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HE    DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


/U^^' 


^^^L"^-'  ^ 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1214  October  1,  1962 

f 

HOW    TO     COMBAT    COMMUNIST    GOALS      • 

by  Deputy  Under  Secretary  Johnson 475 

REALISM,    RESPONSIBILITY,    AND    RESPECT- 
THREE    R's    FOR    THE     UNITED    NATIONS    • 

by  Assistant  Secretary  Cleveland 482 

OUTER  SPACE,  THE  ATMOSPHERIC  SCIENCES,  AND 

U.S.  FOREIGN  POLICY    •     by  Ridmrd  iV.  Gardner   .    .      496 

THE  ADAMS  FAMILY  AND  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF 

STATE       •       by  Assistant  Secretary  Martin 487 


CIAL 

^Y  RECORD 


;ED  STATES 
:iGN  POLICY 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE    DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1214  •  Publication  7431 
October  1,1962 


JIJ 


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Note:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
copyrighted  and  Items  contained  herein  may 
be  reprinted.  Citation  ot  the  Dbpaetment 
o»  Stite  Bulletin  as  tbe  source  will  be 
appreciated.  Tbe  Bdlleiin  is  Indexed  In  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a   weekly  publication   issued   by   the 
Office  of  Media  Services,   Bureau  of 
Public    Affairs,    provides    the   public 
and      interested      agencies      of      the 
Government     icith     information     on 
developments  in  the  field  of  foreign 
relations    and    on    the    work    of   the 
Department  of  State  and  tlie  Foreign 
Service.     The  BULLETIN  includes  se- 
lected press  releases  on  foreign  policy, 
issued  by  tlie   IThite  House  and  the 
Department,  and  statements  and  ad- 
dresses made  by  tJve  President  and  by 
the    Secretary    of    State    and    other 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well  as 
special  articles  on  various  ptmses  of 
international   affairs   and    the  func- 
tions of  the  Department.     Informa- 
tion  is  included  concerning   treaties 
and     international     agreements      to 
which   tlie   United  States   is  or   may 
become  a  party  and  treaties  of  gen- 
eral international  interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  legis- 
lative material  in  the  field  of  inter- 
natiorml  relations  are  listed  currently. 


ow  To  Combat  Communist  Goals 


hy  U.  Alexis  Johnson 

Deputy  Hinder  Secretary  for  Political  Ajf airs  ^ 


I  appreciate  your  courtesy  in  asking  me  to  join 
ith  you  this  evening,  for  all  of  us  involved  in  f or- 
^  affairs  are  well  aware  of  the  helpful  interest 
at  tlie  Junior  Chamber  of  Commerce  has  taken 

the  matters  exemplified  by  this  Institute,  wliile 
5o  carrying  out  the  constructive  work  in  which 
lU  have  long  engaged  within  this  country. 
All  of  us  who  are  in  this  business  realize  that 
r  foreign  policy  can  be  no  stronger  than  the 
pport  that  lies  behind  it  in  the  country  as  a 
liole.  With  no  home  and  no  person  in  our  coun- 
y  more  than  30  minutes  away  from  potential  in- 
neration,  foreign  policy  is  very  much  the  business 
'  all  of  us,  and  the  subject  on  which  I  was  asked 

speak  this  evening,  "How  To  Combat  Commu- 
st  Goals,"  is  indeed  veiy  well  chosen. 
I  sympathize  with  persons  such  as  yourselves 
ho  are  properly  and  of  necessity  engrossed  in 
)ur  daily  business,  community,  and  family  af- 
lirs  and  yet  want  to  take  an  informed  interest 

this  business  of  foreign  affairs.  It  is  a  terribly 
•mplicated  business  and  becoming  more  so  each 
ly;  yet  the  time  you  are  able  to  devote  to  it  is 

cessarily  very  limited.  You  read  this  headline 
day  and  tomorrow  you  read  another,  and  you 
3  not  know  what  or  whom  to  believe.  This  leads 
I  confusion  and  confusion  often  leads  to  anger, 
et  we  all  know  that  anger  does  not  produce  co- 
irent  thinking. 

When  I  am  away  from  the  daily  and  hourly  flow 
I  information  in  Washington  and  dependent  for 
y  information  on  headlines,  with  usually  very 
cief  articles,  it  has  often  occurred  to  me  that  the 


'Address  made  before  the  Middle  Atlantic  Institute  of 
le  Junior  Chamber  of  Commerce  at  Washington,  D.O.,  on 
3pt.  15  (press  release  557  dated  Sept.  14) . 

cfofaer  7,   J  962 


picture  one  gets  of  foreign  affairs  solely  from  such 
sources  must  be  very  like  the  picture  that  the 
proverbial  man  from  Mars  would  get  of  one  of  our 
cities  if  he  were  entirely  dependent  upon  the  local 
press  for  his  information.  I  say  this  in  no  sense 
as  critical  of  the  press,  radio,  or  television  foreign 
news  coverage  but  rather  to  point  out  that  it  is 
inlierent  in  the  situation.  Just  as  in  your  cities 
it  is  not  the  999  people  soberly  going  about  their 
accustomed  tasks  teaching  school,  constructing  a 
building,  ministering  to  the  ill,  manufacturing 
useful  things,  and  so  on,  that  ordinarily  make  the 
news,  but  rather  the  1,000th  who  makes  news  by 
committing  a  crime  or  creating  trouble  of  some 
kind.  We  know  our  own  communities  well 
enough  to  know  that  the  one  is  not  typical  of  the 
other  999,  but  we  do  not  have  the  same  background 
when  it  comes  to  foreign  matters  and  are  tlius  more 
apt  to  take  the  headline  as  typical  of  the  whole. 

My  point  is  not  that  there  is  not  trouble  in  the 
world  around  us,  for  there  is  indeed  trouble,  but 
rather  that  we  need  to  look  not  only  at  the  trouble 
but  also  at  the  tremendous  amount  of  constructive 
work  going  on  in  order  to  have  a  proper  picture 
of  the  situation  in  which  we  find  ourselves. 

You  can  be  sure  that  there  are  none  who  better 
appreciate  that  the  world  we  live  in  is  rapidly 
changing  than  those  of  us  in  the  State  Depart- 
ment who  have  seen  this  transformation  take 
place.  If  you  will  pardon  a  personal  note,  when  I 
joined  the  Foreign  Service  in  1935  there  was  a 
total  of  665  officers  serving  in  Washington  and  in 
the  61  coimtries  with  which  we  maintained  diplo- 
matic relations.  In  an  average  country  abroad 
there  were  usually  not  more  than  five  or  six  of  us, 
including  the  ambassador,  and  we  were  usually 
the  only  official  Americans  in  the  country.    In  a 


475 


busy  month  the  State  Department  might  handle 
something  around  2,000  telegrams.  Today  there 
are  almost  700,000  official  American  civilians 
abroad,  phis  about  another  million  military  per- 
sonnel, and  in  the  State  Department  alone  we 
handle  more  telegrams  in  a  day  than  we  formerly 
handled  in  a  month.  In  just  a  small  way  this  is 
uepresentative  of  the  change  that  has  taken  place 
in  the  impact  of  the  woi'ld  on  these  United  States 
and  our  impact  on  the  world. 

The  Development  of  Nationalism 

During  this  period  two  other  great  forces  have 
had  and  are  having  their  impact  on  the  world. 
One  is  veiy  apparent  to  all  of  us— communism. 
(I  deliberately  do  not  add  the  adjective  "interna- 
tional," "Soviet,"  or  "Cliinese"  as  I  want  later 
to  return  to  this  question.)  The  other  great  force, 
of  which  we  are  less  aware  but  which  may  in  the 
long  run  prove  to  be  at  least  of  equal  importance, 
is  the  development  of  nationalism  among  that  more 
than  half  of  the  world's  population  that  prior  to 
the  Second  World  War  was  under  various  forms 
of  colonialism.  If  we  are  to  understand  and  deal 
with  the  former,  it  is  equally  important  that  we 
also  understand  and  deal  with  the  latter. 

Few  probably  realize  tliat  in  the  17  short  years 
since  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  45  new 
free  states  have  been  formed  and  more  are  still 
on  the  way.  These  range  from  the  great  state  of 
India,  with  its  more  than  450  million  people,  and 
Indonesia,  with  its  almost  100  million,  to  the 
smaller  states  of  Africa.  In  total  population  they 
far  exceed  ourselves.  Western  Europe,  and  the 
Soviet  Union  combined.  Many  of  these  states 
have  gone  through  or  are  going  through  what  we 
may  at  times  regard  as  aberrations.  However, 
they  also  present  aberrations  when  looked  at  from 
Moscow. 

You  will  recall  that  Moscow  has  pressed  might- 
ily on  this  subject  of  colonialism  by  others  on  two 
premises.  One  was  that  being  forced  to  give  up 
its  colonies  would  weaken  the  West,  and  the  sec- 
ond was  that  the  former  colonies  would  embrace 
communism  and  thus  pass  to  the  control  of  Mos- 
cow. However,  this  has  just  not  happened.  No 
single  one  of  these  45  new  states  has  chosen  com- 
munism for  itself.  (I  do  not  include  in  tliis  figure 
Nortli  Viet-Nam  and  North  Korea,  which  bor- 
dered on  Communist  states  and  were  within  the 
grip  of  Communist  armies.)     At  times  some  of 

476 


lippi 

uisi 


ilia: 

ifllB 

ilion 


these  45  states  have  appeared  to  liover  on  the  brinl  "* 
and  Moscow  has  made  major  investments  to  brin  *"' 
them  to  that  brinlc,  but  fierce  national  pride  hs  '"' 
asserted  itself  and  they  have  clambered  back  ui 
the  slippery  slope 

There  is  a  fundamental  truth  here  in  which  w 
can  take  comfort,  although  it  should  not  cause  i 
to  relapse  into  any  form  of  complacency.  Th 
truth  is  that  our  national  well-being,  in  fact  tl: 
fundamental  philosophy  at  the  base  of  our  nation! 
life,  does  not  require  that  foreign  countries  be  oi 
satellites  or  dependencies  or  be  formed  in  ar 
single  image  of  ourselves.  Diversity  and  tole 
ance  of  diversity  are  a  fundamental  part  of  oi 
own  life  and  the  way  we  look  at  the  world.  As  tl 
President  has  stated  it,-  our  goal  is: 

...  a  i)eaceful  world  community  of  free  and  Indepen 
ent  states,  free  to  choose  their  own  future  and  their  ov 
system  so  long  as  it  does  not  threaten  the  freedom 
others. 

Some  may  choose  forms  and  ways  we  would  not  choc 
for  ourselves,  but  it  is  not  for  us  that  they  are  choosii 
We  can  welcome  diversity — the  Communists  cannot.    F 
we   offer   a   world   of   choice — they   offer   the   world 
coercion. 

We  are  naturally  flattered  and  pleased  wh 
someone  seeks  to  pattern  his  social,  political, 
economic  institutions  upon  ours,  for  properly  ^ 
feel  that  those  institutions  have  served  us  we 
However,  we  recognize  that  other  peoples  with  d; 
ferent  cultural  backgrovinds  and  different  natur 
environments  will  probably  evolve  differing  ins! 
tutions.  To  have  stability,  these  political  instit 
tions  must  in  some  form  have  what  our  Declar 
tion  of  Independence  so  aptly  termed  "the  conse 
of  the  governed."  The  old  Chinese  term  for  it  w 
the  "mandate  of  Heaven."  Even  with  the  politic 
genius  of  our  ancestors,  it  took  many  years  and 
great  Civil  War  to  establish  our  own  pattern.  '. 
many  ways  the  process  is  never  finished  and  co 
tinues  with  each  session  of  the  Congress  and  t 
Supreme  Court. 

Understandably,  most  of  these  new  countries  |j 
and,  for  that  matter,  many  older  ones — are  goi 
tlirough  the  same  process,  often  with  much  h  jy 
with  which  to  work  and  always  under  the  gre 
contending  forces  and  pressures  of  this  mode 
world.  We  can  sympathize  with  and  understa; 
this  process.  Wliile  it  is  annoying  and  often  fri 
trating  when  these  countries  do  not  look  at  t 
world  outside  of  them  through  the  same  glasses 


iriod 
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So? 
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ares 
its 
mil 

flhtl 
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m»i 


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'  Bulletin  of  Jan.  29,  19C2,  p.  159. 


Department  of  Stale  Bulle  i 


k 


urselves,  the  thing  that  is  of  vital  national  im- 
n  ortance  to  us  is  that  these  countries  not  become 
iibservient  to  a  power  hostile  to  ourselves. 
ck  I  lappily,  these  countries  are  also  seeking  to  avoid 
abservience  to  anyone,  and  thus  we  have  a  soimd 
asis  for  mutual  cooperation  based  on  the  sound 
rounds  of  mutual  self-interest.  We,  of  course, 
ill  also  always  value  allies  willing  to  associate 
[lemselves  with  us  for  common  ends. 


ationalism  and  Communism  Incompatible 


The  position  of  the  Soviet  Union  is  vastly  dif- 

rent.  The  Soviet  Communist  system  cannot 
jlerate  material  differences  of  diversity,  although 
iictically  it  may  appear  to  do  so  for  temporary 
eriods.  This  demand  for  conformity,  not  only 
Q  a  domestic  but  also  an  international  plane, 
rises  not  just  from  the  personal  characteristics 
f  Soviet  leaders  but  rather  more  fundamentally 
lif«  rem  the  very  imperatives  of  the  system  itself. 

This  is  not  solely  a  matter  of  ideology,  im- 
ortant  tliough  that  is,  but  arises  from  the  practi- 
al  requirements  of  the  system.  Communism  re- 
uires  a  controlled  and  directed  economy  down 
)  its  most  minute  details.  In  my  service  in  a 
Communist  country  I  was  increasingly  impressed 
Tith  the  fact  that  production  and  consumption 
aust  be  regulated  and  controlled  by  a  central  au- 
^  hority  because  there  are  not  built  into  the  system 
hose  automatic  controls  with  which  we  are  so 
amiliar.  This  central  control  of  the  resources 
joing  into  production  includes,  most  importantly, 
he  human  resource — that  is,  people.  To  the  de- 
cree that  such  control  is  effective — that  is,  people 
an  be  made  to  respond  to  it — the  system  can  op- 
rate.  "Wlien  people  do  not  respond  to  it,  the 
ystem  is  endangered. 

The  same  is  true  on  the  international  scale. 
fOomfortably  to  fit  into  the  Soviet  scheme  of 
hings,  other  states  must  be  responsive  and  dis- 
iplined  to  Soviet  control  both  in  the  economic 
md  political  context,  for  one  cannot  be  divorced 
LTom  the  other.  This  is  increasingly  being  recog- 
lized  not  only  in  free  countries  but  also  within 
he  Communist  countries  themselves.  It  faces 
iommunism  with  a  fundamental  challenge  for 
ivhich  it  by  no  means  has  found  an  answer.  My 
)wn  conviction  is  that  it  cannot  find  an  answer 
md  remain  the  communism  that  we  have  known. 

In  part  this  is  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that 
we  can  even  today  no  longer  speak  of  a  "Com- 

Ocfofaer  7,   7962 


0 


munist  bloc"  in  the  same  way  as  we  did  10  years 
ago  in  the  sense  of  a  solid  group  of  countries  cen- 
trally directed  and  controlled  in  all  things  by 
Moscow.  We  need  now  to  differentiate  from  the 
original  Soviet  Communist  model,  each  in  its  sep- 
arate way,  the  variants  of  communism  found  in 
Yugoslavia,  Red  China,  Poland,  and  Albania. 
Thus,  even  in  the  orbit  of  communism,  nationalism 
is  asserting  itself.  The  bitterness  of  even  the  pub- 
lic debate  within  the  Communist  world  is  witness 
to  the  difEculty  that  the  doctrine  is  having  in  try- 
ing to  adapt  itself  to  the  realities  of  the  interna- 
tional scene. 

I  have  hastily  sketched  over  some  of  this  back- 
ground as  I  feel  that  it  is  important  to  understand- 
ing the  world  in  which  we  are  living.  In  doing 
so,  I  hope  that  my  remarks  will  not  be  interpreted 
in  any  sense  as  implying  that  we  can  be  complacent 
or  that  I  am  attempting  to  gloss  over  the  prob- 
lems we  will  continue  to  face,  for  this  is  far  from 
my  thought.  Rather,  what  I  have  attempted  to 
show  is  that  there  are  at  work  in  the  world  many 
different  forces.  While  we  can,  to  a  degree,  hope 
to  influence  some  of  these  forces,  we  cannot  expect 
to  control  them.  To  seek  to  do  so  would  be  to  fall 
into  the  Soviet  error.  Plowever,  what  I  have  tried 
to  demonstrate  is  that  we  need  not  fear  these  forces 
of  nationalism  but  rather  can  welcome  them  as 
being  compatible  with  our  own  tradition  and  in- 
compatible with  Communist  doctrine.  We  should 
take  confidence  in  this,  as  it  again  demonstrates 
that  our  own  tradition  is  still  more  closely  attuned 
to  the  universal  aspirations  of  mankind  than  any 
other  system  yet  devised.  It  is  important  that 
we  remain  true  to  this  tradition. 

Thus  we  have  in  the  world  today  three  great 
forces:  the  aggressive  forces  of  communism,  the 
assertive  nationalism  of  the  newly  developing 
countries,  and  the  great  democratic  tradition  of 
this  country  and  Western  Europe.  "What  are  we 
doing  about  it,  and,  specifically,  what  can  you  do 
about  it? 

Defeating  Communist  Insurgency 

Only  a  few  brief  words  on  the  military  aspects. 
In  the  first  place  it  is  obvious  that  all  else  would 
count  for  little  if  the  Soviet  Union  were  to  achieve 
a  decisive  military  superiority  over  us.  This  it 
has  not  done.  Simply  let  me  say  that  we  have 
sound  grounds  for  confidence  that,  no  matter  what 
degree  of  surprise  the  Soviets  might  acliieve  in  an 

477 


attack  on  the  United  States,  we  could  still  also 
inflict  crippling  devastation  on  the  Soviet  Union. 
Soviet  recognition  of  this  fact  is  our  best  deter- 
rence against  general  war.  However,  this  is  not 
a  static  situation  but  rather  one  that  will  continue 
to  call  for  the  best  of  brains  and  much  of  our 
treasure.  It  would  be  simple  and  easy  to  bring 
about  a  situation  in  which  both  countries  would 
be  devastated.  To  use  this  power  wisely  and  well 
so  as  to  promote  our  interests  without  bringing 
about  such  a  result  calls  for  a  high  degree  of 
sophistication  and  steady  nerves.  At  the  same 
time  we  are  seeking  in  the  disarmament  negotia- 
tions to  halt  and  if  possible  to  turn  downward  this 
ever-increasing  spiral  of  terror. 

With  the  standoff  in  nuclear  power  and  inability 
of  the  Communists  to  win  allegiance  by  open 
means,  we  will  probably  continue  to  face  situations 
such  as  that  in  South  Viet-Nam,  where  the  Com- 
munists seek  to  impose  their  control  by  insurgency 
or  guerrilla  warfare.  This  type  of  warfare  is,  of 
course,  nothing  new.  In  1948  five  Communist-led 
revolutions  were  underway  in  Asia,  in  addition  to 
the  civil  war  in  China.  These  were  in  Indonesia, 
Bunna,  Malaya,  the  Philippines,  and  what  was 
then  called  French  Indochina.  There  was  also  a 
major  push  by  the  Communist  Party  in  India. 
Except  in  North  Viet-Nam,  where  they  were  able 
to  capture  the  nationalist  movement,  the  Commu- 
nists were  defeated  in  all  of  these  efforts,  as  they 
were  also  defeated  in  Greece.  They  were,  of 
course,  successful  in  China,  as  subsequently  they 
were  successful  in  Cuba.  I  will  not  attempt  this 
evening  to  go  into  the  circumstances  that  led  to 
their  success  in  these  latter  two  countries. 

My  point  is  that  Communist  insurgency  can  be 
defeated.  It  usually  has  been,  and  I  am  confident 
it  will  be  defeated  in  South  Viet-Nam.  However, 
in  each  rase  where  it  has  been  defeated  it  has  been 
primarily  by  the  forces  of  nationalism  within  the 
country.  We  can  assist  and  advise,  as  we  are 
doing  in  South  Viet-Nam,  but  we  do  not  and 
should  not  wage  "American  wars"  against  insur- 
gent forces.  In  our  concern  with  the  ever- 
increasing  complexity  of  general  warfare,  we  had 
perhaps  neglected  our  capabilities  of  assisting 
countries  facing  this  type  of  threat  in  which 
muzzle-loading  rifles  and  even  crossbows  are  more 
important  than  supersonic  jet  fighters.  This  type 
of  warfare  calls  for  a  true  blend  of  political,  eco- 
nomic, and  military  measures.    Quiet  organiza- 

478 


t: 
rojres 


iion  10 


tetiveei 
llies » 
stead  0' 


tional  and  training  steps  have  been  taken  by  tk  flat 
administration  both  in  Washington  and  the  fiel  liaB 
to  improve  our  ability  to  assist  in  meeting  the!  hat  of 
situations. 

Terms  of  the  Economic  Struggle 

There  remain  the  terms  of  the  economic  struggl«  ,ji,51a 
I  know  that  this  is  a  field  in  which  you  have 
particular  interest.  Many  of  you  in  this  room  th; 
evening  will  have  a  direct  and  personal  part  t 
play  in  this  process.  There  are  several  facets  t 
this  matter.  First,  and  most  important,  is  how  w 
Americans  continue  to  progress  in  resolving  oi 
own  economic  problems  such  as  assuring  a  decer  j[j,.|ijt, 
income  for  the  perhaps  10  percent  of  our  populi 
tion  who  have  an  income  below  decent  subsisten* 
standards ;  what  we  are  able  to  do  about  those  ( 
our  working  population  who  are  without  jobe  .„ 
wl^at  we  are  able  to  do  about  the  fact  that  the  pe  L 
centage  growth  of  our  gross  national  product  hi 
declined.  While  I  full  well  realize  that  the  dec 
sions  of  government  will  play  an  important  pa 
in  this,  the  ultimate  decisions  on  this  will  be  ma( 
by  the  individual  decisions  of  those  sitting  in  th 
room  and  your  business  colleagues  everywhere  : 
this  country.  This  is  not  just  a  question  of  pr 
senting  to  the  world  a  picture  of  a  vigorou 
healthy  economy  with  the  leadership  and  prestij 
this  naturally  gives  but  also  the  very  practical  ar 
immediate  jsroblem  of  our  ability  to  maintain  o\ 
military  and  economic  posture  overseas. 

Closely  related  to  tliis  question  of  econom 
vigor  and  growth  is  the  type  of  relationship  v 
develop  with  the  European  Common  Market  ar 
the  other  industrialized  free  nations  of  the  wor 
such  as  Japan,  Australia,  and  Canada. 

I  am  sure  that  I  need  not  argue  with  this  grou 
the  degree  to  which  the  size  of  the  "common  ma 
ket*'  we  have  enjoyed  among  our  States  has  co) 
tributed  to  our  own  economic  well-being  ar 
growth.  This  is  so  self-evident  that  it  is  no  longi 
a  subject  of  discussion.  Although,  as  populatic 
patterns  shift  and  economic  patterns  change,  har( 
ships  are  inflicted  upon  individual  industries  ar 
employees,  particularly  those  unable  or  unwillir 
to  move  with  changing  times,  we  recognize  this  ! 
an  inevitable  j^rice  to  be  paid  for  progi'ess  thi 
benefits  the  whole. 

I  know  that  you  are  aware  of  the  formation  ( 
the  European  Common  Market,  whicli  will  prol 
ably  be  joined  shortly  bj-  the  United  Kingdor 

Department  of  State  Bullet 


Aidjtol 

Sot 

omec 
izfdct 
of  Ik 
coimti 
inoiis, 
tries  i 


orlr 

Pover 

i 

iiiiinis 

10 


'm 

Otlol 


?hat  market  will  comprise  a  popiilation  larger 
Ihan  our  own  and,  incidentally,  also  larger  than 
hat  of  the  Soviet  Union.  It  will  comprise  an 
iconomy  that  is  growing  faster  than  our  own  and 
n  some  ways  is  already  superior  to  our  own.  For 
xample,  except  in  a  few  isolated  pockets,  un- 
mployment  is  virtually  nonexistent  in  the  Com- 
^  aon  Market  area.  As  Under  Secretary  Ball  stated 
"  Bst  November,^  we  are  truly  on  the  "threshold  of 
«  new  trading  world"  that  will  affect  every  busi- 
lessman  and  manufacturer  in  this  country.  The 
)rogress  of  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  through  the 
jongress  gives  promise  that  this  country  will  be 
ible  to  enter  into  a  relationship  with  the  Common 
*Iarket  and  the  other  industrialized  free  countries 
,hat  will  give  entirely  new  vigor  and  a  new  dimen- 
iion  to  the  economies  of  the  free  world.  Inci- 
lentally,  it  is  also  giving  a  direct  lie  to  the  so-called 
icientific  theories  of  Marxism-Leninism  on  the 
iconomic  and  political  development  of  relations 
between  capitalist  states.  Instead  of  decaying, 
hese  economies  are  showing  renewed  vigor.  In- 
stead of  withering  when  deprived  of  their  colonial 
Dossessions,  these  countries  are  showing  new 
mergy.  Instead  of  fighting  among  themselves, 
:hese  coimtries  are  submerging  old  rivalries  and 
nationalisms  into  a  greater  good  for  all. 


gf 


m 


m 


s 


Aidjto  Underdeveloped]Countries 

Not  less  important  than  the  development  of  our 
own  economy  and  that  of  the  other  free  industrial- 
ized comitries  is  the  development  of  the  economy 
of  the  newly  independent  and  underdeveloped 
countries.  These  terms  are,  of  course,  not  synony- 
mous, as  there  are  many  long-independent  coun- 
tries such  as  those  in  Latin  America  that  are 
imderdeveloped  in  the  sense  of  providing  a  decent 
standard  of  life  for  the  greater  part  of  their 
populations. 

"While  it  is  often  said  that  we  must  assist  these 
countries  in  their  efforts  to  develop  themselves  in 
order  to  prevent  their  going  Communist,  in  my 
own  opinion  this  oversimplifies  the  matter. 
Poverty  in  itself  does  not  give  rise  to  instability 
and  disorder — fertile  ground  in  which  the  Com- 
munists can  work.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Cuba  had 
one  of  the  highest  per  capita  incomes  in  Latin 
America.  What  does  give  rise  to  instability  and 
disorder  is  a  sense  of  unjustified  inequality  as  be- 


'  IMd.,  Nov.  20, 1961,  p.  831. 


Ocfober   7,    7962 


tween  people   within   the  same  country  and  as 
between  countries. 

This  question  of  development  is,  of  course,  a 
peculiarly  difficult  one  which  we  by  no  means  have 
the  time  to  discuss  this  evening.  "VVliy  does  one 
comitry  develop  while  another  does  not?  It  is 
clearly  not  a  question  of  race — witness  the  devel- 
opment of  Japan.  Wliile  climate  may  have  its 
influence,  vigorous  civilizations  have  flourished  in 
the  tropics.  There  is  clearly  much  that  we  do  not 
know. 

However,  one  thing  is  clear.  There  is  today  no 
comitry  and  no  people  who  are  content  with  the 
old  patterns  and  who  are  not  seeking  to  better 
themselves.  This  desire  is,  of  course,  the  first  step 
toward  progress.  If  communism  had  never 
existed,  we  would  still  have  a  big  stake  in  this 
process,  for  it  is  only  as  it  is  achieved  in  some 
degree  that  we  can  look  forward  to  that  orderly 
and  stable  world  which  is  the  goal  of  our  national 
policy.  From  a  narrow  economic  point  of  view, 
we  also  have  a  big  stake,  for  we  can  only  sell  to 
people  who  can  afford  to  buy.  For  example,  we 
sold  more  to  Japan  last  year  than  we  sold  to  all 
of  the  continent  of  Africa.  (Incidentally,  we  also 
sold  almost  twice  as  much  to  Japan  as  we  bought 
from  her.) 

"VVliat  we  can  do  about  this  question  of  develop- 
ment is  relatively  limited,  for  the  thi-ust  and  re- 
sources must  come  primarily  from  within  the 
country  itself.  What  we  as  a  government  can 
and  are  seeking  to  do  is  to  supply  the  marginal 
increment  without  which  the  country's  own  plans 
would  not  be  successful.  There  is  also  an  even 
greater  role  for  private  investment,  for  just  as  we 
were  heavily  dependent  on  European  capital  for 
our  own  development — in  fact  we  remained  a 
capital-importing  country  up  to  the  First  World 
War — these  countries  will  long  be  heavily  depend- 
ent on  capital  imports.  In  this  connection  it  has 
been  my  observation  that,  particularly  in  some  of 
the  smaller  countries,  the  needs  and  opportunities 
are  much  more  suitable  for  the  individual  or 
smaller  company  than  for  our  larger  industrial 
enterprises. 

I  am  sure  we  all  agree  that,  just  in  self-interest 
economic  terms,  our  postwar  assistance  to  Europe 
and  Japan  has  repaid  us  manyfold.  However, 
our  assistance  to  the  underdeveloped  countries 
operates  more  slowly  and  unevenly,  and  the  results 
are  less  dramatic  to  see.     It  is  here  in  particular 

479 


that  the  great  constructive  accomplishments  tend 
to  be  overshadowed  by  the  occasional  inevitable 
incident  of  mismanagement — or,  perhaps  in  the 
view  of  some,  niisjudgment — that  makes  the 
headlines. 

If  you  will  again  pardon  the  personal  note,  I 
served  for  some  years  in  a  country  in  which  we 
had  a  modest  assistance  program.  I,  of  course, 
closely  followed  the  program  and  frequently  vis- 
ited the  various  projects  and  our  personnel  who 
were  working  on  various  teclmical  assistance  mis- 
sions. Of  course,  some  did  better  than  others, 
but  there  was  no  American  and  no  project  in  which 
I  could  not  take  pride  as  an  American,  in  which 
I  did  not  feel  that  our  funds  were  being  spent 
wisely  and  well.  I  always  urged  on  my  visitors 
that  they  get  out  and  see  for  themselves.  We  were 
at  one  time  criticized  for  cooperating  with  the 
local  government  in  a  road  project  that,  accord- 
ing to  the  allegations,  "started  nowhere"  and 
"ended  nowhere."  As  the  road  was  completed, 
one  of  our  teclmicians  discovered  that  a  variety  of 
corn  was  well  suited  to  the  previously  undeveloped 
territory  through  which  the  road  passed.  "Within 
a  few  years  corn  became  the  fourth  ranking  ex- 
port from  the  country,  thus  contributing  not  only 
to  the  prosperity  of  the  country  but  also  to  its 
ability  to  increase  its  imports  from  the  United 
States.  Incidentally,  that  road  and  an  associated 
airfield  recently  made  possible  a  quick  deployment 
of  U.S.  troops  to  that  country. 

In  other  areas,  such  as  South  Viet-Nam  at  the 
present  time,  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  concentrate 
what  economic  assistance  we  are  able  to  give  on 
helping  the  local  government  meet  its  immediate 
problem  of  fighting  a  civil  war  inspired  and  sup- 
ported from  the  outside.  This  reduces  what  both 
we  and  the  South  Vietnamese  Government  are  able 
to  do  for  its  long-term  economic  development. 
Yet  production  has  been  increasing,  more  rice  is 
being  raised,  villagers  are  for  the  first  time  re- 
ceiving medical  care  and  education,  more  roads 
are  being  built,  and  evei-y  village  is  being  given  a 
means  of  communication.  I  feel  that  this  makes 
military,  economic,  and  political  sense.  The  costs 
of  not  making  the  effort  would  certainly  be  in- 
calculably greater. 

Thus,  it  has  never  seemed  to  me  that  we  should 
think  of  this  program,  90  percent  or  more  of  which 
is  in  any  event  spent  for  goods  in  the  United  States 
or  services  of  American  citizens,  as  a  "giveaway" 


480 


program  but  rather  as  an  investment  in  the  future 
of  the  kind  of  world  we  would  like  to  see.  In- 
cidentally, the  total  amount  being  requested  this 
year  for  the  foreign  assistance  program  is  less  than 
4  percent  of  our  national  budget  and,  if  military 
assistance  is  added,  slightly  over  5  percent  of  the 
budget. 

However,  we  no  longer  are  alone  in  this  field, 
for  the  countries  of  Europe  and  Japan,  as  well  as 
Canada,  Australia,  and  New  Zealand,  have  also 
perceived  that  they  have  a  common  interest  in  thia 
problem.  These  countries  have  rapidly  been  in- 
creasing their  economic  assistance  to  the  under- 
developed states  and,  in  1961,  gave  a  total  of 
approximately  $2.6  billion  as  compared  with  $3.4 
billion  for  the  United  States.  Some  of  these  coim- 
tries  devote  a  larger  share  of  their  gross  national 
product  to  foreign  aid  than  does  the  United  States 


inier 
(jrtsi 


The  Peace  Corps 


4e»i 
in 
im 


I  should  not  close  on  this  subject  of  our  cooper 
ation  in  international  development  without  men 
tioning  the  Peace  Corps.  As  one  who  has  lon^ 
worked  abroad  and  seen  ideas — and  some  migh 
be  called  "gimmicks" — come  and  go,  I  franklj 
had  some  skepticism  when,  while  still  abroad,  ] 
first  heard  of  the  project.  I  felt  that  the  idea  hac 
much  merit,  but  I  was  concerned  as  to  how  it  mighi 
be  carried  out  and  what  the  response  might  be  botl 
at  home  and  abroad.  In  matters  of  this  kind  it  if 
very  difficult  to  strike  the  right  note  between  pa 
tronizing  condescension  toward  a  foreign  people— 
which  understandably  always  gives  rise  to  resent 
ments — and  convincing  a  foreign  people  of  a  gen 
nine  willingness  to  be  helpful.  My  fears  havt 
long  since  been  dispelled  by  the  quality  of  th( 
Peace  Corps  leadership  and  its  personnel  abroad 
I  know  of  nothing  we  have  done  in  recent  year; 
that  has  been  more  eagerly  received  or  which  1 
feel  will  pay  bigger  dividends.  To  my  mind,  noi 
the  least  of  the  dividends  will  be  the  experienc* 
and  understanding  in  depth  of  foreign  people; 
that  the  members  of  the  Peace  Corps  will  brinf  fept 
back  to  this  country. 

These  then  are  some  of  the  facts,  as  I  see  them 
of  the  world  in  which  we  live  and  of  what  we  are 
attempting  to  do  about  them.  What  conclusion; 
can  we  draw?  We  certainly  cannot  promise  anj 
quiciv  or  easy  victory  for  freedom  over  com 
munism.  We  are  living  in  a  world  in  wliich  w 
are  faced  b)'  powerful  enemies.     AVe  would  not  be 


feca 
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Department  of  State  Bulletin^ 


iVinerican  if  we  did  not  feel  frustrated  by  the  un- 
certainties tliat  we  see  around  us.  Yet  we  are 
living  in  a  world  of  change — sometimes  fearfully 
■apid  change.  It  is  not  for  us  to  fear  change. 
We  can  have  confidence  that  those  ideals  for  which 
we  stand  are  more  closely  attuned  to  the  universal 
xspirations  of  mankind  than  any  other  system  yet 
devised.  The  sterility  of  the  Communist  doctrine 
is  increasingly  being  exposed.  As  Secretary  Rusk 
iIj  has  said :  * 

Successful  societies  do  not  have  to  build  walls  and 
string  barbed  wire  against  their  own  people.  The  Berlin 
wall  ...  is  a  monument  to  failure— the  failure  of  a  "com- 
Detitive  coexistence"  that  dared  not  compete. 

What  is  required  of  us?  That  we  remain  true 
:o  those  concepts  that  have  made  us  great,  faith- 
ful to  those  ideals  that  have  made  us  good;  and 
that  we  carry  on  in  concert  with  other  free  men 
.he  great  unfinished  business  of  building  the  kind 
)f  world  of  order  and  peace  sought  by  all  men 
if  good  will. 


President  States  U.S.  Policy 
Toward  Cuba 

Statement  by  President  Kennedy'^ 

There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  talk  on  the 
situation  in  Cuba  in  recent  days  both  in  the  Com- 
munist camp  and  in  our  own,  and  I  would  like  to 
take  this  opportunity  to  set  the  matter  in  perspec- 
tive. 

In  the  first  place  it  is  Mr.  Castro  and  his  sup- 
porters who  are  in  trouble.  In  the  last  year  his 
regime  has  been  increasingly  isolated  from  this 
hemisphere.  His  name  no  longer  inspires  the 
same  fear  or  following  in  other  Latin  American 
countries.  He  has  been  condemned  by  the  OAS 
[Organization  of  American  States],^  excluded 
from  the  Inter-American  Defense  Board,^  and 
kept  out  of  the  [Latin  American]  Free  Trade 
Association.  By  his  own  monumental  eco- 
nomic mismanagement,  supplemented  by  our  re- 


'  IMd.,  Sept.  3, 1062,  p.  343. 

'  Read  by  the  President  at  his  news  conference  on  Sept. 
13. 

'  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Feb.  19,  1962,  pp.  267 
and  270. 

'Ibid.,  p.  2S1. 

October   1,    1962 


fusal  to  trade  with  him,*  his  economy  has  crumbled 
and  his  pledges  for  economic  progress  have  been 
discarded,  along  with  his  pledges  for  political 
freedom.  His  industries  are  stagnating,  his  har- 
vests are  declining,  his  own  followers  are  begin- 
ning to  see  that  their  revolution  has  been  betrayed. 

So  it  is  not  surprising  that  in  a  frantic  effort 
to  bolster  his  regime  he  should  try  to  arouse  the 
Cuban  people  by  charges  of  an  imminent  Ameri- 
can invasion  and  commit  himself  still  further  to 
a  Soviet  takeover  in  the  hope  of  preventing  his 
own  collapse. 

Ever  since  communism  moved  into  Cuba  in 
1958,  Soviet  technical  and  military  personnel  have 
moved  steadily  onto  the  island  in  increasing  num- 
bers at  the  invitation  of  the  Cuban  government. 
Now  that  movement  has  been  increased.  It  is 
under  our  most  careful  surveillance.  But  I  will 
repeat  the  conclusion  that  I  reported  last  week,^ 
that  these  new  shipments  do  not  constitute  a  seri- 
ous threat  to  any  other  part  of  this  hemisphere. 

If  the  LTnited  States  ever  should  find  it  neces- 
sary to  take  military  action  against  communism  in 
Cuba,  all  of  Castro's  Communist-supplied  weap- 
ons and  technicians  would  not  change  the  result  or 
significantly  extend  the  time  required  to  achieve 
that  result. 

However,  unilateral  military  mtervention  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States  cannot  currently  be 
either  required  or  justified,  and  it  is  regrettable 
that  loose  talk  about  such  action  in  this  country 
might  serve  to  give  a  thin  color  of  legitimacy  to 
the  Communist  pretense  that  such  a  threat  exists. 
But  let  me  make  this  clear  once  again :  If  at  any 
time  the  Communist  buildup  in  Cuba  were  to  en- 
danger or  interfere  with  our  security  in  any  way, 
including  our  base  at  Guantanamo,  our  passage  to 
the  Panama  Canal,  our  missile  and  space  activities 
at  Cape  Canaveral,  or  the  lives  of  American  citi- 
zens in  this  country,  or  if  Cuba  should  ever  at- 
tempt to  export  its  aggressive  purposes  by  force  or 
the  threat  of  force  against  any  nation  in  this 
hemisphere,  or  become  an  offensive  military  base 
of  significant  capacity  for  the  Soviet  Union,  then 
this  country  will  do  whatever  must  be  done  to 
protect  its  own  security  and  tliat  of  its  allies. 

We  shall  be  alert  to,  and  fully  capable  of  deal- 
ing  swiftly    with,    any    such   development.     As 


'  Ibid.,  p.  283. 

°  Ibid.,  Sept.  24, 1962,  p.  450. 


481 


President  and  Commander  in  Chief  I  have  full 
authority  now  tx)  take  such  action,  and  I  have 
asked  the  Congress  to  authorize  me  to  call  up  re- 
serve forces  should  this  or  any  other  crisis  make 
it  necessary. 

In  the  meantime  we  intend  to  do  everything 
within  our  power  to  prevent  such  a  threat  from 
coming  into  existence.  Our  friends  in  Latin 
America  must  realize  the  consequences  such  devel- 
opments hold  out  for  their  own  peace  and  free- 
dom, and  we  shall  be  making  further  proposals  to 
them.  Our  friends  in  NATO  must  realize  the 
implications  of  their  ships'  engaging  in  the  Cuban 
trade. 

We  shall  continue  to  work  with  Cuban  refugee 
leaders  who  are  dedicated  as  we  are  to  that  na- 


tion's future  return  to  freedom.  We  shall  con-  jj,] 
tinue  to  keep  the  American  people  and  the  jjti 
Congress  fully  informed.  We  shall  increase  our  f 
surveillance  of  the  whole  Caribbean  area.  We  0 
shall  neither  initiate  nor  permit  aggression  in  this  jdu 
hemisphere. 

With  this  in  mmd,  while  I  recognize  that  rash  diid 
talk  is  cheap,  particularly  on  the  part  of  those  who 
did  not  have  the  responsibilitj',  I  would  hope  that 
the  future  record  will  show  that  the  only  people 
talking  about  a  war  and  invasion  at  this  time  are 
the  Communist  spokesmen  in  Moscow  and  Habana. 
and  that  the  American  people,  defending  as  we  dc 
so  much  of  the  free  world,  will  in  this  nuclear  age 
as  they  have  in  the  past,  keep  both  their  nerve  anc 
their  head. 


more 
ft 

lattf 
™ts 

Blgl 


Realism,  Responsibility,  and  Respect — Three  R's  for  the  United  Nations 


by  Uarlan  Cleveland 

Assistant  Secretary  for  International  Organisation  Affairs'^ 


On  Tuesday  next,  as  the  17th  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly begins  its  work,  the  U.N.  goes  into  its  18th 
year  of  operation.  Seventeen,  going  on  eighteen, 
is  a  wonderful  age.  We  know  that  from  reread- 
ing Booth  Tarkington,  even  if  all  we  can  remember 
ourselves  is  how  hard  it  seemed  to  be  to  grow  up 
convincingly,  with  all  those  adults  looking  on  and 
criticizing.  We  know  as  parents  that  17  is  also 
an  exasperating  age — not  so  bad  as  14  or  15,  per- 
haps, but  still  full  of  uncertainties.  Yet  as  all 
almost-eighteeners  know,  17  is  an  age  of  great 
glory.  The  awkwardness  of  early  adolescence  is 
being  left  behind;  the  mind  and  spirit  make  new 
discoveries;  more  and  more  freedom  is  being 
achieved,  with  greater  and  greater  measures  of 
responsibility ;  and  adventure  lies  in  wait  behind 
every  door. 

Like  all  yoimg  things  the  U.N.  is  still  grow- 
ing— in  size,  in  strength,  and,  we  hope,  in  wisdom. 
As  Adlai  Stevenson  has  said,  the  U.N.  was  built 
for  trouble  and  thrives  on  trouble.     And  all  of 


'  Address  made  before  the  American  Association  for  the 
United  Nations  at  New  York,  N.Y.,  on  Sept.  16  (press 
release  561  dated  Sept.  15). 


482 


its  members  have  been  learning  some  of  the  fact 
of  life — about  money  and  finance;  about  the  re 
lationships  between  calling  tunes  and  payin; 
pipers;  about  reputation,  especially  the  reputa 
tion  of  those  who  cry  "wolf"  too  often ;  and  abou 
the  difference  between  wanting  something  badl; 
and  working  for  it  hard. 

The  U.N.  is  even  old  enough  now  to  get  int 
politics,  the  domestic  politics  of  the  member  cour 
tries.  In  our  case  the  dramatic  events  in  th 
Congo  brought  out  that  most  natural  of  America 
cultural  traits:  the  desire  to  choose  sides  whe 
we  see  a  fight  going  on.  The  interest  in  th 
Congo's  civil  disturbance  became  an  America 
problem  when  Congress,  and  the  people  at  larg 
tlirough  polls  and  letters  to  Washington,  ha 
to  decide  whether  to  buy  $100  million  worth  c 
U.N.  bonds.  You  can  all  feel  pride  and  a  stak 
in  the  American  response  to  the  first  real  "oris: 
of  confidence"  over  U.S.  policy  in  the  U.N.  Bot 
in  the  Senate,  by  70  to  22,  and  in  the  House  c 
Representatives,  by  a  vote  of  256  to  134,  America 
political  leadership  has  responded  to  a  deep  coi 
viction  widely  shared  by  most  Americans:  thf 

Department  of  State  Bulfeli 


)iily 


pire 
kisii 


fOt«S( 

Tkf 
nerel; 
re  a 

lecord 

On  I 
iitlie 
mtke 
»e() 
five  ,1! 


Q-,  f 


fe''  a 
i 

SKtoi 

Aye 
iilti; 
sat((i 


'^hi 


the  United  Nations  is  never  perfect,  often  frus- 
trating, but  always  essential. 

Wliatever  wisdom  and  strength  the  Organiza- 
don  has  acquired  so  far  are  going  to  be  needed 

the  period  just  ahead. 

On  the  agenda  of  the  17th  General  Assembly, 
'"|Vhich  starts  on  Tuesday,  some  90  major  and  minor 
items  have  been  inscribed.^  And  there  will  be 
more  to  come,  making  more  than  100  in  all. 

The  subjects  range  from  A  to  Z,  from  atomic 
mergy  to  the  future  of  Zanzibar,  and  include 
matters  as  far  apart  as  weather  satellites  and  So- 
/iet  satellites,  as  closely  comiected  as  nuclear  test- 
ng  and  disarmament.  And,  for  many  of  the 
;ontroversial  subjects,  the  U.N.  is  about  the 
mly  place  where  they  can  be  settled. 

Now  you  take  100  agenda  items  and  multiply 
hem  by  104  nations  and  you  will  end  up  with  a 
igure  of  more  than  10,000 — 10,000  foreign  policy 
lecisions  to  be  made,  even  if  you  assume  only  one 
lecision  per  item,  and  there  are  quite  often  several 
'otes  on  amendments  as  well. 

The  task  of  the  U.S.  delegation  is  simple: 
nerely  to  make  sure  that  those  10,000  decisions 
ire  compatible  with  the  U.S.  national  interest. 

iecord  of  the  "Sensible  Sixteenth" 

On  this  date  a  year  ago.  Dag  Hammarskjold  was 
11  the  Congo  working  for  peace.     Two  days  later, 
m  the  18th,  he  was  dead.     Last  year  there  was 
!ome  question  as  to  whether  the  U.N.  would  sur- 
rive  as  an  action  agency  for  peace  or  whether  it 
ivould  be  limited  to  what  Hammarskjold  called 
I    permanent    diplomatic    conference — which    is 
iiiti  s^hat  the  Soviets  and  the  hard-core  minority  of 
CF.N.  foes  in  every  countiy  would  like  it  to  be. 
Some   predicted   the   imminent  victory   for  the 
troika,"  the  three-headed-monster  theory  of  U.N. 
administration.     Others   spoke    gloomily   of   an 
unholy  alliance  between  the  so-called  "Afro- Asian 
bloc"  and  the  Soviets.     Tlie  theory  was  that  an 
are  lUeged  identity  of  interest  between  the  Eussians 
liai  and    the    newly    independent    nations    on    anti- 
jolonialism  would  end  up  with  identity  of  in- 
terest on  all  U.N.  matters. 

A  year  ago  the  Soviets  seemed  to  have  the 
initiative  in  disarmament  discussions.  There 
seemed  to  be  a  dearth  of  fresh  ideas  in  the  U.N.'s 
3Conomic    and    social    development    work.     The 


future  of  the  U.N.  Operation  in  the  Congo  was  in 
serious  doubt. 

With  the  death  of  Hammarskjold,  some  of  our 
favorite  dispensers  of  doom  for  democracy,  im- 
consciously  reflecting  the  Communists'  line  that 
they  are  bound  to  win  and  democracy  is  bound  to 
lose,  started  lamenting  overtime.  The  U.N.,  which 
is  rooted  in  a  democratic  charter,  couldia't  survive, 
they  said.  Reasons  for  its  early  burial  sprouted 
from  the  columns  of  commentators  like  mush- 
rooms after  summer  rain.  To  write  "U.N. — Ee- 
quiescat  in  Pace'''  became  an  easy  way  to  gain  a 
reputation  as  a  deep  thinker  about  world  affairs. 

But  the  patient  was  tougher  than  he  looked. 
Tlie  fog  burned  off,  and  sunshine  and  fresh  air 
helped  speed  the  recovery.  The  "troika"  never 
materialized.  U  Tliant  was  appointed  Acting 
Secretary-General  by  unanimoiis  vote.  The  close 
connection  between  the  Soviet  bloc  and  the  Afri- 
cans and  Asians  was  hardly  noticeable  when  the 
constitutional  crunch  came,  and  the  Office  of 
Secretary- General  got  through  the  7-week  crisis 
unimpaired,  with  imdiminished  prestige. 

And  during  the  year  1961-62  the  U.N.  became 
more  and  more  the  kind  of  active,  operational  in- 
stitution which  the  U.S.  interest  requires  and  not 
merely  a  launching  pad  for  propaganda  favored 
by  the  Soviets. 

Look  at  the  record:  new  initiatives  in  outer 
space,  in  economic  development,  in  disarmament, 
in  the  financing  of  peacekeeping  operations;  re- 
sponsible actions  on  colonialism,  with  two  new 
nations — Rwanda  and  Burundi — helped  into 
existence  without  the  strife  which  accompanied  in- 
dependence in  the  Congo;  the  proposal  to  admit 
Red  China  turned  back  by  a  convincing  vote ;  and 
the  propaganda  ploys  of  the  Cubans  revealed 
clearly  for  all  the  world  to  see,  to  yawn  at,  and 
then  reject. 

Much  of  the  consti-uctive  nature  of  the  16th 
General  Assembly — the  "sensible  Sixteenth" — is 
the  result  of  President  Kennedy's  own  initiative, 
his  own  belief  in  the  importance  of  the  Organiza- 
tion to  the  United  States  and  to  the  proposals  set 
forth  in  his  U.N.  speech  of  almost  a  year  ago.^ 

Problems  of  the  17th  General  Assembly 

The  problems  of  last  year  are  not  those  of  this 
year,  even  though  they  may  be  covered  by  the  same 
tired  words  on  the  U.N.  agenda.    It  is  one  thing  to 


^  For  the  provisional  agenda,  see  Buixetin  of  Aug.  20, 
1962,  p.  306,  and  Sept.  24,  1962,  p.  466. 

lOcfofaer   7,    7962 


'lUd.,  Oct.  16, 1961,  p.  619. 


483 


step  on  the  starter.  It  is  another  thing  to  step  on 
the  gas.  Many  of  the  problems  hist  year  were 
tliose  of  getting  started.  Our  major  problem  this 
year  is  to  keep  going,  to  strengthen  the  U.N.  as  an 
institution,  emphasizing  and  backing  its  construc- 
tive activities  and  protecting  the  U.N.  both  from 
Soviet  attack  and  from  internal  erosion. 

At  the  U.N.  "school  of  parliamentary  diplo- 
macy," the  three  R's  this  season  will  be  Eealism, 
Responsibility,  and  Respect,  in  that  order. 
Realism  comes  first.  It  will  lead  to  responsibility, 
and  responsibility  to  respect.  It  is  not  enough  to 
be  warmhearted  about  the  U.N.  and  to  feel  deeply 
about  its  importance.  We  must  also  be  coolheaded 
and  view  each  proposal,  each  resolution,  each  vote, 
not  only  on  the  basis  of  its  own  merits  but  also  on 
the  realistic  basis  of  its  actual  effects  on  the  future 
of  the  U.N.  itself. 

If  the  General  Assembly  gets  the  reputation  of 
an  organization  whose  main  job  is  passing  large, 
shining  resolutions  whose  only  discernible  merit 
consists  of  the  sj-mbolism  of  protest,  then  its  grow- 
ing power  will  be  reduced — which  would  be  bad 
for  every  country  that  is  glad  to  be  equal  with 
every  other  country  as  a  member  of  the  General 
Assembly. 

The  General  Assembly  is  not  an  outdoor  protest 
rally  but  an  indoor  deliberative  assembly.  The 
U.N.  should  not  be  placed  in  the  position  of  "reso- 
luting"  about  matters  it  can't  do  much  of  anything 
about. 

Now  there  are  going  to  be  many  temptations. 
It  is  easy  to  work  up  a  good  head  of  steam  about 
certain  aspects  of  colonialism,  about  disarmament, 
about  nuclear  testing,  about  the  uses  of  outer 
space,  about  economic  development,  and  about 
peacekeeping.  These  are  all  large,  obvious,  and 
sometimes  emotion-packed  issues.  They  are  com- 
pounded of  all-but-universal  hopes  and  fears,  of 
grievances  old  and  new,  of  the  festering  sores  of 
thwarted  ambitions,  the  need  for  status,  and  a 
great  desire  for  peace. 

Therefore  it  will  be  tempting  to  pass  resolutions 
deploring,  or  even  condemning,  bad  things  and 
encouraging  good  things.  It  is  not  too  difficult  to 
pile  up  substantial  majorities  in  favor  of  such 
purely  hortatory  resolutions. 

But  the  real  problems  are  not  to  be  got  at  by 
such  means.  The  real  problems  in  connection  with 
any  question  are:  Wliat  can  the  U.N.  do  about  it? 
and,  if  there  are  substantial  costs  involved,  how 
will  the  job  get  paid  for? 


484 


Financing  Peaceiteeping  Operations 

We  are  faced  with  this  second  problem  right 
now  in  respect  to  financing  peacekeeping  opera- 
tions, particularly  those  in  the  Congo.  The  U.N. 
bond  issue,  Mhich  is  so  much  in  the  news  these 
days,  is  only  a  stopgap  arrangement:  to  pay  for 
peacekeeping  costs  from  June  30  last  until  such 
time  as  better  arrangements  can  be  worked  out. 
Finding  a  responsible  solution  to  this  problem  is 
one  of  the  major  jobs  of  this  General  Assembly. 

Up  until  last  Jmie  30  we  had  an  unsatisfactory 
system  of  assessments — which  some  U.N.  mem- 
bers refused  to  pay,  even  at  reduced  rates — plus 
voluntary  contributions — which  ended  up  with 
the  U.S.  the  only  nation  to  make  a  volimtary  con- 
tribution of  money  to  help  the  U.N.  carry  on  the 
military  operations  in  the  Congo. 

As  a  starter,  the  International  Court  of  Justice' 
has  declared  costs  incurred  by  the  U.N.  in  carry- 
ing out  approved  programs  to  be  "expenses  of  the 
organization"  within  the  meaning  of  the  U.N. 
Charter  and  assessments  levied  upon  the  members 
to  pay  for  such  U.N.  actions  to  be  bindmg.''  As 
a  consequence  of  this  opinion,  nonpayment  of  such 
assessments  may  bring  a  country  up  against  article 
19  and  result  in  that  country's  being  deprived  ol 
the  right  to  vote  in  the  General  Assembly. 

The  next  step  is  for  the  General  Assembly  tc 
adopt  the  advisory  opinion  of  the  Internationa] 
Court  and  thus  establish  once  and  for  all  unsever- 
able  relationship  between  fine  resolutions  and  fi- 
nancial responsibility.  This  will  be  one  of  the 
big  jobs  ahead.  Related  to  it  is  the  job  of  making 
a  vigorous  effort  to  collect  the  long-overdue  assess 
ments  from  delinquent  members. 

Peacekeeping  Takes  Many  Forms 

Now  the  U.N.'s  peacekeeping  activities  don't  al 
have  to  be  so  large  and  so  visible  as  its  operation: 
in  the  Congo  or  the  Middle  East.  Sometimes  ! 
small  patrol  will  do  the  trick.  Perhaps  only  j 
civilian  contingent  to  investigate  and  report 
Perhaps  only  one  man  to  mediate  and  conciliate. 

Again,  it  is  really  not  so  much  a  question  o 
novelty,  of  untried,  untested,  unproved  ways  o 
acting  to  keep  the  peace.  Over  the  years  quit 
a  good  many  different  methods  have  been  devised 
each  one  to  meet  the  needs  of  a  particular  set  o 
circumstances. 


Ii 
b 

OTI 

In 


Kasl 

tioDS 

In 

jiai 

orgai 

saw 

were 

centr 

sloiil 

Ib 

gMi 

Ina 

pan 

jea: 

in 

Hys 

answf 

tratoi 

eraiuf 

tions 

gora 

In: 

tlieGi 
down 
reais 
Conge 


*  For  a  Department  statement  concerning  the  Court 
opinion,  see  ibid.,  Aug.  13, 1962,  p.  246. 

Deparfmenf  of  Sfate   Bullefh 


cat  SOI 
wiild 
offric 

*0I 

•ISpec 

M  a' 

THs 


In  1946  Iran  complained  that  Soviet  troops  were 
illegally  on  its  territory.  The  Soviets  withdrew 
their  ti'oops  when  the  Security  Council  called  for 
'withdrawal. 

In  the  same  year  a  Greek  complamt  about  for- 
eign aid  to  its  rebel  guerrillas  led  to  a  U.N.  Peace 
Observation  Commission  which  helped  the  Greek 
Government  stabilize  the  coimtry. 

In  1948  the  British  mandate  expired  in  Pales- 
tine. In  the  wake  of  the  partition  of  Palestine 
that  followed,  U.N.  truce  supervisors  have  helped 
keep  a  taut  and  precarious  peace  for  14  years. 

Since  1948  fierce  fighting  has  been  replaced  in 
Kashmir  by  a  cease-fire  monitored  by  United  Na- 
tions observei-s. 

In  1950  the  Republic  of  Korea  was  invaded  and 
a  large  armed  force  under  U.N.  command  was 
organized  to  repel  the  invasion.  Many  Americans 
saw  service  with  that  force,  and  54,246  of  them 
were  killed,  successfully  defending  the  charter's 
central  principle  that  in  a  civilized  world  nations 
should  band  together  to  stop  aggression. 

In  1956  the  U.N.  arranged  a  cease-fire  when 
fighting  erupted  in  Sinai  and  over  the  Suez  Canal. 
In  a  few  days  a  U.N.  Emergency  Force  was  on 
guard  in  the  danger  spots.  It  is  still  there  after 
6  years,  and  the  peace  is  still  being  kept. 

In  1958  a  special  session  of  the  General  Assem- 
bly sent  a  U.N.  observer  group  to  Lebanon  in 
answer  to  Lebanon's  comi^laint  that  foreign  infil- 
trators were  assisting  efforts  to  overturn  the  gov- 
ernment. Conditions  were  then  stabilized.  Elec- 
tions were  then  held,  and  the  tlireat  to  orderly 
government  evaporated. 

In  1960  the  United  Nations  was  called  upon  by 
the  Government  of  the  Congo  to  prevent  a  break- 
down of  its  newly  established  independence.  Two 
years  after  the  start  of  the  U.N.  Operation  in  the 
Congo  that  nation  has  a  parliament,  a  government, 
and  the  beginnings  of  federal  order. 

In  1961  the  Assembly  renewed  the  Palestine 
Conciliation  Commission  and  urged  it  to  work 
out  some  destiny  for  the  Palestine  refugees  that 
would  in  time  remove  them  as  a  dangerous  source 
of  friction  in  the  Middle  East  and  a  cancerous 
sore  on  the  conscience  of  the  world  community. 
A  Special  Eepresentative  of  the  United  Nations  is 
hard  at  work  now  under  this  mandate. 

Tliis  year  a  U.N.  Special  Representative  helped 
avert  a  war  over  the  future  of  West  New  Guinea 
by  helping  the  Dutch  and  the  Indonesians  to  agree 

October  1,   1962 


on  a  U.N.-supervised  future  for  the  territory  and 
its  Papuan  inhabitants.^ 

As  you  can  see,  peacekeeping  takes  many  forms. 
We  are  going  to  make  strong  efforts  to  get  the 
U.N.'s  peacekeeping  to  become  moi-e  operational. 

And  the  way  for  us  all  to  do  this — in  General 
Assembly  debate  and  also  in  discussing  the  U.N. 
in  our  own  living  rooms — is  to  look  beyond  desir- 
able ends  to  practical  means,  to  ask  how  as  well 
as  what.  The  key  questions  to  ask  about  every 
one  of  the  hundred  subjects  are:  First,  what 
should  the  U.N.  as  an  organization  do  about  the 
matter?  and  second,  how  will  the  action  we  all 
take  affect  the  strength,  the  support,  and  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  U.N.  as  an  organization  ? 

U.N.  Is  Coming  of  Age 

Wlien  we  were  very  young  we  used  to  cry  for 
the  moon  and  not  understand  the  perversities  of 
fate  which  denied  us  this  much-desired  ornament. 
Later,  we  saw  the  problems  of  the  imiverse  in 
terms  of  naked  absolutes :  Every  proposition  was 
judged  in  terms  of  good  or  bad,  white  or  black, 
for  or  against.  There  was  nothing  in  between, 
or  outside.  There  was  no  room  for  tolerance,  for 
negotiation ;  and  there  was  no  time  to  wait. 

Later  on,  as  we  grew  up,  the  euphoria  of  rose- 
colored  romance  gave  way  to  the  practical  affairs 
of  living.  The  world  became  less  and  less  a  place 
of  knights-at-arms,  smoke-snorting  dragons,  and 
fair  ladies  to  be  rescued,  and  more  and  more  a 
place  of  problems  waiting  to  be  solved  in  prag- 
matic fashion  one  way  or  another;  and  with  the 
attaimnent  of  adult  status  we  were  called  on  to 
help  find  these  solutions,  not  only  to  talk,  to  de- 
bate, or  to  highly  resolve. 

Now,  at  the  threshold  of  maturity,  the  U.N.  is 
coming  of  age  in  politics  and  in  operations.  It 
faces  an  almost  incredible  variety  of  fascinating 
and  important  problems — fascinating  because 
they  are  complex,  important  because  they  are  the 
stuff  of  our  destiny.  It  is  equipped  with  some 
of  the  tecliniques  and  the  tools  it  needs  so  that 
it  can  serve  our  interests,  and  the  interests  of  other 
nations,  in  peacekeepmg  and  nation  building. 
Fifty-five  thousand  people,  spending  more  than 
half  a  billion  dollars  of  the  world's  money,  is  no 
mean  effort  for  a  17-year-old  organization.  It 
has  the  experience  to  move  in  on  international  dis- 


'For  backgroiuid,  see  Hid.,  June  25,  1962,  p.  1039,  and 
Sept.  3,  1962,  p.  349. 

485 


putes  and  to  provide  the  way  for  75  countries 
to  help  125  developing  areas  to  constitute  the 
kinds  of  institutions  they  need  to  govern  them- 
selves and  better  their  life  and  their  prospects  for 
the  future. 

In  all  of  this  wondrous  work,  culminating  as  it 
does  in  a  General  Assembly  of  the  U.N.,  a  real- 
istic approach  leading  to  responsible  action  will 
bring  respect  and  widen  the  support  of  the  U.N. 

Letters  of  Credence 

Federal  Republic  of  Germany 

The  newl}'  appointed  Ambassador  of  the  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany,  Karl  Heinrich  Knapp- 
stein,  presented  his  credentials  to  President 
Kennedy  on  September  14.  For  texts  of  the  Am- 
bassador's remarks  and  the  President's  reply,  see 
Department  of  State  press  release  553  dated  Sep- 
tember 14. 


Advisory  Committee  To  Study 
Cultural  Presentations  Program 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Sep- 
tember 14  (press  release  551)  that  the  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs, 
Lucius  D.  Battle,  had  requested  the  U.S.  Advisory 
Commission  on  International  Educational  and 
Cultural  Affairs  to  undertake  a  special  examina- 
tion of  the  Department's  cultural  presentations 
program.  Dr.  Jolin  W.  Gardner,  president  of  the 
Carnegie  Corporation  of  New  York  and  cliairman 
of  the  Commission,  has  agreed  to  direct  the  study. 

The  primary  aim  of  the  examination  is  to  assure 
that  the  United  States  achieve  maximum  benefits 
from  the  sending  abroad  of  American  performers 
in  music,  drama,  the  dance,  and  sports.  The  Ad- 
visory Commission  was  requested  to  consider  the 
following : 

1.  Opportimities  for  new  approaches  in  this 
field; 

2.  Fuller  utilization  of  nonprofessional  groups 
as  well  as  means  of  drawing  upon  the  best  avail- 
able professional  talent;  and 


3.  Organization  and  procedures  for  screening, 
selection,  contracting,  tour  management,  and  over- 
all admmistration. 

For  its  review  the  Commission  will  enlist  the' 
services  of  authorities  both  inside  and  outside  thei 
Government. 

General  Pulaski's  Memorial  Day,  1962 

A     PROCLAMATION' 

Whereas  Casimir  Pulaski,  a  young  Polish  patriot  and' 
lifelong  fighter  against  tyranny,  volunteered  in  the  Con- 
tinental Army  during  the  American  Revolution,  fought 
with  bravery,  provided  the  struggling  new  nation  with 
brilliant  military  leadership,  was  made  a  brigadier  gen- 
eral by  Congress,  and  formed  his  own  famed  Pulaski'S' 
Legion ;  and 

Whekeas  this  year  marks  the  one  hundred  and  eighty- 
third  anniversary  of  his  death  on  October  11,  1779,  at 
Savannah,  Georgia,  where  he  received  mortal  wounds 
while  leading  a  cavalry  charge  in  the  battle  to  recapture 
that  city ;  and 

Whebeas  the  American  people  feel  deep  g^ratitude  to 
General  Pulaski  and  to  his  countrymen  and  the  many 
other  foreign  patriots  who  joined  in  and  fought  for  the 
cause  of  our  freedom  ;  and 

Whereas  General  Pulaski's  distinguished  dedication  to 
the  cause  of  liberty  will  always  serve  as  an  inspiration  to 
all  peoples  in  their  struggle  for  national  freedom : 

Now,  THEREFORE,  I,  JoHN  F.  KENNEDY,  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  do  hereby  designate  Thursday, 
October  11,  1962,  as  General  Pulaski's  Memorial  Day ; 
and  I  direct  the  appropriate  officials  of  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment to  display  the  flag  of  the  United  States  on  all 
Government  buildings  on  that  day. 

I  also  invite  the  jieople  of  the  United  States  to  observe 
the  day  with  appropriate  ceremonies  in  honor  of  the 
memory  of  General  Pulaski  and  the  high  Ideals  for  which 
he  sacrificed  his  life. 

In  WITNESS  WHEREOF,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand 
and  caused  the  Seal  of  the  United  States  of  America  to 
be  aflixed. 

Done  at  the  City   of  Washington   this  tenth   day   of 

September    in    the   year   of   our   Lord    nineteen 

[seal]     hundred  and  sixty-two  and  of  the  Independence 

of  the  United  States  of  America  the  one  hundred 

and  eighty-seventh. 


The  Ac 


hjl 


ihisqiii 
atmc 
jirtmei 
labitati 
itroiiglj 
Tlie, 
more  to 
ican  fc 
familT. 


By  the  President: 
Dean  Rdsk, 
Secretary  o/  State. 


/fL^  L^ 


'■  No.  3490 ;  27  Fed.  Reg.  9201. 


486 


Oeparfmenf  of  State  Bulletin 


lb  last 
Presi 


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ancestr 

A  St 

esis 

epart 

tancoi 

tkSa 


ofSta 
claim 
oltMs 
nieiitl: 


Rtjrif 

incy 
Otiob, 


9(2 


till 

JSti' 


he  Adams  Family  and  the  Department  of  State 


iy  Edwin  M.  Martin 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter-American  Affairs  ■ 


ate 


The  step  from  the  Department  of  State  into 
his  quiet  old  residence  is  not  as  drastic  a  change 
n  atmosphere  as  it  might  seem.  Both  tlie  De- 
partment and  this  home  were  long  the  natural 
labitats  of  the  Adams  family,  and  both  bear 
itrongly  the  imprint  of  its  collective  personality. 
Tlie  Adams  family  has  probably  contributed 
nore  to  the  development  and  execution  of  Amer- 
can  foreign  policy  than  any  other  American 
"amily.  Historians  have  called  it  the  most  dis- 
inguished  in  the  United  States,  and  I  would  be 
he  last  to  argue  with  this  judgment. 

President  Kennedy  opened  his  book  Profiles  in 
lourage  with  the  story  of  Jolm  Quincy  Adams, 
tvho  willingly  risked  his  public  career  by  submerg- 
jig  not  only  personal  but  regional  interests  to  the 
lational  good.  His  conscience  told  him  that  "pri- 
^'ate  interest  must  not  be  put  in  opposition  to  the 
Dublic  good."  As  the  President  has  written: 
'John  Quincy  maintained  the  unflinching  and 
nflexible  bearing  which  became  his  Puritan 
mcestry." 

A  strong  case  can  be  made  in  support  of  the 
:hesis  that  the  Adams  family  shaped  the  State 
Department's  conscience.  It  is  essentially  a  Puri- 
tan conscience,  with  its  nucleus  the  conviction  that 
the  Nation's  interests  must  always  come  first,  that 
duty  must  come  before  gain  at  both  the  personal 
ind  the  public  levels.  Because  the  Department 
of  State  is  made  up  of  human  beings,  I  make  no 
claim  that  it  has  always  lived  up  to  the  dictates 
of  this  conscience,  nor  do  I  say  that  the  Depart- 
ment has  always  been  infallible  in  judging  how  the 
Nation's  interests  are  best  served.  However,  their 
collective  Puritan  conscience  has  helped  our  Sec- 
retaries  of   State,   our   diplomats,   our   Foreign 


^  Address  made  at   the  Adams  Home  Historical   Site, 
Quincy,  Mass.,  on  Sept.  7   (press  release  543). 

Ocfober  T,   7962 


Service  oiBcers,  and  our  Departmental  policy- 
makers over  tlie  years  to  stand  up  under  abuse, 
demagogy,  regional  and  partisan  pressures,  and 
personal  attacks  while  they  pursued  what  they 
saw  as  the  country's  best  interests. 

I  have  been  invited  here  to  speak  of  the  Adams 
family  in  the  State  Department.  The  subject  is 
an  historical  amateur's  paradise.  Source  material 
is  so  abundant  that,  if  a  sjieaker  cliooses,  he  need 
only  string  together  a  long  list  of  quotations  and 
references  to  provide  a  thrilling  and  inspiring 
talk.  I  intend  to  strike  only  a  few  highlights.  It 
should  be  clear  to  anj^one  who  has  followed  politi- 
cal developments  in  my  area  of  the  world  over 
the  past  couple  of  months  that  I  have  not  had 
much  time  to  become  even  an  amateur  expert  on 
the  activities  of  the  most  active  and  prolific  Adams 
family.  This  speech  owes  a  great  deal,  therefore, 
to  the  knowledge  and  energy  of  a  number  of  my 
colleagues  in  the  Department  of  State. 

Jolin  Adams,  founder  of  the  family  as  we  think 
of  it,  put  his  clear  mind  and  relentless  honesty  to 
the  service  of  his  counti-y.  These  qualities,  which 
he  passed  on  to  his  son  and  which  cheated  both  of 
popularity  and  large  followings,  strangely  enough 
make  both  appear,  in  retrospect,  among  the  most 
flexible  and  farsighted  of  the  Founding  Fathers. 
Incapable  of  following  a  "party  line"  for  the  sake 
of  votes  and  applause,  John  and  Jolm  Quincy 
Adams  placed  on  the  record  reservations  about 
popular  dogmas  of  their  day  that  must  have  made 
their  contemporaries  uncomfortable  but  that 
make  us  look  back  on  them  admiringly. 

In  his  May  16,  1797,  message  to  Congress  as 
President,  for  example,  John  Adams  advised 
against  too  narrow  an  interpretation  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  noninvolvement  in  the  political  systems 
of  Europe.  Noninvolvement  had  already  become, 
and  was  long  to  remain,  a  cornerstone  of  national 

487 


policy,  but  he  warned  that  we  should  not  turn 
our  back  on  those  systems,  nor  ignore  "the  cur- 
rent chain  of  events."  He  p)ointed  out  that, 
whether  we  liked  it  or  not,  our  mere  existence 
caused  us  to  be  taken  into  account  by  the  European 
powers  as  a  "weight  in  the  balance  of  power."  "It 
is  a  natural  policy  for  a  nation  that  studies  to  be 
neutral,"  he  said,  "to  consult  with  other  nations 
engaged  in  the  same  strides  and  jjursuits  at  the 
same  time." 

In  writing  to  Jefferson  about  the  American 
Revolution,  John  Adams  said  it  was  not  to  be  con- 
fused with  the  Revolutionary  War.  This,  he 
pointed  out,  "was  only  an  effect  and  consequence 
of  it.  The  revolution  was  in  the  minds  of  the 
people,  and  this  was  effected  from  1760  to  1775, 
in  the  course  of  fifteen  years,  before  a  drop  of 
blood  was  shed  at  Lexington." 

Those  who  are  inclined  today  to  look  on  revolu- 
tions and  upheavals  anywhere  in  the  world  as  the 
results  of  simple  causes,  of  someone's  immediately 
preceding  actions  or  inactions,  might  do  well  to 
think  hard  on  those  words,  and  to  begin  looking 
deeper  for  the  causes  of  today's  events. 

Another  Adams — Charles  Francis — in  the  third 
generation  brought  a  perfectly  balanced  mind  to 
act  in  his  country's  interest  at  a  time,  it  has  been 
aptly  said,  when  the  world  was  by  no  means  per- 
fectly balanced.  As  our  Minister  to  London  dur- 
ing the  Civil  War,  when  British  official  sympa- 
thies were  definitely  against  the  Union,  he  handled 
our  relations  with  firmness  and  tact.  His  firmness 
was  in  the  best  family  tradition,  but  tact  was  a 
novel  quality  in  an  Adams.  His  father  and  grand- 
father were  noted  for  their  lack  of  it  and  were 
the  first  to  admit  it.  Among  Charles  Francis 
Adams'  less  remembered  services  is  one  for  which 
those  of  us  who  are  concerned  with  Latin  Amer- 
ica may  be  especially  grateful — his  speeding  of 
Great  Britain's  disassociation  with  the  French  ef- 
fort to  convert  Mexico  into  a  French  satellite,  by 
making  clear  in  England  the  Lincoln  administra- 
tion's "cordial  good  wislies  for  the  safety,  welfare 
and  stability  of  the  republic  system  of  govern- 
ment" in  Mexico  and  its  solid  support  for  Juarez. 

In  the  fourth  generation  we  see  the  famed 
Adams  individualism  in  full  sway.  Brooks 
Adams  is  widely  credited  with  having  been  the 
"unofficial  philosopher"  of  the  Theodore  Roosevelt 
administration  and  with  spurring  it  to  ever  wider 
bounds  of  empire  and  militarj'  glory.    Meanwliile, 


488 


his  brother  Henry  looked  on  these  activities  as 
jingoism  and  declared  that  Roosevelt's  mind  had 
gone  to  pieces.  It  was  Henry,  during  his  brief 
association  with  our  Foreign  Service  as  his  father 
Charles  Francis'  secretary  in  London,  who,  at  24, 
showed  how  mucli  he  shared  his  family's  extraor- 
dinary vision.  On  hearing  how  the  Merrimac  had 
proved  the  superiority  of  ironclads  over  wooden 
warships,  he  wrote  his  brother  tliat  he  foresaw 
the  United  States  "left  to  a  career  that  is  positively 
unlimited  except  for  the  powers  of  the  imagina- 
tion," and  that  "for  England,  there  is  still  great- 
ness and  safety,  if  she  will  draw  her  colonies 
around  her,  and  turn  her  hegemony  into  a  confed- 
eration of  British  nations." 

John  Quincy  Adams 

The  entire  Adams  family  has  always  interested 
me.  At  this  moment  in  my  life,  however,  I  am 
Assistant  Secretai-y  of  State  for  Inter- American 
Affairs  and  admit  to  having  acquired  a  temporary 
occupational  bias.  The  Adams  who  was  not  only 
our  sixth  President  but  probably  the  greatest  di- 
plomatist and  Secretary  of  State  in  the  history  of 
our  country,  the  one  who  laid  the  foundation  for 
our  Western  Hemisphere  policies — John  Quincy 
Adams — is  the  one  who  at  present  interests  me 
most.  With  your  permission,  therefore,  I  intend 
to  return  to  the  second  Adams  generation  and  to 
concentrate  on  it. 

After  reviewing  Jolm  Quincy  Adams'  life,  I  am 
left  with  mixed  emotions  by  only  one  of  his  official 
acts.  When  he  took  office  as  Secretary  of  State, 
145  years  ago  this  month  (September  22,  1817,  to 
be  exact),  he  set  an  awesome  precedent.  He  initi- 
ated the  first  of  what  someone  has  estimated  to  be 
545  reorganizations  in  the  State  Department !  I 
have  not  stopped  to  count  how  many  of  these  have 
been  during  my  years  of  service  but  am  imder  the 
impression  tlaat  I  must  have  lived  through  a  large 
percentage  of  them.  Wlien  you  consider  that  the 
first  reorganization  began  with  the  establishment 
of  a  filing  sj'stom,  because  there  had  been  none 
before,  you  liave  some  idea  of  how  simple  life  must 
have  been  in  Washington  in  those  days.  The  Cap- 
ital was  then  nothing  more  than  a  village,  with 


This  fortrait  by  Jean-Baptiste-Adolphe  Gibert 
is  from  the  Departmenfs  collection;  it  hangs  in 
tlie  inner  corridor  of  the  Secretanfs  suite. 

Deparfment  of  Sfafe   Bullefin 


JOHN     QUINCY    ADAMS 

1  767-1848 


658320—62 3 


summers  as  infernally  hot  as  they  are  now,  though 
without  the  additional  annoyance  of  aircondition- 
iiig,  and  the  diplomatic  corps  avoided  assignments 
there  like  the  plague.  When  John  Quincy  Adams 
headed  the  State  Department,  the  diplomatic  cori)S 
consisted  of  the  representatives  of  nine  European 
countries,  only  four  of  them — those  of  France. 
Great  Britain,  Russia,  and  Spain — with  the  rank 
of  Minister  Plenipotentiary  and  Envoy  Extraor- 
dinary. Even  after  we  recognized  the  new  Latin 
American  Republics,  during  Adams'  Secretary- 
ship, the  total  number  of  chiefs  of  mission  rose 
only  to  15.  The  staff  of  the  Department  of  State 
proper  was  12.  How  simple  and  peaceful  that 
sounds  today,  when  106  embassies  and  legations 
are  represented  in  Washington  and  the  Depart- 
ment's staff  runs  over  5,000 ! 

We  have  all  heard  how  John  Quincy  Adams 
used  to  go  for  long  swims,  naked  in  tlie  Potomac, 
with  his  valet  and  sometimes  a  friend,  and  how 
once  he  was  nearly  drowned.  The  picture  is  bu- 
colic and  appealing — especially  to  those  of  us  who 
regret  the  Potomac  today  is  too  dirty  to  swim  in. 
Yet  life  was  never  simple  and  peaceful  very  long 
for  any  Adams.  John  Quincy's  sense  of  duty  and 
his  visions  for  the  future  of  his  countiy  dogged 
him  night  and  day.  He  may  have  had  few  dip- 
lomats to  see,  but  he  had  knotty  problems  to  work 
out  with  them,  especially,  for  example,  with  the 
man  he  called  the  "wily  Don,"  the  Spanish  Min- 
ister Luis  de  Onis  (direct  ancestor,  by  the  way, 
of  Juan  de  Onis,  the  New  York  Timex  correspond- 
ent in  Rio).  It  was  with  him  that  he  negotiated 
the  transcontinental  treaty  of  1819  with  Spain 
that  gave  us  clear  title  to  the  Floridas  and  further 
defined  the  boundaries  of  the  Louisiana  Pur- 
chase— the  treaty  he  himself  considered  the  single 
most  important  achie^■ement  of  his  life.  I  am 
always  struck,  when  i-eading  about  its  negotiation, 
by  the  stubborn  way  Adams  pitted  himself  not 
only  against  the  Spanish  Minister  but  against  his 
fellow  Cabinet  members  and  against  President 
Monroe  himself,  holding  out  for  concessions  that 
were  compatible  witli  his  great  |>ersonal  vision  of 
the  United  States  as  a  nation  stretched  to  conti- 
nental limits.  It  took  great  vision  to  sit  in  a 
sparsely  settled  village,  deep  in  mud  or  shrouded 
in  clouds  of  dust,  and  picture  a  day  when  the  coun- 
try would  be  so  thickly  populated  that  it  must 
stretch  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific. 


The  Adamses  were  always  ahead  of  their  time. 
Take  our  undei"standing  of  the  meaning  of  inde- 
pendence, which  is  part  of  their  legacy  to  us.  They 
insisted  it  meant  freedom  from  domination  of  any 
kind,  positive  exercise  of  one's  own  judgment,  de- 
velopment of  one's  own  abilities.  They  were  con- 
vinced that  the  independence  of  the  nation  and 
that  of  the  individual  are  insepai"able.  They  rec- 
ognized from  the  beginning  that  national  inde- 
pendence cannot  have  full  meaning  unless  the 
political  and  commercial  systems  of  the  nations  of 
the  world  permit  new  countries — as  the  United 
States  was  then— to  develop  their  potentialities 
by  trade  and  by  enjoying  friendly  political  rela- 
tions in  a  world  setting.  John  Quincy  Adams, 
especially,  stressed  that  nations  are  not  fully  inde- 
l>endent  if  they  are  not  permitted,  in  the  world 
community,  to  enjoy  the  same  rights  as  other  na- 
tions. These  concepts,  I  submit,  lead  in  a  straight 
line  to  the  position  the  United  States  maintains 
today  in  the  Organization  of  American  States  and 
in  the  United  Nations. 


Adams'  Posture  Toward  American  Republics 

John  Quincy  Adams'  posture  toward  the  new 
American  Republics  of  his  day  is  curious  and 
characteristic  of  the  man.  He  had  his  marked 
prejudices,  among  them  private  doubts  whether 
the  peoples  of  Latin  America  had  habits  of 
thought  and  the  spirit  of  freedom  that  would  lead 
them  to  set  up  free  and  liberal  institutions.  He 
saw  differences  between  our  Revolutionary  War 
and  theirs,  believing  that,  whereas  ours  was  waged 
to  defend  individual  liberty  and  was  based  on  the 
principle  of  the  social  compact,  theirs  were  forced 
on  them  by  the  weakness  of  Spain  and  by  the 
breakdown  of  the  governing  fabric.  Neverthe- 
less, he  pleaded  the  cause  of  their  right  to  recog- 
nition as  independent  nations.  On  the  other 
hand,  because  he  believed  that  by  temperament, 
background,  and  nature  they  were  not  a  part  of 
the  "American  political  system"  as  he  understood 
it,  he  resisted  all  pressures  to  involve  the  United 
States  in  their  struggle  for  independence.  In 
order  not  to  prejudice  a  happy  conclusion  of  the 
transcontinental  treaty  with  Spain,  he  delayed 
granting  recognition  to  the  new  Republics.  Yet 
he  let  it  be  known  clearly  to  European  powers 
that  we  would  "join  in  no  plan  of  pacification 


490 


Department  of  Sfafe  Bulletin 


founded  on  any  other  basis  than  that  of  the  entire 
independence  of  the  South  Americans."' 

Because  he  believed  it  important  to  maintaining 
the  independence  of  the  United  States,  he  took 
steps  to  encourage  the  new  American  Republics 
to  establish  political  systems  compatible  with  that 
of  the  United  States,  that  is  to  say,  systems  based 
on  "the  sovereignty  of  the  people  and  the  un- 
alienable rights  of  man."  He  saw  it  as  his  duty 
to  help  those  nations  to  form  part  of  an  inter- 
national— or  at  least  an  inter-American — eco- 
nomic system  built  on  the  principle  of  equal 
rights  among  nations  and  freedom  from  economic 
domination  of  one  nation  by  another.  To  these 
ends,  he  insisted  on  developing  trade  with  Latin 
America  on  a  basis  of  equal  rights,  with  no  dis- 
crimination or  exclusive  privileges,  and  on  apply- 
ing the  principle  of  reciprocity.  In  so  doing,  I 
might  point  out,  he  was  following  in  the  footsteps 
of  his  father,  who  had  incorporated  both  the  equal 
rights  and  reciprocity  principles  in  a  draft  treaty 
he  submitted  to  the  Continental  Congress  only  a 
few  weeks  after  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
was  signed. 

John  Quincy  Adams  was  one  of  the  stanchest 
supporters,  even  one  of  the  formulators,  of  the 
doctrine  of  nonintervention.  Yet  he  saw  no  con- 
tradiction between  this  doctrine  and  his  instruc- 
tions to  our  Ministers  in  Buenos  Aires  and 
Bogota  to  urge  on  the  Latin  American  Republics 
the  adoption  of  governments  by  popular  represen- 
tation and  periodical  election,  assuring  the  enjoy- 
ment of  equal  rights,  and  to  press  them  "to  put 
down  the  remnant  of  ecclesiastical  domination,  to 
curb  the  arbitrary  dispositions  of  military  power, 
to  establish  a  truly  representative  government, 
personal  security,  and  the  freedom  of  the  press." 
The  efforts  he  urged  the  United  States  Ministers 
to  make  were  meant  to  assure  the  new  countries 
the  strength  and  stability  they  needed  to  stay  in- 
dependent and  to  help  them  resist  the  intervention 
of  despotic  governments  which  could  be  expected 
to  try  to  keep  the  new  Latin  American  nations 
from  developing  true  independence.  By  "true  in- 
dependence" he  meant,  as  he  has  written,  not  only 
enjoyment  of  the  rights  that  cannot  be  denied 
emergent  states  but  a  status  that  would  make  it 
possible  for  them  "to  observe  the  ordinary  rules 
of  the  laws  of  nations  in  their  intercourse  with 
the  civilized  world." 


October   I,    J 962 


Emergence  of  Pan-Americanism 

During  his  service  as  Secretary  of  State  under 
Monroe,  Jolm  Quincy  Adams  was  confronted  with 
the  first  emergence  of  the  idea  of  pan- Americanism 
at  the  initiative  of  Bolivar,  who  set  great  hopes 
in  his  proposed  Congress  of  Panama,  to  which  he 
invited  the  United  States  to  send  delegates. 
Again,  in  facing  a  new  situation  which  apparently 
ran  counter  to  the  principle  of  noninvolvement 
and  to  isolationist  feeling  which  he  and  the  coun- 
try' upheld,  we  see  in  Adams  an  intellectual  flexi- 
bility and  a  foresight  far  in  advance  of  his  times. 

After  considerable  preliminary  discussion  and 
diplomatic  interchange,  Colombia  couched  its  invi- 
tation to  the  United  States  in  terms  that  gave 
Adams  room  for  maneuver.  The  invitation  was 
to  "participate  in  an  international  congress  for 
the  purpose  of  regulating  the  problems  of  peace 
and  war."  Shortly  after  it  was  received,  John 
Quincy  Adams  became  President,  and,  in  his  first 
amiual  message  to  Congress,  he  announced  that 
he  would  send  ministers  to  the  Panama  meeting. 
He  met  strong  opposition  but  argued  his  case  in 
a  message  to  the  House  that  is  considered  one  of 
the  most  important  of  his  career.  Times,  he  said, 
had  changed  since  Washington  had  warned 
agamst  entangling  alliances — as  Washington  him- 
self had  foreseen  they  might — and  the  United 
States  had  a  clear  interest  in  closer  relations  with 
the  countries  of  Latin  America.  He  won  his 
point,  and  the  instructions  that  he  and  Henry 
Clay  drew  up  for  the  American  delegates  to  the 
Panama  Congress  contained  many  of  the  princi- 
ples of  the  inter- American  system  as  we  know  it 
today,  including  the  doctrine  of  nonintervention. 

As  it  turned  out,  the  American  delegates  never 
did  reach  the  Congress.  One  died  en  route,  and 
the  other  ended  up  in  Mexico  instead.  Adams 
wrote  the  whole  matter  off  as  a  diplomatic  fiasco. 
He  could  not  know  that  Bolivar's  first  effort  to 
bring  about  inter-American  cooperation  would 
eventually  bear  fruit  and  that  a  more  successful 
effort  would  be  made  in  Washmgton  itself  in  1889. 
However,  the  basically  friendly  attitude  toward 
closer  relations  with  Latin  America  than  with 
Europe  that  Adams  voiced  no  doubt  contributed 
importantly  to  the  evolution  of  United  States 
thinking  on  the  subject  of  inter- American  rela- 
tions and  to  the  development  of  an  association  of 
American  nations — the  OAS    [Organization   of 


491 


American  States] — that  mirrors  with  remarkable 
lidelity  Adams'  own  standards  of  desirable  rela- 
tions among  free  nations. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine 

Most  authorities  agree  that  John  Quincy 
Adams'  claim  to  fame  rests  largely  on  his  policy 
of  recognition  of  the  former  Spanish  colonies  and 
on  his  share  in  formulating  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  you  are  all  aware,  has 
again  come  into  the  news,  as  it  does  recurrently. 
It  is  interestmg,  therefore,  to  consider  John 
Quincy  Adams'  views  on  this  topic.  They  are 
highly  pertinent.  I  have  had  good  reason  to 
marvel,  in  recent  weeks,  at  the  persistence  of  his 
memory  and  of  his  influence.  His  name  has  been 
spoken  time  and  agam  as  the  date  for  our  meeting 
here  approached — a  circumstance  that  you  will 
agree  added  to  my  already  considerable  interest  in 
taking  part  in  today's  ceremonies.  I  have  found 
myself  musing  more  than  once  how  he  would  look 
on  our  hemispheric  problems  today,  particularly 
in  the  light  of  a  statement  he  made  at  the  time 
when  he  faced  opposition  to  sending  delegates  to 
the  Congress  of  Panama  and  was  asked  whether 
his  plans  to  do  so  did  not  conflict  with  the  basic 
United  States  policy  of  avoiding  entangling 
alliances. 

"I  do  not  recollect,"'  he  said,  "any  change  in 
polic}';  but  there  has  been  a  great  change  in 
circumstances." 

We  might  usefully  take  a  few  minutes  to  ex- 
amine the  Monroe  Doctrine,  its  content,  its  ante- 
cedents, and  the  interpretations  with  which  it  has 
been  interlarded. 

Samuel  Flagg  Bemis,  in  his  excellent  book  Jolin 
Quincy  Adams  and  the  Foimdatlons  of  American 
Foreign  Policy,  gives  James  Monroe  full  credit 
for  assuming  responsibility  for  voicing  the  doc- 
trine and  for  pronouncing  it  to  the  world  m  a 
message  to  Congress,  rather  than  through  diplo- 
matic channels,  quietly,  as  Adams  would  have 
preferred.  As  to  its  authorship,  however,  Bemis 
says: 

If  we  mean  divining,  sensing,  seizing,  ndapting  and 
combining,  a.X  just  the  right  moment  in  histor.v,  all  this 
nationnl  and  continental  feeling  and  expierience  into  "a 
combined  system  of  policy"  for  the  United  States,  then 
John  Quincy  Adams  more  than  any  other  single  jierson 
helped  to  formulate  the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

We  need  to  keep  in  mind  the  background 
against  which   the   Monroe   Doctrine   was  pro- 


492 


nounced.  To  oversimplify  for  the  sake  of  brevity : 
The  Holy  Alliance  in  Europe  was  bent  on  sup- 
pressing all  resurgence  of  the  principles  of  the 
French  Eevolution.  The  Spanish  colonies  in 
America  were  in  revolt,  and  we  had  recognized 
the  independence  of  several,  while  mamtaining 
neutrality  toward  those  that  were  still  in  conflict 
with  Spain.  France  had  just  helped  to  restore 
absolute  powers  to  Ferdinand  VII  in  Spain,  and 
England  feared  that,  in  exchange,  France  might 
obtain  cession  of  Spanish  claims  over  some  of  its 
revolted  possessions  in  the  Americas,  especially 
Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico,  too  close  for  comfort  to 
Jamaica  and  other  British  possessions.  England 
made  overtures  to  our  Minister  in  London  to  join 
in  at  least  parallel  warnings  to  the  Holy  Alliance 
powers  that  we  would  not  permit  intervention  in 
Latin  America  by  others  than  Spain.  News  of 
this  approach  reached  Washington  and  was  fol- 
lowed by  notification  from  Russia  that  the  czar 
intended  to  restore  "tranquillity"  to  all  parts  of 
the  world,  expressly  including  Latin  America. 
Communications  being  what  they  then  were,  we 
did  not  learn  that  England's  fears  had  been 
quieted  by  private  assurances  from  France  that 
it  had  no  designs  on  Latui  America.  A  sense  of 
crisis  ran  so  high  in  our  governing  circles  that 
Monroe,  with  the  support  not  only  of  his  Cabinet 
but  of  Jefferson  and  Madison,  two  of  the  archi- 
tects of  nonentanglement,  was  ready  to  jettison 
the  nonentanglement  principle  and  act  with 
England  in  preventing  European  intervention  in 
the  former  Spanish  colonies.  Adams,  as  a  good 
Secretary  of  State,  would  have  preferred  to  serve 
notice  on  the  Allied  Powers  through  normal  dip- 
lomatic channels.  Monroe  decided  to  give  notice 
publicly,  in  his  annual  message  to  Congress  of 
December  1823,  but  agreed  to  hew  to  the  nonen- 
tanglement policy  on  which  his  Secretary  of  State 
insisted  and  left  out  much  of  the  belligerent 
language  he  had  originally  intended  to  use. 

In  substance,  the  part  of  his  1823  message  to 
Congress  that  later  became  known  as  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  can  be  broken  down  into  three  prin- 
ciples: noncolonization,  abstention,  and  "hands 
off  the  New  World."'  The  first,  autliorship  of 
which  Adams  eventually  acknowledged  and  which 
he  always  considered  the  most  significant  part  of 
the  doctrine,  stated  that  the  American  continents 
were  no  longer  to  be  considered  subjects  for  future 
colonization  by  any  European  power.  The 
second — abstention — reaffirmed     at     Adams"     in- 

Uepat\meni  of  Sfafe  Bulletin 


sistence  the  nonentanglement  dogma  of  the  Found- 
ing Fathers,  asserting  that  the  United  States 
would  abstain  from  wars  of  the  European  powers 
in  matters  that  concerned  themselves  and  that: 
"It  is  only  when  our  rights  are  invaded  or  seri- 
ously menaced  that  we  resent  injuries  or  make 
preparation  for  our  defense."  The  "hands  off  the 
New  World"  principle  reads  : 

We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor  and  to  the  amicable  re- 
lations existing  between  the  United  States  and  those 
powers  to  declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt  on 
their  part  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this 
hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety.  .  .  . 
we  could  not  view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of 
oppressing  them  [the  independent  states  of  the  New 
World],  or  controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  destiny, 
by  any  European  power  in  any  other  light  than  as  the 
manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the 
United  States. 

Adams  himself  looked  on  this  as  a  corollary  to 
the  principle  of  noncolonization  and  therefore 
secondary,  although,  as  we  know,  it  has  become 
the  heart  of  the  doctrine.  The  abstention  princi- 
ple was  jettisoned  so  long  ago  that  few  now 
remember  it  formed  part  and  parcel  of  it. 

The  adherence  to  the  view  that  policies,  as  well 
as  the  means  for  implementing  them,  must  be 
adapted  to  current  circumstances  is  well  illus- 
trated in  the  final  sentence  of  the  paragraph  from 
which  the  above  quotes  are  taken.    It  reads : 

In  the  war  between  those  new  Governments  and  Spain 
we  declared  our  neutrality  at  the  time  of  their  recog- 
nition, and  to  this  we  have  adhered,  and  shall  continue 
to  adhere,  provided  no  change  shall  occur  which,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  competent  authorities  of  this  Govern- 
ment, shall  make  a  corresponding  change  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  indispensable  to  their  security. 

To  understand  the  original  meaning  of  the  doc- 
trine it  is  important  to  examine  the  clarifying 
documents  to  be  found  in  diplomatic  and  official 
papers  of  the  time.  Adams  was  responsible  for 
the  bulk  of  these,  though  he  always  worked  closely 
and  loyally  with  his  President,  Monroe.  He  went 
out  of  his  way  to  make  clear  that  the  doctrine  was 
unilateral  and  that  it  rested  on  a  "selfish"  national 
point  of  view — although  he  did  not  close  the  door 
to  cooperation  with  others  in  implementing  it. 
He  also  clarified  that  the  United  States  recognized 
the  rights  of  other  nations  to  establish  and  modify 
their  own  governments  according  to  their  own 
judgments.  He  made  it  clear  that  the  no-transfer 
policy,  voiced  as  far  back  as  1811,  was  to  be  con- 
sidered part  and  parcel  of  the  general  policy 
pronounced  in  Monroe's  message  and  that  the 

October   J,   7962 


United  States  would  not  look  with  indifference  on 
"forceable  interposition"  by  European  powers 
other  than  Spain,  either  to  restore  Spain's  domi- 
nation, to  establish  monarchies  in  its  former 
colonies,  or  to  transfer  them  to  other  European 
powers.  Adams,  Monroe,  and  the  Cabinet  went 
out  of  their  way  to  leave  to  Congress  entire  re- 
sponsibility for  any  possible  joint  action  with 
Great  Britain  in  support  of  the  "cause  of  human 
freedom"  and  that  of  Latin  American  inde- 
pendence. 

Evolution  of  Monroe  Doctrine  Concept 

It  may  be  useful  to  review  briefly  the  subsequent 
evolution  of  public  thinking  and  official  interpre- 
tation of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  concept.  Emphasis 
shifted  and  changed  considerably  over  the  years. 
Originally,  the  doctrine  was  essentially  a  political 
policy  to  meet  a  specific  threat.  After  its  pro- 
nouncement. United  States  interest  in  Latin 
America  was  for  a  long  time  largely  negative, 
aimed  at  preventing  European  military  or  politi- 
cal interference  in  the  New  World.  Polk  was  the 
first,  I  believe,  to  bring  the  Monroe  Doctrine  into 
play  when,  in  a  message  to  Congress  in  1845,  he 
appealed  to  it  in  connection  with  the  Oregon 
Territory  controversy,  and  asked  Congress,  on  its 
basis,  to  end  joint  occupation  of  that  territory 
with  the  British.  Polk  also  made  it  clear,  in  1848, 
that  (much,  in  fact,  as  Adams  had  believed),  al- 
though under  the  doctrine  the  United  States  as- 
sured the  Latin  American  Eepublics  protection 
against  European  imperialisms,  the  United  States 
did  not  consider  it  a  self-denying  ordinance  that 
would  prevent  our  country  from  fulfilling  its 
manifest  destiny.  Also  in  1848  the  doctrine  was 
invoked,  successfully,  when  we  protested  British 
seizure  of  territory  in  Nicaragua. 

Wlien  Napoleon  III  set  Maximilian  on  the 
throne  of  Mexico,  the  House  of  ReiDresentatives, 
in  1861,  passed  a  resolution  refusing  to  recognize 
any  government  erected  on  the  ruins  of  any  re- 
publican government  in  America. 

Under  Garfield,  Secretary  of  State  Blaine 
thought  the  doctrine  might  be  used  as  an  effective 
instrument  for  welding  closer  commercial  ties  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Latin  America. 
Although  in  other  ways  he  was  somewhat  high- 
handed in  dealing  with  Latin  American  nations, 
he  deserved  much  credit  for  advancing  the  trend 
toward  pan-Americanism  and  presided  over  the 

493 


first  pan- American  congress  in  Washington  in 
1889. 

Under  Cleveland,  in  1895,  the  doctrine  was  in- 
voked when  Britain  refused  to  submit  to  arbitra- 
tion its  dispute  witli  Venezuela  over  the  boundary 
of  British  Guiana.  The  United  States  position 
took  Britain  by  surprise,  made  it  reconsider  a 
dispute  which  could  turn  the  United  States  into 
an  enemy  and  agree  to  international  arbitration. 
The  doctrine  thus  gained  new  prestige  and  inci- 
dentally caused  Great  Britain  thereafter  to  culti- 
vate closer  relations  with  the  United  States. 

During  the  Spanish  American  War  we  aban- 
doned the  policy  of  neutrality  toward  struggles 
between  Spain  and  her  colonies  and  definitely 
sided  with  Cuba. 

When,  in  1902,  the  British,  Germans,  and 
Italians  blockaded  Venezuela  to  force  payment  of 
debts  to  their  nationals,  and  the  Germans  refused 
to  withdraw  their  warships  after  Venezuela 
agreed  to  go  to  arbitration,  Theodore  Roosevelt, 
invoking  the  doctrine,  alerted  the  Fleet  and  gave 
Germany  48  hours  to  accept  arbitration.  Germany 
did.  Theodore  Roosevelt  gave  the  doctrine  much 
of  the  meaning  that  it  has  for  many  persons  today. 
He  told  Congress  in  1904  that  United  States  ad- 
herence to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  might  force  us, 
however  reluctantly,  to  exercise  international 
police  power  in  the  hemisphere.  He  justified 
plans  to  set  up  a  fiscal  protectorate  of  the  hemi- 
sphere as  a  "practical  test  of  the  efficiency  of  the 
United  States  in  maintaining  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine," therefore  adding  to  the  doctrine's  original 
content  what  might  be  called  the  "protectorate 
policy."  This  constituted  a  complete  swing  away 
from  noninterference.  Wlien  he  found  that  his 
policies  had  developed  strong  resentments  in  Latin 
America,  Roosevelt  told  Congress  in  1905  that 
under  no  circumstances  would  the  United  States 
use  the  doctrine  as  a  cloak  for  territorial 
aggression. 

Finally,  Wilson,  in  1919,  succeeded  in  incorpo- 
rating in  the  World  War  I  peace  treaty  explicit 
recognition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Multilateral  Expressions  of  Doctrine's  Principles 

The  evolution  of  feelings  toward  tlie  doctrine 
are  also  worth  noting.  In  the  United  States,  it 
has  always  been  immensely  popular.  In  Great 
Britain  the  initial  press  reaction  was  good,  until 
official  circles  showed  their  displeiisui'e  at  the  non- 


494 


colonization  principle  and  reflected  their  feeling 
that  pronouncement  of  the  doctrine  had  been  a 
diplomatic  defeat  for  England,  detracting  from 
its  posture  as  sole  defender  of  Latin  America  from 
European  intervention.  Our  own  statesmen  and 
diplomats  kej^t  the  Latin  American  capitals 
closely  informed  about  the  facts. 

European  and  Latin  American  liberals  were  de- 
lighted by  the  doctrine's  warmly  republican  senti- 
ments. However,  the  Latin  Americans  trusted  the 
British  Navy  more  than  our  ideals  and  good  in- 
tentions and  showed  it  by  maintaining  closer  ties 
with  England.  Latin  American  conservatives, 
pro-British  elements,  and  those  with  monarchical 
leanings  disliked  the  doctrine  from  the  beginning. 
Doubts  about  what  it  meant  for  Latin  America 
were  stimulated  when  we  declined  Cliilean, 
Colombian,  and  Brazilian  overtures  for  actual  al- 
liance and  requests  from  Mexico  and  from  the 
United  Provinces  of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata  for  assur- 
ances that  we  would  provide  contingent  assistance 
for  enforcing  the  doctrine's  principles.  Actually, 
•Tohn  Quincy  Adams  was  faithful  to  his  principles 
in  turning  down  these  overtures,  because  they  were 
intended  to  get  the  United  States  involved  in  the 
existing  wars  between  the  countries  concerned  and 
Spain — in  which  we  had  declared  ourselves  neu- 
trals— and,  in  the  case  of  the  La  Plata  Provinces, 
in  their  war  with  Brazil.  The  Mexican  War  and 
Polk's  position  stirred  Latin  American  cynicism 
toward  the  doctrine.  Finally,  Theodore  Roose- 
velt's injection  of  the  "protectorate  policy"  into 
the  doctrine  stirred  up  much  resentment  among 
Latin  American  countries,  especially  those  that 
considered  themselves  mature  and  sophisticated 
in  international  alTairs  and  fully  as  capable  as  the 
United  States  to  share  in  guaranteeing  the  hemi- 
sphere's safety. 

Adherence  by  the  inter- American  sj'stem  to  the 
principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  matter  of 
record.  The  hemisphere  foreign  ministers  warned 
the  European  powers  at  Panamii  in  1939  not  to 
bring  their  conflict  into  American  waters.  They 
championed  at  Habana  in  1940  the  no-transfer 
policy,  at  a  time  when  there  was  real  danger 
that  Hitler's  Germany  might  seek  cession  of 
American  colonies  and  possessions  from  countries 
it  had  overrun.  In  1942  at  Rio  they  set  up  a  Neu- 
trality Coiumittee  concerned  primarily  with  pro- 
tection of  the  Caribbean,  which  later  gave  rise  to 
the  Inter-American  Defense  Agreement.  Tlie  Rio 
Treaty  of  1947  endorsed  the  principle  that  an  at- 

Deparfment  of  Sfofe   Bulletin 


V 


Hew 


tltotiji 


Km  1 


tack  from  outside  the  hemisphere  on  any  American 
state  endangered  all.  The  OAS  charter,^  in  1948, 
provided  for  multilateral  action  to  assure  the 
safety  of  the  hemisphere,  and  the  Caracas  resolu- 
tion^ of  the  Tenth  Inter-American  Conference, 
in  1954,  stated  that  an  attempt  by  an  extraneous 
power  to  impose  its  ideology  on  an  American  state 
constituted  a  menace  to  all,  as  much  as  an  attempt 
at  military  takeover. 

In  these  multilateral  expressions  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  for  -vvhich  he  was 
so  largely  responsible,  we  can  see  realization  of 
one  of  John  Quincy  Adams'  hopes;  that  the  na- 
tions of  Latin  America  might  develop  institutions 
compatible  with  his  cherished  "American  political 
system."  We  can  see  also  in  the  close  consultation 
that  has  characterized  our  intimate  association 
svith  the  inter- American  system  an  outgrowth  of 
John  Adams'  policy  of  consultation  with  other 
countries  on  mutual  interests  and  objectives.  Of 
ill  of  these  developments,  I  am  sure  John  Quincy 
jvould  approve. 

Keystone  of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy 

On  the  other  hand,  given  John  Quincy  Adams' 
overriding  concern  with  his  own  country's  in- 
terests and  his  determination  to  always  maintain 
freedom  of  action  to  serve  those  interests  with 
maximum  effectiveness,  I  am  inclined  to  believe 
that,  while  seeing  with  satisfaction  multilateral- 
ization  of  the  noncolonization  and  "hands  off  the 
New  World"  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
he  would  have  zealously  sustained  the  unilateral 
nature  of  the  doctrine  itself,  as  a  keystone  of 
United  States  policy  and  as  a  reserve  arm  avail- 
able if  and  when  multilateral  instruments  should 
fail  or  break  down.  He  would,  I  feel  certain, 
have  applauded  President  Kennedy's  words  when, 
on  April  20,  1961,  he  told  the  American  Society  of 
Newspaper  Editors  at  the  National  Press  Club  in 
Washington :  ^ 

Should  it  ever  appear  that  the  inter-American  doctrine 
)!  noninterference  merely  conceals  or  excuses  a  policy  of 
lonaction — if  the  nations  of  this  hemisphere  should  fail 
;o  meet  their  commitments  against  outside  Communist 
penetration — then  I  want  it  clearly  understood  that  this 
government  will  not  hesitate  in  meeting  its  primary  obli- 
jations,  which  are  to  the  security  of  our  Nation. 


^  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  May  23,  1948,  p.  666. 
'  For  text,  see  ibid.,  Apr.  26,1954,  p.  638. 
*  Ihid.,  May  8, 1961,  p.  659. 

Dcfober  1,   1962 


As  for  the  various  interpretations  with  which 
the  doctrine  has  been  interlarded  over  the  years, 
I  think  the  clue  to  what  John  Quincy  Adams 
would  think  of  them  lies  in  his  remark  about  not 
being  aware  that  policy  had  changed  but  that 
circumstances  change.  He  would  no  doubt  ex- 
amine the  situation  today,  were  he  with  us,  in  the 
light  of  his  knowledge  and  understanding  of  na- 
tions and  peoples.  He  would  also  look  at  it  in 
the  light  of  the  present  United  States  role  as 
leader  of  the  free  world  in  a  global  struggle 
against  the  dark  forces  of  world  communism, 
armed  by  modern  science  with  weapons  of  almost 
incomprehensible  destructiveness.  He  would 
show  his  characteristic  realism,  with  the  interests 
of  his  country  always  foremost  in  his  mind.  And 
let  it  be  remembered  that  his  interpretation  of  the 
interests  of  his  country  was  never  dictated  by  mass 
sentiment,  that  it  was  never  provincial  or  myopic, 
but  very  broad  and  farsighted.  One  thing  I 
rather  suspect  is  that  he  still  would  stick  to  his 
opinion  that  the  noncolonization  principle  was 
the  most  important  contained  m  the  doctrine. 
Only,  with  changing  times,  he  would  probably 
translate  the  principle  today  in  terms  of  coloniza- 
tion by  subversion  and  demagogy. 

But  I  am  not  here  to  redefine  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, only  to  point  out  the  great  tradition  the 
Adams  family  has  handed  down  to  us,  of  thinking 
constructively  and  deeply  on  all  problems  as  they 
jn-esent  themselves,  with  our  nation's  welfare 
foremost  in  our  minds. 

Productiveness  of  Dissatisfaction 

I  commend  to  all  here,  to  all  Americans,  one 
other  tradition  handed  down  by  John  and  John 
Quincy  Adams.  This  is  the  dissatisfaction  they 
constantly  felt  and  expressed  with  their  own 
achievement.  As  President  Kennedy  has  pointed 
out,  this  dissatisfaction  explains  the  great  contri- 
bution that  John  Quuicy  Adams  and  his  succes- 
sors have  made  to  our  country.  The  productive- 
ness of  dissatisfaction  was  implicit  in  the  words 
of  our  present  Secretary  of  State,  Dean  Rusk, 
when,  addressing  the  School  of  Advanced  Inter- 
national Studies  of  Jolms  Hopkins  University  in 
Washington  last  April  on  "The  Alliance  for 
Progress  in  the  Context  of  World  Affairs,"  he 
said :  ^ 


'Ibid.,  May  14, 1962,  p.  787. 


495 


We  are  dedicating  ourselves  to  a  decade  of  impatience. 
That  is  the  meaning  of  the  Alliance  for  Progress.  Now 
it  is  customary  for  free  men  to  take  their  deepest  common 
commitments  for  granted  and  to  exaggerate  the  impor- 
tance of  their  marginal  differences.  One  of  our  problems 
therefore  within  the  family  of  the  hemisphere  is  to  dis- 
cover how  to  combine  urgency — desperate  urgency- — with 
a  kind  of  common  feeling  which  will  preserve  the  unity 
and  fellowship  of  this  hemisphere. 

As  a  summing  vip,  I  can  find  no  better  words 
than  those  of  John  Adams : 

I  always  consider  the  settlement  of  America  with 
Reverence  and  Wonder,  as  the  Opening  of  a  grand  scene 
and  Design  In  Providence,  for  the  Illumination  of  the 
Ignorant  and  the  Emancipation  of  the  slavish  Part  of 
Mankind  all  over  the  Earth. 

As  a  final  personal  word,  may  I  say  that  I  was 


bom  with  enough  Puritan  blood  in  my  veins  to? 
seek  instinctively  to  find  in  any  serious  effort  aijjjdl 
lesson  or  moral  for  future  guidance.  Any  study 
of  the  lives  of  the  great  members  of  the  Adams 
family  makes  me  wonder  how  we  can  better  adapt 
our  system  to  men  of  their  stamp,  capable  of 
making  the  outstanding  contribution  to  our  nation 
and  to  history  that  they  made.  They  were  tact- 
less, difficult,  sharp-cornered  individuals  with  very 
strong  minds  of  their  own.  Does  the  multiplicity 
and  complexity  of  our  problems  require  a  huge  and 
impersonal  bureaucracy  which  is  not  compatible 
with,  let  alone  able  to  push  up  to  deservedly  tof 
responsibilities,  men  of  this  individualistic  stamp  '<. 
Have  we  no  need  for  leaders  of  the  Adams  mole 
today  ?    I  thmk  we  do. 


THE  CONGRESS 


Outer  Space,  the  Atmospheric  Sciences,  and  U.S.  Foreign  Policy 


Statement  hy  Richard  N.  Gardner 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Internation/il  Organization  Affairs'^ 


The  Department  of  State  is  pleased  to  be  in- 
vited to  make  a  statement  before  this  subcom- 
mittee on  the  relationship  of  the  U.S.  meteoro- 
logical satellite  program  to  our  foreign  relations 
with  other  cotmtries.  United  States  leadership 
in  the  launching  of  Tiros  I  through  V  has  fired 
the  imagination  of  people  throughout  the  world 
with  respect  to  the  possibilities  of  further  de- 
velopments relating  to  weather  forecasting  and  the 
atmosijheric  sciences  on  a  global  scale. 

The  meteorological  satellites  are  a  leading  ex- 
ample of  how  outer  space  can  be  used  to  benefit 
mankind.    Under  both  the  Eisenliower  and  Ken- 


'  Made  before  the  subcommittee  of  the  House  Committee 
on  Science  and  Astronautics  on  Sept.  11  (press  release 
547). 

496 


nedy  administrations,  sjjecial  attention  has  bee 
given  to  this  aspect  of  outer  space. 

In  his  state  of  the  Union  message  of  Januar 
30,  1961,-  President  Kennedy  extended  an  invitE 
tion  to  other  countries  to  jom  with  the  Unite 
States  in  invoking  "the  wonders  of  science  ir 
stead  of  its  terrors."  "Specifically,"  he  said,  " 
now  invite  all  nations — including  tlie  Sovit 
Union — to  join  with  us  in  developing  a  weatht 
prediction  program,  in  a  new  communicatioi 
satellite  program,  and  in  preiDaration  for  probin 
the  distant  planets  of  Mars  and  Venus,  probi 
which  may  someday  unlock  the  deepest  secrets  ( 
the  universe." 


'  For  text,  see  Bdi-letin  of  Feb.  13,  19C1,  p.  207. 

Department  of  State   Bulleti 


lieo 


^^"  On  September  25,  1961,  President  Kennedy 
'  laid  before  the  United  Nations  a  four-point  pro- 
-am of  space  cooperation  under  United  Nations 
luspices.'  Tlie  program  called  for  a  regime  of 
law  and  order  in  outer  space;  the  promotion  of 
scientific  cooperation  and  the  exchange  of  infor- 
mation; a  worldwide  undertaking  in  weather 
forecasting  and  weather  research;  and  interna- 
tional cooperation  in  the  establishment  of  a  global 
system  of  communication  satellites. 

A  resolution  embodying  the  President's  pro- 
gram was  unanimously  approved  by   the  U.N. 
"'  General  Assembly  on  December  20.^    This  resolu- 
tion emphasized  the  four  principal  areas  of  space 
cooperation  outlined  by  the  President : 

1.  It  urged  a  program  of  space  cooperation  on 
the  basis  of  two  basic  principles :  (a)  International 
law,  including  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations, 
applies  to  outer  space  and  celestial  bodies;  and  (b) 
outer  space  and  celestial  bodies  are  free  for  ex- 
ploration and  use  by  all  states  in  conformity  with 
international  law  and  are  not  subject  to  national 
appropriation. 

2.  It  established  a  public  registry  by  the  U.N. 
Secretary-General  of  all  objects  launched  by  states 
into  orbit  or  beyond  and  called  for  the  exchange  of 
scientific  and  technical  information. 

3.  It  noted  that  the  International  Telecommu- 
nication Union  plans  to  call  a  special  conference 
in  1963  to  make  allocations  of  radio  frequency 
bands  for  outer  space  activities  and  proposed  that 
the  ITU  consider  other  aspects  of  space  commu- 
nication in  which  international  cooperation  will 
be  required. 

4.  It  proposed  that  the  World  Meteorological 
Organization  (WMO)  undertake  studies  on  the 
means  of  developing  existing  weatlier  forecasting 
capabilities  and  advancing  atmospheric  science 
and  technology. 

Tlie  WAIO,  which  has  been  asked  to  take  lead- 
ership in  this  field,  is,  as  you  know,  one  of  the  spe- 
cialized agencies  in  the  United  Nations  system, 
having  113  members.  Its  Secretary-General  is 
a  British  national,  David  Arthur  Davies.  The 
convention  of  the  WMO  was  drawn  up  by  a  con- 
ference of  directors  of  the  International  Meteoro- 
logical Organization,  an  international  nongovern- 
mental organization  founded  at  Utrecht,  the 
Netherlands,  in  1878.     The  convention  came  into 


mar 
Bvita 

initt 
ceiii 

r 

Sort 
eailii 
ation 
:otiiii 
[irolx 
retsfl 


'  For  text,  see  ibid.,  Oct.  16, 1961,  p.  619. 
*  For  text,  see  ibid.,  Jan.  29, 1962,  p.  185. 

Ocfober   7,   7962 


effect  in  1950,  and  the  organization  was  established 
at  its  First  Congress  on  April  4,  1951. 

The  basic  objective  of  the  WMO  is  to  coordi- 
nate, standardize,  and  improve  world  meteorologi- 
cal activities  and  to  encourage  an  efficient  exchange 
of  meteorological  information  between  countries. 
The  United  States  was  assessed  19.03  percent  on  a 
budget  of  $666,179  for  the  calendar  year  1961. 
The  WMO  Congress  convenes  once  every  4  years ; 
the  next  Congress  convenes  on  April  1,  1963,  in 
Geneva.  An  executive  committee  meets  every 
year.  Dr.  F.  W.  Keichelderfer,  Chief  of  the  U.S. 
Weather  Bureau,  is  a  member  of  this  committee. 

The  U.N.  resolution  called  upon  the  WMO  to 
prepare  an  initial  report  in  consultation  with 
UNESCO  (United  Nations  Educational,  Scien- 
tific and  Cultural  Organization)  and  the  scientific 
community  on  two  possible  programs.  The  first 
is  an  international  weather  service  program — a 
global  network  to  receive,  process,  and  transmit 
meteorological  information  from  weather  satellites 
as  well  as  earth-based  instruments.  The  second  is 
an  international  research  program  to  yield  infor- 
mation essential  for  improved  weather  prediction 
and  perhaps  eventually  weather  control. 

WMO  Proposals 

Following  passage  of  the  General  Assembly  res- 
olution on  December  20,  1961,  the  WMO  invited 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  to  send 
experts  to  Geneva  to  help  develop  these  proposals 
for  cooperation.  In  response  to  this  invitation, 
Dr.  Harry  Wexler,  Director  of  Meteorological  Ke- 
search  of  the  U.S.  Weather  Bureau,  and  Dr.  V.  A. 
Bugaev,  Director  of  the  Soviet  Central  Weather 
Forecasting  Institute,  were  made  available,  and 
they  produced  a  first  draft  which,  with  some  mod- 
ifications, was  approved  by  the  WMO's  executive 
committee  in  June.  This  report  will  be  consid- 
ered by  the  Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of 
Outer  Space  in  its  meeting  this  week  and  later 
by  the  U.N.  General  Assembly.  The  WMO  quad- 
rennial Congress  of  government  representatives  to 
be  held  in  April  1963  will  also  give  extensive  con- 
sideration to  this  subject. 

In  the  field  of  weather  forecasting,  the  WMO 
proposes  a  system  of  satellites  and  conventional 
observations  called  the  "World  Weather  Watch," 
which  would  bring  improved  weather  services  to 
every  country  of  the  world.  First  steps  in  the 
execution  of  this  program  would  include  the  estab- 


497 


lisliinont  of  three  world  weather  centers  for  the 
collection  and  dissemination  of  data  in  Washing- 
ton, Moscow,  and  a  city  in  the  Southern  Hemi- 
sphere ;  the  establishment  of  regional  centers ;  and 
the  filling  of  existing  gaps  in  the  network  of 
gronnd  and  ship  observatories  in  order  to  estab- 
lish global  weather  coverage. 

The  improved  weather  services  this  program 
is  designed  to  develop  could  lead  to  substantial 
economic  benefits  in  the  United  States  and  other 
countries.  They  hold  special  promise  for  coun- 
tries in  the  tropics  and  Southern  Hemisphere, 
where  vast  uninhabited  and  ocean  areas  cannot 
be  covered  by  conventional  tecliniques. 

More  accurate  prediction  of  storms,  floods,  rain- 
fall, and  droughts  will  bring  major  savings  in  life 
and  property.  Significant  increases  in  farm  pro- 
duction will  be  made  possible  as  the  nature  and 
timing  of  crop  planting  are  adjusted  to  take  ac- 
count of  future  weather  patterns.  Fuels  can  be 
more  effectively  distributed  where  needed.  All 
forms  of  transportation  will  benefit — air,  sea,  and 
surface. 

The  research  aspects  of  cooperation  in  the 
weather  field  may  be  no  less  significant  than  the 
service  aspects.  Increased  knowledge  of  the 
atmosphere  may  lead  to  new  solutions  to  air  pollu- 
tion above  our  cities.  Eventually  it  may  help  us 
to  break  up  dangerous  storms  and  achieve  some 
control  over  climate  and  rainfall.  In  the  words 
of  the  WMO  report,  "It  is  not  unrealistic  to  expect 
that  mankind  will  eventually  have  the  power  to 
influence  weather  and  even  climate  on  a  large 
scale."  By  encouraging  cooperation  now  we  may 
reduce  the  risk  that  this  power  will  eventuallj'  be 
used  by  one  nation  to  achieve  selfish  military  or 
economic  advantage  at  the  expense  of  others. 

The  "WTMO  report  outlines  in  a  preliminary 
fashion  the  possibilities  for  research  in  the  weather 
field.  The  challenge  to  the  United  Nations  in  the 
months  ahead  is  to  find  ways  to  encourage  the 
necessary  cooperation  among  nations  in  research, 
in  the  training  of  weather  experts,  in  the  tracking 
of  weather  satellites,  and  in  the  exchange  of 
weather  information. 

U.S.-Soviet  Discussions 

I  would  like  to  call  attention  to  a  related  devel- 
opment in  this  field.  President  Kennedy  in  his 
letter  of  March  7, 1962,  to  Chairman  Khrushchev,' 


on  possible  areas  of  space  cooperation,  obsei*ved: 

Perhaps  we  could  render  no  greater  service  to  mankind 
through  our  space  programs  than  by  the  joint  establish- 
ment of  an  early  operational  weather  satellite  system. 
Such  a  system  would  be  designed  to  provide  global  weather 
data  for  prompt  use  by  any  nation.  To  initiate  this  serv- 
ice, I  projjose  that  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
each  launch  a  satellite  to  photograph  cloud  cover  and 
provide  other  agreed  meteorological  services  for  all 
nations. 

In  reply,  Chairman  Khrushchev  in  a  letter  to 
President  Kennedy  on  March  20  ^  stated : 

It  is  difl3cult  to  overestimate  the  benefit  which  could  be 
brought  to  mankind  b.v  organizing  a  world  weather  obser- 
vation service  with  the  aid  of  artificial  earth  satellites. 
Precise  and  timely  weather  forecasts  will  be  another 
important  step  along  the  way  to  man's  conquering  of 
nature,  will  help  him  still  more  successfully  to  cope  with 
natural  calamities  and  open  up  new  prospects  for  im- 
proving the  well-being  of  mankind.  Let  us  cooperate  in 
this  field,  too. 

As  a  followup  of  this  exchange  of  corre- 
spondence, bilateral  conversations  were  held  be- 
tween Hugh  Dryden,  Deputy  Director  of  the 
National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration. 
and  Anatoli  Blagonravov  of  the  Soviet  Academy 
of  Sciences  during  the  March  and  June  meetings 
of  the  Outer  Space  Committee  in  New  York  and 
Geneva.'  They  discussed  the  possibilities  of  co- 
operation in  meteorology,  a  world  magnetic  sur- 
vey, and  satellite  telecommunications,  and  for- 
warded recommendations  to  their  governments 
Plans  were  discussed  for  the  gradiial  increase  ir 
the  exchange  of  data  from  weather  satellites  dur 
ing  the  next  few  years,  looking  toward  eventua 
coordinated  launchings  of  meteorological  satel- 
lites with  rapid  dissemination  of  data  to  othei 
states  in  accord  with  the  general  recommendationt 
of  the  •\VMO. 

The  United  States  has  a  considerable  program 
of  cooperation  with  other  countries  in  the  ex 
change  of  meteorological  information.  Twenty 
seven  countries  are  already  cooperating  in  thej 
Tiros  program,  and  it  is  expected  that  even  more 
countries  will  participate  in  later  versions  of  Tirot 
which  will  be  able  to  photograph  cloud  cover  over 
more  countries. 

Twenty-six  countries  attended  an  Internationa' 
meteorological  satellite  workshop  sponsored  by  the 


iidt 

publi 
Salvi 
Irela 

Ztll! 


Th 

sella 
m 
sjtell 
tlieo 
iia 


Me 


"  For  text,  see  ibid.,  Apr.  2, 1962,  p.  536. 
498 


°  Not  printed  here. 

'  For  text  of  a  statement  made  before  the  Committee  bji 
U.S.  Representative  Francis  T.  P.  Plimpton  on  Mar.  ISi 
see  BtJiiETiN  of  May  14, 1962,  p.  809. 

Deporfmenf  of  Stafe   Bulletir 


intb 

Howl 

It 

of» 
ireas 
lerest 

In 
politi 


Iti 


iJoviei 


(til 


W 


National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration 
and  the  Weather  Bureau  in  Washington  from  No- 
vember 13  to  22, 1961.  The  workshop  included  rep- 
resentatives from  Argentina,  Brazil,  Canada,  Re- 
public of  China,  Denmark,  Dutch  West  Indies,  El 
Salvador,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Honduras, 
Ireland,  Israel,  Italy,  Jamaica,  Netherlands,  New 
Zealand,  Nigeria,  Norway,  Pakistan,  Portugal, 
Eepublic  of  South  Africa,  Thailand,  Trinidad, 
United  Arab  Republic,  and  United  Kingdom. 

This  worksliop  was  significant  in  that  the  repre- 
sentatives of  foreign  meteorological  services  re- 
ceived instruction  in  the  techniques  of  utilizing 
satellite-produced  data.  The  weather  services  of 
the  cooperating  countries  were  accordingly  placed 
in  a  better  position  to  utilize  information  gained 
from  satellites  in  their  own  conventional  weather 
forecasting  and  analyzing  services. 

Meteorological  sounding  rockets  are  also  being 
utilized  as  an  important  tool  for  research  in 
meteorology.  NASA  has  cooperated  with  govern- 
ment agencies  in  Italy,  Japan,  Pakistan,  and 
Sweden  in  sounding-rocket  programs,  and  in  the 
near  future  a  group  of  countries  will  conduct 
sounding-rocket  programs  in  the  Indian  Ocean 
area  to  determine  the  causes  for  weather  patterns 
in  that  region. 

How  Meteorological  Program  Serves  U.S.  Interest 

It  is  clear  from  this  review  that  the  progress 
of  cooperation  in  space  meteorology,  as  in  other 
areas  of  space  cooperation,  serves  the  national  in- 
terest of  the  United  States  in  a  nmnber  of  ways : 

In  the  fi?'st  place,  they  provide  a  way,  despite 
political  differences,  to  exploit  the  enormous 
possibilities  which  the  space  age  opens  for  all  man- 
kind. This  approach  is  not  based  on  faith  or  on 
a  fuzzy  idealism.  We  recognize  that  the  deep 
political  differences  of  our  time  place  an  upper 
limit  on  cooperation.  But  we  hope  in  the  fore- 
seeable future  to  develop  cooperative  projects  with 
the  Soviet  Union,  if  not  in  the  form  of  joint  ven- 
tures, at  least  in  the  coordination  of  activities. 

It  is  in  the  interest  of  all  countries,  whatever 
their  ideology,  that  worldwide  weather  services  be 
developed.  Recent  meetings  have  emphasized  this 
common  interest  to  Soviet  scientists  and  technical 
experts.  While  the  U.N.  and  its  specialized  agen- 
cies are  not  the  only  institutions  to  promote  co- 
operation, they  do  help  to  stimulate  affirmative 
Soviet  actions  and  fit  U.S.-Soviet  cooperation  in- 

Ocfober   I,   1962 


to  a  broader  framework  which  recognizes  the  inter- 
ests of  other  countries. 

In  the  second  place,  U.N.  and  bilateral  programs 
can  help  widen  and  deepen  cooperation  on  a  free- 
world  basis  even  if  universal  participation  is  not 
achieved.  The  assistance  of  many  nations  is 
needed  if  our  national  space  program  is  to  be 
successfully  carried  on.  In  weather  and  com- 
mimications,  for  example,  the  teclmology  of  the 
United  States  can  yield  dividends  to  ourselves  and 
others  only  if  many  nations  join  in  allocating  radio 
frequencies,  in  tracking  and  communicating  with 
space  vehicles,  and  in  placing  necessary  ground 
installations  on  their  territories. 

A  good  start  has  already  been  made  in  bilateral 
cooperation  through  the  activities  of  the  National 
Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration,  which  has 
cooperative  ventures  with  some  40  countries  in- 
volving tracking  stations,  exchanges  of  personnel, 
and  joint  space  experiments.  For  certain  countries 
and  for  certain  activities,  however,  cooperative 
projects  may  be  easier  of  achievement  if  they  are 
multilateral  and  bear  United  Nations  endorsement. 

In  the  third  place,  the  program  of  space  coopera- 
tion has  deep  significance  for  the  U.N.  itself.  The 
United  Nations  and  specialized  agencies  will  have 
new  responsibilities  for  promoting  scientific  co- 
operation and  information  exchange  and  for  assist- 
ing in  the  development  of  worldwide  weather  and 
communications  services.  Such  activities  cannot 
fail  to  strengthen  the  United  Nations  as  a  force 
for  peace  by  binding  its  members  together  through 
ties  of  common  interest.  This  is  particularly  true 
of  the  developing  countries,  which  stand  to  derive 
some  of  the  greatest  benefits. 

Looking  toward  the  future,  we  hope  to  continue 
the  cooperative  ventures  now  underway.  The 
Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space 
is  now  meeting  in  New  York  to  examine  the  first 
report  of  the  WMO  covering  weather  forecasting 
and  research.  The  U.N.  General  Assembly  will 
then  consider  this  report.  The  WMO  Congress 
next  April  will  prepare  further  recommendations 
on  this  subject.  We  look  forward  to  further 
meetings  with  the  Soviet  Union  in  this  field.  Our 
bilateral  programs  through  NASA  will  no  doubt 
continue  to  reach  more  comitries. 

A  special  committee  of  the  National  Academy 
of  Sciences  has  been  constituted  to  prepare  recom- 
mendations on  the  atmospheric  sciences  and  hy- 
drology.   The  title  of  this  committee  is  the  Com- 

499 


mittee  on  International  Planning  in  Atmospheric 
Sciences  and  Hydrology  (CIPASH).  It  is  pre- 
paring recommendations  on  the  scientific  aspects 
of  these  programs.  At  the  same  time  we  have 
established  an  interagency  committee  under  the 
chairmansliip  of  Mr.  J.  Herbert  Hollomon,  Assist- 
ant Secretary  of  Commerce  for  Science  and 
Technology',  ■which  includes  representatives  of  the 
Department  of  State,  the  Department  of  Com- 
merce, the  National  Science  Foundation,  NASA, 
and  the  Office  of  Science  and  Technology  to  con- 
sider the  recommendations  of  CIPASH  and  to 
prepare  a  government  policy  position  on  these 
programs. 

In  conclusion,  it  is  the  view  of  the  Department 
of  State  that  the  meteorological  satellite  program 
is  important  in  our  relations  with  other  countries 
and  that  we  should  actively  continue  to  follow  up 
on  the  initiative  and  leadership  we  have  already 
taken  in  this  activity.  Our  willingness  to  share 
the  information  received  through  the  Tiros  satel- 
lites with  other  countries  has  resulted  in  foreign 
cooperation  of  practical  importance  to  our  own 
efforts  as  well  as  good  will  for  the  United  States. 
Full  support  should  be  given  to  the  weather  satel- 
lite program  by  the  United  States  nationally  as 
well  as  internationally.  Here  is  a  program  in  the 
peaceful  uses  of  outer  space  which  is  not  only  im- 
portant to  us  nationally,  for  economic  and  social 
reasons,  but  in  addition  is  recognized  as  vitally 
important  to  the  daily  needs  of  people  in  all  coun- 
tries. It  is  a  program  in  which  we  need  the  par- 
ticipation of  all  countries  because  we  cannot  do 
this  task  alone  effectively.  It  is  an  extraordinary 
example  of  the  need  for  international  cooperation 
in  the  peaceful  uses  of  outer  space. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 


87th  Congress,  2d  Session 

Study  of  Nondiplomatic  Activities  of  Foreign  Govern- 
ments. Report  to  accompany  S.  Res.  362.  S.  Rept.  1708. 
July  11,  19G2.    3  pp. 

Importation  of  Certain  Articles  for  Religious  Purposes. 
Report  to  accompany  H.R.  4449.  S.  Rept.  1719.  July 
11,  1962.     3  pp. 

Conservation  of  Tropical  Tuna.  Report  to  accompany  S. 
2568.     S.  Rept.  1737.     July  16,  1962.     18  pp. 


Departments  of  State,  Justice,  and  Commerce,  the 
Judiciary,  and  Related  Agencies  Appropriation  Bill, 
Fiscal  Year  1963.  Report  to  accompany  H.R.  12580. 
H.  Rept.  1996.    July  17,  1962.    43  pp. 

Amending  Section  632  of  Title  38,  United  States  Code,  To 
Provide  for  an  Extension  of  the  Program  of  Grants-ln- 
Aid  to  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines  for  the  Hospitali- 
zation of  Certain  Veterans.  Report  to  accompany  S. 
3373.     S.  Rept.  1745.     July  19,  1962.    6  pp. 

Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1962.  Conference  report  to 
accompany  S.  2996.  S.  Rept.  2008.  July  20,  1962. 
21pp. 

Economic  Developments  in  South  America.  Report  of  the 
Subcommittee  on  Inter-American  Economic  Relation- 
ships of  the  Joint  Economic  Committee.  July  20,  1962. 
12  pp.     [Joint  Committee  print] 

Trade  Expansion  Act  of  1962.  Hearings  before  the  Senate 
Finance  Committee  on  H.R.  11970,  an  act  to  promote 
the  general  welfare,  foreign  policy,  and  security  of  the 
United  States  through  International  trade  agreements 
and  through  adjustment  assistance  to  domestic  industry, 
agriculture,  and  labor,  and  for  other  purposes.  Part 
1,  July  23-26,  1962,  508  pp. ;  Part  2,  July  3(>-August  6, 
1962,  527  pp. ;  Part  3,  August  7-10, 1962,  605  pp. ;  Part  4, 
August  13-16,  1962,  641  pp. 

Report  of  the  Sixth  Meeting  of  the  Canada-United  Statesi 
Interparliamentary  Group,  February  28-March  4,  1962, 
Ottawa,  Canada.  Prepared  by  Cornelius  E.  Gallagher, 
chairman  of  the  House  of  Representatives  delegation. 
H.  Rept.  2034.     July  25,  1962.     19  pp. 

National  Bank  Branches  in  Foreign  Countries.  Report  to 
accompany  S.  1771.    H.  Rept.  2047.    July  27, 1962.    7  pp. 

Assuring  Payment  of  Just  Compensation  for  the  Use  and 
Occupancy  of  Certain  Lands  on  Kwajalein  and  Dalap 
Islands,  Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  Islands.  Report 
to  accompany  H.R.  11952.  H.  Rept.  2051.  July  30, 
1962.     18  pp. 

Providing  for  the  Settlement  of  Claims  of  Certain  Resi- 
dents of  the  Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  Islands. 
Report  to  accompany  H.R.  12078.  H.  Rept.  2059. 
July  30,  1962.     5  pp. 

Nondiplomatic  Activities  of  Representatives  of  Foreign  "C'Ci 
Governments.     A  preliminary   study   prepared  by  the  }j^[|^'j 
staff    of    the    Senate    Foreign    Relations    Committee. 
July   1962.     14  pp.     [Committee  print] 

Implementation  of  the  Himiphrey  Amendment  to  the' 
Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961.  Prepared  by  the 
Agency  for  International  Development.  S.  Doc.  112, 
July  1962.     37  pp. 

International  Wheat  Agreement  Act  Extension.  Report 
to  accompany  S.  3574.  S.  Rept.  1801.  August  2,  1962, 
10  pp. 

Communications  Satellite  Act  of  1962.  Hearings  before 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  on  H.R.  11040. 
an  act  for  the  establishment,  ownership,  operation,  and 
regulation  of  a  commercial  communications  satellite 
system,  and  for  other  purposes.  August  3-9,  1962 
456  pp. 

Higher  Interest  Rates  on  Time  Deposits  of  ForeigE 
Governments.  Report  of  the  House  Banking  and  Cur- 
rencv  Committee,  together  with  individual  views,  on 
H.R.  12080.     H.  Rept.  2162.     August  9.  1962.     10  pp. 

United  Nations  Loan.  Report  to  accompany  S.  2768.  H 
Rept.  2176.     August  10,  1962.     22  pp. 

Philippine  War  Dam.age  Claims.  Report  to  accompany 
H.R.  11721.     S.  Rept.  18,S2.     August  16.  1962.      8  pp. 

Films  Recording  Mrs.  .John  F.  Kennedy's  Visit  to  Indi£ 
and  Pakistan.  Report  to  accompany  S.  Con.  Res.  84 
S.  Rept.  1883.     August  16,  1962.     5  pp. 

International  Wheat  Agreement  Act  Extension.  Repor 
to  accompany  S.  3574.  H.  Rept.  2246.  August  16 
1962.     4  pp. 


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INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


Calendar  of  International  Conferences  and  Meetings 

icheduled  October  Through  December  1962 


A-ECOSOC:   1st  Regular  Annual  Meeting  at  Expert  Level  ....  Mexico,  D.  F Oct.  1- 

LO  Meeting  of  Experts  on  the  Assessment  of  Manpower  Require-  Geneva Oct.  1- 

ments  for  Economic  Development, 

nternational  Council  for  the  Exploration  of  the  Sea:  50th  Statutory  Copenhagen Oct.  1- 

Meeting. 

TU  Special  Working  Group  on  Radio  Regulations  Revision  ....  Geneva Oct.  1- 

la^J.N.  ECE  Ad  Hoc  Working  Party  on  Standardization  of  Conditions  Geneva Oct.  1- 

of  Sale  of  Potatoes. 

P#J.N.  ECE  Timber  Committee:  20th  Session Geneva Oct.  1- 

0th  ILO  International  Conference  of  Labor  Statisticians Geneva Oct.  2- 

J.N.  EGA  Seminar  on  Administrative  Problems  in  African  Countries  .  Addis  Ababa Oct.  2- 

!)aribbean  Organization  Council:  3d  Meeting Paramaribo,  Dutch  Guiana  .    .  Oct.  3- 

U    J.N.  ECAFE  Seminar  on  Chemicals  and  Allied  Industries Bangkok Oct.  3- 

M    J.N.  Scientific  Advisory  Committee Vienna  or  Geneva Oct.  4- 

;lif     AEA  Symposium  on  Treatment  and  Storage  of  High-Level  Radio-  Vienna Oct.  8- 

active  Wastes. 

i'AO  Regional  Conference  for  Europe (undetermined) Oct.  8- 

MCO  Subcommittee  on  Tonnage  Measurement London Oct.  8- 

"JATO  Science  Committee Paris Oct.  8- 

5ATT  Committee  III  on  Expansion  of  International  Trade   ....  Geneva Oct.  8- 

5ATT  Committee  II  on  Expansion  of  International  Trade     ....  Geneva Oct.  8- 

J.N.  ECE  Working  Party  on  Simplification  and  Standardization  of  Geneva Oct.  8- 

Export  Documents. 

Vorld  Power  Conference:  6th  Plenary  Meeting Melbourne Oct.  9- 

^eace  Corps:  International  Conference  on  Middle-Level  Manpower,  San  Juan Oct.  10- 

Volunteer    Services,    and    Their    Role    in    Social    and    Economic 

Development. 

J.N.  ECE  Working  Party  on  Transport  Costs Geneva Oct.  10- 

='A0  Council:  39th  Session Rome Oct.  15- 

LO  Meeting  of  Consultants  on  Indigenous  and  Tribal  Populations  .  Geneva Oct.  15- 

^MO  Regional  Association  II  (Asia):  3d  Session Bangkok Oct.  15- 

jATT  Working  Party  on  Accession  of  United  Arab  Repubhc     .    .    .  Geneva .    ^ Oct.  15- 

J.N.  ECAFE  Working  Party  on  Economic  Development  and  Plan-  Bangkok Oct.  15- 

ning:   7th  Session. 

J.N.  ECE  Group  of  Experts  on  Standardization  of  Fruit  Juices    .    .  Geneva Oct.  15- 

J.N.  ECE  Conference  of  European  Statisticians:  10th  Session  .    .    .  Geneva Oct.  15- 

Jnited  Nations  Pledging  Conference New  York Oct.  16- 

MCO  Council:  7th  Session London Oct.  17- 

J.N.  ECE  Working  Party  of  Experts  on  Statistical  Information  .    .  Geneva Oct.  17- 

)ECD  Development  Assistance  Committee:  Annual  Review  Meeting.  Paris Oct.  18- 

.\-ECOSOC:  1st  Regular  Annual  Meeting  at  Ministerial  Level    .    .  M&ico,  D.F Oct.  20- 

AEA  Intergovernmental  Committee  on  Draft  Convention  on  Civil  Vienna Oct.  22- 

Liability,  Land-Based  Facilities:  2d  Meeting. 

CAO  Air  Traffic  Control  Automation  Panel:  2d  Meeting Montreal Oct.  22- 

)ECD  Oil  Committee Paris Oct.  22- 

MCO  Working  Group  on  Facilitation  of  International  Travel  and  London Oct.  22- 

Transport. 

CifJouncil  of  Representatives  to  the  G ATT  Contracting  Parties     .    .    .  Geneva Oct.  22- 

J.N.  ECE  Inland  Transport  Committee:  Group  of  Experts  on  Prob-  Geneva Oct.  22- 

lems  Involved  in  Establishing  a  Unified  System  of  Inland  Water- 
ways of  International  Concern  in  Europe. 

Executive  Committee  of  the  Program  of  the  U.N.  High  Commissioner  Geneva Oct.  22- 

for  Refugees:  8th  Session. 


itt« 


(fnfl 


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Ct 


y,       'Prepared  in  the  Office  of  International  Conferences,  Sept.  17,  19G2.     Following  is  a  list  of  abbreviations:  EGA, 

"  Jconomic    Commission   for   Africa ;    ECAFE,    Ecouomie   Commission   for   Asia   and   the   Far   East ;    ECE,    Economic 

Commission  for  Europe:  ECOSOC,  Economic  and  Social  Council;  FAD,  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization;  GATT, 

'"JJJeneral  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade;  IAEA,  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency:  lA-ECOSOC,  Inter-American 

Economic   and    Social   Council;    ICAO,   International   Civil   Aviation   Organization;   ICEM,   Intergovernmental   Com- 

uittee  for   European  Migration;   ILO,   International  Labor  Organization;   IMCO,  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Con- 

ultative  Organization;   ITU,   International  Telecommunication  Union;  NATO,  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization; 

)ECD,  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development;  U.N.,  United  Nations;  UNESCO,  United  Nations 

Qducational,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Organization;  UNICEF,  United  Nations  Children's  Fund;  WHO,  World  Health 

)rganization  ;  WMO,  World  Meteorological  Organization. 

)cfober   1,   1962  501 


Calendar  of  International  Conferences  and  Meetings — Continued 

Scheduled  October  Through  December  1962 — Continued 

G ATT  Contracting  Parties:  20th  Session Geneva Oct.  23- 

OECD  Maritime  Transport  Committee:  Working  Party Paris Oct.  24- 

ILO  Governing  Body:  153d  Session  (and  its  committees) Geneva Oct.  24- 

Inter-Parliamentary  Union:  51st  Conference Brasilia Oct.  24- 

ICAO  Limited  Middle  East-Southeast  Asia  Regional  Air  Navigation  Paris Oct.  25- 

Meeting  (in  conjunction  with  WMO). 

U.N.  EC AFE  Working  Party  on  Customs  Administration:  3d  Session  .  Bangkok Oct.  25- 

UNESCO  Executive  Board:  63d  Session Paris Oct.  25- 

OECD  Manpower  and  Social  Affairs  Committee Paris Oct.  29- 

FAO/UNICEF  Policy  Committee Rome Oct.  29- 

International  North  Pacific  Fisheries  Commission:  9th  Meeting    .    .  Seattle Oct.  29- 

U.N.  EGA  Eastern  African  Transport  Conference Addis  Ababa Oct.  29- 

Consultative  Committee  for  Cooperative  Economic  Development  in  Sydney Oct.  30- 

South  and  Southeast  Asia  (Colombo  Plan):  14th  Meeting. 

U.N.    ECE   Inland   Transport    Committee:  Subcommittee   on    Rail  Geneva Oct.  31-  C{(| 

Transport. 

FAO  Group  on  Citrus  Fruits:  3d  Session Rome October  jl(|f 

FAO  Indo-Pacific  Fisheries  Council:  10th  Meeting Seoul October 

FAO  1963  World  Food  Congress  Preparatory  Committee:  2d  Session.  Rome October 

GATT  Working  Party  on  Television  Programs Geneva October  or 

November 

FAO  Regional  Conference  for  Africa:  2d  Session Tunisia Nov.  1- 

IMCO  Working  Group  of  Experts  on  Carriage  of  Dangerous  Goods  by  London Nov.  5- 

Sea. 

ICEM  Executive  Committee:  20th  Session Geneva Nov.  5- 

WMO  Regional  Association  V  (Southwest  Pacific):  3d  Session  .    .    .  Noumea Nov.  5-  W 

4th  Inter-American  Statistical  Conference Washington Nov.  5- 

Inter-Amerioan  Statistical  Institute:  Committee  on  Improvement  of  Washington Nov.  5- 

National  Statistics.  ^^jjj 

ITU  Meeting  of  Communication  Experts Washington Nov.  5- 

U.N.  ECE  Meeting  of  Senior  Economic  Advisers Geneva Nov.  5- 

U.N.  ECAFE  Inland  Waterways  Subcommittee Bangkok Nov.  6-  tjU, 

UNESCO  General  Conference:"  12th  Session Paris Nov.  9-  ^  . 

ICEM  Council:   17th  Session Geneva Nov.  12-  tropi 

ILO  Tripartite  Technical  Meeting  for  Printing  and  Allied  Trades  .    .  Geneva Nov.  12- 

3d  U.N.  ECE  Consultation  of  Experts  on  Problems  of  Methodology  Geneva Nov.  12- 

of  Agricultural  Problems. 

ICAO  Aerodromes  and  Ground  Aids  Division:  7th  Session      ....  Montreal Nov.  13- 

IMCO  Working  Group  on  Facilitation  of  International  Travel  and  London Nov.  13- 

Transport. 

7th  FAO  Regional  Conference  for  Latin  America Rio  de  Janeiro Nov.  19- 

North  Pacific  Fur  Seal  Commission:  Scientific  Committee Washington Nov.  19- 

ILO  Advisory  Committee  of  the  International  Institute  for  Labor  Geneva Nov.  19- 

Studies. 

2d  Inter-American  Port  and  Harbor  Conference Cartagena,  Colombia     ....  Nov.  20- 

5th  U.N.  ECAFE  Regional  Conference  on  Water  Resources  Develop-  Bangkok Nov.  20- 

ment. 

FAO  Latin  American  Forestry  Commission:  8th  Session Santiago Nov.  22- 

ILO  Committee  of  Social  Security  Experts Geneva Nov.  26- 

North  Pacific  Fur  Seal  Commission:  6th  Meeting Washington Nov.  26- 

ILO  Asian  Regional  Conference:  5th  Session Melbourne Nov.  26- 

U.N.  ECE  Working  Party  on  Housing  and  Building  Statistics  .    .    .  Geneva Nov.  26- 

U.N.  ECE  Inland  Transport  Committee:   Working  Party  on  Inter-  Geneva Nov.  26- 

national  Pa.ssenger  Transport  Services  by  Road. 

U.N.   ECE   Inland   Transport   Committee:   Subcommittee  on   Road  Geneva Nov.  26- 

Transport. 

OECD  Ministerial  Meeting Paris Nov.  27- 

NATO  Medical  Committee Paris Nov.  27- 

U.N.  EC.\FE  Working  Party  of  Senior  Geologists:  5th  Session  .    .    .  Bangkok Nov.  27- 

U.N.  ECE  Gas  Committee:  9th  Session Geneva Nov.  28- 

South  Pacific  Commission:  24th  Session Nouni<>a November 

U.N.  EC.A,FE  Electric  Power  Subcommittee Bangkok November 

International  Wheat  Council:  36th  Session London November 

International  Wool  Study  Group:  7th  Meeting London November 

U.N.  ECAFE  Subcommittee  on  Mineral  Resources  Development:  5th  Bangkok Dec.  3- 

Session. 

U.N.   ECAFE  Inland  Transport  and  Communications  Committee:  Bangkok Dec.  3- 

11th  So.ssion. 

WHO  Seminar  on  Health  Statistics Bangkok Dec.  3- 

FAO  Technical  Advisory  Committee  on  Desert  Locust  Control:  llth  Rome Dec.  5- 

Session. 

U.N.  ECE  Committee  on  Agricultural  Problems:  14th  Session   .    .    .  Geneva Dec.  10- 


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ILO   Committee  of   Experts  on   Determination   of  States  of   Chief 

Industrial  Importance. 
ILO  Committee  on  Conditions  of  Work  in  the  Fishing  Industry.    .    . 

U.N.  ECAFE  Seminar  on  Urban  Community  Development 

U.N.  ECE  Committee  on  Agricultural  Problems 

FAO/ECAFE  Ad  Hoc  Meeting  on  Jute 

U.N.  ECE  Subcommittee  on  Inland  Water  Transport 

OECD  Maritime  Transport  Committee 

UNESCO  Executive  Board:  64th  Session 

U.N.  ECE  Coal  Committee  and  Coal  Trade  Subcommittee 

U.N.  ECE  Housing  Committee  (and  working  parties) 

NATO  Ministerial  Council 

U.N.  Economic  and  Social  Council:  34th  Session  (resumed)     .... 

U.N.  ECE  Consultation  of  Experts  on  Energy  in  Europe 

U.N.  ECOSOC  Regional  Cartographic  Conference  for  Africa  .... 


Geneva Dec.  10- 

Geneva Dec.  10- 

Dacca,  Pakistan Dec.  10- 

Geneva Dec.  10- 

Bangkok Dec.  12- 

Geneva Dec.  12- 

Paris Dec.  13- 

Paris Dec.  13- 

Geneva Dec.  17- 

Geneva Dec.  17- 

Paris December 

New  York December 

Geneva December 

(undetermined) December 


Security  Council  Recommends  U.N. 
Admit  Jamaica,  Trinidad  and  Tobago 

Statement  by  Adlai  E.  Stevenson 

U.S.  Representative  in  the  Secunty  Council  ^ 

Often  in  the  past  several  years  we  have  liad  the 
happy  opportunity  of  voting  to  recommend  the 
admission  of  new  states  from  Africa  and  from 
Asia.  Today  we  consider  the  applications  of  these 
newly  independent  nations  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere :  Jamaica  and  Trinidad  and  Tobago — two 
tropical  and  beautiful  islands  in  the  sun  which 
are  affectionately  known  to  many  of  my  country- 
men and,  I  am  glad  to  say,  to  me  personally. 

I  have  had  the  good  fortune  to  witness  the  re- 
markable development  of  Jamaica  during  many 
happy  holidays  over  many  years,  and  even  made  a 
speech  in  Kingston  at  the  celebration  of  the  300th 
anniversary  of  the  founduig  of  the  British  colony 
in  Jamaica,  which,  I  suspect,  must  be  the  first  time 
a  citizen  of  the  United  States  ever  celebrated  the 
founding  of  a  British  colony  in  North  America. 
And  I  have  also  visited  Trinidad  on  many  occa- 
sions over  more  than  20  years  in  war  and  peace, 
and  I  have  the  happiest  memories  of  meetings  with 
the  talented  and  vigorous  Prime  Minister,  Dr. 
Eric  Williams,  and  his  colleagues.  I  welcome 
here  today  on  behalf  of  my  country  Mr.  Alex 
Clark,  the  new  Ambassador  of  Trinidad  and  To- 
bago to  the  United  Nations  and  to  the  United 
States. 

Jamaica,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  became  inde- 
pendent on  August  6;  Trinidad  and  Tobago  on 
August  31.  The  United  States  was  privileged  to 
participate  in  the  independence  celebrations  of 


'Made  in  the  Security  Council  on  Sept.  12  (U.S./U.N. 
press  release  4037). 

Ocfober   J,   J 962 


both  countries,  which  in  each  instance  marked  the 
end  of  a  long  colonial  association  with  the  United 
Kingdom — and  the  beginning  of  a  new  one  as 
independent  members  of  the  Commonwealth. 

Both  these  new  nations  and  the  United  King- 
dom, it  seems  to  us,  deserve  the  highest  praise  for 
the  careful,  deliberate  planning  which  prepared 
the  way  for  independence.  Jamaica  and  Trinidad 
and  Tobago  enter  the  family  of  nations  equipped 
with  mature  and  robust  political  institutions 
which  should  serve  them  well. 

I  would  like  on  behalf  of  the  United  States  to 
convey  sincere  congratulations  to  Sir  Alexander 
Bustamante,  the  Prime  Minister  of  Jamaica, 
whose  long  and  distinguished  career  has  now  been 
crowned  with  his  country's  highest  office,  an  emi- 
nent world  reputation,  and,  most  joyous  of  all,  the 
blessings  of  matrimony. 

Dr.  Eric  Williams,  the  Prime  Minister  of  Trini- 
dad and  Tobago,  is  similarly  renowned  as  a  cham- 
pion of  his  people  and  of  his  coimtry.  His  great 
energy  and  devotion  have  provided  stanch  leader- 
ship and  inspiration  to  his  countrymen  at  a  cru- 
cial time.  To  him,  also,  I  am  happy  to  extend 
the  congratulations  of  my  Government  and  the 
people  of  this  coimtry. 

Mr.  President,  the  United  States  welcomes  the 
applications  of  Jamaica  and  Trinidad  and  Tobago 
and  looks  forward  to  close  association  with  their 
representatives  here.  We  shall  support  both  of 
the  resolutions  -  submitted  by  the  United  King- 
dom and  Ghana  here  this  afternoon. 


"  U.N.  docs.  S/5164  and  S/5165 ;  the  Council  on  Sept.  12 
unanimously  recommended  that  Jamaica  and  Trinidad 
and  Tobago  be  admitted  to  membership  in  the  United 
Nations.  On  Sept.  18  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  admitted 
by  acclamation  Jamaica,  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Burundi, 
and  Rwanda.  (For  text  of  a  U.S.  statement  In  the 
Security  Council  on  July  26  on  the  applications  of  Burundi 
and   Rwanda,   see  Bulletin  of  Aug.  20,   1962,  p.   206.) 


503 


Senate  Confirms  U.S.  Delegation 
to  17th  U.N.  General  Assembly 

The  Senate  on  September  10  confirmed  the  fol- 
lowing to  be  members  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to 
the  17th  session  of  the  General  Assembly  of  the 
United  Nations: 

Representatives 
Adlai  E.  Stevenson 
Francis  T.  P.  Plimpton 
Albert  E.  Gore ' 
Gordon  Allott ' 
Arthur  H.  Dean  ^ 

Alternate  Representatives 

Charles  W.  Yost 

Philip  M.  Klutznick 

Jonathan  B.  Bingham 

Carl  T.  Rowan  ' 

Mrs.  Marietta  P.  Tree ' 

For  biographic  details,  see  Department  of  State 
press  release  526  dated  August  28. 


United  States  Delegations 
to  International  Conferences 

Meeting  of  GATT  Contracting  Parties 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Sep- 
tember 14  (press  release  555)  that  a  U.S.  delega- 
tion would  begin  consultations  with  the  contract- 
ing parties  to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade  at  Geneva  on  September  24.  The  pur- 
pose of  these  consultations  is  to  conform  U.S. 
GATT  schedules  to  the  revised  U.S.  tariff  sched- 
ules authorized  by  the  Tariff  Classification  Act  of 
1962. 

John  W.  Evans,  Minister  for  Economic  Affairs, 
U.S.  Mission,  Geneva,  is  chairman  of  the  delega- 
tion.   The  other  delegates  are : 

L.  Bruce  Gates,  U.S.  Tariff  Commission 
Marion  E.  Eggleton,  Department  of  Agriculture 
William  T.  Hart,  U.S.  Tariff  Commission 
James  AV.  Ilowell,  U.S.  Tariff  Commission 
Paul  Kaplowitz,  U.S.  Tariff  Commission 
Albert  H.  Small,  Department  of  State 
George  White,  Department  of  Commerce 


*  To  serve  no  longer  than  Dec.  31, 1962. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Atomic  Energy 

Amendment  of  article  VI.A.3  of  the  Statute  of  the  Inter- 
national Atomic  Energy  Agency    (TIAS  3873).     Done 
at  Vienna  October  4,  1961.' 
Acceptances  deposited:  Netherlands  (including  Surinam 

and    Netherlands    Antilles),    September    10,    1962; 

Monaco  and  Sudan,  September  11,  19C2. 

Finance 

Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund. 
Opened  for  signature  at  Washington  December  27,  1945. 
Entered  into  force  December  27.  194.5.     TIAS  1501. 
Siffnaturcs    and    acceptances:    Kuwait,    September    13, 

1962 ;   Sierra  Leone  and  Tanganyika,  September  10, 

1962. 
Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International  Bank  for  Re- 
construction and  Development.     Opened  for  .signature 
at  Washington  December  27,  1945.     Entered  into  force 
December  27,  1945.     TIAS  1502. 
Signatures   and   acceptances:   Kuwait,    September    13, 

1962 ;  Sierra  Leone  and  Tanganyika,  September  10, 

1962. 
Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International  Finance  Cor- 
poration, as  amended.     Done  at  Washington  May  25, 
1955.     Entered   into  force  July  20,   1956.     TIAS   3620 
and  4894. 
Signature    and    acceptance:    Kuwait,    September    13, 

1902. 
Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International  Development 
Association.     Done  at  Washington   January  26,   1960. 
Entered  into  force  September  24,  1960.     TIAS  4607. 
Signature    and    acceptance:    Kuwait,    September    13, 

1962. 

Germany 

Agreement  to  supplement  the  agreement  between  the 
parties  to  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  regarding  the 
status  of  their  forces,  si.yued  at  London  June  19,  1951 
(TIAS  2^6),  with  respect  to  foreign  forces  stationed 
in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  and  protocol  of 
signature.  Signed  at  Bonn  August  3,  1959.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Netherlands,  September  10, 1962. 

Agreement  to  implement  paragraph  5  of  article  45  of  the 
agreement  of  August  3,  1959,  to  supplement  the  agree- 
ment between  the  parties  to  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
regarding  the  status  of  their  forces  with  respect  to  for- 
eign forces  stationed  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many. Signed  at  Bonn  August  3.  19.59.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Netherlands,  September  10, 1962. 

Oil  Pollution 

International  convention  for  the  prevention  of  pollutior 
of   the   sea    by    oil,   with   annexes.     Done   at    Londor 
May   12,   19.54."     Entered  into  force  July  26,  1958;  foi 
the"  United  States  December  8.  1961. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Australia,  August  29,  1962. 


'  Not  in  force. 


504 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Postal  Services 

Convention  of  the  Postal  Union  of  the  Americas  and 
Spain,  tinal  protocol,  and  regulations  of  execution. 
Signed  at  Buenos  Aires  October  14,  1960 ;  entered  into 
force  for  the  United  States  March  1,  1961.  TIAS  4871. 
Ratification  deposited:  Mexico,  June  4, 1962. 

ed  Sea  Lights 

International   agreement  regarding  the  maintenance  of 
certain  lishts  in  the  Red  Sea.     Open  for  signature  at 
London  February  20  to  August  19, 1962.' 
Signatures:  Denmark,  Augusts,  1962;  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany,^  Italy,^  August  14,  1962;  Netherlands," 
August  16,  1962 ;  Norway,"  August  17,  1962 ;  Sweden, 
August  2,  1962  ;  United  Kingdom,  February  20,  1962 ; 
United  States,"  March  2, 1962. 


U 


ki 


Shipping 

Convention  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Consulta- 
tive Organization.     Signed  at  Geneva  March  6,  1948. 
Entered  into  force  March  17,  1958.    TIAS  4044. 
Acceptances   deposited:    Morocco    (with    declaration), 

July  30,  1962;  Spain  (with  reservation),  January  23, 

1962. 

touth  Pacific  Commission 

Agreement  establishing  the  South  Pacific  Commission. 
Signed  at  Canberra  February  6,  1947.  Entered  into 
force  July  29,  1948. 

Notification   of   withdrawal:  Netherlands,   August  20, 
1962,  effective  December  31,  1962. 


lelin 


Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  convention  with  six  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Geneva  December  21,  1959.  Entered 
into  force  January  1,  1961 ;  for  the  United  States  Oc- 
tober 23,  1961.    TIAS  4892. 

Ratification  deposited:  Czechoslovakia,  August  1,  1962." 
Accession  deposited:  Syrian  Arab  Republic,  August  24, 
1962. 


BILATERAL 

Belgium 

Agreement  for  cooperation  on  the  use  of  atomic  energy 
for    mutual    defense    purposes.      Signed    at    Brussels 
May  17,  1962. 
Entered  into  force:  September  5,  1962. 

China 

Agricultural  commodities  agreement  under  title  IV  of  the 
Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assistance  Act  of 
1954,  as  amended  (68  Stat.  454;  73  Stat.  610;  7  U.S.C. 
1731-1736),  with  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  Taipei 
August  31,  1962.     Entered  into  force  August  31,  1962. 

Costa  Rica 

Agreement  relating  to  the  furnishing  of  defense  articles 
and  services  to  Costa  Rica  for  the  purpose  of  contrib- 
uting to  its  internal  security.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  San  Josi5  May  21  and  June  18,  1962.  Entered 
into  force  June  18, 1962. 

Guatemala 

Agreement  providing  for  investment  guaranties.     Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Guatemala  August  9,  1960. 
Entered  into  force:  August  29,  1962. 


"  Subject  to  acceptance. 

°  With  reservations  contained  in  final  protocol. 


Iceland 

Agreement  amending  the  agricultural  commodities  agree- 
ment of  May  3,  1958,  as  supplemented  and  amended 
(TIAS  4027,  4065,  and  4870).  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Reykjavik  August  20,  1962.  Entered  into  force 
August  20,  1962. 

Italy 

Agreement  relating  to  the  improvement  of  the  child  feed- 
ing program  carried  out  by  the  Amministrazione  per 
le  Attivita.  Assisteuziali  Italiane  ed  Internazionali 
(AAI).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Rome  August 
28,  1962.     Entered  into  force  August  28,  1962. 

Japan 

Agreement  regarding  the  settlement  of  postwar  economic 
assistance   and   exchange   of  notes.     Signed  at  Tokyo 
January  9,  1962. 
Entered  into  force:  September  11, 1962. 

Mexico 

Agreement  concerning  the  closeout  of  the  collection  ac- 
counts of  the  agricultural  commodities  agreement  of 
October  23,  1957,  as  amended  (TIAS  3935,  4070,  4129, 
and  4178).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Mfeico 
July  6,  1961,  and  August  9,  1962.  Entered  into  force 
August  9,  1962. 

Peru 

Agreement  relating  to  the  establishment  of  a  Peace  Corps 
program  in  Peru.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Lima  January  25, 1962.  Entered  into  force  January  25, 
1962. 

United  Arab  Republic 

Agreement  amending  the  agricultural  commodities  agree- 
ment of  February  10,  1962,  as  amended  (TIAS  4947, 
4991,  and  5070).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Cairo  September  1,  1962.  Entered  into  force  Septem- 
ber 1,  1962. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  relating  to  the  use  of  the  airfield  at  Wide- 
awake in  Ascension  Island  by  aircraft  of  the  Royal 
Air  Force.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washing- 
ton August  29,  1962.  Entered  into  force  August  29, 
1962. 


DEPARTMENT  AND  FOREIGN  SERVICE 


Dr.  Roliefson  To  Head  New  Office 
of  International  Scientific  Affairs 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Sep- 
tember 14  (press  release  548  dated  September  11) 
the  appointment  of  Professor  Ragnar  Roliefson 
as  Director  of  International  Scientific  Affairs. 
Dr.  Roliefson  will  be  designated  a  principal  of- 
ficer of  the  Department  and  will  also  act  as  the 


Ocfofaer   I,   7962 


505 


adviser  to  tlie  Secretary  of  State  and  other  De- 
partment oflicers  on  scientific  and  teclinological 
matters. 

Dr.  Kollefson  will  head  a  newly  organized 
Office  of  International  Scientific  Affairs.  The 
establislmient  of  this  new  Office  is  in  response  to 
the  Department's  recognized  need  for  strengthen- 
ing the  role  of  science  in  foreign  policy.  The 
primary  functions  of  the  Office  of  International 
Scientific  Affairs  will  be  to  bring  to  bear  the  im- 
pact of  science  and  teclinology  in  foreign  policy 
development  and  decisionmaking,  and  to  provide 
advice  and  guidance  to  the  Department,  other 
Government  organizations,  and  the  science  com- 
munity on  matters  concerning  science  and  technol- 
ogy in  foreign  affairs. 

The  new  Office  will  absorb  the  functions  pre- 
viously carried  out  under  Dr.  Walter  G.  "VVliitman, 
who  joined  the  Department  on  Labor  Day  1960 
as  Science  Adviser.  During  Dr.  'Wliitman's  ten- 
ure the  Science  Adviser's  functions  were  expanded 
to  include  also  the  peaceful  uses  of  outer  space  and 
atomic  energy,  which  had  previously  been  handled 
by  a  separate  office.  The  number  of  science 
attaches  serving  at  overseas  posts  has  increased  to 
17,  and  today  the  following  posts  have  one  or  two 
attaches:  London  (2),  Paris  (2),  Bonn  (2),  Stock- 
holm (2),  Rome  (2),  New  Delhi  (2),  Tokyo  (2), 
Buenos  Aires  (1),  Bern  (1),  and  Rio  de  Janeiro 
(1).  The  post  at  Rio  is  a  regional  office  for  Latin 
America  with  science  representation  from  the  Na- 
tional Institutes  of  Health,  the  National  Science 
Foundation,  and  the  Department  of  Defense. 


Six  New  FSO's  Assigned  as  Interns 
in  Congressional  Offices 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Sep- 
tember 10  (press  release  546)  that  a  new  program 
to  develop  a  closer  working  relationship  with  the 
Congress  had  been  initiated  with  the  assignment  of 
six  new  members  of  the  Foreign  Service  to  work 
as  interns  in  key  congressional  offices  as  pail  of 
their  career  orientation  program. 

The  young  diplomats  are  being  placed  in  some 
of  the  principal  centers  of  influence  on  Capitol 
Hill :  the  offices  of  Senate  Majority  and  Minority 
Leaders  Mansfield  and  Dirksen;  House  Majority 
Leader  Albert;  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  and  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee ; 


and  Representative  Frances  Bolton,  a  ranking 
member  of  the  latter  committee. 

The  interns  are  being  assigned  to  work  and  not 
just  be  observers  in  the  congi'essional  offices.  They 
are  all  new  arrivals  in  the  diplomatic  service  and 
come  equipped  with  a  variety  of  backgrounds  and 
skills.  Collectively  they  speak  French,  German, 
Spanish,  Arabic,  and  Russian.  They  include  a 
former  farm  manager,  senatorial  assistant,  divin- 
ity student,  and  USIA  exhibit  guide. 

As  a  trial  run  for  the  new  program,  the  group 
will  work  in  the  various  offices  for  a  week,  but  the 
State  Department  plans  to  expand  the  program 
later  to  a  month's  assignment  for  new  Foreign 
Service  officers  and  include  a  wide  range  of  con- 
gi'essional  offices.' 


'  For  a  list  of  the  six  officers  in  the  first  group,  see 
Department  of  State  press  release  546  dated  Sept.  10. 


Check  List  of  Department  of|State 
Press  Releases:  September  10-16 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington  25,  D.C. 

Release  Issued  prior  to  September  10  which  ap- 
pears in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  is  No.  543  of 
September  7. 

Subject 

U.S.  participation  in  international  con- 
ferences. 

FSO's  assigned  to  congressional  offices 
(rewrite). 

Gardner :  House  Subcommittee  on 
Science  and  A.stronautics. 

Rollefson  appointed  Director  of  Inter- 
national Scientific  Affairs  (rewrite). 

International  teacher  development 
program. 

U.S.  objectives  in  Eastern  Europe  (ex- 
cerpts from  Tyler  testimony ) . 

Study  of  cultural  presentations  pro- 
gram (rewrite). 

U.N.  Day  concert. 

Germany  credentials  (rewrite). 

Russell  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Tunisia  (biographic  details). 

Delegation  to  GATT  meeting  (re- 
write). 

Cultural  exchange  (Japan). 

U.  Alexis  Johnson :  "How  To  Combat 
Communist  Goals." 

Hilsman :  "A  Report  on  South  Viet- 
Nam." 

Bowles :  "Toward  a  New  'ReaUsm'  in 
American  Foreign  Policy." 

Bowles:  "The  Face  We  Show  to  the 
World"  (excerpts). 

Cleveland :  "Realism,  Responsibility, 
and  Respect." 

•Not  printed. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


No. 

Date 

*545 

9/10  1 

546 

9/10  ] 

547 

9/11  ( 

548 

9/11  ] 

*549 

9/13  ] 

*550 

9/13 

551 

9/14 

*552 

553 

*554 

9/14 
9/14 
9/14 

555 

9/14 

*5a6 
557 

9/14 
9/14 

1558 

9/15 

*550 

9/15 

•5G0 

9/15 

5G1 

9/15 

506 


Departmenf  of  State   Bulletin 


)ctober  1,  1962 

American  Principles.  The  Adams  Family  and  the 
Department  of  State   (Martin) 

American  Republics.  The  Adams  Family  ajid  the 
Department  of  State  (Martin) 

'ommunisRi.  How  To  Combat  Communist  Goals 
(Johnson)  

ingress,  The 

congressional    Documents    Relating    to    Foreign 

Policy 

)uter  Space,  the  Atmospheric  Sciences,  and  U.S. 

Foreign  Policy  (Gardner) 

!ix  New  FSO's  Assigned  as  Interns  in  Congressional 

Offices 

3uba.    President  States  U.S.  Policy  Toward  Cuba  . 

)epartment  and  Foreign  Service 

)r.  Rollefson  To  Head  New  Office  of  International 
Scientific  Affairs 

Ilx  New  FSO's  Assigned  as  Interns  in  Congres- 
sional Offices 

Economic  Affairs 

low  To  Combat  Communist  Goals  (Johnson)  .     .     . 
leeting  of  GATT  Contracting  Parties  (delegation)  . 

iducational  and  Cultural  Affairs.  Advisory  Com- 
mittee To  Study  Cultural  Presentations  Program  . 

'oreign  Aid.  How  To  Combat  Communist  Goals 
(Johnson)  

iermany.    Letters  of  Credence  (Knappstein)     .     . 

nternational  Organizations  and  Conferences 

Jalendar  of  International  Conferences  and  Meet- 
ings     

leetlng  of  GATT  Contracting  Parties  (delegation)  . 

amaica.  Security  Council  Recommends  U.N.  Admit 
Jamaica,  Trinidad  and  Tobago  (Stevenson)  .    .    . 

'eland.  General  Pulaski's  Memorial  Day,  1962 
(text  of  proclamation) 


Index                                        Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1214 

Presidential  Documents 

487         General  Pulaski's  Memorial  Day,  1962 486 

President  States  U.S.  Policy  Toward  Cuba  ....  481 
4g7         Science 

Outer  Space,  the  Atmospheric  Sciences,  and  U.S. 

Foreign  Policy  (Gardner) 496 

Dr.  Rollefson  To  Head  New  Office  of  International 

Scientific  Affairs 505 

Treaty  Information.    Current  Actions 504 

Trinidad  and  Tobago.  Security  Council  Recom- 
mends U.N.  Admit  Jamaica,  Trinidad  and  To- 
bago (Stevenson) 503 

KQg         United  Nations 

Outer  Space,  the  Atmospheric  Sciences,  and  U.S. 

481             Foreign  Policy  (Gardner) 496 

Realism,   Responsibility,    and   Resi)ect — Three   R's 

for  the  United  Nations  (Cleveland) 482 

505  Security  Council  Recommends  U.N.  Admit  Jamaica, 

Trinidad  and  Tobago  (Stevenson) 503 

506  Senate  Confirms  U.S.  Delegation  to  17th  U.N.  Gen- 

eral Assembly 504 

475  Name  Index 

504         Allott,  Gordon 504 

Bingham,  Jonathan  B 504 

4gg         Cleveland,    Harlan 482 

Dean,  Arthur  H 504 

Gardner,  Richard  N 496 

^''■5         Gore,  Albert  E 504 

486         Johnson,  U.  Alexis 475 

Kennedy,  President 481, 486 

Klutznlck,  Philip  M 504 

Knappsteln,  Karl  Heinrich 486 

501         Martin,  Edwin  M 487 

504         Plimpton,  Francis  T.  P 504 

Rollefson,  Ragnar 505 

503         Rowan,  Carl  T 504 

Stevenson,  Adlai  E 503,504 

Tree,  Mrs.  Marietta  P 504 

486         Yost,  Charles  W 504 


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INTER-AMERICAN  EFFORTS 

TO  RELIEVE  INTERNATIONAL  TENSIONS 

IN  THE  WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

1959-1960 


This  4:10-page  volume,  consisting  of  a  narrative  summary  with 
annex  followed  by  a  collection  of  docmnents,  presents  the  record  of 
inter-American  efforts  during  1959  and  1960  to  relieve  international 
tensions  in  the  Hemisphere  and  to  lay  the  foundation  for  a  new 
cooperative  program  of  social  progress  and  economic  development  in 
Latin  America.  In  this  2-year  period  three  Meetings  of  Consultation 
of  IMinisters  of  Foreign  Affairs  were  held  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Organization  of  American  States  (O AS)— the  fifth,  sixth,  and 
seventh  such  meetings  in  the  series  inaugurated  in  1939  to  consider 
urgent  problems  affecting  the  peace  and  security  of  the  Hemisphere. 
Two  meetings  of  a  special  committee  of  the  Council  of  the  OAS  to 
study  the  formulation  of  new  measures  for  economic  cooperation 
(known  as  the  "Committee  of  21")  were  held  during  the  period. 

The  documents  support  and  amplify  the  record  of  events  sum- 
marized m  the  narrative.  They  consist  principally  of  resolutions, 
statements,  committee  reports,  and  other  records  of  the  Council  of  the 
OAS  and  of  the  several  meetings  mentioned  above,  supplemented  by 
documents  of  the  U.N.  Security  Council  and  statements  of  U.S.  and 
Soviet  officials. 


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October  8,  1962 


THE  TASKS  OF  THE  GENERAL  ASSEMBLY: 
PEACEFUL  SETTLEMENT,  NONVIOLENT 
CHANGE,     AND    A     WAR     AGAINST    WANT    • 

Statement  by  Ambassador  Adlai  E.  Stevenson 511 

PRESIDENT  KENNEDY  AND  SECRETARY  RUSK 
URGE  RESTORATION  OF  FOREIGN  AID 
FUNDS 518 

A  REPORT  ON  SOUTH  VIET-NAM  •   by  Roger  Hilsman   .     526 

U.S.  PLEDGES  RESOURCES  AND  COOPERATION  IN 

WORLD  FOOD  PROGRAM     •     Statement  by  Secretary 

of  Agriculture  Orville  L.  Freeman 534 


ITED  STATES 
lEIGN  POLICY 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1215  •  Publication  7433 
October  8,  1962 


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of  the  Budget  (January  19,  1961). 

Note:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
copyriphied  and  items  contained  herein  may 
be  reprinted.  Citation  of  the  Department 
or  State  Bdlletin  as  the  source  »-ill  be 
appreciated.  The  Bulletin  is  Indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a   weekly  publication   issued   by   the 
Office   of  Media   Services,  Bureau  of 
Public    Affairs,    provides    the   public 
and      interested      agencies      of      the 
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tion is   included  concerning   treaties 
and     international     agreements     to 
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'The  Tasks  of  the  General  Assembly:  Peaceful  Settlement, 
Nonviolent  Change,  and  a  War  Against  Want 


Statement  hy  Adlal  E.  Stevenson 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  General  Assemhly  ' 


I  should  like  to  begin  by  reaffirming,  as  em- 
phatically as  I  can,  the  high  significance  which 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  attaches  to 
the  work  of  the  United  Nations.  My  Government 
is  more  than  ever  convinced  that  the  success  or 
failure  of  this  organization  could  well  mean  the 
difference  between  world  order  and  world  anarchy. 
We  believe  that  the  work  that  lies  before  this  I7th 
General  Assembly  is  serious — and  that  it  is  also 
urgent. 

First  let  me,  on  behalf  of  my  Government  and 
oi  the  city  of  New  York,  welcome  the  delegates 
to  this  historic  Assembly.  We  congratulate  you, 
Mr.  President  [Muhammad  Zafrulla  Khan,  of 
Pakistan],  on  your  election  as  President  of  the 
I7th  General  Assembly.  You  assume  a  place  of 
honor  among  the  world  leaders  who  have  been 
ehosen  to  preside  over  the  forum  of  the  world  in  a 
time  of  peril  and  promise — a  place  which  your 
talents  and  attainments  can  only  further  exalt. 

And  I  also  warmly  welcome  the  addition  to  our 
membership  of  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Jamaica, 
Rwanda,  and  Burundi — four  new  nations  from 
sunny  lands  blessed  with  tropic  beauty  that  I  have 
[lad  the  good  fortune  to  visit  and  admire. 

But  I  welcome  most  of  all  the  opportunity  this 
session  gives  us  to  consider  as  a  body  the  direction 
n  which  our  affairs  are  moving  and  the  action 
leeded  to  bring  us  closer  to  the  world  we  seek, 
I  world  of  justice,  freedom,  and  peace. 
I  A  year  ago  we  met  at  a  time  of  doubt  and 
langer.  In  the  12  months  since,  much  has  taken 
olace  to  justify  a  measure  of  fresh  hope  for  the 
:uture. 


^Made  in  plenary  session  on  Sept.  20  (U.S.  delegation 
>ress  release  4043;  as-delivered  text). 

October  8,   J  962 


— A  long,  bitter  war  in  Algeria  has  come  to  a 
close ; 

— A  threatened  conflict  between  two  of  our  mem- 
bers in  the  southwest  Pacific  has  yielded  to  peace- 
ful settlement — through  statesmanship  on  their 
part  and  slcillful  conciliation  by  the  United 
Nations ; 

— In  Laos,  civil  war,  abetted  by  foreign  inter- 
vention, has  been  replaced  by  a  cease-fire  and  an 
independent  government  under  international 
guarantees ; 

— In  the  Congo,  where  the  U.N.  has  played  such 
a  decisive  part,  war  and  threat  of  war  seems  to 
be  yielding  to  new  hopes  for  the  peaceful  re- 
integration of  Katanga  into  the  new  Congo  state 
and  to  the  Secretary-General's  vigorous  efforts, 
with  our  support  and  that  of  the  great  majority 
of  the  members,  to  get  early  implementation  of  the 
United  Nations'  reconciliation  plan; 

— Disarmament  negotiations,  with  the  en- 
couragement of  the  General  Assembly,  have  re- 
sumed in  a  new  forum  with  nonnuclear  powers 
playing  a  useful  and  constructive  role ; 

— We  have  begim,  under  United  Nations  aus- 
pices, a  search  for  cooperation  in  the  development 
of  outer  space  in  the  interests  not  of  any  one 
nation  but  of  humanity; 

— We  have  begun,  too,  an  intensification  of  the 
drive  against  poverty  under  the  United  Nations 
Decade  of  Development. 

These  are  all  legitimate  sources  of  gratification, 
and  there  are  others.  But  we  would  be  decei^ang 
ourselves  if  we  looked  on  the  bright  side  alone. 
We  still — all  of  us — continue  to  live  in  a  dark  and 
precarious  world. 

— The  crisis  in  Berlin  has  not  exploded  into 
war;  but  the  pressures  and  harassments  against 


511 


West  Berlin  continue  to  rank  as  a  most  ominous 
threat  to  the  peace  of  the  woi-kl ; 

— The  government  of  Cuba,  with  moral  and  ma- 
terial support  from  outside,  carries  on  a  campaign 
of  subversion  and  vituperation  against  its  neigh- 
bors in  the  Western  Hemisphere ; 

— Unprovoked  aggression  from  North  Viet- 
Nam  continues  to  tlireaten  the  freedom  and  inde- 
pendence of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  and  to 
menace  the  peace  in  Southeast  Asia; 

— The  Cliinese  Communists  continue  their  policy 
of  provocation,  their  acts  of  force  and  subversion ; 

— The  threat  of  conflict  still  smolders  in  the 
Middle  East,  damped  down  but  not  quenched  by 
the  peacekeeping  machinery  of  the  United  Na- 
tions ; 

— Disputes  involving  members  of  our  orga- 
nization continue  unresolved  on  every  continent; 

— The  continued  repression  of  the  peoples  of 
Eastern  Europe  remains  an  underlying  danger  to 
peace; 

—The  concluding  stage  of  the  worldwide  move- 
ment toward  national  independence  elsewhere  is 
complicated  by  issues  which,  though  transient  and 
manageable,  could  become  explosive  if  cool  heads 
do  not  prevail  over  hot  tempers ; 

— The  prevalence  of  poverty  in  great  areas  of 
the  world  remains  a  source  of  moral  frustration 
and  political  danger ; 

— And,  most  ominous  of  all,  the  suicidal  arms 
race  continues  unabated. 

These  situations  raise  serious  dangers  to  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

It  was  to  deal  with  such  dangers  to  the  peace 
that  half  the  states  in  this  Assembly  hall  estab- 
lished the  United  Nations  17  years  ago — and  that 
the  other  half  have  adhered  to  the  charter  in  the 
years  since. 

That  charter  issued  a  lofty  challenge  to  man- 
kind. It  cannot  be  claimed  that  in  these  17  years 
the  United  Nations  has  established  a  reign  of 
peace  on  earth.  But  the  record  of  our  organiza- 
tion in  meeting  specific  challenges  to  the  peace  is 
nonetheless  impressive.  In  these  years  the  United 
Nations,  whether  through  the  Security  Council  or 
the  General  Assembly,  through  conciliation  or 
cease-fire,  through  peace  observation  or  truce 
supervision  or  direct  military  action,  has  helped 
avert  or  end  hostilities  in  Iran,  in  Greece,  in  the 
Middle  East,  in  Kashmir,  in  Indonesia,  in  Korea, 
at  Suez,  in  Lebanon,  in  the  Congo,  and  now  in 
West  New  Guinea. 

512 


If  the  United  Nations  has  not  succeeded  in 
bringing  the  great  powers  together,  it  has  often 
succeeded  in  keeping  them  apart — in  places  where 
face-to-face  confrontation  might  have  changed 
difficult  situations  into  impossible  situations. 

If  the  United  Nations  has  not  succeeded  in 
settling  all  international  disputes,  it  has  prepared 
the  way  for  the  peaceful  evolution  of  an  interna- 
tional order.  In  that  process  the  U.N.  has  not 
made  the  fatal  error  of  trj'ing  to  freeze  the  move- 
ment of  history.  It  has  not  sought  peace  at  thet 
expense  of  needed  change.  And  we  must  be- 
equally  sure  that,  in  a  world  as  volatile  as  our 
own,  change  is  not  sought  at  the  expense  of  peace, 
which  is  needed  above  all. 

Strengthening  the  U.N.  Structure 

The  record  of  accomplishment  is  formidable; 
but  the  movement  of  history  is  more  peremptory 
than  ever,  and  today's  challenges  of  peace  and  of 
progress  are  tlierefore  more  urgent  than  ever. 
To  meet  these  challenges,  we  need  not  just  a  strong 
but  a  still  stronger  United  Nations.  The  most  im 
portant  general  issue  before  this  Assembly  is  tc 
get  on  with  the  business  of  steadily  improving  oui 
organization  so  that  it  can  deal  ever  more  ener- 
getically, efficiently,  and  promptly  with  the  dan 
gers  to  peace  and  the  obstacles  to  progress. 

This  is  the  essence,  this  is  the  heart,  this  is  the 
day-to-day  stuff  of  our  duty  in  this  Assembly  as 
we  see  it:  to  build  mightier  mansions,  to  keep 
strengthening  the  United  Nations.  The  worth 
and  the  loyalty  of  the  members  will  be  tested  by 
this  standard :  Do  their  actions,  do  their  proposals, 
strengthen  or  weaken  our  organization? 

Strengthening  the  United  Nations  involves 
questions  both  of  structure  and  of  strategy. 

So  far  as  structure  is  concerned,  a  first  necessity 
is  to  set  the  U.N.  on  a  sound  financial  basis.  Oui 
organization  has  today  a  deficit  of  more  than  $15C 
million — brought  about  largely  by  defaults  oi 
delays  in  pajonents  for  peacekeeping  operations 
which  have  proved  as  expensive  as  they  were 
necessary. 

The  emergency  plan  to  meet  this  deficit  through 
the  sale  of  bonds  is  good  as  a  stopgap.  As  a  re- 
sult of  action  by  our  Congress,-  the  United  States 
Government  will  be  in  a  position  to  lend  the  U.N, 


'  For  statements  made  by  Secretary  Rusk,  Acting  Sec 
retary  Ball,  and  Ambas.sador  Stevenson  during  hearing? 
on  the  U.N.  loan  legislation,  see  Bulletin  of  July  23, 1962, 
p.  142. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


TlSl 


Oe 


lialf  of  what  it  will  borrow  under  this  plan.  Other 
nations  already  have  pledged  $73  million.  We 
liope — and  that's  a  mild  word  for  it ! — that  these 
states,  along  with  nations  still  unpledged,  will 
bring  the  total  pledged  to  $100  million.  My  Gov- 
ernment can  then  use  its  full  authority  to  match 
that  sum. 

But  this  is  a  palliative ;  it  is  not  a  solution.  The 
current  deficit  is  a  symptom  of  a  deeper  prob- 
lem— a  problem  created  by  the  inaction  of  too 
many  of  the  governments  in  this  Assembly  hall. 
One  can  understand  past  reasons  for  reluctance 
to  accept  collective  financial  responsibility  for 
U.N".  actions.  Some  states,  for  example,  doubted 
whether  the  General  Assembly  could  legally  make 
a  binding  assessment  for  the  U.N.'s  peacekeeping 
expenses.  But  any  legal  uncertainties  have  now 
been  cleared  up  by  the  recent  opinion  of  the  Inter- 
national Court  of  Justice.^ 

This  Assembly  now  faces  the  compelling  obliga- 
tion of  aiBrming  a  policy  of  collective  financial 
responsibility  for  actions  of  the  United  Nations. 
I  believe  that  this  session  of  the  Assembly  should 
accept  and  act  upon  the  advisory  opinion  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  as  past  Assemblies 
invariably  have  accepted  and  acted  upon  other 
advisoiy  opinions.  The  financial  integrity  and 
independence  of  the  U.N.  are  at  stake.  But  some- 
thing even  more  important  is  at  stake — the  rule 
of  law.  The  Court  has  ruled  on  the  law;  it  re- 
mains to  this  Assembly  to  manifest  at  once  its 
respect  and  its  compliance  by  converting  the  law 
into  policy. 

I  believe  that  this  Assembly  must  also  devise  a 
financing  plan  for  future  peacekeeping  operations 
to  take  efi'ect  when  the  proceeds  from  tlie  bond 
issue  are  exhausted.  The  details  of  such  a  plan 
are  open  to  discussion.  But  whatever  the  charac- 
ter of  the  plan,  it  should  require  that  every  mem- 
ber meet  its  obligations  when  an  assessment  is 
duly  voted. 

We  hope  this  Assembly  will  work  out  a  program 
which  will  finance  operations  authorized  by  itself 
or  by  the  Security  Council.  Otherwise  we  doom 
our  organization  to  impotence.  We  cannot  expect 
the  United  Nations  to  survive  from  day  to  day 
by  passing  a  cup  like  a  beggar  in  the  street. 


'  For  a  statement  made  by  Abram  Chayes,  Legal  Ad- 
viser of  the  Department  of  State,  before  the  Court  on 
May  21,  see  ihid.,  July  2,  1962,  p.  30;  for  a  Department 
statement  concerning  the  Court's  opinion,  see  ibiil.,  Aug. 
13,  1962.  p.  246. 

October  8,    1962 


There  are  other  problems  of  structure  in  addi- 
tion to  finance.  No  one  knows  better  than  we 
in  this  hall  the  need  to  streamlme  the  procedures 
of  this  greatly  expanded  organization  so  that  it 
can  deal  efficiently  with  the  complex  business 
which  crowds  our  long  agenda. 

We  must  enlarge  the  Security  Council  and  the 
Economic  and  Social  Council  to  assure  fair  repre- 
sentation to  every  region  of  the  earth. 

We  must  review  the  rules  and  practices  of  our 
international  civil  service,  particularly  in  the  rela- 
tion of  member  states  to  the  Secretariat,  so  that 
the  staff  of  the  U.N.  remains  "exclusively  inter- 
national," as  the  charter  stipulates. 

We  also  must  elect  unconditionally  a  Secretary- 
General  for  a  full  term  of  office.  After  the  tragic 
death  of  Dag  Hammarskjold  last  year,  the  Assem- 
bly went  through  a  protracted  but  instructive  con- 
stitutional crisis.  We  resolved  this  crisis  by 
vindicating — overwhelmingly  and  I  trust  perma- 
nently— the  integrity  of  the  office  of  Secretary- 
General  as  established  by  the  charter.  We  then 
selected  unanimously  as  Acting  Secretary-General 
a  diplomat  of  extraordinary  personal  qualities, 
who  has  served  this  organization  well  in  a  time 
of  transition  and  uncertainty. 

Our  responsibility  in  this  Assembly  is  to  make 
sure  that  this  important  office  is  as  well  filled  in 
the  next  5  years  as  it  has  been  in  the  past — and 
that  he  who  holds  the  office  retains  the  full  freedom 
and  authority  provided  under  the  charter. 

Patient,  Quiet  Diplomacy  Needed 

But  the  solution  of  all  the  problems  of  organiza- 
tion would  still  leave  unsolved  the  question  of  how 
we  use  the  machinery  we  have  devised.  I  take  it 
that  our  essential  purpose  is  to  find  practical 
means  of  fulfilling  the  intentions  of  the  charter. 
But  I  sometimes  wonder  whether  the  means 
adopted  are  always  the  best  way  to  achieve  the 
ends  desired. 

I  am  well  aware  of  the  frustration,  temptations, 
and  conflicts  in  any  parliamentary  democracy,  but 
it  happens  to  be  tlie  best  system  ever  invented  to 
protect  and  reconcile  all  interests  in  the  conduct 
of  public  affairs.  Given  the  inherent  complexities 
of  this  form  of  organization,  given  the  gravity  of 
the  matters  with  which  we  deal,  given  the  youth 
of  the  United  Nations,  given  its  extremely  rapid 
growth,  it  must  be  said  that  the  General  Assembly, 
with  few  exceptions,  has  conducted  itself  with 


513 


surprising  responsibility  and  maturity. 

Our  plain  duty  now  is  to  perform  our  business 
in  such  a  way  as  to  make  tliis  Assembly  even  more 
responsible,  more  mature — and  therefore  more 
effective. 

It  is  clear  that  the  business  of  this  Assembly 
cannot  be  conducted  effectively  in  the  manner  of 
a  protest  demonstration  in  a  public  square.  It  is 
clear  that  the  influence  of  this  Assembly  cannot 
grow  if  the  quality  of  its  debate  is  debased  by 
propaeranda  or  by  speeches  designed  not  to  f  urtlier 
the  business  before  the  house  but  to  gratify  emo- 
tions back  home. 

Indignation  and  outrage  have  been  powerful 
enemies  of  injustice  since  the  beginning  of  liis- 
tory.  It  would  be  surprising  if  they  had  no  place 
in  the  proceedings  of  the  United  Nations.  But  the 
test  of  resolutions  presented  to  this  Assembly  must 
surely  be  whether  they  promise  to  bring  us  closer 
to  rational  solutions  of  real  problems  and  thereby 
closer  to  justice. 

For  example,  I  think  we  must  all  beware  of  the 
resolution  which  invokes  high  principle  in  sup- 
port of  unrealistic  action  and  does  nothing  to  ad- 
vance a  practical  solution.  If  this  became  com- 
mon practice,  we  would  risk  destroying  the 
influence  of  our  organization,  for  the  value  of  its 
recommendations  would  depreciate  like  inflated 
currency. 

In  the  United  Nations  all  members,  large  and 
small,  are  juridically  equal.  That  is  why  it  is  so 
often  called  the  hope  of  the  world.  That  is  why 
it  is  the  great  guardian  of  the  interests  of  smaller 
states.  And  that  is  also  why,  as  the  Assembly 
grows  in  numbers,  we  must  match  its  size  by  its 
sense  of  relevance  and  its  sense  of  I'esponsibility. 

We  must  also  recognize,  I  think,  that  open  de- 
bate imder  the  TV  cameras  is  not  always  conducive 
to  the  moderation  and  restraint  essential  when 
proud  and  sovereign  states  are  in  dispute.  Nor 
is  the  Assembly  the  only  means  through  wliich 
our  organization  achieves  its  purposes.  We  saw  a 
year  ago  tliat  this  Assembly  could  not  agree  on 
how  to  settle  the  dispute  over  West  New  Guinea. 
We  know  today  how  much  the  U.N.  has  been  able 
to  accomplish  in  composing  this  dispute  by  enter- 
ing it  as  a  quiet  third  partner.^ 

I  believe  that  there  will  be  many  opportunities 
for  the  U.N.  to  serve  as  a  "third  man"  in  world 


affairs:  as  the  objective  factfinder,  the  impartial 
"presence,"  the  policeman  on  the  beat,  the  instru' 
ment  of  quiet  diplomacy.  On  some  issues  befortt  li 
us  even  today,  for  example,  the  U.N.  might  ap-; 
point  a  rapporteur  to  ascertain  the  facts  and  ana- 
lyze the  problems  and  thereby  facilitate  sounc: 
decisions  by  the  General  Assembly. 

Nothing  is  more  important  to  all  of  us  than  a 
sustained  and  systematic  attack  on  the  conflicts, 
which  threaten  the  peace.  Our  world  is  now  a 
crowded  house,  our  planet  a  single  powder  keg; 
We  believe  that  all  nations  must  stay  their  hand; 
in  pursuit  of  national  ambitions  involving  conflici 
with  others  imtil  the  world  community  has  had  i 
chance  to  fijid  solutions  through  jaatient  and  quiei 
diplomatic  effort. 

The  point  here  is  not  to  oppose  or  to  postpont 
desirable  change;  the  point  is  not  to  stall  or  t( 
evade  needed  action.  On  the  contrary,  the  poim 
is  precisely  to  select  the  most  effective  teclmique— 
to  search  out  the  most  relevant  formula — to  insuri 
that  change  can  in  fact  take  place,  that  action  can 
in  fact  be  taken  to  secure  the  peace  of  the  worlc 
and  strengthen  the  United  Nations. 

There  is  work  enough  to  do — and  tools  enouglH  It 
to  do  it.  Let  us  resolve  to  set  about  it  in  an  orderlj 
fashion;  let  us  use  and  combine  our  tools  anc 
techniques  for  a  period  of  active,  inventive  dipla 
macy ;  let  us,  in  this  I7tli  General  Assembly,  aspire 
to  the  highest  forms  of  political  art  and  usher  ir 
a  time  of  peaceful  solutions  of  conflict — of  peace 
ful  passage  through  the  vast  transformation: 
which  contemporary  history  demands. 


*  For  background,  see  ihid.,  June  25,  1962,  p.  1039,  and 
Sept.  3,  19G2,  p.  349. 

514 


Prodigal  Arms  Race  a  Deadly  Folly 

Tlie  path  to  peace  lies  through  thickets  of  con 
flict.  And  the  biggest  obstacle  in  the  path,  thi 
most  overwhelming  danger  of  all,  is  the  onnishinf 
arms  race.  Every  day  it  gathers  momentum  ai 
the  nuclear  powers  and  others,  large  and  small 
enlarge  their  arsenals.  Some  of  us  continue  t( 
invent  and  test  frightful  new  weapons.  We  fee 
obliged  to  do  this  for  the  sake  of  our  separati 
national  interests — at  a  time  in  history  when  th< 
national  interest  of  all  nations,  tliose  with  nucleai 
weapons  and  those  without,  demands  not  the  ex 
pansion  but  the  abolition  of  the  power  to  wag( 
war. 

Let  me  be  as  clear  and  simple  as  I  can :  Tlii; 
prodigal  arms  race  is  dangerous  and  deadly  folly 
Here  in  the  United  States  we  want  to  save,  no) 
destroj',  our  fellow  man.    We  want  to  devote  thf 

Deparlment  of  Stale  Bulletin 


nil  resources  now  swallowed  up  by  this  insatiable 
itti  monster  to  the  unfinished  tasks  of  our  own  society. 
f«  And  we  want  to  devote  these  I'esources  to  giving 
every  soul  on  this  earth  a  chance  for  a  better  life. 

Yet  the  arms  race  goes  on.  It  goes  on  because 
no  nation,  confronted  by  hostile  nations,  can 
neglect  its  defenses.  No  great  power  can  risk 
unilateral  disarmament.  There  is  one  way — and 
one  way  only — out  of  this  intolerable  dilemma: 
that  is,  a  system  of  complete  and  general  disann- 
:^  ament  under  which  all  nations  progressively  tear 
down — in  plain  view  of  the  international  com- 
tnmiity  and  with  suitable  safeguards — their  own 
capacity  to  wage  war. 

A  great  achievement  of  our  last  session  was  to 
endorse  an  agreement  on  a  set  of  principles  for 
general  and  complete  disarmament  in  a  peaceful 
world.'^  But  while  we  have  made  some  progi'ess, 
we  have  not  made  enough  progress  toward  trans- 
lating these  agreed  principles  into  an  agreed 
plan — to  move  by  mutual  actions  in  rapid  stages 
toward  total  disarmament  and  effective  interna- 
tional peacekeeping. 

The  United  States  has  proposed  such  a  plan. 
It  has  submitted  its  proposals  to  this  Assembly 
and  to  the  18-Nation  Disarmament  Conference 
at  Geneva.*' 

But,  just  as  it  takes  at  least  two  to  make  an 
arms  race,  it  takes  at  least  two  to  stop  an  arms 
race.  No  one  in  his  senses  would  expect  one  side 
to  abandon  the  means  of  self-defense  unless  it 
knew  for  sure  that  the  other  side  was  giving  up  its 
arms  as  well.  This  means  that  practical  verifica- 
tion is  the  essence  of  any  workable  agreement  on 
general  disarmament. 

It  need  not  be  total  verification.  We  have 
demonstrated  again  and  again  during  long  nego- 
tiations that  we  are  prepared  to  take  certain  risks 
to  lessen  the  chance  of  an  intensified  arms  race. 
But  we  are  not  prepared  to  risk  our  survival.  If 
other  nations  permit — as  we  have  agreed  to  do — 
the  degree  of  international  inspection  teclmically 
required  for  mutual  security,  we  can  end  the  arms 
race.  But  we  cannot  stake  our  national  existence 
on  blind  trust — especially  on  blind  trust  in  a  great 
and  powerful  nation  which  repeatedly  declares  its 
fundamental  hostility  to  the  basic  values  of  our 
free  society. 


orli 


iiii( 


rii 


IllE 


w« 


^  For  text,  see  Hid.,  Oct.  9, 1961,  p.  589. 

'  For  a  statement  made  by  President  Kennedy  on  Apr. 
18  and  text  of  an  outline  of  a  treaty  on  general  and  com- 
plete disarmament,  see  ibid.,  May  7, 1962,  p.  7-17. 

October  8,   7962 


The  issue  is  plain.  The  price  of  general  disar- 
mament is  mutual  security  within  the  framework 
of  the  United  Nations.  Because  such  security 
would  be  international  inspection,  it  could  have  no 
conceivable  comiection  with  espionage.  Is  inspec- 
tion by  a  United  Nations  agency  too  high  a  price 
to  pay  for  the  safety,  perhaps  survival,  of  man- 
kind? Can  any  society  value  its  secrecy  more 
than  everyone's  safety — especially  a  society  which 
avows  itself  the  model  toward  which  all  other 
societies  must  irresistibly  evolve? 

Mr.  President,  I  put  this  issue  in  all  gravity.  I 
ask  the  members  of  this  Assembly  to  join  the 
peoples  of  the  world  in  demanding  a  program  of 
general  disarmament  which  stands  a  chance  of 
ending  the  arms  race. 

Once  again,  the  answer  to  this  issue  is  not  to  be 
found  in  exhortation  or  emotionalism.  It  is  not 
to  be  found  by  passing  virtuous  resolutions  which 
proclaim  noble  ends  without  realistic  means.  It 
is  to  be  found  only  in  remorseless  effort  to  solve  the 
infinitely  complicated  problems  of  disarmament. 
We  believe  that  serious  negotiations  in  Geneva  will 
bring  us  closer  to  our  goal,  and  I  hope  the  discus- 
sions there  will  continue  to  have  the  prayerful 
and  wholehearted  support  of  this  Assembly. 

Here  in  New  York  the  Assembly  can  insist  on 
the  indispensable  condition  of  world  disarmament : 
assurance  that  agreements  made  are  agreements 
kept. 

Hope  for  Progress  in  Banning  Nuclear  Tests 

But  there  is  a  situation  even  more  immediate 
and  more  hopeful  than  general  disarmament.  I 
refer  to  the  testing  of  nuclear  weapons.  If  we  see 
in  this  a  more  acute  problem,  let  me  suggest  that 
it  is  also  more  manageable — and  therefore  offers 
brighter  hopes  for  early  progress. 

For  nearly  4  years  the  nuclear  powers,  includ- 
ing my  country,  have  been  locked  in  negotiation 
for  a  reliable  and  permanent  ban  on  the  testing  of 
nuclear  weapons.  From  such  a  ban  woidd  come 
a  barrier  to  the  spread  of  such  weapons;  and  there 
would  come  an  end  to  this  new  source  of  radiation 
in  the  human  environment,  and  a  great  step  toward 
the  comprehensive  disarmament  treaty  we  so 
earnestly  seek. 

As  is  plain  from  the  draft  treaties  tabled  in 
Geneva,'  the  United  States  Government  is  pre- 
pared to  stop  the  testing  of  all  nuclear  weapons, 


'  For  texts,  see  ibid.,  Sept.  17,  1962,  pp.  411  and  415. 


515 


provided  only  that  others  are  prepared  to  assume 
the  obligation  to  do  the  same.  Testing  in  the 
atmosphere,  in  the  oceans,  and  in  space  causes 
radiation.  Testing  underground  does  not.  We  are 
prepared  to  stop  testing,  even  without  any  inter- 
national verification,  in  the  atmosphere,  in  the 
oceans,  and  in  space  because  we  have  national 
means  of  detecting  testing  by  others.  And  we  are 
prepared  to  stop  testing  underground — where  we 
don't  have  our  own  means  of  verification — pro- 
vided an  international  system  is  created  to  assure 
that  others  are  doing  the  same. 

It  may  be  interesting  to  you  to  know  that  since 
1945,  when  it  began,  the  United  States  has  ex- 
ploded nuclear  devices  with  a  total  yield  of  about 
140  megatons.  Since  1949,  when  it  began,  the 
U.S.S.R.,  so  far  as  we  can  tell  by  distant  instru- 
mentation, has  exploded  devices  with  a  total 
yield  of  approximately  250  megatons.  Since  the 
U.S.S.E.  broke  tlie  moratorium  last  fall  its  ex- 
plosions have  yielded  200  megatons — those  which 
the  United  States  was  then  compelled  to  under- 
take, only  25  megatons. 

I  repeat,  we  want  to  cease  testing  nuclear  weap- 
ons. If  other  nuclear  powers  are  also  willing  to 
make  an  agreement  to  cease,  the  testing  will  cease. 
But  let  there  be  no  doubt  about  it— the  United 
States  prefers  a  comprehensive  treaty  banning  all 
tests  in  all  environments  for  all  times.  On  this 
transcendent  issue  we  in  the  United  States  are  in 
dead  earnest.  And  I  conclude  with  the  thanks  of 
my  Government  to  the  eight  nonalined  nations 
for  their  helpful  and  constructive  efforts  to  bring 
about  agreement  at  Geneva. 

The  Long  Labor  of  Nationhood 

The  objective  of  peace  is  inseparably  inter- 
twined with  the  objective  of  progress.  As  we 
improve  our  organization's  capacity  to  keep  the 
peace,  we  also  strengthen  the  United  Nations  for 
its  other  essential  tasks:  to  help  build  nations 
in  dignity  and  freedom,  to  help  liberate  humanity 
from  centuries-old  bonds  of  want  and  squalor. 
And  as  we  build  healthy  modem  societies,  we  knit 
stronger  the  fabric  of  peace;  we  reduce  the  chance 
that  misery  and  failure  will  explode  into  conflict. 
Thus  are  peacekeeping  and  nation  building  two 
sides  of  the  U.N.  coin. 

We  wlio  have  attended  these  General  Assemblies 
of  the  United  Nations  have  been  witnesses  of  a 
great  historic  transformation.  In  the  years  since 
1945— and  with  the  support  of  this  Assembly- 
Sid 


.i 


i 


IS 


we  have  seen  the  age  of  classical  colonialism  movi 
toward  an  end.  In  these  years  46  nations — near]; 
half  the  present  membership  of  this  organization- 
have  gained  their  independence.  This  has  repre 
sented  a  revolutionary  change  in  the  structure  o 
international  relations  and  international  powei 

It  has  been  a  change,  I  need  hardly  say,  whicl 
has  been  enthusiastically  welcomed  in  the  Unitei 
States.  As  the  first  modern  state  to  win  freedon 
from  colonialism,  we  have  been  proud  to  hel] 
other  states  begin  that  most  precious  and  difficul 
of  adventures — the  adventure  in  self-government 
We  count  no  task  more  important  than  assisting 
those  everywhere,  in  the  older  colonial  areas  an( 
elsewhere,  to  self-determination. 

This  task  will  engage  this  Assembly  in  grav 
and  determined  deliberations  in  the  months  ahead 
In  no  part  of  the  world  has  the  movement  towar( 
national  independence  attained  more  spectacula 
results  in  the  last  3  years  than  in  Africa.  In  n( 
part  of  the  world  is  it  more  important  to  mak 
further  progress  in  solving  the  remaining  issue  '" 
of  classical  colonialism  on  the  basis  of  genuim 
self-determination.  For  many  months  the  Spe 
cial  Committee  of  17  on  colonialism  has  addressee 
itself  to  these  issues.  We  hope  that  the  Committei 
will  be  able  to  conduct  its  work  in  the  future  h 
an  atmosphere  undistracted  by  the  emotions  o: 
the  cold  war  which  affected  its  work  this  year— 
in  an  atmosphere  where  states  old  and  new  car 
work  together  to  help  bring  into  existence  in  lands 
not  yet  free  the  conditions  essential  for  successf u 
nationhood. 

For  a  nation  is  not  created  by  a  stroke  of  f 
pen.  A  declaration  of  political  independence  ii 
a  beginning,  not  a  conclusion.  Nothing  mon 
discredits  the  great  historic  transformation  of  out 
epoch  than  for  newly  independent  states  to  fall 
into  chaos  and  become  an  international  problem  oi 
an  international  danger.  The  long  labor  oi 
nationhood  requires  the  reality  as  well  as  the  rhet 
oric  of  independence:  It  requires  an  emerging 
national  will  capable  of  the  political  wisdom,  the 
administrative  vigor,  the  economic  energy,  and  the 
moral  discipline  necessary  to  convert  the  promise 
of  national  independence  into  a  free  and  produc- 
tive life  for  its  people.  The  interest  of  my  Gov 
ernment  and  of  the  world  lies  not  in  the  mere 
multiplication  of  nations  but  in  the  multiplica 
tion  of  nations  where  peoples  are  free  and  have 
the  strength  to  survive  and  to  grow  and  to  con 
tribute  to  the  A-itality  of  the  international  order 
in  the  world  community. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


lb 
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ft 


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ioi 


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Tools  for  Self-Development 

leatl  Nation  building  tlius  has  its  political  dimension, 
ion.  }Ut  national  independence  has  its  social  and  eco- 
tfpn  Qomic  and  moral  dimensions  as  well.  That  is 
jTei  why  I  hope  that  this  Assembly  will  devote  its 
lowe  attention  to  tlie  next  great  item  on  the  agenda 
ilii(  sf  nation  building:  that  is,  helping  the  new  na- 
tions fashion  the  tools  to  cany  out  their  tasks  of 
self-development. 

Never  has  a  time  been  more  propitious  for  the 
uccessful     discharge    of    these    tasks.     If    the 
niracles  of  science  have  given  mankind  new  power 
;o  destroy,  they  have  also  given  mankind  new 
DOwer  to  create.     The  challenge  which  confronts 
IS  is  to  turn  the  miracles  of  science  to  the  service 
)f  man — and  of  man  the  laborer  on  this  earth, 
IS  well  as  man  the  explorer  of  the  imiverse  beyond. 
We  have  a  right,  I  think,  to  congratulate  the 
iommittee  on  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space  on 
ts  progress  toward  international  scientific  and 
echnical  cooperation,  progress  which  holds  high 
promise  for  both  peace  and  the  advancement  of 
mowledge.    But  what  does  it  profit  if  a  few  men 
)rbit  the  earth  while  below  them  millions  are 
itarving  ?    "Wliat  is  the  point  of  our  technological 
jltd  jrowess  if  it  can  launch  men  into  space  but  can- 
lot  lift  them  from  the  swamps  of  poverty? 

To  set  out  consciously  to  abolish  poverty  as  the 
Drevailing  condition  of  humanity  is  as  formidable 
fii!  I  task  as  man  ever  set  himself,  and  I  would  ask 
70u  not  to  imderestimate  its  difficulties. 

But  if  the  task  is  enormously  comi:)lex,  it  can 
ilso  be  deeply  fulfilling.  I  am  proud  that  my  own 
;ountry  pioneered  in  offering  a  helping  hand  to 
ii  lations  prepared  to  start  along  the  road  toward 
nfelf-sustaining  growth.  I  am  gratified  too  that 
o  many  of  the  other  industrially  developed  na- 
ions  have  followed  suit.  It  is  heartening  that 
or  groups  of  nations  are  beginning  to  work  out  their 
sconomic  destinies  in  common  through  reefional 
)rganizations  and  coordinating  their  assistance  to 
;he  emerging  nations. 

Over  the  years  the  U.N.  itself  has  established  an 
mpressive  range  of  technical  institutions  geared 
.o  the  job  of  helping  the  less  developed  nations 
o  modernize  their  economies.  The  United  Na- 
tions family  of  agencies  is  the  source  of  new  and 
ixciting  projects:  A  World  Food  Program  is  just 
jetting  under  way ;  ^  the  Board  of  Governors  of 
-he  World  Bank  is  calling  right  now  for  recom- 


tiiem 
istiji 

ki 
m 
cula 


s?e( 


?fii 


ifS 


Bli8 

iei« 


'  See  p.  5^4. 
Dcfober  8,   1962 


mendations  on  the  expansion  of  capital  for  the 
International  Development  Association;  an  un- 
precedented conference  on  the  application  of  sci- 
ence and  technology  to  the  problems  of  develop- 
ment will  be  held  in  Geneva  early  next  year. 

Other  projects  and  programs  attest  to  the  grow- 
ing maturity,  the  expanding  scope,  and  the  rising 
operational  capacity  of  the  U.N.  family  of  agen- 
cies.   This  is  all  to  the  good. 

The  challenge  before  us  now  is  to  make  our 
U.N.  agencies  better  with  each  passing  year — to 
endow  them  with  sound  procedures  and  adequate 
resources;  to  staff  them  with  disinterested  and 
expert  talent ;  to  improve  their  planning  and  pro- 
graming and  administration  and  coordination ;  to 
see  that  they  meet  the  needs  of  realistic  develop- 
ment in  the  new  nations;  to  integrate  them  with 
the  other  forms  of  development  assistance,  na- 
tional, regional,  and  international,  presently  go- 
ing to  the  emerging  nations;  and  thereby  to  insure 
that  development  aid  will  be  applied  everywhere 
on  a  cooperative  rather  than  a  competitive  basis. 
We  need  to  produce  a  closer  harmony  from  the 
orchestra  of  aid  instruments  already  available 
to  ns. 

The  full  promise  of  development  cannot  be 
achieved  within  national  boundaries.  To  stimu- 
late general  prosperity  we  must  remove  the  bar- 
riers which  block  the  free  flow  of  men,  money,  and 
goods  across  national  frontiers. 

We  have  seen  the  extraordinary  burst  of  eco- 
nomic activity  which  has  attended  the  evolution 
of  the  European  Common  Market — one  of  the 
great  adventures  in  creative  statesmanship  of  our 
age.  Groups  of  countries  in  other  parts  of  the 
world  are  also  seeking  ways  to  build  regional 
economies  which  in  turn  can  further  thrive  on 
expanded  woi-ld  trade. 

It  is  essential,  of  course,  that  such  groupings 
should  offer  to  nonmembers  the  fullest  possible  ad- 
vantage of  the  larger  market.  We  know  now  that 
one  nation  cannot  buy  its  prosperity  by  limiting 
the  prosperity  of  others. 

An  expanding  world  trade,  built  on  the  scaffold- 
ing of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade,  rests  in  turn  on  that  further  social  progress, 
that  larger  freedom,  that  broader  structure  of  in- 
ternational peace  which  it  is  the  purpose  of  the 
United  Nations  to  secure.  That  is  why  the  United 
States  was  pleased  to  join  with  its  fellow  members 
of  the  Economic  and  Social  Council  in  the  unani- 
mous call  for  a  United  Nations  Conference  on 

517 


Trade  and  Development.  We  will  do  everything 
we  can  to  help  this  conference  succeed. 

We  need  to  move,  under  the  challenge  of  the 
Decade  of  Development,  toward  a  clearer  strategy 
of  development,  toward  a  better  sense  of  priorities, 
toward  a  sharper  division  of  labor  among  the  vari- 
ous aid  institutions,  and  toward  a  keener  apiireci- 
ation  that  the  economic  and  social  development  of 
a  country  is  not  the  result  only  of  outside  capital 
and  assistance  but  of  political  leadership,  institu- 
tional growth,  economic  and  social  reform,  and 
national  will. 

Here,  then,  are  our  twin  tasks:  to  replace  stri- 
dent politics  with  quiet  but  determined  diplomacy, 
and  to  replace  the  arms  race,  as  the  President  said 
last  year,®  with  a  peace  race — with  a  creative  race 
in  the  production  and  exchange  of  goods  and  the 
elevation  of  living  standards. 


These  tasks  are  not  new — nor  will  they  be  fin- 
ished before  we  adjourn.  But  before  we  adjourn 
I  trust  that  tlie  iTtli  General  Assembly  will  ener- 
getically get  on  with  the  job  of  peaceful  settle- 
ment, of  nonviolent  change,  and  of  war  against 
human  want. 

As  the  custodians  of  the  history  of  our  times, 
we  can  do  no  less.  To  the  discharge  of  thesa 
responsibilities  my  own  Government  pledges  itsi 
firm  and  unswerving  support.  Animated  by  the 
ideals  of  the  charter  and  by  our  obligations  to  oun 
fellow  men  we,  the  members  of  this  Assembly, 
cannot  adjourn  our  deliberations  without  provid- 
ing the  world  tangible  evidence  of  our  devotioni 
to  peace  and  justice.  This  tangible  evidence,  Mr. 
President,  can  lie  only  in  our  decisions  and  deeds' 
in  the  months  ahead. 


President  Kennedy  and  Secretary  Rusk  Urge  Restoration 
of  Foreign  Aid  Funds 


Following  is  a  series  of  statements  made  hy 
President  Kennedy  and  Secretary  Rusk  regarding 
a  cut  in  foreign  aid  funds  recommended  iy  the 
House  Afpro-priations  Committee. 


PRESS  STATEMENT  BY  PRESIDENT  KENNEDY 
SEPTEMBER  19 

White  House  press  release  dated  September  19 

The  drastic  cut  in  foreign  aid  funds  recom- 
mended by  the  House  Appropriations  Committee 
poses  a  threat  to  free- world  security. 

It  makes  no  sense  at  all  to  make  siseeches  against 
the  spread  of  communism,  to  deplore  mstability 
in  Latin  America  and  Asia,  to  call  for  an  increase 
in  American  prestige  and  an  initiative  in  Eastern 
Europe — and  then  vote  to  cut  back  the  Alliance 
for  Progress,  to  hamper  the  Peace  Corps,  to  re- 
pudiate our  long-term  commitments  of  last  year, 
and  to  undermine  the  efforts  of  those  who  are 
seeking  to  stave  off  chaos  and  communism  in  the 


increasingly  meant  trade,  sales,  and  jobs  in  this 
country,  and  reform,  progress,  and  new  hope  in 
the  developing  countries 

The  aid  program  is  just  as  important  as  any 
military  spending  we  do  abroad.  You  cannot 
separate  guns  from  roads  and  schools  when  it 
comes  to  resisting  Communist  subversion  in  luider 
developed  coimtries.  This  is  a  lesson  we  have 
learned  clearly  in  South  Viet-Nam  and  elsewhere 
in  Southeast  Asia.  To  mutilate  the  aid  program 
in  tliis  massive  fashion  would  be  to  damage  the 
national  security  of  the  United  States, 

I  cannot  believe  that  those  in  both  parties  who 
have  consistently  voted  in  the  course  of  three  ad 


ministrations  to  ftdfill  this  nation's  obligations  of  'ff 
leadership  will  permit  this  irresponsible  action  toi 
go  uncorrected 


most  vital  areas  of  the  world. 


Foreign  aid  has 


•  For  an  address  by  President  Kennedy  before  the  16th 
General  Assembly  on  Sept.  25,  19C1,  see  Bulletin  of 
Oct  16, 1961,  p.  619. 

518 


PRESS  STATEMENT  BY  SECRETARY  RUSK 
SEPTEMBER  19 

Press  release  571  dated  September  19 

I  am  deeply  concerned  about  the  effects  which 
the  cuts  now  proposed  in  foreign  assistance  ap- 
propriations will  have  upon  our  foreign  policy 
and  our  national  securitv.     We  are  engaged  in 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  q 


lii 


every  continent  in  a  gi-eat  struggle  between  the 
forces  of  freedom  and  those  who  would  destroy 
freedom.  The  funds  we  are  requesting  are  only 
1  percent  more  than  were  actually  appropriated 
for  foreign  assistance  and  the  Alliance  for  Prog- 
ress in  the  last  fiscal  year.  Tlie  sum  amounts  to 
about  10  percent  of  our  defense  budget — but  is  a 
crucial  part  of  our  defense.  The  cuts  now  being 
considered — the  heaviest  ever  made  by  an  Appro- 
priations Committee — will  represent  a  significant 
reduction  at  a  time  wlien  a  million  American  men 
are  outside  the  U.S.  to  defend  freedom,  and  when 
crises  such  as  Berlin  and  Cuba  indicate  that  we 
face  weeks  and  months  of  demanding  effort. 

It  seems  to  me  that  we  can  well  afford  our  in- 
APstment  in  foreign  assistance  to  win  this  struggle 
for  freedom,  without  war  if  possible,  and  to  sup- 
port and  reinforce  our  men  in  uniform  who  are 
standing  guard  in  foreign  places.  We  have  seen 
in  Cuba,  and  in  other  places,  how  difficult  it  is  to 
restore  freedom  once  it  has  been  extinguished  by 
the  grip  of  Marxist-Leninist  totalitarianism.  We 
cannot  let  that  happen  in  coimtries  that  stand, 
with  us,  in  their  determination  to  keep  their  free- 
dom. If  a  citizen  wishes  to  "do  something"  at 
this  time  of  crisis,  he  can  do  it  by  supporting  the 
President  on  this  matter. 

A  reduction  of  $475  million  in  development 
lending  would  cripple  our  effort  to  transfer  aid 
from  grants  to  dollar-repayable  loans.  This 
is  not  a  giveaway  but  an  investment  in  our  own 
future.  Such  a  deep  cut  would  reverse  the  clear 
intent  of  Congress  to  support  long-term  commit- 
ment on  a  loan  basis. 

We  have  ourselves  reduced  supporting  assist- 
ance and  direct  budgetarj^  grants  as  a  form  of  aid. 
But  the  cut  now  being  contemplated  would  make 
it  extremely  difficult  for  us  to  give  the  minimum 
necessary  support  to  countries  who  are  on  the  front 
lines  in  the  Pacific  and  in  the  Middle  East,  and 
who  are  carrying  military  budgets  on  behalf  of 
our  mutual  security  beyond  the  possibilities  of 
their  own  resources.  We  cannot  at  this  junc- 
ture risk  a  weakening  in  such  places  as  Korea,  Na- 
tionalist China,  Viet-Nam,  and  Turkey. 

It  is  critically  important  that  we  not  cut  the 
requested  appropriation  for  the  Alliance  for 
Progress.  The  struggle  for  freedom  must  go  on 
idi  here  in  our  own  hemisphere,  where  free  institu- 
ip  tions  are  being  directly  challenged  in  and  through 
icj  Cuba.  It  would  be  difffcult  for  the  hemisphere 
iJ  to  understand  that  we  and  they  are,  and  ought  to 

liii  Ocfober  8,   7962 


■hi 


be,  deeply  concerned  about  this  struggle  if  we  re- 
duced the  $600  million  requested  for  the  Alliance 
for  Progress. 

I  strongly  urge  the  House  of  Kepresentatives 
not  to  cripple  this  bipartisan  effort  at  a  time  when 
the  cause  of  freedom  requires  so  much  of  us. 

STATEMENT  BY  MR.  RUSK  BEFORE  SENATE 
APPROPRIATIONS  COMMITTEE,  SEPTEMBER  21 

Press  release  576  dated  September  21 

I  am  grateful  for  your  invitation  to  meet  with 
you  to  discuss  the  appropriations  requested  by  the 
President  for  the  foi'eign  aid  program  for  fiscal 
year  1963.  You  have  heard  extensive  testimony 
on  this  program  over  the  past  several  weeks  by 
many  experts.  Since  their  testimony  the  aid  ap- 
propriation has  been  drastically  cut  by  the  House. 
The  President  has  declared  these  cuts  pose  "a 
threat  to  free-world  security" — that  "to  mutilate 
the  aid  program  in  this  massive  fashion  would  be 
to  damage  the  national  security  of  the  United 
States."  1 

Perhaps  the  most  helpful  contribution  I  can 
make  to  your  consideration  is  to  discuss  with  you 
the  role  which  I  believe  our  aid  program  has 
in  our  foreign  policy  and  why  I  believe  these 
appropriations  are  needed  in  the  full  amounts 
authorized. 

The  Significance  of  Our  Aid  Program 

It  is  imperative  that  we  understand  our  foreign 
aid  program  in  its  true  character.  It  is  vital  to 
the  security  and  welfare  of  our  countiy.  It  is  a 
crucial  part  of  our  defense.  It  reinforces  our  men 
in  uniform  who  are  standing  guard  in  many  for- 
eign places.  It  is  one  of  the  great  bulwarks  of 
freedom  in  the  world.  It  is  central  to  the  achieve- 
ment of  our  greatest  national  objective.  This  ob- 
jective is  nothing  less  than  to  see  established,  in  the 
President's  words,  a  "world  community  of  free  and 
independent  states,  free  to  choose  their  own  future 
and  their  own  system  so  long  as  it  does  not  threaten 
the  freedom  of  others."  ^ 

We  are  in  an  historic  struggle  to  achieve  this 
objective.  The  central  opponent  in  this  struggle 
is  Communist  imperialism.  Its  goals  cannot  be 
reconciled  with  our  own — nor  are  they  shared,  as 


'  See  p.  518. 

'  Bulletin  of  Jan.  29, 1962,  p.  159. 


519 


ours  are,  by  most  nations  and  peoples  throughout 
the  world. 

This  is  a  sti-uggle  in  which  we  cannot  afford  to 
tire  or  falter.  It  is  a  struggle  that  we  must  win. 
It  is  essential  to  realize  that  the  "we"  are  the 
great  body  of  mankind.  The  victory  we  seek  is 
a  victory  for  all  mankind — a  victory  for  freedom. 

Such  a  victory  is  not  a  simple  matter.  To  be 
genuine  it  must  embrace  the  independence  of  na- 
tions and  the  freedom  of  peoples.  To  be  complete 
it  must  provide  for  the  peaceful  settlement  of  dis- 
putes, for  progress  toward  the  rule  of  law  among 
nations,  for  attainment  of  a  world  free  from  ag- 
gression. To  be  worthy,  it  must  allow  the  peoples 
in  all  nations  to  establish  governments  deriving 
their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned; it  must  secure  the  personal  freedoms  essen- 
tial for  the  dignity  of  man;  it  must  give  oppor- 
tunity for  economic  progress  and  the  growth  of 
social  justice. 

This  victory  is  one  for  which  our  foreign  aid 
program  is  designed  and  must  be  perfected.  That 
program  provides,  as  nothing  else  can,  our  con- 
tribution to  the  hopes  for  stability  and  progress 
for  the  peoples  of  the  free  world.  It  is  indispen- 
sable to  victory  of  the  kind  we  seek. 

This  struggle  is  not  a  new  one.  Our  aid  pro- 
gram has  already  had  a  great  role  in  the  successes 
we  have  thus  far  achieved.  This  committee  has 
participated  in  and  is  familiar  with  each  of  those 
successes.  You  made  possible  the  achievements 
of  the  Marshall  Plan,  which  saved  Europe  from 
chaos,  helped  it  regain  its  political  balance,  and 
laid  the  basis  for  the  development  of  its  present 
economic  strength.  You  provided  for  the  assist- 
ance which  saved  Greece  and  Turkey  and  which 
helped  turn  back  the  Communist  aggression 
against  Korea  and  Taiwan  and  which  has  sup- 
ported resistance  to  the  internal  and  external  Com- 
munist pressures  against  Laos  and  Viet-Nam. 
This  same  assistance,  we  sometimes  forget,  also 
made  it  possible  for  the  people  of  the  Philippines 
to  presen-e  their  freedom  against  insurrection  in- 
spired from  abroad. 

In  fact,  the  fight  against  Communist  imperial- 
ism in  many  forms  has  been  carried  on  with  deter- 
mination since  the  end  of  "World  War  II,  and  the 
foreign  assistance  you  have  provided  has  made 
the  defense  of  freedom  possible. 

Yet  there  is  another  aspect  of  our  struggle  for 
victory  which  is  of  equal  or  even  greater  impor- 


tance and  in  wliich  our  aid  program  is  tlie  most 
effective  tool  available  to  us:  That  is  the  fight 
against  ignorance,  poverty,  and  disease,  and 
against  social  injustice  long  endured — but  no 
longer  endurable — by  a  third  or  more  of  the 
world's  population  on  four  continents. 

Victory  in  this  struggle  lies  mainly  in  the  hands 
of  these  peoples  themselves,  for  nothing  can  sub- 
stitute for  their  own  energy,  detennmation,  and 
sacrifice.  But  our  aid — joined  now  in  rising 
amounts  by  the  allies  whose  recovery  we  have  pre- 
viously aided — can  provide  the  margin  of  capital 
and  technical  skill  to  make  success  possible. 

Our  aid  program  will  continue  to  build  upon  the 
accomplislnnents  of  the  past.  Funds  you  voted 
last  year  have  made  a  vital  contribution  to  the 
conduct  of  foreign  policy.  In  the  Far  East  they 
have  furnished  the  necessary  economic  and  mili- 
tary strength  to  enable  the  people  of  Korea  and 
of  Taiwan  to  maintain  their  fi'eedom  and  continue 
their  internal  progress,  despite  the  overhanging 
threat  of  massive  Communist  forces.  In  particu- 
lar, this  year,  aid  funds  have  made  possible  the 
defense  of  Viet-Nam  against  the  renewed  attacks 
of  a  cruel  form  of  aggression. 

Elsewhere  in  Asia,  aid  funds  have  helped  Paki- 
stan and  India  to  show  the  half  billions  of  their 
own  people,  and  the  world  at  large,  that  progress 
can  be  made  by  the  great  masses  under  conditions 
of  freedom — while  the  tragedy  of  the  people  of 
China  under  communism  continues  to  appall  the 
world. 

In  Africa  28  new  nations  have  sprmig  into 
being  since  the  war,  22  of  them  since  the  beginning 
of  1960,  and  more  are  expected.  Loans  and  grants 
from  the  funds  you  have  voted  are  enabling  the 
people  of  those  nations  to  proceed  from  the  base 
of  their  political  independence  to  develop  the  fun- 
damental administrative  and  technical  skills 
needed  to  start  the  long  task  of  developing  effec- 
tive governments,  of  creating  a  more  productive 
agriculture  and  industry,  and  of  advancing  the 
social  welfare  of  their  peoples.  In  one  such  na- 
tion, the  Congo,  delays  in  achieving  national  co- 
hesion have  temporarily  delayed  progress  and 
have  created  a  situation  of  potentially  explosive 
danger.  Our  aid,  provided  to  the  United  Nations, 
has  helped  make  it  possible  to  prevent  the  impend- 
ing explosion  and  to  move  gradually  toward  the 
creation  of  stable  government. 

In  Latin  America,  under  the  Charter  of  Punta 


520 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


del  Este  ^  and  the  Alliance  for  Progress,  our  aid 
and  the  assurance  of  its  future  availability  is 
already  commencing  the  gigantic  task  of  setting 
in  motion  a  continental  movement  of  progress  by 
rapid  evolution  rather  than  by  violent  revolution. 

Improvements  in  the  Aid  Program 

I  said  earlier  that  our  aid  program  must  be  per- 
fected. Efforts  toward  its  improvement  have  been 
the  principal  objective  of  the  past  year.  There 
are  a  few  fundamental  propositions  on  which  we 
are  building  and,  I  believe,  must  continue  to 
build: 

First,  the  adtninistraiion  of  the  program  must 
be  simple  and  flexible,  thoughtful  in  planning, 
rapid  in  response,  economical  in  performance,  and 
persistent  in  improvement.  Those  who  aid  and 
those  who  are  aided  must  realize  it  is  the  Ameri- 
can taxpayer  dollars  we  are  spending. 

We  have  established  and  staffed  the  AID 
[Agency  for  International  Development]  in  this 
spirit.  We  believe  that  with  its  new  leadership 
and  new  organization,  which  give  tlie  individual 
covmtry  programs  the  emphasis  they  require,  it 
will  become  a  more  effective  administrative 
instrument. 

Second,  we  and  those  we  aid  must  act  upon  the 
fundamental  principle  that  the  maximum  of  our 
help  can  equal  only  a  small  part  of  their  own  self- 
help.  Their  progress  must  depend,  as  I  said 
earlier,  upon  themselves.  Yet  our  aid,  used  wisely, 
can  become  the  indispensable  stimulus  to  progress. 

Self-help  is  already  real  and  is  increasing.  In 
Latin  America,  particularly,  the  nations  firmly 
committed  themselves  at  Punta  del  Este  to  a  pro- 
gram of  self-help  and  mutual  appraisal.  Despite 
the  understandably  slow  and  sometimes  reluctant 
beginnings,  there  is  genuine  forward  motion. 

Third,  planning  on  the  basis  of  priorities  is 
fundamental  to  the  economical  use  of  their  and 
our  resources.  Planning,  to  be  most  effective,  must 
be  for  the  long  term,  if  one  stage  of  progress  is  to 
be  built  upon  another.  The  assurance  of  continued 
assistance  made  possible  by  the  long-term  com- 
mitment authority  in  the  legislation  adopted  last 
year  is  one  of  the  greatest  encouragements  to  such 
planning.  Even  so,  it  is  a  difficult  matter  for 
countries  which  are  limited  in  the  skills  and  ex- 


"  For  text,  see  ihicC.,  Sept.  11, 1961,  p.  463. 
October  8,  1962 


perience  of  progress.  We  must  provide  both  help 
and  patience. 

Despite  this  difficulty,  much  progress  has  al- 
ready been  made  in  long-term  planning.  Latin 
American  nations  have  submitted  plans  to  the 
Organization  of  American  States  for  review. 
Others  are  developing  theirs.  In  Africa,  Nigeria 
and  Tunisia  ai-e  leading  the  way  in  developing 
realistic  plans.  India  and  Pakistan  of  course  al- 
ready have  well-prepared  plans,  while  other 
countries  show  promising  progress. 

Fourth,  human  resources  count  above  all.  No 
country  is  stronger  than  its  people,  as  their  poten- 
tial is  realized  through  education.  Education 
must  be  the  focus  of  assistance  in  many  of  the 
aided  countries — particularly  the  newer  ones — 
and  must  be  directed  at  advancing  every  level  of 
their  society,  from  the  farmer  and  the  mechanic 
to  the  most  highly  skilled  managerial  and  govern- 
mental officials.  I  believe  strongly  that  the  prin- 
ciples and  methods  of  broad  public  education  de- 
veloped so  successfully  by  our  land-grant  colleges 
in  the  century  of  their  growth  can  be  adapted  with 
equal  benefit  to  many  nations. 

Fifth,  many  nations  can  help  in  this  process  of 
aid.  We  cannot  and  should  not  carry  this  burden 
alone.  We  are  therefore  greatly  encouraged  by 
the  increasing  part  played  by  the  other  developed 
nations — particularly  those  which  we  aided  in  the 
years  after  the  war.  As  has  been  testified  already, 
several  countries — Germany,  the  United  Kingdom, 
France,  Belgium,  Canada,  and  Japan — ^have  es- 
tablished new  governmental  units  to  administer 
this  aid  program.  We  are  working  closely  with 
those  nations  and  otliers,  both  directly  and 
through  international  bodies,  to  increase  their  par- 
ticipation and  to  assure  that  all  aid  from  all 
sources  is  used  to  attain  the  maximum  benefit. 

The  principal  aiding  nations  have  in  fact  in- 
creased their  aid  by  nearly  a  quarter  in  the  last 
year.  In  proportion  to  their  gross  national  prod- 
uct their  aid  now  is  comparable  with  our  own. 
Their  improved  performance  in  grants  and  long- 
term  loans  has  been  particularly  notable. 

We  have  joined  with  the  World  Bank  and  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  to  create  consortia 
for  the  support  of  soimd  development  plans.  We 
are  also  working  with  the  Development  Assistance 
Committee  of  the  OECD  [Organization  for  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  and  Development]  to  coordi- 


521 


nate  the  provision  of  technical  and  capital  assist- 
ance. We  are  in  most  cases  the  leader  in  these 
cooperative  efforts,  and  it  is  imperative  to  the 
effectiveness  of  our  leadership  in  obtaining  the 
support  of  others  that  it  not  be  weakened. 

Sixth,  the  developing  nations  are  doing  more 
and  more  to  provide  help  to  each  other  by  exchange 
of  technical  assistance,  by  the  pooling  of  educa- 
tional and  other  social  institutions,  by  student  ex- 
change, and  by  regional  planning  and  contribution 
of  industrial,  agricultural,  and  other  facilities. 

The  Program  for  Fiscal  Year  1963 

The  aid  program  for  which  the  President  has  re- 
quested funds  for  fiscal  year  1963  is  based  on  the 
principles  I  have  discussed.  The  sums  requested 
and  the  pui-poses  for  which  they  are  requested  are 
in  conformity  with  policies  established  under  the 
authorizing  legislation  enacted  by  the  Congress. 
It  is  important  to  realize  that  the  funds  now  re- 
quested for  fiscal  year  1963  are  almost  identical 
in  amount  with  the  sums  appropriated  last-  year  to 
be  available  for  fiscal  year  1962.  Indeed,  it  is 
only  some  3  percent  more  tlian  was  appropriated 
for  fiscal  year  1961 — if  the  Alliance  for  Progress, 
which  did  not  then  exist,  is  excluded.  Here  are 
the  figures : 

(In  $  millions) 

Requested 
FY  1961  FY  191)2  FY  1963 

MlUtary  and  economic  aid $3,  831     $3,  915    $3,  972 

Alliance  for  Progress 600  600 

$4,  rA5     $4,  572 
Investment  guaranty  (re- 
serves)        (26)        (104)  180 

$4,  752 

As  this  table  shows,  the  simi  requested  for  the 
regular  military  and  economic  aid  programs  for 
fiscal  year  1963  is  about  1  percent  more  than  was 
appropriated  for  last  year  and  3  percent  more  than 
the  year  before.  The  total  program  for  fiscal  year 
1963.  including  the  Alliance  for  Progress,  is  sub- 
stantially identical  with  last  year.  The  principal 
increase  is  in  the  additional  sum  requested  to  pro- 
vide guaranties  to  attract  private  investment. 
This  increase  is  the  wisest  kind  of  economy  since 
it  will  make  possible  investments  of  over  $600 
million  in  private  enterprise  which  will  stimulate 
economic  growth. 

I  cite  these  figures  for  two  purposes.  First,  to 
emphasize  that  the  program  proposed  for  next 
year  is  substantially  identical  in  scope  with  that 

522 


already  miderway.  Second,  to  point  out,  as  I 
must  stress  most  emphatically,  that  the  sums  re- 
quested by  the  President  for  next  year  are  de- 
signed to  continue  existing  2:)olicies  and  that  any 
reduction  in  the  sums  requested  will  compel  a 
change  in  policy  in  the  face  of  the  fact  that  the 
substantive  legislation  enacted  this  year  firmly 
continues  the  policies  established  in  the  legislation 
last  year. 

The  destructive  effect  of  the  cuts  made  by  the 
House,  if  not  restored,  can  be  seen  in  each  of  the 
categories  of  the  program. 

Development  Lending 

The  President  has  asked  for  an  appropriation 
of  $1,250  million  for  development  lending.  This 
is  pursuant  to  an  authorization  approved  last  year 
of  $1,500  million.  Additional  funds  for  lending 
purposes  are  also  being  asked,  as  they  were  last 
year,  for  the  Alliance  for  Progress,  to  which  I 
shall  return  in  a  moment.  We  intend  to  concen- 
trate these  new  development  lending  funds  in 
countries  which  have  soimd  development  plans  or 
have  individual  projects  which  can  contribute  ef- 
fectively to  national  growth.  One  half  of  these 
development  lending  funds  will  be  needed  to  carry 
forwai'd  long-range  commitments  already  made 
in  India,  Pakistan,  Nigeria,  and  Tanganyika.  We 
intend  to  follow  the  principles  I  have  already 
stated  and  to  focus  our  loan  funds  upon  projects 
and  programs  which  will  make  a  major  contribu- 
tion to  forward  progress.  Development  lending, 
calling  for  repayment  in  dollars,  remains  the 
fundamental  instrument  in  the  long-range  prog- 
ress of  tlie  underdeveloped  nations,  and  the  full 
amount  requested  by  the  President  will  be  needed 
to  be  joined  with  contributions  of  other  nations 
for  this  purpose.  Congress  plainly  set  out  in  the 
authorizing  legislation  that  emphasis  should  be 
increasingly  placed  on  loans  rather  than  grants. 
This  is  the  policy  underlying  the  President's  re- 
quest for  a  small  increase  over  last  year's  appro- 
priation. Yet  the  House  figure  of  $775  million 
is  about  one-third  below  the  sum  appropriated 
and  committed  for  development  loans  in  fiscal  year 
1 962.  It  is  $475  million— or  38  percent— below  the 
smn  requested  and  which  can  be  wisely  used  in 
fiscal  year  1963.  Unless  it  is  restored  to  the  level 
of  the  President's  request,  our  ability  to  carry 
forward  this  central  policy  will  be  seriously 
impaired. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


UUance  for  Progress 

The  most  important  change  provided  in  the 
'Bcently  enacted  authorization  bill  is  the  long-term 
luthority  for  Latin  America.  The  appropriation 
equested  for  this  purpose  for  fiscal  year  1963 
imounts  to  $600  million  in  grants  and  loans.  We 
tsked  the  Congress  for  this  change  in  order  that 
his  important  aspect  of  the  aid  program  could 
)e  consolidated  within  the  AID  legislation  rather 
han  having — as  in  the  past — a  separate  appro- 
)riation  act  to  carry  out  the  objective  of  Punta 
lei  Este  and  the  Act  of  Bogota.  As  I  have  men- 
ioned  earlier,  the  problems  we  face  in  this  pro- 
gram are  huge.  We  are  not  dealing  here  with 
lew  nations  but  with  countries  long  independent 
fhich  have  already  provided  themselves  with 
Quch  of  the  political,  economic,  social,  and  admin- 
strative  substructure  of  development.  The 
hanges  necessaiy  to  move  more  rapidly  with  de- 
-elopment  will  create  tensions  with  certain  estab- 
ished  interests  but  are  necessary  to  avoid  more 
adical  change  through  violent  revolution.  These 
mids  are  needed  to  help  make  possible  necessary 
)rogress  by  peaceful  means. 

I  hardly  thinlc  it  is  necessary  for  me  to  state  in 
letail  why  it  is  important  that  we  go  forward  in 
jatin  America  as  rapidly  as  the  many  difficult 
echnical  and  organizational  problems  will  allow. 
The  House  figure  of  $525  million  will  not  make 
his  possible.  It  will  weaken  the  force  of  our  call 
o  the  governments  and  peoples  of  this  hemisphere 
o  defend  the  freedom  of  our  own  continents.  It 
vill  subject  the  security  of  the  nation,  and  indeed 
)f  the  hemisphere,  to  risks  which  are  both  imwise 
md  uimecessary. 

Development  Grants 

For  areas  other  than  Latin  America,  we  ask  an 
ippropriation  of  $300  million  for  fiscal  year  1963. 
These  funds  are  primarily  to  provide  for  the  de- 
i^elopment  of  human  capacities,  which  are  so  fun- 
iamental  to  progress  in  the  new  nations.  They 
ivill  help  provide  advances  in  education  and  tech- 
lical  training,  improvement  in  health  conditions, 
;he  development  of  public  administration  officials, 
md  the  creation,  improvement,  and  expansion  of 
effective  institutional  structures  and  practices  con- 
.ributing  to  economic  and  social  growth.  Such 
^ants  will  also  be  used  to  help  formulate  effective 
plans  for  general  development.  These  are  among 
;he  most  crucially  needed  of  the  funds  in  the  bill, 

I  October  8,  7962 


and  the  sum  authorized  for  appropriation  and 
now  requested  is  below  the  President's  estimate  of 
need.  It  is  substantially  identical  with  the  actual 
appropriation  last  year.  The  House  cut  to  $225 
million  would  strike  directly  at  the  newest  and 
weakest  of  the  nations  receiving  our  help — those 
which  most  desperately  need  assistance  in  creating 
the  fundamental  institutions  of  free  nations.  To 
weaken  them  is  to  encourage  instability  which  can 
directly  impair  our  own  interests. 

Supporting  Assistance 

In  this  Decade  of  Development  we  intend  to 
concentrate  our  economic  aid  on  development. 
However,  our  goals  require  that  we  also  continue 
assistance  to  support  allied  and  friendly  countries 
struggling  to  maintam  their  independence  under 
heavy  financial  burdens.  Most  of  these  countries 
are  on  the  periphery  of  the  Sino-Soviet  bloc.  The 
$415  million  for  supporting  assistance  now  re- 
quested is  substantially  below  the  sum  originally 
asked  by  the  President.  It  is  nearly  a  third  be- 
low the  request  last  year  and  below  the  $425 
million  actually  appropriated  last  year.  Three- 
quarters  of  it  will  go  to  four  countries :  Viet-Nam, 
Laos,  Korea,  and  Turkey.  As  you  know,  we  are 
ending  this  type  of  assistance,  country  by  country, 
as  soon  as  it  is  possible  in  each  case,  and  are  pro- 
viding needed  further  assistance  through  repay- 
able development  loans.  Our  supporting  assist- 
ance is  still  vital,  however,  to  maintain  political 
stability  and  defensive  capacity  in  a  number  of 
countries,  and  the  funds  required  are  the  practical 
minimum  for  that  purpose.  The  House  figure  of 
$350  million  is  far  below  the  minimum  for  essen- 
tial needs.  It  is  a  dangerous  and  costly  economy 
which  will  simply  delay  the  time  when  we  can 
expect  to  bring  countries  still  in  need  of  support- 
ing assistance  to  the  point  that  they  can  be  trans- 
ferred to  loans. 

Contingency  Fimd 

This  part  of  the  President's  appropriation  re- 
quest provides  the  essential  element  of  flexibility 
in  a  complex  program  which  must  be  administered 
in  a  complex  and  rapidly  changing  world.  It 
deserves  particular  emphasis.  We  believed  that 
the  $400  million  originally  requested  by  the  Presi- 
dent was  not  too  much  for  a  reserve  against  the 
contingencies  which  will  inevitably  occur  during 
the  coming  fiscal  year.  The  needs  which  have 
arisen  during  the  past  year  have  fully  demon- 


523 


strated  the  essentiality  of  having  this  reserve  for 
the  future.  The  contingency  fund  tliis  year  made 
it  possible  for  the  United  States  to  support  a  free 
government  in  the  Dominican  Republic.  It  has 
provided  the  flexibility  to  give  the  assistance 
needed  by  Viet-Nam  to  meet  the  sudden  in- 
crease in  violence  there.  It  provided  assistance  to 
strengthen  our  NATO  ally,  Greece,  during  the 
Berlin  buildup.  I  must  tell  you  most  em- 
phatically that  there  is  nothing  in  the  world  situ- 
ation to  indicate  that  a  sum  less  than  the  $300 
million  now  requested  would  be  adequate  or  safe. 

Military  Assistance 

Secretai7  [of  Defense  Eobeit  S.]  McNamara, 
General  [Lyman  L.]  Lemnitzer,  and  others  have 
discussed  the  military  assistance  request  with  you 
already.  I  can  only  emphasize  what  they  have 
told  you  of  its  essential  role  in  our  own  military 
defense.  I  will  say  only  that  it  is  essential  to  the 
victory  of  freedom  we  are  determined  to  achieve. 
It  is  an  integral  part  of  our  worldwide  security 
system.  It  is  the  principal  means  by  which  we 
help  sustain  that  system  and  the  strength  and  will 
of  free  nations.  Without  this  program  and  the 
confidence  which  it  has  given  the  peoples  of  na- 
tion after  nation  who  have  seen  their  own  security 
forces  grow  and  strengthen  through  the  arms  and 
training  we  have  supplied,  the  structure  of  free 
and  independent  nations  would  in  all  likelihood 
have  collapsed  long  ago. 

The  military  assistance  program  continues  to 
provide  certain  equipment  to  the  strength  of 
NATO,  although  this  contribution  is  rapidly  di- 
minishing as  the  strength  and  capacity  of  NATO 
countries  increase.  It  strengthens  our  first  line 
of  defense  by  helping  nations  on  the  periphery  of 
the  Sino-Soviet  bloc  to  support  forces  prepared  to 
defend  their  own  freedom  on  their  own  soil.  It 
provides  the  equipment  and  the  training  to  help 
other  nations  remain  firm  and  free  in  the  face  of 
insurrection  fomented  and  aided  from  outside. 
It  makes  possible  the  success  of  the  struggle  to 
counter  the  subversion  and  insurrection  carried 
on  by  guerrilla  warfare,  so  evident  a  part  in  the 
Communist  plan  for  conquest. 

Our  military  aid  now  also  serves  the  purposes 
of  economic  growth.  We  have  initiated  civic  ac- 
tion programs  in  several  countries.  They  are 
receiving  increased  emphasis,  and  local  military 
forces  assisted  by  us  are  participating  in  such  pub- 
lic works  a^  road  building,  commimications,  and 

524 


otlier  community  development  projects  which  add 
to  the  general  welfare  of  the  people. 

The  $1,500  million  the  President  requests  for' 
military  equipment  and  training  is  $.'585  million; 
less  than  was  asked  last  year  and  $200  million  less 
than  was  in  fact  authorized  for  this  year.  It  is 
$100  million  less  than  was  actually  appropriated 
last  year.  It  has  been  reduced  to  the  minimum 
essential  to  maintain  the  defenses  of  freedom. 
Any  further  reduction  will  compel  a  weakening 
of  the  strength  and  resolution  of  some  free  nation 
somewhere  which  could  lead  to  disaster. 

The  sharp  reduction — $7  million — in  the  sum 
requested  for  administration  of  the  program  can 
have  costly  effects  far  greater  than  the  apparent 
saving.  In  our  aid  program,  not  only  are  we  en- 
gaged in  the  expenditures  of  very  significant  sums, 
but  the  wisdom  with  which  we  use  them  can  have 
effects  on  the  future  of  our  nation  far  beyond  the 
immediate  value  of  the  funds  involved.  The  ad- 
ministrative funds  requested  are  needed  to  em- 
ploy the  most  capable  personnel  to  man  the  most 
effective  organization  we  can  devise.  We  cannot 
do  this  with  the  reduced  funds  recommended.  The 
$3.1  million  for  the  Department  of  State  is  to 
back  up  NATO  and  the  OECD,  which  is  the  prin- 
cipal agency  through  which  we  work  to  increase 
the  participation  of  our  allies  in  providing 
funds  for  development.  The  reduction  of  $0.4 
million  in  the  administration  funds  for  the  State 
Department,  though  small  in  amount,  would  be 
costly  in  effect. 

One  matter  of  substantive  legislation  is  partic- 
ularly important.  I  understand  that  section  109 
of  the  appropriation  bill  as  recommended  would 
undo  the  work  of  the  Congress  only  a  few  weeks 
ago  in  the  foreign  aid  authorizing  legislation  to 
give  the  President  authority,  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances carefully  spelled  out  in  the  law,  to 
provide  aid  to  such  nations  as  Yugoslavia  and 
Poland.  This  matter  has  been  extensively  dis- 
cussed in  the  Congress,  and  I  shall  not,  therefore, 
repeat  the  reasons  why  it  is  of  the  highest  impor- 
tance that  the  authority  pro\aded  by  the  Congress 
in  the  authorizing  legislation  be  continued. 

Conclusion 

I  spoke  at  the  beginning  of  the  historic  struggle 
we  are  in  and  of  the  victory  we  must  win — the  vic- 
tory for  freedom,  for  the  independence  of  nations, 
for  man's  self-government,  for  human  dignity,  for 

Department  of  State  BuHetin 


the  opportunity  for  economic  progress  and  the 
growth  of  social  justice.  One  of  the  key  issues  will 
be  whether  the  people  of  the  newly  developing 
nations,  a  third  of  humanity,  will  be  able  to  work 
out  their  social  and  economic  progress  with  the 
help  of  the  free  nations — or  whether,  in  despera- 
tion for  want  of  that  help,  they  will  turn  to  the 
illusion  of  progress  by  totalitarian  means  and  be 
lost  to  freedom. 

Victory  for  freedom  can  be  won  only  by  our 
best  efforts — by  vigor,  determination,  and  persist- 
ence. Slackening  on  our  part,  will  only  prolong 
the  contest,  increase  its  cost,  and  endanger  the  out- 
come. A  drastic  reduction  of  fimds  is  a  false  and 
costly  economy.  Our  expenditures  for  our  domes- 
tic defense  progi-am  are  running  at  the  rate  of 
$50  billion  a  year.  These  enormous  expenditures 
are  vital  for  the  preservation  of  the  peace  and  the 
security  of  our  nation.  Yet  it  is  the  aid  program — 
for  which  the  President  is  asking  less  than  one- 
tenth  the  annual  defense  appropriation — which  is 
the  central  element  in  helping  to  win  the  kind  of 
victory  we  are  seeking.  Failure  to  wage  the  peace 
as  effectively  as  we  can  puts  off  the  day  of  suc- 
cess— and  continues  the  period  of  our  tenfold  costs 
of  military  expenditures. 

Our  aid  program  has  served  our  ends  well  in  the 
past — yet  it  has  never  been  more  needed  in  the 
cause  of  freedom.  It  has  never  been  more  im- 
portant that  we  carry  it  forward  with  all  the 
energy,  the  will,  and  the  resources  its  great  pur- 
poses  deserve. 


Trade  and  Foreign  Aid 

Remarks  hy  President  Kennedy  ^ 

The  United  States  faces  two  challenges  and  two 
opportunities.  One  is  the  Common  Market,  where 
we  are  going  to  have,  instead  of  a  number  of  dif- 
ferent countries  to  ti-ade  with  in  Europe,  one  great 
unit.  This  can  be  a  most  powerful  and  prosperous 
and  steadily  growing  economy  which  can  bring 
the  greatest  results  and  strength  to  the  United 
States  and  the  entire  free  world. 

The  new  trade  bill  will  give  us  the  opportunity 


'  Made  on  the  Columbia  Broadcasting  System  network 
program  "Washington  Report"  on  Sept.  23  (White  House 
press  release). 


to  negotiate  with  this  Common  Market,  so  that 
our  goods,  our  agricultural  production,  our  ma- 
chines, and  all  the  rest  can  move  successfully  into 
this  growing  European  market.  It  can  mean  a 
good  deal  to  the  prosperity  of  the  United  States. 

Tlie  other  great  challenge,  of  course,  we  face  is 
the  problem  of  resisting  the  Communist  advance 
wMch  concentrates  its  attention  and  energy  par- 
ticularly on  the  poorer  areas  of  the  world,  Asia, 
Africa,  Latin  America,  where  millions  and  hun- 
dreds of  millions  of  people  live  without  adequate 
food,  without  shelter,  without  education,  without 
a  chance.  And  the  Communists  move  among  them 
and  say,  "Come  with  us." 

Now,  we  have  been  able  to  hold  this  line  against 
this  internal  subversion  by  the  Communists,  as 
well  as  the  external  threat  of  military  invasion, 
because  for  many  years  the  United  States  has  as- 
sisted these  countries  in  meeting  their  own  prob- 
lems. We  are  assisting  the  people  of  Viet-Nam. 
We  are  assisting  countries  in  Latin  America  which 
are  faced  with  staggering  problems.  If  we  stop 
helping  them,  they  stand  upon  the  razor  edge  to- 
day. If  we  stop  helping  them,  they  will  become 
ripe  for  internal  subversion  and  a  Communist 
takeover.  We  have  seen  very  recently,  as  well  as 
in  the  days  since  World  War  II,  how  difficult  it 
is  to  eject  a  Communist  regime  once  it  gets  its 
police  power  and  controls  the  country.  The  best 
way,  the  cheapest  way,  the  safest  way,  the  most 
reliable  way,  is  to  help  them  help  themselves  main- 
tain their  freedom.  The  United  States  has  done 
this.  We  did  it  in  Europe.  We  have  done  it 
around  the  world.  And  it  is  only  a  fraction  of 
what  we  spend  each  year  for  our  own  military 
forces.  But  it  is  a  front  line,  and  if  we  can  ke«p 
these  countries  free,  then  we  can  keep  the  peace 
and  keep  our  own  freedom. 

That  is  what  this  aid  fight  is  all  about,  and  I 
am  hopeful  that  the  LTnited  States  and  the 
increasingly  prosperous  countries  of  Western 
Europe  will  meet  their  responsibilities.  In  this 
way  we  can  defeat  communism.  This  is  the  way 
to  victory.  And  I  hope  that  however  fatigued  we 
may  get  with  this  program  or  carrying  these  bur- 
dens— the  Communists  are  not  tired,  and  we  must 
not  be  tired,  because  we  can  win  tlus  way.  So 
that  is  why,  David  [Schoenbrun],  we  are  working 
as  hard  as  we  are  to  get  this  progi-am  and  the 
trade  bill  through. 


525 


^ 


A  Report  on  South  Viet-Nam 


hy  Roger  Eilsman, 

Director  of  Intelligence  and  Research ' 


In  the  period  when  Mr.  Acheson  was  Secretary 
of  State  and  General  Marshall  was  Secretary  of 
Defense,  it  is  said  that  the  two  men  had  a  special 
understanding.  Whenever  anyone  said,  "This  is 
a  purely  military  problem,"  or  "This  is  a  purely 
political  or  diplomatic  problem,''  then  whoever 
said  it  had  to  leave  the  room. 

In  South  Viet-Nam  we  are  confronted  with  an 
extraordinary  example  of  the  way  military  deci- 
sion and  action  are  interdependent  with  many 
otlier  decisions  and  enterprises.  The  war  there  is 
a  guerrilla  war,  and  the  successful  means  of  coun- 
tering guerrilla  war  are  as  much  political  as  mili- 
tary, for  the  longrim  task  is  nation  building. 

This  guerrilla  war  is  a  form  of  hidden  Com- 
munist aggression,  an  internal  war,  if  you  will. 
As  President  Kennedy  has  said,'' 

.  .  .  their  aggression  is  more  often  concealed  than 
open.  They  have  fired  no  missiles;  and  their  troops  are 
seldom  seen.  They  send  arms,  agitators,  aid,  technicians, 
and  propaganda  to  every  troubled  area.  But  where  fight- 
ing is  required,  it  is  usually  done  by  others — by  guerril- 
las striking  at  night,  by  assassins  striking  alone — 
assassins  who  have  taken  the  lives  of  4,000  civil  oflScers 
in  the  last  12  months  in  Viet-Nam  alone — by  subversives 
and  saboteurs  and  insurrectionists,  who  in  some  cases 
control  whole  areas  Inside  of  independent  nations. 

This  war  in  the  shadows  may  well  be  one  of  the 
most  decisive  battles  of  our  time.  My  subject  is 
a  report  on  one  of  these  shadow  wars,  the  one 
in  South  Viet-Nam,  and  I  would  like  to  start  by 
giving  you  my  outline:  There  is  a  guerrilla  war  in 


*  Address  made  before  the  American  Hospital  Associa- 
tion at  Chicago,  111.,  on  Sept.  18  (press  release  558  dated 
Sept  15). 

»  Bulletin  of  June  12,  1901,  p.  903. 


526 


South  Viet-Nam;  so  I  would  like,  first,  to  say 
something  about  guerrilla  warfare  in  general — the 
conditions  in  wliich  it  arises  and  a  strategic  con- 
cept for  fighting  against  it.  Second,  I  would  like 
to  tell  you  how  these  ideas  are  being  applied  in 
South  Viet-Nam.  And,  finally,  I'd  like  to  give 
you  a  report  on  how  things  are  going  there  in 
South  Viet-Nam. 

Circumstances  Behind  Guerrilla  Warfare 

There  is  something  about  guerrilla  warfare 
which  gives  rise  to  legends.  It  is  part  of  the  op- 
eration, in  fact,  to  see  that  the  enemy  is  full  of 
rumors  which  keep  him  in  the  dark  as  to  facts. 
But  in  appraising  the  uses  of  guerrilla  tactics  we 
should  certainly  try  to  separate  legends  from 
realities.  So  it  seems  useful  to  begui  with  the 
elementary  observation  that  guerrilla  warfare  is 
possible  only  in  two  very  special  sets  of  circum- 
stances : 

The  first  is  when  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  is 
otherwise  engaged.  "When  France  was  occupied 
by  the  Germans  in  World  War  II,  virtually  the 
entire  population  hated  the  Nazis.  There  was  a 
well-organized  and  -supplied  guerrilla  move- 
ment— the  Maquis.  But  so  long  as  the  German 
armies  had  nothing  else  to  do,  the  French  guerril- 
las could  not  be  effective.  There  were  many  in- 
dividual acts  of  sabotage  and  violence,  but  not 
much  else.  At  any  time  that  a  small  guerrilla 
band  attacked,  the  Germans  could  counter  with 
overwhelming  force. 

But  after  D-day,  when  the  Grerman  divisions 
were  fully  engaged  in  fighting  the  Allies,  the 
Maquis  became  a  formidable  and  effective  force. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  second  set  of  circumstances  is  now  the  more 
usual  setting  for  guerrillas  when  they  operate  in 
the  emerging,  still-developing  countries  of  the 
world.  In  much  of  the  world  today,  the  different 
communities  that  make  up  what  we  think  of  as 
nation-states  are  isolated  from  the  central  gov- 
ernment— isolated  by  lack  of  commimications  or 
by  the  terrain,  as  in  mountains,  islands,  or  the 
desert,  but  more  importantly  isolated  in  a  psy- 
chological and  political  sense. 

The  basic  situation  in  many  underdeveloped 
areas  is  that  the  villages  are  turned  inward  on 
themselves.  The  people  are  living  there  as  they 
have  for  hundreds  of  years,  with  few  ties  to  their 
government.  They  appear  rarely  to  have  strong 
political  convictions  one  way  or  another.  In  my 
personal  experience  in  Southeast  Asia  during 
"World  War  II,  where  a  few  of  us  in  the  OSS 
were  sent  behind  the  enemy  lines  to  organize  bands 
of  guerrillas  against  the  Japanese,  it  seemed  to  us 
that  perhaps  10  }>ercent  of  the  people  had  some 
sympathies  for  our  side  and  perhaps  10  percent 
had  some  sympathies  for  the  Japanese.  But  80 
percent  of  the  populace  did  not  have  much  aware- 
ness of  the  stniggle  being  fought  out  in  their 
country.  ]\Iuch  less  did  they  have  ideological  con- 
victions. Even  with  white  faces  we  recruited  a 
guerrilla  force  that  was  larger  in  numbers  than 
the  Communist  guerrilla  force  in  South  Viet- 
Xam  today. 

My  point  is  that  in  these  underdeveloped,  but 
at  the  same  time  ancient,  cultures  the  villagers 
are  isolated  from  each  other  and  from  the  central 
government  in  a  way  that  we  in  the  "West  are  not 
equipped  by  our  experience  to  understand.  The 
villagers  are  turned  inward  on  themselves  and 
identify  not  with  the  nation  but  often  only  witli 
their  family,  clan,  and  village. 

Let  me  illustrate  my  point. 

Eecently  some  friends  of  mine  made  a  tour  of 
the  border  areas  of  such  a  country.  They  visited 
40  villages.  In  10  of  these  villages  no  one  had 
ever  seen  a  government  official  of  any  kind — 
neither  the  district  chief  nor  the  province  chief, 
much  less  a  representative  of  the  national  gov- 
enmient.  Tliey  also  visited  a  town,  where  one 
would  expect  the  people  to  be  better  informed  than 
those  in  the  villages.  There  they  talked  to  a  shop- 
keeper, and  one  would  expect  a  shopkeeper  to  be 
better  informed  than,  say,  a  laborer.  They  asked 
tlic  shopkeeper  who  the  king  of  the  country  was. 


and  he  proudly  named  him  and  pointed  to  a  pic- 
ture on  the  wall — which  had,  incidentally,  been 
furnished  by  the  United  States  Information 
Service.  He  was  asked  who  the  Prime  Minister 
was,  however,  and  inexplicably  named  not  the 
Prime  Minister  of  his  own  comitry  but  the  Prime 
Minister  of  a  nearby  country.  It  seems  that  the 
nearby  country  had  radio  broadcasts  which  he 
could  pick  up  on  his  transistor  radio,  and  he  nat- 
urally assumed  that  since  he  could  hear  the  broad- 
cast the  country  must  be  his  own. 

"What  happens  when  a  village  with  people  as 
isolated  as  these  is  visited  by  a  tough  band  of 
armed  marauders?  The  villagers  are  unarmed, 
and  the  guerrillas  are  armed.  It  is  not  surprising 
that  the  villages  give  or  sell  the  guerrillas  rice. 
It  is  not  surprising  that  the  guerrillas  can  recruit 
a  few  young  men  to  join  their  guerrilla  band  with 
promises  of  adventure  and  good  things  to  come. 
In  siich  circumstances  the  people  do  not  have  to 
be  "against"  the  government  for  a  guerrilla  unit 
to  thrive.  The  people  do  not  have  to  "support" 
the  guerrillas  for  a  guerrilla  movement  to  thrive. 

(Any  comparison  with  our  own  world  must  be 
farfetched,  but  one  may  ask  whether  the  citizens 
of  Chicago  "supported"  the  gangs  which  flour- 
ished in  the  twenties?  The  shopkeeper  who  was 
hit  by  the  "protection"  racket  did  not  "support" 
the  gangs,  but  he  often  had  no  choice  but  to  go 
along  with  them.  Government  jirotection  seemed 
far  away,  and  the  threat  from  the  hoodlums  was 
close  by.  The  same  is  true  in  the  underdeveloped 
areas  of  the  world,  where  the  villages  are  not  only 
isolated  but  also  both  unarmed  and  unprotected.) 

Tying  the  Villages  Into  the  National  Fabric 

Against  this  background,  I  would  suggest  two 
principles  as  a  strategic  concept  for  countering 
guerrilla  warfare  in  the  luiderdeveloj^ed  regions  of 
the  world. 

The  first  principle  is  that  fighting  a  guerrilla 
war  in  an  underdeveloped  nation  requires  as  much 
political  and  ci^nc  action  as  it  does  militai-y  action. 
President  Roosevelt  once  said  that  "Dr.  New 
Deal"  had  been  succeeded  by  "Dr.  "Win  the  "War," 
but  in  guerrilla  wars  in  underdeveloped  nations 
both  "doctors"  are  needed.  Militarj'  action  and 
a  social  new  deal  have  to  proceed  together.  The 
isolated  villages  must  be  tied  into  the  governmen- 
tal structure — at  district,  province,  and  ultimately 
the  national  level.     The  goal  is  to  create  a  net- 


528 


Department   of  Sfofe   Bulletin 


work  in  which  information  about  the  needs  of  the 
yillagers  can  flow  upward  and  government  serv- 
ices can  flow  downward. 

This  flow  of  services  from  the  government  must 
go  all  the  way  across  the  board — feeder  roads  so 
that  the  villagers  can  get  their  products  to  mar- 
ket; radios  and  radio  stations  so  that  their  minds 
can  be  opened  up  to  the  outside  world ;  food  from 
a  prosperous  part  of  the  country  when  famine 
strikes  in  another  part  of  the  country ;  education 
for  the  young;  books  and  magazines  for  the  old 
so  that  they  will  not  lose  their  literacy  for  lack 
of  somethuig  to  read,  as  so  often  happens;  and 
medical  services. 

I  know  that  it  is  familiar  to  those  of  you  in  this 
audience,  but  it  is  not  familiar  to  most  Americans, 
just  how  heavy  some  of  the  ancient  but  now  con- 
trollable scourges  of  mankind  bear  down  on  most 
of  the  peoples  of  the  world.  In  parts  of  Thailand, 
80  percent  of  the  people  are  infested  with  liver 
fluke.  Hookworm  debilitates  the  populations  in 
much  of  Asia.  The  World  Health  Organization, 
our  own  AID  programs,  and  the  efforts  of  many 
of  these  countries  in  their  own  behalf  have  made 
lenormous  strides  in  controlling  malaria.  But 
countless  millions  of  people  are  afflicted  with  con- 
trollable diseases  against  which  no  progress  has 
really  been  attempted. 

You  in  this  room  could  list  these  diseases  and 
their  consequences  much  better  than  I.  But  let 
me  make  two  points. 

The  first  is  that  controlling  many  of  these  dis- 
eases is  not  only  a  question  of  hospitals,  X-ray 
equipment,  and  a  high  proportion  of  doctors  to 
total  population.  Much  can  be  done  by  teaching 
the  villagers  the  elementary  facts  about  sanitation, 
by  medical  technicians  trained  to  deal  with  one  or 
two  particular  diseases,  and  by  an  adequate  sup- 
ply of  modern  drugs. 

The  second  point  is  that  it  is  often  these  one 
or  two  endemic,  but  controllable,  diseases  that 
stand  in  the  way  of  economic  progress  and  de- 
velopment and  hence  contribute  greatly  to  Com- 
mimist  opportunities  for  subversion  and  aggres- 
sion by  guerrilla  warfare. 

To  sum  up  this  first  principle — that  the  villages 
must  be  tied  into  the  governmental  and  national 
fabric — let  me  say  that  it  is  well  for  us  to  remem- 
ber that  in  these  parts  of  the  world  it  is  a  revolu- 
tionary idea  that  the  people  of  a  country  can 
expect  their  government  to  help  them  or  protect 

Ocfober  8,  7962 


them.  They  have  never  asked  what  their  country 
can  do  for  them,  much  less  what  they  can  do  for 
their  country.  Indeed,  there  are  millions  of  peo- 
ple who  do  not  know  what  a  country  or  govern- 
ment is.  If  you  are  looking  for  a  revolutionary 
appeal  to  excite  and  inspire  these  people,  it  is  the 
simple  concept  that  government  exists  to  serve 
and  protect  them. 

Miritary  Operations  To  Achieve  Political  Ends 

My  second  principle  concerns  the  military  side 
of  fighting  guerrillas,  but  in  a  peculiarly  political 
way.  The  principle  is  that,  in  fighting  guerrillas, 
military  operations  must  be  so  conducted  as  to 
achieve  political  ends.  Stated  another  way,  the 
principle  would  be  that  to  fight  guerrillas  you 
must  adopt  the  tactics  of  the  guerrilla  himself. 

Orthodox  military  tactics  are  aimed  at  taking 
and  holding  territory.  Military  formations  de- 
signed for  these  purposes  are  large  and  slower 
moving.  The  guerrilla,  on  the  other  hand,  does 
not  aim  to  take  territory  but  to  win  recruits  and 
alienate  the  people  from  their  government.  The 
guerrilla's  purpose  is  well  served  when  large  mili- 
tary formations  sweep  the  coimtryside,  for  this 
tends  to  make  life  difficult  for  the  villagers  and, 
hence,  to  make  the  villagers  turn  against  their 
government.  Thus,  for  political  reasons  the  mili- 
tary tactics  used  against  guerrillas  should  be  those 
of  the  guerrilla  himself — small  roving  units  con- 
stantly patroling  and  ambushing. 

Finally,  these  tactics  should  be  designed  to  cut 
the  lines  of  communication  between  the  guerrilla 
and  the  thousands  of  villages  to  which  he  goes 
for  food  and  recruits. 

You  have  heard  of  the  so-called  strategic  ham- 
lets and  villages  that  are  now  being  built  in  South 
Viet-Nam.  This  is  a  concept  that  was  developed 
in  Malaya  during  the  Communist  guerrilla  war 
there  and  is  now  being  applied  in  South  Viet-Nam. 

You  remember  my  earlier  point  that  in  under- 
developed areas  the  villagers  are  not  necessarily 
proguerrilla.  But  unless  there  is  some  way  of 
protecting  them  from  marauding  guerrilla  bands 
they  will  be  obliged  to  give  or  to  sell  food  to  the 
guerrilla  and  to  listen  to  his  propaganda. 

One  purpose  of  the  strategic  village  is  to  give 
villages  this  protection^or,  rather,  to  help  the 
villager  to  protect  himself.  Without  arms  or  pro- 
tection the  villager  cannot  refuse  to  give  or  sell 
his  rice  to  the  Communists,  for  fear  of  retalia- 


529 


tion.  Without  protection  the  villager  is  afraid  to 
pass  on  infoi-mation  about  the  Communist  guer- 
rillas to  the  government. 

A  second  purpose  of  the  strategic  village  is  to 
control  the  movement  of  people  and  supplies. 
Identity  cards  are  issued,  and  curfews  are  imposed. 
Thus  anyone  on  the  roads  and  trails  at  night  can 
be  assumed  to  be  a  Communist. 

Through  the  use  of  identity  cards  and  intelli- 
gence from  the  people  the  small  group  of  hard- 
core Communists  in  a  village  of  several  hmidred 
people  can  be  identified  and  arrested.  The  barbed 
■wire  and  curfews  deny  the  guerrillas  easy  access  to 
the  villages.  If  the  guerrillas  need  rice,  they  must 
attack  a  defended  village.  Thus  the  whole  war  is 
turned  around.  Instead  of  the  government  forces 
chasing  the  Commimists  and  falling  into  ambush, 
the  Communists  must  attack  the  villages  and  so 
fall  into  ambushes  themselves. 

It  should  be  stressed  that  the  strategic  hamlets 
are  not  concentration  camps.  The  purpose  is  to 
keep  the  guerrillas  out  of  the  villages  rather  than 
keep  the  villagers  in.  Inevitably,  of  course,  when 
one  throws  a  barbed  wire  fence  around  a  village 
there  is  a  degree  of  regimentation.  But  this  is  a 
type  of  war,  and  some  form  of  regimentation  can- 
not be  avoided.  There  is  a  parallel  in  our  own 
history.  The  early  settlements  of  America  had 
stockades  around  them,  and  life  went  on  behind 
the  stockades  for  a  long  time.  Our  ancestors  did 
not  like  the  rule  that  everyone  had  to  be  inside  the 
stockade  at  sundown.  They  did  not  like  to  bring 
up  their  children  in  such  an  atmosphere,  but  they 
built  the  stockades  as  a  first  step  toward  a  way  of 
life  in  which  stockades  were  no  longer  necessary. 

Now  let  us  see  how  the  South  Vietnamese  Gov- 
ernment is  applying  these  principles  against  the 
Communist  guerrillas. 

The  Enemy  Situation 

There  are  15,000-20,000  liard-core,  full-time 
Communist  guerrillas  in  South  Viet-Nam  and 
many  thousands  more  sympathizers,  part-time 
Communist  guerrillas,  and  political  and  propa- 
ganda agents. 

South  Viet-Nam  is  a  nation  of  about  14  million ; 
so  this  does  not  represent  a  mass  movement.  But 
in  an  underdeveloped  country  with  poor  commu- 
nications, with  mountains  and  jungles,  terrorists 
and  subversive  agents  in  these  numbers  can  cause 
much  damage. 


530 


The  major  concentrations  of  the  Commimist 
guerrillas — who  are  commonly  called  the  Viet 
Cong — are  in  the  mountains  near  the  Laotian 
border  in  the  north;  in  the  moimtains  extending 
eastward  toward  the  coast  in  the  central  region  of 
South  Viet-Nam  and  southward  toward  Saigon; 
and  in  the  Mekong  River  delta  area,  including  the 
Plain  of  Reeds,  west  and  south  of  Saigon. 

The  Communists  try  to  maintain  the  fiction  that 
this  is  a  civil  war  arising  spontaneously  from 
within  South  Viet-Nam.  This  is  not  true.  The 
Communists  in  North  Viet-Nam  are  directing  this 
guerrilla  movement.  For  years  they  have  been 
sending  in  trained  men  to  be  the  cadre  for  the 
Communist  Viet  Cong  battalions.  These  trained 
men  slip  into  South  Viet-Nam  over  various  over- 
land infiltration  routes  that  lead  from  North  Viet- 
Nam  through  mountains  and  jungles  and  by  junk 
landings  along  the  South  Vietnamese  coastline. 
And  let  me  make  this  clear:  By  using  these  infil- 
tration routes  and  conducting  a  guerrilla  war  the 
Communists  are  committing  aggi'ession.  The 
giierrilla  movement  in  South  Viet-Nam  is  directed 
from  outside  by  an  enemy  nation.  It  is  interfer- 
ence by  military  force  in  the  affairs  of  another 
nation. 

Wliat  comes  over  these  infiltration  routes?  The 
answer  is,  largely,  trained  men.  These  are  jungle 
trails — not  roads — and  the  men  must  walk.  They 
can  cari-y  food  for  their  journey.  They  can  carry 
arms  and  ammunition.  They  can  carry  medical 
supplies.  They  can  carry  money.  And  they  can 
carry  certain  specialized  equipment,  such  as  radios 
and  perhaps  some  light  automatic  weapons. 

The  food  for  the  guerrillas  in  South  Viet-Nam 
must  be  obtained  in  South  Viet-Nam  itself. 
Moreover,  by  hitting  army,  security,  and  police 
units  suddenly  and  in  superior  force,  the  guer- 
rillas are  able  to  assure  themselves  a  local  supply 
of  arms  and  ammunition  and  reduce  their  depend- 
ence on  long  supply  lines  from  the  north.  This  is 
demonstrated  by  analyzing  the  equipment  cap- 
tured from  the  Commmiist  Viet  Cong.  The  arms 
captured  from  the  Communists  are  old  weapons 
left  over  from  the  days  when  Viet-Nam  was  a 
French  colony,  those  that  tlie  Communists  have 
captured  from  the  South  Vietnamese  forces,  or 
liomemade  guns,  mines,  grenades,  and  even  cross- 
bows with  poison  arrows. 

Thiis  there  are  two  lines  of  supply  for  the  Com- 
munist Viet  Cong.     The  first  is  the  infiltration 

Department  of  State   Bulletin 


I 


routes  which  supply  largely  trained  men — officers 
and  noncommissioned  officers — and  specialized 
equipment  and  supplies.  The  second  is  the  hun- 
,  dreds  of  jungle  trails  leading  into  thousands  of 
South  Vietnamese  villages,  like  spokes  on  a  wheel. 
It  is  from  these  villages  that  the  Communists  get 
fi>od,  recruits,  and  the  raw  materials  from  which 
t  ( )  manufacture  arms  and  ammunition.  As  I  said 
liefore,  the  villagers  do  not  necessarily  support  the 
Communists,  but  when  the  Commmiists  have  ac- 
cess to  the  villages  they  can  obtain  the  supplies  by 
both  intimidation  and  purchase. 


Objectives  of  South  Vietnamese  Program 

This,  then,  is  the  enemy  situation.  The  South 
Vietnamese  program  for  dealing  with  this  situa- 
ion  has  three  objectives : 

The  first  is  to  strengthen  the  regular  army  and 
security  forces  and  increase  their  mobility.  Here 
Qnited  States  aid  is  vital,  and  the  vigorous  pro- 
gram instituted  by  Secretary  of  Defense  McNa- 
nara  has  been  having  magiiificent  results.  As 
YOU  have  read  in  the  papers,  the  United  States  has 
furnished  arms  and  equipment  and,  most  im- 
portantly, helicopters,  which  give  the  regular 
South  Vietnamese  army  lightning  mobility  to  re- 
nforce  people  attacked  by  the  Communists  and 
;o  seek  out  and  pursue  the  Communists  in  the 
nountains  and  jvmgles. 

The  second  objective  of  the  progi'am  is  to  cut 
;he  infiltration  routes. 

The  Geneva  agreements  neutralizing  Laos^ 
specify  that  the  territory  of  Laos  shall  not  be  used 
for  these  purposes.  Wliether  the  North  Viet- 
aamese  will  keep  their  word  remains  to  be 
seen.  But  in  any  case  the  South  Vietnamese 
ire  not  powerless.  As  you  can  see  from  a  glance 
it  a  map,  these  infiltration  routes  must  in  some 
ustances  wind  their  way  for  long  distances  inside 
South  Viet-Nam  before  reaching  the  areas  of  Viet 
Oong  concentration,  and  the  South  Vietnamese  are 
;aldng  measures  to  cut  these  routes  inside  South 
7iet-Nam  itself. 

An  im^Dortant  part  of  the  measures  to  cut  the 
nfiltration  routes  is  the  recent  decision  to  arm 
;he  montagnards.  These  montagnards  are  the 
noimtain  peoples  of  South  Viet-Nam — hardy, 
courageous  men.  Recently  thousands  of  the  mon- 
agnards  have  fled  into  the  lowlands  to  get  away 
Tom  the  Viet  Cong,  whose  modern  arms  were  too 


'  For  text,  see  iUd.,  Aug.  13,  1962,  p.  259. 
Scfober  8,   7962 


much  for  the  only  weapons  the  montagnards  had — 
spears,  and  bows  and  arrows. 

The  South  Vietnamese  Government  decided  to 
equip  the  montagnards  with  modern  weapons  fur- 
nished by  the  United  States.  The  montagnards 
are  trained  in  the  use  of  these  weapons  and  sent 
back  into  their  home  territories  to  establish  stra- 
tegic villages  of  their  own  in  the  moimtains 
through  which  the  infiltration  routes  pass.  Our 
special  forces  training  officers  estimate  that  about 
23,000  square  miles  are  already  under  the  m,on- 
tagnards'  protection  and  that  in  4  months  the  total 
may  be  40,000  square  miles.  According  to  reports, 
7,000  montagnards  have  already  been  trained  and 
given  weapons  and  another  3,000  are  beginning  the 
course. 

The  third  objective  of  the  South  Vietnamese 
plan  is  the  strategic- village  program  I  have  men- 
tioned, which  is  designed  to  cut  the  major  routes 
of  supply  and  deny  Communist  access  to  thousands 
of  unprotected  villages.  This  program  calls  for 
putting  defenses  around  existing  villages — barbed 
wire,  watchtowers,  and  ditches  filled  with  bamboo 
spikes  and  booby  traps.  It  calls  for  giving  each 
village  a  radio  which  the  villages  can  use  to  call 
for  reinforcements  by  helicopter  if  they  are  at- 
tacked by  a  Viet  Cong  force  too  large  for  them  to 
handle.  It  calls  for  arms  for  the  villagers  to  use 
themselves  when  attacked. 

There  is  one  misconception  about  this  program 
I  would  like  to  correct.  These  plans,  unlike  those 
in  Malaya,  do  not  call  for  relocating  villages  ex- 
cept in  rare  circumstances.  In  general,  the  de- 
fenses are  to  be  put  around  existing  villages.  Al- 
though there  are  one  or  two  places  in  heavily 
penetrated  regions  where  villages  have  actually 
had  to  be  regrouped,  these  are  the  exception,  not 
the  rule. 

The  strategic  villages  will  provide  protection. 
At  the  same  time,  the  South  Vietnamese  plan  to 
tise  the  strategic-village  idea  as  a  way  to  tie  the 
villagers  mto  the  governmental  structure  and  to 
provide  the  villages  with  government  services — 
health,  education,  agricultural  services,  police  pro- 
tection, and  good  village  administration. 

South  Vietnamese  Government  plans  call  for 
civic-action  teams  sent  by  the  provincial  and  na- 
tional governments  which  will  not  only  help  the 
villagers  in  setting  up  their  defenses  but  will  also 
expand  the  political,  social,  and  economic  base  for 
integrating  of  the  villages  into  the  national  fabric. 
For  example,  these  teams  include  a  medical  tech- 


531 


nician,  a  school  teacher,  an  agricultural  credit 
representative,  a  public  information  representa- 
tive, two  or  three  public  administration  advisers, 
and  a  youth  activities  representative,  as  well  as  a 
police  adviser,  a  civil  guard  liaison  officer  to  man 
the  radio  that  calls  for  reinforcements  if  attacked, 
and  a  squad  of  soldiers  to  issue  weapons  to  the 
villagers  and  provide  training  in  their  use. 

When  this  program  is  completed,  in  addition 
to  the  protection  afforded,  the  South  Vietnamese 
should  have  a  much  improved  structure  that  will 
permit  information  about  the  needs  of  the  vil- 
lagers to  go  up  the  ladder  of  government  and 
services  to  meet  their  needs  to  come  down. 

On  the  military  side,  it  will  proAride  a  hedgehog 
of  defended  villages — zones  of  defended  villages 
which  will  act  as  a  meat  grinder  when  the  Com- 
munist guerrillas  venture  into  them.  Each  of  the 
villages  will  have  its  own  self-defense  corps  to 
resist  attack.  In  the  empty  spaces  between  the 
villages,  civil  guard  imits  will  patrol  and  lay  am- 
bush during  curfew  hours.  If  the  Viet  Cong  come 
into  the  zone,  they  are  very  likely  to  run  into  a 
civil  guard  ambush.  Even  if  the  Viet  Cong  do 
not  run  into  an  ambush,  sooner  or  later  they  will 
run  out  of  food  and  be  forced  to  attack  a  strategic 
village.  Thus  the  guerrilla  is  forced  to  attack 
instead  of  being  chased.  The  guerrilla  is  am- 
bushed rather  than  ambushing. 

Results  of  Program  Are  Encouraging 

This,  then,  is  th&  theory  and  the  program  for 
putting  theory  into  practice.  The  final  question 
is,  how  is  it  working  out  in  South  Viet-Nam  ? 

So  far  we  have  grounds  for  guarded  optimism. 

Vigorous  support  from  Secretary  McNamara 
and  the  Department  of  Defense  has  given  the 
South  Vietnamese  army  new  confidence.  It  is 
attacking  the  Viet  Cong  and  has  been  having 
gratifying  success. 

Over  2,000  strategic  hamlets  have  been  built, 
and  1,000  of  these  are  now  equipped  with  radios 
as  a  result  of  United  States  aid.  Not  all  of  these 
strategic  villages  are  perfect.  Some  do  not  have 
enough  arms  and  equipment.  In  some  places,  too, 
there  has  not  yet  been  enough  money  to  pay  the 
villagers  for  the  time  they  have  spent  on  building 
the  village  defenses,  and  inevitably  in  some  vil- 
lages there  is  some  resentment.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  early  returns  seem  to  indicate  that  the 
villagers'  morale  and  their  attitude  toward  their 


532 


ill 


government  are  much  better  than  some  press  re^ 
ports  might  lead  us  to  believe. 

There  have  been  some  very  positive  press  state- 
ments that  the  Government  of  South  Viet-Nam  isi 
unpopular  with  the  villagers.  But  how  can  one  ", 
generalize  about  the  attitude  of  some  12  million 
villagers?  There  are  no  Galluj^  polls.  I  myseli 
do  not  know  the  answer  to  this  question,  and  J 
doubt  seriously  that  anyone  does.  I  can,  however, 
give  you  a  few  hard  facts  that  may  be  at  least 
straws  in  the  wind. 

First,  one  would  expect  that  if  the  villagers 
were  anti-Government  and  pro- Viet  Cong  thej 
would  defect  to  the  Communists  when  they  wen*  *' 
given  arms.  Of  the  villages  that  have  been  armec 
so  far,  I  know  of  none  that  has  gone  over  to  th( 
Communist  side. 

Second,  if  the  villagers  were  merely  indifferent 
to  their  Government  they  would  sell  their  arms  t( 
the  Communists — and  the  Communists  have  of- 
fered very  high  prices  for  these  arms.  But  of  thf 
villages  that  have  been  armed  so  far,  I  know  oJ 
none  where  the  arms  have  been  sold  to  the  Com- 
munists. 

In  fact,  the  villages  have  used  their  arms  tv 
fghf  the  Communists.  Of  the  villages  that  hav< 
been  armed  so  far,  only  a  few  as  yet  have  beer 
attacked,  but  all  of  them  have  fought  when  at- 
tacked and  fought  well.  Only  five  of  the  village 
radios  have  been  lost  as  a  result  of  Viet  Conj 
action,  and  we  really  expected  the  rate  to  be  mucl 
higher.  More  than  this,  in  the  last  few  weeks  i 
high  percentage  of  the  Viet  Cong  killed  hav( 
been  killed  by  villagers  resisting  Viet  Cong  attack 

Let  us  take  one  week  as  an  example.  During 
one  week  in  August,  over  600  Viet  Cong  wert 
killed  as  against  less  than  100  killed  among  th( 
pro-Government  forces.  And  of  these  600  Viet 
Cong  killed,  two-thirds  were  killed  not  by  th« 
South  Vietnamese  regular  army  but  by  villagen 
armed  through  the  strategic-village  program 
This,  I  think,  is  an  encouraging  indication  of  the 
attitudes  of  the  villagers. 

In  sum  then,  although  the  plans  are  just  begin- 
ning to  be  implemented  the  results  are  encourag- 
ing.   The  defection  rate  of  the  Viet  Cong  has  ^ 
risen,  and  the  recruitment  rate  has  gone  down. 
Just  in  the  last  2  months  there  are  areas  of  South  H 
Viet-Nam  that  are  now  safe  that  only  last  spring  * 
could  not  be  entered  without  a  company  of  armed 
guards. 


Department  of  State  BuUetin  5* 


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There  is  a  long  way  to  go.  It  took  7  years  to 
(liminate  guerrillas  in  Malaya.  It  may  take  less 
han  this  in  Viet-Nam,  or  it  may  take  more,  but 
'.  think  we  have  reason  to  feel  confident  that  in  the 
nd  the  South  Vietnamese — with  our  help — will 
vin. 


oreign  Policy  Conference  To  Be  Held 
or  Editors  and  Broadcasters 


'ress  release,  574  dated  September  21 

Invitations  are  being  extended  this  week  by 
secretary  Rusk  to  editors  and  commentators  of 
he  press  and  the  broadcasting  industry  through- 
ut  the  country  to  attend  a  national  foreign  policy 
onference  being  held  on  October  15  and  16,  1962, 
t  the  Department  of  State. 

President  Kennedy,  Secretary  Rusk,  and  a  num- 
er  of  other  principal  officers  of  the  Government 
nil  speak  to  the  group  on  current  and  long-range 
3sues  related  to  foreign  policy. 

The  conference  will  be  the  fifth  in  a  series  of 
ational  meetings  for  media  representatives  held 
1  Washington  during  the  past  18  months  to  as- 
ist  the  Department's  effort  in  making  available 
tiformation  on  U.S.  foreign  relations  to  the 
Lmerican  public  to  the  greatest  extent  possible. 

The  theme  of  the  conference  will  be  "Five 
loals  of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy." 


M 


'resident  Kennedy  Holds  Talks 
ith  President  of  Rwanda 


tl 


■1^ 

"  Following  is  the  text  of  a  joint  communique  5y 
^resident  Kennedy  and  Gregoire  Kayibanda, 
'resident  of  Rwanda,  issued  at  the  close  of  a  dis- 
ussion  they  held  at  Washington  on  September 

■al 

rhite  House  press  release  dated  September  19 

His  Excellency  Gregoire  Kayibanda,  President 
f  the  Republic  of  Rwanda,  conferred  today  with 
he  President  about  the  future  of  United  States- 
Iwandan  relations  and  about  general  problems 
J,  eing  faced  by  the  Rwandan  Government  follow- 
jl  tig  its  entry  into  the  family  of  nations  as  an  inde- 
endent  country  last  July  1. 

President   Kayibanda    and    the   President   ex- 
tressed  the  mutual  determination  of  their  two 


31 


hi 


>cfober  8,   J  962 


Governments  to  maintain  and  foster  the  cordial 
relationship  which  has  emerged  between  the  two 
countries  since  the  attainment  of  independence  by 
Rwanda. 

President  Kayibanda  spoke  of  his  determination 
to  maintain  and  strengthen  the  independence  and 
internal  development  of  his  country.  He  was 
particularly  appreciative  of  the  demonstrated 
sympathy  for  and  interest  in  the  manifold  prob- 
lems now  being  faced  by  his  country  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  Government,  of  the  friendly 
welcome  which  he  and  his  ministers  have  received 
on  all  sides  during  this,  his  first  visit  to  the  United 
States. 

The  President  confirmed  the  determination  of 
the  United  States  to  support  the  efforts  of  the 
Government  of  Rwanda  to  meet  and  overcome  the 
myriad  problems  faced  by  all  new  nations. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 


87th  Congress,  2d  Session 

Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy.  Hearing  before  the 
Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy.  April  10,  1962. 
148  pp. 

Military  Cold  War  Education  and  Speech  Review  Policies. 
Hearings  before  the  Special  Preparedness  Subcommittee 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Armed  Services.  Part  5. 
April  16-May  14,  1962.    606  pp. 

Foreign  Air  Transportation.  Hearing  before  a  subcom- 
mittee of  the  House  Committee  on  Interstate  and  For- 
eign Commerce  on  H.R.  7309,  H.R.  10655,  and  H.R. 
10657.    June  12,  1962.    69  pp. 

Philippine  War  Damage  Claims.  Hearings  before  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  on  S.  2380  and 
S.  3329.    June  12  and  21,  1962.    63  pp. 

Soviet  Oil  in  East-West  Trade.  Hearing  before  the  Sub- 
committee To  Investigate  the  Administration  of  the 
Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal  Security  Laws 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Judiciary.  Testimony 
of  Samuel  Nakasian.    July  3,  1962.    141  pp. 

Foreign  Radio  Stations.  Hearing  before  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Interstate  and  Foreign  Commerce  on  H.R. 
11732.    August  2,  1962.    36  pp. 

Amendments  to  the  Foreign  Service  Buildings  Act  of  1926. 
Hearings  before  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Re- 
lations.   August  2  and  21, 1962.    102  pp. 

Communications  Satellite  Act  of  1962.  Minority  views  on 
H.R.  11040.  S.  Rept.  1873,  part  2.  August  10,  1962. 
6  pp. 

Sixteenth  Semiannual  Report  of  Activities  Carried  on 
Under  Public  480,  S3d  Congress.  Message  from  the 
President  transmitting  the  report  on  operations  during 
the  period  January  1  through  June  30,  1962.  H.  Doc. 
526.    August  20,  1962.    95  pp. 

Amendment  to  the  Communications  Act  of  1934.  Report 
to  accompany  H.R.  11732.  H.  Rept.  2248.  August  20, 
1962.    9  pp. 

Awards  Under  the  Japanese-American  Evacuation  Claims 
Act  of  1948.  Report  to  accompany  H.R.  12719.  H.  Rept. 
2254.    August  20,  1962.    4  pp. 

533 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


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U.S.  Pledges  Resources  and  Cooperation 
in  World  Food  Program 

Statement  hy  Orville  L.  Freeman 
Secretary  of  Agriculture  ^ 

This  is  a  momentous  occasion.  I  appreciate 
deeply  the  privilege  of  taking  part. 

Here  today  the  United  States  is  joining  with 
many  other  nations  in  a  new  combined  attack  on 
hunger.  My  country  and  yours  are  pledging  re- 
sources— and  enthusiasm — in  a  cooperative  effort 
to  improve  utilization  of  the  world's  food  supplies. 
We  are  truty  serving  mankind  in  implementing 
this  new  multinational  World  Food  Program.^ 
At  the  same  time  we  are  taking  another  important 
step  toward  the  goals  of  the  United  Nations  Devel- 
opment Decade.^ 

We  all  Imow  and  appreciate  the  tremendous 
seriousness  of  the  problem  that  faces  us.  It  can 
be  stated  simply.  In  some  countries  food  sup- 
plies are  abundant.  In  others,  accounting  for  over 
half  of  the  world's  population,  people  are  un- 
dernourished or  malnourished.  These  contrasts 
cannot  be  permitted  to  continue  indefinitely. 
Most  of  the  food-deficit  countries  of  the  world  are 
politically  independent  or  are  in  the  process  of 
gaining  their  independence.  With  independence 
has  come  impatience — impatience  not  only  with  a 
generally  unsatisfactory  standard  of  living  but 
especially  with  a  lack  of  the  fundamental  needs  of 
life,  above  all,  food. 

In  a  very  real  sense  there  is  no  surplus  of  food 
anywhere  as  long  as  food  can  be  sent  to  those  who 
do  not  have  enough  to  eat.  To  me,  it  is  a  moral 
imperative  that  we  make  maximum  effective  use 
of  our  God-given  abundance.  The  World  Food 
Program  will  help  us  do  that.  Today  we  serve 
notice,  as  we  pledge  resources  and  cooperation, 


'  Made  to  the  pledtring  conference  of  the  U.N./FAO 
"World  Food  Program  Conference  at  New  York,  N.T.,  on 
Sept.  5  (U.S./U.N.  press  release  4032). 

'  For  background,  see  BtTLij:TiN  of  Jan.  22,  19C2,  p.  150. 

•  For  background,  see  ihUl.,  Aug.  6, 19C2,  p.  225. 


534 


that  we  stand  together  in  the  fight  to  banish  hungei 
from  the  world.     It  can  be  done. 

Tlie  hunger  problem  that  faces  us  continues  t( 
be  formidable.  Although  1962  food  productior 
figures  are  not  yet  available,  the  United  States  De 
partment  of  Agriculture  has  received  enough  in 
formation  to  indicate  the  world  food  picture  ii 
1963  will  be  about  the  same  as  in  recent  years. 

On  the  basis  of  our  early  reports  there  is  enougl 
food  in  the  economically  developed  countries  t( 
provide  adequate  diets.  Production  levels  in  th( 
United  States,  Canada,  and  Australia  will  be  fa: 
above  the  world  average.  Other  industrializec 
nations,  largely  in  the  temperate  northern  areas^ 
will  either  produce  enough  food  to  meet  needs  o 
will  be  able  to  purchase  additional  supplies  abroad 

However,  for  millions  of  people,  mainly  in  th'i 
less  developed  countries  of  the  semitropica 
and  tropical  areas,  chronic  malnutrition — evei 
hunger — will  continue  to  be  a  grim  fact  of  daib 
life.  In  these  countries  gradual  gains  in  foo( 
production  too  often  are  canceled  out  by  rapic 
gains  in  population. 

"Wlien  we  speak  of  hunger,  we  must  also  speak  o 
its  causes.  Food  deficits  have  many  causes 
Among  them  are  land  resources,  climatic  con 
ditions,  farm  techniques,  population  trends,  trad" 
policies.  A  very  important  cause  of  food  deficit 
is  economic  underdevelopment — in  other  words 
poverty.  The  World  Food  Program  will  help  ut 
attack  hunger  directly,  and  it  will  also  enable  u 
to  buy  some  of  the  time  needed  to  promote  tin 
economic  growth  projects  which,  in  the  final  analy 
sis,  are  the  only  cure  for  poverty. 


Development  of  the  Program 

The  World  Food  Program  is  frankly  experl 
mental.  It  will,  for  the  first  time,  provide  fooo 
surpluses  for  economic  development  through  tb 
United  Nations  system. 

The  new  program  will  start  off  on  a  modes 
scale.  It  will  supplement,  not  replace,  the  bi 
lateral  food-aid  programs  already  being  carrie( 

Department  of  State  Bullelh 


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on  by  individual  countries,  including  the  Food- 
for-Peace  Program  of  the  United  States.  Let  us 
not  be  concerned,  however,  about  the  modest 
initial  size  of  the  operation.  It  can  grow — and  I 
think  that  it  will  grow — because  it  is  based  on  a 
sound  premise.  It  is  predicated  on  the  idea  that  a 
problem  that  is  international  in  scope  and  impact 
needs  to  be  approached  through  the  joint  effort  of 
many. 

Development  of  the  program  thus  far  is  a  tribute 
to  many  minds  and  hands,  and  we  of  the  United 
States  are  proud  to  be  associated  in  its  develop- 
ment. 

I  am  pleased  to  recall  that  we  were  one  of  the 
sponsors  of  the  resolution  approved  by  the  General 
Assembly  in  October  I960.*  That  resolution, 
among  other  things,  called  for  a  study  of  how  food 
surpluses  might  be  distributed  under  international 
auspices.  The  Director  General  of  FAO  [Food 
and  Agriculture  Organization]  early  in  1961  pre- 
pared a  challenging  report,  Development  Through 
Food^  whicli  placed  strong  emphasis  on  the  role 
of  food  in  promoting  economic  growth.  The  Di- 
rector General's  ideas  were  transmitted  by  the 
United  Nations  Secretary-General  to  the  Economic 
and  Social  Council.  A  multilateral  approach  to 
food  distribution  was  considered  in  various  meet- 
ings of  the  FAO  and  the  United  Nations  in  1961. 

It  was  my  privilege  to  address  the  FAO  Con- 
ference at  Eome  in  November  1961  and  pledge  the 
strong  support  of  tlie  United  States  to  establish- 
ment of  a  World  Food  Program.  I  followed  with 
keen  personal  satisfaction  other  steps  of  the  FAO 
and  the  U.N.  to  establish  this  program.  I  am 
very  happy  to  be  here  today — to  take  part  in  this 
pledging  ceremony — to  help  give  reality  to  what 
was  only  an  idea  less  than  a  year  ago. 

The  U.S.  Contribution 

The  United  States  is  pleased  to  offer  food,  cash 
assistance,  and  ocean  transportation  services  to 
the  World  Food  Program — to  join  other  members 
of  the  United  Nations  and  the  Food  and  Agricul- 
ture Organization  in  this  great  cooperative  effort. 
The  United  States  herewith  pledges  $40  million 
in  commodities  and  an  additional  $10  million  in 
cash  and  ocean  transportation  services  on  United 
States  vessels.     This  is  the  American  contribution 


*  For  text,  see  iUA.,  Nov.  21, 1960,  p.  800. 
^  U.N.  doc.  E/3462. 

Ocfober  8,   T962 


to  the  total  of  $100  million  for  all  countries  taking 
part  in  this  experimental  program. 

The  United  States  contribution  of  commodities 
and  transportation  services  will  be  made  through 
the  Public  Law  480  program,  while  the  cash  con- 
tribution will  come  from  the  United  States  foreign 
assistance  program.  In  view  of  our  internal  pro- 
cedures for  annual  appropriations  we  are  planning 
that  the  cash  contribution  be  provided  from  the 
appropriations  of  3  years  separately,  beginning 
with  the  one  now  before  the  United  States 
Congress. 

Our  contribution  of  services  is  designed  to  cover 
ocean  freight  costs  on  United  States  vessels  for 
half  our  commodity  contributions.  We  estimate 
that  the  value  at  world  market  rates  of  this  ocean 
freight  will  be  approximately  $4  million.  Our 
cash  contribution  is  subject  to  appropriations  in 
this  and  the  next  2  years  and  to  the  condition  that 
our  cash  contribution  does  not  exceed  40  percent 
of  the  total  cash  contributed  from  all  countries. 
Furthermore,  if  the  world  market  value  of  our 
shipping  contribution  should  rise  above  $4  million, 
our  cash  contribution  of  $6  million  could  decrease, 
but  not  below  $5  million. 

United  States  food  supplies  available  for  this 
program  are  sufficiently  large  as  not  to  require 
designation  of  a  specific  quantity  of  each  com- 
modity. Therefore  we  are  only  naming  the  com- 
modities. The  quantities  are  to  be  worked  out 
with  the  Executive  Director  of  the  program  on 
the  basis  of  project  requirements  and  availabili- 
ties, in  accordance  with  applicable  United  States 
laws  and  regulations. 

The  full  $100  million  maximum  originally  pro- 
posed for  this  program  seems  to  be  almost  in  sight 
today.  A  few  countries,  we  understand,  have  not 
been  able  to  finalize  their  arrangements  for 
pledging  their  contributions  today.  However, 
there  are  indications  that  these  countries  will  also 
be  able  soon  to  make  pledges  which  will  raise  the 
total  to  the  maximum  authorized  by  the  basic 
resolutions.  Every  bit  helps,  and  even  the  small- 
est contributions  will  be  important  both  as  they 
meet  hmnan  needs  and  also  as  they  symbolize  sup- 
port in  the  ideal  of  working  together  to  banish 
hunger  and  malnutrition. 

Permit  me  to  repeat  again  that  the  new  World 
Food  Program  will  supplement,  not  replace,  the 
existing  Food-for-Peace  Program  of  the  United 
States.    In  our  view,  that  operation  also  is  essen- 


535 


tial  in  any  campaign  to  ease  world  hunger.  It 
might  be  noted  that,  through  Food-for-Peace, 
U.S.  farm  products  are  supplementing  the  food 
resources  of  over  100  countries  having  a  combined 
population  of  over  1.3  billion.  In  the  8-year 
period,  1955-62,  Food-for-Peace  shipments  had 
a  total  value  of  $11.2  billion. 

Using  Food  To  Promote  Economic  Development 

Food-for-Peace  has  proved  that  food  can  be 
used  to  promote  economic  development.  It  is 
helping  the  underdeveloped  countries  improve 
their  irrigation,  reclamation,  and  reforestation 
projects ;  for  improvement  of  railroads,  highways, 
and  bridges;  for  construction  of  electric  power 
generating  facilities;  for  building  new  hospitals, 
clinics,  and  schools. 

How  far  we — the  nations  here  assembled — can 
go  in  solving  the  world's  food  problems  per- 
manently will  depend  on  how  much  we  can  pro- 
mote economic  growth.  Economic  growth  can 
bring  expansion  of  fertilizer  production  in  the 
Far  East,  Africa,  and  Latin  America.  It  can 
bring  expansion  of  irrigation,  of  flood  control, 
of  farm-to-market  roads,  of  food  storing  and 
processing  facilities.  Economic  growth  can  pro- 
vide productive  employment  for  the  workers 
of  the  underdeveloped  countries.  With  jobs, 
workers  can  buy  the  food  they  need  for  themselves 
and  their  families. 

The  World  Food  Program,  as  I  mentioned 
earlier,  is  experimental.  The  Director  General 
of  FAO,  Dr.  [B.E.]  Sen,  has  commented,  "The 
program  is  an  effort  to  try  out  various  alternative 
procedures  all  along  the  line,"  including  the  pro- 
vision of  food  for  emergency  needs,  preschool  and 
school  feeding,  and  projects  for  economic  and  so- 
cial development.  The  program  calls  for  a  full 
review  of  how  each  project  is  currently  working 
out  in  practice  and  a  final  review  after  the  project 
is  completed. 

Participation  in  a  program  means  identification 
with  and  sympathy  for  the  program's  objectives. 
This,  I  feel,  is  one  of  the  major  benefits  that  will 
be  derived.  The  enthusiasm  of  participation  by 
a  large  number  of  member  nations  is  invaluable. 
This  enthusiasm  is  felt  even  when  a  nation  is 
able  to  make  only  a  limited  contribution. 

The  program  gives  many  small  countries  a 
means  of  making  their  force  felt  in  the  war  against 
hunger.  The  program,  in  other  words,  provides 
for  a  "team"  on  which  many  countries,  large  and 


small,  may  play.  The  United  States,  I  can  assure 
you,  wants  the  team  to  have  as  many  members  as 
possible.  j 

We  owe  a  debt  of  gratitude  to  the  countries  i 
which  have  served  on  the  intergovernmental  com- 
mittee to  develop  the  arrangements  and  proce- 
dures for  the  operation  of  this  program.  Long 
hours  and  diligent  work  have  been  required  of 
both  FAO  and  U.N.  staff  members.  An  effective 
job  has  been  done.  The  United  States  endorses 
precautions  to  safeguard  the  agricultural  econo- 
mies of  recipient  countries  and  the  agricultural 
markets  of  other  countries  in  accordance  with 
agi'eed  FAO  principles. 

I  want  to  pay  tribute  to  the  Executive  Director 
[Addeke  Hendrik  Boerma].  I  have  been  im- 
pressed by  the  unanimous  support  he  received  in 
the  inter  governmental  committee.  The  strong  be- 
ginning he  has  made  augurs  well  for  effective 
leadership  over  the  3-year  experimental  period. 

Let  me  say,  in  conclusion,  that  we  have  wrought 
well  here  today.  Our  World  Food  Program  is 
dedicated  to  the  benefit  of  mankind;  its  approach 
is  positive  and  constructive.  Hunger  is  a  prob- 
lem that  won't  be  solved  this  year,  or  the  next,  or 
the  next.  But  the  problem  has  been  recognized. 
Progress  is  being  made.  One  day,  I  am  confident, 
hunger  will  be  banished  from  the  earth. 


Continuation  of  Charter  Review 
Committee  Recommended  to  G.A. 

Statement  iy  Francis  T.  P.  Plimpton'^ 

This  Committee  is  meeting  on  the  fourth  occa- 
sion since  its  initial  meeting  in  1957,  charged  with 
the  task  of  determining  whether  there  have  been 
changes  in  the  international  climate  which  would 
now  warrant  the  setting  of  a  time  and  a  place  for 
the  holding  of  a  general  conference  to  review  the 
charter.  At  its  previous  meetings  just  prior  to 
the  12th,  14th,  and  16th  sessions  of  the  General 
Assembly,  this  Committee  in  each  instance  reached 
the  melancholy  conclusion  that  the  time  was  not 
propitious  for  a  constructive  review  of  the  charter. 

Although  a  large  number  of  the  members  of 
the  United  Nations  see  value  in  a  conference  which 


'  Made  in  the  Committee  on  Arrangements  for  a  Con- 
ference for  the  Purpose  of  Reviewing  the  Charter  on 
Sept.  5  (U.S./U.N.  press  release  403.3).  Mr.  Plimpton 
is  Deputy  U.S.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations. 


536 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


I 

I] 


*  vould  permit  a  discussion  and  analysis  of  the 

*  bharter  in  the  light  of  the  history  of  the  United 
N'ations  since  19-±5,  we  thinli  it  is  generally  under- 
stood that  such  a  conference  must  be  based  on  gen- 
>ral  agreement  as  to  its  objectives. 

Debates,  not  only  in  this  Committee  at  previous 
nestings  but  also  in  connection  with  more  recent 
.Jiiscussion  of  other  items  on  the  agenda  of  United 
.  Nations  organs,  indicate  that  such  general  agree- 
Inent  does  not  exist.  As  an  example,  the  distin- 
^ished  representative  of  the  Soviet  Union  has 
wrought  into  this  debate  the  irrelevant  issue  of 
hinese  representation,  an  issue  which  was  deter- 
nined  by  the  General  Assembly  only  9  months 
,go.^  In  light  of  this  state  of  affairs  and  the  un- 
fortunate lack  of  improvement  in  the  interna- 
iional  situation  since  the  meeting  of  the  Committee 
I  year  ago,  we  do  not  think  that  the  Committee 
should  now  set  a  time  and  place  for  a  charter  re- 
iew  conference. 

I  wish  to  make  it  clear  that  the  United  States 
continues,  as  it  has  in  the  past,  to  support  the  con- 
'ening  of  a  review  conference  whenever  a  sub- 
tantial  majority  of  the  members  of  this  organiza- 
ion  believe  that  the  time  is  propitious.  However, 
Ihe  prospects  are  not  favorable.  In  these  circum- 
'^tances  we  would  support  a  recommendation  by  the 
Committee  to  the  General  Assembly  that  the  time 
)f  the  next  meeting  of  this  Committee  be  fixed  by 
he  President  of  the  General  Assembly  in  consul- 
;ation  with  the  Secretary-General.  Or,  if  the 
najority  of  this  Conamittee  feels  that  it  should 
neet  again  at  a  specified  time,  we  would  of  course 
38  glad  to  support  such  a  decision. 

There  are  certain  amendments  to  the  charter 
ivhich  in  our  opinion  are  advisable  and  which 
leed  not  await  the  holding  of  the  general  review 
conference.  Thus,  the  United  States  has  vigor- 
ously supported  and  does  vigorously  support  an 
mlargement  of  the  Security  Council  and  the  Eco- 
lomic  and  Social  Council  to  take  into  account  the 
expansion  in  the  membership  of  the  United  Na- 
tions. We  entirely  agree  with  the  distinguished 
representative  of  Ghana  that  differences  of  opin- 
ion as  to  the  representation  of  China  should  not 
prevent  consideration  of  amendments  to  that  ef- 
fect. Furthermore,  amendments  to  tliat  effect 
need  not  await  the  general  review  conference,  and 
;he  United  States  would  welcome  amendments  to 
ihat  effect  and  would  be  prepared  to  consider  other 
desirable  amendments  to  the  charter,  all  without 


reference  to  a  general  review  conference.  It 
seems  to  us  that  there  is  a  clear  distinction  be- 
tween, on  the  one  hand,  a  general  review  confer- 
ence, which  under  present  conditions  does  not 
seem  practicable,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  pro- 
posal of  specified  amendments  of  the  charter  I 
have  referred  to,  which,  as  I  have  said,  the  United 
States  would  warmly  welcome  and  vigorously 
support. 

In  the  meantime  the  United  States  will  continue 
to  support  all  efforts  to  develop  the  existing  mech- 
anisms and  procedures  of  the  United  Nations  and 
to  encourage  the  growth  of  new  instrumentalities 
within  the  framework  of  the  present  charter.^ 


U.S.  Favors  Conciliation,  Persuasion 
in^South-West  Africa  Question 

Statement  &y  Jonathan  B.  Binglutm 

U.S.  Representative  in  the  Trusteeship  Council^ 

Unlike  the  other  problems  which  have  been  con- 
sidered by  this  Committee,  most  of  which  had 
never  before  been  discussed  in  detail  in  any  United 
Nations  body,  the  problem  of  South-West  Africa 
has  been  discussed  at  great  length  in  various 
bodies  of  the  United  Nations  since  the  founding 
of  this  organization.  For  this  reason,  and  in  order 
to  save  the  time  of  this  Committee,  I  do  not  jiro- 
pose  now  to  restate  in  any  detail  the  views  of  my 
delegation  on  the  problem  of  South-West  Africa 
in  general.  I  would  simply  like  to  refer  briefly  to 
a  speech  I  made  in  the  Fourth  Committee  of  the 
General  Assembly  on  March  13,  1961.=  At  that 
time  I  stated  that  "the  policy  of  apartheid  is  re- 
pugnant to  us  in  the  United  States  of  America" 
and  went  on  to  say,  "It  is  particularly  deplorable 
that  such  a  policy  should  be  exercised  in  an  area 
such  as  the  Territory  of  South-West  Africa,  where 
the  administering  authority  has  international  ob- 
ligations,  even  though  it  refuses  to  recognize  those 
obligations." 


'  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  15,  1002,  p.  lOS. 
October  8,   7962 


'  On  Sept.  5  the  Committee  agreed  to  submit  to  the 
17th  session  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  a  report  includ- 
ing a  draft  resolution  inviting  the  Committee  to  meet 
not  later  than  July  196.3  and  to  report,  with  recommen- 
dations, to  the  ISth  General  Assembly. 

^Made  on  Sept.  6  (U.S./U.N.  press  release  4034)  in  the 
Special  Committee  on  the  Situation  With  Regard  to  the 
Implementation  of  the  Declaration  on  the  Granting  of 
Independence  to  Colonial  Countries  and  Peoples. 

^  Bulletin  of  Apr.  17, 1961,  p.  569. 


537 


It  is  clear  from  the  recent  report  of  the  Special 
Committee  on  South-West  Africa,  and  from  other 
sources,  that  the  apiilication  of  apartheid  has  not 
in  any  way  been  alleviated  in  South-West  Africa 
and  that  if  anything  it  has  been  intensified.  The 
views  of  my  delegation  on  that  subject  remain  the 
same  as  they  were  in  March  of  1961.  We  remain, 
as  we  were  then,  deeply  distressed  at  the  failure  of 
the  Government  of  South  Africa  to  recognize  its 
international  obligations  with  regard  to  the  Terri- 
tory of  South- West  Africa  and  to  indicate  that  it 
intends  to  move  in  the  direction  of  recognizing  the 
right  of  the  people  of  South- West  Africa  to  deter- 
mine their  own  political  future. 

The  question  before  us  at  this  time  is,  what  can 
the  United  Nations — or  more  precisely  what  can 
this  Committee — do  to  help  the  people  of  South- 
West  Africa  realize  their  aspirations? 

In  considering  this  question  it  would  seem 
natural  to  consider  first  of  all  wliether  we  have  at 
hand  any  promising  avenues  of  possible  activity. 

In  this  connection  I  would  like  to  refer  first  of 
all  to  the  proceeding  brought  in  the  International 
Court  of  Justice  against  the  Government  of  South 
Africa  by  the  states  of  Ethiopia  and  Liberia. 
Wlien  that  action  was  initiated,  it  was  welcomed 
as  a  most  constructive  endeavor  by  the  great  ma- 
jority of  the  member  states  of  the  United  Nations. 
We  still  regard  it  as  such,  although  many  dele- 
gations seem  to  have  lost  interest  in  it,  perhaps 
because  judicial  processes  take  some  time.  In  our 
view  no  action  should  be  taken  by  this  Committee 
or  by  the  General  Assembly  which  might  jeop- 
ardize the  basis  for  the  proceeding  or  otherwise 
adversely  affect  its  usefulness.  Thus  we  em- 
phatically agree  with  the  statement  made  the 
other  day  by  the  distinguished  representative  of 
Ethiopia  [Tesfaye  Gebre-Egzy]  that  any  move 
now  toward  cancellation  of  the  mandate  should 
be  given  the  most  careful  consideration  and  study. 

There  is  also  an  avenue  of  approach  to  the 
Government  of  South  Africa  consisting  of  com- 
munication and  the  opportunity  for  persuasion. 
!My  delegation  found  it  encouraging  that  the  Gov- 
ernment of  South  Africa  should  have  invited  the 
chairman  [Victorio  D.  Carpio]  and  vice  chair- 
man [.'^alvador  INfartinez  de  Alva]  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  South-West  Africa  to  make  a  visit  to 
South-West  Africa,  even  though  on  a  limited 
basis.  That  invitation  was  the  first  gesture  which 
the  Government  of  South  Africa  had  made  in  a 
long  time  toward  recognizing,  at  least  in  a  de 


538 


iflii 


ogoi 
ifii«,i 


las 


Ik 


facto  way,  the  legitimate  interest  of  the  United  ion't 
Nations  in  the  affairs  of  South-West  AfricaJffitfsi 
Wliile  one  cannot  say  that  the  Government  oJ 
South  Africa  has  been  much  influenced  over  the 
years  by  the  opinion  of  the  great  majority  of  thti 
member  states  of  the  United  Nations  with  respecv 
to  its  administration  of  South-West  Africa,  allleeu^f 
least  the  invitation  issued  to  the  chainnan  anoreslo 
vice  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  South-Wesi  ipera' 
Africa  suggested  that  the  Government  of  South  if 
Africa  does  have  an  interest  in  that  opinion 
Otherwise  it  would  not  have  made  this  effort 
through  a  personal  visit  by  two  United  Nationii  lecki 
officials — to  clear  up  what  it  considered  to  be  cer 
tain  misconceptions  about  the  situation  in  thi 
territory. 

At  this  point  I  would  like  to  refer  to  the  presi 
release  issued  on  May  26,  1962,  by  the  Office  o: 
Public  Information,  press  release  GA/2501.  T 
contains  the  text  of  what  is  now  sometimes  re 
ferred  to  as  the  "alleged  joint  communique.' 
"\\niile  many  things  about  this  statement  ari<  lation 
unclear,  there  is  one  fact  which  is  clear  and  wliicli  Itf 
seems  to  be  frequently  overlooked.  This  is  thaplif 
the  distinguished  vice  chairman  of  the  Commit 
tee.  Ambassador  Martinez  de  Alva  of  Mexico,  con 
tinues  to  affirm  that  the  communique  was  issuec 
with  his  approval  and  that  it  represents  his  views 
To  that  extent,  while  we  quite  understand  tha' 
the  commimique  was  not  authorized  by  the  Com 
mittee  on  South-West  Africa  as  such,  we  believi- 
that  the  document,  as  a  statement  of  the  conclu 
sions  reached  at  least  as  between  the  vice  chair 
man  of  the  Committee  and  the  Government  ol* 
South  Africa,  following  the  visit  to  the  territory 
is  a  document  wliich  we  cannot  ignore  and  which 
is  indeed  of  considerable  interest. 

My  particular  reason  for  raising  this  controver- 
sial question  at  this  time  is  to  call  attention  tc 
the  very  last  sentence  of  the  so-called  joint  com- 
munique.  This  sentence  read  as  follows :  "Otheij '  ' 
matters  were  raised  and  after  discussion  were 
noted  for  further  consideration."  From  this  sen- 
tence we  may  conclude  that  the  Government  ofijseiii 


itfttii 


South  Afi-ica  is  prepared  to  carry  forward 
the  kind  of  political  contact,  communication^ 
and  dialog  witli  representatives  of  the  TTnited  J" 
Nations  that  was  inaugurated  by  its  invitation  tc 
the  chairman  and  vice  chairman  to  visit  the^ji 
territory  and  by  their  acceptance  of  that  invita- 
tion. 

In  a  situation  such  as  we  are  confronted  with  w 


Department  oi  State  Bulletin 


}rtai 


imtiiit 

!St.lllli 

)reseii 
recour 


impro 
persii! 


U.S. 
Cons 


ontk 
mjde 

llai 
Diiatio 


im 


hfrs 


tors, 
HHSr 


Otiob 


i  >outh-West  Africa,  in  which  the  clearly  expressed 
"it  lews  of  the  great  majority  of  member  states  of 
he  United  Nations  have  for  so  long  been  dis- 
II  egarded  by  the  Government  of  South  Africa  and 
tl  n  which  the  efforts  of  the  United  Nations  to 
P8  ,chieve  any  improvement  of  the  situation  have 
leen  so  consistently  frustrated,  it  seems  to  us  that 
an  re  should  seize  upon  any  indication  of  a  more  co- 
l's >perative  and  forthcoming  attitude  on  the  part 
f  the  Government  of  South  Africa  and  attempt 
o  go  on  from  there.     Certainly  it  would  not  be 
vise,  in  our  view,  for  the  United  Nations  to  cut 
he  channel  of  communication  and  contact  which 
las  been  established.     Rather,   a  more   fruitful 
ipproach    would    be    to    expand    this    contact. 
Certainly   it   does   not   seem   to   us   beyond   the 
ealm  of  possibility  that,  properly  handled,  the 
nitiatives  begun  this  spring  could  result  in  the 
stablislnnent   of   the    type   of   United    Nations 
presence  in  the  mandated  territory  such  as  is 
ecommended  in  the  conclusions  and  recommen- 
lations  of  the  Committee  on  South- West  Africa. 
It  follows  from  these  considerations  that  we  do 
lot  believe  the  time  has  come  when  the  efforts  to 
mprove  the  situation  through  communication  and 
persuasion  should  be  abandoned  in  favor  of  co- 
rcive  alternatives  of  dubious  effectiveness. 


J.S.  States  Position  on  OAS 
Consideration  of  Coups  d'Etat 

Statement  hy  deLesseps  S.  Morrison  ^ 

Very  briefly  I  want  to  make  a  few  observations 
m  the  revised  text  of  the  resohition  presented  by 
ny  delegation.^ 


'  Made  before  a  meeting  of  the  Council  of  the  Orga- 
lization  of  American  States  on  Aug.  22  (press  release 
•15).  Ambassador  Morrison  Is  U.S.  Representative  on 
;he  OAS  Council. 

The  U.S.  draft  resolution  contemplated  the  desirability 
^Bfjf  holding  a  meeting  of  foreign  ministers  to  consider  the 
eneral  problem  of  regimes  arising  from  coups  d'etat.  It 
left  the  convocation  date  and  site  of  the  meeting  to  be 
iecided  subsequently  by  the  governments  in  the  light  of 
general  trends  in  the  hemisphere  which  aiSect  the  effec- 
ive  exercise  of  representative  democracy.  The  U.S.  pro- 
posal asked  governments  to  give  priority  attention  to  the 
general  problem  of  coups  d'etat  and  requested  the  COAS 
committee  studying  the  problem  to  revise  and  complement 
its  studies  in  preparation  for  a  meeting  of  foreign  min- 
isters or  the  11th  Inter-American  Conference,  whichever 
met  first. 

ifii  October  8,    J  962 


tv 


Concerning  the  legal  effect  of  the  proposed  U.S. 
resolution,  as  my  delegation  indicated  in  the  meet- 
ing of  the  General  Committee,  article  39  of  the 
charter  sets  forth  two  criteria  for  the  actual  con- 
vocation of  a  meeting :  one  that  the  matter  be  of 
"common  interest,"  and  the  other  that  it  be  "ur- 
gent." Paragraph  1  of  our  proposed  resolution 
is  intended  to  make  clear  that  the  criterion  of 
"common  interest"  is  fully  satisfied.  At  the  same 
time  paragraph  2  indicates  that  in  our  view  the 
criterion  of  "urgency"  is  not  yet  fully  met  and 
that  therefore  in  accordance  with  the  charter  the 
convocation  of  a  meeting  is  left  to  the  later  deci- 
sion of  the  governments  in  the  light  of  develop- 
ments which  might  make  the  matter  of  sufficient 
urgency.  Thus  the  proposed  resolution  falls 
squarely  within  the  letter  and  spirit  of  article  39. 

Concerning  the  purpose  and  scope  of  the  resolu- 
tion, I  want  to  repeat  that  it  is  not  directed  at  any 
specific  situation.  It  is  an  expression  of  concern 
over  a  general  problem  which  necessarily  affects 
all  our  countries  in  our  pursuit  of  common  objec- 
tives through  cooperative  programs.  The  resolu- 
tion, I  believe,  reflects  a  full  recognition  of  the  fact 
that  the  problem  is  complex  and  delicate  and, 
therefore,  we  should  not  rush  into  it  unprepared. 
At  the  same  time  it  reflects  another,  equally  im- 
portant fact:  that  in  this  hemisphere  we  have 
developed  a  community  of  mutual  interests  which 
gives  our  regional  grouping  a  unique  character. 
This  community  of  interests  has  two  facets.  One 
is  our  interdependence  as  member  states  of  the 
inter-American  system.  This  interdependence 
has  its  roots  in  geography  and  history  and  today 
covers  a  broad  range  of  activities  in  the  political, 
economic,  social,  and  cultural  fields.  The  other  is 
the  interdependence  of  the  objectives  which  we 
pursue.  For  example,  we  know  that  we  cannot 
forge  ahead  in  strengthening  the  practice  of  rep- 
resentative democracy  without  corresponding 
progress  in  economic  development  and  social  jus- 
tice and  vice  versa.  The  range  of  our  common 
interests  is  never  static,  but  constantly  increasing, 
developing,  and  drawing  us  into  closer  inter- 
dependence. 

This  process  of  interdependence  has  come  into 
sharp  focus  during  the  past  year  as  we  grapple 
with  problems  of  economic  and  social  development 
under  the  Alliance  for  Progress.  I  am  sure  we  all 
recognize  that  as  we  work  together  to  solve  these 
problems,  we  will  also  be  creating  more  propitious 
conditions  for  a  more  effective  exercise  in  repre- 


539 


sentative  democracy.  The  strengthening  of  de- 
mocracy in  turn  will  improve  the  climate  for  the 
material  progress  we  seek.  What  would  be  dis- 
turbing to  all  of  us  would  be  a  retrogression  in 
tlie  practice  of  democracy  at  a  time  when  the 
hemisphere  is  making  real  advances  on  the  eco- 
nomic front.  This  is  a  matter  which  necessarily 
concerns  us  all.  And  this  concern  is  reflected  in 
the  resolution. 

I  know  that  several  governments  are  preoccu- 
pied that  the  principle  of  nonintervention  might 
somehow  be  compromised  and  weakened  through 
this  resolution.    My  Government  sees  no  danger 
of  this.    It  is  as  legitimate  to  be  concerned  about 
the  practice  of  democracy  in  our  hemisphere  as  it 
is  about  the  levels  of  public  education,  health,  in- 
dustrialization, and  trade.     Many  experts  have 
contended  that  politics  and  economics  are  inter- 
woven and  cannot  as  a  practical  m.atter  be  sepa- 
rated.   Both  are  concerned  with  the  business  of 
the  people,  and  we  believe  that  we  should  not  apply 
a    double    standard.      If    our    governments    can 
gather  around  a  conference  table  to  discuss  how 
to  improve  economic  and  social  conditions,  there  is 
every  reason  why  they  should  also  be  able  to  meet 
at  the  proper  time  and  under  the  right  circum- 
stances to  consider  the  condition  of  the  democratic 
process  in  the  hemisphere  and  means  to  improve  it. 
To  argue  that  this  constitutes  unwarranted  in- 
tervention in  internal  affairs  proscribed  by  inter- 
American  treaties  seems  to  my  Government  both  to 
mistake  the  proper  meaning  of  the  term  "interven- 
tion" and  to  misread  the  precedents  which  the 
OAS  itself  has  created.    The  general  subject  of 
nondemocratic  governments  has  been  many  times 
discussed  at  meetings  of  foreign  ministers  and 
inter- American  conferences,  and  many  resolutions 
have  been  passed.     It  was  discussed  in  Bogota  in 
1948.    One  of  the  two  topics  on  the  agenda  of  the 
Fifth  Meeting  of  Foreign  Ministers  in  1959  (the 
other  being  tension  in  the  Caribbean  area)  reads 
in  part  as  follows : 

Effective  exorcise  of  representative  democracy  and  re- 
spect for  human  rights,  including:  ...  b.  Procedures 
that  will  make  it  possible  to  measure  compliance  with  two 
fundamental  principles  of  American  international  law: 
the  effective  exercise  of  representative  democracy  and 
respect  for  h\iman  rights ;  and  measures  that  should  be 
taken  in  cases  of  noncompliance  with  those  principles. 

At  that  meeting  the  powers  of  the  lAPC  [Inter- 
American  Peace  Committee]  were  extended  by 
Resolution  IV  to  include  a  study  of  this  topic,  and 


540 


paragraph  2  of  that  resolution  specifically  stat 

In  the  performance  of  its  duties  the  Committee  [lAPClj 
may,  at  the  request  of  governments  or  on  its  own  iniasijl 
tive,  take  action  in  regard  to  the  subject  matter  referre 
to  in  paragraph  1  [the  subject  matter  I  just  quoted],  it 
action  in  either  case  being  subject  to  the  express  consen 
of  the  States  to  investigations  that  are  to  be  made  in  thei 
respective  territories. 

Item  7  of  the  agenda  of  the  11th  Inter-Americai 
Conference,  yet  to  be  held,  is  worded  as  followsj 
"Representative  Democracy:  Principles  am 
Powers;  Machinery,  Measures,  and  Procedui 
for  its  Effective  Exercise  and  for  the  Isolation  o 
Dictatorial  Regimes,  without  Violating  the  Prin 
ciple  of  Nonintervention." 

My  Government  finds  it  difficult  to  be  persuader 
that  it  was  proper  to  discuss  these  principles  an 


korityofe 
tte  Or| 


IMTOm 

ent 


IDDllin! 


previous  meetings  and  it  is  appropriate  to  discuL 

„  .  »•  J  OtUDt  SI 

them  at  the  future  inter-American  conterence(|_ 
but  that  it  is  inappropriate  to  consider  the  possi 
bility  of  discussing  them  at  another  meeting  o« 
foreign  ministers 


In  such  an  eventual  meeting  of  foreign  minis* 


m\  to! 


wis. 


lithe 


ters,  which  the  U.S.  resolution  envisages  as  pos 
sible,  there  need  be  no  question  of  accused  or  ac  ^  ^ 
cuser,  any  more  than  there  was  several  weeks  ag(  '""^'' 
in  this  Council  when,  at  the  request  of  Costa  Rica  '" 
El  Salvador,  Guatemala,  Nicaragua,  and  Peru 
this  very  Council  discussed  a  specific  piece  of  U.S 
legislation.     Moreover,  the  debate  and  study  o? 
U.S.  sugar  legislation  was  held  even  before  oui 
internal  legislative  process  had  been  completed 
It  was  held  at  the  very  time  that  the  matter  was- 
under  consideration  by  the  U.S.  Congress.     In^ 
deed  the  proposal  presented  by  the  five  countries 
would  not  have  had  its  desired  effect  at  any  othei 
time.    With  the  exception  of  one  delegation,  nc 
arguments  were  then  raised  about  intervention 
My  delegation  cooperated  in  the  debate  and  action 
this  Council  unanimously  took  at  that  time,  recog- 
nizing that  our  relations  are  interdependent  and 
that  there  is  a  need  to  cooperate  in  matters  of 
mutual  interest  if  we  are  to  strengthen  our  own 
countries  and  thereby  our  hemispheric  system. 
Can  it  be  persuasively  argued  that  the  principle; 
of  nonintervention  permits  the  discussion  of  a( 
specific  piece  of  legislation  during  the  time  it  isi 
in  the  orderly  constitutional  process  of  considera- 
tion by  a  domestic  legislature  but  that  the  same 
principle  forbids  the  possibility  of  discussing  the* 
general  problem  of  forcible  and  unconstitutional 
seizure  of  power  in  our  countries,  whicli  are  all 


tt 

rention 

My  ar 

wto 

Gcver.: 

III. 

jtion, 

lomaki 

ptefu 

ters  of 

last  w( 

U,S,p 

tkongt 

seieral 

From 


te: 
faei 

My 
oItoi 


Deparfmenf  of  Sfafe   Bulletin 


Octoi 


)mmitted     by     treaties     to     the     practice     of 


'jmocracy 


2 


The  proposed  resolution  which  we  are  present- 
.g  is  thus  squarely  within  the  spirit  and  letter  of 
le  inter-American  system  and  of  precedent.    It 

a  step,  if  only  a  modest  one,  on  the  road  to 
olitical  cooperation.  In  this  context  paragraph 
of  the  proposed  resolution,  the  most  misunder- 
ood  and  the  most  innocuous,  finds  its  place, 
his  paragraph  seeks  to  add  nothing  to  the  au- 
lority  of  existing  organs  and  proposes  no  action 
the  Organization.  It  merely  calls  attention 
)  existing  facilities  which  have  already  been  used 
y  several  countries  and  which  may  prove  of  util- 
y  in  other  cases,  provided  the  governments  on 
leir  own  volition  desire  to  make  use  of  them. 

The  entire  resolution,  then,  is  a  modest  but  im- 
ortant  signpost  on  the  road  of  mutual  coopera- 
lon  in  matters  of  common  interest,  the  pursuance 
the  democratic  process — a  road  we  must  all 
ravel  together  if  we  are  to  reach  our  common 
oals. 

In  the  view  of  my  Government,  aside  from  the 
^ave  peril  of  Communist  subversion  the  great 
anger  facing  the  countries  of  America  today  is 
ot  a  threat  to  our  independence  through  inter- 
ention  but  our  possible  failure  to  realize  and  act 
ully  and  jointly  upon  the  challenging  truth  of 
>ur  zTi^erdependence.  It  is  in  this  spirit  that  my 
jovemment  presents  the  revised  draft. 

In  concluding  this  explanation  of  the  draft  res- 
>lution,  Mr.  Chairman,  my  delegation  would  like 
0  make  a  procedural  suggestion.    "We  are  most 


;!1, 5 


i^;,  fateful  to  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  and  to  the  mem- 
)ers  of  the  Council  for  the  opportunity  afforded 
ast  week  to  hold  informal  consultations  on  the 
J.S.  proposal  in  the  General  Committee.  The 
.houghtful  and  constructive  observations  made  by 
leveral  delegations  are  reflected  in  the  present  text, 
rom  recent  conversations  with  several  delega- 
ions,  it  appears  that  a  continuation  of  this  infor- 
nal  exchange  of  views  would  be  an  added 
lontribution  to  our  mutual  understanding  and 
would  no  doubt  result  in  further  improvements  in 

ip'^  ;he  text.    Moreover,  certain  delegations  have  in- 
iicated  a  desire  for  additional  time  to  obtain 
exact  instructions. 
My  delegation  proposes,  therefore,  that  instead 

;ffi  of  voting  or  engaging  in  extensive  formal  debate 

:t3  on  the  proposal  in  this  Council,  the  chairman 
convoke  a  further  meeting  of  the  General  Com- 
mittee to  deal  with  the  matter. 


lelii 


Foreign  IVIinisters  of  American 
Republics  To  Meet  Informally 

Department  /Statement 

Press  release  566  dated  September  18 

The  Foreign  Ministers  of  the  American  Re- 
publics have  been  generally  receptive  to  the 
suggestion  which  Secretary  Rusk  made  on 
September  5,  through  the  Latin  American  ambas- 
sadors in  Washington,  that  they  hold  an  informal 
meeting  to  exchange  views  on  subjects  of  mutual 
interest. 

On  the  basis  of  the  Secretary's  consultations 
with  his  colleagues,  and  taking  into  account  the 
wishes  and  convenience  of  tlie  largest  number,  the 
Secretary  has  issued  invitations  to  them  to  meet 
informally  in  Washington  on  October  2  and  3. 
The  Secretary  hopes  that  the  dates  chosen  will 
make  it  possible  for  most  of  his  colleagues  to  come. 
In  addition  to  the  Foreign  Ministers,  the  Secretary 
General  of  the  OAS  [Organization  of  American 
States]  has  been  invited  to  attend. 

The  meeting  will  be  informal.  It  will  provide 
the  opportunity  to  exchange  views.  The  sessions 
will  be  closed.  There  will  be  no  formal  agenda, 
voting,  official  minutes,  or  resolutions.  We  expect 
that  the  situation  in  Cuba  and  other  subjects  of 
mutual  interest  will  be  discussed. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Atomic  Energy 

Amendment  to  article  VI.A.3  of  the  Statute  of  the  Inter- 
national Atomic  Energy  Agency   (TIAS  3873).     Done 
at  Vienna  October  4,  1961.  ' 
Acceptances   deposited:  Austria,   September  17,   1962; 

Rumania,  September  18,  1962;  Viet-Nam,  September 

19,  1962. 

Aviation 

Convention  for  unification  of  certain  rules  relating  to 
international  transportation  by  air  and  additional  pro- 
tocol. Done  at  Warsaw  October  12,  1929.  Entered  into 
force  February  13, 1933.    49  Stat.  3000. 


'  Not  in  force. 


October  8,  7962 


541 


Adherenccs    deposited:    Guinea,    September   28,    19C1 ; 
People's   Democratic   Republic   of   Korea,   March   1, 
1961 ; '  Mali,  January  26,  1961 ;  Upper  Volta,  Decem- 
ber 9,  1961. 
'Notifications   received    that    they   consider   themselves 
hound:  Cameroon,  August  21,  1961;  Dahomey,  Jan- 
uary 9,  1962. 
Protocol  to  amend  the  convention  for  uniflcatlon  of  cer- 
tain   rules    relating   to    international   carriage   by    air 
signed  at  Warsaw   October  12,   1929    (49  Stat.  3000). 
Done  at  The  Hague  September  28,  1955.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Pakistan,  January  16,  1961. 
Notifications   received   that    they   consider   themselves 
hound:  Cameroon,  August  21,  1961;  Dahomey,  Jan- 
uary 9,  1962. 

Diplomatic  Relations 

Vienna    convention    on    diplomatic    relations.      Done   at 
Vienna  April  18,  1961.' 
Accession  deposited:  Sierra  Leone,  August  13,  1962. 

Finance 

Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International  Finance  Corpo- 
ration,  as   amended.     Done   at   Washington   May   25, 
1955.    Entered  into  force  July  20,  1956.    TIAS  3620  and 
4891. 
Signatures  and  acceptances:  Saudi  Arabia,  September 

19,   1962 ;  Sierra  Leone  and  Tanganyika,  September 

10,  1962 ;  Togo,  September  4,  1962. 

Shipping 

International  load  line  convention.  Signed  at  London 
July  5,  1930.  Entered  into  force  January  1,  1933.  47 
Stat.  2228. 

Notifications  received  that  they  consider  themselves 
hound:  Cameroon,  Congo  Republic  (Brazzaville), 
Dahomey,  Ivory  Coast,  Malagasy  Republic,  Mauri- 
tania, Niger,  September  17,  1962. 


BILATERAL 

Congo  (Leopoldville> 

Agreement  amending  the  agricultural  commodities  agree- 
ment of  November  18,  1961,  as  amended  (TIAS  4925 
and  5069).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  L(5opold- 
ville  May  23  and  June  8,  1962.  Entered  into  force 
June  S,  1962. 

Agreement  amending  the  agricultural  commodities  agree- 
ment of  November  18,  1961,  as  amended  (TIAS  4925 
and  5069).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  L^opold- 
ville  July  27,  1962.     Entered  into  force  July  27,  1962. 

Costa  Rica 

General  agreement  for  economic,  technical,  and  related 
assistance.    Signed  at  San  Jos6  December  22,  1961. 
Entered  into  force:  September  7,  1962. 

Guatemala 

Agreement  relating  to  the  furnishing  of  defense  articles 
and  services  to  Guatemala  for  the  purpose  of  contribut- 
ing to  its  internal  security.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Guatemala  May  25  and  August  2, 1962.  Entered 
into  force  August  2, 1962. 


'  Not  in  force. 

'  The  Government  of  the  United  States  does  not  recog- 
nize the  so-called  People's  Democratic  Republic  of  Korea 
as  a  state,  and,  therefore,  it  regards  the  adherence  to  the 
convention  by  the  so-called  People's  Democratic  Republic 
of  Korea  as  being  without  legal  effect  and  attaches  no 
significance  thereto. 


542 


Italy 

Agreement  concerning  cooperation  in  a  scientific  experi- 
ment for  the  purjJose  of  launching  a  scientific  satellitai^dHirt 
into  an  equatorial  orbit.     Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  Ljjiv 
at  Rome  September  5,  1962.    Entered  into  force  Sep 
tember  5, 1962. 


f      ■  .1 

lifomal 


Luxembourg 

Treaty    of    friendship,    establishment,    and    navigation! 
Signed  at  Luxembourg  February  23, 1962.' 
Ratification  advised  hy  the  Senate:  September  19,  1962i 

Philippines 

Agreement  for  the  transfer  to  the  Philippines  of  all  right  |^, 
title,  and  interest  which  the  United  States  may  havj 
in  and  to  the  former  U.S.S.  Canopus.     Effected  by  ex<l 
change  of  notes  at  Manila  May  29  and  August  21,  19621  iparlmei 
Entered  into  force  August  21,  1962. 


Togo 

Agreement  relating  to  the  establishment  of  a  Peace  Corps 
program.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Lomf 
August  1  and  September  5,  1962.  Entered  into  force 
September  5, 1962. 


Slates 
i'Etati! 

Eiess 


ntirail 


ppiWnif 
oulirM'i 
fsipiatk 


tonoHt 

mope, 
to  Assis 


DEPARTMENT  AND  FOREIGN  SERVICE 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  September  10  confirmed  Francis  H. 
Russell  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Republic  of  Tunisia. 
(For  biographic  details,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  554  dated  September  14.) 

The  Senate  on  September  11  confirmed  Abba  P. 
Schwartz  to  be  Administrator,  Bureau  of  Security  and 
Consular  Affairs,  Department  of  State.  (For  biographic 
detaUs,  see  White  House  press  release  dated  August  29.) 

Designations 


oreisn  i 

miJent 

r:!'!«n  I 
'ar  an 

eriany 
reeldes 
lietlir! 
Berlin 

nlernat 
r.5.  S 
Cimps 

srael.  ' 

lon-Sel' 
ciliatii 
tioa  (; 

'akislar 

'tesiiei 

'residei 
ration 

'residei 
of  Ry 

tade  a' 


Robert  C.   Creel  as  Director  of  the  Office  of  Germatt 
Affairs,  effective  August  5. 

Martin  J.  Hillenbrand  as  Special  Assistant  to  thekjjiiijj 
Assistant  Secretary  for  European  Affairs  and  as  Head  JF( 
of  the  Interdepartmental  Berlin  Task  Force,  effective 
September  16.  (For  biographic  details,  see  Department F*wts 
of  State  press  release  469  dated  July  21.)  ^^"^ 

itania 


Appointments 


science 


Persii 


Frank  A.  Sieverts  as  Special  Assistant  to  the  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Public  Affairs,  effective  September  12.     ( For 
biographic  details,  see  Department  of  State  press  releasefcmi , 
564  dated  September  18.) 

John  M.  Tinker  as  science  attach^  at  Karachi,  Pakistan, 
effective  September  17.     (For  biographic  details,  see  De-lr[„|. 
partment  of  State  press  release  568  dated  September  19.) 

Robert  T.  Webber  as  science  attach^  at  Tel  Aviv,  Israel, 
effective  Sejrtember  17.  (For  biographic  details,  see  De- 
partment of  State  press  release  569  dated  September  19.; 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


audi 


finisia 

Ciiiltd 

CoBlini 

omnii 

IteTa 

Heat 

^aiii 


ctober  8,  1962 

,,(^riculture.    U.S.  Pledges  Resources  and  Coopera- 
tion in  World  Food  Program  (Freeman)  . 

merican  Republics 

Dreign  Ministers  of  American  Republics  To  Meet 

Informally 

.S.  States  Position  on  OAS  Consideration  of  Coups 
d'Etat  (Morrison,  text  of  resolution) 

9ngress 

ingressional     Documents    Relating    to    Foreign 

Policy 

resident  Kennedy  and  Secretary  Rusk  Urge  Resto- 
ration of  Foreign  Aid  Funds  (Kennedy,  Rusk)    . 

epartment  and  Foreign  Service 

ppointments  (Sie verts.  Tinker,  Webber)  .     .     .     . 

onfirmations    (Russell,   Schwartz) 

esiguations  (Creel,  Hillenbrand) 


conomic  Affairs.  Trade  and  Foreign  Aid  (Ken- 
nedy)       

urope.  Hillenbrand  designated  Special  Assistant 
to  Assistant  Secretary  for  European  Affairs   .     . 

oreign  Aid 

resident  Kennedy  and  Secretary  Rusk  Urge  Resto- 
ration of  Foreign  Aid  Funds  (Kennedy,  Rusk)  . 
rade  and  Foreign  Aid  (Kennedy) 

«rmany 

reel  designated  Director,  Office  of  German  Affairs  . 
illenbrand  designated  Head  of  Interdepartmental 
Berlin  Task  Force 


isi 


prfs 


na! 


nternational     Organizations     and     Conferences. 

U.S.  States  Position  on  OAS  Consideration  of 
Coups  d'Etat  (Morrison,  text  of  resolution)   .     . 

srael.    Webber  appointed  science  attach^  .... 

ron-Self-Governing  Territories.  U.S.  Favors  Con- 
ciliation, Persuasion  in  South-West  Africa  Ques- 
tion (Bingham) 

akistan.    Tinker  appointed  science  attach^   .     .     . 

residential  Documents 

'resident  Kennedy  and  Secretary  Rusk  Urge  Resto- 
ration of  Foreign  Aid  Funds 

resident  Kennedy  Holds  Talks  With  President 
of   Rwanda 

"rade  and  Foreign  Aid 

''fublic  Aflfairs 

oreign  Policy  Conference  To  Be  Held  for  Editors 

and  Broadcasters 

lieverts  appointed  special  assistant  to  Assistant 
Secretary    

Iwanda.  President  Kennedy  Holds  Talks  With 
President  of  Rwanda  (text  of  joint  communique)  . 

Science 

^inker  appointed  science  attach^,  Karachi  .... 
f  I  V^ebber  appointed  science  attach^,  Tel  Aviv   .     .     . 

south  Africa,  Republic  of.  U.S.  Favors  Conciliation. 
Persuasion  in  South- West  Africa  Question  (Bing- 
ham)   

De  Treaty  Information.    Current  Actions 

'*'  Tunisia.    Russell  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .     .     . 
*'  Jnited  Nations 

Continuation  of  Charter  Review  Committee  Rec- 
ommended to  G.A.   (Plimpton) 

The  Tasks  of  the  General  Assembly :  Peaceful  Set- 
tlement, Nonviolent  Change,  and  a  War  Against 
Want    (Stevenson) 


Ind 

534 

541 
539 

533 

518 

542 
542 
542 

525 

542 

518 
525 

542 
542 

539 
542 

537 
542 

518 

533 
525 

533 

542 

533 

542 
542 

537 
541 
542 

536 
511 


e  X 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1215 


U.S.  Favors  Conciliation,  Persuasion  in  South-West 

Africa  Question  (Bingham) 537 

U.S.  Pledges  Resources  and  Cooperation  in  World 

Food  Program  (Freeman) 534 

Viet-Nam.     A  Report  on   South  Viet-Nam   (Hils- 

man) 526 

Name  Index 

Bingham,  Jonathan  B 537 

Creel,  Robert  C 542 

Freeman,  Orville  L 534 

Hillenbrand,  Martin  J 542 

Hilsman,  Roger 526 

Kayibanda,    Gregoire 533 

Kennedy,   President 518,  525,  533 

Morrison,  deLesseps  S 539 

Plimpton,   Francis  T.  P 536 

Rusk,    Secretary 518 

Russell,  Francis  H 542 

Schwartz,  Abba  P 542 

Sieverts,  Frank  A 542 

Stevenson,  Adlai  E 511 

Tinker,  John  M 542 

Webber,  Robert  T 542 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  September  17-23 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office  of 
News,  Department  of  State,  Washington  25,  D.C. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  September  17  which  ap- 
pear in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  515  of 
August  22  and  558  of  September  15. 

Subject 

U.S.  participation  in  international  con- 
ferences. 

Ball :   17th  annual  meeting  of  IBRD. 

Sieverts  appointed  Special  Assistant 
to  Assistant  Secretary  for  Public 
Affairs  (biographic  details). 

Itinerary  for  visit  of  President  of 
Pakistan. 

Meeting  of  Foreign  Ministers  of  Amer- 
ican Republics. 

Delegation  to  lA-ECOSOC   (rewrite). 

Tinker  sworn  in  as  science  attach^  at 
Karachi  (biographic  details). 

Webber  sworn  in  as  science  attach^ 
at  Tel  Aviv  (biographic  details). 

Delegation  to  IAEA. 

Rusk  :  foreign  aid  bill. 

Delegation  to  ICAO  Pacific  Regional 
Air  Navigation  Meeting  (rewrite). 

Itinerary  for  visit  of  President  of 
Pakistan. 

Foreign  policy  conference  for  editors 
and  broadcasters. 

Rusk :  foreign  aid  bill. 

Schaetzel :  "The  European  Common 
Market  and  the  Trade  Expansion 
Program." 

Transcript  of  briefing :  "Five  Goals  of 
U.S.  Foreign  Policy." 

♦Not  printed. 

fHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


No. 

Date 

*562 

9/17 

t563 
*564 

9/18 
9/18 

*o65 

9/18 

566 

9/18 

t567 
*568 

9/18 
9/19 

*569 

9/19 

*570 

571 

t572 

9/19 
9/19 
9/19 

*573 

9/20 

574 

9/21 

576 

t577 

9/21 
9/21 

1578 

9/21 

U.S.   GOVERNMENT  PRINTING   0FFlCE:r962 


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THE  UN  .  .  .  MEETING  PLACE  OF  NATIONS 

This  revised  folder,  released  August  1962,  briefly  describes  the  U.S.  position 
on  the  United  Nations,  the  six  principal  organs  of  the  UN,  and  some  of  the 
activities  and  accomplishments.    A  list  of  the  member  nations  as  of  June  30, 1962, 
is  included. 
Publication  7407  10  cents 


Department 

of 

State 

ABC's  OF  FOREIGN  TRADE 
U.S.  Trade  Policy  in  Brief 

Among  the  questions   answered  in  this  40-page  illustrated  booklet   are  the 
following : 

How  important  is  foreign  trade  to  the  United  States? 
How  important  is  the  United  States  to  foreign  trade? 

How  do  the  Communists  use  foreign  trade  to  expand  world  communism? 
Why  is  expanding  foreign  trade  essential  today? 

What  special  trade  challenge  does  Western   Europe  pose  for  the  United 
States  today? 
Publication  7402                                                                                               25  cents 

U.S.  BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS    QUESTIONS 
AND  ANSWERS 

The  U.S.  balance  of  payments  is  the  financial  record  of  transactions  which  take 
place  between  the  United  States  and  the  rest  of  the  world  during  a  particular 
period  of  time. 

This  recently  released  19-page  pamphlet  explains  the  current  U.S.  balance-of- 
payments   situation   and   the   measures  proposed   to   eliminate   the   remaining 
"basic"  deficit. 
Publication  7392                                                                                               15  cents 

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THE  UN  .  .  .  MEETING  PLACE  OF  NATIONS 

ARr'«  OF  FOREir.N  TRADE,  ITS    TRADE  POLirV  TN  RRTEE 

U.S.  BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS— QUESTIONS  AND  ANSWERS 

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THE    DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


CIAL 

KLY  RECORD 

FED  STATES 
iGN  POLICY 


Vol.  XLYII,  No.  1216 


October  15,  1962 


FIVE  GOALS  OF  U.S.  FOREIGN  POLICY  e  Television 

Briefing  by  Secretary  Rusk,  Secretary  of  Defense  McNamara, 
Under  Secretary  Ball,  AID  Administrator  Hamilton,  Ambas- 
sador  Stevenson,  and  Department  Counselor  Rostow  .... 


547 


SHARING  THE  FINANCIAL  BURDENS  OF  A  CHANG- 
ING WORLD  •  Remarks  by  President  Kennedy  and 
Statement  by  Under  Secretary  Ball 57'} 

INTERNATIONAL  IMPLICATIONS  OF  COMMUNI- 
CATIONS SATELLITE  ACTIVITIES  •  Statement 
by  Assistant  Secretary  Johnson 567 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE    DEPARTIVIENT  OF  STATE 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1216  •  Publication  7435 
October  15,  1962 


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Note:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
copyrighted  and  Items  contained  herein  may 
be  reprinted.  Citation  of  the  Department 
Of  State  Bulleti.n  as  the  source  will  be 
appreciated.  The  Bulletin  Is  Indesecl  In  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
ri    loeekly    publication    issued    by    the 
Office    of  Media    Services,    Bureau  of 
Public    Affairs,    provides    the    public 
and      interested      agencies      of      the 
Government     with     information     on 
developments  in  the  field  of  foreign 
relations    and    on    the    uork    of    the 
Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service.     The  BULLETIN  includes  se- 
lected  press  releases  on  foreign  policy, 
issued  by    the    White  House  and   the 
Department,  and  sUitements  and  ad- 
dresses made  by  the  President  and  by 
the     Secretary     of    State    and    other 
officers  of  the  Departnu-nt,  as  well  as 
special  articles  on  various  phases  of 
international    affairs    and    the  func- 
tions of   the  Department.      Informa- 
tion  is    included   concerning    treaties 
and     international     agreements      to 
which    the    United    States   is   or    may 
become  a  party  and  treaties  of  gen- 
eral international  interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  legis- 
lative material  in  tlte  field  of  inter- 
national relations  are  listed  currently. 


Five  Goals  of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy 


FoUoxoing  is  the  transcrij^t^  of  the  television 
nrogram  '■'■State  Department  Briefing:  Five  Goals 
if  U.S.  Foreign  Policy,''''  produced  by  National 
Educational  Television  in  cooperation  tvith  the 
department  of  State  for  broadcast  by  the  60  af- 
iliated  stations  of  the  NET  network  on  Septem- 
ber £4- 

Participants  in  the  program  were  Dean  Rusk, 
Secretary  of  State;  Robert  S.  McNamara,  Secre- 
ary  of  Defense,'  George  W.  Ball,  Under  Secre- 
ary  of  State;  Fowler  Hamilton,  Administrator, 
igency  for  International  Development;  Adlai  E. 
Uevenson,  U.S.  Representative  to  the  United 
Nations;  W.  W.  Rostow,  Counselor  and  Chairman 
f  the  Policy  Planning  Council,  Department  of 
Hate;  and  Merriman  Smith,  White  House  corre- 
pondent  for  United  Press  International  {mod- 
rator) . 

Mr.  Smith:  I  am  Merriman  Smith  of  United 

ress  International.    I've  been  covering  the  Wash- 

igton  scene  for  quite  a  few  years.    Right  now  you 

re  with  me  on  the  eighth-floor  terrace  of  the  State 

<   )epartment.    In  a  moment  we  will  step  inside  and 

■  leet  the  men  who  plan  and  carry  out  our  foreign 

■  olicy. 

1  Foreign  policy- — that's  no  bloodless  phrase  for 
»  len  in  striped  pants  gadding  about  the  world 
"  ith  pigskin  dispatch  cases.  Foreign  policy — our 
i  jnerican  foreign  policy — is  a  set  of  ideas  and 
:•  rinciples  by  which  we  live  in  the  world  com- 
unity,  a  community  which  includes  some  pretty 
•«'  |ingerous  members  as  well  as  many  law-abiding 
■lends. 

With  today's  instant  communications,  we 
mericans  have  become  more  than  ever  aware  of 
le  rest  of  the  world.  But  these  communications 
n  lead  to  a  rather  narrow  view  of  events  at 


'  Press  release  T/IS  dated  Sept.  21,  as  revised  ;  also  avail- 
ile  as  Department  of  State  publication  7432,  which  may 
purchased  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington  25,  D.C. 
irice  20  cents). 


times.  We  tend  to  see  only  the  crisis  of  the 
moment — the  latest  tragedy,  for  instance,  at  the 
Berlin  wall;  a  guerrilla  ambush  in  Viet-Nam. 
At  times  we  lose  sight  of  the  deeper  currents  of 
the  history  we  are  making. 

To  survive,  to  make  progress  in  this  era  of  rapid 
change,  we  as  a  people  need  to  see  beyond  the 
morning  headlines.  We  need  to  keep  our  eyes  fixed 
firmly  on  the  lasting  interests  of  our  nation. 

To  help  you  and  me  understand  more  clearly 
our  country's  aims  in  the  world  today,  we  now  are 
going  to  sit  in  on  a  unique  meeting,  a  special 
State  Department  briefing  on  the  five  basic  goals 
of  United  States  foreign  policy.  We'll  meet  the 
highest  officials  of  the  State  Department,  the  Sec- 
retary of  Defense,  and  our  Representative  to  the 
United  Nations — men  upon  whom  our  personal 
and  national  security,  in  gi-eat  measure,  depends. 

How  do  you  do,  Mr.  Secretary  ? 

Secretary  Rusk:  Mr.  Smith,  very  glad  to  have 
you  with  us  today.  Mr.  Smith,  let  me  introduce 
you  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  Robert  Mc- 
Namara; our  Under  Secretary  of  State,  George 
Ball ;  Fowler  Hamilton,  who  is  the  Administrator 
of  our  AID  program ;  Walt  Rostow,  the  Counselor 
of  the  Department,  who  is  in  charge  of  our  policy 
planning;  and  then  Adlai  Stevenson,  our  Repre- 
sentative to  the  United  Nations. 

Mr.  Smith :  Mr.  Secretary,  in  such  distinguished 
and  authoritative  company,  let's  get  right  down  to 
a  discussion  of  basic  United  States  foreign  policy. 

Secretary  Rusk:  We  shall  do  our  best.  We 
have  a  simple  but  transcendent  goal.  It  is,  in 
President  Kennedy's  words,  "a  peaceful  world 
community  of  fi'ee  and  indei^endent  states,  free  to 
choose  their  own  future  and  tlieir  own  system  so 
long  as  it  does  not  threaten  the  freedom  of 
others."  ^ 

Unhappily,  there  are  forces  in  the  world  which 
are  opposed  to  that  goal,  forces  detei'mined  to  im- 
pose their  system  on  all  the  peoples  of  the  earth. 


=  Bulletin  of  Jan.  29,  1962  ,p.  159. 


bfofaer   ?5,   7962 


547 


The  rulers  of  the  leadino:  Communist  states  are 
not  only  Marxists  who  believe  their  system  is  best 
and  shall  prevail  over  all  others,  but  they  are 
Leninists  intent  upon  expediting  that  alleged 
historical  inevitability  by  every  practicable  means. 
They  speak,  for  example,  of  peaceful  coexistence, 
but  by  their  own  definition  peaceful  coexistence 
is  a  program  of  conflict,  a  design  for  extending 
Communist  domination  by  all  methods  shoit  of  the 
great  war  which  would  be  self-defeating. 

Their  design  does  not  exclude  the  use  of  force. 
Indeed,  they  expressly  approve  what  they  call 
"wars  of  national  liberation" — a  characteristically 
Comnumist  upside-down  label  for  the  sort  of  ag- 
gression, for  example,  that  they  are  now  inflicting 
on  South  Viet-Nam. 

Our  goal,  the  goal  of  all  free  men,  is  incom- 
patible with  that  Communist  goal.  This  contest 
between  two  incompatible  systems  and  concepts 
will  continue  until  freedom  triumphs.  Our  ob- 
jective is  a  worldwide  victory  not  of  one  people 
or  one  nation  over  another  but  a  worldwide  victoiy 
for  all  mankind,  for  freedom  and  a  decent  world 
order. 

The  struggle  between  coercion  and  freedom  is 
taking  place  in  a  world  of  revolutionary  change. 
The  times  are  dangerous.  A  Secretary  of  State 
must  always  be  prepared  for  more  trouble.  But 
on  balance  the  free  world  is  gaining  strength  rela- 
tive to  the  Communist  world : 

•  The  Communists  are  failing  in  the  competi- 
tion in  production.  Compare  East  Germany  with 
West  Germany,  or  Eastern  Europe  with  Western 
Europe.  The  Berlin  wall  is  itself  a  symbol  of 
Conununist  failure.  Successful  systems  do  not 
have  to  build  walls  against  their  own  peoples. 

•  In  Communist  China  the  vaunted  "shortcut 
to  the  fiiture"  has  proved  to  be  the  shortcut  to 
misery.  Compare  the  conditions  in  mainland 
China  with  those  in  Taiwan  or  Malaya  or  India — 
not  to  mention  Japan. 

•  No  new  nation  has  adopted  communism — in- 
deed, no  nation  has  ever  adopted  it  by  "consent  of 
the  governed,"  tested  in  free  elections. 

•  Most  of  the  new  nations  have  rallied  to  the 
support  of  the  United  Nations  in  the  face  of  Soviet 
attacks. 

•  Disruptive  and  erosive  forces  are  at  work 
within  tlie  Sino-Soviet  bloc:  differences  over  ide- 
ology, practice,  and  leadership;  the  unquenchable 
spirit  of  nationalism;  yearnings  for  more  indi- 


548 


1 
vidual  freedom,  evident  not  only  in  the  Soviet 

satellites  but  in  many  small  ways  within  the  Soviet 

Union  itself. 

We  are  making  progress.  But  the  road  ahead 
will  be  long  and  hard. 

Our  policy  may  be  said  to  have  five  principal 
components : 

1.  To  deter  or  defeat  aggression  at  any  level, 
whether  of  nuclear  attack  or  limited  war  or  sub- 
version and  guerrilla  tactics;  that  is,  "Security 
Through  Strength." 

2.  To  bring  about  a  closer  association  of  the 
more  industrialized  democracies  of  Western 
Europe,  North  America,  and  Asia — specifically 
Japan — in  promoting  the  prosperity  and  security 
of  the  entire  free  world ;  in  other  words,  "Progress 
Through  Partnership." 

3.  To  help  the  less  developed  areas  of  the  worldl  tofc 
carry  through  their  revolution  of  modernization 
without  sacrificing  their  independence  or  their 
pursuit  of  democracy;  that  is,  a  "Revolution  oJ 
Freedom." 

4.  To  assist  in  the  gradual  emergence  of  a  gen- 
uine world  community,  based  on  cooperation  andl  tegi' 
law,  through  the  establishment  and  developmeni  bf 
of  such  organs  as  the  United  Nations,  the  Worla  Hiii 
Court,  the  World  Bank  and  Monetary  Fund,  anci  Med 
other  global  and  regional  institutions;  that  is,  f  h 
world  "Community  Under  Law."  in  tl 

5.  To  strive  tirelessly  to  end  the  arms  race  anrt  miiiii 
reduce  the  risk  of  war,  to  narrow  the  areas  o:  bl) 
conflict  with  the  Communist  bloc,  and  to  continui  prise 
to  spin  the  infinity  of  threads  that  bind  peaoi  mtioi 
together;  that  is,  to  win  "Peace  Through  Per 
severance." 


Security  Through  Strength 

31  r.  Smith:  Mr.  Secretary,  let's  take  these  goal 
one  at  a  time.  First,  I  think  it  would  be  interest- 
ing to  discuss  "Security  Through  Strength." 

Secretary  Rusk:  I  think  the  best  person  to  disi 
cuss  that  would  be  our  Secretary  of  Defenst 
Robert  McNamara. 

Secretary  McNamara:  As  Secretary  Rusk  hi 
indicated,  our  job  in  the  Defense  Department  i 
to  maintain  the  strength  we  need  either  to  dete 
or  to  defeat  aggression  at  whatever  level  it  occu; 

To  this  end  we  have  added  substantially  to  tb 
forces  programed  in  the  Department  when  we  too 
office.      We    have    taken    specific    measures   t 

liepax\men\  of  Stale  Bulleli> 


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strengthen  both  onr  nuclear  and  also  our  nonnu- 
clt'ar  forces.  For  these  purposes  approximately 
SC)  billion  was  added  to  the  $44-billion  defense 
liudoet  originally  planned  for  fiscal  year  1962,  and 
about  $8  billion  above  the  original  '62  levels  has 
been  appropriated  for  the  current  fiscal  year  1963. 
Of  these  two  increments — $6  billion  in  '62  and  $8 
billion  in  fiscal  year  '63 — we  have  sj^ent  about  a 
billion  and  a  half  dollars  in  each  year  to  add  to 
the  strength  of  our  strategic  nuclear  forces,  and 
for  these  expenditures  we  have  increased  the  forces 
in  the  following  ways : 

First,  there  has  been  a  50-percent  increase  in  the 
Polaris  submarine  program.  Originally,  19  Po- 
laris submarines  were  planned  to  be  deployed  at 
the  end  of  1964.  That  number  is  now  programed 
at  29,  as  I  say,  an  increase  of  over  50  percent.  In 
addition,  about  12  additional  submarines,  for  a 
total  of  41,  are  planned  to  be  operational  in  the 
year  shortly  thereafter. 

Secondly,  there  has  been  a  very  significant  in- 
crease in  the  number  of  Minuteman  missiles,  the 
hardened  and  dispersed  intercontinental  ballistic 
missiles  which  will  be  the  foundation  of  our  stra- 
tegic nuclear  forces.  And  in  that  connection  we 
have  doubled  the  production  capacity  for  the 
M[inuteman  missile  in  the  event  that  our  forces 
leed  to  be  further  increased  in  the  future. 

And  thirdly,  there  has  been  a  50-percent  increase 
in  the  number  of  our  strategic  bombers  on  15- 
minute  ground  alert,  the  number  of  B-52  and  B-58 
X)mbers  which  we  expect  will  survive  any  sur- 
3rise  attack,  potential  surprise  attack — on  this 
lation. 

As  I  stated  earlier,  the  budget  increases  have 
jermitted  not  only  an  increase  in  our  nuclear 
forces  but  also  very  substantial  increases  in  our 
conventional  or  tactical  forces  as  well. 

These  include  such  actions,  for  example,  as  a  50- 
jercent  increase  in  the  number  of  combat-ready 
Irmy  divisions.  A  year  ago  July  there  were  11 
;ombat-ready  Army  divisions;  today  there  are  16. 
Secondly,  a  50-percent  increase  in  the  rate  of 
jrocurement  of  munitions  and  ammunition  for  our 
\.rmed  Forces — ground,  sea,  and  air. 

Thirdly,  a  very  substantial  increase  in  the  size 
i  our  airlift  and  sealift — this  to  increase  the 
nobility  of  our  forces  and  the  flexibility  of  our 
jct'  ■espouse. 

Fourthly,  as  you  know,  we  are  reorganizing  the 
fell  ^rmy  Reserve  and  Army  National  Guard — this  to 
rfi    acrease  their  combat  readiness,  complementing  the 

)cfofaer   15,   J  962 


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action  we  have  taken  to  strengthen  our  active 
forces. 

And  finality,  to  deal  more  adequately  with  the 
so-called  "war  of  liberation,"  the  threat  of  overt 
aggression  and  subversion — the  type  of  action,  as 
Secretary  Rusk  mentioned,  which  the  Communists 
are  cariying  on  in  Southeast  Asia  today — we  have 
more  than  tripled  our  counterinsurgency  forces. 

These  are  the  actions  that  have  been  taken  to 
strengthen  our  joresent  militaiy  power. 

But  of  course  it  is  not  enough  to  look  only  at 
the  present.  More  particularly,  with  the  im- 
mensely complicated  weajjons  systems  with  which 
we  are  dealing  today,  we  must  look  and  plan  far 
into  the  future,  and  to  meet  the  future  we  face 
three  major  problems. 

The  firet  of  these  deals  with  the  new  power  rela- 
tionships within  NATO.  Europe's  increasing  in- 
tegration, as  well  as  the  tremendous  economic 
growth  which  has  taken  place  in  Western  Europe, 
requires  us  to  reassess  our  military  relationships. 
These  same  forces,  of  course,  provide  opportunities 
to  increase  substantially  the  NATO  defense  ca- 
pability to  meet  a  variety  of  threats  in  Europe  and 
opportimities  to  work  out  a  closer  relationship 
both  among  the  members  of  NATO  and  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Western  European 
nations. 

The  second  problem  arises  from  the  possibility 
that  the  value  of  our  nuclear  superiority  may  de- 
cline over  time.  We  have  substantial  superiority 
in  strategic  nuclear  forces  today.  We  believe  that 
we  can  maintain  that  nuclear  superiority  in  terms 
of  numbers  in  the  years  to  come,  but  we  caraiot 
maintam  the  near-monopoly  on  strategic  nuclear 
forces  which  we  have  possessed  over  much  of  the 
past  decade.  And  therefore,  since  the  utility  of 
our  numerical  superiority  is  likely  to  decline,  we 
have  to  start  planning  now  against  the  day  when 
our  strategic  nuclear  forces  may  be  a  less  effective 
deterrent  than  they  have  been  against  major  ag- 
gression shoi't  of  a  nuclear  attack  on  NATO. 

We  are  faced  with  a  very  real  paradox :  that  as 
nuclear  weapons  develop  and  continue  to  become 
more  effective,  it  becomes  increasingly  important 
for  us  to  supplement  our  strategic  nuclear  power 
by  adequate  nonnuclear  forces. 

The  third  major  problem  we  face  is  the  problem 
of  arms  control  and  disarmament.  Disarmament 
and  arms  policy  are  intimately  related.  They  are 
part  of  the  effort  to  provide  for  our  national 
security. 

549 


Some  of  the  most  important  things  we  do  in 
this  field  are  not  part  of  what  is  customarily 
thought  of  as  either  disarmament  or  arms  control. 
We  don't,  for  example,  tliink  merely  of  numbers 
of  weapons  when  we  are  estimating  our  defense 
needs.  "We  think  particularly  of  the  kinds  of  weap- 
ons, of  their  survivability,  and  particularly  of 
the  effectiveness  of  our  command  and  control  over 
those  weapons.  Our  armaments  must  protect  our 
national  security  from  inadvertent  as  well  as  from 
deliberate  aggression. 

We  can't  hope  to  deter  aggression  without  tak- 
ing some  of  tlie  risks  that  are  associated  with 
the  failure  of  deterrence,  a  risk  that  we  shall  have 
to  fight  the  war  that  we  are  ti-ying  to  avoid. 
There  is  the  ever-present  problem,  therefore,  of 
the  balancing  of  risks. 

But  fortunately  the  goals  of  deterrence,  of 
defense,  and  of  arms  control  are  not  always  in  con- 
flict. For  example,  when  we  improve  our  com- 
mand and  control  systems,  we  improve  our 
deterrent  to  aggression  and,  at  the  same  time,  we 
decrease  the  chance  of  a  completely  uncontrolled 
war,  should  deterrence  fail.  We  have  installed  a 
number  of  both  administrative  and  physical  safe- 
guards for  our  nuclear  weapons,  which  reduce  as 
far  as  possible  the  chances  of  unauthorized  use. 

The  great  emphasis  we  have  placed  on  forces 
which  can  survive  a  nuclear  attack  from  the  Soviet 
not  only  serves  to  deter  Soviet  aggi'ession  but  also 
greatly  reduces  the  pressure  on  us  to  act  pre- 
cipitately in  a  crisis,  thus  decreasing  the  danger 
of  inadvertent  or  accidental  war. 

In  simimary,  then,  we  are  strengthening  our 
military  forces  to  deal  effectively,  to  deal  flexibly, 
with  a  wide  range  of  threats,  both  political  and 
military,  and  we  are  working  with  our  allies  to 
develop  policies  appropriate  to  the  changing  needs 
of  the  alliance.  In  our  defense  policy,  as  in  our 
foreign  policy  generally,  our  effort  is  to  carry  out 
the  President's  expressed  intention  to  find  a  third 
choice  between  holocaust  and  humiliation. 

Mr.  Smith :  Jlr.  Secretary,  all  of  us  from  time  to 
time  hear  complaints  about  the  size  and  the  cost  of 
our  Armed  Forces  and  the  way  they  are  strung  out 
all  across  the  world.  "V^liat  would  happen  if  we 
just  threw  up  our  hands,  closed  down  our  bases, 
brought  everybody  home,  and  relied  on  the  two 
oceans  to  preserve  our  safety  ? 

Secretary  McNamara:  At  a  time  when  in  our 
strategic  nuclear  forces  and  in  the  strategic  nuclear 
forces  of  our  opponents  there  exist  interconti- 

550 


nental  ballistic  missiles  with  ranges  of  7,500  miles, 
missiles  wliich  can  cross  the  oceans  in  but  a  few 
minutes,  I  think  it  is  perfectly  apparent  that  the 
oceans  no  longer  provide  the  safeguards  that  they 
have  in  past  decades. 


] 


jfal 

KOEO 


Progress  Through  Partnership 

Mr.  Smith:  Now,  Secretary  Eusk,  after  this 
look  at  "Security  Through  Strength,"  why  don't 
we  proceed  to  the  second  basic  point  of  our  for- 
eign policy,  "Progess  Through  Partnership"? 

Secretary  Rusk:  On  that,  Mr.  Smith,  I  would'? 
like  to  call  on  my  colleague,  the  Under  Secretary 
of  State,  Mr.  George  Ball. 

Mr.  Ball:  As  Secretary  Rusk  and  Secretary  Mc- 
Namara have  pointed  out,  a  prime  objective  of  our 
policy  is  the  security  of  the  United  States  and  of 
the  American  people.  In  the  mid-20th  century 
this  security  must  be  sought  in  a  world  of  change, 
in  a  world  of  faster  and  more  pervasive  change 
than  we  have  ever  laiown  before. 

In  the  relatively  brief  time  since  the  war — only 
about  17  years — three  major  alterations  have 
taken  place  in  the  face  of  the  world  as  we  knew  it,. 

As  we  are  all  constantly  aware,  an  Iron  Curtain 
has  been  erected  to  form  a  prison  for  about  one- 
third  of  the  earth's  population,  about  a  billion 
people.  For  the  remaining  two-thirds,  that  por- 
tion of  the  population  which  is  in  what  we  call  the 
free  world  outside  of  the  Iron  Curtain,  great 
changes  have  also  taken  place. 

We  have,  first  of  all,  as  Secretary  Rusk  men- 
tioned a  moment  ago,  the  shattering  of  the  old) 
colonial  systems  and  the  creation  since  1945  of  45 
new  nations,  united  in  their  determination  to 
maintain  their  new-found  freedom  and  sharing  a 
determination  to  attain  a  decent  standard  of  liv- 
ing for  their  peoples. 

Now,  one  might  have  thought  that  with  the  shat 
tering  of  the  old  colonial  systems,  the  colonial 
powers — that  handful  of  countries  in  Western 
Europe  that  had  maintained  such  a  great  influencej  llieOE 
over  so  many  people  in  the  world — would  havej  ioniff 
been  irreparably  weakened.  But,  in  fact,  theyjIVean 
have  turned  their  energies  with  an  extraordinary)  'hiM 
vigor  toward  a  great  and  heroic  task  at  home[ttiioiii 
toward  the  building  of  a  new,  united  Europe,  the|  ionbiiii 
realization  of  a  dream  that  no  conqueror  of  old  wasj  "d  to  t 
ever  able  to  achieve.  'inore 

This  united  Europe  started  with  the  initiative  oil  Witli 
six  continental  powers  who  created  an  economic  wt,  i^\ 

Department  of  Slate  Bulletin  Ortoie, 


lercfi 
mcrej 
ijaii 
Soi 
lomit 
matf 


ia 
In 

k  r; 
onial 
iitj  1 
mrld 
Diite 
nsa 
hi 
1 

f 
ritbu 


Semti 
ladii 
»ft!ie 
■  »iirit 
Ave 
ion  !o 


ommunity,  the  Common  Market,  and  this  Com- 
baon  Market  is  now  about  to  be  joined  by  tiie 
United  Kingdom  and  perhaps  two  or  three  other 
European  countries.  When  this  process  is  com- 
pleted, we  shall  have  on  the  European  side  of  the 
fVtlantic  a  new  entity  containing  about  a  quarter 
)f  a  billion  people,  an  entity  which  has  enjoyed 
md  is  now  displaying  the  most  extraordinary 
economic  growth,  with  a  growth  rate  since  1953  al- 
nost  twice  our  own,  and  which  during  the  period 
rom  1953  to  1960  mcreased  its  exports  by  113 
percent,  as  against  29  percent  for  our  own,  and 
ncreased  its  imports  by  almost  100  percent,  as 
igainst  35  percent  for  the  United  States. 

Now,  as  important  as  this  extraordinary  eco- 
lomic  vitality  in  Europe  may  be  to  us,  of  even 
greater  importance  are  the  implications  of  having 
)olitical  union  in  Europe.  For  the  first  time  in 
)ur  history  we  have  the  possibility  of  an  entity  of 
iqual  size,  commanding  almost  equal  resources, 
hat  can  serve  as  a  partner  with  us  in  our  common 
ndeavors  and  in  our  common  tasks. 

In  the  days  of  reconstruction  of  Europe  after 
he  ravages  of  the  war,  in  the  days  when  the  co- 
onial  empire  was  falling  apart,  Europe  of  neces- 
sity had  to  withdraw  from  many  parts  of  the 
vorld.  Power  vacuums  were  created,  and  the 
Jnited  States  had  to  pick  up  the  burden ;  and  it 
vas  a  very  heavy  burden  indeed,  as  we  all  know. 
3ut  now  that  Europe  is  going  strong  and  now 
hat  Europe  is  becoming  united,  we  can  look  to 

urope  as  an  equal  partner  to  share  our  burdens 
vith  us. 

We  have,  as  you  all  know,  established  two  insti- 
utional  arrangements  for  working  witli  our 
European  partner.  The  first,  NATO,  to  which 
jecretai-y  McNamara  alluded  a  moment  ago,  has 
lad  a  special  responsibility  for  the  whole  security 
if  the  free  world,  and  it  has  been  the  heart  of  our 
ecurity  system. 

A  year  ago  there  came  into  being  the  Organiza- 
ion  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development, 
he  OECD,  as  we  call  it.  Through  this  Organiza- 
ion  we  will  work  on  a  variety  of  economic  tasks. 
Ve  are  concerting  our  economic  policies  in  order  to 
liminate  the  imbalances  and  distortions  in  our 
conomic  affairs.  We  are  working  together  to 
ombine  and  to  conceit  our  national  programs  of 
id  to  the  underdeveloped  countries  and  to  effect 
.  more  equitable  sharing  of  this  common  burden. 

With  the  benefit  of  the  new  Trade  Expansion 
ju  Let,  which  the  President  has  asked  the  Congress 

Jcfofaer   75,    J  962 


to  approve,  we  should  have  a  tool  which  will  en- 
able us  to  negotiate  with  our  European  friends 
and  to  cooperate  with  them  to  bring  about  an  open- 
ing of  markets  all  over  the  world,  not  only  for  the 
United  States  and  for  the  produce  of  our  own 
f amis  and  factories  but  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole 
free  world. 

Finally,  outside  of  this  structure  of  the  Atlantic 
partnership,  as  we  call  it,  the  partnership  between 
the  great  Common  Market  of  Europe  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  great  common  market  of  America 
on  the  other,  there  is  Japan,  which  has  a  special 
meaning  for  us,  not  only  because  it  is  the  largest 
industrial  power  in  Asia,  but  also  because  it  is  a 
vital  trading  partner  of  ours  and  because  it  is 
working  with  us  and  with  Europe  toward  the 
sharing  of  some  of  these  common  tasks. 

So  I  can  assure  you  that  we  have  made  very 
great  progress  indeed,  not  only  through  the  At- 
lantic partnership  but  in  the  development  of  an 
even  firmer  Atlantic  partnership  and  in  the  exten- 
sion of  that  partnership  toward  the  carrying  out 
of  the  common  task  which  we  all  face.  And  this  is 
the  real  meaning  of  what  President  Kennedy  said 
so  eloquently  and  so  well  in  his  great  speech  in 
Philadelphia  on  the  Fourth  of  July,^  when  he 
spoke  of  the  interdependence  of  the  leading  na- 
tions of  the  free  world,  of  the  common  task  which 
the  Atlantic  partnership  must  carry  forward. 

Revolution  of  Freedom 

Mr.  Smith:  Mr.  Secretary,  I  wonder  if  we  could 
now  discuss  a  point  that  follows  right  on  the  dis- 
cussion we  have  just  had  with  I\Ir.  Ball — "Revo- 
lution of  Freedom." 

Secretary  Rusk :  Yes.  I  think  for  some  of  our 
problems  in  that  great  changing  woi'ld  we  ought  to 
turn  to  the  man  who  has  one  of  the  largest  and  most 
complicated  tasks  in  Washington,  Mr.  Fowler 
Hamilton,  our  Administrator  for  AID. 

Mr.  Hamilton:  As  you  Imow,  Mr.  Secretary,  in 
the  17  years  since  World  War  II,  our  Government 
in  our  own  national  self-interest  has  su^jported  a 
large  and  powerful  foreign  aid  progi'am.  The 
program  has  been  based  upon  a  recognition  that,  in 
the  conditions  that  have  existed  in  the  troubled 
world  since  World  War  II,  the  security  of  the 
United  States  depends  upon  the  security  of  the 
free  world.  The  purpose  of  this  program  is  to 
strengthen  the  national  secuiity  of  the  United 


'  IMd.,  July  23, 19C2,  p.  131. 


551 


States  by  strengthening  the  security  of  tlie  free 
world. 

This  progi-am  througliout  its  history  has  been 
bipartisan  and  nonpolitical.  It  has  been  supported 
by  every  President  and  by  every  Congress  that 
has  held  office  and  exercised  power  in  our  country 
during  tliis  period.  That  is  true  of  the  present 
program. 

Tlie  present  program  has  two  parts.  It  has  a 
long-range  part  and  it  has  a  short-range  part. 
The  purpose  of  the  short-range  part  is  to  meet 
challenges  that  the  Communists  present  to  us  on  a 
day-to-day,  week-to-week,  month-to-month  basis. 
Tlie  purpose  of  the  long-range  part  is  to  strengthen 
our  national  security  by  strengthening  the  security 
of  the  free  world  on  a  long-range  basis. 

Now  the  short-range  part,  which  accounts  for 
somewhat  more  than  half  of  the  funds  that  Amer- 
ican citizens  put  up  to  support  this  security  pro- 
gram, consists  primarily  in  assistance  that  we  make 
available  to  our  military  allies,  primarily  to  coun- 
tries that  are  located  around  the  periphery  of  the 
Iron  and  Bamboo  Curtains,  countries  like  Korea 
and  Viet-Nam. 

The  long-range  jsart  is  primarily  focused  upon 
development.  As  President  Kennedy  said  in  his 
message  to  the  Congress  last  year,  the  security  of 
the  United  States  and  the  security  of  the  free 
world  require  a  Decade  of  Development. 

Now,  how  does  it  come  to  be  ?  "VVliat  are  the  cir- 
cumstances that  require  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  to  put  up  these  sums  for  the  development  of 
peoples  and  of  institutions  in  other  coimtries  ? 

Well,  the  principal  factor  is  the  one  that  Secre- 
tary Rusk  adverted  to.  While  the  Conmiunists 
have  been  talking  about  a  world  revolution  of 
violence,  the  fact  is  that  the  free  world  has  achieved 
a  revolution  of  peace  that  is  unprecedented  in 
history. 

In  the  17  years  since  World  War  II  ended,  over 
a  billion  people  have  obtained  their  political  free- 
dom, largely  by  peaceful  means.  A  nimiber  of 
new  countries  have  become  independent ;  45  coun- 
tries, to  be  exact,  have  achieved  their  mdependence 
since  the  end  of  World  War  II. 

Now,  in  many  cases  the  peoples  of  these  coun- 
tries, through  no  fault  of  their  own,  lack  the  edu- 
cation, the  skills,  the  talents  that  are  required  if 
their  societies  are  to  be  stable  and  viable,  if  they 
are  to  have  the  minimum  of  economic  and  political 
strength  that  is  necessary  for  them  to  withstand 

552 


the  kind  of  chaos  that  the  Communists  sow  as  a 
prelude  to  Communist  domination. 

Now,  our  country  is  not  alone  in  this  enterprisfti 
The  amount  of  foreign  aid  that  is  made  available! 
to  these  less  developed  countries  by  other  more  acH 
vanced  countries,  such  as  those  in  Europe  andi 
Japan,  is  approximately  equal  at  the  present  tim«; 
to  the  amoimt  of  aid  that  we  make  available. 

Parenthetically,  I  might  add,  this  is  a  remark- 
able tribute  to  the  success  of  the  Marsliall  Plan 
which,  in  a  brief  period  of  time  since  that  plan  waaf 
successfully  accomplished,  enables  the  former  re- 
cipients  of  aid  now  to  make  a  contribution  to  aic 
equal  to  that  of  our  own  and,  obviously,  by  th<«  "] 
same  token,  an  equal  contribution  to  the  securitj 
of  the  free  world  against  Communist  subversion 

Now,  as  to  the  kinds  of  aid  that  we  have :  Ai 
the  present  time  we  make  available  aid — I  mighll  "'"'' 
add  that  most  of  that  money  is  spent  in  the  United  "^ 
States.  We  don't  give  a  king  or  a  prime  ministe!'  '" " 
or  a  minister  of  a  foreign  government  a  check  am 
say,  "Here  is  the  money."  Wliat  happens  is  tha 
at  least  80  percent  of  the  aid  goods  are  purchaset'i 
in  the  United  States  and  shipped  abroad  unde: 
carefully  controlled  recfuirements.  Indeed,  it  ha 
been  estimated  by  the  great  labor  organization]! 
that  this  economic  activity  generated  by  this  aic 
supplies  jobs  for  700,000  Americans.  That  is  no 
the  purpose  of  it,  of  course.  The  purpose  is  t«- 
help  work  with  our  friends  in  Europe  and  ii 
Japan  to  strengthen  these  countries,  to  help  then 
help  themselves. 

Secondly,  based  on  the  sound  principle  that  th 
Lord  helps  those  that  help  themselves,  we  don' 
extend  aid  unless  the  people  who  are  interested  ifl  -^^ 
receiving  it  are  willing  to  work  out  a  partnershi]( 
arrangement  with  us,  are  willing  to  contribute  tt 
the  extent  that  they  can,  because  ultimately  ty 
only  forces  that  can  save  a  society  from  comi 
munism  are  the  forces  within  that  society— thu  ™f 
strength,  the  integrity,  and  the  willingness  of  tht  ^''fi 
people  to  make  sacrifices  for  freedom,  as  we  hav  '^'ipl 
made  sacrifices  for  freedom.  *«ffl 

I  think  it  is  also  interesting  to  note  that  unde:*  'Pf«ss 
the  present  program  the  preponderant  part  of  th<  H'. 
funds  that  are  made  available  in  the  form  of  eccxf' 
nomic  assistance  are  made  available  as  loans,  n 
as  grants.  Those  loans  are  repayable  over  a  lonjj  *"' 
period  of  years,  it's  true,  but  are  repayable  ill 
dollars. 

Now,  what  does  the  money  go  for?     Under 
scoring  the  last  point  I  made,  most  of  it  goes  fo' 


iltlie 

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oans.  Primarily  it  goes  to  the  development  side 
)f  tlie  program,  to  enable  these  new  countries  and 
lew  societies  to  develop  their  most  plentiful  and 
jriceless  asset,  their  people.  So  it  goes  primarily 
'or  education,  education  with  a  small  "e,"  to  edu- 
ate  farmers  to  be  better  farmers,  to  educate  gov- 
irnment  officials  to  be  more  efficient,  to  educate 
eclinicians,  to  educate  middle-level  people,  so  that 
hese  various  societies  can  have  the  kind  of  compe- 
P]j  ence  and  train  the  kind  of  competence  that  it 
akes  to  maintain  a  society  in  the  modern  world. 

Now,  I  should  like  to  come,  finally,  to  the  Alli- 
,nce  for  Progress,  which  is  one  of  the  most  im- 
)ortant  aspects  of  our  development  program. 

That  is  the  progi-am,  as  you  know,  which  was 
-nnounced  by  President  Kennedy  a  year  ago  last 
(larch,''  in  which  we,  woi'king  with  our  friends 
,nd  neighbors  in  Latin  America,  are  endeavoring 
o  cooperate  with  them  to  help  their  societies  face 
he  very  difficult  political  and  economic  stresses 
,nd  strains  that  have  been  imposed  upon  them  by 
conomic  conditions  that  have  developed  within 
he  last  few  years,  by  technological  changes,  and 
aost  of  all  by  the  fact  that  the  Communists  are 
tOW  coming  into  this  hemisphere  in  an  endeavor 
o  exploit  the  problems  that  our  friends  in  Latin 
J5ji  America  have,  in  the  hope  that  they  can  produce 
haos  as  preliminary  to  Communist  takeovers. 

Now  finally,  I  should  like  to  conclude  by  noting 
hat  we  help  ourselves  to  protect  ourselves  by  rein- 
orcing  the  free  world  against  communism.  AVe 
o  so  because  it  is  in  our  own  interest.  We  also 
o  so  because  it  is  in  the  interest  of  the  1,250,000,- 
00  people  in  the  underdeveloped  areas. 

As  President  Kennedy  has  said,  "If  a  free  so- 
iety  cannot  help  the  many  who  are  poor,  it  can- 
ot  save  the  few  who  are  rich."  ° 

M7\  Smith:  Mr.  Hamilton,  you  have  pointed  out 
he  stake  Americans  have  in  helping  people  of 
ther  lands,  and  yet  it  seems  to  me  it  is  frequently 
ard  for  some  of  us  to  appreciate  this.  How,  for 
xample,  do  you  explain  the  urgent  necessity  for 
oreign  aid  to  a  family  in  one  of  the  perennially 
epressed  areas  in  our  own  country  ? 

Mr.  Hamilton:  Well,  the  first  observation  I 
could  make  on  that  is  that,  of  course,  the  primary 
esponsibility  of  our  Government  is  to  protect  its 
wn  citizens,  and  we  should  see  to  it  that  our  own 
itizens  who  are  suffering  imemployment  have 


•plii 
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If 
ilol 


*  For  an  address  by  President  Kennedy  and  text  of  a 
lessage  to  Congress,  see  itid.,  Apr.  3,  1961,  p.  471. 
'Ihid.,  Feb.  6,  liXil,  p.  175. 

j|jl>cfofaer  75,  7  962 


Government  assistance  that  is  adequate,  assuming 
that  they  also  will  practice  self-help. 

Secondly,  we  won't  have  a  society  in  which  we 
can  help  our  less  fortunate  fellow  citizens  unless 
we  have  a  free  and  independent  United  States  and 
a  strong  and  secure  free  world;  so  the  citizen  of 
the  United  States  has  a  real  stake  in  seeing  to  it 
that  the  citizens  of  these  less  developed  countries 
maintain  freedom. 

Finally,  the  standard  of  living  in  these  countries 
is  so  much  worse  than  that  that  prevails  in  any 
area  of  the  United  States  tliat  there  is  no 
comparison. 

Mr.  Smith:  You  spoke  of  the  need  for  the  re- 
cipient nations'  helping  themselves,  and  yet  at 
times  this  involves  their  taking  a  greater  responsi- 
bility for  internal  improvement.  Have  we  had 
much  success  in  this  field — encouraging  some  of 
our  friendly  nations  to  update  their  laws  and  im- 
prove their  economic  structures,  broaden  their  tax 
bases  ? 

Mr.  Hamilton:  Yes.  I  am  gratified  to  be  able 
to  report  to  you,  Mr.  Smith,  that  we  have. 

The  Alliance  for  Progress  was  announced  in 
March  of  last  year,  but  it  didn't  even  get  on  a  piece 
of  paper  until  last  August,^  so  it  has  only  been  in 
being  for  about  12  months.  It  contemplates  very 
substantial  changes  in  important  matters  in  the 
Latin  American  countries.  A  number  of  those 
countries  have  already  shown  their  good  faith  by 
making  those. 

And  after  all,  you  know,  when  you  talk  about 
taxes  and  land  reform,  it  takes  us  a  good  long 
time  to  get  a  tax  law  passed  in  the  United  States — 
and  we  have  had  taxes  for  a  long,  long  time, 
unfortunately. 

Community  Under  Law 

Mr.  Smith:  Secretary  Rusk,  you  spoke  at  the 
outset  of  our  hope  for  the  gradual  emergence  of 
a  genuine  world  community,  and  this  under  the 
heading  of  the  next  point,  "Community  Under 
Law." 

Secretary  Rusk:  Yes.  To  talk  about  "Com- 
munity Under  Law,"  I  should  like  very  much  to 
go  to  Adlai  Stevenson,  our  United  States  Repre- 
sentative to  the  United  Nations  in  New  York. 

Ambassador  Stevenson:  Thank  you,  Mr.  Secre- 
tary. 


"  For  test  of  the  Charter  of  Punta  del  Este,  see  ibid., 
Sept.  11,  1961,  p.  463. 

SS3 


World  community  under  law.  Let's  try  to  see 
what  we  are  doing  to  turn  this  idea  into  reality. 
If  you  stood  at  my  office  window  in  New  York 
you  would  look  down  across  the  street  at  the  build- 
ings of  the  United  Nations.  In  a  long  row  you 
would  see  the  flags  of  108  member  nations,  the 
United  States  among  them. 

The  United  Nations  is  an  instrument  for  ad- 
vancing the  interests  of  our  country.  But  it  is 
also  an  instrument  for  advancing  the  interests  of 
all  107  of  these  other  members.  Even  where  there 
is  friction,  experience  shows  that  between  their 
interests  and  ours  it  is  usually  possible,  through 
diplomacy  and  not  force,  to  find  common  ground. 
Of  course,  the  U.N.  can't  do  it  all.  This  world 
community  needs  the  support  of  its  faithful  mem- 
bers. In  the  Congo,  for  instance,  it  was  U.S.  Air 
Force  planes  that  carried  U.N.  troops  from  34 
nations. 

Tlie  community  needs,  too,  the  creative  work  of 
great  regional  institutions :  the  European  Common 
Market  and  the  gi-owing  Atlantic  partnership 
whose  help  is  so  vitally  necessary  for  the  develop- 
ment of  the  new  and  emerging  nations.  The  U.N. 
needs  the  stability  and  security  afforded  by  our 
regional  alliances  like  NATO  and  the  Organiza- 
tion of  American  States. 

These  are  not  contradictory  forces.  They  are 
elements  in  a  single  grand  design. 

Now,  what  does  this  idea  of  a  world  community, 
of  which  the  U.N.  is  the  central  institution,  7iiean 
to  the  United  States? 

Remember  the  historical  circumstances  of  our 
time.  Soviet  communism  came  out  of  World  War 
n  as  a  world  power,  challenging  the  old  order  and 
pressing  hard  against  it.  Meanwhile  one  billion 
people  in  Asia  and  Africa  began  emerging  from 
colonial  status  to  independence — often  resentful 
of  their  old  rulers  and  demanding  equality  and 
dignity  and  a  better  life. 

In  ages  past,  the  ending  of  one  great  imperial 
system  has  usually  been  tlie  signal  for  the  rise 
of  another.  In  our  time  it  is  all  too  easy  to 
imagine  a  new  Communist  empire  in  Africa  and 
Asia,  moving  in  on  the  heels  of  the  withdrawing 
Europeans. 

Yet  the  new  nations  themselves  don't  want  to 
be  anybody's  satellite.  What  they  want  is  inde- 
pendence and  the  security  and  sense  of  belonging 
whicli  comes  from  being  full  membei-s  of  a  com- 
mniiity.    That  is  what  the  United  Nations  means 


554 


to  them.     It  means  a  world  in  which  a  nation 
doesn't  have  to  be  strong  in  order  to  be  secure. 

From  this  point  of  view  the  whole  history  of; 
the  U.N.  can  be  understood  as  a  series  of  efforts  to- 
help  small,  weak  nations  in  their  hour  of  trouble. 
The  list  is  already  long :  Iran  in  19-46 ;  Greece  in 
1947 ;  India  and  Pakistan ;  Indonesia,  Israel,  and' 
the  Arab  states ;  the  successful  defense  of  Korea ; 
Suez ;  Lebanon ;  and — greatest  U.N.  effort  of  all — 
the  Congo. 

We  can  learn  a  great  deal  from  the  story  of  the 
Congo.  Here  was  a  newborn  nation — not  well 
equipped  for  independence — erupting  in  violence 
and  ci^^l  chaos.  It  appealed  to  the  U.N.  to  restore 
order  and  uphold  its  independence;  and  the  U.N, 
swifty  answered  with  an  international  armed 
force  of  18,000  men. 

Moscow  had  other  plans.  The  Soviets  placed 
their  bets  on  chaos.  They  demanded  that  the 
U.N.  evict  all  Belgians  and  subdue  Katanga  by 
ai-med  force,  in  an  orgy  of  anti-European  hatred, 
They  illegally  sent  in  military  trucks  and  planes. 

The  U.N.  in  the  Congo  successfully  resisted 
these  Soviet  maneuvers.  Then  came  a  violent  So- 
viet attack  on  the  United  Nations  itself  and  on  itf 
Secretary-General. 

But  Dag  Hammarskjold  refused  to  resign  under 
this  So\'iet  browbeating.  With  perfect  confidence 
he  placed  his  fate,  and  the  fate  of  the  office  of 
Seci'etary-General,  in  the  hands  of  the  U.N.  major- 
ity. He  spoke  to  the  delegates  of  100  nations, 
half  of  which  had  gained  their  independence  since 
World  War  II,  and  said  to  them :  "This  is  your 
organization,  gentlemen."  They  understood  him, 
and  they  refused  to  see  their  organization 
crippled.  Even  after  Hammarskjold's  tragic 
death,  the  office  of  Secretary-General  was  pre 
served  intact  and  U  Thant  was  elected  with  full! 


{TO 


are 


spct 

and 

lie 

T 

ik 


T( 

(w 
M 


powers. 

I  hope  we  Americans  will  remember  tliis  Congo 
story.  It  was  not  we  but  our  So\aet  adversaries 
who  beat  their  desks  in  anger  because  of  the  U.N.'s* 
action  in  the  Congo.  It  is  not  we  but  the  Soviet 
Union  who  used  the  veto  100  times  to  block  major- 
ity votes  in  the  U.N.  Security  Comicil. 

Let  me  emphasize  that  the  U.N.  is  not  paralyzed 
by  such  opposition ;  nor  is  it  weakened  by  the  crisest 
it  has  had  to  face.  In  fact,  evei\v  great  crisis  ini 
the  historj'  of  tlie  U.N.  has  ended  with  the  U.N. 
more  effective  than  before. 

The  U.N.  is  more  tlian  a  fire  brigade.    It  is  also 


It  a?  3 
We 


Department  of  Stale  Bulletin 


(tieS' 
iociei 
oriii 

m 

ffl 

ITe 

BMe 


Court 

iinpor 
Bj 

a, 

ofliii 
di 


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r,:*' 


a  nation  builder.  It  has  proclaimed  the  1960's  the 
U.N.  Decade  of  Development.  U.N.  projects  are 
underway  all  over  the  world  to  develop  the  re- 
sources and  skills  of  the  new  nations — shoemaking 
in  Morocco,  mining  in  the  heart  of  Africa,  rice 
growing  in  Thailand — hundreds  of  such  projects. 
Eighty  percent  of  the  United  Nations  interna- 
tional staff  is  engaged  in  such  constructive  work. 
They,  in  turn,  draw  on  the  wealth  of  resources  in 
the  whole  U.N.  family  of  specialized  and  technical 
agencies,  each  in  its  own  field. 

Now,  what  does  this  all  add  up  to  ?  Clearly  we 
are  far  from  our  ultimate  concept — a  world  "com- 
munity under  law."  Distrust  and  hatred  still 
deeply  divide  our  world.  There  are  still  troiible 
spots  like  the  explosive  frontier  between  Israel 
and  Egypt,  where  U.N.  soldiers  have  kept  things 
quiet  for  5  years. 

Yet  there  are  great  elements  of  strength  on  our 
side.  The  United  Nations  is  now  17  years  old. 
It  is  battered  and  scarred  because  it  has  not  shrunk 
from  conflict.    But  it  is  full  of  vitality. 

Today  it  is  building  bridges  of  community  be- 
tween the  advanced  industrial  democracies  of  the 
Northern  Hemisphere  and  the  poor,  aspiring  new 
nations  of  Africa  and  Asia. 

One  day  it  may  help  to  bridge  that  other  gulf — 
the  gulf  between  the  free  and  open  societies  of 
democratic  nations  and  the  fanatical  closed  soci- 
jties  of  communism.  For  the  U.N.  is  itself  an  open 
society,  a  school  of  tolerance,  of  free  debate,  where 
ordinary  citizens  sit  in  the  gallery ;  and  its  mem- 
bers do  not  take  kindly  to  fanaticism  or  dictation 
from  any  quarter. 

Wliat  of  the  future  ? 

We  shall  ti-y  to  make  the  United  Nations  still 
More  effective.  We  shall  seek  to  strengthen  its 
potential  for  handling  emergencies  and  to  develop 
it  as  a  center  of  '"quiet  diplomacy." 

We  hope  too  for  more  effectiveness  in  the  World 
[I!ourt,  the  most  neglected  arm  of  the  U.N.,  whose 
recent  opinion  on  U.N.  finances ''  may  be  of  historic 
mportance. 

By  such  efforts  we  intend  to  assure  that  the 
[J.N.  will  continue  to  do  its  share  in  the  long  job 
)f  building  a  world  community  mider  law,  in 
vhich  free  peoples  can  live  together  in  peace. 


'  For  a  statement  made  by  Abram  Chayes,  Legal  Ad- 
viser of  the  Department  of  State,  before  the  Court  on 
Hay  21,  see  iUd.,  July  2,  1962,  p.  30;  for  a  Department 
itatement  concerning  the  Court's  opinion,  see  ihUh,  Aug. 
3, 1962,  p.  246. 

Ocfober   75,   1962 


Peace  Through  Perseverance 

Ml'.  Smith:  There  seems,  at  times,  a  certain 
amount  of  futility  in  our  efforts  to  achieve  real 
arms  reduction,  and  yet  this  must  remain  a  very 
vital  part  of  our  foreign  policy. 

The  last  point,  Mr.  Secretary — I  wonder  if  we 
could  turn  to  "Peace  Through  Perseverance." 

Secretary  Rusk:  There  are  some  tasks  that  can 
never  be  abandoned.  We  just  have  to  stay  with 
them.  To  talk  about  "Peace  Through  Persever- 
ance," I  would  like  to  go  to  the  Counselor  of  the 
Department  of  State,  Mr.  Walt  Kostow. 

Mr.  Rostoio:  The  achievement  of  peace  is,  of 
course,  Mr.  Smith,  a  problem,  in  the  end,  of  our 
relations  with  the  Communist  bloc. 

The  policies  you  have  heard  described  this  after- 
noon are  not  the  simple  result  of  the  fact  that  we 
face  the  Communist  conspiracy  in  the  world  and 
the  Communist  thrust  for  world  power.  Given 
the  kind  of  world  in  which  we  live,  with  its  high 
degree  of  interdependence,  we  would  be  pursuing, 
in  any  case,  a  policy  of  partnership  toward  a  re- 
^aved  Europe,  a  policy  of  partnership  toward  a 
remarkably  re\aved  Jaj^an.  We  would  be  turn- 
ing in  the  American  interest  to  assist  the  under- 
developed nations,  wliich  are  feeling  the  surge  of 
ambition  to  modernize  their  societies.  We  would 
be  seeking  to  build  in  this  expanding  and  higUy 
interconnected  free  world  a  community  and  the 
institutions  of  commimity. 

And  given  the  nature  of  nuclear  weapons,  we 
would  have  to  have  a  military  policy  not  unlike 
that  outlined  earlier  by  Secretary  McNamara. 

But  all  of  these  policies  take  on  a  special  mean- 
ing in  the  light  of  the  policy  pursued  from  Moscow 
and  from  Peiping.  Since  1945  it  has  been  Com- 
munist policy  to  fragment,  not  to  unite,  Western 
Europe.  It  has  been  Communist  policy  to  try  to 
draw  the  individual  states  of  Europe  away  from 
association  with  each  other  and  away  from  the 
United  States. 

You  will  all  recall  tliat  in  the  days  just  after  the 
war,  before  the  Marshall  Plan  took  hold,  there 
was  a  systematic  effort  by  the  Communists  to  use 
the  Coromunist  parties  in  Western  Europe  to  try 
to  bring  down  the  govermnents  there. 

As  Western  European  recovery  took  hold  and 
as  we  built  the  Marshall  Plan  and  NATO,  the 
Communists  turned  increasingly,  in  the  past  dec- 
ade, to  the  underdeveloped  areas.  There  they  be- 
lieve that  they  see  vulnerabilities  they  can  exploit. 


555 


! 


They  see  these  AaUnerabilities  in  the  very  emer- 
gence of  these  new  nations  into  the  modern  world, 
in  tlie  changes  they  must  make,  the  confusion  that 
must  come,  as  they  seek  to  transform  old  agri- 
cultural societies  so  that  they  can  receive  and  use 
the  tools  of  modern  science  and  technology. 

Specifically,  we  have  seen  the  Communists  use 
the  ugly  method  of  guerrilla  war  from  Greece  to 
Viet-Nam.  And  we  have  observed  the  ambitions 
of  Castro  with  respect  to  Latin  America.  You 
remember  he  made  a  speech  last  December  in  which 
he  referred  to  guerrilla  war  as  the  "match  you 
throw  into  the  haystack,"  and  then  said  that  Latin 
America  looked  to  him  like  a  pretty  good  haystack. 

This  is  one  technique  they  have  tried  to  apply 
in  these  transitional,  underdeveloped  areas,  but  it's 
not  the  only  technique.  They  have  used  aid  and 
trade  and,  above  all,  the  notion  that  communism 
is  a  technique  for  rapidly  developing  an  under- 
developed area — more  efficient  if  more  ruthless 
than  the  methods  that  we  would  propose. 

In  addition,  the  Communists  have  continued  to 
pose  a  direct  military  threat.  After  the  war  the 
Soviet  Union  did  not  disarm  as  we  did.  It  built 
up  massive  ground  force  strength,  and  it  probed 
at  every  point  of  weakness — in  northern  Azerbai- 
jan, that  is,  in  Iran;  in  Turkey;  in  Greece;  and 
then  at  Berlin  in  '48-'49.  And  they  probed  all 
through  Asia  as  well,  in  Burma,  Malaya,  the 
Philippines,  Indonesia,  Korea. 

With  respect  to  Europe,  they  have  tried  to  per- 
suade the  Europeans  that  they  are  in  the  position 
of  hostage  with  respect  to  nuclear  weapons  and 
that  the  Europeans  should,  therefore,  back  away 
from  Soviet  demands,  notably  in  Berlin. 

This  is  a  form  of  nuclear  blackmail  we  have 
seen  in  recent  years. 

We  must  base  our  policy  toward  the  Communist 
bloc  on  the  assumption  that  they  would  seriously 
consider  the  risk  of  initiating  a  nuclear  war  if  they 
judged  that  we  were  vulnerable. 

Therefore  the  foundations  for  our  policy  to- 
ward the  Communist  bloc  lie  also  in  the  positive 
policies  you  have  heard  outlined. 

Our  first  task  is  to  frustrate  all  forms  of  Com- 
munist aggression,  at  any  level,  by  pursuing  the 
constructive  policies  presented  by  my  colleagues — 
policies  designed  to  build  toward  a  free-world 
community  and  to  defend  that  free- world  com- 
munity at  every  level  of  aggression. 

Nevertheless,  it  is  not  our  interest,  nor  is  it  our 


belief  that  the  cold  war  need  go  on  forever.  His- 
tory is  not  standing  still  within  the  Communist 
bloc. 

We  have  seen  in  recent  years  an  extraordinary 
tendency  of  the  Communist  bloc  to  fragment.  It 
is  a  strange  irony  that,  while  Western  Europe  is 
pulling  together  in  an  unprecedented  movement 
toward  unity,  the  Communists,  who  counted  on 
fragmentation  in  Western  Europe,  are  experienc- 
ing it  within  the  bloc.  The  basis  of  fragmenta- 
tion is  the  assertion,  the  deep  assertion  of  national 
interests  within  the  bloc. 

Secondly,  because  of  the  very  nature  of  commu- 
nism, because  of  the  very  nature  of  the  police-state 
control  which  they  would  impose  over  people  from 
one  end  of  the  bloc  to  the  other,  they  can't  grow 
food  efficiently.  As  I  say,  this  is  no  accident. 
There  are  simply  not  enough  policemen  in  the 
world  to  follow  a  farmer  aroimd  to  make  sure 
he  does  the  things  he  has  to  do  to  make  food  grow. 
And  from  Eastern  Germany  through  Russia  itself 
to  the  great  crisis  in  China,  we  see  this  weakness, 
which  is  not  merely  an  economic  weakness  but 
strikes  at  the  very  heart  of  the  viability  of  the 
police-state  system,  on  which  they  must  rely  if 
communism  is  to  persist. 

Third,  in  addition  to  nationalism,  which  we  see 
asserting  itself — not  least  in  Russia  but  also  in 
China  and  in  Eastern  Europe — there  is  a  quiet 
persistence  of  what  we  might  call  humane  liberal- 
ism. 

Be  clear,  these  trends  toward  liberalism  will 
not  resolve  the  cold  war  for  us.  Poets  do  not  make 
foreign  policy  or  military  policy.  But  it  is  a  fact, 
and  a  wholesome  fact,  that  the  young  Soviet  poets 
are  returning  to  the  oldest  theme  in  the  Western 
and  Russian  culture,  namely,  the  integrity  of  the 
individual.  And  there  are  many  other  signs  that 
the  humane  values  still  live  in  Russia.  These  will 
not  win  the  cold  war  for  us,  but  they  are  signs — and 
hopeful  signs — that  history  has  not  stopped  in  the 
Communist  bloc  and  that  the  great  humane  cur- 
rents in  Russian  and  Western  and  world  history 
are  not  to  bs  counted  out  forever. 

Fourtli,  there  is  the  cost  of  the  arms  race.  The 
arms  race  is  expensive  for  us ;  it  is  even  more  ex- 
pensive for  the  Soviet  Union.  It  costs  them  in 
housing;  it  costs  them  in  food;  it  costs  them  in 
many  other  dimensions.  And  if  Secretary  Mc- 
Namara  carries  through  his  plans,  he  vrill  make 
the  arms  race  in  the  next  years  a  very  costly  dead 
end  for  the  Soviet  Union. 


556 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


eii 
lent 
on 


Fifth,  there  is  the  danger,  as  more  nations  ac- 
nist|  quire  nuclear  weapons,  that  the  risks  of  a  nuclear 
war  will  increase — a  war  which  neither  the  Soviet 
Union  nor  ourselves  would  like. 

Therefore,  our  task,  while  building  and  defend- 
ing the  free  world,  is  to  convince  the  Communists 
that  their  notion  of  world  domination  is  an  im- 
possible notion. 

Our  job  is  to  encourage,  by  every  means  at  our 
disposal,  the  emergence  of  these  forces  of  national- 
ism and  liberalism  still  alive  and  growing  within 
the  bloc. 

It  is  also  our  job  to  be  prepared  to  negotiate  arms 
agreements,  increasing  the  security  of  all,  so  long 
as  effective  systems  of  inspection  are  included  in 
those  agreements. 

And  it  is,  finally,  our  interest  to  limit  and  nar- 
row issues  of  disagreement.  Wliile  defending  our 
vital  interests  we  must  be  prepared  to  make  agree- 
ments which  diminish  the  dangers  of  confronta- 
tions in  such  places  as  Laos  and  Berlin  and  which 
decrease  the  danger  that  the  cold  war  lead  on  to 
war  itself. 

Our  policy  toward  the  Communist  bloc  must  be 
rooted,  then,  in  the  fundamental  policies  of  build- 
ing and  defending  the  free  world.  But  aware  of 
the  forces  of  change  within  the  bloc,  we  must  never 
cease  to  attempt  to  minimize  the  possibility  that 
war  comes  about,  to  diminish  the  likelihood  that 
points  of  confrontation  will  lead  on  to  war,  and 
never  lose  faith  that  the  forces  of  nationalism  and 
liberalism  are  at  work  within  the  bloc. 

If  we  maintain  our  strength  and  unity,  if  we 
persist  doggedly,  if  we  persevere  with  the  lines  of 
policy  that  you  have  heard  laid  out,  we  can  look 
forward  with  confidence  to  a  victory,  and  to  a 
peaceful  victory  for  the  forces  of  freedom. 

Mr.  Smith :  Mr.  Rostow,  it's  quite  obviously  not 
in  our  interests  to  keep  the  cold  war  as  something 
that  will  go  on  forever.  But  is  there  a  dominant 
development  that  we  can  watch  for?  In  other 
words,  what  are  we  looking  for  to  produce  a  break 
or  a  durable  thaw  in  the  cold  war  ? 

Mr.  Rostow :  I  think  that  the  issue  that  you  and 
Secretary  Rusk  began  with  is  the  touchstone,  Mr. 
Smith,  the  issue  of  serious  disarmament  covered 
by  effective  systems  of  inspection. 

If  the^e  forces  that  I  have  described  work  out, 
if  our  policies  succeed  and  these  historical  forces 
push  as  we  would  like  to  see  them  push  within  the 

October  15,   J  962 


bloc,  the  sign  of  victory  would  be  the  Soviet  will- 
ingness to  make  a  serious  arms  agreement,  effec- 
tively inspected. 

That  is  not  yet  in  sight.  But  as  you  began  by 
saying,  this  is  the  ultimate  test  of  whether  we  have 
made  progress. 

Mr.  Smith:  Thank  you,  gentlemen. 

This  has  been  an  interesting  and,  I  think,  a  very 
fast  hour,  and  I  wonder  if  you,  Mr.  Secretary 
Rusk,  could  top  off  this  unusual  briefing  with  a 
glance  at  the  future.     "^^Hiere  do  we  go  from  here  ? 

Secretary  Rusk:  We  have  been  talking  about 
our  business  of  building  a  decent  world,  day  after 
day  and  month  after  month.  There  is  nothing 
easy  and  nothing  cheap  about  the  great  tasks  be- 
fore us;  for  freedom  asks  a  great  deal  from  free 
men,  and  peace  is  not  yet  achieved.  But  those  who 
are  committed  to  freedom  have  less  to  worry  about 
than  those  who  would  reverse  the  entire  history  of 
man. 

It  is  not  for  us  to  fear  the  great  winds  of  change 
that  are  blowing  today.  They  are  the  winds  we 
have  long  sailed  with,  the  winds  which  have  car- 
ried man  on  his  unending  journey,  the  winds  of 
freedom. 

For  the  revolution  of  freedom,  which  we  have  so 
proudly  nurtured  and  fought  for  in  the  past,  is  the 
true,  enduring  revolution,  because  it  springs  from 
the  deepest  and  most  persistent  aspirations  of  men. 
And  history  says  that  this  revolution  will  not  fail. 

Mr.  Smith:  Thank  you,  Mr.  Secretary. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  what  you  have  just  seen 
and  heard  was  unusual,  if  not  unprecedented,  and 
yet  typically  American — the  Secretary  of  State, 
the  Secretary  of  Defense,  our  Ambassador  to  the 
United  Nations,  and  their  chief  advisers,  gathered 
before  the  microphones  and  cameras  to  explain  to 
the  public  the  basic  goals  of  American  foreign 
policy. 

Now,  this  is  no  hard  sell  by  these  men  but  an 
imusual  exercise  in  contemporaiy  history.  Their 
hope  for  this  hour  is  that  their  explanations,  their 
attempts  at  better  understanding,  spread  far  be- 
yond the  facilities  of  this  network  into  the  homes, 
the  shops,  the  workrooms,  and  the  classrooms  of 
America. 

Perhaps  if  there  had  been  facilities  for  this  sort 
of  dead-level  approach  to  foreign  policy  in  other 
countries  and  in  other  years,  there  might  not  be 
quite  the  need  today  for  armies  and  bombs  and 
missiles. 


557 


As  you  discuss  this  program  later  with  your 
friends,  it  might  be  wise  to  remember  an  impor- 
tant point :  What  you've  just  heard  was  not  rimior, 
distortion,  or  something  passed  on  to  you  third 
hand.  This  was  history  straight  from  the 
source — from  the  men  who  execute  American  for- 
eign policy  on  behalf  of  the  President,  the  men 
who  share  with  him  the  awesome  responsibility  for 
tomorrow. 


U.S.  Charges  Soviet  Union  Wants 
To  Maintain  Tensions  in  Berlin 

U.S.  NOTE  OF  SEPTEMBER  25 » 

The  United  States  Government  regrets  that  the 
Soviet  note  of  September  5  does  not  attempt  to 
deal  with  the  points  raised  in  the  United  States 
notes  of  August  24  and  27.^  The  Soviet  note  ig- 
nores the  fact  that  the  tensions  in  Berlin  are  due 
to  the  wall  which  divides  the  city  and  to  the 
brutality  of  the  East  German  regime  towards  its 
inliabitants.  Both  are  the  responsibility  of  the 
Soviet  Government.  The  Soviet  note  is  also  silent 
on  the  cold-blooded  killing  of  refugees  seeking  to 
cross  the  wall  into  West  Berlin  and  makes  no  men- 
tion of  the  particularly  revolting  circumstances 
connected  with  the  death  of  Peter  Fechter  on 
August  17. 

The  United  States  Government  rejects  the  al- 
legations contained  in  the  Soviet  note,  which 
seemed  designed  only  to  distract  attention  from 
the  brutal  activities  of  the  East  German  regime. 

It  is  unfortunate,  to  say  the  least,  that  the  Soviet 
Government  should  say  in  its  note  that  "the  ques- 
tion is  not  one  of  discussing  incidents  and  consul- 
tations." It  is  manifestly  unreasonable  for  the 
Soviet  Government  to  accuse  the  United  States 
Government  of  various  activities  in  Berlin  and  to 
refuse  to  discuss  the  situation  there,  as  the  United 
States  has  proposed  in  its  notes  of  June  25,' 
August  24  and  August  27.  In  opposing  such  a 
discussion  of  the  situation  in  Berlin  the  Soviet 


'  Delivered  by  the  American  Embassy  at  Moscow  to  the 
Soviet  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  (press  release  579 
dated  Sept.  25). 

'  For  texts,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept.  10,  19G2,  p.  378,  and 
Sept.  17,  1962,  p.  417. 

•  For  text,  see  ihUl.,  .Tuly  Ifi,  1902,  p.  97. 


558 


Government  must  bear  a  heavy  responsibility  and 
evidences  tlicreby  its  desire  to  maintain  tension  in 
Berlin. 


SOVIET  NOTE  OF  SEPTEMBER  5 


espeda 
aiiocciipst 
Pit  W 


Unofficuil  translation 
Note    43/USA 

The  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  I 
Socialist  Republics  on  instructions  of  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment declares  the  following  with  regard  to  notes  of  the  i 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America  of  Augu.st 
24  and  27,  1962 : 

The  Soviet  Government  is  constrained  to  state  that 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America,  like  the 
Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  France,  while  paying 
lipservice  to  the  danger  of  the  present  situation  in  West 
Berlin,  is  attempting  to  divest  Itself  of  responsibility  for 
events  which  have  recently  taken  place  there.  It  not  only 
evades  taking  necessary  measures  for  the  suppression  of 
provocative  actions  of  Fa.scistic  West  Berlin  and  West 
German  elements,  but  even  proceeds  to  justify  these  prov- 
ocations, which  could  have  serious  consequences  for 
peace  and  international  security. 

The  Soviet  Government  warned  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  of  America  that  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  and  West  Berlin  authorities  were  preparing 
aggressive  actions  for  the  middle  of  August,  with  a  view 
to  raising  tension  and  interfering  with  a  German  peace 
settlement  and  normalization  of  the  situation  in  West 
Berlin.  However,  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
of  America  took  no  measures  to  prevent  the  sallies  of 
Bonn  and  West  Berlin  revanchists  which  were  in  prepara- 
tion. What  is  more,  the  occupation  authorities  made  their 
aircraft  availah'o  for  transportation  to  West  Berlin  from 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  of  every  kind  of  poli- 
tician and  outright  agent  of  subversive  centers,  who  were 
inciting  the  population  of  the  city  to  provocative  actions 
against  the  German  Democratic  Republic  and  the  Soviet 
TTnion. 

The  occupation  authorities  of  the  United  States,  Brit- 
ain, and  France  in  West  Berlin  bear  the  responsibility 
for  murders  of  German  Democratic  Republic  border 
guards  who  were  protecting  the  security  of  their  Republic. 
The  occupation  authorities  are  also  responsible  for  the 
blowing  up  of  German  Democratic  Republic  border  instal- 
lations by  saboteurs  from  West  Berlin,  which  led  to  casual- 
ties. The  Governments  of  the  three  powers  bear  the 
responsibility  for  penetrations  by  Bunde.swehr  military 
aircraft  into  the  German  Democratic  Republic  air  space; 
the  guilt  for  the  unceasing  acts  of  sabotage  on  the  city's 
rail  system  lies  on  the  authorities  of  the  three  powers  in 
West  Berlin,  although  they  should  have  known  that  this 
could  evoke  complications  in  the  communications  of  West 
Berlin  with  the  outside  world. 

The  Soviet  Government  deems  it  necessary  to  empha- 


i  a  irf 
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(1  tlie  Sot 
Boreseric 

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Fastis* 
r.S.S,E,  C 
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*  Delivered  to  the  American  Embassy  at  Moscow  by  the 
Soviet  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Similar  notes  were 
received  by  the  British  and  French  Embassies. 

Department  of  Sfafe  BuUetin 


tarist 
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adven 
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twetB 
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tjai:  size  especially  that,  as  a  result  of  connivance  by  Ameri- 
can occupation  authorities,  insolent  Fascist  bands  carried 
out  direct  attacks  on  soldiers  of  the  Soviet  Army  and 
diplomatic  employees  of  the  U.S.S.R.  Embassy  in  Berlin, 
as  a  result  of  which  three  soldiers  received  injuries.  It 
was  only  thanks  to  the  restraint  and  presence  of  mind 
of  the  Soviet  soldiers  that  these  events  did  not  take  a 
more  serious  and  dangerous  turn. 

In  the  note  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
lof  America  of  August  27,  1962,  there  is  not  even  a  hint 
of  condemnation  of  the  criminal  actions  of  West  Berlin 
Fascistic  elements.  The  justifiable  demand  of  the 
U.S.S.R.  Government  for  the  punishment  of  those  guilty 
of  violating  the  security  of  Soviet  representatives  is 
pasised  over  in  complete  silence.  The  Government  of 
the  United  States  of  America  is  shielding  the  West  Berlin 
provocateurs  and  all  but  threatening  new  "consequences," 
if  demands  of  the  revanchists  from  Bonn  and  West  Berlin 
for  the  abolition  of  defensive  measures  taken  by  the  au- 
thorities of  the  German  Democratic  Republic  on  its 
boundaries  are  not  satisfied.  The  Soviet  Government  re- 
ards  such  a  position  of  the  United  States  of  America  as 
open  and  direct  encouragement  of  Fascistic  elements  of 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  West  Berlin  to 
new  criminal  acts  and  warns  that,  in  the  event  of  similar 
provocations,  such  measures  will  be  taken  as  may  be 
considered  necessary  for  insuring  the  security  of  Soviet 
representatives  and  soldiers. 

The  most  recent  developments  in  West  Berlin  confirm 
that  the  occupation  regime  in  this  city  has  become  a  cloak 
for  revanchists  and  militarists,  organizers  of  all  types  of 
subversive  activity  against  the  U.S.S.R.  and  other  peace- 
loving  states.  The  present  dangerous  situation  in  West 
Berlin  is  the  direct  result  of  the  "frontline  city"  policy 
which  the  occupation  powers,  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  and  the  West  Berlin  Senat  are  pursuing  there, 
jointly  and  severally.  West  Berlin  has  been  transformed 
into  a  refuge  for  numerous  espionage-diversionary  centers 
and  militaristic  and  revanchist  organizations,  into  a 
loudspeaker  for  shameless  propaganda  of  hate  and  war. 
Developments  in  West  Berlin  and  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany  are  following  in  fact  in  the  very  same  channel 
as  in  Hitlerite  Germany  during  the  period  of  its  prepara- 
tion for  aggression.  And  if  this  today  depended  only 
upon  West  Germany  militarists,  thirsting  for  revenge, 
mankind  would  already  have  been  plunged  into  the  throes 
of  a  new,  bloody  war. 

But  in  our  time  there  are  forces  capable  of  checking 
any  and  every  aggressive  stirring  of  We.st  German  mili- 
tarists and  their  accomplices.  These  forces  will  not 
permit  the  heaping  up  of  combustible  material  for  military 
adventures  and  the  exploitation  of  West  Berlin  for  these 
goals.  The  border  in  Berlin  is  not  simply  a  border  be- 
tween two  states.  It  is  a  defensive  boundary  against 
the  NATO  military  base  set  up  in  West  Berlin,  a  boundary 
against  those  who  are  preparing  for  war  and  seeking 
conflicts.  This  border  will  in  the  future  continue  to  be 
under  reliable  protection. 

The  Governments  of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain, 
and  France  in  their  notes  attempt  to  cast  themselves  in 
the  role  of  defenders  of  humanitarian  principles.  If 
hypocrisy  were  dispensed  with  and  there  were  really  a 


lelii 


Ocfofaer   15,    1962 


desire  to  di-splay  humanitarian  principles,  these  govern- 
ments could  render  assistance  in  the  liberation  of  thou- 
sands of  German  anti-Fascists,  partisans  of  peace,  who, 
as  in  the  times  of  Hitler,  are  languishing  in  the  prisons 
of  West  Germany.  Humanitarian  principles,  which  the 
Western  Powers  invoke,  require  immediate  and  decisive 
curbing  of  West  German  revanchism  and  militarism, 
which  are  guilty  of  the  death  of  tens  of  millions  of 
people  in  two  world  wars.  For  this,  it  is  not  a  "discus.sion 
of  incidents,"  as  proposed  by  the  Governments  of  the 
United  States,  Great  Britain,  and  France  which  is  nec- 
essary, but  a  fundamental  normalization  of  the  situation : 
conclusion  of  a  German  peace  treaty  and  normalization 
on  that  basis  of  the  situation  in  West  Berlin.  The  ques- 
tion is  not  one  of  discussing  incidents  and  consultations. 
It  is  necessary,  at  long  last,  to  liquidate  the  occupation 
regime  in  West  Berlin  on  the  basis  of  the  signing  of  a 
German  peace  treaty,  to  liquidate  the  NATO  military 
base,  and  to  withdraw  the  troops  of  the  three  powers 
from  West  Berlin. 

The  Soviet  Government  is  ready  at  any  time  to  reach 
agreement  with  the  Governments  of  the  United  States, 
Great  Britain,  and  France  on  the  normalization  of  the 
situation  in  West  Berlin  on  the  basis  of  a  German  peace 
settlement.  Such  a  settlement  would  consolidate  the 
foundations  of  peace  in  Europe.  It  would  regulate  rela- 
tions between  West  Berlin  and  the  German  Democratic 
Republic  and  preclude  all  kinds  of  undesirable  incidents. 


U.S.  Asks  Departure  of  Two  EVlembers 
of  Soviet  Mission  to  the  U.iSI. 

Press  release  592  dated  September  29 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  note  from  the  U.S. 
Mission  to  the  United  Nations  to  the  Permanent 
Mission  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 
to  the  United  Nations,  delivered  at  New  York 
on  Septemher  29. 

The  United  States  Mission  to  the  United  Na- 
tions presents  its  compliments  to  the  Permanent 
Mission  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 
to  the  United  Nations  and  wishes  to  call  further 
attention  to  the  espionage  activities  on  the  part  of 
Mr.  Eugeni  M.  Prokhorov  and  Mr.  Ivan  Y.  Vyro- 
dov,  members  of  the  Permanent  Mission  of  the 
Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Eepublics  to  the  United 
Nations. 

Representatives  of  the  Permanent  Mission  of 
tlie  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  to  the 
United  Nations  were  informed  of  their  activities 
earlier  today  when  agents  of  the  FBI  observed 
Mr.  Prokhorov  and  Mr.  Vyrodov  receiving  classi- 
fied documents  of  a  national  defense  nature  from 
a  member  of  the  United  States  Armed  Forces  who 


559 


was  immediately  arrested.  In  this  espionage  op- 
eration Mr.  Prokhorov  and  Mr.  Vyrodov  prevd- 
ously  had  received  other  classified  documents  for 
which  they  paid  substantial  sums  of  money  to 
the  United  States  citizen. 

As  host  to  the  United  Nations  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  strongly  protests  these  es- 
pionage activities  directed  against  the  internal  se- 
curity of  the  United  States.  Not  only  are  such 
activities  clearly  outside  the  scope  of  the  official 
responsibilities  of  these  members  but  they  are  an 
outrageous  violation  of  their  privileges  of  resi- 
dence within  the  meaning  of  Section  13(b)  of  the 
Agreement^  between  the  United  States  and  the 
United  Nations  concerning  the  United  Nations. 
Under  this  provision  of  tlie  Agreement  they  have, 
by  their  actions,  forfeited  their  privilege  of  con- 
tinued residence  in  this  country. 

The  United  States  Mission  requests  the  Per- 
manent Mission  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to  effect  the 
immediate  withdrawal  of  Mr.  Prokliorov  and  Mr. 
Vyrodov  from  the  United  States. 


Government  of  Algeria 
Recognized  by  United  States 

Press  Release  591  dated  September  29 

Department  Announcement 

The  United  States  today  recognized  the  newly 
established  Government  of  the  Eepublic  of 
Algeria. 

President  Kennedy  and  Secretary  Rusk  have 
sent  congratulatory  messages  to  the  chief  officials 
of  the  new  government  in  Algiers.  The  greetings, 
sent  on  behalf  of  the  American  Government  and 
people  and  addressed  to  Algerian  Prime  Minister 
Ahmed  Ben  Bella  and  Foreign  Minister  Moham- 
med Khemisti,  were  delivered  by  the  American 
consul  general  in  Algiers,  William  J.  Porter. 

The  Department  of  State  also  announced  it  has 
requested  Algerian  agreement  to  the  elevation  of 
the  American  consulate  general  to  embassy  status, 
with  Mr.  Porter  as  Charge  d'Affaires  ad  interim. 

It  is  expected  that  an  Ambassador  will  be  named 
in  the  near  future. 


'  61  Stat.  3416. 
560 


Letter  of  President  Kennedy  to  Prime  IVIinister  \ 

September  29,  1962     , 

Dear  Mr.  Prime  Minister:  It  is  with  deep 
pleasure  that  I  extend  to  you  on  behalf  of  the 
Government  and  people  of  the  United  States  my 
warmest  congratulations  upon  your  assumption 
of  the  high  office  of  Prime  Minister  of  the  Algerian 
Government. 

I  wish  you  every  success  in  your  new  duties 
and  responsibilities.  My  Government  and  people 
share  my  earnest  desire  to  foster  and  extend  the' 
cordial  relations  that  exist  between  our  two 
comitries. 

Sincerely  yours, 

John  F.  Kjinnedy 
Letter  of  Secretary  Rusk  to  Foreign  IVIinister 


September  29,  1962 

Dear  Mr.  Minister  :  It  was  with  great  pleasure* 
that  I  learned  of  your  assumption  of  the  respon 
sibilities  of  Foreign  Minister.  I  wish  to  extendi 
my  warmest  congratulations  and  best  wishes  on 
this  occasion,  and  look  forward  to  the  opportunity 
of  meeting  you  in  the  near  future. 
Sincerely  yours. 

Dean  Rusk 


Concern  Expressed  by  United  States 
in  IVSatter  of  Cuban  Fisliing  Port 

Statement  hy  Lincoln  White  ' 

Director,  Office  of  News  ' 

At  present  our  information  with  respect  to  the 
construction  of  a  fishing  port  in  Cuba  is  limited  to 
a  statement  made  yesterday  [September  25]  by 
Fidel  Castro  during  the  televised  ceremony  of  the 
signing  of  a  fishing  agreement  between  Cuba  and 
the  Soviet  Union. 

According  to  Castro  a  fishing  port  will  be  con- 
structed in  Cuba,  with  Cuban  manpower  and  mate- 
rials, for  which  Cuba  will  receive  about  12  million 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  on  Sept.  2fi. 

Department  of  State   Bulletin 


tions' 
area, 
.to 
mttei 
latest 
IbCu 
States 


Presi 
Mak 

Mo 


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Fm 
msi 


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have 
Islat 
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Pres: 

Tl 
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ters 
audi 

Tl 
meet 
mi 
conti 
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pesos  in  food  items  from  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  Soviet  Union,  according  to  this  announce- 
ment, \\\\\  provide  phins,  technicians,  and  equip- 
ment and  will  use  the  port  to  facilitate  the  opera- 
tions of  the  Soviet  fishing  fleet  in  the  Atlantic 
area. 

Any  activity  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  Cuba  is  a 
matter  of  conceni  to  the  United  States.  This 
latest  Soviet  attempt  to  increase  its  involvement 
in  Cuba  will  be  watched  closely  by  the  United 
States  Government  to  determine  whether  and  to 
what  extent  it  may  affect  our  national  security. 


IsM 


in 

fill 


President  Ayub  of  Pakistan 
Maites  Informal  Visit  to  U.S. 

Mohammad  Ayub  Khan,  President  of  Pakistan, 
made  an  informed  visit  to  the  United  States  Sep- 
tember 2^-27.  Following  is  the  text  of  a  joint 
communique  between  President  Kennedy  and 
President  Ayub  released  at  the  close  of  their  dis- 
cussions on  September  24-,  together  with  a  letter  of 
the  same  date  from  President  Kennedy  to  Presi- 
dent Ayub  on  the  problem  of  waterlogging  and 
salinity  in  West  Pakistan. 

JOINT  COMMUNIQUE 

White  House  press  release  (Newport,  E.I.)  dated  September  24 

President  Kennedy  and  President  Ayub  Khan 
have  had  an  informal  meeting  at  Newport,  Rhode 
Island,  today.  The  two  Presidents  have  renewed 
their  personal  association  established  during 
President  Ayub's  state  visit  in  1961.^ 

Tlie  two  Presidents  had  frank  and  cordial  dis- 
cussions which  included  a  general  review  of  the 
world  situation,  with  particular  reference  to  mat- 
ters of  mutual  interest  and  concern  to  Pakistan 
and  the  United  States. 

The  two  Presidents  agreed  that,  since  their  last 
meeting  last  year,  the  threat  to  world  peace  has 
remained  grave  and  that  the  free  nations  must 
continue  to  cooperate  in  the  defense  of  their  in- 
tegrity and  indeiiendence.  The  two  Presidents 
agreed  that  the  close  friendship  and  the  alliance 
between  Pakistan  and  the  United  States  continues 


'  BuLiJCTiN  of  Aug.  7, 1961,  p.  239. 


Oc/ober  75,   1962 

659893—62 3 


to  represent  an  important  contribution  to  the  free 
world's  quest  for  a  durable  peace. 


LETTER  ON  SCIENTIFIC  REPORT 

White  House  press  release  (Newport,  R.I.)  dated  September  24 

September  24,  1962 

Dear  Mr.  President  :  I  am  pleased  to  write  that,  after 
intensive  study  and  analysis  of  the  problems  of  waterlog- 
ging and  .salinity  in  West  Pakistan,  the  United  States 
scientific  team  which  I  appointed  last  fall "  has  drafted  a 
comprehensive  report.  As  you  know.  Dr.  Jerome  B. 
Wiesner,  my  Special  Assistant  for  Science  and  Technology, 
assembled  a  panel  of  specialists  covering  a  broad  range  of 
knowledge  and  experience  in  agriculture,  hydrology,  en- 
gineering, and  the  economic  and  social  sciences.  We  also 
enlisted  the  interest  of  Mr.  Stewart  Udall,  my  Secretary  of 
the  Interior,  and  of  his  Science  Advisor,  Dr.  Roger 
Revelle,  who  has  headed  this  Panel  and  has  participated 
with  great  dedication  in  an  extensive  analysis  of  the 
problems.  The  solution  of  the  problems  of  low  agricul- 
tural productivity  and  waterlogging  and  salinity  in  West 
Pakistan  requires  efforts  of  unprecedented  proportions. 
The  most  far-reaching  conclusion  of  the  Panel  has  been 
that  waterlogging  and  salinity  must  be  attacked  within 
the  context  of  a  broad  approach  toward  a  large  and  rapid 
increase  in  agricultural  productivity.  This  can  be  done 
by  an  integrated  application  of  all  the  factors  of  agricul- 
tural production,  combined  with  sustained  human  effort 
and  sufficient  capital  investment  to  attain  momentum  in 
improvement.  The  Panel's  primary  recommendation  to 
achieve  these  goals  is  a  reorientation  of  the  strategy  to 
concentrate  efforts  on  limited  project  areas,  each  roughly 
a  million  acres  in  size,  so  as  to  permit  a  coordinated  attack 
on  all  aspects  of  the  agricultural  problem.  In  total,  this 
becomes  an  ambitious  program,  but  one  that  is  required 
to  meet  an  exceedingly  difficult  set  of  problems. 

In  transmitting  the  Panel's  report  to  you,  at  this  time, 
we  wish  to  consider  the  Panel's  product  as  still  in  draft 
form,  subject  to  review  and  modification.  We  would  like 
to  have  the  reactions  of  your  officials  and  experts — since 
the  basic  data  utilized  in  the  Panel's  analysis  depends  so 
heavily  on  Pakistan  sources — as  well  as  further  discus- 
sions among  the  members  of  our  scientific  team.  In  addi- 
tion, it  would  be  possible  to  send  Dr.  Roger  Revelle  and 
other  members  of  the  team  to  Pakistan  at  a  time  con- 
venient to  you  for  personal  discussions  of  the  Panel's 
findings  with  your  people. 

I  share  the  enthusiasm  and  feeling  the  Panel  has  had 
on  the  problem  and  wish  you  well  in  your  vital  endeavor 
on  behalf  of  the  people  of  Pakistan. 

With  warm  personal  regards, 
Sincerely  yours, 


John  F.  Kennedy 


His  Excellency  Mohammad  Ayub  Khan 
President  of  Pakistan 


-  For  background,  see  ihici.,  p.  241. 


561 


The  European  Common  Market 
and  the  Trade  Expansion  Program 

hy  J.  Robert  Schaetzel 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Atlantic  Affairs  ^ 

It  seems  to  be  an  inescapable  part  of  our  demo- 
cratic process,  if  not  a  sine  qua  non  of  American- 
ism, to  believe  that  our  country  is  regularly  bested 
at  the  international  negotiating  tables.  Further, 
that  the  foreign  policy  and  negotiators  of  other 
nations  protect  their  interests  and  they  succeed  in 
their  efforts,  but  American  efforts  are  ill-conceived 
and  all  too  regularly  fail. 

My  thesis  is  that  this  stereotype  is,  in  general, 
demonstrably  fallacious  and,  with  reference  to  our 
country's  Atlantic  policy,  wildly  wrong.  In  the 
next  few  minutes  I  shall  try  to  establish  and  defend 
several  simple  but  profoundly  important  points, 
points  critical  to  the  future  security  and  prosperity 
of  the  United  States : 

1.  The  European  Common  Market  is  one  of  the 
great  achievements  of  this  century. 

2.  While  the  movement  toward  European  unity 
is  an  indigenous  European  phenomenon — if  it  had 
not  been  so,  it  would  not  have  succeeded — it  owes 
much  to  the  steady  and  enlightened  support  of 
America. 

3.  If  the  European  Community,  growing  in 
unity  and  strength,  continues  to  work  in  concert 
with  the  United  States,  we  shall  provide  a  firm 
foundation  for  a  secure  free  world. 

4.  The  trade  expansion  program  gives  the  Presi- 
dent authority  to  weld  the  next  link  in  the  chain 
of  collaboration  between  Western  Europe  and  the 
United  States  which  is  now  marked  by  our  inter- 
locking ties  through  NATO  and  the  Organization 
for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD). 

Let  me  return  to  my  first  point.  From  the  Mar- 
shall Plan  onward  all  American  Presidents,  both 
political  parties,  and  both  the  legislative  and  ex- 
ecutive branches  of  our  Government  have  con- 
sistently supported  the  cause  of  European  unity. 
Our  postwar  assistance  made  possible  the  economic 
recovery  of  Western  Europe.    We  urged  the  bene- 


'  Remarks  made  before  the  American  Mining  Congress 
at  San  Francisco,  Calif.,  on  Sept.  24  (i)ress  release  577 
dated  Sept.  21). 


562 


fits  but  did  not  make  European  unity  prerequisite, 
The  combination  of  economic  growth  and  the  idea 
of  unity  created  the  conditions  that  led  to  the 
Schiunan  plan  in  1950 — the  pooling  in  1952  of  the 
coal  and  steel  resources  of  the  six  countries, 
France,  Germany,  Italy,  and  the  three  Benelux 
nations. 

Because  it  is  now  accomplished  fact,  marked, 
for  instance,  by  the  triumphant  visit  2  weeks  ago 
of  General  de  Gaulle  to  Germany,  we  ignore  the 
extraordinary  historic  achievement  that  the  bel- 
ligerency of  centuries  between  these  countries  is 
now,  finally,  a  thing  of  the  past.  Today  there 
exists  on  the  Continent  organic  alliance  and  com- 
mon purpose  where  war  and  hatred  existed  before. 
And  Germany  is  tied  irrevocably  to  the  West. 

The  Soviet  Union  is  also  impressed  by  this  West- 
ern European  achievement  in  imity.  Yet,  first,  they 
refused  to  believe  it  could  succeed.  After  all,  the 
idea  that  capitalist  states  can  unify  short  of  war 
runs  directly  contrary  to  Communist  theology. 
Now,  however,  they  have  accepted  the  unpleasant 
fact  and  today  bend  their  diplomatic  and  propa- 
ganda efforts  to  defeat  the  Common  Market. 

The  reason  for  the  Soviet  Union's  concern  is 
easy  to  see.  The  Common  Market,  growing  at  an 
annual  rate  of  7  percent  a  year,  with  170  million 
intelligent,  skilled  people,  is  the  third  great  source 
of  world  power,  ranking  with  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  disagreements  that  must  mark  any  demo- 
cratic society  or  alliance — -and  they  mark  ours  of 
the  North  Atlantic — obscure  the  extent  of  common 
purpose  and  the  ties  that  bind  Europe  and  the 
United  States  increasingly  closely  together. 
Sometimes  it  seems  that  the  Russians  see  the 
strength  of  the  North  Atlantic  alliance  more  clear- 
ly than  do  the  Allies.  We  should  realize,  as  the 
Russians  doubtless  do,  that  a  solid,  monolithic 
exterior,  backed  by  suUen  discontents — the  War- 
saw Pact  pattern — is  far  less  reliable  in  the  long 
run  than  a  partnership  in  which  differences  are 
freely  expressed  and  resolved. 

Now,  to  relate  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  to  these 
great  European  developments :  If  we  may  assume 
that  the  United  Kingdom  becomes  the  seventh 
member  of  the  Common  Market,  then  the  enlarged 
European  Community  will  include  220  million 
people  with  a  gross  national  product  of  some  $274 
billion  in  1961.  This  is  $35  billion  more  than  that 
of  the  U.S.S.R.  for  the  same  year.   This  vast  West- 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


I; 


ern  European  economic  union  is  in  tlie  process  of 
putting  in  place  a  single  tariff  wall  around  its 
borders,  while  at  the  same  time  all  internal  bar- 
riers within  the  Community  are  rapidly  being 
removed. 

The  principal  purpose  of  the  Trade  Expansion 
Act  is  to  enable  the  President  to  bargain  down  the 
Common  Market's  tariff,  to  bargain  reductions  of 
the  American  tariff  for  reciprocal  redvictions  of 
the  EEC's  new  tariff.  The  crucial  importance  of 
these  prospective  negotiations  can  be  seen  from 
the  fact  that  the  United  States  and  the  enlarged 
Common  Market  together  conduct  among  them- 
selves 90  percent  of  free-world  trade  and  we  and 
the  EEC  account  for  90  percent  of  the  free  world's 
industrial  production. 

It  is  possible  and  highly  agreeable,  in  conclusion, 
to  be  able  to  note  that  the  Congress  and  the  Amer- 
ican people  have  shown  their  support  of  this 
analysis.  The  overwhelming  vote  for  the  trade 
expansion  bill  (78  to  8  in  the  Senate  on  Septem- 
ber 19)  is  a  legislative  assertion  that  the  Presi- 
dent must  be  able  to  negotiate  with  the  Common 
Market.  This  congressional  support,  in  turn,  was 
dependent  upon  and  responsive  to  the  great  attrac- 
tion to  Americans  of  European  unity.  We  have 
a  mandate  to  develop  a  trade  partnership  with 
the  Coimnon  Market. 


SEATO  Members  IVleet  Informally 

Statement  for  the  Press  ^ 

Representatives  of  member  countries  of  SEATO 
[Southeast  Asia  Ti-eaty  Organization]  met  in- 
formally at  lunch  as  guests  of  Secretary  of  State 
Dean  Rusk  in  New  York  today  [September  29]. 
Present  were  Secretary  General  Pote  Sarasin,  the 
Foreign  Ministers  of  Australia,  New  Zealand,  the 
Philippines,  Thailand  and  the  United  Kingdom, 
and  the  French  Ambassador  to  the  United  States. 

Following  lunch  there  was  a  general  exchange 
of  views  on  the  world  situation  and  particularly 
problems  in  the  treaty  area.  During  the  discus- 
sion the  representatives  expressed  their  apprecia- 
tion for  the  work  of  the  Secretary  General  since 
their  last  meeting  of  the  SEATO  Council.  They 
anticipate  that  a  regular  meeting  of  the  Council 


*  Released  at  New  York,  N.T.,  on   Sept.  29. 


of  Foreign  Ministers  might  be  held  in  Paris  in 
the  first  half  of  1963,  the  exact  date  to  be  the  sub- 
ject of  further  consultation. 


U.S.  Officials  and  German  Minister 
Hold  Talks  on  Foreign  Aid  Programs 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  joint  V.S.-German 
communique  released  on  September  28  at  the  con- 
clusion of  talks  held  at  Washington,  D.C.,  between 
Walter  Scheel,  Minister  for  Economic  Coopera- 
tion of  the  Federal  Repuhlic  of  GermMny,  and  U.S. 
Government  officials. 

Press  release  589  dated  September  28 

Mr.  Walter  Scheel,  Minister  for  Economic  Co- 
operation of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  has 
been  in  Washington  throughout  this  week  on  an 
official  visit.  He  came  primarily  to  exchange 
views  and  information  with  U.S.  Government  offi- 
cials about  the  foreign  aid  programs  of  West  Ger- 
many and  the  United  States. 

His  appointments  included  talks  with  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  Douglas  Dillon,  Under  Secretary 
of  State  George  Ball,  AID  [Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development]  Administrator  Fowler  Ham- 
ilton, Deputy  AID  Administrator  Frank  M. 
Coffin,  and  the  President  of  the  Export-Import 
Bank,  Harold  Linder.  Minister  Scheel  also  met 
with  the  Assistant  Secretaries  of  State  and  with 
Assistant  Administrators  of  AID  for  Africa,  the 
American  Republics,  the  Near  East,  South  Asia, 
and  the  Far  East  for  review  of  development  prob- 
lems of  individual  countries. 

Minister  Scheel  described  tlie  program  of  offi- 
cial bilateral  lending  to  less  developed  countries 
which  has  been  launched  by  the  Federal  Republic 
in  recent  years,  supplementing  existing  programs 
of  technical  assistance  and  contributions  to  inter- 
national development  agencies.  The  United 
States  representatives  recognized  the  important 
effort  so  far  made  by  the  Federal  Republic  and 
stressed  the  importance  for  the  common  aid  effort 
of  increasing  aid  to  the  less  developed  countries 
and  of  liberalizing  the  tenns  of  such  aid. 

Discussions  took  place  on  the  means  of  coordi- 
nating the  economic  assistance  being  extended  by 
the  industrialized  countries.  The  need  for  inten- 
sified coordination  of  aid  to  particular  recipient 


Ocfober   75,   7962 


563 


countries  was  accepted  by  both  sides.  It  was  recog- 
nized that  the  Development  Assistance  Committee 
of  the  OECD  [Organization  for  Economic  Co- 
operation and  Development],  in  cooperation  with 
the  IBRD  [International  Bank  for  Reconsti-uction 
and  Development],  and  other  multilateral  institu- 
tions, can  play  a  key  role  in  formulating  plans  for 
coordination  and  in  carrying  them  into  practice. 
It  was  agreed  to  hold  further  conversations  of  this 
kind  at  regular  intervals. 

An  understanding  was  reached  that  the  Federal 
Republic  would  cooperate  closely  with  the  Al- 
liance for  Progress  program  in  order  to  fit  its  bi- 
lateral measures  in  Latin  America  into  the  frame- 
work of  this  program.  Close  cooperation  among 
all  contributors  with  respect  to  the  economic  de- 
velopment of  Africa  was  also  envisaged. 

Minister  Scheel's  itinerary  will  take  him  to 
Seattle  and  New  York,  where  further  discussions 
on  development  problems  will  take  place  at  United 
Nations  headquarters  with  Mr.  Paul  Hoffman  and 
other  U.N.  officials.  He  will  also  be  guest  of 
honor  at  receptions  in  New  York  hosted  by  the 
Council  on  Foreign  Relations  and  the  German 
American  Chamber  of  Commerce  prior  to  depart- 
ing for  Geimany  on  October  4. 


Mr.  McGhee  Visits  Congo  To  Assess 
Progress  on  U.N.  Integration  Plan 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Sep- 
tember 25  that  George  C.  McGhee,  Under  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  Political  Affairs,  departed  from 
Washington  that  day  for  the  Republic  of  the 
Congo.  The  purpose  of  Mr.  McGhee's  trip  is  to 
consult  with  Ambassador  Edmund  Gullion,  Robert 
Gardiner,  Chief  of  the  United  Nations  Operation 
in  the  Congo,  and  Congolese  officials,  including 
Prime  Minister  Cyrille  Adoula,  in  order  to  pre- 
pare a  firsthand  report  for  President  Kennedy  and 
Secretarj'  Rusk  on  the  progress  in  carrying  out  the 
U.N.  Secretary-General's  proposal  for  an  inte- 
grated Congo.^ 

Mr.  McGhee  will  be  accompanied  on  his  trip  by 
J.  Wayne  Fredericks,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
of  State  for  African  Affairs. 


'  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept  17,  19C2,  p.  418. 
564 


President  Approves  Recommendations 
on  Barter  Program 

White  House  Statement 

White  House  press  release  dated  September  25 

The  President  has  approved,  with  the  exception 
of  certain  minor  points  to  be  studied  further,  the 
recommendations  on  the  barter  program  submitted 
to  him  by  the  Executive  Stockpile  Committee, 
cliaired  by  Edward  A.  McDermott,  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Emergency  Planning.  These  recom- 
mendations were  based  on  a  study  made  by  the 
committee  as  part  of  its  continuing  consideration 
of  the  overall  stockpiling  progi'am. 

The  barter  program,  which  is  administered  by 
the  Secretary  of  Agriculture,  was  authorized  by 
the  Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assist- 
ance Act  of  1954,  as  amended.  It  is  a  program 
through  which  surplus  agricultural  commodities 
are  disposed  of  in  exchange  for  strategic  and  other 
materials.  Through  December  31,  1961,  $1,438,- 
500,000  worth  of  surplus  agricultural  commodities 
have  been  exchanged  for  materials,  goods,  and 
equipment.  In  recent  years,  the  volume  of  trans- 
actions has  been  sharply  reduced.  The  President's 
action  approves  methods  through  which  the  vol- 
ume of  the  transactions  through  the  barter  pro- 
gram will  be  increased  over  its  present  rate  but 
carefully  controlled  to  protect  other  national 
objectives. 

The  committee's  recommendations  envision  that 
future  barter  will  be  on  a  more  selective  basis  than 
in  the  past  and  that  the  emphasis  will  be  shifted 
from  the  acquisition  of  strategic  and  critical  mate- 
rials to  its  use  in  various  types  of  offshore  procure- 
ment programs  and  as  an  aid  in  assisting  some  of 
the  lesser  developed  countries. 

Wliile  the  general  rule  would  be  that  barter 
should  not  be  used  to  acquire  strategic  and  critical 
materials  that  are  in  excess  of  national  stockpile 
objectives,  certain  exceptions  were  approved  which 
will  permit  such  strategic  and  critical  materials 
to  be  taken.  An  example  would  be  where  the 
United  States  would  find  it  to  its  advantage  to 
take  useful  materials  in  a  barter  transaction  rather 
than  acquire  additional  foreign  currencies. 

The  Secretary  of  Agriculture  will  consult  with 
the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  respectively,  concerning  the  general  im- 

Department  of  State   Bulletin 


I 


pact  that  the  barter  program  has  on  foreign  policy 
and  balance-of-payments  considerations.  In  cer- 
tain other  specified  instances,  consultations  will  be 
held  with  appropriate  department  heads  before  a 
barter  transaction  can  be  consummated. 


Waiver  of  Personal  Appearance  for  Visa 
Applicant  Facilitates  Travel  to  U.S. 

White  House  press  release  dated  September  27 

The  President  announced  on  September  27  that 
the  Department  of  State  will  amend  its  reg-ula- 
tions  to  facilitate  the  granting  of  nonimmigrant 
visitor  visas  overseas  as  part  of  the  administra- 
tion's major  new  program  to  encourage  foreign 
travel  to  the  United  States. 

Effective  immediately  [October  2],  the  Presi- 
dent said,  the  Department  will  simplify  visa  pro- 
cedures by  authorizing  a  waiver  of  personal 
appearance  for  certain  categories  of  noninmiigrant 
applicants.  The  change  is  directed  primarily  at 
visitors  planning  trips  to  the  United  States  for 
business  or  pleasure. 

The  present  requirement  that  all  visa  applicants 
must  appear  personally  before  a  consular  officer 
is  a  source  of  expense  and  irritation  to  foreign 
travelers,  many  of  whom  are  required  to  go  great 
distances  to  make  personal  appearances. 

The  new  system,  which  permits  applications  by 
mail,  was  worked  out  by  the  Department  of  State 
in  liaison  with  the  appropriate  committees  of  the 
Congress  and  with  the  Immigration  and  Natu- 
ralization Service. 

Simplification  of  visa  procedures  was  one  of 
the  measures  proposed  by  the  President  to  correct 
the  basic  balance-of-payments  deficit.  The  recom- 
mendation was  made  in  the  President's  message 
(February  6,  1961)  to  the  Congress  on  balance  of 
payments  and  gold.^ 

At  the  outset  the  Department  of  State  plans  to 
place  the  new  system  into  effect  in  167  posts  aroimd 
the  world. 

Following  the  message  to  the  Congress  the 
President  requested  the  Department  of  State  and 
other  interested  agencies  (Treasury,  Commerce, 
and  the  Attorney  General)  to  facilitate  tourism 


and  to  take  all  necessary  administrative  steps  to 
simplify  the  issuance  of  nonimmigrant  visas  over- 
seas where  now  required  by  law,  "recognizing  that 
the  Congress  will  be  asked  to  amend  applicable 
statutes  to  waive  non-immigrant  visas  insofar  as 
security  considerations  permit." 

As  a  first  step  in  carrying  out  the  Presidential 
directive,  the  Department  of  State  in  February 
1961  discontinued  using  a  widely  criticized  long- 
form  visa  application  and  substituted  a  simplified 
short  form. 

In  June  of  this  year  a  bill  ^  was  introduced  to 
waive  nonimmigrant  visa  requirements  for  na- 
tionals of  Western  Hemisphere  countries  and 
other  countries  with  "normally  under-subscribed 
quotas."  The  House  Subcommittee  on  Immigra- 
tion and  Nationality,  headed  by  Representative 
Francis  E.  Walter,  held  a  hearing  on  the  bill  and 
indicated  that  this  step  was  premature  and  sug- 
gested some  form  of  waiver  of  personal  appearance 
rather  than  a  waiver  of  the  visa  requirement  itself. 
The  State  Department  then  pursued  this  sugges- 
tion and  evolved  the  new  visa  issuance  procedure. 

The  new  mail  application  system  is  built  around 
a  revised  short  form  which  will  enable  consular 
officers  to  make  a  detennination  whether  the  visa 
may  be  issued  by  mail  or  whether  a  personal  ap- 
pearance should  be  required  in  an  individual  case. 

Under  the  new  plan  security  considerations  are 
fully  protected.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  the 
waiver  of  personal  appearance  for  nonimmigrant 
visa  applicants  is  modified  by  the  requirement  that 
in  individual  cases  where  the  consular  officer  is  not 
satisfied  with  the  documentation  which  has  been 
submitted  by  mail  he  may  ask  the  applicant  for  a 
personal  interview  before  making  a  final  deter- 
mination in  his  case. 

The  Department  of  State  reported  on  Septem- 
ber 27  that  more  foreign  visitors  obtained  visas  to 
travel  in  the  United  States  in  the  last  fiscal  year 
than  ever  before.  Statistics  in  the  Department 
of  State  Visa  Office  reveal  that  752,942  nonimmi- 
grant visas  were  issued,  principally  to  visitors  for 
business  and  pleasure.  This  was  5  percent  higher 
than  the  record  set  in  the  preceding  fiscal  year. 
The  percentage  of  increase  is  the  more  significant 
as  visitor  visas  ordinarily  are  valid  for  4  years. 


'  For  text,  see  Bttlletin  of  Feb.  27,  1961,  p.  287. 


»H.R.  12069. 


October   75,    7962 


565 


United  States  Accepts  Long-Term 
Cotton  Textile  Arrangement 

Press  release  581  dated  September  25 

The  United  States  on  September  25  formally 
accepted  the  long-term  cotton  textile  arrangement 
which  was  negotiated  on  an  ad  referendum  basis 
at  a  meeting  of  the  Cotton  Textiles  Committee  of 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tariti's  and  Trade  held 
at  Geneva  January  29-February  9,  1962.^  Nine- 
teen nations,-  representing  the  principal  cotton 
textile  exporting  and  importing  nations  of  the 
free  world,  participated  in  drafting  the  arrange- 
ment. Notification  of  this  acceptance  has  been 
transmitted  to  the  executive  secretary  of  GATT. 

The  new  arrangement  is  similar  to  an  earlier 
agreement  covering  the  1-year  period  October  1, 
1961,  to  September  30,  1962.^  It  provides  for 
the  development  of  world  trade  in  cotton  textiles 
in  a  reasonable  and  orderly  manner  during  the 
5-year  period  commencing  October  1,  1962.  It 
assures  growing  export  opportunities  in  cotton 
textiles  while  avoiding  disruptive  effects  in  do- 
mestic markets  that  may  be  caused  by  excessive 
imports. 

The  arrangement  provides  the  American  cotton 
textile  industry  with  a  5-year  period  in  which  it 
may  plan  its  production  and  sharpen  its  competi- 
tive position  with  the  confidence  that  foreign  im- 
ports will  not  disrupt  domestic  markets.  The  re- 
quest for  such  an  arrangement  was  based  upon 
point  6  of  President  Kennedy's  seven-point  pro- 
gram of  assistance  to  the  textile  industry,  an- 
nounced  on   May   2,   1961,^   which   directed   the 


•  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Mar.  12,  1962,  p.  431. 

°  Australia,  Austria,  Canada,  Dcnmarls,  India,  Japan, 
Norway,  Pakistan,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  United  King- 
dom (also  representing  Hong  Kong),  United  States,  and 
the  member  states  of  European  Economic  Community 
(Belgium,  France,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Italy, 
Luxembourg,  and  Netherlands). 

'For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Aug.  21,  19G1,  p.  337. 

*  Ihid.,  May  29, 1961,  p.  825. 


Department  of  State  to  seek  an  international  un- 
derstanding in  this  field.  Representatives  of  in- 
dustry and  labor  advised  the  U.S.  Government  in 
the  negotiation  of  tWs  arrangement. 


Benefits  for  Persecutees  Under 
Austrian  Victims'  Welfare  Law 

Press  release  587  dated  September  28 

The  Department  of  State  has  received  informa- 
tion that  the  Austrian  Government  is  now  accept- 
ing applications  for  benefits  under  the  12th  amend- 
ment to  the  Austrian  Victims'  Welfare  Law.  The 
law  provides  for  compensation  for  subjection  to 
any  or  all  of  the  following  persecutory  measures: 

a.  Imprisonment  in  jail  or  concentration  camp. 
No  compensation  will  be  paid  for  imprisonment 
if  the  income  of  the  victim  and/or  survivor  in  each 
of  the  years  1955  and  1960  exceeded  the  amount 
of  Austrian  scliillings  72,000  (approximately 
$2,880). 

b.  Emigration  to  escape  persecution  and  sub- 
sequent internment  by  one  of  the  powers  at  war 
with  Germany. 

c.  Forcible  detention  in  a  ghetto  or  place  of 
internment. 

d.  Being  forced,  because  of  persecution,  to  live 
in  hiding  under  conditions  incompatible  with  hu- 
man dignity. 

e.  Forcible  removal  from  Austria  to  a  place  out- 
side of  Austria. 

f .  The  wearing  of  a  Jewish  star  (Star  of  David) 
for  at  least  6  months. 

Persons  who  were  Austrian  citizens  on  Slarch 
13,  1938,  or  who  for  a  period  of  10  years  prior 
tliercto  liad  their  residence  within  the  territory 
of  the  Eepublic  of  Austria,  regardless  of  their 
present  nationality,  should  request  claim  appli- 
cations from  the  Amt  der  Wiener  Landesregie- 
nrnig,  Magistratsahteilung  12,  Gonzagagasse  23, 
Vienna  I. 


566 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


THE    CONGRESS 


International  Implications  of  Communications  Satellite  Activities 


Statement  hy  G.  Griffith  Johnson 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  ^ 


I  greatly  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  make  a 
statement  on  behalf  of  the  Department  of  State  on 
the  international  implications  and  foreign  policy 
aspects  of  the  communications  satellite  activities 
of  the  United  States.  The  Department  of  State 
is  intimately  involved  with  the  many  foreign  pol- 
icy implications  and  foreign  relations  jDroblems  to 
which  telecommunications  in  general  and  the  de- 
velopment of  a  communications  satellite  system  in 
particular  give  rise. 

The  lamiching  of  the  experimental  satellite 
Telstar^  and  the  recent  enactment  of  the  Com- 
munications Satellite  Act  of  1962  have  created 
enonnous  interest,  both  here  and  throughout  the 
world,  in  this  dramatic  new  communications  tech- 
nique. An  operational  system,  still  some  years  in 
the  future,  offers  great  promise  of  substantially 
increasing  the  rapidity  and  ease  of  long-distance 
communications  at  significantly  lower  rates. 

Wliile  there  is  no  technological  reason  to  pre- 
vent the  use  of  communications  satellites  for 
domestic  communications  over  large  land  masses, 
such  as  our  own  country,  Brazil,  India,  and  the 
U.S.S.R.,  the  economic  data  now  available  indi- 
cates that  their  principal  use,  for  some  time  to 
come,  will  be  for  communications  between  nations. 
It  is  therefore  apparent  that  the  operative  com- 
mimications  satellite  system  in  which  we  are  in- 
terested is  international  in  scope.  The  develop- 
ment of  such  a  system  will  require  the  conclusion 
of  appropriate  international  agreements.  Loca- 
tion   of    ground    stations,    frequency    allocation. 


1  Made  before  the  Subcommittee  ou  Applications  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics  on  Sept. 
27  (press  release  586). 

=  Bulletin  of  July  30,  1962,  p.  191. 


channel  assignments,  technical  standards — all 
these  vital  elements  require  effective  international 
cooperation.  The  system  will  depend  for  its  very 
existence  on  such  cooperation  and  agreement. 

Framework  of  U.S.  Policy 

The  United  States  Govermnent  has  shown  a 
thorough  awareness  of  the  necessarily  interna- 
tional nature  of  a  communications  satellite  sys- 
tem since  the  inception  of  its  planning.  As  a 
result  of  intensive  interagency  study,  under  the 
direction  of  the  Vice  President  and  the  National 
Aeronautics  and  Space  Comicil,  President  Ken- 
nedy issued  a  basic  statement  of  national  policy  on 
July  24,  1961.="  That  policy  statement  reflects 
deep  commitment  to  the  principle  of  developing 
a  commmiications  satellite  system  in  cooperation 
with  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  nations  of  the 
world.  His  statement  can  properly  be  considered 
as  the  first  definition  of  our  foreign  policy  objec- 
tives in  tliis  field. 

The  President  said : 

Science  and  technology  have  progressed  to  such  a  de- 
gree that  communication  through  the  use  of  space  satel- 
lites has  become  possible.  Through  this  country's  leader- 
ship, this  competence  should  be  developed  for  global  benefit 
at  the  earliest  practicable  time. 

This  statement  also  contained  guidelines  to  the 
means  by  which  the  desired  objective  of  global 
benefit  can  become  a  reality.  Specifically,  the  fol- 
lowing requii'ements  were  established:  Opportu- 
nity is  to  be  provided  for  foreign  participation  in 
the  commimications  satellite  system;  nondiscrim- 
inatory use  of  and  equitable  access  to  the  system 


=  For  text,  see  iUd.,  Aug.  11, 1961,  p.  273. 


October   15,    7962 


567 


by  all  authorized  communications  carriers  is  to  be 
granted;  technical  assistance  is  to  be  provided  to 
less  developed  countries  to  help  obtain  a  truly 
global  system  as  soon  as  practicable. 

Following  the  President's  policy  declaration, 
the  executive  branch  and  the  Congress  worked 
intensively  to  establish  the  most  advantageous 
legislative  framework  to  implement  national  pol- 
icy, culminating  in  the  enactment  by  Congress  of 
P.L.  87-624,  approved  by  the  President  on  August 
31,  1962.^ 

Passage  of  this  bill  was  a  source  of  real  satis- 
faction to  us  in  the  Department  of  State.  As  the 
Secretary  of  State  testified  before  the  Senate  For- 
eign Relations  Committee  during  the  hearings  on 
the  bill  :  = 

.  .  .  there  is  every  reason  to  suppose  that  the  impetus 
from  the  passage  of  this  legislation  and  the  organization 
of  this  company  will  bring  measurably  closer  the  time 
when  an  effective  global  satellite  communications  system 
is  in  operation.  That  in  itself  will  be  a  great  advance 
for  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States. 

We  are  anxious  to  get  on  with  the  job  of  imple- 
menting our  national  foreign  policy  objectives 
which  are  set  forth  with  clarity  and  force  in  the 
act  itself. 

In  section  102  (a)  Congress  declares: 

— that  our  purpose  is  to  establish  a  "global  com- 
munications network" ; 

— that  our  aim  is  "global  coverage  at  the  earliest 
possible  date"; 

— that  our  policy  is  to  do  this  "in  conjunction 
and  in  cooperation  with  other  countries"; 

— that  our  purpose  is  to  "serve  the  communica- 
tion needs  of  the  United  States  and  other 
countries" ; 

— that  in  so  doing  "care  and  attention  will  be 
directed  ...  to  economically  less  developed  coun- 
tries and  areas";  and 

— that  the  system  should  be  so  designed  as  to 
"contribute  to  world  peace  and  understanding." 

The  language  of  the  act  thus  explicitly  and 
emphatically  recognizes  that  international  cooper- 
ation and  agreement  is  a  prerequisite  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  satisfactory  communications  satellite 
system  and  that  "international"  includes  all  na- 
tions in  what  is  repeatedly  referred  to  as  a  global 


'  For  text  of  remarks  by  President  Kennedy,  see  ibid., 
Sept.  24, 1962,  p.  467. 
'  For  text,  see  ibid..  Aug.  27, 1062,  p.  315. 


568 


system.  The  needs  of  the  less  developed  countries 
are  expressly  taken  into  account.  And,  finally,  this 
exciting  scientific  development  is  tied  directly  to 
a  basic  goal  of  United  States  foreign  policy  which, 
as  the  act  itself  states,  is  to  "contribute  to  world 
peace  and  understanding." 

Tliis  constitutes  a  broad,  well-defined  charter  of 
our  foreign  policy  objectives  as  related  to  commu- 
nications satellites. 

There  is  need  for  strong  leadership  by  the  United 
States  to  develop  the  most  efficient  international 
arrangements.  The  Department  of  State,  as  the 
President's  agent  in  foreign  relations  matters,  ex- 
pects to  play  an  important  role  in  exerting  this 
leadership.  To  realize  our  objectives  through  the 
joint  efforts  and  close  cooperation  of  government 
and  industry  will  contribute  significantly  to  both 
our  national  and  international  welfare. 

Basic  Policy  of  United  Nations 

A  number  of  international  organizations  are 
also  active  in  this  field.  The  basic  policy  of  the 
United  Nations  is  contained  in  part  D  of  General 
Assembly  Resolution  1721,  adopted  on  December 
20,  1961."  This  resolution  was  sponsored  by  the 
United  States  in  response  to  President  Kennedy's 
progi-am  for  space  cooperation  submitted  to  the 
United  Nations  on  September  25, 1961,'  and  jointly 
sponsored  by  the  Soviet  Union.  The  resolution 
states  that  "communication  by  means  of  satellites 
should  be  available  to  the  nations  of  the  world  as 
soon  as  practicable  on  a  global  and  non-discrimi- 
natory basis."  It  then  notes  with  satisfaction 
that  a  special  conference  to  allocate  radio  frequen- 
cies for  outer  space  activities  is  to  be  held  in  1963, 
recommends  that  the  1963  conference  also  consider 
other  aspects  of  space  communications  requiring 
international  cooperation,  notes  the  potential  util- 
ity to  the  U.N.  itself  of  this  means  of  communica- 
tion, and  invites  all  appropriate  U.N.  agencies  to 
assist  member  countries  to  develop  their  domestic 
communications  so  that  they  may  make  effective 
use  of  space  communications. 

There  are  striking  similarities  between  these 
provisions  and  the  policy  objectives  contained  in 
the  Connnunications  Satellite  Act  of  1962.  There 
is  the  same  concern  that  this  means  of  communica- 
tion be  made  available  to  the  nations  of  the  world 
as  soon  as  practicable;  the  same  conception  of  the 


'  For  text,  see  ihid.,  .Ian.  29,  1962,  p.  185. 
'  Ibid.,  Oct.  16,  1901,  p.  619. 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


system  as  being  global  and  nondiscriminatory ;  and 
similar  recognition  of  the  special  needs  of  the  de- 
veloping nations  of  the  world.  This  is  not  en- 
tirely coincidental.  The  United  States  played  a 
major  part  in  drafting  Kesolution  1721. 

The  resolution  refers  in  several  instances  to  the 
International  Telecommmiication  Union,  the  mem- 
ber of  the  U.N.  family  of  organizations  most 
clearly  concerned  with  space  communications. 
The  ITU  was  created  in  1865.  Since  1949  it  has 
been  a  specialized  agency  of  the  United  Nations. 
The  United  States  associated  itself  with  the  work 
of  the  ITU  at  the  time  of  the  Berlin  Radio  Confer- 
ence in  1906,  and  we  have  since  participated 
actively  m  its  activities. 

The  basic  objective  of  the  ITU  is  to  maintain 
and  extend  international  cooperation  for  the  im- 
provement and  rational  use  of  telecommunications 
of  all  kinds.  In  implementation  of  its  objective 
it  develops  and  promulgates  by  treaty  interna- 
tional regulations  to  govern  those  aspects  of  tele- 
communications operation  and  use  which  require 
uniform  international  solutions.  With  respect  to 
communication  satellites,  it  will  play  a  vital  role 
in  the  allocation  of  radio  frequency  bands  and  the 
adoption  of  technical  standards  and  operating 
procedures,  which  must  be  uniform  internationally 
to  achieve  teclmical  compatibility  and  maximum 
efficiency.  The  technical  work  of  the  ITU  is  car- 
ried on  through  various  permanent  committees, 
including  the  Eadio  Consultative  Committee, 
known  as  the  CCIR,  which  is  actively  working  on 
various  teclmical  aspects  of  the  international  use 
of  communications  satellites. 

At  its  1959  plenary  assembly,  the  ITU  made 
limited  assignments  of  radio  frequency  bands  for 
research  activity  in  outer  space,  including  experi- 
mental communications  satellites.  At  that  tune 
it  judged  that  it  would  be  premature  to  attempt 
to  deal  with  the  needs  of  future  operational  ac- 
tivities but  proposed  that  this  matter  be  deter- 
mined at  a  special  conference  to  be  held  in  1963. 
In  June  1962,  the  ITU  Administrative  Council 
scheduled  an  Extraordinary  Administrative  Radio 
Conference  to  begin  on  October  7, 1963,  in  Geneva. 

As  matters  now  stand,  the  conference  will  deal 
only  with  frequency  allocation  for  space  communi- 
cations, plus  the  amendments  to  other  provisions 
of  the  international  radio  regulations  necessarily 
arising  out  of  the  allocations  for,  and  use  of,  space 
communications.  However,  the  Administrative 
Council  has  asked  members  to  submit  by  Decem- 


ber 31,  1962,  information  on  three  matters:  their 
present  plans  with  respect  to  the  development  of 
space  communications;  the  subjects  they  regard 
as  appropriate  for  international  negotiation  in 
order  to  achieve  global  space  communications; 
and  which  of  these  subjects,  if  any,  they  believe 
should  be  included  on  the  agenda  of  the  1963 
Extraordinary  Administrative  Radio  Conference. 
The  final  agenda  for  the  1963  conference  is,  there- 
fore, not  yet  known.  This  will  be  determined  by 
the  Administrative  Council  at  its  next  meeting  in 
Geneva  in  March  1963. 

Significance  of  ITU  Extraordinary  Conference 

The  significance  of  the  1963  Extraordinary  Con- 
ference should  be  emphasized.  As  you  know,  the 
electromagnetic  frequency  spectrum  is  finite.  It  is 
already  crowded,  and  problems  of  interference  are 
always  present  or  threatening.  It  is  vital  that 
adequate  frequency  allocations  be  available  to  com- 
munications satellites.  The  United  States  is  fully 
conscious  of  the  importance  of  these  considerations 
and  has  been  working  actively  for  some  years  in 
I^reparation  for  the  1963  conference.  The  tech- 
nical parameters  of  a  communications  satellite 
system  will  be  determined  in  large  measure  by 
the  frequency  space  assigned.  In  turn,  these  tech- 
nical parameters  will  deeply  affect  many  of  the 
international  and  foreign  policy  matters,  such  as 
number,  location,  and  cost  of  ground  stations, 
which  must  be  considered  in  establisliing  the  basic 
international  agreements  prerequisite  to  the  crea- 
tion of  an  effective  global  system. 

The  Department  of  State,  throvigh  its  Telecom- 
mimications  Division  and  in  close  cooperation  with 
the  Director  of  Telecommunications  Management, 
the  Interdepartmental  Radio  Advisory  Commit- 
tee, and  the  Federal  Communications  Commission, 
is  actively  engaged  in  the  preparation  of  our  final 
proposals  to  be  presented  to  the  1963  conference. 
Our  preliminary  proposals  were  circulated  in  Oc- 
tober 1961  to  many  of  our  comembers  of  the  ITU 
for  review  and  comment,  and  fiuial  proposals  are 
now  bemg  prepared. 

We  are  making  every  effort  to  insure  that  our 
proposals  are  approved  by  the  1963  conference 
subject  to  as  little  diminution  of  requested  fre- 
quency space  as  possible. 

The  ITU  also  plays  a  role  in  providing  tech- 
nical assistance  to  member  countries  to  further 
development  of  their   communications  systems. 


Ocfober   75,    J  962 


569 


Assistance  in  communications  planning  is  given 
under  the  cjuidance  of  a  Plan  Committee.  In  ad- 
dition, ITU  headquarters  organizes  training  pro- 
grams. The  Secretary-General  also  provides  a 
valuable  source  of  information  and  guidance  to 
member  countries  concerning  the  sources  of  inter- 
national financial  assistance  for  the  development 
of  domestic  communications.  I  have  available  the 
first  report*  by  the  ITU  on  telecommunications 
and  the  peaceful  uses  of  outer  space,  if  the  sub- 
committee would  be  interested  in  incorporating  it 
in  tlie  record  of  these  hearings. 

The  United  States  has  well-defined  foreign 
policy  objectives  in  this  field.  Through  our  ad- 
vances in  this  exciting  new  technology  we  as  a  na- 
tion are  now  able  to  bring  into  existence  a  global 
communications  satellite  system  for  the  use  and 
benefit  of  ourselves  and  the  other  nations  of  the 
world.  This  will  not  be  accomplished  overnight. 
Mucli  additional  work,  both  technical  and  or- 
ganizational, remains  to  be  done.  The  step-by- 
step  working  out  of  a  truly  global  system  will  re- 
quire the  best  efforts  and  intensive  dedication  of 
all  of  us  both  in  and  out  of  government. 

NASA's  International  Program 

In  moving  forward  we  will  be  building  on  the 
accomplishments  to  date.  This  committee  has 
heard  testimony  from  a  representative  of  NASA 
[National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration] 
dealing  principally  with  their  technical  program 
in  communications  satellites.  Because  of  its  suc- 
cess and  importance  for  the  future  I  would  like  to 
comment  briefly  on  NASA's  international  program 
in  this  field.  A  basic  policy  of  NASA  has  been 
that  its  experimental  and  research  efforts  should 
be  carried  out  within  a  framework  of  the  broadest 
possible  international  cooperation  and  results 
made  available  to  the  world  scientific  community 
in  the  largest  possible  measure.  In  implementing 
this  program,  NASA,  with  the  cooperation  and 
assi.stance  as  necessary  of  the  Department  of  State, 
lias  made  various  arrangements  through  which 
more  than  50  countries  are  now  participating  in 
United  States  space  projects.  The  extent  of  for- 
eign participation  varies,  of  course,  as  a  function 
of  the  relative  degree  of  advancement  in  space 
sciences  of  the  particular  country,  ranging  from 
the  exchange  of  personnel  and  the  operation  of 


'  ITU  doc.  2S3.5  dated  May  24,  1902. 
570 


tracking  or  data  acquisition  stations  to  the  design 
and  construction  of  entire  satellites.  NASA  has 
provided  lamiching  facilities  in  the  United  States 
for  a  satellite  equipped  by  Great  Britain  as  well 
as  the  Canadian-designed  satellite  Alouette. 

In  the  field  of  communications  satellites 
NASA's  international  programs  have  followed  a 
similar  pattern.  Commencing  with  Echo  I  ar- 
rangements have  been  made  for  observation,  ex- 
periment, and  testing  with  many  countries.  In 
connection  with  active  repeater  communications 
satellite  experiments,  ground  stations  have  been 
built  by  France  and  Great  Britain  solely  at  their 
own  expense.  Ground  facilities  are  presently  un- 
der construction  in  Germany,  Italy,  and  Brazil. 
In  addition,  expressions  of  interest  have  been  re- 
ceived from  and  discussions  held  with  many  other 
countries  looking  toward  participation  in  this 
experimental  program.  These  activities  are  a 
practical  demonstration  of  the  desirability  of  in- 
ternational cooperation.  Planned  by  scientific  and 
technical  personnel,  they  are  confirmed  by  a  gov- 
ernment-to-government exchange  of  notes  after 
agreement  is  reached  on  the  technical  level. 

Since  the  inception  of  our  research  and  experi- 
mentation in  the  field  of  communications  satel- 
lites we  have  constantly  expanded  these  interna- 
tional cooperative  jDrograms.  This  has  been  and 
continues  to  be  a  decisive  demonstration  of  our 
national  policy  tliat  the  benefits  of  space  technol- 
ogy sliall  be  available  to  all.  We  must  now  move 
through  the  experimental  and  development  stage 
to  an  operational  system  as  rapidly  as  possible. 
The  Department  of  State  is  deeply  aware  that 
this  is  a  high-priority  goal.  The  guidelines  are 
clear,  and  the  means  exist  to  achieve  our  objec- 
tives througli  the  mutual  efforts  and  close  coopera- 
tion of  all  concerned. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  PoHcy 


87th  Congress,  2d  Session 

Federal  Employees  in  the  Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific 
Islands.  Report  to  accompany  S.  3319.  S.  Kept.  1906. 
August  22,  1S)(;2.    5  pp. 

Amendments  to  the  Foreign  Service  Buildings  Act  of  1926. 
Report  to  afcomi)any  H.R.  11880.  S.  Rept.  1925.  Au- 
gust 27,  l!)i;2.     12  pp. 

Attendance  at  Meeting  of  the  Commonwealth  Parliamen- 
tary Association.  Report  to  accompany  S.  Res.  379. 
S.  Rept.  1926.    August  27, 1962.    2  pp. 


Department  of  Sfofe   Bulletin 


World  Newsprint  Supply-Demand :  Outlook  Through 
1964.  Report  of  the  House  Committee  on  Interstate  and 
Foreign  Commerce.  H.  Kept.  2273.  August  27,  1962. 
30  pp. 

Extending  the  Charter  of  the  American  Hospital  of  Paris. 
Report  to  accompany  H.R.  11996.  S.  Rept.  1930.  Au- 
gust 2S.  1962.     3  pp. 

Tariff  Classification  of  Certain  Partideboard.  Report  to 
accompany  H.R.  12242.  H.  Rept.  2318.  August  31, 
1962.    2  pp. 

Duty  Treatment  of  Certain  Bread.  Report  to  accompany 
H.R.  8985.     H.  Rept.  2325.     September  6,  1962.     3  pp. 

The  Fifth  Annual  Report  Covering  U.S.  Participation  in 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  for  1961. 
Message  from  the  President  transmitting  the  report. 
H.  Doc.  538.    September  6, 1962.    31  pp. 

Free  Entry  of  Two  Spectometers  for  the  University  of 
Illinois.  Report,  together  with  supplemental  views,  to 
accompany  H.R.  12529.  S.  Rept.  2045.  September  13, 
1962.    7  pp. 


Permitting  Investment  of  Funds  of  Insurance  Companies 
Organized  Within  the  District  of  Columbia  in  Obliga- 
tions of  the  Inter-American  Development  Bank.  Re- 
port to  accompany  H.R.  12690,  H.  Rept.  2364,  September 
13,  1962,  12  pp. ;  and  report  to  accompany  S.  3358,  S. 
Rept.  2053,  September  14, 1962,  3  pp. 

Tariff  Treatment  of  Certain  Electron  Microscopes.  Re- 
port to  accompany  H.R.  9414.  H.  Rept.  2368.  Septem- 
ber 14, 1962.     2  pp. 

Amending  the  Act  Providing  for  Promotion  of  Economic 
and  Social  Development  in  the  Ryukyu  Islands.  Re- 
port to  accompany  H.R.  10937.  S.  Rept.  2103.  Sep- 
tember 18, 1962.    9  pp. 

Conservation  of  Tropical  Tuna.  Report  to  accompany 
S.  2568.     H.  Rept.  2409.     September  18,  1962.     24  pp. 

Foreign  Aid  and  Related  Agencies  Appropriation  Bill, 
1963.  Report  to  accompany  H.R.  13175.  H.  Rept. 
2410.    September  18, 1962.    39  pp. 

Situation  in  Cuba.  Report  to  accompany  S.J.  Res.  230. 
S.  Rept.  2111.    September  19, 1962.   5  pp. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


Calendar  of  International  Conferences  and  Meetings^ 


Adjourned  During  September  1962 

16th  Annual  Edinburgh  Film  Festival 

I6th  Pan  American  Sanitary  Conference  and  14th  Meeting  of 
WHO  Regional  Committee  for  the  Americas. 

ICAO  Assembly:   14th  Session 

UNESCO  Meeting  of  Experts  on  General  Secondary  Education 
in  Arab  States. 

UNESCO  Executive  Board:  62d  Session 

13th  International  Exhibition  of  Cinematographic  Art 

ICAO  Legal  Committee:   14th  Session 

U.N.  ECAFE:  2d  Symposium  on  the  Development  of  Petroleum 
Resources  of  Asia  and  the  Far  East. 

16th  International  Dairy  Congress 

U.N.  ECE  Meeting  on  Farm  Rationalization 

U.N.  ECE  Working  Party  on  Construction  of  Vehicles     .... 

FAO  International  Rice  Commission:  Working  Party  on  Agricul- 
tural Engineering  Aspects  of  Rice  Production,  Storage,  and 
Processing. 

UNESCO  Intergovernmental  Meeting  on  Higher  Education  in 
Africa. 

OECD  Committee  on  Restrictive  Business  Practices:  Working 
Party  1. 

FAO  World  Food  Program  Pledging  Conference 

U.N.  Committee  on  Arrangements  for  a  Conference  for  the  Pur- 
pose of  Reviewing  the  Charter. 

U.N.  ECOSOC  Commission  on  International  Commodity  Trade: 
Technical  Working  Party  on  Compensatory  Financing. 

PAHO  Executive  Committee:  47th  Meeting 

NATO  Food  and  Agriculture  Planning  Committee 


Edinburgh Aug.  19-Sept.  2 

Minneapolis Aug.  21-Sept.  17 

Rome Aug.  21-Sept.  17 

Tunis Aug.  23-Sept.  1 

Paris  and  Istanbul Aug.  23-Sept.  14 

Venice Aug.  25-Sept.  8 

Rome Aug.  28-Sept.  15 

Tehran      Sept.  1-15 

Copenhagen Sept.  3-7 

Geneva Sept.  3-7 

Geneva Sept.  3-7 

Kuala  Lumpur Sept.  3-8 

Tananarive Sept.  3-12 

Paris Sept.  4  (1  day) 

New  York Sept.  5  fl  day) 

New  York Sept.  5  (1  day) 

New  York Sept.  5-14 

Minneapolis Sept.  6  (1  day) 

Paris Sept.  6-8 


1  Prepared  in  the  Office  of  International  Conferences,  Sept.  28,  1962.  Following  is  a  list  of  abbreviations:  CCITT, 
Comit6  consultatif  international  t616graphique  et  t^l^phonique;  CENTO,  Central  Treaty  Organization;  ECAFE,  Economic 
Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far  East;  ECE,  Economic  Commission  for  Europe;  ECOSOC,  Economic  and  Social  Council; 
FAO,  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization;  GATT,  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade;  IAEA,  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency;  ICAO,  International  Civil  Aviation  Organization;  ILO,  International  Labor  Organization;  ITU,  Inter- 
national Telecommunication  Union;  NATO,  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization;  OECD,  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development;  PAHO,  Pan  American  Health  Organization;  U.N.,  United  Nations;  UNESCO,  United 
Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Organization;  WHO,  World  Health  Organization. 


Ocfober  75,   7962 


571 


Calendar  of  International  Conferences  and  Meetings — Continued 


Adjourned  During  September  1962 — Continued 

CENTO  Scientific  Council:   llth  Meeting 

GATT  Cotton  Textile  Coniniittee 

FAO  International  Kice  Commission:  8th  Session 

GATT  Working  Party  on  Association  of  Greece  with  the  Euro- 
pean Economic  Community. 

U.N.  Committee  on  Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy 

U.N.  ECAFE  Study  Week  on  Promotion  of  Tourism 

FAO  Cocoa  Study  Group:  Preparatory  Working  Party     .... 

U.N.  ECE  Working  Party  on  Rural  Electrification:  Study  Tour  . 

U.N.  Economic  Commission  for  Africa:  Standing  Conunittee  on 
Trade. 

IAEA  Board  of  Governors 

OECD  Development  Assistance  Committee:  Working  Group  on 
Aid  to  Colombia. 

OECD  Economic  Policy  Committee:  Working  Party  III  (Balance 
of  Payments). 

6th  FAO  Regional  Conference  for  Asia  and  the  Far  East.    .    .    . 

UNESCO  Intergovernmental  Oceanographic  Commission:  Inter- 
national Coordination  Group  of  the  International  Cooperative 
Investigations  of  the  Tropical  Atlantic. 

ILO  Meeting  on  Inter-American  Vocational  Training  Research 
and  Documentation  Center. 

GATT  Committee  on  Budget,  Finance,  and  Administration    .    . 

U.N.  ECE  Coal  Committee  and  Working  Parties 

U.N.  ECE  Trade  Committee 

Inter-American  Institute  of  Agricultural  Sciences:  Board  of  Direc- 
tors. 

International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development,  Inter- 
national Monetary  Fund,  International  Finance  Corporation, 
and  International  Development  Association:  Annual  Meetings 
of  Boards  of  Governors. 

IAEA  General  Conference:  6th  Regular  Session 

ILO  Metal  Trades  Committee:  7th  Session 

U.N.  ECAFE  Seminar  on  Community  Facilities  in  Relation  to 
Housing  and  Working  Party  on  Housing  and  Building  Mate- 
rials. 

8th  Inter- American  Travel  Congress 

International  Criminal  Police  Organization:  31st  General  Assem- 
bly. 

WHO  Regional  Committee  for  Western  Pacific:   13th  Session     . 

UNESCO  Intergovernmental  Oceanographic  Commission:  2d 
Session. 

U.N.  ECE  Working  Party  on  Rural  Electrification 

U.N.  ECE  Electric  Power  Committee:  21st  Session 

OECD  Working  Party  II  (Economic  Growth) 

OECD  Industry  Committee 

U.N.  ECE  Steel  Committee 

International  Coinicil  for  the  Exploration  of  the  Sea:  S|)ecial 
Meeting  To  Consider  Problems  in  the  Exploitation  and  Regula- 
tion of  Fisheries  for  Crustacea. 


In  Session  as  of  September  30, 1962 


Istanbul Sept.  8-11 

Geneva Sept.  10-12 

Kuala  Lumpur Sept.  10-14 

Geneva Sept.  10-14 

New  York Sept.  10-14 

Karachi Sept.  10-15 

Rome Sept.  10-20 

Finland  and  Sweden Sept.  10-25 

Addis  Ababa Sept.  12-22 

Vienna Sept.  12-26 

Paris Sept.  13-15 

Washington Sept.  14-16 

Kuala  Lumpur Sept.  15-29 

Paris Sept.  17-19 

Bogota Sept.  17-21 

Geneva Sept.  17-21 

Geneva Sept.  17-21 

Geneva Sept.  17-21 

San  Jose,  Costa  Rica Sept.  17-22 

Washington Sept.  17-22 

Vienna Sept.  17-26 

Geneva Sept.  17-28 

New  Delhi Sept.  17-29 

Guadalajara Sept.  19-25 

Madrid Sept.  19-26 

Manila Sept.  20-25 

Paris Sept.  20-28 

Geneva Sept.  25  (1  day) 

Geneva Sept.  26-28 

Paris Sept.  27-28 

Paris      Sept.  27-28 

Geneva Sept.  27-28 

Copenhagen Sept.  28-29 


Geneva 


Mar.  14- 


Conference  of  the  Eightoen-Nation  Committee  on  Disarmament 

(recessed  September  8  until  November  12). 

U.N.  ECE  Coal  Study  Tour  of  the  U.S.S.R 

Caribbean  Organization:  2d  Meeting  of  the  Standing  Advisory 

Committee  of  the  Caribbean  Plan. 
GATT  Committee  on  Balance-of-Payments  Restrictions  .... 

GATT  Negotiations  on  U.S.  Tariff  Reclassification 

2d  ICAO  Pacific  Regional  Air  Navigation  Meeting Vancouver Sept.  25- 

ITU   CCITT  Study   Group  III   (General  Tariff  Principles  and     Geneva Sept.  27- 

Lease  of  Telecommunications  Circuits). 
U.N.  ECE  Seminar  on  Water  Pollution  Control Basel,  Switzerland Sept.  30- 


U.S.S.R Sept.  23- 

Surinam Sept.  24- 

Geneva Sept.  24^ 

Geneva Sept.  24- 


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572 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Ocl 


Sharing  the  Financial  Burdens  of  a  Changing  World 


Following  are  texts  of  remarks  made  by  Presi- 
dent Kennedy  and  a  statement  made  hy  Under 
Secretary  of  State  Ball  before  the  Boards  of 
Governors  of  the  International  Bank  for  Recon- 
struction  and  Development,  tJie  International 
Monetary  Fund,  the  International  Finance  Cor- 
poration, and  the  International  Development  As- 
sociation, lohich  held  their  annual  meetings  at 
Washington,  D.C.,  September  17-22. 

REMARKS  BY  THE  PRESIDENT,  SEPTEMBER  20 

White  House  press  release  dated  September  20 

Mr.  Chairman,  members  of  the  Board  of  Gover- 
nors, distinguished  guests:  This  is  my  first  op- 
portunity to  take  part  in  your  annual  meetings 
and  to  welcome  you  to  Washington,  and  I  do  so 
with  the  greatest  of  pleasure,  for  you  are  con- 
cerned with  the  problems  which  have  been  among 
my  primary  concerns  since  the  day  I  took  office 
exactly  20  months  ago,  and  in  that  time  I  have 
come  to  appreciate  how  vital  a  role  is  played  by 
the  International  Monetary  Fund  and  the  Inter- 
national Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Develop- 
ment and  its  affiliated  institutions. 

The  work  of  the  International  Development 
Association  is  pai'ticularly  important,  and  this 
country  fully  supports  the  proposal  that  the  execu- 
tive directors  develop  a  program  to  mcrease  its 
resources. 

The  pioneering  practices  of  the  Bank  which 
have  set  a  standard  for  others  to  follow  will 
sorely  miss  the  services  of  Eugene  Black.  I  hope 
he  will  permit  us  to  call  upon  his  wise  counsel  in 
the  future  and  that  the  rest  of  us,  in  pursuing  the 
goals  which  he  set,  will  increase  our  own  efforts, 
including  efforts  in  the  industrialized  countries 
to  provide  greater  capital  assistance  to  the  less 
developed  areas,  efforts  also  in  the  industrialized 
countries  to  maintain  at  home  prosperous  and 
easily  accessible  markets  for  the  products  of  the 
growing  nations,  efforts  to  reach  commodity  agree- 


ments and  other  arrangements  which  will  help 
stabilize  the  export  earnings  of  these  nations,  and 
finally,  and  most  importantly,  greater  efforts  in  the 
developing  nations  themselves  to  mobilize  effec- 
tively their  own  people  and  their  financial  re- 
sources and  to  make  certain  that  the  benefits  of 
increased  output  are  shared  by  the  many  and  not 
by  the  few. 

The  State  of  the  Dollar 

In  addition  to  these  discussions  on  the  role  of 
the  Bank,  your  meetings  this  year,  as  was  true  last 
year,  are  giving  top  attention  to  the  state  of  the 
dollar,  and  that  has  been  at  or  near  the  top  of  my 
own  agenda  for  the  last  year  and  a  half. 

We  in  the  United  States  feel  no  need  to  be  self- 
conscious  in  discussing  the  dollar.  It  is  not  only 
our  national  currency;  it  is  an  international  cur- 
rency. It  plays  a  key  role  in  the  day-to-day  func- 
tioning of  the  free  world's  financial  framework. 
It  is  the  most  effective  substitute  for  gold  in  the 
international  payments  system.  If  the  dollar  did 
not  exist  as  a  reserve  currency,  it  would  have  to  be 
invented,  for  a  volume  of  foreign  trade  already 
reaching  $130  billion  a  year,  and  growing  rapidly, 
accompanied  by  large  international  capital  move- 
ments, cannot  rest  solely  on  a  slowly  growing  stock 
of  gold  which  now  totals  only  $40  billion. 

The  security  of  the  dollar,  tlierefore,  is  and 
ought  to  be  of  major  concern  to  every  nation  here. 
To  undermine  the  strength  of  the  dollar  would 
undermine  the  strength  of  the  free  world.  To 
compete  for  national  financial  security  in  its  nar- 
rowest sense  by  taking  individual  actions  incon- 
sistent with  our  common  goals  would,  in  the  end, 
only  impair  the  security  of  us  all. 

I  recognize  that  this  nation  has  special  responsi- 
bilities as  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  free  world,  as 
its  richest  and  most  powerful  nation,  as  possessor 
of  its  most  important  currency,  and  as  the  chief 
banker  for  international  trade.  We  did  not  seek 
all  of  these  burdens,  but  we  do  not  shrink  from 


jW 


October   15,   1962 


573 


them.  We  are  taking  every  prudent  step  to  main- 
tain tlic  strength  of  the  dolliir,  to  improve  our 
bahmco  of  payments,  and  to  back  up  tlie  dollar 
by  expanding  the  growth  of  our  economy.  We  are 
pledged  to  keep  tlie  dollar  full}^  convertible  into 
gold  and  to  back  that  pledge  with  all  our  resources 
of  gold  and  credit. 

We  have  not  impaired  the  value  of  the  dollar 
by  imposing  restrictions  on  its  use.  We  have  not 
imposed  upon  our  citizens  in  peacetime  any  limita- 
tions on  the  amount  of  dollars  that  they  may  wish 
to  take  or  send  abroad.  We  have  followed  a  lib- 
eral policy  on  trade,  and  we  have  continued  to 
supply  our  friends  and  allies  with  dollars  and  gold 
to  rebuild  their  economies  and  defend  their 
freedom. 

Sharing  the  Burden 

All  this  we  have  willingly  done.  No  other 
country  or  currency  has  borne  so  many  burdens. 
But  we  cannot  and  should  not  bear  them  all  alone. 
I  know  that  other  countries  do  not  exi^ect  us  to 
bear  indefinitely  both  the  responsibilities  of  main- 
taining an  international  currency  and,  in  addition, 
a  disjiroportionate  share  of  the  costs  of  defending 
the  free  world  and  fostering  social  and  economic 
progress  in  the  less  developed  parts  of  the  world. 

Concern  over  our  imbalance  of  pajmients  is  not 
our  concern  alone,  for  it  is  not  caused  by  our 
narrow  self-interests.  Our  deficit  this  year  is  ex- 
pected to  approximate  $11/4  billion,  a  considerable 
improvement  over  last  year's  $2V^  billion  and  even 
higher  deficits  in  the  years  before.  But  our  total 
gross  military  expenditures  abroad  are  $3  billion 
alone.  Our  dollar  aid  expenditures  abroad  are 
$1.3  billion. 

The  dollar,  itself,  is  strong,  and  our  commercial 
trade,  excluding  exports  financed  by  AID  [Agency 
for  International  Development],  produces  a  sur- 
plus of  nearly  $3  billion.  In  short,  our  balance- 
of-payments  deficit  is  not  the  result  of  any 
monetary  or  economic  mismanagement  but  the 
result  of  ex])enditures  our  people  have  made  on 
behalf  of  the  peoples  of  the  free  world. 

In  1946  the  United  States  held  over  60  percent 
of  the  world's  supply  of  gold.  Xow  we  are  down 
to  40  percent,  and  during  that  time  we  have  spent 
some  $88  billion  overseas  for  the  defense  and  aid 
of  others.  The  European  nations  alone  received 
some  $26  billion  in  economic  aid.  The  United 
States,  as  a  result,  no  longer  has  a  disproportion- 


574 


ate    share   of    the   free    world's   gold,    economic 
strength,  or  economic  responsibility. 

That  is  why  I  emphasize  once  again  these  are 
not  American  problems ;  they  are  free- world  prob- 
lems. They  are  problems  which  cannot  be  met  by 
one  nation  in  isolation,  or  by  many  nations  in  dis- 
array. They  are  not  the  sole  concern  of  either  the 
rich  or  the  poor,  of  either  deficit  or  surplus  nations 
alone. 

When  burdens  are  shared,  there  is  no  undue  bur- 
den on  any  nation.  Wlien  risk  is  shared,  there  is 
less  risk  for  all.  And  cooperative  efforts  to  defend 
the  international  currency  system  based  primarily 
on  the  dollar  and  to  share  other  responsibilities 
are  not,  therefore,  based  on  appeals  to  gratitude  or 
even  friendship,  but  on  the  hard  and  factual 
grounds  of  self-interest  and  common  sense. 

Of  course  the  United  States  could  bring  its 
international  payments  into  balance  overnight,  if 
that  were  the  only  goal  we  sought.  We  could 
withdraw  our  forces,  reduce  our  aid,  tie  it  wholly 
to  purchases  in  this  country,  raise  high  tariif  bar- 
riers, and  restrict  the  foreign  investments  or  other 
uses  of  American  dollars. 

Such  a  policy,  it  is  true,  would  give  rise  to  a 
new  era  of  dollar  shortages,  free- world  insecurity, 
and  American  isolation.  But  we  would  have 
solved  the  balance  of  payments.  But  the  basic 
strength  of  the  dollar  makes  such  actions  as  un- 
necessaiy  as  they  are  unwise.  They  would  not 
only  be  inconsistent  with  the  responsibility  and 
role  of  the  United  States  in  the  world  today ;  they 
would,  because  of  the  crucial  role  of  the  dollar, 
be  utterly  self-defeating. 

The  Only  Feasible  Course — Cooperation 

All  of  us  here  are  detemiined  to  follow  the  only 
other  feasible  course — not  the  imacceptable  courses 
of  restriction  and  isolation  or  deflation,  but  the 
course  of  true  cooperation,  of  liberal  payments 
and  trade,  of  sharing  the  cost  of  our  NATO  and 
Pacific  defenses,  of  sharing  the  cost  of  the  free 
world's  development  aid,  and  of  working  together 
on  steps  to  greater  international  stability  with 
other  currencies,  in  addition  to  the  dollar,  bearing 
an  increasing  share  of  its  central  responsibilities. 

We  in  the  United  States  recognize  that  our  own 
obligation  in  this  regard  includes,  as  a  matter  of 
the  first  priority,  taking  action  to  eliminate  the 
deficit  in  our  balance  of  payments  and  to  do  so 
without  resorting  to   deflation   or  retreating  to 

Department  of  State   Bulletin 


isolation.  I  have  spoken  frankly  at  this  meeting 
because  these  two  successful  institutions,  the  Bank 
and  the  Fund,  have  long  flourished  in  a  spirit  of 
candor  and  have  consistently  shown  a  reliable 
capacity  to  respond  both  flexibly  and  effectively  to 
new  needs  and  new  challenges. 

This  spirit  of  cooperation  and  candor  and  initi- 
ative will,  I  know,  continue  in  the  future,  for  only 
in  this  spirit  can  we  hope  to  maintain  a  sturdy 
free-world  financial  system,  witli  stable  exchange 
rates  capable  of  supporting  a  growing  flow  of 
trade  and  foreign  investment  free  from  discrimina- 
tions and  restrictions. 

I  lis  ve  spoken  frankly,  moreover,  because  I  be- 
lieve/he  current  strength  of  the  dollar  enables  us 
to  spyak  frankly  and  with  confidence.  Some  shar- 
ing of  responsibilities  has  already  been  achieved. 
Considerable  progi-ess  in  the  balance  of  our  inter- 
national accounts  has  been  made.  A  new  agree- 
ment among  10  industrialized  countries  to  supple- 
ment the  resources  of  the  Fund,  with  sjDecial 
borrowing  arrangements  of  up  to  $6  billion,  has 
been  concluded,^  and  implementing  action  will  be 
completed  by  the  United  States  Congress  within 
the  next  few  days  or  weeks. 

Less  formal  arrangements  between  the  major 
trading  countries  have  also  been  evolved  to  cope 
with  any  potential  strains  or  shocks  that  might 
arise  from  a  sudden  movement  of  capital.  These 
arrangements,  I  should  add,  contain  within  them- 
selves the  possibility  of  wider  and  more  general 
application,  and  tins  country  will  always  be  re- 
ceptive to  suggestions  for  expanding  these  ar- 
rangements or  otherwise  improving  the  operation 
and  efficiency  of  the  international  payments 
system. 

All  of  this  is  ground  for  confidence,  for  making 
it  increasingly  clear  that  no  extreme  or  restrictive 
measures  are  needed ;  that  speculation  against  the 
dollar  is  losing  its  allure;  and  that  the  economy 
of  the  United  States  can  continue  to  expand  in  a 
framework  based  on  the  maintenance  of  free  ex- 
change and  the  early  achievement  of  equilibriiun. 

The  expansion  in  our  domestic  economy,  while 
not  all  that  we  had  hoped,  has  been  substantial; 
and,  of  equal  importance,  it  has  been  accompanied 
by  price  stability.  Wliolesale  prices  for  indus- 
trial goods  are  actually  lower  today  than  they 
were  during  the  recession  months  of  1961.     Never- 


^  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  29,  1962,  p.  187. 


theless  I  do  not  imderestimate  the  continuing  chal- 
lenge which  faces  us  all  together. 

The  very  success  of  our  efforts,  the  very  pros- 
perity of  those  who  have  prospered,  imposes  ujDon 
us  special  obligations  and  special  burdens.  Cen- 
turies ago,  the  essayist  Burton  referred  with  scorn 
to  those  who  were  possessed  by  their  money  rather 
than  possessors  of  it.  We  who  are  meeting  here 
today  do  not  intend  to  be  mastered  by  our  money 
or  by  our  monetary  problems.  We  intend  to 
master  them,  with  unity  and  with  generosity,  and 
we  shall  do  so  in  the  name  of  freedom. 


STATEMENT  BY  MR.  BALL,  SEPTEMBER  18 

Press  release  563  dated  September  18 

Mr.  Chairman,  President  Black,  and  distin- 
guished guests :  As  the  Bank  returns  to  Washing- 
ton for  its  I7th  annual  meeting,  I  wish  to  convey 
the  greetings  of  my  Government  to  the  members 
assembled  here  this  morning  and  especially  to  the 
new  members.  These  expressions  are,  of  course, 
only  a  prelude  to  the  words  of  welcome  that  Pres- 
ident Kennedy  will  extend  in  person  on  Thursday. 

In  our  discussions  here  this  week  we  can,  I  think, 
rely  with  confidence  upon  the  general  acceptance 
of  certain  common  principles  tested  by  common 
experience.  This  was  not  the  case  18  years  ago 
when  representatives  of  44  governments  assembled 
in  a  resort  hotel  600  miles  northeast  of  here  in  the 
State  of  New  Hampshire.  Those  governments 
had  had  only  a  limited  experience  of  working  to- 
gether; they  had  gained  most  of  that  experience 
in  the  midst  of  a  prolonged  and  brutal  struggle. 
Yet,  in  spite  of  a  pervasive  preoccupation  with 
urgent  wartime  business,  the  delegates  to  the 
Bretton  Woods  Conference  were  able  to  take 
prophetic  steps  toward  improving  the  conditions 
of  peace — a  peace  that  was  to  be  more  than  a  year 
in  coming. 

They  agreed  to  create  an  International  Mone- 
tary Fund  which  would  provide  strength  and  sta- 
bility for  a  world  payments  system  that  has  since 
supported  a  vast  expansion  of  international  trade. 
They  agreed  also  to  establish  an  International 
Bank  for  Eeconstruction  and  Development  dedi- 
cated to  two  major  postwar  tasks — the  reconstruc- 
tion of  economies  shattered  by  conflict  and  the 
raising  of  the  standard  of  living  of  the  less  devel- 
oped countries. 

It  is  to  the  Bank  and  to  these  major  tasks  for 


Ocfofaer   75,   7962 


575 


■which  it  was  created  that  I  shall  address  my  re- 
marks this  morning. 

During  the  18  years  since  the  epic  decisions  at 
Bretton  Woods  we  have  learned  much  about  the 
complexity  and  difficulty  of  each  of  these  tasks. 
Our  experience  has  confirmed  the  wisdom — indeed 
the  necessity — of  creating  international  mecha- 
nisms for  the  purpose.  Moreover,  the  articles  of 
the  Bank  have,  like  all  great  organic  documents, 
proved  flexible  enough  to  meet  tlie  shifting  prob- 
lems of  a  rapidly  evolving  world. 

In  the  light  of  our  discussions  here  this  week 
it  is  clear  that  the  gifted  men  of  Bretton  Woods 
foresaw  with  remarkable  perception  the  nature 
of  the  problems  that  the  Bank  would  face,  even 
if  they  did  not  fully  appreciate  the  magnitude  of 
those  problems. 

Meeting  Needs  of  New  Nations 

Not  surprisingly,  they,  in  company  with  other 
experts  and  statesmen  of  the  time,  underestimated 
the  requirements  for  European  recovery.  In  1944 
it  seemed  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  short- 
range  relief  needs  of  Europe  might  be  met  through 
UNREA  [United  Nations  Relief  and  Rehabilita- 
tion Administration]  and  that  the  external  capi- 
tal needs  for  permanent  recover}'  could  be  supplied 
by  the  International  Bank  as  a  supplement  to 
private  sources. 

By  the  time  the  Bank  had  made  its  first  recon- 
struction loans  in  1947,  however,  it  was  already 
clear  that  its  resources  alone  would  prove  insuffi- 
cient for  the  long-term  needs  of  European  recov- 
ery. As  we  know  today,  it  required  the  Marshall 
Plan,  with  its  greater  scope  and  dimensions,  to 
meet  these  vast  demands. 

Similarly  underestimated  was  the  magnitude  of 
resources  that  would  be  required  if  the  less  devel- 
oped areas  of  the  world  were  to  join  in  the  march 
of  20th-century  technology  and  economic  growth. 
The  statesmen  in  1944  could  not  foresee  tlie  speed 
with  which  the  old  colonial  systems  would  be 
superseded  and  tlie  vigor  witli  which  tlie  former 
colonies  would  demand  full  and  equal  participation 
in  the  modem  economic  order.  It  was  understand- 
able that  there  should  be  these  errors  in  prophecy. 
Who  among  us  would  have  predicted,  wjion  tlie 
Bank  held  its  first  annual  meeting  in  194G,  tliat  by 
the  time  of  its  I7th  meeting  the  member  nations 
would  double  in  number?  "WHio  would  have  fore- 
told that,  during  the  same  period,  the  United 


576 


Nations  would  add  53  new  members,  34  of  whicli 
did  not  even  exist  as  nation-states  when  the 
charter  was  adopted  ? 

It  is  an  old  story  that  people  living  in  the  pres- 
ence of  great  events  rarely  appreciate  their  full 
significance.  But  we  mid-20th-century  men  should 
recognize  that  there  lias  seldom  occurred  in  human 
history  so  profound  a  political  change  as  the 
transformation  from  colonial  status  to  independ- 
ence of  close  to  a  billion  people — one-third  of  the 
population  of  the  world — and  never  has  a  change 
of  such  magnitude  been  achieved  in  such  a  fan- 
tastically short  time.  This  change  of  status  did 
not  by  itself  create  the  need  to  raise  the  standard 
of  living  of  these  peoples.  But  both  the  change 
and  need  were  a  response  to  the  same  economic 
and  political  forces  and  the  same  evolving  sense 
of  the  worth  and  dignity  of  the  individual — and 
we  know  today  that  political  freedom  and  eco- 
nomic well-being  must  go  hand  in  hand  if  either 
is  to  have  its  full  meaning. 

In  providing  for  the  emerging  needs  of  an 
aroused  and  insistent  world  the  Banli  has  played 
a  heroic  role,  although  the  resources  available 
to  it  have  been  far  less  than  those  mobilized  for 
national  programs  by  the  United  States  and  cer- 
tain European  countries.  The  Bank's  contribution 
has  transcended  the  mere  extension  of  credits ;  its 
leadership  has  served  to  give  direction  to  the  total 
effort,  both  bilateral  and  multilateral.  It  has  de- 
vised mechanisms  to  encourage  the  coordination 
of  assistance.  It  has  been  a  counselor  and  friend 
to  new  nations  and  has  lent  its  good  offices  to  the 
reconciliation  of  disputes  among  them. 

International  Development  Association 

Today,  as  we  look  back  over  18  years  of  the 
Bank's  history  since  Bretton  Woods,  the  lessons 
of  its  experience  are  worth  recalling  and  tlie  as 
sumptions  underlying  its  charter  are  worth  re 
affirmation. 

As  the  demands  of  the  less  developed  countries 
for  a  better  life  rose  toward  full  tide,  new  efforts 
were  made  to  provide  needed  resources.  Begin 
iiing  with  a  modest  proposal  for  technical  aid 
embodied  in  the  Point  4  Program  of  1949,  the 
United  States  launched  a  program  of  foreign 
assistance  in  whicli  development  needs  were  pro- 
gressively emphasized  with  each  annual  appropri- 
ation. At  the  same  time  several  of  the  nations  of 
Western  Europe  began  to  develop  and  expand  na- 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


oiai 


i!ie 


tional  programs  of  aid.  These  were  at  first  chiefly 
directed  to  former  colonial  areas,  but  they  are 
recently  broadening  in  scope  and  purpose. 

Throughout  the  fifties  the  Bank  has  sought  to 
widen  the  base  of  its  support  of  its  finances.  It 
has  now  borrowed  in  world  capital  markets  more 
than  $2.5  billion  and  sold  more  than  $1.3  billion 
of  its  loans  to  investors.  In  1958  the  Bank's  capi- 
tal was  increased  from  $10  billion  to  more  than 
$20  billion. 

By  that  time  it  had  become  apparent  that  the 
spurring  of  economic  development  required  not 
merely  more  resources  but  resources  that  could 
be  made  available  on  easier  terms.  Nations  had 
borrowed  extensively  from  the  Bank,  while  at  the 
same  time  obtaining  credits  from  other  govern- 
ments and  private  financial  sources;  in  the  process 
they  had  been  compelled  to  mortgage  their  future 
income  and  foreign  exchange  earnings.  In  order 
to  reduce  and  spread  out  the  burden  of  debt  serv- 
ice, the  Bank  proposed  the  creation  of  the  Inter- 
national Development  Association. 

Through  the  IDA  credits  have  been  made  avail- 
able for  sound  projects  but  on  lenient  terms — 
terms  providing  for  a  small  service  charge  instead 
of  interest,  for  extended  grace  periods,  and  for 
long  maturities.  These  credits  bear  less  heavily 
on  the  borrower's  balance  of  payments  than  con- 
ventional loans ;  they  have  provided  a  needed  sup- 
plement to  more  conventional  credits  from  the 
Bank  and  other  institutions.  At  the  end  of  its 
first  full  year  of  operation  the  IDA  had  extended 
$235  million  of  credits,  and  its  initial  loanable 
capital  will  be  fully  utilized  within  the  next  year. 

The  United  States  Government  looks  with  favor 
on  the  suggestion  of  President  Black  that  the  cap- 
ital requirements  of  the  IDA  should  now  be  re- 
examined. If,  as  a  result  of  this  reexamination, 
an  expanded  capital  program  is  recommended,  my 
Government  is  prepared,  subject  to  appropriate 
legislative  approval,  to  share  with  other  econom- 
ically advanced  countries  in  subscribing  additional 
resources.  The  subscribing  nations  should  provide 
these  new  resources  on  a  basis  of  contributions 
that  reflect,  in  the  light  of  the  realities  of  today, 
the  relative  effort  and  resources  of  the  partici- 
pants. 

The  credits  that  the  IDA  makes  available,  as 
well  as  the  long-term  development  credits  that  the 
United  States  is  providing  under  its  assistance 
program,  are  designed  to  minimize  the  debt-serv- 
icing burden  on  the  recipient  countries.    In  our 

October  15,   1962 


view  this  is  not  merely  desirable  but  necessary. 
If  we  are  to  avoid  recurrent  financial  crises  in  tlie 
future  and  if  we  are  to  make  it  possible  for  the 
less  advanced  countries  to  do  serious  financial  and 
economic  planning,  more  of  the  economically  ad- 
vanced countries  must  provide  credit  on  longer 
terms  and  with  reduced  interest. 

Capital  Accumulation  an  Economic  Necessity 

In  supporting  a  further  effort  to  expand  the 
supply  of  development  funds  represented  by  the 
proposed  increase  in  IDA  capital,  I  would  like  to 
offer  some  general  observations  for  countries  that 
may  seek  credits  to  finance  their  development.  We 
have  all  learned  a  great  deal  about  the  process  of 
national  economic  development  in  the  years  since 
1948,  when  the  Bank  made  its  first  loan  for  this 
purpose.  A  whole  new  branch  of  economic  study 
has  been  bom  and  come  of  age  since  then — the  field 
of  development  economics  with  its  concern  for  the 
dynamics  of  economic  growth,  the  investigation 
of  the  relationship  of  growth  to  social  and  politi- 
cal structures,  and  the  devising  of  methods  for 
analyzing  needed  inputs  and  measuring  results. 
Even  more  important  we  have  gained  pragmatic 
experience  in  providing  capital  under  national  and 
international  programs  for  development. 

We  have  taken  it  for  granted  that  the  objective 
of  these  vast  programs  is  to  enable  the  recipient 
countries  to  reach  the  ultimate  goal  of  self-sustain- 
ing economic  growth — growth  at  a  rate  adequate 
to  meet  the  needs  of  an  expanding  standard  of 
living  for  their  peoples. 

But  we  have  learned  through  repeated  experi- 
ence that  such  growth  does  not  come  automatically 
with  the  infusion  of  external  capital,  nor  is  it 
necessarily  related  to  the  amount  of  the  external 
funds  made  available.  It  depends,  to  a  very  great 
extent,  upon  the  will  of  the  people,  the  intelligence 
and  dedication  of  their  leadership,  the  capacity 
of  the  various  groups  in  the  society  to  organize 
themselves  for  joint  effort,  and  the  willingness  of 
the  traditionally  favored  few  to  yield  some  of 
their  special  privileges  for  the  larger  interests  of 
their  country. 

Nor  will  self-sustaining  growth  be  achieved 
without  regard  to  the  economic  verities.  Among 
the  most  basic  and  evident  of  these  verities  is  the 
need  for  capital.  Capital  accumulation  is  an  eco- 
nomic necessity  and  has  nothing  to  do  with  "cap- 
italism" or  any  other  economic  system.     What- 

577 


ever  success  the  Soviet  Union  has  achie\'ed  in 
economic  growth  is  in  large  measure  attrilnitable 
to  its  inheritance  of  a  substantial  capital  plant 
from  czarist  Russia  and  to  the  regime's  grim  de- 
termination to  accumulate  capital  even  if  it 
means,  as  it  has,  denymg  the  fruit  of  growth  to 
the  Eussian  people  for  almost  a  half  century. 

The  Soviet  example  dramatically  illustrates 
that  even  for  a  coimtry  with  vast  resources,  with 
a  large  inherited  base  of  social  as  well  as  physical 
capital,  and  with  the  most  single-minded  and 
ruthless  of  totalitarian  regimes,  the  process  of 
capital  accumulation  exclusively  through  internal 
efforts  is  necessarily  slow. 

The  only  way — I  repeat,  the  only  way — in  which 
the  developing  countries  can  achieve  the  economic 
growth  they  desire  is  by  expanding  the  capital 
resources  upon  which  they  can  draw.  If  a  coun- 
try is  to  be  able  to  achieve  self-sustaining  growth 
within  a  reasonable  future,  it  will  have  to  pursue 
realistic  policies  to  acquire  the  capital  it  needs. 

First,  such  a  country  must  develop  the  ability 
to  accumiilate  savings  for  productive  investment. 
This  means  not  only  that  it  must  form  the  na- 
tional habit  of  saving  and  investing  and  build  the 
institutional  arrangements  to  make  this  possible 
but  that  it  must  consciously  foster  the  economic 
staljility  and  the  investment  opportunities  that 
will  remove  the  incentives  for  capital  flight. 

Second,  if  it  is  to  achieve  self-sustainmg  growth 
in  a  reasonable  period  of  time,  it  must  create  con- 
ditions that  are  conducive  to  private  external  in- 
vestment, including  assurances  against  discrimi- 
natory treatment  and  expropriation. 

Finally,  it  must  develop  the  capacity  to  earn 
foreign  exchange  to  meet  its  external  obligations. 
It  must  use  its  national  resources  to  best  advan- 
tage, develop  outlets  in  world  markets,  and  pro- 
duce surpluses  in  its  international  accounts. 

Public  Funds  for  Development  Are  Not  Limitless 

I  find  it  necessary  to  repeat  these  self-evident 
propositions  tliis  moniing  since  I  must  report  un- 
happily that  in  many  of  the  countries  where  capi- 
tal assistance  is  being  provided — whether  through 
the  Bank  and  the  IDA  or  through  our  national 
programs — these  conditions  do  not  prevail.  In 
fact,  in  several  areas  of  the  world  recently  the  in- 
flow of  private  investment  from  abroad  has  been 
drying  up  at  an  alarming  rate — in  some  cases 
there  has  even  been  a  net  outflow — because  the 


recipient  countries  are  pursuing  national  policies 
that  make  private  investment  precarious  and  un- 
rewarding. And  what  I  say  about  external  pri- 
vate capital  applies  in  most  of  these  areas  to  in- 
ternal private  capital  accumulation  as  well — and 
for  the  same  reasons. 

It  may  be  thought  by  some  that  a  developing  i 
country  should  be  able  to  look  with  confidence  to 
a  perpetual  inflow  of  public  funds  to  supplement 
its  internal  savings  and  thus  feel  free  to  discourage 
private  investment.  I  think  it  may  be  said  with 
absolute  certainty  that  no  developing  country  can 
safely  make  such  an  assumption. 

We  recognize  that  the  provision  of  public  funds 
by  the  advanced  nations — whether  through  multi- 
lateral agencies  or  through  national  programs — 
must  continue  for  a  veiy  long  period  of  time.  But 
the  amount  of  outside  public  funds  available  for 
investment  in  development  is  finite.  Over  the 
long  pull  those  limited  funds  will  inevitably  tend 
to  find  their  way  into  those  countries  that  are, 
to  the  best  of  their  abilities,  pursuing  policies  that 
ofi'er  hope  of  the  ultimate  achievement  of  self- 
sustaining  growth. 

I  do  not  wish  to  be  misunderstood  on  this  point. 
My  Government,  while  itself  committed  to  free 
enterprise,  does  not  seek  to  dictate  the  form  or 
shape  of  the  economic  systems  of  other  countries. 
I  recognize  that  internal  political  and  emotional 
pressures  may  tempt  political  leaders  in  some 
newly  developing  countries  to  declare  themselves 
opposed  to  investment  of  external  capital  in  their 
countries.  I  further  recognize  that  private  funds 
cannot  do  the  job  alone  and  that  even  the  facilities 
and  organizational  modes  for  providing  such  cap- 
ital require  adjustment  to  changing  conditions. 
Tliey  have  evolved  in  the  past,  and  further  evolu- 
tion is  in  i^rogress. 

But  nations  must  make  their  choices  of  national 
policy  within  the  framework  of  reality  and  with 
full  awareness  of  inescapable  economic  facts.  If 
they  elect  to  pursue  policies  that  tend  to  eliminate 
tlie  private  sector  or  discriminate  against  outside 
capital,  they  must  be  ^jrepared  to  pay  a  great  cost 
in  delaying  their  own  economic  development. 
They  will  find  that  they  cannot  depend  upon  the 
perpetual  infusion  of  public  funds  from  other 
countries  to  assist  them  in  development,  and  tliey 
will  find  themselves  falling  farther  and  fartlier 
back  in  Ihe  march  of  progress  of  the  rest  of  tlie 
underdeveloped  world. 


578 


Deparfmenf  of  Sfofe  Bu//ef/n 


:eto 


mage 


lefor 

r ! 

•te 

tare, 

siliat 

'self- 


ifree 
•m  or 
itries. 


i-elves 


i  If 
iiinate 
iiitsiii» 
It  cost 
rnient 
oatk 


Role  of  Private  Capital  in  Development  Process 

I  have  said  that  private  capital  has  a  vital  role 
to  play  in  the  development  process  of  the  newly 
emerging  nations.  Let  me  be  clear  that  I  do  not 
mean  by  this  to  recall  to  life  the  19th  century  nor 
to  endorse  uncritically  the  i^ractices  of  a  more 
primitive  capitalism  of  an  age  gone  by.  Far  from 
it.  "Within  the  period  since  the  end  of  World  War 
II  enormous  strides  have  been  made  as  the  leaders 
of  the  international  business  commmiity  have 
recognized  with  increasing  clarity  that  inter- 
national private  investment  implies  tlie  need  for 
cooperation  with  the  government  and  people  of 
the  host  country  and  an  alert  awareness  of  the 
public  responsibilities  attendant  upon  such  invest- 
ment. 

New  techniques,  new  attitudes,  new  procedures 
have  become  widespread  as  a  new  form  of  inter- 
national capitalism  has  evolved  in  response  to  the 
conditions  of  this  century.  This  process,  largely 
self -generated  within  the  business  community, 
must  continue  and  be  accelerated  if  private  invest- 
ment is  to  fulfill  its  potential  role  in  the  economic 
development  of  the  newly  emerging  nations. 

But  the  governments  of  those  countries,  as  well 
as  our  international  institutions,  can  do  much  to 
expedite  and  encourage  this  development.  The 
Bank  has  already  undertaken  useful  measures  to 
this  end,  and  others  are  being  proposed. 

From  the  beginning  of  its  operations  the  Bank 
has  been  fully  conscious  of  the  need  to  provide  the 
basic  conditions  that  will  make  possible  the  flow 
of  private  capital,  and  it  has  taken  several  steps 
explicitly  designed  to  encourage  and  facilitate 
private  investment. 

One  initiative  was  the  creation  of  the  Inter- 
national Finance  Corporation,  which  has  now 
made  commitments  of  over  $62  million.  The 
IFC  has  acted  as  a  catalyst  to  the  expansion 
of  investment  in  the  private  sector  of  a  number 
Df  nations. 

In  many  cases  private  investors  are  reluctant 
to  commit  funds  to  projects  in  less  developed 
coiuitries  because  of  uncertainty  as  to  the  mecha- 
nisms for  resolving  controversies  that  may  arise 
with  the  governments  of  those  countries.  As  a 
contribution  to  removing  this  impediment,  the 
Bank  lias  recently  proposed  the  establishment  of 
conciliation  and  arbitration  machinei-y.  This  fa- 
cility would  be  established  under  an  international 
convention.     It  would  provide  a  panel  of  concili- 

Oc/ofaer  IS,   1962 


ators  and  a  panel  of  arbitrators  to  resolve  disputes. 

This  mechanism  would  be  employed  where  a 
state  and  a  national  of  another  state  have  agreed 
to  submit  a  dispute  to  arbitration.  Such  agree- 
ment might  be  contained  either  in  the  investment 
contract  or  in  a  special  agreement  once  the  dispute 
has  arisen. 

My  Government  supports  this  proposal.  Sub- 
ject to  legislative  approval  through  our  estab- 
lished constitutional  processes,  it  is  prepared  to 
join  in  an  international  convention  along  the  lines 
suggested  by  the  Bank. 

Need  To  Readjust  World  Responsibilities 

I  have  spoken  this  morning  of  the  great  post- 
war transformation  that  has  occurred  in  the  po- 
litical relations  among  the  peoples  of  the  free 
world— the  dismantling  of  colonial  arrangements 
and  the  birth  of  half  a  hundred  new  countries. 

This  seismic  change  has  generated  a  surge  of 
energy  throughout  tlie  emerging  countries.  At  the 
same  time,  far  from  weakening  the  former  colo- 
nial powers,  it  has  enabled  them  to  concentrate 
their  efforts  on  the  constructive  task  of  building  a 
strong  and  united  Europe.  Today  there  is  reason 
to  hope  that  the  central  structure  of  this  new 
Europe — the  European  Economic  Community — 
may  be  expanded  by  the  addition  of  the  United 
Ivingdom  and  perhaps  certain  other  European 
countries. 

Obviously  the  tei-mination  of  colonial  ari-ange- 
ments,  many  of  them  more  than  a  century,  or  even 
centuries,  old,  could  not  be  accomplished  without 
strains  and  tensions.  For  the  colonial  powers  it 
has  necessarily  meant  a  substantial  withdrawal  of 
effort  from  many  parts  of  the  world. 

In  many  areas  independence,  marked  as  it  was 
by  the  breaking  of  old  ties,  interrupted,  or  at  least 
diminished,  the  supply  of  capital  and  technical 
assistance  that  had  long  been  provided  under 
colonial  arrangements.  In  almost  every  case  the 
drive  toward  independence,  followed,  as  it  some- 
times was,  by  tlie  drying  up  of  these  historic 
sources  of  assistance,  has  resulted  at  the  same  time 
in  intensifying  the  demand  of  the  newly  independ- 
ent peoples  for  rapid  development  and  the  early 
acliievement  of  a  higher  standard  of  living. 

Faced  with  situations  of  this  kind,  repeated 
again  and  again  in  many  different  parts  of  the  free 
world,  my  Government,  often  with  the  assistance 
of  the  International  Bank,  has  found  it  necessary 


579 


to  assume  a  large  part  of  the  burden  of  assistance 
that  has  been  relinquislied,  and  to  continue  that 
assistance — often  on  a  far  larger  scale. 

This  effort  has  not  been  easy  for  my  country. 
The  responsibilities  we  have  assumed  for  defense 
and  economic  help  on  five  continents  of  the  free 
world  have  proved  a  substantial  burden.  Yet  the 
American  people  have  undertaken  these  tasks  out 
of  a  deep  commitment  to  the  ideals  of  freedom  and 
to  the  obligation  of  helping  the  less  developed  na- 
tions build  a  decent  standard  of  li\-ing  so  that  they 
may  maintain  and  develop  their  new-found  free- 
dom in  an  atmosphere  of  security. 

Tlie  fact  that  the  United  States  has  been  ex- 
panding its  responsibilities  around  the  world 
while  Europe  has  been  concentrating  its  efforts  on 
the  building  of  strength  and  unity  at  home  has 
necessarily  resulted  in  some  economic  imbalance — 
an  imbalance  reflected  in  the  deficit  in  the  United 
States  balance  of  accounts  of  which  Secretary  [of 
the  Treasury  Douglas]  Dillon  will  speak  to- 
morrow. 

We  are  confident,  however,  that  this  imbalance 
is  merely  a  temporally  phase  in  the  readjustment 
of  world  responsibilities.  In  fact,  one  of  the  most 
encouraging  developments  of  the  past  year  has 
been  the  extent  to  which  nations  of  Western  Eu- 
rope have  reestablished  relations  with  their  former 
colonial  dependencies  within  the  framework  of 
new  relationships  based  on  mutual  self-respect. 
There  is  every  reason  to  hope — indeed  it  is  neces- 
sary to  believe — that  this  process  will  continue  and 
that  the  economically  advanced  nations  can  sys- 
tematically tackle  the  reallocation  of  world  respon- 
sibilities on  a  basis  commensurate  with  growing 
strength  and  ability. 

The  end  result  of  this  process  should  be  not  only 
a  better  distribution  of  the  burden  of  effort  but 
a  more  ample  provision  of  assistance  and  the  res- 
toration of  a  better  balance  within  the  payments 
system  of  the  free  world. 

Wlien  I  spoke  to  the  16th  annual  meeting  of 
the  Bank  at  Vienna  last  year  ^  I  pointed  out  that, 
if  the  less  developed  nations  are  to  achieve  self- 
sustaining  growth,  they  must  be  able  to  earn  a 
growing  volume  of  convertible  foreign  exchange 
in  world  markets.  To  do  this  they  must  develop 
reasonably  stable  markets  for  their  raw  materials, 
and,  as  they  progress  toward  industrialization. 


they  must  find  world  outlets  for  their  manufac- 
tures. 

Success  in  finding  markets  will  depend  not  only 
on  the  diligence  and  imagination  of  producers  in 
the  less  developed  countries  but  also  on  the  policies 
of  the  major  industrialized  nations,  which  account 
for  a  high  proportion  of  the  world's  imports. 

Improving  Export  Earnings  of  Growing  Nations 

In  recent  years  the  advanced  countries  have 
shown  increasing  awareness  of  the  need  on  their 
part  to  facilitate  the  entry  of  products  of  the 
less  developed  areas  into  their  markets.  Eecent 
developments  in  Europe  should  have  an  affirmative 
effect  on  the  growth  of  market  opportunities. 
The  formation  and  proposed  expansion  of  the 
European  Economic  Community  should  prove  of 
great  value  to  the  developing  nations.  The 
heightened  flow  of  commerce  resulting  from  a 
closer  economic  integration  of  the  great  indus- 
trialized states  of  Europe  should  make  possible 
increased  levels  of  consumption  and  lead  to  a 
greater — and  more  stable — demand  for  the  raw 
materials  of  the  new  countries. 

The  United  States  on  its  part  is  moving  in  a 
positive  way  to  improve  the  potential  export  earn- 
ings of  the  growing  nations.  As  many  of  you 
know,  President  Kennedy  has  asked  the  United 
States  Congress  to  provide  him  with  the  powers 
with  which  he  can  launch  a  new  and  wide-ranging 
effort  of  trade  liberalization.^  The  proposed 
Trade  Expansion  Act,  which  is  being  debated  in 
the  United  States  Senate  today,  includes  a  pro- 
vision that  would  empower  the  President,  in  con- 
cert with  the  European  Economic  Community,  to 
reduce  and  even  eliminate  tariffs  on  tropical  agri- 
cultural products.  The  exercise  of  powers  of  this 
kind  should  help  to  eliminate  some  of  the  unneces- 
sai'y  impediments  and  discriminatory  practices 
that  interfere  with  the  marketing  of  tropical  prod- 
ucts from  nations  in  Latin  America,  Africa,  and 
the  Far  East  and  that  distort  the  patterns  of  pro- 
duction and  trade. 

The  executive  branch  of  my  Government  is  en- 
gaged in  an  exliaustive  search  for  effective  tech- 
niques to  cushion  abrupt  cyclical  fluctuations  in 
world  markets  for  primary  commodities.  As  a 
first  stage  in  a  program  looking  toward  market 
stabilization,  we  have  played  an  active  role  in  the 


'  For  text,  see  ibid.,  Oct.  9,  1961,  p.  579. 
580 


'  For    President    Kennedy's    message    to    Congress   on 
trade,  see  ihid.,  Feb.  12,  1962,  p.  231. 

Department  of  State   Bulletin 


drafting  of  the  International  Coffee  Agi-eement,* 
which  is  now  being  presented  to  member  govern- 
ments for  signature.  In  addition  we  are  explor- 
ing the  possibilities  of  compensatory  financing 
arrangements  that  might  ameliorate  some  of  the 
problems  resulting  from  severe  short-term  fluctua- 
tions in  the  export  earnuigs  of  the  developmg 
nations. 

Quite  clearly,  m  the  months  ahead  the  indus- 
trialized nations  must  give  greater  attention  to 
the  development  of  markets  for  the  products  of 
the  less  developed  nations.  We  must  seek  solu- 
tions consonant  with  expandmg  world  trade  and 
must  pennit  equality  of  access  for  all  free-world 
countries  to  the  markets  of  each  other. 

The  expansion  of  markets  and  the  maintenance 
of  reasonably  stable  prices  for  the  products  of 
the  less  developed  countries  should  have  a  claim 
of  high  priority  on  the  effort  and  statesmanship 
of  the  industrialized  nations.  They  are  not  easy 
problems  to  solve.  In  most  industrialized  coun- 
tries it  is  easier  for  governments  to  provide  public 
funds  to  help  develop  the  economies  of  less  de- 
veloped coimtries  than  it  is  for  them  to  provide 
access  for  the  products  of  those  economies.  Trad- 
ing habits  acquire  a  life  of  their  own  and  are 
fiercely  resistant  to  change.  But  experience  has 
shown  clearly  enough  that  sharp  fluctuations  in 
world  market  prices  can  frustrate  even  the  most 
ambitious  assistance  programs,  and  the  attain- 
ment of  self-sustaming  growth  for  many  less  de- 
veloped countries  will  depend  in  the  long  run 
upon  the  willingness  of  the  economically  advanced 
nations  to  free  the  world  marketplace  of  barriers 
and  discrimination  and  accept  the  implications  of 
liberal  trade  in  practice  as  well  as  principle. 

Tribute  to  Bank  Officials 

The  Bank  has  not  been  an  idle  bystander  in  the 
turbulent  postwar  world.  It  has  played  a  useful 
and  significant  role  in  many  areas  where  its  efforts 
have  profoundly  affected  the  course  of  develop- 
ment. 

Its  achievements  in  the  past  and  its  impressive 
record  this  year  have  reflected  the  diligence  and 
devotion  of  many — the  members,  the  staff,  and 
the  management.     One  man  above  all,  Eugene 


'  For  a  statement  made  by  W.  Michael  Blumenthal  at 
the  opening  of  the  U.N.  Coffee  Conference  on  July  10, 
see  ibid.,  Aug.  6,  1962,  p.  234. 

October   15,    1962 


Black,  has  been  the  directing  genius  of  the  Bank 
for  more  than  13  years.  The  institution  and  its 
policies  bear  his  imprimatur.  Tlie  Bank's  success 
during  these  years  of  useful  effort  have  been,  in  a 
large  measure,  his  success. 

It  was  Eugene  Black's  ability  to  establish  the 
Bank  in  the  opinion  of  the  international  financial 
community  as  a  soundly  administered  institution 
that  has  enabled  it  to  expand  its  resources  by  the 
sale  of  securities  in  the  financial  markets  of  the 
world.  But  more  than  that,  Eugene  Black  has 
had  a  clear  insight  into  the  kind  of  stable  world 
we  are  seeking — an  insight  always  consistent  and 
well-defined.  He  has  seen  with  perception  that 
such  a  world  could  be  achieved  only  if  the  peoples 
of  the  less  developed  nations  were  given  a  fair 
chance  for  a  full  life.  He  has  recognized  at  the 
same  time  that  economic  development  is  complex 
and  arduous  business  which  involves  hard  de- 
cisions both  for  the  lender  and  the  borrower. 
Finally,  he  has  created  a  role  for  the  Bank  that 
transcends  its  financial  purpose  by  lending  his  con- 
summate skill  as  an  astute  and  patient  negotiator 
to  the  resolution  of  controversies  that  were  con- 
tributing to  tensions  and  instabilities. 

The  members  of  the  Bank  owe  a  substantial  debt 
to  Eugene  Black.  I  am  sure  that  all  of  us  here 
will  join  today  in  extending  to  him  sincere  grati- 
tude and  best  wishes  as  he  relinquishes  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Bank's  affairs  sometime  before  our 
next  annual  meeting. 

I  should  like  also  to  say  a  word  of  appreciation 
to  Sir  "William  Iliff,  who  has  served  the  Bank  with 
sreat  distinction  as  Vice  President.  His  achieve- 
ments  are  well  known  to  all  of  us.  In  South  Asia 
his  name  will  long  be  remembered  as  one  of  the 
prime  negotiators  of  the  Indus  River  agreement, 
which  holds  promise  of  bringing  greater  political, 
economic,  and  social  stability  to  that  great  sub- 
continent. 

The  years  in  which  Eugene  Black  and  Sir  Wil- 
liam Iliff  have  served  the  Bank  have  been  years 
of  record  accomplishment.  But  the  Bank's  busi- 
ness is  always  unfinished  business  since  it  is  con- 
cerned with  the  building  of  a  strong,  free,  and 
stable  world.  With  an  expanding  membership 
and  with  a  deepening  insight  into  the  fundamental 
nature  and  problems  of  development,  the  Bank 
should  build  well  on  the  solid  structure  which 
these  two  gentlemen  have  contributed  so  brilliantly 
to  building. 


581 


In  my  remarks  this  morning  I  have  called  at- 
tention to  certain  massive  changes  in  the  world 
during  the  past  decade  and  a  half  and  have  sug- 
gested some  of  their  implications  for  the  future. 
But,  by  emphasizing  that  the  Bank  has  acquired 
its  present  character  during  a  time  of  change,  I 
do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  it  will  be  able  to 
carry  on  its  work  from  now  on  in  a  static  woi-ld. 
In  taking  note  of  the  uncertainties  which  surround 
us  we  can,  I  tliink,  agree  upon  one  proposition 
with  substantial  certainty — that  the  speed  of 
change  in  the  social,  economic,  and  political  struc- 
ture of  the  world,  wliich  has  so  strongly  marked 
this  postwar  era,  is  accelerating  rather  than 
diminishing. 

If  this  be  so,  then  we  must  be  prepared  to  meet 
great  demands  on  our  resources  of  will  and  imagi- 
nation. We  shall  have — all  of  us,  both  the  de- 
veloped and  developing  nations — to  face  hard 
reality  and  to  make  difficult  decisions.  Above  all, 
we  shall  have  to  display  at  every  point  a  hospitable 
attitude  toward  new  ideas  and  not  entrench  our- 
selves behind  a  body  of  rigid  principles  that  may 
have  been  adequate  for  a  simpler  age  but  is  ob- 
solete in  the  fast-moving  world  of  today. 

In  these  endeavors  the  Bank — which  has  already 
shown  itself  to  be  a  flexible  instrument — will  liave 
to  grow  and  change  with  the  requirements  of  a 
world  in  rapid  movement.  I  am  confident  that 
it  can  do  so. 


U.S.  Replies  to  Charges  on  Cuba 
in  U.N.  General  Assembly 

Statement  hy  Adlai  E.  Stevenson 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  General  Asserribly  ^ 

I  had  hoped  that  it  would  not  be  necessary  to 
interrupt  the  general  debate,  but  the  utterances 
of  the  representative  of  Communist  Cuba  and  of 
Mr.  Gromyko  [Soviet  representative  Andrei  A. 
Gromyko]  today  leave  me  no  choice  but  to  also 
exercise  my  right  of  reply,  not  on  all  that  has  been 
said  here,  which  unhappily  follows  the  pattern  of 
persistent  prosecution  of  the  cold  war,  but  with 


'Made  in  plenary  session  on  Sept.  21  (U.S.  delegation 
press  release  404.5). 


582 


Ur 


respect  to  what  has  been  said  about  Cuba.     The 
sober  17th  session  has  ended  on  the  fourth  day. 

I  remind  the  members  of  the  United  Nations 
that,  since  the  attack  on  Cuba  by  refugees  from 
Cuba  in  April  1961,  repeated  complaints  have  been 
brought  to  the  United  Nations  by  Cuba,  accom- 
panied by  hysterical  charges  that  the  United 
States  was  plotting,  plamiing,  preparing,  immedi- 
ate invasion.  One  of  these  coinplaints,  as  I  recall, 
was  filed  in  August  1961  but  not  pressed  until  6 
months  later.^  The  attack  was  called  imminent 
in  August,  but  evidently  even  the  Cubans  did  not 
believe  it.  As  you  know,  all  of  these  complaints 
were  dismissed  one  by  one,  by  overwhelming  votes, 
but  only  after  the  expenditure  of  much  time  of  the 
delegates  and  expense  to  the  organization. 

From  what  has  been  said  here,  it  is  apparent 
that  we  are  going  to  suffer  another  sustained 
assault  on  our  patience  and  our  credulity.  I  would 
have  thought  that  there  was  plenty  of  useful  work 
to  do  here  without  renewing  these  tired  charges. 

Mr.  Gromyko  says  that  the  United  States  has 
asserted  the  right  to  attack  Cuba  because  it  has 
another  system.  He  says  no  nation  should  inter- 
fere in  the  affairs  of  another.  I  marvel  at  the 
bland  hypocrisy  of  the  nation  that  subverted  the 
wholesome  Cuban  social  revolution  to  commu- 
nism, that  crushed  with  tanks  the  independence  of 
Hungary,  that  holds  in  thrall  all  of  Eastern  Eu- 
rope from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea.  Yet  he 
presumes  to  lecture  us  on  interference  in  the  affairs 
of  others.  But  as  we  know  only  too  well,  such 
righteous  rhetoric  is  the  standard  Communist 
cloak  for  the  very  interference  it  charges  to  others. 

Now,  in  direct  answer,  let  me  say  to  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Soviet  Union  and  of  Cuba  that 
we  are  not  taking  and  will  not  take  offensive  action 
in  this  hemisphere;  neither  will  we  permit  aggres- 
sion in  this  hemisphere.  For.  as  the  President  of 
the  United  States  made  clear  last  week,'  we  and 
other  countries  of  the  Americas  will  not  be  de- 
terred from  taking  whatever  action  is  needed  hy\n 
threat  from  any  quarter.  While  we  will  not  com 
mit  aggression,  we  will  take  whatever  steps  are  ^ 
necessary  to  prevent  the  government  of  Cuba  from  ^^^ 
seeking  to  subvert  any  part  of  this  hemisphere. 
We  shall  work  closely  with  our  inter-American 
partners,  and  tliis  intention  does  not,  of  course. 


"  Bulletin  of  Apr.  2, 10G2,  p.  553. 
•  Ihid.,  Oct.  1, 1962,  p.  481. 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


.ent 


derogate  from  oui"  right,  a  i"ight  anchored  in  the 
United  Nations  Charter,  to  protect  our  vital  na- 
tional security. 

The  threat  to  peace  in  Cuba  comes  not  from  the 
United  States  but  from  tlie  Soviet  Union.  Tlie 
threat  arises  from  the  extraordinary  and  unneces- 
sary flood  of  Soviet  arms  and  military  personnel 
pouring  into  Cuba.  It  is  this  foreign  military 
intei-vention  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  whicli  is 
creating  grave  concern  not  only  in  this  country  but 
throughout  the  hemisphere.  For  what  purpose  is 
this  great  military  buildup  in  Cuba  intended  ?  No 
Dne  can  be  sure,  but  all  of  Cuba's  neighbors  are 
justified  in  feeling  themselves  threatened  and 
mxious. 

If  the  Soviet  Union  genuinely  desires  to  keep 
Jie  peace  in  the  Caribbean,  let  it  stop  this  warlilie 
oosturing,  this  stuffing  of  Cuba  with  rockets,  mili- 
ary aircraft,  advanced  electronic  equipment,  and 
ither  armament  all  out  of  proportion  to  any  legiti- 
nate  needs. 

This  military  intervention  from  outside  of  this 
lemisphei-e  is  the  threat  to  which  the  states  of  the 
iYestern  Hemisphere  cannot  remain  indifferent, 
my  more  than  states  could  anywhere  else. 

But  I  think,  Mr.  President,  the  time  is  long  past 
o  graduate — if  I  can  use  that  word — from  this 
;ort  of  strident  talk  to  address  ourselves  to  the  real 
md  urgent  business  of  this  General  Assembly, 
ivliich  is  not  propaganda  and  abuse  but  peace.  The 
United  States  will  exercise  its  opportunity  to  re- 
spond to  other  aspects  of  the  utterances  we  have 
leard  this  afternoon  at  an  appropriate  time  and 
jlace. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  President,  and  my  apologies  for 
letaining  you. 


Jnited  States  Delegations 
;o  International  Conferences 

nter-American  Economic  and  Social  Council 

Tlie  Department  of  State  announced  on  Septem- 
)er  18  (press  release  567)  that  President  Kennedy 
las  appointed  Douglas  Dillon,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  to  be  U.S.  Representative  and  chairman 
f  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  Inter- American  Eco- 
lomic  and  Social  Council  Meeting  at  the  Minis- 
erial  Level,  which  will  convene  at  Mexico,  D.F., 
October  22.    Other  members  of  the  delegation  are : 

« )cfofaer   15,   1962 


Alternate   U.S.   Representatives 

Teodoro  Moscoso,  vice  chairman,  U.S.  Coordinator,  Alli- 
ance for  Progress 

Jolin  M.  Leddy,  coordinator,  Assistant  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury 

Edwin  M.  Martin,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Inter- 
American  Affairs 

Herbert  K.  May,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
Inter-American  Affairs 

Senior  Advisers 

Harold  F.  Linder,  President  and  Chairman,  Export- 
Import  Bank 

Thomas  C.  Mann,  American  Ambassador  to  Mexico 

deLesseps  Morrison,  U.S.  Representative  on  the  Council 
of  the  Organization  of  American  States 

The  congressional  advisers  on  tlie  delegation 
will  be  subsequently  announced. 

Prior  to  the  ministerial  meeting  there  will  be 
a  meetmg  at  the  expert  level,  which  will  convene 
October  1.  ]\Ir.  May  will  serve  as  U.S.  Representa- 
tive at  this  meeting.^ 

The  purpose  of  the  meetings  is  to  review  the 
advances  made  by  the  Alliance  for  Progress,  in- 
cluding the  formulation,  national  implementation, 
and  international  financing  of  development 
programs. 


ICAO  Pacific  Regional  Air  Navigation  Meeting 

The  Department  of  State  amioimced  on  Sep- 
tember 19  (press  release  572)  that  Claude  H. 
Smith,  chief  of  the  International  Organizations 
Division  of  the  Federal  Aviation  Agency,  would 
be  chaii-man  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  Second 
Pacific  Regional  Air  Navigation  Meetmg  of 
the  International  Civil  Aviation  Organization 
(ICAO),  which  convened  at  Vancouver  on  Sep- 
tember 25. 

The  alternate  U.S.  delegates  are  as  follows:  ^ 
LaVere   K.   Budge,   Operations   Standards  Division,  Air 

Traffic   Service,  Federal  Aviation  Agency 
Edwin  W.  Harn,  Technical  Coordinating  Staff,  Airports 

Service,  Federal  Aviation  Agency 
A.  J.  McCuUough,  Commander,  USCG,  Office  of  Operation, 

Commandant,    U.S.   Coast   Guard,   Department   of   the 

Treasury 
Hugh  H.  McFarlane,  Chief,  Foreign  Overseas  Staff,  Air 

Traffic  Service,  Federal  Aviation  Agency 


'  For  a  list  of  the  other  members  of  the  U.S.  delegation 
to  the  meeting  at  the  expert  level,  see  Department  of  State 
press  release  588  dated  Sept.  28. 

-  For  a  list  of  the  advisers  to  the  U.S.  delegation,  see 
Department  of  State  press  release  572  dated  Sept.  19. 


583 


Rornney  E.  Pattison,  International  Aviation  Service,  Fed- 
eral Aviation  Agency 

Paul  H.  reridicr,  Office  of  International  Meteorological 
I'lans,  Weatlier  Bureau,  Department  of  Commerce 

John  A.  Robertson,  Acting  Manager,  Pacific  Theater, 
Flight  Standards  Service,  Federal  Aviation  Agency, 
San  Francisco,  Calif. 


Senate  Confirms  U.S.  Representatives 
to  IAEA  General  Conference 

Tlie  Senate,  on  September  IS  confirmed  the  nomi- 
nation of  Glenn  T.  Seaborg  to  be  the  Represen- 
tative of  the  United  States  to  the  sixth  session  of 
the  General  Conference  of  the  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency  convening  at  Vienna, 
Austria,  on  September  17. 

Nominations  of  the  following-named  persons 
to  be  alternate  representatives  were  also  confirmed : 
Henry  DeWolf  Smyth,  Robert  E.  Wilson,  James 
T.  Ramey,  and  William  I.  Cargo.^ 


Current  U.N.  Documents: 
A  Selected  Bibliography 

Mimeographed  or  processed,  documents  {snch  as  those 
listed  below)  may  he  consulted  at  depository  libraries  in 
the  United  States.  U.y.  printed  publications  may  be 
purchased  from  the  Sales  Section  of  the  United  Nations, 
United  Nations  Plaza,  N.Y. 

Security  Council 

Letters  from  the  permanent  representative  of  the  Nether- 
lands to  the  Acting  Secretary-General  concerning  Indo- 
nesian actions  in  West  Nev\-  Guinea.  S/.ol5.5,  August  11, 
1962.  1  p..  and  S/5157,  August  14,  1962,  2  pp. 

Report  of  the  Officer-in-Charge  of  the  United  Nations 
Operation  in  the  Congo  to  the  Secretary-General  on 
Developments  Relating  to  the  Application  of  the  Se- 
curity Council  Resolutions  of  February  21  and  Novem- 
ber 24,  1961 :  Report  on  developments  relating  to  Ka- 
tanga following  the  Adoula-Tshombe  talks  and  annexes 
1-28.  S/5053,  Add.  11,  August  20,  1962,  18  pp.,  and 
S/5053/Add.ll/Annexes,  August  21,  1962,  47  pp.:  Re- 
cent fighting  in  North  Katanga.  S/5053/Add.  11/Add.  1, 
August  23, 1062,  4  pp. 

General  Assembly 

Report  of  the  International  Law  Commission  covering  the 
work  of  its  14th  session,  April  24-.Tune  29,  1962. 
A/CN. 4/148.    Julys,  1962.    93pp. 

Report  of  the  Chairman  and  Vice  Chairman  of  the  U.N. 
Special  Committee  for  South  West  Africa  on  their  visit 
to  South  ^Vfrica  and  South  West  Africa.  A/ AC.  110/2. 
JulySl,  19C2.    24  pp. 


'  For  a  complete  list  of  the  members  of  the  U.S.  dele- 
gation, see  Department  of  State  press  release  570  dated 
Sept.  19. 


584 


Constitutions,  Electoral  Laws  and  Other  Legal  Instni 
ments  Relating  to  the  Political  Rights  of  Womei 
Annual  memorandum  by  the  Secretary-General  on  prof 
ress  achieved  in  the  field  of  the  political  rights  c 
women.    A/5153.    August  1,  1962.    49  pp. 

Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space.  Letter 
dated  August  3  from  the  United  States  to  the  Actin 
Secretary-General  on  space  launchings.  A/AC.  105 
INF.13.  August  8,  1962,  5  pp. ;  A/AC.  105/INF.14,  Ai 
gust  22,  1962,  2  pp.;  A/AC.  105/INF.15,  August  2- 
1962,  2  pp. 

Report  of  the  Special  Committee  on  Territories  Unde 
Portuguese  Administration.  A/5100.  August  15,  196! 
149  pp. 


Law 


Economic  and  Social  Council 

Economic  Commission  for  Africa.     Summ.iry  records  ( 

the  23  meetings  held  at  Addis  Ababa  February  6-1; 

1901.     E/CN.     14/110.     E/CN.     14/SR.     33-55     (IIi; 

December  31,  1961.     252  pp. 
Prospective    demand    for    nonagricultural    commoditiei 

problems    of   definition    and    projection    methodologj 

E/3629.     May  23,  1962.     166  pp. 
General   review   of   the   development,   coordination,   an 

concentration  of  the  economic,  social,  and  human  right 

activities  of   the   United  Nations  and  the  specialize 

agencies  as  a  whole.     E/3647.     June  4,  1962.     33  pi 
Annual  report  of  the  Managing  Director  of  the  Specif 

Fund  for  1961.     E/3650.     June  6,  1962.     70  pp. 
Consolidated  work  program  in  the  economic,  social,  an 

human  rights  fields.    E/3651.    June  11,  1962.    52  p) 
Report  of  the  Executive  Chairman  of  the  Technical  Ai 

sistance  Board  on  the  use  of  volunteer  technical  pe 

sonnel.     E/3653,   June   11,  1962,   14  pp.;   and  Add.   : 

June  12,  1962,  2  pp. 
Decentralization  of  the  economic  and  social  activities  c 

the  U.N.  and  strengthening  of  the  regional  economl 

commissions.     E/3643.     June   13,   1962.     26  pp. 
Financing  of  Economic  Development.     E/3654.     June  1' 

1962.    48  pp. 


)pti 


U 

iat 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Atomic  Energy 

Amendment  to  article  VI.A.3  of  the  Statute  of  the  Intei 
national  Atomic  Energy  Agency    (TIAS  3873).     Don 
at  Vienna  October  4,  1961.' 
Acceptances  deposited:  Bulgaria,  September  24.  1962; 

Ecuador,    September  27,   1962;    Iraq,   September  2E! 

1962;   Morocco,   September  22,   1962. 

Automotive  Traffic 

Convention    on    road    traffic,    with    annexes.     Done    ai 
Geneva,     September     19,     1949.     Entered     into     fore 
March  26,  1952.     TIAS  24S7. 
Arcessioyi  deposited:  Thailand,  August  15,  1962. 


'  Not  in  force. 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


ts 
'!ter 

Clili 

103;;, 

-At 


!Je 


ooml 


.me « 

f(ffl 


m  -aw  of  the  Sea 

°^5ponvention   on  the  Territorial   Sea  and  the   Contiguous 

Zone ; 
"tiJonvention  on  the  High  Seas/ 

Done  at  Geneva  April  29,  1958. 

Accession  deposited:  Madagascar  (with  a  statement), 
July  31,  1962. 

onvention  on  Fishing  and  Conservation  of  the  Living 
,   Resources  of  the  High  Seas ; ' 
'  "Vonvention  on  the  Continental  Shelf.^ 

Done  at  Geneva  April  29,  1958. 

Accession  deposited:  Madagascar,  July  31.  1962. 
'"Optional  protocol  of  signature  concerning  the  compulsory 

settlement    of    disputes.     Done   at    Geneva,    April   29, 

1958.' 

Signature:  Madagascar,  August  10,  1962. 

larcotics 

rotocol  bringing  under  international  control  drugs  out- 

W    side  the  scope  of  the  convention  limiting  the  manufac- 

III)    ture  and  regulating  the  distribution  of  narcotic  drugs 

concluded  at  Geneva  July  13,  1931   (48  Stat.  1543),  as 

amended  (61  Stat.  2230;  62  Stat.  1796).     Done  at  Paris 

November  19,  1948.     Entered  into  force  for  the  United 

States  September  11,  19.50.     TIAS  2308. 

'■l  Notification   received    that   it   considers   itself   bound: 

'i?lit        Congo    ( Leopold ville),  August  13,  1962. 

'"  PI  relecommunications 

ladio  regulations,  with  appendixes,  annexed  to  the  inter- 
national telecommunication  convention,  1959  (TIAS 
4892).  Done  at  Geneva  December  21,  1059.  Entered 
into  force  May  1, 1961 ;  for  the  United  States  October  23, 
1961.     TIAS  4892. 

Notification  of  approval:  Overseas  territories  for  the 
international  relations  of  which  the  Government  of 
the  United  Kingdom  are  responsible,  July  30,  1962. 


Veather 

'  H|)onvention    of   the   World   Meteorological   Organization. 
Done  at  Washington  October  11,  1947.     Entered  into 
force  March  23,  1950.     TIAS  2052. 
Accession  deposited:  Tanganyika,  September  14,  1962. 


BILATERAL 

Cyprus 

greeuient  relating  to  the  establishment  of  a  Peace  Corps 
program.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Nicosia 
August  23,  1962.     Entered  into  force  August  23,  1962. 

srael 

k.greement  relating  to  the  closeout  of  the  collection  ac- 
counts of  the  agricultural  commodities  agreements  of 
April  29,  1955,  as  amended  (TIAS  3228,  3261,  and  4097), 
November  10,  1955.  as  amended  (TIAS  3429,  3489,  3497, 
3798,  and  4097),  September  11,  1956,  as  amended  (TIAS 
36.35.  and  4007),  and  November  7,  1057  (TIAS  3[»45, 
4006,  4063,  and  4097).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Tel  Aviv  June  14  and  at  Jerusalem  August  28,  1962. 
Entered  into  force  August  28,  1962. 


/lorocco 

Lgricultural  commodities  agreement  imder  title  I  of  the 
Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assistance  Act  of 
1954,  as  amended  (68  Stat.  455;  7  U.S.O.  1701-1709), 
with  exchange  of  notes.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Rabat  September  11,  1962.  Entered  into  force 
September  11,  1962. 


'  Not  in  force. 


)cfober   75,    7962 


Tunisia 

Agricultural  commodities  agreement  under  title  I  of  the 
Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assistance  Act  of 
1954,  as  amended  (68  Stat.  4.55;  7  U.S.C.  1701-1709), 
with  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  Tunis  September 
14,  1962.     Entered  into  force  September  14,  1962. 


DEPARTMENT  AND   FOREIGN  SERVICE 


Departsnent  Establishes  New  Office 
for  International  Business 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Septem- 
ber 26  (press  release  584)  the  appointment  of 
AUan  Robbins  as  Special  Assistant  for  Interna- 
tional Business  in  tlie  Office  of  the  Under 
Secretary. 

Acting  Secretary  Ball  made  the  announcement 
at  a  Wliite  House  Conference  of  Business  Maga- 
zine Editors  and  Publishers  and  said  tliat  the  es- 
tablislmient  of  this  new  position  reflected  the 
recognition  by  botli  the  Statje  Department  and  the 
American  business  community  that  private  U.S. 
business  activity  abroad  and  American  foreign 
policy  are  becoming  increasingly  interrelated. 

The  growing  volume  of  American  investments 
abroad — it  is  expected  to  exceed  some  $56  billion 
this  year — together  with  expanded  American  ef- 
forts to  increase  our  exports,  were  prime  factors 
in  the  creation  of  this  new  position.  The  emer- 
gence of  the  Common  ilarket  abroad  and  tlie  con- 
gressional action  on  the  President's  trade  expan- 
sion bill  were  also  cited  by  the  Acting  Secretary  as 
developments  which  made  it  essential  that  tlie  De- 
partment be  better  able  to  assist  businessmen  in  the 
handling  of  specific  difficulties  they  meet  in  doing 
business  overseas. 

As  Special  Assistant  for  International  Business, 
Mr.  Eobbins  will  be  the  focal  point  in  the  State 
Department  for  problems  encountered  by  Amer- 
ican business  in  their  relations  with  foreign  gov- 
ernments. He  will  see  to  it  that  all  such  problems 
coming  to  the  attention  of  the  Department, 
wliether  in  Washington  or  through  our  embassies 
and  consular  offices  abroad,  are  given  prompt  and 
appropriate  attention. 

The  new  office  will  work  closely  with  the  De- 
partment of  Commerce  and  other  agencies. 


585 


PUBLICATIONS 


Recent  Releases 

For  sale  hy  the  Superintendent  0/  Documents,  U.S.  Oov- 
ernment  Printing  Office,  Washington  25,  B.C.  Address 
requests  direct  to  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
except  in  the  case  of  free  puUications,  which  may  he 
obtained  from  the  Department  of  State. 

Surplus  Agricultural  Commodities.     TIAS  4863.     3  pp. 

Agreement  with  Uruguay,  amending  the  agreement  of 
December  1,  1959  supplementing  the  agreement  of  Feb- 
ruary 20,  1959,  as  supplemented.  Exchange  of  notes — 
Signed  at  Montevideo  September  18,  1961.  Entered  into 
force  September  18,  1961. 

Mutual  Defense  Assistance — Loan  of  Vessel  to  the  Philip- 
pines.   TIAS  4865.     5  pp.    5<f. 

Agreement  with  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines.  Ex- 
change of  notes — Signed  at  Manila  September  28  and  Octo- 
ber 4,  1961.    Entered  into  force  October  4,  1961. 

Mutual  Defense  Assistance.    TIAS  4866.    3  pp.    50. 

Agreement  with  Luxembourg,  amending  annex  B  to  the 
agreement  of  January  27,  1950.  Exchange  of  notes- 
Signed  at  Luxembourg  September  18  and  22,  1961.  En- 
tered into  force  September  22, 1961. 

Atomic  Energy — Cooperation  in  Operation  of  Atomic 
Weapons  Systems  for  Mutual  Defense  Purposes.  TIAS 
4807.    11  pp.    100. 

Agreement  with  France — Signed  at  Paris  July  27,  1961. 
Entered  into  force  October  9,  1901. 

Surplus  Agricultural  Commodities.  TIAS  4868.  3  pp. 
5<t. 

Agreement  with  the  United  Arab  Republic,  amending  the 
agreement  of  September  2,  1901.  Exchange  of  notes — 
Signed  at  Cairo  October  7,  1961.  Entered  into  force  Octo- 
ber 7,  1961. 

Surplus  Agricultural  Commodities.  TIAS  4869.  10  pp. 
lOcS. 

Agreement  with  Bolivia — Signed  at  La  Paz  April  7,  1961. 
Entered  into  force  April  7,  1961.    With  exchange  of  notes. 


TIAS  4870.     2  pp. 


Surplus  Agricultural  Commodities. 

5^. 

Agreement  with  Iceland,  amending  the  agreement  of  May 
3,  1958,  as  supplemented.  Exchange  of  notes — Signed  at 
Reykjavik  October  3,  1901.  Entered  into  force  October  3, 
1961. 

Money  Orders — Postal  Union  of  the  Americas  and  Spain. 
TIAS  4873.    24  pp.  15('. 

Agreement  and  final  protocol  with  Other  Governments — 
Signed  at  Buenos  Aires  October  14,  1!)00.  Entered  into 
force  March  1,  1961. 

Surplus  Agricultural  Commodities.  TI.\S  4874.  4  pp. 
5(t. 

Agreement  with  Turkey,  amending  the  agreement  of  July 
29,  1961.  Exchange  of  notes — Signed  at  Ankara  Septem- 
ber 6,  1961.    Entered  into  force  September  6,  1961. 


Surplus  Agricultural  Commodities.  TIAS  4875.  3  pii 
5(f. 

Agreement  with  Israel,  amending  the  agreement  of  Jan 
uary  7,  1900,  as  supplemented  and  amended.  Exchange  o 
notes — Signed  at  Tel  Aviv  and  Jerusalem  September  2 
and  October  9,  1961.    Entered  into  force  October  9,  1961. 


TIAS  4876.     7  pi 


Surplus  Agricultural  Commodities. 

10(*. 

Agreement  with  Greece — Signed  at  Athens  October  If 
1901.  Entered  into  force  October  18,  1901.  With  relatei 
note. 

Mutual  Defense  Assistance — Cash  Contribution  by  Japar 

TIAS  4S77.     4  pp.  54. 

Arrangement  with  Japan,  relating  to  the  agreement  o 
March  8,  1954.  Exchange  of  notes — Signed  at  Tokyo  Octc 
ber  31,  1961.    Entered  into  force  October  31, 1961. 

Commission  for  Educational  Exchange.  TIAS  4882 
5  pp.     50. 

Agreement  with  Ecuador,  amending  the  agreement  o 
October  31,  1956.  Exchange  of  notes — Signed  at  Quit' 
May  9,  1961.    Entered  into  force  May  9,  1961. 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  September  24-30 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office  of 
News,  Department  of  State,  Washington  25,  D.C. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  September  24  which  ap- 
pear in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  563  and 
567  of  September  18,  572  of  September  19,  and  577 
and  578  of  September  21. 


No. 
*575 


Date 

9/24 


579    9/25 


t5S0 
581 


9/25 
9/25 


t5S2    9/26 


Subject 

U.S.  participation  in  international 
conferences. 

Reply  to  Soviet  note  of  September  5  on 
Berlin. 

Williams :  "A  Need  for  Boldness." 

U.S.  accepts  long-term  cotton  textile 
arrangement. 

Blumenthal :  "Commodity  Stabilization 
and  Economic  Development  in 
Africa." 

Staliiaker  elected  chairman  of  Board 
of   Foreign   Scholarships    (rewrite). 

Robbins  appointed  special  assistant  for 
international  business  (rewrite). 

Johnson :  American  Production  and 
Inventory  (Control   Society. 

Johnson :  Subcommittee  of  House 
Science  and  Astronautics  Committee. 

Benefits  for  persecutees  under  Austrian 
Victims'  Welfare  Law. 

Delegation  to  lA-ECOSOC  meeting  at 
expert  level. 

U.S.-German  communique  on  foreign 
aid  programs. 

Rusk  interview  on  "News  and  Com- 
ments." 

Kennedy  and  Rusk  :  recognition  of  Al- 
gerian  Government. 

Note  to  Soviet  U.N.  mission  on  es- 
pionage activities. 


•Not  printed. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


t583 

9/26 

5*4 

9/26 

t585 

9/27 

586 

9/27 

587 

9/28 

*588 

9/28 

589 

9/28 

t.590 

9/29 

.591 

9/29 

592 

9/29 

586 


Departmenf  of  Sfafe  Bulletin 


'»  October  15,  1962 


Agriculture.    President     Approves     Recommenda- 
tions on  Barter  Program 


Algeria.    Government    of   Algeria    Recognized    by 
United  States   (Kennedy,  Rusk) 

American     Republics.    Inter-American     Economic 
and  Social  Council   (delegation) 


■18 


^'  Atomic  Energy.    Senate  Confirms  U.S.  Representa- 
'"■     tives  to  IAEA  General  Conference 


ipan 


Index 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1216 


Austria.  Benefits  for  Persecutees  Under  Austrian 
Victims'  Welfare  Law 

Aviation.  ICAO  Pacific  Regional  Air  Navigation 
Meeting  (delegation)       

Claims.  Benefit.s  for  Persecutees  Under  Austrian 
Victims'  Welfare  Law 

Communism.  Five  Goals  of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy 
(Ball,     Hamilton,    McNamara,     Rostow,     Rusk, 

,  J    Smith,    Stevenson) 

It  o: 

dnitJCongo   (Leopoldville).    Mr.  McGbee  Visits  Congo 
To  Assess  Progress  on  U.N.  Integration  Plan     . 

Congress 
ongressional     Documents    Relating    to     Foreign 
Policy 

International  Implications  of  Communications  Sat- 
ellite Activities    (Jobuson) 

Cuba 

ooncern  Expressed  by  United  States  in  Matter  of 
Cuban  Fishing  Port   (WTiite) 

U.S.  Replies  to  Charges  on  Cuba  in  U.N.  General 
Assembly   ( Stevenson) 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 

Department  Establishes  New  Ofiice  for  Interna- 
tional   Business 

Government  of  Algeria  Recognized  by  United  States 
(Kennedy,  Rusk) 

Disarmament.  Five  Goals  of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy 
(Ball,  Hamilton,  McNamara,  Rostow,  Rusk, 
Smith,  Stevenson)       

Economic  Affairs 

Department  Establishes  New  Office  for  Interna- 
tional Business 

The  European  Common  Market  and  the  Trade  Ex- 
pansion Program    (Sehaetzel) 

International  Implications  of  Communications  Sat- 
ellite  Activities    (Johnson) 

Sharing  the  Financial  Burdens  of  a  Changing 
World    (Ball,   Kennedy) 

Jnited  States  Accepts  Long-Term  Cotton  Textile 
Arrangement 

Surope.  The  European  Common  Market  and  the 
Trade  Expansion  Program  (Sehaetzel)   .... 

?"oreign  Aid 

rive  Goals  of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy  (Ball,  Hamilton, 
McNamara,   Rostow,  Rusk,   Smith,  Stevenson)   . 

'resident  Approves  Recommendations  on  Barter 
Program 

Sharing  the  Financial  Burdens  of  a  Changing  World 
(Ball,  Kennedy) 


564 
560 
583 
584 
566 
583 
566 

547 
564 

570 
567 

560 

582 

585 
560 

547 

585 
562 
567 
573 
566 

562 

547 
564 
573 


J.S.  Officials  and  German  Minister  Hold  Talks  on 
Foreign  Aid  Programs  (text  of  communique)    .     .       563 

Jermany 

J.S.  Charges  Soviet  Union  Wants  To  Maintain  Ten- 
sions in  Berlin  (exchange  of  notes) 558 

J.S.  Officials  and  German  Minister  Hold  Talks  on 
Foreign  Aid  Programs  (text  of  communique)   .     .      563 


International  Organizations  and  Conferences 

Calendar    of    International    Conferences    and 

Meetings 571 

Inter-American     Economic     and     Social     Council 

(delegation) 583 

ICAO    Pacific    Regional    Air    Navigation    Meeting 

(delegation) 583 

Senate    Confirms    U.S.    Representatives    to    IAEA 

General  Conference 584 

Sharing    the    Financial    Burdens    of    a    Changing 

World    (Ball,   Kennedy) 573 

Pakistan.  President  Ayub  of  Pakistan  Makes  In- 
formal Visit  to  U.S.  (Ayub,  Kennedy,  text  of  joint 
communique  and  letter  on  scientific  report)     .     .      561 

Presidential  Documents 

Government    of    Algeria    Recognized    by     United 

States 560 

President  Ayub  of  Pakistan  Makes  Informal  Visit 

to  U.S 561 

Sharing  the  Financial  Burdens  of  a  Changing 
World 573 

Publications.    Recent  Releases 586 

Science.  International  Implications  of  Communi- 
cations Satellite  Activities   (Johnson)     ....      567 

Southeast     Asia     Treaty     Organization.     SEATO 

Members  Meet  Informally 563 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 584 

United  States  Accepts  Long-Term  Cotton  Textile 
Arrangement 566 

U.S.S.R. 

Concern  Expressed  by  United  States  in  Matter  of 

Cuban  Fishing  Port   (White) 560 

U.S.  Asks  Departure  of  Two  Members   of  Soviet 

Mission  to  the  U.N 559 

U.S.  Charges  Soviet  Union  Wants  To  Maintain  Ten- 
sions in  Berlin  (exchange  of  notes) 558 

U.S.  Replies  to  Charges  on  Cuba  in  U.N.  General 
Assembly   (Stevenson) 582 

United  Nations 

Current  U.N.  Documents 584 

Five  Goals  of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy  (Ball,  Hamilton, 

McNamara,  Rostow,  Rusk,  Smith,  Stevenson)     .      547 
U.S.  Asks  Departure  of  Two  Members  of  Soviet 

Mission  to  the  U.N 559 

U.S.  Replies  to  Charges  on  Cuba  in  U.N.  General 

Assembly    (Stevenson) 582 

Visas.    Waiver  of  Personal  Appearance  for  Visa 

Applicant  Facilitates  Travel  to  U.S 565 

Name  Index 

Ayub  Khan,  Mohammad 561 

Ball,  George  W 547, 573 

Hamilton,  Fowler 547 

Johnson,  G.  Griffith 567 

Kennedy,  President 560,561,573 

McNamara,  Robert  S 547 

Rostow,  W.  W 547 

Rusk,    Secretary 547, 560 

Sehaetzel,    J.    Robert 562 

Smith,  Merriman 547 

Stevenson,  Adiai  E 547,  582 

White,   Lincoln 560 


us.   fiOVERNMENT  PRfNTlNG   0FFICEM962 


the 


United  States 
Government  Printing  Office 

DIVISION    OF    PUBLIC    DOCUMENTS 

Washington  25,  D.C. 


PENALTY    FOR    PRIVATE    USE  TO    AVOID 

PAYMENT  OF    POSTAGE.  S300 

(GPO) 


OFFICIAL    BUSINESS 


THE  UN  .  .  .  MEETING  PLACE  OF  NATIONS 

Tliis  revised  folder,  released  August  1962,  briefly  describes  the  U.S.  position 
on  the  United  Nations,  the  six  principal  organs  of  the  UN,  and  some  of  the 
activities  and  accomplishments.    A  list  of  the  member  nations  as  of  June  30, 1962, 
is  included. 
Publication  7407  10  cents 


Department 

of 

State 


ABC's  OF  FOREIGN  TRADE 
U.S.  Trade  Policy  in  Brief 

Among  the  questions  answered   in  this  40-page  illustrated  booklet  are  the 
following : 

How  important  is  foreign  trade  to  the  United  States? 
How  important  is  the  United  States  to  foreign  trade? 

How  do  the  Communists  use  foreign  trade  to  expand  world  communism? 
'Why  is  expanding  foreign  trade  essential  today? 

What  special  trade  challenge  does  Western   Europe  pose  for  the  United 
States  today? 
Publication  7402  25  cents 


U.S.  BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS— QUESTIONS 
AND  ANSWERS 

The  U.S.  balance  of  payments  is  the  financial  record  of  transactions  which  take 
place  between  the  United  States  and  the  rest  of  the  world  during  a  particular 
l)eriod  of  time. 

This  recently  released  19-page  pamphlet  explains  the  current  U.S.  balanee-of- 
payments   situation   and   the   measures  proposed   to  eliminate   the   remaining 
"basic"  deficit. 
Publication  7392  15  cents 


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ABC's  OF  FOREIGN  TRADE,  U.S.  TRADE  POLICY  IN  BRIEF 

U.S.  BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS— QUESTIONS  AND  ANSWERS 

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ICIAL 
lEKLY  RECORD 

TED  STATES 
lEIGN  POLICY 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1217 


October  22,  1962 


TRADING  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  FREE  WORLD 

AND   CUBA    •    Statement  by  Under  Secretary  Ball  ....      591 

BUILDING  THE   ATLANTIC  PARTNERSHIP:    SOME 

LESSONS    FROM  THE  PAST   •   by  McGeorge  Bandy. 
Special  Assistant  to  the  President 601 

THE  EEC  AND  THE  FREE- WORLD  COMMUNITY    • 

by  Assistant  Secretary  Johnson 605 

TRADE  AND  INVESTMENT  IN  TROPICAL  AFRICA 

A  Need  for  Boldness  •  by  Assistant  Secretary  Williams    .   .      613 
Commodity   Stabilisation   and   Economic   Development  in 

Africa    •     by  W.  Michael  Blumenthal 616 

TOWARD  AN  OPEN  SCIENTIFIC  COMMUNITY  •  by 

Glenn    T.  Seaborg,  Chairman   of   the   U.S.  Atomic   Energy 
Commission ,•      622 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE    DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1217   •  Publication  7441 
October  22,  1962 


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a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
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I 


Trading  Relations  Between  the  Free  World  and  Cuba 


Statement  by  Under  Secretary  Ball  ^ 


Mr.  Chairman :  In  your  letter  requesting  me  to 
ippear  here  this  morning  you  indicated  tlie  con- 
tinuing interest  of  this  committee  in  the  status  of 
:rade  between  the  free  world  and  the  Suio-Soviet 
aloe.  But  you  emphasized  particularly  the  trade 
svith  Cuba.  Since  the  pi'oblem  of  Cuba  is  very 
nuch  on  the  minds  of  the  American  people  to- 
iay — and  of  real  concern  to  this  committee — I 
ihall  concentrate  in  my  prepared  statement  on  the 
present  trading  relations  between  the  free  world 
ind  Cuba.  I  shall  attempt  not  only  to  describe 
:hose  relations  but  to  relate  them  to  the  larger 
problem  which  a  Commimist-dominated  Cuba 
poses  for  the  United  States  and  the  free  world. 

Our  policy  toward  Cuba  is  based  upon  the  assess- 
ment that  it  does  not  today  constitute  a  military 
threat  to  the  United  States.  Without  doubt  it  is 
m  economic  burden  for  the  Sino-Soviet  bloc.  It 
lias  value  to  the  bloc  primarily  as  a  base  for  the 
subversive  activities  of  international  communism 
n  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

The  policy  of  the  United  States  Government  is 
iirected  toward  nullifying  Cuba's  usefulness  as  a 
source  of  infection  for  international  communism, 
rt'hile  at  the  same  time  rendering  it  more  costly  for 
he  Sino-Soviet  bloc  to  maintain  it  for  that 
>urpose. 

In  pursuit  of  this  objective  we  have  taken  a 
eries  of  measures  both  unilaterally  and  in  col- 
aboration  with  our  friends  and  allies.  These 
neasures  have  already  weakened  the  Casti'o  re- 


^  Made  before  the  House  Select  Committee  on  Export 
'.ontrol  on  Oct.  3  (press  release  595). 


October  22,   1962 


gime,  and  they  have  made  it  a  pariah  among  the 
member  nations  of  the  American  system. 

President  Kennedy  summed  up  the  present  situ- 
ation effectively  when  he  recently  said :  ^ 

...  it  is  Mr.  Castro  and  his  supporters  who  are  in 
trouble.  In  the  last  year  his  regime  has  been  increas- 
ingly isolated  from  this  hemisphere.  His  name  no  longer 
inspires  the  same  fear  or  following  in  other  Latin  Amer- 
ican countries. 

II 

Mr.  Castro's  trouble  is  reflected  in  the  state  of 
the  Cuban  economy  today. 

Since  the  end  of  1960,  living  standards  in  Cuba 
have  fallen  precipitously.  By  government  fiat 
the  total  voliune  of  workers'  salaries  has  been  in- 
creased and  rents  have  been  reduced,  but  this  is 
an  illusory  achievement.  The  volume  of  goods 
available  for  purchase  by  the  population  has 
drastically  shrunk.  Per  capita  food  consumption 
has  declined  by  more  than  15  percent.  In  pre- 
Castro  days  Cuba  was  the  third  highest  in  Latin 
America;  now  it  is  the  seventh.  The  glittermg 
promises  of  new  and  more  adequate  housing  have 
proven  false.  Military  needs  have  eaten  into  the 
limited  construction  resources. 

Cuba  is  a  rich  land  with  a  friendly  climate  and 
a  fertile  soil.  But  as  always  the  Communists 
have  proven  themselves  poor  farmers.  The  1962 
sugar  crop  will  be  the  smallest  in  the  last  6  years 
— and  by  a  substantial  margin.  Meat  supplies 
have  declined  sharply;  they  remain  below  the 


"  Bulletin  of  Oct.  1,  1962,  p.  481. 


591 


level  prevailing  before  the  Castro  takeover. 
With  domestic  production  at  a  low  level  and  food- 
stuff imports  greatly  reduced,  nationwide  ration- 
ing has  been  inevitable. 

Cuba  has  had  the  world's  richest  sugar  econ- 
omy, with  only  the  beginnings  of  industrial- 
ization. In  pre-Castro  days  Cuba  lived  primarily 
by  selling  sugar  to  the  United  States.  In  her  pres- 
ent posture  of  isolation  she  is  living  badly — and 
then  only  as  a  dependent  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

Ill 

Cuba  is  isolated  from  the  other  nations  of  the 
free  world  economically,  politically,  and  spirit- 
ually. 

Castro  contributed  to  that  isolation  in  De- 
cember of  1961  by  making  it  perfectly  explicit  that 
he  was  a  dedicated  Communist.  In  January  1962 
the  foreign  ministers  of  the  OAS  [Organization 
of  American  States]  at  Punta  del  Este  declared 
tliat  the  present  government  of  Cuba  was  ex- 
cluded from  participation  in  the  inter-American 
system.'  Since  the  Punta  del  Este  conference,  the 
American  states  have  carried  out  that  decision. 
They  have  also  established  macliinei-y  to  guard 
against  subversive  activities  in  this  hemisphere. 

The  situation  today  can  be  summarized  by  a 
relatively  few  statistics.  In  1958  U.S.-Cuban 
trade  totaled  more  than  a  billion  dollars.  Today 
it  is  confined  to  minute  exports  of  certain  non- 
subsidized  foods  and  medical  supplies  which 
amounted,  during  the  first  6  months  of  this  year,  to 
only  $373,000 — and  those  shipments  were  per- 
mitted only  for  humanitarian  reasons. 

In  its  Cuban  trade,  Canada  in  1959  had  total 
imports  and  exports  amounting  to  over  $27  mil- 
lion; for  the  first  6  months  of  this  year  they 
amounted  to  less  than  $7  million. 

In  1959  the  other  Latin  American  comitries  did 
total  trade  with  Cuba  amounting  to  $82  million; 
in  1961  this  had  fallen  to  $20  million. 

The  nations  of  Western  Europe  have  also  re- 
duced their  trade  vrith  Cuba.  In  1959  their  ex- 
ports to  Cuba  were  approximately  $122  million. 
By  1961  this  figure  had  been  cut  to  less  than  half. 

IV 

This  drying  up  of  trade  has  not  been  an  acci- 
dent. It  has  been  a  deliberate  response  by  this 
country  and  its  allies  to  the  Communist  efforts 


'  rhiiL,  Feb.  19,  1962,  p.  281. 


to  establish  a  beachhead  for  subversion  in  thi 
hemisphere. 

The  process  of  isolating  Cuba  economically  firs 
began  in  July  1960,  when  the  United  States  pro 
hibited  the  further  import  of  Cuban  sugar  inb 
this  counti-y.'  This  cost  Cuba  the  aimual  amoun 
of  $350  million  in  foreign  exchange.  Thre 
months  later  we  prohibited  the  export  of  Unitec 
States  goods  to  Cuba  except  only  for  the  limitei 
food  and  medicines  mentioned  above." 

In  February  of  this  year.  President  Kenned; 
made  the  embargo  on  Cuban  trade  substantiall; 
complete,  extending  the  embargo  on  sugar  to  al 
other  imports,  whether  direct  or  indirect.' 

America's  allies,  both  in  the  OAS  and  NATO 
have  collaborated  in  limiting  trade  with  Cuba 
At  Pimta  del  Este  the  OAS  foreign  minister 
agreed  to  prohibit  trade  with  Cuba  in  arms  an( 
implements  of  war.  The  Council  of  the  OA' 
undertook  to  study  further  trade  restrictions. 

Our  NATO  allies  have  prohibited  the  export  o 
any  military  items  to  Cuba,  and  they  have  indi 
cated  that  they  are  not  shipping  any  strategic 
items.  They  are  also  cooperating  to  assure  tha 
United  States  exports  will  not  be  diverted  to  Cubi 
through  their  ports. 

Until  early  tliis  year  Japan  was  one  of  thi 
principal  free-world  purchasers  of  Cuban  sugar 
As  a  result  of  discussions  with  the  Japanese  Gov 
emment,  the  Japanese  are  shifting  their  pur 
chases  of  sugar  to  other  free-world  sources 
Castro  has  not  only  been  denied  the  foreign  ex 
change  he  desperately  needs,  but  Japanese  ex 
ports  to  Cuba  are  declining  as  well. 

V 


The  economic  isolation  of  Cuba  has  been  effected 
not  merely  by  cutting  off  credits  and  goods  bul 
also   by   imposing  restrictions   on   the   shipping  n 
available  for  sustaining  Cuban  trade  with  the 
bloc. 

We  have  prohibited  ships  registered  under  the 
flag  of  the  United  States  from  transporting  tc 
Cuba  commodities  on  the  United  States  positive 
list,  the  United  States  munitions  list,  and  items 
controlled  by  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission. 
This  amendment  will  also  affect  about  360  foreign 
flag    vessels    whose   owners    liave    contractually  ipr 


592 


agreed  not  to  violate  the  transportation  order. 

*  Ihid.,  .July  25, 1960,  p.  140. 
°/6W.,  Nov.  7, 1960,  p.  715. 

•  Ibid.,  Feb.  19, 1962,  p.  283. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


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UhiJ  Moreover,  bunkers  are  denied  in  United  States 
ports  to  all  vessels  under  charter  to  the  Sino- 
lirs  Soviet  bloc  engaged  in  Cuba-bloc  trade ;  Cuban- 
3wned  or  -chartered  vessels  are  also  denied  bunkers 
and  ships  stores  in  this  country. 

As  an  island,  Cuba  is  entirely  dependent  upon 
shipping  for  the  maintenance  of  its  tottering 
3conomy.  With  the  decline  of  the  Cuban  economy 
and  with  the  Soviet  buildup  of  arms  and  aid, 
ships  and  shipping  have  emerged  as  a  special 
mai]  oroblem. 

Cuba  relies  upon  imports  for  most  of  her  ma- 
jhinery  and  equipment,  petroleum,  steel,  chemi- 
als,  wood  and  paper  products,  cotton,  and,  to 
iome  extent,  grain.  Cuba  is,  however,  a  small 
;ountry.  Total  imports  to  Cuba  in  1961  amounted 
,o  $641  million;  exports  during  that  year  stood 
it  $614  million.  The  total  trade  of  Cuba  was 
herefore  less  than  one-half  percent  of  world 
rade.  In  1959, 2.2  percent  of  Cuba's  exports  went 
o  the  Sino-Soviet  bloc;  by  1961, 75.7  percent  went 
o  the  bloc. 

No  United  States-flag  ships  have  called  at  Cuba 
vithin  the  last  2  years.  Ships  calling  at  Cuba 
ire  of  three  kinds :  Soviet  bloc  ships,  free-world 
ihips  under  free-world  operation,  and  free-world 
hips  chartered  to  the  Soviet  bloc.  The  Soviet 
Jnion  has  offered  high  rates  to  charter  free- world 
ihips  at  a  time  when  depressed  conditions  in  the 
ndustry  have  produced  nearly  3  million  tons  of 
memployed  laid-up  shipping. 

These  three  kinds  of  shipping  carry  different 
;orts  of  cargo  to  Cuba.  The  Soviet  ships  carry 
general  cargo,  petroleum,  and  arms.  No  other 
hips  carry  arms.  The  free- world  ships  not  under 
barter  typically  carry  peacetime  commodities — 
'ood,  textiles,  etc.;  more  important,  they  do  not 
xsually  participate  in  trade  between  the  bloc  and 
Duba  which,  as  I  have  noted,  supplies  Cuba's 
conomic  needs.  That  trade  moves  to  a  consider- 
ible  extent  on  free-world  ships  which  have  been 
chartered  by  the  Soviet  Union  and  which  are  used 
o  transport  Soviet  bloc  cargoes  though  not — to 
•epeat — arms  or  ammunition.  Statistics  on  ships 
sailing  at  Cuba  harbors  have  recently  been  com- 
)iled  by  the  Maritime  Administrator.  These 
II;  igures  show  that  a  majority  of  the  ships  stopping 
n  Cuba  are  under  free-world  flags,  but,  as  a  result 
•f  Soviet  charter,  more  than  a  majority  are  under 
Soviet  shippmg  orders  and  carrying  Soviet 
argoes. 


3cfober  22,  7962 


As  this  situation  has  emerged,  the  United  States 
Government  has  recognized  that  it  should  take 
steps  to  curtail  or  prevent  the  use  of  free-world 
shipping  in  the  Soviet  bloc-Cuban  trade.  With 
this  purpose  in  mind,  the  Department  of  State 
has  during  the  last  month  approached  our  allies 
on  this  matter. 

So  far,  five  of  our  NATO  allies  have  taken 
positive  actions  to  restrict  the  availability  of  ships. 

The  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  has  promul- 
gated a  new  ordinance  bringing  all  Federal  Re- 
public ship  charters  to  bloc  countries  under  license 
and  barring  Cuba  as  a  destination  for  such 
charters. 

It  is  our  understanding  that  Canada  and  France 
have  no  ships  presently  in  the  Cuban  trade. 

Belgium  is  taking  steps  to  stop  all  traffic  with 
Cuba  on  its  flag  vessels. 

Turkey  has  informed  this  Government  that  it 
plans  to  put  into  effect  measures  which  will  as- 
sure that,  in  the  future,  no  Turkish  vessel  will 
carry  cargo  of  any  type  from  the  Soviet  Union 
to  Cuba. 

The  Italian  Government  has  assured  us  that  no 
strategic  goods  have  been  transported  to  Cuba  on 
Italian  ships. 

We  are  continuing  to  discuss  this  problem  with 
our  other  allies,  including  the  United  Kingdom, 
Greece,  Norway,  and  Denmark.  These  are  great 
maritime  nations  that  depend  heavily  on  their 
merchant  marine  for  their  foreign  exchange  earn- 
ings— and  today  there  is  much  unemployed  ship- 
ping. These  nations  have  long  and  deeply  felt 
traditions  regarding  "freedom  of  shipping." 
Nevertheless,  they  are  giving  careful  considera- 
tion to  our  requests  and  have  given  informal  ad- 
vice to  their  shipowners  in  an  effort  to  discourage 
them  from  allowing  their  ships  to  engage  in 
strategic  trade  with  Cuba. 

VI 

In  sjiite  of  the  progress  that  has  been  made  so 
far,  the  executive  branch  of  the  Government  is 
not  yet  satisfied  that  all  useful  measures  have 
been  taken  to  limit  the  sliipping  available  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  Cuban  economy.  We  are  con- 
sidering several  additional  measures  designed  to 
impose  restrictions  on  the  avaOability  of  sliipping 
to  Cuba. 

Secretary  Rusk  is  consulting  today  with  the 
foreign  ministers  of  the  Organization  of  Ameri- 


593 


can  States'  with  regard  to  those  measures.  At 
the  same  time  they  are  being  discussed  with  our 
NATO  allies.  Because  these  matters  are  under 
consultation  with  foreign  governments,  it  would 
not  be  proper  for  me  to  disclose  them  in  public 
session  today.  I  am,  however,  prepared  to  discuss 
them  with  this  committee  in  executive  session  at 
this  time.  Or  I  should  be  glad  to  review  them 
with  this  committee  on  another  occasion,  after 
the  process  of  consultation  has  been  completed. 

'\Vliile  I  cannot  properly  talk  about  all  of  the 
measures  now  under  consideration,  there  is  one 
which,  I  feel  certain,  will  be  adopted.  This  will 
be  an  order  prohibiting  ships  of  United  States 
registry  or  ships  of  foreign  registry  owned  by  a 
United  States  citizen  from  participating  in  the 
Cuban  trade.  The  exact  terms  of  this  order  are 
now  being  worked  out  by  our  legal  and  shipping 
experts. 

VII 

As  a  result  of  the  measures  that  have  been  taken 
by  the  United  States  and  by  the  members  of  the 
OAS,  NATO,  Japan,  and  other  countries,  Cuba 
today  is  almost  totally  dependent  upon  the  Soviet 
Union  for  its  economic  livelihood.  Threa-fourths 
of  Cuba's  trade  is  with  the  Communist  bloc,  and 
this  p)ercentage  is  increasing  as  other  channels  of 
trade  dry  up. 

In  the  last  few  weeks  we  have  read  much  in  the 
newspapers  of  the  military  buildup  of  Cuba  by 
the  Soviet  Union.  Quite  clearly  it  does  not  con- 
stitute a  threat  to  the  United  States. 

Since  July,  when  the  volume  of  Soviet  military 
shipments  to  Cuba  suddenly  vaulted  upward,  85 
shiploads  have  arrived  in  Cuban  ports.  Many 
of  them  carried  military  items,  supplies,  and  per- 
sonnel. These  shipments  have  consisted,  in  paii:, 
of  types  of  weapons  previously  delivered  to  the 
Cuban  armed  forces,  including  more  tanks,  self- 
propelled  guns,  and  other  groimd-f  orce  equipment. 
The  major  tonnage  in  recent  shipments,  however, 
has  been  devoted  to  SA-2,  surface-to-air  missiles 
(SAMS) — together  with  all  the  related  gear  and 
equipment  necessary  for  their  installation  and 
operation.  To  date,  15  SAM  sites  have  been 
established  in  the  island.  We  estimate  the  total 
may  eventually  reach  25.  These  are  antiaircraft 
missiles  having  a  slant  range  of  20  to  25  miles. 


'  See  p.  598. 
594 


In  addition,  three  and  possibly  four  missile  sites: 
of  a  different  type  have  been  identified.  Thest 
sites  are  similar  to  known  Soviet  coastal-defensf 
missile  sites  that  are  believed  to  accommodate 
antishipping  missiles  with  a  range  of  20-35  miles 
Quite  likely  several  more  such  sites  will  b( 
installed. 

Cuba  is  now  estimated  to  have  60  older  type 
MIG  jet  aircraft.  In  addition  at  least  one  ad 
vanced  jet-interceptor  has  recently  been  received 
and  probably  several  more  are  in  the  process  ol 
assembly.  This  type  of  advanced  jet-interceptoi 
is  usually  equipped  with  infrared  air-to-air  mis 
siles.  We  estimate  that  the  total  of  these  ad- 
vanced interceptors  in  Cuba  may  eventually  read 
25  to  30. 

In  addition,  16  "Komar"  class  guided-missih 
patrol  boats,  wliich  carry  two  short-range  missile; 
(11-17  miles),  were  included  in  recent  shipments 

About  4,500  Soviet  military  specialists  have  ar 
rived,  including  construction  men  and  technicians 

VIII 


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Unpleasant  as  may  be  the  spectacle  of  a  Com-  '" 
munist-dominated  island  just  off  our  shores,  we 
should  not  overlook  the  fact  that  Cuba  is,  at  the 
moment,  a  small,  enfeebled  countiy  with  an  in- 
competent government,  a  limping  economy,  and  a 
deteriorating  standard  of  living.  The  crash  ef- 
forts of  the  Soviet  Union  to  provide  the  Castrc 
regime  with  economic  teclinicians  and  to  build  up 
its  military  defenses  is  a  demonstration  of  Cuban 
weakness.  Because  of  the  desperate  plight  of  the 
Cuban  economy,  Cuba's  isolation  from  the  other 
nations  of  the  hemisphere,  and  the  fear  which  that 
isolation  has  engendered,  the  Cuban  government 
has  turned  itself  into  a  dependency  of  Moscow. 

We  may  take  the  events  of  the  past  month— 
regi-ettable  as  they  may  be  in  many  ways — as  evi- 
dence of  the  essential  soundness  of  the  strategy 
of  isolation  that  we  have  pursued  toward  Cuba 
over  the  past  2  years.  The  additional  measures 
now  under  consideration  with  respect  to  Cuban 
shipping  are  part  and  parcel  of  that  same  strategy. 

We  propose  to  continue  along  these  lines,  taking 
new  measures  as  the  developing  situation  may  re- 
quire. But  in  pursuing  this  policy — as  in  pur- 
suing any  policy — the  United  States  must  never 
forget  that  it  is  engaged  in  a  worldwide  struggle 
and  that  no  policy  can  be  regarded  as  an  end  in 
itself  or  as  existing  apart  from  the  whole  complex 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


evei 
silei 
as( 
iefi 

IV 

We 

clos 


Oti 


eats 
ThfsfSt: 

tfaisf 
iAt(  not 


nomic  isolation  for  our  protection.  If,  contrary 
Ijjto  the  present  evidence,  it  should  ever  appear  that 
the  Soviet  Union  is  succeeding  in  making  Cuba  a 
threat  to  the  security  of  this  coimtry  or  this 
laemisphere,  we  are  prepared  to  take  the  necessary 
lotion — whatever  it  may  be. 


tTjX 


soi 


Secretary  Discusses  Cuban  Situation 
on  "News  and  Comment"  Program 


of  relationships  which  give  the  free  world  its 
rength. 

And,  as  the  President  has  made  clear,  we  shall 
rely  solely  on  the  impact  of  political  and  eco- 


Follow'mg  is  the  transcript  of  an  interview  loith 
^^  Secretary  Rusk  hy  John  Scali,  the  American 
Broadcasting  Company''s  State  Department  corre- 
spondent, videotaped  for  presentation  on  Septem- 
ber 30  on  Howard  K.  Smith''s  '■'■News  and  Com- 
nenf  program  on  ABC-TV. 

'ress  release  590  dated  September  29,  for  release  September  30 

Mr.  Scali:    Mr.  Secretary,  in  the  past  we  have 

that  the  arms  buildup  in  Cuba  is  defensive 

3ven  though  Castro  has  been  supplied  with  mis- 

iles.   Is  it  possible  now  that  Russia's  plan  to  build 

a  so-called  fishing  port^  tips  t\\&  balance  from  a 

'ensive  to  an  offensive  buildup? 

Secretary  Rush:  Well,  those  announcements 
have  to  do  with  action  to  be  taken  in  the  future. 
We  will  be  watching  that  very  carefully  and 
closely  indeed,  and  we  will  make  a  judgment  when 
we  see  what  in  fact  actually  happens.  Now  I 
don't  think  that  we  ought  to  play  with  words  on 
this  question  of  defensive  and  offensive  weapons. 
A.ny  weapon  is  offensive  if  you  are  on  the  wrong 
end  of  it.  But  the  configuration  of  the  military 
forces  in  Cuba  is  a  configuration  of  defensive 
capability.  What  we  are  concerned  about  is  the 
development  of  any  significant  offensive  capabil- 
ity against  Cuba's  neighbors  in  the  Caribbean,  or 
against  this  country,  and  we  are  keeping  a  very 
close  watch  indeed  on  just  that  point.  We  have 
very  great  power  in  that  area,  and  the  President 
has  made  it  very  clear  that  whatever  arms  are  in 
Cuba  will  stay  in  Cuba  and  that  there  will  be  no 


reir- 
cims. 


Com- 

s,  w 

ittliejsaid 

mis- 

aada 

U 

;iistroLjef, 

Miip 

!i!baD 

)fiae 


^  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  15,  1962,  p.  560. 
Ocfober  22,   1962 


effort  by  Castro  to  move  these  arms  into  other 
countries.^ 

Mr.  Scali:  Mr.  Secretary,  how  will  the  Govern- 
ment be  able  to  make  a  judgment  of  when  the  arms 
buildup  shifts  from  a  defensive  to  an  offensive 
status  ? 

Secretary  Rusk:  Well,  that  would  be  a  matter 
of  detail,  affirmation,  and  judgment  based  upon  all 
the  military  views  available  and  that  would  be 
done  with  our  own  military  advisers  taking  a  full 
part  in  an  assessment  of  capabilities. 

Mr.  Scali:  How  would  you  evaluate  the  Soviet 
arms  buildup  in  Cuba  in  terms  of  the  total  Soviet 
cold- war  strategy  ? 

Secretary  Rush:  Oh,  I  think  that  the  Soviets 
have  had  to  face  the  fact  that  this  regime  in  Cuba 
has  been  getting  into  very  serious  trouble  indeed 
on  the  island.  Foodstuffs  are  in  very  short  supply, 
production  has  dropped  off  severely,  there  has 
been  undoubtedly  a  sense  of  uneasiness  and  alarm 
on  the  part  of  the  rulers  there.  They  have  called, 
for  example,  for  a  considerable  number  of  what 
seemed  to  have  to  be  phony  alerts.  I  tliink  they 
may  be  trying  to  draw  attention  away  from  some 
of  the  problems  that  they  are  having  on  the  island. 
I  think  that  the  Cuban  situation  is  certainly  be- 
coming very  expensive  indeed  for  the  bloc  to  shore 
up  the  failures  there;  but  it  is  also  a  very  serious 
problem  for  us  and  has  to  be  treated  as  such. 

Hemisphere  Foreign  Ministers  To  Meet  Informally 

Mr.  Scali:  Mr.  Secretary,  which  is  the  greatest 
danger  to  the  United  States,  the  potential  alienat- 
ing of  much  of  world  opinion  by  taking  finn  ac- 
tion against  Cuba,  or  the  potential  loss  of  prestige 
and  respect  for  permitting  Eussia  to  outflank  us 
and  build  a  base  for  subversion  next  door  to  us? 

Secretary  Rush:  Well,  I  think  neither  one  of 
those  is  a  full  basis  for  deciding  what  action  is 
right  and  wise  and  necessary  in  a  given  situation. 
It  is  clear  that  the  power  of  the  United  States  is 
such  that  you  could  put  ai'med  forces  ashore  in 
Cuba,  but  that  means  a  lot  of  casualties  and  it 
means  a  lot  of  Cuban  casualties;  it  means  blood- 
shed. And  if  we  could  find  an  answer  without 
that,  we  should  try  to  do  so. 

But  the  question  of  prestige  is  primarily  a  ques- 
tion of  solidarity  in  this  hemisphere.     I  think  that 


"  For  a  statement  by  President  Kennedy,  see  iMd.,  Oct.  1, 
19C2,  p.  481. 


595 


general  world  opinion  is  much  less  interested  in 
Cuba  than  we  are  here,  for  quite  understandable 
reasons.  And  we  have  seen  here  in  this  hemi- 
sphere and  are  seeing  a  rapidly  growing  solidarity 
with  respect  to  Cuba.  The  Communists'  voices  in 
the  hemisphere  have  become  more  vocal.  But  on 
the  other  hand,  the  Castro  regime  has  been  losing 
the  sympathy  of  what  might  be  called  the  demo- 
cratic left.  It  is  quite  clear  that  the  moderates 
and  conservatives  throughout  the  hemisphere  are 
losing  their  complacency  about  Castroism  and  are 
becoming  more  and  more  active  and  concerned 
about  it.  There  has  been  a  dramatic  change  since 
the  Costa  Rica  conference  of  I960,'  reflected  in  the 
Punta  del  Este  conference  in  January  *  of  this 
year,  and  that  movement  of  both  peoples  and  gov- 
ernments in  this  hemisphere  continues.  And  I 
am  now  talking  to  foreign  ministers  here  in  New 
York,  and  we  will  be  talking  to  them  next  week,' 
to  see  what  further  steps  we  ought  to  take  in  the 
situation. 

Mr.  Scali:  Mr.  Secretary,  in  this  coming  week 
of  course  you  will  have  the  so-called  informal 
meeting  with  the  inter-American  foreign  minis- 
ters. Could  you  tell  us  why  this  meeting  is  an  in- 
formal one  and  not  a  formal  one  ? 

Secretary  Rusk:  Well,  the  principal  reason  is 
to  have  a  chance  to  meet  as  quickly  as  possible 
and  without  all  of  the  problems  that  are  concerned 
in  convening  a  formal  meeting  under  the  orga- 
nization of  the  OAS  Charter  and  encounter  many 
of  the  other  questions  that  exist  there  among  the 
different  members  of  the  liemisphere.  The  for- 
eign ministers  were  gathering  here  for  the  United 
Nations  General  Assembly.  We  thought  that  we 
ought  to  take  advantage  of  that  fact  to  meet  just 
as  infonnally  as  possible.  It  is  not  a  meeting 
which  can  in  fact  take  decisions  under  the  treaties 
of  the  OAS  because  it  is  so  very  informal,  but  I 
already  know  from  my  own  talks  here  in  prepara- 
tion for  that  meeting  that  it  will  be  a  very  profit- 
able and  worthwhile  meeting. 

Mr.  Scali:  Mr.  Secretary,  in  the  past  you  have 
put  a  great  premium  on  the  desirability  of  unity 
within  the  inter-American  family.  Unliappily, 
several  Latin  American  countries  have  dragged 
their  feet  on  taking  effective  action  against  Castro. 
Is  it  possible  that  at  this  informal  meeting  you 


will  come  up  with  some  sort  of  plan  whereby  the 
nations  most  immediately  threatened  by  Castroism 
in  tlic  Central  American  and  Caribbean  area 
might  join  with  the  United  States  in  some  kind  of 
tougher  action  ? 

Secretary  Rusk:  Well,  that  was  already  antici- 
pated in  the  Punta  del  Este  conference  in  January. 
One  of  the  resolutions  that  was  passed,  I  think  by 
a  l7-vot«  majority,  did  provide  for  joint  actions 
by  groups  within  the  hemisphere  to  deal  with  this 
specific  question  if  necessary.^  We  will  of  course 
continue  not  only  our  consultation  with  the  other 
countries  within  the  Caribbean  area,  but  we  will 
continue  our  close  cooperative  work  with  them  on 
matters  of  common  security  interest — for  example, 
on  surveillance  in  the  Caribbean,  in  being  sure  that 
there  is  no  illicit  arms  traffic  in  the  Caribbean  area 
coming  out  of  Cuba,  and  a  variety  of  other  actions 
which  are  being  taken  behind  the  scenes  with  the 
full  cooperation  of  the  governments  in  that  area. 

Cuban  Refugees  and  Exile  Organizations 

Mr.  Scali:  Mr.  Secretary,  on  another  point,  we 
find  that  many  of  the  Cuban  exile  organizations 
in  the  United  States  are  complaining  rather  bit- 
terly in  some  cases  against  the  restrictions  being 
put  on  them  by  the  American  Government.  Many 
of  tliem  have  all  sorts  of  plans  for  returning  to  the 
homeland.  Wliy  aren't  we  supporting  some  of 
these  exile  organizations  in  the  United  States  in 
allowing  them  more  f  readom  ? 

Secretary  Rusk:  Well,  we  have,  as  you  know, 
been  giving  considerable  support  to  the  refugees 
as  such. 

Mr.  Scali:  Right. 

Secretary  Rusk:  Now,  as  happens  so  frequently 
with  refugees  or  exile  organizations,  there  is  very 
little  unity  among  them.  There  is  a  contest  for 
influence.  They  find  it  difficult  to  work  together. 
This  is  the  principal  problem  insofar  as  any  single 
organization  is  concerned.  Also  I  think  it  has 
to  be  borne  in  mind  that  there  are  anti-Castro 
people  on  the  island  of  Cuba  wlio  need  to  be 
recognized  as  having  a  real  stake  and  part  in  tliis 
whole  problem.  So  I  realize  that  there  are  certain 
groups  or  certain  committees  that  feel  that  they 
ought  to  be  a  chosen  instrvmient  of  some  sort.  But 
the  great  problem  and  the  great  need  is  for  all  non- 
Castro  Cubans  to  get  together  as  closely  as  possible 


'  For  background,  see  ibid.,  Sept.  12,  1960,  p.  395. 
'For  background,   see  ibid.,   Feb.  19,  1962,  p.  270. 
•  See  p.  598. 


•  Resolution  II ;  for  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Feb.  19,  1962, 
p.  279. 


596 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Joint  Resolution  Expressing  the  Determination  of  the  United  States  With  Respect  to  Cuba 


Whereas  President  James  Monroe,  announcing  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  in  1823,  declared  that  the  United  States 
would  consider  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  European 
powers  "to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this 
hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety" ; 
and 

Whereas  in  the  Rio  Treaty  of  1947  ^  the  parties  agreed 
that  "an  armed  attack  by  any  State  against  an 
American  State  shall  be  considered  as  an  attack 
against  all  the  American  States,  and,  consequently, 
each  one  of  the  said  contracting  parties  undertakes  to 
assist  in  meeting  the  attack  in  the  exercise  of  the  in- 
herent right  of  individual  or  collective  self-defense 
recognized  by  article  51  of  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations" ;  and 

Whereas  the  Foreign  Ministers  of  the  Organization  of 
American  States  at  Punta  del  Este  in  January  1962 
declared :'  "The  present  Government  of  Cuba  has 
identified  itself  with  the  principles  of  Marxist-Lenin- 
ist ideology,  has  established  a  political,  economic,  and 
social  system  based  on  that  doctrine,  and  accepts 
military  assistance  from  extracontinental  Communist 
powers,  including  even  the  threat  of  military  inter- 
vention in  America  on  the  part  of  the  Soviet  Union" ; 
and 


Whereas  the  international  Communist  movement  has 
increasingly  extended  into  Cuba  its  political,  eco- 
nomic, and  military  sphere  of  influence :  Now,  there- 
fore, be  it 

Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives 
of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled, 
That  the  United  States  is  determined — 

(a)  to  prevent  by  whatever  means  may  be  neces- 
sary, including  the  use  of  arms,  the  Marxist-Leninist 
regime  in  Cuba  from  extending,  by  force  or  the  threat 
of  force,  its  aggressive  or  subversive  activities  to  any 
part  of  this  hemisphere ; 

(b)  to  prevent  in  Cuba  the  creation  or  use  of  an  ex- 
ternally supported  military  capability  endangering  the 
security  of  the  United  States;  and 

(c)  to  work  with  the  Organization  of  American 
States  and  with  freedom-loving  Cubans  to  support  the 
aspirations  of  the  Cuban  people  for  self-determination. 


'  S.J.  Res.  230 ;  passed  by  the  Senate  on  Sept.  20  by  a 
vote  of  86  to  1  and  by  the  House  of  Representatives  on 
Sept.  26  by  a  vote  of  384  to  7. 

'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept.  21,  1947,  p.  565. 

'  For  text  of  Resolution  VI  adopted  at  Punta  del  Este, 
see  ibid.,  Feb.  19, 1962.  p.  281. 


in  a  great  unity  of  purpose  to  restore  Cuba  to  the 
democratic  life  of  tlie  Western  Hemisphere. 

Mr.  Scali:  Mr.  Secretary,  you  have  mentioned 
the  anti-Castro  underground  in  Cuba,  which  we 
know  exists.  There  are  also  many  people  who  say 
that  we  should  take  a  more  active  role  in  support- 
ing this  anti-Castro  underground,  perhaps  by 
supplying  them  weapons  and  giving  them  en- 
couragement through  other  means.  What  do  you 
say  to  this  ? 

Secretary  Rusk:  Well,  I  obviously  can't  get 
seriously  into  that  question.  The  anti-Castro  ele- 
ments in  Cuba  do  know  that  they  have  the  en- 
couragement and  support  of  everyone  in  this 
hemisphere  who  is  opposed  to  Castroism,  but  I 
think  that  this  is  the  sort  of  thing  or  question  I 
can't  really  get  into. 

Mr.  Scali:  Is  it  our  information,  sir,  that  con- 
siderable anti-Castro  sentiment  exists  in  Cuba  ? 

Secretary  Rush :  I  think  that  that  is  very  defi- 

initely  our  impression  and  that  this  is  growing, 

'  because  of  the  ruthlessness  of  the  regime  and  the 

great  severity  of  the  regime  on  the  people  and 

their  economy  and  their  traditional  way  of  life. 

j  I  think  we  know  that  the  Castro  regime  has  great 

October  22,   7962 


organized  support.  It  has  the  accouterments  of 
a  police  state,  but  it  also  has  underneath  it  what 
has  happened  in  so  many  dictatorships  of  that 
sort — deep  resentment  on  the  part  of  the  people 
themselves. 

Mr.  Scali:  Mr.  Secretary,  the  Kepublicans  on 
Capitol  Hill  seem  to  be  making  quite  an  issue  of 
the  administration  policy  on  Cuba.  Now,  granted 
that  both  Republicans  and  Democrats  have  united 
behind  this  single  resolution  supporting  the  Presi- 
dent, do  you  think  that  many  of  the  Eepublican 
demands  which  may  come  up  during  the  election 
are  reaUy  political  in  nature  ? 

Secretary  Rusk :  Well,  I  think  that  in  the  pres- 
ent campaign  candidates  of  both  parties  are  go- 
ing to  be  and  should  be  talking  about  Cuba  with 
the  people  in  their  constituencies.  I  do  not  believe 
that,  except  for  an  occasional  instance,  this  debate 
can  take  on  a  straight  partisan  line.  Cuba  has 
been  a  problem  for  two  administrations.  It  is  still 
an  unsolved  problem.  And  in  my  discussions  with 
the  committees  and  the  leaders  in  our  Congress,  I 
find  that  the  Democrats  and  the  Republicans  are 
equally  concerned  about  the  problem  and  that  they 
are  equally  concerned  about  finding  the  right  and 


597 


wise  course  of  action  under  all  the  circumstances. 
We  have  a  national  problem  here  in  front  of  us, 
and  I  tliink  vigorous  debate  is  to  be  desired  and  is 
in  any  event  unavoidable,  but  I  would  hope  that 
what  is  necessarily  a  national  problem  does  not 
break  itself  up  into  alleged  partisan  points  of 
view,  because  I  feel  and  know  that  the  leadership 
of  both  parties  are  deeply  concerned — concerned 
that  no  satisfactory  answer  has  yet  been  foimd  and 
that  the  penetration  of  this  hemisphere  by  Castro 
communism  is  sometliing  which  cannot  be  accepted 
in  the  hemisphere  and  by  the  United  States. 

Cuban  Problem  a  Concern  of  All  Free  World 

Mr.  Scali:  Mr.  Secretary,  in  discussing  Cuba 
with  some  of  the  foreign  ministers  here,  I  know 
that  you  have  heard  the  view  expressed  by  some 
that  Cuba  is  a  United  States  problem.  Do  you 
agree  that  tliis  is  a  strictly  United  States  problem  ? 

Secretary  Rusk :  Well,  it  is  in  the  first  instance 
a  major  problem  for  this  hemisphere  because  of  the 
commitments  of  the  hemisphere  imder  its  treaties 
and  charters,  and  in  those  commitments  the  United 
States  plays  a  very  important  role.  It  is  a  problem 
for  us  because  it  is  a  problem  in  the  hemisphere  as 
well.  It  would  be  a  problem  for  us  had  we  not 
had  the  hemisphere  organizations.  But  it  is  here. 
But  it  is  also  a  part  of  a  worldwide  struggle  for 
freedom.  It  is  involved  in  a  worldwide  confron- 
tation between  the  Communist  bloc  and  the  free 
world,  and  therefore  it  is  one  of  those  problems 
which  is  of  concern  to  all  the  free  world  because 
this  struggle  is  relentless  and  unending  in  every 
continent,  and  no  one  can  be,  I  think,  disregardful 
of  it. 

Mr.  Scali:  Mr.  Secretary,  since  this  is  part  of 
a  worldwide  Commvmist  plot,  could  we  not  soon  be 
approached  with  a  deal  to  shut  down  some  of  our 
bases  overseas  in  return  for  which  Russia  would 
close  down  her  base  in  Cuba  ? 

Secretary  Rusk:  This  is  not  a  negotiable  point. 
This  would  not  be  a  way  to  meet  this  struggle  for 
freedom.  You  cannot  support  freedom  in  one 
place  by  surrendering  freedom  in  another.  In  any 
event,  we  have  special  commitments  here  in  this 
hemisphere  under  our  hemisphere  charters,  and  we 
cannot  connect  in  negotiations  or  in  trades  the 
problem  of  Cuba  with  the  defense  of  freedom  in 
other  places.    No.    This  is  not  on. 

Mr.  Scali:  This  would  also  apply  to  any  effort 
to  link  Cuba,  say,  with  Berlin? 


598 


Secretary  Rusk:  Exactly. 

Mr.  Scali:  Mr.  Secretary,  are  you  a  baseball  fan  ? 

Secretary  Rusk:  Yes.  I  have  been  for  many 
years. 

Mr.  Scali:  Do  you  keep  close  tab  on  what  the 
lowly  Wasliington  Senators  are  doing  ? 

Secretary  Rusk :  Well,  some  of  my  friends  think 
that  I  am  a  man  of  little  conscience  because  I  am 
automatically  a  hometown  fan.  I  was  a  New  York 
Yankee  fan  for  many  years,  and  now  I  am  a  Wash- 
ington Senator  fan.  It  hasn't  given  me  too  much 
to  cheer  about  this  season,  but  nevertheless  it  is  a 
good  ball  club  and  I  have  enjoyed  following  them. 

Mr.  Scali:  Do  you  have  any  hope  that  next  year 
it  will  wind  up  any  better?  jj 

Secretary  Rusk:  Well,  when  you  wind  up  in    T 
the  cellar,  you  always  say,  "Wait  until  next  year !"    ' 

Mr.  Scali:  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Secretary. 


American  Foreign  Ministers  Hold 
Informal  Meeting  at  Washington 

DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT 

Press  release  594  dated  October  1 

At  the  invitation  of  Secretary  Rusk,  the  for- 
eign ministers  of  the  19  American  Republics  or 
their  representatives  will  meet  informally  at  the 
State  Department  October  2  and  3.  Wliile  the 
meeting  is  not  being  held  witliin  the  framework 
of  the  Organization  of  American  States,  the  Sec- 
retary General  of  the  OAS  also  will  attend. 

Tiie  principal  subject  for  this  exchange  of  views 
will  be  the  situation  in  Cuba,  and  in  keeping  with 
the  informality  of  the  meeting  it  is  not  expected 
that  formal  speeches  will  be  made.  The  sessions 
will  be  closed,  and  there  will  be  no  formal  agenda, 
voting,  official  minutes,  or  resolutions. 


TEXT  OF  FINAL  COMMUNIQUE 

Press  release  598  dated  October  3 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  pnal  communique 
issued  at  the  conclusion  of  an  informal  meetimg  of 
Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  American  Re- 
publics., at  Washington,  D.C.,  October  2-3. 

In  their  informal  meeting  held  in  Washington, 
D.C.  on  October  2  and  3,  1962,  the  Foreign  Min- 

Deparfment  of  State   Bulletin 


isters  and  Special  Kepresentatives  of  the  American 
Republics  discussed  in  a  spirit  of  strong  friend- 
ship and  cooperation  the  serious  problems  that 
face  the  Western  Hemisphere.  Althougli  the  in- 
formal character  of  the  meeting  precluded  formal 
decisions  or  resolutions,  wliicli  are  in  the  com- 
petence of  the  appropriate  bodies  of  the  OAS,  the 
meeting  was  marked  by  extraordinary  solidarity 
on  matters  affecting  the  security  and  well-being 
of  the  hemispheric  system.  The  Ministers  re- 
viewed the  resolutions  adopted  at  the  Eighth 
Meeting  of  Consultation  of  Ministers  of  Foreign 
Affairs/  the  progress  made  in  response  to  them, 
and  furtlier  steps  which  might  be  taken  to  give 
effect  to  those  resolutions. 

During  the  meeting  it  was  manifest  that  at  the 
present  juncture  the  most  virgent  of  these  prob- 
lems is  the  Sino-Soviet  intervention  in  Cuba  as 
an  attempt  to  conveit  the  island  into  an  armed 
base  for  commimist  penetration  of  the  Americas 
and  subversion  of  the  democratic  institutions  of 
the  Hemisphere.  Tlie  meeting  reiterated  its  ad- 
herence to  the  principles  of  self-determination, 
nonintervention  and  democracy  as  guiding  stand- 
ards of  relations  among  the  American  nations. 

The  meeting  reflected  the  opinion  that  now 
more  than  ever  it  is  necessary  to  strengthen  the 
system  of  representative  democracy  and  to  re- 
double the  efforts  being  made  to  bring  harmonious 
progress  to  the  peoples,  and  the  earliest  and  most 
effective  improvement  in  their  standard  of  living, 
within  the  framewoi'k  of  the  Alliance  for  Prog- 
ress, and  with  the  most  complete  respect  for  hu- 
man rights.  Special  consideration  shall  be  given 
to  expanding  markets  and  increasing  prices  of 
Latin  American  primary  products. 

The  meeting  reasseited  the  firm  intention  of  the 
Governments  represented  and  of  the  peoples  of 
the  American  Eepublics  to  conduct  themselves 
in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  the  regional 
system,  stamichly  sustaining  and  consolidating  the 
principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  Organization  of 
American  States,  and  affirmed  the  will  to  strength- 
en the  security  of  the  Hemisphere  against  all  ag- 
gression from  within  or  outside  the  Hemisphere 
and  against  all  developments  or  situations  capable 
of  threatening  the  peace  and  security  of  the  Hemi- 
sphere through  the  application  of  the  Inter- 
American  Treaty  of  Eeciprocal  Assistance  of  Rio 


de  Janeiro.  It  was  the  view  of  the  Ministers  that 
the  existing  organizations  and  bodies  of  the  inter- 
American  system  should  intensify  the  carrying 
out  of  their  respective  duties  with  special  and  ur- 
gent attention  to  the  situation  created  by  the 
Marxist-Lenmist  regime  in  Cuba  and  that  they 
should  stand  in  readiness  to  consider  the  matter 
promptly  if  the  situation  requires  measures  be- 
yond those  already  authorized. 

In  the  ideological  stiniggle  against  communism, 
destroyer  of  man's  liberties,  the  meeting  expressed 
the  desire  that  the  resources  and  methods  inherent 
in  the  democratic  system  should  be  mobilized  to 
bring  the  peoples  to  realize  fully  the  difference 
between  totalitarianism  and  democracy. 

The  meeting  reaffirmed  its  "repudiation  of  re- 
pressive measures  which,  under  the  pretext  of 
isolating  or  combatting  communism,  may  facili- 
tate the  appearance  or  strengthening  of  reaction- 
ary doctrines  and  methods  which  attempt  to 
repress  ideas  of  social  progress  and  to  confuse 
truly  progressive  and  democratic  labor  organi- 
zations and  cultural  and  political  movements  with 
communist  subversion."  ^ 

The  meeting  observed  that  the  inter- American 
regional  system  has  had  since  its  beginnings  char- 
acteristics of  its  own  that  are  expressed  in  spe- 
cific provisions  agreed  upon  by  a  community  of 
nations  for  its  collective  security  and,  therefore, 
that  a  military  intervention  of  communist  powers 
in  Cuba  cannot  be  justified  as  a  situation  analogous 
to  the  defensive  measures  adopted  in  other  parts 
of  the  Free  World  in  order  to  face  Soviet 
imperialism. 

The  meeting  expressed  tlie  need  for  undertaking 
the  actions  called  for  by  Resolution  VIII  of  the 
Eighth  Meeting  of  Consultation  of  Ministers  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  especially  paragraph  2,  also  in- 
cluding the  use  of  their  ships  in  the  Cuban  trade, 
in  the  light  of  the  new  developments  taking  place 
in  Cuba.  It  also  called  upon  all  other  independent 
countries  to  review  their  policies  in  this  regard. 

The  meeting  agreed  that  it  is  necessary  for  the 
countries,  in  accordance  with  their  laws  and  con- 
stitutional precepts,  to  intensify  measures  to  pre- 
vent agents  and  groups  of  international  commu- 
nism from  carrying  on  their  activities  of  a  sub- 
versive nature. 

Tlie  meeting  recalled  that  the  Soviet  Union's 


*  For  background  and  texts  of  resolutions,  see  Bulletin 
of  Feb.  19, 1962,  p.  270. 

Ocfofaer  22,   1962 


'  Resolution  I,  ibid.,  p.  278. 


599 


intervention  in  Cuba  tlireatcns  the  unity  of  the 
Americas  and  of  its  democratic  institutions,  and 
that  this  intervention  lias  special  characteristics 
which,  pursuant  to  paragraph  3  of  Resolution  II  of 
the  Eiglith  Meeting  of  Consultation  of  Ministers 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  call  for  the  adoption  of  spe- 
cial measures,  both  individual  and  collective. 

The  meeting  observed  that  it  is  desirable  to  in- 
tensify individual  and  collective  surveillance  of 
the  delivery  of  arms  and  implements  of  war  and 
all  other  items  of  strategic  importance  to  the  com- 
munist regime  of  Cuba,  in  order  to  prevent  the 
secret  accumulation  in  the  island  of  arms  that 
can  be  used  for  offensive  purposes  against  the 
Hemisphere. 

The  meeting  concurred  in  the  wish  that  studies 
be  undertaken  urgently,  in  accordance  with  Re- 
solution II  of  the  Eighth  Meeting  of  Consulta- 
tion of  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs,  of  the 
transfer  of  funds  to  the  other  American  Republics 
for  subversive  purposes,  the  flow  of  subversive 
propaganda  and  the  utilization  of  Cuba  as  a  base 
for  training  in  subversive  tecliniques. 

The  meeting  voiced  the  traditional  fraternal  af- 
fection of  all  the  American  peoples  for  the  people 
of  Cuba  and  their  deep  sympathy  for  the  victims 
of  the  present  regime,  and  expressed  the  hope  that 
the  Cuban  people  may  return  as  a  full  member  of 
the  democratic  American  family  of  nations,  under 
a  government  compatible  with  the  purposes  and 
principles  of  the  inter- American  system. 


British  Foreign  Secretary 
Talks  With  President  Kennedy 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  joint  statement  hy 
President  Kennedy  and  the  Foreign  Secretary  of 
Great  Britain^  Lord  Home,  released  at  Washing- 
ton on  Septemher  30. 

White  HoQse  press  release  dated  September  30 

The  President  had  lunch  with  the  Foreign  Sec- 
retary Lord  Home,  Secretary  of  State  Dean  Rusk, 
Ambassador  to  the  United  States  [David] 
Ormsby  Gore,  Under  Secretary  of  State  George 
Ball  and  Ambassador  David  Bruce.  They  met 
for  two  hours.  The  discussions  centered  on 
Berlin,  the  Congo  and  Cuba. 

The  conversations  which  Lord  Home  and  Mr. 
Rusk  had  had  with  Mr.  Gromyko  in  New  York 

600 


were  reviewed.  There  was  complete  agreement  on 
the  assessment  of  the  dangers  of  the  Berlin  situa- 
tion and  on  the  continued  need  for  the  Western 
powers  to  stand  firm  on  their  vital  interests. 

They  agreed  on  the  urgent  need  for  a  settlement 
of  the  continuing  Congo  crisis  on  the  basis  of  the 
reconciliation  plan  proposed  by  the  Secretary 
General  of  the  United  Nations. 

They  agreed  on  the  serious  nature  of  develop- 
ments in  Cuba  and  they  discussed  ways  and  means 
of  containing  further  Communist  expansion  and 
subversion  in  the  Caribbean. 

The  President  and  the  Foreign  Secretary  con- 
firmed their  support  for  the  early  signature  of  a 
test  ban  agreement. 

They  also  agreed  on  the  strong  necessity  for  the 
signatories  of  the  Geneva  Accord  on  Laos  ^  to  see 
to  it  that  all  foreign  forces  are  withdrawn  from 
that  country  by  October  7th. 


John  M.  Stalnaker  Elected  Chairman 
of  Board  of  Foreign  Scholarships 

Tlie  Department  of  State  armounced  on  Septem- 
ber 26  (press  release  583)  that  John  M.  Stalnaker, 
president  of  the  National  Merit  Scholarship 
Corporation,  had  that  day  been  elected  chairman 
of  the  Board  of  Foreign  Scholarships  at  the 
Board's  annual  fall  meeting  at  the  Department  of 
State.  Mr.  Stalnaker  succeeds  Robert  G.  Storey, 
president  of  the  Southwestern  Legal  Center  and 
former  president  of  the  American  Bar  Association, 
who  has  been  chairman  since  1958. 

The  Board  supervises  the  educational  exchange 
programs  administered  by  the  Department  of 
State  imder  the  Fulbright-Hays  Act,  with  respon- 
sibility for  the  selection  of  students,  teachers,  and 
imiversity  professors,  both  in  this  country  and 
abroad,  for  exchange  grants.  Since  its  creation  in 
1947  imder  the  Fulbright  Act,  the  Board  has  given 
grants  to  more  than  50,000  students,  teachers, 
lecturers,  and  scholars  from  other  countries  and 
from  the  United  States.  The  Board  supervises) 
academic  exchanges  with  120  countries  and 
territories.^ 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Aug.  13,  1962,  p.  259. 
'  For  the  names  of  the  other  members  of  the  Board,  set 
Department  of  State  press  release  583  dated  Sept  26. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Building  the  Atlantic  Partnership:  Some  Lessons  From  the  Past 


hy  McGeorge  Bundy 

Special  Assistant  to  the  President  ^ 


'  Address  made  before  the  Atlantic  Treaty  Association 
'■^   at  Copenhagen,  Denmarii,  on  Sept.  27. 


leli 


Your  preoccupation  in  this  meeting,  as  I  under- 
stand it,  is  with  the  Common  Market  and  its  re- 
lation to  NATO  and  the  Atlantic  community.  I 
have  listened  with  great  interest  to  parts  of  the  dis- 
cussions so  far,  and  I  have  had  a  chance  also  to  read 
other  contributions.  I  am  sure  from  what  I  have 
heard  and  read  that  you  have  correctly  selected 
the  topic  of  greatest  immediate  importance.  The 
generally  positive  position  of  the  United  States 
Government  on  this  issue  has  been  clear  for  a 
long  time.  It  is  equally  clear  that  the  main  pres- 
ent processes  of  negotiation  are  best  conducted 
without  noisy  kibitzing  from  official  Americans. 
So  it  seems  best  to  me,  today,  not  to  direct  my  re- 
marks to  this  question,  as  such,  but  rather  to  at- 
tempt some  more  general  comments  on  the 
processes  by  which  we  may  hope  for  the  growth  of 
what  President  Kennedy  has  called  an  Atlantic 
partnership. 

My  purpose  is  to  offer  thoughts  about  what  we 
may  accomplish  in  the  future,  but  I  ask  the  his- 
torian's license  to  state  my  case  mainly  in  terms 
of  propositions  from  our  past  and  from  two  parts 
of  that  past  in  particular.  I  believe  that  there 
are  very  large  negative  lessons  for  us  in  the  record 
of  the  years  between  1925  and  1940  and  vei-y  large 
affirmative  lessons  in  the  record  of  the  years  be- 
tween 1947  and  the  present. 

We  all  know  the  gloomy  record  of  Atlantic 
diplomacy  between  Locarno  and  the  fall  of  France, 
and  it  is  not  my  aim  here  to  recapitulate  it.  The 
greatest  of  our  failures,  of  course,  was  in  the  fail- 
ure to  develop  common  policies  and  purposes  of 


October  22,    7962 


sufficient  coherence  to  prevent — and  later  to  deal 
with — the  rise  of  Adolf  Hitler.  In  this  failure 
there  is  blame  enough  for  all  of  us ;  I  do  not  know 
of  a  country  now  in  the  Atlantic  alliance  whose 
people  and  leaders  I  should  wish  to  represent 
today  in  a  claim  before  liistory  of  total  innocence. 
Each  of  us  is  able  to  write  and  speak  with  particu- 
lar zest,  perhaps,  of  the  shortcomings  of  others — 
but  this  is  hardly  a  profitable  exercise.  Let  me 
instead  suggest  a  series  of  more  general  com- 
ments. 

The  Legacy  of  the  Thirties 

In  the  first  place  one  must  put  the  dangers  of 
neutrality  or  appeasement  as  means  of  dealing 
with  a  determinedly  expansionist  power.  This  is  a 
point  which  needs  no  laboring  in  this  audience. 
But  it  is  not  always  the  simple  points  which  are 
the  least  important.  This  one  deserves  continuous 
and  straightforward  repetition. 

Second,  and  more  subtly,  we  can,  I  tliink,  discern 
in  the  liistory  of  the  years  from  1925  to  1939  an 
astonishing  tendency  to  miss  the  real  issues 
througli  a  preoccupation  with  rivalries  that  be- 
came wholly  pointless  when  the  real  themes  of 
history  were  unfolded. 

Wliat  do  we  care  now  for  the  contest  between  the 
franc  and  the  pound  which  so  engrossed  able  and 
determined  men  on  both  sides?  At  the  onset  of 
the  thirties  what  we  remember  now  is  only  that 
this  contest  was  a  part  of  the  shortsighted  and 
self-destructive  approach  to  money  which  deep- 
ened the  great  depression  and  helped  Hitler  to 
power. 

Wliat  do  we  now  remember  of  the  revulsion 


601 


against  war  and  its  propaganda  whicli  led  Amer- 
icans to  suppose  that  the  Allies,  not  tlie  U-boat, 
had  been  the  real  cause  of  our  entry  into  the  first 
war,  so  that  our  contribution  to  the  keeping  of 
Atlantic  peace  in  the  1930's  was  a  series  of  solemn 
legislative  acts  against  commitment — acts  of  neu- 
trality. What  matters  today  is  that  those  acts,  in 
the  early  years  of  Hitler's  wealoiess,  served  to 
give  him  assurance  that  America  saw  the  enemy 
more  in  alliance  than  in  aggression. 

And  we  forget,  behind  the  general  failures 
named  appeasement,  how  often  in  the  1930's  it 
was  a  narrow  suspicion  of  the  wrong  people  that 
became  the  immediate  cause,  or  excuse,  for  in- 
action— the  Italians  mistrusting  the  French,  the 
French  mistrusting  the  British,  the  British  mis- 
trusting the  Czechs,  Mussolini  mistrusting  eveiy- 
one  imtil  in  a  final  irony  he  was  the  last  to  try 
trusting  Hitler.  This  detailed  record  of  the  follies 
of  nations  which  tried  to  act  alone  carries  a  deeper 
lesson  than  simply  the  warning  against  appease- 
ment. And  that  lesson  is  that  already  in  the 
1930's  no  foreign  nation  could  serve  itself  well  if 
it  tried  to  ser\'e  itself  alone.  The  aggressions  of 
Hitler  and  Mussolini  proved  it  for  everyone  else, 
and  their  failures  proved  it  for  their  own  still  un- 
happier  countries. 

A  third  lesson  from  the  1930's  is  that  govern- 
ments without  courage  can  be  expected  at  critical 
moments  to  take  wrong  decisions  which  they  will 
defend  on  grounds  of  domestic  political  necessity. 
Perhaps  the  sorriest  of  these  demonstrations  is  to 
be  found  in  the  liistory  of  the  war  debts  from  start 
to  finish,  but  other  examples  are  available  in  such 
nimnbers  that  the  choice  is  one  of  taste.  Over  and 
over  again,  when  the  need  was  urgent  and  the  right 
course  clear,  men  in  authority  held  back  their 
diplomatic  hands  lest  they  lose  their  political 
heads. 

It  is  not  for  any  officeholder  to  assert  that  this 
course  is  always  wrong.  Diplomats  who  ignore 
domestic  political  realities  are  deeply  unprofes- 
sional. But  it  remains  fair  to  remark  of  the  1030's 
that  they  record  an  immensely  long  list  of  follies 
committed  in  shortsighted  subservience  to  sup- 
posed opinion — and  a  correspondingly  short  list 
of  men  who  preferred  retirement  to  timidity. 

In  this  assertion  I  do  not  mean  to  leave  public 
opinion  itself  exempt  from  criticism.  This  is  no 
place  for  an  excursion  into  the  endless  fascinations 
of  the  relation  between  opinion  and  leadership; 


602 


my  arginnent  does  not  require  any  assumption 
that  the  fault  was  all  with  statesmen.  Opinion  too 
was  at  fault — and  in  a  variety  of  ways — and  it  may 
well  be  tliat  in  the  widest  of  perspective  later 
students  may  find  that  what  was  needed  to  permit 
avoidance  of  all  the  errors  I  have  cited  was  pre- 
cisely the  terrible  process  of  retribution  and  in- 
sta-uction  which  we  call  the  Second  World  War. 
But  we  camiot  afford  additional  instruction  today. 
Finally,  in  tlais  set  of  gloomy  flashbacks  let  me 
recall  what  we  may  call  the  error  of  the  empty 
commitment.  The  greatest  of  failures  was  the 
League,  and  the  earliest  of  blows  to  that  institu- 
tion was  struck  by  the  United  States.  But  there 
is  in  addition  a  long  and  melancholy  set  of  ties 
that  did  not  bmd  and  words  that  did  not  work: 
The  Kellogg-Briand  Pact  was  always  empty  and 
the  French  tie  to  Czechoslovakia  broke  only  when 
it  was  needed,  but  there  remains  a  family  resem- 
blance among  them.  Both  represented  efforts  to 
exorcise  by  words  a  problem  which  could  only  be 
dealt  with  by  will  and  by  works.  Promises — to 
oneself  or  to  others — cannot  prevent  danger  unless 
they  mean  to  meet  it. 

The  Affirmative  Present 

I  hope  you  will  feel,  as  I  do,  that  it  is  time  to 
more  to  more  cheerful  themes,  to  the  set  of  les- 
sons of  a  very  different  sort  wliich  may  be  drawn 
from  our  common  experience  in  the  years  since 
we  set  about  the  great  business  of  Atlantic  recon- 
struction and  reordering,  since  1947.  And  let  me 
urge  it  upon  you,  sweepingly,  that  the  record 
shows  us  to  have  made  much  progress  in  avoiding 
all  four  of  the  major  failures  I  have  just  charged 
to  an  earlier  time. 

First,  we  have  abandoned  neutrality  and  ap- 
peasement in  the  face  of  the  Soviet  threat,  which 
in  its  gravity  and  in  long-range  importance  has 
required  the  structure  of  political  and  military 
coimnitment  that  we  call  NATO.  This  is  not  so 
remarkable  a  change  for  some  of  our  nations  as 
it  is  for  others,  but  here  in  Copenhagen  I  may 
perhaps  fittingly  note  how  deep  and  significant 
the  decision  has  been  for  coimtries  as  different — 
and  as  much  alike  too — as  Denmark  and  the 
United  States.  Indeed  for  us  Americans  it  is 
this  single,  simple  fact  of  commitment  to  the  At- 
lantic alliance  that  is  repeatedly  decisive  in  the 
whole  range  of  our  relations  to  Europe.  We  are 
in,  and  in  to  stay. 

Deparfmenf  of  Stale  Bulletin 


Second,  we  have  all  of  us  succeeded,  over  and 
over  again,  in  putting  the  larger  common  interest 
ahead  of  small  national  rivalries.  One  thinks  here 
of  such  notable  and  farsighted  acts  as  that  of 
France  in  theSaar — and  indeed  of  the  wider  proc- 
ess of  reconciliation  which  has  marked  the  be- 
havior of  many  countries  toward  Germany.  One 
thinks  also — as  Mr.  Stikker  [Dirk  Stiklcer,  Sec- 
retary General  of  NATO]  so  generously  said  on 
Tuesday — of  the  Marshall  Plan,  and  in  return 
I  may  say  that  m  America  we  understand  also 
what  an  important,  and  unprecedented,  trust 
the  old  and  proud  people  of  Europe  have  shown 
in  us  by  their  acceptance  of  special  Ameri- 
can leadei-ship  in  the  militai'y  aifairs  of  NATO. 
We  believe  that  the  tradition  of  Eisenhower, 
Gruenther,  Ridgway,  and  Norstad  has  been  a 
notable  one — and  we  expect  it  to  continue  in  dis- 
tinguished fashion  under  General  Lemnitzer.  But 
we  do  recognize  that  it  takes  maturity  to  accept 
as  well  as  to  oif  er  this  kind  of  leadership. 

But  perhaps  the  most  striking  example  of 
choosing  the  wide  as  against  the  narrow  interest 
is  to  be  found  in  the  policy  followed  with  siich 
determination,  for  so  long,  by  the  German  Fed- 
eral Republic  under  Chancellor  Adenauer.  Not 
many  years  ago  one  could  find  in  German  politics 
many  deeply  different  tendencies.  There  were 
some  who  hoped  that  answers  might  be  found 
in  some  foiTn  of  neutralism;  others  appeared  to 
lean  toward  a  renewed  nationalism  in  which  Ger- 
man and  only  German  aspirations  would  govern 
policy.  But  in  the  event  what  has  prevailed  is  a 
policy  of  determined  devotion  to  freedom,  deter- 
mined and  ever  more  intimate  integration  both  in 
Europe  and  in  the  Atlantic  alliance,  and  deter- 
mined reconciliation  among  all  the  Western 
Europeans  who  shared,  on  either  side,  in  the 
catastrophe  of  nazism.  Never  givmg  up  the  deep 
concern  which  all  of  us  feel  for  all  the  Euro- 
peans— Germans,  Poles,  Czechs,  and  others — 
whose  true  destiny  is  to  rejoin  us  in  the  tradition 
of  civility  and  the  purpose  of  freedom,  the  Chan- 
cellor has  never  wavered  in  his  knowledge  that 
progress  toward  these  hopes  can  be  made  on  no 
other  basis  than  that  of  unity  and  mutual  com- 
mitment as  among  ourselves.  This  has  seemed 
to  us  in  America,  for  15  years,  to  be  a  wise,  brave, 
and  farsighted  policy,  and  it  has  had  our  steady 
support. 

Third,  and  still  in  contrast  with  the  time  be- 


fore the  Second  War,  we  have  repeatedly  seen 
since  1947  that  political  courage  does  exist — and 
is  not  always  pimished — in  our  affairs.  I  have 
just  spoken  of  the  special  leadership  shown  in  the 
Federal  Republic.  Other  notable  cases  are  to  be 
foimd  in  many  countries,  in  the  processes  which 
have  led  to  the  construction  of  the  new  institu- 
tions of  Europe.  Now  that  the  Common  Mar- 
ket is  a  great  success,  we  tend  to  forget  that  brave 
men  had  to  press  for  it  against  wide  and  varied 
opposition.  And  courage  of  a  liigh  and  tem- 
pered variety  has  been  shown  too  in  the  extra- 
ordinary successes  of  transmutation  mider  which 
so  many  colonial  holdings  have  been  wisely  set 
free.  The  diplomats  and  political  leaders  who 
have  accepted  and  defended  tlieir  part  in  these 
events  will  not  be  badly  treated  by  laistory.  In- 
deed their  wisdom  is  already  apparent  as  the  new 
and  postcolonial  Europe  moves  forward  like  a 
swimmer  who  has  dropped  a  heavy  weight. 

Finally,  in  this  catalog  of  happy  changes  we 
may  set  the  fact  that  we  now  have  treaties  and 
commitments  whose  reality  is  attested  in  a  thou- 
sand ways.  Again  this  needs  no  proof  to  you,  as 
friends  of  NATO ;  so  let  me  simply  cite  as  an  im- 
mediate example  the  case  of  the  United  States. 
We  have  not  merely  signed  article  5 ;  we  have  not 
merely  joined  in  mutual  defense  arrangements  for 
arms  and  equipment  of  constantly  more  modern 
types;  we  have  not  merely  committed  our  pres- 
tige and  our  purpose  by  a  series  of  appointments 
of  our  leading  soldiers  to  the  NATO  command  in 
Paris:  We  have  emplaced  in  Europe  weapons — 
of  all  sorts — in  a  strength  which  far  outweighs  the 
total  explosive  power  employed  by  both  sides  in 
both  wars,  and  we  have  sealed  the  whole  by  the 
presence  in  Europe — essentially  in  forward  de- 
velopment, and  above  aU  in  Germany — of  400,000 
men.  Insofar  as  American  strength  can  defend 
it,  free  Europe  is  as  safe  as  any  State  in  the  Ameri- 
can Union.  This  American  strength  will  remain 
as  long  as  it  is  wanted  in  Eui'ope  and  as  long  as 
the  alliance  continues  to  grow  on  the  basis  of 
shared  trust  and  shared  effort.  To  think  other- 
wise would  be  to  mistake  the  1960's  for  the  1930's. 

There  are  other  lessons,  bej'ond  these  of  direct 
contrast,  to  be  drawn  from  our  experiences  of 
the  last  15  years: 

Tliere  is  our  new  skill  in  creating  international 
institutions — squaring  the  circle  of  traditional  po- 
litical theory  by  showing  that  in  societies  wliich 


October  22,   1962 


603 


■wish  it  so  high  responsibilities  can  be  shared  with- 
out destroying  the  nation. 

There  is  our  success  in  growing  a  new  genera- 
tion of  professional  servants  of  the  West,  men 
whose  loyalty  to  their  own  countries  remains  un- 
doubted while  at  the  same  time  they  see  the  mili- 
tary— or  the  monetary — or  the  trading  problems 
of  the  whole  of  our  community  as  one.  Tliese 
new  expert  professionals  are  not  always  right. 
Political  leadership  is  properly  needful  and  de- 
cisive in  the  community  as  a  whole,  just  as  it  is 
in  each  individual  state.  Still  there  is  a  special 
meaning  to  these  new  classes  of  men  who  work  as 
colleagues  in  the  professions  that  underpin  the 
community;  it  is  and  should  continue  to  be  a 
source  of  strength  to  us.  And  I  will  not  labor 
on  other  points,  because  your  presence  shows  that 
you  believe  it:  The  new  Atlantic  community  has 
been  extraordinarily  dependent  throughout  its  life 
on  the  support,  the  understanding,  and  the  leader- 
ship of  private  citizens. 

I  have  come  a  long  way  through  two  contrasting 
chapters  of  the  past  toward  my  few  comments  on 
the  future.  Fortunately  most  of  what  I  want  to 
say  I  have  managed  to  say  along  the  way,  and  I 
can  simimarize  it  in  one  or  two  sentences. 

We  must  avoid  false  hopes  of  isolation ;  we  must 
rise  above  petty  national  rivalries ;  we  must  see  to 
it  that  our  commitments  are  real  and  strong;  we 
must — people  and  leaders  alike — have  the  courage 
of  our  convictions.  We  must  go  on,  step  by  prac- 
tical step,  with  the  constructon  of  a  partnership 
in  which  the  United  States — and  other  coimtries 
too — will  be  closely  bound  to  the  emerging  Europe 
in  a  series  of  constantly  growing  ways. 

The  Problem  of  Berlin 

But  in  closing  I  would  like  to  offer  one  or  two 
more  direct  comments  on  our  pending  business. 
First,  I  would  like  to  associate  myself — word  for 
word  and  letter  for  letter— with  the  extraordi- 
narily clear  and  well -framed  statement  of  Secre- 
tary General  Stikker  on  the  problem  of  Berlin. 
I  have  just  come  from  Berlin,  I  have  had  a  chance 
to  see  for  myself  the  overwhelming  contrast  be- 
tween the  energetic,  genuinely  high-spirited  life 
of  West  Berlin  and  the  inhuman  ugliness  of  the 
wall.  West  Berlin  is  bound  to  us  all  by  a  thousand 
ties  of  feeling,  of  commitment,  of  trade,  of  travel, 
and  above  all  of  example.  We  must  and  shall 
keep  it  as  it  is  until  the  day  when  good  sense  may 
outweigh  creed  in  the  Soviet  Union — until  the  day 


604 


when  Soviet  policy  may  come  to  reflect  what  all 
honest  and  well-informed  Russians  themselves 
understand :  the  fact  that  the  real  anomaly  in  that 
part  of  Europe  is  not  the  great  human  triumph 
of  West  Berlin  but  the  sordid  inhumanity  of  the 
wall,  and  of  East  Berlin,  and  of  the  whole  dirty 
failure  in  the  Eastern  Zone  of  Germany. 

This  may  be  a  winter  of  renewed  Soviet  threats 
to  Berlin.  We  in  the  Atlantic  community  are 
clear  and  firm  and  ever  more  ready — and  we  could 
not  have  a  better  cause.  I  have  only  one  other 
point. 

Defense  in  the  Nuclear  Age 

Our  defenses  today  are  clear  and  strong,  and 
we  mean  to  keep  them  that  way  for  tomorrow  too. 
As  teclmology  develops,  constant  effort  is  neces- 
sary, and  it  is  wrong  to  suppose  that  we  can  rest 
comfortably  forever  merely  because  our  strength 
today  is  overwhelming.  Moreover,  the  problem 
of  defense  in  the  nuclear  age  is  as  much  psycho- 
logical as  military.  We  in  tlie  United  States  have 
tried  to  set  forth  our  concept  of  effective  nuclear 
defense  on  the  strategic  scale — both  in  the  private 
councils  of  the  alliance  and  in  major  statements 
like  those  of  the  President  at  Ottawa  ^  and  the  Sec- 
retary of  Defense  [Robert  S.  McNamara]  in  Ann 
Arbor.^  We  share  the  view  of  Mr.  Stikker  that 
the  nuclear  defense  of  our  community  is  essentially 
indivisible.  We  believe  also  that  the  special  re- 
sponsibility which  has  fallen  to  us  in  the  United 
States  is  one  which  we  shall  continue  to  be  able  to 
discharge;  our  commitment  is  clear,  our  purpose 
firm,  our  ability  evident,  and  our  forward  plan- 
ning firm.  We  believe,  finally,  that  small,  sep- 
arate, national  deterrents  are  not  likely  to  be 
valuable  and  that,  therefore,  we  should  not,  as  a 
matter  of  policy,  give  our  support  and  assistance 
to  them. 

But  no  one  should  suppose  from  all  this  that  we 
are  blind  either  to  the  common  military  needs  of 
NATO  or  to  the  special  political  and  psychologi- 
cal forces  which  may  most  understandably  press 
on  our  friends  in  Europe.  No  one  should  sup- 
pose that  we  are  unwilling  to  share  in  this  grim 
responsibility  whenever  the  responsibility  is  truly 
shared.  It  would  also  be  wrong  to  suppose  that 
the  reluctance  which  we  feel  with  respect  to  in- 
dividual,   ineffective,    and    unintegrated    forces 


force, 
fectif 
domi 
the  I 
sista: 
woul 
fiW 
men' 
thei 
itsc 
wliii 
Nor 
wlie 
of  I 
E 
to: 


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1\ 


h 
of 
i\ 
cc 


"  For  test,  see  Bulletin  of  June  5,  19C],  p.  839. 
•  For  text,  see  ibid.,  .Tuly  9. 19G2.  p.  64. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


IP: 


Otllll 


would  be  extended  automatically  to  a  European 
force,  genuinely  unified  and  multilateral,  and  ef- 
fectively integrated  with  our  own  necessarily  pre- 
dominant strength  in  the  whole  nuclear  defense  of 
the  alliance.  Any  possible  arrangements  for  as- 
sistance and  cooperation  in  such  an  enterprise 
would,  of  course,  require  full  consultation  and  ap- 
proval by  all  appropriate  agencies  of  our  Govern- 
ment. Moreover,  we  ourselves  cannot  usurp  from 
the  new  Europe  the  responsibility  for  deciding  in 
its  own  way  the  level  of  effort  and  of  investment 
which  it  wishes  to  make  in  these  great  matters. 
Nor  do  we  wish  to  press  for  a  European  answer 
when  in  our  own  honest  judgment  the  instrument 
of  NATO  itself  may  serve  as  well  or  better. 

Here,  as  elsewhere,  we  run  the  risk  of  seeming 
to  interfere  whether  we  speak  or  keep  silent. 
Moreover,  we  would  strongly  endorse  the  opinion 
others  have  expressed  in  this  meeting,  that  these 
matters  need  time  for  careful  thought  and  study — 
time  which  our  present  strength  and  present  for- 
ward planning  permits  us. 

But  it  does  seem  right  at  least  to  say  this :  If  it 


should  turn  out  that  a  genuinely  multilateral 
European  deterrent,  integrated  with  ours  in 
NATO,  is  what  is  needed  and  wanted,  it  will  not 
be  a  veto  from  the  administration  in  the  United 
States  which  stands  in  the  way. 

The  North  Atlantic  nations  have  many  duties 
beyond  those  I  have  discussed.  In  particular,  I 
would  have  liked  to  stress  with  you  the  concern 
which  we  feel  in  the  United  States  for  the  further 
development  of  effective  and  coordinated  efforts  to 
improve  our  help  to — and  our  trade  with — the  less 
industrialized  countries.  Let  me  simply  assure 
you  in  closing  that  this  omission,  and  others,  are 
not  a  signal  of  our  level  in  interest  in  Washing- 
ton but  only  a  frail  mark  of  my  respect  for  the 
patience  with  which  you  have  heard  me  speak  for 
so  long.  It  is  now  time  to  stop,  and  I  will  simply 
repeat,  in  closing,  the  deep  appreciation  of  the 
Government  for  which  I  speak — to  your  organiza- 
tion as  a  whole,  to  you  as  delegates,  to  your  officers, 
and  in  particular  to  our  Danish  hosts — for  all  that 
all  of  you  are  doing  in  the  cause — the  common 
cause — of  safety,  freedom,  and  progress. 


The  EEC  and  the  Free-World  Community 


hy  G.  Griffith  Johnson 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  ^ 


I  am  honored  this  evening  in  having  the  op- 
portunity to  speak  before  the  fifth  congress  of  the 
American  Production  and  Inventory  Control  So- 
ciety, an  organization  which  is  in  the  forefront  of 
those  so  successfully  engaged  in  pushing  back  the 
frontier  of  knowledge  and  techniques  in  the  field 
of  industrial  management.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
dwell  on  the  importance  of  this  profession  to  the 
continued  preeminence  and  progress  of  the  Ameri- 
can economy. 

This  morning  I  testified  before  a  congressional 


"  Address  made  before  the  American  Production  and 
Inventory  Control  Society  at  Boston,  Mass.,  on  Sept.  27 
(press  release  585). 

Ocfober  22,   T962 

660653—62 3 


committee  ^  on  the  subject  of  another  important 
frontier — that  of  satellite  communications  and  the 
complex  problems  for  our  international  relations 
which  such  a  communications  system  will  involve. 
This  offers,  of  course,  a  tremendously  exciting 
vista  and  one  which  has,  through  the  achievement 
of  Telstar,  caught  the  imagination  of  the  people 
not  only  of  this  country  but  of  the  world. 

Tonight  the  subject  which  has  been  suggested 
for  our  discussion  deals  with  still  another  frontier, 
in  many  ways  perhaps  the  most  important  of  all  : 
that  involving  the  efforts  to  develop  a  new  frame- 


=  Bulletin  of  Oct.  15,  1962,  p.  567. 


605 


■work  and  new  institutions  to  meet  the  political 
and  economic  requirements  for  a  free  society  in 
our  modern  world,  without  which  all  our  achieve- 
ments in  science  and  teclmology  could  prove 
abortive. 

Surely  the  European  Common  Market  repre- 
sents a  major  breakthrough  in  this  frontier.  It  is 
now  almost  5  years  since  the  Treaty  of  Eome  came 
into  force,  linking  the  six  countries  into  the  Euro- 
pean Economic  Community.'  It  is  4  years  since 
the  six  made  the  first  tariff  cuts  in  their  schedule 
for  bringing  about  a  complete  customs  union  by 
1970.  The  United  States  strongly  welcomed  this 
development.  It  had  given  encouragement  and 
direct  support  in  the  Marshall  Plan  days  to  Euro- 
pean economic  cooperation  and  to  various  attempts 
toward  more  complete  integration  in  Western 
Europe.  It  looked  at  the  new  undertaking  as  a 
means  for  bringing  the  six  countries  together, 
both  politically  and  economically,  with  the  result 
that  they  would  be  stronger  and  more  effective 
allies  in  assuring  the  security  and  progress  of  the 
free  world. 

At  the  time  the  project  was  met  with  widespread 
skepticism  over  its  success  and  fears  in  the  event 
it  should  succeed.  The  skepticism  grew  out  of 
plausible  doubts  that  the  European  countries  could 
break  down  centuries  of  tradition.  Some  of  the 
postwar  efforts  toward  integration  had,  it  is  true, 
been  successful — the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community  created  by  the  same  six  countries  to 
provide  a  single  market  for  trade  in  coal  and  steel 
was  a  going  concern.  But  progress  had  been  neg- 
ligible in  other  areas,  and  a  most  serious  failure — 
some  thought  a  hopelessly  damaging  one— was  the 
attempt  to  establish  a  European  Defense  Com- 
munity. 

When  a  new  try  was  made  at  integration,  this 
time  in  the  economic  field,  the  United  States  was 
just  as  vitally  interested  and  just  as  hopeful  for 
success.  But  success  or  failure  depended  on  Euro- 
pean readiness  to  move  away  seriously  from 
ancient  attitudes  of  unfettered  sovereignty.  In 
the  face  of  great  skepticism  and  disbelief,  the  Six 
did  bind  themselves  to  create  a  Conunon  Market 
for  trade  in  all  goods  and  for  the  free  movement 
of  workers,  services,  and  capital. 

The  transformation  of  six  economies  into  a 
single  economy  was  not  to  be  accomplished  over- 


'  The  six  EEC  countries  are  Belgium,  France,  the  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  and  the 
Netherlands. 


night.  Economic  integration  was  to  be  carried  out 
over  a  transitional  period  running,  with  some  flex- 
ibility, to  1970.  To  attain  the  objectives,  many 
of  the  detailed  procedures  were  laid  down  in  the 
treaty.  However,  the  treaty  was  in  a  sense  incom- 
plete. The  negotiators  jumped  over  many  knotty 
matters  by  writing  down  what  the  goals  were  and 
then  leaving  the  details  to  be  worked  out  after  the 
treaty  entered  into  force. 

The  first  year  that  the  Community  was  in  exist- 
ence— 1958— was  devoted  largely  to  setting  up  the 
organizational  machinery  and  to  getting  the  new 
Community  officials  started  on  drafting  imple- 
menting measures.  In  effect,  a  good  part  of  the 
treaty  was  being  negotiated  after  it  had  been 
signed,  ratified,  and  put  into  effect.  But  the  de- 
vice permitted  the  six  governments  to  bind  them- 
selves firmly  at  the  right  moment  and  avoided  the 
necessity  of  dealing  then  with  the  complexities  of 
the  whole  integration  idea. 

The  work  of  that  year  was  carried  out  under  a 
gathering  black  cloud.  As  the  months  advanced, 
fears  grew  that  the  economic  difficulties  plaguing 
France  would  prevent  it  from  beginning  to  open 
its  market  to  the  other  member  states  at  the  end 
of  the  year.  Under  the  treaty  it  was  to  cut  its 
tariffs  by  10  percent  and  to  relax  its  quotas. 
Shortly  before  this  deadline  arrived,  France  re- 
valued the  franc  and  took  other  major  steps  to 
rescue  its  economy,  and  thus,  when  the  yearend 
came,  it  was  able  to  meet  its  tariff  and  quota  com- 
mitments in  step  with  the  other  member  states. 

Adaptability  of  European  Businessman 

This  hurdle,  however,  was  not  the  end  of  the 
obstacle  course.  The  fact  that  it  was  overcome 
did  not  mean  that  individual  governments  and 
the  public  would  abandon  all  thoughts  of  insist- 
ing at  some  point  that  the  brakes  be  put  on.  Gov- 
ernment officials  apparently  had  come  to  anticipate 
and  accept  fear  and  resistance  by  the  business  com- 
munity toward  growing  competition.  But  Europe 
had  changed  and  so  had  the  European  business- 
man. Rather  than  clamoring  for  the  reestablish- 
ment  of  the  trade  barriers  which  had  begun  to  be 
torn  down,  the  businessman  had  been  sizing  up 
what  was  in  store  for  himself  and  was  quickly 
planning  the  changes  he  would  make  in  his  ways 
of  operation. 

These  plans  for  adaptation  fell  into  no  single 
mold.      Each    businessman   took    decisions   very 


606 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


much  in  the  liglit  of  his  own  situation.  Many 
turned  toward  changing  methods  of  production 
and  channels  of  distribution  to  prepare  for  the 
planned  shift  from  national  markets  to  a  six- 
country-wide  market.  For  example,  a  producer 
of  machinery  in  Italy  would  decide  to  concentrate 
henceforth  on  producing  heavy  equipment,  while 
a  manufacturer  in  France  would  find  that  he  could 
more  economically  concentrate  on  lighter  lines  so 
that  each  could  serve  in  his  own  country  as  sales 
representative  for  the  products  of  the  other  one. 
This  resourcefulness  and  adaptability,  displayed 
in  fortunate  business  conditions,  helped  to  reveal 
that  increased  competition  would  not  cause  any 
serious  damage  to  the  national  economies  or  to 
individual  industries  in  the  member  states. 

Indeed,  the  timetable  for  the  progressive  dis- 
mantlement of  tariffs  and  quotas  was  subsequently 
accelerated  by  unanimous  decisions  of  the  member 
states.  Tariffs  on  industrial  and  agricultural 
goods  moving  among  the  member  states  have  been 
cut  substantially  below  what  the  original  treaty 
plan  demanded.  As  of  last  July  1,  these  "inter- 
nal" tariffs  on  industrial  goods  have  been  reduced 
by  50  percent.  The  cut  to  this  level  was  origi- 
nally scheduled  to  have  been  reached  only  at  the 
end  of  1964 — or  2i/^  years  later. 

The  growth  of  Community  production  and 
trade  during  these  years  of  tariff  and  quota  lib- 
eralization shows  up  sharply  in  the  statistics. 
Comparing  1958  with  1961,  the  output  of  goods 
and  services  in  the  Common  Market  increased  by 
18  percent  and  trade  among  the  member  states 
rose  by  73  percent. 

Surprisingly,  these  overall  figures  do  not  hide 
any  serious  industrial  dislocation.  Of  course 
every  industry,  under  the  most  favorable  business 
conditions,  cannot  be  expected  to  share  equally 
with  other  industries  in  a  general  prosperity. 
Still,  the  widespread  economic  adjustments  in  the 
Common  Market  have  been  carried  out  remark- 
ably free  of  damage  to  sectors  of  the  economy. 
We  can  see  this  by  looking  at  the  use  made  of  two 
community  devices  for  providing  relief  for  severe 
adjustments. 

One  is  the  European  Li vestment  Bank.  Among 
its  responsibilities,  it  stands  ready  to  lend  money 
under  specially  favorable  conditions  to  European 
producers  to  modernize  or  to  convert  their  fac- 
tories as  the  result  of  the  progressive  establish- 
ment of  the  Common  Market.    So  far  the  Bank 


has  made  no  loans  for  "reconversion."  About  a 
year  ago  it  almost  made  one — for  a  paper-pulp 
factory  in  the  depressed  Borinage  coal-mining  re- 
gion of  Belgium.  However,  the  promoters  ap- 
parently changed  their  plans,  and  the  loan  was 
put  off. 

The  second  major  adjustment  relief  device  under 
the  treaty  is  the  European  Social  Fund.  Operat- 
ing on  a  principle  of  a  50-50  matching  of  its 
money  with  that  spent  by  national  or  local  au- 
thorities, the  Fund  provides  for  financial  assist- 
ance to  workers:  for  moving  from  one  area  to 
another  to  take  up  new  jobs,  for  being  trained  in 
new  skills,  or  for  sustaining  themselves  during 
periods  of  full  or  partial  unemployment  resulting 
from  the  conversion  of  industries  in  which  they 
have  been  working.  So  far,  the  demands  on  the 
Social  Fund  have  been  very  slight  and  have  been 
attributable  to  rather  general  programs  of  voca- 
tional training  rather  than  to  any  particular  prob- 
lem of  dislocation  of  industry.  For  the  entire 
period  1958-61,  the  Social  Fund  was  called  upon 
to  make  matching  payments  of  some  half  million 
dollars  for  vocational  training  and  relocation  al- 
lowances. It  was  not  called  upon  to  make  any 
payments  for  unemplojmient  compensation  in 
connection  with  the  conversion  of  industries. 

In  short,  therefore,  the  history  of  the  Common 
Market  to  date  has  been  one  of  success  and  of 
steady  progress  toward  the  economic  goals  set 
forth  in  the  195Y  treaty.  These  years  have  been 
a  period  of  unparalleled  prosperity  for  the  West- 
em  European  coimtries,  and  some  people  have 
raised  a  question  regarding  the  extent  to  which 
this  prosperity  has  been  made  possible  by  the 
Common  Market  or  has  made  possible  the  Com- 
mon Market's  success  to  date.  But  in  either  event, 
we  must  view  the  Market  as  a  fact,  a  revolutionary 
new  development  in  our  political  and  economic 
relationships.  In  recent  years  the  output  of  goods 
and  services  in  the  Common  Market  has  risen  at 
a  substantially  greater  rate  than  in  the  United 
States,  and  the  dynamic  quality  of  Western  Euro- 
pean economies  is  evident  to  all  who  come  in  con- 
tact with  them. 

Massachusetts  and  the  Common  Market 

If  the  skepticism  has  so  far  proved  false,  so  also 
have — up  to  now — the  fears  of  unfavorable  effects 
on  other  coimtries,  particularly  the  United  States. 

During  this  period  1958  through  1961,  our  ex- 


Ocfober  22,   7962 


607 


ports  to  the  six  Common  Market  states  rose  by 
some  45  percent  and  last  year  reached  $4.1  billion. 
This  rise  in  our  exports  to  the  Six  was  greater  than 
the  rise  in  our  exports  to  the  world  as  a  whole. 
Exports  by  the  Six  to  us  increased  by  some  34 
percent. 

Experience  has  borne  out  the  expectation  that 
economic  integration  in  Europe  would  lead  to 
higher  levels  of  economic  activity  and  would  bene- 
fit outside  countries,  such  as  the  United  States, 
by  providing  them  a  wealthier  market. 

As  the  gross  national  product  of  these  countries 
increases,  their  needs,  desires,  and  capacities  to 
pay  for  our  goods  should  also  increase.  The  ex- 
pansion of  demand  in  Europe  for  consumer  dura- 
bles has  been  enormous.  Automobiles  may  be 
smaller,  but  they  are  being  run  off  the  assembly 
lines  in  sufficient  volume  to  give  city  officials  in 
Paris  or  Milan  the  same  headaches  about  the  in- 
adequacy of  parking  space  as  officials  in  Boston 
or  Springfield.  Nevertheless,  the  Six  have  far  to 
go  to  reach  our  present  levels,  and  the  possibilities 
for  increases  in  consumption  are  great.  Among 
100  Americans,  there  are  7  times  as  many  TV  sets 
as  among  100  people  in  the  Common  Market,  4 
times  as  many  radios,  nearly  5  times  as  many  auto- 
mobiles, refrigerators,  and  wasliing  machines. 
The  market  for  the  goods  which  the  Europeans  are 
anxious  and  increasingly  able  to  buy  will  naturally 
be  filled  in  large  part  by  their  own  production,  but, 
if  we  can  maintain  our  production  and  marketing 
abilities,  our  own  plants  can  increasingly  partici- 
pate as  well. 

Industries  in  this  part  of  the  coimtry  have  a 
direct  interest  in  the  Common  Market  and  other 
overseas  markets.  In  1960  New  England's  in- 
dustries exported  over  $1  billion  of  their  output. 
Almost  half  this — $435  million — came  from  this 
State.  In  looking  at  the  industries  in  Massachu- 
setts and  in  the  Common  Market,  one  might  think 
that  the  two  areas  are  more  competitors  than  mar- 
kets for  each  other.  It  might  surprise  one  to  dis- 
cover that  Germany,  for  example,  is  among  the 
best  foreign  customers  for  the  products  of  our 
industries  producing  nonelectrical  machinery,  in- 
struments and  measuring  devices,  and  chemicals. 
The  fact  is  that  industries  here,  characterized  by 
advances  in  product  development  and  in  efficiency, 
have  a  good  market  in  Europe. 

"Wlien  we  look  at  the  Common  Market,  both  as 
a  customer  and  as  a  competitor,  we  must  bear  in 


mind  the  negotiations  which  have  been  going  on 
in  recent  months,  looking  toward  the  entry  of  the 
United  Kingdom;  and  this  in  turn  may  be  fol- 
lowed by  the  entry  of  other  European  countries. 
As  a  market  for  American  goods,  the  European 
Economic  Community,  in  its  present  size  or  ex- 
panded by  the  addition  of  the  United  Kingdom 
and  possibly  by  other  countries,  should  be  ever 
more  wealthy — a  market  with  a  purchasing  power 
wMch  might  one  day  equal  our  own  and  offering 
great  possibilities  for  mutually  beneficial  trade. 
Together  they  and  we  will  account  for  90  percent 
of  the  free  world's  trade  in  industrial  goods. 

Changes  in  Competitive  Position  of  U.S.  Firms 

It  would  be  a  great  mistake,  however,  to  suppose 
that  this  optimistic  prospect  will  be  automatically 
achieved  or  that  serious  problems  may  not  be  in 
the  offing  for  this  coimtry  and  other  parts  of  the 
world  as  well.  The  newspapers  have  given  promi- 
nence to  the  recent  meeting  in  London  of  the 
Commonwealth  prime  ministers  and  to  the  prob- 
lems posed  and  fears  there  reflected  by  the  leaders 
of  the  Commonwealth  members  from  around  the 
world.  We  also  cannot  ignore  the  possible  diffi- 
culties which  could  be  presented  to  our  Latin 
American  neighbors,  to  the  new  African  countries, 
and  to  others  whose  economies  have  been  sub- 
stantially dependent  on  past  trading  relationships 
with  the  individual  members  of  the  Common 
Market. 

The  American  manufacturer,  exporter,  and  in- 
vestor have  already  begun  to  feel  the  influence  of 
the  new  institutional  framework  and  policies  on 
their  own  activities.  The  welding  of  the  Common 
Market  member  states  into  a  complete  customs 
union  changes  the  competitive  picture  for  Ameri- 
can industries  in  several  respects. 

First,  there  are  the  "external"  and  the  "internal" 
tariff  changes.  The  tariffs  which  each  country 
has  applied  against  the  United  States  and  other 
"outsiders"  are  to  be  replaced  by  "external" 
tariffs  common  to  all  the  member  states.  The  new 
common  rate  on  product  x  as  a  general  rule  will 
be  the  average  of  tlie  rates  which  each  country 
used  to  levy  before  there  was  a  Common  Market. 
Therefore,  the  old  national  rate  whicli  Germany 
applied  on  imports  from  the  United  States  of 
product  X  may  go  up  from  5  percent  to  9  percent, 
while  in  Italy  it  may  go  down  from  15  percent  to 
9  percent.     Tlie  American  producer  wlio  liad  a 


608 


Deporfmenf  of  Sfofe   Bulletin 


market  in  Germany  but  not  in  Italy  may  wonder 
whether  his  gains  in  sales  to  Italy  will  offset  his 
losses  in  sales  to  Germany. 

Even  more  important,  American  producers  will 
be  faced  by  a  tariff  while  those  in  the  Common 
Market  will  not.  For  example:  In  1960  we  sold 
about  $1  million  worth  of  tires  to  France.  These 
tires  competed  in  the  French  market  against  those 
coming  from  Germany.  The  tariffs  used  to  be  the 
same.  Now  American  tires  entering  France  pay 
18  percent,  while  the  German  tires  pay  about  9 
percent.  Over  the  next  few  years  the  tariff  now 
levied  against  German  tires  will  have  been  com- 
pletely removed.  The  price  advantage  for  the 
German  producer  over  the  American  producer 
will  thus  be  about  $2  for  each  tire. 

The  European  producer  will  be  able  to  enjoy 
production  cost  benefits  of  a  mass  market.  The 
widening  of  the  European  market  for  a  manu- 
facturer in,  say,  France  from  his  previous  national 
territory  to  that  of  the  six  member  states  will  per- 
mit him  to  become  more  specialized,  to  produce 
longer  "runs"  of  his  lines  of  equipment,  to  dis- 
tribute through  a  larger  and  more  efficient  sales 
organization,  and  generally  to  enjoy  the  cost-cut- 
ting advantages  in  the  past  more  familiar  to  the 
producer  in  the  United  States. 

In  addition,  as  a  result  of  other  steps  toward 
European  integration,  such  as  freeing  the  move- 
ment of  blue-collar  and  white-collar  workers,  the 
European  producer  will  also  become  entitled  to 
some  benefits  previously  lacking.  For  instance, 
a  French  manufacturer  of  papermaking  ma- 
chinery may  become  freely  able  to  send  his  mill- 
wrights to  Italy  to  set  up  the  large  and  complex 
machinery  he  has  sold  there  rather  than  being 
limited  to  employing  only  Italian  millwrights  who 
are  not  so  intimately  acquainted  with  his  product. 

For  these  and  similar  reasons,  the  advantages 
which  the  American  had  over  the  European  pro- 
ducer, resulting  from  the  fragmentation  of  the 
European  economy,  will  have  altered  and  in  some 
cases  will  have  disappeared.  American  firms 
which  have  had  a  stake  in  the  European  market 
have  for  some  time  been  considering  what  they 
should  do  in  the  face  of  these  prospects. 

There  has  been  a  widespread  belief  that  the  most 
effective  means  for  an  American  firm  to  hold  on 
to  its  competitive  position  in  the  European  market 
is  to  move  some  of  its  productive  facilities  behind 
the  Common  Market  tariff  frontier.    This  direct 


investment  by  American  firms  in  the  Common 
Market  has  caused  worry  in  this  country.  It  has 
often  been  described  as  the  transfer  of  American 
jobs  out  of  this  country,  although  in  many  cases  it 
is  clear  that  tliis  investment  has  increased  jobs  in 
this  coimtry  by  generating  and  sustaining  a  flow  of 
exports — in  equipment,  component  parts,  and  the 
like — which  otherwise  would  not  have  existed,  and 
the  income  from  such  investments  is  an  increas- 
ingly important  item  in  our  balance  of  payments. 

American  plants  have  in  fact  sprouted  and 
spread  rapidly  in  Europe.  New  factory  buildings 
in  continental  surroundings  display  the  names 
and  the  trademarks  of  many  familiar  American 
products.  But  one  should  be  careful  in  drawing 
conclusions.  It  is  true  that  direct  American  in- 
vestment in  the  Common  Market  has  been  heavy 
and  has  been  growing  fast.  As  of  1961,  it 
amoimted  to  slightly  more  than  $3  billion  and  had 
increased  in  the  1957-61  period  by  81  percent. 
However,  tliis  trend  started  early  in  the  postwar 
period,  well  before  the  Common  Market  was  even 
on  the  drawing  board.  Also,  American  direct  in- 
vestment in  Britain  and  in  the  other  European 
countries  outside  the  Common  Market  amounted 
to  more— to  $4.6  billion  in  1961 — and  had  been 
increasing  at  an  even  more  rapid  rate,  rising 
during  that  1957-61  period  by  87  percent. 

For  many  American  manufacturers,  putting  up 
a  plant  abroad  is  simply  out  of  the  question.  The 
practical  problems  can  be  formidable:  conduct- 
ing plant  location  surveys,  dealing  with  national 
and  local  laws  and  practices  for  authorizations 
necessary  to  build  a  plant  and  to  bring  it  into  oper- 
ation, depriving  the  home  plant  of  key  supervisory 
personnel,  and  otherwise  taking  on,  mader  un- 
familiar conditions  abroad,  endless  tasks  wliich  are 
difficult  enough  at  home. 

Many  American  companies  have  chosen  to 
license  foreign  companies  to  manufacture  and  to 
sell  their  products.  There  seems  to  be  no  way  of 
stating  with  any  precision  either  what  volume  of 
European  production  is  covered  by  licenses  from 
American  firms  or  what  the  trend  in  American 
licensing  has  been.  This  kind  of  data  is  imavail- 
able  from  either  official  or  industry  sources.  From 
wliat  can  be  gleaned  from  the  press  and  from  what 
businessmen  and  the  lawyers  who  lend  a  hand 
with  these  intricacies  say,  there  seems  to  have  been 
a  surge  in  the  negotiation  of  licensing  agreements 
as  the  Common  Market  came  into  being  and  then 


October  22,   7962 


609 


Il 


recently  a  more  reserved  attitude  of  many  Amer- 
ican companies. 

Licensing  remains  an  important  and  useful 
means  for  many  American  companies  to  continue 
to  profit  from  their  own  product  and  market  devel- 
opment efforts.  But  for  others  in  this  country 
there  is  disenchantment.  The  American  manufac- 
turer who  has  licensed,  say,  a  company  in  Stutt- 
gart to  produce  and  sell  in  Gei-many  its  fully  auto- 
matic pretzel  bender  may  well  have  come  to  the 
unhappy  realization  that  his  particular  license 
had  a  built-in  death  warrant.  After  producing 
and  marketing  the  item  in  full  and  faithful  com- 
pliance with  the  license,  the  Stuttgart  producer 
may  have  decided,  as  the  license  expired,  that  he 
had  acquired  manufacturing  and  distributing 
knowledge  and  technique  that  he  could  turn  more 
fully  to  his  own  profit.  The  American  producer 
has  then  discovered  that  he  has  lost  future  royalties 
and,  in  fact,  is  faced  with  a  new  and  well-equipped 
foreign  competitor. 

Trade  Expansion  Act 

It  is  thus  difficult  to  generalize  or  to  prescribe 
any  single  course  of  action  which  will  suit  the 
situation  and  qualifications  of  every  American 
corporation.  One  thing,  however,  seems  clear. 
For  the  great  bulk  of  U.S.  industry,  for  the  aver- 
age manufacturer,  and  for  the  U.S.  economy  as 
a  whole,  the  indispensable  method  of  dealing  with 
the  growing  competition  of  the  Common  Market, 
and  for  taking  advantage  of  the  increased  market 
possibilities  which  it  affords,  is  through  the  export 
of  goods  from  this  country. 

Our  export  trade  with  Europe  is  greatly  nour- 
ished by  the  technological  superiority  of  many  of 
our  industries.  It  is  supported  by  our  ability  to 
supply  some  goods — including  agricultural  prod- 
ucts such  as  cotton  and  tobacco — wliich  the  Com- 
mon Market  cannot  itself  produce.  But  to  a  very 
large  extent  our  export  trade  with  Europe — and 
this  goes  back  to  the  old  economic  principle  of 
comparative  advantage — depends  on  our  ability  to 
produce  more  efficiently  products  which  it  is 
within  the  technical  capability  of  Europe  itself  to 
produce;  and  we  in  turn  accept  from  them  the 
goods  in  which  they  have  an  advantage.  This 
is  the  kind  of  economic  competition  from  which 
this  country  has  never  shrunk,  and  the  great  vol- 
ume of  our  exports  at  the  present  time  is  ample 


evidence  of  the  success  of  American  business  and 
agriculture  in  joining  together  with  great  efficiency  ; 
tlie  various  factors  of  production. 

However,  there  is  one  kind  of  market  obstacle 
with  which  the  private  producer  is  helpless  to 
deal :  the  intervention  of  governments  with  high 
tariffs  or  other  trade  restrictions.  With  the  elim- 
ination in  the  past  few  years  of  the  great  bulk  of 
nontariff  restrictions  in  Europe,  for  much  of 
American  industry  the  ci-ucial  factor  in  their  com- 
petitive position  vis-a-vis  Common  Market  pro- 
ducers is  becoming  the  advantage  provided  the 
latter  through  the  common  external  tariffs  of  the 
EEC  and  the  gradual  elimination  of  tariffs  within 
the  EEC. 

For  help  in  this  crucial  area  the  American  busi- 
nessman must  look  to  the  U.S.  Government.  Last 
week,  following  earlier  and  similar  action  by  the 
House  of  Representatives,  the  Senate  took  one  of 
the  momentous  legislative  steps  of  our  time  in 
passing  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  of  1962.*  You 
are  all  familiar  with  the  unprecedented  broad 
scope  of  the  provisions  of  this  act,  which  should 
shape  our  foreign  trade  policy  for  many  years  to 
come.  The  act,  of  course,  concerns  all  of  our  for- 
eign trade  with  all  countries,  but  throughout  its 
consideration  by  the  Congress  and  the  executive 
branch,  attention  has  been  especially  concentrated 
on  the  increasingly  apparent  need  for  the  nego- 
tiation of  satisfactory  trading  relationships  with 
the  other  members  of  the  Atlantic  partnership. 

Basically,  this  legislation  will  permit  the  Presi- 
dent to  negotiate  reductions  in  our  own  tariffs  by 
as  much  as  50  percent  of  the  rates  in  force  on 
July  1,  1962.  Additionally,  it  provides  special 
authority  for  reducing  tariffs  in  negotiations  with 
the  Common  Market,  which  could  bring  about 
greater  reductions  and  even  complete  elimination 
of  duties  on  industrial  products  for  which  we  and 
these  other  countries  are  the  principal  supplier. 
This  additional  authority  was  granted  to  the  Pres- 
ident in  recognition  of  the  need  to  have  special 
tools  to  deal  with  the  dislocations  which  might 
otherwise  develop  from  the  Common  Market's 
wholesale  reshaping  of  trading  conditions.  It 
obviously  applies  to  those  goods  in  which  our 
strong  competitive  position  is  demonstrated  by  our 


'  For  text  of  the  President's  message  to  Congress  on 
trade,  see  Bulletin  of  Feb.  12, 1962,  p.  231 ;  for  remarks  by 
the  President  on  Sept.  23,  see  ibid.,  Oct.  8, 1962,  p.  625. 


610 


Department  of  Stale  Bulletin 


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losition  as  suppliers  in  world  markets,  and  the 
ise  of  this  authority  is  subject  to  the  same  safe- 
uards  which  govern  the  use  of  the  general  tariff 
eduction  authority. 

For  agricultural  goods  there  is  another  form 
f  special  authority  to  take  account  of  the  condi- 
ions  envisaged  in  our  relations  with  the  Common 
■larket.  It  should  be  noted  that  at  present  the 
/ommon  Market  is  our  biggest  customer  for  farm 
oods,  taking  over  $1  billion  a  year  of  such  goods 
r  about  one-third  of  our  total  dollar  exports  of 
gricultural  commodities.  Under  the  new  act  the 
'resident  can  negotiate  reductions  greater  than 
0  percent  or  even  eliminate  duties  on  farm  prod- 
cts  if  he  finds  that  such  action  will  maintain  or 
xpand  our  exports. 

The  authority  provided  by  this  new  legislation 
>'ill  be  used  by  the  Government  in  major  negotia- 
ions.  The  negotiating  situation  can  be  expected 
o  be  complex,  to  embrace  many  coimtries  and 
v-ide  ranges  of  products,  and  to  require  the  most 
horough  preparation.  It  will  take  much  time, 
)atience,  and  perseverance. 

!elp  for  U.S.  Exporters  Through  GATT  and  OECD 

In  the  meantime  there  are  other  steps  which 
an  be  taken  and  are  being  taken  to  foster  and 
)reserve  the  competitive  position  of  American 
xporters. 

One  of  our  instruments  is  the  GATT — the  Gen- 
ral  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade — to  which 
he  United  States,  the  six  Common  Market  coun- 
ries,  and  some  35  other  trading  nations  are  par- 
ies. The  GATT  contains  the  commitments  we 
lave  exchanged  with  other  countries,  not  only  on 
ariff  rates  but  on  quotas  and  other  forms  of  trade 
)arriers.  Quotas  and  other  nontariff  devices  of 
!ontrol  have  hampered  our  trade  opportimities  for 
nany  years.  The  bulk  of  these  restrictions  have 
)een  swept  away.  However,  some  still  remain, 
specially  on  farm  products.  To  attack  these  we 
lave  been  using  the  GATT.  We  have  challenged 
neasures  which  are  imposed  inconsistently  with 
he  letter  of  their  obligations  or  the  objectives  of 
he  agreement. 

We  are  also  using  the  OECD — the  Organiza- 
-ion  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
nent — to  press  our  attack  on  quotas  and  other 
)bstacles  to  international  trade.  In  June  the 
DECD  Trade  Committee  agreed  on  a  system  of 
'confrontation"  for  questioning  or  challenging  the 

Dcfober  22,  1962 


continued  use  of  quotas  as  well  as  of  administra- 
tive and  technical  devices  which  interfere  with  the 
trade  of  the  members.  A  special  program  has  also 
been  instituted  within  the  OECD  in  the  field  of 
quotas  against  agricultural  goods.  Also,  the 
United  States  representative  to  an  OECD  com- 
mittee announced  our  intention  of  requesting  the 
organization  to  study  fiscal  and  other  measures 
which  discriminate  against  American  automobile 
exports.  A  group  within  the  organization  is  to 
examine  import  licensing  procedures,  credit  guar- 
antees, and  government  purchasing  regulations. 

Services  Available  Under  Export  Expansion  Program 

All  our  export  problems  are  by  no  means  at- 
tributable to  the  tariffs,  quotas,  and  devious  trade 
controls  of  other  governments.  Quite  naturally, 
there  are  problems  of  a  more  purely  business  na- 
ture. Here  also  United  States  Government  agen- 
cies have  been  stepping  up  efforts  to  help  our 
exporters.  Some  time  ago  the  President  set  under 
way  an  export  expansion  program  to  improve  the 
Government's  mternational  trade  services  to  the 
American  business  commimity.  I  am  sure  that 
many  of  you  have  had  occasion  to  make  use  of 
the  services  which  are  available  through  the  De- 
partment of  Commerce  field  offices  and  through 
our  commercial  officers  at  American  embassies  and 
consulates  abroad. 

There  are  now  10  different  programs  which  the 
Department  of  Commerce  has  in  operation  to 
bolster  our  exports. 

For  example,  the  regional  export  expansion 
councils  throughout  the  country  are  made  up  of 
businessmen  who  volunteer  to  work  for  the  promo- 
tion of  international  trade,  and  these  councils  give 
sound,  practical  instruction,  advice,  and  guidance 
to  smaller  manufacturers  who  are  interested  in 
exploring  export  trade  opportunities.  The  new 
trade  centers  program  provides  permanent  instal- 
lations where  products  of  a  different  industry  are 
shown  to  the  trade  every  6  weeks  or  so.  These  cen- 
ters give  our  businessmen,  particularly  those  who 
otherwise  would  not  have  international  repre- 
sentatives, the  opportunity  to  show  their  goods  or 
to  negotiate  with  agents  who  can  handle  their 
goods  for  them.  The  first  center  opened  in  London 
in  mid-1961,  and  within  the  Common  Market  there 
will  be  a  trade  center  opening  at  Frankfurt  in 
November.  At  the  center  in  London  one  Ameri- 
can men's  wear  manufacturer  closed  the  biggest 


611 


sale  of  its  type  ever  made  in  England — a  sale  of 
$400,000.  Another  participant  projected  his  firm's 
sales  orders  for  19G2  at  between  one-half  million 
and  one  million  dollars. 

Under  tlie  trade  mission  program,  more  than 
100  groups  of  American  businessmen  have  visited 
comitries  all  over  the  world.  Traveling  with 
Department  of  Commerce  officials,  these  volimteer 
businessmen  carry  abroad  specific  business  pro- 
posals which  have  been  obtained  in  advance  from 
American  manufacturers.  The  missions  return 
with  similar  proposals  for  businessmen  in  this 
country.  In  May  a  trade  mission  of  experts  in 
the  fields  of  packaging  machinery,  printing  eqiiip- 
ment,  machine  tools,  and  a  variety  of  new  elec- 
tronic equipment,  such  as  computers,  came  back 
from  Germany  and  developed  a  number  of  valu- 
able reports  of  opportunities  for  these  and  other 
products. 

Facilities  and  acti^aties  such  as  these,  wliich 
are  available  under  the  President's  trade  expan- 
sion program,  can  of  course  be  meaningful  only 
if  the  business  community  gives  its  support  to  the 
programs  and  takes  advantage  of  the  opportuni- 
ties offered.  Furthermore,  we  should  like  the  as- 
sistance of  businessmen  in  our  dealings  with  other 
governments.  The  Government  would  like  to  have 
specific  infonnation  wliich  could  be  used  by  it  in 
negotiations  and  discussions  with  other  govern- 
ments for  the  removal  of  imnecessary  or  unjusti- 
fiable restrictions  hindering  our  trade.  Looking 
forward  to  the  tariff  negotiations  which  we  shall 
enter  into  on  the  basis  of  the  Trade  Expansion 
Act,  it  would  be  useful  to  gather  information 
showing  the  particular  tariffs  or  restrictions  which 
pose  problems.  The  channel  for  submitting  this 
information  is  the  Committee  for  Reciprocity  In- 
formation, which  is  a  permanent  part  of  our  inter- 
agency trade  agreements  machinery. 

The  cooperation  which  exists,  and  which  should 
be  developed,  between  the  business  community  and 
Government  agencies  engaged  in  various  phases 
of  export  promotion  has  benefits  for  the  country 
as  a  whole  in  helping  to  close  the  gap  in  our  bal- 
ance of  payments.  It  therefore  assists  in  enabling 
the  United  States  to  carrj'  out  its  commitments 
internationally  with  regard  to  the  progress  and 
security  of  the  free  world. 


Future  Commercial  Relationships 

The  developments  in  Europe  are  thus  helpinj 
us  to  focus  on  basic  aspects  of  our  own  situation 
In  all  the  attention  which  must  be  paid  to  detail 
and  in  the  face  of  all  the  difficulties  wliich  wil 
arise  in  specific  commodities  or  industries,  it  i 
most  important  to  keep  constantly  in  mind  thi 
ultimate  objective  of  a  secure  community  of  frei 
nations  and  the  compelling  requirements  whicl 
gi-ow  out  of  what  President  Kennedy  has  callec 
the  interdependence  between  the  United  States 
and  the  new  Europe.^ 

A  new  and  liberalized  set  of  commercial  rela 
tionships  is  an  essential  part  of  this.  Armed  witl 
a  new  Trade  Expansion  Act,  the  United  States 
will  be  able  as  well  as  willing  to  accept  this  chal 
lenge.  But  this  is  not  a  one-way  street.  Oui 
readiness  must  be  matched  by  equal  readiness  and 
enthusiasm  on  the  part  of  others,  and  particularly 
by  the  European  Commiuiity,  in  which  is  combined 
so  large  a  share  of  Western  resources  and  capacity, 

Not  many  years  ago  the  goals  of  the  Common 
Market  would  have  seemed  to  many  to  be  beyond 
the  bounds  of  practicability.  As  we  can  readily 
see,  those  goals  are  being  achieved  and  achieved 
in  many  respects  at  a  more  rapid  pace  than  re- 
quired by  the  treaty  schedule.  Tlie  obvious  need 
to  bring  the  people  of  Western  Europe  closely 
together  in  a  totally  new  kind  of  community  has 
been  matched  by  a  new-found  willingness  and,  in- 
deed, eagerness  of  those  people  to  do  what  is  neces- 
sary to  transform  their  economic  life. 

The  most  important  question  now  is  whether 
this  willingness  and  eagerness  will  be  extended  to 
a  broader  arena,  to  the  steps  necessary  to  weld  to- 
gether— rather  than  fragmentize — the  free-world 
conmiunity.  Policies  now  in  process  of  formula- 
tion, decisions  to  be  made  in  the  near  future,  wiU 
in  fact  begin  to  shape  and  crystallize  the  pattern 
of  future  relationships  between  the  Community 
and  the  outside  world.  In  this  process  the  United 
States  Government  intends  to  play  a  fully  con- 
structive role,  and  we  are  confident  that  our 
friends  in  Europe  will  join  in  pressing  forward 
toward  the  building  of  a  prosperous  free-world 
community. 


Tradi 


hist 
pi  S 


'  Ibid.,  July  23, 1962,  p.  131. 


612 


Department  of  Stale  Bulletin 


rade  and  Investment  in  Tropical  Africa 


Following  are  the  texts  of  addresses  made  hy 
ssistant  Secretary  for  African  Affairs  G.  Men- 
"n  Williams  on  September  25  and  Deputy  Assist- 
nt  Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  W.  Michael 
lumenthal  on  Septemher  £6  before  a  Conference 
n  Trade  and  Investment  in  Tropical  Africa  spon- 
^red  hy  the  Commerce  and  Industry  Association 
f  New  York  at  New  York,  N.Y. 

NEED  FOR  BOLDNESS 


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.ddress  by  Assistant  Secretary  Williams 

ress  release  580  dated  September  25 

Last  week  the  Washington  Daily  News  took 
usnetf  he  National  Association  of  Manufacturers  to  task 
or  being  overly  cautious  in  its  approach  to  ex- 
anded  business  activity  in  the  United  States, 
'he  newspaper  recalled  that  businessmen  had 
heir  troubles  back  in  Henry  Ford's  day  and  were 
,fraid  to  take  risks  until  Ford's  unorthodox 
Qethods  shocked  them  into  a  realization  of  the 
)rofits  to  be  gained  by  his  methods.  The  editorial 
oncluded  that  we  "could  use  a  greater  spirit  of 
idventure  in  the  business  community,  a  greater 
'eeling  of  confidence  in  the  U.S.A." 

Today  I  would  like  to  call  for  "a  greater  spirit 
)f  adventure"  on  the  part  of  prospective  investors 
n  Africa.  There  is  a  need  for  boldness  on  the 
jart  of  America's  entrepreneurs  as  they  come  to 
^rips  with  the  many  opportunities  opening  up  on 
hat  dynamic  continent. 

This  is  not  to  ignore  the  existence  of  risks  in 
African  development.  Some  African  govem- 
nents  do  not  have  adequate  resources  and  have 
)een  unsuccessful  in  obtaining  the  kind  of  assist- 
|ince  needed  to  assure  their  development.  Such 
»untries  are  likely  to  face  serious  political  as 

ell  as  economic  difficulties  because  of  their  in- 
iibility  to  meet  the  expectations  of  their  people. 

The  provision  of  aid  is  one  way  in  which  re- 


sources have  been  made  available  to  certain  Afri- 
can countries.  In  the  long  run,  however,  private 
foreign  capital  can  do  the  job  of  development  in 
most  fields  more  effectively  than  any  government 
institution.  Such  capital,  though,  must  be  pre- 
pared not  only  to  produce  a  profit  for  the  Ameri- 
can investor  but  to  contribute  to  the  development 
of  economic  and  political  stability  in  Africa. 
That  this  can  be  done  is  becoming  recognized  in- 
creasingly, even  in  countries  which  tend  toward 
state  ownership. 

On  my  last  visit  to  Africa  a  particularly  im- 
pressive experience  was  to  encounter  the  frank 
desire  of  a  number  of  countries  to  receive  private 
American  capital. 

We  found  this  desire  in  Sierra  Leone  and  Bu- 
rundi, two  areas  that  have  a  strong  interest  in 
developing  resort  areas  to  attract  tourist  trade. 
We  found  it  in  Coquilliatville  and  Luluabourg  in 
the  Congo  and  in  the  Central  African  Republic — 
places  that  had  been  little  exposed  to  the  United 
States  in  years  past  but  which  are  very  anxious 
to  get  developmental  programs  underway.  We 
also  found  this  same  desire  in  Stanleyville  in  the 
Congo  and  in  Guinea,  two  areas  where  Commu- 
nist bloc  influences  were  heavy  in  recent  years  but 
which  today  are  genuinely  interested  in  obtaining 
private  American  investment. 

Firm  Basis  for  Investment  Opportunities 

Unfortunately,  the  possibilities  for  American 
businessmen  have  been  relatively  unexplored  in 
many  parts  of  Africa.  Some  of  our  missions  re- 
port that  they  do  not  see  an  American  business- 
man from  one  end  of  a  year  to  the  other. 

Perhaps  some  of  the  reluctance  of  U.S.  business- 
men is  due  to  those  few  cases  of  unrest  and  gov- 
ernmental irresponsibility  that  catch  the  headlines. 
Such  headlines  blur  the  fact  that  conditions  in 
most  of  tropical  Africa  are  peacefiil.  Actually, 
most  of  Africa's  energy  is  going  mto  the  construc- 


ggllelinibcrober  22,  1962 


613 


tive  tasks  of  economic  development  and  tlie  main- 
tenance of  political  stability. 

In  the  new  nations  that  evolved  from  the  former 
French  territories  of  Equatorial  and  West  Africa, 
for  instance,  able  and  enlightened  national  leaders 
are  moving  ahead  with  economic  development. 
"\^niile  it  is  natural  that  problems  of  independence 
almost  inevitably  lead  to  change  and  tension,  these 
nations  show  a  remarkably  high  level  of  political 
stability.  The  long-independent  nation  of  Liberia 
also  is  making  important  strides  toward  a  more 
modem  economy  and  has  a  demonstrated  history 
of  seeking  private  investment. 

Among  the  fonner  British  territories,  Nigeria, 
with  the  largest  population  in  Africa — some  40 
million  inhabitants — is  forging  ahead  in  meeting 
the  problems  of  its  diversified  peoples.  Nigerian 
officials  have  engaged  American  public  relations 
counsel  to  help  attract  capital,  and  the  Govern- 
ment has  passed  legislation  embodying  important 
safeguards  for  foreign  investors.  Another  Eng- 
lish-speaking nation,  Ghana,  officially  leans  toward 
state  ownership  of  enterprises,  but  these  policies 
have  not  modified  President  Kwame  Nkrumah's 
appeal  for  private  foreign  investors  to  help 
develop  the  resources  of  his  Government. 

Even  in  the  Congo,  where  the  tragic  course  of 
events  has  made  that  nation  a  symbol  of  all  the 
fears  of  possible  disaster  in  Africa,  most  enter- 
prises have  operated  with  little  interruption.  Al- 
though agricultural  production  was  hardest  hit,  it 
is  now  coming  back  strongly. 

These  facts  are  not  pointed  out  to  minimize 
the  grave  difficulties  that  face  the  investor  in  many 
parts  of  Africa  but  to  put  in  better  perspective  a 
situation  in  which  the  voices  of  disaster  sometimes 
seem  to  be  the  only  ones  heard. 

Experienced  American  investors,  however,  have 
not  been  discouraged  by  these  voices  of  disaster. 
In  fact  many  businessmen  are  increasing  their 
investments.  There  has  been,  for  instance,  a 
greater  interest  on  the  part  of  tlie  American  bank- 
ing community  in  African  banks  and  financial 
institutions.  This  interest  has  led  to  the  develop- 
ment of  closer  working  relations,  participation  in 
equity  capital  in  some  African  institutions,  and 
the  opening  of  several  African  branch  banks. 
Such  activity  is  taking  place  in  cooperation  with 
both  European  financial  houses  and  African  pub- 
lic and  private  investors. 

Direct  U.S.  investment  in  Africa  in  1961  once 


614 


again  shows  a  substantial  rise,  particularly  in  the 
newly  independent  countries.  Last  year  Amer- 
ican investment  in  Africa  rose  by  more  than  $100 
million — an  increase  from  $925  million  to 
$1,070  million. 

Of  particular  interest  are  the  percentage  in- 
creases in  tropical  Africa.  In  East  Africa  the 
increase  in  investment  in  1961  was  more  than  20 
percent,  and  in  "West  Africa  it  was  nearly  20  per- 
cent— both  well  above  the  continent-wide  average 
of  just  under  10  percent. 

Changing  Nature  of  Investments 

While  such  increases  are  encouraging,  they  are 
still  very  low  in  relation  to  most  other  areas  of 
the  world — and  very  low  in  relation  to  Africa's 
needs.  Furthermore,  these  investments  are  not 
as  diversified  as  would  be  desirable.  More  than 
50  percent  of  them  are  in  extractive  industries, 
where  there  are  relatively  few  opportunities  to 
help  develop  badly  needed  local  small  businesses. 
However,  some  American  investors,  notably  the 
oil  companies,  are  doing  a  good  job  of  building 
small  businesses  by  assisting  Africans  to  own  and 
operate  filling  stations  and  tank  trucks. 

There  is  a  real  hunger  for  industrial  and  entre- 
preneurial development  throughout  tropical 
Africa.  For  the  most  part  the  new  nations  want 
such  development  without  disrupting  their  trad- 
ing relations  with  Europe.  We  also  feel  that 
maintaining  these  relations  is  in  the  interest  of  all 
concerned.  There  is  plenty  of  opportimity  for 
everyone  in  Africa,  and  we  are  not  interested  in 
supplanting  existing  commercial  relations. 

But  with  independence  the  traditional  colony- 
metropole  relationsliips  have  been  modified.  Inde- 
pendence has  intensified  interest  in  the  develop- 
ment of  local  manufacturers.  In  the  next  decade 
we  will  see  progressive  increases  in  the  rate  of  in- 
dustrialization. 

British  and  French  investments  in  Africa, 
which  are  many  times  larger  than  ours,  are  trad- 
ing interests  for  the  most  part,  but  they  are  in- 
creasingly helping  to  develop  small  local  industry. 
Over  the  years  their  firms  that  export  agricultural 
commodities  have  begun  to  develop  processing 
industries  for  various  kinds  of  raw  materials — 
coffee-cleaning  establishments,  palm  oil  plants, 
cotton  gins,  abattoirs  with  freezing  equipment, 
tanneries,  textile  factories. 

Major  American,  British,  and  French  enter- 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Drises  in  Africa  have  been  profitable,  even  though 
the  nature  of  investments  in  Africa  has  changed 
with  the  passage  of  years.  Today  there  is  a  trend 
to  iway  from  traditional  plantation  agriculture  into 
ihe  very  early  stages  of  industrialization  repre- 
sented by  commodity-processing  operations.  Such 
jhanges  will  continue  as  Africa  develops  economi- 
cally, but  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  Africa 
(vill  provide  reasonable  profits  in  the  future  as  in 
:he  past. 

There  are  numerous  small  traders — principally 
Lebanese,  Greeks,  Armenians,  and  Indians — who 
ire  finding  it  profitable  to  go  into  small  industry. 
WTiile  the  manufacture  of  pots  and  pans  or  plastic 
pocket  combs  does  not  sound  like  dramatic  invest- 
ment, such  industry  represents  a  necessary  and 
aseful  stage  in  the  growth  of  Africa's  economy. 
These  investments  provide  important  services  for 
Africans  and  indicate  a  high  degree  of  confidence 
in  Africa's  future. 


iifr' 


Wide  Range  of  Opportunities 

Between  these  very  small  industries  and  large- 
scale  extractive  industries,  there  is  a  whole  range 
of  immediate  opportunities  open  to  American  and 
3ther  private  investors.  These  opportimities  in- 
;lude  such  areas  as  insurance,  banking  and  loan 
associations,  hotels,  and  low-cost  housing.  In  ad- 
dition there  is  room  for  commercial,  financial,  and 
industrial  activities,  as  well  as  export  and  import 
Dusinesses,  large  and  small.  Transportation  and 
communication  facilities  are  also  among  the  very 
lighest  priorities  of  African  leaders. 

Transportation  offers  prime  investment  oppor- 
timities for  U.S.  businessmen.  American  trucks 
ire  the  best  in  the  world,  and  our  tires  are  excep- 
:ionally  sturdy — ideal  for  African  conditions. 
There  is  a  great  deal  of  interest  in  Africa  in  ob- 
taining such  American  equipment  to  improve 
transportation.  Furthermore,  American  road- 
juilding  equipment  is  now  in  a  niimber  of  African 
countries,  constructing  new  roads  and  maintaining 
Did  ones.  All  of  this  activity  will  lead  to  an  ex- 
panded transportation  market. 

There  also  will  be  many  sales  opportunities  in 
A.frica  as  that  continent's  purchasing  power  rises 
md  its  population  grows.  Closer  relations  among 
countries  will  lead  to  regional  rather  than  national 
narkets.  And  about  three-quarters  of  our  AID 
^Agency  for  International  Development]  grants 
md  development  loans — now  running  at  more  than 

October  22,   1962 


$200  million  a  year — will  be  spent  on  U.S.  goods 
and  services. 

Of  additional  interest  to  American  investors  is 
the  disposition  on  the  part  of  most  countries  to 
make  it  easy  for  new  kinds  of  industry  to  go  into 
Africa.  At  the  moment  there  are  investment 
guaranty  agreements  in  force  between  the  United 
States  and  nine  governments  in  tropical  Africa, 
and  five  other  agi-eements  in  that  part  of  the  con- 
tinent are  under  active  negotiation.  Several  of 
these  agreements  have  been  negotiated  with  coun- 
tries having  a  strong  interest  in  some  form  of 
mixed  economy,  yet  they  are  acutely  aware  of  the 
value  of  private  foreign  investment  to  their 
development. 

In  addition  to  negotiating  agreements  of  this 
nature  the  United  States,  through  the  U.S.  For- 
eign Service,  engages  in  a  wide  range  of  activities 
designed  to  assist  American  businessmen  and  de- 
velop a  climate  favorable  to  private  investment. 
I  don't  want  to  go  into  these  services  extensively, 
however,  because  Mr.  Blankenheimer  ^  of  the  De- 
partment of  Commerce  will  touch  upon  that  facet 
of  our  foreign  relations. 

Adapting  to  African  Patterns 

In  summary,  then,  there  are  ample  investment 
opportunities  in  Africa  for  anyone  seriously  in- 
terested both  in  making  money  and  in  helping 
Africa  develop.  However,  American  capital  must 
help  with  nation  building  along  with  profit  taking 
or  it  will  not  be  welcome.  Africans  are  developing 
forms  and  institutions  based  on  their  own  familiar 
cultural  patterns,  and  we  cannot  expect  that  their 
patterns  of  operation  necessarily  will  be  the  same 
as  those  f oxmd  elsewhere  in  the  world. 

This  may  be  difficult  for  some  American  busi- 
nessmen to  accept  readily.  But  just  as  American 
investors  and  traders  accustomed  themselves  to 
new  patterns  in  our  own  West  in  pioneer  days  and 
in  Latin  America,  and  as  trading  and  investment 
patterns  were  adapted  to  conditions  in  the  Far 
East  during  the  early  period  of  our  interest  there, 
so  there  will  be  entrepreneurs  who  will  be  quick 
to  catch  the  rhythms  of  the  new  Africa.  These 
will  be  men  with  foresight  and  daring,  men  who 
know  that  Africa  is  taking  its  first  steps  on  a  lad- 
der that  at  this  moment  has  no  top  rung  in  sight. 

But  the  opportunities  lie  in  Africa — and  they 


'  Bernard  Blankenheimer,  Director  of  the  African  Divi- 
sion, Bureau  of  International  Programs. 


615 


cannot  be  fully  explored  from  offices  in  New  York 
or  Chicago  or  San  Francisco.  It  is  not  enough  to 
wait  safely  in  the  United  States  for  the  African 
market  to  come  into  being.  The  place  to  start  is 
on  the  continent  itself.  It  is  important  to  have 
American  management  associating  itself  closely 
with  local  communities — in  the  training  of  local 
employees,  in  sharing  technical  know-how,  and  in 
supporting  community  activities.  Even  if  the 
American  businessman  can  do  no  more  to  begin 
with  than  break  even,  he  will  have  people  on  the 
spot,  watching  for  opportunities  as  they  develop 
and  ready  to  take  advantage  of  them  as  they 
mature. 

This  is  the  real  challenge  of  modem  Africa  for 
the  private  businessman  in  the  United  States.  I, 
for  one,  believe  that  American  business  has  not 
lost  its  spirit  of  boldness — the  spirit  that  gave  our 
nation  the  greatest  economic  system  the  world  has 
ever  seen. 

Together  with  their  colleagues  in  education, 
agriculture,  religion,  health,  and  government, 
American  businessmen  must  move  boldly  to  meet 
Africa's  challenge  and  help  build  an  Africa 
strong  and  free — an  Africa  ready  and  able  to  make 
increasingly  important  contributions  to  the  future 
peace  and  prosperity  of  the  world. 


COMMODITY  STABILIZATION  AND  ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT  IN  AFRICA 

Address  hy  Mr.  Blumenthal 

Press  release  582  dated  September  26 

An  essential  part  of  the  democratic  process  is 
two-way  communication  between  the  business 
world  and  government.  As  one  who  was  in  busi- 
ness until  I  joined  the  State  Department  less  than 
2  years  ago,  I  know  from  experience  both  in  and 
out  of  government  how  difficult  it  is  for  some  busi- 
nessmen to  view  the  world  from  the  perspective  of 
Washington  and  likewise  how  difficult  it  is  for 
some  officials  to  appreciate  your  problems  as  busi- 
nessmen active  in  international  trade  and  invest- 
ment. In  part  the  communications  problem  arises 
because  we  are  all  so  busy  that  we  have  little  time 
to  try  to  view  our  activities  from  a  different 
perspective. 

Thus  I  especially  welcome  and  highly  value 
this  opportunity  to  talk  to  you  about  what  your 
Government  is  tliinkmg  about  commodity  stabili- 

616 


zation  and  to  do  this  with  particular  reference  t 
the  economic  development  of  tropical  Africa. 

Let  me  add  that  I  am  pleased  to  see  a  numbe 
of  diplomatic  representatives  of  African  nations  ii 
this  predominantly  business  audience.  It  is  goo( 
to  note  that  our  business  community  in  this  wa; 
among  others  is  in  touch  with  official  Africa] 
thinking. 

Factors  Affecting  Development 

The  problems  of  the  new  and  old  nations  o 
tropical  Africa  are  manifold.  You  have  no  doub 
been  hearing  much  these  days  about  the  rapidity 
of  political  evolution,  the  pressures  of  socia 
change,  and  the  imperatives  of  economii 
development. 

The  main  facts  bearing  on  the  development  prob 
lem  are  well  known  to  you,  I  am  sure,  and  I  neec 
but  briefly  mention  them  here. 

Large  parts  of  tropical  Africa  are  poor,  ex 
tremely  poor.  Per  capita  national  incomes  an 
under  $100  per  year  in  a  majority  of  countries  anc 
even  in  the  relatively  richer  countries,  such  a; 
Ghana  and  Nyasaland,  do  not  exceed  $200.  Whih 
little  can  be  done  about  underlying  climatic,  soil 
and  resource  deficiencies,  much  can  and  is  being 
done  to  raise  educational  and  health  standards,  tc 
import  technical  and  managerial  skills,  to  build 
ports,  roads,  railways,  and  airports  essential  to  tic 
formerly  subsistence  economies  into  an  African 
and  world  trade  network  and  to  develop  indige- 
nous power  resources  to  support  industrialization. 

Clearly  areas  such  as  the  Congo,  which  are  rich 
in  mineral  wealth  and  in  untapped  hydro  re- 
sources, have  a  great  potential  for  economic  de- 
velopment once  unity  and  stability  are  restored. 
Elsewhere  the  future  is  also  bright  if  capital, 
skills,  and  resources  can  be  effectively  combined. 
The  mushrooming  of  new  enterprises  and  the 
growth,  for  example,  of  a  Nigerian  entrepreneur- 
ial class  give  promise  that  this  will  be  done  in 
much  of  Africa. 

But  the  process  of  modernization  requires  re- 
sources: human,  material,  and  financial.  Let  it 
be  clearly  understood  that  most  of  these  resources 
must,  of  necessity,  be  local  in  origin  for  private 
foreign  investment,  economic  assistance,  and  other 
unilateral  transfers  of  resources  into  the  African 
area  can  form  only  a  small  though  valuable  part 
of  the  total  required.  Moreover,  the  resources 
coming  in  from  the  outside  must  first  and  fore- 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


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"  nost  be  directed  toward  speeding  up  the  process 
)f  generating  indigenous  assets.  They  must  also 
e  employed  to  broaden  the  economic  base  and  to 
'^ii  lelp  move  resources  out  of  commodities  in  over- 
goo(  production  into  new  lines  of  endeavor. 
'^    But  there  can  be  no  question  that,  since  the 

"  :)ossibilities  for  local  savings  are  limited,  the  need 
'or  private  investment  and  economic  assistance 
Tom  tlie  rest  of  the  world  is  great.  In  particular, 
"oreign  exchange  resources  to  finance  essential  im- 
)orts  of  consumer  and  investment  goods  alike  are 

,u)ften  inadequate  to  foster  I'apid  economic  growth. 
To  help  meet  capital  and  foreign  exchange  re- 
luirements,  our  European  allies  will  this  year  pro- 
dde  aid  to  countries  in  tropical  Africa  to  the  tune 
)f  over  $600  million.  Our  aid  effort,  while  com- 
)aratively  modest — roughly  $175  million  in  grants 
,nd  loans  for  tropical  Africa  during  fiscal  year 
962 — will  usefully  supplement  aid  from  France, 
he  United  Kingdom,  the  European  Economic 
bmmunity,  and  elsewhere.  So  too  will  the  flow 
)f  private  American  risk  capital  into  tropical 
Africa,  which  may  have  added  net  new  resources 
)f  about  $60  million  in  1961. 

Yet  the  fact  remains  that  the  export  earnings 
)f  these  countries  are  roughly  four  times  as  im- 

'  )ortant  a  source  of  foreign  exchange  for  them  as 
lid  and  private  investment. 

Moreover,  aid  is  temporary,  but  the  develop- 
nent  of  a  sound  and  growing  volume  of  trade 
ays  a  more  permanent  and  lasting  foimdation. 
The  need  to  stimulate  stable  and  growing  income 
rom  export  earnings  is,  therefore,  of  overriding 
mportance. 


Ive  Serious  Trading  Problems  in  Africa 

Thus  the  African  stake  in  trade  is  crucial.     Yet 
hese   countries   face   serious   trading  problems. 
I  tlitpet  me  mention  five : 

First :  There  is  the  fact  that  one  or  two  primary 
ommodities  often  account  for  between  60  percent 
md  90  percent  of  a  nation's  total  export  earnings. 
!  re-  ^'or  example :  Nigeria  earns  two-thirds  of  its  ex- 
,(t  it  5ort  proceeds  from  cocoa  and  oilseeds ;  the  Ivory 
iMSCoast  earns  about  90  percent  from  coffee,  cocoa, 
ivite  md  timber;  Senegal  85  percent  from  peanuts; 
illiir  jhana  75  percent  from  cocoa  and  timber;  and 
•itf  Jganda  75  percent  from  coffee  and  cotton. 
part  /Second:  The  commodities  on  which  African 
irce!  jountries  are  higMy  dependent  are  subject  to  wide 
fore'  ;hort-term  price  fluctuations.     For  example,  in 


recent  years  declines  in  coffee  and  cocoa  prices 
have  been  dramatic.  Spot  cocoa  is  today  quoted 
in  New  York  at  under  20  cents  a  pound  whereas 
its  1958  high  was  over  60  cents.  Even  though 
Ghanaian  production  and  exports  have  increased 
markedly  in  the  past  2  years,  cocoa  earnings  have 
merely  held  steady.  For  Nigeria,  where  produc- 
tion has  grown  more  slowly,  earnings  from  cocoa 
have  declined,  as  they  have  for  peanuts,  where 
world  prices  are  also  soft.  Although  African 
coffee  producers  have  fared  relatively  better  than 
most  Latin  American  producers  in  the  last  few 
years,  the  sharp  fall  in  coffee  prices  has  hurt  them 
also.  Nigeria  did  benefit  from  a  25  percent  in- 
crease in  tin  prices  from  the  first  to  the  third 
quarter  of  1961,  although  the  price  has  subse- 
quently declined  again. 

For  agricultural  commodities  the  major  source 
of  instability  is  f  oimd  on  the  supply  side.  Yields 
fluctuate  markedly  as  a  result  particularly  of 
weather  variations  and  crop  diseases.  Also,  pro- 
duction of  tree  crops  adjusts  to  changes  in  market 
conditions  only  with  significant  time  lags.  This 
fact  appears  frequently  to  work  to  increase  price 
instabilities. 

For  the  minerals  the  major  source  of  short-term 
instability  is  found  on  the  demand  side,  the  level 
of  economic  activity  in  the  developed  countries 
being  the  leading  influence  on  price. 

Third:  Not  only  do  the  prices  of  most  primary 
commodities  fluctuate  widely,  but  also  the  long- 
term  composite  trend  has  been  down  for  the  past 
10  years.  The  U.N.  price  index  for  primary  prod- 
ucts in  international  trade  is  down  over  10  per- 
cent since  1953.  During  the  same  period  the 
index  for  manufactured  goods  lia^;  risen  by  about 
10  percent,  with  the  consequencb  that  African 
countries  as  well  as  the  other  predominantly  pri- 
mary producing  areas  are  greatly  concerned  with 
what  they  refer  to  as  the  deterioration  in  their 
"terms  of  trade." 

It  is  a  fact  that  demand  for  primary  commodi- 
ties has  grown  less  rapidly  than  demand  for  man- 
ufactured items  and  services.  Technological 
change  has  led  to  economy  of  use  of  raw  materials 
and  the  development  of  substitutes.  And,  even  at 
higher  incomes  and  lower  prices,  there  is  a  limit 
to  how  much  coffee  Americans  will  drink ;  in  tech- 
nical language  the  elasticities  of  demand  for  pri- 
mary commodities  are  often  low. 

These  facts  doubtless  make  the  process  of  de- 


icfober  22,    7962 


617 


velopment  slower  and  more  diflScult  than  it  would 
be  if  demand  for  African  products  were  growing 
more  rapidly  and  if  long-term  price  trends  were 
not  adverse. 

F mirth:  The  pattern  of  trade  for  many  African 
countries  is  directed  predominantly  toward  the 
former  metropoles.  This  is  particularly  true  of 
franc  area  countries.  For  example,  over  60  per- 
cent of  Ivory  Coast  exports  go  to  fraiic  area 
comitries,  and  over  75  percent  of  Ivory  Coast  im- 
ports in  1960  came  from  France.  Moreover,  the 
Ivory  Coast  is  far  from  an  extreme  case  of  trade 
dependence. 

Fifth:  The  efforts  of  African  producers  to  in- 
dustrialize are  hampered  by  protectionism  in  much 
of  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  pattern  is  all  too 
often  that  they  labor  imder  artificial  handicaps 
even  in  processing  their  own  products.  For  ex- 
ample, cocoa  butter  is  often  subject  to  higher 
duties  than  cocoa  beans,  and  freight  rates  on  proc- 
essed items  may  be  disproportionately  high.  Un- 
fortunately, production  of  light  manufactured 
goods  faces  still  more  difficulties. 

As  the  leading  world  power,  dedicated  to  ex- 
panding peacefully  the  area  of  freedom,  the 
United  States  is  necessarily  concerned  with  the 
trade  and  commodity  problems  of  African  states, 
committed  as  they  are  to  economic  progress  by  one 
means  or  another.  Peace  and  prosperity  are  in 
fact  indivisible,  and  like  it  or  not  we  are  inevitably 
concerned  with  the  price  of  peanuts  just  as  we  are 
with  the  future  of  Berlin.  Obviously,  the  degree 
of  our  concern  differs  greatly  from  case  to  case. 

Objectives  of  U.S.  Policy 

Wliat  then  would  we  like  to  do  about  commodity 
stabilization?  What  are  the  objectives  of  U.S. 
policy  ? 

Our  overriding  objective  is  to  keep  commodity 
price  fluctuations  or  declines  from  jeopardizing 
the  development  effort  of  producing  nations — and, 
hopefully,  to  stimulate  commodity  trade  so  that  it 
can  increase  its  contribution  to  development. 

We  want  to  find  solutions  compatible  with  a 
growth  of  freedom  in  the  world  and  to  minimize 
the  temptation  for  the  nonindustrial  nations  to 
seek  the  illusion  of  an  allegedly  easy  Communist 
road  to  rapid  economic  development. 

More  specifically  our  objectives  are,  insofar  as 
feasible  (and  this  is  an  important  caveat)  : 

1.  To  dampen  disruptive  cyclical  price  fluctua- 
tions. 


618 


2.  To  arrest  the  secular  decline  in  commodity 
prices.  This  is  probably  the  most  difficult  ob- 
jective of  all  to  attain,  because  the  downward 
secular  price  trend  appears  in  good  measure  to  b( 
implicit  in  rapid  technological  progress  and  men 
efficient  use  of  materials  and  primary  products. 

3.  To  mitigate  problems  of  acute  supply- 
demand  imbalance  which  have  arisen,  for  example 
with  respect  to  coffee. 

4.  To  solve  commodity  problems  in  ways  whicl" 
promote  the  industrialization  and  diversificatior 
of  the  producing  countiy.  Indeed,  industrializa 
tion  and  the  development  of  trade  within  anc 
among  developing  nations  will  be  an  importani 
part  of  a  solution  of  many  of  the  trade  problems 
of  these  nations. 

5.  To  develop  global,  not  regional,  solutions  tc 
commodity  problems  or  at  least  to  find  nationa' 
and  regional  measures  not  incompatible  with  £ 
global,  multilateral,  nondiscriminatoi-y  approach 

6.  To  avoid  excessive  or  unworkable  control; 
which  might  jeopardize  the  growth  of  free  eco- 
nomic and  political  institutions.  We  would  like  tc 
make  maximum  use  of  market  forces  supple- 
mented, where  necessary,  by  financial  mechanisms 
and  to  place  minimum  reliance  on  such  devices  as  •  f^ 
quotas  and  the  more  direct  types  of  price  support 

7.  To  assure  that  any  commodity  stabilization 
arrangements,  which  necessarily  will  vary  froiBiigu 
commodity  to  commodity,  operate  in  ways  which 
benefit  both  producers  and  consumers. 


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Strategy  in  Commodity  Stabilization  Efforts 

We  are  under  no  illusions  that  commodity  stabi- 
lization will  be  easy  within  the  framework  which 
I  have  outlined.  But  we  are  making  a  concerted  I  ill 
effort  involving  both  study  and  action.  I  would  |P^ 
like  to  describe  the  major  components  of  the 
strategy  we  are  following  in  our  commodity  stabi- 
lization efforts. 

To  deal  with  the  purely  short-term  price  insta- 
bilities, we  are  studying  a  global  compensatory 
financing  scheme  which  might  partially  offset 
cyclical  fluctuations  in  export  earnings  of  produc- 
ing countries  by  providing  short-term  finance  toi  ^ 
permit  imports  to  remain  fairly  stable  and  thereby 
to  avoid  sharp  stops  and  starts  in  carrying  out 
development  plans. 

Our  efforts  to  work  out  compensatory  financing 
mechanisms  to  offset  cyclical  fluctuations  in  export 
earnings  are  focused,  primarily,  in  the  U.N.  Com- 


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Department  of  State  Bulletin 


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I  '!  lission  on  International  Commodity  Trade  (the 
*  ™  )ICT) ,  although  the  Organization  of  American 
*'"  States  has  made  major  contributions  to  the  study 
'"*  f  possibilities  in  this  field,  developing  a  specific 
"^''^  iroposal  which  is  under  consideration.  In  addi- 
ion  the  International  Monetary  Fimd,  which  al- 
eady  provides  a  form  of  compensatory  financing 
hrough  its  balance-of -payments  assistance,  is  also 
onsidering  the  problem. 

Final  consideration  of  what  type  of  compensa- 

ory  financing  system,  if  any,  appears  best  suited 

or  the  long-term  development  needs  of  all  devel- 

'ping  nations  depends  on  many  factors  both  of  a 

lolicy  and  of  a  technical  nature.     The  United 

'"™  Hates  is  prepared  to  consider  any  approach,  or 

ombination  of  devices,  which  promises  to  stimu- 

'"''late  long-term  economic  growth.   We  do,  however, 

ave  doubts  as  to  the  desirability  of  using  com- 

lensatoiy  financing  as  an  aid  mechanism  rather 

han    as    a    short-term    credit   mechanism.     Aid 

ransferred  in  such  a  manner  might  too  often  go 

o  nations  whose  aid  needs  were  relatively  less 

han  other  developing  nations,  and  there  appear  to 

le  diiBcult  technical  problems  of  assuring  that  aid 

n  this  form  would  be  used  as  effectively  as  other 

orms  of  capital  inflows. 

National  and  regional  marketing  boards  also  can 

'"*""  le  fairly  effective  in  smoothing  out  seasonal  price 

™  luctuations.    These  bodies  also  have  a  useful  role 

^''  0  play  in  improving  earnings  tlu'ough  quality  con- 

rols  and  distribution  of  better  seeds,  fertilizers, 

nd  teclinical  information. 

To  deal  with  the  longnm  secular  price  declines 

,nd  with  problems  of  supply-demand  imbalance, 

liiij  ommodity  agreements  may  provide  a  partial  and 

jfjfi  nterim  answer.    Thus  for  a  few  commodities  with 

)articularly  serious  structural  problems — such  as 

otfee  and  possibly  cocoa — we  have  developed  or 

,re  developing  international   commodity  agree- 

iients  with  worldwide  participation  of  producing 

nd  consiuning  nations.    In  such  cases,  for  the 

greements  to  be  effective,  producing  nations  must 

urb  overproduction  and  sliift  excess  resources  out 

f  primaiy  conunodities  in  oversupply  into  other 

.reas.    We  believe  all  of  the  industrial  nations 

fs'lhould  coordinate  their  aid  programs  to  facilitate 

uch  a  resource  shift. 

The  coffee  agreement  which  has  just  been  ne- 
gotiated here  in  New  York  is,  I  think,  a  most 
)romising  arrangement.   Coffee  is  the  second  most 
spi"'  mportant  commodity  in  international  trade  and  a 
irucial  source  of  foreign  exchange  earnings  for  a 

IWcfober  22,   7962 


large  number  of  countries  in  Latin  America, 
Africa,  and  Asia.  We  do  not  pretend  that  schemes 
such  as  the  coffee  agreement,  which  is  built  around 
a  system  of  export  quotas,  are  an  ideal  system  ap- 
plicable in  all  conditions  to  all  conmiodities. 
Kather,  we  regard  the  coffee  agreement  as  a  prag- 
matic effort  to  make  the  best  of  a  very  bad  situa- 
tion. We  are  convinced  that  the  only  way  to  work 
out  the  structural  problems  of  oversupply  and 
long-term  price  deterioration  which  have  plagued 
coffee  producers  is  through  an  enforcible  global 
agreement  including  both  producers  and  con- 
sumers. I  am  hopeful  that  the  agreement  just 
negotiated  will  achieve  our  objectives. 

Despite  my  relative  optimism  for  the  future  of 
the  coffee  agreement,  and  for  more  orderly  coffee 
trade,  I  would  like  to  somid  a  note  of  caution 
about  commodity  agreements.  If  you  will  excuse 
my  analogy,  international  commodity  agreements 
are  the  "ultunate  weapon"  of  commodity  policy. 
Designed  with  skill  and  prudence,  these  agree- 
ments may  provide  an  answer  for  our  most  serious 
commodity  problems.  But  conmiodity  agree- 
ments can  also  be  a  very  dangerous  weapon  and 
must  not  be  used  lightly  or  indiscriminately. 

There  is  ijarticular  danger  that  commodity 
agreements  will  lead  to  artificial  prices  involving 
the  major  risks  both  of  stimulating  primary  com- 
modity production  at  the  expense  of  diversified 
development  and  of  stimulating  the  development 
of  synthetic  or  substitute  products. 

In  those  commodity  arrangements  which  we 
do  find  necessary,  we  want  a  minimum  of  direct 
controls  and  maximum  play  left  to  indirect  market 
forces.  We  face  a  dilemma  in  many  commodities : 
Market  mechanisms  have  either  failed  to  provide 
adequate  stability  or  free  market  mechanisms  have 
never  been  permitted  to  operate;  on  the  other 
hand,  one  alternative  to  the  present  imsatisf  actory 
system  may  be  even  worse — direct  control  and  reg- 
ulation of  commodity  trade.  Our  task — and  I  do 
not  believe  it  is  impossible — is  to  develop  tech- 
niques and  devices  which  will  temper  the  excesses 
of  the  market  mechanism,  to  harness  it  more  di- 
rectly to  the  development  effort  without  abandon- 
ing the  proven  advantages  of  the  marketplace. 

Let  me  add  that  while  we  are  giving  thought  to 
the  so-called  terms-of-trade  problem  we  do  not 
yet  see  any  reasonable  way  of  stabilizing  the 
overall  tenns  of  trade  without  disrupting  the  play 
of  market  forces,  encouraging  the  premature  de- 


619 


velopment  of  substitutes  for  primary  products, 
distorting  development  patterns,  and  creating  new 
and  probably  more  difficult  political  problems. 

To  deal  with  the  more  general  trade  problems, 
we  are  working  largely  in  GATT  for  the  gradual 
elimination  of  preferential  arrangements  in  com- 
modity trade  and  the  drastic  reduction  of  re- 
straints on  consumption,  such  as  tariffs  and 
specific  excise  taxes  on  coffee,  cocoa,  and  tea.  In- 
sofar as  possible  we  seek  free,  nondiscriminatory 
commodity  trade  to  increase  markets  for  primary 
producers.  The  recently  enacted  Trade  Expan- 
sion Act  authorizes  us  to  remove  our  duties  on 
tropical  products  if  our  Atlantic  partner,  the 
European  Economic  Community,  will  do  likewise; 
it  also  authorizes  us  otherwise  to  negotiate  for 
reduction  of  trade  restrictions,  and  we  anticipate 
acliievement  of  broad  reciprocal  concessions. 

Then  too  we  have  already  negotiated  a  textile 
agreement"  which,  while  it  protects  American 
manufactures  from  a  disrupting  flood  of  textile 
imports,  also  provides  for  a  gradual  expansion  of 
markets  in  Europe  and  here  for  the  textile  exports 
of  developing  countries. 

Global'Solutions  to  Commodity  Problems 

Our  efforts  to  obtain  the  gradual  removal  of 
trade  restrictions  and  preferential  marketing  ar- 
rangements should  be  of  particular  interest  to 
African  countries.  As  you  know,  the  African 
states  which  have  associated  themselves  with  the 
European  Common  Market  have  duty-free  access 
into  this  market  for  their  coffee,  cocoa,  oilseeds, 
and  other  products  while  other  producers  of  these 
products,  including  Liberia,  Ethiopia,  Tangan- 
yika, and  Nigeria,  are  faced  with  the  EEC's  com- 
mon external  tariff.  For  two  key  products- 
coffee  and  cocoa — the  eventual  common  external 
tariff,  originally  scheduled  to  be  in  full  effect  by 
1970,  had  been  set  at  16  percent  and  9  percent 
respectively.  I  am  pleased  to  say,  however,  that, 
as  a  result  of  progress  made  thus  far  in  the  re- 
negotiation of  the  Association  Convention  which 
expires  at  the  end  of  this  year,  the  common  ex- 
ternal tariff  on  coffee  and  cocoa  appears  likely  to 
be  cut  by  40  percent,  effective  in  1964.  We  wel- 
come this  prospective  cut  as  a  significant  step  to- 
ward the  eventual  elimination  of  tariffs  on  coffee, 
cocoa,  and  all  tropical  products. 


'  For  background,  see  Buixetin  of  Oct.  15,  1962,  p.  .566. 
620 


The  interest  of  the  United  States  in  pressing  fo 
the  gradual  phasing  out  of  preferences  rests  o 
two  convictions  on  our  part.  First,  preferentia 
arrangements  give  the  exports  of  a  few  develop 
ing  nations  an  artificial  advantage  over  other  de 
veloping  countries.  We  cannot  limit  our  concer 
to  the  exports  of  a  few  countries.  We  mus 
strengthen  or,  if  necessary,  create  institutions  ani 
mechanisms  which  permit  the  expansion  of  all  les 
developed  country  exports  on  equally  beneficia 
terms.  Second,  we  doubt  that  the  permanent  re 
tention  of  preferences  is  in  the  longrun  interest  o 
the  producing  country  supposedly  benefiting  b; 
them.  Rather  the  industrialization  and  diversi 
fication  of  the  national  African  economies  wil 
over  time  be  promoted  by  the  substitution  fo 
sheltered  markets  of  a  world  competitive  markef 

Commodity  exports  are  a  vital  source  of  foreigi 
exchange  for  Africa,  but  they  are  also  importan 
in  terms  of  the  structure  and  growth  potential  o 
the  various  national  economies.  Measures  de 
signed  to  maximize  export  earnings  must  no 
jeopardize  the  ultimate  economic  growth  and  po 
litical  stability  of  the  producing  nation.  To  citi 
a  particularly  painful  case  for  the  United  Statei 
of  imdesirable  commodity  measures,  I  do  not  thinl 
the  long-term  economic  and  political  growth  o: 
Cuba  was  enhanced  by  the  sugar  premiums  it  re 
ceived  in  the  American  market  even  though  thest 
premiums  had  a  substantial  foreign  exchangf 
value.  In  retrospect  it  appears  that  this  incentivt 
for  sugar  production  may  have  been  one  factor 
discouraging  the  growth  of  a  more  balanced  and 
industrialized  economy  with  better  prospects  oi 
developing  viable  free  political  institutions. 

Nor  do  I  believe  that  the  development  of  the 
Ivoi-y  Coast  and  various  other  African  states  will 
be  advanced  in  the  long  run  by  the  indefinite  re- 
ceipt of  premium  prices  and  other  forms  of  prefer- 
ential treatment  in  the  French  market  or  in  tlie 
European  Common  Market. 

In  line  with  our  conviction  that  special  arrange- 
ments are  self-defeating  in  the  long  run,  the' 
United  States  has  pointed  out  to  Latin  American 
nations  that  in  our  view  purely  regional  conmiod- 
ity  arrangements  would  not  be  in  their  interests. 
Rather  we  tend  to  seek  global  solutions  for  trade 
and  commodity  problems.  We  do  recognize,  how- 
ever, that  care  must  be  exercised  in  the  transition 
from  the  present  preferential  systems  to  a  more» 
durable  arrangement  for  trade  in  primary  com- 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


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odities — and  especially  tropical  products.  I 
lerefore  want  to  repeat  here  the  assurance  we 
ave  given  those  African  nations  now  inside  pref - 
rential  systems. 

We  are  not  "takuig  sides"  between  developing 
ations ;  we  are  not  interested  in  the  development 

|f  one  nation  or  region  at  the  expense  of  another 
ation  or  region.    We  are  equally  concerned  with 

;  lie  development  of  the  Ivory  Coast,  Nigeria,  and 
Jrazil — and  of  Senegal,  Tanganyika,  Indonesia, 
nd  Colombia.    The  United  States  is  aware  that 


resto 

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lie  gradual  phasing  out  of  duties  and  other  pref- 
rential  arrangements  must  generally  be  cushioned 
y  adjustment  measures  to  provide  at  least  equiva- 
mt  benefits  to  Africans,  including  acceptable 
afeguards.  The  development  prospects  of  na- 
ions  now  inside  preferential  systems  must  not 
e  jeopardized  in  the  course  of  abolishing  prefer- 
ntial  arrangements.    Our  task  is  to  find  arrange- 


nents  alternative  to  preferences  which  will  help  to 

issure  all  developing  nations  equivalent  export  op- 

'     )ortunities  and  which  will  provide  the  maximum 

,  '.  esources  and  incentives  to  speed  the  creation  of 

^     liversified  and  industrialized  economies.     These 

iltemative  devices  must  necessarily  link  the  flow 

if  economic  assistance  from  industrialized  to  de- 

^eloping  countries  with  our  efforts  to  stabilize 

""  !ommodity   prices   and   to   improve   commodity 

'  rade  arrangements. 

There  is  one  final  point  which,  although  it  is 
'"'"  jometimes  embarrassing  to  industrialized  nations, 
ncluding  the  United  States,  cannot  be  ignored  in 
*"'  m  analysis  of  commodity  problems.    This  is  the 
'^ "  question  of  import  restrictions  and  other  devices 
such  as  internal  taxes  which  curtail  export  mar- 
'' '"  iets  for  primary  commodities.     The  United  States 
™  imposes  import  quotas  on  petroleum,  lead,  zinc,  and 
'f-^  peanuts^to  mention  a  few  key  commodities.     It 
rf'f  is  difficult  for  us  to  ask  other  nations  to  take  the 
often  painful  steps  involved  in,  for  example,  cur- 
tailing coffee  production  or  dismantling  preferen- 
M-'t  tial  devices  when  we  ourselves  retreat,  on  occasion, 
lii'  behind  import  quotas.    We  in  the  United  States, 
s'  too,  must  face  our  worldwide  responsibilities  of 
working  out  the  most  effective  global  arrange- 
ments for  commodity  trade. 

I  also  want  to  emphasize  that  we  recognize  the 
complexity  of  commodity  problems  as  well  as  the 
importance  of  commodity  trade  to  developing 
countries.  We  are  exploring  new  techniques— and 
are  willing  to  consider  any  proposals  which  may  be 


iraJi 


advanced — which  promise  to  stimulate  the  long- 
term  economic  growth  of  developing  nations. 

Finally,  if  primary  commodity  export  markets 
are  to  expand,  if  market  forces  are  indeed  to  play 
their  optimima  roles,  it  is  important  that  the  in- 
dustrial countries  of  the  Atlantic  community  and 
elsewhere  maintain  full  employment  and  achieve 
more  rapid  economic  gi-owth.  Clearly,  if  our 
economy  is  expanding  rapidly,  it  will  be  far  easier 
for  us  to  follow  more  liberal  trading  practices  and 
to  provide  markets  not  only  for  the  primary  prod- 
ucts of  African  nations  but  for  their  nascent  in- 
dustries as  well.  In  the  long  run,  to  our  success 
in  maintaining  a  competitive,  flexible,  and  healthy 
American  and  Atlantic  economy  is  linked  the  eco- 
nomic well-being  and  freedom  of  Africa  as  well. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

87th  Congress,  2d  Session 

United  States  Defense  Policies  in  1961.    Study  prepared 
by  Charles  H.  Donnelly,  Library  of  Congress.    H.  Doc. 
502.    June  7, 1962.    1T3  pp. 
Operation  of  Article  VII,  NATO  Status  of  Forces  Treaty : 
Hearing   before  a   subcommittee   of  the    Senate   Com- 
mittee on  Armed  Services  on  operation  of  article  VII 
of  the  agreement  for  the  period  December  1,  1960, 
through  November  30,  1961.    August  27,  1962.    42  pp. 
Report  of   the   Senate  Committee  on  Armed   Services 
made  by  its  subcommittee  on  the  operation  of  article 
VII.     S.  Kept.  2122.     September  25,  1962.     15  pp. 
Foreign   Radio    Stations.     Hearing   before  the   Subcom- 
mittee on  Communications  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Commerce  on  S.  3252.     August  29,  1962.     29  pp. 
Situation  in  Cuba.     Hearing  before  the  Senate  Commit- 
tees on  Foreign  Relations  and  Armed  Services  on  S.J. 
Res   226,  S.J.  Res.  227,  S.  Con.  Res.  92,  S.  Res.  388,  S. 
Res.  389,  and  S.  Res.  390.     September  17,  1962.     117  pp. 
Report  of  the  Special  Subcommittee  on  Defense  of  South- 
eastern United  States  of  the  House  Committee  on  Armed 
Services.     [No.  73]  September  17,  1962.    3  pp. 
Interest  Rates  on  Foreign  Official  Time  Deposits : 
Hearing  before  the  Senate  Committee  on  Banking  and 
Currency  on  H.R.  12080  and  S.  1413,  biUs  to  permit 
domestic  banks  to  pay  interest  on  time  deposits  of 
foreign   governments   at  rates   differing  from   those 
applicable    to   domestic   depositors.      September    18, 
1962.    63  pp. 
Reports  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Banking  and  Cur- 
rency to  accompany  H.R.  12080,  together  with  minority 
and  supplemental  views.    S.  Kept.  2115,  September  20, 
1962,  11  pp. ;  S.  Rept.  2191,  September  28,  1962,  11 
pp. 
Agency  for   International  Development,   Contract   Oper- 
ations.    Office  of  Research,  Evaluation  and  Planning 
Assistance  Staff.     23d  and  26th  reports  by  the  House 
Committee  on  Government  Operations.     Part  1,   Sep- 
tember 19,  1962,  21  pp. ;  Part  2,  September  26,  1962,  16 
pp. 


WlOcfober  22,  1962 


621 


Toward  an  Open  Scientific  Community 


hy  Glenn  T.  Seaborg 

Chairman,  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Comm,ission  '■ 


I  want  to  speak  briefly  today  concerning  tlie 
value  of  the  free  exchange  of  ideas  in  science — 
among  individuals  and  nations.  This  discussion 
will  lead  me  to  consider  the  mternational  program 
of  cooperation  in  nuclear  science  and  technology 
fostered  by  the  United  States  and  its  importance 
in  the  context  of  an  open  scientific  community. 
How  the  U.S.  international  program  derives  sub- 
stance from  our  domestic  program  of  research, 
development,  and  teclmology  must  be  taken  into 
accoimt,  as  well  as  the  forces  and  circumstances 
that  moved  us  to  work  toward  a  greater  degree  of 
free  commimication  in  the  scientific  world. 

Neither  science  nor  democracy  can  thrive  as  a 
closed  system.  Each  year  tlais  principle  finds  new 
validation.  The  enlarging  concepts  of  the  Orga- 
nization for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment (OECD)  and  the  Common  Market  are  cur- 
rent examples.  Their  emergence  and  growth  have 
broken  barriers  of  long  standing  with  beneficial 
results  that  we  all  recognize — an  improved  stand- 
ard of  living  in  Europe  and  a  new  sense  of  free- 
dom and  confidence. 

Freedom  in  science,  as  we  know,  made  its  way 
painfully  during  the  early  periods  of  its  growth. 
His  successors  must  often  have  repeated  in  a 
different  way  the  stubborn  whisper  of  Galileo: 
"And  yet,  it  moves!"  But  obstacles  have  been 
removed  and  fears  allayed.  The  achievements 
that  made  nuclear  teclmology  feasible  at  the  be- 
ginning of  World  War  II  were  not  the  closely  held 
secrets  of  any  small  gi'oup.  They  were  not  the 
work  of  a  single  country. 

In  the  truest  sense,  the  program  of  nuclear 


'  Address  made  upon  receipt  of  the  "Swedish-American 
of  the  Tear"  award  for  1962  at  Stockholm,  Sweden,  on 
Sept.  16. 

622 


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science  and  teclmology  in  the  United  States  de 
veloped  as  an  effort  of  international  scientific  co 
operation  never  before  conceivable.  But  thougl: 
eminent  men  from  many  countries  participated 
the  nature  of  this  cooperation  had  altered  radicallj 
from  the  traditional  freedom  of  exchange  across 
international  boundaries  prevailing  before  Work 
War  II.  Immediate  threats  to  the  society  of  fret 
nations  required  a  stringent  compartmentaliza- 
tion.  The  desperation  of  our  effort  to  preserve 
freedom  limited,  for  a  time  at  least,  our  own 
freedom  as  scientists. 

As  one  of  the  scientists  engaged  in  work  of  the 
Manhattan  Project,  I  can  assure  you  that  we  -i" 
looked  forward  to  the  day  when  we  could  speak  P 
freely  again,  not  only  with  our  associates  in  the  ^'^ 
United  States  but  with  all  scientists  and  without  fe" 
regard  for  nationality  or  boundary.  For  the  first 
time,  many  of  us  found  ourselves  expressing-f), 
strong  opinions,  vohmtarily  or  at  the  request  of 
leading  men  in  our  Government,  concerning  the 
use  to  which  the  results  of  our  labors  should  be 
put.  Long  before  the  war  had  reached  its  con- 
clusion, scientists,  imder  the  leadership  of  men 
like  Bush  and  Conant,  had  stated  their  conviction 
that  the  United  States  must  do  its  utmost  to  ex- 
tend the  benefits  of  nuclear  science  to  the  whole' 
community  of  mankind.  A  major  corollary  of 
this  view  was  the  thesis  that  freedom  of  commu- 
nication must  be  restored  insofar  as  practicable] 
and  as  rapi  dly  as  possible.  ^^ 

We  were  most  of  us  young  men  and  perhaps  ;|j 
for  that  reason  overoptimistic  in  belie\Tng  ouri  j; 
goals  could  be  achieved  at  once.  But  we  certainly:  |,j 
were  not  wrong  in  our  conviction  that  free  ex-j 
change  is  basic  to  scientific  growth.  The  mixei 
results  of  the  gigantically  organized  wartime  ef' 


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Department  of  State  Bulletin 


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oris,  with  all  their  distortions  and  constrictions, 
>n  the  one  hand  impressed  us  with  the  mushroom 
rowth  of  technical  facilities  and  laboratories 
lolding  great  potential  for  the  future  of  science, 
,nd  on  the  other  with  the  rather  sparse  gains  in 
imdamental  knowledge.  At  any  rate  we  were 
ager  to  explore  new  potentialities. 
I  need  not  recount  the  Iiistory  of  the  postwar 
ears.  Hopes  of  turning  great  gains  made  in  the 
luclear  field  toward  the  solution  of  major  human 
)roblems  were  for  a  while  dimmed  by  fears  for 
uture  security.  The  first  legal  framework  creat- 
ng  an  atomic  energy  program  in  the  United 
States  was  a  product  of  the  disillusionment  result- 
ng  from  our  futile  efforts  to  secure  international 
ontrol  and  at  the  same  time  a  recognition  of  the 
eed  for  maintaming  some  degree  of  security  in 
n  uneasy  world. 
The  depth  of  this  pessimism,  even  as  late  as 
952,  is  reflected  in  one  of  Dr.  Conant's  Bampton 

icr(^jctures  on  "Modern  Science  and  Modem  Man": 
The  world  being  what  it  is  today  and  is  likely  to 
e  for  a  long  time  to  come,  secrecy  and  applied 

alizaluclear  physics  are  words  that  must  be  joined  to- 
gether." "But,"  he  goes  on  to  say,  "it  is  of  the 
itmost  importance  that  the  general  public  under- 
tand  the  consequences  of  this  union.  .  .  .  Ad- 
ances  in  science  are  difficult  witliin  a  secret  na- 
,vi  ional  monopoly  because  necessarily  its  research  is 
yarded  from  all  but  a  few  branches  of  the  gov- 
mment.  Secrecy  and  science  are  fundamentally 
ntithetic  propositions." 


siBj  I.S.  Determination  To  Restore  Scientific  Freedom 

So  wise  a  man  as  Conant  proved  too  pessimistic 


eilii  r^  i^is  judgment  that  restoration  of  freedom  in 
'"  uclear    science    would   be   delayed   indefinitely. 

^hough  encouraging  prospects  for  international 
iM'  ontrol  were  no  less  remote,  our  conviction  grew 
ifii»'  tronger  that  the  United  States  must  secure  for 
10  K  ;self  and  other  well-intentioned  nations  the  bene- 
M  ts  of  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy — including 
rv  oi  lie  renewal  of  an  open,  as  opposed  to  a  restricted, 

ystem  of  scientific  cooperation. 
An  early  public  statement  of  this  new  determi- 

ation  came  in  former  President  Eisenhower's 

ddress  to  the  U.N.  Assembly  on  December  8, 
g  oil  953,^  proposing  an  Atoms  for  Peace  Progi-am  and 
tainl;  le  establishment  of  an  international  agency  to 
sex  romote  peaceful  application  of  atomic  energy. 
mijei 
lef 


"  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  21,  1953,  p.  847. 


0  htober  22,   7962 


In  the  rapid  developments  that  followed,  plans 
were  laid  for  the  first  Geneva  conference  on  peace- 
ful uses  of  atomic  energy.  Congress  acted  during 
the  latter  part  of  1954  to  pass  the  first  complete 
revision  of  the  statutoi-y  charter  of  the  U.S. 
Atomic  Energy  Commission  since  its  establish- 
ment in  1946.  By  this  act,  Atoms  for  Peace  be- 
came the  basic  U.S.  nuclear  policy. 

At  hand  and  waiting  for  just  such  develop- 
ments were  the  resources  of  wartime  and  succeed- 
ing years'  nuclear  progress.  The  first  Geneva 
conference  in  1955  will  stand  as  a  signal  point 
marked  by  its  voluminous  declassification  of  sci- 
entific information  gained  during  the  war  years. 
There  the  nations  came  together  to  witness  con- 
crete evidence  of  what  nuclear  science,  shared  in 
large  measure,  could  do  for  the  world's  future 
social  and  economic  development. 

In  addition  to  its  participation  in  the  first  Ge- 
neva conference,  the  United  States  took  further 
important  steps,  domestically  and  internationally, 
to  introduce  and  accelerate  the  peaceful  uses  of 
nuclear  energy.  The  resources  of  the  U.S.  Atomic 
Energy  Commission  in  information,  equipment 
and  facilities,  and  organization  were  turned  to 
the  stimulation  of  domestic  programs  based  on 
the  peaceful  uses  of  radioisotopes,  reactor  tech- 
nology, and  other  phases  of  research  and  develop- 
ment in  the  nuclear  field. 

Radioisotopes  introduced  into  medical  research 
and  diagnosis  proved  to  be  a  spectacular  success. 
It  was  not  simply  that  these  radioisotopes  pro- 
vided convenient  sources  of  radiation  undreamed 
of  in  the  days  when  we  were  limited  to  X-ray 
equipment  and  minute  quantities  of  radium  but 
that  these  sources  were  now  available  in  the  widest 
possible  range  and  variety  of  types.  This  door 
has  been  opened  wide,  at  home  and  abroad.  Pro- 
duction facilities  in  the  United  States  eliminated 
any  question  of  sufficient  quantities  of  radioiso- 
topes wherever  the  need  might  be.  The  opening 
of  such  AEC  training  facilities  as  the  Oak  Eidge 
Institute  of  Nuclear  Studies'  courses  in  radioiso- 
topes tecliniques  to  hundreds  of  foreign  students 
erased  any  doubt  that  the  techniques  for  their  use 
would  be  widely  disseminated.  If  there  were  more 
time,  I  should  like  to  discuss  in  detail  the  recent 
developments  in  the  applications  of  radioisotopes 
in  agriculture,  medicme,  and  industry  and  their 
exciting  new  applications  as  sources  of  power  in 
space. 

For  the  production  of  special  nuclear  materials 


623 


needed  in  the  development  of  nuclear  power  re- 
actors and  nuclear  marine  propulsion,  the  U.S. 
Atomic  Energy  Commission  had  the  immense 
capabilities  of  its  production  facilities.  Materials 
and  information  were  made  available  to  our 
industry  to  begin  a  program  of  research  and  de- 
velopment of  unparalleled  diversity  in  power  re- 
actor technology.  The  results  of  this  program  and 
similar  etforts  in  otlier  countries  are  now  such  that 
civilian  nuclear  power  needed  so  sorely  in  many 
areas,  including  a  number  of  the  lesser  developed 
countries,  appears  to  be  within  reach.  As  early  as 
1955  the  United  States  had  announced  its  willing- 
ness to  provide  nuclear  materials  to  other  nations 
for  peaceful  research  and  power  uses.  The  early 
offers  have  recently  been  broadened  and  extended. 

Education  and  Training  Facilities 

Underlying  these  and  other  efforts  in  the  Atoms 
for  Peace  Program,  the  Commission's  provision 
of  education  and  training  facilities  has  been  and 
continues  to  be  of  fundamental  importance.  At 
the  national  laboratories— Oak  Ridge,  Argonne, 
and  Brookliaven — the  AEC  opened  its  schools. 
The  training  of  foreign  nationals  in  such  phases 
of  nuclear  science  and  technology  as  reactor  haz- 
ards evaluation,  reactor  operations  supervision, 
industrial  uses  of  radioisotopes,  the  administra- 
tion of  nuclear  energy  programs,  and  research  at 
the  postdoctoral  level  has  been  in  progress  for 
several  years.  Foreign  alumni  of  these  schools 
have  furnished  the  key  staff  members  at  the  in- 
ception of  a  number  of  national  nuclear  energy 
programs. 

Other  means  of  disseminating  and  exchanging 
information  have  also  contributed  to  the  further- 
ance of  the  Atoms  for  Peace  Program.  AEC's 
program  of  exhibits,  including  its  major  exhibits 
at  the  Geneva  conferences,  the  dispatching  of 
technical  missions  abroad,  the  participation  of 
countless  scientists  and  engineers  in  various  spe- 
cialized conferences  and  symposia,  the  exchange 
of  technical  papers,  periodicals,  and  books,  and 
the  provision  of  experts  and  consultants  to  advise 
in  their  fields  of  competence — all  of  these  are  sig- 
nificant and  fruitful  activities. 

There  must,  of  course,  be  made  available  to  the 
scientist  in  any  field  the  essential  tools  of  his 
trade — laboratory  space,  equipment,  instrumenta- 
tion, supplies,  and  materials.    In  direct  projects 


624 


lliiiij 
lary, 


of  bilateral  assistance  and  through  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency,  the  United  States 
has  helped  to  furnish  laboratory  equipment  and 
research  reactors  wliere  such  needs  could  be  iden- 
tified. Laboratory-to-laboratory  partnerships 
have  also  made  a  beginning  in  such  arrangements 
as  the  one  between  our  Brookhaven  National  Lab- 1*"' 
oratory  and  the  Turkish  Nuclear  Energy  Center. 
I  have  spoken  thus  far  largely  in  terms  of  activ- 
ities carried  out  under  the  U.S.  Atoms  for  Peace 
Program.  The  essential  fact  is  that  this  program 
has  been  carried  out  with  the  help  of  other  free 
nations.  At  present  the  United  States  has  38  effec- 
tive agreements  for  cooperation  in  the  civil  uses  [( 
of  atomic  energy  with  36  countries. 

Cooperation  between  the  United  States  and 
Sweden  in  the  peaceful  uses  of  atomic  energy. 
for  example,  is  provided  for  in  an  agreement  that 
first  became  effective  in  January  1956.^  The  agree- 
ment has  been  amended  on  later  occasions  to  jictivi 
broaden  its  provisions  for  the  transfer  of  special 
nuclear  materials  between  our  two  countries,  ir 
terms  of  both  quantity  and  degree  of  enrichment. 
"We  feel  that  the  continuing  activities  conducted 
under  this  research  agreement  for  cooperation 
have  been  mutually  helpful. 

U.S.  cooperation  with  the  European  Atomic 
Energy  Community  (EURATOM)  in  two  major 
programs — one  for  the  construction  of  power  re- 
actors, the  other  for  research  and  development 
related  to  the  power  projects  accepted  under  the 
joint  power  program — is  expected  to  be  of  increas- 
ing significance  to  the  furtherance  of  nuclear 
power  in  Europe.  Our  technical  exchanges  with 
EURATOM  and  the  European  Nuclear  Energy 
Agency  of  the  OECD  are  certainly  of  great  im- 
portance to  ourselves  and  our  partners.  On  a 
more  modest  scale,  the  United  States  has  encour- 
aged certain  regional  cooperation  among  the  Latin 
American  countries  tlirough  the  Inter- American 
Nuclear  Energy  Commission  of  the  Organization 
of  American  States. 

In  this  much  oversimplified  account  I  have 
necessarily  stressed  the  cooperative  activities  ol 
the  United  States,  leaving  out  of  my  story  the 
many  interesting  and  effective  projects  engaged 
in  by  other  nations  bilaterally  and  multilaterally 


:oifarc 


rirhie 
irithi 
mi 
'.mi 

mbli 


latei 
n 
ions 
mid 
md 
)ften 

BOl 

Tl 

mti 
)fS 

m 
ii 
Igfi 
im 
ipi 
i 
utii 
!it| 
mil 
\k 
Jali 
itea 
'A 
fon 


throughout  the  world. 


I  have  yet  to  discuss  the 


•Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  347T, 
3775,  and  4035. 


PIOJ 

pjtl 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  '* 


enj  Jiternational  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  Yet  I 
itate  hink  you  will  agree,  even  on  the  basis  of  this  sum- 
:a!ii  nary,  that  in  less  than  a  dozen  years  important 
strides  have  been  taken  in  the  atomic  energy  field 
sliin  oward  the  goal  of  an  open  scientific  community. 

Lai)  nternational  Atomic  Energy  Agency 

inter, 


use 


lis 


glleK 


There  are  still  great  impediments  to  achieving 
he  potential  benefits  of  open  and  complete  co- 
peration  in  worldwide  scientific  development, 
o^lrhe  East  and  West  continue  to  disagree  as  to  the 
irtues  of  openness.  But  even  here  we  liave  met 
M  vith  encouraging  progress.  As  was  intended  be- 
"ore  its  establishment,  the  International  Atomic 
energy  Agency  has  provided  a  meeting  place  for 
he  great  majority  of  nations  interested  in  the 
«g  »roblems  and  promises  of  nuclear  energy.  In  this 
;tlii  'orum  such  important  questions  as  the  proper 
?ra  aethods  and  standards  for  disposal  of  radio- 
ctive  waste  materials,  the  safeguarding  of  nuclear 
tiaterials  against  diversion  to  military  use,  and 
he  negotiation  and  adoption  of  liability  conven- 
ions  indemnifying  against  harm  from  nuclear 
ncidents  have  been  discussed  and  steps  taken  to- 
vard  answering  them.  The  progress  is  slow  and 
ften  beset  with  difficulties  and  conflicts,  but  it 
s  nonetheless  worth  our  best  efforts. 
The  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  has 
rganized  a  remarkably  competent  staff,  and  it  will 
ontinue  to  progress  under  the  inspired  leadership 
f  Sigvard  Eklund.  The  Agency  has  produced 
aluable  studies  of  the  nuclear  energy  needs  of 
aember  states  and  recommended  appropriate  ways 
if  meeting  those  needs.  The  prospects  for  the 
Agency's  active  encouragement  of  nuclear  power 
levelopments  among  member  states  have  recently 
tnproved. 

And  beyond  their  cooperative  work  in  the  Inter- 
lational  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  nations  of  the 
Cast  and  West  have  made  some  limited  assaults 
n  the  communications  barriers  that  separate  them. 
?he  United  States  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  So- 
ialist  Republics  have  been  able  to  identify  certain 
Teas  of  mutual  interest  in  nuclear  science  and 
echnology  and  have  engaged  in  exchanges  of  in- 
ormation  and  visits.  We  have  discussed  the  pos- 
ibility  of  cooperating  in  an  international 
)roject — the  consti'uction  of  a  very-high-energy 
)article  accelerator  too  expensive  to  be  readily 
Ludertaken  by  any  nation  acting  independently. 
What  vector  could  be  taken  as  the  summation 


;rr« 

■nil 
;refi 


ml 
cerg) 
liiii 
Oni 
icoif 
Litii 

;riKlI 

::uioi 

Ttill 


aH 


of  these  various  significant  developments  I  have 
described?  The  result,  it  seems  to  me,  points  in- 
evitably in  the  direction  of  further  enlarging  the 
freedom  to  communicate  within  the  international 
scientific  community.  The  benefits  already  real- 
ized from  such  enlargement  as  we  have  experienced 
point  to  the  wisdom  of  great  openness. 

Wliat  is  not  so  clearly  realized,  I  am  afraid,  is 
the  danger  faced  by  all  of  us — whatever  the  bent 
of  our  politics — should  international  freedom  not 
be  achieved  for  science.  The  advent  of  nuclear 
energy's  awesome  force  has  been  the  most  challeng- 
ing— and  terrifying — incident  of  modern  times. 
But  I  would  maintain  there  are  other  realities 
growing  out  of  our  increased  knowledge  and  tech- 
nical advancement  that  cry  out  just  as  forcefully 
for  full  and  accurate  communication  of  scientific 
knowledge  among  nations. 

We  have  every  reason,  if  we  are  concerned  not 
only  for  man's  future  prosperity  but  for  his  sur- 
vival as  a  participant  in  terrestrial  ecology,  to 
insist  on  sharing  our  knowledge  with  others  and 
having  them  share  it  with  us.  We  have  no  other 
way. 

Among  nations,  as  among  individuals,  where 
there  is  trust,  encouragement  of  the  greatest  free- 
dom of  communication  is  not  inconsistent  with 
respect  for  privacy  and  the  right  of  every  nation 
to  maintain  the  best  aspects  of  its  individuality 
as  a  nation.  We  hope  to  see  this  community  of 
trust  enlarged  and  the  opportunities  to  speak 
freely  with  each  other  correspondingly  increased. 

We  seek  such  a  community  because  we  wish 
everyone  to  share  in  the  benefits  of  greater  knowl- 
edge. We  seek  it  also  because  we  believe  that,  in 
this  age,  any  world  in  which  we  speak  less  than 
freely  will  be  a  dangerous  world. 

I,  for  one,  believe  we  shall  have  an  increasingly 
open  world — in  science  as  in  other  aspects  of  life. 
I  share  in  the  stubborn  optimism  of  Robert  Frost 
when  he  says : 

"Take  nature  altogether  since  time  began, 
Including  human  nature,  in  peace  and  war, 
And  it  must  be  a  little  more  in  favor  of  man. 
Say  a  fraction  of  one  per  cent  at  the  very  least, 
Or  the  number  living  wouldn't  be  steadily  more. 
Our  hold  on  the  j)lanet  wouldn't  have  so  in- 
creased." * 


October  22,   1962 


*  From  "Our  Hold  on  the  Planet"  from  Complete  Poems 
of  Robert  Frost,  copyright  1&42  by  Robert  Frost ;  reprinted 
by  permission  of  Holt  Rinehart  and  Winston,  Inc. 

625 


Indian  Group  Calls  for  Cessation 
of  Nuclear  Testing  in  Atmosphere 

White  Ilouse  press  release  dated  September  28 

A  dcle<ration  representing  the  Gandhi  Peace 
Foundation,  consisting  of  the  former  Governor 
General  of  India,  Mr.  C.  Rajagopalachari,  Mr.  R. 
R.  Diwakar,  and  Mr.  B.  Shiva  Rao,  met  -with  the 
President  on  September  28  to  present  an  appeal 
on  behalf  of  the  foundation.  While  suegestina: 
that  all  efforts  should  be  made  to  ban  all  nuclear 
weapons,  the  appeal  calls  immediately  for  the 
cessation  of  testing  of  nuclear  weapons  in  the 
atmosphere. 

In  responding  to  the  delegation's  appeal,  the 
President  agreed  with  Mr.  Rajagopalachari  on  the 
urgent  necessity  to  bring  about  an  agreed  end  to 
nuclear  weapons  testing.  Tlie  President  said  tlie 
United  States  is  prepared  to  come  to  an  agree- 
ment today  to  ban  tests  in  the  atmospliere  or  in  the 
water,  if  it  is  impossible  to  get  agreement  to  ban 
all  tests.  He  expressed  the  belief  that  such  an 
agreement,  in  addition  to  ending  any  further 
radioactive  pollution  of  the  atmospliere,  would 
represent  a  significant  forward  step  toward  curb- 
ing the  arms  race. 

The  delegation  suggested  that  if  an  agreement 
is  unobtainable  the  United  States  should  make  a 
unilateral  declaration  that  it  would  cease  tests  in 
the  atmosphere.  The  President  mentioned  the 
difficulty  of  a  proposal  of  this  sort  because  of  the 
previous  Soviet  breach  of  the  moratorium. 

The  President  and  Mr.  Rajagopalachari  in  tlieir 
frank  and  friendly  conversation  also  agreed  that 
early  action  should  be  taken  to  reduce  the  threat 
of  war  wliich  nuclear  and  other  weapons  of  mass 
destruction  now  pose.  The  President  pointed  out 
in  this  regard  the  present  U.S.  disarmament  pro- 
posals addreas  themselves  to  this  key  area  of  con- 
cern. The  delegation  expressed  the  hope  that  the 
United  Nations  would  pass  a  resolution  calling 
upon  all  nations  to  ban  nuclear  tests  in  tlie  atmos- 
pliere. The  President  said  the  United  States 
would  respond  favorably  to  such  a  resolution. 

Tlie  President  expressed  his  great  appreciation 
to  the  Indian  delegation  for  their  long  voj-age  to 
the  United  States  in  the  cause  of  peace  and  stated 
that  the  people  of  the  United  States  and  India  are 
united  in  their  hope  for  world  peace. 

Earlier  in  the  day  the  delegation  was  received 
by  William  C.  Foster,  Director  of  the  U.S.  Arms 
Control  and  Disarmament  Agency. 

626 


ictioi 
ilei 

K« 

iTe( 

in 
I 
tilM 


President  Provides  for  Administration 
of  Cotton  Textile  Arrangement 

AN  EXECUTIVE   ORDER' 
Cotton  Textiles  and  Cotton  Textile  Pkoducts 

B.V  virtue  of  the  authority  vested  in  me  by  Section  204 
of  the  Agricultural  Act  of  1950,  as  amended  (7  U.S.C. 
1854;  P.L.  87^88,  76  Stat.  104),  and  Section  301  of  Title 
3  of  the  United  States  Code,  and  as  President  of  the 
United  States,  it  is  ordered  as  follows : 

Section  1.  The  President's  Cabinet  Textile  Advisory 
Committee,  consisting  of  the  Secretaries  of  State,  the 
Treasury,  Agriculture,  Commerce,  and  Labor  with  the 
Secretary  of  Commerce  as  Chairman,  shall  exercise  super- 
vision over  the  administration  of  the  Long  Term  Arrange- 
ment Regarding  Trade  in  Cotton  Textiles '  done  at  Geneva 
on  February  9,  1962,  and  shall  advise  generally  with  re- 
spect to  problems  relating  to  textiles. 

Sec.  2.  (a)  The  President's  Cabinet  Textile  Advisory 
Committee  shall  establish  a  subcommittee  to  be  known  as 
the  Interagency  Textile  Administrative  Committee  as  a 
successor  to  the  Interagency  Textile  Administrative  Com- 
mittee established  October  18,  1961.'  It  shall  be  located, 
for  administrative  purposes,  at  the  Department  of  Com- 
merce, and  shall  be  under  the  Chairmanship  of  a  designee 
of  the  Secretary  of  Commerce.  This  Committee  shall  be 
composed  of  the  Chairman  and  one  representative  each 
from  the  Departments  of  State,  Treasury,  Agriculture,  and 
Labor. 

(b)  The  Interagency  Textile  Administrative  Committee 
shall  recommend  actions  to  be  taken  by  appropriate 
officials  and  agencies  of  the  United  States  Government 
with  regard  to  the  rights  and  obligations  of  the  United 
States  under  the  Long  Term  Arrangement  and  with  re- 
gard to  such  other  matters  relating  to  textiles  as  may  be 
referred  to  it  by  the  President's  Cabinet  Textile  Advisory 
Committee.  In  the  event  of  disagreement  within  the 
Interagency  Textile  Administrative  Committee  with  re- 
spect to  a  proposed  recommendation,  it  shall  be  reviewed 
and  determined  by  the  President's  Cabinet  Textile  Ad- 
visor.v  Committee. 

Sec.  3.  The  Secretary  of  State,  after  consultation  with 
the  President's  Cabinet  Textile  Advisory  Committee  in 
respect  of  relevant  policies,  shall  undertake  the  negotia- 
tions contemplated  by  the  Long  Term  Arrangement,  in- 
cluding bilateral  textile  agreements.  The  Secretary  of  j(lj|)l| 
State  shall  designate  an  official  of  the  Department  of 
State  to  be  Chairman  of  the  United  States  delegation  to 
the  Cotton  Textiles  Committee  established  by  the  Con- 
tracting Parties  to  the  General  Agreement  on  TarifTs  and 
Trade,  and  shall  request  the  Secretaries  of  Commerce 
and  Labor  each  to  appoint  a  representative  of  his  Depart- 
ment to  serve  on  the  delegation. 

Sec.  4.  The  Commissioner  of  Customs  shall  take  such 


ieci 
idit 

Mi 

Thi 

:on»r 
%i 
lisk 
mire 
:il 
mr, 
Kciei 

BlltliJ 

istii 


ttetu 


'No.  1]0.'')2:  27  Fed.  Reg.  9691. 

'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Mar.  12, 1902,  p.  431. 


'  For  a  memorandum  from  President  Kennedy  to  the  ^^ 


Secretaries  of  State,  Commerce,  and  Labor,  see  ibid.,  Nov. 
6,  1961,  p.  773. 


Department  of  Stale  Bulletin  ^^^. 


Br. 
liivel 

Atr 
i(to 

»ir, ' 


%i\ 


% 


ctions  as  the  Chairman  of  the  President's  Cabinet  Tex- 
ile  Advisory  Committee  may,  upon  either  the  unanimous 
ecommendation  of  the  Interagency  Textile  Administra- 
ive  Committee,  or  the  recommendation  of  the  President's 
Cabinet  Textile  Advisory  Committee,  direct  to  carry  out 
he  Long  Term  Arrangement  with  respect  to  entry,  or 
?ithdrawal  from  warehouse  for  consumption  in  the 
Jnited  States,  of  cotton  textiles  and  cotton  textile 
iroducts. 


Sec.  5.  This  order  shall  be  effective  October  1,  1962,  at 
12:01  a.m.  Eastern  Daylight  Time. 


ffLJ  L^ 


The  White  House, 
Septemher  2S,  1962. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


iecurity  Council  Recommends  U.N. 
Idmit  Algeria  to  fVlembership 


Uatement  hy  Adlai  E.  Stevenson 

7.S.  Representative  in  the  Security  Council  ^ 

The  United  States  joins  enthusiastically  in  the 
ongratulations  to  the  Government  and  people  of 
Vlgeria  on  their  independence  and  on  the  estab- 
ishment  of  their  new  Government.^  We  share  the 
miversal  joy  that  has  been  here  expressed  that 
his  long,  exhausting,  and  fratricidal  conflict  is 
)ver,  and  that  a  new  day  has  dawned,  and  that 
mcient  France  and  new  Algeria,  and  all  their 
nutual  friends  and  admirers,  can  now  look  for- 
ward to  peace  and  progi'ess  instead  of  bitterness 
ind  bloodshed. 

I  made  my  first  journey  through  that  f  ascinat- 
ng  land  of  contrasts  some  35  years  ago,  and  this 
neeting  here  today  in  New  York  brings  back  in- 
ielible  memories  of  the  stirring  days  so  many  of  us 
pent  in  Algeria  and  North  Africa  during  the  last 
.var.  Therefore,  this  is  a  moving  occasion  for  me 
IS  well  as  for  the  Government  and  the  people  of 
he  United  States. 

A  tragic  struggle  has  ended,  and  great  honor  is 
iue  to  those  who  worked  with  patience  and  fore- 
sight and  with  steady  purpose  to  end  the  Algerian 
A'ar.    The  settlement  signed  at  Evian,  we  believe. 


'Made  In  the  Security  Council  on  Oct.  4  (U.S./U.N. 
)ress  release  4052). 

"  For  texts  of  messages  from  President  Kennedy  and 
Secretary  Rusk,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  15,  1962,  p.  560. 

Dcfober  22,  7962 


is  worthy  of  the  brave  men  who  struggled  to  make 
it  for  so  long,  but  independence  is  not  an  end — it 
is  only  a  beginning.  We  know  only  too  well  from 
our  own  history  that  the  period  of  transition  from 
dependence  to  independence  is  bound  to  be  diffi- 
cult. When  the  struggle  has  been  bitter  and  has 
been  long,  the  difficulties  of  readjustment  are  com- 
pounded. The  wisdom  and  courage  of  General  de 
Gaulle,  the  moderation  and  sagacity  of  Algeria's 
leaders,  the  forbearance  of  the  Moslem  popula- 
tion during  the  troubled  months  of  bloody  and 
lawless  attempts  to  subvert  the  peace  in  Algeria 
liave  all  won  admiration  throughout  the  world. 

Soon  we  shall  welcome  here  to  the  United 
Nations  the  first  Prime  IMinister  of  independent 
Algeria,  Ahmed  Ben  Bella.  He  and  his  associates 
have  earned  our  admiration  and  deserve  our  en- 
couragement for  their  efforts  to  insure  the  security 
and  the  tranquillity  of  their  people,  to  organize  an 
effective  administration,  and  to  pave  the  way  for 
economic  recovery  and  development. 

For  the  United  States  the  struggle  in  Algeria 
has  been  over  the  years  the  occasion  for  much  soul 
searching.  France  is  our  oldest  ally.  We  share 
many  memories  and  common  experience.  We  are 
happy,  therefore,  that  the  independence  of  Alge- 
ria finally  came  about  with  the  positive  participa- 
tion of  France. 

No  less  satisfying  to  us  was  the  decision  of  the 
people  of  Algeria,  who  voted  on  1  July  in  favor 
of  independence  in  cooperation  with  France. 
Both  coimtries  have  put  on  record  their  willing- 
ness to  continue  to  cooperate  as  sovereign  part- 

627 


1 


ners.  Algeria's  leaders  have  expressed  the  hope 
that  those  of  European  origin  in  Algeria  will  con- 
tinue to  participate  in  the  challenge  and  the  con- 
structive work  that  lies  ahead. 

Many  of  us  sat  in  these  chambers  when  the 
prospects  for  a  settlement  in  Algeria  seemed  all 
but  hopeless.  Today  other  problems  face  us, 
wliich  present  a  prospect  that  appears  equally 
bleak.  But  we  would  like  to  hope  that  the  states- 
manship which  was  brought  to  bear  on  the 
Algerian  problem  might  serve  as  an  example, 
indeed  an  inspiration,  for  the  solution  of  other 
problems  that  still  trouble  and  divide  the  world. 

The  demonstrated  capacity  and  character  of  the 
Algerian  people  and  of  their  leaders  gives  us  rea- 
son to  expect  that  Algeria  will  play  a  distinguished 
part  in  helping  discharge  the  heavy  responsi- 
bilities that  fall  to  each  member  of  the  United 
Nations  in  this  difficult  period  of  history.  There- 
fore, we  shall  vote  with  pleasure  for  the  draft  res- 
olution' recommending  Algeria's  admission  to 
membership  in  the  United  Nations. 


Conference  on  Middle-Level  Manpower 
To  Meet  in  Puerto  Rico 

STATEMENT  BY  SECRETARY  RUSK 

Press  release  603  dated  October  5,  (or  release  October  7 

On  October  10  delegates  from  43  nations  and 
9  international  organizations,  as  well  as  observers 
from  scores  of  other  nations  and  private  groups, 
will  assemble  in  Puerto  Rico  for  what  could  well 
be  one  of  the  most  important  economic  develop- 
ment conferences  ever  held. 

The  conference — "Human  Skills  in  the  Decade 
of  Development" — will  examine  the  critical  prob- 
lem of  providing  the  human  skills  necessary  to 
transform  natural  resources  and  capital  into  im- 
proved standards  of  living  and  himian  welfare. 

The  experience  of  the  last  decade  has  been  a 
clear  demonstration  that  witliout  the  skilled  men 
and  women  to  man  the  factories,  rim  the  busi- 
nesses, carry  forward  construction  projects,  and 
administer  institutions,  no  program  of  economic 


a 


'  U.N.  doc.  S/5173 ;  the  Conndl  on  Oct.  4  by  a  vote  of  10 
to  0,  with  1  abstention  (Republic  of  China),  recommended 
that  Algeria  be  admitted  to  membership  in  the  United 
Nations.  On  Oct.  8  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  admitted 
Algeria  by  acclamation. 


628 


development  can  hope  to  succeed.  It  has  shown 
that  the  need  for  human  skills  is  at  least  equal  to 
the  need  for  capital  resources  if  we  are  to  bring 
about  economic  development. 

The  conference  will  examine  the  importance 
and  urgency  of  this  problem  and  discuss  tech-  ^^^ 
niques  for  meeting  the  skill  gap  as  rapidly  as 
possible. 

It  is  our  hope  that  from  this  conference  will 
emerge  not  only  a  new  awareness  of  the  need  for 
human  skills  but  many  new  specific  programs  for 
meeting  this  need.  We  can  anticipate  the  devel- 
opment of  new  training  teclmiques  and  the  appli- 
cation of  old  teclmiques  on  a  broader  scale.  In 
addition,  many  countries  have  evidenced  interest 
in  following  the  example  of  the  United  States 
Peace  Corps  in  making  use  of  volunteer  workers 
to  provide  badly  needed  skills  for  development. 
United  Stat«s  private  enterprise  has  indicated  that 
it  has  much  to  offer  in  training  men  and  women 
in  other  parts  of  the  world. 

In  the  midst  of  absorbing  and  dramatic  crises, 
both  at  home  and  abroad,  we  must  not  forget  that 
the  most  important  task  of  this  generation  is  the 
construction  of  a  world  of  independent,  free,  and 
economically  progressing  nations.  The  improve- 
ment of  human  welfare  and  the  long-range  pres- 
ervation of  human  freedom  does  not  often  capture 
the  headlines,  nor  is  it  surrounded  with  the  aura 
of  emergency  meetings  and  dramatic  confronta- 
tions. But  it  is  our  central  task.  And  on  our 
ability  to  perform  this  task  rests,  in  large  measure, 
the  ultimate  fate  of  man. 

I  hope  that  from  this  conference  may  come  the 
outlines  of  a  new  strategy  of  economic  develop- 
ment which  will  help  chart  the  way  to  success  in 
this  historic  Decade  of  Development. 


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U.S.  DELEGATION 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  3 

President  Kennedy  announced  on  October  3  the 

U.S.  delegation  to  the  international  conference  on 
human  resources  to  be  held  at  San  Juan,  P.R., 
October  10,  11,  and  12.  Heading  the  delegation  is 
Vice  President  Lyndon  Johnson,  who  will  deliver 
tlie  keynote  address  at  the  conference.  The  top- 
level  delegation  also  includes: 

W.  Wlllard  Wirtz,  Secretary  of  Labor 
Anthony  J.  Celebrezze,  Secretary  of  Health,  Education, 
and  Welfare 

Department   of  State   Bulletin 


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\\  W.  Rostow,  Counselor  of  the  Department  and  Chair- 
man of  the  Policy  Planning  Council,  Department  of  State 

i^alter  Heller,  Chairman,  Council  of  Economic  Advisers 

i.  Sargent  Shriver,  Director,  Peace  Corps 

ames  M.  Quigley,  Assistant  Secretary  of  Health,  Educa- 
tion, and  Welfare 

}eorge  L.  P.  Weaver,  Assistant  Secretary  of  Labor 

Richard  N.  Goodwin,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 

'rank  Coffin,  Deputy  Director,  Agency  for  International 
Development 

'eodoro  Moscoso,  U.S.  Coordinator,  Alliance  for  Progress 


m 


Attending  the  conference  as  congressional  ad- 

isers  to  the  U.S.  delegation  are  Representatives 

Dharles  C.  Diggs,  Jr.,  and  Edwin  E..  Dumo.  (Two 

r  lenate  members  are  to  be  named.)     A  staff  of 

Bclmical  advisers  will  accompany  the  delegation. 

President  Kennedy  has  hailed  the  conference  as 

,u   la  milestone  in  the  formulation  of  a  strategy  for 

conomic  development."  ^ 

Ministers  and  Cabinet  members  from  43  nations 

^  Old  9  international  organizations  will  gather  for 

Hie  3-day  meeting  to  consider  the  vital  implications 

f  middle-level  manpower  for  economic  growth. 

)iscussion  will  center  on  three  major  aspects  of 

he  subject : 

1.  Methods  of  determining  a  country's  precise 
eeds  in  the  middle,  or  subprofessional,  skills, 
uch  as  junior  engineers,  surveyors,  mechanics, 
Iraftsmen,  carpenters,  nurses,  laboratory  teclini- 
ians,  etc. 

2.  The  role  of  Peace  Corps-type  volunteer 
ssistance  programs  in  providing  developing  na- 
,ions  with  a  body  of  trained  middle-level  man- 
)ower. 

3.  The  role  of  "quick"  training  centers  in  vari- 
)us  countries  for  teaching  multiple  skills  to  un- 
killed  labor  in  minimum  time. 

The  conference,  largest  of  its  kind  outside  the 
Jnited  Nations  since  the  end  of  World  War  II, 
iulminates  the  recognition  of  middle-level  man- 
Dower  as  the  all-important  bridge  between  techni- 
jal  assistance  and  capital  investment  programs  in 
economic  development. 


t.  J.  Sullivan,  F.  C.  Turner  Named 
to  Committee  for  Highway  Congress 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Octo- 
ber 5  (press  release  604)  the  appointment  of 
Richard  J.  Sullivan,  Chief  Coimsel,  Committee  on 


tion 


'  Bulletin  of  Sept.  24, 1962,  p.  465. 


Public  Works,  House  of  Eepresentatives,  and 
Francis  C.  Turner,  Assistant  Federal  Highway 
Administrator  and  Chief  Engineer,  Bureau  of 
Public  Roads,  Department  of  Commerce,  to  the 
Organizmg  Committee  for  the  Ninth  Pan  Amer- 
ican Highway  Congress.  The  Congress  will  be 
held  at  Washington  May  6-18,  1963.i  The 
United  States  is  host  government. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Automotive  Traffic 

Customs  convention  on  the  temporary  importation  of  pri- 
vate road  vehicles.     Done  at  New  York  June  4,  1954. 
Entered  into  force  December  15,  1957.     TIAS  .3943. 
Accession  deposited:  New  Zealand,  August  17,  1962. 

Convention    concerning    customs    facilities    for    touring. 
Done  at  New  York  June  4,  1954.     Entered  into  force 
September  11,  1957.     TIAS  3879. 
Accession  deposited:  New  Zealand,  August  17, 1962. 

Aviation 

Protocol  relating  to  amendment  of  article  50(a)  of  the 
Convention  on  International  Civil  Aviation  to  increase 
membership  of  the  Council  from  21  to  27.  Approved 
by  the  ICAO  Assembly  at  Montreal  June  21,  1961.  En- 
tered into  force  July  17, 1962. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  September  19,  1962. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea, 
1960.    Done  at  London  June  17, 1960.^ 
Acceptance  deposited:  Malagasy  Republic,   September 
13,  1962. 

Slavery 

Slavery  convention  signed  at  Geneva  September  25,  1926, 
as  amended  (TIAS  3532).  Entered  into  force  March 
9,  1927 ;  for  the  United  States  March  21,  1929.  46  Stat. 
2183. 

Notification  received   that   it   considers   itself   hound: 
Togo,  February  27, 1962. 

Trade 

Long-term  arrangements  regarding  international  trade  in 
cotton  textiles.  Concluded  at  meeting  of  Cotton  Textile 
Committee  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade  at  Geneva  February  9, 1962. 

Acceptances    deposited:    Canada     (with    reservation), 
August  23,  1962;   United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and   Northern  Ireland    (with  reservation),  June  27, 
1962;  United  States,  September  26,  1962. 
Entered  into  force:  October  1,  1962. 


itli  October  22,  1962 


^  For  background,  see  Buixetin  of  Sept.  24,  1962,  p.  464. 
*  Not  in  force. 

629 


United  Nations 

Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  Statute  of  the  Inter- 
national Court  of  Justice.  Signed  at  San  Francisco, 
June  26,  1945.  Entered  into  force  October  24,  1945. 
59  Stat.  1031. 

Admission  to  membership:  Burundi,  Jamaica,  Rwanda, 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  September  12,  1962. 


BILATERAL 

Afghanistan 

Agreement  relating  to  the  establishment  of  a  Peace  Corps 
program.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Kabul  Sep- 
tember 6  and  11,  1962.  Entered  into  force  September 
11,  19G2. 

Cameroon 

Agreement  relating  to  the  establishment  of  a  Peace  Corps 
program.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Yaounde 
July  23  and  September  10,  1962.  Entered  into  force 
September  10,  1962. 

Congo  (Brazzaville) 

Agreement  relating  to  investment  guaranties.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Brazzaville  July  26  and  Sep- 
tember 1,  1962.     Entered  into  force  September  1,  1962. 

Congo  (Leopoldville) 

Agreement  amending  the  agricultural  commodities  agi'ee- 
ment  of  November  18,  1961,  as  amended  (TIAS  4925, 
5069,  5159,  and  5164).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Leopoldville  August  31,  1962.  Entered  into  force 
August  31,  1962. 

Turkey 

Agreement  relating  to  the  establishment  of  a  Peace  Corps 
program.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Ankara 
August  27,  1962.     Entered  into  force  August  27,  1962. 


DEPARTMENT  AND  FOREIGN  SERVICE 


Foreign  Service  Selection  Boards  Meet 

Press  release  598  dated  October  3 

The  16th  Foreign  Service  Officer  Selection  Boards  con- 
vened on  October  3  to  review  the  records  and  to  consider 
promotions  for   Foreign   Service  officer  personnel. 

The  S.-TOO  officers  who  will  have  their  performance  files 
reviewed  staff  the  nearly  300  embassies,  legations,  and 
consulates  located  in  over  a  hundred  countries  with  whom 
the  United  States  conducts  foreign  relations.  In  addi- 
tion. Foreign  Service  officers  serve  in  Washington  in  the 
Department  of  State  and  other  executive  agencies,  includ- 
ing Commerce,  Labor,  Defense,  AID,  and  the  Treasury. 

Improved  procedures  have  been  inaugurated  which  it 
is  believed  will  permit  the  Selection  Boards,  which  nor- 


mally deliberate  for  approximately  4  months,  to  complete  [jjtobe 
their  task  in  6  weeks  or  less. 

The  Boards  this  year  will  disregard  age  and  length  oH 
service  as  factors  in  considering  officers'  promotions, 

Membership  on  the  seven  Boards  includes  31  Foreigui 
Service  officers,  7  public  members  drawn  from  private 
life,  and  7  members  from  other  executive  agencies  which 
have  significant  foreign  affairs  interests. 

The  Foreign  Service  officer  members  include  the  Am- 
bassador to  the  Central  African  Republic,  John  H.  Burns ; 
the  Ambassador  to  Colombia,  Fulton  Freeman ;  the  Am- 
bassador to  Mexico,  Thomas  C.  Mann ;  the  former  Undei 
Secretary  of  State,  Livingston  T.  Merchant ;  and  the  Am- 
bassador to  Nigeria,  Joseph  Palmer  II. 

The  public  members  are  Dean  Clowes,  assistant  direc- 
tor. United  Steel  Workers ;  John  Cogley,  staff  director 
The  Center  for  the  Study  of  Democratic  Institutions 
Santa  Barbara,  Calif. ;  John  W.  Davis,  special  director 


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NAACP  Legal  Defense  and  Education  Fund ;  Herbert  loiit 
W.  Hill,  chairman.  Department  of  History,  Dartmoutbi  to' 
College ;  Edward  Korry,  manager,  Special  Projects,  audi  '^* 
special  assistant  to  Gardner  Cowles,  Cowles  Magazin* 

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and  Broadcasting  Co.,  Inc. ;  C.  A.  R.  Lindquist,  bankei 
and  agriculturist ;  and  Robert  E.  McMillen,  researct 
director,  United  Association  of  Journeymen  and  Appren- 
tices of  the  Plumbing  and  Pipe  Fitting  Industry  of  the' 
U.S.  and  Canada. 

Voting  members  from  other  executive  agencies  arwlii' 
Lester  Christerson,  deputy  director,  AID  Mission,  Yemen, 
Agency  for  International  Development ;  Douglas  M.  Craw- 
ford, assistant  administrator  for  agricultural  attaches, 
Department  of  Agriculture;  John  A.  Hamilton,  foreign 
affairs  officer,  Office  of  Assistant  Director,  U.S.  Infor- 
mation Agency  ;  Lowell  Kilgore,  program  officer  for  inter- 
national affairs.  Business  and  Defense  Service  Adminis- 
tration, Department  of  Commerce;  Paul  E.  Pauly,  direc- 
tor, Office  of  Trade  Promotion,  Department  of  Commerce ; 
Lloyd  Prochnow,  chief.  Branch  of  International  Tech- 
nical Cooperation,  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Depart- 
ment of  Labor;  and  John  F.  Scott,  chief,  Employment 
Systems  and  Practices,  Bureau  of  Programs  and  Stand- 
ards, Civil  Service  Commission. 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  October  2  confirmed  the  following  nomi- 
nations : 

W.  Walton  Butterworth  to  be  Ambassador  to  Canada 
fFor  biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  release 
dated  September  11.) 

John  M.  Leddy  to  be  the  representative  of  the  United 
States  to  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development.  (For  biographic  details,  see  White  House 
press  release  dated  September  29.) 

Llewellyn  E.  Thompson  to  be  Ambassador  at  Large. 
(For  biographic  details,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  607  dated  October  8. ) 


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Africa.  Trade  and  Investment  ixi  Tropical  Africa 
(Blumenthal,  Williams) 

Algeria.  Security  Council  Recommends  U.N.  Admit 
Algeria  to  Membership  (Stevenson) 

American  Republics 

American  Foreign  Ministers  Hold  Informal  Meet- 
ing at  Washington  (text  of  communique)    .     .     . 

I.  J.  Sullivan,  F.  C.  Turner  Named  to  Committee 
for  Highvs'ay  Congress 

l'Di](|k.tomic  Energy 

ndian  Group  Calls  for  Cessation  of  Nuclear  Testing 

in  Atmosphere 

?oward  an  Open  Scientific  Community  (Seaborg)    . 

>nada.    Butterworth  confirmed  as  Ambassador    . 


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October  22,  1962 


Index 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1217 


congress 

Congressional    Documents    Relating    to    Foreign 

Policy 

oint  Resolution  Expressing  the  Determination  of 

the  United  States  With  Respect  to  Cuba  .... 
'rading  Relations  Between   the   Free  World  and 

Cuba  (BaU)   

:uba 

unerican  Foreign  Ministers  Hold  Informal  Meet- 
ing at  Washington  (text  of  communique)    .     .     . 

oint  Resolution  Expressing  the  Determination  of 
the  United  States  With  Respect  to  Cuba  .... 

secretary  Discusses  Cuban  Situation  on  "News  and 
Comment"  Program   (Rusk,  Scali) 

Trading  Relations  Between  the  Free  World  and 
Cuba  (Ball) 

department  and  Foreign  Service 

>nflrmations   (Butterworth,  Leddy,  Thompson)    . 
yoreign  Service  Selection  Boards  Meet 

Sconomic  Affairs 

Che  EEC  and  the  Free-World  Community  (John- 
son)     

President  Provides  for  Administration  of  Cotton 
Textile  Arrangement  (text  of  Executive  order)    . 

Trade  and  Investment  in  Tropical  Africa  (Blumen- 
thal, Williams)       

Trading  Relations  Between  the  Free  World  and 
Cuba  (Ball) 

ij|E)ducational  and  Cultural  Affairs.  John  M.  Stal- 
naker  Elected  Chairman  of  Board  of  Foreign 
Scholarships 

Europe 

Building  the  Atlantic  Partnership:  Some  Lessons 
From  the  Past  (Bundy) 

The  EEC  and  the  Free- World  Community  (John- 
son)     

Foreign  Aid.  Conference  on  Middle-Level  Man- 
power To  Meet  in  Puerto  Rico  (Rusk)    .... 

Germany.  Building  the  Atlantic  Partnership: 
Some  Lessons  From  the  Past  (Bimdy)    .... 

[ndia.  Indian  Group  Calls  for  Cessation  of  Nu- 
clear Testing  in  Atmosphere 

international  Organizations  and  Conferences 

American  Foreign  Ministers  Hold  Informal  Meet- 
ing at  Washington  (text  of  communique)    .     .     . 

Conference  on  Middle-Level  Manpower  To  Meet  in 
Puerto  Rico  (Rusk) 

Leddy  confirmed  as  U.S.  Representative  to  OECD  . 

R.  J.  Sullivan,  F.  C.  Turner  Named  to  Committee 
for  Highway  Congress 

Nforth  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  Building  the 
Atlantic  Partnership:  Some  Lessons  From  the 
Past  (Bundy) 


613 

627 

598 
629 


626 
622 

630 


621 
597 
591 

598 
591 
595 
591 

630 
630 

605 
626 
613 
591 

600 

601 
605 

62S 

601 

626 

598 

628 
630 

629 
601 


Presidential  Documents 

British   Foreign   Secretary  Talks  With   President 

Kennedy 600 

President  Provides  for  Administration  of  Cotton 

Textile  Arrangement 626 

Science.     Toward  an   Open   Scientific  Community 

(Seaborg) 622 

Treaty  Information.    Current  Actions 629 

United  Kingdom.  British  Foreign  Secretary  Talks 
With  President  Kennedy  (text  of  joint  state- 
ment)       600 

United    Nations.     Security    Council    Recommends 

U.N.  Admit  Algeria  to  Membership  ( Stevenson)    .  627 

Name  Index 

Ball,  George  W 591 

Blumenthal,  W.  Michael 616 

Bundy,  McGeorge 601 

Butterworth,  W.  Walton 630 

Home,  Lord 600 

Johnson,  G.  Grifiith 605 

Kennedy,  President 600, 626 

Leddy,  John  M 630 

Rusk,    Secretary 595, 628 

Scall,   John 595 

Seaborg,  Glenn  T 622 

Stalnaker,  John  M 600 

Stevenson,  Adlai  E 627 

Sullivan,  Richard  J 629 

Thompson,  Llewellyn  E 630 

Turner,  Francis  C 629 

Williams,  G.  Mennen 613 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  October  1-7 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office  of 
News,  Department  of  State,  Washington  25,  D.C. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  October  1  which  appear 
in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  580  of  Sep- 
tember 25,  582  and  583  of  September  26,  585  of 
September  27,  and  .590  of  September  29. 
Subject 
U.S.  participation  in  international  con- 
ferences. 
Meeting  of  foreign  ministers  of  Amer- 
ican Republics. 
Ball :   statement  on  trade  with  Cuba. 
PSO  selection  boards. 
Bohlen   sworn   in   as   Ambassador  to 

France  (biographic  details). 
Meeting   of   American  foreign   minis- 
ters :    communique. 
Delegation    to    Uganda    independence 

ceremonies. 
Morgan :  "The  U.S.S.R.  in  World  Af- 
fairs." 
Itinerary  for  visit  of  Libyan  Crown 

Prince. 
Schaetzel :  "The  Common  Market,  the 
Atlantic  Partnership,  and  the  Free 
World." 
Rusk :    Peace  Corps  middle-level  man- 
power conference. 
Sullivan    and    Turner    appointed    to 
Organizing  Committee  for  Pan  Amer- 
ican  Highway   Congress    (rewrite). 
Schwartz  sworn  in  as   SCA  Adminis- 
trator  (biographic  details). 

*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


No. 

Date 

*593 

10/1 

594 

10/1 

595 

596 

*.597 

10/3 
10/3 
10/3 

598 

10/3 

*599 

10/4 

t600 

10/4 

*601 

10/4 

t602 

10/5 

603 

10/5 

001 

10/5 

*605 

10/6 

U.S.   GOVERNMENT  PRINTING   0FFICEM962 


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FIVE  GOALS  OF  U.S.  foreign  policy 

•  SECURITY  through  STRENGTH 

•  PROGRESS  through  PARTNERSHIP 

•  REVOLUTION  of  FREEDOM 

•  COMMUNITY  under  LAW 

•  PEACE  through  PERSEVERANCE 

"^^Hiat  U.S.  foreign  policy  is,  how  it  works,  and  the  goals  it  is  de- 
signed to  achieve,  are  defined  in  this  37-page  pamphlet.  It  contains 
the  transcript  of  a  television  interview,  September  24,  1962,  with 
Dean  Rusk,  Secretary  of  State;  Robert  S.  McNamara,  Secretary  of 
Defense ;  George  W.  Ball,  Under  Secretary  of  State ;  Fowler  Hamil- 
ton, Administrator,  Agency  for  International  Development;  Adlai  E, 
Stevenson,  U.S.  Permanent  Representative  to  the  United  Nations; 
and  W.  W.  Rostow,  Counselor  and  Chairman  of  the  Policy  Planning 
Council,  Department  of  State. 


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^HE    DEPARTMENT  OF   STATE 


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ED  STATES 
GN  POLICY 


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Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1218 


October  29,  1962 


UNITED  STATES  PRESENTS  FACILITIES  AT  FORT 
McNAIR     TO     INTER-AMERICAN     DEFENSE 

COLLEGE      •      Address  by  Secretary  Rusk 642 

A    BRIDGE    FOR    THE    AMERICAS        •        by  Under 

Secretary  Ball 645 

THE  COMMON  MARKET,  THE  ATLANTIC  PARTNER- 
SHIP,  AND  THE   FREE  WORLD    •     by  J.  Robert 

Schaetzel 661 

THE  U.S.S.R.  IN  WORLD  AFFAIRS  •  by  George  A.  Morgan  .      649 

UNITED  STATES  POSITION  ON  NUCLEAR  TESTING 
EXPLAINED  TO  UNITED  NATIONS    •    Statement 

by  Ambassador  Adlai  E.  Stevenson 635 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1218  •  Publication  7440 
October  29,  1962 


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The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
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Jnited  States  Position  on  Nuclear  Testing 
[xplained  to  United  Nations 


Statement  hy  Adlai  E.  Stevenson 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  General  Assetnhly  ^ 


I  come  before  you  to  survey  once  again  the 
uclear  testing  issue,  which  by  now  is  familiar 
round  to  most  of  us.  I  wisli  very  much  that  this 
5sue  had  been  behind  us  for  many  years  and  that 
le  peace  of  the  world,  the  survival  of  civilization, 
nd  the  health  of  mankind  were  not  still  endan- 
ered  by  nuclear  weapons.  But  they  are.  In- 
eed,  instead  of  receding,  the  danger  has  increased 
s  the  weapons  have  multiplied  in  number  and  in 
jthal  sophistication. 

So  our  discussion  here  this  year  is  even  more  ur- 
ent,  and  we  must  ask  you  to  examine  the  situa- 
on  even  more  closely  and  help  us  with  patience 
nd  persistence  to  reach  an  agreement  and  reverse 
16  tragic  trend. 

Wliile  we  are  debating  here,  the  Geneva  nego- 
ations  go  on.  Tlie  purpose  of  our  discussion  is 
ot  to  replace  those  negotiations  but  to  encourage 
lem.  This  Assembly  can  register  emphatically 
16  anxiety  and  intense  feeling  of  mankind  on 
le  subject  of  nuclear  testing.  At  Geneva  we 
LUst  translate  those  feelings  into  concrete  form. 
Jid  the  sooner  the  better. 

I  speak  as  a  representative  of  one  of  the  few 
ations  possessing  nuclear  military  power.  Such 
ower  is  a  distinction — if  such  it  be — conferred 
J  history  and  resources,  not  by  choice.  And  it 
,  I  can  assure  you,  an  awesome  responsibility,  to 
3  envied  by  no  one. 

Nuclear  power  imposes,  in  fact,  a  solemn  tliree- 
)ld  duty.  First,  we  have  to  maintain  that  power 
adequate  measure  to  protect  the  national  se- 
irity  of  our  own  country  and  those  numerous 


'Made  in  Committee  I  (Political  and  Security)  on  Oct. 
I  (U.S.  delegation  press  release  4060). 

c/ober  29,  J  962 


countries  and  peoples  who  look  to  it  for  protec- 
tion. Second,  we  have  the  sobering  duty  to  use 
the  power  with  such  restraint  that  the  peace  of 
the  world  is  not  endangered  anywhere.  And, 
finally,  there  is  the  imperative  duty  to  discover 
some  way  to  reduce  a  level  of  military  power 
which  serves  no  other  purpose  than  to  balance  off 
a  concentration  of  power  in  other  hands. 

My  Government  is  totally  committed  to  the 
discharge  of  all  three  of  these  responsibilities. 
But  we  are  concerned  here  today  with  the  third 
responsibility  imposed  by  nuclear  power:  the  ur- 
gent need  to  find  some  way  of  controlling  the  rush 
to  greater  and  greater  power — to  find  some  way 
out  of  the  insensate  and  endless  arms  race. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  little  doubt  that  if  I  rep- 
resented one  of  the  member  states  without  nuclear 
weapons,  I  should  feel  frustrated  by  the  prolonged 
dialog  between  the  nuclear  powers,  annoyed  at 
what  may  seem  like  obsession  with  technicalities, 
and  sorely  tempted  to  step  up  and  say,  in  effect: 
"Stop  arguing  and  get  down  to  business — and  be 
quick  about  it." 

But  to  the  state  which  is  burdened  with  nuclear 
power  it  is  painfully  evident  that  this  is  a  prob- 
lem which  is  hard,  cold,  incredibly  complex,  and 
intensely  practical.  It  will  not  yield  simply  to 
moralizing  and  exhortation,  nor  to  platitudes  or 
slogans.  It  therefore  becomes  the  duty  of  the 
nuclear  powers  to  be  quite  blunt  about  the  reali- 
ties, to  be  candid  about  the  practical  relevance  of 
our  debates  in  this  Assembly  to  the  politics  of  an 
arms  race  which  is  a  fact  of  life. 

There  is  no  point  in  recrimination  nor  in  re- 
hashing old  stories  for  the  sake  of  the  record  whicli 
is  already  ponderous ;  that  would  only  contribute 


635 


to  skepticism  about  the  chances  of  controlling  the 
arms  race.  The  point,  rather,  is  to  look  realisti- 
cally at  our  now  considerable  experience  and  to 
draw  appropriate  lessons  from  it. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  today  to  give  a  detailed  re- 
capitulation of  the  Iiistory  of  the  nuclear  test  ne- 
gotiations. However,  for  the  convenience  of 
delegations  during  the  present  debate,  we  have 
prepared  a  supplemental  white  paper  -  on  those 
negotiations,  whicli  we  shall  be  pleased  to  make 
available  tomorrow. 

Realities  of  Nuclear  Arms  Race 

Our  recent  experience  with  the  problem  of  nu- 
clear testing  is,  I  believe,  most  illuminating  in  this 
connection. 

One  of  the  first  realities  of  the  nuclear  arms  race 
emerged  for  all  to  see — in  a  shockingly  dramatic 
way — just  as  the  16th  General  Assembly  was  about 
to  convene.  For  approximately  3  years  previously 
no  nuclear  testing  had  been  conducted;  a  volun- 
tary, uninspected,  and  informal  moratorium  on 
nuclear  testing  had  been  in  efl'ect.  For  approxi- 
mately 3  years  a  test  ban  conference  in  Geneva  had 
labored  painfully — through  ups  and  downs,  ac- 
cords and  discords — until  agreement  was  reached 
on  a  preamble,  17  articles,  and  2  annexes  of  a  draft 
treaty  ^  to  end  nuclear  testing.  For  approximately 
3  yeai-s  the  Soviet  Union  had  agreed  upon  the  prin- 
ciple that  international  inspection  would  be  re- 
quired to  guarantee  that  the  treaty's  provisions 
were,  in  fact,  being  carried  out.  The  issue  had 
become  the  number  of  detection  posts  and  the  num- 
ber of  onsite  inspections  which  would  be  necessary 
each  year  and  not  the  principle  itself.  At  long  last, 
it  seemed  reasonable  to  hope  that  we  were  on  the 
verge  of  a  workable  treaty  to  ban  all  nuclear  weap- 
ons testing  in  all  environments — forever.  Mean- 
while the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States 
refrauied  from  testing. 

Then,  when  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United 
States  came  forward  with  new  proposals  which 


'International  Negotiations  on  Ending  Nuclear  Weapon 
Tests,  September  1961-8eptemt>er  1962  (United  States 
Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency  publication  9)  ; 
for  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment Printing  Office,  WashinRton  2.">,  D.C.,  price  $1.00. 

"For  texts,  see  Documents  on  Disarmament,  19G0  (De- 
partment of  State  publication  7172),  pp.  370-387  ;  for  sale 
by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington  25,  D.C.,  price  $1.25. 

636 


reasonably  met  all  remaining  Soviet  objections,  a 
strange  thing  occurred;  the  Soviet  delegation  be- 
gan a  retreat  from  points  already  agreed  upon 
which  was  to  culminate  in  November  in  a  complete 
reversal  of  position.  We  were  puzzled  for  a  while, 
but  on  August  30  we  had  the  explanation  of  why 
the  Soviet  delegation  had  ended  meaningful  ne- 
gotiation: The  Soviet  Union  unilaterally  ended 
the  moratorium  by  conducting  what  turned  out 
to  be  a  massive  series  of  nuclear  tests  in  the  atmos- 
phere, a  test  series  which  had  been  under  prepara- 
tion for  a  long  time  and  which  was  climaxed  bj 
an  explosion  of  such  force  that  it  surpassed  al 
rational  military  use. 

This  sudden  and  stunning  reversal  by  the  Soviet 
Union  dramatized  the  need  for  a  firm  agreemen 
which  would  give  stability  to  the  ending  of  test, 
and  confidence  to  all  the  parties. 

Mr.  Chairman,  this  experience  provided  the  firS'  mi 
lesson  about  the  realities  of  the  nuclear  arms  race 
A  voluntary  unverified  moratorium  does  not  re 
duce  tensions,  does  not  build  mutual  confidenct 
does  not  stop  the  perils  of  fallout,  does  not  pu 
a  brake  on  the  arms  race,  is  not  a  step  towar 
general  disarmament,  and  does  not  contribut 
to    the    peace    of    the    world.     The    conclusio 


mc 


sati 
in 
ini 
are 
B( 
pi 
M 


is  obvious :  ^^liere  national  security  is  concernec  pet 
an  open  society  cannot  undertake  with  a  close  pe 
society  an  arrangement  which  cannot  be  verifiec 

The  next  reality  about  tlie  nuclear  arms  race 
that  it  can  be  ended  only  by  agreement  in  whic 
all  parties  can  have  confidence.     Before  this  con 
mittee  on  October  19  of  last  year,  I  stated  * — an 
not  for  the  first  time — that  the  United  States  w! 
ready  to  return  to  the  conference  table  in  Genev 
that  before  the  United  States  followed  the  Sovi 
lead  and  resumed  testing  we  were  prepared 
conclude  a  test  ban  treaty  either  here  or  in  Genev; 
I  declared  that  a  treaty  could  be  signed  within  ; 
days,  and,  of  course,  I  said  my  Government  wou 
be  obliged  to  resume  testing  in  the  atmosphe 
if  tlie  Soviet  Union  continued  and  refused  to  agr 
to  stop  and  if  we  found  that  this  forced  us  to  lo« 
again  to  our  own  security. 

You  know  the  result.  Tlie  Soviet  Union  i 
jected  the  offer  of  the  United  States  and  Unit 
Kingdom,  ignored  the  appeal  of  this  Assemb 
and  continued  its  longest  series  to  its  bitter  a 
violent  end.     But  even  under  these  conditions   ir, . 


if* 


sper 
fee; 
uriiij 
The 
letor 

<  still 

iei 
ttplii 


irf  ( 


'  BuLi-ETi-N  of  Xov.  13,  19G1,  p.  816. 


Department  of  Sfofe  By//e 


teo 


^r 


'IW 


even  after  nearly  50  Soviet  atmospheric  tests  and 
before  any  U.S.  atmospheric  tests — the  United 
States  and  tlie  United  Kingdom  went  back  to 
Geneva  and  urged  a  test  ban  with  international 
supervision  and  inspection  annually  involving  less 
than  one  part  in  2,000  of  Soviet  territory.'^  Even 
this  offer  wfis  rejected.  And  at  last,  after  detailed 
scientific  study,  prolonged  delay,  and  with  deep 
reluctance,  the  President  of  the  United  States 
determined  that,  in  our  own  security  interests,  we 
too  should  have  to  return  to  testing  in  tlie  atmos- 
phere. And  now,  before  our  series  has  been  com- 
pleted, the  Soviet  Union  is  at  it  again. 

"VVliat  lesson  can  be  drawn  from  this  part  of  our 
ixperience  in  the  preceding  years  ?  Nothing  new, 
[  am  afraid ;  nothing  but  confirmation  of  the  mel- 
incholy  fact  that  in  the  contemporary  world  the 
jnly  effective  restraint  upon  military  power  which 
nan  has  been  able  to  invent  is  to  line  up  opposing 
lational  military  power — and  an  increase  in  mili- 
ary power  on  one  side  is  followed  by  an  increase 
n  military  power  on  the  other  side,  almost  as 
iurely  as  night  follows  day. 

Before   yielding   to    despair,  however,    let   us 
luickly  note  the  other  side  of  it.     Even  without  a 
fimdamental  change  in  political  relationships,  if 
::i«  we  could  stop  nuclear  testing  simultaneously,  each 
e  side  could  be  able  to  accept  such  a  balance — as 
to  ong  as  it  is  ascertainable  that  the  stoppage  has 
n  fact  taken  place. 
In  the  light  of  these  rather  somber  realities,  Mr. 
,jj  Chairman,  what  else  can  we  conclude  from  our 
xperience  so  far  with  the  nuclear  testing  issue? 
Ve  can,  I  believe,  draw  at  least  two  more  reas- 
uring  conclusions. 
The  first  is  that,  despite  tlie  futility  of  mere 
'"^   hetoric,  this  Assembly,  overwhelmingly  made  up 
'f  states  without  nuclear  weapons,  is  not  witliout 
nfluence  on  those  which  have  them.     In  the  at- 
losphere  of  gloom  and  apprehension  which  pre- 
vailed last  year  at  the  opening  of  the  16th  General 
I"*' Assembly,  the  members  did  not  give  up  hope  and 
^  urned  once  again  to  the  quest  for  control  of  the 
»'*.uclear  arms  race.     In  this  I  am  certain  that  we 
lave    overwhelming   world    opinion    behind    us. 
ertainly  we  do  in  my  country. 
In  any  event,  encouraged  by  the  Assembly's 
ction  in  calling  for  renewed  negotiations  for  an 


Mf-!, 


For  text  of  a  U.S.-TJ.K.  draft  treaty  introduced  in  the 
Jonference  on  the  Discontinuance  of  Nuclear  Weapon 
'ests  on  Apr.  18,  1961,  see  ihifl.,  June  5,  1961,  p.  870. 

>cfofaer  29,  1962 


internationally  monitored  test  ban  agreement,  we 
picked  up  the  remains  of  3  years  of  hard  work  at 
Geneva  and  returned  to  negotiations. 

This  leads  me  to  the  second  conclusion  of  a  more 
hopeful  nature  which  I  think  we  can  draw  from  re- 
cent experience.  It  is  this:  Continuous  negotia- 
tions— however  fruitless  they  may  look  from  the 
sidelines — do  at  least  help  to  clear  away  the  se- 
mantic confusion,  to  uncover  the  hard-core  prob- 
lems underneath,  to  narrow  the  debate  to  the  real 
issues.  If  this  is  tedious  and  frustrating  work, 
it  is  immensely  important  because  at  long  last  the 
right  questions  can  be  asked  and  wrong  answers 
can  be  exposed.  If,  in  tlie  end,  we  fail  again,  at 
least  we  have  the  advantage  of  knowing  why  we 
failed ;  and  then  we  must  try  yet  again. 

Some  Progress  Toward  Test  Ban  Treaty 

In  the  meantime  some  genuine  progress  appears 
to  have  been  made.  According  to  its  official  state- 
ments, the  Soviet  Government  lias  again  reversed 
itself  and  is  willing  to  accept  a  nuclear  test  ban 
agreement  in  advance  of  general  and  complete 
disarmament.  The  Soviet  Government  now  says 
that  it  is  willing  to  accept  some  arrangement  in 
which  an  international  commission  would  be  a  fea- 
ture. It  is  luiwilling  as  yet,  however,  to  concede 
the  essential  rights  of  international  supervision 
and  inspection. 

For  our  part,  tlie  United  States  and  the  United 
Kingdom  have  agreed,  on  the  basis  of  a  new  tech- 
nical assessment,  that  a  reduction  can  now  be  made 
in  the  number  of  sites  within  the  Soviet  Union 
that  would  be  required  to  monitor  seismic  disturb- 
ances. We  also  have  accepted  a  reduction  in  the 
number  of  inspections  required  within  Soviet  ter- 
ritory for  verification  that  such  seismic  events  were 
not  underground  nuclear  explosions. 

We  were  able  to  accept  these  modifications  be- 
cause of  recent  improvements  in  scientific  tech- 
niques for  detection  of  underground  disturbances. 
For  the  past  2  years  my  Government  has  been  con- 
ducting an  extensive  progi'am  of  research  on  the 
improvement  of  such  teclmiques.  This  program, 
for  which  the  United  States  has  allocated  more 
than  $200  million,  has  produced  much  valuable 
information ;  we  now  have  a  better  understanding 
of  the  phenomena  relevant  to  detection  and  identi- 
fication of  nuclear  tests  than  we  had  even  a  year 
or  two  ago. 

This  is  what  we  have  offered  and  what  we  want : 

637 


a  ban  on  all  tests  for  all  time,  subject  only  to  the 
necessity  of  international  inspection  in  the  one 
environment  where  it  is  scientifically  necessary, 
that  is,  imderground.  The  United  States  and  the 
United  Kingdom  tabled  a  draft  treaty  incorpora- 
ting these  points  at  Geneva  on  August  27th.'= 

So  once  again  the  Western  Powers  have  moved 
toward  the  goal  of  a  test  ban  treaty.  In  that 
process  we  have  been  aided  by  the  positive  and 
responsible  contributions  of  the  delegations  of 
Brazil,  Burma,  Ethiopia,  India,  Mexico,  Nigeria, 
Sweden,  and  the  United  Arab  Republic.  The 
memorandum^  submitted  by  these  eight  delega- 
tions on  April  16  has  been  useful  in  making  it  pos- 
sible to  bring  closer  together  the  opposing  posi- 
tions in  the  test  ban  negotiations. 

These  proposals  did  not  pretend  to  be  a  detailed 
blueprint  for  a  final  treaty  but  expressed  some 
ideas  which  both  sides  could  accept  and  which  they 
now  must  translate  into  precise  treaty  language. 
The  U.S.-U.K.  draft  treaty  of  August  27  is  re- 
sponsive to  these  ideas. 

We  believe  that  nuclear  and  nonnuclear  powers 
alike  owe  these  delegations  a  debt  of  gratitude  for 
their  conscientious  and  constructive  diplomacy  at 
Geneva,  and,  on  behalf  of  my  Government,  I  ex- 
press my  thanks  to  them. 

Need  for  identification  and  Verification 

I  want  to  make  clear  once  again  that  our  con- 
tinued insistence  on  the  need  for  identification 
and  verification  of  undergroimd  phenomena  is  not 
based  on  ideological  or  political  grounds — nor  is 
it  a  bargaining  position.  Our  insistence  is  based 
on  the  scientific  fact  that  knowledge  and  techniques 
do  not  exist  to  distinguish  between  earthquakes 
and  underground  nuclear  explosions  without  on- 
site  inspection. 

The  United  States  delegation  will  circulate  to 
all  delegations  a  brief  memorandiun  *  which  elab- 
orates on  this  problem.  "VVliile  we  can  detect  seis- 
mic events  abov^e  a  certain  threshold  fairly  effec- 
tivclj',  we  cannot  identify  what  they  are.  The  sig- 
nals from  underground  nuclear  tests  are  identical 
with  tliose  of  most  earthquakes.    "When  we  have 


'For  background  and  text,  see  ibid..  Sept  17,  1962,  p. 
403. 

'For  text,  see  U.X.  doc.  DC/203  (ENDC/28). 
"  U.N.  doc.  A/C.  1/873. 

638 


detected  something,  how  do  we  Icnow  wliat  it  is? 
With  a  few  special  types  of  earthquakes,  we  can 
distinguish  an  earthquake  from  an  explosion.  But 
the  reverse  is  not  true,  and  in  no  cases  can  we  iden- 
tify a  nuclear  explosion  as  different  from  most 
earthquakes.  The  only  way  to  answer  that  ques- 
tion is  to  inspect  the  site  of  the  detected  event. 

The  Soviets  seem  to  be  saying  that  they  do  have 
instruments  for  detection  and  identification  of 
underground  nuclear  tests  which  can  operate  on 
a  purely  national  basis.  We  cannot  say  that  they 
do  not  have  such  instruments.  We  can  only  say 
that  we  do  not,  nor  do  we  know  of  any.  The  So- 
viets have  been  repeatedly  invited  to  bring  for- 
ward experts  and  their  instruments  so  that  this 
important  matter  of  fact  can  be  established.  Thej 
have  declined  the  invitation. 

Nevertheless,  as  I  suggested  earlier,  the  Genev£4 
negotiations  have  served  to  narrow  the  discussior 
to  its  fundamentals  and  to  expose  to  the  sunliglr 
the  precise  issue.    Therefore  we  can  now  ask  thi 
right  question,   which  is  this :  Will  the   Soviet  ™ 
Union  agree — as  we  have  agreed — to  the  neces 
sary  nmnber  of  control  posts,  manned  by  Sovie 
nationals  under  an  international  system,  to  moni 
tor  seismic  events?     And  will  the  Soviet  UnioiP^l 
agree — as  we  have  agreed — to  permit  on  its  ter 
ritory  a  limited  number  of  international  verifica 
tion  teams  ? 

We  have  seen  tliat  the  Soviet  Union  has  aban 
doned  its  insistence  that  a  test  cessation  agreemen 
can  be  accomplished  only  as  part  of  general  am 
complete  disarmament.  By  accepting  the  eight 
nation  memorandum  as  a  basis  for  negotiatioi 
they  have  agreed  once  again  that  an  Internationa 
control  system  may  be  established  to  monitor  test; 
Only  one  major  objection  remains;  only  one  o\ 
stacle  bars  the  path  to  the  first  great  step  towar 
nuclear  sanity.  The  Soviet  Union  has  not  y( 
agreed  to  reaffirm  the  position  which  it  took  froi 
1958  until  November  1961 — that  on-site  inspectio 
was  a  necessary  element  of  any  test  ban  agreemen 

Instead  they  have  proposed  inspection  by  inviti 
tion.  The  Soviet  proposal  in  response  to  tl 
eight-nation  memorandum  provides  that  an  inte; 
national  commission  would  have  the  right  to  ae  »ij.  L( 
for  information  about  .seismic  events  and,  after 
period  of  consultations,  could  ask  for  an  on-si 
inspection.  The  state  on  whose  territory  the  evej 
took  place  would  then  decide  whether  it  woa 


itli 
n\ 
irer 

m 


The  I 
Fc 


nen 
1 


Fir 

le  i 
Jnite 
ireo: 
inly, 


remt 
ioTJet 


Mm 
itiieiii 
Foiirt 
small 
mUtl 


"111  ivi 
•tJitiOtt 


Department  of  State  Bulleii  hiks,2 


gree  to  such  an  inspection.  Such  an  arrange- 
aent,  of  course,  defeats  the  purpose  of  inspection, 
t  gives  a  veto  power  over  verification  to  the  very 
itate  in  which  the  suspicious  event  takes  place.  It 
)rotects  cheating.  But  the  point  of  an  interna- 
ional  inspection  system  is  to  give  all  the  parties 
secure  confidence  that  the  treaty  is  not  being 
iolated. 

The  United  States  has  not  and  will  not  aban- 
[on  hope  that  the  Soviet  Union  will  once  again 
eaffirm  their  former  approval  of  some  interna- 
ional  verification  system  so  that  an  agreement  can 
%  ,t  long  last  become  a  reality.  If  the  Soviet  Union 
eally  wants  an  agreement  to  stop  all  testing  for- 
ver,  we  frankly  cannot  imderstand  why  some  in- 
pection  at  the  site,  which  was  acceptable  to  the 
ioviet  Union  a  year  ago,  should  not  be  acceptable 
oday. 


;tk 


Vi 


0V;( 


he  Facts  About  International  Inspection 

For  some  time  now  the  answer  of  the  Soviet 
Jnion  has  been  that  international  verification  is 
lut  a  cover  for  "imperialist  espionage" — or  words, 
n  endless  profusion,  to  that  effect.  But  whatever 
he  words,  the  answer  is  transparently  wrong. 
Lnd  let  me  tell  you  why. 

First,  the  international  inspection  teams  would 
le  chosen  and  organized  by  the  executive  officer  of 
he  international  control  system — not  by  the 
Jnited  States  or  the  United  Kingdom.  The  execu- 
ive  officer  would  be  chosen  by  the  Commission 
nly,  with  the  agreement  of  the  Soviet  Union 
mong  others. 

Second,  transportation  of  the  inspectors  to  and 

rom  the  site  would  be  under  the  control  of  the 

,|jj(  loviet  Government  or  the  country  involved.    If 

jl :  wished  it  could  even  blindfold  the  inspectors  en 

oute. 

Third,  while  at  the  site  the  international  in- 

.  fjjj  pectors  could  be  accompanied  by  such  observers 

s  the  host  government  wishes. 

Fourth,  the  areas  subject  to  inspection  would 

,pj,  e  small  and  strictly  limited  by  treaty  in  each  case. 

tl)  n  all,  the  total  area  subject  to  inspection  annually 

■  „f,  ^ould  be  an  infinitesimal  fraction  of  Soviet  terri- 

j5  5ry.    Let  us  take  the  most  extreme  assumptions : 

fjjt  a)  that  every  suspicious  event  occurred  in  a  dif- 

jiterent  area,  and   (b)   that  all  the  area  of  each 

rent  was  actually  inspected.     Even  under  such 

ij]  onditions,  the  surface  of  the  Soviet  Union  would 


tioM 


05vai 


)«tio 


>cfofaer  29,  1962 


not  be  covered  for  more  than  2,000  years.  If  se- 
curity cannot  be  protected  under  these  conditions — 
and  the  actual  conditions  would  be  much  more 
favorable — then  the  world  indeed  has  much  to  fear. 

Fifth,  the  location  of  sites  to  be  inspected  can- 
not be  determined  in  advance  by  the  United  States 
or  anyone  else.  They  would  be  determined  solely 
by  objective  instrumentation,  operating  under  in- 
ternational control. 

Finally,  only  a  limited  number  of  on-site  inspec- 
tions would  be  conducted  each  year. 

Now  let  us  try  to  see  what  would  happen.  A  sig- 
nal from  an  underground  event  would  be  received 
and  recorded  at  control  posts.  The  signals  would 
be  processed  by  the  international  commission.  If 
it  could  not  identify  the  event  as  an  earthquake,  an 
inspection  team  might  proceed  to  the  site.  The 
site  would  be  determined  solely  on  the  basis  of  the 
scientifically  recorded  signal.  Only  a  small  frac- 
tion of  such  signals  would  be  inspected  on  the  site. 
To  get  to  the  site,  the  inspection  team  would  use 
transportation  under  the  control  of  the  government 
involved.  The  team  could  carry  only  previously 
agreed  and  specified  equipment  related  to  its  im- 
mediate task.  Wliile  at  the  inspection  site  the 
team  would  be  under  the  scrutiny  of  as  many  ob- 
servers as  the  host  government  wished  to  assign. 
Its  members  could  not  leave  the  inspection  site. 
The  inspection  team  would  then  look  for  evidence 
of  an  underground  nuclear  explosion,  report  its 
findings,  and  return — under  the  same  conditions 
as  they  came.  Can  espionage  be  conducted  under 
these  circumstances  ?    The  question  answers  itself. 

We  prayerfully  hope  that  hard  facts  such  as 
these  will  prevail  over  the  mythical  specter  of 
"espionage,"  assuming  it  is  sincere.  If  they  do, 
we  should  be  able  to  complete  a  comprehensive 
nuclear  test  ban  treaty  in  fairly  short  order. 

Possibility  of  a  Limited  Ban 

But  suppose  that  the  Soviet  Union  refuses  to 
accept  a  comprehensive  and  verified  test  ban  treaty 
in  the  near  future.  Can  nothing  then  be  done  to 
curb  the  nuclear  arms  race  that  is  so  dangerous  in 
peace  as  well  as  war  and  so  dreadfully  costly,  when 
so  much  of  the  world  is  in  such  need?  Yes,  Mr. 
Cliairman,  a  great  deal  could  be  done,  and  it  is  so 
easy  to  do  that  I  find  it  incomprehensible  that  we 
are  still  discussing  it. 

I  refer,  of  course,  to  an  agreement  to  ban  aU 

639 


weapons  testing  in  the  water,  in  the  atmosphere, 
and  in  outer  space,  that  is,  all  testing  above 
ground.  We  have  been  referring  to  this  as  a 
"limited  ban."  I  repeat  that  the  United  States 
would  much  prefer  a  comprehensive  treaty  barring 
all  testing  everj'where.  But  if  that  is  impossible, 
a  half  loaf  is  better  than  none.  And  it  is  more 
than  a  half  loaf,  because  at  least  90  percent  of  the 
force  of  all  nuclear  tests  from  the  beginning  has 
been  exploded  above  ground.  In  this  sense  a  ban 
on  all  but  underground  testing  would  deal  with 
90  percent  of  the  problem.  And  it  would  deal 
with  the  test  environments  of  greatest  concern. 
There  is  no  radioactive  fallout  from  an  under- 
ground test,  and  from  the  viewpoint  of  radiation 
hazards  a  treaty  banning  tests  in  the  oceans,  the 
atmosphere,  and  outer  space  would  end  at  least 
that  growing  hazard  to  mankind  everywhere. 

I  say  such  an  agreement  should  be  easy  to  make. 
Why?  Because  national  detection  systems  are 
now  so  well  developed  that  we  can  rely  on  them  to 
identify  nuclear  explosions  miless  they  take  place 
imderground.  No  on-site  inspection  is  necessary 
for  explosions  above  ground.  The  vexatious  issue 
of  inspection  is  eliminated.  Indeed,  there  is  no 
obstacle  whatever  to  such  an  agreement. 

There  remains  only  one  question :  Will  the 
Soviet  Union  agree  with  the  other  nuclear  powers 
to  cease  and  desist  from  the  testing  of  nuclear 
weapons  in  the  oceans,  in  the  atmosphere,  and  in 
outer  space? 

Again  I  regret  to  say  that  the  response  from 
the  Soviet  side  is  negative.  They  have  rejected 
even  such  a  limited  test  ban  agreement  because 
they  say  it  would  "legalize  underground  testing." 
But  it  would  do  no  such  thing.  It  would,  instead, 
make  testing  in  three  environments  illegal — the 
environments  where  most  all  of  the  testing  takes 
place  and  the  environments  where  all  of  the  radia- 
tion takes  place.  Moreover,  it  would  break  the 
deadlock  at  long  last  and  bring  us  a  long  leap 
forward  toward  the  ensuing  steps  to  sanity  and 
safety. 

Should  we  refuse  to  outlaw  testing  in  three  en- 
vironments— which  is  in  our  grasp  this  very  day — 
just  because  we  can't  agree  on  tlie  fourth  environ- 
ment ?  Surely  the  question  of  disarmament  is  one 
field  in  which  any  part  of  a  loaf  is  better  than 
none,  and  this  is  nine-tenths  of  a  loaf. 

The  United  States  and  tlie  United  Kingdom 
want  to  sign  a  treaty  banning  all  nuclear  tests 


640 


above  ground — without  any  inspection  whateveri 
And  we  have  put  forward  a  draft  text.* 

I  do  not  know  why  the  Soviet  Union,  having 
once  approved  the  principle  of  international  in 
spection  which  would  make  possible  a  compre 
hensive  ban,  has  since  opposed  any  inspection  a 
all.  And  it  is  even  more  difficidt  to  understan( 
why  the  Soviet  Union  declines  to  ban  tests  in  thi 
environment,  where  we  all  agree  that  external  o 
national  detecting  sj'stems  are  adequate.  But  w 
will  everlastingly  hope  that  this  opposition  to  an; 
progress  will  thaw  here  in  this  room — and,  if  i 
does  nothing  else,  this  General  Assembly  of  th 
United  Nations  will  thereupon  become  an  histori 
success. 


fro 


da 
aor 
ten 
n 
tk 
reri 
I 

iive 
abli 
W 
» 


irce 
m 
mi 

:c 

ssa 
mj 
m 


SI 

vei 

h 

3tes 

imi 

01 

lorrc 


if 


A  Choice  Between  Hope  and  Horror 

Let  me  now,  Mr.  Chairman,  recapitulate  ver 
briefly  just  where  we  stand  on  the  nuclear  testing  j,, 
issue. 

First,  we  are  deeply  committed  to  the  goal  ( 
general  and  complete  disarmament,  including  tl 
total  elimination  of  all  nuclear  weapons  and  a 
means  of  their  delivery — a  process  which  we  pn 
pose  to  start  in  the  first  stage  of  general  disarm; 
ment.  The  United  States  delegation  will  retui 
to  the  Eighteen-Nation  Disarmament  Conferen( 
with  every  intention  of  staying  there  for  as  Ion 
as  may  be  necessary. 

Second,  we  are  prepared  to  sign  at  once  a  treat 
banning  all  further  tests  in  all  environments,  pn 
vided  only  that  the  Soviet  Union  accepts  tl 
detection  and  verification  procedures,  under  inte 
national  control,  which  are  scientifically  necessai  ^j|j^ 
in  order  to  detect  and  identify  undergi-ound  test 

Third,  if  the  Soviet  Union  cannot  or  will  n 
tolerate  this  modicimi  of  cooperation,  we  are  pr 
pared  to  sign  immediately  a  treaty  banning  a 
tests  above  ground,  where  we  have  the  nation 
capability  of  identifying  Soviet  tests — that  is, 
the  oceans,  the  atmosphere,  and  outer  space.  Ai 
this  is  no  unimportant  step;  it  woidd  eliminate  i 
further  poisoning  of  the  atmosphere;  it  wou 
sharply  inhibit  further  nuclear  weapons  develo 
ment;  it  would  put  a  partial  brake  on  the  proli 
eration  of  nuclear  weapons  capability;  and  su 
an  invigorating  step  forward  would  make  a  ne 
step  easier.  It  would  set  us  on  the  path  towa 
disarmament. 


Mill 
if  pre 
h 

wiri 
ielif 
al 


pjcel 
iytl 
fcfiil 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept.  17,  1962,  p.  415. 

Department  of  Stale   Bullel 


t( 


vei 


In  the  light  of  all  the  conclusions  we  can  draw 
from  our  extensive  experience  with  the  nuclear 
:est  issue — in  light  of  the  progress  that  has  been 

ji  made  between  the  last  Assembly  and  this  one — the 
Qnited  States  Government  is  neither  pessimistic 
lor  optimistic.  We  are  simply  and  doggedly  de- 
ermined  to  keep  at  it  mitil  reason  prevails,  vmtil 
live  arrest  the  upward  spiral  of  nuclear  arms  and 
hen  tum  it  downward — in  stages  which  can  be 
/erified  by  a  grateful  world  community. 

The  moment  may  be  at  hand  wlien  a  comprehen- 
iive  nuclear  test  ban  treaty  has  again  become  pos- 
sible. The  Soviet  Union  has  had  two  large  nuclear 
est  series  in  the  past  year.  The  United  States  is 
•ompleting  a  series  begun  last  spring.  Although 
he  explosive  force  of  the  Soviet  nuclear  blasts  far 
exceeds  the  United  States  tests,  we  are  quite  pre- 
)ared  to  stop  testing  now  as  soon  as  we  have  de- 
pendable means  of  knowing  that  the  Soviet  Union 
s  going  to  stop  and  stay  stopped.  If  the  U.S.S.R. 
s  satisfied  with  the  progress  in  its  present  testing 
)rogram,  a  rare  period  of  equilibrium  may  have 
)een  reached  in  this  sector  of  the  arms  race.  This 
s  a  time,  therefore,  when  finn  insistence  by  the 
jreneral  Assembly  can  forestall  another  cycle  of 
uiclear  tests.  Let  us  make  the  most  of  this  deci- 
live  moment  before  it  passes  from  us. 
In  conclusion,  Mr.  Chairman  and  fellow  dele- 

™  rates,  let  me  say  that  we  are  at  one  of  the  fateful 
urning  points  of  histoi-y,  when  the  ci^dlization 
if  our  times  faces  a  choice  between  hope  and 
lorror.    If  we  choose  wrong,  or  fail  to  choose  at 

*  '1 ,11,  the  consequences  to  a  world  already  sorely 
vounded  by  two  world  wars  in  a  generation  are 

sai  riglitening  at  best.     If  we  choose  rightly,  the 
fenius  of  man  can  carry  us  on  to  new  triimiphs 
■"  if  progress  and  brotherhood. 

If  we  could  here  today,  or  in  Geneva  tomorrow, 
gree  to  ban  nuclear  testing  of  every  kind,  with 
ecurity  for  all,  we  would  lift  a  heavy  burden  from 
he  hearts  and  shoulders  of  all  mankind.  If  we 
an't,  then  let  us  at  least,  and  without  further 

iteii|,rgument  or  acrimony,  do  what  we  can  for  our 
ellow  man  and  clear  the  seas,  the  air,  and  the 

el«l  pace  beyond  of  these  ghastly  weapons  and  their 

)oisonous  spawn.   There  is  no  reason  imder  heaven 

I'  chy  this  step  should  not  be  taken  now,  and  every 

eason  why  it  should  be  taken.    Let  us  close  our 

0151'  ateful  discussion  by  resolving  imanimously  to  end 
uch  tests  and  emancipate  our  people — yes,  and 
lur  conscience — from  this  bondage. 

Dcfofaer  29,  1962 


.li 


ne 


President  Kennedy  Holds  Talks 
With  Crown  Prince  of  Saudi  Arabia 

Followi/ng  is  the  text  of  a  joint  com/nvwriique  'by 
President  Kennedy  and  Crown  Prince  Faysal  of 
Savdi  Arabia  issued  at  the  close  of  talks  held  at 
Washington  on  October  6. 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  5 

On  October  5  His  Royal  Higliness  Crown 
Prince  Faysal  and  President  Kennedy  held  pri- 
vate talks  at  the  Wliite  House.  Frank  and  cor- 
dial discussions  were  held  on  Saudi  Arabian- 
American  relations  and  on  the  world  situation. 
Crown  Prince  Faysal  and  the  President  are  con- 
fident that  this  opportmiity  to  become  personally 
acquainted  will  lead  to  increased  mutual  under- 
standing between  the  United  States  and  Saudi 
Arabia. 


United  States  Congratulates 
Uganda  on  Independence 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  letter  from  President 
Kennedy  to  Prime  Minister  A.  Milton  Ohote  of 
Uganda. 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  S 

October  5,  19G2 
Dear  Mr.  Prime  Minister  :  I  congratulate  you 
and  your  people  upon  Uganda's  independence. 
The  government  and  the  people  of  the  United 
States  wish  Uganda  a  prosperous  futiu-e  as  a 
sovereign  nation. 

The  principle  of  self-determination  in  Africa 
has  in  Uganda  proved  once  more  its  truth  and 
strength.  This  principle  inspired  our  own  people 
in  their  struggle  for  independence,  and  we  there- 
fore feel  a  special  kinship  and  pride  in  welcoming 
Uganda  to  the  community  of  free  nations. 

A  coimnon  devotion  to  the  United  Nations  Char- 
ter will  strongly  bind  our  nations  in  the  impera- 
tive task  of  building  a  just  and  peaceful  world. 
Uganda's  independence  strengthens  the  forces 
working  toward  this  goal. 

Sincerely, 

John  F.  Kennedy 


641 


lof 


United  States  Presents  Facilities  at  Fort  McNair 
to  Inter-American  Defense  College 


Address  by  Secretary  Rush  ^ 


I  am  greatly  honored  to  present  to  tlie  Inter- 
American  Defense  Board,  on  belialf  of  the  United 
States,  these  facilities  at  Fort  McNair  for  use  by 
its  Inter-American  Defense  College.  They  consist 
of  an  academic  administrative  building,  with  an 
auditorium;  an  officers'  field  mess;  and  a  bachelor 
officers'  quarters  which  was  once  the  Walter  Reed 
Army  Hospital — intimately  associated  with  inter- 
American  cooperation  in  making  this  hemisphere 
a  safer  and  better  place  to  live.  The  Government 
and  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  are  gratified 
and  honored  to  make  this  contribution. 

The  Inter- American  Defense  College  was  con- 
ceived 5  years  ago.  Its  function,  as  stated  then, 
is  to  "conduct  courses  of  study  on  the  Inter- Amer- 
ican system,  and  on  the  military,  economic  and 
political,  and  social  factors  that  constitute  essen- 
tial components  of  inter-American  defense  in 
order  to  enhance  the  preparation  of  selected  per- 
sonnel of  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  American  re- 
publics for  undertaking  of  international  coopera- 
tion." 

That  statement  recognizes  that  our  common  pur- 
pose— safeguarding  the  independence,  jDeace,  and 
well-being  of  the  American  Eepublics — is  not  only 
a  military  problem  but  political,  economic,  and 
social  as  well.  It  is  just  as  important  for  military 
men  to  understand  these  other  essentials  of  the 
defense  of  freedom  as  it  is  for  civilians  to  under- 
stand the  vital  role  of  the  military.  The  curricula 
of  our  own  National  War  College  and  our  other 
senior  service  colleges  take  account  of  the  full 
breadth  and  complexity  of  the  world  struggle  in 
which  we  are  encasred. 


'  Made  on  the  occasion  of  the  dedication  of  facilities  at 
Fort  McNair  for  use  by  the  Inter-American  Defense  Col- 
lege at  Washington,  D.C.,  on  Oct.  9  (press  release  COO). 


642 


toti 


H 

net 


for 


And  so,  I  am  informed,  will  the  curriculum  of 
the  Inter-American  Defense  College.  It  is  to  be 
congratulated  on  having  obtained  some  of  the' 
hemisphere's  leading  statesmen  for  its  lecture^  *"! 
courses.  The  unique  luiowledge  of  world  proh 
lems  that  these  men  ofl'er  cannot  but  deepen  thei  H 
understanding  in  tomorrow's  military  leaders  ofl  F 
the  urgent  need  to  strengthen  democracy  in  the 
hemisphere. 

Military  collaboration  among  American  gov 
ernments  has  not  developed  haphazardly.  It  has 
grown  in  response  to  three  serious  challenges  to  ^[ 
the  security  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  The 
first,  of  course,  was  the  threat  of  Axis  dominatior 
that  arose  in  World  War  II.  Then,  in  1950,  we- 
faced  the  threat  of  global  war  provoked  by  thw 
Korean  conflict.  And  now  we  are  confronted  wit? 
Conununist  intervention  into  the  territory  and  af 
fairs  of  this  hemisphere. 

Our  response  to  these  threats  underlines  our  in 
terdependence  in  peace  and  war.  Taken  as  i 
whole,  it  has  resulted  in  the  development  of  tin 
inter- American  security  system,  based  on  the  Ri( 
Treaty  of  1947  and  subsequent  multilateral  instru 
ments  which  gave  that  treaty  meaning  and  force  ™f 
These  regional  defense  arrangements  are  in  ful 
accord  with  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations. 

The  survival  of  our  free  societies  in  this  hemi 
sphere  today  is  dependent  on  our  recognition  o 
the  threat  directed  against  us  by  a  powerful  an 
ruthless  foe.  Our  response  now — those  commo 
measures  which  we  are  taking  and  will  take  fo 
our  own  security — serves  to  protect  the  security  o 
all  mankind. 

Wliat  is  the  crisis  in  the  hemisphere  today  ? 
tliink  it  was  outlined  in  the  clearest  terms  at  tl: 
informal  meeting  last  week  of  the  foreign  mini 


lieirti 


Department  of  State   Bulleti 


iiTori 
ipac 


!»5.  ; 


'ffttt 


w 


ters  of  the  American  Eepublics.^  We  found  unan- 
imously that  the  most  urgent  issue  before  us  is 
the  Sino-Soviet  intervention  in  Cuba  and  its  aim 
of  converting  tliat  island  into  an  armed  base  for 
Communist  penetration  and  subversion  of  demo- 
cratic institutions  in  the  American  Republics. 

As  a  result,  the  Council  of  the  Organization  of 
American  States,  in  sessions  that  begin  today,  is 
considering  the  further  steps  that  are  required 
to  give  effect  to  Resolution  II  ^  adopted  at  Punta 
del  Este  to  counter  Commimist  intervention.  The 
Council  also  will  reexamine  the  trade  relations  of 
the  American  Republics  with  Cuba  in  accord  with 
Resolution  VIII  ^  of  that  same  meeting.  As  you 
will  recall,  that  resolution  established  the  hemi- 
sphere embargo  on  transfer  of  arms  and  munitions 
:o  the  Castro  regime.  In  this  effort,  I  am  happy 
to  point  out,  many  of  our  friends  and  allies  in 
,1,  3ther  parts  of  the  world  are  cooperating  by  extend- 
ing these  restrictions  to  the  movement  of  strategic 
^oods  as  well  as  armaments  proper. 

Here  in  this  hemisphere,  as  a  direct  result  of  last 
week's  informal  meeting,  we  are  united  in  moving 
more  vigorously  to  check  the  Castro-Communist 
regime's  use  against  us  of  their  concealed  instru- 
ments of  war.  We  agreed  to  intensify  our  efforts 
to  check  subversion  by  agents  and  groups  working 
for  international  cormnunism.  Again,  collec- 
;ively  and  individually,  as  authorized  by  Resolu- 
tion II  of  Punta  del  Este,  we  also  agreed  to  devise 
means  of  checking  the  subversive  traffic  in  funds, 
people,  and  propaganda  from  the  island  of  Cuba. 

All  of  us  at  the  informal  meeting  agreed  whole- 
aeartedly  with  the  fundamental  principle  that  the 
bmmmiist  intervention  in  Cuba  cannot  be  justi- 
fied as  analogous  to  the  defensive  measures  we 
idopt  jointly  with  countries  in  other  parts  of  the 
free  world  to  deter  Soviet  imperialism. 

The  free  nations  of  this  hemisphere,  united  not 
mly  by  geogi-aphy  but  by  our  common  revolution- 
iry  origins,  have  for  more  than  seven  decades  built 
ip  a  close  association  among  themselves.  That 
issociation  is  based  on  common  principles  em- 
)odied  in  many  treaties  and  agreements  which  are 
lesigned  to  protect  their  peoples  against  aggres- 
sion. This  is  the  basis  of  our  proper,  conmnon 
;oncern  over  Soviet  intervention  in  Cuba  and, 


tb 


'  Bulletin  of  Oct.  22,  1962,  p.  598. 
'  For  text,  see  ibid.,  Feb.  19, 1962,  p.  279. 


lliM    *  For  text,  see  ibid.,  p.  282. 
jlleti  Dc/ober  29,  7962 


through  Cuba,  in  the  other  American  Republics. 
The  Soviet  Union's  contention  that  it  is  doing 
no  more  in  arming  Cuba  than  we  are  doing  jointly 
with  free-world  nations  is  nonsense — and  is  re- 
futed by  the  record  of  aggression  reflected  in  the 
agenda  of  the  United  Nations  since  1945.  Free- 
dom is  not  negotiable.  It  never  can  be  if  our  sys- 
tem is  to  endure. 

Improving  the  Lot  of  the  Common  Man 

One  of  the  most  significant  results  of  the  infor- 
mal ministerial  meeting  last  week  was  the  empha- 
sis that  all  put  upon  the  need  to  strengthen  repre- 
sentative democracy  in  the  hemisphere.  I  think  it 
is  notable  that,  while  considering  defensive  meas- 
ures to  counter  the  threat  of  the  growing  Soviet 
presence  in  Cuba,  we  were  unanimous  in  the  con- 
viction that  greater  effort  is  needed  to  bring  prog- 
ress and  ijrosperity  to  our  peoples. 

We  must  recognize  that  the  basic  crisis  which 
we  all  face  today  grows  out  of  the  determination 
of  ill-housed,  ill-fed  men  and  women  on  every 
continent  to  create  for  themselves  and  their  chil- 
dren an  environment  in  which  hunger  and  disease 
cease  to  be  daily  companions. 

Communism  feeds  on  the  miseries  and  resent- 
ments of  this  vast  sector  of  our  growing  popula- 
tions. Our  urgent  task  is  to  aid  these  deprived 
masses  in  achieving  improved  living  conditions 
while  at  the  same  time  securing  their  rights  of 
self-respect  and  freedom  from  despotic  rule.  As 
in  the  defense  of  our  system  against  Communist 
aggression  and  subversion,  so  also  are  we  united 
in  our  resolve  to  bring  to  the  people  of  this  hemi- 
sphere the  promise  of  economic  and  social  develop- 
ment that  is  inherent  in  the  Alliance  for  Progress. 

I  would  like  to  make  it  clear  that  this  pledge 
is  extended  to  the  oppressed  people  of  Cuba  as  well. 
Many  peoples  in  this  hemisphere,  including  many 
in  the  United  States,  were  sympathetic  to  the  pro- 
claimed original  aims  of  the  Cuban  revolution. 
There  is  genuine  interest  among  us  all  in  the  free- 
dom and  social  well-being  of  the  Cuban  people. 

In  the  communique  expressing  their  deep  con- 
cern over  the  increasing  involvement  of  the  Sino- 
Soviet  powers  in  the  affairs  of  Cuba,  the  other 
Republics  of  the  hemisphere  confirmed  the  Cuban 
regime's  status  as  the  outcast  of  the  inter-American 
system.  But  there  can  be  no  doubt  about  our  de- 
sire to  welcome  back  to  the  family  of  American 
nations  a  Cuba  whose  government  is  compatible 

643 


1 


with  the  purpose  and  principles  of  the  inter- 
American  system.  Tliis  offer  was  renewed  in  tlie 
communique  when  the  ministers  voiced  their  affec- 
tion and  sympathy  for  the  victims  of  the  present 
regime. 

Military  Civic  Action  Program 

In  pressing  our  campaign  to  improve  the  lot  of 
the  common  man  in  the  hemisphere,  I  believe  tlie 
military  from  all  our  countries  must  play  an  ac- 
tive role.  And  the  most  immediate  application  of 
their  talents  would  be  through  a  sharply  stepped- 
up  program  of  civic  action. 

The  United  States  Government  would  like  to  see 
Latin  American  armed  forces  increase  their  par- 
ticipation in  modernizing  the  basic  facilities  of  all 
the  American  Republics.  "We  believe  they  could 
borrow  profitably  from  the  long  and  honorable 
record  of  our  United  States  Army  Corps  of 
Engineers  in  strengthening  the  civilian  economy. 

Wlien  the  United  States  became  an  independent 
nation  almost  200  years  ago,  only  the  Atlantic 
coastal  region  was  settled  and  developed.  The 
only  engineers  were  a  few  Army  officers  who  had 
been  trained  in  France;  so  naturally  the  Govern- 
ment used  these  engineers  for  many  nonmilitary 
tasks.  They  built  lighthouses  and  harbors  to  serve 
the  shipping  on  which  the  maritime  colonies  de- 
pended. They  built  the  early  railroads  in  tliis 
country,  and  one  of  them,  Lieutenant  George 
Wlieeler,  became  so  proficient  that  he  was  lent  to 
the  czar's  government  to  build  the  Russian  rail- 
way system.  They  charted  highway  routes,  built 
canals,  and  opened  river  waterways.  They  system^ 
atically  explored  the  resources  of  the  wilderness 
and  paved  the  way  for  settlement  and  develop- 
ment. They  mapped  the  shorelines,  rivers, 
mountains,  and  valleys.  Among  their  efforts  was 
the  construction  of  the  dome  of  the  United  States 
Capitol  building  and  the  Washington  Monimient. 
Today  the  civil  works  program  of  the  Army  En- 
gineers is  confined  mainly  to  water-resource  work, 
but  that  work  has  become  one  of  the  United 
States'  most  important  internal  development  ef- 
forts, costing  about  a  billion  dollars  a  year. 

As  you  know,  units  from  the  armed  forces  of  a 
number  of  American  states,  notably,  Peru,  Bolivia, 
Brazil,  and  Chile,  have  been  engaged  in  civic  ac- 
tion as  a  matter  of  standard  practice  over  the 
years.  In  Peru  and  Bolivia  this  country,  through 
its  military   assistance  program,  has  supported 


644 


engineer  construction  units.  We  are  now  actively 
planning  the  expansion  of  this  program  in  other 
countries  of  the  hemisphere. 

Joint  U.S.-Ecuadorean  Projects 

I  would  like  to  call  attention  to  the  joint  United 
States-Ecuador  military  civic  action  program 
which  started  this  summer.  It  is  now  well  into 
its  first  phase  with  the  inauguration  of  two  proj- 
ects :  the  construction  of  a  20-mile  irrigation  canal 
from  the  Caluguro  River  to  the  community  of 
Santa  Rosa,  and  the  repair  and  construction  of 
Alamor.  Other  projects  scheduled  for  initiation 
this  year  include  facilities  for  the  provision  of 
potable  water  in  Guayaquil  and  Salinas,  con- 
struction of  a  road  and  airpoi't  at  Esmeraldas,  re- 
furbishing of  the  cultural  center  at  Giron,  and  a 
number  of  road  repair  and  building  projects. 
We  also  look  to  the  program  to  improve  public 
health  and  education  facilities. 

This  joint  operation  of  self-help  involves  the 
stationing  of  27  U.S.  Army  persomiel  in  Ecuador 
With  their  technical  assistance,  Ecuadorean  Army 
units  are  directing  the  efforts  of  about  10,000  civil- 
ian laborers  who  are  volunteering  their  services 
I  think  Secretary  of  Defense  [Robert  S.]  Mc- 
Namara  expressed  all  of  our  thoughts  aptly  wher 
he  said  that  the  real  long-term  security  of  this 
hemisphere  "depends  on  economic  growth  fai 
more  than  upon  the  use  of  military  forces.  Thiii 
is  exactly  what  the  Alliance  for  Progres" 
contemplates." 

I  need  not  emphasize  the  very  substantial  po 
litical  advantages  to  be  realized  by  a  wholeheartec 
expansion  in  the  Military  Civic  Action  Program 
I  would  suggest  that  the  full  range  of  activitie 
possible  under  joint  civic  action  programs  lie.  mad' 
a  main  field  of  .study  by  the  Inter-American  De 
fense  College. 

The  ultimate  solution  to  the  problems  that  fac 
us  today  will  be  the  achievement  of  political,  eco 
nomic,  and  social  stability  under  democratic  instij 
tut  ions.  All  elements  of  society  have  a  role  i: 
this  solution,  the  militarv  forces  most  important! f!' 


Ai 


Si 


conti 
ew 
■It 
To 


of  Wi 

mi 

Ev( 

;k 

Over 

torie( 

4ii 

'lose 
h 
I  feel 
in 
Oirien 
br,l, 
liarnii 


so.  It  is  toward  this  end  that  we  all  must  worl- 
With  a  deep  sense  of  the  historic  significanc 
of  this  occasion  and  with  utmost  confidence  i 
what  it  represents  for  the  future,  on  behalf  of  th 
United  States  of  America  I  turn  over  these  facil 
ties  to  the  Inter- American  Defense  Board  for  uj 
by  its  Inter-American  Defense  College. 

Department  of  State  Bulleti 


iitiiiie 

illtlOll 


A  Bridge  for  the  Americas 


hy  Under  Secretary  Ball  ^ 


No  one  of  us  here  this  morning  can  be  unaware 
that  this  indeed  is  the  center  of  the  New  World. 
This  is  the  point  of  conjunction — that  dot  on  the 
■i  ^  earth's  surface  that  marks  the  crossing  of  the  paths 
from  one  great  ocean  to  another  and  from  one  vast 
continent  to  another.     This  is  the  center  of  the 
New  World — by  the  logic  of  geograpliy,  the  prece- 
dent of  history,  the  mandate  of  economic  progress. 
' '"      Today  we  are  dedicating  a  bridge,  this  massive 
7et  graceful  span  of  gleaming  metal  that  now 
eaps     from    hemisphere    to    hemisphere.     This 
bridge  makes  Panama  more  than  ever  a  cross- 
roads, and  like  so  many  other  of  the  world's  cross- 
roads— like  Istanbid,  like  Suez,  like  Berlin — this 
''"  ionfiuence  of  world  geogi'aphy  is  also  a  confluence 
"  jf  world   history :    a   relay   post  where   destiny 
hanges  horses. 

Even  before  Europeans  crossed  the  sea,  this 
sthmus  was  itself  serving  as  a  cultural  bridge. 
Dver  it  passed  the  men  who  brought  the  first  re- 
lorded  civilization  to  South  America — the  men 
'  '"*'  vho  in  time  came  to  populate  the  great  southern 
'-'""  ;ontinent  from  one  end  to  the  other.  Columbus, 
""'  (vhose  adventurous  spirit  we  honor  on  this  Dia  de 
a  Kaza,  sailed  along  these  shores  and  lingered  for 
I  week  in  Chiriqui  lagoon.  Balboa  crossed  this 
stlunus  in  1513,  and  from  the  famous  "peak  in 
Darien"  first  saw  the  Pacific.  Pizarro,  a  decade 
ater,  launched  from  Panama  that  incredible  feat 
)f  arms — the  conquest  of  Peru.  Two  famous  buc- 
janeers — Francis  Drake  in  the  IGth  century  and 
lenry  Morgan  in  the  I7th  century — made  their 
'ortunes  on  this  coast.  The  inspired  liberator- 
Bolivar — called  the  first  pan-American 
*'  lonference  here,  in  1826.     In  1855  the  isthmus  was 


CTfi 


raft 

ji  to 
role 


, 


t  won  ■ 


ife»»!  3imon 


e  fifil  *  Address  made  at  a  ceremony  dedicating  the  Thatcher 
foilli  Terry  Bridge  at  Balboa  Heights,  Panama  Canal  Zone,  on 
)ct.  12  (press  release  617  dated  Oct.  11). 


Jcfober  29,  1962 


the  site  of  the  first  transcontinental  railroad. 
And  the  modern  age  opened  in  1914 — not  only  in 
Europe  with  the  war  but  here  with  the  completion 
of  the  Panama  Canal. 

Expansion  of  World  Commerce 

Strife,  violence,  and  bloodshed  marked  many 
of  the  historic  encounters  that  took  place  in  the 
past  along  these  shores.  But  today,  in  the  free 
world  at  least,  a  new  spirit  informs  our  actions. 
It  is  a  spirit  of  partnership,  a  spirit  of  community. 
It  rests  on  the  faith  that  different  men  of  different 
creeds  and  different  tongues  and  different  customs 
can  best  advance  their  fortunes  not  by  fighting 
one  another  but  by  working  together.  Far  more 
than  many  of  us  yet  realize,  that  spirit  of  coopera- 
tion is  rising  and  asserting  itself  all  across  the 
free  world. 

That  spirit  is  evident  in  the  new  sense  of  unity 
that  is  pervading  Europe  and  that  is  bringing  into 
being  the  great  European  Common  INIarket.  It 
is  evident  as  well  in  the  growing  Atlantic  partner- 
ship between  the  United  States  and  the  nations 
of  Europe.  And  what  should  be  made  clear  be- 
yond question  here  today  is  that  the  Atlantic  part- 
iiership  will  never  be  inward-looking  or  selfish  in 
motivation.  It  will  be,  rather,  an  open  partner- 
ship— a  combining  of  resources  that  can  provide 
a  vast  market  for  producers  everywhere,  as  well 
as  a  new  element  of  strength  against  the  enemies 
of  freedom. 

That  partnership  can — indeed  it  will — serve  not 
only  the  interests  of  my  country  but  also  of  Latin 
America.  Yesterday  in  Washington  I  watched 
when  President  Kennedy  signed  the  legislation 
that  brought  into  being  the  new  Trade  Expansion 
Act.=    That  act  is  not  a  measure  merely  to  serve 


'  See  p.  655. 


645 


\ 


the  interests  of  United  States  producers.  It  takes 
special  note  of  the  stake  and  concern  of  the  nations 
of  Latin  America  in  their  trade  with  the  United 
States  and  with  the  countries  of  the  new  united 
Europe.  "Witli  the  broad  powers  provided  by  that 
act,  we  sliould,  working  closely  with  the  govern- 
ments of  Latin  America,  be  able  to  bring  about  a 
very  substantial  expansion  of  the  commerce  of 
the  world — for  the  benefit  of  all  of  us. 

Alliance  for  Progress 

The  new  era  in  international  cooperation  is 
being  given  concrete  meaning  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  as  well  as  in  Atlantic  relations.  We 
have  moved  beyond  the  policy  of  good  neighbor- 
liness  to  the  policy  of  common  endeavor.  This 
new  policy  finds  a  noble  expression  in  the  Aliansa 
para  el  Progreso — the  Alliance  for  Progress. 
Through  this  program  of  vast  conception,  capital 
and  skills  are  being  shared  so  that  each  of  the 
free  nations  of  this  hemisphere  can  help  itself 
along  the  road  to  progress  and  so  that  each  can 
achieve  those  economic  and  social  advances  that  so 
often — in  so  many  areas — are  the  essential  condi- 
tions to  that  progress. 

The  new  era  is  evident  also  in  the  two  Common 
Markets,  now  getting  under  way  in  Central  and 
in  South  America,  which  can  do  so  much  to  widen 
the  economic  opportunities  and  enrich  the  people 
of  our  hemisphere. 

Economic  Problems  of  Latin  America 

The  economic  problems  that  you  face  here — 
the  economic  problems  that  confront  the  whole  of 
Latin  America — are  admittedly  not  easy  to  over- 
come. But  neither  are  they  beyond  the  wit  or 
will  of  those  of  us  who  live  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, provided  we  work  with  a  common  purpose 
and  a  common  dedication.  We  have  learned  a 
great  deal  in  the  past  few  years  about  the  process 
of  economic  development.  And  what  has  emerged 
as  the  overriding  element  is  the  indispensable  need 
for  a  di-iving  determination  on  the  part  of  the 
developing  nations  to  help  themselves. 

I  can  say  to  j'ou  today  with  all  sincerity  that 
there  is  no  nation  in  Latin  America,  provided  it 
possesses  that  driving  determination,  that  cannot 
make  solid  and  steady  progress  toward  a  higher 
standard  of  living.  The  Government  and  the 
people  of  the  United  States  are  determined  to  ap- 


646 


ply  all  of  the  resources  they  can  make  available 
in  a  massive  combined  undertaking  with  the  peo- 
ples of  Latin  America  to  assist  them  in  this  task 
so  clearly  in  keeping  with  our  common  ideals. 

We  have  shown  our  willingness  to  work  together 
in  this  hemisphere  on  many  occasions.  We  shall 
continue  to  seek  new  opportunities  for  lending  a 
willing  hand  to  all  of  the  nations  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  that  are  fully  dedicated  to  the  earnest 
pursuit  of  economic  development. 

We  are  making  solid  progress. 

At  this  very  time  the  Inter- American  Economic 
and  Social  Council  is  in  session  in  Mexico  City. 
The  representatives  of  my  Government  are  meet- 
ing with  the  representatives  of  Panama  and  the 
other  Latin  American  states  in  an  effort  to  develop 
new  and  more  effective  means  for  hemispheric 
cooperation. 

In  Washington  the  Inter-American  Develop- 
ment Bank  is  completing  its  second  year  of  opera- 
tion. It  has  now  made  loans  to  all  of  its  Latin 
American  members  and  is  looking  forward  to  an 
even  more  active  program  for  next  year. 

And  during  the  past  few  months  we  have  turned' 
our  attention  toward  the  solution  of  another  prob- 
lem that  has  retarded  the  economic  developmenli 
of  Latin  America.    INTore  and  more  it  has  become 
evident  that  rapid  cyclical  fluctuations  in  com- 
modity prices  can  frustrate  the  most  earnest  effort; 
toward  the  development  of  nations  that  are  deter 
mined  to  build  their  economies.    Two  weeks  ag< 
we  took  a  long  stride  toward  the  beginning  of  i 
solution  of  this  problem  when  the  United  States 
Brazil,  Costa  Eica,  and  other  countries  of  Latii 
America  signed  a  broad  new  agreement  looking 
toward  the  stabilization  of  coffee  prices  in  th 
world  market.' 

Defense  Through  Common  Action 

But  just  as  man  cannot  live  by  bread  alone,  a 
societies  cannot  grow  and  flourish  merely  by  im  iistee 


proving  their  economic  well-being.  The  first  dut; 
of  any  state  is  to  look  out  for  the  security  of  it 
citizens.  Security  does  not  depend  just  on  tin 
accumulation  of  guns  and  tanks  and  airplanes.    I 


isla: 
tat 
nati 

W 
op 
ak 
coin 

t: 

inci 
jffis: 
anil 


ofC 
ilH 
Casti 
ikc 

Spirit 

Til 
flemi 
it  is  I 
ctted 
tatioi 
itire 


m 
For 


ol  fri( 


Itii 


means  the  achievement  of  political  stability  a  liose 
home;  it  requires  the  courage  and  reliance  tha 
can  come  only  from  a  people  animated  by  an  inne 
sense  of  freedom ;  but  in  the  fuial  analysis  it  raus 


'  See  I).  (!67. 


Department  of  Stale   Bullet' 


mi 


«i 


;W{ 


be  based  on  the  unshakable  determination  of  like- 
minded  nations  to  assure  their  own  defense 
through  common  action. 

Just  last  week  the  foreign  ministers  of  the 
American  Republics  renewed  their  historic  pledge 
that  the  Western  Hemisphere  will  never  tolerate 
intrusion  or  invasion  of  foreign  despots  into  the 
life  and  affairs  of  this  hemisphere.^ 

This  meeting  recognized  that  the  Sino-Soviet 
intervention  in  Cuba,  designed  to  convert  that 
island  into  an  armed  base  for  Communist  pene- 
tration of  the  hemisphere,  is  a  problem  for  all  free 
nations  of  Latin  America.  The  ministers  also 
agreed  upon  measures  to  counter  this  threat — co- 
(jj  operative  measures  to  render  Cuba  ineffective  as 
jU  a  beachhead  for  Communist  penetration  of  their 
lountries. 

The  action  which  we  American  states  have  taken 
in  common  to  guard  against  the  intrusion  of  ag- 
ijjgressive  Communist  power  into  this  hemisphere — 
jtii  an  intrusion  made  possible  only  by  the  weakness 
md  connivance  of  the  Castro  government — does 
not  in  any  sense  detract  from  the  friendship,  in- 
deed the  affection,  that  we  all  feel  for  the  people 
of  Cuba.  Nor  does  it  diminish  the  hope  which  we 
all  devoutly  share  that,  purged  of  the  cancer  of 
Castroism,  Cuba  may  return  before  too  long  to 
the  community  of  free  American  states. 


Spirit  of  Common  Endeavor 

The  new  spirit  that  is  rising  in  the  Western 

Hemisphere  is  not  based  on  dogma  and  tyranny ; 

it  is  not  founded  on  the  importation  of  a  secular 

;:itii  3reed  foreign  to  the  Christian  tradition  that  our 

ikin|  nations  hold  in  connmon.    It  is,  instead,  the  cre- 

ik  itive  spirit  of  common  endeavor — the  spirit  of 

Dartnership  and  commimity.    This  spirit  is  mag- 

lificently  symbolized  by  this  triumphant  span  that 

links  the  Americas. 

For  a  bridge,  after  all,  is  an  eloquent  statement 
m  steel  and  concrete  of  the  spirit  and  the  essence 
it  )f  friendship.  Men  afraid  or  ashamed,  govern- 
nents  that  lack  confidence  in  the  people  or  that 
io  not  dare  to  submit  their  dogmatic  and  oppres- 
sive doctrines  to  the  free  competition  of  ideas — 
those  men,  those  governments,  build  walls,  not 
Dridges — walls  that  make  a  prison  as  in  East  Ber- 
lin today.  But  men  who  are  free,  governments 
that  love  freedom — those  men,  those  governments. 


"BtiLLETiN  of  Oct.  22,  1962,  p.  598. 
Ocfofaer  29,  J  962 


build  bridges,  not  to  keep  people  locked  up  but  to 
enable  them  to  move  freely,  to  make  an  avenue 
for  commerce  and  culture,  a  pathway  for  friend- 
ship. Across  bi-idges  men  learn  to  know  each 
other. 

There  is  a  foretaste  here  of  the  future.  The 
full  understanding  between  the  northern  and 
southern  parts  of  our  Western  Hemisphere  will  in- 
crease in  direct  ratio  with  the  increased  mobility 
of  the  people — a  mobility  that  will  follow  adequate 
.systems  of  roads  and  bridges.  This  increase  in 
mobility,  this  ease  of  movement  from  one  Ameri- 
can state  to  another,  will  bring  with  it  a  gi-eat 
cross-fertilization  of  ideas  and  an  enrichment  of 
the  culture  of  each  of  our  lands. 

We  can  see  tliis  bridge  today,  therefore,  as  a 
new  and  brilliant  step  toward  the  fulfillment  of 
that  old  dream  now  near  reality — the  Pan  Amer- 
ican Highway  system.  Wlien  the  road  has  been 
opened  from  north  to  south,  when  men  can  go 
freely  overland  from  Canada  to  Patagonia,  we 
shall  be  on  our  way  toward  a  new  dimension  in 
hemispheric  consolidation.  The  great  bridge  we 
are  opening  today,  truly  a  bridge  of  tlie  Americas, 
completes  the  last  lap  of  the  Inter-American 
Highway  running  from  the  United  States  to 
Panama.  Lying  ahead  of  us  is  still  the  untracked 
and  formidable  wilderness  of  Darien.  But  we 
may  be  confident  that  this  last  gap  will  be  filled  in 
our  lifetime ;  this  last  barrier  of  jungle  and  wilder- 
ness will  be  conquered  by  the  travelers  and  the 
tourists  from  North  and  South  America. 

It  is  with  pride  and  pleasure  that  I  report  to 
you  today  that  another  step  forward  has  just 
been  taken  toward  the  completion  of  tliis  great 
task.  Within  this  past  fortnight,  on  the  27th  of 
September,  a  contract  was  signed  that  will  make 
possible  a  prompt  and  comprehensive  engineering 
survey  of  the  Darien  area.  This  survey  will  be 
financed  by  a  special  $3  million  fund  of  the  Or- 
ganization of  American  States,  to  which  my  coun- 
try has  subscribed  $2  million.  Tliis  survey  will 
be  initiated  in  the  next  dry  season;  it  should  be 
completed  in  the  next  30  months.  The  Pan  Amer- 
ican Highway  system  moves  ever  closer  to  reality. 

Cooperation  Between  U.S.  and  Panama 

I  have  said  that  this  is  truly  a  bridge  of  the 
Americas.  It  adds  a  new  bond  to  the  enduring 
partnership  between  our  sister  Eepublics.    That 

647 


partnership  finds  unique  expression  in  treaty  re- 
lations and  in  the  Panama  Canal. 

The  canal,  as  I  need  hardlj'  tell  you,  is  vilal 
to  the  security  of  the  whole  free  world.  It  has 
special  mpaninj;  for  the  Westeni  Hemisphere  for 
it  can-ies  the  commerce  of  all  the  American  states. 
It  has  an  even  more  direct  value  to  Panama.  It 
has  made  this  country  a  transportation  hub.  It 
brintrs  more  than  $70  million  of  income  annually 
to  the  people  of  this  great  country.  It  provides 
jobs  directly  for  15,000  Panamanians  and  indi- 
rectly for  many  more. 

Like  the  canal,  this  bridge  will  also  serve  the 
free  world,  tlie  Western  Hemisphere — and  espe- 
cially Panama.  Like  the  canal,  it  was  built  by 
United  States  funds.  As  a  means  of  through 
transit  it  can  be  a  boon  for  all  the  American  states. 
And  because  it  unites  the  two  parts  of  this  country 
once  bisected  by  the  canal,  and  affords  easy  access 
to  Panama  City  and  the  Chiriqui  region,  it  can  be 
of  special  benefit  for  agriculture  and  land  develop- 
ment throughout  Panama.  Precisely  because  the 
canal  and  the  bridge  are  so  similar  in  origin  and 
purpose,  it  seems  especially  fitting  that  we  have 
with  us  today  a  man  who  has  made  a  major  con- 
tribution to  the  building  of  both  the  bridge  and 
the  canal — Maurice  Hudson  Thatcher. 

The  bridge,  of  course,  will  not  be  the  end  of 
special  cooperation  between  the  United  States  and 
Panama.  Ours  is  an  active  partnership.  It  was 
underlined  in  the  visit  of  President  Chiari  to 
Washington  last  June.^  It  is  further  reflected  in 
the  present  discussion  being  conducted  here  be- 
tween representatives  of  President  Chiari  and 
President  Kennedy.  Arrangements  have  been 
made  for  flying  the  flag  of  Panama  together  with 
that  of  the  United  States  at  various  sites  in  the 
Canal  Zone.  Foreign  consuls  who  hold  exequaturs 
issued  by  the  Government  of  Panama  will  bo  au- 
thorized by  the  United  States  Government,  in 
accordance  with  agreed  procedures,  to  perform 
their  functions  in  tlie  Canal  Zone.  And  I  look 
forward  to  successful  conclusions  of  the  negotia- 
tions regarding  the  use  of  Panamanian  postage  in 
the  Canal  Zone  post  office.  For  these,  too,  are  links 
in  the  partnership. 


'■  Ibid.,  July  9,  19C2,  p.  81. 


648 


Joining  of  North  and  South 

It  is  said  tliat  wlien  Columbus  first  reached  these 
sliores  an  Indian  sought  to  explain  to  liim  in  sign 
language  where  he  was  and  what  Panama  was. 
Stretching  his  arms  forward,  he  drew  a  great  circle 
in  the  air.  Twice  he  did  this,  then  laid  his  index 
fingers  side  by  side  between  the  two  circles.  He 
was  telling  Columbus,  the  legend  says,  that  Pan- 
ama is  an  isthmus  (the  joined  fingers)  between  two 
oceans  (the  great  circles).  But  I  think  the  sign 
language  can  also  be  read  to  mean  something  else — 
the  great  circles  are  the  northern  and  southern 
halves  of  our  great  hemisphere,  and  the  connection 
between  them  is  here  at  this  bridge,  this  "bridge  of 
the  Americas." 


U.S.  Welcomes  ICC  Investigations 
of  Troop  Withdrawals  From  Laos 

Statement  hy  Lincoln  White 


rhi 


Director,  Office  of  News  ^ 


iiipi 
asil 
rial 
lecti 
"m 
ati( 
rMc 

m 
T( 
:nv 
low 

mil 

BSOl 

[tis 


In  the  absence  of  certification  by  the  Interna- 
tional Control  Commission  of  the  departure  of  any 
substantial  niunbers  of  Viet  iMinli  military  forces 
known  to  have  been  in  Laos,  we  can  presume  that 
there  continue  to  be  numbers  of  Viet  Minh  ir 
Laos.  In  this  connection  you  will  recall  that  or  wi 
October  7  Prime  Minister  Souvanna  Phouma  re  ti 
ferred  to  stragglers  who  had  not  left.  In  any  cast  v^ 
the  International  Control  Commission  is  chargec 
witli  the  responsibility  of  investigating  violations 

The  United  States  can  and  will  make  availabk 
to  the  International  Control  Commission  and  thtjjjj 
Lao  Government  what  evidence  it  has  of  suspectec 
violations.  The  International  Control  Commis 
sion  will  also  have  other  sources  of  infomiatioi 
about  Viet  Minh  violations. 

Tlie  United  States  will  welcome  such  investiga 
tions  and  considers  it  essential  that  the  Interna 
tional  Control  Commission  be  unhampered  in  thi 
conduct  of  its  duties  if  the  Geneva  agreements 
are  to  be  meaningful  and  observed. 


)f 


leipf 
5It 
we 

lOS 

c« 


iSo' 


'  Made  to  news  corresponilents  on  Oct.  10. 
"  For  texts  of  the  Declaration  on  the  Neutrality  of  Lao 
and  ITotocol,  see  Bulletin  of  Aug.  13,  1002.  p.  259. 


Department  of  Sfafe   Bu//efii 


llitui 

Firs 

Iff 


>tl(l 


he  U.S.S.R.  in  World  Affairs 


hy  George  A.  Morgan 

Director  of  the  Foreign  Service  Institute'^ 


era 

ion  My  subject  is  one  on  which  straight  thinking  is 
upremely  impoii:ant:  the  Soviet  Union.  Now 
asily  the  world's  second  greatest  scientific,  indus- 
rial,  and  military  state,  the  U.S.S.R.  is  also  con- 
lected,  through  its  Communist  niling  class,  with 
I!ommunist  parties,  agents,  and  front  organi- 
ations  throughout  the  world,  the  majority  of 
hich  still  accept  Soviet  leadership.  No  other 
ountry  equals  its  power  to  affect  the  destiny  of  our 
wn  land,  for  good  or  ill. 
Therefore  no  aspect  of  today's  world  places 
raver  questions  before  a  teacher's  conscience, 
low  can  our  boys  and  girls  be  led  to  think 
traightly  and  ti-uly  about  this  vast  phenomenon, 
n  some  ways  so  spectacular,  m  others  so  ominous  ? 
t  is  our  creative  responsibility  as  teachers  to 
nswer  that  question  in  relation  to  each  class  and 
ach   individual  pupil.     All   I   can   do   here   is 

fiS  uggest   some   lines   of  thought   wliicli  may   be 

»« lelpful. 

My  general  theme  is  the  pei-vasive  duality  of 
oviet  existence.  Soviet  aims,  Soviet  activities, 
Imost  always  have  at  least  a  double  aspect. 
)f  course  the  same  might  be  said  of  all  things 
luman,  as  we  proverbially  acknowledge  two 
ides  to  every  question.  But  the  trait  of  duality 
Soviet  in  peculiar  ways  and  to  an  unusual 
egree.  For  this  reason  I  propose  tc  use  it  as 
handy  thread  to  guide  us  on  our  tour  of 
The  U.S.S.R.  in  World  Affairs." 

lixture  of  Nationalism  and  Communism 

First  of  all,  the  Soviet  Union  has  a  twofold 
Wi>ast,  which  deeply  shapes  its  twofold  present, 
t  sprang  from  a  combination  of  Russian  im- 


alJf  5, 

.ill 

fte( 


^  Address  made  before  a  meeting  of  District  of  Co- 
ambia  teachers  of  social  studies  at  Washington,  D.C.,  on 
)ct.  4  (press  release  600). 

||eliij)cfober  29,  7962 

661906 — 62 3 


perialism,  rooted  in  the  age-long  yearnings  and 
expansive  proclivities  of  the  great  Russian  peo- 
ple, with  revolutionary  Marxism,  embodied  in 
Lenin  and  the  Bolshevik  party  he  led.  Stalin 
continued  this  tradition.  His  policies  greatly 
resembled  and  exploited  Russian  nationalist  senti- 
ments— first  in  his  drive  for  "socialism  in  one 
country,"  later  in  his  accent  on  Soviet  might 
as  "the  base  of  world  revolution."  Today  this 
"Soviet  first"  line  is  continued,  with  variations, 
by  Klirushchev — at  the  cost  of  considerable  grief 
with  his  Chinese  partners  in  communism. 

But  it  would  be  naive  mdeed  merely  to  stress 
the  nationalist,  the  Russian,  side  of  Soviet  im- 
perialism, as  some  writers  do.  There  is  em- 
phatically also  a  Commimist  side.  Stalin  built 
his  home  base,  but  he  used  it  to  spread  Com- 
mimist inile  with  grim  success.  Khrushchev  puts 
Soviet  economic  growth  first,  but  he  explains 
how  he  will  use  it  to  bui-y  the  free  world  and 
its  way  of  life.  And  the  blood  that  ran  in 
Budapest  proves  he  means  business. 

Wlio  knows  where  this  historic  pairing  of 
nationalism  and  communism  will  lead  in  the 
future?  Some  see  hope  in  the  thought  that  the 
nationalist  strain  will  gradually  prevail  over 
the  Communist  one.  But  the  two  greatest  wars 
of  history — World  Wars  I  and  II — were  incited 
by  nationalist,  not  Communist,  imperialisms.  And 
the  Russian  nation  was  the  terror  of  its  neigh- 
bors for  centuries.  I  was  once  wryly  amused, 
but  imjiressed,  when  a  diplomat  from  a  country 
bordering  on  the  U.S.S.R.  solemnly  assured  me 
that  Russians  are  worse  than  Communists.  So 
while  we  may  indeed  hope  and  pray  for  a  flow- 
ering of  the  great  gifts  that  lie  in  the  Russian  peo- 
ple, that  flowering  will  depend  less  on  whether 
Russian  nationalism  prevails  over  communism 
than  on  the  extent  to  which  the  nationalism  is 
rational. 


649 


While  speaking  of  national  character,  I  might 
add  that  Russian  human  nature  abounds  in  con- 
trasts which  illustrate  my  theme  of  pervasive 
duality.  For  example,  Russians  are  among  the 
most  warmhearted  and  hospitable  people  in  the 
world.  I  remember  when  I  first  came  to  the  Soviet 
Union  in  1948  to  serve  in  our  embassy  in  Moscow. 
That  was  near  the  height  of  Stalin's  repressive 
anti-Westernism.  The  Berlin  blockade  was  on.  I 
had  been  warned  that  it  was  unsafe  even  to  engage 
a  Russian  in  conversation,  except  on  obvious  busi- 
ness, lest  the  secret  police  hold  it  against  him.  But 
even  though  we  could  not  speak  like  human  be- 
ings, I  could  feel  the  warmth  and  friendliness  of 
the  common  people  I  passed  on  the  street  like  a 
gentle  radiation  through  the  pores  of  my  skin. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  have  never  experienced 
human  coldness  like  that  of  the  hard-core  Russian 
Communist  when  he  is  acting  his  role.  It  is  like 
a  mask  of  granite.  Aboard  ship  while  traveling 
to  the  U.S.S.R. — again  in  1948 — I  exchanged  ci- 
vilities with  a  Soviet  diplomat  and  danced  a  few 
times  with  his  wife.  The  ice  seemed  to  melt  a 
little,  and  my  fellow  passengers  cheered  me  on, 
as  if  to  ease  the  tension  over  Berlin.  But  when 
we  disembarked  the  diplomat  and  his  family  were 
met  by  a  group  of  plug-uglies  who  were  obviously 
Soviet  secret  police  types,  there  to  smell  immedi- 
ately any  infection  by  "bourgeois  capitalism" 
these  Russians  might  have  picked  up  while  abroad. 
As  I  smiled  and  tipped  my  hat  to  them  in  passing, 
I  saw  just  a  flicker  of  recognition;  then  instantly 
the  granite  mask  froze  on  their  faces.  I  have 
seldom  seen  the  Iron  Curtain  so  vividly  descend. 

Doctrinaire  and  Opportunist 

Related  to  the  mixture  of  communism  and  na- 
tionalism in  the  Soviet  makeup  is  the  often-de- 
bated question  whether  ideology  or  opportunistic 
power  seeking  governs  Soviet  policy.  My  answer 
is  that  both  do.  Here  is  another  form  of  pervasive 
duality.  The  protagonists  in  this  argument  tri- 
umphantly refute  each  other  by  citing  half  of  the 
evidence,  but  when  one  looks  at  both  halves  one 
sees  that,  by  Americaoi  standards,  Soviets  are 
at  once  amazingly  doctrinaire  and  amazingly 
opportunistic. 

Was  it  opportunism  when  Lenin  forced  the 
split  between  Bolsheviks  and  Mensheviks,  thus 
reducing  party  strength  by  nearly  half?  When 
Stalin    put   through   collectivization    of   Soviet 

650 


agriculture  at  the  cost  of  untold  human  anc 
material  loss?  "\Anien  Khrushchev  launched  hi; 
massive  program  of  aid  and  other  blandisliment: 
to  woo  the  excolonial  countries  at  the  expense  o: 
a  better  life  for  his  own  people  and  allies? 

On  the  other  hand  was  it  Communist  theory 
that  told  Lenin  to  call  a  halt  to  communizinj 
Russia  with  his  new  economic  policy  in  1921 
Told  Stalin  to  make  a  deal  with  Hitler?  Tolc 
Ivlirushchev  to  seek  summit  meetings  with  Presi 
dent  Eisenhower? 

Clearly,  then,  Soviet  policy  is  a  mixture  of  botl 
elements.  Moreover,  the  mixture  varies  unpredict 
ably.  A  Polish  Communist  leader  once  remarkec 
to  a  Westerner  that  you  never  know  which  side  o 
the  Russians  is  going  to  turn  up ;  today  it  is  smiles 
tomorrow  frowns,  and  you  have  to  begin  each  da; 
by  inferring  from  their  attitude  which  it  is  gc 
ing  to  be.  So  with  most  Soviet  contrasts,  includ 
ing  doctrinairism  and  opportunism.  Yet  it  woul 
be  a  mistake  to  think  of  these  alternations  in  blac' 
and  white  terms,  like  Dr.  Jelsyll  and  Mr.  Hyd( 
The  two  are  almost  always  mingled.  The  answei 
as  usual,  is  not  "either  or"  but  "both,"  as  a  detaile^ 
analysis  of  the  illustrations  I  have  just  cite 
would  show. 

Akin  to  the  one-sided  ideological  thesis  I  hav  P"f 
been  discussing  is  a  group  of  views  which  migh 
be  called  cases  of  idealizing  the  enemy.  The 
express  a  curious  love-hate  complex  that  is  in 
portant  for  you  as  teachers  to  recognize  in  order  t 
help  your  pupils  deal  with  it  in  themselves.  It  i 
natural  for  all  Americans  who  recognize  tb 
urgency  of  the  dangers  posed  for  us  by  Commv 
nist  imperialism  to  fret  at  the  inadequacy,  slow 
ness,  and  clumsiness  which  have  often  charactei 
ized  free- world  responses.  From  this  it  is  natun 
to  proceed  to  dramatize  the  skill  and  effectivenes  kdi 
of  Communists  in  order  to  spur  free-world  actioi  nm? 

But  when  this  impulse  dominates  people  m 
thinking  without  being  balanced  by  other  pert  I  get 
nent  considerations,  it  blows  up  Soviet  prowe;  flat 
into  popular  myths,  such  as  the  idea  that  tl 
Soviets  have  a  "blueprint"  for  world  conques|ies 
Now  the  facts  as  best  we  can  get  at  them  are  thf 
the  Soviets  do  have  a  lot  of  gobbledygook  draw 
from  the  sacred  scriptures  of  Leninism,  which  the 
claim  to  be  a  "scientific"  doctrine  and  a  "mastei|»liai 
strategy.  But  when  the  residue  of  real  meanin 
is  distilled  from  this  verbiage,  it  only  amounts  1 
a  few  generalities,  some  clearly  erroneous  and  a 

Department  of  State  Bullet, 


I 

d] 
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[iiir 
jper 

D  I 


sth 
nit  I 


mi 
iets 


lora 
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id  I 


tiw 

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■apidly  fading  away  into  empirical  detail  when 
lii  )ne  gets  down  to  cases. 

The  same  comment  to  some  extent  applies  to  the 
)ody  of  tactical  and  operational  tecluiiques  that 
re  said  to  be  elaborated  in  imposing  array,  ac- 
(uired  by  years  of  study,  and  then  used  by  Soviet 
perators  to  outsmart  both  diplomatic  and  "ugly" 
'![  Americans  in  the  field.     Soviet  failures  in  Africa 
jjI  a    recent   years,    however,    considerably    deflate 
hese  pretentions. 
Please  do  not  misunderstand  me.     I  am  not  say- 
)tl  ng  these  views  about  Soviet  strategy  and  tech- 
iques  are  all  wrong.     Here,  as  always,  my  thesis 
3  that  both  sides  of  a  contrast  liave  some  validity 
ut  need  balancing.    I  myself  have  spent  labori- 
ng us  hours  decoding  Soviet  doctrine  and  once  pub- 
ished  an  article  which  made  an  international 
nsation  because  it  was  considered  to  have  ad- 
anced  our  insight  into  these  matters.    The  So- 
iets  do  have  an  outline  of  strategy — as  we  do.    It 
5  important  to  grasp  that  outline  in  order  to  deal 
itelligently  with  Soviet  beliavior.      Likewise  the 
oviets  do  have  gi-eat  skill  in  many  kinds  of  ac- 
vity.    They  seek  to  develop  those  skills  further 
nd  teach  tliem.     We  do,  too,  however — at  the 
oreign  Service  Institute  among  other  places — 
.,^  iiough  witli  the  methods  of  freedom  rather  than 
f  coercive  and  pedantic  indoctrination.    The  In- 
titute  has  a  lot  more  to  achieve  along  these  lines 
nd  is  striving  day  and  night  to  do  its  work  better. 
j(,  >ut  we  do  ourselves  and  our  cause  no  service  by 
Ijjnagining  that  our  opponents  are  10  feet  tall  or 
ave  a  magic  formula  for  success. 


oviet  Strategy  of  Blandishment  and  Coercion 

One  of  the  most  striking  characteristics  of  So- 

iiriiet  strategy  and  tactics  is  their  combination  of 

jes  landishment  and  coercion,  and  this  is  another  item 

•ijsn  1  my  list  of  pervasive  dualities.     Persuasion  and 

ressure  are  of  course  universally  human  means 

f  getting  other  people  to  act  in  desired  ways. 

,jg  Tliat  is  peculiarly  Soviet  is  the  extreme  manner  in 

tl)  'hich  these  opposite  methods  are  combined,  some- 

•s  mes  simultaneously,  sometimes  in  succession,  and 

ften  with  a  brazenness  which,  while  impressing 

J-  Dme  people,  tends  to  be  self-defeating  with  others. 

If  you  ask  why  the  Soviets  behave  so  strangely, 

erhaps  part  of  the  answer  can  be  found  in  Marx- 

it  ideology,  which,  with  a  perversity  inherited 

rom  Hegel,  makes  contradiction  the  mainspring 

f  progress.    Another  part  doubtless  derives  from 

>cfober  29,  1962 


the  paradoxes  writers  like  Dostoevsky  have 
plumbed  m  the  depths  of  the  Eussian  soul. 

In  any  case  the  trait  exists.  You  see  it  in  So- 
viet diplomats  who  propose  toasts  to  friendship 
while  the  inhuman  wall  divides  Berlin.  You  see 
it  in  the  bland  expansion  of  cultural  exchanges 
while  Cuba  is  armed  in  order  to  try  to  throw  us 
off  balance  and  make  trouble  with  smaller  neigh- 
bors. You  see  it  also  in  abrupt  changes  of  tactics. 
Brezlmev,  the  Soviet  chief  of  state,  recently  paid 
what  purported  to  be  a  goodwill  visit  to  Yugo- 
slavia. He  arrived  all  smiles  and  sweetness,  but 
suddenly  in  the  middle  of  his  visit  he  made  a  pub- 
lic speech  that  made  him  sound  like  a  Chinese 
Communist,  to  whom  Yugoslav  policies  are 
anatliema. 

Who  knows  why  or  what  the  Soviets  think  they 
stand  to  gain  by  such  tactics?  Usually  we  can 
only  speculate  about  the  answer.  In  general,  how- 
ever, the  nature  of  Soviet  discipline  is  apt  to  be 
highly  relevant.  The  Communist  Party  since 
Lenin  has  always  been  a  tightly  controlled  hier- 
archical organization  run  on  quasi-military  lines. 
Orders — the  "party  line" — como  down  from  the 
top  and  allow  little  flexibility  for  the  poor  party 
worker,  who  has  to  obey  them  in  the  spot  where 
he  happens  to  be.  But  if  he  is  a  good  Communist 
he  grimly  does  his  duty,  no  matter  how  much 
damage  it  does  to  his  own  operation. 

Bizarre  combinations  of  blandishment  and  co- 
ercion are  so  habitual  with  the  Soviets  that  one 
sometimes  wonders  how  much  is  conscious  decep- 
tion, how  much  merely  taken  for  gi-anted  because 
it  comes  naturally.  At  any  rate  the  Soviets  clear- 
ly believe  they  can  work  both  sides  of  any  street 
and  get  away  with  it.  Fortunately,  more  and 
more  people  around  the  world  are  getting  wise  to 
the  trick,  which  loses  much  of  its  power  once  rec- 
ognized. 

What  "Peaceful  Coexistence"  Means  to  Khrushchev 

The  subject  of  blandislmient  leads  me  to  a 
change  in  Soviet  doctrine  and  strategy  induced  by 
Khrushchev.  He  has  given  the  old  slogan  of 
"peaceful  coexistence"  special  prominence  and  one 
important  difference  in  actual  meaning.  Under 
Stalin,  wars  involving  "capitalist"  states  were 
considered  the  main  facilitators  of  Communist 
revolutionary  advances.  Stalin's  writings  show 
that  he  had  been  lying  in  wait  for  years  to  do  sub- 
stantially what  he  did  do  during  and  after  World 


651 


War  II  to  expand  Communist  sway.  Tlius,  for 
Stalin,  "peaceful  coexistence"  was  merely  a  tem- 
porary tactic  between  wars.  He  himself  so  de- 
scribed it  in  his  published  writings. 

By  the  time  Khiiishchev  came  to  power  it  was 
clear  that  major  war,  with  its  colossal  nuclear 
destructiveness,  would  be  ruinously  costly  for  all 
concerned.  It  had  also  become  evident,  even  dur- 
ing Stalin's  last  years,  that  the  Soviet  leaders  felt 
their  economic  and  militai-y  power  to  have  grown 
so  great  that  they  could  I'ely  on  various  means 
short  of  major  war  to  complete  Communist  ex- 
pansion around  the  globe.  So  Khrushchev  has 
made  "peaceful  coexistence''  a  long-tei-m,  rather 
than  a  temporary',  policy — to  the  indignation  of 
the  Chinese  Reds,  who  are  still  Stalinists.  Here 
are  Khrushchev's  own  words  (to  understand 
them  you  must  remember  that  "imperialism"  is 
his  name  for  the  community  of  free  democracies 
to  which  we  belong)  :  ^ 

It  is  generally  known  that  both  World  War  I  and  World 
War  II  exerted  enormous  influence  on  the  emergence  and 
deepening  of  the  general  crisis  of  capitalism.  Does  it 
follow  from  this  that  a  world  war  is  a  necessary  condi- 
tion for  a  further  intensification  of  the  general  crisis  of 
capitalism?  Such  a  conclusion  would  be  profoundly  in- 
correct. .  .  . 

Now  there  is  more  than  one  worker-peasant  state  in  the 
world,  there  is  an  entire  system  of  socialist  states.  Our 
duty  to  history  is  to  insure  peace  and  peaceful  develop- 
ment of  this  great  offspring  of  the  international  working 
class.  .  .  .  The  victory  of  socialism  throughout  the  world 
...  is  now  near.  For  this  victory,  wars  among  states 
are  not  necessary. 

.  .  .  the  policy  of  peaceful  coexistence  ...  is  a  form  of 
intense  economic,  political,  and  ideological  struggle  of  the 
proletariat  against  the  aggressive  forces  of  imperialism  in 
the  international  arena. 

Wliile  opposing  "wars  between  states,"  however, 
Ivlirushchev  goes  on  to  approve  what  he  calls 
"wars  of  liberation"  and  "national  uprisings," 
citing  Cuba  and  Viet-Nam  as  examples:  "The 
Communists  fully  support  sucli  just  wars  and 
march  in  the  front  rank  with  the  peoples  waging 
liberation  struggles."  In  short,  "peaceful  coexist- 
ence" emphatically  includes  aiding  and  abetting 
any  case  of  insurgency  or  civil  war  that  can  be 
turned  to  Communist  ends. 

Tliis  brings  me  to  anotlier  pervasive  Soviet 
duality :  "doublespeak,"  to  borrow  an  ingenious 
term  from  George  Orwell's  lOSJf.  "Peaceful  co- 
existence" means  one  thing  to  ordinary'  people. 


'  All  quotations  are  taken  from  an  address  by  Premier 
Khrushchev  on  Jan.  6,  lOCl. 


652 


including,  by  the  way,  ordinary  Russians.    But  itj 
is  a  word  of  art  in  the  Soviet  lexicon.    As  theito 
quotation  I  have  just  read  says,  it  means,  "Pre- 1  tb 
vent  nuclear  war  while  we  bury  the  free  world  with 
everything  else." 

The  duplicity  of  Soviet  speech  shows  up  in 
other  ways.  For  example,  there  is  the  contrast  be- 
tween Soviet  diplomatic  statements  and  associated 
publicity,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  way  they  talk 
to  party  audiences  on  the  other.  They  live  a^ 
sort  of  double  life  in  this  respect  and  are  as 
indignant  as  any  Victorian  prude  if  one  tactlessly 
points  out  their  inconsistencies.  This  habit  ofl 
talking  on  two  different  planes  will  be  hard  to  ex- 
plain to  your  students,  but  it  is  important  for 
them  to  realize.  When  you  read  Soviet  quotations 
in  the  press,  one  of  the  first  things  you  have  to 
consider  is,  to  which  audience  are  they  speaking; 
and  for  what  purpose  ? 


port 
sb 
just 
Aim 


"Legal"  and  "Illegal"  Communist  Activities 

INIodes  of  speech  of  course  correspond  to  modes 
of  action.  Just  as  a  Soviet  bureaucrat  claims  thals 
it  is  none  of  our  business  to  discuss  with  him  whal 
Communist  parties  are  up  to,  so  the  Conmimiisl 
Party  has  always  carefully  distinguished  be- 
tween "legal"  and  "illegal"  work.  Here  we  hav( 
another  pervasive  double  aspect  of  Soviet  be 
havior,  one  of  the  deepest.  The  whole  sphere  ol 
illegal  activity,  including  the  many  forms  of  sub 
version,  insurgency,  and  civil  war  by  proxy,  are  S( 
foreign  to  modern  Western  standards  that  some 
people  get  almost  hypnotized  by  them,  as  if  thej 
were  the  sole  secret  of  Soviet  successes. 

The  real  novelty  in  Soviet  behavior,  however,  i; 
the  striking  combination  of  legal  and  illegal  activ 
ities.  If  they  stuck  to  the  latter  they  wouk 
obviously  not  get  far  in  many  countries,  excep 
where  they  can  infiltrate  over  borders  or  capture  i 
revolution  as  in  Cuba.  Mostly  they  have  to  usi 
tiie  "respectable"  methods  of  aid,  trade,  and  ex 
changes  to  gain  entry  and  influence — hoping,  m 
doubt,  for  other  things  later.  One  of  Khru; 
.shchev's  innovations  has  been  to  do  this  on  a  bij 
scale. 

In  no  sphere  are  Soviet  subversive  activity  an*  Idp. 
doubletalk  more  cj-nical  than  in  their  exploitai 
tion  of  racial  frictions,  a  subject  acuteh'  on  ou 
own  consciences  in  these  unhappy  days.  In  an 
country,  including  ours,  where  race  problems  exis 
Commmiists  seek  to  magnify  resentments  i-athe 


He 


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tniiK 


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That 


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Department  of  Slate  Bulleth 


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IW( 
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fiiise: 
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Portiia 


than  help  resolve  the  problems  that  cause  them; 
to  distort,  exaggerate,  and  even  provoke  incidents 
that  add  fuel  to  the  flames;  and  in  general  to  do 
eveiytliing  in  their  power  to  make  matters  worse 
in  order  to  channel  the  resulting  bitterness  in  ex- 
plosive revolutionary  directions  which  they  seek 
to  control  for  Communist  ends. 

It  is  a  tribute  to  the  wisdom  and  patriotism  of 
our  colored  fellow  citizens  that  the  Commmaists 
have  made  few  gains  by  these  means  in  our  coun- 
try. But  Communists  do  use  biased  accounts  of 
our  troubles  to  poison  opinion  against  us  abroad, 
not  only  in  Africa  but  wherever  racial  sensitivi- 
ties can  be  exploited.  Few  things  are  more  im- 
portant for  our  foreign  relations  today  than  to 
show  the  world  that  we  can  solve  the  problem  of 
just  and  harmonious  race  relations  by  democratic 
American  methods.  It  will  be  instructive  for  your 
students  in  this  conjiection  to  study  the  contrast 
between  American  civil  rights  and  the  cruelly 
repressive  treatment  which  national  minorities 
in  the  U.S.S.R.  have  from  time  to  time  received. 
The  complaints  about  discrimination  made  by 
African  and  other  nonwhite  students  in  Soviet 
oniversities  are  also  revealing. 

Returning  to  the  "legal"  aspect  of  Soviet  con- 
duct, I  might  mention  that  it  is  just  because  the 
Russians  do  take  this  aspect  seriously,  and  some- 
times practice  it  dependably  in  their  way,  that 
negotiation  has  an  important  place  in  our  dealings 
with  them  and  agreements  are  worth  making  lui- 
der  certain  circumstances  despite  the  long  record 
of  broken  ones.  It  takes  a  high  degree  of  pro- 
fessional sophistication  to  know  when  a  particu- 
lar agreement  is  likely  to  hold  and  for  how  long. 
That  is  one  of  many  cases  where  the  somid  train- 
ing and  experience  of  our  diplomats  come  in 
handy.  But,  to  balance  the  contrast  once  more, 
we  must  never  forget  that  the  Soviets  also  use 
negotiation  as  a  means  of  propaganda  and  political 
warfare — often  entirely  so. 

In  our  brief  look  at  the  U.S.S.R.  this  afternoon 
I  have  by  no  means  considered  all  the  pervasive 
dualities  of  Soviet  life,  nor  is  this  by  any  means 
the  only  theme  around  which  a  complete  picture 
could  and  should  be  drawn.  But  I  hope  it  will 
help  your  pupils  to  acquire  balanced  and  penetrat- 
ing perspectives  if  they  learn  to  bear  in  mind  that, 
in  varying  mixtures,  Soviet  behavior  in  world  af- 
fairs expresses  both  Commimist  and  Russian  na- 
tionalist traditions,  can  be  both  doctrinaire  and  op- 
portunist, habitually  uses  both  blandishment  and 


coercion,  speaks  a  peculiar  language  which  means 
one  thing  to  ordinary  people  and  something  quite 
different  to  Communists,  combines  legal  and  il- 
legal action,  and  espouses  coexistence  which  is 
peaceful  to  the  extent  of  shunning  direct  war  but 
foments  subversive  aggression  wherever  the  situa- 
tion is  judged  ripe. 

The  picture  I  have  just  summarized  is  in  effect  a 
diagnosis  of  the  cold  war.  As  Secretary  Rusk 
has  stated,^  "The  cold  war  is  the  direct  expression 
of  the  announced  determination  of  the  Sino-Soviet 
bloc  to  extend  their  'historically  inevitable'  world 
revolution  by  every  available  means."  He  goes  on 
to  add  that  "the  cold  war  will  end  when  those  who 
declared  it  decide  to  abandon  it."  Our  aim  in  win- 
ning the  cold  war  is  to  lead  them  to  that  decision. 

How  long  this  will  take  no  one  can  tell.  But  as 
President  Kennedy  said  last  year,*  "Only  the 
strong,  only  the  industrious,  only  the  determined, 
only  the  courageous,  only  the  visionary  who  deter- 
mine the  real  nature  of  our  struggle  can  possibly 
survive."  I  wish  you  inspiration  and  success  in 
preparing  our  boys  and  girls  for  their  share  in  our 
common  task. 


U.S.  Protests  Soviet  Violation 
of  Attache's  Diplomatic  Rights 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  note  delivered  on 
October  10  hy  the  U.S.  Embassy  at  Moscow  to  the 
Soviet  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  regarding 
Soviet  detention  of  Comdr.  Raymond  D.  Smith, 
assistant  naval  attache  of  the  Enibassy. 

Press  release  611  dated  October  10 

The  Embassy  of  the  United  States  of  America 
refers  to  the  oral  statement  of  October  5,  1962,  of 
the  head  of  the  United  States  Section  of  the  Min- 
istry of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Union  of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics  regarding  the  apprehension 
and  detention  at  Leningrad  on  October  2,  1962,  of 
Commander  Raymond  D.  Smith,  USN,  Assistant 
Naval  Attache  of  the  Embassy. 

The  Embassy  categorically  rejects  all  allegations 
of  improper  or  inaispropriate  behavior  on  the  part 
of  Commander  Smith  and  specifically  that  he  was 
engaged  m  espionage. 

The  Embassy  vigorously  protests  the  manifold 


»  Bulletin  of  Sept.  25, 1961,  p.  507. 
^lUd.,  May  8,  1961,  p.  659. 


Ocfofaer  29,  1962 


653 


violations  by  Soviet  antliorities  of  the  rights  and 
immunities  appertaining  to  Conxmander  Smith  as 
a  duly  accredited  diplomatic  officer  of  the 
Embassy. 

After  having  been  physically  assaulted  and 
forcibly  deprived  of  items  of  personal  property  by 
allegedly  non-official  Soviet  citizens,  Commander 
Smith  was  detained  by  two  militia  officers  for 
four  and  one-half  hours.  During  this  period  of 
illegal  detention  he  was  refused  permission  to  com- 
municate with  the  Embassy  and  was  subjected  to 
threats  of  violence. 

Commander  Smith  repeatedly  drew  the  atten- 
tion of  the  militia  officers  to  his  diplomatic  status, 
presenting  liis  diplomatic  card,  issued  by  the  Min- 
istry of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  corroboration  thereof. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  this  document  cites,  inter 
alia,  article  2,  pai'agraph  (A)  of  tlie  "Statute  Re- 
garding Diplomatic  and  Consular  Representations 
of  Foreign  Governments  on  the  Territory  of  the 
U.S.S.R.  of  January  14, 1927",  which  states:  "Dip- 
lomatic representatives  enjoy  personal  immunity 
by  virtue  of  which  they  may  not  be  subjected  to 
judicial  or  administrative  arrest  or  detention". 

It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  the  two  militia 
officers  in  question  not  only  violated  the  basic 
principles  of  diplomatic  immunity  as  historically 
and  generally  recognized  in  traditional  diplomatic 
practice  and  the  relations  between  states  but  also 
Soviet  law  itself. 

The  Embassy  expects  the  IMinistry  to  undertake 
the  necessary  disciplinary  measures  with  regard 
to  the  Soviet  officials  involved  in  this  affair  and 
to  assure  that  there  will  be  no  recurrence  of  viola- 
tion of  the  diplomatic  immunities  of  members  of 
the  Embassy  staff. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

87th  Congress,  2d  Session 

International  Fisheries  Conference.  Report  to  accom- 
pany S.  Res.  392.  S.  Rept.  2112.  September  20,  1962. 
7  pp. 

Expressing  the  Determination  of  the  United  States  With 
Respect  to  the  Situation  in  Cuba.  Report  to  accompany 
H.J.  Res.  886.  H.  Rept.  2441.  September  20,  1962.  2 
pp. 

Amendment  to  the  Budget — Department  of  State.  Commu- 
nication from  the  President  transmitting  an  amendment 
to  the  fiscal  year  1963  budget  involving  an  increase  of 
$100  million  to  implement  legislation  providing  for  pur- 
chase of  U.N.  bonds.  S.  Doc.  133.  September  21,  1962. 
2  pp. 

Promoting  the  Foreign  Commerce  of  the  United  States 
Through  the  Use  of  Mobile  Trade  Fairs.  Report  to  ac- 
company S.  3389.  H.  Rept.  2463.  September  21,  1962. 
23  pp. 

Foreign  Aid  and  Related  Agencies  Appropriation  Bill, 
1903.  Report  to  accompany  H.R.  13175.  S.  Rept.  2177. 
September  28, 1902.    26  pp. 

Authorization  for  Diplomatic  Radio  Stations.  Report  to 
accompany  H.R.  11732.  S.  Rept.  2225.  October  1,  1962. 
11  pp. 

World  Food  Congress.  Report  to  accompany  S.  3679.  S. 
Rept.  2203.    October  2,  1962.    10  pp. 

Duty-Free  Importation  of  Certain  Natural  Grasses  and 
Other  Natural  Materials.  Report  to  accompany  H.R. 
12109.     H.  Rept.  2516.     October  2,  1902.    3  pp. 

Trade  Expansion  Act  of  1902.  Conference  report  to  ac- 
company H.R.  11970.  H.  Rept.  2518.  October  2,  1962. 
13  pp. 

Invitation  to  the  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  To 
Hold  a  World  Pood  Congress  in  the  United  States  in 
1903.  Report  to  accompany  H.R.  13307.  H.  Rept.  2524. 
October  3,  1962.    3  pp. 

Refugee  Problem  in  Hong  Kong  and  Macao.  Hearings 
before  the  Subcommittee  To  Investigate  Problems  Con- 
nected With  Refugees  and  Escapees  of  the  Senate  Judi- 
ciary Committee.    May  29-July  10,  1962.    180  pp. 

Conservation  of  Tropical  Tuna.  Hearings  before  the  Sub- 
committee on  Inter-American  AfCairs  of  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on  S.  2568,  a  bill  to  amend  the 
Act  of  September  7,  1960,  to  extend  the  regulatory  au- 
thority of  the  Federal  and  State  agencies  concerned 
under  the  terms  of  the  Convention  for  the  Establishment 
of  an  Inter-American  Tropical  Tuna  Commission,  signed 
at  Washington,  May  31,  1949,  and  for  other  purposes. 
August  14r-30,  1962.    105  pp. 


654 


Department  of  Stale  Bulletin 


Hit 


Trade  Expansion  Act  of  1962  Signed 


Following  are  remarks  made  hy  President 
Kennedy  upon  signing  the  Trade  Expansion  Act 
on  October  11,  together  with  a  summary  of  the 
new  act,  which  was  prepared  in  the  Office  of  Inter- 
national Trade  and  Finance,  Department  of  State. 

REMARKS  BY  PRESIDENT  KENNEDY 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  11 

Today  I  am  signing  H.R.  11970,  the  Trade  Ex- 
pansion Act  of  1962. 

This  is  the  most  important  international  piece 
of  legislation,  I  think,  affecting  economics  since 
the  passage  of  the  Marshall  Plan.  It  marks  a 
decisive  point  for  the  future  of  our  economy,  for 
Dur  relations  with  our  friends  and  allies,  and  for 
the  prospects  of  free  institutions  and  free  societies 
averywhere. 

This  act  recognizes,  fully  and  completely,  that 
we  cannot  protect  our  economy  by  stagnating  be- 
hind tariff  walls  but  that  the  best  protection  pos- 
sible is  a  mutual  lowering  of  tariff  barriers  among 
friendly  nations  so  that  all  may  benefit  from  a  free 
Bow  of  goods.  Increased  economic  activity  result- 
ing from  increased  trade  will  provide  more  job 
>pportunities  for  our  workers.  Our  industry,  our 
igriculture,  our  mining  will  benefit  from  increased 
sxport  opportunities  as  other  nations  agree  to 
lower  their  tariffs.  Increased  exports  and  imports 
will  benefit  our  ports,  steamship  lines,  and  air 
ines  as  they  handle  an  increased  amount  of  trade. 
Lowering  of  our  tariffs  will  provide  an  increased 
Elow  of  goods  for  our  American  consumers.  Our 
industries  will  be  stimulated  by  increased  export 
opportunities  and  by  freer  competition  with  the 
industries  of  other  nations  for  an  even  greater 
ffort  to  develop  an  efficient,  economic,  and  pro- 
iuctive  system.  The  results  can  bring  a  dynamic 
new  era  of  growth. 

By  means  of  agreements  authorized  by  the  act, 
we  can  move  forward  to  partnership  with  the  na- 

Ocfofaer  29,  1962 


tions  of  the  Atlantic  community.  Together  with 
the  Common  Market,  we  account  for  90  percent 
of  the  free  world's  trade  in  industrial  products. 
Together  we  make  up — and  I  think  this  is  most 
important  in  this  vital  period — the  greatest  aggre- 
gation of  economic  power  in  the  history  of  the 
world.  We  now  have  the  means  to  make  certain 
that  we  build  our  strength  together  and  that  we 
can  maintain  this  preeminence. 

We  shall  also  use  the  authority  of  the  act  to 
negotiate  with  our  other  great  trading  partners, 
Canada  and  Japan,  and  with  the  coimtries  of  Latin 
America,  Asia,  and  Africa — and  we  are  particu- 
larly concerned  that  the  countries  of  Latin  Amer- 
ica shall  have  an  opportunity  to  participate  in  this 
period  of  economic  growth  particularly  as  it  af- 
fects the  Common  Market  as  well  as  our  own 
United  States.  We  will  use  the  specific  author- 
ities designed  to  widen  markets  for  the  raw  mate- 
rials and  manufactures  of  the  less  developed 
nations  whose  economic  growth  is  so  important 
to  us  all  and  to  strengthen  our  efforts  to  end  dis- 
criminatory and  preferential  arrangements  which 
in  the  long  nni  can  only  make  everyone  poorer 
and  the  free  world  less  united. 

A  vital,  expanding  economy  in  the  free  world  is 
a  strong  coimter  to  the  threat  of  the  world  Com- 
munist movement.  This  act  is,  therefore,  an  im- 
portant new  weapon  to  advance  the  caiise  of 
freedom. 

I  want  to  express  my  strong  appreciation  to  the 
Members  of  the  Congress  who  were  so  greatly 
involved  in  the  passage  of  this  bill — Chairman 
[Wilbur  D.]  Mills  and  members  of  the  House 
Ways  and  Means  Committee,  who  reported  it  to 
the  floor,  and  the  members  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, who  passed  it ;  Senator  [Han-y  Flood] 
Byrd  and  the  members  of  the  Senate  Finance 
Committee;  Senator  [Robert  S.]  Kerr  and  others 
who  participated  in  the  passage  of  this  legislation ; 
the  leadersliip  of  the  House  and  Senate  and  all 


655 


1 


those  on  both  sides  who  made  this  legislation  pos- 
sible; citizens  groups,  Mr.  Petersen  [Howard  C. 
Petersen,  Special  Assistant  to  the  President],  ]\Ir. 
Gilbert  [Carl  J.  Gilbert,  Chairman  of  the  Com- 
mittee for  a  National  Trade  Policy],  and  the  labor 
organizations;  Mr.  George  Meany,  who  is  here 
today,  who  was  of  great  importance  to  the  passage 
of  this  bill,  which,  if  administered  as  it  must  be 
and  will  be  directly  from  the  Wliite  House,  with 
the  cooperation  of  the  Departments  of  State,  Com- 
merce, Agriculture,  Labor,  can  mean  so  much  to 
this  country. 


SUMMARY  OF  THE  ACT 

I.  Purposes  of  the  Act 

The  purposes  of  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  are,  through 
trade  agreements  affording  mutual  trade  benefits,  to  stim- 
ulate the  economic  growth  of  the  United  States  and  main- 
tain and  enlarge  foreign  markets  for  American  products, 
to  strengthen  economic  relations  with  foreign  countries 
through  the  development  of  open  and  nondiscriminatory 
trading  in  the  free  world,  and  to  prevent  Communist  eco- 
nomic penetration. 

II.  Form  of  the  Act 

The  act  grants  authority  to  the  President  which  can  be 
generally  divided  into  three  major  subjects : 

(1)  the  authority  to  enter  into  trade  agreements; 

(2)  the  authority  to  proclaim  changes  in  the  tariff 
treatment  of  articles  in  order  to  carry  out  such  trade 
agreements ;  and 

(3)  the  authority  to  assist  indu.stries,  firms,  and 
workers  who  may  be  .seriously  injured  by  reason  of  in- 
creased imports  resulting  from  trade  agreement 
concessions. 

These  nipjor  subjects  may  in  turn  be  subdivided  in 
terms  of  limitations,  conditions,  and  safeguards  appli- 
cable to  the  grants  of  authority. 

III.  Authority  To  Enter  Into  Trade  Agreements 

The  act  authorizes  the  President  to  enter  into  trade 
agreements  with  foreign  countries  or  instrumentalities 
thereof  during  the  period  from  July  1,  1962,  through  .Tune 
.SO,  1907,  whenever  he  determines  that  any  existing  duties 
or  other  import  restrictions  of  any  foreign  country  or  the 
United  States  are  unduly  burdening  and  restricting  the 
foreign  trade  of  the  United  States  and  that  any  of  the 
purposes  of  the  act  will  be  thereby  promoted. 

IV.  Authority  To  Modify  Import  Restrictions 

The  President  is  authorized,  within  specified  limits  and 
pursuant  to  prescribed  procedures,  to  make  changes  in 
the  import  restrictions  of  the  United  States  which  are 


656 


required  or  appropriate  to  carry  out  any  trade  agreement 
entered  into  by  him  under  this  act. 

A.  Basic  Authority 

The  basic  authority  in  the  act  permits  the  President  to 
(1)  decrease  by  50  percent  any  rate  of  duty  existing  on 
.July  1,  1902,  or  (2)  increase  by  50  percent  any  rate  of 
duty  existing  on  .Tuly  1,  1934.  The  basic  grant  of  au- 
thority also  permits  the  modification  of  existing  import 
restrictions  other  than  duties  and  the  imposition  of  ad- 
ditional import  restrictions   (e.g.  quotas). 

B.  Special  Authority  for  Negotiations  With  the  European 
Economic   Community 

In  a  trade  agreement  with  the  European  Economic 
Community  (EEC),  the  President  is  authorized  to  exceed 
the  basic  50-percent  limitation  on  the  tariff  reduction  au- 
thority and  to  reduce  tariffs  to  zero  on  industrial  products 
within  categories  of  which  the  United  States  and  EEC  to- 
gether account  for  80  percent  or  more  of  aggregated  world 
export  value  in  a  representative  period.  Intra-EEC  trade 
and  Communist  bloc  trade  (internal  and  external)  are 
excluded  from  global  trade  data  in  determining  "aggre- 
gated world  export  value."  The  basic  50-percent  limita- 
tion on  tariff  reductions  may  also  be  exceeded  with  re- 
spect to  agricultural  commodities  (i.e.  commodities 
referred  to  in  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture  Handbook 
No.  143)  in  a  trade  agreement  with  the  EEC  if,  before 
entering  into  the  agreement,  the  President  determines 
that  the  agreement  will  tend  to  assure  the  maintenance 
or  expansion  of  U.S.  exports  of  the  like  agricultural 
commodity. 

C.  Special    Authority    for    Tropical    Agricultural    and 
Forestry   Commodities 

This  authority  permits  the  President  to  exceed  the  50- 
percent  limitation  on  the  tariff  reduction  authority  and 
to  reduce  tariffs  to  zero  on  any  tropical  agricultural  or 
forestry  commodity  (defined  as  a  commodity  principally 
produced  between  the  20°  latitude  lines),  provided  the 
commodity  is  not  produced  in  significant  quantities  in 
the  United  States  and  provided  the  EEC  has  made  a  com- 
mitment on  a  substantially  nondiscriminatory  basis  with 
respect  to  import  treatment  (tariff  or  other  import  re- 
strictions) of  the  commodity,  which  is  likely  to  assure 
access  to  the  markets  of  the  EEC  countries  comparable  to 
that  which  the  article  will  have  in  U.S.  niarltets.  This  au- 
thority applies  to  unprocessed  commodities  and  those 
commodities  which  have  undergone  only  such  minimum 
processing  as  is  customarily  required  to  prepare  them  for 
marketing  in  substantial  volume  in  international  trade. 

D.  Loio  Duty  Authority 

This  authority  permits  the  President  to  exceed  the  .50 
percent  limitation  on  the  tariff  reduction  authority  and 
to  reduce  tariffs  to  zero  on  products  which  are  dutiable 
at  a  rate  of  not  more  than  5  percent  ad  valorem  (or 
equivalent). 

E.  Limitations  on  Use  of  Authority 

1.  Reservation  of  Articles  From  Tariff  Negotiation 
The  act  provides  that,  under  specified  conditions,  articles 
on  which  a  seriou.s-injury  finding  has  been  made  by  the 
Tariff   Commission   in   an   escape-clause  case  are   to  be 


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eserved  from  negotiations  for  the  reduction  of  any  duty 
r  other  import  restriction  or  the  elimination  of  any 
uty.  The  President  may  also  reserve  any  other  articles 
e  deems  appropriate.  The  conditions  under  which  he 
lUst  reserve  articles  are  as  follows : 

(a)  Articles  on  Which  Action  Is  in  Effect.  Articles 
lust  be  reserved  so  long  as  there  is  in  effect  any  action 
iken  under  the  escape  clause  of  previous  legislation  (see- 
on  7  of  the  Trade  Agreements  Extension  Act  of  1951 )  or 
nder  the  new  act.  In  the  latter  case  the  article  must 
s  reserved  whether  the  action  in  effect  is  an  increased 
irifE  or  other  import  restriction  imjiosed  under  section 
>1  or  an  orderly  marketing  agreement  negotiated  in  ac- 
)rdance  with  section  352.  (Articles  on  which  action  is 
1  effect  under  the  national  security  provision  of  previous 
^gislatlon  or  the  new  act  must  also  be  excluded  from  such 
?gotlations.)  As  of  the  date  of  enactment  of  the  act, 
le  articles  which  would  be  reserved  under  this  provision 
:e  the  following : 

Dried  figs 

Watches 

Toweling  of  flax,  hemp,  or  ramie 

Safety  pins 

Clinical  thermometers 

Lead  and  zinc 

Stainless  steel  table  flatware 

Cotton  typewriter-ribbon  cloth 

Sheet  glass 

Certain  carpets  and  rugs 

Crude  petroleum  and  derivatives 

xcept  for  petroleum,  on  which  action  is  In  effect  under 
le  national  security  provision,  all  other  articles  listed 
bove  are  presently  subject  to  escai)e-clause  action. 

(b)  Articles  on  Which  Action  Is  Not  in  Effect.  During 
IB  5-year  period  beginning  on  the  date  of  enactment  of 
16  new  act,  any  other  article  on  which  the  Tariff  Com- 
lission  made  a  seriou.s-injury  finding  under  the  escape 
iause  of  the  1951  act  must  be  reserved  If  the  article  is 
sted  for  trade  agreement  consideration  and  the  Tariff 
ommission  finds  on  application  by  the  interested  indus- 
y  that  economic  conditions  in  that  industry  have  not 
ibstautially  improved  since  the  basic  escape-clause  find- 
ig.  The  following  are  the  articles  on  which  applications 
)r  reservation  could  be  made  to  the  Tariff  Commission 
Y  the  interested  industries  under  this  provision  if  the 
rticles  were  listed  for  trade  agreement  consideration : 

Women's  fur  felt  hats  and  hat  bodies 

Hatters'  fur 

Garlic 

Tobacco  pipes  and  bowls 

Screen-printed  silk  scan'es 

Scissors  and  shears 

Groundfish  fillets 

Alsike  clover  seed 

Bicycles 

Ferrocerium  (lighter  flints) 

Velveteen  fabrics 

Violins  and  violas 

Straight  pins 

Spring  clothespins 

Umbrella  frames 

Tartaric  acid 

Cream  of  tartar 

Baseball  and  softball  gloves 

Ceramic  mosaic  tile 


•cfober  29,  7962 


2.  National  Security  Provisions.  The  act  repeats  prac- 
tically verbatim  the  provision  of  previous  trade  agree- 
ments legislation  relating  to  national  security.  Under 
this  provision  no  action  is  to  be  taken  reducing  or  elimi- 
nating tariffs  when  the  President  determines  that  such 
action  would  threaten  to  impair  the  national  security. 
In  addition  the  President  is  required  to  take  action  to 
adjust  imports  of  an  article  or  its  derivatives  when  he 
concurs  in  the  advice  of  the  Director  of  the  Office  of 
Emergency  Planning,  following  an  investigation,  that  im- 
ports threaten  to  impair  the  national  security. 

3.  Staging  Requirements.  Tariff  reductions  made  un- 
der the  act  are  in  general  to  take  effect  In  not  less  than 
five  equal  annual  installments.  They  may  take  effect  in 
unequal  intervals  and  amounts  provided  that  the  sum  of 
reductions  at  any  one  time  does  not  exceed  what  would 
occur  under  five  equal  installments.  No  staging  is  re- 
quii-ed  for  reductions  or  eliminations  of  duties  made  under 
the  tropical  products  authority. 

V.  Preagreement  Procedures  and  Safeguards 

A.  Tariff  Commission  Advice  Prior  to  Negotiations 

The  act  requires  the  Tariff  Commission  to  advi.se  the 
President  as  to  the  probable  economic  effect  of  any  pro- 
posed trade  agreement  concession  on  any  article.  The 
President  is  required  to  furnish  the  Tariff  Commission 
with  a  list  of  all  articles  on  which  he  contemplates  ne- 
gotiating, and  the  Commission  is  required  within  6  months 
thereafter  to  render  its  advice.  The  Tariff  Commission 
is  required  to  hold  hearings  in  the  course  of  its  investiga- 
tions and  to  give  all  interested  persons  an  opportunity  to 
present  their  views. 

B.  Other  Advice 

Before  entering  into  any  trade  agreement  under  the 
act,  the  President  is  required  to  seek  information  and 
advice  from  the  Departments  of  Agriculture,  Commerce, 
Defense,  Interior,  Labor,  State,  and  the  Treasury  and 
from  such  other  sources  as  he  may  deem  appropriate.  He 
is  also  required  to  afford  an  opportunity  for  any  inter- 
ested person  to  present  his  views  on  any  matter  relevant 
to  the  proposed  trade  agreement.  For  this  purpose  the 
President  is  required  to  designate  an  agency  or  inter- 
agency committee  which  after  reasonable  public  notice  is 
to  hold  the  hearings. 

C.  Prerequisites  for  Offers 

The  President  may  make  an  offer  of  a  tariff  concession 
in  a  trade  agreement  with  respect  to  any  article  only 
after  he  has  received  (1)  the  Tariff  Commission's  advice 
concerning  the  article  or  after  the  expiration  of  the  rele- 
vant 6-month  period  provided  for  rendering  such  advice, 
whichever  oeeui's  first,  and  (2)  a  summary  of  the  hear- 
ings held  by  the  interagency  committee. 

VI.  General  Provisions  Relating  to  Trade  Agreements 

A.  Special  Representative  for  Trade  Negotiations 

The  act  provides  for  the  appointment  by  the  President, 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  of  a  Special 
Representative  for  Trade  Negotiations,  who  is  to  be  the 


657 


chief  United  States  representative  for  eacli  trade  agree- 
ment negotiation.  Tlie  Special  Representative  is  to  liave 
ambassadorial  ranli  and  is  to  be  chairman  of  the  inter- 
agency trade  organization  referred  to  below.  In  the  per- 
formance of  his  functions  the  Special  Representative  is 
to  seek  information  and  advice  from  representatives  of 
indnstry,  agriculture,  and  labor  and  from  such  agencies 
as  he  deems  appropriate. 

B.  Interagency  Trade  Organization 

The  act  provides  for  the  establishment  of  an  inter- 
agency trade  organization  which  will  be  at  Cabinet  level. 
This  organization  will  make  recommendations  to  the 
President  on  basic  policy  issues  arising  in  the  administra- 
tion of  the  trade  agreements  program ;  make  recommen- 
dations as  to  what  action  the  President  should  take  on 
Tariff  Commission  advice  in  escape-clause  cases;  advise 
the  President  of  the  results  of  hearings  which  it  is  re- 
quired to  hold  concerning  unjustifiable  and  unreasonable 
foreign  import  restrictions  and  recommend  appropriate 
action  with  respect  thereto  ;  and  perform  such  other  func- 
tions with  respect  to  the  trade  agreements  program  as  the 
President  may  designate. 

0.  Congressional  Delegates  to  Tariff  Negotiations 

Two  members  of  the  House  and  two  members  of  the 
Senate  are  to  be  accredited  to  United  States  delegations 
conducting  tariff  negotiations  under  the  act. 

D.  Reports  to  Congress 

The  President  is  required  to  transmit  promptly  to  the 
Congress  a  copy  of  each  trade  agreement  entered  into 
under  the  act,  together  with  a  statement  of  his  reasons 
for  entering  into  the  agreement.  Annual  reports  on  the 
operation  of  the  trade  agreements  program  are  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  Congress  by  the  President  and  by  the  Tariff 
Commission. 

E.  Most-Favored-Nation  Principle 

The  act  continues  existing  policy  of  extending  to  prod- 
ucts of  all  countries,  with  certain  exceptions,  duties  and 
other  import  restrictions  proclaimed  under  the  act  or 
under  previous  legislation.  The  principal  exceptions  to 
this  general  rule  are : 

1.  Communist  Products.  The  President  is  required,  as 
soon  as  practicable,  to  deny  the  benefits  of  trade  agree- 
ment concessions  to  products,  whether  imported  directly 
or  indirectly,  from  any  country  or  area  dominated  or 
controlled  by  communism. 

2.  Foreign  Import  Restrictions.  The  act  contains  sev- 
eral provisions  to  strengthen  the  hand  of  the  President  in 
dealing  with  unjustifiable  and  unreasonable  foreign  im- 
port restrictions : 

First,  it  directs  him  to  take  all  appropriate  and  feasible 
steps  within  his  power  to  eliminate  any  unjustifiable,  i.e. 
illegal,  import  restrictions  which  impair  the  value  of  tariff 
commitments  made  to  the  United  States,  oppress  U.S. 
commerce,  or  prevent  the  expansion  of  trade  on  a  mu- 
tually advantageous  basis.  The  President  may  not  nego- 
tiate the  reduction  or  elimination  of  any  U.S.  import 
restrictions  under  the  act  in  order  to  obtain  the  relaxa- 
tion or  removal  of  any  such  unjustifiable  restriction. 


658 


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Second,  the  President  is  directed,  notwithstanding  a; 
provision  of  any  trade  agreement  under  the  new  act,  andl  j 
to  the  extent  he  deems  necessary  and  appropriate,  to  im- 
pose duties  or  other  import  restrictions  on  the  products  of 
any  country  which  establishes  or  maintains  unjustifiable 
import  restrictions  against  U.S.  agricultural  productslj,( 
when  he  considers  such  action  against  the  products  of  the  ., 
foreign  country  necessary  and  appropriate  to  obtain 
relaxation  of  the  foreign  restriction  and  to  pruvirle  equi 
table  access  for  U.S.  agricultural  products  in  the  foreigi 
market. 

Third,  the  President  is  required,  to  the  extent  such  ac 
tion  is  consistent  with  the  purposes  stated  in  the  act,  t( 
deny  the  benefits  of  existing  trade  agreement  concessionii 
or  to  refrain  from  proclaiming  the  benefits  of  any  new  conn '' 
cession  to  any  foreign  country  or  instrumentality  which    ' 
(a)   maintains  nontarifE  trade  restrictions  including  var 
iable  import  fees  which  substantially  burden  U.S.  com 
merce  in  a  manner  inconsistent  with  trade  agreements 
or  (b)  engages  in  discriminatory  or  other  acts  (includin 
tolerance   of   international   cartels)    or  policies   unjust: 
fiably  restricting  U.S.  commerce. 

Fourth,  the  President  is  authorized,  to  the  extent  tha 
such  action  is  consistent  with  the  purposes  stated  in  th 
act  and  having  due  regard  for  the  international  obligf 
tions  of  the  United  States,  to  deny  the  benefits  of  existin 
trade  agreement  concessions  or  to  refrain  from  proclain 
ing  new  concessions  which  would  benefit  a  country  mail 
taining  unreasonable  (though  not  necessarily  illegal 
import  restrictions  which  either  directly  or  indirectly  sul 
stantially  burden  U.S.  commerce. 

3.  Conservation  of  Fishery  Resources.  The  act  adds 
new  section  to  the  Tariff  Act  of  1930  authorizing  tt 
President  to  increase  the  rate  of  duty  for  such  time  as  1 
deems  necessary  on  any  fish  in  any  form  imported  froi 
a  country  if  In  his  judgment  the  country's  fishery  coi 
servation  practices  or  policies  affect  the  United  Staff 
and  the  country  has  failed  or  refused  to  engage  in  got 
faith  in  international  negotiations  on  such  practice 
The  rate  of  duty  imposed  may  not  be  more  than  50  percei 
above  the  rate  existing  on  July  1, 1934. 

VII.  Tariff  Adjustment  and  Other  Adjustment 
Assistance 

The  act  authorizes  the  provision  of  assistance  to  indu*  Woi 
try,  firms,  or  workers,  as  the  case  may  be,  upon  a  findi] 
by  the  Tariff  Commission  that,  as  a  result  in  major  pa 
of  concessions  granted  under  trade  agreements,  an  artic 
is  being  imix)rted  into  the  United  States  in  such  increase 
quantities  as  to  be  the  major  factor  in  causing  or  thres 
ening  serious  injury  to  the  industry,  firm,  or  worke 
producing  a  like  or  directly  competitive  article.  All  pe 
tions  for  investigation  to  determine  eligibility  for  assi: 
ance  are  to  be  filed  with  the  Tariff  Commission. 

A.  Determinations  of  Injury  to  hidustrics 

Upon  receipt  of  a  petition  on  behalf  of  an  indust 


for  tariff  adjustment  under  section  3.51  (see  below),  t 
Tariff  Commission  must  conduct  an  industry-wide  inves 
gation  to  determine  whether  serious  injury  to  the  indust 
is  occurring  or  is  threatened.     In  the  course  of  such 

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''  estigation  the  Commission  must  hold  public  hearings. 

'^'  n  making  its  determination  the  Tariff  Commission  is 
^  equired  to  take  into  account  all  economic  factors  which 

'^'  :  considers  relevant,  including:  (1)  idling  of  productive 
cilities,  (2)  inability  to  operate  at  a  level  of  reasonable 
rofit,  and  (3)  unemployment  or  underemployment.  The 
iommission's  report  to  the  President  is  to  be  made  not 
Iter  than  6  months  after  the  filing  of  the  petition.     If 

'*'''  tie  Commission  should  find  serious  injury  or  threat 
lereof,  it  is  to  advise  the  President  in  its  report  of  the 
mount  of  the  increase  in  or  imposition  of  any  duty  or 
ther  import  restriction  on  the  article  which  is  necessary 
>  prevent  or  remedy  the  injury. 

!.  Action  by  the  President  After  a  Serious-Injury  Finding 
s  to  an  Industry 
The  President  may  take  any  of  the  following  actions 
fter  receiving  a  report  from  the  Tariff  Commission  con- 
lining  a  finding  that,  as  a  result  in  major  part  of  con- 
liijii  essions  granted   under  trade  agreements,  an  article  is 
ijEst  eing  imported  into  the  United  States  in  such  increased 
uantities  as  to  be  the  major  factor  in  causing  or  threat- 
th  ning  serious  injury  to  the  domestic  industry  producing 
like  or  directly  competitive  article: 

1.  Increased  Import  Restrictions.  Under  section  351, 
tie  President  may  proclaim  increased  duties  or  other 
uport  restrictions.  The  increased  duty  may  not  be  more 
ban  .50  percent  above  the  rate  existing  on  July  1,  1934 
or  if  the  article  is  dutiable  but  no  rate  existed  on  July  1, 
9.34,  the  rate  existing  at  the  time  of  the  proclamation), 
n  the  case  of  an  article  not  subject  to  duty  the  rate  im- 
osed  may  not  exceed  50  percent  ad  valorem.  If  the 
•resident  does  not  concur  in  the  Tariff  Commission's 
nding,  he  must  report  the  reasons  for  his  action  to  the 
!ongress,  which  may  within  60  days  cause  the  Tariff 
iommission's  finding  to  be  put  into  effect  by  adopting 

concurrent  resolution  by  a  vote  of  the  majority  of  the 
uthorized  member.ship  of  each  House. 

2.  Orderly  Marketing  Agreements.  Under  section  352, 
whenever  the  President  determines  that  such  action  would 
e  more  appropriate  to  prevent  or  remedy  serious  injury 
ban  would  action  under  paragraph  1  above,  he  may 
egotiate  international  agreements  with  foreign  countries 
.miting  their  exports  to  the  United  States  of  the  article 
ausing  or  threatening  serious  injury.  He  may  issue  reg- 
lations  governing  the  importation  of  the  article  into  the 

,jj,  fnited  States  from  countries  which  are  parties  to  the 
greement  and  from  other  countries. 

3.  Adjustment  Assistance.  As  an  alternative  to  action 
nder  paragraphs  1  or  2  or  in  combination  with  such 
ction,  the  President  may  provide  adjustment  assistance 
0  firms  and  workers  in  the  industry  concerned.  He  may 
uthorize  its  firms  to  request  the  Secretary  of  Commerce 
or  certifications  of  eligibility  to  apply  for  adjustment  as- 
istanee  under  the  terms  of  the  act  relating  to  firms. 
lIso,  he  may  authorize  workers  to  request  the  Secretary 
f  Labor  for  certifications  of  eligibility  to  apply  for  ad- 
it ustment  assistance  under  the  terms  of  the  act  relating 

il.tljo  workers. 

Termination  or  Extension  of  Escape-Clause  Action 
1.  Termination.     Any   increase   in   import   restrictions 
reclaimed  under  the  escape  clause  of  the  new  act  or  of 

Jcfober  29,  7962 


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previous  legislation  may  be  reduced  or  terminated  by  the 
President  at  any  time  when  he  determines,  after  taking 
into  account  the  advice  of  the  Tariff  Commission  and  after 
seeking  the  advice  of  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and 
the  Secretary  of  Labor,  that  such  reduction  or  termina- 
tion is  in  the  national  interest.  Unless  extended  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  procedures  outlined  below,  any  action 
taken  under  the  escape  clause  of  previous  legislation 
will  terminate  not  later  than  5  years  after  the  date 
of  enactment  of  the  new  act,  and  any  increase  imposed 
under  the  escape  clause  of  the  new  act  will  terminate 
not  later  than  4  years  after  the  proclamation  of  the 
increase.  The  Tariff  Commission  is  to  make  annual  re- 
ports to  the  President  concerning  developments  in  any 
industry  producing  articles  on  which  an  escape-clause 
restriction  is  in  effect. 

2.  Extension.  Any  increase  In  import  restrictions  un- 
der the  escape  clause  of  the  new  act  or  of  previous  legis- 
lation may  be  extended  in  whole  or  in  part  for  such 
periods  (not  in  excess  of  4  years  each)  as  the  President 
may  designate  if  he  determines,  after  taking  into  account 
the  advice  of  the  Tariff  Commission  and  after  seeking 
the  advice  of  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  the  Secre- 
tary of  Labor,  that  such  extension  is  in  the  national  in- 
terest. The  Tariff  Commission  may  advi.se  the  President, 
either  upon  his  request  or  upon  its  own  motion,  of  the 
probable  economic  effect  on  the  industry  concerned  of  the 
reduction  or  termination  of  the  increase  in  import  re- 
strictions. In  addition,  upon  petition  on  behalf  of  the 
industry  concerned,  filed  not  earlier  than  9  months  and 
not  later  than  6  months  before  a  termination  date  under 
paragraph  1  above  or  an  extension  tiereof,  the  Tariff 
Commission  is  to  advise  the  President  of  its  judgment  as 
to  the  probable  economic  effect  on  the  industry  of  such 
termination.  In  rendering  its  advice,  the  Tariff  Commis- 
sion is  to  conduct  an  investigation  during  the  course  of 
which  it  is  to  bold  public  hearings. 

D.  Determinations  of  Injury  to  Firms  and  Workers 

If  a  petition  is  filed  b.v  a  firm  or  group  of  workers  for 
a  determination  of  eligibility  to  apply  for  adjustment 
assistance,  the  Tariff  Commission's  investigation  is  limited 
to  the  situation  of  the  firm  or  group  of  workers  and  does 
not  encompass  the  entire  industry.  The  Commission  is 
required  to  hold  public  hearings  in  the  course  of  its  in- 
vestigation if  requested  by  the  petitioner  or  any  other 
interested  party.  The  Commission's  report  in  such  cases 
must  be  sent  to  the  President  not  later  than  60  days  after 
the  filing  of  the  petition.  The  economic  factors  to  be 
taken  into  account  by  the  Commission  parallel  those  in 
industry-wide  investigations.  After  receiving  a  report 
from  the  Tariff  Commission  containing  an  afl3rraative 
finding  with  respect  to  any  firm  or  group  of  workers,  the 
President  may  certify  that  such  firm  or  group  of  workers 
is  eligible  to  apply  for  adjustment  assistance. 

B.  Adjustment  Assistance  to  Firms 

"When  the  President  has  acted,  after  a  Tariff'  Commis- 
sion finding  of  serious  injury  to  an  industry,  to  provide 
adjustment  assistance  to  firms  in  the  Industry,  the  Secre- 
tary of  Commerce  is  to  certify  an  applicant  firm  as  eligible 
to  apply  for  assistance  upon  a  showing  by  the  firm  that 
the  increased  imports  (which  the  Tariff  Commission  de- 


659 


termined  to  result  in  major  part  from  concessions  granted 
under  trade  agreements)  have  been  the  major  cause  of 
serious  injury  or  threat  thereof  to  that  firm.  This  inter- 
mediate step  is  not  required  when  the  President  has  acted 
after  a  Tariff  Commission  finding  of  serious  injury  to 
the  applicant  firm  rather  than  to  the  industry  as  a  whole. 
In  either  case  the  applicant  firm  must  receive  certifica- 
tion from  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  that  its  adjustment 
proposal : 

(1)  is  reasonably  calculated  materially  to  contribute 
to  the  economic  adjustment  of  the  firm ; 

(2)  gives  adequate  consideration  to  the  interests  of  its 
workers  who  may  be  adversely  affected  by  increased  im- 
ports resulting  from  a  trade  agreement  concession ;  and 

(3)  demonstrates  that  the  firm  will  make  all  reasonable 
efforts  to  use  its  ow'n  resources  for  economic  development. 

Upon  approval  of  such  a  proposal,  the  Secretary  of 
Commerce  will  refer  it  to  such  government  agency  or 
agencies  as  he  determines  to  be  appropriate  to  furnish 
the  necessary  assistance.  He  may  certify  the  firm  as 
eligible  for  any  or  all  of  the  following  forms  of  adjust- 
ment assistance : 

(1)  technical  assistance; 

(2)  financial  assistance  in  the  form  of  loans,  guaran- 
tees of  loans,  or  agreements  for  deferred  participation  in 
loans ;  and 

(3)  tax  assistance  in  the  form  of  special  carryback  of 
operating  losses. 

F.  Adjustment  Assistmice  to  Workers 

In  the  case  of  groups  of  workers,  when  the  President 
has  acted,  after  a  Tariff  Commission  finding  of  serious 
injury  as  to  an  industry,  to  provide  adjustment  assistance 
to  workers  in  the  industry,  the  Secretary  of  Labor  is  to 
certify  an  applicant  group  as  eligible  for  adjustment  as- 
sistance upon  a  showing  by  the  group  that  the  increased 
imports  (which  the  Tariff  Commission  determined  to  re- 
sult in  major  part  from  concessions  granted  in  trade 
agreements)  have  been  the  major  factor  in  causing  or 
threatening  to  cause  unemployment  or  underemployment 
of  a  significant  number  or  proportion  of  workers  of  the 
group's  firm  or  subdivision  thereof.  Paralleling  the  pro- 
cedure for  individual  firms,  this  intermediate  step  is  not 
required  when  the  President  has  acted  to  provide  adjust- 
ment assistance  after  a  Tariff  Commission  finding  relat- 
ing specifically  to  the  situation  in  the  group's  firm  or 
subdivision  thereof. 

The  Secretary  of  Labor  is  to  determine  whether  work- 
ers are  entitled  to  receive  assistance  and  is  to  pay  or 
provide  such  assistance  to  workers  who  qualify  under 
the  standards  of  the  act  governing  the  period  of  eligibility 
and  amount  of  adjustment  assistance  to  which  individual 
workers  may  be  entitled.  The  Secretary  of  Labor  is  au- 
thorized to  enter  into  agreements  with  any  State  or  State 
agency  for  administering  assistance  to  workers  and  dis- 
bursing funds.  Any  payments  made  by  a  State  or  State 
agency  under  such  agreement  are  to  be  reimbursed  by  the 
Federal  Government. 


The  act  authorizes  the  following  forms  of  assistance  t« 
workers :  ' 

(1)  trade  readjustment  allowances  in  the  form  of  com- 
pensation for  partial  or  complete  unemployment ; 

(2)  retraining  of  workers  for  other  types  of  employ- 
ment ;  and 

(3)  relocation  allowances  to  assist  families  in  moving 
to  an  area  where  employment  may  be  available. 

G.  Adjustment  Assistance  Advisory  Board 

An  interagency  Adjustment  Assistance  Advisory  Board 
chaired  by  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  will  be  established 
to  advise  the  President  and  the  administering  agencies 
on  the  development  of  coordinated  programs  for  adjust- 
ment assistance  to  firms  and  workers. 


he 


U.S.  Delegates  Leave  for  Conference 
of  Inter-Parliamentary  Union 


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The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Octobeii 
11  (press  release  615)  that  the  American  delega 
tion  to  the  51st  conference  of  the  Inter-Parlia 
mentary  Union  would  leave  Washington  for  Brai 
silia  on  the  following  day.  The  confereno" 
begins  at  Brasilia  on  October  24.  The  chairman 
of  the  U.S.  delegation  is  Senator  A.  Willis  Rob- 
ertson  of  Virginia.  The  other  members  are  Sena 
tors  Oren  E.  Long  of  Hawaii,  Maurice  J.  Murphy 
Jr.,  of  New  Hampshire,  Benjamin  A.  Smith  II  o 
Massachusetts,  John  Stennis  of  Mississippi,  Her 
man  E.  Talmadge  of  Georgia,  Strom  Thurmonc 
of  South  Carolma,  and  Ralph  W.  Yarborough  o 
Texas;  Representatives  Dale  Alford  of  Arkansas 
Thomas  N.  Downing  of  Virginia,  Paul  C.  Jone  y^j 
of  Missouri,  Lucien  N.  Nedzi  of  Michigan,  Cath  tjjj, 
erine  D.  Norrell  of  Arkansas,  W.  R.  Poage  o  ^^\ 
Texas,  and  Phil  Weaver  of  Nebraska.  iftte 

The  Inter-Parliamentary  Union  was  founded  i:  ifscli 
1889  at  a  conference  attended  by  delegates  from  icert 
countries.  The  Union  now  has  64  membe  wp 
nations.  "«( 

The  aim  of  the  Inter-Parliamentary  Union  ii  ^v\ 
to  encourage  personal  contacts  between  member  *s 
of  all  parliaments  and  to  unite  tliem  in  commo 
action  to  preserve  democratic  institutions.  Th 
Union  makes  known  its  views  on  all  international 
problems  suitable  for  settlement  by  pari iamen tar 
act  ion  and  suggests  improvements  for  the  develop 
ment  of  i>arliamentary  institutions. 


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he  Common  Market,  the  Atlantic  Partnership,  and  the  Free  World 


6y  /.  Robert  Schaetzel 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Atlantic  Affairs  '■ 


i 

Perhaps  the  one  word  that  best  describes  the 

tmosphere   of   the   North   Atlantic   in    1962    is 

;hange."  The  wellsprings  of  change  are  the  fan- 
istic  advances  arising  out  of  man's  inventiveness, 
16  application  of  his  skill  and  imagination  to 
lodern  teclmology,  the  revolution  in  Western  ag- 
iculture,  and,  finally,  the  deadly  genius  that  has 
one  into  the  development  of  new  weapons  sys- 

ms.  Further,  there  is  general  recognition  of  the 
eed  to  change  previous  patterns  of  world  he- 
avier if  we  are  to  preserve  freedom  for  posterity. 

Beyond  all  this  there  is  a  sense  of  movement,  of 
xcitement,  of  a  new  future  flowing  outward  from 
le  phenomenal  success  of  the  European  Common 
larket.  The  Common  IVIarket  seems  to  be  touch- 
ng  not  only  most  lines  of  human  activity  but  all 
eographic  areas  of  the  World — East  and  West. 

Yet,  while  we  face  jx)litical  and  technological 
hange  on  a  massive  scale,  there  is  still  the  tend- 
;f "  ncy  to  decant  these  phenomena  in  the  old  bottles 
f  the  past.  The  world  seems  caught  up  in  a  kind 
f  schizophrenia,  tempted  by,  but  fearfid  of,  an 
ncertain  future  and  still  attempting  to  sort,  these 
ew  phenomena  in  classical  patterns. 

To  cite  an  example,  the  European  Community 
Dday  is  the  development  of  this  century  to  which 
len's  minds  gravitate.  It  is  the  source  of  Euro- 
lean  self-confidence  and  promise.  And  yet,  un- 
erstandably,  the  six  governments^  seem  awed, 
a  some  extent  intimidated,  by  their  own  creation 
nd  its  astonishing  success.  They  are  uncertain 
s  to  its  ultimate  geographic  scope,  unsure  as  to 


'Address  made  before  the  World  Affairs  Council  and 
he  Boston  Regional  Conference  on  NATO  Affairs  at  Bos- 
jn,  Mass.,  on  Oct.  6  (press  release  G02  dated  Oct.  5). 

Belgium,   France,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
taly,  Luxembourg,  and  the  Netherlands. 


W'Oc/ofaer  29,  1962 


how  the  next  step  of  political  union  can  be  taken. 

To  mention  another  case,  one  sees  on  every 
side  unmistakable  evidence  of  what  President 
Kennedy  has  referred  to  as  the  interdependence 
of  the  countries  of  the  North  Atlantic.  Defense 
of  the  West  as  a  whole  dejiends  on  the  North  At- 
lantic Treaty  Organization.  Defense  becomes  far 
less  certain,  the  danger  of  war  more  real  and  the 
outcome  less  certain,  should  there  be  any  break  in 
the  sure  support  or  the  steady  growth  of  this  in- 
stitution. But  this  is  not  to  say  that  other  areas 
of  the  free  world  can  afford  to  shirk  their  own 
responsibilities  for  defense. 

The  strength  of  NATO  seems  to  derive  from  the 
confluence  of  two  streams.  The  first  is  the  political 
comjnitment  of  the  member  states  to  the  concept 
of  the  North  Atlantic  alliance,  the  conscious 
awareness  of  the  15  nations  that  the  survival  of 
the  Atlantic  countries  and  of  the  free  world  de- 
pends on  the  vitality  of  this  alliance.  The  second 
is  growing  knowledge  of  the  characteristics  and 
the  implications  of  modern  weapon  systems,  par- 
ticularly of  nuclear  warheads  and  missile  delivery 
systems.  We  are  seeing  more  clearly  each  day  the 
limits  set  on  any  one  member  of  the  alliance  to 
consider  its  defense  separable  from  that  of  the 
others.    This  is  military  interdependence. 

Economic  Interdependence 

On  every  hand  one  finds  evidence  of  our  eco- 
nomic interdependence.  In  the  financial  field,  one 
nation's  surplus  is  another  nation's  deficit.  We 
are  more  aware  today  that  the  financial  positions 
of  countries  can  shift  rapidly,  as  we  have  foimd 
in  this  country  where  not  so  long  ago  the  "dollar 
gap"  was  the  oppressive  problem. 

Similarly,  we  see  more  clearly  than  ever  before 

661 


the  extent  to  wliicli  international  trade  must  be 
unfettered  and,  as  part  of  the  same  awareness, 
that  no  one  country  of  the  North  Atlantic  can 
insulate  itself  against  the  commerce  of  other  na- 
tions. The  American  proof  of  this  new  wisdom 
is  to  be  found  in  the  dramatic  approval  by  the 
Congress  of  the  President's  trade  expansion  pro- 
gram.^ This  action  is  no  less  than  a  revolutionary 
change  in  150  years  of  American  attitude  toward 
the  tariff. 

The  free  world's  great  producers  of  temperate 
agricultural  products  stand  victims  of  their  own 
success.  "Wliile  we  see  the  problem — the  stagger- 
ing bounty  resulting  from  technology  and  land 
management  applied  to  the  farm — we  are  all  far 
from  clear  as  to  the  solution.  But  the  major  pro- 
ducing countries  agree  that  the  problems  of  mas- 
sive farm  abundance  cannot  be  solved  by  each 
nation  alone,  but  only  by  common  action.  This 
is  further  evidence  of  our  interdependence. 

The   Common   Market  and  the  Commonwealth 

But  while  we  may  absorb  and  ponder  these  lines 
of  interdependence  there  remains  the  nostalgia  for 
traditional  means  of  dealing  with  such  problems, 
a  nostalgia  for  the  classical  minuet  of  internation- 
al behavior. 

Let  me  cite  an  example  here  at  the  risk  of 
wandering  innocently  into  a  family  dispute.  We 
observe  with  sympathy  the  examination  now  going 
on  within  the  British  Commonwealth  as  to  the  ef- 
fects of  prospective  British  membership  in  the 
Conunon  Market  on  the  Commonwealth.  But  it 
is  hard  not  to  be  puzzled  by  some  of  the  needless 
despair — or  so  it  seems  to  me — that  this  debate 
seems  to  incite. 

Well  before  the  July  1961  decision  of  the  British 
Government  to  seek  membersliip  in  the  Common 
Market,  the  Commonwealth  was  itself  being  tum- 
bled and  modified  in  the  strong  currents  of  20th- 
century  change.  The  postwar  creation  of  many 
new  Commonwealth  states  came  on  top  of  an  al- 
tered economic  relationsliip  between  the  U.K.  and 
the  old  members  of  the  Commonwealth.  It  was 
no  longer  a  reciprocal  matter  of  raw  materials 
exchanged  for  manufactured  goods  but  of  the  old 
dominions  industrializing  and  seeking  export 
markets  for  such  goods. 

Tlie  pity  is  that  the  extraordinary  success  of  the 


'See  p.  055. 
662 


rea; 
tori 


en; 


Commonwealth  in  adjusting  itself  to  both  eco-<  ''*' 
nomic  and  political  change  should  be  lost  sight  ofJI 
To  some  extent  it  seems  that  many  of  these  painful! 
but    inevitable    adjustments    of    the    Common- 
wealth— changes  caused  not  at  all  by  the  Common 
IMarket — are  now  laid  at  the  feet  of  the  British 
entry  into  the  European  Community.     I  am  notlera 
arguing  that  British  membership  will  not  require  ijii 
further  adjustment,  only  that  the  Common  Mar 
ket  is  not  the  sole  source  of  change. 

I  venture  on  this  delicate  ground  only  to  makj  'o  i 
the  point  that  much  of  the  worry,  and  indeed  the  icll 
almost  Cassandra  predictions  about  the  consei  mi 
quences,  are  reactions  at  least  in  part  to  fear  OA  liroi 
the  unknown  and  unease  in  the  presence  of  ac  !iit 
celerating  change.  M 

cter 
Success  of  European  Integration  Ei 

Western  Europe  has  made  a  great  new  contribui  """ 
tion  to  democratic  theory.  The  Six  nations  liav*  **' 
demonstrated  that  traditional  societies  can  bot'  '"P 
originate  and  put  into  place  such  revolutionar  " 
ideas  as  are  implicit  in  the  process  of  Europea:  oliti 
integration.  And  in  the  space  of  only  a  fe^  kisc 
years,  dramatic  change  has  taken  place  in  th  !ipa 
thinking  of  various  segments  of  the  Europea  litm 
population.  Wlien  one  reflects  on  the  bitter  enmit  Ino 
between  neighbors  which  threatens  the  peace  t<  jjjj 
day  in  so  many  parts  of  the  world,  and  which  rest  ^(|, 
on  far  less  deeply  rooted  historical  cause,  we  cat  ^^^^ 
only  be  awed  at  the  extent  and  depth  of  th 
rapprochement  of  France  and  Germany.  Th: 
new  relationship  does  more  than  remove  that  clai 
sical  source  of  European  and  world  disaster.  ] 
should  be  as  well  a  beacon  to  other  nations  elsf- 
where  in  the  world  to  consider  their  own  feuc 
and  disputes  in  the  bright  light  of  the  Francci 
German  achievement. 

Many  explanations  have  been  offered  as  to  ho 
it  is,  after  centuries  of  abortive  efforts,  the  Sif* 
nations  finally,  in  1952,  succeeded  in  their  que; 
for  unity.     One  explanation  is  that  within  tl 
last  20  years  each  of  them  had  been  either  occupiej 
or  defeated  in  war  with  the  consequent  destru 
tion  of  their  political  institutions.    This  shatterir 
experience,  so  the  explanation  runs,  may  very  we 
have  had  the  beneficial  side  effect  of  opening  men 
minds  to  the  consideration  of  alternative  forn 
of  pel  itical  organization,  to  the  search  for  whol 
new  approaches  to  the  profound  problems  of  tl 
postwar  world. 

Deparfmenl  of  State  Bulle: 


(onoi 


lorer 


reat 
The 


osiste 


9olial 
To, 


part 


k' 


f»I] 


bol 


)[iei 


)pei 


Tt 


.S.  Adjustment  to  European  Unity 

I  suggest  that  the  constriction  of  our  planet 
ifi  ad  the  pressure  of  tecluiology  and  of  modern 

eapons  are  factors  creating  perhaps  similar  will- 
igness  to  accept  change  in  other  parts  of  the 
itiil  'orld,  parts  which  have  not  had  the  same  shat- 
M  sring  war  experience  as  have  had  the  Six.  This 
ynamism  of  change  has  clearly  permeated  the 
Lmerican  society.  The  process  of  European  in- 
jgration  has  caught  the  imagination  of  America, 
'o  some,  who  see  the  Common  Market  through 
■ell-polished,  rose-tinted  glasses,  a  bright  futui'e 
merges  in  which  all  problems  solve  themselves 
irough  a  partnership  with  the  new  Commimity. 
lut  in  point  of  fact  the  partner  has  still  to  or- 
anize  its  aifairs  and  to  assume  truly  political  char- 

teristics — and  in  ways  still  impossible  to  define. 

But  despite  this  cautionary  caveat,  certainly  the 
lood  created  by  the  Common  Market  and  the  pros- 
ect  of  an  effective,  mutually  supporting  relation- 
lip  between  America  and  the  EEC  were  the  ideas 
lat  caught  American  imagination.  In  turn,  this 
olitical  concept  created  a  current  of  opinion  in 
lis  country  which  led  to  the  passage  of  the  Trade 
Expansion  Act.  Thus  our  society,  which  has  tra- 
itionally  both  created  and  responded  to  change, 
emonstrates  its  capacity  to  adjust.  American 
idustry  and  labor  show  willingness  to  compete 

ith  European  producers — and  competition  is  of 
J  '*  ourse  the  continuing  process  of  change  at  the 

onomic  level.  It  becomes  the  urgent  task  of  the 
rovernment  to  use  fully  the  authority  in  the  new 
i-ade  expansion  legislation  to  open  further  the 
reat  European  market  to  American  goods. 

The  lesson  to  be  drawn  is  that  all  of  the  free 
'orld  must  look  upon  this  period  as  one  requiring 
djustment — not  stubborn  resistance  to  change  or 
isistence  on  forcing  the  developments  of  a  revolu- 
onary  age  into  known  patterns  of  the  past. 


art 
Vive 

Bfll 

lorn 
thol 


lobal  Institutions  and  Regional  Bodies 

To  depart  from  this  philosophical  backdrop, 
ut  a  backdrop  necessary  to  the  discussion  ahead, 

series  of  urgent  questions  arise:  Wliat  is  to  be 
le  relationship  of  the  European  Community  to 
le  rest  of  Europe?  To  the  United  States  and  to 
le  North  Atlantic  alliance?  And  of  the  Atlan- 
c  partnei*ship  to  the  world  ? 

The  United  Nations,  bom  in  the  course  of  World 
^''ar  II  and  out  of  the  hope  that  further  wars 

lefober  29,  1962 


could  be  averted,  was  constructed  on  the  principle 
of  universality,  so  recently  enunciated  by  U  Thant. 
Complementary  regional  bodies  have  grown  up, 
in  response  to  world  needs  and  in  conformity  with 
the  U.N.  Charter.  These  regional  groups  and  in- 
stitutions do  not  detract  from  U.N.  authority  or 
its  functions  but  through  their  more  limited  scope 
can  deal  more  effectively  with  the  varied  problems 
of  a  complicated  world. 

The  dimensions  of  the  problem  thus  become 
clearer.  We  have  a  global  set  of  multilateral  insti- 
tutions. We  need  them,  and  they  serve  useful  pur- 
poses. The  United  States  has  special  and  historic 
relationships  that  run  to  the  Southern  Hemi- 
sphere. We  have  strong  postwar  commitments 
rooted  in  self-interest,  yet  outward-looking,  which 
are  exemplified  in  NATO  and  the  OECD  [Orga- 
nization for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment]. The  Western  European  countries  are 
putting  in  place  new  economic  and  political  rela- 
tionships among  themselves  under  the  stirring 
heading  "European  Unity."  The  problem  we  face 
is  not  to  select  one  pattern  from  this  group  and  to 
demolish  or  reduce  the  others  but  to  see  that  each 
performs  its  appropriate  role  in  contributing  to  a 
peaceful  and  prosperous  world. 

There  is  a  tendency  for  Americans,  with  our 
cormnendable  and  highly  developed  sense  of 
national  and  international  responsibility,  to  be 
self-conscious  about  the  Atlantic  relationship. 
Sometimes  our  nerves  kick  up  at  the  charge  that 
the  Atlantic  relationship  is  exclusively  military 
in  character — when  one  eyes  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty  Organization.  Occasionally  the  sensitivity 
is  to  the  fear  that  this  is  the  rich  countries  against 
the  poor  nations — when  one  considers  our  member- 
ship in  the  OECD ;  or  a  nervousness  that  we  seem 
to  be  cast  as  the  cold-eyed  bankers  eying  the  poor 
nations  of  the  world — when  one  reflects  on  our 
work  with  the  Development  Assistance  Committee. 

Self-consciousness  and  indeed  shame  will  be 
appropriate  sensations  if  the  objectives  and  the 
work  of  these  institutions  should  turn  out  to  be 
self-sei-ving,  rather  than  directed  to  the  general 
welfare  of  the  world.  But  we  would  be  guilty  of 
base  illogic  and  of  an  emotional  binge  of  classical 
proportions  if  we  were  to  be  put  off  from  the  work 
which  the  Atlantic  community  must  do  because  of 
our  fear  of  change  or  because  of  the  alarms  and 
worries,  miderstandable  but  insubstantial,  of  the 
other  jjarts  of  the  world. 


663 


There  are  things  which  must  be  done  and  which 
can  onlj'  be  done  by  limited  bodies.  The  Common 
Market  has  succeeded  for  a  variety  of  reasons. 
But  one  reason  certainly  lias  been  that  there  were 
six  nations — not  16  and  not  60.  The  six  nations 
start  with  common  threads  of  history  and  culture, 
a  common  experience  in  the  disaster  of  modern 
war,  common  appreciation  of  the  responsibilities 
of  government  in  the  area  of  social  welfare,  gen- 
erally comparable  standards  of  economic  activity 
and  income,  and,  finally,  the  willingness  and  the 
political  strength — as  nations — to  make  sacrifices 
of  national  interest  in  return  for  communal  gains. 

Importance  of  Atlantic  Collaboration 

In  turn  there  are  tilings  which  must  be  done  and 
which  can  only  be  done  by  intimate  collaboration 
between  the  United  States  and  the  European  Com- 
munity. These  tasks  arise  out  of  the  special  char- 
acteristics and  responsibilities  of  this  comitry  and 
the  Community.  To  name  the  tasks  is  to  sketch 
the  agenda  for  the  partnership. 

Our  common  security  depends  on  mutual  agree- 
ment on  the  nature  of  the  threat  to  our  survival 
and  on  our  willingness  to  arm  ourselves  in  defense 
against  this  threat. 

We  are  the  advanced  industrial  societies  of  the 
world,  with  all  of  the  advantages  and  disadvan- 
tages this  stage  of  economic  development  implies. 
But  perhaps  most  importantly  of  all,  we  share 
common  responsibilities.  If  there  is  to  be  an  open 
free-world  trading  system  it  can  only  come  about 
on  the  basis  of  agreement  between  the  Common 
Market  and  the  United  States.  For  together  we 
conduct  90  i^ercent  of  the  free- world  trade.  If 
there  is  to  be  an  international  financial  system 
capable  of  supporting  a  constantly  expanding 
volume  of  world  trade  it  must  be  built  across  tlie 
Atlantic.  The  system  will  only  woik  on  the  basis 
of  the  consent  and  with  the  support  of  the  treas- 
uries and  the  central  bankers  of  the  European 
countries  and  of  the  United  States.  If  there  is  to 
be  an  adequate  flow  of  public  and  private  capital, 
that  capita]  must  come  from  the  Atlantic  com- 
munity countries,  for  tliere  is  no  other  major 
source. 

The  emphasis  falls  on  Western  Europe  and  the 
United  States.  This  emphasis  cannot  be  avoided 
because  Atlantic  collaboration  is  the  foundation 
on  which  the  free-world  efforts  must  be  built. 
Tliis  is  not  conceived  as  an  exclusive  relationship, 

664 


nor  conducted  as  such.  There  is  a  second  miracl* 
in  the  modem  world :  Japan.  Today  Japan  play! 
an  indispensable  role  in  the  economic  business  of 
the  free  world.  She  is  an  important  memljer  of' 
the  Development  Assistance  Committee  of  the 
OECD.  Japan  is  also  a  full  partner  in  the  quiet 
work  among  the  leading  industrial  nations  that 
will  hopefully  lead  to  improvement  in  the  free* 


»ii 


iro 


world's  financial  system.     Japan  is  thus  a  kej 
element  in  the  pragmatic  work  that  is  centered  icfl" 

Paris.  ^" 

.  ml 

]« 
k 


Flexibility  and  Continuing  Discussion 


k 


m 


hes 


mil 
In 


If  the  broad  challenge  to  the  North  Atlantic  na^ 
tions  I  have  outlined  is  to  be  met  it  will  requip  |„t 
understanding  on  the  part  of  the  other  regions  o  L^ 
the  world.     They  must  be  led  to  see  why  this  re  JJ, 
lationship    is    indispensable,    to    reserve   critica 
judgment  until   the  results  can  be  seen.     Con 
versely,  it  falls  to  countries  of  the  North  Atlanti 
to  accept  the  full  dimensions  of  responsibility  an' 
to  see  that  in  exercising  this  responsibility  wi;, 
sei-ve  the  higher  interests  of  the  entire  free  worlc! 
Finally,  we  shall  have  to  be  willing  to  hold  stead;'  ^fj^ 
in  the  face  of  frivolous  and  fearful  criticism  wher 
in  our  judgment  we  believe  it  is  necessary  to  dc 
velop  special,  organic  relationships  to  carry  oi 
the  tasks  which  are  tlie  inescapable  duties  of  tb 
countries  of  the  North  Atlantic. 

To  some  extent  the  new  techniques  being  do  njj 
vised  for  North  Atlantic  collaboration  may  a; 
suage  some  of  the  fears  of  the  rest  of  the  worlc 
These  techniques  put  a  high  value  on  flexibilit; 
pragmatism,  and  consultation.  This  type  c 
collaboration  rests  on  the  assumption  that  we  ai 
not  negotiating  with  one  another  but  that  we  an  ^^  j 
partners  in  search  of  solutions  to  common  prol'  ji^f^ 
lems.  We  find  increasingly  that  solutions  do  n(  Ifjjiji 
emerge  from  a  procedure  in  which  one  nation  sla|  (jujj 
a  formal  position  on  the  table  on  a  "take  it  or  leav  kuI^ 
it*'  basis.  Instead,  answers  develop  out  of  a  coii  luj^j 
tinning  process  of  discussion.  nj^ j| 

This  characteristic  of  the  new  partnership  do  tvelop 
not  demand  new  organizations:  NATO  and  tli  ii|f|,j 
OECD  are  entirely  suitable  for  tlie  immediate  ai   k\^^ 

m. 

require  a  willingness  on  the  part  of  the  senii 
oliicials  of  the  several  governments  to  accept  th 
system  of  intimate  collaboration.  Indeed  we  im 
find  it  advisable  to  avoid  commitment  to  new,  pe 
manent  bodies  and  instead  run  contrary'  to  Pa 


nu 


Department  of  State   Bulled 


refe 


tery 
"H,: 


OJ 


Vinson's  law  that  organizations  never  die  by 
■reating  and  then  abolisliing  working  groups  and 
special  committees. 

[Collaboration  in  the  Developing  Community 

The  problem  for  the  European  Community  is 
■onsiderably  more  difficult.     It  is  a  Commmiity 
t  ill  being  shaped.     In  addition  to  the  imminent 
i)rospect  of  further  enlargement  through  the  ad- 
lition  of  the  United  Kingdom,  and  possibly  sev- 
eral other  states,  the  Six  seek  to  reinforce  the 
ommunities  through  a  treaty  of  political  imion. 
These  are  formidable  intellectual  and  organiza- 
'")  ional  tasks,  a  sufficient  challenge  to  the  genius 
1™  hat  has  created  and  advanced  the  European  Com- 
tiunities.     While  struggling  with  these  problems 
he  European  Commimity  has  placed  certain  au- 
hority  in  the  hands  of  the  central  institutions. 
'-*  Tet  real  power  still  lodges  in  the  member  states, 
iut  the  Community,  despite  the  array  of  internal 
■usiness,  cannot  ignore  the  outside  world.     The 
yommunity  and  its  member  states  must  react  to 
he  same  sets  of  problems  I  have  outlined  before, 
f^i  7ithin  the  framework  of  NATO  and  the  OECD, 
,nd  within  the  United  Nations. 
In  a  way  those  of  us  on  the  outside  and  the 
f "'  fiembers  of  the  European  Community  have  a  com- 
lon  problem :  We  both  must  accept  the  fact  that 
new  political-economic  entity  has  been  created 
n  Europe.     The  members  of  the  Community  must 
onquer  the  impulse  to  have  it  both  ways — to  cher- 
fMl'  3h  the  fruits  and  exploit  the  satisfactions  of  the 
'ill'  yommunity  and  yet  to  continue  to  deal  with  the 
»■  '  rorld  as  though  nothing  had  happened  to  the 
ff»  lassical  pattern  of  national  states.     As  nonmem- 
fJ  ers,  it  falls  to  those  of  us  in  the  Atlantic  alliance 
]iri)  Iso  to  accept  the  fact  that  the  Community  exists. 
liii«  Ve  should  expect  and  indeed  welcome  continuing 
isia  conomic   and  political   consultation  among  the 
•lei  lember  states  of  the  EEC  as  an  indispensable 
i  01  haracteristic  of  the  evolving  Community.     Be- 
ause  it  is  new  we  cannot  look  askance  upon  this 
pilo  eveloping  process  of  Community  collaboration 
Jtl.nd  charge  it  as  disruptive  of  the  now  traditional 
tea!  echniques  of  national  operation  within  NATO, 
i,,lo)ECD,  and  the  U.N. 

jfiiii 

itlli  Ipcoming  Trade  Negotiations 

f'jii  I  refer  finally  to  one  practical  problem  of  tre- 
ijfiendous  importance  which  will  be  before  us  in 
!i  Pi  he  very  near  future :  the  trade  negotiations  made 

lulWMofaer  29,  1962 


possible  by  the  new  Trade  Expansion  Act.  These 
negotiations  too  must  be  handled  within  this  com- 
plicated framework  of  existing  institutions  and  in 
today's  atmosphere  of  dynamic  change. 

Here  we  must  introduce  the  GATT,  the  Gen- 
eral Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade,  an  institu- 
tion which  any  horse  player  would  call  a  "sleeper." 
This  institution  has  not  only  contributed  to  the 
orderly  reduction  of  tariff  barriers  during  the 
postwar  period  but  has  performed  with  distinction 
work  on  many  other  aspects  of  the  world's  trading 
problems.  Beyond  this  and  during  its  15-year 
history,  the  GATT  has  established  itself  as  an  in- 
stitution capable  of  dealing  evenhandedly  with 
botli  the  advanced  and  less  developed  coimtries. 
This  balance  and  the  maturity  of  its  i^roduct  have 
coincidentally  created  a  breed  of  governmental 
officials  now  found  in  high  positions  in  the  several 
capitals  of  the  GATT  contracting  parties.  These 
officials  have  a  mutual  respect  for  one  another, 
they  appreciate  the  complexities  of  our  trading 
world,  and  they  lead  the  search  collectively  and 
individually  for  solutions  to  problems,  rather  than 
to  fight  the  problems. 

The  GATT  and  the  men  who  made  it  work  must 
play  a  central  role  in  the  trade  negotiations  made 
possible  by  the  Trade  Expansion  Act.  At  the 
same  tune  we  must  retain  the  flexibility  to  carry 
on  exploratory  and  even  parallel  discussions  with 
the  enlarged  EEC  as  we  work  together  toward 
the  formal  international  negotiations  which  must 
be  set  within  the  GATT  framework. 

There  may  also  be  a  role  for  the  OECD  to  play 
in  reducing  barriers  to  trade.  As  suggested 
earlier,  the  advanced  countries  have  special  prob- 
lems and  in  many  cases  there  are  special  devices 
which  they  employ  in  restricting  or  discriminat- 
ing against  one  another's  trade.  There  are  also 
measures,  such  as  consumption  taxes,  which  limit 
consumption  of  tropical  products  and  depress  still 
further  the  market  for  such  major  world  commodi- 
ties as  coffee.  It  seems  eminently  sensible  for  the 
OECD  members  to  consider  and  to  seek  remedies 
to  these  restraints  and  burdens  on  world  trade. 
The  test  should  not  be  that  because  similar  prob- 
lems are  being  examined  in  GATT  they  cannot  be 
examined  elsewhere.  The  real  test  is  whether  the 
advanced  countries  can,  througli  preliminary  or 
parallel  discussion,  rise  to  more  responsible  levels 
of  economic  behavior  and  to  the  further  reduction 
of  govenunental  restrictions. 

665 


The  same  pragmatism  and  flexibility  should  sur- 
round our  exploration  of  how  best  to  organize  and 
mount  the  future  round  of  trade  negotiations. 
Neither  we,  the  Europeans,  nor  tlie  GATT  should 
devise  and  settle  in  private  the  procedures  or  the 
formula  that  will  lead  to  these  negotiations.  But 
these  decisions  should  arise  from  deliberate  con- 
sideration in  several  forums  of  the  problems  and 
the  potentialities  with  which  these  negotiations 
must  deal. 

Emphasis  on  Product  Rather  Than  Technique 

My  concluding  note  is  that  we  must  either  opti- 
mistically or  fearfully,  depending  on  the  cast  of 
mind,  accept  the  fact  of  dramatic  change  of  world 
affairs,  with  the  North  Atlantic  the  vortex  of  cy- 
clonic activity.  We  should  be  cautious  in  the  face 
of  suggestions  that  existing  institutions  must  be 
uprooted  or  that  new  institutions  should  be  put 
quickly  in  place.  The  challenge  of  the  period  im- 
mediately ahead  seems  to  be  to  realize  the  extent 
of  the  common  business  to  be  done  and  to  develop 
new  processes  for  doing  this  business.  It  would 
appear  less  urgent  to  set  lawyers  to  work  drafting 
new  treaties,  or  bureaucrats  to  the  drawing  boards 
sketching  new  organization  charts. 

We  must  continually  question  ourselves  as  to 
what  we  North  Atlantic  nations  do  in  meeting  our 
world  responsibilities,  rather  than  Kow  we  fulfill 
this  mission.  In  the  final  analysis  it  is  the  product 
of  our  endeavors  and  not  the  technique  that 
counts. 


Secretary  Names  Advisory  Committee 
on  International  Book  Programs 

Press  release  614  dated  October  11 

Secretary  Rusk  announced  on  October  11  the 
appointment  of  the  Government  Advisory  Com- 
mittee on  International  Book  Programs,  a  group 
of  leaders  in  tlie  book  industry  to  work  with  the 
Government  to  determine  the  mo.st  effective  means 
for  increasing  the  number  of  readers  abroad  of 
American  books. 

The  committee  has  been  established  as  a  result 
of  a  suggestion  made  by  Attorney  General 
Eobert  F.  Kennedy  in  a  speech  before  the  Ameri- 


1 

The  AO- 


p 


can  Booksellers  Association  last  June, 
torney  General  said : 

The  communist  deluge  of  printed  matter  is  disturbing? 
It  is  that,  but  it  should  not  be  frightening.  For  we  in 
this  country  can  compete  with  anyone  in  communicatini 
ideas.  We  should  not  shrink  from  a  contest  in  the  fonr 
of  the  printed  word.  .  .  .  Our  greatest  advantage  is  thai 
we  are  a  free  society.  Books  are  created  in  respons«l^J{ 
to  the  need  for  knowledge,  the  need  for  education,  anc 
the  need  for  entertainment.  They  are  not  created  at  the 
whim  of  a  totalitarian  state  .... 

American  books  reflect  our  common  heritage  with  manjJWe 
other  nations  and  their  influence  upon  our  culture.     Thi<  jj 
influences  are  endless,  linking  us  with  the  rest  of  thi 
world.    Thus,  they  are  good  ambassadors  for  us.  .  .  .    I* 
This  is  a  joint  effort.    We  In  Government  must  do  mor«i  atk 
and  we  are  calling  upon  you  in  the  book  industry  to  d  [pf( 

em 

In  asking  Curtis  G.  Benjamin,  chairman  of  th  ri^ei 

board,  McGraw-Hill  Book  Co.,  Inc.,  to  be  chain  [ect; 

man  of  the  committee,  Secretary  Rusk  said: 

The   paucity   of   American  books   available   abroad  i(  '^ 
disturbing,  while  the  demand  and  the  need  for  such  booh<  ipac 
is  great.     Our  progress — governmental  and  private — must   jjj 
be  expanded  and  given  as  much  substance  as  possibli- 
The  need  for  all  of  this  stands  by  its^elf,  but  we  cannc. 
ignore  the  enormous  efforts  In  this  field  by  the  Sovi«( 
Union. 

Other  members  of  the  committee  are : 

Jerome  Hardy,  executive  vice  president.  Time,  Inc. 
John    Howe,    assistant   to   the   president,   Encyclopaedi 

Britannica,  Inc. 
William    Kelty,    assistant    general    manager,    Reader 

Digest 
Igor   Kropotkin,   vice   president  and   manager,    Scribni 

Bookstores 
Freeman  Lewis,  executive  vice  president,  PocketbooW 

Inc. 
Andrew  McNally  III,  president.  Rand  McNally 
M.  R.  Robinson,  president.  Scholastic  Book  Services 
William  Spaulding,  president,  Houghton  Mifflin  Co. 
Franklin  Watts,  president,  Franklin  Watts,  Inc. 
W.  Bradford  Wiley,  president,  John  Wiley  &  Sons 
Thomas  Wilson,  director.  Harvard  University  Press 


cess 
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lew 


Government  representatives  on  the  committt*  -^ 
are  Lucius  D.  Battle,  Assistant  Secretary  for  Edv 
cational  and  Cultural  Affairs,  Department  (- « 
State;  Donald  M.  Wilson,  Deputy  Director,  U.!| 
Information  Agency;  and  Frank  Coffin,  Deput 
Administrator  for  Operations,  Agency  for  Inte 
national  Development. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  committee  will  tal' 
place  October  16  in  the  Department  of  State 


OllllCl 

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■5aiE 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


iternational  Coffee  Agreement 
igned  at  New  York 

atement  hy  Adlai  E.  Stevenson 

.S.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations'^ 

I  address  you  today  with  a  deep  sense  of  grati- 
ation  and  pleasure.  After  many  long  months 
23reparation  and  7  weeks  of  intense  negotiations, 
3  are  met  here  to  sign  the  new  world  coffee 
reement  so  that  it  may  be  ratified  and  put  into 

lis'  feet  as  quickly  as  possible. 

Few  economic  agreements  negotiated  in  recent 
ars  equal  this  pact  in  importance  and  potential 
ipact.  Coffee  is  a  pervasive  factor  in  the  lives 
millions  in  Africa,  Latin  America,  and  else- 
tiere.  It  provides  them  their  daily  bread  and 
elds  for  their  governments  the  foreign  exchange 
icessaiy  for  vital  imports  and  for  the  financing 
■  economic  and  social  development.  Without  a 
Eible,  adequate  income  from  this  major  cash  crop, 
itold  millions  of  people  in  many  lands  would  be 
lable  to  travel  the  road  to  a  better  life. 

,,il,i  So,    Mr.    Chairman,   this    occasion    should   be 
arked  by  soleimiity  and  joy.    The  despair  of  re- 

ito  nt  years  caused  by  price  declines  and  mounting 
rpluses,  cannot  be  undone  overnight,  but  the 
iture  now  looks  more  hopeful. 
Long  preparation  and  difficult  negotiation  have 
ought  us  to  this  day.  The  obstacles  were  great, 
lie  price  objectives  of  the  agreement,  the  means 
operating  it,  the  powers  to  be  granted  to  the 
Duncil,  the  division  of  export  quotas,  the  respec- 
ve  obligations  of  producing  and  consuming  coun- 
ies — all  these  were  formidable  issues.  Perhaps 
ost  formidable  of  all  was  the  root  problem  it- 
If :  overproduction  of  coffee  and  the  resulting 

^'  :cess  stocks.    Many  prophets  flatly  predicted  that 

fp"'  would  be  impossible  to  overcome  all  these  issues 
id  that  tlie  whole  effort  was  doomed. 


fi 


Irje 


ijl 


'  Made  at  the  U.N.  Coffee  Conference  at  New  York.  N.Y., 
the  occasion  of  the  signing  of  the  International  Coffee 
freement  on  Sept.  28  (U.S./U.N.  press  release  4049). 
)r  a  statement  made  on  July  10  by  W.  Michael  Blumen- 
al,  chairman  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  Conference, 
e  Bulletin  of  Aug.  6, 1962,  p.  234. 

cfober  29,   7962 


But  these  prognosticators  were  proved  wrong, 
and  the  credit  for  that  proof  goes  to  you,  the  dele- 
gates here  assembled  who  have  created  this  agree- 
ment which  we  are  about  to  sign.  By  this  docu- 
ment you  have  enabled  all  the  countries  concerned 
to  move  beyond  the  present  short-term  arrange- 
ment, with  all  its  weaknesses,  and  have  overcome 
problems  with  which  that  arrangement  could  not 
begin  to  deal.  This  agreement  takes  a  long  step 
toward  reconcilmg  the  varied  mterests  of  import- 
ers and  exporters — and  thus  toward  establisliing 
a  universal  coffee  policy  for  the  world. 

Lest  we  succumb  to  the  temptation  of  relaxing 
our  efforts,  let  us  be  clear,  Mr.  Chairman,  that, 
while  the  agreement  tells  us  what  should  be  done, 
it  does  not  assure  that  it  will  be  done.  The  main 
tasks  are  therefore  ahead  of  us.  We  must  put  this 
agreement  into  force  quickly.  We  must  apply  its 
provisions  fairly.  We  must  strive  to  make  it  a 
truly  universal  agreement  which  will  bring  bene- 
fits to  all  who  are  prepared  to  undertake  its  obli- 
gations. And  we  must  use  the  agi"eement  as  a  basis 
for  the  evolution  of  a  common  coffee  policy — ^not 
only  as  regards  international  trade  but  also  as 
regards  agreed  production  policies.  Thus  we  may 
assure  by  this  agreement  that  those  to  whom  the 
future  in  coffee  fairly  belongs  shall  ultimately 
realize  it. 

These  are  not  easy  matters.  This  agreement  is 
more  comprehensive  than  any  other  commodity 
agreement  that  has  ever  come  into  effect.  It  will 
take  statesmanship  and  skill  to  put  life  into  the 
agreement  and  to  enable  it  to  survive  the  pressures 
that  will  inevitably  arise  against  it.  Important 
decisions  must  be  taken  periodically  on  export 
quotas. 

The  Council  will  have  very  important  duties. 
It  must  recommend  policies  regarding  production 
and  stocks.  It  must  assure  that  the  price  objec- 
tives of  the  agreement  are  met  and  that  the  agree- 
ment does  not  unwittingly  treat  some  members 
harshly  while  unduly  benefiting  others.  It  should 
be  instrumental  in  persuading  nations  to  eliminate 
imreasonable  tariff,  tax,  or  price  practices  which 
tend  to  reduce  consumption.  Exporters  and  im- 
porters should  be  able  to  obtain  guidance  and  as- 

667 


« 


President  Urges  Early  Consideration 
of  Coffee  Agreement  by  Congress 

statement  hy  President  Kennedy 

White  House  press  release  dated  September  28 

It  gives  me  great  satisfaction  tbat  the  Interna- 
tional Coffee  Agreement  was  signed  today  [Septem- 
ber 28]  at  the  United  Nations  in  New  York.  It 
was  signed  on  behalf  of  our  country  by  Ambassador 
Adlai  E.  Stevenson  and  our  principal  negotiator, 
W.  Michael  Blumenthal,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
of  State  for  Economic  Affairs.  I  am  submitting 
tlie  agreement  to  the  Senate  ^  nest  week  and  shall 
urge  that  it  be  considered  early  in  the  next  Congress. 
Since  we  account  for  50  percent  of  world  coffee  im- 
ports, the  agreement  cannot  take  effect  until  ratified 
by  the  United  States. 

The  agreement  is  a  heartening  example  of  inter- 
nation.al  cooperation  to  resolve  a  vitally  important 
economic  problem.  Coffee  is  the  third  most  traded 
commodity  in  the  world  and  is  the  main  source  of 
foreign  income  in  many  underdeveloped  countries, 
particularly  in  Latin  America.  A  drop  of  1  cent  a 
pound  for  green  coffee  costs  Latin  American  pro- 
ducers $50  million  in  export  proceeds — enough  to 
seriously  undercut  what  we  are  seeking  to  accom- 
plish by  the  Alliance  for  Progress. 

The  agreement  fixes  export  and  import  quotas  for 
coffee.  To  assure  that  prices  to  consumers  are  fair 
and  reasonable,  importing  nations  have  an  equal 
voice  with  exporters  in  fixing  quotas.  Fifty-eight 
countries  took  part  in  the  negotiations,  and  some 
70  nations  may  eventually  join  in  this  agreement 
covering  the  bulk  of  world  trade  in  coffee. 


'  On  Oct.  4  the  agreement  was  submitted  to  the 
Senate  for  its  advice  and  consent  to  ratification. 


sistance  through  the  agreement  in  order  to  comply 
with  their  quota  obligations. 

But,  most  important,  the  Comicil  should  be- 
come an  instrument  for  charting  the  future  for 
coffee.  The  world  can  no  longer  afford  the  an- 
archy which  has  so  often  marked  the  international 
coffee  market.  Nations  which  depend  heavily  on 
coffee  cannot  intelligently  chart  their  futures 
while  at  the  mercy  of  the  whims  of  their  coffee- 
producing  rivals.  It  will  be  wasteful  and  dis- 
tressing if,  through  this  agreement,  better  coordi- 
nation is  not  realized  internationally  in  all  facets 
of  coffee  production  and  trade.  Indeed,  we  may 
doubt  that  the  agreement  itself  will  survive  a 
failure  to  develop  common  policies  in  these 
matters. 


668 


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'rfon 


urre 


Mr.  Chairman,  for  many  countries  economic 
progress,  coffee,  and  international  aid  are  bouni 
together.  If,  therefore,  this  agreement  is  succes 
fully  operated,  it  will  make  a  major  contributic 
to  economic  and  social  development.  Millions  ( 
the  underprivileged  may,  because  of  this  agre 
ment,  achieve  the  political  progress  and  til 
greater  dignity  that  comes  with  freedom  froi 
want. 

The  United  States  Government  has  long  recoj. 
nized  this.  For  this  reason  we  pledged  ourselv^ 
at  Punta  del  Este''  and  at  many  other  intern; 
tional  forums  to  work  for  relief  and  resolution  ( 
the  world's  commodity  problems. 

My  Government  intends  to  seek  early  ratific 
tion  of  the  agreement  and  the  necessary  impl 
menting  legislation.  We  expect  to  be  able  to  plf4  ■""'' 
a  full  :-ole  in  the  agi'eement  early  next  year,  whi 
we  hope  the  Council  will  hold  its  first  meetin 
Meanwhile  we  shall  cooperate  in  every  way  avail 
able  to  us  with  those  nations  in  the  short-ter 
agreement  and  outside  of  it  who  are  striving  f 
these  same  goals. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  cannot  exaggerate  the  respo: 
sibility  that  now  lies  on  all  of  us  to  put  this  agre 
ment  into  effect  and  to  make  it  work.  For  i 
significance  extends  far  beyond  the  coffee  mark* 
important  as  that  is.  It  can  serve,  if  it  succeec 
as  an  example  for  the  creative  solution  of  tl 
major  commodity  problems  of  the  world. 

The  main  problems  of  coffee  are  also  the  pro 
lems  of  other  primary  commodities  in  the  wor 
market:  declining  prices,  cyclical  ups  and  dowr 
and  resulting  uncertainty  about  foreign  exchanj, 
earnings  which  can  sometimes  wreck  the  mo 
carefully  designed  national  economic  developmei 
plan. 

The  United  States  here  renews  its  pledge  to  pU 
an  active  and  constructive  part  in  tlie  solution  < 
world  commodity  problems.  President  Kennec 
has  emphasized  that  this  is  one  of  the  major  obje^  „,ju,j 
tives  of  United  States  foreign  economic  polic 
We  are  determined  to  do  our  part  in  this  caus 
whose  success  means  so  nuicli  to  the  world  in  thi 
Decade  of  Development. 

In  examining  the  text  of  the  agreement  whici 
we  are  about  to  sign,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  could  n^ 
help  noticing  that  there  is  a  lot  of  space  left  fi 
extra  signatures.  I  take  this  as  evidence  of  tl 
great  Iiopes  we  all  have  that  all,  or  nearly  all,  tl 


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Tog 


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uliuri 

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'  For  background,  see  ihid.,  Sept.  11.  1901,  p.  4.50. 

Department  of  State  Bullet 


(fee  importing  and  exporting  interests  of  the 
)rld  will  become  members  of  this  agreement. 
We  in  this  hall  represent  a  great  diversity :  na- 
ms  both  old  and  new;  exporters  and  importers; 
ne  far  along  the  road  of  economic  development, 
s  jm  ne  just  at  the  beginning  of  the  road.  But  from 
it  diversity,  even  that  clash  of  interests,  we  have 
nposed  a  harmony.  Now  let  us  see  if  we  can 
rform  our  own  composition  and  thereby  earn 
rf,,  i  applause  of  the  world. 


flICts 


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jrrent  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


topi  omic  Energy 

lendment  to  article  VI.A.3  of  the  Statute  of  the  Inter- 
aational  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (TIAS  3873).  Done  at 
Vienna  October  4,  1961.' 

i.cwptance  deposited:  Cuba,   October  11,  1962;   Nica- 
ragua, October  9,  1962. 
r'l*l  atute    of    the    International    Atomic    Energy    Agency. 
Done   at   New   York   October   26,   1956.     Entered   into 
force  July  29,  1957.     TIAS  3873. 
RatifiGation  deposited :  Liberia,  October  5,  1962. 

itomotive  Traffic 

nvention  on  road  traffic,  with  annexes.     Done  at  Gen- 
3va  September  19,  1949.    Entered  into  force  March  26, 
1952.     TIAS  2487. 
Notification   7-eceired   that  it   considers  itself   bound: 

Togo,  February  27, 1962. 
nvention    concerning    customs    facilities    for    touring. 
Done  at  New  York  June  4,  1954.     Entered  into  force 
September  11, 1957.     TIAS  3879. 
Ratification  deposited :  Ecuador,  August  30,  1962. 
istoms   convention    on    the   temporary   importation   of 
private  road  vehicles.    Done  at  New  York  June  4,  1954. 
Entered  into  force  December  15,  1957.     TIAS  3943. 
Ratification  deposited :  Ecuador,  August  30,  1962. 


iltural  Relations 

;reement  for  facilitating  the  international  circulation 
of  visual  and  auditory  materials  of  an  educational,  sci- 
entifie,  and  cultural  character,  and  protocol.  Done  at 
Lake  Success  July  15,  1949.  Entered  into  force  Au- 
gust 12,  19.54.= 
Acceptance  deposited:  Brazil,  August  15,  1962. 

IBH  ,w  Of  the  Sea 

*)'  )nvention  on  the  territorial  sea  and  contiguous  zone.' 

Done  at  Geneva  April  29,  1958. 

Ratification  deposited:  Bulgaria,  August  31,  1962. 
ail-lmvention  on  the  continental  shelf.'     Done  at  Geneva 

April  29,  1958. 

Accession  deposited:   Bulgaria,  August  31,  1962. 

mvention  on  the  high  seas.     Done  at  Geneva  April  29 

19.58. 

Ratification  deposited:  Bulgaria,  August  31,  1962. 

Entered  into  force:  September  30,  1962. 


Not  in  force. 

Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 


icfober  29,  7962 


Narcotics 

Convention  for  limiting  the  manufacture  and  regulating 
the  distribution  of  narcotic  drugs,  as  amended  (61 
Stat.  2230;  62  Stat.  1796).  Done  at  Geneva  July  13, 
1931.  Entered  into  force  July  9,  1933.  48  Stat.  1543. 
'Notification  received  that  it  considers  itself  hound: 
Togo,  February  27,  1962. 

Protocol  bringing  under  international  control  drugs  out- 
side the  scope  of  the  convention  limiting  the  manufac- 
ture and  regulating  the  distribution  of  narcotic  drugs 
concluded  at  Geneva  July  1.3,  1931  (48  Stat.  1543),  as 
amended  (61  Stat.  2230;  62  Stat.  1796).  Done  at  Paris 
November  19.  1948.  Entered  into  force  for  the  United 
States  September  11, 19.50.  TIAS  2308. 
Notification  received  that  it  considers  itself  hound: 
Togo,  February  27,  1962. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Amendment  of  regulation  30,  chapter  III  (inflatable 
liferafts),  annexed  to  the  international  convention  for 
the  safety  of  life  at  sea  signed  June  10,  1948  (TIAS 
2495) .     Done  at  London  May  1955.' 

Acceptances:  Australia,  Belgium,  Brazil,  Bulgaria, 
Cambodia,  Cameroon,  Canada,  Central  African  Re- 
public, Congo  (Brazzaville),  Cuba,  Czechoslovakia, 
Dahomey,  Denmark,  Dominican  Republic,  Finland, 
France,  Gabon,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Greece, 
Guinea,  Haiti,  Hungary,  Iceland,  India,  Ireland,  Is- 
rael, Italy,  Ivory  Coast,  Japan,  Korea,  Kuwait,  Mad- 
agascar, Federation  of  Malaya,  JIauritauia,  Monaco, 
Morocco,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Nicaragua,  Nor- 
way, Pakistan,  Panama,  Philippines,  Poland,  Portu- 
gal, Senegal,  Somali  Republic,  South  Africa,  Spain, 
Sweden,  Switzerland,  Turkey,  United  Arab  Republic, 
Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  United  States, 
Venezuela,  Viet-Nam,  Yugoslavia. 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement  of  1958.  Done  at  Lon- 
don December  1,  1958.  Entered  into  force  January  1, 
1959:  for  the  United  States  October  9,  19.59.  TIAS 
4389. 

Cessation  of  application  to :  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Au- 
gust 31,  1962. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  convention  with  six 
annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  December  21,  1959.  En- 
tered into  force  January  1.  1961 ;  for  the  United  States 
October  23, 1961.     TIAS  4892. 

Accession  deposited :  Somali  Republic,  September  28, 
1962. 

Trade 

Declaration  on  provisional  accession  of  Argentina  to  the 

General   Agreement   on   Tariffs   and   Trade.     Done   at 

Geneva  November  18,  1960. 

Acceptance  deposited :  Argentina,   September  14,  1962. 

Entered  into  force :  October  14,  1962. 
Long-term  arrangements  regarding  international  trade  in 

cotton  textiles.     Concluded  at  Geneva  February  9,  19(;2. 

Entered  into  force  October  1, 1962. 

Acceptances  deposited:  Belgium  (with  statement), 
September  28,  1962;  Denmark,  October  1,  1962;  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany  (subject  to  ratification 
and  with  statement),  September  28,  1962;  India,  Sep- 
tember 29,  1962;  Israel,  Italy  (.subject  to  ratification 
and  with  statement),  Japan,  Netherlands  including 
Surinam  (with  statement),  September  28,  1962;  Nor- 
way, Spain,  Sweden,  October  1,  1962. 

Accession  deposited:  United  Arab  Republic,  October  1, 
1962. 

Extension  to:  Hong  Kong,  September  27,  1962. 


669 


Israel  accepted  the  follovnng  instruments,  pursuant  to  its 
deposit  o/  ratification  of  the  protocol  of  accession  to 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade,  June  5, 
1962: 

Fourth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  the 
annexes  and  to  the  texts  of  the  schedules  to  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva 
March  7,  1955.  Entered  into  force  January  23,  1959. 
TIAS  4186. 

Fifth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  the 
texts  of  the  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade.    Done  at  Geneva  December  3,  1955.' 

Sixth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  the 
texts  of  the  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade.    Done  at  Geneva  April  11,  1957.' 

Seventh  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  the 
texts  of  the  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade.    Done  at  Geneva  November  30,  1957.' 

Eighth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  the 
texts  of  the  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade.    Done  at  Geneva  February  18,  19.59.' 

Ninth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  the 
texts  of  the  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade.     Done  at  Geneva  August  17,  19.59.' 

Third  protocol  of  supplementary  concessions  to  the  Gen- 
eral Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (Denmark  and 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany).  Done  at  Geneva,  July 
15,  1955.  Entered  into  force  September  19,  1956. 
TIAS  3629. 

Fourth  protocol  of  supplementary  concessions  to  the  Gen- 
eral Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (Federal  Republic 
of  Germany  and  Norway).  Done  at  Geneva  July  1.5. 
1955.  Entered  into  force  September  19,  1956.  TIAS 
3630. 

Fifth  protocol  of  supplementary  concessions  to  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (Fe<leral  Republic  of 
Germany  and  Sweden).  Done  at  Geneva  July  15.  19.55. 
Entered  into  force  September  19,  1956.     TIAS  3631. 

Sixth  protocol  of  supplementary  concessions  to  the  Gen- 
eral Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva 
May  23,  1956.  Entered  into  force  June  30,  1956.  TIAS 
3591. 

Seventh  protocol  of  supplementary  concessions  to  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (Austria  and 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany).  Done  at  Bonn,  Febru- 
ary 19.  1957.  Entered  into  force  September  1,  1958. 
TIAS  4324. 

Eighth  protocol  of  supplementary  concessions  to  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (Cuba  and 
the  United  States).  Done  at  Habana  June  20,  1957. 
Entered  into  force  June  29,  1957.    TIAS  3882. 

Protocol  amending  part  I  and  articles  XXIX  and  XXX 
of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done 
at  Geneva  March  10, 1955.' 

Protocol  amending  the  preamble  and  parts  II  and  III  of 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at 
Geneva  March  10,  1955.  Entered  into  force  October  7, 
19.57.    TIAS  3930. 

Procds-verbal  of  rectification  concerning  protocol  amend- 
ing part  I  and  articles  XXIX  and  XXX,  protocol 
amending  preamble  and  parts  II  and  III,  and  protocol 
of  organizational  amendments  to  the  General  Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva  December  3, 
19.5.5.     Section  B  entered  into  force  October  7,  1957. 

Protocol  of  rectifications  to  the  French  text  of  the  Gen- 
eral Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva 
June  15.  19.55.  Entered  into  force  October  24,  19.56. 
TIAS  3077. 

Protocol  of  terms  of  accession  of  Japan  to  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade,  with  annex  A  (sched- 
ules of  the  contracting  parties)  and  annex  B  (schedule 
of  Japan).  Done  at  Geneva  June  7,  19.5.5.  Entered  into 
force  September  10,  1955.     TIAS  3438. 


'  Not  in  force. 


Protocol  relating  to  negotiations  for  the  establishment  (  ctol 
new  schedule  III — Brazil — to  the  General  Agreemei 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade.    Done  at  Geneva  December  3i  wri 
1958.'  J, 

litK 


BILATERAL 


tol 

toni 

TesI 
son) 


WDI 


Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Agreement  extending  the  period  of  the  loan  of  the  U.S 
Anthony  in  accordance  with  the  agreement  of  April 
and  May  1,  1957  (TIAS  3852),  relating  to  the  loan 
certain  naval  vessels  or  small  craft  to  the  Federal  R-f'S' 
public  of  Germany.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
Bonn  September  19  and  25,  1962.  Entered  into  fori 
September  25,  1962. 


Paraguay 

Agreement  extending  until  March  31,  1963,  the  reciproc 
trade  agreement  of  September  12,   1946,   as  amend 
(TIAS  1601,  5000).     Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
Asunci6n  September  30  and  October  1,  1962.     Enter- 
into  force  October  1, 1962. 

Sweden 

Agreement  facilitating  the  interchange  of  patent  riglJI 
and  technical  information  for  defense  purposes.     B 
fected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  October 
1962.    Entered  into  force  October  4,  1962. 

United  Arab  Republic 

Agricultural  commodities  agreement  under  title  I  of  t 
Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assistance  A 
of  1954,  as  amended  (68  Stat.  455;  7  U.S.C.  1701-170J 
with  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  Washington  Octot 
8,  1962.    Entered  into  force  October  8,  1962. 


11811 
Poli 
S.1 
Pari 

(par 


m 
Test 
m) 

■m 

leC 
aod 
term 
(Sle 
tsidi 
Agie 
idel 
marj 

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Fort 


United  States  Establishes  Embassy  in  Ugann 


Ifje 


irty 
llarb 
Iforlc 


Ktillfl 

SMei 
ih 
site 


The  Department  of  State  announced  on  October 
(press  release  608)  that  the  United  States  would  elevi 
its  consulate  general  at  Kampala,  Uganda,  to  an  embas 
upon  the  independence  of  that  nation  on  October  9,  19"  nana 

Olcott  H.  Deming,  heretofore  American  consul  gene 
in  Kampala,  will  become  Charg6  d' Affaires  ad  interim 
the  day  of  independence. 

The  United  States  has  maintained  a  consular  ofiice 
Kampala  since  May  1957.  An  information  center  w*,jjj 
established  there  in  August  of  the  same  year.  A  te 
nical  a.ssistance  program,  primarily  in  agricultural  i 
velopment  and  technical  training,  was  initiated  in  IS 
under  the  United  States-United  Kingdom  Technical  ( 
operation  Agreement  of  1951."  A  mission  of  the  Aget 
for  International  Development  was  established  in  Ugan 
in  July  1962. 


"  Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  2281. 


670 


Department  of  Stale  Bulle 


liisi 
Wei 
Mi 
Jith 

tot 

Bat 
Nti 


i 


ctober  29, 1962  Index 


Vol.jXLVII,  No.  1218 


nerican  Republics 

Bridge  for  the  Americas   (Ball) 645 

lited  States  Presents  Facilities  at  Fort  McNair 

to  Inter-American  Defense  College   (Rusk)     .     .      642 

lomic  Energy.  United  States  Position  on  Nuclear 
Testing  Explained  to  United  Nations  (Steven- 
son)     635 

immunism.  The  U.S.S.R.  in  World  Affairs 
(Morgan) 649 

ingress,  The 

ngressional     Documents    Relating    to    Foreign 

fiJPolicy 654 

S.  Delegates  Leave  for  Conference  of  Inter- 
Parliamentary  Union 660 

partment  and  Foreign  Service.     United  States 
['"lEstalilishes  Embassy  In  Uganda 670 

sarmament.  United  States  Position  on  Nuclear 
Testing  Explained  to  United  Nations  (Steven- 
son)    635 

onomic  Affairs 

LG    Common    Market,   the   Atlantic   Partnership, 

md  the  Free  World    (Schaetzel) 661 

ternational  Coffee  Agreement  Signed  atNev?  York 

Stevenson) 667 

esident    Urges    Early    Consideration    of    Coffee 

igreement  by  Congress  (Kennedy) 668 

ade  Expansion  Act  of  1962  Signed  (Kennedy,  sum- 
nary  of   act) 655 

irope.  The  Common  Market,  the  Atlantic  Part- 
aership,  and  the  Free  World  (Schaetzel)  .     .     .     .      661 

reign  Aid.  United  States  Presents  Facilities  at 
Fort  McNair  to  Inter-American  Defense  College 
(Rusk) 642 

ternational  Information.     Secretary  Names  Ad- 
visory   Committee   on   International   Book   Pro- 
rams     666 

ternational  Organizations  and  Conferences.    U.S. 

Delegates  Leave  for  Conference  of  Inter-Parlia- 
mentary Union 660 

OS.  U.S.  Welcomes  100  Investigations  of  Troop 
Withdrawals  From  Laos  (White) 648 

litary  Affairs.    United  States  Presents  Facilities 
jamfet  Fort  McNair  to  Inter-American  Defense  Col- 
lege  (Rusk) 642 

irth  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  The  Common 
Market,  the  Atlantic  Partnership,  and  the  Free 
World     (Schaetzel) 661 

ilSfnama.    A  Bridge  for  the  Americas  (Ball)  .     .     .      645 
esidential  Documents 
esident  Kennedy  Holds  Talks  With  Crown  Prince 

Df  Saudi  Arabia 641 

esident    Urges    Early    Consideration    of    Coffee 

Agreement    by    Congress 668 

r «  ade  Expansion  Act  of  1962  Signed 655 

1 !« lited    States    Congratulates    Uganda    on    Inde- 
I  pendence 641 

15  udi  Arabia.  President  Kennedy  Holds  Talks 
With  Crown  Prince  of  Saudi  Arabia  (text  of 
joint    communique) 641 

eaty  Information 

irrent   Actions 669 

ternational  Coffee  Agreement  Signed  at  New  Tork 

(Stevenson) 667 

esident  Urges  Early  Consideration  of  Coffee 
Agreement  by  Congress 668 


ullil 


Uganda 

United  States  Congratulates  Uganda  on  Inde- 
pendence (Kennedy) 641 

United  States  Establishes  Embassy  in  Uganda    .     .      670 

U.S.S.R. 

The  U.S.S.R.  in  World  Affairs  (Morgan)  ....      649 
U.S.  Protests  Soviet  Violation  of  Attache's  Diplo- 
matic Rights   (text  of  note) 653 

United  Nations 

International  Coffee  Agreement  Signed  at  New 
York  (Stevenson) 667 

United  States  Position  on  Nuclear  Testing  Ex- 
plained to  United  Nations  (Stevenson)  ....      635 

Name  Index 

Ball,  George  W 645 

Crown  Prince  Faysal 641 

Kennedy,  President 641,655,668 

Morgan,  George  A 649 

Rusk,    Secretary 642 

Schaetzel,  J.  Robert 661 

Stevenson,  Adlai  E 635,  667 

White,  Lincoln 648 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  October  8-14 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington  25, 
D.C. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  October  8  which  appear 
in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  600  of  Oc- 
tober 4  and  602  of  October  5. 

Subject 

U.S.    participation    In     international 

conferences. 
Thompson  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  at 

Large  (biographic  details). 
Consulate   general   in    Uganda   raised 

to  embassy  (rewrite). 
Rusk :  dedication    of    Inter-American 

Defense  College. 
Reorganization   of   Office   of   Interna- 
tional Economic  and  Social  Affairs 

(rewrite). 
Note  to  U.S.S.R.  on  expulsion  of  U.S. 

naval  attach^. 
Advisers    to    delegation    to    softwood 

lumber  talks  with  Canada. 
Itinerary  for  visit  of  Grand  Duchess 

of  Luxembourg. 
Government    Advisory    Committee    on 

International  Book  Programs  named. 
Delegation  to  51st  conference  of  Inter- 
Parliamentary  Union. 
Battle:  "UNESCO  and  United  States 

Policy." 
Ball :  "A  Bridge  for  the  Americas." 
Williams :  "The  United  States  and  the 

New  Africa." 
Cleveland:  "High  Hopes  and  a  Hard 

Look." 
Cultural  exchange  (Poland). 
Program  for  visit  of  Crown  Prince  of 

Libya. 

*Not  printed. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


No. 

Date 

•606 

10/8 

*607 

10/8 

608 

10/8 

609 

10/9 

teio 

10/9 

611 

10/10 

t612 

10/11 

*613 

10/10 

614 

10/11 

615 

10/11 

t616 

10/11 

617 

t018 

10/11 
10/12 

t619 

10/12 

*620 
*021 

10/12 
10/12 

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FIVE  GOALS  OF  U.S.  foreign  policy 

•  SECURITY  through  STRENGTH 

•  PROGRESS  through  PARTNERSHIP 

•  REVOLUTION  of  FREEDOM 

•  COMMUNITY  under  LAW 

•  PEACE  through  PERSEVERANCE 

What  U.S.  foreign  policy  is,  how  it  works,  and  the  goals  it  is  de- 
signed to  achieve,  are  defined  in  this  37-page  pamphlet.  It  contains 
the  transcript  of  a  television  interview,  September  24,  1902,  with 
Dean  Rusk,  Secretary  of  State;  Eobert  S.  McNamara,  Secretary  of 
Defense ;  George  W.  BaU,  Under  Secretary  of  State ;  Fowler  Hamil- 
ton, Administrator,  Agency  for  International  Development ;  Adlai  E. 
Stevenson,  U.S.  Permanent  Representative  to  the  United  Nations; 
and  W.  W.  Eostow,  Counselor  and  Chairman  of  the  Policy  Plaiming 
Coimcil,  Department  of  State. 


Publication  7432 


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order  payable  to 
Supt.  of  Docs.) 


Please  send  me  copies  of  FIVE  GOALS  OF  U.S.  FOREIGN  POLICY 


In 


Name: 

Street  Address: 

City,  Zone,  and  State: 


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:IAL 

LY  RECORD 

ED  STATES 
IGN   POLICY 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1219 


\   »iO"^ 


November  5,  1962 


THE  PRESENT  STAGE  OF  THE  COLD  WAR      •      by 

W.  W.  Rostouj,  Counselor 675 

TRADE,      INVESTMENT,     AND      UNITED      STATES 

FOREIGN   POLICY      •      Address  by  Secretary  Rusk   .    .     683 

UNESCO  AND  U.S.  POLICY:  HIGH  HOPES   AND   A 

HARD     LOOK       •       by  Assistant    Secretary    Battle    and 
Assistant  Secretary  Cleveland 695 

THE  UNITED   STATES  AND  THE   NEW   AFRICA     • 

by  Assistant  Secretary  JFilUams 690 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE    DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


Vol.  XLVir,  No.  1219    •  Publication  7444 
November  5,  1962 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  ot  Documents 

U.S.  Goverament  Printing  Office 

Washington  25,  D.C. 

Prick: 

62  issues,  domestic  $8.60,  foreign  $12.2.1 

Single  copy,  25  cents 

Use  of  funds  for  printing  of  this  publica- 
tion approved  by  the  Director  of  the  Bureau 
of  the  Budget  (January  19, 1981). 

Note:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
copyrighted  and  Items  contained  herein  may 
be  reprinted.  Citation  of  the  Depaetment 
OF  State  Bni.LETi.N  as  the  source  will  be 
appreciated.  The  Bulletin  is  inde.ted  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public 
and  interested  agencies  of  the 
Government  u'it/i  information  on 
developments  in  the  field  of  foreign 
relations  and  on  the  work  of  the 
Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service.  The  BULLETIN  includes  se- 
lected press  releases  on  foreign  policy, 
issued  by  the  White  House  and  the 
Department,  and  statements  and  ad- 
dresses made  by  the  President  and  by 
the  Secretary  of  State  and  other 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  tvell  as 
special  articles  on  various  phases  of 
internatioTUil  affairs  and  the  func- 
tions of  the  Department.  Informa- 
tion is  included  concerning  treaties 
and  international  agreements  to 
which  the  United  States  is  or  may 
become  a  party  and  treaties  of  gen- 
eral international  interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  legis- 
lative material  in  the  field  of  inter- 
national relations  are  listed  currently. 


The  Present  Stage  of  the  Cold  War 


hy  W.  TF.  Rostow 

Counselor  of  the  Department  and  Chairman  of  the  Policy  Planning  Council  ^ 


My  first  duty  and  my  great  privilege  this  eve- 
ning is  to  bring  you  greetings  from  the  President 
of  the  United  States.  He  knows  of  our  gathering 
and  what  I  am  about  to  say  to  you.  It  is  quite  im- 
necessary  for  me  to  tell  you  how  deeply  he  is  con- 
cerned with  tlie  affairs  and  the  future  of  this  city. 

No  American  comes  to  this  city  without  long 
memories,  great  admiration,  and  a  sense  of  the 
vital  mutual  commitments  that  bind  the  men, 
women,  and  children  of  Berlin  to  our  own  people 
and  to  the  whole  free  world. 

My  first  visit  here  was  in  the  late  .spring  of 
1946,  when  I  came  to  help  work  out  with  General 
[Lucius  D.]  Clay  and  General  [William  H.] 
Draper  [Jr.]  a  program  of  priorities  for  the  Euhr 
coal  mines  and  miners — priorities  in  steel,  equip- 
ment, housing,  and  food — one  of  the  first  and  most 
fimdamental  steps  in  the  economic  recovery  of 
Germany  and  of  Europe.  I  was  in  Europe  dur- 
ing the  airlift  of  1948-49  and  watched  intimately 
the  diplomatic  process  by  which  the  combination 
Df  your  courage  and  poise  on  the  one  liand  and 
the  success  of  the  airlift  on  the  other  caused  Stalin 
to  abandon  his  brutal  indirect  assault  upon  you. 

I  was  here  again  in  the  spring  of  1959,  after  3 
iveeks  in  Eastern  Europe.  I  shall  never  forget 
;he  impact  of  emerging  from  the  gray  half-life  of 
;he  East  into  this  vital  center  of  democracy  and 
Western  life  and  values — in  their  largest  sense. 
Wliat  you  have  made  Berlin  since  1945  is  evidently 
me  of  the  great  creative  achievements  of  the  post- 
war years. 

Now  I  have  the  honor  to  come  here,  as  a  member 


*  Address  made  before  the  Ernst  Reuter  Society  at  the 
free  University  of  Berlin,  Berlin,  Germany,  on  Oct.  18. 

ifovember  5,    1962 


of  my  Government,  to  talk  with  your  officials 
about  longrun  plans  for  Berlin's  future  and  to 
meet  with  you  tonight. 

In  Washington  my  job  is  planning.  And  I 
must,  therefore,  work  on  selected  problems  along 
the  whole  long  front  of  military  and  foreign 
policy.  To  help  select  these  key  planning  prob- 
lems it  is  part  of  my  job  to  scan,  as  it  were,  the 
full  radar  screen  of  international  affairs;  to  peer 
ahead ;  to  form  an  assessment  of  where  we  of  the 
free  world  stand  in  the  cold  war  and  where  we 
are  going;  to  identify  the  underlying  trends  and 
the  problems  for  the  future  on  which  we  ought  to 
be  working  right  now. 

I  thought  it  might  be  of  interest  if  I  were  to 
share  with  you  tonight  the  kind  of  global  assess- 
ment my  job  requires. 

My  theme  is  simple:  We  stand  at  a  point  of 
both  great  danger  and  great  hope  in  the  cold  w^ar. 
The  danger  is  evident  enough:  here  in  Berlin,  in 
Viet-Nam,  in  Cuba,  and  at  many  other  points  of 
threat,  conflict,  or  tension.  On  the  other  hand, 
powerful  forces  of  history  are  at  work  tending  to 
unify  and  strengthen  the  fi'ee  world  and  to  dilute 
and  fragment  the  danger  we  confront  from  the 
nations  now  controlled  by  communism.  Our  com- 
mon task  is  to  hold  firm  and  imited — as  never 
before — while  simultaneously  working  with  the 
tides  of  history,  for,  in  the  end,  history  is  only 
made  by  determined  individual  men  and  women. 

But  let  me  begin  nearer  the  beginning. 

I  shall  ti-y  this  evening  to  do  four  things. 
First,  to  draw  for  you  a  picture  of  how  I  believe 
our  own  policy  has  unfolded  over  the  past  22 
months;  second,  to  examine  the  events  of  this 
period  from  the  perspective  of  the  Communist 


675 


bloc;  third,  to  suggest  certain  broad  conclusions; 
and  fourth,  to  indicate  how  all  this  may  relate  to 
Berlin. 

U.S.  Policy  Since  January  1961 

AAHien  the  new  administration  came  to  Wash- 
ington in  January  1961  we  faced  two  kinds  of 
problems :  first,  a  series  of  urgent  and  dangerous 
crises;  second,  a  series  of  slower  moving  but 
equally  dangerous  situations  which,  if  constructive 
action  were  not  taken,  might  slide  against  us  and 
the  free  world  as  a  whole. 

In  Southeast  Asia  we  found  that  the  agreements 
made  at  Geneva  in  1954  with  respect  to  both  Laos 
and  Viet-Nam^  were  in  disarray.  The  United 
States  is  not  a  party  to  those  agreements,  but  we 
did  agree  not  to  upset  them  if  they  were  honored 
by  the  Communists.  In  January  1961  they  were 
not  being  honored. 

In  Laos  there  was  a  civil  war  in  which  Com- 
munist Pathet  Lao,  backed  by  the  North  Viet- 
namese, were  seeking  to  take  over  the  country.  In 
South  Viet-Nam  there  has  been  built  up  since 
1958 — as  a  result  of  decisions  taken  in  Hanoi  (evi- 
dently with  support  in  Moscow  and  Peiping) — a 
most  dangerous  guerrilla  war  based  on  infiltration, 
supply,  and  tutelage  by  Communists  in  the  north. 

In  the  Congo  there  existed  all  the  potentialities 
for  a  civil  war  which  might  result  in  the  creation 
of  a  Communist  base  in  central  Africa,  and  which 
could  offer  to  Communists  an  attractive  potential 
terrain  for  guerrilla  warfare. 

In  Cuba  a  Communist  government  existed,  al- 
ready committed  to  spreading  the  methods  of  sub- 
version and  guerrilla  warfare,  which  Castro  had 
used  to  gain  power  in  Cuba,  to  the  mainland  of 
Latin  America. 

Thus,  when  we  read  Mr.  Khrushchev's  speech 
of  Januaiy  6, 1961,  and  the  blessing  he  gave  to  the 
methods  of  subversion  and  guerrilla  warfare,  we 
took  this  matter  very  seriously  indeed.  We 
regarded  the  challenge  not  merely  as  a  series  of 
regional  crises  but  part  of  a  general  Communist 
offensive  designed  to  corrode  the  free  world  with- 
out confronting  either  our  nuclear  or  our  conven- 
tional military  strength.  All  the  potentialities 
existed  in  January  1961  for  the  spread  of  Commu- 
nist power  by  these  methods  into  Southeast  Asia, 


'For  texts,  see  American  Foreign  Policy,  1950-1955: 
Basic  Documents,  vol.  I,  Department  of  State  publication 
6446,  pp.  750  and  775. 


676 


Africa,  and  Latin  America — even  the  quite  rapid 
spread,  for  Khrushchev's  offensive  had  real 
momentum. 

In  addition  we  faced  the  situation  here  in  Ber- 
lin. In  1958  Mr.  Khrushchev  had  stated  his  de- 
mand that  the  Western  Powers  be  witlidrawn 
from  Berlin  and  the  status  of  the  city  be  changed. 
Khrushchev's  proposals,  if  accepted,  could  have 
made  access  to  this  city  a  matter  over  which  Mr. 
Ulbriclit's  [Walter  u'lbricht,  head  of  the  East 
German  regime]  Communists  could  exercise  a 
decisive  control.  By  this  route  the  Soviets  aimed 
to  destroy  the  basis  for  a  free  West  Berlin;  and 
at  Vienna  in  June  1961  Khrushchev  was  blimt 
to  the  point  of  ultimatum  in  stating  his  determina- 
tion to  loosen,  if  not  destroy,  the  Western  presence 
here. 


\ 


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toij 
viab 
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Unit 
iinih 


Moves  To  Protect  Free-World  Interests 

These  five  crises  are  still  with  us,  but  on  each 
of  tliem  we  have  moved  to  protect  the  vital  inter- 
ests of  the  free  world  and  to  seal  off  the  danger  of 
an  extension  of  Communist  power. 

In  Laos  we  have  encouraged  the  establislinient 
of  the  framework  of  a  neutral  and  independent 
state  which  could  permit  the  people  of  this  small 
coimtry  to  work  out  their  destiny  in  their  own 
way.  This  framework  was  judged  superior  to  the 
split  of  Laos.  A  split  Laos  might  have  turned 
over  access  to  northern  Laos  to  Mao  and  Ho  Chi 
Minh — a  distinctly  unattractive  prospect.  Even- 
tually the  negotiation  of  neutrality  was  achieved.' 
It  is  evident  that  the  continued  independence  and 
neutrality  of  Laos  will  require  the  greatest  alert- 
ness, political  imagination,  and  determination  as 
well  as  the  determination  of  the  people  of  Laos 
themselves  to  preserve  their  independence. 

In  Viet-Nam  we  are  working  with  the  South 
Vietnamese  to  help  them  defeat  the  war  of  sub- 
version which  has  been  imposed  by  the  Com- 
munists and  to  get  the  North  Vietnamese  elements 
back  where  they  belong — north  of  the  17th  paral-  j^ 
lei.  Hero  progress  has  been  made.  A  situation  of 
the  most  immediate  danger  has  been  converted 
into  one  which  is  more  hopeful  than  it  was  even 
6  months  ago;  but  the  road  ahead  may  be  long 
and  hard.    Time  has  been  gained  in  whicli  to  make 


wooc 
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an  in 
c 
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tion 
cent: 
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m 

Haba 
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roulii 
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its  in 
riiedi 
alia 
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MS 
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nore  a 
illawi 
'le 
iibrt 
"ople, 
«fptai 
"ojed 


°  For  text  of  a  Declaration  on  the  Neutrality  of  Laos 
and  an  accompanying  protocol,  see  Bdlletin  of  Aug.  13, 
1962,  p.  2rj9. 

Department  of  State  Bullet'w 


'For  a 

I 

'for  It 
i5«l 


a  beginning  on  two  decisive  problems:  the  full 
engagement  of  the  Vietnamese  people  in  the  strug- 
gle, and  the  problem  of  Commmiist  infiltration 
from  the  north,  which  is  ultimately  linlved  to  the 
settlement  in  Laos.  With  respect  to  the  former,  I 
can  report  that  the  Vietnamese  authorities,  backed 
by  our  own  people  and  others,  are  actively  en- 
gaged in  forging  new  constructive  links  between 
Saigon  and  the  villages.  The  Government  and 
the  people  of  Viet-Nam  are  moving  closer  by  means 
which  promise  not  only  to  provide  a  basis  for  vic- 
tory but  also  the  foundations  for  the  longrun 
viability  of  Viet-Nam  as  a  modern  nation. 

In  the  Congo  we  are  backing  the  effort  of  the 
United  Nations  to  help  the  Congolese  create  a 
united,  independent,  and  viable  country.^  There 
Btill  is  no  final  solution ;  we  are  not  yet  out  of  the 
woods,  but  we  have  come  a  long  way.  Despite 
nany  difficulties  the  United  Nations  has  played 
in  important  role  in  helping  the  Congolese  toward 
he  creation  of  a  truly  independent  African  state, 
[n  doing  so  it  helped  frustrate  the  evident  anibi- 
ion  of  Moscow  to  create  a  Communist  base  in 
;entral  Africa. 

In  Cuba,  after  the  events  of  April  1961,  we  have 
vorked  with  our  friends  in  Latin  America  and  in 
'fATO  to  isolate  the  Communist  government  in 
riabana  and  to  insure  that  the  techniques  of  in- 
lirect  aggression  which  the  Cuban  Communists 
vould  like  to  apply  to  Latin  Amei'ica  will  be  frus- 
rated.  We  have  sought  the  cooperation  of  our  al- 
ies  in  imposing  restrictions  on  shipments  to  Cuba. 
?he  danger  of  Cuban  intervention  in  Latin  Amer- 
ca  has  been  diminished  by  these  actions  and  by 
he  decisions  taken  by  the  Organization  of  Amer- 
can  States  at  the  Punta  del  Este  conference  last 
anuary  ^  and  at  the  recent  informal  session  in 
V^ashington."  The  Western  Hemisphere  is  now 
lore  alert  to  the  danger  of  subversion  and  guer- 
illa warfare,  and  it  is  in  a  legal  position  to  move 
Dgether.  To  a  degree,  Castro  has  eased  our  task. 
lis  brutal  and  inefficient  policies  toward  his  own 
eople,  his  behavior  toward  Latin  America,  his 
cceptance  of  subservience  to  Moscow  have  de- 
ls ev*  :royed  the  illusion  that  he  belonged  in  the  authen- 

jjlonsl — 

'  For  a  Department  statement,  see  ibid.,  Sept.  10,  1962, 

379. 

°For  background,  see  Hid.,  Feb.  10,  1962,  pp.  267  and 

ro. 

"  For  text  of  final  communique,  see  ibid.,  Oct.  22,  1962, 

598. 

lovember  5,   1962 


L»s 


fa 
Con- 


pai- 


11  oi 


0 


tic  tradition  of  the  long  Latin  American  struggle 
for  social  justice  and  economic  progress.  Our 
President  has  carefully  defined  the  situations  in 
which  we  would  bring  our  own  military  force  to 
bear  in  Cuba ;  ^  we  have  recently  taken,  unilater- 
ally and  with  our  friends,  important  further  steps 
to  isolate  Cuba  and  to  diminish  the  dangers  it 
represents ;  *  and  we  remain  committed  to  help  the 
people  of  Cuba  regain  their  independence  and  re- 
join the  close  family  of  Latin  American  nations. 
But,  of  coui"se,  the  threat  of  communism  in  Latin 
America  remains. 

With  respect  to  the  city  of  Berlin,  we  formu- 
lated our  position  and  held  to  it.  We  intend  that 
Berlin  shall  remain  free.  We  intend  that  the  ac- 
cess to  the  West  remain  unencumbered.  We  shall 
continue  the  protection  which  the  presence  in  Ber- 
lin of  Western  military  forces  alone  can  afford. 
Moreover,  we  intend  to  work  with  our  friends  in 
Berlin,  in  Germany,  and  elsewhere  to  help  main- 
tain this  city  as  a  viable,  constructive,  and  impor- 
tant part  of  the  free-world  community. 

The  unity  of  the  West  has  been  maintained 
along  these  lines.  It  has  been  tested,  certainly, 
and  it  will  be  tested  again — perhaps  gravely 
tested — before  Khrushchev  realizes  that  his  con- 
tinued Berlin  crisis  is  counterproductive.  But 
there  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  about  the  depth, 
the  seriousness,  or  the  steadiness  of  the  American 
and  Allied  commitment. 

Although  Mr.  Khrushchev  may  one  day  ease 
the  pressure  that  now  bears  down  upon  you — and 
upon  us — Berlin's  situation  will  remain  difficult 
so  long  as  Germany  is  divided.  This  city  will 
remain  a  temptation  to  the  Communists  so  long 
as  the  cold  war  continues. 

U.S.  Aid  and  Trade  Programs  Improved 

In  addition  to  Berlin  and  these  four  other  crises, 
we  found  that  slow  but  dangerous  erosion  was 
taking  place  elsewhere.  We  needed,  for  example, 
a  policy  which  would  aline  the  United  States  ac- 
tively with  the  great  forces  in  Latin  America 
which  seek  economic  development  and  greater  so- 
cial justice.  To  this,  our  response  was  the  Alli- 
ance for  Progress. 


'  Ibid.,  Oct.  1,  1962,  p.  481. 

8  For  a  .statement  by  Under  Secretary  Ball,  see  ibid., 
Oct.  22,  1962,  p.  591 ;  for  text  of  a  joint  congressional 
resolution,  see  ibid.,  p.  597. 

677 


We  needed  a  foreign  aid  program  capable  of 
alining  the  United  States  with  similar  forces  at 
work  in  Asia,  the  Middle  East,  and  Africa.  In 
those  vast  regions  peoples  and  governments  are 
determined  to  develop  their  status  as  independent 
nations  and  to  provide  for  themselves  and  their 
children  an  environment  of  economic  growth, 
progress,  and  human  dignity.  Our  response  was 
a  foreign  aid  program  designed  to  help  nations 
that  showed  a  capacity  and  effective  will  to  mobi- 
lize their  own  energies  and  resources  for  the  devel- 
opment of  their  societies.  Our  aid  progi-am  is 
rooted  in  the  sound  principle  of  self-help.  It  is 
designed  to  reward  those  who  show  a  capacity  and 
a  will  to  help  themselves.  Legislation  passed  by 
the  U.S.  Congress  in  1961  has  made  it  possible  for 
us  to  make  reliable  long-term  commitments  to  na- 
tions with  effective  national  development  pro- 
grams. Along  with  our  Atlantic  partners  and 
Japan  we  hope  gradually  to  build  a  stable  part- 
nership with  the  new  and  aspiring  nations  as  each 
of  them  goes  forward  to  the  stage  where  it  can 
qualify  for  this  type  of  longrun  development 
assistance. 

With  respect  to  Western  Europe,  we  found  that 
our  own  policies  and  those  of  the  Western  Euro- 
pean nations  had  not  yet  come  to  grips  with  two 
massive  facts: 

First,  that  Western  Europe  in  the  1950's  ex- 
perienced an  extraordinary  surge  of  growth  and 
development  and  it  was  eager  to  accept  a  new  de- 
gi-ee  of  authority  over  its  own  destiny  and  on  the 
world  scene ; 

Second,  that  the  movement  toward  European 
unity — which  we  had  helped  foster  immediately 
after  the  war — had  gained  real  momentum.  A 
united  Europe  had  become  a  real  possibility,  but 
its  shape  and  our  policy  toward  its  evolution  were 
not  yet  determined.  Witli  respect  to  Japan  we 
found  that  our  policies  had  not  fully  taken  into 
account  its  impulse — after  a  decade  of  growth 
quite  as  remarkable  as  that  of  Western  Europe — 
to  find  a  new  role  of  dignity  and  responsibility  on 
the  world  scene. 

Our  response  to  these  facts  has  been  to  encourage 
the  movement  toward  European  unity  while  sug- 
gesting to  our  European  friends  a  new  transat- 
lantic partnership,  outlined  particularly  in  the 
President's  speech  of  last  July  4.^    We  are  in  the 


•  Ibid.,  July  23, 1962,  p.  131. 
678 


process  of  working  out  terms  of  that  partnership 
in  military  matters ;  in  trade,  in  problems  of  cur- 
rency and  reserves ;  in  aiding  the  miderdeveloped 
areas ;  and  in  many  other  areas. 

Development  of  New  Relationships 

The  development  of  tliese  new  relationships  will 
take  time.  This  is  the  biggest  piece  of  interna- 
tional architecture  ever  undertaken  in  a  time  of 
peace.  This  new  and  complex  partnership  will 
evolve  over  years,  not  months.  We  are  not  dealing 
now  with  weak,  impoverished  nations,  as  was  the 
case  after  the  war.  We  are  dealing  with  proud  and 
strong  nations  seeking  to  find  new  relations  with 
one  another  and  with  the  United  States,  seeking 
to  define  their  role  on  the  world  scene  for  the  1960's 
and  beyond  but  doing  so  against  the  background 
of  a  long  period  of  dependence  on  us  which  has 
made  them  more  conscious  of  the  fruits  than  of 
the  burdens  of  world  responsibility.  This  proc- 
ess— which,  if  successful,  will  add  vast  strength 
and  stability  to  the  free  world — will  certainly  con- 
front difficulties ;  but  the  related  concepts  of  Euro- 
pean unity  and  Atlantic  partnership  are  soundly 
rooted  in  the  lessons  of  our  common  20th-century 
experience  and  increasingly  in  the  minds  and 
hearts  of  our  peoples.  Similarly,  we  are  workins 
with  the  Government  of  Japan,  with  the  leaden 
of  Japanese  society — at  every  level — and  with  oui 
friends  in  the  Atlantic  community  to  help  weav( 
the  great  potential  contribution  of  Japan  into  th( 
fabric  of  the  free  world's  constructive  enterprises 

"UHiere  then  do  we  stand  ?  Not  one  of  the  crises 
of  1961  is  yet  finally  solved;  all  are  still  dangerous 
but  we  are  making  progress  in  reducing  the  dan 
gers  tliese  crises  represented,  and  we  have  formu 
lated  policies  with  respect  to  each  which  we  an 
prepared  to  back  with  all  the  great  strength  at  oa 
command. 

In  the  longer  run  tasks  we  have  undertakcj 
with  respect  to  Latin  America,  to  the  other  devel 
oping  areas,  and  with  respect  to  Europe  am 
Japan,  we  know  where  we  want  to  go  and  we  ar 
moving.  But  we  are  also  aware  that  it  will  tak 
many  years  of  hard,  persistent,  and  purposefu 
collaborative  effort  to  achieve  the  creative  objec 
tives  we  have  set. 

This  is  roughly  where  we  stand  and  where  w 
are  trj'ing  to  go — seen  from  the  perspective  c 
Washington.    We  see  no  grounds  whatsoever  fc 

Department  of  State  Bulleti 


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complacency  or  self-congratulation.  We  see  rea- 
ons  for  confidence,  for  hope — and  for  hard, 
itubborn,  common  effort. 

The  World  Scene  From  Khrushchev's  Point  of  View 

Now  let  me  try  to  evoke  what  the  world  scene 
nay  look  like  from  Khrushchev's  point  of  view. 

Since  1945  we  have  seen  two  major  Communist 
•ffensives  designed  to  extend  the  power  and  in- 
luence  of  communism  beyond  the  limits  which 
vere  achieved  as  a  result  of  World  War  II. 

Between  1945  and  1951  Stalin  pressed  hard,  first 
n  the  West  and  then  to  the  east.  He  tried  to 
)enetrate  Iran,  Turkey,  Greece,  France,  and  Italy, 
nd  in  1948  he  blockaded  Berlin.  Stalin's  western 
ffensive  came  to  a  halt  with  the  Truman  Doctrine, 
he  Marshall  Plan,  the  founding  of  NATO,  and 
he  success  of  the  Berlin  airlift. 

His  Asian  offensive,  which  involved  the  wide- 
pread  use  of  guerrilla  warfare  in  Indochina, 
lalaya,  Indonesia,  and  the  Philippines — as  well 
s  the  attempt  to  conquer  South  Korea — groimd 
0  a  halt  in  the  spring  of  1951,  when  the  reorga- 
ized  forces  of  the  United  Nations  in  Korea 
mattered  the  Chinese  Communist  armies  at  the 
8th  parallel. 

After  Stalin  died  the  new  group  in  Moscow 
lunched  a  series  of  changes  in  domestic,  military, 
nd  foreign  policy  which  took  some  years  to  move 
orward;  and  they  also  faced  a  muted  struggle 
or  power  which  Khrushchev  did  not  definitively 
?in  until  1957.     At  home  the  Soviets  made  some 


tki 


jflOlb 

iie  iin 


ml" 
latoui 


oncessions  to  the  desire  of  the  Russian  peoples 
or  higher  levels  of  consumption  and  greater  se- 
urity  from  the  arbitrary  power  of  the  secret 
lolice.  In  foreign  policy,  generally  frustrated 
a  Europe  and  Japan,  they  turned  with  great 


ope  to  the  possibility  of  exploiting  potentialities 


or  expanding  Communist  power  and  influence 

1  the  underdeveloped  areas.    In  these  areas  the 

'^'  ^    communists  sought  to  orchestrate  the  instruments 

''°"'"  f  subversion,  trade,  and  aid;  they  appealed  to 

nticolonial  and  nationalist  sentiments;  and  they 

'^*'  ought  to  project  an  image  of  communism  as  the 

.  lost  efficient  method  for  modernizing  an  imder- 

'P*.    eveloped  region.    In  military  policy  the  Soviets 

""   loved    forward — on    a    smaller    scale    than    we 

bought  at  the  time — with  nuclear  weapons  and 

lissiles,  seeking  to  bring  nuclear  blackmail  to 

ear  in  their  diplomacy  as  early  as  1956.    They 


fovemfaer  5,    J  962 


developed  and  exploited  their  big  rockets  to  exe- 
cute certain  glamorous  enterprises  in  space,  and 
they  sought  to  exploit  them  psychologically  and 
politically. 

In  1958,  in  the  wake  of  the  first  Sputniks,  Khru- 
shchev's offensive,  based  on  these  dispositions,  be- 
gan to  take  shape.  It  was  in  1958  that  Khrushchev 
began  to  adopt  a  tougher  line  on  Berlin.  It  was 
in  1958  that  the  Communist  Party  in  Hanoi  an- 
nounced that  it  would  seek  to  overthrow  the  re- 
gime in  Saigon  by  guerrilla  warfare  and  then  pro- 
ceeded systematically  to  try  to  do  so.  It  was  in 
this  post-Sputnik  period,  also,  that  the  Commu- 
nists set  about  to  exploit  the  turbulence  and  con- 
fusion of  the  Congo;  they  seized  power  in  Cuba; 
and  they  conducted  a  most  vigorous  political, 
economic,  and  subversive  campaign  in  the  under- 
developed areas. 

Communist  Clima  also  caught  the  fever.  It 
was  in  this  post-Sputnik  period  tliat  Mao  an- 
nounced that  "the  east  wind  was  prevailing  over 
the  west."  The  "great  leap  forward"  and  the  com- 
munes were  engineered  in  1958,  and  an  effort  was 
made  in  that  year  to  blockade  Quemoy  and  Matsu. 

The  hard  military  strength  underlying  this  of- 
fensive was  not  as  great  as  it  then  appeared  to 
the  world.  The  Russians,  in  fact,  maintained  a 
very  high  priority  for  defensive  armaments ;  they 
built  an  IRBM  [intermediate-range  ballistic  mis- 
sile] force  with  which  they  hoped  to  hold  Europe 
in  nuclear  hostage;  and  they  moved  more  slowly 
toward  an  ICBM  [intercontinental  ballistic  mis- 
sile] capability.  Nevertheless,  taking  the  post- 
Sputnik  offensive  as  a  whole,  it  seemed  to  have  a 
real  momentum. 

Communist  OHensive  In  Disarray 

Today — due,  as  I  would  wish  to  emphasize,  not 
merely  to  actions  we  and  our  allies  have  taken 
but  to  forces  which  are  at  work  deep  within  the 
Communist  bloc — Khrushchev's  and  Mao's  post- 
Sputnik  offensive  is  in  disarray. 

Mao's  "great  leap  forward"  has  utterly  failed. 
Chinese  Conmiunist  policy  was  based  on  the  view 
that  they  stood  in  the  late  1950's  where  Stalin 
stood  in  the  early  1930's.  They  believed  great- 
power  status  was  in  their  grasp.  Such  great-power 
status  has  now  moved  at  least  a  decade  away  from 
them — and  to  move  forward  at  all  they  face  deci- 
sions thus  far  too  painful  for  them  to  take,  deci- 
sions which,  in  my  view,  require  among  other 

679 


1 


things  that  the  peasant  families  of  China  be  given 
back  the  incentive  to  work  and  the  freedom  to 
work  effectively.  Meanwliile,  the  tendency  toward 
the  dilution  of  Moscow's  control  over  the  world's 
Communist  parties  has  continued,  marked  by  the 
drama  of  the  Sino-Soviet  split.  Moreover,  tlie 
inability  of  communism  to  organize  efficiently  tlie 
production  of  food  has  weakened  drastically  the 
Communist  position  in  East  Germany,  in  Cuba, 
and  elsewhere,  as  well  as  in  China. 

At  home  Klirushchev  staked  a  good  deal  on  his 
capacity  to  provide  tlie  Kussian  peoples  with  an 
increase  in  the  quality  of  their  food  and  housing. 
He  announced  in  1957  a  campaign  to  overtake 
within  3  years  U.S.  production  of  meat,  milk,  and 
butter,  and  he  sought  to  provide  an  adequate  sup- 
ply of  grain  for  an  expanding  popidation  by  open- 
ing up  the  vast  virgin  lands.  He  has  now  Iiad 
to  acknowledge  to  his  people  the  existence  of  a 
continuing  agricultural  crisis;  he  has  failed  to 
achieve  the  promised  supply  of  meat  and  dairy 
products;  his  grain  production  is  barely  keeping 
up  with  the  expansion  in  population ;  and  he  has 
instituted  tliis  year  the  first  increase  in  food  prices 
in  the  Soviet  Union  since  the  Second  World  War. 
Moreover,  he  must  limit  his  housing  program, 
which  is  passionately  desired  by  the  Russian  peo- 
ples, in  order  to  increase  armaments  expenditures, 
and  he  must  do  so  in  the  certain  knowledge  that 
the  United  States  is  committed  to  military  plans 
which  will  deny  him  a  relative  improvement  in  his 
nuclear  position  over  the  coming  years. 

Abroad  he  sees  that  everywhere  in  the  under- 
developed areas  the  momentum  of  his  offensive  has 
slowed  down.  There  are  still  Communist  ojjpor- 
tmiities,  but  whether  one  looks  to  Asia,  the  Middle 
East,  Africa,  or  Latin  America,  the  tendency  of 
the  underdeveloped  countries  to  assert  their  inde- 
pendence against  the  Communists,  as  well  as  our- 
selves, is,  from  his  point  of  view,  a  fundamentally 
discouraging  sign. 

Doctrinally,  Marxism  is  increasingly  viewed  by 
the  young  as  a  voice  from  the  past,  not  as  a  guide 
to  the  present  and  the  future ;  and  communism,  as 
a  technique  for  organizmg  either  an  advanced  or 
an  underdeveloped  society,  is  increasingly  per- 
ceived as  inefficient  and  reactionary,  as  well  as 
profoundly  inhumane. 

Communist  beliefs  and  expectations  have  tlius 
been  belied  by  the  movement  toward  unity  in 
Europe;  by  the  solidity  of  NATO  in  the  face  of 

680 


the  Berlin  crisis;  by  the  emerging  transatlantic 
partnership;  by  the  determination  of  the  peoples 
and  governments  in  the  developing  areas  to  main- 
tain their  independence;  and  by  the  corrosion  of 
the  economic  life  of  the  Communist  bloc,  notably 
in  the  agricultural  sector.  i 

Finally,  under  these  gathering  pressures  and  thai  dis] 
persistence  of  nationalism  beneath  the  surface  oflknc 
states  dominated  by  communism,  a  tendency  has 
developed  toward  fragmentation  within  the  Com- 
munist bloc  and  toward  a  progressive  loosening  of 
Moscow's  control  over  the  Communist  parties*  brii 
around  the  world. 

There  is  now  no  Communist  Party  which  is  not, 
in  one  way  or  another,  diverted  and  preoccupied 
by  the  schismatic  debate  centered  on  the  Sino- 
Soviet  conflict  and  the  issues  of  ideology,  power, 
and  policy  related  to  that  conflict. 


I 

ahe 
I 


m 
i«, 
itsp 
part 
tioni 
■d] 
East 
imei 


Ihef 
mer 
Eitei 
m. 

mote 
mate 
mom 
fori 
work 
toth 
came 
ico, 


Response  of  the  Western  World 

The  vision  of  the  world  as  seen  from  Moscow 
has  thus  substantially  changed  in  the  past  2  years 
The  policies  which  Khmshchev  set  in  motion  aftei 
he  had  acquired  leadership  of  the  Soviet  Unior 
have  failed  to  achieve  a  breakthrough ;  meanwhile 
the  resjjonse  of  the  Western  World — plus  the  cor 
rosive  dynamics  within  the  Communist  bloc — hav( 
intertwined  to  produce  a  deep  but  quiet  crisis  ii 
the  histoi-y  of  communism.  Moscow  must  ask  it 
self :  Where  do  we  go  from  here  ? 

In  the  short  run,  the  answer  may  well  be  Berlin 
It  is  possible  that  Mr.  Ivlirushchev  may  miscal 
culate  the  will  and  the  strength  of  the  Allies  anc 
will  attempt  to  precipitate  another  crisis  in  thi; 
city. 

The  United  States  and  its  allies  are  seeking  t( 
make  their  will  sufficiently  evident  to  deter  tha 
crisis.  If  not,  we  have  ready  a  number  of  measure; 
designed  to  meet  it.  I  cannot,  of  course,  go  int(  _^^'"i 
the  details  of  what  these  measures  are.  I  can  sa^ 
that  the  measures  are  M'ide  ranging  and  are  de 
signed  to  take  into  account  a  wide  variety  of  cir 
cumstances.  I  can  say  that  our  allies  are  awar>l 
of  them  and  will  support  them.  We  are  in  con 
stant  consultations  with  Cliancellor  Adenauer  anc 
his  officials  in  Bonn,  with  our  other  allies,  anc 
with  your  redoubtable  ilayor.  Will}'  Brandt,  wh 
has  recently  been  in  consultation  with  Secretar 
of  State  Dean  Rusk  and  President  Kennedy. 

They  know  our  resolve.    I  am  sure  the  peopl 
of  Berlin  kiiow  our  resolve.     The  danger  is  tha 

Deparfment  of  State  Bulletii 


iie«l 


Dtlifr 


fheM 

And 
>f  coll 
inity, 
ffldwi 
»lio,  a 
toilie; 


rti6 


pie 


wei 


rlii 


;he  Soviets  may  not  appreciate  fully  our  resolve ; 
3r,  if  they  do,  they  may  not  appreciate  tlie  con- 
sequences if  they  confront  it.  It  is  our  hope  that 
-his  crisis,  precipitated  by  a  miscalculation  of  the 
trength,  unity,  and  determination  of  the  West,  can 
36  peacefully  resolved;  but  come  what  may,  our 
iispositions  are  made.  We  are  ready,  and  we 
£now  you  are  ready ;  and  we're  in  this  together. 

But  let  us  look  beyond  the  difficult  months 
ihead. 

The  great  tasks  of  the  free  world  are  these :  to 
)ring  to  maturity  the  unification  of  Western 
Europe;  to  bind  up  in  new  unity  the  more  ad- 
Lol  ranced  nations  of  Western  Europe,  North  Amer- 
ca,  and  Japan  in  global  partnership,  with  shared 
•esponsibility ;  to  build  new  constructive  ties  of 
partnership  between  these  mainly  northern  na- 
ions  and  the  developing  nations  which  lie  mainly 
o  the  south — in  Latin  America,  Africa,  the  Middle 
East,  and  Asia;  to  defend  the  borders  of  the 
merging  community  of  independent  nations  by 
generating  the  military  forces,  the  political  unity, 
ind  the  will  this  task  demands ;  and  to  work  with 
he  forces  of  nationalism  and  liberalism  which  may 
imerge  within  the  Commimist  bloc  and  thus  to 
ixtend  the  writ  of  freedom  for  nations  and  for 
nen. 

These  large  objectives  are  not  abstract  or  re- 
note.  They  are  the  goals  which  suffuse  inti- 
nately  what  we  do  from  day  to  day.  At  the 
noment  they  are  particularly  vivid  in  my  mind, 
'or  I  come  to  Berlin  after  several  days  in  Paris 

orking  on  concrete  tasks  designed  to  contribute 
o  the  building  of  the  Atlantic  partnership.  I 
lame  to  Paris  fresh  from  a  conference  in  Puerto 
iico,  wliere  more  than  40  nations — from  the  more 
leveloped  and  less  developed  areas,  from  the  north 
md  the  south — pressed  forward  with  voluntary 
rrangements  of  the  Peace  Corps  type  and  with 
)ther  steps  to  train  the  manpower  in  the  develop- 
ng  nations  in  badly  needed  modern  skills." 


;1DI 
tlli 


Kit 

tlia 
iiirc 

Ultl 


The  Mission  of  Berlin 


And  now  I  am  in  Berlin,  one  of  the  great  points 
)f  cold-war  confrontation,  where  our  strength, 
mity,  and  will  are  under  test,  close  by  the  men 
,nd  women  of  East  Berlin  and  East  Germany, 
'"  vho,  against  their  will,  are  cut  off  from  their 
fi"'  umilies,  their  nation,  and  the  way  of  life  tliey 
vould  freely  choose. 


I  believe  Berlin  has  a  mission  in  all  the  major 
dimensions  of  the  free  world's  policy.  Looking 
ahead,  the  wall  which  cuts  tragically  across  this 
city  need  not  diminish  the  contribution  you  can 
make  to  the  cause  of  freedom  in  all  its  aspects. 
You  are  not  the  passive  wards  of  the  West ;  you  are 
partners  in  a  great  global  effort. 

Working  closely  with  your  brothers  in  the  Fed- 
eral German  Republic,  you  can  play  your  part  in 
all  the  economic  and  cultural  enterprises  of  a 
unifying  Europe  and  an  expanding  Atlantic  part- 
nership; you  can,  with  your  special  human  and 
industrial  skills,  play  your  part  in  the  great  adven- 
ture of  assisting  the  developing  nations ;  you  have 
the  proud  duty  of  standing  cool  and  firm  at  one 
among  several  crucial  points  along  the  frontiers 
of  freedom ;  and,  along  with  those  allied  with  you, 
you  can  play  your  part  in  bringing  peacefully  and 
gradually  to  an  end  the  barrier  that  now  divides 
Germany  and  Europe. 

For  be  clear :  My  Government  has  not  forgotten 
or  abandoned  the  mutual  commitments  made  dur- 
ing the  war  years. 

The  agi-eements  made  between  the  Allies  fight- 
ing Nazi  Germany  envisaged  that  the  occupation 
after  the  war  would  have  as  its  aim  the  restoration 
of  Germany  to  the  family  of  nations.  As  late  as 
1955,  at  the  Four  Power  summit  conference  at 
Geneva,  the  Heads  of  Government  reaffirmed  that 
understanding  and  directed  the  foreign  ministers 
conference  to  carry  it  out."  I  need  not  remind 
you  that  the  Soviet  Union  did  not  honor  this  com- 
mitment. But  the  United  States  and  its  allies 
have  not  wavered  from  that  aim  nor  abandoned 
their  purpose.  Wliat  exactly  is  their  pledge  ?  As 
expressed  in  terms  of  the  1955  directive,  my  Gov- 
ernment remains  committed  to  the  proposition 
that: 

.  .  .  the  settlement  of  the  German  question  and  the 
re-unification  of  Germany  by  means  of  free  elections 
shall  be  carried  out  in  conformity  with  the  national  inter- 
ests of  the  German  people  and  the  interests  of  European 
security. 

If  we  can  build  the  great  northern  partner- 
ship— with  its  massive  superiority  in  resources  and 
men ;  if  we  can  create  new  relations  of  dignity  and 
common  enterprise  with  the  emerging  nations  to 
the  south;  if  we  can  mobilize  steadily  the 
resources,  political  unity,  and  will  necessary  to 
defend   the   frontiers   of   freedom;    if   we   can, 


'  For  background,  see  ibid.,  Oct.  22,  1962,  p.  628. 
inWovember  5,  1962 


"  For  text  of  the  Directive  to  Foreign  Ministers  of  July 
23,  1955,  see  ibid.,  Aug.  1,  1955,  p.  176. 


681 


i 


through  the  fog  of  cold  war,  work  constructively 
with  the  forces  of  nationalism  and  liberalism  that 
exist  or  may  emerge  within  the  Communist  bloc, 
the  day  may  come  sooner  than  we  might  believe 
when  those  who  rule  within  what  we  call  the  Com- 
munist bloc  will  imderstand  two  things :  first,  that 
world  conquest  or  domination  is  an  impossible  and 
dangerous  goal ;  second,  that  in  a  world  of  nuclear 
weapons,  effectively  inspected  measures  of  arms 
control  and  disarmament  are  a  universal  interest 
which  they  fully  share. 

If  the  free  world  has  the  wit  and  the  will  to  per- 
sist along  the  lines  of  present  policy — for  it  surely 
commands  the  resources — the  day  will  surely  come 
when  Moscow — and  Peiping,  too — will  have  to 
decide  whether  to  persist  in  their  thrust  for  exter- 
nal power,  under  progressively  less  advantageous 
terms,  or  to  end  tlie  cold  war  and  make  their  terms 
as  important  but  not  dominating  units  within  the 
family  of  nations  and  of  men.  If  on  that  day  the 
decision  is  correctly  made,  it  will  be  clear  that  the 
maintenance  of  a  divided  Germany  and  a  divided 
Europe  makes  no  sense. 

Wliether  and  when  that  day  comes  about 
depends  in  large  part  on  how  the  affairs  of  the 
free  world  are  conducted:  It  is  not  an  outcome 
to  be  awaited,  but  an  outcome  to  be  created;  it 
depends  on  how  we  comport  ourselves  in  the  face 
of  both  our  immediate  crises  and  the  possibilities 
opened  to  us  by  the  deeper  tides  of  history. 

It  is,  clearly,  a  mission  for  us  all. 


Secretary  Rusk  Stresses  Role 
of  U.S.  Missions  in  Export  Drive 

Press  release  634  dated  October  10 

Secretary  Rusk  on  October  19  sent  a  letter  to 
American  ambassadors  abroad  lohich  stresses  their 
role  and  that  of  their  senior  staff  members  in  giv- 
ing maximttm  support  to  the  export  drive.  The 
text  of  Secretary  RusJc's  letter  folloios. 

October  19,  1962 
Dear  Mr.  Ambassador  :  I  am  gratified  that,  even 
though  no  specific  reply  was  requested,  a  large 
number  of  our  Chiefs  of  Mission  have  responded 
to  Under  Secretary  Ball's  letter  of  May  11,  1962.^ 
That  letter  renewed  the  call,  in  conjunction  with 
the  implementation  of  the  State-Commerce  Agree- 


'  Not  printed  here. 
682 


ment  on  International  Commercial  Activities,  for 
maximum  support  of  the  export  drive. 

I  am  also  heartened  that  our  Chiefs  of  Mission 
realize  that  the  Export  Expansion  Program  is  not 
a  bureaucratic  device  to  export  more  work  to  our 
posts  but  a  fundamental  effort  to  increase  our  ex- 
ports and  thereby  to  improve  our  balance  of  pay- 
ments. It  is  apparent  to  me,  as  I  know  it  is  to  you, 
that  there  is  a  direct  correlation  between  the  level 
of  our  exports  and  our  ability  to  accomplish  many 
of  our  important  foreign  policy  objectives. 

The  Executive,  from  the  President  on  down, 
is  vitally  mterested  in  expanding  the  volume  of 
American  exports.  "We  know  that  in  order  to 
succeed  we  must  have  a  direct  and  active  partici- 
pation in  trade  promotion  by  all  of  our  Chiefs  of 
Mission. 

The  role  of  our  Chiefs  of  Mission  is  subject  to 
change.  Wliat  was  traditional  and  helpful  yester- 
day may  be  outmoded  and  inadequate  today.  I 
have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  this  is  the  case 
as  regards  trade  promotion.  Mission  Chiefs, 
their  deputies,  and  indeed  all  top  officials  of  the 
mission  have  many  acquaintances  in  host  govern- 
ment ministries  and  in  business  and  other  circles 
who  can  be  sources  of  trade  leads  for  our  manu- 
facturers and  exporters.  Not  only  commercial  of- 
ficers but  the  entire  mission  is  obligated  to  be  alert 
to  these  opportunities. 

In  today's  competitive  markets  we  can  do  no 
less  than  our  competitors,  short  of  participating 
in  actual  sales  or  giving  unfair  competitive  ad- 
vantage to  one  American  company  over  another. 
In  the  absence  of  explicit  restrictions  in  the  regu- 
lations, it  is  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  Chief  of 
Mission  as  to  how  far  to  go  in  assisting  American 
businessmen  establish  trade  connections. 

Admittedly,  competitor  nations  historically 
have  a  larger  dependence  on  export  trade  than 
we.  The  governments  of  those  countries  there- 
fore have  a  deeply  imbedded  tradition  of  assistance 
to  their  traders  which  they  continue  to  follow 
But  we  have  no  mean  tradition  ourselves.  In  the 
early  years  of  our  Republic,  our  Ambassadors  and 
Consuls  had  a  pi-imary  mission  of  promoting  our 
commerce  and  trade,  and  made  a  significant  con- 
tribution to  the  success  of  the  "clipper  ship"  era 
in  world  commerce.  Perhaps  we  need  to  recap- 
ture some  of  the  zeal  of  our  forebears,  for  we  are 
in  the  export  business  not  just  for  today  and  to 
morrow  but  for  the  long  haul.    Accordingly,  1 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


TH 


fc!  Spi 

"Kem 


for 


iijii 


Trade,  Investment,  and  United  States  Foreign  Policy 


'!ier. 
.fol 

■iciD 

lU 
i» 
a'jct 


all! 


am  requesting  that  you  as  well  as  your  principal 
aides  be  alert  to  and  seek  out  export  opportunities 
for  American  business. 

I  should  like  to  add  a  word  about  relations  be- 
tween the  mission  and  the  local  American  business 
community.  Wliere  such  a  community  exists,  the 
success  of  your  trade  promotion  effort  is  heavily 
dependent  upon  the  strength  of  these  relations. 

I  therefore  urge  that  you  re-examine  this  situa- 
tion as  it  concerns  your  mission  as  well  as  the  Con- 
sular   Officers    under    your    supervision.     Many 


Ambassadors  have  found  it  useful  to  meet  regu- 
larly with  the  leaders  of  the  American  business 
commimity  in  order  to  brief  them  on  foreign  pol- 
icy developments  and  to  obtain  from  them  what- 
ever assistance  they  may  have  to  offer  in  both 
foreign  policy  and  trade  promotion  matters.  I 
am  confident  that  such  cooperation  cannot  help 
but  work  to  our  mutual  benefit. 
Sincerely, 

Dean  Rttsk 


Address  hy  Secretary  Busk ' 


I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  talk  with  this  dis- 
tinguished group  of  American  business  leaders.  I 
shall  talk  about  the  contribution  of  American 
business  to  furthering  the  key  foi'eign  policy  ob- 
jectives of  the  United  States.  I  should  like  to  see 
the  business  community  focus  its  unique  skills  and 
resources  on  this  great  task. 

I  am  not  suggesting  that  businesses  slaould 
make  uneconomic  investments  or  sacrifice  the  in- 
terests of  stockholders,  employees,  or  old  custom- 
ers. Quite  the  contrary.  It  is  precisely  those 
skills  of  management  and  organization,  the  imagi- 
nation and  the  flexibility  which  a  firm  must  have 
to  operate  at  a  profit,  that  make  the  contribution 
of  business  so  essential  to  our  foreign  policy. 

What  is  the  basic  goal  of  our  foreign  policy? 
In  President  Kennedy's  words,  it  is : ".  .  .  a  peace- 
ful world  community  of  free  and  independent 
states,  free  to  choose  their  own  future  and  their 
own  system  so  long  as  it  does  not  threaten  the 
freedom  of  others."  ^ 

This  is  the  kind  of  world  community  envisioned 
by  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and,  we 


*  Made  In  behalf  of  Secretary  Rusk  by  William  C.  Fos- 
ter, Director  of  the  U.S.  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 
Agency,  before  the  National  Business  Advisory  Council  at 
Hot  Springs,  Va.,  on  Oct.  19   (press  release  633). 

'  Bulletin  of  Jan.  29, 1962,  p.  159. 

November  5,   1962 


believe,  desired  by  the  great  majority  of  mankind. 

In  working  toward  that  goal  we  try  to  pursue  a 
coordinated  strategy.  First,  we  are  determined 
to  hold  in  check  tliose  who  have  an  utterly  differ- 
ent concept  of  world  order — who  seek  to  impose 
their  coercive  system  on  all  others.  We  must 
maintain  our  ability  to  deter  Communist  aggres- 
sion in  all  its  fonns.  With  our  allies,  we  have 
that  ability.  And  we  have  the  will  to  use  it.  We 
hope  that  neither  Moscow  nor  Peiping  will  make 
the  terrible  mistake  of  underestimating  President 
Kennedy's  resolve  to  defend  the  vital  interests  of 
the  free  world. 

While  we  join  with  others  to  protect  the  free 
world,  we  work  to  build  its  strength  and  bind  it 
together.  As  one  of  tlie  main  components  of  this 
constructive  strategy  we  seek  an  ever  closer  part- 
nership with  Western  Europe  and  Japan  and  other 
industrialized  countries.  As  part  of  this  objec- 
tive, we  must  multiply  the  ties  of  commerce  among 
the  advanced  nations. 

Another  main  component  m  our  constructive 
strategy  is  aid  to  the  underdeveloped  nations  of 
Africa,  Asia,  and  Latin  America  in  modernizing 
their  economies  and  social  systems.  This  re- 
quires, among  other  things,  spreading  the  techni- 
cal and  especially  the  managerial  skills  of  modern 
industiy.    We  must  assist  the  developing  nations 

683 


in  demonstrating  that  by  acquiring  these  modern 
skills  they  can  escape  the  age-old  scourge  of  pov- 
erty. 

In  carrjdng  out  our  foreign  policy  American 
business  has  two  fundamental  roles.  First,  busi- 
ness is  the  key  factor  in  maintaining  a  dynamic 
domestic  economy.  Secondly,  business  must  ex- 
pand its  present  important  role  in  the  world  econ- 
omy. The  dynamism  that  has  been  central  in  the 
development  of  the  United  States  must  now  be  em- 
ployed on  a  global  scale. 

Need  for  a  Growing  Domestic  Economy 

A  growing  domestic  economy  is  essential  to  our 
foreign  policy  for  several  reasons.  The  larger  our 
gross  national  product,  the  less  burdensome  will 
be  the  costs  of  our  defense  structure  and  of  our 
aid  to  developing  nations.  At  present  we  are  de- 
voting close  to  10  percent  of  our  gross  national 
product  to  defending  and  building  the  free  world. 
Obviously  an  annual  growth  rate  of  4  or  5  per- 
cent in  our  economy  would  help  more  than  a 
growth  rate  of  2  or  3  percent  to  lighten  this 
burden. 

An  expanding  domestic  economy  is  necessary, 
moreover,  to  insure  the  vigor  and  progress — the 
technological  advances  and  increases  in  produc- 
tivity— which  make  us  competitive  in  world  mar- 
kets. It  is  needed  also  to  absorb  growing  imports 
from  both  advanced  and  developing  nations. 
And  it  is  needed  to  demonstrate  the  continuing 
ability  of  our  economy  to  improve  the  life  of  our 
people. 

The  performance  of  the  advanced  nations — of 
Western  Europe,  of  Japan,  of  the  United  States — 
has  dealt  a  crippling  blow  to  Marxist-Leninist 
theory  and  propliecy.  According  to  the  archaic 
notions  of  the  Communists,  the  industrialized  na- 
tions of  the  free  world  should  be  sinking  in  a  quag- 
mire of  depression  while  slashing  each  other's 
throats  in  a  savage  struggle  for  survival.  In- 
stead they  have  ascended  to  unprecedented  levels 
of  prosperity  and  unprecedented  cooperation. 

But  it  is  not  enough  to  prove  that  tlie  Commu- 
nists are  wrong  in  predicting  the  collapse  of  capi- 
talism. They  make  further  claims — to  having 
invented  shortcuts  to  economic  development  and 
better  ways  to  improve  the  lot  of  the  average  man. 
We  know  they  are  wrong  on  both  counts.  And 
throughout  the  world  men  who  formerly  seemed 


to  attach  some  worth  to  such  Communist  boasts 
are  realizing  increasingly  how  hollow  they  are. 

We  must  all  strive  to  make  ever  clearer  and 
greater  the  superiority  of  our  system  over  the 
Communist  system  in  bettering  the  lot  of  the  ordi- 
narj^  man. 

These  briefly  are  some  of  the  main  implications 
of  domestic  business  activity  for  our  foreign 
policy.  The  international  trade  and  investment 
of  American  business  also  are  important  in  our 
global  strategy.  In  the  rest  of  my  remarks  I 
should  like  to  sketch  out  some  of  the  major  impli- 
cations for  our  foreign  policy  of  American  exports, 
imports,  and  participation  in  foreign  enterprises. 

The  Role  of  Exports 

First  of  all,  we  must  increase  our  exports — and 
at  a  faster  rate  than  in  the  past.  The  strength  of 
the  dollar,  our  ability  to  maintain  overseas  mili- 
tary forces  and  installations  essential  to  the  secur- 
ity of  the  free  world,  and  our  ability  to  continue 
economic  assistance  rest  heavily  on  the  shoulders 
of  American  exporters. 

Tlie  stability  of  the  dollar  and  of  the  free-world 
monetary  system  will  not  permit  indefinite  deficits 
in  the  United  States  balance  of  payments.  We 
are  taking  a  variety  of  measures  to  meet  this  prob- 
lem. The  result  has  been  a  considerable  reduc- 
tion in  our  payments  deficit.  However,  we  still 
face  a  hard-core  deficit.  Theoretically  we  could 
wipe  it  out — and  indeed  create  a  surplus — by 
reducing  drastically  our  overseas  expenditures  for 
defending  and  building  the  free  world.  Military 
defense  accounts  for  soine  $3  billion  a  year  of  our 
dollar  outflow,  and  foreign  aid  for  approximately 
$1.3  billion.  However,  it  would  be  suicidal  to  bal 
ance  our  payments  by  weakening  our  deterrence 
to  Communist  aggression.  And  it  would  be  short 
sighted  and  ultimately  very  costly  to  reduce 
sharply  our  assistance  to  the  less  developed 
countries. 

The  sound,  constructive  way  to  close  the  remain- 
ing gap  in  our  balance  of  payments  is  by  expand- 
ing exports.  In  tlie  old  rhyme  the  kingdom  was 
lost  for  want  of  a  nail.  In  our  case  our  global 
strategy  could  be  undennined  by  failure  to  export. 

The  Government,  through  its  trade  promotion 
program,  is  attempting  to  stinuilate  greutei 
exports,  but  the  basic  job  here  is  one  for  business, 
not    Government.     I    would    like,    however,    tc 


684 


Department  of  Slate  Bu//efif(j|l||>, 


Slid 


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ini  MS 
global 
export, 

iDlOiif 

great 


remind  you  briefly  of  the  services  the  Government 
is  providing  to  assist  businesses  increase  export 
sales.  We  are  building  up  our  export  promotion 
activities.  Our  Foreign  Service  posts  are  placing 
new  emphasis  on  commercial  services.  These 
services  now  include  new  trade  centers  and 
increased  participation  in  trade  fairs  and  trade 
missions.  I  hope  you  will  find  these  activities 
useful  and  that  you  will  suggest  ways  in  which 
they  can  be  improved.  I  have  also  recently  in- 
."tructed  our  chiefs  of  mission  to  take  an  active 
personal  part  in  assisting  American  firms  to  ex- 
pand export  markets.^ 

Secondly,  we  now  have  the  powers  of  the  Trade 
Expansion  Act  of  1962.^  The  administration  in- 
tends to  use  this  new  legislation  vigorously  as  an 
instrument  for  opening  the  way  for  American 
exporters. 

Wliat  are  the  prospects  of  increasing  our  ex- 
ports? I  think  they  are  good  for  the  short  run, 
excellent  for  the  longer  run.  The  debate  on  the 
Trade  Expansion  Act  made  an  important  con- 
tribution, I  think,  to  overcoming  defeatism  regard- 
ing American  exports.  Plainly,  many  of  our 
commercial  exports  are  highly  competitive  in 
world  markets.  In  1961  our  exports,  excluding 
military  grant  aid,  totaled  more  than  $20  billion. 
Our  imports  totaled  $14.7  billion.  After  deduct- 
ing Government-financed  exports  of  more  than 
$2.3  billion,  we  had  a  commercial  export  surplus 
of  $3  billion. 

Looking  ahead  one  can  see  many  favorable  fac- 
tors. For  example,  European  wages  and  prices 
are  rising  faster  than  ours.  European  delivery 
rates  are  stretching  out  as  labor  shortages  limit 
production  increases.  Europe  is  demanding  more 
and  more  of  the  labor-saving  machinery  typical 
of  a  mass-production,  mass-market  economy. 
And  the  prospective  reduction  of  European  im- 
port duties,  especially  on  American  machinery, 
equipment,  advanced  chemical  products,  and  other 
products  included  in  the  special  authority  for 
negotiations  with  the  European  Common  Market, 
should  open  the  way  for  a  flourishing  expansion 
of  our  exports  in  the  years  ahead. 

Many  American  firms  regard  the  world  as  their 
market  and  gear  their  production,  product  design, 
and  marketing   tecliniques   accordingly.     But   I 


to 


Bulle* 


'  See  p.  682. 

'For  remarks  by  President  Kennedy  and  a  summary 
of  the  act,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  29,  1962,  p.  655. 

November  5,   J  962 


fear  that  there  are  still  many  firms  who  regard 
exports — if  they  export  at  all — as  marginal  mar- 
kets to  be  served  on  an  order-taking  basis.  A 
long-term  rapid  expansion  in  our  exports  requires 
a  basic  foreign  market  development  strategy  on 
the  part  of  many  more  American  firms,  large  and 
small.  This  global  business  strategy,  in  brief, 
means  that  American  business  must  think  of  the 
world  as  its  market  and  must  seek  to  maximize  its 
long-term  profits  on  a  world,  not  a  national,  scale. 

The  Role  of  Imports 

The  expansion  of  imports  does  not  require  the 
same  type  of  effort  necessary  for  export  expan- 
sion. In  the  long  run,  however,  our  ability  to  ab- 
sorb increasing  volumes  of  imports  is  essential 
both  to  the  expansion  of  our  export  markets  in 
advanced  coimtries  and  to  the  development  of 
less  developed  countries. 

We  must  be  prepared  to  open  the  American 
market  wider  if  we  are  to  bargain  down  foreign 
barriers  to  our  exports.  Moreover,  the  pressure 
of  foreign  competition  may  lower  our  production 
costs  and  increase  our  export  potential  in  some 
industries.  I  probably  do  not  have  to  remind 
many  of  you  that  foreign  competition  forces  a 
number  of  American  industries  to  keep  a  more 
watchful  eye  on  customer  needs  as  well  as  on  costs. 
These  are  not  new  arguments,  and  I  regard  the 
broad  support  received  by  the  Trade  Act  as  indi- 
cating general  acceptance  of  these  points. 

The  importance  of  imports  does  not  end  here, 
however.  If  the  developing  nations  are  ever  to 
be  able  to  pay  for  their  capital  equipment  needs, 
they  must  progressively  increase  their  exports  to 
the  industrialized  nations.  And  they  cannot  do 
that  simply  by  shipping  out  more  primary  com- 
modities. The  world's  ability  to  absorb  these 
commodities  is  limited. 

During  the  past  decade  of  booming  world  trade, 
exports  of  the  industrial  countries,  which  were 
high  to  begin  with,  almost  doubled  in  value.  Ex- 
port earnings  of  the  developing  countries  on  the 
other  hand  rose  by  less  than  one-tliird.  If  we 
exclude  petroleum,  their  export  earnings  showed 
only  a  moderate  and,  in  terms  of  the  needs,  a  very 
unsatisfactory  rate  of  increase. 

Prices  of  primary  commodities  tend  to  fluctuate 
widely.  In  the  case  of  a  few,  moreover,  prices 
have  moved  persistently  downward,  largely  be- 


685 


cause  of  sluggish  demand  and  chronic  oversupply, 
with  serious  consequences  for  the  development  pro- 
grams of  the  exporting  countries  concerned. 

For  this  reason  we  are  exploring  a  variety  of 
devices  to  blunt  or  offset  the  impact  of  price  weak- 
ness and  instability  in  commodity  markets  and 
to  create  more  stable  conditions  in  the  trade.  Com- 
modity agreements  such  as  the  recently  negotiated 
coffee  agreement  °  are  one  of  the  more  important 
of  these  devices.  We  should  be  under  no  illusion, 
however,  that  commodity  agreements  in  themselves 
will  solve  all  our  problems.  They  may  prove  val- 
uable and  necessary  in  a  number  of  instances  to 
provide  a  breathing  spell — to  buy  time.  But  the 
coffee  agreement,  and  any  other  agreements  wliich 
may  be  negotiated,  will  eventually  fail  unless  we 
deal  with  the  more  fundamental  problems.  For 
many  commodities  the  basic  problem  is  overpro- 
duction. The  only  long-term  solution  we  see  is 
to  shift  resources  out  of  production  of  surplus 
commodities  into  other  areas — especially  process- 
ing and  manufacturing. 

In  short,  the  situation  facing  many  developing 
countries  is  this :  Import  requirements  will  increase 
as  industrialization  progresses;  export  earnings 
from  primary  commodities  cannot  be  expected  to 
meet  these  growing  needs;  if  development  is  to 
continue  these  nations  must  receive  more  aid  or 
export  more  processed  and  manufactured  goods. 

The  industrialized  nations,  and  especially  the 
United  States  and  our  chief  European  allies,  face 
three  choices.  We  can  ignore  the  problems  and 
aspirations  of  the  less  developed  nations,  at  one 
stroke  denying  our  faith  in  freedom  and  the  dig- 
nity of  man  and  leaving  most  of  the  world  to  the 
Communists.  We  can  make  ever  larger  dona- 
tions of  foreign  aid  indefinitely.  Or  we  can  pro- 
gressively widen  our  import  markets  to  manufac- 
tured goods  from  developing  countries. 

The  third  choice,  increasing  our  imports,  is  the 
only  practicable  policy  in  the  long  run.  This  will 
create  some  difficulties — and  I  emphasize  again 
that  all  industrialized  nations  must  join  in  coping 
with  them.  Some  problems  should  be  overcome 
through  use  of  the  trade  adjustment  provisions  of 
the  new  Trade  Act.  Other  more  intractable  prob- 
lems may  require  a  common  approach  embracing 
all  major  exporting  and  importing  nations.  We 
have  to  face  this  issue  directly.    We  must  devise 


'  For  background,  see  ibid.,  p.  667. 
686 


mechanisms  which  permit  a  continuous  growth 
in  imports  of  manufactures  from  developing  na- 
tions while  easing  the  impact  on  vulnerable  do- 
mestic industries. 

While  the  main  thrust  of  our  ti-ade  policy  is  to 
strengthen  our  economy  and  the  economy  of  the 
free  world,  certain  aspects  of  it  touch  directly  on 
our  confrontation  with  the  Soviet  bloc.  I  refer 
particularly  to  the  recent  congressional  action  in 
withdrawing  the  President's  option  to  extend 
most-favored-nation  treatment  to  Poland  and 
Yugoslavia.  This  in  effect  ties  our  hands  in  a  key 
area  in  which  we  are  seeking  to  exploit  cracks  in 
the  Soviet  bloc.  I  hope  Congress  will  reconsider 
its  action  in  the  next  session  and  give  the  Presi- 
dent the  flexibility  necessary  to  accomplish  our 
objectives. 


The  Role  of  Foreign  Investment 

I  turn  to  tlie  role  of  American  investment 
abroad.  Its  relationship  to  our  foreign  policy  if 
complex.  It  cannot  be  judged  merely  in  terms  of 
dollars.  In  the  long  run  the  flows  of  managerial 
skills  and  attitudes,  and  the  ties  developed  be- 
tween American  businessmen  and  their  counter- 
parts in  other  lands,  may  prove  far  more  impor- 
tant than  the  flow  of  capital  alone. 

Especially  in  less  developed  areas  foreign  pri 
vate  enterprise  can  be  of  critical  importance.  I' 
can  demonstrate  how  man,  by  his  own  ingenuity 
can  improve  his  lot.  It  can  prove  the  necessity  foi 
managerial  as  well  as  technical  skills.  It  can  re 
veal  to  often  socialist-minded  leaders  that  moden 
private  enterprise  can  spearhead  economic  growth 
It  can  refute  Communist  claims  that  foreign  busi 
ness  feeds  off,  rather  than  builds  up,  the  loca 
economy. 

Most  of  American  private  investment  abroad  i 
in  the  advanced  nations.  Of  a  total  of  $34.7  billio 
in  direct  investments,  as  of  last  year,  $11.8  billio 
was  in  Canada  and  $7.7  billion  in  Europe — c 
which  $3.5  billion  was  in  the  United  Kingdom  an 
$3  billion  within  the  European  Common  Marke 
During  the  past  decade  American  businessme 
have  seen  the  great  investment  potential  ii 
Europe.  In  the  short  run  the  outflow  of  capit 
has  placed  a  strain  on  our  balance  of  payment 
In  the  longer  term,  however,  the  return  flow  < 
earnings,  foreign  subsidiaries'  procurement  froi 
the  United  States,  and  more  generally  the  glob 
scope,   vitality,   and   profitability   of   America 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


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firms  all  strengthen  both  the  international  position 
of  the  dollar  and  our  domestic  economy. 

As  against  $19.5  billion  m  direct  private  invest- 
ment in  Canada  and  Europe,  we  have  only  $2.5 
billion  in  Asia  and  $1.1  billion  in  Africa.  And 
these  latter  investments,  like  the  $8.2  billion  we 
have  in  Latin  America,  are  largely  in  the  produc- 
tion of  oil  and  ores. 

I  should  like  to  see  American  business  expand 
substantially  its  role  in  modernizing  the  economies 
of  the  less  developed  countries.  Admittedly,  in 
many  instances,  the  returns  may  be  slower  and  less 
certain.  In  some  countries  the  risks,  both  political 
and  economic,  may  be  prohibitive.  Yet  American 
firms  who  participate  in  development  in  its  early 
stages  have  the  prospect  of  securing  ground-floor 
positions  in  great  markets  of  the  future. 

In  considering  risks  I  shall  address  myself  par- 
ticularly to  the  political  risks.  If  we  can  find  ways 
to  minimize  political  risks,  I  am  confident  that 
American  business  ingenuity  will  overcome  the 
economic  obstacles. 

The  most  immediate  political  risk  for  foreign 
investment  is,  of  course,  expropriation.  This  can 
take  either  the  direct  form  of  a  quick  government 
takeover  or  a  variety  of  indirect  or  partial  forms 
by  which  the  host  government  discriminates 
against  foreign  business  or  makes  it  unpossible  to 
operate  at  a  fair  profit. 

Any  sovereign  nation  has  the  right  to  expro- 
priate property,  whether  owned  by  foreigners  or 
nationals.  In  the  United  States  we  refer  to  this 
as  the  power  of  eminent  domain.  However,  the 
owner  should  receive  adequate  and  prompt  com- 
pensation for  his  property.  Moreover,  a  legal 
right  is  not  the  same  thing  as  a  wise  policy. 
Economic  growth  requires  the  expansion  of  capital 
resources.  If  an  underdeveloped  nation  is  to 
achieve  self-sustaining  growth  in  a  reasonable 
period  of  time,  it  must,  as  a  rule,  obtain  external 
capital.  The  amount  of  outside  public  funds 
available  for  investment  is  limited.  And  over  the 
long  run  these  public  fimds  will  tend  to  go  to  those 
coimtries  which  are  pursuing  policies  that  hold 
the  prospect  of  achieving  self-sustaining  growth. 
We  consider  it  extremely  unwise  for  developing 
nations  to  alienate  foreign  investors,  thereby 
stunting  economic  growth. 

The  United  States  Government  is  prepared  to 
intercede  on  behalf  of  American  firms  and  make 
strong   representations  to  host  governments    in 


November  5,   7962 


cases  of  economically  unjustified  expropriation  or 
harassment.  Various  forms  of  investment  guar- 
anties are  also  available  as  insurance  against  cer- 
tain political  risks.  I  am  happy  to  announce  that 
we  are  making  substantial  headway  in  as  difficult 
an  area  as  Latm  America  in  putting  our  invest- 
ment guaranty  program  into  effect.  We  have  re- 
cently reached  an  interim  agreement  with  the 
Colombian  Government  under  which  we  are  to 
extend  our  investment  guaranty  program  to  cover 
inconvertibility ;  expropriation ;  and  war,  revolu- 
tion, and  insurrection  risks.  And  we  have  high 
hopes  of  getting  similar  bilateral  guaranty  agree- 
ments signed  in  the  near  future  in  Argentina  and 
several  other  Latin  American  and  African  coun- 
tries. We  currently  have  one,  two,  or  all  three 
guaranties  effective  in  46  less  developed  countries. 
I  hope  you  will  make  use  of  these  insurance  de- 
vices and  suggest  ways  in  which  they  can  be 
tailored  more  closely  to  your  requirements. 

Despite  the  importance  we  attach  to  dissuading 
governments  from  expropriating  foreign  invest- 
ments, merely  to  forestall  expropriation  is  not 
enough.  A  good  fire  department  and  fire  insur- 
ance coverage  are  indispensable,  but  basic  preven- 
tion of  fires — natural  or  political — stems  from 
sound,  fireproof  construction  and  extreme  care  in 
handling  flammable  materials.  American  firms 
in  developing  nations  often  operate  in  a  volatile 
political  atmosphere.  You  cannot  handle  liquid 
oxygen  in  the  same  way  you  handle  pig  iron.  We 
cannot  assume  that  operating  procedures,  com- 
munity relations,  and  governmental  relations  will 
be  identical  in  advanced  and  developing  nations. 
A  primary  responsibility  for  avoidance  of  polit- 
ical risk,  therefore,  rests  with  the  firm. 

I  am  confident  that  American  firms  can,  through 
their  own  efforts,  avoid  a  large  part  of  the  politi- 
cal risk  inherent  in  operations  in  developing 
nations.  They  can,  if  they  retain  maximum  flex- 
ibility of  operations,  if  they  focus  skills  and  imag- 
ination on  satisfying  both  their  own  imperative 
requirements  and  the  imperative  requirements  and 
sensitivities  of  the  developing  country.  As  many 
of  you  know  from  experience,  it  is  often  helpful 
to  provide  for  substantial  participation  by  local 
partners  and  to  employ  and  train  as  many  local 
citizens  as  possible.  In  some  cases  it  may  be 
possible  to  work  out  management  contracts  or 
other  arrangements  which  keep  the  essential 
American  skills  and  attitudes  in  the  plant  while 
leaving  our  flag  off  the  roof. 

687 


No  matter  what  ingenious  formulas  we  work 
out,  however,  difficulties  do  and  will  continue  to 
arise  between  American  business  and  foreign  gov- 
ernments. We  are  seeking  to  make  our  embassy 
staffs  from  the  ambassador  down  alertly  aware  of 
their  responsibility  to  handle  such  matters  expe- 
ditiously and  to  make  necessary  representations  to 
the  host  governments  concerned. 

Also,  we  have  just  established  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  a  Special  Assistant  for  Interna- 
tional Business  ^  to  handle  the  not  infrequent  cases 
when  American  business  firms  find  they  are  dis- 
criminated against  in  one  form  or  another  in  their 
investment  or  trade  relations  with  a  given  coun- 
try. It  is  the  duty  of  this  Special  Assistant  for 
International  Business  to  see  that  U.S.  business 
does  get  prompt  representation  in  such  matters. 
It  is  hoped  that  the  business  community  will  take 
advantage  of  this  facility,  which  should  not  be 
viewed  as  competitive  with  existing  facilities  for 
the  business  community  but  rather  as  a  focal  point 
for  them  within  the  Department  of  State. 

In  assessing  the  risks  and  opportunities  of  in- 
vestment in  less  developed  areas  we  should  try 
to  keep  a  proper  perspective.  We  must  remain 
fully  aware  of  the  deep  nationalistic,  anticolonial- 
ist,  often  socialistic  sentiment  in  most  developing 
nations.  Private  enterprise,  and  particularly  for- 
eign enterprise,  is  often  highly  suspect.  And  yet 
as  these  new  nations  and  their  leaders  realize  the 
factors  necessary  for  development,  as  they  see  the 
private  sector  in  many  instances  pacing  their  na- 
tions' growth,  their  hostility  is  softening.  In  part 
this  results  from  the  performance  of  the  private 
sector.  It  also  results  from  the  poor  performance 
of  the  Communists.  The  Communist  bloc  econ- 
omy is,  of  course,  pallid  in  comparison  to  the 
West.  The  abysmal  failure  of  Chinese  develop- 
ment is  evident  for  all  the  world  to  see.  Soviet 
incompetence  in  both  the  aid  and  trade  fields  has 
led  to  disillusion  and  the  search  for  closer  ties 
with  the  West  on  the  part  of  several  African  and 
Asian  nations  which  earlier  seemed  to  have  been 
taken  in  by  the  grandiose  Soviet  economic  line. 

Unhappily  a  few  countries  which  previously 
were  receptive  to  private  foreign  investment  are 
now  alienating  it  by  expropriation  and  harass- 
ment. However,  in  many  developing  nations  the 
climate  for  private  enterprise  is  improving. 

There  are  strong  incentives  for  American  firms 


to  stake  their  claim  now  in  these  great  potential 
markets.  As  nations  develop,  business  opportuni- 
ties are  being  created.  Future  profits  will  go  to 
the  films  which  are  enterprising  and  foresighted 
today.  An  American  firm  whose  managerial  skill, 
political  sophistication,  and  contribution  to  de- 
velopment win  the  confidence  of  a  developing 
nation  should  be  in  an  enviable  position.  The  risks 
are  there;  the  long-term  opportunities  are  there. 
Tlie  developing  nations  represent  a  classic  chal- 
lenge to  American  private  enterprise. 


1 


f 


•  For  background,  see  Ibid.,  Oct.  15,  1962,  p.  585. 
688 


The  Trend  of  the  World  Struggle 

In  closing  I  should  like  to  make  a  few  comments 
about  our  present  world  position  and  future  pros- 
pects. We  are  struggling  with  crises  provoked  or 
aggravated  by  the  imperialistic  ambitions  of  the 
Communists.  The  times  remain  perilous.  But 
the  free  world  is  gaining  in  strength  and  cohesion. 

Fifteen  years  ago  France  and  Italy  were  in 
grave  danger  of  being  taken  over  by  the  Com- 
munists and  Germany  was  in  shambles.  The  re- 
surgence of  Western  Europe,  its  progress  toward 
integration,  and  the  vitality  of  the  Atlantic  part- 
nership— these  are  a  mighty  reinforcement  of  the 
cause  of  freedom. 

In  the  vast  less  develojjed  areas  of  the  non- 
Communist  world  we  have  been  witnessing — and 
encouraging — the  epochal  transition  from  colo- 
nialism to  independence.  Never  before  have  so 
many  new  states  been  bom  in  so  short  a  time. 
Some  are  weak  and  floundering.  But  some  are 
making  solid  progress,  and  many  others  have  made 
promising  starts.  It  is  surely  not  without  signifi- 
cance that,  with  the  partial  exceptions  of  North 
Korea  and  North  Viet-Nam,  no  nation  which  has 
achieved  independence  since  the  Second  World 
War  has  succumbed  to  communism. 

Increasingly  leaders  and  peoples  in  the  under- 
developed areas  have  come  to  understand  the  tac- 
tics, purposes,  and  nature  of  communism — have 
come  to  realize  that  commimism  is  the  irrecon 
cilable  enemy  of  freedom.  They  have  been  able  to 
see  also  that  Communist  methods  of  organizing 
production  are  inefficient. 

Within  the  Communist  world  itself  important 
changes  are  occurring:  differences  between  Mos- 
cow and  Peiping,  shortcomings  in  economic  per- 
formance, the  inability  of  the  Communists  tc 
crush  the  spirit  of  nationalism  in  Eastern  Europe 

Department  of  State  Bulletlr 


Successful  societies  don't  have  to  imprison  their 
own  people  behind  barbed  wire  and  walls. 

We  face  a  long  struggle.  But  those  who  are 
committed  to  freedom  have  reason  for  quiet 
confidence. 


geria's  foreign  policy.  There  was  a  useful  and 
cordial  exchange  of  views  on  aspects  of  the  inter- 
national situation.  President  Kennedy  and  the 
Prime  Minister  stated  their  hopes  for  a  close  and 
continuing  friendship  between  the  two  countries. 


President  Kennedy  Holds  Talks  With 
Leaders  of  Algeria  and  Libya 


ALGERIA 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  joint  communique, 
issued  by  President  Kennedy  and  Ahmed  Ben 
Bella,  Prime  Minister  of  the  Democratic  and  Pop- 
ular Repuhlic  of  Algeria,  at  the  close  of  their  dis- 
cussions held  at  Washington  on  October  15. 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  IS 

His  Excellency  Ahmed  Ben  Bella,  Prime  Min- 
ister of  the  Democratic  and  PoiDular  Republic  of 
Algeria,  and  President  Kennedy  met  for  a  dis- 
cussion and  lunch  at  the  White  House  today. 

The  President  took  the  occasion  of  Prime  Min- 
ister Ben  Bella's  presence  at  the  United  Nations 
to  invite  him  to  be  his  guest  so  that  they  might 
become  acquainted  and  review  problems  of  com- 
mon interest. 

President  Kennedy  told  the  Prime  Minister  of 
his  personal  interest  and  that  of  the  people  of 
the  United  States  in  the  future  of  an  independent 
Algeria,  and  expressed  best  wishes  to  the  Prime 
Minister  on  Algeria's  admission  to  the  United  Na- 
tions.^ He  also  explained  the  principles  of  United 
States  foreign  policy. 

The  Prime  Minister  discussed  the  problems  of 
his  country  and  explained  the  principles  of  Al- 


1  For  a  statement  by  Adlai  E.  Stevenson,  U.S.  Repre- 
sentative in  the  Security  Council,  on  Oct.  4,  see  Bulletin 
of  Oct.  22,  1962,  p.  627. 


LIBYA 

Crown  Prince  Hasan  al-Rida  al-Sanusi  of  the 
United  Kingdom  of  Libya  made  an  official  visit 
to  the  United  States  October  15-21(,.  Following 
is  the  text  of  a  joint  communique  issued  by  Presi- 
dent Kennedy  and  Crown  Pri?ice  Hasan  after  their 
talks  at  Washington  on  October  17. 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  17 

His  Eoyal  Highness  Crown  Prince  Hasan  al- 
Rida  al-Sanusi  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Libya 
and  President  John  F.  Kennedy  met  at  the  White 
House  yesterday  in  the  course  of  the  Crown 
Prince's  official  visit  to  the  United  States. 

The  visit  and  meeting  provided  an  opportunity 
for  President  Kennedy  to  meet  the  Crown  Prince 
of  Libya  and  to  enable  His  Royal  Highness  to 
become  acquainted  with  the  United  States  and  to 
hold  discussions  with  U.S.  leaders. 

The  two  leaders  and  their  respective  advisers 
reviewed  the  existing  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Libya  and  exchanged  views  in  com- 
plete frankness  on  problems  of  common  interest 
relating  to  the  area  and  on  the  current  interna- 
tional situation. 

The  President  expressed  joleasure  at  the  efforts 
being  made  by  Libya  toward  the  achievement  of 
progress  and  prosperity  for  its  people  and  indi- 
cated the  interest  and  willingness  of  the  United 
States  to  assist  in  those  efforts  by  appropriate 
means. 

Both  parties  expressed  hope  for  continuing 
close  and  friendly  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Libya. 


November  5,   1962 

662752 — 62 8 


689 


The  United  States  and  the  New  Africa 


IIP' 


hy  O.  Mennen  Williams 

Assistant  Secretary  for  African  Affairs  ^ 


Although  Africa's  life  has  been  my  life  for  the 
past  2  years,  I  do  not  presume  to  come  before  this 
learned  group  to  advance  any  thesis.  Bather,  to- 
night I  would  simply  like  to  give  you  some  of  my 
personal  thoughts  on  what  I  believe  will  be  the 
future  development  of  Africa. 

It  is  my  belief  that  Africa  will  find  a  life  of 
freedom  for  her  people  without  regard  to  their 
color  or  place  of  origin.  As  men  everywhere  have 
found,  freedom,  like  all  things  of  value,  has  its 
price,  and  there  are  obstacles  and  difficulties  in 
attaining  it.  Some  men  rush  headlong  to  buy 
freedom  and  pay  the  price  without  counting  the 
cost.  Others  weigh  the  cost  more  carefully  and 
more  deliberately.  Some  cling  to  traditional  prac- 
tices after  their  day  is  done.  At  the  same  time 
others  make  a  too-headlong  rush  for  new  rights, 
bruising  old  and  just  rights  in  the  process.  But 
in  the  end,  as  the  Lord  said  in  Leviticus  (25:10), 
"Ye  shall  .  .  .  proclaim  liberty  throughout  all  the 
land  imto  all  the  inhabitants  thereof." 

Specifically,  I  should  like  to  say  a  few  words 
about  the  following  points :  ( 1 )  The  African  solu- 
tion will  be  a  solution  of  free  choice;  (2)  Africa 
will  provide  an  increasingly  better  life  for  all  its 
inhabitants;  (3)  Europeans  and  others  who  have 
made  tlieir  homes  in  Africa  will  find  a  productive 
and  rewarding  place  in  the  life  of  Africa ;  and  (4) 
all  the  peoples  of  Africa  will  achieve  governments 
of  their  own  choosing. 

Actually,  great  progress  has  been  made  on  all 
these  points  through  the  joint  efforts  of  men  of 
good  will  in  Africa  and  Europe,  but  much  remains 
to  be  done,  of  course.  Before  this  great  drama  is 
complete,  people  from  all  over  the  world  will  be 


•  Address  made  before  the  fifth  annual  meeting  of  the 
African  Studies  Association  at  Washington,  D.C.,  on  Oct. 
12  (press  release  618). 


690 


called  upon  to  play  their  respective  parts.  In  the 
final  analysis,  however,  it  will  be  the  many  peoples 
of  Africa  who  will  work  out  their  own  solution— 
and  this,  I  believe,  is  the  most  effective  way  to 
assure  Africa's  continuing  membership  in  the 
world  of  free  choice. 

The  African  Solution 

Turning  immediately  to  the  first  point,  I  am 
confident  that  the  African's  solution  of  his  politi- 
cal organization  will  be  peculiarly  his  own.  The 
African  has,  as  you  know,  a  pride  and  determina- 
tion that  his  new  status  will  have  its  own  African 
character.  He  will  not  imitate  the  East  any  more 
than  he  will  the  West,  "\\niile  he  may  draw  from 
other  societies,  the  end  product  will  have  a  distinct 
African  character. 

We  welcome  the  apparent  development  in 
Africa  of  its  own  independent  philosopliy  of  gov- 
ernment. We  apply  no  preconceptions  in  Africa, 
nor  do  we  seek  rigidly  to  impose  our  own  formulas 
in  the  solution  of  African  problems.  Rather,  we 
stand  confident  that  if  the  peoples  of  Africa  exer- 
cise their  own  free  choice  they  will  ultimately  seek 
the  goals  we  seek,  even  though  not  always  by 
exactly  the  same  methods. 

As  President  Kennedj'  said  in  his  second  state 
of  the  Union  message :  ^ 

.  .  .  our  basic  goal  remains  the  same :  a  peaceful  world 
community  of  free  and  independent  states,  free  to  choose 
their  own  future  and  their  own  system  so  long  as  it  does 
not  threaten  the  freedom  of  others. 

Some  may  choose  forms  and  ways  we  would  not  choose 
for  ourselves,  but  it  is  not  for  us  that  they  are  choosing. 
We  can  welcome  diversit.v — the  Communists  cannot.  For 
we  offer  a  world  of  choice — they  offer  the  world  of  coer- 
cion. And  the  way  of  the  past  shows  clearly  that  freedom, 
not  coercion,  Is  the  wave  of  the  future. 


'  Bulletin  of  Jan.  29,  1902,  p.  159. 

Department  of  Stale  Bulletin 


This  concept  is  deeply  imbedded  in  our  Amer- 
ican heritage  of  belief  in  freedom  and  self-deter- 
mination for  peoples  everywhere.  Historically  the 
American  people  firmly  recognize  the  rights  of  all 
peoples  to  determine  their  own  form  of  govern- 
ment. This,  we  believe,  is  the  foundation  of  last- 
ing world  order. 

In  essence,  then,  we  support  what  Africa  wants. 
We  accept  the  African  aspiration  for  nonaline- 
ment — the  African  desire  not  to  be  so  closely  al- 
lied with  any  non-African  state  or  system  that  a 
government's  exercise  of  free  choice  is  threatened. 
And,  to  the  extent  that  this  aspiration  embodies 
neutralism,  we  recognize  that  this  concept  is  not 
a  sterile  neutralism  that  refuses  to  examine  an 
issue  on  its  merits  and  take  a  stand.  Two  of 
Africa's  most  prominent  spokesmen  have  made 
this  point  very  clear  in  the  current  issue  of  Foreign 
Affairs. 

Sir  Abubakar  Tafawa  Balewa,  Prime  Minister 
of  the  Federation  of  Nigeria,  put  it  this  way : 

Our  foreign  policy  has  never  been  one  of  neutrality,  but 
rather  non-alignment.  We  have  never,  for  instance,  been 
neutral  in  African  affairs,  nor  can  we  be  neutral  in  mat- 
ters pertaining  to  world  peace.  We  have  demonstrated 
both  in  the  Congo  and  at  the  United  Nations  that  we  have 
the  courage  of  our  convictions  in  supporting  what  we 
consider  to  be  in  the  interest  of  peace  and  harmony. 
And  if  this  has  meant  supporting  the  policies  of  one  bloc 
or  the  other  at  the  particular  time,  we  have  not  shrunk 
from  it. 

And  Sekou  Toure,  President  of  the  Eepublic 
of  Guinea,  commented  on  the  subject  in  this 
manner : 

African  neutralism,  then,  Is  not  shameful  indifference, 
a  sort  of  political  demobilization.  On  the  contrary,  it  is 
the  expression  of  a  lively  faith  in  a  happy  future  for 
mankind.  It  is  something  active,  a  participating  force, 
an  active  agent  in  the  struggle  for  the  achievement  of  a 
world  society — emancipated,  fraternal  and  united.  Let 
us  hope  that  the  highly  developed  nations  and  peoples  can 
understand  this  historical  movement  in  its  universal  sig- 
nificance, and  that  they  will  take  full  part  in  it,  in  the 
conscious  desire  to  help  build  a  free  and  prosperous 
Africa  in  a  world  of  peace  and  brotherhood. 

Africa's  Potential 

Looking  to  my  second  point,  in  a  continent  beset 
by  poverty,  ignorance,  and  disease  and  divided  by 
custom  and  tribalism,  it  may  be  presumptuous  to 
predict  a  better  life  for  all  the  people  of  Africa 
except  in  a  very  relative  way.  But  I  am  impressed 
that  by  and  large  Africa  is  dynamically  deter- 

November  5,    1962 


mined  and  enthusiastic  to  improve  its  human  re- 
sources. The  passion  for  education  is  absolute, 
and  the  drive  for  living  improvement  along  with 
freedom  is  the  one  constant  of  African  politics. 

Touching  only  momentarily  on  the  political 
side  here,  the  fact  that  in  Africa  today  there  are 
33  independent  governments  where  there  were 
only  4  a  dozen  years  ago,  coupled  with  the  fact 
that  almost  all  of  these  governments  came  into 
being  and  are  functioning  with  a  minimum  of  un- 
rest and  strife,  adds  to  my  optimistic  belief  in 
Africa's  ability  to  develop  successfully. 

Africa's  economic  potential  is  a  particularly 
promising  aspect  of  the  continent's  future. 
Africa  is  magnificently  endowed  by  nature,  and 
one  day  this  great  potential  will  be  realized. 

Minerals  are  among  the  first  items  to  come  to 
mind  when  Africa's  economic  potential  is  dis- 
cussed. In  this  field  Africa  today  is  producing 
commercially  all  but  4  of  the  53  most  important 
minerals  and  metals  in  use.  The  other  four — 
magnesium,  mercury,  molybdenum,  and  sulfur — 
also  are  available  in  Africa  but  are  not  yet  being 
exploited. 

Africa's  iron  ore  reserves  are  now  estimated  at 
2  billion  metric  tons — twice  as  much  as  our  own 
and  two-thirds  of  those  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
Her  coal  reserves  are  estimated  at  100  billion  long 
tons — enough  to  last  for  300  years,  based  on  our 
rate  of  consumption.  New  petroleum  fields  are 
being  discovered  and  brought  in  all  over  the  con- 
tinent, but  the  most  important  strikes  have  been 
made  in  North  Africa.  Algeria's  fields  are  now 
producing  at  the  rate  of  450,000  barrels  a  day — 
about  one-third  that  of  Iran.  Libyan  produc- 
tion has  reached  150,000  barrels  a  day  and  is  ex- 
pected to  reach  600,000  barrels  within  the  next  5 
years.  The  North  Africa  petroleum  supply  takes 
on  added  importance  because  of  its  proximity  to 
the  European  market,  to  which  most  of  the  pro- 
duction will  go. 

Perhaps  Africa's  most  important  reserve  is  hy- 
droelectric potential.  It  is  estimated  that  Africa 
has  40  percent  of  the  world's  water  power — more 
than  that  of  any  other  continent — and  yet  less  than 
1/2  percent  of  it  has  so  far  been  developed.  As 
water  is  one  of  the  most  important  factors  limit- 
ing Africa's  growth,  it  is  not  hard  to  imagine 
how  significantly  this  wealth  of  electric  power 
and  irrigation  will  advance  Africa  when  it  is  de- 
veloped more  fully.    And  with  Africa  producing 


691 


I 


20  percent  of  the  free  world's  uranium,  it  is  not 
difficult  to  see  that  the  continent  is  equipped  to 
step  into  peaceful  uses  of  atomic  energy  at  some 
future  time. 

When  you  add  to  these  estimates  the  fact  that 
much  of  Africa  has  not  yet  been  surveyed  geo- 
logically, it  is  obvious  that  Africa  has  ample  min- 
eral wealth  upon  which  to  build  industrial 
development. 

And  what  is  true  of  Africa's  potential  in  the  field 
of  minerals  and  metals  is  true  in  other  areas  as 
well.  Take  land,  for  example.  Discounting  the 
Sahara  completely,  Africa  still  has  more  arable 
land  and  pasture  land  than  either  the  United 
States  or  the  Soviet  Union.  It  has  more  than 
twice  our  forest  land  and  nearly  as  much  as  the 
U.S.S.R.  It  is  true  that  much  of  this  land  is  un- 
used or  poorly  used  today.  It  is  also  true  that 
with  proper  irrigation  and  modern  agricultural 
techniques  crops  can  be  grown  on  a  year-round 
basis  and  that  all  the  important  crops  in  the  world 
can  be  grown  in  Africa.  As  an  illustration,  one 
of  our  economists  estimates  that  the  Ethiopian 
Highlands  alone,  if  properly  cultivated,  could  pro- 
duce sufficient  food  for  all  of  Western  Europe. 

Additional  examples  could  be  cited,  in  fisheries 
and  livestock  potential,  for  instance,  but  I  think 
these  are  enough  to  indicate  wliy  I  get  excited 
about  Africa's  economic  potential. 

Obviously  there  is  still  a  long  way  to  go  before 
this  potential  can  be  realized.  The  continent's 
lack  of  unity,  its  illiteracy,  malnutrition,  and  dis- 
ease all  conspire  to  hold  back  its  development  to- 
day. On  the  other  hand,  Africa  does  not  have 
the  population  pressures  present  in  otlier  parts  of 
the  world,  and  many  people  are  combining  their 
efll'orts  to  speed  the  day  when  Africa  will  have  a 
viable  economy. 

One  way  this  is  being  done  is  through  the  co- 
operative efforts  of  Africans  themselves.  This 
is  encouraging  because  it  not  only  indicates  their 
willingness  to  initiate  self-help  measures  but  be- 
cause it  tends  to  reduce  artificial  barriers  that  must 
be  lowered  before  continent-wide  development  can 
take  place.  The  United  States  favors  this  trend 
toward  the  development  of  regional  African 
groupings.  In  the  long  run  such  a  course  will 
diminish  the  fears  of  many  non-Africans  that 
Balkanization  of  Africa  will  lead  to  markets  too 
small  for  fruitful  development  and  make  the  con- 
tinent a  seeding  ground  for  future  conflict  among 


692 


great  powers.  We  believe  that  associations  of 
African  states  will  strengthen  Africa  both  politi- 
cally and  economically. 

The  United  States  is  fully  appreciative  of  to- 
day's great  movement  to  build  a  strong,  prosper- 
ous, and  independent  Africa.  We  have  recognized 
that  we  have  a  role  to  play  in  African  develop- 
ment through  our  AID  [Agency  for  International 
Development]  and  other  programs  in  Africa.  In 
some  cases  our  assistance  is  supplementary  to  that 
of  the  former  metropoles;  in  others,  we  are  play- 
ing a  major  I'ole  in  a  country's  development. 

Our  total  economic  assistance  to  Africa,  ex- 
cluding Egypt,  amounted  to  some  $233  million  in 
fiscal  year  1962.  This  is  exclusive  of  U.S.  contri- 
butions to  the  United  Nations  for  economic  re- 
habilitation in  the  Congo,  substantial  contribu- 
tions in  the  form  of  development  loans  from  the 
Export-Import  Bank,  and  Food  for  Peace  pro- 
grams. 

Compared  with  some  of  our  other  worldwide 
commitments,  this  is  not  a  heavy  load,  and  we 
hope  that  with  other  industrialized  countries  we 
can  measure  up  to  the  real  needs  of  this  great 
continent.  In  view  of  Africa's  great  potential, 
our  primary  aim  is  to  help  the  Africans  develop 
in  such  fundamental  fields  as  education,  public 
health,  transportation,  communications,  and 
power  development.  After  this  initial  impetus, 
we  believe  they  can  maintain  momentum  on  their 
own  and  eventually  reach  a  point  where  they 
can  provide  assistance  to  other  continents. 

Although  American  efforts  are  important,  they 
are  modest  compared  with  those  of  European  and 
multilateral  sources.  The  former  metropoles  are 
playing  very  important  roles  in  African  develop- 
ment, and  other  European  countries  are  contribut- 
ing as  well.  France  alone  has  been  contributing 
more  than  $600  million  annually  to  independent 
African  countries,  including  Algeria.  The 
United  Kingdom  total  of  grants  and  loans  has 
been  $150  million  annually.  West  German  obli- 
gations will  reach  about  $155  million  this  year. 

Just  last  week  Belgian  Foreign  Minister  Paul- 
Ilenri  Spaak  pointed  out  that  the  Common  Market 
Development  Fund  has  provided  the  equivalent 
of  $581  million  for  African  development  in  the 
last  5  years  and  indicated  that  this  amount  would 
rise  in  the  next  5  years.  And  interest  in  Africa 
by  the  international  lending  agencies,  notably  the 
World  Bank,  is  becoming  much  broader  with  the 

Department  of  Stale  Bulletin 


of  laccession  to  membership  of  many  new  African 
iti-   states.    We  are,  of  course,  pleased  that  Africa's 

development  is  the  concern  of  many  of  the  more 

developed  nations. 


tk 


I!ie 


The  Future  of  Europeans 

This  brings  me  to  my  third  point.  Many  thou- 
sands of  European  technicians  and  European  set- 
tlers are  making  substantial  contributions  to 
Africa's  future — and  to  their  own  future  in  Africa. 
While  the  presence  of  Europeans  and  other  non- 
indigenous  Africans  is  not  necessarily  as  fixed  a 
feature  of  the  Africa  of  the  future  as  the  presence 
of  rich  mineral  deposits,  I  believe  it  can  be  as 
fixed  and  as  important. 

In  order  for  Africa  to  realize  its  great  economic 
md  political  potential,  it  urgently  needs  great 
numbers  of  professional  and  technical  skills  of 
all  types.  Education  will  eventually  supply  most 
3f  these,  but  for  a  long  time,  as  in  our  own  land, 
A^frica  in  a  hurry  will  require  imported  skills  to 
assist  the  development  of  her  technology,  com- 
merce, and  administration — and  probably  her  all- 
jssential  agriculture,  too. 

The  future  of  the  European  in  Africa  is  one  of 
the  most  hotly  debated  questions  in  that  continent. 
[  have  followed  this  question  with  great  interest, 
ind  it  is  my  considered  judgment  that  favorable 
possibilities  exist  which  can  permit  Europeans  to 
live  harmoniously  in  the  Africa  of  the  future. 
There  has  been  a  tendency  to  view  the  transfer  of 
power  from  European  governments  to  new  Afri- 
can states  as  a  settlement  on  African  terms.  In 
reality  there  has  been  considerable  accommodation 
ay  both  Africans  and  Europeans  in  working  out 
the  future  of  Africa,  and  the  contributions  to  the 
total  welfare  that  Europeans  can  yet  make — in 
concert  with  or  as  parts  of  African  governments — 
^ive  hope  for  true  interracial  societies  in  Africa. 
Df  course  the  day  when  Europeans  can  live  in 
,js  Africa  as  a  superior  and  specially  privileged 
ij.  class  is  gone.  However,  the  future  for  Europeans 
who  become  citizens  of  the  new  African  states,  en- 
vj.  joying  equal  rights  and  privileges  with  all  other 
jitizens,  looks  bright— provided  that  both  the 
Africans  and  the  Europeans  get  on  with  the  job 
that  must  be  done.  The  hour  is  late,  however,  and 
I  am  fully  aware  that  such  hope  could  be  left  un- 
,j,,j  fulfilled  if  the  present  rate  of  progress  is  not  car- 
ried forward  rapidly. 

Certainly  the  United  States  has  a  great  interest 

November  5,  J  962 


rtft 


in  the  development  of  good  relations  between  the 
indigenous  Africans  and  the  Africans  of  European 
origm.  Some  of  the  latter  now  are  third-  and 
fourth-generation  Africans,  and  they  are  very 
anxious  for  a  peaceful  resolution  of  their  conti- 
nent's problems.  The  indigenous  Africans,  for 
their  part,  are  anxious  to  get  on  with  the  tasks  of 
nation  building. 

The  essential  questions  in  obtaining  a  peaceful 
resolution  of  Africa's  problems  will  have  to  be 
decided  by  the  African  and  European  communities 
themselves,  of  course,  but  our  policy  in  Africa  is 
to  assist  in  the  attainment  of  harmony  among  all 
the  contment's  peoples  in  whatever  ways  we  can. 

Transition  to  Self-Govern ment 

Mutually  satisfactory  relations  between  Afri- 
cans and  Europeans  have  been  reasonably  well  es- 
tablished now  in  many  parts  of  Africa.  I  believe 
that  much  credit  for  the  smoothness  of  the  tran- 
sition from  colonial  to  independent  status  through- 
out much  of  Africa  is  due  the  former  metropolitan 
powers,  particularly  France  and  the  United 
Kingdom. 

With  few  exceptions,  former  colonial  ties  are 
being  laid  aside  for  new  types  of  cooperative  ar- 
rangements between  Africa  and  Europe.  And, 
where  African  aspirations  have  been  satisfied,  it 
has  been  the  African  countries  themselves  who 
have  sought  continuing  relations  with  the  former 
metropoles.  We  consider  this  sound  policy,  and  we 
are  pleased  that  the  new  cultural,  economic,  and 
political  relationships  between  the  former  metro- 
poles  and  the  newly  independent  African  countries 
are,  in  most  instances,  close  and  cordial.  There 
is  no  reason  why  such  relations  should  not  be 
compatible. 

However,  let  us  not  blink  the  fact  that  tran- 
sition to  self-government  of  all  the  peoples  of 
Africa  will  be  the  major  test  of  the  political  in- 
genuity of  the  former  colonial  powers — a  test 
which  will  have  consequences  beyond  our  times. 
It  will  be  far  from  easy;  change  is  never  easy. 
Great  courage  and  understanding  is  required  to 
accommodate  to  change.  The  common  good  often 
is  achieved  only  with  the  temporary  inconvenience 
of  the  few,  although  in  the  long  run  all  will  bene- 
fit in  greater  proportion.  But  both  the  few  and 
the  many  must  in  justice  be  heard.  At  such  times 
it  is  often  difficult  to  see  the  demarcation  between 
justice  and  customary  privilege  and  between  newly 


693 


\ 


won  rights  and  understandable  but  overreaching 
zeal  for  reform. 

In  all  of  this  period  of  transition,  timing  will  be 
of  the  essence.  Almost  without  exception,  the  goal 
of  an  interracial  society  and  government  by  the 
consent  of  the  governed  is  an  accepted  policy.  But 
the  rate  and  method  of  realization  of  this  goal 
vary  greatly.  The  great  challenge  to  the  West  is 
to  accommodate  this  rate  to  the  realities  and  many- 
faceted  justice  of  the  situation. 

In  a  movement  where  there  are  few  rules,  there 
is  one  that  stands  out :  A  little  done  quickly  is  bet- 
ter than  much  done  too  late.  Thus  a  quick  and 
judicious  application  of  reform  may  effect  a  har- 
monious transition,  whereas  too  long  a  wait  may 
mean  revolution  rather  than  evolution. 

With  such  a  rule  one  might  think  policy  deter- 
mination would  be  almost  mathematically  easy. 
But  this  is  to  reckon  without  human  nature,  wliich 
understandably  clings,  often  in  desperation,  to 
the  rock  of  the  past- — even  when  it  is  being  en- 
gulfed by  the  waves  of  change — rather  than  leaps 
into  the  ship  of  the  future,  which  may  seem  a  tiny 
and  risky  craft  indeed. 

Alert  and  judicious  application  of  this  rule  for 
political  change,  nevertheless,  can  ease  the  peace- 
ful reconciliation  of  settler  and  indigenous  inter- 
ests in  these  areas  of  transition.  Such  a  reconcilia- 
tion could  have  a  beneficial  effect  on  the  current 
balance  of  forces  in  the  world  and  lay  the  ground- 
work for  a  future  of  productive  cooperation  be- 
tween the  former  metropoles  and  the  new  African 
nations.  The  alternative  could  well  be  a  decade 
of  severe  strife  and  bloodshed,  the  disruption  of 
cordial  and  profitable  African-European  rela- 
tions, and  a  total  loss  of  the  credit  won  thus  far 
by  the  wise  decolonization  policies  of  most  Euro- 
pean powers.  It  would  be  tragic  if  the  many  con- 
tributions the  white  man  can  make — and  has 
made — to  Africa  were  lost  by  his  forced 
withdrawal. 

This  contingency  is  one  reason  why  we  con- 
sider it  urgent  that  all  parties — including  the 
Asians,  wlio  are  a  considerable  factor  in  tliese 
areas — reach  a  common  ground  as  rapidly  as  pos- 
sible. We  believe  it  is  possible  for  all  the  peoples 
of  Africa  to  have  a  good  life  and  that  this  goal  is 


not  necessarily  in  conflict  with  the  desire  of  the 
majority  of  people  in  any  territory  for  self- 
determination.  T 

1 

The  Longrun  Future  | 

From  all  of  these  points  I  have  touched  upon 
tonight  it  should  be  apparent  that  I  am  generally 
optimistic  about  the  longrun  future  of  Africa. 
And  I  believe  that  our  nation's  position  of  leader- 
ship in  world  affairs  requires  that  we  take  a  posi- 
tive role  to  help  Africa  develop  in  peace  and 
freedom. 

It  is  also  my  hope  that  we  will  continue  to  be 
wise  enough  to  keep  our  eyes  on  the  long  pull  and 
not  be  dismayed  by  temporary  disappointments, 
misunderstandings,  or  perhaps  even  setbacks.  In 
the  formulation  of  American  foreign  policy  in 
Africa  we  must  have  vision  and  think  of  the 
African  countries,  as  I  have  tried  to  do  tonight, 
in  terms  of  what  we — and  they — hope  these  na- 
tions will  be  in  the  future.  We  must  continue  to 
envisage  the  dynamic  contribution  to  the  free- 
world  system  which  these  nations  passionately 
desire  to  make. 

In  my  opinion  the  future  will  see  a  strong  and 
vigorous  Africa — an  Africa  that  can  deal  with 
the  rest  of  the  world  in  complete  equality.  I  be- 
lieve the  future  will  see  an  Africa  united  in  its 
dedication  to  the  advancement  of  human  civiliza- 
tion, an  Africa  that  has  an  important  influence  in 
broadening  and  leavening  men's  minds  every- 
where, an  Africa  that  lives  at  peace  with  its  neigh- 
bors and  makes  positive  contributions  to  the  se- 
curity and  stability  of  the  world. 

As  Africa  gets  to  know  us  better,  and  as  we  get: 
to  know  the  countries  of  Africa  better,  I  am  con- 
vinced that  existing  bonds  of  friendship  will  be 
strengthened  and  new  ones  created  which  will  be 
of  great  benefit  to  future  generations. 

For  we  are  not  building  for  today  and  tomorrow 
alone;  we  are  building  toward  the  establishment  of 
an  enduring  community  of  nations  living  together 
in  peace,  prosperity,  and  freedom.  And  we  are^ 
most  anxious  to  speed  the  day  when  the  dynamic 
nations  of  Africa  will  reside  in  that  community 
as  fully  developed  partners. 


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Department  of  State  Bulletin 


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INESCO  and  U.S.  Policy:  High  Hopes  and  a  Hard  Looi< 


Following  are  texts  of  addresses  made  hy  Lucius 
D.  Battle,  Assistant  Secretary  for  Educational  and 
Cultural  Affairs,  and  Harlan  Cleveland,  Assistant 
Secretary  for  International  Organization  Affairs, 
before  the  U.S.  National  Commission  for 
UNESCO  at  Pittsburgh,  Pa.,  on  October  12. 

I. 

?lADDRESS  BY  MR.  BATTLE 

ftli 

Press  release  616  dated  October  11,  for  release  October  12 

This  is  the  first  time  I  have  had  the  opportunity 
formally  to  address  the  National  Commission  for 
UNESCO  since  I  briefly  met  with  you  at  your 
last  session.  I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  meet 
with  you  again. 

Over  the  years  this  Commission  has  made  sig- 
nificant contributions  to  shaping  our  role  in 
UNESCO,  including  our  position  for  the  impor- 
tant General  Conference  which  opens  in  Paris  next 
month.  I  want  to  take  this  opportunity  to  thank 
you  very  sincerely  for  the  constructive  suggestions 
and  advice  which  you  have  given  us,  to  report  to 
you  on  the  steps  we  in  the  Government  have  taken 
since  your  last  meeting,  and  to  discuss  with  you 
the  general  line  we  plan  to  take  at  the  General 
Conference.  I  can  assure  you  that  we  are  going 
to  Paris  conscious  more  than  ever  of  the  vital 
mission  UNESCO  can  play  in  the  world  today 
and  of  the  continued  leaderehip  the  United  States 
must  exert  in  that  organization. 

UNESCO  today  faces  unprecedented  chal- 
lenges. The  newly  developing  countries  need 
massive  programs  of  education  and  training  to 
develop  their  human  resources.  This  need  was 
implicit  in  the  resolution  ^  unanimously  adopted 
by  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  last  year  designat- 
ing the  1960's  as  the  U.N.  Development  Decade. 
Indeed,  it  was  the  President  of  the  United  States 
who  prompted  this  joint  pledge  to  wipe  out  man- 


kind's present  plagues — poverty,  ignorance,  and 
disease.^ 

UNESCO  should  play  a  crucial  role  in  this  most 
promising  project.  We  would  all  agree  that  a 
country  can  develop  and  progress  only  as  fast  and 
effectively  as  it  can  build  its  human  resources 
through  education  and  training.  This  higlily  sig- 
nificant conclusion — that  people  provide  the  prime 
ingredient  for  progress — was  pointed  up  at 
UNESCO  meetings  in  Addis  Ababa,  Tokyo,  and 
Santiago  during  the  last  year  and  a  half.  The 
historic  declaration  ^  adopted  at  Santiago  last 
March  emphasized  that  the  next  decade  will  be  a 
crucial  period  in  Latin  America  in  that  it  will 
decide  whether  or  not  an  anticipated  300  million 
people  will  or  will  not  be  able  to  obtain  higher 
living  standards  and  enjoy  the  benefits  of  tech- 
nical and  cultural  standaixls  "imder  .  .  .  liberty 
and  the  institutions  of  representative  democracy." 
Similar  declarations  emerged  from  the  delibera- 
tions at  Addis  Ababa  and  Tokyo. 

Redirection  of  Program  Needed 

UNESCO  must  be  responsive  to  these  new 
needs;  but  to  accomplish  its  mission  in  the  years 
ahead,  the  organization  must  redirect  its  program 
along  lines  that  contribute  directly  to  the  objec- 
tives of  the  Development  Decade. 

On  the  basis  of  a  careful  study  of  UNESCO's 
proposed  program  and  budget  for  1963-64  (and  I 
might  add  that  we  in  the  Department  of  State  are 
trying  to  make  a  more  careful  study  of  the  pro- 
grams and  budgets  of  all  the  specialized  agencies 
of  the  U.N.  than  we  have  done  in  the  past),  we 
have  found  that  sufficient  recognition  has  not  been 
given  to  the  kind  of  redirection  we  have  in  mind. 
The  proposed  program  does  not,  for  example, 
sufficiently  recognize  the  vital  educational  needs 


^U.N.  doc.  A/RES/1710(XVI). 
^Novemfae^  5,   J  962 


'  For  text  of  an  address  by  President  Kennedy  before 
the  16th  session  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  on  Sept. 
25, 1961,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  16,  1961,  p.  619. 

'  For  text,  see  UNESCO  doc.  12  C/PRG/16. 


695 


of  the  Development  Decade,  nor  does  it,  for  that 
matter,  adequately  reflect  the  mandate  of  the  lltli 
General  Conference  to  give  top  priority  to  educa- 
tion. The  proposed  budget  -n-ould  extend  the 
general  level  of  increases  in  education  and  related 
programs  to  almost  all  phases  of  the  UNESCO 
operation,  with  the  result  that  the  existing  prolif- 
eration of  UNESCO  activities  would  be  continued. 
In  this  connection  you  will  recall  that  in  your  re- 
port on  your  April  meeting  you  stated  that  "there 
was  a  consensus  that  UNESCO  should  establish 
priorities  among  its  manifold  activities  and  work 
toward  a  greater  concentration  of  effort  in  a  more 
limited  nmnber  of  fields  in  which  it  is  uniquely 
qualified  to  render  service,  rather  than  permitting 
its  resources  to  be  spread  too  thinly  over  a  multi- 
tude of  proliferating  projects."  I  heartily  en- 
dorse this  view. 

"We  all  recognize,  of  course,  that  the  UNESCO 
program  must  grow.  The  question  is,  how  and  in 
what  direction?  We  do  not  accept  the  principle 
that  such  growth  must  be  across  the  board.  More- 
over, we  feel  very  keenly  that  the  rate  of  growth 
must  not  exceed  the  management  capabilities  of 
UNESCO  and  that  the  budget  increase  must  not 
be  so  high  as  to  impose  unreasonable  demands  on 
member  states. 

In  applying  to  the  proposed  budget  the  criteria 
which  I  have  just  mentioned,  the  Department  has 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  UNESCO  budget 
level  for  1963-64  should  provide  for  an  increase 
of  $5.5  million  or  17  percent  over  the  1961-62 
biennium.  Such  an  increase  would  result  in  a 
budget  level  of  $38  million  for  the  next  biennium 
instead  of  the  budget  of  $40,884  million  proposed 
by  the  Acting  Director  General.  The  $38  million 
level  would,  in  our  view,  permit  the  organization 
to  carry  out  all  ongoing  and  new  programs  which 
in  our  judgment  are  necessary  and  desirable. 

U.S.  Position  on  Revised  Program 

Inasmuch  as  the  budget  level  proposed  by  the 
United  States  would  require  some  curtailment  of 
program  items  of  lesser  or  marginal  usefulness, 
we  recommended  at  the  Executive  Board  meeting 
that  the  Acting  Director  General  reexamine  tlic 
budget  with  a  view  to  eliminating  or  cutting  back 
such  activities  and  that  he  be  asked  to  revise  the 
program  within  a  $38  million  ceiling.  As  a  matter 
of  general  guidance  in  connection  with  such  reex- 

696 


I 


amination,  we  suggested  that  a  close  examination 
be  made  of  the  following  areas  where,  in  our  view, 
substantial  cutbacks  could  be  made  without  sacri- 
ficing any  of  the  essential  elements  of  the  program. 

First,  we  believe  UNESCO  should  hold  fewer 
meetings  and  restrict  these  to  topics  of  genuine 
importance.  The  proposed  program  of  UNESCO 
calls  for  125  meetings  at  a  cost  exceeding  $3 
million.  Fewer  meetings  would  give  the  secre- 
tariat and  member  governments  more  time  to  pre- 
pare for  them  and  adequately  to  assess  the  results. 

Secondly,  we  consider  that  the  time  has  come 
for  UNESCO  to  determine  whether  the  nongov- 
ernmental organizations  which  it  has  subsidized 
for  many  years  can — at  least  in  some  instances — 
become  self-sustaining  and  whether  or  not 
UNESCO  support,  if  necessary,  might  take  the 
form  of  contracts  for  specific  services  instead  of 
general  subsidies.  "Wliile  there  is  no  question  of 
the  usefulness  of  most  of  these  organizations,  it  is 
significant  to  point  out  that  the  drain  on 
UNESCO  for  this  type  of  support  has  now  risen 
to  $1.5  million;  and  unless  alternative  ways  are 
found  to  put  these  organizations  on  a  more  self- 
sustaining  basis,  they  will  never  achieve  the  inde- 
pendent status  which  we  consider  desirable. 

Third,  while  we  were  pleased  to  note  that  the 
Acting  Director  General  has  placed  time  limits  on 
support  of  regional  institutes  and  centers,  we  be- 
lieve that  UNESCO  should,  in  most  cases,  try  to 
phase  out  its  support  at  dates  earlier  than  those 
proposed  by  the  Acting  Director  General. 
UNESCO's  proper  role  with  respect  to  such 
centers  and  institutes  is  to  provide  initial  financial 
support  based  on  the  assumption  that,  if  the  proj- 
ect is  worth  while  and  of  value  to  member  states, 
the  states  receiving  the  service  will  eventually! 
assume  full  responsibility  for  its  support.  If  th( 
centers  and  institutes  do  not  develop  to  the  point 
of  obvious  usefulness  to  the  states  in  question,  it  is 
fair  to  conclude  they  should  be  phased  out. 

Fourth,  in  our  opinion  some  activities  ol' 
UNESCO  fall  more  properly  witliin  the  scopt 
of  other  agencies  such  as  the  Food  and  Agricul- 
ture Organization,  the  World  Health  Organiza- 
tion, and  the  International  Labor  Organization 
Similarly,  there  may  be  activities  of  these  or 
ganizations  which  fall  within  the  purview  o: 
UNESCO.  Shifting  these  activities  to  when 
they  belong  should  eliminate  imdesirable  compe 

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tition  and  duplication  of  efforts  and  should  pro- 
duce some  savings. 

Fifth,  we  consider  that  UNESCO  shoidd  aban- 
don activities  such  as  youth  conferences,  tenden- 
tious ijublications,  and  those  seminars  which  lead 
to  polemics  i-ather  than  scholarly  results.  The 
question  is  not  only  one  of  cost  but  one  of  integrity, 
for  UNESCO's  standards  of  scholarship,  like 
Caesar's  wife,  must  be  above  suspicion.  A  special 
committee  of  your  commission  has  been  working 
on  the  difficult  problem  of  what  the  UNESCO 
publications  policy  shoidd  be,  and  their  views,  I 
am  sure,  will  be  most  useful  in  our  efforts  to  help 
UNESCO  establish  a  sounder  policy  in  this  field. 

In  suggesting  that  UNESCO  endeavor  to 
tighten  up  its  programs,  our  objective  is  to  try 
to  help  UNESCO  become  a  sounder,  more  effec- 
tive, and  even  more  helpful  organization  than  it 
has  been  in  the  past. 

The  U.S.  position,  as  I  have  outlined  it,  found 
immediate  and  wholehearted  support  from  the 
United  Kingdom  and  New  Zealand,  both  of  which 
had  gone  through  a  somewhat  similar  exercise  and 
had  come  to  about  the  same  conclusions.  As  a 
result  of  this  support,  and  the  support  of  like- 
minded  delegations,  it  was  possible  to  get  through 
the  Executive  Board  a  resolution  to  the  General 
Conference  along  the  lines  of  the  U.S.  position. 

Although  the  margin  of  victory  was  slim,  the 
U.S.  delegation  viewed  the  Executive  Board  action 
as  highly  significant  in  that  it  marked  one  of  the 
first  indications  of  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  the 
Executive  Board  to  exert  itself  as  a  true  policy- 
making body  in  the  field  of  program  and  budget. 

Much  remains  to  be  done  if  we  are  to  have  the 
General  Conference  approve  our  overall  position 
on  the  program  and  budget.  We  hope  for  the 
support  of  other  governments  for  a  $38  million 
budget  ceiling  and  the  needed  program  revisions 
I  have  outlined.  Also  we  are  hopeful  that  some 
of  the  marginal  activities  of  the  organization  will 
be  eliminated  or  curtailed  in  revisions  which  the 
Acting  Director  General  has  been  requested  by  the 
Executive  Board  to  propose  and  submit  to  the 
General  Conference. 

Highlights  of  Tasks  Ahead 

As  you  know,  a  new  Director  General  will  be 
elected  by  the  General  Conference  next  month. 
The  present  Acting  Director  General,  Kene  Ma- 


Ijglii  November  5,   1962 


I 


heu  of  France,  has  received  the  nomination  of  the 
Executive  Board.  Whoever  the  choice  of  the 
General  Conference  may  be,  the  new  Director  Gen- 
eral must  and  will  receive  the  full  support  of  the 
United  States  in  facing  the  arduous  tasks  ahead. 
I  would  like  in  the  final  few  minutes  to  hijrhlight 
wliat  I  believe  some  of  these  tasks  to  be. 

The  first  and  foremost  challenge  is  the  need  for 
educational  development  which,  as  I  have  said,  is 
at  tlie  heart  of  the  Development  Decade.  We 
should  have  no  doubt  about  the  scale  of  the  need. 
One  African  country  alone  has  estimated  that  it 
will  need  20,000  teachers  to  achieve  primary  uni- 
versal education  during  the  next  20  years,  a  goal 
set  by  the  African  countries  themselves  at  the 
Addis  Ababa  conference  last  year.  The  Asian 
countries  have  estimated  that  they  will  need  to 
train  8  million  new  teachers  by  1980.  These  needs 
can  be  met  only  by  a  concerted  international 
effort. 

UNESCO  must  face  up  to  the  implications  of 
the  expanding  frontier  of  science  in  other  areas. 
Among  the  prospects  held  out  to  us  by  scientists 
are  new  sources  of  water,  power,  and  natui-al  re- 
soui'ces;  desalinization  of  ocean  water;  reclaiming 
the  deserts;  exploring  systematically  the  charac- 
ter of  the  oceans  and  studying  ways  in  which  their 
potential  can  be  more  fully  utilized  for  the  benefit 
of  mankind;  harnessing  solar  energy  for  power; 
early  earthquake  detection;  and  the  enormous 
problem  of  providing  water  for  growing  popula- 
tions. All  such  research  henceforth  will  be  un- 
thinkable without  international  cooperation,  for 
such  research  covering  vast  stretches  of  land,  the 
ocean,  or  outer  space  also  affects  the  livelihood  of 
peoples  across  boundaries  and  is  in  many  cases 
too  costly  for  any  one  country  to  undertake. 

In  this  short  discussion  I  have  tried  to  i-eview 
with  you  our  interests  in  UNESCO  and  our  ob- 
jectives at  the  coming  General  Conference  to  make 
UNESCO  an  ever  more  vital  foi'ce  for  man's  im- 
provement, today  and  also  tomorrow.  Indeed  it 
is  not  too  early  to  start  thinking  of  priorities 
and  concrete  proposals  for  the  General  Confer- 
ences of  1964  and  1966.  In  our  concern  for  the 
immediate,  we  must  not  ignore  the  long  range  in 
the  planning  of  UNESCO's  program.  In  conclu- 
sion let  me  assure  you  again  of  the  faitli  of  your 
Government  in  UNESCO  and  of  the  strong  sup- 
port it  is  determined  to  give  to  the  improvement 

697 


I 


and  revitalization  of  these  programs  in  whose  be- 
half you  are  giving  so  unsparingly  of  your  own 
efforts. 

ADDRESS  BY  MR.  CLEVELAND 

Press  release  619  dated  October  12 

This  morning  you  heard  some  plain  words  from 
Luke  Battle  about  the  hard  facts  of  financing 
UNESCO.  I  think  my  colleague  has  made  it  clear 
that  the  United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific 
and  Cultural  Organization  is  not  unloved  and 
will  not  be  undone  by  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment. We  consider  UNESCO  a  priceless  and 
irreplaceable  organization.  That  is  why  we  are 
determined  that  it  shall  not  become  a  catchall 
agency,  a  refuge  for  dilettantism,  a  repository 
for  the  tag  ends  of  operations  of  other  agencies — 
or,  as  Kipling  said,  "a  sort  of  a  bloomin'  cosmop- 
olouse." 

To  some,  however,  the  United  States  intention 
to  hold  down  the  proliferation  of  UNESCO  activ- 
ities and  concentrate  especially  on  its  education 
program  may  sound  tightfisted  or  even  negative. 
It  is  tightfisted.  But  it  is  also  an  affirmative  ap- 
proach, consistent  with  the  practical  policy  we 
are  trying  to  apply  across  the  board  in  the  field 
of  international  organizations. 

UNESCO  is  one  of  the  dozen  and  one  special- 
ized agencies  of  the  United  Nations.  It  is  one 
of  the  51  international  organizations  to  which  the 
United  States  belongs  and  to  which  it  regularly 
pays  dues. 

The  policy  of  this  administration  toward  all  of 
these  organizations  is  to  try  to  see  that  they  un- 
derstand their  mission  the  same  way  we  under- 
stand it,  that  they  know  how  to  do  their  job  and 
are  equipped  to  do  it.  There  is  nothing  simple 
about  this  policy,  and,  of  course,  there  is  no  end 
to  its  pursuit. 

It  is  hard  work  and  costs  us  more  than  $200 
million  a  year. 

Why  U.S.  Belongs  to  International  Organizations 

Then  why  do  we  do  it?  Why  do  we  belong 
and  contribute  to  51  organizations  ? 

The  answer — to  be  quite  blunt  about  it — is  na- 
tional self-interest.  International  organizations 
often  can  do  what  we  would  like  to  see  done  but 
cannot  do  as  well  on  our  own.    They  also  can  do 


698 


some  things  more  cheaply — and  we  can  get  others 
to  help,  too.  Sensitive  new  countries,  and  their 
sensitive  new  leaders,  often  prefer  to  get  advice 
on  sensitive  topics  from  an  expert  who  represents 
all  nations,  and  therefore  represents  no  nation. 
Moreover,  UNESCO  and  the  other  big  interna- 
tional agencies  can  fish  in  a  worldwide  talent  pool 
and  come  up  with  useful  combinations  of  people 
and  skills. 

The  returns  we  expect  as  Americans  from  in- 
ternational organizations  are  not  so  different  in 
kind  from,  let  us  say,  the  protection  Belgium  ex- 
pects to  receive  from  NATO  or  the  capital  input 
Pakistan  seeks  from  the  World  Bank  or  the  clean 
beaches  IMCO  [Intergovernmental  Maritime  Con- 
sultative Organization]  may  be  expected  to  restore 
to  the  United  Kingdom  or  the  peace  of  mind  the 
IAEA  [International  Atomic  Energy  Agency] 
should  provide  the  neighbors  of  a  country  experi- 
menting with  atomic  fission.  These  are  all  legiti- 
mate national  interests,  all  beyond  the  limits  of 
what  national  power  can  achieve  by  itself. 

Does  self-interest  seem  somehow  out  of  place 
when  we  talk  about  international  organizations? 
If  so,  perhaps  Americans  have  been  overindulging 
in  the  national  pastime  of  pretending  to  be  an 
altruistic  duck  instead  of  an  honest  swan. 

Perhaps  we  have  been  persuading  ourselves  that 
our  contributions  to  UNESCO  and  half  a  hun- 
dred other  multilateral  agencies  are  made  in  an 
annual  fit  of  generosity.  They  are  not.  Nobody 
in  the  world  thinks  we're  generous,  so  let  us  not 
kid  ourselves  about  the  matter.  We  pay  our  dues 
to  these  many  international  clubs  because  we  find 
them  useful  to  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United 
States.  We  want  malaria  eradicated,  we  want 
refugees  cared  for,  we  want  children  educated, 
we  want  a  world  weather  watch,  we  want  a  sys- 
tem of  allocating  radio  frequencies,  we  want  food 
transferred  in  an  orderly  way  from  where  it  is 
abundant  to  where  it  is  scarce.  Above  all,  we 
want  to  make  the  free  world  hum  with  prosperity 
and  development,  secure  against  aggression  and 
growing  in  freedom  for  the  individual. 

Very  quietly  and  almost  without  calculation  the 
free  world  is  devising  the  rudimentary  machinery 
for  its  material  salvation.  Even  with  allowance 
made  for  the  familiar  boycotts  and  abstentions  of 
the  Communist  regimes,  the  members  of  the 
United  Nations  are  now  engaged  in  a  staggering 
varict}^  of  efforts. 

Deparfment  of  Stafe  Bulletin 


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We  are  trying,  through  international  organiza- 
tions, to  do  these  things : 

— to  eliminate  war  through  collective  security 
agreements,  sophisticated  peacemakmg  and  peace- 
keeping machinery,  procedures  for  peaceful 
change  and  eventual  progress  in  arms  control ; 

— to  curtail  disease  and  hunger  at  an  unprece- 
dented rate  through  an  international  offensive 
against  their  causes; 

— to  apply  the  benefits  of  science  and  technology 
through  cooperation  in  such  matters  as  transport, 
communications,  and  meteorology  and  the  ex- 
change of  Imowledge  through  technical  assistance 
programs  and  private  agreements  on  patents  and 
know-how ; 

— to  achieve  an  international  commercial,  fiscal, 
and  monetary  system — stable  enough  and  flexible 
enough  to  accommodate  all  nations  who  wish  to 
take  part ; 

— to  transfer  enough  private  and  public  capital 
to  provide  developing  economies  with  the  marginal 
resources  required  for  eventual  self-sustaining 
growth ; 

— to  help  traditional  societies  evolve  into  na- 
tional societies  that  understand  the  usefulness  of 
international  cooperation. 

"Coordination"  and  "Country  Programing" 

As  far  as  the  U.N.  family  of  agencies  is  con- 
cerned, the  current  effort  to  move  forward  on  all 
fronts,  in  what  Secretary  Rusk  calls  the  struggle 
between  the  world  of  free  choice  and  the  world  of 
coercion,  is  summed  up  in  the  bright  symbol  of 
the  United  Nations  Decade  of  Development.  It 
is  easy  to  forget  in  the  heat  of  the  debates  over  the 
Congo  or  disarmament  or  Berlin  that  more  than 
three  out  of  four  men  and  women  employed  in  the 
United  Nations  system — and  the  vast  proportion 
of  the  budgets  of  the  United  Nations,  budgets 
which  now  exceed  half  a  billion  dollars — are  de- 
voted to  very  practical  work,  like  the  work  of 
UNESCO. 

The  bugle  calls  are  "coordination"  and  "coun- 
try programing,"  which  have  a  rather  bureau- 
cratic sound.  The  trouble  with  the  U.N.  system 
is  the  trouble  with  all  large-scale  organizations  in 
our  time :  too  much  specialization,  not  enough  at- 
tention to  "making  a  mesh  of  things." 

Those  who  work  with  one  agency  in  the  sys- 
tem—whether it  be  UNESCO,  or  WHO  [World 


Health  Organization],  or  ILO  [International 
Labor  Organization],  or  FAO  [Food  and  Agri- 
culture Organization] — are  often  reluctant  to  see 
themselves  as  part  of  a  whole.  We  live  today  for 
better  or  worse  in  the  age  of  imbridled  sovereignty, 
and  sovereignty  is  not  just  a  "felt  need"  of  na- 
tions ;  it  seems  to  be  a  "felt  need"  of  bureaucracies 
too — even  of  bureaucracies  dedicated  to  the  build- 
mg  of  an  international  order  where  national  sov- 
ereignty is  mellowed  and  tempered  through 
international  cooperation.  No  person — and  no  ad- 
ministrator— likes  to  see  himself  as  a  satellite. 
And  to  a  large  extent  this  is  well  and  good  even 
in  the  arenas  of  international  cooperation.  After 
all,  each  of  the  screaming  needs  of  mankind, 
whether  it  be  health,  education,  agriculture,  or 
the  special  needs  of  children  or  science — each 
needs  strong  and  articulate  advocates  to  make  sure 
that,  in  the  competition  for  scarce  resources,  no 
particular  need  is  totally  neglected. 

At  the  same  time,  resources  are  scarce — human 
resources  no  less  than  material  and  financial  re- 
sources. The  test  of  our  survival — the  prerequi- 
site for  a  future  less  torn  with  tension  and  less 
preoccupied  with  poverty — depends  more  and 
more  on  the  efficiency  and  the  effectiveness  with 
which  we  use  our  scarce  resources,  human  and 
otherwise.  Advocacy  alone  cannot  do  more  than 
illustrate  the  hard  choices  we  must  make. 

If  I  were  to  characterize  the  major  challenge 
to  the  United  States  in  the  U.N.  system  today,  I 
would  say  that  it  was  not  so  much  the  subversive 
tactics  of  the  Communists  as  it  was  the  growing 
pains  of  a  system  of  world  organizations  whose 
practice  is  too  slowly  and  too  often  awkwardly 
beginning  to  live  up  to  its  promise. 

That  is  why,  at  this  point  in  the  strategy,  it  is 
imperative  that  priorities  be  rigidly  assigned  and 
that  the  greatest  concentrations  of  men,  material, 
and  money  be  placed  at  the  points  of  greatest  need. 
It  is  imnecessary  to  remind  you  that  educational 
needs  are  the  greatest  of  all.  If  there  is  one  les- 
son we  have  learned  in  the  short  and  turbulent 
history  of  our  foreign  aid  program,  it  is  that  the 
prime  bottleneck  in  development  is  not  money  or 
goods  but  trained  people  and  the  social  institu- 
tions which  can  be  built  only  by  people,  not  by 
machinery  or  capital. 

It  is  also  unnecessary  to  tell  you  that  the  United 
States  is,  of  course,  a  sponsor,  leader,  and  chief 
contributor  to  the  Decade.     This  is  an  American 


*"a  UoMQmhet  5,   1962 


699 


policy  and  a  good  one — good  enough  to  have  called 
forth  the  support  of  almost  the  entire  world.  No 
less  than  ourselves,  otlier  nations  realize  they  will 
be  safer  in  a  world  that  has  come  to  grips  witli  its 
problems  and  is  busy  doing  something  about  them. 

U.S.  Support  Premised  on  Achievement 

Tiie  American  people  and  the  American  Con- 
gress have  just  given  fresh  evidence  that  they  will 
support  this  program  wholeheartedly  when  they 
are  convinced  that  it  has  both  direction  and  pur- 
pose. The  Congress  has  just  taken  two  important 
decisions  that  affect  international  organizations. 
The  first  is  well  known.  The  United  Nations 
loan  act  confounded  every  pollster  and  pundit 
when  it  received  the  approval  of  the  Senate  by  a 
vote  of  more  than  three  to  one  and  the  House'  of 
Representatives  by  a  vote  of  almost  two  to  one. 
Some  interesting  theories  have  been  put  forward 
to  explain  this  lopsided  vote  that  not  even  the  best 
of  the  professional  analysts  of  congressional  opin- 
ion came  close  to  predicting. 

I  find  the  outcome  less  baffling  than  the  profes- 
sional theories  suggest.  The  record  of  the  liear- 
ings  of  the  four  committees  that  considered  the 
bond  proposal  and  the  copies  of  the  Congressional 
Record  for  the  5  days  of  House  and  Senate  debate 
on  the  bill  are  in  my  opinion — my  professional, 
even  professorial,  opinion — the  most  complete 
and  relevant  textbook  ever  assembled  on  United 
States  policy  with  regard  to  that  interesting  new 
frontier,  the  limited  use  of  international  peace- 
keeping force.  It  is  also  one  of  the  cheapest. 
Brought  to  a  quick  vote,  the  bond  bill  migl^t  well 
have  failed  miserably  a  year  ago,  but  when  Con- 
gress took  the  time  to  thoroughly  examine  it  in 
terms  of  American  self-interest,  the  proposal 
passed  the  test  and  the  issue  was  settled  by  lop- 
sided votes  in  both  Houses. 

The  same  thing  happened  to  a  set  of  appropria- 
tions tliat  received  almost  no  public  attention  but 
were  carefully  reviewed  by  Congress.  This 
money,  for  contributions  to  international  organi- 
zations, was  more  than  twice  the  amount  of  the 
U.N.  loan.  Everj-thing  the  President  requested 
was  granted.  Most  of  it  was  part  of  the  foreign 
aid  bill,  the  only  part  that  emerged  unscathed 
from  congressional  cuts. 

Again  I  believe  the  reason  lies  in  the  recognition 
that  these  organizations  are  carrying  out  Ameri- 


can aims  beyond  the  reach  of  American  power, 
that  they  are  no  more  and  no  less  than  a  most  effi- 
cient means  for  exercising  American  power  for  an 
American  purpose.  It  is  true  that  the  purpose 
happens  to  be  the  betterment  of  the  human  condi- 
tion, which  yet  retains  a  certain  popularity,  but  the 
achievement  of  this  purpose  is  no  more  safe  or 
certain  for  all  its  ethical  content.  It  requires  the 
same  care  and  hard  bargaining  as  the  most  exact- 
ing business  transaction.  And  it  is  no  less  profit- 
able. International  organizations,  particularly 
the  specialized  agencies  of  the  United  Nations,  are 
not  international  fraternities  or  learned  societies 
and  will  not  be  supported  as  such. 

If  there  are  fewer  people  today  who  regard  the 
United  Nations  system  with  the  sentimentality 
that  one  might  lavish  on  his  favorite  charity,  there 
are  also  fewer  people  who  see  in  every  act  of  the 
organization  the  hand  of  a  dark  conspiracy  di- 
rected at  themselves.  Americans  instead  are  be- 
ginning to  accept  the  United  Nations  system  as  a 
vital  working  part  of  international  diplomacy — 
one  which  deserves  to  be  taken  seriously  and  to  be 
regarded  with  professional  care. 

Reviewing  U.S.  Participation  in  U.N.  System  i 

Today  in  the  State  Department  we  are  asking 
searcliing  questions  about  our  participation  in  the 
U.N.  system,  which  have  not,  I'm  afraid,  been  se- 
riously asked  since  the  Second  World  War.  We 
are  looking  hard  not  only  at  the  program,  staffing, 
and  financing  of  UNESCO  but  at  that  of  every 
member  of  the  U.N.  constellation. 

Each  project  no  matter  how  small  will  be  ex- 
ammed  to  insure  tliat  its  priority  is  genuine  and 
that  it  can  be  coordinated  with  the  programs  of 
other  agencies,  particularly  with  our  own  foreign 
aid  efforts.  Wo  plan  a  radical  approach  to  the 
selection  of  staff  members,  to  the  recruitment  of 
Americans  for  service  where  they  are  needed,  and 
to  standards  of  performance  in  what  is  in  princi- 
ple, and  must  become  in  practice,  the  finest  and 
proudest  form  of  public  service  in  the  world. 

Finally,  we  are  determined  to  streamline  the 
policymaking  macliinery  within  our  own  Govern- 
ment and  to  raise  the  level  of  coordination  of  our 
policies  with  those  of  other  nations  until  it  is 
equal  to  that  achieved  for  the  most  important  po- 
litical issues  before  the  U.N.  General  Assembly — 
which  is  simply  not  the  case  today.     In  the  end  we 


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anticipate  the  equivalent  of  flow  sheets  and  con- 
tinuous audits  of  what  tlie  agencies  are  doing, 
liow  well  they  are  doing  it,  and  what  is  being  over- 
looked or  neglected  and  where  the  remedy  lies. 

To  help  review  these  matters  we  are  calling 
n  the  most  experienced  minds  from  business,  the 
irofessions,  and  from  the  agencies  themselves. 

"Wlien  it  comes  to  making  up  our  own  minds  on 
hese  matters,  there  are  certain  guidelines  we  will 
"ollow.  We  do  not  regard  the  specialized  agencies 
)f  the  U.N.  system  in  the  way  the  Communists 
lo — as  forums  for  either  propaganda  or  for  short- 
im  political  advantage.  We  have  a  record  of 
erious  concern  for  the  effectiveness  of  these  or- 
!:anizations  which  cannot  and  will  not  be  dis- 
arded  in  favor  of  doing  as  the  Communists  do. 
Uit  we  will — and  do — defend  sense  against  non- 
ense  and  will  continue  to  turn  back  the  political 
allies  of  the  Communists. 

Furthermore,  we  have  come  to  regard  the  spe- 
ialized  agencies  more  and  more  as  operating 
.gencies,  rather  than  as  discussion  groups  or  places 
n  which  to  conduct  professional  research.  More 
,nd  more  we  expect  the  specialized  agencies  to 
dentify  themselves  with  successful  field  proj- 
cts — particularly  in  the  less  developed  countries — ■ 
,nd  not  merely  with  successful  committee  meetings 
-t  headquarters.  This  bias  is  dictated  by  the 
imes ;  in  these  days  governments  cannot  afford  to 
evote  scarce  resources  to  organizations  which 
either  spin  nor  weave. 

The  risks  and  responsibilities  of  multilateral 
[iplomacy  are  certainly  high  among  the  most  ex- 
iting prospects  on  the  world  horizon  today.  As 
lore  nations  join  the  U.N.  system  the  promise  will 
IS  (I  ticrease  with  the  complexity.  It  is  not  surprising 
hat,  in  an  agency  like  UNESCO,  where  11  mem- 
ers  pay  70  percent  of  the  budget  and  95  others 
lay  only  30  percent,  there  is  a  need  for  constant 
igilance  on  budget  and  program.  It  is  also  not 
urprising  that  the  money  these  11  nations  spend 
an  accomplish  things  that  they  themselves  could 
ever  do  directly. 
These  are  the  normal  "nonsurprises"  of  multi- 
iteral  diplomacy.  We  in  the  Government,  you 
7ho  advise  us,  and  the  rest  of  responsible  Ameri- 
ans  will  have  to  develop  the  sophistication  to 
laster  this  new  kind  of  diplomacy,  to  learn  new 
ays  of  not  being  surprised.     As  we  move  along 


'ei?. 


ito 


•lilt!' 


0 


1  this  decade  and  on  to  the  next,  we  will  have 


ovember  5,   J  962 


time  to  prepare  ourselves  for  the  biggest  "non- 
surprise"  of  all  time,  the  triumph  of  freedom. 

President  Kennedy  Accepts  Soviet 
Congratulations  on  Space  Flight 

Following  is  an  exchange  of  messages  between 
President  Kennedy  and  Nikita  Khnoshchev, 
Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  the 
U.S.S.R. 

White  House  press  release  (Detroit,  Mich.)  dated  October  6 
President  Kennedy  to  Chairman  Khrushchev 

October  5, 1962 
Dear  Mr.  Chairman  :  I  thank  you  and  the  So- 
viet people  on  behalf  of  the  iVmerican  people  for 
your  congratulations  on  Commander  Schirra's 
successful  space  flight.  Your  greetings  and  best 
wishes  have  been  conveyed  to  Commander  Schirra. 

John  F.  Kennedy 

Chairman    Khrushchev  to   President   Kennedy 

October  4,  1962 
Esteemed  Mr.  President  :  On  behalf  of  the  Soviet 
people  and  myself  personally,  I  am  happy  to  congratulate 
you  and  the  American  people  on  the  occasion  of  the  suc- 
cessful completion  of  the  flight  of  the  space  ship  with 
Cosmonaut  W.  Schirra.  Please  convey  cordial  greetings 
and    very    best    wishes    to    Cosmonaut-Airman    Walter 

Schirra. 

N.  Khrushchev 


Good-Will  Mission  From  Niger 
Visits  Washington 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Octo- 
ber 16  (press  release  626)  that  an  official  good- 
will mission  from  the  Eepublic  of  Niger,  led  by 
Yacouba  Djibo,  Minister  of  Rural  Economy, 
would  visit  Washington  beginning  October  17 
and  call  on  Secretary  of  State  Dean  Eusk  and 
other  Government  officials. 

The  three-man  delegation  from  the  west  Afri- 
can nation  includes  Mahamane  Dandobi,  First 
Vice  President  of  the  National  Assembly,  and 
Mahamane  Sanda,  a  deputy  in  the  Assembly. 
They  will  visit  Canada  and  several  Asian  and 
Near  Eastern  countries  before  returning  to  Niger. 

701 


U.S.  and  Canadian  Officials  Conclude 
Talks  on  Lumber  Industry  Problems 


JOINT  PRESS  STATEMENT 

Press  release  628  dated  October  17 

Officials  of  the  United  States  and  Canadian 
governments  today  concluded  two  days  of  dis- 
cussion at  Ottawa  on  present  and  future  problems 
confronting  the  North  American  softwood  lum- 
ber industries.  They  developed  further  the  sub- 
jects discussed  at  the  first  meeting  ^  relating  to 
the  position  of  the  softwood  lumber  industries  in 
Canada  and  the  United  States,  factors  currently 
affecting  the  two  industries,  and  the  outlook  for 
the  future,  both  short  and  long  term.  Industry 
representatives  from  the  two  countries  were  avail- 
able for  consultation. 

It  was  recognized  that  both  countries  have  a 
mutual  interest  in  a  satisfactory  resolution  of  the 
problems  facing  the  North  American  softwood 
lumber  industries.  It  was  agreed  that  an  ad  hoc 
joint  expert  working  group  of  government  offi- 
cials would  be  established  to  examine  coopera- 
tively such  matters  as  the  results  of  the  recent 
storm  on  the  Pacific  coast,  the  longer  term  North 
American  supply  and  demand  prospects  for  tim- 
ber resources,  wood  utilization  generally  and  mar- 
ket development. 

It  was  agreed  that  as  need  arose,  industry  rep- 
resentatives of  the  two  countries  would  be  con- 
sulted in  an  appropriate  manner. 

INDUSTRY  ADVISERS  TO  U.S.  DELEGATION 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  October 
11  (press  release  612)  that  six  representatives  of 
the  lumber  industry  had  been  invited  to  serve  as 
advisers  to  the  official  delegation  that  would  meet 
with  representatives  of  the  Canadian  Government 
in  Ottawa  on  October  16-17  to  continue  discussions 
on  the  export  of  Canadian  softwood  lumber  to  this 
country.  The  first  intergovernmental  session  was 
held  at  Ottawa  on  August  27-28  as  a  part  of  the 
President's  six-point  program  ^  to  assist  the  U.S. 
lumber  industiy. 


'  For  text  of  a  joint  statement,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept. 
24,  1962,  p.  464. 

'  For  text,  see  Wliite  House  press  release  dated  Jul.v  26, 
inr,2. 


702 


There  has  been  a  substantial  increase  recently 
in  the  volume  of  soft  lumber  coming  into  the 
United  States  from  Canada.  The  case  for  relief 
from  such  imports  is  being  considered  by  the 
Tariff  Commission  at  the  present  time. 

Invitations  have  gone  to :  C.  Cleveland  Edgett, 
executive  vice  president,  West  Coast  Lumbermen's 
Association,  Portland,  Oreg. ;  Horace  H.  Koessler, 
director,  Western  Pine  Association,  and  president, 
Intermountain  Lumber  Co.,  Missoula,  Mont.; 
Joseph  W.  McCracken,  executive  vice  president, 
Western  Forest  Industries  Association,  Portland, 
Oreg.;  W.  Scott  Shepherd,  president.  Southern 
Pine  Association,  and  president.  Lumber  River 
Manufacturing  Co.,  Lumberton,  N.C. ;  Arthur 
Temple,  Jr.,  president,  National  Lumber  Manu- 
facturers Association,  and  president,  Southern 
Pine  Lumber  Co.,  Diboll,  Tex.;  and  T.  Evans 
Wyckoff,  vice  president,  Seaboard  Lumber  Co., 
Seattle,  Wash. 

The  advisers  and  the  delegation  conferred  in 
Washington  on  October  15  at  the  Department  of 
Commerce.  The  delegation  was  headed  by  G. 
Griffith  Johnson,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
Economic  Affairs,  and  included  Assistant  Secre- 
tary of  Commerce  for  International  Affairs  Jack 
N.  Behrman  and  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  In- 
terior John  A.  Carver,  Jr. 


U.S.  Welcomes  Move  by  Greece 
To  Settle  Prewar  Debts 


y 


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recei 
origi 

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Department  Statement 


Press  release  631  dated  October  19 


If, 


The  United  States  Government  is  gratified  to 
leani  of  the  agreement  reached  between  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Greece  and  the  Foreign  Bondholders' 
Protective  Council  for  the  resumption  of  the  serv- 
ice of  the  Greek  prewar  private  dollar  external 
debt.  The  settlement  arrived  at  after  long  nego- 
tiations is  undoubtedly  an  important  step  along 
the  road  of  sound  economic  development.  By  re- 
moving this  major  obstacle  to  the  flow  of  private 
American  capital  into  Greece  and  opening  new 
avenues  of  financing  from  lending  institutions,  it 
will  afford  additional  stimulus  to  the  efforts  of 
the  Greek  people  toward  speeding  economic  ad- 
vancement of  their  country.  The  United  States 
Government,  which  has  taken  and  will  continue  to 
take  an  active  interest  in  the  economic  develop- 


Department  of  State  BuZ/ef/nlHoveig 


T!i 
issiir 
refe 


freei 
kiei 
itiict 
river 


teasoi 
uarla 

ei 
kk 

ap 
foreij 

on 
porta 
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loiint 


lem 


GoT' 


ment  of  Greece,  welcomes  the  agreement  as  widen- 
ing and  strengthening  prospects  of  progress  for 
the  Greek  nation. 


President  Withholds  Approval 

on  Bill  Relating  To  IVSarking  Duties 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  17 

Memorandum  of  Disafproval 

I  am  withholding  my  approval  from  H.R.  1616, 
"For  relief  of  Rickert  and  Laan,  Incorporated." 

In  1959,  the  beneficiary  company  imported  three 
shipments  of  nails  from  an  Italian  firm,  having 
received  assurances  that  such  nails  were  of  Italian 
origin  and  they  were  so  marked  upon  arrival  at 
the  port  of  New  Orleans.  After  the  merchandise 
had  cleared  United  States  Customs,  it  was  dis- 
covered that  the  nails  were,  in  fact,  of  Hungarian 
origin.  The  erroneous  marking  made  the  import- 
ing company  liable  for  special  marking  duties, 
assessed  at  the  rate  of  10  per  cent  of  the  value  of 
the  goods. 

The  original  purpose  of  marking  duties  was  to 
assure  tliat  labels  as  to  comitry  of  origin  could  be 
relied  upon  by  American  consumers  of  imported 
goods.  At  present,  these  duties  serve  the  addi- 
tional purpose  of  helping  to  prevent  mislabeling  of 
products  of  the  Commimist  bloc  as  products  of 
free  world  countries  in  order  to  evade  the  higher 
duties  placed  on  Communist  goods  and  other  re- 
strictions on  trade  that  would  benefit  our 
adversaries. 

Under  present  law,  marking  duties  are  due  on 
improperly  marked  merchandise  whether  or  not 
there  is  evidence  that  the  impoiter  knew  or  had 
reason  to  know  that  the  merchandise  was  mis- 
marked.  I  believe  that  the  policy  behind  this 
rule  is  sound.  It  should  be  the  responsibility  of 
-he  importer  to  assure  proper  marking,  since  he  is 
n  a  position  to  insist  on  indemnification  from  the 
foreign  seller  if  goods  have  been  misrepresented, 
[f ,  on  the  contrary,  relief  were  granted  to  all  im- 
aorters  with  respect  to  mismarked  merchandise 
vhenever  customs  could  not  show  that  the  impoiter 
ivas  aware  of  the  mismarking,  this  would  be  tanta- 
nount  to  making  customs  prove  in  each  case  of  mis- 


marking  that  the  importer  was  at  fault  at  consider- 
able cost  in  time  and  effort.  This  would  greatly 
change  the  impact  of  the  marking  law. 

Since  this  would  be  the  result  of  general  legis- 
lation relieving  importers  of  marking  duties 
whenever  mislabeling  has  resulted  from  the  ac- 
tions of  others,  I  am  constrained  to  withhold  my 
approval  from  H.  R.  1616  as  a  bill  according  re- 
lief which  cannot  be  given  to  all  other  honest 
importers. 

John  F.  Kennedy 

The  White  House 
October  16, 1962 


President  Decides  Against  Prohibiting 
Imports  of  Certain  Coin  Purses 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  16 

The  President  on  October  16  rejected  the  ma- 
jority recommendation  of  the  Tariff  Commission 
that  certain  self-closing  coin  purses  be  prohibited 
from  importation  into  the  United  States.  Chair- 
man [Ben  D.]  Dor f man  had  dissented  from  the 
majority  opinion. 

In  a  complaint  filed  under  section  337  of  the 
Tariff  Act  of  1930,  Quikey  Manufacturing  Co.,  of 
Akron,  Ohio,  had  alleged  that  certain  self-closing 
coin  purses  were  being  imported  into  the  United 
States  and  sold  in  the  domestic  market  without 
license  from  Quikey,  which  holds  a  patent  on  such 
purses,  and  that  as  a  result  of  this  unfair  method 
of  competition  substantial  injury  was  being  caused 
to  Quikey.  In  a  5  to  1  decision,  the  Tariff  Commis- 
sion decided  in  favor  of  this  contention. 

To  warrant  issuance  of  an  exclusion  order  under 
the  statute,  it  must  be  shown  to  the  satisfaction  of 
the  President  that  the  alleged  unfair  methods  of 
competition  have  the  effect  or  tendency  of  destroy- 
ing or  substantially  injuring  an  efficiently  and 
economically  operated  domestic  industry.  Chair- 
man Dorfman  dissented  on  the  ground  that  the 
proper  domestic  "industry"  had  not  been  identified 
so  that  adequate  data  could  be  developed  and  that 
the  evidence  did  not  show  any  effect  or  tendency  to 
destroy  or  substantially  injure  what  the  complain- 
ant identified  as  the  "industry." 


Fovember  5,   7962 


703 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


Calendar  of  International  Conferences  and  Meetings 


Scheduled  November  1962  Through  January  1963 

FAO  Regional  Conference  for  Africa:  2d  Session 

OECD  Working  Party  III  (Balance  of  Payments) 

OECD  Agriculture  Committee:  Preparatory  Meeting 

IMCO  Working  Group  of  Experts  on  the  Carriage  of  Dangerous  Goods 
by  Sea. 

ICEM  Executive  Committee:  20th  Session 

WMO  Regional  Association  V  (Southwest  Pacific) :  3d  Session  .... 

4th  Inter-American  Statistical  Conference 

Inter- American  Statistical  Institute:  Committee  on  Improvement  of 
National  Statistics. 

ITU  Meeting  of  Communication  Experts 

ITU  CCITT  Plan  Subcommittee  for  the  Development  of  the  Interna- 
tional Network  in  Latin  America:  2d  Meeting. 

U.N.  ECE  Meeting  of  Senior  Economic  Advisers 

U.N.  ECAFE  Inland  Waterways  Subcommittee 

OECD  Economic  Policy  Committee 

Intergovernmental  Meeting  on  Tuna 

UNESCO  General  Conference:  12th  Session 

FAO  Conference  on  Pesticides  in  Agriculture 

ICEM    Council:  17th   Session 

ILO  Tripartite  Technical  Meeting  for  the  Printing  and  Allied  Trades  . 

3d  U.N.  ECE  Consultation  of  Experts  on  Problems  of  Methodology  of 
Agricultural  Problems. 

FAO  Regional  Fisheries  Commission  for  Western  Africa 

ICAO  Aerodromes  and  Ground  Aids  Division:  7th  Session 

IMCO  Working  Group  on  Facilitation  of  International  Travel  and 
Transport. 

7th  FAO  Regional  Conference  for  Latin  America 

OECD  Agriculture  Committee:  Ministerial  Meeting 

North  Pacific  Fur  Seal  Commission:  Scientific  Committee 

ILO  Advisory  Committee  of  the  International  Institute  for  Labor 
Studies. 

2d  Inter-American  Port  and  Harbor  Conference 

5th  U.N.  ECAFE  Regional  Conference  on  Water  Resources  Develop- 
ment. 

OECD  Trade  Committee 

FAO  Latin  American  Forestry  Commission:  8th  Session 

ILO  Committee  of  Social  Security  Experts 

North  Pacific  Fur  Seal  Commission:  6th  Meeting 

ILO  Asian  Regional  Conference:  5th  Session 

U.N.  ECE  Working  Party  on  Housing  and  Building  Statistics   .... 

U.N.  ECE  Working  Party  on  International  Passenger  Transport  Serv- 
ices by  Road. 

U.N.  ECE  Subcommittee  on  Road  Transport 

OECD  Ministerial  Meeting 

NATO  Medical  Committee 

U.N.  ECAFE  Working  Partv  of  Senior  Geologists:  5th  Session     .    .    . 

U.N.  ECE  Gas  Committee:  'Oth  Session 

U.N.  ECE  Electric  Power  Subcommittee 

International  Wheat  Council:  36th  Session 


Tunis Nov.  1- 

Paris Nov.  5- 

Paris Nov.  5- 

London Nov.  •5- 

Geneva Nov.  5- 

Noumfia Nov.  5- 

Washington Nov.  5- 

Washington Nov.  5- 

Washington Nov.  5- 

Bogotd, Nov.  5- 

Geneva Nov.  5- 

Bangkok Nov.  6- 

Paris Nov.  7- 

San  Jos6,  Costa  Rica Nov.  7- 

Paris Nov.  9- 

Rome Nov.  12- 

Geneva Nov.  1''- 

Geneva Nov.  12- 

Geneva Nov.  12- 

Tunis Nov.  12- 

Montreal Nov.  13- 

London Nov.  13- 

Rio  de  Janeiro Nov.  1&- 

Paris Nov.  19- 

Washington Nov.  19- 

Geneva Nov.  19- 

Cartagena,  Colombia Nov.  20- 

Bangkok Nov.  20- 

Paris Nov.  22- 

Santiago Nov.  22- 

Geneva Nov.  26- 

Washington Nov.  26- 

Melbourne Nov.  26- 

Geneva Nov.  26- 

Geneva Nov.  26- 

Geneva Nov.  26- 

Paris Nov.  27- 

Paris Nov.  27- 

Bangkok Nov.  27- 

Geneva Nov.  28- 

Bangkok November 

London November 


'  Prepared  in  the  OfRce  of  International  Conferences,  Oct.  16,  1962.  Following  is  a  list  of  .abbreviations:  CCIR, 
Comitfi  consultatif  international  des  radio  communications;  CCITT,  Comitd  consuUatif  international  t<!l6graphique  et 
t€16phonique;  ECAFE,  Economic  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far  East;  ECE,  Economic  Commission  for  Europe; 
ECOSOC,  Economic  and  Social  Council;  FAO,  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization;  IAEA,  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency;  ICAO,  International  Civil  Aviation  Organization;  ICEM,  Intergovernmental  Committee  for  European  Migra- 
tion; ILO,  International  Labor  Organization-  IMCO,  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Consultative  Orgjinization;  iTU, 
Internation,al  Telecommunication  Union;  NATO,  North  Atlantic iTreaty  Organization;  OECD,  Organization  for  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  and  Development;  U.N.,  United  Nations;  UNESCO,  United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and 
Cultural  Organization;  WHO,  World  Health  Organization;  WMO,  World  Meteorological  Organization. 


704 


Departmenf  of  Stale   Bulletin 


U.N.  ECAFE  Subcommittee  on  Mineral  Resources  Development:  5th 

Session. 
U.N.  ECAFE  Inland  Transport  and  Communications  Committee:  11th 

Session. 

WHO  Seminar  on  Health  Statistics       

FAO  Technical  Advisory  Committee  on  Desert  Locust  Control:  llth 

Session. 
U.N.  ECE  Committee  on  Agricultural  Problems:  14th  Session  .... 
ILO  Committee  of  Experts  on  the  Determination  of  the  States  of  Chief 

Industrial  Importance. 
ILO  Committee  on  Conditions  of  Work  in  the  Fishing  Industry     .    .    . 

U.N.  ECAFE  Seminar  on  Urban  Community  Development 

International  Wool  Study  Group:  7th  Meeting 

FAO/ECAFE  Ad  Hoc  Meeting  on  Jute 

U.N.  ECE  Subcommittee  on  Inland  Water  Transport 

OECD  Maritime  Transport  Committee 

NATO  Ministerial  Council 

UNESCO  Executive  Board:  64th  Session 

U.N.  ECE  Coal  Committee  and  Coal  Trade  Subcommittee 

U.N.  ECE  Housing  Committee  (and  working  parties) 

U.N.  Economic  and  Social  Council:  34th  Session  (resumed) 

U.N.  ECE  Consultation  of  Experts  on  Energy  in  Europe 

U.N.  ECAFE  Committee  for  the  Coordination  of  Investigations  of  the 

Lower  Mekong  Basin:  19th  Session  (plenary). 

ICAO  Panel  on  Holding  Procedures:  1st  Meeting 

U.N.  Special  Fund  Governing  Council:  9th  Session 

U.N.  ECOSOC  Commission  on  Human  Rights:  15th  Session  of  Subcom- 

mission  on  Prevention  of  Discrimination  and  Protection  of  Minorities. 
ITU    International    Radio    Consultative    Committee    (CCIR) :     10th 

Plenary  Assembly. 

IAEA  Panel  on  Heavy  Water  Lattices 

U.N.  Scientific  Committee  on  the  Effects  of  Atomic  Radiation:  12th 

Session. 

IMCO  Maritime  Safety  Committee:  6th  Session 

U.N.  ECAFE  Committee  on  Trade:  6th  Session 

U.N.  Cocoa  Conference 

WHO  Executive  Board:  31st  Session 

IAEA  Board  of  Governors 


Bangkok Dec.  3- 

Bangkok Dec.  3- 

Bangkok Dec.  3- 

Rome Dec.  5- 

Geneva Dec.  10- 

Geneva Dec.  10- 

Geneva Dec.  10- 

Dacca,  Pakistan Deo.  10- 

London Dec.  10- 

Bangkok Dec.  12- 

Geneva Dec.  12- 

Paris Dec.  13- 

Paris Dec.  13- 

Paris Dec.  13- 

Geneva Dec.  17- 

Geneva Dec.  17- 

New  York December 

Geneva December 

Laos Jan.  9- 

Moutreal Jan.  14- 

New  York Jan.  14- 

New  York Jan.  14- 

New  Delhi Jan.  16- 

Vienna Jan.  21- 

Geneva Jan.  21- 

London Jan.  22- 

Bangkok Jan.  28- 

New  York  or  Geneva     ....  January 

Geneva January 

Vienna January 


Security  Council  Recommends  U.N. 
Admit  Uganda  to  Membership 

Statement  by  Adlai  E.  Stevenson 

U.S.  Representative  in  the  Security  Council  ^ 

The  United  States  takes  deep  satisfaction  in  the 
opportunity  to  consider  today  tlie  application  of 
Uganda  for  membership  in  tlie  United  Nations. 
We  warmly  congratulate  the  Government,  in 
particular  Uganda's  remarkably  able  Prime  Min- 
ister, Mr.  [A.  Milton]  Obote,  and  the  people  of 
Uganda  on  their  independence. 

We  like  to  think  that  a  common  dedication  to 
equality  and  to  freedom  inspires  a  close  kinship 
between  the  people  of  Uganda  and  the  people  of 
the  United  States.  And  we  see  this  kinship  con- 
finned  when  we  compare  the  constitutional  laws 
of  our  two  countries,  laws  which  foster  political 
imity  in  diverse  societies  and  wliich  provide  for 


•Made  in  the  Security  Council  on  Oct.  15   (U.S./U.N. 
press  release  4065). 

November  5,    1962 


the  protection  of  the  rights  of  the  individual  and 
of  minorities. 

We  rejoice  with  the  people  of  Uganda  in  the 
peaceful  evolution  of  their  nation  to  independ- 
ence, and  we  are  confident  that  the  statesmanship 
exhibited  by  the  leaders  of  both  Uganda  and  the 
United  Kingdom  in  this  achievement  will  charac- 
terize their  future  relations. 

My  comiti'y  enjoys,  we  are  happy  to  say,  strong 
and  friendly  relations  with  Uganda.  We  are  as- 
sisting it  in  the  fields  of  education  and  agriculture 
and  in  the  encouragement  of  Uganda-owned  in- 
dustries. We  are  happy  to  have  in  this  country, 
Mr.  President,  an  increasing  number  of  students 
from  Uganda.  And  let  me  here  reaffirm  the  desire 
of  the  United  States  to  assist  in  every  way  both 
in  strengthening  Uganda's  independence  and  in 
this  new  nation's  efforts  to  acMeve  the  deepest  as- 
pirations of  its  people.  I  wish  to  emphasize  the 
desire  of  the  United  States  to  cooperate  with 
Uganda  as  with  all  other  members  of  the  United 
Nations  in  the  common  search  for  a  just  and  a 
peaceful  world. 

705 


Jl 


We  look  f  oi-ward  with  great  pleasure  to  a  happy 
and  a  fruitful  association  in  the  United  Nations 
■with  the  representatives  of  Uganda,  and  we  will 
vote,  Mr.  President,  enthusiastically  for  the  draft 
resolution  ^  before  us. 


United  States  RepBies  to  Charges 
Made  by  President  of  Cuba 

Following  are  statements  made  on  October  8  iy 
Adlai  E.  Steven^wn,  U.S.  Representative  to  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly,  regarding  charges  made 
against  the  United  States  in  plenary  session  hy 
President  Osvaldo  Dorticos  Torrado  of  Cuba. 

STATEMENT  IN  PLENARY  SESSION 

U.S.  delegation  press  release  4055  dated  October  8 

I  have  asked  to  speak  to  a  point  of  order.  For  17 
years  we  have  come  to  expect  that,  when  a  chief  of 
state  asks  for  the  privilege  of  this  podium,  he  has 
an  obligation  not  to  abuse  it  and  not  to  demean  tlie 
United  Nations  and  the  dialog  of  diplomacy,  but 
to  speak  here  in  a  constructive  and  a  statesmanlike 
manner. 

But  the  President  of  Cuba,  Mr.  President,  speak- 
ing as  chief  of  state  on  a  ceremonial  occasion,  has 
seen  fit  to  use  this  rostrum  to  attack  my  country 
with  unparalleled  calumnies,  slanders,  and  misrep- 
resentations for  1  hour  and  45  minutes. 

Yet,  Mr.  President,  I  will  not  claim  a  right  of 
reply  from  this  platform  this  morning.  Instead,  I 
shall  respond  to  his  intemperate  and  false  charges 
outside  of  this  hall  and  at  once.  And,  with  your 
permission,  Mr.  President,  I  will  have  my  response 
placed  before  the  members  of  the  General  Assem- 
bly in  printed  form  during  the  day. 

Mr.  President,  the  traditions  of  etiquette  and  of 
good  taste  which  have  been  established  here  have 
built  respect  for  this  organization,  and  for  my  part 
I  do  not  want  to  descend  even  by  reply  to  the  levels 
of  the  chief  of  state  we  have  just  heard  on  this 
ceremonial  occasion. 

He  is  right,  however,  on  one  point.  The  last 
word  will  be  written  by  history. 


\ 


'  U.X.  doc.  S/.'5177 ;  the  Council  on  Oct.  15  unanimously 
recommended  that  Uganda  be  admitted  to  membership 
in  the  United  Nations.  On  Oct.  2.5  the  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly admitted  Uganda  by  acclamation. 

706 


STATEMENT  REPLYING  TO  CUBAN  CHARGES' 

U.S.  delegation  press  release  4056  dated  October  8 

Slander  and  invective  are  no  substitute  for  facts, 
and  the  weaker  a  case  is  the  longer  it  takes  to 
present.    I  think  I  can  be  very  brief  indeed. 

The  charges  just  rehearsed  by  President 
Dorticos  of  Cuba  against  my  Govermnent  are 
neither  original  nor  true.  Four  times  within  the 
last  8  months,  once  in  the  Political  Committee  of 
the  Assembly,  once  in  the  plenary,  and  twice  in 
the  Security  Comicil,  the  United  Nations  has  de- 
cisively rejected  accusations  similar  to  those  we 
have  heard  today .^ 

I  repeat  the  policy  of  the  United  States: 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  like  the 
governments  of  the  other  independent  American 
Republics,  will  honor  its  commitments  to  the 
United  Nations  Charter  and  to  the  inter- American 
system.  As  we  have  stated  so  often,  the  United 
States  will  not  commit  aggression  against  Cuba. 
But  let  it  be  equally  clear  that  the  United  States 
will  not  tolerate  aggression  against  any  part  of 
this  hemisphere.  The  United  States  will  exercise 
the  right  of  individual  and  collective  self- 
defense — a  right  expressly  recognized  in  the 
charter- — against  aggression  in  this  hemisphere. 

The  charges  made  by  Cuba  against  the  United 
States  are  dictated  by  two  factors.  One  is  that 
the  Castro  regime  has  associated  itself  with  the 
Communist  bloc  in  its  pursuit  of  world  domina- 
tion. A  tactic  always  used  in  seeking  this  objective 
is  to  ridicule,  malign,  and  vilify  anyone  with  the 
courage  to  oppose  them. 

The  second  factor  is  Cuba's  self-inflicted  exclu- 
sion from  the  American  family  of  nations.  The 
Castro  regime  has  turned  its  back  on  its  history, 
tradition,  religion,  and  culture.  Cuba  has  turned 
away  from  its  neighbors,  and  it  is  at  the  mercy  of 
the  political  riptides  that  sweep  through  the  Com- 
mimist  world  with  such  frequence. 

Thus  the  other  nations  of  the  Americas  are  un- 
derstandably anxious  and  alert.  But  vigilance 
cannot  and  should  not  be  equated  with  interven- 
tion, nor  alarm  with  aggression. 

The  hemisphere — and  the  world — were  prepared 
to  accept  the  original  promises  of  the  Castro  gov- 
ernment that  economic  and  social  justice  would  be 


'  Read    to   news  correspondents  outside   the   General 
Assembly  hall. 

'  For  background,  see  Buuetin  of  Apr.  2,  1962,  p. 
and  Apr.  23, 1962,  p.  684. 


553, 


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jrought  to  the  Cuban  people.  But  its  original 
pledges  have  now  been  discarded  by  the  Cuban 
•egime,  and  we  condemn  with  all  the  force  at  our 
iommand  the  violations  of  civil  justice,  the  drum- 
lead  executions,  and  the  suppression  of  political, 
ntellectual,  and  religious  freedom  which  have  been 
nflicted  on  the  Ciiban  people. 

But  even  these  excesses  would  not  constitute  a 
iirect  threat  to  the  peace  and  independence  of 
)ther  states.  However,  Cuba  has  been  opened  to  a 
lood  of  Soviet  weapons  and  "technicians"  and  to 
he  Soviet  Union's  so-called  "fishing  fleet,"  ^  which 
s  a  long  way  from  the  fishing  grounds  off  the 
lorth  shore  of  Cuba.  The  cod  and  the  herring, 
gentlemen,  are  a  long  way  from  the  new  fishing 
ieet's  headquarters.  Cuba  has  not  only  armed  it- 
self to  a  degree  never  before  seen  in  any  Latin 
^^nerican  country,  but  it  has  also  welcomed  pene- 
tration by  the  foremost  exponent  of  a  doctrine  con- 
lemned  in  this  hemisphere  as  "alien"  and  "incom- 
Datible."  What  we  cannot  accept — and  will  never 
iccept — is  that  Cuba  has  become  the  springboard 
for  aggressive  and  subversive  efforts  to  destroy  the 
nter- American  system,  to  overthrow  the  govern- 
nents  of  the  Americas,  and  to  obstruct  the  peace- 
iil,  democratic  evolution  of  this  hemisphere  to- 
-jjtjj  (vard  social  justice  and  economic  development. 

The  statements  *  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States  on  this  subject  and  the  recent  joint  resolu- 
tion =  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  amply 
ittest  to  this  concern. 

Nor  can  these  developments  be  ignored  by  the 
Ajnerican  Republics  as  a  whole.  Let  there  be  no 
ioubt  as  to  the  solidarity  of  the  nations  of  this 
lemisphere  on  the  problem  of  Cuba. 

The  foreign  ministers  and  special  representa- 
tives of  the  American  Republics  have  just  con- 
rcyof  eluded  2  days  of  informal  discussion  on  Com- 
munist intervention  in  Cuba."  Speaking  unani- 
mously, they  declared  that  the  most  urgent  prob- 
lem facing  the  hemisphere  is  this  foreign  interven- 
tion in  Cuba  and  its  threat  to  convert  the  island 
r«i'  into  an  armed  base  for  penetration  and  subversion 
of  the  democratic  institutions  of  the  hemisphere. 

The  hemisphere  representatives  unanimously 
affirmed  their  will  to  strengthen  our  common  se- 
curity against  all  aggression  and  all  situations 


"  For  background,  see  ibid.,  Oct.  15, 1962,  p.  560. 
*  lUd.,  Sept.  24, 1962,  p.  450,  and  Oct.  1, 1962,  p.  481. 
'For  text,  see  ibid.,  Oct.  22,  1962,  p.  597. 
'  For  text  of  a  final  communique,  see  ibid.,  p.  598. 

November  5,    J  962 


threatening  peace  and  security  in  this  hemisphere. 
Noting  the  special  characteristics  of  the  inter- 
American  regional  system,  they  stated  that  a  mili- 
tary intervention  by  Communist  powers  in  Cuba 
cannot  be  justified  as  a  situation  analogous  to  the 
defensive  measures  adopted  in  other  parts  of  the 
free  world  in  order  to  resist  Soviet  imperialism. 

The  communique  issued  by  the  foreign  ministers 
in  Washington  last  week  reflected  the  sense  of  in- 
creased gi-avity  with  which  the  American  states 
have  witnessed  a  succession  of  developments  in 
Cuba  since  the  Punta  del  Este  meeting,  where  the 
Communist  government  of  Cuba  was  found  to  be 
incompatible  with  the  American  system.'' 

In  the  face  of  this  threat  the  foreign  ministers 
have  again  imanimously  reaffirmed  their  will  to 
strengthen  the  security  of  the  hemisphere  against 
all  aggression,  from  inside  and  outside  the  hemi- 
sphere, and  against  all  developments  and  situations 
capable  of  threatening  its  peace  and  security. 

The  historic  support  of  the  members  of  the  Or- 
ganization of  American  States  for  the  principles 
of  self-determination  and  nonintervention  is  well 
known.  These  principles  have  been  enshrined  in 
acts  of  inter- American  conferences,  antedating  by 
decades  even  the  conception  of  the  United  Nations. 

The  United  States  has  already  begim  to  take 
effective  measures  concerning  shipping  and  trade 
with  Cuba  *  and  the  surveillance  of  traffic  in  arms 
and  other  strategic  items  in  accordance  with  the 
discussions  of  the  ministers  of  foreign  affairs,  the 
resolutions  of  the  Eighth  Meeting  of  Consultation, 
and  other  inter- American  instruments. 

The  purpose  of  these  measures  is  the  collective 
defense  of  the  hemisphere.  As  I  have  said,  these 
measures  have  no  offensive  purpose. 

There  was  incessant  talk  this  morning  about  eco- 
nomic strangulation  and  economic  blockade. 
Neither  of  these  terms  has  any  application  to  tliis 
case.  The  current  regime  in  Cuba  has  pronounced 
its  intention  to  overthrow  other  governments  in 
this  hemisphere.  Could  anyone,  therefore,  take 
part  in  any  trade,  or  aid  trade  designed  to  boost 
the  Cuban  economy  and  to  arm  its  military  serv- 
ices? 

To  say  that  our  self-protective  actions  are  ag- 
gressive or  a  warlike  gesture  is  absurd.    It  is  the 


'  For  background,  see  ibid.,  Feb.  19, 1962,  pp.  267  and  270. 

'  For  a  statement  made  by  Under  Secretary  Ball  on 
Oct.  3  concerning  trading  relations  between  the  free  world 
and  Cuba,  see  ibid.,  Oct.  22,  1962,  p.  591. 

707 


I 


most  normal  and,  indeed,  the  least  violent  way  in 
■wliich  we  can  express  our  strong  disapproval  of 
the  threats  and  sword  rattling  emanating  from 
Cuba. 

No  threat  to  peace  in  this  hemisphere  arises  out 
of  the  unanimous  determination  of  American  Ke- 
publics  in  this  regard. 

The  President  of  Cuba  professes  that  Cuba  has 
always  been  willing  to  hold  discussions  with  the 
United  States  to  improve  relations  and  to  reduce 
tensions.  But  what  he  really  wishes  us  to  do  is 
,  to  place  the  seal  of  approval  on  the  existence  of  a 
'  Communist  regime  in  tlie  Western  Hemisphere. 
The  maintenance  of  communism  in  the  Americas 
is  not  negotiable.  Furthermore  the  problem  of 
Cuba  is  not  a  simple  problem  of  United  States- 
Cuban  relations.  It  is  a  collective  problem  for  all 
the  states  of  this  hemisphere. 

If  the  Cuban  regime  is  sincere  in  its  request  for 
negotiations  and  wishes  to  lay  its  grievances  be- 
fore the  appropriate  forum — the  Organization  of 
American  States — I  would  suggest  the  Cuban  gov- 
ernment might  start  by  some  action  calculated  to 
awaken  the  confidence  of  the  inter- American  sys- 
tem. The  obvious  place  to  begin  would  be  the 
severing  of  its  multiple  ties  to  the  Soviet  bloc. 

Let  no  one  mistake  the  impact  of  this  Soviet 
intervention  in  Cuba  on  the  hope  we  all  share 
for  world  peace.  If  the  Soviet  Union  persists  in 
the  course  it  has  chosen,  if  it  continues  to  try  to 
prevent  the  peaceful  social  revolution  of  the  Amer- 
icas, it  will  increasingly  excite  the  deep  indigna- 
tion of  the  people  of  my  country  and  of  other 
American  states.  The  result  will  be  to  make  the 
resolution  of  issues  far  more  difficult  in  every 
other  part  of  the  world.  A  consequence  of  this 
gratuitous  Soviet  initiative  is  to  postpone  even 
further  the  hope  for  world  stabilization.  I  cannot 
state  this  point  with  sufficient  gravity. 

The  tragedy  of  Cuba  is  still  unfolding.  How 
short  has  been  the  time  since  the  two  continents 
of  the  "Western  Hemisphere  acclaimed  the  down- 
fall of  tlie  Batista  dictatorship  and  hailed  wliat 
promised  to  be  a  democratic  and  progressive  rev- 
olution. IIow  quickly  that  promise  was  replaced 
by  a  reign  of  terror,  confiscation,  and  the  suppres- 
sion of  political,  intellectual,  and  religious  free- 
dom. 

Just  as  fear  is  the  first  price  of  oppression,  it 
would  also  have  been  the  final  price,  if  the  Cuban 
oppressor  had  not  been  saved  from  the  Cuban 
people  by  the  Soviet  Union.    How  many  times  in 


708 


1.5.51 
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TkS 


history  has  fear  of  the  people's  wrath  driven  ty 
rants  to  sell  their  nation  to  more  powerful  tyrants' 

Can  the  Cuban  electorate  send  (lie  Russia) 
forces  home?  Do  the  Cuban  leaders  dare  fac 
their  people  without  these  alien  protectors?  J 
country  bristling  with  Soviet  missiles  and  "pro 
tectors"  is  your  answer. 

We  will  constantly  work  to  reassure  the  Cubai 
people  that  they  have  not  been  forgotten  o 
abandoned  and  make  clear  to  freedom-lovinj 
Cubans,  both  within  and  without  that  country 
that  they  can  count  on  the  sympathy  and  suppor 
of  the  American  people  in  their  efforts  to  escap' 
the  grip  of  Soviet  domination  and  recapture  thei 
own  revolution.  We  did  this  for  those  who  sough 
the  overthrow  of  Batista.  We  can  do  no  les 
today. 

The  foreign  ministers  meeting  at  Washingtoi 
voiced  the  fraternal  affex^tion  of  all  Americai 
peoples  for  the  people  of  Cuba  and  fervently  wisl 
to  see  them  embraced  again  in  the  Americai 
family  of  nations.  The  United  States  join 
wlioleheai-tedly  in  this  dasire. 

If  the  Cuban  regime  wishes  to  establish  norma 
friendly  relations  in  this  hemisphere,  let  it  returi 
to  the  concepts  and  obligations  of  the  inter 
American  system,  let  it  cease  its  subservience  t( 
the  Soviet  Union,  let  it  cease  to  be  an  avenue  oi 
intervention,  which  threatens  the  f undamenta  |,.^' 
principles  and  the  peace  and  security  of  all  its 
neighbors  with  an  alien  doctrine. 

The  way  is  clear,  and  the  choice  is  Cuba's. 


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Senate  Confirms  U.S.  Representatives  [i\i 
to  12tli  UNESCO  General  Conference 

The  Senate  on  October  10  confirmed  the  nom- 
inations of  the  following  persons  ^  to  be  repre- 
sentatives of  the  United  States  to  the  12th  session 
of  the  General  Conference  of  the  United  Nations! 
Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Organiza- 
tion, to  be  held  at  Paris  November  9  to  December 
12: 


iiimei 

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kew: 


Representatives  Alternate  Representatives 

Lucius  D.  Battle  Henry  S.  Commager 

Ooorge  V.  Allen  Herbert  W.  Hill 

Mrs.  Mildred  McAfee  Horton  Eu?ene  H.  Jacobson 

Walter  M.  Kotschnig  Robert  A.  Kevan 

John  II.  Morrow  Joseph  B.  Piatt  Wll\ 

iton] 

'For  biographic  details,  see  Department  of  State  pressi  tac 

release  C:!9  dated  Oct.  2.9. 


Departmenf  of  State  Bulletin 


Nive 


t;  J.S.  Supports  Inscription 
'  )f  Item  on  Hungary 


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k  Uatement  iy  Charles  W.  Tost 
I  7.S.  Representative  to  the  General  Assembly ' 


The  Soviet  representative  seeks  to  overturn  the 
ecommendation  of  the  General  Committee  that 
he  question  of  Hungary  be  inscribed  on  our 
a.  Ever  since  this  item  was  first  brought 
0  this  Assembly  in  1956,  the  Soviet  Union  and 
iS  colleagues  have  opposed  its  inscription,  and 
very  time  the  Assembly  has  decided  to  inscribe 
Let  me  point  out  that  last  year,  in  fact,  in- 
cription  "was  opposed  only  by  the  Soviet  bloc 
nd  a  handful  of  others. 

The  reasons  for  which  my  delegation  requested 
iscription  this  year  were  made  clear  in  our  re- 
uest  ^  and,  more  recently,  when  the  General  Com- 
littee  considered  the  matter.  There  is,  therefore, 
o  need  to  take  time  now  for  a  lengthy  reiteration 
f  our  views  except  to  emphasize  that  they  arise 
ot  from  the  cold  war  but  from  the  concern  of 
tiis  Assembly  for  human  rights  and  human  free- 
om.  "We  believe  that  human  rights  and  human 
reedom  are  as  precious  in  Eastern  Europe  as 
ny  where  else  in  the  world. 

As  tlie  United  Nations  Representative  in  Him- 
ary.  Sir  Leslie  Munro,  informed  the  General 
Committee  last  week,  the  Hungarian  Government 
as  consistently  refused  to  cooperate  with  the 
Jnited  Nations  and  has  refused  to  comply  with 
:s  resolutions.  Large  numbers  of  Soviet  troops 
emain  on  Hungarian  territory,  despite  assurances 
liat  they  would  be  withdrawn.  Large  numbers 
f  political  prisoners  remain  in  prison  because  of 
heir  participation  in  the  uprising  of  1956,  despite 
umerous  appeals  from  all  quarters  of  the  globe 
« *'|liat  they  be  released. 

In  our  view  questions  of  this  sort  are  not,  as 
he  Soviet  delegation  would  have  it,  a  "dead  rat." 
!'his  question  is  very  much  alive  and  will  remain 
nfinished  business  of  the  United  Nations  General 
Lssembly  until  the  Hungarian  Government  shows 
he  will  and  the  desire  to  comply  with  the  wishes 
if  this  Assembly,  as  overwhelmingly  expressed  in 


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^Made  in  plenary  session  on  Sept.  24  (U.S.  delegation 
ress  release  4046).  On  Sept.  24  the  General  Assembly 
ly  a  vote  of  43  to  34,  with  19  abstentions,  approved  the 
ecommendation  of  the  General  Committee  to  include  the 
tern  on  the  question  of  Hungary  in  the  agenda. 

=  Bulletin  of  Sept.  10,  1962,  p.  394. 

/ovemfaer  5,   7962 


repeated  resolutions.  Until  that  time  we  have  no 
choice  but  to  debate  the  question  of  Hungary  once 
again.  "We  hope  that  on  this  occasion  the  debate 
will  be  more  fruitful  and  may  lead  to  concrete  re- 
sults which  could  assist  in  normalizing  the  situa- 
tion in  Hungary.  For  these  reasons  we  will  sup- 
port its  inscription  as  recommended  by  the  Gen- 
eral Committee. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Cultural  Relations 

Agreement  on  the  importation  of  educational,  scientific, 
and  cultural  materials,   and  protocol.     Done  at  Lake 
Success  November  22,  1950.     Entered  into  force  May 
21, 1952.^ 
Acceptance  deposited:  Gabon,  September  4,  1962. 

Narcotics 

Protocol  bringing  xmder  international  control  drugs  out- 
side the  scope  of  the  convention  limiting  the  manufac- 
ture and  regulating  the  distribution  of  narcotic  drugs 
concluded  at  Geneva  Julv  13,  1931  (48  Stat.  1.^43).  as 
amended  (61  Stat.  2230;  62  Stat.  1706).  Done  at  Paris 
November  19,  1948.  Entered  into  force  for  the  United 
States  September  11.  1950.  TIAS  2308. 
Xcceptunce  deposited:  Ecuador,  August  30, 1962. 
bonification  received  that  it  considers  itself  bound: 
Central  African  Republic,  Septeml)er  4,  1962. 

Trade 

Protocol  for  accession  of  Portugal  to  the  General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva  April  6, 
1962.  Entered  into  force.  May  6,  1962 ;  for  the  United 
States  July  1,  1962. 

Signatures:  Belgium,  June  27,  1962;  Denmark,  June  18, 

1962 ;  Dominican  Republic,  July  31,  1062 ;  European 

Economic  Community,  June  27,  1962 ;  France,  June 

27    1962 ;    Federal   Republic   of  Germany,   June  27, 

1962;'   Israel,    July   16,   1962;    Italy,   July  5,   1962; 

Luxembourg,   June  27,   1962;    Netherlands,   May  22, 

1902 ;  New  Zealand,  August  2,  1062 ;  Norway,  June 

19, 1962 ;  South  Africa,  August  1,  1962. 

Protocol  for  the  accession  of  Cambodia  to  the  General 

Agreement   on   Tariffs   and  Trade.     Done  at   Geneva 

April  6,  1962.' 

Signatures:   Belgium,   June  27,   1962;   Dominican  Re- 
public, August  14,  1962 ;  Netherlands,  July  10,  1962 ; 
Turkey,  August  16,  1962. 
Eighth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  texts 
of  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade.    Done  at  Geneva  February  18, 1959.' 
Signature:  Turkey,  September  12, 1962. 


'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 
'  Subject  to  ratification. 
'  Not  in  force. 


709 


Ninth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  texts 
of  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade.    Done  at  Geneva  August  17, 1950.^ 
Signature:  Turkey,  Sejjtember  12,  19tj2. 


BILATERAL 

Chile 

Agricultural  commodities  agreement  under  title  IV  of  the 
Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assistance  Act  of 
1954,  as  amended  (68  Stat.  454;  73  Stat.  610;  7  U.S.C. 
1731-1736),  with  exchanges  of  notes  of  August  7  and 
29,  September  10,  and  October  3  and  4,  19G2.  Signed 
at  Santiago  August  7, 1962.  Entered  into  force  August  7, 
1962. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  establishment  of  a  Peace  Corps 
program.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Santiago 
October  3  and  4,  1962.  Entered  into  force  October  4, 
1962. 

Gabon 

Agreement  relating  to  the  establishment  of  a  Peace  Corps 
program.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Libreville 
October  4,  1962.     Entered  into  force  October  4,  1962. 

Israel 

Agreement  amending  the  agricultural  commodities  agree- 
ment of  May  3,  1962  ( TI AS  .5004 ) .  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Washington  October  12  and  16, 1962.  Entered 
into  force  October  16, 19C2. 

Turkey 

Agreement  amending  the  agricultural  commodities  agree- 
ment of  July  29,  1961,  as  amended  (TIAS  4819.  4874, 
4926,  4937,  4978,  and  5077).  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Ankara  October  11,  1962.  Entered  into  force 
October  11,  1962. 


DEPARTMENT  AND  FOREIGN  SERVICE 


International  Economic  and  Social  Affairs 
Office  Reorganized 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  October  9  (press 
release  610)  that  the  Office  of  International  Economic  and 
Social  Affairs  of  the  Bureau  of  International  Organization 
Affairs  has  been  reorganized  to  include  the  following  four 
units  :  International  Scientific  Organizations ;  Human  Re- 


'  Not  in  force. 


sources  and  Social  Affairs ;  Development  Policy  and  Fi- 
nance ;  and  Economic  and  Social  Council  and  Genera' 
Assembly  Affairs.  Each  of  these  units  will  be  responsible 
for  coordinating  participation  by  all  parts  of  the  U.S 
Government  in  several  major  international  organizations 

Nathaniel  M.  McKitterick  has  been  appointed  Directoi 
of  the  Office.  He  succeeds  Walter  M.  Kotschnig,  who  has 
become  Deputy  U.S.  Representative  to  the  U.N.  Economiw 
and  Social  Council,  with  the  personal  rank  of  minister. 

The  Department  of  State,  in  cooperation  with  the  Bn 
reau  of  the  Budget,  is  presently  conducting  a  major  re 
view  of  U.S.  policies  related  to  the  staflSng  and  financial 
management  of  international  organizations.  The  review 
is  being  carried  out  under  the  direction  of  Harlan  Cleve 
land,  Assistant  Secretary  for  International  Organizatioi 
Affairs,  with  the  advice  of  a  group  of  business  and  pro 
fessional  experts. 


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Confirmations 


The  Senate  on  October  10  confirmed  the  following  nom<  prgijei 


inations : 

Robert  G.   Miner  to  be  Ambassador  to   Trinidad  anit 
Tobago.     (For  biographic  details,  see  White  House  pres«  ^,fyt 
release  dated  October  3. ) 

James  W.  Riddleberger  to  be  Ambassador  to  AustriaiMe' 
(For  biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  releasH . 
dated  October  3.) 

John  W.  Tuthill  to  be  the  representative  of  the  Unitei 
States  to  the  European  Communities,  with  the  rank  am 
status  of  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and  Plenipotentiary 
(For  biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  release 
dated  October  5.) 

James  Wine  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Republic  of  Ivorji 
Coast.  (For  biographic  details,  see  W^hite  House  presi 
release  dated  October  3.) 


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Appointments 

Nathaniel  M.  McKitterick  as  Director  of  the  Office  at 
International  Economic  and  Social  Affairs,  Bureau  o: 
International  Organization  Affairs,  effective  Septembei 
16.  (For  biographic  details,  see  Department  of  Stata 
press  release  610  dated  October  9. ) 

Margaret  L.  Plunkett  as  labor  attach^  at  The  Hague! 
Netherlands,  effective  October  17.  (For  biographic  de* 
tails,  see  Department  of  State  press  release  629  dated 
October  17.) 


Gteete, 

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710 


Department  of  State  Bullelirr 


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fresiiiei 
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Sciencf, 


lldllt. 


Bseprs 


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s  rete 


November  5,  1962  *  Ind 

Africa.    The   United  States  and   the  New  Africa 

(Williams) 690 

Algeria.  President  Kennedy  Holds  Talks  With 
Leaders  of  Algeria  and  Libya  (texts  of  joint 
communiques) 689 

Austria.    Riddleberger  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .       710 

Canada.  U.S.  and  Canadian  Officials  Conclude 
Talks  on  Lumber  Industry  Problems  (text  of 
joint  press  statement) 702 

Communism.    The  Present  Stage  of  the  Cold  War 

(Rostow) 675 

iCuba.     United  States  Replies  to  Charges  Made  by 

j    President  of  Cuba   (Stevenson) 706 

JDepartmeut  and  Foreign  Service 

Vppointments  (McKitterick,  Plunkett) 710 

Jonflrmations  (Miner,  Riddleberger,  Tuthill, 
Wine) 710 

International  Economic  and  Social  Affairs  Office 
Reorganized 710 

Secretary  Rusk  Stresses  Role  of  U.S.  Missions  in 
Export  Drive  (text  of  letter) 682 

Economic  Affairs 

The  Present  Stage  of  the  Cold  War  (Rostow)     .     .       675 

President  Decides  Against  Prohibiting  Imports  of 
Certain  Coin  Purses 703 

President  Withholds  Approval  on  Bill  Relating  To 
Marking  Duties  (text  of  memorandum)  ....      703 

Secretary  Rusk  Stresses  Role  of  U.S.  Missions  in 
Export  Drive  (text  of  letter) 682 

Trade,  Investment,  and  United  States  Foreign 
Policy   (Rusk) 683 

D.S.  and  Canadian  Officials  Conclude  Talks  on  Lum- 
ber Industry  Problems  (text  of  joint  press  state- 
ment)      702 

■jilanlJ.S.  Welcomes  Move  by  Greece  To  Settle  Prewar 

Debts 702 

Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs.  UNESCO  and 
U.S.  Policy:  High  Hopes  and  a  Hard  Look  (Bat- 
tle, Cleveland) 695 

jt]j|)[  Europe.    Tuthill  confirmed  as  U.S.  representative 

to  the  European  Communities 710 

"'Germany.    The   Present   Stage  of  the   Cold  War 

(Rostow) 675 

Greece.  U.S.  Welcomes  Move  by  Greece  To  Settle 
Prewar    Debts 702 

Hungary.  U.S.  Supports  Inscription  of  Item  on 
Hungary    (Yost) 709 

[nternational  Organizations  and  Conferences 

Calendar  of  International  Conferences  and  Meet- 
ings    704 

[nternational  Economic  and  Social  Affairs  Office 
Reorganized 710 

McKitterick  appointed  Director  of  Office  of  Inter- 

national  Economic  and  Social  Affairs 710 

°  ■  ^enate    Confirms    U.S.    Representatives    to    12th 

UNESCO   General   Conference 708 

<)ilat|UNESCO  and  U.S.  Policy:  High  Hopes  and  a  Hard 

[Look   (Battle,  Cleveland) 695 
very  Coast.    Wine  confirmed  as  Ambassador     .     .      710 
iabor.    Miss    Plunkett    appointed    labor    attach^, 
The  Hague 710 
libya.    President     Kennedy     Holds    Talks     With 
Leaders  of  Algeria  and  Libya  (texts  of  joint  com- 
muniques)       689 

N^etherlands.     Miss     Plunkett     appointed     labor 

attach^ 710 

Viger.    Good-Will     Mission     From     Niger    Visits 

Washington 701 

Presidential  Documents 

President  Kennedy  Accepts  Soviet  Congratulations 

on   Space  Flight 701 

President  Kennedy  Holds  Talks  With  Leaders  of 

Algeria  and  Libya 689 

President  Withholds  Approval  on  BiU  Relating  To 

Marking    Duties 703 

Science.    President  Kennedy  Accepts   Soviet  Con- 
gratulations on   Space  Flight    (Kennedy,  Khru- 
l|, shchev)       701 


>|ite* 
if  Sisl 


e  X                                            Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1219 

Treaty  Information.     Current  Actions 709 

Trinidad  and  Tobago.  Miner  confirmed  as  Am- 
bassador       710 

Uganda.  Security  Council  Recommends  U.N.  Ad- 
mit Uganda  to  Membership  (Stevenson)  .     .     .     .  705 

U.S.S.R.  President  Kennedy  Accepts  Soviet  Con- 
gratulations on  Space  Flight  (Kennedy,  Khru- 
shchev)         701 

United  Nations 

Security  Council  Recommends  U.N.  Admit  Uganda 

to  Membership   (Stevenson) 705 

United  States  Replies  to  Charges  Made  by  Presi- 
dent of  Cuba  (Stevenson) 706 

U.S.    Supports   Inscription    of   Item    on   Hungary 

(Tost) 709 

Name  Index 

al-Sanusi,  Hasan  al-Rida 689 

Battle,  Lucius  D 695 

Ben  Bella,  Ahmed 689 

Cleveland,   Harlan 698 

Kennedy,   President 689,  701,  703 

Khrushchev,  Nikita 701 

McKitterick,  Nathaniel  M 710 

Miner,  Robert  G 710 

Plunkett,  Margaret  L 710 

Riddleberger,  James  W 710 

Rostow,  W.  W 675 

Rusk,    Secretary 682,683 

Stevenson,  Adlal  E 705,  706 

Tuthill,  John  W 710 

Williams,  G.  Mennen 690 

Wine,   James 710 

Tost,  Charles  W 709 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  October  15-21 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office  of 
News,  Department  of  State,   Washington  25,   D.C. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  October  15  which  appear 
in  this  issue  of  the  Biilletin  are  Nos.  610  of  Oc- 
tober 9;  612  and  616  of  October  11;  and  618  and 
619  of  October  12. 

Subject 

U.S.  participation  in  international 
conferences. 

Blumeuthal :  "Trade  Problems  and 
the  Alliance  for  Progress." 

German  war  documents  volume  re- 
leased (rewrite). 

Gardner :  U.N.  Association  of  Mary- 
land (excerpts). 

Niger  good-will  mission   (rewrite). 

Itinerary  for  visit  of  Grand  Duchess 
of  Luxembourg. 

U.S.-Canadian  statement  on  lumber 
talks. 

Miss  Plunkett  sworn  in  as  labor  at- 
tach6  at  The  Hague  (biographic 
details). 

U.N.  Charter  exhibited  at  New  York. 

U.S.  welcomes  move  by  Greece  to  set- 
tle prewar  debts. 

20th  session  of  GATT  Contracting 
Parties  (rewrite). 

Rusk :  "Trade,  Investment,  and 
United  States  Foreign  Policy." 

Rusk :  letter  to  U.S.  ambassadors  on 
export  drive. 

Itinerary  for  visit  of  Uganda  prime 
minister. 

*Not  printed. 

fHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


No. 

Date 

*622 

10/15 

1623 

10/16 

t624 

10/15 

*625 

10/16 

626 

*627 

10/16 
10/17 

628 

10/17 

*629 

10/17 

1630 
631 

10/18 
10/19 

t632 

10/19 

633 

10/19 

634 

10/19 

*635 

10/19 

U.S.   COVERHHENT  PRINTING  0FFlCEil962 


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OFFICIAL    BUSINESS 


FIVE  GOALS  OF  U.S.  foreign  policy 

•  SECURITY  through  STRENGTH 

•  PROGRESS  through  PARTNERSHIP 

•  REVOLUTION  of  FREEDOM 

•  COMMUNITY  under  LAW 

•  PEACE  through  PERSEVERANCE 

What  U.S.  foreign  policy  is,  Liow  it  works,  and  the  goals  it  is  de- 
signed to  achieve,  are  defined  in  this  37-page  pamphlet.  It  contains 
the  transcript  of  a  television  interview,  September  24,  1962,  with 
Dean  Rusk,  Secretary  of  State;  Robert  S.  McNamara,  Secretary  of 
Defense ;  George  W.  Ball,  Under  Secretary  of  State ;  Fowler  Hamil- 
ton, Administrator,  Agency  for  International  Development ;  Adlai  E. 
Stevenson,  U.S.  Permanent  Representative  to  the  United  Nations; 
and  W.  W.  Rostow,  Comiselor  and  Chairman  of  the  Policy  Planning 
Council,  Department  of  State. 


Publication  7432 


20  cents 


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To:  Supt.  of  Documents 
Govt.  Printing  Office 
Washington  25,  D.C. 

Enclosed  find: 


Please  send  me  copies  of  FIVE  GOALS  OF  VS.  FOREIGN  POLICY 


Name: 

Street  Address: 

City,  Zone,  and  State: 


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Supt.  of  Docs.) 


THE    DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


ICIAL 

KLY  RECORD 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1220 


November  12,  1962 


THE  SOVIET  THREAT  TO  THE  AMERICAS  •  Address 

by  President  Kennedy ' '^^ 

AMERICAN    REPUBLICS    ACT    TO    HALT    SOVIET 

THREAT      TO      HEMISPHERE        •        Statement    by 
Secretary  Rusk  and  Text  of  Resolution 720 

U.N.    SECURITY   COUNCIL   HEARS   U.S.   CHARGES 
OF   SOVIET  MILITARY  BUILDUP  IN   CUBA     • 

Statements  by  Ambassador  Adlai  E.  Stevenson 7-3 

UNITED   STATES  AND   SOVIET  UNION  AGREE  ON 
FORMULA    FOR    ENDING    CUBAN    CRISIS      • 

711 
Exchange  of  Messages '  ''^ 


fED  STATES 
lEIGN  POLICY 


For  index  see  inside  hack  cover 


THE    DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1220  •  Publication  7452 
November  12,  1962 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

Washington  25,  D.C. 

Price: 

52  issues,  domestic  $8.50,  foreign  $12.25 

Sincle  copy,  25  cents 

Use  of  funds  for  printlnE  of  (tils  publica- 
tion approved  by  the  Director  ol  the  Bureau 
of  the  BudRct  (January  19.  I9C1). 

Note:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
copyrighted  and  Items  contained  herein  may 
be  reprinted.  Citation  of  tlie  Dep*rt.me\t 
OF  State  Bulletin  as  the  source  will  be 
appreciated.  The  Bulletin  Is  indexed  In  the 
Readers'  Ouldo  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  iveekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  oj  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public 
and  interested  agencies  of  the 
Government  ivith  information  on 
developments  in  the  field  of  foreign 
relations  and  on  the  ivork  of  the 
Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service.  The  BULLETIN  includes  se- 
lected press  releases  on  foreign  policy, 
issued  by  the  IT  hite  House  and  the 
Department,  and  statements  and  ad- 
dresses made  by  the  President  and  by 
the  Secretary  of  State  and  other 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  tcell  as 
special  articles  on  larious  phases  of 
international  affairs  and  the  func- 
tions of  the  Department.  Informa- 
tion is  included  concerning  treaties 
and  international  agreements  to 
which  the  United  States  is  or  may 
become  a  party  and  treaties  of  gen- 
eral international  interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  legis- 
lative material  in  the  field  of  inter- 
national relations  are  listed  currently. 


The  Soviet  Threat  to  the  Americas 


Address  by  President  Kennedy  ^ 


Good  evening,  my  fellow  citizens.  This  Gov- 
ernment, as  promised,  has  maintained  the  closest 
surveillance  of  the  Soviet  military  buildup  on  the 
island  of  Cuba.  Within  the  past  week  unmistak- 
able evidence  has  established  the  fact  that  a  series 
of  offensive  missile  sites  is  now  in  preparation  on 
that  imprisoned  island.  The  purpose  of  these 
bases  can  be  none  other  than  to  provide  a  nuclear 
strike  capability  against  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

Upon  receiving  the  first  preliminary  hard  infor- 
mation of  this  nature  last  Tuesday  morning  [Oc- 
tober 16]  at  9 :00  a.m.,  I  directed  that  our  surveil- 
lance be  stepped  up.  And  having  now  confirmed 
and  completed  our  evaluation  of  the  evidence  and 
our  decision  on  a  course  of  action,  this  Govern- 
ment feels  obliged  to  report  this  new  crisis  to  you 
in  fullest  detail. 

The  characteristics  of  these  new  missile  sites 
indicate  two  distinct  types  of  installations.  Sev- 
eral of  them  include  medium-range  ballistic  mis- 
siles capable  of  carrying  a  nuclear  warhead  for  a 
distance  of  more  than  1,000  nautical  miles.  Each 
of  these  missiles,  in  short,  is  capable  of  striking 
Washington,  D.C.,  the  Panama  Canal,  Cape  Ca- 
naveral, Mexico  City,  or  any  other  city  in  the 
southeastern  part  of  the  United  States,  in  Central 
America,  or  in  the  Caribbean  area. 

Additional  sites  not  yet  completed  appear  to  be 
designed  for  intermediate-range  ballistic  missiles 
capable  of  traveling  more  than  twice  as  far — and 
thus  capable  of  striking  most  of  the  major  cities  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere,  ranging  as  far  north  as 
Hudson  Bay,  Canada,  and  as  far  south  as  Lima, 
Peru.  In  addition,  jet  bombers,  capable  of  carry- 
ing nuclear  weapons,  are  now  being  uncrated  and 


*  Delivered  from  the  White  House  by  television  and 
adio  on  Oct.  22  (White  House  press  release;  as-delivered 
:ext). 

November   72,   1962 


assembled  in  Cuba,  while  the  necessary  air  bases 
are  being  prepared. 

This  urgent  transformation  of  Cuba  into  an  im- 
portant strategic  base — by  the  presence  of  these 
large,  long-range,  and  clearly  offensive  weapons  of 
sudden  mass  destruction — constitutes  an  explicit 
threat  to  the  peace  and  security  of  all  the  Amer- 
icas, in  flagrant  and  deliberate  defiance  of  the  Rio 
Pact  of  191:7,^  the  traditions  of  this  nation  and 
hemisphere,  the  Joint  Resolution  of  the  87th  Con- 
gress,^ the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations,  and  my 
own  public  warnings  to  the  Soviets  on  September 
4:^  and  13.=^ 

Soviet  Contradictions  Cited 

This  action  also  contradicts  the  repeated  assur- 
ances of  Soviet  spokesmen,  both  publicly  and  pri- 
vately delivered,  that  the  arms  buildup  in  Cuba 
would  retain  its  original  defensive  character  and 
that  the  Soviet  Union  had  no  need  or  desire  to 
station  strategic  missiles  on  the  territory  of  any 
other  nation. 

The  size  of  this  undertaking  makes  clear  that  it 
has  been  planned  for  some  months.  Yet  only  last 
month,  after  I  had  made  clear  the  distinction  be- 
tween any  introduction  of  ground-to-ground 
missiles  and  the  existence  of  defensive  antiaircraft 
missiles,  the  Soviet  Government  publicly  stated 
on  September  11  that,  and  I  quote,  "The  arma- 
ments and  military  equipment  sent  to  Cuba  are 
designed  exclusively  for  defensive  purposes,"  and, 
and  I  quote  the  Soviet  Government,  "There  is 
no  need  for  the  Soviet  Government  to  shift  its 
weapons  for  a  retaliatory  blow  to  any  other  coun- 

^  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept.  21,  1047,  p.  565. 
'  Ibid..  Oct.  22,  1962,  p.  597. 
*  nid..  Sept.  24, 1962,  p.  450. 
^/6(d.,  Oct.  1,1962,  p.  481. 


715 


try,  for  instance  Cuba,"  and  that,  and  I  quote  the 
Government,  "The  Soviet  Union  has  so  powerful 
rockets  to  carry  these  nuclear  warheads  that  there 
is  no  need  to  search  for  sites  for  them  beyond  the 
boundaries  of  the  Soviet  Union."  That  statement 
was  false. 

Only  last  Thursday,  as  evidence  of  this  rapid 
offensive  buildup  was  already  in  my  hand,  Soviet 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  told  me  in  my  office 
that  he  was  instructed  to  make  it  clear  once  again, 
as  he  said  his  Government  had  already  done,  that 
Soviet  assistance  to  Cuba,  and  I  quote,  "pursued 
solely  the  pui-pose  of  contributing  to  the  defense 
capabilities  of  Cuba,"  that,  and  I  quote  him, 
"training  by  Soviet  specialists  of  Cuban  nationals 
in  handling  defensive  armaments  was  by  no  means 
offensive,"  and  that  "if  it  were  otherwise,"  Mr. 
Gromyko  went  on,  "the  Soviet  Government  would 
never  become  involved  in  rendering  such  assist- 
ance."   That  statement  also  was  false. 

No  Room  for  Deception 

Neither  the  United  States  of  America  nor  the 
world  community  of  nations  can  tolerate  deliber- 
ate deception  and  offensive  threats  on  the  part  of 
any  nation,  large  or  small.  We  no  longer  live  in 
a  world  where  only  the  actual  firing  of  weapons 
represents  a  sufficient  challenge  to  a  nation's 
security  to  constitute  maximum  peril.  Nuclear 
weapons  are  so  destructive  and  ballistic  missiles 
are  so  swift  that  any  substantially  increased  pos- 
sibility of  their  use  or  any  sudden  change  in  their 
deployment  may  well  be  regarded  as  a  definite 
threat  to  peace. 

For  many  years  both  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
United  States,  recognizing  this  fact,  have  deployed 
strategic  nuclear  weapons  with  great  care,  never 
upsetting  the  precarious  status  quo  which  insured 
that  these  weapons  would  not  be  used  in  the 
absence  of  some  vital  challenge.  Our  own  strate- 
gic missiles  have  never  been  transferred  to  the 
territory  of  any  other  nation  under  a  cloak  of 
secrecy  and  deception;  and  our  history,  unlike 
that  of  the  Soviets  since  the  end  of  "World  War 
II,  demonstrates  that  we  have  no  desire  to  domi- 
nate or  conquer  any  other  nation  or  impose  our 
system  upon  its  people.  Nevertheless,  American 
citizens  have  become  adjusted  to  living  daily  on 
the  bull's  eye  of  Soviet  missiles  located  inside  the 
U.S.S.R.  or  in  submarines. 

In  that  sense  missiles  in  Cuba  add  to  an  already 


716 


clear  and  present  danger — although  it  should  be 
noted  the  nations  of  Latin  America  have  never 
previously  been  subjected  to  a  potential  nuclear 
threat. 

But  this  secret,  swift,  and  extraordinai-y  build- 
up of  Communist  missiles — in  an  ai'ea  well  known 
to  have  a  special  and  historical  relationship  to 
the  United  States  and  the  nations  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  in  violation  of  Soviet  assurances,  and 
in  defiance  of  American  and  hemispheric  policy — 
this  sudden,  clandestine  decision  to  station  strate- 
gic weapons  for  the  first  time  outside  of  Soviet 
soil — is  a  deliberately  provocative  and  unjusti- 
fied change  in  the  status  quo  which  cannot  be 
accepted  by  this  country  if  our  courage  and  our 
commitments  are  ever  to  be  trusted  again  by 
either  friend  or  foe. 

The  1930's  taught  us  a  clear  lesson :  Aggressive 
conduct,  if  allowed  to  grow  unchecked  and  un- 
challenged, ultimately  leads  to  war.  This  nation 
is  opposed  to  war.  We  are  also  true  to  our  word. 
Our  unswerving  objective,  therefore,  must  be  to 
prevent  the  use  of  these  missiles  against  this  or 
any  other  country  and  to  secure  their  withdrawal 
or  elimination  from  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

Our  policy  has  been  one  of  patience  and  re- 
straint, as  befits  a  peaceful  and  powerful  nation, 
which  leads  a  worldwide  alliance.  We  have  been 
determined  not  to  be  diverted  from  our  central 
concerns  by  mere  irritants  and  fanatics.  But  now 
further  action  is  required — and  it  is  underway; 
and  these  actions  may  only  be  the  beginning.  We 
will  not  prematurely  or  unnecessarily  risk  the 
costs  of  worldwide  nuclear  war  in  which  even  the 
fruits  of  victory  would  be  ashes  in  our  mouth — 
but  neither  will  we  shrink  from  that  risk  at  any 
time  it  must  be  faced. 

Initial  Steps  Proposed 

Acting,  therefore,  in  the  defense  of  our  own  se- 
curity and  of  the  entire  Western  Hemisphere,  and 
under  the  authority  entrusted  to  me  by  the  Con- 
stitution as  endoreed  by  the  resolution  of  the  Con- 
gress, I  have  directed  that  the  following  initial 
steps  be  taken  immediately : 

First:  To  halt  this  offensive  buildup,  a  strict 
quarantine  on  all  offensive  military  equipment 
under  shipment  to  Cuba  is  being  initiated.  All 
ships  of  any  kind  bound  for  Cuba  from  whatever 
nation  or  port  will,  if  found  to  contain  cargoes  of 
offensive  weapons,  be  turned  back.     This  quaran- 

Department  of  Sfofe   Bulletin 


'ove, 


Interdiction  of  the  Delivery  of  Offensive  Weapons  to  Cuba 


A     PROCLAMATION' 

Whereas  the  peace  of  the  world  and  the  security 
of  the  United  States  and  of  all  American  States  are 
endangered  by  reason  of  the  establishment  by  the 
Sino-Soviet  powers  of  an  offensive  military  capability 
in  Cuba,  including  bases  for  ballistic  missiles  with  a 
potential  range  covering  most  of  North  and  South 
America ; 

Whereas  by  a  Joint  Resolution  passed  by  the  Con- 
gress of  the  United  States  and  approved  on  October  3, 
1962,  it  was  declared  that  the  United  States  is  deter- 
mined to  prevent  by  whatever  means  may  be  neces- 
sary, including  the  use  of  arms,  the  Marxist-Leninist 
regime  in  Cuba  from  extending,  by  force  or  the  threat 
of  force,  its  aggressive  or  subversive  activities  to  any 
part  of  this  hemisphere,  and  to  prevent  in  Cuba  the 
creation  or  use  of  an  externally  supported  military 
capability  endangering  the  security  of  the  United 
States ;  and 

Whereas  the  Organ  of  Consultation  of  the  American 
Republics  meeting  in  Washington  on  October  23,  1962, 
recommended  that  the  Member  States,  in  accordance 
with  Articles  6  and  8  of  the  Inter-American  Treaty  of 
Reciprocal  Assistance,  tal<e  all  measures,  individually 
and  collectively,  including  the  use  of  armed  force, 
which  they  may  deem  necessary  to  ensure  that  the 
Government  of  Cuba  cannot  continue  to  receive  from 
the  Sino-Soviet  powers  military  material  and  related 
supplies  which  may  threaten  the  peace  and  security 
of  the  Continent  and  to  prevent  the  missiles  in  Cuba 
with  offensive  capability  from  ever  becoming  an  active 
threat  to  the  peace  and  security  of  the  Continent : 

Now,  THEREFORE,  I,  JoHN  F.  KENNEDY,  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  acting  under  and  b,\ 
virtue  of  the  authority  conferred  upon  me  by  the  Con- 
stitution and  statutes  of  the  United  States,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  aforementioned  resolutions  of  the 
United  States  Congress  and  of  the  Organ  of  Consulta- 
tion of  the  American  Republics,  and  to  defend  the 
security  of  the  United  States,  do  hereby  proclaim  that 
the  forces  under  my  command  are  ordered,  beginning 
at  2:00  p.m.  Greenwich  time  October  24,  1962,  to  in- 
terdict, subject  to  the  instructions  herein  contained, 
the  delivery  of  offensive  weapons  and  associated  ma- 
teriel to  Cuba. 

For  the  purposes  of  this  Proclamation,  the  following 
are  declared  to  be  prohibited  materiel : 

Surface-to-surface  missiles ;  bomber  aircraft ;  bombs, 
air-to-surface  rockets  and  guided  missiles;  warheads 
for  any  of  the  above  weapons;  mechanical  or  elec- 
tronic equipment  to  support  or  operate  the  above 
items ;   and   any   other  classes   of  materiel  hereafter 


'  No.  3504 ;  27  Fed.  Reg.  10401. 


designated  by  the  Secretary  of  Defense  for  the  pur- 
pose of  effectuating  this  Proclamation. 

To  enforce  this  order,  the  Secretary  of  Defense  shall 
take  appropriate  measures  to  prevent  the  delivery  of 
prohibited  materiel  to  Cuba,  employing  the  land,  sea 
and  air  forces  of  the  United  States  in  cooperation  with 
any  forces  that  may  be  made  available  by  other  Ameri- 
can States. 

The  Secretary  of  Defense  may  make  such  regula- 
tions and  issue  such  directives  as  he  deems  necessary 
to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  this  order,  including  the 
designation,  within  a  reasonable  distance  of  Cuba,  of 
prohibited  or  restricted  zones  and  of  prescribed 
routes. 

Any  vessel  or  craft  which  may  be  proceeding  toward 
Cuba  may  be  intercepted  and  may  be  directed  to  iden- 
tify itself,  its  cargo,  equipment  and  stores  and  its  ports 
of  call,  to  stop,  to  lie  to,  to  submit  to  visit  and  search, 
or  to  proceed  as  directed.  Any  vessel  or  craft  which 
fails  or  refuses  to  respond  to  or  comply  with  directions 
shall  be  subject  to  being  taken  into  custody.  Any  ves- 
sel or  craft  which  it  is  believed  is  en  route  to  Cuba 
and  may  be  carrying  prohibited  materiel  or  may  itself 
constitute  such  materiel  shall,  wherever  possible,  be 
directed  to  proceed  to  another  destination  of  its  own 
choice  and  shall  be  taken  into  custody  if  it  fails  or 
refuses  to  obey  such  directions.  All  vessels  or  craft 
taken  into  custody  shall  be  sent  into  a  port  of  the 
United  States  for  appropriate  disposition. 

In  carrying  out  this  order,  force  shall  not  be  used 
except  in  case  of  failure  or  refusal  to  comply  with 
directions,  or  with  regulations  or  directives  of  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  issued  hereunder,  after  reason- 
able efforts  have  been  made  to  communicate  them  to 
the  vessel  or  craft,  or  in  case  of  self-defense.  In  any 
case,  force  shall  be  used  only  to  the  extent  necessary. 

In  witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand 
and  caused  the  seal  of  the  United  States  of  America  to 
be  affixed. 

Done  in  the  City  of  Washington  this  twenty-third 

day  of  October  in  the  year  of  our  Lord,  nine- 

[SEAL]     teen    hundred    and    sixty-two,     and    of    the 

Independence  of  the  United  States  of  America 

the  one  hundred  and  eighty-seventh. 


<vi 


By  the  President : 
Dean  Rusk, 
Secretary  of  State. 


November   12,    1962 


7\7 


tine  will  be  extended,  if  needed,  to  other  types  of 
cargo  and  carriers.  We  are  not  at  this  time,  how- 
ever, denying  the  necessities  of  life  as  tlie  Soviets 
attempted  to  do  in  their  Berlin  blockade  of  1948. 

Second:  I  have  directed  the  continued  and  in- 
creased close  surveillance  of  Cuba  and  its  military 
buildup.  The  Foreign  Ministers  of  the  OAS 
[Organization  of  American  States]  in  their  com- 
munique of  October  3  rejected  secrecy  on  such  mat- 
ters in  this  hemisphere.  Should  these  offensive 
military  preparations  continue,  tlius  increasing  the 
threat  to  the  hemisphere,  further  action  will  be 
justified.  I  have  directed  the  Armed  Forces  to 
prepare  for  any  eventualities;  and  I  trust  that,  in 
the  interest  of  both  the  Cuban  people  and  the  So- 
viet teclmicians  at  the  sites,  the  hazards  to  all  con- 
cerned of  continuing  this  threat  will  be  recognized. 

Third:  It  shall  be  the  policy  of  this  nation  to 
regard  any  nuclear  missile  launched  from  Cuba 
against  any  nation  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  as 
an  attack  by  the  Soviet  Union  on  the  United 
States,  requiring  a  full  retaliatory  response  upon 
the  Soviet  Union. 

Fourth:  As  a  necessaiy  military  precaution  I 
have  reinforced  our  base  at  Guantanamo,  evacu- 
ated today  the  dependents  of  our  personnel  there, 
and  ordered  additional  military  imits  to  be  on  a 
standby  alert  basis. 

Fifth:  We  are  calling  tonight  for  an  immedi- 
ate meeting  of  the  Organ  of  Consultation,  under 
the  Organization  of  American  States,  to  consider 
this  threat  to  hemisplieric  security  and  to  invoke 
articles  6  and  8  of  the  Rio  Treaty  in  support  of  all 
necessary  action.  The  United  Nations  Cliarter 
allows  for  regional  security  arrangements — and 
the  nations  of  this  hemisphere  decided  long  ago 
against  the  military  presence  of  outside  powers. 
Our  other  allies  around  the  world  have  also  been 
alerted. 

Sixth:  Under  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations,  we  are  asking  tonight  that  an  emergency 
meeting  of  the  Security  Council  be  convoked  with- 
out delay  to  take  action  against  this  latest  Soviet 
threat  to  world  peace.  Our  resolution  will  call  for 
the  prompt  dismantling  and  withdrawal  of  all  of- 
fensive weapons  in  Cuba,  under  the  supervision  of 
U.X.  observers,  before  the  quarantine  can  be  lifted. 

Seventh  and  finally:  I  call  upon  Chairman 
Khrushchev  to  halt  and  eliminate  this  clandestine, 
reckless,  and  provocative  tlireat  to  world  peace 
and  to  stable  relations  between  our  two  nations. 


I  call  upon  him  further  to  abandon  this  course 
of  world  domination  and  to  join  in  an  historic 
effort  to  end  tlie  perilous  arms  race  and  transform 
the  history  of  man.  He  has  an  opportunity  now 
to  move  the  world  back  from  the  abj'ss  of 
destruction — by  returning  to  his  Government's 
own  words  that  it  had  no  need  to  station  missiles 
outside  its  own  territory,  and  witlidrawing  these 
weapons  from  Cuba — by  refraining  from  any 
action  which  will  widen  or  deepen  the  present 
crisis — and  then  by  participating  in  a  search  for 
peaceful  and  permanent  solutions. 

This  nation  is  prepared  to  present  its  case 
against  the  Soviet  threat  to  peace,  and  our  own 
proposals  for  a  peaceful  world,  at  any  time  and  in 
any  forum — in  the  OAS,  in  the  United  Nations, 
or  in  any  other  meeting  that  could  be  useful — 
without  limiting  our  freedom  of  action. 

U.S.  Wishes  Peace  With  U.S.S.R. 

We  have  in  the  past  made  strenuous  efforts  to 
limit  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons.  We  have 
proposed  the  elimination  of  all  arms  and  military 
bases  in  a  fair  and  effective  disarmament  treaty.^ 
We  are  prepared  to  discuss  new  proposals  for  the 
removal  of  tensions  on  both  sides — including  the 
possibilities  of  a  genuinely  independent  Cuba,  free 
to  determine  its  own  destiny.  We  have  no  wish  to 
war  with  the  Soviet  Union,  for  we  are  a  peaceful 
people  who  desire  to  live  in  peace  with  all  other 
peoples. 

But  it  is  difficult  to  settle  or  even  discuss  these 
problems  in  an  atmosphere  of  intimidation.  Tliat 
is  why  this  latest  Soviet  threat — or  any  other 
threat  which  is  made  either  independently  or 
in  response  to  our  actions  this  week — must  and 
will  be  met  with  determination.  Any  hostile  move 
anywhere  in  the  world  against  the  safety  and 
freedom  of  peoples  to  whom  we  are  committed — 
including  in  particular  the  brave  people  of  West 
Berlin — will  be  met  by  whatever  action  is  needed. 

To  the  People  of  Cuba 

Finally,  I  want  to  say  a  few  words  to  the  captive 
people  of  Cuba,  to  wliom  tliis  speech  is  being  di- 
rectly carried  by  special  radio  facilities.  I  speak 
to  you  as  a  friend,  as  one  who  knows  of  your  deep 
attachment  to  your  fatherland,  as  one  who  sliares 
your  aspirations  for  liberty  and  justice  for  all. 

*  For  text,  see  Hid.,  May  7,  1962,  p.  747. 


718 


Department  of  State   Bulletin     •«»( 


And  I  have  watched  and  the  American  people 
have  watched  with  deep  sorrow  liow  your  nation- 
alist revolution  was  betrayed  and  how  your 
fatherland  fell  under  foreign  domination.  Now 
your  leaders  are  no  longer  Cuban  leaders  inspired 
by  Cuban  ideals.  They  are  puppets  and  agents 
of  an  international  conspiracy  which  has  turned 
Cuba  against  your  friends  and  neighbors  in  the 
Americas — and  turned  it  into  the  first  Latin 
American  country  to  become  a  target  for  nuclear 
war,  the  first  Latin  American  country  to  have 
these  weapons  on  its  soil. 

These  new  weapons  are  not  in  your  interest. 
They  contribute  nothing  to  your  peace  and  well- 
being.  They  can  only  undermine  it.  But  this 
country  has  no  wish  to  cause  you  to  suffer  or  to 
impose  any  system  upon  you.  We  know  tliat  your 
lives  and  land  are  being  used  as  pawns  by  those 
wlio  deny  you  freedom. 

Many  times  in  the  past  the  Cuban  people  have 
risen  to  throw  out  tyrants  who  destroyed  their 
liberty.  And  I  have  no  doubt  that  most  Cubans 
today  look  foi-ward  to  the  time  when  they  will  be 
truly  fi-ee — free  from  foreign  domination,  fi-ee  to 
choose  their  own  leaders,  free  to  select  their  own 
system,  free  to  own  their  own  land,  free  to  speak 
and  write  and  worship  without  fear  or  degra- 
dation. And  then  shall  Cuba  be  welcomed  back 
to  the  society  of  free  nations  and  to  the  associations 
of  this  hemisphere. 

U.S.  Chooses  Difficult  Path 

My  fellow  citizens,  let  no  one  doubt  that  this  is 
a  difficult  and  dangerous  effort  on  which  we  have 
set  out.  No  one  can  foresee  precisely  what  course 
it  will  take  or  what  costs  or  casualties  will  be  in- 
urred.  Many  months  of  sacrifice  and  self-disci- 
Dline  lie  ahead — montlis  in  which  both  our  pa- 
ience  and  our  will  will  be  tested,  months  in  which 
nany  threats  and  denunciations  will  keep  us 
iware  of  our  dangers.  But  the  greatest  danger  of 
ill  would  be  to  do  nothing. 

The  path  we  have  chosen  for  the  present  is  full 
)f  hazards,  as  all  paths  are ;  but  it  is  the  one  most 
onsistent  with  our  character  and  courage  as  a 
lation  and  our  commitments  around  the  world. 
The  cost  of  freedom  is  always  high — but  Ameri- 
;ans  have  always  paid  it.  And  one  path  we  shall 
lever  choose,  and  that  is  the  path  of  surrender  or 
ubmission. 

Our  goal  is  not  the  victory  of  might  but  the  vin- 


Wi« 


AN    EXECUTIVE    ORDER' 

Assigning  Authority  With  Respect  to  Ordebing 
Persons  and  Units  in  the  Ready  Reserve  to 
Active  Duty  and  With  Respect  to  Extension 
OF  Enlistments  and  Other  Periods  of  Service 
IN  the  Armed  Forces 

By  virtue  of  the  authority  vested  in  me  by  the 
Joint  Resolution  of  October  3,  1962  (Public  Law 
87-73G),  and  by  section  301  of  title  3  of  the  United 
States  Code,  and  as  President  of  the  United  States, 
it  Is  hereby  ordered  as  follows  : 

Section  1.  The  Secretary  of  Defense,  and,  when 
designated  by  him  for  this  purpose,  any  of  the  Secre- 
taries of  the  military  departments  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Defense,  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
with  respect  to  the  Coast  Guard  are  hereby  author- 
ized and  empowered  to  exercise  the  authority  vested 
in  the  President  until  February  28,  1963,  by  section 
1  of  the  Act  of  October  3,  1962  (Public  Law  87-736) 
to  order,  without  the  consent  of  the  persons  con- 
cerned, any  unit,  or  any  member,  of  the  Ready 
Reserve  of  an  armed  force  to  active  duty  for  not 
more  than  twelve  consecutive  months,  provided 
there  are  not  more  than  150,000  members  of  the 
Ready  Reserve  thereby  on  active  duty  (other  than 
for  training)  without  their  consent  at  any  one  time. 
Sec.  2.  In  pursuance  of  the  provisions  of  section  2 
of  the  said  Joint  Resolution  of  October  3,  1962,  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  and  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  with  respect  to  the  Coast  Guard  are  hereby 
authorized  to  extend  enlistments,  appointments,  pe- 
riods of  active  duty,  periods  of  active  duty  for  train- 
ing, periods  of  obligated  service  or  other  military 
status  in  any  component  of  an  armed  force  or  in  the 
National  Guard  that  expire  before  February  28, 
1963,  for  not  more  than  twelve  months.  However, 
if  the  enlistment  of  a  member  of  the  Ready  Reserve 
who  is  ordered  to  active  duty  under  section  1  of  this 
Executive  Order  would  expire  after  February  28, 
1963,  but  before  he  has  served  the  entire  period  for 
which  he  was  so  ordered  to  active  duty,  his  enlist- 
ment may  be  extended  until  the  last  day  of  that 
period. 

Sec.  3.  In  pursuance  of  the  provisions  of  section 
3  of  the  said  Joint  Resolution  of  October  3,  1962, 
no  member  of  the  armed  forces  who  was  involun- 
tarily ordered  to  active  duty  or  whose  period  of 
active  duty  was  extended  under  the  Act  of  August 
1,  1961,  Public  Law  87-117  (75  Stat.  242),  may  be 
involuntarily  ordered  to  active  duty  under  this 
Executive  Order. 


The  White  House, 
October  23,  1962. 


'  No.  11058 ;  27  Fed.  Reg.  10403. 


November   12,    ?962 


719 


dication  of  right — not  peace  at  the  expense  of 
freedom,  but  both  peace  and  freedom,  here  in  this 
hemisphere  and,  we  hope,  around  the  world.  God 
willing,  that  goal  will  be  achieved. 


American  Republics  Act  To  Halt 
Soviet  Threat  to  Hemisphere 

Following  is  a  statement  made  hy  Secretary 
Rusk  at  a  special  Tneeting  of  the  Council  of  the 
Organization  of  American  States  on  Octoher  23^ 
together  with  the  text  of  a  resolution  adopted  on 
that  day  hy  the  OAS  Council  7neeting  as  the  Pro- 
visional Organ  of  Consultation. 

STATEMENT  BY  SECRETARY  RUSK 

Press  release  640  dated  October  23 

Three  weeks  ago  today,  I  met  with  your  foreign 
ministers  to  consider  the  serious  new  situation 
created  by  the  Soviet  military  buildup  in  Cuba. 
Most  of  you  participated  in  that  meeting.  You 
will  recall  the  discussion  which  took  place  culmi- 
nating in  a  consensus  on  many  important  aspects 
of  the  problem  expressed  in  the  final  communique.' 
In  that  document  the  foreign  ministers  unani- 
mously stated  that  the  efforts  of  the  Sino-Soviet 
bloc  to  convert  the  island  of  Cuba  into  an  armed 
base  for  Communist  penetration  of  the  Americas 
was  the  most  urgent  problem  confronting  the  hem- 
isphere. They  also  found  that  the  organs  of  our 
regional  system  which  have  responsibilities  to 
deal  with  the  situation  created  by  the  Conununist 
regime  in  Cuba  should  intensify  their  efforts  and 
should  stand  in  readiness  to  consider  what  meas- 
ures, beyond  those  already  authorized,  might  be 
required.  And  the  foreign  ministers  also  observed 
that  it  was  desirable  to  intensify  surveillance  of 
arms  deliveries  to  Cuba  in  order  to  prevent  the 
secret  accumulation  in  the  island  of  arms  that  can 
be  used  for  offensive  purposes  against  the 
hemisphere. 

"WHien  the  foreign  ministers  prepared  the  com- 
munique, there  was  no  indication  that  the  arms 
buildup  was  taking  on  an  offensive  character.  To- 
day we  have  incontrovertible  evidence  that  despite 
repeated  warnings  the  Castro  regime  is  permitting 
the  e-stablishment  of  medium-  and  intermediatc- 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  22,  1962,  p.  508. 


720 


range  missile  bases  on  Cuban  territory  by  the  So- 
viet Union.  The  facts  are  clear  and  incontrovert- 
ible and  were  set  forth  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  in  his  statement  last  evening.  And 
these  facts  have  been,  of  course,  also  conveyed  to 
you  by  other  means  directly  and  to  your  govern- 
ments. These  facts  demonstrate  that  the  U.S.S.R. 
is  making  a  major  military  investment  in  Cuba 
with  advanced  weapons  systems  with  substantial 
offensive  capability. 

Wliat  do  these  facts  mean  to  the  independent 
nations  of  this  hemisphere?  Their  significance  is 
immediate,  direct,  and  perhaps  fateful  to  the 
maintenance  of  that  independence.  The  principal 
implications  are : 

First:  The  Communist  regime  in  Cuba  with 
the  complicity  of  its  Soviet  mentors  has  deceived 
the  hemisphere,  iinder  the  cloak  of  secrecy  and 
with  loud  protestations  of  arming  for  .self-defense, 
in  allowing  an  extracontinental  power,  bent  on  de- 
struction of  the  national  independence  and  demo- 
cratic aspirations  of  all  our  peoples,  to  establish  an 
offensive  military  foothold  in  the  heart  of  the  hem- 
isphere. I  will  not  go  into  a  detailed  history  of 
this  partnership  in  deceit.  Sufficient  to  recall 
that  President  Dorticos  [Osvaldo  Dorticos  Tor- 
rado  of  Cuba]  in  a  speech  before  the  United  Na- 
tions General  Assembly  on  October  8  said :  "We 
shall  continue  to  strengthen  our  military  defense, 
to  defend  ourselves,  not  to  attack  anyone."  The 
Soviet  Government  on  its  part  said  in  an  official 
statement  on  September  11 :  "The  armaments  and 
military  equipment  sent  to  Cuba  are  designed  ex- 
clusively for  defensive  purposes."  The  statement 
added  that  Soviet  rockets  are  so  powerful  that 
"there  is  no  need  to  search  for  sites  for  them  be- 
yond the  boundaries  of  the  Soviet  Union."  And 
last  week  the  Soviet  Foreign  Minister  [Andrei  A. 
Gromyko]  in  his  talks  with  President  Kennedy  in 
the  Wliite  House  said  that  Soviet  assistance  to 
Cuba  "pursued  solely  the  purpose  of  contributing 
to  the  defense  capabilities  of  Cuba,"  that  "train- 
ing by  Soviet  specialists  of  Cuban  nationals  in 
handling  defensive  armaments  was  by  no  means 
offensive,"  and  that  "if  it  were  otherwise,  the  So- 
viet Government  would  never  become  involved  in 
rendering  such  assistance." 

Second:  This  offensive  capability  is  of  such  a 
nature  that  it  can  reach  into  the  far  comers  of 
our  hemisplicre  with  its  destructive  force.  These 
new  weai^ons  arriving  in  Cuba  are  not  oidy  di- 

Department  of  Stale  Bulletin 


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rected  against  the  United  States.  Let  there  be 
no  misunderstanding.  There  are  other  strategic 
targets  in  this  hemisphere — in  your  countries — 
which  they  can  devastate  with  their  lethal  loads. 
The  missile  sites  in  being  for  medium-range  bal- 
listic missiles  are  capable  of  carrying  nuclear  war- 
heads as  far  west  as  Mexico  City,  as  far  south  as 
the  Panama  Canal  or  Caracas,  and  as  far  north  as 
Washington,  D.C.  The  new  sites  for  intermedi- 
ate-range ballistic  missiles  in  Cuba  will  be  able  to 
carry  mass  destruction  to  most  of  the  major  cities 
in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  In  the  face  of  tliis 
rapid  buildup,  no  coimti-y  of  this  hemisphere  can 
feel  secure,  either  from  direct  attack  or  from  per- 
sistent blackmail. 

Third:  This  new  Soviet  intervention  means  a 
further  tightening  of  the  enslavement  of  the  Cu- 
jan  people  by  the  Soviet  power  to  which  the  Castro 
egime  has  surrendered  the  Cuban  national  herit- 
ige.  It  signifies  for  the  rest  of  the  hemisphere 
I  vast  strengthening  of  the  offensive  capability  of 
,he  Communist  system,  which  talks  of  peaceful 
ioexistence  by  which  it  appears  to  mean  softening 
'or  subjugation,  which  uses  the  slogan  of  national 
iberation  to  ciiish  every  legitimate  national 
ispiration. 

Fourth:  The  Soviet  intervention  in  this  hemi- 
iphere  with  major  offensive  weapons  challenges  as 
lever  before  the  determination  of  the  American 
governments  to  carry  out  hemispheric  commit- 
Qents  solemnly  assumed  in  inter- American  trea- 
ies  and  resolutions  for  the  defense  of  the  peace 
nd  security  of  the  nations  of  this  hemisphere 
gainst  extracontinental  aggression  or  interven- 
ion.  Here  again  I  hardly  need  to  review  them 
ecause  they  are  familiar  to  us  all.  Beginning 
rith  the  Rio  Treaty  in  1947,^  and  culminating  in 
le  decisions  of  the  foreign  ministers  in  Pmita 
el  Este  ^  and  in  their  communique  issued  here 
'* "  lis  month,  there  has  been  a  mounting  conviction 
n  the  part  of  the  American  peoples  and  their 
overnments  that  the  growing  intervention  of  the 
iternational  Communist  movement  in  this  hemi- 
jhere  must  stop  and  that  the  individual  and  col- 
sctive  means  available  within  the  regional  sys- 
jm  should  be  brought  to  bear  as  necessary  to 
complish  tliis  objective. 
The  task  before  us  is  to  meet  this  new  phase 


lis  a 


ulleli" 


'  For  text,  see  WiA.,  Sept.  21,  1947,  p.  565. 

'  For  texts  of  resolutions,  see  ibiA.,  Feb.  19,  1962,  p.  278. 

ow&mh&t  72,   J 962 


of  Soviet  aggressive  intervention  in  this  hemi- 
sphere. As  free  nations  we  must  act  in  defense  of 
our  national  independence  and  democratic  herit- 
age. We  must  confi'ont  and  overcome  the  chal- 
lenge now  presented  in  Cuba.  In  doing  so  we  must 
tailor  our  response,  individually  and  collectively, 
to  the  degree  and  direction  of  the  threat,  be  firm  in 
our  convictions  and  resolute  and  miited  in  our 
actions. 

In  these  circumstances  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment has  sought  a  policy  which  would  accom- 
plish our  purposes  with  the  appropriate  and  neces- 
sary use  of  force  and  with  necessary  opportunity 
to  remove  this  gi-ave  threat  by  means  other  than 
general  war. 

The  President  has  therefore  stated  that  it  is 
necessary  immediately  to  prevent  the  arrival  of 
additional  offensive  military  weapons  in  Cuba,  to 
seek  promptly  to  arrest  further  work  on  the  offen- 
sive capacity  being  developed  in  Cuba,  and  to 
require  that  all  these  offensive  weapons  be  with- 
drawn or  eliminated  before  we  can  consider  that 
this  new  threat  to  the  peace  of  the  hemisphere 
will  have  been  adequately  dealt  with. 

The  United  States  Government,  therefore, 
strongly  urges  that  the  governments  of  this  hemi- 
sphere take  the  actions  necessary  under  the  Inter- 
American  Treaty  of  Reciprocal  Assistance  to 
achieve  these  objectives. 

As  an  initial  measure,  which  is  primarily  the 
responsibility  of  this  hemisphere  and  of  special 
concern  to  it,  the  United  States  believes  that  we 
should  establish  a  strict  quarantine  to  prevent 
further  offensive  militaiy  equipment  from  reach- 
ing Cuba.  The  immediate  character  of  the  nuclear 
military  threat  to  our  peoples  from  these  bases  in 
Cuba  is  such  that  we  cannot  tolerate  any  further 
opportunity  to  add  to  their  capacity.  To  this  end 
the  United  States  has  requested  this  urgent  meet- 
ing of  the  Council  to  convoke  the  Organ  of  Con- 
sultation under  article  6  of  the  Rio  Treaty  to  deal 
with  this  new  situation.  We  are  convinced  that 
the  evidence  presented  can  leave  no  doubt  that  the 
danger  is  present  and  real.  Furthermore,  because 
of  the  urgency  of  the  situation,  we  believe  that 
the  Coimcil,  acting  provisionally  as  Organ  of  Con- 
sultation, should  immediately  take  the  steps  which 
are  necessaiy  at  tliis  time. 

For  these  purposes  my  Government  has  pre- 
pared two  draft  resolutions,  the  texts  of  which 
have  been  circulated.     The  first  is  a  procedural 


721 


resolution  *  by  which  the  Council  would  decide 
to  convoke  the  Organ  of  Consultation  under  the 
Inter-American  Treaty  of  Keciprocal  Assistance 
and  would  also  decide  to  act  provisionally  as  that 
Organ  in  accordance  with  article  12  of  that  treaty. 
The  second,  more  substantive  resolution  is  one 
wliich  would  be  formally  considered  by  the  Coun- 
cil, once  it  has  approved  the  first  and  has  consti- 
tuted itself  as  the  Organ  of  Consultation.  Under 
this  second  resolution  the  Organ  of  Consultation 
would  call  for  the  immediate  dismantling  and 
withdrawal  from  Cuba  of  all  missiles  and  other 
weapons  of  offensive  capability  and  would  recom- 
mend, though  not  seek  to  compel,  the  member 
states  of  the  OAS  to  take  the  measures  necessary 
to  insure  that  this  buildup  does  not  continue  to 
receive  additional  offensive  weapons,  to  prevent 
the  offensive  capacity  already  acquired  by  the 
Castro  regime  from  being  used  to  destroy  tlie 
peace  and  the  security  of  the  hemisphere. 

Finally,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  want  to  say  a  word 
about  the  action  being  taken  simultaneously  in 
the  Security  Council  of  the  United  Nations.  The 
threat  is  to  our  hemisphere,  and  we  have  the  pri- 
mary responsibility  and  duty  to  act  as  we  are  now 
doing  as  a  hemisphere.  But  the  threat  originates 
from  outside  the  hemisphere,  and  it  is  appropriate 
that  the  extracontinental  power  which  challenges 
our  inter- American  commitments  and  our  delibei-a- 
tions  must  also  be  dealt  with  in  that  forum  in 
which  he  participates.  It  is  therefore  fitting  in 
this  case  that  the  Security  Council  of  the  United 
Nations  be  requested  to  call  upon  this  member  to 
refrain  from  his  aggressive  actions  against  us 
and  to  seek  to  enforce  upon  him  its  decisions. 

Meanwhile,  without  awaiting  the  outcome  of 
the  United  Nations  approach  we  must  insure  that 
our  hemisphere  is  effectively  quarantined  against 
any  further  additions  to  Soviet  offensive  nuclear 
military  power  in  our  midst. 

All  the  world  will  be  watching  how  wisely, 
how  resolutely,  how  unitedly  this  Council  acts  to 
meet  a  challenge  within  our  hemisphere  and  to  our 
own  interest.  May  I  add  that  crucial  in  this  pres- 
ent situation  will  l)e  the  judgment  of  others,  some 
of  them  far  away,  about  the  unity  and  determina- 
tion of  the  nations  of  this  hemisphere.  The  Presi- 
dent made  it  clear  last  evening  that  we  should 
prefer  to  resolve  this  problem  through  peace.    But 


*  Not  printed  here. 
722 


if  others  make  a  grave  mistake  the  danger  will 
be  greatly  increased.  And  therefore,  gentlemen, 
I  am  deeply  convinced  that  the  unanimity  of  this 
hemisphere  is  directly  related  to  the  opportunity 
to  remove  this  threat  within  the  limits  of  force 
whicli  are  now  being  employed.  For  the  future 
of  peace  and  freedom  of  the  world  has  never  be- 
fore been  so  dependent  upon  the  inter-American 
system  as  it  is  today. 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION' 

Whereas, 

The  Inter-American  Treaty  of  Reciprocal  Assistance  ol 
1947  (Rio  Treaty)  recognizes  the  obligation  of  the  Ameri- 
can Republics  to  "provide  for  effective  reciprocal  assist- 
ance to  meet  armed  attaclis  against  any  American  state 
and  in  order  to  deal  with  threats  of  aggression  againsi 
any  of  them" 

Article  6  of  the  said  Treaty  states : 

"If  the  inviolability  or  the  integrity  of  the  territory  oi 
the  sovereignty  or  political  independence  of  any  Americar 
State  should  be  affected  by  an  aggression  which  is  not  ar 
armed  attack  or  by  an  extra-continental  or  intra 
continental  conflict,  or  by  any  other  fact  or  situation  thai 
might  endanger  the  peace  of  America,  the  Organ  of  Con 
sultation  shall  meet  immediately  in  order  to  agree  oi 
the  measures  which  must  be  taken  in  case  of  aggressioi 
to  assist  the  victim  of  the  aggression  or,  in  any  case,  the 
measures  which  .should  be  taken  for  the  common  defens* 
and  for  the  maintenance  of  the  peace  and  security  of  th( 
Continent." 

The  Eighth  Meeting  of  Consultation  of  the  Ministers  o; 
Foreign  Affairs  of  the  American  Republics  in  Punta  de 
Este  in  January,  1962.  agreed  in  Resolution  II  "To  urge 
the  member  states  to  take  those  steps  that  they  maj 
consider  appropriate  for  their  individual  and  coUectivi 
self-defense,  and  to  cooperate,  as  may  be  necessary  oj 
desirable,  to  strengthen  their  capacity  to  counterac 
threats  or  acts  of  aggression,  subversion,  or  other  dangen 
to  peace  and  security  resulting  from  the  continued  inter 
vention  in  this  hemisphere  of  Sino-Soviet  powers,  ii 
accordance  with  the  obligations  established  in  treaties 
and  agreements  such  as  the  Charter  of  the  Organizatioi 
of  American  States  and  the  Inter-American  Treaty  o) 
Reciprocal  Assistance" ; 

The  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Americai 
Republics  meeting  informally  in  Washington,  October 
and  3,  1962,  reasserted  "the  firm  intention  of  the  Govern 
ments  represented  and  of  the  peoples  of  the  Americai 
Republics  to  conduct  themselves  in  accordance  with  thi 
principles  of  the  regional  system,  staunchly  sustaining  [ep( 


'  Adopted  by  the  Council  on  Oct.  23  by  a  vote  of  19  to  0    '' 
with  1  abstention  (Uruguay  abstained  on  Oct.  2.3  becausi 
its  delegate  had  not  received  instructions  from  his  Govern  ^^^ 
ment ;    on    Oct.    24    Uruguay    cast    an    affirmative    vote 
making  approval  of  the  resolution  unanimous). 


Department  of  Sfofe  Bulletif  D^ 


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and  consolidating  the  principles  of  the  Charter  of  the 
Organization  of  American  States,  and  affirmed  the  will  to 
strengthen  the  security  of  the  Hemisphere  against  all 
aggression  from  within  or  outside  the  Hemispliere  and 
against  all  developments  or  situations  capable  of  threaten- 
ing the  peace  and  security  of  the  Hemisphere  through  the 
application  of  the  Inter-American  Treaty  of  Reciprocal 
Assistance  of  Rio  de  Janeiro.  It  was  the  view  of  the 
Ministers  that  the  existing  oi-ganizations  and  bodies  of 
the  inter-American  system  should  intensify  the  carrying 
out  of  their  respective  duties  with  special  and  urgent 
attention  to  the  situation  created  by  the  communist  regime 
in  Cuba  and  that  they  should  stand  in  readiness  to  con- 
sider the  matter  promptly  if  the  situation  requires 
measures  beyond  those  already  authorized." 

The  .same  meeting  "recalled  that  the  Soviet  Union's 
intervention  in  Cuba  threatens  the  unity  of  the  Americas 
and  its  democratic  institutions,  and  that  this  intervention 
has  special  characteristics  which,  pursuant  to  paragraph 
3  of  Resolution  II  of  the  Eighth  Meeting  of  Consultation 
of  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs,  call  for  the  adoption  of 
special  measures,  both  individual  and  collective" ; 

Incontrovertible  evidence  has  appeared  tiat  the  Govern- 
ment of  Cuba,  despite  repeated  warnings,  has  secretly 
endangered  the  peace  of  the  Continent  by  permitting  the 
Sino-Soviet  powers  to  have  intermediate  and  middle- 
range  mi.ssiles  on  its  territory  capable  of  carrying  nuclear 
warheads ; 


The  Council  of  the  Organization  of  American  States, 
Meeting  as  the  Provisional  Organ  of  Consultation, 
Resolves  : 

1.  To  call  for  the  immediate  dismantling  and  with- 
drawal from  Cuba  of  all  missiles  and  other  weapons  with 
any  offensive  capability ; 

2.  To  recommend  that  the  member  states,  in  accordance 
with  Articles  6  and  8  of  the  Inter-American  Treaty  of 
Reciprocal  Assistance,  take  all  measures,  individually  and 
collectively,  including  the  use  of  armed  force,  which  they 
may  deem  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  Government  of 
Cuba  cannot  continue  to  receive  from  the  Sino-Soviet 
powers  military  material  and  related  supplies  which  may 
threaten  the  peace  and  security  of  the  Continent  and  to 
prevent  the  missiles  in  Cuba  with  offensive  capability 
from  ever  becoming  an  active  threat  to  the  jieace  and 
security  of  the  Continent ; 

3.  To  inform  the  Security  Council  of  the  United  Nations 
of  this  resolution  in  accordance  with  Article  5'4  of  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  to  express  the  hope 
that  the  Security  Council  will,  in  accordance  with  the 
draft  resolution  introduced  by  the  United  States,  despatch 
United  Nations  observers  to  Cuba  at  the  earliest  moment ; 

4.  To  continue  to  serve  provisionally  as  Organ  of 
Consultation  and  to  request  the  Member  States  to  keep 
the  Organ  of  Consultation  duly  informed  of  measures 
taken  by  them  in  accordance  with  paragraph  two  of  this 
resolution. 


U.N.  Security  Council  Hears  U.S.  Charges  of  Soviet  Military  Buildup  in  Cuba 


Statements  hy  Adlal  E.  Stevenson 

U.S.  Representative  in  the  Security  Council 


STATEMENT  OF  OCTOBER  23 

U.S. /U.N.  press  release  4070 


I  have  asked  for  an  emergency  meeting  of  the 
"^'^  Security  Council  to  bring  to  your  attention  a  grave 
threat  to  the  Western  Hemisphere  and  to  the  peace 
of  the  world. 
Last  night  the  President  of  the  United  States 
lii  reported  the  recent  alarming  military  develop- 
ments in  Cuba.    Permit  me  to  remind  you  of  tlie 
President's  sobering  words : 

Within  the  past  week  unmistakable  evidence  has  estab- 
ished  the  fact  that  a  series  of  offensive  missile  sites  is 


low  in  preparation  on  that  imprisoned  island. 
)ose  of  these  bases  can  be  none  other  than  to 

INovember   12,   7962 


The  pur- 
provide  a 


nuclear  strike  capability  against  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

Upon  receiving  the  first  preliminary  hard  information  of 
this  nature  last  Tuesday  morning  [October  16]  at  9:00 
a.m.,  I  directed  that  our  surveillance  be  stepped  up.  And 
having  now  confirmed  and  completed  our  evaluation  of  the 
evidence  and  our  decision  on  a  course  of  action,  this  Gov- 
ernment feels  obliged  to  report  this  new  crisis  to  you  in 
fullest  detail. 

The  characteristics  of  these  new  missile  sites  indicate 
two  distinct  types  of  installations.  Several  of  them  in- 
clude medium-range  ballistic  missiles  capable  of  carrying 
a  nuclear  warhead  for  a  distance  of  more  than  1,000 
nautical  miles.  Each  of  these  missiles,  in  short,  is  capable 
of  striking  Washington,  D.  C,  the  Panama  Canal,  Cape 
Canaveral,  Mexico  City,  or  any  otier  city  in  the  south- 
eastern part  of  the  United  States,  in  Central  America,  or 
in  the  Caribbean  area. 

Additional   sites   not   yet  completed   appear   to  be  de- 


723 


U.S.  Request  for  Meeting  of  Security  Council 


The  Department  of  State  on  October  22  (press  release 
6"J6')  released  the  tart  of  the  following  letter  which 
was  delivered  in  New  York  on  that  date  hy  Adlai  E. 
Stevenson,  U.S.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations, 
to  Valerian  A.  Zorin,  President  of  the  Security  Council 
for  the  month  of  October. 

Excellency  :  I  have  the  honor  to  request  an  urgent 
meeting  of  the  Security  Council  to  deal  with  the  dan- 
gerous threat  to  the  peace  and  security  of  the  world 
caused  by  the  secret  establishment  in  Cuba  by  the 
Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  of  launching  bases 
and  the  installation  of  long-range  ballistic  missiles 
capable  of  carrying  thermonuclear  warheads  to  most 
of  North  and  South  America. 

The  United  States  now  has  incontrovertible  evidence 
that  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Repifljlics  has  been 
installing  in  Cuba  a  whole  series  of  facilities  for  launch- 
ing offensive  nuclear  missiles  and  other  offensive  weap- 
ons and  installing  the  weapons  themselves.  These 
steps  are  far  in  excess  of  any  conceivable  defense  re- 
quirements of  Cuba.  The  Soviet  action  in  establishing 
them  signals  an  acceleration  of  the  process  by  which 
the  USSR  has  moved  to  snuff  out  the  integrity  and 
independence  of  the  Cuban  nation.  The  establishment 
of  bases  for  nuclear  missiles  capable  of  raining  ther- 
monuclear destruction  throughout  most  of  the  Western 
hemisphere  constitutes  a  grave  threat  to  the  peace  and 
security  of  this  hemisphere  and  of  the  whole  world. 

The  size  of  the  Soviet  undertaking  in  establishing 
missiles  and  other  offensive  weapons  in  Cuba  makes 
clear  that  it  was  planned  some  months  ago.  Yet, 
throughout  these  montlis,  the  USSR  has  given  repeated 
assurances,  both  in  pul)lic  and  in  private,  that  no  offen- 
sive weapons  were  being  delivered  to  Cuba. 

On  September  11,  1902,  the  Soviet  Union  said  in  an 
official  statement  that  "The  armaments  and  military 
equipment  sent  to  Cuba  are  designed  exclusively  for 
defensive  purposes.  .  .  .  There  Is  no  need  for  the  Soviet 
Union  to  shift  its  weapons  for  the  repulsion  of  aggres- 
sion, for  a  retaliatory  blow,  to  any  other  country,  for 
instance  Cuba.  .  .  .  The  Soviet  Union  has  so  powerful 
rockets  to  carry  these  nuclear  warheads  that  there  is 
no  need  to  search  for  sites  for  them  beyond  the  bound- 
aries of  the  Soviet  Union."  Similarly,  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko  told  the  General  Assembly  on  September  21 
that  any  "sober  minded  man"  knew  that  Cuba  was 
not  "building  up  her  forces  to  such  a  degree  that  she 
can  pose  a  threat  to  t)ie  United  States,  to  the  passage 
of  the  United  States  to  the  Panama  Canal,  or  else  a 
tlireat  to  any  State  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  .  .  . 
The  aid  rendered  by  the  Soviet  Union  to  Cuba  to 
strengthen  her  independence  does  not  pursue  any  of 
these  goals  either.  .  .  ." 

Upon  satisfying  itself  as  to  the  deliberately  pro- 
vocative steps  which  have  in  fact  been  taken,  the 
United  States  Government  has  coramenced  a  series  of 
measures  designed  to  halt  this  offensive  buildup. 

The  United  States  has  called  for  a  meeting  of  the 
Organ  of  Consultation  to  invoke  Articles  6  and  8  of 
the  Rio  Treaty. 

In  order  to  give  effect  to  the  determination  of  the 
countries  of  the  We.stern  hemisphere  which  they  have 
recently  reaffirmed  to  safeguard  and  defend  the  peace 
and  security  of  the  region  against  external  interference 
and  aggression,  the  United  States  Is  Initiating  a  strict 


quarantine  of  Cuba  to  interdict  the  carriage  of  offen- 
sive weapons  to  that  country. 

In  accordance  with  its  obligations  under  the  United 
Nations  Charter,  the  United  States  now  brings  before 
the  Security  Council  the  fact  of  nuclear  missiles  and 
other  offensive  weapons  in  Cuba,  and  proposes  the 
prompt  and  effective  discharge  of  the  Council's  re- 
sponsibilities for  the  maintenance  of  international 
peace  and  security. 

What  is  at  stake  is  the  peace  and  security  both 
of  a  single  region  and  of  the  whole  world.  The  devel- 
opments of  modern  science  and  technology  have  created 
capacities  for  catastrophic  destruction.  The  diffusion 
of  these  capacities  through  the  Soviet  actions  in  Cuba 
can  only  be  regarded  as  the  gravest  kind  of  threat  to 
the  peace. 

It  should  be  the  purpose  of  Security  Council  action 
to  bring  about  the  immediate  dismantling  and  with- 
drawal of  the  Soviet  missiles  and  other  offensive  weap- 
ons in  Cuba,  under  the  supervision  of  United  Nations 
observers,  to  make  it  possible  to  lift  the  quarantine 
which  is  being  put  into  effect.  As  part  of  this  process, 
we  are  willing  to  confer  with  the  Soviet  Union  on 
measures  to  remove  the  existing  threat  to  the  security 
of  the  Western  hemisphere  and  the  peace  of  the  world. 

With  these  objectives  in  mind,  the  United  States 
requests  an  urgent  meeting  of  the  Securit.v  Council. 
Attached  is  a  draft  resolution  which  the  United 
States  hereby  presents  to  the  Security  Council. 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my 
highest  consideration. 

AnLAi   E.   Stevenson 

Draft  Resolution 

The  Security  Council, 

Having  considered  the  serious  threat  to  the  security 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere  and  the  peace  of  the  world 
caused  by  the  continuance  and  acceleration  of  foreign 
intervention  in  the  Caribbean, 

Noting  with  concern  that  nuclear  missiles  and  other 
offensive  weapons  have  been  secretly  introduced  into 
Cuba, 

Noting  also  that  as  a  consequence  a  quarantine  is 
being  imposed  around  the  country, 

Oravely  concerned  that  further  continuance  of  the 
Cuban  situation  may  lead  to  direct  conflict, 

1.  Vails  as  a  provisional  mea.sure  under  Article  40 
for  the  immediate  dismantling  and  withdrawal  from 
Cuba  of  all  missiles  and  other  offensive  weapons ; 

2.  Authorizes  and  requests  the  Acting  Secretary- 
General  to  dispatch  to  Cuba  a  United  Nations  observer 
corps  to  a.ssure  and  report  on  compliance  with  this 
resolution ; 

3.  Calls  for  termination  of  the  measures  of  quaran- 
tine directed  against  military  shipments  to  Cuba  upon 
United  Nations  certification  of  compliance  with  Para- 
graph 1 ; 

4.  Urgently  recommends  that  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 
confer  promptly  on  measures  to  remove  the  existing 
tiireat  to  the  security  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  and 
tlie  peace  of  the  world,  and  rei>ort  thereon  to  the 
Security  Council. 


724 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


signed  for  intermediate-range  ballistic  missiles — capable 
of  traveling  more  than  twice  as  far — and  thus  capable 
of  striking  most  of  the  major  cities  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, ranging  as  far  north  as  Hudson  Bay,  Canada,  and 
as  far  south  as  Lima,  Peru.  In  addition,  jet  bombers, 
capable  of  carrying  nuclear  weapons,  are  now  being  un- 
crated  and  assembled  in  Cuba,  while  the  necessary  air 
bases  are  being  prepared. 

In  view  of  this  transformation  of  Cuba  into  a 
base  for  offensive  weapons  of  sudden  mass  destruc- 
tion, the  President  announced  tlae  initiation  of  a 
strict  quarantine  on  all  offensive  military  weapons 
under  shipment  to  Cuba.  He  did  so  because,  in 
the  view  of  my  Government,  the  recent  develop- 
ments in  Cuba- — the  importation  of  the  cold  war 
into  the  heart  of  the  Americas — constitute  a  threat 
to  the  peace  of  this  hemisphere  and,  indeed,  to  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

U.S.  Commitment  to  U.N.  Charter 

Mr.  President,  17  years  ago  the  representatives 
of  51  nations  gathered  in  San  Francisco  to  adopt 
the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations.  These  nations 
stated  with  clarity  and  eloquence  the  high  purpose 
which  brought  them  together. 

They  announced  their  common  determination 
"to  save  succeeding  generations  from  the  scourge  of 
war  ...  to  reaffirm  faith  in  fundamental  human 
rights  ...  to  establish  conditions  under  which 
justice  and  respect  for  the  obligations  arising  from 
treaties  and  other  sources  of  international  law  can 
be  maintained,  and  to  promote  social  progress  and 
better  standards  of  life  in  larger  freedom."  And 
in  one  sentence,  paragraph  4,  article  2,  they  de- 
fined the  necessary  condition  of  a  community  of 
independent  peoples : 

All  Members  shall  refrain  in  their  international  rela- 
tions from  the  tireat  or  use  of  force  against  the  territorial 
integrity  or  political  independence  of  any  state,  or  in  any 
other  manner  inconsistent  with  the  Purposes  of  the  United 
Nations. 

In  this  spirit  these  51  nations  solemnly  resolved 
to  band  together  in  a  great  cooperative  quest  for 
world  peace  and  world  progress.  The  adventure 
of  the  United  Nations  held  out  to  humanity  the 
bright  hope  of  a  new  world,  a  world  securely 
founded  in  international  peace,  in  national  inde- 
pendence, in  personal  freedom,  in  respect  for  law, 
for  social  justice  and  betterment,  and,  in  the  words 

iNovember   72,    J  962 


of  the  cliarter,  for  "equal  rights  and  self-determi- 
nation of  peoples." 

The  vision  of  San  Francisco  was  the  vision  of  a 
world  community  of  independent  nations,  each 
freely  developing  according  to  its  own  traditions 
and  its  own  genius,  bound  together  by  a  common 
respect  for  the  rights  of  other  nations  and  by  a 
common  loyalty  to  the  larger  international  order. 
This  vision  assumes  that  this  earth  is  quite  large 
enough  to  shelter  a  great  variety  of  economic  sys- 
tems, political  creeds,  philosophical  beliefs,  and 
religious  convictions.  The  faith  of  the  charter  is 
in  a  pluralistic  world,  a  world  of  free  choice,  re- 
specting the  infinite  diversity  of  mankind  and  ded- 
icated to  nations  living  together  as  good  neighbors 
in  peace. 

Like  many  peoples,  we  welcomed  the  world  of 
the  charter,  for  our  society  is  based  on  principles 
of  choice  and  consent. 

We  believe  the  principles  of  an  open  society  in 
the  world  order  survive  and  flourish  in  the  compe- 
titions of  peace.  We  believe  that  freedom  and  di- 
versity are  the  best  climate  for  human  creativity 
and  social  progress.  We  reject  all  fatalistic  phi- 
losophies of  history  and  all  theories  of  political 
and  social  predestination.  We  doubt  whether 
any  nation  has  so  absolute  a  grip  on  absolute  truth 
that  it  is  entitled  to  impose  its  idea  of  what  is  right 
on  others.  And  we  know  that  a  world  community 
of  independent  nations  accepting  a  common  frame 
of  international  order  offers  the  best  safeguard  for 
the  safety  of  our  shores  and  the  security  of  our 
people.  Our  commitment  to  the  world  of  the  char- 
ter expresses  both  our  deepest  philosophical  tra- 
ditions and  the  most  realistic  interpretation  of  our 
national  interest. 

Actions  of  U.S.  After  World  War  II 

Had  we  any  other  vision  of  the  world,  had  we 
sought  the  path  of  empire,  our  opportunities  for 
self-aggrandizement  immediately  after  the  war 
were  almost  unparalleled.  In  1945,  we  were  incom- 
parably the  greatest  military  power  in  the  world. 
Our  troops  and  planes  were  dispersed  at  strategic 
points  around  the  globe.  We  had  exclusive  pos- 
session of  the  terror  and  promise  of  atomic  energy. 
Our  economic  strength  was  unmatched.  If  the 
American    purpose    had    been    world    dominion, 

725 


there  could  have  been  no  more  propitious  moment 
to  set  out  on  such  a  course. 

Instead,  our  commitment,  then  as  now,  was  to 
the  world  of  the  charter — the  creation  of  a  com- 
munity of  freely  cooperating  independent  states 
bound  together  by  the  United  Nations.  In  the 
service  of  this  commitment  and  without  waiting 
for  the  peace  treaties,  we  dismantled  the  miglitiest 
military  force  we  had  ever  assembled.  Armies 
were  disbanded  wholesale.  Vast  supplies  of  war 
equipment  wei'e  liquidated  or  junked.  Within  2 
years  after  the  end  of  the  war,  our  defense  spend- 
ing had  fallen  by  nearly  $70  billion.  Our  Armed 
Forces  were  slashed  from  more  than  12  million  to 
ly^  million  men.  We  did  not  retain  a  single  di- 
vision in  a  state  of  combat  readiness.  We  did  not 
have  a  single  military  alliance  anywhere  in  the 
world.  History  has  not  seen,  I  believe,  a  more 
complete  and  comprehensive  demonstration  of  a 
great  nation's  hope  for  peace  and  amity. 

Instead  of  using  our  monopoly  of  atomic  energy 
to  extend  our  national  power,  we  offered  in  1946  to 
transfer  the  control  of  atomic  energy  to  the  United 
Nations. 

Instead  of  using  our  overwhelming  economic 
strength  to  extend  our  national  power,  we  con- 
tributed more  than  $2.6  billion  to  the  United  Na- 
tions Relief  and  Rehabilitation  Administration, 
much  of  which  went  to  the  relief  of  suffering  in  the 
Communist  countries.  And  after  1948  we  con- 
tributed many  more  billions  to  the  economic  res- 
toration of  Europe — and  invited  the  Communist 
countries  to  participate  as  recipients  of  our  as- 
sistance. 

Instead  of  using  substance  and  strength  to  ex- 
tend our  national  power,  we  supported  the  move- 
ment for  independence  which  began  to  sweep 
through  Asia  and  Africa,  the  movement  which 
has  added  59  new  members  to  the  United  Nations 
in  the  years  since  1945.  Since  the  war  we  have 
contributed  $97  billion  of  economic  and  military 
assistance  to  other  nations,  and,  of  this  sum,  $53 
billion  has  gone  to  the  nations  of  Asia,  Africa,  and 
Latin  America. 

I  liave  often  wondered  what  the  world  would 
be  like  today  if  the  situation  at  the  end  of  the  war 
had  been  reversed — if  the  United  States  had  been 
ravaged  and  shattered  by  war  and  if  tlie  Soviet 
Union  had  emerged  intact  in  exclusive  possession 
of  the  atomic  bomb  and  overwlielming  military 
and  economic  might.    Would  it  have  followed  the 


same  path  and  devoted  itself  to  realizing  the  world 
of  the  charter  ? 


Soviet  Rejection  of  an  Open  World 

To  ask  this  question  suggests  the  central  para- 
dox of  the  United  Nations.  For  among  the  states 
wliich  pledged  their  fidelity  to  the  idea  of  a  plu- 
ralistic world  in  San  Francisco  were  some  who 
had  an  incompatible  vision  of  the  future  world 
order. 

Has  the  Soviet  Union  ever  really  joined  the 
United  Nations?  Or  does  its  philosophy  of  his- 
tory and  its  conception  of  the  future  i"un  counter 
to  the  pluralistic  concept  of  the  charter? 

Against  the  idea  of  diversity,  communism 
asserts  the  idea  of  uniformity;  against  freedom, 
inevitability;  against  choice,  compulsion;  against 
democracy,  dogma;  against  independence,  ideolo- 
gy; against  tolerance,  conformity.  Its  faith  is 
that  the  iron  laws  of  history  will  require  every 
nation  to  traverse  the  same  predestined  path  to 
tlie  same  predestined  conclusion.  Given  this  faith 
in  a  monolithic  world,  the  very  existence  of  diver- 
sity is  a  threat  to  the  Communist  future. 

I  do  not  assert  that  communism  must  always 
remain  a  messianic  faith.  Like  other  fanaticisms 
of  the  past,  it  may  in  time  lose  its  sense  of  infalli- 
bility and  accept  the  diversity  of  human  destiny. 
Already  in  some  countries  we  see  communism  sub- 
siding into  a  local  and  limited  ideology.  There 
are  those  who  have  discerned  the  same  evolution 
in  the  Soviet  Union  itself ;  and  we  may  all  earnest- 
ly hope  that  Chairman  Khrushchev  and  his  asso- 
ciates will  renounce  the  dream  of  malring  the 
world  over  in  the  image  of  the  Soviet  Union.  It 
must  be  the  purpose  of  other  nations  to  do  what 
they  can  to  hasten  that  day. 

But  that  day  has  not  yet  arrived.  The  conflict 
between  absolutist  and  pluralistic  conceptions  of 
the  destiny  of  mankind  remains  the  basic  source 
of  discord  within  the  United  Nations.  It  has 
given  rise  to  what  is  known  as  the  cold  war.  Were 
it  not  for  this  conflict,  this  organization  would 
have  made  steady  progress  toward  the  world  of 
choice  and  justice  envisaged  at  San  Francisco. 

But  because  of  the  Soviet  rejection  of  an  open 
world,  the  hope  for  progress  and  for  peace  has 
been  systematically  frustrated.  And  in  these 
halls  we  spend  much  of  our  time  and  energy  either 


726 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ensfaced  in  or  avoiding  this  incessant  conflict. 

It  began  even  before  the  nations  gathered  at 
San  Francisco.  As  soon  as  the  defeat  of  the  Nazis 
appeared  certain,  the  Soviet  Union  began  to 
abandon  the  policy  of  wartime  cooperation  to 
whicli  it  had  turned  for  self-protection.  In  early 
1945  Moscow  instructed  the  Communist  parties 
of  the  West  to  purge  themselves  of  the  sin  of 
cooperation  and  to  return  to  their  prewar  view 
that  democratic  governments  were  by  definition 
imperialistic  and  wicked.  Within  a  few  weeks 
after  the  meeting  at  Yalta  the  Soviet  Union  took 
swift  action  in  Rumania  and  Poland  in  brutal 
violation  of  the  Yalta  pledges  of  political  free- 
dom. 

At  the  same  time  it  began  a  political  offensive 
against  the  United  States,  charging  that  the 
American  Government — the  government  of 
Franklin  Roosevelt — was  engaged  in  secret  peace 
negotiations  with  Hitler.  Roosevelt  replied  to 
Stalin  that  he  deeply  resented  these  "vile  misrep- 
resentations." At  the  end  of  March  1945  Roose- 
velt   cabled    Winston    Churchill    that    he    was 

'watching  with  anxiety  and  concern  the  develop- 
ment of  the  Soviet  attitude"  and  that  he  was 
"acutely  aware  of  the  dangers  inherent  in  the 
present  course  of  events,  not  only  for  the  imme- 
diate issue  but  also  the  San  Francisco  Conference 
and  future  world  cooperation." 

It  is  important  to  recall  these  facts  because  the 
Soviet  Union  has  tried  in  the  years  since  to  pretend 
that  its  policy  of  aggression  was  a  defensive  re- 

ponse  to  the  change  of  administration  in  the 
United  States,  or  to  Churchill's  1946  speech  at 
Fulton,  Missouri,  or  to  some  other  event  after  the 
ieath  of  Roosevelt.    But  the  historical  record  is 

lear.    As  soon  as  the  Soviet  Government  saw  no 

airther  military  need  for  the  wartime  coalition, 
i  set  out  on  its  expansionist  adventures. 


Moscow's  War  Against  the  U.N.  World 

The  ink  was  hardly  dry  on  the  charter  before 
kloscow  began  its  war  against  the  world  of  the 
Jnited  Nations.  The  very  first  meeting  of  the 
Security  Council — and  I  was  there — was  called 
o  hear  a  complaint  by  Iran  that  Soviet  troops  had 
ailed  to  withdraw  from  the  northern  part  of  tliat 
ioimtry  on  the  date  on  which  they  had  agreed  to 
eave.     Not  only  had  they  declined  to  go;  they 


November   72,   1962 


had  installed  a  puppet  regime  on  Iranian  soil  and 
had  blocked  Iranian  troops  from  entering  part  of 
Iran's  territory.  The  Soviet  Union,  in  short,,  was 
violating  the  territorial  integrity  and  denying  the 
political  independence  of  Iran — and  doing  so  by 
armed  force.  Eventually  the  United  Nations 
forced  a  reluctant  agreement  from  the  Soviet 
Union  to  live  up  to  its  pledge. 

This  was  only  the  beginning.  At  the  time  of 
the  German  surrender,  the  Red  army  was  in  oc- 
cupation of  Rumania,  Bulgaria,  Plungary,  Poland, 
Eastern  Germany,  and  most  of  Czechoslovakia. 
And  there  the  Red  army  stayed.  It  stayed  in  vio- 
lation of  the  agreement  reached  at  Yalta  by  the 
lieads  of  the  Allied  Powers — the  agreement  which 
pledged  the  independence  and  promised  free  elec- 
tions to  these  nations.  By  1948  five  nations  and 
half  of  a  sixth,  with  a  combined  population  of 
more  than  90  million  people,  had  been  absorbed 
into  the  Communist  empire.  To  this  day  the 
peoples  of  Eastern  Europe  have  never  been  per- 
mitted to  exercise  the  charter  right  of  self-deter- 
mination. 

Before  the  suppression  of  Eastern  Europe  was 
complete,  the  Soviet  Union  was  fomenting  guer- 
rilla warfare  and  sabotaging  economic  recovery 
in  Greece  and  Turkey,  assailing  neighboring  re- 
gimes through  all  the  instrumentalities  of  prop- 
aganda and  subversion. 

Nor  were  such  activities  confined  to  Europe.  In 
Malaya,  in  the  Philippines,  in  Burma,  in  Indo- 
china, the  Communists  encouraged  and  supported 
guerrilla  uprisings  against  constituted  govern- 
ments. 

In  one  event  after  another,  on  one  stage  after 
another — the  rejection  in  the  United  Nations  of 
the  American  plan  for  the  internationalization  of 
atomic  energy,  the  rejection  of  the  Marshall  Plan, 
the  blockade  of  Berlin,  and,  finally,  the  invasion 
of  South  Korea — the  Soviet  Union  assailed  poli- 
tical independence,  resisted  the  world  of  the  char- 
ter, and  tried  to  impose  its  design  of  a  Communist 
future. 

Let  me  recall  to  this  Council,  Mr.  President, 
the  record  with  regard  to  international  agree- 
ments. 

The  Soviet  Government  has  signed  treaties  of 
nonaggression,  as  it  did  with  the  Baltic  states  and 
Finland — and  then  systematically  invaded  the 
countries  whose  integrity  it  had  solemnly  promised 
to  respect. 

727 


At  Yalta  and  in  a  succession  of  peace  treaties 
it  pledged  to  the  liberated  countries  of  Eastern 
Europe  "the  right  of  all  peoples  to  choose  the  form 
of  government  under  which  they  will  live — tlie 
restoration  of  sovereign  rights  and  self-govern- 
ment to  those  peoples  who  have  been  forcibly  de- 
prived of  them" — and  then  it  systematically  denied 
those  rights  and  consolidated  that  deprivation. 

In  1945  it  signed  a  30-year  pact  of  mutual  as- 
sistance and  nonaggression  with  China,  pledging 
that  its  military  aid  and  economic  support  would 
be  "given  entirely  to  the  National  Government  as 
the  Central  Government  of  China" — and  violated 
that  treaty  almost  before  the  Chinese  negotiators 
had  left  Moscow. 

At  Potsdam  it  promised  that  "all  democratic 
political  parties  with  rights  of  assembly  and  of 
public  discussion  shall  be  allowed  and  encouraged 
throughout  Germany" — and  within  its  own  zone 
promptly  repudiated  that  promise.  At  Geneva  in 
1954  it  agreed  not  to  introduce  arms  into  Viet- 
Nam — and  sent  guns  and  ammunition  to  the  Viet 
Minh. 

It  denounced  nuclear  testing — and  then  violated 
the  moratorium  which  for  3  years  had  spared  the 
world  the  danger  of  nuclear  tests. 

Within  this  Council  it  has  thwarted  the  major- 
ity will  100  times  by  the  use  of  the  veto. 

The  record  is  clear:  Treaties,  agreements, 
pledges,  and  the  morals  of  international  relations 
were  never  an  obstacle  to  the  Soviet  Union  under 
Stalin.  No  one  has  said  so  more  eloquently  than 
Chairman  Khrushchev. 

Basic  Soviet  Drive  Unaltered 

Witli  the  death  of  Stalin  in  1953,  the  world  had 
a  resurgence  of  hope.  No  one  can  question  that 
Chairman  Khrushchev  has  altered  many  things  in 
the  Soviet  Union.  He  has  introduced  welcome 
measures  of  normalization  in  many  sectors  of 
Soviet  life.  He  has  abandoned  the  classic  Com- 
munist concept  of  tlie  inevitability  of  war.  He 
has  recognized — intermittently,  at  least — the  ap- 
palling dangers  of  nuclear  weapons. 

But  there  is  one  thing  he  has  not  altered,  and 
that  is  the  basic  drive  to  abolish  the  world  of 
the  cliarter,  to  destroy  the  liope  of  a  pluralistic 
world  order.  He  has  not  altered  the  basic  drive 
to  fulfill  the  prophecies  of  Marx  and  Lenin  and 
make  all  the  world  Communist.  And  he  has 
demonstrated  his  singleness  of  purpose  in  a  suc- 


728 


cession  of  aggressive  acts — in  the  suppression  of 
the  East  German  uprisings  in  1953  and  the 
Hungarian  revolution  in  1956,  in  the  series  of 
manufactured  crises  and  truculent  demands  that 
the  Allies  get  out  of  West  Berlin,  in  the  re- 
sumption of  nuclear  testing,  in  the  explosion — 
defj'ing  a  resolution  of  the  General  Assembly — 
of  a  50-megaton  bomb,  in  the  continued  stimu- 
lation of  guerrilla  and  subversive  warfare  all 
over  the  globe,  in  the  compulsive  intervention  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  other  nations,  whether  by 
diplomatic  assault,  by  economic  pressure,  by 
moljs  and  riots,  by  propaganda,  or  by  espionage. 
The  world  welcomed  the  process  known  as  de- 
Stalinization  and  the  movement  toward  a  more 
noi'mal  life  within  the  Soviet  Union.  But  the 
world  has  not  yet  seen  comparable  changes  in 
Soviet  foreign  policy. 

U.S.  Response  to  Soviet  Expansionism 

It  is  this  which  has  shadowed  the  world  since  the 
end  of  the  Second  World  War,  which  has  dimmed 
our  hopes  of  peace  and  progress,  which  has  forced 
tliose  nations  determined  to  defend  their  freedom 
to  take  measures  in  their  own  self-defense.  In  this 
effort  the  leadership  has  inevitably  fallen  in  large 
degree  on  the  United  States.  I  do  not  believe  that 
every  action  we  have  taken  in  the  effort  tc 
strengthen  the  independence  of  nations  has  neces- 
sarily been  correct;  we  do  not  subscribe  to  the 
tliesis  of  national  infallibility  for  any  nation.  But 
we  do  take  great  pride  in  the  role  we  have  per- 
formed. 

Our  response  to  the  remorseless  Soviet  expan- 
sionism has  taken  many  forms. 

We  have  sought  loyally  to  support  the  United 
Nations,  to  be  faithful  to  the  world  of  the  charter, 
and  to  build  an  operating  system  that  acts,  and 
does  not  talk,  for  peace. 

We  have  never  refused  to  negotiate.  We  have 
sat  at  conference  after  conference  seeking  peaceful 
solutions  to  menacing  conflicts. 

We  have  worked  for  general  and  complete  dis- 
armament under  international  supervision.  We 
have  tried  earnestly — and  we  won't  stop  trying — 
to  reach  an  agreement  to  end  all  nuclear  testing. 

We  have  declined  to  be  provoked  into  actions 
whicli  might  lead  to  war — in  face  of  such  chal- 
lenges as  tlie  Berlin  blockade,  such  affronts  to  hu- 
manity as  the  repression  of  the  Hungarian  revolt, 
sucli  atrocities  as  the  erection  of  that  shameful  wall 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


to  fence  in  the  East  Geraians,  who  had  fled  to  the 
West  in  such  vast  multitudes. 

We  have  assisted  nations,  both  allied  and  un- 
aliiied,  who  have  shown  a  will  to  maintain  their 
national  independence.  To  shield  them  and  our- 
selves, we  have  rebuilt  our  armed  forces,  estab- 
lished defensive  alliances,  and,  year  after  year, 
reluctantly  devoted  a  large  share  of  our  resources 
to  national  defense. 

Together  with  our  allies,  we  have  installed  cer- 
tain bases  overseas  as  a  prudent  precaution  in  re- 
sponse to  the  clear  and  persistent  Soviet  threats. 
In  1959,  18  months  after  the  boasts  of  Chairman 
Khrushchev  had  called  the  world's  attention  to  the 
threat  of  Soviet  long-range  missiles,  the  North  At- 
lantic Treaty  Organization,  without  concealment 
or  deceit,  as  a  consequence  of  agi'eements  freely 
negotiated  and  publicly  declared,  placed  intenne- 
diate-range  ballistic  missiles  in  the  NATO  area. 
The  warlieads  of  these  missiles  remain  in  the  cus- 
tody of  the  United  States,  and  the  decision  for 
their  use  rests  in  the  hands  of  tlie  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America  in  association  with  the 
governments  involved. 

Cold  War  Not  a  Private  Struggle 

I  regret  that  people  here  at  the  United  Nations 
seem  to  believe  that  the  cold  war  is  a  private  strug- 
gle between  two  great  superpowers.  It  isn't  a 
private  struggle ;  it  is  a  world  civil  war,  a  contest 
between  the  pluralistic  world  and  the  monolithic 
world,  a  contest  between  the  world  of  the  charter 
and  the  world  of  Communist  conformity.  Every 
nation  that  is  now  independent  and  wants  to  re- 
main independent  is  involved,  whether  they  know 
it  or  not.  Every  nation  is  involved  in  this  grim, 
costly,  distasteful  division  in  the  world,  no  matter 
how  remote  and  how  uninterested. 

We  all  recognized  this  in  1950,  wlien  tlie  Com- 
mvmists  decided  to  test  how  far  they  could  go  by 
direct  military  action  and  imleashed  the  invasion 
of  South  Korea.  The  response  of  the  United  Na- 
tions taught  tliem  that  overt  aggression  would 
produce  not  appeasement  but  resistance.  This  re- 
mains the  essential  lesson.  The  United  Nations 
stood  firm  in  Korea  because  we  knew  the  conse- 
quences of  appeasement. 

The  policy  of  appeasement  is  always  intended 
to  strengthen  the  moderates  in  the  comitry  ap- 
peased; but  its  efl'ect  is  always  to  strengthen  the 
extremists.    We  are  prepared  to  meet  and  recon- 

November   72,    1962 

663695—62 3 


cile  every  legitimate  Soviet  concern ;  but  we  have 
only  contempt  for  blackmail.  We  know  that  every 
retreat  before  intimidation  strengthens  those  who 
say  that  the  threat  of  force  can  always  acliieve 
Communist  objectives  and  undermines  those  in 
the  Soviet  Union  wlio  are  urging  caution  and  re- 
straint, even  cooperation. 

Keluctantly  and  repeatedly,  we  have  to  face  the 
sad  fact  that  the  only  way  to  reinforce  those  on  the 
other  side  who  are  for  moderation  and  peaceful 
competition  is  to  make  it  absolutely  clear  that  ag- 
gression will  be  met  with  resistance  and  force 
with  force. 

The  time  has  come  for  this  Council  to  decide 
whether  to  make  a  serious  attempt  to  bring  peace 
to  the  world — or  to  let  the  United  Nations  stand 
idly  by  while  the  vast  jilan  of  piecemeal  aggres- 
sion unfolds,  conducted  in  the  hope  that  no  single 
issue  will  seem  consequential  enough  to  mobilize 
the  resistance  of  the  free  peoples.  For  my  own 
Govermnent,  this  question  is  not  in  doubt.  We 
remain  committed  to  tlie  principles  of  the  United 
Nations  Charter,  and  we  intend  to  defend  them. 

Communization  of  Cuba 

We  are  engaged  today  in  a  crucial  test  of  those 
principles.  Nearly  4  years  ago  a  revolution  took 
place  on  the  island  of  Cuba.  This  revolution  over- 
threw a  hated  dictatorship  in  the  name  of  demo- 
cratic freedom  and  social  progress.  Dr.  Castro 
made  explicit  promises  to  the  people  of  Cuba.  He 
promised  tliem  the  restoration  of  the  1940  con- 
stitution abandoned  by  the  Batista  dictatorehip ; 
a  "provisional  government  of  entirely  civilian 
character  that  will  retui-n  the  comitiy  to  nonnality 
and  hold  general  elections  withhi  a  period  of  no 
more  than  one  year";  "tndy  honest"  elections 
along  with  "full  and  untrammeled"  freedom  of 
information  and  political  activity. 

That  is  what  Dr.  Castro  offered  the  people  of 
Cuba.  That  is  what  the  people  of  Cuba  accepted. 
Many  in  my  own  country  and  throughout  the 
Americas  symi^athized  with  Dr.  Castro's  stated 
objectives.  The  United  States  Government  of- 
fered immediate  diplomatic  recognition  and  stood 
ready  to  provide  the  revolutionary  regime  with 
economic  assistance. 

But  a  grim  struggle  took  place  within  the 
revolutionary  regime,  between  its  democratic  and 
its  predominant  Communist  wings,  between  those 
who  overthrew  Batista  to  bring  freedom  to  Cuba 


729 


and  those  who  overthrew  Batista  to  bring  Cuba  to 
communism.  In  a  few  montlis  the  struggle  was 
over.  Brave  men  who  had  fought  with  Castro  in 
the  Sierra  Maestra  and  who  had  organized  the 
underground  against  Batista  in  the  cities  were  as- 
sailed, arrested,  and  driven  from  office  into  prison 
or  exile,  all  for  the  single  offense  of  anticommu- 
nism,  all  for  the  single  offense  of  believing  in  the 
principles  of  the  revolution  they  fought  for.  By 
the  end  of  1959  the  Commimist  Party  was  the  only 
party  in  Cuba  permitted  freedom  of  political 
action.  By  early  1960  the  Castro  regime  was 
entering  into  intimate  economic  and  political 
relations  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

It  is  well  to  remember  that  all  these  events  took 
place  months  before  the  United  States  stopped 
buying  Cuban  sugar  in  the  summer  of  1960 — and 
many  more  months  before  exactions  upon  our 
Embassy  in  Habana  forced  the  suspension  of 
diplomatic  relations  in  December  1960. 

As  the  commimization  of  Cuba  proceeded,  more 
and  more  democratic  Cubans,  men  who  had  fought 
for  freedom  in  the  front  ranks,  were  forced  into 
exile.  They  were  eager  to  return  to  their  home- 
land and  to  save  their  revolution  from  betrayal. 
In  the  spring  of  1961  they  tried  to  liberate  their 
country,  under  the  political  leadership  of  Dr. 
Castro's  first  Prime  Minister  and  of  a  Revolu- 
tionary Council  composed  without  exception  of 
men  who  had  opposed  Batista  and  backed  the 
revolution.  The  people  and  Government  of  the 
United  States  sympathized  vsdth  these  men — as 
throughout  our  history  Americans  have  always 
sympathized  with  those  who  sought  to  liberate 
their  native  lands  from  despotism.  I  have  no 
apologies  to  make  for  that  sympathy  or  for  the 
assistance  which  these  brave  Cuban  refugees 
received  from  our  hands.  But  I  would  point 
out,  too,  that  my  Government,  still  forbearing, 
refrained  from  direct  intervention.  It  sent  no 
American  troops  to  Cuba. 

In  the  year  and  a  half  since.  Dr.  Castro  has  con- 
tinued the  communization  of  his  unfortimate 
country.  The  1940  constitution  was  never 
restored.  Elections  were  never  held  and  their 
promise  withdrawn — though  Dr.  Castro's  12 
months  have  stretched  to  42.  The  Castro  regime 
fastened  on  Cuba  an  iron  system  of  repression. 
It  eradicated  human  and  civil  rights.  It  openly 
transformed  Cuba  into  a  Communist  satellite  and 
'  a  police  state.  Whatever  benefit  this  regime 
might  have  brought  to  Cuba  has  long  since  been 

730 


canceled  out  by  the  firing  squads,  the  drumhead 
executions,  the  hunger  and  misery,  the  suppres- 
sion of  civil  and  political  and  cultural  freedom. 

Cuba  a  Soviet  Bridgehead 

Yet  even  these  violations  of  human  rights, 
repellent  as  they  are — even  this  dictatorehip,  cruel 
as  it  may  be — would  not,  if  kept  witliin  the  con- 
fines of  one  country,  constitute  a  direct  threat  to 
the  peace  and  independence  of  other  states.  The 
threat  lies  in  the  submission  of  the  Castro  regime 
to  the  will  of  an  aggi-essive  foreign  power.  It 
lies  in  its  readiness  to  break  up  the  relations  of 
confidence  and  cooperation  among  the  good  neigh- 
bors of  this  hemisphere — at  a  time  when  the 
Alliance  for  Progress,  that  vast  effort  to  raise 
living  standards  for  all  peoples  of  the  Americas, 
has  given  new  vitality  and  hope  to  the  inter- 
American  system. 

Let  me  make  it  absolutely  clear  what  the  issue 
of  Cuba  is.  It  is  not  an  issue  of  revolution.  This 
hemisphere  has  seen  many  revolutions,  including 
the  one  which  gave  my  own  nation  its  mdepend- 
ence. 

It  is  not  an  issue  of  reform.  My  nation  has 
lived  happily  with  other  countries  which  have 
had  thoroughgoing  and  fundamental  social  trans- 
formations, like  Mexico  and  Bolivia.  The  whole 
point  of  the  Alliance  for  Progress  is  to  bring 
about  an  economic  and  social  revolution  in  the 
Americas. 

It  is  not  an  issue  of  socialism.  As  Secretary  of 
State  Rusk  said  at  Punta  del  Este  in  January: 
"Our  hemisphere  has  room  for  a  diversity  of  eco- 
nomic systems."  ^ 

It  is  not  an  issue  of  dictatorship.  The  American 
Republics  have  lived  with  dictators  before.  If 
this  were  his  only  fault,  they  could  even  live  with 
Dr.  Castro. 

The  foremost  objection  of  the  states  of  the 
Americas  to  the  Castro  regime  is  not  because  it  is 
revolutionary,  not  because  it  is  socialistic,  not 
because  it  is  dictatorial,  not  even  because  Dr. 
Castro  perverted  a  noble  revolution  in  the  interests 
of  a  squalid  totalitarianism.  It  is  because  he  has 
aided  and  abetted  an  invasion  of  this  hemisphere 
— and  an  invasion  at  just  the  time  when  the 
hemisphere  is  making  a  new  and  unprecedented 
effort  for  economic  progress  and  social  reform. 


•  Bulletin  of  Feb.  19, 1962,  p.  270. 


DeparfmeM  of  Stale  Bullelin 


'■] 


The  cnicial  fact  is  that  Cuba  has  given  the 
Soviet  Union  a  bridgeliead  and  staging  area  in 
this  liemisphere,  that  it  has  invited  an  extra- 
continental,  antidemocratic,  and  expansionist 
power  into  the  bosom  of  the  American  family,  that 
it  has  made  itself  an  accomplice  in  the  Communist 
enterprise  of  world  dominion. 

Difference  Between  NATO  and  Cuban  Bases 

There  are  those  who  seek  to  equate  the  presence 
of  Soviet  bases  in  Cuba  with  the  presence  of 
NATO  bases  in  parts  of  the  world  near  the  Soviet 
Union. 

Let  us  subject  this  facile  argument  to  critical 
consideration. 

It  is  not  only  that  the  Soviet  action  in  Cuba  has 
created  a  new  and  dangerous  situation  by  sudden 
and  drastic  steps  which  imperil  the  security  of  all 
mankind.  It  is  necessary  furtlier  to  examine  the 
purposes  for  which  missiles  are  introduced  and 
bases  established. 

Missiles  which  help  a  country  defend  its  inde- 
pendence, which  leave  the  political  institutions  of 
the  recipient  comitries  intact,  which  are  not  de- 
signed to  subvert  the  territorial  integrity  or  politi- 
cal independence  of  other  states,  which  are  in- 
stalled without  concealment  or  deceit — assistance 
in  this  form  and  with  these  purposes  is  consistent 
with  the  principles  of  the  United  Nations.  But 
missiles  which  introduce  a  nuclear  threat  into  an 
area  now  free  of  it,  which  threaten  the  security 
and  independence  of  defenseless  neighboring 
states,  which  are  installed  by  clandestine  means, 
which  result  in  the  most  formidable  nuclear  base 
in  the  world  outside  existing  treaty  systems — as- 
sistance in  this  form  and  with  these  purposes  is 
radically  different. 

Ijet  me  state  this  point  very  clearly.  The  mis- 
sile sites  in  NATO  countries  were  established  in 
response  to  missile  sites  in  the  Soviet  Union  di- 
rected at  the  NATO  countries.  The  NATO  states 
had  every  right  and  necessity  to  respond  to  the 
installation  of  these  Soviet  missiles  by  installing 
missiles  of  their  own.  These  missiles  were  de- 
signed to  deter  a  process  of  expansion  already  in 
progress.     Fortunately,  they  have  helped  to  do  so. 

The  United  States  and  its  allies  established  their 
missile  sites  after  free  negotiation,  without  con- 
cealment and  without  false  statements  to  other 
fl  governments. 

November    12,    J  962 


There  is,  in  short,  a  vast  difference  between  the 
long-range  missile  sites  established  years  ago  in 
Europe  and  the  long-range  missile  sites  established 
by  the  Soviet  Union  in  Cuba  during  the-  last  3 
months. 

There  is  a  final  significant  difference.  For  150 
years  the  nations  of  the  Americas  have  painfully 
labored  to  construct  a  hemisphere  of  independent 
and  cooperating  nations,  free  from  foreign  threats. 
An  international  system  far  older  than  this  one — 
the  inter- American  system — has  been  erected  on 
this  principle.  The  principle  of  the  territorial 
integrity  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  has  been 
woven  into  the  history,  tlie  life,  and  the  thought 
of  all  the  people  of  the  Americas.  In  striking  at 
that  principle  the  Soviet  Union  is  striking  at  the 
strongest  and  most  enduring  strain  in  the  policy 
of  this  hemisphere.  It  is  disrupting  tlie  convic- 
tions and  aspirations  of  a  century  and  a  half.  It 
is  intruding  on  the  firm  policies  of  20  nations.  To 
allow  this  challenge  to  go  imanswered  would  be  to 
undermine  a  basic  and  historic  pillar  of  the  securi- 
ty of  this  hemisphere. 

Cuba's  Self-Exclusion  From  the  Hemisphere 

Twenty  years  ago  the  nations  of  the  Americas 
were  understandably  disturbed  by  the  threat  of 
nazism.  Just  as  they  would  have  reacted  with 
vigor  had  any  American  Republic  given  itself 
over  to  the  doctrines  and  agents  of  nazism,  so 
today  they  look  with  equal  concern  on  the  con- 
quest of  Cuba  by  a  foreign  power  and  an  alien 
ideology.  They  do  not  intend  to  applaud  and 
assist  while  Dr.  Castro  and  his  new  friends  try  to 
halt  the  march  of  free  and  progressive  democracy 
in  Latin  America. 

Yet,  despite  the  ominous  movement  of  affairs 
in  Cuba,  the  reaction  of  the  hemisphere  and  of 
my  own  Govermnent  continued  to  be  marked  by 
forbearance.  Despite  Dr.  Castro's  verbal  assaults 
on  other  nations  in  the  hemisphere,  despite  his 
campaign  of  subversion  against  their  govern- 
ments, despite  the  insurrectionary  expeditions 
launched  fi'om  Cuba,  the  nations  of  the  Americas 
retained  their  hope  that  the  Cuban  revolution 
would  free  itself.  But  Dr.  Castro's  persistence  in 
his  campaigns  against  the  governments  of  this 
hemisphere,  his  decision  to  become  the  junior 
partner  of  Moscow,  finally  destroyed  that  hope. 

If  Cuba  has  withdrawn  from  the  American 


731 


family  of  nations,  it  has  been  Dr.  Castro's  own 
act.  If  Cuba  is  today  isolated  from  its  brethren 
of  the  Americas,  it  is  self-inflicted  isolation.  If 
the  present  Cuban  government  has  turned  its  back 
on  its  own  history,  tradition,  religion,  and  culture, 
if  it  has  chosen  to  cast  its  lot  with  the  Communist 
empire,  it  must  accept  the  consequences  of  its  de- 
cision. The  hemisphere  has  no  alternative  but  to 
accept  the  tragic  choice  Dr.  Castro  has  imposed 
on  his  people — that  is,  to  accept  Cuba's  self- 
exclusion  from  the  hemisphere. 

One  after  another,  the  other  governments  of 
this  hemisphere  have  withdrawn  their  diplomatic 
representatives  from  Cuba.  Today  only  three 
still  have  their  ambassadors  in  Habana.  Last 
January  the  American  states  unanimously  de- 
clared that  the  Castro  regime  was  incompatible 
with  the  principles  on  which  the  Organization 
of  American  States  had  been  founded  and,  by 
a  two-thirds  vote,  excluded  that  regime  from  par- 
ticipation in  the  inter-American  system.- 


Soviet  Arms  and  Technicians  in  Cuba 

All  this  took  place  before  Soviet  arms  and  tech- 
nicians began  to  move  into  Cuba  in  a  massive, 
continuous  stream.  But,  even  then,  the  govern- 
ments of  the  hemisphere  were  willing  to  withhold 
final  judgment  so  long  as  the  Soviet  weapons  were 
defensive.  And  my  Government — and  the  United 
Nations — were  solemnly  assured  by  the  represent- 
atives of  both  Soviet  Russia  and  Cuba  that  the 
Soviet  arms  pouring  into  the  island  were,  in  fact, 
purely  defensive  weapons. 

On  September  11,  the  Soviet  Government  said 
in  an  official  statement :  "The  armaments  and  mili- 
tary equipment  sent  to  Cuba  are  designed  exclu- 
sively for  defensive  purposes."  The  Soviet 
Government  added  that  Soviet  rockets  were  so 
powerful  that  "there  is  no  need  to  search  for  sites 
for  them  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  Soviet 
Union."  And  last  week,  on  October  18th,  Mr. 
Gromyko,  the  Soviet  Foreign  Minister,  told  the 
President  of  the  United  States  at  the  White  House 
that  Soviet  assistance  to  Cuba  "pursued  solely  the 
purpose  of  contributing  to  the  defense  capabilities 
of  Cuba,"  that  "training  by  Soviet  specialists  of 


'  Ibid.,  p.  281. 
732 


Cuban  nationals  in  handling  defensive  armaments 
was  by  no  means  otl'ensive,"  and  that  "if  it  were 
otherwise,  the  Soviet  Government  would  never 
become  involved  in  rendering  such  assistance." 
This  once  peaceable  island  is  being  transformed 
into  a  formidable  missile  and  strategic  air  base 
armed  with  the  deadliest,  far-reaching,  modem 
nuclear  weapons. 

The  statement  issued  by  the  Soviet  Government 
this  morning  does  not  deny  these  facts — which  is 
in  refreshing  contrast  to  the  categoric  assurances 
on  this  subject  which  they  had  previously  given. 

However,  this  same  statement  repeats  the  ex- 
traordinary claim  tliat  Soviet  arms  in  Cuba  are  of 
a  "defensive  character."  I  should  like  to  know 
what  the  Soviets  consider  "offensive"  weapons.  In 
the  Soviet  lexicon  evidently  all  weapons  are  purely 
defensive,  even  weapons  that  can  strike  from  1,000 
to  2,000  miles  away.  Words  can  be  stretched  only 
so  far  without  losing  their  meaning  altogether. 
But  semantic  disputes  are  fruitless,  and  the  fact 
remains  that  the  Soviet  has  upset  the  precarious 
balance  and  created  a  new  and  dangerous  situation 
in  a  new  area. 

This  is  precisely  the  sort  of  action  which  the 
Soviet  Government  is  so  fond  of  denouncing  as 
"a  policy  of  positions  of  strength."  Consequently, 
I  invite  the  attention  of  the  Council  to  another  re- 
mark in  the  Soviet  Government's  statement  of  this 
morning :  "Only  madmen  bank  on  a  policy  of  posi- 
tions of  strength  and  believe  that  this  policy  will 
bring  any  success,  will  help  make  it  possible  to 
impose  their  orders  on  other  States." 

I  need  only  mention  one  other  curious  remark 
in  the  Soviet  Government's  statement  of  today, 
and  I  quote  once  more:  "Who  gave  the  United 
States  the  right  to  assume  the  role  of  the  master 
of  destinies  of  other  countries  and  peoples?  .  .  . 
Cuba  belongs  to  the  Cuban  peoples  and  only  they 
can  be  masters  of  their  destiny."  This  latter  sen- 
tence is,  of  course,  a  succinct  statement  of  United 
States  policy  toward  Cuba.  It  is,  however,  very 
far  from  being  Soviet  policy  toward  Cuba. 

When  the  Soviet  Union  sends  thousands  of  mili- 
tary teclmicians  to  its  satellite  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  when  it  sends  jet  bombers  capable  of 
delivering  nuclear  weapons,  when  it  installs  in 
Cuba  missiles  capable  of  carrying  atomic  war- 
heads and  of  obliterating  the  Panama  Canal,  Mex- 
ico City,  and  Wasliington,  when  it  prepares  sites 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


for  additional  missiles  with  a  range  of  2,200  miles 
and  a  capacity  to  strike  at  targets  from  Peru  to 
Hudson  Bay — when  it  does  these  things  under  the 
cloak  of  secrecy  and  to  the  accompaniment  of  pre- 
meditated deception,  when  its  actions  are  in  fla- 
grant violation  of  the  policies  of  the  Organization 
of  American  States  and  of  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations,  this  clearly  is  a  threat  to  this  hem- 
isphere. And  when  it  thus  upsets  the  precarious 
balance  in  the  world,  it  is  a  threat  to  the  whole 
world. 

We  now  know  that  the  Soviet  Union,  not  con- 
tent with  Dr.  Castro's  oath  of  fealty,  not  content 
with  the  destruction  of  Cuban  independence,  not 
content  with  the  extension  of  Soviet  power  into 
the  Western  Hemisphere,  not  content  with  a  chal- 
lenge to  the  inter- American  system  and  the  United 
Nations  Charter,  lias  decided  to  transform  Cuba 
into  a  base  for  Communist  aggression,  into  a  base 
for  putting  all  of  the  Americas  under  the  nuclear 
gim  and  thereby  intensify  the  Soviet  diplomacy 
of  blackmail  in  every  part  of  the  world. 

In  our  passion  for  peace  we  have  forborne 
greatly.  But  there  must  be  limits  to  forbearance 
if  forbearance  is  not  to  become  the  diagram  for 
the  destruction  of  tins  organization.  Dr.  Castro 
transformed  Cuba  into  a  totalitarian  dictatorship 
with  unpunity,  he  extinguished  the  rights  of  polit- 
ical freedom  with  impunity,  he  alined  himself 
with  the  Soviet  bloc  with  impunity,  he  accepted 
defensive  weapons  from  the  Soviet  Union  with 
impunity,  he  welcomed  thousands  of  Communists 
into  Cuba  with  impunity — ^but  when,  with  cold 
deliberation,  he  turns  his  country  over  to  the  So- 
viet Union  for  a  long-range  missile-launching 
base,  and  thus  carries  the  Soviet  progi'am  for  ag- 
gression into  the  heart  of  the  Americas,  the  day  of 
forbearance  is  past. 


J.S.  Resolution 

If  the  United  States  and  the  other  nations  of 
.he  Western  Hemisphere  should  accept  this  new 
phase  of  aggression,  we  would  be  delinquent  in  our 
obligations  to  world  peace.  If  the  United  States 
md  the  other  nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere 
should  accept  this  basic  disturbance  of  the  world's 
itructure  of  power,  we  would  invite  a  new  surge 
)f  Communist  aggression  at  every  point  along  the 


frontier  which  divides  the  Communist  world  from 
the  democratic  world.  If  we  do  not  stand  firm 
here,  our  adversaries  may  think  that  we  will  stand 
firm  nowhere — and  we  guarantee  a  heightening  of 
the  world  civil  war  to  new  levels  of  intensity  and 
danger. 

We  hope  that  Chairman  Khrushchev  has  not 
made  a  miscalculation,  that  he  has  not  mistaken 
forbearance  for  weakness.  We  cannot  believ'e  that 
he  has  deluded  himself  into  supposing  that  though 
we  have  power,  we  lack  nerve ;  that  though  we  \ 
have  weapons,  we  are  without  the  will  to  use  I 
them. 

We  still  hope,  we  still  pray,  that  the  worst  may 
be  avoided — that  the  Soviet  leadership  will  call 
an  end  to  this  ominous  adventure.  Accordingly, 
the  President  has  initiated  steps  to  quarantine 
Cuba  against  further  imports  of  offensive  mili- 
tary equipment.  Because  the  entire  inter- Ameri- 
can system  is  challenged,  the  President  last  night 
called  for  an  immediate  meeting  of  the  Organ  of 
Consultation  of  the  Organization  of  the  American 
States,  to  consider  this  threat  to  hemispheric 
security  and  to  invoke  articles  6  and  8  of  the  Eio 
Treaty  in  support  of  all  necessary  action.  They 
are  meeting  now.  The  results  of  their  delibera- 
tions will  soon  be  available  to  you. 

Mr.  President,  I  am  submitting  today  a  resolu- 
tion ^  to  the  Security  Council  designed  to  find  a 
way  out  of  this  calamitous  situation. 

This  resolution  calls,  as  an  interim  measure  un- 
der article  40  of  the  charter,  for  the  immediate 
dismantling  and  withdrawal  from  Cuba  of  all 
missiles  and  other  offensive  weapons. 

It  further  authorizes  and  requests  the  Acting 
Secretaiy- General  to  dispatch  to  Cuba  a  United 
Nations  obsei-ver  corps  to  assure  and  report  on 
compliance  with  this  resolution. 

Upon  U.N.  certification  of  compliance,  it  calls 
for  the  termination  of  the  measures  of  quaran- 
tine against  military  shipments  to  Cuba. 

And,  in  conclusion,  it  urgently  recommends  that 
the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Soviet 
Union  confer  promptly  on  measures  to  remove  the 
existing  threat  to  the  security  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  and  the  peace  of  the  world  and  to  re- 
port thereon  to  the  Security  Council. 


"  U.N.  doc.  S/51S2 ;  for  text,  see  p.  724. 


i/ovember   12,   1962 


733 


OAS  Resolution 

Mr.  President,  I  have  just  been  informed  that 
the  Organization  of  American  States  this  after- 
noon adopted  a  resohition  *  by  19  affirmative  votes 
containing  the  following  operative  paragraphs: 

The  Council  of  the  Organization  op  American 
States,  Meeting  as  the  Provisionai,  Organ  of  Consul- 
tation, Resolves  : 

1.  To  call  for  the  immediate  dismantling  and  with- 
drawal from  Cuba  of  all  missiles  and  other  weapons  with 
any  offensive  capability ; 

2.  To  recommend  that  the  member  states,  in  accord- 
ance with  Articles  6  and  8  of  the  Inter-American  Treaty 
of  Reciprocal  Assistance,  take  all  measures,  individually 
and  collectively,  including  the  use  of  armed  force,  which 
they  may  deem  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Cuba  cannot  continue  to  receive  from  the  Sino- 
Soviet  powers  military  material  and  related  supplies 
which  may  threaten  the  peace  and  security  of  the  Con- 
tinent and  to  prevent  the  missiles  in  Cuba  with  offensive 
capability  from  ever  becoming  an  active  threat  to  the 
peace  and  security  of  the  Continent ; 

3.  To  inform  the  Security  Council  of  the  United  Na- 
tions of  this  resolution  in  accordance  with  Article  .'54  of 
the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  to  express  the  hope 
that  the  Security  Council  will,  in  accordance  with  the 
draft  resolution  introduced  by  the  United  States,  dispatch 
United  Nations  observers  to  Cuba  at  the  earliest  moment. 


A  Road  to  Peace 

Mr.  President,  the  issue  whicli  confronts  the 
Security  Council  today  is  grave.  Since  the  end 
of  the  Second  World  "War  there  has  been  no  tlireat 
to  the  vision  of  peace  so  profound,  no  challenge  to 
the  world  of  the  charter  so  fateful.  The  hopes  of 
mankind  are  concentrated  in  this  room.  The  ac- 
tion we  take  may  determine  the  future  of  civiliza- 
tion. I  know  that  this  Council  will  approach  the 
issue  with  a  full  sense  of  our  responsibility  and 
a  solemn  undei-standing  of  the  import  of  our 
deliberations. 

There  is  a  road  to  peace.  The  beginning  of 
that  road  is  marked  out  in  the  resolution  I  have 
submitted  for  your  consideration.  If  we  act 
promptly,  we  will  have  another  chance  to  take 
up  again  the  dreadful  questions  of  nuclear  arms 
and  military  bases  and  the  means  and  causes  of 
aggression  and  war — to  take  tliom  up  and  do 
something  about  them. 

This  is  a  solemn  and  significant  day  for  the  life 
of  the  United  Nations  and  the  hope  of  world 
community.    Let  it  be  remembered  not  as  the  day 


when  the  world  came  to  the  edge  of  nuclear  war 
but  as  the  day  when  men  resolved  to  let  nothing 
thereafter  stop  them  in  their  quest  for  peace. 


STATEMENT  TO  THE  PRESS,  OCTOBER  23' 

U.S. /U.N.  press  rele-ise  4071 

I  want  to  say  just  five  quick  things. 

First,  the  U.S.S.K.  did  not  deny  that  Soviet 
MRBM  and  lEBM  sites  and  missiles  have  been 
secretly  installed  in  Cuba. 

Second,  in  consequence  the  representative  of  the 
Soviet  Union  has  in  effect  admitted  that  the  Soviet 
statement  of  September  11  that  there  was  "no 
need  for  the  Soviet  Government  to  shift  its 
weapons  ...  to  any  other  country,  for  instance 
Cuba"  and  that  there  was  "no  need  to  search  for 
sites  for  them  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  Soviet 
Union"  was  deliberate  deceit. 

Third,  the  U.S.S.R.  has  thus  itself  fully  con- 
firmed to  the  Security  Council  the  urgent  necessity 
of  the  measures  we  were  forced  to  take  in  our  own 
defense,  in  defense  of  the  hemisphere,  and  in  de- 
fense of  other  allies  of  the  United  States  and  un- 
alined  powers  alike. 

Fourth,  this  sequence  of  events  should  put  the 
Council  and  the  world  on  the  alert  about  all  prot- 
estations of  innocence  which  we  may  expect  to 
hear  in  the  next  few  days. 

Ajid  fbially,  it  is  now  apparent  that  President 
Dorticos  of  Cuba  was  admitting  the  existence  of 
long-range  nuclear  weapons  in  Cuba  when  he  told 
the  General  Assembly  on  October  8,  "We  have 
sufficient  means  with  which  to  defend  ourselves; 
we  have  indeed  our  inevitable  weapons,  the  weap- 
ons which  we  would  have  preferred  not  to  acquire 
and  which  we  do  not  wish  to  employ." 


FIRST  STATEMENT  OF  OCTOBER  25 

U.S./U.N.  press  release  4073 

Today  we  must  address  our  attention  to  tlie 
realities  of  the  situation  posed  by  the  buildup  of 
nuclear  striking  power  in  Cul)a. 

In  this  connection  I  want  to  say  at  the  outset 
that  the  course  adopted  by  the  Soviet  Union  yes- 
terday to  avoid  direct  confrontations  in  the  zone  of 
quarantine  is  welcome  to  my  Government.     We 


*  See  p.  722. 
734 


"Made   at  8:4.5   p..ni.   after   the  Security   Council   had 
adjourned. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


also  welcome  the  assurance  by  Chairman  Khrush- 
chev in  his  letter  to  Earl  Russell  that  the  Soviet 
Union  will  "take  no  reckless  decisions"  with  re- 
gard to  this  crisis.  And  we  welcome  most  of  all 
the  report  that  Mr.  Khrushchev  has  agreed  to  the 
proposals  advanced  by  the  Secretary-General. 
Perhaps  that  report  will  be  confirmed  here  today. 
My  Government  is  most  anxious  to  effect  a 
peaceful  resolution  of  this  affair.  We  continue  to 
hope  that  the  Soviet  Union  will  work  with  us  to 
diminish  not  only  the  new  danger  which  has  sud- 
denly shadowed  the  peace  but  all  of  the  conflicts 
that  divide  the  world. 

I  shall  not  detain  you  with  any  detailed  discus- 
sion of  the  Soviet  and  the  Cuban  responses  to  our 
complaint.  The  speeches  of  the  Communist  dele- 
gates were  entirely  predictable.  I  shall  make  brief 
comment  on  some  points  suggested  by  these 
speeches  and  some  other  points  which  may  have 
arisen  in  the  minds  of  members  of  the  United 
Nations. 

Both  Chairman  Khrushchev  in  his  letter  to  Earl 
Russell  and  Ambassador  Zorin  in  his  remarks  to 
this  Coimcil  argued  that  this  threat  to  the  peace 
had  been  caused  not  by  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Cuba  but  by  the  United  States. 

We  are  here  today  and  have  been  this  week  for 
ane  single  reason — because  the  Soviet  Union  se- 
cretly introduced  this  menacing  offensive  military 
buildup  into  the  island  of  Cuba  while  assuring 
the  world  that  notliing  was  further  from  their 
thoughts. 

The  argument,  in  its  essence,  of  the  Soviet  Un- 
ion is  that  it  was  not  the  Soviet  Union  wliich 
created  tliis  threat  to  peace  by  secretly  installing 
;hese  weapons  in  Cuba  but  that  it  was  the  United 
States  which  created  this  crisis  by  discovering  and 
•eporting  tliese  installations.  This  is  the  first 
ime,  I  confess,  that  I  have  ever  heard  it  said  that 
he  crime  is  not  the  burglar  but  the  discovery  of 
he  burglar — and  tliat  the  threat  is  not  the  clan- 
lestine  missiles  in  Cuba  but  their  discovery  and  the 
imited  measures  to  quarantine  further  infection. 
The  peril  arises  not  because  tlie  nations  of  the 
iVestern  Hemisphere  have  joined  together  to  take 
lecessary  action  in  their  self-defense  but  because 
he  Soviet  Union  has  extended  its  nuclear  threat 
nto  the  Western  Hemispliere. 

I  noted  that  there  are  still  at  least  some  dele- 
i^ates  in  the  Council — possibly,  I  suspect,  very 
ew — who  say  that  they  do  not  Imow  whether  the 

November   72,   7962 


Soviet  Union  has,  in  fact,  built  in  Cuba  installa- 
tions capable  of  firing  nuclear  missiles  over  ranges 
from  1,000  to  2,000  miles.  As  I  say.  Chairman 
Khrushchev  did  not  deny  these  facts  in  his  letter 
to  Earl  Russell,  nor  did  Ambassador  Zorin  on 
Tuesday  evening.  And  if  fm-ther  doubt  remains 
on  this  score,  we  shall  gladly  exhibit  photographic 
evidence  to  the  doubtful. 

One  other  jioint  I  would  like  to  make  is  to  invite 
attention  to  tlie  casual  remark  of  the  Soviet  repre- 
sentative claiming  that  we  have  35  bases  in  foreign 
countries.  The  facts  are  that  there  are  missiles 
comparable  to  these  being  placed  in  Cuba  with  the 
forces  of  only  three  of  our  allies.  They  were 
only  established  there  by  a  decision  of  the  heads- 
of-government  meeting  in  December  lOST,*^  which 
was  compelled  to  authorize  such  arrangements  by 
virtue  of  a  prior  Soviet  decision  to  introduce  its 
own  missiles  capable  of  destroying  the  countries 
of  Western  Europe. 

Reasons  for  Prompt  U.S.  Action 

In  the  next  place  there  are  some  troublesome 
questions  in  the  minds  of  members  that  are  en- 
titled to  serious  answers.  There  are  those  who 
say  that  conceding  the  fact  that  the  Soviet  Union 
has  installed  these  offensive  missiles  in  Cuba,  con- 
ceding the  fact  that  this  constitutes  a  gi'ave  threat 
to  the  peace  of  the  world,  why  was  it  necessary  for 
the  nations  of  tlie  Western  Hemisphere  to  act  with 
such  speed?  Wiy  could  not  the  quarantine 
against  the  shipment  of  offensive  weapons  have 
been  delayed  until  the  Security  Council  and  the 
General  Assembly  had  a  full  opportunity  to  con- 
sider the  situation  and  make  recommendations? 

Let  me  remind  the  members  that  the  United 
States  was  not  looking  for  some  pretext  to  raise 
the  issue  of  the  transformation  of  Cuba  into  a  mili- 
tary base.  On  the  contrary,  the  United  States 
made  no  objection  whatever  to  the  shipment  of 
defensive  arms  by  the  Soviet  Union  to  Cuba,  even 
though  such  shipments  offended  the  traditions  of 
this  hemisphere. 

Even  after  the  first  hard  intelligence  reached 
Washington  concerning  the  change  in  the  charac- 
ter of  Soviet  militai-y  assistance  to  Cuba,  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  responded  by  directing 
an  intensification  of  surveillance.  And  only  after 
the  facts  and  the  magnitude  of  the  buildup  had 


"  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  6,  1958,  p.  3. 

735 


been  established  beyond  all  doubt  did  we  begin  to 
take  this  limited  action  of  barring  only  these  nu- 
clear weapons  equipment  and  aircraft. 

To  understand  the  reasons  for  this  prompt  ac- 
tion, it  is  necessary  to  imderstand  the  nature  and 
the  purpose  of  this  operation.  It  has  been  marked, 
above  all,  by  two  characteristics — speed  and 
stealth.  As  the  photographic  evidence  makes 
clear,  the  installation  of  these  missiles —  the  erec- 
tion of  these  missile  sites — ^has  taken  place  with 
extraordinary  speed.  One  entire  complex  was  put 
up  in  24  hours.  This  speed  not  only  demonstrates 
the  methodical  organization  and  careful  planning 
involved.  But  it  also  demonstrates  a  premeditated 
attempt  to  confront  this  hemisphere  with  a  fait 
accompli.  By  quickly  completing  the  whole  proc- 
ess of  nuclearization  of  Cuba,  the  Soviet  Union 
would  be  in  a  position  to  demand  that  the  status 
quo  be  maintained  and  left  imdisturbed. 

If  we  were  to  have  delayed  our  coimter action, 
the  nuclearization  of  Cuba  would  have  been 
quickly  completed.  This  is  not  a  risk  which  this 
hemisphere  is  prepared  to  take. 

Wlien  we  firet  detected  tlie  secret  offensive  instal- 
lations, could  we  reasonably  be  expected  to  have 
notified  the  Soviet  Union  in  advance,  through  the 
process  of  calling  the  Security  Council,  that  we 
had  discovered  its  perfidy  and  then  to  have  done 
nothing  but  wait  while  we  debated  and  then  have 
waited  further  while  the  Soviet  representative  in 
the  Security  Council  vetoed  a  resolution,  as  he  has 
already  announced  that  he  will  do?  In  different 
circumstances,  we  would  have.  But  today  we  are 
dealing  with  dread  realities  and  not  with  wishes. 

One  of  the  sites,  as  I  have  said,  was  constructed 
in  24  hours.  One  of  these  missiles  can  be  anned 
with  its  nuclear  warhead  in  the  middle  of  the 
night,  pointed  at  New  York,  and  landed  above 
this  room  5  minutes  after  it  is  fired.  No  debate  in 
this  room  could  affect  in  the  slightest  the  urgency 
of  these  terrible  facts  or  the  immediacy  of  tlic 
threat  to  the  peace. 

There  was  only  one  way  to  deal  witli  that  ur- 
gency and  with  that  immediacy,  and  that  was  to 
act  and  to  act  at  once — but  with  the  utmost  re- 
straint consistent  with  the  urgency  of  the  threat 
to  the  peace. 

And  we  came  to  the  Security  Council,  I  remind 
you,  immediately  and  concurrently  with  the  Or- 
ganization of  American  States.     We  did  not  even 


wait  for  the  OAS  to  meet  and  to  act.  We  came 
here  at  the  same  time.  We  immediately  put  into 
process  the  political  machinery  that,  we  pray,  will 
achieve  a  solution  of  this  grave  crisis.  And  we 
did  not  act  mitil  the  American  Republics  had 
acted  to  make  the  quarantine  effective. 

We  did  not  shirk  our  duties  to  ourselves,  to  the 
hemisphere,  to  the  United  Nations,  or  to  the  world. 
We  are  now  in  the  Security  Council  on  the  initia- 
tive of  the  United  States  precisely  because,  having 
taken  the  hemispheric  action  which  has  been  taken, 
we  wish  political  machinery — the  machinery  of 
the  United  Nations — to  take  over,  to  reduce  these 
tensions,  and  to  interpose  itself  to  eliminate  this 
aggressive  threat  to  the  peace  and  to  assure  the 
removal  from  this  hemisphere  of  offensive  nu- 
clear weapons  and  the  corresponding  lifting  of 
the  quarantine. 

What  Were  the  Alternatives? 

There  are  those  who  say  that  the  quarantine  is 
an  inappropriate  and  extreme  remedy — that  the 
punisliment  does  not  fit  the  crime.  But  I  ask 
those  who  take  this  position  to  put  themselves 
in  the  position  of  the  Organization  of  American 
States  to  consider  what  you  would  have  done  in 
the  face  of  the  nuclearization  of  Cuba.  Were  we 
to  do  nothing  until  the  knife  was  sharpened? 
Were  we  to  stand  idly  by  until  it  was  at  our 
throats  ?    "^^Iiat  were  the  alternatives  available  ? 

On  the  one  hand,  the  Organization  of  American 
States  might  have  sponsored  an  invasion,  or  de- 
stroyed the  bases  by  an  air  strike,  or  imposed  a 
total  blockade  on  all  imports  to  Cuba,  including 
medicine  and  food.  On  the  other  hand,  the  OAS 
and  the  United  States  might  have  done  nothing. 
Such  a  course  would  have  confirmed  the  greatest 
threat  to  the  peace  of  the  Americas  known  to  his- 
tory and  would  have  encouraged  the  Soviet  Union 
in  similar  adventures  in  other  parts  of  the  world. 
And  it  would  have  discredited  our  will,  our  de- 
termination, to  live  in  freedom  and  to  reduce — 
not  increase — the  perils  of  this  nuclear  age. 

The  course  we  have  chosen  seems  to  me  per- 
fectly graduated  to  meet  the  character  of  the 
threat.  To  have  done  less  would  have  been  to 
fail  in  our  obligation  to  peace. 

To  those  who  say  that  a  limited  quarantine  was 
too  much,  in  spite  of  the  provocation  and  the  dan- 
ger, let  me  tell  j'ou  a  story — attributed  like  so 


736 


Department  of  Sfafe  Bulletin 


many  of  our  American  stories  to  Abraham  Lin- 
coln— about  the  passerby  out  in  my  part  of  the 
country  who  was  charged  by  a  farmer's  ferocious 
boar.  He  picked  up  a  pitchfork  and  met  tlie  boar 
head  on.  It  died,  and  the  irate  farmer  denounced 
him  and  asked  him  why  he  didn't  use  the  blimt 
end  of  the  pitchfork.  And  the  man  replied,  "Wliy 
didn't  the  boar  attack  me  with  his  blunt  end?" 

Some  here  have  attempted  to  question  the  legal 
basis  of  the  defensive  measures  taken  by  the 
American  Republics  to  protect  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere against  Soviet  long-range  nuclear  missiles. 

I  would  gladly  expand  on  our  position  on  this, 
but  in  view  of  the  proposal  now  before  us  pre- 
sented last  night  by  the  Secretary-General,  per- 
haps that  is  a  matter  and  a  discussion,  in  view  of 
its  complexity  and  length,  which  could  be  more 
fruitfully  delayed  to  a  later  time. 

Finally,  let  me  say  that  no  twisting  of  logic,  no 
distortion  of  words,  can  disguise  the  plain,  the 
obvious,  the  compelling  commonsense  conclusion 
that  the  installation  of  nuclear  weapons  by  stealth 
— weapons  of  mass  destruction  in  Cuba — poses  a 
dangerous  threat  to  the  peace,  a  threat  which  con- 
travenes article  2,  paragraph  4,  and  a  threat 
which  the  American  Republics  are  entitled  to 
meet,  as  they  have  done,  with  appropriate  re- 
gional defensive  measures. 

The  Basic  Situation 

Nothing  has  been  said  by  the  representatives  of 
the  Communist  states  here  which  alters  the  basic 
situation.  There  is  one  fimdamental  question  to 
which  I  solicit  your  attention.  The  question  is 
this :  Wliat  action  serves  to  strengthen  the  world's 
hope  of  peace  ? 

Can  anyone  claim  that  the  introduction  of  long- 
range  nuclear  missiles  into  Cuba  strengthens  the 
peace? 

Can  anyone  claim  that  the  speed  and  stealth  of 
this  operation  strengthens  the  peace? 

Can  anyone  suppose  that  this  whole  undertak- 
ing is  anything  more  than  an  audacious  effort  to 
increase  the  nuclear  striking  power  of  the  Soviet 
Union  against  the  United  States  and  thereby  mag- 
nify its  frequently  reiterated  threats  against  Ber- 
lin? When  we  are  about  to  debate  how  to  stop 
the  dissemination  of  nuclear  weapons,  does  their 
introduction  in  a  new  hemisphere  by  an  outside 
state  advance  sanity  and  peace? 

November   72,    1962 


Does  anyone  suppose  that,  if  this  Soviet  adven- 
ture should  go  imchecked,  the  Soviet  Union  would 
refrain  from  similar  adventures  in  other  parts 
of  the  world  ? 

The  one  action  in  the  last  few  days  which  has 
strengthened  the  peace  is  the  determination  to 
stop  this  further  spread  of  weapons  in  this  hemi- 
sphere. 

In  view  of  the  situation  that  now  confronts  us 
and  the  proposals  made  here  yesterday  by  the  Act- 
ing Secretary-General,  I  am  not  going  to  further 
extend  my  remarks  this  afternoon.  I  wish  only 
to  conclude  by  reading  to  the  members  of  the 
Council  a  letter  fi'om  the  President  of  the  United 
States  which  was  delivered  to  the  Acting  Secre- 
tary-General just  a  few  minutes  ago  in  reply  to 
his  appeal  of  last  night.    He  said  to  Mr.  U  Thant : 

I  deeply  appreciate  the  spirit  wtiich  prompted  your 
message  of  yesterday. 

As  we  made  clear  in  the  Security  Council,  the  existing 
threat  was  created  by  the  secret  introduction  of  offensive 
weapons  into  Cuba,  and  the  answer  lies  In  the  removal 
of  such  weapons. 

In  your  message  and  your  statement  to  the  Security 
Council  last  night,  you  have  made  certain  suggestions  and 
have  invited  preliminary  talks  to  determine  whether  sat- 
isfactory arrangements  can  be  assured. 

Ambassador  Stevenson  is  ready  to  discuss  these 
arrangements  with  you. 

I  can  assure  you  of  our  desire  to  reach  a  satisfactory 
and  peaceful  solution  of  the  matter. 

I  have  nothing  further  to  say  at  this  time,  Mr. 
President. 


SECOND  STATEMENT  OF  OCTOBER  25 

U.S./U.N.  press  release  4074 

I  want  to  say  to  you,  Mr.  Zorin,  that  I  do  not 
have  your  talent  for  obfuscation,  for  distortion, 
for  confusing  language,  and  for  doubletalk.  And 
I  must  confess  to  you  that  I  am  glad  that  I  do  not  I 

But  if  I  understood  what  you  said,  you  said  that 
my  position  had  changed,  that  today  I  was  defen- 
sive because  we  did  not  have  the  evidence  to  prove 
our  assertions  that  your  Government  had  installed 
long-range  missiles  in  Cuba. 

Well,  let  me  say  something  to  you,  Mr.  Ambas- 
sador— we  do  have  the  evidence.  We  have  it,  and 
it  is  clear  and  it  is  incontrovertible.  And  let  me 
say  something  else — those  weapons  must  be  taken 
out  of  Cuba. 


737 


Next,  let  me  say  to  you  that,  if  I  understood 
you,  with  a  trespass  on  credibility  that  excels  your 
best,  you  said  that  our  position  had  changed  since 
I  spoke  here  the  other  day  because  of  the  pressures 
of  world  opinion  and  the  majority  of  the  United 
Nations.  Well,  let  me  say  to  you,  sir,  you  are 
wrong  again.  We  have  had  no  pressure  from  any- 
one whatsover.  We  came  in  here  today  to  indicate 
our  willingness  to  discuss  Mr.  U  Thant's  proposals, 
and  that  is  the  only  change  that  has  taken  place. 

But  let  me  also  say  to  you,  sir,  that  there  has 
been  a  change.  You — the  Soviet  Union  has  sent 
these  weapons  to  Cuba.  You — the  Soviet  Union 
has  upset  the  balance  of  power  in  the  world. 
You — the  Soviet  Union  has  created  this  new  dan- 
ger, not  the  United  States. 

And  you  ask  with  a  fine  show  of  indignation 
why  the  President  did  not  tell  ]Mr.  Gromyko  on 
last  Thursday  about  our  evidence,  at  the  very 
time  that  Mr.  Gromyko  was  blandly  denying  to 
the  President  that  the  U.S.S.R.  was  placing  such 
weapons  on  sites  in  the  new  world. 

Well,  I  will  tell  you  why — because  we  were  as- 
sembling the  evidence,  and  perhaps  it  would  be 
instructive  to  the  world  to  see  how  a  Soviet  offi- 
cial— how  far  he  would  go  in  perfidy.  Perhaps 
we  wanted  to  know  if  this  country  faced  another 
example  of  nuclear  deceit  like  that  one  a  year  ago, 
when  in  stealth  the  Soviet  Union  broke  the  nucle- 
ar test  moratorium. 

And  while  we  are  asking  questions,  let  me  ask 
you  why  j^our  Government — your  Foreign  Min- 
ister— delil)erately,  cynically  deceived  us  about  the 
nuclear  buildup  in  Cuba. 

And,  finally,  the  other  day,  Mr.  Zorin,  I  remind 
you  that  you  did  not  deny  the  existence  of  these 
weapons.  Instead,  we  heard  that  they  had  sud- 
denly become  defensive  weapons.  But  today, 
again  if  I  licard  you  correctly,  you  now  say  they 
do  not  exist,  or  that  we  haven't  proved  they  exist, 
with  another  fine  flood  of  rhetorical  scorn. 

All  right,  sir,  let  me  ask  you  one  simple  ques- 
tion :  Do  you.  Ambassador  Zorin,  deny  that  the 
U.S.S.R.  has  placed  and  is  placing  medium-  and 
intermediate-range  missiles  and  sites  in  Cuba? 
Yes  or  no — don't  wait  for  the  translation — yes  or 
no? 

[The  Soviet  representaUve  refused  to  answer.] 

You  can  answer  yes  or  no.  You  have  denied 
they  exist.    I  want  to  know  if  I  understood  you 


738 


correctly.  I  am  prepared  to  wait  for  my  answer 
imtil  hell  freezes  over,  if  that's  your  decision. 
Ajid  I  am  also  prepared  to  present  the  evidence  in 
this  room. 

[The  President  called  on  the  representative  of  Chile  to  speak, 
but  Ambassador  Stevenson  continued  as  follows:] 

I  have  not  finished  my  statement.  I  asked  you 
a  question.  I  have  had  no  reply  to  the  question, 
and  I  will  now  proceed,  if  I  may,  to  finish  my 
statement. 

U.S.  Exhibits  Evidence  of  Soviet  Military  Buildup 

I  doubt  if  anyone  in  this  room,  except  possibly 
the  representative  of  the  Soviet  Union,  has  any 
doubt  about  the  facts.  But  in  view  of  his  state- 
ments and  the  statements  of  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment up  until  last  Thursday,  when  Mr.  Gromyko 
denied  the  existence  or  any  intention  of  installing 
such  weapons  in  Cuba,  I  am  going  to  make  a  por- 
tion of  the  evidence  available  right  now.  If  you 
will  indulge  me  for  a  moment,  we  will  set  up  an 
easel  here  in  the  back  of  the  room  where  I  hope  it 
will  be  visible  to  everyone. 

The  first  of  these  exhibits  shows  an  area  north 
of  the  village  of  Candelaria,  near  San  Cristobal, 
southwest  of  Habana.  A  map,  together  with  a 
small  photograph,  shows  precisely  where  the  area 
is  in  Cuba. 

The  first  photograph  shows  the  area  in  late 
August  1962;  it  was  then,  if  you  can  see  from 
where  you  are  sitting,  only  a  peaceful  countryside. 

The  second  photograph  shows  the  same  area  one 
day  last  week.  A  few  tents  and  vehicles  had  come 
into  the  area,  new  spur  roads  had  appeared,  and 
the  main  road  had  been  improved. 

The  tliird  photograph,  taken  only  24  hours  later, 
sliows  facilities  for  a  medium-range  missile  battal- 
ion installed.  There  are  tents  for  400  or  500  men. 
At  the  end  of  the  new  spur  road  there  are 
seven  1,000-mile  missile  trailers.  There  are  four 
launcher-erector  mechanisms  for  placing  these 
missiles  in  erect  firing  position.  This  missile  is  a 
mobile  weapon,  which  can  be  moved  rapidly  from 
one  place  to  another.  It  is  identical  with  the 
1,000-mile  missiles  which  have  been  displayed  in 
AIoscow  parades.  All  of  this,  I  remind  j'ou,  took 
place  in  24  hours. 

The  second  exhibit,  whicli  you  can  all  examine 
at  your  leisure,  shows  three  successive  photo- 
grapliic  enlargements  of  another  missile  base  of 
the  same  type  in  the  area  of  San  Cristobal.    These 

Department  of  Stale  Bulletin 


i3 


enlarged  photograplis  clearly  show  six  of  these 
missiles  on  trailers  and  three  erectors. 

And  that  is  only  one  example  of  the  first  type  of 
ballistic  missile  installation  in  Cuba. 

A  second  type  of  installation  is  designed  for  a 
missile  of  intermediate  range — a  range  of  about 
2,200  miles.  Each  site  of  this  type  has  four  laimch- 
ing  pads. 

The  exhibit  on  this  type  of  missile  shows  a 
laimching  area  being  constructed  near  Guanajay, 
southwest  of  the  city  of  Habana.  As  in  the  first 
exhibit,  a  map  and  small  photogi'aph  show  this 
area  as  it  appeared  in  late  August  1962,  when  no 
military  activities  were  apparent. 

A  second  large  photograph  shows  the  same  area 
xbout  6  weeks  later.  Here  you  will  see  a  very 
heavy  construction  effort  to  push  the  launching 
irea  to  rapid  completion.  The  pictures  show  two 
large  concrete  bunkers  or  control  centers  in  proc- 
jss  of  construction,  one  between  each  pair  of 
launching  pads.  They  show  heavy  concrete  re- 
:aining  walls  being  erected  to  shelter  vehicles  and 
jquipment  from  rocket  blast-off.  They  show  cable 
5cars  leading  from  the  lamich  pads  to  the  bunkers, 
rhey  show  a  large  reinforced  concrete  building 
nider  construction.  A  building  with  a  heavy  arch 
nay  well  be  mtended  as  the  storage  area  for  the 
luclear  warheads.  The  installation  is  not  yet  com- 
plete, and  no  warheads  are  yet  visible. 

The  next  photograph  shows  a  closer  view  of  the 
ame  intermediate-range  launch  site.  You  can 
clearly  see  one  of  the  pairs  of  large  concrete 
amich  pads,  with  a  concrete  building  from  which 
aunching  operations  for  three  pads  are  con- 
rolled.  Other  details  are  visible,  such  as  fuel 
anks. 

And  that  is  only  one  example,  one  illustration, 
)f  tlie  work  being  furnished  in  Cuba  on  inter- 
nediate-range  missile  bases. 

)ther  Types  of  Soviet  Weapons 

Now,  in  addition  to  missiles,  the  Soviet  Union  is 
nstalling  other  offensive  weapons  in  Cuba.  The 
lext  photograph  is  of  an  airfield  at  San  Julian  in 
vestern  Cuba.  On  this  field  you  will  see  22  crates 
lesigned  to  transport  the  fuselages  of  Soviet 
lyushin-28  bombers.  Four  of  the  aircraft  are 
incrated,  and  one  is  partially  assembled.  These 
ombers,  sometimes  known  as  Beagles,  have  an 
•perating  radius  of  about  750  miles  and  are  ca- 
•)able  of  carrying  nuclear  weapons.    At  the  same 

fovember   12,   1962 


field  you  can  see  one  of  the  surface-to-air  antiair- 
craft guided  missile  bases,  with  six  missiles  per 
base,  which  now  ring  the  entire  coastline  of  Cuba. 

Another  set  of  two  photogi-aphs  covers  still  an- 
other area  of  deployment  of  medium-range  mis- 
siles in  Cuba.  These  photographs  are  on  a  larger 
scale  than  the  others  and  reveal  many  details  of 
an  improved  field-type  launch  site.  One  photo- 
graph provides  an  overall  view  of  most  of  the  site; 
you  can  see  clearly  three  of  the  four  launching 
pads.  The  second  photograph  displays  details  of 
two  of  these  pads.  Even  an  eye  mitrained  in 
photographic  interpretation  can  clearly  see  the 
buildings  in  which  the  missiles  are  checked  out 
and  maintained  ready  to  fire,  a  missile  trailer, 
trucks  to  move  missiles  out  to  the  launching  pad, 
erectors  to  raise  the  missiles  to  launching  position, 
tank  trucks  to  provide  fuel,  vans  from  which  the 
missile  firing  is  controlled,  in  short,  all  of  the  re- 
quirements to  maintain,  load,  and  fire  these  ter- 
rible weapons. 

These  weapons,  gentlemen,  these  launching 
pads,  tliese  planes — of  which  we  have  illustrated 
only  a  fragment — are  a  part  of  a  much  larger 
weapons  complex,  what  is  called  a  weapons 
system. 

To  support  this  buildup,  to  operate  these  ad- 
vanced weapons  systems,  the  Soviet  Union  has  sent 
a  large  number  of  military  personnel  to  Cuba — a 
force  now  amounting  to  several  thousand  men. 

These  photographs,  as  I  say,  are  available  to 
members  for  detailed  examination  in  the  Trustee- 
ship Council  room  following  this  meeting.  There 
I  will  have  one  of  my  aides  who  will  gladly  explain 
them  to  you  in  such  detail  as  you  may  require. 

I  have  nothing  further  to  say  at  this  time. 

[After  another  statement  by  the  Soviet  representative,  Ambas- 
sador Stevenson  replied  as  foUows:] 

Mr.  President  and  gentlemen,  I  won't  detain 
you  but  one  minute. 

I  have  not  had  a  direct  answer  to  my  question. 
The  representative  of  the  Soviet  Union  says  that 
the  official  answer  of  the  U.S.S.K.  was  the  Tass 
statement  that  they  don't  need  to  locate  missiles  in 
Cuba.  Well,  I  agree — they  don't  need  to.  But 
the  question  is  not  do  they  need  missiles  in  Cuba ; 
the  question  is  have  they  missiles  in  Cuba — and 
that  question  remains  unanswered.  I  knew  it 
would  be. 

As  to  the  authenticity  of  the  photographs,  which 
Mr.  Zorin  has  spoken  about  with  such  scorn,  I 

739 


wonder  if  the  Soviet  Union  would  ask  its  Cuban 
colleague  to  permit  a  U.N.  team  to  go  to  these 
sites.  If  so,  I  can  assure  you  that  we  can  direct 
them  to  the  proper  places  very  quickly. 

And  now  I  hojie  that  we  can  get  down  to  busi- 
ness, that  we  can  stop  this  sparring.  We  know 
the  facts,  and  so  do  you,  sir,  and  we  are  ready  to 
talk  about  them.  Our  job  here  is  not  to  score 
debating  points.  Our  job,  Mr.  Zorin,  is  to  save 
the  peace.    And  if  you  are  ready  to  try,  we  are.' 


U.S.  Agrees  to  U.N.  Proposal 
for  Talks  on  Cuban  Situation 

FoUoiuing  is  an  exchange  of  messages  between 
President  Kennedy  and  U  TJutnt,  Acting  Secre- 
tary-General of  the  United.  Nations. 

President  Kennedy  to  U  Thant 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  25 

October  25, 1962 

Excellency:  I  deeply  appreciate  the  spirit 
which  prompted  your  message  of  yesterday. 

As  we  made  clear  in  the  Security  Council,  the 
existing  tlireat  was  created  by  the  secret  introduc- 
tion of  offensive  weapons  into  Cuba,  and  the 
answer  lies  in  the  removal  of  such  weapons. 

In  your  message  and  your  statement  to  the  Secu- 
rity Council  last  night,  you  have  made  certain 
suggestions  and  have  invited  preliminary  talks 
to  determine  whether  satisfactory  arrangements 
can  be  assured. 

Ambassador  Stevenson  is  ready  to  discuss  these 
arrangements  with  you. 

I  can  assure  you  of  our  desire  to  reach  a  satis- 
factory and  peaceful  solution  of  the  matter. 

John  F.  Kennedy 

His  Excellency  U  Thant 

Acting  Secretary  General  of  the  United  Nations 

U  Thant  to  President  Kennedy 

October  24,  1!)62 
I  have  been  asked  by  the  permanent  representatives  of 
a  larfje  number  of  member  governmeut.s  of  the  United 
Nations  to  address  an  urgent  appeal  to  you  in  the  present 


'  The  Council  adjourned  at  7 :25  p.m.,  Oct.  25,  to  give  the 
Secretary-General  an  opportunity  to  hold  discussions  with 
interested  parties  and  report  back. 


740 


critical  situation.  These  representatives  feel  that  in  the 
interest  of  international  peace  and  security  all  concerned 
should  refrain  from  any  action  which  may  aggravate  the 
situation  and  bring  with  it  the  risk  of  war.  In  their 
view  it  is  important  that  time  should  be  given  to  enable 
the  parties  concerned  to  get  together  with  a  view  to 
resolving  the  present  crisis  peacefully  and  normalizing 
the  situation  in  the  Caribljean.  This  involves  on  the  one 
hand  the  voluntary  suspension  of  all  arms  shipments  to 
Cuba,  and  also  the  voluntary  suspension  of  the  quarantine 
measures  involving  the  searching  of  ships  bound  for 
Cuba.  I  believe  that  such  voluntary  suspension  for  a 
period  of  two  or  three  weeks  will  greatly  ease  the  situa- 
tion and  give  time  to  the  parties  concerned  to  meet  and 
discuss  with  a  view  to  finding  a  peaceful  solution  of  the 
problem.  In  this  context  I  shall  gladly  make  myself 
available  to  all  parties  for  whatever  services  I  may  be 
able  to  perform.  I  urgently  appeal  to  Your  Excellency  to 
give  immediate  consideration  to  this  message.  I  have 
sent  an  identical  message  to  the  Chairman  of  the  Council 
of  Ministers  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

U  Thant 
Acting  Secreiary-Oeneral 


White  House  Notes  Continuation 
of  Missile  Buildup  on  October  25 

White  House  Statement 

white  House  press  release  dated  October  26 

The  development  of  ballistic  missile  sites  in 
Cuba  continues  at  a  rapid  pace.  Through  the 
process  of  continued  surveillance  directed  by  the 
President,  additional  evidence  has  been  acquired 
which  clearly  reflects  that  as  of  Thuredaj',  Octol^er 
25,  definite  buildups  in  these  offensive  missile  sites 
continued  to  be  made.  The  activity  at  these  sites 
apparently  is  directed  at  achieving  a  full  opera- 
tional capability  as  soon  as  possible. 

There  is  evidence  that  as  of  yesterday,  October 
25,  considerable  construction  activity  was  being 
engaged  in  nt  the  intermediate-range  ballistic  mis- 
sile sites.  Bulldozers  and  cranes  were  observed  as 
late  as  Thursday  actively  clearing  new  areas 
witliin  the  sites  and  improving  the  approach  roads 
to  the  launch  pads. 

Since  Tuesday,  October  23,  missile- related  activ' 
ities  have  continued  at  the  medium-range  ballistic 
mi.ssile  sites  resulting  in  j^rogressive  refinements  at 
these  facilities.  For  example,  missiles  were  ob- 
served parked  in  the  open  on  October  2.3.  Surveil- 
lance on  October  25  revealed  that  some  of  these 
same  missiles  have  now  been  moved  from  their 


Department  of  Stale  Bulletin 


«ii 


tn 


K 


original  parked  positions.  Cabling  can  be  seen 
running  from  the  missile-ready  tents  to  power  gen- 
erators nearby. 

In  summary,  there  is  no  evidence  to  date  indi- 
cating that  tliere  is  any  intention  to  dismantle  or 


discontinue  work  on  these  missile  sites.  On  the 
contrary  the  Soviets  are  rapidly  continuing  their 
constiiiction  of  missile  support  and  launch  facili- 
ties, and  serious  attempts  are  under  way  to  camou- 
flage their  efforts. 


United  States  and  Soviet  Union  Agree  on  Formula 
for  Ending  Cuban  Crisis 


Following  are  the  texts  of  a  White  House  state- 
ment commenting  on  a  m,essage  of  Octoher  27  from 
Nikita  S.  Khrushchev,  Chairman  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers  of  the  U.S.S.H.,  to  President  Kennedy; 
an  exchange  of  messages  of  Octoher  27  and  28;  and 
a  statement  hy  President  Kennedy  of  Octoher  28. 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT  OF  OCTOBER  27 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  27 

Several  inconsistent  and  conflicting  proposals 
have  been  made  by  the  U.S.S.R.  witliin  the  last  24 
hours,  including  the  one  just  made  public  in  Mos- 
cow. The  proposal  broadcast  this  morning  in- 
volves tlie  security  of  nations  outside  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  But  it  is  the  Western  Hemisphere 
countries  and  they  alone  that  are  subject  to  the 
threat  that  has  produced  the  current  crisis — the 
action  of  the  Soviet  Government  in  secretly  intro- 
ducing offensive  weapons  into  Cuba.  Work  on 
these  offensive  weapons  is  still  proceeding  at  a 
rapid  pace.  The  first  imperative  must  be  to  deal 
with  this  immediate  threat,  under  which  no  sensi- 
ble negotiations  can  proceed. 

It  is  therefore  the  j^osition  of  the  United  States 
that  as  an  urgent  preliminary  to  consideration  of 
ir|any  proposals  work  on  the  Cuban  bases  must  stop ; 
offensive  weapons  must  be  rendered  inoperable; 
and  further  shipment  of  offensive  weapons  to 
Cuba  must  cease — all  under  effective  international 
verification. 

As  to  proposals  concerning  the  security  of  na- 
tions outside  this  hemispliere,  the  United  States 


l\rovember  J  2,  7962 


and  its  allies  have  long  taken  the  lead  in  seeking 
properly  inspected  arms  limitation,  on  both  sides. 
These  efforts  can  continue  as  soon  as  the  present 
Soviet-created  threat  is  ended. 


CHAIRMAN  KHRUSHCHEV'S  MESSAGE 
OF  OCTOBER  27 

Onofflcial  translation 

Dear  Mr.  President  :  It  Is  with  great  satisfaction  that 
I  studied  your  reply  to  Mr.  U  Thant  on  the  adoption  of 
measures  in  order  to  avoid  contact  by  our  ships  and  thus 
avoid  irreparable  fatal  consequences.  This  reasonable 
step  on  your  part  persuades  me  that  you  are  showing 
solicitude  for  the  preservation  of  peace,  and  I  note  this 
with  satisfaction. 

I  have  already  said  that  the  only  concern  of  our  people 
and  government  and  myself  personally  as  chairman  of 
the  Council  of  Ministers  is  to  develop  our  country  and 
have  it  hold  a  worthy  place  among  all  i>eople  of  the  world 
in  economic  competition,  advance  of  culture  and  arts,  and 
the  rise  in  people's  living  standards.  This  is  the  loftiest 
and  most  necessary  field  for  competition  which  will  only 
benefit  both  the  winner  and  loser,  because  this  benefit  is 
peace  and  an  increase  in  the  facilities  by  means  of  which 
man  lives  and  obtains  pleasure. 

In  your  statement,  you  said  that  the  main  aim  lies  not 
only  in  reaching  agreement  and  adopting  measures  to 
avert  contact  of  our  ships,  and,  consequently,  a  deepening 
of  the  crisis,  which  because  of  this  contact  can  spark  off 
the  fire  of  military  conflict  after  which  any  talks  would 
be  superfluous  because  other  forces  and  other  laws  would 
begin  to  operate — the  laws  of  war.  I  agree  with  you  that 
this  is  only  a  first  step.  The  main  thing  is  to  normalize 
and  stabilize  the  situation  in  the  world  between  states  and 
between  people. 

I  understand  your  concern  for  the  security  of  the  United 
States,  Mr.  President,  because  this  is  the  first  duty  of 
the  president.     However,  these  questions  are  also  upper- 


741 


most  in  our  minds.  The  same  duties  rest  with  me  as 
chairman  of  the  USSR  Council  of  Jllnlsters.  You  have 
been  worried  over  our  assisting  Cuba  with  arms  designed 
to  strengthen  its  defensive  potential — precisely  defensive 
potential — because  Cuba,  no  matter  what  weapons  it  had, 
could  not  compare  with  you  since  these  are  different 
dimensions,  the  more  so  given  up-to-date  means  of  exter- 
mination. 

Our  purpose  has  been  and  is  to  help  Cuba,  and  no  one 
can  challenge  the  humanity  of  our  motives  aimed  at  al- 
lowing Cuba  to  live  peacefully  and  develop  as  its  people 
desire.  You  want  to  relieve  your  country  from  danger 
and  this  is  understandable.  However,  Cuba  also  wants 
this.  All  countries  want  to  relieve  themselves  from 
danger.  But  how  can  we,  the  Soviet  Union  and  our  gov- 
ernment, assess  your  actions  which,  in  effect,  mean  that 
you  have  surrounded  the  Soviet  Union  with  military 
bases,  surrounded  our  allies  with  military  bases,  set  up 
military  ba.ses  literally  around  our  country,  and  stationed 
your  rocket  weapons  at  them?  This  is  no  secret.  High- 
placed  American  officials  demonstratively  declare  this. 
Your  rockets  are  stationed  In  Britain  and  in  Italy  and 
pointed  at  us.    Your  rockets  are  stationed  in  Turkey. 

You  are  worried  over  Cuba.  You  say  that  it  worries  you 
because  it  lies  at  a  distance  of  90  miles  across  the  sea  from 
the  shores  of  the  United  States.  However,  Turkey  lies 
next  to  us.  Our  sentinels  are  pacing  up  and  down  and 
watching  each  other.  Do  you  believe  that  you  have  the 
right  to  demand  security  for  your  country  and  the  removal 
of  such  weapons  that  you  qualify  as  offensive,  while  not 
recognizing  this  right  for  us? 

You  have  stationed  devastating  rocket  weapons,  which 
you  call  offensive,  in  Turkey  literally  right  next  to  us. 
How  then  does  recognition  of  our  equal  military  possibili- 
ties tally  with  such  unequal  relations  between  our  great 
states?    This  does  not  tally  at  all. 

It  is  good,  Mr.  President,  that  you  agreed  for  our  rep- 
resentatives to  meet  and  begin  talks,  apparently  with  the 
participation  of  U.N.  Acting  Secretary  General  U  Thant. 
Consequently,  to  some  extent,  he  assumes  the  role  of  in- 
termediary, and  we  believe  that  he  can  cope  with  the  re- 
sponsible mission  if,  of  cour.se,  every  side  that  is  drawn 
into  this  conflict  shows  good  will. 

I  think  that  one  could  rapidly  eliminate  the  conflict  and 
normalize  the  situation.  Then  people  would  heave  a  sigh 
of  relief,  considering  that  the  statesmen  who  bear  the 
responsibility  have  sober  minds,  an  awareness  of  their 
responsibility,  and  an  ability  to  solve  complicated  prob- 
lems and  not  allow  matters  to  slide  to  the  disaster  of  war. 

This  is  why  I  make  this  proposal :  We  agree  to  remove 
those  weapons  from  Cuba  which  you  regard  as  offensive 
weapons.  We  agree  to  do  this  and  to  state  this  commit- 
ment in  the  United  Nations.  Tour  representatives  will 
make  a  statement  to  the  effect  that  the  United  States,  on 
its  part,  bearing  in  mind  the  anxiety  and  concern  of  the 
Soviet  stJite,  will  evacuate  its  analogous  weapons  from 
Turkey.  Let  us  reach  an  understanding  on  what  time  you 
and  we  need  to  put  this  into  effect. 

After  this,  representatives  of  the  U.N.  Security  Council 
could  control  on-the-spot  the  fulfillment  of  these  commit- 
ments.   Of  course,  it  is  neces.sary  that  the  Governments  of 


Cuba  and  Turkey  would  allow  these  representatives  to 
come  to  their  countries  and  check  fulfillment  of  this  com- 
mitment, which  each  side  undertakes.  Apparently,  it 
would  be  better  if  these  representatives  enjoyed  the  trust 
of  the  Security  Council  and  ours — the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union — as  well  as  of  Turkey  and  Cuba.  I  think 
that  it  will  not  be  diflicult  to  find  such  people  who  enjoy 
the  trust  and  respect  of  all  interested  sides. 

We,  having  assumed  this  commitment  in  order  to  give 
satisfaction  and  hope  to  the  ijeoples  of  Cuba  and  Turkey 
and  to  increase  their  confidence  in  their  security,  will 
make  a  statement  in  the  Security  Council  to  the  effect 
that  the  Soviet  Government  gives  a  solemn  pledge  to 
respect  the  integrity  of  the  frontiers  and  the  sovereignty 
of  Turkey,  not  to  intervene  in  its  domestic  affairs,  not  to 
invade  Turkey,  not  to  make  available  its  territory  as  a 
place  d'armes  for  such  invasion,  and  also  will  restrain 
those  who  would  think  of  launching  an  aggression  against 
Turkey  either  from  Soviet  territory  or  from  the  territory 
of  other  states  bordering  on  Turkey. 

The  U.S.  Government  will  make  the  same  statement  in 
the  Security  Council  with  regard  to  Cuba.  It  will  de- 
clare that  the  United  States  will  respect  the  integrity  of 
the  frontiers  of  Cuba,  its  sovereignty,  undertakes  not 
to  intervene  in  its  domestic  affairs,  not  to  invade  and  not 
to  make  its  territory  available  as  place  d'armes  for  the 
invasion  of  Cuba,  and  also  will  restrain  those  who  would 
think  of  launching  an  aggression  against  Cuba  either 
from  U.S.  territory  or  from  the  territory  of  other  states 
bordering  on  Cuba. 

Of  course,  for  this  we  would  have  to  reach  agreement 
with  you  and  to  arrange  for  some  deadline.  Let  us  agree 
to  give  some  time,  but  not  to  delay,  two  or  three  weeks, 
not  more  than  a  month. 

The  weapons  on  Cuba,  that  you  have  mentioned  and 
which,  as  you  say,  alarm  you,  are  in  the  hands  of  Soviet 
officers.  Therefore  any  accidental  use  of  them  whatso- 
ever to  the  detriment  of  the  United  States  of  America  is 
excluded.  These  means  are  stationed  in  Cuba  at  the  re- 
quest of  the  Cuban  Government  and  only  in  defensive 
aims.  Therefore,  if  there  is  no  invasion  of  Cuba,  or  an 
attack  on  the  Soviet  Union,  or  other  of  our  allies  then, 
of  course,  these  means  do  not  threaten  anyone  and  will 
not  threaten.     For  they  do  not  pursue  offensive  aims. 

If  you  accept  my  proposal,  Mr.  Tresident,  we  would  send 
our  representatives  to  New  York,  to  the  United  Nations, 
and  would  give  them  exhaustive  instructions  to  order  to 
come  to  terms  sooner.  If  you  would  also  appoint  your 
men  and  give  them  appropriate  instructions,  this  prob- 
lem could  be  solved  soon. 

Why  would  I  like  to  achieve  this?  Because  the  entire 
world  is  now  agitated  and  expects  reasonable  actions 
from  us.  The  greatest  pleasure  for  all  the  peoples  would 
be  an  announcement  on  our  agreement,  on  nipping  in  the 
bud  the  confiict  that  has  arisen.  I  attach  a  great  impor- 
tance to  such  understanding  because  it  might  be  a  good 
beginning  and,  specifically,  facilitate  a  nuclear  test  ban 
agreement.  The  problem  of  tests  could  be  solved  simul- 
taneously, not  linking  one  with  the  other,  because  they 
are  different  problems.  However,  it  is  important  to 
reach  an  understanding  to  both  these  problems  in  order 


742 


Department  of  Stale  Bulletin 


make  a  good  gift  to  the  people,  to  let  them  rejoice  in 
le  news  that  a  nuclear  test  ban  agreement  has  also  been 
(ached  and  thus  there  will  be  no  further  contamination 
'  the  atmosphere.  Your  and  our  positions  on  this  issue 
•e  very  close. 

All  this,  possibly,  would  serve  as  a  good  impetus  to 
•arching  for  mutually  acceptable  agreements  on  other 
sputed  issues,  too,  on  which  there  is  an  exchange  of 
)inion  between  us.  These  problems  have  not  yet  been 
lived  but  they  wait  for  an  urgent  solution  which  would 
ear  the  international  atmosphere.  We  are  ready  for 
is. 

These  are  my  proposals,  Mr.  President. 
Respectfully  yours, 

NiKITA     KHEUSHCHEV 

October  27,  1962 


RESIDENT  KENNEDY'S   MESSAGE 
tiF.  OCTOBER  27 

bite  House  press  release  dated  October  27 

October  27, 1962 
Dear  Mr.  Chairman  :  I  have  read  your  letter  of 
ctober  26th  ^  with  great  care  and  welcomed  the 
atement  of  your  desire  to  seek  a  prompt  solution 
•  the  problem.  The  first  thing  that  needs  to  be 
Diie,  however,  is  for  work  to  cease  on  offensive 
issile  bases  in  Cuba  and  for  all  weapons  systems 
.  Cuba  capable  of  offensive  use  to  be  rendered  in- 
ferable, under  effective  United  Nations  arrange- 
ents. 

Assuming  this  is  done  promptly,  I  have  given 
y  representatives  in  New  York  instructions  that 
ill  permit  them  to  work  out  this  weekend — in  co- 
jeration  with  the  Acting  Secretary  General  and 
)ur  representative — an  arrangement  for  a  per- 
anent  solution  to  the  Cuban  problem  along  the 
nes  suggested  in  your  letter  of  October  26th.  As 
read  your  letter,  the  key  elements  of  your  pro- 
Dsals — which  seem  generally  acceptable  as  I 
iderstand  them — are  as  follows: 

1)  You  would  agree  to  remove  these  weapons 
stems  from  Cuba  under  appropriate  United  Na- 
ons  observation  and  supervision ;  and  undertake, 
itii  suitable  safeguards,  to  halt  the  further  in- 
oduction  of  such  weapons  systems  into  Cuba. 

2)  We,  on  our  part,  would  agree — upon  the 
tablishment  of  adequate  arrangements  through 
le  United  Nations  to  ensure  the  carrying  out  and 

^>ntinuation  of  these  commitments — (a)  to  re- 
ove  promptly  the  quarantme  measures  now  in 
Feet  and  (b)  to  give  assurances  against  an  inva- 


'  Not  printed. 


Jovember   72,   J  962 

r 


sion  of  Cuba.  I  am  confident  that  other  nations 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere  would  be  prepared 
to  do  likewise. 

If  you  will  give  your  representative  similar 
instructions,  there  is  no  reason  why  we  should  not 
be  able  to  complete  these  arrangements  and  an- 
nomice  them  to  the  world  within  a  couple  of  days. 
The  efl'ect  of  such  a  settlement  on  easing  world 
tensions  would  enable  us  to  work  toward  a  more 
general  arrangement  regarding  "other  arma- 
ments", as  proposed  in  your  second  letter  which 
you  made  public.  I  would  like  to  say  again  that 
the  United  States  is  very  much  interested  in  reduc- 
ing tensions  and  halting  the  arms  race ;  and  if  your 
letter  signifies  that  you  are  prepared  to  discuss  a 
detente  affecting  NATO  and  the  Warsaw  Pact,  we 
are  quite  prepared  to  consider  with  our  allies  any 
useful  proposals. 

But  the  first  ingredient,  let  me  emphasize,  is 
the  cessation  of  work  on  missile  sites  in  Cuba  and 
measures  to  render  such  weapons  inoperable, 
under  effective  international  guarantees.  The 
continuation  of  this  threat,  or  a  prolonging  of  this 
discussion  concerning  Cuba  by  linking  these  prob- 
lems to  the  broader  questions  of  European  and 
world  security,  would  surely  lead  to  an  intensifi- 
cation of  the  Cuban  crisis  and  a  grave  risk  to  the 
peace  of  the  world.  For  this  reason  I  hope  we 
can  quickly  agree  along  the  lines  outlined  in  this 
letter  and  in  your  letter  of  October  26th. 

John  F.  Kennedy 


CHAIRMAN   KHRUSHCHEV'S  MESSAGE 
OF  OCTOBER  28 

UnolHcial  translation 

Deab  Me.  Peesident:  I  have  received  your  message  of 
27  October.  I  express  my  satisfaction  and  thank  you  for 
the  sense  of  proportion  you  have  displayed  and  for 
realization  of  the  responsibility  which  now  devolves  on 
you  for  the  preservation  of  the  peace  of  the  world. 

I  regard  with  great  understanding  your  concern  and 
the  concern  of  the  United  States  people  in  connection  with 
the  fact  that  the  weapons  you  describe  as  offensive  are 
formidable  weapons  indeed.  Both  you  and  we  under- 
stand what  kind  of  weapons  these  are. 

In  order  to  eliminate  as  rapidly  as  possible  the  conflict 
which  endangers  the  cause  of  peace,  to  give  an  assurance 
to  all  people  who  crave  peace,  and  to  reassure  the  Ameri- 
can people,  who,  I  am  certain,  also  want  peace,  as  do  the 
people  of  the  Soviet  Union,  the  Soviet  Government,  in 
addition  to  earlier  instructions  on  the  discontinuation  of 
further  work  on  weapons  constructions  sites,  has  given 
a  new  order  to  dismantle  the  arms  which  you  described  as 


743 


offensive,   and  to  crate  and  return  them  to  the  Soviet 
Union. 

Mr.  President,  I  should  like  to  repeat  what  I  had 
already  written  to  you  in  my  earlier  messages — that  the 
Soviet  Government  has  given  economic  assistance  to  the 
Republic  of  Cuba,  as  well  as  arms,  because  Cuba  and  the 
Cuban  iieople  were  constantly  under  the  continuous 
threat  of  an  invasion  of  Cuba. 

A  piratic  vessel  had  shelled  Havana.  They  say  that  this 
shelling  was  done  by  irresponsible  Cuban  emigrecs.  Per- 
haps so.  However,  the  question  is  from  where  did  they 
shoot.  It  is  a  fact  that  these  Cubans  have  no  territory, 
they  are  fugitives  from  their  country,  and  they  have  no 
means  to  conduct  military  operations. 

This  means  that  someone  put  into  their  hands  these 
weapons  for  shelling  Havana  and  for  piracy  in  the  Carib- 
bean in  Cuban  territorial  waters.  It  is  impossible  in  our 
time  not  to  notice  a  i)iriitic  ship,  considering  the  concen- 
tration in  the  Caribbean  of  American  ships  from  which 
everything  can  be  seen  and  observed. 

In  these  conditions,  pirate  ships  freely  roam  around  and 
shell  Cuba  and  make  piratic  attacks  on  peaceful  cargo 
ships.  It  is  known  that  they  even  shelled  a  British  cargo 
ship.  In  a  word,  Cuba  w-as  under  the  continuous  threat 
of  aggressive  forces,  which  did  not  conceal  their  intention 
to  invade  its  territory. 

The  Cuban  people  want  to  build  their  life  in  their  own 
interests  without  external  interference.  This  is  their 
right,  and  they  cannot  be  blamed  for  wanting  to  be  masters 
of  their  own  country  and  disposing  of  the  fruits  of  their 
own  labor.  The  threat  of  invasion  of  Cuba  and  all  other 
schemes  for  creating  tension  over  China  are  designed  to 
strike  the  Cuban  people  with  a  sense  of  insecurity,  intimi- 
date them,  and  prevent  them  from  peacefully  building 
their  new  life. 

Mr.  President,  I  should  like  to  say  clearly  once  more 
that  we  could  not  remain  indifferent  to  this.  The  Soviet 
Government  decided  to  render  assistance  to  Cuba  with 
means  of  defense  against  aggression — only  with  means  for 
defense  purposes.  We  have  supplied  the  defense  means 
which  you  describe  as  offensive  means.  We  have  sup- 
plied them  to  prevent  an  attack  on  Cuba — to  prevent  rash 
acts. 

I  regard  with  respect  and  trust  the  statement  you  made 
in  your  message  of  27  October  1962  that  there  would  be 
no  attack,  no  invasion  of  Cuba,  and  not  only  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States,  but  also  on  the  part  of  other  nations 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere,  as  you  said  in  your  same 
message.  Then  the  motives  which  induced  us  to  render 
assistance  of  such  a  kind  to  Cuba  disappear. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  we  instructed  our  officers — 
these  means  as  I  had  already  informed  you  earlier  are  in 
the  hands  of  the  Soviet  oflBcers — to  take  appropriate  meas- 
ures to  discontinue  construction  of  the  aforementioned 
facilities,  to  dismantle  them,  and  to  return  them  to  the 
Soviet  Union.  As  I  had  informed  you  in  the  letter  of  27 
October,  we  are  prepared  to  reach  agreement  to  enable 
U.N.  representatives  to  verify  the  dismantling  of  these 
means.  Thus  in  view  of  the  assurances  you  have  given 
and  our  instructions  on  dismantling,  there  is  every  condi- 
tion for  eliminating  the  present  conflict. 

744 


I 


I  note  with  satisfaction  that  you  have  responded  to  thet  ,j 
desire  I  expressed  with  regard  to  elimination  of  the  afore- 
mentioned dangerous  situation,  as  well  as  with  regard  to 
providing  conditions  for  a  more  thoughtful  appraisal  of 
the  international  situation,  fraught  as  it  is  with  great 
dangers  in  our  age  of  thermonuclear  weapons,  rocketry, 
spaceships,  global  rockets,  and  other  deadly  weapons.  All 
people  are  interested  in  insuring  peace. 

Therefore,  vested  with  triist  and  great  resjjonsibility, 
we  must  not  allow  the  situation  to  become  aggravated  and 
must  stamp  out  the  centers  where  a  dangerous  situation 
fraught  with  grave  consequences  to  the  cause  of  peace 
has  arisen.  If  we,  together  with  you,  and  with  the  assist- 
ance of  other  people  of  good  will,  succeed  in  eliminating-t), 
this  tense  atmosphere,  we  should  also  make  certain  that 
no  other  dangerous  conflicts,  which  could  lead  to  a  world 
nuclear  catastrophe,  would  arise. 

In  conclusion,  I  should  like  to  say  something  about  a 
detente  between  NATO  and  the  Warsaw  Treaty  countrie8<Jjte[ 
that  you  have  mentioned.  We  have  spoken  about  this  jt(f 
long  since  and  are  prepared  to  continue  to  exchange  views*  ^i 
on  this  question  with  you  and  to  find  a  reasonable  solution. 

We  should  like  to  continue  the  exchange  of  views  or 
the  prohibition  of  atomic  and  thermonuclear  weapons 
general  disarmament,  and  other  problems  relating  to  the 
relaxation  of  international  tension. 

Although  I  trust  your  statement,  Mr.  President,  there 
are  irresponsible  people  who  would  like  to  invade  Cubaijatio 
now  and  thus  touch  off  a  war.  If  we  do  take  practical 
steps  and  proclaim  the  dismantling  and  evacuation  of  th« 
means  in  question  from  Cuba,  in  so  doing  we,  at  the  same 
time,  want  the  Cuban  people  to  be  certain  that  we  are 
with  them  and  are  not  absolving  ourselves  of  responsibilitjMlir] 
for  rendering  assistance  to  the  Cuban  people. 

We  are  confident  that  the  people  of  all  countries,  lik€4laii 
you,  Mr.  President,  will  understand  me  correctly.  We  ard(  ijit 
not  threatening.  We  want  nothing  but  peace.  Our  conn  i 
try  is  now  on  the  upsurge.  Our  people  are  enjoying  ths^fu 
fruits  of  their  peaceful  labor.  They  have  achieved  tre 
mendous  successes  since  the  October  Revolution,  and  cre- 
ated the  greatest  material,  spiritual,  and  cultural  values 
Our  people  are  enjoying  these  values ;  they  want  to  con-  , 
tinue  developing  their  achievements  and  insure  their  fur- 
ther development  on  the  way  of  peace  and  social  progress  "' 
by  their  persistent  labor. 

I  should  like  to  remind  you,  Mr.  President,  that  military- 
reconnaissance  planes  have  violated  the  borders  of  the- 
Soviet  Union.  In  connection  with  this  there  have  been 
conflicts  between  us  and  notes  exchanged.  In  VMO  we 
.shot  down  your  U-2  plane,  whose  reconnaissance  flight 
over  the  USSR  wrecked  the  summit  meeting  in  ParLs.'jWai 
At  that  time,  you  took  a  correct  position  and  denounced!  u 


Wp! 


that  criminal  act  of  the  former  U.S.  administration. 

But  during  your   term   of  office  as  president  nnolherjuj, 
violation  of  our  border  has  occurred,  by  an  American  U-2 
plane  in  the  Sakhalin  area.^     We  wrote  you  about  that 
violation  on  30  August.     At  that  time  you  replied  that 
that  violation  had  occurred  as  a  rcs\ilt  of  poor  weather. 


'  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  May  30, 1960,  pp.  8.51 
and  852:  .lune  6,  1960,  p.  899;  June  1.3.  1960,  pp.  947  and 
9.") ;  and  Sept.  24.  1962.  p.  449. 

Department  of  Sfafe  Bu/fefin 


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Qd  gave  assurances  that  this  would  not  be  repeated. 
7e  trusted  your  assurance,  because  the  weather  was  in- 
eed  poor  in  that  area  at  that  time. 

But  had  not  your  plane  been  ordered  to  fly  about  our 
jrritory,  even  poor  weather  could  not  have  brought  an 
merican  plane  into  our  airspace,  hence,  the  conclusion 
lat  this  is  being  done  with  the  knowledge  of  the  Penta- 
on,  which  tramples  on  international  norms  and  violates 
le  borders  of  other  states. 

A  still  more  dangerous  case  occurred  on  28  October, 
hen  one  of  your  reconnaissance  planes  intruded  over 
oviet  borders  in  the  Chukotka  Peninsula  area  in  the 
orth  and  flew  over  our  territory.  The  question  is,  Mr. 
resident:     How  should  we  regard  this?     What  is  this, 

provocation?  One  of  your  planes  violates  our  frontier 
uring  this  anxious  time  we  are  both  experiencing,  when 
verything  has  been  put  into  combat  readiness.    Is  it  not 

fact  that  an  intruding  American  plane  could  be  easily 
iken  for  a  nuclear  bomber,  which  might  push  us  to  a 
iteful  step;  and  all  the  more  so  since  the  U.S.  Govern- 
lent  and  Pentagon  long  ago  declared  that  you  are  main- 
lining a  continuous  nuclear  bomber  patrol? 

Therefore,  you  can  imagine  the  responsibility  you  are 
ssuming ;  esi>ecially  now,  when  we  are  living  through  such 
asious  times. 

I  should  also  like  to  express  the  following  wish ;  it  con- 
jrns  the  Cuban  people.  Tou  do  not  have  diplomatic  re- 
illitions.  But  through  my  officers  in  Cuba,  I  have  reports 
lat  American  planes  are  making  flights  over  Cuba. 

We  are  interested  that  there  should  be  no  war  in  the 
orld,  and  that  the  Cuban  people  should  live  in  peace, 
nd  besides,  Mr.  President,  it  is  no  secret  that  we  have 
iitiur  people  on  Cuba.  Under  a  treaty  with  the  Cuban  Gov- 
mment  we  have  sent  there  officers,  instructors,  mostly 
lain  people :  specialists,  agronomists,  zootechnicians,  ir- 
ariigators,  land  reclamation  specialists,  plain  workers, 
ractor  drivers,  and  others.  We  are  concerned  about 
hem. 

I  should  like  you  to  consider,  Mr.  President,  that  viola- 
ion  of  Cuban  airspace  by  American  planes  could  also  lead 
5  dangerous  consequences.  And  if  you  do  not  want  this 
0  happen,  it  would  be  better  if  no  cause  is  given  for  a 
angerous  situation  to  arise.  We  must  be  careful  now 
nd  refrain  from  any  steps  which  would  not  be  useful 
3  the  defense  of  the  states  involved  in  the  conflict,  which 
ould  only  cause  irritation  and  even  serve  as  a  provoca- 
ion  for  a  fateful  step.  Therefore,  we  must  display  sanity, 
eason,  and  refrain  from  such  steps. 

We  value  peace  perhaps  even  more  than  other  peoples 
ecause  we  went  through  a  terrible  war  with  Hitler.  But 
,«  ur  people  will  not  falter  in  the  face  of  any  test.  Our 
eople  trust  their  government,  and  we  assure  our  people 
lii  nd  world  public  opinion  that  the  Soviet  Government  will 
ot  allow  itself  to  be  provoked.  But  if  the  provocateurs 
nleash  a  war,  they  will  not  evade  responsibility  and  the 
rave  consequences  a  war  would  bring  upon  them.  But 
re  are  confldent  that  reason  will  triumph,  that  war  will 
ot  be  unleashed,  and  peace  and  the  security  of  the  peo- 
les  will  be  insured. 

In  connection  with  the  current  negotiations  between 
LCting  Secretary  General  U  Thant  and  representatives  of 

rovember   12,   1962 


the  Soviet  Union,  the  United  States,  and  the  Republic  of 
Cuba,  the  Soviet  Government  has  sent  First  Deputy 
Foreign  Minister  V.  V.  Kuznetsov  to  New  York  to  help 
U  Thant  in  his  noble  efforts  aimed  at  eliminating  the 
present  dangerous  situation. 
Respectfully  yours, 

N.  Khrushchev 
28  October  1962 


PRESIDENT  KENNEDY'S  STATEMENT 
OF  OCTOBER  28 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  28 

I  welcome  Chairman  Khrushchev's  statesman- 
like decision  to  stop  building  bases  in  Cuba,  dis- 
mantling offensive  weapons  and  returning  them  to 
the  Soviet  Union  under  United  Nations  verifica- 
tion. This  is  an  important  and  constructive  con- 
tribution to  peace. 

We  shall  be  in  touch  with  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral of  the  United  Nations  with  respect  to  recipro- 
cal measures  to  assure  peace  in  the  Caribbean  area. 

It  is  my  earnest  hope  that  the  governments  of 
the  world  can,  with  a  solution  of  the  Cuban  crisis, 
turn  their  urgent  attention  to  the  compelling  neces- 
sity for  ending  the  arms  race  and  reducing  world 
tensions.  This  applies  to  the  military  confronta- 
tion between  the  Warsaw  Pact  and  NATO  coun- 
tries as  well  as  to  other  situations  in  other  parts 
of  the  world  where  tensions  lead  to  the  wasteful 
diversion  of  resources  to  weapons  of  war. 


PRESIDENT  KENNEDY'S  MESSAGE 
OF  OCTOBER  28 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  28 

October  28,  1962 
Dear  Mr.  Chairman  :  I  am  replying  at  once 
to  your  broadcast  message  of  October  twenty- 
eight,  even  though  the  official  text  has  not  yet 
reached  me,  because  of  the  great  importance  I 
attach  to  moving  forward  promptly  to  the  set- 
tlement of  the  Cuban  crisis.  I  think  that  you 
and  I,  with  our  heavy  responsibilities  for  the  main- 
tenance of  peace,  were  aware  that  developments 
were  approaching  a  point  where  events  could  have 
become  unmanageable.  So  I  welcome  this  mes- 
sage and  consider  it  an  important  contribution  to 
peace. 

The  distinguished  efforts  of  Acting  Secretary 
General  U  Thant  have  greatly  facilitated  both 

745 


our  tasks.  I  consider  my  letter  to  you  of  October 
twenty-seventh  and  your  reply  of  today  as  firm 
undertakings  on  the  part  of  both  our  governments 
which  should  be  promptly  carried  out.  I  hope 
that  the  necessarj'  measures  can  at  once  be  taken 
through  the  United  Nations,  as  your  message  says, 
so  that  the  United  States  in  turn  will  be  able  to 
remove  the  quarantine  measures  now  in  effect.  I 
have  already  made  arrangements  to  report  all 
these  matters  to  the  Organization  of  American 
States,  whose  members  share  a  deep  interest  in  a 
genuine  peace  in  the  Caribbean  area. 

You  referred  in  your  letter  to  a  violation  of  your 
frontier  by  an  American  aircraft  in  the  area  of  the 
Chukotsk  Peninsula.  I  have  learned  that  this 
plane,  without  arms  or  photographic  equipment, 
was  engaged  in  an  air  sampling  mission  in  connec- 
tion with  your  nuclear  tests.  Its  course  was  direct 
from  Eielson  Air  Force  Base  in  Alaska  to  the 
North  Pole  and  return.  In  turning  south,  the 
pilot  made  a  serious  navigational  error  which  car- 
ried him  over  Soviet  territory.  He  immediately 
made  an  emergency  call  on  open  radio  for  naviga- 
tional assistance  and  was  guided  back  to  his  home 
base  by  the  most  direct  route.  I  regret  this  inci- 
dent and  will  see  to  it  that  every  precaution  is 
taken  to  prevent  recurrence. 

Mr.  Chairman,  both  of  our  countries  have  great 
unfinished  tasks  and  I  know  that  your  people  as 
well  as  those  of  the  United  States  can  ask  for  noth- 
ing better  than  to  pursue  them  free  from  the  fear  of 
war.  Modem  science  and  technology  have  given 
us  the  possibility  of  making  labor  fruitful  beyond 
anything  that  could  have  been  dreamed  of  a  few 
decades  ago. 

I  agree  with  you  that  we  must  devote  urgent 
attention  to  the  problem  of  disarmament,  as  it  re- 
lates to  the  whole  world  and  also  to  critical  areas. 
Perhaps  now,  as  we  step  back  from  danger,  we  can 
together  make  real  progress  in  this  vital  field.  I 
think  we  should  give  priority  to  questions  relating 
to  the  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons,  on  earth 
and  in  outer  space,  and  to  the  gi-cat  effort  for  a  nu- 
clear test  ban.  But  we  should  also  work  hard  to 
see  if  wider  measures  of  disarmament  can  be 
agreed  and  put  into  operation  at  an  early  date. 
The  United  States  government  will  be  prepared  to 
discuss  these  questions  urgently,  and  in  a  construc- 
tive spirit,  at  Geneva  or  elsewhere. 

John  F.  Kenxedt 
746 


U.S.  Welcomes  Actions  by  Panama 
and  Liberia  in  Cuban  Trade 

Following  are  two  Department  statements  readt 
to  news  correspondents  on  October  20  by  LincoM 
White,  Director  of  the  Office  of  News,  concerning, 
actions  taken  by  the  Governments  of  Panama  and: 
Liberia  xoith  respect  to  trade  with  Cuba. 


STATEMENT  ON  PANAMA 


of 


The  action  of  Panama  [October  19]  in  re- 
stricting Panamanian  ships  calling  at  Cuba  ia 
very  gratifying  to  the  United  States  Goverimient 
The  Government  of  Panama  obviously  acted  ir 
the  light  of  its  own  interest  and  as  it  interpret; 
recent  events  in  Cuba.  Its  action  is,  however,  alsci 
tangible  evidence  of  the  further  cooperation  bj 
the  Government  of  Panama  with  all  free  nations 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  The  new  action  bj* 
Panama  recalls  that  when  the  foreign  ministere  oJI 
the  American  Republics  held  their  recent  informal 
meeting  ^  they  called  on  the  American  Republic! 
to  reconsider,  in  the  light  of  the  new  developments 
taking  place  in  Cuba,  the  use  of  any  ships  of  th(( 
American  Republics  in  the  Cuban  trade.  The  in- 
formal meeting  of  the  foreign  ministers  also  calleclAi 
upon  all  other  independent  countries  to  review  ' 
their  policies  with  regard  to  the  use  of  their  ship; 
in  the  Cuban  trade. 


Ti 


21 


STATEMENT  ON  LIBERIA 

On  October  10,  1962,  the  Liljerian  shipping, 
commissioner  in  New  York  issued  an  order  re 
quiring  written  prior  approval  l\v  the  Commis- 
sioner of  any  voyage  by  a  Libei'ian-flag  vessel  tc 
Cuba.  Two  days  later,  on  October  12,  the  Li 
berian  Ambassador  at  "Washington  delivered  a 
note  -  to  the  Department  stating  that,  in  view  of 
the  objection  of  the  United  States  Government 
to  the  carrjnng  of  strategic  materials  to  Cuba  and 
in  the  interest  of  cooperating  with  the  United 
States  Government,  the  Liberian  Government  had 


'  For  text  of  a  coiiimuniijue,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  2^ 
]f)G2,  p.  598. 

'  Not  printed  here. 


Deporfmenf  of  Sfofe   Bu/(ef/w  Hoi 


tO! 


instructed  all  Liberian  shipping  commissioners 
that  section  140  of  the  Liberian  maritime  regula- 
tions should  be  applicable  to  Cuba.^ 


U.S.  Acts  To  Avoid   Delays  for  Ships 
Transiting  Waters  in  Vicinity  of  Cuba 

Press  release  644  dated  October  27 

The  Department  of  State  annoimced  on  October 
i7  tlie  institution  of  a  system  of  clearances  to 
K  assist  vessels  which  transit  waters  in  the  vicinity 
)f  Cuba  and  vessels  destined  for  Cuban  ports  with 
largoes  containing  no  offensive  weapons  or  asso- 
;iated  materiel. 

The  system,  developed  by  the  State,  Defense, 
und  Treasury  Departments,  is  designed  to  avoid 
onnecessary  delays  and  other  difficulties  arising 
)ut  of  the  stoppage,  inspection,  or  possible  di- 
.^ersion  of  sliips. 

The  system  is  for  the  convenience  of  shipping, 
ind  clearances  are  obtainable  upon  application  by 
ships'  owners,  agents,  or  officers. 

A  vessel  departing  a  United  States  port  may 

''  obtain  a  special  clearance  from  customs  authori- 

ies  at  the  port  of  departure.     A  vessel  departing 

1  foreign  port  may  obtain  the  clearance  from  an 

M  Ajnerican  consulate. 

The  system  covers  two  types  of  clearances. 
Witli  respect  to  vessels  departing  American  ports, 
whether  destined  for  a  Cuban  port  or  merely 
transiting  waters  in  the  vicinity  of  Cuba,  a  Clear- 
xnce  Certificate  (CLEARCERT)  is  obtainable 
from  United  States  customs  autliorities. 

With  respect  to  vessels  departing  foreign  ports, 
'hose  wliich  only  transit  M-aters  in  the  vicinity  of 
Cuba  may  file  a  Notice  of  Transit  with  the  Ameri- 
s  lan  consulate  at  the  last  port  of  departure ;  those 
destined  for  a  Cuban  port  with  a  cargo  containing 
j|qo  offensive  weapons  or  other  proliibited  materiel 
may  obtain  a  Clearance  Certificate  (CLEAR- 
CERT) from  the  American  consulate  at  the  last 
port  of  departure. 

In  unusual  circumstances  it  may  be  necessary 
o  stop,  inspect,  or  divert  a  ship  despite  the  fact 
[that  it  has  a  clearance. 


'  Section  140  requires  prior  written  approval  by  a  Li- 
Iberian  shipping  commissioner  for  any  voyage  of  a  Liberian 
ship  to  designated  ports. 

(November   72,   7962 


The  procedure  for  the  clearance  of  vessels  from 
United  States  ports  will  be  put  in  effect  by  the 
Treasury  Department  immediately.  In  tlie  case 
of  foreign  countries,  tlie  procedure  will  become 
operative  as  soon  as  arrangements  are  made  with 
those  countries. 


President  and  Mrs.  Kennedy 
Postpone  Visit  to  Brazil 

Following  are  the  texts  of  a  White  House  an- 
nouncement and  an  exchange  of  inessages  hetween 
President  Kennedy  and  Joao  Belchior  GovZart, 
President  of  Brazil. 


White  House  press  release  dated  October  26 
WHITE  HOUSE  ANNOUNCEMENT 

The  ^Vliite  House  and  tlie  Planalto  Palace  an- 
nounced on  October  26  that  President  and  Mrs. 
Jolui  F.  Kennedy  have  postponed  their  Novem- 
ber 12  visit  to  Brazil  because  of  the  international 
situation.  Tlie  two  Presidents  will  confer  after 
the  first  of  the  year  to  set  a  new  date. 


EXCHANGE  OF  MESSAGES 

President  Kennedy  to  President  Goulart 

October  24, 1962 
Dear  Me.  President  :  In  view  of  the  disappoint- 
ment Mrs.  Kennedy  and  I  experienced  last  July 
in  Iiaving  to  postpone  our  visit  to  Brazil,  we  have 
been  especially  anxious  that  nothing  sliould  again 
require  us  to  defer  the  pleasure  of  visiting  for 
tlie  first  time  your  great  country  and  becoming 
acquainted  with  its  people.  LTnfortunately,  the 
recent  challenge  to  tlie  peace  and  security  of  this 
hemisphere  posed  by  the  Soviet  offensive  military 
buildup  in  Cuba  requires  my  presence  in  the 
United  States  and  compels  me  to  request  your  con- 
currence in  a  postponement  once  again  of  our  visit 
to  Brazil.  If  you  agree,  I  suggest  that  we  con- 
sult after  the  fii'st  of  the  coming  year  to  agree 
upon  the  new  date  on  which  Mrs.  Kennedy  and 
I  would  visit  Brazil. 

Mrs.  Kennedy  and  I  are  looking  forward  par- 
ticularly to  visiting  Brazil  because  of  the  long- 

747 


standing  friendship  and  cooperation  between  the 
governments  and  peoples  of  onr  two  countries  in 
the  pursuit  of  peace  and  a  happier  woi-ld  society. 
I  also  recall  with  pleasure,  Mr.  President,  the  per- 
sonal friendship  established  with  you  during  your 
visit  to  the  United  States  last  April,'  and  I  am 
anxious  to  renew  and  deepen  our  personal  rela- 
tions. 

I  should  like  to  take  advantage  of  this  occasion 
to  congratulate  the  people  of  Brazil  on  your  recent 
elections  which  I  have  followed  with  great  inter- 
est. The  peaceful  and  orderly  process  by  which 
some  fifteen  million  Brazilian  voters  went  to  the 
polls  on  October  7  to  choose  their  legislators  and 
state  executives  was  to  me  a  demonstration  of  the 
strength  and  vitality  of  democratic  government 
in  your  country. 

With  best  wishes, 

John  F.  Ivennedy 

His  Excellency  Joao  Belchioe  Goulaet 
President  of  the  Refublic  of  the  United  States  of 

Brazil 
Rio  de  Janeiro 

President  Goulart  to  President  Kennedy 

October  25, 1962 

My  Dear  Mb.  President  :  I  acknowledge  receipt  of  the 
letter  in  wtiich  Your  Excellency  informed  me  that,  by 
force  of  recent  international  events,  you  are  unable  to 
absent  yourself  from  the  United  States  in  the  coming 
days,  by  reason  of  which  you  suggest  that  we  consult 
after  the  first  of  the  next  year  to  agree  on  a  new  date  on 
which  Mrs.  Kennedy  and  Tour  Excellency  will  visit 
Brazil. 

Recognizing  that  the  gravity  of  the  situation  does  not 
permit  you  any  alternative,  I  can  only  say  to  you  that  my 
wife  and  I  sincerely  hope  that  the  reasons  which  are 
causing  the  postponement  of  your  visit  to  our  country 
will  as  rapidly  as  possible  cease  to  exist,  so  that  we  can 
receive  you  with  the  esteem  which  represents  the  senti- 
ments of  the  Brazilian  people  toward  the  American 
people. 

I  retain  the  most  pleasant  memories  of  the  visit  which  I 
made  to  the  United  States  and  of  the  profitable  talks  which 
I  held  with  Your  Excellency.  I  am  certain  that  your 
visit  to  Brazil  will  enable  us  to  strengthen  still  further 
the  ties  of  understanding  and  friendship  between  our 
countries. 

I  am  very  appreciative  of  the  congratulations  whicli 
you  extended  to  the  Brazilian  people  concerning  the 
elections  recently  held  here. 


In  the  name  of  my  wife  and  in  my  own  name  may  I 
present  to  Mrs.  Kennedy  the  expression  of  our  esteem  and 
to  Y'our  Excellency  our  best  wishes  for  happiness,  looking 
forward  with  pleasure  to  our  early  meeting,  inspired  by 
the  purpose,  which  reflects  the  yearning  of  our  peoples, 
of  continuing  to  contribute  to  the  existence  of  a  happier 
world  society  in  an  atmosphere  of  peace  and  confidence 
in  the  future. 


eti 


Joao  B.  Goulabt 


'  For  text  of  a  joint  communique,   see  Bttlletin   of 
Apr.  30,  1962,  p.  705. 


748 


President  John  F.  Kennedy 
The  White  House 
Washington,  D.C. 


Visit  of  Grand  Duchess  Charlotte 
of  Luxembourg  Postponed 

Following  is  an  exchange  of  messages  between 
President  Kennedy  and  the  Grand  Duchess  Char- 
lotte of  Luxemboicrg. 

MESSAGE  FROM  PRESIDENT  KENNEDY 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  24 

October  24,  1962 

YotTR  Royal  Highness  :  It  is  with  the  greatest 
regret  that  I  feel  compelled  to  write  you  to  ask  if 
you  would  agree  to  postpone  your  visit  to  this 
counti-y  for  the  time  being.  I  need  not  tell  you 
how  very  disappointed  I  am  to  have  to  make  this 
request  at  this  late  date,  as  Mrs.  Kennedy  and  I 
have  been  looking  forward  so  much  to  our  meet- 
ing with  you  and  Prince  Felix. 

However,  I  fear  that  the  present  international 
situation  might  imjjair  the  success  of  the  Aasit  to 
the  detriment  of  the  objectives  we  both  seek  from 
it. 

I  feel  it  would  be  preferable,  therefore,  to  de- 
fer your  visit  imtil  the  present  tensions  have  eased 
so  that  it  may  receive  the  imdivided  attention  of 
our  two  countries. 

I  am  sure  you  will  understand  the  reasons 
which  have  obliged  me  to  reach  this  difficult  de- 
cision and  I  hope  that  circumstances  will  soon  per- 
mit us  to  arrange  your  visit  at  a  time  convenient 
to  you.  Mrs.  Kennedy  joins  me  in  warmest  wishes 
to  you  and  Prince  Felix. 
Sincerely  yours, 

John  F.  I^nnedy 

Her  Royal  Highness 

The  Gr.\nd  Duchess  Charlotte 

Luxembourg 


Departmenf  of  Slate  Bulletin  lovj 


(tt 


i 
'ni 
I 

lie 
ip: 
iiii 
tat 
11 
mi 


Fi 

tt; 


MESSAGE  FROM  GRAND  DUCHESS  CHARLOTTE 

Vhlte  House  press  release  dated  October  25 

October  25,  1962 

Drab  Mb.  Pbesident  :  Many  thanks  for  your  so  kind 
'tter  of  October  24th. 

T  iiderstanding  perfectly  well  the  reasons  that  have 
idiiipted  your  proposal,  I  can  but  agree  with  your  sug- 
rstion  to  postpone  our  visit  to  Washington. 

Ill  the  present  situation,  where  the  whole  free  world 
!  (proves  your  attitude  and  the  firmness  of  the  United 
tates  of  America  in  the  face  of  the  menace  to  your  coun- 
■y,  we  feel  with  you  that  every  effort  must  be  concentrat- 
il  cm  the  problems  that  the  moment  bears. 

Prince  Felix  and  my  family  join  me  to  express  to  Mrs. 
;euuedy  and  to  you,  with  our  regrets  for  the  unfortunate 
elay  in  meeting  you,  our  reiterated  wishes  for  your  con- 
inued  well-being. 

Tours  sincerely, 

Ohaklotte 


Inited  States  and  Canada  Exchange 
/iews  on  Expansion  of  World  Trade 

Following  are  the  texts  of  letters  exchanged  he- 
ween  President  Kennedy  and  John  G.  Diefen- 
aher,  Prime  Minister  of  Canada. 

'hite  House  press  release  dated  October  19 
ETTER  FROM  PRESIDENT  KENNEDY 

October  18, 1962 
Dear  Mr.  Prime  Minister  :  Thank  you  for  your 
?tter  on  the  occasion  of  my  signature  of  the  Trade 
Expansion  Act.^  I  am  pleased  to  know  that  the 
Canadian  Goverimaent  welcomes  this  most  sig- 
ificaiit  development  in  the  trade  policy  of  the 
Jnited  States. 

Ever  since  World  War  II,  Canada  and  the 
Inited  States  have  been  partners  in  a  determined 
parch  for  a  non-discriminatory  trading  world 
'hich  affords  to  all  comitries  of  the  Free  World 
le  best  opportunities  for  economic  growth  and 
spansion.  Your  letter  makes  clear  that  we  con- 
nue  to  share  these  common  objectives,  and  I  am 
ratified  to  have  your  pledge  of  close  cooperation 
1   moving   toward   a   wider  acceptance   of  our 


mvictions, 
I  w> 


ould  like  to  take  full  advantage  of  the  au- 


'  For  a  statement  by  President  Kennedy  on  signing  the 
gislation  and  a  summary  of  the  act,  see  Bulletin  of 
et  29, 1962,  p.  655. 

ovember  72,   1962 


thority  which  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  confers 
upon  me  and  I  am  eager  to  explore  witli  other 
like-minded  nations  as  soon  as  possible  the  prob- 
lems and  prospects  for  a  new  approach  to  the 
reduction  of  obstacles  to  world  trade.  In  this 
comiection  the  recent  discussions  in  Ottawa  be- 
tween officials  of  our  two  Governments  have  been 
most  useful.  I  have  been  thinking  that,  after  some 
of  the  preliminary  work  has  been  done  and  a  con- 
sensus reached  among  the  principal  participants, 
a  ministerial  meeting  early  in  1963  of  the  Contract- 
ing Parties  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade  miglit  well  be  the  most  suitable  way  to 
enlist  the  participation  and  support  of  like-minded 
nations. 

On  the  basis  of  your  proposal  for  an  interna- 
tional meeting,  perhaps  we  might  join  forces  in 
recommending  a  special  meeting  of  the  Contract- 
ing Parties  at  the  ministerial  level,  to  be  held  pos- 
sibly as  early  as  February  or  March  of  1963.  I 
should  lie  interested  in  your  reactions  to  this 
suggestion. 

I  am  encouraged  by  the  improvement  in 
Canada's  reserve  position  and  welcome  the  first 
step  you  have  just  taken  in  the  process  of  removing 
the  special  surcliarges  on  imports  in  response  to 
this  improvement.  I  look  forward  to  your  being 
able  to  remove  the  remaining  surcharges.  This 
would  help  us  all  move  forward  in  our  attack  on 
trade  barriers. 

Sincerely, 

John  F.  Kennedy 

The  Right  Honorable 
John  G.  Diefenbaker 

Prime  Minister  of  Canada, 
Ottawa 

LETTER  FROM  PRIME  MINISTER  DIEFENBAKER 

OCTOBEB  11,  1962 

Deab  Mb.  Pbesident:  With  the  enactment  of  the  Trade 
Expansion  Act,  I  wish  to  let  you  know  that  the  Canadian 
Government  welcomes  this  important  development  in 
United  States  of  America  trade  policy  which  holds  out 
promise  for  significant  progress  in  the  expansion  of  world 
trade  on  a  multilateral  basis.  This  is  indeed  an  historic 
accomplishment. 

At  the  Commonwealth  Prime  Ministers'  Conference  in 
London  last  month,  I  proposed  that  all  like-minded  na- 
tions should  meet  at  an  early  date  to  consider  how  the 
great  problems  of  trade  facing  us  today  can  be  dealt 
with  to  the  mutual  advantage  of  all.    I  would  like  to  fol- 


749 


low  up  this  general  proposal  with  a  specific  suggestion 
for  an  early  meeting  on  these  matters.  It  is  vitally  im- 
portant we  find  effective  ways  as  soon  as  possible  for 
dealing  with  these  complex  and  urgent  trade  problems. 
It  appears  that  the  most  convenient  way  of  arranging 
such  a  meeting  would  be  to  discuss  these  broad  trade 
questions  at  a  meeting  of  Ministers. 

The  Canadian  Government  looks  forward  to  participa- 
ting fully  in  these  efforts  and  to  working  with  the  United 
States  of  America  and  other  nations  to  achieve  the  ob- 
jectives which  we  hold  in  common.  It  is  our  conviction 
that  the  opportunities  now  opened  up  for  wider  coopera- 
tion in  trade  and  economic  relations  will  make  a  major 
contribution  to  the  further  strengthening  of  the  free 
world. 

Trade  relations  between  Canada  and  the  United  States 
of  America  are  characterized  by  mutual  understanding 
and  a  constructive  approach  to  our  common  objective  of 
freer  non-discriminatory  trade.  These  new  efforts  to  ex- 
pand world  trade  will  provide  continuing  opportunities 
for  our  two  countries  to  work  closely  together,  each  in  a 
full  understanding  of  the  other's  interests  and  aspirations. 
Tours  sincerely, 

John  G.  Diefenbakee 


Meaning  of  "Nonpredetermination" 
Policy  Is  Clarified 

Statement  hy  Carl  T.  Rowan 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs  ^ 

When  asked  if  I  would  appear  before  this  group 
to  make  a  policy  statement  in  behalf  of  the  State 
Department,  I  accepted  happily,  even  tliough  I 
knew  that  the  time  pressures  would  be  great.  I 
accepted  because  I  wanted  first  of  all  to  express 
my  personal  respect  and  regard  for  those  relative 
newcomers  to  America  who,  breathing  the  air  of 
freedom  and  enjoying  our  special  brand  of  per- 
sonal liberty,  are  not  content  to  enjoy  them  in 
solitary  happiness. 

These  are  tlie  Americans  wlio  do  not  forget  to 
remember  those  left  behind  wlio  are  not  so  fortu- 
nate— those  who  struggle  to  free  tliemselves  from 
sucli  ravages  of  nature  as  hvmger  and  disease,  or 
from  such  manmade  shackles  as  political  bondage 
and  social  oppression.  Throughout  man's  history 
it  lias  been  the  well-off  who  retained  a  concern 
about  tlie  not-so-well-off  who  liave  made  the  major 


contribution  to  man's  elevation,  to  tlie  spread  of  |  tlm 
human  dignity  and  to  the  deepening  of  humanj|[i!i, 
freedom. 


'  Made  before  the   Eighth   Congress  of  Americans   of 
Ukrainian  Descent  at  New  York,  X.Y.,  on  Oct.  12. 

750 


Obviously,  then,  I  find  it  understandable  that 


ide 
Til 


)ffi 
pol 


«i 

It  I 

)DS 


em 


American  organizations  representing  those  of  ouiSI  ™' 
citizens  who  derive  from  a  specific  foreign  herit- 
age  and    culture   should    direct   particular   and 
searcliing   interest   at   those   aspects   of   Unitedl  ■! 
States  policy  wliich  have  a  direct  or  indirect  rela- 
tionsliip  to  their  area  of  ancestral  origin.    It  seems 
natural  to  me  that  this  interest  is  especially  acute*  '"• 
in  those  cases  wliere  tlie  original  homeland  and  its 
inhabitants  are   subjected  to  unnecessary   hard- 
ships, or  wliere  the  people  are  deprived  of  the 
independence   and  freedom  which   we  enjoy   in 
tliis  country.     Our   symjaathies   are  very   much 
witli  those  peoples  who   today   find   themselves* 
under  the   far-reaching  controls  of  Communisfe|rre 
totalitarianism. 

Americans  whose  ancestral  origins  are  in  East- 
ern Europe  and  other  areas  which  for  the  present 
are  under  Communist  control  therefore  follow 
very  closely  all  manifestations  and  expressions  of 
United  States  policies  toward  commimism  and  tlie 
Soviet  bloc.  They  are  extremely  sensitive  to  any 
thing  which  miglit  be  interpreted  as  an  indication 
that  these  policies  are  clianging  in  a  direction  in- 
consistent with  our  traditional  position  on  the 
rights  of  all  peoples  to  self-determination  and  tw  \  j 
those  rights  and  liberties  consonant  with  man's 
God-given  dignity. 

In  this  regard  there  seems  to  have  been  some-^jj] 
misinterpretation  of  that  aspect  of  United  States 
policy  which  on  occasion  has  been  described  a^  j 
"nonpredetermination."    I  would  like  now  to  ex 
plain  to  you  what  this  policy  of  nonpredetermina- 
tion is. 

First  of  all,  and  basic  to  the  United  States  po- 
sition, is  our  consistent  and  continued  adherence  tO' 
the  principle  of  self-determination  as  a  funda- 
mental right  of  peoples  everywhere. 

Equally  basic  is  our  refusal  to  attribute  any  Ijtjj 
sanctity  to  the  status  quo^  an  expression — or,  one'  i, 
might  say,  a  state  of  mind — which  in  this  rapidly 
and  constantly  changing  world  of  ours  has  lost 
any  real  meaning,  if  indeed  it  was  ever  more  than 
a  pious  and  futile  hope  of  jwrsons  lacking  faitb 
in  the  future. 

We  do  have  faith  in  the  future  of  mankind, 
and  we  look  forward  to  a  day  when  all  peoples, 


Deporfmenf  of  Sfafe   Bu//efinr|, 


npl 

3ul( 

oal 
efe 


'iprc 
oup 


Et( 
iiiii( 
opli 
tci 

Ksi 

iki 
opi 
U( 

IllS! 


'ople 
itioii 

issi 

sul 

eol 

'pet: 


"emi 


"i  eluding  those  now  under  Communist  domina- 
•'I  )n,  will  be  able  to  exercise  self-determination 
iid  enjoy  the  blessings  of  freedom. 
II  [That  attitude  of  the  United  States  Govern- 
iiu  int  toward  the  aspirations  of  the  peoples  of  the 
it!  iviet  Union,  which  sometimes  has  been  termed 
DJi  Dolicy  of  nonpredetermination,  is  in  fact  a  corol- 
%  7  of  our  fundamental  policy  favoring  the  right 
li<  self-determination.  It  supports  the  rights  of 
mi  3  peoples  of  the  Soviet  Union  to  self-determina- 
litil  >n.  Wliat  this  policy  means  is  that,  while  con- 
itj  luing  to  affirm  our  sympathy  and  support  for 
nil  3  just  aspirations  of  the  many  peoples  of  the 
ihf  'viet  Union,  the  United  States  Government  does 
ii  It  presume  hei'e  and  now  to  define  these  aspira- 
)ns  as  they  exist,  or  may  develop,  or  to  prejudge 
3  political  arrangements  which  might  be  pre- 
red  by  these  peoples  if  they  were  free  to  choose 
•m  today,  tomorrow,  or  10  years  hence. 
I  realize  that  there  may  be  those  who  believe 
3y  can  answer  these  questions  with  certainty; 
t  forgive  me  if  I  repeat  for  emphasis  that  we 
»l  aply  do  not  Icnow  what  political  arrangements 
'1"  )uld  be  preferred  by  the  peoples  concerned 
ould  they  have  an  opportunity  to  express  their 
i™  eferences. 

i!i  We  do  know — and  I  think  you  will  agree  from 
ili(  ur  own  experience — that  there  are  significant 
lt(  d  sometimes  sharp  differences  of  opinion  and 
iiii  proach  among  nationality,  emigre,  and  other 
oupings  active  here  in  the  United  States  and 
I'lii!  ;ewhere. 

■M  Everyone,  of  course,  is  entitled  to  his  own 
1  a  inion,  and  I  suggest  this  holds  true  also  for  the 
n  oples  behind  the  Iron  Curtain,  who,  under  pres- 
iBi  t  circumstances,  are  inhibited  either  from  ex- 
essing  their  true  opinions  or  from  engaging  in 
p»  B  kind  of  free  discussion  necessary  for  the  de- 
•ft(  lopment  of  considered  opinions. 
jila  I  believe  it  to  be  self-evident  tliat  any  ambi- 
ius  attempts  to  define  possible  future  political 
Mi  ationships  applicable  to  the  highly  diversified 
iini  oples  of  the  Soviet  Union  without  their  jiartici- 
lidlj  tion  and  concurrence  would  only  serve  to  in- 
lomsify  old  disputes,  create  new  ones,  and  confuse 
tlia  3  issues. 

[ail  I  submit  that  the  policy  which  has  been  termed 
e  of  nonpredetermination  is  a  good  one.     I 
aDi  pe  that  I  have  been  helpful  in  clarifying  the 
iplt!  saning  of  this  policy. 


Letters  of  Credence 

JuTnaica 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  Jamaica, 
Neville  Noel  Ashenheim,  presented  his  credentials 
to  President  Kennedy  on  October  23.  For  texts 
of  the  Ambassador's  remarks  and  the  President's 
reply,  see  Department  of  State  press  release  638 
dated  October  23. 


Order  Provides  for  Communication 
of  Restricted  Data  by  Department 

AN    EXECUTIVE    ORDER' 
Authorization  fob  the  Communication  op 
Restricted  Data  by  the  Department  op  State 
By  virtue  of  the  authority  vested  in  me  by  the  Atomic 
Energy  Act  of  1954,  as  amended  (hereinafter  referred  to 
as  the  Act ;  42  U.S.C.  2011  et  seq.) ,  and  as  President  of  the 
United  States,  it  is  ordered  as  follows  : 

The  Department  of  State  is  hereby  authorized  to  com- 
municate, in  accordance  with  the  terms  and  conditions 
of  any  agreement  for  cooperation  arranged  pursuant  to 
subsection  144b  of  the  Act  (42  U.S.C.  2104 (b)),  such 
Restricted  Data  and  data  removed  from  the  Restricted 
Data  category  under  subsection  142d  of  the  Act  (42  U.S.C. 
2102(d) )  as  is  determined 

(i)  by  the  President,  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the 
Act,  or 

(ii)  by  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  and  the  Depart- 
ment of  Defense,  jointly  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of 
Executive  Order  No.  10S41,'  as  amended, 

to  be  transmissible  under  the  agreement  for  cooperation 
involved.  Such  communications  shall  be  effected  through 
mechanisms  established  by  the  Department  of  State  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  agreement 
for  cooperation  involved:  Provided,  that  no  such  com- 
munication shall  be  made  by  the  Department  of  State 
until  the  proposed  communication  has  been  authorized 
either  in  accordance  with  procedures  adopted  by  the 
Atomic  Energy  Commission  and  the  Department  of  De- 
fense and  applicable  to  conduct  of  programs  for  coopera- 
tion by  those  agencies,  or  in  accordance  with  procedures 
approved  by  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  and  the  De- 
partment of  Defense  and  applicable  to  conduct  of  pro- 
grams for  cooperation  by  the  Department  of  State. 


///Ci  ^/Cw/. — C\ 


The  White  House, 
October  18,  1962. 


'  No.  11057 ;  27  Fed.  Reg.  10289. 

'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  19,  1959,  p.  554. 


iJ  vemfaer   12,    1962 


751 


Immigration    Quotas    Estabiislied 
for  Six  Newly  Independent  States 

A     PROCLAMATION' 

Whereas  under  the  provisions  of  section  202(a)  of  the 
Immigration  and  Nationality  Act,  each  independent  coun- 
try, self-governing  dominion,  mandated  territory,  and  ter- 
ritory under  the  international  trusteeship  system  of  the 
United  Nations,  other  than  independent  countries  of 
North,  Central,  and  South  America,  is  entitled  to  he 
treated  as  a  separate  quota  area  when  approved  by  the 
Secretary  of  State ;  and 

Whereas  under  the  provisions  of  section  201(b)  of  the 
Immigration  and  Nationality  Act,  the  Secretary  of  State, 
the  Secretary  of  Commerce,  and  the  Attorney  General, 
jointly,  are  required  to  determine  the  annual  quota  of  any 
quota  area  established  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  sec- 
tion 202(a)  of  the  said  Act,  and  to  report  to  the  President 
the  quota  of  each  quota  area  so  determined :  and 

Whereas  under  the  provisions  of  section  202(e)  of  the 
Immigration  and  Nationality  Act,  the  Secretary  of  State, 
the  Secretary  of  Commerce,  and  the  Attorney  General, 
jointly,  are  required  to  revise  the  quotas,  whenever  neces- 
sary, to  provide  for  any  political  changes  requiring  a 
change  in  the  list  of  quota  areas  ;  and 

Whereas  on  December  9.  1961,  the  former  British  Trust 
Territory  of  Tanganyika  became  independent  upon  the  ter- 
mination of  United  Nations  Trusteeship  ;  and 

Whereas  on  January  1,  19C2,  the  former  New  Zealand 
Trust  Territory  of  Western  Samoa  became  the  Independ- 
ent State  of  Western  Samoa  upon  the  termination  of 
United  Nations  Trusteeship ;  and 

Whereas  on  July  1,  1962,  upon  the  termination  of 
United  Nations  Trusteeship,  the  former  Belgian  Trust 
Territory  of  Ruanda-Urundi  became  the  independent 
states  of  the  Republic  of  Rwanda  and  the  Kingdom  of  Bu- 
rundi ;  and 

Whereas  on  August  6,  1962,  the  former  British  Colony 
of  Jamaica  was  granted  independence  by  the  Government 
of  the  United  Kingdom  ;  and 

Whereas  on  August  31,  1962,  the  former  British  Colony 
of  Trinidad  and  Tobago  was  granted  independence  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  Kingdom ;  and 

Whereas  the  Secretary  of  State,  the  Secretary  of  Com- 
merce, and  the  Attorney  General  have  jointly  determined 
and  reported  to  me  the  immigration  quotas  hereinafter  set 
forth. 

Now,  therefore,  I,  John  F.  Kennedy,  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  acting  under  and  by  virtue 
of  the  authority  vested  in  me  by  the  aforesaid  Act  of 
Congress,  do  hereby  proclaim  and  make  known  that  the 
annual  quotas  of  the  quota  areas  hereinafter  designated 
have  been  determinwl  in  accordance  with  the  law  to  be, 
and  shall  be,  as  follows  : 

Quota  Area  Quota 

Tanganyika     100 

Western  Samoa 100 

Rwanda     100 

Burundi     lOO 

Jamaica     100 

Trinidad  and  Tobago 100 


752 


The  establishment   of  an  immigration  quota   for  ani 
quota  area  is  solely  for  the  purpose  of  compliance  wit*  IK 
the  pertinent  provisions  of  the  Ininiigratiou  and  Natioi 
ality  Act  and  is  not  to  be  considered  as  having  any  signil 
cance  extraneous  to  such  purpose. 

Proclamation  No.  3298  of  June  3,  19.j9,-  as  amende* 
entitled  '•Immigration  Quotas,"  is  further  amended  by  tt 
abolishment  of  the  immigration  quotas  established  fc 
"Tanganyika  (trust  territory.  United  Kingdom) 
"Samoa,  Western  (trust  territory.  New  Zealand) 
"Ruanda-Urundi  (trust  territory,  Belgium)"  and  by  tl 
addition  of  the  immigration  quotas  established  by  th 
proclamation. 

In  witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  an 
caused  the  Seal  of  the  United  States  of  America  to  t 
affixed. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington  this  twenty-third  da 

of  October  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hui 

[seal]     dred  and  sixty-two  and  of  the  Independence  < 

the  United  States  of  America  the  one  hundrc 

and  eighty-seventh. 


II 


/(LJ  L^ 


By  the  President: 
Dean  Rusk, 

Secretary  of  State. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS 
AND  CONFERENCES 


United  States  To  Be  Host 
to  World  Food  Congress 

Statement  by  President  Kennedy 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  19 

Under  the  authority  of  S.  3679,  which  I  lia\ 
just  signed,  the  United  States  will  be  the  host  m 
tion,  June  4-18, 1963,  to  the  World  Food  Con<ricf 
of  the  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  of  th 
United  Nations. 

At  the  World  Food  Congress  the  more  than  ICi 
member  countries  of  FAO  and  tlie  United  Natioi' 
will  bo  invited  to  report  their  progress  in  tb 
current  worldwide  Freedom-From-Hunger  Canf" 
paign  of  the  FAO  and  to  plan  for  further  in 
provement  of  the  food  and  nutrition  of  the  peoph 
of  the  world  for  the  years  ahead. 


'  No.  3.")().3 ;  27  Fed.  Reg.  ia'«)0. 

'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  July  6,  19.'59,  p.  19. 

Department  of  State  Bullet's 


i 


The  World  Food  Congress  will  also  comnieino- 
te  the  20th  anniversary  of  the  founding  of  FAO 
Hot  Springs,  Virginia,  in  1943.  The  United 
:ates,  which  initiated  the  founding  meeting,  is 
charter  member  of  FAO  and  will  arrange  special 
remonies  for  this  obsei'vance. 
Under  the  American  system  of  agriculture,  our 
,rmers  produce  an  abvindance  which  is  a  marvel- 
is  technical  achievement  and  at  the  same  time 
mighty  weapon  in  the  war  against  hunger.  The 
nited  States  has  used  this  abundance  to  combat 
mger  abroad  and  to  provide  nations  striving  to 
ivelop  their  economies  with  the  means  of  im- 
•oving  the  health  and  vigor  of  their  citizens. 
The  Food-for-Peace  Program  is  the  dramatic 
id  tangible  expression  of  our  belief  that  perma- 
int  economic  progress  is  possible — that  thi-ough 
iluntary  cooperation  every  country  in  the  free 
3rld  can  achieve  a  self-supporting  economy  that 
ovides  a  decent  standard  of  livmg  for  each 
;izen. 


nited  States  Delegations 
t  International  Conferences 

th  Session  of  GATT  Contracting  Parties 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  October 

(press  release  632)  that  G.  Griffith  Johnson, 

ssistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Economdc  Affairs, 

3uld  head  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  20th  session 

the  Contracting  Parties  to  the  General  Agree- 

jnt  on  Tariff's  and  Trade,  meeting  at  Geneva, 

vitzerland,  from  October  23  to  November  16. 

Leonard  Weiss,  Director,  Office  of  International 

:ade  and  Finance,  Department  of  State,  and 

sbert  L.  McNeill,  Special  Assistant  to  the  Assist- 

t   Secretary    of    Commerce    for   International 

[fairs,  will  be  vice  chairmen  of  the  delegation. 

her    senior    officers    on    the    delegation    will 

John  W.   Evans,   Counselor  of  Mission   for 

ionomic  Affairs,  U.S.  Mission,  Geneva,  and  Ben 

Dorfman,  Chairman,  U.S.  Tariff  Commission. 

le  Senate  has  been  asked  to  name  two  members 

attend  the  meeting  as  congressional  advisers. 

:her  advisers  to  the  delegation  will  be  drawn 

om  the  Departments  of  Agriculture,  Commerce, 

e  Interior,  Labor,  State,  and  the  Treasury. 

At  the  20th  session  the  Contracting  Parties  will 

Insider  an  agenda  of  more  than  60  items.     A 

*vember   72,    1962 


major  topic  will  be  an  assessment  of  progress  made 
in  the  GATT  program  for  the  expansion  of  inter- 
national trade  since  it  was  dealt  with  at  the  1961 
GATT  ministerial  meeting.'  Key  elements  of  tliis 
program  are  tariff  reduction,  improved  access  to 
markets  for  agricultural  products,  and  removal  of 
obstacles  to  the  trade  of  the  less  developed 
countries. 

The  U.S.  delegation  will  give  special  attention 
to  quantitative  restrictions  originally  justified  for 
balance-of-payments  reasons  but  which  are  now 
in  violation  of  the  GATT.  Increasing  U.S.  con- 
cern over  quantitative  restrictions  has  led  to  a 
formal  complaint  against  French  and  Italian 
quota  restrictions  which  is  listed  on  the  agenda 
at  this  session  for  action.  Also  pending  is  the 
Canadian  Government's  recent  imposition  of  cus- 
toms duty  surcharges.  The  U.S.  delegation  will 
seek  the  earliest  possible  elimination  of  these 
surcliarges. 

The  progress  of  regional  economic  groupings 
will  be  reviewed,  including  the  Latin  American 
Free  Trade  Area,  the  Central  American  Free 
Trade  Area,  and  particularly  the  common  agri- 
cultural policy  of  the  European  Economic  Com- 
munity. 

It  is  expected  that  at  least  two  newly  independ- 
ent nations,  Trinidad  and  Tobago  and  Uganda, 
will  be  formally  admitted  as  contracting  parties 
at  the  session.  The  GATT  membership  has  been 
steadily  growing,  now  numbering  42  nations  cov- 
ering more  than  80  percent  of  free-world  trade. 
The  Contracting  Parties  will  also  consider  the 
future  relationship  to  the  GATT  of  Argentina, 
Poland,  Spain,  and  Yugoslavia,  wliich  now  par- 
ticipate in  the  work  of  the  GATT  under  various 
special  arrangements. 

The  GATT  is  the  basic  international  instru- 
ment guiding  commercial  relations  among  most 
of  the  principal  trading  nations  of  the  world. 
The  provisions  of  the  GATT  are  designed  to  ex- 
pand international  trade  and  thereby  to  raise  liv- 
ing standards,  increase  productive  employment, 
and  utilize  more  fully  the  resources  of  the  world. 
The  meetings  of  the  Contracting  Parties  provide 
an  international  forum  to  discuss  trade  policy 
problems  and  to  resolve  trade  difficulties  in  a  man- 
ner conducive  to  the  growth  rather  than  the  reduc- 
tion of  trade  levels. 


'  For  background,  .see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  1,  1962,  p.  3. 

753 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Aviation 

Protocol  amending  articles  48(a),  49(e),  and  61  ofthe 
convention  on  international  civil  aviation  (TIAS  1591) 
by  providing  that  sessions  of  the  Assembly  of  the  In- 
ternational Civil  Aviation  Organization  shall  be  lield 
not  less  than  once  in  3  years  instead  of  annually.  Done 
at  Montreal  June  1-1,  1945.  Entered  into  force  Decem- 
ber 12,  1956.    TIAS  3756. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Central  African  Republic,  May 
22    1962;  Congo  (Brazzaville),  May  26,  1962;  Congo 
(Lfiopoldville),  August  23,  1902;  Nicaragua,  July  9, 
1962 ;  Poland,  May  23,  1902. 
Protocol  relating  to  amendment  of  article  50(a)   of  the 
Convention  on  International  Civil  Aviation  to  increase 
membership  of  the  Council  from  21  to  27.     Approved  by 
the  ICAO   Assemlilv  at  Montreal  June  21,  1961.     En- 
tered into  force  July  17,  1962.     TIAS  5170. 
Ratifications  deposited:  China,   August  10,   1962;   Cy- 
prus, July  31,  1962;   Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
August  10,  1962 ;  Libya,  August  16, 1962. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Convention  relating  to  the  suppression  of  the  abuse  of 
opium  and  other  drugs.  Signed  at  The  Hague  January 
23,  1912.  Entered  into  force  December  31,  1914;  for 
the  United  States  February  11,  1915.  38  Stat.  1912. 
Notification  received  that  it  considers  itself  bound: 
Central  African  Republic,   September  4,   1962. 

Convention  for  limiting  the  manufacture  and  regulating 
the  distribution  of  narcotic  drugs,  as  amended  (61  Stat. 
2'>30;  62  Stat.  1796).  Done  at  Geneva  July  13,  1931. 
Entered  into  force  July  9,  1933.  48  Stat.  1.543. 
Notification  received  that  it  considers  itself  bound: 
Central  African  Republic,  September  4,  1962. 

Slavery 

Slavery  convention  signed  at  Geneva  September  25,  1926, 
as  amended  (TIAS  3532).  Entered  into  force  March 
9,  1927;  for  the  United  States  March  21,  1929.  46 
Stat.   2183. 

Notification   received   that   it    considers   itself   oouna: 
Central  African  Republic,  September  4, 1962. 

Trade 

The  Dominican  Rcpuhlic  accepted  the  foUoioing  instru- 
ments pursuant  to  its  acceptance  of  the  protocol  to  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade,  embodying 
results  of  the  I'JGO-Gl  Tariff  Conference,  September  IJ,, 
1<k;2: 

Fifth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  the 
texts  of  the  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade.    Done  at  Geneva  December  3,  1955.' 

Sixth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  the 
texts  of  the  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade.     Done  at  Geneva  April  11,  1957.' 

Seventh  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to 
the  texts  of  the  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva  November  30, 
19.';7.' 


'  Not  in  force. 
754 


Protocol   relating  to  negotiations  for  the  establishmenKoTl 
of  new  schedule  III — Brazil — to  the  General  Agreemen' 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade.     Done  at  Geneva  December  31lfric 
19.58.' 

Eighth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  thiijifi 
texts  of  the   schedules  to   the  General  Agreement  o* 
Tariffs  and  Trade.    Done  at  Geneva  February  18,  1959j(iitei 

Ninth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  thii  jei 
texts  of   the  schedules  to   the  General   Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade.    Done  at  Geneva,  August  17,  19594lie 

White  Slave  Traffic 

Agreement  for  the  repression  of  the  trade  in  white  womeni 
as  amended  by  the  protocol  of  May  4,  1949  (TIAS  2332) 
Signed  at  Paris  May  18,  1904.    Entered  into  force  Jul; 
18,  1905 ;  for  the  United  States  June  0,  1908.    35  Stattlin 
1979.  X( 

Notification  received  that  it  considers  itself  bound:  Cen 
tral  African  Republic,  September  4,  1962. 


BILATERAL 


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tit 

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vi 


tk 


Vi 
b;i 
on 
P( 
nb: 
fflf 


Z^ 


Italy 

Agreement  concerning  exportation  of  cotton  velveteen  fal 
rics  from  Italy  to  the  United  States.     Effected  by  e: 
change  of  notes  at  Washington  July  6,  1962.    Entere<4,>| 
into  force  July  6,  1962. 

Japan 

Agreement  relating  to  improving  and  standardizing  .shell 
fish  sanitation  practices  and  exchanging  information  on 
sanitary  controls  applied  to  the  production  and  handlini 
of  fresh  or  frozen  oysters,  clams,  and  mussels  intendec 
for  shipment  between  Japan  and  the  United  States.  El! 
fected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  October  2H 
1962.    Entered  into  force  October  24, 1962. 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  October  22  28 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office  of 
News,  Department  of  State,  Washington  25,  D.C. 

Release  issued  prior  to  October  22  which  appears 
in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  is  No.  632  of  October 
19. 

No.       Date  Subject 

636     10/22     Stevenson:  letter  requesting  Security 
Council  meeting. 

•637     10/22     U.S.    participation    in    international 
conferences. 
638     10/23     Jamaica  credentials   (rewrite). 

•639     10/23     Delegates     to     12th     UNESCO     con- 
ference sworn   in    (biographic  de- 
tails). 
040     10/23     Rusk :      special     meeting     of     OAS 
Council. 

t641     10/24     Shellfish    sanitation   agreement   with 
Japan. 

•642    10/24     Doberty  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Jamaica   (biographic  details). 
044     10/27     Clearance    system    for    shipi)ing    in 
waters  near  Cuba. 

♦645     10/27     Message  to  Aniba-ssador  Stevenson  for 
transmission  to  U  Thant. 

•640     10/28     Harriman :    Statue   of   Liberty   anni- 
versary (excerpt). 

•  Not  [irinted. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  IU'i.i.etin. 


_il 


Deparfment  of  State  Bullet'w 


fovember  12,  1962 

griculture.    United  States  To  Be  Host  to  World 

Food    Congress    (Kennedy) 

merican  Principles.    Meaning  of  "Nonpredetermi- 

nation"  Policy  Is  Clarified  (.Rowan) 

merican  Republics 

merican  Rejiublics  Act  To  Halt  Soviet  Threat  to 
Hemisphere  (Rusk,  text  of  resolution)  .... 
he  Soviet  Threat  to  the  Americas  (Kennedy)  .  . 
tomic  Energy.  Order  Provides  for  Communica- 
tion of  Restricted  Data  by  Department  (text  of 

Executive  order) 

razil.      President    and    Mrs.    Kennedy    Postpone 

Visit  to  Brazil   (Goulart,  Kennedy) 

urundi.  Immigration  Quotas  Establishe<l  for  Six 
Newly  Independent  States  (text  of  proclama- 
tion)   

anada.  United  States  and  Canada  Exchange 
Views  on  Expansion  of  World  Trade  (Dief en- 
baker,   Kennedy) 

jmmunism.     Meaning   of  "Nonpredetermination" 

Policy  Is  Clarified  (Rowan) 

jba 

nerican  Republics  Act  To  Halt  Soviet  Threat  to 
Hemisphere  (Rusk,  text  of  resolution)  .... 
iterdiction  of  the  Delivery  of  Offensive  Weapons  to 

Cuba    (text  of  proclamation) 

lie  Soviet  Threat  to  the  Americas  (Kennedy)  .  . 
N.  Security  Council  Hears  U.S.  Charges  of  Soviet 
Military  Buildup  in  Cuba  (Stevenson)  .... 
S.  Acts  To  Avoid  Delays  for  Ships  Transiting 

Waters  in  Vicinity  of  Cuba 

S.  Agrees  to  U.N.  Proposal  for  Talks  on  Cuban 

Situation  (Kennedy,  U  Thant) 

nited  States  and  Soviet  Union  Agree  on  Formula 
for  Ending  Cuban  Crisis  (Kennedy,  Khrush- 
chev)       

S.    Request    for    Meeting    of    Security    Council 

(Stevenson) 

.S.  Welcomes  Actions  by  Panama  and  Liberia  in 

Cuban  Trade  

hite  House  Notes  Continuation  of  Missile  Build- 
up on  October  25 

epartment  and  Foreign  Service.  Order  Provides 
for  Communication  of  Restricted  Data  by  De- 
partment (text  of  Executive  order) 

conomic  Affairs 

Iterdiction  of  the  Delivery  of  Offensive  Weapons 

to  Cuba  (text  of  proclamation) 

th  Session  of  GATT  Contracting  Parties  (dele- 
gation)    

S.  Acts  To  Avoid  Delays  for   Ships  Transiting 

Waters  in  Vicinity  of  Cuba 

nited  States  and  Canada  Exchange  Views  on  Ex- 
pansion of  World  Trade  (Diefenbaker,  Ken- 
nedy)       

imigration.  Immigration  Quotas  Established  for 
Six  Newly  Independent  States  (text  of  proclama- 
tion)   

ternational  Organizations  and  Conferences 

iierican  Republics  -ict  To  Halt  Soviet  Threat  to 
Hemisphere  (Rusk,  text  of  resolution)  .... 
th  Session  of  GATT  Contracting  Parties  (dele- 
gation)    

nited  States  To  Be  Host  to  World  Food  Congress 

(Kennedy) 

maica 

imigration    Quotas    Established    for    Six    Newly 

Independent  States   (text  of  proclamation)    .     . 

otters  of  Credence  (Ashenheim) 

beria.     U.S.   Welcomes  Actions  by  Panama  and 

Liberia  in  Cuban  Trade 

ixembourg.  Visit  of  Grand  Duchess  Charlotte  of 
Luxembourg  Postponed  (exchange  of  messages)  . 
ilitary  Affairs 

cecutive  Order  Assigning  Authority  for  Service 
in  Armed  Forces 


Index  Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1220 

Interdiction  of  the  Delivery  of  Offensive  Weapons 

752  to  Cuba  (text  of  proclamation) 717 

White  House  Notes  Continuation  of  Missile  Build- 

750  up  on  October  25 740 

Panama.     U.S.  Welcomes  Actions  by  Panama  and 

Liberia  in  Cuban  Trade 746 

720         Presidential  Documents 

715         Executive  Order  Assigning  Authority  for  Service 

in  Armed  Forces 719 

Immigration    Quotas    Established   for    Six    Newly 

751  Independent    States 752 

Interdiction  of  the  Delivery  of  Offensive  Weapons 

747  to    Cuba 717 

Order  Provides  for  Communication  of  Restricted 

Data  by  Department 751 

752  President    and    Mrs.    Kennedy   Postpone    Visit    to 

Brazil 747 

The  Soviet  Threat  to  the  Americas 715 

749  U.S.  Agrees  to  U.N.  Proposal  for  Talks  on  Cuban 

Situation 740 

750  United  States  and  Canada  Exchange  Views  on  E]x- 

pansion  of  World  Trade 749 

United  States  and  Soviet  Union  Agree  on  Formula 

720  for  Ending  Cuban  Crisis 741 

United  States  To  Be  Host  to  World  Food  Congress  .      752 
717         Visit  of  Grand  Duchess  Charlotte  of  Luxembourg 

715  Postponed 743 

Rwanda.    Immigration  Quotas  Establi.shed  for  Six 

723  Newly   Independent    States    (text   of   proclama- 
tion)   752 

747  Tanganyika.     Immigration  Quotas  Established  for 

Six  Newly  Independent  States  (text  of  proclama- 

740  tion) 752 

Treaty  Information.     Current  Actions 754 

Trinidad  and  Tobago.    Immigration  Quotas  Estab- 

741  lished  for  Six  Newly  Independent  States  (text  of 
proclamation) 752 

724  U.S.S.R. 

American  Republics  Act  To  Halt  Soviet  Threat  to 
746  Hemisphere  (Rusk,  text  of  resolution)   ....       720 

Meaning  of  "Nonpredetermination"  Policy  Is  Clari- 

740  fied    (Rowan) 750 

The  Soviet  Threat  to  the  Americas  (Kennedy)  .     .      715 
U.N.  Security  Council  Hears  U.S.  Charges  of  Soviet 
75j^  Military  Buildup  in  Cuba   (Stevenson)    ....      723 

U.S.  Agrees  to  U.N.  Proposal  for  Talks  on  Cuban 

Situation  (Kennedy,  U  Thant) 740 

„..„  United  States  and  Soviet  Union  Agree  on  Formula 

for    Ending    Cuban    Crisis    (Kennedy,    Khrush- 

chev) ".....       741 

U.S.    Request    for    Meeting    of    Security    Council 

„,„  (Stevenson) 724 

White  House  Notes  Continuation  of  Missile  Build- 
up on  October  25 740 

„.„         United  Nations 

U.N.  Security  Council  Hears  U.S.  Charges  of  Soviet 

Military  Buildup  in  Cuba  (Stevenson)     ....       723 
U.S.  Agrees  to  U.N.  ProiKisal  for  Talks  on  Cuban 

752  Situation   (Kennedy,  U  Thant) 740 

U.S.    Request    for    Meeting    of    Security    Council 

( Stevenson ) 704 

720         Western  Samoa.    Immigration  Quotas  Established 
for    Six    Newly    Independent    States     (text    of 

753  proclamation) 752 

Name  Index 

Ashenheim,  Neville  Noel 751 

Diefenbaker,  John  G 749 

_„  Goulart,    .Toao    R 74s 

„',r         Grand  Duchess  Charlotte 749 

Kennedy,  President 7J5 

717, 719,  740,  741,  747,  748,  749,  751,  752 
'■lo         Khrushchev,  Nikita  S 741, 74.3 

Rowan,  Carl  T 750 

748  Rusk,    Secretary 720 

Stevenson,  Adlai  E 723  794 

U  Thant !     .     '  740 

719         White,  Lincoln 745 

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FIVE  GOALS  OF  U.S.  foreign  policy 

•  SECURITY  through  STRENGTH 

•  PROGRESS  through  PARTNERSHIP 

•  REVOLUTION  of  FREEDOM 

•  COMMUNITY  under  LAW 

•  PEACE  through  PERSEVERANCE 

Wliat  U.S.  foreign  policy  is,  how  it  works,  and  the  goals  it  is  de- 
signed to  achieve,  are  defined  in  tliis  37-page  pamphlet.  It  contains 
the  transcript  of  a  television  interview,  September  24,  1962,  with 
Dean  Rusk,  Secretary  of  Stat©;  Robert  S.  McNamara,  Secretary  of 
Defense;  George  W.  Ball,  Under  Secretary  of  State;  Fowler  Hamil- 
ton, Administrator,  Agency  for  International  Development;  Adlai  E. 
Stevenson,  U.S.  Permanent  Representative  to  the  United  Nations; 
and  W.  W.  Rostow,  Counselor  and  Chairman  of  the  Policy  Planning 
Council,  Department  of  State. 


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Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1221  November  19,  1962 

/ 
POWER  AND  DIPLOMACY  •  by  Assistant  Secretary  Cleveland .  759 

THE  LEGAL  CASE  FOR  U.S.  ACTION  ON  CUBA  •  by 

Abram  Chayes,  Legal  Adviser 763 

THE    EXPERIENCE    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES    IN 
ECONOMIC    DEVELOPMENT:    ITS    RELEVANCE 

FOR     LATIN    AMERICA    •    by   Ambassador   Thomas  C. 
Mann 772 

TRADE  PROBLEMS  AND  THE  ALLIANCE  FOR  PROG- 
RESS  •   by  W.  Michael  Blumenthal 777 

U.N.  AGAIN  REJECTS  SOVIET  PROPOSAL  TO   SEAT 

COMMUNIST   CHINA   •  Statement  by  Ambassador  Adlai 

E.  Stevenson • 786 

INDONESIAN-AMERICAN     RELATIONS    TODAY  •  by 

Ambassador  Howard  P.  Jones 766 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


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Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1221   •  Pubucation  7455 
November  19,  1962 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a   weekly  publication   issued  by   the 
Office  of  Media  Services,   Bureau  of 
Public    Affairs,    provides    the    public 
and   interested  agencies   of   the 
Government     with     information     on 
developments  in  the  field  of  foreign 
relations    and    on    the    work    of    the 
Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service.     The  BULLETIN  includes  se- 
lected press  releases  on  foreign  policy, 
issued  by  the  White  House  and  the 
Department,  and  statements  and  ad- 
dresses made  by  the  President  and  by 
the    Secretary    of    State    and    other 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well  as 
special  articles  on  various  phases  of 
international    affairs    and    the  func- 
tions of  the  Department.     Informa- 
tion is   included  concerning   treaties 
and   international   agreements    to 
which   the   United  States   is  or   may 
become  a  party  and  treaties  of  gen- 
eral international  interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
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national relations  are  listed  currently. 


'ower  and  Diplomacy 


l)y  Harlan  Cleveland 

Assistant  Secretary  for  International  Organization  Affairs  ^ 


At  this  time  a  week  ago,  in  the  cold  air  of  an 
ctober  night,  a  few  pickets  appeared  before  the 
liite  House.    They  were  outriders  of  two  large 
mds  who  demonstrated  there  the  following  day. 
lie  band  demonstrated  against  the  use  of  power 
the  Cuban  crisis,  the  other  against  the  use  of 
plomacy  in  the  Cuban  crisis. 
The  police  kept  the  two  legions  apart;  so  the 
parate  marchers  for  power  and  diplomacy  went 
eir  separate  ways  on  the  sidewalks  in  front  of 
e  "Wliite  House.     Not  so  inside  the  picketed 
•use.    There  the  President  of  the  United  States 
bored  to  fashion  power  and  diplomacy  into  a 
I  instrument  of  American   foreign  policy, 
id  during  the  past  12  days  it  has  become  abun- 
ntly  clear  that  the  relationship  between  power 
d  diplomacy  is  primordial. 
These,  as  we  all  know,  have  been  world-shaking 
ys.    The  participants  cannot  yet  read  the  his- 
ry  they  are  writing,  and  I  have  not  come  here 
aight  to  assess  or  to  audit  events  that  are  in- 
mplete  or  ends  that  are  unknown.    I  am,  bow- 
er, happy  to  be  with  you,  for,  no  matter  what 
9  outcome  of  the  current  crisis,  we  may  be  proud 
these  days.    The  days  bear  witness  not  only  to 
}  courage  of  the  American  people  but  to  our 
tional  confidence  and  our  national  restraint. 
What   has  been   notably  insignificant  in  this 
sis  is  the  fruitless  search  for  the  simple  answer, 
effort  to  formulate  neat  two-sided  alterna- 
es,  the  demand  that  we  negotiate  from  fear  or 

from  fiiistration. 
think  that  we  had  already  made  a  good  deal 

progress  in  the  past  year  or  so  in  shaking  off 
at,  for  a  while,  looked  dangerously  like  a  na- 
liial  mood  of  despair.    Even  before  the  test  of 


the  past  12  days,  we  were  hearing  less  about  the 
steady  advance  of  communism  and  the  steady  re- 
treat of  the  West.  The  demonstration  that  46 
nations  can  become  independent,  without  any  of 
them  choosing  Communists  as  leaders  or  Marxism 
as  a  way  of  government,  has  begun  to  sink  in. 
Some  of  the  popular  interpreters  of  the  Kremlin's 
designs  were  beginning  to  blink  away  the  hyp- 
nosis induced  by  the  prophecies  of  these  Com- 
munist prophets  we  are  always  being  urged  to 
reread. 

The  evidence  has  been  piling  up  that  the  apoca- 
lyptic vision  of  triumphant,  aggressive  commu- 
nism on  the  march  around  the  world — that  left- 
wing  doctrine  paradoxically  so  attractive  to  other 
extremists — is  being  dissipated  by  the  stubborn 
and  self-evident  independence  of  most  of  man- 
kind. 

More  and  more  of  the  world's  people  are  insist- 
ing more  and  more  loudly  on  their  imalienable 
rights.  The  British  Foreign  Secretary,  Lord 
Home,  said  it  well  in  his  speech  before  the  United 
Nations  General  Assembly : 

If  imperialism  is  being  thrown  out  of  tlie  window  on 
the  wind  of  change,  so  is  Karl  Marx — and  good  riddance 
too.  It  is  time  we  got  rid  of  these  obsolete  reactionary 
doctrines  of  the  Nineteenth  Century. 

But  avoiding  defeatism  was  only  part  of  the 
problem.  The  chief  enemy  of  confidence  has  been 
acute  frustration.  The  sources  of  frustration  re- 
main with  us — less  a  fear  of  losing  the  cold  war 


'  Address  made  at  a  banquet  sponsored  by  the  Manfred 
Sakel  Foundation  in  honor  of  scientists  participating  in 
the  International  Conference  on  Biological  Treatment  of 
Mental  Illness  at  New  York,  N.Y.,  on  Nov.  2  (press  release 
658). 


/ember   79,   1962 


759 


than  of  not  being  able  to  win  it  quickly  and 
decisively.  The  threat  will  remain  so  long  as  we 
are  deeply  enmeshed  in  every  one  of  the  dozens  of 
pesky  problems  which  make  the  world  dangerous 
and  uncomfortable  and  demanding  of  our  time 
and  attention  and  resources. 

One  reason  these  problems  have  produced  a 
sense  of  frustration  can  be  found  in  our  history — 
or  at  least  the  liistory  we  are  sometimes  taught. 
The  American  story  is  a  success  story.  Perhaps 
we  have  come  as  a  people  to  believe  that  it  is  nat- 
ural and  right  that  things  in  this  world  should 
go  as  we  would  like  them  to  go. 

With  this  practical  kind  of  optimism  built  deep 
into  our  culture,  we  are  naturally  having  a  little 
trouble  getting  used  to  the  fact  that  there  isn't  a 
simple  American  solution  to  every  problem,  even 
though  there  is  an  American  involvement  in  al- 
most every  problem. 

The  frustrating  effect  of  this  long  memory  is 
compounded  by  the  frustrating  effect  of  a  shorter 
memory — that  turn  of  history  that  made  the 
United  States  almost  omnipotent  at  the  end  of 
World  War  II. 

Among  the  major  powers  only  the  United  States 
came  out  of  the  war  physically  undamaged,  with 
a  vastly  expanded  economy,  and  with  the  only 
margin  of  financial  reserves  anywhere  to  start  re- 
covery and  trade  moving  again.  Yet  we  were  des- 
tined not  to  remain  the  sole  center  of  world  power. 
The  Soviet  Union  used  totalitarian  methods  to 
force  through  an  impressive  economic  recovery. 
And  in  the  non-Cormnunist  world  we  soon  helped 
others  to  move  in  and  share  with  us  the  world  of 
power  and  influence.  Western  Europe  had  the 
will  and  the  human  talent  to  come  through  witli  a 
recovery  more  successful,  more  astonishing,  and 
more  impressive  than  the  Soviet  effort — and  it  was 
accomplished  in  a  democratic  framework.  (And 
while  we  helped  with  our  Marshall  Plan,  we 
should  also  remember  that  even  in  its  peak  year 
the  Marshall  Plan  provided  only  4  percent  of  the 
resources  to  make  that  European  recovery  pos- 
sible.) 

The  miracle  of  Japanese  recovery  and  boom  is 
only  gradually  dawning  on  us  now. 

The  fact  is  that  within  a  very  short  time  the 
victims  of  World  War  II — victors  and  vanquished 
alike — regained  positions  of  power  and  influence 
in  world  affairs. 


760 


Political  Influence  of  New  Nations 


Meanwhile,  beyond  the  world's  industrial  nortli, 
the  classical  colonial  system  came  apart  at  the* 
seams — with  a  further  dispersion  of  political  in- 
fluence to  new  nations  and  new  leaders  who  expect 
to  have  more  than  a  little  to  say  about  how  thei ' 
world  should  be  run. 

Many  Americans,  including  some  of  our  most 
articulate,  whose  first  good  look  at  the  world  took 
place  during  the  American  heyday,  fell  victim,  I 
think,  to  a  feeling  that  somehow  we  had  lost  oun  j 
grip  on  the  world — because  they  were  still  living: 
with  the  memory  of  the  time  when  almost  every 
body  had  to  be  agreeable  with  American  ideas  be- 
cause almost  everybody  in  the  non-Communist 
world  was  dependent  on  American  good  will  and 
American  aid. 

Some  Americans  forgot  too   easily  that  this'  ^ 
pluralistic  world,  full  of  ornery,  independent  peo" "' 
pie,  is  just  what  we  have  been  working  for  anci'l 
mvesting  in  and  building  a  military  shield  to  pro 
tect.     We  labored  hard  to  help  Europe  becomi 
strong  and  unified.    But  instead  of  dancing  in  thi 
streets,  there  have  been  those  among  us  who  com 
plain  today  that  the  Europeans  are  competinj^ 
with  us  too  hard,  expressing  too  many  independ'  .^ 
ent  ideas,  and  talking  for  all  the  world  as  if  th 
grace  of  God  had  been  shed  on  them  too. 

Or  take  the  liberation  of  almost  a  billion  peopl 
from  the  old  colonial  system — a  process  which  w 
mightily  helped  to  start  and  have  cheered  on  eve 
since.     The  doctrine  of  self-determination — ou 
doctrine — has  carried  the  day.     But  instead  o 
lighting  bonfires  on  the  hilltops,  there  have  bee 
those  among  us  who  could  not  get  used  to  thes 
uppity  young  nations  which  insist  on  being  equa 
which  act  as  though  they  were  sovereign  and  indt  ^| 
pendent.    And  some  among  us  squirm  still  who?  .(| 
they  realize  there  is  just  no  alternative  to  helpin< 
these  new  nations  with  the  tricky  new  business  o 
cranking  up  their  economies  and  building  up  thei  j, 
governments — along  the  general  lines  which  w  ^ 
have  always  proclaimed  to  be  the  real  "wave  oijfij 
the  future."     It  is  a  very  annoying  habit,  thi  j,, 
tendency  of  each  fresh  sovereignty  to  act  hot) 
sovereign  and  fresh. 

Finally,  there  is  yet  another  source  of  frustKi  ^ 
tion:  The  nuclear  age  has  imposed  on  great  nfl 
tions  the  most  severe  restraints  on  tlie  exercise  c 
military  power.    The  little  war  can  too  easily  \» 


ol 


■as 
tear 


k 


Department  of  Stale  Bullet  '»(ii 

I 


in 

mai 
spoi 


!ome  the  big  war;  the  big  war  can  too  readily 
jecome  nuclear  war.  This  fact  has  made  the  union 
>f  power  and  diplomacy  primordial  to  the  point 
tf  frustration. 

teveloping  Courage  and  Restraint 

.Vnd  yet  we  have  been  learning  to  live  with  the 
rustrations  of  great  power — and  of  national  suc- 
ess.  Two  events  of  this  year  offered  clear  evi- 
ence  that  we  really  were  developing  the  courage 
nd  confidence  and  restraint  that  have  been  mani- 
est  in  the  past  2  weeks. 
One  of  these  events  was  the  action  of  Congress 
1  passing  President  Kennedy's  new  trade  bill " 
y  a  margin  so  lopsided  that  it  is  clear  there  is 
ow  an  American  consensus  on  tliis,  one  of  the  old- 
;t  debate  topics  in  American  political  history, 
mericans  know  instinctively  that  we  must  go 
ito  partnership  with  Europe  in  freeing  up  world 
'ade  for  the  richer  countries  and  the  poorer  coun- 
ies  alike. 

The  other  event  of  the  season  is  again  summa- 

zed  in  a  congressional  vote.    For  the  first  time 

I  its  17  years,  the  United  Nations  received  the 

all  treatment  this  year  as  an  issue  in  American 

omestic  politics.     The  dramatic  events  in  the 

ongo,  and  the  U.N.  involvement  in  them,  sparked 

special  political  interest  when  Congress — and  the 

eople  at  large  through  polls  and  letters  to  Wash- 

gton — had  to  decide  whether  to  buy  $100  million 

orth  of  United  Nations  bonds. 

The  organized  good  sense  of  the  American  com- 

unity  responded  to  this  first  real  "crisis  of  confi- 

nce"  over  United  States  policy  in  the  United 

ations.     In  the  end  what  was  proved — again — 

as  what  must  be  proved  again  and  again  each 

ar :  that  our  efforts  to  build  an  operational  peace 

stem  through  the  United  Nations  are  endorsed 

1  the  leadership,  and  by  most  of  the  rank  and  file, 

both  our  great  political  parties.   This  reaffirma- 

ss  jn  by  the  Congress  of  bipartisanship  in  U.N. 

fairs  is  well  worth  noting  in  our  national  diary. 

After  the  public  debate  appropriate  to  so  im- 

)rtant  a  matter,  the  Senate,  by  a  vote  of  more 

,tl  an  3  to  1  (70  to  22),  and  the  House  of  Kepre- 

\  ntatives,  by  a  vote  of  about  2  to  1  (256  to  134), 

sponded  to  a  deep  conviction  widely  shared  by 


most  Americans :  that  the  United  Nations  is  never 
perfect,  often  frustrating,  but  always  essential. 

The  national  decision  was  reached  just  in  time. 
For  just  aroimd  the  comer,  in  Cuba,  a  test  of  our 
willingness  and  ability  to  use  international  or- 
ganizations as  an  integral  part  of  our  foreign 
policy  was  awaiting  us. 

Turning  Back  the  Threat  to  the  Peace  in  Cuba 

"Wlien  the  Soviet  plot  in  Cuba  was  revealed, 
both  the  power  and  the  diplomacy  of  the  free 
world  were  quietly  and  carefully  mobilized  to  turn 
back  tliis  threat.  For  the  firet  time  the  United 
Nations  has  been  brought  fully  into  a  conflict  tak- 
ing place  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

You  will  recall  that  the  President's  statement 
to  the  Nation  on  October  22  ^  outlined  three  paral- 
lel actions:  a  quarantine,  a  meeting  of  the  Or- 
ganization of  American  States,  and  a  resolution 
to  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  envision- 
ing U.N.  inspection  of  Soviet  dismantling  and 
withdrawal  of  offensive  weapons  in  Cuba. 

The  Council  of  the  Organization  of  American 
States  met  the  next  day  *  and  unanimously  re- 
solved "to  call  for  the  immediate  dismantling  and 
withdrawal  from  Cuba  of  all  missiles  and  other 
weapons  with  any  offensive  capability"  and  rec- 
ommended to  all  members  that  they  "take  all 
measures,  individually  and  collectively,  including 
the  use  of  armed  force,  which  they  may  deem  nec- 
essary to  ensure  that  the  Government  of  Cuba 
cannot  continue  to  receive  from  the  Sino-Soviet 
powers  military  material  and  related  supplies 
which  may  threaten  the  peace  and  security  of 
the  Continent  and  to  prevent  the  missiles  in  Cuba 
with  offensive  capability  from  ever  becoming  an 
active  threat  to  the  peace  and  security  of  the  Con- 
tinent." Then  the  OAS  reported  its  action  to 
the  Security  Council  of  the  United  Nations  in 
accordance  with  the  United  Nations  Charter  and 
expressed  the  hope  that  the  Security  Council 
would  "dispatch  United  Nations  observers  to  Cuba 
at  the  earliest  moment." 

At  the  same  moment,  the  Security  Council  be- 
gan to  debate  the  threat  to  the  peace  in  Cuba." 

In  taking  the  Soviet  threat  directly  into  the 


For  a  statement  by  President  Kennedy  and  a  summary 
the  Trade  Expansion  Act,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  29,  1962, 
655. 


"  lUa.,  Nov.  12, 1962,  p.  715. 
'  ma.,  p.  720. 
'/6i(i.,  p.  723. 


^MQmhet   19,   7962 


761 


Security  Council,  the  United  States  showed  again 
that  it  is  ready  to  work  with  the  United  Nations 
openly  and  willingly,  even  in  this  portentous  chal- 
lenge to  our  own  national  security. 

In  a  situation  as  perilous,  complex,  and  sensi- 
tive as  we  have  ever  faced,  the  United  Nations 
turned  out  to  be  relevant  to  the  crisis — and  hope- 
fully to  its  cure.  If  the  United  Nations  did  not 
exist  we  would  assuredly  have  had  to  invent  it 
last  week. 

The  United  Nations  is  far  from  being  the  only 
or  even  the  main  channel  to  the  Soviet  Union 
in  this  crisis.  But  the  United  Nations  channel 
is  one  of  the  essential  ones.  The  executive  capa- 
city of  the  United  Nations — jaroved  and  developed 
in  helping  keep  the  great  powers  apart  in  the 
marchlands  of  the  Middle  East,  in  the  C!ongo, 
and  in  West  New  Guinea — now  finds  a  role  on 
Cuba,  too. 

U.N.  as  Factor  in  Diplomacy 

Thus  it  is  that  every  lesson  of  parliamentary 
diplomacy,  every  precious  experiment  with  inter- 
national peacekeeping  and  international  inspec- 
tion, every  past  argument  about  U.N.  financing 
and  the  integrity  of  the  office  of  Secretary-Gen- 
eral, is  summed  up  in  the  travels  and  trials  of  U 
Thant.  Thus  it  is  that  the  United  Nations,  that 
complex  tool  and  target  of  every  nation's  foreign 
policy,  is  added  now  to  the  other  relevant  forces, 
ranging  from  navies  to  embassies,  which  have  also 
been  called  into  play. 

For  tliere  is  no  one  force  more  "real"  than  all 
the  others  in  international  affairs.  A  diplomatic 
move  in  a  carpeted  room  in  New  York  can  be  no 
less  real,  no  less  resolute,  and  no  less  vital  to  our 
national  security  than  the  careful,  expertly  man- 
aged military  moves  on  the  high  seas  or  in  the 
Caribbean  sky.  They  are  both,  in  fact,  part  of 
the  same  exercise — an  exercise  essential  to  the  na- 
tional security  of  the  United  States. 

The  citizen,  as  he  watches  the  exertion  of  all 
these  forces,  needs  perhaps  to  remind  himself  that 
just  as  our  arms  serve  the  cause  of  peace  so  does 
our  diplomacy  serve  the  cause  of  security. 


President  Reports  on  Dismantling 
of  Soviet  Missile  Bases  in  Cuba 

StateTTient  hy  President  Kennedy  ^ 


1 


My  fellow  citizens:  I  want  to  take  this  oppor 
tunity  to  report  on  the  conclusions  which  thi^ 
Government  has  reached  on  the  basis  of  yester- 
day's aerial  photographs  which  will  be  made  avail- 
able tomorrow,  as  well  as  other  indications,, 
namely,  that  the  Soviet  missile  bases  in  Cuba  are' 
being  dismantled,  their  missiles  and  related  equip- 
ment are  being  crated,  and  the  fi^ed  installationst 
at  these  sites  are  being  destroyed 

Tlie  United  States  intends  to  follow  closely  tha 
completion  of  this  work  through  a  variety  oil  ' 
means,  including  aerial  surveillance,  imtil  such 
time    as    an    equally    satisfactory    intemationa 
means  of  verification  is  effected. 

While  the  quarantine  -  remains  in  effect,  we  ar« 
hopeful  that  adequate  procedures  can  be  developec 
for  international  inspection  of  Cuba-bound  car 
goes.  Tlie  International  Committee  of  the  Rec 
Cross,  in  our  view,  would  be  an  appropriate  agen 
in  tliis  matter. 

The  continuation  of  these  measures  in  air  anc 
sea,  until  the  threat  to  peace  posed  by  tliese  offen 
sive  weapons  is  gone,  is  in  keeping  with  our  pledg 
to  secure  their  withdrawal  or  elimination  fron 
this  hemisphere.  It  is  in  keeping  with  the  resolu 
tion  of  the  OAS  [Organization  of  America) 
States],^  and  it  is  in  keeping  with  the  exchang 
of  letters  with  Chairman  Ivliruslichev  of  Octo 
ber  27th  and  28th.* 

Progress  is  now  being  made  toward  the  restora 
tion  of  peace  in  the  Caribbean,  and  it  is  our  fim 
hope  and  purpose  that  this  progress  shall  go  for 
ward.  We  will  continue  to  keep  the  America 
people  informed  on  this  vital  matter.  Thank  yoilKi 
lis 

'Made  from  the  White  House  by  radio  and  tclevisiops 
on  Nov.  2  (White  House  press  release).    For  a  statemer 
by  President  Kennedy  on  Oct.  22,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  i: 
1962,  p.  715. 

'  For  text  of  a  proclamation  on  the  interdiction  of  tt 
delivery  of  offensive  weapons  to  Cuba,  see  ihid.,  p.  717 

'  For  text,  see  ihid.,  p.  720. 

*  For  texts,  see  ihld.,  p.  741. 


B' 


Iff 
01 

isl 
le 
«i 


ase 
T 
tii 


!cor 


Ui 


762 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


"»!U 


he  Legal  Case  for  U.S.  Action  on  Cuba 


hy  AhraTTi  Cliayes 
Legal  Adviser  ^ 


The  Cuban  crisis  is  not  over  yet.  It  may  be  a 
eiy  long  time  before  it  is  over.  And  sucli  prog- 
ess  as  we  have  made  cannot,  on  the  wliole,  be  at- 
ributed  to  our  legal  position.  The  primary  ele- 
lents  in  the  confrontation  of  the  last  weeks  have 
een  the  ability  and  the  will  of  the  United  States 
3  deploy  the  necessary  force  in  the  area  to  estab- 
sh  and  enforce  the  quarantine,  and  the  mobiliza- 
jj  ion  of  friends  and  allies — in  the  hemisphere,  in 
Europe,  and  elsewhere  in  the  world — in  support 
f  our  action. 

But  if  it  would  not  have  been  enough  merely  to 
ave  the  law  on  our  side,  that  is  not  to  say  it  is 
'holly  irrelevant  which  side  the  law  was  on.  The 
fQj  eployment  of  force,  the  appeal  for  world  sup- 
dlii  ort,  to  say  nothing  of  the  ultimate  judgment  of 
jj,  istory,  all  depend  in  some  significant  degree  on 
ijj  le  reality  and  coherence  of  the  case  in  law  for  our 
ift)  ction. 

It  is  worthwhile  I  think  to  set  out  that  legal 

QPj  ise  and  to  examine  some  of  its  implications. 

jjfi   The  question  was  not,  as  most  of  my  friends  in 

ji,i  ad  out  of  the  press  seemed  to  think,  "Is  it  a  legal 

.;,,!  lockade  ?"    The  effort  to  name  and  classify  things 

YOi  as  its  place  in  the  law  as  in  other  disciplines,  but 

lis  audience  needs  no  reminder  that  legal  prob- 

;;ii(  >ms  are  something  more  than  a  search  for  pigeon- 

■Bf!  oles  within  which  to  encase  living  phenomena. 

'•■  In  wartime  the  establishment  of  a  blockade,  of 

)urse,  with  all  its  classical  elements,  is  justified 

jcording  to  the  books.    It  represents  minimal  in- 

srfei'ence  with  neutral  commerce  consistent  with 

le  necessities  of  war.    But  even  in  the  most  lial- 

iwed  of  the  texts,  war  is  not  the  sole  situation 

which  such  interference  is  permissible. 


'  Address  made  at  the  10th  reunion  of  the  Harvard  Law 
ihool  Class  of  1952  at  Boston,  Mass.,  on  Nov.  3  (press 
ilease  660). 

ovember  19,  J  962 


It  is  instructive  to  examine  the  rules  of  block- 
ade. They  were  developed  in  the  19th  century. 
They  reflect  very  accurately  the  problems  of  the 
international  order — as  well  as  the  weapons  tech- 
nology— that  then  prevailed.  The  typical  subjects 
of  international  law  were  European  nation-states. 
Their  relations  with  each  other  were  episodic  and 
largely  bilateral. 

The  age  of  total  war  was  only  beginning ;  so  the 
application  of  force  as  an  instrument  of  national 
policy  was  recognized  as  legitimate,  if  not  posi- 
tively beneficial.  When  force  was  applied  it  was, 
at  least  in  theory,  a  bilateral  affair  or,  at  most, 
something  between  small  and  temporary  group- 
ings of  nations  on  each  side.  The  operating  legal 
rules — always  nicer  and  more  coherent  in  retro- 
spect than  at  the  time — had  two  principal  objects: 
first,  to  help  assure  that  these  affrays  were  carried 
out  with  the  smallest  disturbance  of  the  normal 
activities  of  all  concerned ;  and  second,  to  permit 
a  state  to  make  an  unambiguous  choice  whether 
to  join  with  one  of  the  belligerents— and  so  have 
a  chance  to  share  in  any  political  gains— or  to  re- 
main uninvolved  and  make  its  profits  commer- 
cially, which  were  in  any  event  likely  to  be  both 
larger  and  safer. 

International  law  addresses  different  problems 
today  and  in  a  different  context.  Its  overriding 
object  is  not  to  regulate  the  conduct  of  war  but  to 
keep  and  defend  the  peace.  If  nonalinement  con- 
tinues to  be  a  goal  for  some  countries,  noninvolve- 
ment  has  become  a  luxury  beyond  price.  We 
remember  that  war  in  this  century  has  twice  en- 
gulfed us  all,  willy-nilly.  Paper  commitments  to 
right  conduct  did  not  stop  it.  Above  all  we  are 
burdened  with  the  knowledge  and  the  power  to 
destroy  the  world.  The  international  landscape 
today,  too,  looks  quite  different  than  it  did  a  cen- 

763 


tury  ago.  It  is  peopled  with  permanent  organiza- 
tions of  states — some  more  comprehensive,  some 
less,  some  purely  for  defense,  and  some  with 
broader  purposes.  It  is  tlirough  these  organiza- 
tions that  we  hope  to  give  reality  to  our  pledges 
to  maintain  the  peace. 

The  Soviet  Union's  threat  in  Cuba  was  made  in 
the  context  of  this  international  system,  and  it  was 
answered  in  the  same  context. 

Tlie  United  States  saw  its  security  threatened, 
but  we  were  not  alone.  Our  quarantine  -  was  im- 
posed in  accordance  with  the  recommendation  of 
the  Organization  of  American  States  acting  under 
the  Rio  Treaty  of  1947.=  This  treaty,  together 
with  related  agreements,  constitutes  the  inter- 
American  system.  Twenty-one  countries,  includ- 
ing Cuba,  are  parties  to  that  treaty.  None  has  ever 
disaffirmed  it. 

The  Eio  Treaty  provides  for  collective  action  not 
only  in  the  case  of  armed  attack  but  also  "if  the 
inviolability  or  the  integrity  of  the  territory  or 
the  sovereignty  or  political  independence  of  any 
American  State  should  be  affected  ...  by  any  .  .  . 
fact  or  situation  that  might  endanger  the  peace  of 
America.  .  .  ."  In  such  cases,  a  special  body,  the 
Organ  of  Consultation,  is  to  "meet  immediately  in 
order  to  agree  on  the  measures  .  .  .  which  should 
be  taken  for  the  common  defense  and  for  the  main- 
tenance of  the  peace  and  security  of  the  Conti- 
nent." The  Organ  of  Consultation  acts  only  by  a 
two-thirds  vote. 

The  treaty  is  explicit  as  to  the  measures  which 
may  be  taken  "for  the  maintenance  of  the  peace 
and  security  of  the  Continent."  The  "use  of  armed 
force"  is  specifically  authorized,  though  "no  State 
shall  be  required  to  use  armed  force  without  its 
consent." 

On  October  23d,  the  Organ  of  Consultation 
met,*  in  accordance  with  the  treaty  procedures, 
and  considered  the  evidence  of  the  secret  introduc- 
tion of  Soviet  strategic  nuclear  missiles  into  Cuba. 
It  concluded  that  a  situation  existed  which  en- 
dangered the  peace  of  America.  It  recommended 
that  member  states  "take  all  measures,  individ- 
ually and  collectively,  including  the  use  of  armed 


'  For  text  of  a  proclamation  on  the  interdiction  of  de- 
livery of  offensive  weapons  to  Cuba,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov. 
12,  1962,  p.  717. 

•  For  text,  see  ibid.,  Sept.  21, 1947,  p.  565. 

*  For  a  statement  by  Secretary  Busl:  and  text  of  a  reso- 
lution adopted  on  Oct.  23,  see  ibid.,  Nov.  12,  1962,  p.  720. 

764 


force,  which  they  may  deem  necessary  to  ensun 
that  the  Government  of  Cuba  cannot  continue  t( 
receive  from  the  Sino-Soviet  powers  military  ma^ 
terial  and  related  supplies  .  .  .  ."  The  quarantine 
was  imposed  to  carry  out  this  recommendation. 

Action  by  regional  organizations  to  keep  thou 
peace  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  United  Nations 
Charter.    On  the  contrary,  the  charter  assigns  an 
important  role  to  regional  organizations  in  carry- 
ing out  the  purposes  of  the  United  Nations.    Ar- 
ticle 52  ( 1 )  prescribes  the  use  of  "regional  arrange- 
ments or  agencies  for  dealing  with  such  matters 
relating  to  the  maintenance  of  international  peace 
and   security    as    are    appropriate    for   regional 
action.  ..."    And  it  is  certainly  not  irrelevant 
in  the  present  context  that  provisions  dealing  with:  j,, 
regional    organizations   were    written    into    tha  j, 
charter  at  San  Francisco  at  the  insistence  of  the 
Latin  American  countries  and  with  the  inter- 
American  system  specifically  in  mind. 

The  activities  of  regional  organizations,  ol 
course,  must  be  "consistent  with  the  Purposes  and 
Principles  of  the  United  Nations."  It  may  seem-  ■■ 
self-evident  that  action  to  deal  with  a  threat  tc 
the  peace  meets  this  requirement.  But  the  princi- 
ples of  the  United  Nations  are  stated  in  article  S 
of  the  charter  and  include  the  undertaking  of  all 
members  to 


)fi 


ystf 
ntl 


M 

kt 
net 
nine 
refrain  in  tbeir  international  relations  from  thi 
threat  or  use  of  force  against  the  territorial  integrity  o)  ... 
political  independence  of  any  state,  or  in  any  other  man 
ner  inconsistent  with  the  Purposes  of  the  United  Nations 


itlier 


The  quarantine  action  involves  a  use  of  force  anc 
must  be  squared  with  this  principle. 

The  promise  not  to  use  force  is  not  absolute 
One  qualification  comes  readily  to  mind.  Artich 
51  affirms  that  nothing  in  the  charter,  including 
article  2(4),  impairs  "the  inherent  right  of  in 
dividual  or  collective  self-defense  if  an  armed  at 
tack  occurs."  The  quarantine  action  was  designee  .^  " 
to  deal  with  an  imminent  threat  to  our  security 
But  the  President  in  his  speech  °  did  not  invoki 
article  51  or  the  right  of  self-defense.  And  tin 
OAS  acted  not  under  article  3,  covering  cases  o 
armed  attack,  but  under  article  6,  covering  threabi  j™ 
to  the  peace  other  than  armed  attack. 

Self-defense,  however,  is  not  the  only  justifiablt 
use  of  force  under  the  charter.     Obviously,  tht 


M 

titli 
Bsot 


Ht 


m 
niol 
iipo 
He 


•  Ibid.,  p.  715. 


Department  of  State  Bulleth 


h 


'••einl 


m 


United  Nations  itself  could  sanction  the  use  of 
force  to  deal  with  a  threat  to  the  peace.  So  it  did 
jx  Korea  and  in  the  Congo.  We  accept  use  of  force 
n  these  instances  as  legitimate  for  two  reasons, 
^irst,  all  the  members  have  constituted  the  United 
'Nations  for  these  purposes.  In  signing  the  charter 
hey  have  assented  to  its  powers  and  procedures. 
Second,  the  political  processes  by  which  the  U.N. 
iiakes  a  decision  to  use  force  give  some  assurance 
hat  the  decision  will  not  be  rashly  taken. 

I  submit  that  the  same  two  factors  legitimize  use 
if  force  in  accordance  with  the  OAS  resolution 
ealing  with  a  threat  to  the  peace  in  the  hemi- 
phere.  The  significance  of  assent  is  attested  by  the 
act  that,  though  Cuba  is  now  and  has  been  for 
ome  time  the  object  of  sanctions  and  hostility 
rom  the  OAS  and  has  been  suspended  from  par- 
icipation  in  its  agencies,  she  has  remained  a  party 
0  the  treaties  and  a  member  of  the  inter- American 
ystem,  as,  in  a  like  case,  did  the  Dominican  Re- 
ublic.  The  significance  of  the  political  processes 
a  the  Organization  is  attested  by  the  fact  that,  de- 
pite  the  disproportion  of  power  between  the 
Jnited  States  and  its  neighbors  to  the  south,  it 
vas  not  until  the  danger  was  clear  and  present 
hat  the  necessary  majority  could  be  mustered  to 

' ''  anction  use  of  armed  force.  But  when  that  time 
ame,  the  vote  was  unanimous. 
Some  have  asked  whether  we  should  not  first 
ave  gone  to  the  Security  Council  before  taking 
ther  action  to  meet  the  Soviet  threat  in  Cuba. 
Old  I  suppose  that  in  the  original  conception  of 

"'*  le  United  Nations,  it  was  thought  that  the 
ecurity  Council  would  be  the  agency  for  dealing 
dth  situations  of  this  kind.  However,  the  draf  t- 
rs  of  the  charter  demonstrated  their  wisdom  by 
laking  Security  Coimcil  responsibility  for  deal- 
ig  with  threats  to  the  peace  "primary"  and  not 

^''  exclusive."    For  events  since  1945  have  demon- 

?"  ;rated  that  the  Security  Council,  like  our  own 
lectoral  college,  was  not  a  viable  institution.    The 
eto  has  made  it  substantially  useless  in  keeping 
e  peace. 
The  withering  away  of  the  Security  Council  has 

■''"  sd  to  a  search  for  alternative  peacekeeping  insti- 
itions.  In  the  United  Nations  itself  the  General 
Lssembly  and  the  Secretary-General  have  filled 
le  void.  Regional  organizations  are  another  ob- 
lious  candidate. 
Regional  organizations,  even  when  they  employ 

"'"  ovember   19,   ?962 


ritj 


agreed  processes  and  procedures,  remain  subject 
to  check.  They  are  subordinate  to  the  U.N.  by 
the  terms  of  the  charter,  and  in  the  case  of  the 
OAS,  by  the  terms  of  the  relevant  inter- American 
treaties  themselves.  Like  an  individual  state,  it 
can  be  called  to  account  for  its  action  in  the  ap- 
propriate agency  of  the  parent  organization.  In 
recognition  of  tliis  relation,  the  President  ordered 
that  the  case  be  put  immediately  before  the  Securi- 
ty Council.  The  U.N.,  through  the  Council  and 
the  Secretary-General,  is,  as  a  result,  actively  en- 
gaged m  the  effort  to  develop  a  permanent  solu- 
tion to  the  threat  to  the  peace  represented  by  the 
Soviet  nuclear  capability  in  Cuba.^ 

You  will  not  have  failed  to  see  that  the  legal 
defense  of  the  quarantine  I  have  outlined  reflects 
what  I  would  call  an  American  constitutional 
lawyer's  approach  to  intei-national  law. 

There  is  normative  content  in  the  system :  "Con- 
gress shall  make  no  law  .  .  .  abridging  tlie  free 
dom  of  speech,  or  of  the  press  .  .  .";  "Member 
States  shall  refrain  in  their  international  rela- 
tions from  the  threat  or  use  of  force."  But  it 
recognizes  that  norms,  to  be  durable,  must  be  sub- 
ject to  growth  and  development  as  circumstances 
change. 

For  assurance  of  healthy  decision  within  this 
range,  there  must  be  reliance  upon  institutional 
arrangements,  checks  and  balances.  And  there- 
fore we  must  worry  about  the  reality  of  the  assent 
reflected  in  those  arrangements. 

There  is  recognition  that  in  public  international 
law,  as  in  our  domestic  constitutional  system,  the 
membrane  that  separates  law  from  politics  is  thin 
and  permeable.  And  there  must  therefore  be  pro- 
fessional vigilance  so  that  law  is  not  corrupted  by 
raison  d^etat. 

The  consequence  of  having  a  system  with  this 
kind  of  "play  in  the  joints"  is  that  we  must  live 
without  the  certainty,  provided  by  more  formal 
systems,  that  we  have  done  well.  Vindication  or 
failure  of  the  work  of  the  lawyer,  like  that  of  the 
politician  and  other  artists,  must  await  the  riper 
judgment  of  history.  I  am  content  to  submit  our 
efforts  these  past  weeks  to  that  judgment.  I  have 
some  confidence,  perhaps  reflecting  my  parochial 
bias,  that  in  the  final  decision  the  rigor  of  the 
logician  will  be  tempered  by  the  working  precepts 
of  the  American  constitutional  lawyer. 


'  Ibid.,  pp.  723  and  740. 


765 


Indonesian-American  Relations  Today 


hy  Howard  P.  Jones 
Amhassador  to  Indonesia  ^ 


In  talkinf^  to  you  this  evening — to  the  members 
of  the  American-Indonesian  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce and  to  representatives  of  the  Indonesian 
Government  in  the  United  States — I  know  that  I 
am  speaking  not  only  to  friends  but  to  uniquely 
well-informed  friends.  You  know,  as  well  as  I,  the 
exciting,  dynamic  course  of  events  in  Indonesia 
since  1945.  I  certainly  will  not  presume  on  your 
patience  by  attempting  to  explain — as  I  might  to 
another  audience — what  makes  modem  Indonesia 
tick.  I  am  sure  that  all  of  us  here  have  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  forces,  the  pressures,  the  mistakes,  and 
the  triumphs  that  have  combined  to  fonn  present- 
day  Indonesia.  Instead  I  would  like  to  discuss 
briefly  the  subject  of  Indonesian-American  rela- 
tions as  they  st^ind  at  tlie  present  time.  You  of  the 
American-Indonesian  Chamber  of  Commerce,  of 
course,  play  a  substantial  part  in  shaping  those  re- 
lations, and  many  of  you  are  affected  by  them, 
directly  or  indirectly. 

First  of  all,  we  should  take  note  of  the  many 
parallels  in  the  history  of  our  two  countries.  We 
both  fought,  bled,  and  died  for  our  independence. 
More  important,  we  both  would  do  so  again.  Both 
countries  were  bom  in  a  revolution  against  foreign 
colonial  domination.  Both  of  our  nations  are  com- 
posed of  many  different  peoples  speaking  many 
different  languages.  Our  motto  is  "E  Pluribus 
Unum":  the  Indonesian  motto  is  "Unity  in  Diver- 
sity." Our  national  symlx)l  is  the  eagle;  Indo- 
nesia's the  Garuda.  America  began  with  13  colo- 
nies ;  Indonesia  began  with  13  provinces.  We  are 
both  maritime  nations,  although  here  the  Indo- 
nesians, with  their  4,000  islands,  are  far  ahead  of 
us.  Both  nations  arc  committed  to  the  establish- 
ment of  social  justice  and  prosperity.     Both  na- 


'Address  made  before  the  American-Indonesian  Chamber 
of  Commerce  at  New  York,  N.Y.,  on  Oct.  17. 

766 


tions  are  committed  to  religious  freedom.     Botl 
nations  are  committed  to  world  peace. 

It  can  be  dangerous  to  our  understanding  o 
each  other,  however,  if  we  attempt  to  carry  thes 
parallels  too  far.  The  cultures  of  our  two  cour 
tries  are  both  rich,  and  both  represent  a  blending 
a  borrowing,  and  a  perfecting  of  tlie  diverse  ca 
tures  of  older  civilizations.  The  sources  froi 
which  we  have  drawn  our  basic  institutions,  hov 
ever,  are  in  many  instances  different. 

Differing  Historical  Traditions 


al 


lesi 


w 
lie 
«lv 
inei 
lei 
ii(o 
U( 

irif 
oti 


ifli 


The  main  elements  of  our  American  politics  "liii 


itto 


and  economic  system — our  concepts  of  law,  our  n 
spect  for  tlie  sanctity  of  private  property,  and  oi 
belief  in  the  overriding  rights  of  the  individui 
citizen — have  all  flowed  from  the  great  mail 
stream  of  European  civilization:  from  Greec 
from  Kome,  from  the  medieval  scholars  of  Fran<  fs 
and  Italy,  from  the  English  judges  and  parlii 
mentarians  who  compiled  the  great  body  of  Con 
mon  Law.  This  ideological  system  has  been  fu 
ther  molded  by  our  own  experiences  as  a  natic 
and  by  our  own  great  statesmen,  from  Tliomj 
Jefferson  to  Franklin  Roosevelt.  This  system  h; 
brought  to  our  people  such  immense  benefits,  bol 
material  and  spiritual,  that  we  may  perhaps  1 
pardoned  if  we  sometimes  fall  into  the  error  i 
thinking  of  it  as  universal  rather  than  but  one 
several  equally  rewarding  systems. 

Indonesia's  cultural,  political,  and  social  herii 
age  flows  from  equally  exalted  but  very  differe: 
sources — from  the  age-old  civilization  of  Jav 
from  the  India  of  Buddlia  and  Asoka,  from  tl 
laws  of  Manu,  from  the  splendid  empires  of  Si 
widjaja  and  Madjapahit,  from  the  teachings  of  i. 
prophet  Mohammed. 

A  particularl}'  striking  contrast  in  the  ideolo^  (|j 


m, 


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Department  of  State  Bullet 


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nti 


!al  evolution  of  our  two  countries,  however,  has 
«me  in  the  past  200  years.  Since  1782  we  have 
)een  the  masters  of  our  own  destiny,  free  to  draw 
)n  our  cukural  heritage  in  shaping  our  own  soci- 
ity  with  virtually  no  real  interference  from  the 
)utside  world.  During  the  same  200  years  Indo- 
lesia  came  under  the  domination  of  what  was,  to 
he  Indonesian  people,  a  totally  alien  culture. 
)nly  in  the  brief  13  years  since  Indonesia's  inde- 
)endence  struggle  met  with  success  in  1949  have 
he  Indonesian  people  been  able  to  address  them- 
elves  to  the  great  task  which  has  engaged  our 
nergies  for  the  past  200  years — that  of  forging 
heir  political,  ideological,  and  cultural  heritage 
nto  a  unique  national  identity.  Moreover,  the 
ndonesian  people  have  had  to  face  this  task  not 
n  the  remote  world  of  the  18th  and  lOtli  cen- 
uries — when  it  might  take  half  a  year  for  a  letter 
o  travel  from  Djakarta  to  Washington — but  in 
he  full  glare  of  the  present  world  of  instantan- 
ous  communications  and  all-pervasive  ideological 
onflict. 

This  burning  desire  on  the  part  of  the  Indones- 
ian people  to  shape  their  own  national  identity — 
n  identity  neither  American  nor  Russian  nor 
ndian  nor  Chinese  but  Indonesian — is  a  salient 
actor  in  Indonesia's  relations  both  with  the 
01  Jnited  States  and  with  all  other  comitries.  In  the 
elationship  between  Indonesia  and  ximerica  we 
ave,  in  effect,  two  nations  with  a  proud  revolu- 

r(f(  ionary  heritage.     But  one  of  them — ourselves — 
as  had  almost  two  centuries  to  develop  and  per- 

jtli  ect  the  institutions  bom  in  that  revolution.    The 


ther  is  only  now  engaged  in  that  exciting  and 
ften  painful  process. 


lutual  Respect  for  Differing  Systems 

It  should  certainly  not  surprise  us  that  from 
"  lis  process  is  emerging  a  political  and  economic 
*'  system  which  differs  in  many  respects  from  our 
wn.  Our  system,  after  all,  represented  quite  a 
iw  reak  from  that  of  18th-century  Britain,  despite 
16  fact  that — unlike  Indonesia — our  heritage 
'"  owed  directly  from  our  former  colonial  master. 
fef  n  these  natural  differences  we  should  find  not 
lis'  18  seeds  of  disagreement  and  dispute  but  a  source 
n'  f  real  satisfaction  that  a  sovereign  society  is  able 
)  work  out  its  destiny  in  its  own  way,  as  we  our- 
oft^lves  have  been  able  to  do. 

In  the  conduct  of  our  relations  with  Indonesia — 
An  fhether  political,  economic,  or  social — we  recog- 

ullt  ovember   79,    1962 


nize  and  welcome  the  emergence  of  Indonesia's 
own  institutions.  In  building  up  between  our 
two  countries  a  framework  of  trust  and  mutual 
respect,  we  both  find  it  necessary,  on  occasion,  to 
make  adjustments  in  our  actions  to  acconunodate 
the  other,  without,  of  course,  doing  violence  to  our 
own  principles.  In  the  economic  field,  for  ex- 
ample, our  system  of  free  enterprise  obviously 
contrasts  with  Indonesia's  preference  for  a  social- 
ist organization  of  the  economy.  We  must  recog- 
nize that  Indonesian  socialism  stems  from  Indo- 
nesia's own  heritage,  just  as  surely  as  our  system 
of  free  enterprise  stems  from  our  own  heritage, 
and  that  in  the  Indonesian  environment — particu- 
larly in  the  age-old  village  institution  of  gotong- 
rojong — a  form  of  socialism  may  well  be  more 
compatible  to  the  personality  of  the  people  than 
free  entei-prise.  Tlie  important  point  in  this  is 
that  we  respect  absolutely  Indonesia's  right  to 
create  its  own  institutions  in  its  own  image. 

At  the  same  time  I  believe  we  have  the  right 
to  ask  our  Indonesian  friends  for  sympathetic 
understanding  of  the  salient  facts  of  our  own  sys- 
tem. This  is  unquestionably  more  difficult  for 
them  than  is  an  understanding  of  Indonesian 
socialism  on  our  part.  To  the  majority  of  Indo- 
nesians— in  fact  to  most  of  the  newly  emerging 
peoples  of  the  African  and  Asian  world — the  word 
"capitalism"  brings  forth  an  immediate  and  vivid 
picture  of  foreign  control  of  their  economy  and, 
not  infrequently,  of  foreign  exploitation  and  op- 
pression. It  could  not  be  otherwise.  To  the  people 
of  these  countries  that  is  precisely  the  form  of 
capitalism  many  of  them  have  personally  seen 
and  experienced.  To  our  protestations  that  this 
is  not  capitalism  as  known  in  America,  they  reply, 
"But  this  is  capitalism.  We  have  seen  it  with  our 
own  eyes." 

It  is  thus  our  job  to  convince  our  Asian  and 
African  friends — through  actions  rather  than 
words — that  our  system  of  free  enterprise  is  the 
complete  antithesis  of  the  capitalism  they  have 
known  and  that  to  the  American  people  any  form 
of  colonial  exploitation  is  both  morally  wrong  and 
demonstrably  improfitable.  The  recent  growth  of 
interest  in  Indonesia  in  the  concept  of  production 
sharing  as  a  device  for  mutually  profitable  foreign 
investment  is  an  example  of  how  tliis  can  be  done. 
We  must  find  ways  such  as  this  for  sharing  with 
Indonesia,  to  our  mutual  profit,  the  benefits  of  our 
extraordinarily  efficient  and  eminently  nonexploit- 


767 


ative  system.  We  must  do  it,  however,  in  a  way 
that  takes  full  account  of  Indonesia's  own  insti- 
tutions and  Indonesia's  own  sovereign  identitj'. 

At  the  heart  of  our  present  relations  with  Indo- 
nesia, we  thus  find  a  continuing  process  of  adjust- 
ment and  accommodation  on  the  part  of  both 
countries,  carried  out  within  the  framework  of 
our  separate  national  policies  and  our  national 
interests.  There  are  inevitably  many  occasions 
-when  these  policies  do  not  coincide.  Even  the 
closest  friends  cannot  always  see  eye  to  eye,  and 
it  would  be  a  rather  pallid  and  dull  world  if  they 
did.  We  believe,  for  example,  that  the  unbroken 
hostility  and  aggressiveness  of  the  Soviet  Union 
since  its  failure  to  follow  our  lead  in  demobilizing 
after  World  War  II  must  be  met  by  a  collective 
defense  of  the  coimtries  of  the  free  world.  The 
Indonesians  have  determined  that  their  national 
interests  are  best  served  by  remaining  aloof  from 
the  conflict  between  the  free  and  the  Communist 
worlds.  Wlaether  or  not  we  agree  with  Indonesia's 
assessment  in  this  case,  it  is  imperative  that  we  re- 
spect to  the  full  Indonesia's  sovereign  right  to  de- 
termine its  own  interests.  These  differences  need 
not  hamper,  and  certainly  have  not  hampered,  the 
growth  of  friendship  and  trust  between  us.  To 
the  contrary,  I  believe  that  we  often  have  bene- 
fited from  the  frank  exchange  of  views  wlaich 
these  differences  have  provided. 

To  take  an  example  from  the  other  side  the 
Indonesians  have  in  recent  years  been  disturbed 
by  our  failure  to  offer  our  support  in  an  issue 
which,  to  them,  has  been  every  bit  as  crucial  as 
the  pressure  of  Soviet  aggression  has  been  to  us. 
That  issue  was,  of  course,  the  West  Irian  dis- 
pute. However  the  issue  might  be  viewed  else- 
where, to  all  Indonesians  it  had  become,  by  the 
late  1950's,  a  burning  national  challenge,  one  by 
which  the  world's  attitude  toward  colonialism  was 
judged.  They  could  not  understand  how  we,  who 
had  ourselves  thrown  off  the  yoke  of  colonialism, 
could  profess  neutrality  in  this  colonial  dispute. 
We,  on  the  other  hand,  necessarily  regarded  the 
dispute  as  a  most  imfortimate  quarrel  between  two 
of  our  good  friends.  Our  position,  which  the 
Indonesians  under  other  circumstances  might  well 
have  respected,  was  in  fact  deeply  resented  be- 
cause, as  the  Indonesians  saw  it,  neutrality  simply 
meant  continuation  of  the  status  quo — continued 
Dutch  possession  of  the  territory. 


768 


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iisti 
:ioa 
;ati( 


During  the  past  year,  as  you  know,  tlie  dispute 
grew  in  intensity  and  bitterness.  Knowing  that 
both  Indonesia  and  the  Netherlands  would  suffer 
greatly  from  an  outbreak  of  hostilities,  we  utilized 
our  position  as  friend  to  both  in  encouraging  a 
peaceful  solution.  No  nation  is  more  pleased  than 
we  that  our  encouragement  has  been  successful 
Through  the  good  offices  of  the  Acting  Secretary- 
General  of  the  United  Nations — and  with  theCT.' 
United  States  providing  the  facilities  for  negotia^ 
tion — a  peaceful  solution  to  this  most  bitter  oJ  J 
disputes  has  finally  been  reached.^ 

Anyone  who  has  visited  Indonesia  during  tht« 
past  decade  can  testify  to  the  overriding  influenct 
of  the  West  Irian  dispute  in  shaping  the  views  o) 
the  Indonesian  people  toward  the  outside  world 
It  cast  its  shadow  over  the  whole  range  of  Indo 
nesia's  relations  with  the  Western  World,  includ 
ing  the  United  States.  Many  Indonesians  under 
stood  the  reasons  for  our  position  in  this  dispute- 
and  it  certainly  did  not  prevent  the  growth  o 
trust  and  cooperation  in  many  fields — but  there  i 
no  question  that  the  dispute  stood  as  a  major  bar 
rier  between  us. 

This  barrier  has  now  been  removed.  It  has  bee) 
removed  in  a  manner  which  bestows  honor  on  botl 
Indonesia  and  the  Netherlands  for  the  matur 
statesmanship  displayed.  The  Indonesians  sin 
cerely  appreciate  the  fact  that  the  United  State 
played  an  honest,  and  at  times  difficult,  role  in  en 
couraging  a  peaceful  solution.  I  am  convince* 
that  the  settlement  of  this  dispute  can,  and  wil 
open  a  new  era  in  relations  between  our  two  coun 
tries.  No  longer  need  the  shadow  of  suspicior 
distrust,  and  misunderstanding  stand  in  the  wa; 
of  closer  friendship. 


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Guidelines  for  Future  Relations 

And  wliat  of  the  future?  With  the  wound' 
caused  by  the  West  Irian  dispute  now  bein 
liealed,  what  course  should  our  relations  with  Ie! 
donesia  now  take?  The  answer  to  this  is  not  i 
my  hands  but,  essentially,  in  yours — in  the  hand! 
of  the  iVmerican  and  Indonesian  peoples,  thei 
chosen  leaders,  their  executives  both  public  am  ^ 
private,  and  their  citizens.  I  can  only  suggest  i 
general  terms  the  following  guidelines : 


ity 

•i 


kh 


'  For  text  of  the  agreement  settling  the  West  Irian  dl 
pute,  see  U.N.  doc.  A/5170. 

Department  of  State  Bulleli 


NoKen 


•  Indonesia,  this  nation  of  immense  untapped 
^'ealth,  has  undergone  centuries  of  colonial  rule. 
3n  top  of  this  has  come  in  the  past  20  years  an 
ilmost  unbroken  succession  of  disasters  and  other 
listurbances — foreign  invasion,  militai-y  occupa- 
ion,  revolution,  internal  rebellion,  and  the  mobili- 
ation  brought  about  by  the  West  Irian  dispute. 
fill  of  these  disturbances  have  had  their  depressing 
nfluence  on  the  nation's  economy  and  the  nation's 
-bility  to  concentrate  its  efforts  on  bringing  to  its 
oeople  the  fruits  of  their  rich  land.  Now,  in  Oc- 
ober  1962,  these  disturbances  are  all  things  of  the 
)ast.  Indonesia  at  last  has  reached  the  stage  of 
pportunity  to  develop  its  great  resources  and  to 
urn  the  energy  and  genius  of  its  people  whole- 
leartedly  to  the  task  of  creating  a  just  and  pros- 
terous  society. 

•  The  United  States  enjoyed  a  similar  oppor- 
unity  a  centui-y  ago,  at  the  close  of  the  Civil  War, 
nd  we  made  full  use  of  it.  In  the  process  we 
rew  greatly  on  the  resources  of  what  at  that  time 
yere  the  "developed"  coimtries.  We  are  now  our- 
elves  the  greatest  of  the  "developed"  coimtries, 
nd  we  have  consciously  taken  on  the  task  of  aid- 
ng  those  nations  still  in  earlier  stages  of  economic 
levelopment.  We  have  aided  Indonesia  since  1950 
,nd  will  continue  to  do  so,  subject  to  Indonesia's 
pishes. 

It  is  our  firm  hope  that,  with  the  great  new  op- 
jortunities  opened  by  the  West  Irian  settlement, 
t  will  be  possible  to  take  even  more  effective  and 
asting  steps  to  assist  Indonesia  in  making  this 
ivent  the  begimiing  of  a  new  and  prosperous  life 
or  Indonesia's  people.    I  wish  to  emphasize  that 

e  do  this  in  our  own  interest.  A  free  and  pros- 
)erous  Indonesia  contributes  greatly  to  the  inter- 
lational  environment  for  which  we  strive,  while 
i.n  Indonesia  bowed  by  poverty  cannot  fail  to  be  a 
emptation  to  aggressors  and  a  threat  to  the  sta- 
)ility  of  the  world  order. 

•  In  the  worldwide  conflict  between  the  Soviet 
)loc  and  the  free  world,  we  do  not  expect  Indo- 

i  lesia  to  change  its  policy  of  noninvolvement. 
^ith  the  inhibition  of  the  West  Irian  dispute  now 
1™  'emoved,  we  do  hope  that  Indonesia  will,  within 
he  framework  of  this  policy,  be  able  to  attain  a 
leeper  appreciation  and  understanding  of  the  role 
)f  the  free  world  in  this  conflict.  In  this  respect 
ve  ask  only  that  the  Government  and  people  of 
[ndonesia  continue  to  examine  the  facts  of  this 

world  conflict,  imdiverted  by  the  incessant  din  of 


Se 


propaganda.  We  hope,  for  example,  that  they  will 
look  clearly  at  the  Berlin  wall ;  at  those  other  walls 
in  Cuba  where  so  many  hundreds  have  died  with- 
out benefit  of  trial ;  at  the  fate  of  the  "gi'eat  leap 
forward"  in  China ;  and  at  the  fate  of  the  Chinese 
people  who  were  crushed  when  that  great  leap 
came  crashing  to  earth.  They  should  also,  of 
course,  look  at  Oxford,  Mississippi.  We,  too,  have 
our  shames  and  our  failures — although,  to  our 
honor,  we  make  no  effort  to  hide  them  from  the 
world  or  to  claim  loudly  that  they  are  other  than 
what  they  are. 

•  In  the  realm  of  trade  and  investment,  in  which 
many  of  you  are  directly  interested,  we  hope  that, 
as  the  Indonesians  concentrate  increasingly  on  the 
challenging  task  of  realizing  to  the  full  their  great 
economic  potential,  they  will  continue  to  cooperate 
with  us  in  finding  ways  of  reconciling  their  insti- 
tutions and  ours  to  our  mutual  advantage.  De- 
spite the  relieving  and  healing  effects  of  the  West 
Irian  settlement,  this  will  not  be  a  smooth  and  easy 
task  for  either  of  us.  As  I  have  noted,  our  eco- 
nomic systems  are  different  and  they  will  continue 
to  be  different.  Neither  of  us  has  the  ability,  nor 
the  desire,  to  change  the  system  of  the  other.  Con- 
tinued understanding,  patience,  and  good  will  on 
both  sides  will  be  required  to  achieve  a  lasting  and 
beneficial  relationship  between  American  private 
industry  and  Indonesian  socialism.  This  prospect 
should  certainly  not  dismay  nor  discourage  us. 
To  the  contrary,  it  must  be  seen  as  a  challenge  to 
the  moderation,  responsibility,  and  imaginative 
genius  of  both  of  our  peoples — the  sort  of  chal- 
lenge we  should  welcome  as  an  opportunity  to 
display  our  worth. 

In  these  few  moments  I  have  tried  to  indicate 
some  of  the  factors  involved  in  our  relations  with 
Indonesia.  The  problems  that  both  nations  face  in 
this  relationship  are  real  ones.  We  are,  after  all, 
dealing  with  the  affairs  of  two  huge  and  dynamic 
societies  whose  people  total  nearly  300  million  and 
whose  diverse  cultures  reflect  much  of  man's  his- 
tory on  earth.  That  these  relations  are  amicable 
and  constantly  growing  in  trust  and  friendship  is 
a  tribute  to  both  of  us.  Even  more  important,  it 
is  lasting  proof  that  proud  and  free  societies,  each 
developing  in  its  own  way  but  all  devoted  to  the 
greater  good  of  mankind,  can  indeed  make  this 
world  a  place  of  peace  and  security  for  ourselves 
and  our  children. 


Biovemfaer   19,    J  962 


769 


Discussions  Resumed  Witli  Japan 
on  Economic  Aid  to  Ryukyus 

Statement  by  Secretary  Eusk 

Press  release  652  dated  October  31,  for  release  November  1 

Discussions  will  be  resumed  in  Tokyo  on  Novem- 
ber 2  between  United  States  Ambassador  [Edwin 
O.]  Reischauer  and  Japanese  Foreign  Minister 
[Masayoshi]  Ohira  to  work  out  arrangements  for 
a  cooperative  relationship  between  the  United 
Stat«s  and  Japan  in  providing  increased  economic 
assistance  to  the  Ryukj'u  Islands.  This  is  a  fur- 
ther st«p  in  the  implementation  of  an  objective 
discussed  by  President  Kennedy  and  Prime  Min- 
ister [Hayato]  Ikeda  in  June  of  1961  ^  and  subse- 
quently incorporated  in  the  President's  March  19 
policy  statement  on  Okinawa.'' 

Tl\e  United  States,  in  the  years  since  the  end  of 
World  War  II,  has  contributed  very  substantially 
to  the  economic  rehabilitation  and  development  of 
Okinawa.  United  States  aid  has  steadily  grown. 
This  year  the  Congress  increased  to  $12  million 
the  ceiling  on  U.S.  assistance — a  100  percent  in- 
crease— and  provided  an  appropriation  apprecia- 
bly larger  than  any  in  recent  years.  This  will 
enable  us  to  move  forward  in  improving  the  eco- 
nomic and  social  conditions  of  the  people  of  the 
Ryukyu  Islands.  We  hope  that,  as  a  rasult  of  the 
discussions  with  the  Japanese  Government,  greater 
Japanese  assistance  will  also  henceforth  be  avail- 
able, wliich  can  be  utilized  in  conjunction  with 
United  States  and  Ryukyuan  funds  for  the  max- 
imum benefit  of  Okinawa. 

We  live  in  a  period  when  the  essential  security 
interests  of  the  free  world  require  the  continued 
United  States  administration  of  the  Ryulryus;  the 
policies  enunciated  by  President  Kennedy  on 
March  19  provnded  for  steps  to  be  taken  during  this 
period  wliich  will  minimize  the  stresses  that  will 
accompany  the  anticipated  eventual  restoration  of 
these  islands  to  Japanese  administration.  We  are 
now  implementing  these  policies  and  will  continue 
to  do  so.  We  are  confident  of  the  understanding 
of  the  people  of  Japan  and  Okinawa  and  of  the 


'  Bulletin  of  July  10,  ISP.l,  p.  .57. 

'  For  text  of  a  statement  by  President  Kennedy  on  the 
oeea.sion  of  the  signing  of  an  amendment  to  Executive 
Order  10713,  relating  to  the  administration  of  the  Ryulcyu 
Islands,  see  White  House  press  release  dated  Mar.  19, 
19C2. 

770 


Japanese  and  Ryukyuan  governments,  and  we  look 
forward  to  their  support  and  close  cooperation  in 
the  achievement  of  this  common  purpose. 


Letters  of  Credence 

PMUpphms 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Republic  of  the  Philippines,  Amelito  R.  Mutuc, 
presented  his  credentials  to  President  Kemiedy 
on  October  29.  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's 
remarks  and  the  President's  reply,  see  Depart- 
ment of  State  press  release  647  dated  October  29. 


»rt 


» 


r 


for 

I 


Trinidad  and  Tohago 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  Trinidad^Iin 
and  Tobago,  Ellis  Emmanuel  Innocent  Clarke, 
presented  his  credentials  to  President  Kennedy 
on  October  29.  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's 
remarks  and  the  President's  reply,  see  Depart- 
ment of  State  press  release  648  dated  October  29.' jgole 


aval 


Yugoslavia 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the  Fed- 
eral People's  Republic  of  Yugoslavia,  Veljkc 
Micmiovic,  presented  his  credentials  to  President 
Kennedy  on  November  2.  For  texts  of  the  Ambas- 
sador's remarks  and  the  President's  reply,  see 
Department  of  State  press  release  653  dated  No- 
vember 2. 


PUSH 
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Prime  Minister  of  Uganda 
Visits  Washington 

White  House  Statement 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  18 

Prime  Minister  A.  Milton  Oboteof  Uganda  will 
be  President  Kennedy's  guest  in  Washington 
October  22  and  23,  1962.  Uganda  became  inde- 
pendent October  9  and  was  recommended  Octobei 
15  by  the  United  Nations  Security  Comicil  foii 
United  Nations  membership.' 

Prime  Minister  Obote's  visit  is  warmly  wel- 
comed by  the  President  as  an  opportunity  to  estab' 


'  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  5,  1962,  p.  705 
Uganda  became  a  member  of  the  United  Nations  on  Oct 
25. 

Hepartm&ni  of  State  Bulletin 


iorl 


No»e 


■'>} 


,b 


ish  without  delay  the  most  cordial  relations  with 
liis  new  African  nation.  It  will  provide  an  op- 
)ortunity  for  the  President  to  express  once  more 
he  best  wishes  of  the  United  States  for  a  pros- 
perous future  for  Uganda,  wJiich  achieved  its  in- 
lependence  through  application  of  self-deter- 
nination  in  cooperation  with  the  United  Kingdom. 


n  J.S.  Grants  $25  IVIillion  to  Congo 
''or  Import  Financing 

ll^l'ress  release  661  dated  November  3 

Tlie  United  St^ates  Govermnent  announced  on 
November  3,  following  consultation  with  the 
Jnited  Nations  and  with  the  government  of  Prime 

cK  ^linister  [Cyrille]  Adoula  in  Leopoldville,  the 
i\'ailability  of  $25  million  to  finance  imports  of 
J.S.  commodities  into  the  Eepublic  of  the  Congo. 
These  funds  will  be  processed  under  a  new  sys- 
em  of  financial  controls  established  by  the  Con- 
golese Government.  A  program  for  the  most  ef- 
'ective  use  of  these  funds  is  being  prepared  to 
nsure  a  continuing  flow  of  goods  essential  to  the 
(ffective  operation  of  the  Congo  economy. 
Tlie  money  will  be  provided  by  agreement  be- 

ei  ;ween  the  United  Nations,  the  Government  of  the 
Uongo,  and  the  United  States  Government.    The 

sd  ^ant  will  bring  U.S.  assistance  for  import  financ- 

'itt  ng  to  a  total  of  approximately  $81  million  since 
:he  Congo  attained  independence. 

The  United  Kingdom  has  amiounced  a  similar 
^ant  of  $2  million.  Additional  assistance  to  fi- 
lance  imports  into  the  Congo  is  expected  from 
jther  governments. 

An  agreement  was  signed  in  Leopoldville  No- 
rember  2,  1962,  between  the  United  States  Gov- 
jmment  and  the  Republic  of  the  Congo  under 
which  the  United  States  will  provide  an  additional 
100  tons  of  tobacco  and  10,000  tons  each  of  wheat 
lour  and  com  to  the  Congo  under  the  Food-for- 
Peace  Program.    Tliese  commodities,  valued  with 

iiie  shipping  expenses  at  $2.67  million,  are  to  be  sold 
for  local  currency,  90  percent  of  which  will  be 
made  available  to  the  United  Nations  to  help 
finance  the  economic  development  of  the  Congo. 


:A 


Tliis  agreement  brings  to  $36  million  the  total  of 
U.S.  contributions  of  foodstuffs  to  the  Republic 
of  the  Congo  since  its  independence. 


United  States  and  Iceland 
Hold  Talks  on  Air  Services 

Joint  Press  Statement 

Press  release  659  dated  November  2 

Discussions  were  held  in  Washington  from  Oc- 
tober 31  to  November  2  by  representatives  of  the 
Governments  of  the  United  States  and  Iceland 
with  respect  to  air  services  between  the  two  coun- 
tries. The  talks  proceeded  in  a  friendly  and  un- 
derstanding manner,  and  proposals  were  made  for 
the  consideration  of  both  Governments.  The  talks 
will  be  renewed  at  a  later  date  at  a  time  and  place 
agreeable  to  both  parties. 

Announcement  of  Meeting 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  October 
31  (press  release  651)  that  delegations  of  the 
United  States  and  Iceland  would  initiate  civil 
aviation  talks  at  Washington  on  that  day  regard- 
ing the  bilateral  Air  Transport  Services  Agree- 
ment of  January  27, 1945.^ 

The  chairman  of  the  U.S.  delegation  was 
Charles  P.  Nolan,  Special  Adviser,  Office  of  Trans- 
port and  Commimications,  Department  of  State. 
He  was  assisted  by  Robert  T.  Murphy,  Vice  Chair- 
man of  the  Civil  Aeronautics  Board,  and  by  other 
officials  of  the  Department  of  State,  CAB,  and  the 
Department  of  Commerce.  The  Air  Transport 
Association  of  America  was  represented  by  an 
observer. 

The  chairman  of  the  Icelandic  delegation  was 
Thor  Thors,  Ambassador  of  Iceland  to  the  United 
States.  He  was  assisted  by  Agnar  Kofoed-Han- 
sen,  Director  of  Civil  Aviation  of  Iceland,  and 
Niels  P.  Sigurdsson  of  the  Foreign  Ministry  of 
Iceland.  A  representative  of  Icelandic  Airlines 
attended  as  observer. 


'  59  Stat.  1464. 


November  79,   J  962 


771 


The  Experience  of  the  United  States  in  Economic  Development: 
Its  Relevance  for  Latin  America 


by  Thomas  O.  Mann 
Ambassador  to  Mexico  ^ 


I 


Several  of  my  colleagues  have  been  invited  to 
speak  about  economic  development  in  their  par- 
ticular countries.  Thank  you  for  including  me 
among  them. 

In  speaking  of  the  experience  of  the  United 
States  in  economic  development,  I  shall  refer  to 
certain  broad  economic  principles  which  I  consider 
basic  to  our  economic  system.  These  same  prin- 
ciples are  also  basic  to  other  successful  economies 
in  the  free  -world.  However,  it  is  not  my  inten- 
tion to  imply  that  every  nation  could  or  should 
apply  these  general  principles  or  guidelines  in 
the  same  general  way  that  we  have  done.  Cul- 
tures, situations,  and  problems  differ  from  coun- 
try to  coimtry  and  exact  conformity  is  neither 
practical  nor  desirable. 

The  important  thing  is  not  whether  an  economic 
theory  is  logical,  or  whether  its  proponents  have 
good  intentions,  but  rather  whether  it  produces 
results  in  a  particular  country — whether,  without 
destroying  freedom,  it  creates  prosperity  or  pov- 
erty for  the  masses  of  a  particular  country. 

This  is,  I  suggest,  the  yardstick  by  which  all 
economic  systems  and  policies,  including  those  of 
my  own  country,  will  ultimately  be  judged. 
Whether  a  particular  policy  will  promote  or  im- 
pede progress  is  often  open  to  debate.  For,  un- 
like mathematics,  economics  is  not  an  exact  sci- 
ence. But  whether  a  system  or  policy  is,  or  is 
not,  successful  can  ultimately  be  determined  with 
almost  mathematical  exactitude :  In  the  language 
of  tlie  Alliance  for  Progress  *  the  minimum  goal 


*  Address  made  before  tbe  Confederacidn  Patronal  de 
la  Repiiblica  ilexicana  at  Mexico,  D.F.,  on  Sept.  2.5. 

'  For  text  of  the  Charter  of  Punta  del  Este  establishing 
the  Alliance  for  Progress,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept.  11,  1961, 
p.  463. 


is  to  increase  the  income  of  the  individual — and 
this  includes  all  the  people,  the  poor  and  the 
rich — at  a  rate  of  21^  percent  a  year.  In  many 
countries,  of  course,  the  achievement  of  this  goal 
will  require  a  much  higher  annual  increase  in  the 
gross  national  product  because  of  the  rapid  in- 
crease in  population. 

The  Alliance  for  Progress  speaks  of  social  as 
well  as  economic  progress,  that  is  to  say,  an  equi- 
table distribution  among  all  the  people  of  the  fruits 
of  economic  development.  If  I  do  not  speak  spe- 
cifically of  social  progress  and  reform — of  "social 
justice,"  to  use  the  term  familiar  to  our  friends  in 
our  sister  Republics  of  the  hemisphere — it  is  not 
because  the  people  and  Government  of  the  United 
States  are  not  deeply  concerned  about  the  urgent 
need  of  improving  the  living  standards  of  the 
poor.  As  many  of  you  know,  measures  were  taken 
many  years  ago  in  my  country  to  level  off  the  ex- 
tremes of  poverty  and  wealth  so  that  every  citi- 
zen, including  the  workers  in  factories  and  on 
farms,  could  have  the  material  as  well  as  the 
spiritual  blessings  of  freedom.  We  continue  to 
seek  improvements  in  our  social  system  which  do 
not  destroy  those  incentives  or  those  foundations 
of  our  economic  system  which  have  made  prosper- 
ity possible  for  all  our  people. 

Moreover,  when  one  speaks  of  economic  develop- 
ment ho  is  in  a  very  real  sense  also  speaking  of 
social  justice.  The  two  things  are  indivisible. 
One  cannot  imagine  that  any  people  will  benefit 
from  an  equitable  distribution  of  poverty.  It  is 
necessary  to  think,  first,  of  economic  develop- 
ment— of  the  ways  to  produce  wealth — before 
theories  about  the  distribution  of  that  wealth  be- 
come meaningful.  Or,  as  we  say  at  liome,  it  is 
necessary  to  make  a  mighty  big  pie  before  one  can 


772 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


n 


distribute  large  pieces  to  every  member  of  a  large 
family. 

With  these  introductory  remarks,  I  should  like 
now  to  discuss  specifically  certain  broad  economic 
principles,  tested  in  practice  for  more  than  200 
years,  which  form  the  general  guidelines  for  the 
United  States  economic  system  and  for  its  eco- 
nomic policies. 

Economic  Freedom 

The  first  which  I  would  like  to  mention  is  eco- 
nomic freedom. 

You  will  recall  that  during  the  period  of  the 
I7th  and  18th  centuries,  when  Europe  was  ruled 
by  kings  and  our  ancestors  were  colonials,  the 
theory  of  mercantilism  dominated  European  eco- 
nomic and  political  thought. 

Essentially,  mercantilism  taught  that  a  state 
prospers  by  amassing  gold.  This  could  be  brought 
about  by  a  country's  exporting  more  than  it  im- 
ported. Foreign  trade,  as  well  as  domestic  pro- 
duction, was  therefore  tightly  controlled  in  order 
to  make  it  possible  for  the  country  to  maintain, 
on  a  bilateral  basis,  "favorable"  balances  of  trade 
with  each  trading  partner.  The  regulation  of 
trade  and  production  was  very  extensive.  To 
cite  only  one  example  of  the  degree  of  control  ex- 
ercised by  government  in  those  days,  between  1666 
and  1730  it  took  2,000  pages  to  print  the  rules  of 
the  French  textile  industry  alone. 

Your  ancestors  in  Mexico  and  mine  in  the  United 
States  knew  all  too  well  about  mercantilist  prac- 
tices. These  practices  had  much  to  do  with  their 
decisions  to  break  away  from  the  mother  countries. 

"When  it  became  apparent  that  these  controls 
were  stifling  production  and  were  failing  to  raise 
the  living  standards  of  the  masses — and  we  should 
not  forget  that  mercantilism  has  failed — quite 
naturally  the  pendulum  swung  in  the  opposite 
direction. 

Adam  Smith,  in  his  Wealth  of  Nations,  spoke 
of  "natural"  liberty  as  including  the  right  of  peo- 
ple to  be  free  in  the  economic  as  well  as  the  politi- 
cal sense.  Economic  progress  would  come  faster. 
Smith  stated,  if  governments  were  relieved  of  "the 
duty  of  superintending  the  industry  of  private 
people."  This  idea  that  political  and  economic 
freedom  were  all  of  one  piece  was  developed,  in 
England  at  least,  by  other  economists  and  philos- 
ophers and  by  distinguished  lawyers  such  as  Sir 
Henry  Maine  and  Edward  Coke. 

November   79,    7962 

664932 — 62 3 


In  essence  they  feared  the  exploitation  of  man 
by  the  state  even  more  than  they  feared  the  ex- 
ploitation of  man  by  man.  A  free  man,  they 
reasoned,  can  better  protect  himself  from  the  tyr- 
anny of  an  individual  than  from  the  tyraimy  of 
an  all-powerful  state. 

In  our  own  time  Ludwig  Erhardt,  the  chief  ar- 
chitect of  the  remarkable  postwar  recovery  of  West 
Germany,  expressed  the  same  idea  in  his  book 
Prosperity  Through  Competition: 

This  basic  principle  of  freedom  for  the  consumer  must 
logically  be  counterbalanced  by  freedom  for  the  producer 
to  make  and  sell  what  he  believes  to  be  marketable,  that 
is,  what  he  has  found,  after  studying  individual  needs, 
to  be  essential  and  likely  to  succeed.  Freedom  for  the 
consumer  and  freedom  to  work  must  be  explicitly  recog- 
nized as  inviolable  basic  rights  of  every  citizen.  Democ- 
racy and  a  free  economy  are  as  logically  linked  as  are 
dictatorship  and  state  controls. 

The  concept  of  economic  freedom  rims  through 
the  Declaration  of  Independence  and  the  Consti- 
tution of  tlie  United  States.  To  cite  only  two 
illustrations :  Although  we  are  a  gi-oup  of  sover- 
eign States,  no  State  may  put  obstacles  in  the  way 
of  interstate  commerce ;  in  the  vernacular  of  today, 
our  Constitution  created  a  common  market  in 
which  the  free  movement  of  capital  goods  and 
labor  was  guaranteed.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
power  of  the  Federal  Government  to  regulate  in- 
trastate affairs  was  severely  curtailed.  Second, 
because  it  seemed  logical  that  the  right  of  the  in- 
dividual to  the  "pursuit  of  Happiness"  of  wliich 
our  Declaration  spoke  would  be  incomplete  with- 
out economic  as  well  as  political  freedom,  the  Fifth 
Amendment  to  our  Constitution  provided : 

No  person  shall  be  .  .  .  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or 
property,  vv'ithout  due  process  of  law ;  nor  shall  private 
property  be  taken  for  public  use,  without  just  compen- 
sation. 

I  do  not  mean,  of  course,  to  imply  that  we  be- 
lieve economic  freedom  should  l^e  unlimited.  As 
our  own  James  Madison  pointed  out,  men  are  not 
angels.  He  wrote,  for  example,  in  The  Federalist 
papers,  about  the  danger  of  the  tyranny  of  the 
majority : 

A  pure  democracy  can  admit  no  cure  for  the  mischiefs 
of  faction.  .  .  .  there  is  nothing  to  check  the  inducements 
to  sacrifice  the  weaker  party.  Hence  it  is  that  democracies 
have  ever  been  foimd  Incompatible  with  personal  security 
or  the  rights  of  property.  .  .  . 

And  because  tyranny  by  the  few  over  the  many 
is  also  possible,  we  have  adopted  antitrust  laws  to 


773 


prevent  unfair  trade  practices  which  restrict  com- 
petition. Similarly  a  limited  number  of  our  in- 
dustries which  have  monopolistic  or  other  peculiar 
characteristics,  such  as  railroads  and  public  utili- 
ties, are  regulated. 

There  are  other  limitations  to  the  principle  of 
absolute  economic  freedom  in  my  country,  notably 
in  respect  of  research  and  production  of  military 
and  space  machines  and  nuclear  energy.  There 
are  certain  controls  on  shipping,  telecommunica- 
tions, and  aviation  and  controls  on  the  production 
of  a  limited  number  of  agricultural  commodities. 

But  the  point  which  I  wish  to  emphasize  is  that 
these  and  other  things  are  the  exceptions  and  not 
the  rule.  Virtually  all  of  our  industry  and  farms 
are  privately  ovmed.  Individuals  and  corpora- 
tions conduct  their  own  research,  improve  their 
own  designs,  seek  new  and  better  ways  to  improve 
the  quality  and  reduce  the  cost  of  their  product. 

We  believe  that  freedom  of  choice  by  the  indi- 
vidual unleashes  individual  ingenuity  and  inven- 
tiveness which  in  turn  gives  a  vitality  and  dyna- 
mism to  our  economy  that  it  could  not  otherwise 
have.    As  John  Chamberlain  has  observed: 

The  virtue  of  a  free  system  .  .  .  i.e.,  competitive  cap- 
italism ...  is  ttiat  it  allows  energy  to  flow  uncoerced 
into  a  thousand  and  one  different  forms,  expanding  goods, 
services  and  jobs  in  myriad  unpredictable  ways. 

Economists  did  not  plan  or  foresee  the  machines 
of  the  industrial  revolution  or  Eli  Wliitney's  cot- 
ton gin.  No  economist  thought  of  Henry  Ford's 
innovations  in  assembly-line  production;  his  $5 
daily  wage  to  workers  was,  both  in  classical  and 
socialist  theory,  an  economic  impossibility.  New 
techniques  for  making  marginal  land  productive 
and  food  plentiful  disproved  the  gloomy  predic- 
tions of  Malthus  and  Kicardo  which  for  a  hun- 
dred years  were  accepted  as  gospel.  Even  after 
the  industrial  revolution  was  well  advanced,  how 
many  economists  understood  that  in  free  econo- 
mies innovations  were  to  be  continuing  and  self- 
peri)etuating  phenomena  which  would  create  vast 
numbers  of  jobs  and  for  the  first  time  in  history 
place  within  the  reach  of  the  common  man  all  the 
things  he  needs  for  a  decent  life?  Even  today, 
who  can  imagine  the  shape  of  things  to  come  if 
man,  the  individual  man,  remains  free  to  invent, 
to  experiment,  and  to  produce  the  things  which 
the  world  needs? 

We  are  reluctant  in  the  United  States  to  stray 
too  far  from  economic  freedom  in  search  of  easy 

774 


solutions  to  short-term  problems.  We  would,  for 
example,  consider  it  against  our  own  interest  to 
deal  with  a  temporary  balance-of-payments  prob- 
lem in  such  a  way  as  to  diminisli  the  prospects 
for  a  steady,  long-term  economic  growth;  or  to 
force  industrialization  in  a  discriminatory  man- 
ner and  at  a  pac«  which  would  tie  our  economy, 
perhaps  permanently,  to  a  group  of  inefficient 
industries  with  dubious  prospects  of  ever  being 
able  to  compete  and  earn  foreign  exchange  in  the 
outside  world. 

As  Henry  Hazlitt  reminds  us : 

Economics  ...  is  a  science  of  recognizing  secondary 
consequences.  It  is  also  a  science  of  seeing  general 
consequences.  It  is  the  science  of  tracing  the  effects 
of  some  proposed  or  existing  policy  not  only  on  some 
special  interest  in  the  short  run,  but  on  the  general 
interest  in  the  long  run.     [Emphasis  is  the  author's.] 

Competition 

And  now  I  turn  to  a  second  principal  tenet  of 
the  United  States  economic  system:  High  stand- 
ards of  living  for  the  people  can  best  be  acliieved 
in  a  competitive  economy. 

Let  us  first  consider  the  protectionist,  the  one 
who  does  not  wish  to  compete. 

In  my  country  a  minority  of  businessmen,  who 
usually  profess  to  believe  in  "private  initiative" 
and  competition  for  the  other  fellow,  assert  that 
their  business  is  an  exception  and  needs  protec- 
tion. Often  they  say  that  their  only  motive  is 
the  protection  of  the  jobs  of  their  employees  or, 
perhaps,  their  only  interest  is  that  national  "se- 
curity" be  maintained  by  denying  foreign  com- 
petitors access  to  our  markets.  I  have  heard  the 
same  general  ideas  expressed  in  different  words  in 
other  countries. 

To  l>e  sure  there  are  cases  where  protection 
is  justified  and  desirable,  as,  for  example,  in  the 
case  of  an  infant  industry  which  has  good  pros- 
pects of  becoming  efficient  and  competitive  if,  for 
a  limited  period  of  time,  it  is  given  a  reasonable 
degree  of  protection.  There  are  other  exceptions. 
Like  most  economic  decisions  the  problem  in  the 
end  becomes  one  of  scope  and  degree. 

But  my  point  is  that  the  national  economy  and 
the  people  pay  a  high  price  for  excessive  protec- 
tion. Protection  to  a  small  group  of  individuals 
who  own  a  particular  factory  is,  in  economic  terms, 
a  subsidy  to  the  owners  no  matter  what  form  it 
takes — whether  it  is  a  tarilF,  a  quota,  a  licensing 
arrangement,  or  a  cash  subsidy. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  subsidy,  if  in  the  form  of  cash,  is  paid 
by  tlie  taxpayer.  If  it  takes  other  forms,  it  is 
paid  by  the  consuming  public  through  higher 
prices,  usually  for  an  inferior  product,  hence  low- 
ering the  real  income  of  the  people. 

Precisely  the  same  thing  occurs  when  the  in- 
dustry is  state-owned,  with  the  difference  that  in 
this  case  the  higher  prices  for  consiimer  goods 
can  be  considered  as  an  indirect  tax.  In  any  case 
the  result  is  the  same — a  lowering  of  the  real  in- 
come of  the  individual. 

So  in  these  days  when  we  are  all  talking  so 
much  about  raising  the  real  income  of  the  masses 
the  question  may  well  be  asked  on  social  as  well 
as  economic  grounds:  Wlio  receives  the  subsidy? 
Who  pays  the  subsidy?  Will  the  protected  in- 
dustry really  be  able,  within  a  reasonable  period 
of  time,  to  pay  the  people  back  by  efficiently  pro- 
ducing goods  of  high  quality  at  low  cost  ? 

The  economic  disadvantages  of  unlimited  pro- 
tection from  international  competition  are  com- 
pounded if  there  is  also  little  or  no  domestic  com- 
petition either  because  the  number  of  domestic 
producers  are  limited  or  because  of  policies  wliich 
encourage  monopoly. 

There  are  still  other  jsrices  that  are  paid  for  ex- 
cessive pi'otectionism.  National  industries  which 
cannot  compete  abroad  cannot  earn  foi'eign  ex- 
change in  the  markets  of  the  world.  If  too  many 
industries  are  unable  to  compete,  there  will  ob- 
viously be  a  problem  of  how  the  country  can  pay 
for  its  imports.  Moreover,  national  industries 
which  are  shut  off  from  the  spur  of  competition 
have  little  incentive  for  keeping  up  with  modem 
teclinological  advances,  to  modernize  their  ma- 
chines, to  find  better  ways  to  improve  the  produc- 
tivity of  the  individual  worker.  The  result  can 
be  that  the  national  industrial  plant  and  wages 
remain  static  while  the  competitive  world  passes 
them  by  on  the  road  to  more  efficient  production 
and  to  prosperity. 

If  wliat  I  have  said  about  excessive  protec- 
tionism is  sound,  it  follows  that  our  consumer — 
and  this  includes  all  of  my  countrymen,  for  we 
all  buy  consumer  goods — has  a  stake  in  keeping 
our  industry  efficient  and  competitive. 

Whetlier  we  consmners  are  employers  or  em- 
ployees, whether  we  work  in  a  factory,  on  a  farm, 
or  in  an  office,  the  quantity  and  quality  of  the 
things  our  money  will  buy  is  at  least  as  important 
to  our  standard  of  living  and  our  real  income  as 
the  number  of  dollars  we  earn. 

November   79,    1962 


And  the  same  thing  is  doubly  true  of  our  wage 
earner.  His  real  wages  are  reduced  if  he  has  to 
pay  more  for  what  he  consumes.  In  addition,  he 
loses  his  chance  of  a  noninflationary  wage  increase 
because  the  only  noninflationai-y  way  to  increase 
his  wage  is  to  increase  his  individual  productivity. 
Efficient  industries  use  the  latest  and  best  ma- 
chines, which  is  the  principal  way  to  increase  the 
individual  worker's  output.  Protected  industries 
which  are  not  required  to  compete  do  not  have  the 
same  need  to  find  new  and  better  ways  to  produce. 
It  is  no  accident  that  in  free  competitive  econo- 
mies the  real  wages  of  the  worker  are  much  higher 
than  they  are  in  economic  systems  which  avoid 
competition. 

Individual  incentive 

This  brings  me  to  a  third  tenet  of  our  economic 
system — the  value  of  individual  incentive. 

There  may  be  a  few  people  in  the  world  who 
have  no  interest  in  improving  their  material  well- 
being.  But  most  people  do  not  consider  it  a  vir- 
tue to  content  themselves  with  what  they  already 
have.  Most  of  us  want  to  have  a  better  life  for 
ourselves  and  our  children. 

It  is  this  aspiration,  plus  the  activity  which  it 
generates,  that  has  ever  been  the  mainspring  of 
progress.  For  progress  and  economic  growth 
require  human  effort.  And  the  rate  of  progi-ess 
and  growth  is  related  to  the  degree  of  human 
effort  which  people  are  willing  to  put  into  the  job. 

Some  economic  theories  are  premised  on  the  per- 
fectability  of  human  nature — on  the  notion  that 
man  is  capable  of  being  selfless,  of  subordinating 
his  own  self-interest  and  that  of  his  family  to 
the  concept  of  what  the  general  welfare  is. 
"From  each  according  to  his  abilities,  to  each 
according  to  his  needs"  is  the  best  known  state- 
ment of  this  doctrine. 

The  economic  system  of  the  United  States 
rejects  the  notion  that  "you  work  for  John  and 
you  may  be  sure  he  will  attend  to  your  needs"  as 
impracticable  and  Utopian. 

The  people  of  my  country  are  deeply  religious 
and,  I  believe,  as  idealistic  and  as  concerned  about 
their  fellow  man  as  any  people  in  history.  But 
we  also  recognize  the  reality  that  man  has  a  driv- 
ing urge  to  satisfy  his  own  needs  and  those  of  his 
family.  We  therefore  believe  that  society  bene- 
fits from  both  the  idealism  and  the  self-interest  of 
man — that  man  can  best  contribute  to  the  general 


775 


welfare  through  his  efforts  to  provide  for  himself 
and  his  family.  We  therefore  consider  the  profit 
motive  as  an  indispensable  element  of  economic 
progress  and  concern  ourselves  with  preventing 
excesses  and  man's  exploitation  by  man. 

We  assert  that  the  validity  of  this  thesis  is 
proved  by  comparing,  for  example,  the  agricul- 
tural production  in  economic  systems  which  have 
taken  away  the  farmer's  personal  incentives  to 
produce — to  put  more  into  the  land  than  he  takes 
out  of  it — with  our  own  system,  which  provides 
guarantees  to  the  farmer  that  his  land  is  his  to 
own,  improve,  develop,  and  make  productive  and 
to  pass  on  to  his  children. 

Capital  and  Capitalists 

And  this  brings  me  to  the  fourth  and  final  tenet 
which  I  shall  mention  today :  Capital  and  the  capi- 
talist are  essential  and  useful  elements  in  a  free 
economic  society. 

Under  all  economic  systems  national  incomes 
can  only  be  increased  as  national  production  is 
increased.  Economic  development,  or  economic 
growth,  is  nothing  more  than  the  increase  of  na- 
tional production  plus  the  distribution  of  in- 
creased production  on  a  broad  scale  so  as  to 
increase  the  purchasing  power  of  the  masses.  In 
other  words,  the  way  to  increase  the  purchasing 
power  of  the  masses  is  to  raise  the  individual  in- 
come of  the  masses  of  the  people  through  the 
processes  which  I  have  already  mentioned. 

Under  all  economic  systems  the  rate  of  increase 
in  per  capita  production  depends  upon  the  extent 
to  which  a  country,  first,  accumulates  capital  and, 
second,  uses  the  accumulated  capital,  in  combina- 
tion with  its  material  and  human  resources,  in  the 
efficient  production  of  goods  and  services  for  its 
people. 

The  importance  of  land  resources  and  labor  in 
the  productive  process  is  well  known.  Labor  is 
entitled  to  its  fair  share  of  the  product;  in  the 
United  States  real  wages  are  the  highest  in  the 
world.  But  what  principally  distinguishes  highly 
industrialized  from  developing  economies  is  the 
amount  of  capital  available  for  productive  enter- 
prise. 

If  one  looks  about  the  free  world  today,  he  must 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  single  most  im- 
portant missing  component  in  most  economic 
development  problems  is  risk  capital.  Those  coun- 
tries which  liave  created  internal  conditions  wliich 


attract  the  largest  amounts  of  risk  capital  are  thosa 
which  will  have  the  highest  sustained  rates  or 
economic  growth.  Conversely,  those  which  dis- 
courage risk  capital,  and  which  must  then  neces- 
sarily depend  in  the  long  nui  on  their  limited  tax 
revenues,  will  have  lower  rates  of  economic 
growth.  I 

Capital  is  scarce  because,  as  Von  Mises  points* 
out: 

The  only  source  of  the  generation  of  additional  capital 
goods  is  saving.  If  all  the  goods  produced  are  consumed, 
no  new  capital  comes  into  being. 

Who  are  the  savers  that  provide  the  capital 
component  of  economic  development?  In  the- 
United  States  today  they  are  the  millions  of  people 
who  have  slowly  and  with  sacrifice  accumulated 
capital  and  invested  it  in  productive  enterprises 
which  create  jobs  and  produce  goods  for  the 
people.    They  are  the  capitalists. 

If  they  have  correctly  assessed  the  needs  of  the 
consumer,  they  make  a  profit  until  such  time  as  a 
competitor  makes  a  better  product  or  becomes 
more  efficient  and  hence  able  to  sell  at  a  cheaper 
price.  If  he  makes  a  profit,  he  pays  taxes  which 
become  progressively  higher  in  proportion  to  his 
earnings.  But  the  important  thing  from  the 
standpoint  of  economic  growth  is  that  the  capital- 
ist contributes  a  scarce  and  essential  component  of 
a  productive  process  which,  within  a  few  genera- 
tions, has  accomplished  more  material  progress  for 
the  masses  than  was  accomplished  in  the  preceding 
thousand  years. 

And  we  should  not  forget  the  risk  of  loss — the 
risk  that  the  capitalist  and  the  entrepreneur  will 
fail  to  assess  the  consumer's  needs  and  preferences. 
For  example,  some  600  companies  have  been 
formed  in  my  country  to  manufacture  automobiles. 
Out  of  the  fierce  competition  in  this  industry 
not  more  than  a  dozen  significant  producers  exist 
today.  But  the  result  is  a  better  product  at  a  lower 
price  for  the  benefit  of  the  consumer  than  other- 
wise would  have  been  possible. 

In  a  competitive  system  such  as  ours,  one's  suc- 
cess or  failure  depends  entirely  on  whether  he 
satisfies  the  needs  of  the  people  better  than  his 
competitors.  It  is  therefore  no  accident  that  im 
the  United  States  the  liighest  positions  in  industry 
are  filled  by  persons  who  have  "worked  their  way 
up"  from  humble  beginnings  on  the  basis  of  ability. 

The  success  in  private  industi-y  of  the  saver,  the 
capitalist,  the  manager,  the  entrepreneur,  the  tech- 


St 


P: 


T 


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Department  of  State  Bulletin  i 


nologist  depends  not  on  position  or  status  or 
family  but  on  his  merits — on  what  he  himself  has 
contributed  to  society  in  producing  more  efficiently 
and  more  cheaply.  The  sole  judge  is  the  consumer. 
He  makes  his  decision  without  pity  and  witliout 
favoritism  on  the  basis  of  his  own  self-interest. 
Could  there  be  a  fairer  or  more  impartial  judge  or 
standard  ? 

United  States'  Growth  and  Achievement 

Some  will  disagree  with  the  economic  tenets  I 
have  referred  to.  But  no  one  can  dispute  that 
these  principles  liave  worked  well  for  the  United 
States  and  for  other  comitries  too. 

Since  1870  the  gross  national  production  of  the 
United  States  has  increased  between  3  and  4  per- 
cent per  annum.  This  is  not  a  rate  which  is  as 
spectacularly  high  as  has  been  achieved  for  short 
periods  of  time  in  other  countries,  but  no  one  can 
jj,  match  this  record  of  sustained  growth  and  achieve- 
ment over  a  long  period  of  time. 

As  Walter  Hallstein  points  out  in  his  recent  book 
,™  United  Europe  : 

lit|     One  of  the  aspects  of  the  United  States  that  impressed 
Alexis  de  Tocqueville,  as  it  has  impressed  visitors  from 


Europe  to  this  day,  was  the  extraordinary  degree  of 
prosperity  that  he  saw  around  him.  "No  people  in  the 
world,"  he  declared,  "has  made  such  rapid  progress  in 
trade  and  manufactures.  .  .  .  The  Americans  arrived 
but  as  yesterday  on  the  territory  which  they  inhabit,  and 
they  have  already  changed  the  whole  order  of  Nature."  In 
the  century  that  followed,  the  speed  of  this  progress  be- 
came even  more  striking.  Between  1900  and  1938,  United 
States  industrial  production  rose  by  163  percent ;  by  1955, 
the  gross  national  product  per  head  of  population  in  the 
United  States  stood  at  $2,353.  .  .  . 

We  have  had  a  continuously  rising  curve  of  man- 
power productivity,  .steadily  increasing  wages,  and 
an  unmatched  domestic  purchasing  power  created 
by  the  simple  act  of  sharing  growth  with  middle- 
and  low-income  families. 

All  of  this  has  been  accomplished  because  we 
have  a  climate  of  freedom  and  of  competition; 
because  we  recognize  the  value  of  both  tlie  capital- 
ist and  the  worker  and  the  absolute  importance 
of  teamwork  between  them  and  with  the  entre- 
preneur and  the  technologist ;  because  we  recognize 
the  value  of  individual  incentive  and  the  individ- 
ual initiative  which  it  produces ;  and  because  equal 
rights  of  every  person,  whether  he  is  a  citizen  or 
a  foreigner,  are  guaranteed  by  law. 


Trade  Problems  and  the  Alliance  for  Progress 


by  W.  Michael  Blumenthal 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs ' 


ti 


Eighteen  months  ago  President  Kennedy  called 
on  the  people  of  the  American  hemisphere  "to 
join  in  a  new  Alliance  for  Progress  ...  a  vast 
cooperative  effort,  unparalleled  in  magnitude  and 
nobility  of  purpose,  to  satisfy  the  basic  needs  of 
the  American  people  for  homes,  work  and  land, 
health  and  schools.  .  .  ."  - 

In  August  of  the  same  year  19  Latin  American 
nations  and  the  United  States  signed  the  Charter 
of  Punta  del  Este^  and  dedicated  themselves  to 


^  Address  made  at  Rice  University,  Houston,  Tex.,  on 
Oct.  16  (press  release  623). 
'  Bulletin  of  Apr.  3, 1961,  p.  471. 
•  For  text,  see  itid.,  Sept.  11, 1961,  p.  463. 

igjNovember   79,   7962 


translate  the  President's  vision  into  reality.  I 
commend  this  document  to  the  attention  of  those  of 
you  who  have  not  yet  read  it.  Its  objectives  are 
clear :  To  provide  for  all  of  the  400  million  people 
of  this  hemisphere  opportunity,  dignity,  and 
justice ;  to  achieve  massive  economic  development 
through  national  and  international  joint  efforts, 
through  self-help  measures  and  economic 
assistance. 

The  signatories  of  the  charter  are  pledged,  in 
the  course  of  one  decade,  to  accomplish  this  goal 

— by  economic  development  programs  aimed  at 
achieving  a  rat«  of  sustained  growth  of  at  least 
21/^  percent  a  year  in  per  capita  income ; 

777 


— by  improving  tlie  distribution  of  income  and 
the  allocation  of  resources  to  speed  development 
and  to  make  its  fruits  available  to  all ; 

— by  diversification  of  one-crop  economies  and 
improvement  of  agricultural  productivity;  and 

— by  creating  new  educational  and  health  facili- 
ties and  eliminating  illiteracy. 

The  nations  agreed  that  a  minimum  of  $100 
billion  in  capital  iuA-estment  is  required  during 
this  decade  to  accomplish  these  goals  and  to  reach 
a  stage  of  self-sustaining  growth.  Twenty  billion 
is  to  be  provided  from  outside  sources  through 
credits,  loans,  grants,  and  private  investment. 
But  by  far  the  largest  portion— $80  billion— must 
be  generated  by  the  Latin  American  countries 
themselves,  through  increased  levels  of  economic 
activity  and  exports  and  through  greater  savings 
and  investment. 

Self-help,  therefore,  is  a  vital  part  of  the  pro- 
gram, and  those  who  thought  that  the  Alliance 
for  Progress  would  be  just  another  form  of  Ameri- 
can "giveaway"  were  badly  mistaken.  The  major 
effort  is  being  and  must  be  made  by  the  Latin 
American  countries  themselves.  Outside  re- 
sources can  provide  only  a  small,  though  vital, 
part  of  overall  requirements.  The  charter  clearly 
underlines  the  need  for  these  self-help  measures 
and  for  internal  reforms  to  translate  the  goals  of 
the  alliance  into  reality : 

Tax  reforms  so  that  expanded  income  is  well 
utilized  and  reasonably  shared. 

Agricultural  reform-^  to  improve  opportunities 
for  the  rural  population,  to  open  up  new  lands 
and  provide  disincentives  for  allowing  available 
land  to  lie  idle,  better  agricultural  credit  and 
title  arrangements. 

Educational  reforms  to  provide  at  least  6  years 
of  schooling  to  all. 

Adminlntrative  reforms  to  insure  that  the  pat- 
tern of  public  administration  is  better  suited  to 
the  needs  of  development  and  that  tlie  govern- 
mental structure  will  facilitate  rather  than  impede 
action. 

Diversity  of  Problems  in  Latin  America 

This  alliance,  which  seeks  to  accomplish  so 
much  in  so  short  a  span  of  time,  is  indeed  a  gi- 
gantic undertaking.  For  the  second  time  in  15 
years,  the  United  States  has  taken  on  an  important 
part  in  a  program  of  economic  building  and  de- 

778 


velopment.  But  the  Alliance  for  Progress  is  not 
just  a  rerun  of  the  Marshall  Plan — the  second  of 
two  similar  projects.  The  problems  of  Latin 
America  are  vastly  different  and  infinitely  more 
complex  than  were  those  of  postwar  Europe.  The 
task  now  is  not  to  rebuild  but  to  start  anew ;  not 
to  re-create  but  to  create.  Furthermore,  the  ob-  j 
stacks  which  must  be  overcome  are  far  more 
formidable  than  those  which  had  to  be  dealt  with 
in  the  rebuilding  of  Europe. 

For  one  thing,  the  countries  of  Latin  America 
are  more  diverse  than  were  those  of  Marshall  Plan 
Europe.  Each  nation  is  different  with  a  unique 
set  of  problems.  Many  of  the  people  are 
desperately  poor.  Bolivia,  Haiti,  and  Paraguay 
have  per  capita  gross  national  products  of  less 
than  $100,  compared  with  $2,800  in  the  United 
States.  The  average  for  all  of  Latin  America 
was  less  than  $300  per  capita  in  1961. 

The  rate  of  population  growth  is  very  high; 
in  some  cases  as  much  as  4  percent — about  the 
highest  in  the  world. 

In  many  countries  the  educational  system  is 
totally  inadequate  to  provide  the  schooling  and 
the  training  required  for  rapid  development. 
Often  there  is  little  experience  with  effective 
democratic  government  and  a  lack  of  social  and 
political  institutions  adequate  to  meet  the  needs  of 
the  times. 

Moreover,  the  economic  health  and  growth  po- 
tential of  many  countries  is  dependent  on  the  ex- 
ports of  raw  materials  and  foodstuffs  sold  in 
world  markets  at  prices  which  have  constantly  de- 
clined over  the  last  decade  and  for  which  the 
long-term  outlook  is  not  encouraging. 

And,  finally,  there  is,  of  course,  the  activity  of 
the  Soviet  bloc,  aided  by  the  Castroites,  always 
eager  to  disrupt  orderly  evolutionary  progress  and 
development  and  bent  on  exploiting  the  oppor- 
tunities for  confusion  and  violence  which  any 
deep  change  from  an  old  to  a  new  order  provides. 

The  Alliance  for  Progre^ss  has  now  been  offi- 
cially underway  more  than  1  year.  Lest  I  have 
overemphasized  the  problems  and  difficulties,  let 
me  assure  you  that  there  has  been  considerable 
progi-ess  and  that  the  alliance  is  definitely  off  the 
ground.  Those  who  expected  miracles,  who 
thought  that  change  could  be  wrought  overnight, 
that  century-old  institutions,  patterns,  and  prob- 
lems could  quickly  and  painlessly  be  swept  away, 
may  have  been  disappointed.    But  the  many  who 

Department  of  Sfafe   Bulletin 


have  been  actively  engaged  in  making  the  alliance 
work  and  the  millions  who  have  begim  to  see  its 
impact  throughout  the  hemisphere  feel  clearly  the 
healthy  ferment  and  the  wmds  of  change. 

Five  countries  have  already  drafted  long-term 
development  plans.  Two  more  hope  to  complete 
theirs  this  fall,  and  several  others  have  drawn  up 
interim  plans  while  their  long-term  programs  are 
being  shaped.  In  El  Salvador,  Colombia,  Brazil, 
and  other  countries  building  of  low-income  hous- 
ing, school  construction,  installation  of  pure- 
water  facilities,  construction  of  roads,  bridges,  and 
power  plants  is  imdei-way. 

The  meaning  of  self-help  measures  is  being  un- 
derstood more  clearly,  and  the  laws  to  carry  out 
necessary  economic  and  social  refonns  are  being 
debated  and  enacted.  For  our  part,  we  provided 
total  loans  and  grants  of  more  than  a  billion  dol- 
lars in  the  fiscal  year  which  ended  last  June,  most 
of  tliis  for  loans.  By  next  summer,  projects  car- 
ried out  imder  the  alliance  will  yield  direct  bene- 
fits to  some  35  million  people  throughout  Latin 
America. 

The  Question  of  Trade 

Today  I  speak  to  you  on  my  way  to  Mexico  City, 
where  the  first  of  a  series  of  annual  conferences  to 
review  the  progress  of  the  alliance  is  underway. 
All  member  coimtries  will  be  represented,  and  the 
experience  and  problems  of  the  first  year  will  be 
vigorously  studied  and  debated. 

Among  the  various  questions  on  the  agenda, 
none  is  perhaps  as  burning  an  issue  for  the  Latin 
American  countries  as  the  question  of  trade :  how, 
through  the  diversified  export  of  their  products, 
to  finance  their  development  programs  and  to  earn 
enough  to  help  generate  the  $80  billion  in  savings 
which  they  must  provide  for  investment  during 
the  1960's. 

The  trade  problem  of  Latin  America  is  first 
and  foremost  one  of  declining  prices  for  raw 
materials  in  world  markets.  Fifteen  countries, 
for  example,  export  coffee;  for  eleven  it  is  the 
major  export  crop.  In  Brazil  close  to  50  percent 
of  export  earnings  are  derived  from  this  one  com- 
modity ;  in  Colombia,  better  than  two-thirds.  In 
a  number  of  other  countries  of  Central  America 
the  importance  of  coffee  is  almost  as  great.  But 
look  at  the  experience  of  Brazil  over  the  last  7 
or  8  years:  Between  1953  and  1960  her  exports 

November  ?9,   7962 


rose  8  percent  in  volume  but  declined  34  percent 
in  value— a  drop  from  $1,088,000,000  to  $713,000,- 
000  which,  incidentally,  accounted  for  90  percent 
of  the  adverse  shift  in  Brazil's  trade  balance 
during  this  period. 

For  other  tropical  products,  the  experience  of 
the  Latin  American  countries  has  not  been  much 
more  encouraging.  Only  Ecuador  managed  to 
increase  its  earnings  from  bananas  between  1953 
and  1960.  For  the  other  banana-exporting 
countries — Costa  Rica,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  and 
Panama — it  was  the  same  story :  a  higher  volmne 
but  vastly  lower  prices  and  hence  lower  earnings. 
Coffee  and  bananas,  cocoa  and  wool,  all  show  the 
same  pattern  and  the  long-term  outlook  for  any 
of  these  is  for  more  of  the  same. 

Price  trends  for  industrial  raw  materials  have 
been  more  mixed,  but  not  generally  good.  Lead 
prices  have  declined  by  a  third  since  1953. 
Tungsten — of  interest  to  Bolivia — was  worth  a 
fifth  of  its  value  in  1960  as  compared  to  7  years 
earlier.  Chilean  nitrate  and  copper  were  down 
15  percent  and  3  percent,  respectively.  Tin,  zinc, 
silver,  and  petroleum,  on  the  other  hand,  rose 
slightly  during  this  period. 

Unfortunately,  so  many  of  the  Latin  American 
countries  depend  on  one  or  at  best  a  very  small 
number  of  agricultural  and  industrial  raw 
materials  for  the  major  portion  of  their  export 
earnings.  Only  Peru  and  Mexico  derive  their  in- 
come from  a  fairly  large  and  diversified  group  of 
products. 

Reasons  for  Trade  Declines 

The  reasons  for  poor  performance  of  world  raw 
material  markets  are  not  hard  to  find.  In  tropical 
agriculture,  there  is  a  chronic  longrun  oversupply. 
The  technological  revolution  is  having  an  impact 
here  as  it  is  in  the  Temperate  Zones.  Better 
methods,  sprays,  and  disease  control  have  in- 
creased output  greatly.  Consumption  in  the  ad- 
vanced countries  has  risen  much  more  slowly. 
Elasticities  are  low,  and  so,  even  with  declining 
prices,  stocks  are  piling  up.  To  cite  just  one 
example,  coffee  stocks  in  the  world  are  today  twice 
as  great  as  annual  world  trade  needs. 

For  metals  and  minerals,  of  course,  inelastic  de- 
mand in  consuming  countries  is  aggravated  by  de- 
mand fluctuations  which  typically  accompany  the 
stage  of  the  industrial  cycle.  These  ups  and  downs 
complicate  the  process  of  economic  planning  and 

779 


the  efforts  of  tlio  Latin  American  countnes  to  meet 
their  payments  obligations  and  development  needs. 
The  threat  from  synthetics  and  substitutes,  as  in 
the  case  of  tin  and  rubber,  further  compounds  the 
problem  and  prevents  price  recovery. 

Within  the  OAS  [Organization  of  American 
States],  in  the  United  Nations,  the  GATT  [Gen- 
eral Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade],  and  other 
international  forums,  the  United  States  and  other 
importing  and  exporting  countries  are  now  deal- 
ing intensively  with  this  thorny  problem  of  raw 
materials. 

One  answer  is  being  advanced  in  th&se  discus- 
sions with  predictable  regularity:  diversification. 
Everyone  is  agreed  that  the  ultimate  solution  lies 
not  alone  in  controls  or  agreements  or  study  groups 
but  in  the  moving  away  from  excessive  reliance  on 
commodity  exports.  No  one  can  quarrel  with  this 
conclusion.  It  is  clearly  desirable  to  eliminate 
one-crop  economies,  to  diversify  economic  activity 
and  exports  so  as  to  spread  risks  and  reduce  world 
oversupply;  to  diversify,  moreover,  not  only  in 
terms  of  the  number  of  commodities  produced  but 
also  to  shift,  wherever  possible,  from  raw  material 
production  to  processing  and  light  manufacturing. 
Unfortimately,  the  producing  coimtries  encounter 
a  set  of  trading  problems  in  this  area  as  vexing  as 
those  which  plague  raw  material  trade.  Let  me 
give  you  one  or  two  examples. 

Coffee  enters  the  United  States  duty  free,  but 
soluble  coffee  is  subject  to  a  tariff  of  3  cents  a 
pound.  Several  million  tons  of  raw  sugar  are 
allowed  to  enter  the  United  Statas  each  year  under 
quota.  The  amoimt  of  refined  sugar  permitted 
into  our  comitry,  on  the  other  hand,  remains  negli- 
gible. Actually,  we  do  better  in  this  regard  than 
most  of  the  European  countries.  Cocoa,  for  ex- 
ample, enters  the  United  Kingdom  duty  free. 
Cocoa  butter  is  subject  to  a  tariff.  The  same  is 
true  in  France  for  a  whole  range  of  processed 
goods. 

'\^niat  about  manufactured  products?  At  the 
moment,  the  picture  is  not  much  brighter  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  Latin  American  countries. 
Yet  in  the  field  of  cotton  textiles  something  new 
is  now  being  tried.  Largely  due  to  the  initiative 
of  the  United  States,  a  worldwide  agreement  *  has 
been  negotiated  with  the  objective  of  providing 
for  the  elimination  of  quantitative  restrictions  in 


*For  text,  see  ibid..  Mar.  12, 1962,  p.  431. 


Europe  and  for  the  gradual  increase  of  market 
opportunities  for  exporting  countries  such  as  Co- 
lombia and  Mexico  in  Latin  America  and  others 
outside  the  hemisphere,  countries  seeking  to  move 
into  this  field  as  one  means  of  diversifj'ing  out  of 
raw  material  exports.  But  here,  too,  the  advanced 
countries  must  take  into  account  the  problem  of 
their  own  textile  industries,  which  require  protec- 
tion from  rapid  import  increases  and  possible  mar- 
ket disruption  of  the  so-called  low-labor-cost 
countries.  In  many  areas  of  Europe,  the  amount 
of  textiles  allowed  to  enter  from  these  countries 
is  still  very  small. 

It  is  hardly  surprising,  then,  that  Latin  Amer- 
ican exports  as  a  percentage  of  the  free-world  total 
have  declined  in  volume.  They  were  10.3  percent 
in  1953,  had  dropped  to  8.7  percent  in  1957,  and 
were  at  7.3  percent  in  1961.  The  terms  of  trade  in 
the  period  of  1958-1960  as  compared  to  1953-1955 
were  down  for  every  Latin  American  country  save 
Chile.  To  be  specific,  this  adverse  trend  ranged 
from  5  i>ercent  for  Peru  to  a  maximum  of  28  per- 
cent in  El  Salvador  and  Uruguay.  In  fact,  the 
resources  lost  as  a  result  of  these  trade  declines  by 
the  Latin  American  countries  were  considerably 
in  excess  of  the  total  of  aid  fimds  invested  in  the 
area  during  this  period. 

The  European  Common  Market 

A  third  problem  in  the  trade  of  the  Latin 
American  countries  relates  to  developments  with 
regard  to  the  European  Common  Market,  the 
probable  accession  of  the  LTnited  Kingdom  to  the 
EEC  [European  Economic  Community],  and  the 
special  relationship  which  will  exist  between  the 
expanded  Common  Market  and  the  associated 
nations  of  Africa.  The  EEC  will  have  a  common 
external  tariff  on  most  export  products  of  interest 
to  Latin  America  and  Africa.  The  problem  is 
that,  under  the  association  agreement  presently 
being  negotiated  with  18  of  the  African  nations, 
the  Common  Market  intends  to  grant  them  tariff 
advantages  in  the  form  of  preferential  access  over 
other  third-country  suppliers,  including  Latin 
America.  This  represents  an  element  of  discrimi- 
nation which,  if  continued  indefinitely,  could 
severely  impede  the  development  efforts  of  the  Al- 
liance for  Progress.  On  the  other  hand,  these 
trading  advantages,  together  with  other  benefits 
accorded  to  this  group  of  new  nations  of  Africa  by 
the  EEC,  involve  resources  of  great  value  to  the 


780 


Deparfment  of  State   Bulletin 


African  economies.  We  have  certainly  no  inten- 
tion of  impeding  economic  progress  of  our 
African  friends.  On  the  contrary,  we  are  fully 
committed  to  assist  African  development  wher- 
ever possible.  That  is  why  we  are  now  engaged 
in  intensive  efforts  in  the  GATT  and  elsewhere  to 
find  alternative  solutions — a  way  to  approach 
these  commodity  problems  in  a  worldwide  con- 
text which  would  render  superfluous  the  present 
European-African  preferential  arrangements  and 
their  inherent  discriminatory  element  with  regard 
to  the  trade  of  the  Latin  American  countries  and 
other  nonassociated  nations. 

Dealing  With  Trading  Problems 

What,  specifically,  is  being  done  under  the  Al- 
liance for  Progress  and  elsewhere  to  deal  with 
these  trading  problems? 

For  the  last  18  months  we  have  taken  the  lead 
in  many  international  organizations  to  examine 
commodity  problems  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  for 
the  characteristics  of  each  commodity  are  different 
and  possible  approaches  vary.  We  are  firmly 
committed  to  the  notion  that  solutions  must  be 
worldwide  rather  than  regional  and  that  the  great 
raw  material  consuming  nations  of  the  Western 
World  share  joint  responsibility  with  the  export- 
ing countries  to  work  out  adequate  trading 
arrangements. 

For  coffee,  we  were  instrumental  in  bringing 
about  the  negotiation  of  a  new  world  commodity 
agreement  under  the  auspices  of  the  United  Na- 
tions.^  President  Kennedy  has  already  submitted 
this  agreement  to  the  Senate  for  ratification.  We 
hope  that  it  will  be  possible  to  put  it  into  effect 
early  next  year.  The  agreement  attempts, 
through  export  quotas,  effectively  to  limit  the 
amount  of  coffee  that  will  enter  world  markets 
so  that,  with  clear  controls  over  supplies  jointly 
administered  by  exporting  and  importing  nations, 
the  decline  in  world  coffee  prices  will  be  arrested. 

We  are  now  similarly  engaged  in  a  serious  study 
of  the  world  cocoa  situation,  and  it  is  possible  that 
a  producer-consumer  agreement  covering  cocoa 
will  be  negotiated  sometime  next  year. 

One  of  the  main  thrusts  of  our  efforts,  therefore, 
has  been  directed  toward  the  conunodity-by-com- 
modity  attack,  attemptmg  to  identify  the  prob- 
lems, seeking  to  stem  price  erosion  and  to  establish 


'For  background,  see  ibid.,  Oct.  29,  1962,  p.  667. 
November  19,  1962 


relatively  stable  conditions  through  producer-con- 
sumer cooperation  by  way  of  agreements,  through 
study  groups,  and  by  other  means. 

The  Inter- American  Economic  and  Social  Coun- 
cil is  playing  an  important  part  in  this  effort  and 
is  dealing  with  a  number  of  other  commodities 
apart  from  coffee  and  cocoa.  The  United  States 
participated  with  other  governmental  experts  in 
the  study,  under  the  aegis  of  the  lA-ECOSOC,  of 
a  system  of  compensatory  financing  of  export 
earnings.  This  plan  has  now  been  submitted  to 
the  United  Nations  for  further  study.  We  are 
very  much  interested  in  this  idea  of  setting  up  a 
special  fund  to  which  importing  and  exporting 
coimtries  would  contribute  and  on  which  the  pro- 
ducing nations  could  draw  during  periods  of  de- 
cline, thereby  offsetting  the  effects  of  cyclical 
fluctuations  and  of  sharp  sudden  losses  in  export 
earnings.  Repayments  into  the  fund  would  occur 
when  export  earnings  rise  above  the  average  trend. 

This  plan  and  other  ideas  for  compensatory  fi- 
nancing are  being  pursued  in  the  United  Nations 
with  the  thought  that  a  global  fund  of  this  kind 
may  pi'ovide  effective  safeguards  against  disrupt- 
ing cyclical  ups  and  downs.  We  view  this  as  a 
corollary  to  the  commodity-by-commodity  ap- 
proach designed  to  redress  longnm  secular  imbal- 
ances. In  all  of  this  work  we  have  one  objective : 
to  halt  the  decline  in  i-aw  material  prices  relative 
to  manufactured  goods,  to  reduce  the  reliance  of 
the  Alliance  for  Progress  countries  on  earnings 
from  raw  materials,  and  to  insure  that  trade  will 
be  an  asset  rather  than  an  impediment  to  the  eco- 
nomic development  of  Latin  America. 

We  know  that  this  approach  of  supply  control 
in  international  markets  and  of  compensatory  fi- 
nancing is  not  in  itself  a  longrun  and  lasting  solu- 
tion. We  think  of  it  only  as  the  most  practical 
means  of  achieving  some  relatively  immediate  im- 
provement in  an  otherwise  rapidly  deteriorating 
situation.  What  is  needed  is  a  breathing  space, 
so  that  more  fimdamental  adjustments  can  be 
made.  In  the  end  no  commodity  agreement,  re- 
gardless of  how  good  and  even  with  the  most  ef- 
fective enforced  quotas,  can  work  if  the  pressure 
of  excess  production  continues  to  increase.  Cuts 
in  output  must  follow  if  these  arrangements  are  to 
survive.  But  the  shifting  of  resources  is  politi- 
cally and  economically  difficult  and  requires  time 
and  planning. 
That  is  why  there  is  such  a  close  connection  be- 

781 


tween  the  problems  of  aid  and  trade.  We  must  do 
what  vre  can  in  our  economic  and  technical  as- 
sistance to  help  the  Latin  American  countries  to 
effect  needed  changes.  And  so  we  come  full 
circle— for  that  is  what  self-help  and  economic  as- 
sistance and,  indeed,  what  the  Alliance  for  Prog- 
ress is  all  about. 

The  decade  of  the  sixties  will  not  be  an  easy 
one.  The  forces  of  change  are  complex  and  varied, 
and  great  efforts  will  be  needed.  Increasingly, 
the  drive  and  the  will  to  put  the  shoulders  to  the 
wheel  are  becoming  evident  throughout  Latin 
America.  Increasingly,  we  and  our  friends  in 
Europe,  in  Africa,  and  in  Latin  America  are 
learning  to  cooperate  and  to  coordinate  our  efforts, 
to  solve  these  problems  by  joint  action,  determined 
to  succeed  through  evolution  and  by  means  of 
peaceful  change.  For,  as  President  Kennedy  has 
said,  if  evolutionary  change  is  impossible,  revolu- 
tionary change  is  inevitable. 


United  Nations  Week 


MESSAGE  OF  ADLAi  E.  STEVENSON' 

This  week  we  celebrate  another  birtliday,  the 
17th,  in  the  life  of  the  United  Nations.  I  think 
there  has  never  been  a  year  in  wliich  we  Americans 
had  more  cause  to  appreciate  all  that  the  LT.X. 
means  to  our  country  or  more  cause  to  be  grate- 
ful for  its  safe  passage  through  a  time  of  danger. 

One  year  ago  the  U.N.  was  in  peril  of  its  life. 
Dag  Hammarskjold  was  tragically  dead.  No  suc- 
cessor had  been  chosen.  Some  people  were  pre- 
dicting that  the  vei-y  office  of  U.N.  Secretary-Gen- 
eral would  be  reduced  to  impotence  by  the  Soviet 
attack. 

In  the  Congo  the  U.N.  had  thwarted  Soviet  am- 
bitions— but  at  a  cost  which  threatened  to  bank- 
rupt the  whole  organization.  And  the  end  of  the 
LT.N.  Congo  operation  itself  was  not  j-et  in  sight. 

Today  the  U.N.  again  lias  an  able  Secretary- 
General.    The  powers  of  liis  office  are  imirapaired. 


'  Re<-orded  for  di-stribution  tbrough  the  United  States 
Committee  for  the  United  Nations  to  radio  stations 
througliout  the  United  States  for  broadcast  durinf;  the 
weeif  of  Ootolier  21-27  (U.S./U.X.  press  release  40G4  dated 
Oct.  15,  for  release  Oct.  20).  Ambas-sador  Stevenson  is 
U.S.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations. 


The  worst  of  the  financial  crisis  is  over.  And  in 
the  Congo,  thanks  to  the  U.N.,  conflict  between 
the  great  powers  has  been  avoided  and  a  viable 
state  is  being  fashioned. 

In  this  same  year  several  more  new  nations  have 
been  born  and  have  joined  the  U.N.,  adding  to  its 
membership  and  its  vitality.  I 

U.N.  mediation  has  helped  to  end  explosive  dis-  } 
putes  in  the  heart  of  Africa — Rwanda  and  Burun-  | 
di — and  in  West  New  Guinea  in  the  southwest  ■ 
Pacific.  ■ 

The  creative  efforts  of  the  U.N. — in  teclmical  1 
and  economic  aid  for  the  new  and  emerging  na-  j 
tions,  in  pioneering  peaceful  cooperation  in  outer 
space — all  these  have  added  to  the  bridges  of  com- 
munity, of  common  interests  and  common  under-  j 
takings,  which  we  seek  to  build  throughout  the  ' 
world. 

Some  Americans  may  ask  why  a  great  and  pow- 
erful nation  like  the  LTnited  States  needs  the  U.N. 
I  would  answer  that  no  nation,  however  power- 
ful, can  ignore  the  forces  of  history  any  more 
than  the  greatest  sliip  on  the  ocean  can  ignore  the 
wind  and  the  tides.  To  preserve  our  American 
freedom  and  our  security  from  attack  we  must  do 
more  than  keep  strong  armed  forces.  We  must 
study  tlie  winds  and  tides  of  change  which  are 
moving  across  the  world,  the  rising  aspirations  of 
a  billion  human  beings  for  the  same  freedoms  that 
we  claim  as  our  American  birthright;  and, 
through  the  U.N.  and  all  our  diplomacy,  we  must 
harmonize  our  actions  with  theirs. 

Now,  communism  says  that  that  cannot  be  done, 
that  the  interests  of  the  new  nations  and  those  of 
the  industrial  West  cannot  be  harmonized,  and 
that  in  the  clash  of  those  interests  our  free  way 
of  life  will  finally  go  dowm  to  defeat. 

But  the  United  Nations  says  it  can  be  done. 
And  in  fact,  whatever  the  difficulties,  it  is  being 
done  everj'  day. 

Of  course  there  have  been  crises,  and  there  will 
doubtless  be  more.  We  should  not  be  upset  by 
them.  For  experience  at  the  LTnit«d  Nations 
shows  that  each  crisis,  when  it  is  met  with  courage 
and  intelligence  by  those  who  really  believe  in  the 
commiuiity,  leaves  the  U.N.  more  vigorous  than 
before. 

So  I  am  glad  to  join  with  those  fellow  Ameri- 
cans whose  prayer,  on  this  U.N.  anniversary,  is 
that  our  country  may  continue  to  play  in  the  coim- 
cils  of  the  U.N.  the  great  part  for  which  history 


782 


Department  of  Stale   Bulletin 


has  equipped  us  and  that  the  United  Nations,  and 
the  community  it  represents,  may  increasingly  be- 
come a  secure  dwelling  place  for  all  peoples  who 
wish  to  live  in  freedom. 


document,  for  exhibit  in  San  Francisco  in  con- 
nection with  commemorative  meetings  marking 
the  10th  anniversaiy  of  the  signing  of  the 
charter. 


EXHIBIT  OF  U.N.  CHARTER 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Octo- 
ber 18  (press  release  630)  that  the  United  States 
would  send  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  to 
United  Nations  Headquarters  in  New  York  for 
public  display  on  United  Nations  Day  and 
throughout  the  following  week.  This  was  the 
first  appearance  of  the  charter  at  U.N.  Head- 
quarters. 

The  charter  left  the  State  Department  on 
October  22  in  the  company  of  an  official  of  the 
Department  of  State  and  an  honor  guard  of  two 
United  States  marines.  It  was  taken  by  train  to 
New  York  and  delivered  to  the  United  States 
Mission  to  the  United  Nations.  It  was  displayed 
at  the  mission  briefly  on  October  23  in  connection 
with  ceremonies  marking  the  first  day  of  issue  of 
the  U.S.  postage  stamp  honoring  the  late  Dag 
Hammarskjold.  The  charter  was  then  delivered 
to  the  United  Nations.  On  November  3  it  was 
returned  with  a  similar  escort  to  the  Department 
of  State. 

The  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  was  signed 
at  the  closing  session  of  the  United  Nations  Con- 
ference on  International  Organization  at  San 
Francisco  on  June  26,  1945.  Tlie  charter  went 
into  effect  on  October  24  of  that  year,  when  it  had 
been  ratified  by  the  necessary  number  of  nations. 
Since  then,  October  24  has  been  celebrated  as 
United  Nations  Day. 

Within  a  relatively  few  hours  after  the  cere- 
monies for  the  signing  of  the  charter  were  com- 
pleted at  San  Francisco,  the  document  was  on  its 
way  to  Washington  by  air,  enclosed  in  a  small  fire- 
proof combination  safe  and  under  protective 
guard.  In  Washington  it  was  delivered  to  the 
Department  of  State,  the  U.S.  Government  having 
been  designated  as  the  depository  for  the  original 
document,  with  the  responsibility  of  holding  it 
in  trust  for  all  participating  nations. 

The  only  previous  occasion  when  the  charter 
has  been  released  by  the  Department  of  State  for 
exhibition  was  in  June  1955,  when  it  was  lent  to 
the  United  Nations,  subject  to  adequate  pre- 
cautions to  assure  the  safety  and  security  of  the 


President  Sends  IPU  Conference 
Message  on  Threats  to  World  Peace 

The  51st  conference  of  the  Inter-Parliamentary 
Union  met  at  Brasilia,  Brazil,  Octoier  2Jf,-Novem- 
her  1}  Following  is  an  exchange  of  m,essages  be- 
tween President  Kennedy  and  Giuseppe  Godacci- 
Pisanelli,  President  of  the  Inter-Parliamentary 
Council. 

President  Kennedy  to  Mr.  Codacci-Pisanelll 

White  House  press  release  dated  November  1 

November  1,  1962 
Deae  JVIh.  Codacci-Pisanelli  :  I  have  received 
with  appreciation  your  letter  enclosing  the  text 
of  a  resolution  adopted  by  the  51st  Inter-Parlia- 
mentary Conference  at  Brasilia  concerning  threats 
to  world  peace  arising  out  of  the  Cuban  situation 
and  the  Sino-Indian  conflict. 

My  country  and  its  people  would  suffer  perhaps 
more  than  any  others  in  the  event  of  a  major 
breach  of  world  peace.  Hence,  we  have  as  great 
an  incentive  as  any  state  to  do  all  in  our  power 
to  preserve  this  peace.  To  that  end  we  have 
moved  together  with  our  sister  republics  in  this 
hemisphere,  through  the  OAS,  as  well  as  in  the 
United  Nations,  to  bring  an  end  to  the  new  and 
serious  threat  to  peace  created  by  the  rapid  and 
secret  introduction  of  offensive  weapon  systems 
with  nuclear  capability  into  Cuba  by  the  Soviet 
government.  We  are  gratified  that  Chairman 
Khrushchev  has  agreed  to  withdraw  these  weap- 
ons from  this  hemisphere.  The  actions  now  be- 
ing taken  to  implement  this  decision  may,  if  suc- 
cessful, lead  to  the  liquidation  of  this  threat  as 
well  as  the  possibility  of  steps  to  abate  other  ten- 
sions endangering  world  peace. 

With  regard  to  the  conflict  on  the  Sino-Indian 
frontier,  I  deplore  this  further  instance  of  armed 
aggression  by  Communist  China  and  hope  that 
that  state  can  be  persuaded  to  abandon  its  flagrant 


'  For  an  announcement  of  the  meeting  and  names  of 
the  members  of  the  U.S.  delegation,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct. 
29,  1962,  p.  660. 


November  79,   1962 


783 


violation    of    the    territorial     integrity    of    its 
neighbors. 

I  would  appreciate  your  reading  this  message  to 
the  plenary  session  of  the  IPU  Conference. 

Jonx  F.  Kennedy 
Mr.  Codacci-Pisanelli  to  President  Kennedy 

Wliite  nouse  press  release  dated  Novenihor  1 

October  26,  1962 

Dear  JIr.  President:  I  have  the  honor  to  bring  to  your 
urgent  attention  the  enclosed  resolution  which  was  unani- 
mously adopted  this  morning  by  the  51st  Inter-l'arlia- 
meutary  Conference,  meeting  in  Brasilia  with  the  par- 
ticipation of  representatives  of  17  Parliaments. 

Following  is  the  text  of  the  resolution  : 

Deeply  disturbed  by  the  sudden  increase  in  interna- 
tional tension  and  by  the  dangerous  consequences  which 


events  in  the  region  of  Cuba,  as  well  as  on  the  Sino-Indian 
frontier,  could  entail  for  world  peace  ; 

convinced  that  all  international  disputes  should  be  set- 
tled without  resort  to  force  by  direct  negotiations  between 
the  parties  concerned  or  through  procedures  provided  for 
this  purpose  in  the  United  Nations  charter ; 

convinced  that  all  possibilities  of  equitable  agreements 
on  above-mentioned  problems  have  not  yet  been 
exhausted ; 

appeals  urgently  to  the  governments  of  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union,  as  well  as  those  of  India  and  the 
People's  Republic  of  China,  to  avoid  henceforward  tak- 
ing any  action  which  might  lead  to  the  catastrophe  of  gen- 
eral conflict  for  tlie  peoples  of  the  world ; 

invites  the  United  Nations  to  take  urgently,  in  the 
spirit  of  the  Charter,  all  appropriafe  measures  whi<h 
would  contribute  to  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  the 
settlement  of  present  disputes. 

CODACCI-PlSANELU 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


Calendar  of  International  Conferences  and  Meetings^ 


Adjourned  During  October  1962 

U.N.  ECE  Coal  Study  Tour  of  the  U.S.S.R 

Caribbean  Organization:  2d  Meeting  of  the  Standing  Advisory 
Committee  of  the  Caribbean  Plan. 

GATT  Committee  on  Balance-of-Payments  Restrictions 

2d  IC.\0  Pacific  Regional  Air  Navigation  Meeting 

ITU  CCITT  Study  CJroup  III  (General  Tariff  Principles  and  Lease 
of  Telecommunications  Circuits). 

U.N.  ECE  Seminar  on  Water  Pollution  Control 

NATO  Civil  Defense  Committee 

OECD  Development  Assistance  Committee 

U.N.  Scientific  Advisory  Committee 

U.N.  ECE  Timber  Committee:  20th  Session 

FAO/WHO  Conference  on  Food  Standards 

International  Council  for  the  Exploration  of  the  Sea:  50th  Statu- 
tory Meeting. 

lA-ECOSOC:  Annual  Meeting  at  the  Expert  Level 

OECD  Economic  Policy  Committee:  Working  Party  on  Costs  of 
Production  and  Prices. 

10th  ILO  International  Conference  of  Labor  Statisticians 

U.N.  EC.\  Seminar  on  Administrative  Problems  in  African  Coun- 
tries. 


U.S.S.R Sept.  23-Oct.  3 

Surinam Sept.  24-Oct.  1 

Geneva Sept.  24-Oct.  5 

Vancouver Sept.  25-Oct.  19 

Geneva Sept.  27-Oct.  1 

Basel,  Switzerland Sept.  30-Oct.  10 

Paris Oct.  1-2 

London Oct.  1-3 

Geneva Oct.  1-4 

Geneva Oct.  1-5 

Geneva Oct.  1-6 

Copenhagen Oct.  1-10 

Mexico,  D.F Oct.  1-20 

Paris Oct.  2-3 

Geneva Oct.  2-12 

Addis  Ababa Oct.  2-12 


'  Prepared  in  the  Office  of  International  Conferences,  Oct.  30,  1962.  Following  is  a  list  of  abbreviations:  CCITT, 
Comit6  consultatif  international  t(''16graphique  et  t^l^phonique;  EGA,  Economic  Commission  for  Africa;  ECAFE,  Econom- 
ic Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far  East;  ECE,  Economic  Commission  for  Europe;  F.\0,  Food  and  Agriculture  Organi- 
zation; GATT,  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade;  IAEA,  International  Atomic  Energy  .\gency;  I.\-ECOSOC,  Inter- 
American  Economic  and  Social  Council;  IC.\0,  International  Civil  Avi.ition  Organiz.ation;  ILO,  International  Labor 
Organization;  IMCO,  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Consultative  Organization;  ITU,  International  Telecommunication 
Union;  NATO,  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization;  OECD,  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development; 
U.N.,  United  Nations;  UNESCO,  United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Organiz.atlon;  UNICEF,  United 
Nations  Children's  Fund;  WHO,  World  Health  Organization;  WMO,  World  Meteorological  Organization. 


784 


Deparfment  of  State  Bulletin 


Adjourned  During  October  1962 — Continued 

OECD  Development  Assistance  Committee:  Coordinating  Group  Paris Oct.  3—4 

on  Thailand. 

Caribbean  Organization  Council:  3d  Meeting Surinam Oct.  3-8 

ITU  CCITT  Study  Group  I  (Telegraph  Operation  and  Tariffs)  .    .  Geneva Oct.  3-12 

U.N.  ECAFE  Seminar  on  Chemicals  and  AUied  Industries  ....  Bangkok Oct.  3-13 

ITU  Working  Group  on  Revision  of  Structure  of  Radio  Confer-  Geneva Oct.  3-24 

ences  and  Radio  Regulations. 

NATO  Industrial  Planning  Committee Paris Oct.  5-6 

NATO  Science  Committee Paris Oct.  8-9 

IMCO  Working  Party  on  Tonnage  Measurement London Oct.  8-12 

GATT  Committee  II  on  Expansion  of  International  Trade  .    .    .    .  Geneva Oct.  8-12 

G  ATT  Committee  III  on  Expansion  of  International  Trade .    .    .    .  Geneva Oct.  8-12 

U.N.  ECE  Working  Party  on  Simplification  and  Standardization  Geneva Oct.  8-12 

of  Export  Documents. 

International  Wool  Study  Group:  Management  Committee .    .    .    .  London Oct.  9  (1  day) 

FAO  Working  Party  on  Agricultural  Information  Activities  .    .    .  Rome Oct.  10-12 

Peace    Corps:    International    Conference   on    Middle-Level    Man-  San  Juan      Oct.  10-12 

power. 

Consultative  Committee  of  the  International  Convention  for  the  Geneva Oct.  10-21 

Protection  of  Industrial  Property:  Permanent  Bureau. 

FAO  Indo-Paciflc  Fisheries  Council:  10th  Meeting Seoul Oct.  10-25 

GATT  Working  Party  on  Accession  of  United  Arab  Republic    .    .  Geneva Oct.  15-19 

U.N.  ECE  Conference  of  European  Statisticians:  10th  Session  .    .  Geneva Oct.  15-19 

International  Lead  and  Zinc  Study  Group:  Special  Working  Group  .  Geneva Oct.  15-20 

U.N.    ECAFE    Working   Party   on   Economic    Development   and  Bangkok       Oct.  15-23 

Planning:  7th  Session. 

FAO  Council:  39th  Session Rome Oct.  15-26 

South  Pacific  Commission:  24th  Session Noumea Oct.  15-30 

OECD  Committee  for  Scientific  and  Technical  Personnel    ....  Paris Oct.  16-18 

IMCO  Council:  7th  Session London Oct.  16-18 

WMO  Regional  Association  II  (Asia):  3d  Session Bangkok Oct.  18-30 

International  Lead  and  Zinc  Study  Group:  Statistical  Committee  .  Geneva Oct.  22-23 

OECD  Oil  Committee Paris      Oct.  22-24 

OECD  Committee  for  Scientific  Research Paris Oct.  22-24 

IAEA    Intergovernmental    Committee   for   the    Preparation   of   a  Vienna      Oct.  22-27 

Diplomatic  Conference  on  Civil  Liability  of  Land-Based  Facil- 
ities: 2d  Meeting. 

Executive  Committee  of  the  Program  of  the  U.N.  High  Commis-  Geneva Oct.  22-27 

sioner  for  Refugees:  8th  Session. 

Council  of  Representatives  to  the  GATT  Contracting  Parties     .    .  Geneva Oct.  22  (1  day) 

lA-ECOSOC:  1st  Regular  Annual  Meeting  at  Ministerial  Level  .    .  Mexico,  D.F Oct.  22-27 

OECD  Advisory  Group  on  the  Guide  to  Legislation  on  Restrictive  Paris Oct.  23  (1  day) 

Business  Practices. 

OECD  Economic  Policy  Committee:  Working  Party  on  Costs  of  Paris Oct.  23-24 

Production  and  Prices. 

OECD  Maritime  Transport  Committee:  Working  Party Paris Oct.  24  (1  day) 

OECD  Committee  of  Experts  on  Restrictive  Business  Practices  .    .  Paris Oct.  24-26 

International  Lead  and  Zinc  Study  Group:  6th  Session Geneva Oct.  24-27 

OECD  Economic  Policy  Committee:  Working  Party  II  (Economic  Paris Oct.  25-26 

Growth). 

NATO  Petroleum  Planning  Committee Paris Oct.  25-26 

OECD  Economic  and  Development  Review  Committee Paris Oct.  29  (1  day) 

NATO  Civil  Emergency  Planning  Committee Paris Oct.  29-30 

OECD  Manpower  and  Social  Affairs  Committee Paris Oct.  29-31 

In  Session  as  of  October  31, 1962 

United  Nations  General  Assembly:    17th  Session       New  York Sept.  18- 

GATT  Negotiations  on  U.S.  Tariff  Reclassification Geneva Sept.  24- 

ICAO  Air  Traffic  Control  Automation  Panel:  2d  Meeting  ....  Montreal       Oct.  22- 

GATT  Contracting  Parties:  20th  Session Geneva Oct.  23- 

Inter-Parliamentary  Union:  51st  Conference Brasiha Oct.  24- 

U.N.    ECAFE    Working    Party    on    Customs    Administration:  3d  Bangkok Oct.  25- 

Session. 

UNESCO  Executive  Board:  63d  Session Paris Oct.  26- 

FAO  Intergovernmental  Committee  on  the  World  Food  Program     .  Rome Oct.  29- 

FAO/UNICEF  Joint  Policy  Committee:  4th  Session Rome Oct.  29- 

International  Sugar  Council:  12th  Session       London Oct.  29- 

ILO  Governing  Body:   153d  Session Geneva Oct.  29- 

U.N.  EGA  Eastern  African  Transport  Conference Addis  Ababa Oct.  29- 

tJ.N.  ECA  Seminar  on  Population  Problems  in  Africa Cairo Oct.  29- 

ICAO    Limited    European-Mediterranean    Secondary   Surveillance  Paris Oct.  29- 

Radar  Regional  Air  Navigation  Meeting. 

International  North  Pacific  Fisheries  Commission:  9th  Session     .    .  Seattle Oct.  29- 

Consultative  Committee  for  Cooperative  Economic  Development  Melbourne Oct.  30- 

in  South  and  Southeast  Asia  (Colombo  Plan) :  14th  Meeting. 

November   19,   1962  785 


U.N.  Again  Rejects  Soviet  Proposal  To  Seat  Communist  China 


Statement  by  Adlai  E.  Stevenson 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  General  Assembly  '■ 


On  Wednesday  of  this  week  [October  24]  we 
mark  the  I7th  anniversary  of  the  ratification  of 
the  United  Nations  Chart«r.=  During  these  past 
17  j'ears  we  have  seen  the  spirit  of  this  charter, 
and  the  promise  whicli  it  offers,  extended  to  an 
ever-widening  area  of  the  eai-th's  population.  We 
can  take  pride  in  tlie  fact  that,  despite  tlie  turmoil 
and  the  travail  which  this  process  has  involved,  it 
has  been  accomplished  without  compromising  the 
essential  foundations  of  the  cliarter. 

The  preservation  of  the  charter's  integrity  and 
the  gradual  extension  of  its  principles  to  the 
entire  world  is,  in  the  last  analysis,  the  reason  for 
the  existence  of  this  Assembly  and  for  the  presence 
of  all  of  us  here  today.  But  there  are  few  circum- 
stances and  few  issues  which  more  cynically  chal- 
lenge these  principles  than  this  item  which  we 
are  debating  today.  I  know  of  no  single  resolu- 
tion wliich  more  pointedly  suggests  forsaking  the 
very  essentials  of  the  charter  than  this  resolution 
wliich  we  have  before  us.' 

Can  we  honestly  be  expected  to  believe  that  the 
Soviet  Union  is  imaware  of  what  this  resolution 
proposes  to  do  ?  Is  the  So-saet  Union  to  be  taken 
seriously  when  it  argues  that  Peiping  is  "peace- 
loving"  ;  that  for  more  than  13  years  it  has  been 
the  rightful  claimant  to  the  seat  of  Cliina  in  the 
United  Nations  and  that  therefore  the  United 
Nations  must  reject  its  charter,  even  as  it  observes 
the  aimiversary  of  its  adoption?  The  Soviet 
Union  demands,  in  fact,  that  the  majority  of  the 
Assembly  wipe  out  its  previous  decisions,  in- 
cluding the  solemn  condemnation  of  the  Cliinese 


'  Made  in  plenary  session  on  Oct.  22   (U.S.  delegation 
press  release  4068) . 
'  See  p.  782. 
•  U.N.  doc.  A/L.  395. 


786 


Communists  for  their  aggression  in  Korea,  and 
expel  a  loyal  member  state  m  the  hope  that  this 
will  entice  Peiping  to  send  representatives  to  sit 
among  us. 

Does  the  Soviet  delegate  really  believe  liis 
argument  is  valid  ? 

Does  the  Soviet  Government  really  think  so 
highly  of  this  regime  ? 

Last  year,  Mr.  President,  when  I  took  this 
rostrum  to  discuss  this  very  same  question,^  I  felt 
it  important  to  consider  it  against  the  back- 
groimd  of  tlie  era  in  which  we  live,  an  era  of 
sweeping  revolutionary  changes. 

The  age  of  empire  is  drawing  to  a  close,  and  the 
end  is  almost  in  sight.  One  billion  hiunan  beings 
are  marching  onto  the  stage  of  history,  seeking 
and  achieving  national  independence  and  eco- 
nomic progress.  More  than  one-third  of  the 
member  states  of  the  United  Nations  have  become 
independent  since  the  United  Nations  was 
fomided,  and  their  representatives  now  partici- 
pate actively  in  our  deliberations  and  share  their 
counsel. 

Wo  in  the  United  States  Icnow  how  much  they 
cherish  their  new-found  liberty  because  our  own 
nation  was  founded  in  much  the  same  ferment  as 
theirs  and  we  know  how  sweet  are  the  fruits  of 
freedom.  We  understand  their  pride  in  taking 
their  place  here  among  us;  we  understand  their 
aspirations  for  the  future,  for  themselves  and 
their  cliildren. 

We  know,  too,  that  the  new  world  that  is  taking 
shape  is  a  world  that  yearns  for  peace  and  that 
would  do  away  with  the  evils  of  the  past.  It  is  a 
world  in  which  cooperation  and  brotherhood  are 
no  abstract  idealisms  but  practical,  hardheaded 


*  I5UIXETIJJ  of  Jan.  15, 1962,  p.  108. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


necessities  for  survival.  It  is  a  world  that  toler- 
ates no  more  of  imperialism,  empire,  and  the 
subjugation  of  alien  jieoples.  It  is  a  vrorld  made 
up  of  a  community  of  independent  states,  each 
respecting  the  other,  eacli  helping  the  other. 

This  is  a  community,  liowever,  which  can  be 
created  in  our  time  only  if  we  have  courage  and 
foresight.  It  will  not  be  created  if  we  permit 
new  and  even  more  sinister  evils  to  fester  and  take 
root  and  replace  the  old.  At  this  phase  of  history 
we  are  confronted  with  an  issue  the  outcome  of 
which  may  well  determine  whether  we  shall,  in 
the  words  of  the  charter,  "practice  tolerance  and 
live  together  m  peace  with  one  another  as  good 
neighbors." 

That  is  why,  Mr.  President,  I  agree  with  the 
contention  of  the  Soviet  Union  which  has  tenned 
this  agenda  item  a  matter  that  is  "important  and 
urgent."  Its  importance  and  its  urgency,  how- 
ever, are  not  in  the  Soviet  demand  for  the  expul- 
sion of  the  representative  of  a  charter  member, 
the  Eepublic  of  China,  one  of  our  founding  states, 
but  in  the  membei-s  of  this  body  recognizing,  as 
they  have  time  and  time  again  these  past  13  years, 
that  force  is  not  a  passport  for  membersliip  in  the 
United  Nations. 

But  what  of  the  600  million  people  of  the  main- 
land ?  Do  we  forget  them  ?  Do  we  relegate  them 
to  the  wings  of  the  stage  of  history?  No,  Mr. 
President,  we  do  not.  It  is  their  nders  that  do. 
This  body,  by  admitting  the  so-called  People's 
Republic  of  China,  would  not  be  admitting  600 
million  Chinese.  We  would  be  admitting  a  small 
handful  of  tyrants  who  care  little  about  the  people 
and  more,  much  more,  about  power.  Is  this  rep- 
resentation? Is  this  giving  recognition  and  rep- 
resentation to  600  million  voiceless  human  beings? 

I  submit,  Mr.  President,  that  the  teeming  mil- 
lions of  the  mainland  are  today  subjugated  by 
a  regime  that  cares  less  about  their  rights — funda- 
mental human  rights  reaffirmed  by  the  charter — 
than  any  regime  in  modem  history,  perhaps  all 
history.  I  don't  know.  But  I  do  know  that  its 
regime  is  a  dictatorship,  its  ideology  is  power,  its 
aim — professed  with  pride  and  arrogance — is  con- 
quest. Do  we  need  the  counsel  of  this  regime? 
Is  this  a  government  that  would  support  with  a 
pure  heart  and  clean  hands  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations? 

This,  Mr.  President,  is  a  new  imperialism,  a  new 
colonialism  that  seeks  to  carve  out  a  new  empire — 


not  only  in  Asia — and  dash  the  hopes  of  liberty 
the  world  over.  This  is  what  the  Soviet  Union 
would  have  us  admit  to  our  halls — not  600  million 
industrious  Chinese,  but  a  cynical  government  that 
refuses  to  renounce  the  use  of  force  in  the  settle- 
ment of  disputes. 

Events  of  Past  Year 

The  world  knows  well  what  is  going  on  even 
today  in  that  huge  arc  wliich  ranges  from  Man- 
churia through  the  Himalayas.  Let  us  consider 
as  examples  only  tliose  events  in  the  year  since  our 
last  debate  on  this  subject. 

India.  The  Indian  suljcontinent,  today,  is  also 
the  victim  of  incre;ising  military  aggi'ession  along 
its  borders.  Chinese  Communist  military  forces 
persistently  cross  the  borders  of  India  and  press 
by  force  deeper  and  deeper  into  Indian  ten-itory. 
Tliese  are  not  imdisciplined  troops  who  have  lost 
tlieir  way.  These  are.  regular  units  of  the  Chinese 
Communist  armed  forces  acting  under  precise 
orders.  By  their  actions  the  Chinese  Communists 
again  show  their  scorn  for  the  charter  of  this 
organization. 

Even  as  I  speak  here,  brave  men  are  dying  in 
India  as  they  defend  their  land  against  the  in- 
vaders. According  to  a  news  bulletin  I  received 
shortly  before  I  arrived  in  this  hall,  fighting 
now  rages  on  at  least  tliree  fronts.  And  should 
there  be  some  among  us  who  think  that  perhaps 
the  whole  thing  is  a  mistake  that  vrill  right  itself 
before  long,  let  me  point  out  that  when  a  nation 
moves  its  troops  with  tanks  and  armor  it  is  no 
mistake.  It  is  a  premeditated  act.  It  is  naked 
aggression.  And  it  has  been  going  on  with  gather- 
ing momentum  for  some  3  years. 

But  should  there  still  be  some  among  us  who 
thuik  that  perhaps  I  overstate  the  case,  wlio  think 
that  we  should  politely  ignore  the  fact  that  Com- 
munist China  believes  only  in  force,  let  me  refer 
you  to  a  statement  just  issued  by  Prime  Minister 
Nehru,  who  has  told  his  countrymen:  "We  are 
facing  the  greatest  menace  to  our  f  i-eedom." 

Mr.  President,  this  Assembly  would  face  the 
srreatest  menace  to  its  future  if  it  bowed  to  the  de- 
mand  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  admitted  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  People's  Republic.  Indeed,  I 
am  appalled  that  we  should  even  be  asked  to  con- 
sider as  one  of  our  peers  a  government  tliat  ex- 
presses such  disdain  for  all  tliat  this  United 
Nations  represents.    However,  I  feel  I  need  not 


November   19,   7962 


787 


belabor  this  point.  It  must  be  clear  to  everj'one 
here. 

Korea.  The  Cliinese  Communists  stand  con- 
demned by  the  United  Nations  as  aggressors  in 
Korea.  They  refuse  to  recognize  either  their  own 
wrongdoing  or  the  rigliteousness  of  the  United 
Nations  in  defending  a  victim  of  aggression  and  in 
seeking  to  restore  peace  to  this  troubled  land. 
They  assert  the  United  Nations  had  no  business  in 
Korea.  Having  mounted  aggression,  having 
thrown  massive  armed  force  against  the  U.N.'s 
efforts  to  restore  peace  in  Korea,  and  having  rav- 
aged the  country,  they  now  insist  that  the  blame 
was  all  Korea's.  They  even  characterize  the 
United  Nations  Command,  which  is  in  Korea  on 
the  peaceful  mission  of  defending  the  armistice, 
as  an  agent  of  imperialism.  This  is  a  shopworn 
technique  of  calling  white  black  and  black  white. 
The  Chinese  Communist  Foreign  Minister  on 
August  15  of  this  year  declared  that  "the  Chinese 
people  resolutely  support"  the  efforts  of  the  North 
Korean  regime  to  "compel"  the  withdrawal  of  the 
U.N.  Command  from  Korea;  that  is,  the  Chinese 
Communists  proclaim  the  dismantling  of  the 
United  Nations  peacekeeping  mission,  a  mission 
taken  in  solemn  duty  to  the  principles  of  the  char- 
ter, as  an  objective  of  their  national  policy. 

Taiwan.  On  December  22,  1961,  the  Peiping 
People's  Daily,  official  organ  of  the  Chinese  Com- 
munist regime,  declared:  "However  the  United 
Nations  may  vote  and  whatever  resolutions  it  may 
adopt,  the  Chinese  people's  determination  to  liber- 
ate Taiwan  will  never  be  shaken."  On  August  1  of 
this  year  General  Lo  Jwi-ching,  Vice  Premier  of 
the  Chinese  Communist  regime  and  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff,  speaking  at  a  ceremony  commemo- 
rating tlie  35th  anniversary  of  the  founding  of 
the  Communist  army,  stated :  "Taiwan  is  Cliina's 
sacred  territory.  The  Chinese  people  have  the 
sacred  right  to  liberate  Taiwan  at  any  time  and 
by  any  means.  .  .  ." 

Consider  the  source  of  this  statement  and  the 
occasion  on  which  it  was  made.  Clearly  what 
they  have  in  mind  is  something  even  more  deadly 
than  so-called  "peaceful  liberation,"  the  fate 
which  befell  Tibet. 

Southeast  Asia,  an  area  where  the  Chinese  Com- 
munists even  at  this  very  moment  are  ti-ying  to  ex- 
port their  revolutionary  tactics  and  subversion 
against,  established  authority. 

Take  the  example  of  South  Viet-Nam.    Sun 


788 


Hsiao-tsun,  chairman  of  the  China-Vietnam 
Friendship  Association,  at  a  rally  in  Peiping  on 
August  31, 1962,  declared,  according  to  New  China 
News  Agency,  that  "the  Chinese  people  would 
stauncMy  support  the  patriotic,  just,  anti-U.S. 
struggle  of  the  Vietnamese  people  and  that  650 
million  Chinese  people  would  forever  unite  closely 
and  fight  side  by  side  with  the  heroic  Vietnamese 
people."  What  is  meant,  of  course,  is  that  they 
would  support  the  undeclared  war  which  the  Com- 
munists of  North  Viet-Nam  are  waging  to  take 
over  South  Viet-Nam  by  force  without  regard 
for  what  the  will  of  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam 
may  be. 

Tibet.  In  the  past  years  this  Assembly  has  de- 
bated the  tragedy  of  Tibet.  It  has  repeatedly  ex- 
pressed its  grave  concern  at  the  systematic  viola- 
tion of  human  rights  by  Chinese  Communist 
armed  forces  which  entered  Tibet  under  the  ban- 
ner of  "peaceful  liberations."  Last  year  this  As- 
sembly solemnly  renewed  "its  call  for  the  cessation 
of  practices  which  deprive  the  Tibetan  people  of 
their  fimdamental  human  rights  and  freedoms, 
including  their  right  to  self-determination." 

Fifty-six  members  of  the  General  Assembly  sup- 
ported the  resolution  on  Tibet  last  year,  while  it 
was  opposed  by  only  11. 

Peiping's  specific  reaction  to  this  resolution  was 
voiced  in  the  official  statement  by  its  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs  on  December  21,  1961,  that  "no 
foreign  countries  or  international  organization, 
the  United  Nations  included,  have  any  right  to 
meddle"  in  Tibet. 

"Affinity  for  Aggressive  Violence" 

But  it  is  not  only  Communist  China's  neighbors 
who  suffer  aggression  under  the  cloak  of  "peaceful 
coexistence."  Cliinese  Communist  leadership  has 
repeatedly  professed  its  belief  in  revolutions  and 
subversion,  it  has  shown  its  ability  to  export  revo- 
lution, it  has  even  boasted  of  doing  so. 

In  his  general  debate  statement  on  October  3 
this  year,  the  distinguished  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  of  the  Cameroon  offered  proof  of  tlie  Chi- 
nese Communists'  longstanding  policy  of  aggres- 
sion toward  his  country,  the  training  and 
arming — on  the  Chinese  mainland — of  terrorists 
promoting  violent  revolution  thousands  of  miles 
away  from  China  in  the  heart  of  Africa. 

The  official  Cliinese  Communist  organ  People's 
Daily  not  only  lias  failed  to  deny  this  infamous 

Deporfmenf  of  S/afe  Bulletin 


plot;  on  the  contrary  its  editorials  have  boasted 
about  the  wide  circulation  in  Africa,  in  Latin 
America,  and  throughout  Asia  of  pamplilets  on 
guerrilla  warfare  and  on  Chinese  Communist  rev- 
olutionary theories.  Peofle's  Daily  expressed 
the  conviction  that  these  pamphlets  will  gain 
favor  among  these  far-distant  peoples  because 
"sooner  or  later  tliey  will  rise  in  revolution." 
People's  Daily  ignores  the  fact  that  most  of  these 
peoples  have  had  their  revolution  and  are  now 
free  and  independent  nations. 

Speaking  before  this  General  Assembly  on  the 
1st  of  December  last  year  I  touched  on  this  affinity 
for  aggressive  violence  which  characterizes  the 
rulers  of  Peiprng.  I  quoted  a  statement  by  the 
supreme  leader  of  Chinese  communism,  Mao  Tse- 
tung,  who  summed  up  his  world  outlook  in  the 
words,  "Everything  can  be  made  to  grow  out  of  the 
barrel  of  a  gun."  Ten  days  later  the  same  official 
organ,  People's  Daily,  commenting  on  my  re- 
marks, declared:  "All  revolutionary  people  can 
never  abandon  the  truth  that  'all  political  power 
grows  out  of  the  barrel  of  a  gun.'  " 

Once  again  the  Soviet  Union  asks  the  General 
Assembly  to  sanction  the  use  of  force  by  the  Chi- 
nese Commimists  for  the  attainment  of  their  ma- 
terial purposes. 

Tlie  Chinese  Commimist  rulers  have  consistently 
refused  to  renounce  the  use  of  force  against  a  U.N". 
member — the  Republic  of  China.  Indeed,  in  tliis 
they  can  claim  to  have  Soviet  support.  Less  than 
a  year  ago  in  this  very  hall  the  representative  of 
the  Soviet  Union  stated :  "The  Government  of  the 
People's  Republic  of  China  has  the  right  to  liqui- 
date the  clique  of  Chiang  Kai-shek,  both  by  peace- 
ful means  and  by  the  use  of  force;  that  is  within 
its  exclusive  right  and  nobody  else's." 

Let  there  be  no  mistake  about  it.  Those  who 
speak  in  siipport  of  the  admission  of  the  Chinese 
Communists  into  the  United  Nations  inevitably 
lend  support  and  encouragement  to  the  aggressive 
concepts  which  today  govern  the  actions  and  poli- 
cies of  tliis  regime,  thereby  endangering  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  United  Nations  Charter. 

Republic  of  China  Loyal  to  U.N. 

Now  the  Soviet  Union  would  maintain  the 
fiction  that  the  world  would  be  more  peaceful, 
that  this  organization  would  somehow  be  revital- 
ized, by  the  admission  of  the  Chinese  Communist 
regime.    And  in  equally  strident  teiTns  the  Soviet 


Union  insists  that  to  bring  about  this  change  we 
must  first  expel  the  representatives  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  of  China,  a  founding 
member  state.  We  are  asked  to  admit  a  govern- 
ment which  practices  and  preaches  violence  in 
dealing  with  other  governments  and  to  eject  a 
charter  member  of  the  organization  whose  con- 
stitution uniquely  commits  it  to  "respect  .  .  .  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations." 

The  Republic  of  China  is  a  loyal  and  dedicated 
member  of  the  United  Nations.  It  has  been  so 
since  the  founding  of  our  organization.  It 
participates  fully  in  the  economic  and  technical 
assistance  programs  of  the  United  Nations  and 
its  specialized  agencies.  The  Soviet  Union  can- 
not, of  course,  seriously  expect  this  Assembly 
to  expel  the  representatives  of  the  Republic  of 
China. 

Though  faced  with  a  constant  threat  to  its 
very  existence,  posed  by  the  same  hostile  regime 
which  the  Soviet  Union  proposes  to  admit  into 
this  Assembly,  the  Republic  of  China,  despite  the 
demand  for  vigilance  and  constant  effort  in  its 
defense  which  this  threat  imposes  upon  it,  has 
sought  to  preserve  and  foster  those  cultural  values 
and  traditions  which  have  for  centuries  been  the 
unique  attributes  of  Cliinese  civilization.  The 
family  is  respected  as  a  fundamental  social  unit 
whose  welfare  is  the  concern  of  the  conununity. 
Harmony  among  men  is  the  goal  of  society.  To 
each  individual  is  due  recognition  of  his  identity 
as  a  human  being  whose  wants,  desires,  and  hap- 
piness cannot  be  ignored  nor  infringed  upon. 

The  Republic  of  China  has  demonstrated  that 
these  values  may  be  harnessed  with  great  effect 
for  the  progress  of  society.  More  than  11  million 
people  on  Taiwan  today  enjoy  political  well- 
being  and  unprecedented  economic  growth  under 
the  rule  of  these  social  principles.  Taiwan's 
industries  have  expanded  and  become  steadily 
more  diversified,  and  its  commerce  carries  the 
products  of  its  many  factories  to  ever  more  dis- 
tant parts  of  the  globe.  The  farmers  of  Taiwan, 
working  for  themselves  on  their  own  land,  have 
steadily  pushed  agricultural  production  to  new 
levels  and  this  spring  reaped  another  record  har- 
vest. Meanwhile,  the  sons  of  these  good  fanners 
have  gone  abroad  imder  the  Republic  of  China's 
technical  assistance  program  to  share  with 
farmers  of  other  lands  the  skills  they  have  devel- 
oped, and  representatives  of  some  of  the  nations 


November   79,   7962 


789 


of  Africa  who  sit  in  tliis  hall  can  testify  to  the 
success  of  tliese  efforts  and  to  the  good  will  these 
young:  men  liave  created. 

Economic  Breakdown  on  China  Mainland 

The  mainland  brothers  of  the  people  living  on 
Taiwan  have  not  been  so  fortunate  eitlier  socially 
or  economically. 

The  people  and  the  Government  of  the  TTnited 
States  are  not  happy  tliat  tlie  people  of  mainland 
China  are  today  more  oppressed  than  ever  before, 
moi-e  deprived,  more  hungry.  I  do  not  wish  to 
treat  the  specter  of  famine  and  human  misery 
with  anything  but  the  most  sincere  regret.  The 
Cliinese  people,  however,  are  now  confronted  with 
the  cruel  emptiness  of  past  promises  and  exhor- 
tations. From  all  over  mainland  China  come 
reports  of  factories  closed  down,  construction 
projects  abandoned  in  a  state  of  half-completion, 
of  shortages  of  revenue,  raw  materials,  and  equip- 
ment, of  increased  rationing  of  consumer  goods, 
inflation,  colossal  mistakes  in  agricultural  policy, 
increasing  unemployment,  hunger,  and  despair. 
The  increasing  severity  of  the  economic  break- 
down on  the  China  mainland  has  been  so  great 
that  the  Communists  themselves  no  longer  deny 
it.  The  boasts  of  only  a  few  years  ago  have  been 
put  aside  and  now  the  people  hear  Foreign 
Minister  Chen  Yi  saying:  "The  Chinese  people 
are  soberly  aware  that  our  country  is  still  eco- 
nomically poor  and  culturally  baclcward,  and  that 
it  will  yet  take  tens  of  years  of  hard  work  to  turn 
China  into  an  advanced,  prosperous,  and  power- 
ful socialist  country." 

The  mismanagement  of  their  economic  aifairs 
by  the  Chinese  Commimists  has  led  to  widespread 
suffering;  since  our  debate  here  last  year  we  have 
learned  of  many  disturbances  and  disorders, 
particularly  in  South  China,  of  the  serious  riots 
of  the  Canton  railway  station  in  early  June  of  this 
year. 

The  Chinese  Communist  rulers  have  failed  be- 
cause they  have  concentrated  not  on  building  up 
their  own  country  but  in  tearing  down  others. 

I  have  taken  the  time  of  this  Assembly  for  this 
review  because,  Mr.  President,  we  care  very  much 
about  the  600  million  people  of  China  and  what 
happens  to  them.  But  we  could  do  them  no 
greater  disservice  than  to  give  the  stamp  of 
legality  and  approval  to  their  rulers. 


We  hear  much  about  self-determination  and  the 
right  of  every  nation  to  determine  its  own  form  of 
government.  My  Government  fervently  believes 
in  this  principle.  Indeed,  we  fought  a  war  nearly 
200  years  ago  to  win  that  right  for  ourselves. 
Our  own  Declaration  of  Independence  states 
clearly  and  unequivocally  our  belief  that  "Gov- 
ernments are  instituted  among  Men,  deriving 
tlieir  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned." Have  the  Chinese  Communist  rulers, 
Mr.  President,  derived  their  power  from  the  con- 
sent of  600  million  Chinese?  Or  have  they 
grasped  it  by  the  force  of  arms  ? 

In  our  own  Declaration  of  Independence,  too, 
we  emphasize  our  belief  in  "a  decent  respect  to  the 
opinions  of  mankind,"  and  for  nearly  200  years 
this  respect  has  guided  our  actions.  '  Wliat  opin- 
ions, other  than  their  own,  do  the  Chinese  Com- 
munist rulers  respect?  (I  daresay,  incidentally, 
there  are  those  in  the  Soviet  Union  who  may  well 
be  asking  the  same  question.)  Tlie  answer  is 
clear.  The  Chinese  Communists  txxlay  lack 
respect  not  only  for  the  opinions  of  others  but  even 
for  those  held  by  600  million  of  their  coimtrymen. 
It  would,  I  fear,  be  too  much  to  hope,  therefore, 
that  some  useful  purpose  can  be  served  by  our 
debate  this  year.  Or  to  voice  tlie  hope  that  the 
rulers  in  Peiping  will  hear  what  we  say  and  pay 
heed  to  the  views  we  express.  If  they  do  not, 
however,  it  is  hard  to  foresee  how  much  more 
suffering  the  people  of  the  mainland  must  endure. 

For  the  sake  of  the  Chinese  people,  tlierefore, 
we  must  avoid  giving  their  Stalinist  rulers  any 
encouragement  that  would  have  them  believe  the 
United  Nations — contrary  to  the  fimdamental  hu- 
man rights  expressed  in  its  chartei- — will  turn  its 
head  the  other  way  wliile  they  starve  tlieir  people 
into  submission,  or  that  would  encourage  them  to 
believe  they  can  shoot  their  way  into  our  council 
halls. 

Rather  than  taking  this  rostrum  and  arguing 
that  the  Chinese  Communist  "people's  regime"  is 
a  peace-loving  state  tliat  belongs  in  the  United  Na- 
tions, the  representatives  of  the  Soviet  Union 
would  better  serve  the  cause  of  peace  and  of  man- 
kind by  telling  the  rulers  of  Peiping  they  must 
change  their  way.  Ilather  than  pay  lipservice  to 
(lie  cause  of  the  so-called  People's  Republic  of 
China,  let  them  show  their  own  sincerity  by  de- 
manding tiiat  Peiping  renounce  the  use  of  force. 


790 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


No  one,  the  Soviet  Union  included,  seriously  ex- 
pects the  Republic  of  China  to  be  expelled  or  the 
rulers  of  Peiping  to  be  invited  to  sit  in  this  hall. 
Instead,  our  debate  underscores  the  fact  that  Com- 
munist China  is  not  moving  closer  but  further 
away  from  the  United  Nations. 

Once  again,  Mr.  President,  I  emphasize  our  be- 
lief in  the  charter  and  in  the  fundamental  human 
rights  it  reafRi-ms — fiandamental  rights  in  which 
we  fei"vently  wisli  the  people  of  Cliina  eventually 
will  share.  And  for  these  reasons  the  United 
States  opposes  the  Soviet  draft  resolution.  As 
the  representative  of  the  Soviet  Union  said  here 
earlier  this  afternoon,  the  two  operative  para- 
graplis  of  liis  draft  resolution  are  linked.  Both 
call  for  the  expulsion  of  a  loyal  member  state  and 
for  the  admission  of  Communist  China  in  its  place. 
We  are  confident  that  this  proposal  will  be  re- 
jected by  tlie  General  Assembly  and  that  the  char- 
ter will  be  upheld.^ 


U.N.  Considers  Problem  of  Racial 
Discrimination  in  South  Africa 

Statement  hy  Francis  T.  P.  Plimpton 

U.S.  RepresentMive  to  the  General  Assembly  ^ 

No  more  important  question  faces  this  Assembly 
than  the  assurance  to  all  men  and  women  on  this 
earth  of  their  full  rights  and  dignities  as  human 
beings.  If  our  religious  traditions,  our  ethical 
convictions,  and  the  profoundest  injunctions  of 
our  political  philosophies  tell  us  anything,  they 
tell  us  that  men  are  equal  before  God  and  before 
the  conscience  of  humanity — and  that  this  equality 
must  find  full  embodiment  in  the  laws  and  customs 
of  every  state. 

From  the  moment  of  its  birth  my  country  has 
been  committed  to  the  faith  that  all  men  are  cre- 
ated equal.  The  document  by  which  the  Ameri- 
can Colonies  declared  their  independence  nearly 
200  years  ago  described  this  faith  as  a  "self-evi- 
dent" truth.  One  hundred  years  ago  we  fought 
one  of  the  most  sanguinary  wars  in  history  to  vin- 
dicate that  self-evident  truth.     One-thirtieth  of 


'  The  General  Assembly  rejected  the  Soviet  draft  reso- 
lution on  Oct.  30  by  a  vote  of  42  to  56.  with  12  abstentions. 
1  Made  in  the  Special  Political  Committee  on  Oct  19 
(U.S.  delegation  press  release  4067). 

November   79,   7962 


the  entire  population  of  this  country  were  killed  or 
wounded  in  the  war  which  blotted  out  the  stain 
of  slavery  from  this  land.  Nor  is  this  fight  fin- 
ished. Foreign  Minister  [E.  H.]  Louw  spoke  the 
sad  truth  when  he  said  that  South  Africa  is  not 
the  only  place  where  the  problem  of  racial  dis- 
crimination exists.  I  acknowledge  with  sorrow 
the  i^ersistence  of  this  problem  in  the  United 
States,  but  I  speak  with  pride  of  my  Government's 
firm  and  forceful  efforts  to  bring  racial  discrimi- 
nation and  segregation  to  an  end  in  the  pockets 
where  it  still  lingers. 

We  are  determined  that  the  United  States  shall 
be  a  country  where  men  and  women  of  differing 
races,  differing  colors,  and  differing  beliefs  shall 
live  in  equal  freedom,  enjoy  equal  opportunity, 
and  exercise  equal  rights  before  the  law  and  their 
fellow  men. 

By  the  same  token,  our  Government  is  deter- 
mined to  use  its  influence,  wherever  and  however 
appropriate,  to  bring  about  a  recognition  every- 
where in  the  world  of  the  self-evident  truths  about 
the  equality  of  human  rights.  The  principles  of 
human  equality  are  accepted  by  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  mankind  and  by  almost  every  govern- 
ment represented  in  this  organization.  They  are 
specifically  proclaimed  in  articles  55  and  56  of 
our  charter,  articles  which  pledge  all  members  to 
promote  the  observance  of  "human  rights  and 
fundamental  freedoms  for  all  without  distinction 
as  to  race,  sex,  language,  or  religion." 

It  should  be  a  matter  of  universal  shame  that 
these  pledges  have  not  been  fulfilled  by  several 
states  among  us  and  that  a  number  of  states  con- 
tinue to  proscribe  or  penalize  those  whose  race  or 
religion  or  conscience  is  unacceptable  to  the  ruling 
government.  Deliberate  deprivations  of  human 
rights  have  been  and  must  continue  to  be  the  legiti- 
mate concern  of  the  United  Nations,  whether  the 
victims  be  the  peoples  of  South  Africa,  those  of 
Eastern  Europe,  or  those  of  Tibet. 

Today  we  are  addressing  ourselves  to  the  prob- 
lem of  apartheid  in  the  Republic  of  South  Africa. 
The  view  of  the  United  States  on  this  matter  is 
clear.  We  are  unalterably  and  irrevocably  op- 
posed to  apartheid  in  all  its  aspects.  Our  tradi- 
tions and  our  values  i>ermit  us  no  other  position. 
We  believe  that  the  continuation  of  ajmrtheid  can 
only  lead  to  profound  human  tragedy  for  all  races 
in  South  Africa.    We  are  firmly  committed  to  use 

791 


our  best  efforts  to  encourage  South  Africa  to  aban- 
don these  policies  and  to  live  up  to  its  obligations 
under  the  charter. 

Our  concern- — and  that  of  the  United  Nations — 
with  the  question  of  apartheid  derives  not  only 
from  our  dedication  to  the  principle  of  human 
rights,  not  only  from  the  clear  violation  by  the 
South  African  Government  of  articles  55  and  56 
of  the  charter,  and  not  only  from  the  repeated 
refusal  of  that  Government  to  heed  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  General  Assembly  and  the 
Security  Council.  It  derives  most  of  all  from 
concern  for  the  millions  of  men,  women,  and  chil- 
dren whose  lives  this  harsh  and  rigid  policy 
thwarts  and  stunts.  It  derives  from  the  convic- 
tion that  persistence  in  this  policy  will  only 
increase  tensions  among  the  races  throughout 
southern  Africa — a  heightening  of  animosity 
which  can  well  result  in  disaster  for  all  its  races. 

Claims  of  Inequality  Refuted 

The  arguments  used  to  justify  apartheid  ring 
in  our  ears  with  melancholy  familiarity.  These 
were  the  same  arguments  used  a  century  ago  in 
our  own  counti-y  to  justify  a  system  of  human 
bondage  by  which  one  race  claimed  its  right  to 
own  another.  Such  arguments  are  refuted  equal- 
ly by  the  advance  of  morality  and  the  advance 
of  knowledge.  The  notion  of  the  inequality  of 
race  finds  no  sanctions  in  the  ethical  teachings 
which  have  illumined  the  development  of  man- 
kind nor  in  the  scientific  findings  which  have 
brought  the  modem  world  into  being.  In  my 
country  in  the  last  year  the  two  associations  con- 
taining the  scientists  most  qualified  in  these  mat- 
ters have  rendered  clear  verdicts  on  claims  of 
biological  inequality.  Let  me  read  the  resolu- 
tions adopted  by  these  scientific  bodies. 

This  is  the  first  resolution : 

The  American  Anthropological  Association  repudiates 
statements  .  .  .  that  negroes  are  biologically  and  in 
Innate  mental  ability  inferior  to  whites,  and  reaflJrms  the 
fact  that  there  is  no  scientifically  established  evidence  to 
justify  the  exclusion  of  any  race  from  the  rights  guaran- 
teed by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  The  basic 
principles  of  equality  of  opportunity  and  etiuality  before 
the  law  are  compatible  with  all  that  is  known  about 
human  biology.  All  races  possess  the  abilities  needed  to 
participate  fully  in  the  democratic  way  of  life  and  in 
modern  technological  civilization. 

This  is  the  second  resolution : 


We,  the  members  of  the  American  Association  of  Physi- 
cal Anthropologists  .  .  .  condemn  .  .  .  writings  .  .  .  that 
urge  the  denial  of  basic  rights  to  human  beings  .  .  .  we 
affirm,  as  we  have  in  the  past,  that  there  is  nothing  in 
science  that  justifies  the  denial  of  opportunities  or  rights 
to  any  group  by  virtue  of  race. 

Such  are  the  conclusions  of  two  leading  scien- 
tific organizations  of  the  United  States ;  such  are 
the  conclusions  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  and  of  the  overwhelming  majority  of  its 
people.  We  are  convinced  that  in  the  partnership 
of  races,  and  not  in  the  separation  of  races,  lies 
the  secret  of  a  harmonious  and  successful  multi- 
racial society. 

I  regret  to  note  that  the  situation  in  South 
Africa  has  not  improved  since  our  consideration 
of  this  question  last  year.  Indeed,  the  passage 
this  year  by  the  South  African  Parliament  of 
the  General  Law  Amendment  Bill,  popularly 
known  as  the  Sabotage  Bill,  can  only  further  dim 
prospects  for  progress.  The  outside  world  was 
shocked — and  rightly  so — by  this  act  with  its 
vague  and  sweeping  terms  and  its  broad  provi- 
sions for  trials  without  jury  and  its  harsh 
penalties. 

The  passage  of  tliis  act  has  not  stilled  the  voice 
of  protest  within  the  Kepublic  of  South  Africa. 
Hundreds  of  South  Africans  have  been  imprisoned 
for  peacefully  affirming  in  their  own  land  what 
this  Assembly  would  regard  as  the  basic  rights 
of  mankind.  Let  me  take  this  occasion  to  offer 
these  brave  men  and  women  our  sympathy  and 
respect.  In  the  end  it  will  be  the  South  Africans 
themselves — black,  colored,  and  white — who  must 
bring  about  the  change  which  will  allow  all  races 
to  dwell  together  in  mutual  amity. 

What  the  U.N.  Can  Do 

But  these  men  and  women  deserve  more  than 
sympathy.  It  is  incumbent  on  us  here  today  to 
consider  what  we  can  do,  as  members  of  the  United 
Nations  and  as  representatives  of  individual  states, 
to  convince  the  Government  of  South  Africa  that 
apartheid  is  wrong,  that  it  cannot  succeed,  and  that 
its  abandonment  is  indispensable  for  the  future  of 
all  the  peoples  of  South  Africa.  I  would  add  that 
its  abandonment  would  aid  the  continent  as  a 
whole :  for  apartheid  does  more  than  separate  the 
races  within  South  Africa;  it  also  separates  South 
Africa  from  the  rest  of  Africa  and  denies  that 


792 


Deporfmenf  of  Sfa/e  Bulletin 


nation  the  opportunity  to  make  the  contribution 
it  might  make  to  the  development  and  progress 
of  all  Africa. 

We  believe  that  tliis  committee  and  the  General 
Assembly  should  begin  by  reaffirming  its  condem- 
nation of  apartheid  and  by  declaring  again  that 
it  is  South  Africa's  solemn  duty  to  bring  its  racial 
policies  into  conformity  with  the  charter. 

We  believe  further  that  the  Assembly  must 
again  urge  the  Government  of  South  Africa  to 
meet  its  obligations  to  the  charter  with  respect  to 
the  treatment  of  peoples  of  Indian  and  Indo-Pak- 
istan  origin. 

We  believe  that  the  nations  represented  here 
must  take  every  opportunity  to  make  known  to 
the  Government  of  South  Africa  the  sentiments 
of  the  world  community,  and  we  believe  that  any 
resolution  to  be  adopted  must  call  on  individual 
states  to  exert  as  much  influence  as  they  can  on 
that  Government. 

I  would  propose  that  member  states  be  instructed 
to  report  back  to  the  18th  General  Assembly  the 
steps  they  actually  have  taken  to  influence  South 
Africa  to  abandon  these  regressive  policies.  Such 
reports  will  enable  the  Assembly  to  determine 
more  accurately  the  actual  effect  of  various  meas- 
!"'  ares  which  might  be  used  to  hasten  apartheid's 
'  inevitable  end. 

Finally,  in  recognition  of  the  explosive  charac- 
ter of  affairs  in  South  Africa,  we  suggest  that 
the  Security  Council  be  requested  to  maintain  a 
close  and  continuing  watch  on  the  situation  as  one 
which  might  precipitate  a  serious  threat  to  world 
peace  and  security. 

U.S.  Opposes  Application  of  Sanctions 

Some  nations  have  raised  the  question  of  the 
application  of  sanctions  to  South  Africa.  But 
would  the  passage  of  a  resolution  recommending 
sanctions  bring  about  the  practical  result  we  seek? 
We  do  not  believe  this  would  bring  us  closer  to 
our  objective — the  abandonment  of  apartheid  in 
South  Africa.  We  see  little  value  in  a  resolution 
which  would  be  primarily  a  means  for  a  discharge 
of  our  own  emotions,  which  woidd  be  unlikely  to  be 
fully  implemented,  and  which  calls  for  measures 
which  could  be  easily  evaded  by  the  country  to 
hich  they  are  addressed — with  the  result  of  call- 
g  into  question  the  whole  efficacy  of  the  sanction 
Iprocess. 


The  hard  fact  is  that  in  answer  to  such  a  resolu- 
tion sanctions  would  be  applied  only  partially, 
feebly,  and  ineffectually.  Supplies  cut  off  from 
one  source  could  be  easily  furnished  from  other 
sources.  I  could  not  sympathize  more  with  the 
sense  of  frustration  which  lies  behind  the  appeal 
for  sanctions,  but  I  submit  that  that  frustration 
would  be  exacerbated  by  the  adoption  of  a  pro- 
gram inlierently  doomed  to  failure. 

What  would  be  the  impact  on  the  United 
Nations  and  its  members  of  the  adoption  of  such  a 
resolution,  unimplemented  by  many  members? 

For  one  thing,  bitterness  might  arise  between 
members  as  to  who  is  and  who  is  not  fully  com- 
plying with  the  resolution,  with  a  resulting  unfor- 
timate  disunion  which  would  benefit  only  South 
African  apartheid. 

But,  more  important,  the  adoption  of  a  sanctions 
resolution  which  would  not  be  fully  implemented 
and  which  would  not  achieve  the  desired  result 
would  seriously  weaken  the  authority  of  the 
United  Nations,  debase  the  effectiveness  of  its 
resolutions,  and  generally  impair  its  reputation. 
This  is  something  which  I  am  sure  that  all  of  us, 
particularly  the  smaller  nations,  would  wish  to 
avoid.  We  should  all  recall  that  the  decline  of  the 
League  of  Nations  was  precipitated  in  large  part 
by  its  inability  to  make  good  on  a  resolve  to  apply 
sanctions. 

Members  of  this  committee  will  recall  that  last 
year  the  General  Assembly  adopted.  With  near  una- 
nimity, a  resolution  ^  which  called  on  all  members 
to  take  such  individual  or  collective  actions  to  end 
apartheid  as  were  open  to  them  in  conformity  with 
the  charter.  The  United  States  has  supported 
that  resolution  and  has  complied  with  it.  We  be- 
lieve that  each  member  state  can  and  should  take 
measures  which,  given  its  particular  circum- 
stances, will  be  most  effective  to  bring  about  the 
result  that  we  all  desire.  There  is,  however,  a 
vital  distinction,  both  practically  and  in  terms  of 
the  charter,  between  such  a  resolution  and  a  reso- 
lution recommending  specific  sanctions,  such  as  the 
one  which  the  General  Assembly  rejected  last 
year.  The  latter  type  the  United  States  will  con- 
tinue to  oppose. 

The  call  for  sanctions  is  based  on  the  natural  but 
insubstantial  hope  that  there  is  a  shortcut  to  the 


^U.N.  doc.  A/RES/1663  (XVI). 


HNovember   19,    1962 


793 


solution  of  the  terrible  problem  of  apartheid. 
Similarly  the  expulsion  of  South  Africa  from  the 
United  Nations  has  been  suggested  as  a  way  of 
dealing  with  apartheid;  but  the  practical  result  of 
expelling  South  Africa  would  be  to  remove  its 
Government  from  the  one  jilace  where  the  full 
weight  of  world  opinion  can  be  brought  to  bear  on 
it.  We  believe  that  apartheid  can  be  ended,  not 
by  the  contraction  of  relationships  between  South 
Africans — black,  colored,  or  white — and  the  rest 
of  the  world  but  on  the  enlargement  of  those  re- 
lationsliips  and  by  the,  full  and  continued  exposure 
of  the  South  African  Government  to  world 
opinion. 

Ending  apartheid  will  not,  we  believe,  be 
achieved  by  any  one  or  another  dramatic  action 
but  only  by  the  steady  and  repeated  impact  of  the 
mobilized  conscience  of  the  world  community,  and 
we  call  on  all  nations  to  continue  to  mobilize  the 
influence  of  world  opinion  on  South  Africa. 

My  own  Government  fully  recognizes  its  duty 
to  mankind,  as  well  as  to  this  organization,  to  try 
to  bring  the  South  African  Government  to  change 
its  disastrous  policy. 

To  be  concrete,  the  United  States  has  already 
adopted  and  is  enforcing  the  policy  of  forbidding 
the  sale  to  the  South  African  Government  of  any 
arms,  whether  from  governmental  or  commercial 
sources,  which  could  be  used  by  that  Government 
to  enforce  apartheid  either  in  South  Africa  or  in 
the  administration  of  South-West  Africa.  Fur- 
thermore, my  Government  has  made  and  will  con- 
tinue to  make  ofRcial  representations  to  the  South 
African  Government  on  all  aspects  of  apartheid. 
It  has  told  and  will  continue  to  tell  that  Govern- 
ment that  it  owes  it  to  the  world,  to  its  obligations 
under  the  cliarter,  and  to  the  welfare  of  its  own 
people  to  abandon  apartheid.  We  call  on  all  na- 
tions to  join  with  us  in  speaking  in  a  single  voice 
to  express  the  world  community's  condemnation  of 
apartheid  and  its  concern  lest  the  continuation  of 
South  African  policies  lead  to  bloodshed,  wai",  and 
disaster  for  all  races. 

The  Republic  of  South  Africa  must  pay  full 
heed  to  the  lessons  of  history.  No  country,  what- 
ever its  system  of  repression,  can  hope  to  stifle 
forever  the  human  need  for  freedom  and  dignity. 
No  government  can  hope  to  resist  the  onward 
march  of  history  toward  the  goal  of  human  libera- 
tion for  all  men.' 


U.S.  Makes  Pledge  to  U.N.  Technical 
Assistance  and  Special  Fund 

Statement  l)y  Philip  M.  Klutznich 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations  ^  < 

The  United  States  has  given  active  and  tangible 
support,  to  the  Expanded  Program  of  Technical 
Assistance  and  the  Special  Fund  from  the  earliest 
days  of  their  formulation  and  development. 
These  activities  are  designed  to  meet  the  needs  of 
tlie  developing  countries.  They  are  elements  of 
significant  and  growing  importance  to  tlie  United 
Nations  Development  Decade. 

Wlien  the  pledging  conference  convened  a  year 
ago,  the  United  Nations  Development  Decade  was 
but  a  proposal.  Today,  a  year  later,  by  virtue  of 
Eesolution  1710  of  the  16th  General  Assembly  and 
Resolution  916  of  the  34th  session  of  ECOSOC, 
the  challenge  of  the  Decade  of  Development  has 
been  accepted ;  the  broad  framework  of  the  great 
task  before  us  has  been  developed.  Hence  it  was 
my  privilege  to  say  in  Committee  II  [Economic 
and  Financial]  2  weeks  ago :  ^ 

We  shall  be  judged  from  this  point  forth  not  by  the 
brilliance  of  our  words  but  by  the  meticulous  care  and 
painstaking  labor  with  which  we  utilize  the  tools  already 
at  our  hands.  We  are  leaving  the  area  of  broad  and  com- 
prehensive canopies  and  entering  into  the  prosaic  and 
difficult  arena  of  execution  and  performance. 

Tlie  target  of  $150  million  for  the  combined  Ex- 
panded Program  of  Teclmical  Assistance  and  Spe- 
cial Fund  was  accepted  by  the  15th  General  As- 
sembly. In  Resolution  1715  of  the  16th  General 
Assembly  entitled  "United  Nations  Development 
Decade"  the  importance  of  this  goal  was  reem- 


'  During  the  vote  in  plenary  session  on  Nov.  6  on  the 
resolution  on  apartheid  (U.N.  doc.  A/SPC/L.83)  a  motion 
by  Colombia  for  a  separate  vote  on  paragraphs  4  and  8, 
recommending  the  application  of  specific  sanctions  and 
Security  Council  action  on  expulsion,  was  defeated  by  a 
vote  of  49  ( U.S. )  to  52,  with  5  abstentions.  The  resolution 
was  sul)seijuontly  adopted  by  a  vote  of  67  to  16  (U.S.), 
with  23  abstentions. 

'  Made  on  Oct.  16  at  the  pledging  conference  on  the 
Expanded  Program  of  Technical  Assistance  and  the  Spe- 
cial Fund  ( U.S./U.N.  press  release  4066) . 

'  For  text,  see  U.S.  delegation  press  release  4050  dated 
Oct.  3. 


794 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


phasized.    This  year  we  again  call  for  its  attain- 
ment.    Its  fulfillment  would   be  one  important 
means  of  strengthening  the  economic  and  social 
development  work  of  the  United  Nations  during 
this  decade.    Words  alone  will  not  meet  the  goal. 
Resolutions,  so  readily  sponsored  and  adopted  in 
many  forums,  for  more  of  any  necessary  activity 
under  the  Expanded  Program  of  Teclmical  Assist- 
ance or  the  Special   Fund,  will  not  create  the 
means.    Only  by  providing  added  resources  can 
we  demonstrate  clearly  our  dedication  t-o  and  the 
confirmation  of  our  words.    Through  our  pledges 
we  can  help  achieve  the  full  potential  of  these  in- 
't  struments  for  economic  and  social  development. 
We  have  been  heartened  therefore  by  the  sub- 
tantial  increases  over  last  year's  pledges  which 
have  been  announced  by  a  number  of  governments, 
including  the  Netherlands,  Denmark,  the  United 
Kingdom. 
As  another  act  of  faith  in  the  United  Nations 
)£  Development  Decade,  my  Government  pledges  a 
^  jontribution    of    $60    million   to    the    combined 
^  budgets  of  the  Expanded  Program  of  Technical 
Assistance  and  the  Special  Fund  for  1963.    As  in 
the  past  our  contribution  is  subject  to  the  limita- 
tion that  the  United  States  contribution  will  not 
:xceed  40  percent  of  contributions  to  the  central 
«ii  account  by  governments,  including  assessed  and 
audited  local  costs. 

Recognizing  that  the  effective  implementation 
of  these  important  programs  requires  not  only 
pledges  but  also  prompt  payments  to  fulfill  those 
pledges  by  all  member  governments,  the  United 
'!*  States  Government  will  match  1963  pledges  an- 
^'  noimced  at  this  pledging  conference  and  subse- 
quently up  to  December  31,  1963,  the  end  of  the 
*  financial  period,  provided  those  pledges  are  actu- 
ally fulfilled  by  payments  into  the  central  account 
during  the  ensuing  2  years,  i.e.  payments  received 
by  December  31, 1965.    Tliis  automatically  consti- 
*|tutes  a  substantial  increase  in  our  contribution. 
Thus  the  United  States  is  once  more  prepared 
to  do  its  share.    We  hope  that  other  governments 
represented  here  find  themselves  in  a  similar  posi- 
tion.   It  is  our  earnest  hope  that  we  shall  in  tliis 
way  help  to  meet  the  challenge  of  the  United  Na- 
tions Development  Decade — a  symbolic  name  to 
capsulize  man's  determination  to  eliminate  the 
ravages  of  poverty,  disease,  and  illiteracy  from 
the  face  of  the  globe. 

leljf  November   19,   J  962 


William  B.  Dale  Appointed 
U.S.  Executive  Director,  IMF 

The  President  on  November  1  announced  the 
recess  appointment  of  William  B.  Dale  to  be  the 
United  States  Executive  Director  of  the  Inter- 
national Monetary  Fund  for  a  term  of  2  years. 
For  biographic  details,  see  "Wliite  House  press 
release  dated  November  1. 


U.S.  Formally  Adheres  to  IMF 
General  Borrowing  Arrangements 

The  International  Monetary  Fmid  announced 
on  October  24  that  its  resources  had  been  aug- 
mented by  the  formal  adherence  on  that  day  of  the 
Govermnent  of  the  United  States  to  the  Fund's 
general  arrangements  to  borrow.^  The  United 
States  commitment  of  up  to  $2,000  million  raises 
to  the  equivalent  of  $5,650  million  the  amounts  so 
far  committed  by  the  leading  industrial  nations 
of  the  world  that  have  already  adhered  to  the 
Fund's  arrangements. 

The  Fund's  general  arrangements  to  borrow  be- 
came effective  on  receipt  of  the  United  States  ad- 
herence, which  raises  the  total  commitments  above 
the  level  of  $5.5  billion  necessary  for  bringing  the 
arrangements  into  effect.  Commitments  have  al- 
ready been  made  by  the  Governments  of  France, 
Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands,  and  the  United 
Kingdom  and  by  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  and 
Sveriges  Riksbank.  The  Governments  of  Bel- 
gium and  Canada  are  also  expected  to  announce 
their  formal  adherence  when  legislative  approval 
has  been  obtained,  and  this  will  bring  total  com- 
mitments to  the  equivalent  of  $6  billion. 

A  main  reason  why  the  Fmid  had  sought  these 
additional  resources  was  to  equip  it  better  for  deal- 
ing with  possible  sudden  and  substantial  shifts 
of  fimds  from  one  country  to  another.  The  coun- 
tries participating  in  the  borrowing  arrangements 
have  undertaken  to  lend  their  own  currencies  to 
the  Fund  up  to  certain  stated  amoimts,  if  this 
becomes  necessary  to  forestall  or  cope  with  an 
impairment  of  the  international  monetary  sys- 
tem. It  will  thus  be  possible  in  these  circum- 
stances to  arrange  for  the  prompt  mobilization  of 
the  resources  needed  to  deal  effectively  with  the 
situation. 


■  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  29,  1962,  p.  187. 


795 


Requests  for  drawings  which  would  involve  use 
of  these  arrangements  will  be  assessed  according 
to  the  Fund's  establislied  policies  and  practice,s  on 
the  use  of  its  resources,  and  any  currency  drawn 
by  a  member  from  the  Fund's  supplementary  re- 
sources will  be  repayable  to  the  Fund  as  and  when 
the  member's  problem  is  solved  and  in  any  event 
within  3  to  5  years.  Wlien  the  Fund  receives  re- 
payment, it  will  in  its  turn  repay  the  countries 
that  made  supplementary  resources  available  for 
the  drawing,  but  a  country  that  has  lent  to  the 
Fund  may  receive  earlier  repayment  if  its  own 
payments  position  deteriorates.  The  Fund  will 
pay  a  charge  of  one-half  of  1  percent  on  each  bor- 
rowing transaction  and  also  interest  on  the  re- 
sources lent  to  it  based  on  a  formula  which  at 
present  yields  a  rate  of  li/^  percent  per  annum. 

These  provisions  were  incorporated  in  a  deci- 
sion which  the  Fund  adopted  and  published  in 
January  of  this  year.  Tliis  decision  also  provides 
that  the  arrangements  are  to  remain  in  effect  for 
4  years  and  may  be  extended.  The  amounts  in- 
cluded in  the  arrangement  and  the  countries  par- 
ticipating may  be  reviewed  from  time  to  time  and 
altered  with  the  agreement  of  the  Fund  and  all 
participants. 


Three  Fishery  Groups  Designated 
Public  International  Organizations 

AN    EXECUTIVE    ORDER' 

Designating  Public  International  Organizations  En- 
titled To  Enjoy  Certain  Privileges,  Exemptions,  and 
Immunities 

Whereas  the  Inter-American  Tropical  Tuna  Commis- 
sion is  an  international  organization  in  which  the  United 
States  participates  pursuant  to  the  Convention  with  Costa 
Rica  for  the  Establishment  of  an  Inter-American  Tropical 
Tuna  Commission,  May  31,  1949,  1  UST  230,  TIAS  2014; 
and 

Whereas  the  Great  Lakes  Fishery  Commission  is  an  in- 
ternational organization  in  which  the  United  States  par- 
ticipates pursuant  to  the  Convention  with  Canada  for  the 
Establishment  of  a  Great  LaUes  Fishery  Commission, 
September  10,  1954,  6  UST  2836 ;  TIAS  .3326 ;  and 

Whereas  the  International  Pacific  Halibut  Commission 
is  an  international  organization  in  which  the  United 
States  participates  pursuant  to  the  Convention  with  Can- 
ada for  the  Preservation  of  the  Halibut  Fishery  of  the 
Northern  Pacific  Ocean  and  Bering  Sea,  March  2,  19Ji3, 
5  UST  5 ;  TIAS  2900,  being  the  last  of  a  series  of  similar 
treaties  dating  from  1923: 


'  No.  11059 ;  27  Fed.  Reg.  1O105. 
796 


Now,  therefore,  by  virtue  of  the  authority  vested  in  me 
by  Section  1  of  the  International  Organizations  Immuni- 
ties Act  (59  Stat.  669;  22  U.S.C.  288),  I  hereby  designate 
the  Inter-American  Tropical  Tuna  Commission,  the  Great 
Lakes  Fishery  Commission,  and  the  International  Pacific 
Halibut  Commission  as  public  international  organizations 
entitled  to  enjoy  the  privileges,  exemptions,  and  immuni- 
ties conferred  by  the  International  Organizations  Immu- 
nities Act,  except  those  conferred  pursuant  to  Sections 
4(b),  4(e),  and  5(a)  of  that  Act. 

The  designation  of  the  above-named  international  or- 
ganizations as  public  international  organizations  within 
the  meaning  of  the  International  Organizations  Immuni- 
ties Act  is  not  intended  to  abridge  in  any  respect  priv- 
ileges, exemptions,  and  immunities  which  these  organiza- 
tions may  have  acquired  or  may  acquire  by  treaty  or  con- 
gressional action. 


I 


/(LJ  L.^ 


The  White  House, 
October  23,  1962. 


Current  U.N.  Documents: 
A  Selected  Bibliography 


Mimeographed  or  processed  documents  (such  as  those 
listed  hclow)  may  he  consulted  at  depo.fitory  libraries  in 
the  United  States.  U.N.  printed  publications  may  he 
purchased  from  the  Sales  Section  of  the  United  Nations, 
United  Nations  Plaza,  New  York. 

Economic  and  Social  Councii 

Observations  on  the  U.N.  work  program  in  the  economic, 

social,    and   human   rights   fields.     E/3657.     June    15, 

1962.     54  pp. 
Strengthening  of  U.N.  advisory  services  in  the  field  of 

industrial    development.     E/3656.     June    21,    19G2.     6 

pp. 
Questions  Relating  to  Science  and  Technology.     Text  of 

general  recommendations  of  the  UNESCO  Seismological 

Survey  Mission  to  the  Mediterranean  and  Middle  East. 

E/3617/Add.  1.     June  27, 1962.    7  pp. 
Advisory  Services  in  the  Field  of  Human  Rights.     Report 

by   the   Secretary-General.     E/3634/Add.    1.     June  29, 

1962.     2  pp. 
Proposals  for  action  on  the  U.N.  Development  Decade. 

E/3G13/Add.  3,  June  28,  1962,  6  pp.,  and  E/3613/Corr.  1, 

July  6, 1962, 1  p. 

Trusteeship  Council 

Observations  by  UNESCO  on  the  annual  report  on  the 
Trust  Territory  of  Ruanda-Urundi  under  Belgian  ad- 
ministration for  the  year  1960.  T/1592.  May  29,  1962, 
15  pp. 

Dissemination  of  Information  on  the  United  Nations  and 
the  International  Trusteeship  System  in  Trust  Terri- 
tories. Report  of  the  Secretary-General.  T/1593. 
Junel,19G2.    8  pp. 

Offers  by  Member  States  of  Study  and  Training  Facilitiee- 
for   Inhaliitants  of  Trust  Territories.     Report  by  th( 
Secretary-General.     T/1596.     June  13,  19<52.     10  pp. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


k 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


United    States    and    Japan    Conclude 
Shellfish  Sanitation  Agreement 

Press  release  641  dated  October  24 

The  United  States  and  Japan  signed  an  agree- 
ment on  October  24  directed  toward  improving 
sanitation  standards  and  practices  in  the  produc- 
tion and  handling  of  fresh  or  frozen  oysters,  clams, 
and  mussels  intended  for  shipment  between  the 
two  coimtries. 

The  agreement  provides  for  establisliment  of 
mutually  acceptable  sanitation  standards,  the  ex- 
change of  iiiformation  on  the  state  of  compliance 
with  sanitation  standards  by  industries  of  the  re- 
spective countries,  and  a  system  of  certification 
for  fresh  or  frozen  oysters,  clams,  and  mussels 
shipped  from  Japan  to  the  United  States.  The 
agreement  is  similar  to  the  U.S.-Canada  shellfish 
sanitation  agreement  signed  in  1948.^ 

Signing  the  agreement  on  behalf  of  the  United 
States  was  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Far 
Eastern  Affairs  W.  Averell  Harriman,  and  for 
Japan  was  Ambassador  of  Japan  to  the  United 
States  Koichiro  Asakai.  Subsidiary  implementing 
arrangements  were  signed  by  Luther  L.  Terry, 
Surgeon  General  of  the  U.S.  Public  Health  Serv- 
ice, and  Yoshihiko  Hasegawa,  Counselor  of  the 
Embassy  of  Japan. 


15 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Atomic  Energy 

Amendment  to  article  VI.A.3  of  the  Statute  of  the  Inter- 
national Atomic  Energy  Agency  (TIAS  3873).    Done  at 
Vienna,  October  4,  1961.' 
Acceptances  deposited:  Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  October  31, 

1962;    El    Salvador,    October    27,    1962;    Ukrainian 

S.S.R.,  October  31,  1962. 

Automotive  Traffic 

Convention  on  road  traflBe  and  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva 
September  19, 1949.  Entered  into  force  March  26,  1952. 
TIAS  2487. 


1  Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  1747. 
'  Not  in  force. 

November   19,   ?962 


Notification   received   that   it   considers  itself  bound: 
Central  African  Republic,  September  4,  1962. 

Copyright 

Universal  copyright  convention.     Done  at  Geneva  Septem- 
ber 6,   1952.     Entered  into  force  September  16,  1955. 
TIAS  3324. 
Ratification  deposited:  Norway,  October  23,  1962. 

Protocol  1  to  the  universal  copyright  convention  concern- 
ing the  application  of  that  convention  to  the  works  of 
stateless  persons  and  refugees.  Done  at  Geneva  Sep- 
tember 6,  1952.  Entered  into  force  September  16,  1955. 
TIAS  3324. 
Ratification  deposited:  Norway,  October  23,  1962. 

Protocol  2  to  the  universal  copyright  convention  concern- 
ing the  application  of  that  convention  to  the  works  of 
certain  international  organizations.  Done  at  Geneva 
September  6,  1952.  Entered  into  force  September  16, 
19.j5.  TIAS  3324. 
Ratification  deposited:  Norway,  October  23,  1962. 

Protocol  3  to  the  universal  copyright  convention  concern- 
ing the  effective  date  of  instruments  of  ratification  or 
acceptance  of  or  accession  to  that  convention.  Done  at 
Geneva  September  6,  1952.  Entered  into  force  August 
19,  1954.  TIAS  3324. 
Ratification  deposited:  Norway,  October  23,  1962. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  convention  with  six  an- 
nexes.    Done  at  Geneva  December  21,  1959.     Entered 
into  force  January  1,  1961 ;  for  the  United  States  Octo- 
ber 23,  1961.     TIAS  4892. 
Ratification  deposited:  Ireland,  October  1,  1962. 

Weatlier 

Convention   of   the   World   Meteorological   Organization. 
Done  at  Washington  October  11,  1947.     Entered  into 
force  March  23,  1950.     TIAS  2052. 
Accession  deposited:  Burundi,  October  30,  1962. 

Wheat 

International  wheat  agreement,  1962.  Opened  for  signa- 
ture at  Washington  April  19  through  May  1.5,  1962. 
Entered  into  force  July  16,  1962,  for  part  I  and  parts 
III  to  VII,  and  August  1,  1962,  for  part  II.  TIAS  5115. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Cuba,  October  31,  1962. 
Ratification  deposited:  United  Arab  Republic,  October 
30,  1962. 


BILATERAL 
Brazil 

Agreement  amending  the  agricultural  commodities  agree- 
ment of  March  15,  1962  (TIAS  5061).  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  October  4,  1962. 
Entered  into  force  October  4, 1962. 

Canada 

Agreement  concerning  the  coordination  and  use  of  radio 
frequencies  above  30  megacycles  per  second,  with  an- 
nex. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Ottawa  October 
24,  1962.     Entered  into  force  October  24, 1962. 

Colombia 

Agreement  relating  to  investment  guaranties.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bogotil  October  5,  1962.  En- 
tered into  force  October  5,  1962. 

Japan 

Agreement  providing  for  Japanese  financial  contributions 
for  U.S.  administrative  and  related  expenses  during 
Japanese  fiscal  year  1962  under  the  Mutual  Defense 
Assistance  Agreement  of  March  S,  1954  (TIAS  2957). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo  October  19, 
1962.     Entered  into  force  October  19, 1962. 


797 


PUBLICATIONS 


German  War  Documents  Volume 
Released  by  Department 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  October  25 
(press  release  624  dated  October  15)  the  release  of 
Documents  on  German  Foreign  Polioij,  1918-19.^5,  Series 
D,  Volume  XII,  The  War  Years,  February  1-June  22,  19^1. 
Together  with  the  three  volumes  of  series  C  already  re- 
leased, the  present  volume  represents  the  15th  to  be 
prepared  and  published  by  the  cooperative  project  of  the 
United  States,  Great  Britain,  and  France  for  the  publi- 
cation of  documents  from  the  captured  archives  of  the 
former  German  Foreign  Office. 

The  volume  begins  vrith  February  1,  1941,  following 
the  conclusion  of  a  series  of  economic  and  political  agree- 
ments between  Germany  and  Soviet  Russia.  It  termi- 
nates with  June  22,  when  the  German  armies  opened  their 
attack  on  Bussia,  and  Ribbentrop,  in  the  early  morning 
hours,  announced  the  fact  to  the  representatives  of 
powers  friendly  to  Germany  and  to  newspaper  corre- 
spondent.?. 

The  675  documents  of  this  volume  are  printed  in  chrono- 
logical order,  but  the  analytical  list  of  papers  presents 
them  by  topic,  enabling  the  reader  easily  to  follow  any 
main  subject. 

As  has  been  the  practice  in  this  series,  the  selection 
of  documents  has  been  made  jointly  by  the  British, 
French,  and  U.S.  editors,  who  share  responsibility  for 
the  selections  made.  Under  a  reciprocal  arrangement, 
some  of  the  volumes  are  edited  and  printed  by  the  British 
and  some  by  the  U.S.  Government.  This  volume  has  been 
edited  by  the  U.S.  editors  and  printed  at  the  Government 
Printing  Office.  A  British  edition  bound  from  flat  sheets 
printed  at  the  Government  Printing  Office  is  being  re- 
leased simultaneously  in  the  United  Kingdom. 

Copies  of  the  volume.  Department  of  State  publication 
7384,  can  be  obtained  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington  25, 
D.C.,  for  .?4.50  each. 

Recent  Releases 

For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Oov- 
ernment  Printing  Offloe,  Washington  25,  D.C.  Address 
regucJits  direct  to  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  ex- 
cept in  the  case  of  free  publications,  which  may  be 
obtained  from,  the  Department  of  State. 

General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade — Analysis  of 
United  States  Negotiations,  1960-61  Tariff  Conference, 
Geneva,  Switzerland.  Vol.  III.  Analysis  of  reciprociU 
negotiations  with  Cambodia,  Haiti,  India  and  Japan ; 
Consolidated  Schedule  of  Concessions  granted  by  tlie 
United  States.  Pub.  7408.  Commercial  Policy  Series  194. 
152  pp.    45i. 

Information  and  Travel  Tips  (Revised).  Pa.';sport  Infor- 
mation folder.  Pub.  7391).  Department  and  Foreign 
Service  Series  106.    4  pp.     Limited  distribution. 

798 


Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  the  Republic 
of  China— Signed  at  Taipei  April  27,  1962.  Entered  into 
force  April  27,  1962.  With  exchange  of  notes.  TIAS  5010. 
17  pp.     10<;. 

Aviation — Transport  Services.  Agreement  with  In- 
donesia— extending  the  agreement  of  February  2  and 
March  2,  19.59,  as  extended.  Exchange  of  notes — Dated 
at  Djakarta  February  27  and  April  17,  1962.  Entered 
into  force  April  17,  1962.     TIAS  5012.     3  pp.     5<f. 

Whaling.  Amendments  to  the  Schedule  to  the  Interna- 
tiiinal  Whaling  Convention — Signed  at  Wa.shington  on 
December  2,  1946.  Adopted  at  the  Twelfth  Meeting  of 
the  International  Whaling  Commission,  London,  June  24, 

1960.  Entered  into  force  January  23,  1961,  and  January 
26,  1961.    TIAS  5014.    4  pp.  5^ 

Whaling.  Amendments  to  the  Schedule  to  the  Interna- 
tional Whaling  Convention — Signed  at  Washington  on 
December  2,  1946.  Adopted  at  the  Thirteenth  Meeting  of 
the  International  Whaling  Commission,  London,  June  23, 

1961.  Entered  into  force  September  27,  1961.  TIAS  5015. 
2  pp.     5«J. 

Peace  Corps  Program.  Agreement  with  the  Somali  Re- 
public. Exchange  of  notes — Signed  at  Mogadiscio  March 
29  and  April  17,  1962.  Entered  into  force  April  17,  1962. 
TIAS  5016.     5  pp.     5^. 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  October  29-November  4 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office  of 
News,  Department  of  State,  Washington  25,  D.C. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  October  29  which  appear 
in  this  issue  of  the  Buxxetin  are  Nos.  023  of  Octo- 
ber 16 ;  024  of  October  15 ;  630  of  October  18 ;  and 
641  of  October  24. 

No.       Date  Subject 

*643     10/29     U.S.    participation    in    international 

conferences. 
047     10/29     Philippines  credentials  (rewrite). 
648     10/29     Trinidad  and  Tobago  credentials  (re- 
write). 

*649  10/31  Miner  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Trinidad  and  Tobago  (bic^raphic 
details). 

*650  10/30  Wine  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to  the 
Republic  of  Ivory  Coast  (bio- 
graphic  details). 

651  10/31     Delegates  to  civil  aviation  talks  with 

Iceland  (rewrite). 

652  10/31     Rusk :  assistance  to  Ryukyu  Islands. 
6.53     11/2       Yugoslavia  credentials   (rewrite). 

*654  11/2  Mrs.  Norrell  appointed  Deputy  Assist- 
ant Secretary  for  Educational  and 
Cultural  Affairs  (biographic  de- 
tails). 

t655  11/1  Williams:  "Education:  The  Chal- 
lenge for  the  Future  in  Africa." 

♦6.56  11/2  Williams  :  First  Friday  Club  of  Rose- 
ville,  Mich. 

*6.57  11/2  Fredericks:  "Africa  in  the  Interna- 
tional Setting." 

658  11/2      Cleveland  :  "Power  and  Diplomacy." 

659  11/2      U.S.-Iceland  air  talks. 

660  11/3      Chayes  :  legal  case  on  Cuba. 

661  11/3      U.S.  grant  to  Congo. 

•Not  printed. 

tlleld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


Department  of  Stale  Bulletin 


November  19,  1962 

American  Principles.  Power  and  Diplomacy 
(Cleveland) 

American  Republics 

Ihe  Experience  of  the  United  States  in  Economic 
Development:  Its  Relevance  for  Latin  America 
(Mann) 

["lie  Legal  Case  for  U.S.  Action  on  Cuba  (Cliayes)  . 

Power  and  Diplomacy   (Cleveland) 

Prade  Problems  and  the  Alliance  for  Progress 
(Blumeuthal) 

Aviation.  United  States  and  Iceland  Hold  Talks 
on  Air  Services 

China,  Communist.  U.N.  Again  Rejects  Soviet  Pro- 
posal To  Seat  Communist  China   (Stevenson)     . 

;ongo  (L^opoldville).  U.S.  Grants  $25  MilUon  to 
Congo  for  Import  Financing 

longress.  President  Sends  IPU  Conference  Mes- 
sage on  Threats  to  World  Peace 


Cuba 

rhe  Legal  Case  for  U.S.  Action  on  Cuba  (Chayes)  . 

Power  and  Diplomacy   (Cleveland) 

President  Reports  on  Dismantling  of  Soviet  Missile 
Bases  in  Cuba  (Kennedy) 

Economic  Affairs 

SVilliam  B.  Dale  Appointed  U.S.  Executive  Director, 
IMP 

rhe  Exijerience  of  the  United  States  in  Economic 
Development :  Its  Relevance  for  Latin  America 
(Mann) 

Prade  Problems  and  the  Alliance  for  Progress 
(Blumenthal) 

Dnited  States  and  Japan  Conclude  Shellfish  Sanita- 
tion Agreement 

U.S.  Formally  Adheres  to  IMF  General  Borrowing 
Arrangements 

Foreign  Aid 

Discussions  Resumed  With  Japan  on  Economic  Aid 

to  Ryuliyus   (Rusk) 

Prade    Problems    and    the   AUiance    for   Progress 

(Blumenthal) 

U.S.    Grants    $25    Million    to    Congo    for    Import 

Financing 

U.S.  Makes  Pledge  to  U.N.  Technical  Assistance  and 

Special   Fund    (Klutznick) 

Sermany.  German  War  Documents  Volume  Re- 
leased by  Department 

Sealth,  Education,  and  Welfare.  United  States  and 
Japan  Conclude  Shellfish  Sanitation  Agreement  . 

Suman  Rights.  U.N.  Considers  Problem  of  Racial 
DLscrimination  in  South  Africa  (Plimpton)     .     . 

[celand.  United  States  and  Iceland  Hold  Talks  on 
Air  Services 

[ndonesia. 

(Jones) 

International  Law.  The  Legal  Case  for  U.S.  Action 
on  Cuba  (Chayes) 

International  Organizations  and  Conferences 

Calendar  of  International  Conferences  and  Meet- 
ings    

William  B.  Dale  Appointed  U.S.  Executive  Director, 
IMF 

President  Sends  IPU  Conference  Message  on 
Threats  to  World  Peace 

Phree  Fishery  Groups  Designated  Public  Interna- 
tional Organizations  (text  of  Executive  order)  . 


Indonesian-American  Relations  Today 


Ind 

759 

772 
763 

759 

777 

771 

786 

771 

783 

763 
759 

762 

795 

772 
777 
797 
795 

770 
777 
771 
794 

798 

797 

791 

771 

766 

763 

784 
795 
783 
796 


e  X  Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1221 

U.S.  Formally  Adheres  to  IMF  General  Borrowing 

Arrangements 795 

Japan 

Discussions  Resumed  With  Japan  on  Economic  Aid 

to  Ryukyus  (Rusk) 770 

United  States  and  Japan  Conclude  Shellfish  Sanita- 
tion Agreement 797 

Philippines.    Letters  of  Credence  (Mutuc)     .     .     .       770 

Presidential   Documents 

President  Reix)rts  on  Dismantling  of  Soviet  Missile 

Bases  in  Cuba 762 

President     Sends    IPU     Conference    Message    on 

Threats  to  World  Peace 783 

Three  Fishery  Groups  Designated  PubUc  Interna- 
tional Organizations 796 

Publications 

German  War  Documents  Volume  Released  by  De- 
partment    798 

Recent  Releases 798 

Ryukyu  Islands.  Discussions  Resumed  With  Japan 
on  Economic  Aid  to  Ryukyus  (Rusk)     ....      770 

South  Africa.     U.N.  Considers  Problem  of  Racial 

Discrimination  in  South  Africa  (Plimpton)     .     .      791 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 797 

United    States   and    Iceland   Hold    Talks    on    Air 

Services 771 

United  States  and  Japan  Conclude  Shellfish  Sanita- 
tion Agreement 797 

Trinidad     and     Tobago.       Letters     of     Credence 

(Clarke) 770 

Uganda.  Prime  Minister  of  Uganda  Visits  Wash- 
ington    770 

U.S.S.R.  President  Reports  on  Dismantling  of  So- 
viet Missile  Bases  in  Cuba  (Kennedy)     ....       762 

United  Nations 

Current  U.N.  Documents 796 

The  Legal  Case  for  U.S.  Action  on  Cuba  (Chayes)  .      763 

Power  and  Diplomacy  (Cleveland) 759 

U.N.  Again  Rejects  Soviet  Proposal  To  Seat  Com- 
munist China    (Stevenson) 786 

U.N.  Considers  Problem  of  Racial  Discrimination  in 

South  Africa   (Plimpton) 791 

United  Nations  Week   (Stevenson) 782 

U.S.    Grants    $25    Million    to    Congo    for    Import 

Financing 771 

U.S.  Makes  Pledge  to  U.N.  Technical  Assistance  and 

Special   Fund    (Klutznick) 794 

Yugoslavia.    Letters  of  Credence  (Micunovic)   .     .       770 
Name  Index 

Blumenthal,  W.  Michael 777 

Chayes,    Abram 763 

Clarke,  Ellis  Emmanuel  Innocent 770 

Cleveland,   Harlan 759 

Codacci-Pisanelli,   Giuseppe 783 

Dale,  WilUam  B 795 

Jones,  Howard  P 766 

Kennedy,   President 762,  783,  796 

Klutznick,   Philip   M 794 

Mann,  Thomas  O 772 

Micunovic,    Veljko 770 

Mutuc,  Amelito  R 770 

Obote.  A.  Milton 770 

Plimpton,  Francis  T.  P 791 

Rask,   Secretary 770 

Stevenson,  Adlai  E 782,786 


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Documents  on  German  Foreign  Policy, 
1918-1945,  Series  D,  Volume  XII, 

The  War  Years,  February  1-June  22, 1941 


Tliis  volume  begins  with  February  1, 1941,  following  tlie  conclusion 
of  a  series  of  economic  and  political  agreements  between  Germany 
and  Soviet  Russia.  It  terminates  with  June  22,  1941,  when  the  Ger- 
man armies  opened  their  attack  on  Russia  and  Reich  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  Ribbentrop  in  the  early  morning  hours  announced 
the  fact  to  the  representatives  of  powers  friendly  to  Germany  and  to 
newspaper  coiTespondents. 

The  675  documents  of  tliis  volume  are  printed  in  chronological  order 
but  the  analytical  list  of  papers  presents  them  by  topic,  enabling  the 
reader  easily  to  follow  any  main  subject. 

Copies  of  this  volume  can  be  obtained  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Wasliington  25,  D.C. 


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Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1222 


November  26,  1962 


THE    URGENT   NEED    FOR    CONGO    RECONCILIA- 

TION    •    hy  Assistant  Secretary  Williams 803 


UNITED  NATIONS  CONSIDERS  QUESTION  OF 
SUSPENSION  OF  NUCLEAR  AND  THERMO- 
NUCLEAR TESTS  •  Statement  by  Arthur  H.  Dean  and 
Text  of  Resolution 817 


THE    SINO-SOVIET  DISPUTE  •   by  Roger  Hihman  .    ...      807 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


Vol.  XL VII,  No.  1222   •   Pubucation  7457 
November  26,  1962 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

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Note:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
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be  reprinted.  Citation  of  the  Depahtment 
OF  State  Bulletin  as  the  source  will  bo 
appreciated.  The  Btn.i.ETiN  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Ouide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
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^ 


he  Urgent  Need  for  Congo  Reconciliation 


by  G.  Mennen  Williams 

Assistant  Secretary  for  African  Affairs  ' 


It  is  a  great  pleasure  to  have  had  an  opportu- 

ty  tonight  to  stroll  through  the  Yard  of  !Mr.  Jef- 

rson's  university.    His  choice  of  location  for  this 

liversity  provided  a  splendid  setting  in  which 

en  may  "follow  the  truth  wherever  it  may  lead." 

You  have  invited  me  here  to  present  your  Gov- 

nment's  view  on  the  situation  in  the  Congo.    I 

Q  happy  to  do  so  because  I  share  Mr.  Jefferson's 

ilief  that  "when  a  man  assumes  a  public  trust, 

)  should  consider  himself  as  public  property." 

The  Jeiferson  Society's  active  and  longstanding 

terest  in  the  Congo  is  well  known  to  us  in  Wash- 

gton,  and  we  have  examined  the  thoughtful  and 

teresting  booklet  authored  by  the  three  students 

pur  society  chose  to  go  to  the  Congo  last  sunnner. 

would  like  to  be  able  to  say  that  your  delegation 

id  your  Government  find  themselves  in  complete 

ijcord  as  a  result  of  that  study  mission,  but  in 

,)od  conscience  I  cannot  so  state. 

I  My  purpose  here  is  not  to  quarrel  with  the  dele- 

ation's  conclusions,   however.     Rather,   I    have 

iiught  to  find  common  ground  from  which  we  can 

love  forward  tonight.    Such  ground  is  located  in 

lie  article  by  Mr.  Sam  Garrison  of  the  University 

'  Virginia,  who  wrote : 

Continuetl  Katangese  secession  ....  by  weakening  tlie 
ntral  government,  does  create  a  climate  for  renewed 
sorder  and  rejuvenated  shatter-tendencies  in  otlier  parts 
the  Congo  which  might  eventually  endanger  the  pro- 
estern  prerogatives  of  Katanga  itself. 

On  this  ground  we  can  find  agreement,  and  I 


'  Address  made  before  the  Jefferson  Society  of  the  Uni- 
rsity  of  Virginia  at  Charlottesville,  Va..  on  Nov.  9 
iress  release  (!70). 

ovember  26,    7962 


would  like  to  use  this  statement  as  the  basis  for 
my  remarks  this  evening. 

Continued  Katangese  secession  does  indeed 
create  a  climate  for  renewed  disorder — disorder 
that  would  be  dangerous  not  only  to  the  Province 
of  Katanga  but  to  the  entire  Congo,  to  the  African 
Continent  as  a  whole,  and  to  the  peace  of  the 
world  as  well.  There  is  an  urgent  need  for  a 
rapid  end  to  the  Congo  crisis. 

Disorder  in  the  Congo  very  nearly  led  to  an 
East-West  confrontation  in  central  Africa  in  the 
early  days  of  Congolese  independence,  and  contin- 
ued disorder  keeps  alive  the  threat  of  such  a  con- 
frontation. It  was  only  through  the  medium  of 
the  United  Nations  that  such  a  showdown  was 
averted  in  1960.  The  speed  and  skill  with  which 
the  U.X.  moved  into  the  Congo  situation  as  a 
stabilizing  force — with  no  comparable  experience 
to  draw  upon,  I  might  add — makes  that  operation 
a  major  contribution  toward  the  maintenance  of 
world  peace  and  security. 

The  Republic  of  the  Congo  was  less  than  2  weeks 
old  when  the  United  Nations  received  its  urgent 
call  for  assistance.  At  that  time  part  of  the  Con- 
golese army  was  in  open  rebellion,  Belgian  troops 
had  returned  to  the  Congo  with  the  amiomiced 
intention  of  preserving  order,  and  Katanga  Prov- 
ince had  proclaimed  itself  an  independent  country. 
The  day  after  it  received  the  Congolese  request 
for  aid,  the  U.N.  Security  Council  met  in  emer- 
gency session.^     Approximately  2-i  hours  later, 


■  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Aug.  1,  1960,  p.  159, 
and  Aug.  8, 19C0,  p.  221. 

803 


the  United  Nations  had  moved  African  troops 
from  Tunisia  and  Ghana  into  the  Congo. 

During  those  early  grim  days  of  Congolese  inde- 
pendence the  situation  was  blurred  and  confused 
by  Congolese  appeals  for  aid  to  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  in  addition  to  the  United 
Nations.  The  rapid  Conmiunist  response  gave  the 
United  States  three  policy  alternatives  to  consider. 

First,  we  could  have  done  nothing  and  aban- 
doned the  Congo  as  an  unwanted  problem.  Un- 
questionably, this  would  have  led  to  continued 
chaos  and  the  strong  likelihood  that  a  Communist 
foothold  would  have  been  established  in  the  mid- 
dle of  Africa. 

Second,  we  could  have  intervened  directly  with 
sizable  numbers  of  American  troops,  leading  to 
a  direct  confrontation  between  U.S.  and  Soviet 
power  in  central  Africa. 

The  third  alternative  was  to  throw  our  total 
support  behind  a  coordinated  U.N.  military  and 
economic  eifort — an  effort  which  would  unite  the 
world  community  in  the  common  task  of  preserv- 
ing world  peace  and  security.  We  chose  this 
course  as  the  best  way  to  deter  imilateral  actions 
by  external  powers.  In  retrospect  this  course 
seems  to  have  been  the  best  possible  choice  for  our 
country. 

Since  the  U.N.  responded  to  the  Congolese  re- 
quest for  assistance,  there  has  been  visible  evidence 
of  progress  in  the  Congo.  Stability  and  order 
have  been  largely  restored  to  the  country.  Farm- 
ing and  business  have  resumed  but  are  still  below 
normal  because  of  secession.  A  moderate  parlia- 
mentary central  government  imder  Prime  Minister 
Cyrille  Adoula  has  been  formed,  and  it  is  operat- 
ing effectively  and  supported  broadly  everywhere 
except  in  Katanga.  The  pretensions  of  the  oppo- 
sition Orientale  Province  government  have  been 
ended,  and  [Antoine]  Gizenga  has  been  effectively 
neutralized.  The  Communists  have  been  barred 
from  continuing  their  direct  support  of  left-wing 
elements  in  the  Congo.  The  United  Nations  pres- 
ence has  deterred  precipitous  action  by  those  who 
favor  a  violent  solution  to  Congolese  problems. 
And,  perhaps  most  importantly,  the  U.N.  has 
served  as  a  point  of  contact  between  the  Centnil 
Government  and  the  Katanga  secessionists.  With- 
out the  United  Nations  on  the  scene,  there  would 
be  complete  chaos,  as  President  Kennedy  has 
pointed  out. 


804 


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5( 


in 


The  Problem  of  Katanga  ||l( 

The  principal  problem  remaining  to  be  solvei 
in  the  Congo — and  one  on  which  90  percent  of  thej 
Congolese    are    united — is    Katanga's    continued  U. 
secession,  and  I  would  like  to  devote  the  remarndew 
of  my  remarks  to  this  problem. 

Before  independence  the  Congo  had  been  clearlyijp 
defined  and  internationally  recognized  as  a  imified 
territory  under  Belgian  control  for  three-quarters 
of  a  century.     The  Congo  was  divided  into  six 
provinces,  of  which  Katanga  was  one,  but  only  few  [(; 
Belgian  administrative  purposes, 

Katanga  was  considered  very  definitely  a  pari*  ^ 
of  the  Republic  of  the  Congo  when  the  country's 
present  boundaries  were  agreed  to  by  Congolese-  i, 
leaders  at  the  Brussels  Round  Table  Conference  oi 
Januaiy  1960.     Moise  Tshombe,  the  provincia; 
president  of  Katanga,  was  one  of  the  Congolese 
leaders  present  at  Brussels  when  the  Congo's  po 
litical  structure  was  determined. 

While  Mr.  Tshombe,  as  well  as  other  Congolest^el 
leaders,  favored  a  federal  form  of  government 
nevertheless  he  did  in  fact  make  a  speech  welcom 
ing  the  decisions  reached  at  the  conference.   MoreJ 
over,  this  action  was  approved  by  the  people  o 
Katanga  when  they  elected  delegates  to  the  nan  ^jj 
tional  Chamber  of  Deputies  in  the  same  electioi 
in  which  they  elected  their  first  provincial  aafit 
sembly  in  May  1960 

It  is  notable  that  no  nation  has  recognized  Ka* 
tanga  as  a  sovereign  state. 

But  in  addition  to  the  legal  arguments  and  th 
clear  will  of  about  90  percent  of  the  people  of  th 
Congo,  there  are  two  other  points  to  considei 

First,  a  united  Congo  has  numerous  economi 
advantages  for  all  Congolese,  including  Katangal,]] 
and  for  all  countries  interested  in  the  economii 
viability  of  African  countries.  Not  only  can  Ka(  p 
tangan  industry  benefit  the  rest  of  the  Congo,  bu 
the  rest  of  the  Congo  can  benefit  Katanga.  Trad 
between  Katanga  and  the  rest  of  the  Congo  i 
foodstuffs  and  raw  materials  and  manufacture 
used  to  be  sizable.  It  could  be  again.  And  if  : 
were,  the  foreign  exchange  requirements  of  hot 
areas   would  be   cut   if   there   were    unification 

Seoondl\%  if  Katanga  is  allowed  to  secede  fror 
the  Congo,  forces  for  disintegration  would  t 
strengthened  elsewhere  in  Africa.  This  proces 
of  fragmentation,  if  continued,  could  lead  to  state 
neither  politically  nor  economically  viable,  a  bui 

Department  of  State  Bu/feft 


lie 
s 


h 


^ 


ien  both  to  themselves  and  to  the  rest  of  the 
h  ivorld. 
I: 
M  |J.N.  Plan  for  Reconciliation 

Ever  since  Katanga's  secession,  the  Congolese 

entral  Government,  the  United  Nations,  the 
[Jnited  States,  and  other  friendly  nations  have  en- 
couraged the  reintegration  of  the  Congo.  These 
bfforts  have  not  met  with  more  tlian  mild  success 
n  the  nearly  21^  years  since  Katanga  proclaimed 
ts  independence. 

On  August  20  of  this  year,  however,  a  most  im- 
portant new  step  toward  finding  a  basis  for  agree- 
nent  among  Congolese  leaders  was  taken  by  U.N. 
V  cting  Secretary-General  U  Thant.  On  that  date 
le  announced  the  United  Nations  plan  for  Congo 
econciliation.^ 

This  plan  is  based  upon  proposals  from  many 
lifferent  quarters,  including  the  Congolese  Central 
jovernment  and  Katanga  Province,  and  was  de- 
veloped by  the  Secretary-General  following  con- 
ultations  with  Belgium,  the  United  Kingdom, 
ind  the  United  States. 

The  U.N.  plan  calls  for : 

1.  A  federal  constitution  to  establish  a  federal 
;ystem  of  government  for  the  Congo. 

2.  A  new  law  for  division  of  revenues,  and  regu- 
ations  and  procedures  for  the  use  of  foreign 
exchange. 

3.  A   plan   for   national   currency  unification. 

4.  Integration  and  unification  of  all  Congolese 
nilitary  units. 

5.  The  nationalization  of  foreign  affairs. 

6.  A  general  amnesty. 
loml   7.  Full  cooperation  with  the  United  Nations  by 


ai;  ill  Congolese  authorities. 

ion     8.  Eeconstitution  of  the  national  government  to 

iK  provide  equitable  representation  for  all  political 

),li  md  provincial  groups. 

Following  its  announcement  by  the  Secretary- 
jreneral,  the  plan  was  widely  approved  by  the  na- 

™  iions  of  Africa,  as  well  as  those  of  Asia  and 
Europe.  The  United  States  fully  supports  the 
3lan  and  believes  it  is  a  reasonable  and  necessary 
step  to  get  the  Congo  on  the  road  to  unity  and 
rogress.  Prime  Minister  Adoula  unequivocally 
ccepted  the  plan,  and  Mr.  Tshombe  has  given  it 

rwliig  general  approval. 


to 
to,. 


iblj    '  For  text  of  the  U.N.  plan,  see  U.N.  doc.  S/50.53/Ack].ll. 
ovember  26.   7962 


The  next  step  was  and  is  implementation  of  the 
plan  in  good  faith.  It  is  of  the  highest  impor- 
tance that  urgent  priority  be  given  to  such  imple- 
mentation by  all  of  the  parties  involved. 

The  United  States  last  month  reaffirmed  its  sup- 
port of  the  U.N.  plan  and  its  implementation  of 
the  plan  when  Under  Secretary  of  State  George 
McGhee  visited  the  Congo  to  see  what  progress 
had  been  made.  His  presence  there  stimulated 
considerable  activity.  However,  as  of  this  date, 
only  very  modest  progress  has  been  made  by  the 
Central  Government  and  Katanga  Province  to- 
ward implementation  of  the  plan.  Within  the 
context  of  specific  U.N.  proposals,  three  steps  have 
been  taken : 

The  Central  Government  has  presented  a  draft 
constitution  to  the  provincial  presidents  for  study. 
This  plan  was  prepared  by  experts  provided  by 
the  United  Nations. 

Central  Government  and  Katangan  officials  have 
met  in  committees  on  finance  and  military  affairs 
in  Elisabethville  to  work  out  details  of  integrating 
these  critical  fields.  They  have  achieved  no  final 
conclusions,  but  they  have  produced  some  infor- 
mation and  cleared  away  some  preliminary 
obstacles. 

An  International  Monetary  Fund  team  has 
started  to  work  on  the  details  of  integration  of 
currencies. 

Other  Steps  Toward  Reintegration 

Other  steps,  welcome  for  the  momentum  they 
can  impart  to  reintegration  efforts  but  of  them- 
selves not  steps  toward  implementation  of  the 
U.N.  plan,  include : 

Restoration  of  telecommunications  between 
Leopoldville  and  Elisabethville. 

Stationing  of  Central  Government  customs  and 
immigration  officials  in  Elisabethville. 

Reopening  of  the  Lubilash  Bridge,  across  which 
the  first  two  carloads  of  Katangan  copper  have 
been  shipped  to  and  received  in  the  Congolese  port 
of  Matadi.  (I  might  note  that  the  shipment  has 
arrived  at  Matadi  after  only  14  days  in  transit — a 
remarkable  effort  when  one  considers  the  distances 
involved. ) 

Agreement  by  tlie  Central  Government  and  Mr. 
Tshombe  on  three-man  groups  to  oversee  the  stand- 
still of  their  troops  in  north  Katanga.  Central 
Government  participants  are  now  in  Elisabeth- 
ville ready  to  begin  this  work. 


805 


Tlu'  indication  by  Mr.  Tshombe  of  his  intention 
to  make  a  $2  million  deposit  for  the  Central 
Government  against  future  Katangan  foreign 
exchange  earnings  and  revenues. 

Wlaile  these  steps  indicate  some  progress,  the 
major  steps  remain  to  be  taken.  Much  hai'd  work 
remains  to  be  done,  and  done  soon,  if  the  U.N.  plan 
is  to  be  implemented  harmoniously. 

It  is  clear  that  performance  lags  behind  what 
might  be  expected  of  the  parties.  It  is  also  clear 
that  there  is  very  little  time  left  to  wait  for  im- 
proved perfoi-mance.  The  need  for  urgent  prog- 
ress is  great. 

In  my  opinion  the  need  for  a  united  Congo  is 
overwhelming.  The  problem  is  not  so  much 
whether  the  Congo  will  be  reunified  as  who  will 
take  the  necessary  steps  to  effect  reunification 
imder  moderate  U.N.  auspices.  The  question  is 
also  whether  reunification  will  be  achieved  peace- 
fully or  whether  our  failure  to  act  decisively  and 
rapidly  will  permit  radical  forces  to  take  charge 
of  events  in  the  Congo. 

At  the  moment,  reunification  of  Katanga  with 
the  Central  Government  is  sought  peacefully  by 
both  parties,  each  of  which  is  relatively  moderate. 
But  it  is  the  Central  Government  which  has  a 
mandate  to  assure  Katanga's  return  to  the  union. 
Either  reintegration  is  achieved  reasonably  soon, 
or  the  present  moderate  Central  Government  is  in 
danger  of  falling. 

Time  is  running  out.  If  present  means  do  not 
succeed,  the  Adoula  government  may  be  replaced 
by  a  I'adical  one,  or,  as  an  alternative,  the  Adoula 
government  may  be  obliged  to  seek  help  from 
others  than  those  now  helping  it.  This  would 
mean,  in  all  likelihood,  help  from  more  radical 
sources.  The  net  result  would  be  to  discredit  the 
United  Nations  and  the  United  States  and  open 
the  possibility  of  chaos  in  the  Congo — chaos  which 
would  invite  Communist  intervention  in  the  heart 
of  Africa.  This  alternative  the  world  cannot  con- 
template with  equanimity. 

It  is  imperative  that  reunification  of  the  Congo, 
which  everyone  says  they  wish,  be  achieved  by 
vigorous  and  appropriate  action.  Acting  Secre- 
tary-General U  Thant  already  has  indicated  his 
demand  for  early  action,  and  I  am  sure  tiie  United 
States  and  most  of  the  world  hope  there  will  be 
just  that. 

806 


U.S.  Ends  1962  Atmospheric  Tests, 
Repeats  Hope  for  Test  Ban  Treaty 

Statement  hy  President  Kennedy 

White  House  press  release  dated  November  4 

The  medium  altitude  shot  fired  this  morniuj 
off  .Johnston  Island  concludes  our  present  atmos 
phei'ic  test  series  in  the  Pacific.^  Undergrouna 
nuclear  weapons  tests,  free  from  fallout,  are  com 
tinning  in  Nevada. 

I  hope  that  in  the  next  months  we  can  concludi 
an  effective  test  ban  ti-eaty,  so  that  the  world  ca 
be  free  from  all  testing.  Agi'eement  in  this  are 
would  be  an  important  first  step  toward  our  coi 
tinning  goal  of  workable  disarmament  arrangi 
ments  which  can  cut  down  the  threat  of  war.  Lai 
March  2  -  I  offered  to  stop  further  nuclear  test 
if  the  Soviet  Union  would  accept  an  effectivel 
verified  test  ban  treaty.  This  offer  still  stand 
"We  shall  devote  our  best  efforts  to  conclude  siu 
a  treaty  and  hope  all  others  will  do  the  same. 


U.S.  Welcomes  Soviet  Announcement 
of  Intent  To  End  Current  Test  Series 

Department  Statement^ 

The  announced  intention  of  the  Soviet  Union 
end  its  current  series  of  atmospheric  nuclear  wea 
ons  tests  on  November  20  will  be  generally  w( 
comed.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  this  contemplat 
action  is  an  indication  of  the  Soviet  Union's  reac 
ness  now  to  conclude  an  effective  test  ban  agrt 
nient.  If  this  is  so,  tliis  can  be  speedily  achievf 
The  United  States  on  August  27  presented  a  drsi 
treaty  wliich,  as  a  first  step,  would  halt  immei 
ately,  without  an  international  verification  i 
rangement,  tests  in  the  atmosphere,  under  wat 
and  in  outer  space* 

This  treaty,  which  would  end  tests  in  th( 
environments  where  90  percent  of  all  past  te 


'  For  an  announcement  on  the  beginning  of  the  ser 
see  Bur.LETiN  of  May  14,  lOG:",  p.  795. 

'  Ibid.,  Mar.  19, 1962,  p.  443. 

'  Read  to  news  correspondents  on  Nov.  8  by  Line 
White,  Director  of  the  Office  of  News. 

*  For  text  see  Bulletin  of  Sept,  17, 1962,  p.  415. 


Department  of  State  Bo/Ze  ij"' 


have  been  conducted,  requires  nothing  more  than 
the  signatures  of  the  contracting  parties  to  be 
put  into  effect.  However,  if,  as  the  United  States 
prefers,  all  tests  are  to  cease,  this  too  can  be  accom- 
plished quickly  on  the  basis  of  a  comprehensive 
draft  treaty  ^  also  tabled  by  the  United  States  on 
milAugust  27. 


nes 


The  Sino-Soviet  Dispute 


5y  Roger  Hilsman 

Director,  Bureau  of  Intelligence  and  Research  ^ 


It  was  some  weeks  ago  that  I  agreed  to  speak 
to  you  on  the  Sino-Soviet  dispute.  Smce  then 
we  have  gone  through  a  great  world  crisis  in 
which  both  sides  have  recognized  the  excruciating 
dangers  of  thermonuclear  war. 

We  are  so  near  these  events — indeed,  we  are 
still  in  the  midst  of  them — that  the  temptation 
was  strong  to  change  my  topic  entirely.  But  that 
would  be  as  foolish  as  the  ostrich  burying  his 
head  in  the  sand.  We  in  the  West  cannot  ignore 
w  the  debate  going  on  in  the  Commmiist  camp. 
iIjI  But  any  comment  that  we  in  the  West  make  on 
the  Sino-Soviet  debate  must  be  restrained  and 
ijj  responsible,  in  keeping  with  the  principles  of  in- 
ternational relations  in  a  nuclear  age  that  Presi- 
[j,  dent  Kennedy  so  diligently  sought  to  establish 
during  this  recent  crisis. 

My  purpose  here,  therefore,  is  not  speculation 
and  prediction  but  a  factual  suimnary  and  review. 
For  us  in  the  West  both  ends  of  the  Sino-Soviet 
debate    challenge    our   understanding.    Winston 
Churchill  aptly  described  the  mysteries  of  Krem- 
''    lin  politics  in  terms  of  a  riddle  wrapped  in  an 
enigma.     At  the  other  end  of  the  Moscow-Peiping 
f^axis  the  Chinese  puzzle  has  been  surrounded  by 
a  "great  wall"  of  isolation  and  censorship. 


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4 


liii 


^  Address  made  before  the  World  Affairs  Council  at 
Dallas,  Tex.,  on  Nov.  8  (press  release  666  dated  Nov.  7). 


November  26,   1962 


I 


It  has  been  the  intention  of  the  United  States — 
and  it  is  hoped  that  this  view  will  now  be  shared 
by  the  Soviet  Union — to  seek  the  highest  priority 
for  the  conclusion  of  a  test  ban  agreement  when 
the  18-Nation  Disarmament  Committee  resumes 
its  deliberations  in  Geneva  this  month. 


'  For  text,  see  iUd.,  p.  411. 


Of  course  this  double  challenge  has  not  stopped 
the  pimdits  who  freely  speculate  on  eveiy  turn 
in  the  Soviet  line  or  the  latest  propaganda  blast 
from  Peiping.  At  one  extreme  there  are  those 
who  see  all  Communist  moves — Russian  or 
Chinese — as  part  of  one  gigantic,  coordinated  con- 
spiracy. For  these  persons  any  indication  of  dif- 
ferences between  Peiping  and  Moscow  is  merely 
dust  thrown  in  our  eyes  to  blind  us  to  this  con- 
spiracy. Thus  they  point  to  the  Cuban  crisis  and 
the  Chinese  mvasion  of  India  as  a  coordinated 
plot  to  challenge  the  free  world  in  both  East  and 
West. 

Yet  a  close  look  at  recent  events  casts  doubt  on 
this  "conspiracy"  hypothesis.  As  Premier  Khru- 
shchev stepped  back  from  the  brink  and  agreed  to 
remove  his  missiles  from  Cuba,  Mao  Tse-tung's 
propagandists  accused  him  of  appeasement  on  the 
Munich  pattern  and  called  for  complete  defiance 
of  President  Kennedy's  demands.  Meanwhile 
Moscow's  reluctant  endorsement  of  the  Chinese 
position  on  the  Indian  border  won  no  praise  from 
its  Communist  ally.  Instead  Peiping  unloosed  a 
new  attack  against  Prime  Minister  Nehru  which 
clearly  struck  out  against  Soviet  policy.  Thus 
the  last  weeks  have  shown  that,  far  from  operat- 
ing as  a  finely  designed  machine,  the  Sino-Soviet 
alliance  has  its  troubles. 

807 


But  in  expressing  doubt  about  this  notion  of 
perfect  harmony  and  coordination  in  the  Com- 
munist bloc,  I  do  not  want  to  endorse  the  opposite 
extreme  of  speculation  which  foresees  a  sudden 
and  dramatic  end  to  the  Sino-Soviet  alliance. 
In  the  past  loose  talk  of  an  "inevitable"  break  be- 
tween Moscow  and  Peiping  has  led  some  people  to 
think  that  all  our  troubles  were  about  to  end. 
Unfortmiately  we  can  take  no  such  comfort  from 
feuds  in  the  enemy  camp.  Our  problems  in  Viet- 
Nam  and  Laos,  Cuba  and  Berlin  have  not  disap- 
peared because  of  the  Sino-Soviet  rift. 

"Without  arguing  the  case  in  detail,  we  must  re- 
member that  the  Communist  ideology,  with  its 
goal  of  world  revolution,  still  provides  an  overall 
basis  for  unity  between  Peiping  and  Moscow.  So 
long  as  both  partners  see  the  United  States  as  the 
greatest  obstacle  to  the  attainment  of  this  goal, 
they  will  try  to  patch  over  their  differences  and 
unite  against  the  common  enemy. 

Plaving  said  this,  however,  I  must  agree  that 
the  differences  between  Peiping  and  Moscow  are 
very  serious.  The  debate  affects  all  aspects  of 
their  policy  and  especially  the  basic  question  of 
strateg}-  toward  the  West — which  is  the  fimda- 
mental  reason  why  the  Sino-Soviet  debate  must  be 
studied. 

Of  course  we  would  expect  any  alliance  to  have 
problems  and  policy  differences  between  its  part- 
ners. Because  we  have  disagreed  with  the  British 
over  Suez  or  with  the  French  over  nuclear  weap- 
ons, we  tend  to  discount  the  importance  of  Sino- 
Soviet  differences  over  Cuba  or  over  China's  be- 
coming a  nuclear  power. 

There  is  no  real  comparison  here,  however;  dis- 
agreement is  tolerable  and  even  healthy  among 
traditionally  democratic  states.  We  believe  in 
and  respect  the  fundamental  equality  of  all  allies, 
great  or  small.  For  the  Communists,  however, 
disagreement  is  almost  unbearable  and  disunitj' 
fearsome.  Normal  clashes  of  national  interest  be- 
come threats  to  the  world  revolution,  and  ideologi- 
cal differences  become  heresy  undermining  the 
"holy"  doctrine  of  Marxism-Tjeninism. 

Areas  of  Peiping-Moscow  Differences 

How  liavc  tlie  diirercnces  l>etween  Peiping  and 
Moscow  manifested  themselves?  For  one  thing 
we  see  Idirushchev  constantly  in  contact  with 
foreign  countries,  at  the  U.N.  and  in  meetings 


with  world  leaders.  At  least  in  his  own  activities 
he  has  ignored  the  Stalinist  walls  of  isolation  and 
ignorance  which  prevented  Russia  from  acting  as 
a  responsible  world  power.  Contrast  this  with 
Mao  Tse-tung,  who  has  left  Cliina  only  twice  in 
his  life  and  then  to  visit  the  Soviet  Union.  To 
him,  meetings  between  Soviet  and  Western  of- 
ficials constitute  dangerous  traffic  with  an  irrec- 
oncilable enemy.  He  seems  to  prefer  to  remain 
outside  the  family  of  nations  unless  he  can  dictate 
his  terms. 

This  is  more  than  a  superficial  difference  in  be- 
havior. Khrushchev  seems  to  realize  that  isola- 
tion is  dangerous.  He  should  no  longer  have 
illusions — as  did  Stalin — that  firing  off  demands 
from  his  Kremlin  sanctuary  will  achieve  his  goals. 
And  he  seems  to  recognize  that  the  balance  of 
power  lies  with  the  West,  in  spite  of  Mao's  in- 
sistence on  tlie  strategic  superiority  of  the  "social- 
ist camp."  Listen  to  what  Khrushchev  told  Des 
Moines  editor  Gardner  Cowles  last  April : 

Perhaps  I  do  realize  more  concretely  and  realistically 
than  certain  other  statesmen  how  terrible  a  rocket- 
thenuonuclear  war  could  be  if  we  fail  to  prevent  it.  As 
head  of  sovernment,  I  have  to  deal  with  questions  of  de- 
fense and,  consequently,  questions  of  modern  means  of 
warfare,  and  1  have  occasion  to  watch  them  being  tested. 
This  is  why  I  have  a  perfectly  clear  idea  of  their  effects. 

The  Soviets  know  how  swiftly  they  can  lose  the 
material  gains  which  have  been  won  at  such  cost 
and  sacrifice  of  political  freedom  and  pei-sonal 
comfort.  The  Chinese  Communists,  however,  are 
like  the  man  in  the  old  stoiy — "Let's  you  and  him 
fight!" 

The  Chinese  Communists  have  no  nuclear  weaji- 
ons.  They  can  be  blissfully  irresponsible  about 
the  risks  of  war.  To  be  sure,  they  are  not  out  to 
invite  nuclear  disaster  on  themselves.  That  is 
shown  by  their  caution  in  the  Taiwan  Strait. 
Yet  Mao  is  willing  for  Khnishchev  to  take 
chances  and  has  been  ever  since  the  first  sputnik  in 
1957.  Behind  his  picturesque  phrase  "East  Wind 
prevails  over  West  Wind"  is  Mao's  insistence  that 
Moscow  should  be  the  one  to  push  the  West 
around.  In  fact,  if  you  look  back  on  the  Chinese 
Communist  position  in  every  crisis,  you  will  find 
Peiping  has  told  Moscow  to  "go  for  broke" — in 
1958  it  was  Lebanon,  in  1959  Berlin,  in  1960  the 
Congo,  in  1961  Berlin  again,  and  now  in  1962 
Cuba.  In  everj'  international  crisis — whether  be- 
tween Comn^unist  and  non-Communist  or  among 


808 


Departmenf  of  Sfate   Bulletin  \  f| 


free-world  states — the  Chinese  Communists  have 
tried  to  ignite  the  oil  that  others  pour  on  troubled 
waters.  But  as  Khrushchev  told  an  Indian 
journalist  during  the  Middle  East  ci'isis  of  1958, 
"Any  fool  can  start  a  war.  The  problem  is  how 
to  stop  one." 

There  is  another  side  to  this  Sino-Soviet  debate 
on  how  to  promote  communism.  Since  Stalin's 
death  ^Moscow  has  used  economic  aid  to  try  to 
extend  Russian  influence,  especially  among  the 
many  newly  independent  and  nonalined  countries. 
Peiping  experimented  in  peaceful  competition 
with  the  West  for  a  few  years  but  then  abandoned 
it  for  the  militant  promotion  of  world  revolution. 
By  1958  the  Chinese  Communists  found  they 
could  not  compete  with  their  socialist  ally,  much 
less  their  capitalist  enemy.  They  simply  couldn't 
afford  it. 

Moreover,  Peiping  could  hardly  claim  to  be  the 
friend  of  the  Afro-Asian  nations  while  it  fought 
over  its  border  with  the  biggest  Afro-Asian  na- 
tion, India.  Ever  since  1959,  when  Chinese 
Communist  troops  first  fired  on  India's  frontier 
guards,  Peiping  has  hammered  at  Prime  Minister 
Nehru  as  an  "aggressor"  and  a  "hireling  of  im- 
perialism." Moscow,  however,  has  sent  its  high- 
est officials,  large  amounts  of  economic  aid,  and 
even  military  assistance  to  New  Delhi.  Mean- 
while the  Indian  Communist  Party  suffered  from 
political  schizophrenia  as  it  tried  to  reconcile  the 
contradictoi-y  advice  from  Peiping  and  Moscow. 

Such  working  at  cross-purposes  would  strain 
relations  between  any  states.  Compounded  as  it 
is  by  the  ideological  crossfire  between  Moscow  and 
Peiping,  the  Indian  case  has  been  second  only  to 
that  of  negotiations  with  the  United  States  in  its 
effects  on  the  Sino-Soviet  alliance. 

But  Albania  remains  the  most  dramatic  mani- 
festation of  Sino-Soviet  differences.  Throughout 
I960  and  1961  Khrushchev  attempted  to  bend  the 
tiny  Adriatic  country  to  his  will.  Yet,  fantastic 
as  it  seems,  far-off  China  moved  in  with  trade  and 
aid  when  Moscow  imposed  economic  sanctions  on 
Albania.  In  1961  the  Sino-Soviet  confrontation 
broke  into  world  view  at  the  22d  Party  Congress 
when  Khrushchev  denounced  Hoxha,  the  Com- 
munist leader  of  Albania,  and  Chou  En-lai  left 
Moscow  in  protest.  When  the  Albanians  re- 
taliated in  a  blistering  attack  on  Khrushchev, 
Peiping  was  the  only  Commmiist  capital  to  re- 
print   this    diatribe    except    for   Albania    itself. 


And  the  Communist  dictator  of  Albania — 
Hoxha — called  Khrushchev  a  "renegade"  and  a 
"traitor"  to  Marxist-Leninism. 

Albania  came  to  symbolize  the  Sino-Soviet 
struggle  for  supremacy  in  the  international  Com- 
mmiist  movement.  This  struggle  extended  far 
beyond  the  determination  of  bloc  policy  vis-a-vis 
India  or  the  United  States.  Its  reverberations 
shook  Commmiist  parties  throughout  the  world. 
In  Japan  and  Bi-azil  open  splits  found  rival  Com- 
munists promoting  the  claims  of  Peiping  against 
Moscow.  In  India  and  Nepal  the  debate  raged 
between  "Chinese"  and  "Russian"  factions  over 
the  path  to  power.  These  repercussions  of  the 
Sino-Soviet  rift  mocked  Communist  claims  to  pro- 
letarian unity. 

Finally,  foreign  policy  differences  affected  the 
direct  relations  between  the  two  allies.  Chinese 
Communist  dissatisfaction  over  Russian  aid  and 
Peiping's  challenge  to  Moscow  over  the  determina- 
tion of  policy  each  acted  upon  the  other.  As 
Mao  revealed  his  contempt  for  Khrushchev, 
Khrushchev  cut  back  his  military  and  economic 
assistance  to  Communist  China.  This  infuriated 
the  Chinese  Communists,  who  persisted  in  their 
attacks  on  Soviet  policy.  Meanwhile  Moscow 
watched  its  ally  go  to  the  brink  of  bankruptcy, 
without  lifting  a  finger  of  support. 

This  withdrawal  of  Russian  assistance  has  far- 
reaching  implications.  Specifically,  we  know 
that  in  1958  Peiping's  air  chief,  Liu  Ya-lou, 
promised  that  Communist  China  would  have 
"atomic  bombs  in  the  not-too-distant  future." 
However,  4  years  later  Communist  China  still 
could  not  claim  even  token  membership  in  the  nu- 
clear club. 

This  fall  the  Chinese  Communists  openly  com- 
plained that  Soviet-American  discussions  on  stop- 
ping the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons  were  clearly 
aimed  at  keeping  these  weapons  out  of  Communist 
China's  hands.  This  does  not  mean  that  Peiping 
has  no  hope  of  eventually  testing  a  crude  nuclear 
device.  In  fact  their  Foreign  Minister  has  pub- 
licly boasted  of  their  efforts  toward  this  end.  But 
it  appears  that  the  past  few  years  of  the  Sino- 
Soviet  dispute  have  seen  little  if  any  Russian  help 
in  this  program. 

Dramatic  as  might  seem  the  prospect  of  Com- 
munist Cliina's  exploding  a  nuclear  device,  it  will 
not  change  the  balance  of  power  in  Asia,  mucli  less 
throughout  the  world.    Far  more  basic  for  Mao's 


November  26,    1962 


809 


aspirations  to  lead  the  underdeveloped  world  is 
China's  economic  development. 

Here  the  Sino-Soviet  dispute  has  clearly  had 
a  devastating  impact.  It  was  hard  enough  imder 
normal  conditions  for  Peiping  to  meet  its  pay- 
ments on  the  more  than  $2  billion  of  Soviet  credits. 
This  heavy  debt  was  especially  galling  because 
most  of  it  covered  Soviet  militaiy  deliveries  dur- 
ing tlie  Korean  war.  But  when  Mao's  wild 
schemes  of  the  "great  leap  forward"  and  the  com- 
mimes  brought  China's  economy  to  the  brink  of 
collapse,  debt  payment  to  Moscow  became  an  in- 
tolerable burden.  Yet  no  major  moratorium  was 
declared.  Instead,  in  1960  Moscow  pulled  out  its 
technical  assistance,  leaving  half-finished  plants 
and  miintelligible  blueprints  with  its  Chinese 
Communist  ally. 

Today  visitors  returning  from  Communist 
Cliina  tell  of  smokeless  chimneys  at  the  factories 
constructed  during  the  heyday  of  Sino-Soviet  co- 
operation. IVIachinery  stands  uncrated  in  railroad 
yards.  Broken  equipment  lies  abandoned  in  fac- 
tories that  have  become  silent  warehouses. 

Looking  outward  in  the  fall  of  1962,  the  Peiping 
regime  saw  Soviet  missiles  in  Cuba,  the  possibility 
of  MIG-21's  going  to  India,  and  massive  Russian 
assistance  pouring  into  Indonesia,  Afghanistan, 
and  the  U.A.E.  [United  Arab  Republic].  Mean- 
while Communist  China  was  eking  out  a  bare 
subsistence  wliile  providing  an  export  sui-plus  to 
pay  its  Soviet  debts.  As  if  this  were  not  enough, 
Khrushchev  formalized  the  economic  exclusion  of 
Communist  China  from  the  so-called  "socialist 
camp."  This  summer  the  Council  of  Mutual  Eco- 
nomic Assistance  met  in  Moscow.  For  the  first 
time  it  admitted  an  Asian  Communist  country. 
Outer  Mongolia,  as  a  full  member  to  this  organi- 
zation which  acts  to  coordinate  economic  activity 
and  development  in  Soviet  Russia  and  the  East 
European  states. 

Factors  Underlying  Split 

At  this  point  some  of  us  must  wonder:  T^Hiat 
prompted  the  Russians  to  jeopardize  the  survival 
and  security  of  their  greatest  ally  ?  If  it  was  the 
Chinese  challenge  to  Russian  leadei-ship,  why 
should  Peiping  have  defied  so  important  a  source 
of  military  and  economic  assistance?  These  are 
key  problems  in  comprehending  the  Sino-Soviet 
dispute. 

First,  there  is  no  question  that  the  real  deteriora- 


tion in  Sino-Soviet  relations  came  from  the 
Chmese  challenge  to  Russian  policy  and  leader- 
ship. Until  1958  the  alliance  fimctioned  much  as 
it  had  been  expected  to  by  participants  and  observ- 
ers alike.  Soviet  military  aid  modernized  Mao's 
guerrilla  armies.  Soviet  economic  aid  laid  the 
industrial  foundations  of  China's  economic  de- 
velopment. Policy  differences  inevitably  arose  but 
were  settled  behind  the  scenes.  For  all  intents  and 
purposes  the  Moscow-Peiping  axis  carried  forward 
the  goals  of  strengthening  the  "socialist  camp"  and 
"promoting  the  world  revolution"  with  little  inter- 
nal strain. 

From  1958  to  1960,  however,  Chinese  Commu- 
nist comment  on  the  dangers  of  war,  the  need  for 
aggressive  action,  and  especially  on  negotiations 
with  the  West  struck  at  the  basis  of  Soviet  policy. 
Although  this  was  masked  by  attacks  on  Yugo- 
slav revisionism,  observers  saw  an  increasing 
parallel  between  the  crimes  for  which  Tito  was 
excoriated  and  the  policies  of  Klirushchev.  Then 
in  1960  Peiping  unleashed  a  massive  propaganda 
offensive  against  Moscow.  Ostensibly  praising 
Lenin  and  attacking  Tito,  this  propaganda  all 
but  named  Khrushchev  as  betraying  the  so-called 
world  revolution.  The  Chinese  Communists  fol- 
lowed up  this  thinly  veiled  attack  with  explicit 
but  private  criticism  of  Khrushchev  before  dele- 
gates to  a  Conununist- front  trade  union  congress 
in  Peiping. 

Khrushchev  lashed  back  the  next  month  at 
another  Communist  conference  in  Bucharest,  and 
the  fight  was  on.  When  more  than  80  Commu- 
nist parties  met  at  Moscow  in  the  fall  of  1960,  they 
witnessed  the  most  violent  denunciation  exchanged 
between  Communist  "comrades"  since  the  found- 
ing of  the  Communist  International.  In  fact, 
judging  from  the  speeches  of  the  French  and 
Italian  delegates  which  these  parties  published  last 
year,  the  1960  conference  almost  split  the  Com- 
munist movement  wide  open. 

Superficial  unity  was  preserved  by  adoption  of 
a  compromise  manifesto  which  included  all  the 
contradictory  positions  of  both  sides,  Russian  and 
Chinese.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  the  next  Commu- 
nist meeting  in  Moscow  merely  picked  up  where 
the  earlier  one  left  off,  ending  in  Klirushchev's 
denunciation  of  Hoxha  and  Chou  En-lai's  depar- 
ture for  home. 

The  history  of  the  dispute  shows  tliat  the 
Chinese  took  the  initiative  and  that  their  objective 


810 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


was  nothing  less  than  leadership  of  the  interna- 
tional Communist  movement.  This  still  leaves  us 
with  the  question :  Why  would  Peiping  jeopardize 
its  own  interests,  seemingly  dependent  on  Soviet 
military  and  economic  assistance,  for  the  sake  of 
Albania  or  to  win  authority  over  other  Commu- 
nist parties? 

To  understand  the  passion  and  conviction  of  the 
Chinese  Communist  challenge,  we  must  look  at 
the  past  history  of  those  who  rule  in  Peiping. 
These  are  the  men  who  led  the  Chinese  Commu- 
nist Party,  an  outlawed  band  of  thousands  holed 
up  in  the  hills  of  soixthern  China  in  1930.  Isolated 
in  their  ignorance,  they  believed  the  Marxist 
myths  about  capitalism  and  imperialism,  about 
the  inevitability  of  socialism  and  communism, 
without  question.  As  the  Soviets  have  be- 
come more  worldly  wise,  the  Chinese  remained 
simplistic. 

More  than  this,  the  Chinese  Communists  have 
found  their  position  repeatedly  sacrificed  on  orders 
from  Moscow.  Perhaps  they  thought,  on  the  first 
few  occasions,  that  Stalin's  directives  were  only 
blunders.  Later  they  may  have  come  to  suspect 
them  as  a  pattern  of  betrayal.  In  1926  and  1927 
Moscow  repeatedly  held  back  the  Communists  in 
China,  which  permitted  the  rise  of  Chiang  Kai- 
shek.  Again  in  1936  Moscow  threw  its  support 
behind  Chiang  so  as  to  have  a  strong  China  that 
could  guard  the  Soviet  rear  against  Japan.  Even 
in  1946  it  seems  that  Stalin  told  the  Chinese  Com- 
munists to  avoid  war  with  Chiang.  Only  this 
time  ]\Iao  Tse-tmig  went  his  own  way — and  won. 

In  short,  when  25  years  of  struggle  finally  ended 
in  victory,  the  Chinese  Communist  leadership  may 
have  become  convinced  that  it  knew  better  than 
Moscow.  And  even  if  Moscow  might  have  the 
right  answer,  the  suspicion  was  that  it  might  not 
act  on  it  against  Soviet  as  opposed  to  Communist 
interests. 

We  know  far  too  little  about  relations  between 
the  two  parties  before  Stalin  and  Mao  signed  the 
Sino-Soviet  alliance.  But  the  evidence  suggests 
that  neither  ever  wholly  trusted  the  other,  much 
less  believed  the  pledges  of  monolithic  unity  and 
undying  support.  And  we  see  that  relations  grew 
more  strained  after  1958,  the  more  the  Chinese 
Communists  recalled  their  earlier  exiseriences  with 
heresies  akin  to  those  of  Khrushchev — all  foisted 
upon  them  by  Stalin's  advice. 

Therefore  it  seems  to  be  a  logical  progression 


for  the  aging,  megalomaniac  leadership  in  Pei- 
ping to  challenge  Khrushchev.  A  double  miscal- 
culation may  have  caused  Mao  to  trigger  tlie  row 
in  1957-58.  On  the  one  hand,  he  obviously  over- 
estimated China's  economic  prospects.  On  the 
other  hand,  he  underestimated  Khrushchev's 
power.  The  first  error  blinded  him  to  China's 
wealcness  in  the  eyes  of  others,  including  those  he 
was  seeking  to  lead.  The  second  kept  him  from 
backing  off  before  Khrushchev  set  his  own  house 
in  order,  thus  freeing  himself  to  deal  with  Mao. 
In  the  political  escalation  that  ensued,  each  side 
increased  the  pride  and  nationalism  of  the  op- 
ponent. Kefugees  from  China  tell  of  direct 
attacks  on  Khrushchev  in  local  propaganda  meet- 
ings. And  last  year  the  Soviet  press  indirectly 
acknowledged  Mao's  birthday  by  allusions  to  his 
"senility." 

With  all  the  polemics  and  drama,  it  is  difficult 
to  keep  the  Sino-Soviet  dispute  in  perspective. 
The  reasons  against  an  open  break — both  from  an 
ideological  and  political  standpoint — are  compel- 
ling. Yet  so  deep-seated  are  the  antagonisms  be- 
tween Moscow  and  Peiping  that  we  cannot  foresee 
any  genuine  reconciliation  of  the  dispute,  at  least 
while  Mao  and  Khrushchev  hold  power. 

I  have  now  come  to  the  end  of  what  I  have  to 
say — the  place  for  a  conclusion.  But  this  must  be 
a  speech  without  a  conclusion.  As  I  said  in  the 
beginning,  we  have  just  been  through  a  major 
world  crisis.  It  is  too  soon  to  assess  the  effects 
of  these  events  on  the  Sino-Soviet  dispute — on  this 
I  am  sure  you  will  all  agree.  And  events  are  even 
now  taking  place  on  the  frontiers  between  India 
and  China  that  will  also  affect  this  dispute.  And 
so  I  am  unwilling  to  reach  conclusions. 

But  this  I  will  say :  We  have  just  witnessed  a 
world  leader — President  Kennedy — deal  adroitly 
and  wisely  with  what  is  clearly  the  greatest  crisis 
to  face  this  country  since  World  War  II,  at  the 
very  least.  The  President's  policy  in  this  crisis 
has  been  the  combination  of  two  essential 
qualities — fimmess  and  responsibility.  President 
Kennedy  has  managed  short-run  events  without 
ever  forgetting  his  obligation  to  set  precedents 
that  will  ease  the  achievement  of  a  permanently 
peaceful  world.  In  our  thinking  about  the  Sino- 
Soviet  dispute — or  any  other  problem  of  foreign 
policy — we  would  do  well  to  follow  his  lead,  safe- 
guarding long-run  as  well  as  short-run  interests. 


November  26,    J  962 


811 


Education:  The  Challenge  for  the  Future  in  Africa 


hy  G.  Mermen  Williams 

Assistant  Secretary  for  African  Affairs  * 


In  Africa  the  tenns  "education"  and  "future" 
are  practically  synonymous.  As  President  Ken- 
nedy pointed  out  in  1959,  while  he  was  still  a  Sena- 
tor: "Education  is,  in  truth,  the  only  key  to 
genuine  African  independence  and  progress." 

Any  discussion  of  the  future,  whether  in  an 
African  nation's  capital  or  in  a  remote  bush  vil- 
lage, revolves  around  the  magic  word  "education." 
Wherever  I  have  gone  on  my  official  visits  to  Af- 
rica, I  have  found  a  widespread  and  insatiable 
hunger  for  more  and  better  educational  opportuni- 
ties and  facilities. 

This  was  brought  home  to  me  most  forcefully 
last  year  in  Somalia.  As  my  party  was  deplaning 
at  the  Mogadiscio  airport,  the  Somali  officials  pres- 
ent were  joined  by  a  slender  youth  in  work  clothes 
who  was  clearly  not  one  of  the  official  welcomers. 
This  young  man  rushed  up  to  me  and  demanded : 
""Wliere  is  my  scholarship?"  Unfortunately  we 
did  not  carry  scholarships  on  our  plane,  but  we 
did  look  into  the  lad's  request. 

Another  inspiring  example  is  that  of  Legson 
Kayira,  a  young  boy  from  Nyasaland  who  walked 
2,000  miles  across  the  African  Continent,  stopping 
at  U.S.  Infoi'mation  Service  libraries  on  the  way. 
At  one  library  he  picked  up  the  catalog  of  Skagit 
Junior  College  in  the  State  of  Washington  and 
wrote  for  a  scholarship.  This  was  granted,  and 
with  the  help  of  Americans  in  this  country  and 
in  Africa  his  dream  was  fulfilled.  Not  all  Afri- 
cans have  this  vision  and  stamina — nor  tliis  suc- 
cess— but  many  have  the  same  inner  desire  and  are 
willing  to  make  sacrifices  to  attain  a  better 
education. 


*  Address  made  before  the  Virginia  Teachers  Associa- 
tion at  Richmond,  Va.,  on  Nov.  1  (press  release  655). 


The  urgency  of  the  need  for  increased  education 
throughout  the  continent  is  one  point  upon  which 
all  African  leaders  can  agree.  This  universal  need 
unites  the  older  nations  with  the  newly  independ- 
ent countries  and  with  the  yet-to-be  nations.  The 
people  of  all  these  areas  are  calling  upon  their 
leaders  for  broad  and  rapid  improvements  in  edu- 
cational opportunities  to  help  speed  their  economic 
and  social  advancement.  Leaders  who  fail  to  hear 
this  loud  and  clear  call  will  not  long  remain 
leaders. 

IVfajor  improvements  are  needed  in  African  edu- 
cation from  one  end  of  the  educational  spectrum 
to  the  other.  The  continent's  literacy  rate  is  tragi- 
cally low — only  10  percent  on  a  continent-wide 
basis  and  even  lower  in  most  of  tropical  Africa. 
It  is  not  strange,  then,  that  most  Africans  are  urg- 
ing their  leaders  to  improve  educational  systems 
rapidly. 

Primary  Education  in  Africa 

The  brightest  spot  in  the  African  educational 
picture  is  primary  education  of  children  from  age 
5  to  14,  which  has  taken  an  enormous  forward 
spurt  in  the  years  since  World  War  II.  I  should 
like  to  remind  you  that  the  science  of  statistics 
is  still  rudimentary  in  most  of  Africa,  and  the 
figures  I  use  tonight  should  !»  considered  as  the 
best  available  approximations  drawn  from 
UNESCO  [United  Nations  Educational,  Scien- 
tific and  Cultural  Organization]  sources. 

Even  with  incomplete  figures,  however,  one  can 
see  that  there  has  been  remarkable  progress  in 
recent  years.  In  Ghana,  for  instance,  in  the  pre- 
independence  decade  of  1947-57,  primary  enroll- 
ment quadrupled— rising  from  114,000  students  to 


812 


Deparfment  of  Stale  Bullelin 


455,000.  This  trend  has  continued  since  independ- 
ence, and  today  more  than  two-thirds  of  Ghana's 
primary-age  children  are  in  school. 

The  Eastern  and  Westeni  Eegions  of  Nigeria 
also  show  marked  improvement  in  primary  educa- 
tion. The  number  of  pupils  in  these  regions  rose 
from  280,000  in  1945  to  more  than  2  million  by 
1960 — accomiting  for  nearly  100  percent  of  the 
children  in  the  two  regions.  On  the  other  hand, 
progress  has  been  slower  in  Nigeria's  heavily  pop- 
ulated Northern  Region,  which  still  has  only  about 
8  percent  of  its  children  in  school. 

Similar  disparities  can  be  foimd  in  French- 
speaking  tropical  Africa.  Wliile  the  total  number 
of  primary  students  in  these  areas  has  risen  con- 
siderably during  the  postwar  years,  the  rise  has 
been  uneven.  Gabon,  Cameroon,  Congo  (Braz- 
zaville), and  the  Malagasy  Republic  have  some 
50  percent  of  their  children  in  primary  school, 
but  the  figures  for  Mali,  Upper  Volta,  and  Mauri- 
tania are  closer  to  7  percent  and  Niger  is  just  over 
3  percent.  The  long-independent  country  of 
Ethiopia  also  falls  into  this  lower  category,  with 
only  about  4  percent  of  its  children  in  primary 
school. 

In  some  areas  the  principal  reason  for  the  small 
number  of  African  children  in  primary  school  is 
the  lack  of  schools.  In  other  areas  it  is  the  inabil- 
ity of  parents  to  pay  even  the  small  school  fees 
required,  the  fact  that  some  schools  are  set  up  to 
provide  only  2  or  3  years  of  primary  school,  or  the 
lack  of  qualified  teachers.  Local  customs  often 
restrict  the  number  of  girls  who  attend  school. 
Girls  account  for  less  than  30  percent  of  the  total 
enrollment  in  primary  schools  and  only  22  percent 
of  secondary  school  enrollment. 

Another  limiting  factor  is  the  high  dropout  rate 
among  children.  A  recent  study  made  in  the  Con- 
go (Leopoldville)  showed  that,  of  519,000  children 
who  entered  the  first  class  in  1954,  only  some  45,- 
000 — less  than  10  percent — reached  the  final  year 
of  their  6-year  primary  school  in  1960. 

Inadequacy  of  Secondary  School  Training 

When  it  comes  to  secondary  school  enrollment, 
the  figures  are  even  more  appalling.  According  to 
UNESCO  statistics,  Ghana  is  well  ahead  of  all 
tropical  African  countries  in  the  percentage  of 
young  people  attending  secondary  school,  with  a 
total  of  nearly  30  percent.  Ghana  is  followed  by 
western  Nigeria's  8.8  percent,  Sudan's  6.5  percent, 


Zanzibar's  5  percent,  and  about  4.5  percent  for 
Basutoland,  Swaziland,  and  Uganda.  Many  trop- 
ical African  countries  have  less  than  1  percent  of 
their  15-  to  19-year-olds  in  secondary  schools. 

The  inadequacy  of  secondary  school  training  is 
the  most  important  deficiency  in  African  educa- 
tion today.  Paul  Hoffman,  who  directs  the  United 
Nations  Special  Fund,  earlier  this  month  called 
attention  to  the  important  relationship  between 
secondary  school  education  and  nation  building. 
He  said  that  leadership  must  come  from  persons 
with  at  least  12  years  of  schooling.  He  noted  that 
in  this  country  280  persons  out  of  each  1,000  per- 
sons below  70  years  of  age  have  had  12  years  of 
schooling,  while  in  the  less  developed  countries  of 
Africa  the  ratio  is  only  1  to  1,000.  This  led  Mr. 
Hoffman  to  the  conclusion  that : 

Liberal  arts  courses  are  fine.  But  when  you  need  in- 
dustrial en^neers  and  skilled  workmen  of  all  kinds,  a 
choice  has  to  be  made.  That  is  why  I  have  emphasized 
more  and  more  projects  for  the  development  of  secondary 
schooling. 

All  African  nations  are  giving  top  priority  to 
developing  new  secondary  schools  and  teachers. 
Nigeria,  for  instance,  is  putting  $5  million  into 
building  national  high  schools  in  its  regions. 
That  country  hopes  to  triple  the  number  of  pupils 
entering  secondary  schools  by  1970. 

Many  African  governments  are  anxious  to  re- 
cruit foreign  secondary  school  teachers  on  an  ur- 
gent basis,  and  quite  a  few  expatriate  teachers  have 
remained  where  they  were  teaching  before  inde- 
pendence. Thus,  as  of  last  January  1,  it  was  esti- 
mated that  more  than  3,000  French  teachers  were 
in  French-speaking  tropical  Africa  and  1,000  Eng- 
lish teachers  were  in  Nigeria  alone.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  1962-63  school  year,  1,300  Belgian 
teachers  were  in  the  Congo.  And  the  Belgian 
figure  does  not  include  efforts  in  training  admin- 
istrative and  judiciary  personnel  or  specialized 
training  in  agriculture,  medicine,  telecommimica- 
tions,  meteorology,  customs  duties,  and  veterinary 
medicine. 

In  the  field  of  higher  education  there  are  50 
major  institutions  throughout  Africa,  29  of  which 
have  been  established  since  World  War  II.  These 
institutions  account  for  a  total  of  150,000  students 
studying  in  African  nations  this  year.  Of  this 
150,000,  however,  90,000,  or  60  percent,  are  en- 
rolled in  six  north  African  countries — Algeria, 
Egypt,  Libya,  Morocco,  Sudan,  and  Tunisia.   An- 


November  26,    7962 


813 


other  45,000,  or  30  percent  of  the  total,  are  enrolled 
in  14  South  African  institutions,  8  of  which  admit 
white  students  only.  Thus,  only  15,000  students, 
or  10  percent  of  the  total,  are  attending  college  in 
the  vast  belt  of  tropical  Africa. 

Another  35,000  to  40,000  African  students  are 
studying  abroad,  but  here,  too,  north  Africa  ac- 
counts for  more  than  50  percent  of  the  total. 

In  terms  of  students  to  overall  population,  Af- 
rica ranks  very  low  compared  with  other  areas  of 
the  world.  For  Africa  as  a  whole,  the  ratio  is 
about  25  students  per  100,000  people,  and  for 
tropical  Africa  it  is  only  18  per  100,000.  This  is 
far  fewer  than  the  121  students  per  100,000  people 
in  Southeast  Asia,  the  275  per  100,000  in  Latin 
America,  and  the  1,944  per  100,000  in  the  United 
States. 

U.S.  Aid  to  African  Education 

These  deficiencies  in  education  throughout  Af- 
rica have  led  to  much  thought  about  how  progi-ess 
in  this  field  can  be  made.  The  most  comprehen- 
sive effort  to  establish  educational  targets  came 
at  last  year's  Conference  of  African  States  on 
the  Development  of  Education  in  Africa,^  held 
at  Addis  Ababa. 

This  conference  agreed  upon  the  basic  concepts 
that  educational  planning  must  be  made  a  part  of 
total  economic  progress;  that  the  development  of 
human  resources  is  an  essential  component  of 
economic  and  social  growth;  and  that  firm  priori- 
ties must  be  established  and  stern  criteria  applied 
before  substantial  money  grants  and  loans  would 
be  made  to  African  states  by  international  pro- 
grams, donor  states,  and  private  foundations. 

The  three  most  important  priorities  to  emerge 
at  Addis  Ababa  were  the  need  to  remove  bottle- 
necks at  secondary  school  levels;  the  need  to  revise 
and  expand  school  curricula,  particularly  in  agri- 
cultural and  technical  education;  and  the  need 
for  trained  teachers  at  all  levels.  In  the  months 
since  tiie  conference  there  lias  been  a  steady  in- 
crease in  American  efforts — both  governmental 
and  private — to  alleviate  these  priority  problems.-* 

Our  total  effort,  in  terms  of  U.S.  foreign  aid 
to  programs  administered  by  African  ministries 


'  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  .Tune  12,  1961,  p.  936. 

'  For  an  article  on  ".\merica's  Intorost  in  African  Edu- 
cation" by  J.  Wayne  Fredericks,  Deputy  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  African  Affairs,  see  ibid.,  Aug.  27,  1902,  j).  333. 


of  education,  was  nearly  doubled  in  fiscal  year 
19G2— rising  to  $46,515,000  from  the  1961  level  of 
$26,129,000.  Of  this  amount,  $6.7  million  went 
to  10  coimtries  for  secondary  school  and  teacher- 
training  projects,  new  classroom  facilities,  and 
demonstration  schools  for  technical  and  voca- 
tional education.  Another  $8  million  went  into 
building,  equipping,  and  stafBng  urban  and  rural 
teacher-training  institutions  in  12  countries. 

Approximately  $3  million  has  been  allocated  for 
agi'icultural  training  and  $5  million  for  surveys 
and  development  of  facilities  for  technical  and  vo- 
cational education.  An  additional  $16  million 
supports  contracts  between  American  universities 
and  institutions  in  Africa  for  agricultural  and  vo- 
cational education. 

In  other  types  of  programs  $3.5  million  has 
been  allocated  for  the  construction  and  reorgani- 
zation of  African  institutions  of  higher  learning, 
and  $1  million  has  been  pro^nded  for  the  improve- 
ment of  commimications  in  the  field  of  adult  edu- 
cation. 

Teacher  supply  programs  also  were  accelerated. 
In  conjunction  with  Columbia  University,  the 
Agency  for  International  Development  sent  some 
250  teachers  into  east  Africa  to  help  meet  the 
serious  shortage  of  qualified  secondary  school 
teachers.  The  Peace  Corps  is  also  active  in  this 
field  and  increased  its  volunteer  teachers  in  Afri- 
can secondary  schools  from  200  in  1961-62  to 
about  1,000  this  academic  year. 

The  combined  efforts  of  American  private  agen- 
cies also  have  contributed  a  sum  well  in  excess  of 
$20  million  to  help  relieve  the  bottleneck  in  Afri- 
can secondary  school  education.  These  efforts  are 
led  by  the  Ford  Foundation,  the  Carnegie  Cor- 
poration, and  the  Rockefeller  Foundation,  but  a 
number  of  smaller  organizations  are  also  very  ac- 
tive in  the  field. 

Development  of  Higher  Education 

As  a  followup  to  the  Addis  Ababa  conference, 
a  UNESCO  Conference  on  tlie  Development  of 
Higher  Education  in  Africa  was  held  last  month 
in  Tananarive.  This  conference  recognized  staff- 
ing requirements  as  African  education's  greatest 
priority  and  estimated  that  7,000  foreigners  would 
be  needed  in  Africa  during  the  period  1962-80. 
In  tliat  same  period  a  staff  of  14,000  Africans 
would  have  to  be  developed  and  trained.  Tiiis 
conference  also: 


814 


Departmenf  of  Sfafe   Bulletin 


tk 


1.  Asked  non-African  governments  and  private 
foundations  to  study  outside  financial  assistance 
Bstimated  at  $400  million  in  1965,  rising  to  $920 
million  in  1970,  and  dropping  back  to  $400  million 
in  1980. 

2.  Urged  immediate  steps  to  create  a  permanent 
organization  of  African  universities. 

3.  Recommended  that  undergraduate  training 
be  concentrated  in  Africa  as  mucli  as  possible,  that 
overseas  scholarships  be  used  for  undergraduate 
training  in  highly  specialized  fields  not  available 
within  Africa  and  for  graduate  studies,  and  that 
governments  and  organizations  currently  offering 
overseas  undergraduate  scholarships  be  encour- 
aged to  make  grants  to  African  institutions  in- 
stead of  providing  funds  for  overseas  study. 

The  United  States  has  taken  these  recommenda- 
tions imder  advisement  and,  in  fact,  is  already  en- 
gaged in  some  activities  which  support  these  goals. 
We  believe,  however,  that  the  massive  resources 
required  to  implement  this  progi-am  can  be  mobi- 
lized only  through  a  variety  of  channels — interna- 
tional, multilateral,  bilateral,  and  private.  Our 
efforts  are  still  small  compared  to  those  of  the 
former  metropolitan  powers,  and  we  are  drawing 
upon  their  skills  and  experience  in  the  field  to  de- 
v^elop  our  own  jirograms. 

We  further  recognize  that  it  is  not  feasible  to 
transfer  undergraduate  training  to  Africa  im- 
mediately. We  recognize  that  during  the  next 
decade — or  even  longer — -there  will  probably  be  a 
numerical  increase  of  Africans  studying  abroad 
while  African  institutions  are  further  developed. 
Part  of  this  increase  will  be  a  result  of  the  in- 
creasing number  of  secondary  school  graduates 
that  will  flow  from  current  improvements  in  Af- 
rican secondary  education.  We  also  are  aware 
that  it  will  be  many  years  before  the  number  of 
African  graduate  students  will  rise  substantially 
enough  to  have  an  important  effect  on  overseas 
scholarship  programs. 


Need  for  More  Representative  Foreign  Service 

Now  what  does  all  this  mean  to  the  Virginia 
Teachers  Association  ?  Wliat  can  you  do  to  assist 
in  the  vital  growth  in  African  education  ?  I  think 
you  can  help  significantly  in  two  ways. 
First,  and  most  importantly,  you  can  help  with 
i  people.  The  Department  of  State,  the  Foreign 
Service,  the  U.S.  Information  Agency,  the  Agency 
for  International  Development,  the  Peace  Corps — 

November  26,    7962 


all  are  actively  seeking  qualified  personnel  for  a 
variety  of  jobs.  Of  particular  importance  is  the 
active  recruitment  of  more  members  of  minority 
groups  into  the  Foreign  Service  to  make  that  elite 
corps  more  representative  of  America  as  a  whole. 
If  we  profess  to  wish  to  give  Africans  a  true  pic- 
ture of  our  society  and  persuade  them  that  we 
are  working  arduously  to  eliminate  the  disease 
of  discrimination  from  our  country,  surely  one 
good  way  to  do  this  is  by  increasing  the  nimiber 
of  Negro  Americans  and  persons  from  other  mi- 
nority groups  in  our  Foreign  Service  corps.  And 
such  an  increase  is  necessary  not  only  among 
our  Foreign  Service  officers  in  Africa  but  in  Eu- 
rope, Asia,  Latin  America — and  in  Washington, 
D.C.,  I  might  add. 

As  many  of  you  know,  Foreign  Service  person- 
nel is  recruited  both  at  the  junior  officer  level, 
principally  through  the  competitive  Foreign  Serv- 
ice officer  examination,  and  through  the  direct  ap- 
pointment of  a  very  small  number  of  middle- 
and  senior-grade  Reserve  officers.  The  key  to  a 
more  representative  Foreign  Service  is  an  increase 
in  the  number  of  persons  from  minority  groups 
who  come  into  the  system  through  both  channels. 

Although  the  tradition  of  Negro  Americans  en- 
tering the  Foreign  Service  tlirough  examination 
has  been  a  limited  one,  an  increasing  number  of 
colored  Americans  are  taking  the  examinations 
each  year,  and  we  want  to  encourage  this  trend. 
It  is  true  that  not  as  many  Negro  Americans  have 
been  successful  in  passing  the  written  examina- 
tion as  all  of  us  would  like.  This,  I  believe,  is 
due  to  many  social  and  economic  factors.  In  some 
cases  it  is  due  to  shortcomings  in  their  educational 
backgroimd.  In  other  cases  it  is  due  rather  to 
the  orientation  of  their  education. 

This  is  where  the  Virginia  Teachers  Associa- 
tion can  make  an  important  contribution.  By 
encouraging  your  young  people  to  consider  a  ca- 
reer in  the  Foreign  Service,  by  examining  and 
reorienting  your  curricula  for  them,  by  coimsel- 
ing  your  young  men  and  women  on  the  type  of 
examination  given,  and  by  preparing  them  for 
that  examination,  you  can  establish  a  tradition 
that  will  feed  on  itself  in  years  to  come. 

Insofar  as  one  major  geographic  area  is  con- 
cerned, the  African  studies  program  introduced 
by  the  Virginia  Teachers  Association  in  1960  is 
an  excellent  step  in  this  direction.  I  encourage 
you  to  continue  this  type  of  foreign  affairs-ori- 

815 


eiUed  education  to  lielp  your  students  prepare  for 
the  Foreign  Service,  because  there  is  more  to  be 
done. 

Improving  Contacts  With  African  Students 

The  second  way  in  which  you  can  help  in  tliis 
area  is  through  your  contacts  with  African  stu- 
dents who  come  to  this  country.  Too  often  these 
students  find  themselves  in  economic  distress  after 
being  here  a  short  time.  Stronger  efforts  can  be 
made  to  find  or  organize  work  opportunities  for 
tliose  more  deserving  students  who  are  victims  of 
an  underprivileged  background.  Anything  that 
can  be  done  to  assist  African  students  over  the 
financial  hurdle  that  many  of  them  face  would 
be  a  good  investment  in  the  future  of  African- 
American  relations. 

Developing  genuine  human  relations  with  Afri- 
can students  who  are  thousands  of  miles  from 
family  and  friends  is  also  meaningful.  There 
are  still  too  many  instances  when  African  visitors 
find  themselves  with  few  or  no  American  friends. 
Bringing  African  students  into  average  American 
homes  to  show  them  American  life  as  it  is  really 
lived  is  an  excellent  way  to  help  them  learn  more 
alx)ut  us. 

The  impressions  of  America  that  African  stu- 
dents get  in  their  short  time  among  us  are  lasting 
ones,  aJid  the  more  we  help  them  understand  our 
society,  the  better  able  they  will  be  to  help  Africa 
evaluate  the  United  States  when  they  return  to 
their  coimtries.  This  is  an  important  matter  when 
you  consider  that  the  young  Africans  with  whom 
American  students  work  and  live  today  will  be 
among  the  leaders  of  Africa  tomorrow. 

In  closing  let  me  say  how  gratified  I  am  by 
your  interest  in  this  tremendously  vital  and  chal- 
lenging area  of  Africa.  I  hope  you  will  keep  this 
interest  active  and  help  us  find  new  ways  to  con- 
tribute to  the  growing  community  of  interest  de- 
veloping between  Africa  and  the  United  States. 


United  States  and  Senegal  Hold 
Informal  Civil  Aviation  Talks 

Press  release  664  dated  November  6 

Officials  of  the  United  States  and  the  Republic 
of  Senegal  initiated  informal  civil  a\aation  dis- 
cussions in  Washington  on  November  5, 1962.  Th( 
conversations  are  proceeding  in  a  cordial  atmos- 
phere and  concern  various  air  transport  problems 
looking  toward  the  eventual  conclusion  of  a  bilat- 
eral air  transport  agreement  between  the  tw( 
nations. 

Cheikh  Fall,  president  of  Air  Afrique,  is  con- 
ducting the  talks  on  behalf  of  the  Senegalese  Gov 
ernment,  in  conjunction  with  Mahamadou  Kane 
Charge  d'Affaires  ad  interim  of  the  Embassy  ok 
Senegal.  Ernest  A.  Lister,  Deputy  Director,  Of 
fice  of  Transport  and  Communications,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  and  Alan  S.  Boyd,  Chairman,  Civi 
Aeronautics  Board,  are  representing  the  U.S 
Government  at  the  talks. 


Inil 
IN 


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nil 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

87th  Congress,  2d  Session 

State  Department  Security :  The  New  Passport  Regi 
tions.     Hearings  before  the  Subcommittee  To  Inves; 
gate  the  Administration  of  the  Internal  Security  Actot 
and  Other  Internal  Security  Laws  of  the  Senate  Comn 
mittee  on  the  Judiciary.    Part  3.    May  16-June  19, 1962' 
149  pp.  and  appendixes  (34  pp.). 

Captive  European  Nations.  Hearings  before  the  Subcom 
mittee  on  Europe  of  the  House  Committee  on  Foreigi 
Affairs.     June  2-September  19,  1962.     377  pp. 

Report  on  Audit  of  the  Panama  Canal  Company  and  thi 
Canal  Zone  Government  for  Fiscal  Tear  1961.  H.  Doc 
429.    June  6,  1962.    87  pp. 

A  Report  on  Audit  of  the  Development  Loan  Fund, 
Wholly  Owned   Government  CoriK)ration,  Fiscal  Yea;i 
1961.    H.  Doc.  448.    June  25, 1962.    48  pp. 

Mobile  Trade  Fairs.  Hearing  before  the  Senate  Commit(l|.] 
tee  on  Commerce  on  S.  3389.  a  bill  to  promote  the  fort  ' 
eign  commerce  of  the  United  States  through  the  use  0*  Bt! 
mobile  trade  fairs.    July  23, 1962.    73  pp. 

Ilea 
U 

■u 


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ttii 


816 


Department  of  Stale   Bulletii 


TAT 


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ti 

bvi( 


lorn 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


oiiii 
2.11 
atn 


Inited  Nations  Considers  Question  of  Suspension 
'  Nuclear  and  Thermonuclear  Tests 


ISdl 

ieG? 

m\ 
ori 

iCic 

en 


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tefi 

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Following  are  texts  of  a  statement  made  hy 
rthur  H.  Dean,  U.S.  Representative  to  the  Gen- 
ul  Assembly,  and  a  two-part  resolution  adopted 
■  plenary  session  on  November  6. 

ATEMENT  BY  AMBASSADOR  DEAN  > 


One  year  ago  the  Soviet  Union  conducted  the 
rgest  series  of  nuclear  tests  ever  carried  out  ^  and 
us  ended  a  period  during  which,  to  the  extent 
'  our  knowledge,  none  of  the  parties  to  test  ban 
igotiations  carried  out  nuclear  weapon  test  ex- 
osions.  I  say  "to  the  extent  of  our  knowledge" 
scause  in  the  absence  of  an  effective  interna- 
onal  control  system  no  one  can  definitely  prove 
lat  such  explosions  did  not  occur.  We  know  we 
*  d  not  test,  but  the  most  one  can  say  is  that  we 
id  no  evidence  of  such  explosions  in  the  Soviet 
nion.  We  were  willing  to  assume  the  risk  of 
icertainty  at  that  time  because  we  hoped  a  test 
m  agreement  was  imminent  and  because  the 
Dviet  Union  then  seemed  to  be  negotiating  seri- 
But  as  President  Kennedy  said  on  Au- 
[ist291ast:' 


>•  islv 

tied      •' 


Gentlemen's  agreements  and  moratoria  do  not  provide 
e  type  of  guarantees  that  are  necessary.  They  do  not 
ve  assurance  against  an  abrupt  renewal  of  testing  by 
lilateral  action.  This  is  the  lesson  of  the  Soviet  Gov- 
nment's  decision  just  a  year  ago. 

In  1960  the  General  Assembly  adopted  two  res- 


^Made  in  Committee  I  (Political  and  Security)  on 
ct.  26  (U.S.  delegation  press  release  4076)  ;  for  a  state- 
ent  made  by  Ambassador  Adlai  B.  Stevenson  in  the 
>mmittee  on  Oct.  10,  see  Botxetin  of  Oct.  29, 1962,  p.  635. 
'  For  background,  see  iiid.,  Sept.  18,  1961,  p.  475. 

•  lUd.,  Sept.  17,  1962,  p.  417. 


"-"-■•" 


olutions  calling  for  a  continuation  of  the  volun- 
tary suspension  of  testing.*  The  Soviet  Union 
voted  for  these  resolutions  and  then  resumed  test- 
ing the  following  summer.  During  the  intensive 
Soviet  test  series  of  1  year  ago,  this  General  As- 
sembly passed  another  resolution  calling  for  an 
end  to  testing  during  negotiations.'^  That  resolu- 
tion was  passed  to  the  punctuation  of  Soviet  blasts 
and  was  violated  by  the  Soviet  Union  as  soon  as 
it  was  voted  upon.  Now  a  resolution®  has  once 
again  been  presented  to  us  calling,  in  effect,  for  a 
moratorium  on  nuclear  testing  beginning  January 
1,  1963.  In  its  substance  and  effect  such  a  pro- 
vision encourages  states  to  refuse  the  necessary 
prerequisite  for  a  comprehensive  test  ban  treaty : 
namely,  an  effective  verification  system  which  will 
jiermit  the  parties  to  the  agreement  to  know  that 
it  is  being  kept. 

U.S.  Position  on  Test  Ban  Treaty 

Let  me  make  the  position  of  the  United  States 
quite  clear  in  this  committee,  as  we  have  attempted 
to  do  in  the  discussions  preceding  the  introduc- 
tion of  the  text.  We  will  sign  a  treaty  banning 
all  nuclear  tests  in  all  environments  under  effective 
international  control,  such  as  our  draft  A/Cl/STl, 
or  we  will  sign  a  treaty  banning  all  tests  in  the 
atmosphere,  under  water,  or  in  space,  such  as  our 
draft  A/C.1/874,  while  we  continue  to  negotiate 
on  the  broader  treaty.'     We  oppose  and  camiot 


*  U.N.  docs.  A/RES/1577  and  1578  (XV). 

°  For  background  and  text  of  Resolution  1648,  see  Bul- 
letin of  Dec.  4, 1961,  p.  936. 

'  U.N.  doc.  A/C.1/L.310. 

'  For  background  and  texts  of  draft  treaties,  see  Bul- 
letin of  Sept.  17, 1962,  p.  403. 

817 


accept  any  unverified  moratorium  on  nuclear  tests. 
Siiecifically : 

1.  We  will  not  accept  or  negotiate  about  an  un- 
controlled moratorium  on  all  nuclear  weapon  tests 
in  all  environments. 

2.  We  will  not  accept  or  negotiate  about  an  un- 
controlled moratorium  on  undergroiuid  nuclear 
weapon  tests  in  connection  with  an  agreed  ban  on 
nuclear  weapon  tests  in  other  environments. 

3.  We  will  stop  all  tests  the  day  a  treaty  con- 
taining necessary  international  verification  ar- 
rangements, such  as  our  draft  A/C.1/874,  is 
signed.  We  hope  this  could  be  accomplished  by 
January  1, 1963. 

4.  The  United  States  will  vote  against  any  pro- 
vision for  an  unverified,  uncontrolled  moratorium. 
Passage  of  such  a  provision  could  have  only  one 
effect :  to  postpone  the  day  when  all  tests  are  ended 
forever. 

Tliough  I  know  that  emotions  run  high  on  this 
question,  and  understandably  so,  I  would  ask  that 
members  of  this  Assembly  recall  the  cold  facts. 
The  1958-1961  moratorium  did  not  facilitate  nego- 
tiations on  a  test  ban ;  it  did  not  result  in  a  perma- 
nent end  to  nuclear  weapon  tests.  The  Soviet  tests 
of  1961  destroyed  any  chance  that  a  moratorium 
solution  to  the  problem  of  nuclear  testing  would  be 
acceptable  to  us. 

We  have  complete  sympathy  with  the  almost 
universal  desire  of  United  Nations  members  to  end 
nuclear  tests.  There  is  no  member  nation  that  de- 
sires an  end  to  the  tests  more  than  the  United 
States  or  that  has  done  more  to  obtain  one. 

U.S.-U.K.  Draft  Resolution 

This  General  Assembly  has  an  opportunity  to 
express  the  urgency  and  the  sense  of  deep  desire 
which  we  all  feel  for  the  conclusion  of  an  agree- 
ment in  tlie  Geneva  negotiations  wliich  will  halt 
all  tests.  Tlie  United  States  and  the  United  King- 
dom liave  sponsored  a  resolution,  A/C.1/L.311,  on 
this  question,  for  which  we  ask  the  support  of 
this  Assembly.  Its  operative  sentences  are  simple. 
We  ask  that  negotiation  of  a  comprehensive  test 
ban  treaty  be  endorsed  as  tlie  primary  objective 
of  the  18-Nation  Disarmament  Committee  and  of 
its  subcommittee  on  nuclear  testing.  We  ask  for 
endorsement  of  tlie  principle  of  effective  and  ade- 
quate international  control  over  a  comprehensive 
test  ban  treaty.  But  should  it  appear  that  a  com- 
prehensive treaty  cannot  expeditiously  l)e  nego- 


818 


\ 


tiated,  we  believe  that,  without  pi-ejudice  to  the 
negotiation  of  a  comprehensive  test  ban  treaty, 
an  immediate  agi-eement  should  be  reached  to 
ban  tests  in  the  atmosphere,  in  sjjace,  and  in  the 
oceans.  We  ask  that  the  General  Assembly  give 
its  approval  to  the  idea  of  an  early  cutoff  date, 
on  wliicli  date  a  treaty  bamiing  tests  would  come  "® 
into  force. 

When  international  verification  arrangements 
are  necessary  to  assure  the  continuity  and  stabil- 
ity of  agreements,  in  the  interests  of  peace  and 
security,  it  is  the  responsibility  and  duty  of  the 
leading  military  powers  to  accept  reasonable  veri- 
fication arrangements.  Wlienever  the  General  As- 
sembly fails  to  say  this  as  clearly  as  it  can,  it  be- 
comes easier  for  states  to  avoid  this  responsibility. 
Broad  and  unequivocal  backing  for  verification 
when  verification  is  needed  will  promote  a  test 
ban  agreement.  To  condone  the  utterly  unjusti- 
fied refusal  of  one  great  power,  the  Soviet  Union, 
to  accept  adequate  international  verification  ar- 
rangements would  be  a  fatal  blow  to  the  hopes 
for  a  permanent  cessation  of  nuclear  tests.  j 


:or  I 


lefo 


k  li 
\ 

tarr 
iin'i; 


Till 
aclii 
nscii 
oiira 
ill  i 
■Mcli 
isstl 


The  Present  Technical  Situation 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  heard  much  discussioni 
here  in  the  past  several  days  of  what  can  and  wliat 
cannot  be  done  in  detecting — that  is,  recording  on 
seismographs — and  identifying — that  is,  distin- 
guishing tlie  exact  character  or  nature  of — under- 
ground nuclear  explosions. 


leea 
irpi 


I  liave  been  asked  if  there  reallv  is  a  technical^  "'^ 


problem  that  stands  in  the  way  of  a  test  ban  agree- 


ment or  wliether  it  is  purely  a  political  problem.!  "Wi 


'IMl 

earlj 
tsoi( 
gnali 
seia 


ray 


I  assure  you  there  is  a  real  and  fundamental  tech- 


Khi 


irtlqi 


nical  problem  to  wliich  I  shall  advert.  There  ia  sfiitt 
also  a  political  problem :  It  is  the  refusal  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  for  political  reasons  alone,  to  accept 
the  necessary  minimum  of  international  inspec- 
tion for  a  comprehensive  and  effective  nucleafl  liiiiat 
test  ban.  *I 

We  liear  Soviet  groups  say  in  speeches,  as  the  fiival 
distinguished  representative  of  Eumania  did  onj  rtii 
October  17,  that  the  United  States  proposal  foit  Wg 
a  ban  on  all  tests  except  underground  "will  noti  ullji 
in  any  way  affect  the  possibilities  of  increasing!  i«s«o 
and  perfecting  its  nuclear  arsenal."  ^i 

If  this  is  true  and  underground  tests  are  indeed  luiiii 
so  important,  then  it  goes  without  saying  that  thei  tlear 
United  States  is  completely  justified  in  asking  for  iiies 
the  necessary  assurances  that  no  l)arty  to  a  com-  ^iisisi 

Department  of  Sfafe   Bulletin   '«N 


HI 


irehensive  test  ban  treaty  will  test  clandestinely 
nderground.     And  this  is  where  teclmical  con- 
iderations  come  into  play.    We  have  never  asked 
or  more  inspection  than  is  warranted  by  the 
Bchnical  facts.    But  we  will  not  and  cannot  set- 
le  for  less.    Allow  me,  then,  to  explain  what  the 
resent  teclmical  situation  is  as  we  understand  it. 
There  has  been  one  constant  throughout  all 
lie  long  history  of  test  ban  negotiations,  and 
lis  will  provide  my  starting  point.     This  con- 
ant  to  which  I  refer  is  the  fact  that  underground 
uclear  explosions  can  be  detected  only  because 
n   ^^y  generate  waves  or  vibrations  in  the  earth 
Ij    hich  can  be  recorded  on  very  sensitive  instru- 
itl   tents. 

illjl  Unfortunately,  the  earth  itself  also  generates 
3jii  ich  waves  or  vibrations  which  are  also  recorded 
1  scientific  instruments.  Moreover,  it  is  not  the 
mrce  of  the  waves  but  rather  the  earth  itself, 
ith  its  exceedingly  complex  geologic  structures, 
hich  chiefly  affects  the  character  of  waves  which 
ass  through  it. 

There  are  a  good  many  signals  emanating  from 

le  earth  which  can  be  ignored  in  the  solution  of 

ir  problem.     The  sources  of  some  earth  waves, 

)r  example,  are  too  deep  down  in  the  earth  to 

i  manmade.     They  can  be  excluded.     Others  are 

early  associated  with  large  earthquakes  and  can 

i  so  identified  by  distant  instnmients.    Still  other 

gnals  indicate  that  the  initial  earth  motion  from 

seismic  event  was  a  rarefaction  wave — that  is, 

le  caused  by  the  earth's  moving  in  a  direction 

j^  svay  from  the  recording  seismogi'aph — a  phe- 

|p,  jmenon  resulting  only  from  earthquakes.    In  all 

[fi'i  ich  cases  as  these  the  events  recorded  require 

J  further  investigation. 

It  is  only  the  signals  which  could  be  caused  ei- 
g,Y.  ler  by  a  manmade  nuclear  explosion  or  by  an 
^M|,  irthquake  with  which  we  are  concerned.  We 
itimate  that  there  will  be  about  100  earthquakes 
inually  in  the  Soviet  Union  alone,  of  a  size 
[uivalent  at  least  to  the  explosion  of  a  10-kiloton 
)mb  in  a  typical  alluvial  soil — that  is,  unconsoli- 
ited  gravel — whose  seismic  signals  would  be  vir- 
[■ally  indistinguishable  by  distant  stations  from 
Lose  of  nuclear  explosions.  There  is  no  known 
ethod — let  me  repeat,  no  known  method — of  de- 
rmining  which,  if  any,  of  these  events  was  a 
iclear  explosion  except  by  actually  investigating 
1  the  site  the  source  of  the  recorded  earth  waves, 
his  is  the  function  and  the  only  reason  for  on-site 


'SSI 


inspections.  On-site  inspections  are  today  scien- 
tifically indispensable  for  positive  identification  of 
underground  nuclear  explosions.  There  is  simply 
no  other  established  way. 

The  United  States  has  had  for  3  years  a  major 
research  program.  Project  Vela,*  whose  sole  pur- 
pose is  to  help  us  and  the  whole  world  do  a  better 
job  of  detecting  and  distinguishing  earthquakes 
and  underground  explosions.  United  States  scien- 
tists and  scientists  of  other  nations  have  made 
numerous  studies  of  the  capabilities  of  seismic 
equipment,  of  numbers  of  earthquakes,  and  of 
ways  to  identify,  that  is,  to  distinguish,  explosions 
from  earthquakes.  There  have  been  many  dozens 
of  reports  on  this  work,  most  of  them,  incidentally, 
in  the  open  scientific  literature  and  hence  avail- 
able to  the  whole  world.  Some  of  the  more  im- 
portant findings  which  permitted  us  to  reduce 
control  requirements  were  contained  in  a  Depart- 
ment of  Defense  press  release  of  July  7, 1962.  But 
if  there  has  been  any  such  intensive  Soviet  effort, 
we  have  yet  to  hear  of  it. 

Problem  of  Detecting  Explosions 

So  far  I  have  been  discussing  the  problem  of 
sorting  out  nuclear  explosions  from  other  events 
which  produce  earth  waves.  This  is  the  problem 
of  identification  as  opposed  to  detection  or  mere 
recording.  Altliough  the  identification  is  the  more 
complicated  pai"t  of  tlie  problem,  I  would  not  like 
to  leave  the  impression  that  only  the  identification 
of  explosions  jDresents  difficulties:  Detection  is 
also  a  problem  of  major  proportions. 

Although  it  is  a  well-publicized  fact  that  sta- 
tions in  other  countries  have  recorded  certain — ■ 
I  repeat,  certain — of  our  underground  nuclear  ex- 
plosions, there  have  been  many  other  explosions 
which  have  not  been  identified  as  nuclear  explo- 
sions and,  in  fact,  have  not  even  been  detected — 
simjjly  not  detected — by  scientific  stations  and 
observatories  outside  the  United  States.  And  this 
is  true  despite  the  fact  that  we  have  made  public 
announcements  of  the  occurrence  of  underground 
explosions  at  the  Nevada  test  site  and  in  several 
cases  have  given  the  pi'ecise  time  of  the  explosions. 

Let  me  repeat  again  what  I  just  said.  Tlie 
United  States  has  conducted  many  underground 
nuclear  explosions  which  were  not  even  detected — 


'  For  background,  see  ihid.,  Aug.  28,  19G1,  p.  375. 


ovember  26,    1962 


819 


let  alone  identified — by  instrumentation  located 
outside  the  United  States. 

A  further  major  problem  is  that,  in  addition  to 
detecting  a  seismic  event,  one  must  locate  its  geo- 
graphic position.  Otherwise  the  data  are  not 
meaningful.  Detection  at  only  one  station  tells 
you  only  that  an  event  has  occurred  somewhere  in 
the  whole  world.  To  tell  in  which  country  and  at 
what  geographical  coordinates  the  event  occurred, 
you  must  record  the  event  at  several  different  sta- 
tions. Detect,  locate,  identify — without  accom- 
plishing all  three  the  problem  is  simply  not  solved. 

Incidentally,  when  I  hear  the  Soviet  representa- 
tive say  that  "states  do  possess  at  present  the 
necessary  scientific  and  technical  means  to  see 
that  obligations  not  to  undertake  undergi'ound 
tests  are  respected,"  I  cannot  help  wondering  what 
he  means.  ^^Hien  he  tallis  about  detecting  United 
States  tests,  I  think  perhaps  he  means  that  he  has 
the  necessary  scientific  and  technical  means  to  read 
the  United  States  press,  which  generally  records 
in  considerable  detail  the  happenings  relating  to 
the  United  States  test  program.  Or  he  may  be 
referring  to  the  truly  remarkable  scientific  and 
technical  means  by  which  the  Soviet  Union  was 
able,  in  1958,  to  announce  the  detonation  of  a 
United  States  test  device — in  the  atmosphere,  not 
underground — which  had  actually  turned  out  to 
be  a  dud  and  which  produced  no  explosion  what- 
soever. What  kind  of  detection  system  does  the 
Soviet  Union  have  which  permits  it  to  detect  ex- 
plosions which  don't  go  off?  Well,  it's  clear  it's 
a  very  remarkable  but  not  entirely  scientific  tech- 
nique. I  think  the  Assembly  ought  to  take  note 
of  this  when  it  hears  Soviet  claims  about  the 
advanced  state  of  science.  I  will  not  belabor  this 
point  furtlier,  Mr.  Cliairman,  since  I  think  it  is 
already  evident  that  the  absence  of  a  wall  of 
secrecy  around  the  United  States  is  perhaps  the 
chief  reason  for  the  Soviet  representative's  con- 
fidence in  his  scientific  and  technical  detection 
capabilities. 

But  if  the  Soviet  Union  really  does  have  scien- 
tific evidence  which  it  has  not  divulged,  I  appeal 
to  the  Soviet  delegation  to  bring  forward  its  scien- 
tific proof.  The  Soviet  Union  has  a  responsibility 
to  do  so,  for  not  a  shred  of  scientific  evidence  has 
ever  been  advanced  by  the  Soviet  Government 
to  support  its  abandonment  of  the  tecluiical  under- 
pinnings of  the  test  ban  negotiations.  The  Soviet 
Union's  sudden  reversal  of  position  on  the  neces- 


820 


n 


of 
trl", 


sity  for  appropriate  international  verification  hi  f 
blocked  a  test  ban  agreement.  Legitimate  scie 
tific  support  for  the  current  Soviet  position  cou 
help  in  unblocking  the  road  to  agreement;  y 
every  Soviet  statement  is  couched  in  positive  ge 
eralities,  full  of  emphasis  but  carefully  avoidii 
concrete  technical  facts. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  spent  considerable  tin 
in  explaining  the  technical  considerations  unde 
lying  the  United  States  position  on  a  test  bj 
treaty.  The  Soviet  Union  has  never  given  an^jc^ 
reasoned  reply  to  these  technical  consideratior 
which  are  as  well  known  to  Soviet  scientists  ai 
officials  as  they  are  to  us. 


rerb 
:oDtro, 

Is  it 

0St( 

iic«! 


udi 

LllgD! 

rom 


Soviet  Argument  About  Espionage 

Perhaps  this  is  why  the  Soviet  Union  rath 
lamely  resorts  to  a  second  argument  against  i 
adequately  internationally  verified,  comprehe 
sive  test  ban  treaty.  This  is  the  argument  tli 
the  verification  machinery  somehow  could  be  usi 
for  espionage  in  the  Soviet  Union. 

I  can  hardly  imagine  a  more  unlikely  vehic 
for  spying  on  the  Soviet  Union  than  the  inspe 
tion  system  required  for  a  nuclear  test  bi 
treaty.  Let  us  examine  the  Soviet  contention  th 
the  inspection  system  could  be  used  for  "pinpoin 
ing  objectives  for  nuclear  strikes."  This  is  wh 
the  Soviet  representative  last  October  10  said  w: 
the  purpose  of  the  inspection  system,  and  he  sp 
cifically  referred  to  "inspection  and  control  post! 
in  this  connection. 

Well,  liow  could  such  posts  "pinpoint  objectiv 
for  nuclear  strikes"  ? 

Is  it  the  stafl  of  the  few  fixed  control  posts  ' 
tlie  Soviet  Union  that  troubles  the  Soviet  Union  \^^^ 
Well,  this  is  strange,  for  the  United  States  ar 
the  United  Kingdom  have  proposed  a  system 
integrated  stations  which  would  be  owned  ac 
operated  by  the  states  where  such  stations  yv&i> 
located.    Thus,  in  the  Soviet  Union  the  station 
would  be  owned  by  the  Soviet  Government  an 
every  single  member  of  the  operating  staffs  woull  ^ 
be  a  Soviet  citizen.    It  is  true  that  a  few  obsei-v^e)' 
from  an  international  commission  would,  und(t 
our  proposals,  be  guests  of  the  Soviet  Governmeii 
at  these  control  posts.    But  they  could  not  mo^ 
from   these   posts   and   travel   about  the   Sovit  ,[' 
Union  unless  the  Soviet  Government  graciousl 
gave  them  the  normal  privileges  one  might  hope 
government  would  grant  its  guests.     But  that 


Department  of  Slate  Bullelt 


iotht 
1 1 
ntern 
odet 


tk 
iiclis 
leei 

■.s.- 

mpoi 

levie) 

.111 
Wei 
oubl 
Hei 
imii 
torj 
Fii 
laiiizi 
•  [iii«( 

JStffl 

ieta 
Sec 

in' 
ifthe 
Thi 
catii 
iploi 

as 


'Pot 


til 


p  to  the  Soviet  Union.    And  as  the  representa- 

le  ive  of  the  United  Kingdom  pointed  out  on  Octo- 

n  er  17,  many  times  more  foreign  tourists  are  ad- 

litted  annually  to  the  Soviet  Union  than  woidd 

fj  rer  be  required  by  the  operation  of  a  test  ban 

It  antrol  system.     So  it  is  hard  to  find  a  serious 

luse  here  for  concern  by  the  Soviet  Union. 

Is  it  then  a  case  of  Soviet  fear  as  to  what  hap- 

A  ens  to  the  scientific  data  which  such  stations  pro- 

uce?     I  hope  this  is  not  the  case,  for  it  would 

I  iggest  that  the  Soviet  Government  has  not,  after 

tia  1,   really   accepted  the   eight-nation  memoran- 

um  ^  of  April  16  last.     The  eight-nation  mem- 

randum    and    the    U.S.-U.K.    draft    treaty    of 

-ugust  27  (A/C.1/874)  both  propose  that  all  data 

'om  fixed  stations  be  submitted  to  an  interna- 

onal    commission    for    processing   and    review. 

loth  the  eight-nation  memorandum  and  the  U.S.- 

r.K.  draft  treaty  of  August  27  propose  that  the 

iternational  commission  sift  through  this  data 

)  determine  which  detected  events  should  be  put 

ito  the  category  of  those  where  fhirther  clarifica- 

on  might  be  needed.    Thei'efore  I  submit  that, 

the  Soviet  Union  is  objecting  to  the  use  to  wliich 


!lni 


'jf 


I  ich  scientific  data  might  be  put,  it  is  objecting  to 


le  eight-nation  memorandum  as  well  as  to  the 
I.S.-U.K.     draft     treaty — and     this     is     very 


lilt! 


ip'll! 

,jj  nportant, 


post 

ectii 

ICSt! 
[nia 
iesa 


eview  of  On-Site  Inspection  Procedures 

Allow  me  now  to  review  the  on-site  inspection 

rocedures  in  an  effort  to  discover  what  might  be 

■oubling  the  Soviet  Union. 
Here  are  some  of  the  safeguards  which  would 

irround  every  on-site  inspection  in  Soviet  ter- 

itory : 
First,  the  on-site  inspection  teams  would  be  or- 

anized  not  by  the  United  States  or  the  United 
ingdom  but  by  the  executive  officer  of  the  control 
i5^i  p^stem,  whose  appointment  must  meet  with  So- 
jtatii  let  approval. 

■nta  Second,  transportation  to  and  from  the  site  to 
;i«ii  e  investigated  would  be  under  the  jurisdiction 
sen  f  the  Soviet  Government. 

,  Ml  Third,  as  the  teams  of  inspectors  search  at  the 
'rDBii  )cation  of  the  event  for  evidence  of  a  nuclear 
jtnii  splosion,  they  could  be  subjected  to  the  scrutiny 
Soi  f  as  many  obseivers  as  the  Soviet  Union  chose 
acioii  )  send  along. 
thop 
It  til 


•For  text,  see  U.N.  doc.  DC/203  (ENDC/28). 


lovemfaer  26,   1962 


Fourth,  the  area  to  be  inspected  at  the  origin  of 
the  event  would  be  very  small  and  strictly  and 
precisely  limited  by  treaty  and  by  the  essential 
scientific  evidence  specified  in  the  treaty  before 
the  on-site  inspection  team  could  come  in.  In  all, 
the  total  area  which  could  be  inspected  annually 
would  be  an  infinitesimal  fraction  of  Soviet  ter- 
ritory :  less  than  one  two-thousandth  of  the  total 
area  of  the  U.S.S.R. 

Fifth,  we  have  suggested  that  in  the  vast  area 
of  the  Soviet  Union  where  earthquakes  do  not  nor- 
mally occur,  on-site  inspections  would  be  restricted 
by  treaty  agreement  to  a  very  small  number. 
This  area  of  low  earthquake  activity —  and  hence 
of  minimal  on-site  inspection — embraces  all  but  a 
small  fraction  of  the  area  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
This  would  constitute  yet  another  safeguard 
against  the  misuse  of  the  right  of  on-site 
inspection. 

Sixth,  the  location  of  an  event  detected  by  re- 
mote instrumentation  cannot  be  determined  in 
advance  by  the  United  Kingdom  or  the  United 
States;  such  sites  are  determined  solely  by  the 
occurrence  of  an  earthquake  or  by  the  detonation 
of  a  nuclear  weapon  by  the  Soviet  Union. 

One  could  go  on,  but  I  am  afraid  that  the  simple 
fact  is  that  "espionage"  is  nothing  more  than  a 
smokescreen  to  cover  up  the  real  reasons  for  the 
present  Soviet  refusal  to  sign  an  adequate  and 
effective  test  ban  treaty  providing  for  interna- 
tional inspection  of  unidentified  events.  The  So- 
viet Government  is  apparently  determined  at  this 
time  to  continue  nuclear  testing  or  else  it  is  unwill- 
ing or  unable  to  accept  a  test  ban  for  some  political 
reason  which  the  Soviet  leaders  do  not  wish  to 
divulge. 

Mr.  Chairman,  there  is  no  solid  reason  apparent 
in  anything  that  Soviet  spokesmen  have  said  to 
explain  why  this  whole  past  year  has  been  frittered 
away  without  substantial  progress  in  negotiating 
a  comprehensive  test  ban  treaty. 

U.S.  Agrees  on  Urgency  of  Need  for  Suspension 

Now  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  had  two  major 
test  series  in  little  over  a  year,  one  of  which  is  still 
going  on  in  the  atmosphere,  let  us  hope  that  we 
can  again  begin  to  move  toward  a  truly  effective 
test  ban  agreement. 

The  United  States  fully  agrees  with  the  descrip- 
tion of  this  agenda  item:  "The  urgent  need  for 
suspension  of  nuclear  and  thenno-nuclear  tests." 

821 


Indeed  it  is  urgent  that  we  suspend  these  tests — 
and  not  just  some  tests  but  all  of  them — and  not 
just  by  hortatory  hxnguage  but  with  effective,  prac- 
tical treaty  language.  We  do  feel  that  banning 
tests  in  certain  environments  would  be  better  than 
no  ban  at  all,  but  we  are  not  here  to  argue  for  an 
mcomplete  ban.  We  would,  in  fact,  regard  our 
work  as  incomplete  if  it  did  not  result  in  an  effec- 
tive treaty  with  adequate  international  controls 
bamaing  all  tests  forever. 

How  soon  can  this  be  accomplished  ?  The  Soviet 
Union  alone  holds  the  key  to  this  question.  It 
alone  has  the  responsibility  for  no  agreement.  If 
the  Soviet  Union  begins  to  negotiate  in  earnest,  it 
may  not  be  too  optimistic  to  strike  for  January  1, 
1963,  as  a  target  date  for  signature  of  a  treaty. 
This  is  what  the  United  States  had  in  mind  when 
we  proposed  that  the  test  ban  subcommittee  con- 
tinue meeting  in  Geneva  right  through  the  current 
recess  in  the  main  disarmament  talks.  The  sub- 
committee is  still  in  session  and,  at  a  word  from 
Moscow,  could  rapidly  begin  to  put  together  a 
treaty.  We  are  ready  to  work  around  the  clock  to 
do  this.  I  would  like  to  recall  at  this  point  a  state- 
ment by  President  Kennedy.  Last  August  29  the 
President  referred  to  the  January  1  cutoff  date, 
which  I  might  say  was  suggested  originally  by  the 
distinguished  representative  of  Mexico,  and  he 
said: 

I  am  happy  to  say  that  the  United  States  Government 
regards  this  as  a  reasonable  target  date  and  would  like 
to  join  with  all  interested  parties  in  a  maximum  effort 
to  conclude  effective  agreements  which  can  enter  into 
force  on  next  Xew  Tear's  Day.  To  accomplish  this  pur- 
pose the  governments  involved  must  accelerate  their  nego- 
tiations, looking  toward  an  agreed  treaty. 

In  an  effort  to  give  force  and  effect  to  this  state- 
ment we  thereupon  made  our  proposal  to  keep  the 
test  ban  subcommittee  in  operation.  And  while 
the  hour  is  late,  we  still  stand  by  this  statement  of 
the  President. 

As  we  continue  to  work  out  the  problem  of  ban- 
ning underground  tests,  there  is  no  reason  why 
we  should  delay  an  agreement  to  ban  tests  in  other 
areas.  Botli  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Un- 
ion have  agreed  that  existing  means  of  control, 
such  as  each  possess,  can  police  the  cessation  of 
nuclear  tests  in  the  atmosphere,  in  space,  and  in 
the  oceans.  This  is  nothing  to  scoff  at.  This 
agi-eement  in  principle  means  nothing  less  than 
the  fact  that   a  treaty  could  be  signed   which 


822 


!' 


would  ban  those  nuclear  tests  which  cause  human-; 
ity  greatest  concern. 

We  have  put  the  world  on  notice  by  our  tabling 
of  a  treaty  last  August  27  (A/C.1/874)  that  the 
United  States  is  ready  at  any  time  to  signify  its 
formal  renunciation  of  all  nuclear  weapon  tests 
in  the  atmosphere,  in  space,  and  in  the  oceans. 

It  is  testing  in  the  atmosphere  which  causes  con- 
cern about  radioactive  fallout.  Testing  in  space 
has  been  criticized  for  various  reasons,  and  radio- 
activity in  the  oceans  has  also  been  a  source  of'i 
concern.  We  could  stop  all  these  tests  that  people 
are  worried  about  for  reasons  of  health  or  genetics 
and  stop  them  almost  immediately.  There  is  no 
need  to  ignore  these  concerns  until  we  settle  the 
disjiute  over  underground  tests,  which  release  no 
radioactive  debris  into  the  human  environment. 

Soviet  Double  Standard 

The  reply  of  the  Soviet  Government  to  our  ap- 
peal for  an  immediate  end  to  tests  in  the  atmos- 
phere, in  space,  and  in  the  oceans  has  been  a  sterile 
reiteration  of  its  demand  for  a  further  uncon- 
trolled moratorium  on  underground  tests.  The 
Soviet  Government  cannot  fall  back  to  its  "espio- 
nage" argument,  since  there  is  not  the  slightest 
trace  of  international  control  associated  with  our 
partial-treaty  offer.  So  one  highly  spurious  ar- 
gument feebly  mustered  by  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment in  explaining  why  it  is  against  the  partial 
treaty  is  that  an  immediate  ban  on  nuclear  testa 
in  the  atmosphere,  in  space,  and  in  the  oceans' 
would  "legalize"  underground  tests. 

In  paraphrase,  the  Soviet  position  is:  "We'rw 
sorry,  but  it  is  better  for  us  to  continue  to  con- 
taminate the  atmosphere  and  test  in  the  atmos- 
phere and  in  space  and  in  the  oceans  than  to  give' 
anyone  reason  to  think  we  approve  of  underground! 
tests." 

The  Soviet  Government  can  rest  assured  that! 
we  will  not  think  its  agreement  to  a  partial  treaty^ 
means  that  it  endorses  underground  tests.  But  1 
submit  that  Soviet  refusal  to  agree  to  an  immedi- 
ate ban  on  tests  in  the  atmosphere,  in  space,  and  ini 
the  oceans,  wliere  international  control  is  not  re-' 
qTiired,  strongly  suggests  that  it  thorouglily  ap- 
proves of  and  intends  to  continue  tests  in  the 
atmosphere  whenever  and  wherever  it  pleases. 
And  this  is  a  very  serious  matter  for  every  one  o4|| 
us. 


tlw 


of  I 
inc 
Sot 
tliis 
sciei 
muc 
miss 
isi( 

setti 
viet 
oil 
lica 
Tl 
8cai 


wher 
ra(li( 
plan: 
from 
ttspo 
obsfr 


Department  of  Stale  Bullelif 


Ko»ei 


Sometimes,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  hear  it  said  that 
the  United  States  can  do  underground  tests  better 
than  anyone  else  and  therefore  a  ban  on  tests  in 
the  atmosphere,  in  space,  and  in  the  oceans  would 
give  an  unfair  advantage  to  the  United  States. 
Although  this  is  in  no  sense  true,  I  find  this  a  re- 
freshing change  of  tune.  Usually  we  hear  that 
Soviet  science  and  technology  leads  the  world  and 
that  anything  tlie  United  States  can  do  the  Soviet 
Union  can  do  better.  So  when,  with  becoming 
modesty,  the  Soviet  Union  grants  to  the  United 
States  a  status  of  jiermanent  leadership  in  the 
technique  of  underground  testing,  I  am  highly 
flattered  but  I  am  also  highly  skeptical. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  Soviet  Union  is  saying 
that  its  technicians  are  capable  of  doing  only  those 
things  wliich  fit  the  Soviet  political  position — no 
more  and  no  less.  The  Soviet  political  position 
demands  that  Soviet  science  be  capable  of  detect- 
ing and  identifying  underground  nuclear  tests  by 
national  instrumentation  and  without  on-site  in- 
spection.   So  Soviet  science  happily  complies. 

On  the  other  hand,  tlie  Soviet  political  position 
demands  that  Soviet  science  be  utterly  incapable 
of  matching  the  capabilities  of  the  United  States 
in  conducting  underground  tests;  so  once  again 
Soviet  science  is  quite  obliging.  Mr.  Chairman, 
this  double  standard  just  won't  do.  The  same 
science  that  the  Soviet  representative  claims  so 
much  for  when  it  suits  his  purpose  cannot  be  dis- 
missed as  totally  incompetent  whenever  tlie  oc- 
casion demands. 

The  truth  is  that  there  is  nothing  magic  about 
setting  oS  a  nuclear  device  in  a  tunnel.  The  So- 
viet Union  has  done  it  before  and  no  doubt  will 
do  it  again.  It  is,  of  course,  somewhat  more  com- 
plicated to  conduct  tests  underground. 

The  United  States  does  not  test  underground 
because  it  is  cheaper  or  easier  or  produces  better 
Iresults.  We  test  underground  for  the  sole  reason 
that  we  would  rather  have  radioactive  debris 
buried  in  the  earth  than  let  loose  in  the  atmosphere, 
where  it  can  affect  human  beings.  Just  as  we  bury 
radioactive  wastes  from  peaceful  nuclear  power- 
plants,  so  do  we  prefer  to  bury  radioactive  wastes 
from  nuclear  explosions.  This  is  a  simple  code  of 
responsibility,  which  the  Soviet  Union  evidently 
observes  m  its  peaceful  nuclear  program  and 
which  it  ought  to  observe  in  its  nuclear  test  pro- 
gram. Obviously  the  best  solution  is  to  stop  test- 
ing altogether,  but  if  the  Soviet  Union  continues 

November  26,   1962 


to  dodge  effective  international  verification  proce- 
dures which  any  other  state  would  accept,  then 
the  least  it  can  do  is  adopt  a  responsible  code  of 
behavior  in  its  nuclear  testing  progi'am. 

Advantages  of  a  Partial  Treaty 

In  addition  to  stopping  those  tests  which  cause 
radioactive  fallout,  the  partial  treaty  has  other  im- 
portant advantages : 

First,  it  would  have  some  effect  in  inhibiting 
the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons  capabilities.  Nu- 
clear weapons  development  programs  by  states 
wliich  have  not  previously  tested  nuclear  weapons, 
if  not  crippled  altogether,  would  at  least  be  seri- 
ously interfered  with. 

Second,  weapons  testing  by  the  present  nuclear 
powers  would  also  be  hampered.  The  Soviet 
Union  tested  in  the  atmosphere  last  fall  and  again 
this  fall.  Confronted  with  the  resumption  of  So- 
viet atmospheric  tests  and  its  serious  consequences 
for  U.S.  security,  and  in  face  of  the  Soviet  refusal 
to  agree  to  an  effective  test  ban  treaty,  the  United 
States  was  constrained  to  resume  testing  in  the 
atmosphere.  Certain  important  types  of  experi- 
ments simjDly  cannot  be  done  underground.  Our 
partial-treaty  proposal  would  put  a  stop  to  all 
such  atmospheric,  space,  and  underwater  tests  and 
to  this  important  extent  would  accomplish  much 
of  what  a  comprehensive  ban  would  do,  namely, 
slow  down  the  nuclear  arms  race. 

Third,  we  are  convinced  that  a  partial  ban  would 
provide  a  platform  from  wliicli  we  could  move  on 
to  a  comprehensive  ban.  For  one  thing,  all  our 
energies  could  be  devoted  to  negotiation  of  a  treaty 
prohibiting  underground  tests.  And  we  never 
should  underestimate  the  psychological  impact 
which  one  successfully  operating  agreement  would 
have  in  breaking  the  barriers  built  by  congealed 
distrust  on  all  sides. 

These  are  sound  reasons  for  concluding  a  treaty 
without  further  delay  so  that  tests  in  the  atmos- 
phere, in  space,  and  in  the  oceans  can  be  stopped 
once  and  for  all.  We  are  not  blind  to  the  need 
for  immediate  action  in  the  nuclear  test  field,  and 
it  may  be  that  the  route  to  a  comprehensive  treaty 
lies  through  a  partial  agreement.  The  United 
States  feels  that  such  a  treaty  can  and  should  be 
put  into  effect  without  prejudice  to  the  negotia- 
tion of  a  comprehensive  test  ban  treaty. 

We  prefer  a  comprehensive  treaty  because  it 
would  accomplish  the  objective  of  ending  all  nu- 


823 


I 


clear  weapons  tests,  an  objective  the  United  States 
and  the  vast  majority  of  nations  assembled  here 
seek.  Moreover,  an  internationally  controlled 
test  ban  treaty  would  be  a  better  springboard  to 
general  and  complete  disarmament. 

Right  now  the  prospects  for  agreement  are  not 
particularly  bright.  But  let  us  remember  that 
the  political  problems  in  finding  a  way  to  stop  test- 
ing are  not  unyielding,  as  was  evidenced  during 
the  1958-1961  negotiations.  The  scientific  and  en- 
gineering problems  are  difficult  and  complex  but 
not  unmanageable.  With  so  much  to  be  gained 
from  a  test  ban  treaty  in  which  everyone  can  have 
confidence,  it  is  inconceivable  to  my  Government 
that  the  day  when  such  a  treaty  is  signed  can  be 
far  removed.  Now  more  than  ever  the  world 
needs  this  treaty. 

TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION  1° 


The  General  Assembly, 

Deeply  concerned  with  the  continuation  of  nuclear 
weapon  tests, 

Fully  conscious  that  world  opinion  demands  the  im- 
mediate cessation  of  all  nuclear  tests, 

Vicioitig  with  the  utmost  apprehension  the  data  con- 
tained in  the  report  of  the  United  Nations  Scientific  Com- 
mittee on  the  Effects  of  Atomic  Radiation," 

Considering  that  the  continuation  of  nuclear  weapon 
tests  is  an  important  factor  in  the  acceleration  of  the 
arms  race  and  that  the  conclusion  of  an  agreement  pro- 
hibiting such  tests  would  greatly  contribute  to  paving 
the  way  towards  general  and  complete  disarmament. 

Recalling  its  resolution  1648  (XVI)"  of  6  November 
1961,  whereby  the  States  concerned  were  urged  to  refrain 
from  further  nuclear  weapon  test  explosions  pending  the 
conclusion  of  necessary  Internationally  binding  agree- 
ments with  regard  to  the  cessation  of  tests, 

Noting  with  regret  that  the  States  concerned  have  not 
responded  to  the  appeal  contained  in  the  aforementioned 
and  in  other  relevant  resolutions  and  that,  despite  its 
efforts,  the  Conference  of  the  Eighteen-Nation  Committee 
on  Disarmament,  referred  to  in  General  Assembly  resolu- 
tion 1722  (XVI)  of  20  December  1961,  is  not  yet  in  a 
position  to  report  agreement  on  this  vitally  important 
issue. 


"U.N.  doc.  A/RES/1762  (XVII);  adopted  in  plenary 
session  on  Nov.  6.  Part  A  (A/C.l/L.  310  and  Add.  1-4, 
as  amended)  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  75  to  0,  with  21 
abstentions  (U.S.),  and  part  B  (A/C.l/L.  311,  as 
amended)  by  a  vote  of  51  (U.S.)  to  10  (Soviet  bloc),  with 
40  abstentions. 

"  U.N.  doc.  A/5216. 

"  For  text,  see  Bttli-etin  of  Dee.  4, 1961,  p.  938. 

824 


ISI 


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I 
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m 


Recalling  that  in  resolution  1649  (XVI )  "  of  8  November' 

1961  the  General  Assembly  reaffirms  that  an  agreement' 
prohibiting  all  nuclear  weapon  tests  would  inhibit  thei 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons  to  other  countries  and  would! 
contribute  to  the  reduction  of  international  tensions, 

Noting  that,  among  the  States  represented  in  the  Sub- 
Committee  on  a  Treaty  for  the  Discontinuance  of  Nuclear 
Weapon  Tests  of  the  Eighteen-Nation  Committee,  basic 
agreement  now  prevails  as  regards  the  question  of  control 
of  tests  in  the  atmosphere,  in  outer  space  and  under  water, 

Noting  further  that  the  proceedings  of  the  Eighteen- 
Nation  Committee  indicate  a  somewhat  enlarged  area  ol 
agreement  on  the  question  of  effective  control  of  under- 
ground tests. 

Considering  that  the  memorandum  of  16  April  1962 
submitted  to  the  Eighteen-Nation  Committee  by  the  deleLjj 
gations  of  Brazil,  Burma,  Ethiopia,  India,  Mexico,  Nigeria^  . 
Sweden  and  the  United  Arab  Republic,  represents  £■ 
sound,  adequate  and  fair  basis  for  the  conduct  of  negotiEi 
tions  towards  removing  the  outstanding  differences  on  thi 
question  of  effective  control  of  underground  tests. 

Welcoming  the  intention  to  find  a  speedy  settlement  o: 
the  remaining  differences  on  the  question  of  the  cessationjii 
of  nuclear  tests,  declared  in  the  letter  dated  27  Octobe 
1962"  from  Mr.  Khrushchev,  Chairman  of  the  Counci 
of  Ministers  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics'! 
to  Mr.  Kennedy,  President  of  the  United  States  of  Amer 
ica,  in  the  letter  dated  28  October  1902  "  from  Mr.  Kenned; 
to  Mr.  Khrushchev,  and  in  the  letter  dated  28  Octobei 

1962  from  Mr.  Maemillan,  Prime  Minister  of  the  Unite»< 
Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland,  to  Mi( 
Khrushchev, 

Convinced  that  no  efforts  .should  be  spared  to  achiev 
prompt  agreement  on  the  cessation  of  all  nuclear  test^  ii 
all  environments, 

1.  Condemns  all  nuclear  weapon  tests ; 

2.  Asks  that  such  tests  should  cease  immediately  an" 
not  later  than  1  January  1963 ; 

3.  Urges  the  Governments  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Sociajl 
ist  Republics,  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  an  ,  .' 
Northern  Ireland  and  the  United  States  of  America  t 
settle  the  remaining  differences  between  them  in  orde 


n 

Jei 
iec( 
flti 
iitle 


m 

fro. 


leBii 
.Vcli 
ftba 

mix 
Itrnj 
'niM 


to  achieve  agreement  on  the  cessation  of  nuclear  testinj 


by  1  January  1963,  and  to  issue  instructions  to  their  rq  ^ 
resentiitives  on  the  Sub-Committee  on  a  Treaty  for  tU  .(,  . 
Discontinuance  of  Nuclear  Weapon  Tests  to  achieve  thl;    .... 

«°<^:  iJe 

4.  Endorses  the  eight-nation  memorandum  of  16  Apr  , . 

1962  as  a  basis  for  negotiation ;  „, 

5.  Calls  on  the  parties  concerned,  taking  as  a  basis  tb  ,. 
above-mentioned  memorandum  and  having  regard  to  tU 
discussions  on  this   item  at  the  seventeenth  session 


Ifr 


the  General  Assembly,  to  negotiate  in  a  spirit  of  mutuj  j^, 
understanding  and  concession  in  order  to  reach  agreemei  ^  ■ 
urgently,  bearing  in  mind  the  vital  interests  of  mankind  j^ 

6.  Recommends  that  if,  against  all  hope,  the  parties  co) 
cerned  do  not  reach  agreement  on  the  cessation  of  all  tesl  ^^ 


'  For  text,  see  Hid.,  Nov.  12,  1962,  p.  741. 
'  For  text,  see  ihid..  p.  745. 


Deparfment  of  State  Bullet.' 


k 

liar  te 


S'lj 

•tti 
'oiiea 


'r,s, 


3y  1  January  1963,  they  should  enter  into  an  immediate 
agreement  prohibiting  nuclear  weapon  tests  in  the  atmos- 
ohere,  in  outer  space  and  under  water,  accompanied  by  an 
nterim  arrangement  suspending  all  underground  tests, 
making  as  a  basis  the  eight-nation  memorandum  and  tak- 
ng  into  consideration  other  proposals  presented  at  the 
seventeenth  session  of  the  General  Assembly,  such  interim 
igreement  to  include  adequate  assurances  for  effective 
letection  and  identification  of  seismic  events  by  an  in- 
ernational  scientific  commission ; 

7.  Requests  the  Conference  of  the  Eighteen-Nation  Com- 
nittee  on  Disarmament  to  reconvene  not  later  than  12 
■November  1962,  to  resume  negotiations  on  the  cessation 
)f  nuclear  testing  and  on  general  and  complete  disarma- 
nent,  and  to  report  to  the  General  Assembly  by  10  Decem- 
ler  1962  on  the  results  achieved  with  regard  to  the  cessa- 
ion  of  nuclear  weapon  tests. 


The  General  Assembly, 

Believing  that  a  cessation  of  nuclear  weapon  tests  is 
he  concern  of  all  peoples  and  all  nations. 

Declaring  it  imperative  that  an  agreement  prohibiting 
uclear  weapon  tests  for  all  time  should  be  concluded  as 
apidly  as  this  can  be  done. 

Recalling  its  resolutions  1648  (XVI)  of  6  November 
961  and  1649  (XVI)  of  8  November  1961, 

Profoundly  regretting  that  the  agreements  called  for  in 
hose  resolutions  have  not  yet  been  achieved. 

Noting  that  the  endeavour  to  negotiate  a  nuclear  test 
an  agreement  has  been  taking  place  at  the  Conference  of 
he  Eighteen-Nation  Committee  on  Disarmament, 

Noting  that  the  discussions  and  negotiations  in  Geneva 
re  based  on  the  draft  treaty  submitted  on  28  November 
961  by  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,"^  the 
lemorandum  submitted  on  16  April  1962  by  Brazil, 
Surma,  Ethiopia,  India,  Mexico,  Nigeria,  Sweden  and  the 
Inited  Arab  Republic  and  the  comprehensive  and  limited 
raft  treaties  submitted  on  27  August  1962  by  the  United 
kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland  and  the 
fnited  States  of  America, 

1.  Urges  the  Conference  of  the  Eighteen-Nation  Com- 
littee  on  Disarmament  to  seek  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty 

■ '  'ith  effective  and  prompt  international  verification  which 
rohibits  nuclear  weapon  tests  in  all  environments  for 
11  tune ; 

2.  Requests  the  negotiating  Powers  to  agree  upon  an 
irly  date  on  which  a  treaty  prohibiting  nuclear  weapon 

* '  sts  shall  enter  into  force ; 

3.  Notes  the  discussions  and  documents  regarding  nu- 
ear    testing    contained    in    the    two    reports^'    of    the 

ni'  onference ; 

4.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to  bring  to  the  atten- 
on  of  the  Eighteen-Nation  Committee  the  records  of  the 

itfcventeenth  session  of  the  General  Assembly  relating  to 
le  suspension  of  nuclear  testing. 


iP 


"U.N.  doc.  DC/203  (ENDC/11). 

"  U.N.  doc.  DC/203  and  A/5200  ( DC/205) . 

November  26,    7962 


International  Bank  Issues  Financial 
Statement  for  First  Quarter 

The  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development  announced  on  November  1  that  its 
reserves  had  risen  by  $27.4  million  in  the  first 
quarter  of  the  current  fiscal  year  to  a  total  of 
$726.8  million. 

The  additions  to  reserves  in  the  3-month  period 
ending  September  30,  1962,  are  made  up  of  net 
earnings  of  $19.8  million,  which  were  placed  in 
the  supplemental  reserve  against  losses  on  loans 
and  guarantees,  and  loan  commissions  of  $7.6  mil- 
lion, wliich  were  credited  to  the  special  reserve. 
On  September  30  the  supplemental  reserve  totaled 
$495.5  million  and  the  special  reserve  was  $231.3 
million. 

Gross  income,  exclusive  of  loan  commissions, 
was  $49.4  million.  Expenses  totaled  $29.6  million 
and  included  $25.9  million  for  interest  on  the 
Bank's  fimded  debt,  for  bond  issuance  and  other 
financial  expenses. 

During  the  period  the  Bank  made  five  loans 
totaling  $82  million  in  Finland,  Pakistan  (2 
loans),  Panama,  and  Yugoslavia.  This  brought 
the  total  number  of  loans  to  326  in  60  countries 
and  territories  and  raised  the  gross  total  of  com- 
mitments to  $6,754.8  million.  By  September  30, 
as  a  result  of  cancellations,  exchange  adjustments, 
repayments,  and  sales  of  loans,  the  portions  of 
loans  signed  still  retained  by  the  Bank  had  been 
reduced  to  $4,681.3  million. 

Disbursements  on  loans  were  $173.9  million, 
making  total  disbursements  $4,979  million  on  Sep- 
tember 30. 

The  Bank  sold  or  agreed  to  sell  the  equivalent 
of  $28.1  million  principal  amounts  of  loans.  At 
September  30  the  total  amount  of  such  sales  was 
$1,360.1  million,  of  which  all  except  $69  million 
was  without  the  Bank's  guarantee. 

Repayments  of  principal  received  by  the  Bank 
amounted  to  $31.7  million.  Total  principal  re- 
payments amounted  to  $1,137.2  million  on  Sep- 
tember 30,  consisting  of  $574.1  million  repaid 
to  the  Bank  and  $563.1  million  repaid  to  the  pur- 
chasers of  borrowers'  obligations  sold  by  the  Bank. 

On  September  30  the  outstanding  fimded  debt 
of  the  Bank  was  $2,532.1  million,  reflecting  a  net 
increase  of  $11.3  million  in  the  past  3  months. 


825 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Atomic  Energy 

Amendmeut  to  article  VI.A.3  of  the  Statute  of  the  Inter- 
national Atomic  Energy  Agency   (TIAS  3873).     Done 
at  Vienna  October  4, 1961/ 
Acceptance  deposited:  Indonesia,  November  7,  1962. 

Automotive  Traffic 

Convention  on  road  traffic,  with  annexes.    Done  at  Geneva 

September  19,  1919.    Entered  into  force  March  26, 1952. 

TIAS  2487. 

Aeccsxian  deposited:  Ecuador,  September  26,  1962. 
Convention    concerning    customs    facilities    for    touring. 

Done  at  New  York  June  4,  1954.     Entered  into  force 

September  11,  1957.    TIAS  3879. 

Accession  deposited:  Finland  (subject  to  reservations), 
June  21,  1962. 

Aviation 

Convention  for   unification   of  certain   rules   relating  to 
international  transportation  by  air  and  additional  pro- 
tocol.   Done  at  Warsaw  October  12,  1929.    Entered  into 
force  February  13,  1933.    49  Stat.  3000. 
Ratification  deposited:  Austria,  September  28,  1961. 
Adherence  deposited:  Mauritania,  August  6,  1962. 
Notification   received    that    it   considers   itself   iound: 
Malagasy  Republic,  August  17,  1962. 

Protocol  to  amend  the  convention  for  unification  of  certain 
rules  relating  to  international  carriage  by  air  signed  at 
Warsaw  October  12,  1929  (49  Stat.  3000) .     Done  at  The 
Hague  September  2S.  1955.^ 
Signature:  Mali.  August  16, 1962. 

Notification   received    that    it   considers   itself   bound: 
Malagasy  Republic,  August  17,  1962. 

Diplomatic  Relations 

Vienna    convention    on    diplomatic    relations.      Done    at 


Vienna  April  18,  1961.' 
Accessian    deposited:    Ivory 


Coast,    October   1,    1962. 


Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement  of  1958.  Done  at  London 
December  1,  19,58.  Entered  into  force  January  1,  19.59; 
for  the  tluited  States  October  9,  19.59.  TIAS  4389. 
Cissitlii,)!  of  aiiijliratioii   to:  Uganda,  October  9^  1962. 

Telecommunications 

North    American   regional   broadcasting   agreement   and 

final   protocol.      Signed   at    Washington   November   15, 

19.50.     Entered  into  force  April  19,  1960.     TIAS  4460. 

Ratification   deposited:  United   Kingdom  for  Bahama 

Islands,  October  9, 1962. 

Trade 

Long-term  arrangements  regarding  international  trade  in 
cotton  textiles.  Concluded  at  Geneva  February  9, 1962. 
Entered  into  force  October  1,  1962. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Austria.  October  24,  1962;  Por- 
tugal  (with  statement),  September  29,  1962. 

Protocol  for  the  accession  of  Israel  to  the  General  Agree- 


'  Not  in  force. 
826 


ment  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.     Done  at  Geneva  April  6, 

1962.    Entered  into  force  July  5,  1962. 

Signatures:  Belgium,  June  27,  1962;  Denmark.  June  18, 
1962 ;  Dominican  Republic,  July  31,  1962 ;  European 
Economic  Community,  June  27,  1962 ;  France,  June 
27,  1962;  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  June  27, 
1962;-  Ghana,  July  24,  1962;  Italy,  July  5,  1962; 
Japan,  September  13,  1962,'  Luxembourg,  June  27, 
]!)62;  Netherlands,  May  22,  1962;  New  Zealand, 
August  2, 1962  ;  Norway,  June  27, 1962. 

Wheat 

International  wheat  agreement,  1962.  Opened  for  signa- 
ture at  Washington  April  19  through  May  15,  1962. 
Entered  into  force  July  16,  1962,  for  part  I  and  parts 
III  to  VII,  and  August  1,  1962,  for  part  II.  TIAS  5115. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Switzerland,  November  6,  1962. 


BILATERAL 

Honduras 

Agreement  relating  to  the  furnishing  of  military  assist- 
ance to  Honduras.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Tegucigalpa  October  24,  1902.  Entered  into  force  Oc- 
tober 24,  1962. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  relating  to  the  establishment  of  a  Peace  Corps 
program  in  Sarawak.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
London  October  25,  1962.  Entered  into  force  October 
25,  1962. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  establishment  of  a  Peace  Corps 
program  in  North  Borneo.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  London  October  25,  1962.  Entered  into  force 
October  25,  1962. 


llri( 

in 


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i\'D 

res 

ll.S. 

(ot 

ts. 

nial 
for 


lii! 


MJI 


For 

lepar 
ppoi 
m 


Firs 
!irop 


Recess  Appointments 


ttsidi 

pleri 
Trfji 


The  President  on  October  27  appointed  Donald  Dumont 
to  be  Minister  to  the  Kingdom  of  Burundi.     (For  bio- 
graphic details,  see  Department  of  State  press  release  668lf''''y 
dated  November  8.) 

The  President  on  November  5  appointed  William  R. 
Rivkin  to  be  Ambassador  to  Luxembourg.  (For  bio- 
graphic details,  see  Department  of  State  press  release  6S4| 
dated  November  19.) 


Appointments 

John  M.  Leddy  as  U.S.  Representative  to  the  Organiza 
tion  for  Economic  Coojieration  and  Development,  effective 
November  5.  (For  biographic  details,  see  Department  of 
State  press  release  663  dated  November  5. ) 


"  Subject  to  ratification. 

*  Will  give  effect  as  from  Oct.  1.  1962 


Department  of  State   Bulletit' 


fovember  26,  1962 

frica.    Education :  The  Challenge  for  the  Future 
in  Africa    (Williams) 

tomic  Energy 

nited  Nations  Considers  Question  of  Suspension  of 

Nuclear  and  Thermonuclear  Tests  (Dean,  text  of 

resolution) 

.S.  Ends  1962  Atmospheric  Tests,  Eepeats  Hope 

for  Test  Ban  Treaty  (Kennedy) 

.S.  Welcomes  Soviet  Announcement  of  Intent  To 
End  Current  Test  Series 

viation.    United    States    and    Senegal    Hold    In- 
formal   Civil   Aviation   Talks 

urundi. 


Will 


Index 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1222 


hina.  Communist 

man)      .     .     . 


Dumont  appointed  Minister 

The  Sino-Soviet  Dispute  (Hils- 


ongo  (Leopoldvllle).  The  Urgent  Need  for  Congo 
Reconciliation  (Williams) 

ongress.  Congressional  Documents  Relating  to 
Foreign  PoUey 

epartment  and  Foreign  Service 

ppointments     (Leddy) 

ecess  Appointments  (Dumont,  Rivkln)     .... 

conomic  Affairs 

iternational  Bank  Issues  Financial  Statement  for 

First   Quarter 

eddy  appointed  U.S.  Representative  to  OECD    .    . 

urope.  Leddy  appointed  U.S.  Representative 
to  OECD 

>reign  Aid.  Education :  The  Challenge  for  the 
Future  in  Africa   (Williams) 

ealth.  Education,  and  Welfare.  Education:  The 
Challenge  for  the  Future  in  Africa  (Williams)     . 

iternational  Organizations  and  Conferences 

Iternational  Bank  Issues  Financial  Statement  for 

First  Quarter 

3ddy  appointed  U.S.  Representative  to  OECD    .    . 

axembourg.    Rivkin  appointed  Ambassador     .     . 

residential  Documents.  U.S.  Ends  1962  Atmos- 
pheric Tests,  Repeats  Hope  For  Test  Ban 
Treaty 

megal.  United  States  and  Senegal  Hold  Infor- 
mal Civil  Aviation  Talks        


g  :eaty  Information.    Current  Actions 


812 

817 
806 
806 

816 
826 

807 

803 

816 


826 

826 


825 
826 

826 

812 

812 


825 
826 

826 


806 

816 
826 


U.S.S.R. 

The  Sino-Soviet  Dispute  (Hilsman) 807 

U.S.  Welcomes  Soviet  Announcement  of  Intent  To 

End  Current  Test  Series 806 

United  Nations.    United  Nations  Considers  Ques- 
tion of  Suspension  of  Nuclear  and  Thermonuclear 

Tests  (Dean,  text  of  resolution) 817 

Name  Index 

Dean,  Arthur  H 817 

Dumont,  Donald 826 

Hilsman,    Roger 807 

Kennedy,    President 806 

Leddy,    John  M 826 

Rivkin,  William  R 826 

Williams,  G.  Mennen 803,812 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  November  5-11 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office  of 
Nevrs,  Department  of  State,  Washington  25,  D.C. 

Release  issued  prior  to  November  5  vchich  api>ears 
in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  is  No.  655  of  Novem- 
ber 1. 

No.       Date  Subject 

*662    11/5     U.S.  participation  in  international  con- 
ferences. 
*663    11/5    Leddy  sworn  in  as  U.S.  representative 
to  OECD  (biographic  details). 

11/6     U.S.-Senegal  civil  aviation  discussions. 

11/7  Riddleberger  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Austria  (biographic  details). 

11/7     Hilsman :  "The  Sino-Soviet  Dispute." 

11/7    Rusk :  death  of  Mrs.  Roosevelt. 

11/8  Dumont  sworn  In  as  Minister  to  King- 
dom of  Burundi  (biographic 
details). 

11/9  Rostow :  "Where  Do  We  Stand  Now  in 
the  Cold  War?" 

11/9  Williams:  "The  Urgent  Need  for 
Congo  Reconciliation." 

11/10  Program  for  visit  of  Chancellor 
Adenauer. 


664 
*665 

666 
♦667 

•668 


•669 

670 

•671 


*  Not  printed. 


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Documents  on  German  Foreign  Policy, 

1918-1945,  Series  D,  Volume  XII, 

The  War  Years,  February  1-June  22, 1941 


Of 

State 


This  volume  begins  with  February  1, 1941,  following  tlie  conclusion 
of  a  series  of  economic  and  political  agreements  between  Germany 
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rHE    DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


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ign  policy 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1223 


December  3,  1962 


NATO  AND  THE   CUBAN   CRISIS     •     by  Under  Secretary 

Ball 831 

HUMAN  SKILLS  IN  THE  DECADE  OF  DEVELOP- 
MENT •  Summary  Report  of  Conference  on  Middle  Level 
Manpower,  San  Juan,  Puerto  Rico,  October  10-12,  1962   ...     853 

THE  WORLD  ECONOMIC  SITUATION  AND  OUT- 
LOOK    •     by  W.  Miclutel  Blumenthal 840 

THE  TRADE  EXPANSION  ACT  OF  1962     •     Article  by 

Leonard  Weiss 847 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE    DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1223  •  Publication  7459 
December  3,  1962 


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NATO  and  the  Cuban  Crisis 


hy  Under  Secretary  Ball  ' 


This  confei'ence  meets  at  a  time  wlien  the  value 
and  strength  of  the  North  Atlantic  alliance  have 
been  severely  tested.  In  recent  weelfs  the  alliance 
has  witnessed  a  major  confrontation  between  the 
power  and  aggressive  intentions  of  the  East  and 
the  strength  and  determination  of  the  West.  The 
immediate  focus,  as  you  all  know,  was  a  Caribbean 
island  90  miles  ofl'  the  American  coast.  The  cause 
was  the  effort  of  the  Soviet  Union  to  extend  its 
offensive  striking  force  against  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere by  secretly  introducing  missiles  and  bomb- 
ers into  Cuba. 

This  event,  its  implications,  and  the  events  that 
may  follow — for  the  Cuban  affair  is  not  yet 
ended — all  directly  concern  the  Atlantic  alliance. 
I  propose  this  afternoon,  therefore,  to  speak  of 
certain  of  the  lessons  for  NATO  that  may  prop- 
erly be  derived  from  this  experience. 

Lessons  Drawn  From  Cuban  Crisis 

For  the  past  month  I  have  been  a  member  of  a 
small  group  in  Washington  created  to  advise 
President  Kennedy  on  the  developing  problems  of 
the  Cuban  crisis.  That  crisis  has  served  to  set 
out  in  clear  relief  the  central  significance  of  the 
Atlantic  alliance  and  the  interrelationship  of  the 
problems  it  faces.  Already  it  seems  to  me  possible 
to  draw  from  it  three  lessons — three  precepts  that 
we  have  all  dimly  perceived  in  the  past  but  which 
emerge  with  striking  clarity  from  the  events  of 
the  past  month. 

First,  it  is  clear  more  than  it  ever  was  in  the 
past  that  the  Atlantic  nations  are  in  the  Cuban 
crisis  together — as  they  must  necessarily  be  in 
every  major  East- West  confrontation. 


'  Address  made  before  the  NATO  Parliamentarians  Con- 
Iference  at  Paris  on  Nov.  16  (press  release  678). 


In  one  sense,  to  be  sure,  Cuba  is  peculiarly  a 
problem  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  But  there 
can  be  no  doubt  whatever  that  the  intrusion  of 
nuclear  weapons  into  that  unfortunate  small  coun- 
try posed  as  much  of  a  threat  to  Europe  as  to 
America.  These  missiles  were  to  have  been  tar- 
geted on  the  strategic  deterrent  forces  of  the 
United  States.  In  the  last  analysis  the  security 
of  Europe  and  America  alike — indeed  of  the  whole 
free  world — rests  on  the  strength  of  that  deterrent. 

It  seems  clear  enough  from  this  that  in  re- 
moving the  offensive  threat  from  Cuba  we  were 
unquestionably  acting  as  much  in  Europe's  inter- 
est as  in  our  own.  We  are  still  acting  in  that 
common  interest,  and  it  would  be  wholly  wrong  to 
turn  attention  away  from  Cuba  simply  because  the 
immediate  danger  of  nuclear  conflict  seems  to  have 
been  averted. 

The  Cuban  crisis,  in  other  words,  is  still  with 
us — with  all  of  us.  And  we  would  be  involved 
together  in  any  similar  confrontation  elsewhere  in 
the  free  world.  This  was  the  point  President 
Kennedy  was  making  when,  in  his  report  to  the 
American  people  on  the  Cuban  situation,  he  said:  * 

Any  hostile  move  anywhere  in  the  world  against  the 
safety  and  freedom  of  peoples  to  whom  we  are  com- 
mitted— including  in  particular  the  brave  people  of  West 
Berlin — will  be  met  by  whatever  action  is  needed. 

The  second  lesson  of  Cuba  is  the  wisdom — in- 
deed the  necessity — of  the  measured  response. 
There  were,  of  course,  several  ways  in  which  the 
United  States  and  other  nations  in  our  hemisphere 
could  '  a>^e  reacted  to  the  sudden  disclosure  of  a 
new  and  growing  menace  to  the  deterrent 
strength  of  the  free  world.  The  most  direct  and 
obvious  way   would  have  been  to  eliminate  the 


=  Bulletin  of  Nov.  12,  1962,  p.  715. 


)ecember  3,  1962 


831 


offensive  -weapons  by  force — through  a  sudden  air 
strike  or  an  invasion.  Such  a  response  might 
have  seemed  clean,  surgical,  and  definitive.  We 
had  ample  power  to  achieve  a  decisive  stroke  with 
a  minimum  of  cost. 

But  President  Kennedy  chose  not  to  take  such 
action.  lie  made  his  decision  with  full  awareness 
of  the  importance  of  what  he  was  deciding — with 
full  knowledge  that  it  involved  the  interests  not 
merely  of  the  United  States  but  of  the  whole  free 
world.  Pie  chose  instead  a  more  limited  re- 
sponse— a  quarantine,  interdicting  the  buildup  of 
offensive  weapons  in  Cuba."  Through  that  choice 
we  could  avoid  resort  to  an  immediate  use  of  force 
that  might  have  led  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  with  them  their  allies,  up  an 
ascending  scale  of  violence. 

That  choice  also  enabled  the  President  to  gain 
time — time  to  consult  with  our  allies  about  the 
future  steps  we  should  take,  time  also  to  seek  a 
political  solution.  Lastly,  it  enabled  him  to 
keej) — and  he  still  keeps — an  option  for  further 
pressure  if  the  situation  should  require  it. 

In  short,  the  President  applied  a  doctrine  of 
measured  choice  and  thereby  minimized  the  risk 
of  nuclear  incineration.  By  establishing  the 
quarantine  he  developed  an  effective  weapon,  a 
weapon  with  economic  as  well  as  military  impli- 
cations, that  may  usefully  be  included  in  the 
growing  arsenal  that  provides  for  the  free  world 
the  widest  spectrum  of  response  to  military  and 
political  threats. 

The  third  lesson  of  Cuba  is  the  need  for  quick 
reaction  to  sudden  danger.  We  know  very  well 
that  the  effect  of  the  quarantine  would  have  been 
diminished  if  there  had  not  been  wholehearted 
and  immediate  cooperation  from  our  European 
allies. 

Tliere  are  those  who  suppose  that  the  require- 
ments of  speed  and  secrecy  necessarily  preclude  all 
possibility  of  consultation.  They  are  wrong. 
Time  factors  may  render  it  difficult  to  consult  on 
every  step  in  a  swiftly  developing  situation;  they 
may  telescope  the  exchange  of  views  at  moments 
of  crisis,  but  they  should  not  impair  the  con- 
tinuum of  the  consultative  process. 

The  Cuban  crisis,  in  our  view,  makes  manifest 
the  need  for  a  deeper,  franker,  and  more  continu- 
ous exchange  of  views.  For  by  such  exchanges  we 
can  block  out  in  advance  large  areas  of  agreement 


'  For  text  of  a  i)roclamation,  see  ibid.,  p.  717. 


832 


so  that  when  the  moment  of  crisis  comes  we  will 
all  instinctively  move  along  similar  lines. 

The  fact  is  that,  if  the  nations  of  the  alliance 
are  to  be  able  to  respond  with  the  necessary  de- 
cisiveness to  the  challenges  ahead,  we  must  be  able 
to  act  on  the  basis  of  solid  planning  directed  at  a 
great  variety  of  contingencies.  We  are  engaged 
in  this  planning  in  the  case  of  Berlin — working 
through  the  North  Atlantic  Council  and  the  quad- 
ripartite ambassadorial  group  in  Washington. 
But  I  believe  we  can  make  more  progress.  I  think 
we  can  and  should  develop  further  the  technique 
of  contingency  planning,  applying  it  across  the 
board  to  situations  of  danger  confronting  the 
alliance. 

For  the  peril  we  face  is  a  common  peril  that 
springs  from  a  common  source.  It  is  literally 
true,  as  article  5  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
stipulates,  tliat  an  attack  at  any  point  in  the 
NATO  area  is  an  attack  upon  all  of  us.  Not  only 
is  the  peril  common,  but  the  I'esponse  must  be 
coimnon;  it  must,  in  a  word,  be  an  Atlantic 
response.  And  it  is  along  that  guideline — the 
meeting  of  common  peril  by  a  common,  Atlantic 
response — that  we  must  sliape  the  NATO  alliance. 

NATO's  Adjustment  to  Change 

It  is  no  accident  that  the  first  major  progress 
toward  Atlantic  unity  came  in  the  organization 
of  military  power.  The  danger  to  which  the  free 
states  of  the  West  were — and  are — exposed  is  the 
massive  threat  of  disciplined  and  aggressive  com- 
munism, which  commands  one-third  of  the  world's 
population.  Any  effective  response  to  such  a 
threat  must  be  designed  on  a  commensurate  scale. 
Thus  it  has  all  along  been  clear  that  even  a  imited 
Western  Europe  could  not,  by  itself,  mobilize  suf- 
ficient resources  to  provide  adequate  security. 
Safety  lay  in  combining  the  military  power  of 
Western  Europe  with  the  military  power  of  the 
United  States. 

This  was  the  situation  that  underlay  the  crea- 
tion, 4  years  after  the  war,  of  the  Atlantic  alliance. 
In  the  beginning  what  was  provided  under  the 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  had  many  of  the  char- 
acteristics of  a  classical  defensive  alliance;  in 
essence  it  was  an  arrangement  between  the  United 
States  and  Western  European  countries  to  join  to- 
gether for  their  common  defense.  Had  the  alli- 
ance remained  static  in  this  posture,  it  might  well 
have  followed  the  course  of  similar  alliances  in 

Departmenf  of  Sfafe  Bulletin 


the  past.  Its  lifespan  would  have  been  brief ;  its 
vigor  would  have  diminished  with  time;  and  its 
internal  coherence  might  have  been  critically 
weakened  whenever  East-West  tension  was  tem- 
porarily relaxed. 

The  North  Atlantic  Treaty  striicture,  which  is 
of  special  concern  to  you  as  parliamentarians,  is 
growing  in  a  very  different  way.  It  has  devel- 
oped an  inner  life  and  an  organic  force  of  its 
own.  And  like  all  living  organisms  it  has  shown 
a  capacity  of  adjustment  to  change.  NATO  has 
responded  not  only  to  changes  in  military  tech- 
nology but  equally  to  changes  in  the  economic  and 
political  shape  of  world  relationships. 

In  the  13  years  since  the  founding  of  NATO 
not  a  single  inch  of  European  territory  has  come 
under  Comniunist  domination.  The  alliance  has 
been  increased  in  membership  and  in  geograpliic 
scope.  It  has  kept  pace  with  the  rapid  develop- 
ment of  sophisticated  weaponry.  It  has  steadily 
augmented  the  strength  at  its  command.  Its  in- 
stitutions and  staff  have  developed  in  capability 
and  in  confidence.  The  North  Atlantic  Council 
has  come  to  function  as  a  broad  consultative 
organ,  treating,  besides  military  questions,  politi- 
cal issues  of  the  keenest  importance  and  greatest 
variety. 

In  short,  NATO  has  undergone  a  profound 
transformation  into  a  major  element  in  the  Atlan- 
tic partnership.  It  has  never  been  more  signifi- 
cant than  it  is  today.  For  NATO  is,  in  the  mili- 
tary field,  what  the  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  is  be- 
coming in  the  economic  field.  It  is  nothing  less 
than  the  structure  within  which  the  militaiy  aims 
of  the  partnership  will  take  on  form  and 
substance. 

The  Progress  of  Western  Europe 

Paralleling  the  growth  of  the  Atlantic  defensive 
structure,  we  have  seen  the  brilliant  progress  of 
Western  Europe,  now  a  strong  and  prosperous 
community  moving  toward  greater  economic  and 
political  unity.  This  development  has  had  a 
striking  effect  not  only  within  the  alliance  but 
indeed  on  the  Soviet  bloc  and  in  the  uncommitted 
world.  It  has  revived  Europe  spiritually  as  well 
as  economically.  It  promises  still  further  insti- 
tutional growth  that  can  provide  new  lessons  in 
statecraft  for  the  rest  of  the  world. 

It  is,  I  am  certain,  apparent  to  us  all  that  the 


ecember  3,   1962 


new  Europe  has  succeeded  only  because  it  could 
evolve  in  an  atmosphere  of  security.  General 
[Lauris]  Norstad  made  that  point  eloquently  in 
an  American  television  broadcast  on  Veterans 
Day,  when  he  emphasized  that  the  great  growth 
in  the  European  economy  reflected  the  spirit  of 
confidence  made  possible  by  the  North  Atlantic 
alliance.  The  economic  miracle  of  Europe  during 
the  past  10  years,  in  other  words,  could  have  de- 
veloped only  behind  the  shield  of  NATO. 

We  in  the  United  States  have  been  deeply  im- 
pressed by  the  achievements  of  the  European 
Economic  Community.  The  lonely  position  of 
preponderance  in  the  free  world  that  we  occupied 
at  the  end  of  the  war  was  never  congenial  to  our 
tastes.  From  the  beginnmg  we  consistently  en- 
couraged measures  for  the  integration  of  Europe, 
and  we  look  forward  today  to  a  Europe  more  and 
more  united,  more  and  more  prosperous,  and 
speaking  with  a  single  voice  on  a  widening  area 
of  subject  matter.  We  welcome  a  Europe  that 
can  serve  as  an  equal  partner  with  the  United 
States  in  an  Atlantic  partnership. 

Yet,  at  the  same  time,  we  recognize  tliat  the 
sliift  in  the  allocation  of  power  represented  by  the 
advent  of  a  new  and  strong  Europe  will  inevitably 
cause  some  problems  of  adjustment  on  both  sides 
of  the  Atlantic.  It  will  necessitate  some  change 
not  only  in  the  attitudes  but  in  the  habits  of  both 
Americans  and  Europeans. 

For  America,  the  development  of  a  powerful 
European  partner  must  mean  an  increasingly 
effective  voice  for  Europe  in  the  councils  of  the 
Atlantic  pai'tnership,  including  tlie  councils  of  the 
NATO  alliance.  Consultation  witli  a  united 
Europe  will  be  more  natural,  less  cumbersome,  and 
more  effective  than  consultation  can  possibly  be 
today.  Accordingly  the  practice  of  consultation 
is  bound  to  encompass  an  increasingly  large  range 
of  political,  economic,  and  military  matters.  And 
we  on  our  side,  in  phase  with  the  new  development 
of  the  European  commimity,  will  have  to  adjust 
our  own  thinking  and  our  habits. 

We  are,  of  course,  heartened  by  the  disposition 
of  the  new  and  stronger  Europe  to  play  a  larger 
part  in  the  common  defense.  Since  World  War 
II  we  have  at  all  times  identified  our  own  security 
with  the  security  of  Western  Europe.  Indeed,  so 
deep  is  our  commitment  that  we  could  not  possi- 
bly distinguish  an  attack  upon  Western  Europe 
from  an  attack  upon  ourselves. 


833 


We  inaintain  over  400,000  men  iu  Europe,  in- 
cluding tlie  Sixth  Fleet  in  the  Mediterranean.  If 
dependents  of  these  men  are  added,  we  have  about 
700,000  people  constantly  in  Europe.  We  have 
made  available  over  20  tactical  air  squadrons. 
We  maintain  in  place  major  stockpiles  of  nuclear 
and  conventional  weapons  and  a  diversity  of 
means  of  delivery.  Given  the  size  and  character 
of  the  United  States  involvement  in  Europe,  any 
notion  that  we  might  abandon  our  European  com- 
mitment is  destructive,  chimerical,  and  false. 

Yet,  as  much  as  anybody  else,  we  understand 
that  the  present  organization  of  the  Atlantic  alli- 
ance is  not  perfect.  As  much  as  anybody  else, 
we  understand  that  in  the  defense  field,  as  in  all 
others,  we  need  the  cross-fertilization  of  fruitful 
ideas. 

For  defense  in  the  nuclear  age  is  not  simple.  It 
is  expensive ;  it  is  technically  complex ;  it  is  some- 
thing relatively  new  in  the  world ;  and  it  is  con- 
stantly changing  because  of  tlie  rapid  rate  of 
technological  development.  The  fact  that  my 
own  country,  within  a  very  short  period,  has 
moved  from  reliance  on  massive  retaliation  to  a 
search  for  the  widest  range  of  possible  retaliatory 
measures  is  no  accident  of  political  fortune.  It  is 
an  expression  of  the  pace  and  the  sweep  of  change 
that  teclmology  forces  upon  us. 

For  in  the  field  of  modern  defense  thei-e  is  no 
received  wisdom,  no  tablets  of  the  law,  no  copy- 
books, not  even  any  demonstrated  military  pre- 
cepts. On  the  contrary,  modern  strategy  is  a  con- 
tinuous process  of  thought — a  ceaseless  framing, 
testing,  refining,  and  modifying  of  different 
hypotheses.  In  the  United  States  this  process  of 
inner  dialog  goes  on  all  the  time  and  in  many 
places.  It  is  conducted  in  tlie  military  staffs  of 
the  Defense  Department,  in  exclumges  between  the 
Defense  and  State  Departments,  in  the  Congress 
and  its  committees,  in  the  research  institutions  and 
the  universities,  and  in  some  organs  of  the  press. 

A  process  of  thought  similar  in  scope  and  in- 
tensity is  getting  under  way  in  Western  Europe. 
And,  in  that  connection,  you,  as  members  of  par- 
liaments, as  links  between  peoples  and  govern- 
ments, have  a  special  role  to  play.  You  have  the 
ability  to  study  the  operations  of  government. 
You  have  the  power  to  ask  hard  questions  and  to 
elicit  full  and  frank  answers.  You  serve  as  a 
cross  section  of  public  opinion.  You  are,  in  other 
words,  ideally  placed  to  launch  and  to  guide  the 

834 


strategic  debate  that  seems  to  us  the  necessary 
background  to  wise  choice  in  security  matters. 

For  a  wide  range  of  strategic  problems  con- 
fronts us,  and  the  answers  are  neither  obvious  nor 
easy.  Statesmen,  as  well  as  soldiers,  must  deal 
with  the  problems  of  survival.  You  have  a  re- 
sponsibility to  participate  with  your  governments 
in  defining  the  nature  of  the  threat  to  Western 
security  and  the  steps  that  can  best  be  taken  to 
provide  safety  for  us  all  without  inviting  destruc- 
tion. None  of  us  can  neglect  these  matters.  But 
it  is  not  enough  to  consider  solely  the  details  of 
strategic  planning;  we  must  also  ask  ourselves  con- 
stantly whether  we  are  contributing  our  fair  share 
to  the  common  defense,  in  terms  of  expenditures 
in  relation  to  gross  national  product,  in  terms  of 
manpower,  in  terms  of  other  national  assets. 
There  can  be  no  more  critical  matters  for  parlia- 
mentary consideration. 

Need  for  Effective  Conventional  Forces 

In  the  military  field  Europe  shares  with  the 
United  States  responsibility  for  Western  defense 
as  a  whole.  It  is  our  common  duty  to  define  the 
priority  of  needs.  The  most  urgent  need  today 
is  for  the  development  of  more  effective  conven- 
tional forces  for  NATO  to  complement  the  su- 
perior nuclear  power  already  available  to  the 
alliance. 

Hopefully,  the  contingencies  most  apt  to  arise 
in  the  future  are  not  those  likely  to  call  forth  a 
massive  nuclear  exchange.  We  can  certainly  ex- 
pect localized  political  and  military  pressures, 
perhaps  not  too  unlike  the  recent  challenge  in 
Cuba.  Those  pressures  can  best  be  met — as  that 
challenge  has  been  met — by  whatever  response  is 
appropriate,  involving  as  it  may  the  deployment 
and  selective  use  of  conventional  land,  sea,  and 
air  forces. 

Challenges  may  be  presented  at  any  one  of  a 
number  of  sensitive  points.  To  meet  them  with 
steady  nerve,  without  alarums,  excursions,  and 
wasteful  deployment,  we  need  stronger  conven- 
tional forces  than  are  now  available.  That  is 
why  it  is  essential  that  a  Europe  growing  more 
powerful  and  more  unified  should  make  an  in- 
creasing effort  to  further  the  buildup  of  conven- 
tional forces.  The  undertaking  of  such  a  buildup 
is  not  only  necessary  as  a  military  matter  if  NATO 
is  to  have  at  its  command  the  widest  range  of 
measured  response;  it  would  have  a  positive  and 

Deporfmenf  of  State  Bulletin 


transforming  eflfect  on  the  European  spirit.  It 
would  provide  a  critical  increment  of  security  and 
self-confidence  that  should  give  an  even  greater 
sense  of  assurance  and  achievement  to  what  we 
have  come  to  call  the  "new  Europe." 

The  strengthening  of  conventional  forces  is,  of 
course,  eminently  feasible.  In  population  and 
gross  national  pi'oduct,  the  NATO  countries  are 
more  tlian  a  match  for  the  Soviet  Union  and  its 
East  European  satellites.  NATO  forces  already 
dominate  the  sea.  Our  air  strength  is  at  least 
equal  to  that  of  the  Soviet  bloc.  We  do  need  more 
strength  on  the  ground,  not  only  in  terms  of  man- 
power but  in  qualitative  terms.  We  need  more 
and  better  equipment  and  reserves  of  better  quality 
and  higlier  mobility.  The  additional  effort  re- 
quired to  make  up  these  deficiencies  can  pay  big 
dividends.  There  is  no  reason  why  the  NATO 
countries  cannot  maintain  in  the  NATO  area  con- 
ventional forces  that  are  at  least  equal  to  those  in 
Eastern  Europe. 

Let  me  draw  on  the  Cuban  experience  for  an 
illustration.  Why  were  we  able  to  modulate  and 
attune  our  responses  so  closely  to  the  degree  of  our 
need?  Surely  it  was  because  we  had  the  ability 
to  deploy  as  required  a  very  large  variety  of  land, 
sea,  and  air  forces  in  the  fashion  necessary  to  ac- 
complish the  task  at  hand.  Because  we  had  clear 
superiority  of  conventional  forces,  we  were  never 
confronted  with  the  awful  dilemma  of  having  to 
utilize  major  nuclear  weapons  or  to  retreat  from 
our  objective. 

In  the  same  way  we  must  increase  the  spectrum 
of  our  military  choices  on  the  continent  of  Eu- 
rope. If  we  do  so — always  preserving  intact  the 
ultimate  nuclear  deterrent — we  increase  our  abil- 
ity to  achieve  the  purposes  of  the  alliance  at  the 
smallest  risk  of  nuclear  annihilation. 

Europe's  Role  in  Nuclear  Defense 

At  the  same  time  I  understand  fully  that,  as 
Europe  grows  stronger  and  more  unified,  as  it 
develops  an  increasing  sense  of  its  own  mission,  it 
may  wish  to  play  a  larger  role  in  nuclear  defense. 
From  a  strictly  military  standpoint,  we  do  not 
feel  that  the  alliance  has  an  urgent  need  for  a  Eu- 
ropean nuclear  contribution.  But,  should  other 
NATO  nations  so  desire,  we  are  ready  to  give  se- 
rious consideration  to  the  creation  of  a  genuinely 
multilateral  medium-range  ballistic  missile  force 
fully  coordinated  with  the  other  deterrent  forces 

December  3,   7962 


of    the    North    Atlantic    Treaty    Organization. 

It  is  not  for  us — indeed,  it  would  be  out  of  keep- 
ing with  the  spirit  of  the  Atlantic  partnershijD — 
to  dictate  how  such  a  force  should  be  manned, 
financed,  or  organized.  But  it  is  a  proper  respon- 
sibility of  the  United  States,  which  has  had  so 
much  experience  in  the  nuclear  field,  to  make 
available  to  others  our  information  and  ideas  with 
respect  to  the  characteristics  and  capabilities  of  a 
multilateral  force.  And  we  are  now  in  the  process 
of  doing  so. 

In  this  connection  one  thing  is  clear.  The 
faster  Europe  approaches  unity,  the  more  the  na- 
tions of  Europe  hammer  out  common  policies  and 
common  institutions,  the  easier  it  will  be  for  us  to 
work  together  as  equal  partners  within  the  At- 
lantic partnership,  employing  NATO  as  the  mili- 
tary expression  of  that  partnership  to  achieve  the 
indivisibility  of  response — the  indivisibility  of 
command  and  direction — that  is  the  indispensable 
element  of  an  effective  defense  in  this  nuclear  age. 

The  Atlantic  Partnership 

America,  as  you  will  see  from  what  I  have  said, 
looks  to  the  Atlantic  partnership  with  a  great 
sense  of  expectation.  We  envisage  that  partner- 
ship developing  as  a  framework  for  useful  address 
to  all  our  common  problems.  If  mutual  self- 
interest  is  present — and  it  definitely  is — we  also 
believe  that  what  Pericles  said  of  the  Athenians  is 
true  of  ourselves:  A  noble  principle  underlies  our 
work.  It  is  the  pi'inciple  of  shared  responsibility. 
And  we  believe  that  the  Atlantic  nations  act  not 
only  from  self-interest  but  in  the  interest  of  all 
free  men,  that  the  Atlantic  partnership  is  the  ex- 
pression of  a  noble  principle  and  a  model  for  free 
men  and  free  nations  everywhere. 

Three  Members  of  Cuba  Mission 
to  U.N.  Accused  of  Illegal  Actions 

Folloioing  is  the  text  of  a  U.S.  note  delivered  on 
November  17  to  the  Permanent  Mission  of  Cuba  to 
the  United  Nations. 

Press  release  685  dated  November  17 

The  United  States  Mission  to  the  United  Na- 
tions wishes  to  call  to  the  attention  of  the  Perma- 
nent Mission  of  Cuba  to  the  United  Nations  the 
illegal  and  reprehensible  actions  on  the  l^art  of 

835 


Roberto  Santiesteban  Casanova,  Jose  Gomez  Abad 
and  Elsa  Montero  de  Gomez,  who  are  assigned  as 
members  of  the  Permanent  Mission. 

The  apprehension  and  arrest  of  Santiesteban 
by  representatives  of  this  Government  today  re- 
sulted from  his  actions  as  a  participant  in  a  con- 
spiracy to  commit  sabotage  witliin  this  country. 
Santiesteban  does  not  possess  diplomatic  immu- 
nity. He  will  be  subject  to  prosecution  under 
United  States  Federal  Statutes. 

Jose  Gomez  Abad  and  Elsa  Montero  de  Gomez 
also  actively  participated  as  co-conspirators  in  this 
criminal  conspiracy.  Tlieir  activities  are  a  gross 
violation  of  their  status  as  members  of  a  permanent 
mission  to  the  United  Nations.  The  United  States 
Government  considers  this  criminal  activity  a  most 
flagrant  abuse  of  the  privileges  of  residence. 

The  Permanent  Mission  of  Cuba  is  requested  to 
effect  the  immediate  departure  of  Jose  Gomez 
Abad  and  Elsa  Montero  de  Gomez  from  the  United 
States.  The  Acting  Secretai-y  General  of  the 
United  Nations  has  been  informed  of  these  actions 
and  of  the  contents  of  this  note. 


U.S.-German  Talks  Reaffirm  Close 
Cooperation  of  Both  Governments 

Konrad  Adenauer,  Chancellor  of  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  visited  Washington  Novenv- 
her  13-16,  during  which  time  he  met  vnth  Presi- 
dent Kennedy  and  Secretary  Rusk.  Folloxirmg 
are  an  exchange  of  greetings  between  the  President 
and  Chancellor  Adenauer  at  arrival  ceremonies 
at  the  White  House  on  November  1^  and  text  of  a 
joint  com/m,vmique  issued  on  November  15  at  the 
conclusion  of  their  talks. 

EXCHANGE  OF  GREETINGS 

White  House  press  release  dated  November  14 
President  Kennedy 

Chancellor,  it  is  a  great  honor  to  welcome  you 
and  the  members  of  your  govennnent  back  here 
to  the  United  States  once  again.  You  have,  on 
many  occasions,  made  this  long  journej',  and  on 
each  occasion  I  think  it  has  resulted  in  stronger 
ties  between  the  Federal  Republic  and  the  United 
States  of  America. 


As  in  the  case  of  no  other  statesman,  certainlj 
in  the  modern  history  of  the  world,  you  have  the 
benefit  of  a  long  perspective  and  a  long  view  of  oui 
times,  stretching  all  the  way  from  happier  days 
as  lilayor  of  your  native  city  in  the  years  before 
the  first  war,  to  being  Chancellor  of  your  countrj 
in  a  period  of  great  trial,  of  great  difficulty,  and 
also  of  great  opportunity. 

During  this  period  particularly,  as  Chancellor 
of  your  country,  you  have  held  to  a  view  of  a 
greater  Europe,  a  gieater  free  Europe,  opening  up 
unlimited  opportunities  not  only  to  the  people 
of  your  own  country,  not  only  to  the  people  of  Eu- 
rope, but  also  to  all  free  people ;  and  also  a  great 
vision  of  a  greater  Europe  linked  in  a  greater 
Atlantic  partnership  to  Canada  and  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain. 

So,  Chancellor,  because  of  that  view,  which  is 
approaching,  we  believe,  fulfillment,  your  place 
in  the  history  of  your  country  and  the  free  world 
is  assured,  and  we  are  particularly  glad  to  welcome 
you  at  this  time  when  there  are  so  many  matters 
of  concern  to  your  coimtry  and  to  us,  and  to  all 
the  countries  of  the  free  world,  as  we  move  into 
a  climactic  period.  Chancellor,  we  are  very  proud 
to  have  you  with  us  again. 

Chancellor  Adenauer 

Mr.  President,  I  thank  you  very  cordially  for 
the  particularly  friendly  words  you  have  just  ad- 
dressed to  me,  and  through  me  to  the  German  peo- 
ple. I  am  also  very  happy  and  very  grateful,  in- 
deed, for  having  this  new  opportunity  to  be  in 
Washington,  and  every  time  I  am  here  I  am  think- 
ing back  to  the  first  visit  to  Wasliington  after 
World  War  II,  this  city  where  the  power  of  the 
free  M'orld  is  concentrated. 

It  is  true  this  is  my  11th  visit,  Mr.  President, 
and  it  is  certainly  true  that  after  each  visit  I  left 
very  happy  and  very  satisfied  about  the  results  of 
our  discussions.  That  applies  to  my  meetings  with 
President  Truman,  with  President  Eisenhower, 
and  now  witli  President  Kennedy. 

I  believe  that,  more  than  ever  in  the  last  10 
years,  we  are  confronted  today  with  great  dangers. 
But  there  are  also  ahead  of  us  more  promising 
prospects  for  all  those  who  are  of  good  will. 

Mr.  President,  in  the  last  few  weeks  you  had  to 
take  very  difficult  decisions.  Events  were  de- 
veloping very  quickly,  and  the  life  of  many  mil- 
lions of  people  might  possibly  have  been  at  stake, 


636 


Department   of  State   Bulletin 


rJj 


but  let  me  also  emphasize  this :  Liberty  and  free- 
dom was  also  at  stake. 

The  Aflierican  nation  supported  you  and  backed 
you  in  your  decision.  The  American  nation  was 
ready  to  accept  this  challenge  to  uphold  and  de- 
fend their  convictions.  Thus  the  American  peo- 
ple have  rendered  an  invaluable  service  to  their 
friends,  to  the  cause  of  freedom  in  the  world. 

The  measures  you  have  taken,  Mr.  President, 
were  welcomed  right  from  the  beginning  and  with- 
out any  qualification  whatsoever  by  the  German 
people,  by  the  German  Government,  and  by  my- 
self. We  know  that  the  United  States  of  America 
is  the  leader  of  the  free  world,  and  we  are  fully 
aware  that  without  the  leadersliip  of  the  United 
States  of  America  the  cause  of  freedom  and  liberty 
all  over  the  world  would  be  lost. 

Let  me  emphasize  in  conclusion,  Mr.  President, 
that  we  are  firmly  standing  by  your  side,  Mr. 
President,  and  by  the  side  of  the  American  people, 
and  we  are  standing  for  the  cause  of  liberty  and 
freedom. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  President. 

TEXT  OF  JOINT  COMMUNIQUE 

White  House  press  release  dated  November  15 

President  Kennedy  and  Chancellor  Adenauer 
held  conversations  in  Washington  on  November  14 
and  15  in  which  Secretary  of  State  Rusk  and  the 
Federal  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  Dr.  [Ger- 
hard] Schroeder  i^articipated. 

The  conversations  were  conducted  in  a  relaxed 
and  friendly  spirit  which  has  become  traditional 
in  the  relations  between  the  two  Governments. 
The  President  and  the  Chancellor  reviewed  recent 
international  developments  and  examined  the  op- 
portunities which  might  arise  in  the  future  to 
clarify  unresolved  questions  and  to  better  ensure 
peace.  They  were  in  agreement  that  both  Gov- 
ernments will  collaborate  closely  and  confidently 
in  examining  and  utilizing  such  opportunities. 

The  exchange  of  views  between  President  Ken- 
nedy and  Chancellor  Adenauer  dealt  in  particular 
with  the  events  relating  to  Cuba  and  their  effect 
both  on  the  general  situation  and  the  problems  of 
special  interest  to  the  two  countries. 

Among  other  important  international  problems 
discussed  by  the  President  and  the  Chancellor  were 
Germany  including  Berlin ;  Western  Alliance  con- 
tingency planning  for  the  maintenance  of  the  free- 
December  3,  7962 


dom  and  security  of  West  Berlin ;  East-West  rela- 
tions ;  political  and  military  matters  ijertaming  to 
NATO;  developments  relating  to  the  economic 
and  political  mtegration  of  Europe. 

It  was  agreed  that  a  solution  of  the  German 
question  can  be  found  only  in  the  preservation  of 
the  right  of  self-determination  and  that  the  free- 
dom and  viability  of  Berlin  will  be  preserved  in 
all  circumstances  and  with  all  means. 

The  President  and  Chancellor  Adenauer  were 
agreed  that  the  North  Atlantic  Alliance  continues 
to  be  the  basis  for  the  maintenance  of  freedom  and 
that  for  the  future  every  appropriate  means  must 
be  employed  to  strengthen  the  Alliance  and  to 
promote  the  cooperation  of  its  members. 

The  conversations  have  shown  that  both  Govern- 
ments are  in  full  agreement  in  their  assessment  of 
the  international  situation.  The  meeting  has  re- 
affirmed the  very  close  cooperation,  based  on  the 
friendship  of  the  two  peoples,  which  exists  be- 
tween the  two  Governments. 


U.S.  Extends  IVSilitary  Aid  to  India 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT 

Press  release  683  dated  November  17 

The  Department  of  State  released  today  [No- 
vember 17]  the  text  of  an  exchange  of  notes  con- 
cerning the  provision  of  defense  assistance  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America  to 
the  Government  of  India.  In  the  exchange  of 
notes  it  is  stated  that  the  assistance  will  be  fur- 
nished for  the  purpose  of  defense  against  outright 
Chinese  Communist  aggression  now  facing  India. 

In  1954  when  the  United  States  decided  to  ex- 
tend military  aid  to  Pakistan,  the  Government  of 
India  was  assured  that  if  our  aid  to  any  country, 
including  Pakistan,  was  misused  and  directed 
against  another  in  aggression,  the  United  States 
would  undertake  immediately,  in  accordance  with 
constitutional  authority,  appropriate  action  both 
within  and  without  the  United  Nations  to  thwart 
such  aggression.^ 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica has  similarly  assured  the  Government  of  Pak- 
istan that,  if  our  assistance  to  India  should  be 
misused  and  directed  against  another  in  aggres- 


'  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Mar.  15,  1954,  p.  400. 

«37 


sion,  the  United  States  w 
ately,  in  accordance  with 
appropriate  action  botli 
United  Nations  to  thwar 
Needless  to  say,  in  giv 
United  States  is  confident 


ould  undertake  immedi- 
constitutional  authority, 
within  and  without  the 
t  such  aggression, 
ing  these  assurances  the 
tliat  neitlier  of  the  coun- 


tries whicli  it  is  aiding  Iiarbors  aggressive  designs. 


EXCHANGE  OF  NOTES  WITH   INDIA 

Press  release  679  dated  NoTember  17 
U.S.  Note 

November  14, 1962 
Exceixenct:  I  have  the  honor  to  refer  to  the 
Agreement  between  our  two  Governments  effected 
by  an  exchange  of  notes  on  March  7  and  16,  1951,^ 
at  Wasliington,  as  amended  by  an  Agreement  ef- 
fected by  an  exchange  of  notes  on  April  16  and 
December  17,  1958,^  at  New  Dellii.  In  response 
to  requests  from  the  Government  of  India,  my 
Government  is  prepared  to  furnish  assistance  to 
the  Government  of  India  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
fense against  the  outright  Chinese  aggression  di- 
rected from  Peking  now  facing  your  country.  It 
is  the  understanding  of  my  Government  that,  with 
regard  to  defense  articles  made  available  to  the 
Government  of  India  under  special  arrangements 
to  be  concluded  between  representatives  of  our  two 
Governments,  and  including  defense  articles  pro- 
vided between  November  3  and  November  14, 1962, 
the  Government  of  India  considers  the  assurances 
contained  in  the  Agreement  effected  by  the  ex- 
change of  notes  of  March  7  and  16,  1951,  to  be 
applicable  and  that  the  Government  of  India  is 
prepared : 

(1)  to  offer  necessary  facilities  to  representa- 
tives of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  attached  to  the  United  States  Embassy  in 
India  for  the  purpose  of  observing  and  reviewing 
the  use  of  such  articles  and  to  provide  them  with 
such  information  as  may  be  necessary  for  that 
purpose;  and 

(2)  to  offer  for  return  to  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  of  America  such  articles  furn- 
ished by  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  which  are  no  longer  needed  for  the  pur- 
poses for  which  originally  made  available. 


'Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  2241. 
•TIAS  4322. 


A  reply  to  the  effect  that  these  understandings 
are  correct  will  constitute  an  agreement  between 
the  Government  of  India  and  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  which  shall  come 
into  force  on  the  date  of  the  note  of  reply  from 
the  Government  of  India. 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurances  of 
my  liighest  consideration. 

For  the  Secretary  of  State: 

Phillips  Talbot 
His  Excellency 
Braj  Kumar  Neiiru, 
Ambassador  of  India. 

Indian  Note 

November  14,  1962 

Mr.  Secretary,  I  have  the  honour  to  refer  to  your  note 
dated  November  14,  1962  reading  as  follows : — • 

TFulI  text  of  U.S.  note  quoted  here.l 

I  have  the  honour  to  confirm  that  the  understandings 
set  forth  in  the  above  quoted  note  are  correct.  I  agree 
that  your  note  together  with  this  reply  shall  constitute  an 
agreement  between  our  two  Governments  which  comes 
into  force  on  the  date  of  this  reply. 

I  avail  myself  of  the  opportunity  to  convey  to  you,  Mr. 
Secretary,  the  assurances  of  my  highest  consideration. 

B.  K.  Nehru 
Ambassador  of  India 

The  Honourable 

The  Secretary  of  State 

Washington,  D.C. 

Foreign  Policy  Briefing  Conference 
To  Be  Held  at  Louisville 

Press  release  CSl  dated  November  17 

The  Department  of  Stale,  with  the  cooperation 
of  the  University  of  Louisville,  the  Oouner- 
Joumal,  and  the  Ix)uisville  Times,  will  hold  its 
next  regional  foreign  policy  briefing  conference  at 
Louisville,  Ky.,  on  December  10  and  11.  Repre- 
sentatives of  the  press,  radio,  television,  and  non- 
governmental organizations  concerned  with  for- 
eign policy,  and  community  and  business  leaders 
from  the  States  of  Alabama,  southern  Indiana, 
Kentucky,  Mississippi,  southern  Ohio,  Tennessee, 
and  West  Virginia  are  being  invited  to  participate. 

This  will  be  the  eighth  in  the  series  of  rcgioniil 
conferences  which  began  in  July  1961  at  San 
Francisco  and  Denver.  The  purpose  of  these  re- 
gional meetings  is  to  provide  opportunity  for  dis- 


' 


838 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


cussion  of  international  affairs  between  those  who 
inform  the  public  on  issues  and  the  senior  officers 
of  the  executive  branch  who  have  responsibility  for 
dealing  with  them. 

Among  those  officers  of  the  Government  par- 
ticipating in  the  conference  from  the  Department 
of  State  will  be  the  following:  George  C.  McGhee, 
Under  Secretary  for  Political  Affaire ;  W.  W.  Eos- 
tow,  Counselor  and  Chairman  of  the  Policy  Plan- 
ning Council ;  Robert  J.  Manning,  Assistant  Sec- 
retary for  Public  Affairs;  Sterling  J.  Cottrell, 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Far  Eastern  Af- 
fairs: Katie  Louchheim,  Deputy  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  Public  Affairs ;  Arturo  Morales-Carrion, 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- American 
Affairs;  and  Carl  T.  Rowan,  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Public  Affairs.  Adam  Yarmolin- 
sky.  Special  Assistant  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense, 
will  participate  from  the  Department  of  Defense. 

U.S.  and  Japanese  Cabinet  Officers 
To  Hold  Second  Economic  Meeting 

The  Wliite  House  announced  on  November  15 
that,  at  the  invitation  of  the  United  States,  the 
second  meeting  of  the  Joint  United  States-Japan 
Committee  on  Trade  and  Economic  xlffaire  would 
take  place  December  3-5  at  Wasliington,  attended 
by  the  Cabinet  officers  of  both  countries  concerned 
with  economic  matters. 

The  Joint  Committee  on  Trade  and  Economic 
Affairs  was  established  by  President  Kennedy  and 
Premier  Hayato  Ikeda  during  the  latter's  visit 
to  tlie  United  States  in  1961.  The  communique 
of  June  22,  1961,^  stated  the  purposes  of  the  Joint 
Committee  to  be : 

To  consider  means  of  promoting  economic  collaboration 
between  the  two  countries ;  In  particular,  to  exchange 
information  and  views  on  matters  which  might  adversely 
affect  the  continued  expansion  of  mutually  profitable  trade 
and  on  questions  relating  to  the  economic  assistance  pro- 
grams of  the  two  countries  which  require  joint  considera- 
tion ;  To  report  to  the  respective  Governments  on  such 
discussions  in  order  that  consideration  may  be  given  to 
measures  deemed  appropriate  and  necessary  to  eliminate 
conflict  in  the  international  economic  policies  of  the  two 


countries,  to  provide  for  a  fuller  measure  of  economic 
collaboration,  and  to  encourage  the  flow  of  trade. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  Joint  Committee,  which 
was  held  at  Hakone,  Japan,  in  November  1961,^ 
provided  an  invaluable  opportunity  for  discus- 
sion at  the  ministerial  level  of  mutual  economic 
problems  and  resulted  in  further  strengthening  of 
the  U.S.-Japan  partnership  in  the  economic  field. 
The  second  meeting  will  afford  a  welcome  oppor- 
tunity to  continue  and  build  on  the  achievements 
of  the  first. 

The  six  Cabinet  officers  designated  by  Prime 
Minister  Ikeda  to  attend  the  meeting,  all  of  whom 
were  appointed  in  July  of  this  year,  are  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  Masayoshi  Ohira,  Minister 
of  Finance  Kakuei  Tanaka,  Minister  of  Agricul- 
ture and  Forestry  Seishi  Shigemasa,  Minister  of 
International  Trade  and  Industry  Hajime 
Fukuda,  Minister  of  Labor  Takeo  Ohashi,  and 
President  of  the  Economic  Planning  Agency 
Kiichi  Miyazawa. 

The  United  States  delegation  consists  of  Secre- 
tary Rusk,  who  will  serve  as  chairman  of  the  meet- 
ing. Secretary  of  the  Treasury  Douglas  Dillon, 
Secretary  of  the  Interior  Stewart  Udall,  Secre- 
tary of  Agriculture  Orville  Freeman,  Secretary  of 
Labor  Willard  Wirtz,  Acting  Secretary  of  Com- 
merce Edward  Gudeman,  and  Chairman  of  the 
Council  of  Economic  Advisers  Walter  Heller. 

In  the  course  of  the  daily  sessions,  the  Joint 
Committee  will  consider  the  following  subjects : 

1.  Review  of  current  economic  situation  in 
Jaj^an  and  the  United  States. 

2.  Review  of  current  financial,  monetary,  and 
balance-of-payments  situation  in  Japan  and  the 
United  States. 

3.  Economic  growth  in  Japan  and  the  United 
States. 

4.  Expansion  of  trade  and  promotion  of  eco- 
nomic relations  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States. 

5.  Trends  in  international  trade  and  economic 
relations. 

6.  Problems  of  economic  development  in  less  de- 
veloped countries. 

7.  Others. 


'  For  an  exchange  of  notes  of  June  22,  1961,  see  BtnxE- 
TiN  of  July  10,  1961,  p.  58. 


^  For  background  and  text  of  a  communique,  see  ibid., 
Nov.  27,  1961,  p.  890. 


December  3,   7962 


839 


The  World  Economic  Situation  and  Outlooic 


hy  W.  Michael  Blumenthal 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  ' 


I  am  honored  to  be  invited  a  second  time  to  par- 
ticipate in  this  national  Agricultural  Outlook  Con- 
ference. Last  year  I  talked  about  "The  World 
Economic  Situation  and  Outlook" ;  today  my  sub- 
ject is  the  same.  I  would  like  to  be  able  to  report 
that  many  of  the  problems  facing  us  a  year  ago 
have  been  solved  during  the  last  12  months.  Un- 
fortunately, few  world  problems  are  irrevocably 
"solved";  old  problems  seem  to  fade  into  new 
problems  which  are  sometimes  more,  sometimes 
less,  vexing  than  their  predecessors.  If  we  look 
at  the  world  economic  situation  in  terms  of  de- 
cades, however,  we  can  see  certain  dramatic  suc- 
cesses as  well  as  numerous  dangers.  But,  from 
year  to  year,  we  can  only  try  to  spot  key  trends — 
either  favorable  or  unfavorable — which  promise  to 
shape  the  world  economy.  And,  of  course,  our 
job  is  to  try  to  influence  these  trends. 

Two  great  economic  trends  dominated  the  past 
decade :  the  economic  resurgence  of  Europe,  which 
has  surpassed  all  our  expectations,  and  the  drive 
toward  economic  development  of  the  impoverished 
areas  of  Latin  America,  Asia,  and  Africa.  The 
problems  of  economic  development  will  be  with  us 
as  far  ahead  as  we  can  see.  While  much  progress 
can  and  must  be  made,  we  should  not  deceive  our- 
selves that  this  j)rocess  can  be  compressed  into  a 
decade  or  two.  We  are  also  learning  that  economic 
development,  and  the  political,  social,  and  cultural 
transformations  that  must  accompany  it,  involve 
dislocations,  instabilities,  and  dangers.  Just  as  nu- 
clear fission  potentially  may  be  used  either  for  the 
great  benefit  of  mankind  or  for  its  destruction, 
the  radical  changes  inherent  in  economic  develop- 
ment generate  forces  which  can  have  destructive 
as  well  as  constructive  outlets. 


'Address  made  before  the  Agricultural  Outlook  Confer- 
ence at  Washington,  D.C.,  on  Nov.  13  (press  release  673). 


Europe's  economic  performance  is  historic  for 
its  direct  effect  on  the  world's  balance  of  forces  and 
more  significantly  for  its  demonstration  of  the  vi- 
tality of  liberal  and  open  societies.  I  remind  you 
of  the  pessimism  of  a  few  years  ago,  especially 
following  the  first  sputnik,  when  we  fully  realized 
that  free  nations  had  no  monopoly  of  advanced 
technology.  The  Soviet  bloc,  at  great  cost  to  its 
own  people,  is  able  to  maintain  a  vast  modern  war 
machine.  But  it  is  becoming  increasingly  evident 
that  the  bloc  is  having  difficulty  establisliing  a  bal- 
anced modern  economy.  It  has  not  increased  agri- 
cultural productivity,  and,  even  though  Soviet  in- 
dustrial output  up  imtil  now  has  been  rapidly 
expanding,  low  industrial  productivity  is  becom- 
ing a  bottleneck.  Without  question  the  European 
unity  movement,  sparked  by  the  Common  Market, 
combined  with  continued  United  States  strength, 
has  now  taken  center  stage  from  the  Communists. 
This  dramatic  revival  of  Europe  is  of  fundamental 
importance  to  the  United  States.  Complex  eco- 
nomic issues — particularly  in  the  field  of  agricul- 
ture— surround  the  European  unity  movement. 
But  in  our  efforts  to  work  out  solutions  to  these 
issues  we  should  keep  clearly  in  view  the  broad 
range  of  mutual  interest  we  share  with  Europe. 
A  strong  and  free  Europe  exercising  its  world 
responsibilities  is  an  essential  component  of  United 
States  policy. 

Major  forces  shaping  the  world  economy  have 
not  changed  significanth'  in  the  past  year.  Never- 
theless, the  situation  dilfere  in  certain  respects. 
The  immediate  economic  problems  we  face  now  do 
not  necessarily  assume  the  same  form  as  those 
which  concerned  us  last  year,  although  they  stem 
from  the  same  basic  causes.  Before  commenting 
on  the  more  pressing  of  these  immediate  issues, 
however,  I  will  survey  what  seem  to  me  to  be 


840 


Department  of  Sfofe   Bultetin 


certain    key    elements    in    the    world    economic 
situation. 

Problems  of  Industrialized  Nations 

Looking  first  at  the  advanced,  industrialized  na- 
tions, the  condition  of  the  United  States  economy 
is  the  most  important  single  element  in  the  world 
economy.  For  much  of  the  past  decade  our  eco- 
nomic growth  lias  been  at  an  imsatisfactoiy  rate 
of  2  percent  to  3  percent  a  year.  Our  miemploy- 
ment  rate  lias  been  above  5  percent  since  1957.  Al- 
though recent  imemployment  figures  have  shown 
encouraging  decreases,  most  forecasts  of  the  U.S. 
economy  in  1963  indicate  a  continuation  of  the 
trend  of  the  past  decade.  As  President  Kennedy 
has  pointed  out,  this  rate  of  growth  is  inadequate. 
I  am  sure  that  the  next  Congress  will  have  before 
it  major  measures  designed  to  deal  with  this 
situation. 

In  Western  Europe  the  Common  Market  econ- 
omy has  been  growing  at  double  tlie  U.S.  rate,  or 
at  close  to  5  percent  annually.  In  1962  the  six 
nations  ^  of  the  EEC  [European  Economic  Com- 
munity] are  increasing  their  combined  gross  na- 
tional product  by  about  4i/^  percent,  and  the  con- 
sensus of  1963  forecasts  is  that  growtli  next  year 
should  be  at  close  to  the  1962  rate,  althougli  there 
are  signs  of  some  further  slowing  of  European 
expansion.  The  situation  in  Britain,  moreover,  in 
some  respects  resembles  that  in  the  United  States. 
Steps  necessary  for  the  short-term  defense  of  the 
dollar  and  sterling  have  limited  the  ability  of  both 
countries  to  adopt  measures  to  stimulate  their  do- 
mestic economies.  British  national  output  so  far 
in  1962  has  been  only  about  1  percent  over  the 
1961  level,  although  the  growth  rate  appears  to 
be  picking  up  in  the  fourth  quarter.  Japan's 
growth  rate  has  been  the  most  spectacular  of  any 
industrialized  country,  but  the  Japanese  economy 
remains  heavily  dependent  on  exports.  Any  con- 
traction in  Japan's  export  markets  could  have  se- 
vere repercussions  on  this  economy. 

Taking  the  industrialized  countries  as  a  group, 
the  level  of  economic  activity  is  in  some  areas  short 
of  full  capacity.  We  should  be  growing  faster. 
A  few  noted  international  economists  have  even 
hinted  that  we  may  face  a  period  of  deflation.  Cer- 
tainly inflation  is  not  our  worry  now.  And  yet, 
if  you  will  excuse  a  degree  of  optimism  on  my 


part,  I  feel  that  talk  of  deflation  reflects  unjustified 
fears  of  1932.  The  past  30  years  have  brought  vast 
changes  in  the  world  economic  system.  If  defla- 
tion should  appear  a  genuine  threat,  no  advanced 
government  would  hesitate  to  take  the  necessary 
ofi^setting  actions. 

Aside  from  the  tandem  problems  of  growth  and 
unused  economic  capacity,  the  industrialized  na- 
tions face  one  otlier  major  economic  problem — in- 
ternational monetary  policy.  During  the  past  few 
years  the  international  monetary  system  has  ex- 
perienced periods  of  considerable  strain.  This 
strain  has  resulted,  in  part,  from  pressures  on  the 
two  international  reserve  currencies,  the  dollar  and 
sterling.  Over  the  longer  term  a  nimiber  of  emi- 
nent economists  have  feared  the  appearance  of  a 
shortage  of  international  liquidity,  particularly 
when  the  present  reserve-currency  coimtries  pro- 
duced payments  surpluses.  The  cooperative  ac-  j 
tion  taken  this  year  to  supplement  IMF  reserves ; 
tlirough  loans  up  to  $6  billion  from  the  major  in- 
dustrialized members  ^  is  an  important  step  in  in-' 
creasing  international  liquidity. 

Tlie  September  meeting  of  the  International 
Monetary  Fimd  and  World  Bank*  reflected  the 
greatly  increased  confidence  in  the  dollar.  The 
United  States  is  improving  its  balance-of-pay- 
ments  position,  and,  if  our  position  develops  as 
expected,  the  basic  deficit  should  be  wiped  out  by 
the  end  of  1963.  The  consensus  of  most  authori- 
ties in  this  field  is  that,  while  we  cannot  be  lax  in 
pushing  our  export  and  other  payments  policies, 
the  dollar  position  is  well  on  the  road  to 
equilibrium. 

Economic  Outlook  in  Developing  Countries 

The  economic  situation  and  outlook  in  the  less 
developed  countries  is  generally  less  auspicious 
than  in  the  industrialized  nations.  Before  review- 
ing growth  rates  and  other  statistical  evidence, 
however,  I  should  make  one  reservation.  Except 
in  such  areas  as  world  commodity  prices  or  in- 
ternational trade,  statistics  on  growth  rates  may 
either  be  incomplete  or  may  not  accurately  reflect 
the  real  situation  of  a  developing  nation.    The  de- 


^  Belgium,  France,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Italy,  Luxembourg,  and  the  Netherlands. 

December  3,  7962 


'  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  29,  1962,  p.  187, 
and  Nov.  19,  1962,  p.  795. 

*  For  texts  of  remarks  by  President  Kennedy  and  a 
statement  by  Under  Secretary  Ball  made  before  the 
Boards  of  Governors  of  the  international  iinancial  organi- 
zations, see  ibid.,  Oct.  15,  1962,  p.  573. 


841 


velopment  process  involves  an  organic  change  in 
an  entire  society;  it  is  difficult  to  evaluate  this 
change  with  a  handful  of  not  always  accurate 
statistics.  With  this  caveat,  I  will  cite  a  few 
figures  which  indicate  that  some  developing  coun- 
tries are  doing  better  than  others.  I  will  also  re- 
view a  few  trade  and  price  statistics  which  point 
up  a  serious  problem. 

Industrial  production,  including  both  manufac- 
turing and  extractive  industries,  for  all  develop- 
ing countries  has  increased  by  one-third  since  1958. 
This  rate  of  increase  in  industrial  production  is 
considerably  faster  than  in  either  the  United 
States  or  Europe,  but  of  course  it  is  measured  from 
a  base  a  small  fraction  of  that  in  industrialized 
nations.  While  this  general  picture  is  encourag- 
ing, there  are  wide  variations  from  the  average. 
We  can  be  encouraged  by  industrial  growth  in 
India  and  Pakistan,  where  output  has  increased 
by  about  40  percent  since  1958.  The  picture  in 
Mexico  is  also  encouraging,  with  industrial  pro- 
duction in  early  1962  close  to  30  percent  above  1958 
levels.  (By  comparison  United  States  industrial 
production  in  August  this  year  was  26  percent 
above  the  1958  level.)  On  the  less  encouraging 
side,  industrial  output  in  all  Latin  American  coun- 
tries combined  in  1961  was  only  18  percent  above 
1958.  Output  in  Argentina  was  slightly  lower 
than  in  1958. 

"^^Tiile  on  balance  we  can  be  encouraged  by  these 

(increases  in  industrial  production,  growijx  in  de- 
veloping countries'  exports  is  disappointing. 
Moreover,  the  unstable^ and  dediftiiig  prices  of 
many  primary  commodities  are  beconTing_an^  in- 
crftasmgly'sp.ripiis  problem.  The  export  earnings 
of  less  developed  countries  taken  as  a  group  in- 
creased by  4  percent  from  1958  to  1959,  by  anotlier 
6  percent  from  1959  to  1960,  but  since  1960  these 
nations'  total  export  earnings  have  remained  vir- 
tually static.  DuriTig_this  period  sigrnjiciLDJLin- 
creases  in  export  volumes  have  been  largely  offset 
by  price  declines.  The  unit  value  early  this  year 
of  all  less  developed  country  exports — of  which 
primary  commodities  compose  close  to  90  percent 
— was  6  percent  below  1958  levels.  African  ex- 
port unit  values  were  11  percent  below  1958. 
These  are  general  statistics;  the  picture  for  in- 
dividual countries  or  commodities  reveals,  in  some 
cases,  much  sharper  declines. 

Coffee  prices  have  dropped  from  a  1953  level  of 


842 


close  to  60  cents  a  pound  to  about  35  cents  today. 
During  this  period  Brazil's  annual  export  earn- 
ings from  coffee  have  declined  by  more  than  $350 
million  and  Colombia's  coffee  earnings  have  fallen 
by  close  to  $200  million.  Similarly,  cocoa  prices 
have  declined  from  a  1953  level  of  about  37  cents 
a  pound  to  the  present  level  of  about  20  cents.  I 
will  review  the  steps  we  are  taking  to  deal  with 
these  commodity   problems  in  a   few   moments. 

Alliance  for  Progress 

I  would  like  to  single  out  the  situation  in  Latin 
America  for  brief  special  comment.  Two  weeks 
ago  I  attended  the  Mexico  City  meeting  of  the  In- 
ter-American Economic  and  Social  Council.  The 
conference  proved  a  useful  occasion  to  review 
achievements  of  the  Alliance  for  Progress  and  to 
define  more  precisely  the  nature  of  the  develop- 
ment problems  which  face  Latin  America.  As  you 
know,  the  Latin  American  economic  picture  is  not 
as  bright  as  we  would  like  to  see  it.  Production  in 
the  area,  which  expanded  by  7  percent  in  1957, 
slowed  to  about  4  percent  in  1961,  while  popula- 
tion increased  by  close  to  3  percent  during  1961. 
Last  year,  therefore,  per  capita  increase  in  gross 
national  product  was  only  about  1  percent.  The 
picture  for  1962  appears  to  be  no  brighter.  The 
reason  for  this  retarded  growth  can  be  traced  in 
part  to  low  commodity  prices  and  especially  to  the 
general  political  malaise  which  unfortunately 
seems  all  too  typical  of  developing  nations.  Polit- 
ical instability  and  uncertainty  about  treatment  of 
foreign  investment,  predictably,  has  all  but  dried 
up  net  inflows  of  foreign  private  capital,  and 
capital  flight  has  become  a  serious  problem  in  a 
number  of  Latin  American  countries.  The  im- 
mediate outlook  for  the  area,  therefore,  appears 
uncertain,  altliough  such  countries  as  Mexico  are 
pockets  of  strength.  "WHiile  I  do  not  minimize  the 
risks,  we  should  not  be  overly  pessimistic  about 
Latin  America.  It  would  be  ridiculous  to  expect 
tlie  Alliance  for  Progress  to  solve  problems  of  the 
centuries  in  a  year  or  two.  In  the  course  of  this 
decade,  however,  we  still  have  reason  to  expect  a 
great  forward  step  by  our  neighbors  to  the 
south. 

One  clear  failing  of  the  Alliance  for  Progress 
has  been  its  inability  to  attract  increasing  amounts 
of  private  investment,  both  domestic  and  foreign. 
As  I  have  mentioned,  political  instability  usually 


Department  of  Slate  Bulletin 


frightens  private  investors.  ^Vliile  this  invest- 
ment decline  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  it  is 
doubly  regrettable  in  that  not  only  is  it  a  symptom 
of  political  turmoil  but  it  also  jeopardizes  pros- 
pects for  development.  As  Secretary  [of  the 
Treasury  Douglas]  Dillon  stated  at  the  Mexico 
City  meeting,  the  plain  fact  is  that  private  enter- 
prise has  not  always  been  made  to  feel  part  of  the 
alliance.  Public  funds  on  a  scale  adequate  to 
finance  the  enormous  needs  of  the  alliance  are  sim- 
ply not  available.  The  vast  resources  of  the  pri- 
vate sector — both  financial  and  managerial — must 
be  enlisted  if  the  alliance  is  to  have  lasting 
meaning. 

economic  Situation  in  the  Soviet  Bloc 

I  will  complete  this  general  survey  with  a  few 
comments  on  the  economic  situation  in  the  Soviet 
bloc.  The  dramatic  failure  of  the  Communist 
Chinese  development  effort  is  evident  for  all  the 
world  to  see.  While  the  regime  has  been  able  to 
import  enough  food  to  avei't  widespread  starva- 
tion and  more  favorable  weather  has  improved 
prospects  for  this  crop  year,  Communist  China  in 
its  much  publicized  "great  leap  forward"  has 
fallen  flat  on  its  face. 

In  the  Soviet  Union  agriculture  also  continues 
a  major  problem.  The  failure  of  Soviet  farms  to 
increase  output  per  worker  has  denied  much- 
needed  labor  to  industry.  Industrial  output  has 
been  expanding  at  the  rapid  rate  of  about  6i/^  per- 
cent annually  during  the  past  decade,  but,  largely 
due  to  failure  to  achieve  productivity  goals,  this 
growth  rate  now  appears  to  be  slowing.  Moreover, 
Soviet  industry  is  experiencing  difficulties  which 
do  not  show  up  immediately  in  the  statistics.  Pro- 
duction is  not  declining  absolutely,  but  there  are  a 
number  of  indications  that  volume  output  is 
achieved  at  the  expense  of  quality.  Misallocation 
of  materials  and  other  resources  is  also  acting  as  a 
drag  on  growth  rates.  The  importance  of  this 
failure  to  increase  industrial  productivity  becomes 
apparent  when  we  consider  the  major  portion  of 
Soviet  resources  preempted  by  the  military  and 
the  failure  of  the  agricultural  sector  to  release 
more  labor  to  industry. 

One  development  of  interest  from  our  point  of 
view  is  the  disillusion  of  several  less  developed 
nations  in  light  of  their  experience  with  Soviet 
trade.  The  delegate  of  one  African  nation  com- 
mented at  a  recent  conference  sponsored  by  the 


December  3,   7962 


U.N.  that  his  country  was  having  difficulty  living 
up  to  the  terms  of  a  bilateral  trade  agreement  it 
had  concluded  with  the  Soviets.  The  problem,  he 
explained,  was  that  his  country  had  great  difficulty 
finding  products  produced  in  the  bloc  that  they 
wanted  to  buy.  This  nation's  importers  seem  to 
prefer  products  from  the  West  or  Japan  rather 
than  the  bloc.  The  Government  also  wanted  to 
get  the  most  for  its  money,  and,  this  delegate  im- 
plied, values  were  better  on  free-world  markets 
than  in  the  bloc. 

Turning  now  from  this  general  survey,  I  will 
comment  on  two  issues  on  which  we  are  now  focus- 
ing considerable  attention :  the  questions  of  trade 
in  agricultural  products  and  of  less-developed- 
country  primary  commodity  exports. 

Trade  in  Agricultural  Products 

Our  present  concern  with  trade  in  agricultural 
products  stems  most  immediately  from  the  formu- 
lation of  the  Common  Market's  common  agricul- 
tural policy,  or  CAP.  Grains  exporters,  especially, 
have  reason  to  follow  developments  in  Europe 
closely.  Our  interest  in  maintaining  traditional 
European  markets,  the  complexity  of  the  new 
CAP  regulations,  and  especially  the  uncertainty  as 
to  the  ultimate  impact  of  these  regulations  have 
naturally  led  to  concern  on  our  part.  Wliile  this 
concern  is  justified  in  many  respects,  we  should 
bear  in  mind  that  the  trends  in  European  agricul- 
ture which  are  squeezing  certain  of  our  traditional 
grain  markets  long  antedate  the  CAP.  It  is  far 
from  certain  that  we  would  be  better  off  under 
six  separate  restrictive  schemes  than  under  the 
single  system  which  is  being  put  into  effect.  The 
productivity  increases  and  wheat  consumption 
trends  which  are  at  the  root  of  this  problem  are 
products  of  our  modem  society,  not  something 
dreamed  up  by  the  technicians  in  Brussels.  In 
short,  the  common  agricultural  policy  is  an  im- 
portant step  in  the  European  unity  movement; 
it  is  based  on  certain  realities  of  European  and 
world  agriculture.  We  should  focus  our  attention 
and  efforts  on  these  basic  problems  rather  than 
expect  them  to  wither  away  under  the  fire  of  harsh 
words  directed  at  the  CAP. 

The  realities  of  world  grains  production  and 
trade  appear  to  me  to  include,  as  I  have  indicated, 
the  productivity  increases  which  make  it  possible 
for  North  America  to  feed  the  world  or  for  France 


843 


to  feed  Europe.  We  also  must  face  virtually  static 
consumption  of  wheat  in  advanced  countries.  Tlie 
bright  spot  in  this  picture  is  feed  grains.  Income 
elasticity  in  Europe  today  for  meat  and  poultry  is 
on  the  order  of  a  3-percent  consumption  increase 
for  every  1-percent  rise  in  income.  European  im- 
ports and  consumption  of  feed  grains  have  been 
growing  rapidly.  Feed  grains  are  our  great  po- 
tential agricultural  market  in  Europe. 

The  problem,  as  you  well  Icnow,  is  whether  lower 
cost  grains  imports  will  be  able  to  maintain  their 
traditional  market  position  or  whether  these  mar- 
kets will  be  preempted  by  expanding  European 
output.  The  key  question  here  is  price.  The 
higher  the  price  paid  to  the  European  farmer,  the 
more  he  can  invest  in  increasing  productivity  and 
the  more  marginal  farmers  are  encouraged  to  stay 
on  the  land.  We  therefore  have  a  direct^ — indeed 
a  vital — interest  in  obtaining  the  lowest  possible 
European  wheat  and  especially  feed-grain  prices. 
We  anticipate  that  the  adjustments  in  the  world 
grains  trade  stemming  from  Britain's  prospective 
entry  into  the  Common  Market  can  best  be  brought 
about  through  the  mechanism  of  a  world  grains 
agreement.  In  the  negotiation  of  this  agreement 
we  will  want  to  focus  hard  on  this  price  issue.  It  is 
in  the  interest  of  United  States  grain  producers,  of 
all  efficient  world  grain  producers,  and  of  all  con- 
sumers that  a  world  grains  agreement  should  seek 
to  establish  the  lowest  practicable  grains  prices. 
To  obtain  this  objective  we  must  be  prepared  to 
bargain.  We  can  hardly  ask  Europeans  to  nego- 
tiate their  producer  prices  while  maintaining  that 
our  own  are  not  negotiable.  In  brief,  it  is  in  our 
interest  to  obtain  low  prices;  we  must  be  prepared 
to  negotiate  our  domestic  pricing  arrangements  in 
order  to  achieve  this  goal. 

Our  concern  about  U.S.  agricultural  exports  is 
by  no  means  limited  to  grains,  although,  as  I  have 
indicated,  the  complexity  of  the  grains  problem  is 
more  than  enough  to  keep  us  busy.  Our  trade  ex- 
pansion effort — including  most  importantly  the 
implementation  of  the  new  trade  authority  voted 
by  Congress  °  shortly  before  it  adjourned — will  in- 
clude a  major  drive  to  maintain  and  expand  U.S. 
export  markets  for  such  products  as  tobacco,  fresh 
and  canned  fruits,  and  poultry,  as  well  as  gi-ains. 


'  For  an  article  by  Leonard  Weiss  on  "The  Trade  Ex- 
pansion Act  of  1962,"  see  p.  847. 


The  negotiations  under  the  new  Trade  Expan- 
sion Act  will  be  of  immense  importance  to  Ameri- 
can agriculture.  These  negotiations  will  depart  in 
important  respects  from  previous  tariff-cutting 
sessions.  It  would  be  premature  to  speculate  on 
the  precise  manner  in  which  we  might  expect  the 
negotiations  to  be  conducted  or  on  the  details  of 
the  final  package  of  agreements.  But  you  may  be 
interested  in  some  of  our  preliminary  expectations 
as  to  the  effect  of  these  negotiations  on  U.S.  agri- 
culture. For  products  covered  by  the  CAP  vari- 
able levy — grains,  poultry,  and  dairy  products, 
among  others — traditional  reciprocal  tariff  cutting 
is  meaningless  because  tariff's  have  been  replaced 
by  other  trade-controlling  devices.  As  I  have  men- 
tioned, we  foresee  a  world  grains  agreement  as  pro- 
viding the  means  for  our  continued  participation 
in  the  European  grain  market.  A  satisfactory  ar- 
rangement for  world  grains  trade,  whether 
through  a  grains  agreement  or  in  other  ways,  will 
have  to  be  one  component  of  the  total  trade  pack- 
age we  negotiate  with  the  Common  Market.  Sim- 
ilarly we  are  exploring  various  devices  through 
which  we  can  advance  the  export  interests  of 
American  producers  of  other  items  covered  by  the 
CAP.  These  devices  could  include  negotiating 
EEC  internal  price  levels,  the  level  of  lock-gate 
prices,  the  binding  of  maximum  variable  levies, 
or  specific  access  guarantees.  We  have  made  no 
finn  decisions  as  to  which  device  or  devices  are 
most  appropriate  in  each  individual  case.  Our 
only  conunitment  is  to  use  whatever  mechanism 
seems  most  likely  to  advance  U.S.  agricultural 
exports. 

I  should  also  remind  you  that  a  major  portion 
of  our  agricultural  exports  are  not  covered  by  the 
CAP.  On  these  items — and  especially  tobacco  and 
fruit — the  various  authorities  contained  in  the 
Trade  Act  will  permit  us  to  bargain  down  duties. 
Tliese  concessions  must,  of  course,  be  meaningful 
and  not  negated  by  quantitative  or  other  restric- 
tions. We  should  not  expect,  however,  that  we 
can  sweep  away  the  elaborate  structure  of  agricul- 
tural protectionism  during  the  next  2  years. 
"What  we  do  hope  to  accomplish  is  to  allow  pro- 
gi'essively  greater — although  in  many  areas  still 
controlled — access  into  European  markets  for  a 
wide  range  of  American  farm  products. 


844 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Commodity  Exports  of  Developing  Countries 

The  final  topic  I  am  going  to  mention  this  after- 
noon is  the  problem  of  conamodity  exports  of  less 
developed  coimtries.  The  basic  causes  of  this  com- 
modity problem  are  similar  to  those  in  temper- 
ate agriculture — productivity  improvements  and 
other  incentives  have  in  numerous  cases  increased 
output  far  above  demand  at  existing  prices.  Vol- 
ume increases  in  exports  have  typically  failed  to 
offset  declining  prices,  and  export  earnings  of 
many  producing  countries  have  suffered.  Unlike 
temperate  agricultural  exporters,  however,  most 
less  developed  coimtries  are  vitally  dependent  on 
export  earnings  from  a  few  products  to  maintain 
their  development  effort.  Declining  primary  com- 
modity markets  do  not  merely  involve  losses  for 
producers  but  jeopardize  the  entire  economic 
structure — and  thereby  the  political  complexion — 
of  a  large  number  of  Latin  American,  African, 
and  Asian  nations. 

This  current  instability  in  commodity  prices, 
therefore,  is  far  more  serious  than  market  fluctua- 
tions in  past  eras  when  the  world  was  a  larger 
place  and  economic  development  had  not  become  a 
central  element  in  our  foreign  policy.  We  are 
doing  several  things  in  an  attempt  to  counteract 
the  disruptive  effects  of  commodity  price  insta- 
bility. We  are  attempting  to  expand  markets  for 
primary  commodities  by  pressing  for  the  progres- 
sive removal  of  tariff's,  discrimination,  and  in- 
ternal taxes  in  industrialized  countries.  We  are 
actively  considering  a  global  compensatory  financ- 
ing mechanism  which  would  seek  to  blimt  the  im- 
pact on  developing  nations  of  fluctuations  in  ex- 
port, earnings.  In  special  instances  we  have 
negotiated,  or  are  considering,  global  commodity 
agreements  embracing  both  producing  and  con- 
suming nations.  These  agreements,  of  which  the 
recently  negotiated  coffee  agreement^  is  a  prime 
example,  seek  to  check  disruptive  price  fluctua- 
tions and  deterioration  pending  more  basic 
reforms. 

Our  purpose  in  concluding  commodity  agree- 
ments, in  brief,  is  to  provide  a  breathing  spell — 
to  buy  time — during  which  we  can  deal  with  the 
basic  problem  of  overproduction.  Unless  we  are 
able  to  bring  supply  and  demand  into  better  bal- 
ance, commodity  agreements  will  inevitably  fail. 
The  only  long-term  solution  we  see  is  to  shift  re- 


'  For  backpround.  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  29,  1962,  p.  667. 


sources  out  of  production  of  surplus  commodities 
into  other  areas^especially  processing  and  man- 
ufacturing. 

The  situation  facing  many  developing  countries 
is  this:  Import  requirements  will  increase  as  in- 
dustrialization progresses;  export  earnings  from 
primary  commodities  cannot  be  expected  to  meet 
these  growing  needs,  as  demand  for  these  products 
is  limited ;  if  development  is  to  continue,  these  na- 
tions must  receive  more  aid  or  export  a  more  diver- 
sified range  of  goods. 

I  do  not  think  I  am  presenting  the  alternatives 
too  starkly  by  stating  that  the  industrialized  na- 
tions, and  especially  the  United  States  and  our 
principal  European  allies,  face  three  choices :  We 
can  ignore  the  problems  and  aspirations  of  the 
less  developed  nations,  at  one  stroke  denying  our 
own  faith  in  the  dignity  of  man  and  leaving  most 
of  the  world  for  the  Communists.  We  can  make 
ever  larger  donations  of  foreign  aid  indefuiitely. 
Or  we  can  progressively  widen  our  import  markets 
for  agricultural  and  manufactured  goods  from 
developing  countries. 

Our  three  choices,  of  course,  are  not  choices  at 
all.  We  have  no  practicable  longrun  alternative 
but  to  import  increasing  amounts  of  less-de- 
veloped-comitry  products — and  not  merely  those 
such  as  coffee,  cocoa,  or  bananas  which  we  do  not 
produce. 

We  must,  of  course,  find  ways  to  import  progres- 
sively increased  amounts  of  labor-intensive  manu- 
factured goods,  but  I  would  like  to  comment  more 
specifically  here  on  the  relationship  between 
United  States  agricultural  trade  policies  and  our 
economic  development  policies.  American  agri- 
cultural exports  have  often  played  a  key  role  in 
alleviating  hardship  and  in  stimulating  develop- 
ment. On  other  occasions,  however,  our  shipments 
of  surplus  products  may  prove  less  valuable  than 
other  forms  of  assistance.  We  should  not  delude 
ourselves  into  believing  that  our  failure  to  curiail 
domestic  surpluses  is  an  unmixed  blessing  for  the 
rest  of  the  world.  In  many  cases  U.S.  agricul- 
tural exports  are  essential  to  development  pro- 
grams; we  must  continue  shipments  in  these  situa- 
tions. But  a  significant  portion  of  our  national 
wealth  which  is  devoted  to  surplus  agricultural 
production  and  disposal  could  be  better  spent  on 
other  forms  of  economic  assistance. 

On  the  import  side  one  of  the  issues  the  ad- 
vanced countries  must  face  is  the  question  of  pro- 


December  3,   7962 

66(5.569 — 62 3 


845 


tectionism,  including  agricultural  protectionism. 
The  practice  both  of  the  United  States  and  of 
Europe  of  granting  economic  assistance  with  one 
hand,  while  limiting  developing  nations'  ability  to 
export  with  the  other,  requires  reevaluation  to  see 
if  there  are  not  more  constructive  alternatives. 
And  I  should  emphasize  that  this  is  a  problem  to 
be  faced  by  all  industrialized  nations,  not  the 
United  States  alone.  These  increased  imports  will 
create  some  difficulties.  The  adjustment  assistance 
provisions  of  the  new  Trade  Act  open  promising 
avenues  for  working  out  many  of  these  difficulties. 
Other  more  intractable  problems  may  require  a 
common  approach  embracing  all  potential  major 
exporting  and  importing  nations.  We  must  face 
this  issue  directly.  We  have  to  devise  mechanisms 
which  permit  a  continuous  growth  in  a  wide  range 
of  imports  from  developing  nations  while  easing 
the  impact  on  vulnerable  domestic  producers.  A 
rising  level  of  imports  from  developing  nations 
will,  in  turn,  lead  to  expanding  United  States  ex- 
ports to  these  countries. 

Implications  for  the  United  States 

In  closing  I  would  like  to  summarize  cei'tain 
implications  for  the  United  States  of  this  tour  of 
the  world  economic  horizon. 

First,  if  we  expect  other  nations  to  adopt  agri- 
cultural policies  which  leave  room  for  American 
exports,  we  must  be  prepared  to  adapt  our  own 
programs  to  meet  global,  not  merely  national, 
criteria. 

Second,  if  we  are  genuinely  interested  in  the 
development  of  the  nations  of  Latin  America, 
Africa,  and  Asia,  we  must  be  prepared  to  deal  with 
the  trade  implications  of  our  development  policies. 
Markets  for  primary  products  are  limited;  the 
only  way  these  nations  can  earn  enougli  foreign 
exchange  for  development  is  to  diversify  their  ex- 
port lines. 

Tliird,  to  maintain  our  defense  and  foreign  aid 
efforts,  and  to  provide  the  dynamism  and  flexi- 
bility necessary  to  adjust  to  changing  conditions, 
we  must  accelerate  the  growth  rate  of  the  United 
States  economy. 

The  United  States  is  the  largest  single  com- 
ponent in  the  world  economy.  We  have  no  choice 
but  to  conduct  our  national  economic  policies  in 
light  of  combined  national  and  global  objectives. 


Mr.  Herter  Named  Representative 
for  Trade  Negotiations 

President  Kennedy  annoimced  on  November  15 
(Wliite  House  press  release  dated  November  15) 
his  intention  to  appoint  Christian  A.  Herter  as 
Special  Representative  for  Trade  Negotiations  of 
the  United  States.  Tliis  position  was  established 
by  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  of  1962.  Mr.  Herter 
will  have  a  central  role  in  the  fonnulation  of  trade 
policy  and  will  advise  and  assist  the  President  on 
those  programs  and  actions  which  bear  on  these 
vital  aspects  of  U.S.  economic  policy  and  interna- 
tional relationships. 

The  President,  in  announcing  his  intention  to 
make  the  appointment,  said :  "The  Trade  Expan- 
sion Act  of  1962  has  had  the  high  priority,  the 
nonpartisan  support,  and  the  unqualified  commit- 
ment which  must  be  provided  legislation  which  af- 
fects the  vital  security  interests  of  the  United 
States  both  here  and  abroad.  The  Congress  pro- 
vided authority  not  only  to  pursue  agreements  on 
trade  and  tariffs  which  would  accommodate  our  na- 
tional needs  for  expanding  markets  and  thereby 
contribute  to  our  economic  strength  and  growth 
but  also  to  create  entirely  new  reciprocal  trading 
arrangements  which  would  measurably  contribute 
to  the  economic,  political,  and  military  strength 
and  solidarity  of  the  free  world. 

"Thus  the  importance  of  this  task  and  the  scope 
of  interest  and  endeavor  of  the  Special  Representa- 
tive goes  beyond  the  immediate  particulars  of 
negotiations  on  trade  and  tariff  matters.  This 
work  goes  to  the  very  heart  of  the  many  policies 
and  programs,  domestic  and  foreign,  which  will 
help  to  shape  the  world  environment  in  which  the 
United  States  must  maintain  initiative,  command 
respect,  and  provide  leadership.  To  this  end  the 
Special  Representative  will  necessarily  be  ac- 
corded a  central  role  in  the  formulation  of  trade 
policy.  He  will  be  directly  responsible  for  pre- 
paring the  propased  objectives  and  strategies  for 
negotiations  and  for  directing  those  negotiations 
while  they  are  in  process.  In  a  broader  sense  he 
will  become,  along  with  the  Secretaries  of  State 
and  Commerce,  one  of  the  top  policy  officials  of 
the  United  States  Government  in  shaping  and 
achieving  our  international  objectives  in  the  com- 
mercial, trade,  and  economic  fields." 


846 


Deparlment  of  State   Bulletin 


The  Trade  Expansion  Act  of  1962 


hy  Leonard  Weiss 


On  January  25  President  Kennedy  presented  his 
proposal  for  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  of  1962  to 
the  Congress.^  On  October  11  this  act  was  signed 
into  law  by  the  President."  These  comments  are 
intended  to  explain  what  the  act  provides,  how  it 
is  to  be  applied,  and  what  significance  its  key  pro- 
visions have  in  terms  of  our  trade  policy. 

The  Trade  Expansion  Act  may  be  considered 
for  purposes  of  simplification  as  consisting  of  es- 
sentially two  parts:  first,  that  providing  for  new 
authority  to  reduce  tariffs  and,  second,  that  pro- 
viding for  ways  to  deal  with  increased  competition 
from  imports  and  any  problems  of  domestic  re- 
adjustment which  might  arise. 

Authority  To  Reduce  Tariffs 

Let  us  look  at  the  first  part — the  authority  to 
reduce  tarifl's  and  the  procedures  for  carrying  out 
this  authority. 

The  new  act  provides  the  President  with  essen- 
tially four  types  of  new  tariff-reducing  authority : 

1.  general  authority  to  reduce  duties  in  relation 
to  any  other  country ; 

2.  special  authority  to  reduce  or  eliminate  duties 
in  relation  to  the  European  Economic  Community, 
the  EEC,  popularly  called  the  Common  Market ; 

3.  special  authority  to  reduce  or  eliminate  duties 
in  relation  to  the  less  developed  coimtries ;  and 

4.  special  authority  to  eliminate  low  duties. 

As  regards  the  first  authority,  the  President  is 
authorized  to  reduce  in  a  trade  agreement  duties 
existing  on  July  1,  1962,  by  60  percent.    The  act 


has  been  so  drawn  that  duties  "existing  on  July  1, 
1962"  include  those  reduced  duties  to  which  the 
United  States  is  committed  under  international 
agreement  as  of  that  date,  even  though  those  re- 
duced duties  may  not  yet  actually  be  in  effect.  Ac- 
cordingly the  50-percent  authority  is  applicable  to 
those  duties  on  which  tariff  reductions  were  ne- 
gotiated in  the  recent  Geneva  tariff  negotiations  ' 
but  on  which  the  full  amount  of  the  reduction  will 
not  come  into  effect  until  some  time  after  July  1, 
1962,  because  of  the  staging  process. 

In  addition  to  this  authority  available  in  nego- 
tiations with  any  other  comitry,  the  bill  provides 
special  authority  to  deal  with  the  Common  Mar- 
ket. The  Common  Market  presents  a  special 
problem  for  our  exporters.  As  a  result  of  the 
EEC's  agreement  to  eliminate  all  tariffs  internally 
among  the  member  states,  coupled  with  tlie  main- 
tenance of  a  common  tariff  against  the  outside,  our 
exporters  have  a  special  hurdle  to  overcome  which 
they  do  not  face  elsewhere.  If  our  exporters  are 
to  get  over  tliis  hurdle,  a  simple  50-percent  reduc- 
tion in  the  external  tariff  of  the  Common  Market 
may  not  be  enough.  They  may  need  a  greater  re- 
duction or  even  complete  elimination  of  the  par- 
ticular tariff  concerned  if  they  are  to  preserve,  to 
say  nothing  of  expand,  their  position  in  the 
market. 

Naturally,  if  we  are  to  seek  such  substantial 
duty  reductions  and  eliminations  from  the  EEC, 
we  must  be  prepared  to  grant  comparable  tariff" 
concessions  to  the  EEC  on  tlieir  imports  into  the 


'  For  text  of  the  President's  message,  see  Buijletin  of 
Feb.  12, 1962,  p.  2.31. 

■  For  remarks  made  by  the  President  upon  signing  the 
act,  see  ihid.,  Oct.  29,  1962,  p.  6.55. 

^  For  background,  see  ihid.,  Apr.  2,  1962.  p.  561. 


•  Mr.  Weiss,  author  of  the  above  article, 
is  Director  of  the  Office  of  International 
Trade  and  Finance. 


December  3,   7962 


847 


United  States.  Accordingly  the  act  authorizes 
the  President  in  an  agreement  with  the  EEC  to 
reduce  tariffs  on  industrial  products  by  more  than 
50  percent  or  to  eliminate  them  completely  in  those 
cases  where  the  United  States  and  the  EEC  to- 
gether account  for  80  percent  or  more  of  the  world 
export  value  of  all  articles  within  a  specified  cate- 
gory as  determined  by  the  President. 

This  special  authority  goes  one  step  farther  in 
relation  to  agricultural  products.  In  the  case  of 
such  products,  whether  or  not  the  80-percent  trade 
coverage  test  could  be  met,  the  President  is  au- 
thorized in  an  agreement  with  the  EEC  to  reduce 
by  more  than  50  percent  or  to  eliminate  the  duty 
on  an  agricultural  commodity  if  he  determines 
that  such  action  would  help  maintain  or  expand 
U.S.  exports  of  like  articles. 

Any  tariff  concessions  which  we  might  grant  to 
the  EEC  under  this  authority  would  be  extended 
to  imports  from  other  non-Communist  countries. 
Such  generalization  is  in  accordance  with  our 
traditional  policy  of  most-favored-nation  treat- 
ment, which  is  explicitly  reaffirmed  in  the  new 
legislation.  Thus  tariff  reductions  or  eliminations 
under  the  50-percent  or  the  other  authorities  to 
which  I  have  referred,  as  well  as  under  the  EEC 
authority,  would  be  extended  to  other  countries. 

Tliis  authority  in  relation  to  the  EEC  has  been 
drawn  in  the  way  it  has  to  protect  our  position 
in  the  EEC  market  in  commodities  where  we  have 
an  obvious  comparative  advantage.  The  fact  that 
we  and  the  EEC  have  dominated  80  percent  of 
the  world  export  value  in  a  category  reflects  the 
advantage  we  have  over  other  suppliers  in  such 
categories.  "We  want  to  be  sure  that  these  ad- 
vantages are  not  frustrated  and  our  exports  cur- 
tailed as  a  result  of  the  internal  elimination  of 
tariffs  within  the  EEC  while  tariffs  are  main- 
tained against  the  outside.  At  the  same  time,  be- 
cause we  do  enjoy  a  strong  competitive  position, 
as  reflected  by  our  dominance  in  world  exports  in 
these  categories,  we  can  make  substantial  duty  re- 
ductions and  even  eliminations  with  reasonable 
confidence  that  our  domestic  industry  will  not  face 
undue  difficulties  from  imports,  including  imports 
from  other  countries  to  which  concessions  to  the 
EEC  would  be  generalized. 

As  I  have  indicated,  the  act  also  provides  a  spe- 
cial authority  in  relation  to  the  less  developed 
countries.  One  of  the  most  compelling  problems 
which  these  countries  face  is  to  expand  their  ex- 
ports so  that  they  can  earn  the  means  to  support 


848 


their  economic  development,  so  urgently  needed  to ! 
raise  living  standards  and  promote  political  stabil- 
ity. Accordingly  the  act  authorizes  the  President 
to  reduce  or  eliminate  duties  or  other  import  re- 
strictions on  tropical  agricultural  and  forestry 
commodities  not  produced  in  significant  quantities 
in  the  United  States.  This  authority  is  condi- 
tional upon  the  EEC's  taking  comparable  action 
on  a  nondiscriminatory  basis  so  as  to  encourage 
the  maximum  possible  reduction  of  restrictions 
against  the  trade  of  the  less  developed  coimtries. 

Finally  the  act  authorizes  the  President,  in  re- 
ciprocal negotiations  with  other  countries,  to  elim- 
inate tariffs  on  those  products  where  the  duty  is  5 
percent  or  less.  In  such  instances  the  duty  may 
well  not  serve  any  significant  protective  function 
and  may  constitute  only  an  unnecessary  adminis- 
trative impediment  to  trade. 

How  This  Authority  Would  Be  Applied 

The  foregoing  is  the  authority  which  the  act 
provides  to  the  President  to  reduce  or  eliminate 
duties.  In  exercising  this  authority  the  President 
must  first  seek  the  advice  of  the  Tariff  Commission 
as  to  the  probable  economic  effect  of  reductions 
or  eliminations  in  duties  on  U.S.  industries  en- 
gaged in  the  production  of  the  articles  concerned. 
As  under  previous  procedures,  the  Tariff  Cormnis- 
sion  will  hold  public  hearings  in  preparing  its  ad- 
vice to  the  President.  The  Tariff  Commission  will 
also  advise  the  President  with  regard  to  which 
articles  fall  within  the  special  EEC  and  the  trop- 
ical-products authorities. 

To  assist  the  President  in  exercising  his  trade 
agreements  authority  the  new  law  establishes  im- 
])lementing  machinery.  It  provides  for  the  ap- 
pointment by  the  President  of  a  Special  Repre- 
sentative for  Trade  Negotiations,^  wlio  will  be  the 
chief  U.S.  representative  for  negotiations  con- 
ducted under  the  act.  In  performing  liis  func- 
tions the  Special  Representative  is  to  seek  advice 
from  representatives  of  industry,  labor,  and  agri- 
culture and  from  such  Government  agencies  as  he 
deems  appropriate.  The  act  also  establishes  a  new 
Cabinet-level  interagency  trade  organization  to  be 
chaired  by  the  Special  Representative.  This  or- 
ganization is  to  advise  the  President  on  policy 
matters,  including  recommendations  concerning 
tariff  relief  for  seriously  injured  industries  and 
complaints  of  unjustifiable  and  unreasonable  for- 


*  See  I).  R40. 


Departmenf  of  State   Bulletin 


[ 


eign  import  restrictions.  Finally  the  act  pro- 
vides for  the  appointment  of  four  congressional 
advisers  who  would  be  accredited  to  U.S.  delega- 
tions to  tariff  conferences. 

Under  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  the  President 
will  not  be  permitted  to  make  duty  reductions  or 
eliminations  on  any  items  on  which  escape-clause 
action  is  in  effect  pursuant  to  the  escape  clause 
in  previous  legislation  or  to  the  modified  escape 
clause  in  the  new  law.  Nor  may  the  President  re- 
duce or  eliminate  tariffs  on  items  on  which  re- 
strictions have  been  imposed  pursuant  to  the 
national  security  provision  of  the  reciprocal  trade 
agreements  act  or  which  may  be  imposed  under 
the  parallel  provision  of  the  new  act. 

The  act  provides  for  the  withholding  of  tariff 
concessions  from  the  U.S.S.R.  and  from  countries 
which  are  dominated  or  controlled  by  communism. 

To  strengthen  tlie  President's  efforts  to  get  other 
countries  to  reduce  or  remove  vm justifiable  and 
unreasonable  import  restrictions  imposed  on  our 
products,  the  provision  in  past  legislation  direct- 
ing the  President  to  take  action  in  such  cases  has 
been  substantially  expanded.  The  new  law  re- 
quires the  President  to  take  all  appropriate  and 
feasible  steps  to  eliminate  unjustifiable  import  re- 
strictions, but  he  must  refrain  from  using  his 
tariff-reducing  authority  to  bargain  down  such 
illegal  barriers.  If  another  country  imposes  un- 
justifiable import  restrictions  affecting  our  agi'i- 
cultural  products,  the  President  is  directed  to  take 
retaliatory  action  against  imports  from  the  coun- 
try in  question  when  he  determines  such  action  is 
necessary  and  appropriate  to  obtain  relaxation  of 
the  foreign  restriction  and  provide  equitable  ac- 
cess for  our  agricultural  exports  to  the  foreign 
market.  The  President  is  also  required,  to  the 
extent  that  such  action  is  consistent  with  the  pur- 
poses of  the  act,  to  withhold  existing  concessions 
from,  or  to  refrain  from  granting  the  benefits  of 
new  concessions  to  trading  partners  which:  (a) 
maintain  import  restrictions  inconsistent  with 
existing  trade  agreements ;  (b)  engage  in  discrimi- 
natory acts  or  other  restrictive  acts  or  policies 
which  unjustifiably  restrict  U.S.  commerce;  or 
(c)  maintain  unreasonable  import  restrictions 
substantially  burdening  our  commerce.  A  new 
provision  has  been  added  which  requires  the  in- 
teragency trade  organization  to  hold  public  hear- 
ings at  which  any  interested  persons  may  present 
their  views  on  unjustifiable  and  unreasonable 
foreign  import  restrictions. 


The  new  law  also  includes  a  provision  authoriz- 
ing duty  uici'eases  on  fish  imported  from  a  coun- 
try wliich  the  President  determines  has  refused  to 
negotiate  in  good  faith  on  fishery  conservation 
practices  affecting  the  United  States. 

As  is  the  case  under  the  previous  law,  the  new 
act  provides  for  the  staging  of  tariff  reductions  or 
eliminations.  Concessions  will  be  staged  in  five 
equal  annual  installments,  though  they  may  take 
effect  in  unequal  intervals  and  amounts,  provided 
the  sum  of  reductions  at  any  one  time  does  not  ex- 
ceed what  would  occur  under  equal  installments. 
This  feature  permits  smaller  reductions  initially 
and  larger  ones  toward  the  end  of  the  period. 

Dealing  With  Effects  on  Domestic  Producers 

So  much  for  the  authority  to  reduce  and  elimi- 
nate tariffs  and  for  the  way  in  which  this  author- 
ity would  be  applied.  Now  I  would  like  to  turn  to 
those  features  of  the  new  act  designed  to  deal 
with  the  effect  of  imports  on  domestic  producers. 

Perhaps  in  no  respect  was  the  previous  legisla- 
tion so  defective  as  with  regard  to  the  provisions 
designed  to  safeguard  domestic  industry  from  se- 
rious injury.  These  provisions  satisfied  no  one. 
For  those  concerned  about  imports,  the  provisions 
did  not  go  far  enough.  They  were  felt  to  be  un- 
dulj'  time-consuming  and  insufficiently  restrictive 
to  protect  domestic  interests.  For  those  concerned 
with  the  promotion  of  a  liberal  trade  policy,  the 
provisions  were  felt  to  go  too  far.  They  were  con- 
sidered imreasonably  to  inhibit  tariff  reduction,  to 
create  widespread  uncertainty,  and  generally  to 
raise  the  question  whether  the  previous  legislation 
had  become  more  a  vehicle  of  trade  liberalization 
or  trade  restriction. 

The  new  law  recognizes  this  problem  and  intro- 
duces a  constructive  solution.  It  accepts  the  prem- 
ise that  action  in  the  national  interest  to  reduce 
trade  barriers  entails  a  national  responsibility  to 
assist  those  who  may  be  adversely  affected.  It 
does  not  expect  individual  groups  to  bear  the  bur- 
den of  a  policy  felt  to  be  in  the  interest  of  the  Na- 
tion as  a  whole.  It  seeks,  however,  to  meet  tliis 
burden  in  a  positive  rather  than  negative  way, 
consistent  with  a  dynamic  rather  than  static  econ- 
omy. It  seeks,  where  possible,  to  make  our  pro- 
ducers more  competitive  in  their  present  fields  of 
activity.  "VVliere  this  may  not  be  possible,  it  seeks 
to  facilitate  their  adjustment  to  other  fields  where 
they  can  be  competitive.    In  these  ways  it  attempts 


December  3,   7962 


849 


to  provide  for  a  more  efficient  use  of  our  resources, 
for  a  higher  level  of  national  growth,  and,  in  the 
last  analysis,  for  a  better  livelihood  for  our  people. 
With  these  fundamental  concepts  and  purposes 
in  mind,  the  act  provides  assistance  through  vari- 
ous means  to  facilitate  the  adjustment  of  domestic 
producers  to  conditions  which  may  result  from 
the  reduction  or  elimination  of  tariffs.  As  in 
previous  legislation,  the  President  is  authorized  to 
increase  tariffs  or  to  impose  other  import  restric- 
tions when  the  Tariff  Commission  finds,  after  an 
investigation,  that  serious  injury  is  occurring  or 
is  threatened  to  an  industry  as  a  result  in  major 
part  of  increased  imports  due  to  tariff  concessions. 
But  in  an  important  departure  from  previous 
legislation  the  President  is  authorized,  in  addi- 
tion, to  utilize  other  remedies  as  alternatives  or 
supplements  to  increased  import  restrictions.  As 
an  alternative  to  tariff  or  quota  action,  when  there 
is  a  finding  of  injury  to  an  industry  as  a  whole,  he 
may  negotiate  so-called  orderly  marketing  agree- 
ments with  other  countries,  limiting  their  exports 
to  the  United  States.  Also,  as  an  alternative  or 
supplement  to  either  of  these  remedies,  he  may 
provide  adjustment  assistance  directly  to  firms 
or  groups  of  workers.  Such  assistance  may  be 
provided  when  the  finding  of  injury  pertains  only 
to  an  individual  firm  or  group  of  workers  as  well 
as  when  injury  is  found  with  respect  to  an  indus- 
try as  a  whole.  It  was  not  possible  previously  to 
provide  any  remedial  action  unless  the  industiy 
as  a  whole  was  found  to  be  injured. 

Assistance  for  Firms  and  Workers 

The  adjustment  assistance  for  firms  is  of  three 
types.  P'irst,  provision  is  made  for  technical  as- 
sistance to  an  affected  firm.  Such  assistance  in- 
cludes information,  market  and  other  economic 
research,  managerial  advice  and  counseling,  train- 
ing, and  assistance  in  research  and  development. 
Second,  provision  is  made  for  direct  loans  and 
guarantees  of  loans  where  necessary  to  provide 
financial  assistance  which  otherwise  might  not  be 
available.  Third,  provision  is  made  for  tax  assist- 
ance through  the  special  carryback  of  operating 
losses. 

As  regards  workers,  the  act  also  provides  for 
three  types  of  assistance.  First,  it  provides  for 
readjustment  allowances  in  the  form  of  compen- 
sation for  partial  or  complete  unemployment. 
Second,  it  provides  for  retraining  of  workers  so 


that  they  can  shift  into  other  types  of  employ- 
ment. Third,  it  provides  for  relocation  allowances 
to  assist  a  family  in  moving  from  an  area  where 
employment  may  be  lacking  to  an  area  where  em- 
ployment is  available.  These  facilities  are  over 
and  above  those  which  may  already  be  available  to 
firms,  workers,  and  commimities  under  other  legis- 
lation. 

Matters  relating  to  assistance  to  firms  will  be 
referred  to  the  Department  of  Commerce;  those 
relating  to  assistance  to  workers  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  Labor. 

To  advise  the  President  and  the  administering 
agencies  on  the  development  of  programs  for 
adjustment  assistance  to  firms  and  workers,  the 
law  establishes  an  interagency  Adjustment 
Assistance  Advisory  Board  consisting  of  the 
Secretary  of  Commerce,  as  chairman,  and  the 
Secretaries  of  the  Treasury,  Agriculture,  Labor, 
the  Interior,  and  Health,  Education,  and  Welfare, 
and  the  Administrator  of  the  Small  Business  Ad- 
ministration. Tlie  President  may  appoint  to  the 
board  such  other  officials  as  he  deems  appropriate. 
In  addition,  the  chairman  of  the  board  may  ap- 
point for  any  industry  an  industry  committee 
composed  of  members  representing  employers, 
workers,  and  the  public.  Such  committees  would 
advise  the  board  with  regard  to  the  provision  of 
adjustment  assistance. 

Tariff  Relief  and  Orderly  Marketing  Agreements 

As  is  indicated  above,  the  President  may  also 
extend  relief  through  increased  tariffs  or  other 
trade  restrictions,  or  alternatively  he  may  negoti- 
ate orderly  marketing  agreements,  when  he  deter- 
mines that  serious  injury  is  affecting  or  threaten- 
ing an  industry  as  a  whole.  Such  action  may  be 
in  lieu  of  or  in  addition  to  adjustment  assistance. 
Before  making  his  determination,  the  President 
must  have  received  an  affirmative  finding  by  the 
Tariff  Commission  that,  as  a  result  in  major  part 
of  a  concession,  imports  have  increased  so  as  to 
cause  or  threaten  serious  injury  to  an  industry. 

In  the  case  of  an  application  to  the  Tariff  Com- 
mission for  relief  to  an  industry  through  increased 
tariffs  or  other  trade  restrictions,  the  Commission, 
if  it  made  an  injuiy  finding,  would  also  find  and 
report  to  the  President  the  increase,  either  in  duty 
or  in  nontariff  restrictions  such  as  quotas,  neccs- 
sai-y  to  prevent  or  remedy  such  injury.  In  its  in- 
vestigation, in  the  course  of  which  it  is  required 


850 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


to  hold  hearings,  the  Commission  is  directed  to 
take  into  account  all  economic  factors  which  it  con- 
siders relevant,  including  idling  of  productive  fa- 
cilities, inability  to  operate  at  a  reasonable  profit 
level,  and  unemployment  or  underemployment. 

As  has  been  the  case,  the  President  will  make 
the  ultimate  decision  as  to  the  relief  to  be  granted. 
In  making  this  decision  he  is  to  seek  advice  from 
the  Cabinet-level  trade  organization  established 
by  the  act.  If  the  President  does  not  concur  in  a 
Tariff  Commission  finding  that  increased  duties 
or  other  restrictions  are  necessary  to  relieve  or  pre- 
vent serious  injury,  he  must  report  the  reasons  for 
his  action  to  the  Congress.  Within  60  days  the 
Congress  may  then  cause  the  Tariff  Commission 
finding  to  be  put  into  effect  by  adopting  a  con- 
current resolution  by  a  vote  of  the  majority  of  the 
authorized  membei-ship  of  each  House.  A  similar 
provision  for  congressional  review  was  added  to 
previous  legislation  in  1958. 

As  I  mentioned,  action  under  the  provision  for 
tariff  relief  is  to  be  only  to  the  extent  and  for  the 
time  required  to  provide  the  necessary  relief.  Ac- 
cordingly, any  increase  in  duty  or  other  import 
restriction  taken  under  this  provision  shall  be  for 
an  initial  period  not  to  exceed  4  years.  Actions 
taken  shall  be  periodically  reviewable  and  may  be 
reduced  or  terminated  in  less  than  4  years  when 
the  President,  with  the  advice  of  the  Tariff  Com- 
mission and  the  Secretaries  of  Commerce  and  La- 
bor, determines  that  the  national  interest  so  re- 
quires. The  President  is  also  authorized  to  extend 
the  period  when  he  determines  such  action  is  in 
the  national  interest.  The  same  rules  for  termina- 
tion or  extension  apply  to  actions  taken  under 
previous  legislation  and  wMch  are  still  in  effect 


except  that  the  initial  period  in  these  cases  ter- 
minates 5  years  after  the  date  of  enactment  of 
the  new  act. 

General  Significance 

This,  briefly,  is  the  nature  of  the  Trade  Expan- 
sion Act  of  1962,  an  act  described  by  the  Presi- 
dent as  being,  in  his  opinion,  the  most  important 
piece  of  legislation  affecting  international  eco- 
nomic relations  since  the  passage  of  the  Marshall 
Plan.  The  new  act,  as  I  have  attempted  to  show 
in  my  explanation  of  its  various  provisions,  clear- 
ly embodies  a  principle  underlying  our  trade  pol- 
icy since  1934  and  proven  by  almost  30  years'  ex- 
perience: that  the  expansion  of  trade  through  the 
reciprocal  reduction  of  tariffs  is  mutually  bene- 
ficial and  advantageous  to  our  economic  interests 
and  to  those  of  our  trading  partners. 

But  this  act  also  marks  a  new  departure  point 
in  our  trade  policy.  Through  use  of  the  broad 
new  negotiating  authority  we  will  have  the  op- 
portunity to  move  forward  in  partnership  with 
the  Common  Market  and  other  countries  in  the 
free  world  to  achieve  a  comprehensive  liberaliza- 
tion of  tariffs  and  other  obstacles  to  trade  and 
thereby  promote  economic  growth  and  an  increase 
of  living  standards.  In  our  domestic  economy  the 
act,  in  addition  to  providing  new  incentives  for 
our  exporters,  an  increased  flow  of  goods  for  con- 
sumers, and  the  stimulus  of  freer  competition  for 
efficient  growth,  will  enable  effective  and  meaning- 
ful assistance  to  be  provided  where  necessary.  The 
act  thus  opens  up  great  new  opportunities  and 
charts  a  course  for  a  new  era  of  progress  and 
prosperity  for  our  economy  and  the  economies  of 
our  free-world  partners. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


Calendar  of  International  Conferences  and  Meetings^ 

Scheduled  December  1962  Through  February  1963 

U.N.  ECAFE  Subcommittee  on  Mineral  Resources  Development:     Bangkok Dec.  3- 

5th  Session. 
U.N.  ECAFE  Inland  Transport  and  Communications  Committee:     Bangkok Dec.  3- 

11th  Session. 
WHO  Seminar  on  Health  Statistics Bangkok Dec.  3- 

December  3,  7962 


851 


Calendar  of  International  Conferences  and  Meetings — Continued 

Scheduled  December  1962  Through  February  1963 — Continued 

FAO  Technical  Advisory  Committee  on  Desert  Locust  Control:  Rome Dec.  5- 

11th  Session. 

U.X.  ECE  Committee  on  Agricultural  Problems:  14th  Session  .    .  Geneva Dec.  10- 

ILO  Committee  of  Experts  on  the  Determination  of  the  States  of  Geneva Dec.  10- 

Chief  Industrial  Importance. 

ILO  Committee  on  Conditions  of  Work  in  the  Fishing  Industry  .    .  Geneva Dec.  10- 

U.N.  ECAFE  Seminar  on  Urban  Community  Development  ....  Dacca Dec.  10- 

International  Wool  SUidv  Group:  7th  Meeting London Dec.  10- 

FAO/ECAFE  Ad  Hoc  Meeting  on  Jute Bangkok Dec.  12- 

U.N.  ECE  Subcommittee  on  Inland  Water  Transport Geneva Dec.  12- 

OECD  Maritime  Transport  Committee Paris      Dec.  13- 

NATO  Ministerial  Council Paris      Dec.  13- 

UNESCO  Executive  Board:  64th  Session Paris Dec.  13- 

U.N.  ECE  Coal  Committee  and  Coal  Trade  Subcommittee     .    .    .  Geneva Dec.  17- 

U.N.  ECE  Housing  Committee  (and  working  parties) Geneva Dec.  17- 

U.N.  ECAFE  Seminar  on  Family  and  Child  Welfare Bangkok Dec.  19- 

U.N.  Economic  and  Social  Council:  34th  Session  (resumed)  ....  New  York December 

IMCO  Subcommittee  on  Tonnage  Measurement London Jan.  7- 

U.N.  ECE  Working  Party  on  River  Law Geneva Jan.  7- 

FAO   Committee  on  Commodity  Problems:  Ad  Hoc  Meeting  on  Tanga,  Tanganyika Jan.  9- 

Hard  Fibers. 

U.N.  ECAFE  Committee  for  the  Coordination  of  Investigations  of  Laos Jan.  9- 

the  Lower  Mekong  Basin:   19th  Session  (plenary). 

IMCO  Assembly:  Extraordinary  Session London Jan.  10- 

IMCO  Council:  Extraordinary  Session London Jan.  10- 

ICAO  Panel  on  Holding  Procedures:   1st  Meeting Montreal Jan.  14- 

U.N.  Special  Fund:  9th  Session  of  Governing  Council New  York Jan.  14- 

U.N.   ECOSOC   Commission  on  Human   Rights:  15th  Session  of  New  York Jan.  14- 

Subcommission  on  Prevention  of  Discrimination  and  Protection 

of  Minorities. 

ITU  International  Radio  Consultative  Committee  (CCIR):  10th  New  Delhi Jan.  16- 

Plenary  Assembly. 

U.N.  ECE  Inland  Transport  Committee:  22d  Session Geneva Jan.  21- 

U.N.   Scientific   Committee  on  the  Effects  of  Atomic  Radiation:  Geneva Jan.  21- 

12th  Session. 

IMCO  Maritime  Safety  Committee:  6th  Session London Jan.  22- 

U.N.  ECAFE  Committee  on  Trade:  6th  Session Bangkok Jan.  28- 

U.N.  Cocoa  Conference New  York  or  Geneva     ....  January 

WHO  Executive  Board:  31st  Session Geneva January 

IAEA  Board  of  Governors Vienna Feb.  3- 

CENTO  Economic  Committee Karachi Feb.  4- 

U.N.  ECE  Working  Party  on  the  Transport  of  Dangerous  Goods  .  Geneva Feb.  4- 

U.N.  Conference  ou  the  Application  of  Science  and  Technology  for  Geneva Feb.  4- 

the  Benefit  of  the  Less  Developed  Areas. 

U.N.  ECOSOC  Population  Commission:  12th  Session New  York Feb.  4- 

IMCO    Expert    Working    Group    on    Facilitation   of    Travel    and  London Feb.  5- 

Transport. 

ITU  CCIR  Plan  Subcommittee  for  Asia New  Delhi Feb.  5- 

U.N.  ECAFE  Committee  on  Industry  and  Natural  Resources:  15th  Bangkok Feb.  8- 

Session. 

ICAO  Panel  on  Origin-and-Destination  Statistics:  5th  Meeting  .    .  Montreal Feb.  11- 

lAEA  Panel  on  Heavy  Water  Lattices Vienna Feb.  18- 

U.N.  Economic  Comrnission  for  Africa Ldopoldville Feb.  18- 

IMCO  Subcommittee  on  Code  of  Signals London Feb.  19- 

IMCO  Working  Group  on  Financial  Regulations London Feb.  28- 

IBE  Executive  Committee Geneva February 

OECD  Manpower  Committee Paris February 

IAEA  Diplomatic  Conference  on  a  Convention  on  Minimum  Inter-  Buenos  Aires February  or 

national  Standards  for  Land-Based  Reactors.  March 


'Prepared  in  the  OflSce  of  International  Conferences.  Nov.  14,  1902.  Following  is  a  list  of  abbreviations:  CCIR, 
Comity  consultatif  international  des  radio  communications ;  CENTO,  Central  Treaty  Organization ;  ECAFE,  Economic 
Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far  East:  ECE,  Economic  Commission  for  Euroi>e;  ECOSOC,  Economic  and  Social 
Council;  FAO,  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization;  IAEA,  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency:  IBE,  International 
Bureau  of  Education;  ICAO,  International  Civil  Aviation  Organization;  ILO,  International  Labor  Organization; 
IMCO,  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Consultative  Organization;  ITU.  International  Telecommunication  Union;  NATO, 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization;  OECD,  Organization  for  Ecomimk'  Cooperation  and  Development;  U.X.,  United 
Nations;  UNESCO,  United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Organization;  WHO,  World  Health 
Organization. 


852  Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Human  Skiils  in  the  Decade  of  Development 


SUMMARY  REPORT  OF  THE  CONFERENCE  ON   MIDDLE  LEVEL  MANPOWER 
SAN  JUAN,  PUERTO  RICO,  OCTOBER  10-12,  1962 


Delegates  from  41  nations  (and  observers  from 
two),  together  with  representatives  of  several  in- 
tergovernmental and  voluntary  agencies,  met  at 
San  Juan,  Puerto  Rico,  October  10,  11,  12,  1962, 
to  examine  the  role  of  human  skills  in  the  decade 
of  development.^  Vice  President  Lyndon  Johnson 
of  the  United  States  and  Vice  President 
Emmanuel  Pelaez  of  the  Philippines  were  elected 
imanimously  as  Chairman  and  Co-Chairman, 
respectively.  A  full  report  of  the  proceedings 
will  be  published.  Following  is  a  summary  of  the 
main  lines  of  thought  developed  during  the  Con- 
ference, the  accomplishments  noted,  the  tasks  de- 
fined for  future  consideration  and  action,  and  the 
recommendations  made. 


At  its  core,  development  results  from  applying 
within  a  society  the  fruits  of  modem  science  and 
technology.  For  all  nations,  this  requires  new 
and  enlarged  modes  of  education;  a  spirit  among 
the  people  prepared  to  accept  and  use  new 
methods ;  a  heightened  sense  of  individual  respon- 
sibility for  the  fate  of  the  community;  and  un- 
ending change  in  the  society's  institutions  and  in 
the  composition  of  its  working  force.  For  devel- 
oping nations  hitherto  mainly  engaged  in  tradi- 
tional agriculture  and  commerce  in  foodstuffs  and 
raw  materials,  the  impact  of  required  change  is 
immense  and  revolutionary,  touching  the  basic 
structure  of  the  society  itself. 

Human  beings  are  both  the  subject  and  the  prin- 
cipal instriunent  in  the  process  of  development. 

They  are  the  subject  because  developing  nations 
seek  to  use  modern  science  and  technology  to  en- 

"  For  a  statement  by  President  Kennedy,  see  Bulletin 
of  Sept.  24,  1962,  p.  465;  for  a  statement  by  Secretary 
Eusk  and  an  announcement  of  the  U.S.  delegation,  see 
ibid.,  Oct.  22,  1962,  p.  628. 


able  their  people  to  achieve  higher  standards  of 
life,  a  setting  of  greater  dignity,  and  a  more  full 
expression  of  their  individual  and  unique  capaci- 
ties; and  for  nations,  development  is  the  ultimate 
foundation  for  the  independence  and  freedom  of 
their  citizens. 

Human  beings  are  the  instrument  of  develop- 
ment because  it  is  only  through  the  acquisition  by 
large  numbers  of  men  and  women  of  the  tools  and 
the  spirit  of  modem  science  and  technology  that 
national  development  can  be  achieved. 

History,  as  well  as  the  current  unfolding  prac- 
tical experience  with  development  problems,  has 
underlined  the  critical  role  of  human  skills,  devel- 
oped on  the  right  scale  and  in  the  right  categories, 
for  the  success  of  the  development  process;  al- 
though an  appropriate  manpower  program  can 
only  be  devised  by  each  nation  in  the  light  of  its 
unique  problems  and  objectives. 

Measurements  over  long  periods  emphasize  that 
increases  in  total  national  output  and  in  specific 
sectors  such  as  agriculture  can  be  only  partially 
explained  by  increases  in  the  work-force  and  in 
the  amount  of  physical  capital  and  land  involved. 
An  important  component  of  growth  is  generated 
by  education,  by  training,  by  research  which  yields 
new  methods,  and  by  improved  management. 


•  The  International  Conference  on  Mid- 
dle Level  Manpower  wa.s  sponsored  hy  the 
U.S.  Peace  Corps.  The  above  report, 
adopted  by  the  Conference  on  October  12, 
loas  prepared  by  a  drafting  committee  under 
the  chairmanship  of  W.  W.  Rostov),  Coun- 
selor and  Chairman  of  the  Policy  Planning 
Council  of  the  Department  of  State. 


December  3,  7962 


853 


Studies  show  that  about  half  of  the  increase  in 
output  in  tlie  United  States  over  the  last  fifty 
years  is  attributable  to  just  such  non-material 
factors — the  upgrading  skills — rather  than  to 
physical  capital  and  available  labor  force.  In 
agriculture,  the  role  of  these  factors  has  been 
spectacular.  In  Argentina,  for  example,  agricul- 
tural output  climbed  27i  ^%  per  decade  from  1925- 
29  to  1945-49,  but  the  inputs  of  capital  and  man- 
hours  alone  increased  by  only  6%. 

Otlier  studies  have  measured  on  a  strict  and 
narrow  economic  basis  the  rate  of  return  to  the 
individual  on  elementary  and  secondary  educa- 
tion. In  the  United  States,  the  return  on  a  college 
education — tluis  measured — is  roughly  comparable 
to  that  on  business  investments;  the  rate  of  return 
on  elementary  and  high  school  education  is  con- 
siderably higher.  A  study  of  Venezuela  indicates 
that  the  return  on  investment  in  education  is 
higher  than  in  the  United  States,  a  result  likely  to 
hold  for  otlier  developing  nations  suffering  acute 
shortages  in  skilled  manpower. 

In  the  most  practical  sense,  then,  it  can  be 
demonstrated  that  investment  in  education  and 
training  directly  yield  at  least  as  high  a  rate  of  re- 
turn as  direct  investment  in  industry  or  agricul- 
ture, quite  aside  from  its  indirect  benefits  to  the  so- 
ciety and  enriching  value  to  the  individual ;  and  we 
are  learning  that  virtually  anyone  can  be  trained 
and  can  benefit  himself  and  society  from  that 
training. 

The  lessons  which  unfold  from  the  statistics  of 
the  past  are  reinforced  by  the  practical  experi- 
ence of  developing  countries.  Tliey  have  found 
that  one  major  inhibition  on  their  growth  lias 
often  proved  to  be  in  the  field  of  trained 
manpower. 

II 

A  wise  manpower  policy  must  take  into  account 
many  factors  whicJi  will  vary  from  one  country  to 
another.  There  appear,  however,  to  be  certain 
general  lessons  from  recent  experience : 

First,  economic  development  requires  that  man- 
power be  trained  in  the  light  of  an  overall  assess- 
ment of  future  needs;  and  this  requires,  in  turn, 
that  governments  assign  responsibility  for  assess- 
ing human  resources,  for  surveying  and  defining 
these  future  needs  to  some  central  body,  represent- 
ing all  the  interests  involved  in  developing  an  effec- 
tive manpower  program.     Such  programs  must 


seek  also  to  ensure  that  the  trained  manpower 
which  is  available  is  fully  utilized. 

Second,  as  the  modernization  process  acquires 
momentum,  nations  must  consider  whether  their 
systems  of  education — and  the  values  they  incor- 
porate— are  adequately  geared  to  the  requirements 
of  the  present  and  future. 

Third,  since  the  requirement  for  trained  man- 
power is  likely  to  increase  at  two  to  three  times 
the  rate  of  increase  of  gross  national  product,  the 
need  is  both  massive  and  urgent;  and  techniques 
which  can  accelerate  the  acquisition  and  diffusion 
of  useful  skills  should  enjoy  a  high  priority. 

Fourth,  there  is  an  imperative  need  for  train- 
ing in  the  skills  of  what  is  called  middle  level 
manpower;  that  is,  teachers,  rural  workers,  tech- 
nicians, nurses,  agricultural  assistants,  technical 
supervisors,  and  other  personnel  whose  training 
can  be  accomplished  with  relative  rapidity. 

Fifth,  there  is  a  need  to  relate  improvements 
in  the  availability  of  general  education,  particu- 
larly at  the  lower  levels,  to  new  programs  of  train- 
ing in  middle  level  skills.  Middle  level  manpower 
training  rests  on  a  base  of  general  education  to 
which  its  scope  and  content  must  be  adjusted. 

Sixth,  there  is  need  to  take  full  advantage  of 
the  potentialities  of  training  within  the  framework 
of  private  enterprise  which,  in  many  countries, 
has  provided  a  high  proportion  of  middle  level 
manpower  training. 

Seventh,  the  manpower  problem  in  the  under- 
developed areas  is  compounded  by  the  tendency 
of  skilled  personnel  to  concentrate  in  the  major 
cities,  whereas  the  most  urgent  need  for  the  diffu- 
sion of  their  skills  in  the  earlier  phases  of  develop- 
ment often  lies  in  the  countryside.  Development 
requires  the  creation  of  a  new  respect  for  the 
dignity  of  labor  and  the  critical  role  of  agriculture 
and  rural  life. 

Aside  from  these  general  problems,  manpower 
training  must  be  built  on  incentives,  pei-suasion, 
and  the  inner  motivation  of  individuals.  The 
gathering  lesson  of  experience  is  that  such  meth- 
ods are  not  only  required  by  our  humane  values 
and  traditions,  but  they  are  also  proving  a  solid 
and  efficient  basis  for  development. 

For  the  individual,  vocational  training  is  not 
merely  a  means  of  better  serving  his  society;  it 
is  also  required  to  give  meaning  to  the  principle  of 
equality  of  opportunity  and  to  give  substance  to 
the  comniitment  of  nations  to  provide  for  their 


854 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


peoples  a  sustained  increase  in  their  standards 
of  life. 

Ill 

Against  the  background  of  these  broad  assess- 
ments of  the  problem  and  the  lessons  of  recent 
experience,  the  Conference  concentrated  its  dis- 
cussion on  four  major  specific  problems  and 
possibilities. 

The  first  two  of  these  special  points  of  focus 
concerned  tlie  role  of  programs  of  voluntary  as- 
sistance in  manpower  training  in  the  developing 
areas.  It  was  widely  recognized  and  underlined 
that  such  programs  constitute  a  supplement  to  the 
massive  programs  of  technical  assistance  which 
have  been  mounted  for  many  years  by  individual 
nations  and  by  various  international  organizations. 
It  was  further  recognized  that  recent  developments 
in  the  field  of  voluntary  assistance  were  built  on  the 
traditions  and  long  experience  of  many  countries 
in  such  enterprises. 

1.  The  lessons  of  the  experience  of  the  American 
Peace  Corps  were  explored  from  the  perspective 
of  both  the  receiving  countries  and  the  United 
States.  It  was  broadly  agi-eed  that  such  Volun- 
teers are  making  a  significant  contribution,  both 
direct  and  indirect,  to  the  manpower  requirements 
of  the  developing  countries. 

2.  In  the  course  of  the  Conference,  the  Delegate 
of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  announced 
that  his  Government  has  decided  to  establish  a 
German  Volunteer  program  to  be  called  "Lernen 
und  Helfen  in  Ubersee"  (Learning  and  Helping 
Overseas).  Approval  for  this  program  has  re- 
cently been  given  by  the  Development  Assistance 
Committee  of  the  German  Parliament.  Two  Ger- 
man observers  have  come  to  the  United  States  to 
study  the  experience  of  the  Peace  Corps.  The 
German  Government  plans  to  cooperate  closely 
with  interested  private  oi'ganizations  in  this  field. 

The  Delegate  of  Norway  announced  that  the 
Norwegian  people  have  been  concerned  for  some 
time  with  the  idea  of  a  Peace  Corps  to  assist  the 
developing  nations  with  something  more  than 
money  and  to  make  it  possible  for  individuals  to 
take  a  more  personal  part  in  assistance  to  other 
peoples.  The  Norwegian  Government  has  accord- 
ingly reported  to  the  Storting  (Parliament)  that 
Norway  should  consider  the  formation  of  a 
"Fredskorps"  (Peace  Corps)  as  a  governmental 
undertaking.  The  Norwegian  Agency  for  Inter- 
national Development  has  been  given  the  task  of 

December  3,   1962 


preparing  and  submitting  the  necessary  plans,  and 
in  due  coui-se  the  Government's  recommendation 
will  be  placed  before  the  Storting. 

Mr.  Mogens  Pihl,  one  of  the  Delegates  of  Den- 
mark and  a  Member  of  the  Executive  Board  of 
the  Danish  Administration  for  Technical  Cooper- 
ation With  Developing  Countries,  announced  that 
from  a  recent  public  subscription  of  funds  for 
technical  assistance  projects,  a  certain  amomit 
would  probably  be  assigned  to  a  volunteer,  non- 
governmental program  to  be  known  as  "Dansk 
Ungdomssamarbejde  med  Udviklingslandene" 
(Danish  Youth-Cooperation  AVith  Developing 
Countries) .  A  final  decision  on  an  experimental 
program  of  this  sort  is  expected  from  the  Execu- 
tive Board  within  a  few  weeks. 

The  Delegate  of  Colombia,  Belisario  Betancur 
Cuartas,  announced  that  Colombia  has  sent  thirty 
social  workers  to  New  York  City  to  train  along- 
side sixty-three  United  States  Peace  Corps  Volun- 
teers who  will  do  social  rehabilitation  work  in 
Colombian  urban  centers. 

Alberto  Ulloa  Castro,  the  Delegate  from  El 
Salvador,  reported  that  his  country  "has  develop- 
ment plans  of  its  own"  of  the  same  sort. 

Maurice  Brasseur,  the  Delegate  from  Belgium, 
told  the  Conference  that  in  addition  to  private 
Belgian  associations  long  active,  a  new  organiza- 
tion of  young  "peace  vokmteers''  has  recently  been 
formed — with  its  initial  project  the  sending  of  a 
team  to  Ecuador.  The  Belgian  Government  has 
decided  to  support  Nobel  Prize  Winner  Fr.  Pire's 
"The  Bread  of  Peace"  team  of  Europeans  and 
Pakistanis  who  are  teaching  in  East  Pakistan. 
Belgium  in  fact  has  a  law  permitting  exemption 
in  peacetime  from  militai-y  service  of  those  who 
volunteer  for  three  years  of  work  in  a  developing 
country.  In  the  first  year  of  this  new  law,  700 
applied,  600  were  accepted. 

The  Delegate  of  New  Zealand,  Mr.  Brian 
Lendrum,  remarked  that  a  New  Zealand  Council 
for  Volunteer  Service  Abroad  had  been  established 
in  his  country  which  proposed  a  considerable  ex- 
pansion of  the  Volunteer  program  already  in 
operation. 

Mr.  Carlos  Humberto  Matute,  Secretary  Gen- 
eral of  the  National  Economic  Council  of  Hon- 
duras, formally  announced  that  his  government 
would  undertake  immediate  action  to  organize  a 
national  Peace  Corps  as  soon  as  possible,  prob- 
ably   within   the   next   three   months,    with   the 

855 


cooperation  of  the  University,  the  labor  unions,  the 
cooperative  movement,  the  social  welfare  board, 
the  school  of  social  service  and  other  private 
organizations.  He  also  stated  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Honduras  has  the  intention  of  closely  co- 
ordinating the  activities  of  the  Honduran  Peace 
Corps  with  those  of  the  volunteers  of  the  United 
States  Peace  Corps  and  with  the  programs  of  the 
Alliance  for  Progress. 

Hugo  Galvez  Gajardo,  the  Minister  of  Labor 
and  Conference  Delegate  from  Chile,  reported 
that  Chile  is  in  the  process  of  organizing  its  own 
domestic  Peace  Corps  as  a  means  of  waging  "an 
offensive  war  against  poverty,  disease  and  igno- 
rance." Chile's  Peace  Corps  will  work  closely 
with  the  United  States  Peace  Corps  Volunteers 
already  in  Chile  and  will  emphasize  cooperation 
witli  the  existing  voluntary  agencies  such  as 
Chile's  Institute  for  Rural  Education,  the  YWCA 
and  university  organizations. 

Vice  President  Pelaez  of  the  Philippines  in- 
formed the  Conference  that  a  privately  sponsored 
and  privately  run  International  Institute  for 
Rural  Reconsti-uction  is  being  established  near 
Manila.  This  will  be  available  to  trainees  from 
all  over  the  world  as  an  instruction  center  for 
community  development  workers  to  which  the 
techniques  and  experience  of  the  Philippine  Rural 
Reconstruction  Movement  (PRRM)  will  be  made 
available. 

The  Delegate  of  the  United  Kingdom  told  the 
Conference : 

(a)  That  the  number  of  young  volunteers  sent 
out  from  Britain  by  Voluntary  Sen-ice  Overseas 
had  risen  from  18  in  1958  to  250  this  year,  with 
more  increases  to  follow; 

(b)  That  a  Committee  had  been  set  up  in 
London  to  coordinat«  service  overseas  by 
volunteers; 

(c)  That  this  Committee — the  Voluntary 
Societies'  Committee  on  Service  Overseas — has 
plans  to  send  250  graduate  volunteers  overseas 
next  year. 

The  Jamaica  Delegation  annoimced  that  the 
Jamaica  Government  is  now  in  the  process  of 
formulating  a  National  Voluntai-y  Service.  This 
would  he  a  domestic  Peace  Corps  typo  of  effort 
designed  to  incorporate  all  existing  voluntary 
services  and  promote  as  widely  as  possible  otlier 
voluntary   efforts   particularly   in  the  fields   of 


literacy,  health,  athletics,  community  services  and 
fund  raising. 

The  Delegate  from  Israel  informed  the  Con- 
ference of  the  availability  of  a  volunteer  corps 
which  provides  training  in  Israel  especially  in 
agriculture.  The  training  facilities  of  this  corps 
are  open  to  trainees  from  all  developing  countries. 

The  Delegate  of  Japan,  Zentaro  Kosaka,  stated 
that  in  line  with  the  increasing  importance  of  the 
role  played  by  the  volimteer  services,  his  Gov- 
ernment is  planning  to  institute  a  program  of 
sending  "junior  experts"  who  will  work  in  asso- 
ciation with  experts  sent  to  developing  countries. 

The  Delegate  of  Canada  reported  that  a  non- 
governmental organization  known  as  Canadian 
Overseas  Volunteers  came  into  being  two  years 
ago  to  send  abroad  Canadian  volunteers  for  serv- 
ice in  the  developing  countries.  This  voluntary 
agency,  financed  through  private  subscriptions,  is 
now  named  Canadian  University  Services  Over- 
seas. It  has  more  than  100  volunteers  in  the  field 
and  additional  numbers  in  training.  It  receives 
government  encouragement  and  administrative  as- 
sistance but  no  governmental  financial  support. 

3.  The  experience  of  various  nations  in  ex- 
ploiting the  potentialities  of  training  by  private 
industry  was  discussed.  It  was  broadly  agreed 
that  this  was  an  area  of  great  potentiality,  thus 
far  not  fully  utilized,  although  promising  initia- 
tives were  reported  in  this  field  by  several 
governments. 

In  the  course  of  the  Conference,  the  Chief  of  the 
United  States  Delegation.  Vice  President  John- 
son, announced  that  a  group  of  leading  American 
business  firms  has  established  a  special  committee 
within  the  Business  Council  for  International 
Understanding  to  analyze  training  needs  in 
selected  countries  and  to  help  meet  these  needs  by 
the  provision  of  new  training  opportunities,  that 
would  include  non-employee  nationals,  in  the  form 
of  fellowships,  scholai'sliips,  grants  and  expanded 
on-the-job  training.  They  will  establish  new  or 
expanded  training  opportunities,  to  include  non- 
employee  nationals,  in  two  countries  on  an  experi- 
mental basis.  If  successful,  the  opportunities  will 
be  extended  to  other  areas.  He  added  that  the 
participation  of  business  firms  in  other  countries 
would  be  welcome. 

4.  Special  methods  for  the  emergency  diffusion 
of  training  were  considered.  Among  the  promis- 
ing   approaches    are    the    utilization    of    special 


856 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


courses  designed  to  satisfy,  as  rapidly  as  possible, 
the  essential  minimum  on-the-spot  requirements 
for  technicians  and  craftsmen  in  medical,  con- 
struction, and  community  development  fields; 
training  by  doing  and  demonstration;  expanded 
volunteer  service,  particularly  in  teaching;  special 
training  within  military  establishments  in  peace- 
ful skills  and  possibilities  such  as  educational 
radio  and  television  and  teaching  machines. 
Significant  innovations  are  also  under  way  in  the 
intellectual  content  and  method  of  teaching  im- 
portant subjects,  e.g.,  mathematics  and  languages, 
as  well  as  in  the  motivational  structure  of  the 
learning  process. 

Special  Training  Centers  have  been  designed, 
for  instance,  for  rapid  transmission  of  skills  in  the 
general  area  of  construction,  public  works,  medi- 
cal care  and  community  development.  Mr.  Frank 
Coffin,  Deputy  Administrator  for  Operations  of 
the  Agency  for  International  Development,  an- 
nounced that  the  Governments  of  the  United 
States  and  of  Brazil  have  agreed  to  a  survey  of 
the  requirements  for  middle  level  construction 
skills  as  a  basis  for  plans  for  a  Regional  Develop- 
ment Training  Center  of  this  kind  for  Northeast 
Brazil.  Mr.  Coffin  further  announced  that  dis- 
cussions concerning  similar  centers  have  been 
started  in  Pakistan  with  hopes  for  a  positive 
outcome. 

IV 

Many  of  the  problems  and  solutions  on  which 
views  were  expressed  lie  exclusively  within  the 
province  of  national  governments.  Others  are  be- 
ing carried  forward  on  the  basis  of  bilateral  ar- 
rangements or  by  international  agencies  within 
the  United  Nations  system,  such  as  the  United 
Nations  itself  and  the  International  Labor 
Organization,  and  other  intergovernmental  organ- 
izations such  as  the  OECD  [Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development].  The 
Conference  fully  recognized  the  importance  of 
these  efforts  and  expressed  the  hope  that  the  fa- 
cilities of  these  organizations  will  be  used  to  the 
maximum  possible  extent  in  furthering  the  tasks 
suggested  by  the  Conference. 

To  follow  up  certain  specific  initiatives  gen- 
erated at  the  Conference,  it  was  agreed  to  establish 
on  an  interim  basis  for  one  year  a  small  Secre- 
tariat in  Washington  with  the  following  specific 
and  carefully  limited  functions: 

December  3,  7962 


1.  To  wind  up  the  work  of  the  Conference,  in- 
cluding publication  of  teclinical  papers  and  re- 
ports, preparation  of  the  full  Conference  report, 
making  Conference  results  available  on  world- 
wide basis,  etc. 

2.  To  provide  for  the  international  exchange  of 
experience  and  ideas  on  possibilities  and  problems 
of  the  increased  use  of  volunteers  in  the  work  of 
economic  development.  This  includes  Govern- 
ment and  private  Peace  Corps  activities  by  both 
advanced  and  developing  countries. 

3.  To  diffuse  information  and  experience  on  the 
role  of  private  enterprise,  labor  and  management, 
in  training  nationals  of  developing  countries  in 
middle  level  skills. 

For  specific  details  regarding  these  arrangements, 
see  Annex  1. 

Governments  are  invited  to  appoint  one  corre- 
spondent each  with  the  task  of  furnishing  the 
Secretariat  with  information  it  may  require  in  the 
discharge  of  its  functions  and  to  serve  as  a  link 
between  the  interested  governments  and  the 
Secretariat. 

The  Conference  invited  the  International  Labor 
Organization  and  other  international  organiza- 
tions concerned  to  give  high  priority  to  the  diffu- 
sion of  information  on  possibilities  and  problems 
of  developing  accelerated  training  teclmiques  de- 
signed to  train  persons  rapidly  in  a  wide  range  of 
needed  manpower  skills,  particularly  at  the  mid- 
dle skill  level.  This  includes  applications  of  new 
teclmologies  of  training,  outside  the  framework  of 
f  oi-mal  education,  to  the  skill  needs  of  the  develop- 
ing countries. 

The  Conference  further  transmitted  to  the  In- 
ternational Labor  Organization  for  its  considera- 
tion and  appropriate  action  a  resolution  proposed 
by  the  Delegate  from  Jamaica  and  endorsed  by  the 
Conference.  The  text  of  this  resolution  appears 
in  Annex  2. 

V 

The  principal  object  of  the  sessions  was  to 
bring  into  sharp  focus  certain  practical  next  steps, 
against  the  backgroimd  of  underlying  agreement 
on  the  importance  and  urgency  of  expanding 
human  skills  during  the  de«ade  of  de\'elopment. 

The  exchange  exposed,  however,  many  broader 
issues  and  particular  perspectives  derived  from  the 
hard-won  practical  experience  of  those  who  bear 
responsibility  for  development  within  their  coun- 

857 


tries  and  those  who  have  engaged  in  assisting  such 
countries  to  build  their  development  programs: 
for  example,  the  outstripping  of  industrial  expan- 
sion by  the  pace  of  urbanization,  leading  to 
chronic  unemployment  and  underemployment ;  the 
heavj'  pressure  on  the  developing  process  exerted 
by  the  downward  trend  in  prices  of  foodstuffs  and 
raw  materials  and  the  increased  cost  of  imported 
finished  goods  from  fully  developed  countries;  the 
recognition  of  the  potential  contribution  of  free 
trade  unions  and  of  such  institutions  as  private 
collective  bargaining  in  assuring  the  establishment 
of  terms  and  conditions  of  employment  consistent 
with  individual  integrity;  the  problem  of  provid- 
ing technical  assistance  in  a  form  which  demon- 
strates effectively  how  the  job  can  be  done;  the 
possibility  of  tax  incentives  and  other  measures  to 
increase  the  training  contribution  made  by  the 
private  industrial  sector  from  within  and  without 
the  nations  involved ;  the  distortions  in  income  dis- 
tribution and  the  price  structure  as  well  as  social 
tensions  created  within  a  developing  nation  by 
large  numbers  of  foreign  technicians  paid  at  rates 
which  radically  diverge  from  local  standards ;  the 
special  contribution  which  the  military  have  made 
to  development  in  certain  countries  and  to  training 
for  development;  the  changes  in  attitudes  and 
motivation  within  a  developing  society  necessary 
for  the  effective  diffusion  of  skills;  the  improve- 
ment in  technical  assistance  through  coordinated 
pilot  projects;  the  expanded  exchange  of  informa- 
tion on  training  resources;  the  possibility  of  labor 
promotion  programs,  which  upgrade  the  training 
of  labor  in  relatively  short  coui-ses  and  provide 
special  status  for  the  participants:  the  great  possi- 
bilities which  cooperatives  offer  for  the  training 
of  middle  level  manpower,  in  particular  in  the 
field  of  agriculture;  the  need  for  tlie  developed 
countries  to  coordinate  their  cooperation  in  the 
field  of  vocational  training,  furnished  through 
bilateral  agreements  and  international  agencies, 
with  the  employment  demands  called  for  by  the 
population  explosion  in  the  developing  countrias. 

VI 

Three  large  themes  suffused  the  discussion  from 
beginning  to  end. 

First,  that  the  modernization  of  a  developing 
country  requires  the  emergence  of  an  authentic 
sense  of  individual  engagement  in  a  national 
effort.    In  the  words  of  Vice  President  Jolinson, 


858 


"The  key  to  success  within  the  developing  nation 
lies  not  merely  in  the  realm  of  technical  activity. 
Beyond  that,  it  lies  in  bringing  the  city  folk  and 
the  country  folk,  the  rich  and  the  poor,  the  scholar 
and  the  illiterate  into  a  sense  of  common  purpose 
and  common  nationhood." 

Second,  the  exchanges  dramatized  the  growing; 
consciousness  in  developing  areas  that  the  problem 
of  development  is  a  common  task  for  all  nations; 
and  that  in  fulfillment  of  this  task  there  are  values- 
of  equal  importance  for  the  nations  which  give  and 
the  nations  which  receive  such  assistance.  One 
striking  result  of  the  discussions  was  the  emerging^ 
awareness  that,  out  of  diverse  experiences  and  ex- 
periments, the  developing  nations  are  increasingly 
capable  of  assisting  one  another. 

Finally,  it  is  becoming  clear  that  no  aspect  ofl 
the  joint  development  effort  is  likely  to  build  this 
sense  of  communal  purpose  and  commitment  on 
the  world  scene  more  than  the  face-to-face  require- 
ments of  creating  and  diffusing  human  skills  in 
the  decade  of  development.  Solid  experience 
makes  clear  that  the  freely-arranged  interchange 
of  men  and  women  in  these  development  tasks  is 
making  a  major  contribution  to  the  cause  of  inter- 
national understanding,  human  brotherhood,  and 
peace. 

Out  of  the  struggle  of  nations  to  provide  mod 
ern  foundations  for  their  independence  and  free 
dom,  we  are  learning  the  full  measure  of  our  in 
terdependence,  as  nations  and  as  men. 

Annex  1 — Continuing  Arrangements 

1.  There  shall  be  set  up  in  TPashington,  D.C.,  a  small 
Secretariat  with  the  functions  set  forth  in  Part  IV  of  the 
report. 

2.  The  U.S.  Government  undertakes  to  provide,  in  the 
first  instance,  the  chief  administrative  officer  of  the  Sec- 
retariat and  such  staff  as  necessary  and  not  provided  for 
by  other  interested  governments  in  keeping  with  paragraph 
3  below. 

3.  Interested  governments  and  the  International  Labor 
Organization  may  second,  on  the  basis  of  the  reriuirements 
of  the  Secretariat  as  worked  out  by  the  chief  arlniinistra 
tive  officer,  and  at  their  expense,  qualified  individuals  for 
service  with  the  Secretariat. 

4.  Other  expenses,  including  printing  of  Conference 
documents,  official  travel,  etc.,  will  be  paid  during  the 
trial  year  by  the  United  States. 

5.  The  Secretariat  will,  as  appropriate,  carry  on  Itt 
work  in  consultation  and  cooperation  with  the  interested 
intergovernmental  and  voluntary  organizations. 

G.  The  Secretariat  will  function  for  one  year.  Twc 
months  before  the  end  of  this  jieriod  a  decision  will  be 
made  regarding  the  continuation  of  the  Secretariat.     Al 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


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««« 


hat  time  it  will  also  be  decided  whether  any  or  all  of 
ts  functions  will  be  transferred  to  existing  international 
irganizations,  provided  such  organizations  accept  in  writ- 
ng  these  functions.  These  decisions  will  require  the  writ- 
OjJen  assent  of  the  majority  of  those  countries  participating 
n  this  Conference  expressing  their  views. 


INNEX  2 — Resolution  of  the  Jamaica  Delegation 

Whereas  it  is  acknowledged  that  planning  for  the  in- 
estment  of  human  skills  in  social  and  economic  develop- 
aent  is  vital  to  the  strategy  of  increasing  national  pro- 
luction,  and 

Whereas  it  is  recognized  that  planning  for  the  use  of  hu- 
aan  skills  in  development  can  best  be  implemented  if  the 
xtent  to  which  human  skills  affect  production  is  meas- 
ired,  and 

Whereas  systems  of  measurement  can  be  developed  to 
luantify  the  extent  to  which  human  skills  contribute  to 
)roduction  and/or  are  wasted  in  national  production,  and 

Whereas  some  work  has  been  done  to  establish  these 
oeasurements  but  further  work  remains  to  be  done  to 
nake  these  techniques  standard  for  comparative 
)lanning, 

Be  it  resolved  that  the  International  Labor  Organiza- 
ion  consider  speciiic  investigations  and  recommendations, 
f  necessary  by  cooperating  experts  from  participating 
:ountries,  to  devise  and  standardize  suitable  concepts,  no- 
nenclatures,  and  techniques  for  these  and  related  meas- 
irements  in  order  to  minimize  the  misdirection  of  scarce 
luman  resources  and  to  convert  corresponding  intangible 
ind  speculative  aspirations  of  planning  into  realistic  and 
ittainable  targets. 


Current  U.N.  Documents: 
A  Selected  Bibliography 

Mimeographed  or  processed  documents  (such  as  those 
listed  below)  may  be  consulted  at  depository  libraries  in 
the  United  States.  V.N.  printed  publications  may  be 
purchased  from  the  Sales  Section  of  the  United  Nations, 
United  Nations  Plaza,  New  York. 

Trusteeship  Council 

Dnited  Nations  Visiting  Mission  to  the  Trust  Territories 
of  Nauru  and  New  Guinea,  1962 :  Report  on  Nauru, 
T/lOOr).  June  9,  1962,  40  pp. ;  Annexes,  T/1595/Add.  1, 
June  12,  1962,  36  pp.  Report  on  New  Guinea,  T/1597, 
June  22,  1962,  104  pp. ;  Map  showing  Visiting  Mission's 
itinerary,  T/1597/Add.  1,  June  27,  1962,  1  p. 

Examination  of  the  Annual  Report  on  the  Trust  Territory 
of  Nauru  for  the  Year  Ending  June  30,  1961.  Part  II. 
Supplementary  information  submitted  by  Administering 
Authority,  T/i599,  July  2,  1962,  14  pp.  Nauruan  pro- 
posals for  resettlement  submitted  for  consideration  to 
the  Government  of  Australia  on  June  19,  T/1600,  July  2, 
1962,  11  pp. 

Examination  of  the  Annual  Report  on  the  Trust  Territory 
of  New  Guinea  for  the  Year  Ending  June  30,  1961. 
Supplementary  information  on  developments  in  the  Ter- 
ritory since  June  30,  1961.  T/1601.  July  25,  1962, 
59  pp. 

December  3,   1962 


United  States  Welcomes  U.N.  Report 
on  Effects  of  Atomic  Radiation 

Statement  hy  Francis  T.  P.  Plimpton 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  General  Assembly  ^ 

Prior  to  embarking  on  a  substantive  considera- 
tion of  tlie  item  before  us,  I  should  like  to  make  a 
few  preliminary  observations. 

The  first  of  these  is  to  express  my  Government's 
appreciation  to  the  United  Nations  Scientific  Com- 
mittee on  the  Effects  of  Atomic  Radiation  for  its 
second  report.^  Members  will  recall  that  its  first 
report  ^  was  produced  in  1958.  In  it  we  found  out- 
standing evidence  of  the  Committee's  scientific  in- 
tegrity. It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  to  find 
this,  its  second  report,  maintaining  a  high  degree 
of  impartiality  and  professional  competence. 

My  second  observation  relates  to  the  statement 
several  days  ago  before  this  committee  by  the  rep- 
resentative of  the  Soviet  Union,  who  introduced 
the  cold  war  into  what  should  be  a  reasoned  dis- 
cussion of  the  scientific  report  before  us  and  who 
tried  to  defend  the  Soviet  Union's  indefensible 
refusal  to  sign  a  treaty  ending  nuclear  weapons 
tests. 

At  Geneva,  and  here  at  this  Assembly,  the 
United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom  have 
offered  to  sign,  immediately,  either  one  of  two 
treaties — a  treaty  banning  all  nuclear  weapons 
tests  in  all  environments,  with  appropriate  pro- 
visions for  verification,  or,  if  the  Soviet  Union  re- 
fuses, a  treaty  banning  tests  in  the  atmosphere, 
under  water,  and  in  outer  space,  with  no  pro- 
vision for  international  inspection.^  The  Soviet 
Union  has  refused  to  sign  either  of  these  treaties. 

It  is  clear  that  the  sole  obstacle  to  the  ending  of 
nuclear  weapons  tests  is  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  Soviet  refusal  to  agree  to  a  treaty  banning 
tests  in  the  atmosphere,  under  water,  and  in  outer 
space  amounts  to  refusing  a  treaty  ban  of  tests 
in  those  environments  where  radioactive  fallout 
is  a  matter  of  international  concern.    The  Soviet 


'  Made  in  the  Special  Political  Committee  on  Nov.  8 
(U.S.  delegation  press  release  4087). 

'  U.N.  doc.  A/5216. 

'  U.N.  doc.  A/3S38. 

*  For  background  and  texts  of  draft  treaties,  see 
Bui-LETiN  of  Sept.  17,  1962,  p.  403;  for  U.S.  statements  in 
Committee  I,  see  ibid.,  Oct.  29,  1962,  p.  635,  and  Nov.  26, 
1962,  p.  817. 

859 


representative  need  not  be  concerned  at  radioac- 
tivity from  U.S.  underground  tests.  Any  such 
tests  are  conducted  by  the  United  States  on  its  own 
territory  under  proper  precautions.  Furthermore, 
as  the  Soviet  representative  well  knows,  the  treaty 
put  forth  by  the  United  States  and  the  United 
Kingdom  banning  nuclear  weapons  tests  in  the 
atmosphere,  outer  space,  and  under  water  contains 
a  ban  on  tests  in  any  other  environment  if  such 
tests  cause  radioactive  debris  outside  the  territory 
of  the  state  conducting  them. 

As  regards  radiation  in  the  atmosphere  result- 
ing from  nuclear  weapons  tests,  the  whole  world 
knows  that  it  was  the  Soviet  Union's  September 
1961  breaking  of  the  test  ban  moratorium  °  which 
was  directly  and  solely  responsible  for  the  resump- 
tion of  testing.  Furthermore,  the  whole  world 
knows  that  the  Soviet  Union  was  secretly  prepar- 
ing to  resume  testing  for  months  while  pretending 
to  take  part  seriously  in  the  test  ban  negotiations 
in  Geneva  which  the  United  States  and  the  United 
Kingdom  were  conducting  in  good  faith.  One 
has  to  refer  to  a  more  recent  event  to  find  an 
equally  extreme  example  of  diplomatic  duplicity 
and  deceit. 

Since  its  breaking  of  the  moratorium  in  Sep- 
tember 1961,  the  Soviet  Union  has  exploded  in  the 
atmosphere  weapons  with  a  greater  combined 
yield — including  the  5S-megaton  bomb  which  it 
exploded  in  contemptuous  defiance  of  the  General 
Assembly's  resolution  * — a  greater  combined  yield 
than  the  combined  yield  of  all  nuclear  weapons 
tests  conducted  in  the  atmosphere  up  to  that  date. 
Mr.  President,  the  people  of  the  United  States 
and  of  all  the  rest  of  the  world  want  an  end  of 
nuclear  weapons  testing.  It  is  only  the  Soviet 
Union  which  stands  in  the  way.  It  is  the  earnest 
hope  of  the  United  States  that  wiser  counsels  will 
prevail  in  the  Soviet  Government,  that  it  will  heed 
world  opinion,  and  that  it  will  agree  to  the  simple 
and  reasonable  treaty  that  will  end  such  tests 
everj'where,  or  at  least  the  even  simpler  treaty  that 
will  end  them  where  radioactive  fallout  is  a  matter 
of  international  concern — in  the  atmosphere,  un- 
der water,  and  in  outer  space. 

I  shall  say  no  more,  Mr.  Chairman,  as  to  the 
Soviet  representative's  statement  of  last  IVfonday, 
since  the  item  before  this  committee  is  not  the  ces- 


"  IhUl.,  Sept.  18,  1901,  p.  47.'). 

•  U.N.  doc.  A/RES/1648(XVI)  ;  for  text,  see  iUa.,  Dec.  4, 
1901,  p.  938. 


860 


sation  of  nuclear  tests,  which  he  brought  up  and! 
which  is  the  province  of  another  committee,  buti 
the  second  report  of  the  United  Nations  Scientific 
Committee  on  the  Effects  of  Atomic  Kadiation. 

Major  Conclusions  of  Report 

I  mentioned  earlier  that  in  our  view  this  report 
has  maintained  a  high  degree  of  impartiality  and 
professional  competence.  It  is  a  truly  scientific 
and,  happil}',  nonpolitical  document.  Possibly 
its  most  remarkable  feature  is  that,  in  spite  of  th 
number  of  scientists  and  scientific  disciplines  neceS' 
sarily  involved  in  its  preparation  and  the  com- 
plexit}'  and  seriousness  of  the  issues,  it  was  in  f  actJI 
adopted  mianimously  by  the  Scientific  Commit- 
tee. 

The  report  is  an  entirely  new  and  self-contained 
document  which  brings  into  focus  up-to-date  in- 
formation bearing  on  the  biological  effects  of  radi- 
ation. Clearly,  fresh  knowledge  of  the  hereditary 
effects,  as  well  as  the  effects  on  i^eople  now  living, 
is  of  paramount  importance  in  evaluating  the  prac- 
tical significance  of  radiation  in  our  environment. 

Hence,  possibly  the  greatest  value  of  this  report 
will  be  reflected  in  its  use  as  a  guide  for  all  pro- 
fessionals who  are  involved  in  the  study  of  the 
effects  of  atomic  radiation,  that  is  to  say,  the  doc- 
tors, the  scientists,  the  engineers,  and  the  tech- 
nicians who  daily  seek  to  find  ways  of  putting 
radiation  to  work  for  the  mutual  benefit  of  man- 
kind. Medical  practices  in  the  diagnosis  and  treat- 
ment of  diseases  may,  as  a  result  of  this  report,  be 
more  carefully  applied :  research  workers  may  have 
additional  sources  of  data,  as  well  as  a  guide  to 
areas  which  require  special  attention.  These,  for 
example,  might  include  the  biological  effects  of 
radiation  and  the  study  of  the  na(  ural  concentra- 
tion  of  radioactive  minerals  which  occurs  in  the 
eartli's  crust  in  certain  regions  of  the  world  where 
the  levels  of  radiation  are  much  higher  than  in 
others. 

As  a  result  of  the  Scientific  Committee's  work, 
the  intemational  flow  of  information  on  the  sub- 
ject of  radiation  has  substantially  increased.  Now 
any  individual,  any  organization,  or  any  govern- 
ment which  wishes  to  be  informed  on  this  highly 
complex  subject  may  obtain  and  study  not  only  a 
mass  of  basic  data  but  also  the  carefully  assembled 
charts  and  tables  which  synthesize  this  informa- 
tion. 


Deparfmenf  of  Sfafe  Bulletin 


In  this  regard,  I  should  like  particularly  to 
Iraw  the  attention  of  the  committee  to  the  con- 
■lusions  which  are  contained  in  paragraphs  47 
h  rough  53  of  the  report.  Specifically,  the  Com- 
uittee 

.  .  .  emphasizes  the  need  that  all  forms  of  unnecessary 
•adiation  exposure  should  be  minimized  or  avoided  en- 
Irely,  particularly  when  the  exposure  of  large  populations 
s  entailed  ;  and  that  every  procedure  involving  the  peace- 
's ul  uses  of  ionizing  radiation  should  be  subject  to  ap- 
jropriate  immediate  and  continuing  scrutiny  in  order  to 
(J  insure  that  the  resulting  exposure  is  kept  to  the  minimum 
jracticable  level. 

In  order,  however,  to  keep  the  problem  of  radia- 
don  in  its  proper  perspective,  the  Committee  also 
loted  that 

Although  we  have  extensive  and  increasing  informa- 
;ion  about  the  levels  of  radiation  to  which  man  is  exposed 
from  various  sources  and  about  the  types  of  harmful  effect 
(vhich  may  result,  we  still  know  very  little  about  the 
frequency  with  which  such  effects  are  likely  to  occur, 
particularly  following  small  doses  of  radiation  received  at 
low-dose  rates. 

Possibly  even  more  important  than  these  two 
major  conclusions  is  the  encouraging  note  concern- 
ing the  Scientific  Committee's  belief  that  radiation 
problems  need  not  bar  the  increasing  peaceful  uses 
of  nuclear  energy.  On  this  vital  matter  the  report 
states  that 

Advances  in  nuclear  science  and  industry  are  being 
achieved  with  only  slight  resultant  increases  in  the  aver- 
age radiation  levels  to  which  populations  are  exposed,  and 
with  only  very  occasional  accidental  over-exposure  of  in- 
dividuals. 

U.S.  Supports  Resolution 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  work  of  the  Scientific  Com- 
mittee, especially  as  it  has  manifested  itself  in  its 
first  and  second  reports,  proves  to  my  delegation 
at  least  that  there  is  a  continuing  need  for  an  inter- 
national body  to  carry  on  these  f  mictions.  This  is 
why  we  wish  to  support  wholeheartedly  paragraph 
5,  part  I,  of  the  resolution  which  is  now  before  us. 
Indeed,  we  look  forward  to  the  report,  wliich  is 
requested  in  this  paragraph,  to  the  General  Assem- 
bly at  its  18th  session  concerning  the  Committee's 
continued  "assessment  of  radiation  risks  as  well  as 
its  review  of  those  studies  and  further  investiga- 
tions that  should  be  undertaken  in  the  interests  of 
increasing  man's  knowledge  of  the  effects  of  radia- 
tion. .  .  ." 


For  our  part  we  pledge  to  continue  the  coopera- 
tion and  assistance  which  we  have  given  the  Com- 
mittee in  the  past.  I  may  note  in  this  regard  that 
over  the  past  7  years  the  United  States  in  its  sup- 
port of  the  Committee  has  developed  the  major 
proportion  of  the  documentation  now  available 
and  has  been  very  substantially  the  largest  single 
contributor  of  information  so  far  received  by  the 
Committee.  Moreover,  in  response  to  requests  for 
assistance  from  member  states,  we  have  provided 
training  in  radiochemical  and  comiting  procedures 
to  more  than  25  yoinig  scientists  from  14  different 
coimtries.  We  have  also  provided  material  for 
the  collection  of  samples  for  measuring  radioac- 
tivity and  actually  performed  the  radiochemical 
analysis  of  those  collected  samples. 

Turning  to  the  second  part  of  the  resolution,  I 
wish  at  the  outset  to  express  the  appreciation  of 
my  Government  to  the  World  Meteorological  Or- 
ganization for  its  substantial  efforts  aimed  at  ful- 
filling the  tasks  which  were  assigned  to  it  under 
part  II  of  Resolution  1629  of  the  16th  session. 
We  are  pleased  to  note  in  its  report ''  that  the 
World  Meteorological  Organization  has  consulted 
with  the  Scientific  Committee  and  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency  in  the  preparation 
of  its  revised  draft  plan  and  that  this  consultation 
will  continue  until  an  effective  program  of  opera- 
tion has  been  developed  for  the  worldwide  meas- 
urement of  radioactive  fallout. 

We  feel  that  it  is  appropriate  that  the  Scien- 
tific Committee  review  the  draft  plan  of  the  World 
Meteorological  Organization,  which  as  you  know 
is  contained  in  document  A/5253,  at  its  forthcom- 
ing 12th  session,  scheduled  for  January  1963.  In 
this  way  we  should  have  an  assurance  that  any 
plan  which  is  adopted  will  be  based  on  sound  scien- 
tific judgments  and  that  the  results  to  be  obtained 
are  commensurate  with  the  efforts  and  expense  in- 
volved. My  Government,  therefore,  agrees  that 
the  revised  plan  of  the  World  Meteorological  Or- 
ganization, having  been  prepared  with  the  coop- 
eration of  both  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  and  the  Scientific  Committee,  should  be 
put  into  effect  if  indeed  it  is  found  feasible. 

In  conclusion,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  should  like  once 
again  to  express  my  Government's  appreciation  for 


'  U.N.  doc.  A/5253. 


December  3,   7962 


861 


the  Scientific  Committee's  second  report,  to  reit- 
erate our  appreciation  to  the  World  Meteorologi- 
cal Organization,  and  to  congratulate  the  38  pow- 
ers on  their  initiative  in  sponsoring  the  resolution 
contained  in  A/SPC/L.  82/Rev.  1.  We  shall  be 
glad  to  support  the  resolution.' 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Atomic  Energy 

Anieiuluient  to  article  VI.A.3  of  the  Statute  of  the  In- 
ternational Atomic  Energy  Agency  (TIAS  3873).    Done 
at  Vienna  October  4,  1961.' 
Acceptance  depoxited:  Indonesia,  November  7,  1962. 

Automotive  Traffic 

Convention  concerning  customs  facilities  for  touring. 
Done  at  New  York  June  4,  1954.  Entered  into  force 
September  11,  19ri7.    TIAS  3879. 

Accexsion  deposited:  Central  African  Republic,  October 
15,  1962. 

Law  of  the  Sea 

Convention  on  the  high  seas.     Done  at  Geneva  April  29, 
19.58.     Entered  into  force  September  30,  1962. 
Proclaimed  by  tlie  President:  November  9,  1962. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Convention  on  safety  of  life  at  sea.  Signed  at  London 
June  10,  1!)48.  Entered  into  force  November  19,  1952. 
TIAS  249:-;. 

Notifirations  received  that  they  consider  themselves 
bound:  Cameroon,  May  16,  1960;  Central  African  Re- 
public, .November  6,  1961;  Congo  (  r.razzaville),  April 
2.5,  1961  ;  Dahomey,  April  20,  1961  ;  (Jninea,  Slay  4, 
1960;  Ivory  Coast,  April  1,  1961;  Malagasy  Keptiblic, 
June  2,  1961;  Mauritania,  December  5,  1961;  Ni^er, 
September  24,  1962;  Senegal,  June  8,  1961;  Somali 
Republic,  September  17,  1961. 

Trade 

General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade,  with  annexes 
and  schedules,  and  protocol  of  provisional  application. 
Concluded  at  Geneva  October  30,  1947.     TIAS  1700. 
Admitted  as  contracting  parties:  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
August  31,  1962  ;  U^'anda,  October  9,  1962. 

Declaration  on  provisional  accession  of  Argentina  to  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at 
Geneva  November  18,  19G0.  Entered  into  force  Octo- 
ber 14, 1962. 


"The  resolution,  as  revised  (A/SPC/70),  was  adopted 
by  the  Special  Political  Committee  on  Nov.  9. 
'  Not  in  force. 


862 


Signatures:  Japan,   October  25,   1962;    Sweden,   Octo- 
ber 24,  1962. 
Declaration  giving  effect  to  provisions  of  article  XVI  :4 

of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.    Done 

at  Geneva  November  19,  19(i(l.' 

Ratification  deposited:  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
October  15,  1962. 
Protocol   for   the  accession   of  Portugal   to  the   General 

Agreement    on   Tariffs   and   Trade.     Done   at   Geneva 

April  6,  1962.     Entered  into  force  May  6,  1962 ;  for  th& 

United  States,  July  1,  1962. 

Sif/nalnrcs:  Austria   (subject  to  ratification).  May  18, 
1962;    Finland,    May    8,    1962;    Sweden    (subject   to 
ratification),  April  18,  1962. 
Long-term  arrangements  regarding  international  trade  Ini 

cotton    textiles.     Concluded    at    Geneva    February    9, 

1962.     Entered  into  force  October  1,  1962. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Pakistan,  September  21,  1962. 


BILATERAL 

Burma 

Agricultural  commodities  agreement  under  title  I  of  tha 
Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assistance  Act  cm 
19.54,  as  amended  (68  Stat.  455;  7  U.S.C.  1701-1709), 
with  exchanges  of  notes.  Signed  at  Rangoon  Novem- 
ber 9,  1962.     Entered  into  force  November  9,  1962. 

India 

Agreement  concerning  a  joint  program  of  equatorial 
balloon  flights  for  research  purposes.  Effected  by  ex- 
changes of  notes  at  .New  Delhi  October  25,  Xovember  2 
and  30,  and  December  9,  1960,  and  February  7,  1961. 
Entered  into  force  February  7.   1961. 

Agreement  supplementing  the  1951  military  sales  agree- 
ment, as  amended.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  .November  14,  1902.  Entered  into  force 
November  14, 1962. 

Luxembourg 

Treaty  of  friendship,  establishment  and  navigation,  and 
protocol.  Signed  at  LuxembourL'  February  23,  1962.' 
Ratified  by  the  President:  November  9,  1962. 

Trinidad  and  Tobago 

Agreement  for  the  continuance  with  respect  to  Trinidad 
and  Tobago  of  the  air  transport  agreement,  as  amended, 
and  the  collateral  exchange  of  notes  of  November 
22.  1961,  between  the  United  States  and  United  Kingdom. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Port  of  Si)ain  Septem- 
ber 27  and  October  8,  1962.  Entered  into  force  October 
8, 1962. 


DEPARTMENT  AND  FOREIGN  SERVICE 


Recess  Appointments 

The  President  on  November  14  appointed  Outerbridge 
Horsey  to  be  Ambassador  to  Czechoslovakia.  (For 
biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  release  dated 
November  14.) 


Department   of  State   Bulletin 


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December  3,  1962 


Ind 


e  X 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1223 


American  Republics.  The  World  Economic  Situa- 
tion and  Outlook   (Blumenthal) 840 

Uomic  Energy.  United  States  Welcomes  U.N. 
Report  on  Effects  of  Atomic  Radiation  (Plimp- 
ton)     859 

'uba 

y'ATO  and  the  Cuban  Crisis  (Ball) 831 

'liree  Members  of  Cuba  Mission  to  U.N.  Accused  of 

Illegal  Actions  (text  of  U.S.  note) 835 

Czechoslovakia.    Horsey  appointed  Ambassador  .     .       862 
)epartment  and  Foreign  Service.    Recess  Appoint- 
ments   ( Horsey ) 862 

•Economic  AEfairs 

Jr.  Herter  Named  Representative  for  Trade  Nego- 
tiations (Kennedy) 846 

The  Trade  Expansion  Act  of  1962  (Weiss)     ...      847 

J.S.  and  .Japanese  Cabinet  Officers  To  Hold  Second 
Economic  Meeting 839 

The  World  Economic  Situation  and  Outlook 
(Blumenthal) 840 

Europe 

N'ATO  and  the  Cuban  Crisis   (Ball) 831 

The     World     Economic     Situation     and     Outlook 

(Blumenthal) 840 

Foreign  Aid.  Human  Skills  in  the  Decade  of  De- 
velopment   853 

Germany.  U.S.-German  Talks  Reaffirm  Close  Co- 
operation of  Both  Governments  (Adenauer,  Ken- 
nedy, text  of  joint  communique) 836 

Health,  Education,  and  Welfare.    Human  Skills  in 

the  Decade  of  Development 853 

India.  U.S.  Extends  Military  Aid  to  India  (ex- 
change of  notes) 837 

International  Organizations  and  Conferences 

Calendar  of  International  Conferences  and  Meet- 
ings     851 

Human  Skills  in  the  Decade  of  Development    .     .     .      853 

Japan.    U.S.  and  Japanese  Cabinet  Officers  To  Hold 

Second  Economic  Meeting 839 

Military   Affairs.     U.S.    Extends   Military   Aid    to 

India   (exchange  of  notes) 837 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.    NATO  and 

the  Cuban  Crisis  (Ball) 831 

Presidential  Documents 

Mr.  Herter  Named  Re[iresentative  for  Trade  Nego- 
tiations   846 

U.S.-German  Talks  Reaffirm  Close  Cooperation  of 

Both    Governments 836 

Public  Affairs.    Foreign  Policy  Briefing  Conference 

To  Be  Held  at  Louisville 838 


Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 862 

U.S.  Extends  Military  Aid  to  India   (exchange  of 

notes) 837 

United  Nations 

Current  U.N.  Documents 859 

Three  Members  of  Cuba  Mission  to  U.N.  Accused 

of  Illegal  Actions  (text  of  U.S.  note) -835 

United  States  Welcomes  U.N.  Report  on  Effects  of 

Atomic  Radiation  (Plimpton) 859 

Name  Index 

Adenauer,    Konrad 836 

Ball,   George  W 831 

Blumenthal,     W.     Michael 840 

Herter,    Christian    A 846 

Horsey,     Outerbridge 862 

Kennedy,  President 836,  846 

Plimpton,   Francis  T.   P 859 

Weiss,    Leonard 847 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  November  12-18 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office  of 
News,  Department  of  State,  Washington  25,  D.C. 

Subject 

U.S.  participation  in  international 
conferences. 

Blumenthal :  "World  Economic  Situ- 
ation and  Outlook." 

NATO  report  on  International  Insti- 
tute of  Science  and  Technology. 

Rosen  appointed  Deputy  Director, 
Office  of  Personnel  (biographic 
details). 

Louchheim :  "The  American  Woman 
as  a  Pacesetter." 

Rusk :  Eleanor  Roosevelt  memorial 
service. 

Ball :  "NATO  and  the  Cuban  Crisis." 

U.S.-India  exchange  of  notes  on  mili- 
tary aid. 

Itinerary  for  visit  of  Prime  Minister 
of  Somali  Republic. 

Foreign  policy  conference  at  Louis- 
ville, Ky. 

Military  aid  to  India. 

U.S.  note  on  illegal  actions  of  mem- 
bers of  Cuban  mission  to  U.N. 

*Not  printed. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


No. 

Date 

*672 

11/12 

673 

11/13 

t674 

11/14 

*675 

11/14 

•676 

11/14 

•677 

11/15 

678 
679 

11/16 
11/17 

•680 

11/16 

681 

11/17 

683 
6S5 

11/17 
11/17 

t/.S.   GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  0FF1CE:I961 


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Washington  25,  D.C. 


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THE  SUBCONTINENT  OF  SOUTH  ASIA 

Afghanistan  •  Ceylon  •  India  •  Nepal  •  Pakistan 


Department 

of 

State 


All  over  South  Asia  far-reaching  developments  are  taking  place  in 
the  economic,  political,  and  social  fields.  India,  Pakistan,  and  Ceylon 
Jiave  emerged  from  the  colonial  pattern  to  the  status  of  independent 
nations  since  World  War  II.  Nepal  and  Afghanistan,  after  centuries 
of  isolation,  are  building  new  contacts  with  the  rest  of  the  world. 

With  all  of  its  diversity — of  culture,  religion,  climate,  forms  of  gov- 
ernment— the  subcontinent  of  South  Asia  has  certain  characteristics 
which  are  generally  common  to  the  entire  area.  This  revised,  7C-page 
Background  publication,  illustrated  with  maps  and  photographs, 
summarizes  the  characteristics  and  problems  of  the  subcontinent  and 
provides  detailed  information  on  each  of  the  five  coimtries  m  this  area. 


Publication  7410 


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ICIAL 

:kly  record 


TED  STATES 
EIGN  POLICY 


m 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1224  December  10,  1962 

BASIC  ISSUES  UNDERLYING  THE  PRESENT  CRISIS 

#  Address  by  Secretary  Rusk    •    •    • ••••      867 

A    MOST   DANGEROUS   TIME      •      by  Assistant  Secretary 

Cleveland 875 

AFRICA'S  UNFINISHED  STRUGGLE  FOR  FREEDOM: 

THE  REAL  ISSUES  •  by  Robert  C.  Good 882 

THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  ALLIANCE  FOR  PROG- 

RESS  •  An  Evaluation  by  the  Ministerial  Representatives  of 
lA-ECOSOC 897 

U.S.  PLEDGES  FULL  SUPPORT  TO  TASK  OF 
ACHIEVING  GENERAL  AND  COMPLETE  DIS- 
ARMAMENT •  Statement  by  Arthur  H.  Dean  and  Text 
of  Resolution 890 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


M 


THE    DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


Vol-  XLVII,  No.  1224  •  Publication  7462 
December  10,  1962 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  ot  Documents 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

Washington  25,  D.C. 

Pbice: 

62  Issues,  domestic  $8.60,  foreign  $12.25 

Single  copy,  25  cents 

Use  of  funds  for  printing  of  this  publica- 
tion approved  by  the  Director  of  the  Bureau 
of  the  Budget  (January  19, 1961). 

Note:  Contenu  of  this  publication  are  not 
copyrighted  and  Items  contahied  herein  may 
be  reprinted.  Citation  of  the  Depaetment 
OF  State  Bulletin  as  the  source  «1U  be 
appreelated.  The  Bulletin  Is  Indexed  In  the 
Readers'  Oolde  to  Periodical  LIteratiire. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a   weekly  publication   issued  by   the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public    Affairs,    provides    the    public 
and   interested   agencies   of   the 
Government     with     information     on 
developments  in  the  field  of  foreign 
relations    and    on    the    work    of    the 
Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service.    The  BULLETIN  includes  se- 
lected press  releases  on  foreign  policy. 
Issued  by  the  W1iite_Houseand  the 
Department,  and  statements  and  ad- 
dresses made  by  the  President  and  by 
the    Secretary    of    State    and    other 
officers  of  tlve  Department,  as  well  as 
special  articles  on  various  phases  of 
international   affairs   and    the  func- 
tions of  the  Department.     Informa- 
tion   is  included  concerning   treaties 
and   international   agreements    to 
which   the   United  States  is  or   may 
become  a  party  and  treaties  of  gen- 
eral international  interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  legis- 
lative material  in  the  field  of  inter- 
national relations  are  listed  currently. 


Sasic  Issues  Underlying  the  Present  Crisis 


Address  hy  Secretary  Rusk'^ 


The  foreign  policy  of  a  democracy  must  rest 
jpon  the  supiDort  of  informed  citizens.  On  Armi- 
stice eve,  1918,  men  like  Paul  Kellogg  and  Learned 
Hand,  Harry  Emerson  Fosdick  and  Charles 
Beard  brought  into  being  an  organization  to  help 
nterested  citizens  to  become  more  fully  and  intel- 
ligently informed  about  our  relations  witli  tlie 
rest  of  the  world. 

Now  this  is  important  not  just  because  when 
1  great  democracy  moves  in  foreign  policy  it  must 
liave  the  understanding  and  support  of  its  citi- 
zens; it  is  also  because  foreign  policy  in  fact,  re- 
gardless of  the  abstractions  of  international  law, 
reaches  into  every  home  in  the  community  and  in 
the  country.  If  every  county  courthouse,  for  ex- 
imple,  could  display  a  map  of  the  world  showing 
(vhere  the  county's  men  and  women  have  served 
since  1941  throughout  the  world  in  defense  of 
freedom  and  in  defense  of  the  security  of  this 
jountry,  we  would  have  a  dramatic  illustration 
af  the  fact  that  foreign  policy  is  in  fact  the  peo- 
Dle's  business. 

Tlie  Foreign  Policy  Association  has  for  almost 
lalf  a  century  made  a  major  contribution  to  pub- 
ic understanding  of  significant  international 
>roblems  facing  this  country. 

For  about  half  your  history  this  great  coimtry 
)f  ours  was  mider  an  illusion  of  irresponsibility. 
We  were  born ;  we  grew ;  we  were  developed ;  we 
lecame  prosperous  through  more  than  a  century 
)f  the  most  intimate  relations  with  nations  be- 
yond the  oceans,  beyond  our  own  frontiers. 
Somehow,  after  World  War  I,  we  tried  to  put 
hat  aside.  We  tried  to  assume  that  we  had  no 
^eat  burdens  to  bear,  and  we  did  not  bring  into 
:he  international  field  the  full  strength  and  re- 


'  Made  before  the  Foreign  Policy  Association  at  New 
?orlc,  N.  T.,  on  Nov.  20  (press  release  691  dated  Nov.  21). 

>ecember  10,  1962 


sources  and  capacity  to  influence  the  course  of 
events  which  rested  here  in  the  United  States. 

History  has  no  chance  to  write  about  "what 
might  have  been.  But  I  think  that  we,  as  Amer- 
icans, need  to  consider  in  quiet  moments  what  the 
story  might  liave  been  to  prevent  the  tragedy  of 
World  War  II  and  to  stabilize  international  in- 
stitutions, had  we,  during  the  first  half  of  your 
own  history  as  an  organization,  realized  the  re- 
sponsibilities that  go  with  the  capacity  to  act. 

During  the  second  half  of  your  history,  we  have 
had  thrust  upon  us  by  the  course  of  events  a  re- 
sponsibility which  we  have  never  really  known 
before  as  a  people,  imposing  upon  us  great  bur- 
dens, imposing  upon  us  incredibly  difficult  and 
complex  decisions,  but  also  imposing  upon  us  an 
awareness  that  this  country  cannot  be  safe  if  oth- 
ers are  insecure,  that  this  country  cannot  be  pros- 
perous if  others  are  ridden  by  poverty. 

The  Cuban  Crisis 

We  meet  today  in  an  atmosphere  of  crisis,  and 
I  wish  that  I  could  report  to  you  that  that  crisis 
has  been  resolved.  I  cannot,  because  much  re- 
mains to  be  done.  I  suppose  that  many  of  you 
would  like  for  me  to  say  something  about  the 
present  crisis.  In  fact,  our  policy  and  our  course 
of  conduct  are  already  a  matter  of  full  public  rec- 
ord. You  will  have  a  full  understanding  of  the 
situation  if  you  remind  yourselves  of  the  Presi- 
dent's statements  of  September  4  ^  and  13  ^  about 
Cuba,  the  President's  forthright  address  to  the 
Nation  on  October  22d,*  Ambassador  Stevenson's 
classic  speech  before  the  Security  Coimcil  at  the 


"-  Bulletin  of  Sept.  24, 1962,  p.  450. 
"  Ihtd.,  Oct.  1, 1962,  p.  481. 
*  IhiH..  Nov.  12,  1962,  p.  715. 


867 


United  Nations  the  following  day,°  and  the  public 
exchange  of  letters  between  President  Kennedy 
and  Chairman  Ivlirushchev  on  October  27  and 
October  28.« 

There  have  been  private  talks  among  govern- 
ments and  with  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
United  Nations,  and  details  of  these  talks  have 
not  been  made  fully  public;  but  they  are  aimed 
at  the  accomplishment  of  publicly  declared  policy, 
of  purposes  we  all  understand,  of  results  consist- 
ent with  the  security  and  well-being  of  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere  and  of  the  peace  of  the  world. 

In  his  press  conference  today  at  6  o'clock  the 
President  will,  of  course,  comment  on  the  Cuban 
situation '  as  we  now  see  it.  But  no  citizen  need 
suppose  himself  uninformed  about  his  country's 
attitude  on  the  issues  to  be  resolved  before  we  can 
write  an  end  to  what  is  called  the  Cuban  crisis. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  consultations  in  progress 
as  we  meet  here  now  may  very  much  affect  the  sit- 
uation at  today's  end.  So  there  are  moments  when 
the  Secretary  of  State  must  try  to  make  sense 
instead  of  making  news — unless  indeed  that  be 
news.     (Laughter.) 

May  I  say  to  my  friends  of  the  press  that  a  text 
of  what  I  have  to  say  will  be  made  available  later 
in  the  day  when  my  colleagues  have  a  chance  to 
discover  what  I  am  going  to  say,  because  the  situa- 
tion is  so  fluid  that  I  have  made  some  considerable 
revisions  in  what  I  thought  I  might  say  a  few  days 
ago.  And,  as  for  the  photographs,  I  asked  some 
photographers  once  why  they  kept  taking  pictures 
when  they  must  have  thousands  already.  And  one 
of  them  said,  "Well,  because,  Mr.  Secretary,  if  you 
get  shot,  we  want  the  last  one."  But  as  far  as  the 
text  is  concerned,  I  think  it  is  worthwhile  once  in 
a  while  to  remind  the  publishers  and  editors  that 
working  reporters  are  more  valuable  and  have 
more  to  do  than  simply  to  snip  excerpts  from  pre- 
viously produced  texts. 

A  Decision  the  Communists  Must  Make 

Today  I  should  like  to  speak  briefly  and  simply 
about  some  basic  issues  which  underlie  the  present 
crisis.  The  events  of  the  past  2  months  in  Cuba 
and  elsewhere  have  caused  many  capitals  t^  look 
long  and  hard  at  the  prospects  for  peace  and  the 
dangers  of  war. 


•  Ibid.,  p.  72,3. 

•  Ibid.,  p.  741. 
'  See  p.  874. 


I  suspect  that  we  are  on  the  front  edge  of  signif  Sovj 
icant  and  perhaps  unpredictable  events,  a  perioc 
in  which  some  of  the  customary  patterns  o: 
thought  will  have  to  be  reviewed  and  perhap: 
revised,  a  process  that  will  affect  govermnents  u 
all  parts  of  the  world.  It  seems  to  me,  therefore 
that  it  would  be  appropriate  for  me  to  remind  yox 
of  certain  fateful  decisions  wliich  the  govermnent; 
of  the  world  must  face  in  this  present  period,  deci 
sions  which  critically  affect  the  prospects  fo 
peace  and  the  survival  of  freedom. 

The  first  of  these  fateful  decisions  is  one  whicl 
is  to  be  made  by  tlie  leaders  of  the  Communis 
world.  And  I  might  remind  you  of  a  portion  o 
President  Kennedy's  address  to  the  Unitei 
Nations  in  September  of  1961,'*  in  which  he  callei 
for  a  truce  to  terror.   He  said : 

This  will  require  new  strength  and  new  roles  for  tb 
ITnited  Nations.  For  disarmament  without  checks  is  bi 
a  shadow,  and  a  community  without  law  is  but  a  shel 
Already  tlie  United  Nations  has  become  both  the  measui 
and  the  vehicle  of  man's  most  generous  impulses.  Alread 
it  has  provided — in  the  Middle  East,  in  Asia,  in  Afric 
this  year  in  the  Congo — a  means  of  holding  violenc 
within  bounds. 

But  the  great  question  which  confronted  this  body  i 
194.0  is  still  before  us :  whether  man's  cheri.^hed  hopes  fc 
progress  and  peace  are  to  be  destroyed  by  terror  and  di: 
ruption,  whether  the  "foul  winds  of  war"  can  be  tame 
in  time  to  free  the  cooling  winds  of  reason,  and  whetht 
the  pledges  of  our  charter  are  to  be  fulfilled  or  defied- 
pledges  to  secure  peace,  progress,  human  rights,  and  worl 
law. 

In  this  hall  there  are  not  three  forces,  but  two.  One  : 
composed  of  those  who  are  trying  to  build  the  kind  ( 
world  described  in  articles  1  and  2  of  the  charter.  Tl 
other,  seeking  a  far  different  world,  would  undermii 
this  Organization  in  the  process. 

I'm  reminded  of  the  great  concern  expressed  b 
President  Franklin  Roosevelt  before  his  deatl 
before  the  end  of  World  War  II,  that  the  trends  ( 
Soviet  policy  were  causing  him  deepest  concer 
and  augured  ill  for  the  prospects  of  the  Unite 
Nations  conference  then  attempting  to  hammer  oi 
a  United  Nations  Cliarter. 

I  am  reminded  that  in  1947  and  1948  Secretai 
of  State  Marshall  and  President  Truman  invite 
the  Soviet  Union  and  other  members  of  the  Con 
munist  bloc  to  take  part  in  what  came  to  be  know 
as  the  Marshall  I'lan  for  the  reconstruction  of  wa 
devastated  Europe  and  that  that  invitation  w; 
rejected  and  that  soon  thereafter  Secretary  Ma 
shall   was  insistently  and  urgently  inviting  tl 


868 


'  BULLErriN  of  Oct.  16,  1061,  p.  019. 

Department  of  Sfate  Bullef  ((,(, 


nitt 


soviet  Union  really  and  truly  to  join  the  United 
en^l^ations.  Because  in  1945,  '46,  '47,  the  great  trag- 
dy  of  our  day  is  that  we  had  such  a  "near  miss" 
n  the  organization  of  world  affairs.  This  coun- 
ry  came  out  of  World  "War  II  with  unparalleled 
)0wer  in  conventional  forces,  a  monopoly  on  the 
tomic  weapon ;  yet  we  committed  ourselves  fully 
0  the  attempt  to  make  the  United  Nations  a  living 
eality. 

One  can  describe  those  days  either  in  terms  of 
he  "great  commitment"  or,  in  retrospect,  as  "the 
;reat  mistake."  But  we  laid  down  our  arms.  We 
ought  to  place  the  atomic  bomb  under  the  United 
Nations.  We  coimnitted  ourselves  fully  and 
wholeheartedly  to  the  purposes  of  that  charter. 

In  1946  we  had  no  ally  looldng  toward  the  fu- 
ure — only  those  allies  which  had  been  formed  for 
he  purposes  of  defeating  Nazi  Germany  and 
lilitarist  Japan,  alliances  which  were  expected  to 
rither  away.  Our  military  budget  dropped  below 
10  billion  in  1947  and  1948.  This  was  a  signal : 
he  determination  of  the  American  people  to  com- 
(lit  themselves  to  the  purposes  outlined  in  the  pre- 
,mble  and  articles  1  and  2  of  the  charter,  in  dem- 
mstration  of  their  hope  that  this  kind  of  world 
ould  in  fact  be  brought  into  being. 

One  nation  at  that  time  stood  in  the  way.  I  my- 
elf  am  convinced  that,  had  it  not  been  for  that 
^eat  abstention,  the  United  Nations  could  have 
ucceeded  in  handling  efficiently  and  effectively 
he  great  issues  which  are  brought  before  it  that 
lo  not  specifically  involve  that  particular  country. 

The  great  decision  that  has  to  be  made  on  the 
)ther  side  is  whether  in  fact,  as  I  have  said  on  other 
)Ccasions,  they  will  pick  up  the  great  revolutionary 
•esponsibility  that  is  waiting  for  them — the  revo- 
ution  of  peace  which  can  be  brought  about  by  a 
iimple  decision  to  live  at  peace  with  the  rest  of  the 
vorld.  For  no  other  decision  in  the  hands  of  a 
■elatively  few  men  can  so  transform  the  face  of 
he  earth  as  a  simple  decision  to  work  to  make  the 
A^orld  for  their  children  a  living  reality  and  not  a 
Frustrated  hope. 

We  believe  that  in  this  period  there  are  those  on 
ohe  other  side  who  have  had  some  sober  reflections, 
oerhaps  are  making  some  reappraisal,  although 
here  are  others  who  obviously  are  not. 

The  harsh  attack  on  India  ^  is  a  major  problem 

'or  the  entire  free  world,  as  well  as  for  India,  and 

tl  hose  who  are  pressing  this  attack  must  not  be  per- 


'  See  p.  874. 
Jecemfaer   70,   7962 


mitted  to  believe  that  such  conduct  is  consistent 
with  the  possibilities  of  peace  in  the  modern  world. 
But  surely,  having  looked  at  the  dangers  in  our 
present  situation,  we  can  express  the  hope  that 
leaders  in  countries  who  for  ideological  or  other 
reasons  are  not  a  part  of  the  so-called  free  world, 
who  have  differences  about  what  the  future  is 
going  to  hold,  who  have  differences  of  commitment 
or  prediction — surely  we  can  express  the  hope  that 
these  leaders  recognize  the  utter  necessity  of  find- 
ing a  path  toward  peaceful  existence  within  the 
framework  of  the  United  Nations.  Their  own  na- 
tional interests,  the  needs — indeed,  demands — of 
their  own  peoples  give  them  the  same  great  unfin- 
ished tasks  in  their  societies  which  the  rest  of  us 
have.  Commitment  to  those  purposes  could  open 
up  great  opportimities  in  the  days  ahead. 

Dangers  of  a  Spiraling  Arms  Race 

A  second  fateful  decision  for  peace,  I  think,  has 
to  do  with  disarmament.  There  are  many  things 
which  can  and  will,  in  due  course,  be  said  about  the 
Cuban  crisis.  One  of  them  is  that  Cuba  has  pro- 
vided a  dramatic  example  of  the  deadly  dangers  of 
a  spiraling  arms  race.  It  is  not  easy  to  see  how 
far-reaching  disarmament  can  occur  except  as 
major  political  issues  be  resolved  and  as  nations 
accustom  themselves  to  living  at  peace  with  one 
another. 

Nevertheless,  it  is  also  obvious,  as  we  have  seen 
in  recent  weeks,  that  modern  weapons  systems  are 
themselves  a  source  of  high  tension  and  that  we 
must  make  an  urgent  and  earnest  effort  to  bring 
the  arms  race  under  control  and  to  try  to  turn  it 
downward  if  we  possibly  can. 

In  their  exchange  of  messages,  both  Chairman 
Khrushchev  and  President  Kennedy  expressed 
the  hope  that  a  settlement  of  the  Cul^an  crisis 
would  be  followed  by  other  agreed  measures  to 
lessen  the  danger  of  thermonuclear  war.  Iia  his 
letter  President  Kennedy  said: 

Mr.  Chairman,  both  of  our  countries  have  great  unfin- 
ished tasks  and  I  know  that  your  people  as  well  as  those 
of  the  United  States  can  ask  for  nothing  better  than  to 
pursue  them  free  from  the  fear  of  war.  Modem  science 
and  technology  have  given  us  the  possibilit.v  of  making 
labor  fruitful  beyond  anything  that  could  have  been 
dreamed  of  a  few  decades  ago. 

I  agree  with  you  that  we  must  devote  urgent  attention 
to  the  problem  of  disarmament,  as  it  relates  to  the  whole 
world  and  also  to  critical  areas.  Perhaps  now,  as  we 
step  back  from  danger,  we  can  together  make  real  prog- 


869 


ress  in  this  vital  field.  I  think  we  should  give  priority 
to  questions  relating  to  the  proliferation  of  nuclear  weap- 
ons, on  earth  and  in  outer  space,  and  to  the  great  effort 
for  a  nuclear  test  ban.  But  we  should  also  work  hard  to 
see  if  wider  measures  of  disarmament  can  be  agreed  and 
put  into  operation  at  an  early  date.  The  United  States 
government  will  be  prepared  to  discuss  these  questions 
urgently,  and  in  a  constructive  spirit,  at  Geneva  or 
elsewhere. 

That  is  the  spirit  with  which  we  shall  return 
next  week  to  the  18-nation  disarmament  confer- 
ence at  Geneva.  We  earnestly  hope  that  the 
Soviet  negotiators  will  reflect  a  similar  attitude. 
We  also  earnestly  hope  that  they  and  all  the  other 
delegations  will  have  taken  to  heart  some  im- 
portant lessons  underlined  by  the  Cuban  crisis 
and  that  all  delegations,  all  countries,  in  all  re- 
gions, will  look  upon  disarmament  as  a  high  prior- 
ity and  urgent  necessity. 

This  is  not  a  matter  that  affects  just  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  United  States.  There  are  other 
differences,  other  arms  races.  I  would  hope  that 
some  day  we  could  call  a  conference  on  disarma- 
ment in  which  it  would  be  out  of  order  for  any 
delegate  to  say  anything  more  than  what  his  own 
country  was  willing  to  contribute  to  the  solution 
of  disarmament  problems — that  it  would  be  out 
of  order  for  him  to  say  what  somebody  else  should 
contribute  to  these  problems. 

Perhaps  I  shouldn't  say  tliis,  but  I  think  it  is 
of  some  importance  that,  at  a  time  when  the 
United  Nations  is  voting  unanimously  for  dis- 
armament," 70  members  are  asking  the  United 
States  for  military  assistance.  This  is  not  a  prob- 
lem in  which  two  great  powers  have  a  monopoly. 
There  are  tasks  to  be  taken  up  in  every  part  of 
the  world,  although  the  greater  danger  is  of  course 
among  the  great  powers  themselves. 

One  of  the  plainest  of  the  lessons  we  have 
learned  in  these  recent  weeks  all  over  again — if 
we  ever  needed  to  learn  it  again — is  that  verbal 
assurances,  however  formal,  cannot  be  taken  at 
face  value.  Let  us  remember  that  we  have  just 
experienced  an  elaborate  deception  to  cover  the 
secret  effort  to  develop  in  Cuba  a  serious  nuclear 
threat  to  tlie  United  States  and  the  Western  Hem- 
isphere. With  this  experience  freshly  in  mind, 
surely  no  reasonable  person  would  expect  that 


'°  See  p.  890. 


arms  control  or  related  agreements  can  be  effective 
without  appropriate  and  adequate  verification  that 
commitments  are  in  fact  being  met. 

Secrecy  and  Disarmament  Are  Incompatible 

For  16  years  Soviet  objections  to  inspection 
have  stood  as  a  barrier  to  concrete  progress  to 
ward  disarmament.  Soviet  representatives  likt 
to  call  inspection  "espionage."  I  would  not  trj 
to  say  whether  this  is  a  deep-seated,  traditional 
passion  for  secrecy  on  the  Eussian  scene  or  a  con- 
sequence of  the  belief  that  secrecy  is  an  important 
military  asset.  It  is  probably  a  combination  ol 
these  and  many  other  factors. 

But  whatever  the  reasons  behind  this  alleged 
preoccupation  with  espionage,  three  things  seen 
to  me  to  be  clear. 

One  is  that  the  major  powers  Iniow  all  that  thej 
need  to  know  about  each  other  to  inflict  devas 
tating  damage  in  the  event  of  war.  Espionage  ii 
its  classical  sense  is  no  longer  relevant  to  thii 
great  overriding  issue. 

Second,  arrangements  can  be  made  for  inter 
national  inspection,  particularly  in  the  field  o: 
nuclear  testing,  which  does  not  involve  the  gather 
ing  of  information  on  any  matter  not  central  t( 
the  purpose  of  the  inspection  itself.  You  know 
we  have  such  short  memories,  we  need,  for  ex 
ample — all  of  us — to  study  over  again  the  reviev 
of  the  post-World  War  II  period  Avhich  Adla 
Stevenson  made  before  the  Security  Council  or 
October  23d. 

I  suspect  that  many  of  you  have  already  forgot 
ten  that  in  March  of  this  year,  after  the  Soviel 
Union  had  exploded  almost  50  nuclear  tests  anc 
before  we  had  resumed  nuclear  testing  ourselves, 
the  British  and  we  offered  the  Soviet  Union  t 
comprehensive  nuclear  test  ban "  which  would 
involve  having  a  look  at  less  than  one  part  in  twc 
thousand  of  Soviet  territory  in  any  given  year 
(This  inspection  would  of  course  be  reinforced  bj 
instrumentation  and  other  means  of  laiowing  whal 
in  fact  was  happening.)  One  part  in  two  thou 
sand !  A  farthing's  worth  of  inspection  insofai 
as  general  military  information  is  concerned 
Could  tliut  possibly  be  espionage? 


870 


"  For  a  statement  by  Secretary  Rusk  made  before  th( 
18-Nation  Disarmament  Committee  on  Mar.  23,  1962,  se« 
BuixETiN  of  Apr.  9, 1962,  p.  571. 


Deparfmenf  of  Stafe   Bulletin 


seen 
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ofi 
jari 


([iiit 


sarj 
tm 
per 
am 
\ 


oft 


oft 


Cas 
far 
m 


Sov 
sen 
tkj 
liet 
m 


appi 
So;i 
Uoti 
assii 


Third,  we  must  face  the  elementary  fact  that 
secrecy  and  disarmament  are  basically  incompati- 
ble, for  we  cannot  lay  down  our  arms  in  the  face 
of  ignorance  about  what  is  haj)pening  in  those 
various  areas  of  the  Eurasian  landmass.  Until 
the  Soviet  Union  recognizes  and  accepts  the  ele- 
mentary necessity  of  reliable  safeguards,  it  is, 
quite  frankly,  difficult  to  see  how  urgently  needed 
progress  on  disarmament  can  go  forward. 

Such  agreements,  under  present  conditions,  can- 
not rest  on  naked  trust.  But  it  should  not  be  neces- 
sary for  anyone  to  worry  about  whether  one  side 
trusts  the  other,  for  the  assurances  of  faithful 
performance  must  be  built  into  the  system  through 
arrangements  for  independent  verification. 

We  need  the  elementary  institutional  structure 
providing  safeguards  on  which  confidence  can,  in 
due  course,  be  built.  Otherwise  we  shall  not  have 
the  possibility,  either  on  our  side  or  the  other  side 
of  the  Iron  Curtain,  of  handling  responsibly,  hon- 
estly, and  effectively  the  human  tendency  to  sus- 
pect and  to  fear  in  the  presence  of  ignorance  about 
the  other  side. 

In  tlie  Cuban  crisis  Chairman  Khrushchev  said 
that  he  was  prepared  to  agree  tliat  representatives 
of  the  United  Nations  should  verify  tlie  disman- 
tling of  the  Soviet  Union's  offensive  weapons  in 
Cuba.  But  in  the  course  of  the  brass  tacks  of 
negotiation,  it  has  become  evident  that  at  least  Mr. 
Castro's  interpretation  of  such  verification  falls 
far  short  thus  far  of  what  others  could  in  prudence 
accept  as  an  adequate  verification  of  a  disarma- 
ment agreement. 

In  the  disarmament  negotiations  at  Geneva  the 
Soviets  have  paid  a  certain  attention,  perhaps  lip- 
service,  to  the  need  for  international  controls.  But 
they  have  insisted  that  effective  inspection  should 
be  installed  only  after  there  has  been  general  and 
complete  disarmament.  During  the  process  of 
disarmament,  the  Soviet  plan  would  pennit  inspec- 
tion at  places  where  troops  are  being  disbanded 
and  where  armaments  are  being  destroyed.  But  it 
would  not  permit  inspection  of  forces  and  arma- 
ments retained. 

It  seems  obvious,  indeed  elementary,  to  us  that 
such  a  plan  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  practical 
approach  to  disarmament.  We  hope  that  the 
Soviets  will  return  to  Geneva  next  week  with  a 
more  realistic  attitude  toward  tliis  problem  of 
assurance  and  of  safeguards. 


December   70,    7962 


Need  for  Progress  on  Road  to  Disarmament 

The  United  States  believes,  nevertheless,  that 
major  steps  can  be  taken  within  the  3-year  period 
referred  to  as  phase  one.  We  have  proposed  a 
30-percent  cut  in  all  major  armaments.  We  would 
limit  the  production  of  armaments  retained  to 
replacement  on  a  one-f  or-one  basis.  We  have  pro- 
posed other  significant  measures,  including  a  halt 
to  production  of  fissionable  material  for  use  in 
weapons  and  a  reduction  of  the  armed  forces  of 
the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  to  some  2,100,- 
000  men  each.  These  seem  to  us  to  be  feasible 
measures.  They  are  measures  which  can  be  under- 
taken, pending  the  beginnings  of  the  transforma- 
tion of  international  political  life  wliich  opens  the 
way  for  further  measures  to  be  adopted. 

It's  important  to  get  started,  to  do  something 
tangible  and  specific  in  tliis  field  and  not  wait 
until  it  is  possible  for  everythmg  to  be  done  at 
once.  Otherwise,  we  shall  never  get  to  that  point 
and  the  arms  race  will  continue.  But  if  some  of 
these  measures  could  be  adopted  and  carried  out, 
they  might  indeed  start  a  momentous  revolution  in 
international  arrangements. 

A  final  stage  of  general  and  complete  disarma- 
ment is  not  in  sight  for  the  near  future,  since  it 
would  require  a  major  transfonnation  of  interna- 
tional relations  as  an  accompanying  necessity. 
The  institutions  of  law  must  be  consolidated. 
The  conduct  of  nations  must  be  regularized.  The 
possibilities  of  peace  must  be  assured. 

Meanwhile,  however,  we  shall  earnestly  strive 
for  measures  to  halt  the  arms  race  and  to  make 
progress  along  the  road  to  disarmament.  We 
most  earnestly  seek  measures  to  reduce  the  danger 
of  a  gi-eat  war.  These  measures  might  be  of  two 
kinds:  preventing  the  future  diffusion  and  de- 
velopment of  nuclear  weapons,  and  reducing  the 
danger    of   war   by    accident   or  miscalculation. 

In  the  first  category  are  measures  to  prohibit 
the  transfer  of  nuclear  weapons  to  individual 
states  and  to  establish  nuclear-free  zones,  for  ex- 
ample, in  Latin  America  or  Africa,  if  the  states 
in  those  areas  so  desire.  Also  in  this  category  are 
measures  to  keep  outer  space  free  of  nuclear  weap- 
ons in  orbit  and  to  stop  nuclear  testing. 

"\Ylien  the  Geneva  conference  recessed  on  Sep- 
tember 8,  negotiations  on  a  nuclear  test  ban  liad 
reached  an  apparent  deadlock.  Talks  among  the 
United  States,  the  U.K.,  and  the  U.S.S.R.  have 


871 


continued  in  the  nuclear  test  ban  subcommittee  of 
the  18-nation  conference.  So  far  these  have  only 
confirmed  that  the  U.S.S.R.  continues  to  resist  any 
type  of  obligatory  international  on-site  inspection. 
We  ourselves  would  like  to  see  a  comprehensive 
ban  on  nuclear  tests,  that  is,  a  ban  on  tests  in  all 
environments ;  but  we  cannot  accept  this  unless  we 
are  certain  that  all  parties  live  up  to  the  agreement. 
In  the  case  of  earth  tremors,  such  assurance  re- 
quires a  few  on-site  inspections  to  identify  their 
cause. 

If  the  other  side  has  instruments  which  can  do 
this  job  through  instrumentation,  we  would  press 
them  to  come  forward  with  them.  We  cannot  say 
with  complete  assurance  that  no  such  instruments 
exist.  But  we  don't  have  them.  If  the  other  side 
does,  we  would  like  to  see  them.  We  have  urged 
them  at  least  20  times  to  come  forward  with  a 
demonstration  of  the  capacity  to  detect  nuclear 
testing,  because  this  is  a  question  of  fact,  not  neces- 
sarily of  policy.  It's  a  question  of  what  can  be 
done  to  be  reasonably  sure  that  agreements  are 
being  carried  out.  But  thus  far  we  have  not  had 
any  response  on  that  point. 

As  an  alternative  to  a  comprehensive  test  ban, 
we  are  ready  to  agree  today  to  a  ban  on  tests  in  the 
atmosphere,  under  water,  and  in  outer  space,  for 
such  tests  can  be  detected  by  existing  means.  The 
Soviet  Union  says  that  it  will  agree  to  this  only  if 
we  accept  an  unpoliced  moratorium  on  under- 
ground tests  while  an  inspection  system  for  such 
tests  is  worked  out.  We  did  accept  an  unpoliced 
moratorium  once,  and  there  were  secret  prepara- 
tions for  a  long  series  of  tests  by  the  other  side. 
We  do  not  need  elaborate  inspection,  intrusive  in- 
spection, but  only  inspection  to  give  us  assurance 
that  tlie  events  we  are  concerned  about  are  not  in 
fact  occurring.  If  the  other  side  cannot  accept 
that  much  inspection,  the  prospects  for  disarma- 
ment remain,  I'm  afraid,  somewhat  dim. 

Tlie  second  kind  of  measures  are  tliose  to  reduce 
the  danger  of  war  by  accident  or  miscalculation. 
One  such  measure  would  be  an  advance  notice  of 
major  military  movements  and  maneuvers  outside 
of  national  territories.  The  United  States  has 
presented  such  a  proposal  at  Geneva.  We  have 
also  proposed  the  establishment  of  observation 
posts  at  key  points  to  report  on  concentrations 
and  movements  of  military  forces. 

Tlie  importance  of  these  measures  has  been  un- 
derlined by  the  events  of  the  last  few  weeks  in 


872 


Cuba.  Had  these  proposals  been  in  effect,  the 
chances  are  that  the  deployment  to  Cuba  of  offen- 
sive weapons  would  not  have  taken  place.  This 
experience  underlined  also  the  importance  in  times 
of  crisis  of  extremely  rapid  and  reliable  commu- 
nications between  govermnents.  Rapid  commimi- 
cation  was  instrumental  in  this  case  in  averting  a 
possible  war.  But  even  more  rapid  communica- 
tion would  in  fact  be  desirable.  The  United 
States  proposed  this  early  in  the  disarmament 
talks  in  Geneva.  There  has  been  some  expression 
of  interest  in  it  on  the  other  side,  and  we  would 
hope  that  this  measure  is  now  ripe  for  agreement. 
Even  small  and  limited  measures  of  agreement 
can  serve  to  make  a  great  war  a  little  less  likely. 
At  the  resumed  sessions  of  the  disarmament  con- 
ference tlie  United  States  will  press  for  agree- 
ment on  every  measure  which  holds  the  prospects 
of  reducing  danger  while  we  work  on  the  more 
ambitious  task  of  developing  a  treaty  for  general 
and  complete  disarmament  in  a  peacefid  and  law- 
abiding  world. 

Responsibility  of  the  American  People 

A  third  fateful  decision  for  peace  is  one  which 
rests  with  us  here  in  this  country — rests  upon  the 
American  people — that  is,  whether  we  ourselves 
can  fully  comprehend  the  stakes  which  are  at  issue 
in  this  particular  period  of  our  history  and  can 
accept  the  burdens  that  go  witli  the  defense  of  our 
security  and  the  long-range  survival  of  freedom. 

Since  World  War  II  we  have  indeed  been  called 
upon  to  bear  large  burdens.  Speaking  as  an 
American  among  Americans,  I  think  we  can  be 
proud  of  the  fact  that  we  have  responded  so  well  to 
these  demands.  But  it  is  easy  to  become  bored,  or 
tired,  or  a  bit  frustrated  or  resentful  if  the.se  bur- 
dens continue.  But  they  must  continue.  They 
are  not  burdens  that  we  can  afford  to  tear  ourselves 
to  pieces  about  eacli  year  as  though  we  were  de- 
ciding each  year  all  over  again  wliether  we  want 
our  nation  to  survive. 

I  mentioned  the  fact  that  in  1047  and  1048  our 
defense  budget  came  down  to  just  below  $10  bil- 
lion. Today  it's  more  than  $50  billion.  If  we  look 
upon  thiit  earlier  defense  budget  as  the  normal  an- 
nual cost  of  tlie  postwar  defense  establishment  of 
a  nation  trying  to  make  the  United  Nations  work, 
we  find  tliat  the  accumulated  increment  in  our  de- 
fense expenditures  since  1047  over  that  level  has 
amounted  to  more  than  $425  billion.    Tlie  growth 

Depor/menf   of  Slafe   Bullefin 


of  American  defense  expenditures  corresponds 
with  the  tragic  story  of  one  aggression  after  an- 
other, spelled  out  in  the  debates  and  in  the  agenda 
of  the  United  Nations — billions  of  additional  ex- 
penditure because  of  someone  else's  refusal  to  join 
the  United  Nations  in  fad. 

It  is  true  that  the  American  people  have  spent 
between  ninety  and  a  hundred  billion  dollars  in  the 
same  period  for  what  is  called  foreign  aid.  This 
is  not  an  effort  on  which  we  can  relax,  because  the 
failure  to  spend  this  lesser  amount  will  multiply 
the  necessity  for  spending  larger  amounts  on  the 
defense  side. 

This  nation  is  deeply  committed  to  a  world  of 
independent  states  freely  cooperating,  within  the 
framework  of  the  United  Nations  Charter  and  in 
their  common  interests,  to  get  on  with  the  recog- 
nized common  tasks  of  mankind. 

In  1946,  no  allies ;  in  1962,  more  than  40.  Why  ? 
Because  we  have  a  commitment  to  the  independ- 
ence of  states.  Wliat  is  our  interest  in  the  so-called 
unalined  countries?  Their  independence.  If  the 
110  members  of  the  United  Nations  were  genuinely 
secure  and  genuinely  independent  (and  these 
newly  independent  countries  have  shown  a  tough 
zeal  for  their  independence),  there  would  be  no 
great  tension  between  "Washington  and  Moscow. 
The  strictly  bilateral  issues  between  us  are  of  rela- 
tive unimportance.  The  independence  of  these  na- 
tions is  the  issue ;  the  structure  of  our  world  society 
is  the  issue — whether  it  is  to  be  that  spelled  out  in 
the  charter  or  that  imposed  by  a  doctrine  of  world 
revolution. 

We  are,  perhaps,  as  I  said  earlier,  on  the  leading 
edges  of  some  very  important  events.  I  think  the 
free  world  can  look  forward  to  these  with  confi- 
dence. There  is  a  great  vitality  of  recovery  and 
progress  in  the  Atlantic  community.  There  is  a 
solidarity  of  commitment  in  purpose  in  the  great 
alliances,  such  as  the  OAS  [Organization  of 
American  States]  and  NATO  [North  Atlantic 
Treaty  Organization].  There  is  a  keen  interest 
in  their  national  existence,  survival,  and  prosper- 
ity among  the  newly  independent  countries.  There 
is  a  commitment  on  the  part  of  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  nations  to  the  kind  of  world  which  we 
find  congenial. 

If  we  want  to  find  a  succinct  statement  of  the 
long-range  foreign  policy  of  the  American  people, 
we  can  do  worse  than  to  read  the  opening  sections 
of  the  United  Nations  Charter.    It  is  no  accident 


lifli   December   JO,    7962 


that  this  should  be  so,  because  we  helped  draft  the 
charter,  in  a  very  important  sense,  at  a  time  when 
this  country  was  chastened  by  the  fires  of  a  great 
war.  We  were  thinking  deeply  about  ourselves 
and  our  future  in  those  days,  as  we  must  today. 

But  those  commitments  are  not  only  congenial 
with  American  tradition ;  they  are  congenial  with 
the  great  humane  tradition  of  man.  These  things 
we  share  with  other  people,  regardless  of  race,  geo- 
graphical location,  or  indeed — when  we  talk  about 
ordinary  men  and  women — regardless  of  political 
system.  These  great  commitments  that  are  so 
deeply  rooted  in  the  nature  of  man  himself  make 
allies  of  us  all  as  we  move  into  the  future. 

But  if  we  shirk  our  responsibilities  at  this  point, 
if  we  fail  to  cari-y  these  burdens  through  the  pe- 
riod ahead,  this  could  make  a  difference — a  disas- 
trous difference — and  could  shift  the  nature  of  our 
burdens  into  ever  more  dangerous  channels. 

I  will  say  to  you  quite  frankly  we  are  not  look- 
ing for  a  blank  check  in  such  matters  as  foreign 
aid.  We  have  an  obligation  in  Government — and 
those  in  other  countries  receiving  American  as- 
sistance have  an  obligation — to  see  that  these  funds 
are  in  fact  well  used.  There  have  been,  and  there 
will  be,  mistakes.  But  we  should  not  let  the  mis- 
takes disrupt  the  entire  effort. 

Our  friends  abroad  must  recognize  that  these 
funds  come  out  of  taxes,  not  out  of  some  mountain 
of  gold  hidden  away  in  a  Western  desert,  and  that 
in  good  conscience  we  cannot  mobilize  these  funds 
from  the  ordinary  people  of  the  United  States  in 
order  to  match  waste  with  waste.  We  must  match 
performance  with  performance. 

The  external  resources  of  the  Alliance  for 
Progress  will  amount  to  something  in  the  order 
of  2  percent  of  the  gross  national  product  of  the 
Latin  American  countries.  If  by  what  we  do 
with  the  2  percent  we  can  stimulate  and  invigorate 
what's  done  with  the  98  percent,  much  can  be 
accomplished.  To  the  extent  that  we  can  assist 
other  governments  in  mobilizing  the  interests  and 
the  loyalties  of  their  own  people  in  this  great 
effort,  we  need  not  be  concerned  about  whether 
development  will  in  fact  occur;  it  will  occur. 

So  we  have  some  great  tasks  in  front  of  us.  As 
free  people,  we  can  look  forward  to  them  with 
confidence.  They  won't  be  easy  to  cari-y.  But  we 
lay  them  down  in  the  most  literal  sense  at  our  very 
peril. 


873 


U.S.  Team  To  Assess  India's  Needs 
Against  Communist  Incursions 

Statement  iy  President  Kennedy  ^ 

Over  the  last  weekend  the  Chinese  have  made 
great  advances  in  northeastern  India.  Now  they 
have  offered  some  kind  of  cease-fire  proposal,  and 
we  are  in  toucli  with  the  Indian  Government  to 
determine  their  assessment  of  it.  In  order  to  better 
assess  Indian  needs,  we  are  sending  a  team  to  New 
Delhi,  headed  by  Assistant  Secretary  [of  State  for 
Far  Eastern  Affairs]  Averell  Harriman,  includ- 
ing Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  Paul  Nitze  and 
other  representatives  of  the  Defense  Department 
and  State  Department.    It  will  leave  tomorrow. 

In  providing  military  assistance  to  India,  we 
are  mindful  of  our  alliance  with  Pakistan.^  All 
of  our  aid  to  India  is  for  the  purpose  of  defeating 
Chinese  Communist  subversion.  Chinese  incur- 
sions into  the  subcontinent  are  a  threat  to  Pakistan 
as  well  as  India,  and  both  have  a  common  interest 
in  opposing  it. 

We  have  urged  this  point  in  both  governments. 
Our  help  to  India  in  no  way  diminishes  or  quali- 
fies our  conmiitment  to  Pakistan,  and  we  have 
made  this  clear  to  both  governments  as  well. 

President  Kennedy  Reviews  Progress 
Toward  Solution  of  Cuban  Crisis 

Statement  by  President  Kennedy  ^ 

I  have  today  been  informed  by  Chairman 
Khrushchev  that  all  of  the  ILr-28  bombers  now  in 
Cuba  will  be  withdrawn  in  30  days.  He  also 
agrees  that  these  planes  can  be  observed  and 
counted  as  they  leave.  Inasmuch  as  this  goes  a 
long  way  toward  reducing  the  danger  which  faced 
this  hemisphere  4  weeks  ago,^  I  have  this  afternoon 
instructed  the  Secretary  of  Defense  to  lift  our 
naval  quarantine. 

In  view  of  this  action,  I  want  to  take  this  op- 
portunity to  bring  the  American  people  up  to  date 
on  the  Cuban  crisis  and  to  review  the  progress 
made  thus  far  in  fulfilling  the  understandings  be- 


'  Read  by  the  President  at  his  news  coiiference  on 
Nov.  20. 

'  For  baokjjround,  see  BrLLETiN  of  Dec.  3,  1962,  p.  837. 

'  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  12,  19C2,  pp. 
715-746,  and  Nov.  19, 1962,  p.  762. 


tween  Soviet  Chairman  Khruslirhev  and  myself 
as  set  forth  in  our  letters  of  October  27  and  28." 
Chairman  Khrushchev,  it  will  be  recalled,  agreed 
to  remove  from  Cuba  all  weapons  systems  capable 
of  offensive  use,  to  halt  the  further  introduction 
of  sucli  weapons  into  Cuba,  and  to  permit  appro- 
priate United  Nations  observation  and  supervision 
to  insure  the  carrying  out  and  continuation  of 
these  commitments.  We  on  our  part  agreed  that, 
once  these  adequate  arrangements  for  verification 
had  been  established,  we  would  remove  our  naval 
quarantine  and  give  assurances  against  invasion 
of  Cuba. 

The  evidence  to  date  indicates  that  all  known 
offensive  missile  sites  in  Cuba  have  been  dis- 
mantled. The  missiles  and  their  associated  equip- 
ment have  been  loaded  on  Soviet  ships.  And  our 
inspection  at  sea  of  these  departing  ships  has  con- 
firmed that  the  number  of  missiles  reported  by  the 
Soviet  Union  as  having  been  brought  into  Cuba, 
which  closely  corresponded  to  our  own  informa- 
tion, has  now  been  removed.  In  addition  the 
Soviet  Government  has  stated  that  all  nuclear 
weapons  have  been  withdrawn  from  Cuba  and  no 
offensive  weapons  will  be  reintroduced. 

Nevertheless,  important  parts  of  the  understand- 
ing of  October  27th  and  28th  remain  to  be  carried 
out.  The  Cuban  Government  has  not  yet  per- 
mitted the  United  Nations  to  verify  whether  all 
offensive  weapons  have  been  removed,  and  no  last- 
ing safeguards  have  yet  been  established  against 
the  future  introduction  of  offensive  weapons  back 
into  Cuba. 

Consequently,  if  the  Western  Hemisphere  is  to 
continue  to  be  protected  against  offensive  weapons, 
this  Government  has  no  choice  but  to  pursue  its 
own  means  of  checking  on  military  activities  in 
Cuba.  The  importance  of  our  continued  \agilance 
is  underlined  by  our  identification  in  recent  days 
of  a  niunber  of  Soviet  ground  combat  units  in 
Cuba,  although  we  are  informed  that  these  and 
other  Soviet  units  were  associated  with  the  pro- 
tection of  offensive  weapons  systems  and  will  also 
be  withdrawn  in  due  course. 

I  repeat,  we  would  like  nothing  better  than  ade- 
quate international  arrangements  for  the  task  of 
inspection  and  verification  in  Cuba,  and  we  are 
prepared  to  continue  our  efforts  to  achieve  such 
arrangements.  Until  that  is  done,  difficult  prob- 
lems remain.     As  for  our  part,  if  all  offensive 


*  Ibid.,  .Nov.  12,  1902.  p.  743. 


874 


Department  of  Stale  BuUelin 


weapons  are  removed  from  Cuba  and  kept  out 
f  the  hemisphere  in  the  future,  mider  adequate 
erification  and  safeguards,  and  if  Cuba  is  not 
sed  for  the  export  of  aggressive  Communist  pur- 
oses,  there  will  be  peace  in  the  Caribbean.  And 
3  I  said  in  September,"  we  shall  neither  initiate 
or  permit  aggression  in  this  hemisphere. 
We  will  not,  of  course,  abandon  the  political, 
;onomic,  and  other  efforts  of  this  hemisphere  to 
alt  subversion  from  Cuba  nor  our  purpose  and 
ope  that  the  Cuban  people  shall  some  day  be 
Tily  free.  But  these  policies  are  very  different 
•om  any  intent  to  launch  a  military  invasion  of 
le  island. 


'/6i(i.,  Oct.  1,1962,  p.  481. 


In  short,  the  record  of  recent  weeks  shows  real 
progress,  and  we  are  hopeful  that  further  progress 
can  be  made.  The  completion  of  the  commitment 
on  both  sides  and  the  achievement  of  a  peaceful 
solution  to  the  Cuban  crisis  might  well  open  the 
door  to  the  solution  of  other  outstanding  problems. 

May  I  add  this  final  tliought.  In  this  week  of 
Thanksgiving  there  is  much  for  which  we  can  be 
grateful  as  we  look  back  to  where  we  stood  only 
4  weeks  ago — the  miity  of  this  hemisphere,  the 
support  of  our  allies,  and  the  calm  determination 
of  the  American  people.  These  qualities  may  be 
tested  many  more  times  in  this  decade,  but  we 
have  increased  reason  to  be  confident  that  those 
qualities  will  continue  to  serve  the  cause  of  free- 
dom with  distinction  in  the  years  to  come. 


Most  Dangerous  Time 


hy  Harlan  Cleveland 

Assistant  Secretary  for  International  Organization  Affairs  - 


We  have  been  living  this  month  in  one  of  those 
ire  moments  of  conflict  and  clarity  when  each 
f  us  must  try  to  be  his  own  expert  on  intema- 
onal  affairs;  and  each  of  us  has  an  equal  right 
)  cloud  the  crystal  ball  of  world  politics. 

At  sucli  a  moment  you  will  always  find  some 
ublic  speaker  alerting  his  audience  to  the  simul- 
meous  presence  of  great  dangers  and  great  op- 
ortunities  in  the  world  roimd  about.  Wliat  he 
leans,  of  course,  is  that  he  does  not  and  cannot 
now  what  the  future  will  bring. 

But  danger  and  opportunity  do  go  hand  in 
and,  especially  in  times  of  crisis.  They  have  done 
)  for  a  very  long  time.  Even  in  ancient  China  the 
leographic  sign  for  "crisis"  was  a  combination 


^  Address  made  before  the  National  Council  for  the  So- 
al  Studies  at  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  on  Nov.  23  (press  re- 
ase  69.5). 

lecember   70,   1962 


of  the  symbol  for  "danger"  and  the  symbol  for 
"change,"  which,  in  turn,  is  an  element  of  the 
symbol  for  "opportunity." 

Just  about  a  year  ago  at  his  press  conference 
President  Kennedy  commented  that  "we  happen 
to  live  in  the  most  dangerous  time  in  the  history 
of  the  human  race."  No  one — including  the  man 
in  the  Kremlin — could  know  a  year  ago  that  this 
danger  would  come  to  a  climax  in  tlie  form  of  42 
medium-range  ballistic  missiles  on  the  small  and 
misgoverned  island  of  Cuba.  But  there  was  then 
— and  still  is — the  danger  of  nuclear  war  by  de- 
sign or  by  accident  unless  agreement  can  be 
reached  to  bring  the  nuclear  arms  race  under  con- 
trol. There  was  then — and  still  is — the  night- 
marish vision  of  what  has  been  called,  rather 
antiseptically,  the  "nth  country  problem"- — mean- 
ing the  spread  of  nuclear  capability  beyond  the 
present  nuclear  powers  and  the  emergence  of  not 


875 


Il 


4  but  6  or  8  or  10  or  12  nuclear  powers,  not  one 
nuclear  arms  race  but  two  or  three  or  four  of  them 
at  once.  There  was  a  year  ago — as  still  there 
is — the  business  of  relations  between  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Communist  China;  the  half  dozen  or 
so  danger  spots  in  Europe,  the  Far  East,  the  Mid- 
dle East,  and  Africa;  and  the  constant  danger  of 
social  and  political  breakdown  as  old  nations  seek 
to  modernize  at  breakneck  speed  and  new  nations 
try  to  master  the  tricky  business  of  governing 
themselves. 

But  the  center  of  the  danger  has  been  the  con- 
frontation between  the  United  States  and  the  So- 
viet Union. 

Today  we  know  that  this  confrontation  between 
the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.E.  reached  its 
most  dangerous  postwar  crisis  to  date,  not  in  Ber- 
lin or  the  Middle  East  or  Africa  or  Southeast 
Asia  or  even  Korea,  but,  of  all  places,  in  the  Carib- 
bean ;  we  know  that  what  the  Communists  miscall 
the  "socialist  camp"  is  made  up  of  warring  theo- 
logical factions;  and  we  know  that  the  unalined 
nations  are  going  through  an  agonizing  reapprais- 
al of  the  value  of  Soviet  commitments  and  the 
dubious  wisdom  of  cotmting  on  the  friendship  of 
Communist  China. 

We  are.  in  brief,  in  a  period  for  major  readjust- 
ments— of  power  and  of  thinking  about  power. 
No  one  knows  what  kind  of  adjustment  will 
emerge,  or  how  long  it  will  take,  or  whether  the 
dangers  or  the  opportunities  will  predominate  in 
the  months  and  years  ahead. 

Nevertheless  I  want  to  share  with  you  this 
evening  some  thoughts  about  why  things  may 
have  broken  loose  the  way  they  seem  to  have  done 
and  speculate  for  a  moment  about  what  this  might 
have  to  do  with  wliat  American  students  should 
be  learning  and  American  teachers  should  be 
teaching. 

Fortunes  of  the  U.S.S.R.  as  a  Nation 

Tliero  arc  tliose,  of  course,  who  see  nothing  but 
dangers  for  the  United  States  in  the  fluidity  of 
the  current  situation.  There  are  those  who  are 
unable  to  believe  that  world  communism  is  any- 
tliing  but  the  relentless  and  all-powerful  wave  of 
the  future.  There  are  those  who  refuse  to  admit 
that  Soviet  society  has  changed  a  jot  or  a  tittle, 
who  insist  that  the  Soviet  leaders  are  simon-pure 
Ijeninists  whose  every  move  and  every  word  is 
fully  explained  by  the  famous  Lenin  doctrine  of 


876 


"zigs  and  zags."  There  are  those,  including  voci 
erously  loyal  Americans,  who  believe  that  most  c| 
what  happens  in  this  world  is  happening  becaui 
the  Communists  planned  it  that  way.  You  hai 
met  them  in  every  living  room  and  every  cool 
tail  party,  the  good  folk  who  are  persuaded  thii 
for  a  decade  or  more  the  West  has  been  in  steadi 
and  abject  retreat  before  the  onrushing  Commi 
nist  juggernaut. 

But  such  people  not  only  lack  faith  in  oi 
strength,  our  will,  our  intelligence,  and  our  sy 
tem ;  they  are  ill-informed  to  boot.  They  canm 
or  will  not  read  the  record  of  reality  spread  oi 
before  them  in  the  news  of  each  passing  day. 

If  we  want  to  arrive  at  a  rational  view  of  tl 
mixed  dangers  and  opportunities  of  the  day,  v 
should  try  hard  to  look  at  the  world  from  whe 
the  Kussians  view  it — not  to  shed  tears  for  the 
manifold  troubles  but  to  measure  how  deep 
troubled  they  have  reason  to  be. 

It  is  worth  a  few  minutes  for  a  backward  loc 
at  the  fortunes  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  of  cor 
munism  between  the  end  of  World  War  II  ar 
the  time  when  Chairman  Ivlirushchev  set  up  mi 
sile  pads  in  Cuba  and  Chairman  Mao  pushed  h 
infantry  divisions  through  the  high  Himalayas 

The  Soviet  Union  during  this  period  has  clea 
ly  emerged  as  one  of  the  great  military  ar 
ecoTiomic  nation-states  of  the  world,  a  stati 
which  it  doubtless  will  hold  for  the  foreseeab 
future. 

If  this  seems  obvious,  it  is  worth  recalling  th 
at  the  end  of  World  War  TI  the  United  States- 
for  a  fleeting  moment  in  history — was  the  on 
great  power  on  this  planet,  possessor  of  the  on 
bomb.  The  Soviet  Union  had  emerged  from  tl 
war  more  savagely  torn  than  any  other  land.  Tl 
richest  one-third  of  the  nation  had  been  put 
the  torch;  the  human  losses  were  greater  th£ 
those  sustained  by  all  other  belligerents  cor 
liinod:  and  the  remaining  population  was  e 
liausted  by  5  cruel  years  of  effort  and  privatio 

Yet  within  15  years — and  by  prodigious  energ 
— tlie  nation  called  the  Soviet  Union  had  becom 
for  the  first  time  since  the  revolution,  a  top-rar 
world  power.  In  the  view  of  most  people  tl 
Soviet  Union  had  become,  in  fact,  the  other  supe 
power  of  tlie  postwar  world.  Its  scientific  a 
C()m]5lishments  are  iiidul)ital)ly  formidable  and  r 
doubt  will  continue;  the  Soviet  people  have  re- 
son  for  i^ride  in  national  accomplishment;  it 

Department  of  State  Bulleti 


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low  economically  possible  for  the  Soviets  to  make 
•apid  strides  in  raising  the  people's  standard  of 
iving  once  political  factors  free  a  greater  propor- 
:ion  of  resources  to  the  fulfillment  of  civilian 
leeds. 

But  these  successes  have  to  do  only  with  the 
fortunes  of  the  Soviet  Union  as  a  nation  within 
I  world  system  of  nation-states — not  with  its  po- 
itical  or  social  system  or  with  its  pretensions  to 
lead  a  world  movement  called  communism.  "Wliat 
ibout  the  fortimes  of  communism? 

Turning  of  Tides  Against  World  Communism 

As  we  look  back  now  we  can  see  that  tlie  at- 
:ractive  power  of  communism  on  a  global  scale 
reached  its  peak  in  the  years  immediately  follow- 
ing World  War  II. 

At  the  close  of  the  war  Europe  and  Japan  were 
smashed;  the  colonial  empires  were  due  to 
rumble;  Southeast  Asia,  the  Middle  East,  and 
Africa  were  about  to  catch  fire ;  and  Latin  Amer- 
ica was  slumbering  deceptively  under  obsolete, 
and  therefore  flammable,  economic  and  social 
systems. 

The  Soviet  Union  had  been  victorious  in  the 
war  against  nazism  and  fascism;  the  Red  army 
had  covered  itself  with  glory;  the  Communists 
throughout  occupied  Europe  had  supported  and 
stall  often  led  the  underground  resistance  movements 


and  thus  became  national  heroes;  Communists 
were  taken  into  the  cabinets  of  postwar  European 
governments  to  represent  large,  flourishing,  and 
well-financed  national  Communist  parties;  and 
elsewhere  in  the  world  Communists  were  as  active 
as  they  could  be  in  the  national  independence 
movements  about  to  sweep  the  world. 

Much  of  the  world  looked  ripe  for  the  kind 
of  violent  change  and  political  chaos  which  sets 
the  stage  for  Communists  to  play  their  classic  role 
of  scavengers. 

In  the  name  of  international  communism  Stalin 
started  things  off  by  putting  the  clamp  on  eastern 
and  parts  of  central  Europe — by  keeping  terri- 
tory already  overrun  by  the  Red  army. 

Then  came  the  great  windfall  for  communism 
with  the  collapse  of  Nationalist  China  and  the 
consequent  resounding  impact  of  the  Chinese  rev- 
olution on  Asian  affairs  and  Asian  thinking.  The 
call  went  out  from  a  meeting  in  Calcutta  for  Com- 
munist uprisings  throughout  Asia,  and  soon 
China  was  launched  on  that  apparently  spectacu- 

December   70,   J962 


lar  "great  leap  forward"  which  many  began  to 
see  as  the  model  for  modernization. 

For  a  while  communism  really  began  to  look 
to  many — including  some  of  our  homegrown 
havoc-criers — like  the  wave  of  the  future.  But 
suddenly  it  passed  its  peak.  Soviet  pressures  on 
Iran  and  Turkey,  the  Communist  insurrection  in 
Greece,  the  Berlin  blockade,  and  unremitting  hos- 
tility evoked  countermeasures  from  the  West.  In- 
terference in  the  Italian  elections,  the  campaign 
to  sabotage  European  recovery,  and  most  of  all 
the  rape  of  Czechoslovakia  produced  a  moral  re- 
vulsion in  Europe.  By  about  1950  the  bloom  was 
off  the  rose.  The  tide  of  communism  in  Western 
Europe  began  to  ebb,  and  it  has  been  ebbing  ever 
since. 

The  turn  came  somewhat  later  in  Asia  as  the 
"great  leap  forward"  ground  to  a  noisy  halt  and 
then  went  into  reverse — as  one  disaster  of  Com- 
munist mismanagement  followed  another  until 
the  refugees  swarmed  into  Hong  Kong,  as  insur- 
rections were  put  down  in  Malaya  and  the  Philip- 
pines and  the  call  to  revolution  went  unheeded 
elsewhere,  and  as  Asians  learned  from  Korea, 
from  Indochina,  from  Tibet,  and  finally  from  the 
invasion  of  India,  what  the  Europeans  learned 
from  Czechoslovakia. 

Weakened  Communist  parties  in  Asia  are  now 
torn  between  loyalty  to  Moscow  or  Peiping — or 
to  some  national  variant  of  communism;  and  the 
tide  may  now  be  ebbing  for  the  Communists  in 
Asia  as  it  did  for  those  in  Europe  a  dozen  years 
ago. 

Meanwhile  in  the  Middle  East  the  famous 
Communist  "penetration"  of  the  midfifties  ran 
out  of  gas  as  the  Communists  typically  overplayed 
their  hands  and,  also  typically,  bumped  their 
heads  against  nationalism  and  a  stubborn  rejec- 
tion of  alien  doctrine.  Wliatever  social  forms 
evolve  in  the  Middle  East,  they  will  be  in  the  name 
of  local  nationalisms,  not  proletarian  internation- 
alism; and  in  most  countries  it  will  be  sanctified 
by  Moslem,  not  Communist,  prophets — by  Mo- 
hammed perhaps,  but  not  by  Marx. 

In  Africa  the  Soviets  leapt  at  the  chance  opened 
for  them  in  the  Congo.  But  they  played  their 
hand  badly  at  the  United  Nations,  voting  three 
times  in  the  Security  Council  for  a  Congo  oper- 
ation that  cut  right  across  their  own  plans  for 
penetration.  They  showed  their  cards  carelessly 
by  flying  in  those  big  Ilyushins  with  conspicuous 


877 


aid  and  "ugly  Russians";  they  apparently 
thouglit  the  levers  of  power  needed  only  to  be 
grasped,  not  realizing  they  first  had  to  be  created; 
tliey  bet  heavily  and  clumsily  on  an  ineffective 
effort  to  prop  up  [Antoine]  Gizenga;  when  they 
took  out  on  Dag  Hammarskjold  their  frustrations 
in  the  Congo,  they  succeeded  only  in  lining  up 
against  their  Congo  policy  nearly  all  the  small 
nations,  who  would  not  brook  an  attack  on  the 
U.N.  itself. 

Elsewhere  in  Africa  the  Soviets  had  their 
knuckles  rapped  wlien  they  tried  some  heavy- 
handed  meddling  in  other  people's  politics.  The 
leaders  of  Africa,  like  those  of  Asia  and  the  Mid- 
dle East,  clearly  prefer  to  make  their  own  in- 
dependent mistakes  without  outside  guidance. 
The  struggle  for  Africa  has  only  begun,  but  from 
the  Communist  standpoint  it  is  not  going  too  well. 

The  last  chance  for  communism  to  look  like 
the  wave  of  the  future  was  in  Latin  America,  but 
that  chance  has  now  been  reduced  by  the  sordid 
story  of  Dr.  Castro  and  his  sellout  to  Moscow. 
The  Communists  still  have  plenty  of  capacity  for 
disruption  and  general  mischief,  but  the  prospects 
for  the  Soviet  push  into  the  hemisphere  don't  look 
so  bright  after  the  unanimous  determination  of 
the  Organization  of  American  States  to  shoo  them 
off.  Now  much  depends  on  what  we  Americans 
do  in  our  own  hemisphere,  starting  with  redou- 
bled efforts  to  make  the  Alliance  for  Progress 
hum  with  the  noises  of  progress  and  reform. 

The  turning  of  the  tides  against  world  com- 
munism has  been  brought  about  mainly  by  a  whole 
series  of  U.S.  and  Allied  moves  which  made  it 
abundantly  clear  that  freedom  was  much  more 
than  a  wave  of  the  past — the  Truman  Doctrine, 
the  Marshall  Plan,  the  Berlin  airlift,  Korea, 
NATO,  the  Rio  Treaty,  ANZUS,  Point  4,  the  Al- 
liance for  Progress,  the  Common  Market,  our  aid 
to  South  Viet-Nam,  and  many  more — the  sum  of 
postwar  moves  by  the  Western  World,  with  U.S. 
leadership,  to  contain  the  outward  thrust  of  So- 
viet communism  and  to  develop  the  inward  thrust 
of  economic  strength  and  defensive  power  in  the 
non-Communist  world.  And  the  turning  of  the 
tide  was  also  greatly  helped  by  the  deepening 
schism  in  the  Commimist  church  and  the  spinoff 
of  rival  denominations. 

Thus  communism  as  a  world  movement,  reach- 
ing its  crest  in  the  immediate  postwar  years,  be- 
gan to  ebb  first  in  Europe,  then  Asia,  the  Middle 


878 


East,  and  Africa,  and  now — with  those  departinJ 
missiles — in  Latin  America. 

Communism  as  a  worldwide  revolution  is  nc 
stone  dead.  The  wave  can  again  surge  forwar 
but  with  lesser  strength  and  more  backwash.  Am 


' 


as    he    has    recently 
Khrushchev  is  a  man 
the  ladder. 


demonstrated,    ChairmaJ  wl 
who  can  see  the  holes  i 


Slowdown  of  Communist  Economy 

Wliat  of  communism  as  a  social  system  in  th 
Soviet  Union?  What  became  of  that  image  o 
unblemished  success  that  was  to  have  exerted  s 
powerfully  attractive  an  influence  on  the  yoim 
nations  of  Asia,  Africa,  and  Latin  America? 

The  Soviet  Union,  as  a  Communist  societj 
reached  its  peak  of  prestige  and  influence  afte 
the  world  Communist  movement  was  already  i 
decline — with  Sputnik  I  or  perhaps  with  Majo 
Gagarin's  flight.  But  here,  too,  the  ebb  tide  ha 
begun. 

After  the  Second  World  War  the  Soviet  Unio: 
engineered  a  most  remarkable  recovery  from  th 
worst  punishment  any  nation  has  ever  suffers 
in  war.  When  Chairman  Khrushchev  cam 
along  he  looked  like  a  new  kind  of  Communist- 
an  extroverted  political  executive  more  interestei 
in  getting  things  done  than  in  reciting  the  scrip 
tures.  The  internal  terror  was  lifted,  and  So 
viet  society  seemed  on  its  way  to  more  libera 
days;  the  Soviets  were  starting  to  move  about  ii 
the  outside  world  and  to  dish  out  aid  and  trade 
the  internal  economy  was  booming  and  was  be 
ginning  to  look  like  a  patented  prescription  fo 
rapid  modernity;  the  Soviets  were  riding  the  na 
tionalist  revolutions  for  all  they  were  worth— 
and  then  along  came  evidence  that,  by  the  meas 
ure  of  rocket  thrust,  the  Soviet  Union  has  sur 
passed  the  United  States  in  outer  space. 

That  peak  of  prestige,  too,  now  is  past.  Thi 
current  successes  and  future  prospects  of  the  U.Si 
outer  space  program — including  Telstar  and  me 
teorological  satellites  as  well  as  manned  flight  am 
deep  probes — have  wiped  out  the  mirage  of  over 
all  Soviet  scientific  leadership.  They  are  good— 
in  some  fields  superb — but  they  are  not  the  best 

Even  as  the  world  was  gasping  at  sputniks  am 
orbiting  cosmonauts,  a  lengthening  inventory  o: 
internal  problems  suggested  that  Soviet  Com 
munist  society  might  not,  after  all,  be  the  answei 
to  man's  fondest  aspirations. 

Deparfment  of  State  Bulletin 


A  slowed-down  Soviet  economy  seems  to  be 
faced  witli  a  clear  need  for  rather  drastic  reforms 
if  it  is  going  to  maintain  growth  on  the  same 
scale — and  tlie  miserable  record  of  agriculture  in 
many  Communist  states  is  a  well-known  scandal 
wherever  plamiers  discuss  the  advantages  of  al- 
ternative economic  "systems."  Most  recently  the 
Communist  planneis  in  Peiiiing,  reading  woodenly 
out  of  that  same  dog-eared  book  on  agricultural 
economics  that  has  ruined  the  farm  production 
of  half  a  dozen  other  Communist  covmtries,  have 
managed  a  great  leap  backward  in  Chinese  agri- 
culture too.  With  the  entire  underdeveloped 
world  looking  on — a  world  which  is  75  percent 
rural — Communist  planners  have  come  face  to  face 
with  the  impossibility  of  growing  food  efficiently 
by  police-state  methods. 

Meanwhile,  in  the  democratic  world  the  miracle 
of  Germany  was  followed  by  the  miracle  of 
France,  the  miracle  of  Japan,  the  miracle  of  Italy, 
and  now  the  miracle  of  the  Common  Market  with 
the  U.K.  perhaps  included  and  with  an  Atlantic 
economic  partnership  on  the  horizon.  Our  mixed 
economy  does  not  seem  to  be  collapsing  from  in- 
ternal contradictions  or  anything  else;  the  so- 
called  "capitalist  camp"  is  not  going  to  civil  war 
over  dwindling  world  markets  or  anything  else; 
and  the  European  Common  Market  now  embraces 
an  industrial  complex  so  impressive  that  our  So- 
viet critics,  having  failed  to  prevent  it  from  com- 
ing about,  are  now  trying  to  create  their  own 
common  market  with  Eastern  Europe  and  calling 
rather  defensively  for  freer  trade  and  economic 
cooperation  between  the  Eastern  apostles  of 
autarky  and  the  Western  practitioners  of  lib- 
eralized trade. 

Some  Facts  About  the  Soviet  Union 

If  communism  as  a  revolutionai-y  world  move- 
ment is  in  partial  eclipse — and  if  Soviet  society  is 
no  longer  so  bright  a  magnet — what  of  the  Soviet 
Union  as  a  nation-state?  The  U.S.S.R.  is  and 
will  remain  a  great  power.  But  these  things  must 
also  be  said : 

— The  Soviet  Union  is  half  modern  and  half 
rural  slum.  If  the  modem  half  is  to  continiie  to 
grow  at  the  same  pace,  it  must  adopt  more  ade- 
quate substitutes  for  a  price-and-profit  system, 
which  indeed  it  appears  to  be  moving  toward — 
and  trying  to  invent  some  modern  Marxist  lan- 
guage to  describe.     If  the  slum  half  is  to  become 


modern,  the  Kussians  will  have  to  alter  Communist 
agricultural  doctrine  some  more,  which  will  change 
quite  a  lot  of  other  things. 

— The  Soviet  Union  is  now  run  by  a  man  who 
took  one  of  the  most  risky  and  radical  steps  con- 
ceivable to  change  life  in  Eussia — tlie  total  de- 
struction of  the  reputation  of  a  Soviet  idol — and 
in  the  process  clearly  implied  that  the  Communist 
system  cannot  protect  a  people  against  brutality, 
error,  sin,  and  incompetence  at  the  top.  The  les- 
son can  hardly  have  been  lost  on  the  Soviet  people. 

— Before  long  the  Soviet  Union  will  come  under 
another  generation  of  leadership  (though  still 
without  a  mechanism  for  orderly  transfer  of 
power).  For  better  or  for  worse,  the  new  men 
will  see  things  somewhat  differently  than  the 
present  leadership;  how  they  see  things  will  much 
depend  on  how  vigorously  toe  have  been  using  our 
opportunities  around  the  world. 

— State  controls  in  the  Soviet  Union  are  being 
slowly  eroded  by  writers,  painters,  jazz  buffs,  beat- 
niks, juvenile  delinquents,  black  marketeers,  and 
nylon  stockings — probably  an  irreversible  proc- 
ess— further  testimony  that  all  the  propaganda  in 
the  world  cannot  undo  the  cussed  determination 
of  modern  man  to  seek  his  own  kind  of  freedom, 
wearing  his  own  collar. 

Let  us  look  at  a  few  more  facts : 

— The  Soviet  Union  is  a  not-quite-so-closed  so- 
ciety at  a  time  when  science  and  technology  are 
making  closed  societies  increasingly  hard  to  keep 
shut  off  from  the  turbulent,  interesting  world  of 
pluralism  and  variety  outside  the  wall. 

— The  Soviet  Union  clearly  does  not  possess  the 
exclusive  patent  for  rapid  industrialization  and 
economic  growth,  gi\-en  the  "miracles"  of  Ger- 
many, France,  Italy,  and  Japan — or  Israel  or 
Puerto  Rico  for  that  matter.  And  so  the  develop- 
ing countries  are  passing  up  the  temptation  to  copy 
the  faded  Soviet  blueprint. 

— The  Soviet  Union  is  suzerain  of  a  group  of 
European  states  in  which  nationalism  will  not  die, 
which  also  are  being  de-Stalinized,  which  are  all 
having  trouble  with  their  agricultural  sectors,  and 
whose  centrifugal  pull  probably  may  someday  re- 
sult in  the  creation  of  a  much  looser  common- 
wealth— which  was  briefly  offered  to  them,  you 
will  remember,  at  the  height  of  the  Hungarian 
crisis.  And  a  looser  commonwealth  is  the  begin- 
ning of  the  end  of  that  antique  Communist  dream, 
the  closed  and  monolitliic  empire. 


December   10,   7962 


879 


— The  foreijrn  policy  of  tlie  Soviet  Union  is 
frustrated  by  U.S.  initiative,  by  prolonged  stale- 
mate, by  the  undepcndability  of  Communist 
China,  by  nuclear  infei-iority,  by  the  failure  to 
captm-e  the  world  nationalist  revolution,  and  now 
by  pullback  in  the  Caribbean. 

— Tlie  Soviet  Union  is  a  member  of  the  United 
Nations,  which  it  will  not  support,  cannot  control, 
but  dares  not  quit. 

— The  Soviet  Union  is  engaged  in  a  prestige  race 
for  achievement  in  outer  space  which  is  a  serious 
drain  on  resources  and  competes  for  funds  with 
the  armed  forces  and  the  need  for  heavy  invest- 
ment in  agriculture  and  some  sectors  of  industry. 

Prospects  of  a  Watershed  in  the  Cold  War 

It  is  hard  for  an  American,  or  any  Western  man, 
to  compensate  for  the  special  prisms  imposed  on 
the  vision  of  a  Communist.  But  to  Western  eyes, 
trying  to  look  at  things  from  where  Soviet  man 
sits,  it  is  difTicult  to  resist  the  conclusion  that  a 
point  has  been  reached  at  which  the  wisest,  indeed 
the  only  sensible,  course  of  action  for  the  Soviet 
Union  is  to  seek  some  basis  for  living  more  safely 
on  the  same  planet  with  the  non-Commmiist  na- 
tions— some  live-and-let-live  formula,  some  set  of 
explicit  or  tacit  ground  rules  for  nonmilitary 
competition. 

This  would  have  been  a  rational  conclusion  for 
Soviet  leaders  to  reach  before  the  recent  events  in 
the  Caribbean  and  along  the  Sino-Indian  fron- 
tiers. But  in  the  wake  of  these  crises  the  Soviet 
leaders  would  be  justified  in  finding  that  such  a 
conclusion  is  not  onlj'  rational  but  imperative: 
They  have  played  out  their  hand  of  nuclear  black- 
mail and  failed;  the  West  looks  more  formidable 
than  ever;  the  danger  of  putting  nuclear  weapons 
in  the  hands  of  too  many  nations  is  now  too  obvi- 
ous; the  vision  of  unity  in  tlie  Communist  world 
has  turned  out  to  be  illusory;  the  nonalined  states 
are  showing  signs  of  clearer  thinking  about  where 
their  national  interests  really  lie;  the  East  Eiuro- 
pean  satellites  can  be  excused  for  certain  appre- 
hensions about  the  future;  and  the  mythical  goal 
of  a  Communist  world  revolution  begins  to  look 
more  and  more  expensive,  more  and  more  unlikely 
of  achievement. 

If  Soviet  leaders  are  prepared  to  finish  the  job 
of  liquidating  the  Cuban  crisis,  we  may  find  our- 
selves at  an  important  turning  point  in  history,  at 
a  watershed  of  the  cold  war  as  we  have  known  it. 
For  the  Soviet  leaders  hold  in  their  hands  one  of 


880 


the  world's  most  powerful  weapons:  the  simple 
decision  to  live  at  peace  with  their  neighbors,  to 
stop  fighting  the  United  Nations  and  gradually 
join  it  in  fact  as  well  as  name,  to  start  down  the 
I'oad  toward  disarmament,  to  enter  piecemeal  into 
cooperative  scientific  and  technical  projects,  and, 
in  time,  to  become  so  enmeshed  in  international 
organizations  and  obligations  tliat  it  becomes  in- 
escapably clear  to  them — as  it  is  already  clear  to 
the  rest  of  us — ^that  there  is  much  more  to  be  won 
in  this  world  by  cooperation  than  by  coercion. 

But  there  is  a  problem  in  discussing  the  pros- 
pects of  a  watershed  in  world  affairs.  It  is  this: 
People  immediately  jump  to  the  conclusion  that 
we  shall  wake  up  some  fine  Friday  moniing  and 
discover  that  the  horrors  and  threats  and  sweat 
and  struggles  of  the  past  decade  and  a  half  were 
no  more  than  bad  dreams;  all  of  a  sudden,  the 
tensions  will  go  out  of  international  life,  and  we 
can  all  return  to  those  more  private  and  more 
placid  pursuits  which  we  all  claim  to  yearn  for. 
And  the  United  Nations,  of  course,  will  take  care 
of  any  unpleasantness  that  might  intrude  on  the 
new  "normalcy"  in  world  affairs. 

This,  of  course,  is  bottled-in-bond  mythology. 
There  will  be  no  Friday  morning  awakening. 

The  tattered  remains  of  Communist  ideology, 
including  the  mad  dream  of  a  Communist  one- 
world,  will  die  hard  in  the  minds  of  reactionary 
dogmatists  and  will  haunt  new  generations  of 
Communist  leaders. 

Red  China  will  remain  a  threat,  probably  a 
growing  threat,  to  the  peace  of  the  whole  world. 
We  cannot  see  through  the  Himalayan  mists  to 
know  what  an  aggressive  China  with  modem 
weapons  may  mean  for  us,  but  it  more  obviously 
adds  to  the  dangers  than  to  the  opportunities. 

The  ancient  and  fundamental  struggle  between 
freedom  and  coercion  will  go  on  within  the  minds 
of  men,  within  national  societies,  within  the  world 
community. 

Deep  and  dangerous  disputes  rooted  in  religion, 
race,  and  national  ambition  will  continue  to 
crackle  and  threaten  to  explode. 

Injustice  and  poverty  will  continue  to  subvert 
political  stability  and  retard  social  progress. 

Greed,  ambition,  and  love  of  power  will  still 
color  and  sicken  the  minds  of  men. 

And  a  Soviet  Union  in  a  more  nationalistic 
frame  of  mind  could  conceivably  be  as  trouble- 
some as  a  Soviet  Union  promoting  an  illusory 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


i 


world  revolution  of  the  proletariat.  In  any  event 
a  Soviet  Union  which  had  abandoned  the  military 
confrontation  with  the  United  States  would  shift 
to  the  field  of  economic  competition ;  it  would  still 
cling  to  totalitarian  principles;  it  would  still  for 
a  time  cling  to  the  foreign  real  estate  kept  as  booty 
from  World  War  II ;  it  would  still  be  warped  by 
inherited  dogma;  it  would  still  be  fearful  of  the 
open  society,  addicted  to  the  secrecy  that  antedates 
communism  in  Russia ;  it  would  still  be  suspicious 
of  the  motives  of  that  noisy  and  \arious  world 
community  which  the  Communists  insist  on  call- 
ing the  "capitalist  camp."  Living  at  peace  with 
its  neighbors  will  not  come  easy  to  a  state  with  so 
many  phobias  and  neuroses.  Yet  it  would  make 
sense  for  the  Soviet  Union  today. 

So  what  I  mean  by  a  turning  point  in  contempo- 
rary history  is  far  from  a  180-degree  turnabout — 
more  like  an  evolutionary  mutation,  changing 
subtly  and  with  massive  deliberation  but — we  can 
hope — moving  in  the  direction  of  peace  through 
complex  forms  of  cooperation  rather  than  war 
through  simple  appeals  to  pride  and  prejudice. 

Evidence  of  Maturity  in  U.S.  Reaction  to  Crisis 

Does  all  this  have  anything  to  do  with  what 
teachers  should  teach  and  what  children  should 
learn  about  world  affairs  in  the  schools  of  this 
country?  I  shall  not  try  to  coach  professionals 
in  your  business  about  how  to  order  your  own 
affairs. 

But  I  can,  I  think,  suggest  a  few  lessons  that  can 
be  drawn  from  recent  exposure  in  the  world  polit- 
ical arena — that  arena  in  which  crisis  brings  both 
danger  and  opportunity.  If  the  lessons  are  valid 
for  diplomats,  they  are  valid  for  teachers;  if  they 
are  valid  for  adults,  they  are  valid  for  youngsters. 
To  me  at  least,  several  things  are  very  clear  from 
the  busy  days  and  nights  of  the  past  months : 

First:  Crises  never  develop  in  quite  the  way — 
or  at  quite  the  time — the  experts  expect  them  to 
develop.  All  planning  is  contingent,  and  most 
action  is  extemporaneous. 

Second:  The  restrained  use  of  power,  the  appli- 
cation of  the  gentlest  form  of  power  that  serves 
the  purpose,  is  the  most  difficult  and  demanding 
exercise  of  power.  We  therefore  must  learn  how 
to  clench  our  teeth  and  maintain  in  combination 
a  degree  of  restraint  and  a  degree  of  simple  cour- 
age that  has  never  before  been  asked  of  a  dem- 
ocratic people. 

December  70,  7962 

667444 — 62 3 


Third:  Each  problem  or  crisis  in  world  affairs 
is  unique  and  therefore  demands  its  own  solution — 
its  own  mix  of  power  and  diplomacy,  force  and 
restraint;  its  own  instruments  of  action  or  lever- 
age, instruments  military,  political,  economic,  or 
persuasive;  its  own  choices  between  national  ac- 
tion, bilateral  diplomacy,  action  by  regional  allies, 
and  the  use  of  the  United  Nations  as  f  oiiim,  medi- 
ator, and  policeman;  or,  as  in  the  Cuban  case,  a 
judicious  mixture  of  all  of  these.  We  therefore 
must  refrain  from  generalizing  fi'om  the  particu- 
lar— refrain  from  assuming,  for  example,  that 
what  worked  in  the  Caribbean  last  month  neces- 
sarily will  work  the  same  way  anywhere  else. 
And  we  also  must  create  and  build  and  learn  to 
work  these  complicated  and  fascinating  mstru- 
mentalities  of  our  great  but  limited  power,  mclud- 
ing  the  51  international  clubs  of  which  we  are 
paid-up  members. 

Fourth:  There  is  no  single  or  simple  answer  to 
the  woes  of  the  world  at  any  given  time,  no  funda- 
mentalist theory  or  formula  with  the  whole  solu- 
tion, no  one  blinding  insight  into  the  meaning  of 
it  all.  The  better  one  understands  that  human 
affairs  are  almost  infinitely  complex,  the  clearer 
will  be  the  vision.  There  is  hardly  an  issue  in 
world  affairs  worth  discussion  which  is  not  inter- 
related with  other  issues;  which  does  not  involve 
a  mix  of  strategic,  political,  economic,  and  other 
factors;  which  does  not  involve  some  elements 
which  we  control  and  other  elements  wliich  we  do 
not  control ;  which  does  not  involve  contradictions 
between  domestic  politics  and  international  poli- 
tics— for  ourselves  and  for  everyone  else  party  to 
the  issue.  And  this  is  why  we  have  to  search,  un- 
tiring and  unfinistrated,  not  for  the  simple  answer 
which  is  always  wrong  but  for  the  answer  which 
is  complex  enough  to  be  right. 

And  fifth:  We  have  seen  clearly,  I  think,  that 
real  toughness  in  world  afl'airs  is  best  seen  as  ma- 
turity. Maturity  requires  a  cool  head,  steady 
nerves,  unflagging  patience,  tiresome  restraint, 
and  the  sheer  capacity  to  repeat  ourselves  until 
we  are  sure  we  are  understood — which  is  sometimes 
long  past  the  point  of  extreme  boredom.  It  also 
requires  that  ready  confidence,  that  calm  faith  in 
the  future  of  freedom  and  variety  in  human  af- 
fairs, and  that  healthy  pinch  of  optimism  wliich 
help  us  to  see  that  the  deep  tides  of  history  are 
moving  in  our  direction  and  impel  us  to  seize  the 
opportunities  while  facing  up  to  the  dangers.  Fi- 
nally, maturity  requires  a  clear  understanding 


881 


that  we  cannot  impose  quick  solutions  but  we  can, 
by  keeping  stubbornly,  everlastingly,  at  it,  influ- 
ence the  course  of  world  all'airs — not  only  at  mo- 
ments of  deep  crisis  but  during  the  intervals  in 
which  day-to-day  actions  determine  whether  there 
shall,  in  fact,  be  a  new  crisis  and,  if  so,  what  it 
shall  look  like. 

AVe  will  do  well  to  cultivate  these  qualities  and 
attitudes  in  ourselves  and  m  our  students.  The 
future  of  our  nation,  no  less,  may  depend  on  them. 

If  you  ponder  the  recent  spectacular  turns  in 
world  affairs,  I  tliink  you  will  agree  that  these 


lessons  have  been  reflected  in  the  performance  of 
the  United  States.  They  add  up  to  evidence  of  a 
maturity  which  is  becoming  a  dominant  motif  in 
American  public  reaction  to  each  successive  crisis. 
If  the  American  Government  behaved  profes- 
sionally and  maturely  through  the  grim  weeks  just 
past — and  I  think  it  did — it  was  able  to  do  so  be- 
cause the  American  public  kept  its  head,  its  tongue, 
and  its  faith  as  well  and  rejected  homegrown 
hysterics  by  ignoring  them.  And  that  augurs  well 
for  all  of  us  in  this  exhilarating  world  who  prefer 
freedom  and  intend  to  see  it  prevail. 


Africa's  Unfinished  Struggle  for  Freedom:  The  Real  Issues 


hy  Robert  C.  Good 

Director,  Office  of  Research  and  Analysis  for  African  Affairs  ^ 


You  have  asked  me  to  speak  about  the  real  is- 
sues in  Africa's  imfinished  struggle  for  freedom. 
That  is  a  large  order.  It  is  worth  remembering 
at  the  outset  that  the  struggle  for  freedom  is  al- 
ways unfinished — everywhere.  This  is  particu- 
larly true  when  freedom  is  understood  in  its 
broadest  and  deepest  sense. 

Obviously  we  are  not  talking  simply  about  that 
event  which,  over  the  last  decade,  has  taken  place 
some  29  times  across  the  breadth  of  the  world's 
second  largest  continent — when  at  midnight  the 
flag  of  a  new  state  is  run  to  the  top  of  the  mast  to 
herald  the  end  of  a  colonial  regime  and  the  advent 
of  sovereign  independence.  In  many  respects  the 
struggle  for  freedom  is,  in  that  moment,  not  ended 
but  only  begun.  This  must  have  been  what  Togo's 
President,  Sylvanus  Olympic,  had  in  mind  when 
he  noted  that  independence  was  a  little  like  his 
own  situation  upon  release  from  a  prison  of  the 
Vichy  French  regime  during  World  War  II :  "The 

'  Address  made  at  Washlnpton,  D.C.,  on  Oct.  20  before 
the  Afrif-a  Ingtitiite,  sponsored  by  the  School  of  Interna- 
tional Serrlcc  of  the  American  University  and  the  Wash- 
ington Committee  on  Africa. 


jailer  told  me,  'You  are  free.'  But  what  kind  of 
freedom  was  it  when  the  jail  was  in  the  desert, 
hundreds  of  miles  from  my  home,  and  there  was  no 
gasoline  for  the  truck  we  were  to  travel  in?" 

The  struggle  for  freedom  also  encompasses  the 
effort  to  establish  appropriate  relationships  with 
other  equally  free  peoples — relationships  charac- 
terized by  neither  subservience  nor  domination. 
Clearly  the  subservient  partner  is  not  free.  Psy- 
cliiatrists  tell  us  that  the  dominant  partner  is  not 
free  either.  He  is  fettered  by  his  need  to  keep  the 
other  in  subjugation. 

Of  course,  the  most  profound  and  ultimately 
the  only  meaningful  measure  of  freedom  is  the 
opportunity  which  it  provides  for  the  fulfillment 
of  the  individual  personality.  It  is  the  highest 
task  of  political  and  economic  leadership  to  secure 
the  conditions  which  make  this  possible.  Some  of 
these  conditions  we  shall  be  discussing  here. 

The  real  issues  involved  in  Africa's  unfinished 
struggle  for  freedom  are  found,  then,  in  several 
different,  though  related,  areas.  I  would  identify 
them  as  follows : 


882 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


1.  Tlie  establishment  of  a  new  basis  of  relations 
with  the  former  colonial  power. 

2.  The  building  of  the  new  state. 

3.  The  creation  of  a  new  system  of  states  in 
independent  Africa. 

4.  The  relationship  of  Africa  to  the  East-West 
struggle. 

5.  The  problem  of  expanding  the  rights  of  the 
populations  in  the  southern  third  of  Africa. 

In  each  of  these  areas,  as  we  shall  see,  the  issue 
is  known  by  millions  of  people  only  as  a  slogan. 
My  intention  is  to  examine  the  content  of  these 
slogans  to  see  what  about  them  is  real — and  in 
what  ways,  as  all  slogans  must,  they  oversimplify 
and  conceal  reality. 

Relations  With  the  Former  Colonial  Power 

The  issue  here  is  often  described  as  "the  threat 
of  neocolonialism."  Ghana's  President  Kwame 
Nkrumah  has  described  neocolonialism  as  "the 
practice  of  granting  a  sort  of  independence  by  the 
metropolitan  power,  with  the  concealed  intention 
of  making  the  liberated  country  a  client  state  and 
controlling  it  effectively  by  means  other  than 
political  ones." 

There  is,  of  course,  a  basis  for  such  fears.  Many 
new  states  become  independent  almost  fully 
dependent  upon  foreign  skills.  The  Congo  is 
often  cited  as  an  extreme  example.  In  1959,  only 
1  year  before  independence,  there  was  not  a  single 
Congolese  doctor,  lawyer,  engineer,  or  commis- 
sioned officer  in  the  entire  country.  In  the  army 
no  Congolese  held  a  rank  above  warrant  officer. 
At  independence  there  were  only  16  to  20  univer- 
sity graduates  in  the  whole  country.  The  Congo, 
as  one  journalist  put  it,  grasped  the  20th  century 
with  Belgian  hands. 

Ironically,  independence  brings  with  it  still 
greater  reliance  on  external  skills.  The  new  state 
inaugurates  programs— the  expansion  of  services, 
economic  development,  literacy  drives — that 
depend  for  their  fulfillment  on  importing  more 
and  more  talent. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  is  not  to  be  won- 
dered that  many  new  states  fear  domination  from 
those  upon  whom  they  are  so  dependent.  Many 
have  attempted  to  protect  and  consolidate  their 
political  freedom — to  overcome  the  threat  of  neo- 
colonialism— in  two  ways :  first,  by  rapidly  "Afri- 
canizing" their  government  services  and,  second, 
by  attempting  to  diversify  their  dependence  on  the 


outside  world.  These,  it  seems  to  me,  are  perfectly 
normal  objectives.  They  must,  of  course,  be  pur- 
sued with  care  if  they  are  to  contribute  to  the  con- 
solidation of  freedom.  If  the  new  state  African- 
izes too  quicldy,  technical  proficiency  will  decline 
and  with  it  the  capacity  to  serve  the  people  well. 
If  the  new  state  attempts  to  diversify  its  depend- 
ence on  external  resources  precipitately,  it  is  likely 
to  disrupt  traditional  marketing  and  fuiancial  ar- 
rangements before  it  has  found  equally  profitable 
substitutes. 

Actually,  the  objective  of  the  new  state  in  order- 
ing its  relations  with  the  former  colonial  power  is 
not  simply  to  cut  all  existing  ties,  on  the  assump- 
tion that  the  more  ties  it  cuts  the  freer  it  is.  The 
objective  is  to  mobilize  all  available  resources  in 
order  to  develop  as  rapidly  as  possible  its  capacity 
to  serve  its  people. 

For  this,  extensive  external  help  is  vital,  as  all 
African  leaders  have  acknowledged.  Ghana  is  an 
interesting  case  in  point,  precisely  because  its 
President,  more  perhaps  than  any  other  leader  in 
Africa,  has  warned  against  the  dangers  of  neo- 
colonialism. Wlien  I  was  in  Accra  in  1960,  there 
were  more  British  civil  servants  in  the  Ghanaian 
Government  than  there  had  been  prior  to  inde- 
pendence. It  was  only  last  year  that  President 
Nkrumah  appointed  a  Ghanaian  to  be  head  of  his 
army.  Prior  to  that  the  Chief  of  Staff  had  been 
a  British  general.  Yet  no  one  could  accuse  Ghana 
of  subservience  to  any  foreign  master  in  deter- 
mining its  domestic  and  foreign  policies. 

Taking  the  process  of  decolonization  as  a  whole, 
it  is  truly  extraordinary  how  effective  and  how 
cordial  has  been  the  transition  to  independence  in, 
to  date,  29  African  countries.  I  am  not  unaware 
of  the  exceptions,  but  the  rule  is  impressive. 
Equally  impressive  has  been  the  extensive  and 
indispensable  assistance  to  these  new  states 
extended  by  the  former  colonial  powers.  Even 
more  remarkable  is  the  fact  that  this  assistance 
has  been  given  without  the  donor  dominating  the 
policies  of  the  recipient. 

State  Building 

The  consolidation  of  freedom  implies  of  course 
more  than  the  development  of  mutually  beneficial 
relations  with  the  former  metropolitan  power.  It 
also  involves,  as  has  already  been  suggested,  the 
task  of  state  building.  Here  two  slogans  are  fre- 
quently invoked  by  African  leaders :  "African  de- 


December  70,  7962 


883 


mocracy"  and  "African  socialism."  I  want  to  say 
a  word  about  each. 

All  of  the  new  states  are  enijaged  in  a  desperate 
struggle  to  become  nations.  The  familiar  sequence 
of  political  development  has  been  foreshortened — 
in  a  sense,  even  reversed.  First  comes  nationalism, 
an  emotional-intellectual  ferment  among  a  small 
elite.  Then  comes  independence,  precipitately 
and  for  many  new  states  without  a  national  strug- 
gle of  any  significance.  Only  last  comes  what 
should  have  been  prior  to  or  at  least  concurrent 
with  the  first  two  stages — the  long  and  difficult 
task  of  building  something  like  a  national  society 
to  go  with  the  newly  won  legal  status  of 
nationhood. 

In  the  Congo,  for  example,  there  are  some  200 
tribal  groups,  over  70  dialects,  and  no  vivid  con- 
sciousness (except  among  a  small  elite)  of  what  it 
means  to  be  a  Congolese.  The  problem  is  cap- 
suled in  a  line  taken  from  the  introduction  of 
Prime  Minister  Cyrille  Adoula  to  a  mass  meeting 
in  Stanleyville:  "Adoula  is  a  great  nationalist, 
and  he  will  explain  nationalism  to  you." 

A  prominent  Xigerian  nationalist  had  these 
problems  in  mind  when  he  observed  that  a  Greek 
and  a  Briton  had  more  in  common  than  a  Sokoto 
and  Ijaw  villager  in  Xigeria :  for  the  Greek  and 
the  Briton,  he  explained,  enjoy  a  common  Greco- 
Roman  culture  and  share  the  same  religion, 
Christianity,  while  the  Sokoto  and  Ijaw  have 
widely  variant  native  cultures  and  quite  different 
religions,  Islam  and  Christianity. 

Moreover,  these  new  states  have  had  little  ap- 
prenticeship in  the  arts  of  politics.  In  many  cases 
their  political  infrastructure — parties  and  polit- 
ical systems — are  still  rudimentary.  Political 
skills  designed  to  represent  and  conciliate  diverse 
interests  cannot  be  developed  overnight. 

Given  these  limitations  it  is  a  moot  question  as 
to  whether  the  governments  of  many  new  states  can 
satisfy  the  requirements  of  democracy.  Of  course 
democracy  is  fashionable  and  everyone  today  is  a 
democrat — whether  a  "basic  democrat,"  or  a 
"guided  democrat,"  or  a  "people's  democrat,"  or 
an  "African  democrat."  Our  analysis  might  be 
helped  if  we  looked  behind  the  slogan  to  identify 
the  two  basic  requirements  of  a  viable  political 
system  regardless  of  its  forms  or  its  in.stitutional 
structures  or  the  way  in  which  it  describes  itself. 

First,  sufficient  power  must  be  accumulated  at 


the  center  to  make  the  writ  of  the  government 
effective.  This  requirement  is  as  difficult  to  ful- 
fill as  it  is  essential  in  societies  beset,  as  Mr.  Nehru 
once  put  it,  with  "grave  fissiparous  tendencies." 
But  the  accumulation  and  consolidation  of  power 
in  the  hands  of  the  leaders  is  not  enough.  The 
second  requirement  is  that  there  also  be  established 
channels  for  the  effective  communication  and  rep- 
resentation of  the  essential  interests  of  the  various 
groups  that  make  up  the  national  community. 
The  balance  between  orderly  cohesion  and  diversi- 
fied expression  may  be  weighted  very  differently 
in  different  situations,  and  the  institutions  incor- 
porating that  balance  may  be  equally  varied.  But 
unless  each  principle  is  acknowledged,  the  free- 
dom of  the  new  state  will  be  both  bitter  and 
brittle. 

We  have  been  talking  about  the  problem  of  po- 
litical development — ^the  creation  of  a  sense  of 
nationhood  and  the  building  of  political  institu- 
tions. There  is  also  the  problem  of  economic  de- 
velopment. For  this,  the  byword  in  Africa  today 
is  "African  socialism."  Like  other  slogans  it  is 
both  useful  and  troublesome. 

The  problem  confronting  most  new  African 
states  is  not  only  the  relative  poverty  of  physical 
resources  but  the  lack  of  human  skills  and  the 
absence  of  attitudes  essential  to  economic  advance- 
ment. "African  socialism"  is  a  useful  term  for  it 
suggests  that  economic  development  cannot  be 
engineered  from  the  outside,  cannot  automatically 
be  induced  by  huge  inputs  of  foreign  capital  and 
foreign  skills — necessary  as  these  adjuncts  may  be. 

This  is  what  Mr.  Eugene  Black,  the  recently 
retired  head  of  the  International  Bank,  had  in 
mind  when  he  said  that  "the  road  to  a  self-sustain- 
ing growth  must  be  built  by  the  poor  society 
itself."  I  am  reminded  of  a  line  from  the  French 
scholar  Raymond  Aron.  ""^Vliat  is  called  eco- 
nomic development,  above  all  in  its  first  phase,"  he 
wrote  of  tropical  Africa,  "is  a  social  and  human 
mutation;  it  is  a  transformation  of  the  attitude  of 
the  population."  Not  so  much  for  ideological  rea- 
sons but  by  sheer  necessity,  governments  in  the 
underdeveloped  countries  become  the  engines  of 
change,  laboriously  cajoling  and  pressuring  a 
change-resistant  society. 

The  term  "African  socialism"  is  also  deficient. 
It  suggests  a  doctrine  for  the  development  of  eco- 
nomic institutions  when  in  fact  the  approach  of 


884 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


i 


most  African  governments  is  appropriately  prag- 
matic. Even  President  Nkrumah,  who  has 
preached  the  doctrine  of  African  socialism  with 
sustained  eloquence,  practices  in  fact  a  mixed 
economy  based  on  pragmatic,  not  doctrinaire,  con- 
siderations. Cocoa  is  the  staple  of  his  foreign 
exchange.  It  is  grown  by  private  cocoa  farmers. 
It  is  marketed  by  a  government  corporation.  In 
Ghana  state  enterprise  coexists  with  cooperatives 
and  private  enterprise.  Nothing  symbolizes  this 
pragmatic  mixture  more  dramatically  than 
Ghana's  Volta  River  project,  a  public  power  proj- 
ect financed  partly  by  the  Ghana  Goverimaent  and 
partly  by  private  foreign  investors  and  industries. 

Creating  a  New  System  of  States 

We  have  talked  about  Africa's  unfinished  strug- 
gle for  freedom  as  it  involves  establishing  relations 
with  the  former  colonial  power  and  meeting  the 
problems  of  state  building.  There  is  also  the 
search  for  appropriate  relations  among  the  new 
African  states  themselves.  The  byword  here  is 
"pan-African  unity."  Again  the  slogan  is  useful. 
It  points  to  an  important  reality.  But  it  also 
helps  to  conceal  a  reality. 

There  is  much  that  unites  these  new  African 
states.  A  sense  of  unity  derives  from  their  com- 
mon colonial  experiences  and  their  common  post- 
colonial  aspirations.  It  is  the  fight  to  end  all  im- 
perialism. It  is  the  attempt  to  nourish  those  roots 
of  individual  or  cultural  uniqueness  that  have  con- 
tinued to  live  in  the  subsoil  of  "negritude"  or  "Af- 
ricanism" or  "Arabism,"  despite  the  working  of 
the  topsoil  by  a  foreign  culture.  It  is  the  effort  to 
gain  greater  access  to  the  economic  levers  of  power 
— ^skills,  productivity,  and  capital — so  that  the  new 
state  will  more  and  more  be  in  charge  of  its  own 
destiny. 

Pan-Africanism  is  a  force  in  Africa  today,  and 
he  who  does  not  reckon  with  it  does  not  fully  un- 
derstand Africa.  But  the  slogan  "pan-African 
unity" — again  like  all  slogans — is  as  mischievous 
as  it  is  useful,  for  while  pointing  to  that  which 
unites  Africa,  it  conceals  much  that  divides  Africa. 

It  is  worth  remembering  that  we  are  dealing 
with  an  enormous  continent — one  through  which 
history  has  flowed  for  millennia  in  a  great  variety 
of  channels.  Only  a  small  segment  of  that  history 
deals  with  the  impact  on  Africa  of  the  West  Eu- 
ropean cultures.    In  many  instances  that  impact 

I  December  70,  7962 


took  place  only  50  to  75  years  ago  and  was  preceded 
by  a  number  of  alien  incursions.  Gamal  Abdul 
Nasser  tells  us  that  the  curse  he  learned  as  a  boy, 
"O,  Almighty  God,  may  disaster  take  the  Eng- 
lish," derived  from  an  earlier  epithet,  "O  God,  the 
Self-Revealing !  Annihilate  the  Turk !"  Before 
both  the  European  and  the  Turk  in  Africa  there 
were  the  Arabs  themselves.  In  the  late  15th  cen- 
tury the  sailors  of  Prince  Henry  the  Navigator, 
sailing  northward  after  rounding  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope,  discovered  Arab  settlements  along  the 
the  continent's  east  coast.  They  derived  from  set- 
tlers who  had  come  from  Oman  in  the  first  century 
A.D.  to  trade  for  ivory,  ore,  and  slaves.  And  be- 
fore the  Arabs  there  were  the  Romans,  and  before 
the  Romans  the  Phoenicians  and  Greeks.  Indeed 
— an  ominous  foreboding — there  are  ancient  maps 
that  indicate  the  claim  of  Cathay  to  suzerainty 
along  sections  of  the  east  coast  of  Africa. 

But  the  principal  historical  currents  and  eddies 
were  formed  by  Africa's  own  innumerable  tribes, 
separated  (as  one  would  expect  in  a  vast  conti- 
nental expanse)  by  ethnic  and  linguistic  differ- 
ences, by  geography,  and  by  the  mutual  fear  of 
conquest  and  pillage.  Only  in  the  last  few  minutes 
of  the  day  of  Africa's  history  did  Western  impe- 
rialism impose  on  tribal  Africa  a  set  of  arbitrary 
geographical  frames,  "like  a  great  steel  grid,"  in 
Margery  Perham's  image,  set  "over  the  amorphous 
cellular  tissue"  of  isolated  and  often  hostile  com- 
munities. 

Western  imperialism  at  one  and  the  same  time 
further  divided  Africa — French-speaking  Africa, 
English-speaking  Africa,  Portuguese-speaking 
Africa — and  helped  to  create  larger  unities  than 
had  existed  before.  These  are  Africa's  new 
states,  the  controversial  legacy  of  Europe  to  con- 
temporary Africa. 

These  new  states  are  a  paradox.  They  stand  in 
the  way  of  Africa's  aspiration  after  greater  unity 
and  as  such  are  condemned  by  Africans  as  illicit  co- 
lonial constructions.  But  let  anyone  attempt  to 
subdivide  one  of  these  new  states,  as  Tshombe  at- 
tempted in  pronouncing  the  secession  of  Katanga 
in  July  1960,  and  what  Africans  regard  as  the 
illicit  colonial  construction  becomes  an  entity  en- 
shrined in  law  and  right  reason. 

This  paradox  is  not  surprising.  It  expresses 
both  Africa's  aspiration  and  Africa's  reality.  The 
important  thing  is  not  to  ignore  one  at  the  expense 


885 


of  the  other.  The  consolidation  of  Africa's  free- 
dom may  well  depend  on  the  evolution  of  forms  of 
cooperation  and  association  transcending  Africa's 
new  states.  But  these  new  states  will  not  easily 
be  written  off.  Having  assumed  the  rights  of 
sovereignty,  each  new  state  has  also  inherited  the 
obligations  of  sovereignty,  to  organize  the  polity, 
to  assert  its  authority,  and  to  contribute  to  the  wel- 
fare of  the  community  within  its  boundaries.  The 
new  states  have  also  assumed  the  obligations  of 
membership  in  international  society.  Differences 
between  them  are  many  and  often  profound — as 
one  would  expect  in  a  complex  and  vast  system  of 
states.  These  differences  must  be  adjusted  and 
accommodated  according  to  the  rules  of  the  game, 
or  the  hope  of  pan-African  unity  will  stand  in 
jeopardy — and  with  it  Africa's  new-found 
freedom. 

If  border  disputes  or  tribal  animosities,  both  of 
which  are  chronic  in  Africa,  give  way  to  spiraling 
arms  races,  the  stage  will  be  set  for  renewed  great- 
power  intervention.  This  brings  us  to  the  next 
area  in  which  Africa's  struggle  for  freedom  must 
be  analyzed. 

Africa  and  the  East-West  Struggle 

"Keep  the  cold  war  out  of  Africa"  is  the  slogan. 
Africa  is  preoccupied  with  its  national  birth.  The 
problems  vexing  the  superpowers  in  their  contest 
with  one  another  are  of  little  importance.  "^AHien  a 
citizen  of  the  Ivory  Coast  was  asked  how  concerned 
were  the  people  of  Abidjan  with  the  situation  in 
Berlin,  he  replied:  just  as  concerned  as  were  the 
people  of  Berlin  about  the  situation  in  Abidjan. 

Most  of  the  new  states  do  not  measure  the 
issues  of  international  politics  with  cold-war  cali- 
pers. The  meaningful  choices  arc  not  between 
the  "free  world"  and  the  "Communist  world," 
nor  between  "Western  democracy  and  Eastern  au- 
thoritarianism, nor  between  the  economic  sys- 
tems of  East  or  West.  Insofar  as  these  options 
are  incorporated  into  issues  inviting  a  choice  be- 
tween one  or  the  other  of  the  two  opposing  blocs, 
most  of  the  new  states  are  neutral.  And  if  the 
cold  war  is  conceived  as  the  development  of 
spheres  of  influence  by  East  or  West,  all  of  the 
new  states  want  to  "keep  the  cold  war  out." 

This  is  nothing  to  be  dismayed  at.  A  neutral 
Africa  is  in  no  sense  inimical  to  our  interests. 


886 


Rather  than  regimes  that  lean  precariously  to 
the  left  or  right,  we  seek  in  Africa  governments 
that  stand  up  straight  on  their  own  feet. 

We  should  be  concerned  only  that  the  phrase 
"keep  the  cold  war  out  of  Africa"  is  understood 
precisely.  It  means  no  cold-war  alliance  sys- 
tems in  Africa.  It  does  not  mean  that  Africa 
is  magically  impervious  to  great-power  designs 
and  efforts  at  subversion.  Make  no  mistake  about 
it,  the  Communist  bloc  is  in  Africa  and  must  be 
reckoned  with.  If  the  experiences  of  Eastern 
Europe,  Korea,  Viet-Nam,  and  Cuba  teach  us  any- 
thing at  all,  it  is  that  the  bloc's  ultimate  objectives 
are  antithetical  to  the  freedom  of  states  that  fall 
under  bloc  control.  Already  this  danger  has  be- 
come apparent  to  more  than  one  African  leader. 

At  the  same  time  we  ought  to  recognize  that 
the  bloc's  opportunities  for  penetration  are  fre- 
quently in  direct  proportion  to  the  failure  of  the 
West  to  fulfill  its  responsibilities.  This  brings 
me  to  the  final  area  in  which  Africa  struggles  to 
fulfill  its  freedom,  the  problem  of  white-settled 
Africa  and  the  challenge  to  expand  the  rights, 
including  the  political  freedoms,  of  the  African 
populations  of  these  areas. 

The  Southern  Third  of  Africa 

We  are  talking  here  about  everything  south  of 
Tanganyika  and  the  Congo — an  area  populated 
by  some  35  million  black  Africans  and  approxi 
mately  3.5  million  whites.  The  shorthand  slo- 
gans for  treating  the  problems  of  this  area  are 
many.  It  is  a  zone  of  "white  privilege  and  black 
grievance"  where  justice  demands  "one  man,  one 
vote"  and  "political  self-determination." 

It  is  not  my  part  to  suggest  timetables  and 
policies.  Rather  I  want  to  identifj*  the  forces  at 
work  and  underscore  the  monumental  importance 
of  likely  developments  throughout  the  area.  As 
you  deliberate  about  the  problem  of  freedom  in 
this  tlieater,  here  are  some  things  you  might  wish 
to  know. 

1.  The  size  of  the  white  population  differs  in 
the  several  countries.  Its  percentage  of  the  total 
population  is  a  rough  indicator  of  the  intracta^ 
bility  of  the  problem.    I  will  list  the  major  areas 

Nyasaland :  9,000  whites  out  of  3  million,  or  0.3  percent 
Department  of  Slate  Bu//ef/n 


Northern  Rhodesia :  72,000  whites  out  of  2.3  million,  or 
3  percent ; 

Southern  Khodesla :  215,000  whites  out  of  3  million,  or 
7  percent; 

Angola :  190,000  whites  out  of  4.5  million,  or  4  percent ; 

Mozambique :  75,000  whites  out  of  6.3  million,  or  1 
percent ; 

South  Africa  :  3  million  whites  out  of  14.5  million,  or  21 
percent. 


2.  The  areas  differ  from  one  another  politically. 
Nyasaland  and  Northern  Ehodesia  are  British 
protectorates.  Nyasaland's  government  is  al- 
ready predominantly  African.  The  same  may  be 
true  of  Northern  Rhodesia  following  the  elections 
now  in  progress.  Southern  Ehodesia  has  been 
a  self-governing  colony  since  1923.  Its  govern- 
ment is  still  firmly  in  control  of  the  white  settlers. 
The  Portuguese  areas  of  Angola  and  Mozambique 
are  viewed  as  provinces  of  Portugal  and  are 
answerable  directly  to  Lisbon.  South  Africa,  of 
course,  is  an  independent  country. 

3.  The  areas  differ  markedly  in  their  approach 
to  relations  between  the  races.  The  Portuguese 
profess  no  racial  bias.  They  seek  to  establish  a 
state  in  which  ultimately  racial  distinctions  will 
be  meaningless.  (In  actual  fact  only  about  30,- 
000  black  Africans  have  achieved  status  as  the 
equals  of  educated  whites  in  Angola  and  only 
about  6,000  in  Mozambique.)  The  British  set- 
tlers of  Southern  Ehodesia  have  set  partnership 
between  the  races  as  their  goal  and  envisage  a 
situation  in  which  the  African  community  will 
gradually  achieve  a  position  of  political  equality 
with  that  of  the  white  community.  The  Afri- 
kaners of  South  Africa  preach  apaHheid — the 
total  separation  of  the  white  and  nonwhite  com- 

''"Imimities. 

4.  In  all  of  these  areas  the  white  settlers  have 
deep  roots,  frequently  going  back  generations. 
In  all  of  these  areas  the  white  community  has  been 
solely  responsible  for  the  development  of  the 
country  and  today  represents  the  great  prepon- 

•^ierance  of  skills  necessary  to  maintain  both  the 
::ii  government  and  the  economy  at  their  present 
•d  levels. 


What  of  the  Future? 

Now  what  of  the  future  ?  Clearly  we  are  headed 
'or  a  period  of  extremely  difficult  transition.  The 
[uestion  is  not  whether  the  black  majority  wiU  one 


IIjII  (Jecemfaer  TO,  7962 


day  gain  political  control  in  most  if  not  all  of  this 
area.  The  question  is  only  when  and  under  what 
conditions.  I  have  no  idea  how  long  the  process 
will  take.  The  pace  will  be  different  for  different 
areas.  And  development  in  one  area  will  have  a 
profound  impact  on  developments  in  neighboring 
areas. 

"Wliat  I  wish  to  leave  in  your  minds  is  the  notion 
— I  believe  it  is  irrefutable — that  the  course  of 
events  in  Africa's  southern  third  could  have  the 
most  serious  consequences  throughout  Africa  and 
the  world.  There  are  three  possibilities  which  I 
hope  you  will  ponder. 

The  first  would  be  a  confrontation  of  white  and 
black  communities  characterized  by  mounting  vio- 
lence. The  possibility  of  escalation  into  racial  war 
embroiling  all  of  Africa,  whethc  emotionally  or 
actually,  does  not  need  emphasis,  nor  does  the 
likely  effect  such  an  eventuality  would  have  on 
Africa's  relations  to  the  West. 

The  second  possibility  would  involve  an  acute 
and  expanding  chaotic  situation  resulting  from  the 
precipitate  fliglxt  of  white  settlers — chaos  of  such 
dimensions  as  to  make  the  Congo  look  lilce  a  Sun- 
day school  picnic. 

The  third  possibility,  which  might  materialize 
out  of  either  of  the  two  just  mentioned,  would  be 
a  rapid  penetration  of  the  area  by  communism. 

If  these  ominous  developments  are  to  be  avoided, 
we  shall  need  more  than  slogans  to  guide  us,  even 
though  the  slogans — "one  man,  one  vote"  and  the 
like — indicate  one  of  the  requirements  for  expand- 
ing justice.  At  stake,  of  course,  is  not  only  justice 
(for  majority  and  minorities  alike)  but  the  re- 
quirements of  minimal  order.  If  all  parties  con- 
cerned— the  wliite  regimes  and  black  leadership, 
the  metropoles,  the  independent  African  states, 
and  interested  Western  powers — respond  vigor- 
ously and  simultaneously  to  the  requirements  of 
expanding  justice  and  furthering  orderly  change, 
then  this  final  act  in  the  drama  of  Africa's  emer- 
gence will  conclude,  not  without  agony  and  not 
without  bloodshed,  but  with  Africa  at  relative 
peace  and  prepared  to  move  forward  in  coopera- 
tion with  friendly  states  to  further  consolidate  the 
freedom  of  its  people. 

I  cannot  say  what  the  chances  are  that  this  will 
happen.  I  know  only  that  the  stakes  are  very,  very 
high. 

887 


AID  Director  Reports  on  Progress 
in  Korea  Aid  Program 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  letter  from  Fowler 
Hamilton,  Administrator  of  the  Agency  for  Inter- 
national Development,  to  Joseph  Campbell,  Comp- 
troller General  of  the  United  States,  concerning 
a  report  to  Congress  by  the  General  Accounting 
Office  on  UjS.  aid  to  Korea. 

NOX'ESIBER  9,   1962 
The  CosrpTROLLER  General 
OF  THE  United  States 

Dear  Mr.  Campbell:  Tlie  Agency  has  com- 
pleted a  thorough  review  of  your  report  to  Con- 
gress (B-125060  dated  September  21,  1962)  on 
the  examination  of  Economic  and  Teclmical  As- 
sistance Program  for  Korea  for  Fiscal  Years  1957- 
1961. 

Positive  actions  have  cither  been  taken  or  initi- 
ated on  the  report  findings  and  recommendations. 
Agency  comments  and  statements  of  action  taken 
on  your  recommendations  are  attached.^ 

We  appreciated  the  opportunity  to  review  and 
comment  upon  the  report  in  its  draft  form.  We 
found  that  the  Agency's  position  was  presented  in 
a  fair  manner  in  the  final  report.  The  report  deals 
constructively  with  the  problems  and  deficiencies 
found  prior  to  fiscal  year  1962.  Discussions  be- 
tween representatives  of  A.I.D.  and  your  staff 
during  the  review  and  our  subsequent  considera- 
tion of  the  published  report  have  been  a  valuable 
stimulus  to  better  administration  of  the  A.I.D.  pro- 
gram in  Korea. 

It  was  gratifying  that  you  acknowledged  that 
some  hopeful  changes  were  taking  place  in  the 
early  months  of  fiscal  year  1962,  subsequent  to  the 
GAO  review.  In  fact,  several  of  the  audit  rec- 
ommendations were  put  into  effect  by  A.I.D.  in 
cooperation  with  the  new  Korean  Government 
prior  to  the  publication  of  the  report. 

The  lessons  of  the  United  States  experience  in 
seeking  to  make  economic  and  technical  aasistance 
moreeffectiv'e  in  Korea  influenced  to  a  considerable 
degree  the  development  of  new  aid  policies  and 
the  creation  of  the  Agency  for  International  De- 
velopment (A.I.D.)  early  in  fiscal  year  1962.  These 
new  approaches  were  applied  in  our  assistance  ac- 
ti\nties  in  Korea  in  the  months  immediately  fol- 
lowing the  period  of  the  GAO  audit. 


'  Not  printed  here. 
888 


The  past  12  months  have  been  a  period  of  major 
changes  in  Korea's  prospects  for  development  and 
in  our  programs  of  economic  assistance.  United 
States  grant  aid  to  finance  commercial  imports 
has  been  reduced  substantially.  Consequently 
there  is  increasing  pressure  to  restrict  Korean 
foreign  exchange  to  essential  imports.  United 
States  aid  now  is  based  upon  the  gap  in  ex- 
ternal resource  requirements  rather  than  domestic 
budgetary  deficits.  Financing  required  for  capi- 
tal development  now  is  provided  almost  entirely 
through  loans  rather  than  grants.  Technical  as- 
sistance has  been  concentrated  in  crucial  areas. 
European  governments  and  private  businesses  and 
American  private  investors  are  showing  serious 
interest  in  Korea  for  the  first  time.  The  present 
Korean  government  is  negotiating  more  seriously 
than  its  predecessors  with  Japan  for  the  long  over- 
due postwar  settlement  which  should  greatly  im- 
prove South  Korea's  economic  prospects.  The 
Republic  of  Korea's  national  energies  and  aspira- 
tions are  being  focused  as  never  before  on 
planned  economic  development. 

In  general,  this  Agency  agrees  with  the  con- 
clusion that  Korean  economic  development  dur- 
ing 1957-61  fell  short  of  the  results  which  should 
have  been  achieved  by  economic  aid  expenditures 
exceeding  $200  million  per  year.  However,  such 
a  generalization  is  subject  to  misinterpretation, 
It  should  not  obscure  the  fact  that  U.S.  aid  in 
the  five  years  reviewed  did  enable  the  Republic 
of  Korea,  despite  major  political  and  economic 
ills,  to  sustain  a  growing  population  and  one  of 
the  world's  largest  defense  forces  while  building 
the  base  for  greater  production.  These  were  the 
basic,  mutual  objectives  of  the  United  States  and 
the  Republic  of  Korea,  and  they  were  achieved. 

A.I.D.  policy  in  Korea  today  is  compatible  with 
your  recommendations.  The  sharply  reduced 
level  of  grant  aid,  based  upon  a  "maintenance  of 
economy"  standard  for  supporting  assistance,  is 
putting  greater  pressure  on  Korea  to  expand  ex- 
port earnings  and  to  budget  prudently.  United 
States  aid  for  growth  is  being  provided  in  the  | 
context  of  over-all  resource  allocation,  related  to 
investment  from  Korean,  European  and  other  in 
ternational  .sources.  The  content  of  the  U.S.  eco 
nomic  assistance  programs  and  the  size  and 
character  of  the  United  States  A.I.D.  Mission  stafl 
have  been  revised  to  reflect  greater  selectivity  in) 
the  uses  of  aid  and  greater  attention  to  Korean- 


Pres 


J/.. 

Ilin 

la 

•To] 

far 

Tk 


■poi 

Bif 

■kf 

»sio: 

Jiiiiij 
mrti 
iinie 


'ieels 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Mf4 


govermnent  practices  in  the  management  of  eco- 
nomic affairs. 

The  Agency  expects  that  present  U.S.  and 
Korean  practices  will  produce  greater  economic 
progress  at  a  lower  cost  in  United  States  aid 
fmids. 

Copies  of  this  letter  are  also  being  sent  to  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  the  President  of 
the  Senate,  and  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives. 

Sincerely  yours. 

Fowler  Hamiltox 


President  Withholds  Approval  on  Bill 
Relating  to  Lightweight  Bicycles 

Memorandum  of  Disapproval 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  22 

I  am  withholding  my  approval  from  H.R.  8938, 
"To  provide  a  more  definitive  tariff  classification 
description  for  lightweight  bicycles." 

The  new  tariff  classification  description  for 
lightweight  bicycles  would  include  a  description 
of  the  frame.  By  this  means,  it  would  double  the 
import  duties  on  certain  types  of  bicycles  being 
imported. 

Bicycles  are  provided  for  in  paragraph  371  of 
the  Tariff  Act  of  1930  and  were  originally  subject 
to  duty  at  30  percent  ad  valorem.  A  tariff  con- 
cession on  bicycles  was  first  granted  to  the  United 
Kingdom  in  a  bilateral  trade  agreement  effective 
January  1, 1939.  Under  that  agreement  the  frame- 
work of  the  existing  tariff  classification  based  upon 
diameter  of  the  wheel  was  established.  That 
classification  provided  for  separate  categories  of 
duties:  bicycles  with  or  without  tires  having 
wheels  in  diameter  over  25  inches;  over  19  but  not 
over  25  inches ;  and  not  over  19  inches. 

That  classification  and  duty  treatment  were  con- 
inued  following  a  concession  granted  by  the 
[Jnited  States  in  the  General  Agreement  on  Tar- 
ffs  and  Trade  effective  January  1,  1948,  with  one 
raception.    The  exception  provided  that  the  rate 


lU 


of  duty  on  bicycles  with  or  without  tires  having 
wheels  in  diameter  over  25  inches  and  weighing 
less  than  36  pounds  complete  without  accessories 
and  not  designed  for  use  with  tires  having  a  cross 
sectional  diameter  exceeding  1%  inches  was  to  be 
reduced  to  $1.25  each  but  not  less  than  71/2  percent 
nor  more  than  15  percent  ad  valorem.  All  other 
classifications  were  dutiable  at  specific  rates  but 
not  less  than  15  percent  nor  more  than  30  percent 
ad  valorem. 

The  present  duty  on  lightweight  bicycles  is  the 
result  of  a  renegotiation  which  took  place  in 
February  1961.^  This  renegotiation,  in  effect,  re- 
established an  escape  clause  rate  increase  which 
had  been  invalidated  by  a  previous  court  decision. 

The  practical  effect  of  this  legislation  would  be 
to  increase  the  duty  on  imported  bicycles  having 
a  cantilever  or  curved  frame,  weighing  less  than 
36  pounds  from  the  present  duty  of  $1,875  each, 
but  not  less  than  II14  percent  nor  more  than  221^ 
percent  ad  valorem  to  a  new  rate  of  $3.75  each, 
but  not  less  than  22i/^  percent  nor  more  than  30 
percent  ad  valorem.  I  am  informed  that  approxi- 
mately one-half  of  current  imports  of  bicycles  that 
are  imported  under  the  lightweight  classification 
are  those  with  cantilever  or  curved  frames,  and 
would  be  subject  to  this  approximate  100  percent 
increase  in  duty. 

The  enactment  of  this  legislation  within  a  short 
time  after  the  1961  negotiations  and  following  the 
opening  of  new  opportunities  for  trade  expansion 
under  the  recently  approved  Trade  Expansion  Act 
would  hamper  our  efforts  to  improve  the  position 
of  American  industry  in  foreign  markets. 

Under  the  Trade  Expansion  Act,  a  wider  variety 
of  relief  is  available  to  assist  American  firms  suf- 
fering from  imports.  Should  the  American  bi- 
cycle industry  demonstrate  the  need  for  this  re- 
lief, it  should  be  provided. 

John  F.  Kennedy 
The  White  Hottse, 
Octoler  22,  1962. 


^  For  a  Department  announcement  of  Feb.  25,  1961,  and 
text  of  Proclamation  3394,  see  Bulletin  of  Mar.  20,  1961, 
p.  419. 


elOecember   70,   7962 


889 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


U.S.  Pledges  Full  Support  to  Task  of  Achieving 
General  and  Complete  Disarmament 


Following  is  a  statement  made  in  Committee  I 
{Political  and  Security)  on  November  6  hy 
Arthur  H.  Dean,  U.S.  Representative  to  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly,  together  with  the  text  of  a  resolu- 
tion adopted  by  the  Com/mittee  on  November  19. 

STATEMENT  BY  AMBASSADOR   DEAN 

U.S.  delegation  press  release  4084 

I  have  listened  with  the  greatest  interest  to  the 
statements  so  far  made  on  the  subject  of  disarma- 
ment by  the  representatives  of  the  United  Arab 
Republic,  the  Soviet  Union,  and  Italy.  We  meet 
today  to  consider  a  question  of  central  importance 
f  o  the  future  of  mankind — the  question  of  general 
and  complete  disarmament  in  a  peaceful  world. 
Genuine  negotiations  on  broad  disarmament  are 
more  urgent  and  more  pressing  than  ever  before, 
in  the  light  of  the  recent  events  in  the  Caribbean. 
Productive  negotiations,  of  course,  will  depend  on 
the  satisfactory  resolution  of  the  urgent  threat  to 
the  peace  represented  by  the  Soviet  missiles  and 
other  offensive  weapons  in  Cuba.  I  could  hardly 
believe  my  ears  tliis  morning  when  I  heard  the 
representative  of  the  Soviet  Union  characterize 
his  Government  as  peace-loving — and  then,  having 
stated  that  tliey  had  placed  these  offensive  weap- 
ons in  Cuba,  take  great  credit  for  having  averted 
a  thermonuclear  war  by  having  agreed  to  remove 
the  very  weapons  that  they  had  placed  there. 

President  Kennedy's  letter  of  October  28  last  ^ 
to  Premier  IClirushchev  stressed  the  importance  of 
removing  this  threat  in  the  Caribbean  and  getting 
on  with  our  efforts  to  resolve  the  problem  of  dis- 
armament.   President  Kennedy  said : 

I  a)?ree  with  you  tbat  we  must  devote  urgent  attention 
to  the  problem  of  disarmament,  as  it  relates  to  the  whole 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Xov.  12,  1962,  p.  745. 


890 


world  and  also  to  critical  areas.  Perhaps  now,  as  w< 
stop  back  from  danger,  we  can  together  make  real  prog^es^ 
in  this  vital  field.  I  think  we  should  give  priority  to  ques 
tions  relating  to  the  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons,  oi 
earth  and  in  outer  space,  and  to  the  great  effort  for  i 
nuclear  test  ban.  But  we  should  also  work  hard  to  see  i; 
wider  measures  of  disarmament  can  be  agreed  and  pui 
into  operation  at  an  early  date.  The  United  States  Gov 
ernment  will  be  prepared  to  discuss  these  questions 
urgently,  and  in  a  constructive  spirit,  at  Geneva  oi 
elsewhere. 

One  year  ago  the  General  Assembly  unanimous- 
ly endorsed  the  creation  of  a  new  18-Nation  Dis- 
armament Committee  in  order  to  bring  about 
general  and  complete  disarmament.-  "We  believe 
tliat  this  is  a  good  forum.  We  have  been  nego- 
tiating at  Geneva  in  tliat  new  forum  for  6  months 
This  forum  provides  a  wide  cross  section  of  in- 
terests and  views.  Yet  it  is  a  small,  continuing 
Committee  where  ideas  can  be  patiently  and 
tliorouglily  explored  in  depth.  In  such  a  forum 
the  easy  generalities  of  open  debate  can  be  tested 
and  examined  and  real  negotiations,  especially 
in  the  meetings  of  the  two  cocliairmen,  are  pos- 
sible. Details  can  be  agreed  upon  one  by  one 
and  then  woven  into  the  fabric  of  a  disarmament 
treaty. 

The  eight  new  members  have  approached  their 
role  seriously  and  responsiblj-.  They  have  acted 
as  custodians  of  the  interests  of  less  powerful 
states.  At  the  same  time  the  Committee  lias  also 
provided  an  opportunity  for  talks  among  and 
with  the  powers  that  possess  a  preponderance  of 
military  might.  The  18-Natioia  Committee  has 
now  recessed  until  November  12 '  so  that  its  mem- 


'  For  background  and  text  of  resolution,  see  ihid.,  Dec. 
18.  lOGl.  p.  1023. 
•  The  Committee  reconvened  on  Nov.  26. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


uj 


bers  can  participate  in  this  debate  at  the  General 
Assembly. 

From  the  charter  itself  the  General  Assembly 
has  been  given  an  abiding  interest  in  tlie  subject 
of  disarmament.  Those  of  us  who  are  involved 
in  the  Geneva  negotiations  have  the  obligation 
and  the  duty  to  explain  to  you  what  we  have 
done  and  what  we  hope  to  do.  As  you  know, 
there  are  two  interim  reports  *  of  the  Committee 
before  you  in  the  reports  by  the  two  cochairmen 
on  behalf  of  the  Committee,  and  what  I  say  this 
morning  is  in  the  nature  of  a  further  progress 
report.  The  negotiations  in  Geneva  have  really 
only  just  begun,  and  our  first  concern  must  be 
to  get  back  to  the  negotiating  table  and  to  get 
on  with  our  work.  Perhaps  by  the  18th  General 
Assembly  we  will  have  real  progress  to  discuss 
in  detail. 

The  18-Nation  Committee  began  its  work  on 
the  basis  of  the  joint  statement  of  agreed  princi- 
ples worked  out  between  tlie  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  =  and  endorsed  at  the  last  As- 
sembly. The  Committee  has  now  developed  a 
procedure  of  work,  and  two  draft  treaties  liave 
been  submitted,  one  by  the  United  States  '^  and 
the  other  by  the  Soviet  Union,^  which  are  before 
you  for  discussion.  The  Committee  is  trying  to 
produce  a  single  treaty  which  will  bring  together 
these  disparate  approaches.  I  do  not  intend  to 
discuss  the  details  of  these  treaties  this  morning, 
but  I  should  like  to  comment  on  one  statement 
the  representative  of  the  Soviet  Union  made  in 
which  he  said  that  there  was  no  provision,  if  I 
understood  him  correctly,  in  the  United  States 
draft  for  the  complete  elimination  of  nuclear 
weapons.  The  United  States  treaty  draft  is  be- 
fore you  as  an  annex  to  the  report  of  the  18-Nation 
Committee,  and  those  of  you  who  may  be  inter- 
ested will  find  on  page  29,  in  subdivision  C  of 
stage  III,  the  following  statement : 

In  light  of  the  steps  taken  in  Stages  I  and  II  to  halt 
the  production  of  fissionable  material  for  use  in  nuclear 
weapons  and  to  reduce  nuclear  weapons  stockpiles,  the 
Parties  to  the  Treaty  would  eliminate  all — (I  repeat 
"all") — nuclear    weapons    remaining    at    their    disposal, 


'  U.N.  docs.  DC/203  and  A/5200  ( DC/205 ) . 
"  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  9,  1961,  p.  589. 
•U.N.  doc.  DC/203  (ENDC/30)  ;  for  text,  see  also  Bul- 
letin of  May  7, 1962,  p.  747. 
'  U.N.  doc.  A/C.1/867. 


would  cause  to  be  dismantled  or  converted  to  peaceful 
use  all  facilities  for  production  of  such  weapons,  and 
would  transfer  all  materials  remaining  at  their  disposal 
for  use  in  such  weapons  to  purposes  other  than  use  in 
such  weapons. 

It  then  goes  on  to  say : 

In  accordance  with  arrangements  which  would  be  set 
forth  in  the  annex  on  verification,  the  International  Dis- 
armament Organization  would  verify  the  foregoing  meas- 
ures and  would  provide  assurance  that  no — (I  repeat 
"no") — nuclear  weapons  or  materials  for  use  in  such 
weapons  remained  at  the  disposal  of  the  Parties  to  the 
Treaty  and  that  no  such  weapons  or  materials  were 
produced  at  undeclared  facilities. 

At  Geneva  we  seek  ways  of  destroying  the  most 
devastating  weapons  ever  known  to  man,  weapons 
which  are  small  and  easily  concealed  and  which 
could  give  a  decisive  military  advantage  to  any 
state  which  managed  to  retain  them.  We  are 
also  trying — and  this  is  the  greatest  task  of  aU — 
to  find  ways  to  replace  war  itself  with  other  non- 
militaiy  means  for  settling  disputes  and  enforc- 
ing the  peace. 

Since  our  debate  in  this  committee  is  only  a 
pause  from  the  negotiations  to  which  we  shall  soon 
return,  I  do  not  wish  to  put  too  much  emphasis  on 
our  differences  or  the  controversies  which  at  pres- 
ent divide  us.  It  is  still  too  early  to  do  more  than 
note  the  beginnings  and  to  be  hopeful  for  the  fu- 
ture. But  any  progress  report  on  what  we  are 
doing  necessarily  consists  largely  of  the  different 
approaches  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United 
States.  "Wliether  these  differences  on  disarmament 
can  be  composed  while  the  great  political  and  ide- 
ological cleavages  in  the  world  remain  is  a  most 
serious  question.  But  we  must  keep  trying.  The 
dangers  and  the  promise  are  too  great  to  do  other- 
wise. 


The  Issues  at  Geneva 

Let  me  list  briefly  the  issues  around  which  our 
negotiations  in  Geneva  now  revolve. 

First-Stage  Accomplishments 

First,  what  can  safely  and  reasonably  be  accom- 
plished in  the  first  stage  of  a  disarmament  pro- 
gram? For  its  part,  the  United  States  has  sug- 
gested a  30-percent  cut  across  the  board  in  all 
kinds  of  major  armaments,  both  conventional  and 
nuclear,  as  a  realistic  and  yet  radical  beginning  in 
the  first  stage,  with  adequate  verification  and  in- 
spection procedures  in  order  to  insure  that  not  only 


December   10,   7962 


891 


agreed  limitations  take  place  but  also  that  retained 
forces  or  armaments  do  not  exceed  agreed  levels  at 
any  stage  before  moving  on  to  the  next  stage.  We 
believe  that  this  kind  of  reduction  is  possible  be- 
cause it  need  not  fundamentally  affect  the  relative 
balance  of  military  strength. 

For  its  part,  in  its  draft  treaty  the  Soviet  Union 
advocates  a  first-stage  disarmament  program 
which  affects  primarily  all  nuclear  deliveiy  sys- 
tems and  the  elimination  of  all  foreign  bases.  It 
attempts  a  virtual  elimination  of  certain  types  of 
armaments — all  delivery  vehicles  capable  of  de- 
livering a  nuclear  weapon,  that  is,  sliips,  aircraft, 
missiles,  and  rockets — in  only  2  years.  That  would 
virtually  force  the  United  States  to  terminate  all 
its  alliances  and  would  give  a  major  and  tre- 
mendous advantage  to  the  Soviet  Union,  with  its 
vast  land  area  on  the  globe,  its  contiguous  geo- 
graphical relation  with  its  allies,  its  preponder- 
ance in  conventional  weapons,  and  its  advantage 
of  having  comparatively  short  internal  communi- 
cation lines.  Tlie  program  put  forward  by  the 
Soviet  Union  is  not  a  disarmament  plan  but, 
rather,  a  plan  to  disarm  the  free  world.  It  would 
radically  shift  the  present  balance  of  military 
forces  and  is  therefore,  in  its  present  form  at  least, 
quite  unacceptable. 

The  Problem  of  Verification 

In  addition  the  Soviet  Union  rejects  important 
arrangements  to  verify  that  agreed  levels  of  arma- 
ments and  armed  forces  are  not  exceeded  and  that 
clandestine  production  is  not  engaged  in.  This 
leads  us  to  the  second  major  issue  to  be  resolved. 
This  second  issue  is,  of  course,  the  problem  of  veri- 
fication of  any  disarmament  agreement.  Since  the 
end  of  the  Second  "World  "War  this  issue  has  been 
at  the  very  core  of  disarmament  negotiations.  No 
disarmament  program  can  really  begin  imtil  we 
have  agreed  upon  an  adequate  and  effective  verifi- 
cation system.  "Without  verification  there  will 
not  be  the  growing  confidence  and  trust  which 
alone  will  make  a  disarmament  plan  move  for- 
ward. 

In  an  effort  to  advance  the  discussions  and  the 
areas  of  agreement  this  year  the  United  States 
offered  a  new  and  constructive  proposal  which  we 
hoped  would  stimulate  creative  thinking  by  others 
about  this  problem  of  verification.  Our  proposal 
was  to  aj)ply  the  modem  techniques  of  mathemati- 
cal sampling  and  the  latest  accounting  techniques 


in  verifying  disarmament  agreements.  As  an  il- 
lustration of  this  we  suggested  progressive  zonal 
inspection.  Under  this  plan  specifically  defined 
zones  in  each  country  would  be  inspected  by  the 
international  disarmament  organization  to  insure 
that  nations  were  telling  the  truth  when  they  de- 
clared precisely  what  armaments  remained  in  their 
possession  after  the  stated  reductions.  Then,  as 
disarmament  proceeded,  more  zones  would  be 
opened  to  inspection.  At  the  end  of  the  program 
the  entire  territoiy  of  a  country  would  be  subject 
to  inspection. 

There  are  many  ways  in  which  this  technique  of 
mathematical  sampling  could  be  applied.  "We  sug- 
gested one.  "We  hoped  our  suggestion  would  strike 
a  responsive  chord  in  others.  "We  believe  we  will 
have  a  better  chance  for  progress  when  the  Soviet 
Union  begins  to  share  in  this  task  of  making  in- 
spection and  disarmament  move  forward  together. 
Because  of  the  fmidamental  difference  in  our  two 
types  of  society,  one  free  and  the  other  closed,  ap- 
parently the  Soviet  Union  has  not  the  same  inter- 
est in  verification  that  we  have.  The  reason  for 
this  is  that  most  of  the  military  information  the 
Soviet  Union  would  need  is  freely  available  to  it 
in  the  United  States.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the 
Soviet  Union  such  information  is  carefully 
guarded  as  a  state  secret.  Nevertheless,  if  the 
Soviet  Union  is  really  interested  in  true  disarma- 
ment and  not  in  disaiTnament  as  a  futile  exercise 
in  propaganda — if  we  are  to  make  true  progress 
— then  the  responsibility  belongs  to  all  the  parties. 

So  far  we  have  been  disappointed  with  the  lack 
of  contribution  by  the  Soviet  Union  on  this  all- 
important  issue  of  verification  and  its  unyielding 
objection  to  the  establishment  of  control  over 
armaments  and  its  insistence  that  general  and  com- 
plete disarmament  must  first  be  carried  out,  while 
in  the  interim  one  must  rely  on  its  imverified 
assertions. 

Development  of  Peacekeeping  Machinery 

The  third  problem  to  be  resolved  is  the  pacific 
settlement  of  disputes  and  the  preservation  of 
peace.  We  believe  that  general  and  complete  dis- 
armament in  a  jieaceful  world  is  inextricably  tied 
to  the  development  of  effective  peacekeeping 
machinery.  So  far  in  our  Geneva  negotiations  it 
has  not  been  apparent  that  the  Soviet  Union  shares 
this  view.  General  and  complete  disarmament  in 
a  peaceful  world  will  have  to  be  accompanied  by 


892 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


reliable  peacekeeping  measures,  including  an  inter- 
national peace  force  as  provided  in  the  United 
States  plan  in  stage  II,  subdivision  4. 

Arms  are  a  symptom  of  the  search  for  security 
and  the  ultimate  reliance  on  national  strength. 
Full  disarmament  will  not  come  until  there  is  a 
reliable  substitute  in  actual  international  practices 
and  institutions.  The  United  States  disarmament 
plan  emphasizes  building  this  peacekeeping 
machinery.  The  Soviet  plan  completely  ignoi'es 
the  need  for  such  radical  changes  and  seems  to 
reflect  the  view  that  peacekeeping  will  take  care 
of  itself.  Perhaps  the  Soviet  Union  fears  that 
international  institutions,  to  use  Chairman  Khru- 
shchev's phrases,  might  thwart  the  Soviet  aim  of 
liberating  "the  peoples"  from  "rotten  regimes." 
Perhaps  that  is  why  the  Soviet  representative  at 
Geneva  would  not  even  agree  that  the  parties  de- 
clare tliemselves  in  favor  of  a  world  where  inter- 
national change  could  take  place  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  of  the  United  Nations  Charter. 
To  say  tliat  change  could  take  place  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  of  the  United  Nations  Charter 
was  objectionable,  according  to  Mr.  [Valerian  A.] 
Zorin,  because  such  a  statement  might  "impede" 
the  so-called  "national  liberation  movement."  In 
this  connection  we  shall  have  to  build  up  interna- 
tional law  and  organization  if  we  are  ever  to  move 
on  and  to  complete  the  third  and  vital  stage  of  dis- 
armament. This  means,  first  and  foremost,  that 
we  redouble  our  efforts  to  strengthen  the  United 
Nations  in  its  various  peacekeeping  roles — in  me- 
diation, in  conciliation,  in  obsei-vation,  and  in  de- 
fense against  aggression. 

We  should  not  overlook  one  instrument  for  the 
development  and  codification  of  international  law 
which  is  close  at  hand  and  with  whicli  all  of  us 
are  familiar — the  International  Law  Commission. 
Since  its  expansion  last  year  the  Commission  is 
fully  representative  of  our  newer  members,  of  all 
regions  of  the  world,  and  of  all  major  systems  of 
law.  Tlie  Commission  has  already  made  a  most 
important  contribution  to  the  codification  and 
progressive  development  of  international  law.  Its 
work  could  provide  an  essential  link  in  our  total 
effort  for  disarmament.  However,  I  doubt  that  we 
are  now  devoting  to  the  Commission  the  resources 
which  it  would  need  to  perform  such  an  impor- 
tant task.  Despite  its  heavy  workload  tlie  Com- 
mission meets  customarily  during  only  10  weeks 
of  the  year.  Could  we  not  find  ways  to  accelerate 
the  work  of  the   Commission?     My  delegation 


plans  to  discuss  with  our  Sixth  Committer  col- 
leagues ways  of  bringing  this  about,  for  example, 
by  increasing  the  Coimnission's  staff  or  the  num- 
ber of  its  meetings  or  possibly  even  by  reconstitut- 
ing the  Commission  as  a  full-time  body. 

These  then  are  the  three  great  immediate  issues 
in  the  present  disarmament  negotiations.  Wliat 
should  be  and  can  be  accomplished  in  the  first 
stage?  How  can  effective  and  adequate  verifica- 
tion be  provided?  How  can  effective  peacekeep- 
ing machinery  be  developed  to  keep  pace  with  the 
reductions  in  arms? 

What  the  United  States  Is  Proposing 

In  this  very  brief  progress  report  I  have  tried 
to  summarize  generally  the  issues  which  separate 
us  in  our  negotiations  in  Geneva.  Let  me  now 
report  in  somewhat  greater  detail  what  the  United 
States  is  proposing. 

First,  in  the  first  stage  the  United  States  pro- 
poses a  30-percent  cut  in  all  major  types  of  arma- 
ments, including  those  used  for  delivering  nuclear 
weapons  as  well  as  more  conventional  items  such  as 
ships,  tanks,  and  artillery. 

Secondly,  the  LTnited  States  proposes  in  the  first 
stage  an  immediate  reduction  in  armed  forces  to 
2,100,000  men  for  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  and  appropriate  reductions  for  all  other 
parties. 

Thirdly,  in  the  first  stage  the  United  States 
proposes  that  the  production  of  fissionable  mate- 
rials— uranium  and  plutonium — for  nuclear  weap- 
ons be  halted.  We  urge  that  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  each  begin  by  transferring 
.50,000  kilogi-ams  of  weapons-grade  uranium  to 
peaceful  purposes.  Such  a  massive  transfer  by 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  would 
shift  an  enormous  amoiuit  of  destructive  potential 
away  from  the  military  domain.  "WHiile  this  is  a 
beginning,  we  could  move  rapidly  to  reduce  fur- 
ther the  amount  of  fissionable  material  available 
for  nuclear  weapons. 

Fourthly,  in  the  first  stage  of  disarmament  we 
propose  that  measures  be  taken  to  insure  that  outer 
space  is  not  used  for  aggressive,  warlike  purposes. 
For  example,  we  should  agree  that  weapons  ca- 
llable of  mass  destruction  would  not  be  placed  in 
orbit  in  outer  space.  That  would  free  countries 
in  all  parts  of  the  world  from  the  fear  that  the 
satellites  passing  over  tlieir  heads  might  be  armed 
with  nuclear  weapons. 


December   JO,   7962 


893 


Fifthly,  we  propose  in  stage  1  to  take  action  re- 
garding military  expenditures.  We  also  propose 
to  examine  means  of  insuring  and  verifying  the 
reduction  of  military  expenditures. 

During  the  Geneva  negotiations,  and  taking 
account  of  specific  suggestions  from  some  of  tlie 
eight  new  members  of  the  Committee,  the  United 
States  submitted  two  important  amendments  ^  to 
its  outline  treaty  on  general  and  complete  disarma- 
ment. One  of  these  concerned  the  transition  pro- 
cedures from  one  stage  to  the  next,  and  the  other 
concerned  production  allowances  of  arms  and 
armaments.  These  were  commented  upon  briefly 
by  the  representative  of  the  United  Arab  Republic 
in  his  statement  yesterday. 

We  also  urged:  (a)  advance  public  notification 
of  all  major  military  movements  and  maneuvers; 
(b)  the  establishment  of  observation  posts  in  major 
ports,  railway  centers,  and  otlier  agreed  locations 
to  report  on  concentrations  of  movements  of  mili- 
tary forces;  (c)  the  exchange  of  military  missions 
to  improve  communications  between  states  or 
groups  of  states;  (d)  the  establishment  of  rapid 
and  reliable  commimications  between  governments 
in  order  to  reduce  the  danger  of  miscalculation 
regarding  the  intentions  of  the  other  side,  particu- 
larly in  the  midst  of  crises;  (e)  the  establishment 
of  an  international  commission  on  the  reduction 
of  the  risks  of  war.  This  commission  would  ex- 
amine additional  ways  to  minimize  the  risks  of 
war  by  miscalculation  or  failure  of  communi- 
cations. 

May  I  say  in  passing  that  the  Soviet  Union 
happily  has  indicated  an  interest  in  .such  measures 
by  putting  forward  similar  ideas  in  its  disarma- 
ment plan.  The  major  powers  should  rapidly  put 
into  effect  such  measures  which  could  help  avoid 
a  nucle^ar  war  while  we  prepare  a  program  of  arms 
reduction. 

All  of  the.se  things  that  I  have  listed  can  be  done 
during  the  first  ?,  years  of  a  disarmament  program. 
The  second  and  third  stages  of  disarmament  could 
then  follow  with  even  more  drastic  cuts  in  major 
armaments.  At  the  end  of  these  three  stages,  man- 
kind would  have  arrived  at  general  and  complete 
disarmament  in  a  peaceful  world.  I  do  not  need 
to  elaborate  what  that  would  mean  for  every  hu- 
man being  in  every  region  of  the  world.  We 
would  have  taken  one  of  the  most  unusual  steps 

•  y^T  texts,  see  U.N.  doc.  A/C.1/875. 


894 


in  all  human  history.  The  goal  is  not  in  doubt. 
The  stated  objectives  of  both  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  plans  are  much  the  same. 
Thus  the  problem  is  to  develop  an  agreed  pro- 
cedure by  which  this  common  goal  is  to  be 
achieved.  Only  if  it  is  safeguarded  and  balanced 
will  disarmament  come  about. 

In  this  connection,  the  proposal  of  Foreign  Min- 
ister [Andrei  A.]  Gromyko  in  the  United  Nations 
last  month,  and  alluded  to  this  morning  by  Mr. 
Zorin,  modifying  the  first  stage  of  the  Soviet  plan 
may  indeed  be  a  good  omen.  Up  to  the  present, 
at  least,  the  Soviet  position  did  not  appear  to  be 
negotiable  and  was  generally  recognized  at 
Geneva  as  singularly  intransigent.  The  latest 
move  may  forecast  an  attempt  to  restore  credi- 
bility to  the  Soviet  plan.  But  before  we  can  know 
the  significance  of  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko's 
statement  or  Mr.  Zorin's  remarks  this  morning  we 
must  know  the  exact  meaning  of  the  proposal. 
We  need  to  move  in  Geneva  to  negotiate  the  pre- 
cise levels  of  armaments  which  would  be  left  at 
the  end  of  the  first  and  second  stages  of  disarma- 
ment. So  far  we  have  had  to  debate  a  prior  ques- 
tion :  whether  reductions  of  armaments  should  be 
percentage  cuts  of  each  and  all  kinds  of  weapons, 
a  straightforward  quantitative  reduction,  or 
whether  we  should  eliminate  certain  types  and 
leave  others,  a  so-called  qualitative  reduction.  As 
long  as  this  fundamental  difference  as  to  whether 
the  reduction  should  be  quantitative  or  qualitative 
remains,  it  will  be  difficult  to  move  forward.  If 
the  gap  which  divides  us  comes  down  to  the  ques- 
tion of  the  percentage  of  quantitative  arms  reduc- 
tion in  each  stage,  we  shall  have  a  question  with 
which  we  can  come  to  grips. 

Responsibility  of  the  Great  Powers 

The  great  powers  have  a  special  responsibility 
because  they  have  the  most  weapons,  but,  as  Sec- 
retary of  State  Rusk  said  in  a  statement  last 
June : ^ 

I'd  like  to  .see  a  United  Nations  meeting  in  which  it 
would  be  out  of  order  for  any  delegate  to  say  what  some- 
body else  ought  to  do  about  disarmament,  in  which  each 
would  state  quite  simply  what  he  is  prepare<l  to  con- 
tribute to  disarmament. 

Each  region  of  the  world  has  its  own  disarma- 
ment problem.     Many  of  these  could  be  solved 

'  Bulletin  of  .Tuly  2. 1062,  p.  3. 

Department  of  Sfofe  BuHelin 


without  waiting  for  big-power  agreement  on  gen- 
eral and  complete  disarmament.  States  in  many 
regions  of  the  world  could  negotiate  disarmament 
Dr  organize  control  agreements  among  themselves 
50  that  local  arms  races  could  be  prevented  or 
halted.  In  many  areas,  countries  do  not  as  yet 
arry  a  heavy  arms  burden,  and  means  must  be 
foimd  to  maintain  this  blessing.  It  would  be 
easier  now  to  avoid  an  arms  race  than  to  stop 
)r  to  reverse  one  later. 

The  United  States  would  welcome  and  respect 
mch  regional  arrangements,  providing  only  tliat 
hey  were  arrived  at  freely  by  all  the  parties  con- 
cerned in  tlie  region.  We,  for  our  part,  would 
.velcome  and  respect  such  regional  arrangements, 
provided  that  they  were  really  and  truly  freely 
irrived  at  by  the  relevant  and  essential  states, 
[n  this  respect  we  welcome  the  initiative  of  the 
Brazilian  representative  ^''  looking  toward  such  ar- 
angements  in  Latin  America  and  Africa. 

In  an  area  where  nuclear  weapons  are  not  de- 
ployed an  agreement  which  would  insure  keep- 
ng  them  out.  including  arrangements  for  verifi- 
cation, could  be  a  most  important  contribution  to 
)ur  overall  efforts  to  prevent  the  wider  dissemina- 
ion  of  nuclear  weapons. 

Wliile  agreement  on  general  and  complete  dis- 
irmament  is  the  overriding  responsibility  of  tlie 
jeneva  disarmament  talks,  there  are  other  agree- 
nents  which  coidd  be  entered  into  before  general 
ind  complete  disarmament,  to  which  President 
Kennedy  alluded,  as  I  have  mentioned  before. 
These  could  soon  be  negotiated,  and  I  hope  that 
we  will  find  that  the  spirit  to  do  so  is  tliere  when 
ve  return  to  Geneva. 

The  Disarmament  Committee  may  also  find  it 
Kjssible  in  a  reasonably  short  period  of  time  to 
each  a  consensus  on  other  measures  which  could 
)pen  the  way  toward  a  general  disarmament  pro- 
gram. In  short,  the  United  States  supports  the 
)rinciple  that  agreement  on  tlie  broadest  possible 
cale  should  be  reached  and  should  be  put  into 
ffect  as  soon  as  possible.  The  importance  of  dis- 
,rmament  negotiations  has  been  underscored  both 
ly  President  Kennedy  and  by  Chairman  Khrush- 
hev.  The  General  Assembly  can,  I  submit,  most 
ffectively  play  its  part  by  pressing  the  18-Nation 
disarmament  Committee  to  resume  its  negotia- 


tions at  Geneva  on  November  12  and  to  make  a 
supreme  effort  to  reach  agreement. 

As  Ambassador  Stevenson  said  to  this  commit- 
tee last  year,  in  short,  the  United  States  program 
calls  for  the  total  elimination  of  national  capacity 
to  make  international  war  and  to  insure  that  all 
these  steps  are  actually  carried  out  by  each  side 
every  step  of  the  way.  The  plan  calls  for  the 
creation  of  an  international  disarmament  organi- 
zation within  the  framework  of  the  United 
Nations. 

Only  yesterday  this  committee  asked  that  the 
18-Nation  Disarmament  Committee  resume  its  ne- 
gotiations in  Geneva,  as  scheduled,  on  November 
12.^^  The  place  where  agreements  are  made,  I 
submit,  is  at  the  negotiating  table.  The  sooner 
we  can  get  back  there,  the  sooner  we  can  begin 
to  hammer  out  a  really  effective  disarmament  pro- 
gram. For  its  part,  the  United  States  pledges 
its  full  and  unswerving  support  from  every  level 
and  department  of  its  Government  to  the  task  of 
achieving  general  and  complete  disarmament  in  a 
peaceful  world. 

TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION  '^ 

The  General  Assembly, 

Recalling  its  resoluHon  1722  (XVI)  of  20  December 
1961, 

Convinced  that  the  aim  of  general  and  complete  dis- 
armament must  be  achieved  on  the  basis  of  the  eight 
agreed  principles  recognized  in  General  Assembly  reso- 
lution 1722  (XVI), 

Reaffirming  its  responsibility  for  disarmament  under 
the  Charter, 

Talcing  note  of  the  two  Interim  Progress  Reports  of  the 
Conference  of  the  Eighteen-Nation  Committee  on  Dis- 
armament (DC/203  and  DC/205),  the  Draft  Treaty  on 
General  and  Complete  Disarmament  under  strict  inter- 
national control  submitted  by  the  Union  of  Soviet  So- 
cialist Republics  (A/C.1/867)  and  the  Outline  of  Basic 
Provisions  of  a  Treaty  on  General  and  Complete  Disarma- 
ment in  a  Peaceful  World  submitted  by  the  United  States 
of  America  (A/C.1/875), 

Noting  with  regret  that  during  six  months  of  negotia- 
tions at  Geneva  little  agreement  was  achieved  on  vital 
problems  of  disarmament. 

Expressing  its  appreciation  to  the  participants  of  the 
Eighteen-Nation  Committee  engaged  in  disarmament  ne- 
gotiations at  Geneva  for  their  perseverance  in  trying  to 
reach  agreement, 

Welcoming  the  spirit  of  eomijromise  which  prompted 
the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  and  the  United 


'  For  text  of  draft  resolution,  see  U.N.  doc.  A/C.1/L.312. 
itecember  10,  7962 


"  Bulletin  of  Nov.  26,  1962,  p.  824. 

"  U.N.  doc.  A/C.l/L.317/Rev.  1 ;  adopted  in  Committee  I 
on  Nov.  19  by  a  vote  of  97-0,  with  1  abstention  (Prance). 

895 


States  of  America  to  introduce  certain  modifications  to 
their  two  draft  treaties  for  disarmament, 

liccaUimj  hoprfuUii  tlio  letters  exchanged  recently  be- 
tween Chairman  Khrvishcliev,  President  Kennedy  and 
Prime  Minister  Macmillau,  in  which  they  expressed  their 
readiness  to  resnme  disarmament  negotiations  with  re- 
newed determination  and  vigour, 

Determined  to  avert  the  grave  dangers  to  the  human 
race  of  nuclear  confrontation,  on  which  the  recent  crisis 
focused  attention, 

1.  Reaffirms  the  need  for  the  conclusion,  at  the  earliest 
possible  date,  of  an  agreement  on  general  and  complete 
disarmament  based  on  the  Joint  Statement  of  Agreed 
Principles  for  Pisarmament  Negotiations  submitted  on  20 
September  1961  by  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 
and  the  United  States  of  America  (A/4S79)  and  endorsed 
by  the  General  Assembly  in  resolution  1722  (XVI)  dated 
20  December  1961 ; 

2.  Calls  upon  the  Eighteen-Nation  Committee  on  Dis- 
armament to  resume  at  Geneva  its  negotiations  on  general 
and  complete  disarmament,  with  effective  controls,  ex- 
peditiously and  in  a  spirit  of  constructive  compromise, 
until  agreement  has  been  reached  ; 

3.  Recommends  that  urgent  attention  should  be  given 
by  the  Eighteen-Nation  Committee  on  Disarmament  to 
various  collateral  measures  intended  to  decrease  tension 
and  to  facilitate  general  and  complete  disarmament; 

4.  Requests  the  Eighteen-Nation  Committee  on  Dis- 
armament to  report  periodically  to  the  General  Assembly 
on  the  progress  of  its  work  and,  in  any  case,  not  later 
than  the  second  week  of  April  1963  ; 

5.  Transmits  to  the  United  Nations  Disarmament  Com- 
mission and  requests  the  Acting  Secretary-General  to 
make  available  to  the  Conference  of  the  Eighteen-Nation 
Committee  on  Disarmament  the  documents  and  records 
of  plenary  meetings  and  meetings  of  the  First  Committee 
at  which  the  question  of  disarmament  was  discussed. 


NATO  Releases  Report  Recommending 
Institute  of  Science  and  Technology 

Press  release  674  dated  November  14,  for  release  November  IG 

The  establishment  in  Western  Europe  of  an 
advanced  International  Institute  of  Science  and 
Technology  is  recommended  in  a  report  prepared 
by  a  group  of  leading  members  of  the  Western 
scientific  community  and  released  on  November  16 
at  Paris  by  the  Xorth  Atlantic  Council."  The 
study,  prepared  by  a  working  group  headed  by 
James  R.  Killian,  Chairman  of  the  Corporation, 
Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology,  was  under- 


'A  limited  niiml)er  of  copies  of  the  report  An  Inter- 
national  Institute  of  Science  and  TcchnolontI  are  avail- 
able upon  request  from  the  OfBce  of  Media  Services,  De- 
partment of  State,  Washington  25,  D.C. 


896 


taken  at  the  request  of  the  North  Atlantic  Councill 
and  with  the  cooperation  of  the  Ford  Foundation. 
Other  membei-s  of  the  working  group  were  P. 
Caldirola,  Director,  Institute  of  Physics,  "Aide 
Pontremoli,"  University  of  Milan;  IT.  B.  G. 
Casimir,  Director  of  Research  Laboratories,  N.  V. 
Philips  Gloeilampenfabrieken,  Netherlands;  Sir! 
John  Cockcroft,  Master,  Churchill  College,  Cam- 
bridge; P.  G.  A.  Piganiol,  formerly  Delegue  Gen- 
eral a  la  Recherche  Scientifique  et  Technique. 
Paris;  A.  Rucker,  Technische  Hochschule,  Mu- 
nich; and  W.  A.  Nierenberg,  formerly  Assistant 
Secretary  General  for  Scientific  Affairs,  NATO 

The  report  is  being  made  public  by  the  North 
Atlantic  Council  so  that  the  widest  consideration 
can  be  given  to  its  recommendations  both  by  the 
scientific  community  and  by  interested  govern- 
ments. 

The  distinguished  group  of  scientists  found  a 
compelling  need  for  the  creation  of  an  institute 
that  would  set  a  new  pattern  for  advanced  educa- 
tion in  the  sciences,  that  would  itself  help  to  meet 
the  increasing  demand  for  leaders  and  scholars  in 
science  and  technology,  and  that  would  recognize 
in  its  international  format  the  interdependence  of 
the  educational  and  scientific  resources  of  the 
Atlantic  nations.  They  concluded  as  well  that  the 
successful  creation  of  such  an  institute  could  pro- 
vide a  dramatic  demonstration  of  the  intellectual 
strength,  vigor,  and  unity  of  Western  nations 
working  together. 

The  report  advocates  an  interdisciplinary  ap- 
proach to  advanced  education  and  research  and 
recommends  that  the  International  Institute 
should  have  five  interdisciplinary  centers :  applied 
mathematics  and  theoretical  physics,  technological 
processes  and  systems,  materials  research,  earth 
sciences,  and  life  sciences.  In  addition,  the  report 
calls  for  a  Center  for  Advanced  Study. 

The  institute  would  be  at  the  graduate  level  and 
would  award  its  own  advanced  degrees.  With  a 
high  proportion  of  teaching  and  researcli  sliitT  to 
student  body,  it  is  envisaged  that  the  institute 
could  train  1,000  students  annually.  The  capital 
cost  of  establishing  such  an  institute  is  estimated 
at  $56  million,  spread  over  a  period  of  several 
years,  with  annual  costs  when  fully  staffed  esti- 
mated at  $17  million.  It  is  lioped  that  release  of 
the  report  and  reactions  wliich  may  Ik;  received 
to  its  recommendations  will  stimulate  further  dis- 
cussion and  consideration  of  the  pioposal. 


Deparfmenf  of  Sfofe   Bulletin     ki 


The  First  Year  of  the  Alliance  for  Progress 

AN  EVALUATION   BY  THE  MINISTERIAL  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  lA-ECOSOC 
MEXICO,  D.F.,  OCTOBER  22-27,  1962 


1.  The  Inter-American  Economic  and  Social 
Coimcil,  meeting  at  the  Ministerial  Level  in  Mex- 
ico City  from  October  22  to  27,  1962,^  has  con- 
ducted its  review  of  tlie  first  year  of  the  Alliance 
for  Progress  in  the  light  of  the  basic  principles  set 
forth  in  the  Charter  of  Punta  del  Este.^ 

2.  The  experience  in  this  first  year  reaffirms  the 
fundamental  validity  of  the  Charter  of  Punta  del 
Este  and  the  wisdom  of  the  goals  and  principles 
of  the  Alliance  for  Progress,  toward  the  accelera- 
tion of  development  and  changes  in  the  economic 
and  social  structure,  for  the  rapid  improvement  in 
the  standard  of  living  of  the  Latin  American  pop- 
ulation— especially  for  the  rural  and  urban  work- 
ers. The  Alliance  was  born  within  the  historical 
framework  of  Latin  American  evolution  and 
reflected  the  great  landmarks  of  Operation  Pan 
America,  the  Act  of  Bogota  and  the  Charter  of 
Punta  del  Este.  Social  and  economic  progress, 
planned  within  a  framework  of  freedom  and  social 
justice  and  achieved  through  self-help,  basic 
reform  and  external  cooperation,  must  continue 
to  guide  the  Alliance  in  the  years  ahead. 

3.  The  Ministers  reviewed  the  main  accomplish- 
ments of  the  Alliance  during  its  initial  year,  cov- 
ering the  fields  of  self-help,  development  plan- 
ning, basic  products  and  economic  integration, 
economic  and  social  advances  and  external  cooper- 
ation, as  well  as  the  work  of  the  OAS  [Organi- 
zation of  American  States],  of  the  Panel  of 
Experts   and   the   Inter-American   Development 


'  For  an  announcement  of  the  meeting  and  a  list  of  the 
members  of  the  U.S.  delegation,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  15, 
1962,  p.  583. 

'  For  text,  see  ibid.,  Sept.  11, 1961,  p.  463. 


December   70,   7962 


Bank.  They  were  greatly  assisted  in  their  dis- 
cussions by  the  comprehensive  documentation  pre- 
pared by  the  Secretariat  of  the  lA-ECOSOC,  the 
economic  and  social  survey  prepared  in  collabora- 
tion with  the  Secretariat  of  ECLA  [U.N.  Eco- 
nomic Commission  for  Latin  America],  the  report 
of  the  Panel  of  Nine  and  the  work  of  the  lA- 
ECOSOC  Meeting  at  the  Expert  Level. 

4.  In  carrying  out  this  first  annual  review,  the 
Council  was  fully  aware  of  the  responsibilities 
placed  upon  it  to  appraise  the  results  so  far 
achieved;  to  record  both  successes  and  shortcom- 
ings and  difficulties;  and,  above  all,  to  point  the 
way  forward  for  achieving  the  objectives  of  the 
Alliance. 

11 

The  Accomplishments  of  the  First  Year 

5.  Self-help  in  Latin  America  has  received 
strong  impetus  during  the  first  year.  Compre- 
hensive programs  of  agrarian  reform  and  agricul- 
tural development  have  been  initiated  and  con- 
tinued in  several  countries  and  progress  in  plan- 
ning in  these  vital  fields  was  also  recorded  in  sev- 
eral other  coimtries.  Substantial  improvements 
in  the  structure,  administration,  collection  and 
codification  of  tax  systems  were  carried  out,  and 
use  of  income  and  property  taxation  has  been 
broadened  and  strengthened.  Expenditures 
devoted  to  education  and  the  improvement  of 
human  resources  have  increased  substantially  in  a 
large  number  of  countries  and  expanded  educa- 
tional programs  are  under  way.  The  shortage  of 
housing  for  low-income  families  is  being  attacked 
on  a  broad  front  through  improvement  of  credit 
facilities  for  housing,  technical  assistance,  and 
specific  housing  projects. 


897 


G.  The  Social  Progress  Trust  Fund  has  extended 
more  than  $100  million  in  ten  countries  for  low- 
cost  housing  projects.  Advances  have  also  been 
made  in  the  field  of  public  health,  especially  in 
improving  water  and  sewerage  systems,  to  which 
the  Social  Progress  Trust  Fund  has  contributed 
more  than  $100  million  in  project  loans  to  eleven 
countries. 

7.  The  conclusion,  in  September  1962,  of  the 
International  Coffee  Agreement  ^  is  of  the  greatest 
importance  for  the  success  of  the  Alliance  for 
Progress,  representing  as  it  does  a  means  of  rein- 
forcing the  export  income  of  fourteen  of  the  Latin 
American  countries.  This  Agreement  was  made 
possible  by  the  support  of  the  industrialized  con- 
sumer nations,  including  the  United  States,  and 
the  willingness  of  the  producer  nations  to  accept 
mutual  restraints  on  the  production  and  export  of 
coffee.  This  example  of  international  cooperation 
is  heartening.  Steps  were  taken  to  bring  about 
the  active  consideration  in  international  institu- 
tions of  ways  and  means  to  improve  market  con- 
ditions for  primary  products  and  to  reduce 
discriminatory  treatment  presently  affecting  such 
products.  Consideration  was  also  given  during 
the  year  to  the  feasibility  of  international  finan- 
cial arrangements  which  would  provide  to  Latin 
American  countries  and  other  developing  coun- 
tries access  to  credits  from  a  revolving  fund  to 
compensate  for  the  loss  of  export  earnings. 

8.  There  has  been  further  forward  movement 
toward  economic  integration  in  Latin  America. 
Nine  countries  have  now  ratified  the  Montevideo 
Treaty  establishing  the  Latin  American  Free 
Trade  Association  and  a  start  lias  been  made  in 
eliminating  tariffs  on  intra-area  trade.  In  Central 
America  the  movement  toward  the  deep  integra- 
tion of  the  Central  American  economies  gained 
momentum.  Among  other  events,  note  should  be 
taken  of :  the  adherence  of  Costa  Rica ;  the  initia- 
tion of  activities  of  the  Central  American  Eco- 
nomic Integration  Bank ;  the  adoption  of  uniform 
tax  incentives  for  industry;  the  Central  American 
Compensatory  Fund;  and  advances  in  tariff 
equalization. 

9.  The  lA-ECOSOC  noted  with  satisfaction 
the  .statement  of  the  United  States  representative 
that  the  enactment  by  the  United  States  in  19G2  of 
the  Trade  Expansion  Act  offers  great  hope  for  the 

'For  background,  see  Hid.,  Aug.  6,  19C2,  p.  234,  and 

Oft.  20,  lOn-J.  p  (!C.7. 


898 


future  of  Latin  American  exports  to  the  Unitec 
States  and  other  industrialized  countries. 

10.  The  flow  of  external  public  funds,  from  tht 
United  States  and  international  lending  institu 
tions,  inci'eased  during  the  first  year  of  the  Alli- 
ance. In  the  period  of  12  months  ending  in  June 
1962,  $1.7  billion  was  authorized  to  Latin  Ameri 
can  countries.  Disbursements  during  this  period 
reached  $1.2  billion.  The  United  States  fulfilled 
the  commitment  it  made  at  Punta  del  Este  to  pro- 
vide $1  billion  in  public  funds  during  the  first  year 
of  the  Alliance  for  Progress.  Most  of  this  was 
given  at  long-term  low-interest  rates.  Assistance 
to  Latin  America  from  other  industrialized  coun 
tries  increased,  although  the  scale  is  still  relativelj 
modest.  The  intensive  activities  of  the  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank,  including  the 
Social  Progress  Trust  Fund,  resulted  in  commit- 
ments of  nearly  $400  million  during  this  year. 

11.  Almost  all  the  Latin  American  countries 
have  established  or  are  preparing  to  establish 
central  plamiing  agencies  within  the  governmenta 
structure.  The  Panel  of  Experts  created  undei 
the  Charter  of  Pimta  del  Este  to  review  develop- 
ment plans  has  begun  its  work  auspiciously.  The 
development  plans  of  Bolivia,  Chile,  Colombia. 
Mexico  and  Peru  have  been  submitted  for  con- 
sideration by  the  Panel  and  those  of  Honduras. 
Panama  and  Venezuela  are  expected  to  be  sub- 
mitted by  the  end  of  the  year.  The  Panel  has 
been  very  useful  in  implementing  the  Alliance 
and  it  merits  further  support  and  assistance.  The 
development  plans  of  some  countries  may  soon  be 
the  basis  for  coordinated  external  financing  pro 
vided  by  industrialized  countries  and  international 
financial  institutions.  Meanwhile,  the  industri 
alized  countries  and  the  lending  institutions 
should  continiie  to  finance  specific  projects  that 
will  doubtless  become  a  part  of  the  over-all  devel 
opment  plans. 

Ill 

Problems  and  Shortcomings 

12.  The  rate  of  economic  growth  in  Latin  Amer- 
ica has  improved  only  modestly  and  is  still  below 
the  long-term  objectives  of  the  Alliance.  More 
over,  growth  has  not  been  sufficiently  wide-spread' 
among  the  Latin  American  coimtries  or  among 
economic  sectors  within  them  and  the  task  ahead 
remains  enormous.  Although  Latin  American 
manufacturing  output  advanced  by  more  than  8 


Deparlmenf  of  State  Bulletin 


percent  in  1961,  this  was  concentrated  in  a  few 
countries.  In  the  vital  sector  of  agriculture,  from 
which  more  than  half  of  Latin  America's  200  mil- 
lion people  gain  their  livelihood,  the  rate  of 
growth  was  only  about  2.5  percent.  This  under- 
lines the  importance  of  an  intensified  attack  on 
the  problems  of  the  rural  communities  of  Latin 
America. 

13.  While  self-help  and  reform  are  under  way  in 
Latin  America,  the  movement  requires  greater  im- 
pulse. Tax  reform,  both  with  respect  to  adminis- 
tration and  tax  structure;  agriculture  reform; 
and  improved  public  administration — all  of  these 
require  strengthening  in  terms  of  both  the  ade- 
quacy of  the  legislative  and  other  measures  pro- 
posed, and  the  speed  with  which  they  are  being 
introduced.  At  the  same  time,  the  lA-ECOSOC 
recognizes  the  sensitive  nature  of  many  of  these 
reform  measures  and  the  time  required  before  they 
can  yield  their  full  benefits.  Progress  in  imple- 
menting these  reforms  is  also  related  to  the  ade- 
quacy of  measures  to  inform  and  enlist  the  support 
of  public  opinion  for  the  goals  of  the  Alliance.  It 
also  requires  the  existence  of  favorable  external 
and  internal  economic  conditions.  The  review  of 
the  accomi)lisliments  of  the  first  year  of  the  Alli- 
ance reveals  that  the  countries  of  Latin  America 
are  faced  with  a  transitional  period  of  varying 
characteristics.  During  this  transition  planning 
and  basic  reforms  must  be  analyzed  in  the  light  of 
current  conditions  and  external  technical  and  fi- 
nancial cooperation  should  take  into  account  these 
problems  in  order  to  solve  prevailing  imbalances. 

14.  Development  plans  in  Latin  America  in 
their  initial  stages  tend  to  draw  attention  to  aspi- 
rations, but  a  framework  of  realizable  goals  is  also 
required,  together  with  the  measures  designed  to 
achieve  them.  In  order  to  prevent  disappointment 
both  on  the  part  of  the  countries  seeking  assistance 
and  of  the  financing  institutions,  both  national  and 
international,  it  will  be  advisable  to  make  the  con- 
ditions and  operations  of  these  institutions  more 
flexible  and  at  the  same  time  it  will  be  necessary 
for  the  comi tries  to  concentrate  more  attention 
and  resources  in  the  formulation  of  development 
projects  sufficiently  worked  out  as  to  feasibility, 
engineering,  costs  and  benefits  and  social  impact. 
Planning  must  reflect  the  interests  and  potential- 
ities of  all  productive  sectors — industry,  agricul- 
ture, labor  and  others — and  must  identify  not  only 
the  investment  projects  but  also  the  important 


structural  reforms — for  example  in  the  tax  and 
agrarian  fields  and  the  mobilizing  of  domestic 
savings — which  are  essential  to  development. 

15.  The  flow  of  foreign  private  capital  to  Latin 
America  has  diminished  and  there  is  strong  evi- 
dence of  substantial  capital  flight  from  Latin 
America.  Taking  into  account  the  limitations  to 
the  availability  of  public  funds,  it  is  clear  that  the 
objectives  of  the  Alliance  cannot  be  achieved  with- 
out the  full  participation  of  the  private  sector  and 
adequate  measures  must  be  taken  to  assure  maxi- 
mum contribution  to  growth  by  the  private  sector. 

16.  The  problems  facing  Latin  American  ex- 
ports remain  difficult,  especially  in  relation  to 
future  shipments  to  the  European  Economic  Com- 
munity and  these  may  well  be  enlarged  if  the 
United  Kingdom  and  certain  other  European 
countries  join  the  Community.  Price  declines 
for  major  export  commodities  continue  to  limit 
the  ability  of  Latin  America  to  pay  for  necessary 
imports  of  capital  goods  and  to  service  external 
debt.  This  situation  influences  significantly  the 
effectiveness  of  external  assistance.  Restrictive 
measures  to  protect  certain  sectore  and  the  pref- 
erences recently  established  in  favor  of  the  asso- 
ciated overseas  territories  persist  in  limiting 
access  to  industrial  markets.  Wliile  the  flow  of 
external  public  funds  to  Latin  America  increased 
in  the  first  year  of  the  Alliance,  the  total  avail- 
abilities of  external  resources,  including  capital 
inflows  and  foreign  exchange  earnings,  were  in- 
sufficient to  provide  the  vigorous  impulse  needed 
by  the  national  economies.  The  volume  of  Latin 
American  exports  continued  to  increase,  but  it 
should  be  noted  that  their  value  in  1961  (if  ex- 
pressed for  example  in  prices  prevailing  in  1957) 
would  have  produced  an  additional  income  of 
about  one  billion  dollars. 

17.  The  pace  of  Latin  American  economic  inte- 
gration should  be  accelerated.  More  sweeping 
and  speedier  action  is  required  for  the  reduction 
of  trade  barriers  among  the  Latin  American  coun- 
tries which  have  entered  into  integration  agree- 
ments, especially  the  Latin  American  Free  Trade 
Area.  A  more  rapid  advance  toward  economic 
integration  requires  a  financing  system  which 
makes  trade  relations  more  dynamic  and  flexible. 
Adequate  financing  for  the  export  of  capital  and 
durable  goods,  witliin  a  sphere  of  economic  inte- 
gration, would  expand  opportunities  for  intra- 
zonal  trade  and  bring  about  the  formation  of 


leli'i     December   10,   7962 


899 


multinational  markets  more   favorable  to  large 
scale  production. 

18.  While  tlie  Alliance  for  Progress  has  suf- 
fered in  its  first  year  from  the  persistence  of 
economic  problems  and  weaknesses  which  the  Al- 
liance is  designed  to  correct  in  time,  it  has  also 
suffered  from  insufficient  undei-standing  in  some 
sectors  of  opinion  of  its  objectives  and  its  possi- 
bilities to  accelerate  progress  for  the  people  of 
the  Americas.  There  has  also  been  a  feeling  of 
impatience  in  both  Latin  America  and  the  United 
States  for  failure  to  achieve  much  more  rapid 
progress,  an  impatience  born  in  part  from  the 
lack  of  understanding  of  the  complexity  of  the 
process  of  bringing  to  Latin  American  societies 
greater  benefits  from  technological  improvements 
and  more  flexible  social  structures. 

IV 

The  Way  Forward 

19.  The  relationship  between  self-help  and  ex- 
ternal cooperation  must  be  made  more  evident  in 
the  future  years  of  the  Alliance.  Tlie  Charter  of 
Punta  del  Este  establishes  that  the  bulk  of  the 
resources  for  the  development  of  Latin  America 
is  to  be  provided  by  the  Latin  Americans  them- 
selves. The  lA-ECOSOC  recommends:  fin^t,  to 
the  Latin  American  governments  that  specific  pro- 
grams of  self-help  be  made  an  integi-al  part  of 
development  projects  and  programs  for  which  ex- 
ternal financial  and  technical  cooperation  is  re- 
quired: second,  that  the  industrialized  countries 
and  financial  institutions  providing  external 
resources  take  full  account  of  the  progress  that 
is  being  achieved  in  the  field  of  self-help  and  re- 
form; and,  third,  that  these  countries  and  insti- 
tutions also  take  into  account  the  continuing 
internal  development  efTorts  already  made  by 
some  countries  in  the  basic  fields  of  the  Alliance — 
efforts  made  under  adverse  external-price  condi- 
tions which  have  contributed  to  balance  of  pay- 
ments disequilibrium. 

20.  The  Council  reiterates  its  conviction  that 
the  basic  objectives  of  the  Alliance  go  beyond 
the  acceleration  of  national  economic  growth,  in 
that  the  benefits  of  economic  progress  must  be 
shared  by  all  the  economic  and  social  sectors. 
The  Council  therefore  urges  the  members  of  the 
Alliance  to  hasten  the  fundamental  structural 
changes  in  the  economic  and  social  fabric  necessary 


to  convey  the  benefits  of  progress  and  equal  op- 
portunities to  the  great  majority  of  the  people  of 
the  Americas. 

21.  The  lA-ECOSOC  considers  that  more 
emphnsis  must  be  placed  upon  adequate  economic 
planning  in  the  various  Latin  American  countries 
and  recommends  an  intensified  effort  by  the  var- 
ious elements  of  the  inter-American  system  to 
assist  the  countries  of  Latin  America  in  the  field 
of  planning,  including  the  Inter- American  Devel- 
opment Bank,  and  the  Latin  American  Institute 
for  Economic  and  Social  Planning.  Effective 
planning  should  be  considered  on  the  part  of 
financing  agencies  and  institutions  as  a  major  ele- 
ment of  self-help,  with  particular  attention  to 
financing  pre-in vestment  studies. 

22.  The  Council  has  noted  with  satisfaction  the 
statement  of  the  representative  of  the  United 
States  regarding  the  intention  of  the  LTnited 
States,  within  the  context  of  the  Charter  of  Punta 
del  Este  and  the  Act  of  Bogota,  to  continue  to 
provide  technical  and  financial  cooperation  to  the 
Latin  American  members  of  the  Alliance  for  Prog- 
ress in  the  same  general  order  of  magnitude  and 
to  make  available  an  appropriate  portion  of  the 
funds  for  the  purposes  of  the  Social  Progress 
Trust  Fund.  It  also  expresses  the  hope  that  the 
Board  of  Governors  of  the  Inter-American  Devel- 
opment Bank  will  reach  prompt  agreement  on 
measures  to  replenish  the  Bank's  own  resources 
so  as  to  enal)le  it  to  continue  to  play  the  vital  role 
which  it  has  assumed  in  Latin  American  economic 
and  social  development. 

2:'..  The  lA-ECOSOC  calls  upon  all  of  the 
industrialized  countries  of  the  Free  World  to 
assist  in  achieving  the  objectives  of  the  Alliance 
for  Progress.  Tlie  lA-ECOSOC  declares  that  the 
various  instrumentalities  of  the  inter-American 
system  are  prepared  at  all  times  to  cooperate  fully 
with  other  international  institutions  to  tliis  end, 
including  in  particular  the  Organization  for  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  and  Development  and  the 
Development  Assistance  Committee. 

24.  The  lA-ECOSOC  considers  that  if  eco- 
nomic integi'ation  is  to  succeed  it  must  be 
approached  boldly  and  public  support  in  the  var- 
ious sectors  of  the  economy  must  be  mobilized  for 
the  task.  Its  forward  momentum  must  be  firmly 
based  on  the  principle  of  sound  competition  and 
an  increasing  participation  in  international  com- 
merce in  order  to  achieve  expanding  benefits. 


900 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


A 


25.  The  lA-ECOSOC  recommends  that  the 
members  of  the  Alliance  continue  to  press  for  non- 
discriminatory and  non-restrictive  solutions  to 
problems  of  trade  with  the  European  Economic 
Community.  It  is  necessary  to  insist,  tlirough  the 
GATT  [General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade] 
and  other  means  that  may  be  studied,  upon  an 
orderly  and  early  end  to  preferential  agreements 
and  otlier  measures  that  limit  access  and  consump- 
tion of  Latin  American  exports. 

26.  The  lA-ECOSOC  considers  that  members 
must  intensify  tlieir  efforts  to  obtain  solutions  to 
basic  commodity  problems,  including  measures  to 
diversify  their  economies  and  expand  their 
exports,  especially  semi-manufactured  and  indus- 
trial products,  in  connection  with  their  develop- 
ment programs. 

27.  It  also  considers  that  the  private  sector 
should  have  available  incentives  to  strengtlien  the 
important  role  which  it  is  destined  to  play  m  eco- 
nomic and  social  growth  of  Latin  America  under 
the  Alliance.  In  this  connection,  the  lA- 
ECOSOC  calls  to  the  attention  of  member  coun- 
tries the  provision  in  the  Charter  of  Punta  del 
Este  tliat  calls  for:  "promotion  ...  of  con- 
ditions that  will  encourage  the  flow  of  foreign 
investments  and  help  to  increase  the  capital  re- 
sources of  participating  countries  in  need  of 
capital." 

28.  The  lA-ECOSOC  also  calls  to  the  attention 
of  the  member  countries  that  under  the  Charter  of 
Punta  del  Este  the  American  Republics  agreed: 
"to  maintain  stable  price  levels,  avoiding  inflation 
or  deflation  and  the  consequent  social  hardships 
and  maldistribution  of  resources,  always  bearing 
in  mind  the  necessity  of  maintaining  an  adequate 
rate  of  economic  growth."  Howevei',  it  recognizes 
that  in  some  cases  stabilization  programs  require 
strong  domestic  measures  as  well  as  foreign 
cooperation. 

29.  The  lA-ECOSOC  has  decided  to  strengthen 
the  institutional  aspects  of  the  Alliance  for  Prog- 
ress to  promote  coordinated  external  financing  by 
industrialized  countries  and  international  finan- 
cial institutions;  and  to  hold  more  frequent  and 
specialized  meetings  at  the  expert  and  of^cial  level 
for  the  review  and  interchange  of  experience  in  the 
implementation  of  the  Alliance.  It  was  also  con- 
sidered necessary  to  entrust  to  two  outstanding 
citizens  the  study  of  the  current  structure  of  the 
inter-American  system  as  it  relates  to  the  Alli- 


ance for  Progress  for  the  purpose  of  recommend- 
ing adjustments  if  these  should  be  necessary,  to 
the  dynamics  foreseen  in  the  Chai'ter  of  Punta  del 
Este.*  In  addition,  it  was  determined  to  mobilize 
public  opinion  of  the  American  republics  in  sup- 
port of  the  goals  of  the  Alliance.  This  requires 
enlisting  all  sectors  of  the  population,  including 
government,  management,  labor,  the  professions, 
science  and  culture.  An  intensified  effort  must  be 
mounted  to  create  broader  public  understanding 
and  vastly  wider  public  support  of  the  aims  of  the 
Alliance  and  the  work  and  sacrifice  required  to 
achieve  them. 

30.  The  Alliance  for  Progress  is  a  long-term 
comprehensive  attack  on  all  the  economic  and  so- 
cial ills  that  have  beset  the  rising  population  of 
Latin  America  for  many  years.  To  lift  the  stand- 
ards of  living  of  more  than  200  million  people, 
even  to  the  minimum  goals  established  by  the  Alli- 
ance for  Progress,  is  not  the  work  of  one  year  or 
even  a  few.  The  lA-ECOSOC  considers  that 
while  the  first  year  of  the  Alliance  has  been  beset 
by  many  difficulties,  the  accomplishments  are  real 
and  are  promising.  It  calls  upon  the  governments 
of  the  peoples  of  the  hemisphere  to  view  the  fu- 
ture with  perspective  and  steadiness  of  purpose 
and  to  bring  to  the  tasks  ahead  pei-sistence,  pa- 
tience, determination  and  confidence  that  free  man 
in  a  free  America  can  achieve  the  better  life  which 
he  deserves. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Automotive  Traffic 

Customs   convention    on    the    temporary    importation   of 
jirivate  road  vehicles.     Done  at  Xew  Yorli  .June  4.  10-j4. 
Entered  into  force  December  15,  1957.     TIAS  3943. 
Accession  deposited:  Central  African  Republic,  October 
15,  1962. 

Health 

Constitution  of  the  World  Health  Orfjanization.  Done  at 
New  York  July  22,  194G.  Entered  into  force  April  7, 
1948 ;  for  the  United  States  June  21,  1948.  TIAS  1808. 
Raiiflcation  deposited:  Burundi,  October  22,  1962. 


*The  OAS  on  Nov.  20  elected  Juscelino  Kubitschek, 
foimer  President  of  Brazil,  and  Alberto  Lleras  Camargo, 
former  President  of  Colombia,  to  undertake  this  study. 


December  70,   7962 


901 


Narcotics 

Convention  relating  to  the  suppression  of  the  abuse  of 
opium  and  other  drugs.  Signed  at  The  Hague  January 
23,  1912.  Entered  into  force  December  31,  1914;  for 
the  United  States  February  11,  1915.  38  Stat.  1912. 
Notification  received  that  it  considers  itself  bound: 
Congo  (Brazzaville),  October  15,  1962. 

Telecommunications 

Telegraph  regulations  (Geneva  revision  19.')8)  annexed  to 
the  international  telecommunication  convention  of  De- 
cember 22,  1952  (TIAS  32G6),  with  appendixes  and 
final  protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  November  29,  1958. 
Entered  into  force  January  1,  1960.  TIAS  4390. 
Notificatinn  of  apprnral:  Monaco,  October  1,  1962;  Vati- 
can City,  October  3,  1962. 

International  telecommunication  convention  with  six  an- 
nexes.    Done  at  Geneva  December  21,  1959.     Entered 
into  force  January  1,  1961;  for  the  United  States  Oc- 
tober 23,  1901.     TIAS  4S92. 
Ratification  deposited:  Belgium,  October  8,  1962. 

Radio  regulations,  with  appendixes,  annexed  to  the  inter- 
national telecommunication  convention.  1959.  Done  at 
Geneva  December  21,  19.59.  Entered  into  force  May  1, 
1961;  for  the  United  States  October  23,  1961.  TIAS 
4893. 

Notification  of  approval:  Austria,  September  28,  1962; 
Monaco,  October  1,  1962;  Vatican  City,  October  3, 
1962. 

Wheat 

International  wheat  agreement,  1962.  Opened  for  signa- 
ture at  Washington  April  19  through  May  15,  1962. 
Entered  into  force  July  16,  1962,  for  part  I  and  parts 
III  to  VII,  and  August  1,  1962,  for  part  II.  TIAS 
5115. 

Acceptances  deposited:  Israel,  November  21,  1962; 
Spain,  November  23,  1962. 


BILATERAL 

Dominican  Republic 

Agreement  providing  for  a  cooperative  meteorological 
program.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Santo  Do- 
mingo August  2  and  October  25,  1962.  Entered  into 
force  October  25, 1962. 

Italy 

Agreement  providing  for  a  program  of  joint  participation 
in  the  testing  of  experimental  communications  satel- 
lites. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
February  26  and  November  14,  1962.  Entered  into 
force  November  14, 1962. 

Japan 

Agreement  providing  for  a  program  of  cooperation  in  the 
testing  of  experimental  communications  satellites. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Toliyo  November  6, 
1962.     Entered  into  force  November  6,  1962. 


Korea 

Agricultural  commodities  agreement  under  title  I  of  the 
Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assistance  Act 
of  19.J4,  as  amended  (68  Stat.  455;  7  U.S.C.  1701-1709), 
with  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  Seoul  November  7, 
lfl(;2.     Entered  into  force  November  7,  1962. 


DEPARTMENT  AND  FOREIGN  SERVICE 


FSI  Offers  Course  for  Government 
Wives  Going  Overseas 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Novem- 
ber 23  (press  release  692)  that,  beginning  Novem- 
ber 26,  the  Foreign  Service  Institute  would  offer 
a  2-week  general  orientation  course  for  wives  and 
other  adult  dependents  of  Government  personnel 
going  on  overseas  assignments. 

Tlie  "Overseas  Assignment  Course  for  Wives" 
will  be  imder  the  direction  of  Mary  "Vance  Trent, 
a  Foreign  Service  officer  who  has  served  in  Europe 
and  the  Far  East  and  who  was  recently  appointed 
chairman  of  women's  programs  at  the  institute. 
Government  and  nongovernmental  authorities  will 
lecture  on  such  subjects  as  contemporary  American 
life  (cultural,  economic,  political) ;  how  to  answer 
questions  about  the  United  States;  opportunities 
for  wives  to  participate  directly  in  foreign  service 
(e.g.  by  teaching,  ci\ac  work,  cultural  activities, 
etc.) ;  problems  of  emerging  nations;  the  functions 
of  an  American  mission  abroad;  and  other 
subjects. 

Tlio  new  course  is  scheduled  to  be  given  once  a 
month  througliout  the  year.  It  is  being  timed  to 
acconmiodate  wives  who  also  plan  to  take  the  pres- 
ent FSI  2-week  courses  of  introductory  area 
training. 

Appointments 

Frederick  W.  Brown  as  science  attach^  at  Buenos  Aires, 
Argentina,  effective  November  19.  (For  biographic  de- 
tails, see  Department  of  State  pre.ss  release  690  dated 
November  21.) 


902 


Department   of  State   Bulletin 


December  10,  1962  Index 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1224 


Africa.    Africa's  Unfinished  Struggle  for  Freedom  : 

The  Real  Issues   (Good) 882 

American  Republics.  The  First  Tear  of  the  Alli- 
ance for  Progress  (evaluation  by  lA-ECOSOC 
ministerial  representatives) 897 

Argentina.  Brown  appointed  science  attach^, 
Buenos   Aires 902 

China,  Communist.  U.S.  Team  To  Assess  India's 
Needs  Against  Communist  Incursions  (Ken- 
nedy)       874 

Communism.  A  Most  Dangerous  Time  (Cleve- 
land)  875 

Cuba 

Basic     Issues     Underlying     the     Present     Crisis 

(Rusli) 867 

President     Kennedy    Reviews     Progress     Toward 

Solution  of  Cuban  Crisis 874 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 

Appointments    (Brown) 902 

FSI  Offers  Course  for  Government  Wives  Going 
Overseas 902 

Disarmament 

Basic  Issues  Underlying  the  Present  Crisis 
(Rusk) 867 

U.S.  Pledges  Full  Support  to  Task  of  Achieving 
General  and  Complete  Disarmament  (Dean,  text 
of  resolution) 890 

Economic  Affairs.  President  Withholds  Approval 
on  Bill  Relating  to  Lightweight  Bicycles  (Ken- 
nedy)           ...       889 

Foreign  Aid 

AID  Director  Reports  on  Progress  in  Korea  Aid 
Program    (Hamilton) 888 

Basic     Issues     Underlying     the     Present     Crisis 

(Rusk)        867 

The  First  Year  of  the  Alliance  for  Progress  (eval- 
uation by  lA-ECOSOC  ministerial  representa- 
tives)       897 

[ndia.  U.S.  Team  To  Assess  India's  Needs  Against 
Communist  Incursions  (Kennedy) 874 

International     Organizations     and     Conferences. 

The  First  Tear  of  the  Alliance  for  Progress  (eval- 
uation by  lA-ECOSOO  ministerial  representa- 
tives)       897 

Korea.  AID  Director  Reports  on  Progress  in  Korea 
Aid  Program  (Hamilton) 888 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  NATO  Re- 
leases Report  Recommending  Institute  of  Science 
and   Technology 896 

Presidential  Documents 

President  Kennedy  Reviews  Progress  Toward  Solu- 
tion of  Cuban  Crisis 874 

President  Withholds  Approval  on  Bill  Relating  to 
Lightweight  Bicycles 889 

U.S.  Team  To  Assess  India's  Needs  Against  Com- 
munist Incursions 874 


Science 

Brown  appointed  science  attach^,  Buenos  Aires     .      902 

NATO  Releases  Report  Recommending  Institute  of 

Science  and  Technology 896 

Treaty  Information.    Current  Actions 901 

U.S.S.R. 

Basic     Issues     Underlying     the     Present     Crisis 

(Rusk)        867 

A  Most  Dangerous  Time  (Cleveland) 875 

President  Kennedy  Reviews  Progress  Toward  Solu- 
tion  of  Cuban   Crisis 874 

United  Nations.  U.S.  Pledges  Full  Support  to  Task 
of  Achieving  General  and  Complete  Disarmament 
(Dean,  text  of  resolution) soo 

Name  Index 

Brown,   Frederick  W 902 

Cleveland,   Harlan '.'..'.  875 

Dean,  Arthur  H .'  890 

Good,  Robert  C 882 

Hamilton,    Fowler \  888 

Kennedy,  President 874, 889 

Rusk,  Secretary ]     .  '  867 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  November  19-25 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington  25,  D.C. 

Release  issued  prior  to  November  19  which  ap- 
pears in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  is  No.  674  of 
November  14. 


No. 

*682 


Date 
11/19 


*684     11/19 


t6S6 
*687 

t688 


*690 

691 
692 

*693 

*694 

695 


11/19 
11/20 

11/20 

11/20 

11/21 

11/21 
11/23 

11/23 

11/23 

11/23 


Subject 

U.S.    participation    in    international 

conferences. 
Rivkin  sworn  in   as  Ambassador  to 

Luxembourg  (biographic  details). 
Conclusion  of  20th  session  of  GATT. 
Williams :  "Africa's    Challenge    for 

Touth." 
Educational  exchange  agreement  with 

Germany  (rewrite). 
ZafruUa     Khan     to     address     FSI 

seminar. 
Brown  sworn  in  as  science  attach^  at 

Buenos  Aires   (biographic  details). 
Rusk  :  Foreign  Policy  Association. 
FSI  course  for  wives  going  overseas 

(rewrite). 
Program   for  visit  of   Somali  Prime 

Minister. 
Program   for  visit  of  Somali  Prime 

Minister. 
Cleveland:  "A 

Time." 


Most      Dangerous 


*Not  printed. 

fHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


U.S.   GOVERNMENT  PRINTING   0FFICEM962 


United  States 
Government  Printing  Office 

DIVISION    OF    PUBLIC   DOCUMENTS 

Washington  25,  D.C. 


PENALTY    FOR    PRIVATE    USE  TO   AVOID 

PAYMENT  OF    POSTAGE,  9300 

(GPO) 


OFFICIAL    BUSINESS 


THE  SUBCONTINENT  OF  SOUTH  ASIA 


the 


Afghanistan  •  Ceylon  •  India  •  Nepal  •  Pakistan 


Department 

of 

State 


All  over  South  Asia  far-reaching  developments  are  taking  place  in 
the  economic,  political,  and  social  fields.  India,  Pakistan,  and  Ceylon 
have  emerged  from  the  colonial  pattern  to  the  status  of  independent 
nations  since  World  War  II.  Nepal  and  Afghanistan,  after  centuries 
of  isolation,  are  building  new  contacts  with  the  rest  of  the  world. 

With  all  of  its  diversity — of  culture,  religion,  climate,  forms  of  gov- 
ernment— the  subcontinent  of  South  Asia  has  certain  characteristics 
which  are  generally  common  to  the  entire  area.  This  revised,  76-page 
Background  publication,  illustrated  with  maps  and  photographs, 
summarizes  the  characteristics  and  problems  of  the  subcontinent  and 
provides  detailed  information  on  each  of  the  five  countries  in  this  area. 


Publication  7410 


45  cents 


ro: 


Orier  Form 

Supt.  of  Documents 
Govt.  Printing  Office 
Washington  25,  D.C. 

Enclosed  find: 


\ 


(.cash, check, or  money 
order  payable  to 
Supt.  of  Docs.) 


Please  send  me copies  of  The  Subcontinent  of  South  Asia — Afghanistan, 

Ceylon,  India,  Nepal,  and  Pakistan. 


Name: 


Street  Address: 


City,  Zone,  and  State: 


THE    DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


X.X 


"JE^^-. 


E 

•ICIAL 

EKLY  RECORD 

ITED  STATES 
(EIGN  POLICY 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1225 


December  17,  1962 


CHANGING  PATTERNS  IN  WORLD  AFFAIRS   •   CBS 

Television  Interview  With  Secretary  Rusk 907 

UNESCO'S   CONTRIBUTION  TO   THE  U.N.   DECADE 

OF  DEVELOPMENT  •   by  Assistant  Secretary  Battle   .    .      935 

POPULATION  GROWTH  AND  ECONOMIC  DEVELOP- 
MENT    •     by  Robert  W.  Burnett 919 

THE  COMMON  MARKET  AND  INDUSTRIAL  PROP- 
ERTY    •     by  Philip  H.  Trezise 925 

OECD  AGRICULTURE  MINISTERS  DISCUSS  FARM 

PROBLEMS     •     Text  of  Joint  Statement 942 

^-^"'    V 

_    V*      /  For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE    DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1225  •  Publication  7463 
December  17,  1962 


Fornle  by  tbe  Superintendent  of  Docamcnts 

U.S.  OoTornmcnt  Printing  Office 

Washington  25,  D.C. 

Prici; 

S2  Issues,  domestic  tS.CO,  foreign  $12.25 

Single  copy,  25  cents 

Use  of  funds  for  printlnK  of  this  publica- 
tion approved  by  the  Director  of  the  Bureau 
of  tbe  Budget  (January  19, 1961). 

Note:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
copyrighted  and  Items  contained  herein  may 
bo  reprinted.  Citation  of  the  Departve.nt 
or  Btati  BiLiETi.v  as  the  source  will  bo 
appreciated.  The  Bulletin  b  Indexed  In  the 
Beadeis'  Qolde  to  Periodical  Uteratuie. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a   weekly  publication   issued   by    tlie 
Office  of  Media    Services,   Bureau  of 
Public    Affairs,    provides    the    public 
and   interested  agencies   of   the 
Government     with     information     on 
developments  in  the  field  of  foreign 
relations    and    on    the    work    of    the 
Department  of  State  and  t/ie  Foreign 
Service.     The  BULLETIN  includes  se- 
lected press  releases  on  foreign  policy, 
issued  by  the  White  House  and  the 
Department,  and  statements  and  ad- 
dresses made  by  the  President  and  by 
the     Secretary    of    State    and    other 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well  as 
special  articles  on  various  piloses  of 
international    affairs    and    the  func- 
tions of  the  Department.     Informa- 
tion  is   included  concerning    treaties 
and    international   agreements    to 
which   the   United  States   is  or   may 
become  a  party  and  treaties  of  gen- 
eral international  interest. 

Publications  of  tlie  Department, 
United  Nations  tjocuments,  and  legis- 
lative material  in  the  field  of  inter- 
national relations  are  listed  currently. 


Changing  Patterns 

in 

World  Affairs 


Secretary  Rusk  talks  with  David  Schoenbrun  of  CBS  News  (at  left)  on  the 
television  program  "CBS  Reports:  An  Hour  With  the  Secretary  of  State." 


Annovmcer:  '■''CBS  Reports,^''  which  has  made  an 
annual  tradition  of  its  conversations  xoith  former 
President  Eisenhower  and  Walter  Lippmann, 
presents  an  hour  with  the  Secretary  of  State  of 
the  United  States,  Dean  Eusk,  with  CBS  Chief 
Washington  Correspondent,  David  Schoenbrun.^ 

Secretary  Rusk:  We  call  this  the  Benjamin 
Franklin  Room,  after  our  first  great  diplomat. 
He  helped  design  the  Great  Seal  of  the  United 
States.  One  of  the  duties  of  the  Secretary  of 
State  is  to  be  the  keeper  of  the  Great  Seal. 
You'll  notice  that  the  eagle  there,  as  President 
Kennedy  reminded  us  in  his  inaugural  address, 
carries  an  olive  branch  in  one  claw  and  arrows  in 
the  other,  and  these  two — a  desire  for  peace  and 
preparedness  for  war — are  the  great  preoccupa- 
tions of  our  foreign  policy. 

Here  in  this  state  dining  room  we  entertain 


'  This  television  interview,  "An  Hour  With  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,"  was  presented  by  the  Columbia  Broadcast- 
ing System  on  a  nationwide  hookup  on  Nov.  28  (press 
release  700 ;  also  available  as  Department  of  State  publi- 
cation 7464,  which  may  be  purchased  from  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  OfBce, 
Washington  25,  D.C.,  price  15  cents) . 


chiefs  of  government  and  chiefs  of  state  from  many 
countries  each  year — perhaps  20,  25  in  the  course 
of  any  season,  many  of  them  allies,  many  of  them 
neutrals,  but  from  every  corner  of  the  earth. 

This  is  the  Thomas  Jefferson  Room,  named  after 
our  first  Secretary  of  State.  Thomas  Jefferson 
was  a  great  man  in  many  respects,  but  of  course 
we  are  very  proud  of  the  fact  that  he  launched  our 
Government  as  our — or  at  least  our  Department 
of  State — as  our  first  great  Secretary. 

And  this  is  now  the  John  Quincy  Adams  Room, 
who  not  only  was  a  great  Secretary  but  also  a  great 
President,  after  his  service  in  the  Department  of 
State. 

The    President   and    the    Secretary 

Mr.  Schoenbrun:  Mr.  Rush,  do  you  recall  the 
circumstances  of  your  first  meeting  toith  the  Pres- 
ident, when  he  discussed  tlie  possibility  of  your 
getting  the  appointment? 

Secretary  Rusk  :  Well,  I  had  not  had  the  privi- 
lege of  knowing  Senator  Kennedy,  or  President- 
elect Kennedy,  before  December  1960.  I  was  in 
a  board  meeting  of  the  foundation  with  which  I 


December  17,  7962 


907 


was  working,  and  he  asked  me  to  meet  him  for  a 
convei-sation,  I  think  on  a  Thursday,  in  the  middle 
of  December  of  that  year.  Actually,  when  I  had 
my  first  talk  with  him,  there  was  no  discussion  of 
my  being  Secretary  of  State. 

Well,  xohat  did  you  talk  about? 

"Well,  I  don't  know  whether  I  have  his  permis- 
sion to  say  this,  but  I  talked  about — we  talked 
about  my  article  in  Foreign  Ajfairs  on  the  Presi- 
dency. Then  the  next  day  I  had  a  call  asking  me 
if  I  would  take  this  responsibility.  "Well,  this  was, 
I  must  say,  a  bolt  of  lightning.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  I  fully  understood  for  the  first  time  an  inci- 
dent that  I  think  is  not — I've  never  mentioned  be- 
fore. Mr.  Jolin  Foster  Dulles  asked  me  to  come 
up  to  see  him  in  New  York  on  the  day  that  he 
learned  that  he  was  to  be  Secretai^  of  State,  and 
he  was  a  very  sober  and  shaken  man  as  he  faced 
that  responsibility.  I  remember  at  the  time  I 
thought  that  this  was  rather  extraordinary,  be- 
cause here  was  a  man  who  had  been  in  foreign 
policy  matters  all  his  life — since  he  was  19  years 
old,  in  fact. 

Sir,  when  you  speak  of  sobering  thoughts — it 
must  have  been  a  sobering  thought  for  you  to  re- 
flect upon  the  fact  that  2  years  ago  you  were  a 
scholar  and  president  of  the  Rockefeller  Founda- 
tion, engaged  in  studies,  and  2  or  3  weeks  ago  you 
looked  down  the  mouth  of  the  cannon  at  a  moment 
of  great  decision  in  the  history  of  our  country. 

I  sometimes  wonder  whether  it  is  possible  for 
anyone  really  to  be  sure  that  he's  qualified  to  take 
on  such  responsibilities.  But  after  all,  this  is  a 
great  country,  and  the  momentum,  tlie  strength, 
the  commitments  of  this  coTintry  are  a  decisive 
element  in  the  present  stage  of  world  histoi-y.  So 
those  of  us  who  are  called  upon  to  serve  the  Presi- 
dent can  only  do  our  best,  in  a  very  complex  and 
dangerous  world  situation,  and  see  how  the  story 
comes  out. 

Announcer:  The  office  of  Secretary  of  State  has 
been  called  the  impossible  job.  For  several  hours 
on  November  the  IGth  and  again  on  November 
2ith,  the  54th  Secretary  of  State,  Dean  Eusk,  sat 
in  the  John  Quinry  Adams  Room  and  explored 
the  office  from  Jefferson  to  Rusk,  putting  into 
perspective  some  of  the  momentous  decisions  of  the 
past  30  days.  ^^CBS  Reports''''  now  shares  an  hour 
of  that  conversation  with  you. 


Some  Illustrious  Predecessors 

Mr.  Schoenhru,ji:  Mr.  Seci^etary,  you  occupy 
one  of  the  highest  offices  in  our  land  and  the  old- 
est department  of  government.  You've  had  some 
illustrious  predecessors.  Who  among  them  is  your 
own  favorite  hero  as  Secretary  of  State? 

Secretary  Eusk:  "Well,  I  think  I  would  start 
with  Benjamin  Franklin,  although  he  was  not, 
strictly  speaking,  a  Secretary  of  State.  He  wa3 
the  head  of  the  first  ancestor  of  the  Department 
of  State,  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence 
of  the  Continental  Congress,  and  it  was  he  who 
carried  the  main  diplomatic  burden  of  the  Amer- 
ican colonies  in  their  struggle  for  independence, 
both  here  in  the  United  States  and  in  Europe.  He 
gave  the  lie  to  the  ordinary  impression  that  naive 
Americans,  simple  Americans,  go  to  Europe  and 
have  their  pockets  shaken  down  by  the  city  slickers 
of  European  diplomacy. 

I  would  suppose  beyond  Benjamin  Franklin  I 
would  tuni  to  Thomas  Jefferson,  whose  picture 
you  see  behind  me  here.  He  helped  launch  tlie 
country  as  our  first  Secretary  of  State  under 
George  "Washington — again  a  man  of  remarkable 
talents,  who  helped  to  carve  out  our  independence 
and  to  shake  off  the  British  and  Spanish  occupa- 
tions of  territories  that  were  considered  to  be  a 
part  of  the  United  States  of  that  day — highly 
respected  by  people  abroad. 

I  su]:)pose  most  liistorians  would  refer  to  Jolin 
Quincy  Adams,  whose  picture  you  see  here,  as  one 
of  our  great  Secretaries  of  State  of  the  19th  cen- 
tury. Tliat  was  a  period  when  the  rest  of  the 
world  came  to  acknowledge  that  the  United  States 
was  here  to  stay.  I  would  suppose  that  he  would 
clearly  rank  as  one  of  our  great  Secretaries  of 
State. 

But  I  think  I  would  be  tempted,  then,  to  jump 
all  tlie  way  into  the  20th  century,  when  Secretary 
Marshall  set  out  to  do  something  important,  fun- 
damental, about  the  recovery  of  "Western 
Europe  through  the  Marshall  Plan — when  he  held 
out  the  hand  of  friendship  to  the  Soviet  bloc  and 
invited  the  Sovii  t  Union  to  take  part  in  this  post- 
war recovery  and  revival.  President  Truman  has 
said  that  he  considered  General  Marsliall  the 
greatest  American  of  his  day.  He  had  unlimited 
confidence  in  him.  They  were  men  who  had  a 
deep  respect  for  each  other.  General  Marsliall,  on 
the  other  side,  not  only  was  a  great  militaiy  man 


908 


Department  of  Sfafe  Bulletin 


but  a  gi'eat  civilian- — had  a  deep  sense  of  constitu- 
tional propriety;  and  he  had  no  doubt  in  his 
mind  about  wlio  was  President,  when  President 
Truman  was  President.  He  had  a  sense  of  the 
realities  of  the  situation :  "Here's  a  piece  of  paper. 
"\^niat  does  this  mean — out  there  on  the  spot? 
Here's  a  piece  of  paper.  Wliat  do  you  want  me 
to  do  about  it  ?  If  I  sign  my  name  to  this  paper, 
wliat  happens  next?  Wlio's  going  to  do  what?" 
This  was  a  very  good  discipline  for  his  colleagues. 
I  would  also  think  of  Dean  Acheson,  because  I 
think  it  was  he  who  saw  most  clearly  that  the  free 
world  had  made  a  mistake,  in  1945,  in  demobiliz- 
ing so  far  and  so  fast,  and  that  the  weakness  of  the 
free  world  perhaps  subjected  tlie  leaders  in  Mos- 
cow at  that  time  to  almost  intolerable  temptations. 

When  one  thinks  about  it,  George  Catlett  Mar- 
shall., Dean  Acheson,  John  Foster  Dulles,  Dean 
Rusk — you  are  all  such  venj  different  ?n,en.  What 
would  you  say  are  the  essential  qualities  of  a 
Secretary  of  State? 

Well,  I  think  perhaps  I'm  one  of  the  last  who 
ought  to  tiy  to  comment  on  that  question. 

Sir,  may  I  interrupt  you  for  a  moment?  You 
tcere  one  of  the  first  to  comment  on  that  question. 
Let  me  quote  you  hack  to  you. 

That  was  before  I  knew  I  was  going  to  be  Secre- 
tary of  State ! 

Thafs  right.  You  wrote,  ^^The  American  Secre- 
tary of  State  has  had  his  relations  with  the  public 
further  complicated,  and  his  role  in  shapmg  of 
policy  weakened,  by  the  heavy  and  often  conflict- 
ing dem,ands  which  in  recent  years  the  office  lias 
exacted.''''  And  then  you  added  these  key  vwrds: 
^'■/t  has  been  difficult,  in  the  inidst  of  all  this,  for 
the  Secretary  of  State  to  give  to  overall  policy  that 
continuous  thought  and  attention  which  diplo- 
matic strategy  requires  in  a  loorld  so  essentially  in- 
terrelated, where  every  problem,  touches  every 
other.'''' 

Well,  this  always  is  a  central  prol)lem  for  a  Sec- 
retary of  State,  and  particularly  in  this  modern 
era.  Men  like  Elihu  Root,  at  the  turn  of  the  cen- 
tury, could  go  off  to  his  country  place  for  2  or  3 
months  at  a  time  and  leave  the  Department  in 
charge  of  someone  else.  I've  sometimes  put  it, 
since  we  think  of  a  Secretary  of  State  as  someone 
on  an  airplane,  that  a  Secretary  of  State  lias  to 
think  about  four  "motors"  before  he  comes  in  con- 


tact with  a  foreigner  at  all — the  one,  his  relations 
with  the  President ;  his  relations  with  tlie  Depart- 
ment; his  relations  with  the  Congress;  and  his 
relations  with  the  public.  And  only  when  those 
four  motors  are  properly  turning  over  is  he  then 
ready  to  take  on  the  foreigner. 

The    Cuban    Crisis 

Mr.  Secretary,  at  this  point  can  we  bring  up  the 
Cuban  question?  From  Monday,  October  S2d, 
when  President  Kennedy  revealed  the  menace  of 
Soviet  missiles  in  Cuba,  to  Sunday  morning,  Octo- 
ber SSth,  ichen  Khr^ishchev  said  he  would  disman- 
tle and  uulhdraiu,  the  lohole  ivorld  knew  that  we 
were  lualking  on  the  brink.  But  for  1  toeek  before 
thai,  only  you  and  a  very  few  high  offi.cials  knew 
what  loas  going  on.  Can  you  tell  us  about  that 
drannatic  week? 

I  think  the  first  information  that  indicated  that 
something  more  than  defensive  weapons  was  pres- 
ent in  Cuba  came  on  late  Monday  niglit,  the  15th 
[October],  I  tliink  it  was.  I  was  giving  a  dinner 
party  for  the  German  Foreign  Minister,  Mr. 
Schroeder,  that  evening,  and  late  in  the  evening 
I  had  a  telephone  call  indicating  that  something 
seemed  to  be  there  very  definitely  that  was  out- 
side our  understanding  of  defensive  weapons.  So 
we  met  the  next  moniing  and  laid  on  measures 
which  would  tell  us,  for  certain,  exactly  what  was 
tliere  tliroughout  the  island. 

Now,  we  had  several  meetings  a  day  tlirough 
that  week,  on  the  one  side  assessing  the  informa- 
tion, on  the  other  looking  at  all  the  questions.  We 
had  to  give  some  thought,  for  example,  as  to  why 
it  was  the  Soviet  Union  departed  from  its  long- 
standing policy  with  respect  to  such  weapons  and 
tried  to  put  them  into  Cuba.  So  far  as  we  have 
known,  they've  never  put  them  outside  of  the 
Soviet  Union  before — the  medium-range  missiles 
or  the  intermediate-range  missiles.  We  had  to 
consider  what  was  in  their  minds  in  Moscow  to 
lead  them  to  take  this  unusual  and  necessarily 
highly  provocative  and  challenging  step.  We  had 
to  consider  the  w'ide  range  of  possibilities  and  our 
own  response  to  it,  the  effect  on  our  more  than  40 
allies  all  over  the  world,  either  in  doing  something 
or  doing  nothing,  because  whatever  we  do  in  a 
situation  of  this  sort  directly  affects  our  involve- 
ment with  everyone  else.  And  so  we  had  to  spend 
that  week  being  very  sure  that  we  knew  what  the 


D^Qsmhex   17,   7962 


909 


facts  were  and  boxing  the  compass  of  possibilities, 
of  reactions,  of  the  impact  of  tlie  Soviet  action  on 
the  one  side,  our  action  on  tlie  other,  in  order  to 
put  together  tlie  entire  picture,  in  consultation 
with  the  President,  so  that  the  President  would  be 
in  the  best  possible  position  to  make  the  final  de- 
cisions that  only  he  can  make. 

"Well,  by  the  Friday  of  that  week  we  had — I 
think,  Friday  evening — we  had  pretty  full  infor- 
mation. Then  when  the  President's  decision  was 
made,  we  had  to  work  out  consultations  with  a 
great  many  governments — our  allies  in  the  OAS, 
our  allies  in  NATO,  in  other  parts  of  the  world, 
and  consultations  with  the  so-called  unalined 
countries.  From  a  purely  operational  point  of 
view,  this  was  a  very  large  imdertaking.  You 
recall  that  the  President  made  his  speech  on  Mon- 
day, October  22d.^  We  had  a  meeting  of  the  OAS 
the  next  morning.^  We  had  a  meeting  in  the 
Security  Council  of  the  United  Nations  the  next 
day.*  These  were  a  part  of  a  very  far-reaching 
and  comprehensive  political  discussion  with 
governments  all  over  the  world,  looking  toward 
a  protection  of  our  vital  interests,  by  peaceful 
means  if  possible. 

Preserving  Secrecy 

Mr.  Rusk,  never  had  we  seen  a  story  better  kept 
than  those  7  secret  days.  How  many  people  in 
this  huge  State  Department  of  maybe  50,000  em- 
ployees, all  told,  really  knew  about  it?  How  did 
you  keep  your  security?  How  did  you  run  this 
extraordinary  operation? 

Well,  first  I  can't,  because  of  our  relations  with 
Congress,  let  you  get  away  with  that  word  "50,- 
000"!  We  have  about  6,000  here  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  in  Washington. 

Tlicre  were  about  12  or  15  men  in  government 
who  knew  the  entire  picture.  The  Vice  Presi- 
dent, Secretaries  of  State,  Defense,  and  Treasury, 
Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs,  the  Director  of  Cen- 
tral Intelligence,  and  a  few  others — Mr.  McGeorge 
Bundy,  of  course,  of  the  White  House  staff.  But 
it  was  a  very  small  group  indeed,  a  small  group 
indeed.  Now,  that  meant  that  we  had  to  go  on  a 
24-hour  basis  here  in  the  Department  of  State. 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  12,  1962,  p.  71.'). 
'  Ihid.,  p.  720. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  723. 


My  own  colleagues,  Under  Secretary  George  Ball 
and  Deputy  Under  Secretary  Alex  Johnson,  took 
time  about  staying  in  the  Department  at  night, 
so  that  we  had  a  senior  officer  on  duty  at  all  times. 
Wo  met  in  a  variety  of  places,  so  that  we  did  not 
create  too  much  traffic  at  any  one  place.  Senior 
officers  did  their  own  typing ;  some  of  my  own  basic 
papers  were  done  in  my  own  handwriting,  in  order 
to  limit  the  possibility  of  further  spread  of  the 
utterly  vital  matters  that  we  were  dealing  with. 

But  by  the  end  of  the  week,  when  the  President's 
decision  had  been  made,  then  it  became  necessary 
to  extend  the  information  to  a  considerable  num- 
ber of  other  people,  because  we  had  to  be  in  a 
position  to  consult  75  or  80  governments. 

Urgency  of  Communications 

Mr.  Secretary,  after  the  President  addressed 
the  Nation,  it  became  public  knowledge,  but  then 
anotlier  problem  came  about  and  that  is  the  chan- 
nel of  communications  betxoeen  ourselves  and  tlie 
adversary.  Could  you  tell  us  about  how  one  keeps 
communications  open  with  the  adversary  in  such 
a  moment? 

Well,  I  called  in  Ambassador  Dobrynin  of  the 
Soviet  Union  an  hour  before  the  President's  tele- 
vision speech  and  gave  him  a  copy  of  the  speech 
itself,  with  a  covering  memorandum.  Then  dur- 
ing the  next  several  days  there  was  a  variety  of 
contacts  at  the  United  Nations.  But  I  think  the — 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  most  crucial  exchanges 
were  the  public  exchanges.  The  President's  let- 
ter of  October  27  and  the  broadcast  message  from 
Mr.  Khrushchev  on  October  28,°  in  combination, 
unlocked  the  crisis  and  made  it  possible  to  work 
toward  a  peaceful  solution. 

Mr.  Secretary,  on  Sunday  morning,  October  £8, 
Radio  Moscow  broadcast  the  text  of  KhrushcJiev^s 
letter  before  President  Kennedy  or  you  had  ac- 
tually received  the  letter.  Now,  this  suggests  a 
certain  urgency  of  comirvunications. 

I  think  that  there  was  a  question  of  speed  of 
communications  through  normal  channels.  The 
sheer  physical  problem  of  transmitting  messages 
to  people  who  use  another  language,  reijuiring  de- 
coding and  translation,  with  differences  in  office 


'  VoT  texts,  see  ibid.,  p.  743. 


910 


Deparlment  of  Stale   Bulletin 


hours  in  their  respective  capitals,  did  remind  us  all 
over  again  that  immediate  communication  is  im- 
portant; and  I  think  these  public  communica- 
tions turned  out  to  be  the  fastest  communication, 
so  that  this  was,  I  think,  the  importance  of  the 
broadcast  message  on  October  28.  It  was  a  fast 
response  to  the  President's  message  of  the  day  be- 
fore and  perhaps  could  not  have  been  handled 
through  the  elaborate  channels  of  code  and  trans- 
lation and  normal  diplomatic  patterns. 

The  Impact  of  Cuba 

Sir,  perhaps  you  could  take  a  tour  around  the 
world  with  us  and  tell  us  the  impact  of  the  Cuban 
affair  on  world  affairs,  beginning  here  at  home,  on 
the  Organization  of  American  States? 

Well,  I  think  that  the  sudden  appearance  in 
Cuba  of  these  medium-range  ballistic  missiles  and 
these  light  jet  bombers  gave  an  enormous  impetus 
to  a  development  wliich  had  been  going  on  for  a 
year  or  two  in  the  hemisphere — that  is,  growing 
concern  about  what  Cuba  meant  to  the  rest  of  the 
hemisphere.  And  we  were  really  not  surprised, 
but  we  were  deeply  gratified,  to  see  the  immediate 
imification  of  the  hemisphere  with  unanimity  on 
the  nature  of  this  threat  and  the  necessity  that  it  be 
removed. 

I  think  that  the  unanimity  in  the  OAS  and  in 
NATO  had  some  bearing  on  what  Moscow's  de- 
cisions turned  out  to  be  in  this  situation.  Had 
there  been  disunity,  and  liad  we  fallen  to  quarrel- 
ing among  ourselves,  I  think  tlie  results  might  have 
been  quite  different.  I  think  it  gives  us  all  some 
confidence  for  the  future. 

Now  I  don't  want  to  mislead  you  on  that,  be- 
cause we  have  cautioned  our  friends  from  draw- 
ing too  many  conclusions  from  the  Cuban 
experience.  The  Soviet  Union  remains  a  great 
power.  There  were  special  cii'cumstances  in  Cuba 
which  are  not  necessarily  present  in  other  parts  of 
the  world.  It  would  be,  I  think,  wrong  to  say 
that,  because  this  situation  in  Cuba  came  out  the 
way  it  did,  therefore  a  lot  of  other  questions  are 
going  suddenly  to  take  a  new  shape  and  new  form 
in  fundamental  respects.  I  do  think  that  this 
experience  has  caused  an  element  of  caution  on 
all  sides,  in  Moscow  as  well  as  elsewhere — that 
men  have  had  to  look  practically  at  the  fact  that 
nuclear  war  is  a  real  danger  and  not  just  a  theo- 
retical danger. 


Clarifying    Our    Determination 

Is  it  possible,  sir,  that  the  Russians  might  have 
made  a  miscalculation  in  Cuba,  and  if  so  how  can 
we  help  them  not  make  another  miscalculation 
somewhere  else? 

Well,  I  think  it's  very  important  that  they 
understand  that,  when  we  talk  about  vital  inter- 
ests— all  of  us  in  the  free  world — when  we  talk 
about  these  great  issues  of  war  and  peace,  this  is 
serious  talk.  And  I  think  they  do  understand 
that  most  of  the  time.  Because  it's  so  easy  for 
democracies  to  be  underestimated.  We  normally 
do  a  lot  more  than  we're  willing  to  say  in  advance 
that  we'll  do.  And  also,  when  you  have  a  great 
sprawling  democracy  that  is  debating  within  itself 
all  the  time,  as  we  are — we  quarrel  a  good  deal 
with  each  other,  and  we  have  an  alliance  of 
democracies,  and  there  are  times  when  it  appears 
that,  you  know,  we're  not  getting  along  very  well 
together.  The  one  thing  that  the  outsiders  must 
understand  is  that,  on  the  great  underlying  issues 
of  war  and  peace,  we  are  united  and  firm  and 
determined,  and  this  is  the  signal  we  must  get 
across;  and  I  think  there's  good  prospect  that 
after  this  Cuban  affair — that  these  signals  can  go 
across. 

Mr.  Secretary,  your  observation^^  on  determi- 
nation, resolution,  avoidance  of  miscalculation, 
certainly  apply  to  Berlin? 

Yes — -for  the  last  year  and  a  half  we  have  been 
continuing  the  conversations  with  representatives 
of  the  Soviet  Union  about  Bei'lin,  and  that  is  that 
we  consider  it  to  be  our  vital  interest  that  the  com- 
mitments to  the  security  of  the  people  of  West 
Berlin  be  sustained ;  and  that  requires  the  presence 
of  the  Western  forces,  that  requires  access  to  West 
Berlin,  that  requires  a  chance  for  the  people  of 
West  Berlin  to  have  a  viable  economy  and  to  live. 
This  is  a  very  simple  notion,  and  the  opportunities 
for  a  great  deal  of  compromise  have  pretty  well 
been  exhausted  over  the  years ;  but  nevertheless  it 
is  important  that  we  continue  to  talk  about  these 
to  see  if  we  can't  find  some  way  to  manage  that 
problem  without  a  great  crisis. 

Tfie  Tedium  of  Diplomacy 

Sir,  this  co7itinuing  talking  for  years — thafs  the 
thing  I  think  you  once  referred  to  as  the  '''■tedium'''' 
of  diplomacy? 


December   17,    1962 


911 


Yes,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  although  some  of  our 
friends  in  the  press  look  for  the  spectacular  every 
da}',  a  great  deal  of  our  work  is  perhaps  on  the 
boring  side.  In  a  matter  like  Berlin,  we  have 
been  talking,  but  we  felt  it  was  important  that  we 
not  exhibit  the — perhaps  the  traditional  Ameri- 
can impatience  to  get  on  and  get  to  an  answer 
quickly.  "We  can  be  just  as  repetitive.  We  can 
play  the  longplaying  records  just  as  long  as  some- 
one else.  We  don't  feel  that  we  need  to  rush  to  an 
answer  if  the  other  side  is  unwilling  to  find  an  an- 
swer that  is  acceptable.  This  has  gotten  to  the 
point  where — perhaps  our  friends  on  the  other  side 
might  forgive  me  if  I  say  it — it's  gotten  to  the 
point  where,  in  our  conversations,  we've  been  able 
to  refer  to  arguments  by  the  numbers.  He  would 
make  an  argument — the  ambassador  or  the  foreign 
minister — and  I  can  say,  "Well,  you  know  our 
position  on  that;  this  is  argument  No.  5.  Shall 
I  repeat  it,  or  shall  we  save  time  and  go  on?" 
And  they'll  smile  and  say,  well,  we'll  perhaps  go 
on  to  some  other  subject. 

Mr.  Rusk,  some  of  your  colleagues  say  that  you 
are  the  first  Secretary  of  State  weh'e  ever  had  who 
is  a^  repetitive,  stubborn,  and  patient  a.s  a  Hus- 
sion; you  can  go  on  endlessly,  and  others  refer  to 
you  as  '''■the  quiet  American"  What  do  they  mean 
by  that? 

Well,  I  think,  perhaps,  if  there  is  any  truth  in 
this — I  am  told  that  I  made  more  speeches  than 
most  Secretaries  of  State — but  I  think  that  this 
may  come  because,  to  me,  how  the  story  comes  out 
is  the  important  thing  rather  than  the  flashy  or 
sensational  things  that  one  might  say  about  de- 
velopments in  the  process.  Therefore  I  tend  to  be 
a  little  reluctant  to  talk  about  crises  in  the  midst 
of  the  crisis  or  negotiations  in  the  midst  of  the 
negotiations.  I  think  the  public  is,  and  ought  to 
be,  fully  informed  about  what  our  purposes  are, 
wliat  our  policies  are,  what  we're  trying  to  achieve. 
But  I  am  convinced  that,  if  the  story  comes  out 
right,  the  public  interest  and  the  public  desire 
for  knowledge  will  be  more  than  satisfied.  If  it 
doesn't  come  out  right,  flashy  speeches  along  the 
way  are  not  going  to  help  very  much. 

Progress    Under    Free    Societies 

Mr.  Husk,  nobody  knows  better  tluin  you  tliat 
the  leaders  of  the  newly  independent  countries, 


while  interested  in  freedom,  also  want  to  pull 
their  countries  out  of  the  muck  and  the  mud  as 
fast  as  possible.  And  they  so  often  say,  '■'■The 
Communists  have  done  it  in  1^  years — thafs  the 
faM  xvay?''  Ho\o  do  you  com.municate  to  them  the 
fact  that  there  are  other  ivays  to  do  it? 

Well,  I  think  the  first  thing  we  have  to  do  is  to 
ask  them  to  look  at  the  record.  And  I  think  that 
we  in  the  Western  World  have  made  a  great  mis- 
take in  saying  to  these  people,  "Look,  it  takes  two 
or  three  centuries  to  develop;  you  can't  do  this 
fast,"  because  in  fact  it  has  been  done  rapidly  in 
free  societies.  Our  own  public  life  today  is  filled 
with  people  whose  boyhood  was  spent  in  under- 
developed parts  of  our  own  country — men  like 
Vice  President  Johnson,  men  like  Speaker  Sam 
Kayburn,  and  others.  Within  the  lifetime  of  men 
now  living,  large  sections  of  this  coimtry  were 
underdeveloped.  People  now  living  remember 
the  time  when  typhoid  and  malaria  and  pellagra 
and  goiter  and  other  diseases  of  that  sort  were  a 
part  of  the  environment  in  which  Providence  had 
put  us.  Science  and  technology  had  not  come  to 
the  farms  or  to  the  workshops;  education  was 
almost  primitive,  at  least  rudimentary ;  and  in  the 
course  of  40  or  50  years  there's  been  a  great  trans- 
formation in  these  underdeveloped  parts  of  our 
own  country. 

It's  important  to  recall  that  when  I  was  a  boy 
in  Georgia  only  1  percent  of  our  fai-ms  in  the 
United  States  had  electricity  and  that  today  98 
percent  of  them  have  electricity.  Wliat  happened 
to  us  has  happened  to  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
families  all  over  the  United  States  and  again  il- 
lustrates the  point  that  a  great  deal  has  happened 
in  this  countiy  in  the  last  50  years.  My  father 
was  the  only  one  of  12  brothers  and  sisters  who 
went  to  college.  Three  of  his  five  children  went 
to  college,  but  all  of  his  grandchildren  will  go  to 
college.  Now,  that's  happened  to  Americans  all 
over  the  country,  and  it  seems  to  me  that  this 
illustrates  the  dramatic  transformation  of  life  in 
this  country  in  this  last  half -century. 

Race  Relations  and  U.S.  Policy 

Well,  Mr.  Rusk,  without  offense,  there^s  another 
Southern  tradition  that  Pd  like  to  ask  you  about, 
and  its  effect  in  your  job  as  Secretary  of  State. 
What  about  race  relatioTis.  and  how  does  that  enter 


912 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


into  your  job  of  representing  our  country  in  the 
world? 

This  is  why  we're  so  deeply  concerned  when  we 
in  our  own  country  fail  to  live  up  to  our  own 
highest  aspirations  and  our  own  highest  commit- 
ments. This,  perhaps,  40  years  ago  would  not  have 
been  very  important ;  but  today  we  live  under  the 
klieg  lights  of  world  attention,  and — to  use  the 
baseball  expression — we're  expected  to  bat  a 
thousand.  If  we  stub  our  toes,  if  we  fail  to  per- 
form as  we  want  to  perform,  then  these  failures 
are  circulated  around  the  globe,  to  the  joy  of  our 
enemies  and  to  the  discomfort  of  our  friends. 

Now,  I  would  have  to  say  that  these  problems 
of  discrimination  here  in  our  own  country  are  the 
largest  single  bui'den  we  bear  in  the  conduct  of 
our  foreign  relations.  It's  not  because  there  isn't 
discrimination  and  prejudice  in  other  countries; 
not  because  there  aren't  differences  based  on  race 
or  religion,  or  whatever  it  might  be,  wherever 
you  find  differences  of  race  or  religion.  But  so 
much  is  expected  of  us  that  any  failure  on  our 
part  to  make  good  on  our  own  commitments  makes 
an  enormous  difference  to  our  leadership  in  the 
world.  So  I  myself,  as  a  Georgian,  fully  apprecia- 
tive of  the  depth  of  this  problem  and  some  of  the 
difficulties  and  complications  of  finding  prompt 
solutions,  I  do  think  that  we  must  move  as 
promptly  as  we  can  to  establish  the  fact  that 
American  citizens  are  American  citizens  in  every 
sense  of  the  word. 

Foreign  Policy  and  the  People 

This  is  part  of  your  philosophy,  that  every  citi- 
zen helps  to  mahe  foreign  policy? 

It  is  always  a  problem  of  bringing  home  to  peo- 
ple, and  indeed  to  ourselves  in  the  Department  of 
State,  that  when  we  talk  about  great  and  distant 
issues  in  other  parts  of  the  world,  or  when  we  are 
talking  about  the  abstractions  of  international 
law,  or  things  called  states,  we're  talking  about 
things  that  enter  into  every  home  and  every  com- 
mimity  in  the  Nation.  We  can't  be  free  or  pros- 
perous if  the  rest  of  the  world  is  subjected  to 
tyranny  or  is  in  poverty.  This  intimate  connection 
between  every  family  and  what  is  happening  in . 
the  rest  of  the  world  is  something  that  we  need  td| 
emphasize  over  and  over  again. 

And  our  friends  abroad  ought  to  understand 


that.  I've  had  to  say  to  quite  a  few  ambassadors 
this  past  year  that  when  things  like  foreign  aid 
come  up,  we  have  no  mountain  of  gold  out  in  some 
western  desert  out  of  which  we  can  shovel  funds 
for  foreign  aid.  This  money  comes  out  of  the  tax- 
payer's pocket,  and  a  great  deal  of  it  comes  out  of 
the  pockets  of  ordinary  citizens — laborers,  farm- 
workers, taxi  drivers,  schoolteachers — as  well  as 
the  big  corporations. 

Therefore,  unless  they  do  the  kinds  of  things  in 
their  country  that  will  give  us,  in  good  conscience, 
an  opportunity  to  go  to  our  people  and  say,  "We 
think  you  ought  to  contribute  to  the  effort  that 
they  are  making,"  then  we're  on  very  shaky 
grounds  here  at  home.  No,  there's  an  intimate 
involvement  between  the  individual  citizen  and 
what  we  call  foreign  policy. 

Summit  Diplomacy 

Mr.  Rush,  you  wrote  another  article  prior  to 
your  heing  appointed  Secretary  of  State,  this  one 
in  the  magazine  Foreign  Affairs,  and  you  spohe 
about  summitry.  May  I  quote  it  to  you:  ".  .  .  / 
conclude  that  summit  diplomacy  is  to  be  ap- 
proached with  the  wariness  with  which  a  prudent 
physician  prescribes  a  habit-forming  dmg.  .  .  ." 
And  you  tuent  on  to  say  that  this  should  be  used 
very  rarely  and  only  with  the  most  rigorous  safe- 
guards.  Do  you  still  think  so  ? 

Yes,  I  think  I'm  still  of  that  opinion ;  but  I  think 
I  ought  to  distinguish  between  two  kinds  of  meet- 
ings of  people  who  are  heads  of  their  respective 
states  or  governments.  The  one  is  the  informal, 
friendly  visit,  of  which  there  are  a  considerable 
number  each  year — not  just  ceremonial,  but  a 
chance  for  informal  conversation  to  permit  Pres- 
ident Kennedy  and  great  leaders  from  other  coun- 
tries to  get  personally  acquainted.  But  where 
there  is,  in  effect,  adversai-y  negotiation,  and  where 
the  consequences  of  failure  are  very  great,  it  seems 
to  me  that  these  must  be  handled  with  great  care, 
because  when  the  summit  is  in  session  the  court  of 
last  resort  is  in  session.  It's  hard  to  see  where 
you  go  from  there,  if  there's  a  failure.  And  many 
of  these  problems  which  are  in  contest,  say,  be- 
tween ourselves  and  the  free  world  and  the  Soviet 
bloc,  are  so  utterly  complicated  and  so  utterly  dan- 
gerous that  I  felt  that  we  ought  to  try  to  exhausti 
the  processes  of  patient  and  quiet  diplomacy  as  I 
much  as  possible,  to  prepare  the  way  for  agree- 


Ueaemh&r  17,   1962 


913 


.  ment,  because  the  consequences  of  a  final  disagree- 
Iment  are  so  very  great. 

Well,  sir,  summitry  suggests  travel,  and  travel 
suggests  John  Foster  Dulles,  and  I  ielieve  thai 
you  loere  one  of  many  who  used  to  criticize  Mr. 
Dulles  for  his  frequent  travels. 

I  think  in  the  first  year  of  my  tenure  I  outflew 
Mr.  Dulles  to  a  brief  extent,  as  far  as  his  first  year 
■was  concerned.  This  is,  itself,  getting  to  be  a  very 
serious  problem.  I've  been  talking  with  other  for- 
eign ministers  about  a  trade  union  of  foreign  min- 
isters, to  create  more  tolerable  working  conditions 
among  themselves  I  It  has  been  suggested  at  times 
that  wo  pick  up  Thomas  Jefferson's  original  title, 
Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  have  a  rov- 
1  ing  Secretary  of  State,  while  the  principal  Secre- 
Itary  of  State  stays  here  and  takes  care  of  the  De- 
partment and  the  situation  in  "Washington  and 
keeps  in  close  touch  with  the  President. 

Disarmament  and  Nuclear  Testing 

Referring  to  the  aftermath  of  the  Cuban  situ- 
ation, can  you  discuss  its  impact  on  Mr.  Khru- 
shchev and  the  Russians  themselves?  There  seem 
to  he  some  signs  that  perhaps  tliey'^re  reaching  out. 

If  I  may  speak  purely  personally,  it  seems  to 
me  that  we  lived  through  a  period  of  weeks  which 
underlined  the  importance  of  trj^ing  to  make  some 
progress  on  disannament,  if  we  can,  because,  in  a 
very  real  sense,  this  latest  aspect  of  the  Cuban  crisis 
has  been  a  crisis  of  the  arms  race.  Here  we  had 
these  powerful  weapons  in  Cuba,  in  an  unaccus- 
tomed place,  brought  across  an  ocean,  directly 
threatening  our  own  hemisphere  and  this  country. 
Now,  as  we  look  ahead  and  we  see  the  possibility 
of  the  spiraling  arms  race  moving  upward  and  up- 
ward, with  greater  and  greater  sophistication, 
greater  instability,  greater  dangers,  we  should  try 
to  find  ways,  if  possible,  to  turn  that  arms  race 
downward.  Now,  we're  not  going  to  be  able  to 
achieve  that  overnight,  by  some  sudden,  massive 
elimination  of  weapons;  but  surely  we  ought  to  be 
able  to  find  some  specific  and  tangible  and  practi- 
cal steps  in  the  field — at  least  begin  to  stop  the 
spiraling — nuclear  testing  perhaps,  some  of  the 
measures  against  surprise  attack.  There  are  other 
points  where  we  might  take  hold,  find  some  han- 
dles, and  begin  to  say  to  ourselves,  on  both  sides  of 
the  so-called   Iron   Curtain,  that  this  situation 


threatens  to  pass  beyond  the  capacity  of  man  to 
handle  it. 

Mr.  Secretary,  the  Russians  say  that  hoth  sides 
have  a  tamperproof  seismic  box  that  can  distin- 
guish nuclear  explosions,  and  that  onsite  inspection 
isn't  necessary.  This  is  very  much  the  discussion 
going  on  on  a  nuclear  test  ban.  What  is  your  an- 
swer to  that? 

We  do  not  have,  at  the  present  time,  the  kind  of 
instrmnents  which  can  clearly  distinguish  between 
an  underground  nuclear  explosion  and  certain 
kinds  of  earthquakes.  We  have  instruments  that 
will  help  simplify  an  inspection  system,  but  we 
don't  have  the  instmmients  that  will  do  the  crucial 
job  of  telling  whether  this  underground  event  was 
a  nuclear  test  or  an  earthquake.  Now,  we  can't 
say  categorically  that  the  Kussians  don't  have  such 
instruments,  but  what  we  have  said  to  the  Rus- 
sians, more  than  20  times,  is  that  if  you  have  them, 
bring  them  forward.  We'll  take  a  look  at  them. 
Let's  let  our  scientists  sit  down  and  have  a  look 
at  these  instruments,  because  from  that  point  of 
view  there  is  no  policy  argument.  What  we  want 
is  assurance  that,  when  we  sign  a  nuclear  test  ban, 
no  one  tests.  Because  we  can't  live,  quite  frankly, 
with  the  waves  of  suspicion  rolling  over  the  free 
world  in  connection  with  disarmament,  if  we're 
living  in  ignorance  of  what  is  happening  in  this 
vast  area,  the  Eurasian  landmass. 

Red  China  and  the  U.S.S.R. 

Sir,  you've  referred  to  the  great  Eurasian  land- 
mass.  Now,  that  inrludes  China.  From  a  pra/3ti- 
cal  point  of  view,  how  can  we  sign  a  nuclear  test 
ban  treaty  with  Russia  if  China  is  not  a  party  to 

it? 

Well,  in  the  first  instance,  Mr.  Schoenbrun,  we 
have  a  very  simple  answer  for  that.  The  agree- 
ment itself  which  we've  tabled  in  Geneva,  would 
be  canceled  immediately  if  any  other  nation  con- 
ducted a  nuclear  test.  In  other  words,  we  obvi- 
ously could  not  sign  a  nuclear  test  ban  treaty  if 
any  nation  around  the  world  were  free  to  continue 
testing;  so  that  that  is  built  into  the  treat j' — that 
particular  safeguard.  Now,  I  would  have  to  say 
that  the  prospects  at  the  moment  that  the  authori- 
ties in  Peiping  would  sign  a  nuclear  test  ban 
treaty  are  not  very  good. 

Mr.  Rusk,  we  tend  so  much  to  talk  about  the 


914 


Department  of  Sfafe  Bulletin 


quarrels  inside  our  outspohen  free  society,  hut  in 
recent  weeks  it  looks  as  though  the  monolithic 
Communist  Hoc  isnH  all  that  monolithic.  Can 
you  comment  on  that? 

The  principal  arguments  within  the  bloc  have 
to  do  with  how  best  to  get  on  with  their  revolu- 
tion. In  Peiping,  for  example,  they  appear  to 
want  to  take  a  more  aggressive,  more  military, 
approach  to  these  questions — to  go  back  to  some  of 
the — shall  I  say  the  more  primitive  aspects  of 
Leninism.  In  Moscow  they're  more  subtle  and 
sophisticated.  They  talk  about  peaceful  coexist- 
ence. They  are  using  such  instruments  as 
economic  assistance  and  things  of  that  sort.  This 
is  chiefly  an  argument  of  technique.  I  don't  think 
that  we  ouglit  to  jump  too  quickly  to  the  conclusion 
that  these  differences  mean  that  we  have  any  room 
for  complacency  or  relaxation  of  effort,  because 
tliey  botli  are  committed  to  their  kind  of  world 
system. 

But  you  do  judge,  sir,  that  these  are  serious 
differences  hetween  Moscow  and  Peiping? 

They  are  very  serious  and  very  far-reaching. 
They  have  to  do  with  the  leadership  of  the  bloc 
itself,  with  basic  questions  of  philosophy.  I  think 
the  confusion  that  has  been  thrown  into  Commu- 
nist parties  all  over  the  world,  not  just  in  the 
Cormnunist  countries  themselves,  by  this  doctrinal 
debate  between  Moscow  and  Peiping  has  been 
helpful  to  the  free  world.  But  I  just  want  to  be 
certain  that  I  don't  leave  the  impression  that 
there's  much  comfort  in  these  differences  for  us 
yet.    Let's  see  how  the  story  comes  out. 

Red    China    and    India 

Hoiu  would  you  read  China's  adventure  in 
India? 

Well,  it's — I  perhaps  could  say  more  about  that, 
say,  in  mid-December  than  I  can  at  the  present 
time,  because  in  accordance  with  the  announce- 
ment made  by  Peiping  about  their  so-called 
"cease-fire"  December  1  is  a  fairly  important  date. 

As  you  know,  China  has  had  for  many  years, 
before  the  Communists  came  to  power,  certain 
territorial  claims  along  that  southern  frontier. 
But  the  tiling  that  has  most  concerned  us  is  that 
the  authorities  in  Peiping  should  have  used  vio- 
lence in  an  attempt  to  settle  a  question  which 
ought  to  be  settled,  if  possible,  by  a  course  of  ne- 


gotiation; and  the  scale  of  their  violence  holds 
open  the  prospect  that  their  intentions  go  far 
beyond  the  border  issues. 

Now,  I  think  the  events  in  India  have  alerted 
many  Afro-Asian  countries  to  the  threat  which 
has  come  from  Peiping.  They  understand  that 
these  are  not  issues  that  just  turn  upon  some  sort 
of  cold  war  between  Moscow  and  Washington, 
tliat  there  are  other  elements  here  that  threaten 
their  independence.  And  the  rallying  around  of 
world  opinion  behind  India  in  this  situation,  I 
think,  must  be  a  signal  to  the  other  side  that  India 
not  only  is  a  country  with  great  potential  of  its 
own,  great  industrial  strength,  and  is  not  to  be 
easily  tampered  with,  despite  these  immediate  and 
short-term  military  reverses,  but  also  that  India, 
in  the  event  of  aggression,  serious  aggression, 
would  have  the  support  of  the  rest  of  the  world. 
And  this  is  something  that  Peiping  must  think 
seriously  about. 

"The  Great  Human  Tradition" 

Mr.  Secretary,  India  has  always  heen  the  very 
symbol  of  a  neutral  nation.  Now  it  seems  to  he 
seehing  aid  in  soTne  hind  of  alinement.  Can  you 
clarify  this  for  us? 

I'm  reminded  of  the  remark  that  President 
Kennedy  made  to  the  General  Assembly  of  the 
United  Nations  in  September  of  lOGl."  He  said 
that  in  that  hall  there  were  really  only  two  sides, 
not  three.  There  were  those  who  were  trying  to 
build  the  kind  of  world  laid  out  in  the  United 
Nations  Charter,  and  there  were  those  who  were 
trying  to  prevent  that  kind  of  world  from  coming 
into  being.  And  on  that  underlying  issue,  there 
are  only  two  sides. 

Now  let  me  say  that,  as  far  as  allies  are  con- 
cerned, we  do  have  a  very  special  relationship 
with  allies.  We  have  committed  the  safety  and 
the  lives  and  the  material  capacities  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  to  our  allies  in  their  and  our  mutual 
defense.  Now,  what  is  our  principal  interest  in 
the  neutrals'?  It's  their  independence,  so  that  in 
the  most  fundamental  sense  our  interest,  both  in 
allies  and  m  neutrals,  is  the  same — a  world  com- 
munity of  independent  nations,  cooperating  volun- 
tarily across  national  frontiers  in  the  common 
interest.     Now,  that  means  that,  whereas  we  have 


'  Ihid.,  Oct.  16,  1961,  p.  619. 


December   77,   J  962 


915 


very  specific  coinmitmenls  to  allies,  we  also  have 
some  very  deep  interest  in  what  happens  to  the 
neutrals,  and  I  think  both  our  allies  and  I  think 
most  neutrals  understand  this. 

If  I  could  be  just  a  little  presumptuous  as  an 
American,  Mr.  Schoenbrun,  I  really  think  that  it 
would  be  difficult  to  find  any  people,  anywhere  in 
(he  world,  including  those  behind  the  Iron  Cur- 
tain, tliat  believe  that  the  American  people,  or  the 
United  States,  is  trying  to  take  something  away 
from  them  that  belongs  to  them.  I  really  think 
that  one  of  the  greatest  strengths  we  have,  in  this 
present  period,  is  that  we  carry  our  purposes  on 
our  sleeves;  and  the  purposes  we  carry  are  for 
peace  within  the  framework  of  the  United  Nations 
kind  of  world  community.  And  on  these  issues  I 
think  allies  and  neutrals  are  together. 

I  don't  really  think  this  is  a  new  doctrine.  I 
tliink  it's  almost  as  old  as  our  Republic,  because 
the  simple  political  principles  on  which  this 
Republic  was  founded  are  a  part  of  a  great  hu- 
man discourse  that  has  been  going  on  for  more 
than  2,000  years.  Now,  we  are  not  the  pinnacle — 
we  are  not  the  final  result,  the  full  flower  of  that 
tradition;  we're  only  a  part  of  it.  But  these 
simple  notions,  after  2,000  years,  seem  to  me  to  be 
clearly  rooted  deeply  in  the  nature  of  man  himself ; 
and  if  that  is  so,  that  means  that  these  are  shared 
by  men  and  women  all  over  the  world.  The  de- 
mocracy that  we  talk  about  has  been  reflected  in 
the  village  democracy  of  India,  pre-Christian  peri- 
od, and  in  the  traditions  of  people  in  almost 
every  continent  and  every  cultural  tradition. 
This  is  why  I  think  that  we  have  almost  instinctive 
allies  wherever  we  turn,  in  trying  to  build  the 
kind  of  world  that  fits  our  own  tradition,  because 
our  tradition  is  a  part  of  the  great  human 
tradition. 

I  must  say  that  when  we  talk  to  people  from 
other  nations  and  other  racial,  cultural  groups, 
other  religions,  in  different  parts  of  the  world,  we 
don't  really  have  to  spend  much  time  arguing 
with  them  about  what  we're  after.  We're  after  the 
most  elementary  human  opportunities  for  a  decent 
life,  and  they  understand  that.  Our  discussion  is, 
how  do  you  get  there,  under  their  circumstances 
and  OUTS,  and  what  can  we  do  together  to  move  it. 
We  don't  debate  about  purposes.  The~se  purposes 
are  in  the  nature  of  man.  We've  articulated  them 
in  one  way,  they've  articulated  them  in  others; 


but  it  is  really  striking  to  me,  and  is  something 
that  I  experience  almost  every  week,  to  see  how 
strong  is  this  family  of  man,  if  I  might  put  it 
that  way,  and  how  much  confidence  and  assurance 
we  can  get,  that  we're  not  talking  strange  language 
to  other  people. 

Sir,  can  you  communicate  to  these  noncomm,itt.ed 
nations  your  oton  fervor  and  faith  in  America\i 
democracy  and  growth,  so  that  they  understand 
that  the  way  to  progress  is  our  way  and  not  the 
Communist  way? 

If  I  put  it  in  terms  of  "our  way"  as  meaning 
simply  the  American  way,  I  would  fail.  But  if  I 
put  it,  to  use  your  expression,  "our  way''  as  a  joint 
way,  tliere's  not  really  too  much  difficulty.  Again, 
we  do  not  have  a  monopoly  on  these  central  ideas 
that  we  talk  about  here  in  our  Ajnerican  society. 
We  didn't  invent  the  presumption  of  innocence. 
We  didn't  invent  jury  trials.  We  didn't  invent 
constitutional  processes.  But  we  have  made  an 
enormous  contribution  to  the  institutional  struc- 
ture of  freedom,  and  we  have,  I  think,  sharpened 
and  refined  the  ways  in  which  people  can  be  free, 
under  rules  of  law  which  make  it  possible  for 
each  one  of  us,  as  individuals,  to  pursue  our  rather 
eccentric  orbits  without  collision  with  each  other. 
And  this  is  something  that  people  in  other 
countries  want,  appreciate,  but  also  they  claim  it 
as  their  own ;  and  I  wouldn't  want  to  try  to  take 
it  away  from  them  by  saying,  "Look,  this  notion 
that  governments  derive  their  just  powers  from 
the  consent  of  the  governed  is  a  sort  of  American 
invention."  This  is  a  human  invention,  and  they 
understand  it  and  are  reaching  for  it,  and  this  is  a 
joint  effort. 

Changing  Patterns  in  World  Affairs 

Sir,  wlien  Chancellor  Adenauer  was  here  2  weeks 
ago,  tlie  President  in  a  luncheon  toast  spoke  of  a 
great  turning  point  in  East-West  relations  and  a 
historic  change  in  the  world.  You  picked  up,  I 
think,  the  same  theme  in  New  York,  when  you 
spoke  of  great  impending  decisions.^  Are  we  at 
a  moment  of  cliange  in  world  history? 

Well,  that's  a  little  difficult  to  answer,  Mr. 
Schoenbrun,  because  it's  liard  for  me  to  predict 

'  Ihid.,  Dec.  10, 1962,  p.  8C7. 


916 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


what  I  called  in  New  York  unpredictable  events. 
But  I  do  think  that  some  of  the  patterns  of  the 
world  that  we've  been  living-  through,  for  the  last 
decade  or  so,  are  changing,  and  I  think  that  it  is 
possible  that  men's  approach  to  them  will  change. 
I  think  in  these  recent  weeks,  if  I  may  perhaps 
state  it  rather  strangely,  I  think  men  in  more  than 
one  country  have  had  a  chance  to  confront  the 
first  question  of  the  Westminster  Shorter  Cate- 
chism— ^What  is  the  chief  end  of  man? — and  I 
think  that  has  been  a  sobering  experience  for 
everyone  concerned.  Aiid  I  think  some  of  the  illu- 
sory commitments,  some  of  the  fanciful  ideas,  give 
way  to  an  underlying  sense  of  reality,  and  that 
out  of  this  may  come  a  detennination  on  the  part 
of  many  leaders  to  build  the  kind  of  world  which 
is  tolerable  and  not  the  kind  of  world  which — 
whose  problems  almost  literally  pass  beyond  the 
capacity  of  the  mind  of  man  to  handle.  And  so 
I  think  that  there  will  be  a  new  note  of  sobriety 
on  all  sides.  At  least,  that  is  the  hope.  Because 
I  think  this  has  been  a  very  instructive  experience 
through  which  everyone  has  gone. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Secretary. 


President  Hopes  for  Progress 
in  Disarmament  TaEks 

Statement  hy  President  Kennedy  ^ 

The  18-nation  disarmament  conference  resumes 
its  deliberations  in  Geneva  today.  This  is  as  it 
should  be.  The  crucial  developments  within  re- 
cent weeks  have  served  to  confirm  both  the  need 
and  urgency  of  the  task  before  it. 

It  is  clear  that  a  renewed  and  immediate  effort 
must  be  made  to  halt  the  constantly  increasing 
tempo  of  the  arms  race  if  there  is  to  be  assurance 
of  a  lessening  of  the  danger  of  war.  It  is,  there- 
fore, my  continued  hope  that  serious  negotiations 
will  proceed  at  once  on  those  initial  measures  of 


'Read  by  U.S.  Representative  Arthur  H.  Dean  before 
the  Conference  of  the  Eighteen-Nation  Committee  on  Dis- 
armament at  Geneva,  Switzerland,  on  Nov.  26  (White 
House  press  release  (Hyannis,  Mass.)  dated  Nov.  25,  for 
release  Nov.  26). 


disarmament  which  could,  if  put  into  effect  with- 
out delay,  materially  improve  international  se- 
curity and  enhance  the  prospects  for  further  dis- 
armament progress. 

Among  these  measures  we  believe  high  priority 
should  be  given  to  the  conclusion  of  an  effective 
agreement  which  would  end  once  and  for  all  tests 
of  nuclear  weapons."  The  United  States  has  com- 
pleted its  recent  series  of  atmospheric  tests.  There 
is  hope  that  the  Soviet  Union  evidently  will  soon 
conclude  its  series  of  atmospheric  tests.  This  sug- 
gests that  a  moment  may  be  at  hand  to  initiate  the 
beginning  of  the  end  of  the  upward  spiral  of 
weapons  competition.  If  so,  the  opportunity  must 
not  be  lost. 

It  is  important  that  these  negotiations  now  move 
forward  and  that  concrete  progress  be  achieved. 
To  this  end,  I  pledge  anew  my  personal  and  con- 
tinuing interest  in  the  work  of  the  conference. 


U.S.  and  Belgium  Warn  of  Stronger 
Measures  To  Restore  Congo  Unity 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  joint  statement  issued 
at  Washington  hy  President  Kennedy  and  Foreign 
Minister  Paul-Henri  Spaak  of  Belgium  on  No- 
vember 27  after  an  exchange  of  views  on  the 
Congo. 

The  United  States  Government  and  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Belgium  reaffirm  their  full  support  for 
the  U  Thant  plan '  for  the  reunification  of  the 
Congo.  The  United  States  Government  and  the 
Government  of  Belgium  have  up  to  this  point  di- 
rected their  efforts  toward  accomplishment  of  the 
plan  along  the  lines  of  voluntary  discussion  and 
actions  of  the  parties  concerned.  This  approach 
has  not,  however,  produced  the  necessary  results. 
If  there  is  not  substantial  progress  within  a  very 
short  period  of  time,  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment and  the  Government  of  Belgium  fully  realize 
that  it  will  be  necessary  to  execute  further  phases 
under  the  United  Nations  plan  which  include  se- 
vere economic  measures. 


'  For  background,  see  Buixetin  of  Nov.  26,  1962,  p.  817. 
'  For  text,  see  U.N.  doc.  S/u053/Add.l3  and  Corr.  1. 


December   7  7,   J  962 


917 


U.S.  Welcomes  Agreement  by  Pakistan 
and  India  To  Renew  Talks  on  Kashmir 

Department  Statement 

Press  release  702  dated  November  30 

The  United  States  Government  welcomes  the 
agreement  of  President  Mohammad  Ayub  Khan 
of  Pakistan  and  Prime  Minister  Jawaharhxl  Nehru 
of  India  to  renew  their  efforts  at  an  early  date  to 
resolve  the  outstanding  differences  between  their 
two  countries  on  Kashmir  and  related  matters. 
This  is  an  encouraging  sign  of  progress  toward 
solving  a  most  difficult  and  longstanding  problem. 
The  resolution  of  this  dispute  will  greatly  benefit 
both  countries  and  will  contribute  to  the  security 
of  the  subcontinent  and  of  the  free  world.  The 
leaders  of  Pakistan  and  India  are  to  be  congratu- 
lated on  taking  this  important  step,  and  we  wish 
them  well  in  their  endeavors. 


President  Kennedy  Holds  Talks 
With  Prime  Minister  of  Somalia 

Prime  Minuter  Ahdirascid  Ali  Scermurche  of 
the  Republic  of  Somali  visited  the  United  States 
November  25-December  2  at  the  invitation  of 
President  Kennedy.  Following  is  the  text  of  a 
joint  communique  released  at  the  conclusion  of 
their  discussions  at  Washington  November  27-28. 

White  House  press  release  dated  November  28 

His  Excellency  Prime  Minister  Abdirascid  of 
the  Somali  Republic  and  President  John  F. 
Kennedy  have  had  a  most  cordial  exchange  of 
views  on  a  variety  of  subjects  of  interest  to 
Somalia  and  the  United  States  during  the  course 
of  the  Prime  Minister's  visit  to  Washington. 

The  two  leaders  reviewed  the  current  inter- 
national situation,  and  agreed  that  the  settlement 
of  international  disputes  is  essential  in  order  that 
the  full  resources  of  the  nations  of  the  world  may 
be  devoted  to  achieving  progress  for  their  peoples. 

Prime  Minister  Abdirascid  explained  the  steps 
Somalia  is  taking  to  promote  economic  develop- 
ment, and  thanked  President  Kennedy  for  the 
economic  assistance  the  United  States  has  pro- 
vided Somalia,  especially  in  the  building  of  the 
Chisimaio  port .    President  Kennedy  indicated  the 


918 


interest  of  the  United  States  in  Somalia's  efforts 
to  expand  the  prosperity  and  well-being  of  the 
people  of  Somalia,  and  expressed  the  willingness 
of  the  United  States,  along  with  other  friendly 
nations,  to  assist  Somalia  in  these  efforts  by  ap- 
propriate means. 

The  two  leaders  noted  the  fundamental  mutu- 
ality of  interests  and  objectives  of  their  two  na- 
tions, based  on  the  proven  dedication  of  both  the 
Somali  and  American  people  to  the  principles  of 
democracy  and  human  dignity.  They  expressed 
hope  for  continuing  close  and  friendly  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  Somalia. 


President  Terminates  Order 
Interdicting  Deliveries  to  Cuba 

A     PROCLAMATION' 

I,  John  F.  Kennedy,  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  acting  under  and  by  virtue  of 
the  authority  vested  in  me  by  the  Constitution  and 
statutes  of  the  United  States,  do  hereby  proclaim 
that  at  11  p.m.,  Greenwich  Time,  November  20, 
1962,  I  terminated  the  authority  conferred  upon 
the  Secretary  of  Defense  by  Proclamation  No. 
3504,2  dated  October  23,  1962,  and  revoked  the 
orders  contained  therein  to  forces  under  my 
command. 

In  -witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my 
hand  and  caused  the  Seal  of  the  United  States  of 
America  to  be  affixed. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington  this  21st  day 

of  November,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord 

[seal]     nineteen  hundred  and  sixty-two  and  of 

the  Independence  of  the  United  States  of 

America  the  one  hmidred  and  eighty-seventh. 


/iLJ  L^ 


By  the  President : 
Dean  Rusk, 

Secretary  of  State. 


'  No.  3.507 ;  27  Fed.  Reg.  11525. 

•  For  text,  see  Bdixetin  of  Nov.  12,  1962,  p.  717. 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Population  Growth  and  Economic  Development 


hy  Robert  W.  Bamett 

Deputy  Director,  Foreign  Economic  Advisory  Staff  ^ 


Thomas  Robert  Malthus  was,  I  am  told,  the 
father  of  modern  demography.  Born  in  1766, 
author  of  the  celebrated  Essay  on  the  Principle  of 
Population  published  in  1798,  he  died  in  183-1. 
Much  could  be  said  about  the  period  of  change — 
even  turmoil — politically,  intellectually,  and  tech- 
nologically, which  he  observed  and  influenced. 
All  I  care  to  say  here  about  the  Malthusian  con- 
tention that  vice  and  misery  are  unavoidable  be- 
cause population  increases  faster  than  means  of 
subsistence  is  that  it  was,  and  is,  disputed  on  both 
scientific  and  moral  grounds. 

Louis  Pasteur,  Jonas  Salk,  Albert  Einstein,  the 
Wright  brothers  are  but  a  few  of  the  geniuses  who 
have,  for  us  in  the  20th  century,  extended  the  fron- 
tiers of  our  understanding  of  health,  energy,  and 
mobility  and  thus  helped  us  to  transform  our  total 
human  environment  and  its  potentialities.  Al- 
though data  are  richer  and  methods  of  analysis 
more  refined  than  in  the  time  of  Thomas  Eobert 
Malthus,  our  disputes  about  the  population  prob- 
lems of  our  century  still  involve,  and  properly, 
both  scientific  and  moral  issues.  There  is  no  con- 
sensus about  what  to  do  with  the  population 
problem.  This,  the  clergymen  and  businessmen 
in  this  room  should  know,  is  an  assertion  often 
made,  and  it  is  worth  examining. 

We  hear  voices  linking  the  population  problem 
with  the  goals  of  economic  development — social, 
political,  economic,  intellectual,  and  moral — and 


the  mathematics  we  hear  runs  something  like  this : 
If  the  fertility  rate  remains  constant  or  increases 
and  the  mortality  rate  declines,  population  in- 
creases. If  the  rate  of  that  population  growth  is 
1  percent,  total  population  will  double  in  70  years ; 
if  it  is  2  percent,  in  35  years;  if  3.5  percent,  20 
years.  The  past  20  years  have  seen  a  marvelous 
and  beneficent  spread  of  medical  and  sanitary 
improvements  ranging  from  DDT  and  penicillin 
to  boiling  water  and  fly-swatting  campaig-ns. 
Mortality  rates  everywhere  are  declining.  Only 
in  Western  Europe  and  Japan  are  rates  of  pojDula- 
tion  increase  in  the  neighborhood  of  1  percent  or 
less.  Elsewhere  increases  are  high.  Everything 
remaining  equal,  projections  indicate  that  India's 
448  million,  increasing  at  1.9  percent,  will  num- 
ber about  900  million  by  the  year  2000.  Com- 
munist China's  716  million,  increasing  at  2.3 
percent,  will  by  then  number  about  1.4  billion. 
Morocco's  12.3  million,  increasing  at  3  percent, 
will  number  about  25  million  by  1985,  and  Brazil's 
75.3  million,  increasing  at  3.4  percent,  will  number 
about  150  million  by  1982.^  I  heard  Professor 
Philip  Hauser  say  that — using  projections  from 
our  present  Iniowledge — Ajnerica  north  of  the  Rio 
Grande  would  grow  from  its  present  200  million 
to  some  300  million  by  the  end  of  the  century, 
while  south  of  the  Rio  Grande  America's  present 
200  million  would  rise  to  some  600  million  in  the 
same  pei'iod. 

But  let  us  not  be  detained  by  this  aritlunetic: 


■  Address  made  before  a  joint  meeting  of  tbe  Clergy- 
Industry  Relations  Committee  and  the  Clerical  Advisory 
Council  of  the  National  Association  of  Manufacturers  at 
Pittsburgh,  Pa.,  on  Oct.  15. 


'  These  figures  are  only  suggestive.  Those  above  veere 
taken  from  a  table  prepared  by  the  Population  Reference 
Bureau  in  September  1962. 


December   17,    1962 


919 


Projections  are  not  forecasts,  and  everything  may 
not  remain  equal. 

Some  of  our  economists  would  liave  us  use  our 
arithmetic  diil'erently.  They  say  that  there  must 
be  an  amiual  rate  of  saving  representing  3  percent 
of  gross  national  product  to  obtain  a  1-percent 
annual  increase  in  per  capita  income.  To  take 
account  of  population,  add  rate  of  growth  to  the 
increase  in  per  capita  income  desired  and  multiply 
by  three. 

To  illustrate:  Country  x  provides  its  people  a 
$200  per  capita  income  which  it  wants  to  increase 
to  $204,  a  2-percent  increase.  Its  rate  of  popula- 
tion growth  is  2  percent.  Add  2  and  2  and  multi- 
ply by  3.  Country  x  must  save  12  percent  of  its 
GNP  to  achieve  the  goal  of  $4  increase  in  annual 
per  capita  income.  There  happen  to  be  quite  a 
few  countries  with  annual  per  capita  income 
lower  than  $200  and  rate  of  population  increase 
exceeding  2  percent.  To  ask  whether  these  coun- 
tries will  find  it  easy  to  make  the  needed  sacrifices 
for  such  advantage  really  needs  no  answer.  For 
such  societies,  improvements  in  human  welfare 
can  come  only  through  exacting  self-discipline  or 
large-scale  infusions  of  foreign  aid,  and  if  neither 
suffices,  no  general  per  capita  improvement  is 
possible. 

This  is  grim  arithmetic,  and  there  are  those  who 
use  it  to  advocate  drastic  solutions.  What  are 
they?  And  to  what  kinds  of  situations  might 
they  apply  ? 

The  Problem  of  Mauritius 

I  have  just  read  a  little  essay  on  Mauritius,  a 
place  about  half  the  size  of  Long  Island,  east  of 
Madagascar  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  No  one  lived 
there  until  Portuguese  and  Dutch  explorers  some 
350  years  ago  found  and  developed  it  as  a  port  of 
call.  It  is  now  subject  to  an  efficient  British 
colonial  administration,  which  has  maintained 
excellent  statistics  reaching  back  to  1871.  Its  pop- 
ulation problem  dates  from  World  War  II.  There 
has  been  a  50-percent  increase  in  its  numbers 
between  1946  and  1961.  Education  facilities  are 
swamped,  the  social  burden  of  unemployment  is 
overwhelming,  and,  nevertheless,  projections  show 
a  population  of  2  million  on  this  tiny  island  by 
the  year  2000. 

The  causes  of  these  phenomena  are  economic, 
medical,  and  cultural.  Sugar  is  the  single  export 
of  its  economy,  and  900  people  live  on  each  square 


mile  producing  it — with  a  per  ciAta  income  of 
$184  and  the  prospect  that  even  .this  income  will 
decline.  In  1945  there  were  3,544  deaths  from 
malaria;  in  1955,  three.  Between  1944-48  and 
1961  there  was  a  60-percent  decrease  in  infant 
mortality.  In  1961  the  death  rate  of  Mauritius 
was  lower  than  that  of  the  United  Kingdom. 
Meanwhile  women  in  Mauritius  were  marrying  at 
an  average  age  of  about  18.6  years  and  bearing  an 
average  of  5.2  children,  whereas  in  the  United 
Kingdom  the  average  age  of  marriage  was  21.8 
and  women  bore  only  2  children.  Many  of  the 
women  of  Mauritius,  we  are  told,  desire  to  limit 
their  families  but  do  not  know  how  to  or  resort 
to  dangerous  methods  or  simply  do  nothing.  We 
can  see  in  the  well-documented  facts  of  Mauritius 
one  facet  of  the  problem  of  population  growth. 
Is  there,  in  fact,  a  problem  at  all?  I  think  all 
could  agree  that  there  is  one  on  Mauritius. 

The  Situation  in  Japan 

There  are  other  facets.  I  can  remember  long 
talks  which  I  had  with  some  of  my  Japanese 
friends  in  the  late  thirties.  For  them  population 
growth  was  a  f avoi-ite  topic  and  a  justification  for 
territorial  expansion.  Wlien  Japan  was  thrust 
into  the  modern  world,  midway  into  the  19th 
century,  its  population  stood  at  about  35  million, 
maintained  at  that  level  for  many  previous  gen- 
erations by  infanticide  if  otlier  methods  failed. 
By  1940  it  had  grown  to  71  million.  After  Japan's 
surrender  and  the  repatriation  to  Japan  of  some 
7  million  Japanese  overseas,  the  talk  in  Tokyo  was 
that  Japan's  population  would  be  rising  to  some 
120  million  by  1970  and  that  the  economy's  pros- 
pects for  self-support  were  bleak  if  not  absolutely 
hopeless.  However,  tlie  prophets  of  doom  were 
confounded.  Japan's  rate  of  economic  growth  has 
exceeded  10  percent  a  year.  Present  economic 
targets  foreshadow  a  doubling  of  national  income 
in  a  decade.  Agi-icultural  self-sufficiency  is  in 
sight,  and  standards  of  living  approximate  those 
of  advanced  societies  of  the  West.  And  Japan's 
rate  of  population  growtli  is  a  low  1  percent. 

Tiiose  who  tliink  of  Japan  as  an  Asian  country, 
the  lessons  of  whose  experience  should  be  particu- 
larly relevant  to  other  Asian  countries,  will  look 
in  vain  elsewhere,  however,  for  the  patterns  of 
industrialization,  urbanization,  education,  and  tra- 
dition existing  in  postsurrender  Japan.     The  Jap- 


920 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


anese  birth  rate  was  kept  low,  in  part,  by  virtue 
of  a  combination  of  identifiable  circumstances. 
These  included  public  liealth  and  sanitation  serv- 
ices, staffed  by  large  numbers  of  well-trained  med- 
ical personnel ;  the  existence  of  medical  insurance 
and  family  wage-jDayment  systems  which  facili- 
tated, financially,  family  regulation ;  and  adoption 
in  September  1949  of  a  eugenics  protection  law 
which  legalized,  under  specified  conditions,  sterili- 
zation and  abortion  and  permitted  contraceptive 
services  in  health  centers.  Government  and  medi- 
cal authorities  in  Japan  have  been  concerned  about 
the  risks  to  the  health  of  the  race  of  the  widespread 
practice  of  abortion,  and  efforts  have  been  made  to 
promote  wider  use  of  contraceptive  methods. 

Japan  presents  a  second  kind  of  population 
problem,  one  in  which  the  motivation  for  family 
limitation  appears  to  have  been  established  but 
the  techniques  used  are  unperfected. 

Population  Problems  In  Other  Countries 

I  could,  I  suppose,  dwell  in  like  manner  upon 
population  problems  in  India,  Pakistan,  Ceylon, 
Communist  China,  and  Formosa,  and  other  coun- 
tries of  continental  Asia  below  the  U.S.S.R.,  where 
some  53  percent  of  the  world's  population  lives  on 
15.6  percent  of  the  world's  land  area. 

India  and  Pakistan,  for  example,  are  countries 
where  governments  frankly  accept  population 
growth  as  an  impediment — and  perhaps  the  most 
intractable  one — to  the  achievement  of  improve- 
ment in  general  human  welfare  as  a  product  of 
economic  planning.  The  Government  of  India  de- 
voted $1.4  million  in  its  first  5-year  plan  to  popu- 
lation control,  $6.3  million  in  its  second,  and  is 
now  planning  to  spend  $56.7  million  in  its  third. 
Unlike  Mauritius  or  Japan,  India  distrusts  the  sta- 
tistics available  to  it  for  analyzing  accurately  the 
population  factor  in  planning  economic  takeoff. 
Other  difficulties  are :  literacy  is  low,  medical  fa- 
cilities are  limited,  and  tradition  and  custom  are  a 
block  to  enlightenment. 

Ceylon  demonstrates  the  treachery  of  simple 
mathematics.  We  should  have  doubts  about  how 
simple  it  is  to  measure  the  degree  to  which  the 
precipitate  rise  of  population  in  Ceylon  contrib- 
uted to  overpopulation  for  that  country :  The  DDT 
which  diminished  death  rates  by  40  percent  in  one 
year  also  has  made  usable  large  areas  of  previ- 
ously inaccessible  land  so  that  the  man-land  ratio 

December   77,   1962 

668137—62 3 


is  improved  and  resource  potentialities  increased. 

As  to  Communist  China,  we  can  see  or  assume 
some  broad  sunilarities  with  India  and  Pakistan. 
We  can  note  the  appearance,  disappearance,  and 
reemergence  of  government  sponsorship  of  fam- 
ily regulation.  We  can  speak  with  little  assur- 
ance, however,  about  a  country  where,  as  Irene 
Taeuber  says,  "demographic  ignorance  or  secre- 
tiveness  on  the  part  of  the  government  creates  and 
perpetuates  levels  of  ignorance  unparalleled  in  the 
modern  world."  With  its  compulsive  need  to  bend 
science  to  ideology,  can  Peiping  talk  about  the  re- 
productive performance  and  potentialities  of  its 
population  except  in  terms  of  growth,  power,  and 
destiny  ? 

I  have  read  and  heard  analyses  of  the  population 
problems  of  Mauritius,  Japan,  India,  Latin 
America,  and  other  areas  by  Irene  Taeuber,  Philip 
Ilauser,  Donald  Bogue,  Ambassador  Nehni,  Frank 
Notestein,  Jack  Zlotnick,  Eobert  Cook,  and  others 
and  know  that  I  have  done  injustice  here  to  the 
scope  and  subtlety  of  their  findings.  But  it  is 
not  my  purpose  to  match  their  scholarship. 
Kather  I  use  it  to  draw  certain  inferences  of  my 
own  affecting  my  understanding  of  the  relation 
of  population  growth  to  the  jjrocess  of  economic 
development  generally. 

First,  demographic  knowledge  is  not  self-pre- 
scribing, but  it  is  indispensable  for  any  kind  of 
orderly  analysis  of  population  problems  or  even 
the  determination  of  whether  or  not  a  problem 
exists. 

Second,  demographic  knowledge  does  not  end 
merely  with  the  collection  and  orderly  processing 
of  vital  statistics.  Our  data  should  describe  not 
only  different  kinds  of  societies  but  also  different 
kinds  of  peoples  within  societies.  An  under- 
standing of  the  total  cultural,  religious,  and  intel- 
lectual environment  is  as  important  as  some  imder- 
standing  of  the  economic  and  political  environ- 
ment in  perceiving  the  motives  which  cause  par- 
ents to  desire  large  or  small  families. 

Third,  history  affords  us  no  models  or  proto- 
types to  justify  dogmatic  prescription  of  specific 
population  policies  for  specific  societies. 

Consensus  on  Need  for  More  Knowledge 

I  said  earlier  that  there  was  no  consensus  about 
what  to  do  about  the  population  problem.  But 
I  ask  you  now,  is  there  not  consensus  that  there 

921 


should  be  more  knowledge  about  this  problem? 
I  think  there  is.  The  daily  press  all  around  the 
world  seems  to  think  so.  The  Population  Com- 
mission is  a  monument  to  the  United  Nations  con- 
viction that  there  is.  The  regional  commissions 
of  the  IT.N.  in  Asia,  Latin  America,  and  xVfrica 
respond  to  demands  for  knowledge  by  holding  con- 
ferences, publishing  statistics,  and  preparing 
demographic  analyses.  A  declaration^  recently 
adopted  by  the  developing  countries  of  Asia,  Af- 
rica, and  Latin  America,  in  Cairo — going  beyond 
mere  knowledge— proclaims  need  for  taking  legit- 
imate measures  to  deal  with  population  problems 
where  they  exist. 

U.S.   Support  for   Demographic  Analysis  Activities 

The  U.S.  Government  recognizes  the  need  for 
knowledge.  It  is  a  regular  and  forthright  sup- 
porter of  U.N.  activities  in  the  field  of  demographic 
analysis.  It  liiis  used  AID  [Agency  for  Inter- 
national Development]  resources  to  finance  census- 
takinc  and  analysis  activities  in  Asia,  Latin  Amer- 
ica, Africa,  and  the  Middle  East.  Technicians 
have  been  sent  abroad  by  the  Office  of  Interna- 
tional Statistics  of  the  Bureau  of  the  Census  or 
brought  in  from  foreign  countries  for  training  by 
that  office.  Much  more  of  this  activity  can  and 
should  be  undertaken.  For  accurate  understand- 
ing of  population  problems,  voluminous  and  reli- 
able data  susceptible  of  use  at  every  level  of 
analj'tical  sophistication  are  needed.  Global 
estimates  and  figures  are  interesting.  Local 
statistics  of  great  refinement  and  precision  are  re- 
quired for  practical  planning  purposes.  The 
variety  of  purposes  such  information  can  serve  is 
literally  infinite.  There  is  an  insatiable  appetite 
for  knowledge  about  population.  For  what  is 
this  appetite  unless  it  is  a  curiosity  about  man — 
the  human  core  and  end  of  all  planning,  individual 
or  social. 

Happily,  there  are  very  rich  resources  in  the 
United  States  to  enlighten  discourse  in  our 
churches,  foundations,  universities,  laboratories, 
hospitals,  learned  societies,  and  Federal,  State,  and 
local  institutions.  Foreign  societies  wanting  to  do 
so  may  draw  upon  these  resources.  There  is,  I 
think,  consensus  that  this  is  as  it  should  be. 

But  now  we  come  to  a  tenuous  line  between  in- 
vestigation and  advocacy.    The  United  States  has 


•  U.N.  doc.  A/r,162. 


no  demographic  policies  of  its  own.  It  advocates 
none  for  other  countries.  On  the  general  matter 
of  overpopulation,  President  Kennedy  told  a  press 
conference  last  June:  "This  is  a  matter  which 
each  individual,  each  family,  each  country  must 
determine.  It  cannot  be  determined  by  the  actions 
of  another  country."  Our  Government  does  not 
take  this  decision  away  from  the  consciences  of 
individual  parents.  Other  Governments  may  try, 
but  I  doubt  that  over  time  even  they  can  continue 
effectively  to  invade  this  intimate  terrain. 

Conclusion 

And  now  let  me  sum  up  my  remarks. 

Demography  is  an  area  of  investigation  calling 
for  both  scientific  and  moral  judgment — and 
necessarily  so. 

Our  demographers  join  our  economists  in  fore- 
casting for  many  societies  on  earth  growth  of 
population  far  exceeduig  growth  of  means  of 
subsistence  needed  to  preserve  present  standards 
of  living,  not  to  say  to  improve  them. 

Countries  like  Mauritius  have  almost  complete 
documentation  of  the  nature  of  the  population 
problem  they  face,  but  the  possession  of  facts  is  not 
the  same  as  possessing  solutions  of  problems.  For 
countries  much  like  Mauritius  but  where  the  facts 
are  unknown,  the  solution  of  the  problem  is  less 
likely. 

A  country  like  Japan  seems  to  have  solved  its 
population  problem  in  a  way  which  has  facilitated 
substantially  its  economic  development,  but 
Japan's  people  were  apparently  motivated  by 
factors  and  trends  not  present  in  most  developing 
countries  of  Asia,  Africa,  the  Middle  East,  or 
Latin  America,  and  used  unperfected  means  that 
were  thought,  in  fact,  to  be  distasteful  by  many 
Japanese  themselves.  The  model  of  Japan  is  no 
prototype  to  be  slavishly  imitated  by  other 
countries. 

Governments  of  countries  like  India,  Pakistan, 
and  Ceylon  which  consider  population  growth  to 
be  a  thundering  impediment  to  development  of 
general  human  welfare  are  only  on  the  threshold 
of  understanding  the  simplest  facts  of  their  situ- 
ation, not  to  say  means  to  cope  with  it. 

There  seems  to  be  consensus,  worldwide,  that 
we  should  enrich  our  loiowledge  of  man  and  his 
social  environment  by  collection,  analysis,  and  dis- 
semination of  information  about  population. 


922 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


And  now,  finally,  let  me  offer  the  personal  view 
that,  in  the  field  of  population,  governments 
should  rarely  prescribe.  Still,  by  making  certain 
contributions  to  knowledge,  which  they  can  best 
or  uniquely  make,  governments  can  properly  par- 
ticipate in  and  help  to  encourage  that  honest  and 
responsible  inquiry  and  discussion  which  should 
underlie  those  enlightened  decisions  of  free  men 
upon  which  both  the  dignity  of  the  individual  and 
the  welfare  of  his  society  depend. 


Bill  of  Rights  Day 

and  Human  Riglits  Day 

A     PROCLAMATION' 

Whekeas  December  10,  1962,  marks  the  fourteenth 
anniversary  of  the  adoption  by  the  United  Nations  of  the 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  as  a  common 
standard  of  achievement  for  all  nations  and  all  peoples; 
and 

Whekeas  the  General  Assembly  of  the  United  Nations 
has  invited  Member  Governments  to  adopt  December  10 
of  each  year  as  Human  Rights  Day ;  and 

Whereas  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights 
was  brought  into  being  under  the  leadership  of  our  beloved 
citizen,  Eleanor  Roosevelt,  during  the  years  when  she 
served  as  a  Representative  of  the  United  States  in  the 
United  Nations ;  and 

Whereas  December  15,  1962,  marks  the  one  hundred 
and  seventy-first  anniversary  of  the  adoption  of  the  first 
ten  amendments  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
which  are  known  as  the  Bill  of  Rights ;  and 

Whereas  the  principles  of  freedom  and  justice  in  our 
Bill  of  Rights  are  embodied  in  the  Universal  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights,  which  is  gaining  ever  more  recognition 
in  countries  throughout  the  world ;  and 

Whereas  the  Congress,  in  Senate  Joint  Resolution  No. 
60  approved  October  9,  1962,  has  requested  the  President 
to  designate  December  15,  1962,  as  Bill  of  Rights  Day : 

Now,  therefore,  I,  John  F.  Kennedy,  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  do  hereby  proclaim  December 
10,  1962,  as  Human  Rights  Day  and  December  15,  1962, 
as  Bill  of  Rights  Day,  and  call  on  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  on  schools  and  on  civic,  patriotic  and  religious 
organizations  to  observe  December  10-17  as  Human 
Rights  Week,  in  order  to  celebrate  the  blessings  of  liberty 
for  our  country  and  the  equal  and  inalienable  rights  of 
all  members  of  the  human  family. 

Let  us  shoulder  our  responsibilities,  as  trustees  of  free- 
dom, to  make  the  Bill  of  Rights  a  reality  for  all  our 
citizens.  Let  us  reach  beyond  the  fears  that  divide  na- 
tions to  make  common  cause  for  the  promotion  of  greater 
understanding  of  right  and  justice  for  all,  and  in  so  doing 


strengthen  our  faith  in  the  reason  and  conscience  of  men 
as  the  basis  for  a  true  and  lasting  peace. 

In  witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand 
and  caused  the  Seal  of  the  United  States  of  America  to 
be  affixed. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington  this  28th  day  of  Novem- 
ber in  the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and 
[seal]  sixty-two,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the  United 
States  of  America  the  one  hundred  and  eighty- 
seventh. 


ffLJ  L^ 


By  the  President: 
Dean   Rusk, 
Secretary  of  State. 


'  No.  3508 ;  27  Fed.  Reg.  11913. 
December   17,   1962 


U.S.  and  Germany  Establish 
Jointly  Financed  Exchange  Program 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Novem- 
ber 20  (press  release  688)  that  Acting  Foreign 
Minister  Pleinrich  Krone  of  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany  and  U.S.  Ambassador  Walter  C. 
Dowling  had  signed  an  agreement  at  Bonn  that 
day  which  will  establish  a  jointly  financed  Ful- 
bright  program  of  educational  exchange  between 
the  Federal  Republic  and  the  United  States — the 
first  of  its  kind  in  the  entire  history  of  the  world- 
wide Fulbright  program. 

The  agreement  will  extend  on  this  new  basis  the 
excltanges  of  teachers,  students,  and  scholars  which 
have  taken  place  between  the  Federal  Republic 
and  the  United  States  for  the  past  10  yeai-s.  The 
signing  coincides  with  a  week  of  special  programs 
and  observances  in  Bonn  which  have  been  planned 
to  commemorate  the  10th  amiiversary  of  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  program  in  the  Federal  Republic. 

The  signing  took  place  at  the  Foreign  Ministry 
in  the  presence  of  United  States  Senator  J.  W. 
Fulbright,  sponsor  of  the  Fulbright  program; 
Prof.  Oscar  Handlin,  acting  chairman  of  the 
Board  of  Foreign  Scholarships ;  the  five  German 
and  five  American  members  of  the  United  States 
Educational  Commission  in  Germany  (the  Ful- 
bright Commission)  ;  and  various  other  represent- 
atives of  the  two  Governments  concerned. 

This  agreement  has  resulted  from  2  years  of 
negotiation  between  Dr.  Howard  H.  Russell  and 

923 


Henry  Waldstein  of  the  U.S.  Embassy  and  Dr. 
"Walter  Holz  and  Dr.  Georg  Krause-Wiclunann  of 
the  Foreign  Office,  and  has  taken  advantage  of  the 
authorization  for  joint  financing  which  is  pro- 
vided in  tlie  Fulbright-Hays  Act,  which  was 
signed  on  September  21,  1961.  The  Federal  Re- 
public is  the  first  cooperating  counti-y  to  develop 
an  agreement  under  the  provisions  of  this  legisla- 
tion. 

The  new  agreement  extends  the  original  agree- 
ment of  July  18, 1952,^  which  provided  the  equiv- 
alent of  $5  million  for  exchanging  students, 
teachers,  and  professors  in  the  interests  of  improv- 
ing mutual  understanding  between  the  peoples  of 
the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Federal 
Republic,  and  the  exchange  of  notes  on  May  14, 
1958,^  which  made  a  second  siun  equivalent  to 
$5  million  available  for  the  continuation  of  the 
program.  It  increases  the  total  amount  by  the 
equivalent  of  a  further  $5  million,  making  a  total 
of  $15  million  and  assuring  the  continuation  of 
the  program  for  a  period  of  at  least  5  years  beyond 
the  previously  scheduled  1964  expiration  date. 

Each  year  approximately  250  German  grantees 
and  an  equal  number  of  U.S.  grantees  participate 
in  this  program  of  academic  exchanges.  Since 
the  establishment  of  the  program  2,285  Germans 
and  2,441  Americans  have  taken  part. 


Senate  Committee  Enabled  To  Inspect 
Foreign  Representatives'  Tax  Returns 

White  House  press  release  dated  November  22 
WHITE  HOUSE  ANNOUNCEMENT 

Tlic  President  lias  granted  the  Senate  Conmiit- 
tee  on  Foreign  Relations  authority,  during  the 
87th  Congress,  to  examine  income,  excess-profits, 
estate,  and  gift  tax  returns  for  the  years  1950  to 
1962,  inclusive,  under  regulations  governing  the 
inspection  of  returns  by  congressional  committees. 

This  action  was  taken  pursuant  to  the  request  of 


the  chairman  of  the  committee.  The  inspection 
of  these  returns  will  assist  the  committee  in  carry- 
ing out  its  study  of  all  nondiplomatic  activities 
of  representatives  of  foreign  governments,  and 
their  contractors  and  agents,  in  promoting  the  in- 
terests of  those  governments,  and  the  extent  to 
which  such  representatives  attempt  to  influence 
the  policies  of  the  United  States  and  affect  the  na- 
tional interest. 

Any  information  obtained  by  the  committee  is 
confidential,  but  the  committee  may  report  infor- 
mation pertinent  to  its  investigation  to  the 
Senate. 


TEXT  OF  EXECUTIVE  ORDER  > 

Inspection  of  Income,  Excess-Profits,  Estate,  and  Gift 
Tax  Returns  by  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations 

By  virtue  of  the  authority  vested  in  me  by  section  55 
(a)  of  the  Internal  Revenue  Code  of  1939,  as  amended 
(53  Stat.  29,  54  Stat.  1008;  26  U.S.C.  (1952  Ed.)  55(a)), 
and  by  section  6103(a)  of  the  Internal  Revenue  Code 
of  1954  (68A  Stat.  753;  26  U.S.C.  6103(a)),  it  is  hereby 
ordered  that  any  income,  excess-profits,  estate,  or  gift  tax 
return  for  the  years  1950  to  1962,  inclusive,  shall,  during 
the  Eighty-seventh  Congress,  be  open  to  inspection  by  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  or  any  duly  au- 
thorized subcommittee  thereof,  in  connection  with  its 
study  of  all  nondiplomatic  activities  of  representatives 
of  foreign  governments,  and  their  contractors  and  agents, 
in  promoting  the  interests  of  those  governments,  and  the 
extent  to  which  such  representatives  attempt  to  influence 
the  policies  of  the  United  States  and  affect  the  national 
interest,  pursuant  to  Senate  Resolution  362.  87th  Congress, 
agreed  to  July  12,  19G2,  such  inspection  to  be  in  accord- 
ance and  upon  compliance  with  the  rules  and  regulations 
prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in  Treasury 
Decisions  6132  and  6133,  relating  to  the  inspection  of  re- 
turns by  committees  of  the  Congress,  approved  by  the 
President  on  May  3,  1955. 

This  order  shall  be  effective  upon  its  filing  for  publica- 
tion in  the  Federal  Register. 


f 


/(LJ  jL^ 


The  White  House, 
Novemhcr  21,  1962. 


'Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  2553. 
=  TIAS  4039. 


'  No.  11065 ;  27  Fed.  Reg.  11581. 


924 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


The  Common  Market  and  Industrial  Property 


iy  Philip  H.  Trezise 

Acting  Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  ^ 


It  is  a  pleasure  for  me  to  be  here  with  this  group 
of  distinguished  peojile  from  the  governmental, 
academic,  and  business  worlds.  The  Institute  for 
International  and  Foreign  Trade  Law  of  George- 
town University's  Law  Center  is  to  be  commended 
for  bringing  you  together  in  this  Conference  on 
the  Proposed  European  Trademark  Convention. 
This  forum  can  bring  to  bear  on  public  questions 
the  combined  efforts  of  officials,  scholars,  and  busi- 
ness representatives  and — when  the  subject  is  of 
international  interest — can  provide  for  interna- 
tional participation.  Governments  can  benefit 
greatly  from  conferences  like  this  one. 

In  the  Department  of  State  we  have  a  great 
interest  in  developments  among  the  Six  ^  of  the 
European  Economic  Community  on  industrial 
property  questions.  I  welcome  this  opportunity 
to  talk  to  you  about  that  interest. 

The  United  States  has  consistently  and  strongly 
supported  the  drive  for  unity  in  Europe.  General 
Marshall's  Harvard  speech  in  1947  ^  made  clear 
the  United  States  conviction  that  European 
recovery  should  be  organized  as  a  common  effort. 
Through  the  Marshall  Plan  years  and  since,  the 
United  States  has  encouraged  European  integra- 
tion. We  applaud  the  accomplislmients  of  the 
European  Economic  Community,  and  indeed  we 


'  Address  made  at  Washington,  D.C.,  on  Nov.  10  at  a 
Conference  on  the  Proposed  Euroijean  Trademark  Con- 
vention, sponsored  by  the  Institute  for  International  and 
Foreign  Trade  Law  of  the  Georgetown  University  Law 
Center. 

"Belgium,  France,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Italy,  Luxembourg,  and  the  Netherlands. 

'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  June  15,  1947,  p.  11.59. 


seek,  as  President  Kennedy  has  said,*  a  "partner- 
ship" of  mutual  interest  with  the  emerging  new 
Europe. 

Wliile  thus  supporting  and  welcoming  Euro- 
pean economic  integration,  we  have  recognized 
that  the  Common  Market  will  give  rise  to  com- 
petitive disadvantages  for  the  United  States  as 
compared  with  member  countries  in  selling  within 
the  Community.  These  disadvantages  we  have 
accepted  as  one  of  the  aspects  of  a  developing  pro- 
gram that  in  overall  terms  will  benefit  everyone. 
We  believe  strongly,  however,  that  the  Common 
Market  should  be  an  outward-looking,  liberal 
trading  coimnimity  which  operates  to  knit  to- 
gether, not  to  divide,  the  free  world. 

Our  desire  to  see  an  outward-looking  Common 
Market  extends  to  the  field  of  industrial  property. 
It  is  most  important  to  us  that  the  Six  not  create 
in  this  area  a  significant  new  economic  disadvan- 
tage for  American  and  other  non-Common  Mar- 
ket nationals. 

Since  the  Six  have  not  proceeded  very  far  in 
the  development  of  a  trademark  convention,  there 
is  little  I  should  say  about  that  specific  subject 
at  this  time.  I  trust,  however,  that  this  confer- 
ence will  illuminate  the  problems  and  the  possi- 
bilities. We  will  follow  your  proceedings  with 
interest. 

Proposed  European  Patent  Convention 

We  Icnow  more,  of  course,  about  the  patent  con- 
vention being  developed  by  the  Six.  Last  month 
the  EEC  announced  that  a  draft  convention  will 
be  published  soon  and  that  it  will  be  open  for 


'  md.,  July  2.'?,  1962,  p.  131. 


December   77,   J  962 


925 


comments  and  review  by  interested  governments 
and  private  parties  for  some  time  before  a  con- 
vention is  officially  adopted. 

On  the  basis  of  what  has  been  written  and 
said  on  the  subject,  and  of  informal  discussions 
by  United  States  Government  and  industry  peo- 
ple witli  European  officials,  we  know  the  drafting 
of  tlie  convention  has  represented  a  tremendous 
amount  of  intensive  and  effective  work  on  the 
part  of  many  people.  Notable  among  these  has 
been  a  member  of  the  Common  Market  Work- 
ing Party  on  Patents  who  is  present  today — Dr. 
[C.  J.]  de  Haan,  president  of  the  Patent  Office  of 
the  Netherlands. 

There  was  early  recognition  by  officials  of  the 
Community  and  the  member  states  that  the  ex- 
istence of  separate  national  patent  systems  could 
interfere  with  attaining  the  basic  objective  of 
eliminating  impediments  to  trade  within  the  Com- 
munity and  could  frustrate  the  free  movement 
of  certain  goods  in  the  Common  Market.  In  late 
1959  Mr.  [Hans]  von  der  Groeben,  the  EEC  Com- 
missioner primarily  responsible  for  the  EEC  Di- 
rectorate-General of  Competition,  chaired  a  meet- 
ing of  the  Under  Secretaries  of  State  responsible 
for  industrial  property  matters  in  the  Common 
Market  countries  to  consider  the  problems  caused 
by  having  six  separate  industrial  property  sys- 
tems within  the  EEC. 

These  and  other  farsight^d  officials  went  beyond 
the  objective  of  harmonizing  their  national  laws. 
Instead  they  set  to  work  to  draft  a  convention 
designed  to  establisli  for  the  first  time  a  truly  in- 
ternational patent  system.  This  was  not  a  simple 
task,  we  know,  for  there  are  two  fundamentally 
different  patent  systems  in  existence  in  the  Com- 
mon Market  countries.  France,  Belgium,  Lux- 
embourg, and  Italy  have  essentially  nonexamina- 
tion  systems  while  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  and  the  Netherlands  have  examination 
systems  quite  similar  to  the  patent  system  in  the 
United  States.  Tlie  fact  that  a  draft  convention 
for  an  international  patent  system  has  been  de- 
vised in  less  than  3  years  is  a  great  tribute  to  all 
of  the  officials  who  participated  in  the  work. 

American  Interest  in  EEC  Patent  System 

As  you  know,  both  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment and  private  groups  in  this  country  have  been 
following  closely  tlie  negotiations  for  a  Common 


926 


Market  patent  system.  Much  American  atten- 
tion has  naturally  been  focused  on  the  question 
whether  nationals  of  countries  outside  the  Com- 
mon Market  will  be  allowed  to  obtain  a  "Euro- 
pean" or  "Common  Market"  patent.  We  trust 
that  this  patent  will  be  available  to  non-EEC 
nationals — at  least  to  nationals  of  countries  like 
the  United  States  which  adhere  to  the  interna- 
tional convention  for  the  protection  of  industrial 
property.  There  are  three  principal  reasons  for 
this  view. 

First,  one  of  the  major  objectives  of  the  Euro- 
jiean  patent  convention  is  to  eliminate  the  dupli- 
cation of  effort  involved  in  the  processing  of 
patent  applications  on  the  same  invention  in  each 
of  the  member  countries  and  thus  to  relieve  the 
growing  workload  of  the  national  patent  offices. 
We  estimate  that  American  nationals  file  about  15 
percent  of  the  patent  applications  in  the  Common 
Market  countries  as  a  gi'oup.  In  individual  mem- 
ber states  the  figure  ranges  from  about  10  percent 
to  about  20  percent.  If  the  convention  should 
deny  access  of  American  nationals  to  the  Common 
Market  patent,  the  EEC  countries  will  in  effect 
limit  one  of  the  principal  benefits  of  the  conven- 
tion— the  lessening  of  workload  from  multiple 
applications. 

Second,  the  international  convention  for  the 
protection  of  industrial  property,  to  which  the  Six, 
the  United  States,  and  more  than  40  other  cotm- 
tries  are  parties,  provides  that  each  contracting 
party  will  grant  to  nationals  of  other  contracting 
parties  the  same  rights  it  grants  to  its  own.  Al- 
though the  relevance  of  this  provision  to  the  ques- 
tion of  accessibility  by  non-EEC  countries  to  the 
Common  Market  requires  further  study,  the  in- 
ternational convention  seems  to  point  clearly 
toward  making  the  Common  Market  patent  avail- 
able to  all  its  contracting  parties. 

Tiiird,  a  Common  Market  patent  will,  we  gather, 
be  allowed  on  any  product  or  process  already  pat- 
entable in  any  single  member  state.  The  holder 
of  a  Common  Market  patent  will  thus  have  patent 
protection  even  in  a  member  country  under  wliose 
national  laws  that  product  or  process  is  not 
patentable.  We  would  not  wish  to  see  a  situation 
in  M-hich  Common  Market  nationals  could  obtain 
such  "bonus"  patent  protection  in  Italy,  for  ex- 
ample, through  the  Common  Market  patent  sys- 
tem while  non-EEC  nationals  would  be  denied  the 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ll 


same  protection  in  Italy  because  it  was  not  avail- 
able under  the  Italian  national  patent  system. 
We  recognize  that  the  three  considerations  I 
have  discussed  involve  complicated  teclinical  and 
legal  problems  that  we  must  study  further  after 
we  have  seen  the  draft  convention  and  gone  over 
it  carefully. 

Working  in  Spirit  of  Mutual  Cooperation 

We  also  recognize  that  other  countries  may  have 
questions  concerning  some  of  the  complicated 
problems  m  our  own  American  patent  system. 
We  know,  for  example,  tliat  there  has  been  some 
disquiet  in  other  countries  about  the  interference 
practice  in  the  United  States  system,  under  which 
acts  done  abroad  cannot  be  used  to  establish  a  date 
of  invention.  I  am  authorized  by  our  Commis- 
sioner of  Patents  [David  L.  Ladd]  to  say  that  our 
entire  interference  practice  is  under  study  by  the 
Patent  Office.  It  is  also  being  studied  by  our  pat- 
ent bar.  In  any  event  we  would  be  glad  to  discuss 
with  European  officials  any  problems  they  have 
with  the  workings  of  our  system  as  it  may  affect 
their  interests,  in  the  hope  of  both  clarifying  the 
situation  where  any  misunderstanding  may  exist 
and  taking  due  account  of  any  problems  our 
friends  find  in  our  system. 

We  hope  also,  of  course,  to  discuss  with  our 
friends  in  Europe  the  question  of  American  in- 
terests in  the  Common  Market  patent  system,  in 
the  light  of  such  considerations  as  I  have  outlined 
and  after  careful  study  of  the  draft  convention. 
We  shall  also  study  developments  on  the  proposed 
European  trademark  convention  with  the  same 
considerations  in  mind. 

In  August  Commissioner  of  Patents  Ladd,  in  a 
speech  before  the  American  Bar  Association  on 
"The  Patent  Plans  of  the  Common  Market  Coun- 
tries," referred  to  the  increasing  interdependence 
between  the  United  States  and  Europe  and  said : 

As  our  relationships  become  closer — as  they  certainly 
will — it  may  very  well  be  that,  since  patents  and  in- 
dustrial property  are  inextricably  bound  up  in  problems 
of  commerce.  Europe  and  the  United  States — despite 
obvious  obstacles  in  our  disparate  laws  and  traditions  in 
the  industrial  property  field — will  consider  seriously  and 
decide  to  work  for  a  common  patent  system. 

Our  mutual  interests  with  the  Common  Market 
enjoin  us  to  give  carefid  thought  to  that  possi- 
bility. Should  we  and  the  Six  choose  to  travel 
that  road,  however,  we  shall  no  doubt  find  it  a  long 


and  difficult  one.  IVIean while  it  is  essential  that  we 
do  our  utmost  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  to 
work  in  a  spirit  of  mutual  cooperation  on  our  more 
immediate  problems  and  possibilities. 

We  are  confident  that  the  responsible  officials  of 
the  EEC  and  its  member  states  as  well  as  busmess 
interests  in  those  countries  will  recognize  that  our 
comments  and  views  on  industrial  property  devel- 
opments among  the  Six  reflect  not  only  the  United 
States  national  interest  in  the  conduct  of  United 
States  business  abroad  but  also  our  overall  inter- 
est in  the  evolution  of  the  Common  Market  and 
its  relationships  with  the  outside  world. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 


87th  Congress,  2d  Session 

United  Nations  Peace  Bonds.  Hearing  before  the  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  on  S.  2818,  a  bill  to  provide 
an  opportunity  for  the  public  to  give  support  to  the 
U.N.  through  the  purchase  of  U.S.  Treasury  bonds  which 
are  to  be  issued  under  the  title  of  United  Nations  Peace 
Bonds.    July  12, 1062.    02  pp. 

United  States  Policy  Toward  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency.  Hearing  before  the  Joint  Committee 
on  Atomic  Energy.    August  2, 1062.    63  pp. 

Meteorological  Satellites.  Hearings  before  the  Subcom- 
mittee on  Applications  and  Tracking  and  Data  Acquisi- 
tion of  the  House  Committee  on  Science  and  Astro- 
nautics on  progress  of  meteorological  satellite  develop- 
ment and  applications.  No.  15.  August  28-September 
21,  1062.    421  pp. 

Investigation  and  Study  of  the  Administration,  Operation, 
and  Enforcement  of  the  Export  Control  Act  of  1049,  and 
Related  Acts.  Hearings  before  the  House  Select  Com- 
mittee on  Export  Control.  Part  3.  September  13-Octo- 
ber  3,  1962.    277  pp. 

Problems  and  Trends  in  Atlantic  Partnership  I:  Some 
Comments  on  the  European  Economic  Community  and 
NATO.  Staff  study  prepared  for  the  use  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  S.  Doc.  132.  Septem- 
ber 14,  1062.    48  pp. 

Nonmilitary  and  Noneconomic  Aspects  of  the  World 
Crisis.  Hearing  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Interna- 
tional Organizations  and  Movements  of  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Affairs.  Testimony  of  Dean  Ernest 
S.  Griflath,  American  University.  September  25,  1062. 
14  pp. 

Free  Trade,  Tariff  Legislation,  and  Common  Markets  for 
the  Western  Hemisphere :  A  Collection  of  Excerpts  and 
Selected  References.  Prepared  by  the  Economics  Di- 
vision of  the  Legislative  Reference  Service,  Library  of 
Congress.     H.  Doc.  598.     September  27,  1962.     71  pp. 

U.S.  Private  Foreign  Aid  Programs :  The  Unselfish  Ameri- 
can. Presented  by  Senator  Barry  Goldwater.  S.  Doc. 
15.    September  28, 1962.    10  pp. 

Study  of  European  Shipbuilding— Fall  of  1961.  Report 
pursuant  to  H.  Res.  98,  87th  Cong.  H.  Rept.  2530. 
October  4,  1962.    9  pp. 

Foreign  Aid  Appropriation  Bill,  1963.  Conference  report 
to  accompany  H.R.  13175.  H.  Rept.  2540.  October  5, 
1962.    6  pp. 


December   17,   7962 


927 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


Calendar  of  International  Conferences  and  Meetings  > 

Adjourned  During  November  1962 

ICAO  Air  Traflic  Control  Automation  Panel:  2d  Meeting Montreal Oct. 

GATT  Contracting  Parties:  20th  Session Geneva Oct. 

Inter- Parliamentary  Union:  51st  Conference Brasilia Oct. 

U.N.  ECAFE  Working  Party  on  Customs  Administration:  3d  Ses-  Bangkok Oct. 

sion. 

FAO/UN'ICEF  Joint  Policy  Committee:  4th  Session Rome Oct. 

International  Sugar  Council:  12th  Session London Oct. 

ILO  Governing  Body:  153d  Session Geneva Oct. 

U.N.  ECA  Eastern  African  Transport  Conference Addis   Ababa Oct. 

U.N.  ECA  Seminar  on  Population  Problems  in  Africa Cairo Oct. 

ICAO   Limited  Eiu-opean-Mediterranean  Secondary    Surveillance  Paris Oct. 

Radar  Regional  Air  Navigation  Meeting. 

International  North  Pacific  Fisheries  Commission:  9th  Session.    .    .  Seattle Oct. 

Consultative  Committee  for  Cooperative  Economic  Development  Melbourne Oct. 

in  South  and  Southeast  Asia  (Colombo  Plan) :  14th  Meeting. 

OECD  Economic  Policy  Committee:  Working  Party  II  (Balance  of  Paris Nov. 

Payments). 

ITU  Meeting  of  Experts  on  Frequency  Allocations  for  Space.    .    .    .  Washington Nov. 

FAO  Meeting  on  Economic  Problems  of  Dairy  Products Rome Nov. 

IMCO  Working  Group  of  Experts  on  the  Carriage  of  Dangerous  London Nov. 

Goods  by  Sea. 

ICE M  Executive  Committee:  20th  Session Geneva Nov. 

U.N.  ECE  Senior  Economic  Advisers:  2d  Meeting Geneva Nov. 

4th  Inter-American  Statistical  Conference Washington Nov. 

W MO  Regional  Association  V  f Southwest  Pacific):  3d  Session.    .    .  Noumea Nov. 

OECD  Economic  Policy  Committee Paris Nov. 

U.N.  ECAFE  Inland  Waterways  Subcommittee:  6th  Session  .    .    .  Bangkok Nov. 

Inter- American  Tropical  Tuna  Commission:  Special  Session.    .    .    .  San  Jos6,  Costa  Rica Nov. 

FAO  Latin  American  Forestry  Commission:  3d  Session  of  Com-  Santiago Nov. 

mittee  on  Forest  Research. 

ICEM  Council:  17th  Session Geneva Nov. 

FAO  Regional  Fisheries  Commission  for  Western  Africa:  1st  Ses-  Tunis Nov. 

sion. 

FAO  Conference  on  Pesticides  in  Agriculture Rome Nov. 

ILO   Tripartite   Technical    Meeting  for  the   Printing  and  Allied  Geneva Nov. 

Trades. 

OECD  Special  Committee  on  Nonferrous  Metals Paris Nov. 

IMCO  Uorking  Group  on  Facilitation  of  International  Travel  and  London Nov. 

Transport. 

FAO  Latin  American  Forestry  Commission:  8th  Session      ....  Santiago Nov.  13-19 

OECD    Development   Assistance   Committee:   Working   Party   on  Paris Nov.  15(1  day) 

East  Africa. 

OECD  Special  Committee  on  Chemical  Products Paris Nov.  15-16 

International  Wool  Study  Group:   Management  Committee    .    .    .  London Nov.  16(1  day) 

7th  FAO  Regional  Conference  for  Latin  America Rio  de  Janeiro Nov.  17-27 

OECD  Agriculture  Committee:  Ministerial  Meeting Paris Nov.  19-20 

OECD  Special  Committee  for  Pulp  and  Paper Paris Nov.  19-20 

OECD  Turkish  Consortium Paris Nov.  20-21 

North  Pacific  Fur  Seal  CommiMion:  Scientific  Committee  .    .    .    .  Washington.    ........  Nov.  20-23 

5th  U.N.  ECAFE  Regional  Conference  on  Water  Resources  and  Bangkok Nov.  20-26 

Development. 


22-Nov. 

10 

23-Nov. 

16 

24-Nov. 

1 

25-Nov. 

2 

29-Nov. 

1 

29-Nov. 

1 

29-Nov. 

9 

29-Nov. 

9 

29-Nov. 

10 

29-Nov. 

11 

29-Nov. 

19 

30-Nov. 

17 

5-6 

5-8 

5-9 

5-9 

5-9 

5-9 

5-16 

5-17 

6-8 

6-13 

7-8 

10-12 

12-16 

12-17 

12-17 

12-23 

13-14 

13-15 

'Prepared  in  the  Office  of  International  Conferences,  Nov.  30,  1902.  Following  is  a  list  of  abbreviations:  EGA, 
Economic  C<iinmission  for  Africa;  Et'AFK.  Econoniie  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far  Ea.st :  ECE.  Economic  Com- 
mission for  Europe;  ECOSOC,  Economic  and  Social  Council;  FAO,  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization;  (lATT,  gen- 
eral Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade;  ICAO,  International  Civil  Aviation  Organization;  ICEM,  Intergovernmental 
Committee  for  EurofM-an  Migration:  ILO,  International  Labor  OrKunization ;  IMCO,  Intergovernmental  .Maritime 
Con.sultative  Organization;  ITU,  International  Telecommunication  Cni.in  ;  O.VMCE,  Organisation  Africaine  et  Mal- 
gache  pour  la  cooperation  (?conomiquo ;  OECD,  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development;  U.N.,  United 
Nations;  UNESCO,  United  -Nations  Educational,  ScientiQc  and  Cultural  Organization;  UNICEF,  United  Nations  Chil- 
dren's Fund ;  WMO,  World  Meteorological  Organization. 


'28  Department  of  State   Bulletin 


OECD  Special  Committee  for  Iron  and  Steel 
International  Wheat  Council:  36th  Session     .    . 

OECD  Trade  Committee 

OAMCE  Conference  on  Merchant  Marine  .  .  . 
U.N.  ECOSOC  Technical  Assistance  Committee 
OECD  Ministerial  Meeting 


In  Session  as  of  November  30, 1962 

Conference  of  the  Eighteen-Nation  Committee  on   Disarmament 

(resumed  November  26). 

United  Nations  General  Assembly:   17th  Session 

GATT  Negotiations  on  U.S.  Tariff  Reclassification 

UNESCO  Executive  Board:  63d  Session 

U.N.  ECOSOC  Commission  on  International  Commodity  Trade: 

Technical  Working  Group  on  Compensatory  Financing  (resumed 

session) 

UNESCO' General  Conference:  12th  Session 

ICAO  Aerodromes,  Air  Routes,  and  Ground  Aids  Division:  7th 

Session. 

ILO  Asian  Regional  Conference:  5th  Session 

Inter-American    Consultative    Group    on    Narcotics    Control:    3d 

Meeting. 

North  Pacific  Fur  Seal  Commission:  6th  Meeting 

FAO  Cocoa  Study  Group:   12th  Session  of  Executive  Committee  . 


Paris Nov.  21-22 

London Nov.  21-27 

Paris Nov.  22-23 

Dakar Nov.  26-29 

New  York Nov.  26-30 

Paris Nov.  27-28 

Geneva Mar.  14- 

New  York Sept.  18- 

Geneva Sept.  24- 

Paris Oct.    26- 

Geneva Nov.     1- 

Paris Nov.  9- 

Montreal Nov.  13- 

Melbourne Nov.  26- 

Lima Nov.  26- 

Washington Nov.  26- 

Rome Nov.  27- 


U.N.  General  Assembly  Appoints 
U  Thant  Secretary-General 

Statevient  by  Adlai  E.  Stevenson 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  General  Assembly  ^ 

On  tliis  rostrum  a  little  more  than  a  year  ago " 
I  said  that  we  could  rejoice  that  there  was  avail- 
able to  us  a  diplomat  of  such  character,  ability, 
and  experience  that  he  could  command  the  unan- 
imous support  and  confidence  of  this  world 
organization.  I  am  happy  to  repeat  these  words 
today. 

Those  of  us  who  attended  the  funeral  of  Dag 
Hammarskjold  in  the  ancient  cathedral  of  Uppsala 
will  never  forget  him,  or  the  dignity  and  strength 
he  gave  to  his  ofEce.  None  of  us  may  forget  Dag 
Hammarslfjold  and  all  he  stood  for.  We  are 
blessed  indeed,  therefore,  that  the  man  we  have 
chosen  carries  on  liis  proud  tradition. 

U  Thant  has  been  m  office  now  for  little  more 
than  a  year,  and  we  have  rich  evidence  of  the  skill, 
the  patience,  the  energy,  the  intelligence  with 
which  he  has  met  liis  formidable  and  trying 
responsibilities.     U   Thant,   as   an   international 


^Made  in  plenary  session  on  Nov.  30  (U.S.  delegation 
press  release  4109).  The  General  Assembly  on  that  day 
appointed  U  Thant  Secretary-General  until  Nov.  3, 1966,  by 
a  vote  of  109  to  0 ;  Honduras  was  absent. 

'  Bttlletin  of  Nov.  27,  1961,  p.  904. 


civil  servant,  has  been  devoted  to  the  common  good 
of  all  people.  That  so  many  nations  have  faith 
in  him  is  testimony  to  his  strength  of  mind,  his 
clarity  of  purpose,  and,  not  least,  his  firm  belief 
in  the  charter  and  in  the  independence  and 
integrity  of  the  office  he  holds. 

A  man  does  not  grow  overnight.  U  Thant,  as 
Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations,  reflects, 
I  believe,  the  principles  and  aspirations  of  a  life's 
work  devoted  to  the  cause  of  peace  and  under- 
standing among  all  peoples. 

This  Assembly,  by  its  action  now  in  naming 
U  Thant  to  a  term  as  Secretary-General,  well 
serves  itself  and  the  world.  It  demonstrates  again 
its  determination  to  be  a  true  parliament  of  man 
faithful  only  to  the  law  of  the  charter  and  its 
great  goal  of  ridding  the  world  of  "the  scourge  of 
The  full  record  of  this  17th  session  of  the 


war. 


General  Assembly  still  remams  to  be  written. 
But  nothing  we  do  in  the  remaining  weeks  will 
surpass  the  importance  of  this  moment  to  the 
United  Nations  as  an  organization. 

I  say  this  with  full  awareness  of  the  critical 
issues  that  confront  us.  For  by  reaffirming  the 
integrity  of  the  office  of  Secretary-General  we  have 
reaffirmed  our  belief  in  the  United  Nations  as  a 
viable  force  in  the  affairs  of  men. 

This  is  not  the  time  to  talk  of  the  issues  that 
divided  some  of  us  in  our  concept  of  the  office  of 
Secretary-General.    It  is  the  time  to  emphasize — 


December   17,    J  962 


929 


as  it  shall  always  be  the  time  to  emphasize — that 
this  organization  must  grow  and  flourish.  It  can 
do  so  only  if  it  retains  its  strength  and  influence 
and  the  confidence  of  the  peoples  and  governments 
of  the  world. 

Tliat  is  why  the  United  States  has  opposed  any 
action  that  would  have  compromised  the  exclu- 
sively international  responsibilities  of  the  Secre- 
tary-General and  the  Secretariat.  There  are  few 
provisions  of  the  charter  more  vital  than  article 
100.  It  is  of  paramount  importance  that  both  the 
Secretariat  and  each  member  of  the  United  Na- 
tions respect  the  exclusively  international  charac- 
ter of  the  responsibilities  of  the  Secretary-General 
and  the  staif.  We  hear  much  of  strengthening 
international  organization.  Yet  in  all  the  history 
of  international  organization,  in  the  history  of 
internationalism,  no  more  precious  flower  has 
grown  than  the  truly  international  Secretariat.  I 
am  confident  that,  in  the  tenure  of  U  Thant,  that 
flower  will  not  wither. 

All  nations — large  and  small — can  now  take 
heart  in  the  knowledge  that  we  have  a  Secretary- 
General  armed  with  his  full  powers  under  the 
charter.  They  can  now  take  heart  in  the  knowl- 
edge that  they  have  given  continued  force  and 
meaning  to  that  vital  pi'ovision  of  the  charter 
that  debars  "instructioi^s  from  any  government" 
to  the  Secretary-General  and  his  staff. 

And  they  can  now  take  heart  in  the  laiowledge 
that  they  have  given  their  full  support  to  the 
maintenance  of  a  Secretariat  recruited  on  as  wide 
a  geograpliical  basis  as  possible,  representing  "the 
highest  standards  of  efficiency,  competence,  and 
integrity." 

These  are  firm  foundations,  and  today  we  have 
chosen  not  to  undermine  tliem  but  to  build  higlier 
on  them,  secure  in  the  knowledge  that  they  will 
hold  fast. 

My  delegation  is  accordingly  profoundly 
gratified  at  the  Security  Council's  unanimous  rec- 
ommendation, and  our  action  upon  tliat  recom- 
mendation. If,  in  this  case,  the  Council  has  chosen 
to  recommend  the  date  until  which  the  Secretary- 
General  will  serve,  that,  in  my  delegation's  view, 
does  not  impair  the  General  Assembly's  preroga- 
tive to  .set  his  term  of  oflice  and  other  terms  of 
appointment. 

I  should  add  that  my  delegation  would  have 
preferred  that  U  Thant  serve  not  for  5  years  be- 


ginning with  his  installation  as  Acting  Secretary- 
General  but  for  a  fresh  5-year  term  as  Secretary- 
General  beginning  next  April.  However,  the  term 
of  office  now  recommended  is  in  deference  to  U 
Thant's  wish,  which  we  wholly  understand. 

As  I  contemplate  the  problems  confronting  U 
Thant,  I  wonder  if  we  should  not  congratulate 
ourselves  rather  than  him.  But  the  wisdom  and 
serenity  that  are  but  part  of  the  ancient  heritage 
of  his  counti-y  will,  I  am  sure,  be  a  source  of 
strength  and  stability  in  meeting  liis  heavy  re- 
sponsibilities in  the  coming  years,  even  as  they 
have  already  in  the  one  just  past. 

I  would  also,  as  a  friend,  offer  my  own  good 
wishes  to  U  Thant  as  he  now  continues  his  work 
to  lielp  ease  the  critical  issues  of  our  day  and  to 
direct  our  invaluable  Secretariat. 

One  of  America's  great  Presidents,  Abraham 
Lincoln,  once  said :  "Let  us  have  faith  that  right 
makes  might,  and  in  that  faith  let  us  to  the  end 
dare  to  do  our  duty  as  we  understand  it." 

U  Thant  has  shown  he  has  that  faith.  One 
cannot  ask  more  of  any  man. 


U.S.  Presents  Views  on  Work 
of  Committee  of  17 

Statcinent  hy  Jonathan  B.  Binffham 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  General  Assembly'^ 

Almost  a  year  ago  from  this  rostrmn  I  had  the 
privilege  of  discussing  the  question  of  the  imple- 
mentation of  the  historic  Declaration  on  the  Grant- 
ing of  Independence  to  Colonial  Countries  and 
Peoples.-  I  reviewed  my  country's  own  compelling 
tradition  of  anticolonialism,  stemming  from  its 
origins;  I  outlined  the  situation  in  our  three  small 
remaining  non-self-governing  territories  and  in  the 
Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  Islands,  and  I  de- 
scribed our  policies  with  respect  to  those  terri- 
tories. I  also  set  forth  in  some  detail  our  views 
on  some  of  the  remaining  colonial  problems,  par- 
ticularly in  southern  Africa,  and  I  contrasted  the 
record  of  tlie  Western  Powers  in  general  during 


'Made  in  plenary  session  on  Nov.  20  (U.S.  delegation 
press  release  4099). 

'  BuixETiN  of  Jan.  8, 1962,  p.  09. 


930 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


the  last  two  decades  with  the  record  of  the  Com- 
munist empire. 

I  would  not  wish  to  impose  upon  the  patience 
of  the  delegates  by  going  over  this  gi'oiind  again. 
Nor  do  I  need  to.  My  Government's  position  stems 
from  a  fundamental  commitment  to  freedom  that 
does  not  change  from  year  to  year.  Consequently 
its  policies  proceeding  from  that  commitment  also 
remain  steady.  Thus  it  is  that,  outside  the  United 
Nations  and  within,  the  United  States  has  long 
worked  to  further  the  universal  application  of  the 
principle  of  self-determination.  Wliere  quiet  di- 
plomacy and  remonstration  have  offered  a  hope  of 
improving  a  colonial  situation,  my  country  has 
played  what  I  know  to  have  been  a  useful  and  pro- 
gressive role.  Admittedly  success  has  been  far 
from  total  and  the  pace  has  often  seemed  slow, 
but  the  United  States  is  committed  to  persevere. 
This  constancy  of  purpose  is  one  reason  why  my 
country's  policy  toward  colonialism  is  exactly  what 
it  has  always  been — why  it  has  remained  commit- 
ted to  the  essential  criterion  of  freedom.  There 
is  no  intrinsic  merit  in  the  age  or  youth  of  a  pol- 
icy— what  really  matters  is  its  validity.  The 
United  States  hence  does  not  propose  to  alter  its 
fundamentally  sound  policy  toward  colonialism 
in  a  desperate  attempt  "to  come  up  with  something 
new."  We  are  opposed  to  all  efforts  to  curtail 
freedom,  and  we  shall  take  whatever  courses  of 
action  that  promise  to  lead  to  practical  results  on 
freedom's  behalf. 

Review  of  Events 

Before  turning  to  the  report'  of  the  Special 
Committee  on  the  implementation  of  the  granting 
of  independence  to  colonial  countries  and  peoples, 
the  Committee  which  has  come  to  be  known  as 
the  Committee  of  17, 1  should  like  to  review  briefly 
some  of  the  events  of  the  last  year. 

First  of  all,  it  is  gratifying  to  my  delegation  to 
note  that,  during  these  12  months,  eight  new  ter- 
ritories have  emerged  into  independence  and 
nationhood.  In  the  case  of  four  of  these,  Tangan- 
yika, Western  Samoa,  Rwanda,  and  Burundi, 
the  United  Nations,  through  the  operation  of  its 
trusteeship  system,  played  a  significant  role  in 
speeding  the  day  of  independence  and  in  seeking 
to  assure  that  the  peoples  concerned  emerged  into 


'  U.N.  doc.  A/5238. 


nationhood  under  optimum  conditions  of  political 
freedom  and  of  opportunities  for  economic  devel- 
opment and  social  progress.  In  one  case,  Algeria, 
nationhood  came  after  a  long  period  of  struggle, 
climaxed  in  the  final  stages  by  a  notable  series  of 
statesmanlike  acts  on  the  part  of  the  leaders  of 
the  Algerian  and  French  peoples. 

In  the  case  of  the  other  three,  Jamaica,  Trini- 
dad and  Tobago,  and  Uganda,  the  process  was  a 
peaceful  and  orderly  one,  reflecting  the  utmost 
credit  on  the  Government  of  the  United  Kingdom 
and  on  the  leaders  and  peoples  of  those  tliree  new 
countries.  The  Government  of  the  United  King- 
dom had  regularly  reported  to  the  United  Nations 
on  these  territories  in  accordance  with  article  73 
of  the  charter,  and  these  reports  had  received  con- 
sideration in  the  Committee  on  Information  From 
Non-Self-Governing  TeiTitories.  However,  the 
United  Kingdom  itself  played  the  leading  role  in 
working  with  these  emergent  territories  in  pre- 
paratory steps  for  independence  and  in  their 
actual  achievement  of  independence. 

Of  these  eight  new  nations,  seven  are  now,  much 
to  the  satisfaction  of  all  of  us,  sitting  as  members 
of  this  organization  and  contributing  vitally  to 
our  deliberations.  The  eighth,  Western  Samoa, 
by  reason  of  its  small  size  and  limited  resources, 
has  decided  not  to  apply  for  membership. 

Except  for  one  previous  year,  1960,  in  which  18 
nations  achieved  their  independence,  the  past  year 
has  been  an  unprecedented  one  in  terms  of  the 
number  of  formerly  dependent  territories  achiev- 
ing the  status  of  nationhood. 

It  is  a  matter  of  deep  significance  that  in  all 
eight  cases  the  member  states  that  had  previously 
been  administering  these  territories  were  all  mem- 
bers of  the  free  world,  that  part  of  the  world 
which  we  call  free  because  it  rests  on  the  fimda- 
mental  principle  of  freedom  of  choice.  During 
this  same  period  none  of  the  foreign  lands  domi- 
nated by  the  new  Communist  imperialism — lands 
inhabited  by  peoples  of  different  cultural  back- 
ground, different  language,  in  many  cases  dif- 
ferent race  from  their  masters — during  this  same 
period,  I  say,  none  of  these  lands  liave  achieved 
genuine  freedom  or  even  a  limited  degree  of  free- 
dom of  choice. 

I  need  but  refer  to  the  historical  record  set  forth 
in  Document  A/4985  and  particularly  to  the  sec- 
tion on  Soviet  colonial  practices.  Here  are  the 
etlinic   unfortxmates   of   Soviet  colonialism:  the 


December  17,   7962 


931 


Crimean  Tartars,  the  Kalmucks,  the  Ingish,  the 
nations  of  the  BaUic  and  of  Central  Asia.  You 
know  them  all,  and  those  of  you  who  will  protest 
the  most  know  them  best. 

Perhaps  I  can  save  the  representative  of  the 
Soviet  Union  the  trouble  of  exercising  his  right 
of  reply  to  these  remarks.  He  would  undoubtedly 
say  that  in  the  Communist  world  domination  of 
peoples  by  a  distant  and  foreign  government  is 
not  colonialism. 

The  fact  is  that  the  Soviet  delegation  applies 
terms  like  "colonialism"  or  "imperialism"  only  to 
areas  where  the  governmental  system  is  not  to  its 
liking.  In  this  the  Soviet  Union's  representatives 
remind  one  of  Ivewis  Carroll's  Humpty  Dumpty. 
Those  of  you  who  are  familiar  with  the  classic 
Alice  in  Wonderland  and  its  sequel  Through 
the  Looking -Glass  will  remember  that  Humpty 
Dumpty  explained  his  semantic  principles  to  Alice 
in  the  following  words:  "When  /  use  a  word," 
Humpty  Dumpty  said,  "it  means  just  what  I 
choose  it  to  mean^neither  more  nor  less."  "The 
question  is,"  said  Alice,  "whether  you  can  make 
words  mean  so  many  different  things."  "The 
question  is,"  said  Humpty  Dumpty,  "wliich  is  to 
be  master — that's  all." 

Applying  the  reasoning  of  Humpty  Dumpty  to 
the  modern  world,  one  can  say  that  where  the 
Soviet  Union  is  master  there  is  no  colonialism; 
where  the  Soviet  Union  is  not  master  and  perhaps 
seeks  mastery,  there  the  cry  of  colonialism  is 
raised. 

We  see  the  problem  diflFerently:  We  say  that 
colonialism  or  imperialism  exists  where  there  is 
no  freedom  of  choice.  We  are  particularly  at- 
tached to  that  part  of  Resolution  1514  ^  which 
proclaims  that  "All  peoples  have  the  right  to  self- 
determination  ;  by  virtue  of  that  right  they  freely 
determine  their  political  status  and  freely  pursue 
their  economic,  social  and  cultural  development." 
Last  April  President  Kennedy  °  reiterated  this 
view  when  he  told  tJie  Congress  of  the  United 
States  that,  "This  nation  is  committed  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  self-determination  and  will  continue  to 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  2,  1961,  p.  27. 

'For  text  of  a  letter  from  President  Kennedy  to  the 
President  of  the  Senate  and  the  Speaker  of  the  Hou.se  of 
Representatives  concerning  legLslation  which  would  con- 
fer neater  rights  of  self-government  on  the  i)eople  of  the 
American  Virgin  Islands,  see  White  House  press  release 
dated  Apr.  6,  l'JC2. 


932 


support  and  encourage  responsible  self-ride 
throughout  the  world.  .  .  ."  The  same  idea  was 
expressed  in  our  own  Declaration  of  Independ- 
ence, which  contained  the  revolutionary  thought 
that  the  just  powers  of  government  derive  from 
the  consent  of  the  governed. 

Freedom  of  choice  has  brought  about  eight  new 
nations  in  the  last  12  months ;  the  absence  of  it  in 
a  great  part  of  the  world  has  resulted  in  the  con- 
tinued stifling  of  the  aspirations  of  freedom-loving 
men  and  women. 

Report  of  Committee  of  17 

Allow  me  now,  Mr.  President,  to  turn  specifi- 
cally to  the  report  of  the  Committee  of  17.  As 
this  voluminous  report  will  indicate,  this  Commit- 
tee worked  hard  and  diligently  under  the  leader- 
ship of  an  able  and  dedicated  chairman,  vice 
chairman,  and  rapporteur. 

I  must  confess  that  the  Committee  did  not  ap- 
proach its  task  along  the  procedural  lines  which 
we  had  envisaged  when  we  voted  for  Resolution 
1654  (XVI)  ^  or  when  we  agreed  to  serve  as  a 
member  of  the  Committee.  At  the  very  outset 
of  the  Committee's  work  we  suggested  that,  after 
drawing  together  all  the  materials  and  informa- 
tion relevant  to  its  task  and  particularly  drawing 
on  the  experience  of  member  states  who  had  made 
the  transition  to  independence,  the  Committee 
should  address  itself  particularly  to  the  problem 
of  finding  solutions  for  the  various  types  of  co- 
lonial situations  that  exist  in  the  world  and  should 
develop  suggestions  and  recommendations  appli- 
cable thereto. 

The  majority  of  the  Committee,  however,  pre- 
ferred to  follow  a  case-by-case  approach.  Ac- 
cordingly the  Committee  devoted  its  attention  al- 
most ex'"lusively  to  12  specific  territories,  all  but 
one  of  tliem  in  Africa.  A  great  deal  of  useful 
information  was  collected  and  presented  with  re- 
spect to  these  territories,  and  in  some  cases,  for 
example  with  respect  to  Kenya  and  Zanzibar,  the 
Committee's  final  recommendations  were  both  real- 
istic and  constructive.  In  other  cases,  such  as 
Singapore,  the  Committee,  after  hearing  petition- 
ers, very  wisely  decided  not  to  attempt  to  take 
any  action.  In  most  of  the  remaining  territories, 
however,  my  delegation  could  not  agree  with  all 
of  the  contents  of  the  resolutions  or  recommenda- 


•  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  8, 1962,  p.  76. 

Deparfmenf   of  Sfafe   Bulletin 


tions  adoptedA;  In  some  cases  we  felt  that  these 
efforts,  however'  well  intentioned,  were  uni'ealistic 
and  had  no  chance  of  being  put  into  effect. 

In  the  early  stages  of  the  Committee's  work  we 
had  proposed,  and  there  had  been  general  agree- 
ment, that  wherever  possible  the  Committee 
should  attempt  to  follow  the  consensus  procedure 
and  should,  whenever  possible,  avoid  voting.  The 
purpose  of  this  procedure  in  our  view  was  to  work 
toward  maximizing  the  area  of  agreement  among 
the  members  so  as  to  bring  the  greatest  possible 
degree  of  support  behind  the  Committee's  recom- 
mendations. Following  this  practice  it  was  pos- 
sible in  some  instances  for  the  Committee  to  arrive 
at  conclusions  that  could  accurately  be  described 
as  decisions  of  the  Committee,  even  though  some 
members  might  not  have  been  in  a  position  to  vote 
affirmatively  for  them  if  a  vote  was  taken. 

Unfortmiately,  in  a  majority  of  cases  this  prac- 
tice was  not  followed  and  resolutions  or  recom- 
mended resolutions  were  voted  in  such  a  way  as  to 
highlight  and  emphasize  the  differences  of  opinion 
between  the  members  and  hence  to  diminish  the 
impact  of  these  recommendations  upon  those  mem- 
ber states  for  whom  they  were  intended.  For  this 
unfortunate  result  we  believe  that  the  delegation 
of  the  Soviet  Union  was  primarily  to  blame.  That 
delegation  consistently  showed  itself  more  inter- 
ested in  attempting  to  put  certain  member  states 
in  an  adverse  position  and  in  pursuing  self-serving 
political  objectives  than  it  did  in  arriving  at  a 
meaningful  consensus  which  could  have  a  greater 
effect  in  advancing  the  welfare  and  freedom  of 
the  peoples  of  the  territories  concerned. 

In  this  and  in  other  ways  the  Soviet  Union  dele- 
gation consistently  brought  the  cold  war  into  the 
work  of  the  Committee  in  a  manner  which  im- 
peded its  work  and  lessened  its  usefulness.  On 
many  occasions  the  Soviet  delegation  introduced 
extreme  and  violent  charges  against  member  na- 
tions that  were  unfounded  and  often  irrelevant 
to  the  work  of  the  Committee.  This  was  done  botli 
in  the  course  of  the  Committee  proceedings  and 
in  the  course  of  press  conferences  held  in  connec- 
tion with  the  Committee's  visit  to  Africa.  To  cite 
but  one  example,  the  Soviet  delegation  at  one  point 
charged  the  United  States  with  maintaining  a 
rocket  base  on  the  island  of  Zanzibar  when,  as  the 
people  of  that  territory  well  knew,  the  United 
States  installation  in  question  was  a  satellite  track- 
ing station  devoted  exclusively  to  the  work  of 
assisting   in  our  country's  program  of  manned 


space  flights  and  was  a  completely  open  installa- 
tion to  which  visitors  were  expressly  and  cordially 
invited.  This  attack  was  in  strange  contrast  to 
the  gracious  congratulations  conveyed  to  our 
President  by  Chairman  Khruslichev  upon  the 
success  of  these  manned  space  flights. 

At  times,  also,  the  Committee  followed  proce- 
dures which  we  considered  to  be  most  unfortunate, 
and  in  certain  instances  it  did  not  act  as  responsi- 
bly as  desirable.  Particularly  lacking  in  consid- 
eration was  the  so-called  "appeal"  with  respect  to 
Zanzibar  which  was  introduced  and  voted  upon 
the  same  day  (the  last  day  of  the  Committee's 
trip  to  Africa),  without  regard  to  the  requests  of 
several  members  that  tliey  be  given  at  least  the 
opportunity  to  consult  their  governments  with  re- 
spect to  it.  On  another  occasion  petitioners  were 
heard  at  the  insistence  of  the  Soviet  delegation — 
petitioners  who  claimed  to  represent  a  certain 
leading  party  in  an  African  territory  but  who  were 
later  disowned  by  the  proper  authorities  of  that 
party  as  not  having  been  authorized  to  speak  for  it. 

Wo  expressed,  and  still  feel,  reservations  with 
regard  to  the  decision  of  the  Committee  to  visit 
Africa  and  to  hold  meetings  in  certain  capitals 
there.  We  were  most  appreciative  of  tlie  invita- 
tions extended  by  the  three  governments  con- 
cerned— Morocco,  Ethiopia,  and  Tanganyika — • 
and  of  their  hospitality  to  the  Committee.  Never- 
theless, we  did  not  feel  that  this  travel  on  tlie 
part  of  the  Committee  had  been  shown  to  be  the 
best  possible  use  of  the  very  considerable  expendi- 
ture of  funds  that  it  entailed.  In  this  regard  the 
United  Nations  bodies  do  not  seem  to  have  the 
benefit  of  the  kind  of  overall  judgment  which  in 
an  individual  govermnent  can  be  exercised  by  a 
budget  director  or  a  minister  of  finance  who  can 
say  of  a  particular  project,  ''This  may  be  a  very 
desirable  project  but,  looked  at  in  relation  to  the 
other  demands  upon  this  organization,  we  cannot 
afford  it."  In  the  view  of  my  delegation  it  would 
be  highly  desirable  if  some  such  procedures  could 
be  developed  for  application  in  the  future. 

Future  Role  of  Committee 

I  trust,  Mr.  President,  that  delegates  will  under- 
stand the  spirit  in  which  I  have  offered  these  com- 
ments upon  the  work  of  the  Committee  of  17.  If 
the  United  Nations  is  to  continue  to  grow  in  ef- 
fectiveness, there  is  nothing  to  be  gained  by  at- 
tempting to  gloss  over  the  shortcomings  of  its 


December   77,   J  962 


933 


constitiiPiit  bodies.  Xor  can  we  usefully  carry  out 
our  tasks  if  we  seek  to  evade  controversy  or  the 
expression  of  sincere  dissent.  Unfortunately  there 
are  in  the  world  too  many  so-called  deliberative 
bodies  where  dissent  is  lacking  and  stormy  ap- 
plause for  the  dictated  official  line  is  the  only  man- 
ifestation of  opinion  which  is  permitted. 

We  continue  to  believe  that  the  Special  Com- 
mittee on  the  implementation  of  the  declaration 
on  colonialism  can  phiy  a  useful  and  constructive 
role  in  speeding  the  process  of  decolonization  and 
in  helping  to  assure  that  the  emerging  new  nations 
come  to  independence  under  the  best  possible  con- 
ditions. We  believe  that  the  deficiencies  that  we 
have  noted  in  the  work  of  the  Committee  in  the 
past  can  be  corrected  in  the  future,  and  we  hope 
that  our  criticisms  have  therefore  been  construc- 
tive. We  would  hope  that  a  way  could  be  found 
to  reduce  to  the  minimum  the  distractions  and 
irrelevancies  which  have  characterized  in  the  past 
the  efforts  of  one  delegation  to  introduce  the  cold 
war  into  the  work  of  the  Committee.  So  far  as 
tlie  future  composition  of  the  Committee  is  con- 
cerned, we  believe  that  a  committee  of  approxi- 
mately the  present  size  is  about  as  large  as  is 
practicable.  It  would  seem  to  us  natural  and  de- 
sirable to  arrange  for  some  form  of  rotation  of 
membership  so  as  to  combine  experience  with 
freshness  of  approach.  We  are  prepared  to  co- 
operate fully  with  the  Committee,  whether  we  con- 
tinue as  a  member  of  it  or  not. 

In  the  introduction  of  his  annual  report ''  the 
Secretary-General  called  attention  to  the  multi- 
plicity of  committees  that  have  been  set  up  to  deal 
with  colonial  problems.  It  may  well  be  that  de- 
sirable financial  savings  can  be  effected  by  achiev- 
ing a  greater  degree  of  concentration  within  the 
framework  of  the  Special  Committee.  From  the 
point  of  view  of  budgetary  savings  and  sound 
organizational  procedures,  we  would  be  inclined  to 
favor  such  a  concentration.  At  the  same  time, 
there  might  be  individual  situations  in  which  sepa- 
rate committees  would  be  necessary  and  desirable. 

In  conclusion,  Mr.  President,  may  I  simply  say 
that  my  country  looks  forward  to  the  day  with 
keen  anticipation  when  peoples  everywhere  in  the 
world  will  have  the  privilege  of  freedom  of  choice 
as  to  their  political  destinies.  The  United  Na- 
tions has  played  an  important  role  in  helping  man- 


'  D.N.  doc.  A/5201  and  Add.  1. 


kind  to  achieve  this  goal — perhaps  a  more  im- 
portant role  than  was  envisaged  in  San  Francisco 
in  1945— but  it  is  characteristic  of  a  dynamic  or- 
ganization such  as  this  one  that  it  may  grow  and 
develop  in  a  manner  unforeseen  by  its  founders. 
The  United  Nations  can  act,  and  has  been  increas- 
ingly acting,  as  a  powerful  searchlight  focusing 
the  rays  of  woi'ld  public  opinion  on  areas  where 
freedom  is  denied.  That  spotlight  has  already 
focused  on  some  areas  where  the  problems  are 
difficult  and  appear  to  be  intractable.  There  are 
many  other  such  areas  where  the  spotlight  has  yet 
to  be  focused.  In  both  cases  there  is  much  work 
to  be  clone  before  mankind  can  achieve  the  dignity 
and  freedom  everywhere  which  is  its  God-given 
birthright. 


Current  U.N.  Documents: 
A  Selected  Bibliography 

Mimeographed  or  processed  documents  (such  as  those 
listed  below)  may  be  consulted  at  depositor!/  libraries  in 
the  United  States.  U.N.  printed  publications  may  be  pur- 
chased from  the  Sales  Section  of  the  United  Nations, 
Ihiited  Nations  Plaza,  N.Y. 


General  Assembly 

Letters   addressed   to   the   Acting   Secretary-General   re- 
questing inclusion  of  tbe  following  items  on  tlie  agenda 
of  the  17th  session  of  the  General  Assembly: 
The  Cairo  Declaration  of  Developing  Countries.     Letter 
dated  August  14  from  the  permanent  representative  of 
the  United  Arab  Republic.     A/51G2.     August  IG,  1962. 
15  pp. 
The  Question  of  Hungary.     Letter  dated  August  17  from 
the  permanent  representative  of  the  United  States. 
A/5104.     August  17,  19G2.     2  pp. 
Improvement  of  the  Methods  of  Work  of  the  General 
Assembly.     Letter  dated  August  IG  from  the  perma- 
nent representative  of  Tunisia.     A/5165.     August  17, 
1062.     3  pp. 
The  Policies  of  .iparthcid  of  the  Government  of  the  Re- 
public of  South  Africa.    Letter  dated  August  14  from 
the  permanent  representatives  of  several  countries. 
A/51G7  and  Add.  1-G.    August  17,  li)(!2.    G  pp. 
Letters   from   the  representatives  of  India   and  Paki- 
stan concerning  "Treatment  of  people  of  Indian  and 
Indo-Pakistan  origin  in  the  Republic  of  South  Africa." 
A/51G6,  August  17,  19G2,  4  pp.;  A/5173,  August  22, 
1962.    2  pp. 
Agreement  I3etween  the  Republic  of  Indonesi.i  and  the 
Kingdom  of  (he  Netherlands  Concerning  West  New 
Guinea    (West  Irian).     Note  by   the  Secretary -Gen- 
eral.    A/5170  and  Corr.  1.     August  20,  19G2.     21  pp. 
Question   of   Houndaries   Between   Venezuela   and    the 
Territory  of  British  Guiana.     Letter  dated  August  18 
from  the  permanent  mission  of  Venezuela.     A/5168/ 
Add.  1.     August  21,  19G2.     4  pp. 
Executive  Committee  of  the  High  Commissioner's  Pro- 
gramme.   Programme  for  tbe  Completion  of  Maior  .-Vid 
Projects,  A/AC.9G/17G,  August  27.  19G2,  28  pp. ;  Report 
on  the  Resettlement  of  Refugees,  A/AC.96/INF.9,  Oc- 
tober 11,  19G2,  12  pp. 


934 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


UNESCO's  Contribution  to  the  U.N.  Decade  of  Development 


hy  Lucius  D.  Battle 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs  ^ 


Mr.  President  and  delegates  to  the  12th  session 
of  the  General  Conference  of  UNESCO:  Prior 
to  presenting  my  formal  remarks  I  wish  to  ex- 
press, on  behalf  of  my  Government  and  fellow 
countrymen,  deep  gratitude  for  the  tribute  which 
all  delegates  to  this  conference  paid  to  Mrs.  Roose- 
velt at  the  opening  meeting  last  Friday.  I  am 
equally  grateful  to  President  Habte-wold  and  the 
Acting  Director  General  [Eene  Maheu]  for  their 
kind  remarks,  which  reflect  sentiments  shared  by 
all  of  us  for  a  truly  great  and  gracious  lady,  who 
gave  of  herself  so  unsparingly  to  the  cause  of 
hiunanity  and  justice. 

Message  From  President  Kennedy 

I  now  have  the  honor  to  present  a  message 
which  the  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America  asked  me,  prior  to  my  departure,  to  de- 
liver to  this  conference.  These  are  the  President's 
words : 

I  am  glad  to  send  my  best  wishes  to  all  assembled  in 
Paris  for  the  Twelfth  Session  of  the  UNESCO  General 
Conference — and  I  add  a  special  greeting  to  the  delegates 
from  the  new  member  states. 

We  live  in  an  age  when  the  growing  interdependence 
of  international  life  requires  that  nations  consult  and  act 
together  more  freriuently  than  ever  before.  In  such  a 
time,  few  international  gatherings  are  more  vital  to  the 
future  of  civilization  than  those  dedicated  to  the  ad- 
vancement of  education,  science,  learning  and  the  arts. 
In  the  end,   men  achieve  their  greatest  fulfillment  and 


'Address  made  before  the  12th  session  of  the  General 
Conference  of  the  United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific 
and  Cultural  Organization  at  Paris  on  Nov.  13.  For 
addresses  by  Mr.  Battle  and  Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- 
national Organization  Affairs  Harlan  Cleveland  before 
the  U.S.  National  Commission  for  UNESCO  on  Oct.  12, 
see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  5,  1962,  p.  695. 


leave  their  most  imiierishable  monuments  in  the  achieve- 
ments of  the  creative  mind  and  the  free  spirit. 

The  United  States  aflirms  the  responsibility  of  govern- 
ments to  encourage  culture  and  the  arts.  We  share  with 
you  the  vision  of  the  affirmative  role  UNESCO  can  play 
in  the  years  ahead.  And  we  regard  as  of  particular  sig- 
nificance your  efforts  to  carry  forward  the  work  of  the 
United  Nations  Development  Decade.  UNESCO  can  make 
indispensable  contributions  to  help  nations  win  that  liv- 
ing strength  and  independence,  spiritual  as  well  as  politi- 
cal, which  define  full  nationhood. 

I  commend  the  spirit  of  international  cooperation  and 
good  will  which  animates  your  effort.  In  this  spirit,  I 
wish  to  express  on  behalf  of  the  American  people  the 
hope  that  your  conference  attains  every  possible  success. 

John  F.  Kennedt 

My  Government  believes  that  this  12th  General 
Conference  will  achieve  significant  progress  if  it 
will  direct  the  program  of  UNESCO  so  that  this 
specialized  agency  can  take  its  full  part  in  the 
U.N.  Development  Decade.  The  U.N.  General 
Assembly  resolution  of  last  December,  designating 
the  1960's  as  the  Development  Decade,^  is  a  chal- 
lenge to  each  member  agency  of  the  U.N.  family 
for  bold  and  imaginative  thinking  and  for  a  re- 
orientation of  effort  wherever  required  in  the  fields 
of  economic  and  social  development. 

Question  of  Budget  Ceiling 

To  fulfill  its  role  in  this  imdertaking,  UNESCO 
must  grow.  On  this  point  we  will  all  agree,  but 
the  direction  and  rate  of  that  growth  have  already 
been  matters  of  debate  among  us. 

We  heard  yesterday  the  Acting  Director  Gen- 
eral's eloquent  and  candid  statement  about  the 
program  and  budget  to  which  he  and  the  other 


'U.N.  doc.  A/RESA710  (XVI). 


December   7  7,   7962 


935 


members  of  the  secretariat  have  devoted  such  care- 
ful thought.  May  I  exphiin  why  we  have  reached 
somewhat  difl'erent  conchisions  as  to  the  ways  to 
achieve  the  ultimate  objectives  we  all  share. 

INfany  of  you  know  that  the  United  States  is  sup- 
porting the  action  of  the  Executive  Board  in  pro- 
posing a  budget  ceiling  of  $38  million  instead  of 
the  $40,884  million  recommended  by  the  Acting 
Director  General.  The  Acting  Director  General 
has  proposed  an  overall  increase  of  26  percent  over 
the  1961-62  budget.  My  Government,  together 
with  otiiers,  questions  the  wisdom  of  an  increase  of 
this  magnitude.  We  have  reason  to  believe  that, 
especially  with  respect  to  UNESCO's  field  serv- 
ices, the  rapidity  with  which  the  program  has  been 
expanding  is  placing  a  heavy  strain  on  the  man- 
agement capacity  of  the  organization  to  adminis- 
ter a  program  at  the  present  level,  to  say  nothing 
of  a  program  exceeding  the  $38  million  level.  The 
Acting  Director  General's  statement  yesterday 
supports  the  view  that  the  organization  is  already 
ruiming  the  risk  of  exceeding  the  limits  of  its 
capacity. 

After  careful  and  detailed  analysis  of  the  Act- 
ing Director  General's  proposals,  we  are  convinced 
that  a  $38  million  level  would  permit  the  organi- 
zation to  carry  out  all  present  and  new  programs 
which  are  necessary  and  desirable.  This  level 
would  permit  an  increase  of  $5.5  million,  or  17 
percent,  over  the  1961-62  budget. 

Specific  U.S.  Suggestions 

Let  me  suggest  some  specific  steps  by  which  we 
believe  we  can  meet  the  objectives  we  share  with 
the  Acting  Director  General  within  the  budget 
we  propose. 

First,  the  number  and  length  of  meetings  and 
conferences  can  and  should  be  reduced.  The  pro- 
posed program  calls  for  an  average  of  more  than 
one  meeting  each  week  for  the  next  2  j^ears.  Even 
for  a  country  the  size  of  my  own  it  is  becoming 
increasingly  difficult  to  send  adequately  prepared 
representatives  and  technical  experts  to  so  large  a 
number  of  meetings. 

The  situation  for  some  of  the  smaller  countries 
must  be  even  more  difficult.  Many  countries,  in 
sending  representatives  to  such  meetings,  must 
draw  heavily  on  their  limited  manpower  with  ad- 
verse results  to  their  own  national  programs.  In 
many  instances  the  holding  of  meetings  maj'  not 
be  the  best  technique  for  furthering  the  objectives 


of  the  UNESCO  program.  Fewer  meetings — 
each  on  an  issue  of  fundamental  importance — will 
give  tlie  secretariat  and  member  governments  more 
time  to  plan  and  prepare.  I  cite  the  education 
conferences  at  Addis  Ababa,  Santiago,  and  Tokyo 
as  examples  of  useful  conferences.  Adequate 
time  for  planning  and  preparing  will,  in  turn, 
make  for  more  significant  contributions  and  more 
worthwhile  foUowup. 

In  this  connection  I  cannot  emphasize  too 
strongly  the  need,  which  I  am  sure  all  member 
states  feel,  for  earlier  receipt  of  documentation. 
A  chronic  complaint  made  by  participants  at 
nearly  all  of  UNESCO's  meetings,  including  the 
General  Conference  itself,  is  that  documentation 
arrives  too  late  for  proper  consideration  by 
participants. 

Secondly,  my  Government  believes  that  one  of 
the  most  useful  and  creative  activities  of  UNESCO 
has  been  its  program  support  of  certain  interna- 
tional nongovernmental  organizations  but  that 
UNESCO  should  now  determine  (a)  whether 
these  organizations  wliich  it  has  subsidized  for 
many  years  can — in  some  instances — become  self- 
sustaining,  and  (b)  whether  UNESCO  support 
might,  in  some  instances,  take  the  form  of  con- 
tracts for  specific  services  rather  than  general 
subsidies. 

The  amount  which  UNESCO  is  spending  for 
support  of  such  organizations  has  now  risen  to 
$1.5  million.  Useful  as  most  of  these  organiza- 
tions have  been,  ways  should  be  found  to  put  them 
on  a  more  self-sustaining  basis. 

Thirdly,  UNESCO  might  reexamine  its  contin- 
uous support  of  those  projects,  institutes,  centers, 
and  other  activities  which  it  initiated  with  the  in- 
tention of  supporting  for  only  a  limited  time. 
UNESCO's  proper  role  with  respect  to  such  cen- 
ters and  institutes  would  seem  to  be  to  provide  ini- 
tial financial  assistance,  based  on  the  assumption 
that,  if  the  project  is  of  real  value,  the  states  re- 
ceiving tlie  service  will  assume  responsibility 
within  a  reasonable  period.  My  Government  be- 
lieves that  in  many  instances  UNESCO  support 
of  these  organizations  and  projects  might  be  trans- 
ferred to  member  states  at  dates  earlier  than  those 
set  forth  in  tlie  proposed  program  and  budget. 

FourtMy,  there  are  in  the  program  of  UNESCO 
a  number  of  projects  which  may  be  more  properly 
tlie  responsibility  of  other  TT.N.  agencies,  such  as 
the    Food    and    Agriculture    Organization,    the 


936 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


World  Health  Organization,  and  the  Interna- 
tional Labor  Organization.  Similarly  there  may 
be  activities  of  these  other  agencies  which  fall  more 
properly  within  the  purview  of  UNESCO. 
Shifting  such  activities  to  the  proper  agencies 
will  help  to  eliminate  duplication  of  effort  and 
competition  among  the  agencies  and  should  pro- 
duce savings  not  only  to  TTNESCO  but  to  those 
other  international  organizations  which,  let  us  not 
forget,  we  all  support  financially. 

Fifth,  my  Government  considers  that  UNESCO 
should  abandon  activities  such  as  tendentious 
publications,  and  those  seminars,  meetings,  and 
other  projects  which  experience  has  shown  lead 
to  polemics  rather  tlian  scholarly  results.  The 
elimination  of  such  projects  will  result  in  con- 
siderable savings  of  manpower  and  money,  with- 
out in  any  way  impairing  the  essential,  high- 
priority  programs  of  proven  benefit.  The  question 
is  not  only  one  of  cost  but  one  of  integrity,  for 
UNESCO's  standards  of  scholarship,  like  Caesar's 
wife,  must  be  above  reproach. 

The  five  points  I  have  just  made  all  relate  to 
the  1963-64  program  and  budget  as  set  forth  in 
Document  12  C/5  and  its  addendum  and  cor- 
rigendum. An  equally  serious  problem  arises 
from  the  introduction,  just  prior  to  the  General 
Conference,  of  new  proposals,  many  having 
budgetary  implications — proposals  which  mem- 
ber states  have  had  insufficient  time  to  consider 
before  the  General  Conference  gets  underway. 

I  am  informed  that  at  the  last  General  Con- 
ference the  budgetary  overcommitment  in  the 
Program  Connnission,  created  by  hasty  action  on 
last-minute  resolutions,  had  to  be  painfully  cor- 
rected by  a  call  for  a  voluntary  withdrawal  of 
resolutions  and,  in  addition,  by  a  prorated  reduc- 
tion of  the  entire  program,  after  all  items  had 
presumably  already  been  scaled  to  a  minimum. 

Only  yesterday  the  Acting  Director  General 
gave  us  the  disquieting  infonnation  that  ad- 
ditional draft  resolutions  this  year  may  run  as 
much  as  $6  million  above  his  own  budget  proposal. 

Although  the  deadline  for  submitting  resolu- 
tions having  budgetai-y  implications  was  Sep- 
tember 28,  not  one  of  the  proposed  di-aft 
resolutions  had  been  received  by  our  govern- 
ments until  2  or  3  days  before  the  conference 
opened.  To  expect  the  General  Conference  to  deal 
effectively  witli  resolutions  which  member  states 
have  not  had  an  opportimity  either  to  analyze  or 


to  evaluate  is  to  expect  the  impossible. 

If  the  principles  of  program  planning  and 
responsible  use  of  international  funds  mean  any- 
thing whatever,  corrective  action  must  be  taken. 
To  this  end  the  United  States  delegation  will  make 
a  constructive  proposal  to  the  Program  Commis- 
sion for  the  handling  of  such  resolutions. 

In  supporting  a  budget  level  of  $38  million  for 
the  next  biemiium  I  should  like  to  stress  that  a 
budget  ceiling  at  this  level  should  include  all  of 
the  activities  to  be  financed  by  the  organization  in 
1963-64  in  its  regular  program.  We  should  not 
approach  the  process  of  budget  and  program 
making  on  a  piecemeal  basis.  The  Acting  Di- 
rector General  has  proposed  that  we  act  on  parts 
I,  II,  III,  and  IV  on  Friday,  November  16,  and 
act  on  other  budget  and  program  proposals  at  a 
later  date.  My  delegation  finds  such  a  proposal 
unacceptable,  since  we  must  establish  a  budget 
ceiling  on  Friday  that  includes  all  items  which  we 
propose  to  undertake  for  1963-64. 

Campaign  for  Preservation  of  Nubian  Monuments 

May  I  make  one  comment  concerning  the  pro- 
posal on  the  campaign  for  saving  the  monuments 
of  Nubia.  My  Govenmient  is  gratified  with  the 
significant  and  tangible  results  of  the  voluntary 
campaign.  We  are,  however,  concerned  about  the 
proposal  to  convert  this  campaign  from  a  volun- 
tary effort  to  one  which  will  be  compulsory  for 
member  states.  To  change  the  nature  of  this 
commitment  would  seem  to  us  a  breach  of  faith  on 
the  part  of  the  organization. 

The  proposal  to  make  mandatory  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  monuments  of  one  nation  raises  serious 
question  as  to  the  obligation  of  UNESCO  toward 
the  preservation  of  monuments  of  equal  impor- 
tance in  other  member  states. 

Further,  I  would  point  out  that  this  activity— 
the  preservation  of  monuments — if  included  in 
UNESCO's  program,  should  compete  in  terms  of 
priorities  with  the  demands  of  other  programs  in 
developing  areas,  such  as  for  education  and  social 
development.  To  incorporate  the  proposal  for 
Nubia  in  the  regular  program  of  UNESCO,  how- 
ever, would  be  to  give  it  an  overriding  priority 
over  all  existing  programs,  since  bank  loans  must 
be  repaid  when  due. 

Mr.  President,  in  the  course  of  my  remarks  I 
have  made  a  number  of  suggestions  in  the  hope 
that  the  conference  will  direct  UNESCO  activi- 


December   7  7,   7962 


937 


ties  along  the  lines  of  tlie  fundamental  objectives 
of  the  organization.  Let  me  add  one  further  sug- 
gestion toward  improving  tlie  efficiency  of  the 
organization.  My  Government  believes  tliat  at  an 
appropriate  time  after  this  General  Conference 
the  Executive  Board  should  consider  the  advis- 
ability of  having  an  independent  study  and  ap- 
praisal made  of  UNESCO's  administrative  prac- 
tices and  program  techniques.  Such  a  study 
would  assist  the  Director  General  in  eliminating 
marginal  activities,  improve  the  overall  efficiency 
of  the  organization,  result  in  economies,  and  at 
the  same  time  enhance  the  capability  of  UNESCO 
to  provide  service  and  support  to  member  states. 

Need  for  Educational  Development 

Let  us  now  look  ahead.  First  and  foremost  of 
the  challenges  before  us  is  the  need  for  educational 
development,  a  need  which  is  at  the  very  heart  of 
the  U.N.  Development  Decade  and  reflects  the 
decision  of  the  11th  General  Conference.  Educa- 
tion is  indeed  the  principal  means  available  to 
society  to  liberate  individuals  from  hunger,  igno- 
rance, and  all  forms  of  tyranny;  to  give  every  in- 
dividual, however  humble  his  birth,  the  oppor- 
tunity to  develop  as  a  free  individual  in  a  free 
society.  There  is  today  an  almost  universal  faith 
in  the  elevating  and  enriching  power  of  education 
and  the  pursuit  of  knowledge.  As  the  President 
of  the  United  States  told  an  academic  gathering  at 
the  University  of  California  earlier  this  year :  ^ 

.  .  .  knowledge,  not  hate,  is  the  passkey  to  the  future  .  .  . 
knowledge  transoond.s  national  antagonisms  .  .  .  it  speaks 
a  universal  language  ...  it  is  the  possession,  not  of  a 
Binglo  class  or  of  a  single  nation  or  a  single  ideology,  but 
of  all  mankind. 

We  in  America  have  a  profound  conviction  that 
education  is  not  a  secondary  asset  for  a  nation's 
independence  or  growth  but  is  the  very  lifestream 
of  its  development — political,  economic,  social, 
and  spiritual.  Indeed,  we  believe  that  the  goals 
of  training  men  and  investing  in  men  should  be 
regarded  as  equal  in  importance  in  the  next  decade 
with  investment  in  materials  and  machines. 

There  is  no  doubt  about  the  scale  of  the  need 
for  educational  development.  One  African  coun- 
try alone  has  estimated  that  it  will  require  20,000 
teacliers  to  achieve  primary  universal  education 


during  the  next  20  years.  The  countries  of  Asia 
have  estimated  that  they  will  need  to  train  8 
million  new  teachers  by  1980.  These  needs  can  be 
met  only  by  a  concerted  international  effort. 

A  second  challenge  lies  in  the  field  of  science 
and  technology.  The  ever-broadening  horizons  of 
human  knowledge  are  constantly  revealing  new 
and  exciting  visions  in  this  complex  world.  From 
the  vastness  of  outer  space  to  the  deep  recesses  of 
the  ocean  come  challenges  enough  for  all.  The 
frontiers  of  science  have  no  limits.  As  United 
States  Secretary  of  State  Rusk  has  recently  said :  * 

We  cannot  foresee  a  time  when  science  and  technology 
will  cease  placing  new  insights,  new  data,  new  tools,  and 
new  capabilities  at  the  disposal  of  society.  Man's  prob- 
lem is  how  to  use  them.  .  .  . 

Much  remains  to  be  done  also  in  fields  of  social 
relationships — old  and  new.  In  the  long  process 
of  nation  building  there  is  need  to  preserve  na- 
tional cultures.  Change  is  implicit  in  this  process, 
but  change  need  not  mean  upheaval ;  change  can 
come  about  by  adaptation  of  old  cultural  patterns, 
old  value  systems,  and  historic  symbols  so  that 
social  moorings  will  not  be  swept  away.  Here 
UNESCO  can  be  of  special  service. 

I  would  wish  for  the  wisdom  to  offer  perfect 
responses  to  all  the  challenges  which  ITNESCO 
n^ust  face. 

In  closing  may  I  emphasize  that  I  have  been 
trying  to  suggest  that  UNESCO  achieve  a  clear 
direction  of  efTort  by  curtailing  activities  of  mar- 
ginal and  questionable  value  so  that  the  organiza- 
tion may  achieve  an  increased  capability  to  deal 
with  the  most  urgent  needs  of  the  developing 
nations. 

Thus  will  UNESCO  make  its  maximum  contri- 
bution to  the  U.N.  Development  Decade.  Tlius 
will  TTNESCO  round  out  its  fir.st  quarter  century 
with  significant  contributions  to  those  nations 
determined  to  raise  the  educational  and  social 
standards  of  their  people. 

Facing  tlie  future,  UNESCO  must  continue  its 
struggle  against  the  pressing  problems  of  igno- 
rance and  poverty  which  plague  mankind.  No 
nation  alone  po.ssesses  the  key  to  their  solution. 
They  can  be  overcome  only  by  a  cooperative  effort 
of  men  and  nations.  In  bringing  about  this  coop- 
eration, UNESCO  must  continue  to  play  a  central 


"  Bulletin  of  Apr.  IC,  1962,  p.  615. 


*  Ihid.,  June  11, 1962,  p.  931. 


938 


Deporfmenf  o^  State  Bulletin 


role.  In  so  doing,  UNESCO  will  sig:iificantly 
contribute  to  the  objective  to  which  all  of  us 
aspire — that  all  men  may  walk  with  dignity  in 
a  world  of  enlightenment  and  peace. 


GATT  Contracting  Parties 
Conclude  20th  Session 

Press  release  686  dated  November  19 

The  convening  of  a  ministerial-level  meeting 
early  in  1963,  the  prospect  of  the  initiation  of  a 
major  new  movement  of  tariff  and  trade  liberaliza- 
tion, trade  problems  arismg  from  quotas  and  from 
the  imposition  of  temporary  customs  surcharges, 
reports  on  developments  in  the  European  Eco- 
nomic Community  and  other  regional  economic  ar- 
rangements, and  expansion  of  membership  of  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  were 
among  the  principal  subjects  dealt  with  by  the 
Contracting  Parties  to  the  GATT  at  their  20th 
session,  which  took  place  in  Geneva  from  October 
23  to  November  16,  1962.  Over  80  countries,  in- 
cluding the  44  GATT  contracting  parties,  and  12 
intergovernmental  organizations  were  represented 
at  the  session. 

The  U.S.  delegation  was  led  by  G.  Griffith  John- 
son, Assistant  Secretai-y  of  State  for  Economic 
Affairs. 

Leonard  Weiss,  Director,  Office  of  International 
Trade  and  Finance,  Department  of  State,  and 
Robert  L.  McNeill,  Special  Assistant  to  the  As- 
sistant Secretary  of  Commerce  for  International 
Affairs,  served  as  vice  chairmen.  Other  senior  del- 
egates were  John  W.  Evans,  Counselor  for  Eco- 
nomic Affairs,  U.S.  Mission,  Geneva,  and  Ben  D. 
Dorfman,  Chairman,  U.S.  Tariff  Commission. 

The  decision  of  the  Contracting  Parties  to  call 
for  a  GATT  ministerial  meeting  the  early  part  of 
nest  year  stemmed  from  a  joint  proposal  of  the 
United  States  and  Canada.  Widely  endorsed  dur- 
ing the  session  by  contracting  parties  at  all  levels 
of  economic  development,  the  initiative  grew  out  of 
the  sponsors'  conviction  that  there  is  now  a  press- 
ing need  for  ministers  to  consider  basic  trade  prob- 
lems and  policies  if  satisfactory  and  mutually 
beneficial  international  trading  relations  are  to  be 
furthered. 

The  U.S.  representative  pointed  out  that  the 


recently  enacted  Trade  Expansion  Act,^  with  its 
unprecedented  and  far-reaching  authority  in  the 
trade  field,  would  enable  the  United  States  to 
participate  fully  in  the  kind  of  broad  and  com- 
prehensive program  of  world  trade  liberalization 
for  which  it  is  anticipated  that  the  forthcoming 
ministerial  meeting  would  provide  stimulus  and 
direction. 

The  holding  of  a  new  conference  for  the  com- 
prehensive reduction  of  tariff  barriers  on  indus- 
trial goods  and  primary  products,  possibly  in  1964, 
would  be  a  prime  consideration  of  ministers  but 
with  full  recognition  that  if  the  legitimate  trade 
interests  of  all  contracting  parties  are  to  be  met, 
significant  progress  must  be  made  at  the  same  time 
in  such  other  vital  trade  areas  as  agricultural  pro- 
tectionism and  the  need  of  the  less  developed 
countries  for  expanding  markets. 

U.S.  Complaints  on  Import  Restrictions  Considered 

In  addition  to  their  annual  consideration  of 
reports  of  consultations  by  the  Committee  on  Bal- 
ance-of-Payments  Restrictions  with  13  countries 
maintaining  quantitative  import  restrictions  in 
accordance  with  GATT  provisions,  the  Contract- 
ing Parties  had  before  them  several  issues  dealing 
with  other  types  of  import  restrictions.  Promi- 
nent among  those  was  the  U.S.  complaint  against 
France  and  Italy  for  their  persistent  use  of  import 
prohibitions  and  quotas  which  impaired  or  nulli- 
fied tariff  concessions  which  the  European  Eco- 
nomic Community  had  given  to  the  United  States. 
Through  bilateral  consultations  conducted  during 
the  session  with  Italian  representatives,  the 
United  States  delegation  was  successful  in  secur- 
ing a  commitment  to  liberalize  a  significant  group 
of  products  of  interest  to  the  United  States.  On 
the  basis  of  this  forthcoming  action  by  the  Italian 
Government  and  with  the  understanding  tliat 
bilateral  consultations  would  be  continued  on 
remaining  import  restrictions,  the  United  States 
withdrew  its  complaint  against  Italy  from  this 
session's  agenda. 

In  the  case  of  the  French  import  restrictions  the 
Contracting  Parties  convened  a  panel  which 
examined  the  facts  of  the  complaint  in  accordance 


'  For   an  article  by  Leonard   Weiss   summarizing  the 
provisions  of  the  act,  see  Bot-letin  of  Dec.  3,  1962,  p.  847. 


December   17,   1962 


939 


with  prescribed  GATT  (article  XXIII)  proce- 
dures, presented  a  report  wliich  sustained  the  U.S. 
argument  of  nullification  or  impairnipnt  of  trade 
benefits  due  the  United  States,  aiul  called  upon 
the  French  Government  to  withdraw  its  trade 
restrictions  which  were  inconsistent  with  the 
GATT.  At  the  same  time  the  panel  recommended 
that  the  United  States  refrain  "for  a  reasonable 
period"  from  exercisinjj  its  right  under  article 
XXIII  to  suspend  the  application  to  France  of 
concessions  and  other  trade  obligations  equivalent 
to  those  being  denied  to  U.S.  exports.  It  is  hoped 
that  the  findings  and  recommendations  of  the  Con- 
tracting Parties  will  lead  to  early  and  satisfactory 
progress  in  the  removal  of  French  restrictions 
which  have  adverselj'  aft'ected  U.S.  exports  to 
France. 

Tlie  U.S.  delegation  also  brought  before  the 
Contracting  Parties  another  trade  complaint  aris- 
ing from  the  application  by  Canada  of  certain 
provisions  of  its  customs  legislation  which,  in  the 
view  of  the  United  States,  have  had  the  effect  of 
impairing  a  tariff  concession  on  potatoes  negoti- 
ated with  Canada  in  favor  of  the  United  States. 
A  panel  was  established  to  examine  the  facts  in 
the  complaint  and  to  make  recommendations.  The 
panel  report  essentially  sustained  the  U.S.  case, 
and  the  Canadian  Government  was  requested  to 
withdraw  the  additional  customs  charge  in  ques- 
tion or  to  work  out  with  the  United  States  any 
other  mutually  satisfactory  adjustment. 

In  another  area  of  trade  restrictions  of  particu- 
lar significance  to  U.S.  export  interests,  the  Con- 
tracting Parties  considered  the  temporary  import 
surcharges  wliich  were  imposed  bj'  Canada  in 
June  of  this  year  for  balance-of -payments  reasons. 
The  Contracting  Parties  expressed  regret  that  the 
Canadian  Government  had  found  it  necessary  to 
introduce  temporary  measures  contrary  to  the 
GATT,  recommended  that  Canada  remove  its  sur- 
charges expeditiously,  and  requested  Canada  to 
report  in  the  early  part  of  19G3  on  action  taken  to 
this  end.  The  Canadian  delegation,  in  undertak- 
ing to  cooperate  to  the  fullest  possible  extent  in 
following  the  decision  of  the  Contracting  Parties, 
cited  as  evidence  of  its  intentions  a  further  liberal- 
ization  step.  Ry  this  new  action,  surcharges  were 
being  relaxed  on  products  having  an  annual 
import  value  of  about  $260  million. 

As  furtlier  evidence  of  increasing  concern  of 


Contracting  Parties  over  import  restrictions  still 
imposed  by  some  countries  inconsistent  with 
GATT  provisions,  arrangements  were  made  for  a 
continuation  of  notification  and  examination  pro- 
cedures designed  to  maintain  maximum  pressure 
for  the  removal  of  such  restrictions. 

Regional  Economic  Groupings 

In  the  field  of  regional  economic  integration  the 
Contracting  Parties  heard  reports  and  conducted 
examinations  of  developments  in  Europe,  Latin 
America,  and  Africa.  They  gave  special  attention 
to  a  report  by  a  standing  GATT  committee  on  the 
European  Economic  Community's  common  agri- 
cultural policy  and  to  a  working  party  examina- 
tion of  the  agreement  providing  for  the  association 
of  Greece  with  the  EEC.  "Wliile  contracting 
parties  voiced  their  appreciation  of  the  EEC's 
accomplishments  in  laying  the  groundwork  for  the 
highly  complex  operations  required  to  carry  out  a 
common  agricultural  policy,  various  countries,  in- 
cluding the  United  States,  recorded  their  concern 
over  certain  protectionist  aspects  of  the  policy  and 
their  apprehensions  that  the  policy  could  in  some 
areas  lead  to  an  uneconomic  degree  of  self-suffi- 
ciency in  agricultural  trade  which  could  work  to 
the  detriment  of  traditional,  efficient  agricultural 
exporting  nations.  With  regard  to  an  examina- 
tion earlier  this  year  of  the  EEC-Greek  associa- 
tion agreement,  the  Contracting  Parties  decided 
that  in  view  of  divergent  views  on  the  implications 
of  the  agreement  with  respect  to  trade  interests  of 
individual  countries  and  with  regard  to  certain 
provisions  of  the  GATT,  the  application  of  the 
agreement  would  be  kept  under  review,  with  con- 
tracting parties  free  to  exercise  their  rights  under 
the  GATT  should  any  of  them  consider  their  na- 
tional interests  adversely  affected  by  implementa- 
tion of  the  agreement. 

Members  of  the  European  Free  Trade  Associa- 
tion, the  Latin  American  Free  Trade  Area,  and 
the  Central  American  Free  Trade  Area  also  re- 
ported on  progress  in  completing  their  regional 
trading  arrangements. 

Two  recent  agreements  for  regional  groupings 
in  Africa,  the  African  Common  Market  and  the 
Ghana-Upper  Volta  Trade  Agreement,  were  re- 
ferred to  a  working  group  which  will  study  the 
agreements  to  see  wliether  they  qualify  as  customs 
unions  or  free  trade  areas  under  article  XXIV  of 


940 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


^ 


the  GATT.  A  report  is  to  be  made  to  the  GATT 
Council  of  Eepresentatives  early  in  1963. 

The  number  of  full  contracting  parties  to  the 
GATT  rose  from  42  to  44  with  the  accession  of  2 
newly  independent  states,  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
and  Uganda.  In  addition  the  Contracting  Parties 
approved  the  provisional  accession  to  the  GATT 
of  Yugoslavia  and  the  United  Arab  Eepublic  and 
extended  for  2  more  years  a  decision  granting  pro- 
visional accession  to  Argentina.  Tlie  Contracting 
Parties  also  agreed  to  continue  for  anotlier  year 
special  arrangements  to  afford  15  newly  independ- 
ent states  of  Africa  a  further  opportunity  to  ex- 
amine their  future  commercial  policies  and  decide 
whetlier  tliey  should  seek  accession  to  the  GATT 
in  their  own  right. 

In  a  move  recognizing  the  importance  to  all  less 
developed  countries  of  access  to  expanding  mar- 
kets, the  United  States  introduced  a  proposal  that 
the  GATT  Council  of  Eepresentatives  examine 
and  make  recommendations  to  tlie  Contracting 
Parties  on  the  possible  ways  by  which  less  devel- 
oped countries  not  now  parties  to  GATT  could 
contribute  to,  and  participate  in,  aspects  of  GATT 
activity  of  particular  interest  to  them.  The  Con- 
tracting Parties  approved  the  U.S.  proposal,  and 
it  is  expected  that  the  Council  will  begin  its  con- 
sideration the  early  part  of  1963. 

As  has  been  the  rule  for  several  years,  the  Con- 
tracting Parties  devoted  an  important  portion  of 
their  time  to  the  progress  for  the  expansion  of 
international  trade,  the  key  elements  of  which  are 
tariff  reduction,  improved  access  to  markets  for 
agricultural  products,  and  the  removal  of  obstacles 
to  the  trade  of  less  developed  countries.  YHiile  to 
a  considerable  extent  further  progress  in  these 
areas  will  be  dependent  on  policy  guidance  emerg- 
ing from  the  forthcoming  ministerial  meeting,  the 
Contracting  Parties  are  endeavoring  to  maintain 
the  momentum  already  established  since  the  last 
ministerial  meeting  ^  with  a  view  to  providing  the 
basis  for  possible  further  action  to  be  initiated  at 
the  19G3  gathering  of  ministers.  It  is  expected 
that  a  Working  Group  on  Tariff  Eeduction  will 
begin  to  meet  in  the  near  future  in  order  to  lay 
the  groundwork  for  an  imaginative  and  compre- 
hensive program  for  tariff  reduction  and  trade 
liberalization. 


Trade  Prospects  of  Less  Developed  Countries 

Meeting  at  frequent  intervals  throughout  the 
session.  Committee  III,  which  is  concerned  with 
expansion  of  the  export  earnings  of  less  developed 
comitries,  took  stock  of  the  progress  that  has  been 
made  in  the  reduction  of  the  tariff  and  nontariff 
barriers  impeding  such  expansion.  The  committee 
considered  proposals  by  a  group  of  these  countries 
within  GATT  for  more  rapid  and  concrete  action 
to  this  end.  It  was  agreed  to  give  further  atten- 
tion to  other  possibilities  for  enhancing  the  com- 
mittee's usefulness  in  helping  the  less  developed 
countries  enlarge  their  export  earning  capacity, 
including  greater  stress  on  consultations  with  in- 
dustrial countries  maintaining  restrictions  harm- 
ful to  the  trade  of  developing  countries  and  con- 
sultations with  developing  countries  designed  to 
clarify  the  relationship  between  their  trade 
prospects  and  the  financing  of  their  economic 
development. 

The  trade  and  payments  aspects  of  the  Pakistani 
development  plan  was  the  subject  of  an  intensive 
examination  at  this  session  by  Committee  III,  and 
most  contracting  parties  concluded  that  further 
activity  by  the  committee  along  these  lines  would 
be  of  appreciable  benefit  to  developing  and  indus- 
trial countries  alike. 

The  committee  meetings  revealed  that  the  less 
developed  countries  are  far  from  satisfied  with 
progress  made  to  date  toward  the  objectives  of  the 
Declaration  on  Promotion  of  the  Trade  of  Less- 
Developed  Countries  ^  adopted  last  year  and  desire 
an  intensified  effort  to  remove  the  trade  barriers 
which  now  encumber  their  export  trade.  They 
did,  however,  welcome  the  U.S.  Trade  Expansion 
Act  as  a  promising  means  of  achieving  some  of 
their  trade  objectives. 

In  the  field  of  agricultural  trade,  in  addition  to 
the  examination  of  the  common  agricultural  policy 
of  the  EEC,  Committee  II  conducted  consultations 
with  Pakistan  and  Chile.  Further  progress  in  the 
broad  area  of  agricultural  protectionism  through- 
out the  world  is  expected  to  be  achieved  througli 
the  work  of  groups  established  to  deal  with  specific 
commodities,  notably  cereals,  through  such 
initiatives  as  may  eventuate  from  the  ministerial 
meeting  in  1963  and  through  the  results  of  the 
anticipated  tariff  liberalization  conference  in  1964. 


'■  For  background,  see  ibid.,  Jan.  1,  1962,  p.  3. 


'  For  text,  see  ibid.,  p.  9. 


December   17,    1962 


941 


A  wide  variety  of  other  trade  policy  matters 
also  came  before  the  Contracting  Parties.  In  a 
review  of  the  status  of  article  XXXV,  under 
which  many  contracting  parties  withhold  the  ap- 
plication of  the  GATT  to  Japan,  the  Contracting 
Parties  welcomed  the  agreement  of  the  United 
Kingdom  to  disinvoke  this  article  as  well  as  steps 
by  others  toward  the  same  end.  They  expressed 
the  hope  that  other  countries  now  invoking  this 
article  would  reconsider  and  fully  apply  the  provi- 
sions of  the  GATT  in  their  trade  with  Japan. 

Following  exchanges  of  views  with  other  dele- 
gations and  a  reappraisal  of  the  present 
stage  of  bilateral  negotiations,  the  U.S. 
delegation  announced  that  it  had  been  decided  not 
to  ask  the  Contracting  Parties  at  this  session  to 
vote  for  a  waiver  which  would  permit  the  entiy 
into  effect  on  January  1,  1963,  of  the  revised  U.S. 
tariff  schedules  authorized  in  the  Tariff  Classi- 
fication Act  of  1962.  The  U.S.  delegation 
reviewed  the  importance  the  United  States  still 
attached  to  early  implementation  of  the  revised 
schedules  but  explained  that  consultations  imder 
way  since  September  had  in  some  cases  proved 
more  time  consuming  than  anticipated  and  had 
also  been  affected  by  the  problem  of  providing 
adequate  documentation.  The  U.S.  delegation, 
however,  underscored  its  intention  not  to  slacken 
efforts  in  providing  documentation  and  other  tech- 
nical assistance  to  other  delegations  in  order  that 
consultations  and  negotiations  can  move  forward 
to  completion  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

Additional  items  of  business  included  a  report 
by  the  Cotton  Textiles  Committee  on  the  coming 
into  force  of  tlie  long-term  arrangement  for  trade 
in  cotton  textiles,'  a  review  of  special  trading  rela- 
tions between  contracting  parties  and  Poland,  and 
the  submission  by  the  United  States  of  a  revision 
of  an  earlier  proposal  designed  to  accommodate 
the  special  problem  of  applying  the  GATT  to 
international  trade  in  television  programs. 

The  new  cliairman  of  the  Contracting  Parti&s 
for  1963  will  be  J.  H.  Warren  of  Canada.  The 
incumbent  chairman,  "W.  P.  H.  Van  Oorschot, 
unable  to  continue  as  chairman  because  of  other 
responsibilities,  agreed  to  serve  as  one  of  the  two 
vice  chairmen.    The  other  vice  chairmanship  fell 


For  text,  see  ibid..  Mar.  12,  1962,  p.  431. 


to  J.  B.  Daramola  of  Nigeria,  who  was  also  vice 

chairman  in  1962. 

It  was  agreed  that  the  21st  session  of  the  Con- 
tracting Parties  will  take  place  from  October  22 
to  November  15, 1963. 


OECD  Agriculture  Ministers 
Discuss  Farm  Problems 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  joint  statement  issued 
at  Paris  on  November  20  at  the  close  of  a  3-day 
meeting  of  the  Ministers  of  Agriculture  of  the 
moThber  countries  of  the  Organization  for  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  and  Development. 

Changing  Aspects  of  the  Farm  Problem 

1.  Tlie  problems  with  which  member  govern- 
ments have  been  faced  as  regards  agriculture  have 
gradually  evolved  during  the  past  decade  or  so. 
Some  of  these  problems  have  changed  aspect,  while 
others  have  been  accentuated. 

Shortage  of  Food 

2.  Thus,  toward  the  end  of  the  forties,  and  the 
beginning  of  the  fifties,  the  mam  problem  was  a 
more  or  less  general  shortage  of  food  in  most  Euro- 
pean member  countries  associated  with  a  shortage 
of  foreign  exchange,  particularly  of  dollars.  As 
a  resTilt  of  the  combination  of  these  factors,  poli- 
cies in  Europe  were  geared  towards  increasing  out- 
put of  almost  every  food  commodity.  Although 
self-sufficiency  had  never  been  advocated  as  an  aim, 
the  tendency  towards  increased  output  brouglit 
the  intensification  of  severe  barriers  to  trade  with 
the  consequence  of  making  access  to  markets  more 
difficult  for  countries  enjoying  a  comparative  ad- 
vantage in  the  production  of  many  agricultural 
products. 

Excess  Supply 

3.  "\^'itll  time,  tlie  problem  changed  from  one  of 
short  supply  to  one  of  excess  supply.  Techno- 
logical advance  lias  been  an  important  factor  in 
this  connection. 

While  trade  in  general  had  become  more  free  and 
balance-of-payment  difficulties  were  no  longer  of 
the  same  nature,  state  intervention  in  trade,  in 
agricultural  products  both  as  regards  imports  and 


942 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


exports  was  maintained  in  many  cases  as  the  un- 
avoidable consequence  of  national  agricultural  pol- 
icies, particularly  in  the  area  of  farm  price  and 
income  support  programmes. 

Farmers'  Income 

4.  Tlie  problem  of  farmers'  income  has  per- 
sisted throughout  the  last  decade.  Farmers' 
average  per  capita  incomes  in  the  late  forties  and 
early  fifties  were  lower  than  incomes  in  other  sec- 
tors, but  farmers  in  that  period  had  several  possi- 
bilities for  improving  their  situation:  reach  a 
higher  level  of  output,  obtain  higher  prices,  shift 
to  other  occupations  if  employment  offers  were 
available  in  other  sectors.  Towards  the  end  of 
the  fifties  and  the  beginning  of  the  sixties,  the 
accruing  imbalance  between  supply  of  and  demand 
for  agricultural  products  has  in  some  instances 
deprived  farmers  as  a  whole  of  some  of  the  possi- 
bilities they  had  previously,  and  the  choices  be- 
fore them  have  been  reduced  to  little  more  than 
those  of  lowering  their  costs  without  raising  their 
output,  of  leaving  agriculture  as  a  profession  or 
of  agreeing  to  effective  supply  management. 

5.  In  spite  of  the  improvement  in  per  capita 
incomes  in  agriculture  during  the  last  decade,  the 
gap  between  agriculture  and  the  rest  of  the  econ- 
omy has  tended  to  become  wider.  This  is  due  in 
particular  to  the  limited  possibilities  offered  to 
agriculture  for  raising  its  marketable  output  and 
to  the  very  rapid  expansion  of  other  economic 
sectors. 

Agriculture  and  Growth 

6.  The  above-mentioned  twofold  problem  brings 
to  the  forefront  the  place  of  agriculture  in  a 
rapidly  growing  economy,  such  as  that  experienced 
in  most  member  countries  and  thought  desirable  to 
be  pursued  in  the  future. 

Agriculture  in  the  National  Context 

7.  Agriculture  has  an  important  and  positive 
role  to  play  in  promoting  overall  economic  activity 
in  any  given  country :  to  increase  its  own  output 
by  an  amount  corresponding  to  the  increase  in 
effective  demand,  provide  a  market  for  goods  and 
services  produced  by  other  sectors,  release  re- 
sources, including  labour,  which  could  more  pro- 
ductively be  employed  in  expanding  sectors,  and 
contribute  to  cost-of-living  stability.    Agriculture 

December   17,    J  962 


in  the  past  has  been  successful  in  these  respects 
and  should  continue  to  play  a  stabilising  role. 

Agriculture  in  the  International  Context 

8.  Agriculture  has  its  role  to  play  also  in  pro- 
moting an  harmonious  economic  growth  between 
countries :  Countries  whose  agriculture  contributes 
to  a  great  extent  to  gross  national  product,  or 
whose  export  earnings  depend  greatly  on  agricul- 
tural exports,  should  be  given  the  possibility  by 
their  trading  partners  to  make  an  efficient  use 
of  the  productive  resources  they  have,  inter 
alia  through  taking  advantage  of  regional 
specialisation. 

Needed  Adjustments  in  Agriculture 

9.  But  while  agriculture  contributes  either  di- 
rectly or  indirectly  to  economic  growth,  economic 
growth  creates  serious  adjustment  problems  for 
agriculture  if  the  sector  is  to  enjoy  average  per 
capita  incomes  comparable  to  those  in  other  sec- 
tors and  is  to  produce  what  is  economically  useful. 

10.  As  the  ultimate  aim  is  to  help  agriculture 
to  stand  on  its  own  feet  without  the  need  for  sup- 
port, the  far-reaching  adjustments  which  should 
be  arrived  at  concern  the  size  of  the  farm  popula- 
tion and  the  amomit  of  land  and  capital  devoted 
to  agricultural  production,  the  structui'e  of  the 
sector  and  the  volume  and  composition  of  output. 

11.  It  seems  likely  that  if  production  were  to 
be  adapted  to  economic  outlets,  there  would  be  a 
constantly  diminishing  need  for  agricultural 
labour.  The  success  achieved  in  moving  labour 
out  of  agriculture  or  in  providing  farmers  with 
additional  income  from  non-farm  occupations  is 
largely  dependent  on  developments  in  other  sec- 
tors of  the  economy,  since  there  is  no  gain  in 
transferring  manpower  from  agriculture  unless 
more  useful  work  can  be  provided  elsewhere.  A 
reduction  in  agricultural  population,  or  in  the  de- 
pendence of  farmers  upon  agi-iculture  for  their 
livelihood,  will  therefore  be  greatly  facilitated  to 
the  mutual  advantage  of  agriculture  and  the  other 
sectors  by  the  accelerated  growth  of  the  economy 
aimed  at  by  tlie  50%  collective  growth  target  and 
the  resulting  creation  of  additional  employment. 

12.  In  tlie  short  run,  and  until  these  adjust- 
ments take  place,  it  may  be  important  to  ensure 
that  the  international  repercussions  of  ill-adjusted 
national  policies  do  not  become  more  serious,  and  to 


943 


make  the  best  possible  use  of  excess  productive 
resources. 

Trade 

13.  The  solution  of  domestic  agricultural  prob- 
lems should  not  jeopardize  international  trade  in 
agricultural  i)roducts.  To  this  end,  member  coun- 
tries and  groupings  of  member  countries  should 
formulate  their  agricultural  policies  in  the  light  of 
international  trade  responsibilities  as  well  as  of 
domestic  considerations. 

14.  In  view  of  the  necessity  for  agricultural 
producing  nations  to  remain  acutely  aware  of 
their  international  responsibilities  in  the  trade 
field,  they  should  avoid  stimidating  imeconomic 
production  which  jeopardizes  the  development  of 
international  agi'icultural  trade. 

15.  The  short-term  stabilisation  of  world  mar- 
kets is  an  important  factor  in  contributing  both  to 
harmonious  world  economic  expansion  and  to  the 
establishment  of  healthier  conditions  of  trade  in 
agricultural  products.  The  joint  woi'king  party 
of  the  Committees  for  Agriculture  and  Trade  is 
already  active  in  this  respect.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  development  at  the  international  level  of  suita- 
ble long-term  solutions  to  market  problems  could 
promote  necessary  adjustments  at  national  levels. 

Food  Aid 

IG.  The  committee  [for  agriculture]  has  carried 
out  a  thorough  examination  of  the  extent  to  which 
programmes  of  food  aid  can  contribute  to  the  eco- 
nomic development  of  countries  in  coui-se  of  devel- 
opment. It  has  come  to  the  conclusion  that  in 
circumstances  where  food  shortages  constitute  a 
factor  limiting  the  rate  of  development,  and  whore 
a  coimtry  has  inadequate  foreign  exchange  to  im- 
port additional  food  on  a  commercial  basis,  the 
provision  of  food  on  a  grant  or  loan  basis  can  dur- 
ing a  relatively  limited  transitional  period  ac- 
celerate the  rate  of  development.  Attention  has 
been  given  to  specific  ways  in  which  additional 
food  supplies  can  be  used,  including  the  possibility 
of  assisting  desirable  adaptations  in  the  agricul- 
ture of  the  less-developed  country  by  making  good 
the  shortage  of  food  or  fodder  which  is  liable  to 
arise  during  the  period  of  adaptation. 

17.  At  the  same  time  the  committee  is  aware  of 
the  risk  that  food  aid  programmes  ma}'  displace 
supplies  from  agriculture  in  the  receiving  country 


or  from  commercial  imports,  or  may  depress  the 
price  level  of  tlie  products  in  question.  It  believes 
that  careful  planning  can  reduce  such  risks  to  a 
minimum,  in  particidar  by  ensuring  that  the  addi- 
tional food  supplies  correspond  to  the  increase  in 
demand  for  food  resulting  from  the  country's  eco- 
nomic growth.  Since  the  rate  of  economic  growth 
in  an  underdeveloped  counti-y  is  generally  de- 
pendent on  the  overall  volume  of  aid  it  receives, 
it  appears  necessary  that  food  aid  programmes 
should  be  closely  co-ordinated  with  otlier  aid 
programmes. 

18.  The  committee  has  also  given  special  atten- 
tion to  the  danger  that  the  possibility  of  disposing 
of  surpluses  through  food  aid  programmes  may 
reduce  the  incentive  for  developed  countries  to 
carry  out  desirable  changes  in  their  own  agricul- 
ture. It  feels  that  this  question  should  be  kept 
carefully  under  reA'iew  in  the  context  of  the  com- 
mittee's studies  of  agi'icultural  policies  in  mem- 
ber countries  and  of  the  relation  of  agriculture  to 
economic  growth. 

Role  of  O.E.C.D. 

Adaptation  of  Agriculture  to  Conditions  of  Rapid 
Economic  Growth 

19.  The  organisation  should  help  member  coun- 
tries to  devise  policies  which,  while  ensuring  agri- 
culture's contribution  to  an  harmonious  overall 
economic  growth,  would  make  it  possible  for  agri- 
culture to  benefit  from  this  growth.  In  this  con- 
nection it  would  be  desirable  to  project  demand, 
supply  and  international  trade  in  agricultural 
products,  and  in  the  light  of  the  results  to  be  ob- 
tained from  these  projections,  to  identify  what 
changes  in  agricultural  policies,  including  price 
changes  and  structural  adjustments,  would  be 
called  for. 

20.  Some  member  countries  have  instituted 
beneficial  programmes  aimed  at  solving  the  prob- 
lems created  for  agriculture  by  rapid  economic 
growtii :  Their  experience  is  worth}'  of  close  atten- 
tion, particularly  with  regard  to  the  possibility  of 
raising  productivity  per  man  bj'  diminisliing  costs 
of  production  and  to  the  beneficial  results  of  re- 
structuring and  increased  efficiency  on  the  problem 
of  low-income  farms. 

1  mprovement  of  Trade  in  Agricultural  Products 

21.  Another  main  task  concerns  the  improve- 
ment of  the  conditions  in   which   international 


944 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


trade  in  agricultural  products  takes  place. 
While  in  the  short  term  it  appears  desirable  to 
organise  consultations  whenever  agricultural  poli- 
cies and  trade  practices,  due  to  their  restrictive  or 
artificial  nature,  are  likely  to  have  adverse  effects 
on  member  countries'  interest,  the  organisation 
should  not  lose  sight  of  the  necessity  for  promot- 
ing in  the  long  run  healthier  conditions  for  trade 
in  agricultural  products,  due  account  being  taken 
of  the  interests  of  both  importing  and  exporting 
countries. 

Food  Aid  as  a  Contribution  to  Economic 
Development 

22.  The  organisation  should  support  the  princi- 
ple that  any  such  programmes,  either  bilateral  or 
multilateral,  should  be  co-ordinated  with  overall 
aid  programmes  and  with  development  plans  in 
receiving  countries.  Moreover,  if  it  were  possible, 
in  co-operation  with  the  international  organisa- 
tions concerned,  to  obtain  a  better  knowledge  of 
the  results  achieved  so  far,  and  of  the  possibilities 
for  using  food  as  a  contribution  to  economic  de- 
velopment, existing  or  potential  programmes 
could  be  carried  out  more  effectively. 

Promotion  and  Adaptation  of  Intellectual 
Investments 

23.  Heretofore,  investments  in  education  in  the 
agricultural  sector  have  been  relatively  meagre  in 
some  countries  and  consequently  adaptation  to  the 
rapid  pace  of  modern  technological,  economic  and 
social  progress  has  been  slow.  Increased  intel- 
lectual investments  in  agriculture,  at  all  levels, 
are  essential  to  economic  growth  and  development, 
and  the  organisation  is  active  in  promoting  such 
investments  in  higher  education  and  research, 
vocational  training,  advisory  and  information 
work. 


Recess  Appointments 

The  President  on  November  28  appointed  David  E.  Bell 
to  be  Administrator  of  the  Agency  for  International  De- 
velopment. (For  biographic  details,  see  White  House 
press  release  dated  November  28.) 

The   President  on  November  29  appointed  J.  Wesley 

December   17,    1962 


Jones  to  be  Ambassador  to  Peru  and  William  J.  Porter 
to  be  Ambassador  to  Algeria.  (For  biographic  details, 
see  White  House  press  releases  dated  November  29.) 

Designations 

Henry  deWolf  Smyth  as  adviser  to  Harlan  Cleveland, 
Assistant  Secretary  fur  International  Organization  Af- 
fairs, and  to  Ragnar  RoUefson,  Director  of  the  Office 
of  International  Scientific  Affairs,  on  problems  connected 
with  the  work  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency, 
effective  October  8.  (For  biographic  details,  see  Depart- 
ment of  State  press  release  705  dated  December  1.) 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Narcotics 

Convention  for  limiting  the  manufacture  and  regulating 
the  distribution  of  narcotic  drugs,  as  amended  (61  Stat. 
2230;  62  Stat.  1796).  Done  at  Geneva  July  13,  1931. 
Entered  into  force  July  9,  1933.  48  Stat.  1543. 
Notification  received  that  it  considers  itself  iound: 
Congo  (Brazzaville),  October  15,  1902. 

Protocol  bringing  under  international  control  drugs  out- 
side the  scope  of  the  convention  limiting  the  manufac- 
ture and  regulating  the  distribution  of  narcotic  drugs 
concluded  at  Geneva  July  13,  1931  (48  Stat.  1543),  as 
amended  (61  Stat.  2230;  62  Stat.  1796).  Done  at  Paris 
November  19,  1948.  Entered  into  force  for  the  United 
States  September  11,  1950.  TIAS  2308. 
yotifiratioii  received  tluit  it  considers  itself  hound: 
Congo  (Brazzaville),  October  15,  1962. 

Protocol  for  limiting  and  regulating  the  cultivation  of  the 
poppy  plant,  the  production  of,  international  and  whole- 
sale trade  in,  and  use  of  opium.  Done  at  New  York 
June  23,  19.53.' 

Notification  received   that   it   considers   itself   tound: 
Congo  (Brazzaville),  October  15, 1962. 

Slavery 

Slavery  convention  signed  at  Geneva  September  25,  1926, 
as  amended  (TIAS  3532).  Entered  into  force  March  9, 
1927 ;  for  the  United  States  March  21,  1929.  46  Stat. 
2183. 

Notification   received   that   it   considers   itself   hound: 
Congo  (Brazzaville),  October  15,  1962. 

Trade 

Long-term  arrangements  regarding  international  trade  in 

cotton  textiles.     Concluded  at  Geneva  February  9,  19G2. 

Entered  into  force  October  1,  1962. 

Acceptances  deposited:    France  (with  a  statement)  and 

Luxembourg  (with  a  statement),  September  28,  1962. 

Whaling 

Amendment  to  paragraph  5  of  the  Schedule  to  the  Inter- 
national  Whaling   Convention   of   1946    (TIAS    1849). 


'  Not  in  force. 


945 


Adopted    at    the    14tli    meeting    of    the    International 
Whaling  Commission.  London  July  6,  1902. 
Entered  into  force:  October  i),  19G2. 

Wheat 

International  wheat  agreement,  1962.  Open  for  signature 
at  Washington  April  19  through  Ma.v  15,  1962.  Entered 
into  forte  .luly  l(i.  1962,  for  part  I  and  parts  III  to  VII, 
and  August  1,  1962,  for  part  II.  TIAS  5115. 
Accession  deposited:  Libya,  October  9, 1962. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Spain,  November  23,  1962; 
Sweden,  November  29,  1962. 

White  Stave  Traffic 

Agreement  for  the  repression  of  the  trade  in  white 
women,  as  amended  by  the  protocol  of  May  4,  1949 
(TIAS2:«2).  Signed  at  Paris  May  18,  1904.  Entered 
into  force  July  18,  1905 ;  for  the  United  States  June  6, 
1908.    35  Stat.  1979. 

Notification  received   that  it  considers   itself  bound: 
Congo  (Brazzaville),  October  15,  1962. 


BILATERAL 

Afghanistan 

Agreement  extending  the  technical  cooperation  program 
agreement  of  June  30,  19.53,  as  extended  (TIAS  2856, 
4670,  and  4979).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Kabul 
September  25  and  November  7,  1962.  Entered  into  force 
November  7, 1962. 

China 

Agricultural  commodities  agreement  under  title  I  of  the 
Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assistance  Act  of 
19.54,  as  amended  (68  Stat.  455;  7  U.S.C.  1701-1709), 
with  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  Taipei  November  19, 
3iHj2.     Entered  into  force  November  19,  1962. 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Agreement  for  conducting  certain  educational  exchange 
programs.  Signed  at  Bonn  November  20,  1962.  Enters 
into  force  on  the  date  the  U.S.  Government  is  notified 
by  the  Government  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
that  the  domestic  prerequisites  for  the  entry  into  force 
have  been  met. 

Agreement  regarding  the  use  of  German  territorial  waters 
and  ports  by  the  N.S.  Savannah.  Signed  at  Washington 
November  29,  1962.  Entered  into  force  November  29, 
1962. 

Guinea 

Agreement  providing  for  an  informational  media  guarant.v 
program.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Conakry 
October  31  and  November  3,  1962.  Entered  into  force 
November  3, 1962. 

Panama 

Agreement  amending  the  Army  Mission  agreement  of 
July  7,  1942  (EAS  2.58),  as  amended.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Panamd  September  20  and  October 
8,  19(32.    Entered  into  force  October  8,  1962. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  assignment  of  personnel  to 
the  Army  Mission  and  extending  the  Army  Mission 
agreement  of  July  7,  1942  (EAS  258),  as  amended. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Panama  March  26  and 
July  6,  1962.    Entered  into  force  July  6,  1962. 


PUBLICATIONS 


Recent  Releases 

For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment  Printing  Office,  n'ashimjton  2.'),  D.C.  Address 
requests  direct  to  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  ex- 
cept in  the  case  of  free  publications,  which  may  be  ob- 
tained  from  the  Department  of  State. 

Trade.  Agreement  with  the  European  Economic  Conmiu- 
nity — pursuant  to  Article  XXIV  :6  of  the  General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Signed  at  Geneva  March 
7,  1962.  Entered  into  force  March  7,  1962.  TIAS  5018. 
72  pp.     25^. 

Trade.  Interim  agreement  with  the  European  Economic 
Community — relating  to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tar- 
iffs and  Trade.  Signed  at  Geneva  March  7,  1962.  En- 
tered into  force  March  7,  1962.    TIAS  5021.    146  pp.    45<l(. 

Trade.  Interim  agreement  with  the  United  Kingdom — 
relating  to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade. 
Signed  at  Geneva  March  7,  1962.  Entered  into  force 
March  7,  1962.     TIAS  5026.     70  pp.  25<t. 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  November  26-December  2 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office  of 
News,   Department  of   State,  Washington  25,  D.C. 

Releases  appearing  in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin 
which  were  issued  prior  to  November  26  are  Nos. 
686  of  November  19  and  688  of  November  20. 

Subject 

U.S.  participation  in  international 
conferences. 

Cleveland  :  Atomic  Industrial  Forum. 

Smyth  :  Atomic  Industrial  Forum. 

Program  for  visit  of  President  of 
Honduras. 

Rusk :  CBS  television  interview. 

Program  for  Joint  U.S.-Japan  Eco- 
nomic Committee. 

India-Pakistan  talks  on  Kashmir 
problem. 

Program  for  Joint  U.S.-Japan  Eco- 
nomic Committee. 

Smyth  designated  adviser  on  IAEA 
matters  (biographic  details). 

♦  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bolletin. 


No. 

Date 

*696 

11/26 

t697 
t698 
•699 

11/28 
11/28 
11/28 

700 
*701 

11/28 
11/29 

702 

11/30 

•703 

11/30 

•705 

12/1 

I 


946 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


December  17,  1962 


Index 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1225 


Agriculture.    OECD  Agriculture  Ministers  Discuss 

Farm  Problems  (text  of  joint  statement)    .     .     .      942 
Algeria.    Porter  appointed  Ambassador 945 

American  Principles 

Bill  of  Rights  Day  and  Human  Rights  Day  (text 

of  proclamation) 923 

Changing     Patterns     in     World     Affairs     (Rusk, 

Schoenbrun) 907 

Atomic  Energy 

President  Hopes  for  Progress  in  Disarmament  Talks 

(Kennedy) 917 

Smyth  designated  adviser  on  IAEA  matters  .     .     .       945 

Belgium.  U.S.  and  Belgium  Warn  of  Stronger 
Measures  To  Restore  Congo  Unity  (Kennedy, 
Spaak) 917 

Cliina,  Communist.  Changing  Patterns  in  World 
Affairs  (Rusk,  Schoenbrun) 907 

Congo  (Leopoldville).  U.S.  and  Belgium  Warn  of 
Stronger  Measures  To  Restore  Congo  Unity  (Ken- 
nedy, Spaak) 917 

Congress 

Congressional  Documents  Relating  to  Foreign  Pol- 
icy  927 

Senate  Committee  Enabled  To  Inspect  Foreign  Rep- 
resentatives' Tax  Returns  (text  of  Executive 
order) 924 

Cuba 

Changing     Patterns     in     World     Affairs     (Rusk, 

Schoenbrun) 907 

President  Terminates  Order  Interdicting  Deliveries 

to  Cuba    (proclamation) 918 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 

Changing     Patterns     in     World     Affairs     (Ruslc, 

Schoenbrun) 907 

Designations  (Smyth) 945 

Recess  Appointments  (Bell,  Jones,  Porter)    .     .     .       945 

Disarmament 

Changing  Patterns  in  World  Affairs  (Rusk,  Schoen- 
brun)      907 

President  Hopes  for  Progress  in  Disarmament  Talks 

(Kennedy) 917 

Economic  A£Fairs 

The    Common    Market    and    Industrial    Profyerty 

(Trezise) 925 

GATT  Contracting  Parties  Conclude  20th  Session   .      939 

OECD  Agriculture  Ministers  Discuss  Farm  Prob- 
lems (text  of  joint  statement) 942 

Population    Growth    and    Economic    Development 

(Barnett) 919 

President  Terminates  Order  Interdicting  Deliveries 

to  Cuba    (proclamation) 918 

Senate  Committee  Enabled  To  Inspect  Foreign  Rep- 
resentatives' Tax  Returns  (text  of  Executive 
order) 924 

Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs 

UNESCO's  Contribution  to  the  U.N.  Decade  of  De- 
velopment  (Battle) 935 

U.S.  and  Germany  Establish  Jointly  Financed  Ex- 
change Program 923 

Europe 

The    Common    Market    and    Industrial    Property 

(Trezise) 925 

OECD  Agriculture  Ministers  Discuss  Farm  Prob- 
lems (text  of  joint  statement) 942 

Foreign  Aid.    Bell  appointed  AID  Administrator  .      945 

Germany.  U.S.  and  Germany  Establish  Jointly  Fi- 
nanced Exchange  Program 923 


India 

Changing  Patterns  in  World  Affairs  (Rusk,  Schoen- 
brun)      907 

U.S.  Welcomes  Agreement  by  Pakistan  and  India 

To  Renew  Talks  on  Kashmir 918 

International  Organizations  and  Conferences 

Calendar  of  International  Conferences  and  Meet- 
ings    928 

GATT  Contracting  Parties  Conclude  20th  Session  .      939 

OECD  Agriculture  Ministers  Discuss  Farm  Prob- 
lems (text  of  joint  statement 942 

President  Hopes  for  Progress  In  Disarmament 
Talks   (Kennedy) 917 

Smyth  designated  adviser  on  IAEA  matters  .     .     .      945 

UNESCO's  Contribution  to  the  U.N.  Decade  of  De- 
velopment (Battle) 935 

Military    Affairs.      President    Terminates    Order 

Interdicting  Deliveries  to  Cuba  (proclamation)    .      918 

Non-Self-Governing    Territories.      U.S.    Presents 

View.s  on  Work  of  Committee  of  17  (Bingham)    .      930 

Pakistan.    U.S.  Welcomes  Agreement  by  Pakistan 

and  India  To  Renew  Talks  on  Kashmir  ....       918 

Peru.    Jones  appointed  Ambassador 945 

Presidential  Documents 

Bill  of  Rights  Day  and  Human  Rights  Day ....      923 

President  Hopes  for  Progress  in  Disarmament 
Talks 917 

President  Kennedy  Holds  Talks  With  Prime  Min- 
ister of  Somalia 918 

President  Terminates  Order  Interdicting  Deliveries 

to  Cuba 9ig 

Senate  Committee  Enabled  To  Inspect  Foreign  Rep- 
resentatives' Tax  Returns 924 

U.S.  and  Belgium  Warn  of  Stronger  Measures  To 

Restore  Congo  Unity 917 

Publications.    Recent  Releases 946 

Science.  Smyth  designated  adviser  on  IAEA 
matters 945 

Somali  Republic.  President  Kennedy  Holds  Talks 
With  Prime  Minister  of  Somalia  (text  of  joint 
communique) 918 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 945 

U.S.  and  Germany  Establish  Jointly  Financed  Ex- 
change  Program 923 

U.S.S.R.      Changing    Patterns    in    World    Affairs 

(Busk,  Schoenbrun) 907 

United  Nations 

(Jurrent  U.N.  Documents 934 

U.N.  General  Assembly  Appoints  U  Thant  Secre- 
tary-General   929 

U.S.  Presents  Views  on  Work  of  Committee  of  17 

(Bingham) 930 

'Same  Index 

Abdirascid  All  Scermarche 918 

Barnett,  Robert  W 919 

Battle,  Lucius  D .  935 

Bell,  David  E 945 

Bingham,  Jonathan  B 930 

Jones,  J.  Wesley 945 

Kennedy,  President 917,918,923,924 

Porter,  William  J 945 

Rusk,  Secretary 907 

Schoenbrun,  David 907 

Smyth,  Henry  deWolf 945 

Spaak,  Paul-Henri 917 

Stevenson,  Adlai  E 929 

Trezise,  Philip  H 925 


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OUR  SOUTHERN  PARTNERS 

The  Story  of  Inter-American  Cooperation 


One  of  the  most  encouraging  developments  in  the  direction 
of  increasing  free-world  strength  and  unity  is  the  concerted  effort 
of  the  peoples  of  the  Americas  to  perfect  a  community  of  fraternal 
trust,  common  purpose,  equality,  and  widespread  economic  and 
social  opportunity. 

The  land  and  the  people  of  the  20  nations  of  Latin  America 
and  their  political,  social,  and  economic  development  with  partic- 
ular emphasis  on  their  common  problems  are  described  in  this 
59-page  illustrated  booklet.  Other  subjects  covered  are  United 
States  relations  and  economic  assistance  to  Latin  America,  the 
Alliance  for  Progress,  the  Peace  Corps  operations  in  sevei'al  South 
American  countries,  foreign  trade  and  regional  trade  arrange- 
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Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1226 


December  24,  1962 


FUTURE  OF  THE  ALLIANCE  FOR  PROGRESS  •   by 

Assistant  Secretary  Martin 951 

ROLE  OF  INTERNATIONAL  ATOMIC  ENERGY 

AGENCY    IN   U.S.    FOREIGN  POLICY      •      Remarks 

by  Assistant  Secretary  Cleveland  and  Henry  D.  Smyth     .    .    .      966 

U.S.  ANNOUNCES  AGREEMENT  WITH  THE  SOVIET 
UNION  ON  COOPERATION  IN  PEACEFUL  USES 

OF  OUTER    SPACE    •    Statement  by  Ambassador  Adlai 

E.  Stevenson  and  Text  of  Technical  Agreement 962 

PRINCIPLES  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  CONCERN- 
ING FRIENDLY  RELATIONS  AMONG  STATES  • 

Statement  by  Albert  Gore 972 

JOINT  U.S.-JAPAN  COMMITTEE  CONCLUDES  SEC- 
OND  MEETING      •      Text  of  Joint  Communique  ....      959 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE    DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


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Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1226  •  Publication  7466 
December  24,  1962 


DEPOSITORY 


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The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN', 
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is;M 


Future  of  the  Alliance  for  Progress 


6y  Ecltoin  M.  Martin 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- American  Ajfairs  ^ 


Wliat  is  the  Alliance  for  Progress  ?  This  is  not 
just  a  rhetorical  question  to  get  a  speech  started. 
[  suspect  most  Americans  are  as  little  familiar 
with  the  charter  of  the  alliance '  as  they  are  with 
;he  provisions  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
ifter  the  list  of  self-evident  truths.  I  know  that 
:oo  many  U.S.  correspondents,  even  some  of  those 
ipecializing  in  Latin  American  affairs,  still  use 
'Alliance  for  Progress"  as  synonymous  with  the 
[J.S.  aid  program  in  Latin  America.  This  it  most 
emphatically  is  not. 

Wliat  the  charter  does  is  to  set  forth  certain 
^oals  to  be  achieved  by  1970  by  the  cooperative 
fforts  of  the  19  Latin  American  countries  and  the 
Jnited  States — the  participating  members  of  the 
Drganization  of  American  States.  The  principal 
)nes  are : 


1.  To  have  a  2i/^  percent  per  year  growth  in  per 
capita  income,  well  distributed  among  the  popula- 
ion  and  based  on  a  balanced  and  diversified  ex- 

ite    >ansion  of  industry  and  agriculture. 

2.  To  eliminate  adult  illiteracy  and  to  provide 
years  of  schooling  as  a  minimum  for  all  children, 

)lus  a  general  raising  of  the  quality  and  suitabil- 
ty  for  the  modern  world  of  all  education. 

3.  To  increase  life  expectancy  by  5  years  by, 
imong  other  measures,  providing  potable  water 
nd  sewage  disposal  for  75  percent  of  the  urban 
-nd  50  percent  of  the  rural  population. 

4.  To  build  more  low-cost  houses — no  one  knows 
nough  about  the  deficiencies,  except  that  they  are 
luge. 


'  Address  made  at  the  Institute  of  World  Affairs,  TJni- 
ersity  of  Southern  California,  Pasadena,  Calif.,  on  Dec. 
(press  release  707  ;  as-revised  text) . 
For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept.  11,  1961,  p.  463. 


December  24,  7962 


5.  To  have  price  stability,  larger  export  earn- 
ings, and  to  strengthen  economic  integration 
movements. 

Speaking  of  its  broader  goals,  the  Alliance  for 
Progress  is  a  program  through  which  the  coun- 
tries of  the  hemisphere  hope  to  be  able  to  enjoy 
more  fully  the  cultural,  spiritual,  and  material 
riches  which  the  20th  centui-y  has  to  offer,  and 
especially  to  put  them  into  the  hands  of  whole 
populations  rather  than  just  a  select  few.  In 
these  terms  it  represents  an  effort  to  open  new 
vistas  of  opportunity  to  millions  of  people  and 
prepare  them  to  take  advantage  of  all  the  new 
possibilities  offered  by  modern  science  and  tech- 
nology. From  this  standpoint  bricks  and  mortar 
and  machinery  are  clearly  only  means,  and  the  at- 
titudes, values,  and  enthusiasms  of  people  are  the 
essential  substance  of  the  program. 

Changing  Traditional  Attitudes 

First  of  all  it  is  necessary  to  accept  change  it- 
self as  a  good  thing,  more  likely  to  bring  better 
things  than  worse.  Quantitative  precision,  exact- 
ness in  work  and  production  schedules,  careful 
calculation  of  cost  advantages — all  must  become 
second  nature  to  have  a  modern  society.  Scientific 
or  rational  habits  of  thought  as  opposed  to  the 
traditional  or  romantic  approach  to  problems  is 
equally  imperative,  as  are  the  somewhat  antiro- 
mantic  virtues  of  neatness  and  cleanliness  and 
order.  (Parenthetically,  I  am  not  just  issuing 
prescriptions  for  the  good  life.  I  am  merely  stat- 
ing the  minimum  needs  for  a  modern  society  with 
a  20th-century  standard  of  material  well-being — 
something  all  countries  say  they  want.)  And 
what  is  most  important  is  an  approach  to  life 


951 


■which  seeks  practical  or  compromise  solutions  of 
coiiflictinji;  interests  rather  than  tlie  ultimate  theo- 
retical right  or  wrong. 

There  are  many  in  Latin  America  who  have 
the?e  qualifications,  and  they  are  leading  their 
countries  into  tlie  future.  Great  patience  will  be 
required,  however,  in  the  face  of  the  normal  inertia 
and  longevity  of  people  and  ideas  and  habits. 
For  changes  in  basic  attitudes  and  values  and  ways 
of  doing  things  are  the  slowest  kinds  of  change 
known  to  history.  But  it  is  encouraging  tliat  the 
charter  is  the  product  of  the  Latin  Americans 
themselves.    Their  governments  want  change. 

What  it  takes  to  set  people  on  fire,  more  than 
anything  else,  is  other  peojDle — people  with  vision 
and  imagination  and  enterprise.  Only  as  more 
Latin  Americans — and  the  Americans  we  send 
there — begin  to  get  the  vision  of  what  can  be  done, 
and  then  learn  how  to  transmit  it  to  the  millions 
waiting  for  "tlie  word,"  can  we  hope  to  make 
progress. 

Five  main  lines  of  action  are  being  pursued  to 
reach  the  alliance's  ambitious  goals : 

1.  A  stepped-up  mobilization  of  present  re- 
sources of  goods  and  people  in  each  coimtry  to 
build  a  better  future. 

2.  An  expansion  in  assistance,  in  men  and 
money  from  the  outside. 

3.  Basic  changes  in  laws  and  institutions  to 
open  the  way  to  the  new  life  and  see  that  the 
added  resources  give  maximum  benefits  to  all  the 
people. 

4.  Improved  international  arrangements  for 
stabilizing  commodity  prices  and  widening 
markets. 

5.  Integration  of  the  economies  of  the  countries 
of  Central  and  South  America. 

By  merely  listing  these  requirements  it  becomes 
clear  that  what  we  are  engaged  in  is  not  just  a 
social  and  economic  development  effort.  Success 
depends  above  all  else  on  mature,  energetic,  and 
efficient  political  leadership,  supported  by  an  in- 
formed and  wise  electorate.  Governments  must 
be  able  to  demand  and  secure  sacrifices  of  present 
income  for  future  benefits,  to  plan  and  execute 
economic  and  social  programs  wisely,  to  resist  all 
sorts  of  special-interest  pressures  in  putting  into 
effect  major  institutional  reforms,  and  to  main- 
tain peace  and  order.  This  must  be  done  in  a 
period  of  high  tensions  resulting  from  drastic 

952 


change,  change  which  is  opposed  both  l)y  man, 
of  all  classes  who  look  back  longingly  to  the  goo 
old  days  as  well  as  those  who  see  violent  revoh 
tion  in  the  Cuban  pattern  as  the  only  solution  t 
current  problems.  These  enormous  tasks  are  lai 
on  political  organizations  and  government  bi 
reaucracies  which  in  most  countries  have  litt: 
depth  of  successful  experience  with  democratic  c 
active  government.  Before  we  judge  them  tc 
harshly  we  must  remember  some  of  the  failures  c 
democracy  in  the  Atlantic  area — its  birthplace- 
during  this  century. 

One  other  point  must  be  kept  in  mind  when  v. 
think  of  the  demands  on  these  governments.  Tl 
United  States  is  strictly  a  junior  partner  in  tl 
exercise.  Most  of  the  capital  and  men  must  coai  ^ 
from  the  Latin  Americans  themselves,  and  tl 
hard  decisions  to  change  drastically  their  socii 
and  economic  structures  must  necessarily  be  the: 
own.  Unless  the  blueprints  of  the  new  world  ai 
not  only  Latin  American  but  Brazilian  or  Ven« 
zuelan  or  Costa  Rican,  they  can  have  no  vitalit; 


mi 

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Problems  Confronting  Latin  America 

How  have  we  done  in  the  first  year  of  this  1( 
year  program?  Before  being  able  to  pass  a  fai 
judgment  on  the  facts,  it  is  important  to  kno' 
where  we  started  from. 

The  salient  point  here  is  that  as  far-reachin 
and  unprecedented  a  document  as  the  charter  wa 
accepted  only  because  the  situation  was  so  despei 
ate.  Hence  much  of  the  effort,  in  the  first  yeai^ist 
will  necessarily  have  to  be  spent  on  plugging  u 
holes;  only  then  will  there  be  a  solid  foundatio: 
on  which  the  alliance  program  can  be  built. 

Thus  some  40  percent  of  all  the  United  State 
funds  made  available  in  the  first  year,  over  a  bil 
lion  dollars,  have  gone  for  balance-of -payment  j, 
and  budgetaiy-support  purposes,  necessaiy  to  pre 
vent  banlcruptcy  and  social  disintegration,  rathe 
than  for  constructive  new  economic  and  social  proj 
ects.  The  record  for  the  second  year  maj-  be 
little  better,  but  I  am  afraid  not  much. 

This  has  been  necessary  largely  because  of  i 
steady  deterioration  since  1953  in  Latin  America! 
terms  of  trade — the  relation  between  the  price 
they  pay  for  their  imports  and  the  prices  they  r© 
ceive  for  their  exports.  Between  1953  and  1961 
Latin  American  exports  other  than  oil  grew  h 
quantity  by  30  percent  but  brought  in  only  4  per 
cent  more  foreign  exchange.    If  prices  had  stayei' 


tosp 
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ttit 


'iit  1953  levels,  Latin  American  earnings  from  ex- 
jorts  would  have  been  $1.3  billion  larger  than  they 
vere.  You  can  understand  how  much  difference 
his  would  have  made. 

Their  exports  are  largely  products  whose  prices 
luctuate  widely  in  response  to  small  variations  of 
lupply.  Accordingly,  if  they  had  exported  much 
nore  of  those  products,  they  would  probably  have 
arned  less  rather  than  more.  Even  as  it  was,  the 
average  price  in  1961  of  coflFee  and  cocoa  was  only 
-bout  60  percent  of  the  1953  level,  bananas  85  per- 
ent,  and  fibers — cotton  and  wool — about  80 
lercent.  These  products  alone  accovmted  for 
me- fourth  of  Latin  American  export  earnings  in 
liat  year.  Meanwhile  U.S.  wholesale  prices — a 
ough  guide  to  their  import  costs — liad  increased 
0  percent. 
This  4-percent  increase  in  export  earnings  was 
ccompanied  by  an  increase  in  population  of  some 

0  percent.  Clearly  per  capita  export  earnings  fell 
ubstantially.  And  since  government  revenues  are 
reatly  affected  by  both  export  levels  and  the 
mount  of  imports  export  levels  permit  to  be 
ought,  as  well  as  by  related  domestic  business 
irosperity,  they  have  increasingly  fallen  short  of 

i;i  he  demands  made  upon  them. 

For  various  reasons  these  demands  have  at  the 

iime  time  greatly  increased.    The  population  in- 

:liiii  rease  itself,  the  highest  in  the  world  at  2.7  percent 

'er  year,  has  put  great  strains  on  government 

rvices  and  public  investment  of  all  kinds.    As 

yei  list  one  example,  we  estimate  that  the  alliance 

ijifrogram  will  build   17.000  new  classrooms  this 

seal  year.    This  is  a  high  figure  but  falls  short 

y  over  12,000  of  taking  care  of  the  added  num- 

er  of  school-age  children — about  1,100,000.    And 

does  nothing  to  cut  into  the  backlog  of  15-20 

lillion  children  who  as  of  now  have  no  schools 

)  go  to.    An  intelligent  guess,  but  no  more  than 

guess,  is  that  a  million  new  families  are  added 

1  Latin  America  each  year  and  about  three-quar- 
irs  of  a  million  homes  built.  We  are  running 
ist  but  falling  ever  farther  behind  in  this  criti- 
il  race  for  a  decent  place  to  live  for  all,  a  race 

"^  hicli  we  are  starting  with  enonnous  deficiencies 

"'  )  be  made  up. 

And  as  more  and  more  of  the  people  flock  to 
le  cities  as  a  result  of  the  poverty  and  lack  of 
7portunity  in  the  countryside,  the  very  heavy 

P  ipital  costs  of  city  homes  and  streets  and  schools 

'•    id  utilities  are  swamping  the  municipal  govem- 

lecember  24,   J  962 


IV I 


ments.     The  result   is  the   massive,   foul   slums 
about  which  I  know  you  have  all  heard. 

Meanwhile  all  these  people,  recently  greatly 
helped  by  vast  numbers  of  cheap  transistor  radios, 
have  been  learning  more  and  more  about  what  life 
means  to  other,  more  privileged  peoples,  and  de- 
manding more  instead  of  less. 

And  lastly  the  current  threat  of  Communist 
mobilization  for  revolt  of  these  discontented 
masses  has  forced  governments  to  try  to  buy  peace 
and  order  by  spending  more  in  many  ways. 

So  we  have  begmi  this  enterprise  with  some 
governments  facing  bankruptcy  and  most  of  the 
others  having  to  deal  with  financial  crises  of  only 
slightly  less  urgency.  The  consequence  lias,  of 
course,  been  widespread  political  and  social  unrest 
of  the  sort  that  is  fertile  ground  for  Communist- 
inspired  violence.  "We  started  too  with  govern- 
ments and  social  and  economic  structures  which 
had  had  neither  the  time  nor  the  leisure  to  adapt 
themselves  to  meet  these  new  pressures.  Evei-y- 
thing  needed  attention  at  once  in  a  new  and  dan- 
gerous world,  one  in  which  far  too  few  were 
trained  or  experienced  in  the  skills  required. 

It  is  important  also  to  remember  tliat  the  adop- 
tion of  the  charter  of  the  alliance,  while  a  great 
act  of  faith  and  courage  in  the  power  of  man  to 
change  his  condition,  in  itself  clianged  nothing. 
The  same  intractable  problems  were  there  the  next 
day  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  same  people  and  insti- 
tutions as  before,  though  now  there  was  some 
hope  to  be  disappointed  only  at  great  risk. 

Review  of  First  Year  of  Alliance 

With  this  introduction  let  us  see  what  has  hap- 
pened in  the  first  year  of  the  alliance.^  Statistics 
are  not  too  accurate  for  Latin  American  countries, 
and  it  is  a  bit  early  in  any  case  for  final  guesses, 
but  it  would  appear  that  the  Latin  American 
countries  invested  something  over  $8  billion  of 
their  own  public  and  private  fluids  for  ex^onomic 
and  social  development.  Foreign  sources  commit- 
ted nearly  $1.8  billion  more,  of  which  about  $1.1 
billion  came  from  the  United  States  and  the  rest 
from  international  institutions  and  the  Europeans. 

These  overall  figures  come  pretty  close  to  the 
average  annual  rates  talked  al)out  at  Punta  del 


'  For  an  evaluation  of  the  first  year  of  the  Alliance  for 
Progress  by  the  ministerial  representatives  of  the  Inter- 
American  Economic  and  Social  Council,  meeting  at  Mex- 
ico, D.F.,  Oct.  22-27,  1062,  see  ihid.,  Dec.  10,  1962,  p.  897. 

953 


Este  as  the  total  tliat  would  he  i-cquired  for  the 
program  to  succeed — $10  billion  a  year,  with  $2 
billion  from  outside.  No  one,  I  might  add, 
expected  the  first  year  to  be  up  to  that  average. 

But  several  important  caveats  must  be  regis- 
tered. The  World  Bank  figtire  of  over  $-100 
million  for  the  year  was  imnsually  large  and  does 
not  set  a  pattern  we  can  rely  on  in  the  future. 

U.S.  private  investors  took  out  a  little  more 
capital  than  they  put  in,  instead  of  adding  the 
$300  million  annual  total  that  had  been  hoped  for, 
a  figure  often  reached  during  the  1950's. 

Along  with  the  shortfall  in  United  States 
private  investment,  unsettled  economic  and  politi- 
cal conditions  cut  back  on  local  reinvestment  of 
savings,  too  much  of  which  went  abroad.  As  the 
alliance  succeeds  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  political 
and  economic  stabilitj' ,  accompanied  by  expanding 
markets  and  more  skilled  and  healthy  workers, 
will  attract  this  capital  back  to  Latin  America  and 
help  keep  current  savings  at  home.  Unless  local 
investors  acquire  confidence  in  the  future  of  their 
countries,  we  are  surely  in  for  trouble. 

As  mentioned  earlier,  too  little  of  United  States 
public  fimds  went  into  permanent  investments  and 
too  much  into  current  operating  expenses.  Too 
much  went  too  for  local  rather  than  foreign  ex- 
change costs,  thus  burdening  more  than  desirable 
the  U.S.  balance  of  payments. 

And  if  present  rates  of  population  growth  con- 
tinue, it  will  clearly  take  even  larger  capital  in- 
vestment than  originally  forecast  to  improve 
economic  and  social  conditions  substantially. 
Thus  we  have  some  vigorous  corrective  action  to 
take  over  the  next  few  years  to  make  our  per- 
formance adequate.  It  is  too  soon  to  have  any 
good  measures  of  (he  effect  of  the  alliance  on 
economic  activity  or  per  capita  incomes  in  this 
first  3'ear.  But  from  the  1961  figures  it  would  ap- 
pear that  incomes  rose  less  than  21/2  percent,  that 
agricultural  growth  was  very  small,  and  that 
increases  in  industrial  output,  while  considerable, 
were  concentrated  in  a  relatively  few  areas  like 
Mexico,  Argentina,  and  the  State  of  Sao  Paulo  in 
Brazil. 

On  the  institutional  front  there  is  now  a  great 
ferment  in  Latin  America  and  significant  changes 
are  in  the  making.  It  is  not  always  easy  to  tell 
whether  these  changes  promise  an  improvement, 
for  real  success  requires  that  changes  be  closely 
adapted   to  thr^  needs  and  capabilities  of  each 

954 


coimtry.  There  is  no  standard  model  applicabh 
to  all  countries  which  can  have  any  vitality  01 
lasting  usefulness.  Moreover,  new  laws  may  jus 
clutter  up  an  already  overthick  statute  book;  how 
they  are  applied  is  the  real  test. 

Often  vigorous  and  fair  administration  of  ex 
isting  measures  should  have  a  higher  jjriority  thar 
the  most  perfect  new  law  United  States  or  OAS' 
experts  can  devise.  And  despite  the  difficulties 
in  any  democratic  society  in  reaching  a  workin< 
consensus  on  the  specific  laws  changing  the  f  unda 
mental  political  and  economic  balance  of  forces  ii 
the  society — note  our  recent  prolonged  struggles  t( 
agree  on  very  modest  tax  reforms — building  i 
trained  and  ciTective  bureaucracy  to  apply  thesi 
laws  takes  much  longer,  even  were  there  a  surplu; 
of  educated  experts  at  hand.  We  are  really  talk 
ing  about  a  tradition  of  selfless,  honest,  and  skillec 
service  for  the  public  good — and  as  we  knov 
traditions  are  traditionally  of  slow  growth.  Con 
sequently  we  must  record  in  this  first  year  tha 
there  were  more  laws  passed  than  there  were  rea' 
and  solid  improvements  in  the  life  of  the  peoplt 
as  a  result  of  these  laws.  These  will  come,  hope 
fully,  in  the  future. 

Now  for  a  brief  catalog,  perhaps  dull,  but  re 
fleeting  straggles  so  profound  that  even  in  th( 
initial  stages  they  have  produced  some  bloodshed 


Revision  Needed  in  Handling  of  Public  Funds 

Talk  about  alliance  reform  tends  to  center  on  tas 
and  agrarian  reform.  This  is  too  narrow  and  over- 
simplified on  several  counts.  There  are,  of  course, 
many  other  important  areas  in  which  new  ways  ol 
doing  things  must  be  found — education,  health 
housing,  treatment  of  private  enterprise  and  espe- 
cially foreign  investment  are  examples.  But  in 
addition  it  is  central  to  success  that  public  finance 
as  a  whole  be  the  subject  of  thorough  revision.  * 
not  just  tax  laws.  Greatly  expanded  expenditures 
for  public  infrastructure  like  roads  and  schooli 
and  ports  and  housing  and  health  facilities  are 
essential  not  only  to  political  stability  but 
to  economic  development  itself.  There  has  been  a 
serious  imbalance  in  investment  between  public 
and  private  purposes.  Foreign  resources  can  help, 
but  the  bulk  of  financing  must  come  from  within; 
the  needs  are  too  great  to  be  met  otherwise,  and  "s 
mostly  they  involve  local  currency  costs,  which  are 


far  more  difficult  for  outsiders  to  bear  than  foreign 
exchange  costs. 


Department  of  Stale   Bulletin 


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In  addition  public  funds  must  be  found  to  meet 
he  constantly  increasing  load  of  operating  and 
naintaining  the  new  investments.  It  does  no  good 
,o  build  a  school  or  hospital  but  have  no  funds  to 
lire  teachers  or  nui-ses  or  to  maintain  buildings, 
lo  build  roads  without  the  funds  to  keep  them 
epaired,  especially  in  tropical  comitries,  is  pure 

-:oiiy. 

It  is  therefore  essential  to  ask  a  wide  range  of 
luestions.  Is  there  a  budget  or  financial  plan  ?  Is 
t  carried  out?  Are  expenditures  carefully 
;hecked  and  audited?  Is  tax  collection  efficient 
md  are  tax  laws  enforced  with  vigor  and  reason- 
able penalties  imposed  ?  Is  the  tax  structure  prop- 
erly related  to  income?  Are  there  nuisance  taxes 
vhich  cost  more  to  collect  than  they  bring  in  ? 

Progress  on  these  fronts  is  necessai-y  to  adequate 
Drogress  on  any  of  the  others.  This  is  the  top- 
priority  issue  in  eveiy  country,  unromantic  and 
)olitically  unpopular  as  all  aspects  of  handling 
5ublic  funds  may  appear. 

During  the  first  year  major  tax  legislation  was 
passed  in  10  coimtries.  Perhaps  more  important, 
improvements  in  tax  administration  have  been 
Jistituted  in  seven  countries.  Notable  have  been 
;he  first  criminal  charge  for  tax  evasion  ever 
jrought  in  Chile,  a  50-percent  increase  in  income 
,ax  collections  in  Panama  in  the  first  4  months  of 
;his  year  without  any  change  in  rates,  the  addition 
)f  over  200,000  persons  to  the  income  tax  rolls  in 
Argentina,  and  major  increases  in  customs  revenue 
in  Paraguay  and  Bolivia  due  solely  to  improved 
idministration.  Advisers  from  the  United  Na- 
tions, the  Organization  of  American  States,  and 
the  Inter-American  Development  Bank  are  work- 
ing on  further  improvements  in  fiscal  policies  and 
administration  in  six  countries  at  the  present  time. 

Less  progress  has  been  made  in  the  equally  im- 
portant field  of  centralized  budget  and  expendi- 
ture control  or  in  establishing  more  rigorous 
standards  for  government  employment  and  job 
security.  But  important  steps  have  been  taken  in 
this  first  year  in  five  countries. 

Bolivia,  Mexico,  Venezuela,  Chile,  and  Colom- 
bia have  produced  overall  development  plans,  the 
latter  two  of  which  have  been  reviewed  favorably 
by  the  World  Bank.  It  is  now  organizing  global 
consortiums  to  provide  the  outside  capital  re- 
quired for  them.  Overall  or  sector  plans  are  un- 
der active  development  in  Panama,  Honduras,  and 
Brazil.    Planning  bodies  with  varying  degrees  of 


December  24,   7962 


!|: 


authority  to  insure  that  government  funds  go  only 
for  priority  purposes  have  been  established  in  10 
other  countries,  leaving  only  one  or  two  countries 
without  such  organizations  at  the  present  time. 

Agrarian  reform  is  urgently  needed  in  most 
Latin  American  countries.  In  some  places  it  is 
primarily  a  political  problem  of  poverty-stricken 
and  landless  peasants  surrounded  by  rich  unused 
land  in  the  hands  of  private  landholders  or  the 
government.  Given  a  stake  in  the  country  by  be- 
coming landowners  with  a  clear  title,  they  will 
soon  acquire  a  changed  view  of  the  world.  This 
is  a  more  serious  problem  than  most  of  us  in  the 
United  States  can  imagine,  for  maldistribution  of 
land  going  back  to  the  days  of  crown  grants  to 
Spanish  conquistadors  is  beyond  anything  we  have 
known. 

For  example,  3,250  farms,  each  exceeding  2,500 
acres  in  size,  make  up  three-fourths  of  Chile's  en- 
tire agricultural  area.  Farms  of  less  than  12  acres 
in  size  account  for  37  percent  of  all  farms  but  oc- 
cupy  only   3   percent  of  the  agricultural   area. 

In  Colombia  56  percent  of  all  farms  are  less  than 
12  acres  in  size  and  account  for  about  4  percent  of 
the  agricultural  area.  At  the  other  extreme  some 
8,000  estates,  each  exceeding  1,250  acres,  occupy 
about  40  percent  of  the  agricultural  area. 

But  generally  it  is  a  question  of  expanding  agri- 
cultural output  and  income,  thus  raising  living 
standards,  expanding  rural  markets  for  manufac- 
tured goods,  and  keeping  surplus  population  out  of 
the  cities.  At  the  same  time  more  output  can  save 
imports  or  expand  exports  depending  on  the  crops. 
From  all  these  standpoints  tlie  emphasis  is  nat- 
urally on  putting  unused  land  under  cultivation, 
expanding  extension  service  and  supervised  credit 
programs  to  increase  productivity,  and  on  roads 
and  cooperative  organization  to  increase  market- 
ing efficiency.  The  problem  is  clearly  different  not 
only  in  each  country  but  between  regions  within  a 
country. 

Progress  was  made  this  first  year  in  many  types 
of  agrarian  reform.  Agricultural  credit  programs 
accompanied  by  technical  assistance  to  borrowers 
have  been  instituted  in  five  countries  and  greatly 
expanded  in  one. 

Resettlement  projects  on  public  lands  have  been 
instituted  during  the  year  in  four  countries,  bring- 
ing to  six  the  countries  in  which  this  kind  of  pro- 
gram is  going  on. 

Projects  for  improving  tax  collections  on  agri- 


955 


cultunil  lands,  especially  unused  land,  have  been 
adopted  in  four  countries.  This  program  as  well 
as  the  firming  up  of  titles  to  present  occupants  will 
be  greatly  facilitated  by  cadastral  surveys,  which 
are  currently  underway  in  three  countries. 

Programs  for  reducing  the  size  of  latifundia,  or 
the  great  landholdings,  or  combining  minifundia, 
which  are  fragmented  smaller  holdings,  into  farms 
of  economic  size  are  underway  in  five  countries,  of 
which  two  are  based  on  legislation  passed  since 
the  Alliance  for  Progress  started. 

It  is  worth  noting  that  in  the  last  several 
months,  that  is,  in  the  first  months  of  the  second 
year  of  the  alliance,  Chile,  Panama,  Honduras, 
Guatemala,  and  the  Peruvian  junta  have  passed 
important  agrarian  reform  laws.  And  action  on 
new  basic  tax  laws  has  been  taken  in  Brazil, 
Chile,  and  Guatemala,  and  additional  laws  may 
be  passed  shortly  in  Chile,  El  Salvador,  and 
Colombia. 

Social  and  Economic  Progress 

Housing  is  receiving  a  great  deal  of  attention  in 
nearly  all  Latin  American  countries,  but  overall 
figures  are  not  yet  available.  The  savings-and- 
loan  association  idea  is  just  getting  imderway,  and 
authorizing  laws  have  been  passed  and  associations 
are  coming  into  operation  in  five  countries.  This 
will  add  an  important  source  of  local  finance  for 
home  ownership  as  well  as  providing  a  soimd  in- 
vestment for  small  savers. 

I  find  it  difficult  to  know  how  to  measure  more 
precisely  actual  progress  in  education,  vital  as  it 
is  to  all  our  goals.  It  is  simple  enough  to  count 
the  number  of  schoolrooms  added,  as  I  did  a  little 
earlier,  but  they  really  won't  make  much  differ- 
ence unless  they  are  filled  with  healthy  children 
learning  things  important  to  them  from  interested 
teachers.  Quality  is  far  more  important  than 
quantity;  and  quality  takes  so  long.  Brick  and 
mortar  can  make  a  schoolroom  in  months,  but  it 
takes  years  to  train  teachers  who  are  qualified  to 
educate  a  new  generation  of  engineers  and  scien- 
tists and  economists  and  scholars  to  run  a  new 
world.  By  then  we  are  far  past  1970.  This  is 
why  education  must  have  the  high  priority  neces- 
sary to  get  it  off  to  an  earlj'  start. 

We  do  have  a  few  evidences  of  educational 
progress.  "We  have  distributed  1.5  million  ele- 
mentary grade  textbooks  during  the  first  year. 
Colombia  has  almost  doubled  its  education  budget, 

956 


and  most  other  countries  have  made  increases, 
often  over  20  percent  of  total  national  government 
expenditures.  Guatemala  has  built  more  schools 
during  the  current  regime  than  in  the  previous  6C 
j'cars.  The  Central  American  countries  have 
taken  the  bold  step  of  putting  all  outside  financing 
of  their  universities  under  a  central  committee 
which  is  following  a  policy  of  common  basic 
studies,  equivalent  to  junior  college  work,  with 
professional  specialties  divided  up  among  the  na- 
tional universities  of  each  country. 

In  the  field  of  health,  major  emphasis  has  been 
placed  on  improving  water  and  sewer  systems. 
As  of  midyear  11  countries  had  received  more 
than  $100  million  of  outside  alliance  funds  to  pro- 
vide their  people  with  these  basic  facilities  which 
are  so  essential  to  sound  public-health  programs. 
In  at  least  four  other  comitries  these  funds  are  un- 
derwriting the  construction  and  staffing  of  new 
health  centers  and  the  dispatch  of  medical  teamsi 
to  rural  areas. 

You  will  note  that  most  of  these  programs  are 
aimed  directly  at  improving  the  condition  of  the 
average  family.  This  is  as  it  should  be.  An  even 
more  direct  and  successful  attack  at  the  problem 
of  helping  people  directly  has  been  made  by  the 
Peace  Corps.  "We  can't  begin  to  fill  the  demand 
for  their  volunteers. 

There  are  three  major  developments  on  the  in- 
stitutional side  that  deserve  notice.  The  "nine 
wise  men"  authorized  at  Punta  del  Este  to  review 
country  plans  under  the  alliance  started  in  busi- 
ness and  produced  interim  reports  on  three  plans. 
The  LAFTA,  or  the  Latin  American  Free  Ti-ade 
Association,  was  formally  established  and  began 
carrying  out  its  program.  Costa  Rica  joined  the 
Central  American  Common  Market,  which  also 
opened  a  Central  American  Investment  Bank  to 
finance  projects  of  region-wide  interest.  From 
in.'iO  to  1901  the  percentage  of  the  total  trade  of 
the  original  four  countries,  which  was  among 
themselves,  doubled. 

On  the  export  front  total  exports  from  Latin 
America  in  the  first  6  months  of  calendar  1962 
increased  by  only  2  percent  over  the  same  period 
of  19G1.  However,  those  of  Mexico  and  Vene- 
zuela were  up  by  40  percent,  and  there  were  also 
important  otiier  major  increases  in  those  of  Chile 
and  the  Dominican  Republic.  The  United  States 
bought  al)out  6  percent  more  from  Latin  America 
than  it  did  in  1961. 

Department  of   State   Bulletin 


& 


por 


The  major  trade  development  in  this  initial 
period,  however,  was  the  signing  by  40  countries 
of  a  far-reaching  international  coilee  agreement.* 
This  should  ha^■e  an  important  effect  by  at  least 
preventing  further  declines  in  coffee  prices  and 
by  expanding  its  consumption.  A  1-cent  change 
in  tlie  price  of  coffee  beans  per  pound  makes  a 
difference  of  $40  million  a  year  in  Latin  American 
export  income.  Prices  of  basic  commodities  im- 
portant to  Latin  America  clianged  rehitively  little, 
a  hopeful  sign  after  long-declining  curves. 

Encouraging  Political  Developments 

Politically  the  Latin  American  scene  was  rela- 
tively encouraging  during  the  first  year  of  the  al- 
liance. There  were,  of  course,  somewhat  out-of- 
bounds  changes  of  govenmient  in  Ecuador  and 
Argentina  and  a  real  militaiy  usurpation  in  Peru. 
Tliere  were  vigorous  attempts  to  unseat  the  gov- 
ernments in  power  in  Venezuela  and  Guatemala, 
involving  both  street  riots,  some  guerrilla  activity 
in  the  hills,  and  some  military  disaffection. 
Other  problems  of  varying  degrees  of  seriousness 
were  created  in  nearly  every  counti-y  by  the  well- 
organized  and  -financed  subversive  activities  of 
the  Castro  Communists.  There  was  continued 
banditry  on  a  substantial,  though  reduced,  scale  in 
Colombia  and  a  near  civil  war  in  Brazil  after 
President  Quadros  resigned. 

But  in  Ecuador  and  Argentina  the  legal  bases 
of  civil  government  were  maintained.  In  Peru  the 
junta  punished  no  one,  restored  essential  civil  lib- 
erties within  a  week,  informed  the  OAS  that  it 
was  organizing  elections  for  June  1963,  and 
pledged  tliat  it  would  accept  the  results,  whatever 
they  might  be. 

All  the  other  efforts  at  revolt  failed,  and  to  cap 
it  off  a  governing  council  was  establislied  in  the 
Dominican  Republic  jjledged  to  tuni  over  power 
to  a  democratically  elected  President  and  Congress 
in  Februaiy  1963,  thus  ending  31  years  of  the  hated 
Trujillo  dictatorship. 

In  Venezuela  Betancourt  is  well  on  the  way  to 
becoming  the  first  elected  President  in  the  coun- 
try's history  to  serve  out  his  term.  In  Honduras 
Villeda  IMorales  looks  as  if  he  may  be  becoming  the 
second  to  achieve  this  honor.  Rather  peaceful  elec- 
tions were  held  m  Costa  Rica,  Colombia,  El  Salva- 
dor, Ecuador,  and  Bolivia.    Not  all  of  them  would 


'For  background,  see  Hid.,  Oct.  29,  1962,  p.  607. 
December  24,   J  962 


receive  a  clean  bill  of  health  from  a  punctilious 
Senate  Elections  Committee,  but  then  we  occasion- 
ally have  problems  too. 

'Wlien  one  looks  at  the  history  of  Latin  America 
over  just  this  century  tliis  is  a  most  commendable 
record.  To  pick  a  recent  year  at  random — 1955 — 
one  can  make  a  pretty  good  case  that  10  of  tlie  20 
comitries  were  run  by  dictators,  mostly  militaiy 
and  few  benevolent.  Today  it  is  just  about  im- 
possible to  find  a  good  old-fashioned  brutal,  graft- 
ing military  caudillo.  Unless,  of  course,  one  looks 
at  Cuba.  There  no  improvement  could  be  foimd 
in  the  lot  of  the  Cuban  people.  Rather  it  was  the 
contrarj',  for  the  Communists  with  their  usual  skill 
had  managed  to  make  a  shambles  of  Cuba's  natu- 
rally richest  asset,  its  agricultural  production. 

But  we  should  not  become  overconfident. 
Democracy  is  still  a  fragile  plant.  There  is  little 
depth  of  experience.  Relatively  few  people  are 
educated  to  a  full  understanding  of  the  tasks  and 
responsibilities  of  government  in  the  modern 
world.  And  the  discontented  of  the  far  right  and 
left  are  constantly  seeking  for  weaknesses  to  ex- 
ploit, constantly  exploiting  illegal  means  to  create 
new  weaknesses.  Better  assurances  of  future 
political  stability  and  of  maintenance  of  law  and 
order  will  be  required  before  people  can  lead 
wholly  normal  and  relaxed  lives  and  before  pri- 
vate entei'prise  will  feel  able  to  play  its  full  role 
by  investing  its  capital  throughout  the  area  on 
tlie  basis  of  economic  considerations  alone.  And 
we  need  its  help  badly. 

Does  the  absence  of  much  tangible  advance  in 
general  well-being  m  this  first  year,  or  the  wide- 
spread feeling  of  disappointment  and  dissatisfac- 
tion and  even  sharp  criticism,  mean  that  the  goal 
we  set  was  too  ambitious  or  the  means  chosen  in- 
appropriate? I  do  not  think  so.  It  does  mean 
that  the  10-year  program  is  just  that.  It  does 
mean  that  in  1970  there  will  still  be  much  to  do. 
It  does  mean  that  our  patience  and  ingenuity  and 
energies  will  be  severely  tested  throughout  the 
sixties. 

It  does  mean  too  that  we  must  accept  the  fact 
that  to  the  extent  that  the  alliance  is  succeeding  it 
will  become  the  subject  of  increasingly  bitter  con- 
troversy and  criticism  from  the  opponents  of 
change  on  the  right  and  the  advocates  of  violent 
revolution  from  the  left.  When  it  is  no  longer 
attacked,  when  people  are  no  longer  outspokenly 
dissatisfied  with  its  slowness,  it  will  be  dead,  and 
it  will  be  past  time  to  start  looking  for  a  substitute. 


957 


Let  us  hope  this  time  never  comes,  for  we  have 
little  choice.  To  keep  our  close  neighbors  in  Latin 
America  in  the  free  world  requires  and  justifies 
continuing  our  efforts  to  make  the  Alliance  for 
Progress  a  success.  No  better  approach  than  this 
community-wide  attack  on  the  problem  of  making 
what  is  our  community  a  better  place  for  all  of 
us  to  live  in  has  been,  to  my  knowledge,  suggested. 
And  more  and  more  evidences  of  the  necessary 
ferment  in  people's  minds  are  there.  I  feel  sure 
that  the  United  States  will  find  the  means  to  do 
its  share,  and  the  Latin  Americans  will,  if  we  have 
patience,  more  than  do  theirs. 


President  Kennedy  Holds  Talks 
With  President  of  Honduras 

President  Ramoyi  Villeda  Morales  of  the  Re- 
public of  Honduras  visited  Washington  November 
30-Decemher  1.  Folloioing  is  the  text  of  a  joint 
conununique  ietioeen  President  Kennedy  and 
President  Villeda  released  at  the  close  of  their 
talks  on  November  30. 

White  House  press  release  dated  November  30 

The  President  of  the  Republic  of  Honduras  and 
the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America  met 
and  talked  today  in  a  spirit  of  frankness,  under- 
standing and  sincere  friendship.  The  two  Presi- 
dents discussed  general  relations  between  their  two 
countries,  and  topics  of  hemisplieric  concern. 
They  reviewed  the  positive  contributions  of  the 
Organization  of  American  States  and  its  members 
in  their  action  of  October  23 '  calling  for  the  dis- 
mantling and  removal  from  Cuba  of  offensive 
weapons  systems  and  in  seeking  adequate  safe- 
guards against  their  reintroduction  in  Cuba. 
They  discussed  the  future  measures  necessary  to 
safeguard  the  peace  and  security  of  the  states  and 
peoples  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  from  the  sub- 
versive attempts  of  governments  alien  to  this 
hemisphere. 

The  Presidents  reaffirmed  their  adherence  to 
the  principles  and  commitments  of  the  Charter 
of  Punta  del  Este,^  and  they  noted  with  satisfac- 
tion the  frankness  and  realistic  character  of  the 
first  annual  review  of  the  Alliance  for  Progress  in 
the  meeting  of  Ministers  in  Mexico  City  in  Octo- 


"  Bulletin  of  Nov.  12, 19G2,  p.  720. 

•  For  text,  see  ibid.,  Sept.  II,  1001,  p.  4G.3. 


ber.'  The  Presidents  noted  the  Ministers  had  re 
affirmed  the  validity  of  the  Alliance  as  a  joim 
effort  calling  for  effective  use  of  national  as  wel 
as  external  resources,  institutional  reforms,  tai 
reforms,  vigorous  application  of  existing  laws 
and  a  just  distribution  of  the  fruits  of  nationa 
development  to  all  sectors  of  the  community.  Th( 
two  Presidents  discussed  the  need  for  the  full  par- 
ticipation of  private  investment  in  development 
noting  tliat  the  absence  of  such  participation  wil 
cause  the  development  to  fall  far  short  of  its  po 
tentialities.  They  discussed  measures  to  enlist 
such  private  participation.  The  two  President! 
discussed  how  cooperation  between  Honduras  anc 
the  United  States  can  contribiite  to  the  progress 
and  well-being  of  the  people  of  Honduras. 

The  two  Presidents  agreed  that  their  Govern- 
ments should  seek,  on  an  urgent  basis,  a  solutior 
of  the  question  of  Swan  Island,  within  the  frame- 
work of  the  Inter-American  system  and  taking: 
full  account  of  the  rights  and  interests  of  botli 
parties. 

The  two  Presidents  declared  tliat  political  de- 
mocracy, national  independence  and  the  self-de- 
termination of  peoples  are  the  political  principles 
which  shape  the  national  policies  of  Honduras  andl 
the  United  States.  Both  countries  are  joined  in 
a  hemisphere-wide  effort  to  accelerate  economic 
progress  and  social  justice. 

In  conclusion  the  two  Presidents  expressed 
their  gratification  at  this  opportunity  to  exchange 
views  and  to  strengthen  the  friendly  and  mutually 
beneficial  relationship  which  has  long  existed  be- 
tween Honduras  and  the  United  States.  Their 
meeting  was  a  demonstration  of  the  underetanding 
and  reciprocal  cooperation  of  the  two  countries  and 
strengthened  the  bonds  of  common  interests  and 
friendship  between  their  respective  peoples. 


AID  Makes  Alliance  for  Progress 
Grant  to  Dominican  Republic 

Department  Statement 

Press  release  720  dated  December  7 

Tlie  Department  of  State  announced  on  Decern- 
ber  7  that  Ambassador  John  Bartlow  Martin  has 
informed  President  Kafael  Bonnolly  of  the  Do- 
minican Republic  that  AID  [Agency  for  Inter- 


jriiil 


irr. 


eratii 
m 


Con 


as 
id 
m 

DJi 

EXC 

Pnss 
Setr 


Itli 


958 


'  Ibid..  Dec.  10,  1002.  r-  897. 

Deparfment  of  State  BuUetin 


in 
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Dat 


m 


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iitio 

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,kiii| 
tot 


national  Development]  is  making  a  grant  of 
$22,750,000  to  the  Government  of  the  Dominican 
Republic  under  the  Alliance  for  Progress.  This 
grant  is  being  made  to  assist  the  Government  of 
the  Dominican  Republic  in  carrying  out  economic 
and  social  development  projects  which  will  con- 
tribute to  the  economic  rehabilitation  of  the  coun- 
try. It  also  is  made  in  recognition  of  the  valiant 
efforts  of  the  Dominican  Government  and  people 
to  establish  a  viable,  democratic  state  after  three 
decades  of  dictatorship.  This  action  by  the  United 
States  Government  demonstrates  the  strong  sup- 
port and  sympathy  of  the  American  people  for 
these  efforts  and  for  the  objectives  of  mutual  coop- 
eration and  advancement  embodied  in  the  Alli- 
ance for  Progress. 


Joint  U.S.-Japan  Committee 
Concludes  Second  Meeting 

The  Joint  United  States-Japan  Cotiwiittee  on 
Trade  and  Economic  Affairs  held  its  second  meet- 
ing at  Washington  December  3-5.  Following  is 
an  exchange  of  remarks  hetioeen  Secretary  Rush 
and  Foreign  Minister  Masayoshi  Ohira  at  the 
conclusion  of  the  meeting,  together  with  the  text 
of  a  joint  communique. 

EXCHANGE  OF  REMARKS 

Press  release  713  dated  December  5 

Secretary  Rusk 

Mr.  Foreign  Minister,  we  have  just  completed 
the  second  meeting^  of  the  United  States-Japan 
Committee  on  Trade  and  Economic  Affairs,  which 
we  have  been  holding  here  in  Washington  for  the 
past  3  days.  We  have  issued  a  communique,  and 
I  think  you  will  agree  with  me,  Mr.  Minister,  that 
contrai-y  to  most  communiques  this  one,  I  think, 
says  something  of  substance,  because  we  have  had 
good  discussions  in  which  each  side  has  been  able 
to  speak  frankly  and  in  a  friendly  way  about  the 
real  and  practical  problems  that  necessarily  arise 
between  two  great  trading  partners  like  Japan 
and  the  United  States.  I  think  in  this  meeting  we 
have  emphasized  this  element  of  partnership  be- 
cause it  is  not  just  a  bilateral  matter  between  our 


sei 
iiiS 
lallj 


la 
Do 

iter 


'  For  text  of  a  joint  communique  issued  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  first  meeting,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  27,  1961, 
p.  891. 


two  countries  but  because  both  of  us  are  now  en- 
gaged in  a  great  free-world  effort  to  liberalize 
trade  and  to  expand  the  free-world  economies. 

We  have  had  the  most  satisfactory  exchange. 
These  discussions  will  continue  between  the  Gov- 
ernments throughout  the  year.  These  are  work- 
ing problems  which  we  will  follow  up  in  every 
respect,  and  I  am  happy  to  say  we  have  agreed 
that  we  will  meet  a  year  from  now  in  Japan  for 
our  third  meeting.  On  the  American  side  we  look 
forward  to  that  with  the  greatest  jjossible  pleasure. 

Mr.  Minister,  would  you  have  a  comment? 

Foreign  Minister  Ohira  ' 

Mr.  Secretary,  for  these  past  3  days  we  too  have 
been  most  pleased  to  conduct  full  and  frank  dis- 
cussions of  the  common  problems  which  exist 
among  us  with  the  United  States  Cabinet  officials. 
The  happy  results  of  our  talks  are  contained  in 
the  joint  communique  which  has  been  released 
today. 

We  would  like  to  bring  to  life  in  tlie  future  the 
spirit  expressed  in  tliis  joint  communique  and  to 
that  end  we  will  further  our  own  efforts  so  that 
Japan  and  the  United  States  may  increase  their 
mutual  trade  and  commerce  on  tlie  basis  of  ener- 
getic exchanges  of  opinions  whicli  we  may  conduct 
among  ourselves. 

We,  together  with  our  wives,  have  received  such 
a  heart- warming  welcome  in  Washington  from  the 
Pi-esident  and  the  other  officials  of  the  Government 
and  their  wives  that  we  would  like  to  take  this  op- 
portunity to  express  our  heartfelt  thanks.  Next 
year  we  will  be  most  pleased  to  welcome  our  Cab- 
inet colleagues  from  the  United  States  to  beautiful 
Japan. 

Thank  you  very  much. 

TEXT  OF  JOINT  COMMUNIQUE 

Press  release  710  dated  December  5 


The  second  meeting  of  the  Joint  United  States-Japan 
Committee  on  Trade  and  Economic  Affairs  was  held  at 
Washington  from  the  3rd  to  the  5th  of  December,  1962. 
The  purpose  of  the  meeting  as  expressed  in  the  exchange 
of  notes  between  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  dated  June  22,  1961,'  was  to  exchange 
Information  and  views  in  order  that  appropriate  measures 
could  be  considered  "to  eliminate  conflict  in  the  Interna- 


'  As  Interpreted  from  the  Japanese. 

'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  July  10,  1961,  p.  58. 


yii    December  24,   J  962 


959 


tional  economic  policies  of  liie  two  countries,  to  provide 
for  a  fuller  measure  of  economic  collaboration,  and  to  en- 
courage the  flow  of  trade." 

Japan  was  represented  by  Masayoshi  Ohira,  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs ;  Kakuei  Tanaka,  Minister  of  Finance ; 
Seishi  Shigemasa,  Minister  for  Agriculture  and  Forestry  ; 
Hajime  Fukuda,  Minister  for  International  Trade  and 
Industry;  Takeo  Ohashi,  Minister  of  Labor;  and  Kiichi 
Miyazawa,  Director  General  of  the  Economic  Planning 
Agency.  Koicbiro  Asakai,  .Japanese  Ambassador  to  the 
United  States,  and  liyuji  Takeuchi,  Vice  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  as  well  as  advisers  from  the  Ministries 
concerned,  were  also  present. 

The  United  States  was  represented  by  Dean  Rusk, 
Secretary  of  State;  C.  Douglas  Dillon,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury;  Stewart  L.  Udall,  Secretary  of  the  Interior; 
Orville  L.  Freeman^  Secretary  of  Agriculture ;  W.  Willard 
Wirtz,  Secretary  of  Labor;  Edward  Gudeman,  Acting 
Secretary  of  Commerce ;  and  Walter  W.  Heller,  Chairman 
of  the  President's  Council  of  Economic  Advisers.  Edwin 
O.  Reischauer,  United  States  Ambassador  to  Japan,  and 
advisers  from  the  several  Departments  concerned  were 
also  present.  Secretary  Rusk  acted  as  Chairman  of  the 
meeting. 

The  Joint  Committee's  discussions  covered  the  whole 
range  of  United  States-Japan  bilateral  economic  relation- 
ships and  dealt  also  with  certain  aspects  of  the  economic 
relations  of  the  two  countries  with  the  rest  of  the  world. 

II 

Recognizing  the  close  connection  between  domestic 
economic  conditions  and  developments  in  international 
economic  relations,  the  Committee  considered  first  the 
current  economic  situation  in  the  United  States  and  in 
Japan.  It  noted  that  both  countries  have  been  making 
progress  in  meeting  their  recent  economic  problems.  The 
Committee  looked  forward  to  the  favorable  effect  on 
United  StJites-Japan  economic  relationships  of  higher 
levels  of  economic  activity  in  both  countries. 

In  this  context,  the  delegations  discussed  problems  of 
economic  growth  in  Japan  and  the  United  States.  Japan 
and  the  United  States  alike  will  have  increa.sing  numbers 
of  new  entrants  into  their  labor  forces  during  the  next 
several  years  and  the  Committee  considered  it  of  the  first 
order  of  importance  that  the  potential  contribution  of 
these  new  workers  to  national  income  .should  be  realized. 
Both  delegations  emphasized  the  need  for  a  high  rate  of 
growth  in  order  to  deal  with  the  problems  of  underemploy- 
ment and  the  lagging  sectors  of  their  economies.  The 
Committee  stressed  that  fuller  use  of  labor  and  plant, 
along  with  greater  productivity  per  worker,  was  essential 
to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  people  of  the  two  countries 
and  also  to  enable  the  two  governments  better  to  discharge 
their  responsibilities  as  members  of  the  community  of 
free  nations. 

The  Committee  reviewed  the  balance  of  payments  posi- 
tions of  the  two  countries.  It  recognized  the  need  to 
eliminate  the  deficit  in  the  United  States  balance  of  pay- 
ments, which  has  its  origin  in  the  unique  role  of  the  Unitetl 
States  in  the  free  world.  It  noted  at  the  same  time  that 
Japan's  economic  growth,  as  well  as  its  capability  for 
meeting  its  international  responsibilities,  has  been  period- 


ically threatened  by  disequilibrium  in  its  balance  of  i)ay- 
meuts.  It  noted  the  measures  being  taken  by  both 
Governments  to  restore  equilibrium,  with  special  emphasis 
on  export  expansion. 

The  Committee  agreed  that  expanding  the  volume  ot 
world  trade  would  be  a  controlling  factor  in  dealing  with 
the  balance  of  payments  problems  of  both  nations.  In 
the  further  course  of  the  balance  of  payments  review, 
the  Committee  paid  special  attention  to  the  need  for 
close  consultation  and  cooperation  among  the  major  indus- 
trial nations  with  respect  to  international  monetary  and 
financial  matters. 

Turning  to  the  field  of  international  trade,  tlio  Com 
mittee  emphasized  the  need  for  strengthening  the  niultl 
lateral  trading  system  of  the  free  world  and  for  expand 
ing  trade  between  the  United  States  and  Japan.     The- 
Committee   discussed   the   implications   of   developmental 
within  the  European  Economic  Community  for  the  econ 
omies  of  the  United  States  and  Japan.     It  agreed  that 
an  expanding  and  unified  economy  in  Western  Europe, 
operating  on  an  open  and  liberal  basis,  would  make  a 
major  contribution  to  the  expansion  of  world  trade. 

The  United  States  delegation  gave  a  i)reliminary  ex- 
position of  the  actions  the  United  States  expected  toi 
take  under  the  recently  enacted  Trade  Expan.sion  AcfJ 
of  1962.  The  Japanese  delegation  welcomed  the  Act  as 
a  reafBrmation  of  the  liberal  trading  policies  of  the  Unitedi 
States  and  expressed  the  hope  that  it  would  be  the  meanst 
to  the  fullest  possible  extension  of  open  and  non-discrim- 
inatory trading  in  the  free  world. 

The  delegations  discussed  the  desirability  of  a  major 
new  negotiation  on  tariff  reductions  at  the  earliest  feasi- 
ble date,  to  take  place  under  the  Articles  of  the  Generalitorj 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT).  They  also  las 
agreed  that  tariff  reductions  arrived  at  in  a  new  round 
should  be  applied  in  full  accordance  with  the  uncondi- 
ti(mal  most-favored-nation  clau.se  of  the  General  Agree- 
ment and  that  efforts  should  be  made  to  secure  the  par- 
lii-i)>ation  in  the  negotiations  of  all  the  contracting  parties^ 
to  the  GATT  on  the  fullest  possible  basis.  The  Committee 
agreed  on  the  importance  of  assuring  that  the  value  of 
tariff  concessions  should  not  be  impaired  by  quantitative' 
and  other  non-tariff  restrictions,  whether  applied  gener- 
ally or  on  a  discriminatory  basis. 

In  the  exchange  of  views  about  the  bilateral  economic 
relationship  between  Japan  and  the  United  States,  Ja- 
pan's restraints  on  exports  to  the  United  States  were 
di.scussed  and  the  Japanese  delegation  expres.sed  the  hope 
that  developments  in  the  United  States  would  permit 
their  early  relaxation.  The  Japanese  delegation  expressed 
its  serious  concern  over  some  features  of  the  official  pro- 
curement policies  of  the  United  States  Government  which 
have  resulted  in  reduced  pureha.ses  in  Japan.  The  United 
States  delegation  explained  the  role  of  these  policies  in 
maintaining  defense  and  foreign  aid  programs,  freedom 
of  capital  movements,  and  policies  aimed  at  domestic 
economic  expansion.  The  Japanese  delegation  aLso  raised 
questions  with  respect  to  relations  in  the  fields  of  ship- 
ping and  aviation.  On  the  part  of  the  United  Stati 
delegation,  emphasis  was  placed  on  the  importance 
further  trade  and  exchange  liberalization  in  Japan. 
The  Committee  discussed  in  detail  mutual  problems  in 


tliift 
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Department  of  Slate   Bulletin 


the  fields  of  agriculture  and  fisheries.  Attention  was  paid 
to  the  role  of  natural  resources  in  investment  and  trade 
between  the  two  countries,  with  special  mention  being 
given  to  the  possibilities  for  building  upon  the  close 
geographic  link  between  Alaska  and  the  Pacific  North- 
west and  Japan. 

In  examining  the  economic  relations  of  the  two  coun- 
tries with  other  parts  of  the  world,  the  Committee  wel- 
comed the  progress  that  has  been  made  toward  the  elimi- 
nation of  discriminatory  restrictions  on  Japan's  exports 
and  expressed  the  hope  that  remaining  restrictions  of 
this  kind  would  be  removed  at  an  early  date. 

The  United  States  delegation  expressed  the  strong  sup- 
port of  the  United  States  Government  for  fuller  participa- 
tion by  Japan  in  the  Organization  for  Economic  Coopera- 
tion and  Development  (OECD)  and  stated  that  it  favored 
full  Japanese  membership  in  that  organization  in  the  near 
future. 

The  Joint  Committee  agreed  that  both  Japan  and  the 
United  States  should  continue  and  coordinate  their  efforts 
to  assist  economic  progress  in  the  developing  countries. 
The  members  reviewed  current  levels  of  assistance  and 
expressed  their  understanding  of  the  urgent  need  for  an 
expanding  volume  of  financial  and  technical  aid.  The 
delegations  also  discussed  the  desirability  of  expanding 
the  resources  of  the  International  Development  Associa- 
tion and  expressed  their  intention  to  support  such 
expansion. 

Attention  was  also  given  to  the  need  of  the  developing 
countries  for  greater  export  earnings.  The  Committee 
considered  that  means  should  be  found  to  provide  the 
developing  countries  with  improved  and  nou'-discrimina- 
tory  access  to  the  markets  of  the  industrial  countries.  It 
was  noted  that  technical  assistance  might  be  devoted  to 
improving  the  marketability  of  the  export  products  of  the 
developing  countries. 

Ill 

In  reviewing  their  deliberations,  the  members  of  the 
Committee  unanimoiLsly  expressed  the  belief  that  these 
annual  meetings  are  of  great  value  in  furthering  mutually 
beneficial  economic  relations  between  the  two  countries, 
to  which  both  governments  attach  major  importance. 
Both  delegations  look  forward  to  the  continued  develop- 
ment of  the  Committee  as  an  effective  instrument  to  carry 
out  the  high  puri)oses  for  which  it  was  established. 


iLetters  of  Credence 

Jordan 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Hashemite  Kingdom  of  Jordan,  Sa'ad  Jum'a, 
presented  liis  credentials  to  President  Kennedy 
on.  December  5.  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's 
remarks  and  the  President's  reply,  see  Depart- 
ment of  State  press  release  708  dated  December  5. 

\  Niger 

The  newly  apj^ointed  Ambassador  of  the  Re- 


public of  Niger,  Abdon  Sidikou,  presented  his 
credentials  to  President  Kennedy  on  December  4. 
For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  remarks  and  the 
President's  reply,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  706  dated  December  4. 


Secretary  Rusk  Visits  Ireland 

Press  release  715  dated  December  6 

Secretary  Husk  will  travel  to  Dublin  December 
16  for  a  1-day  visit  to  Ireland.  This  will  be  the 
Secretary's  first  official  visit  to  Ireland  since  be- 
coming Secretary  of  State.  The  visit  is  in  response 
to  a  longstanding  invitation  tendered  by  the  Irish 
Minister  for  External  Affairs,  Frank  Aiken. 

While  in  Dublin,  Secretary  Rusk  will  confer 
with  Irish  ministers  on  matters  of  mutual  interest. 
He  will  pay  a  courtesy  call  on  President  de  Valera 
and  will  lunch  with  the  Prime  Minister  [Sean 
Lemass],  Minister  Aiken,  and  other  members  of 
Government. 


United  States  Restates  Policy  Toward 
Peoples  and  Governments  of  Africa 

Department  Statement 

Press  release  711  dated  December  4 

The  Department  of  State  has  received  inquiries 
regarding  remarks  attributed  to  Senator  [Allen 
J.]  Ellender  in  Salisbury,  Southern  Rhodesia,  on 
December  1. 

Senator  Ellender  made  clear  in  his  remarks  at 
a  press  conference  that  his  comments  on  African 
governments  were  entirely  personal  and  did 
not  reflect  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
Government. 

The  United  States  has  repeatedly  demonstrated 
its  support  for  the  aspirations  of  the  peoples  and 
governments  of  Africa  for  the  achievement  and 
maintenance  of  freedom  and  independence,  per- 
sonal and  national  dignity  and  equality,  and  eco- 
nomic and  social  progress. 

We  have  welcomed  the  independence  of  new 
African  nations  and  support  the  application  of  the 
principles  of  self-determination  for  peoples  in  a 
dependent  status.  This  Government  opposes  any 
abridgment  of  human  rights  and  encourages  the 
protection  of  the  just  rights  of  minorities  in 
Africa. 


hDecember  24,   7962 


961 


U.S.  Announces  Agreement  With  the  Soviet  Union 
on  Cooperation  in  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space 


Following  is  a  statement  made  by  Adlai  E. 
Stevenson,  U.S.  Representative  to  the  General 
Assembly,  in  Comrnittee  I  {Political  and  Security) 
on  Decemher  5,  together  with  documents  released 
on  that  date  by  tlie  U.S.  Mission  to  the  United 
Nations  {U.S. /U.N.  press  release  ilH),  which  in- 
clude a  letter  of  transmittal  to  U.N.  Secretary- 
General  U  Thant,  the  text  of  the  U.S. -U.S. S.I?, 
technical  agreement  of  June  8,  and  exchanges  of 
notes  and  letters  conf nning  the  agreement. 


STATEMENT  BY   MR.  STEVENSON 

U.S.  delegntlon  press  release  4115 

As  the  iiiember.s  of  tliis  committee  are  aware, 
the  President  of  tlie  United  States  in  his  state  of 
tlie  Union  message  on  January  30, 1961,'  invited  all 
nations  to  join  in  peaceful  cooperation  in  outer 
space.  Last  March  an  exchange  of  letters  took 
place  between  President  Kennedy  and  Chairman 
Khrushchev  containing  more  detailed  proposals 
for  cooperative  efforts.-  These  letters  were  circu- 
lated as  U.X.  documents.  American  and  Soviet 
scientists  thereafter  met  in  New  York  and  in 
Geneva  concurrent  with  the  meetings  of  the 
Technical  Subcommittee  of  the  United  Nations 
Outer  Space  Committee. 

In  June  of  this  year  agreement  was  reached  for 
cooperation  in  three  fields  of  space  activity :  co- 
ordinated launchings  of  meteorological  satellites 
and  the  exchange  of  data  thus  obtained;  coordi- 
nated launchings  of  satellites  to  map  the  earth's 
magnetic  field;  and  experiments  in  space  com- 
munications by  means  of  a  U.S.  passive  reflector 
satellite,  with  consideration  to  be  given  to  future 


•  BoxLETiN  of  Feb.  13, 1961,  p.  207. 

'For  text  of  a  letter  dated  Mar.  7,  1962,  from  President 
Kennedy  to  Chairman  Khrushchev,  see  ihiV/.,  Apr.  2,  1962, 
p.  5.36;  for  text  of  Mr.  Khrushchev's  reply  of  Mar.  20, 
see  U.N.  doc.  A/AC.  105/2. 


lEX 


Jitle 

IJEtl 

Sill 
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a. 


cooperation  in  joint  experiments  using  active  re- 
peater satellites.  The  agreement  provides  that 
among  matters  to  be  discussed  in  future  meetings 
is  the  preparation  for  the  working  out  with  other 
countries  of  an  experimental  system  of  global 
space  communications. 

It  was  agreed  that  the  results  of  these  coopera- 
tive experiments  would  be  made  freely  available 
to  all  interested  states.  The  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  have  requested  the  Secretary- 
General  to  circulate  this  agreement  as  a  U.N. 
document.''  This  promising  program  directed  to 
the  peaceful  use  of  outer  space  should  now  move 
forward  toward  implementation. 

Here  we  have  a  practical  demonstration  that  our 
two  nations  can,  despite  political  difl'erences,  co- 
operate in  a  highly  important  field  of  human 
endeavor.  jMy  Government  is  hopeful  that  the 
agreement  will  lead  to  a  further  expansion  of 
outer  space  cooperation  involving  many  countries 
on  a  broad  basis  with  the  encouragement  and 
assistance  of  the  United  Nations. 

LETTER  OF  TRANSMITTAL 

December  5, 1962 
Dear  Mb.  Secretary  General  :  Wo  have  the  honor 
herewith  to  submit  documents  relating  to  an  agreement 
reached  on  cooin'ration  in  the  peaceful  uses  of  outer  space 
as  a  result  of  meetings  between  Dr.  Hugh  Drydon  of  the 
National  Aeronautics  and  Sjiace  Administration  and 
Academician  A.  A.  Blagonravov  of  the  U.S.S.U.  Academy 
of  Sciences. 

AVe  request  that  these  documents  be  circulated  to  all 
United  Nations  Members  as  an  official  United  Nations 
document. 

Respectfully, 

A.  Stevenson  V.  Zorin 

Permanent  Representative  Permanent    Representative 

of  the   United  States  to  of    the    U.S.S.R.    to    the 

the  United  Nations  United  Nations 


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tie 
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Mil 

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In 
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'  U.N.  doc.  A/C.1/880. 


962 


Department  of  Sfafe   Bulletin 


TEXT  OF  TECHNICAL  AGREEMENT 

Geneva,  Switzerland 

June  S,  1982 
The  representatives  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics  and  the  United  States  of  America  have  con- 
ducted discussions  on  the  question  of  cooperation  in  the 
use  of  outer  space  for  peaceful  purposes  during  the  period 
29  May  to  8  June,  1962.  The  agreed  upon  recommenda- 
tions are  described  in  the  attached  documents,  the  texts 
of  which  have  been  checlied  by  us  in  both  languages  and 
are  identical. 


A.  A.  Blagonravov 


Hugh  L.  Dbyden 


Summary  of  Understandings 
Introduction 

Following  the  exchange  of  views  between  Nilsita  S. 
Khrushchev,  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of 
the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  and  John  F. 
Kennedy,  President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
regarding  cooperation  in  the  exploration  and  use  of 
space  for  peaceful  purposes,  the  USSR  and  U.S.  repre- 
sentatives designated  for  the  purpose  have  discussed  in 
some  detail  the  possibilities  of  cooperation  in  meteorology, 
a  world  geomagnetic  survey,  and  satellite  telecommunica- 
tions. 

In  the  field  of  meteorology,  it  is  important  that  the  two 
satellite  launching  nations  contribute  their  capabilities 
toward  the  establishment  of  a  global  weather  satellite 
system  for  the  benefit  of  other  nations. 

The  compilation  of  a  map  of  the  magnetic  field  of 
the  earth  with  the  aid  of  satellites  is  extremely  important 
both  for  the  further  successful  exploration  of  space  and 
for  advancing  the  science  of  earth  magnetism. 

Telecommunications  by  means  of  satellites  is  expected 
to  lead  to  a  considerable  improvement  of  communications 
facilities  all  over  the  world  and  can  be  a  most  important 
contribution  to  the  extension  of  contacts  and  friendship 
among  nations.  Communication  satellites  can  also  be 
used  for  domestic  needs  within  a  single  country. 

The  USSR  and  U.S.  representatives  have  arrived  at  the 
following  understandings  which  they  agree  to  refer  to 
their  governments  for  consideration. 

Meteorology 

It  is  agreed  that  this  program  falls  naturally  into  two 
stages,  an  experimental  and  an  operational  stage. 

The  first  stage  will  extend  approximately  from  the  pres- 
ent time  through  1963-64  during  the  development  of  ex- 
perimental weather  satellites  by  both  the  USSR  and  the 
U.S. 

In  this  first  stage,  the  two  countries  will  arrange  for  the 
establishment  of  communication  links  adequate  for  the 
transfer,  from  each  to  the  other,  of  the  data  gathered  by 
each  nation  from  its  own  experimental  meteorological  sat- 
ellites. These  communication  links  would  connect  the 
World  Weather  Centers  at  Moscow  and  Washington.  A 
Joint  Working  Group  of  technical  experts  will  meet  in 

I  December  24,   J  962 


October  1962  to  decide  upon  suitable  communication  links 
to  be  established  with  due  regard  to  the  sharing  of  costs 
and  the  Interests  of  other  nations. 

The  Joint  Working  Group  will  also  establish  the  criteria 
for  the  two-vifay  transfer  of  satellite  data  over  such  links, 
with  the  understanding  that  such  transfers  will  include 
selected  cloud-cover  pictures,  especially  related  to  storms, 
vortices,  fronts,  and  the  generation  of  these  phenomena, 
with  geographical  coordinates  provided  for  ail  pictures 
selected,  together  with  nephanalyses  based  upon  the  data 
as  a  whole.  The  Joint  Working  Group  will  agree  upon 
a  date  for  initiating  the  two-way  transfer  of  such  data, 
designating  this  date  with  due  regard  for  the  readiness  of 
the  communication  links  and  the  readiness  of  the  USSR 
and  the  U.S.  to  provide  data  of  approximately  equivalent 
interest.  Data  should  be  exchanged  as  quickly  as  possible. 
The  same  communication  links  would  be  used  to  exchange 
weather  charts,  diagrams,  vertical  cross-sections,  and  the 
material  required  for  solving  the  problems  of  world 
weather,  including  the  extension  of  prediction  periods. 
Coordinated  research  efforts  should  be  directed  toward 
these  goals. 

The  second  stage  of  the  meteorological  satellite  pro- 
gram will  begin  approximately  in  1964-65  and  will  apply 
to  the  coordinated  launchings  by  the  two  nations  of  a  sys- 
tem of  operational  weather  satellites.  In  order  to  prepare 
adequately  and  in  a  timely  fashion  for  such  coordinated 
launchings,  a  second  Joint  Working  Group  will  meet  in 
March  1963  to  determine  mutually  agreeable  launching 
schedules  for  the  operational  satellites,  the  numbers  of 
such  satellites,  their  orbits,  and  the  comparability  (to 
the  degree  desirable)  of  the  characteristics  of  their  sen- 
sors and  the  data  to  be  obtained. 

These  discussions  as  to  satellite  characteristics,  num- 
bers, and  orbits  shall  be  made  with  due  consideration  of 
recommendations  of  the  World  Meteorological  Organiza- 
tion (WMO)  with  regard  to  the  objectives  of  weather-data 
acquisition  by  satellites  for  both  operations  and  research. 

The  two-way  transfer  of  data  during  the  second  stage 
shall  be  determined  by  the  two  nations  and  shall  be  made 
on  a  real-time  basis.  This  transfer  and  the  wider  dissemi- 
nation of  such  data  to  other  nations  will  proceed  with  full 
consideration  of  the  recommendations  and  procedures  of 
the  World  Meteorological  Organization  (WMO).  Neph- 
analyses, pictures  of  cloud  cover,  and  processed  data  on 
radiation  fluxes  will  be  exchanged  mutually. 

World  Geomagnetic  Survey 

It  was  agreed  to  be  useful  to  arrange  for  a  joint  effort 
in  this  field  by  the  coordinated  launching  of  two  artificial 
earth  .satellites  equipped  with  magnetometers  during  the 
period  of  the  International  Year  of  the  Quiet  Sun.  These 
two  satellites  will  be  launched,  one  by  the  USSR  and 
the  other  by  the  U.S.,  on  different  mutually  agreed  orbits. 
The  period  before  the  International  Year  of  the  Quiet 
Sun  will  be  used  by  both  parties  (the  USSR  and  the 
U.S.)  to  continue  magnetic  measurements  in  space  in 
accordance  with  national  work  programs,  with  mutual 
exchange  of  processed  data  of  the  magnetic  measurements. 

The  representatives  of  the  USSR  and  the  U.S.  agreed 
that  it  would  be  desirable  to  establish  a  Joint  Working 
Group,  consisting  of  USSR  and  U.S.  specialists,  for  the 


963 


preliminary  consideration  of  the  scientific  and  technical 
aspects  of  the  compilation  of  a  map  of  the  magnetic  field 
of  the  earth  with  the  aid  of  artificial  earth  satellites. 
In  particular,  the  Joint  Working  Group  is  to  make  rec- 
ommendations on  the  shape  of  the  orbits,  their  angle  of 
inclination  to  the  equator,  the  period  during  which  the 
satellites  are  to  be  operated,  the  necessary  accuracy  of 
measurements,  the  tyi^e  of  magnetometers  to  be  used  on 
the  satellites,  the  methods  of  processing  and  analyzing 
the  data  obtained,  the  methods  of  correcting  them,  and 
so  on. 

Conducting  its  work,  the  .Joint  AA'orking  Group  will 
txike  into  consideraticm  any  possible  recommendations  on 
this  question  of  the  Scientific  and  Technical  Subcommittee 
of  the  UN  Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer 
Space. 

The  parties  agreed  that  it  would  be  desirable  for  the 
members  of  this  Joint  Working  Group  to  be  appointed 
by  each  side  as  soon  as  technically  possible  to  begin  work 
on  the  problems  placed  before  the  group,  by  correspond- 
ence and  by  sub.sequcnt  meetings,  if  necessary. 

The  parties  recognized  that  data  obtained  in  earth 
magnetic  ob.servatories  were  of  particularly  great  impor- 
tance for  the  successful  compilation  of  a  map  of  the  mag- 
netic field  of  the  earth  with  the  aid  of  the  artificial  earth 
satellites.  They  therefore  agreed  to  make  efforts  to  ar- 
range, through  World  Data  Centers  A  and  B,  for  a  prompt 
exchange  of  standard  magnetograms  from  earth  observa- 
tories, and  to  arrange  that  these  magnetograms  contain 
all  the  data  required  for  their  use  for  analyzing  the  data 
acquired  by  satellites.  Each  side  agreed  to  use  its  influ- 
ence with  non-governmental  organizations  (such  as  the 
International  Committee  on  Geophysics  (CIG),  the  Com- 
mittee on  Space  Research  (COSPAK).  and  others)  to 
expedite  the  transmission  to  World  Data  Centers  A  and 
B  of  the  necessary  earth  magnetic  data  from  third  coun- 
tries cooperating  with  the  USSR  and  U.S. 

SatelHte  Telecommunications 

Recognizing  the  role  of  the  International  Telecommuni- 
cations Union  and  the  importance  of  the  establishment 
of  bilateral  cooperation  between  the  USSR  and  the  U.S. 
in  the  exploration  and  peaceful  use  of  outer  space,  we 
submit  the  following  recommendations : 

In  1902-C3  the  USSR  and  the  U.S.  agree  to  cooperate 
in  experiments  on  communication  by  means  of  the  U.S. 
satelUte  "Echo  A-12". 

We  agree  to  give  further  consideration  to  the  possibil- 
ities of  cooperation  in  joint  experiments  using  active 
satellites  that  may  be  launched  by  either  nation  in  the 
future,  including  the  mutual  exchange  of  information  on 
the  results  of  such  experiments,  and  to  resume  discus- 
sions of  these  possibilities  at  our  next  series  of  meetings. 

Among  the  problems  which  should  be  discussed  at  the 
following  meetings  is  that  of  the  preparation  for  the  work- 
ing out  with  other  nations  of  a  project  for  an  experi- 
mental global  system  of  space  communications  with  due 
regard  to  the  recommendations  of  the  ITU. 

CoticUtsion 
The  recommendations  proi)osed  at  the  present  stage  of 
the   bilateral   discussions  by   the  representatives  of  the 


USSR  and  the  U.S.  have  a  preliminary  character  and  will 
be  presented  by  both  parties  to  their  governments  through 
appropriate  agencies  for  final  consideration.  If  either  of 
the  two  parties  finds  it  necessary  to  make  any  corrections, 
additions,  or  deletions  in  the  text  of  the  prepared  docu- 
ments, then  all  of  these  changes  should  be  made  within 
the  period  of  two  months  from  this  date  by  correspond- 
ence, which  will  be  sent  to  the  following  address  in 
Moscow : 

Academy  of  Sciences  of  the  USSR 
Leninsk :  Prospekt  14 
Moscow 
USSR 

and  to  the  following  address  in  Washington :  , 

National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration 
Attention ;  Dr.  Hugh  L.  Dryden 
400  Maryland  Avenue,  S.W. 
Washington  25,  D.C.,  U.S.A. 

Geneva,  June  S,  1962 

Appendix 

The  following  persons  participated  in  the  discussions : 

USSR  Representatives 

Academician  A.  A.  Blagonravov 
Deputy  Minister  I.  V.  Klokov 
Professor  Y.  D.  Kalinin 
Professor  V.  A.  Bugaev 
Mr.  Y.  A.  Barinov 
Mr.  G.  S.  Stashevsky 

U.S.  Representatives 

Dr.  Hugh  L.  Dryden 
Professor  Donald  F.  Hornig 
Dr.  John  W.  Townsend,  Jr. 

Other  U.S.  Consultants 

Mr.  Arnold  W.  Frutkin 
Mr.  Howard  Furnas 
Dr.  Richard  W.  Porter 
Dr.  Harry  Wexler 
Dr.  James  P.  Heppner 
Mr.  Philip  II.  Valdes 
Congressman  George  P.  Miller 
Congressman  James  G.  Fulton 


EXCHANGE  OF  NOTES 

U.S.  Note  of  August  29 

The  Embassy  of  the  United  States  of  America  presents 
its  compliments  to  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
USSR  and  has  the  honor  to  refer  to  the  technical  agree- 
ment reached  in  Geneva  on  June  8,  10G2,  by  representa- 
tives of  the  USSR  and  the  United  States  of  America, 
headed  by  Academician  Blagonravov  and  Dr.  Hugh 
Dryden  on  cooperation  in  space  activities. 

The  Embassy  recalls  that  the  agreement  of  June  8  took 
the  form  of  recommendations  submitted  to  the  two  gov- 


^ 


1 ' 


964 


Department  of  S/ofe   Bulletin 


ernments  for  final  consideration,  and  specified  a  jwriod  of 
two  months  during  wlaich  either  side  could  propose  changes 
of  in  the  agreement.  On  July  9,  19G2,  Dr.  Dryden  wrote  to 
Academician  Blagonravov  informing  him  that  as  United 
States  technical  representative  he  had  no  changes  to  pro- 
pose on  behalf  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

As  the  period  of  two  months  has  elapsed  and  as 
Academician  Blagonravov  has  not  proposed  changes,  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America  therefore 
proposes  to  the  Government  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Social- 
ist Republics  an  exchange  of  notes  referring  to  and  con- 
firming the  agreement  of  June  8.  This  exchange  could 
take  place  in  Moscow  or  Washington,  as  the  Government 
of    the    Union    of    Soviet    Socialist    Republics    prefers. 

Soviet  Note  of  October  12 

No.  49/USA 

The  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  USSR  presents 
its  compliments  to  the  Embassy  of  the  USA  and  in  con- 
nection with  the  Embassy's  note  No.  216  of  August  29, 
1962,  has  the  honor  to  state  the  following. 

In  the  course  of  a  meeting  at  Geneva  of  USA  and 
USSR  scientists  which  took  place  in  June,  1962,  technical 
recommendations  on  several  questions  of  cooperation  in 
the  field  of  the  peaceful  research  of  the  use  of  outer  space 
were  agreed  upon  between  the  Academy  of  Sciences  of  the 
USSR  and  the  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Adminis- 
tration of  the  USA. 

On  September  13,  1962  Academician  A.  A.  Blagonravov, 
during  the  course  of  his  stay  in  New  York  for  a  session 
of  the  UN  Committee  on  the  use  of  space  for  peaceful 
purposes,  informed  NASA  representative,  Mr.  A.  Frutkin 
of  the  approval  by  the  Soviet  side  of  the  aforementioned 
recommendations  of  the  .scientists  regarding  outer  space. 

The  President  of  the  Academy  of  Sciences  of  the  USSR 
is  sending  the  Director  of  NASA  appropriate  official  noti- 
fication on  this  question. 

Moscow 
October  12,  1962 


EXCHANGE  OF  LETTERS 

Mr.  Keldysh  to  Mr.  Webb  * 

October  12, 1962 
Dear  Mk.  Webb  :  Referring  to  the  agreement  on  coopera- 
tion in  the  peaceful  exploration  and  uses  of  outer  .space 
which  was  reached  during  the  meetings  between  delega- 
tions of  Soviet  and  American  scientists,  headed  by  Dr. 
Hugh  Dryden  and  Academician  A.  A.  Blagonravov,  in  June 
of  1962,  the  Academy  of  Sciences  of  the  USSR  notes  that 
neither  .side  has  proposed  within  the  sijecified  period  of 


'  James  E.  Webb,  Administrator,  National  Aeronautics 
and  Space  Administration. 


time  any  changes  or  additions  to  the  text  of  the  recom- 
mendations as  agreed  in  Geneva. 

In  view  of  this,  we  consider  the  above  named  agreement 
to  have  thus  entered  into  force  and  are  informing  you 
herewith  that  Soviet  scientists  are  prepared  to  commence 
its  implementation. 

The  Academy  of  Sciences  of  the  USSR  expresses  the 
hope  that  the  agreement  on  cooperation  in  the  peaceful  ex- 
ploration and  use  of  outer  space  will  provide  a  good  be- 
ginning for  the  further  development  and  exprtn.sion  of 
cooperation  between  Soviet  and  American  scientists  in  this 
noble  task  for  the  sake  of  scientific  progress  and  the 
strengthening  of  peace  on  earth. 
Respectfully  yours. 

M.  V.  Keliiysii 
President, 

Academy  of  Sciences  of 
the  USSR 

Mr.  Webb  to  Mr.  Keldysh 

October  30,  1962 
Dear  President  Keldysh  :  This  will  acknowledge  your 
letter  of  October  12,  1962,  expressing  the  desire  of  the 
USSR  Academy  of  Sciences  to  commence  implementation 
of  the  agreement  reached  in  Geneva  last  June  by  Dr. 
Dryden  and  Academician  Blagonravov.  Since  our  two 
governments  have  now  confirmed  this  agreement,  I  believe 
such  a  step  to  be  appropriate  and  desirable. 

1  am  asking  Dr.  Dryden  to  communicate  with  Academi- 
cian Blagonravov  in  order  to  establish  mutually  agreeable 
dates  for  convening  working  groups  to  begin  this  agreed 
cooperative  program. 

I  hope,  with  you,  that  this  first  step  will  be  a  fruitful 
one,  and  that  it  will  lead  to  other  such  steps. 
Sincerely  yours, 

James  E.  Webb 


Effective  Date  of  Mew  Tariff 
Schedules  Postponed 

The  Treasury  Department  annoimced  on  De- 
cember 3  that  the  new  U.S.  tariff  schedules  pro- 
vided for  in  the  Tariff  Classification  Act  of  1962 
will  not  go  into  effect  on  January  1,  1963,  as  orig- 
inally planned.^ 

The  decision  to  delay  the  effective  date  of  the 
new  schedules  was  reached  on  an  interagency  level, 
with  representation  by  the  Departments  of  State, 
Treasury,  Defense,  Interior,  Agi-iculture,  Com- 
merce, and  Labor. 

The  date  on  which  they  will  be  made  effective 
will  be  announced  later. 


'  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  July  2,  1962,  p.  25. 


iecember  24,    7962 

668972—62 3 


965 


Role  of  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  in  U.S.  Foreign  Policy 


Following  are  remarks  made  by  Harrlan  Cleve- 
land^ Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Interna- 
tional Organization  Affairs,  arid  Henry  D.  S?nyth, 
UjS.  Representative  to  tlie  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency,  before  the  Atomic  Industrial 
Forum,  at  Washington,  B.C.,  on  November  28. 


REMARKS  BY  MR.  CLEVELAND 

Press  release  697  dated  November  28 

The  United  States  is  today  a  dues-paying  mem- 
ber of  51  international  organizations.  Taken  to- 
gether with  22  related  international  programs,  we 
are  fraternizing  in  tliis  fashion  at  a  cost  of  more 
than  $300  million  a  year,  which  is  about  30  times 
the  greens  fee  for  the  same  course  in  1945. 

These  organizations  are  busy  doing  things  that 
we  want  done.  They  do  some  things  well,  some 
indifferently,  a  few  rather  badly.  At  their  best, 
they  are  able  to  put  together  men,  money,  and  in- 
fluence from  many  nations  and  thereby  operate 
more  eifectively,  especially  in  sensitive  functions 
and  sensitive  new  nations,  than  any  single  nation 
could  do.  Fortunately  we  have  stojjped  arguing 
among  ourselves  that  tiresome  theoretical  question 
of  whether  aid  programs  should  be  organized  on 
a  bilateral  or  a  multilateral  basis.  AVe  now  know 
that  neither  is  ideal  for  all  purposes.  Tlie  rele- 
vant query  is :  If  there  is  a  particular  function  we 
want  performed,  what  kind  of  organization  has 
the  comparative  advantage  in  performing  it? 

To  answer  this  question  in  specific  and  practical 
detail  the  United  States  Government  is  now  en- 
gaged in  a  deep  audit  of  every  member  of  the  IJ.N. 
family  of  organizations.'  Our  purpose  is  to 
strengthen  those  that  are  weak,  to  provide  a  sense 
of  direction  for  tliose  that  lack  it,  and  to  give  fuller 
rein  to  tliose  that  are  working  well. 


•  Kor  Ixukyround,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  5,  19C2,  p.  710. 
966 


In  the  family  of  international  organizations 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  is  still 
an  infant.  At  its  birth  it  was  widely  believed  that 
nuclear  fuel  would  be  in  desperately  short  supply 
and  that  the  competitive  advantage  of  nuclear 
power  would  be  obvious.  When  the  world  turned 
out  to  have  more  nuclear  fuel  than  it  yet  needed, 
half  of  the  case  for  haidng  an  international  agency 
at  all  was  already  in  question;  if  you  don't  have 
a  bottleneck,  you  don't  need  a  controller  at  the 
supply  gate.  When  the  widespread  development 
of  nuclear  power  did  not  turn  out  to  be  just  around 
the  corner,  another  part  of  the  Agency's  raison 
dPetre  also  was  called  into  question. 

And  so  it  took  3  years  to  get  the  Agency  es- 
tablished at  all  and  5  more  years  for  the  new 
Agency,  groping  its  way  into  a  new  field,  to  de- 
cide what  it  ought  to  do  in  addition  to  developing 
international  safeguards  against  the  diversion  of 
atomic  fuels  to  military  purposes.  As  an  agency 
in  search  of  a  function,  it  established  itself  rather 
surprisingly  well.  Lacking  the  central  functions 
which  it  might  have  had,  it  built  its  staff  around 
the  peripheral  tasks  that  came  readily  to  hand :  a 
fellowship  program,  a  teclmical  assistance  pro- 
gram, a  small  research  activity,  a  series  of  scien- 
tific and  technical  conferences.  It  was  not  clear 
tliat  a  big  new  agency  was  needed  for  just  these 
puri)oses,  but  once  the  Agency  was  formed  under 
the  glittering  symbol  of  Atoms- for- Peace,  with  the 
full  political  commitment  of  the  United  States 
and  the  grudging  acquiescence  of  the  Soviet 
Union,  it  started  doing  what  came  naturally  and 
nobody  suggested  that  it  stop. 

Conclusions  of  Smyth  Report 

That  brings  us  to  1962  and  the  future  of  this 
same  organization.  As  you  know,  the  Department 
of  State  established  a  special  review  committee  to 
lielp  us  decide  what  kind  of  future  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency  ought  to  have  and 

Department  of  State   Bulletin 


the  nature  and  degree  of  United  States  interest  in 
supporting  it.-  Elsewhere  on  this  program  Dr. 
Henry  Smytli,  United  States  Ambassador  to  the 
International  Agency,  has  summed  up  the  report 
that  was  produced  by  the  Advisory  Committee  he 
headed.  But  if  I  may  risk  a  layman's  precis  of 
an  expert's  summary,  I  think  the  Government  got 
three  main  things  out  of  this  new  "Smyth  report" : 

First,  the  Committee  gave  us  a  new  judgment 
about  the  future  of  nuclear  power,  stressing  the 
point  that  it  would  be  increasingly  imiwrtant  in 
a  number  of  areas  of  the  world  during  the  next 
few  years.  (The  Committee  did  not  make  a  judg- 
ment about  the  competitiveness  of  atomic  power 
in  the  United  States;  but  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  has  just  provided  a  new  and  some- 
what more  bullish  prognosis  on  that  subject  too.) 

Second,  the  report  underscored  the  vital  func- 
tion of  the  Agency  in  helping  the  newly  develop- 
ing nations  to  build  up  the  skills  and  institutions 
they  will  need  to  handle  the  newly  developing 
technology  of  atomic  energy. 

Third,  on  the  assumption  that  there  will  be  a 
marked  expansion  of  atomic  installations  around 
the  world,  the  Committee  highlighted  the  very 
special  role  the  Agency  should  play  in  establish- 
ing international  safeguards  against  the  diversion 
of  nuclear  products  to  military  purposes. 

The  United  States  believes  that  safeguards  of 
some  kind  must  be  applied  to  all  peaceful  nuclear 
materials  and  equipment  that  are  transferred  be- 
tween states.  Much  recent  evidence,  including  Dr. 
Smyth's  report  and  the  evaluations  of  the  Atomic 
Energy  Conunission,  point  to  a  world  that  will 
before  long  be  dotted  with  power  reactors.  Each 
one  of  these  contains  the  seed  of  warmaking 
potentials. 

Obviously  a  safeguard  system  by  itself  cannot 
stop  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons.  It  cannot 
prevent  the  development  by  nations  of  their  own 
nuclear  weapons  and  is  meaningless  for  comitries 
that  are  already  atomic  powers.  But  it  can  serve 
as  a  partial  brake  on  nuclear  proliferation  by  pre- 
venting countries  from  cheating  their  way  into 
the  nuclear  club. 


^  For  a  statement  made  by  Mr.  Cleveland  before  the 
Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  on  Aug.  2  and  an 
excerpt  from  the  report  of  the  Advisory  Committee  on 
U.S.  Policy  Toward  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  see  ihid.,  Aug.  27, 1962,  p.  326. 


Advantages  of  Multilateral  Safeguards 

I  noted  earlier  that  the  United  States  was  prag- 
matic, not  doctrinaire,  in  its  choice  between  bilat- 
eral and  multilateral  institutions  as  instruments  of 
our  foreign  policy.  This  is  true  in  the  nuclear  as 
well  as  in  the  foreign  aid  field.  But  I  also  sug- 
gested that  the  relevant  question  was  what  kind  of 
organization  has  the  comparative  advantage  in 
performing  the  particular  task  at  hand.  In  the 
case  of  nuclear  safeguards  the  answer  is  very 
clear.  There  are  at  least  four  solid  practical  rea- 
sons why  the  multilateral  safeguards  of  the  IAEA 
are  to  be  preferred  to  bilateral  safeguards : 

First,  under  a  single  system  administered  by 
one  international  organization  there  is  bound  to 
be  a  greater  uniformity  in  the  application  of  safe- 
guards than  there  will  be  if  5,  10,  or  15  countries 
each  conduct  their  own  inspection. 

Second,  inspection  conducted  by  international 
inspectors  of  diifering  nationalities  is  more  likely 
to  eliminate  the  possibility  of  fraud  and  will  cer- 
tainly present  more  credible  evidence  to  the  world 
that  materials  and  equipment  are  not  being  di- 
verted to  military  purposes,  especially  if  the  ma- 
terials have  been  supplied  by  a  rival  power. 

Third,  experience  gained  in  international  in- 
spection is  the  only  kind  that  is  relevant  to  prob- 
lems of  arms  control  and  disarmament. 

Fourth,  in  terms  of  cost  and  efficiency,  inter- 
nationally administered  safeguards  require  only 
one  organization,  thus  eliminating  the  cost  and 
difficulty  of  many  different  countries'  establishing 
their  own  inspection  corps. 

In  emphasizing  the  practical  value  of  IAEA 
safeguards,  we  would  do  well  to  distinguish  clearly 
between  the  Agency's  safeguards  function  and  its 
supplier  function.  It  is  doubtful  that  the  IAEA 
will  play  a  major  role  as  the  supplier  of  nuclear 
fuels  in  the  foreseeable  future.  But  it  can  be  sig- 
nificant in  three-cornered  arrangements  in  which 
its  safeguards  are  applied  pursuant  to  the  trans- 
fer of  nuclear  materials  between  supplier  and  re- 
ceiving countries. 

If  the  United  States  believes  in  the  practical 
value  of  IAEA  safeguards,  what  is  it  proposing 
to  do  about  it  ? 

We  should  work  hard  toward  achieving  an  in- 
ternational consensus  on  the  superiority  of  the 
international  safeguards  system. 

We  are  trying  to  extend  the  coverage  of  the 
IAEA  system  to  power  reactors  as  well  as  re- 


December  24,  7962 


967 


search  reactors.  As  you  know,  the  present  sys- 
tem is  limited  to  power  level?  below  100  mei^awatts 
(thermal).  This  limitation  was  justifiable  in  the 
early  experimental  period.  But,  as  I  indicated 
earlier,  a  number  of  countries  will  soon  be  com- 
pleting larjrer  reactors  for  commercial  purposes. 
It  is  these  larger  reactors  which  pose  the  prin- 
cipal danger  of  diversion  of  fuels  for  military 
purposes.  In  the  face  of  this  situation  it  would 
make  little  sense  to  apply  the  IAEA  safeguards  to 
the  research  reactors  wdiile  ignoring  the  larger 
installations. 

In  summarj',  then,  we  are  clear  in  our  view  that, 
after  a  shaky  start,  the  IAEA  has  evolved  some 
valuable  programs,  like  technical  assistance,  fel- 
lowships, and  conferences,  which  merit  our  con- 
tinued support;  that  the  IAEA  will  have  much 
more — and  more  important — work  to  do  in  the 
near  future;  and  that  its  international  safegiiards 
system  is  definitely  to  be  preferred  to  bilateral 
supervision. 

REMARKS  BY  DR.  SMYTH' 

Press  release  698  dated  November  28 

I  take  it  my  assignment  this  morning  is  to  re- 
view the  role  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  in  Vienna  in  United  States  foreign  policy. 
The  Agency  is  of  course  only  one  of  the  means  now- 
used  by  the  United  States  to  promote  the  peaceful 
uses  of  atomic  energy.  It  is,  however,  the  only 
international  organization  of  worldwide  repre- 
sentation concerned  with  the  peaceful  uses  of 
atomic  energy.  I  shall  review  its  organization 
briefly  but  try  to  spend  most  of  my  time  on  the 
functions  which  the  Agency  discharges,  on  its  fu- 
ture possibilities,  and  on  the  flavor  of  the  meetings 
of  the  Board  of  Governors  and  the  General 
Conference. 

It  is  easy  to  say  that  the  Agency  was  founded  on 
two  fallacies.  In  fact  I  have  said  so  myself,  all 
too  glibly.  I  am  sure  that  it  is  possible  to  cite 
many  historical  examples  of  institutions  or  ideas 
that  turned  out  to  be  extremely  useful  even  though 
assumptions  on  which  they  were  based  proved  to 
be  fallacious. 


'  For  an  announcement  of  Ambassador  Smyth's  desifrna- 
tion  as  adviser  to  Mr.  Cleveland  and  to  Ragnar  Rollefson, 
Director  of  the  Oflice  of  International  Scientific  Affairs, 
see  Department  of  State  press  release  70.5  dated  Dec.  1. 


But  I  do  not  think  even  this  kind  of  an  argument; 
is  necessary  to  justify  the  establishment  of  the 
Agency,  since  I  think  the  basic  assumption  on 
which  it  was  made  was  a  correct  one.  This  basic 
assumption  was  that  nuclear  energy  could  meet 
the  rapidly  increasing  energy  needs  of  modern 
industrial  civilization  around  the  world.  To  be 
sure,  the  detailed  assumptions  were  wrong  as  to 
timing.  When  the  Agency  was  first  envisaged 
in  1954,  it  was  believed  that  nuclear  powerplants 
would  be  cheap  and  that  uranium  to  furnish  fuel 
for  such  plants  would  be  scarce.  In  fact  the 
technology  of  cheap  nuclear  power  has  proven 
difficult  to  develop,  and  uranium  is  far  more  plen- 
tiful than  had  been  supposed. 

In  the  5  years  since  the  Agency  was  actually 
established  the  tecluiology  of  nuclear  power  has 
developed  to  the  point  where  it  is  now  competi- 
tive or  on  the  verge  of  being  competitive  with  con- 
ventional power  in  many  parts  of  the  world.  Con- 
sequently the  fir.st  assumption  on  which  the 
Agency  was  based  may  have  been  fallacious  at 
the  time  it  was  made  but  is  now  becoming  valid. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  widespread  use  of 
nuclear  power,  it  is  fortunate  that  the  second 
assumption — scarcity  of  uranium — has  proven  to 
be  wrong.  It  is  now  apparent  that  there  is  enough 
uranium  available  around  the  world  immediately 
to  supplement  the  use  of  conventional  fuels  and 
ultunately  to  supplant  them  to  a  great  extent  once 
the  technology  of  breeder  reactors  has  been 
developed. 

Present  Activities  of  IAEA 

I  believe  that  nuclear  power  is  the  most  impor- 
tant factor  in  the  future  of  the  peaceful  uses  of 
atomic  energy.  Contributions  to  the  spread  of  nu- 
clear power  must  therefore  be  important  in  the 
future  of  the  Agency.  But  there  are  many  other 
activities  in  which  the  Agency  has  proven  useful 
in  the  past  and  which  will  continue  to  be 
important.  These  activities  range  from  those 
which  clearly  are  best  done  by  an  international 
agency  dedicated  to  atomic  energy-  to  those  which 
might  conceivably  be  handled  through  other 
means. 

In  the  first  category  are  the  studies  of  liealth  and 
safety  problems  arising  out  of  the  use  of  atomic 
energ}'  in  various  forms.  Such  studies  involve 
both  legal  and  technical  questions.  The  Agency 
has  made  considerable  progress  in  these  areas.    It 


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Department   of  Stale   Bulletin         h 


has,  for  example,  drawn  up  a  code  for  the  safe 
transport  of  radioactive  materials.  It  has  also  set 
up  health  and  safety  standards.  It  has  concerned 
itself  with  nuclear  accidents  and  liability  prob- 
lems arising  from  them. 

The  Agency  laboratory  at  Seibersdorf  is  active 
in  standardizing  sources  of  various  radioactive 
isotopes  and  has  also  done  appropriate  research  in 
connection  with  health  and  safety  standards.  Re- 
search in  the  use  of  radioisotopes  is  supported  by 
the  Agency,  both  directly  at  Seibersdorf  and  by 
contract  elsewhere. 

In  the  field  of  management  of  radioactive  wastes 
the  limited  financial  resources  of  the  Agency  pre- 
vent it  from  doing  research  on  a  scale  comparable 
with  that  done  by  the  major  atomic  nations.  Nev- 
ertheless the  Agency  has  a  role  in  research  on  prob- 
lems of  a  peculiarly  international  character  in 
this  field. 

Technical  Conferences  and  Technical  Assistance 

One  of  the  major  activities  of  the  Agency  dur- 
ing its  5  years  of  existence  has  been  to  convene 
small  technical  conferences  in  such  fields  as  liabil- 
ity and  waste  management  but  also  in  many  other 
fields  of  atomic  energy.  These  specialized  con- 
ferences have  served  an  extremely  useful  purpose. 
While  some  of  them  might  well  have  been  con- 
vened by  other  organizations,  there  is  a  real 
advantage  in  having  a  permanent  organization 
interested  in  arranging  such  affairs  and  choosing 
topics  in  a  systematic  way.  I  might  cite  as  an  ex- 
ample one  of  the  more  successful  conferences,  that 
on  plasma  physics  and  controlled  nuclear  fusion 
research,  held  in  Salzburg  in  September  1961. 
That  particular  conference  was  probably  of  most 
interest  to  the  most  technically  advanced  mem- 
bers of  the  Agency.  On  the  other  hand,  many  of 
the  Agency  conferences  are  aimed  specifically  at 
the  scientific  problems  of  the  lesser  developed 
countries  in  the  Agency.  A  particular  example 
which  seems  to  me  of  importance  is  a  series  of 
conferences  under  Agency  ausj^ices  having  to  do 
with  the  use  of  research  reactors.  There  are  many 
such  reactors  available  around  the  world,  some- 
itimes  in  areas  where  tlie  number  of  knowledgeable 
scientists  available  to  use  them  is  very  limited. 
The  Agency  plays  an  important  role  in  suggesting 
how  such  reactors  can  be  used  for  research,  for 
jiproducing  short-lived  isotopes,  for  training,  and 


for  the  stimulation  of  scientific  activity  in  the 
countries  where  they  have  been  placed. 

The  Agency  has  been  invited  by  several  member 
states  to  make  studies  of  the  practicability  of  nu- 
clear power  in  their  countries.  These  have  been 
increasingly  valuable  as  the  Agency  has  gained  in 
experience.  Probably  this  activity  of  the  Agency 
will  increase. 

To  many  member  countries  of  the  Agency,  prob- 
ably in  fact  to  the  majority,  the  most  welcome 
activity  of  the  Agency  comes  under  the  general 
heading  of  technical  assistance.  I  must  admit 
that  such  activities  might  be  carried  out  by  other 
agencies  than  the  IAEA.  Nevertheless  they  are 
related  specifically  to  atomic  energy  and  are  cer- 
tainly perfectly  appropriate  for  the  Agency. 
There  are  three  major  aspects  of  the  technical  as- 
sistance program.  The  first  is  the  provision  of 
fellowships  for  advanced  training;  the  second  is 
the  provision  of  visiting  experts,  either  on  a  short- 
term  basis  or  for  periods  of  a  year  or  more ;  and  the 
third  is  the  provision  of  equipment  gi'ants.  Of 
course  all  three  of  these  activities  are  limited  to 
the  general  field  of  atomic  energy.  It  is  my  per- 
sonal belief  that  in  cari-ying  out  this  program  of 
technical  assistance  the  definition  of  "atomic  en- 
ergy" should  be  interpreted  as  broadly  as  possible. 

It  has  been  suggested  at  various  times  not  only 
that  "atomic  energy"  should  be  broadly  inter- 
preted but  that  the  IAEA  might  well  be  expanded 
to  cover  broader  activities  in  science  than  can  rea- 
sonably be  classed  as  atomic  energy.  Wliile  I  be- 
lieve this  possibility  should  be  borne  in  mind 
and  explored  from  time  to  time,  I  think  any  de- 
cision along  these  lines  would  be  premature  in 
the  light  of  the  present  status  of  the  Agency. 

Safeguards  To  Retard  Spread  of  Atomic  Armaments 

I  have  listed  most  of  the  present  activities  of 
the  Agency  and  have  suggested  that  nuclear  pow- 
er must  be  a  major  concern  of  the  Agency  in  the 
near  future.  There  is  one  other  aspect  of  the 
Agency's  work  which  I  should  discuss  at  this 
point. 

Not  only  the  United  States  but  every  other  coun- 
ti"y  which  has  developed  nuclear  weapons,  and 
many  which  have  not,  have  been  concerned  with 
the  possible  fabrication  of  nuclear  weapons  by 
countries  not  now  having  them.  Unfortunately  it 
is  impossible  to  operate  nuclear  powerplants  with- 


)ecember  24,   7962 


969 


out  making  material  that  could  be  converted  into 
nuclear  weapons.  Whenever  the  United  States  lias 
supplied  nuclear  material  to  other  countries  for  use 
in  reactors,  it  has  set  up  a  system  of  safeguards 
against  the  diversion  of  this  material,  or  of  prod- 
ucts resulting  from  its  operation,  to  military  use. 
The  United  States  continues  to  consider  such  a 
system  of  safeguards  of  major  importance. 

Teclmically  a  country  which  has  no  intention 
of  diverting  material  to  military  purposes  will 
not  lind  a  safeguards  system  burdensome.  The 
kinds  of  control  over  the  materials  involved  and 
the  equipment  use  which  are  involved  in  the  safe- 
guards system  are  exactly  the  kinds  of  control  that 
prudent  management  would  require.  The  hesita- 
tion of  some  countries  to  accept  the  safeguards 
system  arises  from  psychological  and  political  re- 
luctance to  receive  external  inspectors,  which  any 
effective  safeguards  system  requires.  Although 
the  United  States  has  established  bilateral  safe- 
guards in  manj'  cases  and  has  encountered  no 
significant  resistance  to  its  inspectors,  the  United 
States  believes  tliat  tliere  are  many  advantages 
in  an  international  safeguards  system. 

Such  a  system  was  set  up  by  the  IAEA  with  the 
approval  of  the  General  Conference  of  1960.  Al- 
tliough  at  present  the  system  that  has  been  for- 
mally worked  out  and  described  in  documents 
publicly  available  covers  reactors  of  a  power  level 
up  to  100  megawatts  thermal,  there  appears  to 
be  no  technical  difficulty  in  extending  such  a 
system  to  higlier  power  levels.  The  IAEA  by  now 
has  acquired  some  experience  in  carrying  out  its 
safegiuirds  system.  In  fact  the  United  States  has 
put  four  of  its  own  reactors  under  this  system  * 
and  two  inspections  have  been  carried  out.  While 
the  negotiation  of  the  detailed  agreement  cover- 
ing these  four  reactors  and  the  inspections  them- 
selves showed  up  a  number  of  problems,  none  of 
them  have  proved  insuperable. 

We  should  not  suppose  that  the  responsible  offi- 
cials in  the  United  States  Government  who  believe 
in  a  safeguards  system,  and  more  specifically  in 
an  IAEA  safeguards  system,  are  so  naive  as  to 
suppose  that  this  will  automatically  prevent  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons.  We  believe  that  sucli 
a  technical  system  of  control  will  lessen  the  prob- 


*  For  an  announcement  of  the  signing  of  an  agreement 
between  the  United  States  and  IAEA,  see  Bulletin  of 
Apr.  2.3, 19C2,  p.  09C. 


970 


ability  of  illicit  diversion  of  nuclear  material  to 
military  purposes  and  will  increase  the  probability 
that  any  such  diversion  would  become  known  at 
an  early  date.  Clearly  every  appropriate  political 
and  diplomatic  effort  also  needs  to  be  made  to  deter 
countries  from  developing  atomic  weapons.  But 
it  is  the  point  of  view  of  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment that  any  step  that  tends  to  retard  the  spread 
of  atomic  armaments  is  worth  taking. 

How  the  IAEA  Is  Organized 

Turning  now  to  the  question  of  how  the  IAEA  is 
organized,  I  think  I  will  confine  myself  to  an  out- 
line, leaving  comment  to  those  who  are  more 
expert  than  I  in  international  organizations.  At 
present  78  nations  belong  to  the  IAEA.  Once  a 
year  there  is  a  meeting,  called  the  General  Confer- 
ence, of  representatives  of  all  these  nations  in 
Vienna.  For  more  detailed  control  of  the  Agency 
there  is  a  Board  of  Governors,  which  currently 
consists  of  23  members  but  will  shortly  be  enlarged 
to  25.  In  the  early  days  of  the  Agency  the  Board 
of  Governors  met  with  great  frequency.  During 
1962  there  have  been  five  meetings  of  the  Board, 
one  in  March,  one  in  June,  one  for  a  special  pur- 
pose in  July,  one  just  before  the  General  Confer- 
ence in  September,  and  one  just  after  the  General 
Conference.  Naturally  the  Board  has  various  ap- 
propriate committees  for  the  review  of  the  budget, 
programs,  and  so  forth.  I  believe,  and  many  share 
tliis  view,  that  the  costs  of  the  General  Conference 
and  of  the  Board  meetings,  though  considerably 
reduced  in  the  last  year  or  so,  are  still  out  of  pro- 
portion to  the  total  budget  of  the  Agency.  Various 
suggestions  have  been  made  to  reduce  this  propor- 
tion, the  most  drastic  of  which  would  be  to  have 
the  General  Conference  biennially. 

While  I  am  speaking  of  expenses  I  should  re- 
mind you  that  the  Agency  costs  relatively  little 
to  operate.  The  budget  is  $7  million  a  year.  Per- 
sonally I  think  the  technical  and  political  value 
of  the  Agency  is  far  greater  than  the  small  budget 
implies. 

Probably  the  most  important  question  before 
the  Agency  at  the  moment  is  long-range  planning. 
At  tlie  behest  of  the  General  Conference,  but  with 
the  enthusiastic  agreement  of  the  Director  Gen- 
eral, the  Agency  is  drawing  up  a  plan  for  its  activ- 
ities over  the  next  5  years.  You  all  know  how 
useful  such  an  exercise  can  be  for  any  institution. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


«l 


J 


I  am  sure  you  also  know  that  any  such  plan  must 
be  guiding,  not  binding,  for  an  agency  operating 
in  a  rapidly  developing  field.  It  is  a  particularly 
oi^portune  time  for  the  Agency  to  examine  itself 
and  its  future.  The  Agency  is  5  years  old;  its 
present  director,  Dr.  A.  Sigvard  Eklund  of  Swe- 
den, has  been  on  the  job  just  a  year,  and  there  is  a 
resurgence  of  restrained  optimism  about  tlie  future 
of  nuclear  power. 

But  we  have  to  remember  that  the  future  of  the 
Agency  depends  not  only  on  the  vision  and  compe- 
tence of  the  Director  General  and  his  staff  but  on 
the  nature  of  the  support  he  gets  from  the  member 
nations  and  their  re^jresentatives. 

Idealistically  the  member  states  should  think  of 
the  Agency  as  an  international  body  having  a  sub- 
stantive job  to  do,  namely,  to  spread  the  benefits 
of  the  greatest  scientific  discovery  of  our  time  as 
wide!}'  as  possible  and  as  quickly  as  possible.  I 
believe  that  in  the  long  run  tlie  value  of  the 
Agency  to  all  tlie  member  states  will  be  in  direct 
relation  to  tlie  support  that  is  given  to  this  ideal. 
But  other  positions  can  be  taken  and  frequently 
have  been.  The  Agency  can  be  viewed  as  a  means 
of  enhancing  the  prestige  of  various  member 
states.  It  can  be  viewed  as  an  agency  distributing 
technical  aid  supplied  by  advanced  nations  to 
lesser  developed  ones.  It  can  be  viewed  as  a 
political  forum  for  diplomatic  maneuver  and  for 
propaganda  speeches  appropriate  to  international 
organizations  that  are  frankly  political.  All 
these  viewpoints  and  variations  of  them  have  ap- 
peared in  tlie  General  Conference  and  the  meetings 
of  the  Board  of  Governors. 

Yet  in  the  past  year  there  has  been  a  noticeable 
change  in  the  atmosphere  of  these  meetings.  Po- 
litical tirades  have  become  less  frequent,  less 
heated.  Substantive  discussions  on  such  questions 
as  a  theoretical  physics  institute  have  been  carried 
out,  with  constructive  comments  or  reasonable 
doubts  coming  from  a  great  variety  of  members, 
regardless  of  traditional  political  alinement. 
Whether  this  change  of  atmosphere  will  continue 
remains  to  be  seen.  As  more  and  more  substantive 
tasks  emerge  that  are  appropriate  for  tlie  Agency, 
I  believe  political  bickering  can  be  minimized. 

The  United  States  was  largely  responsible  for 
setting  up  the  Agency.  It  has  a  continuing  re- 
sponsibility for  making  it  work.  I  have  every 
hope  and  expectation  that  the  Agency  can  grow  in 
effectiveness  and  importance. 


Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 
Personnel  Presents  Report 

Statement  hy  Secretary  Rusk 

Press  release  714  dated  December  6,  for  release  December  8 

On  behalf  of  the  Department  of  State,  and  for 
myself,  I  should  like  to  express  appreciation  to 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  Personnel  and 
its  12  distinguished  members  who  produced  the 
impressive  report  Personnel  for  the  Neiu  Diplo- 
macy '  presented  to  me  today  by  Governor  Herter. 

Our  thanks  go  also  to  the  Carnegie  Endowment 
for  International  Peace,  under  whose  auspices 
this  committee  of  private  citizens  more  than  a  year 
ago  undertook  the  task  of  surveying  the  personnel 
programs  of  our  Government  in  the  foreign  affairs 
field.  The  importance  of  this  undertaking  cannot 
be  overempliasized.  One  of  my  central  concerns 
is  a  foreign  affairs  staff  which  in  every  respect 
measures  up  to  tlie  demanding  requirements  of 
our  great  responsibility  in  the  sixties. 

The  report  will,  in  my  opinion,  focus  the  atten- 
tion of  the  Department  and  related  agencies,  the 
Congress,  and  the  general  public  on  a  subject  of 
great  importance  to  the  national  interest. 

"Wliile  I  have  not  yet  come  to  my  own  conclu- 
sions about  all  the  details  of  the  proposals  of  the 
committee,  which  I  liave  just  received,  it  is  clear 
that  the  recommendations  are  of  major  signifi- 
cance.    This  report  will  not  go  unheeded. 


Austria  Adds  $24  Million  to  Fund 
for  Former  Persecutees 

Press  release  712  dated  December  5 

The  Austrian  Government  has  allotted  an  addi- 
tional $24  million  to  the  Fund  To  Provide  Assist- 
ance to  Political  Persecutees  Who  Have  Their 
Place  of  Domicile  and  Permanent  Eesidence 
Abroad  (aid  hmd—Hilfsfonds) .  Awards  will  be 
made  for  occupational  or  professional  damage  suf- 
fered as  a  result  of  Nazi  persecution  and  for 
damage  caused  by  the  termination  or  interruption 
for  more  than  31^  years  of  occupational  (pro- 
fessional) or  preoccupational  (preprofessional) 
training.    Awards  will  be  made  to  persons  perse- 


'  Copies  of  the  report  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Taplinger  Publishing  Co.,  Inc.,  119  W.  .57th  St.,  New  Yorii, 
N.Y. ;  paperbound  $1.45,  clothbound  $2.45. 


December  24,   7962 


971 


cuted  "on  political  grounds  whatever  their  nature 
{inter  alia,  also  because  of  origin,  religion  or 
nationality)." 

Persons  who  were  Austrian  citizens  on  March 
13,  1!)3S,  or  who,  during  a  period  prior  to  March 
13,  1938,  had  their  uninterrupted  place  of  domicile 
and  permanent  residence  in  the  territory  of  the 
Republic  of  Austria,  may  apply  for  awards  under 
the  fund.    In  addition,  persons  who  on  March  13, 


1938,  possessed  German  nationality  and  emigi-ated 
from  Austria  because  of  political  pei-secution  may 
also  apply. 

The  deadline  for  filing  claims  is  October  31, 
1963.  Application  forms  are  available  from  the 
Fonds  zur  Hilfeleistung  an  PoUtisch  Verfolgte, 
Taborstrasse  4—0,  Vienna  II,  Austria,  from  the 
Austrian  Embassy,  Washington,  D.C.,  and  from 
Austrian  consulates  throughout  the  United  States. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


Principles  of  International  Law  Concerning 
Friendly  Relations  Among  States 


0 


Statement  by  Albert  Gore 

UJS.  Representative  to  the  General  Assembly  ^ 


The  United  States  delegation  has  had  occasion 
earlier  this  session  to  emphasize  the  importance 
which  it  ascribes  to  the  agenda  item :  "Consider- 
ation of  principles  of  international  law  concern- 
ing friendly  relations  and  co-operation  among 
States  in  accordance  with  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations."  Consideration  of  this  item  may 
mark  the  initiation  by  our  committee  of  a  pro- 
gram of  concerted,  constructive  effort.  If  it  so 
elects,  this  committee  may,  by  its  action  on  this 
item,  undertake  the  clarification  and  elaboration 
of  important  topics  of  international  law.  The 
committee  either  may  undertake  constructive 
work  on  questions  on  which  it  has  expert  knowl- 
edge— legal  questions — or  it  may  accept  for  itself 
a  role  no  more  impressive  than  that  of  echo  of  the 
political  committees.  The  opportunity  is  pre- 
sented now  to  our  committee;  so  is  the  choice. 

In  deciding  the  future  course  of  our  committee 

'Made  in  Coinmilti-o  VI  (Legal)  on  Nov.  21  (U.S. 
delecation  press  release  4101). 


it  may  be  useful  to  trace  the  parliamentary  path 
which  has  led  us  to  the  present  juncture.  The 
agenda  item  with  which  we  are  now  concerned 
arose  from  discussions  on  future  work  in  the  field 
of  the  codification  and  progressive  development  of 
international  law  at  the  15th  session.  At  that 
session  21  states  sponsored  Resolution  1505  (XV), 
proposing  that  the  General  Assembly  place  on  the 
provisional  agenda  of  the  16th  session  the  topic: 
"Future  work  in  the  field  of  the  codification  and 
progressive  development  of  international  law." 
Pui-suant  to  that  resolution  the  Sixth  Committee, 
at  its  last  session,  conducted  a  far-ranging  debate 
on  the  activities  of  the  United  Nations  in  the  field 
of  the  codification  and  progressive  development  of 
inteniational  law.  Its  work  was  rewarded  by  the 
adoption  by  the  General  Assembly  of  Resolution 
1686  (XVI),  placing  our  present  item  on  the 
agenda  of  this  session.  The  title  of  that  agenda 
item  originally  appeared  as  an  amendment  pro- 
posed by  certain  delegations,  of  wliicli  mine  was 
one. 


972 


Department  of  Stale   Bulletin 


This  parliamentary  history  is  a  source  of  en- 
couragement and  reassurance.  Eef  reshingly,  this 
is  not  a  history  of  controversy  and  basic  disagree- 
ment. The  authorship  of  the  resohitions  to  wliicli 
I  have  referred  -was  widely  based,  reflecting  a 
broad  agreement  even  among  delegations  which 
often  disagree  within  this  committee.  Support 
for  these  resolutions  within  the  committee  was 
widespread.  It  may  be  that  a  basis  of  this  con- 
sensus was  an  anxiety,  shared  by  many,  that  the 
Legal  Committee  had  not  in  the  recent  years  done 
all  that  it  could  do  within  the  United  Nations 
system  to  help  establish,  in  the  words  of  the  char- 
ter, "conditions  under  which  justice  and  respect 
for  the  obligations  arising  from  treaties  and  other 
sources  of  international  law  can  be  maintained." 
To  do  so  with  greater  impact  and  significance  is 
our  task  at  the  present  session. 

"Wlien  this  committee  decided  at  the  16th  session 
to  inscribe  on  the  provisional  agenda  of  the  present 
session  the  item  "Consideration  of  principles  of 
international  law  concerning  friendly  relations 
and  co-operation  among  States  in  accordance  with 
the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations,"  the  scope  and 
content  of  this  agenda  item  was,  by  general  agree- 
ment, left  for  determination  at  this  session.  My 
delegation  will  shortly  suggest  what  it  believes 
this  scope  and  content  ought  to  be.  It  should  first 
be  noted,  however,  that  this  committee  adopted 
the  terminology  "fi'iendly  relations  and  co-oper- 
ation among  States  in  accordance  with  the  Charter 
of  the  United  Nations"  in  preference  to  the  term 
"peaceful  coexistence"  as  the  title  of  the  item.  I 
feel  constrained  to  recall  this  because  some  dele- 
gations have  repeatedly  referred  to  "peaceful  co- 
existence" as  the  subject  before  us. 

What  interpretation  should  we  place  on  the 
decision  of  this  committee  not  to  inscribe  the 
topic  "peaceful  coexistence"?  My  delegation 
cannot,  in  suggesting  an  interpretation  to  be 
placed  on  our  action,  presmne  to  speak  for  the 
committee.  There  were  many  and  varying  re- 
sponses to  the  proposal  that  "peaceful  coexist- 
ence" be  inscribed ;  and  some  delegations  were  in 
favor  of  that  title.  The  United  States  delega- 
tion is,  however,  aware  of  the  sentiments  of  the 
many  delegations  with  which  we  consulted  during 
the  committee's  consideration  of  that  proposal,  as 
well  as  of  what  our  own  views  then  were  and  still 
remain. 

In  our  view  the  decision  of  the  Sixth  Committee 


at  the  last  session  of  the  General  Assembly  was  a 
frank  recognition  of  the  inadvisability  of  entering 
into  a  cold-war  controversy  in  circumstances 
where  a  simple  form  of  words  might  avoid  that 
controversy.  Controversy  would  spring  from  the 
fact  that  the  term  "peaceful  coexistence"  has  been 
employed  as  a  cold-war  slogan.  Of  course,  "peace- 
ful coexistence"  has  more  than  one  meaning.  Its 
expression,  in  terms  of  the  Pancha  Shila  and 
the  Bandimg  declaration,  does  not  arouse  contro- 
versy. Conununist  usage  of  the  term  does.  Thus, 
while  the  scope  and  content  of  the  agenda  item 
"friendly  relations  and  co-operation  among  States 
in  accordance  with  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations"  was  left  for  subsequent  decision,  our  com- 
mittee's decision  to  avoid  the  use  of  a  controversial 
label,  capable  of  engendering  cold-war  suspicions 
and  cold-war  debate,  appears  to  have  been  moti- 
vated by  the  conviction  that  this  committee  should 
proceed  to  productive  work,  leaving  aside  the  con- 
tentious questions  which  attach  to  certain  interpre- 
tations of  the  term  "peaceful  coexistence." 

May  I,  relying  on  Premier  Klirushchev,  briefly 
illustrate  the  contentious  character  of  the  term 
"peaceful  coexistence."  At  the  22d  Congress  of 
the  Communist  Party,  Premier  lOirushchev  de- 
clared that : 

The  policy  of  peaceful  coexistence  is  a  form  of  intense 
economic,  political  and  ideological  struggle  of  the  prole- 
tariat against  the  aggressive  forces  of  iini>erialism  in  the 
international  field. 

It  is  perfectly  true,  as  the  distinguished  dele- 
gate of  Mexico  has  noted,  that  Premier  Khru- 
shchev has  given  definitions  of  "peaceful  coexist- 
ence" that  are  less  contentious  than  those  I  have 
just  read.  One  may  contrast  his  definition  in 
Foreign  Affairs  of  October  1959,  which  speaks  of 
"peaceful  coexistence"  developing  into  "peaceful 
competition,"  with  that  made  to  the  22d  Congress 
of  the  Communist  Party.  Nevertheless  the  con- 
tentious interpretation  of  the  term  "peaceful 
coexistence" — that,  as  authoritative  Soviet  spokes- 
men have  made  clear,  it  aims  at  the  triumph  of 
communism  throughout  the  world — is  sufficient 
to  destroy  its  utility  as  a  topic  for  codification  by 
the  General  Assembly.  If  the  codification  and 
progressive  development  of  international  law  is 
to  proceed  fruitfully,  every  consideration  of  rea- 
son and  comity  suggests  that  unnecessary  political 
controversy  should  be  avoided.  Ingenuity  should 
suffice  to  find  a  formulation  of  our  business  wliich 
will  not  engender  suspicions  impeding  the  effec- 


Dezember  24,    7962 


973 


tive  performance  of  our  work.  Ingenuity  did 
suffice  to  find  such  a  formulation  at  our  last  ses- 
sion.   Wo  should  adhere  to  it. 

Kind  of  Work  To  Be  Undertaken  in  Committee  VI 

May  I  now  turn,  Mr.  Chairman,  to  the  question 
of  the  kind  of  work  which  this  committee  can  use- 
fully undertake.  Is  it  useful,  Mr.  Chairman,  for 
a  legal  body,  such  as  this  committee,  to  luidertake 
the  formulation,  in  the  guise  of  the  codification 
and  progressive  development  of  international 
law,  of  broadly  phrased  codes  of  state  conduct  of 
the  kind  reproduced,  for  instance,  in  the  draft 
resolution  contained  in  Document  A/C.6/L.505? 

As  the  distinguished  representative  of  Chile  has 
persuasively  observed,  the  fundamental  code  of 
state  conduct  is  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations. 
The  obligations  stated  in  the  charter  run  the  i"isk 
of  being  obscured  or  distorted  by  attempts  to 
formulate  a  comparable  code.  The  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations  is,  moreover,  more  than  a  mere 
statement  of  broad  rules  of  state  conduct;  it  is 
the  constitution  for  political  organs,  by  wliich 
those  broad  rules  are  interpreted  and  applied  on 
a  case-by-case  basis.  This  is  the  living,  growing 
law  of  the  charter ;  it  was  by  these  organs  that  the 
authors  of  the  charter  contemplated  that  it  would 
be  interpreted  and  its  provisions  clarified.  This 
is  in  fact  what  has  been  happening  since  the 
earliest  days  of  the  organization. 

There  has  been  only  scanty  effort  in  the  General 
Assembly  to  prepare  a  code  of  state  conduct  of 
sufficient  breadth  and  generality  that  would  state 
the  obligations  of  states  under  the  regime  of  the 
charter.  A  number  of  resolutions  adopted  in  the 
political  committees  of  this  Assembly  have  been 
marked  by  a  high  degree  of  generality.  Such  reso- 
lutions as  Resolution  1236  (XII)  on  "Peaceful 
and  neighbourly  relations  among  States,"  1301 
(XIII)  on  "Pleasures  aimed  at  the  implementa- 
tion and  promotion  of  peaceful  and  neiglibourly 
relations  among  States,"  and  1495  (XV)  on  "Co- 
operation of  Member  States,"  come  readily  to 
mind.  These  resolutions,  general  in  formulation 
and  hortatory  in  language,  cannot  be  said  to  have 
had  a  significant  legal  effect. 

Whatever  their  lack  of  legal  effect,  these  resolu- 
tions avoid  a  fundamental  pitfall  into  wiiich  the 
authors  of  broad  codes  of  state  conduct  proposed 
in  the  Legal  Committee  might  fall  and  into  which 
the  supporters  of  the  draft  resolution  appearing 


in  Document  A/C.6/L.505  have  in  fact  fallen. 
There  is  a  basic  difference  between  resolutions 
proposed  by  political  committees  as  political 
statements  and  resolutions  proposed  by  the  Legal 
Committee  of  our  organization.  General  Assem- 
bly resolutions  recommended  by  the  political  com- 
mittees state  the  political  wishes  of  the  General 
Assembly.  These  expressions  of  view  are  entitled 
to  great  weight  because  of  the  importance  of  the 
political  forum  from  which  they  emanate.  They 
contain  what  they  purport  to  state — the  political 
convictions  of  the  General  Assembly.  However, 
what  might  be  proposed  in  the  Legal  Committee, 
and  what  is  in  fact  proposed  in  the  draft  resolu- 
tion contained  in  A/C.6/L.505,  is  that  the  General 
Assembly,  on  the  recommendation  of  its  Legal 
Committee,  should  purport  to  state  what  is  pres- 
ently required  by  international  law  on  the  most 
significant  and  far-reaching  question  of  our 
time — the  maintenance  of  peace.  International 
law  is  not  necessarily  what  the  General  Assembly 
says  that  it  is  or  that  it  should  be.  If  the  General 
Assembly  states  that  the  law  is  what  the  law  in 
fact  is  not,  tliat  resolution  of  itself  does  not  change 
the  law.  It  may  depreciate  the  status  and  signifi- 
cance of  resolutions  of  the  General  Assembly. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  a  General  Assembly  declara- 
tion of  what  the  law  is  may  not  be  of  great  impor- 
tance. It  may  constitute  evidence  of  the  views  of 
a  majority  of  states  as  to  the  content  of  interna- 
tional law.  This,  it  seems  to  me,  however,  serves 
to  emphasize  the  caution  with  which  the  Assembly 
must  approach  the  adoption  of  resolutions  which 
are  meant  to  be  expressive  of  the  rules  of  interna- 
tional law. 

Dangers  of  Broad  Codes  of  State  Conduct 

A  danger  of  broad  codes  of  state  conduct,  of 
comprehensive  declarations  of  the  law  governing 
relations  among  states,  is  the  temptation  to  in- 
clude as  alleged  legal  rules  matters  as  to  which 
political  convictions  are  strong  and  the  law  weak; 
as  to  which  political  objectives  are  clear  and  provi- 
sions of  international  law  obscure.  This  danger  is 
illustrated  by  the  resolution  contained  in  A/C.6/- 
L.505.  Like  Oscar  Wilde's  lady,  the  only  thing 
the  author  of  that  resolution  could  not  resist  was 
temptation.  For  example,  the  sixth  principle  of 
the  Czech  resolution  declares  that  "war  propa- 
ganda in  any  form"  and  "propaganda  aimed  at  the 
incitement  of  national  and  racial  hatred  .=liall  be 


974 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


prohibited  as  incompatible  with  the  generally 
recognized  norms  of  international  law"  and  the 
charter.  The  words  "shall  be  prohibited"  suggest 
that  war  propaganda,  in  the  view  of  the  Czech 
delegation,  is  not  now  prohibited  by  international 
law.  In  this  the  Czech  resolution  is  correct. 
However,  my  delegation  doubts  that  our  Czecho- 
slovak colleagues  are  correct  in  suggesting  that 
states  are  under  a  legal  duty  to  prohibit  war  prop- 
aganda. 

Again,  permit  me  to  be  perfectly  plain — to 
avoid  the  confusion  between  political  objectives 
and  present  law  which  the  Czech  resolution  em- 
bodies. The  United  States  opposes  war  propa- 
ganda. It  opposes  atomic  saber-rattling.  It 
deplores  the  threats  of  nuclear  devastations  that 
have  been  leveled  against  many  states  by  a  certain 
nuclear  power.  The  depth  of  my  Govermnent's 
concern  over  war  propaganda  is  demonstrated  by 
its  success,  after  considerable  effort,  in  arriving  at 
an  agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union  at  Geneva  this 
past  summer  which  would  have  called  upon  states 
to  take  steps  to  prohibit  war  propaganda.  How- 
ever, although  we  had  been  publicly  assured  at 
the  conclusion  of  the  negotiations  that  the  agree- 
ment was  acceptable  to  the  Soviet  Union  and  that 
the  Soviet  Government  was  prepared  to  accept 
that  agreement,  its  representatives  subsequently 
declined  to  do  so.  Thus,  the  agreement  has  never 
gone  into  effect. 

The  fact  that  it  was  necessary  for  states  to 
negotiate  an  agreement  on  this  problem  may  in- 
dicate that,  in  the  absence  of  an  international 
agreement,  such  propaganda — as  long  as  it  does 
not  become  a  threat  to  peace —  is  not  incompatible 
with  existing  international  law.  My  delegation 
equally  doubts  that  states  are  under  a  duty  to  con- 
clude such  an  agreement,  but,  if  there  is  such  a 
duty,  it  is  not  the  United  States  which  has  violated 
it. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  could  cite  a  number  of  further 
examples  where  political  zeal  appears  to  have  out- 
weighed concern  for  the  content  of  international 
law.  However,  the  distinguished  representative 
of  Australia  has  already  incisively  explored  such 
deficiencies  in  the  Czechoslovak  draft.  Accord- 
ingly, I  shall  not  pursue  them  further.  May  I 
merely  note  that  many  of  the  subjects  dealt  with 
in  the  draft  resolution  contained  in  Document  A/- 
C.6/L.505  have  proved  intractable  in  political 
negotiations;  to  pursue  these  negotiations  in  the 


context  of  the  formulation  of  rules  of  international 
law  may  simply  insure  that  the  resulting  statement 
of  alleged  international  law  will  be  disregarded 
and  that  compliance  with  the  actual  rules  of  in- 
ternational law  may  be  pi'ejudiced. 

Efforts  to  formulate  broad  codes  of  state  con- 
duct thus  may  well  pose  dangers  to  the  integrity 
of  international  law  and  may  act  as  an  impedi- 
ment to  compliance  with  rules  of  international  law 
whose  validity  is  indisputable.  I  have  referred  in 
this  connection  only  to  the  draft  resolution  con- 
tained in  Document  A/C.6/L.505  because  we  have 
had  sufficient  opportunity  to  study  that  resolution 
closely.  The  extent  to  which  other  resolutions  em- 
bodying codes  of  state  conduct  reflect  these  same 
deficiencies  is,  of  course,  to  be  determined  in 
the  light  of  the  provisions  of  those  resolutions. 
While,  for  our  part,  we  doubt  the  value  of  broad 
declarations  that  sweep  over  all  or  much  of  inter- 
national law,  our  concern  is  primarily  with  decla- 
rations which  misstate  the  law. 

The  draft  resolution  submitted  by  the  delega- 
tions of  Afghanistan,  Algeria,  Cambodia,  Ghana, 
India,  Indonesia,  Mali,  Morocco,  Somalia,  Syria, 
the  United  Arab  Eepublic,  and  Yugoslavia,  in 
Document  A/C.6/L.509,  has  been  before  us  for 
only  a  few  days.  Our  views  on  it  accordingly  are 
of  a  preliminary  character.  Our  initial  reaction 
to  the  draft  resolution  is  that,  while  it  certainly 
avoids  many  of  the  disabilities  of  L.505,  it  does 
not,  among  other  disabilities,  adequately  recog- 
nize the  central  position  of  the  United  Nations 
Charter  as  the  fundamental  statement  of  legal 
rules  relating  to  friendly  relations  and  coopera- 
tion among  states.  In  this  connection  we  were 
troubled  by  the  statement  of  one  of  the  sponsors 
at  last  Monday's  meeting,  at  which  L.509  was  de- 
scribed as  correcting  the  inadequacies,  as  they  were 
conceived,  of  the  charter.  A  number  of  provi- 
sions of  this  resolution  appear  to  depart  signifi- 
cantly, and  unfortunately,  from  the  charter's 
provisions. 

Communist  Doctrinal  Emphasis  on  Treaty  Law 

In  giving  this  preliminary  aj^praisal,  Mr.  Chair- 
man, my  delegation  is  not  imaware  that  the  spon- 
sors of  the  draft  resolution  contained  in  Docu- 
ment A/C.r)/L.509  have  made  a  genuine  effoi't  to 
facilitate  agreement  within  our  committee.  My 
delegation  is  appreciative  of  their  initiative  and 
good  will. 


December  24,    1962 


975 


Before  turning  to  the  11-power  resolution  which 
is  contained  in  Document  A/C.6/L.507,  and  to 
what  my  delegation  believes  should  be  the  nature 
of  our  work  on  the  item  before  us,  I  would  like  to 
discuss  the  Czechoslovak  resolution  [L.505]  in  one 
further  respect — and,  I  am  glad  to  saj^,  to  praise 
it. 

Paragraph  18  of  the  Czechoslovak  resolution 
provides  that:  "Every  State  is  liable  to  fulfil,  in 
good  faith,  obligations  ensuing  for  it  from  inter- 
national treaties  concluded  by  it  freely  and  on  the 
basis  of  equality,  as  well  as  obligations  ensuing 
from  international  customary  law."  It  is  to  this 
last  phrase,  "obligations  ensuing  from  interna- 
tional customary  law,"  that  I  invite  your  atten- 
tion. It  marks  a  welcome  departure  from  the  al- 
most exclusive  emphasis  that  Communist  legal 
scholars  have  placed  on  treaty  law. 

Until  very  recently,  Communist  writings  on  in- 
ternational law  seemed  to  take  the  position  that 
only  international  law  flowing  from  treaties  is 
worthy  of  respect.  The  expressly  consensual  ele- 
ment in  the  formation  of  international  law  was 
stressed  to  the  exclusion  of  other  lawmaking  proc- 
esses. This  approach  derived  from  an  extreme 
and  archaic  view  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  state, 
a  view  which,  reduced  to  simple  terms,  taught  that 
only  the  specific,  articulated  consent  of  the  state 
could  operate  to  subject  the  state  to  international 
law.  Thus,  at  our  7l7tli  meeting  on  November 
21st  last  3'ear,  the  distinguished  representative  of 
the  Soviet  Union,  Professor  [Grigory  I.]  Tunkin, 
said: 

The  transformation  which  took  place  in  the  human  so- 
ciety and,  above  all,  the  changes  in  its  economic  struc- 
ture led  to  alterations  in  international  law.  Those  alter- 
ations were  effected  by  agreement  hetween  States  which 
constituted  the  only  mean,s  of  creating  and  changing  the 
norms  of  international  law. 

This  extreme  doctrinal  emphasis  on  treaty  law 
at  the  same  time  attempted  to  portray  the  great 
body  of  customary  international  law  as  outmoded, 
obsolete,  colonialist;  as  bourgeois,  creditor-ori- 
ented, and — in  some  sinister  sense — "Western." 
Wliile  the  Czechoslovak  resolution,  which  has  been 
supported  by  a  number  of  delegations  from  Com- 
munist states,  gives  increased  weight  to  customary 
international  law,  neither  it  nor  the  comments  of 
our  Communist  colleagues  clearly  disavow  the  im- 
putations against  customary  international  law  to 
which  I  have  alluded.  If  I  may,  Mr.  Chairman, 
I  should  like  for  a  moment  to  discuss  this  question, 


which  so  importantly  relates  to  our  concern  with 
the  progressive  development  of  international  law. 

Progressive  Development  of  International   Law 

Surely  we  all  recognize  that  a  part  of  what  was 
international  law,  now  irrevocably  dead,  could  not 
today  be  justified.  The  19th-century  capitulations 
between  certain  European  and  certain  Asian  and 
African  states  cannot  be  defended.  However,  not 
only  have  these  capitulations  long  since  ceased  to 
exist.  They  represented  international  law  not 
flowing  from  custom  but  from  international  agree- 
ments.    They  were,  in  fact,  treaties. 

Equally  a  thing  of  the  past  is  the  phenomenon 
by  which  consular  officers  of  a  number  of  Euro- 
pean states,  including  Russia  and  the  United 
States,  exercised  quasi-sovereign  prerogatives  in 
other  states.  These  arrangements  never  became  a 
part  of  modem  international  law.  iloreover,  the 
jurisdictional  prerogatives  of  the  consuls  arose 
from  contractual  arrangements — from  treaties,  not 
from  custom. 

This  is  not  to  say  that  customary  international 
law  has  carried  forward  no  elements  that  require 
pruning,  no  aspects  that  require  revision.  On  the 
contrary,  the  very  concept  of  the  progressive  devel- 
opment of  international  law  imports  change.  My 
delegation  recognizes  that  existing  international 
law,  whether  springing  from  custom  or  from  treaty 
or  other  source,  needs  to  be  strengthened ;  that  the 
iiile  of  law  in  international  affairs  is  far  from 
realized.  International  law  must  grow,  it  must 
change,  and  it  must  change  for  the  better.  In  the 
process  of  change  the  new  states  of  the  world  can 
make  a  contribution  of  particular  importance. 
That  contribution  can  be  made  in  the  International 
Law  Commission  and  in  the  process  of  treaty- 
making  to  which,  the  Commission's  work  gives 
rise.  It  can  be  made  by  participation  in  the  work 
of  the  United  Nations.  It  can  be  made  in  other 
ways. 

At  the  same  time,  as  we  jointly  imdertake  the 
progressive  development  of  international  law,  we 
must  take  care  not  to  depreciate  and  discard  that 
which  is  of  value  in  existing  international  law. 
Today's  international  law,  whether  stemming  from 
treaty  or  custom  or  general  principles  of  law,  is  a 
valuable  law,  responsive  to  the  needs  of  states  the 
world  over,  whether  new  or  old,  whether  of  the 
East  or  of  tlio  West.  The  fact  that  the  older  states 
of  Europe  and  the  Americas  have  played  a  pre- 


976 


Depor/menf   of  Sfofe   Bulletin 


dominant  role  in  the  creation  of  customary  inter- 
national law  does  not  mean  that  that  law  is  not  of 
universal  validity  and  appeal.  There  is  much  in 
international  law  that  flows  from  the  mere  exist- 
lence  of  states;  the  content  of  the  law  has  not  been 
idetemiined  by  the  region  of  the  world  in  which 
Ithose  states  happen  to  have  been  located.  More- 
over, to  the  extent  that  international  law  does  have 
a  specifically  Western  content — a  content  which 
can  easily  be  exaggerated — that  is  not  necessarily 
occasion  for  apology.  Tliere  is  much  in  the  tradi- 
tion of  Western  legal  thought  and  practice  of 
which  every  man,  whatever  the  geographical  acci- 
dent of  his  birth,  can  be  proud. 

Permit  me  to  give  a  few  examples  of  the  univer- 
sal validity  and  appeal  of  customai-y  international 
law  and  of  its  interplay  with  treaty  law. 

The  privileges  and  immunities  accorded  to  dip- 
lomatic missions  under  customary  international 
law  uniformly  facilitated  the  functions  of  those 
missions  for  many  years  without  distinction  be- 
tween large  and  small,  old  and  new  states.  All 
states,  regardless  of  their  size  and  years  of  inde- 
pendence, are  both  sending  and  receiving  states. 
The  balanced  international  rules  on  this  subject 
protect  both  sender  and  receiver.  The  Vienna 
Convention  on  Diplomatic  Eelations,  concluded  on 
the  basis  of  a  set  of  draft  articles  prepared  by  the 
International  Law  Commission,  will  become,  upon 
its  entry  into  force,  the  source  of  legal  riglits  and 
duties  in  this  area.  The  preamble  of  that  con- 
vention expressly  affirms  the  continuing  validity 
of  existing  international  law  on  questions  not 
determined  by  its  provisions.  Next  spring  we 
will  again  convene  in  Vienna  to  draft  a  conven- 
tion on  a  comparable  topic — consular  relations — 
whose  present  content  is  detennined  both  by  cus- 
tomary international  law  and  by  treaties  now  in 
force. 

The  body  of  customary  international  law  deal- 
ing with  the  use  of  international  rivers  is  simi- 
larly universal  in  its  appeal.  In  the  absence  of 
specific  treaty  provisions  to  the  contrary,  the  trend 
lof  the  law  is  that  no  state  may  claim  to  use  the 
watei's  of  an  international  river  in  such  a  way  as 
to  cause  material  injury  to  the  interests  of  other 
states,  nor  may  a  state  oppose  use  of  river  waters 
by  other  states  unless  this  causes  material  injury 
lejto  itself.  Of  course  this  rule  is  nonpartisan,  due 
leH  simply  to  the  geographical  fact  that  powerful  old 
s  Jstates  may  be  situated  downstream  from,  as  well  as 
upstream  of,  less  developed  new  states.    It  is  a 


rule     that     illustrates     the     law's     progressive 
development. 

The  law  of  treaties  illustrates  still  another  area 
of  customary  international  law  whose  respon- 
siveness to  the  needs  of  all  states  is  obvious.  That 
law  is  in  need  of  codification  and  development,  a 
process  now  in  progress.  But  it  could  not  be 
seriously  suggested  that  that  law,  which  springs  in 
such  large  measure  from  the  practice  of  the  older 
states,  should  be  discarded  as  colonialist  and 
obsolete. 

Resolution    Suggests   Study   of   Specific   Topics 

Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  return  to  the  immediate 
business  before  us:  the  scope  and  content  of  the 
agenda  item  on  friendly  relations. 

If  this  committee  is  to  avoid  controversy,  if  it  is 
to  avoid  impromising  efforts  to  draft  broad  codes, 
what  content  and  scope  should  it  give  to  this 
topic?  The  sponsors  of  the  draft  resolution  con- 
tained in  Document  A/C.6/L.507  have  suggested — 
wisely,  in  our  view — that  the  committee  should 
utilize  this  agenda  item  to  initiate  a  detailed, 
substantive  study  of  certain  topics  of  international 
law  which  are  at  present  in  need  of  clarification 
and  elaboration  and  whose  articulation  would  be 
of  general  and  immediate  interest  in  the  establish- 
ment of  friendly  relations  and  cooperation  among 
states.  These  topics,  while  essentially  legal  in 
content,  have  political  elements  which  make  them 
not  wholly  suitable  for  the  work  of  the  Interna- 
tional Law  Commission.  The  sponsors  have  urged 
that  the  committee  should  deal,  by  careful,  schol- 
arly, and  dispassionate  discussion,  with  specific 
topics  of  international  law  whose  clarification 
would  contribute  to  friendly  relations  and  coop- 
eration among  states. 

Naturally  that  discussion  cannot  be  undertaken 
in  depth  at  this  session.  The  kind  of  discussion 
capable  of  making  a  significant  contribution  re- 
quires advance  research  and  preparation  by  our 
respective  governments  and  is  most  effectively  car- 
ried forward  in  the  light  of  their  prior  written 
observations.  What,  I  take  it,  the  sponsors  of 
Eesolution  507  would  have  us  do  at  this  session  is 
to  decide  that  such  a  program  will  be  undertaken 
and  to  determine  upon  its  initial  content. 

What  benefits  would  accrue  from  the  type  of 
process  which  the  sponsors  of  Resolution  507  pro- 
pose? Obviously,  the  research  which  will  be 
required   if  our  governments  are  to  contribute 


December  24,   1962 


977 


significantly  to  such  a  discussion  would  be  bene- 
ficial to  each  of  us.  The  exchange  of  points  of 
view  could  contribute  greatly  to  international 
understanding;  it  would  indicate  areas  of  com- 
mon agreement  and  shed  light  upon  issues  on 
which  divergence  of  views  makes  future  inquiry 
appropriate.  Finally,  and  perhaps  more  signifi- 
cantly, careful  and  detailed  statements  by  our 
governments,  by  articulating  state  practice  and 
positions  on  these  issues,  would  systematically  pro- 
vide data  on  the  facts  of  state  conduct,  conduct 
whicli  is  the  basis  of  much  of  present-day  inter- 
national law.  Let  me  disclaim  any  impression 
that  our  statements,  even  though  prepared  after 
study  and  consideration,  would  be  equivalent  to 
state  practice.  There  is  of  course  a  frequent  di- 
vergence between  the  rules  which  states  declare 
and  the  rules  which  they  observe  in  practice. 
Our  statements  would,  nevertheless,  constitute  as 
close  an  approach  as  we  are  capable  of  making  in 
this  committee  to  the  practice  of  states.  They 
would  be,  as  the  distinguished  representative  of 
Japan  so  persuasively  demonstrated,  of  consider- 
able future  benefit  to  scholars  of  international  law 
and  to  our  governments  in  deciding  what  rules 
states  must  observe  in  areas  where  guidelines  are 
presently  uncertain. 

The  sponsors  of  the  draft  resolution  contained 
in  Document  A/C.6/L..507  have  suggested  for  con- 
sideration two  topics  which  are,  in  our  view,  excel- 
lent. These  topics  fully  meet  certain  criteria 
which,  we  believe,  should  determine  the  selection 
of  topics.  What  are  those  criteria?  First,  the 
topic  should  be  of  general  and  immediate  interest 
and  should  bear  directly  on  the  maintenance  of 
friendly  relations  and  cooperation  among  states. 
Second,  while  few  topics  can  be  considered  exclu- 
sively legal  in  cliaracter,  the  topic  should  be  pre- 
dominantly legal,  rather  than  political.  While  a 
topic  dealt  with  in  the  Sixth  Committee  can 
properly  contain  a  significant  political  element, 
unlike  topics  dealt  with  by  the  International  Law 
Commission,  that  political  element  should  be  sub- 
ordinated to  the  legal.  Third,  the  topic  should 
bo  one  whose  substance  requires  clarification,  that 
is,  it  should  be  a  topic  whose  rules  or  potential  are 
not  clearly  defined  by  existing  international  law. 

Wliile  the  appropriateness  of  the  topics  sug- 
gested by  the  sponsors  of  Document  A/C.6/L.507 
seems  undeniable,  it  should  be  emphasized  that 
the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  discussing  them 


depend  primarily  on  the  kind  of  discussion  we 
undertake.  Useful  discussions  would  be  based  on 
a  thorough  study  of  existing  international  law. 
They  would  involve  a  detailed  appraisal  of  the 
practices  of  our  respective  states  and  an  exposi- 
tion of  the  positions  of  our  governments  on  the 
desirable  direction  of  the  law's  evolution.  These 
miglit  be  set  forth  in  the  written  comments  of  our 
governments  and  in  our  discussion  in  this  com- 
mittee and  should  be  set  forth  in  an  accurate,  de- 
tailed, and  nonpolemic  presentation. 

Such  treatment  will  not  be  easy  precisely  be- 
cause, as  I  have  indicated,  the  existing  rules  and 
practices  on  the  questions  selected  in  the  resolution 
contained  in  Document  A/C.6/L.507  are  in  some 
respects  complex  and  uncertain.  But  the  alterna- 
tive treatment — that  of  the  easy  formulation  of 
sweeping  statements — may  waste  the  great  oppor- 
tunity which,  my  delegation  is  convinced,  is  now 
presented  to  this  committee.  For  example,  in  dis- 
cussing the  topic  concerning  tlie  obligation  to 
respect  the  independence  of  states,  simple  state- 
ments that  intervention  is  illegal,  without  attempt- 
ing to  define  what  kinds  of  actions  constitute 
intervention  or  to  indicate  what  restrictions  states 
generally  observe  in  practice,  would  involve  much 
less  of  an  expenditure  of  effort  in  preparation  and 
be  of  correspondingly  limited  A^alue. 

The  discussion  of  topics  in  the  Legal  Committee 
would  partake  of  both  codification  and  progressive 
development.  The  written  comments  of  our  gov- 
ernments and  the  positions  stated  by  their  delega- 
tions should  reflect  both  the  recognition  of  what 
the  present  state  of  international  law  is  and  ex- 
pressions of  view  as  to  what  that  law  sliould  be. 
Inherent  in  such  presentations  would  be  an  initial 
inquiry  into  the  present  state  of  international 
law  on  a  given  topic.  We  must  know  what  the 
present  international  law  provides,  in  cases  where 
that  law  is  applicable,  before  we  can  suggest  what 
it  ouglit  to  be.  An  inquiry  into  the  present  pro- 
visions of  international  law  on  these  topics  may 
disclose  much  of  value,  and  this  initial  inquiry 
may  be,  as  I  have  suggested,  one  of  the  most 
valuable  benefits  which  this  discussion  will  pro- 
vide for  each  of  us. 

The  proposal  set  forth  in  the  11 -power  draft 
[L.  507]  appears  to  have  met  with  wide  support 
in  this  committee.  However,  a  few  criticisms 
have  been  made,  and  I  should  like  to  advert  to 
them. 


978 


Department  of  Stale   Bulletin 


It  has  been  said  that  Resohition  1686  (XVI) 
envisages  not  a  concentration  upon  certain  topics 
but  rather  a  broad  consideration  of  all  of  inter- 
national law  relating  to  friendly  relations  and 
cooperation  among  states.  I  see  no  basis  for  that 
claim.  Resolution  1686  speaks  of  "consideration 
of  principles"  of  international  law  respecting 
friendly  relations.  In  our  view  "consideration" 
implies  more  than  the  easy  proclamation  of  a 
general  declaration.  Further,  the  resolution 
speaks  not  of  all  the  principles  of  international 
law  nor  of  "the  i^rinciples,"  but  simply  of  "prin- 
ciples" ;  that  is  to  say,  of  certain  principles.  More 
than  this,  the  intent  of  our  committee  last  year,  as 
I  have  earlier  described  it,  shows  that  there  was 
not  general  agreement  on  the  desirability  of 
drafting  a  code. 

A  second  objection  to  507  which  has  been  ad- 
vanced is  that  the  effect  of  concentrating  on  two 
topics  is  to  debar  new  states  from  exerting  their 
influence  on  the  evolution  of  the  whole  of  the  law 
of  peace.  This  contention  is  unsound  for  these 
reasons. 

First,  the  two  topics  suggested  by  507  are  central 
to  the  law  of  peace. 

Second,  the  list  of  topics  in  507  is  not  exhaus- 
tive ;  the  committee  of  course  remains  free  to  add 
other  topics.  If  our  experiment  in  the  treatment 
of  these  topics  is  successful,  my  delegation  would 
hope  that,  in  future  years,  our  committee  will  take 
up  additional  topics. 

Third,  the  influence  that  any  state,  new  or  old, 
exerts  on  the  evolution  of  international  law 
through  the  process  of  participation  in  the  promul- 
gation of  broad  codes  is  minimal.  As  I  noted 
earlier,  such  resolutions  of  the  General  Assembly 
do  not  carry  the  force  of  law. 

Fourth,  new  states  as  well  as  old  do  fully  par- 
ticipate in  the  international  lawmaking  process, 
both  through  their  practice  and  their  role  in  the 
process  of  codification. 

Mr.  Chairman,  much  has  been  said  about  the 
need  for  a  positive  approach  to  the  work  of  the 
Legal  Committee.  The  United  States  delegation 
believes  that  the  proposal  contained  in  Document 
A/C.6/L.507  is  positive  in  the  onl}'  realistic  sense: 
It  contemplates  a  constructive  program  of  legal 
endeavor  designed  to  bring  clarity  to  international 
law  in  important  areas  where  the  law  is  not  clear. 
There  is  no  substitute  for  a  firm  decision  on  the 
part  of  this  committee  to  get  down  to  work,  to 

December  24,   7962 


begin  the  demanding  efforts  of  legal  scholarship 
which  constitute  an  appropriate  function  of  this 
committee.  This  is  the  only  area  of  endeavor  in 
which  this  committee  is  in  a  unique  position  to 
contribute  to  friendly  relations  and  cooperation 
among  states  in  accordance  with  the  Charter  of 
tlie  United  Nations. 


OECD  IVIinisterial  Council 
Meets  at  Paris 

Following  are  texts  of  a  communique  issued  hy 
the  Ministerial  Council  of  the  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  at  Paris 
on  November  38  and  a  resolution  on  trade  and  aid 
policy  adopted  iy  the  Council  on  the  same  day. 

TEXT  OF  COMMUNIQUE 

1.  The  Ministerial  Coimcil  of  the  OECD,  meet- 
ing in  Paris  on  27th  and  28th  November,  1962, 
under  the  chairmanship  of  the  Honorable  Donald 
M.  Fleming,  of  Canada,  reviewed  the  economic 
prospects  for  its  20  member  countries  in  Europe 
and  North  America  and  the  world-wide  respon- 
sibilities of  the  OECD  community. 

2.  The  Ministers  undertook  this  review  and 
surveyed  progress  towards  the  gi-owth  target  they 
defined  last  year,^  basing  themselves  on  compre- 
hensive studies  in  the  Organization. 

3.  In  the  United  States  there  is  unemployed 
labor  and  imutilized  capacity.  There  is  a  clear 
need  for  action  to  stimulate  demand. 

Production  in  some  European  countries  is  now 
growing  less  rapidly  than  last  year,  but  no  country 
is  expecting  a  substantial  slowing-down  in  the 
growth  of  production  next  year. 

The  Organization  will  continue  to  keep  the  sit- 
uation closely  under  review.  The  Ministers  agreed 
that  should  the  need  to  take  expansionary  meas- 
ures arise  later  on,  it  would  be  important  for  mem- 
ber countries  to  act  quickly  and  in  concert. 

4.  There  has  been  a  substantial  improvement  in 
the  international  competitive  position  in  the 
United  States,  in  Canada,  and  in  the  United  King- 
dom. This  will  contribute  increasingly  to  a  better 
balance  in  international  payments.    National  au- 

'  For  text  of  a  communique  Issued  by  the  Council  on 
Nov.  17,  lOGl,  see  Bui.letin  of  Dee.  IS,  1061,  p.  1018. 


979 


thorities  will  continue  their  close  cooperation  to 
moderate  the  remaining  elements  of  imbalance. 
In  particular,  further  efforts  are  needed  to  ensure 
that  capital  flows  assist  rather  than  impede  the 
restoration  of  balance  of  payments  equilibrium, 
account  being  taken  of  the  situation  in  the  various 
countries.  It  should  be  noted  that  large  resources 
are  available  to  deal  with  temporary  balance  of 
payments  difficulties. 

5.  Prices  and  costs  have  been  rising  in  Europe. 
The  rise  needs  to  be  halted  without  restrictive 
jjolicies  which  might  arrest  sound  economic 
expansion. 

Continued  economic  growth  without  undesira- 
ble rises  in  costs  and  prices  could  be  facilitated  by 
adequate  income  policies  and  measures  to  secure 
mobility  of  productive  resources.  A  report  on 
costs  and  prices  will  be  published. 

6.  The  Ministers  had  before  them  a  first  report 
which  will  be  published  on  some  problems  related 
to  the  collective  target  of  50  per  cent  in  real 
national  product  during  the  decade  from  1960  to 
1970,  set  by  the  Ministerial  Council  in  1961. 
"N^Hiile  this  objective  is  well  within  the  physical 
capabilities  of  the  member  countries,  experience 
over  the  first  two  years  of  the  decade  points  to 
the  need  for  a  better  and  fuller  use  of  economic 
resources  for  this  purpose. 

7.  Referring  to  last  year's  communique,  the 
Ministers  reaffirmed  the  special  desirability  of 
rapid  growth  in  all  member  countries  in  process  of 
development  and  confirmed  the  importance  which 
they  attach  to  the  continuation  of  the  efforts  of 
the  Organization  in  this  field.  In  this  context  they 
stressed  the  importance  of  the  work  to  be  done  by 
the  consortia  established  to  support  the  develop- 
ment policies  of  Greece  and  Turkey. 

8.  The  Slinisters  noted  with  satisfaction  the 
conclusions  of  the  first  annual  re\'iew  of  the  aid 
policies  of  the  members  of  the  Development  As- 
sistance Committee. 

They  recognized  the  need  for  further  concerted 
action  to  increase  the  volume  and  effectiveness  of 
aid  to  developing  countries  and  to  relate  it  more 
closely  to  the  development  efforts  of  the  benefit- 
ing countries  themselves. 

Aid  programs  should  be  a  well-established  part 
of  the  policy  of  every  developed  member  country. 

The  Ministers  noted  with  satisfaction  the  deci- 
sion taken  on  the  establishment  of  a  development 
center,  the  work  of  which  will  have  to  be  prepared 
by  the  Organization. 


9.  In  the  field  of  trade  important  tasks  lie 
ahead.  If  the  less-developed  countries  are  to 
achieve  a  substantial  improvement  in  their  stand- 
ards of  living,  efforts  in  the  field  of  aid  must  be 
supplemented  by  policies  designed  to  increase  their 
foreign  exchange  earnings  and  provide  expanding 
markets  for  their  products,  including  manufac- 
tured articles.  To  this  end,  the  Ministers  have 
recommended  that  member  countries,  in  the  frame- 
work of  the  Organization,  should  work  towards 
policies  which  take  full  account  of  the  interde- 
pendence of  trade  and  aid. 

In  the  light  of  the  development  of  the  negotia- 
tions on  the  enlargement  of  the  EEC  [European 
Economic  Community]  and  of  the  perspectives 
opened  by  the  United  States  Trade  Expansion 
Act,"  the  Organization  will  have  to  consider  how 
it  could  best  contribute  to  the  expansion  of  world 
trade  on  a  multilateral  and  non-discriminatory 
basis,  as  provided  for  in  the  convention. 

10.  Substantial  adaptations  in  the  fields  of  agri- 
culture, industry  and  manpower  will  be  necessary 
to  facilitate  economic  growth  and  the  expansion 
of  trade.  In  view  of  its  general  competence  in 
economic  matters,  OECD  can  usefully  help  mem- 
ber coimtries  to  cooperate  in  this  task. 

The  Ministers  noted  the  statement  published  by 
the  OECD  Ministers  of  Agriculture.''  Their  work 
will  strengthen  cooperation  through  the  OECD  in 
the  fields  of  agricultural  policy,  international  agri- 
cultural trade  and  food  aid  to  the  less-developed 
countries. 

11.  Eecognizing  the  increasing  importance  of 
science  and  technology  in  their  many  relations 
with  economic  life,  the  Ministers  noted  the  work 
undertaken  by  the  Organization  in  this  field  pur- 
suant to  the  convention.  They  instructed  the  Or- 
ganization to  prepare  a  ministerial-level  meeting 
on  cooperation  with  regard  to  scientific  policy  and 
research,  to  be  called  within  the  next  year. 


RESOLUTION  ON  TRADE  AND  AID 

Ministerial  Resolution  on  the  Co-ordination  of 
Trade  and  Aid  Policy 

The  Council, 

Having  regard  to  Article  1   (B)   and   (C)   and  Article 
2(E)  of  the  convention, 

Considering  that  economic  growth  achieved  by  mem- 


•  For  background,  see  ibid.,  Dec.  3,  1962,  p.  847. 
'  For  text,  see  ibid,  Dec.  17,  1062,  p.  042. 


980 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Hi 


ber  countries,  in  their  efforts  to  attain  the  target  estab- 
lished in  November  1961,  will  provide  the  basis  for  addi- 
tional action  to  promote  economic  expansion  in  less-de- 
veloped countries, 

Recognizing  that  trade  is  no  less  important  than  aid  for 
the  development  of  less-developed  countries, 

Bearing  in  mind  initiatives  taken  or  envisaged  by  other 
international  organizations  with  a  view  to  promoting 
trade  with  less  developed  countries,  in  jaarticular  at  the 
November  1961  meeting  of  Ministers  of  the  contracting 
parties  to  the  GATT.* 

I. 

Recommends  that  member  countries,  by  cooperation  in 
the  Organization,  seek  to  formulate  concerted  policies 
which  are  designed  to  further  the  economic  development 
of  the  less  developed  countries,  and  which  take  fuU 
account  of  the  interdependence  of  trade  and  aid,  having 
in  mind : 

(A)  The  need  to  increase  the  earnings  of  the  less-de- 
veloped countries  from  their  exports  of  both  primary 
products  and  of  manufactured  goods ; 

(B)  The  need  to  integrate  aid  programs  more  closely 
with  other  efforts  aimed  at  stabilizing  and  expanding  for- 
eign exchange  earnings  of  less-developed  countries  and 
thus  facilitating  their  efforts  to  achieve  balanced  and 
steady  economic  growth. 

II. 
Instructs : 

(A)  The  Organization  to  examine  existing  policies  in 
these  fields,  to  determine  the  means  of  implementing  the 
above  recommendation  and  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to 
give  it  effect,  taking  full  account  of  the  work  of  other 
international  organizations ; 

(B)  The  Executive  Committee  to  guide  and  coordinate 
the  work  pursuant  to  this  recommendation,  and  to  report 
to  the  Council  as  soon  as  possible. 


United  States  Delegations 
to  International  Conferences 

International  Wool  Study  Group 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Decem- 
ber 7  (press  release  716)  that  the  United  States 
would  be  represented  by  the  following  delegation 
at  the  7th  session  of  the  International  "Wool  Study 
Group  to  be  held  at  London  December  10-14 : 

Delegates 

W.    Michael    Blumenthal,    chairman,    Deputy    Assistant 

Secretary  of  State  for  Economic  Affairs 
Daniel  P.  Moynihan,  Executive  Assistant  to  the  Secretary 

of  Labor 
Stanley  Nehmer,  vice  chairman,  Office  of  International 

Resources,  Department  of  State 
Hickman  Price,  Assistant  Secretary  of  Commerce 


*/6Jd.,  Jan.  1,1962,  p.  3. 
December  24,   J  962 


Robert  Wallace,  Assistant  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury 

Oovernment  Advisers 

Robert  N.  Anderson,  agricultural  attach^,  American  Em- 
bassy, London 

Edgar  I.  Eaton,  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Department 
of  Labor 

Joseph  A.  Greenwald,  economic  officer,  American  Em- 
bassy, London 

James  S.  Love,  Office  of  Textiles,  Department  of  Commerce 

Charles  E.  Raymond,  Economic  and  Statistical  Analysis 
Division,  Department  of  Agriculture 

Industry  Advisers 

Solomon  Barkin,  Textile  Workers  Union  of  America,  New 
York,  N.X. 

George  A.  Dorr,  Jr.,  president  of  Dorr  Woolen  Co.,  Guild, 
N.H.,  and  chairman  of  the  Northern  Textile  Associa- 
tion, Boston,  Mass. 

Richard  I.  Goodrich,  president  of  the  Boston  Wool  Trade 
Association,  Boston,  Mass. 

Sidney  S.  Korzenik,  executive  director,  National  Knitted 
Outer-AVear  Association.  New  York,  N.l'. 

Penrose  B.  Metcalf ,  president  of  the  National  Wool  Grow- 
ers Association,  Salt  Lake  City,  Utah 

Stephen  P.  Neumann,  executive  vice  president,  Simpson 
Importers,  Inc.,  New  York,  N.Y.,  and  director  of  the 
National  Council  of  American  Importers,  New  York, 
N.Y. 

Lazare  Teper,  International  Ladies  Garment  Workers 
Union,  New  York,  N.Y. 

Edwin  Wilkinson,  president  of  the  National  Association 
of  Wool  Manufacturers,  New  York,  N.Y. 

The  International  Wool  Study  Group,  estab- 
lished in  1946,  is  comprised  of  representatives 
from  countries  having  a  substantial  interest  in  the 
production,  consumption,  or  trade  in  wool  and 
woolen  textiles. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Diplomatic  Relations 

Vienna    convention    on    diplomatic    relations.    Done    at 
Vienna  April  18,  1961.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Tanganyika,  November  5,  1962. 

Optional  protocol  to  the  Vienna  convention  on  diplomatic 
relations  concerning  the  compulsory  settlement  of  dis- 
putes.    Done  at  Vienna  April  18,  1901.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Tanganyika,  November  5,  1962. 


'  Not  in  force. 


981 


Trade 

Protocol  to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 

embodying   results   of   the   1960-61   Tariff   Conference. 

Done  at  Geneva  July  16, 1962. 

Signatures:  Austria''  and  Canada,  July  16,  1962 
Dominican  Republic,  September  14,  1962;  Finland 
August  30,  1902;  Japan,  September  13,  1962 
Sweden.'  July  24,  1962;  Switzerland,'  July  16,  1962 
United  States,  December  3, 1962. 

Enters  into  force  for  the  United  States:  December  31, 
1962. 

Weather 

Convention   of   the   World   Meteorological   Organization. 
Done  at  Washington  October  11,  1947.     Entered   into 
force  March  23,  1950.     TIAS  2052. 
Accession  deposited:  Kuwait,  December  1,  1962. 


BILATERAL 
Belgium 

Agreement  amending  annex  B  of  the  mutual  defense  a.s- 
sistance  agreement  of  January  27,  1950  (TIAS  2010). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Brussels  October  29 
and  November  20,  1962.  Entered  into  force  November 
20,  1962. 

Ceylon 

Agreement  relating  to  the  establishment  of  a  Peace  Corps 
program.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Colombo  No- 
vember 21,  1962.    Entered  into  force  November  21,  1962. 

Congo  (Leopoldville) 

Agreement  amending  the  agricultural  commodities  agree- 
ment of  November  18,  1961,  as  amended  (TIAS  4925, 
5069,  5159,  5164,  and  51S2).  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Leopold ville  November  2,  1962.  Entered  into 
force  November  2,  1962. 

India 

Agricultural  commodities  agreement  under  title  I  of  the 
Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assistance  Act  of 
1954,  as  amended  (68  Stat.  4.J5 ;  7  U.S.C.  1701-1709), 
■with  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  New  Delhi  Novem- 
ber 26,  1962.     Entered  into   force   November  26,   1962. 

Agricultural  commodities  agreement  under  title  I  of  the 
Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assistance  Act  of 
1954,  as  amended  (68  Stat.  4.55;  7  U.S.C.  1701-1709), 
with  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  Washington  Novem- 
ber 30,  1962.     Entered  into  force  November  30,  1962. 

Israel 

Agricultural  commodities  agreement  under  title  I  of  the 
Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assistance  Act  of 
1954,  as  amended  (68  Stat.  455;  7  U.S.C.  1701-1709), 
with  memorandum  of  understanding.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington December  6,  1902.  Entered  into  force  Decem- 
ber 6, 1962. 

Paraguay 

Agricultural  commodities  agreement  under  title  I  of  the 
Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assistance  Act  of 
19.54,  as  amended  (68  Stat.  455;  7  U.S.C.  1701-1709). 
with  exchanges  of  notes.  Signed  at  Asuncion  November 
24,  1962.     Entered  into  force  November  24, 1962. 


'  Subject  to  ratification. 


Switzerland 

Agreement  concerning  the  reciprocal  acceptance  of  ceii' 
titicates  of  airworthiness  for  imported  aircraf; 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bern  October  13,  1961 
Entered  into  force:  November  21, 1962. 

Turkey 

Agreement  amending  the  agricultural  commodities  agret 
ment  of  July  29,  1961,  as  amended  (TIAS  4819,  487^ 
4926,  4937,  4978,  5077,  and  5185).  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Ankara  November  21,  1962.  Enterftn 
into  force  November  21,  19G2. 

Viet-Nam 

Agricultural  commodities  agreement  under  title  I  of  thu 
Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assistance  Ac 
of  1954,  as  amended  (68  Stat.  455;  7  U.S.C.  1701-1709) 
with  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  Saigon  November  21 
1962.     Entered  into  force  November  21,  1962. 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  December  3-9 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Ofl^ce  of 
News,  Department  of  State,  Washington  25,  D.C. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  December  3  which  appear 
in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  697  and  698 
of  November  28. 

Subject 

U.S.  participation  in  international  con- 
ferences. 

Niger  cretlentials  (rewrite). 

Martin :  University  of  Southern  Cali- 
fornia. Pasadena. 

Jordan  credentials  (rewrite). 

Program  for  visit  of  President  of  Chile. 

Joint  communique  of  U.S. -Japan  Com- 
mittee on  Trade  and  Economic 
Affairs. 

Department  statement  on  Senator 
EUender's  remarks. 

Austria  grants  additional  funds  for 
former  persecutees. 

Rusk  and  Ohira  :  conclusion  of  joint 
economic  meeting. 

Rusk :  report  of  Committee  on  Foreign 
Affairs  Personnel. 

Rusk  visit  to  Ireland. 

Delegation  to  7th  session  of  Inter- 
national Wool  Study  Group  (re- 
write). 

Delegation  to  NATO  ministerial  meet- 
ing (rewrite). 

Lisle  designated  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Public  Affairs  (bio- 
graphic details). 

Foreign  Relations  volume  on  American 
Republics. 

AID  grant  to  Dominican  Republic. 

McGhee :  "Our  Forward  Strategy  in  a 
World  of  Crisis." 


No. 

Date 

*704 

12/3 

706 
707 

12/4 
12/4 

708 

*709 

710 

12/5 
12/5 

12/5 

711 

12/4 

712 

12/5 

713 

12/5 

714 

12/6 

715 
716 

12/6 
12/7 

t717 

12/7 

*718 

12/7 

t719     12/7 


720 
*721 


12/7 
12/8 


*  Not  i)rinted. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


982 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


)ecember  24,  1962 

frica.  United  States  Restates  Policy  Toward  Peo- 
ples and  Governments  of  Africa 

merican  Republics.  Future  of  the  Alliance  for 
Progress    (Martin) 

tomic  Energy.  Role  of  International  Atomic  En- 
ergy Agency  in  U.S.  Foreign  Policy  (Cleveland, 
Smyth) 

ustria.  Austria  Adds  $24  Million  to  Fund  for 
Former  Persecutees 

epartment  and  Foreign  Service.  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs  Personnel  Presents  Report 
(Rusk) 

ominican  Republic.  AID  Makes  Alliance  for  Prog- 
ress Grant  to  Dominican  Republic 

conomic  Affairs 

ffective  Date  of  New  Tariff  Schedules  Postponed  . 

iternational  Wool  Study  Group  (delegation)    .     . 

)int  U.S.-Japan  Committee  Concludes  Second 
Meeting  (Ohira,  Rusk,  text  of  communique)    .     . 

ECD  Ministerial  Council  Meets  at  Paris   .... 

oreign  Aid 

ID  Makes  Alliance  for  Progress  Grant  to  Domini- 
can Republic 

uture  of  the  Alliance  for  Progress  (Martin)  .     .     . 

onduras.  President  Kennedy  Holds  Talks  With 
President  of  Honduras  (text  of  joint  com- 
munique)    

£iternational  Law.  Principles  of  International  Law 
Concerning  Friendly  Relations  Among  States 
(Gore) 

iternational  Organizations  and  Conferences 

Iternational  Wool  Study  Group  (delegation)    .     . 

ECD  Ministerial  Council  Meets  at  Paris  .... 

;ole  of  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  in  U.S. 
Foreign  Policy  ( Cleveland,  Smyth ) 

'eland.    Secretary  Rusk  Visits  Ireland 

ipan.  Joint  U.S.-Japan  Committee  Concludes 
Second  Meeting  (Ohira,  Rusk,  text  of  communi- 
que)   


Index  Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1226 

Jordan.    Letters  of  Credence  (Jum'a) 961 

961         Niger.    Letters  of  Credence  (Sidikou) 961 

Presidential  Documents.    President  Kennedy  Holds 

^51  Talks  With  President  of  Honduras 958 

Science.    U.S.  Announces  Agreement  With  the  So- 
viet Union  on  Cooperation  in  Peaceful  Uses  of 
^^^             Outer  Space  ( Stevenson,  text  of  technical  agree- 
ment)      962 

971 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 981 

U.S.  Announces  Agreement  With  the  Soviet  Union 
^"^^  on  Cooperation  in  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space 

(Stevenson,  text  of  technical  agreement)    .     .     .      962 
958         U.S.S.R.    U.S.  Announces  Agreement  With  the  So- 
viet Union  on  Cooperation  in  Peaceful  Uses  of 
965             Outer  Space  (Stevenson,  text  of  technical  agree- 
9S1  ment) 962 

„__         United  Nations 

959 

nyo         Principles     of     International     Law     Concerning 

Friendly  Relations  Among  States  (Gore)     .     .     .      972 

U.S.  Announces  Agreement  With  the  Soviet  Union 

nrjg  on  Cooperation  in  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space 

ggi  ( Stevenson,  text  of  technical  agreement)  ....      962 

Name  Index 

958  Cleveland,   Harlan 966 

Gore,  Albert 972 

Jum'a,   Sa'ad 961 

Kennedy,  President 958 

gg]^         Martin,  Edwin  M 951 

979         Ohira,  Masayoski 959 

Rusk,  Secretary 959,971 

966 

Sidikou,  Abdou 961 

961 

Smyth,  Henry  D 966 

Stevenson,  Adlai  E 962 

959  Villeda  Morales,  Ramdn 958 


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The  Story  of  Inter-American  Cooperation 


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Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1227 


December  31,  1962 


lAL 

LY  RECORD 


LAWYERS  AND  DIPLOMATS   •    hy  Under  Sectetary  Ball   .     987 

SECRETARY  RUSK'S  NEWS  CONFERENCE  OF 

DECEMBER  10 994 

A  CLOSE   LOOK  AT  AFRICA     •     by  Chester  Bowles   .   .   .  1002 

THE  MEANING  OF  ATLANTIC  PARTNERSHIP    •    by 

Assistant  Secretary  Tyler 1008 

U.S.   PRESENTS  WORKING  PAPER  ON  MEASURES 

TO  REDUCE  RISK  OF  WAR  (text) 1019 


:d  states 
ign  policy 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


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Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1227  •  Publication  74'! 
December  31,  1962 


I 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  tlie  public 
and  interested  agencies  of  the 
Government  with  information  on 
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relations  and  on  the  work  of  the 
Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service.  The  BULLETIN  includes  se- 
lected press  releases  on  foreign  policy, 
issued  by  the  White  House  and  the  |j 
Department,  and  statements  and  ad- 
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special  articles  on  various  phases  of 
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lawyers  and  Diplomats 


I 


iy  Acting  Secretary  Ball  ^ 


Not  long  ago  a  European  friend  of  mine,  upon 
li  rning  that  I  had  spent  most  of  my  career  in 
t!  practice  of  law,  observed  that  I  was  a  migrant 
f  )m  an  old  profession  to  an  older  one.  When  I 
qestioned  this  remark,  he  referred  me  to  a  classic 
dbate  involving  a  lawyer,  a  doctor,  an  engineer, 
ad  a  diplomat. 

The  lawyer  started  the  argument — as  lawyers 
0!asionally  do — by  asserting  that  the  law  was 
tl)  oldest  profession.  As  evidence  to  support  this 
c'im,  he  cited  the  Bible — the  Book  of  Genesis — • 
^.ere  it  is  recorded  that  Cain  murdered  his 
b)ther  Abel.  If  there  was  a  murder,  the  lawyer 
C'ltended,  there  had  to  be  a  trial.  If  there  was 
I  rial,  there  had  to  be  a  lawyer. 

This  argument  did  not  persuade  the  doctor,  who 
operved  that  even  earlier  in  the  Book  of  Genesis 
a^ib  had  been  removed  from  Adam's  side.  Sur- 
'I  y  of  this  kind,  he  said,  necessarily  required  the 
KTices  of  a  doctor. 

But,  contended  the  engineer,  even  before  Adam 

I  [leared  on  the  scene,  the  Bible  states  that  the 
Lrd  created  the  world  out  of  chaos — a  feat  re- 
]  ring  the  most  brilliant  engineering  skill. 

Vnd  at  this  point  the  diplomat  ended  the  con- 

!versy    by    remarking:    "You    overlook    one 

lit,  gentlemen.    After  all,  who  created  chaos?" 

n  spite  of  the  relation  between  murder  and 

■lies,  the  bond  between  law  and  diplomacy  has 

1   always  been  acknowledged  or  applauded.    An 

h-century    French    authority    on    diplomatic 

1  tters,  Francois  de  Callieres,  wrote : 

^  ^  j'he  training  of  a  lawyer  breeds  habits  and  disposition 
Mmind  which  are  not  favorable  to  the  practice  of  diplo- 
B\v.  The  occupation  of  a  lawyer,  which  is  to  split  hairs 
I.  ut  nothing,  is  not  good  preparation  for  the  treatment 
I  j;rave  public  affairs  in  the  region  of  diplomacy. 


/,[,' 


Address  made  before  the  New  Yorlr  Lawyer's  Associa- 
11  at  New  York,  N.T.,  on  Dec.  13  (press  release  725). 


And  this  opinion  was  echoed  by  that  brilliant 
but  caustic  English  writer  and  diplomat  Sir 
Harold  Nicolson,  who  stated  that,  in  his  judg- 
ment, "The  worst  kind  of  diplomatists  are  mis- 
sionaries, fanatics  and  lawyers." 

Yet,  if  neither  the  French  nor  the  British  re- 
gard the  law  as  the  proper  training  for  diplo- 
macy, this  view  would  not  appear  to  reflect  the 
conventional  wisdom  in  America.  I  take  it  as  no 
accident  that,  since  1789,  45  of  our  52  Secretaries 
of  State  have  been  membere  of  tlie  bar.  One 
member  of  that  small  band  of  7  who  has  not  been 
a  lawyer — my  distinguished  chief  and  colleague, 
Dean  Rusk — does  not  conceal  the  fact  that  he  was 
studying  law  when  the  war  intervened.  It  cut 
off  what  would  undoubtedly  have  been  a  brilliant 
career  at  the  bar,  and  it  no  doubt  made  liim  Secre- 
tary of  State  several  years  sooner. 

I  am  prepared  to  state  quite  categorically — al- 
though obviously  this  is  in  the  nature  of  a  self- 
serving  statement  made  to  a  preconditioned 
audience — that  the  law  is,  in  fact,  a  first-rate  ap- 
prenticeship for  diplomacy.  Certainly  the  pro- 
fessions require  many  of  the  same  qualities.  Yet 
there  are  differences  between  the  demands  im- 
posed on  the  lawyer  and  on  the  public  official 
dealing  with  problems  of  foreign  policy.  And  the 
major  point  of  difference  can  be  made  quit© 
explicit. 

Foreign  Policy  Problems  Not  Self-Contained 

Not  always,  but  quite  often,  the  lawyer  finds 
himself  in  the  happy  position  of  being  able  to 
consider  a  problem  as  self-contained.  He  can 
resolve  it  within  its  own  four  walls  as  a  neat  and 
rewarding  intellectual  exercise.  But  for  the 
practitioner  of  foreign  policy,  particularly  if  he 
serves  the  government  of  a  leading  nation,  this 
luxury  is  never  possible. 


)?:emfaer  37,   7962 


987 


For  in  this  inid-20tli  century  an  interconnected 
web  of  tension  runs  around  the  globe.  Every 
problem  casts  a  shadow  over  every  other  problem, 
and  the  whole  world  can  be  set  agog  by  what  in 
other  days  would  have  seemed  remote  and  isolated 
incidents— incidents  high  on  Himalayan  moun- 
tain peaks,  deep  in  African  jungles,  or  in  Asian 
rice  paddies,  to  say  nothing  about  Caribbean 
islands.  Because  of  the  preeminence  of  the 
United  States,  a  principal  objective  of  the  foreign 
policy  of  nations  the  world  over  is  to  influence  our 
attitude  toward  them  or  toward  their  enemies, 
and  their  attitudes  are  of  concern  to  us  as  well. 
For  America  today,  at  the  center  of  free-world 
affairs,  each  problem  of  foreign  policy  flows  on 
many  levels  at  once,  each  opens  the  way  to  count- 
less contingencies,  each  directly  or  indirectly 
affects  the  interests  of  obscure  parties  in  distant 
places.  We  are  forced,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
to  see  every  problem  through  a  glass  darkly,  a 
glass  that,  like  a  many-sided  prism,  has  dozens  of 
subtly  merging  facets. 

I  suspect  that  this  is  familiar  enough  to  you. 
Yet  I  feel  compelled  to  emphasize  it  again,  since 
it  is  the  basic  explanation  for  much  of  tlie  failure 
of  understanding,  the  failure  of  communication, 
between  the  American  people  and  the  officials 
responsible  for  the  conduct  of  their  foreign  policy. 

Most  problems  of  foreign  policy  enter  the  pub- 
lic mind  through  the  medium  of  crises,  that  is, 
with  one  or  two  elements  cast  into  stark  and 
dramatic  relief.  But,  in  foreign  affairs,  to  con- 
centrate only  on  what  is  dramatically  prominent 
is  to  repeat  the  fallacy  of  the  blind  men  who 
formed  their  separate  impressions  of  an  elephant 
by  feeling  a  different  part  of  the  beast's  anatomy. 
As  a  result,  the  elephant  appeared,  to  the  differ- 
ent observers,  as  a  snake,  a  saber,  a  tree,  a  house, 
and  a  rope.  But  in  the  presence  of  a  problem  of 
foreign  policy,  we  must  recognize  the  elephant 
for  what  it  is  and  deal  with  the  whole  animal. 
We  must  make  sure  that,  while  we  are  dodging 
his  tusks,  he  does  not  step  on  us  with  his  foot— 
and  we  must  keep  in  mind,  too,  that  in  the  field  of 
world  politics  the  elephants  travel  in  herds. 

Our  experience  during  the  recent  Cuban  crisis 
illustrates  the  point.  Back  in  1898,  in  a  far  less 
complicated  world,  the  United  States  took  direct 
military  action  to  invade  the  island  and  drive  out 
the  Spanish.  Our  decision  then  was  relatively 
simple  to  make.    The  United  States  was  not  yet 


988 


the  leading  nation  of  the  world.  The  int( 
dependence  that  characterizes  modern  politic 
life  did  not  exist,  nor  did  the  institutions  for  joi 
action.  There  was  no  cold  war.  There  were : 
nuclear  weapons.  The  United  States  could  a)i 
did  act  unilaterally,  with  results  with  which 
are  all  familiar. 

Today  we  are  in  quite  a  different  position.    "^ 
live  in  a  world  that  is  divided  against  itself, 
world  half  slave,  half  free.    We  have  diplomat 
relations  with  108   countries,  and  we  count 
allies  spread  around  the  globe.     As  one  of  t 
two  great  nuclear  powers — and  thus  a  trustee 
humanity's   fate — we  have  an  obligation  to  i 
mankind  to  prevent  the  kind  of  conflict  that  cou 
result   in   the   incineration   of   a   large   part 
civilization. 


■  itii 


0 

iliw 

KI 
111' 

ipl 


The  Cuban  Crisis 

Against  this  background  of  circumstance  ai 
responsibility,  how  does  the  Cuban  crisis  appea 

In  its  most  important  aspect  it  was  a  confront 
tion  between  the  vital  interests  of  the  Unit 
States  and  the  aggressive  intentions  of  the  Sovi 
Union.  The  Soviet  Union  had  made  a  reckk 
move  to  improve  its  world  power  position  in  bo 
a  military  and  political  sense,  a  move  that  affect 
a  precarious  balance  and  thus  jeopardized  the  i 
terests  of  the  free  world. 

But  at  the  same  time,  of  course,  the  crisis  w 
part  of  the  conflict  between  the  United  Stat 
and  the  Castro  government,  which  had  permitti 
itself  to  be  used  as  a  tool  for  Soviet  ambitions. 

Yet  even  in  terms  of  the  conflict  with  Casti- 
this  is  an  oversimplification.  The  prime  mena« 
of  Castroism  is  the  danger  of  Communist  infe 
tion  of  Latin  America.  It  poses,  of  necessity, 
hemispheric  problem  in  which  the  interests  of  oi 
partners  in  the  Organization  of  American  Stat|(|| 
are  all  engaged.  As  a  consequence  it  was  essenti 
that  any  response  to  the  threat  of  Soviet  offensi" 
weapons  in  Cuba  be  conceived  in  the  framewo)! 
of  our  hemispheric  obligations  and  undertake 
with  the  support  and  participation  of  the  oth, 
American  states. 

Nor  could  we  ignore  the  interests  of  our  NAT 
and  other  allies.  No  one  could  be  certain  of  tl 
form  or  character  of  the  reaction  of  the  Sovi 
Union  to  whatever  move  we  might  make  to  elim 
nate  the  offensive  weapons.  No  one  could  be  ce 
tain  that  the  Soviet  Union  would  confine  its  rea. 


m 


Fir 

ITS 


Tl 
m 
h 
M 

It 

m 
m 


Or 

b, 

In 
t 

B 
00 


Deparfment  of  State  BulhH  ^^^ 


on  to  the  Western  Hemisphere.  Our  partners 
1  Western  Europe  and  our  allies  and  bases  in 
ther  parts  of  the  world  are  included  within  the 
irget  system  of  Soviet  missiles.  Apart  from 
eaty  considerations,  all  had  a  supreme  stake  in 
uy  line  of  action  that  might  Iiave  escalated  into 
uclear  conflict. 

And  finally  we  could  not  approach  the  crisis 
ithout  taking  account  of  its  impact  on  the 
United  Nations,  which  serves  as  the  voice  and 
rganized  conscience  for  more  than  100  member 
itions. 


Bt« 


Compound  Variables  and  Multiple  Unknowns" 

The  problem,  therefore,  was  one  of  several 
imensions,  calling  for  a  solution  that  met  and 
ilanced  many  simultaneous  objectives,  not  one 
mple  objective.  The  problem  was  to  design  the 
ind  of  measured  response  that  would  remove 
18  threat  to  the  Western  Hemisphere  and  to  the 
olitical  and  military  balance  of  the  world  in  a 
ay  that : 

First,  posed  a  minimum  risk  to  ourselves  and 
ir  allies; 

Second,  involved  a  minimimn  danger  of  escala- 
on  toward  higher  orders  of  violence ; 
Third,  was  consistent  with  our  treaty  obliga- 
ons;  and 

Fourth,  did  not  contravene  the  principles  for 
hich  we  stood  as  a  nation. 

The  choice  of  available  response  covered  a 
'oad  spectrum.  Possibilities  ranged  all  the  way 
'om  purely  diplomatic  action  to  various  forms 

mil  '  direct  military  action.     That  broad  spectrum 

ill  fered  a  large  number  of  possible  variations  and 
)mbinations.  There  was  a  time  dimension,  too. 
On  the  one  hand,  time  was  needed  for  the  de- 
ilopment  of  comprehensive  intelligence,  princi- 

s"!  illy  by  air  surveillance.  On  the  other  hand,  ae- 
on was  required  before  the  arsenal  of  Soviet 
fensive  weapons  could  become  fully  operational. 
We  were  presented,  therefore,  with  an  equation 

■  *  :  compound  variables  and  multiple  unloiowns. 
b  one  has  yet  devised  a  computer  that  will  digest 
ich  raw  data  as  was  available  to  us  and  promptly 


01'  rint  out  a  recommended  course  of  action.  We 
*"'  jed  the  instrument  at  hand,  an  ancient  but  honor- 
i*'"  )le  instrument,  the  pooled  judgment  and  experi- 
1*'  ice  of  a  small  group  of  men  consisting,  in  this 
»■*  ise,  principally  of  the  12  officials  who  constituted 

i*  ecember  37,   J 962 


the  Executive  Committee  of  the  National  Secu- 
rity Council.  During  the  epic  week  of  day-and- 
night  effort  that  preceded  the  President's  speech 
on  October  22,^  we  struggled  to  solve  the  prob- 
lem thrust  upon  us  by  applying  the  honored  meth- 
ods of  comparison,  debate,  and  analysis  to  test  the 
virtues  and  disadvantages  of  first  one  and  then  an- 
other possible  solution,  with  all  their  innimierable 
shades  and  variants. 

This  process  entailed  canvassing  each  possibil- 
ity, grinding  considerations  against  each  other, 
plotting  out  each  apparent  course  of  action  with 
its  possible  consequences,  step  by  step.  It  in- 
volved estimates  as  to  the  possible  reaction  of  the 
Soviet  Union  to  each  action  we  might  take.  In 
what  seemed  endless  permutations  it  then  meant 
devising  possible  counters  to  each  hypothetical  So- 
viet reaction. 

At  times  I  had  the  feeling  that  we  were  con- 
ducting continuous  midnight  sessions  of  the  kind 
with  which  you  and  I  are  familiar — the  sessions 
that  take  place  in  the  middle  of  a  complex  law- 
suit. But  the  stakes  were  higher  and  the  ad- 
versary less  predictable.  There  was  no  judge, 
and  the  jury  would  be  all  mankind. 

Advantages  of  Measured  Response 

It  was  not  difBcult  to  devise  a  military  plan  that 
would  quickly  have  achieved  the  elimination  of 
the  offensive  weapons.  But  it  had  to  be  a  plan 
that  did  not  block  the  road  leading  back  from  the 
use  of  force  to  a  political  solution.  It  had  also  to 
be  a  plan  that  involved  the  least  danger  of  escala- 
tion up  an  ascending  scale  of  violence. 

At  the  end  of  the  process  of  analysis,  President 
Kennedy  chose,  as  all  the  world  Imows,  to  take, 
as  the  initial  step,  a  consciously  measured  response 
— a  quarantine  interdicting  the  buildup  of  offen- 
sive weapons  in  Cuba.^  That  choice  had  many 
advantages. 

First  of  all,  while  involving  force  it  did  not  in- 
volve the  immediate  use  of  violence.  In  fact,  it 
offered  the  possibilities,  which  events  bore  out,  of 
avoiding  the  use  of  violence.  The  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment was  not  compelled  to  respond  instantane- 
ously— was  not,  therefore,  compelled  to  take  hasty 
action  without  calm  consideration  of  the  conse- 
quences.    The  plan  put  the  burden  of  initiating 


'  BuuxTiN  of  Nov.  12, 19G2,  p.  71.5. 

'  For  text  of  proclamation,  see  iliid.,  p.  717. 


989 


II 


the  use  of  violence  on  Chairman  Klirushchev — 
who  elected  not  to  assume  that  burden. 

Meanwhile  lines  of  communications  were 
opened  directly  between  Washington  and  Mos- 
cow and  through  the  United  Nations  to  permit  a 
political  solution,  albeit  a  political  solution  shaped 
by  our  willingness  and  ability  to  use  force.  In- 
volving as  it  did  no  abrupt  resort  to  violence,  the 
quarantine  gave  us  time  to  consult  with  our  allies 
in  the  Organization  of  American  States  and  gain 
their  unanimous  support  for  our  action.*  It  gave 
time  for  us  to  advise  our  friends  around  the  world, 
time  to  consult  with  our  NATO  allies  regarding 
subsequent  steps  that  might  be  required. 

The  quarantine,  moreover,  defined  the  struggle 
clearly  as  one  between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  lifting  it  out  of  its  purely  Cuban 
context.  In  its  initial  phase  it  was  narrowly  di- 
rected at  the  introduction  into  Cuba  of  offensive 
weapons — which  was  the  prime  cause  of  the  crisis. 
But  it  was  a  potentially  flexible  instrument  since 
the  proscribed  list  could  be  extended  to  include 
such  items  as  petroleum,  had  additional  pressure 
proved  necessary.  For  it  must  be  understood  that 
the  quarantine  was  conceived  as  only  the  first  move 
in  a  complicated  strategy,  and,  while  the  details  of 
the  quarantine  were  being  worked  out,  prepara- 
tions were  going  forward  simultaneously  to  put 
in  readiness  a  sequence  of  other  coordinated 
actions  if  the  weapons  were  not  removed  as  a  result 
of  the  initial  action. 

Complexities  in  Formulation  of  Policy 

I  have  described  this  episode  in  the  Cuban  crisis 
primarily  to  illustrate  the  complexities  of  the 
problems  implicit  in  the  formulation  and  execu- 
tion of  foreign  policy  today.  In  the  end  one  man, 
the  President,  had  to  make  the  lonely  decision  to 
choose  the  quarantine  as  the  first  and  crucial  step  in 
a  larger  strategy.  But  in  the  development  of  the 
alternative  plans  that  were  put  before  him  by  the 
Executive  Committee,  the  principal  role  was 
played  not  by  any  one  man  but  by  the  process  so 
painfully  employed  during  a  week  in  which  all 
participants,  like  the  Ancient  Mariner,  grew  wiser 
with  the  experience.  In  a  real  sense — in  a  sense 
that  I  kiiow  we,  as  lawyers,  well  understand — one 
can  say  that  the  process  was  the  author  of  the 
policy.    For  that  reason,  among  others,  speculation 


Ik 

0i 


liJ) 


Id 

lite 
hilt 


as  to  particular  positions  taken  by  particuls 
participants  during  particular  phases  of  tl 
process  can  serve  only  to  mislead  and  confuse. 

Cuban  Solution  Not  a  Precedent 

As  lawyers  we  also  imderstand  well  that  tlf 
precedential  value  of  a  case  does  not  extend  bti 
yond  its  facts.  The  facts  that  were  presented  t 
us  in  the  Cuban  crisis  are  not  likely  to  be  foum 
again  in  quite  the  same  combination.  Cuba  is  an 
island  only  90  miles  off  the  continental  Unite 
States;  in  Cuba,  to  a  greater  degi-ee  than  in  almo! 
any  place  in  the  world,  we  had  overwhelming  Iocs 
militaiy  superiority  of  every  kind.  Moreove 
this  was  the  only  crisis  in  the  nuclear  age  trij 
gered  by  genuinely  secret  intelligence.  With  ao 
vance  warning  and  the  opportunity  to  devise 
strategy,  we  were  not  required  to  show  our  hand  i 
advance.  Hence  we  were  able  to  move  with  di 
cision  along  a  well-planned  line  of  action. 

I  do  not  suggest,  therefore,  that  the  particula  T 
response  developed  with  respect  to  the  offensi 
weapons  in  Cuba  will  itself  be  the  solution  fci 
other  problems  that  will  come. 

The  Cuban  crisis,  properly  viewed,  is  an  incidei* 
in  a  moving  stream  of  incidents  that  shape  reh 
tions  between  the  free  world  and  the  Communis 
world,  indeed,  that  shape  all  international  reh 
tions.  In  this  stream  the  Cuban  experience  stand 
out :  it  has  caught  the  attention  of  the  world  b«< 
cause  it  involved  the  direct  confrontation  of  th 
two  giants — the  United  States  and  the  Sovit 
Union. 

The  experience  has  been  of  particular  value  be  J 
cause  in  an  unambiguous  way  it  has  agar 
demonstrated  to  the  world  the  power  and  the  res 
olution  of  the  United  States  and  its  allies.  Wit 
equal  clarity,  it  has  also  demonstrated  the  restrain 
and  the  care  with  which  that  power  is  used. 


*  Ibid.,  p.  720. 
990 


Changing  World  Relationships 

The  other  significance  of  the  Cuban  affair  is  ol 
greater  breadth.  It  has  not  introduced  a  milieu 
nium  or  a  new  era  of  secure  peace.  But  the  event 
in  Cuba,  taken  together  with  other  events  discern 
ible  about  us,  suggest  that  we  may  be  passing  f  roD 
a  period  of  rigidity  in  world  politics  into  an  era  o 
greater  mobility  and  maneuver.  Ever  since  tb 
war  long-term  secular  trends  have  been  at  worif* 
beneath  the  surface  of  world  politics.  Thosi 
trends  are  now  forcing  into  the  open  profound'* 

Department  of  State  Bulleiii  Df 


K] 


SJH 


tll( 


I 


I 


'laanges  in  the  relationsliips  that  have  become  fa- 
niliar  to  us. 

First  thei-e  is  movement  within  the  Communist 
jIoc.  We  have  long  been  dimly  aware  of  a  wid- 
ening rift  between  the  two  fortresses  of  Commu- 
nist power — the  Soviet  Union  and  Red  China. 
But  within  the  past  few  weeks  this  rift  has  been 
nade  dramatically  visible  to  all.  In  its  attack  on 
[ndia,  China  has  clearly  run  athwart  Soviet 
oolicy.  And  today  the  theologians  of  both  Com- 
nunist  factions  do  not  hesitate  to  shout  their 
)oleniics  at  each  other  in  public. 

In  the  Western  World  we  are  also  in  the  process 
)f  transformation.  A  new  united  Europe  is  being 
)uilt  and  expanded.  Slowly  and  painfully,  but 
mmistakably,  the  free  world  is  moving  toward  a 
mity  that  contains  great  promise  for  the  com- 
non  endeavors  of  the  United  States  and  its  part- 
lers  in  freedom. 

We  are,  at  the  same  time,  nearing  the  end  of  an- 
)ther  long  and  not  always  attractive  period — the 
Hid  of  Western  colonialism.  These  past  17  years 
dnce  the  end  of  the  World  War  have  seen  the 
iismantling  of  the  great  colonial  structures — the 
jirth  of  46  free  countries  created  out  of  former 
jolonial  dependencies.  (And,  parenthetically,  not 
me  of  these  has  become  Communist.)  The  day  is 
lot  far  off  when  colonialism  will  be  no  more  than 
m  historical  fact,  no  longer  a  continuing  source 
)f  friction  and  discontent.  As  the  colonial  period 
loses  we  shall  have  large,  continuing  obligations 
r  ;o  the  emergent  peoples,  the  new  nations  struggling 
;o  maintain  and  develop  their  freedom  and  achieve 
decent  standard  of  living.  But  we  shall  have  a 
lealthy  relationship  founded  on  mutual  self- 
:«spect.  The  mortgage  to  the  past  will  have  been 
^  laid  off,  and  in  the  end,  if  we  show  the  wisdom, 
jjj  sympathy,  and  generosity  that  are  our  heritage, 
we  should  have  provided  a  far  better  chance  for 
peace  and  stability. 

Finally,  in  this  swiftly  moving  world,  we  may, 
)ef ore  too  long,  begin  to  detect  the  first  faint  signs 
ot  a  change  for  the  better  in  the  cold  war.  From 
the  long  view  of  history,  the  cold  war  has  had  only 
the  briefest  life ;  it  has  endured  so  far  only  a  little 
more  than  a  decade  and  a  half — a  mere  moment 
in  time.  And  there  is  no  historical  inevitability 
that  fixes  it  as  a  permanent  aspect  of  the  world 
scene.  On  the  contrary  there  is  reason  to  think 
that  tidal  forces  are  at  work  behind  the  Iron  Cur- 
tain as  well  as  on  this  side. 


M 


)ecember  37,   7962 


I  hold  out  no  prospect  for  a  safe  or  easy  life. 
However  much  we  may  trumpet,  the  Iron  Curtain 
will  not  drop  away  like  the  walls  of  Jericho.  I 
suggest  to  you  only  that  we  are  entering  a  period 
of  profound  political  change — a  period  of  move- 
ment and  maneuver  in  which  the  pace  of  events 
will  be  quicker,  the  prizes  we  seek  more  nearly 
within  our  grasp,  and  the  hazards  closer  to  the  sur- 
face and  more  constantly  in  play. 

More  than  ever  before,  it  will  be  essential  to 
have  steady  nerves,  to  see  events  in  their  full  per- 
spective, to  avoid  the  extremes  of  euphoria  and 
despair,  and,  above  all,  to  keep  our  sense  of  historic 
direction.  Amidst  the  perils  of  the  modern  world, 
the  United  States  must  be  ready  for  whatever  may 
come ;  we  cannot  afford  to  discount  any  possibili- 
ties. Still  our  past  experience  and  our  present  cul- 
ture impose  upon  us  certain  imperatives.  There  is 
an  American  way.  It  was  not  for  nothing  that 
our  forefathers  declared  themselves  for  life,  lib- 
erty, and  the  pursuit  of  happiness;  that  they  set- 
tled and  cultivated  a  country  that  is  a  continent; 
that  they  established  equality  before  the  law ;  that 
they  created  high  living  standards  by  hard  work 
and  set  aside  broad  reaches  for  education,  leisure, 
and  the  arts.  These  continuing  accomplishments 
represent  the  American  contribution  to  civiliza- 
tion; they  are  the  message  we  proclaim  to  the 
world.  And  I  think  we  may  take  it  as  our  chief 
task  and  supreme  opportvmity  to  show,  in  the  fu- 
ture as  in  the  past,  that  in  America  power  is  used 
not  to  play  fast  and  loose  with  the  destinies  of 
mankind  but  to  achieve  constructive  purpose  on 
the  grand  scale. 

President  Alessandri  of  Chile 
Visits  Washington 

Jorge  Alessandri  Rodriguez,  President  of  the 
BejmbliG  of  Civile,  visited  at  Washington  De- 
cember 11-13.  Following  is  the  text  of  a  joint 
communique  between  President  Kennedy  and 
President  Alessandri  released  following  their  dis- 
cussions on  December  11  and  12. 

White  House  press  release  dated  December  12 

For  two  days,  we  have  had  the  opportunity  for 
a  frank  exchange  of  our  points  of  view  on  an  im- 
portant number  of  topics  referring  to  the  develop- 
ment of  relations  between  our  two  countries  and 
the  resixjiisibility  for  their  international  action  at 


991 


both  the  American  and  world  level.  We  are  happy 
to  state  that  our  conversations  have  been  extremely 
useful.  The  purpose  of  this  statement  is  to  report 
briefly  on  the  lines  followed  by  those  conversa- 
tions and  the  results  attained. 

Since  their  beginning  as  free  nations,  the  United 
States  and  Chile  have  been  constantly  involved  in 
a  historic  revolution — a  revolution  that  seeks  to 
improve  the  lot  of  the  common  man  of  our  two 
countries  imder  a  system  of  political  freedom  and 
individual  dignity.  We  have  no  reason  to  attempt 
to  rectify  what  was  done  by  our  forebears,  or  to 
doubt  what  the  present  generation  can  and  should 
do  in  order  to  progress  toward  the  achievement 
of  the  objectives  which  our  countries  have  worked 
out  as  the  goals  of  their  convictions  and  aspi- 
rations. 

We  are  aware  that  the  progress  of  science  and 
technology,  as  well  as  comparison  with  the  ways 
of  life  that  prevail  in  the  more  developed  nations, 
have  given  a  new  and  bracing  tone  of  urgency  to 
the  legitimate  claims  of  the  masses  of  those  coun- 
tries which  are  still  demanding  that  a  proper  equa- 
tion be  found  between  the  ideals  of  liberty  and 
democracy  in  the  political  order,  and  the  satisfac- 
tion of  their  desires  for  a  more  abundant  way  of 
life  in  the  spiritual  order  and,  in  the  social  field, 
equality  of  opportunity  for  all. 

In  this  sense,  we  believe  that  the  Alliance  for 
Progress  constitutes  an  adequate  reply  to  the  con- 
cern which  we,  as  leaders  of  government,  have  for 
satisfying  those  aspirations  and  demands  of  our 
peoples.  During  our  meetings,  we  have  come  to  a 
clear  and  firm  agreement  to  encourage  by  all  pos- 
sible means  the  effective  advance  of  that  inter- 
American  cooperative  undertaking.  At  the  end 
of  the  first  year  since  this  bold  venture  was  ini- 
tiated at  Punta  del  Este,^  we  have  noted  on  the 
one  hand  the  progress  achieved,  but  we  have  also 
examined  objectively  the  weaknesses  and  gaps  that 
still  hinder  its  further  progress.  In  both  the  con- 
cept and  the  implementation  of  the  Alliance,  we 
have  already  overcome  innumerable  barriers  that 
some  years  ago  might  perhaps  have  jeopardized 
the  undertaking  itself  or  its  material  success. 

We  have  agreed  that  the  Chilean  Ten-Year 
Plan,  taken  together  with  the  recommendations 
of  the  IBRD  [International  Bank  for  Reconstruc- 
tion  and  Development]    and  the  Committee   of 


ilf 


*  Bulletin  of  Sept.  11, 1961,  p.  459. 


Tli( 


Experts  of  the  OAS,  constitutes  a  useful  frame 
work  for  achieving  the  increase  in  living  stand 
ards  called  for  in  the  Charter  of  Punta  del  Esti 
and  that  the  Plan  merits  the  support  of  the  Unitei 
States  and  other  external  capital  sources.  In  thii 
respect,  we  have  found  that  this  program  pro\dde| 
for  an  adequate  measure  of  internal  effort  am 
that  Chile  has  been  vigorously  taking  a  number  o: 
the  important  steps  necessary  to  achieve  that  ef 
fort  as  contemplated  in  the  Program. 

We  have  agreed  that  the  impulse  which  the  Al- 
liance for  Progress  is  designed  to  give  to  the  prog- 
ress of  these  countries — and  Chile  in  particular — • 
will  not  be  possible  without  an  ample  amount  ofll'''™ 
foreign  private  capital,  since  investments  of  thiS)  '"'' 
nature  have  contributed  and  continue  to  contrib-  f" 
ute  substantially  to  the  economic  development  of  lnii 
the  region  as  a  whole  and  especially  of  Chile.  till 

Nor  are  we  unaware  of  the  fact  that  the  objec-   feet 
tives  of  the  Alliance  for  Progress  make  it  impera-  ptl 
tive  that  Latin  America  succeed  in  the  next  few   u 
years  in  bringing  its  development  as  a  whole  in 
line  with  the  new  shape  of  world  trade.    It  must    jji,j 
move  progressively  toward  economic  integration, 
in  accordance  with  formulas  that  are  yielding  sig- 
nificant results  in  other  areas  of  the  world.    It  is 
our  purpose  to  spare  no  effort  so  that  our  respec- 
tive countries  may  adapt  their  international  con- 
duct, public  as  well  as  private,  to  practices  that   ^ 
will  best  favor  the  integration  of  Latin  America 
and  its  action  as  an  important  force  in  world 
affairs. 

To  succeed  in  this  undertaking,  we  have  noted 
the  need  for  constantly  improving  the  overall  ma- 
chinery of  the  Alliance  and  its  operation.  We  rec- 
ognize that,  along  with  its  important  achieve- 
ments, this  year  of  experience  has  demonstrated 
certain  difficulties  in  moving  rapidly  toward  the 
objectives  of  the  Alliance.  As  Chiefs  of  State,  it 
is  our  firm  proposal  to  support  and  promote  the 
measures  to  implement  the  Alliance.  For  this  rea- 
son, we  are  in  full  agreement  with  the  recent  reso- 
lution appointing  two  prominent  personalities  of 
the  hemisphere  who  have  been  entrusted  with  the 
formulation  of  recommendations  for  revision  of 
the  inter-American  system  so  as  to  promote  the 
progress  of  the  Alliance.^ 

We  should  emphasize  the  fact  that  this  Alliance 
in  wliich  we  are  engaged  with  the  other  nations 


'Ibid.,  Dec.  10, 1962,  p.  901,  footnote 4. 


fflt 


tti- 


note 

(Otl 

ret 


)fm 
leb; 
m 
f« 
ieii 


k\ 


Te 


KID 


i 


992 


Departmenf  of  State  Bulletin    peci 

i 


if  Latin  America  is  only  one  aspect  of  our  reply 
oday  to  the  threat  that  hangs  over  the  free  world 
o  which  we  belong  and  in  whose  defense  we  are 
psolved  to  play  the  responsible  role  dictated  to 
IS  by  history  and  our  common  spiritual  heritage. 
Ve  firmly  believe  in  democracy  and  personal  lib- 
rty;  we  also  believe  that  through  a  system  that 
espects  the  national  sovereignty  and  independ- 
jnce  of  our  coimtries,  we  shall  be  able  to  improve 
he  destiny  and  accelerate  the  progress  of  our 
ountries. 

The  faith  and  democratic  course  of  the  United 
itates  and  Chile  have  not  altered  in  more  than  a 
entury  and  a  half  of  independent  life.  We  main- 
lin  that  they  cannot,  and  should  not,  be  inter- 
upted.  In  the  face  of  the  threats  that  appear  on 
he  inter-American  horizon  from  time  to  time,  we 
eaffirm  our  decision  firmly  to  call  upon  our  re- 
pective  national  communities  to  continue  to  ful- 
ill  the  obligations  they  have  freely  accepted,  based 
n  the  principle  of  inter- American  solidarity.  Ee- 
ent  actions  of  the  OAS  in  connection  with  the 
yuban  case,^  in  which  our  participation  was  deci- 
ive,  demonstrate  beyond  a  doubt  the  vigor  of  that 
lecision. 

We  reaffirm  our  adherence  to  the  United  Na- 
ions  and  our  firm  decision  to  continue  collaborat- 
ng  with  the  efforts  of  that  organization  to  pro- 
note  understanding  among  the  peoples  of  the 
Forld  and  the  maintenance  of  peace.  Especially 
re  undertake  to  provide  every  assistance  to  the 
fforts  to  obtain  disarmament  and  the  outlawing 
if  nuclear  tests,  under  adequate  control,  both  tasks 
)eing  of  special  significance  for  the  people  of  tliis 
lemispliere  who  must  accomplish  in  the  next  few 
ears  the  rational  and  constmctive  investment  of 
heir  human  and  material  resources. 

The  United  States  and  Chile  are  playing  a  key 
ole  at  this  time  in  the  history  of  the  Americas. 
Ve  do  not  intend  to  avoid  our  responsibility.  We 
hall  not  cease  in  our  efforts  until  hunger,  poverty, 
gnorance,  social  injustice,  and  the  threat  to  our 
ree  institutions  have  been  definitely  eradicated. 
Ve  consider  that  working  through  democracy  is 
he  best  means  of  bringing  prosperity  and  well- 
)eing  to  our  peoples.   Our  complete  understanding 


on  the  occasion  of  tliis  meeting  has  only  confirmed 
our  faith  and  will  to  work  together  for  the  good  of 
the  Americas  and  the  Free  World  in  the  future. 

Secretary  Rusk  Expresses  Appreciation 
to  Venezuela  for  Quarantine  Action 

Press  release  731  dated  December  14 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  personal  message  from, 
Secretary  Rush  to  the  Foreign  Minister  of  Vene- 
zuela, Dr.  Marcos  Falcon  Briceno. 

December  10,  1962 

Dear  j\£r.  JVIintster:  As  you  are  aware,  the 
quarantine  measures  against  the  delivery  of  offen- 
sive weapons  and  associated  materials  to  Cuba 
ceased  on  November  20, 1962.^ 

The  foi-thright  and  vigorous  manner  in  which 
your  Government  responded  to  the  threat  to  the 
hemisphere,  immediately  assuming  its  correspond- 
ing responsibilities  in  those  dramatic  hours  and 
contributing  forces  to  insure  the  effectiveness  of 
the  quarantine  measures  instituted,  has  been  widely 
and  favorably  regarded. 

The  effective  participation  of  two  Venezuelan 
destroyers,  along  with  the  forces  of  the  United 
States  and  other  members  of  the  Organization  of 
American  States,  was,  indeed,  an  eloquent  demon- 
stration of  your  Government's  full  assumption  of 
its  responsibilities  to  defend  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere during  this  critical  period  in  its  history. 

It  is  particularly  inspiring  to  note  that  your 
Government,  at  a  time  when  it  was  courageously 
engaged  in  defending  its  own  independence 
against  the  Communist-led  and  inspired  subver- 
sion and  insurrection,  made  a  significant  contribu- 
tion to  the  defense  of  the  hemisphere. 

I  trust  that  Providence  will  continue  to  guide 
the  energies  of  both  of  our  nations  in  the  service  of 
peace,  the  preservation  of  the  political  independ- 
ence of  the  American  States  and  the  maintenance 
of  the  high  ideals  of  justice  and  peaceful  progress 
in  the  world. 

Sincerely  yours, 

Dhan  Eusk 


'  Ihii.,  Nov.  12, 1962,  p.  720. 


'  BULLBTIN  of  Dec.  17, 1962,  p.  918. 


December  31,  7962 


993 


Secretary  Rusk's  News  Conference  of  December  10 


Press  release  726  dated  December  11 

Secretary  Rush:  I  have  no  formal  statement  to- 
day, but  I  will  make  a  few  comments  on  the  forth- 
coming NATO  meeting. 

I  am  leaving  this  evening  at  10  o'clock  from  An- 
drews. I  do  not  expect  to  make  a  departure  state- 
ment; so  my  friends  in  the  press  can  save  them- 
selves a  laborious  trip  out  there. 

I  tliink  it  would  be  wrong  for  us  to  expect  that 
each  meeting  of  the  NATO  ministers  will  produce 
major  new  decisions  or  take  up  wholly  unexpected 
subjects.  After  all,  these  are  stated  annual  meet- 
ings, these  December  meetings  in  Paris  each  year, 
in  which  the  foreign  ministers,  the  finance  minis- 
ters, and  the  defense  ministers  do  get  together  to 
run  over  the  entire  range  of  NATO  work. 

Our  first  day  will  be  taken  up  largely,  I  think, 
wi^.h  a  full  exchange  among  foreign  ministers  on 
the  world  situation  and  an  examination  of  what 
this  situation  means  for  specific  NATO  problems 
and  responsibilities.  This  kind  of  talk  will  go  on 
not  only  aroimd  the  NATO  table  as  a  whole  but 
also  in  private  talks  among  mmisters  on  a  bilateral 
or  other  basis. 

Political  Consultation  in  NATO 

We  will,  I  think,  give  additional  attention  to 
the  growing  process  of  political  consultation  in 
NATO.  About  a  year  and  a  half  ago  we  began 
to  emphasize  the  importance  of  the  fullest  con- 
sultation among  the  NATO  countries,  not  just 
on  NATO  matters  but  on  problems  arising  in 
other  parts  of  the  world,  in  order  that  we  could 
have  a  common  understanding  of  policy  and  in- 
terests and,  to  the  extent  possible,  coordinate  our 
governmental  attitudes  wherever  such  issues 
arise. 

I  think  that  has  shown  some  dividends  already 
in  a  variety  of  ways.  I  think  it  is  particularly 
noticeable,  for  example,  at  the  present  session 

994 


ilnl 


Is 
ides 
del 

isii 

JOS 


of  the  General  Assembly  in  New  York.  This  ia  jji 
not  an  exclusive  kind  of  consultation.  Many  othi  || 
er  governments  are  involved  in  these  same  issues  ,(],( 
but  we  have  found  that  this  greatly  intensified!  «( 
political  consultation  in  NATO  has  proved  vei^l 
valuable  even  though,  on  occasion,  it  does  disclos*  '^ 
that  the  NATO  countries  are  not  together  on  par 
ticular  issues  in  other  parts  of  the  world. 


th 


Annual  Military  Review  |g[|, 

Then  we  shall  spend  a  good  deal  of  time  on  b 
our  annual  military  review,  in  which  we  take  uj  is 
for  serious  discussion  the  status  of  forces  in  re- 
lation to  force  goals,  and  this  will  be  connectec 
also  with  the  discussion  of  strategic  problems.  1 
think  it  is  no  secret  that  we  in  the  United  States 
believe  that  the  NATO  countries,  all  of  us,  should 
move  as  promptly  as  possible  to  bring  our  forces 
into  line  with  the  agreed  NATO  force  goals  andl 
although  there  has  been  considerable  progress  in 
this  matter,  that  there  is  much  that  remains  to  be 
done. 

In  this  connection  there  will  undoubtedly  bfr 
further  discussion  of  multilateral  nuclear  force  in 
the  alliance.     Our  present  nuclear  arrangements 
grew  up  pretty  much  as  a  matter  of  history  and  it 
development.     They  involve  very  heavy  responsi- 
bility  on  the  part  of  the  United  States.    Thera 
have  been  some  in  Europe  who  would  like  to  see  pus 
this  aspect  changed,  feeling  that  the  European  > 
countries  themselves  should  take  a  more  impor- 
tant part  in  the  nuclear  field. 

But  we  are  entirely  happy  to  go  into  these  ques-lstei 
tions  with  them.  There  are  two  main  lines  of  ap-'  On 
proach  which  are  immediately  being  discussed,  ij 
The  one  is  within  existing  arrangements  to  ex-i  oK 
tend  and  expand  our  consultation  on  nuclear  matn  »so 
ters  as  fully  as  possible  with  our  NATO  allies,  in)  ~- 
the  development  of  guidelines  and  in  the  develop- 
ment  of  agreed  strategy,  in  order  that  they  andl 


n|) 

Noi 
t(iTi 
i\ 
\k 

?F 
'mhii 

ill!!i 

oil 
iot 
(cre 


nil 


ftli 


Deparfmenf  of  Sfofe  Bo/fefin|v 

ll 


ips 


•e  can  be  sure  that  our  thinking  in  the  alliance 
bout  nuclear  matters  is  running  in  the  same 
lirection. 

I  We  also  have  expressed  our  willingness,  if  our 
Hies  wish  to  do  so,  to  consider  a  multilateral 
iiclear  force  which  would  not  be  so  heavily  de- 
endent  upon  the  United  States  alone.  Now,  we 
ave  not  ourselves  put  forward  a  precise  plan  in 
lis  regard.  This  is  something  that  our  friends 
?ross  the  Atlantic  would  presumably  wish  to  do 

■  they  conclude  what  it  is  they  would  like  to  pro- 
ise  in  this  field,  "\\1iat  we  have  had  a  responsi- 
lity  for  doing  is  to  give  them  full  information 
\  the  scientific,  technical,  economic,  and  other 

'"■*  spects  of  this  matter,  so  that  they  would  be  in 
position  to  make  responsible  judgments  about 

"  >w  they  would  like  to  proceed.  We  have  been 
that  process  for  some  time  now.  I  think  for 
le  first  time  our  colleagues  are  getting  into  po- 
tion to  develop  their  own  thoughts  in  the  matter 
uch  more  accurately  and  in  a  way  much  more 
■levant  to  the  real  situation  than  would  ether- 
ise have  been  the  case. 

mj 

lecti^ropean  Economic  Problems 

Now.  in  the  third  great  field  of  North  Atlantic 
J*™  ;tivity,  in  the  economic  field,  most  of  the  cen- 
al  issues  there  are  of  course  dealt  with  outside 
'  the  framework  of  NATO  itself.  The  overrid- 
g  problems  at  the  moment  are  related  to  the 
ommon  Market  negotiations  with  the  United 
ingdom,  with  the  development  and  preparation 

■  our  own  trade  program  under  the  recent  legis- 
tion  passed  by  the  Congress,^  of  which  formei- 
scretary  Herter  will  take  the  lead  in  working 

p,  it  these  trade  relations  across  the  Atlantic  in 
le  light  of  trade  relations  with  other  parts  of 
le  world,  and  of  course  the  continuing  discus- 
ons  we  are  having  with  our  friends  on  assistance 
developing  countries.  We  will  advert  to  some 
'  these  questions,  of  course,  at  the  NATO  meet- 
g,  but  I  doubt  that  we  will  take  them  up  in  any 
stematic  fashion. 
jjj  On  the  way  home  from  NATO  I  expect  to  make 
^  J  first  official  visit  to  Ireland,  to  which  I  am 
jf  oking  forward  very  much.=  We  have  many 
JJJ   asons  for  having  an  affectionate  interest  in  Ire- 

ie!,i 
:elo 


art 


'For  an  article  by  Leonard  Weiss  on  the  Trade  Expan- 
)n  Act  of  1962,  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  3,  1962,  p.  847. 
f  ^   '  For  an  announcement,  see  iUd.,  Dec.  24, 1962,  p.  961. 

lIWi  ecember  31,   7962 


land,  not  only  because  of  the  close  relations  be.- 
tween  that  counti-y  and  our  own  people— partly 
because,  if  I  may  speak  a  little  informally,  we 
do  not  get  from  our  embassy  in  Dublin  a  daily 
stream  of  crisis  telegrams,  and  one  especially  ap- 
preciates a  capital  from  which  that  is  the  case. 

I  was  asked  by  an  Irish  newspaper  for  some 
background  on  my  own  Irish  ancestry,  but  I  had 
to  caution  that  this  would  perhaps  not  contribute 
to  the  purposes  of  my  visit,  because  I  came  from 
the  wrong  part  of  Ireland. 

Let  us  have  your  questions. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  think  that  the  con- 
troversy over  Ambassador  Stevenson's  role  in  the 
Ciiban  crisis  will  inhiiit  o-fficials  in  advising  the 
President  in  future  crises? 

A.  No,  I  don't  think  so.  I  think  that  no  official 
could  possibly  hold  back  or  would  hold  back  from 
the  President  his  genuine  views  on  important  is- 
sues because  the  stakes  that  are  involved  in  such 
advice  so  far  outweigh  the  trivial  nature  of  this 
recent  controversy  that  I  just  don't  think  it  will 
have  any  effect  at  all. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  were  quoted  freely  in 
that  article  hy  \^Stewart'\  Alsop  and  [Charles'] 
Bartlett.    Were  those  quotes  in  fact  yours? 

A.  Well,  I  did  not  speak  to  either  Alsop  or 
Bartlett  during  the  preparation  of  that  article, 
and  since  I  have  not  gone  back  to  check  each  one  of 
the  quotations  attributed  to  me,  I  don't  think  I 
ought  to  answer  that  yes  or  no.  I  recall  that 
perhaps  one  or  two  of  them  were  accurate.  I  had 
my  very  severe  doubts  about  one  or  two  others. 

Soviet  Military  Personnel  in  Cuba 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  what  is  the  future  course  of 
our  negotiations  with  Russia  regarding  the  with- 
drawal of  Soviet  military  personnel  from  Cuba 
and  the  issue  of  onsite  V.N.  inspections? 

A.  Well,  I  think  that  on  the  issues  that  arose 
out  of  the  introduction  of  offensive  weapons  into 
Cuba,  the  situation  is  approximately  as  it  was  at 
the  time  of  the  President's  November  20  press 
conference,  and  I  would  urge  you  to  go  back  and 
look  at  that.^  In  that  he  had  indicated  that  we 
had  been  informed  that  certain  forces  which  were 
in  Cuba  for  the  protection  of  these  offensive 
weapons   would   in    fact   be   withdrawn    in   due 


'  Ihid.,  Dec.  10, 1962,  p.  874. 


995 


course.  Our  impression  is  that  there  continues 
to  be  an  outmovement  of  military  personnel  from 
Cuba,  but  this  is  not  necessarily  the  end  of  the 
story  on  that  particular  point.  Certainly  we  in 
this  hemisphere  could  not  accept  as  a  normal 
situation  any  Soviet  militaiy  presence  in  Cuba. 

Now,  in  regard  to  the  negotiations  in  New 
York,  those  have  been  concerned  with  the  question 
as  to  whether  it  is  possible  to  draw  a  conclusion 
to  this  particular  phase  of  the  Cuban  crisis  on 
any  agreed  basis.  The  absence  of  effective  veri- 
fication in  Cuba  with  respect  to  the  removal  or 
remtroduction  of  offensive  weapons  is  a  very 
serious  deficiency  from  our  point  of  view.  I  just 
don't  laiow  as  of  now  whether  it  will  be  possible 
to  work  this  out  on  an  agreed  basis. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  can  you  tell  us,  if  we  can  go 
hack  to  the  Stevenson  matter  for  one  moment, 
lohether  you  regard  the  role  of  Mr.  Stevenson  in 
the  Cuban  crisis  as  that  of  a  "^awZ;"  or  a  '■'■dove''''? 

A.  Well,  I  am  not  going  to  be  drawn  into  a  con- 
troversy that  should  never  have  arisen  in  the  first 
place.  I  think  that  the  statements  by  President 
Kennedy  and  by  Ambassador  Stevenson  settle 
it,  as  far  as  I  am  concerned,  and  I  am  going  to 
leave  it  there. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  you  tell  us  j'ust  what 
is  going  on  now  in  the  negotiations  in  New  York? 
Are  there  meetings  going  on  in  the  last  week  or  so 
on  this  question? 

A.  I  think  there  was  one  meeting  toward  the 
end  of  last  week,  and  there  may  be  another  in  the 
next  day  or  two.  I  am  not  certain  of  that.  But, 
as  I  say,  the  question  there  is  whether  it  is  possi- 
ble to  report  to  the  Security  Council  that  some 
basis  of  agreement  has  been  reached  for  terminat- 
ing this  particular  phase  of  the  Cuban  crisis.  I 
could  not  give  encouragement  to  the  expectation 
today  that  such  an  agreement  will  be  possible. 

The  Berlin  Question 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  how  do  you  rate  the  signs 
which  some  people  have  commented  upon  as  evi- 
dences tlmt  perhaps  tlie  Berlin  crisis  is  nearing  a 
point  where  it  might  he  easier  to  try  to  negotiate 
a  settlement?  I  refer,  of  course,  to  the  Ulhricht 
statement  and  the  statements  of  some  of  the  other 
Soviet  hloc  leaders.  What  is  your  thinking  on 
the  Berlin  prohlem  at  this  point? 


996 


'!» 

I 
jjiii 

11?' 


A.  There  hasn't  been  any  serious  and  systemati  "* 
discussion  of  other  issues  of  that  sort  during  til 
Cuban  crisis.  I  think  it  probably  lias  been  fe| 
on  both  sides  that  it  would  be  important  to  get  t]i 
Cuban  crisis  out  of  the  way,  if  possible,  before  ai 
attention  were  paid  to  these  other  questions. 
is  true,  of  course,  that  the  Geneva  disarmame: 
talks  did  reconvene  and  obviously  some  discussio: 
occurred  there  with  respect  to  the  disarmame 
questions,  but  those  have  not  yet  indicated  ai 
particularly  dramatic  results  or  any  real  forwai 
movement. 

I  would  not  want  to  speculate  about  whether  tl 
Berlin  question  is  assuming  a  new  form.  Y 
have,  of  course,  seen  and  read  the  statements 
which  you  refer,  but  on  the  other  hand  we  ha 
not  really  seen  any  significant  evidence  that  tl 
basic  positions  have  changed.  Therefore  ^ 
would  not  want  to  speculate  about  its  easing  up  > 
becoming  more  critical  or  characterize  it  in  ai 
way.    It  is  just  a  case,  I  tliink,  of  "wait  and  sea 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  go  hack  a  moment  to  the  pu 
lie  agreement  hetween  the  President  and  M 
Khrushchev.'^  Is  it  the  position  of  this  Gover 
ment  that,  aside  from  a  continuing  tiling  like  ti 
Geneva  talks,  the  United  States  is  not  prepan 
really  to  negotiate  in  other  fields  icith  the  Sovi^  ^ 
Union  until  the  coTnmitmsnt  which  Mr.  Khr^ 
shchev  gave  in  Cuba  is  in  fact  fully  carried  ou< 

A.  Well,  I  would  not  want  to  handcuff  tl 
future  by  as  precise  a  statement  as  that.  The: 
are  some  pieces  of  imfinished  business  in  th 
Cuban  matter.  I  think  a  good  deal  will  tui 
upon  the  circumstances,  the  conditions,  the  f  ram 
work,  within  which  the  Cuban  matter  is  resolvf 
and  what  that  means  in  terms  of  moving  on  i 
otlier  questions. 

This  question  of  onsite  inspection  is  a  vei 
difficult  one,  and  the  President  in  his  Novembt' 
20  press  conference  indicated  tliat  in  the  abseni 
of  such  inspection  tlie  nations  of  the  hemisphei 
would  have  to  use  other  means  to  give  themselv( 
such  assurances  as  possible.  This  means  that  th 
situation  is  not  easy  to  predict  in  detail,  but 
would  not  want  to  say  that  any  ability  to  discus^  nd 
any  otlier  question  with  the  Soviet  Union  depencj  \ 
upon  a  final  agreement  on  Cuba — that  it  include  \ 
items  A,  B,  C,  and  D.  I  think  we  have  to  wa 
and  see. 


lore 
u 
»li 
ie( 
m 

it! 

m 
m 
m 


tesi 


» 
A 


♦  For  text,  see  il)id.,  Nov.  12, 1962,  p.  743. 


Department  of  State  Bulleth  k 


(a 


ore 


he  Leading  Edge  of  New  Events 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary.,  you  said,  I  believe,  in  a 
pcech  in  New  York  ^ — aiid  I  am  sure  I  am  not 
noting  you  exactly  right,  hut  you  will  recognize 
' — that  toe  seem  to  be  possibly  on  the  leading 
dge  of  new  events,  and  this  came  at  tlxe  time 
'hen  the  President  was  talking  about  a  possibly 
climactic  period." "  Can  you  elaborate  amy  more 
n  that,  particularly  icith  reference  to  the  possible 
nplications  of  the  Red  Chinese  attach  on  India? 

A.  I  fortunately  protected  myself  thoroughly 
gainst  having  to  answer  that  question  by  refer- 
ing  to  these  events  in  my  New  York  speech  as 
npredictable ;  so  that  means  obviously  that  I 
m't  say  exactly  what  I  had  in  mind.  But  I  do 
link  that  there  are  a  number  of  things  that 
oint  to  the  fact  that  the  situation  is  becoming 
lore  fluid,  more  subject  to  motion,  fraught  with 
ot  only  possibilities  of  danger  but  possibilities  of 
jal  opportunity.  The  Chinese-Indian  matter  is 
tie  of  them.  The  sharpness  of  the  debate  be- 
sveen  Moscow  and  Peiping  is  another.  Some  of 
18  serious  economic  problems  within  the  bloc 

'■m  ave  a  bearing  on  this.  Perhaps  this  strain  be- 
tveen  Moscow  and  Habana  in  regard  to  these 

epji  scent  events  may  be  a  part  of  it.  The  prospect 
lat  the  free  world  will  be  able  to  move  ahead  in 

l\\  18  economic  field  with  great  vigor  is  another 
lement.  Some  of  the  things  that  have  been  ex- 
ressed  or  learned  m  the  so-called  micommitted 
Duntries  as  they  look  at  this  present  world  situa- 
on  have  a  bearing  upon  this.  In  other  words,  I 
link  that  a  good  many  of  the  set  patterns  are 
eing  now  subjected  to  change  and  we  will  just 
ave  to  see  how  these  develop. 


I  Ti 


Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  returning  specifically  to  the 
uestion  of  a  Security  Council  statement,  do  we 
lake  our  statement  contingent  upon  a  solution  of 
he  Soviet  troops  in  Cuba?  In  other  words,  do 
ou  expect  them  to  loithdraw  their  combat  troops 
efore  we  are  ready  to  m-ake  our  own  statement? 

A.  I  think,  as  far  as  any  statement  in  the  Secu- 

kl  ity  Council  is  concerned,  we  will  just  have  to  wait 

iij  nd  see  how  these  talks  in  New  York  come  out. 

;pei  VTiether  there  will  be  a  statement  in  the  Security 

!ouncil — I  can't  say  today  that  there  surely  will 

e  a  statement  in  the  Security  Council.   I  think  we 


'  For  text,  see  iUd.,  Dee.  10, 1962,  p.  867. 
'  IUd.,  Dee.  3, 1962,  p.  836. 


,jj  lecember  37,   1962 


will  just  have  to  hold  that  as  a  contingency.  The 
President  did  say  on  November  20th  that  it  had 
been  indicated  that  certain  of  the  troops  in  Cuba 
wliich  were  related  to  various  functions  in  connec- 
tion with  offensive  weapons  would  be  withdrawn. 
But  that  was  a  very  inexact  indication  from  the 
other  side,  and  so  we  will  just  have  to  wait  and  see. 
There  was  a  question  over  here. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  a  group  of  18  Afro-Asian  na- 
tions have  again  urged  direct  negotiations  between 
the  Arab  countries  and  Israel  to  settle  their  differ- 
ences. The  United  States  in  the  past,  and  I  think 
presently,  has  not  endorsed  direct  negotiations. 
Could  you  give  us  your  thinking  and  the  thinking 
of  the  administration  on  this  position? 

A.  "Well,  I  think  there  are  two  principal  points 
there.  There  have  been  from  time  to  time  a  series 
of  resolutions  introduced  from  one  side  or  the  oth- 
er in  the  General  Assembly  which  are  higlily  con- 
troversial in  character  as  far  as  the  other  side  is 
concerned.  We  have  felt  that  the  better  way  to 
get  on  with  this  matter  was  to  leave  the  opportu- 
nity wide  open  for  quiet  diplomacy  and  not  to  pass 
resolutions  in  the  General  Assembly  which  were 
basically  unacceptable  to  one  side  or  the  other. 

Now,  there  is  no  general  objection,  of  course,  to 
direct  negotiations,  but  if  there  is  no  indication 
whatever  that  direct  negotiations  can  in  fact  occur, 
or  that  such  negotiations  would  have  any  result, 
then  such  a  resolution  is  not  one  which  can  bring 
about  direct  negotiations  but  would  produce  other 
results.  So  it  is  one  thing  to  be  in  favor  of  direct 
negotiations,  if  possible,  and  another  thing  to  take 
an  attitude  on  a  particular  resolution  as  one  of  sev- 
eral resolutions  before  the  General  Assembly.  So 
we  are  inclined  to  thinlc  that  these  unagreed  resolu- 
tions simply  add  to  the  difficulty  in  debate  and 
should  not  be  pressed. 

Efforts  To  Integrate  the  Congo 

Q.  How  muck  do  you  think  the  present  shaki- 
ness  of  Premier  [Cyrille]  Adoula''s  government  in 
the  Congo  impels  a  stronger  U.N.  move  to  support 
an  integrated  Congo  at  this  time? 

A.  I  think  that  the  two  are  derived  from  per- 
haps the  same  element.  That  is,  the  efforts  to  inte- 
grate the  Congo  on  a  federal  or  any  other  basis 
have  thus  far  not  shown  a  great  deal  of  success. 
This  puts  very  considerable  pressure  upon  Prime 
Minister  Adoula  from  those  who  are  supporting 

997 


him  in  Leopoldville  and  other  parts  of  the  Congo, 
because  the  Katanga  issue  is  the  central  and  the 
overriding  issue  in  the  Congo.  We  ourselves  feel 
that  it  is  very  important  to  see  some  movement  in 
the  vei-y  near  future  in  the  Congo,  because  we  don't 
believe  that  there  is  a  viable  future  for  the  Congo 
or  for  the  Katanga  except  on  the  basis  of  the  type 
of  unification  anticipated  in  the  U.N.  plan. 

So  that  it  is  our  expectation  that  the  U.N.  and 
interested  governments  will  step  up  their  measures 
in  the  Congo  in  an  effort  to  bring  this  matter  to 
a  resolution  because  time,  I  think,  is  not  on  the 
side  of  conciliation  but  on  the  side  of  disintegra- 
tion. Therefore  we  must  all  be  about  the  central 
business  of  getting  tliis  question  solved. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary.,  this  Government,  through 
Ambassador  [W.  Averell]  Harriman,  and  the 
British  through  Mr.  Sandys  [U.K.  Secretary  for 
Commomuealth  Relations  Duncan  Sandys']  have 
striven  very  hard,  and  apparently  with  success,  to 
get  the  Indian^s  and  Pakistanis  to  talk  about 
Kashmir.  Do  we  believe  that  this  is  any  more 
soluble  a  problem  at  this  moment  than,  say,  the 
Arab-Israel  dispute  f 

A.  I  would  not  want  to  compare  one  particular 
dispute  with  another,  but  I  think  the  fact  that  the 
two  governments  have  publicly  announced  that 
they  are  prepared  to  discuss  this  matter  is  itself 
a  gain.  But  I  think  Ambassador  Ilarriman  upon 
his  return  cautioned  against  excessive  optimism 
on  this  point.  It  is  going  to  be  a  very  difficult 
question.  It  has  long  historical  and  sentimental 
and  political  roots  among  the  peoples  of  both 
countries,  and  we  should  not,  I  think,  expect 
miracles.  But  the  fact  that  the  two  governments 
publicly  indicated  they  are  prepared  to  be  in  touch 
with  each  other  about  it  is  at  least  a  first  step, 
and  of  course  we,  and  I  think  most  people  in  other 
parts  of  the  world,  would  hope  that  these  steps 
could  be  successful. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  it  was  reported  that  '■'■Che'''' 
Guevara  had  said  that  the  Cubans  during  the  re- 
cent crisis  were  planning  a  nuclear  attack  on  the 
United  States.  Is  there  any  substance  to  these 
reports,  and  what  are  your  comments  generally? 

A.  We  obviously  would  not  know  what  was  in 
their  minds  at  the  time,  but  I  think  that  it  illus- 
trates the  wisdom  of  the  action  taken  to  make  that 
question  hypothetical.  No,  the  President  in  his 
October  22  speech  '  made  it  very  clear  that  nuclear 

998 


weapon  attack  on  this  country  would  be  a  crisi  1  '^ 
of  the  most  severe  sort  and  that  there  would  b"  '•' 
immediate  counteraction  taken;  so  I  tliink  ti 
was  just  talk,  frankly. 

Q.  Mr.   Secretary,  in  your   discussion  of  ii 
NATO,  do  you  intend  to  give  any  consideratim 
to  a  suggestion  about  a  nonaggression  treaty  be 
tween  the  NATO  and  the  Warsaw  Pact  or  an\ 
form    of    detente    between    those    two    miliU 
groups? 

A.  We  have  had  no  discussion  in  connection 
with  this  Cuban  affair  about  a  pact  as  such.  Ther 
have  been  on  our  side  some  general  references  i^ 
hope  that  the  relationship  between  the  NATC 
and  Warsaw  Pact  countries  can  be  improved.  Ac 
tually  I  would  think  that  the  most  immediate  waj 
in  which  this  could  occur  would  be  through  som 
of  tlie  disarmament  measures  that  are  now  u] 


irec 


lilt 
llieii 
ton 


before  the  meeting  in  Geneva,  but  I  don't  thinl 
that  there  is  likely  to  be  at  this  NATO  meetinji ""' 
any  discussion  of  a  pact.  ^, 

IT  jl 

Q.  There  is  not  any  possibility,  no  matter  hovi  "' 
remote,  for  a  peaceful  solution  of  differences  be  |  j^ 
tween  Cuba  and  the  United  States,  and  the  inter 
American    system,    let   us    say,    through   direc 
negotiation? 

A.  I  referred  earlier  to  the  aspect  of  the  Cuban 
crisis  that  was  related  to  the  introduction  of  offeii' 
sive  weapons.  I  did  that  with  a  design,  because 
there  is  another  part  of  the  Cuban  crisis,  and  il 
is  also  another  part  of  the  Cuban  problem,  and  il 
also  is  on  the  piiblic  record.  I  would  suppose  thai 
one  of  the  best  outlines  of  that  problem  would 
be  the  resolutions  of  the  hemisphere  at  Punta  del 
Este  in  January.^  That  is,  the  other  members  oi 
this  hemisphere  have  long  since  decided  among 
themselves  that  a  Marxist-Leninist  government  in 
this  hemisphere  is  incompatible  with  the  commit- 
ments of  the  hemisphere;  so  when  we  are  talking 
about  normal  relationships,  we  are  talking  about 
things  which  go  far  beyond  the  immediate  crisis 
precipitated  by  the  offensive  weapons  in  Cuba. 

Now,  the  solution  of  the  offensive  weapons 
problem  does  not  itself  immediately  and  neces- 
sarily solve  the  other  part  of  it,  but  that  also  does  *« 
not  mean  that  this  recent  crisis  changes  the  basic  w 
views  of  this  hemisphere  about  the  nature  of  thiak* 


'  Ibid.,  Nov.  12, 1962,  p.  715. 

» For  texts,  see  ibid.,  Feb.  19,  1962,  p.  278. 


i 


Departmenf  of  State  Bulletin 


■nik 


regime  and  the  basis  on  which  tlie  liemisphere 
would  welcome  the  Cuban  people  back  into  the 
hemisphere.  So  we  simply  take  up  again  that 
question  that  we  had  before  us  before  the  offen- 
sive weapons  got  into  Cuba. 

Question  of  Nuclear  Force  in  Europe 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  has  there  been  any  real  change 
jji  !n  the  Government's  attitude  on  a  separate  or  swp- 
lementary  nuclear  force  in  Europe  since  Secre- 
tary McNamara's  speech  at  Ann  Arior?  ^  He 
'^  'hen  indicated  tlmt  these  forces  were  neither  de- 
'^irahle  or  necessary. 

A.  Well,  this  has  not  been  discussed  further 
jetween  us  and  other  NATO  governments.  Wliat 
ve   are    discussing   is    a   genuinely    multilateral 

ATO  force,  and  we  have  not  had  any  proposals 
5ut  to  us  from  across  the  Atlantic  in  any  other 

irection,  so  that  I  would  think  that  his  Ann  Ar- 
i)or  speech  stands. 

Q.  Would  we  be  included  in  such  a  multilateral 
SATO  force? 

A.  I  would  suppose  that  that  would  be  the  case, 
out  if  our  European  friends  have  another  view, 
hen  they  are  perfectly  free  to  put  that  forward 
KG  us  as  a  proposal  from  their  side. 

Q.  I  am  sorry;  I  don't  understand  what  might 
be  the  case — that  the  whole  United  States  nuclear 
striking  power  would  be  integrated  in  NATO? 
That  is  the  sense  of  the  question,  as  I  understand. 

A.  No,  that  was  not.    I  am  glad  you  asked  for 

MS  fclarification,  if  you  had  that  impression,  because 

tai  .t   was  certainly   not  mine.     The  basic  way   in 

8f   B^hich  American  nuclear  power  is  coordinated  in 

*  ;he  alliance  is  through  consultation  on  policy  and 

strategy,  on  the  discussion  of  guidelines,  on  the 

letermination  of  what  has  to  be  done  where,  and 

by  whom,  under  what  circumstances. 

Now,  if  our  friends  in  the  alliance  wish  to  have 

I  more  specific  and  operational  role  with  respect 

;o  these  forces,  then  one  of  the  possibilities  would 

^.  36  to  have  a  multilateral  nuclear  force,  to  which 

(ve  could  make  a  contribution,  they  would  make 

jontributions,  and  would  be  established  on  that 

asis.    But  this  will  depend  upon  examination  of 

great  many  very  complicated  questions,  includ- 


.■ 


k 
[t*^ 


•  For  text,  see  ibid.,  July  9,  1962,  p.  64. 
Secember  3J,   1962 


ing  questions  of  command,  control,  deployment, 
costs,  and  questions  of  that  sort.  These  are  all 
being  fully  talked  out  in  tlie  alliance,  so  that  gov- 
ernments will  have  a  basis  of  fact  on  which  they 
can  make  the  judgments  about  the  directions  in 
which  they  want  to  move. 

Q.  Senator  [Allen  /.]  Ellender  has  been  barred 
from,  a  few  African  countries  because  of  certain 
statements  that  he  is  alleged  to  have  made.  Do 
you  think  the  statements  that  the  Senator  was  said 
to  have  made  toill  work  against  the  United  States? 

A.  Well,  he  also,  I  believe,  made  another  state- 
ment in  Nairobi  on  Saturday  [December  8],  and 
if  you  haven't  had  the  text  of  that  statement  you 
might  want  to  get  it  from  my  press  colleagues 
afterward.  I  think  the  Senator  discovered  what 
Secretaries  of  State  very  quickly  discover,  and 
that  is,  it  is  not  always  easy  to  make  statements  in 
press  conferences  when  traveling  abroad.  But  his 
second  statement  on  Saturday  clarified,  and  I 
think  greatly  improved,  the  effect  of  the  state- 
ment which  he  made  in  Salisbury  earlier.  Cer- 
tainly any  distinguished  American,  holding  public 
office  or  in  private  life,  who  goes  abroad  and 
makes  statements  that  are  interpreted  as  an  Amer- 
ican point  of  view  running  contrary  to  the  basic 
attitude  of  the  American  people  generally,  and  to 
the  Government  in  particular — that  does  create 
problems  for  us.    There  is  no  question  about  it. 

Rift  Between  Soviet  Union  and  Red  China 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  agree  with  the  view 
expressed  by  some  others  in  the  State  Department 
that  it  loould  be  a  mistake  for  us  to  try  to  do  any- 
thing to  widen  the  rift  between  the  Soviet  Union 
and  Red  China? 

A.  Oh,  I  don't  think  that  is  the  view.  I  think 
what  is  a  more  realistic  view  is  that  it  is  not  a 
very  good  thing  for  us  to  tinker  with  this,  as 
though  we  were  playing  with  toys,  and  it  is  not  so 
easy  to  determine  what,  in  fact,  would  be,  in  the 
first  place,  effective  in  widening  the  rift  and,  sec- 
ondly, would  be  in  our  own  interests,  and  in  which 
directions. 

This  is  a  very  complex  and  difficult  question, 
and  if  there  are  those  who  don't  think  that  there  is 
anything  very  striking  or  dramatic  that  we  can  do 
in  the  situation,  it  isn't  necessary,  I  think,  to  re- 
treat behind  the  business  that,  "Well,  we  ought  not 
to  anyhow." 


999 


Q.  Do  you  think  there  is  anything  we  can  or 
should  do  at  the  moment  in  the  Indian  situation, 
to  capitalise  on  the  rift  between  the  Soviet  and 
Red  ChirM? 

A.  Well,  I  think  the  important  thing  in  the 
Indian  situation  is  to  give  such  assistance  as  we 
can  to  India  so  that  India  is  not  subjected  to  a 
settlement  of  problems  with  China  by  forceful 
means  applied  by  China.  Now  that  itself  may 
have  a  bearing  on  the  Moscow-Peiping  relation- 
ship, but  one  can't  be  sure  exactly  what  that 
effect  will  be.  But  the  central  issue  for  us  there 
is  not  that  outside  relationship  but  the  security  of 
India  as  a  great  Asian  democracy. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  on  October  ^2d,  the  date  of 
the  Presidenfs  '■'■crisis  speech''"'  on  Ciiba,  tliere  had 
heen  under  consideration  for  some  time  certain 
measures  to  restrict  shipping  to  Quia}"  Ap- 
parently that  has  heen  suspended  during  the  big- 
ger crisis,  and  I  wonder  if  you  could  tell  us  what 
the  status  of  that  project  is  at  this  time? 

A.  It  is  still  suspended.  It  is  still  under  con- 
sideration, and  it  has  not  been  canceled.  No 
final  decision  has  been  taken,  but  it  is  still  where 
it  was  on  October  22d. 

Q.  Can  you  give  us  your  latest  estimate  of  the 
numljer  of  Soviet  combat  forces  in  Cuba  and  some 
idea  of  how  you  see  the  threat,  the  threat  to  lohom, 
and  in  wliat  way  is  it  a  threat? 

A.  Well,  I  think  I  would  let  someone  who  is 
more  expert  and  who  normally  puts  out  such 
figures  give  the  precise  figures.  I  think  that  tliere 
are  several  thousand  Soviet  military  personnel  in 
Cuba,  and  some  of  them  are  organized  into  what 
appear  to  be  Soviet  combat  units,  not  of  large 
scale  but  of  modest  scale — but  well  armed. 
Wliether  these  were  there  for  the  protection  of 
certain  sites,  missile  sites  or  otherwise,  or  for  some 
other  purpose,  is  something  that  is  being,  of 
course,  watched  very  carefully.  The  numbers  are 
significant  but  not  large.  Their  role  there  is 
something  of  great  concern  to  us  and  something  we 
will  follow  very  carefully. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  to  refer  to  another  contro- 
versy, do  you  think  BritairCs  role  as  an  independ- 
ent power  is  about  played  out? 


'°  For  a  statement  by  Under  Secretary  Ball  before  the 
House  Select  Committee  on  Export  Control  on  Oct.  3,  see 
iUH.,  Oct.  22, 1962,  p.  591. 

1000 


A.  Well,  I  remember  many  years  ago  when 
was  an  assistant  secretary  working  under  Secre 
tary  [Dean]  Acheson  I  made  a  speech  in  which  '. 
did  not  use  perhaps  the  exact  language  which  h 
might  have  used  had  he  made  the  speech.  He  wa 
pressed  pretty  hard  on  it  at  a  press  conference 
and  I  was  grateful  to  him  for  saying,  "I  am  no: 
going  to  be  drawn  into  an  examination  of  my  col! 
league's  rhetoric." 

Now,  I  think  that  there  might  have  been  a  seni 
tence  or  two  in  that  speech  that  perhaps  the  Secre' 
tary  of  State  would  not  have  used,  but  th« 
important  thing  about  that  speech  is  what  he  wasi 
getting  at — the  importance  of  strengthening  th( 
North  Atlantic  alliance  politically,  militarily,  am 
economically.  Now,  one  of  the  really  great  pow- 
ers in  this  Atlantic  conomunity  is  Great  Britain 
and  any  of  us  who  were  in  World  War  II  woula 
be  happy  to  testify  that  if  you  are  in  a  fight  yora 
would  like  to  look  along  beside  you  and  see  the 
British  alongside  of  you. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  you  figure  out  what  Mr 
Acheson' s  plan  was  for  solving  the  German  reuni- 
fication question  in  that  speech?  Did  he  explain  it 
to  you,  or  have  you  ever  discussed  it  with  him? 

A.  No,  I  haven't  discussed  the  speech  with  him, 
either  lie.fore  or  after  it  was  made.  I  have  simply 
read  the  speech  and  saw  what  he  said  there,  and* 
I  could  not  add  anything  to  that. 

Special  Relationship  Between  U.S.  and  U.K. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  believe  that  the  re- 
ports— /  believe  in  Pravda—that  the  United 
States  is  letting  Great  Britain  down  are  taken 
seriously  by  our  British  allies?  Obviously  the  So- 
viet Union  does  not  mind  trying  to  break  up 
friendships.  We  are  a  little  more  reluctant  to  do 
it,  but  do  you  think  that  these  reports  are  taken 
seriously  by  our  British  allies? 

A.  I  don't  think  so.  I  think  that  in  the  family 
of  the  North  Atlantic  we  are  going  to  have  occa- 
sional words  passed  back  and  forth  across  the  At- 
lantic of  passing  interest,  and  stir  up  a  little 
commotion,  but  don't  really  go  to  the  root  of  the 
matter  or  affect  the  vitality  of  the  alliance  or  our 
relationships  with  a  country  like  Great  Britain 
We  have  had  a  special  relationship  with  the  Brit- 
ish, for  example,  for  almost  400  years.  We  have 
had  our  spats  in  the  process  and  became  independ- 
ent in  the  process.     But  we  have  had  so  many 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


¥ 


ti 


titi 

ieli;  ! 


liii 


si 
'ah 


;At 
litili 
ftlif 
rou 
tail 
Bnt 
lian 

iJBii 

jarij 


interests,  great  common  interests,  of  practical  ne- 
cessity, as  well  as  great  sentimental  attachment,  so 
that  I  don't  think  there  is  any  problem  on  this. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary^  for  clari-lication,  did  your 
remarks  at  the  beginning  on  the  Paris  consulta- 
tions apply  only  to  the  NATO  meeting  itself,  or 
does  that  cover  the  talks  you  intend  to  have  with 
individuals  hefore  the  formal  sessions  begin? 

A.  I  would  not  expect  anything  spectacular  to 
occur  either  in  these  bilateral  talks  or  individual 
talks,  or  at  the  meeting  itself.  I  was  referring  to 
both.  You  see,  there  is  a  little  tendency  for  us  to 
look  upon  each  one  of  these  meetings  as  a  highly 
special  occasion  in  which  something  dramatic  is 
iioing  to  happen.  "Well,  actually  they  are  sched- 
uled every  year,  two  a  year,  on  the  calendar,  so 
that  whether  something  particular  will  happen  in 
one  meeting  or  another  depends  more  on  events 
than  on  the  schedule,  and  I  am  just  predicting  for 
those  of  you  who  are  wondering  whether  to  use 
travel  money  to  go  over  there,  I  don't  think  a  great 
deal  unusual  is  going  to  happen  at  this  meeting, 
except  to  go  on  with  their  main  business. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  to  go  hack  to  your  earlier 
statement  that  you  did  not  want  to  handcuff  the 
future.  Could  one  infer  from  that  that  you  are, 
despite  the  still  raveled  edge  of  the  Cuian  crisis — 
that  the  United  States  is  prepared  to  negotiate  out 
any  question  toith  the  Soviet  Union,  provided  the 
Russians  are  xoilling  to  move  off  past  postures 
which  we  found  unnegotiablef 

A.  No,  what  I  was  simply  saying  on  that  is  you 
may  not  be  able  to  get  a  formal  conclusion  to  this 
phase  of  the  Cuban  question.  Each  side  may  have 
to  indicate  where  it  stands,  what  it  requires,  what 
it  will  do  in  the  alternative,  what  its  reservations 
are  about  the  situation,  and  let  it  go  at  that.  If  in 
fact  the  situation  reaches  a  point  of  relative  calm, 
then  maybe  the  atmosphere  will  open  up  where 
other  questions  can  be  discussed.  All  I  am  saying 
is  that  we  don't  want  to  say  that  in  the  absence  of  a 
contract  with  a  lot  of  fine  print  in  it  there  is  not 
going  to  be  any  talk  with  anybody  about  anything. 
I  think  that  would  be  vei-y  foolish,  but  I  think  this 
will  probably  clarify  in  the  next  week  or  10  days. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  with  regard  to  NATO  and  the 
nuclear  deterrent  for  Britain,  the  Skybolt  has  so 
mnich  political  portent  for  Great  Britain,  might  we 


December  37,   7962 

669820—62 3 


he  persuaded  to  go  ahead  with  the  production  of 
that,  because  of  our  promises  to  the  British — our 
commitments? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  adopt  such  words  as  "prom- 
ises" and  things  of  that  sort,  but  what  is  happen- 
ing is  there  is  now  going  on  a  regular  review  of  our 
weapons  systems  in  connection  with  the  budget, 
and  this  goes  on  each  year  and  particularly  with 
reference  to  those  matters  that  are  in  a  research 
and  development  stage.  These  have  to  be  re- 
viewed, examined,  and  plans  made  for  the  future. 
If  decisions  or  prospective  decisions  on  those  in 
any  way  affect  our  allies,  we  consult  with  our  allies. 
In  this  instance,  Mr.  [Secretary  of  Defense  Robert 
S.]  McNamara  has  been  and  will  be  consulting 
with  the  British.  He  will  be  visiting  there  on,  I 
think,  Monday,  and  I  think  he  will  be  making  a 
statement  on  that  subject  while  he  is  in  London. 
So  I  prefer  to  defer  that  question  to  liim. 

Q.  Is  the  Skyiolt  thing  not  settled,  then? 

A.  It  is  not  settled.    That  is  the  point. 

Q.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Department  Issues  Warning 
on  Travel  to  Cuba 

Press  release  729  dated  December  13 

On  January  16,  1961,  the  Department  of  State 
announced  that,  in  view  of  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment's inability  to  extend  normal  protective 
services  to  Americans  visiting  Cuba,  U.S.  citizens 
desiring  to  go  to  Cuba  must  obtain  passports  spe- 
cifically endorsed  by  the  Department  of  State  for 
such  travel.^    This  requirement  is  still  in  effect. 

Passports  of  U.S.  citizens  may  be  validated  for 
travel  to  Cuba  when  their  travel  may  be  regarded 
as  being  in  the  best  interests  of  the  United  States, 
such  as  newsmen  or  businessmen  with  previously 
established  business  interests. 

The  De^aartment  has  recently  received  informa- 
tion from  several  sources  that  a  group  of  Ameri- 
can students  is  being  encouraged  to  visit  Cuba 
during  the  Christmas  holidays.  Since  these  stu- 
dents do  not  meet  the  established  criteria,  their 
passports  have  not  been  validated  for  such  travel. 


'  For  text  of  announcement,  see  Bulletin  of  Feb.  6, 
1961,  p.  178. 


1001 


The  Department  warns  all  concerned  that  travel 
to  Cuba  by  a  U.S.  citizen  without  a  passport  spe- 
cifically validated  by  the  Department  of  State  for 
that  purpose  constitutes  a  violation  of  the  Travel 


A  Close  Look  at  Africa 


iy  Chester  BoioJes  ^ 


I  am  very  happy  to  be  with  you  tonight  at  this 
50th-anniversai'y  dimmer  of  the  Phelps-Stokes 
Fund.  During  its  many  years  of  concern  with 
Africa,  the  fund  has  done  much  to  build  a  bridge 
of  understanding  with  this  long-neglected  conti- 
nent. The  present  floodtide  of  books,  articles, 
movies,  and  documentaries  on  Africa  is  in  no  small 
measure  the  result  of  your  own  early  efforts. 

Yet  the  extent  of  America's  involvement  in 
African  affairs  could  scarcely  have  been  foreseen 
even  a  few  years  ago.  As  recently  as  January 
1955,  when  I  first  visited  Africa  south  of  the 
Sahara,  our  national  ignorance  was  still  abysmal. 

For  instance,  in  preparing  for  my  trip  I  had 
occasion  to  visit  the  Library  of  Congress,  where 
I  looked  in  vain  for  an  African  division  that 
would  tell  me  something  about  then  current  devel- 
opments in  the  Gold  Coast,  Nigeria,  Kenya,  and 
the  Rhodesias.  When  I  turned  in  desperation  to 
the  librarian,  she  remarked  with  some  impatience, 
"You  will  find  those  colonies  listed  imder  Europe. 
Look  up  Belgium,  Great  Britain,  Portugal,  and 
France." 

"But  where,"  I  asked,  "can  I  find  information 
on  such  free  countries  as  Liberia  and  Ethiopia?" 
"Oh,  they  come  under  'miscellaneous,' "  she  an- 
swered. 

The  weeks  that  my  wife  and  I  subsequently 
spent  traveling  along  the  west  coast  of  Africa  to 
the  Congo,  across  to  the  Rhodesias,  and  then  up 


'  Address  made  at  the  SOth-annlversary  dinner  of  the 
Phelps-Stokes  Fund  at  New  York,  N.Y.,  on  Dee.  14  (press 
release  7.30).  Mr.  Bowles  is  the  President's  Special  Rep- 
resentative and  Adviser  on  African,  Asian,  and  Latin 
American  AfEairs. 

1002 


Control  Law  and  Regulations  (Title  8,  U.S.  Code,) 
sec.  1185;  Title  22,  Code  of  Federal  Regulations,! 
sec.  63.3) .  A  willful  violation  of  the  law  is  punish 
able  by  fine  and/or  imprisonment. 


f) 


the  east  coast  to  Ethiopia,  were  among  tlie  most 
stimulating,  rewarding,  and  disturbing  we  have 
ever  experienced. 

Except  in  British  West  Africa,  we  found  colo- 
nial opposition  to  self-determination  unrelenting. 
With  a  few  notable  exceptions,  European  civil 
servants  appeared  as  smugly  confident  of  the  per- 
manence of  things  as  their  grandfathers  were  in 
the  days  of  Queen  Victoria. 

Wlio  could  reasonably  expect  the  European  set- 
tlers of  East  Africa  to  compromise  their  pleasant 
and  profitable  existence  under  pressure  from  "ig- 
norant natives"?  And  how  could  anyone  expect 
the  Congo  to  gain  independence  with  less  than  two 
dozen  college  graduates  in  the  entire  country  ? 

Although  a  handful  of  forward-looking  Euro- 
pean leaders  in  East  Africa  and  the  Congo  were 
conscious  of  a  growing  ferment  and  anxious  to 
move  with  the  times,  the  pace  was  too  swift  for 
them.  Before  the  war,  they  had  been  doing  things 
to  the  Africans.  Now,  belatedly,  they  were  striv- 
ing to  do  things  for  them.  But,  with  few  excep- 
tions, they  had  not  yet  learned  to  do  things  with 
them. 

"Wlaen  we  returned  from  Africa,  I  found,  to  my 
embarrassment,  that  a  few  weeks  spent  in  a  dozen 
or  so  countries  had  suddenly  turned  me  into  an 
African  expert.  Shortly  after  my  return  I  was 
asked  by  the  University  of  California  to  give  the 
Berkeley  lectures  the  following  spring  on  "Afri- 
ca's Future  Relationship  to  the  United  States." 
Wlien  I  explained  the  limitations  of  my  knowl- 
edge, they  replied  that  they  still  wanted  my 
views — "because  hardly  anyone  has  been  there  even 


that  long." 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


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In  those  lectures,  which  were  later  published  by 
the  University  of  California  Press,  I  suggested 
that  Africa  was  moving  much  more  rapidly  to- 
ward freedom  than  was  generally  assimied  and 
that  we  and  our  European  associates  must  either 
revamp  our  outlook  or  be  left  behind  by  events. 

Specifically  I  suggested  that  we  introduce  a  res- 
olution in  the  Trusteeship  Council  of  the  U.N. 
proposing  self-determination  for  all  trust  terri- 
tories in  20-25  years.  For  such  "visionary, 
woolly-headed"  concepts,  I  was  promptly  rebuked 
on  all  sides.  "Africa,"  I  was  reminded,  "is  wholly 
unprepared  for  freedom ;  we  must  adopt  a  realistic 
view." 

Since  then,  I  have  made  half  a  dozen  trips  to 
Africa,  and  I  have  foimd  the  pace  of  change  on 
each  occasion  impressive.  What  disturbs  me  is 
that  so  few  Americans  appreciate  the  speed  of 
African  economic  and  political  development  and 
the  unique  quality  of  the  emerging  African 
societies. 

I  suppose  it  is  inevitable  that  a  busy  people  such 
as  ourselves  should  see  the  world  largely  in  terms 
of  stereotypes.  For  instance,  when  some  of  us 
think  of  Japan,  the  first  things  that  come  to  mind 
are  Geisha  girls,  Fujiyama,  and  eager-beaver 
Japanese  businessmen.  Similarly,  we  see  India 
in  terms  of  sacred  cows,  hmigry  millions,  and 
strange  religious  rites.  Africa  comes  into  focus 
as  a  continent  of  witch  doctors,  big-game  hunting, 
and  violent  conflict  typified  by  Algeria,  Kenya, 
and  the  Congo. 

Although  right  now  we  face  a  particularly  ex- 
plosive clash  in  the  Congo,  the  African  stereo- 
type in  general  is  as  distorted  and  ridiculous  as 
the  other  two.  If  our  policies  in  regard  to  Africa 
are  to  be  wise  and  well-founded,  we  Americans 
must  develop  a  more  balanced  and  realistic  view. 
Let  me  briefly  suggest  a  few  guidelines  that  may 
help  to  bring  our  thinking  up  to  date. 

Tolerant  Perspective  of  African  Leaders 

In  a  recent  month-long  trip  to  a  dozen  African 
nations  south  of  the  Sahara  I  talked  to  some  40 
national  leaders.  In  every  instance  I  was  im- 
pressed with  their  extraordinary  tolerance  even 
toward  those  with  whom  they  vigorously  disagree. 
Although  they  had  experienced  much  to  make 
them  bitter,  surprisingly  few  held  grudges  against 
the  former  colonial  powers  or  their  own  European 
minorities. 

December  31,   7962 


For  instance,  leaders  in  Kenya  whose  views  have 
often  been  described  as  "extreme"  told  me  that, 
while  their  first  concern  was  to  secure  their  inde- 
pendence, they  felt  it  essential  that  this  be  accom- 
plished in  such  a  way  that  the  European  minority 
will  have  a  sense  of  security  and  participation  in 
building  a  new,  independent  country.  African 
nationalist  leaders  in  Southern  Rhodesia  expressed 
similar  views. 

In  other  parts  of  Africa  we  f oimd  the  same  will- 
ingness to  live  and  let  live,  to  forget  past  wrongs. 
The  nations  that  were  once  included  in  what  we 
called  French  West  Africa  have  shown  equal  ma- 
turity and  capacity  for  reconciliation. 

The  Republic  of  Guinea  is  a  particularly  dra- 
matic example:  In  1958  the  French,  exasperated 
by  Sekou  Toure's  decision  to  leave  the  French 
Union,  reduced  their  investments  and  recalled 
many  of  their  doctors,  teclinicians,  and  teachers. 
"Wlien  we  sidestepped  Toure's  request  for  U.S. 
assistance  for  fear  of  antagonizing  our  French 
allies,  Guinea  turned  in  desperation  to  the  Soviet 
Union  for  economic  aid.  The  Kremlin  responded 
favorably,  and  some  American  policymakers 
promptly  wrote  off  this  new  African  nation  as 
a  probable  Communist  satellite. 

Yet  today,  4  years  later,  Guinea's  young  lead- 
ers see  the  world  in  a  clear  and  refreshingly  toler- 
ant perspective,  which  includes  a  genuine  desire 
to  reestablish  friendly  relations  with  the  French, 
for  whom  they  express  respect  and  good  will.  In 
today's  world  of  violence  and  revolution,  tolerance 
of  this  kind  is  deeply  heartening. 

And  yet  Guinea  is  no  anomaly  in  Africa.  With 
the  exception  of  Algeria  and  the  Congo,  there  has 
been  surprisingly  little  violence.  Indeed,  in  the 
25  African  nations  south  of  the  Sahara  which  have 
emerged  from  colonial  rule  in  the  last  7  years, 
total  casualties  thus  far  have  been  estimated  at  no 
more  than  a  few  thousand.  Wlien  we  consider 
the  heavy  loss  of  life  that  accompanied  similar 
revolutionary  upheavals  in  China,  Russia,  or  even 
the  Indian  subcontinent,  this  record  of  orderly 
change  is  all  but  miraculous. 

Another  quality  of  modern  Africa  is  the  youth, 
enthusiasm,  and  humility  of  most  of  its  leaders. 
In  counti-y  after  comitry  these  new  leaders  have 
appeared  to  come  out  of  nowhere,  and  a  great 
many  of  them  are  in  their  thirties  or  early  forties. 

Equally  impressive  is  the  sophistication  with 
which  African  planners  are  approaching  the  chal- 

1003 


|! 


lenge  of  economic  development.  In  1955  the  few 
African  nationalist  leaders  with  whom  I  was  per- 
mitted to  talk  were  dreaming  of  independence  in 
terms  of  nuclear  reactoi's,  global  airlines,  and  steel 
mills.  These  visions  of  economic  grandeur  have 
now  been  replaced  with  a  down-to-earth  under- 
standing of  basic  needs. 

Wlien  I  asked  some  40  African  leaders  in  a 
dozen  countries  to  tell  me  their  present  priorities 
for  national  development,  I  found  in  their  replies 
not  only  realism  but  a  surprising  degree  of 
imiformity. 

First,  they  said,  is  the  need  for  education,  in- 
cluding technical  education.  To  this  they  gave 
highest  priority. 

Their  second  concern  was  with  rural  develop- 
ment, with  particular  emphasis  on  more  produc- 
tive agriculture  based  on  extension  work,  experi- 
mental farms,  low-interest  credit,  cooperatives, 
and  commercial  fertilizers. 

Third,  they  felt  the  need  for  modem  communi- 
cations— roads,  railroads,  telephone  and  telegraph 
installations. 

And  fourth,  they  stressed  small  industries  that 
can  manufacture  inexpensive  consumer  goods  to 
provide  incentives  for  extra  production  in  both 
rural  and  urban  areas.  In  this  regard  there  was 
a  general  agreement  that  such  industries  should 
be  located  largely  in  the  small  provincial  towns. 
The  present  headlong  rush  into  the  large  cities 
would,  therefore,  be  slowed  down,  and  people 
would  be  encouraged  to  find  a  worthwhile  life 
near  their  original  homes,  where  they  feel  most 
secure. 

In  only  two  African  countries  was  I  pressed  for 
major  capital  investment ;  and  in  each  case  I  felt 
that  they  were  ready  for  it. 

New  Feeling  of  National  Identity 

I  was  particularly  impressed,  as  on  other  visits, 
with  the  diversity  of  Africa  and  the  pride  that 
each  new  nation  is  taking  in  its  own  future. 

Because  Africans  know  by  experience  how  un- 
comfortable it  is  to  be  ruled  by  others,  however 
generous  and  well-intentioned,  a  fierce  sense  of 
independence  is  evident  everywhere.  This  is  often 
expressed  in  an  almost  belligerent  detennination 
not  to  appear  to  be  influenced  by  anyone — and 
particularly  by  white  foreigners.  This  determina- 
tion to  build  their  own  future  within  the  frame- 
work of  their  own  culture  is  one  of  the  most  power- 


ful political  forces  in  the  new  Africa;  and,  ij 
terms  of  our  own  interests,  it  is  a  healthy  develop 
ment. 

Wliile  we  see  in  this  new  feeling  of  national 
identity  a  reflection  of  the  spirit  of  freedom,  thu 
world  Communist  movement — still  dreaming 
great  dreams  of  dominant  ties  with  Africai 
states — must  find  it  a  formidable  obstacle. 

Yet  there  is  also  a  welcome  absence  of  provin 
cialism.  Side  by  side  with  this  fierce  dedicatioi 
to  independent  growth  is  a  sober  realization  of  tht 
need  for  cooperation  among  neighbors  in  viabh 
geographic  units. 

Although  talk  of  an  all-Africa  federation  ii 
generally  considered  unrealistic,  there  is  a  steady 
growing  movement  toward  various  forms  of  multi 
national  cooperation  in  both  east  and  west  Africa 
Almost  invariably  the  basis  of  this  regional  co- 
operation is  economic.  It  is  bom  out  of  the  reali- 
zation that  small  nations  of  two  or  three  millior 
people,  whose  borders  are  often  a  legacy  of  clash- 
ing IDth-centuiy  colonial  ambitions,  have  much  tc 
gain  by  merging  development  plans  and  govern 
mental  services  with  their  neighbors.  Farsighted 
individuals  see  these  economic  ties  as  a  first  im 
portant  step  toward  political  integration. 

The  Economic  Potential  of  Africa 

Finally,  I  am  impressed  with  what  I  believe  to 
be  the  extraordinary  economic  potential  of  Afri- 
ca. Indeed,  in  spite  of  Africa's  short  supply  of 
educated  and  technically  skilled  manpower,  we 
may  expect  the  rate  of  per  capita  income  growth 
in  most  of  Africa  to  be  substantially  faster  by 
1975  than  in  either  Latin  America  or  Asia. 

Although  the  built-in  obstacles  of  inadequate 
education  and  inexperience  in  public  administra- 
tion are  formidable,  I  believe  that  they  will  be 
overcome  more  rapidly  than  most  observers  think. 
As  this  is  accomplished,  Africa's  vast  economic 
promise  will  become  dramatically  evident. 

For  one  thing,  only  two  or  three  African  coun- 
tries are  plagued  with  the  deeply  rooted  resist- 
ance to  political  reforms  which  characterizes 
much  of  Latin  America  and  many  parts  of  Asia, 
where  representatives  of  the  old  order  cling  to 
an  unjust,  inefficient,  and  doomed  status  quo. 

Although  some  observers  point  to  the  tribal 
system  in  most  parts  of  Africa  as  a  similar  bar- 
rier, I  am  impressed  with  the  relative  ease  with 
which  many  of  these  tribal  arrangements,  includ- 


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ing  the  common  ownership  of  land,  may  evolve 
into  cooperative  ownership  and  management. 

An  even  more  important  African  asset  for  the 
long  haul  is  the  extraordinarily  favorable  ratio, 
in  most  areas,  of  people  to  natural  resources. 

Consider,  for  instance,  two  of  the  most  striking 
examples:  the  Congo  and  the  Sudan.  Each  is 
about  two-thirds  the  size  of  India  and  in  all  prob- 
ability possesses  about  two-thirds  of  India's  re- 
sources. Yet  the  population  of  India  is  440  mil- 
lion, while  the  population  of  the  Sudan  and  the 
Congo  is  approximately  13  million  each.  Once 
trained  and  educated  Congolese  and  Sudanese 
are  available  to  help  organize  and  develop  their 
vast  natural  resources,  we  may  expect  the  per  capi- 
ta incomes  in  both  countries  to  grow  far  more 
rapidly  than  in  India,  in  spite  of  the  extraordi- 
nary vitality  and  capacity  of  Indian  democracy. 

A  major  contributing  factor  will  be  the  rapid 
introduction  of  laborsaving  machinery,  with  the 
consequent  growth  of  a  well-paid  core  of  indus- 
trial workere  and  a  developing  middle  class. 

In  the  more  heavily  populated  Asian  countries 
such  machinery  is  often  resisted  because  its  firet 
impact  is  to  throw  people  out  of  work.  In  most 
parts  of  Africa  we  are  likely  to  face  an  increasing 
labor  shortage  and  a  consequent  rapid  increase  in 
per  capita  incomes  as  machinery  is  introduced  to 
fill  the  gap. 


U.S.  Commitment  to  a  United  Congo 

Although   Africa's   present   development   and 
long-term  future  prospects  are  remarkably  promis- 
ing, it  would  be  a  mistake  to  ignore  the  dangers. 
A  sober  view  must  take  into  account  certain  built- 
5tn  in  political  traps  which  could  quickly  turn  promise 
11 1  into  disaster.    The  most  dangerous  of  these  is  the 
iiil  Congo. 

Here,  in  the  heart  of  Africa,  the  United  Na- 
tions under  the  leadership  of  Secretaiy-General 
1111  U  Thant  has  been  patiently  striving  to  end  the 
sisi  secession  of  Katanga  and  to  help  the  Congo  trans- 
lia  form  itself  from  a  once  profitable  colony  into  a 
y^viable,  unified  nation.^ 

Before  independence,  the  Province  of  Katanga, 
through  its  vast  copper  exports,  supplied  the  Bel- 
ibllgian  Congo  with  nearly  half  of  its  foreign  ex- 


I 


'  For  text  of  the  Secretary-General's  Plan  of  National 
Reconciliation,  see  U.N.  doc.  S/5053/Add.  13  (annex  I). 

December  37,   7962 


change  and  more  than  half  of  its  annual  tax  in- 
come. Its  internal  transportation  system,  foreign 
trade,  and  much  of  the  Congolese  economy  were 
built  around  this  natural  resource. 

Now  Katanga  threatens  to  establish  itself  as  an 
independent  state.  If  this  should  occur,  the 
Congo's  prospects  of  becoming  politically  stable 
and  economically  viable  would  fade  and  we  would 
be  called  upon  to  foot  the  bill. 

The  present  government  in  Leopoldville,  headed 
by  Prime  Minister  [Cyrille]  Adoula,  is  a  moderate 
nationalist  government.  It  is  a  government  which 
has  acted  decisively  against  those  who  would  trade 
the  Congo's  independence  to  Communist  agents  for 
personal  political  gain.  It  has  been  steadily  in- 
creasing the  Congo's  role  as  a  respected  and  influ- 
ential member  of  the  African  community. 

If  U  Thant's  efforts  to  miify  the  Congo  under 
this  present  government  should  fail,  we  will  al- 
most certainly  witness  a  bloody  civil  war  in  the 
heart  of  Africa  and  the  political  disintegration  of 
a  potentially  wealthy  country  nearly  one-third  the 
size  of  the  United  States. 

This  will  invite  another  determined  Coramunist 
effort  to  fill  the  Congolese  vacuum  and  to  establish 
a  power  position  in  central  Africa,  similar  to  the 
Soviet  moves  which  very  nearly  succeeded  2  years 
ago. 

The  impact  of  such  a  failure  would  quickly 
spread  far  beyond  the  Congo  itself.  In  the  south- 
ern third  of  the  continent,  for  instance,  there  are 
forces  that  would  hail  the  U.N.'s  defeat  as  a  vic- 
tory. Thus  the  lines  of  conflict  would  be  tightly 
and  dangerously  drawn. 

With  the  effectiveness  of  the  U.N.  gravely  weak- 
ened, the  United  States  would  be  faced  with  a 
critical  choice :  either  to  turn  its  back  on  this  dan- 
gerous political  debacle  or  to  act  unilaterally  at 
substantial  cost  and  risk  to  pick  up  the  pieces.  In 
such  circumstances  we  cannot  compromise  our  sup- 
port for  concerted  action  to  unify  and  stabilize 
the  Congo.  The  commitment  of  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment to  a  united  Congo  is  clear. 

How  the  U.S.  Should  Deal  With  the  New  Africa 

Elsewhere  than  the  Congo,  how  should  the 
United  States  deal  with  the  new  Africa  ? 

The  first  requirement,  it  seems  to  me,  is  to  con- 
tinue to  make  everlastingly  clear  our  support  for 
the  right  of  all  peoples  to  determine  their  own 
form  of  government.  Respect  for  this  funda- 
mental right  has  been  an  intrinsic  part  of  our 

1005 


American  tradition  since  the  Revolutionary  days 
of  Thomas  Paine. 

In  1825  Prince  Mettemich,  the  spokesman  for 
reaction  in  post-Napoleonic  Europe,  in  referring 
to  American  support  for  the  Greek  war  of  libera- 
tion against  the  Turks,  said,  "Wlierever  a  subject 
people  seek  revolutionary  change,  there  you  will 
find  the  Americans  applauding  those  who  succeed 
and  bemoaning  those  who  fail."  In  this  tradition 
let  us  never  fail  to  make  clear  where  we  stand  on 
the  question  of  self-determination  in  Africa. 

Second,  while  wholeheartedly  supporting  this 
concept,  let  us  not  minimize  the  difficulties  of  our 
friends  in  Europe. 

The  British,  the  French,  and  the  Belgians  have, 
by  and  large,  conducted  themselves  in  these  recent 
years  with  extraordinai-y  understanding,  flexibil- 
ity, and  skill.  If  they  had  failed  in  this  respect, 
Africa  today  would  now  be  a  bloody  shambles  of 
conflict  rather  than  a  promising  and  surprisingly 
stable  continent.  So  let  us  forgo  patronizing 
lectures  in  dealing  with  our  European  associates. 
Instead,  let  us  strive  to  understand  their  problems 
and  to  work  with  them  toward  realistic  and 
reasonable  solutions. 

Third,  in  the  last  2  years  the  Bureau  of  African 
Affairs  in  the  State  Department  has  developed 
great  sensitivity  and  competence  under  the  able 
leadership  of  Assistant  Secretary  G.  Mennen  Wil- 
liams. Some  of  our  youngest  and  ablest  ambas- 
sadors are  now  serving  in  African  capitals.  Let 
us  continue  to  build  on  this  promising  start. 

Fourth,  the  Peace  Corps  appears  to  be  ideally 
suited  to  the  needs  of  Africa,  and  nowhere  is  its 
success  likely  to  be  greater.  In  Ethiopia,  Tangan- 
yika, Nigeria,  Cameroon,  and  Liberia  I  met  groups 
of  young  Americans  who  reflected  the  very  best  in 
American  life.  The  Peace  Corps  is  the  most  out- 
standing new  contribution  to  foreign  policy  of  the 
last  decade.  Let  us  expand  it  in  Africa  as  else- 
where as  rapidly  as  our  resources  pei-mit. 

Fifth,  we  should  make  sure  not  only  that  those 
African  nations  which  are  able  to  absorb  economic 
assistance  are  helped  but  that  they  are  given  the 
right  kind  of  help. 

In  line  with  the  priorities  set  by  responsible 
African  leaders  education  should  be  given  major 
emphasis,  closely  followed  by  integrated  develop- 
ment of  the  rural  areas,  agricultural  extension, 
public  administration  and  health  services,  and 
road  construction. 


Insofar  as  possible  we  should  encourage  local  I 
initiative  in  these  undertakings,  particularly  in 
the  construction  of  schools  and  roads.  A  simple, 
bamboo-mud  school  or  a  connecting  road  built  by 
the  parents  and  the  villagers  themselves,  in  the 
tradition  of  our  own  rural  development,  will  create 
an  exciting  sense  of  participation  in  the  forging 
of  the  commimity.  Such  projects  will  contribute 
far  more  to  the  orderly  political  growth  of  a  vil- 
lage than  a  better  constructed  road  or  a  "show 
place"  school  built  with  no  local  involvement. 

Sixth,  in  our  desire  to  build  a  partnership  with 
African  nations,  let  us  be  careful  not  to  compro- 
mise our  own  interests  or  principles  in  an  effort 
to  please  them  on  short-term  issues  where  we  feel 
in  all  honesty  that  they  are  in  error.  An  effort 
to  curry  favor  with  African  leaders,  regardless 
of  their  rightness  or  wrongness,  will  not  create  the 
solid  ground  necessary  for  an  enduring  partner- 
ship. 

In  the  U.N.,  for  example,  we  will  find  ourselves 
voting  in  most  cases  with  the  African  nations  for 
some  very  basic  reasons:  our  common  desire  for 
freedom  and  independence  and  our  common  op- 
position to  Communist  subversion.  But  when  is- 
sues do  arise  about  which  we  fail  to  see  eye  to  eye, 
we  should  not  hesitate  to  say  so. 

Seventh  and  finally,  let  us  curb  our  frustration 
and  impatience  when  particular  situations  fail  to 
develop  as  we  think  they  should.  The  new  African 
nations,  having  at  long  last  thrown  off  British, 
French,  and  Belgian  rule,  have  no  desire  to  be 
Russianized,  Sinocized,  or  even  Americanized. 

Although  they  share  our  hopes  and  fears  on 
most  aspects  of  world  affairs,  they  are  anxiously 
and  often  belligerently  determined  to  maintain 
their  own  identity.  Wlien  they  sense  that  their 
independence  of  judgment  is  being  compromised, 
they  will  go  out  of  their  way  to  assert  it,  regard- 
less of  what  we  say  or  think — frequently  at  the 
expense  of  their  own  interests. 

Therefore  let  us  not  get  too  excited  when  the 
Prime  Minister  of  country  A  or  the  President  of 
country  B  announces  a  visit  to  Moscow  or  enter- 
tains a  visiting  team  of  Soviet  gymnasts. 

We  should  also  keep  our  perspective  when  an 
occasional  African  speech  or  resolution  is  based 
on  information  which  we  know  to  be  false.  De- 
spite our  own  massive  sources  of  information,  we 
too  have  been  guilty  of  serious  errors ;  in  the  new 
African  capitals  reliable  intelligence  is  consider- 
ably less  adequate. 


1006 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


m 
tisl 


iisli 


si 


Moreover,  in  the  postwar  years,  when  we  were 
learning  the  hard  way  about  the  techniques  of 
communism  and  the  intransigence  and  devious- 
ness  of  Communist  diplomacy,  most  of  the  pres- 
ent crop  of  African  leaders  wei'e  obscure  civil 
servants,  budding  young  lawyers,  or  university 
students,  and  largely  unconcerned  with  world 
affairs. 

In  short  the  new  Africa,  although  heavily  laden 
with  question  marks,  is,  in  many  ways,  the  most 
exciting  and  promising  continent  in  our  modern 
world.  I  earnestly  hope  that  many  Americans  will 
come  to  know  it  better.  I  can  guarantee  that  they 
will  find  it  rewarding. 

And  in  closing  may  I  express  again  my  deep  ap- 
preciation to  you  of  the  Phelps-Stokes  Fund  for 
your  farseeing  effort  to  build  a  bridge  of  under- 
standing between  Africans  and  Americans  at  a 
time  when  such  bridges  were  few  and  far  between. 


U.S.  Reaffirms  Friendship 
and  Support  for  Tanganyil<a 

White  House  press  release  (Albuquerque,  N.  Mex.)  dated  Decem- 
ber 7,  for  release  December  8 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  letter  from.  Presi- 
dent Kennedy  to  Mwallmu  Julius  K.  Nyerei'e, 
President  of  the  Republic  of  Tanganyika. 

December  7,  1962 
Dear  Mr.  President:  It  is  a  great  pleasure  to 
extend  the  warmest  congratulations  of  tlie  gov- 
ernment and  people  of  the  United  States  on  the 
establisliment  of  the  Eepublic  of  Tanganyika.  It 
is  an  equal  pleasure  to  congratulate  you  on  your 
inauguration  as  the  first  President  of  the  Kepublic. 
I  reaffirm  American  friendship  and  support  for 
the  aspirations  of  the  people  of  Tanganyika  and 
for  the  goals  which  your  government  has  set  as 
you  begin  this  new  and  important  chapter  in  your 
nation's  history.  Tanganyika's  non-racial  society 
is  an  outstanding  example  to  all.  The  United 
States  will  continue  to  assist  Tanganyika  and 
other  new  nations  in  Africa  in  their  drive  for 
rapid  social  and  economic  advance.  The  progress 
of  Tanganyika  justifies  our  confidence  and 
support. 


December  31,  7962 


With  Tanganyika  the  United  States  shares 
African  desires  for  the  dignity  and  equality  of 
the  individual.  We  welcome  new  African  nations 
to  freedom  and  independence  in  the  world 
community. 

I  am  confident  that  the  friendly  ties  between 
Tanganyika  and  the  United  States  will  grow 
stronger  in  coming  years.  In  partnership  we  can 
work  for  peace  and  progress. 

Please  accept  my  personal  congratulations  and 
good  wishes  for  yourself  and  your  country. 
Sincerely, 

John  F.  Kennedy 

His  Excellency 

MwALiMTT  Julius  K.  Nterere 

President  of  the  Rejmblic  of  Tanganyika 


Committee  Formed  To  Advise 
on  Foreign  Operations  Programs 

White  House  press  release  dated  December  10 

The  White  House  announced  on  December  10 
the  formation  of  a  group  to  advise,  on  a  con- 
tinuing basis,  the  President,  the  Secretary  of 
State,  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  and  the  Admin- 
istrator of  the  Agency  for  International  Develop- 
ment on  foreign  operations  programs  in  the  eco- 
nomic and  military  fields.  To  be  known  as  the 
Committee  To  Strengthen  the  Security  of  the  Free 
World,  the  group  of  distinguished  private  citizens 
will  be  headed  by  Gen.  Lucius  D.  Clay  and  will 
include  Kobert  A.  Lovett,  George  Meany,  Edward 
S.  Mason,  Eugene  R.  Black,  Robert  B.  Anderson, 
L.  F.  McCollum,  Herman  Phleger,  and  Clifford 
Harden. 

At  the  President's  request,  the  Committee  will 
undertake  an  immediate  review  of  our  military 
and  economic  assistance  to  determine  whether  the 
level  and  distribution  of  these  programs  is  con- 
tributing materially  to  the  security  of  the  United 
States  and  is  directed  to  specific  and  attainable 
goals  of  economic  and  political  stability  in  the 
free  world. 

The  Committee  has  been  assigned  broad  ad- 
visory responsibility  and,  in  addition  to  respond- 
ing to  governmental  requests,  is  expected  to  under- 
take inquiries  on  its  own  initiative. 


1007 


The  Meaning  of  Atlantic  PartnersFiip 


hy  'William  R.  Tyler 

Assistant  Secretary  for  European  Affairs  '■ 


One  of  the  characters  in  Dostoevsky's  novel  The 
Possessed  made  this  prediction  : 

Europe  will  last  our  time  I  think,  but  when  that  Baby- 
lon out  there  does  fall,  great  will  be  the  consequences 
thereof. 

We  all  know  of  the  European  fall  and  of  the 
disaster  that  ensued  in  the  two  world  wars.  But 
now  a  European  revival  is  underway.  And  of 
Europe's  20th-century  renaissance,  one  thing  is 
clear — great  can  be  the  consequences  thereof. 

Indeed  it  is  our  central  purpose,  as  our  part  in 
helping  to  make  sure  that  the  consequences  are 
great,  to  see  to  it  tliat  the  energies  of  our  coun- 
tries are  joined  so  that  they  may  perpetuate  them- 
selves and  be  transmitted  to  the  rest  of  the  world 
for  constructive  purpose.  Therein  lies  the  true 
politique  de  grandeur  of  our  times.  And  therein 
lies  the  real  meaning  of  Atlantic  partnership, 
which  is  tlie  subject  of  my  talk  this  evening. 

Now  what  do  we  mean  by  Atlantic  partnership  ? 
Evidently,  like  any  broad  policy  sranmarized  in 
a  simple  slogan,  it  is  difficult  to  give  to  this  term 
a  precise  content  which  is  valid  for  all  time.  In 
this  sense  it  is  as  difficult  to  define  Atlantic  part- 
nership as  it  is  European  imity.  Democratic  na- 
tions do  not  operate  on  the  basis  of  inflexible 
doctrines.  At  the  same  time,  to  be  successful  they 
must  have  at  least  a  clear  sense  of  direction  by 
which  their  reactions  to  day-to-day  events  can 
be  shaped.  In  this  sense  we  have  a  clear  idea  of 
what  we  are  talking  about  when  we  speak  of  a 
developing  partnership  between  the  United  States 
and  an  increasingly  strong  and  united  Europe. 
We  also  know  what  we  do  not  mean  by  this  term. 
Three  points  stand  out: 

'  Address  made  before  the  European  Foundation  for  In- 
ternational Exchanges  at  Brussels,  Belgium,  on  Dee.  3. 

1008 


First,  European  unification  and  Atlantic  part- 
nership are  not,  as  is  sometimes  suggested,  con- 
tradictory or  competitive  notions.  On  the  con- 
trary they  are  complementary  and  mutually 
reinforcing.  On  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  there 
are  men  of  little  faith  and  less  imderstanding  who 
believe  that  the  successful  movement  toward  imity 
in  Western  Europe  is  someliow  a  threat  to  closer 
ties  across  the  Atlantic.  Similarly  there  are 
those,  equally  misguided,  who  conceive  that  the 
development  of  closer  partnership  between  the 
United  States  and  Europe  will  somehow  inhibit 
the  historic  effort  wliich  the  peoples  of  Europe 
have  successfully  prosecuted  since  the  war  to 
create  among  themselves  ever  closer  organic  bonds 
of  unity.  Both  schools  are  quite  wrong:  The 
movement  toward  increasing  unity  in  Europe  has 
developed  within  the  framework  of  the  equally 
historic  creation  of  closer  bonds  across  the  Atlan- 
tic; and  the  success  of  the  European  movement 
is,  in  turn,  the  necessary  condition  of  further  prog- 
ress in  the  Atlantic  area.  As  Professor  Hall- 
stein  [Walter  Hallstein,  President  of  the  Com- 
mission of  the  European  Economic  Commimity] 
so  aptly  summed  it  up  in  his  remarkable  speech 
to  the  NATO  Parliamentary  Association  in  Paris 
2  weeks  ago: 

What  I  am  affirming  Is  that  a  major  part  of  that  im- 
pulse, and  a  major  part  of  the  new  opportunities  which 
we  now  enjoy,  derive  from  the  dynamic  of  European  in- 
tegration, at  present  limited  to  economic  subject  matter, 
but  potentially — even  more  than  potentially — a  major  po- 
litical contribution  to  the  strength  of  the  free  world. 

A  second  canard  is  the  notion  that  in  proposing 
closer  ties  of  partnership  the  United  States  is 
somehow  motivated  primarily  by  petty  and  self- 
ish motives.  Now  I  wonder  if,  in  the  light  of  the 
postwar  record,  there  can  really  be  serious  men 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


i 


in  Europe  who  believe  that.  Certainly  in  our  Eu- 
ropean and  Atlantic  policy  since  the  war  we  in 
the  United  States  have  felt  that  we  were  acting 
in  a  manner  consistent  with  our  interest;  but  we 
have  conceived  our  higher  and  long-term  interest 
as  being  essentially  identical  with  that  of  West- 
em  Europe.  Thus,  in  contributing  to  the  recov- 
ery and  development  of  Western  Europe  in  the 
Marshall  Plan  and  after,  and  in  the  consistent 
support  we  have  given  to  the  closer  imification 
of  Europe,  we  have  been  motivated  essentially  by 
the  conviction  that  the  higher  and  long-term  in- 
terests of  Western  Europe  itself  were  identical  or 
at  least  parallel  with  ours.  Tliis  is  why  we  have 
viewed  with  encouragement  the  development  in 
recent  years  of  an  increasing  sense  of  "European" 
identity  among  our  partners  in  the  Atlantic  al- 
liance; for  we  have  been  convinced  that,  as  the 
nations  of  Western  Europe  discovered  their  vo- 
cation, not  only  as  members  of  their  own  his- 
torical national  communities  but  as  parts  of  a 
European  whole,  tliey  would  also  mcreasingly  rec- 
ognize in  action  these  higher  long-term  interests. 
And  this  brings  me  to  my  third  point :  Growing 
power  must  be  accompanied  by  a  growing  sense 
of  responsibility  if  constructive  common  action 
is  to  be  possible.  Any  powerful  countiy  or  entity 
faces  a  constant  day-to-day  choice  between  the  re- 
sponsible use  of  its  power  and  the  temptation 
to  use  it  to  preserve  and  promote  narrow,  selfish, 
and  anachronistic  interests.  It  is  the  essential 
function  of  statesmanship —  and  its  greatest  test — 
to  choose  the  first  of  these  alternatives  in  the  face 
of  the  inevitable  pressures  for  the  second. 

Elements  of  Atlantic  Partnership 

So  these  are,  in  our  view,  the  essential  elements 
which  imderlie  the  notion  of  Atlantic  partner- 
ship: First,  the  growing  strength  and  unity  of 
Western  Europe  and  the  strengthening  of  part- 
nership ties  across  the  Atlantic  are  not  contradic- 
tory ideas  but  complementary  and  mutually  rein- 
forcing ones.  Second,  the  higher,  long-term 
interests  of  the  United  States  and  of  Western 
Europe  viewed  as  a  whole  are  parallel,  and,  as 
a  European  identity  increasingly  finds  institu- 
tional expression,  the  conditions  will  be  created 
for  even  closer  transatlantic  relations.  Finally 
it  is  the  task  of  responsible  statesmanship  on  both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic  to  seek  common  policy  which 
will  serve  these  essentially  parallel  interests  and 

December  31,    7962 


in  so  doing  to  override  the  natural  pressures  to 
focus  on  the  narrow  interests  wlaich  may  some- 
times divide  us.  These  requirements  must,  in  our 
view,  be  met  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  if  true 
partnership  is  to  be  made  into  a  working  reality. 
Our  policy  has  been  based  on  the  assmnption  they 
could  and  should  be  met. 

When  President  Kennedy  first  spoke  of  a  decla- 
ration of  interdependence  and  of  Atlantic  partner- 
ship last  July  i,"  some  people  had  the  idea  that 
tliis  declaration  should  be  followed  up  immedi- 
ately by  bold  new  initiatives.  But  a  review  of 
the  points  I  have  already  made  shows,  I  think, 
that  to  build  a  partnersliip  will  require  joint 
efforts  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  Indeed,  in 
most  of  the  principal  areas  we  must  look  for  the 
next  initiative  to  come  from  the  side  of  Europe 
and  the  European  Community.  Let  us  take  these 
prmcipal  questions  one  by  one : 

First  of  all,  the  question  of  political  consulta- 
tion. During  the  13  years  in  which  the  Atlantic 
alliance  has  existed,  we  have,  I  think,  made  very 
real  progress  in  improving  both  the  forms  and 
the  substance  of  consultation  among  us  on  the 
major  questions  of  foreign  policy  which  we  face 
together.  When  common  policies  proved  impos- 
sible to  achieve,  we  have  at  least  managed  to  in- 
sure a  better  understanding  of  each  other's  view- 
points. No  one  would  maintain  that  the  record 
is  perfect  or  that  the  methods  of  consultation 
themselves  could  not  bear  considerable  improve- 
ment. I  am  convinced  that  over  the  coming 
months  and  years  we  will  be  able  to  make  such 
improvements.  But  as  we  study  the  problem  more 
and  more  closely,  we  cannot  avoid  coming  to  grips 
with  the  central  question:  Who  do  we  consult 
with?    The  answer  is  up  to  you. 

Advancing  U.S.  and  Free-World  Trading  Interests 

The  field  where  there  is  perhaps  the  greatest 
hope  of  progress  over  the  near  term,  exactly  be- 
cause it  is  the  field  in  which  Europe  has  made 
the  greatest  progress  toward  organizing  itself  in 
such  a  way  that  its  identity  can  find  institutional 
expression,  is  the  field  of  trade.  In  this  area  the 
United  States  Government  has  now  obtained  legis- 
lative sanction  for  the  view  that  our  own  essential 
interest  as  a  world  trading  power  lies  in  a  major 
new  effort  to  remove  the  barriers  wliich  stand  in  the 


'  BuixETiN  of  July  23,  1962,  p.  131. 


1009 


way  of  the  expansion  of  international  trade. 
Through  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  of  1962 '  the 
United  States  Congress  has  now  given  to  the  Presi- 
dent the  authority  which  he  needs  to  help  make  a 
reality  out  of  partnership  in  the  economic  field. 
It  has  done  so  despite  the  objections  and  pressures 
of  particular  economic  interests  which  have  felt 
that  in  one  way  or  another  they  might  be  hurt 
by  this  process.  And  in  giving  this  authority  to 
the  President,  the  Congress  has  taken  a  leaf  from 
your  own  experience  and  attempted  to  provide 
for  constructive  ways  of  coping  with  the  problems 
of  these  particular  interests  without  endangering 
the  higher  interest  of  the  country  and,  indeed,  of 
the  Atlantic  area  as  a  whole.  The  President  has 
recently  confirmed  the  seriousness  of  his  inten- 
tion to  move  forward  in  this  field  by  giving  the 
major  task  of  carrying  out  this  policy  to  a  dis- 
tinguished former  Secretaiy  of  State,  Christian 
A.  Herter.* 

The  passage  of  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  is  a 
milestone  in  the  foreign  economic  and  commercial 
relations  of  the  United  States.  Just  as  our  mem- 
bership in  NATO  symbolized  the  abandonment  of 
isolationism  by  the  United  States,  so  does  the 
Trade  Expansion  Act  symbolize  American  re- 
jection of  narrow  protectionism  in  favor  of  lib- 
eralized international  trading  policies.  Thus  a 
new  road  is  opened  for  the  United  States  to  follow 
toward  the  goal  of  increased  free- world  prosperity 
and  strength  through  expanded  international 
trade.  The  freedom  of  the  West  and  its  ability  to 
help  the  developing  countries  depend  in  large 
measure  upon  tough,  flexible  economic  sinews ;  the 
Trade  Expansion  Act  should  permit  the  United 
States  to  contribute  more  effectively  than  ever  to 
the  creation  of  such  strength. 

I  shall  not  go  into  the  details  of  the  Trade  Ex- 
pansion Act  at  this  time,  but  I  believe  I  should 
emphasize  that  this  legislation  gives  us  an  oppor- 
tunity for  advancing  the  trading  interests  of  all 
the  free  world,  which  is  equaled  only  by  the  grave 
responsibilities  which  are  ours  to  live  up  to  the 
challenge.  President  Kennedy  now  has  the  au- 
thority not  only  to  reduce  existing  tariffs  by  up 
to  50  percent  in  reciprocal  multilateral  negotia- 
tions, but  he  has  the  authority  to  eliminate  tariffs 
generally  completely  on  those  categories  of  com- 


^  For  an  article  by  Leonard  Weiss  on  the  Trade  Ex- 
pansion Act  of  1962,  see  ibid.,  Dec.  3,  1962,  p.  847. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  840. 

1010 


modities  for  which  the  Common  Market  countries, 
together  with  the  United  States,  account  for  80 
percent  of  free-world  trade.  We  also  have  the 
possibility,  together  with  the  Common  Market 
countries,  to  eliminate  completely  import  tariffs 
on  certain  of  the  commodities  wliich  are  the  chief 
foreign  exchange  earners  for  many  of  the  less  de- 
veloped countries.  The  advantages  of  our  tariffi 
reductions  will,  of  course,  be  extended  to  all  free- 
world  countries  by  reason  of  the  most-favored- 
nation  principle,  and  the  free  world  will  thusi 
benefit  from  whatever  we  are  able  to  do.  How- 
ever, I  should  stress  that,  as  the  Common  Marketl 
and  the  United  States  are  the  two  largest  trad- 
ing entities  in  the  world,  the  chief  negotiating 
responsibilities  will  fall  on  us  and  we  have  pre- 
pared ourselves  with  the  Trade  Expansion  Act. 
So,  in  this  field,  the  readiness  of  the  United 
States  to  move  forward  is  clear.  The  response  is 
now  up  to  yovi.  The  European  Economic  Com- 
munity, which  in  this  area  expresses  the  identity 
of  European  interests,  represents  a  great  world 
trading  power.  Like  the  United  States,  the  Com- 
munity is  dependent  for  its  prosperity  and  sur- 
vival on  a  high  level  of  international  trade. 
Indeed  the  Community  is  much  more  dependent 
upon  world  trade  even  than  we  are.  It  seems 
clear  that  the  higher  interest  of  Europe  lies  with 
the  success  of  a  new  effort.  On  our  side  we,  of 
course,  recognize  that  what  is  needed  is  not  just 
a  new  program  of  tariff  reduction  but  a  construc- 
tive effort  to  meet  all  of  the  problems  involved 
in  raising  the  level  of  trade  between  us  and  with 
the  rest  of  the  world.  We  hope  to  have  the  op- 
portunity over  the  coming  months  to  discuss  these 
problems  in  greater  detail  with  the  Community 
and  with  the  other  countries,  large  and  small, , 
throughout  the  world  who  are  our  trading  part- 
ners and  yours.  But  the  success  of  this  common 
effort  depends  in  the  first  instance  on  your 
response. 

Agricultural  Trade 

Another  field  of  particular  concern  to  us  at  this 
moment  is  the  problem  of  agricultural  trade. 
Secretary  [of  Agriculture  Orville  L.]  Freeman  in 
Paris  last  week  has  already  given  voice  to  the 
concern  that  we  in  Washington  feel  at  the  direc- 
tion things  seem  to  be  taking  in  this  area.  The 
United  States  has  from  the  beginning  recognized 
that  a  common  agricultural  policy  was  a  necessary 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


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part  of  the  creation  of  a  customs  and  economic 
imion  among  the  comitries  of  the  Common  Mar- 
ket. Tliis  point  has  never  been  in  doubt.  But 
the  notion  of  a  common  policy  is  essentially  neu- 
tral in  its  effects  on  the  interests  of  outsiders; 
what  counts  is  the  substance  of  that  policy  it- 
self. Who,  for  example,  can  argue  that  such 
recent  actions  as  the  sudden  arbitrary  increase  in 
the  rate  of  the  Community's  levy  on  poultry  im- 
ports are  necessary  in  order  to  build  or  preserve 
the  unity  of  Europe?  Or  that  grain  prices  must 
be  pushed  higher  in  the  Community,  thereby  cur- 
tailing agricultural  imports  generally,  to  foster 
that  goal  ?  In  our  view  such  actions,  which  take 
no  account  of  the  legitimate  interests  of  agricul- 
tural producers  among  the  Community's  partners, 
lack  that  essential  element  of  responsibility  which 
I  spoke  of  earlier. 

We  recognize  that  the  whole  area  of  the  prob- 
lem of  agricultural  policy  is  one  of  the  most  diffi- 
cult for  all  of  us  in  the  developed  coimtries  of 
the  world.  To  solve  it  in  a  manner  wluch  takes 
accoimt  of  the  legitimate  interests  of  all  will  re- 
quire a  tremendous  effort  of  statesmanship.  But 
unless  we  approach  these  as  common  problems  and 
deal  with  them  in  common — and  not  simply  as 
a  f  imction  of  the  internal  pressures  to  which  all  of 
us  are  subject — it  is  difficult  to  see  how  we  can 
move  forward  along  the  road  to  partnership. 

For  we  know  that  in  agriculture,  too,  there 
must  be  an  element  of  reciprocity.  It  was  for 
this  reason  that  we  agreed,  at  the  OECD  minis- 
terial meeting  in  Paris  last  week,°  that  we  should 
examine  together  the  whole  broad  field  of  agri- 
culture and  that  the  United  States  indicated  its 
readiness  also  to  consult  on  its  own  agricultural 
policies. 

The  decisions  of  the  Common  Market  in  this 
field  will  largely  determine  the  course  not  only 
of  agricultural  trade  but  also  international  trade 
generally.  It  is  not  only  illogical  but,  indeed, 
impossible  to  be  liberal  minded  with  regard  to 
trade  in  industrial  goods  and  to  be  protectionist 
in  the  agricultural  sector.  We  believe  that  this 
problem  is  a  basic  one  in  the  relations  of  the  Com- 
mon Market  with  the  United  States  and  with 
other  trading  coimtries,  and  we  urge  your  states- 
manship in  working  out  with  us  a  solution  by 
which  your  and  our  interests  are  respected. 


For  text  of  a  joint  statement,  see  itid.,  Dec.  17,  1962, 
p.  942. 

December  31,   1962 


External  Responsibilities  of  Partnership 

I  have  spoken  so  far  mostly  of  what  might  be 
called  the  "internal"  problems  of  the  partnership. 
But  we  must  be  alert  to  our  external  responsibili- 
ties as  well.  "Wliat  we  are  talking  about,  after 
all.  is  not  how  to  feather  our  own  nests  but  how 
to  mobilize  our  total  resources  in  the  interests  of 
survival  and  prosperity;  and  our  survival  and 
prosperity  is  bomid  up  in  turn  with  the  fat«  of 
those  countries  which  are  struggling  to  create 
viable  and  prosperous  societies  and  are  prepared 
to  look  for  help  and  guidance  to  whatever  politi- 
cal and  economic  system  may  offer  it  to  them. 

Our  relations  with  these  countries,  indeed,  ai^e 
one  of  the  major  tests  of  partnership.  And  this 
test  we  must  meet  by  common  action,  addressed 
not  only  to  the  need  for  development  capital  but 
also  to  the  urgent  requirement  for  stable  and  grow- 
ing markets  for  the  goods — both  primary  and 
manufactured — of  the  developing  countries.  At 
the  ministerial  meeting  of  the  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  just  com- 
pleted, we  have  reaffirmed  our  common  pledge  to 
deal  constructively  with  these  problems,  and  we 
have  set  out  some  guidelines  for  future  action. 
Our  task  now  is  to  turn  this  pledge  and  these 
guidelines  into  reality. 

In  specific  terms,  we  have  suggested  that,  in 
examining  our  efforts  to  help  the  coimtries  in  the 
course  of  development,  we  must  view  our  trade 
relations  and  our  aid  programs  as  integral  parts 
of  a  single  policy  designed  to  promote  their  de- 
velopment. In  this  connection  I  have  very  much 
in  mind  the  problem  of  the  worsening  terms  imder 
which  the  countries  in  the  course  of  development 
must  trade  due  to  price  trends  which  have  been 
particularly  adverse  from  their  standpoint.  Thus 
prices  of  their  exports  have  fallen  sliarply — the 
index  of  the  prices  of  their  prunary  product  ex- 
ports has  fallen  from  102  in  1955  to  88  in  1962. 
Meanwhile  the  index  of  the  prices  of  the  manu- 
factured goods  they  purchase  has  risen  from  98 
in  1954  to  109  in  1961. 

I  have  left  imtil  last  a  subject  of  primordial 
importance  but  on  which  the  answer  most  clearly 
must  come  from  Europe  and  from  Europe  alone : 
the  present  negotiations  for  the  accession  of  the 
United  Kingdom  to  the  European  Economic  Com- 
munity. Clearly  the  outcome  of  these  negotiations 
will  deeply  affect  the  future  shape  of  Europe  and 
hence   the   possibility   of  Atlantic   partnership. 

1011 


But,  equally  clearly,  the  adjustment  of  many 
interests  involved  in  these  negotiations  is  so  deli- 
cate that  any  comment  on  them  here  would  be 
inappropriate.  I  can  only  say  that  as  interested 
outsiders  we  in  the  United  States  wish  the  negotia- 
tors well.  We  hope  they  will  succeed  in  finding 
solutions  to  their  problems  which  will  permit  the 
U.K.  to  accede  to  the  Community  under  terms 
wliich  strengthen  the  unity  and  effectiveness  of  the 
Community  and  at  the  same  time  take  due  accoimt 
of  the  legitimate  mterests  of  nonmember  countries. 
As  Europe  grows  stronger  and  acquires  a  more 
significant  sense  of  political  identity,  the  Atlantic 
partnership  will  take  on  new  meaning  and  respon- 
sibility for  free  men  everywhere.  Europe  and 
America,  working  together,  can  establish  and 
maintain  a  lasting  climate  of  security,  economic 
well-being,  and  peace. 


Views  Exchanged  With  Tin  Council 
on  U.S.  Surplus  Disposal  Program 


Department  Statement 


Press  release  732  dated  December  14 


In  accordance  with  understandings  reached  last 
July,^  consultations  were  held  at  Washington  De- 
cember 13  and  14  between  a  delegation  of  the  Inter- 
national Tin  Council  and  re^jresentatives  of  the 
State  Department  and  other  agencies  of  the 
United  States  Government.  The  purpose  of  the 
talks  was  to  review  the  operation  of  the  first  plan  ^ 
for  disposal  of  tin  surplus  to  the  needs  of  the 
United  States  stockpile  which  wiU  conclude 
December  19. 

These  consultations  were  used  by  the  Council 
and  the  United  States  Government  officials  to  ex- 
change views  and  to  see  to  what  extent  it  might 
be  possible  in  the  next  program  to  benefit  from 
the  experience  gained  during  the  first  disposal. 
These  discussions  were  essentially  exploratory, 
and  good  progress  was  made  toward  a  mutual 
understanding  of  problems  and  objectives. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  talks  the  United  States 
stated  it  plans  to  announce  the  details  of  the  pro- 
gram for  the  second  disposal  period  in  January 


•  Bulletin  of  Aug.  13,  1962,  p.  255. 
•For  a  Department  statement  on  the  U.S.  decision  on 
disposal  of  surplus  tin,  see  ihid.,  Sept.  10,  1962,  p.  386. 


1012 


and  indicated  the  Tin  Council  will  be  invited  tc 
comment  on  it  in  advance.  In  the  meantime,  the 
General  Services  Administration  will  continue  tc 
offer  tin  for  sale  in  the  same  quantities  as  during 
the  first  period. 


Extradition  Convention  Signed 
With  Israel 

Press  release  724  dated  December  10 

An  extradition  convention  was  signed  at  Wash- 
ington on  December  10  between  the  United  States 
and  Israel.  The  convention  was  signed  for  the 
United  States  by  Secretary  Eusk  and  for  Israel 
by  Ambassador  Avraham  Harman. 

The  convention,  negotiated  in  January  1962, 
contains  19  articles  and  generally  follows  the  pat- 
tern of  other  extradition  agreements  to  which  the 
United  States  is  a  party.  Article  2  contains  a 
list  of  crimes  for  which  the  two  countries  agree 
extradition  shall  be  granted.  Other  articles  spec 
ify  the  conditions  which  must  be  satisfied  and 
tlie  procedure  which  must  be  followed  to  obtain 
the  extradition  of  a  fugitive  from  justice. 

The  convention  will  come  uito  force  upon  the 
exchange  of  ratifications. 


Compensatory  Trade  Agreement 
Signed  With  United  Kingdom 

Press  release  723  dated  December  10 
DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT 

The  Department  of  State  annoimced  on  Decem- 
ber 10  the  sigiiing  in  Geneva  that  day  of  a  trade 
agreement  negotiated  with  the  United  Kingdom 
to  compensate  for  the  escape-clause  actions  taken 
by  the  United  States  to  increase  its  import  duties 
on  certain  carpets  and  glass  which  affected  con- 
cessions previously  granted  by  the  United  States 
on  these  products.  The  escape-clause  actions  on 
carpets  and  glass  became  effective  in  Jime  1962.^ 


m 


StH 


'  Proclamations  3454,  3455,  and  3458  (27  Fed.  Reg.  2789, 
2791,  and  3101). 


Department  of  State  BuUetin 


The  agi-eement  provides  for  reductions  of  20 
percent  in  U.S.  duties  on  17  items  (on  basis  of 
Schedule  A  classifications) .  U.S.  imports  from  all 
countries  of  the  products  covered  by  the  compen- 
satory concessions  amounted  to  $12.2  million  in 
1961,  of  which  the  United  Kingdom  supplied  $9.3 
Imillion. 

The  products  of  largest  trade  coverage  included 
in  the  trade  agreement  are :  certain  electric  motors 
over  i/io  horsepower  and  under  200  horsepower, 
certain  packaging  and  wrapping  machines  con- 


taining an  electrical  element,  mustard,  certain  flax 
threads  and  flax  yams,  lawn  tennis  balls,  oil- 
tanned  chamois  leather,  and  fancy  goat  and  kid 
leatlier. 

The  agreement  was  entered  into  within  the 
period  provided  for  in  section  257(c)  of  the  Trade 
Expansion  Act,  which  extends  until  December  31, 
1962,  the  period  for  concluding,  under  section  350 
of  the  Tariff  Act  of  1930,  trade  agreements  based 
on  public  notices  issued  in  connection  with  the 
1960-61  tariff  conference. 


*"'  SCHEDULE   OF  U.S.  CONCESSIONS 


196: 
epai 
U 
lins 
W 


Schedule  op  Compensatory  Concessions  to  United  Kingdom 


Tarifl 
paragraph 


fai 


itt 


207 

!22(b) 

!12 
i53 

!53 


W  )20 

nidi 


ik! 


itie 


j,8  1004(b)  (c) 
iOl  1502 


.004(a) 


1502 

1530(c) 
1530(d) 


Schedule  A 
No.  1957 


8350110 

5310170 
5310180 

5220200-5 
5220210-5 
5220220-5 

6081200 


7090360 


7100550 


1538000 
3200000 


3270100 
3270400 

3272400 

2045000 
9433300 
0335800 

0345250 


Description 


Sodium  alginate 

Clays,  common  blue  and  ball: 

TJnwrought  and  unmanufactured  .    .    .    . 
Wrought  and  manufactured 

Plate  glass  containing  a  wire  netting: 

Not  over  384  sq.  in 

Over  384  and  not  over  720  sq.  in  .    .    .    . 
Over  720  sq.  in 

Structural  iron  and  steel: 

Sashes  and  frames 

Electric  motors  (stationary,  railway,  vehicle, 
and  other,  n.e.s.): 
Over  Ko  h.p.  and  under  200  h.p     .    .    .    . 

Machines  and  other  articles  having  as  an 
essential  feature  an  electrical  element  or 
device,  n.e.s.: 

Machines  for  packaging  pipe  tobacco; 
machines  for  wrapping  cigarette  pack- 
ages; machines  for  wrapping  candy;  and 
combination  candy  cutting  and  candy 
wrapping  machines;  and  parts. 

Mustard,  ground  or  prepared 

Lace  window  curtains,  nets,  nettings,  pillow- 
shams,  bed  sets,  and  articles  and  fabrics, 
plain  or  Jacquard  figured,  made  of  vege- 
table fiber  on  the  Nottingham  lace-cur- 
tain machine. 

Single  yarns  of  flax,  flax  and  hemp  or  ramie, 
or  both: 

►     Not  finer  than  60  lea 

Threads,  twines,  and  cords: 

Flax,  less  than  Yie  inch  in  diameter  .  .  . 
Rubber  balls: 

Lawn  tennis 

Table  tennis  balls 

Chamois  leather,  oil-tanned 

Grained,  embossed,  etc.,  or  fancy  leather: 

Goat  and  kid 


Rate  of  duty 


July  1,  1958 


12/2%.     . 

85(i  ton    . 
$1.70  ton     , 

5(5  sq.  ft  .  . 
6.6(5  sq.  ft.  . 
7.65(i  sq.  ft . 


12K%. 


10/2%.    . 


10% 


4.25(ilb  . 
40%     .    . 


25%.    . 

30%.    . 

12K%  . 
20%.  . 
15%.    . 

12;^%  . 


Jan.  1,  1963 


11%.     .     . 

73(t  ton  . 
,$1.45  ton 

4M  sq.  ft 
5.9ji  sq.  ft 
6.8(5  sq.  ft 

11%.    .    . 


95^2% 


9% 


3.8(5  lb 
36%.    . 


22H%.  . 

27%.    .  . 

11%.    .  . 

18%.    .  . 

13}^%  .  . 

11%.    .  . 


December  31,   1962 


Final  stage 


10%.    .    . 

62(5  ton    . 
$1.21  ton  . 

H  sq.  ft  .  . 
5.25^  sq.  ft, 
6.1^  sq.  ft  . 

10%.    .    . 


8/2%. 


8% 


3.4(5  lb. 
32%.    . 


20% 


10%. 
16%. 
12%. 

10%. 


U.S. 
imports 

from 
U.K., 

1961 
($1,000) 


210 

207 

205 

313 

2,951 

337 


341 
218 


1,230 

295 

705 

154 

1,291 

787 


9,250 


1013 


THE  CONGRESS 


Foreign  Trade  and  the  Balance-of-Payments  Situation 


Statement  hy  Acting  Secretary  Ball  ^ 


This  subcommittee  has  requested  that  I  discuss 
with  you  this  morning  the  role  of  foreign  trade 
in  helping  to  improve  our  balance-of-payments 
situation.  You  have  also  requested  that  I  out- 
line the  State  Department's  plans  and  expecta- 
tions with  regard  to  the  new  Trade  Expansion 
Act.^  As  the  subcommittee  noted  in  its  request 
to  me,  the  President  has  just  appointed  Mr.  Chris- 
tian Herter  as  his  Special  Eepresentative  for 
Trade  Negotiations  under  the  new  act.^  Wlien  he 
has  assumed  office,  Mr.  Herter  will  be  able  to  pro- 
vide a  more  definitive  and  detailed  projection  of 
the  administration's  proposed  action  under  the 
act. 

This  subconmiittee  has  received  ample  and  ex- 
pert advice  on  our  balance-of-payments  problem. 
An  impressive  series  of  recent  studies  has  been 
prepared  for  the  committee  on  factors  affecting 
the  United  States  balance  of  payments.  You 
have  heard  the  testimony  of  other  officials  of  the 
administration.  I  am  sure  that  I  need  not  under- 
take to  review  the  history  of  the  Nation's  position 
in  world  trade. 

I  propose  also  to  take  it  as  given  that  the  United 
States  must  find  the  answer  to  its  balance-of- 
payments  problem  primarily  through  a  favorable 
trade  balance  in  goods  and  services.  We  cannot 
afford  any  significant  cutback  in  our  foreign  aid 
or  military  commitments.  We  are  entitled  to  look 
forward  to  an  increasing  participation  in  these 
commitments  by  the  other  industrialized  nations 


'  Made  before  the  Subcommittee  on  International  Ex- 
change and  Payments  of  the  Joint  Economic  Committee 
on  Dec.  13    (press  release  727). 

^  For  an  article  by  Leonard  Weiss  on  the  Trade  Ex- 
pansion Act  of  1962,  see  Bulletin  of  Dee.  3,  1962,  p.  847. 

3  Ihid.,  p.  846. 

1014 


of  the  West,  and  we  are  working  constantly  to 
ward   this  objective.     But  this  transition   take 
time,   and   our  balance-of-payments  problem 
immediate. 

History,  as  well  as  analysis,  demonstrates  that 
it  is  realistic  to  look  to  an  expanded  trade  surplus 
as  the  major  instrument  for  resolving  our  balance- 
of-payments  problem.  For  example,  when  we 
had  a  large  balance-of-payments  surplus,  in  the 
years  1946  to  1949,  our  surplus  of  exports  ran  at 
an  average  of  $6.9  billion  per  year;  when  we  had 
an  overall  deficit,  in  the  years  1950  to  1956,  our 
trade  surplus  averaged  only  $2.4  billion  per  year. 
In  the  Suez  crisis  year  of  1957,  when  we  last  en- 
joyed an  overall  surplus,  our  trade  surplus  was 
$6.1  billion. 

To  use  another  illustration,  in  the  years  1959 
to  1960,  when  our  trade  surplus  averaged  $3  bil- 
lion per  year,  our  balance-of-payments  deficit  av- 
eraged $3.7  billion  annually ;  but  when,  in  the  18 
months  of  1961  through  the  first  half  of  1962, 
our  trade  surplus  nearly  doubled  to  an  annual  av- 
erage of  $5.2  billion,  our  deficit  correspondingly 
was  nearly  cut  in  half  to  an  annual  rate  of  $2 
billion. 

Other  factors  may  intervene,  as  in  1960,  when 
our  trade  surplus  resumed  substantial  proportions 
while  our  payments  remained  in  deficit.  But  as 
a  generalization  we  may  sensibly  look  to  a  favor- 
able balance  of  trade  as  the  key  to  a  satisfactory 
balance  of  payments. 


Restricting  Imports 

It  is  obvious  that  a  favorable  balance  of  trade 
may  be  struck  either  by  reducing  imports  or  by 
raising  exports.  For  the  United  States  restric- 
tions on  imports  are  impractical  and  dangerous. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


I 


^ 


JK 


As  the  President  said  on  February  6,  1961,  in  his 
message  to  Congress  on  balance  of  payments  and 
gold :  ^ 

A  return  to  protectionism  is  not  a  solution.  Such  a 
course  would  provoke  retaliation ;  and  the  balance  of 
trade,  which  is  now  substantially  in  our  favor,  could  be 
turned  against  us  with  disastrous  effects  to  the  dollar. 

There  are  several  reasons  why  the  administra- 
tion has  made  its  firm  and  conscious  decision  not 
to  restrict  imports  in  an  effort  to  increase  our 
trade  surplus. 

In  the  first  place,  our  imj^orts  are  made  up 
to  a  great  extent  of  raw  materials  and  other  goods 
which  we  do  not  produce.  We  need  these  mate- 
rials and  it  makes  no  sense  to  exclude  them. 

In  the  second  place,  restrictions  on  imports  in- 
vite retaliatory  restrictions  with  respect  to  our 
own  exports.  Particularly  for  a  country  like  the 
United  States,  which  has  a  substantial  trade  sur- 
plus, the  cost  in  retaliation  would  certainly  be 
greater  than  any  saving  we  could  realize  by  re- 
stricting imports.  The  United  States  is  the 
largest  exporting  country  in  the  world — and  it  is 
exports  that  must  cover  our  payments  deficit. 

Third,  curtailment  of  purchases  by  us  from  oth- 
er friendly  countries  and  allies  can  have  serious 
repercussions  on  these  countries  and  thereby 
weaken  our  combined  strength  in  the  defense  of 
the  free  world. 

Fourth — and  this  point  is  seldom  given  the 
place  of  importance  it  deserves — the  United  States 
today  plays  a  leading  role  in  setting  the  direction 
of  the  free  world's  trade  policy.  If  the  United 
States  should  retreat  to  protectionism,  it  would 
have  instantaneous  effect  on  the  policies  of  the  rest 
of  the  world  trading  community.  Many  nations 
would  revert  to  the  self-defeating  particularism 
that  we  have  for  30  years  struggled  to  overcome. 
Tlie  United  States,  particularly  in  conjunction 
with  the  European  Economic  Community,  has  it 
within  its  power  to  lead  the  free  world  toward  a 
rational  and  open  competitive  international  econ- 
omy. "We  should  throw  this  opportunity  away  if 
we  were  to  embrace  the  false  solution  of  import 
restrictions. 

Finally,  imports  help  us  in  another  way.  Im- 
ports are  a  tonic  to  the  growth  of  our  own  econ- 
omy. One  may  adapt  Hippocrates  to  economics: 
Strength  grows  through  use;  disuse  produces 
weakness.    This  has  been  clearly  demonstrated  by 


*  JMd.,  Feb.  27,  1961,  p.  287. 
December  31,  1962 


the  experience  of  the  European  Common  Market. 
As  Walter  Hallstein,  President  of  the  European 
Economic  Commission,  remarked  last  week: 

Sharper  competition  is  the  natural  consequence  for  aU 
concerned  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  I  am,  however, 
inclined  to  regard  this  too  as  an  asset.  From  more  than 
four  years'  experience  with  the  Common  Market,  we  have 
learned  that  brisker  and  keener  competition  brings  advan- 
tages— not  disadvantages — for  everybody.  We  all  become 
stronger  as  we  vie  with  each  other.  For  instance,  two 
states  as  highly  developed  as  Germany  and  France  have 
given  up  50%  of  their  tariff  protection  in  a  relatively  short 
while,  and  at  the  same  time  the  economies  of  these  two 
states  have  been  striding  forward  at  an  almost  unprece- 
dented pace. 

Clearly  the  solution  to  our  balance-of-payments 
problem  does  not  lie  in  the  restriction  of  imports. 

I  do  not  mean  to  say  in  a  doctrinaire  manner 
that  there  can  never  be  situations  in  which  it  may 
be  necessary  to  adopt  measures  that  liave  an  effect 
upon  the  flow  of  imports.  For  example,  in  a  spe- 
cial situation  of  customs  exemption  the  Congress 
recently  lowered  from  $500  to  $100  the  amount 
of  duty-free  goods  which  American  tourists  may 
bring  home  with  them.  In  order  to  reduce  sov- 
ernmental  expenditures  abroad,  the  Department 
of  Defense  has  been  adjusting  its  programs  to 
shift  purchases  from  foreign  to  U.S.  sources. 
This  diversion  of  purchases  to  the  United  States 
suppliers  avoids  a  further  increase  in  foreign-held 
liquid  liabilities,  but  it  does  so  at  the  expense  of 
an  increase  in  the  budgetary  cost  of  our  economic 
assistance  and  defense  programs.  In  certain  high- 
ly specialized  situations,  where  a  serious  market 
disruption  threatens,  as  in  the  case  of  cotton  tex- 
tiles, it  has  proved  possible  to  achieve  international 
agreement  based  upon  a  degree  of  voluntary  ex- 
port restraints.  And  in  a  handful  of  instances  it 
has  been  found  necessary  for  reasons  of  national 
security  to  impose  import  restrictions. 

With  these  limited  and  special  exceptions,  how- 
ever, the  administration  has  held  firmly  to  its  con- 
viction that  the  solution  to  our  balance-of-pay- 
ments problem  cannot  be  found  in  restricting  im- 
ports. We  must  look  to  the  export  side  of  the 
equation  for  our  answer. 

Competitive  Ability 

The  fear  is  sometimes  expressed  that  our  bal- 
ance-of-payments problems  are  primarily  due  to 
a  long-range  deterioration  in  our  competitive  posi- 
tion on  world  markets.    I  disagree  with  this  de- 

1015 


featism.  Our  ability  to  compete  cannot  be  quan- 
titatively measured  with  any  precision  merely  by 
the  analysis  of  relative  costs  of  production.  Over 
the  years  we  have  a  creditable  record  in  world 
competition  in  spite  of  trade  barriers,  and  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  large  segments  of  American  in- 
dustry have  found  ample  outlets  in  American  mar- 
kets and  have  thus  made  no  greait  effort  to  develop 
their  export,  potential.  We  are  the  world's  larg- 
est exporter  and  have  been  for  many  years.  Our 
balance  of  trade  has  consistently  been  favorable. 
As  a  share  of  total  world  trade  our  exports  (exclu- 
sive of  transfers  under  military  grants)  have  been 
substantially  constant  since  1953. 

If  we  were  losing  competitive  strength  one 
would  expect  to  find  some  evidence  of  it  on  the 
import  side,  but  no  such  evidence  exists.  Since 
1959  our  imports  have  been  relatively  constant  in 
comparison  to  domestic  sales  of  commodities  and 
have  declined  in  comparison  to  our  gross  national 
product. 

As  a  further  test  of  our  ability  to  compete,  con- 
sider our  trade  wdth  Japan  and  with  Western  Eu- 
rope. We  continue  to  export  more  to  Japan  than 
we  import  from  her.  As  for  Western  Europe, 
while  both  imports  and  exports  have  increased 
substantially  in  recent  years  our  exports  have  in- 
creased faster  than  our  imports.  These  data 
hardly  indicate  a  wilting  or  decadent  United 
States  economy  unable  to  withstand  the  fresh 
breezes  of  international  competition. 

Those  of  little  faith  in  our  ability  to  increase 
exports  seem  also  to  misassess  the  soaring  world 
demand  for  the  products  that  the  American  econ- 
omy produces  best.  This  demand  is  expanding  so 
rapidly  that  there  should  be  plenty  of  room  for  all 
producers  to  grow.  Eising  demand  is  a  phenom- 
enon known  throughout  the  world.  It  is  most 
dramatic  in  the  European  Common  Market  and 
Japan. 

The  six  member  nations  of  the  Common  Mar- 
ket 5  (the  European  Economic  Conmiunity)  now 
have  a  population  aggregating  170  million.  If 
the  United  Kingdom  becomes  a  member,  the  total 
population  will  approach  250  million.  The  total 
gross  product  of  the  present  six  member  nations 
of  the  Community  is  expected  to  rise  from  its  pres- 
ent level  of  $181  billion  to  $288  billion  by  1970— 
an  increase  of  almost  60  percent.    On  the  basis  of 


"Belgium,  France,   the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Italy,  Luxembourg,  and  the  Netherlands. 

1016 


past  experience,  a  60-percent  increase  in  gross  na- 
tional product  will  bring  with  it  a  comparable 
increase  in  demand  for  imports — and  the  United 
States  is  the  largest  supplier. 

Europe  is  presently  at  a  far  earlier  stage  o; 
consumption  than  the  United  States.  For  every 
1,000  inhabitants  in  the  United  States,  there  are; 
340  automobiles;  in  the  Common  Market  there] 
are  78.  In  the  United  States  there  are  1,030  radio] 
sets  for  every  1,000  inhabitants  and  315  televisionj 
sets;  the  corresponding  figures  in  the  Commoi 
Market  are  244  and  60.  Every  indication  is  thai 
the  population  in  the  Common  Market  countriei 
is  on  the  road  toward  the  kind  of  consumer  ex- 
pansion  experienced  in  the  United  States  in  thi 
last  40  years.  If  American  industry  and  agricul- 
ture are  not  excluded  by  artificial  barriers,  ou; 
opportimities  in  this  market  should  be  enormous, 
Not  only  does  the  European  market  offer  a  vast 
potential  for  growth,  but  it  is  the  kind  of  market 
best  suited  for  American  products.  European  in- 
dustrialists have  been  accustomed  to  selling  their 
products  in  small,  narrow,  national  markets. 
They  have  built  their  industrial  plants  with  that 
in  mind.  We  alone  in  the  free  world  have  fully 
developed  the  teclmiques  of  mass  production,  for 
we  alone  have  had  a  great  mass  market  open  to  us. 
If  American  industry  has  the  will  and  energy,  and 
if  access  to  the  Common  INIarket  can  be  assured  to 
it  through  the  tools  provided  by  the  Trade  Expan- 
sion Act,  it  should  find  in  Europe  new  trading 
opportunities  of  a  kind  not  dreamed  of  a  few 
years  ago. 

Of  course  the  development  of  the  European  mar- 
ket for  American  products  will  not  be  easy.  It 
will  make  heavy  demands  on  our  imagination  and 
ingenuity.  It  will  require  a  considerable  effort  of 
merchandising  of  a  kind  few  American  firms  have 
ever  attempted  in  Europe,  because  in  the  past  the 
potential  of  limited  national  markets  has  never 
seemed  to  justify  the  trouble.  It  will  require  us 
to  do  much  more  than  merely  ship  abroad  tlie  sur- 
plus runs  of  the  goods  we  produce  for  Americans. 
It  will  mean  much  greater  attention  to  the  tailor- 
ing of  products  designed  expressly  for  European 
tastes  or  European  conditions. 

Yet  I  see  no  reason  why  American  industry 
should  not  display  the  vitality  and  creativeness 
that  have  stamped  its  performance  in  the  past. 
Industrial  research  in  the  United  States  continues 
at  a  level  many  times  higher  than  that  of  Europe. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


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Each  year  American  industry  creates  new  prod- 
ucts and  processes  responding  to  the  high  living 
standards  of  our  people  and  creating  the  improved 
production  techniques  that  will  push  those  living 
standards  higher  still. 

Our  machinery  industries,  generating  a  continu- 
|ous  stream  of  new  inventions  for  export  to  the 
world,  are  the  acknowledged  leaders  of  mass  pro- 
duction systems.  Our  synthetic  cliemical  prod- 
ucts continue  to  pro^nde  most  of  tlie  major  ad- 
vances in  tlie  world's  new  synthetic  products — so 
much  so  that  half  or  more  of  the  sales  of  some  of 
our  leading  producers  consists  of  items  that  did 
not  exist  10  years  ago. 

Finally  I  sliould  like  to  take  special  note  of  the 
fact  that  exports  are  made  up  not  only  of  tangible 
goods  but  also  of  services  of  every  kind.  One  of 
the  most  important  developments  in  the  20tli-ceTi- 
tury  economy  of  the  United  States  is  the  sliif  t  from 
blue-collar  work  to  white-collar  work,  from  the 
production  of  tangible  goods  to  tlie  generation  of 
services.  Here  again,  in  this  aspect  of  tlie  modern 
industrial  society,  the  United  States  is  in  a  position 
of  clear  leadership.  This  leadership  shows  itself 
in  the  export  of  services  such  as  engineering,  ad- 
vertising, management,  communications,  and  or- 
ganizational skills.  As  Europe  moves  increasingly 
from  a  Ballvanized  economy  to  a  mass  economy,  it 
will  inevitably  call  more  and  more  upon  the  skills 
and  services  which  tlie  economy  of  the  United 
States  has  had  to  develop  to  cope  with  similar  cir- 
cumstances. We  may  safely  predict  that  remit- 
tances for  these  exported  services,  already  sub- 
stantial, will  continue  to  rise. 

We  are  a  creative  nation.  There  is  every  reason 
to  suppose  that  we  shall  remain  so.  We  respond 
with  vigor  when  the  challenge  is  great  enough. 
That  we  can  turn  our  creative  genius  to  use  in 
this  new  and  promising  mass  market  of  Eurojje 
and  an  awakening  world  I  have  no  doubt. 

Agriculture 

Agricultural  products  play  a  vital  part  in 
United  States  exports.  The  subject  of  interna- 
tional trade  in  agricultural  products  is,  as  this 
committee  knows  well,  exceedingly  complex,  and 
I  will  not  seek  to  exjilore  it  today.  I  should  like 
to  make  a  note  or  two  on  this  topic  however. 

It  is  obviously  of  great  importance  to  our  bal- 
ance of  payments — as  well  as  to  the  economic  well- 
being  of  an  important  segment  of  our  economy — 


that  we  maintain  and  develop  more  agricultural 
markets  in  Europe.  It  would  be  higlily  unfortu- 
nate if  the  member  nations  of  the  European  Eco- 
nomic Community  were  to  replace  their  compli- 
cated national  systems  of  agricultural  protection 
by  a  common  agi-icultural  policy  that  was  equally 
or  more  restrictive.  This  has  been  the  subject  of 
numerous  discussions,  representations,  and  con- 
sultations with  European  governments.  Recently 
Secretai-y  [of  Agriculture  Orville  L.]  Freeman 
made  the  United  States  position  emphatically 
clear  in  Europe.^  And  I  also  made  known  our 
profound  concern  with  regard  to  this  question 
during  the  proceedings  of  the  OECD  ministerial 
meeting  in  Paris  last  week.^ 

I  think  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  about 
two-thirds  of  our  agriculture  exports  to  the  Euro- 
pean Common  Market  consists  of  commodities 
that  are  not  domestically  produced  in  the  mem- 
ber nations.  These  exports  are,  therefore,  unlike- 
ly to  be  seriously  affected  by  trade  restrictions 
under  the  common  agricultural  policy.  Some  of 
our  biggest  export  categories,  such  as  cotton  and 
soybeans,  and  probably  even  tobacco,  will  quite 
probably  share  in  tlie  expanded  market  of  the 
growing  European  economy.  It  is  only  with  the 
remaining  one-third  that  difficulties  may  arise. 
This  remaining  one-third  consists  largely  of 
grains — both  wheat  and  feed  grains — while  an- 
other significant  item  is  poultry. 

Unquestionably  over  a  period  of  time  we  can 
expect  to  see  sliifts  in  the  emphasis  of  our  agri- 
cultural exports  to  Europe.  As  the  standard  of 
living  rises  in  the  Common  Market,  consumer  de- 
mand is  likely  to  shift  toward  a  greater  consump- 
tion of  proteins,  which  will  be  reflected  in  a  ten- 
dency for  our  wheat  exports  to  drop  off  while  our 
feed  grain  exports  increase.  This  tendency  has 
already  been  noted. 

As  the  committee  is  aware,  the  common  agri- 
cultural policy,  as  it  is  being  developed  by  the 
Community,  will  employ  target  prices,  interven- 
tion prices,  and — tlirough  tlie  use  of  variable  lev- 
ies— gate  prices.  Tliis  repertory  of  controls  is 
intrinsically  neither  liberal  nor  protectionist.  The 
test  will  be  how  they  are  applied. 

"  For  text  of  a  joint  statement  issued  at  Paris  on  Nov.  20 
by  the  Ministers  of  Agriculture  of  the  member  countries 
of  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  De- 
velopment, see  BuxLETiN  of  Dec.  17,  1962,  p.  942. 

'Ibid.,  Dec.  24,  19C2,  i>.  979. 


December  31,   1962 


1017 


The  crucial  test,  in  lact,  will  come  when  the 
Community  fixes  the  common  price  for  grain.  It 
will  take  its  first  decisions  on  this  subject  next 
spring. 

Obviously  it  is  of  great  importance  to  the 
United  States  that  the  Community  adopt  a  sys- 
tem of  low  grain  prices.  We  are  giving  serious 
consideration  to  the  possibility  that,  rather  than 
approaching  the  whole  question  of  international 
trade  in  grains  through  bilateral  negotiations, 
global  arrangements  may  be  preferable.  Nego- 
tiation on  these  and  many  other  aspects  of  agri- 
cultural policy  will  be  continuously  underway 
throughout  the  next  year  or  two. 

Program 

Administration  of  the  Nation's  trade  policy  is 
now  centered  in  the  President's  Special  Repre- 
sentative for  Trade  Negotiations.  From  the  be- 
ginning the  Department  of  State  has  enthusi- 
astically supported  this  administrative  change 
made  by  the  Trade  Expansion  Act.  Trade  mat- 
ters cut  across  the  concerns  of  many  departments 
of  the  Government,  and  the  special  concerns  of  all 
should  be  given  proper  weight. 

The  administration's  trade  program  will  take 
form  under  the  guidance  of  Mr.  Herter.  A  broad 
time  schedule  can  however  begin  to  be  discerned 
at  this  time. 

The  calendar  year  1963  will  have  to  be  devoted 
in  large  measure  to  preliminary  negotiations  look- 
ing forward  to  fonnal  negotiations  in  1964.  A 
special  working  committee  of  the  GATT  [General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  is  already  turn- 
ing its  attention  to  the  1964  round.  Within  the 
United  States  1963  will  be  the  year  for  the  pre- 
liminary procedures  required  under  the  Trade 
Expansion  Act  prior  to  any  tariff  negotiation. 
Work  on  these  preliminary  steps  is  underway. 
Continuous  negotiations  will  proceed  with  the 
European  Economic  Community,  particularly  as 
the  outlines  of  the  Common  Market's  commei'cial 
policy  begin  to  assume  form  and  as  the  position  of 
the  United  Kingdom  and  other  countries  vis-a-vis 
the  Common  Market  gradually  crystallizes. 


The  years  1963  and  1964  will  be  a  time  when  the 
world's  whole  underlying  economic  structure  is 
being  redesigned  and  rearranged.  With  the 
Trade  Expansion  Act  in  hand,  the  United  States 
should  be  equipped  to  play  a  central  role. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

87th  Congress,  2d  Session 

Particleboard.  Hearing  before  the  Senate  Finance  Com- 
mittee on  H.  K.  12242,  an  act  to  provide  for  tlie  tariff 
classification  of  certain  particleboard.  October  3,  1962. 
20  pp. 

Design  Costs  of  Unbuilt  Vessels  and  Suspension  of  Tariff 
Schedules.  Hearings  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Mer- 
chant Marine  of  the  House  Merchant  Marine  and  Fish- 
eries Committee  on  H.R.  10181,  identical  and  similar 
bills,  to  relieve  ship  operators  of  part  of  the  cost  of 
designing  vessels  as  required  under  operating  differ- 
ential subsidy  agreements,  and  S.  804,  to  amend  the  act 
of  March  3,  1933  (47  Stat.  1426),  relating  to  the  length 
of  time  by  which  the  Federal  Maritime  Board  may 
suspend  tariff  schedules.     June  12-26,  1962.     66  pp. 

Fair  Trade.  Hearings  before  a  special  subcommittee  of 
the  Senate  Commerce  Committee  on  S.  1722,  a  bill  to 
amend  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  Act,  as  amended, 
so  as  to  protect  and  equalize  rights  in  the  distribution 
of  merchandise  identified  by  a  trademark,  brand,  or 
trade   name.     July   25-August   28,    1961.     165   pp. 

Report  on  the  Inter-American  Highway  and  Rama  Road. 
Hearing  before  the  House  Public  Worlcs  Committee  on 
H.R.  11973,  to  authorize  the  appropriation  of  adequate 
funds  to  provide  the  completion  of  the  construction  of 
the  Inter-.\merican  Highway,  and  for  other  purposes. 
August  30,  1962.     31  pp. 

Mobile  Trade  Fairs.  Hearing  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Merchant  Marine  of  the  House  Merchant  Marine  and 
Fisheries  Committee  on  H.R.  12533,  to  amend  the  Mer- 
chant Marine  Act,  19.36,  to  develop  the  American  mer- 
chant marine  and  promote  the  foreign  commerce  of  the 
United  States  through  the  use  of  mobile  trade  fairs, 
and  S.  3389,  to  promote  the  foreign  commerce  of  the 
United  States  through  the  use  of  mobile  trade  fairs. 
August  30,  1962.     90  pp. 

Agency  for  International  Development  Contract  Opera- 
tions (Ofiice  of  Research,  Evaluation  and  Planning 
Assistance  Staff).  Hearings  before  a  subcommittee  of 
the  House  Government  Operations  Committee.  Part  2. 
September  10-11,  1962.     204  pp. 

Testimony  of  a  Defector  From  Communist  China.  Hear- 
ing before  the  Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Admin- 
istration of  the  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other 
Internal  Security  Laws  of  the  Senate  Judiciary  Com- 
mittee.    November  29,  1962.     16  pp. 


V: 


1018 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


J.S.  Presents  Working  Paper  on  Measures  To  Reduce  Risk  of  War 


Following  is  the  text  of  a  working  paper  f  re- 
lented hy  U.S.  Representative  Arthur  H.  Dean 
IS^^  Geneva  on  December  12  hefore  the  Conference 
/  the  Eighteen-N ation  Committee  on  Disarma- 
Tient. 


CTnited  States  Working  Paper  on  Eeduction  of 
THE  Risk  of  War  Through  Accident,  Miscal- 

CXTLATION,  OR  FAILURE  OF  COMMUNICATION 


The  Problem 

The  technolooy  and  techniques  of  modem  war- 
fare are  such  that  much  reliance  is  inevitably 
laced  on  the  ability  to  respond  rapidly  and  ef- 
fectively to  hostile  military  action.  Events  which 
nay  occur  in  connection  with  the  efforts  of  one 
state  to  maintain  its  readiness  to  respond  to  such 
action  may,  in  varying  degrees  and  with  varying 
consequences,  be  misconstrued  by  another.  The 
initiating  state  may  have  underestimated  the 
ambiguity  of  such  events  and  may  have  miscal- 
culated the  response  they  would  call  forth.  The 
observing  state  may  misinterpret  them  and  feel 
compelled  to  act. 

Non-belligerent  steps  of  a  precautionary 
character  taken  by  one  state  may  be  viewed  by 
another  as  being  provocative  at  best  and,  at  worst, 
as  presaging  or  constituting  the  initiation  of 
hostilities.  Accidents  can  occur  and  may  be  con- 
sidered deliberate  acts.  Unauthorized  acts  may 
appear  to  reveal  hostile  purpose,  and  fault  may 
be  incorrectly  assigned. 

Particularly  where  such  actions  and  events  may 
occur  against  the  background  of  an  already  exist- 
ing crisis  in  the  relations  of  the  states  concerned, 
erroneous  assessments  may  dictate  a  rapid  and 
disproportionate  response.  As  a  consequence, 
sudden  and  unexplained  changes  in  the  military 

December  31,   1962 


situation  may  increase  the  risk  of  the  outbreak 
of  war. 

The  United  States  has  been  keenly  aware  of 
this  problem  and  has  taken  positive  measures  to 
reduce  the  risk  of  the  outbreak  of  war  in  so  far 
as  its  own  armaments  and  armed  forces  are  con- 
cerned. On  a  continuing  basis,  the  United  States 
seeks  to  accomplish  such  objectives  as  the 
following : 

1.  To  incorporate  special  safety  features  into 
the  design  of  weapons  in  order  to  preclude  an 
accidental  nuclear  explosion. 

2.  To  develop  types  of  weapons  systems  and  to 
design  techniques  for  their  employment  calcu- 
lated to  increase  tlie  feasibility  of  deferring  a 
military  response  until  confirmatory  evidence  has 
been  received  and  evaluated. 

3.  To  exercise  effective  command  and  control 
over  the  choice  of  military  response  and  to  main- 
tain procedures  and  arrangements  for  limiting 
any  possibility  of  unauthorized  use  of  weapons. 

The  United  States  regards  its  approach  to 
these  matters  as  a  useful  contribution  to  reduc- 
tion of  the  risk  of  the  outbreak  of  war.  How- 
ever, the  United  States  recognizes  that  there  are 
limits  to  the  effectiveness  of  measui-es  which  any 
state  may  undertake  alone.  In  any  case,  the  prob- 
lem, which  exists  in  respect  of  non-nuclear  as  well 
as  nuclear  armaments,  is  of  concern  to  many 
states.  It  will  continue  to  exist  as  long  as  arma- 
ments and  armed  forces,  whether  nuclear  or  con- 
ventional, remain  at  the  disposal  of  states 
separated  by  immediate  differences  or  historical 
grievances. 

These  considerations  offer  compelling  reasons 
for  seeking  to  curtail  the  arms  race  and  to  achieve 
disarmament  in  a  peaceful  world.  They  also  caU 
attention  to  the  need  for  reaching  agreement  on 

1019 


the  early  implementation  of  limited  measures  de- 
signed to  reduce  the  risk  of  the  outbreak  of  war 
through  accident,  miscalculation,  or  failure  of 
communication. 

General  Considerations 

The  "Outline  of  Basic  Pi'ovisions  of  a  Treaty 
on  General  and  Complete  Disannament  in  a  Peace- 
ful World",  presented  by  the  United  States  to  the 
Eighteen-Nation  Conmiittee  on  Disannament, 
April  18,  1962,^  proposes  measures  concerning 
advance  notification  of  major  military  movements 
and  maneuvers,  conduct  of  confinnatoiy  and  sup- 
plementary obsei-vations,  improvement  of  means 
of  continuing  consultation  on  military  matters  and 
of  communication  in  time  of  military  emergencies, 
and  establislunent  of  aiTangements  for  examina- 
tion of  possible  additional  steps.  The  common 
purpose  of  such  measures  is  to  reduce  the  risk  of 
the  outbreak  of  war  through  accident,  miscalcula- 
tion, or  failure  of  communication.  Depending  on 
their  exact  character,  these  measures  could  lessen 
the  hazard  that  sudden  changes  in  the  military 
situation  might  inadvertently  be  misconstrued  as 
representing  the  moimting  of  an  attack. 

In  the  context  of  a  disarmament  program,  these 
measures  would  contribute  importantly  to  the 
building  of  confidence  and  also  to  prevention  of 
possible  disruption  of  the  disarmament  process. 
They  can  also  be  placed  in  operation  prior  to  the 
implementation  of  a  disarmament  program  and 
might  help  bring  about  conditions  under  which 
such  a  program  might  more  readily  be  achieved. 

There  may,  of  course,  be  differences  in  the  char- 
acter of  measures  suitable  in  the  context  of  a  dis- 
armament program  and  the  character  of  those 
which  might  be  acceptable  in  advance  of  such  a 
program ;  that  is  to  say,  certain  measures  might  be 
undertaken  on  a  more  extensive  scale  during  dis- 
armament than  prior  to  its  initiation.  However, 
although  most  of  the  measures  must  be  regarded  as 
experimental  in  character  and  too  much  should  not 
be  asked  of  those  measures  which  may  be  con- 
sidered approi^riate  for  early  implementation, 
they  can  effect  useful  and  significant  advances  in 
the  capabilities  of  states  to  provide  mutual 
I'eassurance. 

The  measures  proposed  by  the  United  States 
can  be  undertaken  cither  as  a  group,  in  which  case 
each  would  serve  to  reinforce  the  effectiveness  of 


the  others,  or  specific  measures  can  be  undertaken 
separately.  A  beginning  can  be  made  with  as 
much  or  as  little  as  may  be  agreed  at  any  particu- 
lar time,  and  as  experience  is  gained  through  co- 
operative implementation  of  early  agreements,  the 
initial  measures  can  be  modified  or  expanded,  and; 
new  measures  can  be  added. 

Taken  as  a  whole  or  considered  separately,  thei 
measures  suggested  by  the  United  States  can  havei 
wide  applicability  to  the  relations  of  a  nmnber  of' 
states  or  groups  of  states  in  different  geographic 
areas.  Some  measures  can  be  imdertaken  directly 
between  the  states  concerned;  depending  on  the- 
circmustances,  others  might  be  more  effective  if'l 
undertaken  by  groups  of  states.  It  follows  that 
details  of  procedures  and  arrangements  to  imple- 
ment the  measures  can  best  be  developed  in  specific 
cases  by  the  states  or  groups  of  states  involved  ini 
order  to  ensure  that  the  measures  will  be  designedl' 
to  meet  their  special  needs. 

In  outlining  the  general  character  of  these 
measures  in  the  sections  below,  the  United  States 
hopes  not  only  that  the  measures  will  commend 
themselves  to  states  represented  in  the  Eighteen- 
Nation  Committee  on  Disarmament  but  also  that 
other  states  will  recognize  their  desirability.  For 
its  own  part,  the  United  States  is  prepared  to 
work  out  the  details  of  these  measures  with  other 
states  which  may  be  interested,  including  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  where  particular  measures 
might  be  most  effective  if  undertaken  by  groups 
of  states,  the  United  States  is  prepared  to  consult 
with  other  members  of  the  groups  in  which  it  par- 
ticipates, such  as  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Orga- 
nization, and  to  join  them  in  working  out 
mutually  agreeable  arrangements. 


» 
ill 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  May  7,  1962,  p.  747. 
1020 


Advance  Notification 

Purpose.  Advance  notification  of  major  mili- 
tary movements  and  maneuvers  could  provide 
additional  opportunity  for  calm  appraisal  of 
military  activities  which  might  give  rise  to  mis- 
interpretation as  threatening  the  imminent  out- 
break of  hostilities.  The  ultimate  character  of  ^ 
such  an  appraisal  would,  of  course,  depend  oni 
many  considerations  in  addition  to  the  fact  that 
advance  notification  had  been  provided.  How- 
ever, the  establishment  and  use  of  procedures  for 
advance  notification  could  assist  in  reducing  any 
hazard  that  detection  of  an  unannounced  activity 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


of  seemingly  major  proportions  might  induce  a 
rapid  and  disproportionate  military  response. 

A  certain  amount  of  information  is  currently 
made  available  by  a  number  of  states.  In  some 
instances,  such  information  is  necessary  to  ensure 
the  safety  of  non-militaiy  activities  being  pur- 
sued in  the  vicinity.  Moreover,  for  its  own  part-, 
the  United  States  frequently  provides  advance 
notification  specifically  in  order  to  preclude  any 
possibility  of  misinterpretation.  As  a  general 
matter,  however,  the  current  practices  of  states 
vary  widely  as  to  content,  timing,  and  procedure, 
and  there  arises  the  question  of  whether  such 
practices  can  be  expanded,  regularized,  and  more 
fully  utilized.  The  suggestions  of  the  United 
l"iStates  in  this  regard  are  outlined  below. 

Content  and  timing.  Criteria  for  determining 
rwhat  military  activities  might  be  of  concern  are, 
in  many  respects,  subjective  and  dependent  on  the 
general  situation  in  which  a  particular  activity 
may  occur,  the  states  or  geographic  areas  in- 
volved, and  the  level  of  tension  at  the  time. 
Accordingly,  it  may  be  difficult  to  specify  pre- 
cisely all  activities  respecting  which  advance  noti- 
fication might  be  most  useful  on  a  continuing 
basis,  and  in  a  number  of  instances  substantial 
reliance  may  of  necessity  have  to  be  placed  on  the 
j|j  judgment  of  the  state  initiating  an  activity. 

However,  if  advance  notification  procedures  are 
to  be  effective,  the  states  or  groups  of  states  con- 
Hjljcemed  would  wish  to  know  with  reasonable  cer- 
tainty what  information  could  be  expected  on  a 
continuing  basis,  and,  of  equal  importance,  what 
types  of  activities  would  not  be  regularly  re- 
ported. The  following  types  of  activities  might 
usefully  be  explored  from  the  standjjoint  of  their 
inclusion  in  advance  notification  procedures: 

1.  Movements  and  maneuvers  by  ground  forces 
of  considerable  strength  where  such  activities  may 
be  conducted  in  the  proximity  of  frontiers. 

2.  Significant  movements  and  maneuvers  of 
naval  surface  forces  of  substantial  size. 

3.  Coordinated  flights  of  sizable  numbers  of 
military  aircraft  where  such  fliglits  may  deviate 
from  routine  or  well-known  patterns  or  where 
they  may  take  place  in  the  vicinity  of  frontiers. 

4.  Launchings  of  long-range  ballistic  missiles 
jfdjj  where  an  unusual  number  of  such  launchings  may 

be  scheduled  to  occur  within  a  limited  period  of 
intjitime. 


(It! 


m 


A 


miJ 


The  foregoing  list,  which  could  be  more  clearly 
defined  in  an  agreed  manner,  is  intended  to  sug- 
gest tlie  principal  types  of  activities  which  might 
be  of  some  concern  and  in  respect  of  wliich  it 
might  be  feasible  to  establish  routine  advance  no- 
tification procedures.  However,  states  should  be 
free  to  provide  advance  notification  in  any  addi- 
tional instances  deemed  by  them  to  warrant  use 
of  such  procedures  as  might  be  established. 

Although  the  exact  amount  of  detail  provided 
might  vaiy,  such  matters  as  the  following  could 
reasonably  be  expected  to  be  covered :  the  type  of 
activity;  the  approximate  size  of  the  units  in- 
volved; the  beginning  and  terminal  dates  of  the 
activity  or  the  period  during  which  it  was  sched- 
uled to  occur;  and  the  locations,  areas,  or  direc- 
tion of  movement  involved. 

Such  information  should  be  provided  on  a  time- 
ly basis.  As  a  general  matter,  notice  might  be 
provided  as  schedules  become  reasonably  firm, 
with,  say,  seven  days'  notice  being  given  where 
practical  in  the  case  of  major  activities.  Notice 
of  clianges  in  initial  schedules  shoidd  be  reported 
as  promptly  as  possible. 

Procedures.  To  ensure  authenticity,  and  to 
avoid  the  lack  of  precision  which  might  result 
from  voice  transmission  of  information,  notifica- 
tion could  appropriately  be  made  in  the  form  of 
an  official  written  communication  issued  by  the 
state  or  group  of  states  initiating  the  activity. 
Such  procedures  as  the  following  might  be 
considei-ed : 

1.  Under  a  bilateral  arrangement,  a  state  ini- 
tiating an  activity  could  provide  advance  notifi- 
cation directly  to  tlie  other  state  concerned. 
Specific  channels  could  be  designated  for  this  pur- 
pose in  order  to  ensure  that  notifications  would 
promptly  reach  those  officials  having  an  interest 
in  them. 

2.  "Wliere  groups  of  states  were  concerned,  simi- 
lar procedures  could  be  designed.  A  question 
would  arise  as  to  wliether  notice  would  be  given 
by  the  military  headquarters  of  one  group  to  that 
of  the  other,  which  would  then  re-transmit  the  in- 
formation to  its  member  states,  or  whether  pro- 
cedures should  be  such  that  both  the  military 
headquarters  of  a  group  of  states  and  the  military 
headquarters  of  member  states  would  receive  the 
information  simultaneously. 

3.  A  "clearinghouse",  established  jointly  by  the 
states  or  groups  of  states  entering  into  a  particu- 
lar arrangement,  might  receive  and  disseminate 


\December  31,    7962 


1021 


information  made  available  by  participants. 
Since  timeliness  would  be  a  key  consideration,  the 
most  direct  procedures  would  seem  best  suited 
for  the  purposes  of  advance  notification.  How- 
ever, the  concept  of  a  "clearinghouse"  might  be 
examined  as  a  possible  supplement  to,  rather  than 
a  replacement  for,  direct  procedures. 

Observation  Posts 

Purpose.  Advance  notification  constitutes  a 
potentially  useful  measure  whether  undertaken 
separately  or  in  conjimction  with  other  measures. 
A  closely  related  measure  would,  in  effect,  repre- 
sent an  extension  of  the  advance  notification  con- 
cept through  the  establishment  of  systems  of 
ground  observation  posts  at  major  transportation 
centers.  The  posts  comprising  such  systems  could 
receive  such  information  relative  to  militai-y  activ- 
ities in  their  vicinity  as  the  host  state  might  wish 
to  provide  and  could,  under  agreed  arrangements, 
observe  the  flow  of  military  traffic  and  the  genei'al 
level  of  military  activity  on  a  local  basis,  thereby 
clarifying  reports  made  pursuant  to  advance  noti- 
fication procedures. 

Not  only  the  capability  of  supplementing  ad- 
vance notification  through  direct  observation  but 
also  the  willingness  of  host  states  to  cooperate  in 
the  establishment  and  operation  of  observation 
post  systems  could  contribute  further  to  the  build- 
ing of  confidence  and  the  improvement  of  reassur- 
ance in  the  relations  of  the  states  or  groups  of 
states  concerned. 

Elem,ents  of  systems.  It  would  be  impractical 
(as  well  as  unnecessary  from  the  standpoint  of 
providing  general  reassurance)  to  attempt  to  es- 
tablish obsei-vation  posts  at  all  transportation 
centers.  It  would  be  sufficient  to  place  posts  at 
such  locations  as  certain  principal  ports,  major 
railroad  junctions,  intersections  of  key  highways, 
and  possibly  at  certain  significant  airfields. 

The  complement  of  posts  might  vary  as  the  re- 
sult of  differing  conditions  in  the  locations  of  in- 
terest, but  relatively  limited  complements  should 
be  adequate.  Members  of  post  complements  would 
enjoy  such  privileges  and  immunities  and  would 
have  such  travel  rights  as  might  be  agreed. 

Each  post  would  be  responsible  for  observing 
military  movements  within  an  agreed  surroimding 
area.  Over-all  value  of  the  posts  would  be  en- 
hanced if,  on  the  occasion  of  military  movements 


1022 


through  nearby  areas,  host  states  would,  at  theii  jitii 
discretion,  afford  opportunities  for  observation  atj  jfts 
the  point  nearest  the  post-city.  Similarly,  itj 
might  be  useful  to  be  able  to  conduct  occasional! 
visits  to  transportation  centers  where  no  posts)  ntioi 
were  pennanently  located.  In  all  cases,  access  fioiiii 
would  be  limited  to  points  appropriate  for  ob- 
servation purposes. 

To  facilitate  accomplislunent  of  the  missions' 
of  observation  posts,  host  states  should  provide  ad- 
vance notification  of  movements  passing  through 
the  post  area.  Such  notification  should  include  at^ 
least  those  relevant  movements  reported  through 
advance  notification  procedures.  However,  lesa  * 
significant  movements  could  also  be  brought  to  the< 
attention  of  the  nearest  post. 

Extent  of  geographic  coverage.  The  potential 
usefulness  of  systems  of  observation  posts  is  not 
confined  to  particular  states  or  areas.  In  the 
broadest  sense,  such  systems  would  be  useful 
wherever  significant  military  activities  take  place. 
The  geographic  coverage  of  particular  systems, 
however,  would,  as  a  practical  matter,  be  designed 
to  reflect  military  relationships  in  a  realistic 
manner. 

Where  neighboring  states  might  undertake  to 
provide  mutual  reassurance  through  establish- 
ment of  a  system  of  observation  posts,  it  is  not 
imlikely  that  transportation  centers  near  frontiers 
would  offer  suitable  locations.  Wliere  groups  of 
states  might  wish  to  undertake  such  a  measure,  ap- 
preciation of  military  realities  would  seem  to  make 
desirable  the  establishment  of  posts  in  each  of  the 
participating  states  since  observation  of  areas 
from  which  forces  miglit  be  projected  would  be- 
of  importance  in  addition  to  observation  of  more 
central  locations. 


Additional  Observation  Arrangements 

Purpose.  The  establishment  of  systems  of 
ground  observation  posts  in  fixed  locations  would 
represent  a  major  improvement  in  existing  con- 
ditions. However,  it  is  apparent  that  the  capabili' 
ties  of  such  posts  would  be  limited.  Accordingly, 
it  would  seem  useful  to  consider  whether  mutually 
acceptable  arrangements  for  additional  types  of 
obseiwation  could  be  developed  either  to  supple- 
ment systems  of  ground  observation  posts  or  as 
separate  measures.  As  a  general  matter  such  ar- 
rangements could  be  useful  either  on  an  ad  hoc  or 


Department  of  Stale  Bulletin 


continuing  basis  and  could  provide  highly  effec- 
tive and  flexible  means  of  rapidly  identifying  and 
clarifying  military  activities  and  events. 

Elements  of  systems.  Any  and  all  of  such  obser- 
vation tecliniques  as  the  following  offer  substantial 
promise : 

1.  Aerial  observation. 

2.  Mobile  ground  observation  teams. 

3.  Over-lapping  radars. 

Each  of  these  teclmiques  offers  a  different  ap- 
proach to  resolving  the  same  problems:  that  of 
lessening  the  possibility  of  unexpected  confronta- 
tions of  military  power  and  thereby  lessening  the 
risk  of  the  outbreak  of  war.  The  details  of  ar- 
rangements for  employing  such  techniques  would 
be  on  an  agreed  basis  and  of  a  character  designed 
to  give  equal  assurance  to  all  participating  states. 
Extent  of  geogra'phic  coverage.  "VVliere  states 
or  groups  of  states  wished  to  employ  techniques 
such  as  the  foregoing,  agreement  would  have  to 
be  reached  on  the  geographic  areas  involved. 
Such  areas  might  be  identical  for  all  techniques 
although  this  need  not  necessarily  be  the  case. 
The  problem  can  be  approached  on  a  pragmatic 
basis  with  due  regard  to  the  relationships  of  the 
states  or  groups  of  states  concerned. 

Exchange  of  Military  Missions 

Purpose.  The  problem  of  reducing  the  risk  of 
the  outbreak  of  war  does  not,  of  course,  arise  sim- 
ply from  the  unexpected  character  of  certain  mili- 
taiy  activities  or  lack  of  factual  knowledge 
concerning  them.  In  the  first  place,  the  state  ini- 
tiating an  activity  may  have  miscalculated  the 
response  that  might  be  occasioned  on  the  part  of 
another  state.  In  the  second  place,  a  state  which 
views  a  particular  activity  with  concern  may  be 
misinterpreting  its  true  character.  In  both  cases, 
each  of  the  states  involved  will  proceed  not  only  on 
the  basis  of  such  factual  information  as  may  be 
available  but  also  in  the  light  of  its  own  past  ex- 
perience, its  assessment  of  over-all  military  rela- 
tionships, and  its  military  as  well  as  political 
evaluation  of  the  intentions  of  the  other  state. 

Even  with  adequate  factual  information,  there 
is  no  way  of  ensuring  that  these  broader  factors 
which  govern  calculations  and  interpretations 
will  prove  accurate  guides  m  a  specific  situation. 
However,  it  appears  reasonable  to  suppose  that 
such  factors  may  be  more  nearly  accvirate,  or  less 


so,  to  the  extent  that  they  are  formed  on  the  basis 
of  extensive  or  narrow  contacts  between  the 
states  or  groups  of  states  involved.  In  this  re- 
gard, it  may  be  of  some  significance  that  direct 
contacts  between  the  military  establishments  of 
many  states  and  groups  of  states  are,  generally 
speaking,  relatively  narrow.  The  exchange  of 
military  missions  suggests  itself  as  a  possible  ap- 
proach to  this  aspect  of  the  problem. 

General  character  of  exchanges.  The  exchange 
of  military  missions  is  conceived  as  taking  place 
between  the  central  military  headquarters  of 
states  or  groups  of  states.  Each  mission  would 
be  headed  by  an  officer  of  high  rank.  A  nmnber 
of  additional  officers,  possibly  of  specialized  com- 
petence, and  the  necessary  supporting  presonnel 
would  complete  the  mission.  Members  of  the 
mission  would  be  fully  accredited  and  would 
enjoy  such  privileges  and  immunities  and  would 
have  such  travel  rights  as  might  be  agreed. 

Within  the  fi'amework  of  the  agreed  arrange- 
ments, the  mission  would  carry  out  formal  and 
continuing  liaison  with  the  military  headquarters 
of  the  host  state  or  group.  Functions  of  the 
mission  might  include  such  activities  as  the 
following : 

1.  Keceipt  of  such  information  or  views  on 
military  matters  as  the  host  state  or  group  might 
wish  to  make  available. 

2.  Observation  of  such  specific  military  activi- 
ties or  events  as  the  host  state  or  group  might,  at 
its  discretion  or  under  agreed  arrangements, 
make  accessible. 

3.  Consultation  on  military  matters  of  common 
concern. 

4.  Participation,  upon  request,  in  efforts  to 
clarify  ambiguous  situations  where  lack  of 
authentic  information  miglit  prove  disquieting 
either  to  the  host  or  the  sponsoring  state  or  group. 

5.  Reporting  of  the  foregoing  to  the  sponsoring 
state  or  group  and  representation  of  its  views  on 
military  matters  in  contacts  with  the  host 
headquarters. 

Although  the  foregoing  functions  are  of  con- 
siderable importance,  it  would  be  hoped  that  in 
practice  the  opportunity  for  continuing  contact 
between  competent  and  responsible  military  offi- 
cials would  itself  prove  to  be  of  substantial  value 
to  those  involved  and  to  the  states  or  groups  they 
would  represent. 


December  37,    7962 


1023 


Communications  on  Military  Emergencies 

Purpose.  Although  extensive  tecluiical  means 
of  communication  are  available  today,  there  is  a 
question  as  to  whether  existing  arrangements  for 
communications  between  states  would  prove  suffi- 
ciently rapid  and  reliable  in  time  of  a  military 
emergency  or  crisis.  If  there  is  to  be  assurance 
that  means  of  communication  will  be  available 
when  needed,  steps  must  be  taken  in  advance,  and 
it  would  appear  to  be  a  reasonable  precaution  to 
place  in  effect  between  particular  states  special 
arrangements  wliich  could  ensure  the  availability 
of  prompt,  dependable,  and  direct  communica- 
tions. Awareness  of  the  availability  of  such 
communications  links  could  itself  prove  reassur- 
ing, and  should  the  need  to  use  them  arise,  they 
could  be  employed  with  a  minimum  of  the  un- 
certainty that  is  characteristic  of  periods  of 
tension. 

Principal  elements.  In  considering  the  estab- 
lisliment  of  special  communications  links,  it  would 
be  necessary  for  the  states  concerned  to  reach 
agreement  on  a  number  of  matters. 

1.  In  view  of  the  essentially  experimental  and 
untested  cliaracter  of  such  arrangements,  it  would 
not  appear  necessary  or  desirable  to  attempt  to 
specify  in  advance  all  types  of  situations  in  which 
a  special  communications  link  might  be  utilized. 
However,  there  should  be  a  conmion  imderstand- 
ing  of  the  general  purpose  of  the  link  and  of  the 
broad  circumstances  under  which  it  might  be  most 
useful.  In  the  view  of  the  United  States,  such  a 
link  should,  as  a  general  matter,  be  reserved  for 
emergency  use;  that  is  to  say,  for  example,  that  it 
might  be  reserved  for  communications  concerning 
a  sudden  change  in  the  military  situation  or  the 
emergence  of  a  military  crisis  which  might  appear 
directly  to  threaten  the  security  of  either  of  the 
states  involved  and  where  such  developments  were 
taking  place  at  a  rate  which  appeared  to  preclude 
the  use  of  normal  consultative  procedures.  Effec- 
tiveness of  the  link  should  not  be  degraded  through 
use  for  other  matters. 

2.  Specific  technical  means  should  be  determined 
in  the  light  of  the  geographic  locations  and  types 
of  equipment  available  to  the  states  concerned. 
The  primary  criteria  would  be  that  technical  ar- 
rangements be  effective  on  a  continuing  basis  and 
that  they  be  as  rapid  as  practical.  Ordmary  voice 
telephone  represents  one  possibility,  and  radio 
the  willingness  of  other  states  also  to  participate. 


cations  satellites  become  available  on  an  opei'a- 
tional  basis,  radio  might  not  prove  sufficiently 
reliable.  In  both  these  cases,  however,  there  would 
seem  to  be  some  possibility  of  inadvertent  error 
either  through  lack  of  precision  in  reception  or 
through  incorrect  translation.  Considering  all 
aspects  of  the  problem,  the  use  of  teletype  systems 
might,  on  balance,  prove  preferable.  It  should  be 
noted  that  a  line  reserved  for  transmission  of  mes- 
sages by  teletype  could  have  a  dual  capability  and 
be  used  for  voice  communication  as  well  should 
that  i^rove  desirable. 

3.  Each  state  would  be  responsible  for  arrange- 
ments within  its  own  territory,  would  determine 
the  terminal  (or  originathig)  point  of  the  link,  in 
so  far  as  its  end  of  the  circuit  was  concerned,  and 
would  make  such  arrangements  as  might  be  needed 
to  effect  internal  distribution  of  messages  to  ap- 
propriate government  officials.  In  the  case  of  the 
United  States,  it  might  be  practical  for  the  link  to 
originate  (or  terminate)  in  the  national  command 
center,  which  maintains  continuing  contact  with 
principal  government  officials,  including  the  Presi- 
dent. Such  a  location  would  also  permit  relevant 
data  and  experience  in  military  matters  to  be 
brought  rapidly  to  bear.  The  route  for  connecting 
the  two  end  points  of  a  particular  linlc  would,  of 
course,  have  to  be  agreed. 

4.  Adequate  arrangements  would  be  made  by 
each  state  for  continuous  manning  of  tlie  link  and 
for  acting  on  messages  which  might  be  received. 
Periodic  joint  tests  or  checks  of  the  link  could  be 
midertaken. 

5.  No  excliange  of  personnel  would  be  involved. 
However,  if  military  missions  were  exchanged  con- 
currently with  the  establishment  of  a  direct  com- 
mimications  link,  such  missions  would  be  available 
for  consultation  should  that  prove  desirable  in 
comiection  with  matters  requiring  use  of  the  link. 

Although  the  foregoing  arrangements  would  be 
undertaken  directly  between  the  states  concerned, 
such  states  might,  at  their  discretion,  wish  to 
notify  the  Secretary  General  of  the  United  Na- 
tions of  the  circumstances  involved  in  a  military 
situation  of  a  character  warranting  emergency 
use  of  the  link. 

Other  Areas  of  Possible  Interest 

It  was  noted  at  the  outset  that  the  problem  of 
reducing  the  risk  of  the  outbreak  of  war  will  con- 
tinue to  exist  as  long  as  and  wherever  armaments 


1024 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


and  armed  forces  remain  in  the  hands  of  states 
holding  opposing  views.  It  was  also  recognized 
that  the  problem  has  been  increased,  although  not 
created,  by  the  emergence  of  modem  weapons 
technology  and  teclmiques  of  warf  ai'e.  The  meas- 
ures proposed  by  the  United  States  would  provide 
a  useful  beginning  and  are  pointed  toward  what 
appears  practical  at  this  time.  However,  they  are 
not  addressed  to  all  aspects  of  the  problem,  and 
other  aspects,  in  particular  those  which  are  highly 
technical  in  character,  may  warrant  deeper  ex- 
amination. Moreover,  in  a  period  of  rapidly 
changing  technology,  continuing  review  may  be 
desirable. 

With  these  considerations  in  view,  the  United 
States  has  included  among  its  proposals  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  international  commission  on  re- 
duction of  the  risk  of  war.  Such  a  commission 
would  be  composed  of  technical  and  military  ex- 
perts. Its  size  should  be  relatively  small,  and  its 
method  of  operation  should  be  as  informal  as 
practical. 

A  body  of  this  character  might,  for  example, 
undertake  such  functions  as  the  following : 

1.  Consideration  of  those  implications  of 
modern  weapons  technology  and  techniques  of 
warfare  which  have  a  bearing  on  increasing  or 
reducing  the  risk  of  war. 

2.  Consideration  of  data  which  member  states 
might  wish  to  present  respecting  steps  they  are 
taking  to  prevent  accident,  misinterpretation,  and 
miscalculation,  and  to  improve  communication. 

3.  Identification  of  specific  technical  risks  and 
clarification  of  supposed  risks. 

4.  Development  of  proposals  for  additional 
agreed  measures  and  encouragement  of  separate 
efforts  by  the  states  concerned  where  such  efforts 
might  offer  a  more  practical  approach. 

The  foregoing  functions  are  not  offered  as 
specific  terms  of  reference  but  are  rather  intended 
to  be  illustrative  of  broad  areas  which  might  be  of 
interest  to  a  commission  such  as  that  suggested  by 
the  United  States.  Progress  in  working  out  the 
technical  details  of  the  other  measures  outlined  in 
preceding  sections  may  assist  in  determining  when 
it  might  be  useful  to  establish  a  special  commis- 
sion of  this  character.  For  its  own  part,  the 
United  States  would  be  prepared  in  this  case,  as  in 
the  case  of  other  measures,  to  participate  fully, 
and  the  United  States  would  find  reassurance  in 
the  willingness  of  other  states  also  to  participate. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Atomic  Energy 

Statute    of    the    International    Atomic    Energy    Agency. 
Done    at   New   York   October  26,   1956.     Entered   into 
force  July  29,  1957.     TIAS  3873. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Saudi  Arabia,  December  13,  1962. 

Amendment  to  article  VI.  A.  3  of  the  Statute  of  the  Inter- 
national Atomic  Energy  Agency   (TIAS  3873).     Done 
at  Vienna  October  4, 1961.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Saudi  Arabia,  December  13, 1962. 

Health 

Constitution  of  the  World  Health  Organization.  Oi)ened 
for  signature  at  New  Tork  July  22,  1946.  Entered  into 
force  April  7, 1948.    TIAS  1808. 

Acceptances  deposited:  Algeria,  November  8,  1962; 
Rwanda,  November  7,  1962. 

Marriage 

Convention  on  consent  to  marriage,  minimum  age  for  mar- 
riage, and  registration  of  marriages.  Opened  for  signa- 
ture at  the  United  Nations  December  10,  1962.  Enters 
into  force  on  90th  day  following  date  of  deposit  of  eighth 
instrument  of  ratification  or  accession. 
Signatures:  Chile,  France,  Guinea,  Israel,  Netherlands, 

Sweden,    United    States    (with  understanding),   and 

Yugoslavia,  December  10, 1962. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea,  1960. 
Done  at  London  June  17,  I960.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Morocco,  November  28, 1962. 

Trade 

Protocol  to  the  General  .Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
embodying  results  of  1960-61  tariff  conference.  Done 
at  Geneva  July  16,  1962.  Enters  into  force  for  the 
United  States  December  31, 1962. 

Signatures:  Haiti,  November  6,  1962;  New  Zealand, 
November  15,  1962. 

Eighth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  texts 
of  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade.    Done  at  Geneva  February  18,  1959.' 
Signature:  Haiti,  November  6,  1962. 

Ninth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  texts 
of  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade.    Done  at  Geneva  August  17,  1959.' 
Signatures:  Greece,  November  16,  1962;  Haiti,  Novem- 
ber 6,  1962. 

Proems-verbal  extending  declaration  on  provisional  acces- 
sion of  Swiss  Confederation  to  the  General  Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva  December  8, 
1961.  Entered  into  force  December  31,  1961;  for  the 
United  States  January  9,  1962.  TIAS  49.57. 
Signatures:  India,  November  15,  1902;  Indonesia,  Sep- 
tember 27.  1962. 

Protocol  for  accession  of  Cambodia  to  the  General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva  April  6, 
1962.' 

Signatures:  Haiti,  November  6,  1962;  India,  Novem- 
ber 15,  1962;  Israel,  November  20,  1962;  New  Zea- 
land. November  15,  1962. 


'  Not  in  force. 


December  37,   7962 


1025 


BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  May  9,  1961 
(TIAS  4739),  relating  to  sampling  by  means  of  bal- 
loons the  radioactivity  of  the  upper  atmosphere.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Canberra  September 
11  and  October  30,  1962.  Entered  into  force  October 
30,  1962. 

Bolivia 

Agreement  amending  the  agricultural  commodities  agree- 
ment of  February  12,  1962,  as  amended  (TIAS  5047 
and  5121).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  La  Paz 
December  6,  1962.  Entered  into  force  December  6, 
1962. 

Chile 

Agreement  amending  the  agricultural  commodities  agree- 
ment of  August  7,  1962,  as  amended  (TIAS  5195). 
Effected  by  exchanges  of  notes  at  Santiago  November 
29,   1962.     Entered  into  force  November  29,  1962. 

Pakistan 

Agreement  amending  the  agricultural  commodities  agree- 
ment of  October  14,  1961  (TIAS  4852).  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Karachi  December  3,  1962.  Entered 
into  force  December  3, 1962. 

Turkey 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May  26,  1955,  re- 
lating to  redistributable  and  excess  equipment  and  ma- 
terials furnished  pursuant  to  the  mutual  defense  as- 
sistance program.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Ankara  August  10,  1962.  Entered  into  force  August  10, 
1962. 

Yugoslavia 

Agricultural  commodities  agreement  under  title  I  of  the 
Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assistance  Act  of 
1954,  as  amended  (68  Stat.  4.55;  7  U.S.C.  1701-1709), 
with  exchanges  of  notes.  Signed  at  Belgrade  Novem- 
ber 28,  1962.    Entered  into  force  November  28,  1962. 

Agreement  amending  the  agricultural  commodities  agree- 
ment of  April  21,  1962,  as  amended  (TIAS  5008  and 
5053).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Belgrade  No- 
vember 28,  1962.    Entered  into  force  November  28,  1962. 


PUBLICATtONS 


Department  Publishes  Foreign  Relations 
Volume  on  American  Republics  for  1941 

Press  release  719  dated  December  7,  for  release  December  16 

The  Department  of  State  released  on  December  16 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  1941,  Volvme  VII, 
The  American  Republics.  This  publication  is  one  of 
two  volumes  on  relations  with  the  American  Republics 
in  1941  in  the  Department's  series  of  annual  Foreign 
Relations  volumes.  The  other  volume,  Volume  VI,  is 
still  in  process  of  preparation.  Volume  VII  contains 
sections  on  bilateral  relations  with  Colombia,  Costa  Rica, 
Cuba,     Dominican     Republic,     Ecuador,     El     Salvador, 

1026 


Guatemala,  Haiti,  Honduras,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Panama,Sll(«j] 
Paraguay,   Peru,   Uruguay,   and  Venezuela.     Volume  V] 
will  contain  a  general  section  giving  documentation  omjijiia. 
multilateral  relations  and  sections  on  bilateral  relatlom| 
with  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  and  Chile. 

The  subjects  documented  in  Volume  VII  for  the  mosB 
part  relate  to  the  cooperation  of  the  other  American 
Republics  with  the  United  States  in  the  war  againstt 
the  Axis  Powers. 

Copies  of  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  191il, 
Volume  VII,  The  American  Republics  (viii,  627  pp.)  may 
be  obtained  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington  25,  D.C.,  for 
$3.25. 


Ipid 
ft 
liirii 

titD 

Hi: 


Recent  Releases 

For  sale  by  the  Svperintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment Printing  Office,  Washington  25,  D.C.  Address 
requests  direct  to  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  ex- 
cept in  the  case  of  free  publications,  which  may  be  ob- 
tained from,  the  Department  of  State. 

Trade.  Interim  agreement  with  Peru — relating  to  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Signed  at 
Geneva  March  5,  1962.  Entered  into  force  March  5,  1962. 
With  exchange  of  notes — Signed  at  Geneva  May  30,  1962. 
TIAS  5028.    11pp.    10(J. 

Trade.  Interim  agreement  with  Israel — relating  to  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Signed  at 
Geneva  March  5,  1962.  Entered  into  force  March  5,  1962. 
TIAS  5029.    8  pp.    lOif. 

Trade.  Interim  agreement  with  India — relating  to  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Signed  at 
Geneva  June  15,  1962.  U.S.  Schedule  entered  into  force 
July  1,1962.    TIAS  5030.    9  pp.    10(f. 

Trade.  Interim  agreement  with  Switzerland — relating  to 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade — Signed 
at  Geneva  March  5,  1962.  With  exchange  of  letters — 
Signed  at  Geneva  and  Bern  June  7  and  14,  1962.  U.S. 
Schedule  entered  into  force  July  1,  1962.  TIAS  5031. 
20  pp.    15«^. 

Trade — United  States  Compensatory  Concessions  Under 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Agree- 
ments with  Other  Governments.  Exchanges  of  letters — 
Signed  at  Geneva — Belgium,  Luxembourg,  and  the  Nether- 
lands (Benelux),  January  29  and  February  1,  1962;  Den- 
mark, January  26  and  February  12,  1962 ;  Federal  Repub- 
lic of  Germany,  January  29,  1962 ;  Italy,  December  8  and 
9,  1961,  and  March  7,  1962;  Japan,  February  9,  1962; 
United  Kingdom,  January  20  and  February  16,  1962. 
TIAS  5032.    31pp.    15(f. 

Agricultural  Trade.  Agreement  with  Colombia — Signed 
at  Washinston  May  15,  1962.  Entered  into  force  May  15, 
1962.    TIAS  5036.   3  pp.    5<}. 

Telecommunication — Facilities  of  Radio  Ceylon.  Agree- 
ment with  Ceylon — amending  and  extending  the  agreement 
of  May  12  and  14,  1951,  as  extended.  Exchange  of  notes — 
Signed  at  Colombo  April  30,  1962.  Entered  into  force 
April  30,  1962.     TIAS  5037.     5  pp.     5(f. 

Telecommunication — Allocation  of  Television  Channels 
Along  United  States-Mexican  Border.  Agreement  with 
Mexico — amending  the  agreement  of  August  10  and  Sep- 
tember 26,  1951,  as  amended.  Exchange  of  notes — Signed 
at  Mexico  September  8  and  24,  1959.  Entered  into  force 
September  24,  1959.     TIAS  503S.     5  pp.     5^. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


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I.S. 


December  31,  1962 


Ind 


ex 


Vol.  XLVII,  No.  1227 


Africa.    A  Close  Look  at  Africa  (Bowles)     .     .     . 
Agriculture.    The   Meaning   of   Atlantic   Partner- 


ship    (Tyler) 


Documents 
and     the 


Relating    to     Foreign 
Balance-of -Payments 


American  Republics.     Department  Publishes  For- 

"'*■    eign  Relations  Volume  on  American  Republics 

for   1941     

Chile.  President  Alessandri  of  Chile  Visits  Wash- 
ington (Alessandri,  Kennedy) 

Congo  (Leopoldville).  Secretary  Rusk's  News 
Conference  of  December  10 

Congress 

Congressional 

Policy     .     .     . 
Foreign     Trade 

Situation  (Ball) 

Cuba 

Oti  Department  Issues  Warning  on  Travel  to  Cuba    .     . 

irei  Lawyers  and  Diplomats   (Ball) 

Secretary  Rusk  Expresses  Appreciation  to  Vene- 
zuela   for   Quarantine  Action 

Secretary   Rusk's  News   Conference  of  December 

10 

Diplomacy.    Lawyers  and  Diplomats  (Ball)     .    . 

Disarmament.  U.S.  Presents  Working  Paper  on 
Measures  To  Reduce  Risk  of  War  (test  of  work- 
ing  paper)     

Sconomic  Afifairs 

;;omi)ensatory  Trade  Agreement  Signed  With 
United   Kingdom 

Foreign  Trade  and  the  Balance-of-Payments 
Situation   (Ball) 

The  Meaning  of  Atlantic  Partnership  (Tyler)     .     . 

Views  Exchanged  With  Tin  Council  on  U.S.  Sur- 
plus   Disposal    Program 

Europe 

Foreign     Trade     and 

Situation   (Ball) 

The  Meaning  of  Atlantic  Partnership  (Tyler)  .  . 
Secretary   Rusk's   News   Conference  of  December 

10 

Foreign  Aid.  Committee  Formed  To  Advise  on 
Foreign   Operations  Programs        

International     Organizations     and     Conferences. 

U.S.  Presents  Working  Paper  on  Measures  To 
Reduce  Risk  of  War  (text  of  working  paper)  .     . 

Israel.  Extradition  Convention  Signed  With 
Israel    

Military  Affairs 

Committee  Formed  To  Advise  on  Foreign  Opera- 
tions    Programs 

Secretary  Rusk's  News  Conference  of  December 
10 


the     Balance-of-Payments 


North    Atlantic    Treaty    Organization.     Secretary 
Rusk's  News  Conference  of  December  10        .     . 

Passports.    Department  Issues  Warning  on  Travel 
to    Cuba 

Presidential  Documents 

President  Ales.sandri  of  Chile  Visits  Washington  . 
D.S.  Reaffirms  Friendship  and  Support  for  Tangan- 
yika   


1002 
1008 

1026 
991 
994 

1018 
1014 

1001 
987 

993 

994 

987 

1019 

1012 

1014 
1008 

1012 

1014 
1008 

994 
1007 

1019 
1012 

1007 
994 

994 

1001 

991 
1007 


Publications 

Department   Publishes  Foreign   Relations  Volume 

on  American  Republics  for  1941 1026 

Recent  Releases 1026 

Tanganyika.  U.S.  ReaflSrms  Friendship  and  Sup- 
port for  Tanganyika  (Kennedy) 1007 

Treaty  Information 

Compensatory     Trade     Agreement     Signed     With 

United  Kingdom 1012 

Current  Actions 1025 

Extradition   Convention   Signed  With  Israel     .     .     1012 

U.S.S.R.  Secretary  Rusk's  News  Conference  of 
December    10 994 

United  Kingdom 

Compensatory     Trade     Agreement     Signed     With 

United  Kingdom 1012 

Secretary  Rusk's  News  Conference  of  December 
10 994 

Venezuela.  Secretary  Rusk  Expresses  Apprecia- 
tion to  Venezuela  for  Quarantine  Action     .     .     .      993 

Name  Index 

Alessandri   Rodriguez,    Jorge 991 

Ball,  George  W 987, 1014 

Bowles,  Chester 10O2 

Kennedy,    President 991,1007 

Rusk,  Secretary 993,994 

Tyler,    William    R 1008 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  December  10-16 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington  25,  D.C. 

Release  issued  prior  to  December  10  which  ap- 
pears in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  is  No.  719  of 
December  7. 

Subject 
U.   S.   participation   in  international 

conferences. 
Compensatory  trade  agreement  with 

U.K. 
U.S.-Israel     extradition     convention 

signed. 
Ball :   "Lawyers  and  Diplomats." 
Rusk :  news  conference  of  December 

10. 
Ball :  Subcommittee  on  International 

Exchange  and  Payments. 
Miller:    "The    Concept   of    'National 

Interest.'  " 
Warning  on  travel  to  Cuba. 
Bowles :   "A  Close  Look  at  Africa." 
Rusk :  message  to  Foreign  Minister 

of  Venezuela. 
Talks  with  International  Tin  Coun- 
cil. 


No. 

Date 

*722 

12/10 

723 

12/10 

724 

12/10 

725 

12/13 

726 

12/11 

727 

12/13 

*728 

12/11 

729 

12/13 

730 

12/14 

731 

12/14 

732     12/14 


♦Not  printed. 


U.S.   GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFlCEilSSt 


the 

Department 

of 

State 


United  States 
Government  Printing  Office 

DIVISrON    OF    PUBLIC   DOCUMENTS 

Washington  25,  D.C. 


PENALTY   FOR    PRIVATE    USE  TO    AVOID 

PAYMENT  OF    POSTAGE.  ^OO 

(GPOl 


OFFICIAL    BUSINESS 


OUR  SOUTHERN  PARTNERS 

The  Story  of  Inter-American  (hioperation 


One  of  the  most  encouraging  developments  in  the  direction 
of  increasing  free- world  strength  and  unity  is  the  concerted  effort 
of  the  peoples  of  the  Americas  to  perfect  a  community  of  fraternal 
trust,  common  purpose,  equality,  and  widespread  economic  and 
social  opportunity. 

The  land  and  the  people  of  the  20  nations  of  Latin  America 
and  their  political,  social,  and  economic  development  with  partic- 
ular emphasis  on  their  common  problems  are  described  in  this 
59-page  illustrated  booklet.  Other  subjects  covered  are  United 
States  relations  and  economic  assistance  to  Latin  America,  the 
Alliance  for  Progress,  the  Peace  Corps  operations  in  several  South 
American  countries,  foreign  trade  and  regional  trade  arrange- 
ments, and  the  Organization  of  American  States  (OAS). 


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