing by Secretary Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, 
Under Secretary Ball, AID Administrator Hamilton, Ambas- 
sador Stevenson, and Department Counselor Rostow .... 


ING WORLD • Remarks by President Kennedy and 
Statement by Under Secretary Ball 57'} 

by Assistant Secretary Johnson 567 

For index see inside back cover 


Vol. XLVII, No. 1216 • Publication 7435 
October 15, 1962 

For sale by the Supeiintondent of Documents 

U.S. GovernmeDt Printing Office 

Washington 2B, D.C. 


62 Issues, domestic $8.60, foreign $12.26 

Single copy, 25 cents 

Use of fvmds tor printing of this publica- 
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau 
of the Budget (January 19, 1061). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
Of State Bulleti.n as the source will be 
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indesecl In the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
ri loeekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
and interested agencies of the 
Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the uork of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by the White House and the 
Department, and sUitements and ad- 
dresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Departnu-nt, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and legis- 
lative material in tlte field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 

Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy 

FoUoxoing is the transcrij^t^ of the television 
nrogram '■'■State Department Briefing: Five Goals 
if U.S. Foreign Policy,'''' produced by National 
Educational Television in cooperation tvith the 
department of State for broadcast by the 60 af- 
iliated stations of the NET network on Septem- 
ber £4- 

Participants in the program were Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State; Robert S. McNamara, Secre- 
ary of Defense,' George W. Ball, Under Secre- 
ary of State; Fowler Hamilton, Administrator, 
igency for International Development; Adlai E. 
Uevenson, U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations; W. W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman 
f the Policy Planning Council, Department of 
Hate; and Merriman Smith, White House corre- 
pondent for United Press International {mod- 
rator) . 

Mr. Smith: I am Merriman Smith of United 

ress International. I've been covering the Wash- 

igton scene for quite a few years. Right now you 

re with me on the eighth-floor terrace of the State 

< )epartment. In a moment we will step inside and 

■ leet the men who plan and carry out our foreign 

■ olicy. 

1 Foreign policy- — that's no bloodless phrase for 
» len in striped pants gadding about the world 
" ith pigskin dispatch cases. Foreign policy — our 
i jnerican foreign policy — is a set of ideas and 
:• rinciples by which we live in the world com- 
unity, a community which includes some pretty 
•«' |ingerous members as well as many law-abiding 

With today's instant communications, we 
mericans have become more than ever aware of 
le rest of the world. But these communications 
n lead to a rather narrow view of events at 

' Press release T/IS dated Sept. 21, as revised ; also avail- 
ile as Department of State publication 7432, which may 
purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, 
S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. 
irice 20 cents). 

times. We tend to see only the crisis of the 
moment — the latest tragedy, for instance, at the 
Berlin wall; a guerrilla ambush in Viet-Nam. 
At times we lose sight of the deeper currents of 
the history we are making. 

To survive, to make progress in this era of rapid 
change, we as a people need to see beyond the 
morning headlines. We need to keep our eyes fixed 
firmly on the lasting interests of our nation. 

To help you and me understand more clearly 
our country's aims in the world today, we now are 
going to sit in on a unique meeting, a special 
State Department briefing on the five basic goals 
of United States foreign policy. We'll meet the 
highest officials of the State Department, the Sec- 
retary of Defense, and our Representative to the 
United Nations — men upon whom our personal 
and national security, in gi-eat measure, depends. 

How do you do, Mr. Secretary ? 

Secretary Rusk: Mr. Smith, very glad to have 
you with us today. Mr. Smith, let me introduce 
you to the Secretary of Defense, Robert Mc- 
Namara; our Under Secretary of State, George 
Ball ; Fowler Hamilton, who is the Administrator 
of our AID program ; Walt Rostow, the Counselor 
of the Department, who is in charge of our policy 
planning; and then Adlai Stevenson, our Repre- 
sentative to the United Nations. 

Mr. Smith : Mr. Secretary, in such distinguished 
and authoritative company, let's get right down to 
a discussion of basic United States foreign policy. 

Secretary Rusk: We shall do our best. We 
have a simple but transcendent goal. It is, in 
President Kennedy's words, "a peaceful world 
community of fi'ee and indei^endent states, free to 
choose their own future and tlieir own system so 
long as it does not threaten the freedom of 
others." ^ 

Unhappily, there are forces in the world which 
are opposed to that goal, forces detei'mined to im- 
pose their system on all the peoples of the earth. 

= Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962 ,p. 159. 

bfofaer ?5, 7962 


The rulers of the leadino: Communist states are 
not only Marxists who believe their system is best 
and shall prevail over all others, but they are 
Leninists intent upon expediting that alleged 
historical inevitability by every practicable means. 
They speak, for example, of peaceful coexistence, 
but by their own definition peaceful coexistence 
is a program of conflict, a design for extending 
Communist domination by all methods shoit of the 
great war which would be self-defeating. 

Their design does not exclude the use of force. 
Indeed, they expressly approve what they call 
"wars of national liberation" — a characteristically 
Comnumist upside-down label for the sort of ag- 
gression, for example, that they are now inflicting 
on South Viet-Nam. 

Our goal, the goal of all free men, is incom- 
patible with that Communist goal. This contest 
between two incompatible systems and concepts 
will continue until freedom triumphs. Our ob- 
jective is a worldwide victory not of one people 
or one nation over another but a worldwide victoiy 
for all mankind, for freedom and a decent world 

The struggle between coercion and freedom is 
taking place in a world of revolutionary change. 
The times are dangerous. A Secretary of State 
must always be prepared for more trouble. But 
on balance the free world is gaining strength rela- 
tive to the Communist world : 

• The Communists are failing in the competi- 
tion in production. Compare East Germany with 
West Germany, or Eastern Europe with Western 
Europe. The Berlin wall is itself a symbol of 
Conununist failure. Successful systems do not 
have to build walls against their own peoples. 

• In Communist China the vaunted "shortcut 
to the fiiture" has proved to be the shortcut to 
misery. Compare the conditions in mainland 
China with those in Taiwan or Malaya or India — 
not to mention Japan. 

• No new nation has adopted communism — in- 
deed, no nation has ever adopted it by "consent of 
the governed," tested in free elections. 

• Most of the new nations have rallied to the 
support of the United Nations in the face of Soviet 

• Disruptive and erosive forces are at work 
within tlie Sino-Soviet bloc: differences over ide- 
ology, practice, and leadership; the unquenchable 
spirit of nationalism; yearnings for more indi- 


vidual freedom, evident not only in the Soviet 

satellites but in many small ways within the Soviet 

Union itself. 

We are making progress. But the road ahead 
will be long and hard. 

Our policy may be said to have five principal 
components : 

1. To deter or defeat aggression at any level, 
whether of nuclear attack or limited war or sub- 
version and guerrilla tactics; that is, "Security 
Through Strength." 

2. To bring about a closer association of the 
more industrialized democracies of Western 
Europe, North America, and Asia — specifically 
Japan — in promoting the prosperity and security 
of the entire free world ; in other words, "Progress 
Through Partnership." 

3. To help the less developed areas of the worldl tofc 
carry through their revolution of modernization 
without sacrificing their independence or their 
pursuit of democracy; that is, a "Revolution oJ 

4. To assist in the gradual emergence of a gen- 
uine world community, based on cooperation andl tegi' 
law, through the establishment and developmeni bf 
of such organs as the United Nations, the Worla Hiii 
Court, the World Bank and Monetary Fund, anci Med 
other global and regional institutions; that is, f h 
world "Community Under Law." in tl 

5. To strive tirelessly to end the arms race anrt miiiii 
reduce the risk of war, to narrow the areas o: bl) 
conflict with the Communist bloc, and to continui prise 
to spin the infinity of threads that bind peaoi mtioi 
together; that is, to win "Peace Through Per 

Security Through Strength 

31 r. Smith: Mr. Secretary, let's take these goal 
one at a time. First, I think it would be interest- 
ing to discuss "Security Through Strength." 

Secretary Rusk: I think the best person to disi 
cuss that would be our Secretary of Defenst 
Robert McNamara. 

Secretary McNamara: As Secretary Rusk hi 
indicated, our job in the Defense Department i 
to maintain the strength we need either to dete 
or to defeat aggression at whatever level it occu; 

To this end we have added substantially to tb 
forces programed in the Department when we too 
office. We have taken specific measures t 

liepax\men\ of Stale Bulleli> 






strengthen both onr nuclear and also our nonnu- 
clt'ar forces. For these purposes approximately 
SC) billion was added to the $44-billion defense 
liudoet originally planned for fiscal year 1962, and 
about $8 billion above the original '62 levels has 
been appropriated for the current fiscal year 1963. 
Of these two increments — $6 billion in '62 and $8 
billion in fiscal year '63 — we have sj^ent about a 
billion and a half dollars in each year to add to 
the strength of our strategic nuclear forces, and 
for these expenditures we have increased the forces 
in the following ways : 

First, there has been a 50-percent increase in the 
Polaris submarine program. Originally, 19 Po- 
laris submarines were planned to be deployed at 
the end of 1964. That number is now programed 
at 29, as I say, an increase of over 50 percent. In 
addition, about 12 additional submarines, for a 
total of 41, are planned to be operational in the 
year shortly thereafter. 

Secondly, there has been a very significant in- 
crease in the number of Minuteman missiles, the 
hardened and dispersed intercontinental ballistic 
missiles which will be the foundation of our stra- 
tegic nuclear forces. And in that connection we 
have doubled the production capacity for the 
M[inuteman missile in the event that our forces 
leed to be further increased in the future. 

And thirdly, there has been a 50-percent increase 
in the number of our strategic bombers on 15- 
minute ground alert, the number of B-52 and B-58 
X)mbers which we expect will survive any sur- 
3rise attack, potential surprise attack — on this 

As I stated earlier, the budget increases have 
jermitted not only an increase in our nuclear 
forces but also very substantial increases in our 
conventional or tactical forces as well. 

These include such actions, for example, as a 50- 
jercent increase in the number of combat-ready 
Irmy divisions. A year ago July there were 11 
;ombat-ready Army divisions; today there are 16. 
Secondly, a 50-percent increase in the rate of 
jrocurement of munitions and ammunition for our 
\.rmed Forces — ground, sea, and air. 

Thirdly, a very substantial increase in the size 
i our airlift and sealift — this to increase the 
nobility of our forces and the flexibility of our 
jct' ■espouse. 

Fourthly, as you know, we are reorganizing the 
fell ^rmy Reserve and Army National Guard — this to 
rfi acrease their combat readiness, complementing the 

)cfofaer 15, J 962 




action we have taken to strengthen our active 

And finality, to deal more adequately with the 
so-called "war of liberation," the threat of overt 
aggression and subversion — the type of action, as 
Secretary Rusk mentioned, which the Communists 
are cariying on in Southeast Asia today — we have 
more than tripled our counterinsurgency forces. 

These are the actions that have been taken to 
strengthen our joresent militaiy power. 

But of course it is not enough to look only at 
the present. More particularly, with the im- 
mensely complicated weajjons systems with which 
we are dealing today, we must look and plan far 
into the future, and to meet the future we face 
three major problems. 

The firet of these deals with the new power rela- 
tionships within NATO. Europe's increasing in- 
tegration, as well as the tremendous economic 
growth which has taken place in Western Europe, 
requires us to reassess our military relationships. 
These same forces, of course, provide opportunities 
to increase substantially the NATO defense ca- 
pability to meet a variety of threats in Europe and 
opportimities to work out a closer relationship 
both among the members of NATO and between 
the United States and the Western European 

The second problem arises from the possibility 
that the value of our nuclear superiority may de- 
cline over time. We have substantial superiority 
in strategic nuclear forces today. We believe that 
we can maintain that nuclear superiority in terms 
of numbers in the years to come, but we caraiot 
maintam the near-monopoly on strategic nuclear 
forces which we have possessed over much of the 
past decade. And therefore, since the utility of 
our numerical superiority is likely to decline, we 
have to start planning now against the day when 
our strategic nuclear forces may be a less effective 
deterrent than they have been against major ag- 
gression shoi't of a nuclear attack on NATO. 

We are faced with a very real paradox : that as 
nuclear weapons develop and continue to become 
more effective, it becomes increasingly important 
for us to supplement our strategic nuclear power 
by adequate nonnuclear forces. 

The third major problem we face is the problem 
of arms control and disarmament. Disarmament 
and arms policy are intimately related. They are 
part of the effort to provide for our national 


Some of the most important things we do in 
this field are not part of what is customarily 
thought of as either disarmament or arms control. 
We don't, for example, tliink merely of numbers 
of weapons when we are estimating our defense 
needs. "We think particularly of the kinds of weap- 
ons, of their survivability, and particularly of 
the effectiveness of our command and control over 
those weapons. Our armaments must protect our 
national security from inadvertent as well as from 
deliberate aggression. 

We can't hope to deter aggression without tak- 
ing some of tlie risks that are associated with 
the failure of deterrence, a risk that we shall have 
to fight the war that we are ti-ying to avoid. 
There is the ever-present problem, therefore, of 
the balancing of risks. 

But fortunately the goals of deterrence, of 
defense, and of arms control are not always in con- 
flict. For example, when we improve our com- 
mand and control systems, we improve our 
deterrent to aggression and, at the same time, we 
decrease the chance of a completely uncontrolled 
war, should deterrence fail. We have installed a 
number of both administrative and physical safe- 
guards for our nuclear weapons, which reduce as 
far as possible the chances of unauthorized use. 

The great emphasis we have placed on forces 
which can survive a nuclear attack from the Soviet 
not only serves to deter Soviet aggi'ession but also 
greatly reduces the pressure on us to act pre- 
cipitately in a crisis, thus decreasing the danger 
of inadvertent or accidental war. 

In simimary, then, we are strengthening our 
military forces to deal effectively, to deal flexibly, 
with a wide range of threats, both political and 
military, and we are working with our allies to 
develop policies appropriate to the changing needs 
of the alliance. In our defense policy, as in our 
foreign policy generally, our effort is to carry out 
the President's expressed intention to find a third 
choice between holocaust and humiliation. 

Mr. Smith : Jlr. Secretary, all of us from time to 
time hear complaints about the size and the cost of 
our Armed Forces and the way they are strung out 
all across the world. "V^liat would happen if we 
just threw up our hands, closed down our bases, 
brought everybody home, and relied on the two 
oceans to preserve our safety ? 

Secretary McNamara: At a time when in our 
strategic nuclear forces and in the strategic nuclear 
forces of our opponents there exist interconti- 


nental ballistic missiles with ranges of 7,500 miles, 
missiles wliich can cross the oceans in but a few 
minutes, I think it is perfectly apparent that the 
oceans no longer provide the safeguards that they 
have in past decades. 




Progress Through Partnership 

Mr. Smith: Now, Secretary Eusk, after this 
look at "Security Through Strength," why don't 
we proceed to the second basic point of our for- 
eign policy, "Progess Through Partnership"? 

Secretary Rusk: On that, Mr. Smith, I would'? 
like to call on my colleague, the Under Secretary 
of State, Mr. George Ball. 

Mr. Ball: As Secretary Rusk and Secretary Mc- 
Namara have pointed out, a prime objective of our 
policy is the security of the United States and of 
the American people. In the mid-20th century 
this security must be sought in a world of change, 
in a world of faster and more pervasive change 
than we have ever laiown before. 

In the relatively brief time since the war — only 
about 17 years — three major alterations have 
taken place in the face of the world as we knew it,. 

As we are all constantly aware, an Iron Curtain 
has been erected to form a prison for about one- 
third of the earth's population, about a billion 
people. For the remaining two-thirds, that por- 
tion of the population which is in what we call the 
free world outside of the Iron Curtain, great 
changes have also taken place. 

We have, first of all, as Secretary Rusk men- 
tioned a moment ago, the shattering of the old) 
colonial systems and the creation since 1945 of 45 
new nations, united in their determination to 
maintain their new-found freedom and sharing a 
determination to attain a decent standard of liv- 
ing for their peoples. 

Now, one might have thought that with the shat 
tering of the old colonial systems, the colonial 
powers — that handful of countries in Western 
Europe that had maintained such a great influencej llieOE 
over so many people in the world — would havej ioniff 
been irreparably weakened. But, in fact, theyjIVean 
have turned their energies with an extraordinary) 'hiM 
vigor toward a great and heroic task at home[ttiioiii 
toward the building of a new, united Europe, the| ionbiiii 
realization of a dream that no conqueror of old wasj "d to t 
ever able to achieve. 'inore 

This united Europe started with the initiative oil Witli 
six continental powers who created an economic wt, i^\ 

Department of Slate Bulletin Ortoie, 



k r; 
iitj 1 


■ »iirit 
ion !o 

ommunity, the Common Market, and this Com- 
baon Market is now about to be joined by tiie 
United Kingdom and perhaps two or three other 
European countries. When this process is com- 
pleted, we shall have on the European side of the 
fVtlantic a new entity containing about a quarter 
)f a billion people, an entity which has enjoyed 
md is now displaying the most extraordinary 
economic growth, with a growth rate since 1953 al- 
nost twice our own, and which during the period 
rom 1953 to 1960 mcreased its exports by 113 
percent, as against 29 percent for our own, and 
ncreased its imports by almost 100 percent, as 
igainst 35 percent for the United States. 

Now, as important as this extraordinary eco- 
lomic vitality in Europe may be to us, of even 
greater importance are the implications of having 
)olitical union in Europe. For the first time in 
)ur history we have the possibility of an entity of 
iqual size, commanding almost equal resources, 
hat can serve as a partner with us in our common 
ndeavors and in our common tasks. 

In the days of reconstruction of Europe after 
he ravages of the war, in the days when the co- 
onial empire was falling apart, Europe of neces- 
sity had to withdraw from many parts of the 
vorld. Power vacuums were created, and the 
Jnited States had to pick up the burden ; and it 
vas a very heavy burden indeed, as we all know. 
3ut now that Europe is going strong and now 
hat Europe is becoming united, we can look to 

urope as an equal partner to share our burdens 
vith us. 

We have, as you all know, established two insti- 
utional arrangements for working witli our 
European partner. The first, NATO, to which 
jecretai-y McNamara alluded a moment ago, has 
lad a special responsibility for the whole security 
if the free world, and it has been the heart of our 
ecurity system. 

A year ago there came into being the Organiza- 
ion for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
he OECD, as we call it. Through this Organiza- 
ion we will work on a variety of economic tasks. 
Ve are concerting our economic policies in order to 
liminate the imbalances and distortions in our 
conomic affairs. We are working together to 
ombine and to conceit our national programs of 
id to the underdeveloped countries and to effect 
. more equitable sharing of this common burden. 

With the benefit of the new Trade Expansion 
ju Let, which the President has asked the Congress 

Jcfofaer 75, J 962 

to approve, we should have a tool which will en- 
able us to negotiate with our European friends 
and to cooperate with them to bring about an open- 
ing of markets all over the world, not only for the 
United States and for the produce of our own 
f amis and factories but for the benefit of the whole 
free world. 

Finally, outside of this structure of the Atlantic 
partnership, as we call it, the partnership between 
the great Common Market of Europe on the one 
hand and the great common market of America 
on the other, there is Japan, which has a special 
meaning for us, not only because it is the largest 
industrial power in Asia, but also because it is a 
vital trading partner of ours and because it is 
working with us and with Europe toward the 
sharing of some of these common tasks. 

So I can assure you that we have made very 
great progress indeed, not only through the At- 
lantic partnership but in the development of an 
even firmer Atlantic partnership and in the exten- 
sion of that partnership toward the carrying out 
of the common task which we all face. And this is 
the real meaning of what President Kennedy said 
so eloquently and so well in his great speech in 
Philadelphia on the Fourth of July,^ when he 
spoke of the interdependence of the leading na- 
tions of the free world, of the common task which 
the Atlantic partnership must carry forward. 

Revolution of Freedom 

Mr. Smith: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we could 
now discuss a point that follows right on the dis- 
cussion we have just had with I\Ir. Ball — "Revo- 
lution of Freedom." 

Secretary Rusk : Yes. I think for some of our 
problems in that great changing woi'ld we ought to 
turn to the man who has one of the largest and most 
complicated tasks in Washington, Mr. Fowler 
Hamilton, our Administrator for AID. 

Mr. Hamilton: As you Imow, Mr. Secretary, in 
the 17 years since World War II, our Government 
in our own national self-interest has su^jported a 
large and powerful foreign aid progi'am. The 
program has been based upon a recognition that, in 
the conditions that have existed in the troubled 
world since World War II, the security of the 
United States depends upon the security of the 
free world. The purpose of this program is to 
strengthen the national secuiity of the United 

' IMd., July 23, 19C2, p. 131. 


States by strengthening the security of tlie free 

This progi-am througliout its history has been 
bipartisan and nonpolitical. It has been supported 
by every President and by every Congress that 
has held office and exercised power in our country 
during tliis period. That is true of the present 

Tlie present program has two parts. It has a 
long-range part and it has a short-range part. 
The purpose of the short-range part is to meet 
challenges that the Communists present to us on a 
day-to-day, week-to-week, month-to-month basis. 
Tlie purpose of the long-range part is to strengthen 
our national security by strengthening the security 
of the free world on a long-range basis. 

Now the short-range part, which accounts for 
somewhat more than half of the funds that Amer- 
ican citizens put up to support this security pro- 
gram, consists primarily in assistance that we make 
available to our military allies, primarily to coun- 
tries that are located around the periphery of the 
Iron and Bamboo Curtains, countries like Korea 
and Viet-Nam. 

The long-range jsart is primarily focused upon 
development. As President Kennedy said in his 
message to the Congress last year, the security of 
the United States and the security of the free 
world require a Decade of Development. 

Now, how does it come to be ? "VVliat are the cir- 
cumstances that require the citizens of the United 
States to put up these sums for the development of 
peoples and of institutions in other coimtries ? 

Well, the principal factor is the one that Secre- 
tary Rusk adverted to. While the Conmiunists 
have been talking about a world revolution of 
violence, the fact is that the free world has achieved 
a revolution of peace that is unprecedented in 

In the 17 years since World War II ended, over 
a billion people have obtained their political free- 
dom, largely by peaceful means. A nimiber of 
new countries have become independent ; 45 coun- 
tries, to be exact, have achieved their mdependence 
since the end of World War II. 

Now, in many cases the peoples of these coun- 
tries, through no fault of their own, lack the edu- 
cation, the skills, the talents that are required if 
their societies are to be stable and viable, if they 
are to have the minimum of economic and political 
strength that is necessary for them to withstand 


the kind of chaos that the Communists sow as a 
prelude to Communist domination. 

Now, our country is not alone in this enterprisfti 
The amount of foreign aid that is made available! 
to these less developed countries by other more acH 
vanced countries, such as those in Europe andi 
Japan, is approximately equal at the present tim«; 
to the amoimt of aid that we make available. 

Parenthetically, I might add, this is a remark- 
able tribute to the success of the Marsliall Plan 
which, in a brief period of time since that plan waaf 
successfully accomplished, enables the former re- 
cipients of aid now to make a contribution to aic 
equal to that of our own and, obviously, by th<« "] 
same token, an equal contribution to the securitj 
of the free world against Communist subversion 

Now, as to the kinds of aid that we have : Ai 
the present time we make available aid — I mighll "'"'' 
add that most of that money is spent in the United "^ 
States. We don't give a king or a prime ministe!' '" " 
or a minister of a foreign government a check am 
say, "Here is the money." Wliat happens is tha 
at least 80 percent of the aid goods are purchaset'i 
in the United States and shipped abroad unde: 
carefully controlled recfuirements. Indeed, it ha 
been estimated by the great labor organization]! 
that this economic activity generated by this aic 
supplies jobs for 700,000 Americans. That is no 
the purpose of it, of course. The purpose is t«- 
help work with our friends in Europe and ii 
Japan to strengthen these countries, to help then 
help themselves. 

Secondly, based on the sound principle that th 
Lord helps those that help themselves, we don' 
extend aid unless the people who are interested ifl -^^ 
receiving it are willing to work out a partnershi]( 
arrangement with us, are willing to contribute tt 
the extent that they can, because ultimately ty 
only forces that can save a society from comi 
munism are the forces within that society— thu ™f 
strength, the integrity, and the willingness of tht ^''fi 
people to make sacrifices for freedom, as we hav '^'ipl 
made sacrifices for freedom. *«ffl 

I think it is also interesting to note that unde:* 'Pf«ss 
the present program the preponderant part of th< H'. 
funds that are made available in the form of eccxf' 
nomic assistance are made available as loans, n 
as grants. Those loans are repayable over a lonjj *"' 
period of years, it's true, but are repayable ill 

Now, what does the money go for? Under 
scoring the last point I made, most of it goes fo' 









lost I 






Deporfmenf of Sfofe Bullefii liloie, 






oans. Primarily it goes to the development side 
)f tlie program, to enable these new countries and 
lew societies to develop their most plentiful and 
jriceless asset, their people. So it goes primarily 
'or education, education with a small "e," to edu- 
ate farmers to be better farmers, to educate gov- 
irnment officials to be more efficient, to educate 
eclinicians, to educate middle-level people, so that 
hese various societies can have the kind of compe- 
P]j ence and train the kind of competence that it 
akes to maintain a society in the modern world. 

Now, I should like to come, finally, to the Alli- 
,nce for Progress, which is one of the most im- 
)ortant aspects of our development program. 

That is the progi-am, as you know, which was 
-nnounced by President Kennedy a year ago last 
(larch,'' in which we, woi'king with our friends 
,nd neighbors in Latin America, are endeavoring 
o cooperate with them to help their societies face 
he very difficult political and economic stresses 
,nd strains that have been imposed upon them by 
conomic conditions that have developed within 
he last few years, by technological changes, and 
aost of all by the fact that the Communists are 
tOW coming into this hemisphere in an endeavor 
o exploit the problems that our friends in Latin 
J5ji America have, in the hope that they can produce 
haos as preliminary to Communist takeovers. 

Now finally, I should like to conclude by noting 
hat we help ourselves to protect ourselves by rein- 
orcing the free world against communism. AVe 
o so because it is in our own interest. We also 
o so because it is in the interest of the 1,250,000,- 
00 people in the underdeveloped areas. 

As President Kennedy has said, "If a free so- 
iety cannot help the many who are poor, it can- 
ot save the few who are rich." ° 

M7\ Smith: Mr. Hamilton, you have pointed out 
he stake Americans have in helping people of 
ther lands, and yet it seems to me it is frequently 
ard for some of us to appreciate this. How, for 
xample, do you explain the urgent necessity for 
oreign aid to a family in one of the perennially 
epressed areas in our own country ? 

Mr. Hamilton: Well, the first observation I 
could make on that is that, of course, the primary 
esponsibility of our Government is to protect its 
wn citizens, and we should see to it that our own 
itizens who are suffering imemployment have 




* For an address by President Kennedy and text of a 
lessage to Congress, see itid., Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471. 
'Ihid., Feb. 6, liXil, p. 175. 

j|jl>cfofaer 75, 7 962 

Government assistance that is adequate, assuming 
that they also will practice self-help. 

Secondly, we won't have a society in which we 
can help our less fortunate fellow citizens unless 
we have a free and independent United States and 
a strong and secure free world; so the citizen of 
the United States has a real stake in seeing to it 
that the citizens of these less developed countries 
maintain freedom. 

Finally, the standard of living in these countries 
is so much worse than that that prevails in any 
area of the United States tliat there is no 

Mr. Smith: You spoke of the need for the re- 
cipient nations' helping themselves, and yet at 
times this involves their taking a greater responsi- 
bility for internal improvement. Have we had 
much success in this field — encouraging some of 
our friendly nations to update their laws and im- 
prove their economic structures, broaden their tax 
bases ? 

Mr. Hamilton: Yes. I am gratified to be able 
to report to you, Mr. Smith, that we have. 

The Alliance for Progress was announced in 
March of last year, but it didn't even get on a piece 
of paper until last August,^ so it has only been in 
being for about 12 months. It contemplates very 
substantial changes in important matters in the 
Latin American countries. A number of those 
countries have already shown their good faith by 
making those. 

And after all, you know, when you talk about 
taxes and land reform, it takes us a good long 
time to get a tax law passed in the United States — 
and we have had taxes for a long, long time, 

Community Under Law 

Mr. Smith: Secretary Rusk, you spoke at the 
outset of our hope for the gradual emergence of 
a genuine world community, and this under the 
heading of the next point, "Community Under 

Secretary Rusk: Yes. To talk about "Com- 
munity Under Law," I should like very much to 
go to Adlai Stevenson, our United States Repre- 
sentative to the United Nations in New York. 

Ambassador Stevenson: Thank you, Mr. Secre- 

" For test of the Charter of Punta del Este, see ibid., 
Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463. 


World community under law. Let's try to see 
what we are doing to turn this idea into reality. 
If you stood at my office window in New York 
you would look down across the street at the build- 
ings of the United Nations. In a long row you 
would see the flags of 108 member nations, the 
United States among them. 

The United Nations is an instrument for ad- 
vancing the interests of our country. But it is 
also an instrument for advancing the interests of 
all 107 of these other members. Even where there 
is friction, experience shows that between their 
interests and ours it is usually possible, through 
diplomacy and not force, to find common ground. 
Of course, the U.N. can't do it all. This world 
community needs the support of its faithful mem- 
bers. In the Congo, for instance, it was U.S. Air 
Force planes that carried U.N. troops from 34 

Tlie community needs, too, the creative work of 
great regional institutions : the European Common 
Market and the gi-owing Atlantic partnership 
whose help is so vitally necessary for the develop- 
ment of the new and emerging nations. The U.N. 
needs the stability and security afforded by our 
regional alliances like NATO and the Organiza- 
tion of American States. 

These are not contradictory forces. They are 
elements in a single grand design. 

Now, what does this idea of a world community, 
of which the U.N. is the central institution, 7iiean 
to the United States? 

Remember the historical circumstances of our 
time. Soviet communism came out of World War 
n as a world power, challenging the old order and 
pressing hard against it. Meanwhile one billion 
people in Asia and Africa began emerging from 
colonial status to independence — often resentful 
of their old rulers and demanding equality and 
dignity and a better life. 

In ages past, the ending of one great imperial 
system has usually been tlie signal for the rise 
of another. In our time it is all too easy to 
imagine a new Communist empire in Africa and 
Asia, moving in on the heels of the withdrawing 

Yet the new nations themselves don't want to 
be anybody's satellite. What they want is inde- 
pendence and the security and sense of belonging 
whicli comes from being full membei-s of a com- 
mniiity. That is what the United Nations means 


to them. It means a world in which a nation 
doesn't have to be strong in order to be secure. 

From this point of view the whole history of; 
the U.N. can be understood as a series of efforts to- 
help small, weak nations in their hour of trouble. 
The list is already long : Iran in 19-46 ; Greece in 
1947 ; India and Pakistan ; Indonesia, Israel, and' 
the Arab states ; the successful defense of Korea ; 
Suez ; Lebanon ; and — greatest U.N. effort of all — 
the Congo. 

We can learn a great deal from the story of the 
Congo. Here was a newborn nation — not well 
equipped for independence — erupting in violence 
and ci^^l chaos. It appealed to the U.N. to restore 
order and uphold its independence; and the U.N, 
swifty answered with an international armed 
force of 18,000 men. 

Moscow had other plans. The Soviets placed 
their bets on chaos. They demanded that the 
U.N. evict all Belgians and subdue Katanga by 
ai-med force, in an orgy of anti-European hatred, 
They illegally sent in military trucks and planes. 

The U.N. in the Congo successfully resisted 
these Soviet maneuvers. Then came a violent So- 
viet attack on the United Nations itself and on itf 

But Dag Hammarskjold refused to resign under 
this So\'iet browbeating. With perfect confidence 
he placed his fate, and the fate of the office of 
Seci'etary-General, in the hands of the U.N. major- 
ity. He spoke to the delegates of 100 nations, 
half of which had gained their independence since 
World War II, and said to them : "This is your 
organization, gentlemen." They understood him, 
and they refused to see their organization 
crippled. Even after Hammarskjold's tragic 
death, the office of Secretary-General was pre 
served intact and U Thant was elected with full! 











I hope we Americans will remember tliis Congo 
story. It was not we but our So\aet adversaries 
who beat their desks in anger because of the U.N.'s* 
action in the Congo. It is not we but the Soviet 
Union who used the veto 100 times to block major- 
ity votes in the U.N. Security Comicil. 

Let me emphasize that the U.N. is not paralyzed 
by such opposition ; nor is it weakened by the crisest 
it has had to face. In fact, evei\v great crisis ini 
the historj' of tlie U.N. has ended with the U.N. 
more effective than before. 

The U.N. is more tlian a fire brigade. It is also 

It a? 3 

Department of Stale Bulletin 












a nation builder. It has proclaimed the 1960's the 
U.N. Decade of Development. U.N. projects are 
underway all over the world to develop the re- 
sources and skills of the new nations — shoemaking 
in Morocco, mining in the heart of Africa, rice 
growing in Thailand — hundreds of such projects. 
Eighty percent of the United Nations interna- 
tional staff is engaged in such constructive work. 
They, in turn, draw on the wealth of resources in 
the whole U.N. family of specialized and technical 
agencies, each in its own field. 

Now, what does this all add up to ? Clearly we 
are far from our ultimate concept — a world "com- 
munity under law." Distrust and hatred still 
deeply divide our world. There are still troiible 
spots like the explosive frontier between Israel 
and Egypt, where U.N. soldiers have kept things 
quiet for 5 years. 

Yet there are great elements of strength on our 
side. The United Nations is now 17 years old. 
It is battered and scarred because it has not shrunk 
from conflict. But it is full of vitality. 

Today it is building bridges of community be- 
tween the advanced industrial democracies of the 
Northern Hemisphere and the poor, aspiring new 
nations of Africa and Asia. 

One day it may help to bridge that other gulf — 
the gulf between the free and open societies of 
democratic nations and the fanatical closed soci- 
jties of communism. For the U.N. is itself an open 
society, a school of tolerance, of free debate, where 
ordinary citizens sit in the gallery ; and its mem- 
bers do not take kindly to fanaticism or dictation 
from any quarter. 

Wliat of the future ? 

We shall ti-y to make the United Nations still 
More effective. We shall seek to strengthen its 
potential for handling emergencies and to develop 
it as a center of '"quiet diplomacy." 

We hope too for more effectiveness in the World 
[I!ourt, the most neglected arm of the U.N., whose 
recent opinion on U.N. finances '' may be of historic 

By such efforts we intend to assure that the 
[J.N. will continue to do its share in the long job 
)f building a world community mider law, in 
vhich free peoples can live together in peace. 

' For a statement made by Abram Chayes, Legal Ad- 
viser of the Department of State, before the Court on 
Hay 21, see iUd., July 2, 1962, p. 30; for a Department 
itatement concerning the Court's opinion, see ihUh, Aug. 
3, 1962, p. 246. 

Ocfober 75, 1962 

Peace Through Perseverance 

Ml'. Smith: There seems, at times, a certain 
amount of futility in our efforts to achieve real 
arms reduction, and yet this must remain a very 
vital part of our foreign policy. 

The last point, Mr. Secretary — I wonder if we 
could turn to "Peace Through Perseverance." 

Secretary Rusk: There are some tasks that can 
never be abandoned. We just have to stay with 
them. To talk about "Peace Through Persever- 
ance," I would like to go to the Counselor of the 
Department of State, Mr. Walt Kostow. 

Mr. Rostoio: The achievement of peace is, of 
course, Mr. Smith, a problem, in the end, of our 
relations with the Communist bloc. 

The policies you have heard described this after- 
noon are not the simple result of the fact that we 
face the Communist conspiracy in the world and 
the Communist thrust for world power. Given 
the kind of world in which we live, with its high 
degree of interdependence, we would be pursuing, 
in any case, a policy of partnership toward a re- 
^aved Europe, a policy of partnership toward a 
remarkably re\aved Jaj^an. We would be turn- 
ing in the American interest to assist the under- 
developed nations, wliich are feeling the surge of 
ambition to modernize their societies. We would 
be seeking to build in this expanding and higUy 
interconnected free world a community and the 
institutions of commimity. 

And given the nature of nuclear weapons, we 
would have to have a military policy not unlike 
that outlined earlier by Secretary McNamara. 

But all of these policies take on a special mean- 
ing in the light of the policy pursued from Moscow 
and from Peiping. Since 1945 it has been Com- 
munist policy to fragment, not to unite, Western 
Europe. It has been Communist policy to try to 
draw the individual states of Europe away from 
association with each other and away from the 
United States. 

You will all recall tliat in the days just after the 
war, before the Marshall Plan took hold, there 
was a systematic effort by the Communists to use 
the Coromunist parties in Western Europe to try 
to bring down the govermnents there. 

As Western European recovery took hold and 
as we built the Marshall Plan and NATO, the 
Communists turned increasingly, in the past dec- 
ade, to the underdeveloped areas. There they be- 
lieve that they see vulnerabilities they can exploit. 



They see these AaUnerabilities in the very emer- 
gence of these new nations into the modern world, 
in tlie changes they must make, the confusion that 
must come, as they seek to transform old agri- 
cultural societies so that they can receive and use 
the tools of modern science and technology. 

Specifically, we have seen the Communists use 
the ugly method of guerrilla war from Greece to 
Viet-Nam. And we have observed the ambitions 
of Castro with respect to Latin America. You 
remember he made a speech last December in which 
he referred to guerrilla war as the "match you 
throw into the haystack," and then said that Latin 
America looked to him like a pretty good haystack. 

This is one technique they have tried to apply 
in these transitional, underdeveloped areas, but it's 
not the only technique. They have used aid and 
trade and, above all, the notion that communism 
is a technique for rapidly developing an under- 
developed area — more efficient if more ruthless 
than the methods that we would propose. 

In addition, the Communists have continued to 
pose a direct military threat. After the war the 
Soviet Union did not disarm as we did. It built 
up massive ground force strength, and it probed 
at every point of weakness — in northern Azerbai- 
jan, that is, in Iran; in Turkey; in Greece; and 
then at Berlin in '48-'49. And they probed all 
through Asia as well, in Burma, Malaya, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Korea. 

With respect to Europe, they have tried to per- 
suade the Europeans that they are in the position 
of hostage with respect to nuclear weapons and 
that the Europeans should, therefore, back away 
from Soviet demands, notably in Berlin. 

This is a form of nuclear blackmail we have 
seen in recent years. 

We must base our policy toward the Communist 
bloc on the assumption that they would seriously 
consider the risk of initiating a nuclear war if they 
judged that we were vulnerable. 

Therefore the foundations for our policy to- 
ward the Communist bloc lie also in the positive 
policies you have heard outlined. 

Our first task is to frustrate all forms of Com- 
munist aggression, at any level, by pursuing the 
constructive policies presented by my colleagues — 
policies designed to build toward a free-world 
community and to defend that free- world com- 
munity at every level of aggression. 

Nevertheless, it is not our interest, nor is it our 

belief that the cold war need go on forever. His- 
tory is not standing still within the Communist 

We have seen in recent years an extraordinary 
tendency of the Communist bloc to fragment. It 
is a strange irony that, while Western Europe is 
pulling together in an unprecedented movement 
toward unity, the Communists, who counted on 
fragmentation in Western Europe, are experienc- 
ing it within the bloc. The basis of fragmenta- 
tion is the assertion, the deep assertion of national 
interests within the bloc. 

Secondly, because of the very nature of commu- 
nism, because of the very nature of the police-state 
control which they would impose over people from 
one end of the bloc to the other, they can't grow 
food efficiently. As I say, this is no accident. 
There are simply not enough policemen in the 
world to follow a farmer aroimd to make sure 
he does the things he has to do to make food grow. 
And from Eastern Germany through Russia itself 
to the great crisis in China, we see this weakness, 
which is not merely an economic weakness but 
strikes at the very heart of the viability of the 
police-state system, on which they must rely if 
communism is to persist. 

Third, in addition to nationalism, which we see 
asserting itself — not least in Russia but also in 
China and in Eastern Europe — there is a quiet 
persistence of what we might call humane liberal- 

Be clear, these trends toward liberalism will 
not resolve the cold war for us. Poets do not make 
foreign policy or military policy. But it is a fact, 
and a wholesome fact, that the young Soviet poets 
are returning to the oldest theme in the Western 
and Russian culture, namely, the integrity of the 
individual. And there are many other signs that 
the humane values still live in Russia. These will 
not win the cold war for us, but they are signs — and 
hopeful signs — that history has not stopped in the 
Communist bloc and that the great humane cur- 
rents in Russian and Western and world history 
are not to bs counted out forever. 

Fourtli, there is the cost of the arms race. The 
arms race is expensive for us ; it is even more ex- 
pensive for the Soviet Union. It costs them in 
housing; it costs them in food; it costs them in 
many other dimensions. And if Secretary Mc- 
Namara carries through his plans, he vrill make 
the arms race in the next years a very costly dead 
end for the Soviet Union. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Fifth, there is the danger, as more nations ac- 
nist| quire nuclear weapons, that the risks of a nuclear 
war will increase — a war which neither the Soviet 
Union nor ourselves would like. 

Therefore, our task, while building and defend- 
ing the free world, is to convince the Communists 
that their notion of world domination is an im- 
possible notion. 

Our job is to encourage, by every means at our 
disposal, the emergence of these forces of national- 
ism and liberalism still alive and growing within 
the bloc. 

It is also our job to be prepared to negotiate arms 
agreements, increasing the security of all, so long 
as effective systems of inspection are included in 
those agreements. 

And it is, finally, our interest to limit and nar- 
row issues of disagreement. Wliile defending our 
vital interests we must be prepared to make agree- 
ments which diminish the dangers of confronta- 
tions in such places as Laos and Berlin and which 
decrease the danger that the cold war lead on to 
war itself. 

Our policy toward the Communist bloc must be 
rooted, then, in the fundamental policies of build- 
ing and defending the free world. But aware of 
the forces of change within the bloc, we must never 
cease to attempt to minimize the possibility that 
war comes about, to diminish the likelihood that 
points of confrontation will lead on to war, and 
never lose faith that the forces of nationalism and 
liberalism are at work within the bloc. 

If we maintain our strength and unity, if we 
persist doggedly, if we persevere with the lines of 
policy that you have heard laid out, we can look 
forward with confidence to a victory, and to a 
peaceful victory for the forces of freedom. 

Mr. Smith : Mr. Rostow, it's quite obviously not 
in our interests to keep the cold war as something 
that will go on forever. But is there a dominant 
development that we can watch for? In other 
words, what are we looking for to produce a break 
or a durable thaw in the cold war ? 

Mr. Rostow : I think that the issue that you and 
Secretary Rusk began with is the touchstone, Mr. 
Smith, the issue of serious disarmament covered 
by effective systems of inspection. 

If the^e forces that I have described work out, 
if our policies succeed and these historical forces 
push as we would like to see them push within the 

October 15, J 962 

bloc, the sign of victory would be the Soviet will- 
ingness to make a serious arms agreement, effec- 
tively inspected. 

That is not yet in sight. But as you began by 
saying, this is the ultimate test of whether we have 
made progress. 

Mr. Smith: Thank you, gentlemen. 

This has been an interesting and, I think, a very 
fast hour, and I wonder if you, Mr. Secretary 
Rusk, could top off this unusual briefing with a 
glance at the future. "^^Hiere do we go from here ? 

Secretary Rusk: We have been talking about 
our business of building a decent world, day after 
day and month after month. There is nothing 
easy and nothing cheap about the great tasks be- 
fore us; for freedom asks a great deal from free 
men, and peace is not yet achieved. But those who 
are committed to freedom have less to worry about 
than those who would reverse the entire history of 

It is not for us to fear the great winds of change 
that are blowing today. They are the winds we 
have long sailed with, the winds which have car- 
ried man on his unending journey, the winds of 

For the revolution of freedom, which we have so 
proudly nurtured and fought for in the past, is the 
true, enduring revolution, because it springs from 
the deepest and most persistent aspirations of men. 
And history says that this revolution will not fail. 

Mr. Smith: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Ladies and gentlemen, what you have just seen 
and heard was unusual, if not unprecedented, and 
yet typically American — the Secretary of State, 
the Secretary of Defense, our Ambassador to the 
United Nations, and their chief advisers, gathered 
before the microphones and cameras to explain to 
the public the basic goals of American foreign 

Now, this is no hard sell by these men but an 
imusual exercise in contemporaiy history. Their 
hope for this hour is that their explanations, their 
attempts at better understanding, spread far be- 
yond the facilities of this network into the homes, 
the shops, the workrooms, and the classrooms of 

Perhaps if there had been facilities for this sort 
of dead-level approach to foreign policy in other 
countries and in other years, there might not be 
quite the need today for armies and bombs and 


As you discuss this program later with your 
friends, it might be wise to remember an impor- 
tant point : What you've just heard was not rimior, 
distortion, or something passed on to you third 
hand. This was history straight from the 
source — from the men who execute American for- 
eign policy on behalf of the President, the men 
who share with him the awesome responsibility for 

U.S. Charges Soviet Union Wants 
To Maintain Tensions in Berlin 


The United States Government regrets that the 
Soviet note of September 5 does not attempt to 
deal with the points raised in the United States 
notes of August 24 and 27.^ The Soviet note ig- 
nores the fact that the tensions in Berlin are due 
to the wall which divides the city and to the 
brutality of the East German regime towards its 
inliabitants. Both are the responsibility of the 
Soviet Government. The Soviet note is also silent 
on the cold-blooded killing of refugees seeking to 
cross the wall into West Berlin and makes no men- 
tion of the particularly revolting circumstances 
connected with the death of Peter Fechter on 
August 17. 

The United States Government rejects the al- 
legations contained in the Soviet note, which 
seemed designed only to distract attention from 
the brutal activities of the East German regime. 

It is unfortunate, to say the least, that the Soviet 
Government should say in its note that "the ques- 
tion is not one of discussing incidents and consul- 
tations." It is manifestly unreasonable for the 
Soviet Government to accuse the United States 
Government of various activities in Berlin and to 
refuse to discuss the situation there, as the United 
States has proposed in its notes of June 25,' 
August 24 and August 27. In opposing such a 
discussion of the situation in Berlin the Soviet 

' Delivered by the American Embassy at Moscow to the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (press release 579 
dated Sept. 25). 

' For texts, see Bulletin of Sept. 10, 19G2, p. 378, and 
Sept. 17, 1962, p. 417. 

• For text, see ihUl., .Tuly Ifi, 1902, p. 97. 


Government must bear a heavy responsibility and 
evidences tlicreby its desire to maintain tension in 


Pit W 

Unofficuil translation 
Note 43/USA 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet I 
Socialist Republics on instructions of the Soviet Govern- 
ment declares the following with regard to notes of the i 
Government of the United States of America of 
24 and 27, 1962 : 

The Soviet Government is constrained to state that 
the Government of the United States of America, like the 
Governments of Great Britain and France, while paying 
lipservice to the danger of the present situation in West 
Berlin, is attempting to divest Itself of responsibility for 
events which have recently taken place there. It not only 
evades taking necessary measures for the suppression of 
provocative actions of Fa.scistic West Berlin and West 
German elements, but even proceeds to justify these prov- 
ocations, which could have serious consequences for 
peace and international security. 

The Soviet Government warned the Government of 
the United States of America that Federal Republic of 
Germany and West Berlin authorities were preparing 
aggressive actions for the middle of August, with a view 
to raising tension and interfering with a German peace 
settlement and normalization of the situation in West 
Berlin. However, the Government of the United States 
of America took no measures to prevent the sallies of 
Bonn and West Berlin revanchists which were in prepara- 
tion. What is more, the occupation authorities made their 
aircraft availah'o for transportation to West Berlin from 
the Federal Republic of Germany of every kind of poli- 
tician and outright agent of subversive centers, who were 
inciting the population of the city to provocative actions 
against the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet 

The occupation authorities of the United States, Brit- 
ain, and France in West Berlin bear the responsibility 
for murders of German Democratic Republic border 
guards who were protecting the security of their Republic. 
The occupation authorities are also responsible for the 
blowing up of German Democratic Republic border instal- 
lations by saboteurs from West Berlin, which led to casual- 
ties. The Governments of the three powers bear the 
responsibility for penetrations by Bunde.swehr military 
aircraft into the German Democratic Republic air space; 
the guilt for the unceasing acts of sabotage on the city's 
rail system lies on the authorities of the three powers in 
West Berlin, although they should have known that this 
could evoke complications in the communications of West 
Berlin with the outside world. 

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to empha- 

i a irf 
MS only ' 
(1 tlie Sot 


r.S.S,E, C 
o( violati 

thf Faitei 



for Ike i 



gards m 

(fftn an( 


tew crii 






for rev: 







into a 1 

and It 





ton 1 

Vn ' 


of an 

* Delivered to the American Embassy at Moscow by the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similar notes were 
received by the British and French Embassies. 

Department of Sfafe BuUetin 




tjai: size especially that, as a result of connivance by Ameri- 
can occupation authorities, insolent Fascist bands carried 
out direct attacks on soldiers of the Soviet Army and 
diplomatic employees of the U.S.S.R. Embassy in Berlin, 
as a result of which three soldiers received injuries. It 
was only thanks to the restraint and presence of mind 
of the Soviet soldiers that these events did not take a 
more serious and dangerous turn. 

In the note of the Government of the United States 
lof America of August 27, 1962, there is not even a hint 
of condemnation of the criminal actions of West Berlin 
Fascistic elements. The justifiable demand of the 
U.S.S.R. Government for the punishment of those guilty 
of violating the security of Soviet representatives is 
pasised over in complete silence. The Government of 
the United States of America is shielding the West Berlin 
provocateurs and all but threatening new "consequences," 
if demands of the revanchists from Bonn and West Berlin 
for the abolition of defensive measures taken by the au- 
thorities of the German Democratic Republic on its 
boundaries are not satisfied. The Soviet Government re- 
ards such a position of the United States of America as 
open and direct encouragement of Fascistic elements of 
the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin to 
new criminal acts and warns that, in the event of similar 
provocations, such measures will be taken as may be 
considered necessary for insuring the security of Soviet 
representatives and soldiers. 

The most recent developments in West Berlin confirm 
that the occupation regime in this city has become a cloak 
for revanchists and militarists, organizers of all types of 
subversive activity against the U.S.S.R. and other peace- 
loving states. The present dangerous situation in West 
Berlin is the direct result of the "frontline city" policy 
which the occupation powers, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, and the West Berlin Senat are pursuing there, 
jointly and severally. West Berlin has been transformed 
into a refuge for numerous espionage-diversionary centers 
and militaristic and revanchist organizations, into a 
loudspeaker for shameless propaganda of hate and war. 
Developments in West Berlin and the Federal Republic 
of Germany are following in fact in the very same channel 
as in Hitlerite Germany during the period of its prepara- 
tion for aggression. And if this today depended only 
upon West Germany militarists, thirsting for revenge, 
mankind would already have been plunged into the throes 
of a new, bloody war. 

But in our time there are forces capable of checking 
any and every aggressive stirring of German mili- 
tarists and their accomplices. These forces will not 
permit the heaping up of combustible material for military 
adventures and the exploitation of West Berlin for these 
goals. The border in Berlin is not simply a border be- 
tween two states. It is a defensive boundary against 
the NATO military base set up in West Berlin, a boundary 
against those who are preparing for war and seeking 
conflicts. This border will in the future continue to be 
under reliable protection. 

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain, 
and France in their notes attempt to cast themselves in 
the role of defenders of humanitarian principles. If 
hypocrisy were dispensed with and there were really a 


Ocfofaer 15, 1962 

desire to di-splay humanitarian principles, these govern- 
ments could render assistance in the liberation of thou- 
sands of German anti-Fascists, partisans of peace, who, 
as in the times of Hitler, are languishing in the prisons 
of West Germany. Humanitarian principles, which the 
Western Powers invoke, require immediate and decisive 
curbing of West German revanchism and militarism, 
which are guilty of the death of tens of millions of 
people in two world wars. For this, it is not a "discus.sion 
of incidents," as proposed by the Governments of the 
United States, Great Britain, and France which is nec- 
essary, but a fundamental normalization of the situation : 
conclusion of a German peace treaty and normalization 
on that basis of the situation in West Berlin. The ques- 
tion is not one of discussing incidents and consultations. 
It is necessary, at long last, to liquidate the occupation 
regime in West Berlin on the basis of the signing of a 
German peace treaty, to liquidate the NATO military 
base, and to withdraw the troops of the three powers 
from West Berlin. 

The Soviet Government is ready at any time to reach 
agreement with the Governments of the United States, 
Great Britain, and France on the normalization of the 
situation in West Berlin on the basis of a German peace 
settlement. Such a settlement would consolidate the 
foundations of peace in Europe. It would regulate rela- 
tions between West Berlin and the German Democratic 
Republic and preclude all kinds of undesirable incidents. 

U.S. Asks Departure of Two EVlembers 
of Soviet Mission to the U.iSI. 

Press release 592 dated September 29 

Following is the text of a note from the U.S. 
Mission to the United Nations to the Permanent 
Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
to the United Nations, delivered at New York 
on Septemher 29. 

The United States Mission to the United Na- 
tions presents its compliments to the Permanent 
Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
to the United Nations and wishes to call further 
attention to the espionage activities on the part of 
Mr. Eugeni M. Prokhorov and Mr. Ivan Y. Vyro- 
dov, members of the Permanent Mission of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Eepublics to the United 

Representatives of the Permanent Mission of 
tlie Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the 
United Nations were informed of their activities 
earlier today when agents of the FBI observed 
Mr. Prokhorov and Mr. Vyrodov receiving classi- 
fied documents of a national defense nature from 
a member of the United States Armed Forces who 


was immediately arrested. In this espionage op- 
eration Mr. Prokhorov and Mr. Vyrodov prevd- 
ously had received other classified documents for 
which they paid substantial sums of money to 
the United States citizen. 

As host to the United Nations the Government 
of the United States strongly protests these es- 
pionage activities directed against the internal se- 
curity of the United States. Not only are such 
activities clearly outside the scope of the official 
responsibilities of these members but they are an 
outrageous violation of their privileges of resi- 
dence within the meaning of Section 13(b) of the 
Agreement^ between the United States and the 
United Nations concerning the United Nations. 
Under this provision of tlie Agreement they have, 
by their actions, forfeited their privilege of con- 
tinued residence in this country. 

The United States Mission requests the Per- 
manent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics to take the necessary steps to effect the 
immediate withdrawal of Mr. Prokliorov and Mr. 
Vyrodov from the United States. 

Government of Algeria 
Recognized by United States 

Press Release 591 dated September 29 

Department Announcement 

The United States today recognized the newly 
established Government of the Eepublic of 

President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk have 
sent congratulatory messages to the chief officials 
of the new government in Algiers. The greetings, 
sent on behalf of the American Government and 
people and addressed to Algerian Prime Minister 
Ahmed Ben Bella and Foreign Minister Moham- 
med Khemisti, were delivered by the American 
consul general in Algiers, William J. Porter. 

The Department of State also announced it has 
requested Algerian agreement to the elevation of 
the American consulate general to embassy status, 
with Mr. Porter as Charge d'Affaires ad interim. 

It is expected that an Ambassador will be named 
in the near future. 

' 61 Stat. 3416. 

Letter of President Kennedy to Prime IVIinister \ 

September 29, 1962 , 

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: It is with deep 
pleasure that I extend to you on behalf of the 
Government and people of the United States my 
warmest congratulations upon your assumption 
of the high office of Prime Minister of the Algerian 

I wish you every success in your new duties 
and responsibilities. My Government and people 
share my earnest desire to foster and extend the' 
cordial relations that exist between our two 

Sincerely yours, 

John F. Kjinnedy 
Letter of Secretary Rusk to Foreign IVIinister 

September 29, 1962 

Dear Mr. Minister : It was with great pleasure* 
that I learned of your assumption of the respon 
sibilities of Foreign Minister. I wish to extendi 
my warmest congratulations and best wishes on 
this occasion, and look forward to the opportunity 
of meeting you in the near future. 
Sincerely yours. 

Dean Rusk 

Concern Expressed by United States 
in IVSatter of Cuban Fisliing Port 

Statement hy Lincoln White ' 

Director, Office of News ' 

At present our information with respect to the 
construction of a fishing port in Cuba is limited to 
a statement made yesterday [September 25] by 
Fidel Castro during the televised ceremony of the 
signing of a fishing agreement between Cuba and 
the Soviet Union. 

According to Castro a fishing port will be con- 
structed in Cuba, with Cuban manpower and mate- 
rials, for which Cuba will receive about 12 million 

' Read to news correspondents on Sept. 2fi. 

Department of State Bulletin 












pesos in food items from the Soviet Union. 

The Soviet Union, according to this announce- 
ment, \\\\\ provide phins, technicians, and equip- 
ment and will use the port to facilitate the opera- 
tions of the Soviet fishing fleet in the Atlantic 

Any activity of the Soviet Union in Cuba is a 
matter of conceni to the United States. This 
latest Soviet attempt to increase its involvement 
in Cuba will be watched closely by the United 
States Government to determine whether and to 
what extent it may affect our national security. 




President Ayub of Pakistan 
Maites Informal Visit to U.S. 

Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, 
made an informed visit to the United States Sep- 
tember 2^-27. Following is the text of a joint 
communique between President Kennedy and 
President Ayub released at the close of their dis- 
cussions on September 24-, together with a letter of 
the same date from President Kennedy to Presi- 
dent Ayub on the problem of waterlogging and 
salinity in West Pakistan. 


White House press release (Newport, E.I.) dated September 24 

President Kennedy and President Ayub Khan 
have had an informal meeting at Newport, Rhode 
Island, today. The two Presidents have renewed 
their personal association established during 
President Ayub's state visit in 1961.^ 

Tlie two Presidents had frank and cordial dis- 
cussions which included a general review of the 
world situation, with particular reference to mat- 
ters of mutual interest and concern to Pakistan 
and the United States. 

The two Presidents agreed that, since their last 
meeting last year, the threat to world peace has 
remained grave and that the free nations must 
continue to cooperate in the defense of their in- 
tegrity and indeiiendence. The two Presidents 
agreed that the close friendship and the alliance 
between Pakistan and the United States continues 

' BuLiJCTiN of Aug. 7, 1961, p. 239. 

Oc/ober 75, 1962 

659893—62 3 

to represent an important contribution to the free 
world's quest for a durable peace. 


White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated September 24 

September 24, 1962 

Dear Mr. President : I am pleased to write that, after 
intensive study and analysis of the problems of waterlog- 
ging and .salinity in West Pakistan, the United States 
scientific team which I appointed last fall " has drafted a 
comprehensive report. As you know. Dr. Jerome B. 
Wiesner, my Special Assistant for Science and Technology, 
assembled a panel of specialists covering a broad range of 
knowledge and experience in agriculture, hydrology, en- 
gineering, and the economic and social sciences. We also 
enlisted the interest of Mr. Stewart Udall, my Secretary of 
the Interior, and of his Science Advisor, Dr. Roger 
Revelle, who has headed this Panel and has participated 
with great dedication in an extensive analysis of the 
problems. The solution of the problems of low agricul- 
tural productivity and waterlogging and salinity in West 
Pakistan requires efforts of unprecedented proportions. 
The most far-reaching conclusion of the Panel has been 
that waterlogging and salinity must be attacked within 
the context of a broad approach toward a large and rapid 
increase in agricultural productivity. This can be done 
by an integrated application of all the factors of agricul- 
tural production, combined with sustained human effort 
and sufficient capital investment to attain momentum in 
improvement. The Panel's primary recommendation to 
achieve these goals is a reorientation of the strategy to 
concentrate efforts on limited project areas, each roughly 
a million acres in size, so as to permit a coordinated attack 
on all aspects of the agricultural problem. In total, this 
becomes an ambitious program, but one that is required 
to meet an exceedingly difficult set of problems. 

In transmitting the Panel's report to you, at this time, 
we wish to consider the Panel's product as still in draft 
form, subject to review and modification. We would like 
to have the reactions of your officials and experts — since 
the basic data utilized in the Panel's analysis depends so 
heavily on Pakistan sources — as well as further discus- 
sions among the members of our scientific team. In addi- 
tion, it would be possible to send Dr. Roger Revelle and 
other members of the team to Pakistan at a time con- 
venient to you for personal discussions of the Panel's 
findings with your people. 

I share the enthusiasm and feeling the Panel has had 
on the problem and wish you well in your vital endeavor 
on behalf of the people of Pakistan. 

With warm personal regards, 
Sincerely yours, 

John F. Kennedy 

His Excellency Mohammad Ayub Khan 
President of Pakistan 

- For background, see ihici., p. 241. 


The European Common Market 
and the Trade Expansion Program 

hy J. Robert Schaetzel 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs ^ 

It seems to be an inescapable part of our demo- 
cratic process, if not a sine qua non of American- 
ism, to believe that our country is regularly bested 
at the international negotiating tables. Further, 
that the foreign policy and negotiators of other 
nations protect their interests and they succeed in 
their efforts, but American efforts are ill-conceived 
and all too regularly fail. 

My thesis is that this stereotype is, in general, 
demonstrably fallacious and, with reference to our 
country's Atlantic policy, wildly wrong. In the 
next few minutes I shall try to establish and defend 
several simple but profoundly important points, 
points critical to the future security and prosperity 
of the United States : 

1. The European Common Market is one of the 
great achievements of this century. 

2. While the movement toward European unity 
is an indigenous European phenomenon — if it had 
not been so, it would not have succeeded — it owes 
much to the steady and enlightened support of 

3. If the European Community, growing in 
unity and strength, continues to work in concert 
with the United States, we shall provide a firm 
foundation for a secure free world. 

4. The trade expansion program gives the Presi- 
dent authority to weld the next link in the chain 
of collaboration between Western Europe and the 
United States which is now marked by our inter- 
locking ties through NATO and the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 

Let me return to my first point. From the Mar- 
shall Plan onward all American Presidents, both 
political parties, and both the legislative and ex- 
ecutive branches of our Government have con- 
sistently supported the cause of European unity. 
Our postwar assistance made possible the economic 
recovery of Western Europe. We urged the bene- 

' Remarks made before the American Mining Congress 
at San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 24 (i)ress release 577 
dated Sept. 21). 


fits but did not make European unity prerequisite, 
The combination of economic growth and the idea 
of unity created the conditions that led to the 
Schiunan plan in 1950 — the pooling in 1952 of the 
coal and steel resources of the six countries, 
France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux 

Because it is now accomplished fact, marked, 
for instance, by the triumphant visit 2 weeks ago 
of General de Gaulle to Germany, we ignore the 
extraordinary historic achievement that the bel- 
ligerency of centuries between these countries is 
now, finally, a thing of the past. Today there 
exists on the Continent organic alliance and com- 
mon purpose where war and hatred existed before. 
And Germany is tied irrevocably to the West. 

The Soviet Union is also impressed by this West- 
ern European achievement in imity. Yet, first, they 
refused to believe it could succeed. After all, the 
idea that capitalist states can unify short of war 
runs directly contrary to Communist theology. 
Now, however, they have accepted the unpleasant 
fact and today bend their diplomatic and propa- 
ganda efforts to defeat the Common Market. 

The reason for the Soviet Union's concern is 
easy to see. The Common Market, growing at an 
annual rate of 7 percent a year, with 170 million 
intelligent, skilled people, is the third great source 
of world power, ranking with the United States 
and the Soviet Union. 

The disagreements that must mark any demo- 
cratic society or alliance — -and they mark ours of 
the North Atlantic — obscure the extent of common 
purpose and the ties that bind Europe and the 
United States increasingly closely together. 
Sometimes it seems that the Russians see the 
strength of the North Atlantic alliance more clear- 
ly than do the Allies. We should realize, as the 
Russians doubtless do, that a solid, monolithic 
exterior, backed by suUen discontents — the War- 
saw Pact pattern — is far less reliable in the long 
run than a partnership in which differences are 
freely expressed and resolved. 

Now, to relate the Trade Expansion Act to these 
great European developments : If we may assume 
that the United Kingdom becomes the seventh 
member of the Common Market, then the enlarged 
European Community will include 220 million 
people with a gross national product of some $274 
billion in 1961. This is $35 billion more than that 
of the U.S.S.R. for the same year. This vast West- 

Department of State Bulletin 


ern European economic union is in tlie process of 
putting in place a single tariff wall around its 
borders, while at the same time all internal bar- 
riers within the Community are rapidly being 

The principal purpose of the Trade Expansion 
Act is to enable the President to bargain down the 
Common Market's tariff, to bargain reductions of 
the American tariff for reciprocal redvictions of 
the EEC's new tariff. The crucial importance of 
these prospective negotiations can be seen from 
the fact that the United States and the enlarged 
Common Market together conduct among them- 
selves 90 percent of free-world trade and we and 
the EEC account for 90 percent of the free world's 
industrial production. 

It is possible and highly agreeable, in conclusion, 
to be able to note that the Congress and the Amer- 
ican people have shown their support of this 
analysis. The overwhelming vote for the trade 
expansion bill (78 to 8 in the Senate on Septem- 
ber 19) is a legislative assertion that the Presi- 
dent must be able to negotiate with the Common 
Market. This congressional support, in turn, was 
dependent upon and responsive to the great attrac- 
tion to Americans of European unity. We have 
a mandate to develop a trade partnership with 
the Coimnon Market. 

SEATO Members IVleet Informally 

Statement for the Press ^ 

Representatives of member countries of SEATO 
[Southeast Asia Ti-eaty Organization] met in- 
formally at lunch as guests of Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk in New York today [September 29]. 
Present were Secretary General Pote Sarasin, the 
Foreign Ministers of Australia, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom, 
and the French Ambassador to the United States. 

Following lunch there was a general exchange 
of views on the world situation and particularly 
problems in the treaty area. During the discus- 
sion the representatives expressed their apprecia- 
tion for the work of the Secretary General since 
their last meeting of the SEATO Council. They 
anticipate that a regular meeting of the Council 

* Released at New York, N.T., on Sept. 29. 

of Foreign Ministers might be held in Paris in 
the first half of 1963, the exact date to be the sub- 
ject of further consultation. 

U.S. Officials and German Minister 
Hold Talks on Foreign Aid Programs 

Following is the text of a joint V.S.-German 
communique released on September 28 at the con- 
clusion of talks held at Washington, D.C., between 
Walter Scheel, Minister for Economic Coopera- 
tion of the Federal Repuhlic of GermMny, and U.S. 
Government officials. 

Press release 589 dated September 28 

Mr. Walter Scheel, Minister for Economic Co- 
operation of the Federal Republic of Germany has 
been in Washington throughout this week on an 
official visit. He came primarily to exchange 
views and information with U.S. Government offi- 
cials about the foreign aid programs of West Ger- 
many and the United States. 

His appointments included talks with Secretary 
of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary 
of State George Ball, AID [Agency for Interna- 
tional Development] Administrator Fowler Ham- 
ilton, Deputy AID Administrator Frank M. 
Coffin, and the President of the Export-Import 
Bank, Harold Linder. Minister Scheel also met 
with the Assistant Secretaries of State and with 
Assistant Administrators of AID for Africa, the 
American Republics, the Near East, South Asia, 
and the Far East for review of development prob- 
lems of individual countries. 

Minister Scheel described tlie program of offi- 
cial bilateral lending to less developed countries 
which has been launched by the Federal Republic 
in recent years, supplementing existing programs 
of technical assistance and contributions to inter- 
national development agencies. The United 
States representatives recognized the important 
effort so far made by the Federal Republic and 
stressed the importance for the common aid effort 
of increasing aid to the less developed countries 
and of liberalizing the tenns of such aid. 

Discussions took place on the means of coordi- 
nating the economic assistance being extended by 
the industrialized countries. The need for inten- 
sified coordination of aid to particular recipient 

Ocfober 75, 7962 


countries was accepted by both sides. It was recog- 
nized that the Development Assistance Committee 
of the OECD [Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development], in cooperation with 
the IBRD [International Bank for Reconsti-uction 
and Development], and other multilateral institu- 
tions, can play a key role in formulating plans for 
coordination and in carrying them into practice. 
It was agreed to hold further conversations of this 
kind at regular intervals. 

An understanding was reached that the Federal 
Republic would cooperate closely with the Al- 
liance for Progress program in order to fit its bi- 
lateral measures in Latin America into the frame- 
work of this program. Close cooperation among 
all contributors with respect to the economic de- 
velopment of Africa was also envisaged. 

Minister Scheel's itinerary will take him to 
Seattle and New York, where further discussions 
on development problems will take place at United 
Nations headquarters with Mr. Paul Hoffman and 
other U.N. officials. He will also be guest of 
honor at receptions in New York hosted by the 
Council on Foreign Relations and the German 
American Chamber of Commerce prior to depart- 
ing for Geimany on October 4. 

Mr. McGhee Visits Congo To Assess 
Progress on U.N. Integration Plan 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 25 that George C. McGhee, Under Secre- 
tary of State for Political Affairs, departed from 
Washington that day for the Republic of the 
Congo. The purpose of Mr. McGhee's trip is to 
consult with Ambassador Edmund Gullion, Robert 
Gardiner, Chief of the United Nations Operation 
in the Congo, and Congolese officials, including 
Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, in order to pre- 
pare a firsthand report for President Kennedy and 
Secretarj' Rusk on the progress in carrying out the 
U.N. Secretary-General's proposal for an inte- 
grated Congo.^ 

Mr. McGhee will be accompanied on his trip by 
J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for African Affairs. 

' For background, see Bulletin of Sept 17, 19C2, p. 418. 

President Approves Recommendations 
on Barter Program 

White House Statement 

White House press release dated September 25 

The President has approved, with the exception 
of certain minor points to be studied further, the 
recommendations on the barter program submitted 
to him by the Executive Stockpile Committee, 
cliaired by Edward A. McDermott, Director of the 
Office of Emergency Planning. These recom- 
mendations were based on a study made by the 
committee as part of its continuing consideration 
of the overall stockpiling progi'am. 

The barter program, which is administered by 
the Secretary of Agriculture, was authorized by 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist- 
ance Act of 1954, as amended. It is a program 
through which surplus agricultural commodities 
are disposed of in exchange for strategic and other 
materials. Through December 31, 1961, $1,438,- 
500,000 worth of surplus agricultural commodities 
have been exchanged for materials, goods, and 
equipment. In recent years, the volume of trans- 
actions has been sharply reduced. The President's 
action approves methods through which the vol- 
ume of the transactions through the barter pro- 
gram will be increased over its present rate but 
carefully controlled to protect other national 

The committee's recommendations envision that 
future barter will be on a more selective basis than 
in the past and that the emphasis will be shifted 
from the acquisition of strategic and critical mate- 
rials to its use in various types of offshore procure- 
ment programs and as an aid in assisting some of 
the lesser developed countries. 

Wliile the general rule would be that barter 
should not be used to acquire strategic and critical 
materials that are in excess of national stockpile 
objectives, certain exceptions were approved which 
will permit such strategic and critical materials 
to be taken. An example would be where the 
United States would find it to its advantage to 
take useful materials in a barter transaction rather 
than acquire additional foreign currencies. 

The Secretary of Agriculture will consult with 
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the 
Treasury, respectively, concerning the general im- 

Department of State Bulletin 


pact that the barter program has on foreign policy 
and balance-of-payments considerations. In cer- 
tain other specified instances, consultations will be 
held with appropriate department heads before a 
barter transaction can be consummated. 

Waiver of Personal Appearance for Visa 
Applicant Facilitates Travel to U.S. 

White House press release dated September 27 

The President announced on September 27 that 
the Department of State will amend its reg-ula- 
tions to facilitate the granting of nonimmigrant 
visitor visas overseas as part of the administra- 
tion's major new program to encourage foreign 
travel to the United States. 

Effective immediately [October 2], the Presi- 
dent said, the Department will simplify visa pro- 
cedures by authorizing a waiver of personal 
appearance for certain categories of noninmiigrant 
applicants. The change is directed primarily at 
visitors planning trips to the United States for 
business or pleasure. 

The present requirement that all visa applicants 
must appear personally before a consular officer 
is a source of expense and irritation to foreign 
travelers, many of whom are required to go great 
distances to make personal appearances. 

The new system, which permits applications by 
mail, was worked out by the Department of State 
in liaison with the appropriate committees of the 
Congress and with the Immigration and Natu- 
ralization Service. 

Simplification of visa procedures was one of 
the measures proposed by the President to correct 
the basic balance-of-payments deficit. The recom- 
mendation was made in the President's message 
(February 6, 1961) to the Congress on balance of 
payments and gold.^ 

At the outset the Department of State plans to 
place the new system into effect in 167 posts aroimd 
the world. 

Following the message to the Congress the 
President requested the Department of State and 
other interested agencies (Treasury, Commerce, 
and the Attorney General) to facilitate tourism 

and to take all necessary administrative steps to 
simplify the issuance of nonimmigrant visas over- 
seas where now required by law, "recognizing that 
the Congress will be asked to amend applicable 
statutes to waive non-immigrant visas insofar as 
security considerations permit." 

As a first step in carrying out the Presidential 
directive, the Department of State in February 
1961 discontinued using a widely criticized long- 
form visa application and substituted a simplified 
short form. 

In June of this year a bill ^ was introduced to 
waive nonimmigrant visa requirements for na- 
tionals of Western Hemisphere countries and 
other countries with "normally under-subscribed 
quotas." The House Subcommittee on Immigra- 
tion and Nationality, headed by Representative 
Francis E. Walter, held a hearing on the bill and 
indicated that this step was premature and sug- 
gested some form of waiver of personal appearance 
rather than a waiver of the visa requirement itself. 
The State Department then pursued this sugges- 
tion and evolved the new visa issuance procedure. 

The new mail application system is built around 
a revised short form which will enable consular 
officers to make a detennination whether the visa 
may be issued by mail or whether a personal ap- 
pearance should be required in an individual case. 

Under the new plan security considerations are 
fully protected. It should also be noted that the 
waiver of personal appearance for nonimmigrant 
visa applicants is modified by the requirement that 
in individual cases where the consular officer is not 
satisfied with the documentation which has been 
submitted by mail he may ask the applicant for a 
personal interview before making a final deter- 
mination in his case. 

The Department of State reported on Septem- 
ber 27 that more foreign visitors obtained visas to 
travel in the United States in the last fiscal year 
than ever before. Statistics in the Department 
of State Visa Office reveal that 752,942 nonimmi- 
grant visas were issued, principally to visitors for 
business and pleasure. This was 5 percent higher 
than the record set in the preceding fiscal year. 
The percentage of increase is the more significant 
as visitor visas ordinarily are valid for 4 years. 

' For text, see Bttlletin of Feb. 27, 1961, p. 287. 

»H.R. 12069. 

October 75, 7962 


United States Accepts Long-Term 
Cotton Textile Arrangement 

Press release 581 dated September 25 

The United States on September 25 formally 
accepted the long-term cotton textile arrangement 
which was negotiated on an ad referendum basis 
at a meeting of the Cotton Textiles Committee of 
the General Agreement on Tariti's and Trade held 
at Geneva January 29-February 9, 1962.^ Nine- 
teen nations,- representing the principal cotton 
textile exporting and importing nations of the 
free world, participated in drafting the arrange- 
ment. Notification of this acceptance has been 
transmitted to the executive secretary of GATT. 

The new arrangement is similar to an earlier 
agreement covering the 1-year period October 1, 
1961, to September 30, 1962.^ It provides for 
the development of world trade in cotton textiles 
in a reasonable and orderly manner during the 
5-year period commencing October 1, 1962. It 
assures growing export opportunities in cotton 
textiles while avoiding disruptive effects in do- 
mestic markets that may be caused by excessive 

The arrangement provides the American cotton 
textile industry with a 5-year period in which it 
may plan its production and sharpen its competi- 
tive position with the confidence that foreign im- 
ports will not disrupt domestic markets. The re- 
quest for such an arrangement was based upon 
point 6 of President Kennedy's seven-point pro- 
gram of assistance to the textile industry, an- 
nounced on May 2, 1961,^ which directed the 

• For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431. 

° Australia, Austria, Canada, Dcnmarls, India, Japan, 
Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United King- 
dom (also representing Hong Kong), United States, and 
the member states of European Economic Community 
(Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and Netherlands). 

'For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 21, 19G1, p. 337. 

* Ihid., May 29, 1961, p. 825. 

Department of State to seek an international un- 
derstanding in this field. Representatives of in- 
dustry and labor advised the U.S. Government in 
the negotiation of tWs arrangement. 

Benefits for Persecutees Under 
Austrian Victims' Welfare Law 

Press release 587 dated September 28 

The Department of State has received informa- 
tion that the Austrian Government is now accept- 
ing applications for benefits under the 12th amend- 
ment to the Austrian Victims' Welfare Law. The 
law provides for compensation for subjection to 
any or all of the following persecutory measures: 

a. Imprisonment in jail or concentration camp. 
No compensation will be paid for imprisonment 
if the income of the victim and/or survivor in each 
of the years 1955 and 1960 exceeded the amount 
of Austrian scliillings 72,000 (approximately 

b. Emigration to escape persecution and sub- 
sequent internment by one of the powers at war 
with Germany. 

c. Forcible detention in a ghetto or place of 

d. Being forced, because of persecution, to live 
in hiding under conditions incompatible with hu- 
man dignity. 

e. Forcible removal from Austria to a place out- 
side of Austria. 

f . The wearing of a Jewish star (Star of David) 
for at least 6 months. 

Persons who were Austrian citizens on Slarch 
13, 1938, or who for a period of 10 years prior 
tliercto liad their residence within the territory 
of the Eepublic of Austria, regardless of their 
present nationality, should request claim appli- 
cations from the Amt der Wiener Landesregie- 
nrnig, Magistratsahteilung 12, Gonzagagasse 23, 
Vienna I. 


Department of State Bulletin 


International Implications of Communications Satellite Activities 

Statement hy G. Griffith Johnson 
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 

I greatly appreciate this opportunity to make a 
statement on behalf of the Department of State on 
the international implications and foreign policy 
aspects of the communications satellite activities 
of the United States. The Department of State 
is intimately involved with the many foreign pol- 
icy implications and foreign relations jDroblems to 
which telecommunications in general and the de- 
velopment of a communications satellite system in 
particular give rise. 

The lamiching of the experimental satellite 
Telstar^ and the recent enactment of the Com- 
munications Satellite Act of 1962 have created 
enonnous interest, both here and throughout the 
world, in this dramatic new communications tech- 
nique. An operational system, still some years in 
the future, offers great promise of substantially 
increasing the rapidity and ease of long-distance 
communications at significantly lower rates. 

Wliile there is no technological reason to pre- 
vent the use of communications satellites for 
domestic communications over large land masses, 
such as our own country, Brazil, India, and the 
U.S.S.R., the economic data now available indi- 
cates that their principal use, for some time to 
come, will be for communications between nations. 
It is therefore apparent that the operative com- 
mimications satellite system in which we are in- 
terested is international in scope. The develop- 
ment of such a system will require the conclusion 
of appropriate international agreements. Loca- 
tion of ground stations, frequency allocation. 

1 Made before the Subcommittee ou Applications of the 
House Committee on Science and Astronautics on Sept. 
27 (press release 586). 

= Bulletin of July 30, 1962, p. 191. 

channel assignments, technical standards — all 
these vital elements require effective international 
cooperation. The system will depend for its very 
existence on such cooperation and agreement. 

Framework of U.S. Policy 

The United States Govermnent has shown a 
thorough awareness of the necessarily interna- 
tional nature of a communications satellite sys- 
tem since the inception of its planning. As a 
result of intensive interagency study, under the 
direction of the Vice President and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Comicil, President Ken- 
nedy issued a basic statement of national policy on 
July 24, 1961.=" That policy statement reflects 
deep commitment to the principle of developing 
a commmiications satellite system in cooperation 
with and for the benefit of the nations of the 
world. His statement can properly be considered 
as the first definition of our foreign policy objec- 
tives in tliis field. 

The President said : 

Science and technology have progressed to such a de- 
gree that communication through the use of space satel- 
lites has become possible. Through this country's leader- 
ship, this competence should be developed for global benefit 
at the earliest practicable time. 

This statement also contained guidelines to the 
means by which the desired objective of global 
benefit can become a reality. Specifically, the fol- 
lowing requii'ements were established: Opportu- 
nity is to be provided for foreign participation in 
the commimications satellite system; nondiscrim- 
inatory use of and equitable access to the system 

= For text, see iUd., Aug. 11, 1961, p. 273. 

October 15, 7962 


by all authorized communications carriers is to be 
granted; technical assistance is to be provided to 
less developed countries to help obtain a truly 
global system as soon as practicable. 

Following the President's policy declaration, 
the executive branch and the Congress worked 
intensively to establish the most advantageous 
legislative framework to implement national pol- 
icy, culminating in the enactment by Congress of 
P.L. 87-624, approved by the President on August 
31, 1962.^ 

Passage of this bill was a source of real satis- 
faction to us in the Department of State. As the 
Secretary of State testified before the Senate For- 
eign Relations Committee during the hearings on 
the bill : = 

. . . there is every reason to suppose that the impetus 
from the passage of this legislation and the organization 
of this company will bring measurably closer the time 
when an effective global satellite communications system 
is in operation. That in itself will be a great advance 
for the foreign policy of the United States. 

We are anxious to get on with the job of imple- 
menting our national foreign policy objectives 
which are set forth with clarity and force in the 
act itself. 

In section 102 (a) Congress declares: 

— that our purpose is to establish a "global com- 
munications network" ; 

— that our aim is "global coverage at the earliest 
possible date"; 

— that our policy is to do this "in conjunction 
and in cooperation with other countries"; 

— that our purpose is to "serve the communica- 
tion needs of the United States and other 
countries" ; 

— that in so doing "care and attention will be 
directed ... to economically less developed coun- 
tries and areas"; and 

— that the system should be so designed as to 
"contribute to world peace and understanding." 

The language of the act thus explicitly and 
emphatically recognizes that international cooper- 
ation and agreement is a prerequisite to the estab- 
lishment of a satisfactory communications satellite 
system and that "international" includes all na- 
tions in what is repeatedly referred to as a global 

' For text of remarks by President Kennedy, see ibid., 
Sept. 24, 1962, p. 467. 
' For text, see ibid.. Aug. 27, 1062, p. 315. 


system. The needs of the less developed countries 
are expressly taken into account. And, finally, this 
exciting scientific development is tied directly to 
a basic goal of United States foreign policy which, 
as the act itself states, is to "contribute to world 
peace and understanding." 

Tliis constitutes a broad, well-defined charter of 
our foreign policy objectives as related to commu- 
nications satellites. 

There is need for strong leadership by the United 
States to develop the most efficient international 
arrangements. The Department of State, as the 
President's agent in foreign relations matters, ex- 
pects to play an important role in exerting this 
leadership. To realize our objectives through the 
joint efforts and close cooperation of government 
and industry will contribute significantly to both 
our national and international welfare. 

Basic Policy of United Nations 

A number of international organizations are 
also active in this field. The basic policy of the 
United Nations is contained in part D of General 
Assembly Resolution 1721, adopted on December 
20, 1961." This resolution was sponsored by the 
United States in response to President Kennedy's 
progi-am for space cooperation submitted to the 
United Nations on September 25, 1961,' and jointly 
sponsored by the Soviet Union. The resolution 
states that "communication by means of satellites 
should be available to the nations of the world as 
soon as practicable on a global and non-discrimi- 
natory basis." It then notes with satisfaction 
that a special conference to allocate radio frequen- 
cies for outer space activities is to be held in 1963, 
recommends that the 1963 conference also consider 
other aspects of space communications requiring 
international cooperation, notes the potential util- 
ity to the U.N. itself of this means of communica- 
tion, and invites all appropriate U.N. agencies to 
assist member countries to develop their domestic 
communications so that they may make effective 
use of space communications. 

There are striking similarities between these 
provisions and the policy objectives contained in 
the Connnunications Satellite Act of 1962. There 
is the same concern that this means of communica- 
tion be made available to the nations of the world 
as soon as practicable; the same conception of the 

' For text, see ihid., .Ian. 29, 1962, p. 185. 
' Ibid., Oct. 16, 1901, p. 619. 

Department of State Bulletin 

system as being global and nondiscriminatory ; and 
similar recognition of the special needs of the de- 
veloping nations of the world. This is not en- 
tirely coincidental. The United States played a 
major part in drafting Kesolution 1721. 

The resolution refers in several instances to the 
International Telecommmiication Union, the mem- 
ber of the U.N. family of organizations most 
clearly concerned with space communications. 
The ITU was created in 1865. Since 1949 it has 
been a specialized agency of the United Nations. 
The United States associated itself with the work 
of the ITU at the time of the Berlin Radio Confer- 
ence in 1906, and we have since participated 
actively m its activities. 

The basic objective of the ITU is to maintain 
and extend international cooperation for the im- 
provement and rational use of telecommunications 
of all kinds. In implementation of its objective 
it develops and promulgates by treaty interna- 
tional regulations to govern those aspects of tele- 
communications operation and use which require 
uniform international solutions. With respect to 
communication satellites, it will play a vital role 
in the allocation of radio frequency bands and the 
adoption of technical standards and operating 
procedures, which must be uniform internationally 
to achieve teclmical compatibility and maximum 
efficiency. The technical work of the ITU is car- 
ried on through various permanent committees, 
including the Eadio Consultative Committee, 
known as the CCIR, which is actively working on 
various teclmical aspects of the international use 
of communications satellites. 

At its 1959 plenary assembly, the ITU made 
limited assignments of radio frequency bands for 
research activity in outer space, including experi- 
mental communications satellites. At that tune 
it judged that it would be premature to attempt 
to deal with the needs of future operational ac- 
tivities but proposed that this matter be deter- 
mined at a special conference to be held in 1963. 
In June 1962, the ITU Administrative Council 
scheduled an Extraordinary Administrative Radio 
Conference to begin on October 7, 1963, in Geneva. 

As matters now stand, the conference will deal 
only with frequency allocation for space communi- 
cations, plus the amendments to other provisions 
of the international radio regulations necessarily 
arising out of the allocations for, and use of, space 
communications. However, the Administrative 
Council has asked members to submit by Decem- 

ber 31, 1962, information on three matters: their 
present plans with respect to the development of 
space communications; the subjects they regard 
as appropriate for international negotiation in 
order to achieve global space communications; 
and which of these subjects, if any, they believe 
should be included on the agenda of the 1963 
Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference. 
The final agenda for the 1963 conference is, there- 
fore, not yet known. This will be determined by 
the Administrative Council at its next meeting in 
Geneva in March 1963. 

Significance of ITU Extraordinary Conference 

The significance of the 1963 Extraordinary Con- 
ference should be emphasized. As you know, the 
electromagnetic frequency spectrum is finite. It is 
already crowded, and problems of interference are 
always present or threatening. It is vital that 
adequate frequency allocations be available to com- 
munications satellites. The United States is fully 
conscious of the importance of these considerations 
and has been working actively for some years in 
I^reparation for the 1963 conference. The tech- 
nical parameters of a communications satellite 
system will be determined in large measure by 
the frequency space assigned. In turn, these tech- 
nical parameters will deeply affect many of the 
international and foreign policy matters, such as 
number, location, and cost of ground stations, 
which must be considered in establisliing the basic 
international agreements prerequisite to the crea- 
tion of an effective global system. 

The Department of State, throvigh its Telecom- 
mimications Division and in close cooperation with 
the Director of Telecommunications Management, 
the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Commit- 
tee, and the Federal Communications Commission, 
is actively engaged in the preparation of our final 
proposals to be presented to the 1963 conference. 
Our preliminary proposals were circulated in Oc- 
tober 1961 to many of our comembers of the ITU 
for review and comment, and fiuial proposals are 
now bemg prepared. 

We are making every effort to insure that our 
proposals are approved by the 1963 conference 
subject to as little diminution of requested fre- 
quency space as possible. 

The ITU also plays a role in providing tech- 
nical assistance to member countries to further 
development of their communications systems. 

Ocfober 75, J 962 


Assistance in communications planning is given 
under the cjuidance of a Plan Committee. In ad- 
dition, ITU headquarters organizes training pro- 
grams. The Secretary-General also provides a 
valuable source of information and guidance to 
member countries concerning the sources of inter- 
national financial assistance for the development 
of domestic communications. I have available the 
first report* by the ITU on telecommunications 
and the peaceful uses of outer space, if the sub- 
committee would be interested in incorporating it 
in tlie record of these hearings. 

The United States has well-defined foreign 
policy objectives in this field. Through our ad- 
vances in this exciting new technology we as a na- 
tion are now able to bring into existence a global 
communications satellite system for the use and 
benefit of ourselves and the other nations of the 
world. This will not be accomplished overnight. 
Mucli additional work, both technical and or- 
ganizational, remains to be done. The step-by- 
step working out of a truly global system will re- 
quire the best efforts and intensive dedication of 
all of us both in and out of government. 

NASA's International Program 

In moving forward we will be building on the 
accomplishments to date. This committee has 
heard testimony from a representative of NASA 
[National Aeronautics and Space Administration] 
dealing principally with their technical program 
in communications satellites. Because of its suc- 
cess and importance for the future I would like to 
comment briefly on NASA's international program 
in this field. A basic policy of NASA has been 
that its experimental and research efforts should 
be carried out within a framework of the broadest 
possible international cooperation and results 
made available to the world scientific community 
in the largest possible measure. In implementing 
this program, NASA, with the cooperation and 
assi.stance as necessary of the Department of State, 
lias made various arrangements through which 
more than 50 countries are now participating in 
United States space projects. The extent of for- 
eign participation varies, of course, as a function 
of the relative degree of advancement in space 
sciences of the particular country, ranging from 
the exchange of personnel and the operation of 

' ITU doc. 2S3.5 dated May 24, 1902. 

tracking or data acquisition stations to the design 
and construction of entire satellites. NASA has 
provided lamiching facilities in the United States 
for a satellite equipped by Great Britain as well 
as the Canadian-designed satellite Alouette. 

In the field of communications satellites 
NASA's international programs have followed a 
similar pattern. Commencing with Echo I ar- 
rangements have been made for observation, ex- 
periment, and testing with many countries. In 
connection with active repeater communications 
satellite experiments, ground stations have been 
built by France and Great Britain solely at their 
own expense. Ground facilities are presently un- 
der construction in Germany, Italy, and Brazil. 
In addition, expressions of interest have been re- 
ceived from and discussions held with many other 
countries looking toward participation in this 
experimental program. These activities are a 
practical demonstration of the desirability of in- 
ternational cooperation. Planned by scientific and 
technical personnel, they are confirmed by a gov- 
ernment-to-government exchange of notes after 
agreement is reached on the technical level. 

Since the inception of our research and experi- 
mentation in the field of communications satel- 
lites we have constantly expanded these interna- 
tional cooperative jDrograms. This has been and 
continues to be a decisive demonstration of our 
national policy tliat the benefits of space technol- 
ogy sliall be available to all. We must now move 
through the experimental and development stage 
to an operational system as rapidly as possible. 
The Department of State is deeply aware that 
this is a high-priority goal. The guidelines are 
clear, and the means exist to achieve our objec- 
tives througli the mutual efforts and close coopera- 
tion of all concerned. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign PoHcy 

87th Congress, 2d Session 

Federal Employees in the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands. Report to accompany S. 3319. S. Kept. 1906. 
August 22, 1S)(;2. 5 pp. 

Amendments to the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926. 
Report to afcomi)any H.R. 11880. S. Rept. 1925. Au- 
gust 27, l!)i;2. 12 pp. 

Attendance at Meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamen- 
tary Association. Report to accompany S. Res. 379. 
S. Rept. 1926. August 27, 1962. 2 pp. 

Department of Sfofe Bulletin 

World Newsprint Supply-Demand : Outlook Through 
1964. Report of the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce. H. Kept. 2273. August 27, 1962. 
30 pp. 

Extending the Charter of the American Hospital of Paris. 
Report to accompany H.R. 11996. S. Rept. 1930. Au- 
gust 2S. 1962. 3 pp. 

Tariff Classification of Certain Partideboard. Report to 
accompany H.R. 12242. H. Rept. 2318. August 31, 
1962. 2 pp. 

Duty Treatment of Certain Bread. Report to accompany 
H.R. 8985. H. Rept. 2325. September 6, 1962. 3 pp. 

The Fifth Annual Report Covering U.S. Participation in 
the International Atomic Energy Agency for 1961. 
Message from the President transmitting the report. 
H. Doc. 538. September 6, 1962. 31 pp. 

Free Entry of Two Spectometers for the University of 
Illinois. Report, together with supplemental views, to 
accompany H.R. 12529. S. Rept. 2045. September 13, 
1962. 7 pp. 

Permitting Investment of Funds of Insurance Companies 
Organized Within the District of Columbia in Obliga- 
tions of the Inter-American Development Bank. Re- 
port to accompany H.R. 12690, H. Rept. 2364, September 
13, 1962, 12 pp. ; and report to accompany S. 3358, S. 
Rept. 2053, September 14, 1962, 3 pp. 

Tariff Treatment of Certain Electron Microscopes. Re- 
port to accompany H.R. 9414. H. Rept. 2368. Septem- 
ber 14, 1962. 2 pp. 

Amending the Act Providing for Promotion of Economic 
and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands. Re- 
port to accompany H.R. 10937. S. Rept. 2103. Sep- 
tember 18, 1962. 9 pp. 

Conservation of Tropical Tuna. Report to accompany 
S. 2568. H. Rept. 2409. September 18, 1962. 24 pp. 

Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 
1963. Report to accompany H.R. 13175. H. Rept. 
2410. September 18, 1962. 39 pp. 

Situation in Cuba. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 230. 
S. Rept. 2111. September 19, 1962. 5 pp. 


Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings^ 

Adjourned During September 1962 

16th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival 

I6th Pan American Sanitary Conference and 14th Meeting of 
WHO Regional Committee for the Americas. 

ICAO Assembly: 14th Session 

UNESCO Meeting of Experts on General Secondary Education 
in Arab States. 

UNESCO Executive Board: 62d Session 

13th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art 

ICAO Legal Committee: 14th Session 

U.N. ECAFE: 2d Symposium on the Development of Petroleum 
Resources of Asia and the Far East. 

16th International Dairy Congress 

U.N. ECE Meeting on Farm Rationalization 

U.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles .... 

FAO International Rice Commission: Working Party on Agricul- 
tural Engineering Aspects of Rice Production, Storage, and 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on Higher Education in 

OECD Committee on Restrictive Business Practices: Working 
Party 1. 

FAO World Food Program Pledging Conference 

U.N. Committee on Arrangements for a Conference for the Pur- 
pose of Reviewing the Charter. 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: 
Technical Working Party on Compensatory Financing. 

PAHO Executive Committee: 47th Meeting 

NATO Food and Agriculture Planning Committee 

Edinburgh Aug. 19-Sept. 2 

Minneapolis Aug. 21-Sept. 17 

Rome Aug. 21-Sept. 17 

Tunis Aug. 23-Sept. 1 

Paris and Istanbul Aug. 23-Sept. 14 

Venice Aug. 25-Sept. 8 

Rome Aug. 28-Sept. 15 

Tehran Sept. 1-15 

Copenhagen Sept. 3-7 

Geneva Sept. 3-7 

Geneva Sept. 3-7 

Kuala Lumpur Sept. 3-8 

Tananarive Sept. 3-12 

Paris Sept. 4 (1 day) 

New York Sept. 5 fl day) 

New York Sept. 5 (1 day) 

New York Sept. 5-14 

Minneapolis Sept. 6 (1 day) 

Paris Sept. 6-8 

1 Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Sept. 28, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCITT, 
Comit6 consultatif international t616graphique et t^l^phonique; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; 
FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic 
Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; ITU, Inter- 
national Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization. 

Ocfober 75, 7962 


Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued 

Adjourned During September 1962 — Continued 

CENTO Scientific Council: llth Meeting 

GATT Cotton Textile Coniniittee 

FAO International Kice Commission: 8th Session 

GATT Working Party on Association of Greece with the Euro- 
pean Economic Community. 

U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 

U.N. ECAFE Study Week on Promotion of Tourism 

FAO Cocoa Study Group: Preparatory Working Party .... 

U.N. ECE Working Party on Rural Electrification: Study Tour . 

U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: Standing Conunittee on 

IAEA Board of Governors 

OECD Development Assistance Committee: Working Group on 
Aid to Colombia. 

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance 
of Payments). 

6th FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Far East. . . . 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Inter- 
national Coordination Group of the International Cooperative 
Investigations of the Tropical Atlantic. 

ILO Meeting on Inter-American Vocational Training Research 
and Documentation Center. 

GATT Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration . . 

U.N. ECE Coal Committee and Working Parties 

U.N. ECE Trade Committee 

Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: Board of Direc- 

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter- 
national Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, 
and International Development Association: Annual Meetings 
of Boards of Governors. 

IAEA General Conference: 6th Regular Session 

ILO Metal Trades Committee: 7th Session 

U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Community Facilities in Relation to 
Housing and Working Party on Housing and Building Mate- 

8th Inter- American Travel Congress 

International Criminal Police Organization: 31st General Assem- 

WHO Regional Committee for Western Pacific: 13th Session . 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 2d 

U.N. ECE Working Party on Rural Electrification 

U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: 21st Session 

OECD Working Party II (Economic Growth) 

OECD Industry Committee 

U.N. ECE Steel Committee 

International Coinicil for the Exploration of the Sea: S|)ecial 
Meeting To Consider Problems in the Exploitation and Regula- 
tion of Fisheries for Crustacea. 

In Session as of September 30, 1962 

Istanbul Sept. 8-11 

Geneva Sept. 10-12 

Kuala Lumpur Sept. 10-14 

Geneva Sept. 10-14 

New York Sept. 10-14 

Karachi Sept. 10-15 

Rome Sept. 10-20 

Finland and Sweden Sept. 10-25 

Addis Ababa Sept. 12-22 

Vienna Sept. 12-26 

Paris Sept. 13-15 

Washington Sept. 14-16 

Kuala Lumpur Sept. 15-29 

Paris Sept. 17-19 

Bogota Sept. 17-21 

Geneva Sept. 17-21 

Geneva Sept. 17-21 

Geneva Sept. 17-21 

San Jose, Costa Rica Sept. 17-22 

Washington Sept. 17-22 

Vienna Sept. 17-26 

Geneva Sept. 17-28 

New Delhi Sept. 17-29 

Guadalajara Sept. 19-25 

Madrid Sept. 19-26 

Manila Sept. 20-25 

Paris Sept. 20-28 

Geneva Sept. 25 (1 day) 

Geneva Sept. 26-28 

Paris Sept. 27-28 

Paris Sept. 27-28 

Geneva Sept. 27-28 

Copenhagen Sept. 28-29 


Mar. 14- 

Conference of the Eightoen-Nation Committee on Disarmament 

(recessed September 8 until November 12). 

U.N. ECE Coal Study Tour of the U.S.S.R 

Caribbean Organization: 2d Meeting of the Standing Advisory 

Committee of the Caribbean Plan. 
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions .... 

GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification 

2d ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting Vancouver Sept. 25- 

ITU CCITT Study Group III (General Tariff Principles and Geneva Sept. 27- 

Lease of Telecommunications Circuits). 
U.N. ECE Seminar on Water Pollution Control Basel, Switzerland Sept. 30- 

U.S.S.R Sept. 23- 

Surinam Sept. 24- 

Geneva Sept. 24^ 

Geneva Sept. 24- 









Department of State Bulletin 


Sharing the Financial Burdens of a Changing World 

Following are texts of remarks made by Presi- 
dent Kennedy and a statement made hy Under 
Secretary of State Ball before the Boards of 
Governors of the International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development, tJie International 
Monetary Fund, the International Finance Cor- 
poration, and the International Development As- 
sociation, lohich held their annual meetings at 
Washington, D.C., September 17-22. 


White House press release dated September 20 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Board of Gover- 
nors, distinguished guests: This is my first op- 
portunity to take part in your annual meetings 
and to welcome you to Washington, and I do so 
with the greatest of pleasure, for you are con- 
cerned with the problems which have been among 
my primary concerns since the day I took office 
exactly 20 months ago, and in that time I have 
come to appreciate how vital a role is played by 
the International Monetary Fund and the Inter- 
national Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment and its affiliated institutions. 

The work of the International Development 
Association is pai'ticularly important, and this 
country fully supports the proposal that the execu- 
tive directors develop a program to mcrease its 

The pioneering practices of the Bank which 
have set a standard for others to follow will 
sorely miss the services of Eugene Black. I hope 
he will permit us to call upon his wise counsel in 
the future and that the rest of us, in pursuing the 
goals which he set, will increase our own efforts, 
including efforts in the industrialized countries 
to provide greater capital assistance to the less 
developed areas, efforts also in the industrialized 
countries to maintain at home prosperous and 
easily accessible markets for the products of the 
growing nations, efforts to reach commodity agree- 

ments and other arrangements which will help 
stabilize the export earnings of these nations, and 
finally, and most importantly, greater efforts in the 
developing nations themselves to mobilize effec- 
tively their own people and their financial re- 
sources and to make certain that the benefits of 
increased output are shared by the many and not 
by the few. 

The State of the Dollar 

In addition to these discussions on the role of 
the Bank, your meetings this year, as was true last 
year, are giving top attention to the state of the 
dollar, and that has been at or near the top of my 
own agenda for the last year and a half. 

We in the United States feel no need to be self- 
conscious in discussing the dollar. It is not only 
our national currency; it is an international cur- 
rency. It plays a key role in the day-to-day func- 
tioning of the free world's financial framework. 
It is the most effective substitute for gold in the 
international payments system. If the dollar did 
not exist as a reserve currency, it would have to be 
invented, for a volume of foreign trade already 
reaching $130 billion a year, and growing rapidly, 
accompanied by large international capital move- 
ments, cannot rest solely on a slowly growing stock 
of gold which now totals only $40 billion. 

The security of the dollar, tlierefore, is and 
ought to be of major concern to every nation here. 
To undermine the strength of the dollar would 
undermine the strength of the free world. To 
compete for national financial security in its nar- 
rowest sense by taking individual actions incon- 
sistent with our common goals would, in the end, 
only impair the security of us all. 

I recognize that this nation has special responsi- 
bilities as one of the leaders of the free world, as 
its richest and most powerful nation, as possessor 
of its most important currency, and as the chief 
banker for international trade. We did not seek 
all of these burdens, but we do not shrink from 


October 15, 1962 


them. We are taking every prudent step to main- 
tain tlic strength of the dolliir, to improve our 
bahmco of payments, and to back up tlie dollar 
by expanding the growth of our economy. We are 
pledged to keep tlie dollar full}^ convertible into 
gold and to back that pledge with all our resources 
of gold and credit. 

We have not impaired the value of the dollar 
by imposing restrictions on its use. We have not 
imposed upon our citizens in peacetime any limita- 
tions on the amount of dollars that they may wish 
to take or send abroad. We have followed a lib- 
eral policy on trade, and we have continued to 
supply our friends and allies with dollars and gold 
to rebuild their economies and defend their 

Sharing the Burden 

All this we have willingly done. No other 
country or currency has borne so many burdens. 
But we cannot and should not bear them all alone. 
I know that other countries do not exi^ect us to 
bear indefinitely both the responsibilities of main- 
taining an international currency and, in addition, 
a disjiroportionate share of the costs of defending 
the free world and fostering social and economic 
progress in the less developed parts of the world. 

Concern over our imbalance of pajmients is not 
our concern alone, for it is not caused by our 
narrow self-interests. Our deficit this year is ex- 
pected to approximate $11/4 billion, a considerable 
improvement over last year's $2V^ billion and even 
higher deficits in the years before. But our total 
gross military expenditures abroad are $3 billion 
alone. Our dollar aid expenditures abroad are 
$1.3 billion. 

The dollar, itself, is strong, and our commercial 
trade, excluding exports financed by AID [Agency 
for International Development], produces a sur- 
plus of nearly $3 billion. In short, our balance- 
of-payments deficit is not the result of any 
monetary or economic mismanagement but the 
result of ex])enditures our people have made on 
behalf of the peoples of the free world. 

In 1946 the United States held over 60 percent 
of the world's supply of gold. Xow we are down 
to 40 percent, and during that time we have spent 
some $88 billion overseas for the defense and aid 
of others. The European nations alone received 
some $26 billion in economic aid. The United 
States, as a result, no longer has a disproportion- 


ate share of the free world's gold, economic 
strength, or economic responsibility. 

That is why I emphasize once again these are 
not American problems ; they are free- world prob- 
lems. They are problems which cannot be met by 
one nation in isolation, or by many nations in dis- 
array. They are not the sole concern of either the 
rich or the poor, of either deficit or surplus nations 

When burdens are shared, there is no undue bur- 
den on any nation. Wlien risk is shared, there is 
less risk for all. And cooperative efforts to defend 
the international currency system based primarily 
on the dollar and to share other responsibilities 
are not, therefore, based on appeals to gratitude or 
even friendship, but on the hard and factual 
grounds of self-interest and common sense. 

Of course the United States could bring its 
international payments into balance overnight, if 
that were the only goal we sought. We could 
withdraw our forces, reduce our aid, tie it wholly 
to purchases in this country, raise high tariif bar- 
riers, and restrict the foreign investments or other 
uses of American dollars. 

Such a policy, it is true, would give rise to a 
new era of dollar shortages, free- world insecurity, 
and American isolation. But we would have 
solved the balance of payments. But the basic 
strength of the dollar makes such actions as un- 
necessaiy as they are unwise. They would not 
only be inconsistent with the responsibility and 
role of the United States in the world today ; they 
would, because of the crucial role of the dollar, 
be utterly self-defeating. 

The Only Feasible Course — Cooperation 

All of us here are detemiined to follow the only 
other feasible course — not the imacceptable courses 
of restriction and isolation or deflation, but the 
course of true cooperation, of liberal payments 
and trade, of sharing the cost of our NATO and 
Pacific defenses, of sharing the cost of the free 
world's development aid, and of working together 
on steps to greater international stability with 
other currencies, in addition to the dollar, bearing 
an increasing share of its central responsibilities. 

We in the United States recognize that our own 
obligation in this regard includes, as a matter of 
the first priority, taking action to eliminate the 
deficit in our balance of payments and to do so 
without resorting to deflation or retreating to 

Department of State Bulletin 

isolation. I have spoken frankly at this meeting 
because these two successful institutions, the Bank 
and the Fund, have long flourished in a spirit of 
candor and have consistently shown a reliable 
capacity to respond both flexibly and effectively to 
new needs and new challenges. 

This spirit of cooperation and candor and initi- 
ative will, I know, continue in the future, for only 
in this spirit can we hope to maintain a sturdy 
free-world financial system, witli stable exchange 
rates capable of supporting a growing flow of 
trade and foreign investment free from discrimina- 
tions and restrictions. 

I lis ve spoken frankly, moreover, because I be- 
lieve /he current strength of the dollar enables us 
to spyak frankly and with confidence. Some shar- 
ing of responsibilities has already been achieved. 
Considerable progi-ess in the balance of our inter- 
national accounts has been made. A new agree- 
ment among 10 industrialized countries to supple- 
ment the resources of the Fund, with sjDecial 
borrowing arrangements of up to $6 billion, has 
been concluded,^ and implementing action will be 
completed by the United States Congress within 
the next few days or weeks. 

Less formal arrangements between the major 
trading countries have also been evolved to cope 
with any potential strains or shocks that might 
arise from a sudden movement of capital. These 
arrangements, I should add, contain within them- 
selves the possibility of wider and more general 
application, and tins country will always be re- 
ceptive to suggestions for expanding these ar- 
rangements or otherwise improving the operation 
and efficiency of the international payments 

All of this is ground for confidence, for making 
it increasingly clear that no extreme or restrictive 
measures are needed ; that speculation against the 
dollar is losing its allure; and that the economy 
of the United States can continue to expand in a 
framework based on the maintenance of free ex- 
change and the early achievement of equilibriiun. 

The expansion in our domestic economy, while 
not all that we had hoped, has been substantial; 
and, of equal importance, it has been accompanied 
by price stability. Wliolesale prices for indus- 
trial goods are actually lower today than they 
were during the recession months of 1961. Never- 

^ For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187. 

theless I do not imderestimate the continuing chal- 
lenge which faces us all together. 

The very success of our efforts, the very pros- 
perity of those who have prospered, imposes ujDon 
us special obligations and special burdens. Cen- 
turies ago, the essayist Burton referred with scorn 
to those who were possessed by their money rather 
than possessors of it. We who are meeting here 
today do not intend to be mastered by our money 
or by our monetary problems. We intend to 
master them, with unity and with generosity, and 
we shall do so in the name of freedom. 


Press release 563 dated September 18 

Mr. Chairman, President Black, and distin- 
guished guests : As the Bank returns to Washing- 
ton for its I7th annual meeting, I wish to convey 
the greetings of my Government to the members 
assembled here this morning and especially to the 
new members. These expressions are, of course, 
only a prelude to the words of welcome that Pres- 
ident Kennedy will extend in person on Thursday. 

In our discussions here this week we can, I think, 
rely with confidence upon the general acceptance 
of certain common principles tested by common 
experience. This was not the case 18 years ago 
when representatives of 44 governments assembled 
in a resort hotel 600 miles northeast of here in the 
State of New Hampshire. Those governments 
had had only a limited experience of working to- 
gether; they had gained most of that experience 
in the midst of a prolonged and brutal struggle. 
Yet, in spite of a pervasive preoccupation with 
urgent wartime business, the delegates to the 
Bretton Woods Conference were able to take 
prophetic steps toward improving the conditions 
of peace — a peace that was to be more than a year 
in coming. 

They agreed to create an International Mone- 
tary Fund which would provide strength and sta- 
bility for a world payments system that has since 
supported a vast expansion of international trade. 
They agreed also to establish an International 
Bank for Eeconstruction and Development dedi- 
cated to two major postwar tasks — the reconstruc- 
tion of economies shattered by conflict and the 
raising of the standard of living of the less devel- 
oped countries. 

It is to the Bank and to these major tasks for 

Ocfofaer 75, 7962 


■which it was created that I shall address my re- 
marks this morning. 

During the 18 years since the epic decisions at 
Bretton Woods we have learned much about the 
complexity and difficulty of each of these tasks. 
Our experience has confirmed the wisdom — indeed 
the necessity — of creating international mecha- 
nisms for the purpose. Moreover, the articles of 
the Bank have, like all great organic documents, 
proved flexible enough to meet tlie shifting prob- 
lems of a rapidly evolving world. 

In the light of our discussions here this week 
it is clear that the gifted men of Bretton Woods 
foresaw with remarkable perception the nature 
of the problems that the Bank would face, even 
if they did not fully appreciate the magnitude of 
those problems. 

Meeting Needs of New Nations 

Not surprisingly, they, in company with other 
experts and statesmen of the time, underestimated 
the requirements for European recovery. In 1944 
it seemed reasonable to assume that the short- 
range relief needs of Europe might be met through 
UNREA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilita- 
tion Administration] and that the external capi- 
tal needs for permanent recover}' could be supplied 
by the International Bank as a supplement to 
private sources. 

By the time the Bank had made its first recon- 
struction loans in 1947, however, it was already 
clear that its resources alone would prove insuffi- 
cient for the long-term needs of European recov- 
ery. As we know today, it required the Marshall 
Plan, with its greater scope and dimensions, to 
meet these vast demands. 

Similarly underestimated was the magnitude of 
resources that would be required if the less devel- 
oped areas of the world were to join in the march 
of 20th-century technology and economic growth. 
The statesmen in 1944 could not foresee tlie speed 
with which the old colonial systems would be 
superseded and tlie vigor witli which tlie former 
colonies would demand full and equal participation 
in the modem economic order. It was understand- 
able that there should be these errors in prophecy. 
Who among us would have predicted, wjion tlie 
Bank held its first annual meeting in 194G, tliat by 
the time of its I7th meeting the member nations 
would double in number? "WHio would have fore- 
told that, during the same period, the United 


Nations would add 53 new members, 34 of whicli 
did not even exist as nation-states when the 
charter was adopted ? 

It is an old story that people living in the pres- 
ence of great events rarely appreciate their full 
significance. But we mid-20th-century men should 
recognize that there lias seldom occurred in human 
history so profound a political change as the 
transformation from colonial status to independ- 
ence of close to a billion people — one-third of the 
population of the world — and never has a change 
of such magnitude been achieved in such a fan- 
tastically short time. This change of status did 
not by itself create the need to raise the standard 
of living of these peoples. But both the change 
and need were a response to the same economic 
and political forces and the same evolving sense 
of the worth and dignity of the individual — and 
we know today that political freedom and eco- 
nomic well-being must go hand in hand if either 
is to have its full meaning. 

In providing for the emerging needs of an 
aroused and insistent world the Banli has played 
a heroic role, although the resources available 
to it have been far less than those mobilized for 
national programs by the United States and cer- 
tain European countries. The Bank's contribution 
has transcended the mere extension of credits ; its 
leadership has served to give direction to the total 
effort, both bilateral and multilateral. It has de- 
vised mechanisms to encourage the coordination 
of assistance. It has been a counselor and friend 
to new nations and has lent its good offices to the 
reconciliation of disputes among them. 

International Development Association 

Today, as we look back over 18 years of the 
Bank's history since Bretton Woods, the lessons 
of its experience are worth recalling and tlie as 
sumptions underlying its charter are worth re 

As the demands of the less developed countries 
for a better life rose toward full tide, new efforts 
were made to provide needed resources. Begin 
iiing with a modest proposal for technical aid 
embodied in the Point 4 Program of 1949, the 
United States launched a program of foreign 
assistance in whicli development needs were pro- 
gressively emphasized with each annual appropri- 
ation. At the same time several of the nations of 
Western Europe began to develop and expand na- 

Department of State Bulletin 



tional programs of aid. These were at first chiefly 
directed to former colonial areas, but they are 
recently broadening in scope and purpose. 

Throughout the fifties the Bank has sought to 
widen the base of its support of its finances. It 
has now borrowed in world capital markets more 
than $2.5 billion and sold more than $1.3 billion 
of its loans to investors. In 1958 the Bank's capi- 
tal was increased from $10 billion to more than 
$20 billion. 

By that time it had become apparent that the 
spurring of economic development required not 
merely more resources but resources that could 
be made available on easier terms. Nations had 
borrowed extensively from the Bank, while at the 
same time obtaining credits from other govern- 
ments and private financial sources; in the process 
they had been compelled to mortgage their future 
income and foreign exchange earnings. In order 
to reduce and spread out the burden of debt serv- 
ice, the Bank proposed the creation of the Inter- 
national Development Association. 

Through the IDA credits have been made avail- 
able for sound projects but on lenient terms — 
terms providing for a small service charge instead 
of interest, for extended grace periods, and for 
long maturities. These credits bear less heavily 
on the borrower's balance of payments than con- 
ventional loans ; they have provided a needed sup- 
plement to more conventional credits from the 
Bank and other institutions. At the end of its 
first full year of operation the IDA had extended 
$235 million of credits, and its initial loanable 
capital will be fully utilized within the next year. 

The United States Government looks with favor 
on the suggestion of President Black that the cap- 
ital requirements of the IDA should now be re- 
examined. If, as a result of this reexamination, 
an expanded capital program is recommended, my 
Government is prepared, subject to appropriate 
legislative approval, to share with other econom- 
ically advanced countries in subscribing additional 
resources. The subscribing nations should provide 
these new resources on a basis of contributions 
that reflect, in the light of the realities of today, 
the relative effort and resources of the partici- 

The credits that the IDA makes available, as 
well as the long-term development credits that the 
United States is providing under its assistance 
program, are designed to minimize the debt-serv- 
icing burden on the recipient countries. In our 

October 15, 1962 

view this is not merely desirable but necessary. 
If we are to avoid recurrent financial crises in tlie 
future and if we are to make it possible for the 
less advanced countries to do serious financial and 
economic planning, more of the economically ad- 
vanced countries must provide credit on longer 
terms and with reduced interest. 

Capital Accumulation an Economic Necessity 

In supporting a further effort to expand the 
supply of development funds represented by the 
proposed increase in IDA capital, I would like to 
offer some general observations for countries that 
may seek credits to finance their development. We 
have all learned a great deal about the process of 
national economic development in the years since 
1948, when the Bank made its first loan for this 
purpose. A whole new branch of economic study 
has been bom and come of age since then — the field 
of development economics with its concern for the 
dynamics of economic growth, the investigation 
of the relationship of growth to social and politi- 
cal structures, and the devising of methods for 
analyzing needed inputs and measuring results. 
Even more important we have gained pragmatic 
experience in providing capital under national and 
international programs for development. 

We have taken it for granted that the objective 
of these vast programs is to enable the recipient 
countries to reach the ultimate goal of self-sustain- 
ing economic growth — growth at a rate adequate 
to meet the needs of an expanding standard of 
living for their peoples. 

But we have learned through repeated experi- 
ence that such growth does not come automatically 
with the infusion of external capital, nor is it 
necessarily related to the amount of the external 
funds made available. It depends, to a very great 
extent, upon the will of the people, the intelligence 
and dedication of their leadership, the capacity 
of the various groups in the society to organize 
themselves for joint effort, and the willingness of 
the traditionally favored few to yield some of 
their special privileges for the larger interests of 
their country. 

Nor will self-sustaining growth be achieved 
without regard to the economic verities. Among 
the most basic and evident of these verities is the 
need for capital. Capital accumulation is an eco- 
nomic necessity and has nothing to do with "cap- 
italism" or any other economic system. What- 


ever success the Soviet Union has achie\'ed in 
economic growth is in large measure attrilnitable 
to its inheritance of a substantial capital plant 
from czarist Russia and to the regime's grim de- 
termination to accumulate capital even if it 
means, as it has, denymg the fruit of growth to 
the Eussian people for almost a half century. 

The Soviet example dramatically illustrates 
that even for a coimtry with vast resources, with 
a large inherited base of social as well as physical 
capital, and with the most single-minded and 
ruthless of totalitarian regimes, the process of 
capital accumulation exclusively through internal 
efforts is necessarily slow. 

The only way — I repeat, the only way — in which 
the developing countries can achieve the economic 
growth they desire is by expanding the capital 
resources upon which they can draw. If a coun- 
try is to be able to achieve self-sustaining growth 
within a reasonable future, it will have to pursue 
realistic policies to acquire the capital it needs. 

First, such a country must develop the ability 
to accumiilate savings for productive investment. 
This means not only that it must form the na- 
tional habit of saving and investing and build the 
institutional arrangements to make this possible 
but that it must consciously foster the economic 
staljility and the investment opportunities that 
will remove the incentives for capital flight. 

Second, if it is to achieve self-sustainmg growth 
in a reasonable period of time, it must create con- 
ditions that are conducive to private external in- 
vestment, including assurances against discrimi- 
natory treatment and expropriation. 

Finally, it must develop the capacity to earn 
foreign exchange to meet its external obligations. 
It must use its national resources to best advan- 
tage, develop outlets in world markets, and pro- 
duce surpluses in its international accounts. 

Public Funds for Development Are Not Limitless 

I find it necessary to repeat these self-evident 
propositions tliis moniing since I must report un- 
happily that in many of the countries where capi- 
tal assistance is being provided — whether through 
the Bank and the IDA or through our national 
programs — these conditions do not prevail. In 
fact, in several areas of the world recently the in- 
flow of private investment from abroad has been 
drying up at an alarming rate — in some cases 
there has even been a net outflow — because the 

recipient countries are pursuing national policies 
that make private investment precarious and un- 
rewarding. And what I say about external pri- 
vate capital applies in most of these areas to in- 
ternal private capital accumulation as well — and 
for the same reasons. 

It may be thought by some that a developing i 
country should be able to look with confidence to 
a perpetual inflow of public funds to supplement 
its internal savings and thus feel free to discourage 
private investment. I think it may be said with 
absolute certainty that no developing country can 
safely make such an assumption. 

We recognize that the provision of public funds 
by the advanced nations — whether through multi- 
lateral agencies or through national programs — 
must continue for a veiy long period of time. But 
the amount of outside public funds available for 
investment in development is finite. Over the 
long pull those limited funds will inevitably tend 
to find their way into those countries that are, 
to the best of their abilities, pursuing policies that 
ofi'er hope of the ultimate achievement of self- 
sustaining growth. 

I do not wish to be misunderstood on this point. 
My Government, while itself committed to free 
enterprise, does not seek to dictate the form or 
shape of the economic systems of other countries. 
I recognize that internal political and emotional 
pressures may tempt political leaders in some 
newly developing countries to declare themselves 
opposed to investment of external capital in their 
countries. I further recognize that private funds 
cannot do the job alone and that even the facilities 
and organizational modes for providing such cap- 
ital require adjustment to changing conditions. 
Tliey have evolved in the past, and further evolu- 
tion is in i^rogress. 

But nations must make their choices of national 
policy within the framework of reality and with 
full awareness of inescapable economic facts. If 
they elect to pursue policies that tend to eliminate 
tlie private sector or discriminate against outside 
capital, they must be ^jrepared to pay a great cost 
in delaying their own economic development. 
They will find that they cannot depend upon the 
perpetual infusion of public funds from other 
countries to assist them in development, and tliey 
will find themselves falling farther and fartlier 
back in Ihe march of progress of the rest of tlie 
underdeveloped world. 


Deparfmenf of Sfofe Bu//ef/n 




r ! 





•m or 


i If 
It cost 

Role of Private Capital in Development Process 

I have said that private capital has a vital role 
to play in the development process of the newly 
emerging nations. Let me be clear that I do not 
mean by this to recall to life the 19th century nor 
to endorse uncritically the i^ractices of a more 
primitive capitalism of an age gone by. Far from 
it. "Within the period since the end of World War 
II enormous strides have been made as the leaders 
of the international business commmiity have 
recognized with increasing clarity that inter- 
national private investment implies tlie need for 
cooperation with the government and people of 
the host country and an alert awareness of the 
public responsibilities attendant upon such invest- 

New techniques, new attitudes, new procedures 
have become widespread as a new form of inter- 
national capitalism has evolved in response to the 
conditions of this century. This process, largely 
self -generated within the business community, 
must continue and be accelerated if private invest- 
ment is to fulfill its potential role in the economic 
development of the newly emerging nations. 

But the governments of those countries, as well 
as our international institutions, can do much to 
expedite and encourage this development. The 
Bank has already undertaken useful measures to 
this end, and others are being proposed. 

From the beginning of its operations the Bank 
has been fully conscious of the need to provide the 
basic conditions that will make possible the flow 
of private capital, and it has taken several steps 
explicitly designed to encourage and facilitate 
private investment. 

One initiative was the creation of the Inter- 
national Finance Corporation, which has now 
made commitments of over $62 million. The 
IFC has acted as a catalyst to the expansion 
of investment in the private sector of a number 
Df nations. 

In many cases private investors are reluctant 
to commit funds to projects in less developed 
coiuitries because of uncertainty as to the mecha- 
nisms for resolving controversies that may arise 
with the governments of those countries. As a 
contribution to removing this impediment, the 
Bank lias recently proposed the establishment of 
conciliation and arbitration machinei-y. This fa- 
cility would be established under an international 
convention. It would provide a panel of concili- 

Oc/ofaer IS, 1962 

ators and a panel of arbitrators to resolve disputes. 

This mechanism would be employed where a 
state and a national of another state have agreed 
to submit a dispute to arbitration. Such agree- 
ment might be contained either in the investment 
contract or in a special agreement once the dispute 
has arisen. 

My Government supports this proposal. Sub- 
ject to legislative approval through our estab- 
lished constitutional processes, it is prepared to 
join in an international convention along the lines 
suggested by the Bank. 

Need To Readjust World Responsibilities 

I have spoken this morning of the great post- 
war transformation that has occurred in the po- 
litical relations among the peoples of the free 
world— the dismantling of colonial arrangements 
and the birth of half a hundred new countries. 

This seismic change has generated a surge of 
energy throughout tlie emerging countries. At the 
same time, far from weakening the former colo- 
nial powers, it has enabled them to concentrate 
their efforts on the constructive task of building a 
strong and united Europe. Today there is reason 
to hope that the central structure of this new 
Europe — the European Economic Community — 
may be expanded by the addition of the United 
Ivingdom and perhaps certain other European 

Obviously the tei-mination of colonial ari-ange- 
ments, many of them more than a century, or even 
centuries, old, could not be accomplished without 
strains and tensions. For the colonial powers it 
has necessarily meant a substantial withdrawal of 
effort from many parts of the world. 

In many areas independence, marked as it was 
by the breaking of old ties, interrupted, or at least 
diminished, the supply of capital and technical 
assistance that had long been provided under 
colonial arrangements. In almost every case the 
drive toward independence, followed, as it some- 
times was, by tlie drying up of these historic 
sources of assistance, has resulted at the same time 
in intensifying the demand of the newly independ- 
ent peoples for rapid development and the early 
acliievement of a higher standard of living. 

Faced with situations of this kind, repeated 
again and again in many different parts of the free 
world, my Government, often with the assistance 
of the International Bank, has found it necessary 


to assume a large part of the burden of assistance 
that has been relinquislied, and to continue that 
assistance — often on a far larger scale. 

This effort has not been easy for my country. 
The responsibilities we have assumed for defense 
and economic help on five continents of the free 
world have proved a substantial burden. Yet the 
American people have undertaken these tasks out 
of a deep commitment to the ideals of freedom and 
to the obligation of helping the less developed na- 
tions build a decent standard of li\-ing so that they 
may maintain and develop their new-found free- 
dom in an atmosphere of security. 

Tlie fact that the United States has been ex- 
panding its responsibilities around the world 
while Europe has been concentrating its efforts on 
the building of strength and unity at home has 
necessarily resulted in some economic imbalance — 
an imbalance reflected in the deficit in the United 
States balance of accounts of which Secretary [of 
the Treasury Douglas] Dillon will speak to- 

We are confident, however, that this imbalance 
is merely a temporally phase in the readjustment 
of world responsibilities. In fact, one of the most 
encouraging developments of the past year has 
been the extent to which nations of Western Eu- 
rope have reestablished relations with their former 
colonial dependencies within the framework of 
new relationships based on mutual self-respect. 
There is every reason to hope — indeed it is neces- 
sary to believe — that this process will continue and 
that the economically advanced nations can sys- 
tematically tackle the reallocation of world respon- 
sibilities on a basis commensurate with growing 
strength and ability. 

The end result of this process should be not only 
a better distribution of the burden of effort but 
a more ample provision of assistance and the res- 
toration of a better balance within the payments 
system of the free world. 

Wlien I spoke to the 16th annual meeting of 
the Bank at Vienna last year ^ I pointed out that, 
if the less developed nations are to achieve self- 
sustaining growth, they must be able to earn a 
growing volume of convertible foreign exchange 
in world markets. To do this they must develop 
reasonably stable markets for their raw materials, 
and, as they progress toward industrialization. 

they must find world outlets for their manufac- 

Success in finding markets will depend not only 
on the diligence and imagination of producers in 
the less developed countries but also on the policies 
of the major industrialized nations, which account 
for a high proportion of the world's imports. 

Improving Export Earnings of Growing Nations 

In recent years the advanced countries have 
shown increasing awareness of the need on their 
part to facilitate the entry of products of the 
less developed areas into their markets. Eecent 
developments in Europe should have an affirmative 
effect on the growth of market opportunities. 
The formation and proposed expansion of the 
European Economic Community should prove of 
great value to the developing nations. The 
heightened flow of commerce resulting from a 
closer economic integration of the great indus- 
trialized states of Europe should make possible 
increased levels of consumption and lead to a 
greater — and more stable — demand for the raw 
materials of the new countries. 

The United States on its part is moving in a 
positive way to improve the potential export earn- 
ings of the growing nations. As many of you 
know, President Kennedy has asked the United 
States Congress to provide him with the powers 
with which he can launch a new and wide-ranging 
effort of trade liberalization.^ The proposed 
Trade Expansion Act, which is being debated in 
the United States Senate today, includes a pro- 
vision that would empower the President, in con- 
cert with the European Economic Community, to 
reduce and even eliminate tariffs on tropical agri- 
cultural products. The exercise of powers of this 
kind should help to eliminate some of the unneces- 
sai'y impediments and discriminatory practices 
that interfere with the marketing of tropical prod- 
ucts from nations in Latin America, Africa, and 
the Far East and that distort the patterns of pro- 
duction and trade. 

The executive branch of my Government is en- 
gaged in an exliaustive search for effective tech- 
niques to cushion abrupt cyclical fluctuations in 
world markets for primary commodities. As a 
first stage in a program looking toward market 
stabilization, we have played an active role in the 

' For text, see ibid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 579. 

' For President Kennedy's message to Congress on 
trade, see ihid., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231. 

Department of State Bulletin 

drafting of the International Coffee Agi-eement,* 
which is now being presented to member govern- 
ments for signature. In addition we are explor- 
ing the possibilities of compensatory financing 
arrangements that might ameliorate some of the 
problems resulting from severe short-term fluctua- 
tions in the export earnuigs of the developmg 

Quite clearly, m the months ahead the indus- 
trialized nations must give greater attention to 
the development of markets for the products of 
the less developed nations. We must seek solu- 
tions consonant with expandmg world trade and 
must pennit equality of access for all free-world 
countries to the markets of each other. 

The expansion of markets and the maintenance 
of reasonably stable prices for the products of 
the less developed countries should have a claim 
of high priority on the effort and statesmanship 
of the industrialized nations. They are not easy 
problems to solve. In most industrialized coun- 
tries it is easier for governments to provide public 
funds to help develop the economies of less de- 
veloped coimtries than it is for them to provide 
access for the products of those economies. Trad- 
ing habits acquire a life of their own and are 
fiercely resistant to change. But experience has 
shown clearly enough that sharp fluctuations in 
world market prices can frustrate even the most 
ambitious assistance programs, and the attain- 
ment of self-sustaming growth for many less de- 
veloped countries will depend in the long run 
upon the willingness of the economically advanced 
nations to free the world marketplace of barriers 
and discrimination and accept the implications of 
liberal trade in practice as well as principle. 

Tribute to Bank Officials 

The Bank has not been an idle bystander in the 
turbulent postwar world. It has played a useful 
and significant role in many areas where its efforts 
have profoundly affected the course of develop- 

Its achievements in the past and its impressive 
record this year have reflected the diligence and 
devotion of many — the members, the staff, and 
the management. One man above all, Eugene 

' For a statement made by W. Michael Blumenthal at 
the opening of the U.N. Coffee Conference on July 10, 
see ibid., Aug. 6, 1962, p. 234. 

October 15, 1962 

Black, has been the directing genius of the Bank 
for more than 13 years. The institution and its 
policies bear his imprimatur. Tlie Bank's success 
during these years of useful effort have been, in a 
large measure, his success. 

It was Eugene Black's ability to establish the 
Bank in the opinion of the international financial 
community as a soundly administered institution 
that has enabled it to expand its resources by the 
sale of securities in the financial markets of the 
world. But more than that, Eugene Black has 
had a clear insight into the kind of stable world 
we are seeking — an insight always consistent and 
well-defined. He has seen with perception that 
such a world could be achieved only if the peoples 
of the less developed nations were given a fair 
chance for a full life. He has recognized at the 
same time that economic development is complex 
and arduous business which involves hard de- 
cisions both for the lender and the borrower. 
Finally, he has created a role for the Bank that 
transcends its financial purpose by lending his con- 
summate skill as an astute and patient negotiator 
to the resolution of controversies that were con- 
tributing to tensions and instabilities. 

The members of the Bank owe a substantial debt 
to Eugene Black. I am sure that all of us here 
will join today in extending to him sincere grati- 
tude and best wishes as he relinquishes the direc- 
tion of the Bank's affairs sometime before our 
next annual meeting. 

I should like also to say a word of appreciation 
to Sir "William Iliff, who has served the Bank with 
sreat distinction as Vice President. His achieve- 
ments are well known to all of us. In South Asia 
his name will long be remembered as one of the 
prime negotiators of the Indus River agreement, 
which holds promise of bringing greater political, 
economic, and social stability to that great sub- 

The years in which Eugene Black and Sir Wil- 
liam Iliff have served the Bank have been years 
of record accomplishment. But the Bank's busi- 
ness is always unfinished business since it is con- 
cerned with the building of a strong, free, and 
stable world. With an expanding membership 
and with a deepening insight into the fundamental 
nature and problems of development, the Bank 
should build well on the solid structure which 
these two gentlemen have contributed so brilliantly 
to building. 


In my remarks this morning I have called at- 
tention to certain massive changes in the world 
during the past decade and a half and have sug- 
gested some of their implications for the future. 
But, by emphasizing that the Bank has acquired 
its present character during a time of change, I 
do not mean to suggest that it will be able to 
carry on its work from now on in a static woi-ld. 
In taking note of the uncertainties which surround 
us we can, I tliink, agree upon one proposition 
with substantial certainty — that the speed of 
change in the social, economic, and political struc- 
ture of the world, wliich has so strongly marked 
this postwar era, is accelerating rather than 

If this be so, then we must be prepared to meet 
great demands on our resources of will and imagi- 
nation. We shall have — all of us, both the de- 
veloped and developing nations — to face hard 
reality and to make difficult decisions. Above all, 
we shall have to display at every point a hospitable 
attitude toward new ideas and not entrench our- 
selves behind a body of rigid principles that may 
have been adequate for a simpler age but is ob- 
solete in the fast-moving world of today. 

In these endeavors the Bank — which has already 
shown itself to be a flexible instrument — will liave 
to grow and change with the requirements of a 
world in rapid movement. I am confident that 
it can do so. 

U.S. Replies to Charges on Cuba 
in U.N. General Assembly 

Statement hy Adlai E. Stevenson 

U.S. Representative to the General Asserribly ^ 

I had hoped that it would not be necessary to 
interrupt the general debate, but the utterances 
of the representative of Communist Cuba and of 
Mr. Gromyko [Soviet representative Andrei A. 
Gromyko] today leave me no choice but to also 
exercise my right of reply, not on all that has been 
said here, which unhappily follows the pattern of 
persistent prosecution of the cold war, but with 

'Made in plenary session on Sept. 21 (U.S. delegation 
press release 404.5). 



respect to what has been said about Cuba. The 
sober 17th session has ended on the fourth day. 

I remind the members of the United Nations 
that, since the attack on Cuba by refugees from 
Cuba in April 1961, repeated complaints have been 
brought to the United Nations by Cuba, accom- 
panied by hysterical charges that the United 
States was plotting, plamiing, preparing, immedi- 
ate invasion. One of these coinplaints, as I recall, 
was filed in August 1961 but not pressed until 6 
months later.^ The attack was called imminent 
in August, but evidently even the Cubans did not 
believe it. As you know, all of these complaints 
were dismissed one by one, by overwhelming votes, 
but only after the expenditure of much time of the 
delegates and expense to the organization. 

From what has been said here, it is apparent 
that we are going to suffer another sustained 
assault on our patience and our credulity. I would 
have thought that there was plenty of useful work 
to do here without renewing these tired charges. 

Mr. Gromyko says that the United States has 
asserted the right to attack Cuba because it has 
another system. He says no nation should inter- 
fere in the affairs of another. I marvel at the 
bland hypocrisy of the nation that subverted the 
wholesome Cuban social revolution to commu- 
nism, that crushed with tanks the independence of 
Hungary, that holds in thrall all of Eastern Eu- 
rope from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Yet he 
presumes to lecture us on interference in the affairs 
of others. But as we know only too well, such 
righteous rhetoric is the standard Communist 
cloak for the very interference it charges to others. 

Now, in direct answer, let me say to the repre- 
sentatives of the Soviet Union and of Cuba that 
we are not taking and will not take offensive action 
in this hemisphere; neither will we permit aggres- 
sion in this hemisphere. For. as the President of 
the United States made clear last week,' we and 
other countries of the Americas will not be de- 
terred from taking whatever action is needed hy\n 
threat from any quarter. While we will not com 
mit aggression, we will take whatever steps are ^ 
necessary to prevent the government of Cuba from ^^^ 
seeking to subvert any part of this hemisphere. 
We shall work closely with our inter-American 
partners, and tliis intention does not, of course. 

" Bulletin of Apr. 2, 10G2, p. 553. 
• Ihid., Oct. 1, 1962, p. 481. 

Department of State Bulletin 


derogate from oui" right, a i"ight anchored in the 
United Nations Charter, to protect our vital na- 
tional security. 

The threat to peace in Cuba comes not from the 
United States but from tlie Soviet Union. Tlie 
threat arises from the extraordinary and unneces- 
sary flood of Soviet arms and military personnel 
pouring into Cuba. It is this foreign military 
intei-vention in the Western Hemisphere whicli is 
creating grave concern not only in this country but 
throughout the hemisphere. For what purpose is 
this great military buildup in Cuba intended ? No 
Dne can be sure, but all of Cuba's neighbors are 
justified in feeling themselves threatened and 

If the Soviet Union genuinely desires to keep 
Jie peace in the Caribbean, let it stop this warlilie 
oosturing, this stuffing of Cuba with rockets, mili- 
ary aircraft, advanced electronic equipment, and 
ither armament all out of proportion to any legiti- 
nate needs. 

This military intervention from outside of this 
lemisphei-e is the threat to which the states of the 
iYestern Hemisphere cannot remain indifferent, 
my more than states could anywhere else. 

But I think, Mr. President, the time is long past 
o graduate — if I can use that word — from this 
;ort of strident talk to address ourselves to the real 
md urgent business of this General Assembly, 
ivliich is not propaganda and abuse but peace. The 
United States will exercise its opportunity to re- 
spond to other aspects of the utterances we have 
leard this afternoon at an appropriate time and 

Thank you, Mr. President, and my apologies for 
letaining you. 

Jnited States Delegations 
;o International Conferences 

nter-American Economic and Social Council 

Tlie Department of State announced on Septem- 
)er 18 (press release 567) that President Kennedy 
las appointed Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the 
Treasury, to be U.S. Representative and chairman 
f the U.S. delegation to the Inter- American Eco- 
lomic and Social Council Meeting at the Minis- 
erial Level, which will convene at Mexico, D.F., 
October 22. Other members of the delegation are : 

« )cfofaer 15, 1962 

Alternate U.S. Representatives 

Teodoro Moscoso, vice chairman, U.S. Coordinator, Alli- 
ance for Progress 

Jolin M. Leddy, coordinator, Assistant Secretary of the 

Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs 

Herbert K. May, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs 

Senior Advisers 

Harold F. Linder, President and Chairman, Export- 
Import Bank 

Thomas C. Mann, American Ambassador to Mexico 

deLesseps Morrison, U.S. Representative on the Council 
of the Organization of American States 

The congressional advisers on tlie delegation 
will be subsequently announced. 

Prior to the ministerial meeting there will be 
a meetmg at the expert level, which will convene 
October 1. ]\Ir. May will serve as U.S. Representa- 
tive at this meeting.^ 

The purpose of the meetings is to review the 
advances made by the Alliance for Progress, in- 
cluding the formulation, national implementation, 
and international financing of development 

ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting 

The Department of State amioimced on Sep- 
tember 19 (press release 572) that Claude H. 
Smith, chief of the International Organizations 
Division of the Federal Aviation Agency, would 
be chaii-man of the U.S. delegation to the Second 
Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meetmg of 
the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), which convened at Vancouver on Sep- 
tember 25. 

The alternate U.S. delegates are as follows: ^ 
LaVere K. Budge, Operations Standards Division, Air 

Traffic Service, Federal Aviation Agency 
Edwin W. Harn, Technical Coordinating Staff, Airports 

Service, Federal Aviation Agency 
A. J. McCuUough, Commander, USCG, Office of Operation, 

Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of the 

Hugh H. McFarlane, Chief, Foreign Overseas Staff, Air 

Traffic Service, Federal Aviation Agency 

' For a list of the other members of the U.S. delegation 
to the meeting at the expert level, see Department of State 
press release 588 dated Sept. 28. 

- For a list of the advisers to the U.S. delegation, see 
Department of State press release 572 dated Sept. 19. 


Rornney E. Pattison, International Aviation Service, Fed- 
eral Aviation Agency 

Paul H. reridicr, Office of International Meteorological 
I'lans, Weatlier Bureau, Department of Commerce 

John A. Robertson, Acting Manager, Pacific Theater, 
Flight Standards Service, Federal Aviation Agency, 
San Francisco, Calif. 

Senate Confirms U.S. Representatives 
to IAEA General Conference 

Tlie Senate, on September IS confirmed the nomi- 
nation of Glenn T. Seaborg to be the Represen- 
tative of the United States to the sixth session of 
the General Conference of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency convening at Vienna, 
Austria, on September 17. 

Nominations of the following-named persons 
to be alternate representatives were also confirmed : 
Henry DeWolf Smyth, Robert E. Wilson, James 
T. Ramey, and William I. Cargo.^ 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed, documents {snch as those 
listed below) may he consulted at depository libraries in 
the United States. U.y. printed publications may be 
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, 
United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Letters from the permanent representative of the Nether- 
lands to the Acting Secretary-General concerning Indo- 
nesian actions in West Nev\- Guinea. S/.ol5.5, August 11, 
1962. 1 p.. and S/5157, August 14, 1962, 2 pp. 

Report of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations 
Operation in the Congo to the Secretary-General on 
Developments Relating to the Application of the Se- 
curity Council Resolutions of February 21 and Novem- 
ber 24, 1961 : Report on developments relating to Ka- 
tanga following the Adoula-Tshombe talks and annexes 
1-28. S/5053, Add. 11, August 20, 1962, 18 pp., and 
S/5053/Add.ll/Annexes, August 21, 1962, 47 pp.: Re- 
cent fighting in North Katanga. S/5053/Add. 11/Add. 1, 
August 23, 1062, 4 pp. 

General Assembly 

Report of the International Law Commission covering the 
work of its 14th session, April 24-.Tune 29, 1962. 
A/CN. 4/148. Julys, 1962. 93pp. 

Report of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the U.N. 
Special Committee for South West Africa on their visit 
to South ^Vfrica and South West Africa. A/ AC. 110/2. 
JulySl, 19C2. 24 pp. 

' For a complete list of the members of the U.S. dele- 
gation, see Department of State press release 570 dated 
Sept. 19. 


Constitutions, Electoral Laws and Other Legal Instni 
ments Relating to the Political Rights of Womei 
Annual memorandum by the Secretary-General on prof 
ress achieved in the field of the political rights c 
women. A/5153. August 1, 1962. 49 pp. 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Letter 
dated August 3 from the United States to the Actin 
Secretary-General on space launchings. A/AC. 105 
INF.13. August 8, 1962, 5 pp. ; A/AC. 105/INF.14, Ai 
gust 22, 1962, 2 pp.; A/AC. 105/INF.15, August 2- 
1962, 2 pp. 

Report of the Special Committee on Territories Unde 
Portuguese Administration. A/5100. August 15, 196! 
149 pp. 


Economic and Social Council 

Economic Commission for Africa. Summ.iry records ( 

the 23 meetings held at Addis Ababa February 6-1; 

1901. E/CN. 14/110. E/CN. 14/SR. 33-55 (IIi; 

December 31, 1961. 252 pp. 
Prospective demand for nonagricultural commoditiei 

problems of definition and projection methodologj 

E/3629. May 23, 1962. 166 pp. 
General review of the development, coordination, an 

concentration of the economic, social, and human right 

activities of the United Nations and the specialize 

agencies as a whole. E/3647. June 4, 1962. 33 pi 
Annual report of the Managing Director of the Specif 

Fund for 1961. E/3650. June 6, 1962. 70 pp. 
Consolidated work program in the economic, social, an 

human rights fields. E/3651. June 11, 1962. 52 p) 
Report of the Executive Chairman of the Technical Ai 

sistance Board on the use of volunteer technical pe 

sonnel. E/3653, June 11, 1962, 14 pp.; and Add. : 

June 12, 1962, 2 pp. 
Decentralization of the economic and social activities c 

the U.N. and strengthening of the regional economl 

commissions. E/3643. June 13, 1962. 26 pp. 
Financing of Economic Development. E/3654. June 1' 

1962. 48 pp. 





Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Intei 
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Don 
at Vienna October 4, 1961.' 
Acceptances deposited: Bulgaria, September 24. 1962; 

Ecuador, September 27, 1962; Iraq, September 2E! 

1962; Morocco, September 22, 1962. 

Automotive Traffic 

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done ai 
Geneva, September 19, 1949. Entered into fore 
March 26, 1952. TIAS 24S7. 
Arcessioyi deposited: Thailand, August 15, 1962. 

' Not in force. 

Department of State Bulletii 







.me « 


m -aw of the Sea 

°^5ponvention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 

Zone ; 
"tiJonvention on the High Seas/ 

Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. 

Accession deposited: Madagascar (with a statement), 
July 31, 1962. 

onvention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
, Resources of the High Seas ; ' 
' "Vonvention on the Continental Shelf.^ 

Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. 

Accession deposited: Madagascar, July 31. 1962. 
'"Optional protocol of signature concerning the compulsory 

settlement of disputes. Done at Geneva, April 29, 


Signature: Madagascar, August 10, 1962. 


rotocol bringing under international control drugs out- 

W side the scope of the convention limiting the manufac- 

III) ture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs 

concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as 

amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris 

November 19, 1948. Entered into force for the United 

States September 11, 19.50. TIAS 2308. 

'■l Notification received that it considers itself bound: 

'i?lit Congo ( Leopold ville), August 13, 1962. 

'" PI relecommunications 

ladio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the inter- 
national telecommunication convention, 1959 (TIAS 
4892). Done at Geneva December 21, 1059. Entered 
into force May 1, 1961 ; for the United States October 23, 
1961. TIAS 4892. 

Notification of approval: Overseas territories for the 
international relations of which the Government of 
the United Kingdom are responsible, July 30, 1962. 


' H|)onvention of the World Meteorological Organization. 
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into 
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Tanganyika, September 14, 1962. 



greeuient relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps 
program. Effected by exchange of notes at Nicosia 
August 23, 1962. Entered into force August 23, 1962. 


k.greement relating to the closeout of the collection ac- 
counts of the agricultural commodities agreements of 
April 29, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3228, 3261, and 4097), 
November 10, 1955. as amended (TIAS 3429, 3489, 3497, 
3798, and 4097), September 11, 1956, as amended (TIAS 
36.35. and 4007), and November 7, 1057 (TIAS 3[»45, 
4006, 4063, and 4097). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Tel Aviv June 14 and at Jerusalem August 28, 1962. 
Entered into force August 28, 1962. 


Lgricultural commodities agreement imder title I of the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.O. 1701-1709), 
with exchange of notes. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Rabat September 11, 1962. Entered into force 
September 11, 1962. 

' Not in force. 

)cfober 75, 7962 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 4.55; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), 
with exchange of notes. Signed at Tunis September 
14, 1962. Entered into force September 14, 1962. 


Departsnent Establishes New Office 
for International Business 

The Department of State announced on Septem- 
ber 26 (press release 584) the appointment of 
AUan Robbins as Special Assistant for Interna- 
tional Business in tlie Office of the Under 

Acting Secretary Ball made the announcement 
at a Wliite House Conference of Business Maga- 
zine Editors and Publishers and said tliat the es- 
tablislmient of this new position reflected the 
recognition by botli the Statje Department and the 
American business community that private U.S. 
business activity abroad and American foreign 
policy are becoming increasingly interrelated. 

The growing volume of American investments 
abroad — it is expected to exceed some $56 billion 
this year — together with expanded American ef- 
forts to increase our exports, were prime factors 
in the creation of this new position. The emer- 
gence of the Common ilarket abroad and tlie con- 
gressional action on the President's trade expan- 
sion bill were also cited by the Acting Secretary as 
developments which made it essential that tlie De- 
partment be better able to assist businessmen in the 
handling of specific difficulties they meet in doing 
business overseas. 

As Special Assistant for International Business, 
Mr. Eobbins will be the focal point in the State 
Department for problems encountered by Amer- 
ican business in their relations with foreign gov- 
ernments. He will see to it that all such problems 
coming to the attention of the Department, 
wliether in Washington or through our embassies 
and consular offices abroad, are given prompt and 
appropriate attention. 

The new office will work closely with the De- 
partment of Commerce and other agencies. 



Recent Releases 

For sale hy the Superintendent 0/ Documents, U.S. Oov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, B.C. Address 
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, 
except in the case of free puUications, which may he 
obtained from the Department of State. 

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4863. 3 pp. 

Agreement with Uruguay, amending the agreement of 
December 1, 1959 supplementing the agreement of Feb- 
ruary 20, 1959, as supplemented. Exchange of notes — 
Signed at Montevideo September 18, 1961. Entered into 
force September 18, 1961. 

Mutual Defense Assistance — Loan of Vessel to the Philip- 
pines. TIAS 4865. 5 pp. 5<f. 

Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Manila September 28 and Octo- 
ber 4, 1961. Entered into force October 4, 1961. 

Mutual Defense Assistance. TIAS 4866. 3 pp. 50. 

Agreement with Luxembourg, amending annex B to the 
agreement of January 27, 1950. Exchange of notes- 
Signed at Luxembourg September 18 and 22, 1961. En- 
tered into force September 22, 1961. 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation in Operation of Atomic 
Weapons Systems for Mutual Defense Purposes. TIAS 
4807. 11 pp. 100. 

Agreement with France — Signed at Paris July 27, 1961. 
Entered into force October 9, 1901. 

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4868. 3 pp. 

Agreement with the United Arab Republic, amending the 
agreement of September 2, 1901. Exchange of notes — 
Signed at Cairo October 7, 1961. Entered into force Octo- 
ber 7, 1961. 

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4869. 10 pp. 

Agreement with Bolivia — Signed at La Paz April 7, 1961. 
Entered into force April 7, 1961. With exchange of notes. 

TIAS 4870. 2 pp. 

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. 


Agreement with Iceland, amending the agreement of May 
3, 1958, as supplemented. Exchange of notes — Signed at 
Reykjavik October 3, 1901. Entered into force October 3, 

Money Orders — Postal Union of the Americas and Spain. 
TIAS 4873. 24 pp. 15('. 

Agreement and final protocol with Other Governments — 
Signed at Buenos Aires October 14, 1!)00. Entered into 
force March 1, 1961. 

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TI.\S 4874. 4 pp. 

Agreement with Turkey, amending the agreement of July 
29, 1961. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ankara Septem- 
ber 6, 1961. Entered into force September 6, 1961. 

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4875. 3 pii 

Agreement with Israel, amending the agreement of Jan 
uary 7, 1900, as supplemented and amended. Exchange o 
notes — Signed at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem September 2 
and October 9, 1961. Entered into force October 9, 1961. 

TIAS 4876. 7 pi 

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. 


Agreement with Greece — Signed at Athens October If 
1901. Entered into force October 18, 1901. With relatei 

Mutual Defense Assistance — Cash Contribution by Japar 

TIAS 4S77. 4 pp. 54. 

Arrangement with Japan, relating to the agreement o 
March 8, 1954. Exchange of notes — Signed at Tokyo Octc 
ber 31, 1961. Entered into force October 31, 1961. 

Commission for Educational Exchange. TIAS 4882 
5 pp. 50. 

Agreement with Ecuador, amending the agreement o 
October 31, 1956. Exchange of notes — Signed at Quit' 
May 9, 1961. Entered into force May 9, 1961. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 24-30 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of 
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. 

Releases issued prior to September 24 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 563 and 
567 of September 18, 572 of September 19, and 577 
and 578 of September 21. 




579 9/25 



t5S2 9/26 


U.S. participation in international 

Reply to Soviet note of September 5 on 

Williams : "A Need for Boldness." 

U.S. accepts long-term cotton textile 

Blumenthal : "Commodity Stabilization 
and Economic Development in 

Staliiaker elected chairman of Board 
of Foreign Scholarships (rewrite). 

Robbins appointed special assistant for 
international business (rewrite). 

Johnson : American Production and 
Inventory (Control Society. 

Johnson : Subcommittee of House 
Science and Astronautics Committee. 

Benefits for persecutees under Austrian 
Victims' Welfare Law. 

Delegation to lA-ECOSOC meeting at 
expert level. 

U.S.-German communique on foreign 
aid programs. 

Rusk interview on "News and Com- 

Kennedy and Rusk : recognition of Al- 
gerian Government. 

Note to Soviet U.N. mission on es- 
pionage activities. 

•Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 






















Departmenf of Sfafe Bulletin 

'» October 15, 1962 

Agriculture. President Approves Recommenda- 
tions on Barter Program 

Algeria. Government of Algeria Recognized by 
United States (Kennedy, Rusk) 

American Republics. Inter-American Economic 
and Social Council (delegation) 


^' Atomic Energy. Senate Confirms U.S. Representa- 
'"■ tives to IAEA General Conference 



Vol. XLVII, No. 1216 

Austria. Benefits for Persecutees Under Austrian 
Victims' Welfare Law 

Aviation. ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation 
Meeting (delegation) 

Claims. Benefit.s for Persecutees Under Austrian 
Victims' Welfare Law 

Communism. Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Ball, Hamilton, McNamara, Rostow, Rusk, 

, J Smith, Stevenson) 

It o: 

dnitJCongo (Leopoldville). Mr. McGbee Visits Congo 
To Assess Progress on U.N. Integration Plan . 

ongressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

International Implications of Communications Sat- 
ellite Activities (Jobuson) 


ooncern Expressed by United States in Matter of 
Cuban Fishing Port (WTiite) 

U.S. Replies to Charges on Cuba in U.N. General 
Assembly ( Stevenson) 

Department and Foreign Service 

Department Establishes New Ofiice for Interna- 
tional Business 

Government of Algeria Recognized by United States 
(Kennedy, Rusk) 

Disarmament. Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Ball, Hamilton, McNamara, Rostow, Rusk, 
Smith, Stevenson) 

Economic Affairs 

Department Establishes New Office for Interna- 
tional Business 

The European Common Market and the Trade Ex- 
pansion Program (Sehaetzel) 

International Implications of Communications Sat- 
ellite Activities (Johnson) 

Sharing the Financial Burdens of a Changing 
World (Ball, Kennedy) 

Jnited States Accepts Long-Term Cotton Textile 

Surope. The European Common Market and the 
Trade Expansion Program (Sehaetzel) .... 

?"oreign Aid 

rive Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Hamilton, 
McNamara, Rostow, Rusk, Smith, Stevenson) . 

'resident Approves Recommendations on Barter 

Sharing the Financial Burdens of a Changing World 
(Ball, Kennedy) 











J.S. Officials and German Minister Hold Talks on 
Foreign Aid Programs (text of communique) . . 563 


J.S. Charges Soviet Union Wants To Maintain Ten- 
sions in Berlin (exchange of notes) 558 

J.S. Officials and German Minister Hold Talks on 
Foreign Aid Programs (text of communique) . . 563 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Calendar of International Conferences and 

Meetings 571 

Inter-American Economic and Social Council 

(delegation) 583 

ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting 

(delegation) 583 

Senate Confirms U.S. Representatives to IAEA 

General Conference 584 

Sharing the Financial Burdens of a Changing 

World (Ball, Kennedy) 573 

Pakistan. President Ayub of Pakistan Makes In- 
formal Visit to U.S. (Ayub, Kennedy, text of joint 
communique and letter on scientific report) . . 561 

Presidential Documents 

Government of Algeria Recognized by United 

States 560 

President Ayub of Pakistan Makes Informal Visit 

to U.S 561 

Sharing the Financial Burdens of a Changing 
World 573 

Publications. Recent Releases 586 

Science. International Implications of Communi- 
cations Satellite Activities (Johnson) .... 567 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. SEATO 

Members Meet Informally 563 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 584 

United States Accepts Long-Term Cotton Textile 
Arrangement 566 


Concern Expressed by United States in Matter of 

Cuban Fishing Port (White) 560 

U.S. Asks Departure of Two Members of Soviet 

Mission to the U.N 559 

U.S. Charges Soviet Union Wants To Maintain Ten- 
sions in Berlin (exchange of notes) 558 

U.S. Replies to Charges on Cuba in U.N. General 
Assembly (Stevenson) 582 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 584 

Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Hamilton, 

McNamara, Rostow, Rusk, Smith, Stevenson) . 547 
U.S. Asks Departure of Two Members of Soviet 

Mission to the U.N 559 

U.S. Replies to Charges on Cuba in U.N. General 

Assembly (Stevenson) 582 

Visas. Waiver of Personal Appearance for Visa 

Applicant Facilitates Travel to U.S 565 

Name Index 

Ayub Khan, Mohammad 561 

Ball, George W 547, 573 

Hamilton, Fowler 547 

Johnson, G. Griffith 567 

Kennedy, President 560,561,573 

McNamara, Robert S 547 

Rostow, W. W 547 

Rusk, Secretary 547, 560 

Sehaetzel, J. Robert 562 

Smith, Merriman 547 

Stevenson, Adiai E 547, 582 

White, Lincoln 560 



United States 
Government Printing Office 


Washington 25, D.C. 






Tliis revised folder, released August 1962, briefly describes the U.S. position 
on the United Nations, the six principal organs of the UN, and some of the 
activities and accomplishments. A list of the member nations as of June 30, 1962, 
is included. 
Publication 7407 10 cents 




U.S. Trade Policy in Brief 

Among the questions answered in this 40-page illustrated booklet are the 
following : 

How important is foreign trade to the United States? 
How important is the United States to foreign trade? 

How do the Communists use foreign trade to expand world communism? 
'Why is expanding foreign trade essential today? 

What special trade challenge does Western Europe pose for the United 
States today? 
Publication 7402 25 cents 


The U.S. balance of payments is the financial record of transactions which take 
place between the United States and the rest of the world during a particular 
l)eriod of time. 

This recently released 19-page pamphlet explains the current U.S. balanee-of- 
payments situation and the measures proposed to eliminate the remaining 
"basic" deficit. 
Publication 7392 15 cents 

Order Form 

'o: Supt. of Documents 
Govt. Printing Office 
Washington 25, D.C. 

Enclosed find: 

(cash, check, or money 
order payable to 
Supt. of Docs.) 

Please send me copies of: 





Street Address : 

City, Zone, and State: 





Vol. XLVII, No. 1217 

October 22, 1962 


AND CUBA • Statement by Under Secretary Ball .... 591 


LESSONS FROM THE PAST • by McGeorge Bandy. 
Special Assistant to the President 601 


by Assistant Secretary Johnson 605 


A Need for Boldness • by Assistant Secretary Williams . . 613 
Commodity Stabilisation and Economic Development in 

Africa • by W. Michael Blumenthal 616 


Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission ,• 622 

For index see inside back cover 


Vol. XLVII, No. 1217 • Publication 7441 
October 22, 1962 

For sale b; tbe Soperlntendcnt of Docamsnts 

U.S. Qoverament Printing Office 

Washington 28, D.O. 


B2 Issties, domestic $8.60, foreign $12.25 

Single copy, 26 cents 

Use of funds for printing of tbls publica- 
tion approved b; tbe Director of tbe Bureau 
of tbe Budget (January IB, 1061). 

Note: Contents of tbls publication are not 
oopyrlgbted and Items contained bereln may 
be reprinted. Citation of tbe Defaktuent 
or State Bulletin as tbe source will be 
appreciated. Tbe Bulletin la Indexed In tbe 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
and interested agencies of tlie 
Government tcith information on 
developments in tlie field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. Tlie BULLETIN includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by the White House and the 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as tcell as 
special articles on various pliases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. .Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
tchich tlie United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of tlie Department, 
United Nations documents, and legis- 
lative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 


Trading Relations Between the Free World and Cuba 

Statement by Under Secretary Ball ^ 

Mr. Chairman : In your letter requesting me to 
ippear here this morning you indicated tlie con- 
tinuing interest of this committee in the status of 
:rade between the free world and the Suio-Soviet 
aloe. But you emphasized particularly the trade 
svith Cuba. Since the pi'oblem of Cuba is very 
nuch on the minds of the American people to- 
iay — and of real concern to this committee — I 
ihall concentrate in my prepared statement on the 
present trading relations between the free world 
ind Cuba. I shall attempt not only to describe 
:hose relations but to relate them to the larger 
problem which a Commimist-dominated Cuba 
poses for the United States and the free world. 

Our policy toward Cuba is based upon the assess- 
ment that it does not today constitute a military 
threat to the United States. Without doubt it is 
m economic burden for the Sino-Soviet bloc. It 
lias value to the bloc primarily as a base for the 
subversive activities of international communism 
n the Western Hemisphere. 

The policy of the United States Government is 
iirected toward nullifying Cuba's usefulness as a 
source of infection for international communism, 
rt'hile at the same time rendering it more costly for 
he Sino-Soviet bloc to maintain it for that 

In pursuit of this objective we have taken a 
eries of measures both unilaterally and in col- 
aboration with our friends and allies. These 
neasures have already weakened the Casti'o re- 

^ Made before the House Select Committee on Export 
'.ontrol on Oct. 3 (press release 595). 

October 22, 1962 

gime, and they have made it a pariah among the 
member nations of the American system. 

President Kennedy summed up the present situ- 
ation effectively when he recently said : ^ 

... it is Mr. Castro and his supporters who are in 
trouble. In the last year his regime has been increas- 
ingly isolated from this hemisphere. His name no longer 
inspires the same fear or following in other Latin Amer- 
ican countries. 


Mr. Castro's trouble is reflected in the state of 
the Cuban economy today. 

Since the end of 1960, living standards in Cuba 
have fallen precipitously. By government fiat 
the total voliune of workers' salaries has been in- 
creased and rents have been reduced, but this is 
an illusory achievement. The volume of goods 
available for purchase by the population has 
drastically shrunk. Per capita food consumption 
has declined by more than 15 percent. In pre- 
Castro days Cuba was the third highest in Latin 
America; now it is the seventh. The glittermg 
promises of new and more adequate housing have 
proven false. Military needs have eaten into the 
limited construction resources. 

Cuba is a rich land with a friendly climate and 
a fertile soil. But as always the Communists 
have proven themselves poor farmers. The 1962 
sugar crop will be the smallest in the last 6 years 
— and by a substantial margin. Meat supplies 
have declined sharply; they remain below the 

" Bulletin of Oct. 1, 1962, p. 481. 


level prevailing before the Castro takeover. 
With domestic production at a low level and food- 
stuff imports greatly reduced, nationwide ration- 
ing has been inevitable. 

Cuba has had the world's richest sugar econ- 
omy, with only the beginnings of industrial- 
ization. In pre-Castro days Cuba lived primarily 
by selling sugar to the United States. In her pres- 
ent posture of isolation she is living badly — and 
then only as a dependent of the Soviet Union. 


Cuba is isolated from the other nations of the 
free world economically, politically, and spirit- 

Castro contributed to that isolation in De- 
cember of 1961 by making it perfectly explicit that 
he was a dedicated Communist. In January 1962 
the foreign ministers of the OAS [Organization 
of American States] at Punta del Este declared 
tliat the present government of Cuba was ex- 
cluded from participation in the inter-American 
system.' Since the Punta del Este conference, the 
American states have carried out that decision. 
They have also established macliinei-y to guard 
against subversive activities in this hemisphere. 

The situation today can be summarized by a 
relatively few statistics. In 1958 U.S.-Cuban 
trade totaled more than a billion dollars. Today 
it is confined to minute exports of certain non- 
subsidized foods and medical supplies which 
amounted, during the first 6 months of this year, to 
only $373,000 — and those shipments were per- 
mitted only for humanitarian reasons. 

In its Cuban trade, Canada in 1959 had total 
imports and exports amounting to over $27 mil- 
lion; for the first 6 months of this year they 
amounted to less than $7 million. 

In 1959 the other Latin American comitries did 
total trade with Cuba amounting to $82 million; 
in 1961 this had fallen to $20 million. 

The nations of Western Europe have also re- 
duced their trade vrith Cuba. In 1959 their ex- 
ports to Cuba were approximately $122 million. 
By 1961 this figure had been cut to less than half. 


This drying up of trade has not been an acci- 
dent. It has been a deliberate response by this 
country and its allies to the Communist efforts 

' rhiiL, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 281. 

to establish a beachhead for subversion in thi 

The process of isolating Cuba economically firs 
began in July 1960, when the United States pro 
hibited the further import of Cuban sugar inb 
this counti-y.' This cost Cuba the aimual amoun 
of $350 million in foreign exchange. Thre 
months later we prohibited the export of Unitec 
States goods to Cuba except only for the limitei 
food and medicines mentioned above." 

In February of this year. President Kenned; 
made the embargo on Cuban trade substantiall; 
complete, extending the embargo on sugar to al 
other imports, whether direct or indirect.' 

America's allies, both in the OAS and NATO 
have collaborated in limiting trade with Cuba 
At Pimta del Este the OAS foreign minister 
agreed to prohibit trade with Cuba in arms an( 
implements of war. The Council of the OA' 
undertook to study further trade restrictions. 

Our NATO allies have prohibited the export o 
any military items to Cuba, and they have indi 
cated that they are not shipping any strategic 
items. They are also cooperating to assure tha 
United States exports will not be diverted to Cubi 
through their ports. 

Until early tliis year Japan was one of thi 
principal free-world purchasers of Cuban sugar 
As a result of discussions with the Japanese Gov 
emment, the Japanese are shifting their pur 
chases of sugar to other free-world sources 
Castro has not only been denied the foreign ex 
change he desperately needs, but Japanese ex 
ports to Cuba are declining as well. 


The economic isolation of Cuba has been effected 
not merely by cutting off credits and goods bul 
also by imposing restrictions on the shipping n 
available for sustaining Cuban trade with the 

We have prohibited ships registered under the 
flag of the United States from transporting tc 
Cuba commodities on the United States positive 
list, the United States munitions list, and items 
controlled by the Atomic Energy Commission. 
This amendment will also affect about 360 foreign 
flag vessels whose owners liave contractually ipr 


agreed not to violate the transportation order. 

* Ihid., .July 25, 1960, p. 140. 
°/6W., Nov. 7, 1960, p. 715. 

• Ibid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 283. 

Department of State Bulletin 


it SI 




















I till 


UhiJ Moreover, bunkers are denied in United States 
ports to all vessels under charter to the Sino- 
lirs Soviet bloc engaged in Cuba-bloc trade ; Cuban- 
3wned or -chartered vessels are also denied bunkers 
and ships stores in this country. 

As an island, Cuba is entirely dependent upon 
shipping for the maintenance of its tottering 
3conomy. With the decline of the Cuban economy 
and with the Soviet buildup of arms and aid, 
ships and shipping have emerged as a special 
mai] oroblem. 

Cuba relies upon imports for most of her ma- 
jhinery and equipment, petroleum, steel, chemi- 
als, wood and paper products, cotton, and, to 
iome extent, grain. Cuba is, however, a small 
;ountry. Total imports to Cuba in 1961 amounted 
,o $641 million; exports during that year stood 
it $614 million. The total trade of Cuba was 
herefore less than one-half percent of world 
rade. In 1959, 2.2 percent of Cuba's exports went 
o the Sino-Soviet bloc; by 1961, 75.7 percent went 
o the bloc. 

No United States-flag ships have called at Cuba 
vithin the last 2 years. Ships calling at Cuba 
ire of three kinds : Soviet bloc ships, free-world 
ihips under free-world operation, and free-world 
hips chartered to the Soviet bloc. The Soviet 
Jnion has offered high rates to charter free- world 
ihips at a time when depressed conditions in the 
ndustry have produced nearly 3 million tons of 
memployed laid-up shipping. 

These three kinds of shipping carry different 
;orts of cargo to Cuba. The Soviet ships carry 
general cargo, petroleum, and arms. No other 
hips carry arms. The free- world ships not under 
barter typically carry peacetime commodities — 
'ood, textiles, etc.; more important, they do not 
xsually participate in trade between the bloc and 
Duba which, as I have noted, supplies Cuba's 
conomic needs. That trade moves to a consider- 
ible extent on free-world ships which have been 
chartered by the Soviet Union and which are used 
o transport Soviet bloc cargoes though not — to 
•epeat — arms or ammunition. Statistics on ships 
sailing at Cuba harbors have recently been com- 
)iled by the Maritime Administrator. These 
II; igures show that a majority of the ships stopping 
n Cuba are under free-world flags, but, as a result 
•f Soviet charter, more than a majority are under 
Soviet shippmg orders and carrying Soviet 

3cfober 22, 7962 

As this situation has emerged, the United States 
Government has recognized that it should take 
steps to curtail or prevent the use of free-world 
shipping in the Soviet bloc-Cuban trade. With 
this purpose in mind, the Department of State 
has during the last month approached our allies 
on this matter. 

So far, five of our NATO allies have taken 
positive actions to restrict the availability of ships. 

The Federal Republic of Germany has promul- 
gated a new ordinance bringing all Federal Re- 
public ship charters to bloc countries under license 
and barring Cuba as a destination for such 

It is our understanding that Canada and France 
have no ships presently in the Cuban trade. 

Belgium is taking steps to stop all traffic with 
Cuba on its flag vessels. 

Turkey has informed this Government that it 
plans to put into effect measures which will as- 
sure that, in the future, no Turkish vessel will 
carry cargo of any type from the Soviet Union 
to Cuba. 

The Italian Government has assured us that no 
strategic goods have been transported to Cuba on 
Italian ships. 

We are continuing to discuss this problem with 
our other allies, including the United Kingdom, 
Greece, Norway, and Denmark. These are great 
maritime nations that depend heavily on their 
merchant marine for their foreign exchange earn- 
ings — and today there is much unemployed ship- 
ping. These nations have long and deeply felt 
traditions regarding "freedom of shipping." 
Nevertheless, they are giving careful considera- 
tion to our requests and have given informal ad- 
vice to their shipowners in an effort to discourage 
them from allowing their ships to engage in 
strategic trade with Cuba. 


In sjiite of the progress that has been made so 
far, the executive branch of the Government is 
not yet satisfied that all useful measures have 
been taken to limit the sliipping available for the 
maintenance of the Cuban economy. We are con- 
sidering several additional measures designed to 
impose restrictions on the avaOability of sliipping 
to Cuba. 

Secretary Rusk is consulting today with the 
foreign ministers of the Organization of Ameri- 


can States' with regard to those measures. At 
the same time they are being discussed with our 
NATO allies. Because these matters are under 
consultation with foreign governments, it would 
not be proper for me to disclose them in public 
session today. I am, however, prepared to discuss 
them with this committee in executive session at 
this time. Or I should be glad to review them 
with this committee on another occasion, after 
the process of consultation has been completed. 

'\Vliile I cannot properly talk about all of the 
measures now under consideration, there is one 
which, I feel certain, will be adopted. This will 
be an order prohibiting ships of United States 
registry or ships of foreign registry owned by a 
United States citizen from participating in the 
Cuban trade. The exact terms of this order are 
now being worked out by our legal and shipping 


As a result of the measures that have been taken 
by the United States and by the members of the 
OAS, NATO, Japan, and other countries, Cuba 
today is almost totally dependent upon the Soviet 
Union for its economic livelihood. Threa-fourths 
of Cuba's trade is with the Communist bloc, and 
this p)ercentage is increasing as other channels of 
trade dry up. 

In the last few weeks we have read much in the 
newspapers of the military buildup of Cuba by 
the Soviet Union. Quite clearly it does not con- 
stitute a threat to the United States. 

Since July, when the volume of Soviet military 
shipments to Cuba suddenly vaulted upward, 85 
shiploads have arrived in Cuban ports. Many 
of them carried military items, supplies, and per- 
sonnel. These shipments have consisted, in paii:, 
of types of weapons previously delivered to the 
Cuban armed forces, including more tanks, self- 
propelled guns, and other groimd-f orce equipment. 
The major tonnage in recent shipments, however, 
has been devoted to SA-2, surface-to-air missiles 
(SAMS) — together with all the related gear and 
equipment necessary for their installation and 
operation. To date, 15 SAM sites have been 
established in the island. We estimate the total 
may eventually reach 25. These are antiaircraft 
missiles having a slant range of 20 to 25 miles. 

' See p. 598. 

In addition, three and possibly four missile sites: 
of a different type have been identified. Thest 
sites are similar to known Soviet coastal-defensf 
missile sites that are believed to accommodate 
antishipping missiles with a range of 20-35 miles 
Quite likely several more such sites will b( 

Cuba is now estimated to have 60 older type 
MIG jet aircraft. In addition at least one ad 
vanced jet-interceptor has recently been received 
and probably several more are in the process ol 
assembly. This type of advanced jet-interceptoi 
is usually equipped with infrared air-to-air mis 
siles. We estimate that the total of these ad- 
vanced interceptors in Cuba may eventually read 
25 to 30. 

In addition, 16 "Komar" class guided-missih 
patrol boats, wliich carry two short-range missile; 
(11-17 miles), were included in recent shipments 

About 4,500 Soviet military specialists have ar 
rived, including construction men and technicians 







Unpleasant as may be the spectacle of a Com- '" 
munist-dominated island just off our shores, we 
should not overlook the fact that Cuba is, at the 
moment, a small, enfeebled countiy with an in- 
competent government, a limping economy, and a 
deteriorating standard of living. The crash ef- 
forts of the Soviet Union to provide the Castrc 
regime with economic teclinicians and to build up 
its military defenses is a demonstration of Cuban 
weakness. Because of the desperate plight of the 
Cuban economy, Cuba's isolation from the other 
nations of the hemisphere, and the fear which that 
isolation has engendered, the Cuban government 
has turned itself into a dependency of Moscow. 

We may take the events of the past month— 
regi-ettable as they may be in many ways — as evi- 
dence of the essential soundness of the strategy 
of isolation that we have pursued toward Cuba 
over the past 2 years. The additional measures 
now under consideration with respect to Cuban 
shipping are part and parcel of that same strategy. 

We propose to continue along these lines, taking 
new measures as the developing situation may re- 
quire. But in pursuing this policy — as in pur- 
suing any policy — the United States must never 
forget that it is engaged in a worldwide struggle 
and that no policy can be regarded as an end in 
itself or as existing apart from the whole complex 

Department of State Bulletin 







iAt( not 

nomic isolation for our protection. If, contrary 
Ijjto the present evidence, it should ever appear that 
the Soviet Union is succeeding in making Cuba a 
threat to the security of this coimtry or this 
laemisphere, we are prepared to take the necessary 
lotion — whatever it may be. 



Secretary Discusses Cuban Situation 
on "News and Comment" Program 

of relationships which give the free world its 

And, as the President has made clear, we shall 
rely solely on the impact of political and eco- 

Follow'mg is the transcript of an interview loith 
^^ Secretary Rusk hy John Scali, the American 
Broadcasting Company''s State Department corre- 
spondent, videotaped for presentation on Septem- 
ber 30 on Howard K. Smith''s '■'■News and Com- 
nenf program on ABC-TV. 

'ress release 590 dated September 29, for release September 30 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, in the past we have 

that the arms buildup in Cuba is defensive 

3ven though Castro has been supplied with mis- 

iles. Is it possible now that Russia's plan to build 

a so-called fishing port^ tips t\\& balance from a 

'ensive to an offensive buildup? 

Secretary Rush: Well, those announcements 
have to do with action to be taken in the future. 
We will be watching that very carefully and 
closely indeed, and we will make a judgment when 
we see what in fact actually happens. Now I 
don't think that we ought to play with words on 
this question of defensive and offensive weapons. 
A.ny weapon is offensive if you are on the wrong 
end of it. But the configuration of the military 
forces in Cuba is a configuration of defensive 
capability. What we are concerned about is the 
development of any significant offensive capabil- 
ity against Cuba's neighbors in the Caribbean, or 
against this country, and we are keeping a very 
close watch indeed on just that point. We have 
very great power in that area, and the President 
has made it very clear that whatever arms are in 
Cuba will stay in Cuba and that there will be no 



s, w 









^ For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 15, 1962, p. 560. 
Ocfober 22, 1962 

effort by Castro to move these arms into other 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, how will the Govern- 
ment be able to make a judgment of when the arms 
buildup shifts from a defensive to an offensive 
status ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, that would be a matter 
of detail, affirmation, and judgment based upon all 
the military views available and that would be 
done with our own military advisers taking a full 
part in an assessment of capabilities. 

Mr. Scali: How would you evaluate the Soviet 
arms buildup in Cuba in terms of the total Soviet 
cold- war strategy ? 

Secretary Rush: Oh, I think that the Soviets 
have had to face the fact that this regime in Cuba 
has been getting into very serious trouble indeed 
on the island. Foodstuffs are in very short supply, 
production has dropped off severely, there has 
been undoubtedly a sense of uneasiness and alarm 
on the part of the rulers there. They have called, 
for example, for a considerable number of what 
seemed to have to be phony alerts. I tliink they 
may be trying to draw attention away from some 
of the problems that they are having on the island. 
I think that the Cuban situation is certainly be- 
coming very expensive indeed for the bloc to shore 
up the failures there; but it is also a very serious 
problem for us and has to be treated as such. 

Hemisphere Foreign Ministers To Meet Informally 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, which is the greatest 
danger to the United States, the potential alienat- 
ing of much of world opinion by taking finn ac- 
tion against Cuba, or the potential loss of prestige 
and respect for permitting Eussia to outflank us 
and build a base for subversion next door to us? 

Secretary Rush: Well, I think neither one of 
those is a full basis for deciding what action is 
right and wise and necessary in a given situation. 
It is clear that the power of the United States is 
such that you could put ai'med forces ashore in 
Cuba, but that means a lot of casualties and it 
means a lot of Cuban casualties; it means blood- 
shed. And if we could find an answer without 
that, we should try to do so. 

But the question of prestige is primarily a ques- 
tion of solidarity in this hemisphere. I think that 

" For a statement by President Kennedy, see iMd., Oct. 1, 
19C2, p. 481. 


general world opinion is much less interested in 
Cuba than we are here, for quite understandable 
reasons. And we have seen here in this hemi- 
sphere and are seeing a rapidly growing solidarity 
with respect to Cuba. The Communists' voices in 
the hemisphere have become more vocal. But on 
the other hand, the Castro regime has been losing 
the sympathy of what might be called the demo- 
cratic left. It is quite clear that the moderates 
and conservatives throughout the hemisphere are 
losing their complacency about Castroism and are 
becoming more and more active and concerned 
about it. There has been a dramatic change since 
the Costa Rica conference of I960,' reflected in the 
Punta del Este conference in January * of this 
year, and that movement of both peoples and gov- 
ernments in this hemisphere continues. And I 
am now talking to foreign ministers here in New 
York, and we will be talking to them next week,' 
to see what further steps we ought to take in the 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, in this coming week 
of course you will have the so-called informal 
meeting with the inter-American foreign minis- 
ters. Could you tell us why this meeting is an in- 
formal one and not a formal one ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, the principal reason is 
to have a chance to meet as quickly as possible 
and without all of the problems that are concerned 
in convening a formal meeting under the orga- 
nization of the OAS Charter and encounter many 
of the other questions that exist there among the 
different members of the liemisphere. The for- 
eign ministers were gathering here for the United 
Nations General Assembly. We thought that we 
ought to take advantage of that fact to meet just 
as infonnally as possible. It is not a meeting 
which can in fact take decisions under the treaties 
of the OAS because it is so very informal, but I 
already know from my own talks here in prepara- 
tion for that meeting that it will be a very profit- 
able and worthwhile meeting. 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, in the past you have 
put a great premium on the desirability of unity 
within the inter-American family. Unliappily, 
several Latin American countries have dragged 
their feet on taking effective action against Castro. 
Is it possible that at this informal meeting you 

will come up with some sort of plan whereby the 
nations most immediately threatened by Castroism 
in tlic Central American and Caribbean area 
might join with the United States in some kind of 
tougher action ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, that was already antici- 
pated in the Punta del Este conference in January. 
One of the resolutions that was passed, I think by 
a l7-vot« majority, did provide for joint actions 
by groups within the hemisphere to deal with this 
specific question if necessary.^ We will of course 
continue not only our consultation with the other 
countries within the Caribbean area, but we will 
continue our close cooperative work with them on 
matters of common security interest — for example, 
on surveillance in the Caribbean, in being sure that 
there is no illicit arms traffic in the Caribbean area 
coming out of Cuba, and a variety of other actions 
which are being taken behind the scenes with the 
full cooperation of the governments in that area. 

Cuban Refugees and Exile Organizations 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, on another point, we 
find that many of the Cuban exile organizations 
in the United States are complaining rather bit- 
terly in some cases against the restrictions being 
put on them by the American Government. Many 
of tliem have all sorts of plans for returning to the 
homeland. Wliy aren't we supporting some of 
these exile organizations in the United States in 
allowing them more f readom ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have, as you know, 
been giving considerable support to the refugees 
as such. 

Mr. Scali: Right. 

Secretary Rusk: Now, as happens so frequently 
with refugees or exile organizations, there is very 
little unity among them. There is a contest for 
influence. They find it difficult to work together. 
This is the principal problem insofar as any single 
organization is concerned. Also I think it has 
to be borne in mind that there are anti-Castro 
people on the island of Cuba wlio need to be 
recognized as having a real stake and part in tliis 
whole problem. So I realize that there are certain 
groups or certain committees that feel that they 
ought to be a chosen instrvmient of some sort. But 
the great problem and the great need is for all non- 
Castro Cubans to get together as closely as possible 

' For background, see ibid., Sept. 12, 1960, p. 395. 
'For background, see ibid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270. 
• See p. 598. 

• Resolution II ; for text, see Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962, 
p. 279. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Joint Resolution Expressing the Determination of the United States With Respect to Cuba 

Whereas President James Monroe, announcing the Mon- 
roe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States 
would consider any attempt on the part of European 
powers "to extend their system to any portion of this 
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety" ; 

Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 ^ the parties agreed 
that "an armed attack by any State against an 
American State shall be considered as an attack 
against all the American States, and, consequently, 
each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to 
assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the in- 
herent right of individual or collective self-defense 
recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations" ; and 

Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of 
American States at Punta del Este in January 1962 
declared :' "The present Government of Cuba has 
identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Lenin- 
ist ideology, has established a political, economic, and 
social system based on that doctrine, and accepts 
military assistance from extracontinental Communist 
powers, including even the threat of military inter- 
vention in America on the part of the Soviet Union" ; 

Whereas the international Communist movement has 
increasingly extended into Cuba its political, eco- 
nomic, and military sphere of influence : Now, there- 
fore, be it 

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
That the United States is determined — 

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be neces- 
sary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist 
regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat 
of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any 
part of this hemisphere ; 

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an ex- 
ternally supported military capability endangering the 
security of the United States; and 

(c) to work with the Organization of American 
States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the 
aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination. 

' S.J. Res. 230 ; passed by the Senate on Sept. 20 by a 
vote of 86 to 1 and by the House of Representatives on 
Sept. 26 by a vote of 384 to 7. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 21, 1947, p. 565. 

' For text of Resolution VI adopted at Punta del Este, 
see ibid., Feb. 19, 1962. p. 281. 

in a great unity of purpose to restore Cuba to the 
democratic life of tlie Western Hemisphere. 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, you have mentioned 
the anti-Castro underground in Cuba, which we 
know exists. There are also many people who say 
that we should take a more active role in support- 
ing this anti-Castro underground, perhaps by 
supplying them weapons and giving them en- 
couragement through other means. What do you 
say to this ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I obviously can't get 
seriously into that question. The anti-Castro ele- 
ments in Cuba do know that they have the en- 
couragement and support of everyone in this 
hemisphere who is opposed to Castroism, but I 
think that this is the sort of thing or question I 
can't really get into. 

Mr. Scali: Is it our information, sir, that con- 
siderable anti-Castro sentiment exists in Cuba ? 

Secretary Rush : I think that that is very defi- 

initely our impression and that this is growing, 

' because of the ruthlessness of the regime and the 

great severity of the regime on the people and 

their economy and their traditional way of life. 

j I think we know that the Castro regime has great 

October 22, 7962 

organized support. It has the accouterments of 
a police state, but it also has underneath it what 
has happened in so many dictatorships of that 
sort — deep resentment on the part of the people 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, the Kepublicans on 
Capitol Hill seem to be making quite an issue of 
the administration policy on Cuba. Now, granted 
that both Republicans and Democrats have united 
behind this single resolution supporting the Presi- 
dent, do you think that many of the Eepublican 
demands which may come up during the election 
are reaUy political in nature ? 

Secretary Rusk : Well, I think that in the pres- 
ent campaign candidates of both parties are go- 
ing to be and should be talking about Cuba with 
the people in their constituencies. I do not believe 
that, except for an occasional instance, this debate 
can take on a straight partisan line. Cuba has 
been a problem for two administrations. It is still 
an unsolved problem. And in my discussions with 
the committees and the leaders in our Congress, I 
find that the Democrats and the Republicans are 
equally concerned about the problem and that they 
are equally concerned about finding the right and 


wise course of action under all the circumstances. 
We have a national problem here in front of us, 
and I tliink vigorous debate is to be desired and is 
in any event unavoidable, but I would hope that 
what is necessarily a national problem does not 
break itself up into alleged partisan points of 
view, because I feel and know that the leadership 
of both parties are deeply concerned — concerned 
that no satisfactory answer has yet been foimd and 
that the penetration of this hemisphere by Castro 
communism is sometliing which cannot be accepted 
in the hemisphere and by the United States. 

Cuban Problem a Concern of All Free World 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, in discussing Cuba 
with some of the foreign ministers here, I know 
that you have heard the view expressed by some 
that Cuba is a United States problem. Do you 
agree that tliis is a strictly United States problem ? 

Secretary Rusk : Well, it is in the first instance 
a major problem for this hemisphere because of the 
commitments of the hemisphere imder its treaties 
and charters, and in those commitments the United 
States plays a very important role. It is a problem 
for us because it is a problem in the hemisphere as 
well. It would be a problem for us had we not 
had the hemisphere organizations. But it is here. 
But it is also a part of a worldwide struggle for 
freedom. It is involved in a worldwide confron- 
tation between the Communist bloc and the free 
world, and therefore it is one of those problems 
which is of concern to all the free world because 
this struggle is relentless and unending in every 
continent, and no one can be, I think, disregardful 
of it. 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, since this is part of 
a worldwide Commvmist plot, could we not soon be 
approached with a deal to shut down some of our 
bases overseas in return for which Russia would 
close down her base in Cuba ? 

Secretary Rusk: This is not a negotiable point. 
This would not be a way to meet this struggle for 
freedom. You cannot support freedom in one 
place by surrendering freedom in another. In any 
event, we have special commitments here in this 
hemisphere under our hemisphere charters, and we 
cannot connect in negotiations or in trades the 
problem of Cuba with the defense of freedom in 
other places. No. This is not on. 

Mr. Scali: This would also apply to any effort 
to link Cuba, say, with Berlin? 


Secretary Rusk: Exactly. 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, are you a baseball fan ? 

Secretary Rusk: Yes. I have been for many 

Mr. Scali: Do you keep close tab on what the 
lowly Wasliington Senators are doing ? 

Secretary Rusk : Well, some of my friends think 
that I am a man of little conscience because I am 
automatically a hometown fan. I was a New York 
Yankee fan for many years, and now I am a Wash- 
ington Senator fan. It hasn't given me too much 
to cheer about this season, but nevertheless it is a 
good ball club and I have enjoyed following them. 

Mr. Scali: Do you have any hope that next year 
it will wind up any better? jj 

Secretary Rusk: Well, when you wind up in T 
the cellar, you always say, "Wait until next year !" ' 

Mr. Scali: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

American Foreign Ministers Hold 
Informal Meeting at Washington 


Press release 594 dated October 1 

At the invitation of Secretary Rusk, the for- 
eign ministers of the 19 American Republics or 
their representatives will meet informally at the 
State Department October 2 and 3. Wliile the 
meeting is not being held witliin the framework 
of the Organization of American States, the Sec- 
retary General of the OAS also will attend. 

Tiie principal subject for this exchange of views 
will be the situation in Cuba, and in keeping with 
the informality of the meeting it is not expected 
that formal speeches will be made. The sessions 
will be closed, and there will be no formal agenda, 
voting, official minutes, or resolutions. 


Press release 598 dated October 3 

Following is the text of a pnal communique 
issued at the conclusion of an informal meetimg of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Re- 
publics., at Washington, D.C., October 2-3. 

In their informal meeting held in Washington, 
D.C. on October 2 and 3, 1962, the Foreign Min- 

Deparfment of State Bulletin 

isters and Special Kepresentatives of the American 
Republics discussed in a spirit of strong friend- 
ship and cooperation the serious problems that 
face the Western Hemisphere. Althougli the in- 
formal character of the meeting precluded formal 
decisions or resolutions, wliicli are in the com- 
petence of the appropriate bodies of the OAS, the 
meeting was marked by extraordinary solidarity 
on matters affecting the security and well-being 
of the hemispheric system. The Ministers re- 
viewed the resolutions adopted at the Eighth 
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs/ the progress made in response to them, 
and furtlier steps which might be taken to give 
effect to those resolutions. 

During the meeting it was manifest that at the 
present juncture the most virgent of these prob- 
lems is the Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba as 
an attempt to conveit the island into an armed 
base for commimist penetration of the Americas 
and subversion of the democratic institutions of 
the Hemisphere. Tlie meeting reiterated its ad- 
herence to the principles of self-determination, 
nonintervention and democracy as guiding stand- 
ards of relations among the American nations. 

The meeting reflected the opinion that now 
more than ever it is necessary to strengthen the 
system of representative democracy and to re- 
double the efforts being made to bring harmonious 
progress to the peoples, and the earliest and most 
effective improvement in their standard of living, 
within the framewoi'k of the Alliance for Prog- 
ress, and with the most complete respect for hu- 
man rights. Special consideration shall be given 
to expanding markets and increasing prices of 
Latin American primary products. 

The meeting reasseited the firm intention of the 
Governments represented and of the peoples of 
the American Eepublics to conduct themselves 
in accordance with the principles of the regional 
system, stamichly sustaining and consolidating the 
principles of the Charter of the Organization of 
American States, and affirmed the will to strength- 
en the security of the Hemisphere against all ag- 
gression from within or outside the Hemisphere 
and against all developments or situations capable 
of threatening the peace and security of the Hemi- 
sphere through the application of the Inter- 
American Treaty of Eeciprocal Assistance of Rio 

de Janeiro. It was the view of the Ministers that 
the existing organizations and bodies of the inter- 
American system should intensify the carrying 
out of their respective duties with special and ur- 
gent attention to the situation created by the 
Marxist-Lenmist regime in Cuba and that they 
should stand in readiness to consider the matter 
promptly if the situation requires measures be- 
yond those already authorized. 

In the ideological stiniggle against communism, 
destroyer of man's liberties, the meeting expressed 
the desire that the resources and methods inherent 
in the democratic system should be mobilized to 
bring the peoples to realize fully the difference 
between totalitarianism and democracy. 

The meeting reaffirmed its "repudiation of re- 
pressive measures which, under the pretext of 
isolating or combatting communism, may facili- 
tate the appearance or strengthening of reaction- 
ary doctrines and methods which attempt to 
repress ideas of social progress and to confuse 
truly progressive and democratic labor organi- 
zations and cultural and political movements with 
communist subversion." ^ 

The meeting observed that the inter- American 
regional system has had since its beginnings char- 
acteristics of its own that are expressed in spe- 
cific provisions agreed upon by a community of 
nations for its collective security and, therefore, 
that a military intervention of communist powers 
in Cuba cannot be justified as a situation analogous 
to the defensive measures adopted in other parts 
of the Free World in order to face Soviet 

The meeting expressed tlie need for undertaking 
the actions called for by Resolution VIII of the 
Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, especially paragraph 2, also in- 
cluding the use of their ships in the Cuban trade, 
in the light of the new developments taking place 
in Cuba. It also called upon all other independent 
countries to review their policies in this regard. 

The meeting agreed that it is necessary for the 
countries, in accordance with their laws and con- 
stitutional precepts, to intensify measures to pre- 
vent agents and groups of international commu- 
nism from carrying on their activities of a sub- 
versive nature. 

Tlie meeting recalled that the Soviet Union's 

* For background and texts of resolutions, see Bulletin 
of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270. 

Ocfofaer 22, 1962 

' Resolution I, ibid., p. 278. 


intervention in Cuba tlireatcns the unity of the 
Americas and of its democratic institutions, and 
that this intervention lias special characteristics 
which, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Resolution II of 
the Eiglith Meeting of Consultation of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs, call for the adoption of spe- 
cial measures, both individual and collective. 

The meeting observed that it is desirable to in- 
tensify individual and collective surveillance of 
the delivery of arms and implements of war and 
all other items of strategic importance to the com- 
munist regime of Cuba, in order to prevent the 
secret accumulation in the island of arms that 
can be used for offensive purposes against the 

The meeting concurred in the wish that studies 
be undertaken urgently, in accordance with Re- 
solution II of the Eighth Meeting of Consulta- 
tion of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of the 
transfer of funds to the other American Republics 
for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive 
propaganda and the utilization of Cuba as a base 
for training in subversive tecliniques. 

The meeting voiced the traditional fraternal af- 
fection of all the American peoples for the people 
of Cuba and their deep sympathy for the victims 
of the present regime, and expressed the hope that 
the Cuban people may return as a full member of 
the democratic American family of nations, under 
a government compatible with the purposes and 
principles of the inter- American system. 

British Foreign Secretary 
Talks With President Kennedy 

Following is the text of a joint statement hy 
President Kennedy and the Foreign Secretary of 
Great Britain^ Lord Home, released at Washing- 
ton on Septemher 30. 

White HoQse press release dated September 30 

The President had lunch with the Foreign Sec- 
retary Lord Home, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 
Ambassador to the United States [David] 
Ormsby Gore, Under Secretary of State George 
Ball and Ambassador David Bruce. They met 
for two hours. The discussions centered on 
Berlin, the Congo and Cuba. 

The conversations which Lord Home and Mr. 
Rusk had had with Mr. Gromyko in New York 


were reviewed. There was complete agreement on 
the assessment of the dangers of the Berlin situa- 
tion and on the continued need for the Western 
powers to stand firm on their vital interests. 

They agreed on the urgent need for a settlement 
of the continuing Congo crisis on the basis of the 
reconciliation plan proposed by the Secretary 
General of the United Nations. 

They agreed on the serious nature of develop- 
ments in Cuba and they discussed ways and means 
of containing further Communist expansion and 
subversion in the Caribbean. 

The President and the Foreign Secretary con- 
firmed their support for the early signature of a 
test ban agreement. 

They also agreed on the strong necessity for the 
signatories of the Geneva Accord on Laos ^ to see 
to it that all foreign forces are withdrawn from 
that country by October 7th. 

John M. Stalnaker Elected Chairman 
of Board of Foreign Scholarships 

Tlie Department of State armounced on Septem- 
ber 26 (press release 583) that John M. Stalnaker, 
president of the National Merit Scholarship 
Corporation, had that day been elected chairman 
of the Board of Foreign Scholarships at the 
Board's annual fall meeting at the Department of 
State. Mr. Stalnaker succeeds Robert G. Storey, 
president of the Southwestern Legal Center and 
former president of the American Bar Association, 
who has been chairman since 1958. 

The Board supervises the educational exchange 
programs administered by the Department of 
State imder the Fulbright-Hays Act, with respon- 
sibility for the selection of students, teachers, and 
imiversity professors, both in this country and 
abroad, for exchange grants. Since its creation in 
1947 imder the Fulbright Act, the Board has given 
grants to more than 50,000 students, teachers, 
lecturers, and scholars from other countries and 
from the United States. The Board supervises) 
academic exchanges with 120 countries and 

' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259. 
' For the names of the other members of the Board, set 
Department of State press release 583 dated Sept 26. 

Department of State Bulletin 

Building the Atlantic Partnership: Some Lessons From the Past 

hy McGeorge Bundy 

Special Assistant to the President ^ 

' Address made before the Atlantic Treaty Association 
'■^ at Copenhagen, Denmarii, on Sept. 27. 


Your preoccupation in this meeting, as I under- 
stand it, is with the Common Market and its re- 
lation to NATO and the Atlantic community. I 
have listened with great interest to parts of the dis- 
cussions so far, and I have had a chance also to read 
other contributions. I am sure from what I have 
heard and read that you have correctly selected 
the topic of greatest immediate importance. The 
generally positive position of the United States 
Government on this issue has been clear for a 
long time. It is equally clear that the main pres- 
ent processes of negotiation are best conducted 
without noisy kibitzing from official Americans. 
So it seems best to me, today, not to direct my re- 
marks to this question, as such, but rather to at- 
tempt some more general comments on the 
processes by which we may hope for the growth of 
what President Kennedy has called an Atlantic 

My purpose is to offer thoughts about what we 
may accomplish in the future, but I ask the his- 
torian's license to state my case mainly in terms 
of propositions from our past and from two parts 
of that past in particular. I believe that there 
are very large negative lessons for us in the record 
of the years between 1925 and 1940 and vei-y large 
affirmative lessons in the record of the years be- 
tween 1947 and the present. 

We all know the gloomy record of Atlantic 
diplomacy between Locarno and the fall of France, 
and it is not my aim here to recapitulate it. The 
greatest of our failures, of course, was in the fail- 
ure to develop common policies and purposes of 

October 22, 7962 

sufficient coherence to prevent — and later to deal 
with — the rise of Adolf Hitler. In this failure 
there is blame enough for all of us ; I do not know 
of a country now in the Atlantic alliance whose 
people and leaders I should wish to represent 
today in a claim before liistory of total innocence. 
Each of us is able to write and speak with particu- 
lar zest, perhaps, of the shortcomings of others — 
but this is hardly a profitable exercise. Let me 
instead suggest a series of more general com- 

The Legacy of the Thirties 

In the first place one must put the dangers of 
neutrality or appeasement as means of dealing 
with a determinedly expansionist power. This is a 
point which needs no laboring in this audience. 
But it is not always the simple points which are 
the least important. This one deserves continuous 
and straightforward repetition. 

Second, and more subtly, we can, I tliink, discern 
in the liistory of the years from 1925 to 1939 an 
astonishing tendency to miss the real issues 
througli a preoccupation with rivalries that be- 
came wholly pointless when the real themes of 
history were unfolded. 

Wliat do we care now for the contest between the 
franc and the pound which so engrossed able and 
determined men on both sides? At the onset of 
the thirties what we remember now is only that 
this contest was a part of the shortsighted and 
self-destructive approach to money which deep- 
ened the great depression and helped Hitler to 

Wliat do we now remember of the revulsion 


against war and its propaganda whicli led Amer- 
icans to suppose that the Allies, not tlie U-boat, 
had been the real cause of our entry into the first 
war, so that our contribution to the keeping of 
Atlantic peace in the 1930's was a series of solemn 
legislative acts against commitment — acts of neu- 
trality. What matters today is that those acts, in 
the early years of Hitler's wealoiess, served to 
give him assurance that America saw the enemy 
more in alliance than in aggression. 

And we forget, behind the general failures 
named appeasement, how often in the 1930's it 
was a narrow suspicion of the wrong people that 
became the immediate cause, or excuse, for in- 
action — the Italians mistrusting the French, the 
French mistrusting the British, the British mis- 
trusting the Czechs, Mussolini mistrusting eveiy- 
one imtil in a final irony he was the last to try 
trusting Hitler. This detailed record of the follies 
of nations which tried to act alone carries a deeper 
lesson than simply the warning against appease- 
ment. And that lesson is that already in the 
1930's no foreign nation could serve itself well if 
it tried to ser\'e itself alone. The aggressions of 
Hitler and Mussolini proved it for everyone else, 
and their failures proved it for their own still un- 
happier countries. 

A third lesson from the 1930's is that govern- 
ments without courage can be expected at critical 
moments to take wrong decisions which they will 
defend on grounds of domestic political necessity. 
Perhaps the sorriest of these demonstrations is to 
be found in the liistory of the war debts from start 
to finish, but other examples are available in such 
nimnbers that the choice is one of taste. Over and 
over again, when the need was urgent and the right 
course clear, men in authority held back their 
diplomatic hands lest they lose their political 

It is not for any officeholder to assert that this 
course is always wrong. Diplomats who ignore 
domestic political realities are deeply unprofes- 
sional. But it remains fair to remark of the 1030's 
that they record an immensely long list of follies 
committed in shortsighted subservience to sup- 
posed opinion — and a correspondingly short list 
of men who preferred retirement to timidity. 

In this assertion I do not mean to leave public 
opinion itself exempt from criticism. This is no 
place for an excursion into the endless fascinations 
of the relation between opinion and leadership; 


my arginnent does not require any assumption 
that the fault was all with statesmen. Opinion too 
was at fault — and in a variety of ways — and it may 
well be tliat in the widest of perspective later 
students may find that what was needed to permit 
avoidance of all the errors I have cited was pre- 
cisely the terrible process of retribution and in- 
sta-uction which we call the Second World War. 
But we camiot afford additional instruction today. 
Finally, in tlais set of gloomy flashbacks let me 
recall what we may call the error of the empty 
commitment. The greatest of failures was the 
League, and the earliest of blows to that institu- 
tion was struck by the United States. But there 
is in addition a long and melancholy set of ties 
that did not bmd and words that did not work: 
The Kellogg-Briand Pact was always empty and 
the French tie to Czechoslovakia broke only when 
it was needed, but there remains a family resem- 
blance among them. Both represented efforts to 
exorcise by words a problem which could only be 
dealt with by will and by works. Promises — to 
oneself or to others — cannot prevent danger unless 
they mean to meet it. 

The Affirmative Present 

I hope you will feel, as I do, that it is time to 
more to more cheerful themes, to the set of les- 
sons of a very different sort wliich may be drawn 
from our common experience in the years since 
we set about the great business of Atlantic recon- 
struction and reordering, since 1947. And let me 
urge it upon you, sweepingly, that the record 
shows us to have made much progress in avoiding 
all four of the major failures I have just charged 
to an earlier time. 

First, we have abandoned neutrality and ap- 
peasement in the face of the Soviet threat, which 
in its gravity and in long-range importance has 
required the structure of political and military 
coimnitment that we call NATO. This is not so 
remarkable a change for some of our nations as 
it is for others, but here in Copenhagen I may 
perhaps fittingly note how deep and significant 
the decision has been for coimtries as different — 
and as much alike too — as Denmark and the 
United States. Indeed for us Americans it is 
this single, simple fact of commitment to the At- 
lantic alliance that is repeatedly decisive in the 
whole range of our relations to Europe. We are 
in, and in to stay. 

Deparfmenf of Stale Bulletin 

Second, we have all of us succeeded, over and 
over again, in putting the larger common interest 
ahead of small national rivalries. One thinks here 
of such notable and farsighted acts as that of 
France in theSaar — and indeed of the wider proc- 
ess of reconciliation which has marked the be- 
havior of many countries toward Germany. One 
thinks also — as Mr. Stikker [Dirk Stiklcer, Sec- 
retary General of NATO] so generously said on 
Tuesday — of the Marshall Plan, and in return 
I may say that m America we understand also 
what an important, and unprecedented, trust 
the old and proud people of Europe have shown 
in us by their acceptance of special Ameri- 
can leadei-ship in the militai'y aifairs of NATO. 
We believe that the tradition of Eisenhower, 
Gruenther, Ridgway, and Norstad has been a 
notable one — and we expect it to continue in dis- 
tinguished fashion under General Lemnitzer. But 
we do recognize that it takes maturity to accept 
as well as to oif er this kind of leadership. 

But perhaps the most striking example of 
choosing the wide as against the narrow interest 
is to be found in the policy followed with siich 
determination, for so long, by the German Fed- 
eral Republic under Chancellor Adenauer. Not 
many years ago one could find in German politics 
many deeply different tendencies. There were 
some who hoped that answers might be found 
in some foiTn of neutralism; others appeared to 
lean toward a renewed nationalism in which Ger- 
man and only German aspirations would govern 
policy. But in the event what has prevailed is a 
policy of determined devotion to freedom, deter- 
mined and ever more intimate integration both in 
Europe and in the Atlantic alliance, and deter- 
mined reconciliation among all the Western 
Europeans who shared, on either side, in the 
catastrophe of nazism. Never givmg up the deep 
concern which all of us feel for all the Euro- 
peans — Germans, Poles, Czechs, and others — 
whose true destiny is to rejoin us in the tradition 
of civility and the purpose of freedom, the Chan- 
cellor has never wavered in his knowledge that 
progress toward these hopes can be made on no 
other basis than that of unity and mutual com- 
mitment as among ourselves. This has seemed 
to us in America, for 15 years, to be a wise, brave, 
and farsighted policy, and it has had our steady 

Third, and still in contrast with the time be- 

fore the Second War, we have repeatedly seen 
since 1947 that political courage does exist — and 
is not always pimished — in our affairs. I have 
just spoken of the special leadership shown in the 
Federal Republic. Other notable cases are to be 
foimd in many countries, in the processes which 
have led to the construction of the new institu- 
tions of Europe. Now that the Common Mar- 
ket is a great success, we tend to forget that brave 
men had to press for it against wide and varied 
opposition. And courage of a liigh and tem- 
pered variety has been shown too in the extra- 
ordinary successes of transmutation mider which 
so many colonial holdings have been wisely set 
free. The diplomats and political leaders who 
have accepted and defended tlieir part in these 
events will not be badly treated by laistory. In- 
deed their wisdom is already apparent as the new 
and postcolonial Europe moves forward like a 
swimmer who has dropped a heavy weight. 

Finally, in this catalog of happy changes we 
may set the fact that we now have treaties and 
commitments whose reality is attested in a thou- 
sand ways. Again this needs no proof to you, as 
friends of NATO ; so let me simply cite as an im- 
mediate example the case of the United States. 
We have not merely signed article 5 ; we have not 
merely joined in mutual defense arrangements for 
arms and equipment of constantly more modern 
types; we have not merely committed our pres- 
tige and our purpose by a series of appointments 
of our leading soldiers to the NATO command in 
Paris: We have emplaced in Europe weapons — 
of all sorts — in a strength which far outweighs the 
total explosive power employed by both sides in 
both wars, and we have sealed the whole by the 
presence in Europe — essentially in forward de- 
velopment, and above aU in Germany — of 400,000 
men. Insofar as American strength can defend 
it, free Europe is as safe as any State in the Ameri- 
can Union. This American strength will remain 
as long as it is wanted in Eui'ope and as long as 
the alliance continues to grow on the basis of 
shared trust and shared effort. To think other- 
wise would be to mistake the 1960's for the 1930's. 

There are other lessons, bej'ond these of direct 
contrast, to be drawn from our experiences of 
the last 15 years: 

Tliere is our new skill in creating international 
institutions — squaring the circle of traditional po- 
litical theory by showing that in societies wliich 

October 22, 1962 


■wish it so high responsibilities can be shared with- 
out destroying the nation. 

There is our success in growing a new genera- 
tion of professional servants of the West, men 
whose loyalty to their own countries remains un- 
doubted while at the same time they see the mili- 
tary — or the monetary — or the trading problems 
of the whole of our community as one. Tliese 
new expert professionals are not always right. 
Political leadership is properly needful and de- 
cisive in the community as a whole, just as it is 
in each individual state. Still there is a special 
meaning to these new classes of men who work as 
colleagues in the professions that underpin the 
community; it is and should continue to be a 
source of strength to us. And I will not labor 
on other points, because your presence shows that 
you believe it: The new Atlantic community has 
been extraordinarily dependent throughout its life 
on the support, the understanding, and the leader- 
ship of private citizens. 

I have come a long way through two contrasting 
chapters of the past toward my few comments on 
the future. Fortunately most of what I want to 
say I have managed to say along the way, and I 
can simimarize it in one or two sentences. 

We must avoid false hopes of isolation ; we must 
rise above petty national rivalries ; we must see to 
it that our commitments are real and strong; we 
must — people and leaders alike — have the courage 
of our convictions. We must go on, step by prac- 
tical step, with the constructon of a partnership 
in which the United States — and other coimtries 
too — will be closely bound to the emerging Europe 
in a series of constantly growing ways. 

The Problem of Berlin 

But in closing I would like to offer one or two 
more direct comments on our pending business. 
First, I would like to associate myself — word for 
word and letter for letter— with the extraordi- 
narily clear and well -framed statement of Secre- 
tary General Stikker on the problem of Berlin. 
I have just come from Berlin, I have had a chance 
to see for myself the overwhelming contrast be- 
tween the energetic, genuinely high-spirited life 
of West Berlin and the inhuman ugliness of the 
wall. West Berlin is bound to us all by a thousand 
ties of feeling, of commitment, of trade, of travel, 
and above all of example. We must and shall 
keep it as it is until the day when good sense may 
outweigh creed in the Soviet Union — until the day 


when Soviet policy may come to reflect what all 
honest and well-informed Russians themselves 
understand : the fact that the real anomaly in that 
part of Europe is not the great human triumph 
of West Berlin but the sordid inhumanity of the 
wall, and of East Berlin, and of the whole dirty 
failure in the Eastern Zone of Germany. 

This may be a winter of renewed Soviet threats 
to Berlin. We in the Atlantic community are 
clear and firm and ever more ready — and we could 
not have a better cause. I have only one other 

Defense in the Nuclear Age 

Our defenses today are clear and strong, and 
we mean to keep them that way for tomorrow too. 
As teclmology develops, constant effort is neces- 
sary, and it is wrong to suppose that we can rest 
comfortably forever merely because our strength 
today is overwhelming. Moreover, the problem 
of defense in the nuclear age is as much psycho- 
logical as military. We in tlie United States have 
tried to set forth our concept of effective nuclear 
defense on the strategic scale — both in the private 
councils of the alliance and in major statements 
like those of the President at Ottawa ^ and the Sec- 
retary of Defense [Robert S. McNamara] in Ann 
Arbor.^ We share the view of Mr. Stikker that 
the nuclear defense of our community is essentially 
indivisible. We believe also that the special re- 
sponsibility which has fallen to us in the United 
States is one which we shall continue to be able to 
discharge; our commitment is clear, our purpose 
firm, our ability evident, and our forward plan- 
ning firm. We believe, finally, that small, sep- 
arate, national deterrents are not likely to be 
valuable and that, therefore, we should not, as a 
matter of policy, give our support and assistance 
to them. 

But no one should suppose from all this that we 
are blind either to the common military needs of 
NATO or to the special political and psychologi- 
cal forces which may most understandably press 
on our friends in Europe. No one should sup- 
pose that we are unwilling to share in this grim 
responsibility whenever the responsibility is truly 
shared. It would also be wrong to suppose that 
the reluctance which we feel with respect to in- 
dividual, ineffective, and unintegrated forces 

the I 
of I 




" For test, see Bulletin of June 5, 19C], p. 839. 
• For text, see ibid., .Tuly 9. 19G2. p. 64. 

Department of State Bulletin 



would be extended automatically to a European 
force, genuinely unified and multilateral, and ef- 
fectively integrated with our own necessarily pre- 
dominant strength in the whole nuclear defense of 
the alliance. Any possible arrangements for as- 
sistance and cooperation in such an enterprise 
would, of course, require full consultation and ap- 
proval by all appropriate agencies of our Govern- 
ment. Moreover, we ourselves cannot usurp from 
the new Europe the responsibility for deciding in 
its own way the level of effort and of investment 
which it wishes to make in these great matters. 
Nor do we wish to press for a European answer 
when in our own honest judgment the instrument 
of NATO itself may serve as well or better. 

Here, as elsewhere, we run the risk of seeming 
to interfere whether we speak or keep silent. 
Moreover, we would strongly endorse the opinion 
others have expressed in this meeting, that these 
matters need time for careful thought and study — 
time which our present strength and present for- 
ward planning permits us. 

But it does seem right at least to say this : If it 

should turn out that a genuinely multilateral 
European deterrent, integrated with ours in 
NATO, is what is needed and wanted, it will not 
be a veto from the administration in the United 
States which stands in the way. 

The North Atlantic nations have many duties 
beyond those I have discussed. In particular, I 
would have liked to stress with you the concern 
which we feel in the United States for the further 
development of effective and coordinated efforts to 
improve our help to — and our trade with — the less 
industrialized countries. Let me simply assure 
you in closing that this omission, and others, are 
not a signal of our level in interest in Washing- 
ton but only a frail mark of my respect for the 
patience with which you have heard me speak for 
so long. It is now time to stop, and I will simply 
repeat, in closing, the deep appreciation of the 
Government for which I speak — to your organiza- 
tion as a whole, to you as delegates, to your officers, 
and in particular to our Danish hosts — for all that 
all of you are doing in the cause — the common 
cause — of safety, freedom, and progress. 

The EEC and the Free-World Community 

hy G. Griffith Johnson 

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 

I am honored this evening in having the op- 
portunity to speak before the fifth congress of the 
American Production and Inventory Control So- 
ciety, an organization which is in the forefront of 
those so successfully engaged in pushing back the 
frontier of knowledge and techniques in the field 
of industrial management. It is not necessary to 
dwell on the importance of this profession to the 
continued preeminence and progress of the Ameri- 
can economy. 

This morning I testified before a congressional 

" Address made before the American Production and 
Inventory Control Society at Boston, Mass., on Sept. 27 
(press release 585). 

Ocfober 22, T962 

660653—62 3 

committee ^ on the subject of another important 
frontier — that of satellite communications and the 
complex problems for our international relations 
which such a communications system will involve. 
This offers, of course, a tremendously exciting 
vista and one which has, through the achievement 
of Telstar, caught the imagination of the people 
not only of this country but of the world. 

Tonight the subject which has been suggested 
for our discussion deals with still another frontier, 
in many ways perhaps the most important of all : 
that involving the efforts to develop a new frame- 

= Bulletin of Oct. 15, 1962, p. 567. 


■work and new institutions to meet the political 
and economic requirements for a free society in 
our modern world, without which all our achieve- 
ments in science and teclmology could prove 

Surely the European Common Market repre- 
sents a major breakthrough in this frontier. It is 
now almost 5 years since the Treaty of Eome came 
into force, linking the six countries into the Euro- 
pean Economic Community.' It is 4 years since 
the six made the first tariff cuts in their schedule 
for bringing about a complete customs union by 
1970. The United States strongly welcomed this 
development. It had given encouragement and 
direct support in the Marshall Plan days to Euro- 
pean economic cooperation and to various attempts 
toward more complete integration in Western 
Europe. It looked at the new undertaking as a 
means for bringing the six countries together, 
both politically and economically, with the result 
that they would be stronger and more effective 
allies in assuring the security and progress of the 
free world. 

At the time the project was met with widespread 
skepticism over its success and fears in the event 
it should succeed. The skepticism grew out of 
plausible doubts that the European countries could 
break down centuries of tradition. Some of the 
postwar efforts toward integration had, it is true, 
been successful — the European Coal and Steel 
Community created by the same six countries to 
provide a single market for trade in coal and steel 
was a going concern. But progress had been neg- 
ligible in other areas, and a most serious failure — 
some thought a hopelessly damaging one— was the 
attempt to establish a European Defense Com- 

When a new try was made at integration, this 
time in the economic field, the United States was 
just as vitally interested and just as hopeful for 
success. But success or failure depended on Euro- 
pean readiness to move away seriously from 
ancient attitudes of unfettered sovereignty. In 
the face of great skepticism and disbelief, the Six 
did bind themselves to create a Conunon Market 
for trade in all goods and for the free movement 
of workers, services, and capital. 

The transformation of six economies into a 
single economy was not to be accomplished over- 

' The six EEC countries are Belgium, France, the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 

night. Economic integration was to be carried out 
over a transitional period running, with some flex- 
ibility, to 1970. To attain the objectives, many 
of the detailed procedures were laid down in the 
treaty. However, the treaty was in a sense incom- 
plete. The negotiators jumped over many knotty 
matters by writing down what the goals were and 
then leaving the details to be worked out after the 
treaty entered into force. 

The first year that the Community was in exist- 
ence — 1958— was devoted largely to setting up the 
organizational machinery and to getting the new 
Community officials started on drafting imple- 
menting measures. In effect, a good part of the 
treaty was being negotiated after it had been 
signed, ratified, and put into effect. But the de- 
vice permitted the six governments to bind them- 
selves firmly at the right moment and avoided the 
necessity of dealing then with the complexities of 
the whole integration idea. 

The work of that year was carried out under a 
gathering black cloud. As the months advanced, 
fears grew that the economic difficulties plaguing 
France would prevent it from beginning to open 
its market to the other member states at the end 
of the year. Under the treaty it was to cut its 
tariffs by 10 percent and to relax its quotas. 
Shortly before this deadline arrived, France re- 
valued the franc and took other major steps to 
rescue its economy, and thus, when the yearend 
came, it was able to meet its tariff and quota com- 
mitments in step with the other member states. 

Adaptability of European Businessman 

This hurdle, however, was not the end of the 
obstacle course. The fact that it was overcome 
did not mean that individual governments and 
the public would abandon all thoughts of insist- 
ing at some point that the brakes be put on. Gov- 
ernment officials apparently had come to anticipate 
and accept fear and resistance by the business com- 
munity toward growing competition. But Europe 
had changed and so had the European business- 
man. Rather than clamoring for the reestablish- 
ment of the trade barriers which had begun to be 
torn down, the businessman had been sizing up 
what was in store for himself and was quickly 
planning the changes he would make in his ways 
of operation. 

These plans for adaptation fell into no single 
mold. Each businessman took decisions very 


Department of State Bulletin 

much in the liglit of his own situation. Many 
turned toward changing methods of production 
and channels of distribution to prepare for the 
planned shift from national markets to a six- 
country-wide market. For example, a producer 
of machinery in Italy would decide to concentrate 
henceforth on producing heavy equipment, while 
a manufacturer in France would find that he could 
more economically concentrate on lighter lines so 
that each could serve in his own country as sales 
representative for the products of the other one. 
This resourcefulness and adaptability, displayed 
in fortunate business conditions, helped to reveal 
that increased competition would not cause any 
serious damage to the national economies or to 
individual industries in the member states. 

Indeed, the timetable for the progressive dis- 
mantlement of tariffs and quotas was subsequently 
accelerated by unanimous decisions of the member 
states. Tariffs on industrial and agricultural 
goods moving among the member states have been 
cut substantially below what the original treaty 
plan demanded. As of last July 1, these "inter- 
nal" tariffs on industrial goods have been reduced 
by 50 percent. The cut to this level was origi- 
nally scheduled to have been reached only at the 
end of 1964 — or 2i/^ years later. 

The growth of Community production and 
trade during these years of tariff and quota lib- 
eralization shows up sharply in the statistics. 
Comparing 1958 with 1961, the output of goods 
and services in the Common Market increased by 
18 percent and trade among the member states 
rose by 73 percent. 

Surprisingly, these overall figures do not hide 
any serious industrial dislocation. Of course 
every industry, under the most favorable business 
conditions, cannot be expected to share equally 
with other industries in a general prosperity. 
Still, the widespread economic adjustments in the 
Common Market have been carried out remark- 
ably free of damage to sectors of the economy. 
We can see this by looking at the use made of two 
community devices for providing relief for severe 

One is the European Li vestment Bank. Among 
its responsibilities, it stands ready to lend money 
under specially favorable conditions to European 
producers to modernize or to convert their fac- 
tories as the result of the progressive establish- 
ment of the Common Market. So far the Bank 

has made no loans for "reconversion." About a 
year ago it almost made one — for a paper-pulp 
factory in the depressed Borinage coal-mining re- 
gion of Belgium. However, the promoters ap- 
parently changed their plans, and the loan was 
put off. 

The second major adjustment relief device under 
the treaty is the European Social Fund. Operat- 
ing on a principle of a 50-50 matching of its 
money with that spent by national or local au- 
thorities, the Fund provides for financial assist- 
ance to workers: for moving from one area to 
another to take up new jobs, for being trained in 
new skills, or for sustaining themselves during 
periods of full or partial unemployment resulting 
from the conversion of industries in which they 
have been working. So far, the demands on the 
Social Fund have been very slight and have been 
attributable to rather general programs of voca- 
tional training rather than to any particular prob- 
lem of dislocation of industry. For the entire 
period 1958-61, the Social Fund was called upon 
to make matching payments of some half million 
dollars for vocational training and relocation al- 
lowances. It was not called upon to make any 
payments for unemplojmient compensation in 
connection with the conversion of industries. 

In short, therefore, the history of the Common 
Market to date has been one of success and of 
steady progress toward the economic goals set 
forth in the 195Y treaty. These years have been 
a period of unparalleled prosperity for the West- 
em European coimtries, and some people have 
raised a question regarding the extent to which 
this prosperity has been made possible by the 
Common Market or has made possible the Com- 
mon Market's success to date. But in either event, 
we must view the Market as a fact, a revolutionary 
new development in our political and economic 
relationships. In recent years the output of goods 
and services in the Common Market has risen at 
a substantially greater rate than in the United 
States, and the dynamic quality of Western Euro- 
pean economies is evident to all who come in con- 
tact with them. 

Massachusetts and the Common Market 

If the skepticism has so far proved false, so also 
have — up to now — the fears of unfavorable effects 
on other coimtries, particularly the United States. 

During this period 1958 through 1961, our ex- 

Ocfober 22, 7962 


ports to the six Common Market states rose by 
some 45 percent and last year reached $4.1 billion. 
This rise in our exports to the Six was greater than 
the rise in our exports to the world as a whole. 
Exports by the Six to us increased by some 34 

Experience has borne out the expectation that 
economic integration in Europe would lead to 
higher levels of economic activity and would bene- 
fit outside countries, such as the United States, 
by providing them a wealthier market. 

As the gross national product of these countries 
increases, their needs, desires, and capacities to 
pay for our goods should also increase. The ex- 
pansion of demand in Europe for consumer dura- 
bles has been enormous. Automobiles may be 
smaller, but they are being run off the assembly 
lines in sufficient volume to give city officials in 
Paris or Milan the same headaches about the in- 
adequacy of parking space as officials in Boston 
or Springfield. Nevertheless, the Six have far to 
go to reach our present levels, and the possibilities 
for increases in consumption are great. Among 
100 Americans, there are 7 times as many TV sets 
as among 100 people in the Common Market, 4 
times as many radios, nearly 5 times as many auto- 
mobiles, refrigerators, and wasliing machines. 
The market for the goods which the Europeans are 
anxious and increasingly able to buy will naturally 
be filled in large part by their own production, but, 
if we can maintain our production and marketing 
abilities, our own plants can increasingly partici- 
pate as well. 

Industries in this part of the coimtry have a 
direct interest in the Common Market and other 
overseas markets. In 1960 New England's in- 
dustries exported over $1 billion of their output. 
Almost half this — $435 million — came from this 
State. In looking at the industries in Massachu- 
setts and in the Common Market, one might think 
that the two areas are more competitors than mar- 
kets for each other. It might surprise one to dis- 
cover that Germany, for example, is among the 
best foreign customers for the products of our 
industries producing nonelectrical machinery, in- 
struments and measuring devices, and chemicals. 
The fact is that industries here, characterized by 
advances in product development and in efficiency, 
have a good market in Europe. 

"Wlien we look at the Common Market, both as 
a customer and as a competitor, we must bear in 

mind the negotiations which have been going on 
in recent months, looking toward the entry of the 
United Kingdom; and this in turn may be fol- 
lowed by the entry of other European countries. 
As a market for American goods, the European 
Economic Community, in its present size or ex- 
panded by the addition of the United Kingdom 
and possibly by other countries, should be ever 
more wealthy — a market with a purchasing power 
wMch might one day equal our own and offering 
great possibilities for mutually beneficial trade. 
Together they and we will account for 90 percent 
of the free world's trade in industrial goods. 

Changes in Competitive Position of U.S. Firms 

It would be a great mistake, however, to suppose 
that this optimistic prospect will be automatically 
achieved or that serious problems may not be in 
the offing for this coimtry and other parts of the 
world as well. The newspapers have given promi- 
nence to the recent meeting in London of the 
Commonwealth prime ministers and to the prob- 
lems posed and fears there reflected by the leaders 
of the Commonwealth members from around the 
world. We also cannot ignore the possible diffi- 
culties which could be presented to our Latin 
American neighbors, to the new African countries, 
and to others whose economies have been sub- 
stantially dependent on past trading relationships 
with the individual members of the Common 

The American manufacturer, exporter, and in- 
vestor have already begun to feel the influence of 
the new institutional framework and policies on 
their own activities. The welding of the Common 
Market member states into a complete customs 
union changes the competitive picture for Ameri- 
can industries in several respects. 

First, there are the "external" and the "internal" 
tariff changes. The tariffs which each country 
has applied against the United States and other 
"outsiders" are to be replaced by "external" 
tariffs common to all the member states. The new 
common rate on product x as a general rule will 
be the average of tlie rates which each country 
used to levy before there was a Common Market. 
Therefore, the old national rate whicli Germany 
applied on imports from the United States of 
product X may go up from 5 percent to 9 percent, 
while in Italy it may go down from 15 percent to 
9 percent. Tlie American producer wlio liad a 


Deporfmenf of Sfofe Bulletin 

market in Germany but not in Italy may wonder 
whether his gains in sales to Italy will offset his 
losses in sales to Germany. 

Even more important, American producers will 
be faced by a tariff while those in the Common 
Market will not. For example: In 1960 we sold 
about $1 million worth of tires to France. These 
tires competed in the French market against those 
coming from Germany. The tariffs used to be the 
same. Now American tires entering France pay 
18 percent, while the German tires pay about 9 
percent. Over the next few years the tariff now 
levied against German tires will have been com- 
pletely removed. The price advantage for the 
German producer over the American producer 
will thus be about $2 for each tire. 

The European producer will be able to enjoy 
production cost benefits of a mass market. The 
widening of the European market for a manu- 
facturer in, say, France from his previous national 
territory to that of the six member states will per- 
mit him to become more specialized, to produce 
longer "runs" of his lines of equipment, to dis- 
tribute through a larger and more efficient sales 
organization, and generally to enjoy the cost-cut- 
ting advantages in the past more familiar to the 
producer in the United States. 

In addition, as a result of other steps toward 
European integration, such as freeing the move- 
ment of blue-collar and white-collar workers, the 
European producer will also become entitled to 
some benefits previously lacking. For instance, 
a French manufacturer of papermaking ma- 
chinery may become freely able to send his mill- 
wrights to Italy to set up the large and complex 
machinery he has sold there rather than being 
limited to employing only Italian millwrights who 
are not so intimately acquainted with his product. 

For these and similar reasons, the advantages 
which the American had over the European pro- 
ducer, resulting from the fragmentation of the 
European economy, will have altered and in some 
cases will have disappeared. American firms 
which have had a stake in the European market 
have for some time been considering what they 
should do in the face of these prospects. 

There has been a widespread belief that the most 
effective means for an American firm to hold on 
to its competitive position in the European market 
is to move some of its productive facilities behind 
the Common Market tariff frontier. This direct 

investment by American firms in the Common 
Market has caused worry in this country. It has 
often been described as the transfer of American 
jobs out of this country, although in many cases it 
is clear that tliis investment has increased jobs in 
this coimtry by generating and sustaining a flow of 
exports — in equipment, component parts, and the 
like — which otherwise would not have existed, and 
the income from such investments is an increas- 
ingly important item in our balance of payments. 

American plants have in fact sprouted and 
spread rapidly in Europe. New factory buildings 
in continental surroundings display the names 
and the trademarks of many familiar American 
products. But one should be careful in drawing 
conclusions. It is true that direct American in- 
vestment in the Common Market has been heavy 
and has been growing fast. As of 1961, it 
amoimted to slightly more than $3 billion and had 
increased in the 1957-61 period by 81 percent. 
However, tliis trend started early in the postwar 
period, well before the Common Market was even 
on the drawing board. Also, American direct in- 
vestment in Britain and in the other European 
countries outside the Common Market amounted 
to more— to $4.6 billion in 1961 — and had been 
increasing at an even more rapid rate, rising 
during that 1957-61 period by 87 percent. 

For many American manufacturers, putting up 
a plant abroad is simply out of the question. The 
practical problems can be formidable: conduct- 
ing plant location surveys, dealing with national 
and local laws and practices for authorizations 
necessary to build a plant and to bring it into oper- 
ation, depriving the home plant of key supervisory 
personnel, and otherwise taking on, mader un- 
familiar conditions abroad, endless tasks wliich are 
difficult enough at home. 

Many American companies have chosen to 
license foreign companies to manufacture and to 
sell their products. There seems to be no way of 
stating with any precision either what volume of 
European production is covered by licenses from 
American firms or what the trend in American 
licensing has been. This kind of data is imavail- 
able from either official or industry sources. From 
wliat can be gleaned from the press and from what 
businessmen and the lawyers who lend a hand 
with these intricacies say, there seems to have been 
a surge in the negotiation of licensing agreements 
as the Common Market came into being and then 

October 22, 7962 



recently a more reserved attitude of many Amer- 
ican companies. 

Licensing remains an important and useful 
means for many American companies to continue 
to profit from their own product and market devel- 
opment efforts. But for others in this country 
there is disenchantment. The American manufac- 
turer who has licensed, say, a company in Stutt- 
gart to produce and sell in Gei-many its fully auto- 
matic pretzel bender may well have come to the 
unhappy realization that his particular license 
had a built-in death warrant. After producing 
and marketing the item in full and faithful com- 
pliance with the license, the Stuttgart producer 
may have decided, as the license expired, that he 
had acquired manufacturing and distributing 
knowledge and technique that he could turn more 
fully to his own profit. The American producer 
has then discovered that he has lost future royalties 
and, in fact, is faced with a new and well-equipped 
foreign competitor. 

Trade Expansion Act 

It is thus difficult to generalize or to prescribe 
any single course of action which will suit the 
situation and qualifications of every American 
corporation. One thing, however, seems clear. 
For the great bulk of U.S. industry, for the aver- 
age manufacturer, and for the U.S. economy as 
a whole, the indispensable method of dealing with 
the growing competition of the Common Market, 
and for taking advantage of the increased market 
possibilities which it affords, is through the export 
of goods from this country. 

Our export trade with Europe is greatly nour- 
ished by the technological superiority of many of 
our industries. It is supported by our ability to 
supply some goods — including agricultural prod- 
ucts such as cotton and tobacco — wliich the Com- 
mon Market cannot itself produce. But to a very 
large extent our export trade with Europe — and 
this goes back to the old economic principle of 
comparative advantage — depends on our ability to 
produce more efficiently products which it is 
within the technical capability of Europe itself to 
produce; and we in turn accept from them the 
goods in which they have an advantage. This 
is the kind of economic competition from which 
this country has never shrunk, and the great vol- 
ume of our exports at the present time is ample 

evidence of the success of American business and 
agriculture in joining together with great efficiency ; 
tlie various factors of production. 

However, there is one kind of market obstacle 
with which the private producer is helpless to 
deal : the intervention of governments with high 
tariffs or other trade restrictions. With the elim- 
ination in the past few years of the great bulk of 
nontariff restrictions in Europe, for much of 
American industry the ci-ucial factor in their com- 
petitive position vis-a-vis Common Market pro- 
ducers is becoming the advantage provided the 
latter through the common external tariffs of the 
EEC and the gradual elimination of tariffs within 
the EEC. 

For help in this crucial area the American busi- 
nessman must look to the U.S. Government. Last 
week, following earlier and similar action by the 
House of Representatives, the Senate took one of 
the momentous legislative steps of our time in 
passing the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.* You 
are all familiar with the unprecedented broad 
scope of the provisions of this act, which should 
shape our foreign trade policy for many years to 
come. The act, of course, concerns all of our for- 
eign trade with all countries, but throughout its 
consideration by the Congress and the executive 
branch, attention has been especially concentrated 
on the increasingly apparent need for the nego- 
tiation of satisfactory trading relationships with 
the other members of the Atlantic partnership. 

Basically, this legislation will permit the Presi- 
dent to negotiate reductions in our own tariffs by 
as much as 50 percent of the rates in force on 
July 1, 1962. Additionally, it provides special 
authority for reducing tariffs in negotiations with 
the Common Market, which could bring about 
greater reductions and even complete elimination 
of duties on industrial products for which we and 
these other countries are the principal supplier. 
This additional authority was granted to the Pres- 
ident in recognition of the need to have special 
tools to deal with the dislocations which might 
otherwise develop from the Common Market's 
wholesale reshaping of trading conditions. It 
obviously applies to those goods in which our 
strong competitive position is demonstrated by our 

' For text of the President's message to Congress on 
trade, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for remarks by 
the President on Sept. 23, see ibid., Oct. 8, 1962, p. 625. 


Department of Stale Bulletin 

IS It 



losition as suppliers in world markets, and the 
ise of this authority is subject to the same safe- 
uards which govern the use of the general tariff 
eduction authority. 

For agricultural goods there is another form 
f special authority to take account of the condi- 
ions envisaged in our relations with the Common 
■larket. It should be noted that at present the 
/ommon Market is our biggest customer for farm 
oods, taking over $1 billion a year of such goods 
r about one-third of our total dollar exports of 
gricultural commodities. Under the new act the 
'resident can negotiate reductions greater than 
percent or even eliminate duties on farm prod- 
cts if he finds that such action will maintain or 
xpand our exports. 

The authority provided by this new legislation 
>'ill be used by the Government in major negotia- 
ions. The negotiating situation can be expected 
o be complex, to embrace many coimtries and 
v-ide ranges of products, and to require the most 
horough preparation. It will take much time, 
)atience, and perseverance. 

!elp for U.S. Exporters Through GATT and OECD 

In the meantime there are other steps which 
an be taken and are being taken to foster and 
)reserve the competitive position of American 

One of our instruments is the GATT — the Gen- 
ral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — to which 
he United States, the six Common Market coun- 
ries, and some 35 other trading nations are par- 
ies. The GATT contains the commitments we 
lave exchanged with other countries, not only on 
ariff rates but on quotas and other forms of trade 
)arriers. Quotas and other nontariff devices of 
!ontrol have hampered our trade opportimities for 
nany years. The bulk of these restrictions have 
)een swept away. However, some still remain, 
specially on farm products. To attack these we 
lave been using the GATT. We have challenged 
neasures which are imposed inconsistently with 
he letter of their obligations or the objectives of 
he agreement. 

We are also using the OECD — the Organiza- 
-ion for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
nent — to press our attack on quotas and other 
)bstacles to international trade. In June the 
DECD Trade Committee agreed on a system of 
'confrontation" for questioning or challenging the 

Dcfober 22, 1962 

continued use of quotas as well as of administra- 
tive and technical devices which interfere with the 
trade of the members. A special program has also 
been instituted within the OECD in the field of 
quotas against agricultural goods. Also, the 
United States representative to an OECD com- 
mittee announced our intention of requesting the 
organization to study fiscal and other measures 
which discriminate against American automobile 
exports. A group within the organization is to 
examine import licensing procedures, credit guar- 
antees, and government purchasing regulations. 

Services Available Under Export Expansion Program 

All our export problems are by no means at- 
tributable to the tariffs, quotas, and devious trade 
controls of other governments. Quite naturally, 
there are problems of a more purely business na- 
ture. Here also United States Government agen- 
cies have been stepping up efforts to help our 
exporters. Some time ago the President set under 
way an export expansion program to improve the 
Government's mternational trade services to the 
American business commimity. I am sure that 
many of you have had occasion to make use of 
the services which are available through the De- 
partment of Commerce field offices and through 
our commercial officers at American embassies and 
consulates abroad. 

There are now 10 different programs which the 
Department of Commerce has in operation to 
bolster our exports. 

For example, the regional export expansion 
councils throughout the country are made up of 
businessmen who volunteer to work for the promo- 
tion of international trade, and these councils give 
sound, practical instruction, advice, and guidance 
to smaller manufacturers who are interested in 
exploring export trade opportunities. The new 
trade centers program provides permanent instal- 
lations where products of a different industry are 
shown to the trade every 6 weeks or so. These cen- 
ters give our businessmen, particularly those who 
otherwise would not have international repre- 
sentatives, the opportunity to show their goods or 
to negotiate with agents who can handle their 
goods for them. The first center opened in London 
in mid-1961, and within the Common Market there 
will be a trade center opening at Frankfurt in 
November. At the center in London one Ameri- 
can men's wear manufacturer closed the biggest 


sale of its type ever made in England — a sale of 
$400,000. Another participant projected his firm's 
sales orders for 19G2 at between one-half million 
and one million dollars. 

Under tlie trade mission program, more than 
100 groups of American businessmen have visited 
comitries all over the world. Traveling with 
Department of Commerce officials, these volimteer 
businessmen carry abroad specific business pro- 
posals which have been obtained in advance from 
American manufacturers. The missions return 
with similar proposals for businessmen in this 
country. In May a trade mission of experts in 
the fields of packaging machinery, printing eqiiip- 
ment, machine tools, and a variety of new elec- 
tronic equipment, such as computers, came back 
from Germany and developed a number of valu- 
able reports of opportunities for these and other 

Facilities and acti^aties such as these, wliich 
are available under the President's trade expan- 
sion program, can of course be meaningful only 
if the business community gives its support to the 
programs and takes advantage of the opportuni- 
ties offered. Furthermore, we should like the as- 
sistance of businessmen in our dealings with other 
governments. The Government would like to have 
specific infonnation wliich could be used by it in 
negotiations and discussions with other govern- 
ments for the removal of imnecessary or unjusti- 
fiable restrictions hindering our trade. Looking 
forward to the tariff negotiations which we shall 
enter into on the basis of the Trade Expansion 
Act, it would be useful to gather information 
showing the particular tariffs or restrictions which 
pose problems. The channel for submitting this 
information is the Committee for Reciprocity In- 
formation, which is a permanent part of our inter- 
agency trade agreements machinery. 

The cooperation which exists, and which should 
be developed, between the business community and 
Government agencies engaged in various phases 
of export promotion has benefits for the country 
as a whole in helping to close the gap in our bal- 
ance of payments. It therefore assists in enabling 
the United States to carrj' out its commitments 
internationally with regard to the progress and 
security of the free world. 

Future Commercial Relationships 

The developments in Europe are thus helpinj 
us to focus on basic aspects of our own situation 
In all the attention which must be paid to detail 
and in the face of all the difficulties wliich wil 
arise in specific commodities or industries, it i 
most important to keep constantly in mind thi 
ultimate objective of a secure community of frei 
nations and the compelling requirements whicl 
gi-ow out of what President Kennedy has callec 
the interdependence between the United States 
and the new Europe.^ 

A new and liberalized set of commercial rela 
tionships is an essential part of this. Armed witl 
a new Trade Expansion Act, the United States 
will be able as well as willing to accept this chal 
lenge. But this is not a one-way street. Oui 
readiness must be matched by equal readiness and 
enthusiasm on the part of others, and particularly 
by the European Commiuiity, in which is combined 
so large a share of Western resources and capacity, 

Not many years ago the goals of the Common 
Market would have seemed to many to be beyond 
the bounds of practicability. As we can readily 
see, those goals are being achieved and achieved 
in many respects at a more rapid pace than re- 
quired by the treaty schedule. Tlie obvious need 
to bring the people of Western Europe closely 
together in a totally new kind of community has 
been matched by a new-found willingness and, in- 
deed, eagerness of those people to do what is neces- 
sary to transform their economic life. 

The most important question now is whether 
this willingness and eagerness will be extended to 
a broader arena, to the steps necessary to weld to- 
gether — rather than fragmentize — the free-world 
conmiunity. Policies now in process of formula- 
tion, decisions to be made in the near future, wiU 
in fact begin to shape and crystallize the pattern 
of future relationships between the Community 
and the outside world. In this process the United 
States Government intends to play a fully con- 
structive role, and we are confident that our 
friends in Europe will join in pressing forward 
toward the building of a prosperous free-world 


pi S 

' Ibid., July 23, 1962, p. 131. 


Department of Stale Bulletin 

rade and Investment in Tropical Africa 

Following are the texts of addresses made hy 
ssistant Secretary for African Affairs G. Men- 
"n Williams on September 25 and Deputy Assist- 
nt Secretary for Economic Affairs W. Michael 
lumenthal on Septemher £6 before a Conference 
n Trade and Investment in Tropical Africa spon- 
^red hy the Commerce and Industry Association 
f New York at New York, N.Y. 



lity M 










.ddress by Assistant Secretary Williams 

ress release 580 dated September 25 

Last week the Washington Daily News took 
usnetf he National Association of Manufacturers to task 
or being overly cautious in its approach to ex- 
anded business activity in the United States, 
'he newspaper recalled that businessmen had 
heir troubles back in Henry Ford's day and were 
,fraid to take risks until Ford's unorthodox 
Qethods shocked them into a realization of the 
)rofits to be gained by his methods. The editorial 
oncluded that we "could use a greater spirit of 
idventure in the business community, a greater 
'eeling of confidence in the U.S.A." 

Today I would like to call for "a greater spirit 
)f adventure" on the part of prospective investors 
n Africa. There is a need for boldness on the 
jart of America's entrepreneurs as they come to 
^rips with the many opportunities opening up on 
hat dynamic continent. 

This is not to ignore the existence of risks in 
African development. Some African govem- 
nents do not have adequate resources and have 
)een unsuccessful in obtaining the kind of assist- 
|ince needed to assure their development. Such 
»untries are likely to face serious political as 

ell as economic difficulties because of their in- 
iibility to meet the expectations of their people. 

The provision of aid is one way in which re- 

sources have been made available to certain Afri- 
can countries. In the long run, however, private 
foreign capital can do the job of development in 
most fields more effectively than any government 
institution. Such capital, though, must be pre- 
pared not only to produce a profit for the Ameri- 
can investor but to contribute to the development 
of economic and political stability in Africa. 
That this can be done is becoming recognized in- 
creasingly, even in countries which tend toward 
state ownership. 

On my last visit to Africa a particularly im- 
pressive experience was to encounter the frank 
desire of a number of countries to receive private 
American capital. 

We found this desire in Sierra Leone and Bu- 
rundi, two areas that have a strong interest in 
developing resort areas to attract tourist trade. 
We found it in Coquilliatville and Luluabourg in 
the Congo and in the Central African Republic — 
places that had been little exposed to the United 
States in years past but which are very anxious 
to get developmental programs underway. We 
also found this same desire in Stanleyville in the 
Congo and in Guinea, two areas where Commu- 
nist bloc influences were heavy in recent years but 
which today are genuinely interested in obtaining 
private American investment. 

Firm Basis for Investment Opportunities 

Unfortunately, the possibilities for American 
businessmen have been relatively unexplored in 
many parts of Africa. Some of our missions re- 
port that they do not see an American business- 
man from one end of a year to the other. 

Perhaps some of the reluctance of U.S. business- 
men is due to those few cases of unrest and gov- 
ernmental irresponsibility that catch the headlines. 
Such headlines blur the fact that conditions in 
most of tropical Africa are peacefiil. Actually, 
most of Africa's energy is going mto the construc- 

ggllelinibcrober 22, 1962 


tive tasks of economic development and tlie main- 
tenance of political stability. 

In the new nations that evolved from the former 
French territories of Equatorial and West Africa, 
for instance, able and enlightened national leaders 
are moving ahead with economic development. 
"\^niile it is natural that problems of independence 
almost inevitably lead to change and tension, these 
nations show a remarkably high level of political 
stability. The long-independent nation of Liberia 
also is making important strides toward a more 
modem economy and has a demonstrated history 
of seeking private investment. 

Among the fonner British territories, Nigeria, 
with the largest population in Africa — some 40 
million inhabitants — is forging ahead in meeting 
the problems of its diversified peoples. Nigerian 
officials have engaged American public relations 
counsel to help attract capital, and the Govern- 
ment has passed legislation embodying important 
safeguards for foreign investors. Another Eng- 
lish-speaking nation, Ghana, officially leans toward 
state ownership of enterprises, but these policies 
have not modified President Kwame Nkrumah's 
appeal for private foreign investors to help 
develop the resources of his Government. 

Even in the Congo, where the tragic course of 
events has made that nation a symbol of all the 
fears of possible disaster in Africa, most enter- 
prises have operated with little interruption. Al- 
though agricultural production was hardest hit, it 
is now coming back strongly. 

These facts are not pointed out to minimize 
the grave difficulties that face the investor in many 
parts of Africa but to put in better perspective a 
situation in which the voices of disaster sometimes 
seem to be the only ones heard. 

Experienced American investors, however, have 
not been discouraged by these voices of disaster. 
In fact many businessmen are increasing their 
investments. There has been, for instance, a 
greater interest on the part of tlie American bank- 
ing community in African banks and financial 
institutions. This interest has led to the develop- 
ment of closer working relations, participation in 
equity capital in some African institutions, and 
the opening of several African branch banks. 
Such activity is taking place in cooperation with 
both European financial houses and African pub- 
lic and private investors. 

Direct U.S. investment in Africa in 1961 once 


again shows a substantial rise, particularly in the 
newly independent countries. Last year Amer- 
ican investment in Africa rose by more than $100 
million — an increase from $925 million to 
$1,070 million. 

Of particular interest are the percentage in- 
creases in tropical Africa. In East Africa the 
increase in investment in 1961 was more than 20 
percent, and in "West Africa it was nearly 20 per- 
cent — both well above the continent-wide average 
of just under 10 percent. 

Changing Nature of Investments 

While such increases are encouraging, they are 
still very low in relation to most other areas of 
the world — and very low in relation to Africa's 
needs. Furthermore, these investments are not 
as diversified as would be desirable. More than 
50 percent of them are in extractive industries, 
where there are relatively few opportunities to 
help develop badly needed local small businesses. 
However, some American investors, notably the 
oil companies, are doing a good job of building 
small businesses by assisting Africans to own and 
operate filling stations and tank trucks. 

There is a real hunger for industrial and entre- 
preneurial development throughout tropical 
Africa. For the most part the new nations want 
such development without disrupting their trad- 
ing relations with Europe. We also feel that 
maintaining these relations is in the interest of all 
concerned. There is plenty of opportimity for 
everyone in Africa, and we are not interested in 
supplanting existing commercial relations. 

But with independence the traditional colony- 
metropole relationsliips have been modified. Inde- 
pendence has intensified interest in the develop- 
ment of local manufacturers. In the next decade 
we will see progressive increases in the rate of in- 

British and French investments in Africa, 
which are many times larger than ours, are trad- 
ing interests for the most part, but they are in- 
creasingly helping to develop small local industry. 
Over the years their firms that export agricultural 
commodities have begun to develop processing 
industries for various kinds of raw materials — 
coffee-cleaning establishments, palm oil plants, 
cotton gins, abattoirs with freezing equipment, 
tanneries, textile factories. 

Major American, British, and French enter- 

Department of State Bulletin 

Drises in Africa have been profitable, even though 
the nature of investments in Africa has changed 
with the passage of years. Today there is a trend 
to iway from traditional plantation agriculture into 
ihe very early stages of industrialization repre- 
sented by commodity-processing operations. Such 
jhanges will continue as Africa develops economi- 
cally, but there is no reason to doubt that Africa 
(vill provide reasonable profits in the future as in 
:he past. 

There are numerous small traders — principally 
Lebanese, Greeks, Armenians, and Indians — who 
ire finding it profitable to go into small industry. 
WTiile the manufacture of pots and pans or plastic 
pocket combs does not sound like dramatic invest- 
ment, such industry represents a necessary and 
aseful stage in the growth of Africa's economy. 
These investments provide important services for 
Africans and indicate a high degree of confidence 
in Africa's future. 


Wide Range of Opportunities 

Between these very small industries and large- 
scale extractive industries, there is a whole range 
of immediate opportunities open to American and 
3ther private investors. These opportimities in- 
;lude such areas as insurance, banking and loan 
associations, hotels, and low-cost housing. In ad- 
dition there is room for commercial, financial, and 
industrial activities, as well as export and import 
Dusinesses, large and small. Transportation and 
communication facilities are also among the very 
lighest priorities of African leaders. 

Transportation offers prime investment oppor- 
timities for U.S. businessmen. American trucks 
ire the best in the world, and our tires are excep- 
:ionally sturdy — ideal for African conditions. 
There is a great deal of interest in Africa in ob- 
taining such American equipment to improve 
transportation. Furthermore, American road- 
juilding equipment is now in a niimber of African 
countries, constructing new roads and maintaining 
Did ones. All of this activity will lead to an ex- 
panded transportation market. 

There also will be many sales opportunities in 
A.frica as that continent's purchasing power rises 
md its population grows. Closer relations among 
countries will lead to regional rather than national 
narkets. And about three-quarters of our AID 
^Agency for International Development] grants 
md development loans — now running at more than 

October 22, 1962 

$200 million a year — will be spent on U.S. goods 
and services. 

Of additional interest to American investors is 
the disposition on the part of most countries to 
make it easy for new kinds of industry to go into 
Africa. At the moment there are investment 
guaranty agreements in force between the United 
States and nine governments in tropical Africa, 
and five other agi-eements in that part of the con- 
tinent are under active negotiation. Several of 
these agreements have been negotiated with coun- 
tries having a strong interest in some form of 
mixed economy, yet they are acutely aware of the 
value of private foreign investment to their 

In addition to negotiating agreements of this 
nature the United States, through the U.S. For- 
eign Service, engages in a wide range of activities 
designed to assist American businessmen and de- 
velop a climate favorable to private investment. 
I don't want to go into these services extensively, 
however, because Mr. Blankenheimer ^ of the De- 
partment of Commerce will touch upon that facet 
of our foreign relations. 

Adapting to African Patterns 

In summary, then, there are ample investment 
opportunities in Africa for anyone seriously in- 
terested both in making money and in helping 
Africa develop. However, American capital must 
help with nation building along with profit taking 
or it will not be welcome. Africans are developing 
forms and institutions based on their own familiar 
cultural patterns, and we cannot expect that their 
patterns of operation necessarily will be the same 
as those f oxmd elsewhere in the world. 

This may be difficult for some American busi- 
nessmen to accept readily. But just as American 
investors and traders accustomed themselves to 
new patterns in our own West in pioneer days and 
in Latin America, and as trading and investment 
patterns were adapted to conditions in the Far 
East during the early period of our interest there, 
so there will be entrepreneurs who will be quick 
to catch the rhythms of the new Africa. These 
will be men with foresight and daring, men who 
know that Africa is taking its first steps on a lad- 
der that at this moment has no top rung in sight. 

But the opportunities lie in Africa — and they 

' Bernard Blankenheimer, Director of the African Divi- 
sion, Bureau of International Programs. 


cannot be fully explored from offices in New York 
or Chicago or San Francisco. It is not enough to 
wait safely in the United States for the African 
market to come into being. The place to start is 
on the continent itself. It is important to have 
American management associating itself closely 
with local communities — in the training of local 
employees, in sharing technical know-how, and in 
supporting community activities. Even if the 
American businessman can do no more to begin 
with than break even, he will have people on the 
spot, watching for opportunities as they develop 
and ready to take advantage of them as they 

This is the real challenge of modem Africa for 
the private businessman in the United States. I, 
for one, believe that American business has not 
lost its spirit of boldness — the spirit that gave our 
nation the greatest economic system the world has 
ever seen. 

Together with their colleagues in education, 
agriculture, religion, health, and government, 
American businessmen must move boldly to meet 
Africa's challenge and help build an Africa 
strong and free — an Africa ready and able to make 
increasingly important contributions to the future 
peace and prosperity of the world. 


Address hy Mr. Blumenthal 

Press release 582 dated September 26 

An essential part of the democratic process is 
two-way communication between the business 
world and government. As one who was in busi- 
ness until I joined the State Department less than 
2 years ago, I know from experience both in and 
out of government how difficult it is for some busi- 
nessmen to view the world from the perspective of 
Washington and likewise how difficult it is for 
some officials to appreciate your problems as busi- 
nessmen active in international trade and invest- 
ment. In part the communications problem arises 
because we are all so busy that we have little time 
to try to view our activities from a different 

Thus I especially welcome and highly value 
this opportunity to talk to you about what your 
Government is tliinkmg about commodity stabili- 


zation and to do this with particular reference t 
the economic development of tropical Africa. 

Let me add that I am pleased to see a numbe 
of diplomatic representatives of African nations ii 
this predominantly business audience. It is goo( 
to note that our business community in this wa; 
among others is in touch with official Africa] 

Factors Affecting Development 

The problems of the new and old nations o 
tropical Africa are manifold. You have no doub 
been hearing much these days about the rapidity 
of political evolution, the pressures of socia 
change, and the imperatives of economii 

The main facts bearing on the development prob 
lem are well known to you, I am sure, and I neec 
but briefly mention them here. 

Large parts of tropical Africa are poor, ex 
tremely poor. Per capita national incomes an 
under $100 per year in a majority of countries anc 
even in the relatively richer countries, such a; 
Ghana and Nyasaland, do not exceed $200. Whih 
little can be done about underlying climatic, soil 
and resource deficiencies, much can and is being 
done to raise educational and health standards, tc 
import technical and managerial skills, to build 
ports, roads, railways, and airports essential to tic 
formerly subsistence economies into an African 
and world trade network and to develop indige- 
nous power resources to support industrialization. 

Clearly areas such as the Congo, which are rich 
in mineral wealth and in untapped hydro re- 
sources, have a great potential for economic de- 
velopment once unity and stability are restored. 
Elsewhere the future is also bright if capital, 
skills, and resources can be effectively combined. 
The mushrooming of new enterprises and the 
growth, for example, of a Nigerian entrepreneur- 
ial class give promise that this will be done in 
much of Africa. 

But the process of modernization requires re- 
sources: human, material, and financial. Let it 
be clearly understood that most of these resources 
must, of necessity, be local in origin for private 
foreign investment, economic assistance, and other 
unilateral transfers of resources into the African 
area can form only a small though valuable part 
of the total required. Moreover, the resources 
coming in from the outside must first and fore- 

Department of State Bulletin 








r, » 



to til 



" nost be directed toward speeding up the process 
)f generating indigenous assets. They must also 
e employed to broaden the economic base and to 
'^ii lelp move resources out of commodities in over- 
goo( production into new lines of endeavor. 
'^ But there can be no question that, since the 

" :)ossibilities for local savings are limited, the need 
'or private investment and economic assistance 
Tom tlie rest of the world is great. In particular, 
"oreign exchange resources to finance essential im- 
)orts of consumer and investment goods alike are 

,u)ften inadequate to foster I'apid economic growth. 
To help meet capital and foreign exchange re- 
luirements, our European allies will this year pro- 
dde aid to countries in tropical Africa to the tune 
)f over $600 million. Our aid effort, while com- 
)aratively modest — roughly $175 million in grants 
,nd loans for tropical Africa during fiscal year 
962 — will usefully supplement aid from France, 
he United Kingdom, the European Economic 
bmmunity, and elsewhere. So too will the flow 
)f private American risk capital into tropical 
Africa, which may have added net new resources 
)f about $60 million in 1961. 

Yet the fact remains that the export earnings 
)f these countries are roughly four times as im- 

' )ortant a source of foreign exchange for them as 
lid and private investment. 

Moreover, aid is temporary, but the develop- 
nent of a sound and growing volume of trade 
ays a more permanent and lasting foimdation. 
The need to stimulate stable and growing income 
rom export earnings is, therefore, of overriding 

Ive Serious Trading Problems in Africa 

Thus the African stake in trade is crucial. Yet 
hese countries face serious trading problems. 
I tlitpet me mention five : 

First : There is the fact that one or two primary 
ommodities often account for between 60 percent 
md 90 percent of a nation's total export earnings. 
! re- ^'or example : Nigeria earns two-thirds of its ex- 
,(t it 5ort proceeds from cocoa and oilseeds ; the Ivory 
iMSCoast earns about 90 percent from coffee, cocoa, 
ivite md timber; Senegal 85 percent from peanuts; 
illiir jhana 75 percent from cocoa and timber; and 
•itf Jganda 75 percent from coffee and cotton. 
part /Second: The commodities on which African 
irce! jountries are higMy dependent are subject to wide 
fore' ;hort-term price fluctuations. For example, in 

recent years declines in coffee and cocoa prices 
have been dramatic. Spot cocoa is today quoted 
in New York at under 20 cents a pound whereas 
its 1958 high was over 60 cents. Even though 
Ghanaian production and exports have increased 
markedly in the past 2 years, cocoa earnings have 
merely held steady. For Nigeria, where produc- 
tion has grown more slowly, earnings from cocoa 
have declined, as they have for peanuts, where 
world prices are also soft. Although African 
coffee producers have fared relatively better than 
most Latin American producers in the last few 
years, the sharp fall in coffee prices has hurt them 
also. Nigeria did benefit from a 25 percent in- 
crease in tin prices from the first to the third 
quarter of 1961, although the price has subse- 
quently declined again. 

For agricultural commodities the major source 
of instability is f oimd on the supply side. Yields 
fluctuate markedly as a result particularly of 
weather variations and crop diseases. Also, pro- 
duction of tree crops adjusts to changes in market 
conditions only with significant time lags. This 
fact appears frequently to work to increase price 

For the minerals the major source of short-term 
instability is found on the demand side, the level 
of economic activity in the developed countries 
being the leading influence on price. 

Third: Not only do the prices of most primary 
commodities fluctuate widely, but also the long- 
term composite trend has been down for the past 
10 years. The U.N. price index for primary prod- 
ucts in international trade is down over 10 per- 
cent since 1953. During the same period the 
index for manufactured goods lia^; risen by about 
10 percent, with the consequencb that African 
countries as well as the other predominantly pri- 
mary producing areas are greatly concerned with 
what they refer to as the deterioration in their 
"terms of trade." 

It is a fact that demand for primary commodi- 
ties has grown less rapidly than demand for man- 
ufactured items and services. Technological 
change has led to economy of use of raw materials 
and the development of substitutes. And, even at 
higher incomes and lower prices, there is a limit 
to how much coffee Americans will drink ; in tech- 
nical language the elasticities of demand for pri- 
mary commodities are often low. 

These facts doubtless make the process of de- 

icfober 22, 7962 


velopment slower and more diflScult than it would 
be if demand for African products were growing 
more rapidly and if long-term price trends were 
not adverse. 

F mirth: The pattern of trade for many African 
countries is directed predominantly toward the 
former metropoles. This is particularly true of 
franc area countries. For example, over 60 per- 
cent of Ivory Coast exports go to fraiic area 
comitries, and over 75 percent of Ivory Coast im- 
ports in 1960 came from France. Moreover, the 
Ivory Coast is far from an extreme case of trade 

Fifth: The efforts of African producers to in- 
dustrialize are hampered by protectionism in much 
of the rest of the world. The pattern is all too 
often that they labor imder artificial handicaps 
even in processing their own products. For ex- 
ample, cocoa butter is often subject to higher 
duties than cocoa beans, and freight rates on proc- 
essed items may be disproportionately high. Un- 
fortunately, production of light manufactured 
goods faces still more difficulties. 

As the leading world power, dedicated to ex- 
panding peacefully the area of freedom, the 
United States is necessarily concerned with the 
trade and commodity problems of African states, 
committed as they are to economic progress by one 
means or another. Peace and prosperity are in 
fact indivisible, and like it or not we are inevitably 
concerned with the price of peanuts just as we are 
with the future of Berlin. Obviously, the degree 
of our concern differs greatly from case to case. 

Objectives of U.S. Policy 

Wliat then would we like to do about commodity 
stabilization? What are the objectives of U.S. 
policy ? 

Our overriding objective is to keep commodity 
price fluctuations or declines from jeopardizing 
the development effort of producing nations — and, 
hopefully, to stimulate commodity trade so that it 
can increase its contribution to development. 

We want to find solutions compatible with a 
growth of freedom in the world and to minimize 
the temptation for the nonindustrial nations to 
seek the illusion of an allegedly easy Communist 
road to rapid economic development. 

More specifically our objectives are, insofar as 
feasible (and this is an important caveat) : 

1. To dampen disruptive cyclical price fluctua- 


2. To arrest the secular decline in commodity 
prices. This is probably the most difficult ob- 
jective of all to attain, because the downward 
secular price trend appears in good measure to b( 
implicit in rapid technological progress and men 
efficient use of materials and primary products. 

3. To mitigate problems of acute supply- 
demand imbalance which have arisen, for example 
with respect to coffee. 

4. To solve commodity problems in ways whicl" 
promote the industrialization and diversificatior 
of the producing countiy. Indeed, industrializa 
tion and the development of trade within anc 
among developing nations will be an importani 
part of a solution of many of the trade problems 
of these nations. 

5. To develop global, not regional, solutions tc 
commodity problems or at least to find nationa' 
and regional measures not incompatible with £ 
global, multilateral, nondiscriminatoi-y approach 

6. To avoid excessive or unworkable control; 
which might jeopardize the growth of free eco- 
nomic and political institutions. We would like tc 
make maximum use of market forces supple- 
mented, where necessary, by financial mechanisms 
and to place minimum reliance on such devices as • f^ 
quotas and the more direct types of price support 

7. To assure that any commodity stabilization 
arrangements, which necessarily will vary froiBiigu 
commodity to commodity, operate in ways which 
benefit both producers and consumers. 













Strategy in Commodity Stabilization Efforts 

We are under no illusions that commodity stabi- 
lization will be easy within the framework which 
I have outlined. But we are making a concerted I ill 
effort involving both study and action. I would |P^ 
like to describe the major components of the 
strategy we are following in our commodity stabi- 
lization efforts. 

To deal with the purely short-term price insta- 
bilities, we are studying a global compensatory 
financing scheme which might partially offset 
cyclical fluctuations in export earnings of produc- 
ing countries by providing short-term finance toi ^ 
permit imports to remain fairly stable and thereby 
to avoid sharp stops and starts in carrying out 
development plans. 

Our efforts to work out compensatory financing 
mechanisms to offset cyclical fluctuations in export 
earnings are focused, primarily, in the U.N. Com- 


Department of State Bulletin 









I '! lission on International Commodity Trade (the 
* ™ )ICT) , although the Organization of American 
*'" States has made major contributions to the study 
'"* f possibilities in this field, developing a specific 
"^''^ iroposal which is under consideration. In addi- 
ion the International Monetary Fimd, which al- 
eady provides a form of compensatory financing 
hrough its balance-of -payments assistance, is also 
onsidering the problem. 

Final consideration of what type of compensa- 

ory financing system, if any, appears best suited 

or the long-term development needs of all devel- 

'ping nations depends on many factors both of a 

lolicy and of a technical nature. The United 

'"™ Hates is prepared to consider any approach, or 

ombination of devices, which promises to stimu- 

'"''late long-term economic growth. We do, however, 

ave doubts as to the desirability of using com- 

lensatoiy financing as an aid mechanism rather 

han as a short-term credit mechanism. Aid 

ransferred in such a manner might too often go 

o nations whose aid needs were relatively less 

han other developing nations, and there appear to 

le diiBcult technical problems of assuring that aid 

n this form would be used as effectively as other 

orms of capital inflows. 

National and regional marketing boards also can 

'"*"" le fairly effective in smoothing out seasonal price 

™ luctuations. These bodies also have a useful role 

^'' play in improving earnings tlu'ough quality con- 

rols and distribution of better seeds, fertilizers, 

nd teclinical information. 

To deal with the longnm secular price declines 

,nd with problems of supply-demand imbalance, 

liiij ommodity agreements may provide a partial and 

jfjfi nterim answer. Thus for a few commodities with 

)articularly serious structural problems — such as 

otfee and possibly cocoa — we have developed or 

,re developing international commodity agree- 

iients with worldwide participation of producing 

nd consiuning nations. In such cases, for the 

greements to be effective, producing nations must 

urb overproduction and sliift excess resources out 

f primaiy conunodities in oversupply into other 

.reas. We believe all of the industrial nations 

fs'lhould coordinate their aid programs to facilitate 

uch a resource shift. 

The coffee agreement which has just been ne- 
gotiated here in New York is, I think, a most 
)romising arrangement. Coffee is the second most 
spi"' mportant commodity in international trade and a 
irucial source of foreign exchange earnings for a 

IWcfober 22, 7962 

large number of countries in Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia. We do not pretend that schemes 
such as the coffee agreement, which is built around 
a system of export quotas, are an ideal system ap- 
plicable in all conditions to all conmiodities. 
Kather, we regard the coffee agreement as a prag- 
matic effort to make the best of a very bad situa- 
tion. We are convinced that the only way to work 
out the structural problems of oversupply and 
long-term price deterioration which have plagued 
coffee producers is through an enforcible global 
agreement including both producers and con- 
sumers. I am hopeful that the agreement just 
negotiated will achieve our objectives. 

Despite my relative optimism for the future of 
the coffee agreement, and for more orderly coffee 
trade, I would like to somid a note of caution 
about commodity agreements. If you will excuse 
my analogy, international commodity agreements 
are the "ultunate weapon" of commodity policy. 
Designed with skill and prudence, these agree- 
ments may provide an answer for our most serious 
commodity problems. But conmiodity agree- 
ments can also be a very dangerous weapon and 
must not be used lightly or indiscriminately. 

There is ijarticular danger that commodity 
agreements will lead to artificial prices involving 
the major risks both of stimulating primary com- 
modity production at the expense of diversified 
development and of stimulating the development 
of synthetic or substitute products. 

In those commodity arrangements which we 
do find necessary, we want a minimum of direct 
controls and maximum play left to indirect market 
forces. We face a dilemma in many commodities : 
Market mechanisms have either failed to provide 
adequate stability or free market mechanisms have 
never been permitted to operate; on the other 
hand, one alternative to the present imsatisf actory 
system may be even worse — direct control and reg- 
ulation of commodity trade. Our task — and I do 
not believe it is impossible — is to develop tech- 
niques and devices which will temper the excesses 
of the market mechanism, to harness it more di- 
rectly to the development effort without abandon- 
ing the proven advantages of the marketplace. 

Let me add that while we are giving thought to 
the so-called terms-of-trade problem we do not 
yet see any reasonable way of stabilizing the 
overall tenns of trade without disrupting the play 
of market forces, encouraging the premature de- 


velopment of substitutes for primary products, 
distorting development patterns, and creating new 
and probably more difficult political problems. 

To deal with the more general trade problems, 
we are working largely in GATT for the gradual 
elimination of preferential arrangements in com- 
modity trade and the drastic reduction of re- 
straints on consumption, such as tariffs and 
specific excise taxes on coffee, cocoa, and tea. In- 
sofar as possible we seek free, nondiscriminatory 
commodity trade to increase markets for primary 
producers. The recently enacted Trade Expan- 
sion Act authorizes us to remove our duties on 
tropical products if our Atlantic partner, the 
European Economic Community, will do likewise; 
it also authorizes us otherwise to negotiate for 
reduction of trade restrictions, and we anticipate 
acliievement of broad reciprocal concessions. 

Then too we have already negotiated a textile 
agreement" which, while it protects American 
manufactures from a disrupting flood of textile 
imports, also provides for a gradual expansion of 
markets in Europe and here for the textile exports 
of developing countries. 

Global'Solutions to Commodity Problems 

Our efforts to obtain the gradual removal of 
trade restrictions and preferential marketing ar- 
rangements should be of particular interest to 
African countries. As you know, the African 
states which have associated themselves with the 
European Common Market have duty-free access 
into this market for their coffee, cocoa, oilseeds, 
and other products while other producers of these 
products, including Liberia, Ethiopia, Tangan- 
yika, and Nigeria, are faced with the EEC's com- 
mon external tariff. For two key products- 
coffee and cocoa — the eventual common external 
tariff, originally scheduled to be in full effect by 
1970, had been set at 16 percent and 9 percent 
respectively. I am pleased to say, however, that, 
as a result of progress made thus far in the re- 
negotiation of the Association Convention which 
expires at the end of this year, the common ex- 
ternal tariff on coffee and cocoa appears likely to 
be cut by 40 percent, effective in 1964. We wel- 
come this prospective cut as a significant step to- 
ward the eventual elimination of tariffs on coffee, 
cocoa, and all tropical products. 

' For background, see Buixetin of Oct. 15, 1962, p. .566. 

The interest of the United States in pressing fo 
the gradual phasing out of preferences rests o 
two convictions on our part. First, preferentia 
arrangements give the exports of a few develop 
ing nations an artificial advantage over other de 
veloping countries. We cannot limit our concer 
to the exports of a few countries. We mus 
strengthen or, if necessary, create institutions ani 
mechanisms which permit the expansion of all les 
developed country exports on equally beneficia 
terms. Second, we doubt that the permanent re 
tention of preferences is in the longrun interest o 
the producing country supposedly benefiting b; 
them. Rather the industrialization and diversi 
fication of the national African economies wil 
over time be promoted by the substitution fo 
sheltered markets of a world competitive markef 

Commodity exports are a vital source of foreigi 
exchange for Africa, but they are also importan 
in terms of the structure and growth potential o 
the various national economies. Measures de 
signed to maximize export earnings must no 
jeopardize the ultimate economic growth and po 
litical stability of the producing nation. To citi 
a particularly painful case for the United Statei 
of imdesirable commodity measures, I do not thinl 
the long-term economic and political growth o: 
Cuba was enhanced by the sugar premiums it re 
ceived in the American market even though thest 
premiums had a substantial foreign exchangf 
value. In retrospect it appears that this incentivt 
for sugar production may have been one factor 
discouraging the growth of a more balanced and 
industrialized economy with better prospects oi 
developing viable free political institutions. 

Nor do I believe that the development of the 
Ivoi-y Coast and various other African states will 
be advanced in the long run by the indefinite re- 
ceipt of premium prices and other forms of prefer- 
ential treatment in the French market or in tlie 
European Common Market. 

In line with our conviction that special arrange- 
ments are self-defeating in the long run, the' 
United States has pointed out to Latin American 
nations that in our view purely regional conmiod- 
ity arrangements would not be in their interests. 
Rather we tend to seek global solutions for trade 
and commodity problems. We do recognize, how- 
ever, that care must be exercised in the transition 
from the present preferential systems to a more» 
durable arrangement for trade in primary com- 

Department of State Bulletin 


















! IIlllS 

odities — and especially tropical products. I 
lerefore want to repeat here the assurance we 
ave given those African nations now inside pref - 
rential systems. 

We are not "takuig sides" between developing 
ations ; we are not interested in the development 

|f one nation or region at the expense of another 
ation or region. We are equally concerned with 

; lie development of the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and 
Jrazil — and of Senegal, Tanganyika, Indonesia, 
nd Colombia. The United States is aware that 


s n 


lie gradual phasing out of duties and other pref- 
rential arrangements must generally be cushioned 
y adjustment measures to provide at least equiva- 
mt benefits to Africans, including acceptable 
afeguards. The development prospects of na- 
ions now inside preferential systems must not 
e jeopardized in the course of abolishing prefer- 
ntial arrangements. Our task is to find arrange- 

nents alternative to preferences which will help to 

issure all developing nations equivalent export op- 

' )ortunities and which will provide the maximum 

, '. esources and incentives to speed the creation of 

^ liversified and industrialized economies. These 

iltemative devices must necessarily link the flow 

if economic assistance from industrialized to de- 

^eloping countries with our efforts to stabilize 

"" !ommodity prices and to improve commodity 

' rade arrangements. 

There is one final point which, although it is 
'"'" jometimes embarrassing to industrialized nations, 
ncluding the United States, cannot be ignored in 
*"' m analysis of commodity problems. This is the 
'^ " question of import restrictions and other devices 
such as internal taxes which curtail export mar- 
'' '" iets for primary commodities. The United States 
™ imposes import quotas on petroleum, lead, zinc, and 
'f-^ peanuts^to mention a few key commodities. It 
rf'f is difficult for us to ask other nations to take the 
often painful steps involved in, for example, cur- 
tailing coffee production or dismantling preferen- 
M-'t tial devices when we ourselves retreat, on occasion, 
lii' behind import quotas. We in the United States, 
s' too, must face our worldwide responsibilities of 
working out the most effective global arrange- 
ments for commodity trade. 

I also want to emphasize that we recognize the 
complexity of commodity problems as well as the 
importance of commodity trade to developing 
countries. We are exploring new techniques— and 
are willing to consider any proposals which may be 


advanced — which promise to stimulate the long- 
term economic growth of developing nations. 

Finally, if primary commodity export markets 
are to expand, if market forces are indeed to play 
their optimima roles, it is important that the in- 
dustrial countries of the Atlantic community and 
elsewhere maintain full employment and achieve 
more rapid economic gi-owth. Clearly, if our 
economy is expanding rapidly, it will be far easier 
for us to follow more liberal trading practices and 
to provide markets not only for the primary prod- 
ucts of African nations but for their nascent in- 
dustries as well. In the long run, to our success 
in maintaining a competitive, flexible, and healthy 
American and Atlantic economy is linked the eco- 
nomic well-being and freedom of Africa as well. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

87th Congress, 2d Session 

United States Defense Policies in 1961. Study prepared 
by Charles H. Donnelly, Library of Congress. H. Doc. 
502. June 7, 1962. 1T3 pp. 
Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty : 
Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Armed Services on operation of article VII 
of the agreement for the period December 1, 1960, 
through November 30, 1961. August 27, 1962. 42 pp. 
Report of the Senate Committee on Armed Services 
made by its subcommittee on the operation of article 
VII. S. Kept. 2122. September 25, 1962. 15 pp. 
Foreign Radio Stations. Hearing before the Subcom- 
mittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on 
Commerce on S. 3252. August 29, 1962. 29 pp. 
Situation in Cuba. Hearing before the Senate Commit- 
tees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services on S.J. 
Res 226, S.J. Res. 227, S. Con. Res. 92, S. Res. 388, S. 
Res. 389, and S. Res. 390. September 17, 1962. 117 pp. 
Report of the Special Subcommittee on Defense of South- 
eastern United States of the House Committee on Armed 
Services. [No. 73] September 17, 1962. 3 pp. 
Interest Rates on Foreign Official Time Deposits : 
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency on H.R. 12080 and S. 1413, biUs to permit 
domestic banks to pay interest on time deposits of 
foreign governments at rates differing from those 
applicable to domestic depositors. September 18, 
1962. 63 pp. 
Reports of the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur- 
rency to accompany H.R. 12080, together with minority 
and supplemental views. S. Kept. 2115, September 20, 
1962, 11 pp. ; S. Rept. 2191, September 28, 1962, 11 
Agency for International Development, Contract Oper- 
ations. Office of Research, Evaluation and Planning 
Assistance Staff. 23d and 26th reports by the House 
Committee on Government Operations. Part 1, Sep- 
tember 19, 1962, 21 pp. ; Part 2, September 26, 1962, 16 

WlOcfober 22, 1962 


Toward an Open Scientific Community 

hy Glenn T. Seaborg 

Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Comm,ission '■ 

I want to speak briefly today concerning tlie 
value of the free exchange of ideas in science — 
among individuals and nations. This discussion 
will lead me to consider the mternational program 
of cooperation in nuclear science and technology 
fostered by the United States and its importance 
in the context of an open scientific community. 
How the U.S. international program derives sub- 
stance from our domestic program of research, 
development, and teclmology must be taken into 
accoimt, as well as the forces and circumstances 
that moved us to work toward a greater degree of 
free commimication in the scientific world. 

Neither science nor democracy can thrive as a 
closed system. Each year tlais principle finds new 
validation. The enlarging concepts of the Orga- 
nization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment (OECD) and the Common Market are cur- 
rent examples. Their emergence and growth have 
broken barriers of long standing with beneficial 
results that we all recognize — an improved stand- 
ard of living in Europe and a new sense of free- 
dom and confidence. 

Freedom in science, as we know, made its way 
painfully during the early periods of its growth. 
His successors must often have repeated in a 
different way the stubborn whisper of Galileo: 
"And yet, it moves!" But obstacles have been 
removed and fears allayed. The achievements 
that made nuclear teclmology feasible at the be- 
ginning of World War II were not the closely held 
secrets of any small gi'oup. They were not the 
work of a single country. 

In the truest sense, the program of nuclear 

' Address made upon receipt of the "Swedish-American 
of the Tear" award for 1962 at Stockholm, Sweden, on 
Sept. 16. 













science and teclmology in the United States de 
veloped as an effort of international scientific co 
operation never before conceivable. But thougl: 
eminent men from many countries participated 
the nature of this cooperation had altered radicallj 
from the traditional freedom of exchange across 
international boundaries prevailing before Work 
War II. Immediate threats to the society of fret 
nations required a stringent compartmentaliza- 
tion. The desperation of our effort to preserve 
freedom limited, for a time at least, our own 
freedom as scientists. 

As one of the scientists engaged in work of the 
Manhattan Project, I can assure you that we -i" 
looked forward to the day when we could speak P 
freely again, not only with our associates in the ^'^ 
United States but with all scientists and without fe" 
regard for nationality or boundary. For the first 
time, many of us found ourselves expressing-f), 
strong opinions, vohmtarily or at the request of 
leading men in our Government, concerning the 
use to which the results of our labors should be 
put. Long before the war had reached its con- 
clusion, scientists, imder the leadership of men 
like Bush and Conant, had stated their conviction 
that the United States must do its utmost to ex- 
tend the benefits of nuclear science to the whole' 
community of mankind. A major corollary of 
this view was the thesis that freedom of commu- 
nication must be restored insofar as practicable] 
and as rapi dly as possible. ^^ 

We were most of us young men and perhaps ;|j 
for that reason overoptimistic in belie\Tng ouri j; 
goals could be achieved at once. But we certainly: |,j 
were not wrong in our conviction that free ex-j 
change is basic to scientific growth. The mixei 
results of the gigantically organized wartime ef' 











Department of State Bulletin 







oris, with all their distortions and constrictions, 
>n the one hand impressed us with the mushroom 
rowth of technical facilities and laboratories 
lolding great potential for the future of science, 
,nd on the other with the rather sparse gains in 
imdamental knowledge. At any rate we were 
ager to explore new potentialities. 
I need not recount the Iiistory of the postwar 
ears. Hopes of turning great gains made in the 
luclear field toward the solution of major human 
)roblems were for a while dimmed by fears for 
uture security. The first legal framework creat- 
ng an atomic energy program in the United 
States was a product of the disillusionment result- 
ng from our futile efforts to secure international 
ontrol and at the same time a recognition of the 
eed for maintaming some degree of security in 
n uneasy world. 
The depth of this pessimism, even as late as 
952, is reflected in one of Dr. Conant's Bampton 

icr(^jctures on "Modern Science and Modem Man": 
The world being what it is today and is likely to 
e for a long time to come, secrecy and applied 

alizaluclear physics are words that must be joined to- 
gether." "But," he goes on to say, "it is of the 
itmost importance that the general public under- 
tand the consequences of this union. . . . Ad- 
ances in science are difficult witliin a secret na- 
,vi ional monopoly because necessarily its research is 
yarded from all but a few branches of the gov- 
mment. Secrecy and science are fundamentally 
ntithetic propositions." 

siBj I.S. Determination To Restore Scientific Freedom 

So wise a man as Conant proved too pessimistic 

eilii r^ i^is judgment that restoration of freedom in 
'" uclear science would be delayed indefinitely. 

^hough encouraging prospects for international 
iM' ontrol were no less remote, our conviction grew 
ifii»' tronger that the United States must secure for 
10 K ;self and other well-intentioned nations the bene- 
M ts of peaceful uses of nuclear energy — including 
rv oi lie renewal of an open, as opposed to a restricted, 

ystem of scientific cooperation. 
An early public statement of this new determi- 

ation came in former President Eisenhower's 

ddress to the U.N. Assembly on December 8, 
g oil 953,^ proposing an Atoms for Peace Progi-am and 
tainl; le establishment of an international agency to 
sex romote peaceful application of atomic energy. 

" For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847. 

htober 22, 7962 

In the rapid developments that followed, plans 
were laid for the first Geneva conference on peace- 
ful uses of atomic energy. Congress acted during 
the latter part of 1954 to pass the first complete 
revision of the statutoi-y charter of the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission since its establish- 
ment in 1946. By this act, Atoms for Peace be- 
came the basic U.S. nuclear policy. 

At hand and waiting for just such develop- 
ments were the resources of wartime and succeed- 
ing years' nuclear progress. The first Geneva 
conference in 1955 will stand as a signal point 
marked by its voluminous declassification of sci- 
entific information gained during the war years. 
There the nations came together to witness con- 
crete evidence of what nuclear science, shared in 
large measure, could do for the world's future 
social and economic development. 

In addition to its participation in the first Ge- 
neva conference, the United States took further 
important steps, domestically and internationally, 
to introduce and accelerate the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy. The resources of the U.S. Atomic 
Energy Commission in information, equipment 
and facilities, and organization were turned to 
the stimulation of domestic programs based on 
the peaceful uses of radioisotopes, reactor tech- 
nology, and other phases of research and develop- 
ment in the nuclear field. 

Radioisotopes introduced into medical research 
and diagnosis proved to be a spectacular success. 
It was not simply that these radioisotopes pro- 
vided convenient sources of radiation undreamed 
of in the days when we were limited to X-ray 
equipment and minute quantities of radium but 
that these sources were now available in the widest 
possible range and variety of types. This door 
has been opened wide, at home and abroad. Pro- 
duction facilities in the United States eliminated 
any question of sufficient quantities of radioiso- 
topes wherever the need might be. The opening 
of such AEC training facilities as the Oak Eidge 
Institute of Nuclear Studies' courses in radioiso- 
topes tecliniques to hundreds of foreign students 
erased any doubt that the techniques for their use 
would be widely disseminated. If there were more 
time, I should like to discuss in detail the recent 
developments in the applications of radioisotopes 
in agriculture, medicme, and industry and their 
exciting new applications as sources of power in 

For the production of special nuclear materials 


needed in the development of nuclear power re- 
actors and nuclear marine propulsion, the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission had the immense 
capabilities of its production facilities. Materials 
and information were made available to our 
industry to begin a program of research and de- 
velopment of unparalleled diversity in power re- 
actor technology. The results of this program and 
similar etforts in otlier countries are now such that 
civilian nuclear power needed so sorely in many 
areas, including a number of the lesser developed 
countries, appears to be within reach. As early as 
1955 the United States had announced its willing- 
ness to provide nuclear materials to other nations 
for peaceful research and power uses. The early 
offers have recently been broadened and extended. 

Education and Training Facilities 

Underlying these and other efforts in the Atoms 
for Peace Program, the Commission's provision 
of education and training facilities has been and 
continues to be of fundamental importance. At 
the national laboratories— Oak Ridge, Argonne, 
and Brookliaven — the AEC opened its schools. 
The training of foreign nationals in such phases 
of nuclear science and technology as reactor haz- 
ards evaluation, reactor operations supervision, 
industrial uses of radioisotopes, the administra- 
tion of nuclear energy programs, and research at 
the postdoctoral level has been in progress for 
several years. Foreign alumni of these schools 
have furnished the key staff members at the in- 
ception of a number of national nuclear energy 

Other means of disseminating and exchanging 
information have also contributed to the further- 
ance of the Atoms for Peace Program. AEC's 
program of exhibits, including its major exhibits 
at the Geneva conferences, the dispatching of 
technical missions abroad, the participation of 
countless scientists and engineers in various spe- 
cialized conferences and symposia, the exchange 
of technical papers, periodicals, and books, and 
the provision of experts and consultants to advise 
in their fields of competence — all of these are sig- 
nificant and fruitful activities. 

There must, of course, be made available to the 
scientist in any field the essential tools of his 
trade — laboratory space, equipment, instrumenta- 
tion, supplies, and materials. In direct projects 



of bilateral assistance and through the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency, the United States 
has helped to furnish laboratory equipment and 
research reactors wliere such needs could be iden- 
tified. Laboratory-to-laboratory partnerships 
have also made a beginning in such arrangements 
as the one between our Brookhaven National Lab- 1*"' 
oratory and the Turkish Nuclear Energy Center. 
I have spoken thus far largely in terms of activ- 
ities carried out under the U.S. Atoms for Peace 
Program. The essential fact is that this program 
has been carried out with the help of other free 
nations. At present the United States has 38 effec- 
tive agreements for cooperation in the civil uses [( 
of atomic energy with 36 countries. 

Cooperation between the United States and 
Sweden in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. 
for example, is provided for in an agreement that 
first became effective in January 1956.^ The agree- 
ment has been amended on later occasions to jictivi 
broaden its provisions for the transfer of special 
nuclear materials between our two countries, ir 
terms of both quantity and degree of enrichment. 
"We feel that the continuing activities conducted 
under this research agreement for cooperation 
have been mutually helpful. 

U.S. cooperation with the European Atomic 
Energy Community (EURATOM) in two major 
programs — one for the construction of power re- 
actors, the other for research and development 
related to the power projects accepted under the 
joint power program — is expected to be of increas- 
ing significance to the furtherance of nuclear 
power in Europe. Our technical exchanges with 
EURATOM and the European Nuclear Energy 
Agency of the OECD are certainly of great im- 
portance to ourselves and our partners. On a 
more modest scale, the United States has encour- 
aged certain regional cooperation among the Latin 
American countries tlirough the Inter- American 
Nuclear Energy Commission of the Organization 
of American States. 

In this much oversimplified account I have 
necessarily stressed the cooperative activities ol 
the United States, leaving out of my story the 
many interesting and effective projects engaged 
in by other nations bilaterally and multilaterally 









throughout the world. 

I have yet to discuss the 

•Treaties and Other International Acts Series 347T, 
3775, and 4035. 



Department of State Bulletin '* 

enj Jiternational Atomic Energy Agency. Yet I 
itate hink you will agree, even on the basis of this sum- 
:a!ii nary, that in less than a dozen years important 
strides have been taken in the atomic energy field 
sliin oward the goal of an open scientific community. 

Lai) nternational Atomic Energy Agency 





There are still great impediments to achieving 
he potential benefits of open and complete co- 
peration in worldwide scientific development, 
o^lrhe East and West continue to disagree as to the 
irtues of openness. But even here we liave met 
M vith encouraging progress. As was intended be- 
"ore its establishment, the International Atomic 
energy Agency has provided a meeting place for 
he great majority of nations interested in the 
«g »roblems and promises of nuclear energy. In this 
;tlii 'orum such important questions as the proper 
?ra aethods and standards for disposal of radio- 
ctive waste materials, the safeguarding of nuclear 
tiaterials against diversion to military use, and 
he negotiation and adoption of liability conven- 
ions indemnifying against harm from nuclear 
ncidents have been discussed and steps taken to- 
vard answering them. The progress is slow and 
ften beset with difficulties and conflicts, but it 
s nonetheless worth our best efforts. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency has 
rganized a remarkably competent staff, and it will 
ontinue to progress under the inspired leadership 
f Sigvard Eklund. The Agency has produced 
aluable studies of the nuclear energy needs of 
aember states and recommended appropriate ways 
if meeting those needs. The prospects for the 
Agency's active encouragement of nuclear power 
levelopments among member states have recently 

And beyond their cooperative work in the Inter- 
lational Atomic Energy Agency, nations of the 
Cast and West have made some limited assaults 
n the communications barriers that separate them. 
?he United States and the Union of Soviet So- 
ialist Republics have been able to identify certain 
Teas of mutual interest in nuclear science and 
echnology and have engaged in exchanges of in- 
ormation and visits. We have discussed the pos- 
ibility of cooperating in an international 
)roject — the consti'uction of a very-high-energy 
)article accelerator too expensive to be readily 
Ludertaken by any nation acting independently. 
What vector could be taken as the summation 








of these various significant developments I have 
described? The result, it seems to me, points in- 
evitably in the direction of further enlarging the 
freedom to communicate within the international 
scientific community. The benefits already real- 
ized from such enlargement as we have experienced 
point to the wisdom of great openness. 

Wliat is not so clearly realized, I am afraid, is 
the danger faced by all of us — whatever the bent 
of our politics — should international freedom not 
be achieved for science. The advent of nuclear 
energy's awesome force has been the most challeng- 
ing — and terrifying — incident of modern times. 
But I would maintain there are other realities 
growing out of our increased knowledge and tech- 
nical advancement that cry out just as forcefully 
for full and accurate communication of scientific 
knowledge among nations. 

We have every reason, if we are concerned not 
only for man's future prosperity but for his sur- 
vival as a participant in terrestrial ecology, to 
insist on sharing our knowledge with others and 
having them share it with us. We have no other 

Among nations, as among individuals, where 
there is trust, encouragement of the greatest free- 
dom of communication is not inconsistent with 
respect for privacy and the right of every nation 
to maintain the best aspects of its individuality 
as a nation. We hope to see this community of 
trust enlarged and the opportunities to speak 
freely with each other correspondingly increased. 

We seek such a community because we wish 
everyone to share in the benefits of greater knowl- 
edge. We seek it also because we believe that, in 
this age, any world in which we speak less than 
freely will be a dangerous world. 

I, for one, believe we shall have an increasingly 
open world — in science as in other aspects of life. 
I share in the stubborn optimism of Robert Frost 
when he says : 

"Take nature altogether since time began, 
Including human nature, in peace and war, 
And it must be a little more in favor of man. 
Say a fraction of one per cent at the very least, 
Or the number living wouldn't be steadily more. 
Our hold on the j)lanet wouldn't have so in- 
creased." * 

October 22, 1962 

* From "Our Hold on the Planet" from Complete Poems 
of Robert Frost, copyright 1&42 by Robert Frost ; reprinted 
by permission of Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 


Indian Group Calls for Cessation 
of Nuclear Testing in Atmosphere 

White Ilouse press release dated September 28 

A dcle<ration representing the Gandhi Peace 
Foundation, consisting of the former Governor 
General of India, Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, Mr. R. 
R. Diwakar, and Mr. B. Shiva Rao, met -with the 
President on September 28 to present an appeal 
on behalf of the foundation. While suegestina: 
that all efforts should be made to ban all nuclear 
weapons, the appeal calls immediately for the 
cessation of testing of nuclear weapons in the 

In responding to the delegation's appeal, the 
President agreed with Mr. Rajagopalachari on the 
urgent necessity to bring about an agreed end to 
nuclear weapons testing. Tlie President said tlie 
United States is prepared to come to an agree- 
ment today to ban tests in the atmospliere or in the 
water, if it is impossible to get agreement to ban 
all tests. He expressed the belief that such an 
agreement, in addition to ending any further 
radioactive pollution of the atmospliere, would 
represent a significant forward step toward curb- 
ing the arms race. 

The delegation suggested that if an agreement 
is unobtainable the United States should make a 
unilateral declaration that it would cease tests in 
the atmosphere. The President mentioned the 
difficulty of a proposal of this sort because of the 
previous Soviet breach of the moratorium. 

The President and Mr. Rajagopalachari in tlieir 
frank and friendly conversation also agreed that 
early action should be taken to reduce the threat 
of war wliich nuclear and other weapons of mass 
destruction now pose. The President pointed out 
in this regard the present U.S. disarmament pro- 
posals addreas themselves to this key area of con- 
cern. The delegation expressed the hope that the 
United Nations would pass a resolution calling 
upon all nations to ban nuclear tests in tlie atmos- 
pliere. The President said the United States 
would respond favorably to such a resolution. 

Tlie President expressed his great appreciation 
to the Indian delegation for their long voj-age to 
the United States in the cause of peace and stated 
that the people of the United States and India are 
united in their hope for world peace. 

Earlier in the day the delegation was received 
by William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. 






President Provides for Administration 
of Cotton Textile Arrangement 

Cotton Textiles and Cotton Textile Pkoducts 

B.V virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 204 
of the Agricultural Act of 1950, as amended (7 U.S.C. 
1854; P.L. 87^88, 76 Stat. 104), and Section 301 of Title 
3 of the United States Code, and as President of the 
United States, it is ordered as follows : 

Section 1. The President's Cabinet Textile Advisory 
Committee, consisting of the Secretaries of State, the 
Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor with the 
Secretary of Commerce as Chairman, shall exercise super- 
vision over the administration of the Long Term Arrange- 
ment Regarding Trade in Cotton Textiles ' done at Geneva 
on February 9, 1962, and shall advise generally with re- 
spect to problems relating to textiles. 

Sec. 2. (a) The President's Cabinet Textile Advisory 
Committee shall establish a subcommittee to be known as 
the Interagency Textile Administrative Committee as a 
successor to the Interagency Textile Administrative Com- 
mittee established October 18, 1961.' It shall be located, 
for administrative purposes, at the Department of Com- 
merce, and shall be under the Chairmanship of a designee 
of the Secretary of Commerce. This Committee shall be 
composed of the Chairman and one representative each 
from the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture, and 

(b) The Interagency Textile Administrative Committee 
shall recommend actions to be taken by appropriate 
officials and agencies of the United States Government 
with regard to the rights and obligations of the United 
States under the Long Term Arrangement and with re- 
gard to such other matters relating to textiles as may be 
referred to it by the President's Cabinet Textile Advisory 
Committee. In the event of disagreement within the 
Interagency Textile Administrative Committee with re- 
spect to a proposed recommendation, it shall be reviewed 
and determined by the President's Cabinet Textile Ad- 
visor.v Committee. 

Sec. 3. The Secretary of State, after consultation with 
the President's Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee in 
respect of relevant policies, shall undertake the negotia- 
tions contemplated by the Long Term Arrangement, in- 
cluding bilateral textile agreements. The Secretary of j(lj|)l| 
State shall designate an official of the Department of 
State to be Chairman of the United States delegation to 
the Cotton Textiles Committee established by the Con- 
tracting Parties to the General Agreement on TarifTs and 
Trade, and shall request the Secretaries of Commerce 
and Labor each to appoint a representative of his Depart- 
ment to serve on the delegation. 

Sec. 4. The Commissioner of Customs shall take such 








'No. 1]0.'')2: 27 Fed. Reg. 9691. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1902, p. 431. 

' For a memorandum from President Kennedy to the ^^ 

Secretaries of State, Commerce, and Labor, see ibid., Nov. 
6, 1961, p. 773. 

Department of Stale Bulletin ^^^. 



»ir, ' 



ctions as the Chairman of the President's Cabinet Tex- 
ile Advisory Committee may, upon either the unanimous 
ecommendation of the Interagency Textile Administra- 
ive Committee, or the recommendation of the President's 
Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee, direct to carry out 
he Long Term Arrangement with respect to entry, or 
?ithdrawal from warehouse for consumption in the 
Jnited States, of cotton textiles and cotton textile 

Sec. 5. This order shall be effective October 1, 1962, at 
12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time. 

ffLJ L^ 

The White House, 
Septemher 2S, 1962. 


iecurity Council Recommends U.N. 
Idmit Algeria to fVlembership 

Uatement hy Adlai E. Stevenson 

7.S. Representative in the Security Council ^ 

The United States joins enthusiastically in the 
ongratulations to the Government and people of 
Vlgeria on their independence and on the estab- 
ishment of their new Government.^ We share the 
miversal joy that has been here expressed that 
his long, exhausting, and fratricidal conflict is 
)ver, and that a new day has dawned, and that 
mcient France and new Algeria, and all their 
nutual friends and admirers, can now look for- 
ward to peace and progi'ess instead of bitterness 
ind bloodshed. 

I made my first journey through that f ascinat- 
ng land of contrasts some 35 years ago, and this 
neeting here today in New York brings back in- 
ielible memories of the stirring days so many of us 
pent in Algeria and North Africa during the last 
.var. Therefore, this is a moving occasion for me 
IS well as for the Government and the people of 
he United States. 

A tragic struggle has ended, and great honor is 
iue to those who worked with patience and fore- 
sight and with steady purpose to end the Algerian 
A'ar. The settlement signed at Evian, we believe. 

'Made In the Security Council on Oct. 4 (U.S./U.N. 
)ress release 4052). 

" For texts of messages from President Kennedy and 
Secretary Rusk, see Bulletin of Oct. 15, 1962, p. 560. 

Dcfober 22, 7962 

is worthy of the brave men who struggled to make 
it for so long, but independence is not an end — it 
is only a beginning. We know only too well from 
our own history that the period of transition from 
dependence to independence is bound to be diffi- 
cult. When the struggle has been bitter and has 
been long, the difficulties of readjustment are com- 
pounded. The wisdom and courage of General de 
Gaulle, the moderation and sagacity of Algeria's 
leaders, the forbearance of the Moslem popula- 
tion during the troubled months of bloody and 
lawless attempts to subvert the peace in Algeria 
liave all won admiration throughout the world. 

Soon we shall welcome here to the United 
Nations the first Prime IMinister of independent 
Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella. He and his associates 
have earned our admiration and deserve our en- 
couragement for their efforts to insure the security 
and the tranquillity of their people, to organize an 
effective administration, and to pave the way for 
economic recovery and development. 

For the United States the struggle in Algeria 
has been over the years the occasion for much soul 
searching. France is our oldest ally. We share 
many memories and common experience. We are 
happy, therefore, that the independence of Alge- 
ria finally came about with the positive participa- 
tion of France. 

No less satisfying to us was the decision of the 
people of Algeria, who voted on 1 July in favor 
of independence in cooperation with France. 
Both coimtries have put on record their willing- 
ness to continue to cooperate as sovereign part- 



ners. Algeria's leaders have expressed the hope 
that those of European origin in Algeria will con- 
tinue to participate in the challenge and the con- 
structive work that lies ahead. 

Many of us sat in these chambers when the 
prospects for a settlement in Algeria seemed all 
but hopeless. Today other problems face us, 
wliich present a prospect that appears equally 
bleak. But we would like to hope that the states- 
manship which was brought to bear on the 
Algerian problem might serve as an example, 
indeed an inspiration, for the solution of other 
problems that still trouble and divide the world. 

The demonstrated capacity and character of the 
Algerian people and of their leaders gives us rea- 
son to expect that Algeria will play a distinguished 
part in helping discharge the heavy responsi- 
bilities that fall to each member of the United 
Nations in this difficult period of history. There- 
fore, we shall vote with pleasure for the draft res- 
olution' recommending Algeria's admission to 
membership in the United Nations. 

Conference on Middle-Level Manpower 
To Meet in Puerto Rico 


Press release 603 dated October 5, (or release October 7 

On October 10 delegates from 43 nations and 
9 international organizations, as well as observers 
from scores of other nations and private groups, 
will assemble in Puerto Rico for what could well 
be one of the most important economic develop- 
ment conferences ever held. 

The conference — "Human Skills in the Decade 
of Development" — will examine the critical prob- 
lem of providing the human skills necessary to 
transform natural resources and capital into im- 
proved standards of living and himian welfare. 

The experience of the last decade has been a 
clear demonstration that witliout the skilled men 
and women to man the factories, rim the busi- 
nesses, carry forward construction projects, and 
administer institutions, no program of economic 


' U.N. doc. S/5173 ; the Conndl on Oct. 4 by a vote of 10 
to 0, with 1 abstention (Republic of China), recommended 
that Algeria be admitted to membership in the United 
Nations. On Oct. 8 the U.N. General Assembly admitted 
Algeria by acclamation. 


development can hope to succeed. It has shown 
that the need for human skills is at least equal to 
the need for capital resources if we are to bring 
about economic development. 

The conference will examine the importance 
and urgency of this problem and discuss tech- ^^^ 
niques for meeting the skill gap as rapidly as 

It is our hope that from this conference will 
emerge not only a new awareness of the need for 
human skills but many new specific programs for 
meeting this need. We can anticipate the devel- 
opment of new training teclmiques and the appli- 
cation of old teclmiques on a broader scale. In 
addition, many countries have evidenced interest 
in following the example of the United States 
Peace Corps in making use of volunteer workers 
to provide badly needed skills for development. 
United Stat«s private enterprise has indicated that 
it has much to offer in training men and women 
in other parts of the world. 

In the midst of absorbing and dramatic crises, 
both at home and abroad, we must not forget that 
the most important task of this generation is the 
construction of a world of independent, free, and 
economically progressing nations. The improve- 
ment of human welfare and the long-range pres- 
ervation of human freedom does not often capture 
the headlines, nor is it surrounded with the aura 
of emergency meetings and dramatic confronta- 
tions. But it is our central task. And on our 
ability to perform this task rests, in large measure, 
the ultimate fate of man. 

I hope that from this conference may come the 
outlines of a new strategy of economic develop- 
ment which will help chart the way to success in 
this historic Decade of Development. 








White House press release dated October 3 

President Kennedy announced on October 3 the 

U.S. delegation to the international conference on 
human resources to be held at San Juan, P.R., 
October 10, 11, and 12. Heading the delegation is 
Vice President Lyndon Johnson, who will deliver 
tlie keynote address at the conference. The top- 
level delegation also includes: 

W. Wlllard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor 
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare 

Department of State Bulletin 








HI 1(1 



\\ W. Rostow, Counselor of the Department and Chair- 
man of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State 

i^alter Heller, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers 

i. Sargent Shriver, Director, Peace Corps 

ames M. Quigley, Assistant Secretary of Health, Educa- 
tion, and Welfare 

}eorge L. P. Weaver, Assistant Secretary of Labor 

Richard N. Goodwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

'rank Coffin, Deputy Director, Agency for International 

'eodoro Moscoso, U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress 


Attending the conference as congressional ad- 

isers to the U.S. delegation are Representatives 

Dharles C. Diggs, Jr., and Edwin E.. Dumo. (Two 

r lenate members are to be named.) A staff of 

Bclmical advisers will accompany the delegation. 

President Kennedy has hailed the conference as 

,u la milestone in the formulation of a strategy for 

conomic development." ^ 

Ministers and Cabinet members from 43 nations 

^ Old 9 international organizations will gather for 

Hie 3-day meeting to consider the vital implications 

f middle-level manpower for economic growth. 

)iscussion will center on three major aspects of 

he subject : 

1. Methods of determining a country's precise 
eeds in the middle, or subprofessional, skills, 
uch as junior engineers, surveyors, mechanics, 
Iraftsmen, carpenters, nurses, laboratory teclini- 
ians, etc. 

2. The role of Peace Corps-type volunteer 
ssistance programs in providing developing na- 
,ions with a body of trained middle-level man- 

3. The role of "quick" training centers in vari- 
)us countries for teaching multiple skills to un- 
killed labor in minimum time. 

The conference, largest of its kind outside the 
Jnited Nations since the end of World War II, 
iulminates the recognition of middle-level man- 
Dower as the all-important bridge between techni- 
jal assistance and capital investment programs in 
economic development. 

t. J. Sullivan, F. C. Turner Named 
to Committee for Highway Congress 

The Department of State announced on Octo- 
ber 5 (press release 604) the appointment of 
Richard J. Sullivan, Chief Coimsel, Committee on 


' Bulletin of Sept. 24, 1962, p. 465. 

Public Works, House of Eepresentatives, and 
Francis C. Turner, Assistant Federal Highway 
Administrator and Chief Engineer, Bureau of 
Public Roads, Department of Commerce, to the 
Organizmg Committee for the Ninth Pan Amer- 
ican Highway Congress. The Congress will be 
held at Washington May 6-18, 1963.i The 
United States is host government. 


Current Actions 


Automotive Traffic 

Customs convention on the temporary importation of pri- 
vate road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. 
Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS .3943. 
Accession deposited: New Zealand, August 17, 1962. 

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. 
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force 
September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879. 
Accession deposited: New Zealand, August 17, 1962. 


Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation to increase 
membership of the Council from 21 to 27. Approved 
by the ICAO Assembly at Montreal June 21, 1961. En- 
tered into force July 17, 1962. 
Proclaimed by the President: September 19, 1962. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 
1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.^ 
Acceptance deposited: Malagasy Republic, September 
13, 1962. 


Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926, 
as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force March 
9, 1927 ; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 

Notification received that it considers itself hound: 
Togo, February 27, 1962. 


Long-term arrangements regarding international trade in 
cotton textiles. Concluded at meeting of Cotton Textile 
Committee of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade at Geneva February 9, 1962. 

Acceptances deposited: Canada (with reservation), 
August 23, 1962; United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland (with reservation), June 27, 
1962; United States, September 26, 1962. 
Entered into force: October 1, 1962. 

itli October 22, 1962 

^ For background, see Buixetin of Sept. 24, 1962, p. 464. 
* Not in force. 


United Nations 

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the Inter- 
national Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco, 
June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945. 
59 Stat. 1031. 

Admission to membership: Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, 
Trinidad and Tobago, September 12, 1962. 



Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps 
program. Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul Sep- 
tember 6 and 11, 1962. Entered into force September 
11, 19G2. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps 
program. Effected by exchange of notes at Yaounde 
July 23 and September 10, 1962. Entered into force 
September 10, 1962. 

Congo (Brazzaville) 

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Brazzaville July 26 and Sep- 
tember 1, 1962. Entered into force September 1, 1962. 

Congo (Leopoldville) 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agi'ee- 
ment of November 18, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4925, 
5069, 5159, and 5164). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Leopoldville August 31, 1962. Entered into force 
August 31, 1962. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps 
program. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara 
August 27, 1962. Entered into force August 27, 1962. 


Foreign Service Selection Boards Meet 

Press release 598 dated October 3 

The 16th Foreign Service Officer Selection Boards con- 
vened on October 3 to review the records and to consider 
promotions for Foreign Service officer personnel. 

The S.-TOO officers who will have their performance files 
reviewed staff the nearly 300 embassies, legations, and 
consulates located in over a hundred countries with whom 
the United States conducts foreign relations. In addi- 
tion. Foreign Service officers serve in Washington in the 
Department of State and other executive agencies, includ- 
ing Commerce, Labor, Defense, AID, and the Treasury. 

Improved procedures have been inaugurated which it 
is believed will permit the Selection Boards, which nor- 

mally deliberate for approximately 4 months, to complete [jjtobe 
their task in 6 weeks or less. 

The Boards this year will disregard age and length oH 
service as factors in considering officers' promotions, 

Membership on the seven Boards includes 31 Foreigui 
Service officers, 7 public members drawn from private 
life, and 7 members from other executive agencies which 
have significant foreign affairs interests. 

The Foreign Service officer members include the Am- 
bassador to the Central African Republic, John H. Burns ; 
the Ambassador to Colombia, Fulton Freeman ; the Am- 
bassador to Mexico, Thomas C. Mann ; the former Undei 
Secretary of State, Livingston T. Merchant ; and the Am- 
bassador to Nigeria, Joseph Palmer II. 

The public members are Dean Clowes, assistant direc- 
tor. United Steel Workers ; John Cogley, staff director 
The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions 
Santa Barbara, Calif. ; John W. Davis, special director 









NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund ; Herbert loiit 
W. Hill, chairman. Department of History, Dartmoutbi to' 
College ; Edward Korry, manager, Special Projects, audi '^* 
special assistant to Gardner Cowles, Cowles Magazin* 




and Broadcasting Co., Inc. ; C. A. R. Lindquist, bankei 
and agriculturist ; and Robert E. McMillen, researct 
director, United Association of Journeymen and Appren- 
tices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the' 
U.S. and Canada. 

Voting members from other executive agencies arwlii' 
Lester Christerson, deputy director, AID Mission, Yemen, 
Agency for International Development ; Douglas M. Craw- 
ford, assistant administrator for agricultural attaches, 
Department of Agriculture; John A. Hamilton, foreign 
affairs officer, Office of Assistant Director, U.S. Infor- 
mation Agency ; Lowell Kilgore, program officer for inter- 
national affairs. Business and Defense Service Adminis- 
tration, Department of Commerce; Paul E. Pauly, direc- 
tor, Office of Trade Promotion, Department of Commerce ; 
Lloyd Prochnow, chief. Branch of International Tech- 
nical Cooperation, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Depart- 
ment of Labor; and John F. Scott, chief, Employment 
Systems and Practices, Bureau of Programs and Stand- 
ards, Civil Service Commission. 


The Senate on October 2 confirmed the following nomi- 
nations : 

W. Walton Butterworth to be Ambassador to Canada 
fFor biographic details, see White House press release 
dated September 11.) 

John M. Leddy to be the representative of the United 
States to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. (For biographic details, see White House 
press release dated September 29.) 

Llewellyn E. Thompson to be Ambassador at Large. 
(For biographic details, see Department of State press 
release 607 dated October 8. ) 




















Deparlmenf of Sfate Bullefin 




Africa. Trade and Investment ixi Tropical Africa 
(Blumenthal, Williams) 

Algeria. Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit 
Algeria to Membership (Stevenson) 

American Republics 

American Foreign Ministers Hold Informal Meet- 
ing at Washington (text of communique) . . . 

I. J. Sullivan, F. C. Turner Named to Committee 
for Highvs'ay Congress 

l'Di](|k.tomic Energy 

ndian Group Calls for Cessation of Nuclear Testing 

in Atmosphere 

?oward an Open Scientific Community (Seaborg) . 

>nada. Butterworth confirmed as Ambassador . 





s, u 


5 an 


October 22, 1962 


Vol. XLVII, No. 1217 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 


oint Resolution Expressing the Determination of 

the United States With Respect to Cuba .... 
'rading Relations Between the Free World and 

Cuba (BaU) 


unerican Foreign Ministers Hold Informal Meet- 
ing at Washington (text of communique) . . . 

oint Resolution Expressing the Determination of 
the United States With Respect to Cuba .... 

secretary Discusses Cuban Situation on "News and 
Comment" Program (Rusk, Scali) 

Trading Relations Between the Free World and 
Cuba (Ball) 

department and Foreign Service 

>nflrmations (Butterworth, Leddy, Thompson) . 
yoreign Service Selection Boards Meet 

Sconomic Affairs 

Che EEC and the Free-World Community (John- 

President Provides for Administration of Cotton 
Textile Arrangement (text of Executive order) . 

Trade and Investment in Tropical Africa (Blumen- 
thal, Williams) 

Trading Relations Between the Free World and 
Cuba (Ball) 

ij|E)ducational and Cultural Affairs. John M. Stal- 
naker Elected Chairman of Board of Foreign 


Building the Atlantic Partnership: Some Lessons 
From the Past (Bundy) 

The EEC and the Free- World Community (John- 

Foreign Aid. Conference on Middle-Level Man- 
power To Meet in Puerto Rico (Rusk) .... 

Germany. Building the Atlantic Partnership: 
Some Lessons From the Past (Bimdy) .... 

[ndia. Indian Group Calls for Cessation of Nu- 
clear Testing in Atmosphere 

international Organizations and Conferences 

American Foreign Ministers Hold Informal Meet- 
ing at Washington (text of communique) . . . 

Conference on Middle-Level Manpower To Meet in 
Puerto Rico (Rusk) 

Leddy confirmed as U.S. Representative to OECD . 

R. J. Sullivan, F. C. Turner Named to Committee 
for Highway Congress 

Nforth Atlantic Treaty Organization. Building the 
Atlantic Partnership: Some Lessons From the 
Past (Bundy) 


















Presidential Documents 

British Foreign Secretary Talks With President 

Kennedy 600 

President Provides for Administration of Cotton 

Textile Arrangement 626 

Science. Toward an Open Scientific Community 

(Seaborg) 622 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 629 

United Kingdom. British Foreign Secretary Talks 
With President Kennedy (text of joint state- 
ment) 600 

United Nations. Security Council Recommends 

U.N. Admit Algeria to Membership ( Stevenson) . 627 

Name Index 

Ball, George W 591 

Blumenthal, W. Michael 616 

Bundy, McGeorge 601 

Butterworth, W. Walton 630 

Home, Lord 600 

Johnson, G. Grifiith 605 

Kennedy, President 600, 626 

Leddy, John M 630 

Rusk, Secretary 595, 628 

Scall, John 595 

Seaborg, Glenn T 622 

Stalnaker, John M 600 

Stevenson, Adlai E 627 

Sullivan, Richard J 629 

Thompson, Llewellyn E 630 

Turner, Francis C 629 

Williams, G. Mennen 613 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 1-7 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of 
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. 

Releases issued prior to October 1 which appear 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 580 of Sep- 
tember 25, 582 and 583 of September 26, 585 of 
September 27, and .590 of September 29. 
U.S. participation in international con- 
Meeting of foreign ministers of Amer- 
ican Republics. 
Ball : statement on trade with Cuba. 
PSO selection boards. 
Bohlen sworn in as Ambassador to 

France (biographic details). 
Meeting of American foreign minis- 
ters : communique. 
Delegation to Uganda independence 

Morgan : "The U.S.S.R. in World Af- 
Itinerary for visit of Libyan Crown 

Schaetzel : "The Common Market, the 
Atlantic Partnership, and the Free 
Rusk : Peace Corps middle-level man- 
power conference. 
Sullivan and Turner appointed to 
Organizing Committee for Pan Amer- 
ican Highway Congress (rewrite). 
Schwartz sworn in as SCA Adminis- 
trator (biographic details). 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 
































United States 
Government Printing Office 


Washington 25, D.C. 





FIVE GOALS OF U.S. foreign policy 






"^^Hiat U.S. foreign policy is, how it works, and the goals it is de- 
signed to achieve, are defined in this 37-page pamphlet. It contains 
the transcript of a television interview, September 24, 1962, with 
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of 
Defense ; George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State ; Fowler Hamil- 
ton, Administrator, Agency for International Development; Adlai E, 
Stevenson, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations; 
and W. W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning 
Council, Department of State. 

Publication 7432 

20 cents 

Order Form 

To: Snpt, of Documents 
GoTt. Printing Office 
Washington 25, D.C. 

Enclosed find: 

Please send me copies of FIVE GOALS OF US. FOREIGN POLICY 


Street Address: 

City, Zone, and State: 

{cath, check, or money 
order payable to 
Supt. of Docs.) 







h 'o 

Vol. XLVII, No. 1218 

October 29, 1962 


COLLEGE • Address by Secretary Rusk 642 


Secretary Ball 645 


Schaetzel 661 

THE U.S.S.R. IN WORLD AFFAIRS • by George A. Morgan . 649 


by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 635 

For index see inside back cover 


Vol. XLVII, No. 1218 • Publication 7440 
October 29, 1962 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing OlDce 

Washington 25, D.C. 


62 issues, domestic $8.50, foreign $12.25 

Single copy, 25 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publica- 
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau 
of the Budget (January 19. 1961). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
OF State Bulletin as the source will be 
appreciated. The Bulletin Is indexed in the 
Readers' Qulde to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
and interested agencies of the 
Government with information on 
developments in tlie field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by the White House and the 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and otlier 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which tlie United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and legis- 
lative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 

Jnited States Position on Nuclear Testing 
[xplained to United Nations 

Statement hy Adlai E. Stevenson 

U.S. Representative to the General Assetnhly ^ 

I come before you to survey once again the 
uclear testing issue, which by now is familiar 
round to most of us. I wisli very much that this 
5sue had been behind us for many years and that 
le peace of the world, the survival of civilization, 
nd the health of mankind were not still endan- 
ered by nuclear weapons. But they are. In- 
eed, instead of receding, the danger has increased 
s the weapons have multiplied in number and in 
jthal sophistication. 

So our discussion here this year is even more ur- 
ent, and we must ask you to examine the situa- 
on even more closely and help us with patience 
nd persistence to reach an agreement and reverse 
16 tragic trend. 

Wliile we are debating here, the Geneva nego- 
ations go on. Tlie purpose of our discussion is 
ot to replace those negotiations but to encourage 
lem. This Assembly can register emphatically 
16 anxiety and intense feeling of mankind on 
le subject of nuclear testing. At Geneva we 
LUst translate those feelings into concrete form. 
Jid the sooner the better. 

I speak as a representative of one of the few 
ations possessing nuclear military power. Such 
ower is a distinction — if such it be — conferred 
J history and resources, not by choice. And it 
, I can assure you, an awesome responsibility, to 
3 envied by no one. 

Nuclear power imposes, in fact, a solemn tliree- 
)ld duty. First, we have to maintain that power 
adequate measure to protect the national se- 
irity of our own country and those numerous 

'Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Oct. 
I (U.S. delegation press release 4060). 

c/ober 29, J 962 

countries and peoples who look to it for protec- 
tion. Second, we have the sobering duty to use 
the power with such restraint that the peace of 
the world is not endangered anywhere. And, 
finally, there is the imperative duty to discover 
some way to reduce a level of military power 
which serves no other purpose than to balance off 
a concentration of power in other hands. 

My Government is totally committed to the 
discharge of all three of these responsibilities. 
But we are concerned here today with the third 
responsibility imposed by nuclear power: the ur- 
gent need to find some way of controlling the rush 
to greater and greater power — to find some way 
out of the insensate and endless arms race. 

Mr. Chairman, I have little doubt that if I rep- 
resented one of the member states without nuclear 
weapons, I should feel frustrated by the prolonged 
dialog between the nuclear powers, annoyed at 
what may seem like obsession with technicalities, 
and sorely tempted to step up and say, in effect: 
"Stop arguing and get down to business — and be 
quick about it." 

But to the state which is burdened with nuclear 
power it is painfully evident that this is a prob- 
lem which is hard, cold, incredibly complex, and 
intensely practical. It will not yield simply to 
moralizing and exhortation, nor to platitudes or 
slogans. It therefore becomes the duty of the 
nuclear powers to be quite blunt about the reali- 
ties, to be candid about the practical relevance of 
our debates in this Assembly to the politics of an 
arms race which is a fact of life. 

There is no point in recrimination nor in re- 
hashing old stories for the sake of the record whicli 
is already ponderous ; that would only contribute 


to skepticism about the chances of controlling the 
arms race. The point, rather, is to look realisti- 
cally at our now considerable experience and to 
draw appropriate lessons from it. 

It is not my purpose today to give a detailed re- 
capitulation of the Iiistory of the nuclear test ne- 
gotiations. However, for the convenience of 
delegations during the present debate, we have 
prepared a supplemental white paper - on those 
negotiations, whicli we shall be pleased to make 
available tomorrow. 

Realities of Nuclear Arms Race 

Our recent experience with the problem of nu- 
clear testing is, I believe, most illuminating in this 

One of the first realities of the nuclear arms race 
emerged for all to see — in a shockingly dramatic 
way — just as the 16th General Assembly was about 
to convene. For approximately 3 years previously 
no nuclear testing had been conducted; a volun- 
tary, uninspected, and informal moratorium on 
nuclear testing had been in efl'ect. For approxi- 
mately 3 years a test ban conference in Geneva had 
labored painfully — through ups and downs, ac- 
cords and discords — until agreement was reached 
on a preamble, 17 articles, and 2 annexes of a draft 
treaty ^ to end nuclear testing. For approximately 
3 yeai-s the Soviet Union had agreed upon the prin- 
ciple that international inspection would be re- 
quired to guarantee that the treaty's provisions 
were, in fact, being carried out. The issue had 
become the number of detection posts and the num- 
ber of onsite inspections which would be necessary 
each year and not the principle itself. At long last, 
it seemed reasonable to hope that we were on the 
verge of a workable treaty to ban all nuclear weap- 
ons testing in all environments — forever. Mean- 
while the United Kingdom and the United States 
refrauied from testing. 

Then, when the United Kingdom and the United 
States came forward with new proposals which 

'International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon 
Tests, September 1961-8eptemt>er 1962 (United States 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency publication 9) ; 
for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, WashinRton 2.">, D.C., price $1.00. 

"For texts, see Documents on Disarmament, 19G0 (De- 
partment of State publication 7172), pp. 370-387 ; for sale 
by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., price $1.25. 


reasonably met all remaining Soviet objections, a 
strange thing occurred; the Soviet delegation be- 
gan a retreat from points already agreed upon 
which was to culminate in November in a complete 
reversal of position. We were puzzled for a while, 
but on August 30 we had the explanation of why 
the Soviet delegation had ended meaningful ne- 
gotiation: The Soviet Union unilaterally ended 
the moratorium by conducting what turned out 
to be a massive series of nuclear tests in the atmos- 
phere, a test series which had been under prepara- 
tion for a long time and which was climaxed bj 
an explosion of such force that it surpassed al 
rational military use. 

This sudden and stunning reversal by the Soviet 
Union dramatized the need for a firm agreemen 
which would give stability to the ending of test, 
and confidence to all the parties. 

Mr. Chairman, this experience provided the firS' mi 
lesson about the realities of the nuclear arms race 
A voluntary unverified moratorium does not re 
duce tensions, does not build mutual confidenct 
does not stop the perils of fallout, does not pu 
a brake on the arms race, is not a step towar 
general disarmament, and does not contribut 
to the peace of the world. The conclusio 



is obvious : ^^liere national security is concernec pet 
an open society cannot undertake with a close pe 
society an arrangement which cannot be verifiec 

The next reality about tlie nuclear arms race 
that it can be ended only by agreement in whic 
all parties can have confidence. Before this con 
mittee on October 19 of last year, I stated * — an 
not for the first time — that the United States w! 
ready to return to the conference table in Genev 
that before the United States followed the Sovi 
lead and resumed testing we were prepared 
conclude a test ban treaty either here or in Genev; 
I declared that a treaty could be signed within ; 
days, and, of course, I said my Government wou 
be obliged to resume testing in the atmosphe 
if tlie Soviet Union continued and refused to agr 
to stop and if we found that this forced us to lo« 
again to our own security. 

You know the result. Tlie Soviet Union i 
jected the offer of the United States and Unit 
Kingdom, ignored the appeal of this Assemb 
and continued its longest series to its bitter a 
violent end. But even under these conditions ir, . 



< still 


irf ( 

' BuLi-ETi-N of Xov. 13, 19G1, p. 816. 

Department of Sfofe By//e 




even after nearly 50 Soviet atmospheric tests and 
before any U.S. atmospheric tests — the United 
States and tlie United Kingdom went back to 
Geneva and urged a test ban with international 
supervision and inspection annually involving less 
than one part in 2,000 of Soviet territory.'^ Even 
this offer wfis rejected. And at last, after detailed 
scientific study, prolonged delay, and with deep 
reluctance, the President of the United States 
determined that, in our own security interests, we 
too should have to return to testing in tlie atmos- 
phere. And now, before our series has been com- 
pleted, the Soviet Union is at it again. 

"VVliat lesson can be drawn from this part of our 
ixperience in the preceding years ? Nothing new, 
[ am afraid ; nothing but confirmation of the mel- 
incholy fact that in the contemporary world the 
jnly effective restraint upon military power which 
nan has been able to invent is to line up opposing 
lational military power — and an increase in mili- 
ary power on one side is followed by an increase 
n military power on the other side, almost as 
iurely as night follows day. 

Before yielding to despair, however, let us 
luickly note the other side of it. Even without a 
fimdamental change in political relationships, if 
::i« we could stop nuclear testing simultaneously, each 
e side could be able to accept such a balance — as 
to ong as it is ascertainable that the stoppage has 
n fact taken place. 
In the light of these rather somber realities, Mr. 
,jj Chairman, what else can we conclude from our 
xperience so far with the nuclear testing issue? 
Ve can, I believe, draw at least two more reas- 
uring conclusions. 
The first is that, despite tlie futility of mere 
'"^ hetoric, this Assembly, overwhelmingly made up 
'f states without nuclear weapons, is not witliout 
nfluence on those which have them. In the at- 
losphere of gloom and apprehension which pre- 
vailed last year at the opening of the 16th General 
I"*' Assembly, the members did not give up hope and 
^ urned once again to the quest for control of the 
»'*.uclear arms race. In this I am certain that we 
lave overwhelming world opinion behind us. 
ertainly we do in my country. 
In any event, encouraged by the Assembly's 
ction in calling for renewed negotiations for an 


For text of a U.S.-TJ.K. draft treaty introduced in the 
Jonference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon 
'ests on Apr. 18, 1961, see ihifl., June 5, 1961, p. 870. 

>cfofaer 29, 1962 

internationally monitored test ban agreement, we 
picked up the remains of 3 years of hard work at 
Geneva and returned to negotiations. 

This leads me to the second conclusion of a more 
hopeful nature which I think we can draw from re- 
cent experience. It is this: Continuous negotia- 
tions — however fruitless they may look from the 
sidelines — do at least help to clear away the se- 
mantic confusion, to uncover the hard-core prob- 
lems underneath, to narrow the debate to the real 
issues. If this is tedious and frustrating work, 
it is immensely important because at long last the 
right questions can be asked and wrong answers 
can be exposed. If, in tlie end, we fail again, at 
least we have the advantage of knowing why we 
failed ; and then we must try yet again. 

Some Progress Toward Test Ban Treaty 

In the meantime some genuine progress appears 
to have been made. According to its official state- 
ments, the Soviet Government lias again reversed 
itself and is willing to accept a nuclear test ban 
agreement in advance of general and complete 
disarmament. The Soviet Government now says 
that it is willing to accept some arrangement in 
which an international commission would be a fea- 
ture. It is luiwilling as yet, however, to concede 
the essential rights of international supervision 
and inspection. 

For our part, tlie United States and the United 
Kingdom have agreed, on the basis of a new tech- 
nical assessment, that a reduction can now be made 
in the number of sites within the Soviet Union 
that would be required to monitor seismic disturb- 
ances. We also have accepted a reduction in the 
number of inspections required within Soviet ter- 
ritory for verification that such seismic events were 
not underground nuclear explosions. 

We were able to accept these modifications be- 
cause of recent improvements in scientific tech- 
niques for detection of underground disturbances. 
For the past 2 years my Government has been con- 
ducting an extensive progi'am of research on the 
improvement of such teclmiques. This program, 
for which the United States has allocated more 
than $200 million, has produced much valuable 
information ; we now have a better understanding 
of the phenomena relevant to detection and identi- 
fication of nuclear tests than we had even a year 
or two ago. 

This is what we have offered and what we want : 


a ban on all tests for all time, subject only to the 
necessity of international inspection in the one 
environment where it is scientifically necessary, 
that is, imderground. The United States and the 
United Kingdom tabled a draft treaty incorpora- 
ting these points at Geneva on August 27th.'= 

So once again the Western Powers have moved 
toward the goal of a test ban treaty. In that 
process we have been aided by the positive and 
responsible contributions of the delegations of 
Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Sweden, and the United Arab Republic. The 
memorandum^ submitted by these eight delega- 
tions on April 16 has been useful in making it pos- 
sible to bring closer together the opposing posi- 
tions in the test ban negotiations. 

These proposals did not pretend to be a detailed 
blueprint for a final treaty but expressed some 
ideas which both sides could accept and which they 
now must translate into precise treaty language. 
The U.S.-U.K. draft treaty of August 27 is re- 
sponsive to these ideas. 

We believe that nuclear and nonnuclear powers 
alike owe these delegations a debt of gratitude for 
their conscientious and constructive diplomacy at 
Geneva, and, on behalf of my Government, I ex- 
press my thanks to them. 

Need for identification and Verification 

I want to make clear once again that our con- 
tinued insistence on the need for identification 
and verification of undergroimd phenomena is not 
based on ideological or political grounds — nor is 
it a bargaining position. Our insistence is based 
on the scientific fact that knowledge and techniques 
do not exist to distinguish between earthquakes 
and underground nuclear explosions without on- 
site inspection. 

The United States delegation will circulate to 
all delegations a brief memorandiun * which elab- 
orates on this problem. "VVliile we can detect seis- 
mic events abov^e a certain threshold fairly effec- 
tivclj', we cannot identify what they are. The sig- 
nals from underground nuclear tests are identical 
with tliose of most earthquakes. "When we have 

'For background and text, see ibid.. Sept 17, 1962, p. 

'For text, see U.X. doc. DC/203 (ENDC/28). 
" U.N. doc. A/C. 1/873. 


detected something, how do we Icnow wliat it is? 
With a few special types of earthquakes, we can 
distinguish an earthquake from an explosion. But 
the reverse is not true, and in no cases can we iden- 
tify a nuclear explosion as different from most 
earthquakes. The only way to answer that ques- 
tion is to inspect the site of the detected event. 

The Soviets seem to be saying that they do have 
instruments for detection and identification of 
underground nuclear tests which can operate on 
a purely national basis. We cannot say that they 
do not have such instruments. We can only say 
that we do not, nor do we know of any. The So- 
viets have been repeatedly invited to bring for- 
ward experts and their instruments so that this 
important matter of fact can be established. Thej 
have declined the invitation. 

Nevertheless, as I suggested earlier, the Genev£4 
negotiations have served to narrow the discussior 
to its fundamentals and to expose to the sunliglr 
the precise issue. Therefore we can now ask thi 
right question, which is this : Will the Soviet ™ 
Union agree — as we have agreed — to the neces 
sary nmnber of control posts, manned by Sovie 
nationals under an international system, to moni 
tor seismic events? And will the Soviet UnioiP^l 
agree — as we have agreed — to permit on its ter 
ritory a limited number of international verifica 
tion teams ? 

We have seen tliat the Soviet Union has aban 
doned its insistence that a test cessation agreemen 
can be accomplished only as part of general am 
complete disarmament. By accepting the eight 
nation memorandum as a basis for negotiatioi 
they have agreed once again that an Internationa 
control system may be established to monitor test; 
Only one major objection remains; only one o\ 
stacle bars the path to the first great step towar 
nuclear sanity. The Soviet Union has not y( 
agreed to reaffirm the position which it took froi 
1958 until November 1961 — that on-site inspectio 
was a necessary element of any test ban agreemen 

Instead they have proposed inspection by inviti 
tion. The Soviet proposal in response to tl 
eight-nation memorandum provides that an inte; 
national commission would have the right to ae »ij. L( 
for information about .seismic events and, after 
period of consultations, could ask for an on-si 
inspection. The state on whose territory the evej 
took place would then decide whether it woa 



The I 



le i 



"111 ivi 

Department of State Bulleii hiks,2 

gree to such an inspection. Such an arrange- 
aent, of course, defeats the purpose of inspection, 
t gives a veto power over verification to the very 
itate in which the suspicious event takes place. It 
)rotects cheating. But the point of an interna- 
ional inspection system is to give all the parties 
secure confidence that the treaty is not being 

The United States has not and will not aban- 
[on hope that the Soviet Union will once again 
eaffirm their former approval of some interna- 
ional verification system so that an agreement can 
% ,t long last become a reality. If the Soviet Union 
eally wants an agreement to stop all testing for- 
ver, we frankly cannot imderstand why some in- 
pection at the site, which was acceptable to the 
ioviet Union a year ago, should not be acceptable 




he Facts About International Inspection 

For some time now the answer of the Soviet 
Jnion has been that international verification is 
lut a cover for "imperialist espionage" — or words, 
n endless profusion, to that effect. But whatever 
he words, the answer is transparently wrong. 
Lnd let me tell you why. 

First, the international inspection teams would 
le chosen and organized by the executive officer of 
he international control system — not by the 
Jnited States or the United Kingdom. The execu- 
ive officer would be chosen by the Commission 
nly, with the agreement of the Soviet Union 
mong others. 

Second, transportation of the inspectors to and 

rom the site would be under the control of the 

,|jj( loviet Government or the country involved. If 

jl : wished it could even blindfold the inspectors en 


Third, while at the site the international in- 

. fjjj pectors could be accompanied by such observers 

s the host government wishes. 

Fourth, the areas subject to inspection would 

,pj, e small and strictly limited by treaty in each case. 

tl) n all, the total area subject to inspection annually 

■ „f, ^ould be an infinitesimal fraction of Soviet terri- 

j5 5ry. Let us take the most extreme assumptions : 

fjjt a) that every suspicious event occurred in a dif- 

jiterent area, and (b) that all the area of each 

rent was actually inspected. Even under such 

ij] onditions, the surface of the Soviet Union would 




>cfofaer 29, 1962 

not be covered for more than 2,000 years. If se- 
curity cannot be protected under these conditions — 
and the actual conditions would be much more 
favorable — then the world indeed has much to fear. 

Fifth, the location of sites to be inspected can- 
not be determined in advance by the United States 
or anyone else. They would be determined solely 
by objective instrumentation, operating under in- 
ternational control. 

Finally, only a limited number of on-site inspec- 
tions would be conducted each year. 

Now let us try to see what would happen. A sig- 
nal from an underground event would be received 
and recorded at control posts. The signals would 
be processed by the international commission. If 
it could not identify the event as an earthquake, an 
inspection team might proceed to the site. The 
site would be determined solely on the basis of the 
scientifically recorded signal. Only a small frac- 
tion of such signals would be inspected on the site. 
To get to the site, the inspection team would use 
transportation under the control of the government 
involved. The team could carry only previously 
agreed and specified equipment related to its im- 
mediate task. Wliile at the inspection site the 
team would be under the scrutiny of as many ob- 
servers as the host government wished to assign. 
Its members could not leave the inspection site. 
The inspection team would then look for evidence 
of an underground nuclear explosion, report its 
findings, and return — under the same conditions 
as they came. Can espionage be conducted under 
these circumstances ? The question answers itself. 

We prayerfully hope that hard facts such as 
these will prevail over the mythical specter of 
"espionage," assuming it is sincere. If they do, 
we should be able to complete a comprehensive 
nuclear test ban treaty in fairly short order. 

Possibility of a Limited Ban 

But suppose that the Soviet Union refuses to 
accept a comprehensive and verified test ban treaty 
in the near future. Can nothing then be done to 
curb the nuclear arms race that is so dangerous in 
peace as well as war and so dreadfully costly, when 
so much of the world is in such need? Yes, Mr. 
Cliairman, a great deal could be done, and it is so 
easy to do that I find it incomprehensible that we 
are still discussing it. 

I refer, of course, to an agreement to ban aU 


weapons testing in the water, in the atmosphere, 
and in outer space, that is, all testing above 
ground. We have been referring to this as a 
"limited ban." I repeat that the United States 
would much prefer a comprehensive treaty barring 
all testing everj'where. But if that is impossible, 
a half loaf is better than none. And it is more 
than a half loaf, because at least 90 percent of the 
force of all nuclear tests from the beginning has 
been exploded above ground. In this sense a ban 
on all but underground testing would deal with 
90 percent of the problem. And it would deal 
with the test environments of greatest concern. 
There is no radioactive fallout from an under- 
ground test, and from the viewpoint of radiation 
hazards a treaty banning tests in the oceans, the 
atmosphere, and outer space would end at least 
that growing hazard to mankind everywhere. 

I say such an agreement should be easy to make. 
Why? Because national detection systems are 
now so well developed that we can rely on them to 
identify nuclear explosions miless they take place 
imderground. No on-site inspection is necessary 
for explosions above ground. The vexatious issue 
of inspection is eliminated. Indeed, there is no 
obstacle whatever to such an agreement. 

There remains only one question : Will the 
Soviet Union agree with the other nuclear powers 
to cease and desist from the testing of nuclear 
weapons in the oceans, in the atmosphere, and in 
outer space? 

Again I regret to say that the response from 
the Soviet side is negative. They have rejected 
even such a limited test ban agreement because 
they say it would "legalize underground testing." 
But it would do no such thing. It would, instead, 
make testing in three environments illegal — the 
environments where most all of the testing takes 
place and the environments where all of the radia- 
tion takes place. Moreover, it would break the 
deadlock at long last and bring us a long leap 
forward toward the ensuing steps to sanity and 

Should we refuse to outlaw testing in three en- 
vironments — which is in our grasp this very day — 
just because we can't agree on tlie fourth environ- 
ment ? Surely the question of disarmament is one 
field in which any part of a loaf is better than 
none, and this is nine-tenths of a loaf. 

The United States and tlie United Kingdom 
want to sign a treaty banning all nuclear tests 


above ground — without any inspection whateveri 
And we have put forward a draft text.* 

I do not know why the Soviet Union, having 
once approved the principle of international in 
spection which would make possible a compre 
hensive ban, has since opposed any inspection a 
all. And it is even more difficidt to understan( 
why the Soviet Union declines to ban tests in thi 
environment, where we all agree that external o 
national detecting sj'stems are adequate. But w 
will everlastingly hope that this opposition to an; 
progress will thaw here in this room — and, if i 
does nothing else, this General Assembly of th 
United Nations will thereupon become an histori 















A Choice Between Hope and Horror 

Let me now, Mr. Chairman, recapitulate ver 
briefly just where we stand on the nuclear testing j,, 

First, we are deeply committed to the goal ( 
general and complete disarmament, including tl 
total elimination of all nuclear weapons and a 
means of their delivery — a process which we pn 
pose to start in the first stage of general disarm; 
ment. The United States delegation will retui 
to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conferen( 
with every intention of staying there for as Ion 
as may be necessary. 

Second, we are prepared to sign at once a treat 
banning all further tests in all environments, pn 
vided only that the Soviet Union accepts tl 
detection and verification procedures, under inte 
national control, which are scientifically necessai ^j|j^ 
in order to detect and identify undergi-ound test 

Third, if the Soviet Union cannot or will n 
tolerate this modicimi of cooperation, we are pr 
pared to sign immediately a treaty banning a 
tests above ground, where we have the nation 
capability of identifying Soviet tests — that is, 
the oceans, the atmosphere, and outer space. Ai 
this is no unimportant step; it woidd eliminate i 
further poisoning of the atmosphere; it wou 
sharply inhibit further nuclear weapons develo 
ment; it would put a partial brake on the proli 
eration of nuclear weapons capability; and su 
an invigorating step forward would make a ne 
step easier. It would set us on the path towa 

if pre 



' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 17, 1962, p. 415. 

Department of Stale Bullel 



In the light of all the conclusions we can draw 
from our extensive experience with the nuclear 
:est issue — in light of the progress that has been 

ji made between the last Assembly and this one — the 
Qnited States Government is neither pessimistic 
lor optimistic. We are simply and doggedly de- 
ermined to keep at it mitil reason prevails, vmtil 
live arrest the upward spiral of nuclear arms and 
hen tum it downward — in stages which can be 
/erified by a grateful world community. 

The moment may be at hand wlien a comprehen- 
iive nuclear test ban treaty has again become pos- 
sible. The Soviet Union has had two large nuclear 
est series in the past year. The United States is 
•ompleting a series begun last spring. Although 
he explosive force of the Soviet nuclear blasts far 
exceeds the United States tests, we are quite pre- 
)ared to stop testing now as soon as we have de- 
pendable means of knowing that the Soviet Union 
s going to stop and stay stopped. If the U.S.S.R. 
s satisfied with the progress in its present testing 
)rogram, a rare period of equilibrium may have 
)een reached in this sector of the arms race. This 
s a time, therefore, when finn insistence by the 
jreneral Assembly can forestall another cycle of 
uiclear tests. Let us make the most of this deci- 
live moment before it passes from us. 
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and fellow dele- 

™ rates, let me say that we are at one of the fateful 
urning points of histoi-y, when the ci^dlization 
if our times faces a choice between hope and 
lorror. If we choose wrong, or fail to choose at 

* '1 ,11, the consequences to a world already sorely 
vounded by two world wars in a generation are 

sai riglitening at best. If we choose rightly, the 
fenius of man can carry us on to new triimiphs 
■" if progress and brotherhood. 

If we could here today, or in Geneva tomorrow, 
gree to ban nuclear testing of every kind, with 
ecurity for all, we would lift a heavy burden from 
he hearts and shoulders of all mankind. If we 
an't, then let us at least, and without further 

iteii|,rgument or acrimony, do what we can for our 
ellow man and clear the seas, the air, and the 

el«l pace beyond of these ghastly weapons and their 

)oisonous spawn. There is no reason imder heaven 

I' chy this step should not be taken now, and every 

eason why it should be taken. Let us close our 

0151' ateful discussion by resolving imanimously to end 
uch tests and emancipate our people — yes, and 
lur conscience — from this bondage. 

Dcfofaer 29, 1962 



President Kennedy Holds Talks 
With Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia 

Followi/ng is the text of a joint com/nvwriique 'by 
President Kennedy and Crown Prince Faysal of 
Savdi Arabia issued at the close of talks held at 
Washington on October 6. 

White House press release dated October 5 

On October 5 His Royal Higliness Crown 
Prince Faysal and President Kennedy held pri- 
vate talks at the Wliite House. Frank and cor- 
dial discussions were held on Saudi Arabian- 
American relations and on the world situation. 
Crown Prince Faysal and the President are con- 
fident that this opportmiity to become personally 
acquainted will lead to increased mutual under- 
standing between the United States and Saudi 

United States Congratulates 
Uganda on Independence 

Following is the text of a letter from President 
Kennedy to Prime Minister A. Milton Ohote of 

White House press release dated October S 

October 5, 19G2 
Dear Mr. Prime Minister : I congratulate you 
and your people upon Uganda's independence. 
The government and the people of the United 
States wish Uganda a prosperous futiu-e as a 
sovereign nation. 

The principle of self-determination in Africa 
has in Uganda proved once more its truth and 
strength. This principle inspired our own people 
in their struggle for independence, and we there- 
fore feel a special kinship and pride in welcoming 
Uganda to the community of free nations. 

A coimnon devotion to the United Nations Char- 
ter will strongly bind our nations in the impera- 
tive task of building a just and peaceful world. 
Uganda's independence strengthens the forces 
working toward this goal. 


John F. Kennedy 



United States Presents Facilities at Fort McNair 
to Inter-American Defense College 

Address by Secretary Rush ^ 

I am greatly honored to present to tlie Inter- 
American Defense Board, on belialf of the United 
States, these facilities at Fort McNair for use by 
its Inter-American Defense College. They consist 
of an academic administrative building, with an 
auditorium; an officers' field mess; and a bachelor 
officers' quarters which was once the Walter Reed 
Army Hospital — intimately associated with inter- 
American cooperation in making this hemisphere 
a safer and better place to live. The Government 
and the citizens of the United States are gratified 
and honored to make this contribution. 

The Inter- American Defense College was con- 
ceived 5 years ago. Its function, as stated then, 
is to "conduct courses of study on the Inter- Amer- 
ican system, and on the military, economic and 
political, and social factors that constitute essen- 
tial components of inter-American defense in 
order to enhance the preparation of selected per- 
sonnel of the Armed Forces of the American re- 
publics for undertaking of international coopera- 

That statement recognizes that our common pur- 
pose — safeguarding the independence, jDeace, and 
well-being of the American Eepublics — is not only 
a military problem but political, economic, and 
social as well. It is just as important for military 
men to understand these other essentials of the 
defense of freedom as it is for civilians to under- 
stand the vital role of the military. The curricula 
of our own National War College and our other 
senior service colleges take account of the full 
breadth and complexity of the world struggle in 
which we are encasred. 

' Made on the occasion of the dedication of facilities at 
Fort McNair for use by the Inter-American Defense Col- 
lege at Washington, D.C., on Oct. 9 (press release COO). 






And so, I am informed, will the curriculum of 
the Inter-American Defense College. It is to be 
congratulated on having obtained some of the' 
hemisphere's leading statesmen for its lecture^ *"! 
courses. The unique luiowledge of world proh 
lems that these men ofl'er cannot but deepen thei H 
understanding in tomorrow's military leaders ofl F 
the urgent need to strengthen democracy in the 

Military collaboration among American gov 
ernments has not developed haphazardly. It has 
grown in response to three serious challenges to ^[ 
the security of the Western Hemisphere. The 
first, of course, was the threat of Axis dominatior 
that arose in World War II. Then, in 1950, we- 
faced the threat of global war provoked by thw 
Korean conflict. And now we are confronted wit? 
Conununist intervention into the territory and af 
fairs of this hemisphere. 

Our response to these threats underlines our in 
terdependence in peace and war. Taken as i 
whole, it has resulted in the development of tin 
inter- American security system, based on the Ri( 
Treaty of 1947 and subsequent multilateral instru 
ments which gave that treaty meaning and force ™f 
These regional defense arrangements are in ful 
accord with the Charter of the United Nations. 

The survival of our free societies in this hemi 
sphere today is dependent on our recognition o 
the threat directed against us by a powerful an 
ruthless foe. Our response now — those commo 
measures which we are taking and will take fo 
our own security — serves to protect the security o 
all mankind. 

Wliat is the crisis in the hemisphere today ? 
tliink it was outlined in the clearest terms at tl: 
informal meeting last week of the foreign mini 


Department of State Bulleti 


!»5. ; 



ters of the American Eepublics.^ We found unan- 
imously that the most urgent issue before us is 
the Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba and its aim 
of converting tliat island into an armed base for 
Communist penetration and subversion of demo- 
cratic institutions in the American Republics. 

As a result, the Council of the Organization of 
American States, in sessions that begin today, is 
considering the further steps that are required 
to give effect to Resolution II ^ adopted at Punta 
del Este to counter Commimist intervention. The 
Council also will reexamine the trade relations of 
the American Republics with Cuba in accord with 
Resolution VIII ^ of that same meeting. As you 
will recall, that resolution established the hemi- 
sphere embargo on transfer of arms and munitions 
:o the Castro regime. In this effort, I am happy 
to point out, many of our friends and allies in 
,1, 3ther parts of the world are cooperating by extend- 
ing these restrictions to the movement of strategic 
^oods as well as armaments proper. 

Here in this hemisphere, as a direct result of last 
week's informal meeting, we are united in moving 
more vigorously to check the Castro-Communist 
regime's use against us of their concealed instru- 
ments of war. We agreed to intensify our efforts 
to check subversion by agents and groups working 
for international cormnunism. Again, collec- 
;ively and individually, as authorized by Resolu- 
tion II of Punta del Este, we also agreed to devise 
means of checking the subversive traffic in funds, 
people, and propaganda from the island of Cuba. 

All of us at the informal meeting agreed whole- 
aeartedly with the fundamental principle that the 
bmmmiist intervention in Cuba cannot be justi- 
fied as analogous to the defensive measures we 
idopt jointly with countries in other parts of the 
free world to deter Soviet imperialism. 

The free nations of this hemisphere, united not 
mly by geogi-aphy but by our common revolution- 
iry origins, have for more than seven decades built 
ip a close association among themselves. That 
issociation is based on common principles em- 
)odied in many treaties and agreements which are 
lesigned to protect their peoples against aggres- 
sion. This is the basis of our proper, conmnon 
;oncern over Soviet intervention in Cuba and, 


' Bulletin of Oct. 22, 1962, p. 598. 
' For text, see ibid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 279. 

lliM * For text, see ibid., p. 282. 
jlleti Dc/ober 29, 7962 

through Cuba, in the other American Republics. 
The Soviet Union's contention that it is doing 
no more in arming Cuba than we are doing jointly 
with free-world nations is nonsense — and is re- 
futed by the record of aggression reflected in the 
agenda of the United Nations since 1945. Free- 
dom is not negotiable. It never can be if our sys- 
tem is to endure. 

Improving the Lot of the Common Man 

One of the most significant results of the infor- 
mal ministerial meeting last week was the empha- 
sis that all put upon the need to strengthen repre- 
sentative democracy in the hemisphere. I think it 
is notable that, while considering defensive meas- 
ures to counter the threat of the growing Soviet 
presence in Cuba, we were unanimous in the con- 
viction that greater effort is needed to bring prog- 
ress and ijrosperity to our peoples. 

We must recognize that the basic crisis which 
we all face today grows out of the determination 
of ill-housed, ill-fed men and women on every 
continent to create for themselves and their chil- 
dren an environment in which hunger and disease 
cease to be daily companions. 

Communism feeds on the miseries and resent- 
ments of this vast sector of our growing popula- 
tions. Our urgent task is to aid these deprived 
masses in achieving improved living conditions 
while at the same time securing their rights of 
self-respect and freedom from despotic rule. As 
in the defense of our system against Communist 
aggression and subversion, so also are we united 
in our resolve to bring to the people of this hemi- 
sphere the promise of economic and social develop- 
ment that is inherent in the Alliance for Progress. 

I would like to make it clear that this pledge 
is extended to the oppressed people of Cuba as well. 
Many peoples in this hemisphere, including many 
in the United States, were sympathetic to the pro- 
claimed original aims of the Cuban revolution. 
There is genuine interest among us all in the free- 
dom and social well-being of the Cuban people. 

In the communique expressing their deep con- 
cern over the increasing involvement of the Sino- 
Soviet powers in the affairs of Cuba, the other 
Republics of the hemisphere confirmed the Cuban 
regime's status as the outcast of the inter-American 
system. But there can be no doubt about our de- 
sire to welcome back to the family of American 
nations a Cuba whose government is compatible 



with the purpose and principles of the inter- 
American system. Tliis offer was renewed in tlie 
communique when the ministers voiced their affec- 
tion and sympathy for the victims of the present 

Military Civic Action Program 

In pressing our campaign to improve the lot of 
the common man in the hemisphere, I believe tlie 
military from all our countries must play an ac- 
tive role. And the most immediate application of 
their talents would be through a sharply stepped- 
up program of civic action. 

The United States Government would like to see 
Latin American armed forces increase their par- 
ticipation in modernizing the basic facilities of all 
the American Republics. "We believe they could 
borrow profitably from the long and honorable 
record of our United States Army Corps of 
Engineers in strengthening the civilian economy. 

Wlien the United States became an independent 
nation almost 200 years ago, only the Atlantic 
coastal region was settled and developed. The 
only engineers were a few Army officers who had 
been trained in France; so naturally the Govern- 
ment used these engineers for many nonmilitary 
tasks. They built lighthouses and harbors to serve 
the shipping on which the maritime colonies de- 
pended. They built the early railroads in tliis 
country, and one of them, Lieutenant George 
Wlieeler, became so proficient that he was lent to 
the czar's government to build the Russian rail- 
way system. They charted highway routes, built 
canals, and opened river waterways. They system^ 
atically explored the resources of the wilderness 
and paved the way for settlement and develop- 
ment. They mapped the shorelines, rivers, 
mountains, and valleys. Among their efforts was 
the construction of the dome of the United States 
Capitol building and the Washington Monimient. 
Today the civil works program of the Army En- 
gineers is confined mainly to water-resource work, 
but that work has become one of the United 
States' most important internal development ef- 
forts, costing about a billion dollars a year. 

As you know, units from the armed forces of a 
number of American states, notably, Peru, Bolivia, 
Brazil, and Chile, have been engaged in civic ac- 
tion as a matter of standard practice over the 
years. In Peru and Bolivia this country, through 
its military assistance program, has supported 


engineer construction units. We are now actively 
planning the expansion of this program in other 
countries of the hemisphere. 

Joint U.S.-Ecuadorean Projects 

I would like to call attention to the joint United 
States-Ecuador military civic action program 
which started this summer. It is now well into 
its first phase with the inauguration of two proj- 
ects : the construction of a 20-mile irrigation canal 
from the Caluguro River to the community of 
Santa Rosa, and the repair and construction of 
Alamor. Other projects scheduled for initiation 
this year include facilities for the provision of 
potable water in Guayaquil and Salinas, con- 
struction of a road and airpoi't at Esmeraldas, re- 
furbishing of the cultural center at Giron, and a 
number of road repair and building projects. 
We also look to the program to improve public 
health and education facilities. 

This joint operation of self-help involves the 
stationing of 27 U.S. Army persomiel in Ecuador 
With their technical assistance, Ecuadorean Army 
units are directing the efforts of about 10,000 civil- 
ian laborers who are volunteering their services 
I think Secretary of Defense [Robert S.] Mc- 
Namara expressed all of our thoughts aptly wher 
he said that the real long-term security of this 
hemisphere "depends on economic growth fai 
more than upon the use of military forces. Thiii 
is exactly what the Alliance for Progres" 

I need not emphasize the very substantial po 
litical advantages to be realized by a wholeheartec 
expansion in the Military Civic Action Program 
I would suggest that the full range of activitie 
possible under joint civic action programs lie. mad' 
a main field of .study by the Inter-American De 
fense College. 

The ultimate solution to the problems that fac 
us today will be the achievement of political, eco 
nomic, and social stability under democratic instij 
tut ions. All elements of society have a role i: 
this solution, the militarv forces most important! f!' 




of Wi 







I feel 

so. It is toward this end that we all must worl- 
With a deep sense of the historic significanc 
of this occasion and with utmost confidence i 
what it represents for the future, on behalf of th 
United States of America I turn over these facil 
ties to the Inter- American Defense Board for uj 
by its Inter-American Defense College. 

Department of State Bulleti 



A Bridge for the Americas 

hy Under Secretary Ball ^ 

No one of us here this morning can be unaware 
that this indeed is the center of the New World. 
This is the point of conjunction — that dot on the 
■i ^ earth's surface that marks the crossing of the paths 
from one great ocean to another and from one vast 
continent to another. This is the center of the 
New World — by the logic of geograpliy, the prece- 
dent of history, the mandate of economic progress. 
' '" Today we are dedicating a bridge, this massive 
7et graceful span of gleaming metal that now 
eaps from hemisphere to hemisphere. This 
bridge makes Panama more than ever a cross- 
roads, and like so many other of the world's cross- 
roads — like Istanbid, like Suez, like Berlin — this 
''" ionfiuence of world geogi'aphy is also a confluence 
" jf world history : a relay post where destiny 
hanges horses. 

Even before Europeans crossed the sea, this 
sthmus was itself serving as a cultural bridge. 
Dver it passed the men who brought the first re- 
lorded civilization to South America — the men 
' '"*' vho in time came to populate the great southern 
'-'"" ;ontinent from one end to the other. Columbus, 
""' (vhose adventurous spirit we honor on this Dia de 
a Kaza, sailed along these shores and lingered for 
I week in Chiriqui lagoon. Balboa crossed this 
stlunus in 1513, and from the famous "peak in 
Darien" first saw the Pacific. Pizarro, a decade 
ater, launched from Panama that incredible feat 
)f arms — the conquest of Peru. Two famous buc- 
janeers — Francis Drake in the IGth century and 
lenry Morgan in the I7th century — made their 
'ortunes on this coast. The inspired liberator- 
Bolivar — called the first pan-American 
*' lonference here, in 1826. In 1855 the isthmus was 



ji to 


t won ■ 

ife»»! 3imon 

e fifil * Address made at a ceremony dedicating the Thatcher 
foilli Terry Bridge at Balboa Heights, Panama Canal Zone, on 
)ct. 12 (press release 617 dated Oct. 11). 

Jcfober 29, 1962 

the site of the first transcontinental railroad. 
And the modern age opened in 1914 — not only in 
Europe with the war but here with the completion 
of the Panama Canal. 

Expansion of World Commerce 

Strife, violence, and bloodshed marked many 
of the historic encounters that took place in the 
past along these shores. But today, in the free 
world at least, a new spirit informs our actions. 
It is a spirit of partnership, a spirit of community. 
It rests on the faith that different men of different 
creeds and different tongues and different customs 
can best advance their fortunes not by fighting 
one another but by working together. Far more 
than many of us yet realize, that spirit of coopera- 
tion is rising and asserting itself all across the 
free world. 

That spirit is evident in the new sense of unity 
that is pervading Europe and that is bringing into 
being the great European Common INIarket. It 
is evident as well in the growing Atlantic partner- 
ship between the United States and the nations 
of Europe. And what should be made clear be- 
yond question here today is that the Atlantic part- 
iiership will never be inward-looking or selfish in 
motivation. It will be, rather, an open partner- 
ship — a combining of resources that can provide 
a vast market for producers everywhere, as well 
as a new element of strength against the enemies 
of freedom. 

That partnership can — indeed it will — serve not 
only the interests of my country but also of Latin 
America. Yesterday in Washington I watched 
when President Kennedy signed the legislation 
that brought into being the new Trade Expansion 
Act.= That act is not a measure merely to serve 

' See p. 655. 



the interests of United States producers. It takes 
special note of the stake and concern of the nations 
of Latin America in their trade with the United 
States and with the countries of the new united 
Europe. "Witli the broad powers provided by that 
act, we sliould, working closely with the govern- 
ments of Latin America, be able to bring about a 
very substantial expansion of the commerce of 
the world — for the benefit of all of us. 

Alliance for Progress 

The new era in international cooperation is 
being given concrete meaning in the Western 
Hemisphere as well as in Atlantic relations. We 
have moved beyond the policy of good neighbor- 
liness to the policy of common endeavor. This 
new policy finds a noble expression in the Aliansa 
para el Progreso — the Alliance for Progress. 
Through this program of vast conception, capital 
and skills are being shared so that each of the 
free nations of this hemisphere can help itself 
along the road to progress and so that each can 
achieve those economic and social advances that so 
often — in so many areas — are the essential condi- 
tions to that progress. 

The new era is evident also in the two Common 
Markets, now getting under way in Central and 
in South America, which can do so much to widen 
the economic opportunities and enrich the people 
of our hemisphere. 

Economic Problems of Latin America 

The economic problems that you face here — 
the economic problems that confront the whole of 
Latin America — are admittedly not easy to over- 
come. But neither are they beyond the wit or 
will of those of us who live in the Western Hemi- 
sphere, provided we work with a common purpose 
and a common dedication. We have learned a 
great deal in the past few years about the process 
of economic development. And what has emerged 
as the overriding element is the indispensable need 
for a di-iving determination on the part of the 
developing nations to help themselves. 

I can say to j'ou today with all sincerity that 
there is no nation in Latin America, provided it 
possesses that driving determination, that cannot 
make solid and steady progress toward a higher 
standard of living. The Government and the 
people of the United States are determined to ap- 


ply all of the resources they can make available 
in a massive combined undertaking with the peo- 
ples of Latin America to assist them in this task 
so clearly in keeping with our common ideals. 

We have shown our willingness to work together 
in this hemisphere on many occasions. We shall 
continue to seek new opportunities for lending a 
willing hand to all of the nations of the Western 
Hemisphere that are fully dedicated to the earnest 
pursuit of economic development. 

We are making solid progress. 

At this very time the Inter- American Economic 
and Social Council is in session in Mexico City. 
The representatives of my Government are meet- 
ing with the representatives of Panama and the 
other Latin American states in an effort to develop 
new and more effective means for hemispheric 

In Washington the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank is completing its second year of opera- 
tion. It has now made loans to all of its Latin 
American members and is looking forward to an 
even more active program for next year. 

And during the past few months we have turned' 
our attention toward the solution of another prob- 
lem that has retarded the economic developmenli 
of Latin America. INTore and more it has become 
evident that rapid cyclical fluctuations in com- 
modity prices can frustrate the most earnest effort; 
toward the development of nations that are deter 
mined to build their economies. Two weeks ag< 
we took a long stride toward the beginning of i 
solution of this problem when the United States 
Brazil, Costa Eica, and other countries of Latii 
America signed a broad new agreement looking 
toward the stabilization of coffee prices in th 
world market.' 

Defense Through Common Action 

But just as man cannot live by bread alone, a 
societies cannot grow and flourish merely by im iistee 

proving their economic well-being. The first dut; 
of any state is to look out for the security of it 
citizens. Security does not depend just on tin 
accumulation of guns and tanks and airplanes. I 







it is I 


ol fri( 


means the achievement of political stability a liose 
home; it requires the courage and reliance tha 
can come only from a people animated by an inne 
sense of freedom ; but in the fuial analysis it raus 

' See I). (!67. 

Department of Stale Bullet' 




be based on the unshakable determination of like- 
minded nations to assure their own defense 
through common action. 

Just last week the foreign ministers of the 
American Republics renewed their historic pledge 
that the Western Hemisphere will never tolerate 
intrusion or invasion of foreign despots into the 
life and affairs of this hemisphere.^ 

This meeting recognized that the Sino-Soviet 
intervention in Cuba, designed to convert that 
island into an armed base for Communist pene- 
tration of the hemisphere, is a problem for all free 
nations of Latin America. The ministers also 
agreed upon measures to counter this threat — co- 
(jj operative measures to render Cuba ineffective as 
jU a beachhead for Communist penetration of their 

The action which we American states have taken 
in common to guard against the intrusion of ag- 
ijjgressive Communist power into this hemisphere — 
jtii an intrusion made possible only by the weakness 
md connivance of the Castro government — does 
not in any sense detract from the friendship, in- 
deed the affection, that we all feel for the people 
of Cuba. Nor does it diminish the hope which we 
all devoutly share that, purged of the cancer of 
Castroism, Cuba may return before too long to 
the community of free American states. 

Spirit of Common Endeavor 

The new spirit that is rising in the Western 

Hemisphere is not based on dogma and tyranny ; 

it is not founded on the importation of a secular 

;:itii 3reed foreign to the Christian tradition that our 

ikin| nations hold in connmon. It is, instead, the cre- 

ik itive spirit of common endeavor — the spirit of 

Dartnership and commimity. This spirit is mag- 

lificently symbolized by this triumphant span that 

links the Americas. 

For a bridge, after all, is an eloquent statement 
m steel and concrete of the spirit and the essence 
it )f friendship. Men afraid or ashamed, govern- 
nents that lack confidence in the people or that 
io not dare to submit their dogmatic and oppres- 
sive doctrines to the free competition of ideas — 
those men, those governments, build walls, not 
Dridges — walls that make a prison as in East Ber- 
lin today. But men who are free, governments 
that love freedom — those men, those governments. 

"BtiLLETiN of Oct. 22, 1962, p. 598. 
Ocfofaer 29, J 962 

build bridges, not to keep people locked up but to 
enable them to move freely, to make an avenue 
for commerce and culture, a pathway for friend- 
ship. Across bi-idges men learn to know each 

There is a foretaste here of the future. The 
full understanding between the northern and 
southern parts of our Western Hemisphere will in- 
crease in direct ratio with the increased mobility 
of the people — a mobility that will follow adequate 
.systems of roads and bridges. This increase in 
mobility, this ease of movement from one Ameri- 
can state to another, will bring with it a gi-eat 
cross-fertilization of ideas and an enrichment of 
the culture of each of our lands. 

We can see tliis bridge today, therefore, as a 
new and brilliant step toward the fulfillment of 
that old dream now near reality — the Pan Amer- 
ican Highway system. Wlien the road has been 
opened from north to south, when men can go 
freely overland from Canada to Patagonia, we 
shall be on our way toward a new dimension in 
hemispheric consolidation. The great bridge we 
are opening today, truly a bridge of tlie Americas, 
completes the last lap of the Inter-American 
Highway running from the United States to 
Panama. Lying ahead of us is still the untracked 
and formidable wilderness of Darien. But we 
may be confident that this last gap will be filled in 
our lifetime ; this last barrier of jungle and wilder- 
ness will be conquered by the travelers and the 
tourists from North and South America. 

It is with pride and pleasure that I report to 
you today that another step forward has just 
been taken toward the completion of tliis great 
task. Within this past fortnight, on the 27th of 
September, a contract was signed that will make 
possible a prompt and comprehensive engineering 
survey of the Darien area. This survey will be 
financed by a special $3 million fund of the Or- 
ganization of American States, to which my coun- 
try has subscribed $2 million. Tliis survey will 
be initiated in the next dry season; it should be 
completed in the next 30 months. The Pan Amer- 
ican Highway system moves ever closer to reality. 

Cooperation Between U.S. and Panama 

I have said that this is truly a bridge of the 
Americas. It adds a new bond to the enduring 
partnership between our sister Eepublics. That 


partnership finds unique expression in treaty re- 
lations and in the Panama Canal. 

The canal, as I need hardlj' tell you, is vilal 
to the security of the whole free world. It has 
special mpaninj; for the Westeni Hemisphere for 
it can-ies the commerce of all the American states. 
It has an even more direct value to Panama. It 
has made this country a transportation hub. It 
brintrs more than $70 million of income annually 
to the people of this great country. It provides 
jobs directly for 15,000 Panamanians and indi- 
rectly for many more. 

Like the canal, this bridge will also serve the 
free world, tlie Western Hemisphere — and espe- 
cially Panama. Like the canal, it was built by 
United States funds. As a means of through 
transit it can be a boon for all the American states. 
And because it unites the two parts of this country 
once bisected by the canal, and affords easy access 
to Panama City and the Chiriqui region, it can be 
of special benefit for agriculture and land develop- 
ment throughout Panama. Precisely because the 
canal and the bridge are so similar in origin and 
purpose, it seems especially fitting that we have 
with us today a man who has made a major con- 
tribution to the building of both the bridge and 
the canal — Maurice Hudson Thatcher. 

The bridge, of course, will not be the end of 
special cooperation between the United States and 
Panama. Ours is an active partnership. It was 
underlined in the visit of President Chiari to 
Washington last June.^ It is further reflected in 
the present discussion being conducted here be- 
tween representatives of President Chiari and 
President Kennedy. Arrangements have been 
made for flying the flag of Panama together with 
that of the United States at various sites in the 
Canal Zone. Foreign consuls who hold exequaturs 
issued by the Government of Panama will bo au- 
thorized by the United States Government, in 
accordance with agreed procedures, to perform 
their functions in tlie Canal Zone. And I look 
forward to successful conclusions of the negotia- 
tions regarding the use of Panamanian postage in 
the Canal Zone post office. For these, too, are links 
in the partnership. 

'■ Ibid., July 9, 19C2, p. 81. 


Joining of North and South 

It is said tliat wlien Columbus first reached these 
sliores an Indian sought to explain to liim in sign 
language where he was and what Panama was. 
Stretching his arms forward, he drew a great circle 
in the air. Twice he did this, then laid his index 
fingers side by side between the two circles. He 
was telling Columbus, the legend says, that Pan- 
ama is an isthmus (the joined fingers) between two 
oceans (the great circles). But I think the sign 
language can also be read to mean something else — 
the great circles are the northern and southern 
halves of our great hemisphere, and the connection 
between them is here at this bridge, this "bridge of 
the Americas." 

U.S. Welcomes ICC Investigations 
of Troop Withdrawals From Laos 

Statement hy Lincoln White 


Director, Office of News ^ 






In the absence of certification by the Interna- 
tional Control Commission of the departure of any 
substantial niunbers of Viet iMinli military forces 
known to have been in Laos, we can presume that 
there continue to be numbers of Viet Minh ir 
Laos. In this connection you will recall that or wi 
October 7 Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma re ti 
ferred to stragglers who had not left. In any cast v^ 
the International Control Commission is chargec 
witli the responsibility of investigating violations 

The United States can and will make availabk 
to the International Control Commission and thtjjjj 
Lao Government what evidence it has of suspectec 
violations. The International Control Commis 
sion will also have other sources of infomiatioi 
about Viet Minh violations. 

Tlie United States will welcome such investiga 
tions and considers it essential that the Interna 
tional Control Commission be unhampered in thi 
conduct of its duties if the Geneva agreements 
are to be meaningful and observed. 






' Made to news corresponilents on Oct. 10. 
" For texts of the Declaration on the Neutrality of Lao 
and ITotocol, see Bulletin of Aug. 13, 1002. p. 259. 

Department of Sfafe Bu//efii 





he U.S.S.R. in World Affairs 

hy George A. Morgan 

Director of the Foreign Service Institute'^ 


ion My subject is one on which straight thinking is 
upremely impoii:ant: the Soviet Union. Now 
asily the world's second greatest scientific, indus- 
rial, and military state, the U.S.S.R. is also con- 
lected, through its Communist niling class, with 
I!ommunist parties, agents, and front organi- 
ations throughout the world, the majority of 
hich still accept Soviet leadership. No other 
ountry equals its power to affect the destiny of our 
wn land, for good or ill. 
Therefore no aspect of today's world places 
raver questions before a teacher's conscience, 
low can our boys and girls be led to think 
traightly and ti-uly about this vast phenomenon, 
n some ways so spectacular, m others so ominous ? 
t is our creative responsibility as teachers to 
nswer that question in relation to each class and 
ach individual pupil. All I can do here is 

fiS uggest some lines of thought wliicli may be 

»« lelpful. 

My general theme is the pei-vasive duality of 
oviet existence. Soviet aims, Soviet activities, 
Imost always have at least a double aspect. 
)f course the same might be said of all things 
luman, as we proverbially acknowledge two 
ides to every question. But the trait of duality 
Soviet in peculiar ways and to an unusual 
egree. For this reason I propose tc use it as 
handy thread to guide us on our tour of 
The U.S.S.R. in World Affairs." 

lixture of Nationalism and Communism 

First of all, the Soviet Union has a twofold 
Wi>ast, which deeply shapes its twofold present, 
t sprang from a combination of Russian im- 

alJf 5, 



^ Address made before a meeting of District of Co- 
ambia teachers of social studies at Washington, D.C., on 
)ct. 4 (press release 600). 

||eliij)cfober 29, 7962 

661906 — 62 3 

perialism, rooted in the age-long yearnings and 
expansive proclivities of the great Russian peo- 
ple, with revolutionary Marxism, embodied in 
Lenin and the Bolshevik party he led. Stalin 
continued this tradition. His policies greatly 
resembled and exploited Russian nationalist senti- 
ments — first in his drive for "socialism in one 
country," later in his accent on Soviet might 
as "the base of world revolution." Today this 
"Soviet first" line is continued, with variations, 
by Klirushchev — at the cost of considerable grief 
with his Chinese partners in communism. 

But it would be naive mdeed merely to stress 
the nationalist, the Russian, side of Soviet im- 
perialism, as some writers do. There is em- 
phatically also a Commimist side. Stalin built 
his home base, but he used it to spread Com- 
mimist inile with grim success. Khrushchev puts 
Soviet economic growth first, but he explains 
how he will use it to bui-y the free world and 
its way of life. And the blood that ran in 
Budapest proves he means business. 

Wlio knows where this historic pairing of 
nationalism and communism will lead in the 
future? Some see hope in the thought that the 
nationalist strain will gradually prevail over 
the Communist one. But the two greatest wars 
of history — World Wars I and II — were incited 
by nationalist, not Communist, imperialisms. And 
the Russian nation was the terror of its neigh- 
bors for centuries. I was once wryly amused, 
but imjiressed, when a diplomat from a country 
bordering on the U.S.S.R. solemnly assured me 
that Russians are worse than Communists. So 
while we may indeed hope and pray for a flow- 
ering of the great gifts that lie in the Russian peo- 
ple, that flowering will depend less on whether 
Russian nationalism prevails over communism 
than on the extent to which the nationalism is 


While speaking of national character, I might 
add that Russian human nature abounds in con- 
trasts which illustrate my theme of pervasive 
duality. For example, Russians are among the 
most warmhearted and hospitable people in the 
world. I remember when I first came to the Soviet 
Union in 1948 to serve in our embassy in Moscow. 
That was near the height of Stalin's repressive 
anti-Westernism. The Berlin blockade was on. I 
had been warned that it was unsafe even to engage 
a Russian in conversation, except on obvious busi- 
ness, lest the secret police hold it against him. But 
even though we could not speak like human be- 
ings, I could feel the warmth and friendliness of 
the common people I passed on the street like a 
gentle radiation through the pores of my skin. 

On the other hand, I have never experienced 
human coldness like that of the hard-core Russian 
Communist when he is acting his role. It is like 
a mask of granite. Aboard ship while traveling 
to the U.S.S.R. — again in 1948 — I exchanged ci- 
vilities with a Soviet diplomat and danced a few 
times with his wife. The ice seemed to melt a 
little, and my fellow passengers cheered me on, 
as if to ease the tension over Berlin. But when 
we disembarked the diplomat and his family were 
met by a group of plug-uglies who were obviously 
Soviet secret police types, there to smell immedi- 
ately any infection by "bourgeois capitalism" 
these Russians might have picked up while abroad. 
As I smiled and tipped my hat to them in passing, 
I saw just a flicker of recognition; then instantly 
the granite mask froze on their faces. I have 
seldom seen the Iron Curtain so vividly descend. 

Doctrinaire and Opportunist 

Related to the mixture of communism and na- 
tionalism in the Soviet makeup is the often-de- 
bated question whether ideology or opportunistic 
power seeking governs Soviet policy. My answer 
is that both do. Here is another form of pervasive 
duality. The protagonists in this argument tri- 
umphantly refute each other by citing half of the 
evidence, but when one looks at both halves one 
sees that, by Americaoi standards, Soviets are 
at once amazingly doctrinaire and amazingly 

Was it opportunism when Lenin forced the 
split between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, thus 
reducing party strength by nearly half? When 
Stalin put through collectivization of Soviet 


agriculture at the cost of untold human anc 
material loss? "\Anien Khrushchev launched hi; 
massive program of aid and other blandisliment: 
to woo the excolonial countries at the expense o: 
a better life for his own people and allies? 

On the other hand was it Communist theory 
that told Lenin to call a halt to communizinj 
Russia with his new economic policy in 1921 
Told Stalin to make a deal with Hitler? Tolc 
Ivlirushchev to seek summit meetings with Presi 
dent Eisenhower? 

Clearly, then, Soviet policy is a mixture of botl 
elements. Moreover, the mixture varies unpredict 
ably. A Polish Communist leader once remarkec 
to a Westerner that you never know which side o 
the Russians is going to turn up ; today it is smiles 
tomorrow frowns, and you have to begin each da; 
by inferring from their attitude which it is gc 
ing to be. So with most Soviet contrasts, includ 
ing doctrinairism and opportunism. Yet it woul 
be a mistake to think of these alternations in blac' 
and white terms, like Dr. Jelsyll and Mr. Hyd( 
The two are almost always mingled. The answei 
as usual, is not "either or" but "both," as a detaile^ 
analysis of the illustrations I have just cite 
would show. 

Akin to the one-sided ideological thesis I hav P"f 
been discussing is a group of views which migh 
be called cases of idealizing the enemy. The 
express a curious love-hate complex that is in 
portant for you as teachers to recognize in order t 
help your pupils deal with it in themselves. It i 
natural for all Americans who recognize tb 
urgency of the dangers posed for us by Commv 
nist imperialism to fret at the inadequacy, slow 
ness, and clumsiness which have often charactei 
ized free- world responses. From this it is natun 
to proceed to dramatize the skill and effectivenes kdi 
of Communists in order to spur free-world actioi nm? 

But when this impulse dominates people m 
thinking without being balanced by other pert I get 
nent considerations, it blows up Soviet prowe; flat 
into popular myths, such as the idea that tl 
Soviets have a "blueprint" for world conques|ies 
Now the facts as best we can get at them are thf 
the Soviets do have a lot of gobbledygook draw 
from the sacred scriptures of Leninism, which the 
claim to be a "scientific" doctrine and a "mastei|»liai 
strategy. But when the residue of real meanin 
is distilled from this verbiage, it only amounts 1 
a few generalities, some clearly erroneous and a 

Department of State Bullet, 



D I 

nit I 


id I 










■apidly fading away into empirical detail when 
lii )ne gets down to cases. 

The same comment to some extent applies to the 
)ody of tactical and operational tecluiiques that 
re said to be elaborated in imposing array, ac- 
(uired by years of study, and then used by Soviet 
perators to outsmart both diplomatic and "ugly" 
'![ Americans in the field. Soviet failures in Africa 
jjI a recent years, however, considerably deflate 
hese pretentions. 
Please do not misunderstand me. I am not say- 
)tl ng these views about Soviet strategy and tech- 
iques are all wrong. Here, as always, my thesis 
3 that both sides of a contrast liave some validity 
ut need balancing. I myself have spent labori- 
ng us hours decoding Soviet doctrine and once pub- 
ished an article which made an international 
nsation because it was considered to have ad- 
anced our insight into these matters. The So- 
iets do have an outline of strategy — as we do. It 
5 important to grasp that outline in order to deal 
itelligently with Soviet beliavior. Likewise the 
oviets do have gi-eat skill in many kinds of ac- 
vity. They seek to develop those skills further 
nd teach tliem. We do, too, however — at the 
oreign Service Institute among other places — 
.,^ iiough witli the methods of freedom rather than 
f coercive and pedantic indoctrination. The In- 
titute has a lot more to achieve along these lines 
nd is striving day and night to do its work better. 
j(, >ut we do ourselves and our cause no service by 
Ijjnagining that our opponents are 10 feet tall or 
ave a magic formula for success. 

oviet Strategy of Blandishment and Coercion 

One of the most striking characteristics of So- 

iiriiet strategy and tactics is their combination of 

jes landishment and coercion, and this is another item 

•ijsn 1 my list of pervasive dualities. Persuasion and 

ressure are of course universally human means 

f getting other people to act in desired ways. 

,jg Tliat is peculiarly Soviet is the extreme manner in 

tl) 'hich these opposite methods are combined, some- 

•s mes simultaneously, sometimes in succession, and 

ften with a brazenness which, while impressing 

J- Dme people, tends to be self-defeating with others. 

If you ask why the Soviets behave so strangely, 

erhaps part of the answer can be found in Marx- 

it ideology, which, with a perversity inherited 

rom Hegel, makes contradiction the mainspring 

f progress. Another part doubtless derives from 

>cfober 29, 1962 

the paradoxes writers like Dostoevsky have 
plumbed m the depths of the Eussian soul. 

In any case the trait exists. You see it in So- 
viet diplomats who propose toasts to friendship 
while the inhuman wall divides Berlin. You see 
it in the bland expansion of cultural exchanges 
while Cuba is armed in order to try to throw us 
off balance and make trouble with smaller neigh- 
bors. You see it also in abrupt changes of tactics. 
Brezlmev, the Soviet chief of state, recently paid 
what purported to be a goodwill visit to Yugo- 
slavia. He arrived all smiles and sweetness, but 
suddenly in the middle of his visit he made a pub- 
lic speech that made him sound like a Chinese 
Communist, to whom Yugoslav policies are 

Who knows why or what the Soviets think they 
stand to gain by such tactics? Usually we can 
only speculate about the answer. In general, how- 
ever, the nature of Soviet discipline is apt to be 
highly relevant. The Communist Party since 
Lenin has always been a tightly controlled hier- 
archical organization run on quasi-military lines. 
Orders — the "party line" — como down from the 
top and allow little flexibility for the poor party 
worker, who has to obey them in the spot where 
he happens to be. But if he is a good Communist 
he grimly does his duty, no matter how much 
damage it does to his own operation. 

Bizarre combinations of blandishment and co- 
ercion are so habitual with the Soviets that one 
sometimes wonders how much is conscious decep- 
tion, how much merely taken for gi-anted because 
it comes naturally. At any rate the Soviets clear- 
ly believe they can work both sides of any street 
and get away with it. Fortunately, more and 
more people around the world are getting wise to 
the trick, which loses much of its power once rec- 

What "Peaceful Coexistence" Means to Khrushchev 

The subject of blandislmient leads me to a 
change in Soviet doctrine and strategy induced by 
Khrushchev. He has given the old slogan of 
"peaceful coexistence" special prominence and one 
important difference in actual meaning. Under 
Stalin, wars involving "capitalist" states were 
considered the main facilitators of Communist 
revolutionary advances. Stalin's writings show 
that he had been lying in wait for years to do sub- 
stantially what he did do during and after World 


War II to expand Communist sway. Tlius, for 
Stalin, "peaceful coexistence" was merely a tem- 
porary tactic between wars. He himself so de- 
scribed it in his published writings. 

By the time Khiiishchev came to power it was 
clear that major war, with its colossal nuclear 
destructiveness, would be ruinously costly for all 
concerned. It had also become evident, even dur- 
ing Stalin's last years, that the Soviet leaders felt 
their economic and militai-y power to have grown 
so great that they could I'ely on various means 
short of major war to complete Communist ex- 
pansion around the globe. So Khrushchev has 
made "peaceful coexistence'' a long-tei-m, rather 
than a temporary', policy — to the indignation of 
the Chinese Reds, who are still Stalinists. Here 
are Khrushchev's own words (to understand 
them you must remember that "imperialism" is 
his name for the community of free democracies 
to which we belong) : ^ 

It is generally known that both World War I and World 
War II exerted enormous influence on the emergence and 
deepening of the general crisis of capitalism. Does it 
follow from this that a world war is a necessary condi- 
tion for a further intensification of the general crisis of 
capitalism? Such a conclusion would be profoundly in- 
correct. . . . 

Now there is more than one worker-peasant state in the 
world, there is an entire system of socialist states. Our 
duty to history is to insure peace and peaceful develop- 
ment of this great offspring of the international working 
class. . . . The victory of socialism throughout the world 
... is now near. For this victory, wars among states 
are not necessary. 

. . . the policy of peaceful coexistence ... is a form of 
intense economic, political, and ideological struggle of the 
proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in 
the international arena. 

Wliile opposing "wars between states," however, 
Ivlirushchev goes on to approve what he calls 
"wars of liberation" and "national uprisings," 
citing Cuba and Viet-Nam as examples: "The 
Communists fully support sucli just wars and 
march in the front rank with the peoples waging 
liberation struggles." In short, "peaceful coexist- 
ence" emphatically includes aiding and abetting 
any case of insurgency or civil war that can be 
turned to Communist ends. 

Tliis brings me to anotlier pervasive Soviet 
duality : "doublespeak," to borrow an ingenious 
term from George Orwell's lOSJf. "Peaceful co- 
existence" means one thing to ordinary' people. 

' All quotations are taken from an address by Premier 
Khrushchev on Jan. 6, lOCl. 


including, by the way, ordinary Russians. But itj 
is a word of art in the Soviet lexicon. As theito 
quotation I have just read says, it means, "Pre- 1 tb 
vent nuclear war while we bury the free world with 
everything else." 

The duplicity of Soviet speech shows up in 
other ways. For example, there is the contrast be- 
tween Soviet diplomatic statements and associated 
publicity, on the one hand, and the way they talk 
to party audiences on the other. They live a^ 
sort of double life in this respect and are as 
indignant as any Victorian prude if one tactlessly 
points out their inconsistencies. This habit ofl 
talking on two different planes will be hard to ex- 
plain to your students, but it is important for 
them to realize. When you read Soviet quotations 
in the press, one of the first things you have to 
consider is, to which audience are they speaking; 
and for what purpose ? 


"Legal" and "Illegal" Communist Activities 

INIodes of speech of course correspond to modes 
of action. Just as a Soviet bureaucrat claims thals 
it is none of our business to discuss with him whal 
Communist parties are up to, so the Conmimiisl 
Party has always carefully distinguished be- 
tween "legal" and "illegal" work. Here we hav( 
another pervasive double aspect of Soviet be 
havior, one of the deepest. The whole sphere ol 
illegal activity, including the many forms of sub 
version, insurgency, and civil war by proxy, are S( 
foreign to modern Western standards that some 
people get almost hypnotized by them, as if thej 
were the sole secret of Soviet successes. 

The real novelty in Soviet behavior, however, i; 
the striking combination of legal and illegal activ 
ities. If they stuck to the latter they wouk 
obviously not get far in many countries, excep 
where they can infiltrate over borders or capture i 
revolution as in Cuba. Mostly they have to usi 
tiie "respectable" methods of aid, trade, and ex 
changes to gain entry and influence — hoping, m 
doubt, for other things later. One of Khru; 
.shchev's innovations has been to do this on a bij 

In no sphere are Soviet subversive activity an* Idp. 
doubletalk more cj-nical than in their exploitai 
tion of racial frictions, a subject acuteh' on ou 
own consciences in these unhappy days. In an 
country, including ours, where race problems exis 
Commmiists seek to magnify resentments i-athe 






Department of Slate Bulleth 




than help resolve the problems that cause them; 
to distort, exaggerate, and even provoke incidents 
that add fuel to the flames; and in general to do 
eveiytliing in their power to make matters worse 
in order to channel the resulting bitterness in ex- 
plosive revolutionary directions which they seek 
to control for Communist ends. 

It is a tribute to the wisdom and patriotism of 
our colored fellow citizens that the Commmaists 
have made few gains by these means in our coun- 
try. But Communists do use biased accounts of 
our troubles to poison opinion against us abroad, 
not only in Africa but wherever racial sensitivi- 
ties can be exploited. Few things are more im- 
portant for our foreign relations today than to 
show the world that we can solve the problem of 
just and harmonious race relations by democratic 
American methods. It will be instructive for your 
students in this conjiection to study the contrast 
between American civil rights and the cruelly 
repressive treatment which national minorities 
in the U.S.S.R. have from time to time received. 
The complaints about discrimination made by 
African and other nonwhite students in Soviet 
oniversities are also revealing. 

Returning to the "legal" aspect of Soviet con- 
duct, I might mention that it is just because the 
Russians do take this aspect seriously, and some- 
times practice it dependably in their way, that 
negotiation has an important place in our dealings 
with them and agreements are worth making lui- 
der certain circumstances despite the long record 
of broken ones. It takes a high degree of pro- 
fessional sophistication to know when a particu- 
lar agreement is likely to hold and for how long. 
That is one of many cases where the somid train- 
ing and experience of our diplomats come in 
handy. But, to balance the contrast once more, 
we must never forget that the Soviets also use 
negotiation as a means of propaganda and political 
warfare — often entirely so. 

In our brief look at the U.S.S.R. this afternoon 
I have by no means considered all the pervasive 
dualities of Soviet life, nor is this by any means 
the only theme around which a complete picture 
could and should be drawn. But I hope it will 
help your pupils to acquire balanced and penetrat- 
ing perspectives if they learn to bear in mind that, 
in varying mixtures, Soviet behavior in world af- 
fairs expresses both Commimist and Russian na- 
tionalist traditions, can be both doctrinaire and op- 
portunist, habitually uses both blandishment and 

coercion, speaks a peculiar language which means 
one thing to ordinary people and something quite 
different to Communists, combines legal and il- 
legal action, and espouses coexistence which is 
peaceful to the extent of shunning direct war but 
foments subversive aggression wherever the situa- 
tion is judged ripe. 

The picture I have just summarized is in effect a 
diagnosis of the cold war. As Secretary Rusk 
has stated,^ "The cold war is the direct expression 
of the announced determination of the Sino-Soviet 
bloc to extend their 'historically inevitable' world 
revolution by every available means." He goes on 
to add that "the cold war will end when those who 
declared it decide to abandon it." Our aim in win- 
ning the cold war is to lead them to that decision. 

How long this will take no one can tell. But as 
President Kennedy said last year,* "Only the 
strong, only the industrious, only the determined, 
only the courageous, only the visionary who deter- 
mine the real nature of our struggle can possibly 
survive." I wish you inspiration and success in 
preparing our boys and girls for their share in our 
common task. 

U.S. Protests Soviet Violation 
of Attache's Diplomatic Rights 

Following is the text of a note delivered on 
October 10 hy the U.S. Embassy at Moscow to the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding 
Soviet detention of Comdr. Raymond D. Smith, 
assistant naval attache of the Enibassy. 

Press release 611 dated October 10 

The Embassy of the United States of America 
refers to the oral statement of October 5, 1962, of 
the head of the United States Section of the Min- 
istry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics regarding the apprehension 
and detention at Leningrad on October 2, 1962, of 
Commander Raymond D. Smith, USN, Assistant 
Naval Attache of the Embassy. 

The Embassy categorically rejects all allegations 
of improper or inaispropriate behavior on the part 
of Commander Smith and specifically that he was 
engaged m espionage. 

The Embassy vigorously protests the manifold 

» Bulletin of Sept. 25, 1961, p. 507. 
^lUd., May 8, 1961, p. 659. 

Ocfofaer 29, 1962 


violations by Soviet antliorities of the rights and 
immunities appertaining to Conxmander Smith as 
a duly accredited diplomatic officer of the 

After having been physically assaulted and 
forcibly deprived of items of personal property by 
allegedly non-official Soviet citizens, Commander 
Smith was detained by two militia officers for 
four and one-half hours. During this period of 
illegal detention he was refused permission to com- 
municate with the Embassy and was subjected to 
threats of violence. 

Commander Smith repeatedly drew the atten- 
tion of the militia officers to his diplomatic status, 
presenting liis diplomatic card, issued by the Min- 
istry of Foreign Affairs, in corroboration thereof. 
It is noteworthy that this document cites, inter 
alia, article 2, pai'agraph (A) of tlie "Statute Re- 
garding Diplomatic and Consular Representations 
of Foreign Governments on the Territory of the 
U.S.S.R. of January 14, 1927", which states: "Dip- 
lomatic representatives enjoy personal immunity 
by virtue of which they may not be subjected to 
judicial or administrative arrest or detention". 

It would appear, therefore, that the two militia 
officers in question not only violated the basic 
principles of diplomatic immunity as historically 
and generally recognized in traditional diplomatic 
practice and the relations between states but also 
Soviet law itself. 

The Embassy expects the IMinistry to undertake 
the necessary disciplinary measures with regard 
to the Soviet officials involved in this affair and 
to assure that there will be no recurrence of viola- 
tion of the diplomatic immunities of members of 
the Embassy staff. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

87th Congress, 2d Session 

International Fisheries Conference. Report to accom- 
pany S. Res. 392. S. Rept. 2112. September 20, 1962. 
7 pp. 

Expressing the Determination of the United States With 
Respect to the Situation in Cuba. Report to accompany 
H.J. Res. 886. H. Rept. 2441. September 20, 1962. 2 

Amendment to the Budget — Department of State. Commu- 
nication from the President transmitting an amendment 
to the fiscal year 1963 budget involving an increase of 
$100 million to implement legislation providing for pur- 
chase of U.N. bonds. S. Doc. 133. September 21, 1962. 
2 pp. 

Promoting the Foreign Commerce of the United States 
Through the Use of Mobile Trade Fairs. Report to ac- 
company S. 3389. H. Rept. 2463. September 21, 1962. 
23 pp. 

Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 
1903. Report to accompany H.R. 13175. S. Rept. 2177. 
September 28, 1902. 26 pp. 

Authorization for Diplomatic Radio Stations. Report to 
accompany H.R. 11732. S. Rept. 2225. October 1, 1962. 
11 pp. 

World Food Congress. Report to accompany S. 3679. S. 
Rept. 2203. October 2, 1962. 10 pp. 

Duty-Free Importation of Certain Natural Grasses and 
Other Natural Materials. Report to accompany H.R. 
12109. H. Rept. 2516. October 2, 1902. 3 pp. 

Trade Expansion Act of 1902. Conference report to ac- 
company H.R. 11970. H. Rept. 2518. October 2, 1962. 
13 pp. 

Invitation to the Food and Agriculture Organization To 
Hold a World Pood Congress in the United States in 
1903. Report to accompany H.R. 13307. H. Rept. 2524. 
October 3, 1962. 3 pp. 

Refugee Problem in Hong Kong and Macao. Hearings 
before the Subcommittee To Investigate Problems Con- 
nected With Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Judi- 
ciary Committee. May 29-July 10, 1962. 180 pp. 

Conservation of Tropical Tuna. Hearings before the Sub- 
committee on Inter-American AfCairs of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on S. 2568, a bill to amend the 
Act of September 7, 1960, to extend the regulatory au- 
thority of the Federal and State agencies concerned 
under the terms of the Convention for the Establishment 
of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, signed 
at Washington, May 31, 1949, and for other purposes. 
August 14r-30, 1962. 105 pp. 


Department of Stale Bulletin 


Trade Expansion Act of 1962 Signed 

Following are remarks made hy President 
Kennedy upon signing the Trade Expansion Act 
on October 11, together with a summary of the 
new act, which was prepared in the Office of Inter- 
national Trade and Finance, Department of State. 


White House press release dated October 11 

Today I am signing H.R. 11970, the Trade Ex- 
pansion Act of 1962. 

This is the most important international piece 
of legislation, I think, affecting economics since 
the passage of the Marshall Plan. It marks a 
decisive point for the future of our economy, for 
Dur relations with our friends and allies, and for 
the prospects of free institutions and free societies 

This act recognizes, fully and completely, that 
we cannot protect our economy by stagnating be- 
hind tariff walls but that the best protection pos- 
sible is a mutual lowering of tariff barriers among 
friendly nations so that all may benefit from a free 
Bow of goods. Increased economic activity result- 
ing from increased trade will provide more job 
>pportunities for our workers. Our industry, our 
igriculture, our mining will benefit from increased 
sxport opportunities as other nations agree to 
lower their tariffs. Increased exports and imports 
will benefit our ports, steamship lines, and air 
ines as they handle an increased amount of trade. 
Lowering of our tariffs will provide an increased 
Elow of goods for our American consumers. Our 
industries will be stimulated by increased export 
opportunities and by freer competition with the 
industries of other nations for an even greater 
ffort to develop an efficient, economic, and pro- 
iuctive system. The results can bring a dynamic 
new era of growth. 

By means of agreements authorized by the act, 
we can move forward to partnership with the na- 

Ocfofaer 29, 1962 

tions of the Atlantic community. Together with 
the Common Market, we account for 90 percent 
of the free world's trade in industrial products. 
Together we make up — and I think this is most 
important in this vital period — the greatest aggre- 
gation of economic power in the history of the 
world. We now have the means to make certain 
that we build our strength together and that we 
can maintain this preeminence. 

We shall also use the authority of the act to 
negotiate with our other great trading partners, 
Canada and Japan, and with the coimtries of Latin 
America, Asia, and Africa — and we are particu- 
larly concerned that the countries of Latin Amer- 
ica shall have an opportunity to participate in this 
period of economic growth particularly as it af- 
fects the Common Market as well as our own 
United States. We will use the specific author- 
ities designed to widen markets for the raw mate- 
rials and manufactures of the less developed 
nations whose economic growth is so important 
to us all and to strengthen our efforts to end dis- 
criminatory and preferential arrangements which 
in the long nni can only make everyone poorer 
and the free world less united. 

A vital, expanding economy in the free world is 
a strong coimter to the threat of the world Com- 
munist movement. This act is, therefore, an im- 
portant new weapon to advance the caiise of 

I want to express my strong appreciation to the 
Members of the Congress who were so greatly 
involved in the passage of this bill — Chairman 
[Wilbur D.] Mills and members of the House 
Ways and Means Committee, who reported it to 
the floor, and the members of the House of Repre- 
sentatives, who passed it ; Senator [Han-y Flood] 
Byrd and the members of the Senate Finance 
Committee; Senator [Robert S.] Kerr and others 
who participated in the passage of this legislation ; 
the leadersliip of the House and Senate and all 



those on both sides who made this legislation pos- 
sible; citizens groups, Mr. Petersen [Howard C. 
Petersen, Special Assistant to the President], ]\Ir. 
Gilbert [Carl J. Gilbert, Chairman of the Com- 
mittee for a National Trade Policy], and the labor 
organizations; Mr. George Meany, who is here 
today, who was of great importance to the passage 
of this bill, which, if administered as it must be 
and will be directly from the Wliite House, with 
the cooperation of the Departments of State, Com- 
merce, Agriculture, Labor, can mean so much to 
this country. 


I. Purposes of the Act 

The purposes of the Trade Expansion Act are, through 
trade agreements affording mutual trade benefits, to stim- 
ulate the economic growth of the United States and main- 
tain and enlarge foreign markets for American products, 
to strengthen economic relations with foreign countries 
through the development of open and nondiscriminatory 
trading in the free world, and to prevent Communist eco- 
nomic penetration. 

II. Form of the Act 

The act grants authority to the President which can be 
generally divided into three major subjects : 

(1) the authority to enter into trade agreements; 

(2) the authority to proclaim changes in the tariff 
treatment of articles in order to carry out such trade 
agreements ; and 

(3) the authority to assist indu.stries, firms, and 
workers who may be .seriously injured by reason of in- 
creased imports resulting from trade agreement 

These nipjor subjects may in turn be subdivided in 
terms of limitations, conditions, and safeguards appli- 
cable to the grants of authority. 

III. Authority To Enter Into Trade Agreements 

The act authorizes the President to enter into trade 
agreements with foreign countries or instrumentalities 
thereof during the period from July 1, 1962, through .Tune 
.SO, 1907, whenever he determines that any existing duties 
or other import restrictions of any foreign country or the 
United States are unduly burdening and restricting the 
foreign trade of the United States and that any of the 
purposes of the act will be thereby promoted. 

IV. Authority To Modify Import Restrictions 

The President is authorized, within specified limits and 
pursuant to prescribed procedures, to make changes in 
the import restrictions of the United States which are 


required or appropriate to carry out any trade agreement 
entered into by him under this act. 

A. Basic Authority 

The basic authority in the act permits the President to 
(1) decrease by 50 percent any rate of duty existing on 
.July 1, 1902, or (2) increase by 50 percent any rate of 
duty existing on .Tuly 1, 1934. The basic grant of au- 
thority also permits the modification of existing import 
restrictions other than duties and the imposition of ad- 
ditional import restrictions (e.g. quotas). 

B. Special Authority for Negotiations With the European 
Economic Community 

In a trade agreement with the European Economic 
Community (EEC), the President is authorized to exceed 
the basic 50-percent limitation on the tariff reduction au- 
thority and to reduce tariffs to zero on industrial products 
within categories of which the United States and EEC to- 
gether account for 80 percent or more of aggregated world 
export value in a representative period. Intra-EEC trade 
and Communist bloc trade (internal and external) are 
excluded from global trade data in determining "aggre- 
gated world export value." The basic 50-percent limita- 
tion on tariff reductions may also be exceeded with re- 
spect to agricultural commodities (i.e. commodities 
referred to in U.S. Department of Agriculture Handbook 
No. 143) in a trade agreement with the EEC if, before 
entering into the agreement, the President determines 
that the agreement will tend to assure the maintenance 
or expansion of U.S. exports of the like agricultural 

C. Special Authority for Tropical Agricultural and 
Forestry Commodities 

This authority permits the President to exceed the 50- 
percent limitation on the tariff reduction authority and 
to reduce tariffs to zero on any tropical agricultural or 
forestry commodity (defined as a commodity principally 
produced between the 20° latitude lines), provided the 
commodity is not produced in significant quantities in 
the United States and provided the EEC has made a com- 
mitment on a substantially nondiscriminatory basis with 
respect to import treatment (tariff or other import re- 
strictions) of the commodity, which is likely to assure 
access to the markets of the EEC countries comparable to 
that which the article will have in U.S. niarltets. This au- 
thority applies to unprocessed commodities and those 
commodities which have undergone only such minimum 
processing as is customarily required to prepare them for 
marketing in substantial volume in international trade. 

D. Loio Duty Authority 

This authority permits the President to exceed the .50 
percent limitation on the tariff reduction authority and 
to reduce tariffs to zero on products which are dutiable 
at a rate of not more than 5 percent ad valorem (or 

E. Limitations on Use of Authority 

1. Reservation of Articles From Tariff Negotiation 
The act provides that, under specified conditions, articles 
on which a seriou.s-injury finding has been made by the 
Tariff Commission in an escape-clause case are to be 







re 11 




)?. I 





Oeparfmenf of Slafe Bulletin Wliei 

eserved from negotiations for the reduction of any duty 
r other import restriction or the elimination of any 
uty. The President may also reserve any other articles 
e deems appropriate. The conditions under which he 
lUst reserve articles are as follows : 

(a) Articles on Which Action Is in Effect. Articles 
lust be reserved so long as there is in effect any action 
iken under the escape clause of previous legislation (see- 
on 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 ) or 
nder the new act. In the latter case the article must 
s reserved whether the action in effect is an increased 
irifE or other import restriction imjiosed under section 
>1 or an orderly marketing agreement negotiated in ac- 
)rdance with section 352. (Articles on which action is 
1 effect under the national security provision of previous 
^gislatlon or the new act must also be excluded from such 
?gotlations.) As of the date of enactment of the act, 
le articles which would be reserved under this provision 
:e the following : 

Dried figs 


Toweling of flax, hemp, or ramie 

Safety pins 

Clinical thermometers 

Lead and zinc 

Stainless steel table flatware 

Cotton typewriter-ribbon cloth 

Sheet glass 

Certain carpets and rugs 

Crude petroleum and derivatives 

xcept for petroleum, on which action is In effect under 
le national security provision, all other articles listed 
bove are presently subject to escai)e-clause action. 

(b) Articles on Which Action Is Not in Effect. During 
IB 5-year period beginning on the date of enactment of 
16 new act, any other article on which the Tariff Com- 
lission made a seriou.s-injury finding under the escape 
iause of the 1951 act must be reserved If the article is 
sted for trade agreement consideration and the Tariff 
ommission finds on application by the interested indus- 
y that economic conditions in that industry have not 
ibstautially improved since the basic escape-clause find- 
ig. The following are the articles on which applications 
)r reservation could be made to the Tariff Commission 
Y the interested industries under this provision if the 
rticles were listed for trade agreement consideration : 

Women's fur felt hats and hat bodies 

Hatters' fur 


Tobacco pipes and bowls 

Screen-printed silk scan'es 

Scissors and shears 

Groundfish fillets 

Alsike clover seed 


Ferrocerium (lighter flints) 

Velveteen fabrics 

Violins and violas 

Straight pins 

Spring clothespins 

Umbrella frames 

Tartaric acid 

Cream of tartar 

Baseball and softball gloves 

Ceramic mosaic tile 

•cfober 29, 7962 

2. National Security Provisions. The act repeats prac- 
tically verbatim the provision of previous trade agree- 
ments legislation relating to national security. Under 
this provision no action is to be taken reducing or elimi- 
nating tariffs when the President determines that such 
action would threaten to impair the national security. 
In addition the President is required to take action to 
adjust imports of an article or its derivatives when he 
concurs in the advice of the Director of the Office of 
Emergency Planning, following an investigation, that im- 
ports threaten to impair the national security. 

3. Staging Requirements. Tariff reductions made un- 
der the act are in general to take effect In not less than 
five equal annual installments. They may take effect in 
unequal intervals and amounts provided that the sum of 
reductions at any one time does not exceed what would 
occur under five equal installments. No staging is re- 
quii-ed for reductions or eliminations of duties made under 
the tropical products authority. 

V. Preagreement Procedures and Safeguards 

A. Tariff Commission Advice Prior to Negotiations 

The act requires the Tariff Commission to the 
President as to the probable economic effect of any pro- 
posed trade agreement concession on any article. The 
President is required to furnish the Tariff Commission 
with a list of all articles on which he contemplates ne- 
gotiating, and the Commission is required within 6 months 
thereafter to render its advice. The Tariff Commission 
is required to hold hearings in the course of its investiga- 
tions and to give all interested persons an opportunity to 
present their views. 

B. Other Advice 

Before entering into any trade agreement under the 
act, the President is required to seek information and 
advice from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, 
Defense, Interior, Labor, State, and the Treasury and 
from such other sources as he may deem appropriate. He 
is also required to afford an opportunity for any inter- 
ested person to present his views on any matter relevant 
to the proposed trade agreement. For this purpose the 
President is required to designate an agency or inter- 
agency committee which after reasonable public notice is 
to hold the hearings. 

C. Prerequisites for Offers 

The President may make an offer of a tariff concession 
in a trade agreement with respect to any article only 
after he has received (1) the Tariff Commission's advice 
concerning the article or after the expiration of the rele- 
vant 6-month period provided for rendering such advice, 
whichever oeeui's first, and (2) a summary of the hear- 
ings held by the interagency committee. 

VI. General Provisions Relating to Trade Agreements 

A. Special Representative for Trade Negotiations 

The act provides for the appointment by the President, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, of a Special 
Representative for Trade Negotiations, who is to be the 


chief United States representative for eacli trade agree- 
ment negotiation. Tlie Special Representative is to liave 
ambassadorial ranli and is to be chairman of the inter- 
agency trade organization referred to below. In the per- 
formance of his functions the Special Representative is 
to seek information and advice from representatives of 
indnstry, agriculture, and labor and from such agencies 
as he deems appropriate. 

B. Interagency Trade Organization 

The act provides for the establishment of an inter- 
agency trade organization which will be at Cabinet level. 
This organization will make recommendations to the 
President on basic policy issues arising in the administra- 
tion of the trade agreements program ; make recommen- 
dations as to what action the President should take on 
Tariff Commission advice in escape-clause cases; advise 
the President of the results of hearings which it is re- 
quired to hold concerning unjustifiable and unreasonable 
foreign import restrictions and recommend appropriate 
action with respect thereto ; and perform such other func- 
tions with respect to the trade agreements program as the 
President may designate. 

0. Congressional Delegates to Tariff Negotiations 

Two members of the House and two members of the 
Senate are to be accredited to United States delegations 
conducting tariff negotiations under the act. 

D. Reports to Congress 

The President is required to transmit promptly to the 
Congress a copy of each trade agreement entered into 
under the act, together with a statement of his reasons 
for entering into the agreement. Annual reports on the 
operation of the trade agreements program are to be sub- 
mitted to the Congress by the President and by the Tariff 

E. Most-Favored-Nation Principle 

The act continues existing policy of extending to prod- 
ucts of all countries, with certain exceptions, duties and 
other import restrictions proclaimed under the act or 
under previous legislation. The principal exceptions to 
this general rule are : 

1. Communist Products. The President is required, as 
soon as practicable, to deny the benefits of trade agree- 
ment concessions to products, whether imported directly 
or indirectly, from any country or area dominated or 
controlled by communism. 

2. Foreign Import Restrictions. The act contains sev- 
eral provisions to strengthen the hand of the President in 
dealing with unjustifiable and unreasonable foreign im- 
port restrictions : 

First, it directs him to take all appropriate and feasible 
steps within his power to eliminate any unjustifiable, i.e. 
illegal, import restrictions which impair the value of tariff 
commitments made to the United States, oppress U.S. 
commerce, or prevent the expansion of trade on a mu- 
tually advantageous basis. The President may not nego- 
tiate the reduction or elimination of any U.S. import 
restrictions under the act in order to obtain the relaxa- 
tion or removal of any such unjustifiable restriction. 



Second, the President is directed, notwithstanding a; 
provision of any trade agreement under the new act, andl j 
to the extent he deems necessary and appropriate, to im- 
pose duties or other import restrictions on the products of 
any country which establishes or maintains unjustifiable 
import restrictions against U.S. agricultural productslj,( 
when he considers such action against the products of the ., 
foreign country necessary and appropriate to obtain 
relaxation of the foreign restriction and to pruvirle equi 
table access for U.S. agricultural products in the foreigi 

Third, the President is required, to the extent such ac 
tion is consistent with the purposes stated in the act, t( 
deny the benefits of existing trade agreement concessionii 
or to refrain from proclaiming the benefits of any new conn '' 
cession to any foreign country or instrumentality which ' 
(a) maintains nontarifE trade restrictions including var 
iable import fees which substantially burden U.S. com 
merce in a manner inconsistent with trade agreements 
or (b) engages in discriminatory or other acts (includin 
tolerance of international cartels) or policies unjust: 
fiably restricting U.S. commerce. 

Fourth, the President is authorized, to the extent tha 
such action is consistent with the purposes stated in th 
act and having due regard for the international obligf 
tions of the United States, to deny the benefits of existin 
trade agreement concessions or to refrain from proclain 
ing new concessions which would benefit a country mail 
taining unreasonable (though not necessarily illegal 
import restrictions which either directly or indirectly sul 
stantially burden U.S. commerce. 

3. Conservation of Fishery Resources. The act adds 
new section to the Tariff Act of 1930 authorizing tt 
President to increase the rate of duty for such time as 1 
deems necessary on any fish in any form imported froi 
a country if In his judgment the country's fishery coi 
servation practices or policies affect the United Staff 
and the country has failed or refused to engage in got 
faith in international negotiations on such practice 
The rate of duty imposed may not be more than 50 percei 
above the rate existing on July 1, 1934. 

VII. Tariff Adjustment and Other Adjustment 

The act authorizes the provision of assistance to indu* Woi 
try, firms, or workers, as the case may be, upon a findi] 
by the Tariff Commission that, as a result in major pa 
of concessions granted under trade agreements, an artic 
is being imix)rted into the United States in such increase 
quantities as to be the major factor in causing or thres 
ening serious injury to the industry, firm, or worke 
producing a like or directly competitive article. All pe 
tions for investigation to determine eligibility for assi: 
ance are to be filed with the Tariff Commission. 

A. Determinations of Injury to hidustrics 

Upon receipt of a petition on behalf of an indust 

for tariff adjustment under section 3.51 (see below), t 
Tariff Commission must conduct an industry-wide inves 
gation to determine whether serious injury to the indust 
is occurring or is threatened. In the course of such 

Department of Slate Bo//e»' 













11 fed 







!r si 







'' estigation the Commission must hold public hearings. 

'^' n making its determination the Tariff Commission is 
^ equired to take into account all economic factors which 

'^' : considers relevant, including: (1) idling of productive 
cilities, (2) inability to operate at a level of reasonable 
rofit, and (3) unemployment or underemployment. The 
iommission's report to the President is to be made not 
Iter than 6 months after the filing of the petition. If 

'*''' tie Commission should find serious injury or threat 
lereof, it is to advise the President in its report of the 
mount of the increase in or imposition of any duty or 
ther import restriction on the article which is necessary 
> prevent or remedy the injury. 

!. Action by the President After a Serious-Injury Finding 
s to an Industry 
The President may take any of the following actions 
fter receiving a report from the Tariff Commission con- 
lining a finding that, as a result in major part of con- 
liijii essions granted under trade agreements, an article is 
ijEst eing imported into the United States in such increased 
uantities as to be the major factor in causing or threat- 
th ning serious injury to the domestic industry producing 
like or directly competitive article: 

1. Increased Import Restrictions. Under section 351, 
tie President may proclaim increased duties or other 
uport restrictions. The increased duty may not be more 
ban .50 percent above the rate existing on July 1, 1934 
or if the article is dutiable but no rate existed on July 1, 
9.34, the rate existing at the time of the proclamation), 
n the case of an article not subject to duty the rate im- 
osed may not exceed 50 percent ad valorem. If the 
•resident does not concur in the Tariff Commission's 
nding, he must report the reasons for his action to the 
!ongress, which may within 60 days cause the Tariff 
iommission's finding to be put into effect by adopting 

concurrent resolution by a vote of the majority of the 
uthorized member.ship of each House. 

2. Orderly Marketing Agreements. Under section 352, 
whenever the President determines that such action would 
e more appropriate to prevent or remedy serious injury 
ban would action under paragraph 1 above, he may 
egotiate international agreements with foreign countries 
.miting their exports to the United States of the article 
ausing or threatening serious injury. He may issue reg- 
lations governing the importation of the article into the 

,jj, fnited States from countries which are parties to the 
greement and from other countries. 

3. Adjustment Assistance. As an alternative to action 
nder paragraphs 1 or 2 or in combination with such 
ction, the President may provide adjustment assistance 
firms and workers in the industry concerned. He may 
uthorize its firms to request the Secretary of Commerce 
or certifications of eligibility to apply for adjustment as- 
istanee under the terms of the act relating to firms. 
lIso, he may authorize workers to request the Secretary 
f Labor for certifications of eligibility to apply for ad- 
it ustment assistance under the terms of the act relating 

il.tljo workers. 

Termination or Extension of Escape-Clause Action 
1. Termination. Any increase in import restrictions 
reclaimed under the escape clause of the new act or of 

Jcfober 29, 7962 




ill pel 


previous legislation may be reduced or terminated by the 
President at any time when he determines, after taking 
into account the advice of the Tariff Commission and after 
seeking the advice of the Secretary of Commerce and 
the Secretary of Labor, that such reduction or termina- 
tion is in the national interest. Unless extended in ac- 
cordance with the procedures outlined below, any action 
taken under the escape clause of previous legislation 
will terminate not later than 5 years after the date 
of enactment of the new act, and any increase imposed 
under the escape clause of the new act will terminate 
not later than 4 years after the proclamation of the 
increase. The Tariff Commission is to make annual re- 
ports to the President concerning developments in any 
industry producing articles on which an escape-clause 
restriction is in effect. 

2. Extension. Any increase In import restrictions un- 
der the escape clause of the new act or of previous legis- 
lation may be extended in whole or in part for such 
periods (not in excess of 4 years each) as the President 
may designate if he determines, after taking into account 
the advice of the Tariff Commission and after seeking 
the advice of the Secretary of Commerce and the Secre- 
tary of Labor, that such extension is in the national in- 
terest. The Tariff Commission may the President, 
either upon his request or upon its own motion, of the 
probable economic effect on the industry concerned of the 
reduction or termination of the increase in import re- 
strictions. In addition, upon petition on behalf of the 
industry concerned, filed not earlier than 9 months and 
not later than 6 months before a termination date under 
paragraph 1 above or an extension tiereof, the Tariff 
Commission is to advise the President of its judgment as 
to the probable economic effect on the industry of such 
termination. In rendering its advice, the Tariff Commis- 
sion is to conduct an investigation during the course of 
which it is to bold public hearings. 

D. Determinations of Injury to Firms and Workers 

If a petition is filed b.v a firm or group of workers for 
a determination of eligibility to apply for adjustment 
assistance, the Tariff Commission's investigation is limited 
to the situation of the firm or group of workers and does 
not encompass the entire industry. The Commission is 
required to hold public hearings in the course of its in- 
vestigation if requested by the petitioner or any other 
interested party. The Commission's report in such cases 
must be sent to the President not later than 60 days after 
the filing of the petition. The economic factors to be 
taken into account by the Commission parallel those in 
industry-wide investigations. After receiving a report 
from the Tariff Commission containing an afl3rraative 
finding with respect to any firm or group of workers, the 
President may certify that such firm or group of workers 
is eligible to apply for adjustment assistance. 

B. Adjustment Assistance to Firms 

"When the President has acted, after a Tariff' Commis- 
sion finding of serious injury to an industry, to provide 
adjustment assistance to firms in the Industry, the Secre- 
tary of Commerce is to certify an applicant firm as eligible 
to apply for assistance upon a showing by the firm that 
the increased imports (which the Tariff Commission de- 


termined to result in major part from concessions granted 
under trade agreements) have been the major cause of 
serious injury or threat thereof to that firm. This inter- 
mediate step is not required when the President has acted 
after a Tariff Commission finding of serious injury to 
the applicant firm rather than to the industry as a whole. 
In either case the applicant firm must receive certifica- 
tion from the Secretary of Commerce that its adjustment 
proposal : 

(1) is reasonably calculated materially to contribute 
to the economic adjustment of the firm ; 

(2) gives adequate consideration to the interests of its 
workers who may be adversely affected by increased im- 
ports resulting from a trade agreement concession ; and 

(3) demonstrates that the firm will make all reasonable 
efforts to use its ow'n resources for economic development. 

Upon approval of such a proposal, the Secretary of 
Commerce will refer it to such government agency or 
agencies as he determines to be appropriate to furnish 
the necessary assistance. He may certify the firm as 
eligible for any or all of the following forms of adjust- 
ment assistance : 

(1) technical assistance; 

(2) financial assistance in the form of loans, guaran- 
tees of loans, or agreements for deferred participation in 
loans ; and 

(3) tax assistance in the form of special carryback of 
operating losses. 

F. Adjustment Assistmice to Workers 

In the case of groups of workers, when the President 
has acted, after a Tariff Commission finding of serious 
injury as to an industry, to provide adjustment assistance 
to workers in the industry, the Secretary of Labor is to 
certify an applicant group as eligible for adjustment as- 
sistance upon a showing by the group that the increased 
imports (which the Tariff Commission determined to re- 
sult in major part from concessions granted in trade 
agreements) have been the major factor in causing or 
threatening to cause unemployment or underemployment 
of a significant number or proportion of workers of the 
group's firm or subdivision thereof. Paralleling the pro- 
cedure for individual firms, this intermediate step is not 
required when the President has acted to provide adjust- 
ment assistance after a Tariff Commission finding relat- 
ing specifically to the situation in the group's firm or 
subdivision thereof. 

The Secretary of Labor is to determine whether work- 
ers are entitled to receive assistance and is to pay or 
provide such assistance to workers who qualify under 
the standards of the act governing the period of eligibility 
and amount of adjustment assistance to which individual 
workers may be entitled. The Secretary of Labor is au- 
thorized to enter into agreements with any State or State 
agency for administering assistance to workers and dis- 
bursing funds. Any payments made by a State or State 
agency under such agreement are to be reimbursed by the 
Federal Government. 

The act authorizes the following forms of assistance t« 
workers : ' 

(1) trade readjustment allowances in the form of com- 
pensation for partial or complete unemployment ; 

(2) retraining of workers for other types of employ- 
ment ; and 

(3) relocation allowances to assist families in moving 
to an area where employment may be available. 

G. Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board 

An interagency Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board 
chaired by the Secretary of Commerce will be established 
to advise the President and the administering agencies 
on the development of coordinated programs for adjust- 
ment assistance to firms and workers. 


U.S. Delegates Leave for Conference 
of Inter-Parliamentary Union 





The Department of State announced on Octobeii 
11 (press release 615) that the American delega 
tion to the 51st conference of the Inter-Parlia 
mentary Union would leave Washington for Brai 
silia on the following day. The confereno" 
begins at Brasilia on October 24. The chairman 
of the U.S. delegation is Senator A. Willis Rob- 
ertson of Virginia. The other members are Sena 
tors Oren E. Long of Hawaii, Maurice J. Murphy 
Jr., of New Hampshire, Benjamin A. Smith II o 
Massachusetts, John Stennis of Mississippi, Her 
man E. Talmadge of Georgia, Strom Thurmonc 
of South Carolma, and Ralph W. Yarborough o 
Texas; Representatives Dale Alford of Arkansas 
Thomas N. Downing of Virginia, Paul C. Jone y^j 
of Missouri, Lucien N. Nedzi of Michigan, Cath tjjj, 
erine D. Norrell of Arkansas, W. R. Poage o ^^\ 
Texas, and Phil Weaver of Nebraska. iftte 

The Inter-Parliamentary Union was founded i: ifscli 
1889 at a conference attended by delegates from icert 
countries. The Union now has 64 membe wp 
nations. "«( 

The aim of the Inter-Parliamentary Union ii ^v\ 
to encourage personal contacts between member *s 
of all parliaments and to unite tliem in commo 
action to preserve democratic institutions. Th 
Union makes known its views on all international 
problems suitable for settlement by pari iamen tar 
act ion and suggests improvements for the develop 
ment of i>arliamentary institutions. 

iij its 


Department of Slate Bulleli 








he Common Market, the Atlantic Partnership, and the Free World 

6y /. Robert Schaetzel 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs '■ 


Perhaps the one word that best describes the 

tmosphere of the North Atlantic in 1962 is 

;hange." The wellsprings of change are the fan- 
istic advances arising out of man's inventiveness, 
16 application of his skill and imagination to 
lodern teclmology, the revolution in Western ag- 
iculture, and, finally, the deadly genius that has 
one into the development of new weapons sys- 

ms. Further, there is general recognition of the 
eed to change previous patterns of world he- 
avier if we are to preserve freedom for posterity. 

Beyond all this there is a sense of movement, of 
xcitement, of a new future flowing outward from 
le phenomenal success of the European Common 
larket. The Common IVIarket seems to be touch- 
ng not only most lines of human activity but all 
eographic areas of the World — East and West. 

Yet, while we face jx)litical and technological 
hange on a massive scale, there is still the tend- 
;f " ncy to decant these phenomena in the old bottles 
f the past. The world seems caught up in a kind 
f schizophrenia, tempted by, but fearfid of, an 
ncertain future and still attempting to sort, these 
ew phenomena in classical patterns. 

To cite an example, the European Community 
Dday is the development of this century to which 
len's minds gravitate. It is the source of Euro- 
lean self-confidence and promise. And yet, un- 
erstandably, the six governments^ seem awed, 
a some extent intimidated, by their own creation 
nd its astonishing success. They are uncertain 
s to its ultimate geographic scope, unsure as to 

'Address made before the World Affairs Council and 
he Boston Regional Conference on NATO Affairs at Bos- 
jn, Mass., on Oct. 6 (press release G02 dated Oct. 5). 

Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
taly, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 

W'Oc/ofaer 29, 1962 

how the next step of political union can be taken. 

To mention another case, one sees on every 
side unmistakable evidence of what President 
Kennedy has referred to as the interdependence 
of the countries of the North Atlantic. Defense 
of the West as a whole dejiends on the North At- 
lantic Treaty Organization. Defense becomes far 
less certain, the danger of war more real and the 
outcome less certain, should there be any break in 
the sure support or the steady growth of this in- 
stitution. But this is not to say that other areas 
of the free world can afford to shirk their own 
responsibilities for defense. 

The strength of NATO seems to derive from the 
confluence of two streams. The first is the political 
comjnitment of the member states to the concept 
of the North Atlantic alliance, the conscious 
awareness of the 15 nations that the survival of 
the Atlantic countries and of the free world de- 
pends on the vitality of this alliance. The second 
is growing knowledge of the characteristics and 
the implications of modern weapon systems, par- 
ticularly of nuclear warheads and missile delivery 
systems. We are seeing more clearly each day the 
limits set on any one member of the alliance to 
consider its defense separable from that of the 
others. This is military interdependence. 

Economic Interdependence 

On every hand one finds evidence of our eco- 
nomic interdependence. In the financial field, one 
nation's surplus is another nation's deficit. We 
are more aware today that the financial positions 
of countries can shift rapidly, as we have foimd 
in this country where not so long ago the "dollar 
gap" was the oppressive problem. 

Similarly, we see more clearly than ever before 


the extent to wliicli international trade must be 
unfettered and, as part of the same awareness, 
that no one country of the North Atlantic can 
insulate itself against the commerce of other na- 
tions. The American proof of this new wisdom 
is to be found in the dramatic approval by the 
Congress of the President's trade expansion pro- 
gram.^ This action is no less than a revolutionary 
change in 150 years of American attitude toward 
the tariff. 

The free world's great producers of temperate 
agricultural products stand victims of their own 
success. "Wliile we see the problem — the stagger- 
ing bounty resulting from technology and land 
management applied to the farm — we are all far 
from clear as to the solution. But the major pro- 
ducing countries agree that the problems of mas- 
sive farm abundance cannot be solved by each 
nation alone, but only by common action. This 
is further evidence of our interdependence. 

The Common Market and the Commonwealth 

But while we may absorb and ponder these lines 
of interdependence there remains the nostalgia for 
traditional means of dealing with such problems, 
a nostalgia for the classical minuet of internation- 
al behavior. 

Let me cite an example here at the risk of 
wandering innocently into a family dispute. We 
observe with sympathy the examination now going 
on within the British Commonwealth as to the ef- 
fects of prospective British membership in the 
Conunon Market on the Commonwealth. But it 
is hard not to be puzzled by some of the needless 
despair — or so it seems to me — that this debate 
seems to incite. 

Well before the July 1961 decision of the British 
Government to seek membersliip in the Common 
Market, the Commonwealth was itself being tum- 
bled and modified in the strong currents of 20th- 
century change. The postwar creation of many 
new Commonwealth states came on top of an al- 
tered economic relationsliip between the U.K. and 
the old members of the Commonwealth. It was 
no longer a reciprocal matter of raw materials 
exchanged for manufactured goods but of the old 
dominions industrializing and seeking export 
markets for such goods. 

Tlie pity is that the extraordinary success of the 

'See p. 055. 



Commonwealth in adjusting itself to both eco-< ''*' 
nomic and political change should be lost sight ofJI 
To some extent it seems that many of these painful! 
but inevitable adjustments of the Common- 
wealth — changes caused not at all by the Common 
IMarket — are now laid at the feet of the British 
entry into the European Community. I am notlera 
arguing that British membership will not require ijii 
further adjustment, only that the Common Mar 
ket is not the sole source of change. 

I venture on this delicate ground only to makj 'o i 
the point that much of the worry, and indeed the icll 
almost Cassandra predictions about the consei mi 
quences, are reactions at least in part to fear OA liroi 
the unknown and unease in the presence of ac !iit 
celerating change. M 

Success of European Integration Ei 

Western Europe has made a great new contribui """ 
tion to democratic theory. The Six nations liav* **' 
demonstrated that traditional societies can bot' '"P 
originate and put into place such revolutionar " 
ideas as are implicit in the process of Europea: oliti 
integration. And in the space of only a fe^ kisc 
years, dramatic change has taken place in th !ipa 
thinking of various segments of the Europea litm 
population. Wlien one reflects on the bitter enmit Ino 
between neighbors which threatens the peace t< jjjj 
day in so many parts of the world, and which rest ^(|, 
on far less deeply rooted historical cause, we cat ^^^^ 
only be awed at the extent and depth of th 
rapprochement of France and Germany. Th: 
new relationship does more than remove that clai 
sical source of European and world disaster. ] 
should be as well a beacon to other nations elsf- 
where in the world to consider their own feuc 
and disputes in the bright light of the Francci 
German achievement. 

Many explanations have been offered as to ho 
it is, after centuries of abortive efforts, the Sif* 
nations finally, in 1952, succeeded in their que; 
for unity. One explanation is that within tl 
last 20 years each of them had been either occupiej 
or defeated in war with the consequent destru 
tion of their political institutions. This shatterir 
experience, so the explanation runs, may very we 
have had the beneficial side effect of opening men 
minds to the consideration of alternative forn 
of pel itical organization, to the search for whol 
new approaches to the profound problems of tl 
postwar world. 

Deparfmenl of State Bulle: 













.S. Adjustment to European Unity 

I suggest that the constriction of our planet 
ifi ad the pressure of tecluiology and of modern 

eapons are factors creating perhaps similar will- 
igness to accept change in other parts of the 
itiil 'orld, parts which have not had the same shat- 
M sring war experience as have had the Six. This 
ynamism of change has clearly permeated the 
Lmerican society. The process of European in- 
jgration has caught the imagination of America, 
'o some, who see the Common Market through 
■ell-polished, rose-tinted glasses, a bright futui'e 
merges in which all problems solve themselves 
irough a partnership with the new Commimity. 
lut in point of fact the partner has still to or- 
anize its aifairs and to assume truly political char- 

teristics — and in ways still impossible to define. 

But despite this cautionary caveat, certainly the 
lood created by the Common Market and the pros- 
ect of an effective, mutually supporting relation- 
lip between America and the EEC were the ideas 
lat caught American imagination. In turn, this 
olitical concept created a current of opinion in 
lis country which led to the passage of the Trade 
Expansion Act. Thus our society, which has tra- 
itionally both created and responded to change, 
emonstrates its capacity to adjust. American 
idustry and labor show willingness to compete 

ith European producers — and competition is of 
J '* ourse the continuing process of change at the 

onomic level. It becomes the urgent task of the 
rovernment to use fully the authority in the new 
i-ade expansion legislation to open further the 
reat European market to American goods. 

The lesson to be drawn is that all of the free 
'orld must look upon this period as one requiring 
djustment — not stubborn resistance to change or 
isistence on forcing the developments of a revolu- 
onary age into known patterns of the past. 




lobal Institutions and Regional Bodies 

To depart from this philosophical backdrop, 
ut a backdrop necessary to the discussion ahead, 

series of urgent questions arise: Wliat is to be 
le relationship of the European Community to 
le rest of Europe? To the United States and to 
le North Atlantic alliance? And of the Atlan- 
c partnei*ship to the world ? 

The United Nations, bom in the course of World 
^''ar II and out of the hope that further wars 

lefober 29, 1962 

could be averted, was constructed on the principle 
of universality, so recently enunciated by U Thant. 
Complementary regional bodies have grown up, 
in response to world needs and in conformity with 
the U.N. Charter. These regional groups and in- 
stitutions do not detract from U.N. authority or 
its functions but through their more limited scope 
can deal more effectively with the varied problems 
of a complicated world. 

The dimensions of the problem thus become 
clearer. We have a global set of multilateral insti- 
tutions. We need them, and they serve useful pur- 
poses. The United States has special and historic 
relationships that run to the Southern Hemi- 
sphere. We have strong postwar commitments 
rooted in self-interest, yet outward-looking, which 
are exemplified in NATO and the OECD [Orga- 
nization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment]. The Western European countries are 
putting in place new economic and political rela- 
tionships among themselves under the stirring 
heading "European Unity." The problem we face 
is not to select one pattern from this group and to 
demolish or reduce the others but to see that each 
performs its appropriate role in contributing to a 
peaceful and prosperous world. 

There is a tendency for Americans, with our 
cormnendable and highly developed sense of 
national and international responsibility, to be 
self-conscious about the Atlantic relationship. 
Sometimes our nerves kick up at the charge that 
the Atlantic relationship is exclusively military 
in character — when one eyes the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. Occasionally the sensitivity 
is to the fear that this is the rich countries against 
the poor nations — when one considers our member- 
ship in the OECD ; or a nervousness that we seem 
to be cast as the cold-eyed bankers eying the poor 
nations of the world — when one reflects on our 
work with the Development Assistance Committee. 

Self-consciousness and indeed shame will be 
appropriate sensations if the objectives and the 
work of these institutions should turn out to be 
self-sei-ving, rather than directed to the general 
welfare of the world. But we would be guilty of 
base illogic and of an emotional binge of classical 
proportions if we were to be put off from the work 
which the Atlantic community must do because of 
our fear of change or because of the alarms and 
worries, miderstandable but insubstantial, of the 
other jjarts of the world. 


There are things which must be done and which 
can onlj' be done by limited bodies. The Common 
Market has succeeded for a variety of reasons. 
But one reason certainly lias been that there were 
six nations — not 16 and not 60. The six nations 
start with common threads of history and culture, 
a common experience in the disaster of modern 
war, common appreciation of the responsibilities 
of government in the area of social welfare, gen- 
erally comparable standards of economic activity 
and income, and, finally, the willingness and the 
political strength — as nations — to make sacrifices 
of national interest in return for communal gains. 

Importance of Atlantic Collaboration 

In turn there are tilings which must be done and 
which can only be done by intimate collaboration 
between the United States and the European Com- 
munity. These tasks arise out of the special char- 
acteristics and responsibilities of this comitry and 
the Community. To name the tasks is to sketch 
the agenda for the partnership. 

Our common security depends on mutual agree- 
ment on the nature of the threat to our survival 
and on our willingness to arm ourselves in defense 
against this threat. 

We are the advanced industrial societies of the 
world, with all of the advantages and disadvan- 
tages this stage of economic development implies. 
But perhaps most importantly of all, we share 
common responsibilities. If there is to be an open 
free-world trading system it can only come about 
on the basis of agreement between the Common 
Market and the United States. For together we 
conduct 90 i^ercent of the free- world trade. If 
there is to be an international financial system 
capable of supporting a constantly expanding 
volume of world trade it must be built across tlie 
Atlantic. The system will only woik on the basis 
of the consent and with the support of the treas- 
uries and the central bankers of the European 
countries and of the United States. If there is to 
be an adequate flow of public and private capital, 
that capita] must come from the Atlantic com- 
munity countries, for tliere is no other major 

The emphasis falls on Western Europe and the 
United States. This emphasis cannot be avoided 
because Atlantic collaboration is the foundation 
on which the free-world efforts must be built. 
Tliis is not conceived as an exclusive relationship, 


nor conducted as such. There is a second miracl* 
in the modem world : Japan. Today Japan play! 
an indispensable role in the economic business of 
the free world. She is an important memljer of' 
the Development Assistance Committee of the 
OECD. Japan is also a full partner in the quiet 
work among the leading industrial nations that 
will hopefully lead to improvement in the free* 



world's financial system. Japan is thus a kej 
element in the pragmatic work that is centered icfl" 

Paris. ^" 

. ml 


Flexibility and Continuing Discussion 





If the broad challenge to the North Atlantic na^ 
tions I have outlined is to be met it will requip |„t 
understanding on the part of the other regions o L^ 
the world. They must be led to see why this re JJ, 
lationship is indispensable, to reserve critica 
judgment until the results can be seen. Con 
versely, it falls to countries of the North Atlanti 
to accept the full dimensions of responsibility an' 
to see that in exercising this responsibility wi;, 
sei-ve the higher interests of the entire free worlc! 
Finally, we shall have to be willing to hold stead;' ^fj^ 
in the face of frivolous and fearful criticism wher 
in our judgment we believe it is necessary to dc 
velop special, organic relationships to carry oi 
the tasks which are tlie inescapable duties of tb 
countries of the North Atlantic. 

To some extent the new techniques being do njj 
vised for North Atlantic collaboration may a; 
suage some of the fears of the rest of the worlc 
These techniques put a high value on flexibilit; 
pragmatism, and consultation. This type c 
collaboration rests on the assumption that we ai 
not negotiating with one another but that we an ^^ j 
partners in search of solutions to common prol' ji^f^ 
lems. We find increasingly that solutions do n( Ifjjiji 
emerge from a procedure in which one nation sla| (jujj 
a formal position on the table on a "take it or leav kuI^ 
it*' basis. Instead, answers develop out of a coii luj^j 
tinning process of discussion. nj^ j| 

This characteristic of the new partnership do tvelop 
not demand new organizations: NATO and tli ii|f|,j 
OECD are entirely suitable for tlie immediate ai k\^^ 


require a willingness on the part of the senii 
oliicials of the several governments to accept th 
system of intimate collaboration. Indeed we im 
find it advisable to avoid commitment to new, pe 
manent bodies and instead run contrary' to Pa 


Department of State Bulled 




Vinson's law that organizations never die by 
■reating and then abolisliing working groups and 
special committees. 

[Collaboration in the Developing Community 

The problem for the European Community is 
■onsiderably more difficult. It is a Commmiity 
t ill being shaped. In addition to the imminent 
i)rospect of further enlargement through the ad- 
lition of the United Kingdom, and possibly sev- 
eral other states, the Six seek to reinforce the 
ommunities through a treaty of political imion. 
These are formidable intellectual and organiza- 
'") ional tasks, a sufficient challenge to the genius 
1™ hat has created and advanced the European Com- 
tiunities. While struggling with these problems 
he European Commimity has placed certain au- 
hority in the hands of the central institutions. 
'-* Tet real power still lodges in the member states, 
iut the Community, despite the array of internal 
■usiness, cannot ignore the outside world. The 
yommunity and its member states must react to 
he same sets of problems I have outlined before, 
f^i 7ithin the framework of NATO and the OECD, 
,nd within the United Nations. 
In a way those of us on the outside and the 
f "' fiembers of the European Community have a com- 
lon problem : We both must accept the fact that 
new political-economic entity has been created 
n Europe. The members of the Community must 
onquer the impulse to have it both ways — to cher- 
fMl' 3h the fruits and exploit the satisfactions of the 
'ill' yommunity and yet to continue to deal with the 
»■ ' rorld as though nothing had happened to the 
ff» lassical pattern of national states. As nonmem- 
fJ ers, it falls to those of us in the Atlantic alliance 
]iri) Iso to accept the fact that the Community exists. 
liii« Ve should expect and indeed welcome continuing 
isia conomic and political consultation among the 
•lei lember states of the EEC as an indispensable 
i 01 haracteristic of the evolving Community. Be- 
ause it is new we cannot look askance upon this 
pilo eveloping process of Community collaboration 
Jtl.nd charge it as disruptive of the now traditional 
tea! echniques of national operation within NATO, 
i,,lo)ECD, and the U.N. 


itlli Ipcoming Trade Negotiations 

f'jii I refer finally to one practical problem of tre- 
ijfiendous importance which will be before us in 
!i Pi he very near future : the trade negotiations made 

lulWMofaer 29, 1962 

possible by the new Trade Expansion Act. These 
negotiations too must be handled within this com- 
plicated framework of existing institutions and in 
today's atmosphere of dynamic change. 

Here we must introduce the GATT, the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, an institu- 
tion which any horse player would call a "sleeper." 
This institution has not only contributed to the 
orderly reduction of tariff barriers during the 
postwar period but has performed with distinction 
work on many other aspects of the world's trading 
problems. Beyond this and during its 15-year 
history, the GATT has established itself as an in- 
stitution capable of dealing evenhandedly with 
botli the advanced and less developed coimtries. 
This balance and the maturity of its i^roduct have 
coincidentally created a breed of governmental 
officials now found in high positions in the several 
capitals of the GATT contracting parties. These 
officials have a mutual respect for one another, 
they appreciate the complexities of our trading 
world, and they lead the search collectively and 
individually for solutions to problems, rather than 
to fight the problems. 

The GATT and the men who made it work must 
play a central role in the trade negotiations made 
possible by the Trade Expansion Act. At the 
same tune we must retain the flexibility to carry 
on exploratory and even parallel discussions with 
the enlarged EEC as we work together toward 
the formal international negotiations which must 
be set within the GATT framework. 

There may also be a role for the OECD to play 
in reducing barriers to trade. As suggested 
earlier, the advanced countries have special prob- 
lems and in many cases there are special devices 
which they employ in restricting or discriminat- 
ing against one another's trade. There are also 
measures, such as consumption taxes, which limit 
consumption of tropical products and depress still 
further the market for such major world commodi- 
ties as coffee. It seems eminently sensible for the 
OECD members to consider and to seek remedies 
to these restraints and burdens on world trade. 
The test should not be that because similar prob- 
lems are being examined in GATT they cannot be 
examined elsewhere. The real test is whether the 
advanced countries can, througli preliminary or 
parallel discussion, rise to more responsible levels 
of economic behavior and to the further reduction 
of govenunental restrictions. 


The same pragmatism and flexibility should sur- 
round our exploration of how best to organize and 
mount the future round of trade negotiations. 
Neither we, the Europeans, nor tlie GATT should 
devise and settle in private the procedures or the 
formula that will lead to these negotiations. But 
these decisions should arise from deliberate con- 
sideration in several forums of the problems and 
the potentialities with which these negotiations 
must deal. 

Emphasis on Product Rather Than Technique 

My concluding note is that we must either opti- 
mistically or fearfully, depending on the cast of 
mind, accept the fact of dramatic change of world 
affairs, with the North Atlantic the vortex of cy- 
clonic activity. We should be cautious in the face 
of suggestions that existing institutions must be 
uprooted or that new institutions should be put 
quickly in place. The challenge of the period im- 
mediately ahead seems to be to realize the extent 
of the common business to be done and to develop 
new processes for doing this business. It would 
appear less urgent to set lawyers to work drafting 
new treaties, or bureaucrats to the drawing boards 
sketching new organization charts. 

We must continually question ourselves as to 
what we North Atlantic nations do in meeting our 
world responsibilities, rather than Kow we fulfill 
this mission. In the final analysis it is the product 
of our endeavors and not the technique that 

Secretary Names Advisory Committee 
on International Book Programs 

Press release 614 dated October 11 

Secretary Rusk announced on October 11 the 
appointment of the Government Advisory Com- 
mittee on International Book Programs, a group 
of leaders in tlie book industry to work with the 
Government to determine the effective means 
for increasing the number of readers abroad of 
American books. 

The committee has been established as a result 
of a suggestion made by Attorney General 
Eobert F. Kennedy in a speech before the Ameri- 


The AO- 


can Booksellers Association last June, 
torney General said : 

The communist deluge of printed matter is disturbing? 
It is that, but it should not be frightening. For we in 
this country can compete with anyone in communicatini 
ideas. We should not shrink from a contest in the fonr 
of the printed word. . . . Our greatest advantage is thai 
we are a free society. Books are created in respons«l^J{ 
to the need for knowledge, the need for education, anc 
the need for entertainment. They are not created at the 
whim of a totalitarian state .... 

American books reflect our common heritage with manjJWe 
other nations and their influence upon our culture. Thi< jj 
influences are endless, linking us with the rest of thi 
world. Thus, they are good ambassadors for us. . . . I* 
This is a joint effort. We In Government must do mor«i atk 
and we are calling upon you in the book industry to d [pf( 


In asking Curtis G. Benjamin, chairman of th ri^ei 

board, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., to be chain [ect; 

man of the committee, Secretary Rusk said: 

The paucity of American books available abroad i( '^ 
disturbing, while the demand and the need for such booh< ipac 
is great. Our progress — governmental and private — must jjj 
be expanded and given as much substance as possibli- 
The need for all of this stands by its^elf, but we cannc. 
ignore the enormous efforts In this field by the Sovi«( 

Other members of the committee are : 

Jerome Hardy, executive vice president. Time, Inc. 
John Howe, assistant to the president, Encyclopaedi 

Britannica, Inc. 
William Kelty, assistant general manager, Reader 

Igor Kropotkin, vice president and manager, Scribni 

Freeman Lewis, executive vice president, PocketbooW 

Andrew McNally III, president. Rand McNally 
M. R. Robinson, president. Scholastic Book Services 
William Spaulding, president, Houghton Mifflin Co. 
Franklin Watts, president, Franklin Watts, Inc. 
W. Bradford Wiley, president, John Wiley & Sons 
Thomas Wilson, director. Harvard University Press 







Government representatives on the committt* -^ 
are Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Edv 
cational and Cultural Affairs, Department (- « 
State; Donald M. Wilson, Deputy Director, U.!| 
Information Agency; and Frank Coffin, Deput 
Administrator for Operations, Agency for Inte 
national Development. 

The first meeting of the committee will tal' 
place October 16 in the Department of State 


IS f( 



Depar/menf of S/afe Bu/Ze." 



iternational Coffee Agreement 
igned at New York 

atement hy Adlai E. Stevenson 

.S. Representative to the United Nations'^ 

I address you today with a deep sense of grati- 
ation and pleasure. After many long months 
23reparation and 7 weeks of intense negotiations, 
3 are met here to sign the new world coffee 
reement so that it may be ratified and put into 

lis' feet as quickly as possible. 

Few economic agreements negotiated in recent 
ars equal this pact in importance and potential 
ipact. Coffee is a pervasive factor in the lives 
millions in Africa, Latin America, and else- 
tiere. It provides them their daily bread and 
elds for their governments the foreign exchange 
icessaiy for vital imports and for the financing 
■ economic and social development. Without a 
Eible, adequate income from this major cash crop, 
itold millions of people in many lands would be 
lable to travel the road to a better life. 

,,il,i So, Mr. Chairman, this occasion should be 
arked by soleimiity and joy. The despair of re- 

ito nt years caused by price declines and mounting 
rpluses, cannot be undone overnight, but the 
iture now looks more hopeful. 
Long preparation and difficult negotiation have 
ought us to this day. The obstacles were great, 
lie price objectives of the agreement, the means 
operating it, the powers to be granted to the 
Duncil, the division of export quotas, the respec- 
ve obligations of producing and consuming coun- 
ies — all these were formidable issues. Perhaps 
ost formidable of all was the root problem it- 
If : overproduction of coffee and the resulting 

^' :cess stocks. Many prophets flatly predicted that 

fp"' would be impossible to overcome all these issues 
id that tlie whole effort was doomed. 




' Made at the U.N. Coffee Conference at New York. N.Y., 
the occasion of the signing of the International Coffee 
freement on Sept. 28 (U.S./U.N. press release 4049). 
)r a statement made on July 10 by W. Michael Blumen- 
al, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Conference, 
e Bulletin of Aug. 6, 1962, p. 234. 

cfober 29, 7962 

But these prognosticators were proved wrong, 
and the credit for that proof goes to you, the dele- 
gates here assembled who have created this agree- 
ment which we are about to sign. By this docu- 
ment you have enabled all the countries concerned 
to move beyond the present short-term arrange- 
ment, with all its weaknesses, and have overcome 
problems with which that arrangement could not 
begin to deal. This agreement takes a long step 
toward reconcilmg the varied mterests of import- 
ers and exporters — and thus toward establisliing 
a universal coffee policy for the world. 

Lest we succumb to the temptation of relaxing 
our efforts, let us be clear, Mr. Chairman, that, 
while the agreement tells us what should be done, 
it does not assure that it will be done. The main 
tasks are therefore ahead of us. We must put this 
agreement into force quickly. We must apply its 
provisions fairly. We must strive to make it a 
truly universal agreement which will bring bene- 
fits to all who are prepared to undertake its obli- 
gations. And we must use the agi"eement as a basis 
for the evolution of a common coffee policy — ^not 
only as regards international trade but also as 
regards agreed production policies. Thus we may 
assure by this agreement that those to whom the 
future in coffee fairly belongs shall ultimately 
realize it. 

These are not easy matters. This agreement is 
more comprehensive than any other commodity 
agreement that has ever come into effect. It will 
take statesmanship and skill to put life into the 
agreement and to enable it to survive the pressures 
that will inevitably arise against it. Important 
decisions must be taken periodically on export 

The Council will have very important duties. 
It must recommend policies regarding production 
and stocks. It must assure that the price objec- 
tives of the agreement are met and that the agree- 
ment does not unwittingly treat some members 
harshly while unduly benefiting others. It should 
be instrumental in persuading nations to eliminate 
imreasonable tariff, tax, or price practices which 
tend to reduce consumption. Exporters and im- 
porters should be able to obtain guidance and as- 



President Urges Early Consideration 
of Coffee Agreement by Congress 

statement hy President Kennedy 

White House press release dated September 28 

It gives me great satisfaction tbat the Interna- 
tional Coffee Agreement was signed today [Septem- 
ber 28] at the United Nations in New York. It 
was signed on behalf of our country by Ambassador 
Adlai E. Stevenson and our principal negotiator, 
W. Michael Blumenthal, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for Economic Affairs. I am submitting 
tlie agreement to the Senate ^ nest week and shall 
urge that it be considered early in the next Congress. 
Since we account for 50 percent of world coffee im- 
ports, the agreement cannot take effect until ratified 
by the United States. 

The agreement is a heartening example of inter- cooperation to resolve a vitally important 
economic problem. Coffee is the third most traded 
commodity in the world and is the main source of 
foreign income in many underdeveloped countries, 
particularly in Latin America. A drop of 1 cent a 
pound for green coffee costs Latin American pro- 
ducers $50 million in export proceeds — enough to 
seriously undercut what we are seeking to accom- 
plish by the Alliance for Progress. 

The agreement fixes export and import quotas for 
coffee. To assure that prices to consumers are fair 
and reasonable, importing nations have an equal 
voice with exporters in fixing quotas. Fifty-eight 
countries took part in the negotiations, and some 
70 nations may eventually join in this agreement 
covering the bulk of world trade in coffee. 

' On Oct. 4 the agreement was submitted to the 
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. 

sistance through the agreement in order to comply 
with their quota obligations. 

But, most important, the Comicil should be- 
come an instrument for charting the future for 
coffee. The world can no longer afford the an- 
archy which has so often marked the international 
coffee market. Nations which depend heavily on 
coffee cannot intelligently chart their futures 
while at the mercy of the whims of their coffee- 
producing rivals. It will be wasteful and dis- 
tressing if, through this agreement, better coordi- 
nation is not realized internationally in all facets 
of coffee production and trade. Indeed, we may 
doubt that the agreement itself will survive a 
failure to develop common policies in these 





Mr. Chairman, for many countries economic 
progress, coffee, and international aid are bouni 
together. If, therefore, this agreement is succes 
fully operated, it will make a major contributic 
to economic and social development. Millions ( 
the underprivileged may, because of this agre 
ment, achieve the political progress and til 
greater dignity that comes with freedom froi 

The United States Government has long recoj. 
nized this. For this reason we pledged ourselv^ 
at Punta del Este'' and at many other intern; 
tional forums to work for relief and resolution ( 
the world's commodity problems. 

My Government intends to seek early ratific 
tion of the agreement and the necessary impl 
menting legislation. We expect to be able to plf4 ■""'' 
a full :-ole in the agi'eement early next year, whi 
we hope the Council will hold its first meetin 
Meanwhile we shall cooperate in every way avail 
able to us with those nations in the short-ter 
agreement and outside of it who are striving f 
these same goals. 

Mr. Chairman, I cannot exaggerate the respo: 
sibility that now lies on all of us to put this agre 
ment into effect and to make it work. For i 
significance extends far beyond the coffee mark* 
important as that is. It can serve, if it succeec 
as an example for the creative solution of tl 
major commodity problems of the world. 

The main problems of coffee are also the pro 
lems of other primary commodities in the wor 
market: declining prices, cyclical ups and dowr 
and resulting uncertainty about foreign exchanj, 
earnings which can sometimes wreck the mo 
carefully designed national economic developmei 

The United States here renews its pledge to pU 
an active and constructive part in tlie solution < 
world commodity problems. President Kennec 
has emphasized that this is one of the major obje^ „,ju,j 
tives of United States foreign economic polic 
We are determined to do our part in this caus 
whose success means so nuicli to the world in thi 
Decade of Development. 

In examining the text of the agreement whici 
we are about to sign, Mr. Chairman, I could n^ 
help noticing that there is a lot of space left fi 
extra signatures. I take this as evidence of tl 
great Iiopes we all have that all, or nearly all, tl 




en Si 
















MI l[ 

' For background, see ihid., Sept. 11. 1901, p. 4.50. 

Department of State Bullet 

(fee importing and exporting interests of the 
)rld will become members of this agreement. 
We in this hall represent a great diversity : na- 
ms both old and new; exporters and importers; 
ne far along the road of economic development, 
s jm ne just at the beginning of the road. But from 
it diversity, even that clash of interests, we have 
nposed a harmony. Now let us see if we can 
rform our own composition and thereby earn 
rf,, i applause of the world. 










jrrent Actions 


topi omic Energy 

lendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter- 
aational Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at 
Vienna October 4, 1961.' 

i.cwptance deposited: Cuba, October 11, 1962; Nica- 
ragua, October 9, 1962. 
r'l*l atute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into 
force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873. 
RatifiGation deposited : Liberia, October 5, 1962. 

itomotive Traffic 

nvention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Gen- 
3va September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 
1952. TIAS 2487. 
Notification 7-eceired that it considers itself bound: 

Togo, February 27, 1962. 
nvention concerning customs facilities for touring. 
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force 
September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879. 
Ratification deposited : Ecuador, August 30, 1962. 
istoms convention on the temporary importation of 
private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. 
Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943. 
Ratification deposited : Ecuador, August 30, 1962. 

iltural Relations 

;reement for facilitating the international circulation 
of visual and auditory materials of an educational, sci- 
entifie, and cultural character, and protocol. Done at 
Lake Success July 15, 1949. Entered into force Au- 
gust 12, 19.54.= 
Acceptance deposited: Brazil, August 15, 1962. 

IBH ,w Of the Sea 

*)' )nvention on the territorial sea and contiguous zone.' 

Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. 

Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, August 31, 1962. 
ail-lmvention on the continental shelf.' Done at Geneva 

April 29, 1958. 

Accession deposited: Bulgaria, August 31, 1962. 

mvention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29 


Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, August 31, 1962. 

Entered into force: September 30, 1962. 

Not in force. 

Not in force for the United States. 

icfober 29, 7962 


Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating 
the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 
Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Geneva July 13, 
1931. Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543. 
'Notification received that it considers itself hound: 
Togo, February 27, 1962. 

Protocol bringing under international control drugs out- 
side the scope of the convention limiting the manufac- 
ture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs 
concluded at Geneva July 1.3, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as 
amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris 
November 19. 1948. Entered into force for the United 
States September 11, 19.50. TIAS 2308. 
Notification received that it considers itself hound: 
Togo, February 27, 1962. 

Safety at Sea 

Amendment of regulation 30, chapter III (inflatable 
liferafts), annexed to the international convention for 
the safety of life at sea signed June 10, 1948 (TIAS 
2495) . Done at London May 1955.' 

Acceptances: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Re- 
public, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, 
Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, 
France, Gabon, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, 
Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Is- 
rael, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Mad- 
agascar, Federation of Malaya, JIauritauia, Monaco, 
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nor- 
way, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portu- 
gal, Senegal, Somali Republic, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab Republic, 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States, 
Venezuela, Viet-Nam, Yugoslavia. 


International sugar agreement of 1958. Done at Lon- 
don December 1, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 
1959: for the United States October 9, 19.59. TIAS 

Cessation of application to : Trinidad and Tobago, Au- 
gust 31, 1962. 


International telecommunication convention with six 
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. En- 
tered into force January 1. 1961 ; for the United States 
October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892. 

Accession deposited : Somali Republic, September 28, 


Declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at 

Geneva November 18, 1960. 

Acceptance deposited : Argentina, September 14, 1962. 

Entered into force : October 14, 1962. 
Long-term arrangements regarding international trade in 

cotton textiles. Concluded at Geneva February 9, 19(;2. 

Entered into force October 1, 1962. 

Acceptances deposited: Belgium (with statement), 
September 28, 1962; Denmark, October 1, 1962; Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany (subject to ratification 
and with statement), September 28, 1962; India, Sep- 
tember 29, 1962; Israel, Italy (.subject to ratification 
and with statement), Japan, Netherlands including 
Surinam (with statement), September 28, 1962; Nor- 
way, Spain, Sweden, October 1, 1962. 

Accession deposited: United Arab Republic, October 1, 

Extension to: Hong Kong, September 27, 1962. 


Israel accepted the follovnng instruments, pursuant to its 
deposit o/ ratification of the protocol of accession to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, June 5, 

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the 
annexes and to the texts of the schedules to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
March 7, 1955. Entered into force January 23, 1959. 
TIAS 4186. 

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the 
texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.' 

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the 
texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.' 

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to the 
texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.' 

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the 
texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 19.59.' 

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the 
texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 19.59.' 

Third protocol of supplementary concessions to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Denmark and 
Federal Republic of Germany). Done at Geneva, July 
15, 1955. Entered into force September 19, 1956. 
TIAS 3629. 

Fourth protocol of supplementary concessions to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Federal Republic 
of Germany and Norway). Done at Geneva July 1.5. 
1955. Entered into force September 19, 1956. TIAS 

Fifth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Fe<leral Republic of 
Germany and Sweden). Done at Geneva July 15. 19.55. 
Entered into force September 19, 1956. TIAS 3631. 

Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
May 23, 1956. Entered into force June 30, 1956. TIAS 

Seventh protocol of supplementary concessions to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Austria and 
Federal Republic of Germany). Done at Bonn, Febru- 
ary 19. 1957. Entered into force September 1, 1958. 
TIAS 4324. 

Eighth protocol of supplementary concessions to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Cuba and 
the United States). Done at Habana June 20, 1957. 
Entered into force June 29, 1957. TIAS 3882. 

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done 
at Geneva March 10, 1955.' 

Protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at 
Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7, 
19.57. TIAS 3930. 

Procds-verbal of rectification concerning protocol amend- 
ing part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol 
amending preamble and parts II and III, and protocol 
of organizational amendments to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 
19.5.5. Section B entered into force October 7, 1957. 

Protocol of rectifications to the French text of the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
June 15. 19.55. Entered into force October 24, 19.56. 
TIAS 3077. 

Protocol of terms of accession of Japan to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annex A (sched- 
ules of the contracting parties) and annex B (schedule 
of Japan). Done at Geneva June 7, 19.5.5. Entered into 
force September 10, 1955. TIAS 3438. 

' Not in force. 

Protocol relating to negotiations for the establishment ( ctol 
new schedule III — Brazil — to the General Agreemei 
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3i wri 
1958.' J, 







Germany, Federal Republic of 

Agreement extending the period of the loan of the U.S 
Anthony in accordance with the agreement of April 
and May 1, 1957 (TIAS 3852), relating to the loan 
certain naval vessels or small craft to the Federal R-f'S' 
public of Germany. Effected by exchange of notes 
Bonn September 19 and 25, 1962. Entered into fori 
September 25, 1962. 


Agreement extending until March 31, 1963, the reciproc 
trade agreement of September 12, 1946, as amend 
(TIAS 1601, 5000). Effected by exchange of notes 
Asunci6n September 30 and October 1, 1962. Enter- 
into force October 1, 1962. 


Agreement facilitating the interchange of patent riglJI 
and technical information for defense purposes. B 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington October 
1962. Entered into force October 4, 1962. 

United Arab Republic 

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of t 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance A 
of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-170J 
with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington Octot 
8, 1962. Entered into force October 8, 1962. 






• m(i( 


United States Establishes Embassy in Ugann 





The Department of State announced on October 
(press release 608) that the United States would elevi 
its consulate general at Kampala, Uganda, to an embas 
upon the independence of that nation on October 9, 19" nana 

Olcott H. Deming, heretofore American consul gene 
in Kampala, will become Charg6 d' Affaires ad interim 
the day of independence. 

The United States has maintained a consular ofiice 
Kampala since May 1957. An information center w*,jjj 
established there in August of the same year. A te 
nical a.ssistance program, primarily in agricultural i 
velopment and technical training, was initiated in IS 
under the United States-United Kingdom Technical ( 
operation Agreement of 1951." A mission of the Aget 
for International Development was established in Ugan 
in July 1962. 

" Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2281. 


Department of Stale Bulle 





ctober 29, 1962 Index 

Vol.jXLVII, No. 1218 

nerican Republics 

Bridge for the Americas (Ball) 645 

lited States Presents Facilities at Fort McNair 

to Inter-American Defense College (Rusk) . . 642 

lomic Energy. United States Position on Nuclear 
Testing Explained to United Nations (Steven- 
son) 635 

immunism. The U.S.S.R. in World Affairs 
(Morgan) 649 

ingress, The 

ngressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

fiJPolicy 654 

S. Delegates Leave for Conference of Inter- 
Parliamentary Union 660 

partment and Foreign Service. United States 
['"lEstalilishes Embassy In Uganda 670 

sarmament. United States Position on Nuclear 
Testing Explained to United Nations (Steven- 
son) 635 

onomic Affairs 

LG Common Market, the Atlantic Partnership, 

md the Free World (Schaetzel) 661 

ternational Coffee Agreement Signed atNev? York 

Stevenson) 667 

esident Urges Early Consideration of Coffee 

igreement by Congress (Kennedy) 668 

ade Expansion Act of 1962 Signed (Kennedy, sum- 
nary of act) 655 

irope. The Common Market, the Atlantic Part- 
aership, and the Free World (Schaetzel) . . . . 661 

reign Aid. United States Presents Facilities at 
Fort McNair to Inter-American Defense College 
(Rusk) 642 

ternational Information. Secretary Names Ad- 
visory Committee on International Book Pro- 
rams 666 

ternational Organizations and Conferences. U.S. 

Delegates Leave for Conference of Inter-Parlia- 
mentary Union 660 

OS. U.S. Welcomes 100 Investigations of Troop 
Withdrawals From Laos (White) 648 

litary Affairs. United States Presents Facilities 
jamfet Fort McNair to Inter-American Defense Col- 
lege (Rusk) 642 

irth Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Common 
Market, the Atlantic Partnership, and the Free 
World (Schaetzel) 661 

ilSfnama. A Bridge for the Americas (Ball) . . . 645 
esidential Documents 
esident Kennedy Holds Talks With Crown Prince 

Df Saudi Arabia 641 

esident Urges Early Consideration of Coffee 

Agreement by Congress 668 

r « ade Expansion Act of 1962 Signed 655 

1 !« lited States Congratulates Uganda on Inde- 
I pendence 641 

15 udi Arabia. President Kennedy Holds Talks 
With Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (text of 
joint communique) 641 

eaty Information 

irrent Actions 669 

ternational Coffee Agreement Signed at New Tork 

(Stevenson) 667 

esident Urges Early Consideration of Coffee 
Agreement by Congress 668 



United States Congratulates Uganda on Inde- 
pendence (Kennedy) 641 

United States Establishes Embassy in Uganda . . 670 


The U.S.S.R. in World Affairs (Morgan) .... 649 
U.S. Protests Soviet Violation of Attache's Diplo- 
matic Rights (text of note) 653 

United Nations 

International Coffee Agreement Signed at New 
York (Stevenson) 667 

United States Position on Nuclear Testing Ex- 
plained to United Nations (Stevenson) .... 635 

Name Index 

Ball, George W 645 

Crown Prince Faysal 641 

Kennedy, President 641,655,668 

Morgan, George A 649 

Rusk, Secretary 642 

Schaetzel, J. Robert 661 

Stevenson, Adlai E 635, 667 

White, Lincoln 648 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 8-14 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington 25, 

Releases issued prior to October 8 which appear 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 600 of Oc- 
tober 4 and 602 of October 5. 


U.S. participation In international 

Thompson sworn in as Ambassador at 

Large (biographic details). 
Consulate general in Uganda raised 

to embassy (rewrite). 
Rusk : dedication of Inter-American 

Defense College. 
Reorganization of Office of Interna- 
tional Economic and Social Affairs 

Note to U.S.S.R. on expulsion of U.S. 

naval attach^. 
Advisers to delegation to softwood 

lumber talks with Canada. 
Itinerary for visit of Grand Duchess 

of Luxembourg. 
Government Advisory Committee on 

International Book Programs named. 
Delegation to 51st conference of Inter- 
Parliamentary Union. 
Battle: "UNESCO and United States 

Ball : "A Bridge for the Americas." 
Williams : "The United States and the 

New Africa." 
Cleveland: "High Hopes and a Hard 

Cultural exchange (Poland). 
Program for visit of Crown Prince of 


*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 








































United States 
Government Printing Office 


Washington 25, D.C. 




official business 

FIVE GOALS OF U.S. foreign policy 






What U.S. foreign policy is, how it works, and the goals it is de- 
signed to achieve, are defined in this 37-page pamphlet. It contains 
the transcript of a television interview, September 24, 1902, with 
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Eobert S. McNamara, Secretary of 
Defense ; George W. BaU, Under Secretary of State ; Fowler Hamil- 
ton, Administrator, Agency for International Development ; Adlai E. 
Stevenson, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations; 
and W. W. Eostow, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Plaiming 
Coimcil, Department of State. 

Publication 7432 

20 cents 

Order Form 

Snpt. of Documents 
Govt. Printing Office 
Washington 25, D.C. 

Enclosed find: 


(cash, check, or money 
order payable to 
Supt. of Docs.) 

Please send me copies of FIVE GOALS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 



Street Address: 

City, Zone, and State: 





Vol. XLVII, No. 1219 

\ »iO"^ 

November 5, 1962 


W. W. Rostouj, Counselor 675 


FOREIGN POLICY • Address by Secretary Rusk . . 683 


HARD LOOK • by Assistant Secretary Battle and 
Assistant Secretary Cleveland 695 


by Assistant Secretary JFilUams 690 

For index see inside back cover 


Vol. XLVir, No. 1219 • Publication 7444 
November 5, 1962 

For sale by the Superintendent ot Documents 

U.S. Goverament Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.C. 


62 issues, domestic $8.60, foreign $12.2.1 

Single copy, 25 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publica- 
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau 
of the Budget (January 19, 1981). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Depaetment 
OF State Bni.LETi.N as the source will be 
appreciated. The Bulletin is inde.ted in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
and interested agencies of the 
Government u'it/i information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by the White House and the 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as tvell as 
special articles on various phases of 
internatioTUil affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and legis- 
lative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 

The Present Stage of the Cold War 

hy W. TF. Rostow 

Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council ^ 

My first duty and my great privilege this eve- 
ning is to bring you greetings from the President 
of the United States. He knows of our gathering 
and what I am about to say to you. It is quite im- 
necessary for me to tell you how deeply he is con- 
cerned with tlie affairs and the future of this city. 

No American comes to this city without long 
memories, great admiration, and a sense of the 
vital mutual commitments that bind the men, 
women, and children of Berlin to our own people 
and to the whole free world. 

My first visit here was in the late .spring of 
1946, when I came to help work out with General 
[Lucius D.] Clay and General [William H.] 
Draper [Jr.] a program of priorities for the Euhr 
coal mines and miners — priorities in steel, equip- 
ment, housing, and food — one of the first and most 
fimdamental steps in the economic recovery of 
Germany and of Europe. I was in Europe dur- 
ing the airlift of 1948-49 and watched intimately 
the diplomatic process by which the combination 
Df your courage and poise on the one liand and 
the success of the airlift on the other caused Stalin 
to abandon his brutal indirect assault upon you. 

I was here again in the spring of 1959, after 3 
iveeks in Eastern Europe. I shall never forget 
;he impact of emerging from the gray half-life of 
;he East into this vital center of democracy and 
Western life and values — in their largest sense. 
Wliat you have made Berlin since 1945 is evidently 
me of the great creative achievements of the post- 
war years. 

Now I have the honor to come here, as a member 

* Address made before the Ernst Reuter Society at the 
free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany, on Oct. 18. 

ifovember 5, 1962 

of my Government, to talk with your officials 
about longrun plans for Berlin's future and to 
meet with you tonight. 

In Washington my job is planning. And I 
must, therefore, work on selected problems along 
the whole long front of military and foreign 
policy. To help select these key planning prob- 
lems it is part of my job to scan, as it were, the 
full radar screen of international affairs; to peer 
ahead ; to form an assessment of where we of the 
free world stand in the cold war and where we 
are going; to identify the underlying trends and 
the problems for the future on which we ought to 
be working right now. 

I thought it might be of interest if I were to 
share with you tonight the kind of global assess- 
ment my job requires. 

My theme is simple: We stand at a point of 
both great danger and great hope in the cold w^ar. 
The danger is evident enough: here in Berlin, in 
Viet-Nam, in Cuba, and at many other points of 
threat, conflict, or tension. On the other hand, 
powerful forces of history are at work tending to 
unify and strengthen the fi'ee world and to dilute 
and fragment the danger we confront from the 
nations now controlled by communism. Our com- 
mon task is to hold firm and imited — as never 
before — while simultaneously working with the 
tides of history, for, in the end, history is only 
made by determined individual men and women. 

But let me begin nearer the beginning. 

I shall ti-y this evening to do four things. 
First, to draw for you a picture of how I believe 
our own policy has unfolded over the past 22 
months; second, to examine the events of this 
period from the perspective of the Communist 


bloc; third, to suggest certain broad conclusions; 
and fourth, to indicate how all this may relate to 

U.S. Policy Since January 1961 

AAHien the new administration came to Wash- 
ington in January 1961 we faced two kinds of 
problems : first, a series of urgent and dangerous 
crises; second, a series of slower moving but 
equally dangerous situations which, if constructive 
action were not taken, might slide against us and 
the free world as a whole. 

In Southeast Asia we found that the agreements 
made at Geneva in 1954 with respect to both Laos 
and Viet-Nam^ were in disarray. The United 
States is not a party to those agreements, but we 
did agree not to upset them if they were honored 
by the Communists. In January 1961 they were 
not being honored. 

In Laos there was a civil war in which Com- 
munist Pathet Lao, backed by the North Viet- 
namese, were seeking to take over the country. In 
South Viet-Nam there has been built up since 
1958 — as a result of decisions taken in Hanoi (evi- 
dently with support in Moscow and Peiping) — a 
most dangerous guerrilla war based on infiltration, 
supply, and tutelage by Communists in the north. 

In the Congo there existed all the potentialities 
for a civil war which might result in the creation 
of a Communist base in central Africa, and which 
could offer to Communists an attractive potential 
terrain for guerrilla warfare. 

In Cuba a Communist government existed, al- 
ready committed to spreading the methods of sub- 
version and guerrilla warfare, which Castro had 
used to gain power in Cuba, to the mainland of 
Latin America. 

Thus, when we read Mr. Khrushchev's speech 
of Januaiy 6, 1961, and the blessing he gave to the 
methods of subversion and guerrilla warfare, we 
took this matter very seriously indeed. We 
regarded the challenge not merely as a series of 
regional crises but part of a general Communist 
offensive designed to corrode the free world with- 
out confronting either our nuclear or our conven- 
tional military strength. All the potentialities 
existed in January 1961 for the spread of Commu- 
nist power by these methods into Southeast Asia, 

'For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: 
Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State publication 
6446, pp. 750 and 775. 


Africa, and Latin America — even the quite rapid 
spread, for Khrushchev's offensive had real 

In addition we faced the situation here in Ber- 
lin. In 1958 Mr. Khrushchev had stated his de- 
mand that the Western Powers be witlidrawn 
from Berlin and the status of the city be changed. 
Khrushchev's proposals, if accepted, could have 
made access to this city a matter over which Mr. 
Ulbriclit's [Walter u'lbricht, head of the East 
German regime] Communists could exercise a 
decisive control. By this route the Soviets aimed 
to destroy the basis for a free West Berlin; and 
at Vienna in June 1961 Khrushchev was blimt 
to the point of ultimatum in stating his determina- 
tion to loosen, if not destroy, the Western presence 




Moves To Protect Free-World Interests 

These five crises are still with us, but on each 
of tliem we have moved to protect the vital inter- 
ests of the free world and to seal off the danger of 
an extension of Communist power. 

In Laos we have encouraged the establislinient 
of the framework of a neutral and independent 
state which could permit the people of this small 
coimtry to work out their destiny in their own 
way. This framework was judged superior to the 
split of Laos. A split Laos might have turned 
over access to northern Laos to Mao and Ho Chi 
Minh — a distinctly unattractive prospect. Even- 
tually the negotiation of neutrality was achieved.' 
It is evident that the continued independence and 
neutrality of Laos will require the greatest alert- 
ness, political imagination, and determination as 
well as the determination of the people of Laos 
themselves to preserve their independence. 

In Viet-Nam we are working with the South 
Vietnamese to help them defeat the war of sub- 
version which has been imposed by the Com- 
munists and to get the North Vietnamese elements 
back where they belong — north of the 17th paral- j^ 
lei. Hero progress has been made. A situation of 
the most immediate danger has been converted 
into one which is more hopeful than it was even 
6 months ago; but the road ahead may be long 
and hard. Time has been gained in whicli to make 

an in 


its in 
nore a 

° For text of a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos 
and an accompanying protocol, see Bdlletin of Aug. 13, 
1962, p. 2rj9. 

Department of State Bullet'w 

'For a 


'for It 

a beginning on two decisive problems: the full 
engagement of the Vietnamese people in the strug- 
gle, and the problem of Commmiist infiltration 
from the north, which is ultimately linlved to the 
settlement in Laos. With respect to the former, I 
can report that the Vietnamese authorities, backed 
by our own people and others, are actively en- 
gaged in forging new constructive links between 
Saigon and the villages. The Government and 
the people of Viet-Nam are moving closer by means 
which promise not only to provide a basis for vic- 
tory but also the foundations for the longrun 
viability of Viet-Nam as a modern nation. 

In the Congo we are backing the effort of the 
United Nations to help the Congolese create a 
united, independent, and viable country.^ There 
Btill is no final solution ; we are not yet out of the 
woods, but we have come a long way. Despite 
nany difficulties the United Nations has played 
in important role in helping the Congolese toward 
he creation of a truly independent African state, 
[n doing so it helped frustrate the evident anibi- 
ion of Moscow to create a Communist base in 
;entral Africa. 

In Cuba, after the events of April 1961, we have 
vorked with our friends in Latin America and in 
'fATO to isolate the Communist government in 
riabana and to insure that the techniques of in- 
lirect aggression which the Cuban Communists 
vould like to apply to Latin Amei'ica will be frus- 
rated. We have sought the cooperation of our al- 
ies in imposing restrictions on shipments to Cuba. 
?he danger of Cuban intervention in Latin Amer- 
ca has been diminished by these actions and by 
he decisions taken by the Organization of Amer- 
can States at the Punta del Este conference last 
anuary ^ and at the recent informal session in 
V^ashington." The Western Hemisphere is now 
lore alert to the danger of subversion and guer- 
illa warfare, and it is in a legal position to move 
Dgether. To a degree, Castro has eased our task. 
lis brutal and inefficient policies toward his own 
eople, his behavior toward Latin America, his 
cceptance of subservience to Moscow have de- 
ls ev* :royed the illusion that he belonged in the authen- 

jjlonsl — 

' For a Department statement, see ibid., Sept. 10, 1962, 


°For background, see Hid., Feb. 10, 1962, pp. 267 and 


" For text of final communique, see ibid., Oct. 22, 1962, 


lovember 5, 1962 




11 oi 

tic tradition of the long Latin American struggle 
for social justice and economic progress. Our 
President has carefully defined the situations in 
which we would bring our own military force to 
bear in Cuba ; ^ we have recently taken, unilater- 
ally and with our friends, important further steps 
to isolate Cuba and to diminish the dangers it 
represents ; * and we remain committed to help the 
people of Cuba regain their independence and re- 
join the close family of Latin American nations. 
But, of coui"se, the threat of communism in Latin 
America remains. 

With respect to the city of Berlin, we formu- 
lated our position and held to it. We intend that 
Berlin shall remain free. We intend that the ac- 
cess to the West remain unencumbered. We shall 
continue the protection which the presence in Ber- 
lin of Western military forces alone can afford. 
Moreover, we intend to work with our friends in 
Berlin, in Germany, and elsewhere to help main- 
tain this city as a viable, constructive, and impor- 
tant part of the free-world community. 

The unity of the West has been maintained 
along these lines. It has been tested, certainly, 
and it will be tested again — perhaps gravely 
tested — before Khrushchev realizes that his con- 
tinued Berlin crisis is counterproductive. But 
there is not the slightest doubt about the depth, 
the seriousness, or the steadiness of the American 
and Allied commitment. 

Although Mr. Khrushchev may one day ease 
the pressure that now bears down upon you — and 
upon us — Berlin's situation will remain difficult 
so long as Germany is divided. This city will 
remain a temptation to the Communists so long 
as the cold war continues. 

U.S. Aid and Trade Programs Improved 

In addition to Berlin and these four other crises, 
we found that slow but dangerous erosion was 
taking place elsewhere. We needed, for example, 
a policy which would aline the United States ac- 
tively with the great forces in Latin America 
which seek economic development and greater so- 
cial justice. To this, our response was the Alli- 
ance for Progress. 

' Ibid., Oct. 1, 1962, p. 481. 

8 For a .statement by Under Secretary Ball, see ibid., 
Oct. 22, 1962, p. 591 ; for text of a joint congressional 
resolution, see ibid., p. 597. 


We needed a foreign aid program capable of 
alining the United States with similar forces at 
work in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. In 
those vast regions peoples and governments are 
determined to develop their status as independent 
nations and to provide for themselves and their 
children an environment of economic growth, 
progress, and human dignity. Our response was 
a foreign aid program designed to help nations 
that showed a capacity and effective will to mobi- 
lize their own energies and resources for the devel- 
opment of their societies. Our aid progi-am is 
rooted in the sound principle of self-help. It is 
designed to reward those who show a capacity and 
a will to help themselves. Legislation passed by 
the U.S. Congress in 1961 has made it possible for 
us to make reliable long-term commitments to na- 
tions with effective national development pro- 
grams. Along with our Atlantic partners and 
Japan we hope gradually to build a stable part- 
nership with the new and aspiring nations as each 
of them goes forward to the stage where it can 
qualify for this type of longrun development 

With respect to Western Europe, we found that 
our own policies and those of the Western Euro- 
pean nations had not yet come to grips with two 
massive facts: 

First, that Western Europe in the 1950's ex- 
perienced an extraordinary surge of growth and 
development and it was eager to accept a new de- 
gi-ee of authority over its own destiny and on the 
world scene ; 

Second, that the movement toward European 
unity — which we had helped foster immediately 
after the war — had gained real momentum. A 
united Europe had become a real possibility, but 
its shape and our policy toward its evolution were 
not yet determined. Witli respect to Japan we 
found that our policies had not fully taken into 
account its impulse — after a decade of growth 
quite as remarkable as that of Western Europe — 
to find a new role of dignity and responsibility on 
the world scene. 

Our response to these facts has been to encourage 
the movement toward European unity while sug- 
gesting to our European friends a new transat- 
lantic partnership, outlined particularly in the 
President's speech of last July 4.^ We are in the 

• Ibid., July 23, 1962, p. 131. 

process of working out terms of that partnership 
in military matters ; in trade, in problems of cur- 
rency and reserves ; in aiding the miderdeveloped 
areas ; and in many other areas. 

Development of New Relationships 

The development of tliese new relationships will 
take time. This is the biggest piece of interna- 
tional architecture ever undertaken in a time of 
peace. This new and complex partnership will 
evolve over years, not months. We are not dealing 
now with weak, impoverished nations, as was the 
case after the war. We are dealing with proud and 
strong nations seeking to find new relations with 
one another and with the United States, seeking 
to define their role on the world scene for the 1960's 
and beyond but doing so against the background 
of a long period of dependence on us which has 
made them more conscious of the fruits than of 
the burdens of world responsibility. This proc- 
ess — which, if successful, will add vast strength 
and stability to the free world — will certainly con- 
front difficulties ; but the related concepts of Euro- 
pean unity and Atlantic partnership are soundly 
rooted in the lessons of our common 20th-century 
experience and increasingly in the minds and 
hearts of our peoples. Similarly, we are workins 
with the Government of Japan, with the leaden 
of Japanese society — at every level — and with oui 
friends in the Atlantic community to help weav( 
the great potential contribution of Japan into th( 
fabric of the free world's constructive enterprises 

"UHiere then do we stand ? Not one of the crises 
of 1961 is yet finally solved; all are still dangerous 
but we are making progress in reducing the dan 
gers tliese crises represented, and we have formu 
lated policies with respect to each which we an 
prepared to back with all the great strength at oa 

In the longer run tasks we have undertakcj 
with respect to Latin America, to the other devel 
oping areas, and with respect to Europe am 
Japan, we know where we want to go and we ar 
moving. But we are also aware that it will tak 
many years of hard, persistent, and purposefu 
collaborative effort to achieve the creative objec 
tives we have set. 

This is roughly where we stand and where w 
are trj'ing to go — seen from the perspective c 
Washington. We see no grounds whatsoever fc 

Department of State Bulleti 













IS till 















in Ell 



if iubi 


* efl 













complacency or self-congratulation. We see rea- 
ons for confidence, for hope — and for hard, 
itubborn, common effort. 

The World Scene From Khrushchev's Point of View 

Now let me try to evoke what the world scene 
nay look like from Khrushchev's point of view. 

Since 1945 we have seen two major Communist 
•ffensives designed to extend the power and in- 
luence of communism beyond the limits which 
vere achieved as a result of World War II. 

Between 1945 and 1951 Stalin pressed hard, first 
n the West and then to the east. He tried to 
)enetrate Iran, Turkey, Greece, France, and Italy, 
nd in 1948 he blockaded Berlin. Stalin's western 
ffensive came to a halt with the Truman Doctrine, 
he Marshall Plan, the founding of NATO, and 
he success of the Berlin airlift. 

His Asian offensive, which involved the wide- 
pread use of guerrilla warfare in Indochina, 
lalaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines — as well 
s the attempt to conquer South Korea — groimd 
a halt in the spring of 1951, when the reorga- 
ized forces of the United Nations in Korea 
mattered the Chinese Communist armies at the 
8th parallel. 

After Stalin died the new group in Moscow 
lunched a series of changes in domestic, military, 
nd foreign policy which took some years to move 
orward; and they also faced a muted struggle 
or power which Khrushchev did not definitively 
?in until 1957. At home the Soviets made some 



iie iin 


oncessions to the desire of the Russian peoples 
or higher levels of consumption and greater se- 
urity from the arbitrary power of the secret 
lolice. In foreign policy, generally frustrated 
a Europe and Japan, they turned with great 

ope to the possibility of exploiting potentialities 

or expanding Communist power and influence 

1 the underdeveloped areas. In these areas the 

'^' ^ communists sought to orchestrate the instruments 

''°"'" f subversion, trade, and aid; they appealed to 

nticolonial and nationalist sentiments; and they 

'^*' ought to project an image of communism as the 

. lost efficient method for modernizing an imder- 

'P*. eveloped region. In military policy the Soviets 

"" loved forward — on a smaller scale than we 

bought at the time — with nuclear weapons and 

lissiles, seeking to bring nuclear blackmail to 

ear in their diplomacy as early as 1956. They 

fovemfaer 5, J 962 

developed and exploited their big rockets to exe- 
cute certain glamorous enterprises in space, and 
they sought to exploit them psychologically and 

In 1958, in the wake of the first Sputniks, Khru- 
shchev's offensive, based on these dispositions, be- 
gan to take shape. It was in 1958 that Khrushchev 
began to adopt a tougher line on Berlin. It was 
in 1958 that the Communist Party in Hanoi an- 
nounced that it would seek to overthrow the re- 
gime in Saigon by guerrilla warfare and then pro- 
ceeded systematically to try to do so. It was in 
this post-Sputnik period, also, that the Commu- 
nists set about to exploit the turbulence and con- 
fusion of the Congo; they seized power in Cuba; 
and they conducted a most vigorous political, 
economic, and subversive campaign in the under- 
developed areas. 

Communist Clima also caught the fever. It 
was in this post-Sputnik period tliat Mao an- 
nounced that "the east wind was prevailing over 
the west." The "great leap forward" and the com- 
munes were engineered in 1958, and an effort was 
made in that year to blockade Quemoy and Matsu. 

The hard military strength underlying this of- 
fensive was not as great as it then appeared to 
the world. The Russians, in fact, maintained a 
very high priority for defensive armaments ; they 
built an IRBM [intermediate-range ballistic mis- 
sile] force with which they hoped to hold Europe 
in nuclear hostage; and they moved more slowly 
toward an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic mis- 
sile] capability. Nevertheless, taking the post- 
Sputnik offensive as a whole, it seemed to have a 
real momentum. 

Communist OHensive In Disarray 

Today — due, as I would wish to emphasize, not 
merely to actions we and our allies have taken 
but to forces which are at work deep within the 
Communist bloc — Khrushchev's and Mao's post- 
Sputnik offensive is in disarray. 

Mao's "great leap forward" has utterly failed. 
Chinese Conmiunist policy was based on the view 
that they stood in the late 1950's where Stalin 
stood in the early 1930's. They believed great- 
power status was in their grasp. Such great-power 
status has now moved at least a decade away from 
them — and to move forward at all they face deci- 
sions thus far too painful for them to take, deci- 
sions which, in my view, require among other 



things that the peasant families of China be given 
back the incentive to work and the freedom to 
work effectively. Meanwliile, the tendency toward 
the dilution of Moscow's control over the world's 
Communist parties has continued, marked by the 
drama of the Sino-Soviet split. Moreover, tlie 
inability of communism to organize efficiently tlie 
production of food has weakened drastically the 
Communist position in East Germany, in Cuba, 
and elsewhere, as well as in China. 

At home Klirushchev staked a good deal on his 
capacity to provide tlie Kussian peoples with an 
increase in the quality of their food and housing. 
He announced in 1957 a campaign to overtake 
within 3 years U.S. production of meat, milk, and 
butter, and he sought to provide an adequate sup- 
ply of grain for an expanding popidation by open- 
ing up the vast virgin lands. He has now Iiad 
to acknowledge to his people the existence of a 
continuing agricultural crisis; he has failed to 
achieve the promised supply of meat and dairy 
products; his grain production is barely keeping 
up with the expansion in population ; and he has 
instituted tliis year the first increase in food prices 
in the Soviet Union since the Second World War. 
Moreover, he must limit his housing program, 
which is passionately desired by the Russian peo- 
ples, in order to increase armaments expenditures, 
and he must do so in the certain knowledge that 
the United States is committed to military plans 
which will deny him a relative improvement in his 
nuclear position over the coming years. 

Abroad he sees that everywhere in the under- 
developed areas the momentum of his offensive has 
slowed down. There are still Communist ojjpor- 
tmiities, but whether one looks to Asia, the Middle 
East, Africa, or Latin America, the tendency of 
the underdeveloped countries to assert their inde- 
pendence against the Communists, as well as our- 
selves, is, from his point of view, a fundamentally 
discouraging sign. 

Doctrinally, Marxism is increasingly viewed by 
the young as a voice from the past, not as a guide 
to the present and the future ; and communism, as 
a technique for organizmg either an advanced or 
an underdeveloped society, is increasingly per- 
ceived as inefficient and reactionary, as well as 
profoundly inhumane. 

Communist beliefs and expectations have tlius 
been belied by the movement toward unity in 
Europe; by the solidity of NATO in the face of 


the Berlin crisis; by the emerging transatlantic 
partnership; by the determination of the peoples 
and governments in the developing areas to main- 
tain their independence; and by the corrosion of 
the economic life of the Communist bloc, notably 
in the agricultural sector. i 

Finally, under these gathering pressures and thai dis] 
persistence of nationalism beneath the surface oflknc 
states dominated by communism, a tendency has 
developed toward fragmentation within the Com- 
munist bloc and toward a progressive loosening of 
Moscow's control over the Communist parties* brii 
around the world. 

There is now no Communist Party which is not, 
in one way or another, diverted and preoccupied 
by the schismatic debate centered on the Sino- 
Soviet conflict and the issues of ideology, power, 
and policy related to that conflict. 






Response of the Western World 

The vision of the world as seen from Moscow 
has thus substantially changed in the past 2 years 
The policies which Khmshchev set in motion aftei 
he had acquired leadership of the Soviet Unior 
have failed to achieve a breakthrough ; meanwhile 
the resjjonse of the Western World — plus the cor 
rosive dynamics within the Communist bloc — hav( 
intertwined to produce a deep but quiet crisis ii 
the histoi-y of communism. Moscow must ask it 
self : Where do we go from here ? 

In the short run, the answer may well be Berlin 
It is possible that Mr. Ivlirushchev may miscal 
culate the will and the strength of the Allies anc 
will attempt to precipitate another crisis in thi; 

The United States and its allies are seeking t( 
make their will sufficiently evident to deter tha 
crisis. If not, we have ready a number of measure; 
designed to meet it. I cannot, of course, go int( _^^'"i 
the details of what these measures are. I can sa^ 
that the measures are M'ide ranging and are de 
signed to take into account a wide variety of cir 
cumstances. I can say that our allies are awar>l 
of them and will support them. We are in con 
stant consultations with Cliancellor Adenauer anc 
his officials in Bonn, with our other allies, anc 
with your redoubtable ilayor. Will}' Brandt, wh 
has recently been in consultation with Secretar 
of State Dean Rusk and President Kennedy. 

They know our resolve. I am sure the peopl 
of Berlin kiiow our resolve. The danger is tha 

Deparfment of State Bulletii 




>f coll 
»lio, a 





;he Soviets may not appreciate fully our resolve ; 
3r, if they do, they may not appreciate tlie con- 
sequences if they confront it. It is our hope that 
-his crisis, precipitated by a miscalculation of the 
trength, unity, and determination of the West, can 
36 peacefully resolved; but come what may, our 
iispositions are made. We are ready, and we 
£now you are ready ; and we're in this together. 

But let us look beyond the difficult months 

The great tasks of the free world are these : to 
)ring to maturity the unification of Western 
Europe; to bind up in new unity the more ad- 
Lol ranced nations of Western Europe, North Amer- 
ca, and Japan in global partnership, with shared 
•esponsibility ; to build new constructive ties of 
partnership between these mainly northern na- 
ions and the developing nations which lie mainly 
o the south — in Latin America, Africa, the Middle 
East, and Asia; to defend the borders of the 
merging community of independent nations by 
generating the military forces, the political unity, 
ind the will this task demands ; and to work with 
he forces of nationalism and liberalism which may 
imerge within the Commimist bloc and thus to 
ixtend the writ of freedom for nations and for 

These large objectives are not abstract or re- 
note. They are the goals which suffuse inti- 
nately what we do from day to day. At the 
noment they are particularly vivid in my mind, 
'or I come to Berlin after several days in Paris 

orking on concrete tasks designed to contribute 
o the building of the Atlantic partnership. I 
lame to Paris fresh from a conference in Puerto 
iico, wliere more than 40 nations — from the more 
leveloped and less developed areas, from the north 
md the south — pressed forward with voluntary 
rrangements of the Peace Corps type and with 
)ther steps to train the manpower in the develop- 
ng nations in badly needed modern skills." 





The Mission of Berlin 

And now I am in Berlin, one of the great points 
)f cold-war confrontation, where our strength, 
mity, and will are under test, close by the men 
,nd women of East Berlin and East Germany, 
'" vho, against their will, are cut off from their 
fi"' umilies, their nation, and the way of life tliey 
vould freely choose. 

I believe Berlin has a mission in all the major 
dimensions of the free world's policy. Looking 
ahead, the wall which cuts tragically across this 
city need not diminish the contribution you can 
make to the cause of freedom in all its aspects. 
You are not the passive wards of the West ; you are 
partners in a great global effort. 

Working closely with your brothers in the Fed- 
eral German Republic, you can play your part in 
all the economic and cultural enterprises of a 
unifying Europe and an expanding Atlantic part- 
nership; you can, with your special human and 
industrial skills, play your part in the great adven- 
ture of assisting the developing nations ; you have 
the proud duty of standing cool and firm at one 
among several crucial points along the frontiers 
of freedom ; and, along with those allied with you, 
you can play your part in bringing peacefully and 
gradually to an end the barrier that now divides 
Germany and Europe. 

For be clear : My Government has not forgotten 
or abandoned the mutual commitments made dur- 
ing the war years. 

The agi-eements made between the Allies fight- 
ing Nazi Germany envisaged that the occupation 
after the war would have as its aim the restoration 
of Germany to the family of nations. As late as 
1955, at the Four Power summit conference at 
Geneva, the Heads of Government reaffirmed that 
understanding and directed the foreign ministers 
conference to carry it out." I need not remind 
you that the Soviet Union did not honor this com- 
mitment. But the United States and its allies 
have not wavered from that aim nor abandoned 
their purpose. Wliat exactly is their pledge ? As 
expressed in terms of the 1955 directive, my Gov- 
ernment remains committed to the proposition 

. . . the settlement of the German question and the 
re-unification of Germany by means of free elections 
shall be carried out in conformity with the national inter- 
ests of the German people and the interests of European 

If we can build the great northern partner- 
ship — with its massive superiority in resources and 
men ; if we can create new relations of dignity and 
common enterprise with the emerging nations to 
the south; if we can mobilize steadily the 
resources, political unity, and will necessary to 
defend the frontiers of freedom; if we can, 

' For background, see ibid., Oct. 22, 1962, p. 628. 
inWovember 5, 1962 

" For text of the Directive to Foreign Ministers of July 
23, 1955, see ibid., Aug. 1, 1955, p. 176. 



through the fog of cold war, work constructively 
with the forces of nationalism and liberalism that 
exist or may emerge within the Communist bloc, 
the day may come sooner than we might believe 
when those who rule within what we call the Com- 
munist bloc will imderstand two things : first, that 
world conquest or domination is an impossible and 
dangerous goal ; second, that in a world of nuclear 
weapons, effectively inspected measures of arms 
control and disarmament are a universal interest 
which they fully share. 

If the free world has the wit and the will to per- 
sist along the lines of present policy — for it surely 
commands the resources — the day will surely come 
when Moscow — and Peiping, too — will have to 
decide whether to persist in their thrust for exter- 
nal power, under progressively less advantageous 
terms, or to end tlie cold war and make their terms 
as important but not dominating units within the 
family of nations and of men. If on that day the 
decision is correctly made, it will be clear that the 
maintenance of a divided Germany and a divided 
Europe makes no sense. 

Wliether and when that day comes about 
depends in large part on how the affairs of the 
free world are conducted: It is not an outcome 
to be awaited, but an outcome to be created; it 
depends on how we comport ourselves in the face 
of both our immediate crises and the possibilities 
opened to us by the deeper tides of history. 

It is, clearly, a mission for us all. 

Secretary Rusk Stresses Role 
of U.S. Missions in Export Drive 

Press release 634 dated October 10 

Secretary Rusk on October 19 sent a letter to 
American ambassadors abroad lohich stresses their 
role and that of their senior staff members in giv- 
ing maximttm support to the export drive. The 
text of Secretary RusJc's letter folloios. 

October 19, 1962 
Dear Mr. Ambassador : I am gratified that, even 
though no specific reply was requested, a large 
number of our Chiefs of Mission have responded 
to Under Secretary Ball's letter of May 11, 1962.^ 
That letter renewed the call, in conjunction with 
the implementation of the State-Commerce Agree- 

' Not printed here. 

ment on International Commercial Activities, for 
maximum support of the export drive. 

I am also heartened that our Chiefs of Mission 
realize that the Export Expansion Program is not 
a bureaucratic device to export more work to our 
posts but a fundamental effort to increase our ex- 
ports and thereby to improve our balance of pay- 
ments. It is apparent to me, as I know it is to you, 
that there is a direct correlation between the level 
of our exports and our ability to accomplish many 
of our important foreign policy objectives. 

The Executive, from the President on down, 
is vitally mterested in expanding the volume of 
American exports. "We know that in order to 
succeed we must have a direct and active partici- 
pation in trade promotion by all of our Chiefs of 

The role of our Chiefs of Mission is subject to 
change. Wliat was traditional and helpful yester- 
day may be outmoded and inadequate today. I 
have come to the conclusion that this is the case 
as regards trade promotion. Mission Chiefs, 
their deputies, and indeed all top officials of the 
mission have many acquaintances in host govern- 
ment ministries and in business and other circles 
who can be sources of trade leads for our manu- 
facturers and exporters. Not only commercial of- 
ficers but the entire mission is obligated to be alert 
to these opportunities. 

In today's competitive markets we can do no 
less than our competitors, short of participating 
in actual sales or giving unfair competitive ad- 
vantage to one American company over another. 
In the absence of explicit restrictions in the regu- 
lations, it is left to the discretion of the Chief of 
Mission as to how far to go in assisting American 
businessmen establish trade connections. 

Admittedly, competitor nations historically 
have a larger dependence on export trade than 
we. The governments of those countries there- 
fore have a deeply imbedded tradition of assistance 
to their traders which they continue to follow 
But we have no mean tradition ourselves. In the 
early years of our Republic, our Ambassadors and 
Consuls had a pi-imary mission of promoting our 
commerce and trade, and made a significant con- 
tribution to the success of the "clipper ship" era 
in world commerce. Perhaps we need to recap- 
ture some of the zeal of our forebears, for we are 
in the export business not just for today and to 
morrow but for the long haul. Accordingly, 1 

Department of State Bulletin 


fc! Spi 




Trade, Investment, and United States Foreign Policy 





am requesting that you as well as your principal 
aides be alert to and seek out export opportunities 
for American business. 

I should like to add a word about relations be- 
tween the mission and the local American business 
community. Wliere such a community exists, the 
success of your trade promotion effort is heavily 
dependent upon the strength of these relations. 

I therefore urge that you re-examine this situa- 
tion as it concerns your mission as well as the Con- 
sular Officers under your supervision. Many 

Ambassadors have found it useful to meet regu- 
larly with the leaders of the American business 
commimity in order to brief them on foreign pol- 
icy developments and to obtain from them what- 
ever assistance they may have to offer in both 
foreign policy and trade promotion matters. I 
am confident that such cooperation cannot help 
but work to our mutual benefit. 

Dean Rttsk 

Address hy Secretary Busk ' 

I welcome this opportunity to talk with this dis- 
tinguished group of American business leaders. I 
shall talk about the contribution of American 
business to furthering the key foi'eign policy ob- 
jectives of the United States. I should like to see 
the business community focus its unique skills and 
resources on this great task. 

I am not suggesting that businesses slaould 
make uneconomic investments or sacrifice the in- 
terests of stockholders, employees, or old custom- 
ers. Quite the contrary. It is precisely those 
skills of management and organization, the imagi- 
nation and the flexibility which a firm must have 
to operate at a profit, that make the contribution 
of business so essential to our foreign policy. 

What is the basic goal of our foreign policy? 
In President Kennedy's words, it is : ". . . a peace- 
ful world community of free and independent 
states, free to choose their own future and their 
own system so long as it does not threaten the 
freedom of others." ^ 

This is the kind of world community envisioned 
by the Charter of the United Nations and, we 

* Made In behalf of Secretary Rusk by William C. Fos- 
ter, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, before the National Business Advisory Council at 
Hot Springs, Va., on Oct. 19 (press release 633). 

' Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159. 

November 5, 1962 

believe, desired by the great majority of mankind. 

In working toward that goal we try to pursue a 
coordinated strategy. First, we are determined 
to hold in check tliose who have an utterly differ- 
ent concept of world order — who seek to impose 
their coercive system on all others. We must 
maintain our ability to deter Communist aggres- 
sion in all its fonns. With our allies, we have 
that ability. And we have the will to use it. We 
hope that neither Moscow nor Peiping will make 
the terrible mistake of underestimating President 
Kennedy's resolve to defend the vital interests of 
the free world. 

While we join with others to protect the free 
world, we work to build its strength and bind it 
together. As one of tlie main components of this 
constructive strategy we seek an ever closer part- 
nership with Western Europe and Japan and other 
industrialized countries. As part of this objec- 
tive, we must multiply the ties of commerce among 
the advanced nations. 

Another main component m our constructive 
strategy is aid to the underdeveloped nations of 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America in modernizing 
their economies and social systems. This re- 
quires, among other things, spreading the techni- 
cal and especially the managerial skills of modern 
industiy. We must assist the developing nations 


in demonstrating that by acquiring these modern 
skills they can escape the age-old scourge of pov- 

In carrjdng out our foreign policy American 
business has two fundamental roles. First, busi- 
ness is the key factor in maintaining a dynamic 
domestic economy. Secondly, business must ex- 
pand its present important role in the world econ- 
omy. The dynamism that has been central in the 
development of the United States must now be em- 
ployed on a global scale. 

Need for a Growing Domestic Economy 

A growing domestic economy is essential to our 
foreign policy for several reasons. The larger our 
gross national product, the less burdensome will 
be the costs of our defense structure and of our 
aid to developing nations. At present we are de- 
voting close to 10 percent of our gross national 
product to defending and building the free world. 
Obviously an annual growth rate of 4 or 5 per- 
cent in our economy would help more than a 
growth rate of 2 or 3 percent to lighten this 

An expanding domestic economy is necessary, 
moreover, to insure the vigor and progress — the 
technological advances and increases in produc- 
tivity — which make us competitive in world mar- 
kets. It is needed also to absorb growing imports 
from both advanced and developing nations. 
And it is needed to demonstrate the continuing 
ability of our economy to improve the life of our 

The performance of the advanced nations — of 
Western Europe, of Japan, of the United States — 
has dealt a crippling blow to Marxist-Leninist 
theory and propliecy. According to the archaic 
notions of the Communists, the industrialized na- 
tions of the free world should be sinking in a quag- 
mire of depression while slashing each other's 
throats in a savage struggle for survival. In- 
stead they have ascended to unprecedented levels 
of prosperity and unprecedented cooperation. 

But it is not enough to prove that tlie Commu- 
nists are wrong in predicting the collapse of capi- 
talism. They make further claims — to having 
invented shortcuts to economic development and 
better ways to improve the lot of the average man. 
We know they are wrong on both counts. And 
throughout the world men who formerly seemed 

to attach some worth to such Communist boasts 
are realizing increasingly how hollow they are. 

We must all strive to make ever clearer and 
greater the superiority of our system over the 
Communist system in bettering the lot of the ordi- 
narj^ man. 

These briefly are some of the main implications 
of domestic business activity for our foreign 
policy. The international trade and investment 
of American business also are important in our 
global strategy. In the rest of my remarks I 
should like to sketch out some of the major impli- 
cations for our foreign policy of American exports, 
imports, and participation in foreign enterprises. 

The Role of Exports 

First of all, we must increase our exports — and 
at a faster rate than in the past. The strength of 
the dollar, our ability to maintain overseas mili- 
tary forces and installations essential to the secur- 
ity of the free world, and our ability to continue 
economic assistance rest heavily on the shoulders 
of American exporters. 

Tlie stability of the dollar and of the free-world 
monetary system will not permit indefinite deficits 
in the United States balance of payments. We 
are taking a variety of measures to meet this prob- 
lem. The result has been a considerable reduc- 
tion in our payments deficit. However, we still 
face a hard-core deficit. Theoretically we could 
wipe it out — and indeed create a surplus — by 
reducing drastically our overseas expenditures for 
defending and building the free world. Military 
defense accounts for soine $3 billion a year of our 
dollar outflow, and foreign aid for approximately 
$1.3 billion. However, it would be suicidal to bal 
ance our payments by weakening our deterrence 
to Communist aggression. And it would be short 
sighted and ultimately very costly to reduce 
sharply our assistance to the less developed 

The sound, constructive way to close the remain- 
ing gap in our balance of payments is by expand- 
ing exports. In tlie old rhyme the kingdom was 
lost for want of a nail. In our case our global 
strategy could be undennined by failure to export. 

The Government, through its trade promotion 
program, is attempting to stinuilate greutei 
exports, but the basic job here is one for business, 
not Government. I would like, however, tc 


Department of Slate Bu//efif(j|l||>, 







ini MS 



remind you briefly of the services the Government 
is providing to assist businesses increase export 
sales. We are building up our export promotion 
activities. Our Foreign Service posts are placing 
new emphasis on commercial services. These 
services now include new trade centers and 
increased participation in trade fairs and trade 
missions. I hope you will find these activities 
useful and that you will suggest ways in which 
they can be improved. I have also recently in- 
."tructed our chiefs of mission to take an active 
personal part in assisting American firms to ex- 
pand export markets.^ 

Secondly, we now have the powers of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962.^ The administration in- 
tends to use this new legislation vigorously as an 
instrument for opening the way for American 

Wliat are the prospects of increasing our ex- 
ports? I think they are good for the short run, 
excellent for the longer run. The debate on the 
Trade Expansion Act made an important con- 
tribution, I think, to overcoming defeatism regard- 
ing American exports. Plainly, many of our 
commercial exports are highly competitive in 
world markets. In 1961 our exports, excluding 
military grant aid, totaled more than $20 billion. 
Our imports totaled $14.7 billion. After deduct- 
ing Government-financed exports of more than 
$2.3 billion, we had a commercial export surplus 
of $3 billion. 

Looking ahead one can see many favorable fac- 
tors. For example, European wages and prices 
are rising faster than ours. European delivery 
rates are stretching out as labor shortages limit 
production increases. Europe is demanding more 
and more of the labor-saving machinery typical 
of a mass-production, mass-market economy. 
And the prospective reduction of European im- 
port duties, especially on American machinery, 
equipment, advanced chemical products, and other 
products included in the special authority for 
negotiations with the European Common Market, 
should open the way for a flourishing expansion 
of our exports in the years ahead. 

Many American firms regard the world as their 
market and gear their production, product design, 
and marketing tecliniques accordingly. But I 



' See p. 682. 

'For remarks by President Kennedy and a summary 
of the act, see Bulletin of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 655. 

November 5, J 962 

fear that there are still many firms who regard 
exports — if they export at all — as marginal mar- 
kets to be served on an order-taking basis. A 
long-term rapid expansion in our exports requires 
a basic foreign market development strategy on 
the part of many more American firms, large and 
small. This global business strategy, in brief, 
means that American business must think of the 
world as its market and must seek to maximize its 
long-term profits on a world, not a national, scale. 

The Role of Imports 

The expansion of imports does not require the 
same type of effort necessary for export expan- 
sion. In the long run, however, our ability to ab- 
sorb increasing volumes of imports is essential 
both to the expansion of our export markets in 
advanced coimtries and to the development of 
less developed countries. 

We must be prepared to open the American 
market wider if we are to bargain down foreign 
barriers to our exports. Moreover, the pressure 
of foreign competition may lower our production 
costs and increase our export potential in some 
industries. I probably do not have to remind 
many of you that foreign competition forces a 
number of American industries to keep a more 
watchful eye on customer needs as well as on costs. 
These are not new arguments, and I regard the 
broad support received by the Trade Act as indi- 
cating general acceptance of these points. 

The importance of imports does not end here, 
however. If the developing nations are ever to 
be able to pay for their capital equipment needs, 
they must progressively increase their exports to 
the industrialized nations. And they cannot do 
that simply by shipping out more primary com- 
modities. The world's ability to absorb these 
commodities is limited. 

During the past decade of booming world trade, 
exports of the industrial countries, which were 
high to begin with, almost doubled in value. Ex- 
port earnings of the developing countries on the 
other hand rose by less than one-tliird. If we 
exclude petroleum, their export earnings showed 
only a moderate and, in terms of the needs, a very 
unsatisfactory rate of increase. 

Prices of primary commodities tend to fluctuate 
widely. In the case of a few, moreover, prices 
have moved persistently downward, largely be- 


cause of sluggish demand and chronic oversupply, 
with serious consequences for the development pro- 
grams of the exporting countries concerned. 

For this reason we are exploring a variety of 
devices to blunt or offset the impact of price weak- 
ness and instability in commodity markets and 
to create more stable conditions in the trade. Com- 
modity agreements such as the recently negotiated 
coffee agreement ° are one of the more important 
of these devices. We should be under no illusion, 
however, that commodity agreements in themselves 
will solve all our problems. They may prove val- 
uable and necessary in a number of instances to 
provide a breathing spell — to buy time. But the 
coffee agreement, and any other agreements wliich 
may be negotiated, will eventually fail unless we 
deal with the more fundamental problems. For 
many commodities the basic problem is overpro- 
duction. The only long-term solution we see is 
to shift resources out of production of surplus 
commodities into other areas — especially process- 
ing and manufacturing. 

In short, the situation facing many developing 
countries is this : Import requirements will increase 
as industrialization progresses; export earnings 
from primary commodities cannot be expected to 
meet these growing needs; if development is to 
continue these nations must receive more aid or 
export more processed and manufactured goods. 

The industrialized nations, and especially the 
United States and our chief European allies, face 
three choices. We can ignore the problems and 
aspirations of the less developed nations, at one 
stroke denying our faith in freedom and the dig- 
nity of man and leaving most of the world to the 
Communists. We can make ever larger dona- 
tions of foreign aid indefinitely. Or we can pro- 
gressively widen our import markets to manufac- 
tured goods from developing countries. 

The third choice, increasing our imports, is the 
only practicable policy in the long run. This will 
create some difficulties — and I emphasize again 
that all industrialized nations must join in coping 
with them. Some problems should be overcome 
through use of the trade adjustment provisions of 
the new Trade Act. Other more intractable prob- 
lems may require a common approach embracing 
all major exporting and importing nations. We 
have to face this issue directly. We must devise 

' For background, see ibid., p. 667. 

mechanisms which permit a continuous growth 
in imports of manufactures from developing na- 
tions while easing the impact on vulnerable do- 
mestic industries. 

While the main thrust of our ti-ade policy is to 
strengthen our economy and the economy of the 
free world, certain aspects of it touch directly on 
our confrontation with the Soviet bloc. I refer 
particularly to the recent congressional action in 
withdrawing the President's option to extend 
most-favored-nation treatment to Poland and 
Yugoslavia. This in effect ties our hands in a key 
area in which we are seeking to exploit cracks in 
the Soviet bloc. I hope Congress will reconsider 
its action in the next session and give the Presi- 
dent the flexibility necessary to accomplish our 

The Role of Foreign Investment 

I turn to tlie role of American investment 
abroad. Its relationship to our foreign policy if 
complex. It cannot be judged merely in terms of 
dollars. In the long run the flows of managerial 
skills and attitudes, and the ties developed be- 
tween American businessmen and their counter- 
parts in other lands, may prove far more impor- 
tant than the flow of capital alone. 

Especially in less developed areas foreign pri 
vate enterprise can be of critical importance. I' 
can demonstrate how man, by his own ingenuity 
can improve his lot. It can prove the necessity foi 
managerial as well as technical skills. It can re 
veal to often socialist-minded leaders that moden 
private enterprise can spearhead economic growth 
It can refute Communist claims that foreign busi 
ness feeds off, rather than builds up, the loca 

Most of American private investment abroad i 
in the advanced nations. Of a total of $34.7 billio 
in direct investments, as of last year, $11.8 billio 
was in Canada and $7.7 billion in Europe — c 
which $3.5 billion was in the United Kingdom an 
$3 billion within the European Common Marke 
During the past decade American businessme 
have seen the great investment potential ii 
Europe. In the short run the outflow of capit 
has placed a strain on our balance of payment 
In the longer term, however, the return flow < 
earnings, foreign subsidiaries' procurement froi 
the United States, and more generally the glob 
scope, vitality, and profitability of America 

Department of State Bullet 






firms all strengthen both the international position 
of the dollar and our domestic economy. 

As against $19.5 billion m direct private invest- 
ment in Canada and Europe, we have only $2.5 
billion in Asia and $1.1 billion in Africa. And 
these latter investments, like the $8.2 billion we 
have in Latin America, are largely in the produc- 
tion of oil and ores. 

I should like to see American business expand 
substantially its role in modernizing the economies 
of the less developed countries. Admittedly, in 
many instances, the returns may be slower and less 
certain. In some countries the risks, both political 
and economic, may be prohibitive. Yet American 
firms who participate in development in its early 
stages have the prospect of securing ground-floor 
positions in great markets of the future. 

In considering risks I shall address myself par- 
ticularly to the political risks. If we can find ways 
to minimize political risks, I am confident that 
American business ingenuity will overcome the 
economic obstacles. 

The most immediate political risk for foreign 
investment is, of course, expropriation. This can 
take either the direct form of a quick government 
takeover or a variety of indirect or partial forms 
by which the host government discriminates 
against foreign business or makes it unpossible to 
operate at a fair profit. 

Any sovereign nation has the right to expro- 
priate property, whether owned by foreigners or 
nationals. In the United States we refer to this 
as the power of eminent domain. However, the 
owner should receive adequate and prompt com- 
pensation for his property. Moreover, a legal 
right is not the same thing as a wise policy. 
Economic growth requires the expansion of capital 
resources. If an underdeveloped nation is to 
achieve self-sustaining growth in a reasonable 
period of time, it must, as a rule, obtain external 
capital. The amount of outside public funds 
available for investment is limited. And over the 
long run these public fimds will tend to go to those 
coimtries which are pursuing policies that hold 
the prospect of achieving self-sustaining growth. 
We consider it extremely unwise for developing 
nations to alienate foreign investors, thereby 
stunting economic growth. 

The United States Government is prepared to 
intercede on behalf of American firms and make 
strong representations to host governments in 

November 5, 7962 

cases of economically unjustified expropriation or 
harassment. Various forms of investment guar- 
anties are also available as insurance against cer- 
tain political risks. I am happy to announce that 
we are making substantial headway in as difficult 
an area as Latm America in putting our invest- 
ment guaranty program into effect. We have re- 
cently reached an interim agreement with the 
Colombian Government under which we are to 
extend our investment guaranty program to cover 
inconvertibility ; expropriation ; and war, revolu- 
tion, and insurrection risks. And we have high 
hopes of getting similar bilateral guaranty agree- 
ments signed in the near future in Argentina and 
several other Latin American and African coun- 
tries. We currently have one, two, or all three 
guaranties effective in 46 less developed countries. 
I hope you will make use of these insurance de- 
vices and suggest ways in which they can be 
tailored more closely to your requirements. 

Despite the importance we attach to dissuading 
governments from expropriating foreign invest- 
ments, merely to forestall expropriation is not 
enough. A good fire department and fire insur- 
ance coverage are indispensable, but basic preven- 
tion of fires — natural or political — stems from 
sound, fireproof construction and extreme care in 
handling flammable materials. American firms 
in developing nations often operate in a volatile 
political atmosphere. You cannot handle liquid 
oxygen in the same way you handle pig iron. We 
cannot assume that operating procedures, com- 
munity relations, and governmental relations will 
be identical in advanced and developing nations. 
A primary responsibility for avoidance of polit- 
ical risk, therefore, rests with the firm. 

I am confident that American firms can, through 
their own efforts, avoid a large part of the politi- 
cal risk inherent in operations in developing 
nations. They can, if they retain maximum flex- 
ibility of operations, if they focus skills and imag- 
ination on satisfying both their own imperative 
requirements and the imperative requirements and 
sensitivities of the developing country. As many 
of you know from experience, it is often helpful 
to provide for substantial participation by local 
partners and to employ and train as many local 
citizens as possible. In some cases it may be 
possible to work out management contracts or 
other arrangements which keep the essential 
American skills and attitudes in the plant while 
leaving our flag off the roof. 


No matter what ingenious formulas we work 
out, however, difficulties do and will continue to 
arise between American business and foreign gov- 
ernments. We are seeking to make our embassy 
staffs from the ambassador down alertly aware of 
their responsibility to handle such matters expe- 
ditiously and to make necessary representations to 
the host governments concerned. 

Also, we have just established in the Depart- 
ment of State a Special Assistant for Interna- 
tional Business ^ to handle the not infrequent cases 
when American business firms find they are dis- 
criminated against in one form or another in their 
investment or trade relations with a given coun- 
try. It is the duty of this Special Assistant for 
International Business to see that U.S. business 
does get prompt representation in such matters. 
It is hoped that the business community will take 
advantage of this facility, which should not be 
viewed as competitive with existing facilities for 
the business community but rather as a focal point 
for them within the Department of State. 

In assessing the risks and opportunities of in- 
vestment in less developed areas we should try 
to keep a proper perspective. We must remain 
fully aware of the deep nationalistic, anticolonial- 
ist, often socialistic sentiment in most developing 
nations. Private enterprise, and particularly for- 
eign enterprise, is often highly suspect. And yet 
as these new nations and their leaders realize the 
factors necessary for development, as they see the 
private sector in many instances pacing their na- 
tions' growth, their hostility is softening. In part 
this results from the performance of the private 
sector. It also results from the poor performance 
of the Communists. The Communist bloc econ- 
omy is, of course, pallid in comparison to the 
West. The abysmal failure of Chinese develop- 
ment is evident for all the world to see. Soviet 
incompetence in both the aid and trade fields has 
led to disillusion and the search for closer ties 
with the West on the part of several African and 
Asian nations which earlier seemed to have been 
taken in by the grandiose Soviet economic line. 

Unhappily a few countries which previously 
were receptive to private foreign investment are 
now alienating it by expropriation and harass- 
ment. However, in many developing nations the 
climate for private enterprise is improving. 

There are strong incentives for American firms 

to stake their claim now in these great potential 
markets. As nations develop, business opportuni- 
ties are being created. Future profits will go to 
the films which are enterprising and foresighted 
today. An American firm whose managerial skill, 
political sophistication, and contribution to de- 
velopment win the confidence of a developing 
nation should be in an enviable position. The risks 
are there; the long-term opportunities are there. 
Tlie developing nations represent a classic chal- 
lenge to American private enterprise. 



• For background, see Ibid., Oct. 15, 1962, p. 585. 

The Trend of the World Struggle 

In closing I should like to make a few comments 
about our present world position and future pros- 
pects. We are struggling with crises provoked or 
aggravated by the imperialistic ambitions of the 
Communists. The times remain perilous. But 
the free world is gaining in strength and cohesion. 

Fifteen years ago France and Italy were in 
grave danger of being taken over by the Com- 
munists and Germany was in shambles. The re- 
surgence of Western Europe, its progress toward 
integration, and the vitality of the Atlantic part- 
nership — these are a mighty reinforcement of the 
cause of freedom. 

In the vast less develojjed areas of the non- 
Communist world we have been witnessing — and 
encouraging — the epochal transition from colo- 
nialism to independence. Never before have so 
many new states been bom in so short a time. 
Some are weak and floundering. But some are 
making solid progress, and many others have made 
promising starts. It is surely not without signifi- 
cance that, with the partial exceptions of North 
Korea and North Viet-Nam, no nation which has 
achieved independence since the Second World 
War has succumbed to communism. 

Increasingly leaders and peoples in the under- 
developed areas have come to understand the tac- 
tics, purposes, and nature of communism — have 
come to realize that commimism is the irrecon 
cilable enemy of freedom. They have been able to 
see also that Communist methods of organizing 
production are inefficient. 

Within the Communist world itself important 
changes are occurring: differences between Mos- 
cow and Peiping, shortcomings in economic per- 
formance, the inability of the Communists tc 
crush the spirit of nationalism in Eastern Europe 

Department of State Bulletlr 

Successful societies don't have to imprison their 
own people behind barbed wire and walls. 

We face a long struggle. But those who are 
committed to freedom have reason for quiet 

geria's foreign policy. There was a useful and 
cordial exchange of views on aspects of the inter- 
national situation. President Kennedy and the 
Prime Minister stated their hopes for a close and 
continuing friendship between the two countries. 

President Kennedy Holds Talks With 
Leaders of Algeria and Libya 


Following is the text of a joint communique, 
issued by President Kennedy and Ahmed Ben 
Bella, Prime Minister of the Democratic and Pop- 
ular Repuhlic of Algeria, at the close of their dis- 
cussions held at Washington on October 15. 

White House press release dated October IS 

His Excellency Ahmed Ben Bella, Prime Min- 
ister of the Democratic and PoiDular Republic of 
Algeria, and President Kennedy met for a dis- 
cussion and lunch at the White House today. 

The President took the occasion of Prime Min- 
ister Ben Bella's presence at the United Nations 
to invite him to be his guest so that they might 
become acquainted and review problems of com- 
mon interest. 

President Kennedy told the Prime Minister of 
his personal interest and that of the people of 
the United States in the future of an independent 
Algeria, and expressed best wishes to the Prime 
Minister on Algeria's admission to the United Na- 
tions.^ He also explained the principles of United 
States foreign policy. 

The Prime Minister discussed the problems of 
his country and explained the principles of Al- 

1 For a statement by Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Repre- 
sentative in the Security Council, on Oct. 4, see Bulletin 
of Oct. 22, 1962, p. 627. 


Crown Prince Hasan al-Rida al-Sanusi of the 
United Kingdom of Libya made an official visit 
to the United States October 15-21(,. Following 
is the text of a joint communique issued by Presi- 
dent Kennedy and Crown Pri?ice Hasan after their 
talks at Washington on October 17. 

White House press release dated October 17 

His Eoyal Highness Crown Prince Hasan al- 
Rida al-Sanusi of the United Kingdom of Libya 
and President John F. Kennedy met at the White 
House yesterday in the course of the Crown 
Prince's official visit to the United States. 

The visit and meeting provided an opportunity 
for President Kennedy to meet the Crown Prince 
of Libya and to enable His Royal Highness to 
become acquainted with the United States and to 
hold discussions with U.S. leaders. 

The two leaders and their respective advisers 
reviewed the existing relations between the United 
States and Libya and exchanged views in com- 
plete frankness on problems of common interest 
relating to the area and on the current interna- 
tional situation. 

The President expressed joleasure at the efforts 
being made by Libya toward the achievement of 
progress and prosperity for its people and indi- 
cated the interest and willingness of the United 
States to assist in those efforts by appropriate 

Both parties expressed hope for continuing 
close and friendly relations between the United 
States and Libya. 

November 5, 1962 

662752 — 62 8 


The United States and the New Africa 


hy O. Mennen Williams 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^ 

Although Africa's life has been my life for the 
past 2 years, I do not presume to come before this 
learned group to advance any thesis. Bather, to- 
night I would simply like to give you some of my 
personal thoughts on what I believe will be the 
future development of Africa. 

It is my belief that Africa will find a life of 
freedom for her people without regard to their 
color or place of origin. As men everywhere have 
found, freedom, like all things of value, has its 
price, and there are obstacles and difficulties in 
attaining it. Some men rush headlong to buy 
freedom and pay the price without counting the 
cost. Others weigh the cost more carefully and 
more deliberately. Some cling to traditional prac- 
tices after their day is done. At the same time 
others make a too-headlong rush for new rights, 
bruising old and just rights in the process. But 
in the end, as the Lord said in Leviticus (25:10), 
"Ye shall . . . proclaim liberty throughout all the 
land imto all the inhabitants thereof." 

Specifically, I should like to say a few words 
about the following points : ( 1 ) The African solu- 
tion will be a solution of free choice; (2) Africa 
will provide an increasingly better life for all its 
inhabitants; (3) Europeans and others who have 
made tlieir homes in Africa will find a productive 
and rewarding place in the life of Africa ; and (4) 
all the peoples of Africa will achieve governments 
of their own choosing. 

Actually, great progress has been made on all 
these points through the joint efforts of men of 
good will in Africa and Europe, but much remains 
to be done, of course. Before this great drama is 
complete, people from all over the world will be 

• Address made before the fifth annual meeting of the 
African Studies Association at Washington, D.C., on Oct. 
12 (press release 618). 


called upon to play their respective parts. In the 
final analysis, however, it will be the many peoples 
of Africa who will work out their own solution— 
and this, I believe, is the most effective way to 
assure Africa's continuing membership in the 
world of free choice. 

The African Solution 

Turning immediately to the first point, I am 
confident that the African's solution of his politi- 
cal organization will be peculiarly his own. The 
African has, as you know, a pride and determina- 
tion that his new status will have its own African 
character. He will not imitate the East any more 
than he will the West, "\\niile he may draw from 
other societies, the end product will have a distinct 
African character. 

We welcome the apparent development in 
Africa of its own independent philosopliy of gov- 
ernment. We apply no preconceptions in Africa, 
nor do we seek rigidly to impose our own formulas 
in the solution of African problems. Rather, we 
stand confident that if the peoples of Africa exer- 
cise their own free choice they will ultimately seek 
the goals we seek, even though not always by 
exactly the same methods. 

As President Kennedj' said in his second state 
of the Union message : ^ 

. . . our basic goal remains the same : a peaceful world 
community of free and independent states, free to choose 
their own future and their own system so long as it does 
not threaten the freedom of others. 

Some may choose forms and ways we would not choose 
for ourselves, but it is not for us that they are choosing. 
We can welcome diversit.v — the Communists cannot. For 
we offer a world of choice — they offer the world of coer- 
cion. And the way of the past shows clearly that freedom, 
not coercion, Is the wave of the future. 

' Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1902, p. 159. 

Department of Stale Bulletin 

This concept is deeply imbedded in our Amer- 
ican heritage of belief in freedom and self-deter- 
mination for peoples everywhere. Historically the 
American people firmly recognize the rights of all 
peoples to determine their own form of govern- 
ment. This, we believe, is the foundation of last- 
ing world order. 

In essence, then, we support what Africa wants. 
We accept the African aspiration for nonaline- 
ment — the African desire not to be so closely al- 
lied with any non-African state or system that a 
government's exercise of free choice is threatened. 
And, to the extent that this aspiration embodies 
neutralism, we recognize that this concept is not 
a sterile neutralism that refuses to examine an 
issue on its merits and take a stand. Two of 
Africa's most prominent spokesmen have made 
this point very clear in the current issue of Foreign 

Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister 
of the Federation of Nigeria, put it this way : 

Our foreign policy has never been one of neutrality, but 
rather non-alignment. We have never, for instance, been 
neutral in African affairs, nor can we be neutral in mat- 
ters pertaining to world peace. We have demonstrated 
both in the Congo and at the United Nations that we have 
the courage of our convictions in supporting what we 
consider to be in the interest of peace and harmony. 
And if this has meant supporting the policies of one bloc 
or the other at the particular time, we have not shrunk 
from it. 

And Sekou Toure, President of the Eepublic 
of Guinea, commented on the subject in this 
manner : 

African neutralism, then, Is not shameful indifference, 
a sort of political demobilization. On the contrary, it is 
the expression of a lively faith in a happy future for 
mankind. It is something active, a participating force, 
an active agent in the struggle for the achievement of a 
world society — emancipated, fraternal and united. Let 
us hope that the highly developed nations and peoples can 
understand this historical movement in its universal sig- 
nificance, and that they will take full part in it, in the 
conscious desire to help build a free and prosperous 
Africa in a world of peace and brotherhood. 

Africa's Potential 

Looking to my second point, in a continent beset 
by poverty, ignorance, and disease and divided by 
custom and tribalism, it may be presumptuous to 
predict a better life for all the people of Africa 
except in a very relative way. But I am impressed 
that by and large Africa is dynamically deter- 

November 5, 1962 

mined and enthusiastic to improve its human re- 
sources. The passion for education is absolute, 
and the drive for living improvement along with 
freedom is the one constant of African politics. 

Touching only momentarily on the political 
side here, the fact that in Africa today there are 
33 independent governments where there were 
only 4 a dozen years ago, coupled with the fact 
that almost all of these governments came into 
being and are functioning with a minimum of un- 
rest and strife, adds to my optimistic belief in 
Africa's ability to develop successfully. 

Africa's economic potential is a particularly 
promising aspect of the continent's future. 
Africa is magnificently endowed by nature, and 
one day this great potential will be realized. 

Minerals are among the first items to come to 
mind when Africa's economic potential is dis- 
cussed. In this field Africa today is producing 
commercially all but 4 of the 53 most important 
minerals and metals in use. The other four — 
magnesium, mercury, molybdenum, and sulfur — 
also are available in Africa but are not yet being 

Africa's iron ore reserves are now estimated at 
2 billion metric tons — twice as much as our own 
and two-thirds of those of the Soviet Union. 
Her coal reserves are estimated at 100 billion long 
tons — enough to last for 300 years, based on our 
rate of consumption. New petroleum fields are 
being discovered and brought in all over the con- 
tinent, but the most important strikes have been 
made in North Africa. Algeria's fields are now 
producing at the rate of 450,000 barrels a day — 
about one-third that of Iran. Libyan produc- 
tion has reached 150,000 barrels a day and is ex- 
pected to reach 600,000 barrels within the next 5 
years. The North Africa petroleum supply takes 
on added importance because of its proximity to 
the European market, to which most of the pro- 
duction will go. 

Perhaps Africa's most important reserve is hy- 
droelectric potential. It is estimated that Africa 
has 40 percent of the world's water power — more 
than that of any other continent — and yet less than 
1/2 percent of it has so far been developed. As 
water is one of the most important factors limit- 
ing Africa's growth, it is not hard to imagine 
how significantly this wealth of electric power 
and irrigation will advance Africa when it is de- 
veloped more fully. And with Africa producing 



20 percent of the free world's uranium, it is not 
difficult to see that the continent is equipped to 
step into peaceful uses of atomic energy at some 
future time. 

When you add to these estimates the fact that 
much of Africa has not yet been surveyed geo- 
logically, it is obvious that Africa has ample min- 
eral wealth upon which to build industrial 

And what is true of Africa's potential in the field 
of minerals and metals is true in other areas as 
well. Take land, for example. Discounting the 
Sahara completely, Africa still has more arable 
land and pasture land than either the United 
States or the Soviet Union. It has more than 
twice our forest land and nearly as much as the 
U.S.S.R. It is true that much of this land is un- 
used or poorly used today. It is also true that 
with proper irrigation and modern agricultural 
techniques crops can be grown on a year-round 
basis and that all the important crops in the world 
can be grown in Africa. As an illustration, one 
of our economists estimates that the Ethiopian 
Highlands alone, if properly cultivated, could pro- 
duce sufficient food for all of Western Europe. 

Additional examples could be cited, in fisheries 
and livestock potential, for instance, but I think 
these are enough to indicate wliy I get excited 
about Africa's economic potential. 

Obviously there is still a long way to go before 
this potential can be realized. The continent's 
lack of unity, its illiteracy, malnutrition, and dis- 
ease all conspire to hold back its development to- 
day. On the other hand, Africa does not have 
the population pressures present in otlier parts of 
the world, and many people are combining their 
efll'orts to speed the day when Africa will have a 
viable economy. 

One way this is being done is through the co- 
operative efforts of Africans themselves. This 
is encouraging because it not only indicates their 
willingness to initiate self-help measures but be- 
cause it tends to reduce artificial barriers that must 
be lowered before continent-wide development can 
take place. The United States favors this trend 
toward the development of regional African 
groupings. In the long run such a course will 
diminish the fears of many non-Africans that 
Balkanization of Africa will lead to markets too 
small for fruitful development and make the con- 
tinent a seeding ground for future conflict among 


great powers. We believe that associations of 
African states will strengthen Africa both politi- 
cally and economically. 

The United States is fully appreciative of to- 
day's great movement to build a strong, prosper- 
ous, and independent Africa. We have recognized 
that we have a role to play in African develop- 
ment through our AID [Agency for International 
Development] and other programs in Africa. In 
some cases our assistance is supplementary to that 
of the former metropoles; in others, we are play- 
ing a major I'ole in a country's development. 

Our total economic assistance to Africa, ex- 
cluding Egypt, amounted to some $233 million in 
fiscal year 1962. This is exclusive of U.S. contri- 
butions to the United Nations for economic re- 
habilitation in the Congo, substantial contribu- 
tions in the form of development loans from the 
Export-Import Bank, and Food for Peace pro- 

Compared with some of our other worldwide 
commitments, this is not a heavy load, and we 
hope that with other industrialized countries we 
can measure up to the real needs of this great 
continent. In view of Africa's great potential, 
our primary aim is to help the Africans develop 
in such fundamental fields as education, public 
health, transportation, communications, and 
power development. After this initial impetus, 
we believe they can maintain momentum on their 
own and eventually reach a point where they 
can provide assistance to other continents. 

Although American efforts are important, they 
are modest compared with those of European and 
multilateral sources. The former metropoles are 
playing very important roles in African develop- 
ment, and other European countries are contribut- 
ing as well. France alone has been contributing 
more than $600 million annually to independent 
African countries, including Algeria. The 
United Kingdom total of grants and loans has 
been $150 million annually. West German obli- 
gations will reach about $155 million this year. 

Just last week Belgian Foreign Minister Paul- 
Ilenri Spaak pointed out that the Common Market 
Development Fund has provided the equivalent 
of $581 million for African development in the 
last 5 years and indicated that this amount would 
rise in the next 5 years. And interest in Africa 
by the international lending agencies, notably the 
World Bank, is becoming much broader with the 

Department of Stale Bulletin 

of laccession to membership of many new African 
iti- states. We are, of course, pleased that Africa's 

development is the concern of many of the more 

developed nations. 



The Future of Europeans 

This brings me to my third point. Many thou- 
sands of European technicians and European set- 
tlers are making substantial contributions to 
Africa's future — and to their own future in Africa. 
While the presence of Europeans and other non- 
indigenous Africans is not necessarily as fixed a 
feature of the Africa of the future as the presence 
of rich mineral deposits, I believe it can be as 
fixed and as important. 

In order for Africa to realize its great economic 
md political potential, it urgently needs great 
numbers of professional and technical skills of 
all types. Education will eventually supply most 
3f these, but for a long time, as in our own land, 
A^frica in a hurry will require imported skills to 
assist the development of her technology, com- 
merce, and administration — and probably her all- 
jssential agriculture, too. 

The future of the European in Africa is one of 
the most hotly debated questions in that continent. 
[ have followed this question with great interest, 
ind it is my considered judgment that favorable 
possibilities exist which can permit Europeans to 
live harmoniously in the Africa of the future. 
There has been a tendency to view the transfer of 
power from European governments to new Afri- 
can states as a settlement on African terms. In 
reality there has been considerable accommodation 
ay both Africans and Europeans in working out 
the future of Africa, and the contributions to the 
total welfare that Europeans can yet make — in 
concert with or as parts of African governments — 
^ive hope for true interracial societies in Africa. 
Df course the day when Europeans can live in 
,js Africa as a superior and specially privileged 
ij. class is gone. However, the future for Europeans 
who become citizens of the new African states, en- 
vj. joying equal rights and privileges with all other 
jitizens, looks bright— provided that both the 
Africans and the Europeans get on with the job 
that must be done. The hour is late, however, and 
I am fully aware that such hope could be left un- 
,j,,j fulfilled if the present rate of progress is not car- 
ried forward rapidly. 

Certainly the United States has a great interest 

November 5, J 962 


in the development of good relations between the 
indigenous Africans and the Africans of European 
origm. Some of the latter now are third- and 
fourth-generation Africans, and they are very 
anxious for a peaceful resolution of their conti- 
nent's problems. The indigenous Africans, for 
their part, are anxious to get on with the tasks of 
nation building. 

The essential questions in obtaining a peaceful 
resolution of Africa's problems will have to be 
decided by the African and European communities 
themselves, of course, but our policy in Africa is 
to assist in the attainment of harmony among all 
the contment's peoples in whatever ways we can. 

Transition to Self-Govern ment 

Mutually satisfactory relations between Afri- 
cans and Europeans have been reasonably well es- 
tablished now in many parts of Africa. I believe 
that much credit for the smoothness of the tran- 
sition from colonial to independent status through- 
out much of Africa is due the former metropolitan 
powers, particularly France and the United 

With few exceptions, former colonial ties are 
being laid aside for new types of cooperative ar- 
rangements between Africa and Europe. And, 
where African aspirations have been satisfied, it 
has been the African countries themselves who 
have sought continuing relations with the former 
metropoles. We consider this sound policy, and we 
are pleased that the new cultural, economic, and 
political relationships between the former metro- 
poles and the newly independent African countries 
are, in most instances, close and cordial. There 
is no reason why such relations should not be 

However, let us not blink the fact that tran- 
sition to self-government of all the peoples of 
Africa will be the major test of the political in- 
genuity of the former colonial powers — a test 
which will have consequences beyond our times. 
It will be far from easy; change is never easy. 
Great courage and understanding is required to 
accommodate to change. The common good often 
is achieved only with the temporary inconvenience 
of the few, although in the long run all will bene- 
fit in greater proportion. But both the few and 
the many must in justice be heard. At such times 
it is often difficult to see the demarcation between 
justice and customary privilege and between newly 



won rights and understandable but overreaching 
zeal for reform. 

In all of this period of transition, timing will be 
of the essence. Almost without exception, the goal 
of an interracial society and government by the 
consent of the governed is an accepted policy. But 
the rate and method of realization of this goal 
vary greatly. The great challenge to the West is 
to accommodate this rate to the realities and many- 
faceted justice of the situation. 

In a movement where there are few rules, there 
is one that stands out : A little done quickly is bet- 
ter than much done too late. Thus a quick and 
judicious application of reform may effect a har- 
monious transition, whereas too long a wait may 
mean revolution rather than evolution. 

With such a rule one might think policy deter- 
mination would be almost mathematically easy. 
But this is to reckon without human nature, wliich 
understandably clings, often in desperation, to 
the rock of the past- — even when it is being en- 
gulfed by the waves of change — rather than leaps 
into the ship of the future, which may seem a tiny 
and risky craft indeed. 

Alert and judicious application of this rule for 
political change, nevertheless, can ease the peace- 
ful reconciliation of settler and indigenous inter- 
ests in these areas of transition. Such a reconcilia- 
tion could have a beneficial effect on the current 
balance of forces in the world and lay the ground- 
work for a future of productive cooperation be- 
tween the former metropoles and the new African 
nations. The alternative could well be a decade 
of severe strife and bloodshed, the disruption of 
cordial and profitable African-European rela- 
tions, and a total loss of the credit won thus far 
by the wise decolonization policies of most Euro- 
pean powers. It would be tragic if the many con- 
tributions the white man can make — and has 
made — to Africa were lost by his forced 

This contingency is one reason why we con- 
sider it urgent that all parties — including the 
Asians, wlio are a considerable factor in tliese 
areas — reach a common ground as rapidly as pos- 
sible. We believe it is possible for all the peoples 
of Africa to have a good life and that this goal is 

not necessarily in conflict with the desire of the 
majority of people in any territory for self- 
determination. T 


The Longrun Future | 

From all of these points I have touched upon 
tonight it should be apparent that I am generally 
optimistic about the longrun future of Africa. 
And I believe that our nation's position of leader- 
ship in world affairs requires that we take a posi- 
tive role to help Africa develop in peace and 

It is also my hope that we will continue to be 
wise enough to keep our eyes on the long pull and 
not be dismayed by temporary disappointments, 
misunderstandings, or perhaps even setbacks. In 
the formulation of American foreign policy in 
Africa we must have vision and think of the 
African countries, as I have tried to do tonight, 
in terms of what we — and they — hope these na- 
tions will be in the future. We must continue to 
envisage the dynamic contribution to the free- 
world system which these nations passionately 
desire to make. 

In my opinion the future will see a strong and 
vigorous Africa — an Africa that can deal with 
the rest of the world in complete equality. I be- 
lieve the future will see an Africa united in its 
dedication to the advancement of human civiliza- 
tion, an Africa that has an important influence in 
broadening and leavening men's minds every- 
where, an Africa that lives at peace with its neigh- 
bors and makes positive contributions to the se- 
curity and stability of the world. 

As Africa gets to know us better, and as we get: 
to know the countries of Africa better, I am con- 
vinced that existing bonds of friendship will be 
strengthened and new ones created which will be 
of great benefit to future generations. 

For we are not building for today and tomorrow 
alone; we are building toward the establishment of 
an enduring community of nations living together 
in peace, prosperity, and freedom. And we are^ 
most anxious to speed the day when the dynamic 
nations of Africa will reside in that community 
as fully developed partners. 






yon I 


Department of State Bulletin 




INESCO and U.S. Policy: High Hopes and a Hard Looi< 

Following are texts of addresses made hy Lucius 
D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, and Harlan Cleveland, Assistant 
Secretary for International Organization Affairs, 
before the U.S. National Commission for 
UNESCO at Pittsburgh, Pa., on October 12. 




Press release 616 dated October 11, for release October 12 

This is the first time I have had the opportunity 
formally to address the National Commission for 
UNESCO since I briefly met with you at your 
last session. I welcome this opportunity to meet 
with you again. 

Over the years this Commission has made sig- 
nificant contributions to shaping our role in 
UNESCO, including our position for the impor- 
tant General Conference which opens in Paris next 
month. I want to take this opportunity to thank 
you very sincerely for the constructive suggestions 
and advice which you have given us, to report to 
you on the steps we in the Government have taken 
since your last meeting, and to discuss with you 
the general line we plan to take at the General 
Conference. I can assure you that we are going 
to Paris conscious more than ever of the vital 
mission UNESCO can play in the world today 
and of the continued leaderehip the United States 
must exert in that organization. 

UNESCO today faces unprecedented chal- 
lenges. The newly developing countries need 
massive programs of education and training to 
develop their human resources. This need was 
implicit in the resolution ^ unanimously adopted 
by the U.N. General Assembly last year designat- 
ing the 1960's as the U.N. Development Decade. 
Indeed, it was the President of the United States 
who prompted this joint pledge to wipe out man- 

kind's present plagues — poverty, ignorance, and 

UNESCO should play a crucial role in this most 
promising project. We would all agree that a 
country can develop and progress only as fast and 
effectively as it can build its human resources 
through education and training. This higlily sig- 
nificant conclusion — that people provide the prime 
ingredient for progress — was pointed up at 
UNESCO meetings in Addis Ababa, Tokyo, and 
Santiago during the last year and a half. The 
historic declaration ^ adopted at Santiago last 
March emphasized that the next decade will be a 
crucial period in Latin America in that it will 
decide whether or not an anticipated 300 million 
people will or will not be able to obtain higher 
living standards and enjoy the benefits of tech- 
nical and cultural standaixls "imder . . . liberty 
and the institutions of representative democracy." 
Similar declarations emerged from the delibera- 
tions at Addis Ababa and Tokyo. 

Redirection of Program Needed 

UNESCO must be responsive to these new 
needs; but to accomplish its mission in the years 
ahead, the organization must redirect its program 
along lines that contribute directly to the objec- 
tives of the Development Decade. 

On the basis of a careful study of UNESCO's 
proposed program and budget for 1963-64 (and I 
might add that we in the Department of State are 
trying to make a more careful study of the pro- 
grams and budgets of all the specialized agencies 
of the U.N. than we have done in the past), we 
have found that sufficient recognition has not been 
given to the kind of redirection we have in mind. 
The proposed program does not, for example, 
sufficiently recognize the vital educational needs 

^U.N. doc. A/RES/1710(XVI). 
^Novemfae^ 5, J 962 

' For text of an address by President Kennedy before 
the 16th session of the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 
25, 1961, see Bulletin of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619. 

' For text, see UNESCO doc. 12 C/PRG/16. 


of the Development Decade, nor does it, for that 
matter, adequately reflect the mandate of the lltli 
General Conference to give top priority to educa- 
tion. The proposed budget -n-ould extend the 
general level of increases in education and related 
programs to almost all phases of the UNESCO 
operation, with the result that the existing prolif- 
eration of UNESCO activities would be continued. 
In this connection you will recall that in your re- 
port on your April meeting you stated that "there 
was a consensus that UNESCO should establish 
priorities among its manifold activities and work 
toward a greater concentration of effort in a more 
limited nmnber of fields in which it is uniquely 
qualified to render service, rather than permitting 
its resources to be spread too thinly over a multi- 
tude of proliferating projects." I heartily en- 
dorse this view. 

"We all recognize, of course, that the UNESCO 
program must grow. The question is, how and in 
what direction? We do not accept the principle 
that such growth must be across the board. More- 
over, we feel very keenly that the rate of growth 
must not exceed the management capabilities of 
UNESCO and that the budget increase must not 
be so high as to impose unreasonable demands on 
member states. 

In applying to the proposed budget the criteria 
which I have just mentioned, the Department has 
come to the conclusion that the UNESCO budget 
level for 1963-64 should provide for an increase 
of $5.5 million or 17 percent over the 1961-62 
biennium. Such an increase would result in a 
budget level of $38 million for the next biennium 
instead of the budget of $40,884 million proposed 
by the Acting Director General. The $38 million 
level would, in our view, permit the organization 
to carry out all ongoing and new programs which 
in our judgment are necessary and desirable. 

U.S. Position on Revised Program 

Inasmuch as the budget level proposed by the 
United States would require some curtailment of 
program items of lesser or marginal usefulness, 
we recommended at the Executive Board meeting 
that the Acting Director General reexamine tlic 
budget with a view to eliminating or cutting back 
such activities and that he be asked to revise the 
program within a $38 million ceiling. As a matter 
of general guidance in connection with such reex- 



amination, we suggested that a close examination 
be made of the following areas where, in our view, 
substantial cutbacks could be made without sacri- 
ficing any of the essential elements of the program. 

First, we believe UNESCO should hold fewer 
meetings and restrict these to topics of genuine 
importance. The proposed program of UNESCO 
calls for 125 meetings at a cost exceeding $3 
million. Fewer meetings would give the secre- 
tariat and member governments more time to pre- 
pare for them and adequately to assess the results. 

Secondly, we consider that the time has come 
for UNESCO to determine whether the nongov- 
ernmental organizations which it has subsidized 
for many years can — at least in some instances — 
become self-sustaining and whether or not 
UNESCO support, if necessary, might take the 
form of contracts for specific services instead of 
general subsidies. "Wliile there is no question of 
the usefulness of most of these organizations, it is 
significant to point out that the drain on 
UNESCO for this type of support has now risen 
to $1.5 million; and unless alternative ways are 
found to put these organizations on a more self- 
sustaining basis, they will never achieve the inde- 
pendent status which we consider desirable. 

Third, while we were pleased to note that the 
Acting Director General has placed time limits on 
support of regional institutes and centers, we be- 
lieve that UNESCO should, in most cases, try to 
phase out its support at dates earlier than those 
proposed by the Acting Director General. 
UNESCO's proper role with respect to such 
centers and institutes is to provide initial financial 
support based on the assumption that, if the proj- 
ect is worth while and of value to member states, 
the states receiving the service will eventually! 
assume full responsibility for its support. If th( 
centers and institutes do not develop to the point 
of obvious usefulness to the states in question, it is 
fair to conclude they should be phased out. 

Fourth, in our opinion some activities ol' 
UNESCO fall more properly witliin the scopt 
of other agencies such as the Food and Agricul- 
ture Organization, the World Health Organiza- 
tion, and the International Labor Organization 
Similarly, there may be activities of these or 
ganizations which fall within the purview o: 
UNESCO. Shifting these activities to when 
they belong should eliminate imdesirable compe 

Deparimenf of Sfafe Bullefh 








tition and duplication of efforts and should pro- 
duce some savings. 

Fifth, we consider that UNESCO shoidd aban- 
don activities such as youth conferences, tenden- 
tious ijublications, and those seminars which lead 
to polemics i-ather than scholarly results. The 
question is not only one of cost but one of integrity, 
for UNESCO's standards of scholarship, like 
Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion. A special 
committee of your commission has been working 
on the difficult problem of what the UNESCO 
publications policy shoidd be, and their views, I 
am sure, will be most useful in our efforts to help 
UNESCO establish a sounder policy in this field. 

In suggesting that UNESCO endeavor to 
tighten up its programs, our objective is to try 
to help UNESCO become a sounder, more effec- 
tive, and even more helpful organization than it 
has been in the past. 

The U.S. position, as I have outlined it, found 
immediate and wholehearted support from the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand, both of which 
had gone through a somewhat similar exercise and 
had come to about the same conclusions. As a 
result of this support, and the support of like- 
minded delegations, it was possible to get through 
the Executive Board a resolution to the General 
Conference along the lines of the U.S. position. 

Although the margin of victory was slim, the 
U.S. delegation viewed the Executive Board action 
as highly significant in that it marked one of the 
first indications of a disposition on the part of the 
Executive Board to exert itself as a true policy- 
making body in the field of program and budget. 

Much remains to be done if we are to have the 
General Conference approve our overall position 
on the program and budget. We hope for the 
support of other governments for a $38 million 
budget ceiling and the needed program revisions 
I have outlined. Also we are hopeful that some 
of the marginal activities of the organization will 
be eliminated or curtailed in revisions which the 
Acting Director General has been requested by the 
Executive Board to propose and submit to the 
General Conference. 

Highlights of Tasks Ahead 

As you know, a new Director General will be 
elected by the General Conference next month. 
The present Acting Director General, Kene Ma- 

Ijglii November 5, 1962 


heu of France, has received the nomination of the 
Executive Board. Whoever the choice of the 
General Conference may be, the new Director Gen- 
eral must and will receive the full support of the 
United States in facing the arduous tasks ahead. 
I would like in the final few minutes to hijrhlight 
wliat I believe some of these tasks to be. 

The first and foremost challenge is the need for 
educational development which, as I have said, is 
at tlie heart of the Development Decade. We 
should have no doubt about the scale of the need. 
One African country alone has estimated that it 
will need 20,000 teachers to achieve primary uni- 
versal education during the next 20 years, a goal 
set by the African countries themselves at the 
Addis Ababa conference last year. The Asian 
countries have estimated that they will need to 
train 8 million new teachers by 1980. These needs 
can be met only by a concerted international 

UNESCO must face up to the implications of 
the expanding frontier of science in other areas. 
Among the prospects held out to us by scientists 
are new sources of water, power, and natui-al re- 
soui'ces; desalinization of ocean water; reclaiming 
the deserts; exploring systematically the charac- 
ter of the oceans and studying ways in which their 
potential can be more fully utilized for the benefit 
of mankind; harnessing solar energy for power; 
early earthquake detection; and the enormous 
problem of providing water for growing popula- 
tions. All such research henceforth will be un- 
thinkable without international cooperation, for 
such research covering vast stretches of land, the 
ocean, or outer space also affects the livelihood of 
peoples across boundaries and is in many cases 
too costly for any one country to undertake. 

In this short discussion I have tried to i-eview 
with you our interests in UNESCO and our ob- 
jectives at the coming General Conference to make 
UNESCO an ever more vital foi'ce for man's im- 
provement, today and also tomorrow. Indeed it 
is not too early to start thinking of priorities 
and concrete proposals for the General Confer- 
ences of 1964 and 1966. In our concern for the 
immediate, we must not ignore the long range in 
the planning of UNESCO's program. In conclu- 
sion let me assure you again of the faitli of your 
Government in UNESCO and of the strong sup- 
port it is determined to give to the improvement 



and revitalization of these programs in whose be- 
half you are giving so unsparingly of your own 


Press release 619 dated October 12 

This morning you heard some plain words from 
Luke Battle about the hard facts of financing 
UNESCO. I think my colleague has made it clear 
that the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization is not unloved and 
will not be undone by the United States Govern- 
ment. We consider UNESCO a priceless and 
irreplaceable organization. That is why we are 
determined that it shall not become a catchall 
agency, a refuge for dilettantism, a repository 
for the tag ends of operations of other agencies — 
or, as Kipling said, "a sort of a bloomin' cosmop- 

To some, however, the United States intention 
to hold down the proliferation of UNESCO activ- 
ities and concentrate especially on its education 
program may sound tightfisted or even negative. 
It is tightfisted. But it is also an affirmative ap- 
proach, consistent with the practical policy we 
are trying to apply across the board in the field 
of international organizations. 

UNESCO is one of the dozen and one special- 
ized agencies of the United Nations. It is one 
of the 51 international organizations to which the 
United States belongs and to which it regularly 
pays dues. 

The policy of this administration toward all of 
these organizations is to try to see that they un- 
derstand their mission the same way we under- 
stand it, that they know how to do their job and 
are equipped to do it. There is nothing simple 
about this policy, and, of course, there is no end 
to its pursuit. 

It is hard work and costs us more than $200 
million a year. 

Why U.S. Belongs to International Organizations 

Then why do we do it? Why do we belong 
and contribute to 51 organizations ? 

The answer — to be quite blunt about it — is na- 
tional self-interest. International organizations 
often can do what we would like to see done but 
cannot do as well on our own. They also can do 


some things more cheaply — and we can get others 
to help, too. Sensitive new countries, and their 
sensitive new leaders, often prefer to get advice 
on sensitive topics from an expert who represents 
all nations, and therefore represents no nation. 
Moreover, UNESCO and the other big interna- 
tional agencies can fish in a worldwide talent pool 
and come up with useful combinations of people 
and skills. 

The returns we expect as Americans from in- 
ternational organizations are not so different in 
kind from, let us say, the protection Belgium ex- 
pects to receive from NATO or the capital input 
Pakistan seeks from the World Bank or the clean 
beaches IMCO [Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization] may be expected to restore 
to the United Kingdom or the peace of mind the 
IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] 
should provide the neighbors of a country experi- 
menting with atomic fission. These are all legiti- 
mate national interests, all beyond the limits of 
what national power can achieve by itself. 

Does self-interest seem somehow out of place 
when we talk about international organizations? 
If so, perhaps Americans have been overindulging 
in the national pastime of pretending to be an 
altruistic duck instead of an honest swan. 

Perhaps we have been persuading ourselves that 
our contributions to UNESCO and half a hun- 
dred other multilateral agencies are made in an 
annual fit of generosity. They are not. Nobody 
in the world thinks we're generous, so let us not 
kid ourselves about the matter. We pay our dues 
to these many international clubs because we find 
them useful to the foreign policy of the United 
States. We want malaria eradicated, we want 
refugees cared for, we want children educated, 
we want a world weather watch, we want a sys- 
tem of allocating radio frequencies, we want food 
transferred in an orderly way from where it is 
abundant to where it is scarce. Above all, we 
want to make the free world hum with prosperity 
and development, secure against aggression and 
growing in freedom for the individual. 

Very quietly and almost without calculation the 
free world is devising the rudimentary machinery 
for its material salvation. Even with allowance 
made for the familiar boycotts and abstentions of 
the Communist regimes, the members of the 
United Nations are now engaged in a staggering 
varict}^ of efforts. 

Deparfment of Stafe Bulletin 







We are trying, through international organiza- 
tions, to do these things : 

— to eliminate war through collective security 
agreements, sophisticated peacemakmg and peace- 
keeping machinery, procedures for peaceful 
change and eventual progress in arms control ; 

— to curtail disease and hunger at an unprece- 
dented rate through an international offensive 
against their causes; 

— to apply the benefits of science and technology 
through cooperation in such matters as transport, 
communications, and meteorology and the ex- 
change of Imowledge through technical assistance 
programs and private agreements on patents and 
know-how ; 

— to achieve an international commercial, fiscal, 
and monetary system — stable enough and flexible 
enough to accommodate all nations who wish to 
take part ; 

— to transfer enough private and public capital 
to provide developing economies with the marginal 
resources required for eventual self-sustaining 
growth ; 

— to help traditional societies evolve into na- 
tional societies that understand the usefulness of 
international cooperation. 

"Coordination" and "Country Programing" 

As far as the U.N. family of agencies is con- 
cerned, the current effort to move forward on all 
fronts, in what Secretary Rusk calls the struggle 
between the world of free choice and the world of 
coercion, is summed up in the bright symbol of 
the United Nations Decade of Development. It 
is easy to forget in the heat of the debates over the 
Congo or disarmament or Berlin that more than 
three out of four men and women employed in the 
United Nations system — and the vast proportion 
of the budgets of the United Nations, budgets 
which now exceed half a billion dollars — are de- 
voted to very practical work, like the work of 

The bugle calls are "coordination" and "coun- 
try programing," which have a rather bureau- 
cratic sound. The trouble with the U.N. system 
is the trouble with all large-scale organizations in 
our time : too much specialization, not enough at- 
tention to "making a mesh of things." 

Those who work with one agency in the sys- 
tem—whether it be UNESCO, or WHO [World 

Health Organization], or ILO [International 
Labor Organization], or FAO [Food and Agri- 
culture Organization] — are often reluctant to see 
themselves as part of a whole. We live today for 
better or worse in the age of imbridled sovereignty, 
and sovereignty is not just a "felt need" of na- 
tions ; it seems to be a "felt need" of bureaucracies 
too — even of bureaucracies dedicated to the build- 
mg of an international order where national sov- 
ereignty is mellowed and tempered through 
international cooperation. No person — and no ad- 
ministrator — likes to see himself as a satellite. 
And to a large extent this is well and good even 
in the arenas of international cooperation. After 
all, each of the screaming needs of mankind, 
whether it be health, education, agriculture, or 
the special needs of children or science — each 
needs strong and articulate advocates to make sure 
that, in the competition for scarce resources, no 
particular need is totally neglected. 

At the same time, resources are scarce — human 
resources no less than material and financial re- 
sources. The test of our survival — the prerequi- 
site for a future less torn with tension and less 
preoccupied with poverty — depends more and 
more on the efficiency and the effectiveness with 
which we use our scarce resources, human and 
otherwise. Advocacy alone cannot do more than 
illustrate the hard choices we must make. 

If I were to characterize the major challenge 
to the United States in the U.N. system today, I 
would say that it was not so much the subversive 
tactics of the Communists as it was the growing 
pains of a system of world organizations whose 
practice is too slowly and too often awkwardly 
beginning to live up to its promise. 

That is why, at this point in the strategy, it is 
imperative that priorities be rigidly assigned and 
that the greatest concentrations of men, material, 
and money be placed at the points of greatest need. 
It is imnecessary to remind you that educational 
needs are the greatest of all. If there is one les- 
son we have learned in the short and turbulent 
history of our foreign aid program, it is that the 
prime bottleneck in development is not money or 
goods but trained people and the social institu- 
tions which can be built only by people, not by 
machinery or capital. 

It is also unnecessary to tell you that the United 
States is, of course, a sponsor, leader, and chief 
contributor to the Decade. This is an American 

*"a UoMQmhet 5, 1962 


policy and a good one — good enough to have called 
forth the support of almost the entire world. No 
less than ourselves, otlier nations realize they will 
be safer in a world that has come to grips witli its 
problems and is busy doing something about them. 

U.S. Support Premised on Achievement 

Tiie American people and the American Con- 
gress have just given fresh evidence that they will 
support this program wholeheartedly when they 
are convinced that it has both direction and pur- 
pose. The Congress has just taken two important 
decisions that affect international organizations. 
The first is well known. The United Nations 
loan act confounded every pollster and pundit 
when it received the approval of the Senate by a 
vote of more than three to one and the House' of 
Representatives by a vote of almost two to one. 
Some interesting theories have been put forward 
to explain this lopsided vote that not even the best 
of the professional analysts of congressional opin- 
ion came close to predicting. 

I find the outcome less baffling than the profes- 
sional theories suggest. The record of the liear- 
ings of the four committees that considered the 
bond proposal and the copies of the Congressional 
Record for the 5 days of House and Senate debate 
on the bill are in my opinion — my professional, 
even professorial, opinion — the most complete 
and relevant textbook ever assembled on United 
States policy with regard to that interesting new 
frontier, the limited use of international peace- 
keeping force. It is also one of the cheapest. 
Brought to a quick vote, the bond bill migl^t well 
have failed miserably a year ago, but when Con- 
gress took the time to thoroughly examine it in 
terms of American self-interest, the proposal 
passed the test and the issue was settled by lop- 
sided votes in both Houses. 

The same thing happened to a set of appropria- 
tions tliat received almost no public attention but 
were carefully reviewed by Congress. This 
money, for contributions to international organi- 
zations, was more than twice the amount of the 
U.N. loan. Everj-thing the President requested 
was granted. Most of it was part of the foreign 
aid bill, the only part that emerged unscathed 
from congressional cuts. 

Again I believe the reason lies in the recognition 
that these organizations are carrying out Ameri- 

can aims beyond the reach of American power, 
that they are no more and no less than a most effi- 
cient means for exercising American power for an 
American purpose. It is true that the purpose 
happens to be the betterment of the human condi- 
tion, which yet retains a certain popularity, but the 
achievement of this purpose is no more safe or 
certain for all its ethical content. It requires the 
same care and hard bargaining as the most exact- 
ing business transaction. And it is no less profit- 
able. International organizations, particularly 
the specialized agencies of the United Nations, are 
not international fraternities or learned societies 
and will not be supported as such. 

If there are fewer people today who regard the 
United Nations system with the sentimentality 
that one might lavish on his favorite charity, there 
are also fewer people who see in every act of the 
organization the hand of a dark conspiracy di- 
rected at themselves. Americans instead are be- 
ginning to accept the United Nations system as a 
vital working part of international diplomacy — 
one which deserves to be taken seriously and to be 
regarded with professional care. 

Reviewing U.S. Participation in U.N. System i 

Today in the State Department we are asking 
searcliing questions about our participation in the 
U.N. system, which have not, I'm afraid, been se- 
riously asked since the Second World War. We 
are looking hard not only at the program, staffing, 
and financing of UNESCO but at that of every 
member of the U.N. constellation. 

Each project no matter how small will be ex- 
ammed to insure tliat its priority is genuine and 
that it can be coordinated with the programs of 
other agencies, particularly with our own foreign 
aid efforts. Wo plan a radical approach to the 
selection of staff members, to the recruitment of 
Americans for service where they are needed, and 
to standards of performance in what is in princi- 
ple, and must become in practice, the finest and 
proudest form of public service in the world. 

Finally, we are determined to streamline the 
policymaking macliinery within our own Govern- 
ment and to raise the level of coordination of our 
policies with those of other nations until it is