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FICIAL
EEKLY RECORD
^ITED STATES
jREIGN POLICY
INDKX
VOLUME
XLVIII: Numbers
January 7- June 24, 1963
1228-
1252
Issue
Number
Date of Issue
Pages
1228
Jan. 7, 1963
1- 40
1229
Jan. 14,1963
41- 80
1230
Jan. 21, 1963
81- 112
1231
Jan. 28, 1963
113- 156
1232
Feb. 4, 1963
157- 192
1233
Feb. 11,1963
193- 232
1234
Feb. 18,1963
233- 268
1235
Feb. 25,1963
269- 308
1236
Mar. 4, 1963
309- 344
1237
Mar. 11,1963
345- 380
1238
Mar. 18,1963
381- 420
1239
Mar. 25, 1963
421- 464
1240
Apr. 1,1963
465- 508
1241
Apr. 8,1963
509- 548
'
1242
Apr. 15,1963
549- 588
1243
Apr. 22, 1963
589- 632
1244
Apr. 29, 1963
633- 676
1245
May 6,1963
677- 724
1246
May 13,1963
725- 768
1247
May 20, 1963
769- 812
1248
May 27,1963
813- 852
1249
June 3, 1963
853- 892
1250
June 10,1963
893- 928
1251
June 17,1963
929- 964
1252
June 24, 1963
965-1000
J^
^3^''3
MAR 5 1964
Correction for Volume XLVIII
The Editor of the Bulletin wishes to call atten-
tion to the following error in Volume XLVIII:
February 25, page 295, the article entitled "Presi-
dent Proclaims U.S. Tariff Concessions to Japan and
Spain": The second line of the first paragraph
should read "that the President had on January 31
signed a , . . .''
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Publication 7617
Released February 1964
For Bale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C., 20402 - Price 30 cents
INDEX
Volume XLVill: Numbers 1228-1252, January 7-June 24, 1963
Abel, Elie, G44
Abu Simbel, temples of, 957
Academy of Sciences, Soviet, 748
ACDA. See Arms Ontrol and Disarmament Agency,
U.S.
Action Committee for the United States of Europe, 195
Adenauer, Konrad, 247
Adjudication, international, significant cases (Meeker),
84
Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board, 659
Advisory Commission on International Educational
and Cultural AfCairs, 46, 96. 215, 617, 753, 755
Advisory Committee on International Book Programs,
95, 756
Advisory Committee on International Business Prob-
lems, establishment and members, 296, 540, 735
Advisory Committee on International Organizations,
809
Advisory Committee on the Arts, appointments and
designation, 190, 448, 663
Aerial photography and mapping, agreement with
Ethiopia, 306
Afghanistan, resumption of relations with Pakistan
(Rusk), 931
Africa {see also individual countries) :
Aspirations uniting (Williams), 902
Coffee exports (McGhee), 494
Communist subversive activities in (Manning), 141
Conference of heads of state (Kennedy), 902
Cultural programs in :
U.S. exchange programs (Williams), 67
UNESCO (Battle), 957
Democracy and development, African views (Wil-
liams), 541
Development Bank, proposed, U.S. support (Kotsch-
nig),627
Economic Commission for, U.N., 625
Economic development : Kotsehnig, 625 ; Williams,
208
Education in :
Communists, students trained by (Williams), 880
Germany, role of (Williams), 904
UNESCO programs, 603, 955
U.S. aid, need for (Williams), 68, 208
Germany's role in (Williams), 901
Nationalism, Communist impact on (Williams), 877
Newly independent nations, problems of (Johnson),
449
Africa — Continued
Pan-Africanist Congress, opposition to communism
(Williams), 880
Portuguese territories in, 582, 694
Students, U.S. aid to students leaving Bulgaria, 375,
448
Transition from colonialism to independence (Man-
ning), 139
United Nations:
Afro- Asian group in, 105, 798
Relationship between (Williams), 602
U.S. poUcy : Cleveland, 167 ; Williams, 251, 457
Visit of Assistant Secretary Williams to, 250
Afro-Asian group in the U.N., 105, 798
Agency for International Development :
Administrator (Bell), confirmation, 376 ; swearing in,
65
Advisory Committee on International Business
Problems, 296, 540
Africa, ORT program in, 209
Aid to underdeveloped countries: Kennedy, 596;
Rusk, 668
Brazil, financial aid to, 561
Economic assistance loans (Johnson), 832
Foreign aid program :
Administration of (Rusk) , 363, 366
Appropriation request for FY 1964, 225, 226, 881
Reobligation of funds. Congressional request for
information (Kennedy), 185
Lao refugees, aid to, 571
Priorities and standards for aid, criteria (Bowles),
780, 943
Agricultural Sciences, Inter-American Institute of,
convention on and protocol amending : Brazil, 629
Agricultural surpluses, U.S., use in overseas programs :
Agreements with : Argentina, 38 ; Bolivia, 110, 341,
673 ; Chile, 505, 888 ; China, 230, 306 ; Colombia,
765; Congo (L^opoldville), 849; Dominican
Republic, 110; Ecuador, 765; El Salvador,
849; Greece, 110; Guinea, 962; Iceland, 342;
India, 673 ; Indonesia. 38 ; Iran, 342 ; Israel, 306,
849; Philippines, 378; Poland, text, 303, 306;
Ryukyu Islands, 378, 888 ; Sudan, 306 ; Turkey,
505, 765 ; Viet-Nam, 505, 765 ; Yugo.slavia, 962
Algeria, U.S. food provided to under P.L. 480
(WiUiams), 458
Brazil, proposed aid to, 561
Sales of, authority to sell Egyptian pounds to U.S.
tourists, 173
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1963
714-736—64 1
1003
Agriculture {see also Agricultural surpluses and Food
and Agriculture Organization) :
Agrarian reform. See Land reform
Communist problems, 275, 454, 826
Cuba, U.N. Special Fund aid for research station,
U.S. views : Gardner, 359, 480 ; Rusk, 357
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences,
convention on and protocol amending: Bolivia,
629
Latin America, developments in (Martin), 920, 922
Role in development process : Bowles, 941 ; Rostow,
825
Trade in agricultural products {see also Commodity
trade problems) :
EEC policy : Rusk, 701 ; Trezijse, 499, 974
GATT proposals (Herter), 990, 993
Restrictions on : Kotsebnig, 628 ; Trezise, 498
Western Europe-U.S. (Ball), 691
Agronsky, Martin, 202
Aguirre, Aureliano, 54
AID. See Agency for International Development
Air Defense Mission to India, joint Commonwealth/
U.S., 249n.
Air navigation and transport. See under Aviation
Aircraft. See Aviation
Airmail, universal postal convention (1957) provisions
re : Burundi, 810 ; Cuba, 765 ; Dominican Republic,
Honduras, Nepal, 505 ; Rwanda, 810 ; Tanganyika,
Upper Volta, 765
Ala, U.S. shrimp boat, attack by Cuba on, 356
Alaska, airspace, U.S. protests Soviet violation of, 476
Albania, relations with Soviet Union (Hilsman), 273
Alexander, Archibald S., 505
Algeria :
Developments in (Williams), 458
Treaties, agreements, etc., 110, 722, 849, 961
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 505
AUoMza para el Progrcso. See Alliance for Progress
Alliance for Progress :
Appropriation request for FY 1964: Kennedy, 225,
226, 227 ; Rusk, 672
Inter-American conference of Ministers of Labor
(Kennedy), 884
Objectives and progress: Blumenthal, 219; Bowles,
781 ; Kennedy, 89, 161, 513, 518, 519, 596 ; Martin,
409, 711 ; Rusk, 669 ; Stevenson, 707
Support for, U.S. discussions with: Argentina, 212;
Venezuela, 446
AUott, Gordon A., 70
Alpha 66, 520
American Organization for Rehabilitation Through
Training (ORT),208
American Red Cross, 137
American Republics (see also Latin America and
Organization of American States), interdependence
of (Martin), 710
American Society of Newspaper Editors, 679, 685
American States, Organization of. See Organization
of American States
Anderson, Rudolf, 164
Angola :
Problem of (Yates), 582
U.S. proposal for study by U.N. representatives,
withdrawal of, 105
Anguilla, Nevis and, international telecommunication
convention (1959), 306
Antarctica treaty :
Entry into force, 305
Recommendations furthering principles and objec-
tives of, approval of : Argentina, Australia, Bel-
giimi, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Nor-
way, South Africa, Soviet Union, U.K., U.S., 305
Antigua, treaties, agreements, etc., 189, 306
Anuman Rajadbon, Somchai, 58
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.) CouncU
meeting :
Text of final communique, 967
U.S. delegation, 809, 969
Apartheid, problem of (Williams), 604
Arab states {see also individual countries) :
Refugees, problem of, U.S. views: Rowan, 99;
Stevenson, 151
Situation in (Rusk), 435
UNESCO aid to education (Battle), 955
Argentina :
Foreign Minister, visit to U.S., 170, 211
Meat exports to U.S., arrangements re, 212
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 266, 305, 306, 377, 585,
761, 926, 998
U.S. relations with and support for government of,
reaflirmed, 211
Armaments {see also Disarmament, Missiles, and Nu-
clear weapons) :
Control and reduction of :
Soviet attitude (Foster), 117, 133
U.S. position ( Foster) , 115, 132 ; Beam, 489
OAS policy re arms trafiic to and from Cuba (Rusk),
470, 473
Outer space, U.S. position (Meeker) , 750
Race, dangers of and need to halt: Foster, 129;
Rusk, 433
Safeguards against risk of war (Foster), 4
Supply :
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization :
Nuclear force
Soviet supply to Cuba. See under Cuba
U.S. supply to Portugal, and refutation of claim
of diversion to Africa (Bingham), 104
Armed forces :
Foreign forces in Germany :
NATO status of forces agreements, Belgium, 888 ;
Germany, 961
Rights, obligations, and tax treatment of, 1959
agreement abrogating 1952 agreements concern-
ing: Germany, 961
Germany, Federal Republic of, Soviet protest re
strength of, 865
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
Armed forces
Soviet Union, in Cuba. See Cuba: Soviet troops
1004
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIIJ'
Armed forces — Continued
Treatment of in time of war, Geneva conventions
(1949) relative to: Cyprus, Ireland, Malaya,
Mauritania, 230
U.N., in the Congo. See Congo, Republic of: U.N.
role and operation in
Armed forces, U.S. :
Accidental war, safeguards for prevention (Foster),
4, 6, 133
Australia :
Naval communication station in, agreement for
establishment, 926
Status of U.S. forces in, agreement re, 926
Germany, claims against members from nonduty use
of private motor vehicles, agreement for settle-
ment, 673
Military missions :
El Salvador, agreement extending 1954 Army mis-
sion agreement, 888
Exchange of, Soviet proposal for (Foster), 7
Morocco, agreement for withdrawal of, 601
Protection of U.S. ships in international waters
(Rusk), 389
Purpose of (Rusk), 383
Ships. See Ships and shipping
Viet-Nam :
Casualties of, 641
Number of (Rusk), 365
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. :
Appropriation request for FY 1964 (Kennedy), 226,
228
Assistant Director, confirmation, 505
Background and goals of (Foster), 116, 134
Need for (Gilpatric), 120
Statements on:
Direct teletype communication with Soviet Union,
600
Nuclear test ban treaty, 403
Army mission, agreement extending 1954 agreement
with El Salvador re, 888
Arnold, Mrs. Dexter Otis, 698
Arts, Advisory Committee on the, appointments and
designation, 190, 448, 663, 840
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia {see also ANZUS
"" Council, Pacific, Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-
tion, and individual countries:
Afro- Asian group in the U.N. (Plimpton), 798
Colombo Plan efforts to increase technical training
(Marks), 977
Communist activities : Harriman, 275, 696 ; Hilsman,
897 ; Johnson, 635 ; Rusk, 311
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East,
505, 660
Foreign aid program in Southeast Asia: Johnson,
639 ; Rusk, 702
Japan's relationship to (Johnson), 611
Newly independent nations (Johnson), 449
Population conference, 20
Social and economic development research center
in (Battle), 956
UNESCO programs (Battle), 955, 957
INDEX, JANXJAKY TO JUNE 1963
Atlantic alliance. See North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation
Atlantic community (see also Atlantic partnership and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization) :
"Grand design" for a unified Europe (Rusk), 246,
248
Partnership in (Ball), 196
U.S. views : Tyler, &19 ; Rostow, 855
Atlantic partnership :
Nuclear problems within (Rostow), 552
Role of De Gaulle (Ball) , 372
U.S. position: Rusk, 315, 316; Schaetzel, 326; Ball,
372, 690 ; McGhee, 771
Atlantic Policy Advisory Group, NATO, 721, 774
Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center, 866
Atmospheric Sciences and Hydrology, Committee on
International Programs in, 742
Atmospheric tests (Rusk), 938
Atomic Energy, Joint Committee on (Rusk), 488
Atomic energy, peaceful uses of :
Agreements re civil uses of : Colombia, 810 ; U.K., 998
Nuclear training and research equipment and mate-
rials, agreement with India providing grant for,
342
Third international conference in 1964, proposed
(Stevenson), 150
Atomic Energy Agency, International, statute of :
Current actions : Bolivia, 504 ; Syrian Arab Republic,
997; Uruguay, 230
Amendment of art. VI.A.3, Ethiopia, 110 ; Spain, 266 ;
U.S., 377; Yugoslavia, 926
Atomic radiation, problem of (Rusk), 487
Auguste, Carlet, 55
Australia :
ANZUS Council meeting, 967
Colombo Plan program of technical training, pro-
posals for (Marks), 979
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 189, 305, 477, 546, 765,
926
Austria :
Dispute with Italy over South Tyrol (Meeker), 85
Treaties, agreements, etc., 306, 764, 926
Automotive traffic. See Road traffic
Aviation :
Air transport :
U.S. international policy, 784
U.S. negotiations with: Mexico, 840; U.A.R., 223,
297
Aircraft :
Alaskan airspace, U.S. protests Soviet violation of,
476
Cuban MIG attack on U.S. motorship Floridian,
600
Soviet MIG's in Cuba (Rusk) , 244
U.S. military, "failsafe" procedure, 4
Civil Aviation Organization, International, 504, 585,
888
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Aerospace disturbances, U.S.-New Zealand agree-
ment re research program on, 962
1005
Aviation — Continued
Treaties, Agreements, etc. — Continued
Air navigation services, joint financing of,
agreements :
Faroe Islands and Greenland : Art. V., amend-
ment of, entry into force, 888 ; current actions,
France, 153 ; Japan, 722
Iceland : France, 153
Air routes between the West Indies and U.S., U.S.-
U.K. agreement as applicable to Jamaica, 77
Air services transit agreement, international
(1944) : Algeria, 849; Trinidad and Tobago, 629
Air transport, U.S.-France agreement re compromis
of arbitration pursuant to art. X of, 342
Aircraft :
Double taxation on earnings from operation of,
U.S.-Iceland agreement for relief of, 77
International recognition of rights in, convention
(1948) on : Denmark, 341 ; Niger, 230
Precautionary attachment of, convention (1933)
for unification of certain rules re: Congo,
Mauritania, 341
Reciprocal acceptance of certificates of air-
worthiness for imported aircraft, U.S.-Japan
agreement re, 342
Airmail regulations, tiniversal postal convention
provisions re : Burundi, 810 ; Cuba, 765 ; Domini-
can Republic, Honduras, Nepal, 505 ; Rwanda,
810 ; Tanganyika, Upper Volta, 765
Carriage by air, convention (1929) for unification
of certain rules re : Congo, 38 ; protocol amend-
ing: Switzerland, 38
Civil aviation, international, convention (1944)
on :
Current actions, Jamaica, 585 ; Trinidad and
Tobago, 504
Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and
61 on sessions of ICAO Assembly: Cuba,
Malagasy Republic, 888
Protocol amending article 50(a) re ICAO Coun-
cil membership: Cuba, El Salvador, Ethiopia,
France, Honduras, Malagasy Republic, Philip-
pines, 888
Bahama Islands, treaties, agreements, etc., 189, 306
Bailiwick of Guernsey, international wheat agreement
(1962), 189
Balance of payments :
Brazil (Gordon), 284
Canada, U.S. discussions (Kennedy, Pearson), 815
Europe, status of (Trezise), 973
Foreign economic aid, effect on (Johnson), 832
U.S., status of and efforts to improve : Kennedy, 228,
594 ; Trezise, 973
Baldwin, Charles F., 505
Balkans (Pearcy), 334
Ball, George W., addresses, remarks, and statements :
Brazil, U.S. regrets misinterpretation of statement
re political situation in, 521
Churchill, Winston, ceremony conferring honorary
U.S. citizenship, 716
Ball, George AV. — Continued
"Issues and Answers" interview, 369
Monnet, Jean, contribution to European unity, 195
National Academy of Foreign Affairs, support for,
619
NATO multilateral nuclear force, 372, 373
Nuclear deterrent and the Atlantic alliance, 736
Soviet troops in Cuba, 370
State Department, question of public support for, 371
U.K.-EEC negotiations, breakdown in, 412
U.S. confidence in Atlantic partnership, 372
Baltic States (Pearcy), 334
Bangoura, Karim, 360
Barbados, treaties, agreements, etc., 189, 266
Barnes, Nathan, 53
Bataan Day, U.S.-Philippine commemorative ceremony,
647
Battle, Lucius D., 92, 265, 752, 915
Bay of Pigs prisoners, return of (Kennedy), 88
Beehhoefer, Bernhard G., 115, 125, 126
Belgium :
Congo, Belgian assistance to, 483
Treaties, agreements, etc., 230, 266, 305, 306, 629,
765, 810, 888, 926
Bell, David Elliott :
Confirmation as Alternate Governor, Inter-American
Development Bank, 765
Correspondence and statements :
Brazil, economic and financial aid to, 557, 560
Foreign aid program, request for FY 1964 appro-
priation, 881
Director of AID : confirmation of, 376 ; qualifications
of ( Bowles) , 939 ; swearing in, 66
Benelux (Pearcy), 335
Berlin :
Court action re "Association of Victims of Nazi
Persecution", Soviet protest and U.S. reply, 45
Freedom of, relation to African freedom (Williams),
901
Judges Law, 751
Legal rights re (Meeker), 86
Possible discussions during 1963 (Rusk), 135
Situation in (Rusk), 700
Soviet Union attitude: Ru.sk, 135; McGhee, 870
Western position : Kennedy, Macmillau, 43 ; Rusk,
135, 136
Bermuda, treaties, agreements, etc., 189, 306, 585
Betancourt, Romulo, 445
Bills of lading, international convention (1924) for
unification of rules re : Tanganyika, 230
Bingham, Jonathan B., 104, 106, 258, 459, 505
Black, Eugene, 538
"Black boxes," 122
Blaustein, Jacob, 540
Blumenthal, W. Michael, 218. 844
Board of Foreign Scholarships, 296, 755
Bolivia :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 751
Treaties, agreements, etc., 110, 341, 504, 629, 673, 926
Bolster, Edward A., 840
1006
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
BOMARC-B weapons system in Canada, 243
Bonds, German Dollar, 146
Bonds, U.N., U.S. purchase, 149
Books :
"Books USA" campaign (Rusk), 806
International Advisory Committee, 756
U.S. program (Battle), 94
Borja, Jacinto Castel, 58
Bowles, Chester :
Addresses and correspondence :
Foreign aid program, objectives of, 777, 939
Nyasaland, independence of, 253
U.S. world relationships, problems and objectives,
817
Confirmation as Ambassador to India, 848
Bowman, Heath, 190
Brazil :
Coffee trade (Gordon), 289
Economic and Social Development, Three-Tear Plan
for, 558
Economic relations with U.S. :
Address (Gordon), 284
Discussions re, results of (Bell), 557; review of
(Rusk), 934
U.S. aid, 144, 285, 560
Finance Minister, visit to U.S., 434, 557
Satellite Relay, U.S., inauguration of broadcasts via,
171
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 153, 341, 377, 629, 764,
810, 888, 926
U.S. regrets misinterpretation of statement re politi-
cal situation in (Ball), 521
Brezhnev, Leonid, 137
British Guiana, treaties, agreements, etc., 189, 306
British Honduras, treaties, agreements, etc., 189, 306
Briti-sh Solomon Islands protectorate, international
wheat agreement (1962) , 189
British Virgin Islands, treaties, agreements, etc., 189,
306
Brucker, Herbert, 684
Brunei, radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed
to international telecommunications convention
(1959), 962
Budget for 1964 (Kennedy), 224
Bulgaria :
African students, departure from, 375
Convention on road traffic with annexes, 585
Minister to U.S., credentials, 946
Property, extension of deadline on filing declarations,
905
Bullitt, John C, 375
Bundy, MeGeorge, 467
Bunker, Ellsworth, 148
Burma, articles of agreements of International Devel-
opment Association, 504
Burundi, treaties, agreements, etc., 341, 418, 810, 926
Business Problems, International, Advisory Committee
on, 296, 540, 735
Byelorussian S.S.R., convention for pacific settlement
of international disputes, 341
Caicos Islands, treaties, agreements, etc., 77, 306
Cairo Conference of Developing Countries (Gardner),
908
Calendar of international conferences and meetings
(see also suhject), 13, 98, 186, 257, 338, 416, 503,
580, 718, 807, 952
California, 15
Cambodia, protocol of accession to GATT, 266
Cameron, Warde M., 461
Cameroon, treaties, agreements, etc., 341, 505, 926
Canada :
Niagara shoal, U.S. request for IJC approval for
removal, 717
North Pacific fisheries, U.S.-Canada-Japan proposed
discussions, 914
Nuclear weapons, negotiations with U.S. concern-
ing: Department, 243; Rusk, 235, 242, 435, 936
Prime Minister, meetings with President Kennedy at
Hyannis Port, 815
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 306, 418, 629, 888, 926
Canal Zone, U.S.-Panamanian agreement re procedural
matters, 171
Carey, James B., 115, 124
Caribbean (see also individual countries) :
Peace in, dependent on Cuba (Rusk), 206
Press secretaries meeting at Oaxaca, postponed, 809
Suspicious trafiie in, question of U.S. surveillance
(Rusk), 684
Carr, Randolph, 271, 281
Castro, Fidel, 263, 351
Cayman Islands, treaties, agreements, etc., 77, 306
CENTO. See Central Treaty Organization
Central African Republic, treaties, agreements, etc., 77,
266, 377, 764, 926
Central America (see also individual countries) :
Common market, plans for establishment of, 213, 437
Heads of Government and Ministers, meetings of.
.S'ee San Jos§ meetings
U.S. Ambassadors, meeting of, 213
Central Treaty Organization :
Ministerial Council, 11th session :
Statement (Rusk), 841
Text of final communique, 843
U.S. observer delegation, 484
Statement (Rusk), 384
Visit to member coimtries by Secretary Rusk, an-
nouncement, 739
Ceylon :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 703
Expropriation of U.S. property, negotiations for
compensation (Rusk), 240, 241
Treaties, agreements, etc., 546, 961
U.S. aid, susi)ension of, 328
Chad:
Radio regulations (1959), 722
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 765
Chakravarty, B. N., 56
Charlotte, Grand Duchess, 647, 776
Charter of the United Nations. See United Nations
Charter
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1963
1007
Chayes, Abram, 296, 318
CMari, Roberto F., 171, 213
Chile :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 360
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 110, 189, 305, 306, 505,
764, 888, 926
China :
Historical background and nature of (Johnson), 276
U.N. representation question (Stevenson), 150
China, Communist (see also Communism) :
Aggression against India. See under India
ANZUS concern and views on activities, 967
Cuban activities (Rusk), 686
Economic problems : Harriman, 275 ; Johnson, 454 ;
Rostow, 826
Emergence of ( Bowles ) , 818, 820
Nuclear capability, problem of (Rusk), 249
Nuclear war, views on : Harriman, 694 ; Johnson,
282
On-site inspections in, question of permission for
(Rusk), 203
Recognition of, question of (Rusk), 702
Southeast Asia, objectives in (Johnson), 636
Soviet relations :
Aid, Soviet withdrawal (Hilsman), 273, 274
Doctrinal dispute. See Sino-Soviet dispute
Soviet policy toward (Rusk), 204, 205
U.N. representation, question of (Stevenson), 150
UNESCO conference, rejection of representation
(Battle), 9.55
China, Republic of :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 230, 306, 764
U.N. representation, U.S. position (Stevenson), 150
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 848
U.S. policy toward (Johnson), 279
Christensen, Lew, 663
Churchill, Randolph, 715
Churchill, Winston, 715
CIPASH. See Committee on International Programs
in Atmospheric Sciences and Hydrology
Civil Aviation Organization, International, 504, 585,
888
Civilian persons in time of war, Geneva convention
(1949) relative to treatment of: Cyprus, Ireland,
Malaya, Mauritania, 230
Claims :
Ceylon, question of compensation for nationalization
of U.S. property in, 240, 241, 328
Germany, Federal Republic of, agreement for settle-
ment of claims from nonduty use of private
motor vehicles of members of U.S. Armed Forces,
673
Poland, agreement for compensation of U.S. claims
against, 948
Unclaimed property of victims of Nazi persecution,
amendment of Executive order re, 618
Clark, John C, 506
Clarke, Ellis, 59
Clay, Lucius D., 431, 574, 882
Clay Committee. See Committee To Strengthen the
Security of the Free World
Cleveland, Harlan, 60, 165, 613, 872
Clifford, Clark, 805
Cocoa, international agreement on (Blumenthal), 846
Coffee :
Brazil, trade in (Gordon), 289
International coffee agreement, 1962 :
Current actions: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon,
Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia,
Congo (Lfiopoldville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Den-
mark, 926 ; Dominican Republic, 926, 997 ; Ecua-
dor, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Germany,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Italy, 926 ; Ivory Coast, 926, 961 ; Japan, Leba-
non, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Nor-
way, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone, Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Tanganyika, Trinidad and Tobago, U.K.,
U.S., Uganda, Venezuela, 926
Provisions, negotiations, and implementation (Blu-
menthal), 218, 220
U.S. views: Blumenthal, 846; Gordon, 291; Ken-
nedy, 514 ; Kotschnig, 628 ; McGhee, 493, 869
Coffey, John W., 848
Cold war, definition (Cleveland), 169
Collective security (see oiso Mutual defense) :
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. See ANZUS
and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Europe. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Free world support (Gardner), 796
Near and Middle East. See Central Treaty Or-
ganization
U.S. position (Rusk), 641
Western Hemisphere. See Organization of Ameri-
can States
Colombia, treaties, agreements, etc., 110, 305, 764, 765,
810, 926
Colombo Plan :
Colombo Plan Day, 978
Purpose and accomplishments (Marks), 977
Working party, recommendations of, 980
Colonialism :
African states concern re (Williams), 604
U.S. position : Bingham, 459 ; Yates, 581
Columbia River, Canadian-U.S. cooperative develop-
ment of (Kennedy, Pearson), 816
Comay, Michael S., 53
Commerce, Department of, export expansion program,
229
Commercial treaties. See Trade : Treaties
Committee on International Programs in Atmospheric
Sciences and Hydrology, 742
Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. See
Outer Space, U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of
Committee on Space Research of the International
Council of Scientific Unions, 24, 924
1008
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free
World (Clay Committee) :
Meetings of, 329, 431
Report of : Kennedy, 574, 593 ; Rusk, 666, 667
Commodity Credit Corporation, 914
Commodity Trade, International, U.N. Commission on
(Blumeuthal), &44
Commodity trade problems (see also Agriculture:
Trade owd individual commodity) :
Latin America : Johnson, 834 ; Martin, 920, 922
Less developed countries (Trezise), 975
Price stabilization, problem of (Blumenthal), 844
Common markets. See name of market
Communications (see also Radio and Telecommunica-
tion) :
Advances in (Battle), 92
Australia, agreement re naval communication sta-
tion, 888
Belgium, agreement re communication facilities in,
765
CENTO projects, 843
Mexico, agreement re communication station at
Guaymas, Sonora, 926
Satellites :
Developments: Chayes, 837; Gardner, 740, 743;
McGhee, 868
Global system, proposed (Gore), 25
Relay satellite, inauguration of broadcasts be-
tween North and South America, 171
U.S. programs and achievements: Gardner, 743;
Gore, 25
UNESCO's proposals re (Battle), 957
U.S.-Soviet direct teletype communications link, pro-
posed: ACDA statement, 600; Foster, 7; Rusk,
934
UNESCO's programs (Battle), 956
Communications satellite corporation, 25
Communism («ee also China, Communist ; Cuba ; Sino-
Soviet dispute ; and Soviet Union) :
Africa, unsuccessful in (Williams), 877
Aggression and subversive activities :
Africa : Manning, 141
Cuba : Rusk, 313, 386
Latin America. See under Latin America
Southeast Asia. See Laos and Viet-Nam
Western hemisphere : Martin, 347, 404 ; Rusk, 313,
664, 474
Central control, importance (Johnson), 277
Cold vrar, definition (Cleveland), 169
Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, 273.
Free-world struggle against: Betancourt-Kennedy,
446 ; Hilsman, 897 ; Kennedy, 595 ; Lee, 423
Less developed countries, danger (Rostow), 554
Moscow meetings, effect (Rusk), 933
Propaganda. See Propaganda
World, objectives: Bowles, 819; Harriman, 274;
Kennedy, 197 ; Rusk, 204, 283, 842
Conferences and organizations, international. See
International organizations and conferences and
suiject
Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville), treaties, agreements,
etc., 306, 341, 418, 620, 764
Congo, Republic of the (L4opoldville) :
Current status of situation : Kennedy, Macmillan, 43 ;
Rusk, 312, 680
Economic and social development (Williams), 209,
210
Special mission to study situation in, named, 148
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 341, 764, 849, 926
U.N. role and operation in and U.S. support:
Addresses, remarks, and statements: Bingham,
460; Cleveland, 165, 166, 169, 874; Department,
91; Gardner, 478; Kennedy, 207; Meeker, 85;
Rusk, 396, 437, 442 ; Sisco, 532 ; Stevenson, 148,
524 ; Williams, 605
Financing : Gardner, 536 ; General Assembly reso-
lution, 37 ; Klutznick, 30, 31
U.S. consulate, opened at Bukavu, 765
U.S. policy and aid :
Addresses : Cleveland, 874 ; WiUiams, 210
Summary of, report on, 481
Congress, U.S. :
Bipartisan support re U.S. foreign policy (Rusk),
363
Coffee agreement, international (1962), approval re-
quested (McGhee), 493
Connally amendment, benefits of repeal (Foster), 124
Documents relating to foreign policy, lists, 229, 329,
376, 579, 717, 883, 917, 951
Legislation, proposed:
Budget, FY 1964, 224
Foreign aid program, FY 1964: Kennedy, 591;
Rusk, 664, 671
Foreign Assistance Act, amendments: announce-
ment, 296 ; Kennedy, 599 ; Tyler, 947
National academy of foreign affairs (Ball), 619;
Kennedy, 228, 427; Lee, 424, 425, 426; Orrick,
623 ; Rusk, 429
Presidential messages, letters, and reports. See
under Kennedy, John F.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, hearings:
Communist subversion (Martin), 347, 404
Foreign government agents, investigations (Ball),
375
Information policies (Manning) , 575
Nuclear explosions and test ban negotiations
(Rusk), 485, 488
Tax returns of foreign representatives, authoriza-
tion to inspect, 254
Connally amendment, 124
Conservation of Uving resources of the high seas,
convention on : Colombia, 305
Consular relations :
U.N. conference at Vienna, U.S. representative, 461
U.S. agreements with:
Japan, 546, 585
Korea, 154
Panama, for issuance of exequaturs in Canal Zone,
172
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1963
714-736—64 2
1009
Consular relations — Continued
Vienna convention (1963) on and optional protocol:
Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Central African Re-
public, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazza-
ville), Congo (LSopoldville), Cuba, Dahomey, Den-
mark, Dominican Republic, France, Gabon, Ghana,
Holy See, Iran, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Lebanon,
Liberia, Liechtenstein, Niger, Norway, Peru,
Philippines, U.S., Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vene-
zuela, Yugoslavia, 764.
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic De-
velopment in South and Southeast Asia. See
Colombo Plan
Contiguous zone and territorial sea, convention (1958)
on : Portugal, 341 ; South Africa, 810
Continental -shelf, convention (1958) on the: Portugal,
341 ; South Africa, 810
Contingency fund, FY 1964 appropriation, 672, 882
Copyright convention (19.")2), universal:
Current actions : Bermuda, North Borneo, Zanzibar,
585
Protocol 1, application to works of stateless persons
and refugees : Finland, 546 ; Greece, 997
Protocol 2, application to works of international
organizations : Finland, 546 ; Greece, 998
Protocol 3, effective date of instruments of ratifica-
tion, acceptance, or accession : Finland, 546 ;
Greece, 998
Corea, Luis F., 115, 123
Corner, F. H., 58
COSPAR. See Committee on Space Research
Costa Rica :
Coffee agreement (1962), international, 926
President Kennedy's visit to, 517
Sau Jose meetings of Central American Presidents
and Ministers. See San Jos^ meetings
Cotton textiles :
Japanese exports to U.S. (Johnson), 609
Long-term arrangements re trade in: Australia, 189;
Mexico, 153
Cottrell, Sterling J., 190
Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, 273
Council of Finance Ministers of Latin American gov-
ernments, cited (Martin), 919
Courts. See International Court and Permanent Court
Crimmins, John Hugh, 190
Crockett, William J., 997
Cuba (see also Cuban crisis) :
Aggressive and subversive activities : Martin, 348,
711; Rusk, 313, 386, 388, 440, 474; U.S. note,
263
Agricultural research project, U.N. Special Fund,
U.S. views: Gardner, 3.59, 480; Rusk, 357
Bay of Pigs invasion :
Prisoners, welcome on return to U.S. (Kennedy),
88
Question concerning (Rusk) , 368
Chinese and Soviet personnel in (Rusk), 686
Cuba — Continued
Refugees and exile groups in U.S. :
Attack on Soviet merchant vessel, 599
Hit-and-run raids by, U.S. position, 520, 600, 687
Influx into U.S. (Rusk), 473
Problem of (Martin), 984
U.S. policy toward : Department, 709 ; Martin, 983
Soviet domination (Kennedy), 514
Soviet troops and militai-y equipment, U.S. concern
and question of withdrawal: Ball, 369, 370;
McGhee, 870 ; Rusk. 206. 238. 242, 244, 312, 362,
365, 388, 432, 470, 472, 646, 681, 686, 733, 934;
Stevenson, 147
Swiss Representatives visit to U.S. prisoners on Isle
of Pines, 137
Travel to, recommended limitations on, 719
Treaties, agreements, etc., 266, 306, 764, 765, 888,
926
U.S. policy toward: Martin, 988; Rusk, 206, 240,
361, 363, 680, 698, 732
U.S. vessels, attacks on, protests and requests for
explanations, 356, 573, 600
Cuban crisis :
Lessons of (Manning) , 142
OAS and Western Hemisphere action and support:
Martin, 405, 712 ; Rusk, 135, 207, 469 ; Stevenson,
704
President's handling of (Rusk) , 204
Report to U.N., U.S.-Soviet, 153
Shipping and trade during. See under Ships and
shipping
U.N. role : Cleveland, 874 ; Gardner, 477 ; Sisco, 531 ;
Stevenson, 147, 525, 705
U.S. actions :
Argentine support, 212
Blockading, question of (Rusk), 207, 473
Embargo on shipping and trade : announcement,
283 ; Rusk, 207, 470
Quarantine of:
Advance notification of (Foster) , 4
Legal case for (Meeker) , 87
Support of allies ( Rusk ) , 204
U.S.-Soviet confrontation (Blumenthal), 219
Cultural, Educational and Scientific Organization.
See Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion.
Cultural center, national, proposed, 93
Cultural relations and programs (see also Educational
exchange and Exchange of persons) :
Advisory Committee on the Arts, 46, 190, 448, 663
Books program. See Books
Importance of and support (or : Battle, 92 ; Norrell,
214, 216
Presentations programs :
Advisory Commission on International Educational
and Cultural Affairs, recommendations of, 46, 96
Statements : Battle, 96, 915 ; Norrell, 215
Programs in: Africa (Williams), 67, 69; Japan
(Battle), 97
1010
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Cultural relations and programs — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc.
Cultural agreement with : Germany, 93 ; Malaya,
265 ; Rumania, 661, 673
Educational, scientific, and cultural materials,
agreement and protocol on importation of : Tan-
ganyika, 722
Performing artists, agreement with Poland re re-
ciprocal waiver of visa fees, 306
UNESCO programs (Battle), 957
Customs (sec also Tariff policy) :
Commercial samples and advertising material, con-
vention (1952) to facilitate importation: Tan-
ganyika, 926
Relief supplies and packages, duty-free entry and
defrayment of inland transportation charges on,
agreement amending 1955 agreement with Korea,
154
Road vehicles, convention (1954) on temporary im-
portation : Tanganyika, 377
Cutler, Lloyd N., 540
Cyprus, treaties, agreements, etc., 230, 341, 673, 722
Czechoslovakia :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 962
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 506
DAC. See Development Assistance Committee
Dahomey, treaties, agreements, etc., 764, 962
Dale, William B., 375
Danubian countries, geographic term (Pearcy), 334
Dean, Arthur H., 115, 121, 125, 126
Decade of Development :
Economic goals (Gardner) , 17, 908
Purpose (Bingham), 460
U.S. support (Kennedy), 208, 531
UNESCO role (Battle), 954, 955
Defense (see also Collective security. Mutual defense,
and National defense) :
Free-world alliances (Rusk), 384
India, U.S. production consultations, 283
Internal defense and security :
Agreements re furnishing articles and services:
Chile, 189 ; Jamaica, 976 ; Peru, 189
Communist subversion, newly developed countries
(Johnson), 452
U.S. programs (Martin), 406
Defense, Department of, 118, 444
Defense College, Inter-American, 409
De Gaulle, Charles :
U.S. visit, question of (Rusk), 933
Views on, question of :
Atlantic alliance (Rusk) , 248 ; Ball, 372
Europe (Harriman), 281
NATO nuclear deterrent (RuskJ, 205, 206
Del Rosario Ceballos, Enriquillo Antonio, 976
Deming, Olcott H., 153, 505
Demography. See Population growth, problems of
Denmark, treaties, agreements, etc., 341, 377, 764, 926
Denney, George C, Jr., 889
Dennison, Robert L., 521
Department of Commerce, export expansion program,
229
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 256
Department of Justice, 600
Department of State. See State Department
Department of State 1963, published, 849
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) :
Activities, importance of (Johnson), 456
Africa, aid (Williams), 209
Chairman, election, 417
Goals of (Rostow),857
Development Association, International. See Interna-
tional Development Association
Development Bank, Inter-American. See Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank
Development loans, FY 1964 appropriation, 226, 671,
882
Diplomatic relations and recognition :
Haiti, possible break (Rusk), 936
Recognition :
Guatemala, 703
Iraq, 316
Syrian Arab Republic, 476
Togo, Republic of, 969
Yemen, 11
Vienna convention (1961) and protocol : Congo (Braz-
zaville), 629 ; Laos, Niger, 110
Diplomatic representatives abroad. See Foreign
Service
Diplomatic representatives in the U.S. :
Presentation of credentials : Bolivia, 751 ; Bulgaria,
946 ; Oylon, 703 ; Chile, 360 ; Dominican Repub-
lic, 976; Ghana, 751; Guinea, 360; Iran, 751;
Japan, 751; Rwanda, 317; Switzerland, 360;
Upper Volta, 170 ; Venezuela, 317
Yemen legation raised to Embassy, 250
Disarmament («ee also Armaments, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Nuclear weapons and Outer
space) :
Complete and general :
Importance (Kennedy), 163
NATO views, 10
Partial measures (Fester), 126
Risks of (Foster) , 3, 5, 129
18-Nation Disarmament Committee. See Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee
Soviet position : Department, 127 ; Foster, 133
U.N. Disarmament Commission, 960
U.S. position and efforts: Department, 127; Depart-
ment briefing, 115 ; Foster, 3, 132, 133 ; Gardner,
791 ; Gore, 24 ; McGhee, 869 ; Rusk, 842
Disarmament Commission, U.N., 960
Discrimination. See Racial discrimination
Disputes, pacific settlement of. See Pacific settlement
Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-19^5,
Series G (1933-1937), The Third Reich: First
Phase, Volume IV, April 1, 19S5-March 4, 1936,
published, 77
Doherty, William C, 506
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1963
1011
Dominican Republic :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 976
Dispute with Haiti, OAS and Security Council efEorts
(Yost), 958
Elections (Department), 8
Treaties, agreements, etc. : 110, 153, 189, 306, 504, 505,
764, 926, 997, 998
Double taxation :
Agreements and conventions for avoidance of :
Earnings from ships and aircraft, Iceland, 77
Income, Luxembourg, 9
Negotiations to eliminate, proposed (Hilsman), 900
Downs, Hugh, 202
Drugs, narcotic:
Manufacture and distribution of :
Convention (1931) limiting and regulating :
Senegal, Upper Volta, 961
Protocol (1948) bringing under international con-
trol drugs outside scope of 1931 convention:
Senegal, Upper Volta, 961
Opium, regulating production, trade, and use of :
Convention (1912), Senegal, 961
Protocol (1953) : Greece, 341; Senegal, 998; U.S.,
505
East-West relations :
Communist meetings in Moscow, effect of (Rusk),
933
Nassau talks (Kennedy, Macmillan), 43
Sino-Soviet dispute, effect of (Johnson), 278
EGA. See Economic Commission for Africa
ECAFE. See Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East
ECE. See Economic Commission for Europe
ECLA. See Economic Commission for Latin America
Economic and Social Council, U.N. :
Commission on International Commodity Trade,
meeting of (Blumenthal), 844
Dociunents, lists of, 584, 960
Survey and recommendations on demographic prob-
lems : Gardner, 909 ; Martin, 919
Trade problems of less developed countries, proposed
conference on, 264
U.S. representative to, confirmation (Bingham), 505
Economic and social development (see also Economic
and technical aid, Foreign aid programs, and Less
developed countries:
Africa. See under Africa
Central America, proposals at meeting of Central
American Presidents, 511, 516
Commodity trade, importance of (Blumenthal), 844
Cuba, economic situation in (Rusk), 441
Economic diversification, importance to (Blumen-
thal), 222
European unity, achievement through (Schaetzel),
324
Latin America. See Alliance for Progress
Need for improvement (Cleveland), 63
Pacific Islands, ANZUS Council recommendation, 968
Economic and social development — Continued
Population growth, relationship to. See Population
growth
Programs of and U.S. cooperation : Brazil, 557 ;
Greece, 970; Japan, 608; Costa Rica, 517, 518;
Viet-Nam, 968
Rural development, relationship to (Rostow), 824
Southeast Asia (see also Colombo Plan), SEATO's
views on, 643
UNESCO program for (Battle) , 956, 957
U.S. position : Bowles, 941 ; Johnson, 453, 455 ; Gard-
ner, 540 ; Kennedy, 593 ; Rusk, 669
Economic and technical aid to foreign countries {see
also Agency for International Development, Agri-
cultural surpluses. Alliance for Progress, Economic
and social development. Foreign aid programs,
Inter-American Development Bank, International
Bank, International Development Association,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, and United Nations : Technical assistance
programs) :
Administration and coordination of (Bowles), 944
Aid to : Africa, 626 ; Argentina, 617 ; Brazil, 144, 285 ;
Congo, 209; Ceylon (suspended), 328; Japan,
607 ; Latin America, 919 ; Portugal, 105
Appropriation and authorization requests for FY
1964 : Bell, 881 ; Kennedy, 224, 598 ; Rusk, 666,
671
Tamily planning programs (Gardner), 910
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
U.S. agreements with: Central African Republic,
377 ; Japan, 418 ; Somali Republic, 154 ; Tunisia,
38
U.S. programs for (Johnson), 830
West German aid to Africa (Williams), 903
Yugoslavia, question of U.S. aid to (Rusk), 239
Economic Commission for Africa, U.N., 5th session
(Kotsehnig), 625
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, U.N. :
Study of Tokaido railway problems, 660
U.S. representative to 19th session, confirmation
(Baldwin), 505
Economic Commission for Europe, U.N., U.S. repre-
sentative to 18th session, confirmation, 765
Economic Commission for Latin America, U.N., 10th
session :
Statement (Martin), 918
U.S. representative, confirmation, 765
Economic Cooperation Administration, 647
Economic Cooperation and Development, Organization
for. See Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development
Economic policy and relations, U.S. (see also indi-
vidual countries) :
Domestic economy:
Effect of disarmament on : Gilpatric, 123 ; Foster,
125
Need for expansion : Kennedy, 159 ; Bowles, 823
1012
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETnf
Economic policy and relations, U.S. — Continued
Foreign economic policy :
Balance-of-payments problem. See Balance of
payments
EEC. See European Economic Commission
Foreign aid program. See Foreign aid
Recognition of economic interdependence (Ball),
413
Tariff policy. See Tariff policy, U.S.
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. See Trade Expan-
sion Act
Economic Report of the President (excerpts), 228
ECSC. See European Coal and Steel Community
Ecuador :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 230, 765, 926
U.S. tuna fishing, dispute over (RusIj), 976
Education (see also Cultural relations and programs,
Educational exchange, and Exchange of persons) :
Africa. See Africa
American schools abroad, proposed legislation to aid
(Kennedy), 599, 672
Central America, strengthening of, 516
Colombo Plan efforts to increase technical training
in Southeast Asia (Marks), 978, 979
Foreign affairs. See Foreign Service Institute and
National academy of foreign affairs
Foreign students in America (Battle), 752
International, U.S. aid to (Norrell), 216
Pacific Islands, Trust Territory of, U.S. views (Cleve-
land), 615
U.S. Educational Foundation, agreement with Philip-
pines, 673
UNESCO programs (Battle), 955
Education and World Affairs, Inc. (Battle), 755
Educational exchange program, international (see also
Cultural relations. Education, and Exchange of
persons) :
Advisory Commission, 46, 96, 617, 753, 755
Agreements with : Colombia, 110, 765 ; Germany, 93 ;
Iceland, 765; Malaya, 378; Philippines, 673;
Thailand, 945, 998
Appropriation request for FY 1964 (Kennedy), 226,
228
Board of Foreign Scholarships, responsibilities, 297
Review of (Battle), 753, 755
U.S. programs in: Africa, 68; Germany, 93; Philip-
pines, 545
Educational, scientific, and cultural materials, agree-
ment (1950) and protocol on importation of:
Italy, 189 ; Tanganyika, 722
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
U.N.:
Aid to African education ( Williams), 603
Constitution of : Algeria, 110 ; Burundi, Jamaica,
Mongolia, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, Ugan-
da, 341
Director General (Maheu), visit to Washington, 584
General conference of, 12th session (Battle), 954
U.S. role in (Norrell), 216
EEC. See European Economic Community
Egypt. See United Arab Republic
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee:
Nuclear test ban negotiations to be resumed by
(Foster), 236
Progress at, question of : Dean, 121 ; Rusk, 389, 703
Resumption of discussions (Kennedy), 340
Soviet Union and U.S. cochairmen of, 127
U.S. proposals (Foster), 3, 5, 124, 398, 399
Eisenhower, Dwlght D., 166
El Salvador:
San Jos6 meetings of Central American Presidents
and Ministers. See San Jos6 meetings
Treaties, agreements, etc., 849, 888, 926
Embargo on Cuban shipping and trade, effectiveness
(Rusk), 207
Emergency preparedness functions, assigned to Secre-
tary of State, Executive order, 629
English-language teaching program abroad (Battle),
95
Erpf , Armand, 732
Establishment, friendship, and navigation, treaty with
Luxembourg, 403, 418, 505
ETAP. See Expanded Program of Technical Assist-
ance, U.N.
Ethiopia :
Emperor, to visit U.S., 938
Treaties, agreements, etc., 110, 306, 418, 888
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 505
Europe (see also Atlantic partnership, European head-
ings, individual countries, and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization) :
Balance of payments, status (Trezise), 973
De Gaulle proposals re, effect of Sino-Soviet dispute
on ( Harriman ) , 281
Eastern Europe, U.S. policy re trade expansion
(Tyler), 947
Economic Commission for, U.S. representative to
18th session, confirmation, 765
Economic development and problems (see also Eu-
ropean Economic Community) : Fanfani-Ken-
nedy, 164; Bowles, 779; MacArthur, 174;
Manning, 138, 139, 141, 142; Stevenson, 706
Geographic terminology (Pearcy), 330
U.S. relations, review (McGhee), 771, 773
Unification of:
De Gaulle position re, question of, 247, 248
EEC development aids (Ball), 412, 414
Efforts and principles: Ball, CS9; McGhee, 772;
Schaetzel. 324 ; Tyler, 648
French-German reconciliation, aid to (Rusk), 206,
242
Monnet, role of (Ball, Kennedy), 195
U.S. supports: Chayes, 318; McGhee, 868; Ros-
tow, 855, 856; Schaetzel, 324; Trezise, 972
Western Europe:
Communism (Chayes), 319
Countries in (Pearcy), 332
U.S. forces In, purpose (Rusk) , 247
U.S. relations (Rusk), 314, 391
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1963
1013
European Coal and Steel Community, purpose of
(Schaetzel), 324
European Defense Community, failure of: Chayes,
318, 319, 320 ; Rusk, 246 ; Schaetzel, 324
European Economic Community :
Africa, development fund aids (Williams), 209
Commission of. Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations, proposed talks with, 180
Progress and purpose : Chayes, 320 ; McGhee, 772 ;
Trezise, 971
Trade:
Agricultural policy, Argentine-U.S. joint state-
ment, 212
Poultry import fees, proposed meeting (Herter),
996
Tariff, common external, U.S. publication on, 889
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 230
U.K., membership question. See under United King-
dom
U.S. economy challenged (MacArthur), 174
U.S. relations: Rusk, 701; Trezise, 971
U.S. vievps : Ball, 692 ; Tyler, 649, 651
Unity, basis (Ball), 689
Exchange of persons program (see also Educational
exchange) :
Africa, exchange of students and specialists with
(Williams), 68
Leaders and specialists, visits to U.S. (Norrell), 215
Executive orders :
Emergency preparedness functions, assigned to Sec-
retary of State (11087), 629
International Wheat Agreement Act of 1949, dele-
gation of authority (11108), 914
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (1962), ad-
ministration of (11077), 255
Senate Committee granted authority to inspect for-
eign representatives' tax returns (11080), 254
Trade agreements program, administration of
(11106), 839
Trade Expansion Act, administration of (11075), 180
Trading With the Enemy Act, amendment of Execu-
tive order 10587 re administration of Section
32(H) of Executive order 11086, 618
Exequatur, agreement with Panama re issuance in
Canal Zone, 172
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, U.N.
(see also Special Fund) :
Africa, aid in (Williams) , 602
Objectives (Bingham) , 259, 261
Export-Import Bank :
Argentina, financial negotiations with, 617
Budget and programs for FY 1964 (Kennedy), 225,
226, 227
Loans to Poland, 303
Exports (see also Imports owe? Trade) :
Africa, need to increase earnings of (Kotschnig),
627
Brazil, U.S. proposals re (Gordon), 291
Coffee. See Coffee
Exports — Continued
EEC-U.S. negotiations on poultry import fees, 997
Latin America, increases in ( Martin) , 919
Less developed countries, GATT discussions (Her-
ter), 990
U.S.:
Expansion of, promotion program for (Kennedy),
229
Financing of, 229
Italy removes restrictions on, 12
Opportunities in EEC, 175
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. See Trade Expan-
sion Act
Expropriation of property abroad :
Ceylon, negotiation for compensation (Rusk), 240,
241
Compensation for, U.N. resolution re, 787
Hickenlooper amendment re, 296
Fahmy, Ismail, 924
Family -planning programs, U.S. views (Gardner), 913
Panfani, Amintore, 164
FAO. See Pood and Agriculture Organization
Far East. See Asia
Faroe Islands, agreement on joint financing of certain
air navigation services in :
Article V, amendment of, entry into force, 888
Current actions : France, 153 ; Japan, 722
Fedorenko, N. T., 198
Ferguson, C. Vaughan, Jr., 110, 506
Fiji Islands, international wheat agreement (1962),
189
Finance Corporation, International, articles of agree-
ment : Ivory Coast, 504
Finland :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 77, 230, 546
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 505
Finletter, Thomas K., 197
Fish and fisheries :
Ecuador, dispute over U.S. tuna fishing (Rusk), 976
Fishing and conservation of living resources of high
seas, convention (1958) on: Colombia, 305;
Portugal, 341 ; South Africa, 810
Halibut, U.S. accepts recommendations of the In-
ternational North Pacific Fisheries Commission
on abstention, 574
North Pacific fisheries :
International convention (1952) on, amendments
to annex : Canada, Japan, U.S., 888
Proposed discussions, Canada, Japan, U.S., 914
Flags, agreement with Panama re display of in Canal
Zone, 172
Plannery, Harry W., 440
Florence agreement, 95
Floridian, U.S. motorship, 573, 600
Pood and Agriculture Organization, U.N. :
Freedom from hunger campaign, U.S. participation,
254
Projects in Cuba, U.S. views, 357, 480
World Food Congress, sponsored by, 583, 663
1014
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Food Congress, World, 5S3, 663
Food-f or-Peace Program :
Accomplishments and value : Johnson, 831 ; Kennedy,
Appropriation request FT 1964 (Kennedy), 226, 228
Foreign affairs, national academy of, proposed. See
National academy of foreign affairs
Foreign Affairs Personnel, Committee on, 425, 429, 622
Foreign aid programs, U.S. (see also Agency for Inter-
national Development, Economic and technical aid,
and Peace Corps) :
Administration of, problems (Rusk), 684
Appropriations and authorizations requests for FY
1964: Bell, SSI; Kennedy, 225, 226, 591; Rusk,
664, 671
Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free
World. See Committee To Strengthen the Se-
curity of the Free World
Effect on balance of payments ( Rusk ) , 734
Future of and review of accomplishments (Johnson),
829
Need for and objectives of: Bowles, 777, 822, 939;
Rusk, 386, 683
Public image of (Cleveland), 60
Question of misuse or waste (Rusk), 685
Role in foreign policy (Manning), 144
Foreign aid programs of other governments (Cleve-
land), 62, 64
Foreign Assistance Acts :
1961, amendments : Kennedy, 599 ; Tyler, 947
1962, amendment (Department), 296
Foreign Credit Insurance Association, 229
Foreign currency, authorization for sale of Egyptian
pounds to U.S. tourists, 173
Foreign government agents in the U.S. : Ball, 375 ;
Executive order re, 254
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 805
Foreign investments {see also Investment), agreements
with sovereign states re, U.N. position (Steven-
son), 150
Foreign Ministers conference of American Republics,
cited ( Martin ) , 407, 408
Foreign policy, U.S. :
Bipartisan congressional support (Rusk), 363, 438
Briefing conferences :
Broadcasters and editors, 618
National nongovernmental organizations, 935, 946
Regional : Los Angeles, 173 ; Philadelphia, 443 ;
San Francisco, 254, 311
Conduct of (Rusk), 367
Congressional documents relating to foreign policy,
lists, 229, 329, 376, 579, 717, 883, 917, 951
Educational and cultural exchange, relationship to,
216
Principles, objectives, and problems : Bowles, 817 ;
Cleveland, 167; Kennedy, 195; Manning, 138;
Rostow, 551 ; Rusk, 203, 679 ; Williams, 251, 252
Race discrimination, effect of (Rusk), 935
Status of (Rusk), 203
U.N. role (Stevenson), 522
Foreign Relations of the United States, series :
Advisory Committee recommendations (Rusk), 586
X9.i2, Volume VI, The American Republics, pub-
lished, 883
Foreign Scholarships, Board of, 296, 755
Foreign Service (see also State Department) :
Ambassadors :
Appointments and confirmations, 110, 153, 376, 505,
765, 848, 997
Central American and Panamanian, meeting at
San Salvador, proposed, 213
Budget, increase of (Kennedy) , 226, 228
Consulate at Bakavu, Republic of the Congo, opened,
765
Education and training. <Sce Foreign Service Insti-
tute and National academy for foreign affairs,
proposed
Language training in, 61
Multiple entry visas for diplomatic representatives,
agreement with Czechoslovakia re issuance, 154
Role in struggle against communism (Lee), 424
Women's organizations seminar, 716
Yemen, legation raised to Embassy, 250
Foreign Service Institute (see also National academy
for foreign affairs, proposed) :
Language training facilities ( Lee) , 424
Legislation repealing establishment, proposed (Ken-
nedy), 428
Purpose of : Ball, 622 ; Orriek, 623
Foreign students in the U.S. (see also Educational ex-
change) :
African (Williams), 68
Aid to (Norrell),216
Government's role (Battle), 752
Foreign trade. See Trade
Forest Service, U.S., use of observation satellites
(Meeker), 748
Foroughi, Mahmoud, 751
Foster, William C, 3, 115, 128, 198, 236, 398
France :
Atlantic partnership, position re (Ball) , 372
European integration, position re : Ball, 414 ; Chayes,
318
German foreign policy documents (1935-36), volume
released, 77
German-French reconciliation: Ball, 374; Rusk, 206,
242
NATO nuclear force, position on (Rusk), 205, 937
President de Gaulle. See De Gaulle
Treaties, agreements, etc., 153, 230, 305, 342, 418, 546,
629, 764, 888, 926
U.S. policy toward (Rusk), 368, 933
Veto of U.K.'s entry into Common Market: Ball,
689, 692 ; Chayes, 321 ; Rusk, 205
Frank. Isaiah, 264
Freedom-from-Hunger Week, proclamation, 254
Friendship, commerce, and navigation, treaty with the
Netherlands, 418
Friendship, establishment, and navigation, treaty with
Luxembourg, 403, 418, 505
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 196 3
1015
Fulbright, James William, 33
Fulbright-Hays Act {see also Educational exchange),
216, 752, 753, 755
Gabon, treaties, agreements, etc., 764, 765, 926
Galbraith, John Kenneth, 982
Gambia (colony and protectorate), international wheat
agreement (1962), 189
Gardner, John W., 617
Gardner, Richard N., 14, 358, 477, 535, 789, 906
GATT. See Tariffs and trade, general agreement on
General agreement on tariffs and trade. See Tariffs
and trade, general agreement on
General Assembly, U.N. :
Accomplishments ; Sisco, 530 ; Stevenson, 147, 523
Committee I (Political and Security), consideration
of:
Korean question (Allott) and resolution, 70
Outer space, peaceful uses (Gore), 21
Committee II (Economic and Financial), considera-
tion of population and economic development
(Gardner) , 14, 908, 909, 911
Committee IV (Trusteeship), consideration of Por-
tuguese arms diversion to Angola (Bingham),
104
Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary), con-
sideration of financing of peacekeeping oi)era-
tions in Congo and Middle East. 30
Documents, lists of, 107, 340, 528, 584, 925, 960
Financing peacekeeping operations:
Addresses : Cleveland, 873 ; Gardner, 535 ; Klutz-
nick, 30
Bond issue, authorized, 799
4th special session, U.S. delegates, 884
lOJ advisory opinions, U.N. acceptance of (Klutz-
nick), 34
Purpose of (Chayes), 563, 565
Resolutions :
Hungarian question, 76
Outer space, cooperation In peaceful uses, 28
Peacekeeping operations in Congo and Middle East,
accepting ICJ opinion on and financing, 37
Population growth and economic development, 19
UNRWA, extending mandate of, 103
Roosevelt, Anna B., memorial tribute to, 48
Special Political Committee, consideration of:
Arab refugee problem, 99
Hungarian problem (Rowan), 74
Voting patterns in (Cleveland), 873
General Services Administration, 182
Geneva Accords, U.S. and Lao support and Communist
nonsupport, 85, 312, 447, 569, 642, 680, 687, 728, 731,
897
Geneva conventions (1049) relative to treatment of
prisoners of war, wounded and sick, armed forces,
and civilians in time of war: Cyprus, Ireland,
Malaya, Mauritania, 230
Geneva Disarmament Conference. See Eighteen Na-
tion Disarmament Committee
Geophysical Year, International (Meeker), 746
German Dollar Bonds, Validation Board, 146
Germany :
Berlin. See Berlin
Foreign policy documents (1935-36), volume released
by Department, 77
Germany, Federal Republic of :
Army, Soviet views, 865
Association of Victims of Nazi Persecution, court
action re, Soviet protest and U.S. reply, 45
Berlin. See Berlin
Defense Minister, visit to U.S., 444
French-German reconciliation : Ball, 374 ; Busk, 206,
242
Soviet protests accession to NATO, 865
Treaties, agreements, etc., 93, 110, 230, 418, 673, 888,
961, 962
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 765
Ghana :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 751
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 585, 629, 764, 961
Gibraltar, international wheat agreement (1962), 189
Gilbert and EUice Islands Colony, international wheat
agreement (1962), 306
Gilpatric, Roswell L., 115, 118, 123, 126
Goa, Indian takeover of (Meeker), 85
Godber, J. B., 52
Goddard Space Flight Center, 294
Gordon, Lincoln, 284
Gore, Albert, 21, 105
Gossett, William T., 376
Government Advisory Committee on International Book
Programs, 95, 756
Governmeut-in-exile, Cuban, question of U.S. recogni-
tion of (Martin), 989
Graham, Martha, 217
Grand Duchess Charlotte, 647, 776
Granik, Theodore, 698
Great Lakes, 418
Greece :
Defense problems, NATO aid, 10
Minister of Coordination, visit to U.S., 970
Treaties, agreements, etc., 110, 341, 673, 810, 997
Greenland, agreement on joint financing of certain air
navigation services in :
Article V, amendment of, entry into force, 888
Current actions : France, 153 ; Japan, 722
Grenada, treaties, agreements, etc., 189, 306
Guaranty of private investment. See Investment
Guaranty Program
Guatemala :
San Jos6 meetings of Central American Presidents
and Ministers. See San Jos§ meetings
Treaties, agreements, etc., 546, 722, 926
U.S. recognition, 703
Guinea :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 360
Communist subversion (Williams), 879
Nonalined policy (Williams), 903
ORT program, 209
1016
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN
Guinea — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc., 77, 962
Gutierrez-Olivos, Sergio, 360
Haiti :
Diplomatic relations, question of U.S. breaking
(Rusk), 936
Dispute with Dominican Republic, OAS and Security
Council efforts (Yost), 958
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 926
U.S. citizens, avoid traveling to and withdrawal
from, 834
Halaby, N. E., 784
Halibut, U.S. accepts recommendations of the Inter-
national North Pacific Fisheries Commission re,
574
Hammarskjold, Dag, cited, 785
Harbor and port conference, 2d inter-American, U.S.
delegation, 925
HARP project, 266
Harriman, W. Averell :
Confirmed as Under Secretary of State, 630
Statements on Sino-Soviet dispute, 271, 274, 279
U.S. representative to ANZUS Council meeting, 809.
967, 969
U.S. representative to meeting with Premier Khru-
shchev on Laos, 775
Harvey, C. Daggett, 540
Hassan II, King of Morocco, 601
Haugland, Jens, 57
Hayes, Alfred, 732, 734, 735
Health, Education, and Welfare, Department of, 256
Health Organization, World. See World Health Or-
ganization
Herter, Christian A. :
Address and statements :
Poultry import fees, EEC, 996
Trade negotiations and OECD, 298
Trade with Poland and Yugoslavia, question of,
951
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations :
Confirmation, 376
Duties and functions : Executive orders, 180 ;
Weiss, 658
U.S. representative to GATT Ministerial meeting,
885
Visit to Europe for talks with EEC, GATT, and
OECD representatives, 180
Hickenlooper amendment, 296
High seas, convention (1958) on: Central African
Republic, Nepal, 266 ; Portugal, 341 ; South Africa,
810
Highways, Nepal, agreement terminating regional
agreement (1958) between India, Nepal, and U.S.
re transportation facilities development, 585
Hilsman, Roger, Jr., 271, 765, 897
Ho Chi Minh, 280
Holy See, Vienna convention on consular relations.
764
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1963
714-736 — 64 3
Honduras :
San Jos6 meetings of Central American Presidents
and Ministers. See San Jos6 meetings
Treaties, agreements, etc., 341, 505, 888, 926
Hong Kong, international wheat agreement (1962), 189
Horsey, Outerbridge, 506
Hound Dog missile, 44
Housing, Costa Rican program, 517
Hughes, Thomas L., 849
Hungary :
U.N. consideration of problem of (Rowan), 74
U.S. position (Stevenson), 151
Hydrological decade, international, proposed (Battle),
956
Hydrology and Atmospheric Sciences, Committee on
International Programs in, 742
IAEA. Sec Atomic Energy Agency, International
Iberian Peninsula (Pearcy),335
IBRD. See International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development
ICAO. See International Civil Aviation Organization
Iceland, treaties, agreements, etc., 77, 153, 342, 722, 765
ICJ. See International Court of Justice
IDA. See International Development Association
IFC. See International Finance Corporation
IJC. See International Joint Commission
ILO. See International Labor Organization
IMF. See Monetary Fund, International
Immigration (see also Visas) :
Fingerprint requirements for nonimmigrant appli-
cants, agreement with Cyprus, re waiver of, 341
Nonimmigrant visas, reciprocal, agreement with
Ecuador, 230
Imports («ee also Customs; Exports; Tariff policy,
U.S.; Tariffs and trade, general agreement on;
and Trade) :
Dollar-area imports, need for relaxation of restric-
tions on (Trezise), 499
Duties. See Tariff policy
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Aircraft, imported certificates of airworthiness for,
agreement with Japan for reciprocal acceptance,
342
Commercial samples and advertising material
convention (1952) to facilitate importation:
Tanganyika, 926
Educational, scientific, and cultural materials,
agreement and protocol on : Italy, 189
Road vehicles, customs convention (1954) on :
Tanganyika, 377
U.S. agricultural, volume of, 994
Income, convention (1963) with Luxembourg for relief
of double taxation on, 9
India:
Communist China aggression :
Addresses and statements : Harriman, 275, 695 ;
Kennedy, Macmillan, 43 ; Rusk, 642, 664
1017
India — Continued
Communist China aggression — Continued
Military aid to :
Soviet Union (Harriman), 276
U.K. and U.S. : Harriman, 276 ; Rusk, 249, 439,
664
U.S. defense ijroduction experts' consultations,
283
Economic aid to :
IBRD (Johnson), 456
Soviet Union (Harriman), 276
U.S. : Bowles, 779 ; Johnson, 833
Economic and social developments in (Bowles), 940
Goa, Indian takeover (Meeker), 85
Pakistan, relations with (Kennedy, Macmillan), 43
President Radhakrishnan visit to U.S., 883, 969
Secretary Rusk, proposed visit to, 484
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 77, 189, 342, 585, 629,
673, 849, 926
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 848
Visit of Assistant Secretary Talbot to, purpose of
(Rusk), 243
Indian Ocean Expedition, international, agreements
with India, 189, 849
Indonesia :
Communism and nationalism in : Harriman, 281 :
Hilsman, 898
Soviet Union economic and military support (Harri-
man), 275
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 585, 926
U.S. interest in (Harriman) , 697
West New Guinea, settlement of dispute with Nether-
lands : Meeker, 84 ; Rusk, 366 ; Stevenson, 148
Industrial property, convention (1883, as revised) for
protection of : Cuba, 266 ; Switzerland, 266
Information activities and programs (see also Publi-
cations and United States Information Agency) :
Expansion of (Rusk), 387
Freedom and management of news: Ball, 370; Man-
ning, 500, 575 ; Rusk, 365, 366, 438
Outer space, General Assembly resolution concern-
ing, 29
UNESCO program (Battle), 956
Viet-Nam situation, need for improved coverage
(Rusk), 238
Institute for educational planning, international, pro-
posed (Battle), 955
Institute of International Education, 448
Instituto de Biofisica de Universidade do Brasil, radio-
biological and research program, 810
Intelligence Advisory Board, Foreign, 805
Interagency steering committee on air transport policy,
784
Inter- American Development Bank :
Appropriation request for U.S. subscription, for FY
1964, 225, 227
U.S. alternate governor, confirmation (Bell), 765
Inter-American port and harbor conference, 2d, U.S.
delegation, 925
Inter- American Program for Social Progress, appropri-
ation request for FY 1964 (Rusk), 672
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
(Rusk), 384
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion, convention on : Brazil, 629 ; Syrian Arab Re-
public, 505
International air services transit agreement: Algeria,
849 ; Trinidad and Tobago, 629
International Atomic Energy Agency. See Atomic
Energy Agency, International
International Bank for Reconstruction and Develoi)-
ment:
Africa, loans to (Williams), 603
Articles of agreement : Ivory Coast. 504 ; Jamaica,
377 ; Niger, 765 ; Upper Volta, 810
Assistance to India and Pakistan (Johnson), 456
Financial statement, 301
Relationship to U.N. Special Fund (Bingham), 261
U.S. Executive Director, confirmation, 375
International Civil Aviation Organization, 504, 585, 888
International Coffee Council, 221, 495
International commission on reduction of risk of war,
proposed (Foster), 8
International Cooperation Administration (Rusk), 685
International Court of Justice :
Advisory opinion on U.N. assessments for financing
peacekeeping operations in Congo and Middle
East:
General Assembly resolution accepting, 37
U.S. support and views : Klutznick, 30 ; Plimpton,
800; Rusk, 396
Judicial arm of the U.N. (Chayes), 565
Role of (Gardner), 792, 794, 795
Statute of : Kuwait, 926
International Development Association :
Appropriation request for U.S. subscription for FY
196i, 225, 227
Articles of agreement: Burma, Dominican Republic,
Ivory Coast, Nepal, 504 ; Niger, 765 ; Sierra
Leone, Tanganyika, 504
Collaboration with U.N. Special Fund (Bingham),
262
International Finance Corporation, articles of agree-
ment : Ivory Coast, 504
International Geophysical Year (Meeker), 746
International Joint Commission, U.S. -Canada, 717
International Labor Conference, 47th session, U.S. dele-
gation, 959
International Labor Organization:
Constitution of, amendment, 961
Peace Corps program, agreement concerning, 546
International law {see also International Court of
Justice and Law of the sea) :
Challenge of in U.N., 785
International Law Commission, 795
Outer space, development : Chayes, 835 ; Gore, 22 ;
General Assembly resolution, 28 ; Meeker, 923
Role in world affairs : McGhee, 807 ; Meeker, 83
Strengthening, efforts for (Foster), 124
1018
DEPARTMENT OF STATE RTTT.T.THTTIf
International Monetary Fund. See Monetary Fund,
International
International office of weights and measures, conven-
tion for creation of : U.A.R., 722
International organizations (see also subject) :
Appropriation request for U.S. contributions, FY
1964 : Kennedy, 226, 228 ; Rusk, 672
Calendar of meetings, 13, 98, 186, 257, 338, 416, 503,
580, 718, 807, 952
Growth of law through (Meeker), S3
Staffing of, report released, 809
Works of, application of 1952 universal copyright
convention to, protocol 2 : Finland, 230 ; Greece,
997
International Telecommunication Union :
Frequency allocation by ITU for outer space conunu-
nications : Chayes, 837 ; Gardner, 743
Proposed 1963 conference re space communications
(Gore), 26, 29
International tensions, U.S. efforts for reduction (Gil-
patric), 126
International Year of the Quiet Sun, 29
Investment Guaranty Program :
Accomplishments (Kennedy), 596
Agreements with: Argentina, 998; Congo (Lfiopold-
ville), 3S; Gabon, 765; Greece, 810; Israel, 462;
Jamaica, 154; Nigeria, 110; Trinidad and To-
bago, 266 ; Tunisia, 629 ; Venezuela, 77
Investment of private capital abroad :
Agreements regarding, U.N. position (Stevenson),
150
Brazil (Gordon), 293
Expropriation. See Expropriation
Greece, efforts to attract, 970
Latin America (Martin), 920
Nigeria, 458
Protection of. See Investment Guaranty Program
Role of and U.S. efforts to expand: Kennedy, 595;
Rusk, 364
Tax credit for new investment, proposed, 596
U.N. Special Fund role (Bingham), 261, 262
Iran:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 751
Congratulations on results of referendum (Kennedy) ,
316
Secretary Rusk to visit, 484
Treaties, agreements, etc., 342, 764
U.S. aid to (Rusk), 685
Iraq:
New government (Ball), 369
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 997
U.S. recognition, 316
Ireland, treaties, agreements, etc., 230, 764
Isle of Man, international wheat agreement (1962), 189
Israel :
Arab refugee problem : Rowan, 99 ; Stevenson, 151
Technical assistance programs in Africa (Williams),
209
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 266, 306, 341, 377, 462,
849
Istomin, Eugene, 915
Italy:
Dispute with Austria over South Tyrol (Meeker), 85
Imports from U.S., removal of restrictions on, 12
NATO nuclear force, Italian interest (Rusk), 936
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 189, 230, 341, 418,
673, 849, 926
Visit of President Fanfani to U.S., 164
ITU. See International Telecommunication Union
Ivory Coast, treaties, agreements, etc., 504, 505, 764,
926, 961
Jackson, Elmore, 101
Jamaica :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 77, 154, 341, 377, 418, 585,
673, 962, 976
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 506
Japan :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 751
Consular convention with U.S., 546, 585
Cultural and educational exchanges with U.S., dis-
cussions on, 97
North Pacific fisheries, U.S.-Canada- Japan proposed
discussions on, 914
OECD, U.S. supports membership in: Johnson, 609,
610 ; Rusk, 572
Role as a major nation (Johnson) , 606
Trade :
Export pattern, change in (Gordon) , 292
With U.S. (Johnson), 607, 609
U.S.-Japanese compensatory concessions, 108, 154,
182, 295
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 305, 342, 418, 673, 722,
849, 888, 926
Jayaratnem, Merenna Francis de Silva, 703
Jewish Restitution Successor Organization, 618
Johnson, James Allen, 1(34
Johnson, U. Alexis, 271, 449, 606, 635, 829
Johnstone, William C, 271, 280, 282
Jones, J. Wesley, 376
Jordan, treaties, agreements, etc., 77, 418, 961
Justice, Department of, 600
Kabore, Boureima John, 170
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 719
Kennedy, Jacqueline, 90
Kennedy, John F. :
Addresses, statements, etc. :
Atlantic Alliance, realities underlying, 197
Central America, Presidents' meeting at San Jos6,
511, 520
Churchill, Winston, honorary citizen of U.S., 715
Costa Rica, visits to housing project and univer-
sity in, 517
Cuban Invasion Brigade, acceptance of flag and
welcome to U.S., 88
Decade of Development, 208
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, re-
sumption of conference, 340
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUN1E 1963
1019
Kennedy, John F. — Continued
Addresses, statements, etc. — Continued
International affairs, nintti annual conference on,
greetings to, 393
Katanga secession, welcomes end of, 207
National cultural center, proposed, 93
NATO multilateral force, 197
Olympio, Sylvanus, death of, 170
State of the Union (excerpts) , 159
United Nations conference on the application of
science and technology for the benefit of the less
developed areas, 302
Correspondence and messages :
Africa, conference of heads of state, 902
AID requested to inform Congress of reobligation
of funds, 185
Bataan Day commemorated, 647
Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free
World, acknowledgment of report from, 574
Freedom-from-Hunger Campaign Week, 254
Iran, congratulations on results of referendum,
316
Labor, inter-American conference of ministers of,
884
Marshall Plan employees, greetings at reunion of,
647
Monnet, Jean, contribution to European unity, 195
National Organizations, 13th annual conference of,
greetings to delegates of, 531
New Tear's greeting to Soviet leaders, 137
Nuclear test ban proposals, 200
Saudi Arabia, assurance of U.S. cooperation, 144
Decision on Tariff Commission recommendation re
escape-clause action on imports, 145
Executive orders. See Executive orders
Meetings with :
Heads of State and officials of, remarks and joint
communiques : Canada, 815 ; Central America,
213 ; Ethiopia, 938 ; India, 969 ; Italy, 164 ; Laos,
447 ; Luxembourg, 776 : Morocco, 601 ; Panama,
171, 213 ; United Kingdom, 43 ; Venezuela, 445
NATO Secretary General, 417
Messages, letters, and reports to Congress :
Budget message, excerpts, 224
Defense and assistance programs, request for FY
1964 appropriations, 591
Economic report, excerj^ts, 228
National Academy of Foreign Affairs, re bill for
establishment of, 427
State of the Union (excerpts), 159
Proclamations. See Proclamations
Visit to Central America, 511
"Kennedy round". See Tariffs and trade, general
agreement on : International negotiations, 1964
Khan, Muhammad ZafruUa, 48, 152
Khrushchev, Nikita S., ,50, 137, 198, 201, 775
Klutznick, Philip M., 30
Knight, Ridgeway B., 476
Korea :
Conflict, U.N. role (Meeker), 86
Korea — Continued
General Assembly debate on Korean item, question
of participation of Korean representatives
(AUott) and text of resolution, 70
Korea, north, rejection of U.N. authority on Korean
question (AUott), 71, 74
Korea, Republic of :
Support of U.N. actions and invitation to participate
in General Assembly debate on Korean item
(Allott) and text of resolution, 72
Treaties, agreements, etc., 77, 154, 189, 418
U.S. views on military junta rule, 573
Korry, Edward M., 505
Kotschnig, Walter M., 264, 625, 765
Krishnaswamy, S. Y., 663
Kuwait :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 504, 505, 926
U.N. membership, 884
Kuznetsov, Vassily V., 153
Labor :
Canada, proposed discussions re problems (Kennedy,
Pearson), 816
Canal Zone, U.S.-Panama discussions, 172
Competition with world industries (MacArthur),
177
Efforts for disarmament (Foster) , 125
Inter-American conference of ministers of, meeting
at Bogotd (Kennedy) , 884
International Labor Conference, 47th session, U.S.
delegation, 959
International Labor Organization, 546, 961
Migrant labor, agreement amending agreement
(1951) with Mexico, 505
Labor Organization, International :
Conference, 47th session, U.S. delegation, 959
Constitution of, amendment of, 961
Peace Corps program, agreement concerning, 546
Lachs, Manfred, 52
Land reform :
Japan, accomplishments (Johnson), 610
Need for (Bowles), 942
U.A.R., ban on foreign ownership of agricultural
land, 328
Laos :
Cease fire in, U.S. requests restoration, 646
Independence and neutrality of :
ANZUS support, 967
Geneva accords : Embassy statement, 569 ; Hils-
man, 897; Lao-U.S. communique, 447; Meeker.
85 ; Rusk, 311, 642, 680, 687, 728, 731
U.S.-Soviet support, 775
Refugee problem, 567
Status of developments in :
Polish views (Rusk) , 936
SEATO position, 643
U.S. views: Johnson, 638; Rusk, 642, 680, 687
Treaties, agreements, etc., 77, 110
Visit of King to U.S., 447
Larsen, Roy E., 448
1020
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Larson, Warner, 448
Latin America (sec also Central America, luter-
Amerlcan, Organization of American States, and
individual countries) :
Coffee trade problems. See Coffee
Communism in and efforts against : Martin, 347, 404,
711 ; resolution, 720 ; Rusli, 386, 472 ; U.S. note,
263
Council of Finance Ministers, 919
Economic and social development {see also Alliance
for Progress), progress and problems: Bowles,
781 ; Martin, 918 ; Rusk, 699
Exports, problems of : Johnson, 834 ; Martin, 919
Free Trade Association, proposed (Martin), 921
Population increase, problem of (Rusk), 687
Social science research center in (Battle), 956
U.N. Economic Commission for, 765, 918
UNESCO's aid in education (Battle), 955
Laurel-Langley trade agreement (Hilsman), 899, 900
Law Commission, International, U.S. proposal (Gard-
ner), 795
Law Day (1963), proclamation, 297
Law, international. See International law
Law of the sea {see also Geneva conventions and Safety
of life at sea), conventions on, 266, 305, 341, 585,
810
Leaders and specialists, foreign, programs for : Nor-
rell, 215 ; Williams, 69
Lebanon, treaties, agreements, etc., 764, 926
Lee, John M., 197
Lee, Robert E., 423
Legal Subcommittee, U.N. Outer Space Committee, dis-
cussion of law for outer space, 22, 835, 923
Less developed countries {see also Newly Independent
nations) :
Commodity trade. See Commodity trade
Economic and social development (see also Eco-
nomic and technical aid and Economic and social
development) :
DAC aid (Johnson), 456
Japanese aid (Johnson), 610
U.N. Special Fund, aid to industrialization (Bing-
ham), 262
U.S. position and views: Ball, 413, 415; Bowles,
777, 781, 939; Cleveland, 63; Herter, 990;
Manning, 140; Rostow, 825; Schaetzel, 325
Education in and visits to U.S., effect of (Rusk),
670
Financial aid, sources of (Trezise) , 973
GATT discussions on agricultural products, ques-
tion of participation in (Herter), 995
Intel-national law, approach to (Schwebel), 787
Populati<jn problems. See Population
Sino-Sovlet views re (Hilsman) , 281
Trade problems, U.N. conference proposed considera-
tion of, 264, 265
U.N. conference on application of science and tech-
nology in: Bingham, 461; Kennedy, 302; Rusk
and U.S. representatives to, 188
Less developed countries^Continued
U.S. position : Bowles, 941 ; Kennedy, 161 ; Rostow,
554
UNESCO programs in (Battle), 955, 957
Lewis, W. Arthur, 291
Liberia, treaties, agreements, etc., 764, 888
Libya, U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 848
Liechtenstein, Vienna convention on consular rela-
tions and optional protocol, 7(54
Lightner, E. Allan, Jr., 848
Linowltz, Sol M., 809
Living standards (Williams) , 903
Loans, U.S. (See also Development Loans and Ex-
port-Import Bank), burden on taxpayers (Gor-
don), 286
Locke, Edwin A., Jr., 540
London, Kurt L., 271, 279, 282
Louchheim, Mrs. Katie, 716, 801
Luxembourg :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 9, 77, 230, 403, 418, 505,
629, 673, 926
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 506
Visit of Grand Duchess Charlotte and Prince Jean
to U.S., 647, 776
Lyerly, J. Edward, 190
MacArthur, Douglas, II, 174
Macmillan, Harold, 43
Madagascar. See Malagasy Republic
Maheu, Ren6, 584, 956
Malagasy Republic :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 849, 888, 926
U.S. Ambassador, appointment, 110; confirmation,
506
Malaya, treaties, agreements, etc., 230, 265, 378
Malaysia Federation, proposed:
ANZUS support, 968
Statement (Rusk), 366
Mali :
ORT program in (Williams), 209
Road traffic convention (1949), 77
Manila Pact («ee also Southeast Asia Treaty Organi-
zation), U.S. views, 641, 642
Manning, Robert J., 138, 500, 575
Mapping and aerial photography, agreement with
Ethiopia, 306
Maritime Consultative Organization, Intergovernmen-
tal, convention on : Brazil, 629 ; Syrian Arab Re-
public, 505
Marks, Matthew J., 977
Marriage, convention (1962) on, Philippines, 926
Marsden, Howard J., 925
Marsh, Helen, 55
Marshall Plan, 647, 779, 830
Martin, Edwin M. :
Addresses and statements:
American states, interdependence of, 710
Communist subversion in Western Hemisphere,
347, 404
Latin American economic development, 918
INDEX, JANXJAKX TO JUNE 1963
1021
Martin, Edwin M. — Continued
Confirmation as U.S. representative to 10th session
of ECLA, 765
Meeting of Ambassadors at San Salvador, participa-
tion, 213
Mauritania, treaties, agreements, etc., 230, 341
Mauritius, international wheat agreement (1962), 189
Mayobre, Jos6 Antonio, 918
McDermott, Walsh, 188, 302
McGhee, George C, 493, 765, 771
Measures and weights, convention (1875) creating in-
ternational olBce of and convention (1921) amend-
ing : U.A.R., 722
Medical research centers, SEATO, 644
Meeker, Leonard C, 83, 746, 923
Mennin, Peter, 448
Merchant, Livingston, 197
Mercury project, tracking facilities for, agreement with
Australia, 377
Merrow, Chester Earl, 630
Meteorological Organization, World. See World Mete-
orological Organization
Meteorological research :
Barbados, agreement with U.K. for, 266
Indian Ocean, agreements with India concerning, 189,
849
Mexico, agreement extending 1957 agreement, 629
Meteorological satellites:
Canada, agreement for establishment of command
and data acquisition station, 154
U.N. and U.S. programs : Gardner, 740, 741 ; Gore, 26 ;
Meeker, 747
Mexico :
Air transport talks with U.S., 840
Broom production costs, use in U.S. determination of
duties on broom imports, 376
Migrant labor, agreement with U.S., 505
Travel between Cuba and Mexico, problem of
(Rusk), 474
Treaties, agreements, etc., 77, 153, 505, 629, 926
Miami, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs field oflSce estab-
lished, 190
Middle East. See Near and Middle East
Migrant labor, agreement with Mexico, 505
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (1962), admin-
istration of. Executive order, 255
Military aircraft, U.S., "failsafe" procedure, 4
Military alliance, Sino-Soviet (Hilsman), 274
Military assistance (see also Military missions, and
Mutual defense) :
Authorization and appropriation requests for FY
1964: BeU, 882; Kennedy, 224, 226; Rusk, 667,
672
Latin America (Martin), 406
Objectives (Kennedy), 593, 595
Military missions:
El Salvador, agreement extending 1954 Army mission
agreement with, 888
Exchange of, Soviet proposal for (Foster), 7
Mills, H. R., 979
Mir6 Cardona, Jos6, 709, 985, 988
Missiles :
NATO multilateral nuclear force. See under North
Atlantic Treaty Organization
Polaris. See Polaris missiles
Soviet, in Cuba, question of withdrawal. See Cuba :
Soviet troops and military equipment
U.S. margin of superiority in (Gilpatric), 126
U.S. supply to :
Japan, agreement re, 888
U.K., consultations and agreement re, 44, 368, 673,
759
Use in multilateral nuclear force : Ball, 738 ; McGhee,
775 ; Rostow, 859
Monetary Fund, International :
Argentina, loan to, 617
Articles of agreement : Ivory Coast, 504 ; Jamaica,
377 ; Niger, 765 ; Upper Volta, 810
Brazil, proposed financial negotiations, 560
Compensatory financing facility (Blumenthal), 847
New borrowing arrangement (Trezise), 973
U.S. Executive Director, confirmation, 375
Mongolia, People's Republic of :
Sino-Soviet rivalry (Hilsman), 272, 273
Treaties, agreements, etc., 341, 629
Monnet, Jean, 195, 323, 324
Monroe Doctrine, 732
Montserrat, treaties, agreements, etc., 189, 306
Moon, Surveyor project, 746
Morgan, Edward P., 369
Morocco, visit of King Hassan II to U.S., 601
Morris, Brewster H., 765
Morrison, de Lesseps S., 264
Morrow, Conrad F., 271, 282
Moscoso, Teodoro, 213
Moyers, Bill D., 153, 376
Mozambique, U.S. proposal for study by U.N. repre-
sentatives, withdrawal of, 105, 583
MpaUaniye, Lazare, 317
Muniz, Carlos Manuel, 170, 211
Munro, Sir Leslie, 75, 76, 77
Mutual defense and assistance program (Kennedy),
161, 162
Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of
1961, 216
NAC. See North Atlantic Council
NAFSA. See National Association of Foreign Student
Advisers
Narcotics. See Drugs, narcotic
NASA. See National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration
Nassau meeting (President Kennedy, Prime Minister
Macmillan) :
Implementation of, 308
Joint communique and attached statement, 43
Provisions of (Kennedy), 160
National academy of foreign affairs, proposed :
Address (Lee), 424, 425
Panel recommendation, 47
1022
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
National academy of foreign affairs — Continued
President's budget message, 228
Proposed legislation :
Memorandum (Rusk), 429
President's letter of transmittal, 427
Senate Committee hearings : Ball, 619 ; Orrick, 623
National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Interna-
tional Programs in Atmospheric Sciences and Hy-
drology (Gardner), 742
National Advisory Council on the Teaching of English
as a Foreign Language, 96
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Sur-
veyor project, proposed programs (Meeker), 746
National Association of Foreign Student Advisers
(Battle), 752
National Coffee Association, 220
National cultural center, proposed, 93
National defense and security :
Importance of (Gilpatric), 118
Maintenance (Kennedy), 163
Relationship of foreign aid programs to (Kennedy),
591
National Defense Education Act (Bowles), 783
National Meteorological Center (Gardner), 741
National organizations, 13th annual conference of,
greeting to delegates (Kennedy), 531
Nationalism :
Communism, incompatibility betv^een (Johnson), 277
Newly independent nations: Johnson, 450; Steven-
son, 523
Nationalization of U.S. property in Ceylon, question of
compensation, 240, 241, 328
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Natural resources, permanent sovereignty over
(Stevenson), 150
Naval communication center, agreement relating to
establishment of, with Australia, 926
Naval ships. See Ships
Navigation, treaties concerning, with : Luxembourg,
403, 418, 505 ; Netherlands, 418
Nazi Persecution, Association of Victims of, 45
Near and Middle East (see also individual covntries) :
Arab refugee problem : Rowan and General As-
sembly resolution, 99 ; Stevenson, 151
Central Treaty Organization. See Central Treaty
Organization
Great Powers disputes in, U.N. role (Meeker), 85
Situation in (Rusk), 475
U.N. peacekeeping operation in, financing: Gardner,
536 ; General Assembly resolutions, 37 ; Klutz-
nick, 30
Nepal, treaties, agreements, etc., 266, 305, 504, 505, 585
Netherlands :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 230, 342, 418, 462.
849, 926
West New Guinea, settlement of dispute with In-
donesia : Meeker, 84 ; Rusk, 366 ; Stevenson, 148
Neutrality and nonalined nations :
African (Williams), 902
Decrease in (Rusk) , 204
INDEX, JANTJART TO JTTNE 1963
Neutrality and nonalined nations — Continued
Sino-Soviet views (Johnson), 279
U.S. views (Kennedy), 161
Nevis and Anguilla, treaties, agreements, etc., 189, 306
New York State Power Authority, 717
New Zealand :
ANZUS Council meeting, 967
Treaties, agreements, etc., 305, 926
Newly independent nations (see also Less developed
countries) :
Africa (Williams), 541
Communist threat (Williams), 877
U.N. role and actions: Cleveland, 875; Stevenson,
149
U.S. relations : Bowles, 817 ; Williams, 457, 901
Newman, J. Wilson, 732, 734
Niagara River, International Joint Commission's ap-
proval requested by New York State for removal
of shoal in, 717
Nicaragua :
International coffee agreement, 926
San Jos6 meetings of Central American Presidents
and Ministers. See San Jos6 meetings
Niger, treaties, agreements, etc., 77, 110, 230, 764, 765,
962
Nigeria :
Economic development (Williams), 458
Treaties, agreements, etc., 110, 962
Nimbus satellite, 27, 747
Nkrumah, Kwame, cited, 544
Nongovernmental organizations :
Foreign policy conference, 935, 946
Role in aid program ( Bowles ) , 944
Non-self-governing territories :
Nyasaland protectorate, attainment of self-govern-
ment, 585
Portuguese territories. See under Portugal
South- West Africa, U.S. position (Williams), 605
Trust Territory of Pacific Islands, 615, 946, 968
NORAD. See North American Air Defense Command
Norrell, Mrs. Catherine D., 153, 214
North American Air Defense Command, 244, 936
North Atlantic Council :
Ministerial meetings :
Ottawa (1963), text of communique, 895; U.S.
delegation, 896
Paris (1962), text of communique, 9; U.S. delega-
tion, 11
Multilateral nuclear force discussions, principal U.S.
members, 197
U.S. Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, appoint-
ment (Smith), 521
North Atlantic Ocean stations, 1954 agreement on:
Current actions, Japan, 722
Entry into force of amendment to, 462
North Atlantic Treaty Organization :
Armed forces :
Canadian forces In Europe, question of U.S. supply-
ing nuclear weapons to, 243
1023
North Atlantic Treaty Organization — Continued
Armed forces— Continued
Jupiter missiles, replaced with Polaris missiles,
242, 247, 896
Modernization program (Uusk),247
NAC communiques, 10, 895
Nuclear force. See infra
Status of forces, agreements concerning: Belgium,
888 ; Germany, 961
U.K. and U.S. forces, discussions on assignment
to, 368
Atlantic Policy Advisory Group, 3d meeting, 721
Consultations in: McGhee, 774; Rusk, 242, 646
Council of. See North Atlantic Council
Cuban crisis, unity during (Rusk), 135
European unity, effect on (Tyler), 648
Importance and success of : Kennedy, 197 ; Rusk, 205,
246, 392, 442 ; Schaetzel, 325
Missile bases, purpose of ( Rusk ) , 361
Nuclear force, multilateral, proposed :
French rejection, effect of (Rusk), 205, 206
Italian-U.S. discussions, 164, 936
Negotiations, U.S. representatives, 197
Soviet position, 862, 896
Support for (Rusk), 315
U.K.-U.S. talks, 44, 932
U.S. position and views : Ball, 372, 373, 414, 736,
738; Beam, 491; Kennedy, 160; Manning, 141;
McGhee, 775; Rostow, 5.52, 857; Rusk, 31.5, 385,
389, 390, 392, 46S, 469, 759, 937 ; Schaetzel, 327 ;
U.S. note, 860
Western Europe-U.S. consultations (Rusk), 434
Objectives and commitments : Bingham, 105 ; NAC
communique, 896 ; Rusk, 384, 700 ; Schaetzel, 326 ;
U.S. note, 861
Secretary General, visit to U.S., 417
U.S. participation and commitment to: Chayes, 319;
Rusk, 314
North Borneo, treaties, agreements, etc., 189, 585, 962
North Pacific fisheries. See under Fish and fisheries
Norway, treaties, agreements, etc., 266, 305, 585, 764,
810, 849, 926
NS Savannah, agreements concerning :
Belgium, visit to Belgian ports, 810
Netherlands, public liability for damage, 342, 926
Norway, use of ports and territorial waters, 585
Nubian monuments, 957
Nuclear defense or deterrent :
NATO and Europe. See North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization : Nuclear force, multilateral proposed
U.K.:
Consultations on, 43, 368, 932
Polaris missiles, agreement for sale, 673, 759
Nuclear energy. See Atomic energy, NS Savannah,
and Nuclear headings
Nuclear test ban treaty, proposed :
Provision re nonparticipating nations: Dean, 125;
Rusk, 241
U.S. views and efforts (Rusk), 2.39, 240, 241, 485,
1024
Nuclear training and research equipment, agreement
granting to India, 342
Nuclear weapons :
Accidental war, measures for reducing danger of
(Foster), 4, 118
Canada, negotiations with, concerning : Department,
243 ; Rusk, 235, 242, 435, 936
China, Communist, capability (Rusk), 249
Competitive situation (Rusk), 468
Delivery vehicles, Soviet proposal for destruction
(Foster), 133
Dissemination of, problems of : ANZUS Council
views, 968; Ball, 737; Beam, 490; Rusk, 486;
Rostow, 552
NATO nuclear force. See under North Atlantic
Treaty Organization
Security and disarmament, problem of (Fo-ster), 128
Stockpiles of (Rusk), 486
Tests. See Nuclear weapons tests
U.K.-U.S. relationship re, 43, 368, 759, 857
U.S. monopoly, problem of (Manning), 141
Nuclear weapons tests :
Atmospheric tests, Soviet position (Rusk), 931, 938
Cessation of:
ANZUS Council views, 968
Inspection and control of :
Soviet position : Dean, 122 ; Foster, 130, 399, 401 ;
Khrushchev, 198, 201 ; Rusk, 202, 236, 238, 471
U.S. proposal and position : Foster, 130, 399,
400, 401; Kennedy, 200; Rusk, 203, 236, 238,
241, 249, 250, 367, 432, 439
Negotiations :
Progress of ( Kennedy-MacMillan ) , 43
Question of summit meeting (Rusk), 934
Resumption at Geneva (Ball), 375
U.K., U.S., U.S.S.R., announced, 127 ; exchanges
and progress, 198 ; suspension of, 235, 236, 403
U.S. efforts and position : ACDA, 403; Rusk, 367,
485, 931
Soviet position, 367, 433, 931, 938
U.S. position and proposals : ACDA statement, 403 ;
Beam, 489 ; Foster, 118, 130, 398 ; Gore, 23 ; Rusk,
485 ; McGhee, 869
Chinese and French tests (Rusk) , 241
Detection of, Pugwash conference proposal, 199, 201
U.S. underground tests in Nevada :
Postponed (Kennedy), 238
Resumption of, preparations for (Rusk), 237, 241,
250
Nyasaland and Rhodesia, Federation of. See Rhodesia
and Nyasaland, Federation of
OAS. See Organization of American States
O'Brien, Frank, 271, 281
Obscene publications, agreement to repress circulation
of: Madagascar, 849
Observation posts, propo.sed as deterrent against in-
advertent war (Foster), 6
Observer corps, U.N., proposed, 795
Oceanographic program, UNESCO (Battle), 956
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
i
OECD. See Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development
Oil:
Pollution of sea by, convention (1954) for prevention
of, with annexes : Jordan, 961 ; U.A.R., 888
Soviet exports to Communist CliLna, 279
Soviet supply to Cuba, 473
Venezuela, position in world market, 447
Okazaki, Katsuo, 55
Olympic, Sylvanus, 170
ONUC. See Congo, Republic of the: U.N. role and
operation in
Opium. See under Drugs, narcotic
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment:
Development Assistance Committee. See Develop-
ment Assistance Committee
Japan, U.S. supports membership for: Johnson, 609,
610 ; Rusk, 572
Less developed countries, aid to (Rusk), 315
Negotiations for reduction of trade barriers, pro-
posed (Herter), 298
Progress of (Ball), 413, 414
Secretary-General, Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations proposed talks with, 180
Organization for Trade Cooperation, agreement on:
Brazil, 888 ; Trinidad and Tobago, 377
Organization of American States :
Action and efforts against subversive activities : Cen-
tral American declaration, 517 ; Martin, 407,
712 ; Rusk, 440
Cuban crisis, role and efforts: Martin, 405; Rusk,
135 ; Stevenson, 704
Dominican-Haitian dispute, role in (Yost), 958
Soviet troops in Cuba, question of U.S. request for
action (Ball), 371
Support of, U.S.-Venezuela call for, 446
U.S. warning of Cuban threat, 263
Orlansky, Mrs. Jesse, 115, 123, 126
Orlich, Francisco, 213
Ormsby Gore, David, 198, 715
Orrick, William H., Jr., 623
ORT. See American Organization for Rehabilitation
Through Training
OTC. See Organization for Trade Cooperation
Outer Mongolia. See Mongolia
Outer space (see also Satellites, earth) :
Committee on Space Research, 24, 924
Law, proposals and discussions : Chayes, 835 ; Gen-
eral Assembly resolution, 28 ; Gore, 22 ; Meeker,
923
Meteorology, development of and U.S. objectives
(Gardner), 740
Observation in (Meeker), 746
U.N. role and efforts: Gardner, 745; Gore, 21; Gen-
eral Assembly resolution, 28
U.S. programs and policy: Gardner, 740; Gore, 21;
Rusk, 295, 387, 683
UNESCO program (Battle), 956
Outer space — Continued
Vehicle tracking, agreements re : Australia, 377 ;
Mexico, 926
Outer Space, U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of:
Legal Subcommittee, discussions : Chayes, 836 ; Gore,
22; Meeker, 923
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, proposals
(Gore), 22
Pacific community (Cleveland), 613
Pacific Islands, Trust Territory of the :
ANZUS Council recommendation for economic and
social development, 968
U.S. administration of (Cleveland), 615
U.S. Survey Mission, proposed visit to, 946
Pacific settlement of disputes :
Conventions for (1899 and 1907) (Permanent
Court of Arbitration) : Byelorussian S.S.R.,
Cameroon, Congo (L^opoldville), Honduras,
Israel (1907 convention), Ukrainian S.S.R.,
Upper Volta, 341
Optional protocol of signature concerning : Portugal,
341
Vienna convention on consular relations, optional
protocol relating to. See Consular relations
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, 317
Pakistan :
Afghanistan, resumption of relations (Rusk), 931
CENTO Ministerial Council meeting, 484
Dispute with India, 43, 439
IBRD aid to (Johnson), 456
Loan of vessel from U.S., agreement on, 418
Palestine refugees, U.S. position: Rowan, 99; Steven-
son, 151
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1963 :
Proclamation, 317
Statement (Stevenson), 704
Pan-Africanism (Williams), 902
Pan-Africanist Congress (Williams), 880
Panama :
San Jos6 meetings of Central American Presidents
and Ministers. See San Jos^ meetings
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 306, 926
Visit of President Chiari to U.S., 171
Papaligouras, Panagiotis, 970
Papua, New Guinea, international coffee agreement
(1962), 926
Paraguay, treaties, agreements, etc., 505, 673
Pavicevie, Miso, 55
Pazhwak, Abdul Rahman, 57
PCC. See United Nations Palestine Conciliation
Commission
Peace :
Peacemaking role of U.N. (Kennedy), 163
Prospects for (Rusk), 202, 203, 204
Peace Corps :
Appropriation request for FY 1964 (Kennedy), 226,
227
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1963
1025
Peace Corps — Continued
Deputy Director, appointment and confirmation, 153,
376
Importance (Kennedy), 162
Programs :
Africa (Kotschnig), 627
Agreements concerning : Guatemala, 546 ; Guinea,
77; ILO, 546; India, 77; Indonesia, 585; Niger,
962
Peace Observation Commission, U.N., 795
Peaceful coexistence :
China, Communist, rejection, 273
U.S.S.R. views (Schwebel), 788
Pearcy, G. Etzel, 330
Pearson, Lester B., 148, 815
Pendell, Gerald, 164
Pengel, Johan, 838
Permanent Court of Arbitration, 341
Personnel, Foreign Affairs, Committee on, 425, 429, 622
Persons on leave, agreement with Germany on status
of, 962
Peru:
Communist subversion (Martin), 355
Treaties, agreements, etc., 189, 764, 926
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 376
Petroleum. See Oil
Philippines :
Bataan Day, commemoration of (Kennedy), 647
Economic and social development (Hilsman), 897
Fulbright agreement, ceremonies on 15th anniversary
of, 545
Treaties, agreements, etc., 266, 378, 673, 764, 888, 926
Pilotage services on Great Lakes and St. Lawrence
River, coordination of, agreement amending agree-
ment (1961) with Canada, 418
Plimpton, Francis T. P., 796
Poland :
Agricultural commodities agreement, text of, 303,
306
Laos situation, views on, 936, 938
Most-favored-nation tariff treatment, question of:
Kennedy, 599 ; Rusk, 239 ; Tyler, 947
Political situation in (Tyler), 950
Treaties, agreements, etc., 303, 306, 377
U.S. children's hospital in, 672
Polaris missiles:
French rejection of U.S. offer (Rusk), 205, 206
Replacement for Jupiter missiles (Rusk), 242, 247,
391
Role in NATO defense pattern: Ball, 738; Chayes,
321 ; Kennedy, MacmlUan, 44
U.S. sale to U.K. :
Consultations, 44, 368
Text of agreement, 673, 759
Police Academy, Infer- American (Martin), 407
Pollution of sea by oil, international convention (1954)
with annexes, for prevention of : Jordan, 961 ;
U.A.R., 888
Popov, Lyubomir, 946
Population growth, problems of:
D.N. research and studies : Gardner, 14, 18, 906, 909 ;
Martin, 919
U.S. views and proposed program (Gardner), 912
Port and harbor conference, 2d inter-American, U.S.
delegation, 925
Porter, William J., 505
Portugal :
African territories, U.S. views: Yates, 582; Williams,
694
Arms diversion to Angola, refutation of by U.S.
(Bingham), 104
Goa, Indian takeover (Meeker), 85
Treaties, agreements, etc., 110, 306, 341, 418, 926
U.N. representatives proposed visit to Angola and
Mozambique, withdrawal of U.S. proposal for,
105
Postage stamps. Canal Zone, U.S.-Panama discussions
re usage of Panamanian stamps in, 172
Postal convention (1959), universal, with final proto-
col, annex, regulations of execution and provisions
re airmail: Burundi, 810; Cuba, 765; Dominican
Republic, Honduras, Nepal, 505 ; Rwanda, 810 ;
Tanganyika, Upper Volta, 765
Poultry, EEC import fees (Herter) , 996
Prebiseh, Raul, 918
Presidential advisory panel on the National academy
of foreign affairs : Ball, 622 : Lee, 424, 426 ; Rusk.
429
Press, the :
Caribbean press secretaries meeting at Oaxaca, post-
poned, 809
Freedom of and management of news, question of:
Ball, 370 : Manning, 500, 575 ; Rusk, 365, 366, 438
Prince Jean of Luxembourg, 647, 776
Prisoners :
Bay of Pigs invasion, Cuba, return to U.S., 88
Geneva conventions (1949) relative to treatment of
prisoners of war : Cyprus, Ireland, Malaya,
Mauritania, 230
U.S. prisoners in Cuba, visit by Swiss representa-
tives, 137
Proclamations by the President :
Churchill, Winston, honorary citizen of U.S. (3525),
716
Law Day, 1963 (3515), 297
National Freedom-from-Hunger Week (3514), 255
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1963
(3519), 317
United Nations Day, 1963 (3533), 806
World Trade Week, 1963 (3532), 758
Procurement, direct, agreement with Germany on set-
tlement of disputes from, 962
Project Mercury, tracking facilities for, agreement
with Australia, 377
Project Vela, 125, 491
Propaganda (see also Communism: Aggression and
subversive activities) :
Africa : Manning, 141 ; Williams, 877
1026
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Propaganda — Continued
Cuban. See Cuba : Aggressive and subversive ac-
tivities
Latin America : Martin, 347, 404, 711 ; Rusk, 386, 472 ;
U.S. note, 263
Property :
Bulgaria, U.S. owners to file tax forms on, 905
Excess, agreement vrith Korea veaiving restrictions
for disposal of, 418
Expropriated. See Expropriation
Industrial, convention (1883) for protection of:
Cuba, 266 ; Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 998 ; Switz-
erland, 266 ; Tanganyika, 998
Publications :
Congressional documents relating to foreign policy,
lists, 229, 329, 376, 579, 717, 883, 917, 951
Obscene publications, agreement on repression of
circulation of, Madagascar, 849
State Department :
Department of State 1963, published, 849
Documents on, German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945,
Series 0 (1933-1937), The Third Reich: First
Phase, Volume IV, April 1, 1935-March J,, 1936,
released, 77
Foreign Relations of the United States, 19^2, Vol-
ume VI, The American Republics, released, 883
Foreign Relations series. Advisory Committee rec-
ommendation for (Rusk), 586
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Analy-
sis of United States Negotiations, vol. IV, pub-
lished, 889
Lists of recent releases, 78, 190, 378, 506, 586, 673,
766, 850, 889, 962
StaflBng International Organizations, report, 809
U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educa-
tional and Cultural Affairs, Report of Survey of
Cultural Presentations Program, 46
United Nations :
Housing, Building and Planning in the Develop-
ment Decade, report, 262
Lists of current documents, 107, 340, 462, 528, 584,
809, 925, 960
Pugwash conference, 10th, at London, "black box" pro-
posal for detecting nuclear tests, 122, 199, 201
Punta del Este, charter of, 411, 706, 884
Quezon City (Bagobantay), agreement with Philip-
pines re relinquishment of U.S. naval transmitting
facility, 266
Racial discrimination :
Apartheid (Williams), 604
Effect on foreign relations (Rusk), 934, 935
Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, 883, 969
Radio:
Regulations (1959), annexed to 1959 international
telecommunication convention. See tinder Tele-
communication convention (19.59)
Radio — Continued
U.S. agreements with :
Dominican Republic, communications between
amateur stations on behalf of 3d parties, 998
Philippines :
Broadcasting facilities, agreement and protocol,
962
U.S. naval transmitting facility, relinquishment,
266
Radioactive fallout, problem of (Eusk),487
Rana, Jagdish S., 57
Randall, Clarence B., 296, 540
Ranger, tuna boat, 976n
Read, Benjamin H., 672
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, program under
(Weiss), 653
Red Cross, American, 137
Refugee Assistance Act (1962), designation of func-
tions, Executive order, 255
Refugees and displaced persons :
Arab refugee problems, need for solution and U.S.
views : Rowan, 99 ; Stevenson, 151
Copyright convention (1952), universal, protocol 1
on application to works of : Finland, 546 ;
Greece, 997
Cuban. See under Cuba
Korean, UNCURK report, 73
Laos, problem in, 567
Vietnamese (Rusk), 728
Relay satellite, 25, 171
Relief supplies and packages, duty-free entry and de-
frayment of inland transportation charges on,
agreement amending 1955 agreement with Korea,
154
Research equipment, nuclear, agreement with India
granting, 342
Retails, John D., 59
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation of :
Nyasaland protectorate, acquires self-government,
585
Treaties, agreements, etc., 888, 998
U.S. position (Williams), 604
Ribeiro, Miguel Augustus, 751
Rio Treaty, 384
Rivera, Julio A., 213
Rivkin, William R., 506
Road traflBc, convention (1949) on, with annexes:
Bulgaria, 585 ; Mali, 77
Road vehicles, customs convention (1954) on tempo-
rary importation : Tanganyika, 377
Robbins, Allan J., 296
Rome Treaty (see also European Economic Commu-
nity), 414
Rossel, Mrs. Agda, 54
Rossides, Zenon, 59
Rostow, Walt W.. 551, 824, 840, 855
Rowan, Carl T., 74, 99, 505
Royall, Kenneth, 732
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1963
1027
Rusk, Dean :
Addresses, remarks, and statements :
Afghanistan and Pakistan, resumption of relations
between, 931
Arab states, situation in, 435
Armed forces, U.S., purpose of, 383
Arms control and disarmament, U.S. policy on,
115, 127
Atlantic community, grand design for and De
Gaulle's position re, 246, 248
Atomic radiation, problem of, 487
Berlin situation, 135, 700
"Books USA" campaign, 806
Brazil :
Finance Minister, proposed visit to U.S., 434
U.S. economic aid, review of, 934
Canada, nuclear weapons negotiations, 235, 435, 936
Caribbean area, surveillance of traffic in, 684
Central America, common market in, 437
Central Treaty Organization, 11th ministerial
meeting, 841
Ceylon, negotiations for compensation of expro-
priated property, 240, 241
China, Communist :
Nuclear weapon development, problem of, 249
Recognition, question of, 702
Trade, U.S. position, 645
U.S. policy toward, 271, 283
Communism, threat of aggression of, 842
Communist meetings at Moscow, effect of, 933
Congo, U.N. forces in, 437, 442
Cuba. See Cuba and Cuban crisis
Ecuador, tuna fishing problem with, 976
EEC, U.S. relationships with, 701
18-nation committee on disarmament, conference
of, 389, 703
Foreign aid program :
Administration, problems of, 363, 366, 684
Appropriations request for FY 1964, 664
Effect on balance of payments, 734
Swearing-in of new Administrator, 65
Foreign policy, U.S. :
Conduct of, 367
Congressional support re, 363
Effect of race discrimination on, 935
Objectives, 282, 679
Problems and developments, 311
Status of, 203
Foreign trade, promotion of, 734
France, U.S. policy toward, 368
Free-world struggle for security and freedom, 383
GATT tariff negotiations, prospects of, 937
German-French proposed treaty, 242
Haiti, question of diplomatic break with, 936
India, U.S. aid to, 249, 439, 664
Investment of private capital abroad, object of,
364
Japan, U.S. supports membership in OECD, 572
Laos, situation in, 687, 936, 938
Rusk, Dean — Continued
Addresses, remarks, and statements — Continued
Latin America :
Communist activities, efforts to prevent, 440, 472
Population increase, problem of, 687
Malaysia, Federation of, proposed, 366
Middle East, situation in, 475
Monroe Doctrine, 732
NATO:
Commitments of, 700
Consultations in, 242
Importance of, 205, 442
Multilateral nuclear force, 361, 390, 434, 469,
932, 936
Neutralism, decrease in, 204
News, question of management of, 365, 366
Nuclear test ban :
Control of, 249
Soviet position, 931, 938
Western position, 931
Nuclear test ban treaty :
French and Chinese participation, question of,
241
Negotiations for, 367, 934
Purpose and effects of, 239, 240
Soviet position on, 433
U.S. efforts, 485
Nuclear weapons :
Dangers in spread of, 486
National nuclear forces, 932, 937
Stockpiles of, 486
Nuclear weapons tests :
Detection equipment for, question of, 241
Soviet position on, 202, 238
U.S. su.spension, 250
Peace, prospects for, 202, 203, 204
Polaris missiles, 391
Presidents' conference in Costa Rica, 699
Roosevelt, Eleanor, memorial service, 51
Satellite Relay, inauguration of broadcasts to Latin
America, 171
Science and technology conference, U.N., 188
Shipping, U.S., protection of, 389
Sino-Soviet dispute, 204, 365, 644, 702
Southeast Asia, foreign aid program in, 702
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 8th meeting
of Council of Ministers, 641
Soviet Union:
Military forces and equipment in Cuba. See
under Cuba.
Nuclear test ban, position on, 235, 239, 242, 367,
471
U.S. cooperation with and policy toward, 271,
283, 471
Space science, international cooperation in, 294
Special Fund, project in Cuba, 357
State Department, volume of business in, 367
Travel between Mexico and Cuba, problem of, 474
U.K., EEC membership question, 236, 366
1028
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
Rusk, Dean — Continued
Addresses, remarks, and statements — Continued
U.N.:
Financing peacekeeping operations, 436
U.S. commitment to, 394
Viet-Nam :
Situation in, 238, 391, 435, 680, 687, 727
U.S. aid to and policy in, 364, 701
U.S. armed forces in, 364
Venezuela, U.S. support to resist Cuban subversive
activities in, 440
Western Europe-U.S. relations, 391
Yemen :
Egyptian troops in, problem of, 936
U.S. policy toward, 475
West New Guinea, Indonesia and Netherlands dis-
pute over, 366
Yugoslavia, question of aid, 239
Correspondence :
Foreign aid shipments, allegations on, 685
Foreign Relations series, recommendation en-
dorsed for, 586
National academy of foreign affairs, proposed, 429
U.S.-U.K. Polaris sales agreement, 759
Meetings :
Argentine Foreign Minister, 170, 211
CENTO, 11th Ministerial meeting, head of U.S. ob-
server delegation, 484
NATO Ministerial Council meeting, U.S. represent-
ative to, 896
SEATO, Council of Ministers, 8th meeting at Paris,
584
News conferences, transcripts of, 235, 361, 388, 432,
684, 931
Participation in briefing conference at Los Angeles,
173
Radio and TV interviews, transcripts of, 115, 135,
202, 244, 271, 283, 361, 388, 440, 644, 698
Visit to CENTO countries, 739
Rumania, treaties, agreements, etc., 661, 673
Rwanda :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 317
Treaties, agreements, etc., 306, 341, 810, 926
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 505
Ryukyu Islands, treaties, agreements, etc., 378, 888
Safety of life at sea, convention (1960) on: Greece,
673 ; Japan, 673, 849 ; Spain, 462
St. Christopher, treaties, agreements, etc., 189, 306
St. Helena, international wheat agreement (1962), 189
St. Lawrence River, agreement with Canada re pilot-
age services on, 418
St. Lucia, treaties, agreements, etc., 189, 306
St. Vincent, international telecommunication conven-
tion (1959), 306
Salazar, Alfonso, 809
Samoa, Western, international wheat agreement
(1962), 962
San Jos6 meetings :
Meeting of Presidents of Central America, Panama,
and U.S. :
Announcement of, 213
Arrival and opening statements (Kennedy) , 512
Preparations for, U.S. Ambassadors meeting, 213
Statement upon departure (Kennedy), 520
Statement upon return (Kennedy), 511
Text of Declaration, 515
U.S. views (Rusk), 699
Meeting of Ministers of Central America, Panama,
and U.S., resolutions of, 719
San Salvador, U.S. Ambassadors meeting, 213
Sana'a Treaty, 12
Sdnchez de Lozada, Enrique, 751
Santiago Dantas, Francisco Clementino, 435, 557
Sarawak, treaties, agreements, etc., 189, 962
Satellites, earth :
Communications satellites. See Communications
satellites
Meteorological satellites. See Meteorological satel-
lites
Tracking stations, cooperation re (Rusk), 294
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Meteorological satellite system, agreement with
Canada, 154
Tracking stations, agreements with: Australia,
377 ; Mexico, 926
Saudi Arabia :
U.S. policy: Department, 90; Kennedy, 114
Visit of Ellsworth T. Bunker (Rusk), 437
Savang Vatthna, 447
Scali, John, 369
Scandinavia (Pearcy),334
Schaetzel, J. Robert, 322
Schaufele, William E., Jr., 765
School feeding program, agreement with Israel, 849
Schurmann, C. W. A., 56
Schwebel, Stephen M., 785
Science (see also Atomic energy. Nuclear weapons,
Outer space, and Satellites) :
Free- world superiority (Kennedy), 160
U.N. conference on application to less developed
countries: Bingham, 461; Kennedy, 302; Rusk
and U.S. delegation, 188
U.S. science attach^, appointment (Clark), 506
UNESCO. See Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
Scientific, Educational and Cultural Organization.
See Education, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion
SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Seaton, George, 448
Secretary of State (see also Rusk, Dean), emergency
preparedness functions assigned to. Executive
order, 629
Secretary-General of the United Nations. See under
United Nations
INDEX, JANXJAKY TO JUNE 1963
1029
Security Council, U.N. :
Cuban crisis, consideration of : Sisco, 531 ; Stevenson,
525
Documents, lists of, 107, 462, 528, 809, 960
Haitian-Dominican dispute, consideration of (Yost),
959
Maintenance of law and order in the Congo, author-
ity for (Gardner), 478
Veto power, Soviet use of (Stevenson), 527
Seif, Ahmad Abdel-Hamid, 223
Seismic stations, automatic, 122, 199, 201
Selassie, Haile, 938
Self-determination :
Africa : Gardner, 479 ; Williams, 252, 604
Pacific Islands (Cleveland), 616
Portuguese African territories (Yates), 582
U.S. position and support ( Bingham ) , 459
Senegal, treaties, agreements, etc., 961, 997, 998
Sherman, Saul, 146
Ships and shipping:
Cuban crisis and Caribbean area :
Attacks on U.S. ships: Ala, 356; Florldian, 573,
600
Blockade and embargo : Department, 283 ; Rusk,
207, 470, 473
Exiles, attacks on Soviet ships, 520, 599, 986
Reduction in Cuban trade, 240
Surveillance of (Rusk), 684
U.S. shipping on ships used in Cuban trade, ban
on, 283
Protection of American ships in international waters
(Rusk), 389
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Double taxation on earnings from operation of,
agreement with Iceland for relief, 77
IMCO, convention on : Brazil, 629 ; Syrian Arab
Republic, 505
NS Savannah, agreements re : Belgium, 810 ;
Netherlands, 342, 926 ; Norway, 585
Pilotage services on Great Lakes and St. Law-
rence River, coordination of, agreement amend-
ing agreement (1961) with Canada, 418
Safety of life at sea, convention (1960) on:
Greece, 673 ; Japan, 673, 849 ; Spain, 462
U.S. vessels, agreements re loan of: Korea, 418;
Norway, 266 ; Pakistan, 418
U.S. vessels, agreement with Australia re furnish-
ing .supplies and services, 765
Sierra Leone, treaties, agreements, etc., 504, 585, 926
Silla, Albert, 56
Singapore, radio regulations (1959), 961, 962
Sino-Soviet dispute, U.S. views : Harriman, 273, 274,
279, 280, 281, 693, 694; Hilsman, 272, 280, 281;
Johnson, 276, 279, 280, 455; Kennedy, 162; Man-
ning, 143; Martin, 352; Rusk, 204, 283, 365, 390,
644, 646, 702
Si-sco, Joseph J., ,529
Skybolt missile. 43
Slave trafiic, white, agreement (1904) for repression,
Senegal, 998
Slavery convention (1926), as amended: Belgium, 266;
France, 546; Ghana, 961; Nepal, 305; Senegal,
961 ; Tanganyika, 377
Slim, Taieb, 54
Smith, Benjamin A., 914
Smith, Gerard C, 197
Smith, Harold Page, 521
Smith, Howard K., 500
Snowdon, Henry T., 223, 297
Social development. See Economic and social develop-
ment
Solomon, Anthony M., 946
Somali Republic :
Technical cooperation, agreement extending Italian-
U.S. agreement (1954) re, 154
U.S. Ambassador, appointment, 110 ; confirmation,
506
Somoza, Luis, 213
South Africa :
Communism, actions against (Williams), 880
Treaties, agreements, etc., 305, 306, 810
South and Southeast Asia. See Asia
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization :
Clinical research center, Thai-U.S. agreement on
establishment, 888
Council of Ministers, 8th meeting :
Communique and statement (Rusk), 641
U.S. delegation, 584
Purpose of (Johnson), 637
South- West Africa, U.S. position (Williams), 605
Soviet Union (see also Communism) :
Aircraft, U.S. protests violation of Alaskan airspace,
476
Albania, relations between (Hilsman), 273
Armaments, position on control and reduction of
(Foster), 117, 133
"Association of Victims of Nazi Persecution," pro-
test to U.S. at Berlin court action re, 4.j
"Berlin Judges Law," reply to Soviet note re, 751
Coffee agreement, support for U.S. position (BIu-
menthal), 221
Communication, direct, with U.S. proposed, 7, 600,
934
Communist China, doctrinal dispute. See Sino-
Soviet diispute
Cuba:
Attacks on Soviet merchant vessels by exile groups,
520, 599, 986, 987
Broadcasts to troops in Russian language (Rusk),
686
Cost of supporting Cuban economy (Rusk), 473
Cuban crisis, U.S.-Soviet report to U.N., 153
Dilemma confronting (Manning), 143
Disarmament :
Soviet position: Dean, 122; Foster, 117, 133;
Gardner, 791
U.S.-Soviet talks on, 127
Foreign aid program, failures of (Cleveland), 64
1030
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Soviet Uuiou- -Contiuxied
Growth of (Bowles), 817
India and Indonesia, aid to, 275, 276
Industrial production, advances in (Harriman), 693
Korean question, Soviet position (AUott), 73
Laos neutrality, Soviet position, 775
Meteorological projects with U.S. (Meeker), 748
Military bases in Europe (Rusk), 361
Military troops and equipment in Culia. See under
Cuba
NATO :
Nuclear defense forces, views on, 862, 896
German accession to, position on, 865
New Year's greeting, exchanged with U.S., 137
Nuclear weapons. See Nuclear weapons
Population problem, position at U.N. debate on
(Gardner), 911
Soviet trawler, U.S. ships charged with firing on, 475
Treaties, agreement, etc., 305, 926
U.S. relations with : Meeker, 86 ; Rusk, 471 ; Steven-
son, 150
United Nations :
Attitude toward ( Schwebel) , 477, 787
Peacekeeping operations, position toward (Gard-
ner), 793
Security Council, use of veto power in (Steven-
son), 527
Special agencies, contributions to (Stevenson), 528
War, inadvertent, reducing risk of, Soviet position
(Foster), 5
Space. See Outer space and Satellites
Spain :
GATT, notice of public hearings re accession to, 183
Treaties, agreements, etc., 146, 154, 266, 462, 849, 926
U.S. compensatory tariff concessions to, 182, 295
Special Consultative Committee on Security, OAS
(Martin), 407, 408, 712
Special Fund, U.N. :
Africa, aid to (Williams), 602
Agricultural research station in Cuba, U.S. views:
Gardner, 3.59, 480 ; Rusk, 357
Role and progress (Bingham), 258
U.S. position : Gardner, 480 ; Stevenson, 527
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations :
Confirmations (Gossett, Herter), 376
Duties and functions, 180, 658
Establishment of. Executive order, 859
Notices inviting views on Spanish and U.A.R. acces-
sions to GATT, 183
Specialized agencies, U.N. :
Executing agent for Special Fund projects (Bing-
ham), 260
Soviet Union contributions (Stevenson), 528
State Department {see also Agency for International
Development, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Foreign Service, and Peace Corps) :
Appointments and designations, 153, 190, 630, 672,
848, 849, 889
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, con-
firmation (Hilsman), 765
State Department — Continued
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, con-
firmation (Martin), 765
Budget of, decrease in (Kennedy) , 226, 228
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, reorga-
nization of (Battle), 755
Bureau of European Affairs, responsibilities of
(Pearcy), 337
Consular relations, U.N. conference on, U.S. repre-
sentative to, 461
Deputy Under Secretary of State, confii-mation
(Crockett), 997
Emergency preparedness functions, assigned to. Ex-
ecutive order, 629
Foreign policy briefing conferences. See under For-
eign policy
Information policies (Manning), 576
Miami office of Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, field
established, 190
Office of International Finance and Economic Analy-
sis (OFE), established, 342
Public support of, question of (Ball), 371
Publications. See under Publications
Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, designation of func-
tions, 255
Trade Negotiations, Ambassadors and Special Rep-
resentatives for, confirmations (Gossett, Her-
ter), 376
Under Secretary of State, confirmation (Harriman),
630
Visits, State and official, policy on length of, 90
Volume of business (Rusk) , 367
State of the Union (Kennedy) , 159
State visits, policy on length of, 90
Status of forces (NATO), agreements supplementing
and implementing agreement on : Belgium, 888 ;
Germany, Federal Republic of, 961
Steele, John, 115, 271
Stein, Herbert, 271, 280
Stevenson, Adlai E., addresses, letter, and statements :
Cuba, report to U.N. on U.S.-Soviet talks, 153
General Assembly, 17th, accomplishments, 147
Inter-American community, growth of, 704
Roosevelt, Anna E., memorial tribute to, 48
United Nations, U.S. views, 522
Stevenson, Eric, 115, 126
Stikker, Dirk U., 416
Strong, Robert C, 997
Subversive activities. See under Communism
Sudan, agricultural commodities agreement with U.S.,
306
Suez crisis (1956), 85, 869
Supporting assistance, appropriation request for FY
1964 (Rusk), 672
Surinam, Minister President-designate, visit to U.S.,
838
Sweden, treaties, agreements, etc., 230, 266, 306, 926
Switzerland :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 360
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 196 3
1031
Switzerland — Continued
Americans imprisoned in Cuba, Swiss representative
visit to, 137
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 154, 230, 266, 377, 629,
926
Syncom satellite (Gore) , 25
Syrian Arab Republic :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 505, 997
U.S. recognition, 476
Szell, George, 840
Takeuchi, Ryuji, 751
Talbot, Phillips, 243
Tanganyika, treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 230, 377,
504, 722, 765, 926, 998
Tariff Commission, U.S. :
Duties under Trade Expansion Act (Weiss), 659
Report of investigation on brooms made of broom-
com. President's decision, 376
Tariff policy, U.S. (see also Customs : Economic policy
and relations; Tariffs and trade, general agree-
ment on ; and Trade) :
Agricultural products. See Agriculture: Trade
Brooms, Presidential decision re duty on imports of,
376
Compensatory concessions :
Japan, schedule of, 108; effective date, 182; cur-
rent action, 154 ; proclaimed, 295
Spain, schedule of, 146 ; effective date, 182
U.K., current action, 38 ; effective date, 145
Escape-clause action on imports of cotton typewriter
ribbon cloth, dried figs, and lead and zinc, de-
cisions against reopening, 145
Europe and EEC (see also European Economic Com-
munity) : Ball, 691; MacArthur, 176; Trezise,
973, 975
Most-favored-nation tariff treatment, Poland and
Yugoslavia, question of: Kennedy, 237; Rusk,
239 ; Tyler, 947, 948
1964 tariff negotiations. See Tariffs and trade, gen-
eral agreement on : International tariff negotia-
tions
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. See Trade Expansion
Act
Tropical products, duties and restrictions on
(Kotschnig),628
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on :
Agreements, declarations, proc§s-verbal, and proto-
cols:
Accessions to, current actions on :
Argentina, provisional: Argentina, 266, 306;
Austria, 306; Belgium, 306; Canada, 306;
Chile, 306 ; Germany, 110 ; Ghana, 585 ; India,
585 ; South Africa, 306 ; Trinidad and Tobago,
377 ; U.K., 306 ; U.S., 38, 266
Cambodia: Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 888;
Sweden, 266
Israel: Sweden, 266; Trinidad and Tobago,
377 ; Turkey, 266
Portugal : Sweden, 306 ; Turkey, 306
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on — Continued
Agreements, declarations, etc. — Continued
Accessions to, current actions on — Continued
Switzerland, provisional : Italy, 673 ; Trinidad
and Tobago, 377
Tunisia, provisional: Australia, 38; India, 38;
Switzerland, 38 ; Trinidad and Tobago, 377
United Arab Republic, provisional :
Current actions : Canada, 629 ; Czechoslovakia,
962; France, Ghana, India, 629; Italy, 849;
Luxembourg, 629 ; Netherlands, Norway,
849; Turkey, 962; U.A.R., U.K., 962; U.S.,
629
Notice of U.S. public hearings, 183
Text of declaration, 184
Annecy protocol of terms of accession to : Trinidad
and Tobago, 546
Article XIV, special protocol modifying : Trinidad
and Tobago, 546
Article XVI :4, declaration re provisions of, entry
into force, 38
Article XXIV, special protocol relating to : Trini-
dad and Tobago, 546
Australia, protocol replacing schedule I : Trinidad
and Tobago, 546
Brazil, new schedule III, protocol on establish-
ment, current actions : Haiti, 38 ; Italy, 341 ;
Trinidad and Tobago, 377; Turkey, 38
Ceylon, protocol replacing schedule VI: Trinidad
and Tobago, 546
Cotton textiles, arrangements re international
trade in : Australia, 189 ; Mexico, 153
French text, protocol of rectification to, current
actions : Chile, 110 ; Trinidad and Tobago, 377
Geneva tariff conference (1960-61) :
Protocol embodying results of :
Current actions : Belgium, 230 ; Denmark, 377 ;
France, EEC, Germany, 230; India, 673;
Italy, 230, 341; Luxembourg, 230; Nether-
lands, 230 ; Norway, 810 ; Sweden, Switzer-
land, 230 ; U.K., 673
Part I of U.S. schedule annexed to:
EEC, Japan, Switzerland, 154
Rectifications to U.S. schedules proposed, 182
Modifications of, 1st protocol : Trinidad and To-
bago, 546
Organization for Trade Cooperation with annex :
Brazil, 888; Trinidad and Tobago, 377
Organizational amendments to, protocol of:
Brazil, 888; Trinidad and Tobago, 377
Part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol and
procfes-verbal re : Chile, 38 ; Trinidad and To-
bago, 377, 546
Poland, declaration on relations between Contract-
ing Parties and Poland : Trinidad and Tobago,
377
Preamble and parts II and III and article XXVI:
Brazil, 888; Chile, 38; Trinidad and Tobago,
377, 546
Protocol modifying certain provisions of: Trinidad
and Tobago, 546
1032
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on — Continued
Agreements, declarations, etc. — Continued
Provisional application of, protocol of: Cayman
Islands, 77; Turks and Caicos Islands, 77
Rectification :
Protocol of: Trinidad and Tobago, 546
2d-5th protocols : Trinidad and Tobago, 546
Rectifications and modifications to texts of
schedules :
Ist-Sth protocols: Trinidad and Tobago, 341,
546
9tli protocol : Italy, 341 ; Trinidad and Tobago,
341
Supplementary concessions to, 6th protocol of:
Trinidad and Tobago, 377
Torquay protocol : Trinidad and Tobago, 546
Contracting Parties :
Establishment of relationships with certain coun-
tries, announcement re, 145
Ministerial meeting :
Announcement and U.S. delegation to, 419, 885
Resolution on tariff negotiating procedures, 995
U.S. views (Herter), 990
Executive Secretary, Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations, proposed talks with, 180
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Analysis
of United States Negotiations, vol. IV, pub-
lished, 889
International tariff negotiations, 1964 :
Agricultural trade, consideration of problems on
(Trezise), 974
Latin America, importance to (Martin), 921
Purpose of: Blumenthal, 847; Herter, 298; HUs-
man, 900 ; Rusk, 937 ; Trezise, 498
Japan, participation by (Johnson), 609
Spain, negotiations and U.S. public hearings re ac-
cession to, 146, 183
U.S. position (Weiss), 655, 660
Working Party on Procedures for Tariff Reductions,
recommendations of (Herter), 922, 993
Taxation :
Double taxation, conventions for avoidance of. See
Double taxation
Foreign forces in Germany, agreement (1959)
abrogating agreement on tax treatment of and
finance convention (1952) : Germany, 961
Legislation recommended re tax credit for invest-
ments in developing countries (Kennedy), 596
U.S. owners of Bulgarian property, extension of date
for filing declaration, 905
Technical assistance and cooperation. See Economic
and technical assistance
Tejera-Paris, Enrique, 317
Telecommunication (see also Communications and
Radio) convention (1952), telegraph regulations
(Geneva revision, 1959) annexed to: Brazil, 153;
Cyprus, 722 ; Dominican Republic, 153 ; Guate-
mala, 722 ; Korea, 77 ; Kuwait, 505 ; Panama, 38
Telecommunication convention (1959), international:
Current actions : Algeria, 961 ; Anguilla, Antigua,
Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Br. Guiana, Br.
Honduras, Br. Virgin Islands, 306; Burundi,
418 ; Cayman Islands, 306 ; Ceylon, 961 ; Congo
(Brazzaville), Cuba, Dominica, 306; Ethiopia,
418; France, 153; Germany, 418; Ghana, 38;
Grenada, 306 ; India, 38 ; Italy, Jamaica, Jordan,
418 ; Kuwait, 504 ; Luxembourg, 77 ; Montserrat,
Nevis and Anguilla, 306; Niger, 77; Panama,
306 ; Portugal, 418 ; Rwanda, St. Christopher, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent, 306 ; Spanish provinces, 849 ;
Tanganyika, 38 ; Thailand, 77 ; Turks and Caicos
Islands, 306; Uganda, 722
Radio regulations (1959), annexed to: Brazil, 153;
Brunei, 961; Cameroon, 505; Central African
Republic, 77; Chad, 722; Congo (Brazzaville),
418; Dahomey, 961; Ethiopia, France, 418;
Guatemala, 722; Israel, 38; Ivory Coast, 505;
Jordan, 77; Kuwait, 505; Laos, 77; Nether-
lands, 38; Niger, 77; North Borneo, 961; Pan-
ama, 38; Paraguay, 505; Sarawak, Singapore,
961; Switzerland, 629; Viet-Nam, 585; Yugo-
slavia, 961
Telecommunication Union International. See Inter-
national Telecommunication Union
Telstar satellite (Gore), 25, 743
Territorial sea and contiguous zone, convention
(1958) on: Portugal, 341; South Africa, 810
Terry, Luther L., 808
Thailand :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 77, 888, 945, 998
U.S. aid (Johnson), 638, 833
Thant, U, 30, 36, 148
Thorp, Willard L., 417
Tin, U.S. extension of interim disposal program, 182
Tin Council, International, 182
Tin Maung, U, 53
Tiros satellites, 26, 740, 741, 747
Togo, Republic of :
Provisional government, U.S. recognition of, 969
President Olympio's death (Kennedy), 170
Tokaido Railway, Japan, ECAFE study of, 660
Tonga, Kingdom of, international wheat agreement
(1962), 189
Torbert, Horace G., Jr., 110, 506
Torres, Mrs. Lorraine B., 271, 280, 282
Tour6, S6kou, cited, 544
Tracking stations, satellite, agreements with :
Australia, 377 ; Mexico, 926
Trade {see also Agricultural surpluses. Customs,
Economic policy, Exports, Imports, and Tariff
policy) :
Balance-of -payments problems. See Balance of pay-
ments
Barriers, reduction of :
Negotiations proposed, 298, 886
U.S. position (Herter), 991
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1963
1033
Trade, etc. — Continued
China, Communist, U.S. position (Rusk), 645
Commodities. See Commodity trade and individual
commodity
Cuba. See Cuban crisis : U.S. action
EEC. See European Economic Community
Expansion of, efforts for :
Africa (Kotschnig), 627
ANZUS Council views, 968
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations of
the U.S. See Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations of the U.S.
U.K. nonmembership In EEC, effect of (Rusls), 439
U.N. Trade and Development Conference:
Preparatory committee for, 847, 848, 886
Statements (Blumenthal), 847, 848
U.S. delegation, 264
U.S. position: Kennedy, 161; Trezise, 497; Rusk,
734
Japan. See under Japan
Philippines (Hilsman), 899
Sino-Soviet (Hilsman), 274
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. See Trade Expansion
Act
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Bills of lading, international convention (1924)
for unification of rules re, Tanganyika, 230
Coffee. See Coffee
Cotton textiles, arrangements re international
trade in: Australia, 189; Mexico, 153
Trade agreements. See Trade agreements
Trademarks, declaration for protection of, termi-
nation of agreement with Luxembourg, 673
U.S. trade :
Canada, negotiations with (Kennedy, Pearson),
816
Euroiie, relations with (MacArthur), 174
Policy (Weiss), 652
Trade agreements. See Trade agreements
World trade by U.S. firms, need for new outlook
(MacArthur), 177, 178
Trade agreements :
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, program under
(Weiss), 653
Termination of prior trade agreements proclama-
tions, announcement re, 145
U.S. program, administration of, Executive order,
839
With :
Japan, compensatory concessions, 108, 154, 182, 295
Paraguay, termination of reciprocal agreement
postponed until June 30, 1963, 673
Spain, compensatory concessions, 146, 182 ; interim
agreement under GATT art. XXXIII, 1,54
Switzerland, modification of section A of schedule
I of reciprocal trade agreement, 154
U.K., compensatory concessions, 38, 145
Trade Cooperation, Organization for, agreement on:
Brazil, 888 ; Trinidad and Tobago, 377
Trade Executive Committee (Weiss), 658
Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee (Weiss),
658
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 :
Administration of. Executive order, 180, 839
Authority granted to President under (Weiss), 656,
657
Export expansion program (Kennedy), 229
Latin America, benefits for (Martin), 921
Negotiations (Ru.sk), 315
Objectives and importance of : Blumenthal, 219 ;
Herter, 991; McGhee, 773; Trezise, 497
Poland and Yugoslavia, provision for nondiscrimina-
tory tariff treatment to : Kennedy, 599 ; Rusk
239 ; Tyler, 947
Trade Information Committee (Weiss), 659
Trade Staff Committee (Weiss) , 658
Trading with the Enemy Act, amendment of Executive
order re administration of Section 32(H), 618
Travel :
Cuba :
Between Cuba and Mexico, problem of (Ru.sk),
474
U.S. limitations on, 719
Haiti, U.S. citizens urged to avoid traveling to, 834
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Nepal, termination of regional agreement (1958)
between India, Nepal, and U.S. re transportation
facilities development, 585
Road traffic, convention (1949) on, with annexes:
Bulgaria, 585 ; Mall, 77
Road vehicles, private, customs convention (1954)
on temporary Importation : Tanganyika, 377
Treaties, agreements, etc., international {for indi-
vidual treaty, see subject), 38, 77, 110, 153, 189,
230, 266, 305, 341, 377, 418, 462, 504, 546, 585, 629,
673, 722, 764, 810, 849, 888, 926, 961, 997
Trezise, Philip H., 497, 971
Trinidad and Tobago, treaties, agreements, etc., 266,
305, 306, 341, 377, 504, 546, 629
Truman, Louis, 148
Trust Territories, U.N. (see also Non-self-governing
territories). Pacific Islands, 615, 946, 968
Trusteeship Council, U.N., U.S. representative, con-
firmation (Yates), 505
Tsarapkin, Semen K., 198, 202
Tuna fishing boats, U.S., Ecuadorean detention of
(Rusk). 976
Tunisia, treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 377, 629
Turkey :
Secretary Rusk to visit, 484
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 266, 306, 505, 765, 962
Turks and Caicos Islands, treaties, agreements, etc.,
77, 306
Tyler, William R., 368, 648, 947
Tyrol, South, Austrian-Italian dispute over (Meeker),
85
U.A.R. See United Arab Republic
U.S.S.R. See Soviet Union
U Thant, 30, 36, 148
1034
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Uganda :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 341, 546, 629, 722, 926
U.S. Ambassador, appointment, 153 ; confirmation,
505
Unna, Warren, 271, 280, 281
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, conventions
(1899, 1907) for pacific settlement of international
disputes, 341
UNCURK. See United Nations Commission for the
Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
UNEF. Bee United Nations Emergency Force
UNESCO. See Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, U.N.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet Union
United Arab Republic :
Civil aviation tall^s with U.S.. 223, 297
Egyptian pounds from sales of agricultural surpluses,
authorized for sale to U.S. tourists, 173
Farm land, ban on foreign ownership, 328
GATT, notice of public hearings and declaration
re provisional accession to, 183, 184, 849
Incursions across Yemen border : Department, 12,
90 ; Rusk 936
Treaties, agreements, etc., 629, 722, 888, 962
U.S. science attach^, appointment (Clark) 506
United Kingdom :
Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center, U.S.-
U.K. establishment of, 866
EEC, veto of U.K. membership : Ball, 412, 689, 692 ;
Chayes, 320, 321; Department, 237; Kennedy-
Alacmillan, 43 ; McGhee, 772 ; Rusk, 206, 236, 246,
366 ; Tyler, 651
German foreign policy documents (1935-36), volume
released, 77
Nassau meeting of Prime Minister Macmillan and
President Kennedy, 43
Nuclear weapons, U.S.-U.K. negotiations, 44, 368,
759, 857
Polaris missiles, U.S. supply, 44, 368, 673, 759, 760
Restrictions on imports of U.S. fruits (Trezise), 499
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 145, 266, 305, 306, 377,
673, 759, 926, 962, 998
United Nations :
Accomplishments, problems, and role of : Chayes,
562 ; Cleveland, 165, 874 ; Gardner, 477, 790 ; Ken-
nedy, 163; Sisco, 529; Stevenson, 152, 522
Africa, relationship with (Williams), 602
Afro-Asian group in, 105, 798
Charter. See United Nations Charter
Conferences :
Application of science and technology to less de-
veloped areas. See under Science
Consular relations. See Consular relations
Trade and development. See Trade : U.N. con-
ference
Decade of Development. Sec Decade of Development
Documents, lists of, 107, 340, 462, 528, 584, 809, 925,
960,
Economic commissions. See Economic Commission
United Nations — Continued
Financing of :
Budget, U.S. share and contributions and delin-
quent members : Cleveland, 875 ; Plimpton, 798
Peacekeeping operations :
General Assembly resolutions, 37
U.S. concern and position : Cleveland, 875 ; Klutz-
nick, 30 ; Gardner, 535 ; Rusk, 436 ; Sisco, 530 ;
Stevenson, 149 ; U.S. Mission statement, 443
General Assembly. See General Assembly
Institute, proposed : Gardner, 795 ; Stevenson, 151
International law in (Schwebel), 785
Membership, admission to:
ICJ opinion re (Klutznick),34
Kuwait, admission, 884
Memorial tribute to Mrs. Roosevelt, 48
Oflice of Secretary-General :
Election of U Thant (Stevenson), 149
Role of : Chayes, 564 ; Kennedy, 207 ; Rowan, 74
Representative on Hungary, abolition of position, 77
Registry of space flights with (Chayes), 835, 837
Security Council. See Security Council
Soviet views. See under Soviet Union
Specialized agencies. See Specialized agencies
Technical assistance programs:
Expanded program of Technical Assistance :
Bingham, 259, 261 ; Williams, 602
Special Fund. See Special Fund
U.S. views and support: Cleveland, 872; Foster, 134;
Rusk, 393, 394 ; Stevenson, 152, 522
United Nations Day, 1963, proclamation, 806
Voting patterns in (Plimpton), 796
United Nations Charter:
Collective security arrangements, basis for (Mc-
Ghee), 869
Congo operation, legal basis for (Cleveland), 167
Outer Space, application to: Chayes, 838; Meeker,
750
Statute of : Kuwait, 926
United Nations Children's Fund (Williams), 603
United Nations Commission for the Unification and
Rehabilitation of Korea, 73
United Nations Committee on Housing, Building, and
Planning (Bingham), 262
United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space. See Outer Space, U.N. Committee on
United Nations Disarmament Commission, documents,
960
United Nations Economic and Social Council. See
Economic and Social Council
United Nations Economic Commissions. See Economic
Commission
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization. See Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization, U.N.
United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East,
financing, 30, 37, 536
United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission, 99
United Nations Peace Observation Commission (Gard-
ner), 705
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1963
1035
United Nations Population Commission (Gardner), 18,
909, 910
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pales-
tine Refugees in the Near East :
Report, U.S. views (Rowan) , 101
U.S. pledge (Jackson), 101
United Nations Special Committee on Portuguese Ter-
ritories, 105
United Nations Special Fund. See Special Fund, U.N.
United Nations Trusteeship Council, 505
United States Advisory Commission on International
Educational and Cultural Affairs, 46, 96, 215, 617,
753, 755
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
See Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S.
United States citizens and nationals :
Aid program, need for better understanding
(Bowles), 945
Churchill, Winston, honorary citizenship for (Ken-
nedy), 715
Protection of:
Cuba, limitations on travel to, 719
Haiti, avoid travel in and withdrawal of citizens
from, 834
Tasks confronting (Manning), 143
United Arab Republic, decree banning ownership of
agricultural lands in, 328
United States Information Agency :
African program, 69
Appropriations for and expansion of (Kennedy),
226, 228
Latin America, efforts against Communist activities
(Martin), 405
Role of (NorreU),216
Universal copyright convention (1952). See Copy-
right convention
Universal postal convention (1959). See Postal con-
vention
UNRWA. See United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
Upper Volta :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 170
Treaties, agreements, etc., 341, 764, 810, 961
Urquidi, Victor L., 288
Uruguay, treaties, agreements, etc., 230, 764
USIA. See United States Information Agency
tjstiln, Giindogdu, 58
Validation Board for German Dollar Bonds, 146
Vance, Nina, 663
Vatican City, Vienna convention on consular relations,
764
Vela Project, 125, 491
Venezuela :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials : 317
Communist subversion In (Martin), 355
Cuban crisis, proposal re (Rusk) , 440
President Betancourt, visit to U.S., 445
Treaties, agreements, etc., 77, 764, 926, 998
Vessels. See Ships
Vienna conventions on consular and diplomatic rela-
tions. See under Consular relations and Diplo-
matic relations
Viet-Nam :
Communist aggression and subversion :
ANZUS views, 967
Casualties inflicted (Johnson), 641
Desire for freedom in (Hilsman) , 897
Guerrilla warfare in (Johnson), 637
Present status of situation (Rusk), 238, 311, 312,
391, 435
Press, availability of information to (Rusk), 642
SEATO position, 643
Stno-Soviet dispute, effect on : Harriman, 280 ;
Hilsman, 282
U.S. position and aid: Johnson, 637; Rusk, 364,
680, 701, 727
Violation of Geneva Accords (Rusk), 687
Treaties, agreements, etc., 505, 585, 765
Viet-Nam, north, aggression and subversion in Vlet-
Nam. See Viet-Nam : Communist aggression
ViUeda, Ram6n, 213
Visas {see also Immigration) :
Fees for performing artists, agreement with Poland
re reciprocal waiver of, 306
Fingerprint requirements for nonimmigrant appli-
cants, agreement with Cyprus re waiver of, 341
Multiple entry visas to diplomatic personnel, agree-
ment with Czechoslovakia re issuance, 154
Nonimmigrant visas, reciprocal, agreement with
Ecuador, re, 230
Treaty trader and treaty investor status, negotia-
tions with Philippines, 900
Visits, State and official, policy on length of, 90
Vocational education, program in Africa (Williams),
208
Voice of America, budget request FY 1964 (Kennedy),
228
Von Hassel, Kai Uwe, 444
Walrath, Laurence K., 660
War:
Inadvertent, measures to reduce (Foster), 3, 133
Inevitability of, Communist views, 273
Watt, James, 505
Weather :
Forecasting and research (Gardner), 740
North Atlantic Ocean stations, agreement (1954) on:
Japan, 722; amendment (1962) of annex II-A
of, entry into force, 462
Satellites. See Meteorological satellites
World Meteorological Organization. See World
Meteorological Organization
Weaver, George L-P, 959
Weights and measures, convention (1975) creating In-
ternational office of, and convention (1921) amend-
ing : U.A.R., 722
Weiss, Leonard, 652
West New Guinea, settlement of Indonesia-Netherlands
dispute : Meeker, 84 ; Rusk, 366 ; Stevenson, 148
1036
DEPARTIiIENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
Western alliance :
Differences within (Rusli), 391, 392
Foundation of (Rusk), 362
Unity during Cuban crisis (Rusk) , 135
Western Europe. See Europe: Western Europe
Western Samoa, international wheat agreement (1962),
962
Wheat agreement (1962), international, current ac-
tions : Antigua, Bahama Islands, Barbados, Ber-
muda, Br. Guiana, Br. Honduras, Br. Solomon Is-
lands, Br. Virgin Islands, Dominica, Fiji, 189 ;
Finland, 77; Gambia, Gibraltar, 1S9; Gilbert and
Ellice Islands Colony, 306 ; Grenada, Bailiwick of
Guernsey, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, 189 ; Liberia,
888 ; Mauritius, 189 ; Mexico, 77 ; Montserrat, 189 ;
Netherlands, 462; Nevis and Anguilla, North
Borneo, Sarawak, St. Christopher, St. Helena, St.
Lucia, 189; St. Vincent, 306; Kingdom of Tonga,
189 ; Venezuela, 998 ; Western Samoa, 962 ; Zanzi-
bar, 189
Wheat agreement act (1949), international, delegation
of authority. Executive order, 914
White, Lincoln, 403
White slave traffic, agreement (1904) for repression
of : Senegal, 998
White Star, tuna boat, 976m
WHO. See World Health Organization
Williams, G. Mennen :
Addresses, remarks, and statements :
Africa :
Communist failures, 877
Cultural exchange with, 67
Democracy and emerging nations, 457, 541
Developing human and natural resources, 208
Germany's role in, 901
U.N. relationships, 602
U.S. policy, 251
Message on Nyasaland independence, 253
Visit to Africa, announcement, 250
Withers, Charles D., 505
WMO. See World Meteorological Organization
Wolfe, Glenn G., 190
Women, changing status and contribution of (Louch-
heim ) , 801
Women's organizations seminar, 716
World Bank. See International Bank
World Food Congress, 583, 663
World Health Assembly, 16th, U.S. delegation, 808
World Health Organization :
Constitution of ; Jamaica, 673 ; Trinidad and Tobago,
305 ; Uganda, 629
U.S. representative on Executive Board, confirma-
tion (Watt), 505
World Meteorological Organization :
Arrangements to advance atmospheric science and
technology (Meeker), 748
Convention of : Algeria, 722 ; Cyprus, 673 ; Jamaica,
962 ; MongoUa, 629 ; Rwanda, 306 ; Trinidad and
Tobago, 306 ; Uganda, 546
Recommendations of (Gardner), 741
Weather satellites. See Meteorological satellites
World Population Conference, 20, 909, 910
World Trade Week, 1963, proclamation, 758
Wright, Jerauld, 848
Yates, Sidney R., 505, 581
Ydfgoras, Miguel, 213
Yemen :
Border incursions by U.A.R. forces ; Department, 12,
90 ; Rusk, 936
U.S. legation raised to Embassy, 250
U.S. policy (Rusk), 475
U.S. recognition, 11
Visit of Ellsworth T. Bunker to Saudi Arabia to
discuss situation in (Rusk), 437
Yost, Charles W., 958
Yugoslavia :
Independent policies of (Tyler), 949
Treaties, agreements, etc., 764, 962
U.S. most-favored-nation tariff treatment, question
of : Kennedy, 237 ; Rusk, 239 ; Tyler, 947
Zehnder, Alfred, 360
Zonta clubs (Louchheim), 801
Zorin, Valerian A., 50
U.S. SOVERNHENT PRINTINC OFFICEit9C4
I
ni
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
yfe/^
ICIAL
EKLY RECORD
ITED STATES
tElGN POLICY
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1228
January 7, 1963
POSSIBILITIES FOR REDUCING THE RISKS OF WAR
THROUGH ACCIDENT, MISCALCULATION, OR
FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION • by William c.
Foster **
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL HOLDS MINISTERIAL
MEETING • Text of Communique 9
UNITED STATES POLICY ON OUTER SPACE • State-
ment by Albert Gore and Text of Resolution 21
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTS TWO RESOLU-
TIONS ON FINANCING OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS • Statement by Philip M. Klutznick and
Texts of Resolutions 30
POPULATION GROWTH, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
AND THE UNITED NATIONS • Statements by Richard
N. Gardner and Text of Resolution 14
For index see inside back cover
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1228 • Publication 7476
January 7, 1963
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 2fi, D.C.
Phice:
62 Issues, domestic $8.60, foreign $12.25
Single copy, 26 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Depaetmknt
OF State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed in the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government uiith information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
spec'al articles on various phases of
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tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
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national relations are listed currently.
Possibilities for Reducing tlie Risks of War Tlirougli
Accident, Miscalculation, or Failure of Communication
hy William C. Foster
Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ^
Ours is a world divided seriously by ideology
and aspirations. It reposes uneasily in fragile
peace. To lament the past serves no useful pur-
pose, for we are, of course, destined to live in
the future. I believe, however, that we are all
convinced that the hands on the clock of time
have not run so fast and so far that a world of
free and independent peoples, living peacefully
under institutions of their own choosing, is be-
yond our grasp. The world has not yet become
such a cauldron of conflicting systems, each pos-
sessing the military power to destroy the other,
that man's only recourse is to await his
executioner.
Rather, we are living with a curious paradox
in that the horror of modern weapons helps to
serve as a barrier against their use. In fact the
so-called "balance of terror" has in a very real
sense given mankind a reprieve in which new
and intensified efforts can be made to outlaw
mass extermination as an instrument of national
policy.
We stand, therefore, at another of the cross-
roads of human destiny. It is for us to deter-
mine whether we have the resolve and the
wisdom to assert our wills to survive in a stable
and peacefully progressing world or, failing
this, possibly to participate in its demise.
We have the ingenuity to fashion a world free
from the scourge of war; of this we have no
doubt. Our confidence in this cause is certainly
reflected in the basic position we have adopted
' Address made before the Foreign Policy Association
of Pittsburgh at Pittsburgh, Pa., on Dec. 20.
at the 18-nation disarmament conference in
Geneva. There we introduced a disarmament
program^ which is at once far-reaching and
detailed. It calls upon the nations of the world
to stop the arms race at an agreed time, to freeze
the military situation as it then appears, and
then ultimately to shrink military establish-
ments to zero.
The eventual goal is a free, secure, and peace-
ful world of independent states adliering to
common standards of justice and international
conduct and subjecting the use of force to the
rule of law. But we are under no delusions.
We recognize fully the magnitude of this task.
And we expect no quick or simple solutions.
Most important, we know that if this effort is to
be brought to fruition there must be a common
desire within the community of nations to effect
such a world — a desire that is not yet apparent
on all sides.
Danger of Unpremeditated War
Yet even as we undertake this wide-ranging
offensive, there is an immediate danger which
confronts us. Ironically, the nature of this
threat is such that while we seek to move toward
a disarmed world we could find ourselves un-
wittingly engulfed by just the type of holo-
caust we are striving to avoid.
I refer, of course, to the very real threat of
war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of
" For text of an outline of a U.S. draft treaty on gen-
eral and complete disarmament, see Bulletin of May
7, 1962, p. 747.
JANUARY 7, 1963
3
communication. We need look only at the So-
viet Union's recent adventurism in Cuba to
conclude that this is a danger which is not only
real and ever present but a danger which war-
rants our immediate attention.
The danger itself, of course, is not new. The
factors which make unpremeditated war pos-
sible— false alarm, misunderstanding, panic, or
loss of control — have plagued mankind for cen-
turies. But with the advent of nuclear weap-
ons the consequences of such a war have assumed
a new and teiTifying dimension.
The technology and techniques of modem
warfare are such that much reliance is inevita-
bly placed on the ability to respond rapidly
and effectively to hostile military action.
Events whicli may occur in connection with the
efforts of one state to maintain its readiness to
respond to such action may, in varying degrees
and with varying consequences, be misconstrued
by another. The initiating state may have
miderestimated the ambiguity of such events
and may have miscalculated the response they
would call forth. The observing state may mis-
interpret them and feel compelled to act.
Nonbelligerent steps of a precautionai-y
character taken by one state may be viewed by
another as being provocative at best and, at
worst, as presaging or constituting the initia-
tion of hostilities. Accidents can occur and may
be considered deliberate acts. Unauthorized
acts may appear to reveal hostile purpose, and
fault may be incorrectly assigned.
Particularly where such actions and events
may occur against the background of an already
existing crisis in the relations of the states con-
cerned, erroneous assessments may dictate a
rapid and disproportionate response. As a con-
sequence, sudden and unexplained changes in
the military situation may increase the risk of
the outbreak of war.
Administrative and Physical Safeguards
Such efforts as have been taken thus far to
avoid unintentional war have, for the most part,
been taken independently by states. For some
years now the United States has progressively
instituted numerous unilateral steps to insure
that control over our Military Establislmient
would preclude the possibility of war by acci-
dent. These safeguards could be described as of
two types : "administrative" safeguards, which
say "you may not" ; and "physical" safeguards,
which create a situation so that "you cannot."
Taken together they are such that it would re-
quire more than a Houdini to circumvent them.
On tlie administrative side, only the President
may autliorize the use of atomic or hydrogen
weapons, and the transference of tliis authority
is carefully controlled. There is also the so-
called two-man rule, which requires at least two
responsible individuals to be present at every
level of operation for handling of nuclear weap-
ons. No one man is authorized to depart from
this rule. There is also the so-called fail-safe
procedure, which, in essence, precludes aircraft
from proceeding beyond a predetermined point
without an explicit "go" order.
On the physical side thei'e are various devices
built into the weapons themselves which prevent
improper use. For example, there may be an
aiming switch which can be tampered with only
by disassembling the weapon and which can be
activated only by remote control or by the inser-
tion of a "key" held in careful custody.
There is also the device of making the re-
quired aiming actions too much for one man to
handle. Bai-ricades provide additional safe-
guards against unauthorized use. Other devices
prevent the accidental explosion of a nuclear
weapon. There are other devices of both admin-
istrative and physical nature which place
restraints on a nuclear firing by accident or
violation of authority.
On the political side similar unilateral actions
have been instituted. Again, the Cuban situa-
tion provides a recent and vivid demonstration
of this. I refer, of course, to the President's
advance notification of his decision to quaran-
tine Cuba^ — an annomicement designed to in-
sure that the intentions of the United States in
that operation would not be misunderstood.
Had advance notification of this action not been
given, the events that followed might well have
been different and, perliaps, even tragic. But
so crucial is our concern that we have sought to
pass beyond these unilateral efforts.
^ Ibid., Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.
DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
Negotiations at Geneva
At the Geneva disarmament conference we
li;ive expressed our desire to take joint steps to
luomote reassurance against the danger of in-
advertent war. We recognize that steps in this
direction are no substitute for disarmament.
But we do believe that international agreements
on specific worldwide measures in this area can
and should be undertaken now. Reducing the
likelihood of war and increasing confidence can
make an important difference until such time
as a general disarmament treaty becomes a
reality. However, to date, our endeavors in this
direction have been something less than
successful. Unfortunately the Soviet Union has
displayed a notable lack of enthusiasm toward
developing such measures.
Early in the negotiations at Geneva there was
a unanimous belief among those represented at
the conference table that certain collateral
measures should be agreed and executed in ad-
vance of a general disarmament treaty. Yet the
Soviet Union in its initial listing of such meas-
ures did not include among these immediate
measures directed toward the problem of inad-
vertent war. Its other four partners in the
negotiations — Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Po-
land, and Rumania — to the surprise of no one
adopted a similar position. Last summer the
Soviets did respond to certain of our proposals
in this area. But this was a halfhearted re-
sponse at best. To date, they still have given
no real indication of their willingness to come
to grips with this problem. This stands as one
of the most regrettable episodes of the negotia-
tions thus far, for it is but a simple fact of
international life that the task of abolishing all
weapons will take time. In the interim the
danger of accidental war will persist.
Our Western colleagues — Canada, Italy, and
the United Kingdom — have repeatedly ex-
pressed concern over the risks of war being un-
leashed by mistake. They too have urged that
early action be taken on measures which could
substantially reduce these risks.
Many of the eight nations new to the dis-
armament negotiations — Brazil, Burma, Ethio-
pia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the
JANUARY 7, 1963
United Arab Republic — seem also to share this
concern. They know that creation of a dis-
armed world will take time. In the meantime
they recognize that the risk of accidental war is
a liovering specter. Should it occur, they are
fully aware that in today's compressed world
a war touched off by accident could well engulf
them — indeed, could engulf a multitude of
nations.
At Geneva the Soviet Union has gone to some
lengths to support its contention that steps di-
rected toward minimizing the risks of war by
accident can await agreement on a total pro-
gram for disarmament. It takes the position
that general measures which might be instituted
to relieve the risk of war by accident would not
provide any degree of insurance against such a
possibility. It sees the execution of any early
anti-accidental-war measures as ones that would
serve only to increase such dangers as might
now exist. At the same time it alleges that we
seek such measures as a means by which the
gathering of intelligence information could be
legalized.
Yet as early as 1958 the Soviet Union ex-
hibited considerable anxiety over accidental
war. At that time it publicly expressed concern
over aircraft equipped with atomic and hydro-
gen weapons conducting flights over the terri-
tories of foreign states or the open seas. This,
it said, was "a serious threat to world peace,"
and could "become the cause of a military con-
flict as a result of miscalculation."
More recently — actually 6 months prior to the
beginning of the current Geneva disarmament
negotiations — the Soviet Government, in a
memorandum submitted to the United Nations
General Assembly stated that "steps can and
must be taken towards the adoption of a num-
ber of simple decisions . . . which would lessen
the danger of the outbreak of war and on which
States might reach agreement in the immediate
future."
The Soviet attitude in the current negotia-
tions seems strange indeed when viewed in the
light of these past pronouncements. However,
there have been instances in which the Soviets
have faced about abruptly. With this and the
lesson of Cuba in mind, last week in Geneva we
again pressed for early action in this area.^
Although newspaper headlines may not so
indicate, we intend to pursue the matter.
One may ask where joint steps can be taken,
above and beyond the individual measures a
nation may itself prescribe, to reduce the risks
of war by accident, miscalculation, or failure
of communications. What are the principal
areas of concern and what can be done about
them?
As I proceed to deal with these questions I
ask that one point be kept in mind. The steps
I shall outline are not inspection measures.
They are steps designed to provide positive as-
surance that some of the uncertainties that con-
front military powers today can be dispelled.
This assiirance would stem from two sources:
the fact that there would be greater knowledge
about what nations are doing and the fact that
nations were willmg to undertake these
obligations.
I turn now to specific problems and recom-
mended measures.
Advance Notice of Military Movements
One major problem concerns large military
movements or maneuvers. Wlien undertaken
by one nation, they may give rise to suspicion
and fear on the part of others. You might re-
call that some months ago the United States
deployed its Marines to Thailand.^ In that
instance, as in Cuba, we gave notice in advance
of our then pi-oposed action. But suppose this
action had been taken without providing such
advance notification. Those nations distrustful
of our motives might have viewed the operation
as a gesture sufficiently threatening in nature as
to require an immediate countermove — one of
such proportions as to lead to an extremely dan-
gerous buildup of forces — a situation in which
anything could happen. But by making
known in advance the intention to make such
a movement, no baseless fears need arise. What
* For text of a working paper presented to the 18-
Natlon Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on Dec.
12 by U.S. Representative Artliur H. Dean, see iMd.,
Dec. 31, 1062, p. 1019.
° For background, see ihid., June 4, 1962, p. 904.
has imfortunately been termed "the panic but-
ton" would not be pushed in circumstances in
which it was perfectly clear what was going on
and why.
To improve communications between nations
in this respect, there would seem to be great ad-
vantage in states giving advance notification of
many of their military movements and maneu-
vers. Such information, provided in the form
of an official commimication and made known
to all concerned at least a week prior to the ac-
tual occurrence of the event, could act as a
brake to rash action by a potential enemy who,
had he been left in the dark, could well have
read something ominous into such a move.
Possible Use of Observation Posts
Wliile this measure by itself would be help-
ful, its value would be increased if additional
arrangements could be agreed upon to assure the
authenticity of the information transmitted.
Some assistance in this direction could be
achieved by the establishment of so-called ob-
servation posts. Posts located at principal rail-
way centers, highways, river crossings, and
airbases would permit on-the-spot observation
of movement and concentration of large forces.
In the broadest sense such an arrangement
would be useful whenever significant military
activities take place.
It is possible that if such an arrangement
were carried out, particularly in countries or
areas of the world where histories of suspicion
and hostility have existed, increased confidence
might quickly result. Being located in key
areas, not only could these posts verify reports
giving advance notification of troop movements,
but they might in part also serve as a means of
determining that no buildup of military forces
for an attack by surprise was in preparation.
In particularly tense or suspicious atmospheres
such a scheme could provide welcome reassur-
ance to those who might otherwise suspect the
worst.
Additional types of observation could be de-
veloped to supplement fixed observation posts.
Aerial observation, mobile ground observation
teams, or overlapping radars all could assist
in lessening the possibility of an miexpected
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULIJITIN
face-to-face of military power, thereby lessen-
ing the risk of the outbreak of war.
Particularly dangerous zones in terms of in-
advertent war are those in which a military
confrontation presently exists. We tend often
to forget that such a situation is not unique to
the European area — although certainly this is
an area of primary concern. There are many
places around the globe where a similar, if more
dormant, type of confrontation exists. It is
axiomatic that in these forward, exposed posi-
tions suspicions and fears are quite readily nur-
tured. In most cases this is not by design but
is due largely to a pervading air of uncertainty.
In such areas apprehension is a natural condi-
tion of life. It cannot be entirely overcome,
but it can be considerably tempered. Appre-
hension thrives on the unknown.
To minimize this psychological barrier we
see merit in an exchange of military missions
between states, or groups of states, where such
confrontations are potentially dangerous.
These missions, operating much in the same
manner as military attaches (who are now some-
thing on the order of permanent fixtures in the
embassies of a large majority of nations), could
contribute significantly to promoting improved
communications and understanding. The pres-
ence of such missions, each small in number and
headed by an officer of high rank, could well
generate confidence enough to offset measurably
the present strong and unfortunate air of un-
certainty that now exists in these areas. This
was one proposal the Soviet Union last sunmier
incorporated in its overall disarmament pro-
gram. So here, perhaps, we have at least an
agreement in principle. Wliether the Soviet
Union and its allies consider it valuable enough
to put into operation jsrior to agreement on a
total disarmament program remains to be seen.
Improvement of Communications
A particularly distressing picture to contem-
plate in the realm of accidental war is the pos-
sible failure of communications between states
in a time of crisis. I have already alluded to
the numerous safeguards we have installed over
our Military Establishment. Yet in this era of
modern weapons it is quite possible that not all
states possessing these weapons have invested
enough in a policy to insure against their forces
being "accident prone."
The nature of modem weapons systems is
such that the improvement of communications
between states, particularly between states pos-
sessing these modern weapons systems, could
serve in time of crisis as a valuable link to pre-
vent the occurrence of unintentional war. The
establishment of rapid and reliable communi-
cations among governments, and perhaps even
with the United Nations, would be vital in a
situation such as this. Here again, the Soviet
Union has indicated an interest. Yet here, too,
a question remains as to whether it is prepared
to pursue this idea in advance of, or as part of,
a total disarmament program. If the latter
should prove to be the case, early and effective
action to allay such a danger could not be
undertaken.
A reference to the "purple telephone" must
necessarily be included at this point. News
reports periodically have mentioned that
improved communications would mean the
establishment of a direct telephone line between
the Kremlin and the Wliite House.
A direct connection between Washington and
Moscow terminating in a purple receiver
perched on the desks of President Kennedy and
Chairman Khrushchev is a unique thought, in-
ternational politics being what they are today.
But such a dramatic arrangement overlooks the
basic point. This is not that heads of govern-
ment of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. or any other
world leaders need necessarily be in instan-
taneous personal contact. Rather it is that in
time of tension a channel is readily available
for responsible officials of governments — and,
when required, heads of government — to reach
one another as rapidly as today's science and
technology will permit without the need to rely
solely on normal channels of communication.
For example, given our Government's structure
it might be most effective to use a teletype sys-
tem, as President Kennedy suggested recently,
and to tie our end of such a contemplated com-
munication link to our National Command Cen-
ter— a command post which maintains contact
with many government officials, including the
President, wherever they may be. The desires
of the other nations concerned would determine
JANUAKY 7, 1963
the terminal point in their governmental
structure.
U.S. Ready To Take Initial Measures
These are some of tlie means by which states
in a cooperative mamier can take effective action
toward reducing the real and present dangers
of war by accident. For our part, we are pre-
pared now to establisli the necessary working
groups so tliat these measures can be put into
effect without delay. But I must hastily add
that these steps are not the be-all and end-all.
Further discussions of this problem could well
lead to additional measures to check the threat
of inadvertent war. Certainly no one nation
has a monopoly on ideas in this field, and it may
well behoove all to consider the establishment
of an international commission on reduction of
the risk of war. Working in an atmosphere
largely devoid of immediate political and nego-
tiating overtones, such a commission could de-
vote full time exclusively to the risks inherent
in this problem and attempt to develop prac-
tical means of coping with them. This would
assure all concerned that deliberate wisdom and
experience would be responsibly engaged in
seeking to make the possibility of war by mis-
hap even less likely.
We in our Agency are actively studying
means of putting into effect those measures to
reduce the risks of war which we already have
proposed in Geneva. And we are just as ac-
tively studying other measures which could
serve the same purpose.
As has been pointed out, efforts to minimize
war by accident cannot stand as a substitute for
the more basic steps of armaments reduction
and control that must be taken if the dangers
posed by modern weapons are to be removed.
Yet, while the time available for achieving suc-
cess in this task is not unlimited, there is no
reason why nations must await the day the full
process of disarmament begins before taking
action to forestall the r'sks of being involved
unwittingly in a war. Initial measures of the
type I have just enumerated can be readily im-
dertaken. If put into effect, nations will be able
to breathe a little easier. Moreover, further
strides down the road to disarmament could be
taken with greater confidence.
I mentioned earlier that we stand at another
of the crossroads of human destiny. We know
the road the United States wishes to follow.
Indeed we have already taken our first steps
in that direction. But it is a long way to the
end of that road. As we journey along it, we
must provide assurance against the danger of
unwanted war. We know that nations can take
joint steps to provide such assurance, and we in-
tend to do all we can to persuade them that they
should — that they must — do so. Therefore^
when negotiations resume in Geneva next month
this problem will receive our full and undi-
vided attention.
We have reached that time of year when the
symbol of peace on earth to men of good will
becomes very real and very meaningful. But
this is ovr goal 12 months of the year. And I
wish to emphasize that we welcome the com-
ments, the criticisms, and the fresh suggestions
that come from associations such as yours and
from those individuals who take a deep interest
in arms control and disarmament.
Ours is a new agency, just entering the second
year of its existence. To my knowledge this
is the first time in history that a sovereign na-
tion has established a sejiarate agency to work
full time on the central problem, and all the re-
lated problems, of arms control and disarma-
ment. Because the duties are so paramount,
we welcome and, indeed, we call upon individu-
als, whoever they may be, to help us develop
those proposals which may lead the way to the
beginning of a turndown in the arms race and
tlien to disarmament.
Dominican Republic Elections
Hailed by United States
Department Statement
Press release 740 dated December 19
The Department of State today [December
19] called attention to an event to take place
tomorrow which is of great importance to the
Western Hemisphere and wliich holds the in-
terest and hopes of free men everywhere. For
the first time in more than .30 years the people
of the Dominican Republic by means of a gtin-
8
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETTN
eral election will freely choose from among their
fellow citizens those who will constitute the new
government of the Kepublic. The fact that the
Dominican people, after three decades in which
they were denied their most basic liberties by
the Trujillo dictatorship, have reached this his-
toric milestone in their progress toward repre-
sentative democracy is a remarkable tribute to
them and to their present leaders — President
Rafael Bonnelly and the Coimcil of State — who
have guided the nation through this difficult
transition period marked by serious threats
from both the extreme right and extreme left.
The people and Government of the United
States, who have followed the progress of the
Dominican Republic in this past year with par-
ticular sympathy and ready economic assistance,
now await the outcome of this civic decision,
confident that the winner of this election, who-
ever he may be, will share the aspirations of
the hemisphere as expressed in the goals of the
Alliance for Progi'ess. The United States looks
forward to working with him in order to help
overcome the problems which will confront the
new government in its efforts to build a better
life for the Dominican people under a demo-
cratic system.
Tax Convention With Luxembourg
Signed at Washington
Press release 736 dated December 18
Secretary Rusk and Georges Heisbourg,
Luxembourg Ambassador, signed at Washing-
ton on December 18 a convention between the
United States and Luxembourg for the avoid-
ance of double taxation of income, prevention
of fiscal evasion, and promotion of trade and
investment.
The provisions of the convention follow, in
general, the pattern of income-tax conventions
entered into by the United States with numer-
ous other comitries. The convention is designed
to remove an undesirable impediment to inter-
national trade and economic development by
doing away as far as possible with double taxa-
tion on the same income.
So far as the United States is concerned,
the convention applies only with respect to
JANUARY 7, 1963
670598—63 2
United States (that is. Federal) taxes. It does
not apply to the imposition of taxes by the
several States, or the District of Columbia,
except that article XX (3) contains the na-
tional-treatment provision that citizens of one
of the countries shall not, while residents of
the other country, be subject to other or more
burdensome taxes (national, State, communal,
or municipal) than are the citizens of such other
country who are residents of its territory.
Under the terms of the convention, it will be
brought into force by the exchange of instru-
ments of ratification. Upon entry into force,
the convention will be effective for taxable years
beginning on or after January 1 of the year in
which the exchange takes place.
Each country will take such action as is nec-
essary in accordance with its own constitutional
procedures with a view to ratification. The
convention will be submitted to the United
States Senate for advice and consent to
ratification.
North Atlantic Council Holds
Ministerial IVieeting
The North Atlantic Coimcil held its regidar
ministerial meeting at Paris December 13-15}
Folio-wing is the text of a communique issued
on December 15, together xoith a list of the
members of the U.S. delegation.
TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE
Press release 734 dated December 18
The regular Ministerial Session of the North
Atlantic Council was held in Paris from 13th to
15th December, 1962.
The Ministers reviewed the international sit-
uation. They noted that the Alliance is sound
and vigorous, and that the dynamism of free
societies continues to demonstrate its advan-
tages in promoting world progress and well-
being.
The recent attem^Jt by the Soviet Union to
'■ For text of a communique issued at the end of the
spring session at Athens, see Bulletin of May 28, 1962,
p. 862.
9
tilt the balance of force against the West by
secretly stationing nuclear missiles in Cuba
brought the world to the verge of war.^ The
peril was averted by the firmness and restraint
of the United States, supported by the Alliance
and other free nations.
The Ministers also discussed the grave impli-
cations of the recent Communist actions in Asia.
The aim of the Atlantic Alliance remains
what it has always been — peace, freedom, and
security based on the rule of law. However, the
Alliance is determined to respond appropri-
ately to any hostile action affecting the security
and freedom of covmtries of the Alliance sub-
jected to threats and pressure. Regarding
Berlin, the Council recalled and reaffirmed its
determination, as expressed in its Declaration
of the 16th December, 1958,^ to defend and
maintain the freedom of West Berlin and its
people.
In the liglit of their discussions, the Ministers
concluded tliat constant vigilance and unity of
purpose in a spirit of intei'dependence, as well
as readiness to examine any reasonable possi-
bility of reducing international tension, must
continue to guide the policies of the Alliance.
It is a prerequisite of any progress towards
equitable settlement of outstanding interna-
tional issues that the Alliance should maintain
its defensive strength.
The Ministers emphasised the value of close
political consultation in regard to the construc-
tive tasks of the Alliance, as well as in prepar-
ing to deal effectively with contingencies which
may arise. They agreed that this consultation
should be intensified.
The Coimcil reaffirmed that general and com-
plete disarmament, under effective international
control, continued to be a question of major
concern. It emphasised the importance of
reaching an agreement which would step by
step bring peace and security to the world. It
expressed the hope that the Soviet attitude,
which has so far frustrated concrete agreement
on any of the key questions at issue, would
change.
The Ministers took careful stock of the
' For background, see ihid., Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 715-741.
" For text, see ibid., Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4.
threats which face the Alliance and the re-
sources available for defence against them as
established in the course of the 1962 Triennial
Review. They agreed that it was necessary to
increase tlie effectiveness of conventional forces.
They further agreed that adequate and bal-
anced forces, both nuclear and conventional,
were necessary to provide the Alliance with the
widest possible range of response to whatever
threat may be directed against its security.
They recognised that a sustained effort will
be required to provide and improve these forces.
The Ministers invited the Permanent Council
to review procedures in order to secure a closer
alignment between NATO military require-
ments and national force plans as well as an
equitable sharing of the common defence
burden.
Tlie Council also reviewed the work done
over the past six months in the exchange of
technical information on nuclear weapons and
the study of various suggestions for the fur-
ther development and co-ordination of NATO
nuclear capabilities. They decided to pursue
and intensify exchanges in this field to facili-
tate the continuing review of NATO defence
policy.
The Ministers also noted, in accordance with
the resolution taken during the Athens meeting,
that in a spirit of solidarity and interdepend-
ence, measures had been decided on to assist
Greece in solving the special defence problems
with which she is at present confronted.
At their separate meeting on 15th December,
Defence Ministers reviewed the report of the
High Level Group established to seek means of
obtaining improved co-operation among mem-
ber nations in Research, Development and Pro-
duction of military equipment. In approving
this report tlie Ministers reaffirmed their will to
co-operate and their intention to translate it
into positive action at all levels.
The Ministers noted that tlie free world had
continued to advance towards an ever greater
degree of prosperity. Only on the basis of con-
tinuing economic expansion can the Alliance
foster the well-being of its peoples and provide
a sound basis for a defence effort equitably
shared among the Allies and commensurate
with their economic potential. Furthermore,
10
DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
economic expansion in the West, by facilitating
the provision of increased aid and stimulating
world trade, is essential to steady economic
progress and a rising standard of living in the
developing countries.
The IMinisters emphasised their determina-
tion to intensify measures to sustain the efforts
of those countries of the Alliance which, while
making an important contribution to the com-
mon defence, at the same time are faced with
the urgent problem of speeding up their eco-
nomic development.
The IMinisters examined a report on national
and international civil emergency plans, which
are an essential complement to the defence
effort.
The next Ministerial Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council will be held, on the invitation
of the Canadian Government, in Ottawa, 21st-
23rd Slay, 1963.
MEMBERS OF DELEGATION
The Department of State announced on De-
cember 7 (press release 717) that the following
would be members of the U.S. delegation to the
NATO ministerial meeting:
U.S. Representatives
Dean Rusk, chairman, Secretary of State
Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense
U.S. Representative on the North Atlantic Council
Thomas K, Finletter
Advisers
Willis C. Armstrong, Director, Office of British Com-
monwealth and Northern European Affairs, Depart-
ment of State
John W. Auchincloss, Political OfBcer, U.S. Mission to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Eu-
ropean Regional Organizations, Paris
Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to France
Dixon Donnelley, Assistant to the Secretary of the
Treasury
Elbridge Durbrow, Deputy U.S. Representative on the
North Atlantic Council
Brig. Gen. Samuel K. Eaton, USA, Director, European
Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs
Philip J. Farley, Director, Office of Political Affairs,
U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion and European Regional Organizations, Paris
Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Jr., USA, Special
Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Special Assistant to the Assist-
ant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Robert H. Kranich, Office of Atlantic Political and
Military Affairs, Department of State
Lawrence Levy, Defense Adviser and Defense Repre-
sentative, U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and European Regional Organizations,
Paris
Edward S. Little, Deputy Executive Secretary, Execu-
tive Secretariat, Department of State
Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs
Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for In-
ternational Security Affairs
David H. Popper, deputy coordinator, Director, Office
of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Depart-
ment of State
Arthur W. Robinson, Assistant Director of Research
and Engineering, Department of Defense
W. W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy
Planning Council, Department of State
Henry S. Rowen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of De-
fease for International Security Affairs
J. Robert Schaetzel, coordinator. Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of State for European Affairs
Gen. Dean C. Strother, USAP, U.S. Representative to
the NATO Military Committee and Standing Group
Charles A. Sullivan, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of the Treasury
Emory C. Swank, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State
Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff
Llewellyn B. Thompson, Ambassador at Large
William N. Turpin, Assistant to the Secretary of the
Treasury
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs
Christopher Van Hollen, Office of Atlantic Political and
Military Affairs, Department of State
Secretary of Delegation
Francis Cunningham, Director, Office of International
Conferences, Department of State
U.S. Recognizes Government
of Yemen Arab Republic
Department Statement
Press release 739 dated December 19
In view of a number of confusing and con-
tradictory statements which have cast doubt
upon the intentions of the new regime in Yemen
the United States Government welcomes the
JANUARY 7, 1963
11
reafRrmatioii by the Yemen Arab Republic Gov-
ernment of its intention to honor its interna-
tional obliaations, of its desire for normalization
and establishment of friendly relations with its
neighbors, and of its intention to concentrate
on internal affairs to raise the living standards
of the Yemeni people.
Tlie United States Government also is grat-
ified by the statesmanlike appeal of the Yemen
Arab Republic to Yemenis in adjacent areas
to be law-abiding citizens and notes its under-
taking to honor all treaties concluded by pre-
vious Yemeni governments. This, of course, in-
cludes the Treaty of Sana'a concluded with the
British Government in 1934, which provides
reciprocal guarantees that neither party should
intervene in the affairs of the other across the
existing international frontier dividing the
Yemen from territory imder British protection.
Further the United States Government wel-
comes the declaration of the United Arab Re-
public signifying its willingness to undertake
a reciprocal disengagement and expeditious
phased removal of troops from Yemen as ex-
ternal forces engaged in siipport of the Yemen
royalists are removed from the frontier and as
external support of the royalists is stopped.
In believing that these declarations provide
a basis for terminating the conflict over Yemen
and in expressing the hope that all of the parties
involved in the conflict will cooperate to the end
that the Yemeni peoples themselves be permitted
to decide their own future, the United States
has today [December 19] decided to recogiiize
the Government of the Yemen Arab Republic
and to extend to that Government its best wishes
for success and prosperity. Tlie United States
has instructed its Charge d'Affaires in Yemen
to confirm this decision in writing to the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs of the Yemen Arab
Republic.
Italy Announces Removal
of Import Restrictions
Press release 738 dated December 18
At the 20th session of the Contracting Parties
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
held at Geneva from October 23 to November 16,
12
1962,^ Italy stated it would relax its remain-
ing restrictions on most products of export in-
terest to the United States. This action also
had the effect of virtually eliminating all dis-
crimination against dollar-area goods.
On December 3 the Government of Italy an-
nounced the removal of residual restrictions on
imports of the following products: natural
honey, raisins in packages of less than 500
grams, crude linseed oil, degras, macaroni, spa-
ghetti and similar products, iodine, iodides,
oxyiodides, iodates and periodates, turpeneless
essential oils from citrus fruit, mixtures of two
or moi-e odoriferous substances with a basis of
citi-us essence, propellent powders excluding
those used for hunting purposes, prepared ex-
plosives, parts of projectiles and munitions.
As of January 1, 1963, licenses will be granted
without restriction for imports of the following :
tulle and other net fabrics (but not including
woven, Icnitted, or crocheted fabrics), plain;
tulle, bobbin-net and knotted net fabrics, lace;
articles of tulle, bobbin-net and other net fab-
rics (but not including woven, knitted, or cro-
cheted fabrics) , figured or of mechanically made
lace; other printing machinery; machines for
uses ancillary to printing; machinery for print-
ing wallpaper and wrapping paper and parts
of such machineiy except cutting cylinders for
engraving wallpapers and wrapping paper;
chassis fitted with engines, and bodies (includ-
ing cabs) for the motor vehicles falling within
heading Nos. 87.02 and 87.03; trucks for the
transport of goods driven by electric motors or
by internal combustion engines and fitted with
a device for lifting their load-carrying plat-
form ; motorcycles, sidecars, motor scooters, ex-
cluding motorcycles weighing more than 170
kgs. net each; sidecars for motorcycles; parts
and accessories of motorcycles, sidecars, and
scooters.
Dollar import quotas which still exist for soy-
bean oil, raisins, and antiknock pi-eparations and
tetraethyl lead will be increased by 20 percent
January 1, 1963.
Bilateral discussions are continuing seeking
the removal of the few remaining Italian import
restrictions including the above restrictions
' For a report, see Bulletin of Dec. 17, 1962, p. 939|
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETII
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings >
Scheduled January Through March 1963
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement London Jan. 7-
U.N. Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Prevention of Crime Geneva Jan. 7-
and Treatment of Offenders.
WHO Standing Committee on Administration and Finance . Geneva Jan. 8-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: Ad Hoc Meeting Tanga, Tanganjdka Jan. 9-
on Hard Fibers.
U.N. ECAFE Committee for the Coordination of Investiga- Laos Jan. 9-
tions of the Lower Mekong Basin: 19th Session (plenary).
IMCO Assembly: Extraordinary Session London Jan. 10 (1 day)
IMCO Council: Extraordinary Session London Jan. 10-
ICAO Panel on Holding Procedures: 1st Meeting Montreal Jan. 14-
U.N. Special Fund: 9th Session of Governing Council . . . . New York Jan. 14-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 15th Session New York Jan. 14-
of Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities.
WHO Executive Board: 31st Session Geneva Jan. 15-
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Geneva Jan. 16-
10th Plenary Assembly.
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: 22d Session . . . Geneva Jan. 21-
U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radia- Geneva Jan. 21-
tion: 12th Session.
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 6th Session London Jan. 22-
OECD Committee for Scientific Research Paris Jan. 23-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: 6th Session Bangkok Jan. 28-
GATT Council of Representatives Geneva Jan. 29-
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel . . Paris Jan. 29-
CENTO Economic Committee Karachi Jan. 29-
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II Paris Jan. 31-
(Economic Growth).
U.N. Cocoa Conference New York or Geneva .... January
U.N. ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the Conference on New York January
Trade and Development.
IAEA Board of Governors Vienna Feb. 3-
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Geneva Feb. 4-
Goods.
U.N. Conference on the Application of Science and Technol- Geneva Feb. 4-
ogy for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas.
U.N. ECOSOC Population Commission: 12th Session . . . New York Feb. 4-
IMCO Expert Working Group on FaciUtation of Travel and London Feb. 5-
Transport.
ITU CCIR Plan Subcommittee for Asia New Delhi Feb. 5-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Re- Bangkok Feb. 8-
souroes: 15th Session.
IMCO Working Group on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods London Feb. 11-
by Sea.
ICAO Panel on Origin-and- Destination Statistics: 5th Meet- Montreal Feb. 11-
ing.
OECD Maritime Transport Committee: Working Party . . Paris Feb. 15-
lAEA Panel on Heavy Water Lattices Vienna Feb. 18-
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa L^opoldville Feb. 18-
IMCO Subcommittee on Code of Signals London Feb. 19-
ILO Governing Body: 154th Session Geneva Feb. 19-
' Prepared in the OfEce of International Conferences, Dec. 17, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR,
Comit6 consultatif international des radio communications; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE,
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic
and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;
IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International
Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; WHO, World Health Organization.
JANUARY 7, 1963 13
ILO: 3d Session of the Board of the International Institute
for Labor Studies.
U.N. Olive Oil Conference
OECD Economic Policy Committee
IMCO Working Group on Financial Regulations
IBE Executive Committee
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: Meeting of the Party
Governments Pursuant to Article XI.
Universal Postal Union: 15th Congress
U.N. Conference on Consular Privileges
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmental Organiza-
tions.
CENTO Ministerial Council: 11th Meeting
IMCO Working Group on Intact Stability of Ships: 1st
Session.
U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 19th
Session.
IMCO Working Group on Waterright Subdivision and
Damage Stability of Passenger and Cargo Ships.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 17th
Session.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 17th Session.
OECD Manpower and Social Afi'airs Committee
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Construction of Vehicles .
ICAO Legal Subcommittee
ITU Administrative Council: 18th Session
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement: 3d Session.
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Rap-
porteurs on Comparisons of Systems of National Accounts
in Use in Europe.
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Special Working
Group.
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 29th Session
IAEA Board of Governors
ITU Communications Division: Special Meeting To Prepare
for ITU Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference.
Geneva Feb. 20-
Geneva Feb. 26-
Paris Feb. 27-
London Feb. 28-
Geneva February
Tokyo February
(undetermined) March 1-
Vienna March 3-
New York March 4-
Karachi March 5-
London March 5-
Manila March 5-
London March 11-
New York March 11-
Geneva March 1 1-
Paris March 12-
Geneva March 18-
Berlin March 18-
Geneva March 23-
Londou March 25-
Geneva March 26-
Geneva March 25-
Geneva March 28-
Vienna March
Montreal March or April
Poputation Growth, Economic Development, and the United Nations
Following are two statements made hy Rich-
ard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretar-y for
International Organization Affairs, in Com-
inlttee II iyEcononvio and Financial) during
debate on the item '''■ Population growth and
economic development" together with the text
of a resolution adopted in plenary session on
December 18.
STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 10
U.S. delegation press release 4119
The United States welcomes the initiative of
the cosponsors of the resolution now before us ^
in drawing further attention to the subject of
population growth and its relation to economic
' U.N. doc. A/C.2AI.657 and L.709.
development. This is a subject of transcendent
importance for the United Nations and all its
members.
There are today some 3 billion people in the
world. It required hundreds of thousands of
years, from the beginning of life on earth to the
beginning of this century, to reach 1^/^ billion.
Within the last 60 years we have doubled that
number. According to United Nations esti-
mates we will double that number again to 6
billion by the end of this centui-y.
It is obvious from these statistics that the
world's population is not merely growing in
absolute nmniers. The rate of population
growth has increased at an extraordinary pace.
The annual growth rate has doubled from 1
percent in 1945 — itself an unprecedented high
in world history — to 2 percent today. It is ex-
14
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
pected to go even liigher. But even if the pres-
ent rate of growth of world population is main-
tained at its present level, the numbers we have
to contemplate are staggering.
"Whether the growth of world population con-
tinues at its present rate, whether a reduction
in that rate is brought about by increases in the
death rate or decreases in the birth rate, and
wliether, to reduce the birth rate, measures are
found which are consistent with the economic,
cultural, ethical, and religious circumstances
of the members of the United Nations — these
are all questions of paramomit importance.
The resolution before us is entitled "Popula-
tion Growth and Economic Development."
The United States agrees with the sponsors of
this resolution that the impact of population
growth on economic development and of eco-
nomic development on population growth is a
subject deserving of increased attention. Our
governments are pledged under articles 55 and
56 of the charter to take joint and separate
action in cooperation with the United Nations
for "the creation of conditions of stability and
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations" — including
higher standards of living, full employment,
and conditions of economic and social progress
and development; solutions of international
economic, social, health, and related problems;
and universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and f midamental freedoms for all.
In the opinion of my Government progi-ess
toward these high aims of the United Nations
Charter cannot be measured merely by increases
in gross national product. The object of eco-
nomic development is the welfare and dignity
of the individual human being. "We must con-
cern ourselves, not with aggregate statistics, but
with progress made in assuring each person a
full and satisfactory life — adequate levels of
personal consmnption, including food and hous-
ing, health and education, and also satisfaction
of those political, cultural, and spiritual needs
that are fundamental to all men.
If the condition of the individual, and not
gross statistics, is to be the measure of our
progress, then it is absolutely essential that v.e
be concerned with population trends. Popula-
tion changes are one of the most important
single factors determining our progress or lack
of progress toward the Iiigh aims of the United
Nations Charter. So long as we are concerned
with the quality of life we have no choice but
to be concerned with the quantity of life.
Experience of California
"We believe tliese statements are true not just
for some but for all nations. My own country,
blessed though it is with abundant resources
and high living standards, recognizes the fim-
damental importance of the population factor
in its efforts at economic and social develop-
ment.
"Within the United States our local. State,
and Federal governments are all devoting at-
tention to population trends as part of tlieir
planning for the improvement of individual
welfare. This is true in areas of great wealth
as well as in areas less fortunately endowed.
For example, California, a region which has
one of the highest living standards in the entire
world, has been obliged to pay increasing atten-
tion to population trends. Tlie total population
of the State, now something over 17 million,
is increasing at an average annual rate of about
3.8 percent. It has approximately doubled its
population every 20 years over the past cen-
tury. About 60 percent of the present growth
results from migrations; natural increase adds
almost 250,000 new residents annually out of
the total annual growth of about 600,000
persons.
Three aspects of California's rapid popula-
tion gi'owth are shared with other regions of
the United States and with other countries of
the world. First, it involves large-scale inter-
nal migration — the movement of about a third
of a million people annually from other parts
of the Nation — rather than international migra-
tion. Second, population gains are concentrated
in the urban areas, which account for about 90
percent of the growth, so that 86.4 percent of
the State population was reported as urban in
the 1960 census. Third, the high growth rate
has posed many problems for government — the
need for more schools, highways, and hospitals,
for example, must be considered iii terms of the
ability to finance construction and operation —
JANUARY 7, 1963
15
and there must be more jobs to provide em-
ployment needed to support the new residents.
Faced with these problems, the State govern-
ment has turned to the analysis of its current
population and projected gains as a basis for
planning its programs for action. It is also
examining the social and economic implications
of rapid growth rates in order to employ its
human and material resources most effectively
in the future. Because an adequate water sup-
ply is vital to continued growth, the State is
engaged in a multibillion-dollar project of
dams, reservoirs, and canals, the largest State-
financed water project ever undertaken in the
United States. A master plan for higher edu-
cation has been prepared and accepted, and
planning for highway needs over the next 2
decades is well advanced. And a comprehen-
sive study of the economic basis for future
growth and development is now underway.
Tlie California experience demonstrates the
importance of continued study and analysis of
population growth at every level of economic
development. The population of the United
States as a whole is growing at about 1.7 per-
cent a year — somewhat below the world aver-
age— with no foreseeable end in siglit. We have
come to recognize that this growth has both
advantages and disadvantages and that we can-
not fail to take account of it in seeking a better
life for our citizens, specifically in planning for
such things as medical care, education, conser-
vation of natural resources, recreation areas,
public housing, and urban transportation.
Population Problems of Developing Countries
Population trends are clearly important for
high-income countries in the advanced stages
of economic development. As many speakers
in this debate have already indicated, popula-
tion questions may be even more significant
for countries in an earlier stage of economic
development.
There are at least two reasons why this is so :
In the -first place, the rate of population
growth in a great many less developed countries
is much higher tlian in developed countries —
about 70 percent higher on tlie average. In
many less developed countries the rate of popu-
lation growth exceeds 3 percent a year. About
80 percent of the one-half-billion growth in
world population in the last decade took place
in the less developed areas. In the years ahead
the highest rates of growth will continue to be
in these areas. It is estimated, for example,
that, if present rates of growth were to continue,
between now and the year 2000 the population
of North America would grow from 200 to 300
million, while the population of South and Mid-
dle America would grow from some 200 to 600
million.
This extraordinary differential in the rates
of growth between more developed and less
developed countries reflects some important
differences in historical experience. In the
countries that are now more developed the effect
of improved medical and public-health services
came only gradually over many years, while
in the case of the newly developing countries
these services have recently developed very
rapidly with decisive and overwhelming impact.
Furthennore, the gradual effect of improved
health services in the case of more developed
countries came simultaneously with industriali-
zation and rapidly rising living standards
which tended to reduce the birth rate and slow
the rate of population growth. However, in
the case of the newly developing countries mod-
ern medicine and public health have not only
hit all at once; they have hit before industriali-
zation and rising living standards have had the
effect — as has been the case in many countries —
of reducing the rate of population growth.
Thus, while all countries are concerned with
population trends, the population problems of
the newly developing countries are of a new and
different order from those encountered now or
in the past by the more developed countries.
For there is little immediate prospect that the
factore which reduced the rate of population
growth in developed regions such as Europe will
take effect in the less developed countries in the
immediate future.
In the second place, rapid population growth
is obviously of greater concern to countries in
an earlier stage of economic development. The
problem for developed countries is to increase
already relatively high per capita income levels
and to devote increasing jjortions of already
large national savings to services such as medi-
16
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
cal care, health, and housing. But less devel-
oped countries whose economy is at the
subsistence level may be able to save little or
nothing at existing income levels for improve-
ments in social infrastructure.
It is all many of the developing countries
can do to enlai'ge the total economic product
as fast as the added people. Yet they have
not merely to provide additional facilities for
increased population but to create new and ade-
quate facilities for the existmg population as
well.
For newly developing countries the problem
of population growth is not, as some people
think, the problem of avoiding starvation or
finding standing room. It is the problem of
finding sufficient savings after current consump-
tion needs are met to assure a tolerable rate of
progress toward modernization and higher
standards of living based on self-sustaining eco-
nomic growth. In some of the world's poorest
areas population increase is outpacing the in-
crease in gross national product. As a result
there are no resources available for capital for-
mation and no increases in living standards.
The prospect is for more and more people to
share less and less income.
Just 1 year ago the General Assembly set as
its goal for the United Nations Development
Decade the attainment by 1970 of an annual
growth rate of 5 percent a year in aggregate
national income in each of the developing coun-
tries. The achievement of this goal will re-
quire enormous efi'orts. It has been estimated
that in the decade of the 1950's the developing
countries overall had a growth rate of 3 percent
a year and a population growth of 2 percent a
year, with annual per capita increases in income
of 1 percent a year. Making the generally ac-
cepted assumption of a capital-output ratio of
three to one, these countries will have to in-
crease their savings and investment from 9 to
15 percent in order to achieve the goals of the
Development Decade. This is obviously a
formidable task at present levels of population
growth.
Assuming that the goals of the Development
Decade are acliieved, prospective increases in
population will greatly dilute the impact of
overall increases in income on individual levels
JANUARY 7, 1963
670598—68 --8
of welfare. For example, gradual progress to-
ward the 5 percent annual growth goal during
the Development Decade would by the end of
this decade increase a $100 per capita income to
$123 in a country with a 2 percent rate of popu-
lation growth and to $111 in a country with a
3 percent rate of population growth.
Obviously there is much that we do not know
about the relationship of population trends to
economic and social development. But from
an examination of these and other facts one
conclusion seems inescapable — that in certain
less developed countries it may be virtually im-
possible at the present time, even with maximum
external assistance and maximum self-help, to
bring about a rate of economic growth which
will provide the rate of improvement in indi-
vidual living standards which the counti-y seeks
to attain and which, more fundamentally, is
essential to the exercise of the individual's hu-
man faculties.
Summary of U.S. Policy
These are facts which the members of the
United Nations must take into account in con-
sidering the subject now before us. Let me
turn now from these facts to define the policies
of my Government on this important question.
I can summarize these policies as follows :
1. The United States is concerned about the
social conseqiiences of its own population trends
and is devoting attention to them.
2. The United States wants to know more,
and help others to know more, about population
trends in less developed countries where present
levels of population growth may constitute a
major obstacle to the realization of goals of
human economic and social development.
3. The United States would oppose any effort
to dictate to any country the means to be em-
ployed in dealing with its population problem.
The population policy of any country must be
determined by that country and that country
alone.
4. WTiile the United States will not suggest
to any other government what its attitudes or
policies should be as they relate to population
or the adoption of specific measures in its imple-
mentation, the United States believes that ob-
stacles should not be placed in the way of other
17
governments which, in the light of their own
economic needs and cultural and religious val-
ues, seek solutions to their population problems.
While we will not advocate any specific policy
regarding population growth to another coun-
try, we can help other countries, upon request,
to find potential sources of information and
assistance on ways and means of dealing with
population problems.
5. The United States believes that there is a
great need for additional knowledge on popula-
tion matters. There is a need for more infor-
mation about the actual size and composition of
existing populations and about future popula-
tion trends — and botli private organizations and
governments as well as international organiza-
tions can help to provide it. Tliere is a need for
more facts about alternative methods of family
planning that are consistent with different eco-
nomic, social, cultural, and religious circum-
stances. There is a need for more facts about
the impact of economic and social development
on population trends and of population trends
on economic and social development.
6. The United States believes that the United
Nations and its affiliated agencies can have a
significant role to play in the population field.
My Government has actively siipported the
demographic work of the United Nations from
the very early days of the organization and
wishes to commend particularly the Popula-
tion Commission, the Population Branch of the
Bureau of Social Affairs, the Economic Com-
mission for Asia and the Far East, the Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America, the Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa, and the Kegional
Demographic Research and Training Centers
for their excellent work. It is the hope of the
United States that these valuable efforts will be
substantially expanded.
Role of the United Nations
Let me close with more specific observations
about the role of the United Nations. The
United States believes that member countries
should be able to obtain from the United Na-
tions and its agencies such assistance as they
may need and request in connection with their
efforts to deal with their population problems.
We believe that the United Nations should
focus its efforts on three areas : first, the encour-
aging and assisting of member governments to
obtain factual information on the demographic
aspects of their economic and social develop-
ment; second; the training of nationals of mem-
bers for demographic work ; and third, the pro-
motion of full and responsible discussion of
population problems.
In the area of demographic information there
is much that remains to be done. The demo-
graphic section of the Secretariat was down-
graded from a division to a branch in the
Secretary-General's 1955 reorganization and its
staff substantially reduced. It is time to con-
sider whether the resources being devoted to
this subject in the Secretariat are adequate to
the needs. We should also consider ways to
sti-engthen the demographic staffs of the re-
gional economic commissions. The commissions
are in a particularly good position to extend
effective assistance to member governments in
the context of the problems of particular
regions.
In the field of demographic training much
more should be done to train nationals of mem-
ber governments so that they may acquire the
demographic information on which to base
sound economic plans. This would include the
training of people in census taking, in the mak-
ing of population projections, and in analyzing
the economic and social consequences of demo-
graphic statistics. We welcome the establish-
ment by the United Nations of Eegional Demo-
graphic Research and Training Centers in
Bombay, Santiago, and Cairo and would sup-
port the establishment of further centers if
they were desired by the countries concerned.
In the field of discussion the United States
will continue to play an active role in the work
of the Population Commission and the regional
commissions of the United Nations. Moreover
we look forward with great interest to the Asian
population conference scheduled for 1963 and
the world population conference later on.
With experience in these forms of collab-
oration, the needs of individual countries and
the present and potential resources of the
United Nations would become better known and
future collaboration more fruitful.
18
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
These, in sum, are the views of the United
States on popuhvtion growth and economic de-
velopment. We consider tlie resokition now
before the committee to be broadly consistent
with these views. We are, accordingly, pre-
pared to give it our support.
STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 13
U.S. delegation press release 4124
The United States wishes to explain its af-
firmative votes on the first and second amend-
ments submitted by France, Gabon, Lebanon,
Liberia, and Spain.^ In our view these amend-
ments did not constitute significant changes in
the substance of the resolution, and we have
supported them in the interest of acconunodat-
ing the views of the widest possible number of
members.
The United States also mshes to explain its
abstaining vote on the tliird amendment sub-
mitted by France, Gabon, Lebanon, Liberia, and
Spain to delete operative paragraph 6 of the
resolution on population growth and economic
development.
In the opinion of the United States, operative
paragraph 6 does not add or subtract from the
authority which the United Nations already
possesses as a result of resolutions of the Gen-
eral Assembly and of the Economic and Social
Council concerning the gi'anting of teclmical
assistance upon request to member nations. In
our view, the paragraph is therefore super-
fluous.
"Wliile the United States believes that the
authority to lend technical assistance in all as-
pects of population problems already exists, we
also believe, as I stated earlier in the general
debate, that assistance by the United Nations
should emphasize those three areas in which
there appears to be broad agreement among
members, namely, the encouraging and assisting
of member governments to obtain factual infor-
mation on the demographic aspects of their
economic and social development ; the training
of nationals of members for demographic work ;
and the promotion of full and responsible dis-
cussion of population problems.
It was in the light of these considerations
that the United States decided to abstain on the
amendment to delete operative paragraph 6.
The United States wishes to explain its votes
on the various parts of operative paragraph 6
of the resolution. The United States voted for
the phrase "as well as other aspects" because
it believes that the United Nations should as-
sist members who wish help in obtaining basic
data and carrying out essential studies in all
aspects of their economic and social develop-
ment. The United States abstained on the
phrase "and that the United Nations give tech-
nical assistance, as requested by governments,
for national projects and programmes dealing
with the problems of population" for the same
reasons it abstained on the amendment to de-
lete operative paragraph 6.
The United States voted for the resolution
as a whole because of the importance we attach
to the relation between population growth and
economic development and because we regard
the resolution as broadly consistent with the
views of the United States as put forward in
our intervention during the general debate.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION 3
The General Assemlily,
Cemsidering that rapid economic and social progress
in the developing countries is dependent, not the least,
upon the ability of these countries to provide their
peoples with education, a fair standard of living and
the possibility for productive work.
Considering further that economic and social de-
velopment and population policies are closely interre-
lated and may be carried out simultaneously to secure
maximum benefits.
Recognizing that the health and welfare of the
family is of paramount importance, not only for obvi-
ous humanitarian reasons, but also with regard to
economic development and social progress, and that the
health and welfare of the family require special atten-
tion in areas with a relatively high rate of population
growth.
Recognizing further that It is the responsibility of
• U.N. doc. A/C.2/L.709/Rev. 2.
JANXJAKT 7, 1963
° U.N. doe. A/C.2/L.657, as revised ; adopted in ple-
nary session on Dec. 18 by a vote of 69 (U.S.) to 0,
with 27 abstentions. In a separate vote (34 to 34, with
32 abstentions (U.S.)) the following phrase was de-
leted at the end of operative paragraph 6: ". . . and
that the United Nations give technical assistance, as
requsted by Governments, for national projects and
programmes dealing with the problems of population."
19
each Government to decide Its own policies and devise
its own programmes of action for dealing with the
problems of population and economic and social
progress,
Reminding States Members of the United Nations
and of the specialized agencies that according to recent
census results the effective population increase during
the last decade has been particularly high in many
low-income less developed countries,
Reminding Member States that in formulating their
economic and social policies it is useful to talie into
account the latest relevant facts on the interrelation-
ship of population growth and economic and social
development and that the forthcoming World Popu-
lation Conference and the Asian Population Confer-
ence might throw new light on the importance of this
problem, especially for the developing countries,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 1217 (XII),
which, inter alia, invites Member States, particularly
the developing countries, to follow as closely as possi-
ble the interrelationships existing between economic
and population changes, and requests the Secretary-
General to ensure the co-ordination of the activities of
the United Nations in the demographic and economic
fields,
Recalling Economic and Social Council resolution
820 (XXXI) which contains provisions aiming at in-
tensified efforts to ensure international co-operation
in the evaluation, analysis and utilization of popula-
tion census results and related data, particularly in the
less developed countries, and which requests the Sec-
retary-General to explore the possibilities of increasing
the amounts of technical assistance funds which may
be made available for these activities,
Recognizing that further studies and research are
necessary to fill the gaps in our knowledge about the
causes and consequences of demographic trends, par-
ticularly in the less developed countries.
Recognizing that removals of large national groups
to other countries may give rise to ethnical, political,
emotional and economic difficulties,
1. Notes with appreciation the report of the Acting
Secretary-General, entitled "The United Nations De-
velopment Decade, Proposals for Action" ' which, inter
alia, refers to the interrelationship between population
growth and economic and social development;
2. Expresses its appreciation of the work on popula-
tion problems which has up to now been carried out
under the guidance of the Population Commission of
the Economic and Social Council ;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to conduct an in-
quiry among the Governments of States Members of
the United Nations and of the specialized agencies
concerning the particular problems confronting them
as a result of the reciprocal action of economic devel-
opment and population changes ;
4. Recommends that the Economic and Social Coun-
cil in co-operation with the specialized agencies, the
regional economic commissions and the Population
Commission, and taking into account the results of the
inquiry referred to in paragraph 3 above, intensify its
studies and research on the interrelationship of popu-
lation growth and economic and social development,
with particular reference to the needs of the developing
countries for investment in health and educational
facilities within the framework of their general de-
velopment programmes ;
5. Further recommends that the Economic and So-
cial Council report on its findings to the General Assem-
bly not later than at its nineteenth session ;
6. Endorses the view of the Population Commission'
that the United Nations should encourage and assist
the Governments, especially of the less developed coun-
tries, in obtaining basic data and carrying out essential
studies of the demographic aspects, as well as other
aspects, of their economic and social development prob-
lems;
7. Recommends that the second World Population
Conference pay special attention to the interrelation-
ships of population growth with economic and social
development, particularly in countries that are less de-
veloped, and that efforts be made to obtain the fullest
possible participation in the Conference by experts
from such countries.
' U.N. doc. E/3613.
' U.N. doc. E/3451, paragraph 15.
20
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
United States Policy on Outer Space
Following is a statement by Albert Gore, U.S.
Representative to the General Assembly, regard-
ing U.S. folicy on outer space, together with the
text of a resolution adopted unanimously by the
General Assembly on December H.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR GORE'
This is Year Six of the Age of Space — the great-
est era of exploration in the history of man, a
period of breathtaking discovery with unforesee-
able consequences for the future of peoples and
of nations.
A short 5 years ago it was not known that man
could survive travel in space ; today we are confi-
dent that he will arrive safely on the surface of the
moon within this decade. Five years ago peo-
ple wondered whether all the effort and cost of
space exploration would turn out to be worth
while; today, after nearly 150 successful satellite
launchings and deep probes into the univei'se, ac-
tivities in space already are providing practical,
everyday benefits to mankind.
Since the outer space item was debated in this
committee during the 16th General Assembly, just
1 year ago,^ scientists have made extensive prog-
ress in the quest for knowledge of the universe :
— The feasibility of telecommunications between
continents by artificial satellite has been dramat-
ically demonstrated.
— Immediately useful meteorological satellites
have been placed in space to provide early reports
of hurricanes, typhoons, and other weather for-
mations.
— There have been successes in orbiting man in
space, demonstrating his ability to live in a strange
and incredibly difficult environment.
— Space probes have been launched toward Ve-
nus and Mars, with the potential of giving the
world its first closeup looks at these neighboring
planets.
— New and definitive knowledge of the key
mechanisms in the relationship of the sun to the
earth have been obtained through the launching of
the first orbiting solar observatory and inter-
planetary probes.
— The first two international satellites have been
laimched, providing substantial new information
on the behavior of the ionosphere, which is so
critical to our earthly communications and to our
understanding of the earth's immediate environ-
ment.
Results of Actions of 16th General Assembly
In the meantime several United Nations organi-
zations have been engaged in trying to see to it
that man's conduct in outer space is reasonably
orderly, surely peaceful, and in the best interest of
all nations and all peoples. Our actions at the
16th General Assembly achieved these notable
results :
— The United Nations Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space has been reconstituted
and has held useful meetings in March ' and again
in September;
— The Outer Space Committee has adopted a
number of recommendations for international co-
operation in scientific and technical projects ;
— Legal experts have met to consider legal prob-
lems arising in the exploration and use of outer
space ; *
— The World Meteorological Organization has
'Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Dec.
3 (U.S. delegation press release 4111).
• Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 180.
' For a statement made by U.S. Representative Francis
T. P. Plimpton before the opening session of the Commit-
tee on Mar. 19, see iUd., May 14, 1962, p. 809.
* For an address by Richard N. Gardner on "Extending
Law Into Outer Space," see ihid., Apr. 9, 1962, p. 586.
JANUAET 7, 1963
21
submitted proposals to strengthen weather serv-
ices and meteorological research in the light of the
demonstrated value of weather satellites;
— The International Telecommunication Union
is preparing to consider aspects of space communi-
cations which require international cooperation
and will hold an important meeting on frequency
allocation next fall ; and
— These and other specialized agencies are con-
sidering the implications for their work of the on-
rushing science of space.
In March tlie Committee established a Scientific
and Technical Subcommittee and a Legal Sub-
conmiittee, which met in Geneva in the early sum-
mer. The Technical Subcommittee, with com-
mendable dispatch, agreed on a number of
specific proposals including one for sponsorship
by the United Nations of international sounding
rocket facilities, and the full Committee has en-
dorsed its report to the General Assembly, which
we shall consider a bit later on. The Legal Sub-
committee, however, was unable to reach an agree-
ment, although discussions revealed a consensus
on several important questions.
At the ]\farch meetings of the parent Commit-
tee in New York, there had been a wide measure
of agreement on the need for an international
agreement covering liability for space-vehicle
accidents and on the desirability of measures to
facilitate rescue and return of astronauts and
space vehicles. These questions were the subject
of thorough discussion at Geneva. The main dif-
ficulty in the Legal Subcommittee was that the
Soviet Union was unwilling to consider these
questions in the absence of agi-eement by the sub-
conunittee to go forward with the Soviet draft
declaration of general principles."
The United States, for its part, recalled that the
General Assembly had recently adopted an ex-
tremely important statement of principles on the
law of outer space and felt that the Legal Subcom-
mittee would be well advised to move aliead on
some specific legal problems already identified in
man's new adventures into space.
Let me underscore the fundamental and far-
reaching nature of the declaration of principles
which was voted unanimously by the General As-
sembly in December 1961.® First, the Assembly
confirmed that international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations, governs the rela-
22
tions of states in outer space. Thus the obliga-
tion to "refrain . . . from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Na-
tions" applies without any possible equivocation
to conduct in outer space.
The General Assembly went further. In the
same resolution it proclaimed another guiding
principle — that outer space and celestial bodies
are not subject to national appropriation, that is,
there will be no empire-building in outer space —
and that outer space is free and open for explora-
tion and use by all in accordance with interna-
tional law.
These principles adopted by the General As-
sembly last year have seemed to us an excellent
start on a working statement to guide man's ac-
tivities and behavior in outer space. At the same
time the United States has made clear, both at
Geneva and at the September session of the full
Outer Space Committee, our readiness and inter-
est in working to develop further principles. We
would hope that work could proceed and progress
be recorded contemporaneously on general princi-
ples and solutions to specific legal problems.
We have been impressed by the thoughtful and
constructive ideas set forth in the draft on general
principles which was presented at the meeting of
the full Committee in September by the United
Arab Republic.'' In an effort to make a further
contribution to the development of sound prin-
ciples, the United States has also prepared a draft
declaration * which my delegation will submit
during the debate.
Development of Law for Outer Space
The development of law for outer space requires
more than the formulation of general principles,
and it requires more than the conclusion of agree-
ments on specific problems, such as liability, and
rescue and return. It requires the constructing
of adequate assurance that the exploration and use
of outer space will be for peaceful purposes. I
"For text, see U.N. doc. A/5181(annex III, A).
'For text of Resolution 1721 (XVI), see Bulletin of
Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.
' U.N. doc. A/5181 (annex III, E).
' U.N. doc. A/C.1/8S1.
I
DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I
should like to state quite explicitly the views of
my Government on the most pressing aspects of
this problem.
It is the view of the United States that outer
space should only be used for peaceful — that is,
nonaggressive and beneficial — purposes. The
question of military activities in space cannot be
divorced from the question of military activities
on earth. To banish these activities in both en-
vironments we must continue our efforts for gen-
eral and complete disarmament. Until this is
achieved the test of any space activity must not
be whether it is military or nonmilitary but
whether or not it is consistent with the United
Nations Charter and other obligations of inter-
national law.
There is, in any event, no workable dividing line
between military and nonmilitary uses of space.
American and Russian astronauts are members of
the Armed Forces, but this is no reason to chal-
lenge their activities. A navigational satellite in
•outer space can guide a submarine as well as a
merchant ship. The instruments which guide a
space vehicle on a scientific mission may also guide
a space vehicle on a military mission.
One of the consequences of these facts is that
any nation may use space satellites for such pur-
poses as observation and information gathering.
Observation from space is consistent with inter-
national law, just as is observation from the high
seas. Moreover, it serves many useful purposes.
Observation satellites can measure solar and stel-
lar radiation and observe the atmosphere and sur-
faces of other planets. They can observe cloud
formations and weather conditions. They can
observe the earth and add to the science of geodesy.
Observation satellites obviously have military as
well as scientific and commercial applications.
But this can provide no basis for objection to
observation satellites. With malice toward none,
science has decreed that we are to live in an in-
creasingly open world, like it or not, and openness
can only serve the cause of peace. The United
States, like every other nation represented here,
is determined to pursue every nonaggressive step
which it considers necessary to protect its national
security and the security of its friends and allies,
until that day arrives when such precautions are
no longer necessary.
As I have said, we cannot banish all military
activities in space until we banish them on earth.
This does not mean, however, that no measures of
arms control and disarmament in space can be
undertaken now. On the contrary, the United
States believes that certain things can be done
immediately to prevent an expansion of the arms
race into space.
In the first place, it is the policy of the United
States to bring to a halt the testing of nuclear
weapons in outer space. In addition to proposing
a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear
weapons tests in all environments with only that
amount of international inspection necessary to
insure compliance, the United States has also of-
fered a treaty banning testing under water, in
the atmosphere, and in outer space with no inter-
national inspection." Thus the testing of nuclear
devices in space can be banned at any hour the
Soviet Union agrees to do so.
In the second place, even though it is now feasi-
ble the United States has no mtention of placing
weapons of mass destruction in orbit unless com-
pelled to do so by actions of the Soviet Union.
The draft treaty for general and complete dis-
armament,i° proposed by the United States and
now before the conference in Geneva, includes a
provision against the placing of weapons of mass
destruction into orbit during the first stage of the
disarmament process. Nonetheless, while the dif-
ficult negotiations continue for the actual elimina-
tion of nuclear weapons and the means of deliver-
ing them, it is especially important that we do
everything now that can be done to avoid an arms
race in outer space — for certainly it should be eas-
ier to agree not to arm a part of the environment
that has never been armed than to disarm parts
that have been armed. We earnestly hope that
the Soviet Union will likewise refrain from taking
steps which will extend the arms race into outer
space.
Outer space is not a new subject; it is just a
new place in which all the old subjects come up.
The things that go on in space are intimately re-
lated to the things that go on here on earth. It
would be naive to suppose that we can insulate
° For texts of draft treaties, see Bulletin of Sept. 17,
1962, p. 411.
"" For test of a U.S. outline of basic provisions of a
treaty on general and complete disarmament, see iMd.,
May 7, 1962, p. 747.
JAKTJART 7, 1963
23
outer space from other aspects of human existence.
Some limited measures of arms control, as I
noted earlier, may be achieved. But the key to
the survival of manlvind lies in the progress which
we make toward disarmament on earth as well
as in space. It is with this fact in mind that the
United States has advanced three proposals for
reducing world armaments: a draft outline of
basic provisions of a treaty for general and com-
plete disannament; a draft treaty to ban all nu-
clear testing in all environments with a minimal
amoimt of international inspection; and a draft
treaty to ban all testing under water, in the atmos-
phere, and in outer space withoiit any inspection
at all. Progress on these proposals would provide
the greatest single contribution we could make to
law and order in outer space.
Policy Regarding Space Experiments
Permit me, Mr. Chairman, to turn now to some
other aspects of United States policy which are
particularly relevant to our work in tliis com-
mittee.
The United States believes that nations which
conduct activities in outer space should take all
I'easonable steps to avoid experiments or other ac-
tivities which seriously threaten to deny or to
limit the use of outer space to other nations. This
is consistent witli well-established principles of in-
ternational law. We encourage prior international
discussion concerning experimental activities in
space wliich may liave undesirable effects, and we
are prepared in tlie future, as in the past, to con-
sult with scientists of other coiuitries as well as
United States scientists wherever practicable and
consistent with our national security.
The problems of possible harmful effects of
space experiments are difficult at best. They must
be studied by competent and objective scientific
bodies. To this end we welcome the creation of a
consultative group for this purpose by the
international Committee on Space Research,
COSPAR. The United States will continue to
conduct its space program with a high sense of
responsibility in tliis respect, making available to
the world scientific community, both before and
after the experiments wliich it conducts, as much
scientific data as is possible. We trust that other
nations will do the same.
24
Cooperative Aspects of U.S. Space Program
It is a keystone of United States policy that its
space program should be as open and cooperative
as possible. We report all launchings to the
United Nations. We make an extensive and fac-
tual repoi-t on our si^ace program and plans to
COSPAR every year. Tliis past September we
submitted an additional report on our national
space program to the United Nations Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which has
since been circulated in a U.N. document.^^ Early
this year we invited members of that Committee
to visit our launching site at Cape Canaveral, and
nearly all of them accepted. Major Titov came
here and inspected Colonel Glenn's spaceship. So
much for the openness with which my country
conducts our space program — open so that, in the
words of General Assembly Resolution 1721
(XVI). the exploration and use of outer space
shall be "to the benefit of States irrespective of the
stage of their economic or scientific development.''
As for the cooperative aspect, it was at the 12th
General Assembly in 1957 — the opening year of
the Space Age — that the United States first pro-
posed a United Nations role in cooperative and
peaceful development of outer space. Ever since,
the United States has initiated or supported with-
in this Assembly and other United Nations bodies
all proposals for international cooperation in outer
space and for making the United Nations the
focal point for encouragement of such common
endeavor.
Meanwhile our national progi-am has been de-
veloped with as great a degree of international
cooperation as other nations have been in a posi-
tion to undertake. It has been forthcoming to a
striking degree. Five years ago the Soviet Union
and the United States were virtually alone in the
fields of space research and development. Todaj'
more than 50 nations are associated with the
United States on one or another aspect of this
work. There are over two dozen space-tracking
and data-acquisition stations in 19 separate polit-
ical areas in support of United States scientific
programs, the majority operated wholly or in part
by technicians of the host countries. Scientists of
44 nations are working with NASA [National
Aeronautics and Space Administration] in
" U.N. doc. A/AC. 105/7.
DEPARTSIENT OP STATE BULLETIN
ground-based research projects in meteorology,
communications, and otlier space sciences, directly
utilizing United States satellites. Thirteen na-
Itions are engaged with us in actual flight projects
in which experiments, jointly determined by the
scientists of both countries, are sent into space
[either on vertical sovmding rockets or in earth
satellites. The recently launched Canadian Alou-
ette satellite and the United Kingdom's Ariel are
conspicuous examples of such cooperation. These
have all been truly cooperative experiments, the
results of which are open to all. Finally, fellow-
ships have been established to assist those newly
and seriously interested in the theoretical and ex-
perimental aspects of space research.
Mr. Chairman, it is the firm policy of my Gov-
ernment to cooperate with all nations of good will
on all problems and opportunities. This is a nor-
mal consequence of our kind of society ; and it is,
of course, as much to our advantage as it is to the
advantage of nations willing and able to cooper-
ate with us. But the problems and opportunities
of outer space are such as almost to compel inter-
national cooperation. Outer space is not only be-
yond the reach of sovereign claims by our
decisions; it is universal in nature. It is an in-
triguing thought that we may be on the threshold
of an epoch in which science will batter down the
political obstacles to international cooperation;
that it will force us to cooperate increasingly for
the down-to-earth reason that this is the only way
to live sanely, or perhaps to live at all, in the Age
I of Space.
Global Communication Satellite System
There are two uses of outer space where inter-
dependence calls for early cooperation and where
cooperation can yield practical dividends to all.
The United States wishes to take part in a truly
universal system of space commimications and a
truly universal system of weather reporting and
forecasting — both using satellites in outer space.
Both of these exciting prospects are close at hand.
Many of the problems already have been solved.
Teclinology in these fields is advancing rapidly.
The need for international agreements and inter-
national action is pressing in upon us.
Just 6 months ago the world's first active com-
jmunications satellite was launched from Cape
Canaveral. Early in July of this year transatlan-
tic television was ushered in, when cooperating
ground stations in Brittany and in Cornwall
picked up telecasts originating in the United
States. Telstar, an experimental satellite, was
given an extraordinary range of assignments. In
some 400 demonstrations it transmitted telephone
calls, telegrams, radiophotographs, radiofacsimi-
les, and 47 transatlantic telecasts originating in
Europe and the United States. These latter,
among other things, have permitted viewers in
Europe to see and hear, simultaneously with their
occurrence, special-event programs at the United
Nations. The world has glimpsed some of the
excitement and wonder of tliis, and we can all
imagine the potential benefits for education, for
the free exchange of ideas among people of the
world, and for international understanding.
Within the next month the United States will
launch Kelay, a second type of repeater communi-
cations satellite, which will bring Latin America
as well as Europe into the constellation of space-
linked continents ; and very soon we will laimch a
third — Syncom — which will, in effect, remain fixed
above a given point on earth. Syncom will orbit
22,300 miles above the earth, and at that distance
its speed will be synchronized with the turning of
the earth.
Although much research and development re-
main to be done, the United States intends to press
forward as rapidly as possible toward the estab-
lishment of an operational system of global satel-
lite communications. The United States has
authorized by legislation the establishment of a
communication satellite corporation, private in
character, but subject to governmental regula-
tion.^- It is intended that this corporation be the
United States participant in an international sys-
tem. The United States, of course, will be respon-
sible for the close supervision of the broad policies
of the corporation in its international activities.
We hope to see established a single international
system for commercial use based on the principle
of nondiscriminatory access. There are impres-
sive reasons — economic, political, and technical —
why a single system is to be preferred to several
competing systems. A single system would avoid
wasteful duplication of scarce resources and also
" For a statement made by President Kennedy upon the
signing of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, see
Bui-LETiN of Sept. 24, 1962, p. 467.
JANUARY 7, 1963
25
avoid destructive political competition. It would
facilitate technical compatibility between satellites
and ground terminals and would maximize opera-
tional efficiency. It would assure the best use of
the frequency spectrum.
If we are to achieve the objectives of a single
commercial system, it should be a truly interna-
tional venture open to all countries. In view of
the importance of communications to all states,
many will want to own and operate their own
ground stations. Some may want to participate in
ownership of the satellites themselves.
What we propose, then, is a single global satel-
lite communications system for commercial pur-
poses, with wide participation in ownership and
management, and operated so as to realize eco-
nomic and political benefits to all nations.
We realize there are many problems which must
be solved and many obstacles overcome before such
a system can be made operational. Even so we are
confident that success is possible. This confidence
is encouraged by the example of Eurovision, in
which 18 Western European nations joined forces
to erase communication barriers and thus to enable
some 100 million Europeans to receive telecasts
originating in any of these 18 nations. Eurovision
was no mean accomplishment, and the United
States pays tribute to those who solved the difficult
problems of language, varied technical standards,
and political differences.
In moving forward toward a global communi-
cation satellite system, we can learn from this
European experience and from the experiences in
international cooperation in earthbound communi-
cations. Communicating from space, however,
will pose new problems toward the solution of
which there is little experience to draw upon. We
must cut through the underbrush of technical
problems, and we must reach agreement on the
political plane. Decisions will have to be made as
to the type of satellite, or combination of satellites,
to be used — that is, the choice of satellite system —
on participation in, and ownership of, the satellites
and ground terminals, on the allocation of radio
channels between uses and users, on technical
standardization, and on assistance to less developed
countries so that they too may be able to take ad-
vantage of this new medium of international
communication.
Clearly, Mr. Chairman, the Extraordinary Ad-
ministrative Radio Conference, to be convened in
October of next year by the International Tele-
communication Union, now takes on added im-
portance. This conference will make allocations
of radio frequencies for space communications.
Unless ample space in the precious frequency spec-
trum is made available, there can be no fully
global space commimication system.
The allocation of radio frequencies is but one of
many problems which will have to be solved
through international agreement to clear the way
for communications satellites. In recognition of
this fact the General Assembly in Resolution 1721
invited the ITU to consider at the 1963 conference
other aspects of space communications in which
international cooperation will be required.
To prepare for the 1963 conference the ITU has
asked members by the end of 1962 to submit infor-
mation on three matters : their present programs
with respect to the development of space conrniU'
nications; the subjects they regard as appropriate"
for international cooperation in order to achieves
global space communications ; and which of those
subjects, if any, they believe should be included
on the conference agenda. The Secretary General
of the ITU will prepare a report for the guidance
of member states on the basis of these repliesi
Meteorological Satellites
The report of the U.N. Outer Space Commit-
tee ^^ recommends, inter alia, that member statea
and the specialized agencies concerned support
improvement of the worldwide system for the dis*
tribution of meteorological information in antici-
pation of the availability of meteorological data
from satellites. The United States warmly en-
dorses this recommendation. The United States
weather satellite program, as you know, has been
operational for some time. In fact six satellites ol
the Tiros family have been orbited since early 1960
and they have sent back highly useful data or
atmospheric phenomena. Two of them are doing
this today. These data have been made available:
to the entire world in radioteletype and radiofac-
simile broadcasts. Special advisory bulletins have!
been radioed to alert countries likely to be affected
by special meteorological events, including tropi-,
cal storms. Upward of 170,000 photographs ol;
' U.N. doc. A/5181.
26
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I
cloud conditions have assisted substantially in im-
proving weather reporting and forecasting. Con-
ventional meteorological observation can supply
weather uiformation covering less than one-fifth
of the earth's surface. Meteorological satellites
ix'ive promise in time of being able to supply such
data on all of the earth's regions.
Year in and year out, tropical storms of hurri-
I cane intensity have devastated the coasts of many
comitries, including Australia, Japan, India, Pak-
istan, and the Americas, often v^ith little or no
advance warning. Few nations can afford the cost
of maintaining weather stations on the high seas.
The Tiros satellites have already helped to fill this
gap. In 1961 Tiros III iihotographed 20 tropical
storms and gave the first warning of hurricane
Esther, sighted in the South Atlantic. In 1962
Tiros V and VI have photographed at least 16
tropical storms. In the case of 10 of these storms
tlie information relayed from the satellite was re-
ceived prior to any information received by the
U.S. National Meteorological Center through con-
ventional weather observation services. This is,
we believe, a striking example of the value of
meteorological satellites. Their utility would be
materially enhanced by improvements in facilities
for disseminating the data which they are able to
transmit.
General Assembly Eesolution 1721 requested the
World Meteorological Organization to prepare a
report on appropriate organizational and financial
arrangements to advance the state of meteorolog-
ical science and technology and to expand existing
weather forecasting capabilities in the light of
developments in outer space. The WMO invited
an American and a Soviet national to help in the
preparation of the report. Tlie late Dr. Harry
Wexler, then Director of Meteorological Eesearch
of the United States Weather Bureau, and Dr. V.
A. Bugaev, Director of the Central Weather Fore-
casting Institute of the Soviet Union, produced a
draft which, after consultation with experts from
other countries, was approved by the "WlIO Ex-
ecutive Committee in June. Here is an example
of cooperation by representatives of the two lead-
ing space powers in a field of prime interest to all
the world. The "WMO report," a comprehensive
document, makes recommendations for the devel-
opment of an internationally coordinated plan for
' U.N. doc. E/.Sfifi2.
the use of meteorological satellites, for the estab-
lisloment of a World Weather Watch as an inter-
national weather observation and prediction
system, for the expansion of weather observation
facilities particularly in the equatorial zone, and
for the improvement of telecommunication net-
works for the rapid exchange of meteorological
data obtained both from satellites and by conven-
tional means.
The WMO will hold a Congress in April of next
year to consider these and other proposals in the
report. The United States does not believe that
we in the General Assembly should at this time
attempt to pass on the merits of these proposals.
However, it is clear that meteorological services
should be strengthened so that they may be tech-
nically capable of processing weather data from
satellites. It is also clear that research in atmos-
pheric sciences should be expanded to extend our
knowledge of the physical processes that determine
day-to-day weather conditions and influence long-
tenn climate trends. The WMO should be en-
couraged to continue its work in both these fields.
The United States hopes that member states wish-
ing to take advantage of meteorological data from
satellites will strengthen their internal weather ob-
servation and forecasting services. In this con-
nection U.N. agencies in the technical and financial
assistance field can be helpful by giving sympa-
thetic consideration to requests from member
states to supplement their resources for strength-
ening their networks of meteorological observation.
In the coming year the United States expects
to launch an advanced type of meteorological sat-
ellite which we call Nimbus. As with Tiros, the
data from this satellite will be received by a pair
of complex and expensive receiving stations on
the North American Continent, and the results
will be transmitted over the entire globe. In ad-
dition, research and development now underway
gives us reason to hope that, with relatively inex-
pensive radio receivers, readout of weather data
directly from this satellite for local regions will
be possible. Thus any nation with this inexpensive
equipment would have direct access to regional
meteorological information developed by the satel-
lite— information which would materially im-
prove its iimnediate weather forecasting capabil-
ities. Limited experimental testing of this system
may be initiated next year.
27
So, Mr. Chairman, United States policy on
outer space is :
— to be guided by the general principles already
laid down by the United Nations for the establish-
ment of a regime of law in outer space and to
negotiate an extension of those principles by inter-
national agreement ;
— to conclude a treaty banning immediately the
testing of any more nuclear weapons in outer
space ;
— to preclude the f)lacing in orbit of weapons
of mass destruction ;
— to take all reasonable and practicable steps,
including consultation with the world scientific
community, to avoid space experiments with
harmful effects;
— to conduct a program which is as open as our
security needs will permit and as cooperative as
others are willing to make it ;
— to press forward with the establishment of
an integrated global satellite communication sys-
tem for commercial needs and a cooperative
weather satellite system, both with broad interna-
tional participation.
In more general terms. United States policy
and United States programs for outer space are
peaceful in intent, cooperative in practice, and
beneficial in action. In this hopeful but danger-
ous world we must and we shall continue to look
to our own security in outer space as elsewhere;
but we shall strive earnestly and hopefully in
outer space as elsewhere to lessen the dangers, to
achieve order vmder law, and to secure the peace
and welfare of all. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we shall
work to make this great Age of Space — in its 6th,
its 16th, or its 60th year — the age in which man at
last escaped from his sectarian earthly quarrels
and went forth to create his universal destiny —
an open and cooperative system of world order.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION"
The General Assemhh/,
RecalUng resolution 1721 (XVI) on international co-
operation in the peaceful uses of outer space,
Believing that the activities of States in the explora-
tion and use of outer space should be carried out in con-
formity with international law including the Charter of
the United Nations, in the interest of friendly relations
among nations,
Stressing the necessity of the progressive development
of international law pertaining to the further elaboration
of basic legal principles governing the activities of States
in the exploration and use of outer space and to liability
for space vehicle accidents and to assistance to and re-
turn of astronauts and space vehicles and to other legal
problems,
Bearing in mind that the application of scientific and
technological advances in outer space, particularly in the
fields of meteorology and communications, can bring great
advantages to mankind and contribute to the economic
and social progress of the developing countries as en-
visaged in the United Nations Development Decade,
Earing considered the report of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space made in response to resolu-
tion 1721 (XVI),
A
1. Notes with regret that the United Nations Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has not yet
made recommendations on legal questions connected with
the peaceful uses of outer space ;
2. Calls upon all Member States to co-operate In the
further development of law for outer space ;
3. Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space to continue urgently its work on the fur-
ther elaboration of basic legal principles governing the
activities of States in the exploration and use of outer
space and on liability for space vehicle accidents and on
assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles
and on other legal problems ;
4. Refers to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space as a basis for this work all proposals which
have been made thus far, including the Draft declara-
tion of the basic principles governing the activities of
States pertaining to the exploration and use of outer
space," submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics ; the Draft international agreement on the rescue
of astronauts and spaceships making emergency land-
ings," submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics; the Draft proposal on assistance to and return of
space vehicles and personnel." submitted by the United'
States of America ; the Draft proposal on liability for
space vehicle accidents," submitted by the United States
of America : the Draft code for international co-operation
in the peaceful uses of outer space," submitted by the
United Arab Republic : the Draft declaration of basic
principles governing the activities of States pertaining
to the exploration and use of outer space," submitted by
the United Kingdom ; the Draft declaration of principles
relating to the exploration and use of outer space," sub-
mitted by the United States of America ; and all other
proposals and documents presented to the General As-
sembly during its debates on this agenda item and the
records of those debates.
"U.N. doc. A/C.l/L..320/Rev.l; adopted unanimously
in plenary session on Dec. 14.
28
"For texts, see U.N. doc. A/5181 (annex III, A-E).
" U.N. doc. A/C.1/879.
" U.N. doc. A/C.1/881.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN i
1. Eitdorsc-'i the recommendations set forth in the report
couceriiing the exchange of information :
L'. Notes with appreciation that a number of Member
States have already, on a voluntary basis, provided in-
forniation on their national space programmes, and urges
other States and regional and international organizations
to do so ;
3. Urges all Member States and appropriate specialized
agencies to give wholehearted and effective support to
the international programmes mentioned in the report,
and already under way, including the International Year
of the Quiet Sun and the World Magnetic Survey:
4. Notes that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space considers that the creation and use of sound-
ing rocket launching facilities under United Nations
spiinsorship would contribute to the achievement of the
objectives of General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI)
by furthering international collaboration in space research
and the advancement of human knowledge, and by pro-
viding opixirtunity for valuable practical training for
interested users :
5. Notes the recommendation that Member States con-
sider the establishment under United Nations sponsorship
of a sounding rocket facility, or facilities, on the geomag-
netic equator in time for the International Year of the
Quiet Sun ;
6. Endorses the basic principles suggested by the Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for the oper-
ation of such facilities under United Nations sponsorship ;
7. Affirms that such facilities when established and
operated in accordance with these principles shall, upon
request of the host Member State, be eligible for United
Nations sponsorship.
C
1. Notes with appreciation the prompt initial response
of the World Meteorological Organization to the request
of the General Assembly, as embodied in resolution 1721
(XVI), that it report on a programme to advance atmos-
pheric science research and to develop improved weather
forecasting capabilities in the light of developments in
outer space ;
2. Calls on Member States to strengthen weather fore-
casting services and to encourage their scientific com-
munities to co-operate in the expansion of atmospheric
science research ;
3. Recommends that the World Meteorological Organ-
ization, in consultation with other United Nations agencies
and governmental and non-governmental organizations,
develop in greater detail its plan for an expanded pro-
gramme to strengthen meteorological services and re-
search, placing particular emphasis upon the use of me-
teorological satellites and the expansion of training and
educational opportunities in these fields ;
4. Inriles the International Council of Scientific Unions
through its member unions and national academies to
develop an expanded programme of atmospheric science
researcli which will complement the programmes fostered
by the World Meteorological Organization ;
5. Invites United Nations agencies concerned with the
granting of technical and financial assistance, in consulta-
tion with the World Meteorological Organization, to give
sympathetic consideration to requests from Member States
for technical and financial assistance to supplement their
own resources for these activities including the improve-
ment of meteorological networks ;
6. Bequests the World Meteorological Organization, fol-
lowing its Congress in April 1963, to reiwrt to the Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and to the
Economic and Social Council at its thirty-sixth session
on steps taken relating to these activities.
D
1. Notes with appreciation the prompt initial response
of the International Telecommunication Union to the re-
quest of the General Assembly, as embodied in resolution
1721 (XVI), that it report on those aspects of space com-
munications in which international co-operation will be
required ;
2. Believes that communication by satellite offers great
benefits to mankind as it will permit the expansion of
radio, telephone and television transmissions, including
the broadcast of United Nations activities, thus facilitat-
ing contact among the peoples of the world ;
3. Emphasizes the importance of international co-opera-
tion to achieve effective satellite communications which
will be available on a world-wide basis ;
4. Observes that the Secretary-General of the Inter-
national Telecommunication Union has invited Member
States to submit information on: (a) technical progress
and developments in .space telecommunications: (b) sub-
jects which they regard as appropriate for international
co-operation in order to achieve the objectives set forth
in General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI) Part D: and
(c) which of those subjects, if any, should be included on
the agenda of the Extraordinary Administrative Radio
Conference to be held in October 1963 :
5. Notes that the Secretary-General of the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union in the light of the re-
plies will report on the.se questions to the next meeting of
its Administrative Council in March 1963 in order that
the Council may complete the agenda for this Conference ;
6. Considers it of utmost importance that this Confer-
ence make allocations of radio frequency bands sufficient
to meet expected outer space needs ;
7. Requests the International Telecommunication Union
to report to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space and to the Economic and Social
Council at its thirty-sixth session on progress made relat-
ing to its outer space activities.
JANUARY 7, 19 63
29
U.N. General Assembly Adopts Two Resolutions
on Financing of Peacekeeping Operations
Following is a statement hy Philip M. Klutz-
nick, U.S. Representative to the General Assem-
bly., made in Committee V {Administrative and
Budgetary) on December 3, together with the text
of two resolutions adopted on December 19.
STATEMENT BY MR. KLUTZNICK
U.S. delegation press release 4112
On November 30th, in a simple, but moving,
ceremony, U Thant was unanimously elected Sec-
retary-Genei'al.^ In an acceptance statement
which reflected the qualities of humility, sincer-
ity, and serenity which have been the hallmarks
of his service, the Secretai-y-General referred to
the problem of the Congo in these words :
The problem remains unsolved in spite of the best ef-
forts of all concerned. As a consequence, the financial
problem of the Organization also remains unsolved. Both
these problems must, however, be solved, and soon, if
the usefulness of the Organization for the future is not to
be seriously affected. And today I appeal anew to all
Member Governments, who have come to value the use-
fulness of the Organization, to assist in solving these
long-standing issues.
It is in direct response to this earnest appeal,
and in the same spirit, that we approach the con-
sideration of the item to which we address our-
selves this day. Elsewhere and in other hands
rest the political and military aspects of this mat-
ter; but only here, in this committee, can steps be
taken in response to the urgent challenge of the
financial problem of the organization which has
grown out of the events in the Congo. This is a
weighty responsibility which has a difficult and
contentious history; yet, with deliberation and
statesmanship, we have, in the light of experience,
the opportunity to make significant progress. My
^ For a statement by Adlai E. Stevenson in plenary ses-
sion on Nov. 30, see Bulletin of Dec. 17, 1962, p. 929.
30
delegation realizes that even now there are differ-
ences of opinion as to means and methods. But
we approach the current situation with the hope
that we can find in this arena a unanimous willing-
ness to forgo the polemics that so frequently char-
acterized the discussions of the past and together
help mold a program which will give the Secre-
tary-General the measure of support and assurance
that he so richly merits and rightly requests.
When the Legal Adviser of the Department of
State [Abram Chayes] was privileged to address
the International Court of Justice on the case of I
Certain Expenses of the United Nations^ he de- j
clared that: "In the view of the Government of
the United States, no more important question has
ever been before the International Court." Cor-
respondingly, few more important questions have
ever been before this committee. The issue before
us raises questions of a fundamental character:
the role and the rule of international law; the
standing of the International Court of Justice and
the relation of this Assembly to that Court; the
ability of the United Nations to keep the peace;
and the financial integrity of this organization —
with all it implies for the continued existence and
effectiveness of the United Nations.
The obligations of members, under the Charter
of the United Nations, in respect of the expenses of
UNEF [United Nations Emergency Force] and
ONUC [United Nations Operation in the Congo]
has in the past given rise to dispute in this com-
mittee. The character of these obligations like-
wise gave rise to dispute in the Working Group f)f
Fifteen. That group wisely decided that, before
the question of financing could be defined, the
prior question of legal obligation — a question of
law — needed to be settled through legal proceed-
ings. It recommended that the General Assemblv
' IMd., July 2, 1962, p. 30.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I
H't>k an advisory opinion from the International
\mrt of Justice. That this Assembly decided to
\o.'
That decision was equally wise. "Where there
s a legitimate question about the obligations of
lunnbers of the United Nations, and about the
ililigations of the United Nations to its members,
md where that question has led to controversy
imong us, it is highly desirable and highly im-
wrtant that that doubt be dealt with through
judicial means. The charter provides that "the
n-incipal judicial organ of the United Nations"
s the International Court of Justice. It further
uovides tliat the General Assembly may request
he International Court of Justice "to give an ad-
■isorj' opinion on any legal question." This As-
sembly did request an opinion ; and it is that opin-
nn that is before us today.''
My delegation is pleased that there is before us
m opinion of the Court. We are no less pleased
hat this vital question was presented to the Court
ictively and with deep conviction by those liold-
ug differing views. This was not a p7'o forma
)roceeding. A score of governments presented
vritten statements to the Court. Nine member
tates participated in the Court's oral argument,
imong them a distinguished representative of the
soviet Union. This marked the first time tliat
ho Soviet Union has participated in oral argu-
nent in a case before the World Court in its 40-
,'ear history.
The number of members participating by way
)f written or oral argument in this advisory pro-
ceeding was tlie largest that has participated in
Any advisory proceeding. This is eloquent testi-
mony to the importance of this opinion.
My delegation does not approach this opinion
retrospectively, in a spirit of who was right and
who was wrong about yesterday's debates on the
aature of obligations concerning certain United
Nations expenses. Rather we do so in the hope
we may all call a page of history closed while we
examine calmly, deliberatively, and constructively
the course opened to us by the light shed through
the judicial process. We have asked the Court for
its advice. The Court has given it. The law is
now clear. Wliat remains is for us to act.
■ U.N. doc. A/RES/1731 (XVI) .
' For a Department statement on the Court's decision,
•see Bm-LETiN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246.
I JANUARY 7, 1963
To do otherwise must in the end surely mean
that by failure to act positively we start to aban-
don the first, and primary, purpose of tlie charter,
paragraph 1 of article 1 of which states:
To maintain international peace and security, and to
that end : to talje efifective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in
conformity with the principles of justice and international
law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes
or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace ;
Wliat we now do must be guided by only one con-
sideration— preserving and nurturing this institu-
tion of which we are members.
We submit that it is not in the interest, nor do
we believe it is the intention, of any member to
bankrupt the United Nations. As the unanimous
election of our distinguished Secretary-General a
few days ago demonstrated, whatever our differ-
ences we all share a deep-rooted determination to
keep life in the United Nations. How do we
translate the good will and the good faith that all
of us share into action which will conform to these
profound sentiments? That is the challenge and
the opportunity of this hour.
My delegation is privileged to cosponsor two
resolutions. The first, reproduced in A/C.5/L.760,
provides in its sole operative paragraph that this
Assembly "accepts the opinion of the Court on
the question submitted to it."
The second resolution is reproduced in A/C.5/-
L.761. In essence it reestablishes the Working
Grouj:) of Fifteen to consider methods of financ-
ing, in the future, peacekeeping operations of the
United Nations involving heavy expenditures. In
a sense one resolution deals with the past, the
other with the future. One is not dependent on
the other. Permit me initially to speak to the first
resolution.
Draft Resolution on Court Opinion
The draft resolution submitted in Document
L.760 refers to the action taken last year request-
ing the Court's opinion, which set forth this As-
sembly's "need for authoritative legal guidance as
to obligations of Member States under the Charter
of the United Nations in the matter of financing
the United Nations operations in the Congo and
in tlie Middle East." It recalls the question sub-
31
mitted to tlie Court and summarizes the Court's
holding. Finally, in its operative paragraph, this
Assembly would accept the opinion of the Court.
The operative paragraph is phrased so as to spec-
ify that the Assembly would accept the Court's
opinion only on the specific question submitted
to it.
By adopting the draft resolution the Assembly
would not pass upon the reasoning of the Court.
In the view of my delegation the Court, in its
opinion of 20 July 1962, has measured up to the
highest standards of judicial service. Yet we
should make it clear that my Government sees no
need for this Assembly to pass upon, or even to
go into, the reasoning of the Court.
Acceptance of Court's Opinion
In accepting the Court's opinion on the question
submitted to it, this Assembly would not neces-
sarily accept any particular argument or implica-
tion of the Court's opinion. It would neither
commend nor criticize the Court on its reasoning.
This is no more our function than to commend or
criticize those member states who in the past
have contended for their varying views on the
question before this committee or before the
Court. We would merely accept the precise an-
swer of the Court on the precise question the As-
sembly put to it.
The draft resolution anticipates the General
Assembly performing a function which is proper
to it. The General Assembly is not a court. It is
not a judicial organ of the United Nations, and
still less is it "the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations," as article 92 of the charter de-
scribes the International Court of Justice. It is
not the function of this Assembly — and certainly
not of this committee — to act as a court to review
the International Court of Justice. To do so
would be to depart from the charter's clear inten-
tion. Wlien the Court's opinion is asked, estab-
lishment and interpretation of the law, in the
design of the charter, is the fimction of the Court;
action to implement the law is, as the case may be,
the function of other organs of the United Nations.
In both advisory and contentious cases the Court
has declared the law. The dilference between a
judgment in a contentious case and an advisory
opinion relates not to the validity of the Court's
32
^1
statement of the law but to the obligations ths
flow from that statement. While an advisoi
opinion does not have binding force, it does n<
follow that it is not an authoritative statement (
the law. As the Court has pointed out, "Tl
Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even
giving advisory opinions, depart from the essei
tial rules guiding their activity as a Court." °
The advisory opinion has no binding force b(
cause in advisory proceedings there are no parti*
on whom the obligation of compliance can be
posed. But this fact, as a leading authority o
the Court has said, "does not affect the quality c
the opinion as an authoritative pronouncement (
what the law is." ® As Judge Azevedo has pointe
out, while in League of Nations practice the ord
nary advisory opinion did not produce the eff&
of res adjudieata, that fact "is not sufficient i
deprive an advisory opinion of all the moral coi
sequences which are inherent in the dignity of th
organ delivering the opinion, or even of its legs
consequences." '
Indeed, in a report of a committee composed o
Judges Loder, Moore, and Anzilotti, which accom
panies a clause in the Kules of the Court, it Wi
concluded in 1927 that: "In reality, where then
are in fact contending parties, the diffei-ence ba
tween contentious cases and advisory cases is onlj
nominal ... so that the view that advisory opin
ions are not binding is more theoretical than real."
The distinguished Polish jurist, Judge Winiarski
who is now President of the Court and who reai
in open court the opinion before us, in anothe
opinion has declared that the Court "must in vieM
of its high mission, attribute" to advisory opini
ions "great legal value and a moral authority."
His Yugoslav colleague, Judge Zoricic, noted thai
"the Court's advisory opinions enjoy the same am
thority as its judgments, and are cited by jurisb
who attribute the same importance to them as t<
judgments. The Court itself refers to its previoui
° P.C.I. J., Series B, No. 5, p. 29, quoted in Certain Ex
penses of the United Nations, I.G.J. Reports 1962, pp
151, 1.5.5.
"Rosenne, The International Court of Justice (1957)i
pp. 492-193.
' Interpretation of Peace Treaties, I.C.J. Reports 195i
pp. 65, 80.
" P.C.I..T., Series E, No. 4, 1927, p. 76.
' Interpretation of Peace Treaties, I.C.J. Reports 1950
pp. 65, 91.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
It
ft
III
Hi
■ :ivisory opinions in the same way as to its judg-
*jients." He concludes : ". . . an advisory opinion
■'hich is concerned with a dispute between States
. -cm a legal point of view amounts to a definitive
■lision upon the existence or nonexistence of the
gal relations, which is the subject of tlie dis-
■ ute.""'
It would profit little to delve further into the
)mplex jurisprudential question of the precise
)rce of advisory opinions. My delegation holds
" le view that an advisory opinion of the Interna-
onal Court of Justice — this organization's "prin-
pal judicial organ" — is authoritative. This is
le view which this Assembly has adopted in the
List. The Sixth Committee in its report to the
' eneral Assembly in connection with the Repara-
on case noted: "the authoritative nature of the
Ivisoiy opinion should be taken for granted." "
In this connection permit me to advert to the
osition taken by the distinguished delegate of
ranee in considering the Assembly's response to
le Court's opinion in the Reparation case. Ma-
une Bastid described the Court as "the highest
u-idical and constitutional authority that exists
I the world today." She stated that, while an
jinion of the Court is not binding upon states,
I'.t is authoritative. . . ." She said: "Jurists in
,■ lis General Assembly and delegates in this As-
•mbly have appealed to the Court on a problem
pen which they could not take a decision. They
lereby recognized that there should be an opin-
>n of the highest judicial authority that exists."
"Now," she asked, "before taking action, should
e refer this advisory opinion once again to the
ates and have it filtered and screened by the
.ssembly ? We do not believe that this is neces-
iry. The role of the General Assembly, of the
olitical body, is to take a decision for action
ither by following, or by failing to follow, or
oUowing in part the opinion of the Court." ^^ We
gree with this view.
May we burden the committee with one more
uotation, both because of the eminence of its
uthor and its pertinence to the point before us.
)ir Gerald Fitzmaurice, now a Judge of the Court,
leclared in this Assembly : ^^
Advisory opinions were not binding in the sense that
adgments of the Court were, because in the ease of ad-
isory opinions the General Assembly was not bound to
fANTJART 7, 1963
act in accordance with the opinion. The Assembly could
take other factors into consideration ; it was also free to
accept or reject that opinion. It could not be said, how-
ever, that the opinion of the Court was wrong from the
legal standpoint or that the Assembly did not agree with
the Court in its findings, because the Assembly had no
competence in a legal matter to agree or disagree with the
Court on a point of law. The Court was the highest au-
thority on matters of international law and its findings
were necessarily authoritative.
U.S. Position on Acceptance
Now it has been the uniform practice of this
Assembly in the past to accept or act upon the
Court's advisory opinions. My Government has
consistently favored this practice, even where it
disagreed with the opinion of the Court. Thus
in 1954 the Fifth Committee debated acceptance
of the Court's advisory opinion in the case of
Effects of Awards of Compensation Made hy the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal. Sen-
ator Fulbright, speaking for the United States,
stated: ". . . while the United States delegation
did not share the Court's opinion ... it would
maintain its consistent policy and continue to re-
spect the Court's authority and competence."
The response to Senator Fulbright's declaration
was instructive. The distinguished delegate of
India declared that his delegation "was pleased
to hear . . . that the United States delegation
accepted the Court's opinion, in accordance with
that true democratic tradition which demanded
respect for the decisions of judicial bodies. . . ."
And the distinguished delegate of France, Mr.
Ganem, whose wisdom and experience continue
to grace this committee, declared that France "had
no difficulty whatever in accepting the Court's
opinion. ... in that connection, the French dele-
gation noted with satisfaction that the United
States, in accordance with its finest tradition,
bowed before the decision of a judicial
body. . . .""
'° lua., pp. 101-102.
" U.N. doc. A/1101, para. 7.
'= U.N. doc. A/PV.262, pp. 66-70.
" Offlcial Records of the Fourth Sessioti of the V.N.
General AssemMy, Sixth Committee, 184th meeting, para.
25.
"Official Records of the Ninth Session of the U.N.
General AssemUy, Fifth Committee. 474th meeting, paras.
50-52 ; 475th meeting, paras. 23, 25.
35
We do not recall these facts to imply special
merit but to suggest that there is no sound path
open to us but to act in accordance with the law
as the competent body finds the law to be. This
is the essence of our relationsliip to one another.
If we leave the moorings of the law we can only
lose ourselves in the swift currents where power
alone dominates.
General Assembly and Advisory Opinions
Now let us return to the practice of tliis Assem-
bly with respect to advisory opinions. There have
been nine advisory opinions requested by the Gen-
eral Assembly of the International Court of Jus-
tice, apart from the one that now concerns us. In
all of these cases — with one exception, of which we
shall speak in a moment — the General Assembly
adopted a resolution at the conclusion of its dis-
cussion of the opinion. The form of the resolution
adopted has varied somewhat according to the
circumstances of each case.
In the operative paragraphs of these resolutions
the Assembly has given effect to the opinions of
the Court. On occasion it has authorized or di-
rected the Secretary-General or called on member
states to act in accordance with the Court's opin-
ion. On other occasions the Assembly has ex-
plicitly accepted or accepted and endorsed the
Court's opinion. The resolution contained in Doc-
imient L. 760 wholly conforms to the Assembly's
traditional terminology.
In every instance the General Assembly has fol-
lowed the Court's opinion, either expressly or
tacitly. The one case in which it did not adopt a
resolution enunciating its decision to follow the
Court's opinion was on the Competence of the
General Assemhly for the Admission of a State to
the United Nations. There the Court was asked
whether the admission of a state to membership
pursuant to article 4 of the charter can be ef-
fected by a decision of the General Assembly when
the Security Council has made no recommenda-
tion for admission, either by reason of the candi-
date failing to obtain the requisite majority or
because of the negative vote of a permanent
member upon a resolution recommending admis-
sion. The Court replied that a positive recom-
mendation of the Security Council was necessary
for the General Assembly to admit a member. The
Assembly acted in accordance with this opinion
34
by abandoning any consideration of admittmj
new members where the Security Council had no-
given a positive recommendation.
Actually, the record is even more persuasive
While 9 advisory opinions have been put to th(
Court, 17 questions have been embraced in answer
to the 9 requests. The General Assembly has ac
cepted or acted upon the replies of the Court ii
all 17 instances. The Assembly's response, uni
form as it has been, has not varied with the ma
jority by which the Court rendered its opinion
But some may raise the question of the majorit;;
by which this decision was adopted. That ma
jority is of no relevance, for when the Court ren
ders an opinion, it is the opinion of the Court
whatever its majority.
But it may be of interest to note that tlie ma
jorities in the prior 9 cases sometimes have beei
larger and sometimes smaller than that in th
opinion before us. The first advisory opinion ren
dered by the Court, on 17 November 1947, re
sponded to each of the two questions put to th
Court by a vote of 9 to 6; the second opinion, o
11 April 1949, answered the first part of the firs
question put to it unanimously and the second par
by 11 votes to 4. A second question was answere<
by 10 votes to 5. In some subsequent cases th
majority votes were larger and in others smallei
Speaking for a country whose Supreme Court ha
decided great cases by a single vote, the majorit
in this instance of 9 to 5 is impressive.
Now, while the Court's opinion sets forth th
law of the matter, this Assembly can choose not t
follow the Court's authoritative holding. Th
effect of any such decision — considering it, for
moment, from simply a legal point of view — coul
not be underestimated. Since an opinion of th
World Court has never before been rejected in al
the history of the League of Nations and th
United Nations, to reject this opinion would be t
strike a massive blow against the Court itseh
Since the Court's advisory opinions are general!
acknowledged to be authoritative statements o
the law, to reject the Court's opinion would sap th
vitality of international law and its role in th
United Nations. To reject the Court's opinion
whether directly or indirectly, would hardly pre
mote that high purpose whicli the preamble of th
charter proclaims: "to establish conditions unde
which justice and respect for the obligations aris
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETU
I
t
ing from treaties and other sources of international
law can be maintained. . . ."
Financial and Political Aspects of Question
But, for the sake of argument, let us put the
credit of the Court and the credibility of inter-
national law aside. Let us look at the United
Nations finance and politics of the question.
If this opinion is not accepted and acted upon
by the General Assembly, what are the financial
prospects of tlie United Nations? Are we not say-
ing to those states that in the past have contested
their legal obligation to pay assessments for the
expenses of UNEF and ONUC, "You may relax
about the problem"? We know only too well the
political difficulties and, in some cases, the financial
hardship facing states that have not kept cur-
rent in the payment of assessments. None of us
seeks false victories. Acceptance of the opinion
would provide all siich states with a dignified op-
portunity to reexamine their positions. A failure
to accept would leave us at best where we were a
year ago, exposed to argument, debate, and con-
fusion while the organization sinks deeper and
deeper into the quicksand of financial disaster.
It would malfe a mockery of the breathing spell
afforded the organization by those states who have
purchased bonds.
Many states bought bonds on the assumption
that tliere would be a day of clarification and an
hour when first concrete steps could be taken to
restore the financial integrity of the United Na-
tions. Wliat hope is there that the organization's
financial credit could survive a failure to accept
the Court's opinion? Wliat government, what
third party, could rely with confidence upon the
financial commitments of this organization ? What
possibility would there be of sustaining, still less
strengthening, the organization's activities in fields
which are directly related to UNEF and ONUC
only in their common requirement for funds?
How could it be expected that the parliaments of
those members of the organization which have ful-
filled their financial obligations — and some who
have surpassed them by way of voluntary contribu-
tions— not only in the sphere of peacekeeping but
in humanitarian and economic and social pro-
grams will respond in the future as they have in
the past ?
These are questions we need not pursue. It is
clear that the alternative to acceptance of the
Court's opinion is financial irresponsibility of a
kind tliat would mark the beginning of the end
of the hope symbolized by tliis organization. We
confront these prospects only to express the con-
fidence that the overwhelming majority of our
membersliip will reject the darloiess and look to-
ward the light when we solve this troublesome
problem in accordance with the rule of law.
Now what of the politics of the matter? Were
we not to accept the Court's opinion, we would
stifle the organization's appropriate role in keep-
ing the peace. The Court's opinion concerns only
past assessments. But the possibility of the or-
ganization having the capacity collectively, by
whatever kind of assessment, to finance opera-
tions that preserve the peace is indispensable to
its purpose of saving "succeeding generations
from the scourge of war." The possibility of the
organization paying for peacekeeping — its pri-
mary purpose — is too important to belabor. If it
had lacked this capacity in the past, it can be
fairly said that the organization might not have
seen this day or else would have existed as a dis-
credited vehicle of vehement debate alone. Its
future would be impromising indeed.
Draft Resolution on Financing Peacekeeping
Mr. Chairman, we come now to the second res-
olution [L. 761]. It is concerned with this very
question of the future — of how the United Na-
tions will finance peacekeeping operations that in-
volve heavy expenditures. We do not purport
to have the answers today to this troubled ques-
tion.
While the balance sheet of the United Nations
remains in an awkward state of imbalance, a
combination of events seem to my delegation to
permit a few months in which to negotiate, re-
view, and prepare a program for the future that
can meet with general acceptance. We would
suggest that the Secretary-General be authorized
by appropriate resolution to continue the Congo
and Middle East operations without assessing or
appropriating any additional funds now. If the
total of the bond issue, which was previously au-
thorized and the terms of which are settled, can
be fully subscribed, and if members will accelerate
the payment of arrearages, then, even at the pres-
JANUART 7, 1963
35
ent rate of expenditures, the organization should
manage with those funds for at least 5 or 6
montlis.
This is especially desirable since we are in the
last days of this session. There is neither the time
nor tlie atmosphere for deliberate consultation and
thinking together that should precede planning
and decisions on additional assessments or contri-
butions for the operations in the Congo and the
Middle East. These months for which the funds
I have mentioned will last must be used to the full-
est advantage to rethink the problem and to try
to accommodate as many views of members as
may be feasible and constructive. We have the
many suggestions made in the i^ast. We would
also hope that members will use this time to
present such further views on methods and for-
mulas as they deem appropriate. Given this addi-
tional time, members will be able to submit their
views in writing so that the working gi-oup con-
templated by the second resolution can liave at its
disposal material helpful to it in dispatching its
assignment.
The draft resolution fomid in document L. 761
accordingly proposes that, in the liglit of the
Court's clarification of the law, this Assembly con-
stitute a committee that can marry the organiza-
tion's legal capacity with what is practical and
equitable so as to arrive at a method or methods
of future financing of peacekeeping operations.
This resolution by no means suggests that future
financing of such operations must be done through
mandatory assessments upon the membership.
Nor does it suggest the contrary. It does not sug-
gest that the scale of assessment, if any, be that of
the regular budget. For that matter it should be
noted that the Court's opinion itself expressly
states that it does not pass on the scale of assess-
ment. All this would be left open. Only the Gen-
eral Assembly can and should determine this.
"Wliat we seek is time to prepare for the future in
a fashion that will be fair to us all. The commit-
tee that this resolution would establish is free to
consider any method of financing peacekeeping
activities, whether by way of assessment or by
voluntary contributions, or by some combination
of the two. In short, the second resolution looks
toward the future in an open spirit of conciliation.
It seeks solutions.
We are fully aware that some delegations would
36
like a solution now. So would my delegation, if
we felt that time and circumstances permitted a
soimd solution which would be workable. We
know how heavily the pressure of even reduced
assessments weighs on developing states when the
total budget for operations assumes large propor-
tions. My Government has frequently expressed
this awareness in something more than words.
But time has come when hastily contracted for-
mulas produced imder urgent pressure must yield
to a more studied approach. If we were required
to seek a new assessment now, there would be in-
escapable merit in examining and approving some
basic principles now; but, since the day can and
should be deferred, it is our view that acceptance
of principles before an opportunity is given to a
working group to explore and evaluate all ideas
could do more harm than good. What we need
above all is a chance to digest all ideas, to discuss
and negotiate in an atmosphere of calm delibera-
tion. In our judgment the few days left to us
here will not provide that atmosphere. Therefore,
while we have every sympathy for those who view
with concern the costs of continuing large-scale
operations without having settled upon a set of
principles for their payment, it is only the ques-
tion of timing that really separates some of us.
We Ijelieve that debate on principles must follow
the efforts of a working group, not precede it.
We beeran this intervention with some words
from U Thant's acceptance statement. It may be
appropriate to conclude by quoting the Secretary-
General further: "On this occasion," he said, "I
would recall the words of my distinguished pred-
ecessor on his re-election to a second term. He
said, and I quote : 'Nolx)dy, I think, can accept the
position of Secretary-General of tlie ITnited Na-
tions, knowing what it means, except from a sense
of duty.' He had over four years' experience in
that office when he made that statement. My ex-
perience has been shorter, but I believe that I do
know what that office means, and I accept my ex-
tended mandate with humility and out of a sense
of duty."
Mr. Chairman, having witnessed the demands
on tlie Secretary-General and having sensed the
loneliness of some of his most trying moments,
one could not have questioned his riglit to reject
the Ijurden. Only a sense of duty would compel
a modest and devoted man to accept the unanimous
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIH
call to this oiEce of complex pressures in a world
of uncertain and chaotic movement. It would
constitute a denial of our duty if we failed to find
at least a path toward the solution of the organ-
ization's oppressive financial problems. Toj^ether
we can and we must move forward to put an end
to the specter of bankruptcy and to uphold the
integrity of the charter and the organization that
brings us together. By the acceptance of the
Court's opinion and the establishment of the work-
ing group to seek fundamental solutions in the
liglit of the law, we give our eai'uest commitment
that we shall not fail the hopes and prayers of
mankind that the United Nations shall continue
its consecration to the building of a better world."
TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS
Accepting World Court Opinion >«
The General AssemMxj,
Having regard to resolution 1731 (XVI) of 20 De-
cember 1961, in whicli it recoguized "its need for au-
thoritative legal guidance as to obligations of Member
States under the Charter of the United Nations in the
matter of financing the United Nations operations in the
Congo and in the Middle East",
Recalling the question submitted to the International
Court of Justice in that resolution.
Having received, the Court's advisory opinion of 20
July 1962, transmitted to the General Assembly by the
Secretary-General under document A/5161, declaring that
the expenditures authorized in the General Assembly reso-
lutions designated in resolution 1731 (XVI) constitute
"expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of
Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter,
Accepts the opinion of the Court on the question sub-
mitted to it.
Financing Peacekeeping Operations"
The General Assemtly.
Recognizing that peace-keeping operations of the United
Nations, such as those in the Congo and in the Middle
East, impose a heavy financial burden upon Member
States, and in particular on those having a limited ca-
pacity to contribute financially.
" On Dec. 11 the cosponsors of L. 761 withdrew their
draft resolution and joined the sponsors of L. 763 in
submitting a new draft resolution, L. 767.
" U.N. doc. A/C.5/L. 760 ; adopted in plenary session
on Dee. 19 by a vote of 76 (U.S.) -17, with 8 abstentions.
" U.N. doc. A/C. 5/L. 767 ; adopted in plenary session on
Dec. 19 by a vote of 78 (U.S.) -14, with 4 abstentions.
Recognizing that in order to meet the expenditures
caused by such operations a procedure is required differ-
ent from that applied to the regular budget of the United
Nations,
Taking into account the advisory opinion of the Inter-
national Court of Justice of 20 July 1(K>2 in answer to the
question contained in resolution 1731 (XVI),
ComHnccd of the necessity to establish at the earliest
possible opportunity financing methods different from the
regular budget to cover in the future peace-keeping oper-
ations of the United Nations involving heavy expenditures,
such as those for the Congo and the Middle East,
1. Decides to re-establish the Working Group of Fifteen
with the same membership as that established in resolu-
tion 1C20 (XV) and to increase its membership to twenty-
one by the addition of six Member States to be appointed
by the President of the General A.ssembly with due regard
to geographical distribution as provided for in resolution
1620 (XV), to study, in consultation as appropriate with
the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions and the Committee on Contributions, special
methods for financing peace-keeping operations of the
United Nations involving heavy expenditures such as those
for the Congo and the Middle East, including a possible
special scale of assessments ;
2. Reciiicsts the Working Group of Twenty-One to take
into account in its study the criteria for the sharing of
the costs of peace-keeping operations mentioned in past
resolutions of the General Assembly, giving particular at-
tention to the following :
(a) The references to a special financial responsibility
of members of the Security Council as mentioned in res-
olutions 1619 (XV) and 1732 (XVI) ;
(b) Such special factors relating to a particular peace-
keeping operation as might be relevant to a variation in
the sharing of the costs of the operation ;
(c) The degree of economic development of each Mem-
ber State and whether or not a developing State is in
receipt of technical assistance from the United Nations;
(d) The collective financial responsibility of the Mem-
bers of the United Nations ;
3. Requests further the Working Group of Twenty-One
to take into account any criteria proposed by Member
States at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly
or submitted by them directly to the Working Group ;
4. Requests the Working Group of Twenty-One to study
also the situation arising from the arrears of some Mem-
ber States in their payment of contributions for financing
peace-keeping operations and to recommend, within the
letter and the spirit of the Charter, arrangements designed
to bring up to date such payments, having in mind the
relative economic positions of such Member States ;
5. Requests the Working Group of Twenty-One to meet
as soon as possible in 1963 and to submit its report with
the least possible delay and in any ease not later than
31 March 1963;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to distribute the re-
port of the Working Group of Twenty-One to Member
States as soon as possible with a view to its consideration
when appropriate by the General Assembly.
JANUARY 7, 1963
37
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Aviation
Convention for unification of certain rules relating to
International transportation by air and additional
protocol. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. En-
tered into force February 13, 1933. 49 Stat. 3000.
Notification received that it coiisiders itself bound:
Congo (L^opoldville), July 27, 1962.
Protocol to amend the convention for unification of
certain rules relating to international carriage by
air signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929 (49 Stat.
3000). Done at The Hague September 2.S, 19.55.^
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, October 19, 1962.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with six
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. En-
tered into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United
States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
Ratifications deposited: Ghana, October 31, 1962;
India, November 1, 1962.
Accession deposited: Tanganyika, October 31, 1962.
Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the
international telecommunication convention, 1959.
Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into
force May 1, 1961. TIAS 4893.
Notifications of approval: Israel, October 11, 1962;
Netherlands, October 19, 1962 ; Panama, October
18, 1962.
Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed
to the international telecommunication convention
of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with appendixes
and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29,
1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS
4390.
Notification of approval: Panama, October 18, 1962.
Trade
Proc^s-verbal of rectification concerning protocol
amending part 1 and articles XXIX and XXX, proto-
col amending the preamble and parts II and III,
and protocol of organizational amendments to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva December 3, 1955. Section B entered into
force October 7, 1957.
Siynature: Chile, November 21, 1962.
Declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force May
' Not in force.
21, 1960 ; for the United States June 15, 1960. TIAS
4498.
Signatures: Australia, September 5, 1962 ; Switzer-
land, February 14, 1962.
Protocol relating to negotiations of new schedule III —
Brazil — to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva, December 31, 1958.'
Signatures: Haiti, November 6, 1962; Turkey, Au-
gust 13, 1962.
Declaration giving effect to provisions of article XVI :4
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Done at Geneva November 19, 1960.
Entered into force: November 14, 1962.
Proc^s-verbal extending declaration of November 12,
1959 (TIAS 4498), on provisional accession of Tu-
nisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Done at Geneva December 9, 1961. Entered into
force for the United States January 9, 1962.
Signatures: Australia, September 5, 1962; India,
November 15, 1962.
Proc^s-verbal extending the period of validity of the
declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of No-
vember 18, 1960. Done at Geneva November 7,
1962.'
Signature: United States, December 18, 1962.
BILATERAL
Argentina
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreements of April 25, 1955, as amended (TIAS
3l.'47 and 4032), and December 21, 1955 (TIAS
3459). Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos
Aires September 19 and November 26, 1962. En-
tered into force November 26, 1962.
Congo (Leopoidville)
Agreement relating to investment guaranties with re-
lated notes. Effected by exchange of notes at Leo-
poidville October 25 and November 17, 1962. En-
tered into force November 17, 1962.
Indonesia
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of February 19, 1962, as amended (TIAS
4952, 5054, and 5118) . Effected by exchange of notes
at Djakarta December 10, 1962. Entered into force
December 10, 1962.
Tunisia
Agreement relating to the commitment by the United
States to Tunisia's three-year plan. Effected by
exchange of notes at Tunis September 28 and Oc-
tober 29, 1962. Entered into force October 29, 1962.
United Kingdom
Agreement providing compensatory concessions for in-
creases in import duties on certain carpets and glass.
Signed at Geneva December 10, 1962. Entered into
force December 10, 1962.
38
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
January 7, 1963 I n d
Congo (Leopoldville). U.N. General Assembly
Adopts Two Resolutions on Financing of
Peacekeeping Operations (Klutznick, texts
of resolutions) 30
Disarmament. Possibilities for Reducing the
Risks of War Through Accident, Miscalcula-
tion, or Failure of Communication (Foster) . 3
Dominican Republic. Dominican Republic Elec-
tions Hailed by United States 8
Economic Affairs
Italy Announces Removal of Import Restric-
tions 12
Population Growth, Economic Development, and
the United Nations (Gardner, text of resolu-
tion) 14
Tax Convention With Luxembourg Signed at
Washington 9
International Law. U.N. General Assembly
Adopts Two Resolutions on Financing of
Peacekeeping Operations (Klutznick, texts
of resolutions) 30
International Organizations and Conferences.
Calendar of International Conferences and
Meetings 13
Italy. Italy Announces Removal of Import Re-
strictions 12
Luxembourg. Tax Convention With Luxem-
bourg Signed at Washington 9
Middle East. U.N. General Assembly Adopts
Two Resolutions on Financing of Peacekeep-
ing Ojierations (Klutznick, texts of resolu-
tions) 30
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North
Atlantic Council Holds Ministerial Meeting
(text of communique, U.S. delegation) ... 9
Recognition. U.S. Recognizes Government of
Yemen Arab Republic 11
Science. United States Policy on Outer Space
(Gore text of resolution) 21
Treaty Information
Current Actions 38
Tax Convention With Luxembourg Signed at
Washington 9
LTnited Nations
Population Growth, Economic Development, and
the United Nations (Gardner, text of resolu-
tion) 14
e X Vol. XLVIII, No. 1228
U.N. General Assembly Adopts Two Resolutions
on Financing of Peacekeeping Oiwrations
(Klutznick, texts of resolutions) 30
United States Policy on Outer Space (Gore,
text of resolution) 21
Yemen. U.S. Recognizes Government of Yemen
Arab Republic 11
Name Index
Foster, William O 3
Gardner, Richard N 14
Gore, Albert 21
Klutznick, Philip M 30
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 17-23
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25,
D.C.
Release issued prior to December 17 which
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 717
of December 7.
Subject
Note to U.S.S.R. on Nazi persecutee
association.
NATO communique.
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
Tax convention with Luxembourg.
Williams : "The Cultural Exchange
Program in Africa : A Path to
Peace."
Italy removes import restrictions.
Recognition of Yemen Arab Repub-
lic.
Dominican elections.
Torbert sworn in as Ambassador
to Somalia (biographic details).
Documents on Oerman Foreign
Policy.
Ferguson sworn in as Ambassador
to Malagasy Republic (bio-
graphic details).
Report on cultural presentations
program (revised).
Rusk : swearing-in of Bell as AID
Administrator.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
No.
Date
1733
12/17
734
*735
12/18
12/17
736
t737
12/18
12/18
738
739
12/18
12/19
740
*741
12/19
12/20
t742
12/21
*743
12/21
t744
12/21
t745
12/21
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The Story of Inter-American Cooperation
One of the most encouraging developments in the direction
of increasing free-world strength and unity is the concerted effort
of the peoples of the Americas to perfect a community of fraternal
trust, common purpose, equality, and widespread economic and
social opportunity.
The land and the people of the 20 nations of Latin America
and their political, social, and economic development with partic-
ular emphasis on their common problems are described in this
59-page illustrated booklet. Other subjects covered are United
States relations and economic assistance to Latin America, the
Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps operations in several South
American countries, foreign trade and regional trade arrange-
ments, and the Organization of American States (OAS).
Publication 7404
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"HE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1229 January 14, 1963
PRESIDENT KENNEDY HOLDS TALKS AT NASSAU
WITH PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN • Texts of
Joint Communique and Statement on Nuclear Defense
Systems 43
THE CARICATURE OF FOREIGN AID • by Assistant
Secretary Cleveland 60
THE CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM IN AFRICA:
A PATH TO PEACE • by Assistant Secretary Williams . 67
UNITED NATIONS PAYS TRIBUTE TO MEMORY OF
MRS. ROOSEVELT 48
Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents
MARl 1963
DEPOSITORY
For index see inside back cover
MENT OF STATE
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tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
or State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bdlletin Is Indexed In the
Readers' Qulde to Periodical Literature.
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1229 • Publication 747
January 14, 1963
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
'resident Kennedy Holds Talks at Nassau
Vith Prime Minister IVIacmillan
FoU owing are the texts of a joint communi-
le and an attached statement on nuclear de-
'.nse systems issued on December 21 hy
resident Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold
'acmillan of the United Kingdom at the close
f discussions held at Nassau, the Bahamas,
'ecejnher 18-21.
ihite House press release (Nassau) dated December 21
DINT COMMUNIQUE
The President and the Prime Minister met in
assau from December 18th to December 21st.
Ihey were accompanied by the Secretary of
•efense, Mr. [Robert S.] McNamara, and the
nder Secretary of State, Mr. [George W.]
all, and by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Home,
le Minister of Defense, Mr. [Peter] Thoniey-
oft and the Secretary of State for Common-
«ealth Relations and Colonies, Mr. [Duncan]
andys.
The President and the Prime Minister dis-
iissed a wide range of tollies. They reviewed
He state of East-West relations in the after-
math of the October crisis in Cuba, and joined
I the hope that a satisfactory resolution of this
•isis might open the way to the settlement of
;her problems outstanding between the West
id the Soviet Union.
In particular, they reviewed the present state
[ the negotiations for a treaty ending nuclear
:sts, and reaffirmed their intent to seek agree-
lent on this issue with the U.S.S.R. in the hope
lat this agreement would lead on to successful
egotiations on wider issues of disarmament.
As regards Berlin, they reaffirmed their in-
»rest m arriving at a solid and enduring set-
lement which would insure that Berlin remains
:ee and viable.
The Chinese Communist attack on India was
discussed with special consideration being given
to the way in which the two governments might
assist the Government of India to counter this
aggression. Defense problems of the subconti-
nent were reviewed. The Prime Minister and
the President are hopeful that the common in-
terests of Pakistan and India in the security of
the subcontinent would lead to a reconciliation
of India-Pakistan differences. To this end,
they expressed their gratification at the states-
manship shown by President Ayub and Prime
Minister Nehru in agreeing to renew their ef-
forts to resolve their differences at this crucial
moment.
The two leaders discussed the current state of
affairs in the Congo, and agreed to continue
their efforts for an equitable integration of this
troubled country. They expressed support for
Mr. [Paul-Henri] Spaak's proposal for a fair
division of revenues and noted with concern the
dangers of further discord in the Congo.
The Prime Minister informed the President
of the present state of negotiations for U.K.
membership in the Common Market. The Pres-
ident reaffirmed the interest of the United
States in an early and successful outcome.
The President and the Prime Minister also
discussed in considerable detail policy on ad-
vanced nuclear weapons systems and considered
a variety of approaches. The result of this
discussion is set out in the attached statement.
ATTACHED STATEMENT
Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems
December U, 1962
(1) The President and the Prime Minister
reviewed the development program for the Sky-
bolt missile. The President explamed that it
was no longer expected that this very complex
ANUARY 14, 1963
43
weapons system would be completed within the
cost estimate or the time scale which were pro-
jected when the program was begun.
(2) The President informed the Prime Min-
ister that for this reason and because of the
availability to the United States of alternative
weapons systems, he had decided to cancel plans
for the production of Skybolt for use by the
United States. Nevertheless, recognizing the
importance of the Skybolt program for the
United Kingdom, and recalling that the pur-
pose of the offer of Skybolt to the United King-
dom in 1960 had been to assist in improving
and extending the effective life of the British
V-bombers, tlie President expressed his readi-
ness to continue the development of the missile
as a joint enterprise between the United States
and the United Kingdom, with each coimtry
bearing equal shares of the future cost of com-
pleting development, after which the United
Kingdom would be able to place a production
order to meet its requirements.
(3) Wliile recognizing the value of this offer,
the Prime Minister decided, after full consider-
ation, not to avail himself of it because of
doubts that had been expressed about the pros-
pects of success for tliis weapons system and
because of uncertainty regarding date of com-
pletion and final cost of the program.
(4) As a possible alternative the President
suggested that the Royal Air Force might use
the Hound Dog missile. The Prime Minister
responded that in the light of the technical dif-
ficulties he was unable to accept this suggestion.
(5) The Prime Minister then turned to the
possibility of provision of the Polaris missile
to the United Kingdom by the United States.
After careful review, the President and the
Prime Minister agreed that a decision on Po-
laris must be considered in the widest context
both of the future defense of the Atlantic Al-
liance and of the safety of the whole Free
World. They reached the conclusion that this
issue created an opportunity for the develop-
ment of new and closer arrangements for the
organization and control of strategic Western
defense and that such arrangements in turn
could make a major contribution to political
cohesion among the nations of the Alliance.
(6) The Prime Minister suggested and the
President agreed, that for the immediate fu
ture a start could be made by subscribing b
NATO some part of the forces already in ex
istence. This could include allocations fron
United States Strategic Forces, from Uniti
Kingdom Bomber Command, and from tactica'
nuclear forces now held in Europe. Sucli
forces would be assigned as part of a NATCJ
nuclear force and targeted in accordance witl
NATO plans.
(7) Returning to Polaris the President am
the Prime Minister agreed that the purpose o
their two governments with respect to the pro
vision of the Polaris missiles must be the de
velopment of a multilateral NATO nuclea
force in the closest consultation with othe
NATO allies. They will use their best en
deavors to this end.
(8) Accordingly, the President and th
Prime Minister agreed that the U.S. will mak
available on a continuing basis Polaris missile
(less warheads) for British submarines. Th
U.S. will also study the feasibility of makini
available certain support facilities for such sub
marines. The U.K. Government will construe
the submarines in which these weapons will b
placed and they will also provide the nuclea
warheads for the Polaris missiles. Brit is
forces developed under this plan will be a(
signed and targeted in the same way as tb
forces described in paragraph 6.
These forces, and at least equal U.S. force
would be made available for inclusion in
NATO multilateral nuclear force. The Prin:
Minister made it clear that except where Ha
Majesty's Government may decide that su
preme national interests are at stake, thes
British forces will be used for the purposes o
intei-national defense of the Western Alliana
in all circumstances.
(9) The President and the Prime Ministe
are convinced that this new plan wi
strengthen tlie nuclear defense of the Weste;
Alliance. In strategic terms this defense is in
divisible, and it is their conviction that in a'
ordinary circumstances of crisis or danger, i
is this very unity which is the best protectio)
of the West.
(10) The President and the Prime Ministe
agreed that in addition to liaving a nuclea
44
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIll
\ield it is important to have a non-midear
,yonl. For this purpose they agreed on the
uportance of increasing the effectiveness of
leir conventional forces on a worldwide basis.
i.S. Rejects Soviet Allegations
n Court Action in Berlin
FoUoic'mg is an exchange of notes between
( United States and the Soviet Union re-
I riling the opening in Berlin of court action
'iir-crning an organization entitled the "^s-
ciiftion of Victims of Nazi Persecution.''''
S. NOTE OF DECEMBER 17 >
The Soviet Government in its note of Novem-
■r '29, 1962, has protested against the opening
Berlin of a court action concerning an or-
inization entitled "Association of Victims of
:\zi Persecution (VVN)." In connection
erewith, the United States Government
ishes to state the following :
The Soviet Government's note contains in-
eurate and unacceptable allegations concern-
g l)oth the nature and the judicial propriety
these proceedings.
The Federal Administrative Court has been
ked by the Federal Government to give a rul-
g whether in the Federal Republic of Ger-
nny the Association of Victims of Nazi
Msecution is a prohibited organization under
rticle 9, paragraph 2 of the basic law. In
is matter the Federal Goveniment is acting
full accordance with the provisions of the
sic law and with regular legal procedures
liich assure to persons or organizations in-
ilved the extensive guarantees always avail-
ile in a democratic society for the maintenance
civil liberty. The Court is properly and
gaily seized of this question and the United
ates Government has no intention of inter-
ring.
Tlie location of the Court in Berlin is equally
' Delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
S.S.R. on Dec. 17 by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow
iress release 733 dated Dec. 17) .
unimpeachable, and the Soviet Government can
hardly be unfamiliar with the procedure by
which it came about. The Federal Administra-
tive Court was established in the British Sector
of Berlin in 1952 with the agreement of the
Allied Kommandatura. Its presence in no way
affects the legal status of the city, which has
remained unchanged since 1945.
The United States Government must, there-
fore, reject in toto the allegations contained in
the Soviet note of November 29.
SOVIET NOTE OF NOVEMBER 29
Unofficial translation
No. 59/DSA
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics presents Its compliments to the
Embassy of the United States of America and, on the
Instructions of the Soviet Government, states the
following.
On November 29, 1962, in the so-called Federal Ad-
ministrative Court, illegally located in We.st Berlin,
the authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany
intend to institute legal action to ban the West German
"Union of Persecutees of Nazism". People entered this
Union, which sprang up after the end of the Second
World War, who, risking their lives and regardless of
very brutal repressions and Gestapo terror, fought in
Germany against Fascist barbarism. As is known,
these were people of different ideologies and diverse
social status, but united in their striving to end German
militarism and NazLsm, to secure a peaceful future
for the German people. The "Union of Persecutees of
Nazism" belongs to those organizations whose ix>litical
program has an anti-Fascist character and fully con-
forms to the principles of the Potsdam Agreement and
other allied decisions on Germany. The Allied Pow-
ers, including the United States of America, at one
time directly supported the formation of such organi-
zations, which strove for the democratic renewal of
Germany.
The reprisal being prepared by the authorities of the
Federal Republic of Germany against the "Union of
Persecutees of Nazism" is politically an open defiance
of all those who fought on the side of the United Na-
tions against Hitlerite Germany, who even today con-
tinue to oppose the rebirth of revanchism and mili-
tarism in West Germany. This directly contradicts
the Declaration on the defeat of Germany adopted
jointly by the Allied Powers.^ The trial of the Union
of German anti-Fasclsts is one of a series of other
shameful anti-democratic actions of the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany, which is attempt-
- For text, see Bulletin of June 10, 1945, p. 1051.
VNDARY 14, 1963
45
ing to crush all dissidents, as Is shown, for example,
by the scandalous affair of the Hamburg magazine
"Spiegel".
Actions of this kind cannot but recall Germany's
recent past and alarm all sincere advocates of the
strengthening of peace in Europe. Today the same
people are being persecuted in the Federal Republic
of Germany who were driven into concentration camps
and destroyed under Hitler. They are being perse-
cuted again because they are defending the ideas of
peace and are raising their voices against the prepara-
tions for a new war which are being made in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany. Who is persecuting them?
The militarists, revanchists, and Hitlerite epigones,
who not infrequently occupy official positions there.
The situation which is developing harbors a threat
to peace in Europe.
The governments of the United States of America,
Britain, and France more than once have declared that
West Berlin is not a part of the Federal Republic of
Germany. However, the authorities of the FRG, under
cover of the occupation of that city by the troops of
the three powers, are more and more actively using
West Berlin, transformed into a NATO military base,
in their interests, contrary to the cause of peace and
the goals which were established by agreements among
the powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. The trial
which has been planned in West Berlin shows that the
occupation forces of the Western powers are becoming
in fact participants in the persecution of those who
fought against Hitlerite fascism.
Everything talving place in West Berlin graphically
confirms the degree to which the necessity of a German
peace settlement and normalization of the situation in
West Berlin on its basis has become urgent.
The Soviet Government assumes that the Govern-
ment of the United States of America will draw the
necessary conclusions from the present appeal and will
take steps to prevent the use of West Berlin by the
ruling circles of the FRG for the purpose of a judicial-
police reprisal against the "Union of Persecutees of
Nazism".
Moscow, November 29. 1962
Advisory Group Subrsiits Report
on Cultural Presentations
The Department of State announced on De-
cember 21 (press release 744, revised) that four
major recommendations to improve the U.S.
program of overseas cultural presentations are
contained in a report submitted on that day to
the Department of State.^
The report was based on a survey conducted
at the request of Lucius D. Battle, Assistant
Secretary for Educational and Cultural Af-
fairs. Mr. Battle said he accepted the conclu-
sions and recommendations of the report in
general, noting that some points would require
further study before being acted upon.
The 30-page report of the United States Ad
visory Commission on International Educa
tional and Cultural Affairs was turned over to
Mr. Battle by Dr. John AV. Gardner, Commis-
sion chairman and president of the Carnegie
Corporation of New York.
In laying the foundation for its recommenda-
tions, the Commission stressed three points
artistic excellence as the preeminent criterion,
of the creative and performing arts program ;j
the strong roles played by both professionals!
and amateurs; and the importance of "offstage''
activities, such as clinics and student work-
shops, in gaining appreciation of America's
cultural strength. To achicA^e these and othei
aims, the report recommended:
1. The role of the Advisory Committee on
the Arts be revitalized and expanded to in-
clude selection of program attractions.
2. The State Department reassume full r&i
sponsibility for direct management of al]
phases of the program, which consists of tha
sending abroad of American performers in
music, drama, the dance, and sports.
3. Long-range planning to meet objectives
in various areas of the world be adopted aa
formal policy and practice.
4. Increased recognition be given those whc
participate in the program.
Mr. Battle said he concurred in early ap-
pointment of members of the Advisory Comi
mittee on the Arts, with whom he woulo
discuss implementation of the report.
The Commission's 9-week survey was con-
ducted by Roy E. Larsen, vice chairman of the
Advisory Commission and chairman of the
executive committee of Time, Inc., and Glenn
G. Wolfe, a Foreign Service officer.
' A limited number of copies of the Report of Sur'
vey of Cultural Presentations Program are available
upon request from the Office of Media Services, De*
partment of State, Washington 25, D.C.
46
DEPAETKENT OF STATE BULLETIS
Panel Recommends National
\cademy of Foreign Affairs
(Vhlte House press release dated December 17
A presidential advisory panel on December
1" strongly recommended the establislunent of
I National Academy of Foreign Affairs. In a
statement accepting the recommendation, Presi-
:lent Kennedy said he would submit legislation
3n this subject to the next session of Congress.
The advisory panel was chaired by James A.
Perkins, vice president of the Carnegie Corpo-
ration of New York. Its report recommends:
•A new institution should be formed to provide
lew orientations and leadership required for
he training, education, and research needs of
3ur foreign operations."
]\Ir. Perkins presented the report to the Presi-
dent in his ofRce in the presence of Secretary of
State Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State
Christian A. Herter, Deputy Secretary of De-
fense Eoswell L. Gilpatric, and other high
Grovernment officials. The President told Mr.
Perkms, "I share your belief that our training
uid educational programs have not kept pace
with the profound changes that have taken
place in the conduct of foreigii affairs and your
conclusion that ... a new institution [is
needed] . I also share your belief that such an
institution should be interdepartmental in
character. . . ."
The President went on to say that these con-
clusions and the similar conclusions reached in
the report submitted December 8 by former
Secretaiy of State Christian A. Herter's Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs Personnel "support
my conviction that we must move forward with
this basic idea as soon as possible. I have, there-
fore, decided to make appropriate recommenda-
tions to the next session of Congress concerning
this subject."
The President concluded by asking the
Secretary of State to take the lead for the
administration in formulating legislation. He
also noted that "considerable interest" has been
expressed by Congress in this area and that
congressional views would be taken into con-
sideration in the development of the legislative
proposals.
The report of the panel states that the pro-
posed National Academy "should concentrate
on interdepartmental programs and leave
purely departmental concerns to the individual
agencies." In the panel's view, it should absorb
some of the functions of the present Foi-eign
Service Institute. It would not take over the
responsibilities of the military war colleges,
although military and civilian personnel of the
Department of Defense would participate along
witli personnel of the Agency for International
Development, the U.S. Information Agency, the
Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies
with foreign affairs responsibilities in programs
offered by the Academy.
The panel recommends that the National
Academy be autonomous with its own organic
statute. It would be governed by a 10-member
board of regents, chaired by the Secretary of
State, and would be headed by a full-time chan-
cellor, "a man of outstanding qualifications."
The regents and the chancellor would be ap-
pointed by the President and con finned by the
Senate. The chancellor's "salary and perquisites
should equal those of tlie heads of our outstand-
ing educational institutions," according to the
report.
In the panel's view, the proposed National
Academy "must be oriented towards political
and operational requirements and it must be
prepared to deal with the delicate dynamite of
democratic strategy. It must be so constituted
that it can contribute to deeper understanding
of the nature of the problems in international
affairs facing the nation." "Thus, like our great
universities, it should be engaged in research
and other means of extending knowledge, as
well as transmitting this knowledge to career
officers," the report states.
In addition to Mr. Perkins, other members of
the advisory panel, appointed last April by the
President to examine the adequacy of training
and research facilities in the area of national
security and foreign affairs, are Col. George A.
Lincoln, professor of social sciences, U.S. Mili-
tary Academy; John W. Masland, provost,
Dartmouth College ; Max F. Millikan, director,
Center for International Studies, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology; and Don K. Price,
dean, Graduate School of Public Administra-
tion, Harvard University.
JANUARY 14, 1963
47
United Nations Pays Tribute to Memory of IVIrs. Roosevelt
Following is a series of statements made in
the United Nations General Assembly on No-
vember 9 in f/inbute to tJie memory of Mrs.
Franklin D. Roosevelt., who died at Neiv York
on Novemher 7.
Muhammad Zafrulla Khan >
Since our last meeting we have learned with
deep sorrow of the death of ]\Irs. Eleanor
Roosevelt. The news came to all of ns witli a
sense of profomid shock.
I need not review in detail Mrs. Roosevelt's
outstandins contribution to the United Nations
ever since the inception of the organization.
She served as a member of successive United
States delegations, and in pai'ticular as a mem-
ber of tlie United Nations Commission on
Human Rights and of the Comjnission on the
Status of Women. Her contribution is en-
shrined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, in the Covenants on Human Rights,
and in the many related conventions and decla-
rations which have been adopted by the United
Nations during the past years. All her many
activities reflected her own personal devotion to
the cause of enriching the life of all jjeoples
everywhere without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion. Through her work, her
personal example, her generous support of
many humanitarian causes, especially those
sponsored by tlie United Nations, Mrs. Roose-
velt lias left us a deepened imderstanding of the
words "the dignity and worth of the human
person."
Many of us knew Mrs. Roosevelt personally
as a warm friend and an eloquent and thouglit-
ful interpreter of the finest traditions of Ameri-
can life. We shall cherish tlie memory of her
friendship.
' President of the 17th ses.sion of the General As-
sembly.
To the members of Sirs. Roosevelt's family
and to her fellow citizens in the United
States — and, may I add, throughout the
world — we extend our deep sympathy.
May I invite the members of the General As-
sembly to stand and observe a minute of silence
in memory of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt.
The refresentatives stood in silence.
Adiai E. Stevenson (United States)
I come here for the second time in little more
than a year sad in lieart and in spirit. The
United States, tlie United Nations — the
world — has lost one of its great citizens. Mrs.
Eleanor Roosevelt is dead; a cherished friend
of all mankind is gone.
Yesterday I said I had lost more tlian a
friend. I had lost an inspiration. She would
rather light candles than curse the darkness,
and her glow had warmed the world.
My country mourns lier, and I know that all
in this Assembly mourn witlt us. But even as
we do, the sadness we share is enlivened l\v the
faith in her fellow man and his future which
filled the heart of this strong and gentle woman.
She imparted this faith not only to those who
shared the privilege of knowing her and of
working by her side but to countless men,
women, and children in every part of the world
who loved her even as she loved them. For she
embodied the vision and tlie will to achieve a
world in which all men can walk in peace and
dignity. And to this goal — a better life — she
dedicated her tireless energy and the strange
strength of her extraordinary personality.
I don't think it amiss to suggest that the
United Nations is, in no small way, a memorial
to her and to her aspirations. To it she gave
the last 15 years of her restless spirit. She
breathed life into this organization. Tlie
48
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ANNA ELEANOR ROOSEVELT
1884-19 62
670933 — 63 2
United Nations has meaning and hope for mil-
lions, thanks to her labors, her love, no less than
to her ideals — ideals that made her, only weeks
after Franklin Roosevelt's death, put aside all
thoughts of i^eace and quiet after the tumult of
their lives, to serve as one of this nation's dele-
gates to the first regular session of the General
Assembly. Her duty then — as always — was to
the living, to the world, to peace.
Some of you in this hall were present at that
first historic Assembly in London 17 years ago.
More of you were witnesses to her work in sub-
sequent Assemblies in the years that followed.
The members of the Third Committee — the
committee on social, humanitarian, and cultural
questions — and the Commission on Human
Rights, which she served so long as chairman —
you, in particular, will remember the warmth,
the intelligence and infectious buoyancy which
she brought to her tasks. You know better than
any of us the unceasing crusade that helped to
give the world, after years of painstaking,
patient travail, one of the noblest documents of
mankind : the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
This is not the time to recount the infinite
services of this glorious and gracious lady ; the
list is as inexhaustible as her energies! But
devotion to the world of the charter, to the
principles of the United Nations, to a world
without war, to the brotherhood of man,
underscored them all. And, happily for us all,
she could communicate her devotion, her enthu-
siasm, to others. She saw clearly; she spoke
simply. The power of her words came from
the depth of her conviction.
"We must be will ing," she said, "to learn the
lesson that cooperation may imply compromise,
but if it brings a world advance it is a gain for
each individual nation. There will be those
who doubt their ability to rise to these new
heights, but the alternative is not possible to
contemplate. We must build faith in the hearts
of those who doubt, we must rekindle faith in
ourselves when it grows dim, and find some
kind of divine courage within us to keep on till
on earth we have peace and good will among
men.'
While she lived, Mrs. Roosevelt rekindled
that faith in ourselves. Now that she is gone.
50
the legacy of her lifetime will do no less.
bert Schweitzer wrote :
Al-
No ray of sunlight is ever lost, but the green which
it wakes . . . needs time to sprout, and it is not always
granted to the sower to live to see the harvest. All
work that is worth anything is done in faith.
Mr. President, I trust you and the members
of the Assembly will forgive me for having
taken your time with these very personal
thoughts. The issues we debate in this hall are
many and grave. But I do not think that we
are divided in our grief at the passing of this
great and gallant human being — who was called
the "First Lady of the World."
Ik
I
Valerian A. Zorin (U.S.S.R.) ^
It is with feelings of deep sorrow that the
Soviet delegation learned of the demise of Mrs.
Eleanor Roosevelt. She was doubtless among
those to whom death comes much too early.
Some say that each person leaving this world
takes a part of it with him ; but the death of Mrs.
Eleanor Roosevelt has removed something from
the lives of each one of us. Those who are con-
nected with the work of this organization feel
this loss all the more since Mrs. Eleanor Roose-
velt, for many years, worked with this
organization and spent much efi'ort in it. She
was deeply alive to developments in interna-
tional affairs, and in her heart we could always i
find warm feelings for all people and good will '
for the interests of peace throughout the world.
In expressing deep sympathy to the family of
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, the Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr.
Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, wrote:
J
The Soviet Government and all the Soviet peoples'
knew Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt as an outstanding Amer-
ican i)ublic figure, the closest friend of that greatest of
all Americans, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, with whose
name so many good pages in the history of Soviet-
American relations are connected, both in times of
peace as well as during the common struggle against
Hitlerite Germany. Following upon the death of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt
remained true to his conviction of the need to
strengthen peace throughout the world.
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt embodied many of
' Interpreted from the Russian.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Eleanor Roosevelt Memorial Service
Held at Washington Cathedral
RcDKirks hij Secretary Rusk '
For 7 days, hundreds of millious all over the
earth have expressed their affection for Eleanor
Roosevelt and their sadness over her passing. PjIo-
quence in high places has been given its true mean-
ing by simple remarks at family hearthsides in
every land, by those of every race and color and
creed and political or social condition. Once again
the gap between feeling and words has been appar-
ent ; once again men try to express the unexpress-
able.
We are not diminished as a nation by the fact
that one whom we loved and called a great Ameri-
can has belonged as much to all the rest as to our
own country ; for nations are neither as venerable
nor as enduring as that company of men and
women, to which Eleanor Roosevelt belonged, whose
members, as Abou Ben Adhem's tribe, have been
blessed with a love of God in consequence of a love
of their fellow men.
She was a woman who had no caisacity for hate
but much for indignation. Her compassion was
nothing passive ; it led her to passionate words and
deeds against poverty, disease, exploitation, pre.iu-
dice, fear, and oppression — and against such viola-
tions of human rights as a smashed printing press,
the sale of a child in the marliet, a desecrated
shrine, or a people robbed of their human dignity.
The United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights will be an enduring memorial to
Eleanor Roosevelt. To her these central ideas Vi'ere
neither vague nor unreal but were at the heart of
man himself — the distant stars by which he must
set his course. Shortly before that declaration was
adopted she said : '
"We must not be confused about what freedom
is. Basic human rights are simple and easily un-
derstood : freedom of speech and a free press ; free-
dom of religion and worship ; freedom of assembly
^Made at the Washington Cathedral, Washing-
ton, D.C., on Nov. 15 (press release 677).
' For the text of an address made by Mrs. Roose-
velt at Paris on Sept. 28, 1948, see Bulletin of
Oct. 10, 1948, p. 457.
and the right of petition ; the right of men to be
secure in their homes and free from unreasonable
search and seizure and from arbitrary arrest and
punishment.
"We must not be deluded by the efforts of the
forces of reaction to prostitute the great words of
our free tradition and thereby to confuse the
struggle. Democracy, freedom, human rights have
come to have a definite meaning to the people of
the world which we must not allow any nation to
so change that they are made synonymous with
suppression and dictatorship."
One also thinks of her courage ; for she had her
full share of the legendary courage of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt. She asked, with Dante, "O race
of men, born to soar aloft, why do you let a little
wind upset you?" She knew that man has lived
through appalling events, has committed great
crimes, has skirted the edge of the abyss. But she
also knew that man has accomplished miracles and
that the peaks ahead are to be climbed despite the
dangers of the slippery and treacherous slopes.
Her colleagues stood in awe of her boundless
energy. For many years it was customary to assign
a staff officer to each delegate to the United Na-
tions. To Eleanor Roosevelt it was necessary to
assign two, for one alone could not match the pace
she set from breakfast to midnight as she went
about her tasks. For her there was no place for
discouragement, no thought of failure, no chance
that man would not come out as man at his best.
Some years ago a friend of mine was sitting next
to a woman from the Soviet Union listening to a
debate at the United Nations. The friend asked
her what she thought of the proceedings. She said
quietly, "These men are playing such childish and
dangerous games." Eleanor Roosevelt had that in-
stinctive caution about illusion, pride, irrational
fear, senseless posturing. She kept her eyes on the
enduring aspirations which are both our highest
aims and our protection against destruction.
Her life was one with the great story of man,
and her memory will enrich those chapters which
we in our day are privileged to write.
ANUARY 14, 1963
51
the best qualities of the American people, and
we believe that her attitude toward the Soviet
Union and the peoples of the Soviet Union is
shared by millions of Americans.
The Soviet delegation expresses its sincere
sympathy and condolences to the United States
delegation and the American people in connec-
tion witli this sad, irretrievable loss.
J. B. Godber (United Kingdom)
I would like to add my words of sympathy
and my expressions of appreciation of the life
of Eleanor Roosevelt, on behalf of the delega-
tion of the United Kingdom. This is not an
occasion for long speeches; it is an occasion to
let our hearts speak and to say how much we
all lament the passing of one who was not only
for many years the First Lady of the United
States but who was a leader and an inspiration
to humanity throughout the world.
The name of Roosevelt bulks large m our
I'ecent memories: Eleanor Roosevelt supported
her husband during many anxious years, and
after the war efforts were over, and when she
herself came here to the United Nations, she
was, I know, an inspiration to many people of
all nationalities; she was a frequent and hon-
ored visitor to my own country, and she always
displayed that warm interest and that deep
humanity which characterized her nature in
everything that she did. She embodied all the
best that the United Nations stands for, and
that, I think, is why we all, particularly in this
organization, mourn her here today. Her
death is indeed a tragic loss, but it must not
only be considered in that light, for what she
stands for, what she did, and what she sought
to perpetuate is something that I am sure will
long live in our hearts, and our memory of her
will be one of constant gratitude. I hope that
it will inspire us, despite many difficulties, to
go forward even more strongly with all the
things in which she believed, and if we do that
then we shall be keeping faitli with what she
stood for.
To those of my delegation who had the privi-
lege of meeting her and working with her, to-
day is a very sad day. But I know that we will
gain strength from our memories of what she
it Si
ns
Itil
?f(
itll
did, and I think that, probably, is what s
would have wished more than anything el
that we remember her gratefully and that
go forward in our determination to carry
the work for which she labored so unceasinj
and which has left her in our hearts for
time.
On behalf of the United Kingdom delegati
I add my deep appreciation for the life of Ele
nor Roosevelt and for the honor of havh
worked with her.
ites
IVIanfred Lachs (Poland) [^-ii
It is with great sorrow that I speak toda *"
not only on behalf of Poland but of other cou
tries of people's democracy of Eastern Europ
Humanity has suffered a great loss. No mo
will we see this noble figure; no more will v
hear her words and appeals, whenever the cau
of man was at stake. For she was not only
great and worthy companion of a great Pres
dent of the United States; she was a grei
human being in her own right. By her passin
the world has become poorer — not only the coui:
ti-y she so ably represented in many fields h\\ n'
the United Nations as a whole. We who ha
the privilege to work with her in the counci
of the United Nations will never forget he
enthusiasm and devotion to humanity, to a
mankind, irrespective of race and creed, to tY
great family of man.
Greatness has many dimensions but, if then
was a person who combined exceptional qual
ties of intellect and heart, selflessness and devc
tion, it was Eleanor Roosevelt. Only 2 yeai
ago we welcomed her in Poland at the Confer
ence of the World Federation of United Nation
Associations. Disregarding her frail he.altl
and the hardships of a distant journey, sh'
came to us to make her voice heard on behal
of the cause of peace and the friendly coopera
tion of nations; to these causes she has devotee
lier whole life.
We wish to express words of deep sympathj
to the family of Eleanor Roosevelt, to tht
American nation, and to the delegation of the
United States to the ITnited Nations. Eleanor
Roosevelt made a lasting contribution to the
great causes which are so dear to all of us, andl
Ei
52
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
lat s tieref ore we are all united in mourning her
!l|)day.
Iiat
'^Tloger Seydoux (France) '
*^ I -wish to associate myself, on behalf of the
' ©legation of France and of many delegations
f West European comitries which have asked
or me to do so, with the tribute paid to the
lemory of Madame Koosevelt. Her death-
MlllO
irop ':
in i
'res
m
or her country, for the entire world, and for
lie United Nations — is a cruel loss, and I would
ddress to the President of the General Assem-
ly — in this Assembly where she served so well
,Ja -to the head of the American delegation, and
the chairman of the Third Committee, ex-
Tessions of our deepest sympathy and om- most
loving expression of condolence. This feeling
shared by all in my country, where Madame
loosevelt, among all, by her example of fight-
ig for the most noble and just ideals, evoked
(le warmest and deepest sympathy and con-
•ratulations. Together with other eminent
personalities, she, during the Assembly of 1948,
rew up and had approved the Universal Dec-
iration of Himian Rights, which, by its veiy
itle and by its contents, is so dear to the hearts
f the French people. She was a great lady
lijjdio carried a great name and who played a
;reat role in world affairs.
She is no more, but the work she has done,
he ideals she embodied, remain with us, and
am convinced that we will draw inspiration
lali rom them in our task of establishing trust and
?f« leace among people, which is the supreme pur-
" )Ose of our organization, just as it was the ideal
'f >f Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt's life.
on
ill
X lathan Barnes (Liberia)
Today we mourn the tragic loss of a great
vorld personality, a great lady, whose life was
me of dedication, usefulness, and service. I
jpeak of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, whose un-
timely death has cast a pall not only over her
own country but over the entire world. Mrs.
IRoosevelt served the cause of humanity well,
and the world will indeed be poorer by her ab-
' Interpreted from the French.
JANUARY 14, 1963
sence from this scene of mankind's quest for a
just, peaceful, and orderly world, a world in
which all men despite their creed, their race,
and their color can seek, in brotherhood, enrich-
ment of their souls and the abundance of life.
Her useful life is enshrined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, a monumental
and historic document which proclaims the dig-
nity of the human person. Thus she has left
with us an everlasting testament, so badly
needed in this world, torn asimder by man's in-
humanity to man. Her memory will long be
cherished by all who, like her, dipped into the
future as far as human eye could see, saw the
vision of the world and all the wonders that
could be, till the war drums talked no longer
and the battle flags were furled, in what we
hope the United Nations will be — a parliament
of man and the federation of the world.
On behalf of the delegation of Liberia, I ex-
tend deepest sympathy to the delegation of the
United States, her family, and the people of
this great country.
Michael S. Comay (Israel)
My delegation, and the whole people of
Israel, fully shares the sense of deep loss and
sadness at the passing of Mrs. Roosevelt.
She made three visits to our country and left
an indelible impression on the many men,
women, and children she met in every walk of
life. Her friendship toward our people, her
faith in the future of our state, was to us a
source of unfailing inspiration and courage.
The world is a poorer plac« without her but a
richer place for her sojourn in it.
Our heartfelt sympathy goes out to her fam-
ily and her nation, to the United Nations she
served so nobly, and to all of us who had the
privilege of knowing her personally.
U Tin Maung (Burma)
With a deep feeling of sadness we learn of
the demise of Mrs. Roosevelt. We knew and
recognized her as a great American humani-
tarian and as a citizen of the world. We knew
her also as the tireless champion of the poor,
the underprivileged, and the downtrodden.
Her great dedication to and her deep faith in
53
tlie principles and purposes of the charter and
her constructive contribution to progress in the
field of human rights and social justice mark
her as one of the outstanding world figures.
Her devotion to the cause of peace and her mon-
umental work will continue to inspire all of us.
On behalf of the delegation of Buraia, I wish
to request the delegation of the United States
to convey our condolences to all the members
of her family in their recent bereavement.
Taieb Slim (Tunisia)
It is with a feeling of great sorrow and sad-
ness that we speak today about the passing
away of Mrs. Roosevelt, one of the greatest fig-
ures in our world.
Mrs. Eoosevelt had devoted her whole life to
the service of mankind and was connected with
the work of our organization. She had, during
her life, shown a sense of humanity, under-
standing, and sympathy to all the people of the
world and, in particular, to those who are fight-
ing for their rights and their dignity. There
is hardly any universal organization dealing
with human rights which did not enjoy the
sympathy and the valuable help and contribu-
tion of that great citizen of the world.
The world today mourns her passing away —
the passing away of a great citizen — and we in
Africa have lost a great friend who inspired our
lives and our struggle. It is on behalf of the
African delegations, wliich asked me to speak,
that I wish to express through you to the family
of that great lady and to the delegation of the
United States our sincere condolences. We
wish to express to them all the sympathy of the
African Continent.
Aureliano Aguirre (Uruguay) *
The Uruguayan delegation cannot remain si-
lent during this solemn tribute. We are not
only moved by our solidarity and friendship
with the people of the United States, who are
shocked today by this great loss, but also by the
affection and appreciation of the personal char-
acteristics of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. We shall
* Interpreted from the Spanish.
not dwell on an enumeration of each and everj
one of her qualities, first as the inspirer anc
great support of Franklin Delano Rooseveh
and in her own capacity in following up th(
pursuit of tliat man's great ideals. We shal
only evoke her in what for us was the most val
uable aspect of her personality. We refer tc
her eminently humanitarian sentiments, hei
friendship and spontaneous kindness to al
peoples, her interest in peoples throughout th(
world, in friendship and in brotherhood.
We would say that very few people incar
nated the most noble and inspired ideals of oui tigi:
organization as she did. Reason tells us that jla
this would not be a true homage or tribute to
Mrs. Roosevelt. Quite to the contrary, gentle-
men, our best tribute will be to devote ourselves
more fully to our task for the cause of mankind
peace and progress in order to fulfill tlie mes
sage that she left us.
p>
•gof
'Jit
■slji
sliot
3! in
«1
itol
h
U
Mrs. Agda Rossei (Sweden)
May I, on behalf of the Governments and the
delegations of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and
Sweden, convey our condolences to the United
States mission and to the family of Mrs. Roose-
velt. Our sorrow is deep, and I do not think
we can yet imderstand how deep our loss is,
At the same time we cannot forget and wei
should remember that we are enriched by alll
that she gave us, the representatives of thei
United Nations, to the United Nations and alll Sle
its organs and to the world as a whole. May
I be allowed to say that especially the women
of the world have a special gratitude to her for
all that she taught us, for all the encouragement
she gave to women all over the world in their
endeavors. She belonged and belongs to
mankind.
We are all in some way her heirs, and upon
us is laid the duty to be the trustees of the
wealth of constructive thoughts and ideas of
realistic idealism and of all her endeavors. It
is up to us to carry on what she did in such a
noble manner and in a way which has raised
an eternally living monument over her. I hope
that we will be worthy of the trust and belief
she had in the United Nations and in mankind.
54
DEPAETMENT OF STATE BXJLLETIN
1
iatsuo Okazaki CJapan)
Mi Words are scarcely adequate to express the
*^' 'eeling of sadness which overtook the delega-
P ' ion of Japan when we learned of the death of
klrs. Eleanor Eoosevelt.
We in the United Nations honor her today
lot only because she was a great American
lady but also because she was a great lady of
;he United Nations. Her outstanding contri-
butions and devoted service to our organization
luring its early formative years will be a last-
ng inspiration to all of us. But most of all
(ve grieve because the entire Japanese people
lad come to know and love Mrs. Roosevelt as
I great champion of human rights and of all
hat is good and true and noble in human na-
ture and in human relations regardless of race
""iDr color or nationality, regardless of creed or
, of poverty or richness.
Mrs. Roosevelt belonged not alone to the
United States, or to the United Nations; she
oelonged to Inunanity. A woman, she loved all
mankind and all mankind will cherish forever
fier memory.
Carlet Auguste (Haiti) ^
The world has learned with the deepest con-
sternation of the demise of Mrs. Eleanor Roose-
velt, one of the greatest feminine figures in our
century, particularly in the North American
!ontinent. She passed away after devoting her
(life to work in all the spheres that honor man
lin order to advance our world to a better under-
itanding of its great social problems.
On this American soil and more especially
un each capital of Latin America and in Haiti,
Ithis tragic loss, which draws so many tears,
tis felt more than anywhere else, because it is
ipossible to speak of the great virtues of this il-
llustrious person but we cannot do so without
lassociating with her the name of that great hu-
manitarian figure President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt. She was a great collaborator of this
great man, who gave her name and her devo-
tion and aid to all those tasks that helped to
a better understanding of the world.
' Interpreted from the French.
JANUARY 14, 1963
She was a great lady, great because she
treated so well the cause of our century and,
more especially, the cause of Latin America. It
is therefore a jjious duty, dictated by apprecia-
tion and recognition, to come liere on behalf of
all these Latin American people and bow be-
fore the mortal remains of Mrs. Franklin Dela-
no Roosevelt and extend to her family and her
country our most heartfelt condolences.
Miss Helen Marsh (Canada)
It is fitting that we should take this hour
from our labors to pay tribute in this hall to
a vei-y great lady, a lady whose name will re-
main in our liearts and memories as one of the
builders of the United Nations.
We in Canada have particular cause to mourn
her death. The tributes from all countries of
the world testify to her remarkable ability to
inspire all whom she met. As a neighboring
country our ties were especially close and we
benefited the more from them. She also spent
many happy days in our country in the Roose-
velt family home on Campobello Island.
She achieved the unique distinction of be-
coming during her lifetime a symbol of the dig-
nity of the individual and of the profound
impact that a warm and generous personality
can have on our destinies. Our task now is to
dedicate ourselves to the achievement of the
goals which have guided her numerous activi-
ties, the benefit of humanity and respect for
the fundamental rights of the individual. In
her own person she became a living embodiment
of the ideals of the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
On behalf of the Government and the peo-
ple of Canada I wish to record how deep is our
regret and our sense of loss at the death of Anna
Eleanor Roosevelt.
Miso Pavicevic (Yugoslavia)
The Yugoslav delegation wishes to join in
the expressions of condolence and deep sym-
pathy on the passing away of Mrs. Eleanor
Roosevelt expressed here and in all parts of the
world to her family, to the American people,
55
and to the United States delegation at the
United Nations.
By the death of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt the
American people suffers a great loss of one of
the outstanding personalities of its new history,
and the world and our organization particu-
larly have lost a great humanitarian and an
imtiring champion of the cause of peace and
friendship among nations.
When, today, all her great merits in many
fields are being recalled, the Yugoslav delega-
tion feels in duty bound to recall that it was
Mrs. Roosevelt who was among the first to
understand and support the struggle of the
Yugoslav people for freedom and independ-
ence. Thereby Mrs. Roosevelt gi-eatly contrib-
uted to the building of friendship and mutual
understanding between the United States and
Yugoslavia.
For all these reasons the people of Yugo-
slavia will cherish a warm and lasting memory
of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt.
C. W. A. Schurmann (Netherlands)
Yesterday a distinguished member of our
delegation gave expression in the Third Com-
mittee to our feelings of deep sorrow on the
passing of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. I do not
wish to repeat here what he said, but having
had the honor and the privilege of knowing
this great lady I would simply say, here in this
Assembly TTall as well, that the people of the
Netherlands mourn her profoundly because
they know that she was one of those rare human
beings — and wonderful human beings — whose
dedication, whose understanding, and whose
charity are universal.
Let me add that Mrs. Roosevelt was a per-
sonal and intimate friend of our Queen and
that I know that Her Majesty is as moved by
this loss as are all of us. On behalf of the
people of the Netherlands as well as of my dele-
gation I would convey our condolences to Mrs.
Roosevelt's family, to her country, and to her
delegation.
Albert Silla (Madagascar) '
The 12 Republics of the Alalagasy and Afri-
can Union — Senegal, Mauritania, Upper Volta,
' Interpreted from the French.
Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Congo
(Brazzaville), Gabon, the Central African Re-
public, Chad, Cameroon, and Madagascar —
wish to associate their voices with all those
which were raised in paying tribute to the
memory of Airs. Roosevelt.
Tliis loss will be felt not only by the Ameri-
can people but also by all the peoples of the
world who remember in this day of mourning
how great was this noble figure and the part
which she played in the drafting of the T^niver-
sal Declaration of Human Rights. In the
farthermost corners of Africa and Madagascar
her memory will be remembered with emotion,
just like the memory of all those who have
fought for the dignity of the human person, for
his freedom and liberty.
To her family and to the American people
the 12 Republics of the Malagasy and African
Union send expressions of their deep sympathy.
"\^niereas so many paasing glories are lost in
oblivion, her memory will remain with us and
be a beacon for all mankind.
B. N. Chakravarty (India)
We were deeply shocked and grieved to learn
of the passing away of Mrs. Eleanor Roose-
velt. I have been asked to speak by my Indo-
nesian colleague on his behalf as well. On be-
half of the delegations of India and Indonesia
I beg to associate myself with others in paying
homage and tribute to the memory of this great
lady.'
She was a tireless champion of the poor and
the downtrodden. Her devotion to the cause
of peace, her contributions toward the estab-
lislmient of human rights and social justice,
will always be cherished in history. She is not
merely a former Fii-st Lady in this country but
was a great world citizen in her own right. She
had always taken a leading part in the activi-
ties of the United Nations, which she served so
well. The world is all the poorer today by the
death of this great humanitarian lady.
Mrs. Roosevelt had visited my country and
taken a great deal of interest and shown sym-
pathetic imderstanding of our people. We
mouni her loss profoundlj^
On behalf of the Government and people of
India and of Indonesia, we would like to offer
56
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
our sincerest sympathy and deep condolences
to Mrs. Roosevelt's family, to the United States
delegation, and to the American people.
Abdul Rahman Pazhwak (Afghanistan)
On behalf of the delegation of Afghanistan,
and also the delegation of Iran, allow me to
join my voice with those who have paid homage
and tribute to the memory of the late Mrs.
Roosevelt. I do this with a mind full of respect
and a heart full of profound sorrow, and we
share the sad feelings of the mission of the
United States of America and also other mem-
bers of this organization, the people of the
United States, and the family and friends of
Mrs. Roosevelt wherever they may be on this
sad occasion. The death of Mrs. Roosevelt is a
great loss not only for the American people but
for humanity as a whole.
Mr. President, in your statement you have
spoken of the great contributions of Mrs. Roose-
velt to the United Nations and the promotion
of human rights everywhere. And no one can
find better words than those spoken by Mr.
Stevenson. Therefore, I request you, Mr. Pres-
ident, and also Mr. Stevenson, to allow me to
wholeheartedly associate myself with every
word spoken by him and by you. I assure Mr.
Stevenson that, in speaking today here and in
the words that he chose for it, he has not spoken
as an American only, or only as a friend of Mrs.
Roosevelt, but he has spoken for all human
'' beings who have respect and a sense of appre-
ciation.
I request the mission of the United States to
accept our most sincere condolences on this sad
occasion and to convey our feelings to the
family of Mrs. Roosevelt and the great Ameri-
can people.
Mrs. Roosevelt had the greatest love for man-
kind and for hiunanity, and she will always live
in the heart, of humanity as a great inspiration.
Tliis flame of love, in the words of an Afghan
poet, does not die. This candle is removed
from one room only to glow in another. If all
Mrs. Roosevelt wanted for humanity is
achieved, Mr. President and fellow delegates,
we will have a much better world in which
death will be a much sadder event indeed. Her
spirit will be happy if those she has left behind,
JANUARY 14, 1963
670933—63 3
particularly in this organization, will complete
the noble mission to which she had dedicated
her life. Tliis we should do as a tribute to Mrs.
Roosevelt.
For us, and for me personally because I had
the privilege of working with Mrs. Roosevelt,
the greatest thing to remember always is the
memory of the expression of the greatness of
her own mind by understanding the minds of
others.
Jens Haugland (Norway)
The death of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt has
caused deep sorrow in Norway. The Norwe-
gian people were proud and happy to be able
to regard her as a very close friend. Like her
husband, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
she took a personal and warm interest in Nor-
way's fate during the Second World War, as
she was always sincerely and fervently devoted
to the cause of all peoples and individuals fight-
ing for life and freedom and dignity.
When the late Crown Princess Martha of
Norway and her children were forced into exile
with King Haakon and the Crown Prince, Pres-
ident Roosevelt and Mrs. Roosevelt extended
their ever-present hospitality and friendship to
them and gave them a wartime home in the
United States, for a long time even in the Pres-
ident's own residence at Hyde Park.
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt visited Norway af t«r
the war and was received by the Norwegian
Royal Family, the people, and its Government
as a longstanding friend. In Oslo she un-
veiled a statue of President Roosevelt raised
by Norwegians in memory of his inspiring lead-
ership. Today this statue will also remind us
of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt's own achievements
in the cause of freedom and democracy.
In honoring the memory of Mrs. Eleanor
Roosevelt in the United Nations, we will in par-
ticular remember her work in the field of human
rights. In this way she contributed conclu-
sively toward the fulfilment of a vital part of
the ideals of her husband when he conceived
the United Nations.
The sorrow of the American people and its
Government over the death of Mrs. Eleanor
Roosevelt is shared by all Norwegians.
57
Jagdish S. Rana (Nepal)
On behalf of my delegation I take the floor
of this Assembly to mourn the passing of a great
lady and to share the loss and sorrow of those
present here. The death of Mrs. Eleanor
Koosevelt has not only deprived the world of
a person whose tireless efforts were always di-
rected toward the good of humanity but also
a person who has been long considered as a
citizen of the world.
Today all the nations of the world feel this
loss and mourn with the United States of
America, which gave the world this great lady.
May I, on behalf of the delegation of Nepal,
pay homage to the departed soul and extend
deep condolences to the representatives of the
United States and, through them, to the peo-
ple of the United States and to the bereaved
family.
Jacinto Castel Borja (Philippines)
I speak on behalf of the delegation of the
Federation of Malaya and my own delegation
of the Republic of the Philippines. My country
and our neighbor, Malaya, are especially sad-
dened to hear that Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, that
great lady who has helped soften the heart of
the world toward the underprivileged and the
disinherited of the goods of this earth, is no
more.
As countries which have had close relations
with the United States, we had an opportunity
to witness her work and to benefit from the
warmth of her personality. The other delega-
tions paid tribute to her humanitarian ideals
and her activities which she gave to the world,
to her country, and to the United Nations. We
join the whole world in extending to the United
States delegation and to her family our sin-
cerest condolences. Her figure will be an in-
spiration for us at the United Nations and to
the world for all time. I am sure that with the
years we shall all cherish her memory as an
institution of himianitarian faith.
Gundogdu Ustiin (Turkey)
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt's death came as a
great shock to the people of Turkey. Mrs.
Roosevelt's contribution to the work of the
United Nations in humanitarian and social ;
fields is so well known that it is hardly neces-
sary for me to repeat it. I only wish to asso-
ciate myself with the other speakers who
preceded me on this rostrum to pay tribute to
the memory of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt.
I wish also, on behalf of the Turkish delega-
tion, to present to the Government and people .]
of the United States our deepest sympathy and
our most sincere condolences.
F. H. Comer (New Zealand)
Mrs. Roosevelt's natural instincts were on the
side of truth and justice. These good instincts,
though infused with passion, never led her to
be overbearing: her compassion for her fellow
creatures was too great, her lack of pride too
absolute. She was truly a gentle woman, with-
out guile, her good manners reflecting her good
nature. She was a beautiful woman: for the
transparent beauty and purity of her soul shone
in her every expression. Many of the best
achievements of the United Nations owe some-
thing of their quality to her.
This is a political institution. As in all such
institutions, we are in daily danger that our
preoccupation with means may blind us to our
ends. To the extent that the memory of Mrs.
Roosevelt remains alive in us — and which of us
who knew her can ever forget her? — the more
likely we are to remain true to the noble prin-
ciples of our charter. What better legacy could
anyone leave us ?
We New Zealanders share with her family,
with the people of the United States, and with
people throughout the world a sense of irrepa-
rable loss. But we give thanks for her life.
Somcliai Anuman Rajadhon (Thailand)
I wish to add my voice, on behalf of the Gov-
ernment and people of Thailand, to those of the
representatives who have spoken before me, in
paying our tribute to the memory of a great
personality, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt.
It is with deep sorrow and sadness that we
learned of this tragic loss. We in Thailand
remember very well the contribution which she
made to her nation in particular and to the
world in general, especially in the field of
58
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN
I humanity. We have lost her, but the contribu-
Ition she has made to mankind will always re-
main and be cherished, and her name will be
long remembered. On behalf of my delegation
I wish to ask the United States delegation to
convey to her family our heartfelt and sincere
condolences.
[Ellis Clarke CTrinidad and Tobago)
Wliile we deeply mourn the passing of Mrs.
Eleanor Roosevelt, we feel that this sad event
is the culmination of the dedicated labor of this
great lady. For we must today of necessity
turn our thoughts to the ideals for which Mrs.
Roosevelt continually strove. In doing so, we
have no alternative but to pay Mrs. Roosevelt
the deserved tribute of msuring that we bring
to reality those ideals for which she would will-
ingly have given her life.
On behalf of tlie delegations of Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago, I extend our sincere con-
dolences to her family, her country, and the
delegation which she once adorned.
Zenon Rossides (Cyprus)
On behalf of my delegation, the Government
and people of Cyprus, I come to this rostrum to
pay tribute and homage to the memory of
Eleanor Roosevelt, who has been truly ac-
claimed the "First Lady of the World." As rep-
resentative of a small and newly independent
country, I have added reasons to express my
great sorrow for the passing of Mrs. Roosevelt,
a great friend and supporter of the cause of
freedom and independence.
Through her dedication and earnest work for
social justice and human rights, Mrs. Roosevelt
won the hearts of all peoples everywhere.
Eleanor Roosevelt's service to humanity paral-
lels that of her great husband, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, whose imaginative policy and great
work in building peace and founding the
United Nations will be remembered throughout
the ages as a monumental contribution to the
progress of mankind.
It is perhaps one of the rarest occasions when
a husband and wife, each individually, by their
own intrinsic worth and dedicated service to
mankind, separately earn the very first position
as citizens of the world and the respect and love
of the whole world community. The best me-
morial that could be erected to them would be
to work toward the construction of the edifice
of peace in a world of law and order, to which
their lives were dedicated. Especially would
it be a fitting memorial for Eleanor Roosevelt
to promote tlie effective application of human
rights tlirough a sense of urgency in the adop-
tion of the Human Rights Covenant.
In paying our last respects to this great lady,
my delegation would like to express its deepest
sympathy to the family of Mrs. Eleanor Roose-
velt as well as to the United States delegation
and the Government and people of the United
States.
John D. Retails (Greece)
I would like to associate myself with the pre-
vious speakers and express, on behalf of my
delegation and the Government and people of
Greece, the deepest condolences on the tragic
loss of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. My country
will never forget the personality of the First
Lady, who is no longer among us. Her great
effort for the creation of a better international
atmosphere for peace and understanding and
her fight for the promotion of the highest hu-
man ideals will not be forgotten by the peoples
of the whole world.
I wish to extend to the United States delega-
tion, the people of the United States, and the
members of the family of Mrs. Roosevelt the
sincere expression of the profound sorrow and
heartfelt condolences of my Government.
JANUARY 14, 1963
59
The Caricature of Foreign Aid
hy Harlan Cleveland
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs'
S'
The New Yeai- is almost here. Once again —
sooner, it seems, each time around — we face the
time to make resolutions and the time to take
stock and to foretell our own destiny.
Having just helped nurse another United
Nations General Assembly to bed, I already
have my fill of resolutions. But I would like
this evening to make and defend a prediction.
I predict that the United States foreign aid
program — the effort, to help the world's less de-
veloped areas build new institutions as a basis
for a new prosperity in increasingly open so-
cieties— will be a success. I predict further,
and with even greater temerity, that our for-
eign aid program will in time be popular in
this country.
This business of looking into the future is
one of the perils that goes with public office.
The public expects predictions, and we who
work for the people are expected to be as
obliging as the yomig businessman who went to
the Beaux Arts Ball in Paris dressed as a pay-
roll so his Bohemian friends could thereafter
claim they had met one.
It is not enough, of course, for public officials
to use the guide to crystal-ball gazing that some
of our favorite pundits and pooh-bahs seem to
have tacked up on the walls near their desks.
Syndicated wisdom requires close attention to
the rules of the forecasting game:
First. Look way ahead, far into the future.
Wlien the time comes to check your prediction,
almost everybody will have forgotten about it.
Second. Take the broad view ; wrap your pre-
i
'Address made before the Modern Language Asso-
ciation of America at Washington, D.C., on Dec. 28
(press release 746).
dictions in the warm mist of generality. Above
all, don't use numbers in your forecasts. They
can too easily be compared with reality later
on.
Third. Be pessimistic — it's better for circula-i
tion. Keep your head in the old kit bag of
troubles. The boy who cried wolf, the Bibli-
cal Jeremiah, and the Trojan seeress Cassandra
set the pattern long ago. Few people will
really believe pessimistic predictions, and even
fewer will act on them. These three were
quite imable to avert the disasters they foretold
— but look what a reputation they made for
themselves.
A government official does not get off so
easily. His professional preoccupation is the
near future. He has to deal in specifics. And
he is bound to think well of the future — and
try to make it come out that way.
Progress in Language Learning
It was, for example, this commandment of
confidence that made it imperative for public
officials to reject, as the Modern Language As-
sociation has long ago rejected, the dismal
image of the tonguetied American abroad —
tonguetied, that is, in any language but his own.
A generation ago a distmguished writer was
contending in a personal history that he was
the only American from the Midwest who
learned to speak French. Five years ago the
public was being told, in a bestselling political
tract disguised as a novel, that the overseas
Americans were a queer lot, babbling to each
other in bad English and shouting at the na-
tives of a hundred foreign countries in the same.
The peculiar notion that Americans neither
60
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
3uld nor would leai'n foreign languages is as
Id and as silly as the idea that we never won
peace. Language training was in fact a cr}'-
iig need, and standards for government serv-
■0 were not what tliey should have been. But
10 need was not for recrimination or ridicule ;
lie need was for more training and higher
andards. Prodded bj' your spur, the United
rates Government has gotten down in earnest
) the business of language training.
It was notoriously true that in 1958 half of
11 Foreign Service officers could not speak any
oreign language. Today nearly 90 percent
ave at least a working knowledge of a foreign
inguage and 6i percent have a professional
■roficiency. Not only are more officers learn-
ag languages; they are also learning more
uiguages and harder ones. A total of 56 differ-
nt languages is now being taught in Washing-
3n and in the field. Moreover, a special
inguage program for Foreign Service wives
.as begmi this year and is already full to over-
owing.
This progress in language learning has not
een confined to the Department of State. The
National Defense Act of 1958 has proved that,
f we understand and accept the purposes and
imitations of language training, we can pro-
uce a program that will be successful and will
le handsomely supported by the American pub-
ic. Today a quarter of a million students are
ising teaching materials developed under the
esearch program this act made possible.
In time we will have an adequate number of
jroperly trained linguists. This will be no
piarantee that we know what to say : Remem-
ler poor Jenny, "who in seventeen languages
:ouldn't say 'no'." But it will be proof, once
igain, that for Americans the "impossible" is
lot really out of reach; it just takes a little
onger.
Complexities of Foreign Aid
My twin prediction tonight — success and
support for foreign aid — runs counter to cur-
rent mythology on the subject, of course. It
will have rough going with these professional
stargazers, entrails sorters, numerologists, and
other usually unreliable sources who are busy
greeting the new Administrator [David E.
Bell] of the AID [Agency for International
Development] prograna with jeremiads replete
with blunders, cutbacks, retreats, punched
pillows, ratholes, deadbeats, and deadends.
Indeed, the net impression from recent discus-
sion of the foreign aid program seems to be
that the task is hopeless, the program is an
uncharted swamp, and the honor of being its
Administrator is akin to the conjugal joys of
being Bluebeard's bride.
Certainly the management of the foreign aid
program is no bed of roses — unless you count the
thorns. It is immensely complex, enormously
difficult, and more than a little fi-ustrating.
Albert Einstein used to say that every propo-
sition should be as simple as possible — but not
one bit simpler. Foreign aid cannot be made
simple. If you hear anybody say he's going
to make it simple for you, put him down as
simple minded.
International development is an intricate role
of international complexity, and our foreign
aid, as part of it, is a multipurpose tool.
This is, of course, why purposes and limita-
tions of AID are so widely misunderstood.
Everybody's favorite modern language teacher.
Professor Henry Higgins, had a similar prob-
lem with grasping the varied purposes and mo-
tivations of one Eliza Doolittle. If you think
it's hard to understand the "why" of foreign
aid, stop a moment and think whether you
really know why any one person of your ac-
quaintance acts just the way he does. Then
multiply your uncertainty by 180 million givers
and a billion recipients of aid. This exercise
won't help you understand U.S. foreign eco-
nomic policy any better, but it's designed to
make you feel better.
Economic aid is like water coming from a
hose. The water can be used for many pur-
poses— to put out leaf fires, to wash the car, to
cool off the children in summer, to break up a
dog fight, or even to water the lawn. To ask,
"Is the water successful?" is to ask another,
preconditioning question, "What was it being
used for?"
Thus aid is used to relieve victims of disaster,
to get a strategic base, to help allies build their
armed strength, to stave off economic collapse.
It is used to promote international develop-
JANTTART 14, 1963
61
ment — that is, to help build free institutions
inside other people's countries and help the
people there to make those free institutions
work. We should not be disappointed if aid
given to build a military liighway fails to raise
more rice or reduce the death rate from malaria.
We should be disappointed only if aid designed
to build free institutions fails to build free insti-
tutions.
False Impressions of Aid Program
The current impression of the foreign aid
program as a hapless, hopeless chore strikes me
as a badly distorted caricature, compounded of
five illusions :
Fh'st, that the task of helping other countries
is a lonely burden, borne quite unfairly by long-
suffering Uncle Sam.
Second, that the very process of economic
growth — what starts it, what keeps it going,
and how an outsider can help — is an unfathom-
able mystery.
Third, that foreign aid is an endless task at a
growing cost to the American taxpayer.
Fourth, that the Communists do this sort of
thing better than we do.
Fifth, that there is no public support for
foreign aid.
These impressions are false. Let us look at
them with the fishy eye they deserve.
U.S. Not Alone in Foreign Aid
Many people still have the impression that
Uncle Sam is carrying the whole load of help-
ing others modernize their institutions because
we were the first to get into the business. That
was way back in the dim past — a decade and a
half ago — when General Marshall, as Secretary
of State, helped start an era of history first
called European recovery, more recently the
Common Market, and soon to be called Atlantic
partnership.
It is still a fact that the burden sharing is
still somewhat uneven. But certainly we are
not alone in the business. We have never been
all alone, yet. Until recently, talk of getting
others to set up foreign aid programs of their
own was met with innocent unconcern, like the
Oi
young lady (returning from language stud;
abroad, I suppose) who was asked by the c
toms inspector if she was carrying any pomoi
raphy and replied, "Why, sir, I don't even o
a pomograph !"
Today ours is not the only government witll
an overseas aid agency. There are foreign aiil
agencies now in London and Paris and Bom
and Tokyo and Brussels and Tel Aviv an(
Stockliolm and Copenhagen as well.
And this refers only to national aid pro
grams. As you well know, we also worl
through big international organizations — -thi
World Bank, the International Developmen
Association, the International Monetary Fund
and all the specialized agencies of the Unite(
Nations. We are typically the largest stock
holder in these enterprises, as we should be an(
want to be. But hundreds of millions of dollar
are put in by other countries, totaling far raon
than we contribute. Indeed, one of the gooc
things about working at economic developmeni
through international agencies is that it helpi
make sure that others are doing their part, too.
No, we are not in this thing by ourselves
Only if we were out of it would we be al
alone.
What We Know About Economic Growth
The second component of the caricature ii
that the whole business of starting and helpinj:
economic growth is a total mystery. There ia
indeed, much that we do not yet know about iK
What is the role of political leadership in creafe
ing a national "will to grow"? How does oni
go about rooting out corruption in societie
where it has become part of the national fabric
How and at what pace can one change, withou
producing social tramna, customs which frus
trate growth ? There are many tough questioni
like these; and to all of them must be added thi
even tougher question: How, in each country
can outsiders help the insiders build theii
own free institutions — without making thing;
worse ?
I sometimes tliink that stimulating and man-
aging the modernization process is the mosl
complex and delicate task of social engineering
ever consciously undertaken by the mind 01
62
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
lan. It is full of pitfalls, and those who are
.oikiiig at it will surely tumble into some of
liem. But, as our own pioneers learned on the
unerican prairie, it was no good to have the
■ nirage to begin without the strength to con-
imie.
We have not been long at this task, but we
lave learned much — from mistakes, needless to
ay.
Our first mistake was to set out breezily to
ransfer wholesale the institutions and ideas of
he economically dynamic to the static societies.
Vlien it turned out that you couldn't dig a hole
nd plant there a replica of some European or
American institution, many Americans suffered
, sentimental revolution and swung the other
w&y: The developed countries, we were told,
Ihould simply do for the less developed what
he "people themselves" wanted done.
But there were problems in transf onning this
dea into action too. One was that the leaders
if the less developed countries tended to make
he same mistake that we did in the earliest
)eriod : that is, they tended to think that what
hey wanted was what we already had. An-
)ther was the difficulty of being sure, from the
)utside, who the "people themselves" were. It
s not easy to analyze the rapid mutation of
political power in somebody else's country.
In the end it was necessary to learn how to
nake a creative blend of our technology and
idministrative skills and their folkways and
fforkways — building modern-style institutions
3ut of local cultural raw materials.
Our understanding is still primitive. The
state of our theory about how to do this — how
to transfer and adapt the growth-inducing ele-
ments from one society to another — is still woe-
fully short of the practitioners' needs. But at
least we know enough about it to check some old
ideas. For example:
We know that a few miles of road in the
wilderness, an isolated health center, a country
schoolhouse, or a cleanup campaign in one vil-
lage do not add up to a development process.
We know that it is much harder to grow peo-
ple than it is to grow anything else — and much
more important too.
We know that we are living in an era of
deep mutual involvement in each other's inter-
nal affairs, and we know that this raises some
interesting policy questions about the role of
the outsider and the principle of noninterven-
tion by a nation in the affairs of other nations.
We know now that the most useful measur-
ing rods in development are those which meas-
ure the building of institutions rather than
those which measure only production, trade, or
national income.
We know that technicians who leave insti-
tutions behind are good technicians, and tech-
nicians who just leave teclaniques are bad
technicians — even if everybody loves them and
they are fairly dripping with cultural empathy.
We know that the vigorous effort by almost
all technical specialists to exclude politics from
their calculations is doomed to failure.
We know, in short, that development is
whole.
If this much knowledge does not provide
answers to all the problems, it at least helps
to define them. And it is quite a lot to leam
about so complex a subject in so short a time
as 15 years. If we can apply these lessons as-
tutely these next 15 years, the foreign aid pro-
gram will be a success — measured by the
number and quality of free institutions other
peoples have created with our help.
Task Is Finite in Cost and Duration
The third component of the foreign aid car-
icature is the impression that the need for aid
is a bottomless pit, that the development road
runs through a long curving tunnel with no
light at the end, that the cost of the thing is be-
yond measure and the task is without limit.
Of course worldwide development is expen-
sive. And unfortunately we cannot today put
a price tag on the job of setting the whole world
on the road to self-sustaining growth. But that
is not because the cost is so astronomical as to be
inmieasurable ; it is simply that we do not yet
know enough to measure it with any real ac-
curacy.
Of course this will be a long-term job. And
unfortunately we cannot today establish a ter-
minal date for the whole affair, as we were able
JANUARY 14, 1963
63
to do with the Marshall Plan. But we do know
that it will be shorter if we think of it as long-
range. It is guaranteed to last forever only if
we make the most costly mistake of all — of tack-
ling 20-year problems with 5-year plans using
2-year personnel and 1-year money.
The point is that there will be a peak after
which the load will begin to taper off. Tliere
are more than 100 countries and territories in
the so-called less developed world. Yet 40 per-
cent of the total population of that world lives
in just two countries. Is it beyond the realm of
reason that India and Brazil could, with maxi-
mum efforts now, reach a stage of growth dur-
ing this Decade of Development where massive
inputs of govemment-to-government aid no
longer will be required ? Or, to put it another
way : India and Pakistan, sharing a single sub-
continent, have more people than all of Latin
America and Africa put together. Some 40
percent of our e<?onomic aid goes to those two
countries. Is it beyond reason that they can, in
a decade of hard work, be earning a consider-
ably larger share of their own way toward self-
sustaining growth?
In the meantime there is a limit to the levels
of external assistance, especially capital assist-
ance, which can be absorbed effectively by the
developing institutions in the developing coim-
ties. We do not loiow just what the global level
is, but probably it is not very much higher than
the present rate of flow. So the demand is not
unlimited, whatever that limit is.
Also, in the meantime, the aid-exporting
nations will be sharing the so-called burden on,
we hope, an increasingly equitable basis. And
as the leading countries now in the "less de-
veloped" category move toward modernization,
they too can begin to share in the common en-
terprise as Chile, India, Egypt, and others are
already beginning to do.
In my view, we should work harder than we
have before at the job of establishing at least
tentative target dates for self-sustaining
growth and of estimating the price tag for
reasonably well defined stages. But, whether
we can do this or not with any degree of ac-
curacy in the period immediately ahead, the
fact remains that the task is finite in cost and
finite in duration.
I,
Mistakes in Soviet Foreign Aid Program
The fourth face of the caricature is that tl;
Commmiists are better at the foreign aid bus.^
ness tlian we are. They are not.
Perhaps we should get a graduate student il
a language-and-area study program to trace tl
mistakes the Soviets have made in their foreig
aid program. They started by making
slavish copy of ours. Then they failed to lear
from our trials and errors. They insisted
making all the same mistakes we made i|
roughly the same order in which we mad
them — with a time lag of 4 or 5 years, of coursd
They built large concrete "monuments" an^
put bronze plaques on them.
They sent "ugly Russians" who lived
haughty compounds.
They made technical errors. The Sovie
engineers who sent cement made for dr
climates had to watch in despair as it hardene(|
in the humidity of Rangoon.
They reached out into the less developetj
nations to grasp the levers of power, not realiz
ing those levers had first to be created befor
anybody could manipulate them, for good oil
for ill.
They overplayed their hand repeatedly-
the Middle East, then in Africa, then in CubaJ
They thought, as some Americans still some [
times do, that aid was a road to popularity-
not remembering the lesson in the famous storj
about the rich Bengali who was told a frieno
of his really hated him and replied, "Wh]]
should that man hate me ? I never helped hinj
in my life?" Power and popularity don't mixi
for them or for us.
Above all, the Communists could never hide
their ambition to make every nation beholden to
one doctrine and one totalitarian system oJ
power. And that is an insuperable handicap in
a world which likes variety, a world peopled bjl
men and women who can easily tell who wants
to see them free and who wants to see them
enslaved. '
Maybe I don't need to labor the point.
Maybe the prostitution of Cuba and the inva-
sion of India have settled, for the moment at
least, the question of Communist solicitude for
the less developed areas of the world.
64
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
insistent Public Support of Program
The riiial illusion in tlic foreign aid carica-
n-e is that nobody reall}- likes it.
The foreign aid program will, of course, re-
ain under attack — and therebj' prove it is im-
ortant enough to be worth attacking. You
ill surely remember, as I vividly do, that when
it> Marshall Plan was first proposed loud
aices were raised to proclaim that it would
inkrupt the United States, that it would build
icialism in Europe, and that, if it worked at all,
would only add to the strength of the Com-
lunist world when the Soviet Union took over
Europe. I also remember that, when it began
1 become clear that the Marshall Plan was to be
l)rilliant success, everybody and his brother
ere for it and it turned out that a remarkable
umber of people had suggested it first. "Seven
ities vied for Homer dead, where Homer living
cirged his bread."
In any case the fact of the matter is that
ublic opinion polls — whenever the questions
ere not loaded — have shown consistent major-
y public supi^ort for sharing our prosperity to
elp other countries develop the economic base
ithout which there can be no political stability,
'very year the leaders of an impressive cross
eetion of the major private organizations of
his country parade to Capitol Hill to testify in
iipport of one or another aspect of the biparti-
an foreign aid legislation. Every President
nd every presidential candidate since the Sec-
lul "World War ha\'e come out publicly and
epeatedly for continuing foreign aid.
You may have observed that the supporters
if aid stress the economics of the poor countries,
vhile the opponents of aid talk mostly about the
jolitics of the jioor countries. Thus foreign
■conomic aid is the special target of those who
ire dissatisfied about the way the recipients of
lid talk and act politically.
The foreign aid director can and should con-
rol the administration of his own program. He
:annot control what this or that political leader,
talking for home consumption, may say at Ban-
dung or Belgrade. Surely the antidote to their
loose talk is not to justify it by loose talk of our
own about other people's aifairs, but rather to
help national leaders in every free country to
concentrate on spurring internal growth and
building free institutions in their own back-
yards.
Meanwhile we Americans will just have to get
used to the brickbats that go with power. The
purpose of American foreign policy is never
popularity or gratitude, but respect and results.
David E. Betl Becomes
Administrator of AID
FoUowlng are statements by Secretary Riosk
and David E. Bell inade on December 21 at
Washington, D.C., on tlie occasion of Mr. BelVs
swearing-in as Administrator of the Agency
for Intemational Development,
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK
Press release 745 dated December 21
It is with great pleasure that I welcome
David E. Bell to his new duties as Administra-
tor of the Agency for International Develop-
ment. This position carries with it some of the
most complex and difficult responsibilities in
our Government. I am delighted that David
Bell has accepted the position because of his
high qualifications to meet the challenge of
leadership demanded of the man who directs
our foreign assistance program.
I am mindful of his special background of
practical experience. He served in the Budget
Bureau and elsewhere in the Government imder
two previous Presidents before becoming Presi-
dent Kennedy's Director of the Bureau of the
Budget. He is both an economist and an ad-
ministrator. For more than 2 years he grap-
pled with pi'oblems of economic development
in the field as an adviser to the Govermnent of
Pakistan's Planning Board and as a project
field superintendent.
In the worldwide struggle between coercion
and freedom our AID program has a crucially
important role. It is the principal instrument
by which we assist the less developed parts of
the free world to make economic and social
progress, thus to achieve and preserve political
stability in freedom. And unless the hungry
half of the world makes progress, the outlook
JANUARY 14, 1963
65
for freedom will be dim. Our foreign aid pro-
gram is as indispensable as our military
defense.
President Kennedy has faced the fact that
this crucially important task of helping the less
developed peoples to move into the modem
world cannot be accomplished in 2 or 3 or 4
years. We must think, and are thinking, in
terms of a decade of development.
This task of building the strength of the free
world, of working toward a peaceful world com-
munity of free and independent states, is a com-
pelling one. But it is hard and requires hard-
headed, practical judgments at every turn. We
who have been watching this global struggle
day by day, month by month, and year by year
know that our foreign aid has accomplished
great things already. We know that it is in no
small part responsible for the fact that not one
of the newly independent nations of the world
has as yet slipped behind the Iron Curtain. In
this hemisphere it has helped to forge the
solidarity of purpose and resolution demon-
strated in the recent Cuban crisis. We look
forward with confidence in the potentialities
of our foreign aid program.
During the past year, imder Mr. Fowler
Hamilton, the Agency for International De-
velopment has been extensively reorganized
and reoriented. Mr. Hamilton has left good
foundations for new accomplishments under
Mr. Bell's direction.
It is a mark of the importance that President
Kennedy attaches to this area of foreign affairs
that he saw fit to nominate as AID Administra-
tor one in whom he has the utmost confidence
and trust. We in the Department of State look
forward to our association with Mr. Bell and
will give him our full support.
STATEMENT BY MR. BELL
I am highly honored by your presence here
today, which recognizes the importance of the
work of the Agency I am joining. I am very
pleased to join this organization. I share tlie
President's strong conviction that the work of
the Agency for International Development is
essential to the security of our country because
it contributes to the development of a commu-
*
nity of free and self-sustaining countries, whicl
is the kind of world m which our own nation's
freedom can survive and flourish.
This is not the time or occasion for a speech
about our various programs of economic and
military assistance and how they can be best
organized and planned to accomplish maximum
results at minimum cost. I do think it appro
IDriate to make one or two brief comments.
First, I take it we are all agreed that thd
principal effort to develop any country's eco
nomic, political, and military strength must be;
made by the people of that country. Any as-j
sistance from outside lias meaning and signifi-i
cance and can achieve results only if the people!
of the country and its leaders have the desirej
and the willingness to commit themselves and
their energies and to make, in many cases, thei
sacrifices necessary to reach their goals. We
can and want to help people who are prepared
to help themselves.
Second, I am delighted to join the Depart-
ment of State in this critical and all-important
undertaking. I am equally delighted to see here
today the representatives of many Federal
agencies in addition to the Department of State
itself. This is appropriate recognition of the
fact that, in order to conduct effective programs
of United States assistance to the growing
strength and security of other free countries,
we must engage the wisdom, resources, and the
talents of agencies throughout the Federal Gov-
ernment and of institutions throughout our
country. We are engaged in the delicate and
difficidt business of working to achieve institu-
tional change in foreign coiuitries, and this re-
quires the highest caliber of skill and wisdom
that we can obtain throughout American
society.
Third, if I may say so without sounding
parochial, I bring with me from the Bureau of
the Budget a very strong feeling that any enter-
prise of the Federal Government involving the
use of public funds ought to be managed with
the highest prudence and frugality. The en-
deavors in which we are engaged are necessarily
so expensive that there is no excuse for the
slightest waste. I expect to take as my model
in this regard the extraordinarily successful
pattern which has been set by Secretary [Robert
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
\] JMcNamara in the Defense Department,
iiuler which he is achievin<j very hirge increases
n tlie efiiciencj' with which public resources
re being used in support of our national de-
eiise eil'ort. I think that we, in these interna-
ioiial muUial security eti'orts, can and should
et the same higli standards of increasing effi-
iency in using resources.
3Ir. Secretary, in closing may I say that I
iin very pleased indeed to join the thousands
if Americans in posts all around the world who
mve committed their time and talents to the
effort to assist other free coimtries in achieving
increasing strength and stability. My wife and
children and I were fortunate enough some
years ago to spend several years in Asia. That
experience was a very happy one for us in a
personal sense, and we came away from it with
the strong belief in the importance of working
to achieve a strong and secure community of
free nations as the framework for progress in
the world. In a sense our return here now
brings us back to direct participation again in
the effort, and we are glad to be here.
The Cultural Exchange Program In Africa: A Path to Peace
bi/ G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretm'y for African Affairs ^
For all practical purposes we are the first gen-
fsration of Americans able to discuss culture
ind cultural affairs without some feeling of
self-consciousness. Indeed we have almost
paade a national pastime out of such discussion.
iind yet why should we not be absorbed by the
unique set of values which comprise Ajnerican
culture ?
No less a scholar than Max Lerner ranks
America with Greece and Rome as "one of the
distinctive civilizations of histoi-y." And Pres-
ident Kennedy has declared that centuries hence
America will be known not as much "for vic-
tories or defeats in battles or in politics but for
our contributions to the human spirit." ^
Out of this vast melting pot we call the
United States, a clearly discernible American
culture has emerged — a culture that distin-
' Address made at the Jewish Community Center of
Greater Washington, Washington, D.C., on Dec. 18
(press release 737).
' For the text of President Kennedy's remarks on
Nov. 29 at Washington, D.C., on a closed-circuit tele-
vision broadcast on behalf of the National Cultural
Center, see White House press release dated Nov. 29.
guishes us readily from any other people.
While recognizing the imperfections and
shortcomings that exist in our society, we can
nevertheless take great pride in the ideals and
accomplishments of American civilization.
These are widely known and greatly respected,
even in remote corners of the world.
Cultural Exchange and U.S. African Policy
But why, some people may ask, does the As-
sistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
have to be involved with culture? What pur-
pose does cultural exchange serve in our African
policy ? Can Africa give us anything that we
don't already have ?
Questions such as these would never occur to
Americans familiar with modern Africa. But
they do occur and are asked by many other
Americans, and I shall try to answer them
tonight.
Let me point out first that the converse of
these questions might just as readily be asked in
Africa. There are many Africans, knowledge-
able and proud of Africa's cultural achieve-
ments, who wonder if there is equal value to
JANUARY 14, 1963
67
Africa in cultural exchange with the United
States.
In evaluating that question it should be
pointed out that Africa already has enriched
this country's cultural potential through the
nearly 20 million Negro-^Vjiierican citizens of
African descent in this country.
Furthermore there is considerable evidence
that one of our outstanding cultural contribu-
tions to the world — American jazz music— owes
a substantial part of its origin to the music of
Africa.
Another aspect of our cultural debt to Africa
can be found in Africa's rich and varied paint-
ing and sculpture, which has left a mark on
cubist and impressionist art in this country. A
Nigerian bronze, a Malian wood carving, or a
Congolese ceremonial mask can stand pi'oudly
with the art of any of the other peoples of the
world.
Increasingly Africans are becoming aware
that mankind may have had its origin in Africa.
This is a possibility raised by the Tanganyikan
archeological treasures unearthed by the dis-
tinguished scholar L. S. B. T^eakey. Africans
also are aware that the Egyptian civilization
which flowed through many parts of the conti-
nent places Africa in the earliest pages of
recorded history. They are aware that flourish-
ing national states existed in West Africa
centuries before the white man set foot in Amer-
ica. They are aware that outstanding African
universities were founded before comparable
institutions existed in Italy, France, or Eng-
land. And they are aware that the introduc-
tion of Western culture in Africa put Africans
in bondage until the 20th century.
To bridge this gap between us, therefore — to
make available to Africa the best in American
culture and to receive from Africa the best in
African culture — is a major purpose of our ex-
change program. We know relatively little of
each other in this age when ignorance is dan-
gerous, and through cultural exchange comes,
first, knowledge and then understanding and
friendship.
This is why cultural affairs play an important
role in our African policy and why the Assist-
ant Secretary of State for African Affairs must
be deeply concerned with culture. If we are
ever going to attain our long-range goal of il, f
stable and peaceful world for future genera^ 0
tions to enjoy, we must work at building such a !fl
world with every tool in our possession. And il^
not the least of these tools is cultural exchange, u,
Scope of U.S. Program (
Our total exchange program embraces many
types of acti\aties in such varied fields as educa- 1"
tion, health, labor, public administration, jouiv In
nalism, agriculture, social welfare, and the arts.
Many of these activities are conducted by the
Department of State in cooperation with a num-
ber of Government agencies. There are also a
great many private organizations very muc
involved with African programs — foundations,*
corporations, colleges and universities, religious
groups, labor unions and farm organizations,
professional, technical, social, and scholarly
associations, and local community organizations
with a variety of interests. The impact of these
combined efforts is producing a rich harvest ofl
beneficial African-American relationships.
Perhaps our deepest involvement in cultural'
relations with Africa is in education. It is in
this field that Africa's needs are the most press-
ing, and fortunately we are in a position to be of
genuine assistance in meeting those needs.
Today there are nearly 5,000 African students
in 49 of our States, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Eico. Many of them are here under
governmental or private organization auspices,
but a significant number of them have come with
their own funds. About 10 percent of these
African students are here on governmental edu-
cational exchange programs under the Ful-
bright and Smith-Mundt Acts. Public and
private efforts also are combined to meet emer-
gency needs of African students and to help
them adjust to American university life.
In the private field I am pleased to pay
tribute to the pioneering efforts of the Phelps-
Stokes Fund, to which President Kennedy sent
greetings last Friday night on the occasion of
its 50th anniversary.'' Under the Phelps-Stokes
Fund's auspices the first international commis-
sions to study Africa's educational needs were
I
^ For an address by Chester Bowles at the fund's
.50th-anniversary dinner on Dec. 14, see Bulletin of
Dee. 31, 19<52, p. 1002.
68
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
rganized in flic early li)20"s, and the reports of
aose commissions are now classics in African
rUicational history.
Also in the private field the Ford Founda-
lon, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Rocke-
eller Fonndation, as well as a host of smaller
hilanthropical organizations, are making ini-
ortant contributions to African education both
t liome and abroad.
In Africa the bulk of American assistance is
hanneled into secondary school and teacher
raining projects, new classrooms, and agricul-
ural, technical, and vocational training. For
xample, in cooperation with Columbia Univer-
ity the Agency for International Development
Mit 250 teachere to East Africa to help alleviate
iK't area's shortage of secondary school
?achers. In another type of activity the Peace
'orps will have 1,427 volunteers in Africa by
he end of the year, more than 1,000 of them
eachers.
Still another project is the State Depart-
lent's university-to-university project. An
xample of this activity is the arrangement be-
ween Northwestern University and the Uni-
ersity of Khartoum to develop the latter's
ngineering faculty through an exchange of
isiting lecturers and faculty members.
The second major category of the State De-
)artment's cultural program is the exchange
if leaders and specialists. Under this progi'am
American specialists in professional, educa-
ional, and cultural fields visit Africa for spec-
fied periods as teachers or lecturers. Similarly
Vfrican leaders and specialists in many fields
.'isit the United States for discussions with their
American colleagues and to observe American
ife.
A number of Congolese parliamentarians, for
fexample, visited Washington under this pro-
gram to see Congress in operation in early
iiutumn, and a Nigerian parliamentai-y delega-
tion came here earlier in the year. Other ex-
changes involved a group of Young Pioneers
from Ghana, a Mali youth group, and a student
group from the University of Dakar. Sixteen
Nigerian women leaders studied homemaking
and social p.sychology at Columbia University
during the summer and, on a stage at the State
Department in September, presented an amus-
ing dramatic account of their experiences in
New York, which included a shopping expedi-
tion at Macy's and riding on New York
subways.
Tlie third major aspect of the Department's
cultural relations with Africa is called cultural
presentations. This activity, conducted by the
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
is primarily concerned with the performing arts
and sends prominent American performers and
athletes to Africa. Among the varied groups
and individuals which have made African trips
imder this program are singers "William War-
field and Leontyne Price, the Boston Celtics
basketball team, the San Francisco Ballet, the
Westminster Singers, track champions Parry
O'Brien and Don Bragg, and the Golden Gate
Quartet. American jazz is a very popular cul-
tural presentation in Africa, and such groups as
those of Louis Armstrong, Herbie Mann, and,
currently. Cozy Cole enjoy great popularity in
all sections of Africa.
"\^niile we have no program to bring African
artists to this country, we do encourage Ameri-
can impresarios to bring them here, and we as-
sist however we can during their visits. I'm
sure many of you remember the highly success-
ful tours of "Les Ballets Africaines" in 1959
and 1961. I was privileged to see members of
that troupe perform in Guinea earlier this year,
and once again I was impressed with the beauty
and exuberance of African dancing.
African artists who have visited the United
States recently include the Ghanaian painter
and sculptor, Kofi Antubam, and the Nigerian
composer, Fela Sowande, whose "African Sym-
l^hony'' was presented at Carnegie Hall on June
1 of this year.
Beyond these activities are our day-to-day
cultural contacts with Africans at U.S. Foreign
Service posts in Africa. We now have 22 full-
time cultural affairs officers throughout Africa
and have American information and cultural
centers at almost all of our posts.
Emphasis on People and Personal Contacts
In conclusion I want to point out that in ev-
ery phase of our educational and cultural rela-
tions with Africa the emphasis is on people and
personal contacts. Tlie people we are dealing
JANUARY 14, 1963
69
with in our programs are the leaders of Africa,
today and tomorrow. We want to learn about
them and their cultures, and we want them to
learn about us and our culture. In this way
we can hope to develop those long-term friendly
relations needed among peoples to achieve the
understanding fundamental to stability and
lasting peace.
The interest exhibited by your presence here
tonight is a good sign, and I hope you will de-
velop ever-larger interests in this vital part of
our foi'eign policy in Africa. There will al-
ways be a need for groups such as yours to assist
your Government in this field, and this chal-
lenge offers scope for unlimited initiative and
imagination on a continuing basis.
U.N. Invites Republic of Korea
To Take Part in Debate
Folloioing is a statetnent hy Gordon A. Al-
lott, U.S. Representative to the General Assem-
bly, made in Committee I {Political and Secu-
rity) on December 11 regarding the question of
inviting Korean representatives to participate in
the discussion of the item on Korea, together
with the text of a resolution adopted hy the
committee on that date.
STATEIViENT BY SENATOR ALLOTT
U.S. delegation press release 4121
Today we begin our annual discussion of the
Korean question. This issue has been on the
agenda of the General Assembly every year
since 1947. The United Nations is deeply em-
bedded in the recent history of Korea. And
the reverse is also true. The Korean question
has deeply affected the history of the develop-
ment of the United Nations.
It was ill Korea that members of tlie United
Nations first acted collectively with military
force to fulfill the purposes of the charter. For
nations wliich look to the United Nations for
support and security, tlie United Nations action
in Korea is a promise and a sign. It is difficult
to find any similar example in history in which
nations from far away undertook with courage
and generosity an enormous investment in lives i
and money to defend a small state, victim of
aggression. This deep emotional and historical
significance of the Korean question forms the'
background of our annual debate.
The immediate issue before this committee isi
to invite Korean representatives to participate •
in our debate. We hope this question can be
settled promptly and that we can move on to
discussion of the Korean question itself. But
we all know that this question of Korean par-
ticipation goes deep to the heart of the Korean
question. It reflects the fundamental positions
of all of us on the nature and the facts of the
issue. The Soviet representative has tried to
force a quick debate, which he has called merely
procedural. Maybe he believed through such
tactics he could lead this committee to take an
ill-considered decision which it would not take
following a thorough consideration of the is-
sues. Koi'ean participation is not a simple
matter of procedure to be decided in a political
vacuum.
The first question of course is whether Ko-
reans should participate in our debate at all.
Here there appears to be no disagreement. The
Republic of Korea has been heard in our debates
for many years, and both the United States and
the Soviet resolutions assume that at least some
participation is desirable.
The second question is which Koreans should
be heard. All of us who participated in the
70
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
; debates on the Korean question at the 15th and
IGth sessions of the General Assembly will re-
member the answer given by overwhelming ma-
jorities representing nearly all parts of the
General Assembly. Only Korean spokesmen
who accept the competence and authorit}^ of the
Fnited Nations to act on the Korean question
should be heard. Any other position would
defy all reason. It would be absurd to invite
as pai'ticipants in our debate those who reject in
advance our right to make whatever decisions
may result.
For the past 2 years the United Nations has
issued invitations to the Republic of Korea and
the North Korean regime, provided that the
competence and authority of the United Nations
to act on the Korean question be accepted un-
equivocally by the North Koreans. On both
occasions the results have been the same. The
Eepublic of Korea has done everything possible
to cooperate with tlie United Nations, has ac-
cepted its decisions faithfully, has supported its
work attentively. In contrast, up to the present
time, the North Korean regime has used every
occasion to reject United Nations competence,
authority, and past decisions. In these circum-
stances, to paraphrase our decision of last J^ear,^
there is no basis for participation by representa-
tives of the North Korean regime. What use-
ful purpose could possibly be sei-ved by asking
once again the position of a regime which con-
tinues to defy our right to discuss the question?
Perhaps the North Korean regime may some
day change its attitude and demonstrate its will-
ingness to accept the competence and authority
of the United Nations. If representatives of
the North Korean regime should change their
policy and be willing to cooperate constnictively
with this committee and the United Nations,
then we could consider the question of participa-
tion in a very different light.
There is a clear continuity of jDolicy on the
part of the North Koreans in their attitudes
toward the United Nations. The attitude of the
North Korean authorities is not significantly
diiferent from what it was when the North
Koreans were participating in aggression
against South Korea and against the United
' For background, see Bulletin of May 15, 1961, p.
736.
Nations. If we pretended we did not know this,
we would be putting our heads in tlie sands;
we would suggest that the United Nations, and
that we as delegates, are ignorant of what is
going on in Korea and are not aware of the offi-
cial North Korean policy. Communist frustra-
tion of United Nations efforts to assist in a solu-
tion of tlie Korea question dates from 1047, and
nothing has happened in the last year which
changes that in the slightest.
Record of North Korean Rejection of U.N.
Let me review the record of North Korean re-
jection of the United Nations, a record which
extends right up to the present time. The
United States presented the question of Korean
independence to the United Nations in Septem-
ber 1947, having been thwarted in direct nego-
tiations with the Soviet Union to bring about
the unification of Korea on the basis of the Yalta
discussions and the Potsdam declaration. After
a full debate, the General Assembly adopted a
resolution on November 14, 1947, which set forth
a fair and reasonable program for solution of
the Korean problem — a program based upon
f I'ee elections under United Nations observation,
proportional representation, and the formation
of a national government by the freely elected
representatives to a National Assembly. It was
a program for real self-determmation following
a long period of colonial rule.
That program for reunification has been reg-
ularly reaffimied by the United Nations in its
resolutions on the Korean question. The Soviet
occupation forces refused, however, to permit
the United Nations Commission even to enter
North Korea, and they exercised a complete
boycott of the United Nations program. Never-
theless, a lawful government of Korea at Seoul
was established in accordance with the United
Nations program.
Then the Pyongyang regime was established
in North Korea. That regime has consistently
opposed all United Nations efforts to deal with
the Korean question. It has opposed not only
particular United Nations proposals to deal with
the substance of the Korean question; it has
challenged the right of the United Nations to
deal with the Korean question on any tenns
except the terms of the North Korean authori-
JANUARY 14, 1963
71
ties. It has challenged not only the solutions
proposed by the United Nations but the com-
petence and authority of the United Nations to
propose such solutions. It has for 15 years
rejected the competence and authority of the
United Nations to act on the Korean question.
From 19i7 to the present day it has refused to
permit the United Nations Commission to enter
its territories. We wonder what it has to hide.
On June 25, 1950, this regime launched fla-
grant military aggression against the Republic
of Korea, defied tlie call of the United Nations
to cease this aggression, and fought against
United Nations forces which sought to repel
them and restore the peace.
On May 3, 1954, at the Korean Political Con-
ference in Geneva following the armistice,
North Korean representatives rejected even a
reference to United Nations discussions on the
Korean question which had taken place up to
that time. I would add, it remains the position
of the North Korean authorities to reject any
reference to United Nations decisions or dis-
cussions of tlie Korean problem which have
taken place during the past 15 years.
On at least nine different occasions since 1959,
through its controlled press and radio, or in
public statements by spokesmen for the regime,
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has
denied tlie right of the United Nations to deal
with the Korean question.
On October 23, 1962, Premier Kim Il-song
made his regime's position unmistakably clear
in a speech before tlie Third Supreme People's
Assembly, saying "AVe consider that the United
Nations has no right to discuss the Korean
question and it has no riglit to interfere in the
domestic affairs of our country."
As recently as November 24 of this year
North Korea issued a memorandum stating
flatly and categorically : "The United Nations
must no longer interfere in the Korean question.
It must take its hands off Korea."
And now on December 8 the North Koreans
have issued a new declaration.^ Its meaning is
the same as that contained in the North Korean
letter of December 19, 1961, in which the North
Koreans replied to the qualified invitation of
this committee. That reply was declared b
this committee to provide no basis for Nort
Korean participation. This year, before th
committee could even discuss whether to rene^
its qualified invitation, the North Koreans hav
sent a similar reply. Again it provides no basi
for North Korean partici2:)ation. It asserts one
again that "The United Nations has no righ
... to discuss the 'Korean Question.' "
This position of the North Korean regime i
no recent or equivocal position. It is not some
tiling tactical or sudden. We have not takei
texts out of context in a way which changes th
position of the North Korean regime. Th
North Korean regime has shouted its reject ioi
of the United Nations action in Korea fror
the housetops right up to the present time. I
has missed no opportunity to define, clarify, an(
emphasize its rejection and abuse of the Unite(
Nations and the United Nations efforts for 1 ]
years to deal with tlie problem of Koreai
division.
Position of Republic of Korea
The position of the Republic of Korea standi
in stark contrast with the defiance and rejectio]
of the Communist regime in the north. Pursui
ant to the General Assembly's resolution O'
November 14, 1947, the Republic of Korea sue
cessfully held elections on May 10, 1948, despit
Communist efforts to oppose them by violence
The procedures and conduct of these election
were fi'eely observed by the United Nation
Commission. That Commission made a findinj,
on June 25, 1948, "that the results of the l)allo
of May 10, 1948 are a valid expression of th
free will of the electorate in those parts o
Korea which were accessible to the Commissioi
and in whicli the inhabitants constituted ap
proximately two-tliirds of the people of Korea.' '
The General Assembly concurred in this findin<
in its declaration of December 12, 1948,' whicl
said that "there has been established a lawfu
government (tiie Government of the Republic
of Korea) . . . and that this is the only sucl
Government in Korea." In passing, it is wort]
noting that the General Assembly recommendec
in its resolution of December 12, 1948, thai
'■ D.N. doe. A/C. 1/883.
' For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 19, 1S«8, p. 760.
72
DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
lomber states should take this mto considera-
uui in establishing their relations with the
lovernment of the Kepublic of Korea.
riie Republic of Korea's cooperation with
lie United Nations has continued to the present
line. As consistently' revealed by reports of the
'nited Nations Commission for the Unification
lul Reliabilitation of Korea— UNCURK— the
onnnission has been permitted to travel and
bserve freel j' throughout South Korea in carry-
liX out its mandate from the General Assembly.
I lias agreed to the United Nations program
~ ;i basis for unification of the country, and it
;is consistently accepted the competence and
uthority of the United Nations to take action
n the question. This particularly is the posi-
mn of the present government. On June 24,
!m;1. Foreign Minister Kim Hong-il said that
le Government rejected unification by force
lul supported past United Nations resolutions
n the Korean question, by adhering to the
'nited Nations Charter and by respecting the
onipetence and authority of the United Nations
J take action on the Korean question.
As set forth in the addendum of the
JNCURK report * of December 1961, Chair-
lan Park, following talks with Presideiit Ken-
edy on November 14, 1961,° "reaffirmed his
aith in the United Nations, and his determina-
lon to seek the unification of Korea in freedom
hrough peaceful means under the principles
lid down and reaffirmed by the United Nations
reneral Assembly."
The latest report " of UNCURK dated Sep-
jmber 1, 1962, notes in paragraph 21 that lead-
ig figures of the Government have reiterated
he Republic of Korea's adherence to the Char-
3r of the United Nations and its respect of the
ompetence and authority of the organization.
In a fundamental way the Republic of Korea
3 a child of the United Nations, which the
Jnited Nations for 15 years has been trying to
ssist. Our efl'orts to solve the greatest handi-
* U.N. doc. A/4900/ Add. 1.
'For text of a joint communiriue released at the
onclu.sion of meetings between President Kennedy and
"Jen. Chung Hee Parli, chairman of the Supreme Coun-
il for National Recon.«truction of the Republic of
forea. see Bulletin of Dec. 4, 1961, p. 928.
r.N. doe. A/.521.3 and Add. 1.
cap wliirli the Korean people face — their sepa-
ration into two parts — has not yet succeeded;
but those efl'orts go on, and the great hope of
the Korean people is that the United Nations
will succeed. In spite of its enormous handicaps
of military attack, subversion from outside, and
constant political and propaganda harassment,
South Korean governments since independence
have gradually broadened relations with other
countries and developed constructive participa-
tion in international affairs. Although de-
prived of membership in the United Nations
itself by Soviet veto, the Republic of Korea has
been admitted to, and is active in, many of the
United Nations specialized agencies. It was
admitted to the Colombo Plan on November 16,
1962. Fifty-one members of the United Nations
have established, or agreed to establish, diplo-
matic relations with this Government.
Mr. Chairman, the contrasting records and
attitudes of the Republic of Korea and of the
Communist regime speak eloquently for them-
selves. Yet despite the great differences be-
tween the two, the U.S.S.R. resolution seeks to
place on the same plane the two governments
and to allow each to come before this body to
discuss the Korean question — a question which,
I emphasize, the Communists deny the right of
this committee and the General Assembly to
consider.
The Soviet resolution ^ asks us to act as if we
thought the North Korean regime and the Re-
public of Korea would participate in the same
manner and to the same ends. It assumes there
are no differences in the policies and history of
the two. The draft reads as if this committee
had not twice stated the conditions for partici-
pation in our debate. It ignores the rejection
given in advance in the December 8 declaration
of the North Korean regime.
The United States has also submitted a resolu-
tion.^ It reaffirms in its preambular paragraphs
the principles for participation which this com-
mittee has twice before set specifically, that the
North Korean regime may participate if it is
prepared to accept unequivocally the compe-
tence and authority of the United Nations to
■ U.N. doc. A/C.l/L. 318 ; rejected by the committee
on Dec. 11 by a vote of 29-,56-14.
'U.N. doo. A/C.l/L. 321.
lAXUARY 14, 1963
73
take action on the Korean question. The
United States resolution in its first operative
paragraph notes in moderate language — which
if adopted would emphasize the dignified posi-
tion of the United Nations in the face of North
Korean slander — that the North Korean regime
has twice rejected the competence and authority
of the United Nations and maintains such a
position at the present time. In such circum-
stances we believe it would be undignified and
■certainly unnecessary to go through the for-
mality of a further invitation to the North Ko-
reans to be followed by a new formal rejection.
Finally, the United States resolution extends
an invitation to the Government of Korea to
participate in our debate. I believe there will
be virtually no objection to such a paragraph.
It would be inconceivable for the United Na-
tions not to invite participation by the Republic
of Korea.
In fact, from the full record of North Korean
statements there cannot be the slightest doubt
that the regime there does reject the authority
and competence of the United Nations. This
is so clear that it is not a question or an issue.
But we should ask why the North Korean re-
gime takes that position. The answer, regret-
tably, lies in its determination, with outside
guidance and assistance, to force its own solu-
tion to the problem of Korean unity even against
the will of the Korean people. To that end it
even instigated one of modern history's most
flagrant acts of aggression to unify the country
by force. This design, however, has been
thwarted by the United Nations. That is why
the North Koreans abuse and reject the United
Nations eiforts to assist in solving the Korean
problem. Thus the question of participation
by the North Korean regime is not a procedural
issue in this debate. It goes to the very heart
of the purposes of the United Nations and its
effectiveness as an instrument for security and
peace.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION!'
The First Committee,
Reaffirming its view set forth in resolutions adopted
at the 1146th and 1217th meetings that a representa-
!i.
m
tive of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ma;
participate in the discussions of the Korean questio:
provided that it first unequivocally accepts the comp€
tence and authority of the United Nations within th
terms of the Charter to take action on the Korea:
question as the Republic of Korea has already done,
1. Notes that the Democratic People's Republic o
Korea in messages of 17 April 1061 and 19 Decembe
1961 responding to the Committee's resolutions rt
jected the competence and authority of the Unit©
Nations to take action on the Korean question, tha
Premier Kim II Song declared in a speech on 23 Octobe
1962 "we consider that the United Nations has no righ
to discuss the Korean question", and that in a memo
randum dated 24 November 1962 the Democratic Pec
pie's Republic of Korea regime has again rejected th
right of the United Nations to take action on th
Korean question ;
2. Decides to invite a representative of the Republi
of Korea to take part in the discussion of the Koreai
question without right of vote.
U.N. Asks Secretary-General To Taki
Initiative on Hungary
(
FolJoio'ing is a stateTnent made in the Specia
Political Committee on December 18 hy Car
T. Rowan, U.S. Representative to the Generca
Asseinbly, together with the text of a ?'esolm
tion adopted in plenary session on Decemhei
20.
STATEMENT BY IVSR. ROWAN
U.S. delegation press release 4129
Mr. Chairman, once again this committee i
called upon to deal with the question of Hum
gary. No delegation here wishes more thaiJ
mine that such a debate were not necessary
None wishes more than mine that the peoples
of Hungary were enjoying the blessings of lib-
erty and j^ersonal freedom to such an extern
that we could wipe from our minds memories
of those ugly, sorrowful days of 1956. Tl«
United Nations' undying concern for these peo-
ples of Hungary is what brings this item uf
again, Mr. Chairman.
Many of us were here during those fateful
autumn days of 1956, when the Security Coim
cil met^ to deal with a situation whose portent
' U.N. doc. A/C.l/L. 321 ; adopted by Committee I on
Dec. 11 by a vote of 65-»-26.
' For background, see Bxtlletin of Nov. 12, 1956, p/
757.
74
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETINl
as foreboding, to say the least. We remem-
er still how the Soviet representative, Mr.
Arkady A.] Sobolev, assured the Security
|jOuncil that the U.S.S.R. was about to enter
to discussions with the then-existing Hungar-
,n government — negotiations tliat would in-
isi lude the question of withdrawal of Soviet
liii roops from Hungary. But within hours of
* Hr. Sobolev's assurance, Soviet troops and ar-
'5* acred columns launched their attack upon the
■lungarian patriots; Soviet personnel seized
P, lungarian government officials and set up a
m government of the Soviet Union's choice.
I know that many here will not remember
he debates, the speeches of compassion and in-
lignation, that resounded in these chambers in
.956. Some who are here today were only
Ireaming of independence in 1956 — dreaming, I
night add, with much more hope than Hun-
gary's harassed masses.
As for me, Mr. Chairman, I shall never for-
get those dramatic debates during which dele-
gates from every race and every continent took
.he rostrum to articulate man's determination
o be free. I remember particularly that tense
noment when an Asian delegate announced
hat he was voting to formally condemn the
Soviet Union because the people of his tiny
;ountry looked toward the ravaged peoples of
:iny Hungary and said, "There, but for the
Trace of God, go we."
Here were a speech and a resolution about
•ssues that transcended the cold war. Involved
were such f uiidamental principles as independ-
3nce, self-determination, freedom of worship —
all those principles that man has clung to in his
march from barbarity to civilization.
My purpose, INIr. Chairman, is not to recount
all of this sad chapter in human affairs. I wish
merely to emphasize the fact that, in the yeai-s
since 1956, scores of delegates here have ex-
pressed eloquently their ]5ro found indignation
and the General Assembly has been moved to
adopt by overwhelming majorities a dozen or
more resolutions. But always the result was
defiance or noncompliance.
In addition the U.N. has appointed a siiecial
committee and two special representatives to
investigate and report on the situation in
Hungary. Their reports are well known to all
of us. Equally well known is the fact that
Soviet and Hungarian authorities have refused
to cooperate with eitlier the U.N., its appointed
representatives, or anyone else seeking to im-
prove the situation in Hungary.
"We have before us now, Mr. Chairman, the
latest report ' of the U.N. Representative on the
question of Hungary, Sir I^slie Munro. Sir
Leslie has served in this position with ability
and devotion. He has made a substantial con-
tribution to keeping the members of this body
and the M'orld at large informed about condi-
tions under which the Hungarian people live.
It is through no lack of dedication and effort on
his part that the Hungarian problem remains
unresolved. On behalf of my Government, I
want to express appreciation for the work that
he has done.
It is clear from Sir Leslie's latest report that,
while conditions in Hungary have undergone
some improvement, the situation of the Hun-
garian people, including the plight of those
who remain in prison because of their partici-
pation in the 1956 national uprising, is not yet
such as to pei-mit the U.N. to abandon its con-
cern or terminate its considerations of the
Hungarian question.
The people of Hungary know painfully well
that time does not heal all wounds; and we here
know all too well that time tends to mute the
forces of indignation. But my Government
urged that this item be continued on the
agenda,' Mr. Chairman, because we did not be-
lieve that the spirit of liberty had grown so
weak with time as to require this body to say
to the Hungarian people : "We have ceased to
care."
At the same time, Mr. Chairman, we feel the
need for a fresh approach to this problem. But
we want a new approach that maintains U.N.
responsibility and U.N. concern for those fun-
damental principles that have always guided
consideration of this question. With this in
mind, my Government has submitted the fol-
lowing draft resolution :
[Here Mr. Rowan read the text of a draft resolution,
A/SPC/L. 92.]
' U.N. doc. A/5236.
' For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 10, 1962, p.
394, and Nov. 5, 1962, p. 709.
JANUAKY 14, 1963
75
I
Oiu- purpose in submitting this resolution,
Mr. Chairman, is to seek to improve the situ-
ation of the Hungarian people by the most ef-
fective, practical, and honorable means avail-
able to us within the framework of the United
Nations. We want to sustain the just hopes of
the Hungarian people. By requesting the Sec-
retary-General himself to take any initiative
that he deems helpful in relation to this prob-
lem, we are asking him to discharge functions
for which he bears the necessary responsibility
in regard to any question of which the orga-
nization is seized and to reflect the legitimate
concern of the organization for the welfare of
the Hungarian people and for the reaffirmation
of the principles and objectives of the charter.
We are confident that he will assume this re-
sponsibility conscientiously and will do what,
in his judgment, will best serve the interests of
the Hungarian people.
At the same time, however, we continue to
assert our view that the Hungarian government
and the Soviet Union bear responsibility for
the continued presence of the question of Hun-
gary on the General Assembly agenda. My
Government firmly maintains that until this
Assembly and the world are convinced that the
situation of the Hungarian people has suffi-
ciently improved no decision should be taken on
the credentials of the Hungarian delegation.
Since 1956 the General Assembly has decided
that no decision be taken on the credentials of
the Hungarian delegation. This procedure was
designed to express the Assembly's dissatisfac-
tion with, and disapproval of, the actions and
attitudes of the Hungarian government.
Nothing has changed in Hungary to the extent
that this Assembly should reverse the actions of
the last six. But we intend to urge the Assem-
bly to withhold a decision on Hungarian cre-
dentials until an acceptable basis has bee)i
establislied for final disposition of tliis item.
In concluding, Mr. Chaimian, there is one
point that I wish this connnittee to understand
clearly : No matter what allegations you may
hear to the contrary, the United States is not
pursuing this question out of any cold-war mo-
tivation. Indeed, it is difficult for us to under-
stand how efforts to improve the situation of
the Hmigarian people — to show real concern
i
and respect for fundamental human free
doms — and in so doing to maintain the integrity
of the United Nations commitment to this end
can in any way be characterized as "cold war.'"
These freedoms are the basic right of every
people everywhere. The denial of hiunar
rights to peoples in one part of the world must r;
be a matter of great concern to us in this As-
sembly, no matter where these principles are
violated. In introducing this resolution we
are motivated by one purpose only, i.e. to re-
affirm the concern and responsibility of thefl
United Nations with the situation in Hmigaryi
and to suggest a constructive course whicl
could lead to an improvement of the lot of thi
Hungarian people.
Mr. Chairman, my delegation earnestly hop
that the new approach we have proposed will
be endorsed by an overwhelming majority of
those present. Let us make it clear with our
votes that, after 6 years or 60, there are prin-
ciples of human dignity that we do not forget.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION'
The General Assembly,
Having eonsidered the reimrt of the United Nationsi
Representative on Hungary, Sir Leslie Munro, who was*
appointed by General Assembly resolution 1312 (XIII)
of 12 December 19,58 " for the purpose of reporting to
Member States or to the General Assembly on signifi-
cant developments relating to the implementation off
the resolution.? of the General Assembly on Hungary,
and noting with concern the fact that the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and Hungary have not given,
to the United Nations Representative for Hungary the>
co-operation necessary for the full discharge of hisi
responsibilities,
Reaffirm in;/ the objectives of General Assembly reso-
lution 1004 (ES-II) of 4 November 1956, 1005 (ES-II)
of 9 November 19.56, 1127 (XI) of 21 November 1956,
1131 (XI) of 12 December 1956, 1132 (XI) of
10 January 1957 and 1133 (XI) of 14 September
1957,"
1. rtei/Kents the Secretary-General to take any ini-
I
'U.N. doe. A/SPC/77 (A/SPC/L.92) ; adopted in
plenary .session on Dec. 20 by a vote of 50 (U.S.) -13,
with 43 abstentions.
° For background and text of resolution, see Bulle-
tin of .Tan. 12, 1959, p. 55.
' For texts of re.'Jolutions, see ibid., Nov. 19, 1956, pp.
803 and 806 ; Dec. 3, 1956, p. 870 ; Dec. 24 and 31. 19.56,
p. 979 : Jan. 28, 1957, p. 140 ; and Sept. 30, 1957, p. 524.
76
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
rttive that lie deems helpful in relatiou to the Him-
iriau question;
2. Cou.iidcr.'i that under the circumstances the posi-
(Ui of the United Nations Representative ou Hungary
^ed no longer he continued and expresses its appre-
ation to the United Nations Representative on Hun-
iry. Sir Leslie Munro. for the efforts he has made in
ischarging his responsibilities relating to the imple-
eutation of the Assembly resolutions on Hungary.
I
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
utomotive Traffic
onvention on road traffic and annexes. Done at Ge-
neva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March
2(5. 1952. TIAS 2487.
Xotification received that it considers itself bound:
Mali, November 19, 1962.
elecommunications
'elegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) an-
nexed to the international telecommunication con-
vention of December 22, 19.52 (TIAS 3266), with
appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva No-
vember 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960.
TIAS 4390.
y<itification of approval: Korea, October 8, 1962.
uternational telecommunication convention with six
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959.
Entered into force January 1. 1961 ; for the United
States October 23. 1961. TIAS 4892.
Ratifications deposited: Luxembourg, November 9,
1962 : Thailand, November 15, 1962.
Accession deposited: Niger, November 2, 1962.
tadlo regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the
international telecommunication convention, 19.59.
Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into
force May 1, 1961; for the United States October
23, 1961. TIAS 4893.
Notifications of approval: Central African Republic,
October 30. 1962 ; Jordan. November 5, 1962 ; Laos,
October 30, 1962 ; Niger, October 15, 1962.
'rade
:'r(>tocol of provisional application of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
October 30. 1947. Entered into force January 1,
1948. TIAS 1700.
Extension to: Turks and Caicos Islands and Cay-
man Islands, December 20, 1962.
Wheat
[nternational wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signa-
ture at Washington April 19, through May 15, 1962.
Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts
III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS
5115.
Accepta)ice deposited: Mexico, December 27, 1962.
Accession deposited: Finland, December 27, 1962.
BILATERAL
Guinea
Agreement relating to the estiiblishment of a Peac-e
Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at
Conakry December 11 and 14, 1962. Entered into
force December 14, 1962.
Iceland
Agreement for relief from double taxation on earnings
from operation of ships and aircraft. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington December 21, and
27, 1962. Entered into force December 27, 1962.
India
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at
New Delhi November 13 and 21, 1962. Entered into
force November 21, 1962.
Jamaica
Agreement to continue in force insofar as applicable
to Jamaica agreement of November 22, 1961 (TIAS
4955), with the United Kingdom providing air routes
between the West Indies and the United States.
Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston October
25 and November 29, 1962. Entered into force No-
vember 29, 1962.
Venezuela
Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Caracas November 26
and 29, 1962. Entered into force November 29, 1962.
PUBLICATIONS
German Foreign Office Documents, 193&-36,
Released by Department
The Department of State announced on December 27
(press release 742 dated December 21) the release of
Documents on German Foreign Policy, 191S-1945,
Series C (1933-1937), The Third Reich: First Phase,
Volume IV, April 1, 1933-March J,, 1936. Together
with the 12 volumes of series D already issued, the
present volume represents the 16th to be prepared and
published by the cooperative project of the United
States, Great Britain, and Prance for the publication
of documents from the captured archives of the former
German Foreign Office.
This volume opens on April 1, 193.5, immediately
after the conversations held in Berlin by Sir John
Simon, the British Foreign Minister, and Anthony
Eden. It ends with March 4, 1936, on the eve of
Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland.
Copies of the volume (Department of State publica-
tion 74.39) may be obtained from the Superintendent
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington 25, D.C., for $4.75 each.
JANUARY 14, 1963
77
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printinfj Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex-
cept in the case of free publications, which may be ob-
tained from the Department of State.
Defense— Additional Pumping Stations on the Haines-
Fairbanks Pipeline. Agreement with Canada — relating
to the agreement of June 30, 1953, as amended by the
agreement of March 31, 1960. Exchange of notes— Signed
at Ottawa April 19, 1962. Entered into force April 19,
1962. TIAS 5039. 3 pp. 5^.
Defense— Furnishing of Articles and Services. Agree-
ment with El Salvador. Exchange of notes — Signed at
San Salvador April 10 and 13, 1902. Entered into force
April 13, 1962. TIAS 5040. 5 pp. 5(*.
Agricultural Trade. Agreement with El Salvador —
Signed at Washington May 15, 1962. Entered into force
May 15, 1962. TIAS 5041. 5 pp. 5^.
Defense— Loan of Additional Vessels. Agreement with
Greece — relating to the agreement of December 15, 1958,
and January 15, 1959. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Athens April 4 and 14, 1962. Entered into force April 14,
1962. TIAS 5042. 2 pp. 5^.
Telecommunication— Assignment of Television Channels
Along United States-Mexican Border. Agreement with
Mexico effected by exchange of notes — Signed at Mexico
April 18, 1962. Entered into force April 18, 1962. TIAS
5043. 21 pp. 35(f.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Uruguay-
Signed at Montevideo April 27, 1962. With exchanges of
notes. Entered into force April 27, 1962. TIAS 5044.
15 pp. 20«}.
Education— Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree-
ment with Peru — amending the agreement of May 3, 1956,
as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Lima Janu-
ary 20 and February 1, 1962. Entered into force Febru-
ary 1, 1962. TIAS 5045. 4 pp. 50.
Trade. Interim agreement with Haiti — relating to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at
Washington June 6, 1962. Entered into force June 6, 1962.
TIAS 5046. 5 pp. 5<f.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia —
Signed at La Paz February 12, 1962. Entered into force
February 12, 1962. With exchange of notes — and amend-
ing agreement. Exchange of notes — Signed at La Paz
March 27, 1962. Entered into force March 27, 1962. TIAS
5047. 16 pp. 100.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Vlet-Nam —
amending the agreement of December 27, 1961. Exchange
of notes— Signed at Saigon May 3, 1962. Entered into
force May 3, 1962. TIAS 5048. 3 pp. 50.
Technical Cooperation, Special Technical, Services.
Agreement with Brazil — Signe<l at Rio de Janeiro May
30, 1953 and extending agreement effected by exchange
of notes— Signed at Rio de Janeiro December 31, 1960.
Entered into force provisionally December 31, 1960. TIAS
5049. 15 pp. 100.
Technical Cooperation— Extension of Cooperative Pro-
gram Agreements for Vocational Education, Agriculture
and Natural Resources, and Special Technical Services,
as Amended and Extended. Agreement with Brazil ef-
fected by exchange of notes — Signed at Rio de Janeiro
December 29, 1961, and January 11, 1962. Entered into
force January 11, 1962. TIAS 5050. 4 pp. 50.
78
h
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement, with exch!>(|jj
notes, with India — Signed at New Delhi May 1, 196:;/
amending agreement effected by exchange of :;(
Signed at New Delhi May 17, 1962. Entered intcfo)
May 17, 1962. TIAS 5051. 11 pp. 100.
Guaranty of Private Investments. Agreement
Guinea. Exchange of notes — Signed at Wasl
May 9, 1962. Entered into force May 9, 1902. TIAt
6 pp. 5«(.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
ment with Yugoslavia — amending the agreement o:
21, 1962. Exchange of notes — Signed at Belgrad
IS, 1962. Entered into force May IS, 1962. TIA!
3 pp. 50.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indot^
amending the agreement of February 19, 1962. Es i
of notes — Signed at Djakarta May 15, 1962. Eeii
into force May 15, 1962. TIAS 50.54. 2 pp. 50
Postal Matters — Money Orders. Agreement wit
rocco — Signed at Rabat October 31, 1961, and at Wi fi]
ton November 30, 1961. Entered into force April '
TIAS 5055. 7 pp. 10(f.
Agricultural Trade. Agreement with Guatemala — pui
at Washington May 21, 1962. Entered into force R 7%
1962. TIAS 5056. 5 pp. 50.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Gt ;a-
amending the agreement of February 2, 1962. Ex up
of notes — Signed at Wa.shington May 3, 1962. E 3r4
into force May 3, 1962. TIAS 5057. 4 pp. 50.
Liquidation of German Property in Switzerland. :(
with France, the United Kingdom, and Switzerla ,
fected by exchange of notes — Dated at Washingto )l
25, 1946. Entered into force June 27, 1946. TIA! «
13 pp. 100.
Liquidation of German Property in Switzerland.
ment with France, the United Kingdom, and S
land— Signed at Bern August 28, 1952. Entered int !
March 19, 1953. With related letters. TIAS 50i
pp. 150.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 24-30
Press releases may be obtained upon request fi 1
the Office of News, Department of State, Washi ■
ton 25, D.C.
Releases issued prior to December 24 which •
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 677 '■
November 15 ; 733 of December 17 ; 737 of Deci •
ber IS ; and 742, 744, and 745 of December 21.
No. Date Subject
746 12/28 Cleveland: "The Caricature of F-
eign Aid."
*747 12/26 U.S. participation in intematio I
conferences.
t748 12/28 Meeker: Association of Amerid
Law Schools.
t749 12/29 Battle : "New Dimensions in Cultu
Communications."
*Not printed.
fHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BDLLl><
nuarv 14, 1963
Index
Vol. XLVllI, No. 1229'
rica. The Cultural Exchange Program in
Africa: A Path to Peace (Williams) ... 67
■partment and Foreign Service
ivid E. Bell Becomes Administrator of AID
iBell. Rusk) 65
) uel Recommends National Academy of For-
eign Affairs 47
lucational and Cultural Affairs
Ivisory Group Submits Report on Cultural
rreseutations 46
■ le Cultural Exchange Program in Africa : A
Path to Peace (Williams) 67
ireign .\id
ivid E. Bell Becomes Administrator of AID
I Bell, Rusk) 65
le Caricature of Foreign Aid (Cleveland) . . 60
>rmany
■rmau Foreign Office Documents, 1935-36, Re-
leased by Department 77
S. Rejects Soviet Allegations on Court Action
in Berlin (exchange of notes) 45
I jman Rights
eanor Roosevelt Memorial Service Held at
Washington Cathedral (Rusk) 51
lited Nations Pays Tribute to Memory of Mrs.
Roosevelt 48
ingary. U.N. Asks Secretary-General To Take
Initiative on Hungary (Rowan, text of resolu-
tion) 74
jrea. U.N. In\ates Republic of Korea To Take
Part in Debate (AUott, text of resolution) . 70
ilitary Affairs. President Kennedy Holds
Talks at Nassau With Prime Minister Mac-
millan (texts of joint communique and at-
tached statement) 43
iblications
jrman Foreign Office Documents, 1935-36, Re-
leased by Department 77
ecent Releases 77
reaty Information. Current Actions .... 77
.S.S.R. U.S. Rejects Soviet Allegations on
Court Action in Berlin (exchange of notes) . 45
nited Kingdom. President Kennedy Holds
Talks at Nassau With Prime Minister Mac-
millan (texts of joint communique and at-
tached statement) 43
United Nations
Eleanor Roosevelt Memorial Service Held at
Washington Cathedral (Rusk) 51
U.N. Asks Secretary-General To Take Initiative
on Hungary (Rowan, text of resolution) . . 74
U.N. Invites Republic of Korea To Take Part in
Debate (AUott, text of resolution) .... 70
United Nations Pays Tribute to Memory of Mrs.
Roosevelt 4S
Name Index
Aguirre, Aureliano 54
AUott, Gordon A 70
Aiiuman Rajadhon, Somchai 58
Auguste, Carlet 5.5.
Barnes, Nathan 53.
Bell, David E 65
Borja, Jacinto Castel 58
Chakravarty, B. N .56
Clarke, ElUs 59
Cleveland, Harlan 60
Comay, Michael S 53.
Corner, F. H 58
Godber, J. B 52:
Haugland, Jens 57
Kennedy, President 43
Khan, Muhammad Zafrulla 48;
Lachs, Manfred 52'
Macmillan, Harold 43
Marsh, Helen 55.
Okazaki, Katsuo 55
Pavicevic, Miso 55.
Pazhwak, Abdul Rahman 57
Rana, Jagdish S 58;
Retails, John D 59'
Rossel, Mrs. Agda 54
Rossides, Zenon 59
Rowan, Carl T 74
Ru.sk, Secretary 51, 65-
Schurmann, C. W. A 56
Seydoux, Roger 53.
Silla, Albert 56
Slim, Taieb 54
Stevenson, Adlai E 48
tjstiin, Giindogdu 58
U Tin Maung 5a
WiUiams, G. Mennen 67
Zorin, Valerian A 50
II
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Documents on German Foreign Policy
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The Third Reich: First Phase
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HE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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'T^O^^ )A^C)
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1230
January 21, 1963
ROLE OF LAW IN POLITICAL ASPECTS OF WORLD
AFFAIRS • by Leonard C. Meeker 83
PRESIDENT KENNEDY ACCEPTS CUSTODY OF
FLAG OF CUBAN BRIGADE 88
NEW DIMENSIONS IN CULTURAL COMMUNICA-
TION • by Assistant Secretary Battle 92
U.N. ASKS CONCILIATION COMMISSION TO
CONTINUE EFFORTS WITH ARAB REFUGEES •
Statements by Carl T. Rowan and Text of Resolution ... 99
For index see inside back cover
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Vol. XLVIII, No. 1230 • Publication ?■
January 21, 1963
The Department of State BULLETIN i
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lected press releases on foreign policy,
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Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
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tion is included concerning treaties
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which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
Role of Law in Political Aspects of World Affairs
by Leonard C. Meeker
Deputy Legal Adviser ^
At the start of our discussion on the role of
law in the political aspects of world affairs I
should like to note two phenomena which
were not present on the world scene a hundred
years ago and were at most incipient possibili-
ties at the beginning of the 20th century.
One of these phenomena is a climate, atmos-
phere, or state of mind. There is abroad and
at work today a widely held idea that the na-
tions of this planet need to organize themselves
into a community able to formulate and operate
under laws consciously and deliberately arrived
at, a community in which collective decision-
making replaces the unilateral pursuit of na-
tional ambitions. This is a relatively new
attitude. It was not present in the 18th cen-
tury, and it did not mark the thinking of the
19th. It is an attitude powered by the shrink-
ing of the globe through scientific and techno-
logical developments. The attitude is enforced
on contemporary man by the facts of thermo-
nuclear weapons and the prospect of general
destruction if a major conflict breaks out.
The notion of world conmiunity under law
remains in the realm of the ideal — what men
would like to see, while they realize it does not
exist today. The notion is voiced in the state-
ments of government leaders. It runs through
the writings of legal scholars and political scien-
tists. It makes its appearance commonly
enough in the daily press of many countries.
The fact that the notion of world community
under law is not immediately translated into
effective action reflects the cultural lag between
^ Address made before the Association of American
Law Schools at Chicago, 111., on Dec. 29 (press release
748 dated Dec. 28).
ideas on the one hand and institutions and
events on the other.
The significance of law as an ideal for the
conduct of world affairs consists in this ideal
having become a part of the background and
matrix of thought from wliich the actions of
the future will emerge. This backgromid to-
day is a far cry from that of 1863. A hundred
years ago the world was conceived of as being
made up of states quite separately sovereign
and free to protect and advance their interests
by force if they chose. International law was
then thought of as a set of rules found in prec-
edents and authorities rather than as an or-
ganic process made to fulfill the requirements
of the time. While international law prescribed
certain rules and consequences if a state chose
the path of war, it did not impose real limita-
tions on this choice of policy or offer alterna-
tives to it.
There is another phenomenon of the current
scene which makes it impressively different
from the time of the American Civil War and
which demonstrates in dramatic fashion the
progress the world has made. That is the ex-
istence today of a whole panoply of interna-
tional political institutions in which states,
represented by their governments, are the
members.
There are worldwide institutions, of which
the United Nations is the foremost. There are
regional institutions, like the European com-
munities and the Organization of American
States. Mr. [Oscar] Schachter [Office of Legal
Affairs, United Nations] will be talking about
the role of international organizations ; so at this
stage I would express only one general thought
JANUARY 21, 19 63
83
about the phenomenon of international political
institutions. The existence of international in-
stitutions today, to which states bring their de-
mands and their problems, signifies the avail-
ability of a practical alternative to unilateral
action.
It is often pointed out that there is no world
legislature with general power to enact binding
laws, that there is no international executive to
execute the laws, and that there are neither
courts of general compulsory jurisdiction nor
police to enforce compliance. All this is true.
To deduce from this, however, that there is no
international legal order is to misunderstand
tlie international political institutions we have
and the roles fulfilled by them. They may not
look quite like the legislatures, executives, and
courts that are familiar on the national scene.
Yet these institutions perform similar tasks and
should be recognized as an ongoing develop-
ment of the greatest importance to law in the
modern world.
Scholars of the common law have made the
point that its early history was marked not by
the emergence of a highly developed body of
substantive law. Instead the growth was of
institutions and processes for dealing with con-
flicts and controversies. Increasing resort to
the procedures which were fashioned led, in
time, to the accretion of the substantive rules
which in the aggregate have made the common
law.
I wonder if there is not a similar growth un-
derway in world law. The fact that some of the
new international institutions — such as the
councils of ministers of the European commu-
nities and the General Assembly of the United
Nations — do not particularly resemble the
United States Congress, or a State legislature,
should not put us off. The first court of equity
must have seemed thoroughly strange and un-
predictable to the lawyers of early modem
times.
Today the public process of international in-
stitutions may appear to be predominantly
political in character. If and when it has be-
come more standardized and more predictable,
and as it is resorted to more consistently, it may
come to be more positively identified as a legal
process.
84
Practical Issues of International Politics
Suppose we look now at some of the practical
issues of international politics which have oc-
cupied the world stage in the last 15 years.
These have varied widely — in their nature, in
the pressures brought to bear by third parties |,
for a settlement without resort to force, and in
the steps actually taken and the outcome
reached. Yet there has, I think, been one per-
vading factor common to all the cases and sit-
uations: that is the background presence of
notions about legal rules and about the need to
have recourse to the procedures of pacific settle-
ment that were available. I am suggesting this
as the minimum role that law has played in the
disputes between nations.
Not infrequently law has played a larger
role. The examples which spring to mind most
readily are those where disputes were resolved
by international adjudication. Honduras and
Nicaragua did this with a Central American
bomidary dispute. Thailand and Cambodia
did so in order to resolve conflicting claims to
an area occupied by a temple. Unlike some of
the territorial claims cases which have been
decided by the International Court of Justice
since World War II, these disputes involved
substantial political stakes. Despite this, and
despite the strength of feeling in the countries
involved, the disputes were voluntarily sub-
mitted to the Court and the decisions of the
Court were accepted and given effect.
It sometimes comes as a surprise to domestic
lawyers that international adjudication can be
successful at all in the absence of either com-
pulsory jurisdiction or an ultimate sanction to
insure compliance. The absence of these does
limit the usefulness of international adjudica-
tion. That usefulness depends upon the value
of adjudication to the disputants in particular
cases as an acceptable alternative to imilateral
action.
If resort to international adjudication is one
way in which international law offers an ac-
ceptable alternative to unilateral action, it is by
no means the only way. Resort to the processes
and procedures of nonjudicial international in-
stitutions is another way.
In the last year a dispute between Indonesia
DEPAKTMBNT OF STATE BULLETIN
and the Netherlands over West New Guinea,
which threatened to erupt into large-scale vio-
lence between tlie two countries, has been
settled. The settlement was negotiated with
the assistance of the United Nations Secretary-
General and of a mediator named by him.
Moreover, the settlement is being effectuated
with the participation of United Nations
machineiy. This machinery takes the form of
a temporary United Nations administration of
West New Guinea and is providing the legal
means of transition from Dutch administration
to Indonesian administration.
Of course, there have been other cases where
DO settlement through recourse to law has been
ronched. For example, in the South Tyrol dis-
pute between Austria and Italy, proposals for
adjudication and for a negotiated settlement
liave not borne fruit. Still the irredentist
claims of Austria have not been prosecuted by
resort to force. Is it not likely that the pres-
ence of a background framework of legal rules
and procedures has operated as a restraint?
Even last year's annexation by India of the
Portuguese territories on the Indian subconti-
nent is not an uncomplicated instance of a
stronger military force overpowering a weaker
one. For years a dispute over the territories
had dragged on between India and Portugal.
One phase of it had been carried to the Court at
Tlie Hague and adjudicated. Only after 14
years, and when India perhaps felt protected by
the strong anticolonial tide signified by declara-
tory resolutions of the United Nations General
Assembly in 2 successive years, did India pro-
ceed with the invasion of Goa.
Disputes Involving Great Powers
I have spoken so far of disputes which were
largely of concern to middle and smaller
powers and which did not engage the great
powers in any important way. There has been
another series of political problems on the
world scene since World War II in which the
great powers have been deeply interested, al-
though they have not been the primary parties.
In the Middle East the Arab-Israeli war of 1948
was brought to an end on the call of the United
Nations Security Council and with the active
participation of United Nations mediators.
The resulting armistice arrangements, and the
machinery which they established for dealing
with complaints of violation, have formed a
legal system whicli has been generally success-
ful in keeping the peace of the area.
Both in the Suez crisis of 1956 and in the
Congo since 1960 the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
chose not to exert directly their power in pur-
suit of rival national objectives. Instead they
chose the path of the law and elected to let the
law take its course.
In the case of Suez this meant that both the
United States and the Soviet Union opposed
the Israeli, French, and British invasions of
Egypt as contrary to obligations under the
United Nations Charter, and they supported a
cease-fire and withdrawal of forces. This was
ultimately accomplished with the aid of the
parliamentary process of the United Nations
and with the aid of a United Nations Emer-
gency Force to be stationed in the Middle East
between the forces of Israel and Egypt.
In the Congo, general breakdown accom-
panied by serious disorders occurred in July
1960. The Security Council and the General
Assembly thereupon proceeded to legislate, in
effect, a series of international remedies over the
next 2 years. These have been applied under the
aegis of the United Nations and through the in-
strumentality of a very substantial United Na-
tions operation in the Congo. A new kind of
international law has been fashioned to deal
with this situation, replacing unilateral inter-
vention with collective action taken on the in-
vitation of the Government of the Republic of
the Congo.
Wlien, for various political reasons, it is
sometimes considered impractical to refer
troublesome situations to existing institutions,
ad hoc machinery can serve a similar function.
A case in point is Laos, which has been sorely
troubled since the summer of 1960. This situa-
tion has not been considered in depth through
the processes of the United Nations. However,
in 1961 and 1962 the U.S. and U.S.S.R. chose
not to continue, increase, and intensify their
respective national programs in Laos, which
were already in collision. They chose instead.
JANTJART 21, 1963
85
through the medium of a ll-nation conference
in Geneva and through protracted and com-
plicated negotiations in a number of world cap-
itals, to develop an agreed solution for the
future of Laos involving a coalition govern-
ment and neutralization of the country.^ We
have yet to see whether tliis settlement can be
made to work. It remains the policy of the
United States to see to it the obligations of the
Geneva accords on Laos are faithfully carried
out.
In all of these cases the international legal
order is effective when and because it offers an
acceptable alternative to unilateral action.
Specifically, it offers, in addition to impartial
procedures and objective criteria for settling
disputes, an institutional framework for nego-
tiations and a forum for registering the con-
sensus of other nations.
So far we have been talking about disputes
which either did not involve the great powers
at all, as with the border disputes, or involved
them only indirectly, as with the Congo and
Laos. The most prominent dispute involving
at least one of the great powers directly was
the Korean conflict of 1950 to 1953. A surprise
invasion by the Communist North Korean army
in the early morning of June 25, 1950, was
identified and reported to the United Nations
by the U.N. Commission on Korea. For the
first time large-scale military forces were mo-
bilized under a United Nations Command to
repel aggression. First the Security Council,
and later the General Assembly imder the
"Uniting for Peace" resolution, provided a
framework for collective response to armed
attack.
If there are fewer examples of international
law playing a prominent role in the solution of
problems involving a direct confrontation be-
tween the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., neither side
has regarded this law as irrelevant.
The first direct confrontation between the
United States and the Soviet Union since World
War II was caused by the Soviet blockade of
Berlin in 1948. Various factors — some practi-
cal, some political — were brought to bear in the
' For texts of a declaration on the neutrality of Lacs
and an accompanying protocol, see Botxetin of Aug.
13, 1962, p. 259.
86
search for a solution of that crisis. The air-
lift, successful even beyond expectation, surely
played its part. The debates in the Security
Council and tiie discussions held by the non-
permanent members of the Council also con-
tributed. In the spring of 1949, after patient
negotiations in New York conducted by Am-
bassador [Philip C] Jessup for the United
States, an agreement was reached lifting the
blockade and confirming the legal rights of
access to West Berlin.
In the last 4 years there has been another
confi'ontation over Berlin. In November 1958
the Soviet Government, in a note to the Ameri-
can Embassy in Moscow, informed the United
States that the U.S.S.R. regarded as null and
void the Four Power agreements on Germany
and on Berlin.^ The Soviet note referred to the
Western presence as "the illegal occupation of
West Berlin."
The note was delivered on November 27, 1958.
On Decemlier 19 the United States Department
of State circulated vei"y widely to a number of
governments a detailed statement of its legal
position on Berlin.^ That statement set forth
energetically the case sustaining our right to be
in Berlin. By the time of the foreign min-
isters meeting in May and June 1959, Mr.
[Andrei A.] Gromyko had substantially altered
the Soviet position. On June 2 he said :
The representatives of the Western Powers fre-
quently interpret the Soviet Government's proposal to
give West Berlin the status of a Free City as meaning
that the Soviet Union does not take into consideration
the rights of the United States of America, Britain and
France which derive from the fact of the capitulation
of Hitler's Germany. But this is an incorrect inter-
pretation. We do not think that the American, British
and French troops vpere in Berlin in any sense
unlawfully.
And on June 19 Chairman Khrushchev had the
following to say in a speech given in Moscow :
What right have the Western Powers to keep their |
occupation troops in West Berlin, to maintain an occu-
pation regime there? This right of the three Western
Powers stems from the capitulation of Hitlerite Ger-
many in the last war and is founded on appropriate
" For texts of the Soviet note of Nov. 27 and a U.S.
note of Dec. 31, 1958, in reply, see ihid., Jan. 19, 19.^0,
p. 79.
'For text of a memorandum, see ihid., Jan. 5, 19.'>9,J1
p. 5.
'.W
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
.icmuents drawn up during the war aud signed after
he war. And we not only recognize these rights of the
ictorious powers but we ourselves have taken advan-
;iso of them.
It was not necessary for the U.S.S.K. to
liange its position so completely on the ques-
ion of legal rights with respect to Berlin. If
he Soviets had merely chosen to exhibit an atti-
ude of greater accommodation in the spring of
959, they could have done so in a political con-
est and without altering their legal position,
t is interesting that the Soviet Union consid-
red it appropriate, on reflection and reconsid-
ration, to revise its legal position so strikingly.
t is certainly apparent that both the United
States and Soviet Governments gave much at-
ention to the question of legal basis for their
espective positions. Here it might be added,
s a footnote, that in July 1961 President Ken-
edy proposed that the question of legal rights
1 Berlin be submitted to the International
'ourt of Justice for adjudication.'*
In October of this year the United States
nd the Soviet Union were engaged in another
onfrontation, over the stationing of offensive
weapons systems in Cuba, which is still fresh
ti the minds of all of us. It was an important
oncern of the United States that our action in
he face of the secret Soviet missile buildup in
]uba should have a sound legal basis. If it did,
nd if the Soviets and the rest of the world
ecognized tliis, the risk of an outbreak of
rmed conflict would be minimized.
The quarantine interdictuag the buildup of
ffensive weapons in Cuba was developed as a
leasure which would be lawful for the United
States to take.° It rested on the following
)oints :
1. The Organ of Consultation under the In-
er-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
the Rio Treaty)^ coidd recommend, under ar-
icles 6 and 8 of the treaty, the use of armed
orce to deal with a situation endangering the
)eace of the hemisphere. Although the Castro
egime had been excluded from participation in
° For text of President Kennedy's report to the Na-
ion on the Berlin crisis, see ibid., Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.
^ ' For text of the proclamation, see ibid., Nov. 12,
962, p. 717.
' For text, see ibid., Sept. 21, 1947, p. 565.
the organs of the inter- American system, Cuba
neither denounced nor withdrew from the Rio
Treaty. On October 23 the Organ of Consulta-
tion in fact recommended the taking of all nec-
essary measures, including the use of armed
force, to deal with the offensive missiles in
Cuba.«
2. Since the defensive quarantine was au-
thorized by a regional organization qualifying
under chapter VIII of the United Nations
Charter, it did not contravene the restraints on
threat or use of force contained in paragraph
4, article 2, of the United Nations Charter. The
quarantine, though involving ultimately a re-
sort to force if siich should be necessai-y to stop
ships that might be carrying offensive weapons,
was a limited measure, carefully proportioned
to the needs of the situation. Moreover, the
United States affirmatively sought a Security
Council debate on the grave threat to peace
which we considered the U.S.S.R. had posed in
Cuba.
It should be noted here that the legal ra-
tionale in support of the defensive quarantine
was not devised after the f act.^ The planning
for United States action, when construction of
the Soviet missile bases in Cuba had been dis-
covered, was conducted with continuing refer-
ence to the legal position and rights of the
United States and to the view which the world
would take of our action. The course followed
and the sequence of actions taken were framed
in relation to just these considerations.
There was political risk in seeking an au-
thorization from the Organ of Consultation un-
der the Rio Treaty. There was also risk that
the membership of the United Nations Security
Council or General Assembly would appraise
our position and rights differently from our
view of them. In fact the American action
drew wide support from the world commimity.
The U.S.S.R. decided at the end of October
to withdraw the offensive weapons from Cuba.
That it did so, I believe, was not unconnected
with the unanimous vote given by the Organ of
" For text of a resolution, see ibid., Nov. 12, 1962, p.
722.
" For an address by Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser,
on the legal case for U.S. action on Cuba, see ibid.,
Nov. 19, 1962, p. 763.
87
Consultation under the Eio Treaty. The Soviet
action was also taken in the light of a clear un-
derstanding of the wide support which the
United States had for its action.
Some Tentative Conclusions
In looking back over the events of the last
15 years, some very tentative conclusions
emerge.
For example, we notice at once an effort on
the part of states to establish positions with
reference to international law whenever they
become involved in disputes or situations in-
volving significant national interests. They
may do so both in order to acquire some de-
fensive protection against adversary claims and
in order to forward and advance their own
political case. Such conduct on the part of
governments attributes some degree of efficacy
to international law.
We have also seen that incipient legal proc-
esses, in the form of international institutions,
can serve as a catalyst in arriving at settlements
of international differences when there is a
disposition on the part of governments to settle,
or when there is at least not a firm policy to
refuse settlement. And we have seen how inter-
national institutions — in the form of a United
Nations force or presence or an international
control commission — can be instrumental in op-
erating the provisions of a settlement.
Finally, I would suggest that considerations
of international law play a role in decisions by
governments on their policy. Particularly if
the power factors of a given situation — eco-
nomic, political, and military power — are at all
closely balanced, governments find it necessary
to give added weight to intangibles, such as
considerations of international law. Indeed
such intangibles may assume a very pragmatic
importance. Many if not most governments,
including those of the great powers, exercise
care not to resort to force in delicately balanced
international situations if such resort would be
contrary to generally understood notions of
international law.
The role of law in political aspects of inter-
national relations is clearly subject to fluctua-
tions of time, place, and circumstance. Equally
clearly, it seems to me, world law has grown
in the past 20 years. That law must continue
to grow in the use made of its processes; its
rules must become more definite and certain in
common understanding; and law must have in-
creasing influence on the actions of governments
if the 20th-century world is to negotiate suc-
cessfully the perils of the thermonuclear age.
President Kennedy Accepts Custody
of Flag of Cuban Brigade
Following are remarks noade by President
Kennedy and Mrs. Kennedy in the Orange Bowl
at Miami, Fla., on December 29 before the
2506tli Cuban Invasion Brigade during cere-
monies making the United States custodian
of the brigade^s flag. Mrs. Kennedy spoke in
Spanish.
White House press release (Miami, Fla.) dated December 29
PRESIDENT KENNEDY
I want to express my great appreciation to the
brigade for making the United States the cus-
todian of this flag. I can assure you that this
flag will be returned to this brigade in a free
Habana.
I wonder if Seiior [Secundo] Miranda,
who preserved this flag through the last 20
months, would come forward so we can meet
him. I wanted to know whom I should give it
back to.
I always had the impression — I hope the mem-
bers of the brigade will sit down again — I al-
ways had the impression that the brigade was
made up of mostly young men, but standing over
there is a Cuban patriot 57, one 59, one 61. I
wonder if those three could stand so that the
people of the United States could realize that
they represent the spirit of the Cuban revolution
in its best sense.
All of you members of the brigade, and mem-
bers of their families, are following an historic
road, one which has been followed by other
Cubans in other days and, indeed, by other pa-
triots of our hemisphere in other years — Juarez,
San Martin, Bolivar, O'Higgins — all of whom
fought for liberty, many of whom were de-
feated, many of whom went in exile, and all of
whom came home.
88
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Seventy years ago Jose Marti, the guiding
spirit of the first Cuban struggle for inde-
pendence, lived on these shores. At that time
in 1889 the first international American confer-
ence was held, and Cuba was not present. Then,
as now, Cuba was the only state in the hemi-
sphere still controlled by a foreign monarch.
Then, as now, Cuba was excluded from the so-
ciety of free nations. And then, as now, brave
men in Florida and New York dedicated their
lives and their energies to the freedom of their
homeland.
The brigade comes from behind prison walls,
but you leave behind you more than 6 million of
our fellow countrymen who are also in a very
real sense in prison, for Cuba is today, as Marti
described it many years ago, as beautiful as
Greece and stretched out in chains — a prison
moated by water.
On behalf of my Government and my coun-
try I welcome you to the United States. I bring
you my nation's respect for your courage and
for your cause. Our primary gratitude for your
liberation must go to the heroic efforts of the
Cuban Families Committee, Mr. [Alvaro] San-
chez and others, and their able and skilled nego-
tiator, Mr. James Donovan, and those many
private American citizens who gave so richly of
their time and their energies in order to save
free men of Cuba from Castro's dungeons and
to reunite you with your families and friends.
Their efforts had a significance beyond the
important desire to salvage individual human
beings. For your small brigade is a tangible
reaffirmation that the human desire for freedom
and independence is essentially unconquerable.
Your conduct and valor are proof that, al-
though Castro and his fellow dictators may rule
nations, they do not rule people ; that they may
imprison bodies, but they do not imprison spir-
its; that they may destroy the exercise of lib-
erty, but they cannot eliminate the determina-
tion to be free. And by helping to free you
the United States has been given the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate once again that all men
wlio fight for freedom are our brothers and
sliall be until your country and others are free.
The Cuban people were promised by the rev-
olution political liberty, social justice, intellec-
tual freedom, land for the campesinos, and an
end to economic exploitation. They have re-
ceived a police state, the elimination of the
dignity of land ownership, the destruction of
free speech and of free press, and the complete
subjugation of individual human welfare to the
service of the state and of foreign states.
Under the Alianza para el Progreso we sup-
port for Cuba and for all the countries of this
hemisphere the right of free elections and the
free exercise of basic human freedoms. We sup-
port land reform and the right of every campe-
sino to own the land he tills. We support the
effort of every free nation to pursue programs
of economic progress. We support the right
of every free people to freely transform the
economic and political institutions of society so
that they may serve the welfare of all.
These are the principles of the Alianza para
el Progreso. They are the principles we sup-
port for Cuba. These are the principles for
which men have died and fought, and they are
the principles for which you fought and for
which some died in your brigade. And I be-
lieve these are the principles of the great ma-
jority of the Cuban people today, and I am con-
fident that all over the island of Cuba, in the
government itself, in the army, and in the mi-
litia, there are many who hold to this freedom
faith, who have viewed with dismay the de-
struction of freedom on their island and who
are determined to restore that freedom so that
the Cuban people may once more govern them-
selves.
I know that exile is a difficult life for any
free man. But I am confident that you recog-
nize that you hold a position of responsibility
to the day when Cuba is once again free. To
this end it is important that you submerge mon-
etary differences in a common united front;
that the brigade — those who serve in the bri-
gade— will work together to keep alive the
spirit of the brigade so that some day the peo-
ple of Cuba will have a free chance to make a
free choice. So I think it incumbent upon all
of you who are here today to work together, to
submerge those differences which now may dis-
turb you, to the united end that Cuba is free,
and then make a free choice as to what kind of
a government and what kind of a country you
freely wish to build.
JAirUART 21, 1963
The brigade is the point of the spear, the ar-
row's head. I hope they and the members of
their families will take every opportunity to
educate your children, yourselves, in the many
skills and disciplines which will be necessary
when Cuba is once more free.
Finally, I can offer no better advice than
that given by Jose, Marti to his fellow exiles in
1895, when the hour of Cuban independence
was then at hand. "Let the tenor of our words
be," Marti said, "especially in public mattere,
not the useless clamor of fear's vengeance which
does not enter our hearts, but the honest weari-
ness of an oppressed people who hope through
their emancipation from a government con-
victed of uselessness and malevolence, for a gov-
ernment of their own which is capable and
worthy. Let them see in us," Marti said, "con-
structive Americans and not empty bitterness."
Gentlemen of the brigade, I need not tell you
how happy I am to welcome you here to the
United States and what a profound impression
your conduct during some of the most difficult
"days and montlis that any free people have ex-
perienced—what a profound impression your
conduct made upon not only the people of this
country but all the people of this hemisphere.
Even in prison you served in the strongest pos-
sible way the cause of freedom, as you do today.
I can assure you that it is the strongest wish
of the people of this country, as well as the peo-
ple of this hemisphere, that Cuba shall one day
be free again, and when it is, this brigade will
deserve to march at the head of the free column.
MRS. KENNEDY
It is an honor for me to be today with a group
of the bravest men in the world and to share
in the joy that is felt by their families, who, for
so long, lived hoping, praying, and waiting.
I feel proud that my son has known the offi-
cers. He is still too young to realize what has
happened here, but I will make it my business to
tell him the story of your courage as he grows
up. It is my wish and my hope that some day
he may be a man at least half as brave as the
members of Brigade 2506. Good luck.
Policy Announced on Length
of State and Official Visits
Press release 1 dated January 2
The Department of State, consistent with
President Kennedy's desire to continue to see
and talk to as many world figures as his heavy
schedule in 1963 permits, annoimced on January
2 that effective January 1, 1963, future state
and official visits may last up to 10 days— 2 days
at Wasliington, D.C., and up to 8 days elsewhere
in the United States.
The Department of State will continue to an-
nounce itineraries in the scheduling of the of-
ficial state and Presidential guest visits as th(
scheduling of visits becomes firm.
U.S. Urges Disengagement of Foreigr
Forces in Yemen Conflict
Department Statement ^
The Department has been informed that ii
pursuit of operations in the north of Yemen, oi
behalf of the Yemen Arab Republic, aircraf
operated by pilots of the United Arab Republic
bombed and strafed the Oasis of Najran, ii
Saudi Arabia, between December 30 and Janu
ary 1.
In deploring these incidents, which threatei
to expand the Yemen conflict, the United State
Government has expressed its concern to th
Government of the United Arab Republic. Th
United Arab Republic has given its assurance
that it does not order incursions across the Yem
en border and that it will do its best to avoic
a repetition of these attacks across the border.
The United States enjoys cordial and clos
relations with the Government of Saudi Arabi:
and has made known its interest in the preser
vation of its integrity, as well as that of othe
states of the area.
In noting these incidents and other measure'
^Read by Lincoln WTiite, Director of the Office o
News, to news correspondents on Jan. 3. For a Dc
partment statement of Dec. 19 announcing U.S. recog
nitlon of the Yemen Government, see Bui-letin of Jai
7, 1963, p. 11.
90
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIS
representing external support for military ac-
tion within Yemen, the United States, as an
impartial friend of all governments involved,
remains convinced that the best interests of the
Yemeni people will be served by disengagement
Df foi-eign military forces and termination of
bhis external intervention.
United States Calls for Prompt Congo
Reunification Under U.N. Plan
T>, partinent Statement
Press release 2 dated January 4
As a result of hostilities which broke out on
December 26 on the initiative of the Katangan
cjendarmerie, the United Nations forces in the
Ivatanga now occupy most key populated areas
ind mining centers.
As the Secretary-General [U Tliant] stated
jDn December 31, however, the United Nations
'is seeking no victory and no surrender in Ka-
'tanga, for the United Nations is not waging
war against anyone in that Province," and the
lU.N. does not intend to use its force for po-
llitical ends nor intervene in the political affairs
of the Province of Katanga or any other Prov-
ince. At the same time, the Secretary-General
treaffirmed that the Central Government of the
Congo, itself a member of the United Nations,
is the only legitimate government of the Con-
go and the United Nations therefore would not
recognize any claims to secession or deal with
Katanga except as a Province of the Congo.
On January 1, in a speech. Prime Minister
[Cyrille] Adoula reaffirmed the amnesty de-
clared by President [Joseph] Kasavubu and as-
sured the people of Katanga that reintegration
of South Katanga will mean full enjoyment of
civil rights throughout the Congolese Republic.
The United States reaffii-ms its support for
the policies enunciated in the Secretary-
General's reconciliation plan,^ his public state-
ment of December 31, and Prime Minister
Adoula's speech of January 1. We understand
the object of the U.N. to be a peaceful Katanga,
reintegrated into the Congolese state and econ-
omy. There is no desire to deny Mr. Tshombe
[iloise Tshombe, President of Katanga Prov-
ince] a place in the future political life of the
Congo, but this will depend on the Congolese
people and on Mr. Tshombe himself. There lies
on Mr. Tshombe at this moment a heavy re-
sponsibility not to persist in actions which he
has threatened — a scorched earth and a fight to
the finish which would result in disruption of
economic life and the sowing of seeds of bitter-
ness which would make extremely difficult the
peaceful reintegration of the Katanga into the
Congo, which he himself has accepted. Mr.
Tshombe should act at this vital moment in the
interests of all of the Congolese people.
We expect Mr. Tshombe to end promptly the
Katanga secession by recognizing the U.N.'s
full freedom of movement throughout the Ka-
tanga, advising foreign mercenaries to disband
and leave the country, and by exerting his in-
fluence with Katangese military personnel and
the civilian population to prevent sabotage and
damage to important installations and property
and cooperating in maintaining law and order.
Mr. Tshombe should also make himself avail-
able hnmediately to cooperate with the U.N. in
the above measures and to put into effect other
practical arrangements required to carry out
swiftly the clear provisions of the U Thant
plan.
This is the road to peaceful reintegration of
the Katanga. Tlais is the road not of destruc-
tion but of constructive building of a new and
more vigorous Congolese nation.
'U.N. doc. S/5053/Add. 13 (annex I) and Corr. 1.
JANUARY 21, 19C3
91
New Dimensions in Cultural Communication
hy Lucius D. Battle
Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Afairs ^
It would be difficult to place alongside each
other two words that have more vague and
varied meanings, to most people, than the last
two words in the title I have given to these
remarks. The words are "cultural" and
"conununication."
This is not the place — or at any rate I am
not the "professor" — for a seminar in semantics.
But I cannot let this opportunity pass without
pointing out the problems of nomenclature —
of language — with which we must contend.
The phrase "educational and cultural affairs"
is clearly a case in point. The actual activities
covered by this phrase are concrete and specific.
But this phrase itself and others like it —
"cross-cultural relations," "cultural inter-
change," and the like — are imprecise and there-
fore largely meaningless to many people.
I relate this to you partly in the hope that
among you may be a phrasemaker who can help
us with this problem. Because it is a problem —
especially with groups less favorably oriented
toward our activities than yours is — to discuss
this field in terms that have hardness and real-
ity. (Any interested phrasemakers are invited
to step forward after the session or by letter;
their suggestions will be most welcome.)
"Cultural" and "communication" are, how-
ever, well-established prestige woi'ds, in easy
and frequent and common use. We hear much
of "cultural centers," of the "cultural explo-
sion"— or the "cultural epidemic" as it is now,
happily, becoming — and of the "communica-
' Address made before the Modern Language Associ-
ation of America at Washington, D.C., on Dec. 29
(press release 749).
tions revolution." We all know what the terms
mean, we think. But do we?
Can we really grasp the degree of change
that the "communications revolution" repre-
sents unless we occasionally update our frame
of comparison? Can we really know the fidl
meaning of "cultural exchanges" today unless
we see them in their full scope and impact, and
against the background of their beginning, on
any extensive basis, only a few short years ago?
Or do we continue to use such phrases glibly,
without thinking of the changing content that
lies behind them ?
Perhaps it would be useful, therefore, to focus
anew on the underlying realities behind such
phrases, which may be worn thin by overuse or
overextension, or because we have lost a sense
of their historical development. This exercise,
which I would like to try out briefly with you
here, can also have meaning for us in terms of
our present opportunities and what we decide
we can do about them.
A Frame of Comparison
Let's begin by setting up, in terms of the
"communications revolution," a present-day
frame of comparison centering about a great
historical event: tlie discovery of America by
Christopher Columbus, now being reenacted in
the Bahamas by a reproduction of the original
Nina. In Admiral of the Ocean Sea, Samuel
Eliot Morison tells how slowly the news of the
successful voyage seeped through Europe.
Five months after Nina I had weathered a
stormy return crossing and put in safely at
Lisbon the news had apparently not yet reached
92
DEPARTKENT OF STATE BULLETIN
lorthern Europe. For the great Nuremberg
'Jhronlde was printed on July 21, 1493, without
my mention of the discovery of America. And
S'uremberg was the center of geographical stud-
es in northern Europe.
"What would happen today if an event in
Surope comparable to the Nina's return, with
Jolumbus in command, were to take place?
\ Telstar could be there, Eurovision could be
here, and, by various means, other television
ystems in other countries and continents. All
he apparatus of print, film, radio, and tele-
nsion could be there. You could be there.
The world could be there — for instant, immedi-
ite, simultaneous confrontation of the great
vent as it unfolded.
A "communications revolution"? In today's
erms, this is understatement.
Do we likewise use "cultural" too glibly,
vithout fully realizing the increasingly solid
ontent that lies behind this word ? There are
. iiany ways to indicate this changing content,
nd we must of course turn to varieties of evi-
lence rather than to any single citation.
"We can shorten our frame for comparison if
re think of cultural communication only in
erms of the organized effort our Government
Las made. This short span alone affords dra-
matic comparison. Our effort is only a relatively
ew years old; next year, as a matter of fact,
rill be the 25th anniversary of the founding,
ust prior to "World War II, of a Division of
Cultural Relations in the Department of State.
In such a short time the evidences are
mpressive that cultural relations have taken on
lew reality and importance. Last month
'resident Kennedy said, on behalf of the pro-
)0sed National Cultural Center in "Washington :
Behind the storm of daily conflict and crisis, the
ramatic confrontations, the tumult of political
- truggle, the poet, the artist, the musician, continues
he quiet work of centuries, building bridges of ex-
lerience between peoples, reminding man of the univer-
■ ality of his feelings and desires and despairs, and
eminding him that the forces that unite are deeper
ban those that divide.
In the early fall Secretary Rusk told a Senate
:ommittee that educational and cultural ex-
hange is "one of our important and powerful
ools in the conduct of foreign relations in
today's world of revolution and change." And
he added :
It is through this program, as perhaps in no other
way, that we can take a certain leadership in the
change that is taking place in the world.
Tills fall, for the first time, "Cultural Affairs
and Foreign Relations" became a subject for
discussion by the American Assembly of Colum-
bia University meeting at Arden House and
later through regional sessions in various parts
of the country.
At the end of November the United States
and the Federal Republic of Germany, observ-
ing the 10th anniversary of the Fulbright
Agreement between them, signed a new agree-
ment which utilizes a significant new authoriza-
tion provided by the Fulbright -Hays Act of
1961.^ This authorization permits joint financ-
ing of exchanges, and the Federal Republic of
Germany became the first nation to commit
itself to a share of the cost. "Were the ex-
changes without substance and reality to the
Federal Republic of Germany, it is doubtful
that it would have agreed to provide $4 million
in deutsche marks from 1964 to 1969 to continue
this program.
These, then, are some representative evidences
of the solid place educational and cultural ex-
change has made for itself in a relatively short
time-frame — evidences that these activities are
more than good things to do in today's world
but are now seen as necessary things to do. By
updating our frame of comparison on exchanges
we see more clearly how far we have come and,
I hope, what we should do now, with advanced
knowledge and skiUs, to meet the opportunities
of today and tomorrow.
Basic Conditions for Period of Enlightenment
It may be instructive to take one more look
to the past and again to the time of Columbus.
This is to see basic conditions that gave rise to
the great period of enlightenment then emerg-
ing. For one, a great communications revolu-
tion— the invention and spread of printing
from movable type — was underway.
' For background, see Buixetin of Dec. 17, 1962, p.
923.
lANUARY 21, 1963
93
But the communications revolution of the
15th century was a slow affair by today's
standards. A specimen still preserved came
from the city of Mainz before 1450, from Guten-
berg soon after. By 1465 the press had reached
Italy, by 1470 Paris; then London by 1480,
Lisbon by 1490, Spain by 1499. By 1500 there
were at least 9 million books in Europe and
some 30,000 titles. There were perhaps a thou-
sand printers.
I cite these numbers to show a basic condition
for the spread of knowledge and beliefs : the
availability of mass commmiication.
"The consequences for intellectual life were
momentous," Jolin Herman Randall, Jr., wrote
in The Making of the Modern Mind. He
continued :
. . . the circle of the educated, formerly confined
largely to the clergy, broadened immeasurably ; that
rapid spread of knowledge and beliefs we call a period
of enlightenment was made possible.
The period of enlightenment was made pos-
sible too, of course, by other conditions that
made men ready to seek new knowledge, new
bases of belief, new social institutions. It was
on such f ovindations that the whole cultural and
intellectual revolution known as the Renaissance
came into being.
I do not want to try to strain the parallelism,
but there are several similarities in that time
and ours. In both periods we see enthusiastic
and vigorous activity along literary, artistic, and
cultural lines, an increasing pursuit of learn-
ing, and an imaginative response to broader
horizons generally. We in our time can cite as
specific evidences, at least in large parts of the
world, the newly born hunger for knowledge
of so many millions and the urgent desire among
so many new nations for "development."
Let me mention just a few more specifics : more
foreign students seeking higher education ; more
nations participating, through multilateral
organizations such as UNESCO [United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization] and OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development], in
efforts to assist "hirnian resource development"
in their own and other nations ; more recogni-
tion in our Government of the role of educa-
94
tional and cultural exchanges in foreign rela-
tions; more colleges and universities offering
courses related to world affairs, including for-
eign language and area study centers; more
business firms supporting overseas educational
efforts relating to their overseas operations;
more students and teachers going out to other
countries, via the Peace Corps and other pro-
grams, to help develop greater educational op-
portunities ; more realization that the arts speak
across national lines and across the gulfs that
separate political systems — in brief, more recog-
nition that a worldwide "common market" of
knowledge, ideas, aspirations, and beliefs does
exist and is expanding.
And, as we need hardly emphasize, we have
new extensions of communications techniques,
all the way from learning equipment for the
classroom to satellites sending back their sig-
nals from outer space. Today's communica-
tions techniques are far beyond anything con-
ceived even a few short years ago.
So the two great preconditions for a period oft
enlightenment — desire to know and the means
to know — come together in our time. They can]
lead now to a new period of cultural and intel-
lectual advance, just as parallel conditions did
by the 16th century, if we meet our opportu-
nities as fully as we can and should.
American Books Abroad
Wliat are some of the ways in which we are
trying, through the office I represent and
through other governmental and nongovern-
mental offices, to meet these opportunities?
One prime field of opportunity is books.
Once again we are at a jjoint in time when
books can play a crucial role in the enlighten-
ment of men's minds. We have the opportunity
to make the heritage and insights of the past, as
contained in American books, more widely avail-
able throughout the world.
I have made the subject of American books
abroad one of my first concerns since taking
office last June. The needs and opportunitiesi
have been well pointed out to us by surveys'
and studies, including one reported by Dan
Lacy of the American Book Publishers Council
more than a year ago and, within the year, one
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
)n "Books in Latin America" and one on "Books
for Ghana and Nigeria" by American pub-
isliers wlio visited those areas.
An address by Attorney General Robert
[vonnedy last June before the American Book-
;ellers Association significantly supplemented
lieso basic background papers. The Attorney
xeneral reported his observations of book-
ielline abroad. His recommendation was that
•a committee of leaders of the book industry
n this country be formed to consider how we
■an get more and better American books read by
nore people — particularly students — in the un-
■ommitted nations of the world." The Attor-
ley General spoke of American books as reflect-
ng "our conunon heritage with many other
lations and their influence upon our culture."
The influences of books are endless, he said;
>ooks can be good ambassadors for us.
Secretary of State Rusk has now appointed
iuch an advisory committee.^ It is called the
Government Advisory Committee on Interna-
ional Book Programs and chaired by Curtis G.
Benjamin, chairman of the board of McGraw-
HiW Book Company. Twelve members repre-
sent the book publishing field; in addition Dr.
Leona Baumgartner, Assistant Administrator
for Human Resources and Social Development
)f the Agency for International Development ;
Donald M. Wilson, Deputy Director, U.S. In-
formation Agency ; and I serve as Government
•epresentatives. The committee is meeting
ipproximately monthly. Three ad hoc panels
lave been appointed: on Latin America; on
nedical, scientific, and engineering books ; and
Dn investment guarantees and credit insurance.
The committee has passed a resolution, which
:ias been distributed to the book industry, rec-
Dmmending a formula for the sale to USIA or
Dther Government agencies of Spanish and
Portuguese translation rights for Latin Amer-
ica. It has also passed a resolution recom-
mending to the Secretary of State that every
effort be made by the Department to push
implementing legislation for the Florence
Agreement so that such legislation might be
passed during the next session of Congress.
•/6i(f., Oct. 29, 1962, p. 666.
The Florence Agreement, in effect in 39
countries, provides for the exemption from
customs duties of books and other educational,
scientific, and cultural materials.
We now have in this committee a powerful
mechanism for helping to relate the resources
and enterprise of private publishers to business
opportunities abroad and, at the same time, to
the Nation's needs. The Executive order imple-
menting the Fulbright-Hays Act ^ lays on my
office, by delegation from the Secretary of
State, the responsibility for "policy guidance"
to the various agencies of the Government con-
cerned with international educational and cul-
tural affairs. I intend to encourage in evei-y
way possible the fullest cooperation of Govern-
ment agencies in this book program. We want
to see American books, both in English and in
translation, realize their great inherent capa-
bility as ambassadors for us. To do this we
must help find ways to widen markets abroad.
There are real problems — the relation of wider
markets to lower costs, for example — which
will tax the ingenuity of even the excellent
advisory committee we have. But I am confi-
dent this dimension of cultural communication
can, and will, be more fully developed.
English-Language Program
Another dimension of cultural communica-
tion is, of course, English as a second language —
as a foreign language in other countries of the
world. English, as we all know, is now the
most sought-after language in the world. I say
this without a trace of chauvinism but merely as
a matter of simple fact. Even meetings of na-
tions whose national language is not English,
such as the Bandung Conference of 1955, are
almost always carried on in the English lan-
guage.
The desire to learn English is worldwide; it
is a demand we are not, however, organized to
meet at all adequately. Cultural cooperation as
well as national self-interest both dictate that
we make the greater effort now required.
This effort, both public and private, must be
further clarified and strengthened if overall
'For text of Executive Order 11034 (27 Fed. Reg.
6071), see ibid., July 23, 1962, p. 138.
JANUARY 21, 1963
95
U.S. Government objectives, as well as specific
agency objectives, are to be attained. Earlier
this month we asked our diplomatic posts for
their views on how to obtain a better integrated
U.S. Government effort in each individual
country. The responses, which are due by Jan-
uary 15, are to be the basis for a broad statement
of the national interest and effort in this field.
In the private sector significant steps are be-
ing taken too. Let me refer briefly to one of
these. Just a few days ago the Ford Founda-
tion announced a grant of $470,000 over a 7-
year period to Cornell University to expand its
English-teaching program. This will give
Cornell greatly strengthened resources for
training both Americans and foreign nationals
in the teaching of English as a second language.
Michigan, Georgetown, and other institutions
have, like Cornell, shown a keen awareness of
needs in this field and have developed strong
programs. We will hope that the grant to Cor-
nell will give new impetus to collaborative
efforts by foundations and universities. Gov-
ernment cannot greatly expand its present
English-language activities unless there is sub-
stantial increase in the number of xVmericans
who are trained in this field and who are, in
turn, able to train foreign teachers of English
both here and abroad.
We are favored by fortune in having a lan-
guage so many people want to learn. But we
can enhance the favors of fortune by well-
directed and well-applied efforts.
Your own association's Center for Applied
Linguistics, here in Washington, represents
such an effort. In the months I have been As-
sistant Secretary I have become familiar with
the constructive role the center is playing and
can play in this field. I am thinking of the
availability of advice and information from
which Government officers administering pro-
grams of English-language teacMng can and do
benefit; of the sponsorship of special studies;
and of the leadership in organizing conferences
and meetings, both national and international,
of direct interest to Government as well as to the
academic community. Of special promise has
been the creation of the National Advisory
Council on the Teaching of English as a For-
eign Language, to bring the Government and
the academic community into a closer working
relationship.
I would like to have you know of our most
sincere gratitude for— and our great dependence
on— the center which MLA, with Ford Foun-
dation help, has brought into being. The center
is a bulwark of our effort to achieve greater
cultural communication through English as a
second language.
Cultural Presentations
Another means of closer cultural communi-
cation in which we put great hope is cultural
presentations, the sending to other countries of
representative examples of America's perform-
ing arts. By our definition this covers a broad
bracket of activities, including music, drama, the
dance, and sports.
This program was begun under the Depart-
ment's auspices in 1954 and has many major suc-
cesses to its credit. At the same time it has en-
countered troublesome obstacles which have
prevented us, I believe, from realizing the maxi-
mum benefits to be had from this effort.
Accordingly, last September I asked the new
U.S. Advisory Commission on International
Educational and Cultural Affairs, headed by
John W. Gardner of the Carnegie Corporation,
of New York, to make a survey of the programi
and recommendations for its improvement. Thei
survey was conducted by Roy E. Larsen, chair-
man of the executive committee of Time, Inc.,,
and vice chairman of the commission, and by ai
veteran Foreign Service officer, Glenn G. Wolfe.
Just before Christmas the commission report-
ed on the survey ° and made a number of recom-
mendations which will, I think, be extremely
beneficial to the future of this activity. The
commission put special emphasis on three funda-
mental approaches as being essential to the full
success of the program. They are :
1. Artistic excellence should be the preemi-
nent criterion of the performing arts program.
2. Amateurs, as well as professionals, should
have broad opportunities in this program.
3. Appreciation of America's cultural devel-
opment can be significantly enhanced by both
professionals and amateurs through participa-
'/fiirf., Jan. 14, 19C3, p. 40.
96
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN
I
tion in clinics, student workshops, and other
aonper forming activities.
Among the report's recommendations is that
ong-range planning be made a formal policy
and practice. As one feature of long-range
planning, the report suggested that consider-
aUon be given to selection of amateur groups by
a system of competitions.
The overall purpose of the program, as de-
fined by the commission, is "to reflect abroad the
state of the performing arts in America, both
in terms of creative cultural vitality and of the
desire and capacity of a free people to support
the development of a flourishing national cul-
:ure. A nation can disclose," the report con-
tinued, "important aspects of its total character
through the manner in which it seeks to develop
the highest peaceful arts."
The report gives special emphasis to the desir-
ability of reaching university and other young
audiences abroad and of doing so in part
through the greater use of our own college stu-
dents and young professionals who are most
talented in the fields of the arts. "The sharing
of discovery and enthusiasm by youth can,"
the report said, "do much 'to provide inter-
national cooperation . . . for cultural advance-
ment'."
This report has greatly heightened our hopes
that cultural presentations can be an increas-
ingly effective form of communication and
has provided valuable guidelines for this
development.
The rise of multilateral organizations is
another relatively new means of encouraging
cultural communication. UNESCO, the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, and the Organization of Ameri-
can States are only some of the international
organizations which, by meetings and other
program activities, are helping to form closer
educational and cultural ties. I recently at-
tended for a period of 3 weeks the UNESCO
General Conference in Paris.^ The reality of
direct communication on cultural matters, by
politically friendly and unfriendly nations
' For text of an address made by Mr. Battle at the
UNESCO meeting on Nov. 13, see ibid., Dec. 17, 1962,
p. 93.5.
alike, was made abundantly clear to me there.
(Parenthetically, let me acknowledge here the
strong support the Modern Language Associa-
tion of America has given to the work of the
U.S. National Commission for UNESCO in the
language field.)
The bilateral conference can be a productive
form of cultural communication too. Last
January in Tokyo Americans and Japanese sat
down together at the first U.S.-Japan Confer-
ence on Cultui-al and Educational Interchange.'
The American delegation included Aaron
Copland, Kobert Penn Warren, Arthur Schles-
inger, Jr. One of the first-priority recommen-
dations of the conference was a "massive effort"
to break the language barrier of communication
and understanding between the United States
and Japan. A second conference will be held
in Washington late in 1963.
Educational and Cultural Exchanges
Educational and cultural exchanges, in some
new and varied forms, of course continue to con-
stitute the main component of the effort to
establish and expand cultural communication
with other countries. How well are we doing
in this general effort? There are many favor-
able factors : the passage of the Fulbright-Hays
Act providing broader authorizations, the
growing recognition of cultural affairs as a
component of our foreign relations, the increas-
ing involvement in countless ways of the
academic community, voluntary organizations,
and other parts of the private sector. It is the
totality of this support that will make our
cultural effort most effective.
But there can be no doubt that we are doing
less than the opportunities of this time in the
affairs of men suggest. For this is a time when
the preconditions of cultural and educational
advancement are clearly evident : the desire for
knowledge and the means to satisfy it. It is
a time when nothing less than the best efforts all
of us can make, and the widest support we can
attract, will be good enough.
' For background, see ibid., Jan. 15, 1962, p. 99, and
Jan. 22, 1962, p. 142.
JANUARY 21, 1963
97
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings^
Adjourned During December 1962
United Nations General Assembly: 17th Session New York Sept. 18-Dec. 20
UNESCO Executive Board: 63d Session Paris Oct. 26-Dec. 12
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Geneva Nov. 1-Dec. 7
Technical Working Group on Compensatory Financing "(resumed
session).
UNESCO General Conference: 12th Session Paris Nov. 9-Dec. 8
ICAO Aerodromes, Air Routes, and Ground Aids Division: 7th Montreal Nov. 13-Dec. 14
Session.
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 6th Meeting Washington Nov. 26-Dec. 3
ILO Asian Regional Conference: 5th Session Melbourne Nov. 26-Dec. 8
Inter- American Consultative Group on Narcotics Control: 3d Lima Nov. 26-Dec. 8
Meeting.
FAO Cocoa Study Group: 12th Session of Executive Committee . Rome Nov. 27-Dec. 4
GATT Subcommittee on Tariffs and Trade Geneva Dec. 2-7
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee: Bangkok Dec. 3-11
11th Session.
OECD Energy Committee Paris Dec. 4-5
FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 1 1th Rome Dec. 5-1 1
Session.
OECD Industry Committee Paris Dec. 6-7
NATO Medical Committee Paris Dec. 6-7
FAO Regional Fisheries Advisory Commission for the Southwest Rio de Janeiro .... Dec. 10-14
Atlantic.
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 14th Session . . Geneva Dec. 10-14
International Wool Study Group: 7th Meeting London Dec. 10-14
ILO Committee on Conditions of Work in the Fishing Industry . . Geneva Dec. 10-19
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Urban Community Development . . . Singapore Dec. 10-20
OECD Turkish Consortium Paris Dec. 11-12
OECD Development Assistance Committee Paris Dec. 11-13
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance Paris Dec. 12-13
of Payments).
FAO/ECAFE Ad Hoc Meeting on Jute Bangkok Dec. 12-18
OECD Special Committee for Coal Paris Dec. 13-14
OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris Doc. 13-14
NATO Ministerial Council Paris Dec. 13-15
UNICEF Program Committee and Executive Board New York Dec. 17-20
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 34th Session (resumed) .... New York Dec. 17-21
U.N. ECAFE Asian Seminar on Training for Family and Child Bangkok Dec. 19-31
Welfare.
In Recess as of December 31, 1962
Conference of the Eigh teen-Nation Committee on Disarmament Geneva Mar. 14-
(recessed December 21 until February 12, 1963).
GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification (recessed De- Geneva Sept. 24-
cember 15 until March 1963).
' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Dec. 21, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations:
ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC,
Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; NATO,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N.,
United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United
Nations Children's Fund.
98 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
lu.N. Asks Conciliation Commission To Continue
.Efforts With Arab Refugees
Following are three statements made in the
U.N. Special Political Committee hy Carl T.
Rowan, U.S. Representative to the General
Assembly, together with the text of a resolution
adopted in plenary session on December 20.
STATEMENT OF DECEMBER U
U.S. delegation press release 4122
For several days now my delegation has sat
through a long and sometimes spirited debate
on the question of Palestine Arab refugees.
This debate has included sharp words about the
states directly involved and occasional taunts
at my own Government. My delegation has
been asked why it has not immediately exercised
the right of reply. I believe that our answer
should be a simple exposition of our central
attitude on tliis question.
This question of the Palestine refugees is an
old issue — almost as old, in fact, as the United
Nations itself. It troubles my delegation to note
that, while other grievous problems have flared
up and eased away, the Palestine refugee prob-
lem has continued to defy our best efforts. It
has refused to yield to the most dedicated at-
tempts to acliieve a workable solution.
With each passing year the Palestine refugee
problem becomes more intractable. Each day
that the solution to this problem is delayed
means one more day of frustration for more
than a million human beings. The problem be-
comes worse as the number of refugees increases.
And time, far from healing the wounds, brings
greater bitterness. This accentuates the waste
of a new generation coming into maturity.
Mr. Chairman, it is sometimes difficult for
those who are not directly involved in this dis-
pute to understand why in 15 years some sig-
nificant progress has not been made, however
difficult and complex the question may be. Even
the most sympathetic observer reaches the con-
clusion that an acceptable solution is extremely
difficult to find because there is not the nuitu;il
understanding necessary for solution.
We would stress that the primary responsi-
bility for solving this problem rests squarely
with the five states directly concerned — with
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Re-
public, and the United Arab Republic. Let the
Assembly face tliis reality. Conciliation efforts
by third parties, however earnest, fair, ingeni-
ous, and well-intentioned, cannot succeed in the
absence of a disposition on the part of the sov-
ereign governments on both sides of the armis-
tice line to resolve the problem, to demonstrate
genuine concern for the refugees as human be-
ings above all else. Such a disposition has been
largely and disappointingly absent. The refu-
gees themselves have cause to be sorely disap-
pointed at the preoccupations of governments
which deny them and their offspring the op-
portunity to lead normal lives. It is the refu-
gees after all who are the human core of this
problem; it is the refugees who should be our
fundamental concern, who in a free world must
have a voice in their own future.
As the years go by, each of the two sides
stands fixed in the same rigid attitudes, some-
how hoping in the face of all logic tliat some
miraculous development will occur that will
destroy the arguments of the adversaries and
permit the problem to be worked out according
to its own point of view. But, on the record
of 14 years of polemics, such development is
unlikely. We have heard spokesmen from both
sides boast that "time is on our side." It is time
JANUARY 21, 1963
99
we all freed ourselves of this self-deception.
So long as this dispute exists, with all the pas-
sions that we have once again heard expressed,
time is on the side of danger and despair.
And surely time is not on the side of the
refugees, a new generation of whom is falling
heir to the deprivations and burdens of refugee
life.
Again and again we are treated to new tacti-
cal variations on the same discordant themes.
Some appear to feel that the chasm now divid-
ing the parties can be simply and abruptly
bridged if only they all were urged by this
Assembly to sit down around a conference table.
We have always been, and we remain, in favor
of direct talks between the parties at such time
as this offers real prospect of helping the refu-
gees or of other constructive outcome. But re-
grettably that time appears not to be now.
In these circumstances such proposals are
unhelpful.
The United States would like very much to
see Israel and its Arab neighbors come together
for a resolution of their differences. Given the
intense emotions involved, it may be quite some
time before this occurs. We should not forget
that at the center of the problem are people
who feel dispossessed of their ancestral lands,
who feel deeply that an injustice has been done
to them. This is a most compelling reason why
a peaceful and just solution must be found. We
are convinced that this day can be hastened by
demonstrable evidence of willingness to compro-
mise on the key issues — such as the refugee
issue— which now divide the parties. The ob-
jective observer must perceive that the Arabs
remain unconvinced that there is such a willing-
ness on Israel's part. And the same observer
must perceive how very difficult it is for Israel
to evince such a readiness in the face of con-
tinued threats against her very existence.
On the other side there is the proposition for
appointment of a United Nations custodian of
properties in Israel viewed by the refugees as
theirs. This proposal too, we think, oflFers no
realistic basis for adjustment or for helping the
refugees. In fact it would be a gesture of retro-
gression, for it is clearly designed to strike at
the very foundations of Israel's sovereignty.
The United States has from the very begin-
!
ning taken a deep and sympathetic interest in
the problem of the Arab refugees. We have j
borne the heaviest financial burden for their |
survival and minimum welfare. And we have
always shown, materially and otherwise, great
sympathy for the unhappy lot of the refugees. |
We have the most sincere concern for the rights *
and interest of the states involved.
Since the 15th General Assembly the Pales-
tine Conciliation Commission has been actively
engaged in a new initiative to overcome the
impasse on this issue. Thanks largely to the
dedication, imagination, persistence, and real-
ism of the Commission's Special Representative,
Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, this has proved to be a
useful endeavor. The Commission has learned
much about what will not work, at least in
present circumstances, and about what might
possibly work. The realities of the problem
have been more sharply defined.
In deference to the specific and unanimous
request of all the parties directly concerned, and
because the Commission's initiative is still in
progress, it was decided that there would be no
publication at this time of specific details about
Dr. Johnson's efforts. I urge this committee to
respect the wishes of the parties in this regard.
I also urge you, my fellow delegates, not to place
credence in various published distortions of the
work accomplished.
Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that my Govern-
ment is profoundly disappointed about the
course this dispute has taken over the years.
It is not enough year after year to come to the
General Assembly only to hear once more ex-
changes of recriminations in the same words
leading to the same conclusions — no progress.
For the refugees lack of progress is not enough.
For us the status quo cannot be accepted.
Together we must find the means to solution.
No solution can ever be foimd that will be per-
fect from all points of view. Each side must
be ready to sacrifice some part of its desires.
We must explore thoroughly every new sugges-
tion and press forward every new initiative
which holds some hope for progress. The
United States is prepared to continue working,
with other members of the Conciliation Com-
mission, toward a solution. It is the sincere
hope of my delegation that during the coming
100
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
U.S. Announces Pledge to UNRWA for Current Fiscal Year
statement by Elmore Jackson '
On behalf of the United States Government, I
take pleasure in announcing a pledge of $24.7 million
to UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East]
for the current fiscal year ending June 30, 1963.
Part of this contribution will consist of foodstuffs
to be used in the Agency's relief program. Again
the United States contribution will be made avail-
able to the extent that it does not exceed 70 percent
of total governmental contributions.
The United States stipulates that at least $1.7
million of our contribution be used in UNRWA's
promising program of vocational and teacher
training.
I should like to take this occasion again to com-
mend Commissioner-General [John H.] Davis and
his staff for the excellent job which UXRWA is do-
ing for the Palestine refugees. They deserve our
full support as they attempt to relate their work
to the human needs of the refugees and to the
changing circumstances in the area.
I would like also to take note of the renewed ef-
forts of the Palestine Conciliation Commission to
develop means to make progress on the problem of
the Palestine refugees. The United States supports
this initiative. As my delegation indicated in its
recent statement on the UNRWA item in the Special
Political Committee, we believe the General Assem-
bly should each year thoroughly examine the ques-
tion of international assistance to the refugees. The
United States would have preferred the extension
of UNRWA"s mandate on a year-to-year basis. On
' Made at the UNRWA pledging conference on
Dec. 20 (U.S./U.N. press release 4135). Mr. Jack-
son is Special Assistant for U.N. Planning, Bureau
of International Organization Affairs, Department
of State.
this question we acquiesced to the wishes of other
interested delegations and to the conviction of Dr.
Davis that this approach would at least at this
stage greatly complicate his procurement problems.
The United States believes, however, that there
should be an annual evaluation of UNRWA's ac-
tivities to insure that they are tailored to the
fundamental needs of the refugees. It is, in addi-
tion, important that the development of this pro-
gram take into account the cooperation of the host
governments and any progress made in finding a
basic solution to the refugee question. The Agency
requires more assistance and cooperation from host
governments in its important task of doing away
with glaring inequities in the distribution of relief
supplies. Surely the Assembly can expect that more
cooperation will be forthcoming so that the provi-
sion of UNRWA supplies and services can be lim-
ited to bona fide Palestine refugees who actually
need those supplies and services. The rectification
of the relief rolls has been too long delayed. We
shall continue to give the Commissioner-General our
fullest support in his efforts on this matter.
More fundamentally, my Government considers
that the fact that many of the refugees are finding
opportunities for work, due to a number of factors,
including the success of UNRWA's vocational
training program, should be refiected in a gradual
curtailment of the Agency's expenditures on relief.
The refugees as a whole would be well served by
such change, for the funds thus saved could be
shifted to vocational training and other education
programs. It would seem that action along this
forward-looking line could be initiated during 1963.
These programs, together with the other key as-
pects of the Agency's work, can be kept under con-
tinuous review.
year the parties will be considerably more forth-
coming than they have been thus far.
As is all too usual in our deliberations, I fear
there lias been little focus on the report ^ of the
Commissioner- General of UNRWA [United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East] — that is, on the
measures being taken to provide the refugees
with food, educational opportunities, and medi-
' U.N. doc. A/5214.
cal attention. Considering the means it has
available, the Agency is doing a very good job.
My Government is glad to commend Dr. John
H. Davis and his dedicated staff for the compas-
sion and the sound administrative principles
which they are applying to their difficult task.
My Government did not and does not associate
itself with all the views espoused in the current
UNRWA report. We are convinced, however,
that the Agency is ably performing a function
of prime importance not only to the refugees
JANUARY 21, 1963
101
but to all five member states directly concerned
with the problem. My delegation is prepared to
support the extension of UNEWA's mandate
for 1 year, until June 30, 1964. My delegation
will, at the pledging session, comment further
on UNRWA's successes and problems. I trust
all members are carefully considering whether
their forthcoming jjledges will match their
ability to contribute and their expressions of
interest in the problem.
I do not need to go into more detail here
today. There is little more that need be said
here now. The solution to the Arab refugee
problem will not be found in repetitive debate.
It will be found in the quiet endeavors of men
of vision and good will patiently working out,
detail by detail, a procedure for fulfilling inso-
far as possible the desires of the refugees while
protecting the legitimate concerns of the inter-
ested states. But no plan, however ingenious,
can ever succeed unless there is a minimum of
good will and tolerance. It is that spirit of
good will that, after 14 years, still eludes us.
The refugees have been encouraged to look to
the United Nations for help. Let us, in turn,
look squarely at them and tackle anew the chal-
lenge they present to the United Nations and
therefore to all of us.
STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 14
U.S. delegation press release 4127
My delegation respectfully commends to the
attention of the committee a draft resolution ^
addressed to the key problems we are consider-
ing under the present item. It is a straight-
forward, realistic draft resolution, aimed at
providing the optimum conditions for further
earnest efforts to achieve progress on the serious
problem of the Palestine refugees.
After citing various pertinent previous reso-
lutions on the subject and noting the annual
report of the Commissioner-General of the
UNRWA, the draft expresses thanks to persons
and organizations devotedly pursuing the chal-
lenging task of providing a better life for the
refugees and of seeking a fair and reasonable
■ U.N. doc. A/SPC/L. 91.
way out of the impasse in which they find
themselves.
The PCC is requested to continue its efforts
in the latter regard, and I stress again the will-
ingness of my Government to continue to par-
ticipate actively in this difficult conciliation
endeavor. In this connection I venture to as-
sume that the distinguished delegates of France
and Turkey will readily agree with us that serv-
ing on the PCC is not, except for the thorns we
encounter, a bed of roses. We have repeatedly
expressed our receptiveness to any constructive
suggestions by the parties directly concerned or
by other members. Such suggestions are still
welcome. We hope that the parties concerned
will cooperate fully with the PCC in its future
endeavors. We hope the PCC will be able to
work in an atmosphere conducive to practical
progress.
The request for such staffing facilities as may
be required by the PCC relates primarily to the
desirability of completing expeditiously its
technical work concerning immovable proper-
ties left behind by the refugees. I
The provision for a 2-year extension of the
UNRWA mandate represents a deferral on our
part to the views of a number of other interested
delegations. It remains the considered view of
my Government that IT.N. assistance to the
Palestine refugees should be subjected to search-
ing reexamination by evei'y regular General
Assembly. The refugees themselves certainly
deserve such frequent, thorough consideration
of the ways and means by which they can be
most effectively assisted. This is what moti-
vated my delegation to indicate on December 11
our preference for a 1-year extension of the
Agency's mandate. It is as simple as that.
My Government's concern for the immediate
needs of the Palestine refugees has been amply
demonstrated in several meaningful ways.
There can be no early end to the refugee prob-
lem, even if there is some prospect of progress
toward its solution. My Government will con-
tinue to be responsive to the needs of the Pales-
tine refugees. And we must be aware that con-
ditions do change. So, while my delegation
agreed to the proposition that UNRWA's man-
date sliould now be extended for 2 years, we
strongly favor an annual evaluation.
I
102
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtJIiLETIN
The last paragraph of my delegation's draft
resolution relates to this sad fact: While it is
apparently not too difficult for many member
states to have and to voice a decided opinion on
the complex Palestine refugee problem, only a
relatively few governments have matched their
expressed concern with adequate material as-
sistance for the refugees. The pledging session
for UNRWA is scheduled for December 19. It
v.ould be a striking demonstration of the Assem-
bly's solicitude for the refugees if every mem-
ber pledged some amount, however modest,
toward the betterment of the lot of the Palestine
Arab refugees in 1963.
We commend our resolution to this commit-
tee. We believe it is best suited to the needs of
the present situation and urge its adoption
unchanged.
We also have before us two other proposals.
In my previous statement before the committee,
I expressed the United States view regarding
the draft resolution appealing for direct nego-
tiations^ and the draft resolution requesting
the appointment of a U.N. custodian in Israel.*
We hope neither of these proposals will be
pressed to a vote since doing so would not, in
our considered judgment, contribute to prac-
tical progress on the Palestine refugee question.
STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 18
tions of substance, or otherwise, to the amend-
ment submitted by the delegate of Cyprus.
We have voted for the paragraph before, and
in fact we inserted it last year. The fact is,
however, that this year in tabling this resolution
we asked that it be adopted unchanged. We are
tired of partisan proposals, recrimination, and
words of acrimony. We made it clear that we
wanted progress — aid for the refugees.
During the last several days we had several
amendments pi'essed upon us by all sides in this
dispute. We rejected them all with the asser-
tion that we would oppose them in this com-
mittee. Out of consistency with this declara-
tion, we voted against the amendment just as we
voted for paragraph 2 as is, resisting any effort
to separate its parts — just as we were opposed
to the two other resolutions. Our opposition all
week long to all amendments was based on our
fear that to take any other position would have
been to open a Pandora's box, subjecting this
resolution to a series of contentious amend-
ments. Mr. Chairman, our sticking to this posi-
tion resulted in my delegation's being left naked
in a snowstorm, as it were, but it was merely my
delegation's remaining faithful to a position it
had expressed often during the week.
. I wish to make it clear that my delegation is
delighted at the position to which this commit-
tee has now come.
U.S. delegation press release 4131
]\Iy delegation has no wish to prolong the
discussion of this item. We merely wish to
express our appreciation to the sponsors of res-
olutions 89 and 90 for not pressing their resolu-
tions to a vote.
They have shown restraint, statesmanship,
and good will worthy of this bod3^ This kind
of spirit lies at the heart of a vote by my delega-
tion which we do not wish to be misunderstood.
I refer to the vote on the amendment ^ to SPC/-
L.91 submitted with eloquent persuasion by the
distinguished delegate of Cyprus. I want to
make it clear that my delegation had no objec-
' U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.89.
* U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.90.
' U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.93.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION'
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December
1948, 302 (IV) of S December 1949, 393 (V) and 394
(V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513
(VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November
19.52, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4
December 19.54, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI)
of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957,
1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 14.56 (XIV) of 9
December 1959, 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961 and 1725
(XVI) of 20 December 1961,
Noting tbe annual report of the Commissioner-
General of tbe United Nations Relief and Works
° U.N. doc. A/SPC/L. 91, as amended ; adopted by the
Special Political Committee on Dec. 18 by a vote of 101
to 0, with 2 abstentions (Cameroon and Lsrael), and in
plenary session on Dec. 20 by a vote of 100 to 0, with
2 abstentions (Israel and Portugal).
J.^XUARY 21, 1963
103
Agency for Palestine Refugees In the Near East, cover-
ing the period 1 July 1^61-30 June 1962,
Noting tcith deep regret that repatriation or compen-
sation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11
of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been
effected, that no substantial progress has been made
in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolu-
tion 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either
by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the
situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of
serious concern,
1. Expresses its thanks to the Commissioner-General
and the Staff of the Agency for their continued faithful
efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine
refugees and to the specialized agencies and private
organizations for their valuable work in assisting the
refugees ;
2. Expresses its thanks to the United Nations Con-
ciliation Commission for Palestine for its efforts to find
a way to progress on the Palestine Arab refugee prob-
lem pursuant to paragraph 11 of General Assembly
resolution 194 (III), and requests the Commission to
continue its endeavours with the Member States direct-
ly concerned ;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the
staff and facilities that the Commission may require
in carrying on its work ;
4. Decides to extend the mandate of the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency until 30 June 1965 ;
5. Directs attention to the precarious financial posi-
tion of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and urges
non-contributing Governments to contribute, and con-
tributing Governments to consider increasing their
contributions, so that the Agency can carry out its
essential programmes.
U.S. Calls Claims of Portuguese
Arms Diversion Unfounded
Statement by Jonathan B. Bingham
V.8. Representative to the General Assenibly ^
I have asked for the floor at this stage of the
debate in order to reply to various statements
that have been made here witli regard to the
use of American-manufactured arms by the
Government of Portugal in its African
territories.
First of all, I should like to emphasize once
again that in 1961 the United States Govern-
ment, on hearing reports that certain equip-
' Made in Committee IV (Trusteeship) on Nov. 29
(U.S. delegation press release 4107).
ment — for the most part transport vehicles —
furnished to Portugal by the United States un-
der our military assistance agreement in the
framework of NATO had been diverted to
Africa, promptly called this to the attention of
the Government of Portugal and requested and
received assurance that sucli material would not ;
be diverted to Africa in the future.
When assurances of such a character are
made to us by a sovereign state with which we
maintain friendly relations, we accept them as
having been made in good faith, unless we have j
evidence to the contrary of a compelling char-
acter. Up to the present time, we have seen no
such evidence.
Charges have been made, here and elsewhere,
that the Portuguese Government is violating
the assurances they gave to my Government.
However, for the most part these charges have
been general in character, apparently not based
on firsthand information and not specific as to
type of equipment, time of use, or method of
acquisition. The petitioners who made state-
ments on this, for example, obviously could not
be expected to be able to distinguish between
American-made equipment furnished to Portu-
gal under our military assistance program and
American-made equipment which may have
been obtained through other channels.
Clearly it is impossible to control all arms
transactions taking place through private chan-
nels. In the summer of 1961 the United States
Government undertook measures to prevent the
commercial export of arms to the area. But
large amounts of arms manufactured in the
United States have been available on the in-
ternational surplus market since World War 11.
(This is true, for example, of napalm bombs,
as well as many other items.) Such arms and
equipment can find their way into almost any
area in the world. Thus we have had repeated
reports that United States-manufactured
arms — landmines, for example — have been used
by the forces of the Angolan National Libera-
tion Front fighting in Angola.
We have expert representatives in Portugal,
as in other countries with which we have simi-
lar military assistance agreements. It is part
of their task to monitor equipment supplied to
Porluffal hv the Ignited States in accordance
104
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLpmN *
with our agreements. These representatives
have no indication that any of this material has
been divei'ted to Portuguese Africa since we re-
ceived assurances from Portugal in the summer
of 1961.
We regret that the Special Committee on
Portuguese Territories apparently concluded
that the Portuguese Government was not abid-
ing by its 1961 assurances to the United States
Government and that it could not be relied on
to do so. "We cannot agree with this conclusion.
Moreover, we have not been able to find in the
information released by the Committee specific
evidence to support it. Apparently the Com-
mittee was impressed with the report of a
United States congressional investigation on
this subject, held in March 1962, in which an
ofScial representative of our executive branch
stated that some limited diversions had taken
place early in 1961. However, the fact is, and
a careful study of the transcript of the hearing
in question will show, that the diversions re-
ferred to were those which led to the United
States request to Portugal — in other words, pre-
ceded the request and the subsequent assurances
given by the Government of Portugal. There
was nothing in that testimony to indicate that
the assurances obtained were being violated.
The suggestion has also been made here that
the United States provides budgetary aid to
Portugal, that is to say, cash grant aid, for the
purpose of helping Portugal to meet the ex-
penses of maintaining her armed forces. This
is not the case.
The United States has in the past made avail-
able to Portugal loan funds for specific eco-
nomic development projects within Portugal.
During the last fiscal year the United States
made a substantial loan to Portugal to aid in
the construction of the Tagus River bridge at
Lisbon. Tlie United States is also providing
at present limited amounts of surplus agricul-
tural commodities imder U.S. Public Law 480.
Both of these forms of aid for particular do-
mestic purposes are programs which are well
and, I believe, favorably known to many other
member states.
Reference was made by one of the petitioners,
and, I believe, subsequently by several dele-
gates, to the possibility that Unitied States mili-
tary forces under NATO orders were sent to
Angola for the purpose, as I imderstand it, of
assisting the Portuguese armed forces at the
time the imhappy conflict began in Angola.
Frankly this idea is fantastic, if not grotesque.
May I solemnly assure this committee that no
United States military forces, either under
United States or NATO command, have ever
been sent either to Angola or any other Por-
tuguese African territory to assist, support, or
in any way operate in conjunction with Portu-
guese military forces.
Finally, there seems to be a widespread mis-
understanding regarding the role of NATO.
This organization acts as a coordinating mech-
anism only. NATO owns no arms, possesses
no troops. Let me repeat: There are no such
things as NATO arms or NATO troops ; there
are only national arms and national troops.
The military aid which the United States gives
to some of its NATO partners is designed solely
to increase the effectiveness of the defense of the
North Atlantic area.
Mr. Chairman, as I made clear at the outset,
this statement has been made in the exercise
of right of reply. I should like to reserve our
right to intervene in the course of the general
debate on the substance of the question
before us.
U.S. Withdraws Proposal on Angola
Opposed by Afro-Asian Group
Folloioing are statements regarding the sit-
uation in Angola made in plenary session of the
U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representa-
tives Albert Gore and Jonathan B. Bingham.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR GORE,
DECEMBER 18
U.S. delegation press release 4128
My delegation is today introducing the fol-
lowing short and simple resolution : ^
The General Assembly,
Recalling its previous consideration of Angola and
of Mozambique,
• U.N. doc. A/L. 420.
JANUARY 21, 1963
105
Having concluded that there is a need for further
detailed information from within Angola and Mozam-
bique on conditions there,
1. Requests the President of the Seventeenth Gen-
eral Assembly to appoint two United Nations Repre-
sentatives, one for the purpose of gathering informa-
tion on conditions in Angola, the other for the purpose
of gathering information on conditions in Mozambique
(in both cases including information on political, eco-
nomic and social conditions) by visiting those two
territories and other places as they may deem
necessary ;
2. Requests the Government of Portugal to extend to
the United Nations Representatives such assistance as
they may require pursuant to their mandate ;
3. Requests the United Nations Representatives to
draw up reports for the consideration of the Eight-
eenth General Assembly.
I believe that this resolution is self-explana-
tory and needs little additional comment. So
far as the appointment of the representatives is
concerned, the President would presmnably fol-
low the usual procedure in making the appoint-
ments after full consultations with delegations
and would appoint persons of unimpeachable
integrity and objectivity in whom all would
have confidence.
The draft resolution I am now introducing is
the result of an understanding between my
Government and the Government of Portugal
that has been reached at a very high level. I
want to emphasize that it is of the utmost im-
portance that this resolution not be amended if
it is to succeed in its purpose. I say this in full
recognition of the fact that many delegations
wonld prefer to see the resolution changed in
one way or another — either to incorporate ex-
pressly references to certain past resolutions of
the General Assembly or to substitute a com-
mittee or group of representatives for the con-
cept of a single representative. I can
appreciate the reasons delegations might have
for such changes, but I want to make clear that
in this case what we have to decide is whether
or not it is worth while to take the step that is
available to us. The United States believes
that it is.
If tliis resolution is adopted and carried out,
it would mean that for the first time a United
Nations representative would officially visit
Angola and Mozambique. Tliis, in the view of
my Government, would be a very significant
step.
I should like to emphasize that adoption of
this resolution would not in any way reflect on
the Subcommittee on Angola, the Special Com-
mittee on Portuguese Territories, or the Com-
mittee of 17. None of these committees was
permitted to visit the Portuguese territories, al-
though the former two asked the Portuguese
Government's permission to do so. This per-
mission was denied. Thus there has been no
such thing as a United Nations representative
in Angola and ISIozambique, except for repre-
sentatives of the specialized agencies. My Gov-
ernment is convinced that the presence of such
United Nations representatives in the Portu-
guese territories would be useful. It is now up
to the members of this Assembly to decide
whether or not they agree with that conviction.
STATEMENT BY MR. BINGHAM, DECEMBER 20
U.S. delegation press release 4136
Mr. President, I take the floor to respond very
briefly to the statement just made by the dis-
tinguished representative of Morocco [Ahmed
Taibi Benhima] , who, speaking in his capacity
as chairman of the Afro- Asian group for De-
cember and on their behalf, has informed this
Assembly that the resolution sponsored by my
delegation, contained in Document A/L.420, is
not acceptable to the great majority of the Afri-
can and Asian delegations. On behalf of the
group, he has appealed to my delegation not
to press for a vote on this resolution.
Mr. President, as most of the delegates laiow,
the resolution contained in Document A/L.420
was the result of a series of discussions carried
on at the highest level between my Government
and the Government of Portugal. Earlier this
week the distinguished representative of Portu-
gal [Vasco Vieira Garin] affirmed from this
rostrum his Government's agreement to this
proposal. In our view this response was a ges-
ture of good will toward the United Nations
and a helpful sign of even more meaningful
cooperation in the future.
We have believed that the adoption of this
resolution would have represented a significant
106
DEPAUTMENT OF STATE BCLLETIN
ent for the people of Angola, Mozambique,
,d other Portuguese territories. True, it
""jjould haA^e been only a firet step, and there was
assurance as to what the second step might
ive been. But we had hoped that the imple-
lentation of tliis resolution, which, in our view.
luld in no way have contributed to a deteriora-
iin of the situation, would have led to addi-
onal constructive developments.
As the delegates well Icnow, nij' Government
as consistently supported the principle of self -
etermination for the peoples of the Portuguese
^' arritories. We will continue to work for peace-
"^' ul solutions to the problems of Angola and the
-'' jther territories.
"■ To the many distinguished delegates who
'P lave so willingly given their earnest and sym-
'' liathetic consideration to our proposal, I wish
' 0 express the thanks of my delegation. We
ully recognize the extent of their efforts, and
1 ve are grateful for the public and private ex-
)ressions of appreciation for our efforts and,
)articularly, for the words of appreciation so
'loquently expressed just now by the distin-
guished representative of Morocco.
\\ Before closing, Mr. President, I should like
:o quote briefly from Ambassador Stevenson's
speech ^ in the general debate at this session.
While speaking of the General Assembly's re-
I sponsibilities, Ambassador Stevenson said :
Indignation and outrage have been powerful enemies
of injustice since the beginning of history. It would
be surprising if they had no place in the proceedings of
the United Nations. But the test of resolutions pre-
sented to this Assembly must surely be whether they
promise to bring us closer to rational solutions of real
problems and thereby closer to justice.
We believe, Mr. President, that our resolution
offered an opportmiity to bring us closer to a
rational solution of a very real problem and
thereby closer to justice.
It is therefore with great regret that we have
been advised of the decision taken by the Afro-
Asian group. Under the circumstances, my
delegation has no choice but to respond affirm-
atively to the appeal made by the distinguished
representative of Morocco. My delegation will
not press for a vote on Resolution A/L.420.
' Bulletin of Oct. 8, 1962, p. 511.
Current U.N Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed hcloiv) may he consulted at depository lihraries in
the United States. U.N. printed publications may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations.
United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Letter dated October 11, 1962, from the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa to the
Secretary-General concerning sale of aircraft to Ka-
tanga. S/5180. October 15, 1962. 2 pp.
Letters concerning the Cuban crisis. S/5189, October 24,
1962, 4 pp.; S/5191, October 24, 1962, 1 p.; S/5192,
October 25, 1962, 7 pp. ; S/5193, October 25, 1962, 4 pp. ;
S/5194. October 25. 1962, .3 pp.; S/5195, October 25,
1962, 2 pp.; S/5199, October 29, 1962, 2 pp.; S/5200,
October 31, 1962, 3 pp. ; S/5202, November 1, 1962, 26 pp.
Report to the Secretary-General from the Officer-in-Charge
of the United Nations Operation in the Congo on de-
velopments relating to the application of the Security
Council resolutions of February 21 and November 24.
1961 : Addendum to annexes I and II — Foreign military
personnel reliably report to ONUC to have been at large
in Katanga as from January 1962. S/5053/Add.l2,
Add.l. November 13, 1962. 13 pp.
General Assembly
Question of the Publication of a United Nations Juridi-
cal Yearboolv. Comments by Governments on the form
and contents of the proposed yearbook. A/5169, Au-
gust 20, 1962, 13 pp., and A/5169/Add. 1, September 5,
1962. 6 pp.
Consular Relations. Comments by Governments on the
draft ai-ticles on consular relations adopted by the In-
ternational Law Commission at its 13th session in 1961.
A/5171, August 21, 1962, 105 pp. ; A/5171/Add. 1, Sep-
tember 10, lt)62, 15 pp.
United Nations Emergency Force. Report of the Sec-
retary-General. A/5172. August 22, 1962. 24 pp.
Question of Convening a Conference for the Purpose of
Signing a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of
Nuclear and Thermo-Nuelear Weapons. Report of the
Secretary-General. A/.5174. August 30, 1962. 89 pp.
Public Information Activities of the United Nations. Re-
port of the Secretary-General. A/5179. September 6,
1962. 9 pp.
Applications of Jamaica and the State of Trinidad and
Tobago for Admission to Membership in the United
Nations. Letters dated September 12 from the Presi-
dent of the Security Council to the Acting Secretary-
General. A/5188 and A/5189. September 13. 1962.
1 p. each.
Report of the Committee on Arrangements for a Confer-
ence for the Purpose of Reviewing the Charter.
A/5193. September 14, 1962. 3 pp.
Report to the United Nations of the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Note l>y
the Secretary-General. A/.j200. September 18, 1962.
90 pp.
International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space. A/5181. September 27, 1962. 30 pp.
Offers by Member States of Study and Training Facilities
for Inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories. Re-
port of the Secretary-General, A/.5242, September 28,
1962, 15 pp. ; A/5242/ Add. 1, October 18, 1962, 2 pp.
JAXUART 21, 1963
107
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and Japan Sign
Compensatory Trade Agreements
Press release 751 dated December 31
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
Two compensatory trade agreements with
Japan were signed at Geneva on December 31.
In one agreement the United States granted
compensatory tariff concessions to Japan for
the escape-clause action taken by the United
States in June 1962 on carpets and glass. In
the other agreement Japan granted tariff con-
cessions to the United States in compensation
for the modification by Japan of a number of
concessions previously granted under the Gren-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
The United States escape-clause compensa-
tion agreement provides for reductions in the
U.S. duties on three items, as shown in Annex
A. U.S. imports from all countries of the
products covered by these concessions amounted
to $8.7 million in 1961, of which Japan supplied
$7 million. The tariff increases in carpets and
glass affected imports from Japan valued at
about $12.5 million in 1961. The agreement
was entered into under the authority of section
257(c) of the Trade Expansion Act, which ex-
tends until December 31, 1962, the period for
concluding trade agreements based on public
notices issued in connection with the 1960-61
GATT Tariff Negotiations Conference.
A schedule showing the duty rates modified
by Japan and the compensatory concessions
granted by Japan in the second agreement is
attached as Annex B, which also gives trade
data for the commodities affected.
ANNEX A
U.S. Concessions to Japan in Article XIX Negotiations
Tariff
paragraph
Schedule A
No. (1967)
Brief description
Rate of duty
July 1, 1963
New rate
1209
1210
3743 900
3740 300
9410 620
Silk handkerchiefs and mufflers, valued at more than S5 per dozen
Silk scarves -- -- - - - -
27^2%
32K%
32%
25%
30%
1513
Toys, n.s.p.f., in form of musical instruments -
26%
ANNEX B
Negotiations With Japan Under Article XXVIII
/. Concessions to the United States To Be Modified
New tarlfl Item
number
statistical number
Brief description
Present rate
Modified rate
Imports
from U.S.,
1961
($1,000)
2006-l-(l)
ex 2104-1-(1)
053-0151
099-095!
ex 053-0330
ex 065-0272
ex 412-0300
283-1920
Pineapples, canned, bottled or
potted, with added sugar,
molasses, syrup or honey.
25%
20%
20%
17%
10%
Free
72 yen per kilogram
25%
25%
25%
30 yen per kilogram
For a quota of not
less than 2,000
metric tons (MO
content) per year:
Free.
Other: 15%.
11
32
ex 2002-2-(l)
ex 2007-2- (2)
ex 1507-5
Tomato paste and tomato pu-
ree, in airtight containers.
Tomato juices, in airtight con-
tainers, not sugared.
Cotton seed oil _ _ ^ _
158
50
569
ex 2601-4
Molybdenum ore and concen-
trates.
' 2, 552
108
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ANNEX B— Continued
New tarifl item
number
M 7407-2
ex 8523
ex 8523
ex 8523
ex 8523
ex 8523
statistical number
682-0235
ex 721-1330
ex 721-1330
721-1340
721-1350
721-1369
Brief description
Brass and bronze, pipes and
tubes, not coated with metals.
Insulated cables and wire for
electricity, special type, of
plastic materials.
Insulated cables and wire for
electricity, special type, of
synthetic rubber.
Insulated cables and wire for
electricity, magnet wire.
Insulated cables and wire for
electricity, power cables.
Insulated cables and wire for
electricity, communication
cables, n.e.s.
Present rate
15%
18%
18%
18%
18%
18%
Modified rate
25%
20 %|
25%]
20%
25%
25%
Imports
from U.S.,
1961
($liOOO)
215
34
3
36
21
3,680
Net value of trade affected after allowance for 2,000-ton duty-free quota.
3. Compensatory Concessions to the United Stales by Japan
Imports
Tarifl item number
statistical number
Brief description
Present rate
New rate
from U.S.
1901
($1,000)
0515-4
ex 271-0110
Animal products, n.e.s.: blood, dried.
5% a.v.
Free
299
0812
ex 052-0190
Dried prunes
20% a.v.
15%, a.v.
179
1203-1
ex 292-0530
Vegetable seeds, for sowing - _
15% a.v.
10%, a.v.l
10% a.v./
1203-4
Other seeds, for sowing
15%, a.v.
119
ex 2002-2-(2)
ex 055-0299
Canned vegetables (excluding green
peas, tomatoes, asparagus, bamboo
sprouts, mushrooms, marinated
vegetables, garlic powder, mashed
potatoes and potato flakes) in air-
tight containers, not more than 10
kgs. each, including containers.
25%, a.v.
20%, a.v.
47
2006-2- (2)
ex 053-0169
ex 053-0199
Nuts, prepared or preserved
25% a.v.
20% a.v.
128
ex 2513
ex 272-0731
ex 272-0732
ex 272-0741
Emery sands and corundum sands
not less than 330 yen per kilogram.
Free
Free
23
2710-2-(l)
ex 313-0410
Greases and lubricating preparations.
18%, a.v.
16% a.v.
893
ex 3403
2710-2-(2)B
ex 313-0441
1 Petroleum oil preparations contain-
30% a.v.
ex 313-0442
f ing not less than 70% but not
22.6% a.v.
15%, a.v.
396
ex 313-0449
J more than 95% by weight of
petroleum oils in dehydrated state:
lubricating preparations, in liquid,
excluding cutting oils and in-
sulating oils.
20%, a.v.
2711
ex 314-0100
Liquefied petroleum gas
20% a.v.
10% a.v.
3209-2
533-0364
ex 721-0416
Pearl essence
10% a.v.
25%, a.v.
8% a.v.
20%, a.v.
606
8515-2
Television receivers, with cathode-
44
ray tube, max. length of image
face not less than 53.34 cm.
8521-1
ex 721-0452
Receiving tubes (excluding "re-
liable" tubes).
25%, a.v.
20%, a.v.
90
2,824
JANUARY 21, 19«3
109
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Amendment of article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873).
Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.
Acceptance deposited: Ethiopia, December 31, 1962.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961.'
Accessions deposited: Laos, December 3, 1962 ; Niger,
December 5, 1962.
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplo-
matic relations concerning the compulsory settle-
ment of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.'
Accession deposited: Laos, December 3, 1962.
Trade
Protocol of rectification to French text of General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
June 15, 1955. Entered into force October 24, 1956.
TIAS 3677.
Ratification deposited: Chile, November 30, 1962.
Declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva, November 18, 1960. Entered into force Oc-
tober 14, 1962. TIAS 5184.
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany,
December 11, 1962.
UNESCO
Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Sci-
entific and Cultural Organization. Done at London
November 16, 1945. Entered into force November
4,1946. TIAS 1580.
Siynature and acceptance: Algeria. October 15, 1962.
Wheat
International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for sig-
nature at Washington April 19 through May 15,
1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I
and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part
IL TIAS 5115.
Acceptance deposited: Portugal, August 31, 1962.
BILATERAL
Bolivia
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455 ; 7 U.S.C. 1701--
1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at La Paz
December 17, 1962. Entered into force December
17, 1962.
Colombia
Agreement amending the agreement of January 9,
1957, as amended, for financing certain educational
exchange programs. Effected b.v exchange of notes
at Bogota May 3 and 11, 1962. Entered into force
May 11, 1902.
Dominican Republic
Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7:J Stat. 610;
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes of No-
vember 30 and December 5, 1962. Signed at Santo
Domingo November 30, 1962. Entered into force
November 30, 1962.
Greece
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 4.55; 7 U.S.C.
1701-1709), with related letter. Signed at Athena
October 22, 1962. ICutered into force October 22,
1962.
Nigeria
Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Lagos August 28 and
December 24, 1962. Entered into force December 24,
1962.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
' Not in force.
Recess Appointments
The President on December 17 appointed C. Vaughan
Ferguson, Jr., to be Ambassador to the Malagasy Re-
public and Horace G. Torbert, Jr., to be Ambassador
to the Somali Republic. (For biographic details, see
Department of State press releases 743 dated December
21 and 741 dated December 20.)
110
DEPAKTjrENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Januarv 21. 1%3
Ind
e X
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1230
Africa. U.S. Calls Claims of Portuguese Arms
Diversion Unfounded (Bingham) 104
Angola. U.S. Withdraws Proposal on Angola
Opposed by Afro-Asian Group (Bingham,
Gore) 105
Congo (Leopoldville). United States Calls for
Prompt Congo Reunification Under U.N. Plan . 91
Cuba
President Kennedy Accepts Custody of Flag of
Cuban Brigade (Kennedy, Mrs. Kennedy) . . 88
Role of Law in Political Aspects of World Af-
fairs (Meeker) 83
Department and Foreign Service. Recess Ap-
pointments (Ferguson, Torbert) 110
Economic Affairs. United States and Japan
Sign Compensatory Trade Agreements . . . 108
Educational and Cultural Affairs. New Dimen-
sions in Cultural Communication (Battle) . . 92
Germany. Role of Law in Political Aspects of
World Affairs (Meeker) 83
International Law. Role of Law in Political As-
pects of World Affairs (Meeker) 83
International Organizations and Conferences.
Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 98
Japan. United States and Japan Sign Compen-
satory Trade Agreements 108
Malagasy Republic Ferguson appointed Ambas-
sador 110
Middle East
U.N. Asks Conciliation Commission To Continue
Efforts With Arab Refugees (Rowan, text of
resolution) 99
U.S. Announces Pledge to UNRWA for Current
Fiscal Tear (Jackson) 101
U.S. Urges Disengagement of Foreign Forces in
Yemen Conflict 90
Military Affairs. U.S. Calls Claims of Portu-
guese Arms Diversion Unfounded (Bingham) . 104
Portugal
U.S. Calls Claims of Portuguese Arms Diversion
Unfounded (Bingham) 104
U.S. Withdraws Proposal on Angola Opposed by
Afro- Asian Group (Bingham, Gore) .... 105
Presidential Documents. President Kennedy Ac-
cepts Custody of Flag of Cuban Brigade . . 88
Protocol. Policy Announced on Length of State
and OflBcial Visits 90
Refugees
U.N. Asks Conciliation Commission To Continue
Efforts With Arab Refugees (Rowan, text of
resolution) 99
U.S. Announces Pledge to UNRWA for Current
Fiscal Year (Jackson) 101
Somali Republic. Torbert appointed Ambas-
sador 110
Treaty Information
Current Actions no
United States and Japan Sign Compensatory
Trade Agreements 108
U.S.S.R. Role of Law in Political Aspects of
World Affairs (Meeker) 83
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 107
Role of Law in Political Aspects of World Af-
fairs (Meeker) §3
U.N. Asks Conciliation Commission To Continue
Efforts With Arab Refugees (Rowan, text of
resolution) 99
U.S. Announces Pledge to UNRWA for Current
Fiscal Year (Jackson) 101
U.S. Calls Claims of Portuguese Arms Diversion
Unfounded (Bingham) 104
United States Calls for Prompt Congo Reunifi-
cation Under U.N. Plan 91
U.S. Withdraws Proposal on Angola Opposed
by Afro- Asian Group (Bingham, Gore) . . . 105
Yemen. U.S. Urges Disengagement of Foreign
Forces in Yemen Conflict 90
Name Index
Battle, Lucius D 92
Bingham, Jonathan B 104, 106
Ferguson, C. Vaughan, Jr no
Gore, Albert 105
Jackson, Elmore lOl
Kennedy, Jacqueline 90
Kennedy, President 88
Meeker, Leonard C §3
Rowan, Carl T 99
Torbert, Horace G., Jr no
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 31-January 6
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25,
D.C.
Releases issued prior to December 31 which
appear in this issue of the Bitlletin are Nos. 748
of December 28 and 749 of December 29.
Subject
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
Trade agreements with Japan.
Trade agreement with Spain.
Duration of ofiicial visits to U.S.
U.S. statement on Oango.
MacArthur : "United States Trade
Relations With the New Europe :
The Challenge and the Opportu-
nities."
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
No.
Date
*750
12/31
751
12/31
t752
12/31
1
1/2
2
1/4
t3
1/3
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Documents on German Foreign Policy
1918-1945, Series C (1933-1937)
Tlie Third Reicli: First Ptiase
Volume IV, April 1, 1935-Marcti 4, 1936
Volume IV of Series C of Documents on German Foreign Policy
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HE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1231
January 28, 1963
ARMS CONTROL A1\D DISARMAMENT • Television
Briefing by Secretary Rusk, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Gilpatric, ACDA Director Foster, and Ambassador Dean . . 115
RISK AND SECURITY IN THE AGE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS • by William C. Foster, Director, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency 128
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: PROBLEMS AND CHAL-
LENGES FOR 1963 • by Assistant Secretary Manning . . 138
THE 17TH SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL
ASSEMBLY: MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS •
Statement by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 147
U^ston FubUc Library
■■J', I '-
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DEPOSITORY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTIVIENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1231 • Publication 7482
January 28, 1963
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Price:
62 issues, domestic $8.50, foreign $12.25
Single copy, 25 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
Note: Contents of this pubhcation are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
OF State Bulletin as the source will bo
appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the
Readers' Qulde to Periodical Literature.
Tlie Department of State BULLETIN,
a iveekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of tlie
Government tcith information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the^
Department of State and the Foreign'
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy ,
issued by the IT'hite House and thei
Department, and statements and ad'
dresses made by the President and byi
the Secretary of State and othen
officers of the Department, as well a:
special articles on various phases oj\
internatioruil affairs and the funC'
tions of the Department. Informa
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements tot
which the United States is or may>
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
Arms Control and Disarmament
Following is the transcript ' of the television program ^^State Depart-
ment Briefing: Disarmament,''^ produced cooperatively by the Depart-
ment of State, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and
National Educational Television and first broadcast on January 14 ^y
the NET network. On this program four U.S. officials with major
responsibility in the field of arms control and disarmament describe
U.S. policy in this area and answer questions posed by a group of non-
governmental participants.
Taking part in the discussion were Dean Rusk, Secretary of State;
William G. Foster, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency; Roswell L. Gllpatrlc, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Arthur
H. Dean, chairman, U.S. delegation to the Conference of the 18-Nation
Committee on Disarmament; James B. Carey, president, Intematioruil
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers; Lids F. Corea, vice
president, Riggs National Bank; Mrs. Jesse Orlansky, cliairman. For-
eign Policy Committee, Washington, D.G., League of Women Voters;
Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, attorney, author of '■'■Postwar Negotiations
for Arms ControV ; and Eric Stevenson, research associate, Interna-
tional Studies Division, Institute for Defence Analysis. John Steele,
chief, Time-Life Washington Bureau, was moderator.
STATEMENTS OF U.S. POLICY
Every man, woman, and child lives under a
muclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the
^slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at
any moment by accident or miscalculation or
by madness. The weapons of war must be
tobolished before they aboUshus.
— President John F. Kennedy
Address before the U.N.
General Assembly
September 25, 1961
Mr. Steele: My name is Jolui Steele. I am
chief of the Time-Life Washington Bureau.
In a few moments you will join me in a some-
what unique meeting — a special State Depart-
ment briefing by the men who plan and carry
out this country's policies in the vital area of
arms control and disarmament.
"The weapons of war must be abolished be-
fore they abolish us." Is this just a fervent
hope, or is there a practical chance that this
hope can be realized ?
Since World War II the great military pow-
ers have been negotiating witli little success.
Many people in this country and abroad have
lost interest, even hope, or worse yet, they have
succumbed to dangerous blandishments of
disarmament at any price.
Three months ago, the United States and
the Soviet Union faced the possibility of nu-
clear war over Cuba and the Soviets turned
back. Since then there is some — though by no
means certain — evidence that the Kremlm may
be conducting its own agonizing reappraisal of
its policies.
'Press release 20 dated Jan. 11, as revised; also
available as U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency publication 11, which may be purchased from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (price 25 cents).
115
It may be that the Soviet Union soon will be
ready to face the dangers of the nuclear arms
race in earnest and thus to move toward a i-eal-
istic disarmament agreement with the Western
Powers. This would be an historic turning
point, not only in the cold war but in the entire
history of nations.
To help you and me understand more clearly
our country's position and its efforts in this
critical area, we are honored to have with us
Ambassador Arthur Dean, who has been the
head of the United States delegation to the in-
ternational disarmament conference at Geneva.
Mr. Dean, who has faced the Communists
across the conference table perhaps more often
than any other American in recent years, just
recently resigned his post, but he will remain a
consultant to the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.
Other participants in the discussion include
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L.
Gilpatric, and the Director of the United
States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, William C. Foster. Later in the pro-
gram we shall meet the Secretary of State,
Dean Rusk.
With us today, also, is a group of distin-
guished citizens who have gathered here for
this special briefing and who will have the op-
portunity, after the briefing, to comment on
what they have heard and seen and to raise
questions which may not have been touched on.
Included among them are Mr. James B.
Carey, president of the International Union of
Electrical Workers, Mr. Luis F. Corea, vice
president of the Riggs National Bank, Mrs.
Jesse Orlansky, chairman of the Foreign Pol-
icy Committee of the Washington, D.C.,
League of Women Voters, Mr. Bernhard G.
Bechhoefer, attorney and author of the Brook-
ings Institution study, "Postwar Negotiations
for Arms Control," and Mr. Eric Stevenson of
the International Studies Division, Institute
for Defense Analysis.
Disarmament Possibilities
Mr. Foster, the veiy existence of a U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency seems to in-
dicate that the United States Government
believes some real progress toward interna-
tional disarmament is a practical possibility.
Measured against the dismal past, isn't this a
pretty optimistic point of view ?
Mr. Foster: No, Mr. Steele. I think the
political facts of life dictate such a view. Ef-
forts to maintain a so-called "balance of terror"
in the world provide no real long-term se-
curity. This is a course beset witli dangers.
In today's situation the possibility exists that
some mistake or miscalculation could plunge
the world into unimaginable disaster. We rec-
ognize this. We believe that the leaders of the
Soviet Union do too. It is this mutual interest
in avoiding a catastrophe which convinces
me that some progress, however limited, is
possible.
Of course there are other reasons. One is
the concern which both sides share over the
crushing cost of the arms buildup. The finan-
cial stakes in this effort are appalling. Since
World War II we have spent over $500 billion
on defense. This is something over an average
of $30 billion a year, more than half of our
total Federal expenditures over this 16-year
period.
When we consider what even $1 billion would
buy in terms of roads, or schools, or dams, we
begin to recognize the tremendous drag the
arms buildup has been on the development of
our own country and other countries.
Another factor is the continuing advance of
weapons technology. The swift pace of devel-
opments in this area could make the future even
more dangerous than the present, a grim pros-
pect which provides an added drive on both
sides toward progress in disarmament.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
We in the United States, historically, have
done our utmost to help build a peaceful world.
Today the organization of our Government to
deal with the problems of arms control and dis-
armament is a case in point.
Take our organization — the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) . No com-
parable goA-ernment agency exists anywhere else
in the world. It was established 16 months
ago to further our ultimate goal of creating a
world fi'ee from war, a world in which the use
of force has been subordinated to the rule of law
116
DEPARTSIENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and in whicli international adjustments to
change are peaceably achieved. It is a new
agency of peace, but not of "peace at any price."
We have a staff of 150 people, all told, and
our current annual budget is $6.5 million. We
are responsible for United States participation
in international disarmament negotiations. We
are also responsible for conducting, supporting,
and coordinating disarmament research by both
Government and private agencies. Actually of
our $6.5 million budget, $4 million are ear-
marked directly for research.
Many other elements of the executive branch
of our Government — the Office of the President,
the Department of State, the Atomic Energy
Commission, the Department of Defense, and
the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration— are also engaged in this effort.
A major purpose of this vast marshaling of
forces is to obtain international agreements
vrhich, while they promote peace, also promote
and stabilize national security.
U.S. Disarmament Proposals
Mr. Steele : Mr. Foster, we are in the midst of
disarmament negotiations now at Geneva.
Wliat, in brief, are we proposing there ?
Mr. Foster: Mr. Steele, we went to Geneva
recognizing that the problems to be faced per-
mitted no expectation of quick success, but we
were convinced that every effort should be made
to explore the possibilities for agreement. Last
April IS our chief delegate, Ambassador Dean,
introduced the most far-reaching, detailed dis-
armament plan any nation ever produced in
history.^ It is designed to permit the nations
of the world to stop the arms race at an agreed
time, to freeze the military situation as it is at
that moment, and then, over a period of time, to
shrink the military establishments of both sides
ultimately to almost zero, under effective
controls.
The aim here is to keep the relative military
balance of the parties, at every stage, as closely
as possible to what it was before they began to
disarm. This would be accomplished by
cxitting all armaments and armed forces by
' For text, see Bulletin of May 7, 1962, p. 747.
JANUARY 28, 1963
approximately one-third of their initial size in
each of the program's three stages.
At the same time our plan emphasizes the de-
velopment of peacekeeping machinery to insure
that, as national armed forces are scaled down,
international peace and security will be fully
and fairly protected.
We believe this approach meets the three
basic tests of any disarmament plan. First, it
assures balance. It permits no state or group
of states to gain a military advantage during
the disarmament process. Second, it provides
for effective, progressive verification. It sug-
gests inspection arrangements which can pro-
vide the necessary guarantees but which would
be only as great or as little as the degree and
nature of disarmament at each stage require.
And, finally, this approach establishes, at the
appropriate time, the international machinery
required to keep the peace during the disarma-
ment process and thereafter.
Now, on the first of these principles — the
principle of balance — the United States and the
Soviet Union have agreed, at least in theory.
But unfortunately the plan which the Soviets
put forward does not follow through in prac-
tice. It seeks to gain a military advantage
which we cannot concede.
On verification, there is an important dis-
agreement even in principle. The Soviet
Union so far has refused to admit the essential
need of each side to know not only what weap-
ons have been destroyed but also whether the
agreed retained levels of armaments at each
stage are being maintained or whether any
stocks of arms have been concealed or are being
secretly produced.
As to the general strengthening of peace-
keeping institutions, again there appears to be
basic agreement, in principle, between us and
the Soviets. But there is certain to be a great
deal of hard argument on the practical arrange-
ments when we get down to cases.
Mr. Steele: That summary does not seem to
justify very much optimism.
Mr. Foster: No, it is true that, unless the
Soviet Union severely modifies its general dis-
armament approach, the prospects for an all-
inclusive disarmament agreement will remain
117
pretty dim. I think the immediate opportu-
nity for agreement lies in the direction of certain
limited, first-step measures.
U.S. Policy on Weapons Testing
One priority first step would be an end to
nuclear weapons testing.' We have been nego-
tiating on this for about 4i/o years, and an
agreement now appears to be within reach.
We are prepared now to ban tests in the atmos-
phere, tests undei-water, and tests in outer space,
without international verification arrange-
ments, because these kinds of tests can be
checked by existing methods.
To put this test ban into effect today requires
little more than a stroke of the pen. The only
obstacle to an interim agreement of this kind,
pending agreement on a total ban, is the Soviet
insistence that underground tests be included
without any provision for inspection. This
would be a pseudosolution which we cannot
accept.
There is no way, at present, to distinguish
certain natural underground occurrences from
nuclear explosions. We have therefore insisted
that, if underground tests are banned, we must
have the right to conduct a very limited number
of on-site inspections each year in suspicious
cases, to make sure that they were not secret
tests.
This the Soviet Union has adamantly op-
posed. But ways can certainly be foimd to
proceed, if the Soviet Union will display a more
flexible attitude.
Some First-Step Measures
Then there are first-step measures which could
be taken to reduce the danger of war by accident
or miscalculation.* One such step would be an
agreement to give advance notice of major mili-
tary movements and maneuvers in agreed areas.
We have made a proposal to this end at Geneva.
We have also proposed the establislmient of
observation posts at key points on both sides
' For texts of two U.S.-U.K. draft treatie.s, one ban-
ning tests in all environments, the second banning tests
in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water,
see ibid., Sept. 17, 1962, pp. 411 and 415.
' For text of a U.S. working paper, see ibid., Dec. 31,
1962, p. 1019 ; for a correction, see p. 127.
to report on concentrations and movements of I
military forces. The importance of measures P
of tliis kind has been underlined by the events
of recent months in Cuba. Had these proposals
been in effect, the cliances are that the Soviet
military buildup in Cuba would not have taken
place.
The Cuban experience also imderlined the im-
portance in times of crisis of rapid and reliable
communications between governments. Rapid
communication was extremely useful in avert-
ing a possible war in the Cuban situation. But
even more rapid and dependable communica-
tion between tlte two sides is desirable, so that
every possible opportunity to prevent misunder-
standing of the intentions on both sides can be
utilized. Tliis, too, we have proposed at Geneva.
Now, when we weigh the prospects for suc-
cess, I think we should remember this : History
has already recorded some success for our efforts
to negotiate what sometimes seemed to be un-
realizable political agreements with the Com-
munist world. The Austrian State Treaty, for
example, was 8 years, I believe, in the making.
It is my hope that disarmament will hold the
next, perhaps presently imexpected, gain.
Role of the Department of Defense
Mr. Steele: Let's turn now to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric.
Mr. Gilpatric, how does the Defense Depart-
ment look at the problem of disarmament?
Mr. Gilpatric: Mr. Steele, essentially we look
at it in the same way as Mr. Foster and Ambas-
sador Dean. All of us are concerned with the
national security of the United States. The
possibility of a nuclear attack is obviously a
threat to our national security, and so all of
us have an interest, a very intense interest, in
steps that can be taken to lessen the chance of
such an attack occurring.
Now you have two sides of this problem.
One, which we associate generally with the idea
of deterrence, involves having the kind of mili-
tarj' power and policy on our side which will
minimize tlie chance that the other fellow will
be tempted to use his military power, or threaten
to use it, in order to force concessions from us.
The second, which we associate generally with
the idea of arms control and disarmament,
118
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
covers all the things we can try to do, either by
ourselves or through some kind of formal or
tacit agreements with the other fellow, which
reduce the chance of stumbling into a nuclear
exchange through accident, or misunderstand-
ing, or the sheer unbearable tensions that could
develop out of an imcontrolled arms race.
These terms, as you know, take on slightly
different connotations depending on the context
in which they are used. But I will be using
them in the sense I have just outlined. My
main point will be that you have to look at the
problem of national security as a whole and keep
both aspects — deterrence and arms control/dis-
armament— in mind.
Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament
Mr. Steele : But don't these two aspects of the
problem, deterrence on the one hand and dis-
armament on the other, conflict?
Mr. Gllpatric : Not necessarily. I think there
is a good analogy here with the problems that
we have to deal with in foreign aid. There we
have to worry both about the short-term sta-
bility of a country, which may depend on mili-
tary assistance, and about the longer term basic
solutions, which require social and political re-
forms and economic development.
In tlie narrow sense short-term stability can
sometimes conflict with the long-term goal of
national development. This might be the case
when a country has to divert resources from de-
velopment to defense, as India is now doing.
Rut in the broader and more important sense,
such objectives do not conflict, because obvi-
ously you are going to have a hard time cany-
iiig through a 5-year development program if
the country collapses in chaos 6 months after
you get started.
In Defense we have to deal with the same kind
of apparent conflicts between short- and long-
term goals. It must be clear to anyone who has
given serious thought to the problem that dis-
armament is not something you can decide
whether you are for or against, any more than
you can decide whether to be for or against
development of the underdeveloped nations.
Anyone who thinks that the new nations are
going to stay in the same condition they were in
durmg the colonial period just doesn't under-
stand the world we live in. The only real ques-
tion is whether this inevitable — and desirable —
development is going to take place through
fundamentally democratic or fundamentally
totalitarian processes.
In the same way anyone who does not realize
that some form of disarmament is inevitable has
not faced up to the kind of world we live in.
The principal question is whether the world is
going to achieve disarmament before or after we
have a nuclear war.
The object of our defense policy is not to pro-
vide a substitute for disarmament but to pro-
vide stability while we work toward the long-
term solution which, as Mr. Foster pointed out,
is the only basic answer to our dilemma. In
fact the degree to which both arms control/dis-
armament and deterrence considerations are in-
separably mixed in the elements of your na-
tional security program is a good index of the
soundness of that program.
Take the U.S. proposal for mutual inspection
of troop movements to guard against surprise
attack that Mr. Foster just referred to. That
would be thought of as an arms control/dis-
armament proposal, and it is, in part. It tends
to reduce suspicion on both sides, and it lessens
the chance of accidental war. But that same
proposal is also good for deterrence. It makes
it more difficult for a nation tempted to commit
aggression to laimch a surprise attack. So it
helps the deterrence posture of any nation
wliich seeks to prevent aggression.
A Single Policy
Mr. Steele : Mr. Gilpatric, there are those who
feel that the increases in our defense budget in
the past several years show that our interest in
deterrence is in complete conflict with our inter-
est in arms control. Wliat is your view of this ?
Mr. Gilpatric: I think not. The absolute in-
creases in the military budget might be ex-
plained purely from the point of view of de-
terrence. But the kind of things we are buying
with this increased budget and the kinds of
policies which called for this increased spend-
ing caimot be fully understood unless you think
in terms of arms control as well as deterrence.
The increased emphasis that we are putting
on conmaand and control, on flexible response,
JANUARY 28, 1963
119
and on nonnuclear forces can only be fully un-
derstood in a framework which includes ideas
such as reducing the risk of war by accident or
miscalculation, of limiting the dangers of esca-
lation, and of promoting stability, all of which
are more commonly associated with arms con-
trol/disarmament measures, in contrast — mis-
taken contrast, I would say — to measures to im-
prove our deterrent.
The point of all this is that we don't have two
policies, a deterrence policy and an arms control
policy. We have one policy, which is to safe-
guard our national security. You just can't
draw a line and say, this is deterrence and this
is arms control/disarmament. Nor can you
draw a line and say, tliis is arms control/dis-
armament and that is Mr. Foster's problem, or
this is deterrence and that is the Defense De-
partment's problem.
We both have the same objective, wliich is to
avoid both aggression and a nuclear holocaust,
and each of us would be irresponsible if we ig-
nored the other half of the problem.
Positive Role of Defense
Mr. Steele: I find that an interesting state-
ment. How well do you think the Defense De-
partment is living up to it ?
Mr. Gilpatric: I think we are coming along
well. I don't know of any top official, or top
military officer, who hasn't given this whole
problem a good deal of serious thought. There
is unmistakably a far deeper understanding of
this problem within Defense than there was a
few years ago.
We could point to specific organizations and
jobs that exist in the Defense Department. At-
tached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff we have the
Directorate for Arms Control, headed by Dale
Smith. The parallel staff witliin the Office of
the Secretary of Defense is headed by Arthur
Barber, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Arms Control.
But existence of these ranking officers and
special staffs devoted to arms control is not
the real measure of what is being done. We
would have to have them anyway, even if our
attitude was completely negative. The im-
portant thing is the matter of attitude, not the
kind of organization you can point to on paper.
Beyond just making our people aware of the
arms control side of our problems, we are trying
very hard to establish within our own Defense
Department an understanding that the role of
the Defense Department isn't just to look at
proposals that come over from Mr. Foster and
to think in tenns of merely saying, yes, we can
stand that or, no, we can't go along with that.
We in Defense have a positive role to
play in this business. We have to accept the
whole range of our share of the responsibility
for national security and not merely think in
terms of answering yes or no, but of "Yes, and
here is something we can do to help on this
point" or "No, but here is something you
might not have thought of that might accom-
plish the same purpose." We should be com-
ing forward with positive proposals of our
own.
Let us hope for a parallel move in the same
direction of serious concern with the problems
of arms control/disarmament within the Soviet
Union.
The Need for ACDA
Mr. Steele: Well, Mr. Gilpatric, if the De-
fense Department is going to be so active, do
we actually need an Arms Control Agency at
all?
Mr. Gilpatric: My answer to that would be,
definitely, yes. As you know, the top officials
of both the Kennedy and Eisenhower adminis-
trations all strongly supported the measures
setting up ACDA when it was before the
Congress last year.
The main thing, I think, is to have an agency
of the Government specifically charged with
looking into the long-range problem of work-
ing toward a disarmed world under a rule of
law.
Second, we need an agency which has a spe-
cial interest in negotiated agreements. In
Defense I think we have an unavoidable ten-
dency to think, as we should, mainly in terms
of things we can do ourselves, without formal
negotiations — things like reducing the chance
of an accidental nuclear explosion or improv-
ing our command and control systems.
120
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
In ACDA, because they are responsible for
carrying through negotiations, you are gomg
to get, also unavoidably, a special interest in
the kind of things that can be done through
negotiations. Now you need to be working on
both kinds of possibilities; and to get around
these built-in special interests which each of us
has in our specific organizations you need both
a Defense Department effort and an effort
sponsored by the negotiating agency, which is
ACDA.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, we
need an Arms Control Agency because there
should be a strong voice in the Government
specifically concerned with that side of our
problem, which can press the rest of its to move
in the right direction if we show any sign of
slacking off in our interest in the very serious
problems of long-term stability at which the
arms control/ disarmament effort is ultimately
aimed.
The Geneva Conference
Mr. Steele: Now we turn to Ambassador
Dean, who has been the United States' chief
delegate to the disarmament conference at
Geneva ever since it opened.
Mr. Ambassador, you have just returned
from the diplomatic front lines, so to speak.
Could you tell us something about the confer-
ence at Geneva?
Mr. Dean: Well, as you know, Mr. Steele, the
West is represented by Canada, Italy, and the
United Kingdom, in addition to the United
States. France, the fifth Western nation on
the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, has
elected, thus far, not to participate in the con-
ference. We hope that sooner or later she will
fill her empty chair, which, incidentally, now
rotates around the conference table every day
with the others, as that day's chairman takes
his seat.
The Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and Rumania represent the East.
Then there are eight nations heretofore new
to disarmament negotiations. These countries
represent the world's major geographic areas.
They are Brazil and Mexico, Sweden, Ethiopia
and Nigeria, the United Arab Republic, India,
and Burma. They see their role as dampening
the cold- war fires and "bringing the two giants
together." I would say their participation has
been one of the most helpful elements of the
conference so far.
For almost a year now, between plenary
sessions, nuclear-testing subcommittee sessions,
and sessions between myself and the Soviet
cochairman, we have been devoting 16
hours a day to efforts to hammer out mutually
acceptable agreements.
Results to Date
In terms of hard and fast agreements we
have nothing to show. Yet our work to date
has not been without results. Each side has
introduced a comprehensive disarmament plan.
Since then, each side has modified certain
elements of its positions.
Wliile these shifts have not led to any major
breakthroughs, they do give room for further
useful exploration. A pi'ocedure of work has
been adopted which provides for orderly dis-
cussion in depth of the most vital aspects of
the disarmament problem. In addition we
have put forward two alternative draft
treaties for discontinuing nuclear testing in
whole or in part. But perhaps most valuable
of all is the mere fact that the United States
and the U.S.S.R. are continuing to analyze
their problems together. This alone seems to
me to be of great influence for peace.
Mr. Steele: Ambassador Dean, you sit at the
conference table or in private talks with the
Soviet representatives almost every day. What
can you tell us about them and their approach,
in general, to the disarmament issues?
Mr. Dean: Well, the Soviet delegation lately
has been headed by Ambassador [Semyon K.]
Tsarapkin. He is an able and very personable
man who has spent the better part of 5 years at
Geneva for various conferences. He knows his
business.
As I said, I think we have made some gains
even though negotiating with the Soviets can
be trying at times. For example, after weeks
of intensive work last summer with Deputy
Foreign Minister [Valerian A.] Zorin, we and
the Soviets agreed on the text of a declaration
against war propaganda. This wasn't the most
121
important accord from our point of view, but
since it proposed a greater exchange of infor-
mation among all nations, it did represent a
welcome step forward. Yet 4 days later, with-
out any reasonable explanation, the Soviets
reversed themselves and turned thumbs down
on the declaration.
Our really fundamental difficulties arise
from the general Soviet approach to dis-
armament. They continue to ignore a basic
disarmament principle, in my opinion, by
design.
The Soviet Approach on "Balance"
Quite obviously, a disannament program
must insure that at no time during the disarm-
ing process will one state or groups of states
gain a military advantage over the others.
This is what we mean by balance. Now, if we
adopted the Soviet Union's program, it would
immediately give a relative military advantage
to the Communist bloc.
Within 24 montlis the picture would look
something like this: Almost all means of de-
livering nuclear weapons (missiles, aircraft,
warships, submarines, and rockets) would be
destroyed. All military bases on foreign terri-
tory would be wiped out and all troops with-
drawn from foreign bases.
This would place the core of Western military
power in the United States, where, without the
means of delivery, we would be unable to honor
effectively our overseas commitments. At the
same time the Soviet Union, with its Warsaw
Pact allies, and Communist China, with their
power concentrated through a vast, contiguous
territory stretching from Europe and Central
Asia to the Pacific, would be free to operate
with conventional forces around the periphery
of their territory and to threaten all the rest
of Europe and Asia.
In this connection we noted with interest Mr.
[Andrei A.] Gromyko's suggestion, made at the
U.N. recently, that at least a few nuclear-de-
livei-y vehicles might be retained into the second
stage of disarmament. But imtil the Soviets
exhibit a greater degree of political realism at
the conference table than they have so far, the
outlook for substantial disarmament progress
will continue to be rather bleak.
The Soviet Approach on Inspection
Now, another barrier to progress is the Soviet
attitude on inspection. For reasons peculiar to
themselves, the Soviets have sought to cloak
their world in a mantle of secrecy. This phobia
is a real roadblock to progress.
Nuclear weapons testing is a good example.
There really is no good reason why a ban on
all tests is not now a reality. It hasn't come
about because the Soviet Union refuses to ac-
cept any inspection. Our requirements on this
score are really very reasonable. No one, includ-
ing the Soviet Union, has been able to demon-
strate scientifically that natural underground
events like earthquakes can be consistently dif-
ferentiated from manmade nuclear explosions.
This means that certain underground disturb-
ances will be suspect. The only way to deter-
mine the true nature of these events is to go to
at least some of the places where they have
taken place. Wlien you get there, you can drill
a deep hole, if need be, and either you do or
you don't come up with radioactive debris.
Well, that is evidence. That settles it.
Yet the Soviets say no to this. They claim
the real purpose of this is to conduct espionage
sorties into their territory. Even when we pro-
pose that the inspection teams be sent to the
site of a suspicious event by routes prescribed
by the host country, in host-comitry aircraft
with windows blacked out and inspectors blind-
folded, and with host-country observers along
to see that everything goes according to Hoyle,
still they say this is espionage.
The Black Boxes
At present they claim that three unmanned
seismic stations, so-called black boxes, can keep
a test ban agreement honest without on-site in-
spection. Well, this just isn't so.
Black boxes are not magical devices. They
are compact seismic stations which would
operate automatically and could be anywhere
from tlie size of a standard home refrigerator,
I suppose, to something very much larger.
They would most likely be bolted to concrete
122
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
poured over a solid rock formation, to insure the
best reception of tremors under the earth's
crust. If a station such as this could really be
made tamper-proof, it could provide a useful
service in checking on the internationally super-
vised and nationally manned seismic stations we
have proposed.
Even with a substantial number of such au-
tomatic stations surrounding the Soviet
Union — a premise they are not now prepared to
accept — suspicious events will remain and
certain of these will have to be checked out by
international, on-site inspection teams.
Even when we talk about general disarma-
ment, they are unwilling to admit the quite
obvious necessity for effective inspection. They
say, "Sure, you can come to some location we'll
designate in advance and see us destroy a cer-
tain quantity of arms we have agreed to
destroy." But they draw the line at any inspec-
tion to find out whether the level of arms to
which they have agreed to reduce is, in fact,
being maintained.
In other words, they won't let us look in the
closet to see if they're holding any weapons
back. "\^Tien you are dealing with the basic
security interests of your country and the free
world to which we are committed, this kind of
approach is not Avorth serious consideration.
My remarks, Mr. Steele, may suggest that the
going is tough at the front line, as you put it.
But in spite of the difficulties, I do believe some
advances can be made. Wliat we really need is
a starting point. I think the type of first-step
measures which Mr. Foster has mentioned can
be just that.
After a start is made, and stability and con-
fidence grow, then I think we'll be in a position
to take more and longer steps along the road.
But one thing is certain : If we don't negotiate,
tliere won't be a ghost of a chance to bring about
the free, secure, and disarmed world we all
seek.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Steele : That concludes our briefing. We
turn now to our distinguished audience for their
questions and observations on the views that
have been expressed here today. Mr. Corea ?
JANtTART 28, 1963
Economic Adjustment
Mr. Corea: Mr. Gilpatric, I am sure that we
have all learned a great deal about disarma-
ment here today, but in the meantime, pending
negotiations for firm settlements with the
Soviets, what provision, could you explain, is
being made for the long-term change to the
economic life of our country when our Defense
budget is being gradually reduced from $45
billion or $50 billion to a fraction of that
amount? You will recall that Ambassador
Dean touched briefly on that subject last De-
cember when he said in part that the allocation
or nonallocation of Defense contracts to a par-
ticular community or industry may well point
to the difference between prosperity and severe
difficulties. May we have further elaboration
on that point?
Mr. Gilpatric: Mr. Corea, this country has
been through the kind of adjustment that you
refer to once before in the lifetime of those of
us here. Our Defense budget went down from
an even higher level than that at which it is
today to a very low level when we disarmed
at the conclusion of World War II. The ad-
justments which took place were painful in
certain areas, but it was not very long before we
soaked up the output of the companies that had
been working on arms. Consider the long-
pent-up demand for television, for example.
The automotive industry and the other major
industries turned back to civilian production.
Now, in the case of disarmament today, I can
think of many uses to which the output of de-
fense industries could be turned. Take the
question of satellite commimications or other
nonmilitary space activities. There is a tre-
mendous potential for our electronic, our manu-
facturing, our electromechanical industries in
these fields. So that the prospect to which you
refer does not seem to me to be something which
our ingenuity and productiveness cannot deal
with when the time comes.
Peacekeeping Machinery
Mi'S. Orlansky: Mr. Foster, you and the other
panelists pointed out that while we negotiate
on arms control and disarmament we must also
work to strengthen peace and to develop in the
world a rule of law rather than a rule of force.
123
Could you tell me what we are doing now to
further this rule-of-law objective and possibly
what more we might be doing?
Mr. Foster: I will certainly be glad to try,
Mrs. Orlansky. You will recall that in our pro-
posed treaty at Geneva there is a gradual build-
ing up of international peacekeeping institu-
tions which parallels the reduction in arms. In
the first stage of three stages, we attempt to
establish an international disarmament organi-
zation, which will have as its main function
verification measures. Those functions, of
course, will increase as you move down the path
of the safeguarded treaty.
In the second stage, there is a strengthening
of the International Court of Justice and a par-
ticipation by the United States in the compul-
sory submission of conflicts to that institution.
There is also the establishment of an inter-
national peace force which, of course, has many
problems and requires a great deal of time and
study in order to develop command and con-
trol institutions, in order to determine the
method by which the force will be built up, in
order to carry out any assignments in the sup-
planting of national forces by such an interna-
tional force.
So throughout, we have suggested this as
being essential. We have provided the means
by which these efforts can be developed at
Geneva from whence Ambassador Dean has just
come.
We recently had a meeting of international
jurists to take a look at this problem of what
are the necessary changes in international law
procedures. We will have another meeting of
that kind with distinguished international
jurists to look at all of this. So all of this is
being developed concurrently with the negotia-
tions for the reduction of arms.
It is quite obvious that, unless such interna-
tional institutions are vastly strengthened, it
will be impossible to actually achieve the sub-
stantial reduction in armaments which is con-
templated in a movement toward general and
complete disarmament.
Mrs. Orlanshy: Pending the agreement on
these proposals, isn't it possible that we could
do something to indicate more confidence in the
World Court? I think the repeal of the Con-
124
nally Amendment, for instance, would help ; or
could we do something to strengthen the staffing,
the appropriation, the meeting time of the
International Law Commission of the United
Nations ; or could we make sure that our experi-
ments in space would be free from umiecessary
hazards and would be mider the auspices of the
Space Commission of the U.N. that we were so
eager to set up.
Mr. Foster: All of those are very good sug-
gestions. Most of them we are doing some-
thing about. In space, for instance, you are
aware of the activities in the United Nations in
which there has been a partial agreement
between the Soviet Union and ourselves on cer-
tain measures which we can do jointly. This
was initiated and negotiated mider the frame-
work of the United Nations. There was sub-
mitted a series of legal outlines of what might be
applied to space in the international field. So
that in tliis particular area, certainly, we are
actively pursuing it.
As to the Connally Amendment, as you know,
the last two administrations had felt that this
should be repealed. In questions concerning
this before, some Members of Congress, where
our plan had been debated, have said, "You are
planning on the basis that the Connally Amend-
ment might be repealed ; otherwise what you are
suggesting could not come to pass."
And we have said, "Well, we think perhaps it
might change by the time we get to the second
stage of the program." It will have to, and we
believe that this would be thoroughly consistent
with progress down this path of a safeguarded
treaty.
Use of Disarmament Savings
Mr. Carey: May I first commend tliis panel,
on behalf of Ainerican labor, for the kind of
work that they are engaged in and commend
their associates for the kind of policies that you
expressed here. They parallel the policies of
the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions in disarmament and other matters. I
wonder if we shouldn't emphasize more, how-
ever, the vast savings that could be derived and
converted to socially useful purposes with a
universal disarmament program of the kind that
this nation is so actively pressing?
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIlSr
Mr. Steele: Mr. Foster, I wonder if j-ou would
try that?
Mr. Foster: I would be happy to try. First,
may I say we appreciate very much the com-
ments of Mr. Carey. We know of his personal
familiarity and participation in the formation
of the ICFTU and of his great efforts at the
time the Commimists were attempting to take
over the "World Federation of Trade Unions.
I As to the possibility of the diversion of sav-
' ings from disarmament to constructive uses,
this, of course, is one of the great incentives on
both sides. The Soviet Union must have the
same incentive for this kind of diversion to
constructive uses — as I said in my remarks a
little earlier — to roads and dams and schools, to
education, to better living, to all the things that
can make life better for all people.
So that while this is still somewhat in the
distance, Mr. Carey, nonetheless, this is a thor-
oughly appropriate thing for both sides to have
in mind, and certainly the United States has
suggested ways in which tliis might come to
pass. We have made a number of studies in our
agency as to how this might be done.
I think there has been a mistake on the part
of some that you could predict the proportions
that could be assigned to this or that particular
segment. There is certainly a need of some as-
signment of savings, additional savings, to the
aid of the less developed nations. But the at-
tempt to set a specific percentage to this seems
to us to be somewhat premature.
May I also say that I think that, as you have
30 indicated, international labor has a great
part to play in this kind of thing. I believe that
the advice and counsel, the participation in the
activities of this sort by labor is higUy desir-
able. You and I know, from personal coopera-
tion in the past, that in the Marshall Plan, for
instance, we had a number of labor representa-
tives who were chiefs of missions, who were
senior members of the staff, who made great
contributions, as well as your own contribution
as an adviser to the agency.
So I would hope that this can be developed
much more actively, and I certainly welcome
your comments toward this end. I can assure
you that it is our thought and plan to further
develop this sort of cooperation.
Problem of Nonparticipants
Mr. Bechhoefer: Ambassador Dean, I have a
specific question which I believe brings up a
general problem. If the test cessation confer-
ence in Geneva should agree on a safeguarded
nuclear test ban and the Chinese Communists,
for example, refuse to permit the installation of
the safeguard machinery within Communist
Cliina, what action would you visualize to pre-
vent Communist China from acquiring a nu-
clear weapons capability ?
Tliis really brings up the entire question of
binding into disarmament agreements states
which are not participating in the conference —
Germany, Latin American states, and others, as
well as Communist China.
Mr. Dean: Well, that is a very good question,
Mr. Bechhoefer, which we have thought about
a great deal. We have put into the proj^osed
treaty to stop nuclear weapons tests a provision
that, if anyone signs the treaty and then can
produce evidence that someone who is not a
party to the treaty either has tested or is about
to test, they can give notice of this, and then
either that person must sign the treaty within
a specified period of time or, if he does not, the
other parties to the treaty have the right to
terminate.
Now, of course, when we started in early '61,
there wasn't this rift which has since taken
place between Communist China and the Soviet
Union. We had rather hoped at that tune that,
if we worked out a treaty, practically everyone
would sign it and then together — the Soviet
Union and the United States— we might be able
to bring sufficient pressure to bear upon nations
w'ho have not signed it to come in and to ob-
serve its terms.
As a result of our vast research of this Vela
program ° that we have been carrying out, we
know a great deal more about how to detect
these nuclear weapons tests than we did even
2 or 3 years ago. Of course, the big problem,
as you know well, is the problem of identifica-
tion; that is, distinguishing between an earth-
quake and a nuclear event. But we think if we
do get an agreement with the Soviet Union and
they are prepared to carry it out, that we are
coing to get such tremendous approval from
= For background, see ibid., Aug. 28, 1961, p. 375.
JANUARY 28, 1963
125
tlie rest of the world that we probably, some-
how, will be able to solve the problem which
you mentioned specifically.
Mr. Bechhoefer: That is very encouraging,
Mr. Ambassador.
Margin of Superiority
Mr. Stevemon: Mr. Gilpatric, press reports
have indicated that we are going to have, in
less than 5 years, about 1,500 long-range mis-
siles, and so it has been suggested that we cut
back — we could safely cut back — any number
of those missiles, provided that they were
sufficiently secure from attack. Would you
care to comment on that ?
Mr. Gilpatric: It is true, Mr. Stevenson, that
the number of our ICBM and other strategic
weapons is going to increase over the predictable
future, the next 4 or 5 years. We also have
reason to believe that the Soviet ICBM system
will enlarge too. We think it is essential that
we maintain the kind of margin that we now
possess, because under the self-denial that we
have placed upon ourselves in this nuclear race
— and it really is that — we are not preparing
ever to engage in a preemptive strike.
We are denying ourselves the advantage of
surprise. Therefore we need a measurable
margin of superiority in strategic nuclear
power. And hence, whether we attain the level
that you suggest that has been referred to in
the press, or some higher or lower level, it will
be in relation to the power that confronts us,
which might change, of course, if some progress
is made in the area of arms control that we
have been discussing here today.
Mr. Steele: I should like to return to Am-
bassador Dean for a moment. Did I imder-
stand you, Mr. Dean, to suggest that it is now
less necessary than it once was to have on-site
inspection and that — if this is the case — we are
ready to drop this?
Mr. Dean: No, no. I didn't even mention
on-site inspection. The question Mr. Bech-
hoefer asked me was: How could we sign an
effective treaty with the Soviet Union, if the
Communist Chinese refused to cooperate and
would permit no detection posts on their terri-
tory ? There are ways and means by which we
can do other things to detect disturbances ; even
seismic events of a large order give off certain
atmospheric waves. But if we found, through
other means, that the Chinese Communists were
actually testing, we could, of course, denounce
the treaty.
Reducing Tensions '
Mrs. Orlansky : If I can, I would like to come
back to Mr. Gilpatric. Is there anything we
can do unilaterally, without jeopardizing our
national security, that would indicate our desire
to reduce tensions ?
Mr. Gilpatric: I think we are doing a good
deal of that in the sense that we are indicating,
fii'st of all, that we will avoid precipitate, ac-
cidental, miscalculated vise of our weapons. We
are introducing into these sophisticated nuclear
weapons systems electronic controls that will
enable the highest civilian authority to make
sure that a weapon isn't used except upon the
making of a deliberate national decision at
the highest level.
That type of thing, I think, is being communi-
cated to the Soviets, who have the same appre-
ciation that we do of the dangers of laimching
a thermonuclear exchange.
Mr. Steele : We have time for one more quick
question. Mr. Bechhoefer.
Partial Measures
Mr. Bechhoefer: Mr. Foster, you spoke of a
program of partial measures of arms limitation
wliich might ultimately lead to more extensive
disarmament. Is there any indication that the
Soviet Union is willing to discuss that topic
today as opposed to general and complete
disarmament ?
Mr. Foster: Yes, I think so. This is men-
tioned in the agreement that Mr. [John J.]
McCloy and Mr. Zorin came to in the fall of
1961." This also has been discussed at Geneva,
and Mr. Gromyko at the General Assembly a
year ago brought up a number of things wliich
they might be interested in.
So we believe that something can be separated
out from general and complete disarmament in
order to achieve some of the results that Mrs.
Orlansky questioned, and I think there is a good
chance.
I
" For text, see ihid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.
126
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
Mr. Steele: Thank you very much, Mr.
Foster.
CONCLUSION
And now we all would like to hear the views,
I am sure, of the Secretary of State, Secretary
Eusk.
May we now ask you to tell us how you look
at this problem of disarmament, Mr. Eusk?
Mr. Rmk : Thank you, Mr. Steele.
Ladies and gentlemen, this is the interna-
tional conference chamber of the Department
of State. Those flags on the wall behind me
are the flags of the 17 nations which have been
meeting in another conference room, at Geneva,
since last spring to try to agree on at least a
first step toward disarmament.
The memory of '45 and '46 is still vividly
fresh in mj' mind and in the minds of all those
responsible for the security of this country. In
those years, all the people of this country
wanted disarmament, after a long and costly
war. But hardly were our armies disbanded
and our warplanes scrapped, when a new threat
to the peace of the world, posed by Soviet ex-
pansion, forced us once again to take up arms.
The threat has not diminished. In fact, it
has greatly increased.
In Geneva we are making a determined effort
to reverse this trend. We are prepared to be-
gin tomorrow to lay down our arms. But our
terms have to be clear. Our weapons cannot
be destroyed and our soldiers, sailors, and air-
men camaot stand down, without a proportional
measure of arms reduction by the other side.
And we will insist on making absolutely certain
that these reductions do, in fact, take place as
agreed.
The obstacles to agreement are great. But
all great achievements, in all ages, have been
great precisely because they had seemed beyond
our reach.
We have no choice but to persevere. In one
lifespan we have seen weaponry advance from
the howitzer to the hydrogen bomb and the in-
tercontinental missile. In today's bitterly di-
vided world, the problems of controlling these
forces of destruction are multiplying geometri-
cally with every year. They threaten to outrun
the mind of man.
The (luestion is not whether we can end the
arms race. We must end it. Our very survival
may depend on it.
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Discuss Issues
of Nuclear Testing and Disarmament
Department Statement
Press release 23 dated January 12
Following discussions between United States
oiScials and Soviet officials, it is believed that
further discussions in the United States on the
issues of nuclear testing and disarmament
might be useful.
The Soviet Union and the United States are
cochairmen of the 18-nation disarmament con-
ference in Geneva. It is hoped that meetings
between representatives of the two Govern-
ments will assist in advancing preparations for
the resumed sessions of the conference next
month in Geneva.
The meetings will be held beginning Mon-
day, January 14, in New York. The United
States will be represented by William C. Foster,
Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. The Soviet Union will be represented
by His Excellency N. T. Fedorenko, Soviet
Ambassador to the United Nations, and His
Excellency S. K. Tsarapkin, chairman of the
Soviet delegation to the 18-Nation Disarma-
ment Committee.
Correction
The Editor of the Bulletin wishes to call at-
tention to the following printer's error:
Bulletin of December 31, 1962, p. 1024 : The
last sentence beginning at the bottom of the left-
hand column should read, "Ordinary voice tele-
phone represents one possibility, and radio might
also be considered although until communica-
tions satellites become available on an opera-
tional basis, radio might not prove sufficiently
reliable."
JANUAKY 28, 1963
127
Risk and Security in tlie Age of Nuclear Weapons
hy William C. Foster
Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ^
First, let me express appreciation and ad-
miration to all those in the University of
Michigan and in the Bendix Corporation who
originated and energized these symposia. The
goals are thoughtfully and moderately con-
ceived and the margins of thought to be
explored have been competently laid out.
It is not at all my jiurpose to appear in the
least critical. However, I thiak that it may be
helpful if, before I cover my assigned ground,
I take these given margins and set them in a
constellation of related areas — if that is the
word — of thought. For so clamoring are the
daily headlines that I sometimes fear we will,
in a sort of despair, take out the question of
disarmament and rather delicately but distantly
treat it as a nice but misty idea in a patently not
nice world. Yet if we are practical men seek-
ing tangibly constructive ends, we must recog-
nize that the state of mind of the world and
the state of disarmament are interdependent.
We must work not only for what is desirable but
for what is possible.
Ten years ago we called what is taking place
over wide areas of the earth a "revolution of
rising expectations.''^ Today I think we would
have to agree that it is a "revolution of rising
demands."
Mr. [Arnold] Toynbee, and others, have
rightly noted that in this period, and for the
first time in human history, it is possible, tech-
nically possible, considering our advances in
agriculture, to adequately feed every man,
woman, and child on the globe. I suppose it
' Address made before the University of Michigan
and Bendix Corporation Arms Control Symposium at
Ann Arbor, Mich., on Dec. 15.
would also be relatively easy to adequately
clothe everybody and house everybody if we
really set our hearts to it. And it seems in-
credible that we cannot open up for everybody
who expresses the least wisp of desire the won-
derful realms of thought and inspiration
available to those who can read and write.
But the aritlmietic is depressing. As you
know, a majority of the people of the world
are still improperly fed, clothed, and housed,
and it is a fact of vivid sadness and waste that 44
I^ercent of all the people 14 years old and older
are illiterate.
I suspect that if somehow one could suspend
in space and hear the authentic voice of the
earth at the close of this year of our Lord, he
would not hear of arms production and na-
tional ambitions. He would, I think, hear the
cry of hungry children and the plea of those
who would have knowledge and a chance.
One wishes that he could reach into the
hearts of the Russian people, who have suf-
fered so much themselves, and simply ask:
"Don't you think we should be about a better
business?"
Weighing the Relative Risks
But now I must descend from that plane and
deal with the matter at hand — risk and security
in the age of nuclear weapons. Perhaps the
most troubled year of these last 10 is draw-
ing to its close. The currents that have been
set in motion by Soviet adventurism in Cuba
and by Chinese aggi-ession in India will remain
with us for some time to come. These events
confront us with the need to reassess once again
the ways in which we ought to seek national and
128
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIiLETTN
international security in this age of nuclear
weapons.
In this period of history no route before us
is without risk. In seeking security we do not
have a clear-cut choice between one route that
is hazardous and another that will lead us
safely, and without error, to our goal. Thus,
in determining tlie direction in which we should
move we can only weigh the relative risks of the
alternatives.
Specifically, we must weigh the risks of the
continiuxtion of the arms race in relation to the
risks involved in arms control and disarma-
ment.
"We are emerging from the Cuban situation
with a heightened awareness of our present
strength. However, we have not, as some seem
to have feared and others seem to have hoped,
acquired a nuclear superiority complex. For
that we can be thankful.
Development of an effective military strategy
when nuclear weapons are available to our ene-
mies has proved a difficult task. We rely on
our nuclear weapons to deter nuclear attack
against ourselves and our allies. However, it is
apparent that the relationship of great nuclear
strength to the deterrence or resolution of local
conflicts is not always clear. In the case of tlie
Cuban situation we should not overestimate the
value of strategic nuclear strength and under-
estimate the importance of readily available
landing craft.
"Wliat I am saying is simply that we should
not jump to too many conclusions on the basis
of our most recent experience. For although
we face the fact that nuclear weapons may at
some time have to be employed in the defense of
ourselves and our allies, it also has become clear
that we need improved flexibility of conven-
tional response. The effort to develop the
doctrine and the means of flexible, controlled
response is, in its own way, a form of arms con-
trol. The approach is a logical one, and it may
be the best approach we can expect to devise
under existing circumstances.
Hazards of Arms Race
Nonetheless, we cannot enjoy a real sense of
security today. If the arms race continues, the
hazards to our own security will become increas-
ingly sharp. Continuation of the arms race
would place on the Soviet Union a greater eco-
nomic burden than on the United States, but
that would be for the Soviet Union to face, and
it may do so. It has in the past.
It is sometimes said that improvement of
Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities might les-
sen their fears that their deterrent may be vul-
nerable. Logically we might expect a more
stable situation to result as we, and they, rested,
so to speak, on our arms. However, if tlie stra-
tegic nuclear capabilities of botli sides continue
to increase and if stability should fail— and this
is a more likely possibility— and if then a stra-
tegic nuclear exchange should take place, the
damage to all would be multiplied. Presum-
ably, as this prospect materialized we would
first once again seek greater flexibility of con-
ventional response. Possibly another recycling
of the arms race — this time in conventional
weapons, or conceivably in weapons of even
greater than nuclear capability — would take
place.
There is still another aspect of the problem
that is of grave concern. The only ground rule
which limits the number of contestants in the
arms race is that of the resources available to
particular countries or groups. As long as the
major nuclear powers continue their present
course, there will be a strong compulsion for
others to seek security in the same manner.
Over the next decade additional coiuitries, if
they have the necessary resources and wish to
devote them to this end, can acquire nuclear
capabilities and at least limited capabilities for
delivering them. I do not think a strategy has
yet been formulated which takes that situation
fully into account, and perhaps we should begin
ti-ying to develop such a strategy, for there is
every reason to believe that we will be con-
fronted with this prospect if the arms race
continues.
Risks in Arms Control and Disarmament
Since the arms race does exist, it may appear
to some as offering a more practical route than
arras control and disarmament, where we find
ourselves still in the stage of developing mean-
ingful concepts and of trying to reach agree-
ment on effective measures and programs. We,
JANXTAKT 28, 1963
129
671989—63-
however, refuse to take the arms race for
granted. And we do not permit our lack of
success in negotiations to date to discourage
even more intensive efforts to find a practical
means of curtailing this race.
There are risks along this route too. It would
be a service to no one to pretend that such risks
do not exist. But it would be an equal dis-
service to tolerate the formidable risks of the
arms race and at the same time refuse any
risk whatever in arms control and disarmament.
The problem is neither to ignore nor to exag-
gerate the risk involved but rather to try to
measure it objectively and to find means of
holding it within acceptable limits. In the final
analysis each country must make its own de-
termination as to what these limits are, and if
agreements are to be reached, they will reflect
a sharing of risks within the limits of what is
regarded as acceptable by each of the countries
involved.
It frequently seems that the Soviet Union
expects us to believe, in the words of one of
our popular songs, that "wishing will make it
so." It has become a standard feature of the
Soviet approach to any given issue to argue
that it is unthinkable that any party to an
arms control and disarmament agreement
would violate its obligations. In the first place,
says the Soviet Union, no great nation would
do so. In the second place, say the Soviets,
if such a nation did so, it would incur the over-
whelming opprobrium of world opinion. The
Soviet Union seems little disturbed by the in-
consistency of its arguments.
Unfortunately, in the field of arms control
and disarmament, as in the field of nuclear
strategy, we cannot avoid thinkmg about the
"unthinkable." Few coimtries have demon-
strated such sensitivity to world opinion as to
forgo actions which they may regard as vital
to their own security. We cannot overlook that
fact when we attempt to measure risk. We have
to provide a system of checks and balances in
order to hold the risk within acceptable limits.
Test Ban Negotiations
When we went to Geneva in March of this
year ^ a major item of unfinished business had
been carried over from previous talks with the
Soviet Union. We had already been discussmg
for an extended period the cessation of nuclear
weapons test explosions. No agreement had
been reached, and, in fact, the Soviet Union had
broken its Chairman's pledge on nuclear test-
ing. We made a further effort to reach an im-
mediate agreement at Genev^a, and only then
did we ourselves resume testing.
Although these circumstances did not facili-
tate negotiations, there were other factors which
might reasonably have been expected to do so.
For our own part, largely as the result of our
continuing research, we had improved our un-
derstanding of the problems involved in effec-
tively halting nuclear weapons tests. We found
it possible to revise our estimate of the risk
and to modify our proposed system of checks
and balances accordingly.
Problem of Inspection
There remained and still remains, in the de-
tection and identification of underground tests,
an area of ambiguity wliich would be significant
from the standpoint of the security of parties
to an agreement. This remaining risk could not
be ignored. Nor could the fact that, at present,
scientific instruments and teclmiques cannot
reduce the area of ambiguity, and the risk, to
tolerable limits. This is why we have continued
to include provision for on-site inspection in our
system of checks and balances.
For the system to work effectively, it is not
necessary that the number of inspections equal
the number of ambiguous events. However,
it is necessary that the right to conduct at least
some inspections not be dependent on the cal-
culations of the party to be inspected.
In view of our own extended research into
the matter (some $100 million worth so far)
we were surprised to be informed that the
Soviet Union possesses instruments which made
on-site inspection unnecessary. In fact, we
found that the Soviet Union has quite a catalog
of such instruments. They seemingly range
from mystical long-range detection stations
° For statements made by Secretary Rusk before
the 18-nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva in
March, see Buxletin of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 531 ; Apr. 9,
1002, p. 571 ; and Apr. 16, 1962, p. 618.
130
DEPAETMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
wliicli can detect everytliing, to mysterious
black boxes which can detect anything the long-
range stations do not. We are always in the
market for scientific instnunents, and we have
asked the Soviet Union to explain to us how
these instruments work. But so far they have
not chosen to do so.
To the elements of mysticism and mystery
with which they invested their scientific instru-
ments, the Soviet Union added their standard
element of myth. On-site inspection, they
claim, is unnecessary. Consequently our re-
quirement for on-site inspection is obviously
nothing more than a cloak for espionage activ-
ities. When we point out that our approach
to on-site inspection could not possibly lend it-
self to this purpose, they choose not to discuss
this matter either.
Since agreement had not been reached in the
area of underground tests, we offered in August
to separate underground testing from testing in
other environments.^ We expressed our will-
ingness to ban, without the establishment of
any international verification arrangements, all
tests except those underground. At the same
time negotiations would continue in an eifort
to resolve this remaining difficulty. They
have described this approach as a "dangerous
illusion," since the arms race might be con-
tiuTied underground and therefore be lost from
view. It was not to be expected that the Soviet
TTnion would clarify for us what it regards as
illusory about the termination of nuclear weap-
ons tests explosions in three of the four environ-
ments in which they can be conducted. Nor
have they explained why they prefer the dan-
gerous reality of continuing such tests to the
alternative of halting them.
We do not find the Soviet arguments con-
vincing; the nonalined countries do not find
them convincing; and I think we are entitled
to suspect that the Soviet negotiators do not
find them convincing either. The Soviet nego-
tiators are being asked to play a very difficult
role. Wlien we propose discussing the matter
in scientific terms, the Soviet negotiators re-
spond on cue that the problem is political.
' For texts of U.S.-U.K. proposals of Aug. 27, 1962,
see Hid., Sept. 17, 1962, p. 403.
When we approach the problem in political
terms, we are informed that science has all the
answers.
Science, of course, cannot provide all the
answers, but it can help us arrive at reasonable
political decisions. If such decisions are to be
sound, they cannot be reached in a scientific
vacuum. Certainly we must have the scientific
facts. But then we must make the political
decision as to what risk is acceptable and what
system of checks and balances would best serve
to hold the risk within acceptable limits. That
is the process we have gone through in our
efforts to bring about an effective nuclear
weapons test ban.
Four Test Ban Alternatives
Having done as well as we can on the basis
of our own imderstanding of the matter, we
have been and are still prepared to learn where
we may be wrong. We are still prepared to con-
tinue working on scientific instruments which
might some clay make on-site inspection un-
necessary. However, we would like to have an
agreement today. Therefore, in an effort to
break through the circular debate that has been
taking place, we are prepai'ed to consider four
alternatives in the possible banning of nuclear
tests :
1. We will consider a comprehensive treaty
without on-site inspection if the Soviet Union
can demonstrate why on-site inspection is
unnecessary.
2. If they cannot do so, we are prepared to
consider a comprehensive treaty with limited
requirements for on-site inspection.
3. If neither of the foregoing approaches is
acceptable to the Soviet Union, we are pre-
pared to enter into a partial treaty, with an
interim agreement banning underground tests
and providing adequate controls while negoti-
ations for a lasting arrangement continue.
4. If the Soviet Union does not wish to accept
adequate controls even on an interim basis, we
are prepared to accept a partial treaty which
would ban tests in the atmosphere, in outer
space, and under water. Underground tests
would continue while we sought agreement for
that environment.
JANUARY 28, 1963
131
n
This is the position that the Soviet Union has
described as "inflexible."
On balance, we must regretfully conclude that
for reasons of its own, reasons which have not
been brought out in the present negotiations,
the Soviet Union does not desire a nuclear test
ban agreement at this time. However, I must
emphasize the word "agreement." While re-
jecting opportunities for an agreement in the
formal sense of the word, the Soviet Union may
now consider it timely once again to make
the magnanimous proposal of a moratorium on
testing. This is its perennial solution for ex-
tricating itself from an untenable tactical
situation.
The Soviet Union broke the last moratorium
a little over a year ago with a series of nuclear
tests that brought the megatons it has exploded
to a total exceeding that of all tests by all other
countries. We are objective enough to know
that history might not repeat itself, but I think
it will be understood if we desire more assur-
ance than that of a New Year's resolution.
We have had over 400 meetings with the
Soviet Union in search of a nuclear test ban
agreement. If persistence and stamina are
what it takes, we shall continue negotiating
until the Soviet Union reaches the political de-
cision to bring an effective end to nuclear test-
ing. Therefore, may I conclude this discussion
in the field of nuclear testing by stating that
we are willing to take a reasonable, but not an
excessive, measure of risk in the interests of
increased security.
U.S. Disarmament Proposals
Moving on, the same basic problems confront
us in the field of disarmament, where substan-
tially more complex interrelationships must be
taken into account. The United States has the
objective of halting the arms race and then ef-
fecting steady reductions of existing arms. The
initial reductions would be substantial and
would diminish the risk that war might occur.
This risk could be further reduced by measures
designed to safeguard the disarmament process
from disruption by war through accident, mis-
calculation, failure of communications, or
surprise attack. As the disarmament process
proceeded, verification would be progressively
extended and mternational peacekeeping ar-
rangements would be strengthened.
These are, in effect, the principal elements
from which it might be possible to construct a
system of checks and balances leading to dis-
armament in a peaceful world. It is clearly mis-
leading to identify verification as the sole ele-
ment of such a system. Wliat we are con-
cerned with is developing an approach which
would bring each of the elements into proper
relationship with the other.
I would not maintain that our initial pro-
posals * are perfect. However, they are pro-
posals we could live with, and we believe the
Soviet Union could live with them too. There
will have to be a great deal of learning on both
sides if disarmament is to succeed.
Our disarmament proposals reflect the situa-
tion that exists today. No country has a mo-
nopoly of armaments in any category, and no
country is superior in all categories. Strengths
and weaknesses differ, but considered in total,
there appears to exist a rough, overall balance
between the major powers and groups. This is
the so-called "balance of terror."
It is not a neat balance. It was weighted in
our favor in Cuba, against us in Laos. But if
we are to halt the arms race and turn it down-
ward, there is some merit in taking things as
they are and descending from that point.
This view is essentially reflected in what we
have proposed. We propose across-the-board
reductions of major armaments by equal per-
centages for both the United States and the
Soviet Union. The United States would con-
tinue to be superior in some categories and the
Soviet Union in others. Obviously the whole
nub of the idea is to reduce in such a way that
neither side has at any given moment a de-
cisive advantage. Our proposals have had the
counsel of our top military and political leaders.
We have not advanced ideas which did not have
this serious clearance before we laid them on
the table. I could not insist that our initial pro-
posals were perfect, but we believe they were,
and are, proposals that we could live with.
* For text of an outline of basic provisions on general
and complete disarmament, submitted by the U.S. dele-
gation to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee on
Apr. 18, 1962, see ibid.. May 7, 1962, p. 747.
132
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN
Soviet Approach to Disarmament
The Soviet approach to the reduction of
armaments has been a simple and direct one:
the immediate destruction of all nuclear-deliv-
erx veliicles. They have coupled this with the
proposal that the United States withdraw its
forces from overseas. Considering geographic
factors, as well as the distribution of strength
in different categories of armaments, it is clear
that the initial Soviet approach was designed to
place the United States and its allies at a deci-
sive disadvantage.
Eecently. and with a great show of reluctance,
the Soviet Union has expressed willingness to
consider permitting retention of a small num-
ber of certain types of nuclear-delivery vehicles
into the second stage of disarmament. The
Soviet Union has not provided the details of
what they are considering, but we will, of
course, listen when they are ready.
Tlie extent and rate of arms reduction in the
nuclear age is one of the most complex problems
that mankind has ever faced. In summarizing
the United States and Soviet Union approaches
I have necessarily only sketched what represents
many hundreds, if not thousands, of man-hoiu'S
of thought by many of the best thinkers on our
side and, I dare say, on the Soviet side as well.
You understand that nuclear weapons range
from those designed for strategic deterrence to
those desigiaed for tactical and battlefield use.
Many types of delivery vehicles have both con-
ventional and nuclear capabilities. The line
between conventional and nuclear is thus some-
times blurred. Geograpliy and local consider-
ations cut across all aspects of the military
equation.
We are not seeking, nor do we expect, a pre-
cise balancing of these complex factors. But if
disarmament is to offer a practical alternative
to continuation of the arms race, we must have
a workable balance. We must have reasonable
assurance that armaments are destroyed and
that the limitation or halting of production is
observed. And we must have assurance that
remaining armaments are at agi'eed levels and
that there is no cheating going on to alter those
levels.
We cannot and do not expect absolute pre-
cision, but we want to be sure that decisive dis-
crepancies do not come about. We have offered
the concept of progressive inspection as a means
reasonably related to the degree of risk. Witliin
this context zonal inspection has been suggested
as one illustration of how the broad concept of
progressive inspection might be carried out.
There are other ways in which it might be
implemented.
However, the Soviet Union has neither shown
interest in this concept nor advanced a reason-
able alternative. In this case, as in others, we
cannot simply ignore what appears to be the
insurmountable. The problem will not go away
of itself.
Partial Measures
Even under the best of circumstances there
would be some rough edges in efforts to achieve
balanced reductions of armaments and verifica-
tion of the agreed procedure. We have sought
to cushion these rough edges by suggesting a
series of measures to reduce the risk of war
through accident, miscalculation, failure of
communication, or surprise attack.'' Implemen-
tation of a disarmament program would effect
an immediate reduction in the possibility that
the outbreak of war might occur. However, it
would be prudent, in our view, to reduce still
further any remaining risk that the disarma-
ment process might be disrupted.
Tlius we have suggested measures which
range from improvements in direct communi-
cations between governments to minimizing the
possibility that sudden and ambiguous changes
in the military situation on one side might
give rise to a disproportionate response by the
other.
Such measures might play a useful role in
the system of checks and balances for disarma-
ment. The United States is already doing a
great deal on a unilateral basis to preclude war
by accident or miscalculation, as you have
learned from Mr. McNaughton [John T. Mc-
Naughton, General Counsel, Department of De-
fense]. But there are limits to what any
country can in its own interest do alone.
Measures to reduce the risk of war are not
"For text of a U.S. working paper on measures
to reduce the risk of war, see Md., Dec. 31, 1962, p.
1019 ; for a correction, see p. 127.
JANUARY 28, 1963
133
<a substitute for disarmament. However, it is
inherent that in measures of this kind a begin-
ning can be made with as much or as little as
may be agreed at any one time. We regard
this particular area as of immediate interest;
■we hope to pursue it further in Geneva, and we
are actively engaged in developing the details
of such proposals.
Strengthening Peacekeeping Arrangements
There is still another area of immediate in-
terest which carries over into disarmament.
That is the area of peacekeeping. Strengthen-
ing of international arrangements for keeping
the peace is one of the major thrusts of our cur-
rent efforts in the United Nations. Additional
efforts would form a necessary part of a system
of checks and balances for disarmament. As in
some other cases, I would place greater em-
phasis on the importance of this concept rather
than on the specific types of steps that we have
proposed for illustrative purposes. The ulti-
mate objective is not to erect a bulwark against
change but rather to strengthen the framework
within which change can take place through
peaceful means.
These, then, are some of the major issues re-
lated to disarmament which have been under
discussion at Geneva.
As we continue to negotiate it will be im-
portant to determine whether a sulEcient area
of agreement can be reached to halt the arms
race and initiate a significant degree of dis-
armament as early as possible. The early im-
plementation of an area of agreement is contem-
plated in the joint statement of principles to
which the United States and the Soviet Union
agreed in September 1961.'= The current nego-
tiations are proceeding on tlie basis of tliat joint
statement. It is very difficult to reach agree-
ment on the means of translating principles into
practice, but we intend to continue our efforts.
In the development and negotiation of arms
control and disarmament problems, it would
be easy to give way to discouragement. But
we are not discouraged.
We recognize that it will be a difficult and
' For text, see ihid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.
lengthy process to resolve the difficulties we
face. We accept the fact that the countries
concerned may not measure the risks involved
in the same way. The elements of a system of
checks and balances proposed by one country
may be viewed by another as entailing risk to
its own interests. But our purpose is that of
finding a practical alternative to the continua-
tion of the arms race. If this aim is to be ful-
filled, then nations must generate on a continu-
ing basis new ideas and reasonable and secure
proposals to this end. For our part we have
already given meaning to this conviction. The
United States has created the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency — the only such
agency in world history— to devote full time
to the central problem and all related problems
of arms control and disarmament.
But this is not enough. I deeply feel that,
as other nations participate in this effort to
discover means for stabilizing the peace, they
too must develop their own apparatus to cope
with these problems. Only in this way can
there be assurance tliat serious, methodical, and
persistent attention will be given to the reduc-
tion and eventual elimination of modem weap-
ons. It is for this reason I hope the Soviet
Union in particular, and other nations as weU,
will accept this challenge of our time and bring
into being "new agencies of peace."
Those of us in the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency believe that our exploration
to date of the arms control and disarmament
problem has led to the introduction of sound
and reasonable proposals. But tmlike the
Soviet negotiators, we feel under no compulsion
to insist that our answers are the only ones.
In this regard we welcome the comments, crit-
icisms, and ideas that symposia such as this
stimulate.
Within the Government we work closely with
other interested departments and agencies.
We wish to work closely with you in the aca-
demic community and in industry as well.
"Wliile we cannot guarantee that our joint ef-
forts will meet with success, we can be sure that
they are imdertaken with the energy and dedica-
tion they so deserve.
And the need is ursent.
134
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Secretary Discusses Berlin
in Filmed Interview
Following is the transcript of an interview
loith Secretary Rit.sk iy John Steele., chief.,
Time-Life Washington Bureau., filmed on De-
cember 88 and first broadcast on Time-Life
stations on January 12.
Press release 18 dated January 11, for release January 12
Mr. Steele: Mr. Secretaiy, the pi'oblem of
Berlin has been with us for a long time, some-
times flaming to crisis proportions. What do
you see as the prospects for 1963 in Berlin ? Do
you expect major events there, and, if so, what
shape are they likely to take?
Secret<iry Rusk: Well, I wouldn't attempt to
be a prophet, but I would expect that during
1963 there would be further discussions about
Berlin. It is, obviously, one of the most seri-
ous, potentially dangerous questions we have
in front of us. I think there will be further
discussions among the Allies and with the So-
viet Union. In what form, what way, these will
develop, I think it is a little too early to say.
Whether they will result in systematic and
serious negotiations looking toward a final
agreement — again, I think one cannot say at
this point. But I think it is very important
that on a matter of this importance there be
effective contact among the governments, and I
think that means also that there will be ex-
changes between ourselves and the Soviet Union
as well as with our allies.
I would hope very much that those on the
other side would recognize that this is for us a
fundamental question and that no incidents
occur or no action be taken there which would
inflame this crisis into major proportions, be-
cause that would make it very difficult to reach
a peaceful settlement.
3/r. Steele: Mr. Secretary, what really are
the major issues or differences between the
West, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other,
over Berlin?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we and the British
and the French, who have the responsibility for
West Berlin, as well as the Federal Eepublic
of Germany and the other members of NATO,
have made it very clear and very simple in state-
ments, repeatedly, that the security of West
Berlin, the presence of the Western forces there,
free access to the city, and the viability of West
Berlin are all vital interests of the West in this
situation.
Now this is not all of our interest in the
German-Berlin situation. We would like to see
brought about there in Germany, and in Cen-
tral Europe, a condition of stability and con-
tentment which would point toward long-term
peace in that part of the world.
Now we in this country, for example, take
the view that, when great political issues should
be resolved, it is of the first order of importance
that the attitudes of the people directly con-
cerned be known, be consulted. This leads us
instinctively to say that self-determination by
the Germans is crucial to a final settlement of
this total problem. But, in the immediate
problem of Berlin, I have indicated what our
vital interests are, and I think that the other
side fully understands what we consider our
vital interests to be.
Mr. Steele: Mr. Secretary, we recently saw
a strong and successful application of American
foreign policy in the Soviet missile buildup
in Cuba, an application of policy which led to
removal of Soviet missiles and bombers. Do
you feel that our action in the Cuban crisis
has, in turn, strengthened Western unity and
determination so far as our basic policy objec-
tives in Berlin are concerned ?
Secret-ary Rusk: Well, I think the Cuban
crisis recorded a unity and detei-mination, but
that unity and determination was already there
before the Cuban crisis as far as Berlin was
concerned.
Now I must say that I think that the unity
of the inter-American states — the OAS [Or-
ganization of American States] — on the one
side and the unity of NATO on the other with
regard to Cuba did make its point in Moscow
and did make a major contribution toward a
peaceful settlement of that particular crisis.
But, despite the Cuban affair, it has been clear
for a very long time that all of us in the West
are unified and determined on these vital in-
terests of ours in Berlin. There is a connection,
because we did record the unity of the Western
World in the face of a dangerous crisis this
year, but I wouldn't want to leave the impres-
JANtTARY 28, 1963
135
sion tliat that unity and determination was an
invention of 1962; it was already there.
Mr. Steele: Would you be inclined in this
connection to feel that the outcome of the Cuban
affair materially reflects on or alters the out-
look for a settlement of the Berlin question?
Secretary Rtisk: As I have said on other oc-
casions, I think that the Cuban experience has
led to a degree of soberness, of reappraisal, of
deep thinking, on the part of all governments,
including the govenunent in Moscow, and that
there may be a fresh realization that these
great issues, which can get to be so dangerous,
have to be approached with care and with recog-
nition of the vital interests of the other side.
I think, in that sense, that the experience we
have had in the latter part of 1962 should mean
to all of us that a question like Berlin should
be approached with the care that it deserves
and not be treated as something in which one
can achieve a spectacular victory by appearing
to put pressures on, even though vital interests
are directly involved.
Mr. Steele: Very recently Soviet Premier
Klirushchev told West German Chancellor
Adenauer that the West German Republic's
policy in Berlin is pointed toward war and that
if, as a result, war comes, West Germany will,
in Khrushchev's words, "bum like a candle
in the very first hours." What do you make of
this statement ?
Secretary Rush: Well, I saw that statement,
read it with considerable interest. There were
portions of it which were harsh, as such state-
ments have been in the past. I did not see any-
thing new in it from a policy point of view.
There seems to be an impression in some
quarters in Moscow that this Berlin matter
is of interest only to the Federal Eepublic of
Germany, that somehow the other Allies are
merely reflecting the policies of the Federal
Republic.
Wliat they must understand is that West
Berlin is a deep, vital interest for all the rest
of us, as well as for Germany, that we have
in the United States vital interests at stake in
West Berlin, and that on these matters we are
united as an alliance and are not simply ac-
commodating a friend by following a friend's
point of view. These vital interests are just as
vital to us as they are to France, or to Great
Britain, or to the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, or to the people of West Berlin
themselves.
Mr. Steele : Mr. Secretary, is it possible that
the Berlin crisis has become so crystallized in its
issues over the years that none of the interested
parties now can negotiate and compromise ? In
other words, is it perhaps becoming a pennanent
crisis of an insoluble kind ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think in diplomacy
we ought never to use this word "insoluble."
Diplomacy has to act on the optimistic thesis
that solutions are possible. Otherwise we
would run into too many blind alleys and too
many dangers would accumulate.
Now it is tnie that the margins of compro-
mise on German and Berlin questions are very
thin indeed. Our vital interests, as I have ex-
plained them earlier, are there, and it is very
difficult indeed to see in what respects you can
jeopardize those vital interests by any signifi-
cant or major compromise.
But nevertheless it's the task of diplomacy to
protect these vital interests by peaceful means,
if possible, and that means that diplomacy must
try to find out whether there are opportunities
for a peaceful settlement of a problem of this
sort.
But it won't be easy because, again, the atti-
tudes of the two sides are very far apart and
very great stakes are at issue.
Mr. Steele: Well, on the other hand, IMr.
Secretary, is there a likelihood that the people
of the Western World will tire of the sometimes
fever-pitched tensions which have been built
up over Berlin and thus lead the West perhaps
to an overwillingness to compromise?
Secretary Rush: Oh, I think we have
learned in recent years that the impatience of
democracies to move rapidly toward a solution
will not necessarily protect our vital interests or
work out to our own advantage. I think we
have learned a good deal about patience and
persistence.
I think that we in the West, the United States
as well as Western Europe, must not nourish
the illusion that we can somehow throw off these
burdens, that we have to get a settlement at any
cost so that we can feel more comfortable, or
136
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
reduce our taxes, or reduce our armed forces,
or reduce our foreign aid, or whatever it might
be.
No, I am not, myself, concerned that the peo-
ples of the Western democracies will tire when
such a vital issue as Berlin is involved. I have
no doubt of that whatever.
Mr. Steele: Mr. Secx-etary, thank you very
much for being with us today. We appreciate
it.
Swiss Representatives Visit
Americans Imprisoned in Cuba
Press release 15 dated January 9
On January 5 the Swiss Ambassador and two
other officers of the Swiss Embassy at Habana,
acting on behalf of the U.S. Government, visited
the American citizens imprisoned on the Isle of
Pines, Cuba.
According to the Swiss report of tlie visit, the
men have been quartered since December 28 in
a large wing of the prison, the address of which
is Pavilion 2, Salon A, Keclusorio Nacional,
Nueva Gerona, Isla de Pinos, Cuba. They have
the use of a larger interior courtyard where they
are now able to exercise in the fresh air. The
new quarters have running water, good sani-
tary facilities, showers, and beds. The prison-
ers told the Swiss representatives that the
guards are treating them well and that they are
now getting more food. The Swiss observed
that the prisoners' health had improved and was
in general satisfactory. Their morale also is
reported as good. The Swiss found the prison-
ers' condition much better than on their pre-
vious visit, stating that their attitude was calm
and dignified and advising the families not to
worry.
The Swiss Embassy sent each prisoner a
Christmas package containing items provided
by the American Red Cross, and the prisoners
confirmed the receipt of these packages. During
the January 5 visit the Swiss representatives
were able to give the prisoners American medi-
cines, as well as articles purchased locally.
The prisoners are allowed to receive one
parcel per month from their families through
the Swiss Embassy.
The above information has been conveyed to
the next of kin of the imprisoned Americans by
letter from the Department.
President Exclianges New Year's
Messages With Soviet Leaders
Following is an exchange of messages bekoeen
President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Covmcil of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R., and Leonid Brezhnev, Chairman of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.
President Kennedy to Soviet Leaders
White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla.) dated
January 2
December 30, 1962
Dear Chairman Khrushchev and Chair-
man Brezhnev: On behalf of the American
people and myself, I extend best wishes for the
new year to the Soviet people and to you and
your families.
The American people look forward to the
coming year with the deepest desire that the
cause of peace be advanced. For our part, I
assure you that no opportunity will be missed
to promote world peace and understanding
among all peoples.
John F. Kennedy
Soviet Leaders to President Kennedy
Dnofflcial translation
Decembeb 30, 1962
Deab Me. Peesident: On the eve of the new year
we extend to the American people and also to you and
your family New Tear's congratulations and very best
wishes from the Soviet people and from us personally.
The year of 1962 now passing into history witnessed
events, the fatal development of which it was possible
to avert thanks to the fact that the (two) sides showed
a sensible approach and reached a compromise. Now
the peoples of the whole world expect from us ener-
getic efforts aimed at the solution of urgent problems
fraught with the threat of the rise of new crises in
order to assure reliable conditions for peaceful life
and constructive labor on the earth. There is no doubt
that the people of the United States are no less inter-
ested in this than are the Soviet people. May the new
year he a year of a turn for the better in relations
between our countries, a year of joint efforts for a
decisive improvement of the international situation in
the interest of all humanity.
N. Khkushchev
L. Brezhnev
JANUARY 28, 1963
137
U.S. Foreign Policy: Problems and Challenges for 1963
hy Robert J. Manning
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs ^
It is fashionable at this time of year to talk
of new cliapters, of turning points. Tliis year
it is not only fashionable but extremely per-
tinent. As we look from January 1963 into the
future, we are struck first by how much of the
past is indeed past. Consider for a moment
what has happened to our world in the relatively
few years since the war. The four basic im-
pulses that have dominated international af-
fairs since 1945 have come either to an end, to
clear turning points, or to a state of major
transformation.
I refer to the reconstruction of Europe, the
dismantling of the colonial system that pre-
vailed over much of the earth for more than two
centuries, the almost unhindered physical domi-
nation of the free world by the United States,
and the emergence of the cold war. Each of
these basic impulses has either ended, to be re-
placed by new forces and circumstances, or has
been so altered in character as to represent a
break between the recent past and a future that
has already begun. I do not want to be mismi-
derstood when I include in this list the cold
war; it is still very much with us, and will be
for much time to come, but profound changes
have been taking place within the system that
mounted that political war effort and within
the West's capacities and opportunities for
waging it.
It can be said that these basic impulses have
changed more than our own reflexes or the
vocabulary with which we think and talk about
' Address made before the Broome County World
Affairs Council at Binghamton, N.Y., on Jan. 11 (press
release 21).
the problems and challenges which confront the
United States in world affairs.
Wliile thinking in old terms and talking with
old slogans, we have carried — and have been
carried — into an era of new chapters, of new
adventures- — and of new risks. As these new
chapters begin to unfold, we will find ourselves
in the state of mind of the old-time Chicago
newspaper editor who one day called his staff
together and decreed: ""^AHiat this newspaper
needs is some new cliches."
It is possible that the Western World today
stands, politically and economically, on the
verge of a great release of energy and organiza-
tional genius that has a certain parallel to the
great outburst of geographical and intellectual
exploration after the Crusades, when Europe
propelled itself around the globe.
The analogy is tricky and can easily be over-
blown. What I mean is that we have before
us a year or more of major decisions, many of
them uncharted ; a year of many unknowns that
may require of political and economic leaders
the same degree of imagination, daring — and
hardship — that carried the Magellans, the
Vespuccis, the Hudsons, the Marco Polos out
into the uncharted frontiers of their own
civilization.
Of the many big unknowns that inexorably
will be evolving into known quantities in the
months to come, these are among the most
important :
"Wliat will be the course of the Soviet-Chinese
ideological split, and what opportunities or haz-
ards will it present to the free world?
What will be the shape of Europe and the
Common Market? Related to that, how will
the alliance solve its interallied economic rela-
138
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tionships and responsibilities, and its political
disagreement over control of its momentous
power ?
Related to that, what will be the future course
of General de Gaulle and his design for France
and for Europe? And, in tui-n, what will be
the course of, first. West German Chancellor
Adenauer in the months remaining of his
power, and second, what will be the course of
West Germany after Adenauer?
How will the United States and the U.S.S.R.,
the two chief centers of global power, fare with
the pressing internal problems and questions
that have a direct bearing on their abilities to
pursue their differing objectives in foreign
affairs?
In our own hemisphere, will we be able fur-
ther to whittle away the potential for danger
and violence that remains in Castro Cuba even
though direct presence of Soviet military of-
fensive capability has been eliminated? And
will we and our allied governments in the hemi-
sphere find the increasing will and means to
bring about the long-overdue peaceful evolution
of Latin America into a continent of free, inde-
pendent, and prospering nations ?
Were you to seek to invite someone to appear
here and give you worthwhile answers to these
questions, and the many supplementary ques-
tions they raise, I would not be able to suggest
where you seek such a wizard. They are basic
and pressing questions. We operate, in Secre-
tai'y of State Rusk's phrase, "on the leading
edge of events" ^ and may have to leave to lus-
torians the writing of the answers. Still, the
very raising of the questions, the thinking
about them and the pondering of possible al-
ternatives, is the beginning of the process that
will produce the answers.
Success of European Interdependence
It is well to recall that the task of recon-
struction had to deal with more than the de-
struction wrought in World War II, terrible as
that was. It is no historical overstatement to
note that each of these nations — the United
States with them — was economically on its
knees in the 1930's. A paralyzing cycle of de-
' Bulletin of Dec. 10, 1962, p. 873.
JANUARY 28, 1963
pression and stagnation had brought into
sharp question the very viability of economic
systems based on predominantly private, that
is, nongovernmental, enterjirise. The recovery
of Western Europe, Japan, and the United
States in the past decade and a half has con-
founded the doom-sayers of the 1930's. Their
question had been whether an economic system
based on free enterprise could work. Today's
question is phrased: Can the economy grow
fast enough to maintain full employment and
rising standards of living, and to reach out
with this talent to the benefit of the large parts
of the globe that do not have it ?
Few developments have caused such dismay
in Communist circles as the striking success
achieved in Europe through economic interde-
pendence. It has dashed a basic Marxist pre-
diction and a fond Communist hope: that the
nations of the West would experience economic
stagnation and would fall to quarreling among
themselves in the aftermath. A key factor in
this pattern as discerned by Marxist theorizers
was to be competition among the decaying co-
lonialist powers leading to imperialist wars as
each nation fought to protect its share of the
raw materials and the markets for its finished
goods, represented by the underdeveloped re-
gions of the world.
Transition From Colonialism to Independence
The falseness of this prediction has now been
shown so decisively that it meshes with a sec-
ond major turning point. The former co-
lonialist empires have not provided the
occasion for destructively competitive imperi-
alist warfare. Rather they are with a few
exceptions being peaceably dismantled. The
new nations so created are undergoing
profound and striking changes, but in a
pattern far removed from that expected by
communism's prophets.
The map of Africa, once broadly shaded to
mark the majestic spheres of influence of the
European powers, today more resembles an
erratically sewn patchwork quilt. Dozens of
new nations have sprouted in the past decade.
Nearly all have accomplished the transition
from a colonial position to independence.
Vestiges remain, but the colonial era is over.
139
Independence, the new nations are learnmg,
may mean the end of a pattern they foimd op-
pressive and unjust. But they have quickly
discovered that independence carries with it
heavy burdens of its own. Togo's President
[Sylvanus Olympio] not long ago compared
independence to his own situation when he was
released from imprisonment by the Vichy
French regime during the war: "The jailer
told me, 'You are free.' But what kind of
freedom was it when the jail was in the desert,
himdreds of miles from my home, and there
was no gasoline for the truck we were to travel
in?"
Overnight a freed colony finds itself trans-
formed from an absentee owner's warehouse to a
sovereign nation charged with assembling the
rudiments, the trappings, and the means to in-
dependent action in a tossing sea of more than
100 sovereign nations. Overnight it finds it
necessary to have a policy not only on matters
that directly affect its own being but on the
more than 120 questions that annually stud
the agenda of the United Nations General
Assembly.
In turn the United States and, ideally, the
alliance as a whole must conceive of individual
policies and programs to deal with the exist-
ence, the aspirations, and the actions of each of
these individual new nations. Wliile each is
potentially as different as one man's finger-
prints from another's, it is only common sense
that the West look for the basics of its policy
toward the new and imderdeveloped nations
(and those that are old yet too-long underde-
veloped) in the overriding characteristics they
share in common. The first of these is the
passion of nationalism.
History may find great irony here. At the
time when we advanced and well-to-do powers
of the West find nationalism inadequate and
grope toward a new historical phase of inter-
dependence and international law and overlap-
ping sovereignties, the force that moves the
larger part of the globe is our old passion of
the jealously guarded, vocally patriotic, sov-
ereignty-sensitive nation-state. This is the
innermost emotion of the peoples of the ex-
colonial world. It raises problems that deeply
complicate the already complicated business of
establishing creative and forward-looking pro-
grams that give reality to their new freedom
and further our own interests. Yet it has its
advantages as well, for the blood of new na-
tionalism flows thick and resists the virus of
outside isms. Many observers were struck by
the way in which the recent Chinese Com-
munist invasion of India abruptly erupted
the nationalism of the Indian people to the
extent that the Indian Communist Party
sided sharply with its enemy, the Indian
Government.
Happily there are many leaders of the new
nations who appear to recognize the dangers of
a nationalism that, while lending coherence to
their nation, can impede their economic, social,
and political development if it becomes exces-
sive in zeal. In proper focus, the passion works
in favor of that American goal the Secretary of
State describes as "simple and transcendent" ^ —
a paste of nationalism and interdependence that
cements a world community of free nations.
The Gap Between Rich and Poor Nations
The second overriding characteristic of the
underdeveloped nations is their awareness of,
and their drive to do something about, the still-
widening gap between the rich and poor nations.
This problem, and the ugly shadow of nuclear
war, are viewed by President Kennedy as the
two gi-eatest problems confronting the world.
The things of life cannot continue to be divided
inequitably between the one-third of the world's
popidation that command five-sixths of the
world's output of goods and services, and the
two-thirds that command only one-sixth; be-
tween the one-third of the world that enjoy a
life expectancy of 67 years and the two-thirds
that enjoy one of only 38 years; between the
privileged one-third that suffer an illiteracy
rate of only 4 percent and the two-thirds who
are 70 percent illiterate. The answer lies not
in taking away from those who have, to help
those who do not, but in the infinitely more ex-
acting— yet more inspiring — direction of using
the resources of the well-to-do to fertilize free
abimdance for those who are not.
We must hope for intelligence on the part of
' Ibid., Sept. 3, 1962, p. 343.
140
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the underdeveloped world, and demand it of
ourselve.s, if we are to tackle this problem in a
way that reduces its temptations and opportuni-
ties for those who would exploit it for ideolog-
ical and political gain.
In our own hemisphere the Alliance for
Progress represents — and tries to grasp — the
challenge nearest to home.
In Africa we should be encouraged by a wide-
spread African desire that coincides with ours :
"Keep the cold war out of Africa." But we
must understand what that requires. It does
not mean simply that we or Africa can by mere
wish avoid great-power designs or efforts at sub-
version of the new states. There have been too
many examples in recent history of the ability
of communism to subvert new-found freedom,
and Africa's emergent freedom is a fragrant
temptation. The Communists' opportunities
for making something of that temptation stand,
for the most part, in direct proportion to the in-
ability or failure of the West to fulfill its re-
sponsibilities there.
The Congo, over which there has been so much
travail, so much bloodshed, and so much rancor,
is of course the African trial of the moment. In
all the controversy over the U.N.-directed effort
to produce a viable, unified Congo state, a major
original purpose of the procedure should be
kept very much in mind : to avoid in that impre-
pared new country a direct confrontation be-
tween the two major cold- war protagonists. It
should be recalled, too, how energetically the
Soviet Union attempted physically to move into
the Congo when the first dissension smoldered
into violence. That was 30 months ago. The
intervention was turned back without the neces-
sity of direct American involvement. Now we
may at last be coming to the moment when a
peacefully integrated Congo is a reality and
the 14,000,000 Congolese may begin to achieve
the fruits of independence.
If such proves to be the case, it will be the
successful end of one harrowing chapter in
Africa's rise to independence. But there may
be more to come. The contortion is still to
come in the southern third of Africa — that part
south of Tanganyika and the Congo. Here
live 35,000,000 black Africans and about 3,500,-
000 whites, many of whom are almost as indig-
enous to the continent as the blacks. It is an
area of white privilege and black grievance.
It is an area where only great statesmanship,
great courage, and great patience can avert ca-
lamity. The alternatives are between develop-
ing justice and orderly change, on the one hand,
and an eruption of race violence that could
make the Congo seem a strawberry festival.
One cannot say much more at this juncture than
that the stakes are high indeed.
The U.S. and the Western Alliance
Even closer to us than this turbulence are the
new developments involving our own country,
its role as the major power of the alliance and
major antagonist of the Communist system.
The circumstances that put us into this position
were not voted, were not the result of conscious
ambitions of men. Now, with Western Europe
returned to its strength and power, we are see-
ing a certain diffusion of the decision-making
and action-taking initiative that has rested so
dominantly with us.
Our very power as possessor of all but a frac-
tion of the Western alliance's nuclear strength
is in itself a factor that reduces, rather than
adds, to our freedom of action. (It is this con-
centration of NATO's power in the hands of
one ally, incidentally, that made the recent
threat of Soviet missiles in Cuba a threat not
just to that one ally but to all NATO, which
depends on U.S. nuclear striking power as the
core of its overall defense.)
The very nature of a problem like Berlin
binds us to the necessity of the most delicately
close coordination with the British, the French,
the West Germans, and the NATO alliance.
Tlie renewed ability and responsibility of the
European allies for joining in the effort to solve
the problems that confront us further reduce
our freedom of action. The renewed ability of
the European allies— and Japan— to share in
the benefits and the responsibilities of commerce
and development makes it further necessary to
find ways of concerting with them. Such is
the purpose of the expanded trade legislation
enacted last year. The years of strain on the
U.S. economy, dramatized by the 1 million
American soldiers still stationed overseas and
the billions of U.S. dollars committed around
JANTTART 28, 1963
141
the globe, make us further dependent on our
allies to carry a greater share of the burden.
They can now afford it.
This recital— and there could be more— is not
designed to suggest the likelihood of a re-
trenched American foreign policy but rather to
dramatize the inevitability of the historic trend
which the President described in his July 4 ad-
dress on Atlantic interdependence.* That
trend to increasing militai-y, diplomatic, and
economic cohesion between the Western Euro-
peans, the North Americans, and Japan is the
Atlantic wave of the future. In months to
come there will be many manifestations of dif-
ferences, of discord, perhaps even fallings-out
among allies over given problems and issues.
But it is important that these squalls of choppy
water not be mistaken for the big wave which,
in the opinion of many who shape policy here
and across the Atlantic, is the inexorable one.
One must be waiy of euphoria on this point.
There are difficult interludes ahead as we try
to work out with our allies solutions to prob-
lems that perplex them, or us, or both of us.
If, by some misfortune, negotiations between
Britain and the Common Market fail, drastic
improvisations may be necessary to avoid seri-
ous corrosion within the entire alliance. If, as
we hope, those negotiations succeed, the United
States, Canada, and Japan must be prepared
for adjustments at home that may be onerous
for some in their midst. They must be pre-
pared, too, with imaginative programs for help-
ing to assure that the bountiful strength of the
Common Market is not turned inward but out-
ward, to ease the fears and enhance the oppor-
tunities of the underdeveloped countries.
There will be long and complicated rumina-
tions as we attempt to work out, in a manner
acceptable to the allies and ourselves, an answer
to the Europeans' desire to have a greater share
in the control of the nuclear power that now
rests so largely with us.
The Nassau agreement with Britain ° is a
large step toward the attainment of a multilat-
eral arrangement. But many more steps will
be required and much time, probably several
years, before it can be expected to be achieved.
* Ibid., .Tuly 23. 1062, p. 1.31.
"Ibid., Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.
In some ways this most complex of problems,
bristly with conflicting national prides and am-
bitions, may yet prove the most beneficial be-
cause it dramatizes more clearly the D'Arta-
gnan indivisibility of the free world's position —
in a nuclear showdown it is quite simply "all
for one and one for all." The logic of this
illuminates the logic of increasing interdepend-
ence in all fields.
We cannot altogether look ahead without
looking briefly backward — to Cuba, to the re-
cent Chinese Communist aggression against
India, to the long-building rift within the Com-
munist bloc.
The Experience in Cuba
Cuba has many meanings for us and, one
hopes, for the Soviet Union. It suggests that in
the nuclear age the willingness to use power is
the first requisite of the avoidance of the actual
use of those weapons. It demonstrated that
the Soviet Union was capable of a gross mis-
reading of American reaction to a politi-
comilitary invasion of this hemisphere. It
raised the perplexing question — as did Korea,
the Communist coup of Czechoslovakia, the
infiltration of Viet-Nam — of how accurately
the Kremlin assesses the will and capabilities of
tho West to resist aggression. It showed, in the
reaction of unalined capitals around the world,
that when the chips are down there is not really
much neutralism: A huge part of the world
shared relief and admiration at the calm, con-
sidered way the Russians were forced to back
their offensive weapons out of Cuba. It gal-
vanized free-world unity, as demonstrated in
tho unanimous support of the Organization of
American States and the support of our other
allies. -
It is not prudent to conclude that what
worked in Cuba will serve in another crisis,
further from American power and closer to
Communist power. Nor should there be high
expectation that one such setback will necessar-
ily alter Soviet aims in the many other parts of
the world where Western interests are more vul-
nerable. It is possible, however, that the Cuban
experience may provoke more caution on the
part of Soviet leaders.
Admittedly, Cuba is not finished. Several
142
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
thousand Soviet military personnel remain; we
want to see those troops out of there. And Cas-
tro remains, with his Marxist-Leninist hold on
the Cuban people depending heavily on Soviet
buttressing for its continuation. For as long
as communism remains on the island, normalcy
is on leave in the Caribbean.
The Crisis Within Communism
As a last stop in this perhaps too ambitious
tour of the horizon, consider the ideological
eruption within the Commimist bloc. It is
difficult for Western observers — and probably
for Communist observers — to predict where tliis
will end and how. It was not too long ago that
the experts were insisting on the "fundamental
unity" of the bloc. Now we see the monolith
riven by a quarrel between China and Russia
that many consider to be irresolvable. Obvi-
ously a rift in the bloc weakens the power and
the appeal of communism ; it means moi'e diffi-
culties for Moscow, and it robs Peiping of its
large source of the materials and the support it
needs to convert its failures into the beginnings
of successes. In months to come the dissension
may have serious effect on morale and direction
within Communist parties all over the world.
Two words of caution, however, about this
crisis within communism :
First, the West cannot be certain that a com-
plete rift, unharnessing a hate-propelled, unre-
lenting Communist China from the comparative
restraints of Soviet Russia, will be a good thing
for the West. Second, it should be kept in mind
that this is still chiefly an ideological quarrel,
not over whether communism will bury us but
how communism will bury us. The desire to
perform the burial ceremony still exists as
strongly in Moscow as in Peiping.
With these reservations in mind, the Chinese-
Russian dispute adds significantly to the di-
lemma that now faces communism. From Mos-
cow's point of view, the road ahead must seem
to consist of three possible forks :
One, a continued expansion of military force
in order to persist in assuming great risks, as
they have been doing in recent years in Berlin
and Cuba, while continuing to press aggres-
sively for the breaks in the underdeveloped
areas.
Two, a conclusion that the armaments race
is a costly, dangerous, and hopeless course, that
it must be halted, at the expense of some con-
cessions to the West in disarmament, in order
to transfer strained resources to agriculture,
consumer goods, and industrial production.
Three, a pause, in which to reduce interna-
tional tension and tackle some of the many
urgent problems confronting the Soviet leader-
ship and to provide time for choice as to wliich
other fork to follow.
The West must, of course, equip itself to cope
with any of these alternatives. If, as some
believe, the third course is the one Moscow is
now choosing ; if, as some believe, Soviet leaders
are inclined to more caution ; if, as many believe,
the Communist system cannot shoulder its own
massive internal problems and the massive bur-
den of the continuing nuclear arms buildup —
if all these probabilities are at work, the West
is moving into a time when it can push strongly
forward with its huge task of international
architecture.
What Is Required of Americans?
Another full speech could be devoted to a dis-
cussion of what precisely this task requires of
Americans. Instead, let us consider briefly a
few of the more evident needs.
First, to get our own house in order. Inte-
gration has moved at little more than a token
pace m America. In the words of Secretary
Rusk, ". . . these problems of discrimination
here in our own country are the largest single
burden we bear in the conduct of our foreign
relations." " It is time we got on with it and
lightened that mifair burden.
It is time, too, to substitute for sterile debate
over "win" and "no-win" policies a truly con-
structive dialog to attain objectives that are
imanimously shared by Anaericans. It is not
enough to complain, for example, about a "mess
in Laos" or "chaos in the Congo." There must
be an honest facing up to alternatives.
Also we have much to do at home to stimulate
our economy to productivity and efficiency.
Sensible tax reforms, an imaginative use of the
new tools in the Trade Expansion Act, tangible
'Ihid., Dec. 17, 19G2, p. 907.
JANUAKT 28, 1963
143
actions to improve our lagging social and health
processes — these are but a few of the steps that
are necessary to the national trimness and
health without which we are not going to run
the race that is being demanded of us.
Surely few of us are satisfied with the pallid
state of American education. We are not edu-
cating for the future. As "Walter Lippmann
puts it: "As we fail to educate adequately one
generation of school children, the evil results of
this failure do not appear fully until these
children grow up and become the uneducated
parents of a still less educated generation."
Finally we must look with fresh, if sharp,
eyes at the uses and needs for economic aid in
foreign policy. It is understandable that after
all these years of dispensing foreign aid there
should be fatigue, impatience, even some dis-
illusionment over the results — understandable
but not tolerable. Foreign aid is a major in-
strument of American foreign policy. Foreign
policy in turn is simply the means of protect-
ing and furthering the American interest. The
program has suffered in recent years ; it is going
to suffer to the point of mutilation this year
unless Americans find it in themselves to inspire
a rededication to the proposition that a great
part of the power of the world's richest nation
lies in its ability constructively, and self-inter-
estedly, to apply that power where it will do
most for freedom. The public has a right to
expect an increasingly hardheaded, realistic
aid program from the administration. The ad-
ministration for its part has the right to expect
enlightened support from the public.
History, as the President wrote recently, is
what men make of it. There has never been
a more challenging year in which to make it.
Having begun with many questions, I should
like to conclude with one : Are we going to do
it?
U.S. Makes Short-Term Credit
Available to Brazil
Press release 10 dated January 7
Following consultations with Ambassador
Roberto Campos, acting on behalf of the Bra-
zilian Government, the U.S. Government is
making available a short-term credit totaling
$30 million to Brazil, which is repayable in 90
days.
The Brazilian Government has stated that
it is preparing definite plans and measures for
putting into force, beginning early 1963, an ef-
fective program to limit inflationary pressures
as well as a development plan designed to sup-
port strong and balanced economic growth.
Certain actions in line with this objective have
already been taken, including particularly the
approval in November 1962 of legislation de-
signed to help in reducing the potential Govern-
ment budget deficit in 1963 and to initiate a
broad reform of Brazil's tax structure and col-
lection machinery.
The Government of Brazil has indicated its
intention to initiate, at an early date, discus-
sions with the United States, other countries,
and appropriate international financial insti-
tutions both m order to describe the measures
it is plamimg to take to acliieve financial
recovery and assure sustained economic growth
as well as with a view to exploring what exter-
nal financial support may be available to sup-
plement the Brazilian effort.
United States Assures Saudi Arabia
of Support and Friendship
Following is the text of a letter from Presi-
dent Kennedy to Crown Prince Faysal of
Saudi Arabia.
White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla.) dated
January 8
October 25, 1962
YotiR Highness: As Your Higliness as-
sumes new and important responsibilities upon
returning to Saudi Arabia, I wish to recall
your visit to the Wliite House on October 5.^ I
then stated, and I want it understood clearly,
that Saudi Arabia can depend upon the friend-
ship and the cooperation of the United States
in dealing with the many tasks which lie before
it in the days ahead. The United States has
deep and abiding interest in Saudi Arabia and
in the stability and progress of Saudi Arabia.
Under your firm and enlightened leadership I
' For text of a joint communique, see Bulletin of
Oct. 29, 1962, p. 641.
144
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
am confident Saudi Arabia will move ahead
successfully on the path of modernization and
reform wliich it has already charted for itself.
In pursuing this course you may be assured of
full United States support for the maintenance
of Saudi Arabia's integrity.
I am fully aware that in order to accomplish
your goals you must have the requisite tran-
quillity— an atmosphere devoid of recrimina-
tions and instigations from within or without.
I share your concern at the tensions which pre-
vail in the area and which hamper your design
to strengthen the fabric of government and so-
ciety in Saudi Arabia. As I indicated to you
in Washington, the United States desires to be
helpful in finding means of reducing these
tensions.
I foresee for our two countries not merely
the continuance of the cordial relationship
which began so auspiciously during the reign
of your illustrious father, His Majesty Abdul
Aziz Ibn Saud ; rather I foresee the opening of
a chapter in Saudi-United States relations in
which the common bond of enlightened self-
interest is firmly riveted by a common dedi-
cation to the inalienable rights of man for
self-fulfillment, progress and freedom.
I wish you success and send you my warmest
personal regards. May God keep you and the
Saudi people and grant you peace.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy
President Concurs in Findings
on TFiree Escape-Clause Actions
White House press release dated January 9
The President on January 9 concurred with
the U.S. Tariff Commission's recent findings
that no formal investigation should be insti-
tuted at tliis time to determine whether the
modified trade agreement concessions on cotton
typewriter- ribbon cloth, lead and zinc, and dried
figs may be restored. The President found,
with the Tariff Commission, that there is not
sufficient reason to reopen these respective es-
cape-clause actions, which resulted in increases
in duties on cotton typewriter-ribbon cloth in
1960, on lead and zinc in 1958, and on dried
figs in 1952. Therefore, the present duties for
each of the items concerned will continue to
apply without modification.
The President's action was taken after con-
sultation with the Trade Policy Committee.
The Tariff Commission's reports were made
pursuant to Executive Order 10401, which re-
quires periodic review of affirmative actions
taken under the escape clause of trade agree-
ments legislation.
Recent Trade Agreements
Made Effective
Press release 13 dated January 8
The President on December 28, 1962, signed
two proclamations putting into effect certain
recently concluded trade agreements.
Under one proclamation,^ the trade agree-
ment with the United Kingdom granting com-
pensatory tariff concessions for the escape-
clause action taken by the United States earlier
this year with respect to duties on imported
carpets and glass was made effective on Janu-
ary 1, 1963. The substance of tliis agreement
is contained in Department of State press re-
lease 723 of December 10.-
The other proclamation' relates to a number
of agreements which contain no new tariff con-
cessions by the United States and terminates a
number of prior trade agreement proclamations.
The agreements provide for (1) the consolida-
tion of previously proclaimed tariff concessions
into the U.S. schedule of concessions under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), (2) the modification of certain of the
general provisions of the GATT, and' (3) the
establishment of relationships between the Con-
tracting Parties to the GATT and certain other
countries. The trade agreement proclamations
which are being terminated in whole or in part
relate principally to agreements which have
themselves terminated. None of these termi-
nations results in any modification of rates of
duty now in effect.
Both proclamations are printed in the Federal
Register of January 4.
^ For text of Proclamation 3512, see 28 Fed. Reg. 103.
^ BULLETIN of Dec. 31, 1962, p. 1012.
^ For text of Proclamation 3513, see 28 Fed. Reg. 107.
JANITART 28, 1963
145
Saul Sherman Named to German
Dollar Bond Validation Board
The Department of State announced on
January 9 (press release 16) the appointment
of Saul L. Sherman as the U.S. member on the
Validation Board for German Dollar Bonds.
Validation procedures in respect to German
dollar bonds were established in the United
States pursuant to an Executive agreement
signed at Bonn on February 27, 1953, and
treaties which were signed at Bonn on April 1,
1953, and August 16, 1960. The purpose of
validation is to separate valid bonds from those
which were looted in Germany during World
War II. Under the terms of the Agreement
on German External Debts, only obligations
which are validated by the Board are eligible
for payment.
Trade Agreement Signed
by U.S. and Spain
Press release 752 dated December 31
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
A trade agreement between the United States
and Spain was signed on December 31 at
Geneva. This agreement marks the completion
of the first of a series of negotiations under-
taken by Spain looking toward accession to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).
In this agreement, the first to be concluded
between the United States and Spain since initi-
ation of the trade agreements program in 1934,
the United States has agreed to reduce its duties
on seven import classifications which are shown
in the attached schedule. The principal com-
modities are olive oil in bulk and sherry-type
wines. U.S. imports from Spain of the prod-
ucts covered by the agreement amounted to
$11.8 million in 1961.
Spain granted tariff reductions or bindings
to the United States on approximately 50 items
in the Spanish tariff, accounting for commercial
imports from the United States in 1961 of
$29.3 million. Upon accession to the GATT,
Spain will benefit not only from the concessions
granted by the United States in this agreement
but also fi'om the direct rights acquired in con-
cessions already made to other countries within
the GATT.
The agreement was entered into within the
period provided for in section 257(c) of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which permits
(until December 31, 1962) the conclusion of
trade agreements based on public notices issued
in connection witli the 1960-61 GATT Tariff
Negotiations Conference. It is anticipated
that the initial stage of the U.S. reductions will
be placed in effect early in 1963 and the final
stage 1 year later.
SCHEDULE OF U.S. CONCESSIONS
Schedule A
No. (1957)
Brief description
Rate of duty-
U.S. im-
Tariff
paragraph
July 1, 1968
Under agreement
ports from
Spain, 19(il
($1,000)
First stage
Final stage
53
58
1425000
2290 200
8400 100
8712 500
1732640
(part)
1732600
(part)
1250 990
(part)
Olive oil, edible, 40 lb. or over
Eucalyptus oil
Natural iron-oxide and iron-hy-
droxide pigments.
Toilet soap, valued over 20!( per
lb.
Slierry-type wine, in containers
of 1 gallon or less.
Sherry-type wine, in containers
of over 1 gallon.
Capers
3}iipeT Ib..--
6%
20%,
2.92ji per lb._.
5%
18%,
2.6^ per lb..__
4%o
7,759
104
73
16%,
101
80
sy2%
$1.25 per gal-
lon.
$1.25 per gal-
lon.
20% ---
7><%
$1.12 per gal-
lon.
$1.12 per gal-
lon.
18%,
6K% .
223
804
804
1558
$1 per gallon- _
SI per gallon-.
16%
3,228
226
182
11,823
146
DEPARTJMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The 17th Session of the U.N. General Assembly:
Major Accomplishments
Statement hy Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the General Assenibly ^
Wlien the I7th General Assembly convened
exactly 3 months ago today, I reaffirmed most
emphatically the high significance that the Gov-
ernment of the United States attached to the
work of the United Nations, and I said we were
"more than ever convinced that the success or
failure of this organization could well mean
the difference between world order and world
anarchy."
Now, at the conclusion of this I7th General
Assembly, I should like to repeat that. I have
several reasons for this.
The U.N. and the Cuban Crisis
My first has to do with Cuba and the unfor-
gettable lesson about Communist tactics learned
by the people of the world as a result of that
crisis. It was a lesson learned only at the cost
of extreme international danger. Prompt
United States action taken in the Organiza-
tion of American States and in the Security
Council under the Charter of the U.N. were
contributing factors to the peaceful settlement
of the crisis. The United States hoped for such
a solution, but at all times we were prepared
to act in whatever manner necessity demanded
to eliminate this nuclear menace to all of the
Americas.
' Made at a press conference at U.N. Headquarters
on Dec. 21 ( U.S. delegation press release 4137) .
It was a classic example of United Nations
perf omiance in the manner contemplated by the
charter. The Security Council provided for
public discussion of our complaint by the
parties. It provided a means of focusing public
attention on the facts and the threat to peace
and security, and it provided through the Sec-
retai-y-General the means of consideration,
mediation, and negotiation.
Let me anticipate one of your questions and
speculate on what caused the Soviet Union to
have second thoughts about Cuba as an offensive
military base. I can mention at least three — •
the determmed United States stand which left
no room for doubt, the solidarity of the Latm
American nations, and the force of world opin-
ion against the Soviet maneuver.
As I have previously stated, I think President
Kennedy's firmness and prudence have been
richly rewarded. I am proud to have had a
part in the formulation of our policy and its ex-
ecution. And I am delighted that the peace-
keeping machinery of the U.N. functioned so
well and so effectively in this crisis which was
so dangerous to the world.
My appraisal, incidentally, of the role played
by the United Nations in the peaceful settlement
of this crisis over Cuba as an offensive-weapons
base is shared by Senator Albert Gore and Sen-
ator Gordon AUott, both members of the United
States delegation to this Assembly and both of
whom have contributed so much to the delibera-
JANUARY 28, 1963
147
tions of this session. Those of you who have
followed the work of the various committees
know something at least of this invaluable pub-
lic contribution.
I should also like to bring to your attention
some observations on the matter by a gentleman
most of you know quite well, Lester Pearson,
former Foreign Minister of Canada and a
former President of the General Assembly. I
believe I quote him accurately :
When you have a good ease, with strength to back
it, stand firm : without provocation or panic. When
action in defense of that ease has to be taken quickly,
and by yourself, bring that action before the United
Nations at once — as the U.S.A. did on this occasion.
The United Nations, once again, became the in-
dispensable agency through which the parties could
find a way out of a crisis, without war. I know the
United Nations can't force a solution on a great power
which doesn't want it. But you can't exaggerate its
importance as a means for finding and for supervising
a solution.
That, I think, just about sums it up.
However, I would not want to turn from the
question of Cuba leaving you with the mistaken
impression that the matter was entirely dis-
posed of. It is not. There are, as you know,
still some loose ends, and we are still negotiating
with the Eussians about them. I hope we will
have something definite to report in the near
future.
The U.N. Effort in the Congo
Joining the Cuban crisis as a predominant fac-
tor in any appraisal of this session of the Gen-
eral Assembly — although, again, you will not
find it on the agenda as such — is the Congo.
Here, once more, the United Nations looms large
in the picture, with 18,000 troops from S4 na-
tions participating from time to time in the
U.N. eif ort to maintain law and order.
Nonetheless, time is rimning out, and the uni-
fication of the Congo cannot be put off much
longer. The United States, therefore — as it has
from the beginning — wholeheartedly supports
Secretary-General U Thant's plan of national
reconciliation, which has as its principal pur-
pose ending the secession and the full integra-
tion of Katanga into the political and economic
life of the Congo.
At the present, in response to requests by the
Secretary-General, we are making available
equipment and are airlifting it to the Congo.
In addition, as ftirther evidence of the United
States resolve to stand iirmly behind the Secre-
tary-General, the President, as you know, has
named a special mission headed by Lieutenant
General Louis Truman to conduct a study of the
Congo situation.
It is our hope that the entire matter will be
settled in the shortest possible time.
Settlement of West New Guinea Problem
I think we should note, too, the role played by
the Secretary- General's initiative in West New
Guinea, or West Irian, depending on where you
come from. This was another serious threat to
international peace during 1962 that was effec-
tively met and countered by the United Nations.
It is no small satisfaction to me, either, that a
distinguished United States diplomat, Mr. Ells-
worth Bunker, was instriunental in helping the
Secretary-General find a formula for settlement.
To turn to matters debated in the Assembly
itself, two issues, I believe, stand out as among
the most important. These were the election of
the Secretary-General and acceptance of the ad-
visory opinion handed down by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice on the financial obliga-
tions of the membership to support the peace-
keeping activities of the United Nations, spe-
cifically, of course, the United Nations Emer-
gency Force and the Congo operations.
I have tied the two together because they
clearly demonstrate the intent of the majority
of the members to see to it that this organiza-
tion retains its integrity and basic purpose,
which is to keep the peace. Had there been any
other outcome — had we accepted a troika or had
we turned our back on tlie ICJ opinion— an ef-
fective United Nations would not have long
survived and tliis press conference, perhaps,
might have been in the nature of a wake.
Appointment of Secretary-General
As it is, we have been strengthened. The
charter's concept of the Secretary-General as a
strong, independent officer of this organization,
148
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I
committed to no country, has been decisively
rindicated. I can only say that we have been
fortiuiate indeed in the quality of the men we
have chosen, for they have helped shape this
office and have given it the stature and vitality it
now possesses.
U Thant has quietly and firmly sustained the
concept of his office, like his predecessors, and
that can only mean good for the organization
and its members, even those who have tried to
diminish it. I think his unanimous election
and the prestige he enjoys as the result of his
own labors are good omens that, if carried over
to difficulties that still face us, can help re-
solve them. But it is necessary for everyone in-
volved to demonstrate the same concern for the
organization and the same aspirations for man-
kind that he has enunciated.
The Problem of U.N. Financing
With regard to the wide support demon-
strated for the ICJ decision, which, inciden-
tally, again cut across the so-called "bloc votes"
that we continue to hear so much about, I do not
mean to convey the impression that it solves the
U.N.'s financial dilemma. Quite obviously it
doesn't, and financing remains the single most
important problem confronting the U.N. as an
organization. There is nothing particularly new
about this statement; it has been made with
timetable regularity almost from the first session
of the General Assembly.
Not only that ; there is the question of im-
plementing the ICJ decision, and at this pomt
I can only trust that when the time comes the
entire membership will again show it believes in
the rule of law. And I say this with equal em-
phasis to all.
To get back to the overall question of financ-
ing, however, it is high time to solve this peren-
nial problem once and for all. Otherwise all the
ideals of the charter face slow economic strangu-
lation.
I don't think there is much point in repeating
what has already been said about this. First of
all, it would keep you here for hours ; and sec-
ondly, what is needed now is not old recrimina-
tion but new imagination. That is why the
United States favors a special session of the
JANTTARY 28, 1963
General Assembly sometime this coming
spring — next year — to consider ways and means
of putting this organization on a sound finan-
cial footing. The working group set up in the
resolution just passed by the General Assembly
has a vital task to perform, and its recommen-
dations can do much to rid the U.N. of the
financial problems past and present that haunt
the corridors like a Scrooge before his
reformation.
That is why, too, we are in favor of the As-
sembly's extending to June 30th the time in
which pledges of U.N. bonds can be made by
member countries. By then I tnist the entire
$200 million issue will be sold, and this, of
course, will go a long way to advancing us on
the road to solvency.
To back up our words with action, we are
today delivering to the Secretary-General a
check m the amount of $15,569,840 for a second
purchase of United Nations bonds. This when
added to our initial purchase of $44,103,000
brings our purchases within a small amount of
the total so far purchased by other nations.
But, once again, the solution must be found
in the special session next year.
Colonial Problems in the U.N.
Now permit me to turn to an area in which
tlie U.N. has fulfilled — and continues to ful-
fill— one of its most vital functions. We see it
most clearly, I think, in the fact that, since its
organization 17 years ago, the U.N. has more
than doubled its membership.
The old colonial empires are dissolving, and
more than a billion people are marching onto
the stage of history as free and independent
participants.
This is a development particularly gratifying
to the United States, which recalls its own strug-
gles for liberty. We believe, therefore, as we
have believed from the very birth of our nation,
in a people's right to determine its own form
of government and to pursue life, liberty, and
happiness without interference or restraints ex-
cept the law of nations. And this belief shall
continue to shape our policy and aspirations.
I wish to emphasize this because there have
been some issues having to do with colonial
problems on which the United States and many
149
of its friends from the newly independent na-
tions have not always seen eye to eye. I don't
think we need stress these differences — mainly
because our areas of agreement are far greater
in number and in importance, but also because
1 feel it vital for all of us to realize that we
must work together to erase all the inherited
evils of colonialism.
But let us erase them with a realistic ap-
proach calculated to do good among people and
not just looh good on paper. In this sense we
were happy to support the resolution extend-
ing the mandate of the Committee of 17, which
now becomes the Committee of 24, because any
reference to target dates for independence was
eliminated. We feel the sponsors showed a
marked wisdom and understanding of the is-
sues involved, and this bodes well for the future
consideration of these problems.
Proposals on Which U.S. and U.S.S.R. Agreed
I think, incidentally, in discussing what was
accomplished during this session, it would be
well to acknowledge that, despite the gap that
separates us, the United States and the Soviet
Union have, from time to time, foimd them-
selves in agreement. I know this may sound
odd, but, the cold war to the contrary, it hap-
pens to be true, although it may disappoint some
who think the two can't agree on anything ex-
cept perhaps getting Soviet missiles out of Cuba.
We found it possible to reach agreement on
the peaceful uses of outer space, both bilaterally
and within the U.N. context. The hopes for
broader international cooperation in this area
were furthered significantly by the unanimously
passed resolution.
In another field where we and the U.S.S.R.
hold leading positions we found ready Soviet
agreement to the proposal that a third Interna-
tional Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy should be held in 1964.
Thus there is modest progress in both these
fields which will speed the earlier realization of
practical benefits by people all over the world.
And then there was the resolution on the eco-
nomic consequences of disarmament, which, it
should be stressed, mentions the words "dis-
armament imder international control."
150
Other Issues Before Assembly
As to some of the other issues that came before
the Assembly, I should like to offer a few brief
comments on the following :
Nuclear Testing. I would not say that an
ideal resolution evolved, but the position of the
United States and the United Kingdom was re-
flected in it, particularly on the crucial matter '
of inspection. As we stated during the debate,
as well as many times before and since, this y
problem can be easily solved when an adequate
inspection system is agreed upon.
Disarmament. This issue was wisely sent
back to Geneva, where the negotiations had
barely begim before the opening of the General
Assembly. With any luck, we should have more
to talk about next year.
The Question of Chinese Representation.
The vote in support of the United States posi-
tion that Communist China did not fulfill the'
charter obligation for membership in the
United Nations was even stronger this year
than it was last year. Communist China's un-
provoked attack on India was, of course, a fac-
tor in this, but also important was the
widespread feeling neither to expel the repre-
sentative of China nor to lose the benefit of its
continued presence among us.
The Korean Question also found greater
Assembly support for the United States posi-
tion and also, I will say, for the same reason.
This Assembly has become aware of the grow-
ing intransigence of North Korea, supported
as it is by Communist China.
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Re-
sources. We consider this resolution as passed
by the G.A. particularly noteworthy. It should
be reassuring to the world's business community
that the United Nations has now affirmed that
foreign investment agreements freely entered
into with sovereign states shall be faithfully
observed. In a sense this is a statement of obli-
gations the sovereign state has to those who in-
vest in it, and it should therefore help stimu-
late the flow of investment capital which can
do so much to build the underdeveloped coun-
tries of the world. As such, tlie importance of
this action by the United Nations cannot be em-
phasized too strongly.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
II might say in passing that more and more
businessmen are beginning to appreciate what a
practical as well as personal stake they have in
the United Nations. We are beginning to see,
for example, the economic stimulation that
:omes from such pi'ograms as the Alliance for
Progress and the Decade of Development, as
well as the business opportunities being de-
veloped by such United Nations agencies as the
Special Fund and the World Bank. I will have
more to say on this, however, at a later time.
Hungary. I should like to stress that the
United States basic position on the question of
Hungary has not changed. We still feel, as we
have all along, that the United Nations has a
special responsibility toward the people of
Hungary; however, we also feel that more will
be accomplished by shifting from a United Na-
tions representation of little effect to the posi-
tive representation of the Secretary-General,
who, we hope, will find new prospects for solv-
ing the issue.
I should also like to stress that it was at the
initiative of the United States that the Hun-
garian item was placed on the agenda of this
(ieneral Assembly. In the same spirit we in-
tend to move forward with a new approach that
will be of benefit to the Hungarian people.
Palestine Refugees. This is an issue
involving one of the most urgent problems be-
fi)re the United Nations. Wliat concerns us
Iiere is people — seeking a fair and responsible
solution that will take them out of the void in
which they are now existing.
Although we originally favored a 1-year ex-
tension of the UNRWA [United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East] mandate, we deferred to a num-
ber of views of other interested delegations that
felt, for administrative reasons, it should be for
2 years. We still feel that United Nations as-
sistance to the Palestine refugees should be sub-
ject to examination by every regvdar session of
the General Assembly, and this view is not al-
tered by the fact that we voted for the 2-year
extension.
In connection with the Palestine issue I
should also like to express my gratification to
the parties involved for not pressing to the vote
their resolutions calling for direct negotiations
and for the appointment of a United Nations
custodian in Israel. It was, as we repeatedly
said, the wisest course to follow, for one of the
greatest lessons we have in the U.N. is the wis-
dom of steering clear of unrealistic resolutions
that cannot reach fruition.
United Nations Research and Training In-
stitute. The Assembly authorized the study of
the desirability of establishing a United Na-
tions institute which would arrange for the
training of nationals of member countries for
service with the U.N. system and which would
also serve as a center for research on problems
of concern to the U.N. This could be a signif-
icant steji forward toward strengthening the
U.N.'s effectiveness as an operating institution.
Population Growth and Economic Develop-
nfient. The Assembly adopted a resolution on
population which was at once historic in its
recognition of the problem and moderate in its
recommendations.
Increasing Number of Agenda Items
Any appraisal of the I7th General Assembly
must, of necessity, take into account the stag-
gering number of agenda items that have come
up for debate. Each year not only does the
wox-k load of the Assembly gi"ow, but so does
the membership and, therefore, the number of
nations that join in the debate. This, of course,
is as it should be, for everyone desiring to should
be heard on any or all issues.
At the same time, however, the situation does
present us with certain practical questions, ones
I am not alone in raising. I do not propose to
offer any answers at this time, but it is obvious
that they must be foimd. Perhaps the commit-
tee set up by the Assembly can find some.
The issues of peace and freedom and a better
life and justice for all are far too urgent and
grave to be buried under an avalanche of rhet-
oric or to be tied up in procedural knots the
cutting of which would defy even an Alexander
the Great. The issues demand our attention,
not our boredom, and we must rise to this de-
mand if we are to discharge our responsibilities
to history.
JANUARY 28, 1963
151
Under the circumstances and in view of the
staggering agenda that we are on the verge of
completing, no tribute that I could pay to the
President of the I7th General Assemblj', Za-
frulla Khan, would be adequate. Let me just
say that he has performed magnificently and
has set a notable example of parliamentary
efficiency, fairmindedness, and tact. I salute
him.
Viewing the work of the 17th General As-
sembly as a whole, it has, I think, compiled a
worthwhile and even enviable record, and that
record will show that the areas of agreement
between the United States and the majority
were greater by far than those of disagreement.
And where we did disagree, the reasons had to
do not so much with basic objectives as with
differences in emphasis.
The U.S. and the U.N.
With this in mind I should like to review
and, perhaps, restate some of those basic objec-
tives, as well as considerations, that impel the
United States to offer its strong support to the
United Nations.
First, I believe it would be well to remember
that the U.N. is not a sovereign power. Rather
it is an instrument in the hands of its members,
an instrument dedicated by its charter to certain
common aims of peace, progress, and justice, to
a world order solid enough so that no nation
need be stronger than its neighbor in order to be
secure.
To achieve that world order, the emerging na-
tions need help in two areas: help to protect
them from aggression and war and help to en-
able them to stand on their own feet eco-
nomically.
These are the vital fimctions of the United
Nations: defending nations and building na-
tions. And if you followed the proceedings of
the General Assembly from day to day, inciden-
tally— as you ladies and gentlemen of the press
most assuredly did — I think you found that the
organization also functioned as a school for the
new nations, a school not only of the technique
of diplomacy and debate but, more basically, a
school of tolerance and accommodation.
Let me sum up by saying that the United
States has an aim in this world, and it is a far
better and more mature aim than that of com-
munism. Our aim is to build a commimity of
nations, diverse, tolerant, and genuinely in-
dependent, but bound together by a sense of
common humanity and by a common interest in
peace and progress. In such a community every
nation and every man, strong or weak, will have
the greatest chance to develop the milimited pos-
sibilities of freedom that they then will be able
to hand down to future generations.
To build this community, the U.N. is the most
effective instrument available to us. Its spirit
is that of community, tolerance, give-and-take.
Its method is parliamentary diplomacy, debat-
ing, voting, the writing and rewriting of resolu-
tions, clays and nights of discussion and careful
listening.
And I would add, no wonder the United
States is successful at it, and no wonder the
majority supports our views, because the spirit
and the method of the U.N. are second nature to
American democracy — and basically alien to
the habits of dictatorsliip.
The events of the months since the opening
of the Assembly debates on September 20th have
amply demonstrated that we cannot for a mo-
ment relax our vigilance. Pi-eserving the peace
is a full-time operation commanding more than
dedication and ideals, but courage too. For
peace will not be maintained by surrender to at-
tempted terror, only by standing firm against it.
All of you are familiar with Abraham Lin-
coln's classic comment about not being able to
fool aU the people all of the time. We trust
that the people of the world will not permit
themselves to be fooled again by mere pious dec-
larations of peaceful intent. As I said earlier,
they learned a lesson from Cuba and they will
not forget it.
They are also, I believe, learning another les-
son as a result of the Chinese Communist attack
on India, and they will not forget that either.
And bearing these lessons in mind, now is
the time, I believe, for us to appraise the issues
of our day and to meet them realistically. If
we do, if we guide ourselves by the vision of a
free world at peace as specified in the charter,
perhaps we shall yet fulfill the aspirations of
one whose birth 1,962 years ago we celebrate a
few days from now.
152
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
J.S. and Soviet Union Report
to U.N. on Cuban Tail<s
FoUoioing is the text of a Utter to U.N. Sec-
-etary-General U Thant from U.S. Representa-
tive Adlai E. Stevenson and Soviet First
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vassily V.
Kuznetsov.
a.N. doc. S/5227
January 7, 1963
On behalf of the Governments of the United
States of America and the Soviet Union we de-
sire to express to you our appreciation for your
sfforts in assisting our Governments to avert
the serious threat to the peace which recently
arose in the Caribbean area.
While it has not been possible for our Gov-
ernments to resolve all the problems that have
arisen in connexion with this affair, they be-
lieve that, in view of the degree of understand-
ing reached between them on the settlement of
the crisis and the extent of progress in the
implementation of this understanding, it is not
necessaiy for this item to occupy further the
attention of the Security Coimcil at this time.
The Governments of the United States of
America and of the Soviet Union express the
hope that the actions taken to avert the threat
of war in connexion with this crisis will lead
toward the adjustment of other differences be-
tween them and the general easing of tensions
that could cause a further threat of war.
Adlai E. Stevenson
Permanent Representa-
tive of the United
States to the United
Nations
V. KUZNETSOV
First Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs of
the USSR
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Recess Appointments
The President on January 7 appointed Olcott H.
Deming to be Ambassador to Uganda. (For bio-
graphic details, see White House press release (Palm
Beach, Fla.) dated January 7.)
The President on December 29 appointed Bill Moyers
to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps. (For bio-
graphic details, see White House press release (Palm
Beach, Fla.) dated December 29.)
Appointments
Mrs. Catherine Dorris Norrell as Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, ef-
fective January 7. (For biographic details, see De-
partment of State press release 654 dated Novem-
ber 2.)
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Aviation
Agreement on joint financing of certain air naviga-
tion services in Iceland.
Agreement on joint financing of certain air naviga-
tion services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands.
Done at Geneva September 25, 1956. Entered into
force June 6, 1958. TIAS 4048 and 4049,
respectively.
Acceptaiice deposited: France, November 20, 1962.
Telecommunications
Telegraph regulations (Gieneva revision, 1958) annexed
to the international telecommunication convention
of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with appendixes
and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29,
1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS
4390.
Notifications of approval: Brazil, November 19, 1962'
Dominican Republic, November 21, 1962.
International telecommunication convention with six
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959.
Entered into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United
States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
Ratification deposited: France; group of territories
represented by the French Overseas Post and
Telecommunication Agency (Comoro Islands,
French Somaliland, New Caledonia and dependen-
cies, French Polynesia, St. Pierre and Miquelon,
French southern and Antarctic territories, Wallis
and Futuna) ; the Anglo-French Condominium of
the New Hebrides, November 19, 1962.
Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the in-
ternational telecommunication convention, 19.59.
Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into
force May 1, 1961 ; for the United States October 23,
1961. TIAS 4893.
'Notification of approval: Brazil, November 19, 1962.
Trade
Long-term arrangements regarding international trade
in cotton textiles. Concluded at Geneva February
9, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962.
Accession deposited: Mexico, December 11, 1962.
JANUARY 28, 1963
153
BILATERAL
Canada
Agreement providing for the establishment and opera-
tion in Canada of a command and data acquisition
station. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa
December 28, 1962. Entered into force December 28,
1962.
Czechoslovakia
Agreement relating to the issuance of multiple entry
visas to diplomatic personnel. Effected by exchange
of notes at Prague December 18 and 21, 1962. En-
tered into force December 21, 1962.
European Economic Community
Agreement to rectify part I of schedule XX (United
States) in annex A to protocol to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade embodying results of
1960-61 tariff conference. Effected by exchange of
letters at Geneva December 11 and 18, 1962. En-
tered into force December 18, 1962.
Jamaica
Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Kingston December
11, 1962, and January 4, 1963. Entered into force
January 4, 1963.
Japan
Agreement to rectify part I of the U.S. schedule an-
nexed to protocol to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade embodying results of 1960-61
tariff conference. Effected by exchange of letters at
Geneva December 18, 1962. Entered into force De-
cember 18, 1962.
Agreement supplementary to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade to provide compensatory con-
cessions for increases in certain import duties.
Signed at Geneva December 31, 1962. Entered into
force December 31, 1962.
Korea
Consular convention. Signed at Seoul January 8. 1963.
Enters into force on 30th day following the day of
exchange of ratifications.
Agreement amending the memorandum of interpre-
tation to the agreement of April 22 and May 2,
1955 (TIAS 3264), relating to duty-free entry and
defrayment of inland transportation charges on re-
lief supplies and packages. Effected by exchange
of notes at Seoul November 9 and December 28,
1962. Entered into force December 28, 1962.
Somali Republic
Agreement further extending the technical cooperation
program agreement between the United States and
Italy of June 28, 1954, as amended (TIAS 31.50,
4915). Effected by exchange of notes at Mogadiscio
December 28 and 31, 1962. Entered into force
December 31, 1962.
Spain
Interim agreement pursuant to article XXXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed
at Geneva December 31, 1962. Entered into force
December 31, 1962.
Switzerland
Agreement to rectify part I of U.S. schedule in annex
C of protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade embodying results of 1960-61 tariff con-
ference. Effected by exchange of letters at Geneva
and Bern December 11 and 27, 1962. Entered into
force December 27, 1962.
Agreement modifying section A of schedule I of re-
ciprocal trade agreement of January 9, 1936, as
modified (49 Stat. 3917; TIAS 4379). Effected by
exchange of notes January IS and December 20 and
28, 1962. Entered into force January 1, 1963.'
' Supersedes item in Bulletin of Apr. 9, 1962, p. 610.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 7-13
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25,
D.C.
Release issued prior to January 7 which ap-
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 752 of
December 31.
Subject
Wolfe and Bowman to implement
cultural presentations program re-
port (biographic details).
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
U.S. delegation to U.N. science con-
ference (rewrite).
P.L. 480 currency available for sale
to U.S. tourists in Cairo.
Rusk: U.N. science conference.
Mrs. Xorrell sworn in as Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for Educational
and Cultural Affairs (biographic
details).
U.S. short-term credit to Brazil.
U.S. and Korea sign consular con-
vention.
Reception for NATO ambassadors.
Trade agreement proclamations.
Cottrell designated Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs (biographic details).
Swiss representatives visit U.S.
citizens imprisoned in Cuba.
Sherman appointed to Validation
Board for German Dollar Bonds
(rewrite).
Joint communique and aide memoire
on Panama Canal talks.
Rusk : interview on Berlin.
Blumenthal: "The World Coffee
Agreement and United States
Foreign Economic Policy" (re-
No.
Dat
*4
1/7
*5
1/7
t6
1/7
t7
1/7
t8
*9
1/7
1/7
10
tn
1/7
1/8
*12
13
»14
1/8
1/8
1/8
15
1/9
16
1/9
tl7 1/10
18
tl9
1/11
1/11
20
21
1/11
1/11
1/11
vised).
Transcript
Briefing:
Manning :
23 1/12
of "State Department
: Disarmament."
.„ _„. "U.S. Foreign Policy:
Problems and Challenges for 1963."
Lyerly designated Deputy Adminis-
trator, Bureau of Security and
Consular Affairs (biographic
details).
U.S.-U.S.S.R. talks on disarmament.
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
154
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTILLETIN
anuarv 28. 1003
Index
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1231
.tomic Energy
jms Control and Disarmament (transcript of
television program) H5
Usk and Security in the Age of Nuclear Weap-
ons (Foster) 128
•.S. and U.S.S.R. Discuss Issues of Nuclear Test-
ing and Disarmament 127
Jrazil. U.S. Makes Short-Term Credit Available
to Brazil 1^
"ommunism. U.S. Foreign Policy: Problems
and Challenges for 1963 (Manning) .... 138
3uba
5wiss Representatives Visit Americans Impris-
oned in Cuba 137
J.S. and Soviet Union Report to U.N. on Cuban
Talks (Kuznetsov, Stevenson) 153
J.S. Foreign Policy : Problems and Challenges
for 1963 (Manning) 138
Department and Foreign Service
ippoiutments (Norrell) 153
Recess Appointments (Deniing, Moyers) . . . 153
Disarmament
irms Control and Disarmament (transcript of
television program) 115
Risk and Security in the Age of Nuclear Weap-
ons (Foster) 128
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Discuss Issues of Nuclear Test-
ing and Disarmament 127
Economic Affairs
President Concurs in Findings on Three Escape-
Clause Actions 145
Recent Trade Agreements Made Effective . . . 145
Saul Sherman Named to German Dollar Bond
Validation Board 146
Trade Agreement Signed by U.S. and Spain . . 146
U.S. Makes Short-Term Credit Available to
Brazil 144
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Mrs. Norrell
appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary . . . 153
Europe. U.S. Foreign Policy : Problems and
Challenges for 1963 (Manning) 138
Foreign Aid. Moyers appointed Deputy Di-
rector, Peace Corps 153
Germany
Saul Sherman Named to German Dollar Bond
Validation Board 146
Secretary Discusses Berlin in Filmed Interview . 135
International Organizations and Conferences.
Arms Control and Disarmament (transcript
of television program) 115
Presidential Documents
President Exchanges New Year's Messages With
Soviet Leaders 137
United States Assures Saudi Arabia of Support
and Friendship 144
Protection of Nationals. Swiss Representa-
tives Visit Americans Imprisoned in Cuba . . 137
Saudi Arabia. United States Assures Saudi
Arabia of Support and Friendship (Kennedy) . 144
Spain. Trade Agreement Signed by U.S. and
Spain 146
Switzerland. Swiss Representatives Visit Amer-
icans Imprisoned in Cuba 137
Treaty Information
Current Actions 153
Trade Agreement Signed by U.S. and Spain . . 146
Uganda. Deming appointed Ambassador . . 153
U.S.S.R.
Arms Control and Disarmament (transcript of
television program) 115
President Exchanges New Year's Messages With
Soviet Leaders (texts of messages) .... 137
U.S. and Soviet Union Report to U.N. on Cuban
Talks (Kuznetsov, Stevenson) 153
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Discuss Issues of Nuclear Test-
ing and Disarmament 127
United Kingdom. Recent Trade Agreements
Made Effective 145
United Nations
The 17th Session of the U.N. General Assembly :
Major Accomplishments (Stevenson) . . . 147
U.S. and Soviet Union Report to U.N. on Cuban
Talks (Kuznetsov, Stevenson) 153
Name Index
Bechhoefer, Bemhard G 115
Brezhnev, Leonid 137
Carey, James B 115
Corea, Luis F 115
Dean, Arthur H 115
Deming, Olcott H 153
Foster, William C 115,128
Gilpatric, Roswell L 115
Kennedy, President 137, 144
Khrushchev, Nikita 137
Kuznetsov, Vassily V 153
Manning, Robert J 138
Moyers, Bill 153
Norrell, Mrs. Catherine Dorris 153
Orlansky, Mrs. Jesse 115
Rusk, Secretary 115,135
Sherman, Saul L 146
Steele, John 115,135
Stevenson, Adlai E 147,153
Stevenson, Eric 115
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING 0FFICE;1963
the
Department
of
State
United States
Government Printing Office
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Washington 25, D.C.
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, $300
(SPO)
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Foreign Relations
of the United States
1941, VOL. VII
THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS
The Department of State recently released Foreign Relations of
the United States, 19U^ Volume VII, The American Republics.
This publication is one of two voliunes on relations with the Ameri-
can Republics in 1941 in the Department's series of annual volumes.
A large part of the documentation relates to cooperation in plans for
hemisphere defense in view of the danger presented by the war in
Europe. Volume VII contains sections on bilateral relations with
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Volume VI, still in
process of preparation, will, in addition to documentation of bilateral
relations with the remainder of the American Republics, contain a
section on United States multilateral relations with these Republics.
There also will be two volumes covering United States relations
with the American Republics, 1942. Voliune V, containing docu-
mentation on bilateral relations with Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil,
was released in Jime 1962. Volmne VI, with subjects relating for
the most part to cooperation of the other American Republics with
the United States against the Axis Powers, will be released most
probably during March 1963.
Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 19^1, Volume
VII, The American Repuhlics (Publication 7447) may be purchased
from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office,
Washington 25, D.C, for $3.25. Copies of Volume V for 1942, "The
American Republics" (Publication 7373) at $3.00 per copy, are still
available from the same source.
To:
Order Form
Supt. of Documents
Govt. Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.
Please send me copies of Foreign Relations of the United
States, The. American Republics :
1941, Vol. VII, Publication 7447 $3.25 Q
1942, Vol. V, Publication 7373 $3.00 Q
Enclosed find:
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(cash, check, or money
order payable to
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E DEPARTMENT OF STATE
. t'Hi
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1232
February 4, 1963
THE STATE OF THE UNION • Address of the President
to the Congress (^Excerpts) 159
:iAL
LY RECORD
ED STATES
IGN POLICY
ii
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONGO: THREE
QUESTIONS • by Assistant Secretary Clevelan^l .... 165
UNITED STATES TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE
NEW EUROPE:
THE CHALLENGE AND THE OPPORTUNITIES
• by Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II ,
174
Boston Public Library
Superintendent ot Documents
FEB 12 1963
DEPOSITORY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEFWRTIVIENT OF ST7VTE
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1232 • Publication 7486
February 4, 1963
For lale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Qoverament Printing Office
Washington 26, D.C.
Price:
E2 issues, domestic $8.60, foreign J12.26
Single copy, 25 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
o? State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed In the
Beaders' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well aa
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
The State of the Union
ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS (EXCERPTS) i
Little more than a hundred weeks ago I as-
sumed the office of President of the United
States. In seeking the help of the Congress
and my countrymen, I pledged no easy answers.
I pledged — and asked — only toil and dedication.
These the Congress and the people have given
in good measure. And today, having witnessed
in recent months a heightened respect for our
national purpose and power, having seen the
courageous calm of a maited people in a perilous
hour, and having observed a steady improve-
ment in the o^jportunities and well-being of our
citizens, I can report to you that the state of
this old but youthful Union is good.
In the world beyond our borders, steady prog-
ress has been made in building a world of order.
The people of West Berlin remain free and
secure. A settlement, though still precarious,
has been reached in Laos. The spearpoint of ag-
gression has been blunted in South Viet-Nam.
The end of agony may be in sight in the Congo.
The doctrine of troika is dead. And, while
danger continues, a deadly threat has been re-
moved from Cuba.
At home, the recession is behind us. Well
over a million more men and women are work-
ing today than were working 2 years ago. The
average factory workweek is once again more
than 40 hours; our industries are turning out
more goods than ever before; and more than
half of the manufacturing capacity that lay
silent and wasted 100 weeks ago is humming
with activity.
'Delivered on Jan. 14 (H. Doc. 1, 88th Cong., 1st
s.-SS.).
In short, both at home and abroad, there may
now be a temptation to relax. For the road
has been long, the burden heavy, and the pace
consistently urgent.
But we cannot be satisfied to rest here. This
is the side of the hill, not the top. The mere
absence of war is not peace. The mere absence
of recession is not growth. We have made a
beginning — but we have only begmi.
Now the time has come to make the most
of our gains — to translate the renewal of our
national strength into the achievement of our
national purpose.
Domestic Vitality and World Leadership
. . . upon our achievement of greater vital-
ity and strength at home hang our fate and
future in the world : our ability to sustain and
supply the security of free men and nations;
our ability to command their respect for our
leadership; our ability to expand our trade
without threat to our balance of payments ; and
our ability to adjust to the changmg demands of
cold-war competition and challenge.
We shall be judged more by what we do at
home than what we preach abroad. Nothing
we could do to help the developmg countries
would help them half as much as a booming
American economy, which consumes their raw
materials. And nothing our opponents could
do to encourage their own ambitions would en-
courage them half so much as a lagging U.S.
economy. These domestic tasks do not divert
our energy from our security — they provide
FEBRUARY 4, 1963
159
m
the very foundation for freedom's survival and
success.
Scientific and Military Superiority
Turning to the world outside, it was only a
few years ago — in Southeast Asia, Africa,
Eastern Europe, Latin America, even in outer
space — that communism sought to convey the
image of a imified, confident, and expanding
empire, closing in on a sluggish America and
a free world in disarray. But few people
would hold to that picture today.
In these past months, we have reaffinned the
scientific and military superiority of freedom.
We have doubled our efforts in space, to assure
us of being first in the future. We have under-
taken the most far-reaching defense improve-
ments in the peacetime history of this country.
And we have maintained the frontiers of free-
dom from Viet-Nam to West Berlin.
But complacency or self-congratulation can
imperil our security as much as the weapons of
our adversary. A moment of pause is not a
promise of peace. Dangerous problems remain
from Cuba to the South China Sea. The
world's prognosis prescribes not a year's vaca-
tion, but a year of obligation and opportunity.
Four special avenues of opportimity stand
out: the Atlantic alliance, the developing na-
tions, the new Sino-Soviet difficulties, and the
search for worldwide peace.
Tlie Atlantic Alliance
First, how fares the grand alliance? Free
Europe is entering into a new phase of its long
and brilliant history. The era of colonial ex-
pansion has passed ; the era of national rivalries
is fading ; and a new era of interdependence and
unity is taking shape. Defying the old proph-
ecies of Marx, consenting to what no conqueror
could ever compel, the free nations of Europe
are moving toward a unity of purpose and
power and policy in every sphere of activity.
For 17 years this movement has had our con-
sistent support, both political and economic.
Far from resenting the new Europe, we regard
her as a welcome partner, not a rival. For the
road to world peace and freedom is still very
long, and there are burdens which only full
partners can share — in supporting the common
defense, in expanding world trade, in alining
our balance of payments, in aiding the emergent
nations, in concerting political and economic
policies, and in welcoming to our common effort
other industrialized nations, notably Japan,
whose remarkable economic and political de-
velopment of the 1950's permits it now to play
on the world scene a major constructive role.
No doubt differences of opinion will continue
to get more attention than agreements on ac-
tion, as Europe moves from independence to
more formal interdependence. But these are
honest differences among honorable associates —
more real and frequent, in fact, among our
West European allies than between them and
the United States. For the unity of freedom
has never relied on uniformity of opinion, for-
tunately. But the basic agreement of this al-
liance on fundamental issues continues.
Tlie Nassau Agreement
The first task of the alliance remains the
common defense. Last month Prime Minister
Macmillan and I laid plans for a new stage in
our long cooperative effort, one which aims to
assist in the wider task of framing a common
nuclear defense for the whole alliance.
The Nassau agreement- recognizes that the
security of the West is indivisible, and so must
be our defense. But it also recognizes that this
is an alliance of proud and sovereign nations,
and works best when we do not forget it. It
recognizes further that the nuclear defense of
the West is not a matter for the present nuclear
powers alone, that France will be such a power
in the future, and that ways must be found
without increasing the hazards of nuclear diffu-
sion, to increase the role of our other partners
in planning, manning, and directing a truly
multilateral nuclear force within an increasing-
ly intimate NATO alliance. Finally, the
Nassau agreement recognizes that nuclear de-
fense is not enough, that the agreed NATO
levels of conventional strength must be met, and
that the NATO alliance cannot afford to be in
a position of having to answer every threat
with nuclear weapons or nothing.
' For text, see Buixetin of Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.
160
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BTTLLETrN
We remain too near the Nassau decisions, and
too far from their final realization, to know
their final place in history. But I believe that,
for the first time, the door is open for the nu-
clear defense of the alliance to become a source
of confidence, instead of a cause of contention.
The next most pressing concern of the alliance
is our common economic goals of trade and
growth. This Nation continues to be concerned
about its balance-of-payments deficit, which, de-
spite its decline, remains a stubborn and
troublesome problem. We believe, moreover,
that closer economic ties among all free nations
are essential to prosperity and peace. And
neither we nor the members of the Common
Market are so affluent that we can long afford to
shelter high-cost farms or factories from the
winds of foreign competition, or to restrict the
channels of trade with other nations of the free
world. If the Common Market should now
move toward protectionism and restrictionism,
it would undermine its own basic principles.
This Government means to use the authority
conferred on it last year by the Congress to en-
courage trade expansion on both sides of the
Atlantic and around the world.
The Developing Nations
Second, what of the developing and non-
alined nations? They were shocked by the
Soviets' sudden and secret attempt to trans-
form Cuba into a nuclear striking base, and by
Communist China's arrogant invasion of India.
They have been reassured by our prompt assist-
ance to India, by our support through the
United Nations of the Congo's imification, by
our patient search for disarmament, and by the
improvement in our treatment of citizens and
visitors whose skins do not happen to be white.
And as the older colonialism recedes, and the
neocolonialism of the Commimist powers stands
out more starkly than ever, they realize more
clearly that the issue in the world struggle is
not commimism versus capitalism, but coercion
versus free choice.
They realize that the longing for independ-
ence is the same the world over, whether it is
the independence of West Berlin or Viet-Nam.
They realize that such independence runs
athwart all Communist ambitions but is in keep-
ing with our own — and that our approach to
their needs is resilient and resourceful, while the
Communists rely on ancient doctrines and old
dogmas.
Nevertheless it is hard for any nation to
focus on an external or subversive threat to its
independence when its energies are drained in
daily combat with the forces of poverty and
despair. It makes little sense for us to assail,
in speeches and resolutions, the horrors of com-
munism, to spend $50 billion a year to prevent
its military advance, and then to begrudge
spending, largely on American products, less
than one-tenth of that amount to help other
nations strengthen their independence and cure
the social chaos in which communism always
has thrived.
Mutual Defense and Assistance Program
I am proud — and I think most Americans
are proud — of a mutual defense and assistance
program, evolved with bipartisan support in
three administrations, which has, with all of
its recognized problems, contributed to the fact
that not a single one of the nearly 50 U.N.
members to gain independence since the Second
World War has succumbed to Communist
control.
I am proud of a program and of a country
that has helped to arm and feed and clothe
millions of people on the frontlines of
freedom.
I am especially proud that this country has
put forward for the 1960's a vast cooperative
effort to achieve economic growth and social
progress throughovit the Americas — the Alli-
ance for Progress.
I do not underestimate the difficulties that we
face in this mutual effort among our close
neighbors, but the free states of this hemisphere,
working in close collaboration, have begun to
make this Alliance a reality. Today it is feed-
ing one out of every four school-age children
in Latin America an extra food ration from our
farm surplus. It has distributed 1.5 million
schoolbooks and is building 17,000 classrooms.
It has helped resettle tens of thousands of farm
families on land they can call their own. It is
stimulating our good neighbors to more self-
help and reform — fiscal, social, institutional,
FEBRUARY 4, 1963
161
and land reforms. It is bringing housing and
hope and healtli to millions who were pre-
viously forgotten. The men and women of
this hemisphere know that the Alliance would
not succeed if it were only another name for
U.S. handouts — that it can succeed only as the
Latin American nations themselves devote their
best effort to fulfilling its goals.
Tlie story is the same in Africa, in the Middle
East, in Asia. Wlierever nations are willing to
help themselves, we stand ready to help them
build new bulwarks of freedom. We are not
purchasing votes for the cold war; we have
gone to the aid of imperiled nations, neutrals
and allies alike. Wliat we do ask — and all that
we ask — is tliat our help be used to the best ad-
vantage, and that their own efforts not be di-
verted by needless quaiTels with other inde-
pendent nations.
Despite all its past achievements, the con-
tinued progress of the mutual assistance pro-
gram requires a persistent discontent with
present progress. We have been reorganizing
this program to make it a more effective and
efficient instrument, and that process will con-
tinue this year.
But free-world development will still be an
uphill struggle. Governmental aid can only
supplement the role of private investment, trade
expansion, and commodity stabilization, and,
above all, internal self-improvement. The pro-
cesses of growth are gradual — bearing fruit in
a decade, not in a day. Our successes will
neither be quick nor dramatic. But if these
programs were ever to be ended, our failures in
a dozen countries would be sudden and would
be certain.
The Peace Corps
Neither money nor technical assistance, how-
ever, can be our only weapon against poverty.
In the end, the crucial effort is one of purpose,
requiring not only the fuel of finance but the
torch of idealism. And nothing carries the
spirit of American idealism and expresses our
hopes better and more effectively to the far cor-
ners of the earth than the Peace Corps.
A year ago, less than 900 Peace Corps volun-
teers were on the job. A year from now they
will number more than 9,000 — men and women,
aged 18 to 79, willing to give 2 years of their
lives to helping people in other lands.
There are, in fact, nearly 1 million Americans
serving their coimtry and the cause of freedom
in overseas posts, a record no other people can
match. Surely those of us who stay at home
should be glad to help indirectly — by siipport-
ing our aid programs ; by openmg our doors to
foreign visitors and diplomats and students;
and by proving, day by day, by deed as well as
by word, that we are a just and generous people.
Disarray of Communist Empire
Third, what comfort can we take from the
increasing strains and tensions within the Com-
munist bloc? Here liope must be tempered
with caution. For the Soviet-Chinese disagree-
ment is over means, not ends. A dispute over
how to bury the West is no grounds for Western
rejoicing.
Nevertheless, while a strain is not a fracture,
it is clear that the forces of diversity are at
work inside the Communist camp, despite all
the iron disciplines of regimentation and all the
iron dogmatisms of ideology. Marx is proven
wrong once again : for it is the closed Commu-
nist societies, not the free and open societies,
which carry within themselves the seeds of in-
ternal disintegration.
This disarray of the Commimist empire has
been heightened by two other formidable forces.
One is the historic force of nationalism and the
yearning of all men to be free. The other is
the gross inefficiency of their economies. For
a closed society is not open to ideas of progress,
and a police state finds it cannot command the
grain to grow.
New nations asked to choose between two
competing systems need only compare condi-
tions in East and West Germany, Eastern and
Western Europe, North and South Viet-Nara.
They need only compare the disillusionment of
Communist Cuba with the promise of a hemi-
sphere Alliance for Progress. And all the
world knows that no successful system builds a
wall to keep its people in and freedom out, and
that the wall of shame dividing Berlin is a
symbol of Communist failure.
162
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The Search for Enduring Peace
Finally, what can we do to move from the
pi-esent pause toward enduring peace? Again
I would counsel caution. I foresee no spec-
tacular reversal in Communist methods or
goals. But if all these trends and develop-
ments can persuade the Soviet Union to walk
the path of peace, then let her know that all
free nations will join with her. But until that
choice is made, and until the world can develop
a reliable system of international security, the
free peoples have no choice but to keep their
arms near.
This country, therefore, continues to require
the best defense in the world — a defense wliich
is suited to the sixties. This means, unfortu-
nately, a rising defense budget — for there is no
substitute for adequate defense, and no "bar-
gain basement" way of achieving it. It means
the expenditure of more than $15 billion this
year on nuclear weapons systems alone, a sum
which is about equal to the combined defense
budgets of our European allies.
But it also means improved air and missile
defenses, improved civil defense, a strength-
ened antiguerrilla capacity, and, of prime
importance, more powerful and flexible non-
nuclear forces. For threats of massive retalia-
tion may not deter piecemeal aggression — and
a line of destroyers in a quarantine, or a divi-
sion of well-equipped men on a border, may be
more useful to our real security than the multi-
plication of awesome weapons beyond all
rational need.
But our commitment to national safety is
not a commitment to expand our Military
Establishment indefinitely. We do not dismiss
disarmament as an idle dream. For we believe
that, in the end, it is the only way of assuring
the security of all without impairing the inter-
ests of any. Nor do we mistake honorable
negotiation for appeasement. Wliile we shall
never weary in the defense of freedom, neither
shall we abandon the pursuit of peace.
Role of the United Nations
In this quest the United Nations requires our
full and continued support. Its value in serv-
ing the cause of peace has been shown anew in
its role in the West New Guinea settlement, in
its use as a forum for the Cuban crisis, and in
its task of imification in the Congo. Today the
United Nations is primarily the protector of
the small and the weak, and a safety valve for
the strong. Tomorrow it can form the frame-
work for a world of law — a world in which no
nation dictates the destiny of another, and in
which the vast resources now devoted to de-
structive means will serve constructive ends.
In short, let our adversaries choose. If they
choose peaceful competition, they shall have it.
If they come to realize that their ambitions can-
not succeed — if they see that their "wars of
liberation" and subversion will ultimately fail ;
if they recognize that there is more security in
accepting inspection than in permitting new na-
tions to master the black arts of nuclear
weapons and war; and if they are willing to
turn their energies, as we are, to the great un-
finished tasks of our own peoples — then, surely,
the areas of agreement can be very wide indeed :
a clear understanding about Berlin, stability in
Southeast Asia, an end to nuclear testing, new
checks on surprise or accidental attack, and,
ultimately, general and complete disarmament.
Worldwide Victory of Men
For we seek not the worldwide victory of one
nation or system but a worldwide victory of
men. The modern globe is too small, its
weapons too destructive — they multiply too
fast — and its disorders too contagious to permit
any other kind of victory.
To achieve this end the United States will
continue to si)end a greater portion of its na-
tional production than any other people in the
free world. For 15 years no other free nation
has demanded so much of itself. Through hot
wars and cold, through recession and prosper-
ity, through the ages of the atom and outer
space, the American people have neither
faltered nor has their faith flagged. If at times
our actions seem to make life difficult for others,
it is only because history has made life difficult
for us all.
But difficult days need not be dark. I think
these are proud and memorable days in the
cause of peace and freedom. We are proud, for
FEBRUARY 4, 1963
163
example, of Major Rudolf Anderson, who gave
his life over the island of Cuba. We salute
Specialist James Allen Johnson, who died on
the border of South Korea. We pay honor to
Sergeant Gerald Pendell, who was killed in
Viet-Nam. They are among the many who in
this century, far from home, have died for our
country. Our task now, and the task of all
Americans, is to live up to their commitments.
My friends, I close on a note of hope. We
are not lulled by the momentary calm of the sea
or the somewhat clearer skies above. We know
the turbulence that lies below, and the storms
beyond the horizon this year. Now the winds
of change appear to be blowing more strongly
than ever, in the world of commimism as well as
our own. For 175 years we have sailed with
those winds at our back, and with the tides of
human freedom in our favor. We steer our
ship with hope, as Thomas Jefferson said, "leav-
ing fear astern."
Today we still welcome those winds of
change — and we have every reason to believe
that our tide is running strong. With thanks
to Almighty God for seeing us through a peri-
lous passage, we ask His help anew in guiding
the good ship Union.
President Kennedy Holds Talks
With Prime Minister of Italy
Amintore Fanfani, President of the Cowndl
of the Republic of Italy, visited at Washington
January 15-18. Following is the text of a joint
communique tetween President Kennedy and
Prime Minister Fanfani folloiuing their discus-
sions January 16 and 17, released on January 17
6y the Office of the White House Press Secre-
tary and the Press Secretary to the President
of the Council of the Republic of Italy.
President Kennedy and President of the
Council Fanfani, with their advisors, have to-
day concluded two days of cordial and con-
structive conversations on the principal inter-
national problems of common interest to the
United States and Italy.
The meeting has given an opportunity for an
exchange of views on recent international de-
velopments with special emphasis on the evolv-
ing relationship between the United States and
Europe.
In this connection, the President amplified
the position of the United States with respect
to the possible development of a NATO multi-
lateral nuclear force within the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. The Prime Minister ex-
pressed great interest in the possibility of such
a force and agreed that the United States pro-
posals should receive the most serious consid-
eration by all members of the Alliance. The
President and the Prime Minister agreed on
the need to modernize both the nuclear and con-
ventional weapons and forces which their
countries contribute to the Alliance..
In the course of the examination of the po-
litical and economic situation in Europe, the
Prime Minister stressed Italy's continuing ef-
fort in support of European economic integra-
tion and the entry of Great Britain into the
Common Market. The President agreed with
the Prime Minister that increasing integration
would bring greater political solidity and pros-
perity to Europe and permit it to participate
more effectively in the policy of assisting im-
derdeveloped areas, in which effort Italy and
the United States realErm their feeling of
special commitment.
The two leaders reviewed the work which has
been undertaken to reach a disarmament agree-
ment with adequate safeguards and a controlled
cessation of nuclear testing. They agreed on
the necessity to further prepare for the forth-
coming Geneva Conference and expressed the
hope that this conference would achieve posi-
tive results.
President Kennedy and President of the
Council Fanfani reaffirm the intention of their
respective Governments to press forward in
1963 with the important task of promoting the
interests of the peoples of the United States
and Italy working toward the consolidation of
world peace and fulfilling their commitments
to these ends.
164
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTTLLETTN
The United Nations and the Congo: Three Questions
hy Harlan Cleveland
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs '■
I have the greatest sympathy these days for
even the most enlightened groups of private
citizens endeavoring — as they should — to make
up their own minds about world affairs. When
affairs are as crazily complex as they are, when
events move with such speed, when government
is sometimes obliged in the national interest
to prepare its moves and conduct its negotia-
tions with no one looking over its shoulder, it
must indeed seem bewildering from the outside.
Indeed it is sometimes hard not to be be-
wildered on the inside.
I, therefore, thought it might be worth while
to use our time here today to discuss that most
bewildering of all crises since the end of
World War II — that distant crisis called the
Congo which seemed interminable until a few
days ago.
The whole story of the Congo is a jumbled
tale : It has elements of finance and economics
and politics, domestic and international
variety ; it presents examples of fumbling and
examples of superb performance; it has chap-
ters on propaganda, on knavery, and on
promises made and broken; it has stories of
patience, persistence, valor, and success; it has
had moments of violence and periods of diplo-
macy; and sometimes the tale has been told
with such semantic confusion as to rival beatnik
poetry — or even the current Moscow-Peiping
dialectic.
And it has its share of human tragedy.
On January 3, on the outskirts of Jadotville,
U.N. soldiers fired a volley at a civilian auto-
^ Address made before the Women's Democratic Club
of Northern Virginia at Arlington, Va., on Jan. 17
(press release 34).
mobile wliich apparently ignored a signal to
halt and tried to evade a search pouit. The
tragic result was the death of two women riding
in the car. A dramatic photograph of the an-
guished and wounded driver — husband of one
of the women — told this tragic story on the
front pages of our newspapers. Journalisti-
cally, it was a great photograph, and I suspect
we shall see it again because it might well win a
prize some day. I do not question its wide-
spread use.
But the horror of that single mistake by a
nervous soldier with a gun in his hand almost
obscured what had just happened in Jadotville
that day. Wliat happened is that a brave, pro-
fessional, and disciplined Indian general, in
command of a tiny U.N. detacliment, made a
brilliant sortie in an open jeep and talked his
way into Jadotville without firing a shot — with
the assistance of the town mayor, who preferred
U.N. protection to dependence on undisciplined
Katangese troops and desperate mercenaries
who had vowed to fight for the town "block
by block," destroying all its industrial facilities
in the process.
There is no acceptable reason why those two
women had to die on the outskirts of Jadot-
ville. But the danger is that the tragic side
may be all that is remembered — along with
unpaid assessments, recriminations among
allies, and Soviet attacks on the U.N. Secre-
tariat. If this should happen, we shall ignore
one of the brightest chapters in the history of
international cooperation.
It is, of course, true that there have been
black spots — and that many nations have paid
little or notliing on their U.N. assessments. But
FEBRUARY 4, 1963
165
it is equally true that a score of countries were
willing to send their soldiers to possible death
in a countiy whose only interest to them was
its threat to the peace of the world. It is also
true that most members of the United Nations
consistently supported an operation which was
opposed in varying degrees by several of the
larger nations. It is true as well that enough
countries, including the United States, kept
their nerve and honored their word and saw the
operation through.
The Congo is about to be free and whole
again. It is moving toward law and order.
The secessionist bubbles have burst. There are
no iminvited foreign troops, no Communist
enclaves, no "army of liberation," no reason
for a single American soldier to die there, no
excuse for a Soviet soldier to live there. Those
who believe this is good news — and I am one
of them — will do well to bear in mind that the
price paid for this U.N. achievement was not
a hypothetical violation of the doctrine of self-
determination; the price was a goodly amount
of money and the lives of some good men, in-
cluding Dag Hammarskjold, one of the best
men our times have known. It is a high price;
but it was paid in a liigh cause: to help keep
the peace.
Many details of this story are still un-
known, and some of them may never come to
light. But in my discussions with people out-
side the Department of State, I find they are
curious not so much about the details but about
the fundamentals; essentially they want to
know the why, what, and how of the U.N.
operation in the Congo.
U.N. in Congo "To Deal With Threat to the Peace"
Why does the United Nations have an armed
force of nearly 20,000 men and an unarmed
force of some 400 civilians in the Congo?
There are three mutually reinforcing answers.
First, in July 1960, when mutinies broke out
in the armed forces of the Congo, when law and
order broke down, when the Government was
unable to gain control of the situation, when
mobs roamed the streets and hunger haunted
the countryside, when the nation began to break
up into rival provinces, there was a clear threat
to international peace in that huge new nation
in the heart of tropical Africa. And we have
surely learned by now that peace is indivisi-
ble— that a threat to the peace anywhere is a
threat to the peace everywhere. That is to say,
the United States had a national security in-
terest in what hajapened in the Congo.
Second, the United Nations was established
in 1945 primarily to deal with threats to the
peace. That is the main business of the or-
ganization; that's what it's there for.
Third, there was no other organization or
government in the world qualified or acceptable
for the role of peacemaker. Wlio else could do
it? The Belgians did return — with para-
troops— to protect their nationals; but obvi-
ously they could not stay because it was the
Belgians who had just relinquished colonial
rule. It was certainly not the business of
NATO or any other military alliance, which
would be bound to look like colonialism
resurrected.
That left us — and the Russians. And, in-
deed, tlie Congolese Cabinet met within a few
days of its independence in July 1960 and
formally asked the United States to send in
military imits. They also asked the Russians
to send troops; and they asked the United
Nations to come to the rescue.
Tlie Eisenhower administration was con-
fronted with a clear choice. Should the Con-
go's chaos be tackled by a hastily assembled
international peace force? Or should we send
in a division of United States Marines? Or
should we just sit on our hands and wait for
our adversaries to exploit the situation?
Wisely, I think, President Eisenhower
decided to bet on an unprecedented U.N. peace-
keeping operation. He chose not to risk a con-
frontation of nuclear powers in the center of
Africa. He bet on the proposition that a peace-
keeping force under the U.N. Charter would
operate in the national interest of the United
States — and in the national interest of the great
bulk of U.N. members.
Any American who finds the U.N. Congo
operation not wholly to his liking or taste
should ask himself the tough, realistic question :
Would he have preferred, and would he now
prefer, the direct use of American military
force to restrain competitive international in-
166
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTILiETIN
tervention, prevent civil war, and maintain law
and order while the Congolese settle their own
political future?
Our object in supporting the U.N. in the
Congo is to advance United States policy for
Africa. Tliat policy is to help African lead-
ership develop truly independent, cooperating,
and progressive states going about the prime
business of Africa, which is its own moderniza-
tion. Our policy is to help legitimate govern-
ments which ask for help to maintain their
territorial integrity and political independence
and to defend themselves against chaos and
subversion from any quarter. This is the same
policy we have for the rest of the world; and
it is as good today as it was when Pi-esident
Truman so clearly enunciated it when the
Greeks asked for help to put down an armed
insurrection in 1947.
U.N. Responds to Appeal From Congo Government
If this is the why, what about the liow? The
U.N. started, and still operates, in the Congo
because the Congolese asked for help.
The beginning was a frantic appeal to the
U.N. from the lawful heads of the legitimate
government of the nation called the Republic
of the Congo for immediate assistance fi-om the
United Nations. That provoked an emergency
meeting of the U.N.'s Security Coimcil, which
adopted a resolution telling the Secretai-y-Gen-
eral to organize a peacekeeping mission in the
Congo.^
There followed an almost incredible feat of
mobilizing troops from 17 nations and techni-
cians from a dozen agencies for the rescue mis-
sion— the most complex and most difficult
peacekeeping assignment ever taken on in the
history of the United Nations. Within 24
hours of the call for help, the first Tunisian
troops were on the scene and a unit of Swedes
was on its way from the U.N. Emergency Force
stationed in the Middle East — a movement
made possible only by what has become the
largest international airlift in history, carried
out for the U.N., with extraordinary efficiency
and a perfect safety record, by the United
States Air Force.
' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 161.
It is extremely tempting to pause here to tell
you something about the 90 percent of the Congo
story which never gets told — the story of U.N.
successes, both in the restoration of law and
order in five out of the Congo's six provinces
and the rescue of hundreds of thousands of
Congolese from starvation, epidemic, and chaos.
But we are dealing with the basic critical ques-
tions being asked about the U.N. in the Congo.
One question that seems to bother people more
than any other is the legal basis for what the
U.N., with our support, has tried so long to do
and now seems finally to have done. I have met
well-informed people who do not question the
validity of the objective of the United Nations
in the Congo, who agree that any available al-
ternative to the United Nations would be woree,
who see at once that the operation is fully in
line with U.S. policies and objectives for
Africa — but who are still worried about the
constitutional question. They agree that this
trip by the U.N. is necessary, but they wonder
whether it is strictly legal.
The answer is a clear and imequivocal yes.
But the question comes up in a number of
forms. Let's deal separately with each of them.
Does the U.N. intervention in the Congo mean
that the U.N. has the legal right to intervene in
Mississippi ? Certainly not. The U.N. is for-
bidden by its charter from intervening in the
domestic jurisdiction of any state; and I have
mentioned already that it came to the rescue
in the Congo in response to the direct request
of the legitimate government of that country.
The United Nations did not "intervene"; it
accepted an invitation.
By what charter authority, then, was action
taken in the Congo? The basic action was
taken by the Security Council, the primary or-
gan of peacekeeping established by the charter.
The charter is a solemn treaty, ratified by the
Senate under our own Constitution. Among
others, three provisions of the United Nations
Charter apply to the Congo action :
— Article 1, paragraph 7, which defines as
the first purpose of the United Nations: "To
maintain international peace and security, and
to that end: to take effective collective meas-
ures for the prevention and removal of threats
to the peace. . . ."
FEBRUART 4, 1963
167
— Article 24, by which the members confer
on the Security Council "primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and
security" and agree that in carrying out its
duties under this responsibility "the Security
Council acts on their behalf," and which pro-
vides that in discharging these duties the Coun-
cil "shall act in accordance with the Purposes
and Principles of the United Nations."
—Chapters VI and VII, and especially
article Ifi, which give the Security Council au-
thority to take such "provisional measures" as
it thinks are needed to prevent a dangerous
situation from getting worse, that is, to prevent
a threat to the peace from becoming a breach
of the peace.
If all this sounds a bit legalistic, it is be-
cause the charter is a legal document and was
thoroughly edited by lawyers more concerned
with precision than with readability. So let
me hasten to cite the observation, in a recent
majority opinion of the International Court of
Justice on an issue related to the Congo,' that
the Security Council's action "was clearly
adopted with a view to maintaining interna-
tional peace and security." The Court added:
". . . it must lie within the power of the Secur-
ity Council to police a situation even though it
does not resort to enforcement action against
a State." In short, the majority of the World
Court found that international law had been
observed and the U.N. had stayed within its
own constitution.
Maintaining Territorial Integrity of Congo
Just what did the United Nations, acting
under the charter by constitutional process, au-
thorize the Secretary-General to do in the
Congo under the various resolutions passed in
July 1960 and subsequently ? Here I will spare
you the legal language and give you the net of
it in plainer words. The U.N. resolutions essen-
tially authorized the Secretary-General (first
Dag Hammarskjold, then U Thant) to raise a
force to do five things :
° For a statement regarding financial obligations of
U.N. members, made before the court on May 21 by
Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser of the Department of
State, see iUd., July 2, 1962, p. 30 ; for a Department
statement regarding the Court's opinion, see ibid,., Aug.
13, 1962, p. 246.
— to help the Government of the Congo main-
tain its territorial integrity ;
■ — to assist the Government to restore and
maintain law and order within the Congo ;
— to prevent civil war ;
— to secure the withdrawal of foreign mer-
cenary troops ; and
— to provide technical aid until Congolese
could be trained to take over vital services such
as public health and communications.
But how does all this square with the
charter's prohibition against interference by
the United Nations in affairs essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of a state? This
brings us straight to the heart of the main
trouble in the Congo for the past 214 years.
The Congo is a single state established under
a so-called "fundamental law," under which it
gained independence. All major regional and
tribal leaders, including Mr. [Moise] Tshombe
for the Katanga, helped frame this "fundamen-
tal law," and all of them signed it. It estab-
lished the territorial and political unity of all
the Congo, recognizing its various regions as
being within its defined borders.
Now any such nation has the inherent right
to maintain its territorial integrity against in-
vasion from the outside or sedition from within.
But when trouble broke out in the Congo 21/4
years ago, it was plagued immediately by a
series of seditions, including that of the Prov-
ince of Katanga — or, more accurately, the
southern half of tlie Province of Katanga. No
government anywhere in the world believed that
these secessions raised the issue of self-determi-
nation. No government anywhere ever recog-
nized the illegal breakaway of the Katangan
regime.
The legitimate Government of the Congo re-
quested the United Nations to help its "terri-
torial integrity and political independence" —
that's good charter language. And in an agree-
ment signed in August 1960 between the
Secretary-General, acting under the mandate
given him by the Security Council, and the
Government of the Congo, acting as the invit-
ing power, the United Nations was granted
full freedom of movement within the Congo,
including the Province of Katanga. The oppo-
sition by the so-called gendarmerie of Mr.
168
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Tslionibe — which is a private army, not a pub-
lic police force — to the exercise of the U.N.'s
freedom of movement is essentially the source
of the fighting which has taken place during
the past 15 months in Katanga Province. By
"opposition" I mean harassment, roadblocks,
and sustained attack with automatic weapons
and heavy mortars.
In using force after provocation the United
Nations troops exercised their inherent legal
right of self-defense. In eliminating serious
opposition to its own freedom of movement, the
peace force was following the clear mandate of
the Security Council, adopted by the Council
without a dissenting vote, supported by two suc-
cessive U.S. administrations, and endorsed (so
far as financial support is concerned) by large
majorities in both Houses of Congress.
Lessons Learned From the Congo Crisis
Thus there is a solid, detailed and substan-
tial legal foundation for the U.N. action in the
Congo from sudden start to prospective finish.
This is important. But I should like to depart
from the narrow legal framework to make two
observations on the Congo story.
The first is that, from our standpoint as
Americans, there are overwhelming national
security and foreign policy reasons why the
Congo crisis could never be looked upon as only
a domestic political squabble between tribal fac-
tions in Africa.
Ever since the end of World War II world
affairs have been dominated by the cold war —
that is, the unremitting eiforts of the Conunu-
nist world to subvert the non-Communist world
versus the unremitting efforts of the non-Com-
munist world, led by the United States, to
remain independent and free. And in the last
decade the destructive power in the hands of
the Soviet Union and the United States has
grown to the point where distance is no longer
a reliable cushion against sudden and violent
confrontation.
This means, quite simply, that chaos or con-
flict anywhere in the world carries the seeds of
great-power confrontation. And great-power
confrontation anywhere in the world — in Cuba,
in Southeast Asia, in Korea, in Africa — would
carry the seeds of intercontinental thennonu-
clear war.
There certainly was chaos and conflict in the
Congo 21^ yeai"s ago — chaos which threatened
to develop into international conflict. The
only way to prevent a competitive power play
there was to inject the U.N. instead. The
Congo crisis was not at all a local affair from
which we could abstain — because we could not
depend on others to abstain. It was, and is,
just about the most international affair one can
imagine, from which we could abstain only at
the ultimate peril of our own national security.
My other nonlegalistic observation about the
Congo experience has to do with the brandnew
business of peacekeeping in the field. I said a
moment ago that when the United Nations used
force in the Congo it was in the exercise of its
inlierent right of self-defense : Everyone knows
that a policeman has a right to use his stick
or his gun to defend his right to walk the beat
to which he has been lawfully assigned. There
is no doubt that the U.N. force has made mis-
takes, has occasionally acted in an uncoordi-
nated way, has had its quota of undisciplined
soldiers. Assignment to an international force
is not a guarantee of good behavior; a blue
U.N. helmet is not yet a halo. Yet there is
also no doubt that for the most part the U.N.
troops demonstrated quite remarkable restraint
imder severe provocation. In the last days of
December, less than a month ago, they held
their fire for some 10 hours after the opening
of sustained attacks; U.N. soldiers were killed
and wounded before their leaders finally de-
cided the peace force had to strike back in self-
defense. Taking the good with the bad, this
can be said : The military men serving the U.N.
have behaved on the whole the way military
men all over the world are trained to behave
under fire.
Peacekeeping troops may justly be held to
the highest standards of conduct. The use of
force by U.N. troops cannot be justified solely
on the grounds of inherent and legal rights. A
military force serving in the name of the world
community is a very special kind of force.
Just how special it is was brought home to me
when I visited a Malayan unit with the U.N.
Force in a remote part of the Congo about a
ITBRtJARY 4, 1963
169
year ago. It was commanded by an experi-
enced and perceptive brigadier, who well un-
derstood that eveiy U.N. military miit is and
must be an instrmnent of conciliation — that
each day's move by every platoon has implica-
tions for the political settlement which is the
alternative to civil war in the Congo. And in
the course of our conversation about tliis curi-
ous new business of operational peacekeeping
this Malayan officer (who had come straight
from fighting Communists in the Malayan
jungles to police duty in the Congo) put his
finger on the heart of the matter. "A United
Nations military operation," he said, "is not
like any other militai-y operation in history —
because the United Nations, even if it has to
fight, can have no enemy."
Now, if you will mull over the implications
of soldiers without enemies — of military opera-
tions without militaiy objectives — of guns in
the service of peaceful settlement, you will
agree, I think, that the officers and men for any
future U.N. peacekeeping operations should
have some very special training for such a very
special kind of military operation. And this
may well turn out to be one of the most im-
portant lessons we have to learn from the ex-
cruciating crisis in the Congo.
In the meantime this fact remains : Acting
under the charter, the United Nations is carry-
ing out the mandates lawfully given by its
members — it is preserving the territorial integ-
rity and political independence of the Congo;
it is preventing civil war; it is restoring law
and order; and it has forestalled a dangerous
confrontation of nuclear powers. No other
oi'ganization could have done as much. If the
United Nations had not existed, the responsible
members of the world community might have
had to mvent it, to serve them in the Congo.
Letters of Credence
Upper Volta
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Upper Volta, Boureima John
Kabore, presented his credentials to President
Kennedy on January 18. For texts of the
Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release
36 dated January 18.
President Calls Togo President's
Death Loss for Africa and World
Statement iy President Kennedy ^
President [Sylvanus] Olympio's tragic as-
sassination is a blow to the progress of stable
govermnent in Africa. It is also a loss not only
for his own country but for all those who knew
him here in the United States. His visit in
March 1962 ^ was helpful in increasing our
miderstanding of African problems and aspira-
tions. His positive role in fostering coopera-
tion between English- and French-speaking
countries helped to promote peace and progress
in Africa. His wise judgment and statesman-
ship will be missed by all nations which cherish
human values and ideals.
Argentine Foreign Minister
Visits United States
Press release 30 dated January 16
Carlos Manuel Muniz, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Argentine Republic, will visit the
United States this coming week at the invita-
tion of the Secretary of State. The Foreign
Minister will arrive at New York on January
19 and proceed to "Washington the following
day. Wliile in Washington he will confer with
Secretary Rusk, as well as with Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Edwin
M. Martin, Alliance for Progress Coordinator
Teodoro Moscoso, and other U.S. and inter-
national organization officials on a wide range
of matters of mutual interest within the context
of hemispheric cooperation.
It is understood that the Foreign Minister
also has been invited to address a special session
of the Council of the Organization of American
States. The Foreign Minister's visit will ex-
' Read to news correspondents by Pierre Salinger,
White House Press Secretary, on Jan. 14.
= Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 638.
170
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tend until January 24, when he will return to
Xew York for additional activities which are
being arranged on his behalf by the Argentine
Embassy.
Tlie Foreign jNIinister will be accompanied
by several advisers from the Argentine Foreign
^linistry.
Secretary Inaugurates Broadcasts
to Latin America Via Relay
Stafernent iy Secretary Ru.sk ^
It is not strange that tlie United States and
Brazil are maugurating a new era of communi-
cations between North and South America.
Just as we are now using the means of space
satellite communications to transmit this mes-
sage, in 1876 Alexander Graham Bell spoke
with the Emperor of Brazil, Dom Pedro II,
at a demonstration of his new invention at the
Philadelphia Centeimial Exposition. A few
months later, when Bell improved his telephone,
Dom Pedro was one of the first to order its
installation. Brazil thus became one of the
first countries in the world to make practical
use of the telephone.
Just as that historic conversation between
leading figures of our two comitries served to
dramatize a new era of understanding between
Brazil and the United States, this new mode of
instantaneous conmaunication through space
will serve as another bridge to broaden the en-
tire spectrum of relations among coimtries of
the Western Hemisphere.
Satellite Relay, now carrying my voice to
you, represents another big step in that series
of events born out of the outstanding achieve-
ments of both your own Santos Dumont and the
Wright brothers. I venture to say that the peo-
ple of the Americas easily comprehend the po-
tential of this orbiting satellite as a veliicle
toward mutual understanding between the
countries of the new world. The lands of the
^ Transmitted via ttie Relay satellite to Latin Amer-
ica on Jan. 17 (press release 33). The Secretary's
remarks were in the nature of an exchange with Bra-
zilian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hermes
Lima.
constellation of the Southern Cross and the
Stars and Stripes, which fatliered the first pio-
neers of flight, symbolize in their very flags
mankind's loftiest ideals when contemplating
the heavens and his unceasing search for un-
derstanding himself and the universe.
On a more earthly plane, but within tlie same
spirit of the space age, Brazil, the United
States, and the other sister Republics, are em-
barked on another great undertaking — the Al-
liance for Progress. Let me reaffirm our com-
mitment to the ideals and to the practical goals
of the Charter of Pmita del Este. As the con-
quest of space promises mitold benefits to man-
kind for the future, let us dedicate the Alianza
to the pressing problems of today, so that our
peoples may reap the fruits of a not too distant
golden age, rich in cultural attainments and
material development.
U.S. and Panama Agree on Certain
Procedural Matters in Canal Zone
Press release 17 dated January 10
President Kennedy and President Roberto
F. Chiari of the Republic of Panama agreed^
during President Chiari's visit to Washington
on June 12-13^ to appoint high-level repre-
sentatives to discuss points of dissatisfaction
with provisions of the U.S.-Panama treaty gov-
erning the Panama Canal. The results of the
discussions in Panama, which are continuing,
are summarized in the following joint com-
nwnique and aide memoir e released on Jan-
uary 10.
JOINT COMMUNIQUE
The representatives of the Governments of
the Republic of Panama and of the United
States of America, appointed to discuss points of
dissatisfaction in United States-Panamanian
relations with regard to the Canal Zone have
periodically met during the last five months.
Various aspects of pending questions have been
discussed up to the present, with the following
results :
^ For text of a joint communique, see Bulletin
of July 9, 1962, p. 81.
FEBRUART 4, 1963
171
First: It has been agreed that the flag of
the Republic of Panama will be flown together
with the flag of the United States of America
on land in the Canal Zone where the flag of
the United States of America is flown by civil-
ian authorities. Private organizations and per-
sons in the Zone are free to display flags at
will over their places of residence or business.
Other aspects of the flag question will be dis-
cussed later.
Second: Foreign Consuls, on the basis of
exequaturs issued by the Government of Pan-
ama and, in accordance with procedures and
understandings which have been agreed upon
by the Government of Panama and the Govern-
ment of the United States, may function in the
Canal Zone. Subject to these procedures and
understandings the United States Government
will cease issuing documents of exequatur.
Third: The representatives of both Govern-
ments have discussed labor problems relating to
Panamanian citizens who work in the Canal
Zone. Special attention has been devoted to
the subject of wage scales, equal opportunities
for Panamanian and United States citizens at
all levels, and Social Security benefits. All
these problems continue to be under discussion.
Fourth : The representatives of Panama sub-
mitted for discussion the question of using
Panamanian postage stamps in the Canal Zone
postal system. The U.S. Government has pro-
posed the use of Panamanian stamps in the
Zone in accordance with technical arrangements
now under consideration and in conformance
with international postal standards.
Fifth: In accordance with instructions, the
representatives have discussed Panama's need
for pier facilities and have visited the present
pier facilities in Cristobal. This subject con-
tinues to be under discussion.
The representatives of the Governments of
the United States of America and of the Re-
public of Panama will continue their present
discussions aimed at finding solutions to other
problems which remain unresolved.
The discussions are continuing in the spirit
of the joint communique issued by the Presi-
dent of Panama and the President of the United
States of America at the end of the visit which
the President of Panama made to "Washington
in June of last year.
From time to time additional joint communi-
ques outlining the progress of the discussions
will be issued. ■
U.S. AIDE MEMOIRE'
January 10, 1963
With reference to the conversations between
His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs
and the American Ambassador concerning the
meeting on September 11, 1962, of the United
States and Panamanian representatives to dis-
cuss improvement of United States-Panama-
nian relations with regard to the Canal Zone,
His Excellency will recall that the following
decision was reached.
It was agreed that the practice heretofore
followed on the part of the United States with
respect to the issuance of exequaturs for use in
the Canal Zone would be changed as follows :
The United States Government would not be
agreeable to the exercise of consular functions
by a consular officer from a government not
recognized by the United States. Also, the
Government of the United States will notify
the Government of Panama and will prohibit
a consular officer from acting in the Canal
Zone if, for example, in the opinion of the
United States Government, a situation arises
in the future in which a consular officer ac-
credited by Panama is a security risk, or his
functioning would interfere with the operation,
maintenance, or defense of the Canal.
Hereafter, when the Government of Panama
has on request issued an exequatur to a consular
officer to function in Panama, and has notified
the Depai'tment of State to that effect, the De-
partment of State, providing it has no objection
in accordance with the preceding paragraph,
will inform the Government of Panama by note
that said consular officer may function in the
Canal Zone, and the Government of Panama
will so inform said consular officer; in the event
the Department of State objects in accordance
' Delivered by the American Embassy at PanamA to
the Panamanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Jan. 10.
172
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
th the preceding paragrapli, information to
It etJ'ect will be supplied the Government of
Inania and the consular officer may not under-
]ce to perform consular functions in the Canal
le.
FL. 480 Currency Available for Sale
t U.S. Tourists in Cairo
1 -s release 7 dated January 7
The Department of State and the Treasury
j'partment announced on January 7 that the
^ uerican Embassy at Cairo, United Arab Ee-
] blic, has been authorized to sell to American
t irists Egyptian pounds received by the
lited States from the sale of sui-jjIus agricul-
iral commodities.
The action was taken under a recent Execu-
te order ^ which put into effect a 1961
lendment to the Agricultural Trade
i"\elopment and Assistance Act of 1954.
Since enactment of this amendment, provi-
3ns for sales to tourists have been included in
^eements with 17 countries; however, in
ost of these countries the currencies held by
i.e United States, and which would otherwise
) available for this purpose, are presently ex-
jcted to be needed to meet U.S. operational ex-
snses in these countries, and sales to tourists
'. this time have not been authorized. In still
:her countries, where the United States holds
irrencies in excess of its normal operational
?quirements, individual agreements must be
egotiated with such countries before the
urrencies can be sold to American tourists.
American tourists, upon presentation of
•assport, can obtain Egyptian pounds at the
k.merican Embassy at Cairo in exchange for
J.S. currency, personal checks drawn on a
>ank in the United States, or certain other
'.S. dollar instruments.
' For text of Executive Order 110.36 (27 Fed. Reg.
1653), see Bulletin of Aug. 6, 1962, p. 222.
Regional Foreign Policy Conference
To Be Held at Los Angeles
Press release ;i2 dated Jauuary 16
The Department of State, with the cosponsor-
ship of the Los Angeles World Aifairs Coun-
cil in cooperation with Town Hall, will hold its
next regional foreign policy conference at Los
Angeles, Calif., on February 13, 1963.
Kepresentatives of the press, radio, television,
and nongovernmental organizations concerned
with foreign policy, and community and busi-
ness leaders from southern California, Arizona,
Hawaii, and southern Nevada are being invited
to participate.
This will be the ninth in the series of regional
conferences which began in July 1961 at San
Francisco and Denver and will be the first in
which Secretary Eusk has participated. The
purpose of these regional meetings is to pro-
vide opportunity for discussion of international
affairs between those who inform the public on
foreign policy issues and the senior officers of
the executive branch who have responsibility
for dealing with them.
In addition to Secretary Rusk the other offi-
cials of the Govermnent participating in the
conference will be : David Bell, Administrator,
Agency for International Development; Robert
J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs; G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; Paul
H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs; Mrs. Katie
Louchheim, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Public Affairs; Herbert K. May, Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs; J. Wayne Fredericks, Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs ; James P. Grant, Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of State for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs; and J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Atlantic
Affairs.
•EBRUART 4, 1963
672786—63 3
173
United States Trade Relations With the New Europe:
The Challenge and the Opportunities
hy DoxigJas MacA7'thur 11
Amhassador to Belgium ^
It is a pleasure and an honor to participate in
this Annual Forecasting Conference of the
Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce. I say this
because the Philadelphia chamber has won de-
served and widespread recognition as a vigorous
and forward-looking organization which,
through this annual conference, is making a
great contribution to the development of sound
future American economic and industrial
thought and action.
I have been asked to talk today about United
States trade relations with the new Europe, par-
ticularly about the challenge and opportunities
that the new Europe poses for us. This subject
seems most appropriate because the great post-
war movement toward European unity is one of
the most excitmg and far-reaching develop-
ments that have occurred for centuries. Indeed,
the creation of this great new European entity
has been likened in its potential importance and
long-term implications to the discovery of the
New World in 1492. In any event, it will vitally
affect not only Europeans and Americans but,
indeed, peoples in every corner of the world.
While the European unification movement
involves both political and economic aspects,
this morning I will confine myself largely to tlie
European Economic Community.
Wlien the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957
and the Common Market for which it provided
came into being in 1958, there were some who
' Address made before the Annual Forecasting Con-
ference of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce at
Philadelphia, Pa., on J.in. 10 (press release 3 dated
•Tan. 3, for release Jan. 10) .
174
believed it would not amount to very much, b
they were proven dramatically wrong. F
since the Common Market got underway, t
level of industrial activities of its members h
continued to advance at the very high rate
some 6 percent per year, whereas the progro
in other European countries, such as Britai
and the Scandinavian countries, and indft'
that of the United States, has been only abo
half as great.
The Common Market's Challenge
The great challenge of the Common Marlx
and its future impact on our own prosper:
and well-being are underlined by the followi
facts:
1. During the period 1957-1961, the anni
gross national product of the Common Mark
countries - inci-eased at the very high rate
almost 22 percent, whereas the gross nation
product of the United States increased by or.
about 10 percent.
2. The Common Market has great industrii
strength that is increasing. In 1961 its st«
production was over 80 percent that of t||
United States and well ahead of the Sot
Union. Should Britain join the Common M£(
ket, it will be the world's greatest steel pi
ducer. Furthermore, Common Market produ
tivity is increasing at a rate of almost twi i
that of the United States, and in automobili ,
° The six Common Market countries are Belgiii
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Li
embourg, and the Netherlands.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETl:
nsport equipment, macliinery, chemicals,
o\ products, and a host of other manufac-
es it is giving us hard competition in world
mrkets.
3. AVith this great surge of economic activity,
rdl wages and purchasing power in the Com-
am Market are steadily rising. During the
priod 1953-1962, consumption expenditures
pr person increased almost 40 percent in the
Ommon Market countries, compared with
aout 18 percent in the United States. While
tDse countries started from a lower base and
t^ir standards of living are still lower than
crs, it is clear that wages, standards of living,
nd consumption will grow toward those of the
hited States. Already automobiles, television
Es, frigidaires, and other such consumers" dur-
fles are within reach of the Common Market
^n-kers. Indeed there is every indication that
te population of the Common Market is on
le road toward the kind of consumer expan-
i)n experienced in the United States during
e lust 40 years.
i. This dramatic increase of the Common
'. arket's economic activity has been accom-
jinied by a very substantial increase in foreign
i ade and especially trade between the members.
(a) Total foreign trade of the six Common
Market members with all countries increased
om about $43 billion in 1956, just before f or-
ation of the Common Market, to about $64
llion in 1961, a tremendous 48 percent.
(b) Trade between the six members of the
ommon Market increased during that same
3riod from $12.7 billion to $23.7 billion, an in-
•edible 85 percent. Although both of these
icreases are important, the latter is particu-
irly significant as it reflects the development
f closer trading ties among the six Common
larket countries as tariff barriers on industrial
roducts have been halved since 1958 and the
uty on agricultural commodities lowered by
5 percent.
5. The six Common Market nations already
ave a population of over 170 million. Should
be negotiations with Britain and the subse-
uent negotiations with Denmark, Ireland, and
I^orway succeed, it will have a population of
Imost 250 million, as contrasted with our 186
lillion.
6. It has a much greater pool of scientific and
technological skills and knowledge than we, that
will increasingly be applied to industrial ad-
vances and improved products.
7. The Common Market is already the great-
est single international trading bloc in the
world. In 1961 the six Common Market coun-
tries, without Britain, had imports of about
$32 billion and exports of almost the same
amount for an overall trade total of about $64
billion. In comparison our own total foreign
trade amounts to roughly $37 billion, consistuig
of $21 billion of exports and $16 billion of im-
ports.
The Opportunities
Although the challenge of the Common Mar-
ket is great, the opportunities are equally great.
It is a market where American products, both
industrial and agricultural, are well and favor-
ably known. Today our exports to the Common
Market are 50 percent greater than our imports
from it. It is a market with a rapidly expand-
ing population. It is a market where real
wages are rising rapidly. This will not only
improve our competitive position but result in
greatly increased consumption, from which we
should benefit.
Indeed the European market offers a vast
potential for growth and is the kind of market
best suited for our production system. Euro-
pean industrialists have been accustomed to sell-
ing their products in small national markets
and have built their industrial plants with that
in mind. We, on the other hand, have fully
developed the techniques of mass production,
for we have had a great mass market open to
us. If we can maintain our access to the Euro-
pean market, we should find new trading op-
portunities not dreamed of a few years ago.
On the other hand, if we cannot continue to
sell an important part of our industrial and
agricultural production to the Common Market,
we will be in deep trouble. Tliis is true because
our exports to all of Western Europe, of which
the Common Market is the heart, amomit to
almost $7 billion or over 30 percent of our total
exports, of which about $2.2 billion are farm
products and over $4 billion are industrial
products.
EBRUAra' 4, 1963
175
Maintaining Access to Common Market
How then do we maintain and expand our
access to this great new European market on
which our own economy and the prosperity and
well-being of the American people so largely
depend ?
There is no quick or easy answer. Our con-
tinuing access to the European market depends
on a number of factors but principally on what
our Government does and on the attitudes and
actions of two other principal sectors of our
national life, American labor and American
business. I would therefore like to outline, as
I see it, the interrelated responsibilities and
roles of (1) the United States Government,
(2) American labor, and (3) American busi-
ness and industrj' in meeting the challenge.
The Role of the U.S. Government
First a word about the Government's respon-
sibility. While the tariff barriers between the
Common Market members are disappearing, a
common external tariff wall is being main-
tained around the Common Market which will
make it progressively more difficult for Ameri-
can products to enter this market. The United
States Government must negotiate downward
these tariff barriers and other protective de-
vices which the Common Market may apply
against imports of American products to the
point where American goods can continue to
flow into the Common Market.
As a result of congressional passage of Presi-
dent Kennedy's trade expansion legislation, we
now have the necessary tools to conduct mean-
ingful tariff negotiations.^ But let me em-
phasize most emphatically that while in these
negotiations we hold very good cards — Europe
needs a prosperous and strong America and
also needs our market as much as we need hers —
we do not hold all the cards.
Some Americans today do not realize that our
own relative strengtli and position in the world
have vastly changed since the period following
World War II. The unbalanced, and indeed
^ For an article by Leonard Weiss on the Trade Ex-
imnsion Act of VM'Z, see Bulletin of Dec. 3. 1962,
p. S47.
unhealthy, postwar situation where we alone it
the free world had any real economic and finan
cial strengtli and power is gone for good. To
day in Europe we have a strong partner witi
great and increasing economic, financial, and in
dustrial power. In our tariff negotiations witl
this strong new Europe we will have tx) mak(
concessions to gain concessions.
Our Government must conduct these negotiai
tions not just on a basis of narrow, limited ini
dustrial interests but in a way to safeguarc
American industry and agi'iculture as a whole
It is inevitable that some of our enterprises wil
encounter difficulties as a result of reductions
that we will be obliged to make in our tariffs ir
order to obtain concessions for our exports t(.
Europe. However, there are important safe
guards in the President's program, including,
governmental assistance to businesses suffering
hardships as a result of tariff reductions anc
import, competition. And of course our natior
as a whole stands to benefit infinitely more f ron
expanded exports than from a restrictive protec
tionist policy that eventually could only leac
to reduced economic activity with all the con
sequences that would entail.
There are, of course, some sincere people wIk
think that the answer to the challenge we faci
in the field of international trade lies in protec
tionism. I would reply that, if the Unitec
States adopts a policy of trade protectionism
we can expect our friends to reciprocate. A;
the President said in his February 6, 1961, mes-
sage to Congress : *
A return to protectionism is not a solution. Such l
course would prorolje retaliation ; and the balance o)
trade, which is now substantially in our favor, conk
be turned against us with disastrous effects to the
dollar.
Furthermore, such retaliation could be ap-
plied not only against industrial commodities
but also against American agriculture, that is
such an essential part of our economy.
Our Government also has the responsibility to
see that our trade policy serves the vital inter-
national interests of the American people.
President Kennedy's trade expansion program
is designed to this end. Based on liberal trade
' IMd., Feb. 27, 1961, p. 287.
176
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
policies, vre seek to expand world trade and
presen'o the interests of the United States in a
worldwide tradine; context that goes far beyond
Europe and the United States. For we must
also think of the problems of our friends in
Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Af-
rica. Our aim is that the benefits of lower
American and European tariffs, through the
most-favored-nation principle, will also bene-
fit countries elsewhere in the world. In other
words, we seek to establish a pattern of in-
ternational trade and economic relations that
will help to unify and bring the free world to-
gether, rather than, as the Communists hope,
let trade become a terrible divisive force that
tears free nations apart and ultimately weak-
ens us all for a Communist takeover.
The United States Government also has the
obligation to assist American businessmen en-
gaged in foreign operations. I must frankly
confess that I do not believe that in the past
our Government's services have always done
as much as they could to help American busi-
ness abroad. However, in the last 2 years a
series of steps have been taken to strengthen
Government support for American business
abroad. Insofar as the State Department is
concerned. Secretary Rusk and Under Secre-
tary Ball have personally given much time to
improve the backstopping that the State De-
partment, our embassies, and Foreign Service
give to American businessmen. I know that in
my own case roughly 65 percent of my time,
first in Japan and now in Belgium, is spent
on economic and trade problems affecting
American business. We hope that many more
American businessmen will avail themselves of
the services we offer, for we can help in many
ways.
So much for our Government's basic respon-
sibilities to develop a sound national and inter-
national trade policy, to assist American busi-
ness abroad and negotiate downward the
external tariff wall which surrounds the Com-
mon Market. But even if we succeeded in
negotiating the tariff wall down to zero, Amer-
ican goods will not sell in world markets (1)
unless they are competitive with European and
other products in terms of price and quality,
and (2) unless a more imaginative and effective
effort is made to sell our wares abroad. This
is where the role and responsibility of Amer-
ican labor and business come into the picture.
American Labor, Its Task and Responsibility
Insofar as labor is concerned it seems evident
that, if we are to continue to sell our products,
we cannot afford wage-price spirals that price
our goods out of world markets. As European
industries in Common Market countries merge
or in other ways expand their production to
supply the great Common Market, their unit
production costs will fall, making price competi-
tion tougher than ever for us. Therefore, if we
are to continue to sell our products at competi-
tive prices, our wage increases will in general
have to be absorbed by increased productivity
rather than by higher prices.
And, of course, the entire increase in produc-
tivity cannot be devoted to wage increases. It
is essential that a part be reserved to business
and industry for research and plant moderniza-
tion programs that are also essential elements
in our ability to compete in world markets.
Labor also has the obligation to continue to
see that the workmanship that goes into our fine
products is of the highest caliber. For shoddy
workmanship will result either in products that
cannot compete quality -wise or in increased pro-
duction costs because of too large a percentage
of rejections by American industry's fine qual-
ity-control programs.
Contributions of American Business
Finally, what is the role and responsibility
of American business ? I will say frankly that
I do not think all sectors of American business
and industry have in recent years made the con-
tribution to our foreign trade that they are
capable of making.
We are emerging from a unique period, dur-
ing most of which American industry has had
little serious competition. In fact, from 1940
until about 1954, American industry enjoyed
what amounted to almost total and absolute
protection. The outbreak of the war in 1939
eliminated our two great industrial competi-
FEBRUAKT 4, 1963
177
tors— Western Europe and Japan. And after
the war, as the shattered industries of Europe
and Japan were gradually rebuilt, their indus-
trial output went largely into the local Euro-
pean and Asian home markets to fill the needs
caused by the privations of the war. Thus we
had little or no competition in the United States
or third-country markets.
That world of little or no competition is gone
forever. We must recognize that in the period
ahead we will have to face even tougher compe-
tition. Our Government cannot do the job
alone. If our economy is not to stagnate and
wither, American business will have to be more
imaginative and active in seeking ways to meet
competition and in developing new markets. It
will require a real merchandising effort of a
kind few American firms have attempted in
Europe, because in the past the potential of
limited national markets did not seem to justify
the trouble. If we are to succeed, it is impera-
tive that American business devote the same
imagination, boldness, and skill to foreign mar-
kets that it does to our great domestic market.
Let me just cite briefly one or two cases that
illustrate what I mean when I say American
business can do more abroad. During exten-
sive travels in the Middle East and Asia during
the period from 1953 to 1961, I often encoun-
tered hard-hitting market sui-vey teams from
Britain, Germany, Italy, France, and the Low
Countries. They were studying detailed prob-
lems involved in entering the market, such as
costs, method of market penetration, servicing,
training of local personnel, language problems,
taxes, local advertising methods, and so forth.
Now during these visits I also encountered
some American businessmen, but they were not
there to capture a market. Wlien asked about
the prospects, some replied to me that there were
sales possibilities but that it would take a good
deal of work and hardly seemed worth while
since the market was not large. Some also
observed that American products were superior
to others and sold themselves. Happily, this
philosophy is not embraced by the American
business community as a whole, for if it were,
I shudder to think of what would happen to
our balance-of-payments problem and our
economy.
I remember during one visit to a newly in-
dependent country a foreign ambassador ap-
proached me saying his fine American car would
not run. He had cabled the factory for parts
and pertinent technical instructions which the
local mechanics could understand. The reply
said there were no manuals or teclinical in-
structions, except in English, but that if he
would ship his car to a third country some hun-
dreds of miles away, it could be repaired there.
In this same country European automobile
manufacturers had published instruction books
in the local language and operated maintenance
and repair facilities manned by local personnel
instructed and trained in Europe.
American business is also sometimes dis-
tressingly deficient in replying promptly and
helpfully to business inquiries from abroad,
particularly those written in foreign languages.
During the past year I have had complaints
from Belgian companies that wish to purchase
American products that their letters of inquiry
and followup letters to American companies
remain unanswered. When a foreign company
wishing to purchase American products does
not even receive the courtesy of a reply, it turns
to a non-U.S. source. Even wci-se, such treat-
ment causes extreme irritation and resentment
that gives the entire American business world
a reputation of lack of interest, lack of effi-
ciency, or rudeness. This affects adversely
American business as a whole and does real
damage to our export program. Conversely, a
friendly, helpful, and prompt reply to foreign
inquiries, even if there is no possibility of im-
mediate sales, is a worthwhile investment for
furthering American exports. And if an
American company is not itself interested, it
might be able to suggest another American firm
so that we rather than a foreign company will
make the sale.
Keys to Success in Selling Abroad
Before closing, I would like to say a brief
word about different ways to penetrate foreign
markets. These include selling products abroad
through import-export houses; establishing for-
eign sales branches with full-time personnel,
warehouses, and service staffs ; setting up manu-
178
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
facturing facilities abroad tlirough an entirely
U.S.-owned subsidiary branch or in partnership
with local businessmen; or licensing arrange-
ments ■which provide a steady income from
royalties with little capital outlay. "Wliich
method to choose must be carefully studied and
selected on a case-by-case basis. And of course
one of the keys to success in selling abroad is to
offer what our foreign friends want and to pre-
sent it in a way that appeals, rather than trying
to sell them what we want in the United States.
We must pay much greater attention to tailor-
ing products designed expressly for the tastes
of our European or other foreign consumers.
And we must present them in ways that will in-
crease their sales appeal, such as labeling them
in the language of the country.
Business abroad involves many corporate and
other complex local problems. They require
not only the best corporate planning available
but also the very best men you can get to live
and work abroad. It is no longer sufficient for
an American business reiDresentative abroad to
have only mastary of his product or its produc-
tion. He must be sensitive to the political and
psychological environment in which he is oper-
ating. He must be tactful as well as firm. He
must understand that the method of approach
and of doing business is often different abroad
than in the United States.
Let me illustrate this point. Recently a very
tough-minded and successful European busi-
nessman, commenting on a large American com-
pany that started operating in Europe last year,
observed that it was not doing nearly as well as
it could because "the American manager, while
having admirable technical and professional
qualifications, talked to his European business
associates as if he were an Army colonel and
they were lieutenants. This is resented, and so
he doesn't get the cooperation he otherwise
would receive."
To succeed today an American businessman
abroad must be an understanding and respected
member of the foreign community without los-
ing Ms integrity as an American. He must be
able to pass Dale Carnegie's course with a good
mark.
American business also has a unique role in
seeing to it that American products are com-
petitive, quality-wise, in world markets. Your
research and development programs are more
important than ever because the Common Mar-
ket has a much larger pool of technically and
scientifically skilled talent that in the future
will make an increasing contribution to Europe-
an industrial products and techniques.
American business, with active Government
understanding and encouragement, must also
do a big job in terms of plant modernization.
We were fortimate in World War II not to
have our homes and factories bombed out. How-
ever, the great war damage in Western Europe
and Japan has led to the construction of a vast
amount of new industrial capacity in Japan
and Europe, and these fine new plants are often
more modern than our own.
Conclusion
In conclusion let me say again that, while the
challenge we face is immense, I am not pes-
simistic. We will, of course, be up against
much stronger competition from our European
friends. However, I for one believe that com-
petition brings advantages — not disadvantages.
Certainly our country has grown strong as our
industries have vied with each other in the
keenest kind of competitive effort within our
free enterprise system.
We also must expect some very tough trade
negotiations with the Common Market, which
holds a very strong hand. But we also have
good cards, for Europe needs us every bit as
much as we need her. Indeed, in the fields of
both trade and military security, on which
Europe's well-being and survival so largely de-
pend, the United States is an essential partner.
I am convinced that we have the capability
of continuing to compete successfully in the
Common Market and other world markets if
there is the will and energy and if we all do our
part. Therefore let each of us — Government,
labor, and business — face up to the challenge
and attack our problems with the same guts,
the same resolution, and the same imagination
as our forefathers, who made our coimtry the
great country that it is today.
FEBRUARY 4, 196«
179
Mr. Herter Holds Trade Talks
at Brussels, Geneva, and Paris
The White House announced on January 18
that Christian A. Herter, Special Representa-
tive of the President for Trade Negotiations,
■will be traveling to Brussels, Geneva, and Paris
from January 24 to February 2.
At Brussels Mr. Herter will meet with Presi-
dent [Walter] Hallstein and other members of
the Commission of the European Economic
Commvmity to explore informally with them
possible approaches to trade negotiations which
the United States is empowered to conduct
under the provisions of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962.1 Since this will be the iirst official
contact with the EEC on this matter, it is ex-
pected that the exchange of views will be largely
exploratory and of a very general nature.
At Geneva Mr. Herter proposes to meet with
Eric Wyndham Wliite, the Executive Secretary
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
to discuss the role of the GATT in such nego-
tiations.
At Paris Mr. Herter will meet with Secre-
tary-General Thorkil Kristensen of the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment to examine the role of the OECD in
these trade negotiations.
President Sets Up Administration
of Trade Expansion Act
AN EXECUTIVE ORDER'
Administration of the Trade Expansion Act
OF 1962
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Public Law 87-794,
approved October 11, 1962; 76 Stat. 872), and by Sec-
tion 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as
President of the United States, it is ordered as
follows :
Section 1. Definition. As used in this order the
term "the Act" means the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 (Public Law 87-794, approved October 11, 1962),
exclusive, however, of chapters 2, 3, and 5 of title III
thereof.
Sec. 2. Special Representative, (a) The Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations' provided for
in Section 241 of the Act (hereinafter referred to as
the Special Representative) shall be located in the
Executive OflBce of the President and shall be directly
responsible to the President.
(b) There shall be a deputy Special Representa-
tive for Trade Negotiations with the rank of Ambas-
sador, whose principal functions shall be to conduct
negotiations under title II of the Act, and who shall
perform such additional duties as the Special Repre-
sentative may direct.
Sec. 3. Functions of Special Representative, (a)
The Special Representative shall have the functions
conferred upon him by the Act, the functions delegated
or otherwise assigned to him by the provisions of this
order, and such other functions as the President may
from time to time direct.
(b) The Special Representative generally shall as-
sist the President in the administration of, and facili-
tate the carrying out of, the Act. Except as may be
unnecessary by reason of delegations of authority
contained in this order or for other reasons, the Spe-
cial Representative shall furnish timely and appropri-
ate recommendations, information, and advice to the
President in connection with the administration and
execution of the Act by the President.
(c) As he may deem to be necessary for the proper
administration and execution of the Act and of this
order, the Special Representative (1) shall draw upon
the resources of Federal agencies, and of bodies es-
tablished by or under the provisions of this order, in
connection with the performance of his functions, and
(2) except as may be otherwise provided by this order
or by law, may assign to the head of any such agency
or body the performance of duties incidental to the
administration of the Act.
(d) In connection with the performance of his func-
tions the Special Representative shall, as appropriate
and practicable, consult with Federal agencies.
(e) The Special Representative shall from time to
time furnish the President lists of articles proposed
for publication and transmittal to the Tariff Commis-
sion by the President under the provisions of Section
221(a) of the Act
(f ) The functions conferred upon the President by
Section 222 of the Act are hereby delegated to the
Special Representative.
(g) The functions conferred upon the President by
the first sentence of Section 223 of the Act are hereby
delegated to the Special Representative. The Special
Representative is hereby designated to perform the
functions prescribed b.v the second sentence of that
section.
(h) The Special Representative shall make arrange-
ments under which the committee established by Sec-
' For an article by Leonard Weiss on the Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962, see Bulletin of Dec. 3, 1962, p.
847.
' No. 11075 ; 28 Fed. Reg. 473.
' For an announcement of the appointment of
Christian A. Herter as Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations, see Buixetin of Dec. 3, 1962, p.
846.
180
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
tion 4 of this order shall provide for pwblie hearings In
pursuance of the second sentence of Section 252(d) of
the Act The functions conferred upon the President
by the first sentence of that section are hereby dele-
gated to the Special Representative.
(i) Any proclamation proposed for issuance under
Section 201(a) or Section 351(a) of the Act (sub-
mitted pursuant to the provisions of subsection (b) of
this section) shall be subject to the provisions of Ex-
ecutive Order No. 11030 of June 19, 1962.
(j) Advice furnished by the Secretaries of Com-
merce and Labor under Section 351(c) of the Act
shall be transmitted by the respective Secretaries to
the President through the Special Representative.
(k) Subject to available financing, the Special
Representative may employ such personnel as may
be necessary to assist him in the performance of his
functions.
Seo. 4. Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee.
(a) There is hereby established the Trade Expansion
Act Advisory Committee (hereinafter referred to aa
the Committee). The Committee shall be composed
of the Special Representative, who shall be its chair-
man, and the following other members : the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary
of Defense, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secre-
tary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and
the Secretary of Labor.
(b) Each Secretary referred to in Section 4(a) of
this order may designate an official from his depart-
ment, who is in status not below that of an Assistant
Secretary of an executive or military department, to
serve as a member of the Committee in lieu of the
designating Secretary when the latter Is unable to
attend any meeting of the Committee. In correspond-
ing circumstances, the Special Representative may
designate the Deputy Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations, for a corresponding purpose. Except for
his accountability to his designating authority, any
person while so serving shall have in all respects the
same status, as a member of the Committee, as do other
members of the Committee.
(c) The Special Representative may from time to
time designate any member of the Committee (includ-
ing any person serving as a member of the Committee
under the provisions of Section 4(b) hereof) to act
as chairman of the Committee when the Special Repre-
sentative is unable to attend any meeting of the
Committee.
(d) The Committee shall have the functions con-
ferred by the Act upon the interagency organization
referred to in Section 242 of the Act and shall also
perform such other functions as tlie President may
from time to time direct
(e) The recommendations made by the Committee
under Section 242(b)(1) of the Act, as approved or
modified by the President, shall guide the adminis-
tration of the trade agreements program.
(f) The functions conferred upon the President by
the second sentence of Section 242(c) of the Act, to
the extent that they are in respect of procedures, are
hereby delegated to the Committee.
Sec. 5. Tariff Commission, (a) The United States
Tariff Commission is requested to determine the ad
valorem equivalent, and, for this purpose, the author-
ity conferred upon the President by the provisions of
Section 256(7) of the Act is hereby delegated to the
Commission.
(b) Reports required to be made, and transcripts of
hearings and briefs required to be furnished, by the
Tariff Commission under the provisions of Section
301(f)(1) of the Act (1) shall, in respect of investi-
gations made by it under Section 301(c)(1) of the
Act be transmitted by the Commission to the President
through the Secretary of Commerce, and (2) shall. In
respect of Investigations made by it under Section
301(c) (2) of the Act be transmitted to the President
through the Secretary of Labor.
(c) All other reports, findings, advice, hearing tran-
scripts, briefs, and information which, under the terms
of the Act, the Tariff Commission is required to fur-
nish, report, or otherwise deliver to the President
shall be transmitted to him through the Special
Representative.
(d) Advice of the Tariff Commission under Section
221(b) of the Act shall not be released or disclosed In
any manner or to any extent not specifically author-
ized by the President or by the Special Representative.
Sec. 6. Secretary of the Treasury. There is hereby
delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury the author-
ity to issue regulations, conferred upon the President
by the provisions of Section 352(b) of the Act.
Sec. 7. Secretary of Commerce. The authority to
certify, conferred upon the President by the provisions
of Section 302(c) of the Act, to the extent that such
authority is in respect of firms, is hereby delegated to
the Secretary of Commerce.
Sec. 8. Secretary of Labor. There are hereby dele-
gated to the Secretary of Labor the authority to cer-
tify, conferred upon the President by the provisions of
Section 302(c) of the Act, to the extent that such
authority is in respect of groups of workers, and the
authority conferred upon the President by the provi-
sions of Section 302(e) of the Act.
Sec. 9. Committees and task forces. To perform
assigned duties in connection with functions under the
Act and as may be permitted by law, the Special Rep-
resentative may from time to time cause to be consti-
tuted appropriate committees or task forces made up
in whole or in part of representatives or employees of
Interested agencies, of representatives of the commit-
tee established by the provisions of Section 4 of this
order, or of other persons. Assignments of personnel
from agencies, in connection with the foregoing, and
assignments of duties to them, shaU be made with the
consent of the respective heads of agencies concerned.
Sec. 10. Threat of impairment of national security.
Executive Order No. 11051 of September 27, 1962, is
hereby amended by striking from Section 404(a)
thereof the text "Section 2 of the Act of July 1, 1954
FEBRUARY 4, 1963
181
(68 Stat. 300; 19 U.S.C. 1352a)" and inserting in lieu
of the striclien text the following: "Section 232 of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962".
Sec. 11. References. Except as may for any reason
be inappropriate, references in this order to any other
Executive order or to the Act or to the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1902 or to any other statute, and references
in this order or in any other Executive order to this
order, shall be deemed to include references thereto,
respectively, as amended from time to time.
Sec. 12. Prior bodies and orders, (a) The pend-
ing business, and the records and property, of the
Trade Policy Committee, Trade Agreements Commit-
tee, and Committee for Reciprocity Information (now
existing under orders referred to in Section 12(b)
below) shall be completed or transferred as the Special
Representative, consonant with law and with the pro-
visions of this order, shall direct ; and the said com-
mittees are abolished effective as of the thirtieth day
following the date of this order.
(b) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this sec-
tion, the following are hereby superseded and revoked :
(1) Executive Order No. 10082 of October 5, 1949.
(2) Executive Order No. 10170 of October 12, 1950.
(3) Executive Order No. 10401 of October 14, 1952.
(4) Executive Order No. 10741 of November 25, 1957.
elusion of these talks the United States stated
it planned to announce the details of the pro-
gram for the next disposal period during
January and that the new program would take
the place of the trial plan which had been in
effect since September 12, 1962. However, the
time required to work out details of the new
program and to arrange for subsequent in-
ternal U.S. Government review has delayed its
completion.
During the current period it will be possible
for the General Senaces Admmistration to test
the marketing situation for tin located in depots
in some of the geogi-aphically outlying areas
and at the same time to maintain its present
trade relationships on an uninterrupted basis.
The GSA will continue to exercise caution not
to disrupt the tin market.
The United States plans to invite comments
of both producing countries and the Interna-
tional Tin Council in advance of formal an-
nouncement of the new program.
The White House,
January 15, 1963.
United States Extends Interim
Tin Disposal Program
Department Statement
Press release 38 dated January 18
The Department of State has informed the
governments of the principal tin-producing
countries and the International Tin Council
that it has been decided to extend the present
temporary tin disposal program, which calls
for offerings of 200 tons of tin per week for
both commercial and government use, for the
balance of the first quarter of 19G3.
Consultations took place in December 1962 '
between a delegation of the ITC and represent-
atives of the State Department and other
agencies of the U.S. Government. At the con-
Certain U.S. Trade Agreement
Concessions Enter Bnto Force
The Department of State announced on Jan-
uary 14 (press release 24) that the U.S. Gov-
ernment has, imder the trade agreement signed
with Spain on December 31, 1962, notified the
Government of Spain of its intention to put
into effect the first stage of the U.S. concessions
on February 1. Conclusion of this agreement
was announced in Department of State press
release 752 of December 31.^
The trade agreement providing concessions
compensatory for U.S. escape-clause action,
signed with Japan on December 31, 1962, and
announced in Department of State press release
751 of December 31 - provides that the first
stage of the U.S. concessions in that agreement
will be made effective on Febniary 1.
During December 1962 three agreements
were signed rectifying the U.S. schedules to the
protocol embodying results of the 1960-61 tariff
negotiations, which was proclaimed by Procla-
' BuLtETiN of Dec. 31, 1962, p. 1012.
'■ BuiXETiN of .Tan. 28, 1963, p. 146.
'Ibid., Jan. 21, 1963, p. 108.
182
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
mation 3513 of December 28, 1962.^ It is
anticipated that tliese rectifications will also
become effective on February 1.*
Views Invited on GATT Relations
With Spain and U.A.R.
Press release 26 dated January 14
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
The Special Eepresentative for Trade Ne-
gotiations on January 14 issued a public notice
requesting views regarding proposed arrange-
ments for the accession of Spain to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the pro-
visional accession of the United Arab Eepublic
to that agreement.
The accession of Spain had been anticipated
at the 1960-61 tariff conference,^ but the com-
pletion of tariff negotiations between contract-
ing parties to the General Agreement and that
country lias been delayed, and it is now antici-
pated that accession will take place during the
earlier part of 1963.
The United Arab Eepublic requested acces-
sion to the General Agreement, and arrange-
ments are now before contracting parties which
would provide for the provisional accession of
that country pending the conduct of further
negotiations on specific trade matters. Such
arrangements will result in a status for the
United Arab Eepublic comparable to that now
applicable under the General Agreement to
Argentina and Tunisia.
The notice contains the procedures to be fol-
lowed by any persons desiring to present writ-
ten or oral views with respect to the proposed
arrangements with Spain and the United Arab
Eepublic.
' 28 Fed. Reg. 107 ; for background, see Bulletin of
Jan. 28, 1963, p. 145.
* For texts of the agreements with Japan and Spain,
exchanges of letters regarding the three rectification
agreements with the Commission of the European
Economic Community, Switzerland, and Japan, and
schedules of U.S. concessions, see Department of
State press release 24 dated Jan. 14.
' For background on U.S. negotiations with GATT
contracting parties, see Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 561.
NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARINGS
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Acces-
sion OF Spain ; Provisional Accession of the
United Arab Republic
Closing date for Applications to Appear at Hearing
February 4, 1963
Closing date for Submission of Briefs February 8, 1963
Public Hearings Open February 11, 1963
Notice is hereby given by the Special Representative
for Trade Negotiations of intention to consider ar-
rangements, not involving the conduct of new tariff
negotiations, for the accession of Spain to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and for the provi-
sional accession of the United Arab Republic to that
Agreement.
Spain. The Interdepartmental Committee on Trade
Agreements in its notice of May 27, 1960,^ announced
intention to conduct trade agreement negotiations un-
der the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with
certain foreign governments including the Government
of Spain. Tariff negotiations conducted with the Gov-
ernment of Spain pursuant to that notice resulted in
the conclusion on December 31, 1962, of an interim bi-
lateral trade agreement with Spain,' pursuant to
section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19
U.S.C. 1351) and section 257(c) of the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-794, 76 Stat. 882). This
agreement provides that the United States schedule
of tariff concessions annexed thereto shall be applied
as though it were a schedule to the General Agreement,
pending the subsequent opening for acceptance of a
protocol for the accession of Spain to the General
Agreement, the United States schedule annexed to
which protocol would be the same as that annexed to
the interim bilateral agreement with Spain. Whereas
the interim agreement is essentially an agreement re-
lating to tariff concessions, under the protocol of
accession the provisions of the General Agreement as
a whole would become applicable between the United
States and Spain.
United Arab Republic. Under the arrangements for
the provisional accession of the United Arab Republic
that country would apply the provisions of the General
Agreement to contracting parties to that Agreement
which formally accept these arrangements. The
United Arab Republic would not undertake obligations
with respect to tariff concessions. In return such con-
tracting parties would apply to the United Arab Re-
public the provisions of the General Agreement other
than those which accord direct rights to their schedules
containing tariff concessions. The United States has
no bilateral trade agreement with the United Arab
Republic.
' For text, see ibid., June 13, 1960, p. 971.
' Ibid., Jan. 28, 1963, p. 146.
FEBRUARY 4, 1963
183
The proposals in this notice with respect to Spain
and the United Arab Republic would not involve any
new modification or specific continuance of United
States tariff rates.
The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
hereby gives notice that all applications for oral pres-
entation of views in respect to any aspects of the
foregoing proposals shall be submitted not later than
February 4, 1963. Such communications should be
addressed to "Committee for Reciprocity Information,
Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D.C."
Fifteen copies of written statements, either typed,
printed, or duplicated, shall be submitted, of which
one copy shall be sworn to. Written statements sub-
mitted te the Committee, except information and busi-
ness data proffered in confidence, shall be open to
inspection by interested persons. Information and
business data proffered in confidence shall be sub-
mitted on separate pages clearly marked "For OflScial
Use only of the Committee for Reciprocity Infor-
mation".
Public hearings will be held before the Committee
for Reciprocity Information, at which hearings oral
statements will be heard, beginning at 10 a.m. on
February 11, 1963 in the Hearing Room in the Tariff
Commission Building, Eighth and E Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. Witnesses who malie application
to be heard will be advised regarding the time and
place of their individual appearances. Appearances
at such hearings may be made only by or on behalf of
those persons who have filed written statements and
who have within the time prescribed made written
application for oral presentation of views. Statements
made at public hearings shall be under oath.
Copies of this notice and of the accompanying press
release issued today by the Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations may be obtained from the Commit-
tee for Reciprocity Information or may be inspected
at the Field Offices of the Department of Commerce.
Issued this 14th day of January, 1963.
WnXIAM T. GOSSETT
Deputy Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations
DECLARATION ON U.A.R.
PROVISIONAL ACCESSION OF THE UNITED
ARAB REPUBLIC
Declaration of IS November 1962
The Government of the United Arab Republic and
the other governments on behalf of which this Declara-
tion has been accepted (the latter governments being
hereinafter referred to as the "participating govern-
ments"),
Considering that the Government of the United Arab
Republic on 17 April 1962 made a formal request to
accede to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(hereinafter referred to as the "General Agreement")
in accordance with the provisions of Article XXXIII
of the General Agreement, and that that Government
will be prepared to conduct the negotiations on customs
tariffs, or their equivalent, with contracting parties,
which it is considered should precede accession under
Article XXXIII, as soon as such negotiations can be
arranged.
Considering that, pending accession imder Article
XXXIII, the United Arab Republic is prepared to
accept the obligations of the General Agreement,
Considering that, in view of the desirability of
basing the trade relations of the United Arab Republic
with contracting parties upon the General Agreement
as soon as possible, it would be desirable to provide
for the provisional accession of the United Arab Re-
public to the General Agreement as a step towards
its eventual accession pursuant to Article XXXIII :
1. Declare that, pending the accession of the United
Arab Republic to the General Agreement under the
provisions of Article XXXIII, which will be subject
to the satisfactory conclusion of negotiations on
customs tariffs or their equivalent, in accordance with
rules and procedures to be adopted by the Contracting
Parties for this purpose, and to the settlement of
other matters relevant to the application of the Gen-
eral Agreement, the commercial relations between the
participating governments and the United Arab Re-
public shall be based upon the General Agreement,
subject to the following conditions :
(a) The Government of the United Arab Republic
shall apply provisionally and subject to the provisions
of this Declaration (i) Parts I and III of the General
Agreement, and (ii) Part II of the General Agreement
to the fullest extent not inconsistent with its legisla-
tion existing on the date of this Declaration ; the
obligations incorporated in paragraph 1 of Article I
of the General Agreement by reference to Article III
thereof and those incorporated in paragraph 2(b) of
Article II by reference to Article VI shall be considered
as falling within Part II of the General Agreement
for the purpose of this paragraph.
(b) While the United Arab Republic under the most-
favored-nation provisions of Article I of the General
Agreement will receive the benefit of the concessions
contained in the schedules annexed to the General
Agreement, it shall not have any direct rights with
respect to those concessions either under the provi-
sions of Article II or under the provisions of any
other Article of the General Agreement.
(c) In each case in which paragraph 6 of Article
V, sub-paragraph 4(d) of Article VII, and sub-para-
graph 3(c) of Article X of the General Agreement,
refer to the date of that Agreement, the applicable date
in respect of the United Arab Republic shall be the
date of this Declaration.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph
1 of Article I of the General Agreement, this Declara-
tion shall not require the elimination by the Govern-
ment of the United Arab Republic of any preferences
184
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
iu respect of import duties or charges accordefl by the
I'nited Arab Republic exclusively to one or more of the
following countries : Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon,
Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, provided, however, that
these preferences do not exceed the levels in effect on
the date of this Declaration.
(e) Tlie preceding paragraph shall be deemed to
lie a Decision of the Contracting Parties under
Article XXV :5 as if it were a Decision pursuant to
paragraph 3 of Article I.
(f) In the event that the United Arab Republic
should at some future date desire to modify the pref-
erences referred to in paragraph (e) above, including
the addition of products not at present subject to pref-
erence, the matter shall be dealt with by the Con-
tracting Parties in accordance with paragraph 3 of
Article I.
(g) Nothing in paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) above
will affect the right of the United Arab Republic to
benefit from the provisions of the General Agreement
relating to the formation of a customs union or a
free-trade area,
(h) The provisions of the General Agreement to
be applied by the United Arab Republic shall be those
contained in the test annexed to the Final Act of the
second session of the Preparatory Committee of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employ-
ment as rectified, amended, supplemented, or other-
wise modified by such instruments as may have become
effective by the date of this Declaration.
2. Request the Contracting Parties to the General
Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Contract-
ing Parties") to perform such functions as are neces-
sary for the implementation of this Declaration.
3. This Declaration, which has been approved by a
majority of two thirds of the contracting parties shall
be deposited with the Executive Secretary of the
Contbactinq Parties. It shall be open for acceptance,
by signature or otherwise, by the United Arab Repub-
lic, by contracting parties to the General Agreement
and by any governments which shall have acceded pro-
visionally to the General Agreement.
4. This Declaration shall become effective between the
United Arab Republic and any participating govern-
ment on the thirtieth day following the day upon
which it shall have been accepted on behalf of both
the United Arab Republic and that government ; it
shall remain in force until the Government of the
United Arab Republic accedes to the General Agree-
ment under the provisions of Article XXXIII thereof
or until 31 December 1964, whichever date is earlier,
unless it has been agreed between the United Arab
Republic and the participating governments to extend
its validity to a later date.
5. The Executive Secretary of the Contracting
Parties shall promptly furnish a certified copy of this
Declaration, and a notification of each acceptance
thereof, to each government to which this Declaration
is open for acceptance.
Done at Geneva this thirteenth day of November one
thous.Tud nine hundred and sixty-two, in a single copy
in the French and EnglLsh languages, both texts
authentic.
AID Requested To Inform Congress
of Reobligation of Prior Year Funds
Following is the text of a memoraTidum
from President Kennedy to the Administrator
of the Agency for International Development.
White House press release dated January 9
January 8, 1963
Memorandum for the Administrator, Agency
FOR International Development
The Foreign Aid and Kelated Agencies Ap-
propriation Act, 1963 contains a provision
which states that program changes involving
funds for economic assistance carried forward
from prior years may be made only if the
Appropriations Committees of the Congress are
notified prior to such changes and no objection
is entered by either Committee within 60 days.
I have been advised by the Attorney General
that this provision is unconstitutional either as
a delegation to Congressional committees of
powers which reside only in the Congress as a
whole or as an attempt to confer executive
powers on the Committee in violation of the
principle of separation of powers prescribed in
Articles I and II of the Constitution. Pre-
vious Presidents and Attorneys General have
objected to similar provisions permitting a
Committee to veto executive action authorized
by law.
On July 17, 1944 President Eoosevelt signed
a bill to permit increased oil production from
the Elk Hills reserve because there was an im-
mediate need for the legislation ; in his signing
statement he objected to a requirement that
contracts and leases not be undertaken without
prior consultation with the Naval Affairs Com-
mittees on the grounds that to delegate this
function to two Committees is "to disregard
principles basic to our form of government."
On July 19, 1952 President Truman vetoed a
bill granting authority to lease space for postal
purposes because a Congressional committee
FEBRUARY 4, 1963
185
would be allowed to pass on proposed
contracts.
On July 13, 1955 President Eisenhower
signed the fiscal year 1956 Defense Appropria-
tion Bill only because the funds were urgently
needed; in his signing statement he objected
strongly to a provision permitting a Congres-
sional committee to veto contracts with private
enterprise for work previously performed by
Government personnel.
I concur in these views. However, I con-
sider it entirely proper for the committees to
request information with respect to plans for
the expenditures of appropriated funds, and I
recognize the desirability of consultations be-
tween officials of the executive branch and the
committees. It is therefore my intention, act-
ing on the advice of the Department of Justice,
to treat this provision as a request for informa-
tion. You are therefore requested to keep the
ajipropriations committees fully informed of
any reobligation of prior year funds.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings'
Scheduled February Through April 1963
IAEA Board of Governors
IMCO Workiiig Group on Facilitation of International Travel and
Transport: Subgroup on Customs.
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods .
U.N. Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for
the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas.
U.N. ECOSOC Population Commission: r2th Session
IMCO Expert Working Group on Facilitation of Travel and Trans-
port.
ITU CCIR Plan Subcommittee for Asia
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: 15th
Session.
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: Meeting of the Party Govern-
ments Pursuant to Article XI.
IMCO Working Group on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea .
ICAO Panel on Origin-and-Destination Statistics: 5th Meeting . .
OECD Maritime Transport Committee: Working Party
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa
IMCO Subcommittee on Code of Signals
ILO Governing Body: 154th Session
U.N. Olive Oil Conference
OECD Economic Policy Committee
IMCO Working Group on Financial Regulations
IBE E.xecutive Committee
Vienna Feb. 3-
London Feb. 4-
Geneva Feb. 4—
Geneva Feb. 4-
New York Feb. 4-
London Feb. 5-
Geneva Feb. 5-
Bangkok Feb. 8-
Tokyo Feb. 11-
London Feb. 11-
Montreal Feb. 11-
Paris Feb. 15-
Uopoldville Feb. 18-
London Feb. 19-
Geneva Feb. 19-
Geneva Feb. 26-
Paris Feb. 27-
London Feb. 28-
Geneva February
■ Prepared in the Ofl^ce of International Conferences, Jan. 11, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations:
CCIR, Comity consultatif international des radio communications; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE,
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic
Commission for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; PAO, Food and Agriculture Organization;
IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International
Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization;
U.N., United Nations- UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WMO,
World Meteorological Organization.
186
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued
Scheduled February Through April 1963^Conlinued
IAEA Diplomatic Conference on a Convention on Minimum Inter-
national Standards Regarding Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
for Land-Based Reactors.
U.N. ECLA Committee of the \Yhole: 9th Session
Universal Postal Union: 15th Congress
U.N. Conference on Consular Privileges
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations . .
CENTO Ministerial Council: 11th Meeting
IAEA Symposium on the Application of Radioisotopes in Hy-
drology.
IMCO Working Group on Intact Stability of Ships: 1st Session . .
U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 19th
Session.
IMCO Working Group on Watertight Subdivision and Damage
Stability of Passenger and Cargo Ships.
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: Working Party on Urban Renewal
and Town Planning Aspects of Housing.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 17th Session . .
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 19th Session . . .
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee
FAO General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean: 7th Session .
U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee: Coal Committee and Working
Party on Productivity.
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Construction of Vehicles ....
ICAO Legal Subcommittee
ITU Administrative Council: 18th Session
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement: 3d Session . . .
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Rapporteurs on
Comparisons of Systems of National Accounts in Use in Europe.
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Special Working Group .
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 29th Session
IAEA Board of Governors
ICAO Facilitation Division: 6th Session
World Meteorological Organization: 4th Congress
South Pacific Commission: Regional Seminar on Education . . .
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 35th Session
U.N. ECE Committee on Electric Power: Rapporteurs on Rural
Electrification.
U.N. ECE Coal Committee: Rapporteurs on Utilization of Fly Ash .
ICAO Communications Division: Special Meeting To Prepare for
ITU Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference.
Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees:
9th Session.
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 18th Session
NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 15th Meeting ....
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade:
Special Working Party.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Committee on Illicit
Traffic.
PAHO Executive Committee: 48th Meeting
IAEA International Conference on Draft Convention on Civil Lia-
bility, Land-Based Facilities.
IMCO Working Group on Facilitation of International Travel and
Transport: 2d Session.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade:
11th Session.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 18th Session . . .
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 22d Plenary Meeting . .
WMO Executive Committee: 15th Session
WMO Executive Committee: Extraordinary Session
U.N. Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Terri-
tories.
U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission: 15th Session
U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 5th Session . . .
U.N. ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the Conference on Trade
and Development.
Bureau of UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commis-
sion.
Buenos Aires February or
March
Santiago February or
March
(undetermined) Mar. I-
Vienna Mar. 3-
New York Mar. 4-
Karachi Mar. 4-
Tokyo Mar. 5-
London Mar. 5-
Manila Mar. 5-
London Mar. 11-
Geneva Mar. 11-
New York Mar. 11-
Geneva Mar. 11-
Paris Mar. 12-
Madrid Mar. 12-
Geneva Mar. 18-
Goneva Mar. 18-
Montreal Mar. 18-
Geneva Mar. 23-
London Mar. 25-
Geneva Mar. 25-
Geneva Mar. 25-
Geneva Mar. 28-
Vienna March
Mexico, D.F March
Geneva Apr. 1-
Noum^a Apr. 1-
New York Apr. 2-
Geneva Apr. 3-
Geneva Apr. 8-
Montreal Apr. 16-
Geneva Apr. 17-
Geneva Apr. 18-
London Apr. 22-
New York Apr. 22-
Geneva Apr. 23-
Washington Apr. 25-
Vienna Apr. 29-
London Apr. 29-
New York Apr. 29-
Geneva Apr. 29-
New Delhi April
Geneva April
Geneva April
New York April
New York April
Bangkok April
New York April
Rio de Janeiro April
FEBRUARY 4, 1963
187
United States To Participate
in U.N. Science Conference
Following is a statement of January 7 hy
Secretary Rusk regarding the United Nations
Conference on the Application of Science and
Technology for the Benefit of the Less De-
veloped Areas, to he held at Geneva February
k.-20, together loith an announcement of the
names of the leading U.S. representatives.
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK
Preaa release 8 dated January 7
Tlie Department of State has appointed a
large and distinguished United States delega-
tion to the United Nations Conference on the
Application of Science and Technology for the
Benefit of the Less Developed Areas (UN-
CAST). There are three major reasons why
the Department considers this meeting of un-
usual significance.
First, the highest ambition of the leaders of
two- thirds of the world's population is for rapid
modernization of their own societies. That is
wliy we in the industrialized parts of the world
must be able to say just what we have learned
about science and teclinology and about the
building of institutions that can help the de-
veloping countries to modernize in a hurry.
The United States must naturally be a leader
in this effort.
Second, the developing nations are creating
a variety of institutions and services, public and
private, to meet their own needs. The open
societies in the industrialized world have them-
selves invented a broad variety of public and
private institutions to guide their economic and
social growth. We need to bring this experience
together for study by the developing nations as
they decide how they are going to train and
organize men and women for rapid develop-
ment.
Third, we still have much to learn about how
to fashion new kinds of institutions, appropri-
ate to developing nations, by combining our
teclmology with their local cultural raw ma-
terials. The UNCAST conference will afford
q
an opportunity to pioneer in joint exploration
of practical ways to adapt technology and insti-
tutions from one cultural and technical en-
vironment to another.
For these reasons we consider this conference
a highly significant exercise in international co-
operation. It is an excellent example of what
can be done, within the United Nations, to fur-
ther the purposes of the U.N. Decade of De-
velopment. The United States hopes that all
participants will approach this task in the spirit
of free exchange and open inquiry.
U.S. REPRESENTATIVES
The Department of State announced on
January 7 (press release 6) that Walsh Mc-
Dermott would be chairman of the U.S. dele-
gation to the United Nations Conference on
the Application of Science and Technology for
the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas, to be
held at Geneva February 4—20. Dr. McDer-
mott is chairman of the department of public
health, Cornell University Medical College,
New York, N.Y.
Other leading American representatives will
be:
Edward Gudeman, Under Secretary of Commerce '
Jerome Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology and Director of the
Office of Science and Technology
Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs
Frank M. Coffin, Deputy Administrator for Operations,
Agency for International Development
Isidor I. Rabi, professor of physics, Columbia Uni-
versity
S. Milton Nabrit, president, Texas Southern Univer-
sity
John Diebold, chief executive officer, The Diebold
Group, Inc.
Detlev W. Bronk, president. Rockefeller Institute,
and former president, National Academy of Sciences
Leona Baumgartner, Assistant Administrator for Hu-
man Resources and Social Development, AID, and,
' The Department of State announced on Jan. 15
(press release 28) that J. Herbert Hollomon, Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Science and Technology,
would replace Under Secretary Gudeman. (See press
release 28 also for the names of the 90 other members
of the U.S. delegation.)
188
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
until recently, Commissioner of Health for New
York City.
Between 1,500 and 2,000 delegates from 80
or more member nations of the United Nations
or of its specialized agencies are expected to
attend the conference. More than 1,800 papers
have been submitted by authorities in the 12
different subject areas to be covered by the con-
ference, including agriculture, industry, nat-
ural resources, transportation, communica-
tions, health, manpower, technical training,
economic planning, housing and problems
of urbanization, technical assistance, and
scientific policies.
The U.S. delegation will take part in 97 dif-
ferent sessions scheduled for the 16 days of the
conference. There will be 3 plenary sessions
it the beginning and close of the conference,
12 general sessions concerned with major sub-
ject categories, and 82 meetings on specialized
fields.
TREATY INFORMATION
U.S. and Republic of Korea
Sign Consular Convention
Press release 11 dated January 8
A consular convention between the United
States and the Republic of Korea was signed
on January 8 at Seoul, Korea, by Samuel D.
Berger, American Ambassador at Seoul, and
Diik Shin Choi, Foreign Minister of the Re-
public of Korea.
The convention defines and establishes the
duties, rights, privileges, exemptions, and im-
mimities of consular officers of each country in
the territory of the other country. The pro-
visions of this convention, although similar in
substance to the provisions of consular conven-
tions with foreign coimtries concluded in pre-
vious years, are set forth more succinctly than
heretofore. It is anticipated that this new for-
FEBRUART 4, 1963
mat will serve as a prototype for consular con-
ventions to be negotiated with other countries.
The convention will enter into force on the
30th day following the day on which ratifica-
tions of the two Governments are exchanged.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Cultural Relations
Agreement on the importation of educational, scien-
tific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at
Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force
May 21, 1952.'
Acceptance deposited: Italy, November 26, 1962.
Trade
Long-term arrangements regarding international trade
in cotton textiles. Concluded at Geneva February
9, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962.
Acceptance deposited: Australia (with understand-
ing), November 21, 1962.
Wheat
International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signa-
ture at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962.
Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts
III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS
5115.
Acceptance deposited: France, January 4, 1963.
Application to: Antigua, Bahama Islands, Barbados,
Bermuda, British Guiana, British Honduras,
British Solomon Islands Protectorate, British Vir-
gin Islands, Dominica, Fiji, The Gambia (Colony
and Protectorate), Gibraltar, Grenada, Bailiwick
of Guernsey, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Mauritius,
Montserrat, North Borneo, Sarawak, St. Chris-
topher, Nevis and Anguilla, St. Helena, St. Lucia,
Kingdom of Tonga, Zanzibar, January 15, 1963.
BILATERAL
Chile
Agreement relating to the furnishing of defense
articles and services to Chile. Effected by exchange
of notes at Santiago November 7 and December 7,
1962. Entered into force December 7, 1962.
India
Agreement relating to the International Indian Ocean
Expedition. Effected by exchange of notes at New
Delhi September 28 and October 5 and 9, 1962. En-
tered into force October 9, 1962.
Peru
Agreement relating to the furnishing of defense ar-
ticles and services to Peru. Effected by exchange of
notes at Lima December 17 and 20, 1962. Entered
into force December 20, 1962.
' Not in force for the United States.
189
DEPARTWENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Department To Open Office at Miami
To Coordinate Cuban Programs
The Department of State announced on January 16
(press release 31) tbat it shortly will open an office
at Miami, Pla., as part of the Government's efforts to
coordinate Federal programs in that area connected
with Cuban affairs.
The Miami office, which will serve as the local arm
of the newly established office of Coordinator of Cuban
Affairs, will be headed by John Hugh Crimmins.
Educational and Cultural Exchange Program, July 1,
1960-June 30, 1961. Annual report summarizLng the
activities of the program administered by the Depart-
ment of State. Pub. 7390. International Information
and Cultural Series 81. 69 pp. Limited distribution.
U.S. Participation in the International Atomic Energy
Agency, Report by the President to Congress for the
Year 1961. Fifth annual report on the work of the
Board of Governors and the meeting of the fifth regular
session of the General Conference, as well as the work
of the Secretariat. Pub. 7393. International Organiza-
tion and Conference Series 31. 31 pp. Limited dis-
tribution.
The Department of State Building. A description of
the new modern efficient home of the Department, the
oldest executive department of the U.S. Government,
with a brief explanation of some of its functions.
Pub. 7400. Department and Foreigpa Service Series
107. 30 pp. 25^.
Designations
Heath Bowman as director of the secretariat of
the Advisory Committee on the Arts, Bureau of Edu-
cational and Cultural AflEairs, effective January 7.
( For biographic details, see Department of State press
release 4 dated January 7.)
Sterling J. Cottrell as Senior Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary for Inter- American Affairs and Coordinator of
Cuban Affairs, effective January 8. (For biographic
details, see Department of State press release 14 dated
January 8.)
J. Edward Lyerly as Deputy Administrator, Bureau
of Security and Consular Affairs, effective December
23. (For biographic details, see Department of State
press release 22 dated January 11.)
Glenn G. Wolfe as director of the Office of Cultural
Presentations, Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs, effective January 7. (For biographic details,
see Department of State press release 4 dated Janu-
ary 7.)
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, B.C. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex-
cept in the case of free publications, which may be ob-
tained from, the Department of State.
Chinese Communist World Outlook. A handbook of
Chinese Communist statements and the public record
of a militant ideology. Pub. 7379. Far Eastern Series
112. 139 pp. 70^.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 14-20
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington
25. D.C.
Releases issued prior to January 14 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 3
of January 3 ; 6, 7, and 8 of January 7 ; 11 of
January S ; 17 of January 10.
No. Date Subject
24 1/14 Entry into force of trade agreement
concessions (rewrite).
*25 1/14 U.S. participation in international
conferences.
2a 1/14 GATT relations with Spain and
U.A.R.
t27 1/15 Mrs. Noirell : "Road to Interna-
tional Understanding."
*28 1/15 Delegation to UNCAST conference.
*29 1/15 Program for visit of Italian Prime
Minister.
30 1/16 Visit of Argentine Foreign Minister.
31 1/16 Office opened at Miami to coordinate
Cuban programs (rewrite).
32 1/16 Foreign policy briefing conference
at Los Angeles.
33 1/17 Rusk : inaugural Relay satellite
broadcast to Latin America.
34 1/17 Cleveland: "The United Nations
and the Congo : Three Questions."
*35 1/17 Amendments to program for visit of
Italian Prime Minister.
36 1/18 Upper Volta credentials (rewrite).
t37 1/18 Delegation to U.N. Conference on
Trade and Development (rewrite).
38 1/18 Tin disposal program.
*39 1/18 Rusk : death of Hugh Gaitskell.
*40 1/19 Program for visit of Argentine
Foreign Minister.
t43 1/20 U.S.-Soviet exchange of views on
test ban.
*\ot printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
190
DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
February 4, 1963
American Republics
Cottrell designated Senior Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs . . .
Secretary Inaugurates Broadcasts to Latin
America Via Relay (Rusls)
Argentina. Argentine Foreign Minister Visits
United States
Brazil. Secretary Inaugurates Broadcasts to
Latin America Via Relay (Rusk)
Communism. The State of the Union (Ken-
nedy)
Congo (Leopoldville). The United Nations and
The Congo : Three Questions (Cleveland . .
Index
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1232
Congress
AID Requested To Inform Congress of Reobliga-
tion of Prior Tear Funds (Kennedy)
The State of the Union (Kennedy)
Cuba
Cottrell designated Coordinator of Cuban
Affairs
IDepartment To Open OtSce at Miami To Co-
ordinate Cuban Programs
IDepartment and Foreign Service
■Department To Open Office at Miami to Co-
ordinate Cuban Programs
[Designations (Bowman, Cottrell, Lyerly,
Wolfe)
lEconomic Affairs
(Certain U.S. Trade Agreement Concessions Enter
Into Force
Mr. Herter Holds Trade Talks at Brussels,
Geneva, and Paris
(President Sets Up Administration of Trade Ex-
pansion Act (text of Executive order)
!P.L. 4S0 Currency Available for Sale to U.S.
Tourists in Cairo
United States Extends Interim Tin Disposal
Program
United States Trade Relations With the New-
Europe : The Challenge and the Opportunities
(MacArthur)
Views Invited on GATT Relations With Spain
and U.A.R
Educational and Cultural Affairs
Bowman designated director of secretariat. Ad-
visory Committee on Arts
Wolfe designated director, OflBce of Cultural
Presentations
Europe
Certain U.S. Trade Agreement Concessions
Enter Into Force
Mr. Herter Holds Trade Talks at Brussels,
Geneva, and Paris
The State of the Union (Kennedy)
United States Trade Relations With the New
Europe : The Challenge and the Opportunities
(MacArthur)
Foreign Aid
AID Requested To Inform Congress of Reobliga-
tion of Prior Tear Funds (Kennedy) . . . .
The State of the Union (Kennedy)
International Organizations and Conferences.
Calendar of International Conferences and
Meetings
190
171
170
171
159
165
185
159
190
190
190
190
182
180
180
173
182
174
183
190
190
182
180
159
174
185
159
186
Italy. President Kennedy Holds Talks With
Prime Minister of Italy (Faufani, Kennedy) . 164
Japan. Certain U.S. Trade Agreement Conces-
sions Enter Into Force 182
Korea. U.S. and Republic of Korea Sign Con-
sular Convention 189
Panama. U.S. and Panama Agree on Certain
Procedural Matters in Canal Zone (texts of
joint communique and aide memoire) . . . 171
Presidential Documents
AID Requested To Inform Congress of Reobliga-
tlon of Prior Year Funds 185
President Calls Togo President's Death Loss for
Africa and World 170
President Kennedy Holds Talks With Prime
Minister of Italy 164
President Sets Up Administration of Trade Ex-
pansion Act 180
The State of the Union 159
Public Affairs. Regional Foreign Policy Confer-
ence To Be Held at Los Angeles 173
Publications. Recent Releases 190
Science. United States To Participate in U.N.
Science Conference (Rusk, delegation) . . 188
Spain
Certain U.S. Trade Agreement Concessions Enter
Into Force 182
Views Invited on GATT Relations With Spain
and U.A.R 183
Switzerland. Certain U.S. Trade Agreement
Concessions Enter Into Force 182
Togo. President Calls Togo President's Death
Loss for Africa and World (Kennedy) . . . 170
Treaty Information
Current Actions 189
U.S. and Republic of Korea Sign Consular Con-
vention 189
United Arab Republic
P.L. 480 Currency Available for Sale to U.S.
Tourists in Cairo 173
Views Invited on GATT Relations With Spain
and U.A.R 183
United Nations
The State of the Union (Kennedy) 159
The United Nations and the Congo : Three
Questions (Cleveland) 165
United States To Participate in U.N. Science
Conference (Rusk, delegation) 188
Upper Volta. Letters of Credence (Kabore) . . 170
[Name Index
Bowman, Heath 190
Cleveland, Harlan 165
Cottrell, Sterling J 190
Fanfani, Amintore 1G4
Kabore, Boureima John 170
Kennedy, President 159, 164, 170, 180, 185
Lyerly, J. Edward 190
MacArthur, Douglas II 174
Rusk, Secretary 171, 188
Wolfe, Glenn G 190
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Government Printing Office
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OFFICfAL BUSINESS
Foreign Relations
of the United States
1941, VOL. VII
THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS
The Department of State recently released Foreign Relations of
the United States, lO^l, Volume VII, The American Republics.
This publication is one of two volumes on relations with the Ameri-
can Republics in 1941 in the Department's series of annual volumes.
A large part of the documentation relates to cooperation in plans for
hemisphere defense in view of the danger presented by the war in
Europe. Volume VII contams sections on bilateral relations with
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Volimae VI, still in
process of preparation, wiU, in addition to documentation of bilateral
relations with the remainder of the American Republics, contain a
section on United States multilateral relations with tliese Republics.
There also will be two volumes covering United States relations
with the American Republics, 1942. Volume V, containing docu-
mentation on bilateral relations with Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil,
was released in Jime 1962. Volume VI, with subjects relating for
the most part to cooperation of the other American Republics with
the United States against the Axis Powers, will be released most
probably during March 1963.
Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 194.1, Volume
VII, The Amejican Republics (Publication 7447) may be purchased
from the Superintendent of Docmnents, Government Printing Office,
Washington 25, D.C, for $3.25. Copies of Volume V for 1942, "The
American Republics" (Publication 7373) at $3.00 per copy, are still
available from the same source.
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E DEPARTMENT OF STAT
I * '^3'^r3ja.io
(
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1233
February 11, 1963
JEAN MONNET HONORED AS "MR. EUROPE" • Text
of Letter From President Kennedy and Remarks by Under
Secretary Ball 195
DEVELOPING AFRICA'S HUMAN AND MATERIAL
RESOURCES • by Assistant Secretary Williams .... 208
ROADS TO INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING • by
Mrs. Catherine D. Norrell 214
THE WORLD COFFEE AGREEMENT AND U.S. FOR-
EIGN ECONOMIC POLICY • by W. Michael Blumenthal . 218
U.S. AND U.S.S.R. EXCHANGE VIEWS ON NUCLEAR
TEST BAN 198
fED STATES
EIGN POLICY
Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Document!''"' '"''«'^ «<^« '"«'«**' ^"''^ '^«»'«''
FEB 2 1 1963
DEPOSITORY
THE DEPARTIVIENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1233 • Publication 7489
February 11, 1963
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 26, D.C.
Price:
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Use of funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
OP State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin is Indexed in the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by t/ie
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides tlie public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in tlie field of foreign
relations and on the work of tlie
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various pluises of
internatioiuil affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
Jean Monnet Honored as "Mr. Europe"
Following is the text of a letter from Presi-
dent Kennedy to Jean Monnet, President of the
Action Committee for the United States of Eu-
rope, which was read hy Under Secretary of
State Ball at a Freedom House dinner in honor
of Mr. Monnet at New York, N.Y., on January
23, together loith remarhs Tnade hy Mr. Ball
after he had read tlie President's letter.
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY
White House press release dated January 23
January 22, 1963
Dear Me. Monnet: I am delighted to join
my friends at Freedom House in doing honor
to your great achievements. You come at a
moment of high importance — and you come as
the exemplar of disinterested service to Europe
and to the Atlantic World.
For centuries, emperors, kings and dictators
have sought to impose unity on Europe by
force. For better or worse, they have failed.
But vmder your inspiration, Europe has moved
closer to unity in less than twenty years than
it had done before in a thousand. You and
your associates have built with the mortar of
reason and the brick of economic and political
interest. You are transforming Europe by the
power of a constructive idea.
Ever since the war the reconstruction and
the knitting together of Europe have been ob-
jectives of United States policy, for we have
recognized with you that in unity lies strength.
And we have also recognized with you that a
strong Europe would be good not only for Eu-
ropeans but for the world. America and a
united Europe, working in full and effective
partnership, can find solutions to those urgent
problems that confront all mankind in this
crucial time.
I have been happy, therefore, to read your
statement of January 16th in which you call
attention to the responsibility of Europe to
share with the United States in the common
defense of the West. I believe, with you, that
"Americans and Europeans must recognize that
neither one nor the other is defending a par-
ticular country, but that the ensemble is defend-
ing a common civilization." The United States
will be true to this conviction, and we trust that
it will have the support of Europeans too.
Your practical wisdom, your energy in per-
suasion, your tested courage, and your earned
eminence in Europe are the reasons for this
celebration in your honor. They are also a
gi-eat resource for freedom, and I wish you
many years of continued strength in your serv-
ice to our cause.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy
REMARKS BY MR. BALL
Press release 48 dated January 23
And now, if I may, let me add a few per-
sonal observations about a man whom it has
been my great fortune to know for 20 years.
All who have enjoyed the close friendship of
Jean Monnet — and our niunber is legion — can
recount incidents without number to illustrate
his qualities as a friend, his generosity and com-
passion, his warmth and thoughtfulness, his
genuine concern for the problems of others.
But Jean Monnet would be impatient with
me were I to pursue tliis theme tonight. No
man has ever cared less for personal adulation,
and he has not come here for that purpose.
Jean Monnet has not flown across the Atlantic
at a time of crisis to receive personal honor but
rather to participate in honoring and explain-
FEBRUAEY 11, 1963
195
ing those ideas of which he is a symbol, in the
liope that they may be even more widely under-
stood.
So tonight I shall not speak of Jean Monnet,
that warm, gallant, and modest friend from
Cognac. Neither shall I seek to expound his
ideas, for he will do that much better himself.
Eather I shall say a very few words about that
almost legendary figure of epic stature who has
become known to an admiring world as "Mr.
Europe."
Jean Monnet has become Mr. Europe, it
seems to me, because he is preeminently a
modern man. More deeply than any of us he
has perceived the central discord of our com-
plex time — the discord between our technology,
on the one hand, with its rapid pace of advance
and its requirements of scope and scale, and, on
the other hand, the institutional arrangements
under which we live, so slow to change and so
often parochial in character. The consequences
of this discord are familiar to all of us. They
are evident in the problems we deal with every
day, the problems of our cities, of our schools,
and of our transportation systems — not to men-
tion our newspapers. But they find their most
sigiiificant expression in the relations between
the peoples of the Atlantic world, where de-
fense is indivisible, where economic life is in-
terdependent, and where the major political
decisions must of necessity be taken in concert
if the full streng-th of the free world is to be
effectively mobilized against a common danger.
Because Jean Monnet has seen this fact with
crystal clarity he has striven to transform the
nation-states of Europe into a new unity, not
merely to end forever the frictions that more
than once have embroiled the whole world in
sanguinary conflict but to enable Europe to
contribute its full potential to the shaping of a
better world. And at the same time he has
sought to promote between Europe and the
United States that close cooperation which can
give real content and meaning to the Atlantic
partnership.
These objectives have represented no Utopian
dream. Jean Monnet is unquestionably hard-
headed and pragmatic, but he recognizes a com-
pelling logic in world affairs.
I have called Jean Monnet a modem man,
but this does not mean that he is unaware or
disdainful of the past. Indeed he has, I think,
a profound sense of the meaning of history and
of the deep forces it has generated. He has had
the insight to recognize that history is not a
static affair, not the constant replaying of old
themes, but a flow of events which, if man is to
survive, must be channeled in directions that
meet the requirements of an evolving new age.
He has, therefore, never been tempted into
the unhappy error — induced by a nostalgic
longing for a world tliat never was — of seeking
to recapture the past. He has not sought to
unfurl ancient banners, reinstate old forms, re-
vive the vanished symbols that beglamored the
centuries gone by. Instead he has pursued the
more relevant purpose of bending men's efforts
toward a nobler future.
It is because Jean Monnet so clearly perceives
the nature of the great tidal forces at work in
the world that he is sturdily immune to tran-
sient disappointments. I have been with him on
more than one occasion when the movement of
new ideas has seemed to many of us irrevocably
halted by the abrupt intrusion of obsolete, yet
fiercely held, ideas that echoed a distant and
earlier age. Invariably — and sometimes almost
alone — Jean Monnet has remained imdismayed.
At such moments of crisis his reaction is always
the same. "What has happened, has happened,"
he is inclined to say, "but it does not affect any-
thing fmidamental. The important point is for
us not to be deflected, not to lose momentum.
We must go forward. We may alter our tactics
but never our main objectives."
It is because of this apparent imperturba-
bility that Jean Monnet is known — to the
admiration of his friends and the exasperation
of his opponents — as an incorrigible optimist.
This attitude of mind does not stem from any
Panglossian idea that all is for the best in the
best of all possible worlds, but rather from a
dauntless faith in the logic of events and the
essential rationality of man — a faith in the ine-
luctable dii'ection of deeply moving forces.
Jean Monnet is an optimist because he is a prac-
tical man with a passionate desire to get things
done ; and for sucli a man optimism is the only
useful working hypothesis.
As a practical man he pursues his purposes in
a most practical way — a way that is peculiarly
his own. Mr. Walter Lippmann has spoken of
196
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
him as a man -who can "induce and cajole men
to work together for their own good." To say
it in other words, Jean Monnet is the supreme
practitioner of the art of personal diplomacy.
And he practices that art with unfailing per-
ception of the loci of power and with an oxtraor-
(liiiary single-mindedness.
Optimism works for him because he accepts
opponents but not defeat. I still remember a
book he once gave me — the story of an Arab
prince who, in a time of troubles, went out to the
desert to find the wisdom of the ages. The
prince returned from his sojourn with this
u motto :
May God bless even my enemies,
For they too are a means to my end.
It is by the vital force of his deep convictions,
in short, that Jean Monnet has become Mr.
Europe — the keeper of the conscience of a con-
tinent. And he has demonstrated anew the
ancient adage that a resolute man, plus the
truth, can become a majority.
Principals Named for Negotiations
on NATO MuEtilateral Force
Statement hy President Kenedy
White House press release dated January 24
I am pleased to announce that Career Am-
bassador Livingston Merchant, one of our most
distinguished diplomats, has agreed to take the
leadership of the preparation and negotiation
of United States proposals with respect to the
NATO multilateral force. He will assist Am-
bassador [Thomas K.] Finletter in discussions
in the Xorth Atlantic Council.
The negotiations to be carried out in con-
junction with the study of this subject in the
North Atlantic Council are an outgrowth of
the agreement between myself and Prime Min-
ister Macmillan, at Nassau on December 21st,^
that our two Governments would seek the de-
velopment of a multilateral NATO nuclear
force in the closest consultation with other
NATO allies.
The other members of the team will be Gerard
C. Smith, former Assistant Seci-etary of State
for Policy Planning, who headed a State De-
partment-Department of Defense mission
which visited Europe to discuss the problems
of a multilatei-al force with our allies in the
fall of 1962, and Rear Adm. John M. Lee, rep-
resenting the Department of Defense, who also
participated in that mission. These three prin-
cipal negotiatoi-s will bo supported by an
appropriate staff.
The Realities Underlying
the Atlantic Alliance
Statement hy President Kennedy '
It would be well to remind all concerned of
the hard and fast realities of this nation's re-
lationship with Europe — realities of danger,
power, and purpose which are too deeply rooted
in history and necessity to be either obscured
or altered in the long run by personal or even
national differences.
The reality of danger is that all free men
and nations live under the constant threat of
the Communist advance. Although presently
in some disarray, the Communist apparatus
controls more than one billion people, and it
daily confronts Europe and the United States
with hundreds of missiles, scores of divisions,
and the purposes of domination.
The reality of power is that the resources
essential to defense against this danger are con-
centrated overwhelmingly in the nations of the
Atlantic alliance. In unity this alliance has
ample strength to hold back the expansion of
communism until such time as it loses its force
and momentum. Acting alone, neither the
United States nor Europe could be certain of
success and survival.
The reality of purpose, therefore, is that that
which serves to unite us is right, and what
tends to divide us is wrong.
The people and Government of the United
States over the three past administrations have
built their policy on these realities. The same
policy has been followed by the people and gov-
ernments of Europe. If we are to be worthy of
our historic trust, we must continue on both
sides of the Atlantic to work together in trust.
^ For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.
FEBRUARY 11, 1963
' Read by the President at the opening of his news
conference on Jan. 24.
197
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Views on Nuclear Test Ban
Press release 43 dated January 20
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF JANUARY 20
Officials of the United States and the Soviet
Union, the cochairmen of the Geneva disarma-
ment conamittee, have been meeting informally
in New York since January 14 ' for discussions
on issues related to a possible agreed cessation
of nuclear tests.
The United States has been represented by
William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency. Soviet repre-
sentatives at the meetings have been N. T.
Fedorenko, Soviet Ambassador to the United
Nations, and S. K. Tsarapkin, chairman of the
Soviet delegation to the 18-Nation Disarmament
Committee.
The discussions to date have centered on the
issue of on-site inspections and related prob-
lems, including the possible use of automatic re-
cording stations.
The procedures and number of on-site inspec-
tions of underground events are, of course, key
issues in the whole problem of reaching agree-
ment on the cessation of nuclear tests. Ade-
quate safeguards offer assurance to all parties
that an agreement, once reached, is being
adhered to.
Therefore, the United States is pleased that
the Soviet Union is again accepting the princi-
ple of on-site inspections. It is to be hoped that
the Soviet Union will approach negotiations on
the number of such inspections and other re-
lated arrangements in a realistic and meaning-
ful way.
It has been agreed that talks would resume
in Washington on Tuesday, Januaiy 22, and
that the United Kingdom, the other member of
the nuclear testing subcommittee, would par-
ticipate. The United Kingdom, which has been
kept fully informed concerning the talks thus
' For an announcement, see Bii-Letin of Jan. 2S, 1963,
p. 127.
198
far, will be represented by Sir David Onnsby
Gore, British Ambassador to the United States.
The United States is hopeful that these dis-
cussions can be continued to a successful con-
clusion. Nations the world over are awaiting
that beginning of progress wliich will signal
a slowing down of the arms race and the start
of arms control.
EXCHANGE OF LETTERS
Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy,
December 19, 1962
Dear Mb. President, In our recent correspondence
related to the events in the Caribbean area we have
touched on the question of cessation of nuclear weapon
tests.^ Today I would like to come back again to that
problem and to set forth my views concerning possible
ways of its speediest solution which would be mutually
acceptable to both our sides.
It seems to me, Mr. President, that the time has come
now to put an end once and for all to nuclear tests,
to draw a line through such tests. The moment for
this is very, very appropriate. Left behind is a period
of utmost acuteness and tension in the Caribbean.
Now we have untied our hands to engage closely in
other urgent international matters and, in particular,
in such a problem which has been riije for so long aa
cessation of nuclear tests. A certain relaxation of
international tension which has emerged now should,
in my view, facilitate this.
The Soviet Union does not need war. I think that
war does not promise bright prospects for the United
States either. If in the past after every war America
used to increase its economic potential and to accumu-
late more and moie wealth, now war with the use of
modern rocket nuclear weapons wiU stride across seas
and oceans within minutes. Thermonuclear catas-
trophe will bring enormous losses and sufferings to
the American people as well as to other peoples on
earth. To prevent this we must, on the basis of com-
plete equality and with just regard for each other's
interests, develop between ourselves peaceful relations
and solve all issues through negotiations and mutual
concessions.
One of such questions with which the governments
' Ibid., Nov. 12, 1962, p. 741.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of our ooimtries have been dealing for many years is
till' (lui'stion of concluding a treaty banning all tests of
luu'lenr weapons.
Both of us stand on the same position with regard to
the fact that national means of detection are sufficient
to control the banning of experimental nuclear explo-
sions in outer space, in the atmosphere and under
water. So far, however, we have not succeeded in
finding a mutually acceptable solution to the problem
of cessation of underground tests. The main obstacle
to an agreement is the demand by the American side of
international control and inspection on the territories
of nuclear powers over cessation of underground nu-
clear tests. I would like to believe that you yourself
derstand the Tightness of our arguments that now
atlonal means are sufficient to control also this kind of
;ests and be sure that agreement is observed by any
side. But so far you do not want to recognize openly
this actual state of things and to accept it as a basis
f 1 <r concluding without delay an agreement on cessation
irf tests.
Striving to find a mutually acceptable basis for agree-
ment the Soviet Union has made lately an important
step toward the West and agreed to installing auto-
matic seismic stations. This idea, as is known, was
put forward not by us. It was introduced by British
scientists during the recent meeting in London of the
participants of the Pugwash movement. Moreover, it
is well known to us that when this idea was proposed,
it was not alien to your scientists who were in London
at that time.
We proposed to install such stations both near the
borders of nuclear powers and directly on their terri-
tories. We stated our agreement that three such sta-
tions be installed on the territory of the Soviet Union in
the zones most frequently subjected to earthquakes.
There are three such zones in the Soviet Union where
these stations can be installed : Central Asian, Altaian
and Far Eastern.
In the opinion of Soviet scientists the most suitable
places for locating automatic seismic stations in the
Soviet Union are the area of the city of Kokchetav
for the Central Asian zone of the U.S.S.R., the area of
the city of Bo<laibo for the Altaian zone and the area
of the city of Yakutsk for the Far Eastern zone. How-
ever, should, as a result of exchange of opinion between
our representatives, other places be suggested for lo-
cating automatic seismic stations in these seismic
zones, we wiU be ready to discuss this question and find
a mutually acceptable solution.
Beside the above said zones there are two more seis-
mic zones in the Soviet Union — Caucasian and Car-
pathian. However, these zones are so densely popu-
lated that conducting nuclear tests there is practically
excluded.
Of course, delivery to and from an international cen-
ter of appropriate sealed equipment for its periodic
replacement at automatic seismic stations in the
U.S.S.R. could well be made by Soviet personnel and
on Soviet planes. However if for such delivery of
equipment to and from automatic seismic stations par-
ticipation of foreign personnel were needed we would
agree to this also, having taken, if necessary, precau-
tionary measures against use of such trips for recon-
naissance. Thus our proposal on automatic seismic
stations includes elements of international control.
This is a major act of good will on the part of the
Soviet Union.
I will tell you straightforwardly that before making
this proposal I have consulted thoroughly the special-
ists and after such consultation my colleagues in the
Government and I came to a conclusion that so far
as the Soviet Union is concerned the above said con-
siderations on the measures on our part are well
founded and, it seems to us, they should not cause ob-
jections on the part of the American side.
You, Mr. President, and your representatives point
out that without at least a minimum number of on-site
inspections you will not manage to persuade the U.S.
Senate to ratify an agreement on the cessation of testa.
This circumstance, as we understand, ties you and does
not allow you to sign a treaty which would enable all
of us to abandon for good the grounds where nuclear
weapons are tested. Well, if this is the only difficulty
on the way to agreement, then for the noble and hu-
mane goal of ceasing nuclear weapon tests we are ready
to meet you halfway in this question.
We noted that on this October 30, in conversation
with First Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R.
v. V. Kuznetsov in New York, your representative Am-
bassador [Arthur H.] Dean stated that, in the opinion
of the U.S. Government, it would be sufficient to carry
on 2-4 on-site inspections each year on the territory of
the Soviet Union. According to Ambassador Dean's
statement, the United States would also be prepared to
work out measures which would rule out any possibility
of carrying on espionage under the cover of these in-
spection trips including such measures as the use of
Soviet planes piloted by Soviet crews for transportation
of inspectors to the sites, screening of windows in the
planes, prohibition to carry photo-cameras, etc.
We took all this into account and, in order to over-
come the deadlock and to arrive at last at a mutually
acceptable agreement, we would agree, in those cases
when it would be considered necessary, to 2-3 inspec-
tions a year on the territory of each of the nuclear
powers in the seismic areas where some suspicious
earth's tremors might occur. It goes without saying
that the basis of control over an agreement on an im-
derground nuclear test ban would be the national means
of detection in combination with automatic seismic
stations. On-site inspections could be carried on with
the precautions mentioned by Ambassador Dean against
any misuse of control for purposes of espionage.
We believe that now the road to agreement is straight
and clear. Beginning from January 1 of the new
year of 19C3 the world can be relieved of the roar of
nuclear explosions. The peoples are waiting for this —
this is what the U.N. General Assembly has called for.'
= For text of resolution adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly on Nov. 6, 1962, see ibid., Nov. 26, 1962, p. 824.
FEBRUARY 11, 1963
199
With the elimination of the Cuban crisis we relieved
mankind of the direct menace of combat use of lethal
nuclear weapons that impended over the world. Can't
we solve a far simpler question — that of cessation of
experimental explosions of nuclear weapons in the
peaceful conditions? I think that we can and must
do it. Here lies now our duty before the peoples of
not only our countries but of all other countries. Hav-
ing solved promptly also this question — and there are
all the preconditions for that— we shall be able to fa-
cilitate working out an agreement on disarmament
and with even more confidence proceed with solving
other urgent international problems, which we and you
unfortunately are not short of.
Sincerely,
N. Kheushchev
President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev,
December 28, 1962
Deak Mk. Chaiuman : I was very glad to receive your
letter of December 19, 1962, setting forth your views on
nuclear tests. There appear to be no differences be-
tween your views and mine regarding the need for
eliminating war in this nuclear age. Perhaps only
those who have the responsibility for controlling these
weapons fully realize the awful devastation their use
would bring.
Having these considerations in mind and with re-
spect to the issue of a test ban, I therefore sincerely
hope that the suggestions that you have made in your
letter will prove to be helpful in starting us down the
road to an agreement. I am encouraged that you are
prepared to accept the principle of on-site inspections.
These seem to me to be essential not just because of the
concern of our Congress but because they seem to us
to go to the heart of a reliable agreement ending
nuclear testing.
If we are to have peace between systems with far-
reaching ideological differences, we must find ways for
reducing or removing the recurring waves of fear and
suspicion which feed on ignorance, misunderstanding
or what appear to one side or the other as broken
agreements. To me, the element of assurance is vital
to the broader development of peaceful relationships.
With respect to the question of on-site inspections
I would certainly agree that we could accept any rea-
sonable provision which you had in mind to protect
against your concern that the on-site inspectors might
engage in espionage enroute to the area of inspec-
tion. In a statement at the United Nations, Ambassa-
dor Stevenson suggested ' that the United States would
accept any reasonable security provision while the
inspectors were being taken to the site, so long as they
had reasonable provision for satisfying themselves
that they were actually at the intended location and
had the freedom necessary to inspect the limited des-
ignated area.
'Ibid., Oct. 29, 1962, p. 635.
With respect to the number of on-site inspections
there appears to have been some misunderstanding.
Your impression seems to be that Ambassador Dean
told Deputy Minister Kuznetsov that the United States
might be prepared to accept an annual number of on-
site inspections between two and four. Ambassador
Dean advises me that the only number which he
mentioned in his discussions with Deputy Minister
Kuznetsov was a number between eight and ten. This
represented a substantial decrease in the request of the
United States as we had previously been insisting upon
a number between twelve and twenty. I had hoped
that the Soviet Union would match this motion on the
part of the United States by an equivalent motion in
the figure of two or three on-site inspections which it
had some time ago indicated it might allow.
I am aware that this matter of on-site inspections
has given you considerable difficulty although I am not
sure that I fully understand why this should be so.
To me, an effective nuclear test ban treaty is of such
importance that I would not permit such international
arrangements to become mixed up with our or any
other national desire to seek other types of informa-
tion about the Soviet Union. I believe quite sincerely
that arrangements woulil be worked out which would
convince you and your colleagues that this is the case.
But in this connection, your implication that on-site
inspections should be limited to seismic areas also
gives us some difficulty. It is true that in the ordinary
course we would have concern about events taking
place in the seismic areas. However, an unidentified
seismic event coming from an area in which there are
not usually earthquakes would be a highly suspicious
event. The United States would feel that in such a
circumstance the U.S.S.R. would be entitled to an on-
site in.spection of such an event occurring in our area
and feels that the United States should have the same
rights within its annual quota of inspection.
Perhaps your comment would be that a seismic event
in another area designatetl for inspection might coin-
cide with a highly sensitive defense installation. I
recognize this as a real problem but believe that some
arrangement can be worked out which would prevent
this unlikely contingency from erecting an insuperable
obstacle.
Your suggestion as to the three locations in the
Soviet Union in which there might be uumaimed seis-
mic stations is helpful but it does not seem to me to
go far enough. These stations are all outside the
areas of highest seismicity and therefore do not record
all of the phenomena within those areas. These sta-
tions would be helpful in increasing the detection
capability of the system but I doubt that they would
have the same value in reducing the number of suspi-
cious seismic events by identifying some as earth-
quakes. For this purpose unmanned seismic stations
should be in the areas of highest seismicity, not out-
side them. To achieve this result there would be need
for a number of stations in the vicinity of the
Kamchatka area and a number in the Tashkent area.
It might be possible, of course, to reduce somewhat the
200
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
number aetually in the Soviet Union by arranging sta-
tions in Hcilikaido, PakistJin, and Afglianistan. If
tlie stations on Soviet territory were sited in locations
free from local disturbances and could be monitored
periodically by competent United States or interna-
tional observers who tooli in portable seismometers
and placed thein on the pedestals it would be very
helpful in reducing the problem of identification.
You have referred to the discussion of the "black
box" proposal at the Tenth Pugwash Conference in
I.ondon in September of this year as a United Kingdom
proposal to which the United States has agreed. I
do not believe that this was the situation. This pro-
posal was reported to me as a Soviet proposal which
was discussed with some United States scientists. Of
the United States scientists who signed the statement
none represented the United States Government or had
discussed the matter with responsible ofiicials. All
were speaking as individuals and none were seismol-
ogists. Their agreement does not signify anything
other than that this was an area which justified
further study. The United States Government has
given it that study and the results have been the con-
clusions which I have indicated above.
Notwithstanding these problems, I am encouraged
by your letter. I do not believe that any of the prob-
lems which I have raised are insoluble but they ought
to be solved. I wonder how you think we might best
proceed with these discussions which may require
.■^ome technical development. It occurs to me that you
might wish to have your representative meet with Mr.
William C. Foster, the Director of our Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, at a mutually convenient
place, such as New York or Geneva. I will be glad to
have your suggestions. After talks have been held we
will then be in a position to evaluate where we stand
and continue our work together for an effective agree-
ment ending all nuclear tests.
Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy,
January 7, 1963
Dear Mr. President, I received your reply to my
message of December 19, 1962. I am satisfied that
you have appraised correctly the Soviet Government's
proposals set forth in that message as directed to
securing in the very near future a ban on all tests of
nuclear weapons.
■\Ve understand your answer as meaning that you do
not object that national means of detection together
with automatic seismic stations should be the basis
for control over an agreement banning underground
nuclear tests. We note your agreement that installa-
tion of automatic seismic stations will prove useful
from the i>oint of view of increasing the effectiveness of
control over cessation of miderground nuclear explo-
sions. During the Geneva talks it was justly observed,
also by your representatives, that installation of such
seismic stations would serve as good means of verifying
the correctness of functioning of national seismic sta-
tions. It is precisely by these considerations that the
Soviet Government was guided in proposing that the
idea of installing automatic seismic stations put for-
ward at the Pugwash meeting of scientists be utilized.
In my message of December 19, 1962, I indicated
those three areas where in the opinion of our scientists
automatic seismic stations should be set up on the
territory of the Soviet Union. Tho.se areas were se-
lected after u thorough study with comprehensive
consideration being given to geological and seismic con-
ditions in those places.
In the areas of Kokchetav and Bodaibo automatic
seismic stations would be located, according to our sug-
gestion, at the exposures of crystalline rocks while in
the Yakutsk area — in the zone of eternal congelation.
As is known on crystalline rocks and on grounds frozen
deep down always only minor seismic hindrances are
noticed which facilitate reliable detection of under-
ground nuclear explosions. In combination with seis-
mic stations abroad, on territories adjacent to the
seismic zones in the Soviet Union, automatic stations
located in the above mentioned points will be adequate
means capable of removing ijossible doubts of the other
side with regard to the correctness of functioning of
the national seismic stations network.
You did not make any comments on the location of an
automatic seismic station for the Altai zone in the
region of the city of Bodaibo, and thus we could con-
sider this question as agreed upon.
However, you have doubts as to the location of auto-
matic seismic stations for the other .seismic zones in the
Soviet Union — Far Eastern and Central Asian ones.
As far as those zones are concerned, in your opinion,
it would be expedient to place such stations in the
Kamchatka area and in the area of Tashkent. In the
opinion of Soviet scientists placing automatic seismic
stations in the areas of Tashkent and Kamchatka would
be a worse variant as compared to the one that we pro-
pose because in those areas functioning of automatic
stations will be seriously handicapped by seismic hin-
drances. But if you believe it more expedient to re-
locate those stations we will not object to that. In
my message to you I have already pointed out that the
Soviet Union is prepared to seek a mutually acceptable
solution also in the question of location of automatic
seismic stations. We would agree to relocate the
automatic seismic station for the Central Asian zone
of the U.S.S.R. to the Tashkent area placing it near the
city of Samarkand and for the Far Eastern zone —
to place the automatic station at Seimchan which ia
part of the Kamchatka seismic area.
Location of an automatic seismic station on the
Kamchatka peninsula itself seems, in the opinion of
Soviet scientists, clearly unacceptable in view of strong
hindrances caused by the proximity of the ocean and
strong volcanic activity in the peninsula itself which
will Inevitably hamper normal functioning of a station.
It appears to us that thus we could consider as agreed
upon also the question of the location of automatic
seismic stations for the Central Asian and Far Eastern
zones of the U.S.S.R.
The Soviet Government having consulted its special-
FEBRUARY 11, 1963
201
ists came to the conclusion that it is quite enough to
install three automatic seismic stations on the territory
of the Soviet Union. The more so that in your mes-
sage, Mr. President, a possibility is envisaged of
setting up automatic seismic stations on territories
adjacent to the seismic zones in the Soviet Union — on
the Hokkaido, in Pakistan and Afghanistan, naturally
wi(h the consent of respective governments.
The Soviet Government has named definite areas for
the location of automatic seismic stations on the ter-
ritory of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, Mr. President, tak-
ing into account your wishes we agree to relocate two
stations to new places. We are entitled to expect
therefore that your side also will name definite areas
where such stations should be set up on the territory
of the U.S. and that in reaching an agreement on the
sites where stations are to be placed the American side
will take into account our wishes.
Mr. President, we are convinced that all conditions
exist now for reaching an agreement also on the ques-
tion of in.spection. It is known that all the recent time
we heard not once from the Western side — agree in
principle to inspection and then the road to agreement
will be open. We believed and we continue to believe
now that, in general, !nsi>ection i.s not necessary and
if we give our consent to an annual quota of 2-3
inspections this is done solely for the purpose of
removing the remaining differences for the sake of
reaching agreement.
As you see we have made a serious step in your
direction. The quota of inspections on the territory
of each of the nuclear powers that we propose is suffi-
cient. Indeed, in the negotiations your representatives
themselves recognized that there is no need to verify
all or a greater part of significant suspicious phenom-
ena to restrain the states from attempts to violate the
treaty. And they gave figures of annual inspections
practically equaling the quota proposed by us. Natu-
rally it is most reasonable to carry out inspection in
seismic areas where the biggest number of unidentified
seismic phenomena may occur. However if you con-
sider it necessary we have no objection to inspection
being carried out also in non-seismic areas provided
such inspections are conducted within the annual
quota indicated by us.
I noticed that in your reply you agree with the neces-
sity of taking reasonable measures of precaution which
would exclude a pos.sibility of using inspection trips
and visits to automatic seismic stations for the pur-
pose of obtaining intelligence data. Of course, in car-
rying out on-site inspection there can be circumstances
when in the area designated for inspection there will
be some object of defense importance. Naturally, in
such a case it will be necessary to take appropriate
measures which would exclude a possibility to cause
damage to the interests of security of the state on the
territory of which inspection is carried out. In this
respect I fully agree with the considerations expressed
in your message.
Mr. President, in your message you suggest that our
representatives meet in New York or in Geneva for a
brief preliminary consideration of some of the prob-
lems you touched upon. We have no objections to such
meeting of our representatives. The Soviet Govern-
ment for that purpose appointed N. T. Fedorenko,
U.S.S.R. Permanent Representative to the U.N., and
S. K. Tsarapkin, U.S.S.R. Representative to the 18-
nation Disarmament Committee, who could meet with
your representative Mr. William C. Foster in New York
on January 7-10. We proceed here from the assump-
tion that meetings of our representatives should lead
already in the very near future to agreement on ques-
tions still unsettled so that upon the re-opening of the
18-nation committee session our representatives could
inform it that the road to the conclusion of an agree-
ment banning all nuclear weapons tests is open.
Secretary Rusk Interviewed
on NBC's ''Today'' Program
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rush hy Martin Agronshy and
Hugh Downs fresented in the ''^Cabinet Series''''
on the National Broadcasting Coinpany's tele-
vision 'program ''■Today''' on January 21.
Pre.ss release 45 dated .January 21
Mr. Agronshy : Good morning, Hugh.
Mr. Secretary, have the prospects for peace
been improved by the announcement last night ^
that we made that Premier Khrushchev has
agreed to two or three on-the-site inspections to
promote the prospects for a nuclear test ban
agreement ?
Secretary Rush: Well, I think if we could
look at it objectively we could agree that it is in
tlie interests of both sides to try to turn down
the spiraling arms race in the nuclear age. The
frightful burdens and dangers of an unlimited
arms race make this so.
Now, Mr. Khrushchev's acceptance of the
principle of on-site inspection has at least
opened the way to some serious discussion. So
long as he was saying that the number was
zero it was not possible to engage in serious dis-
cussions to discover whether a test ban is
possible.
You see, the very simple element in disarma-
ment, which is fundamental to us, is that the
' See p. 198.
202
DEPARTMENT OF ST.VTE I'.tn.LETIN
rest of us cannot disami significantly without
this knowledge of what is going on in that vast
land area in the heart of the Russian landmass.
This is not a question of espionage. It's a
question of bemg reasonably assured that the
agreements are being carried out. Otherwise
the world would be swept by great waves of
suspicion, and indeed things could happen in
that landmass which would be vital to our own
interests. So we are encouraged to believe that
the way is now open for some serious talks, and
we hope very much that we can make some
lieadway.
Mr. Agronfil-y : Then there is a certain amount
of optimism about this?
Secretary Rusk: I think there is at least en-
couragement that we have come thus far. But
let's find out now in the talks to come whether
we can go further.
Mr. Agron-flii/: You speak of the gi'eat Soviet
landmass. "WHiat of the Communist Chinese
landmass, where also we would need on-the-site
inspection?
Secretary Rusk: I think that would be the
next question to be dealt with. If we could get
agreement with the Soviet Union ui the case of
atmospheric tests or underground, under water,
or outer space tests, I think there is no great
problem. On the question of underground
tests in China, there would be a very serious
problem.
Mr. Agron-ihy: Did the Russians give us any
indication at all that they would use their good
offices with the Chinese Communists in order to
make possible on-the-site inspection there ?
Secretary Rusk: No, but I would suppose, if
we and the Russians and the British and the
Disarmament Committee in Geneva could re-
port to the world agreement in this field, all of
us would be taken up with such mvolvements
as we have contact with — the idea that all
should subscribe to it.
Mr. Agronsky : So that is not excluded?
Secretary Rusk: That's right. That's right.
Mr. Agronsky: Good. Mr. Secretaiy, the
President said in the state of the Union mes-
sage ^ that the state of the Union is good. Now,
looking at the world crisis after your 2 years as
Mr. Kennedy's Secretary of State, would you
- Bulletin of Feb. 4, 1963. p. I.y9.
say that its state has changed as a result of the .
administration's foreign policy, and would you
say, sir, that the change is for the better or for
the worse ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, Martin, when we look
out across the world with more than 110 states,
a world which we can mfluence but cannot con-
trol, there is always going to be unfinished busi-
ness in the foreign policy field. Indeed, so far
as we can look into the future, there will be 20
or 25 changes of government somewhere in the
world every year indefinitely into the future.
But we do work at these problems in all parts of
the world with great diligence and intermi-
nably. We get about 400,000 cables a year into
the Department of State, for example.
Encouraging Signs of Prospects for Peace
Looking back this past year, I think we can
see a number of signs of encouragement. The
President mentioned some of them in tlie state
of the Union message: a rather fragile, but
nevertheless important, agreement in Laos; an
ending of the aggression in Viet-Nam to an en-
couraging extent; the war in Algeria was
brought to an end by President de Gaulle and
the Algerian leaders; the Indonesians and the
Dutch have reached agreement on West New
Guinea.
The defenses of the free world are stronger
than they have ever been, both in the conven-
tional and the nuclear field. I think it's fair to
say that in the disarmament talks we have
moved somewhat away from the propaganda
battle into the discussion of the real issues. I
think the cause of freedom in this hemisphere
has been greatly strengthened by the i-eduction
in the stature of Castro. The democratic left
has abandoned the conspiratorial apparatus of
the extreme left and isolated it in one country
after another.
I think that the recent meeting of the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations showed
that "troika" is dead, that most of the nations
of the world now see what it was that President
Kennedy was talking about when he spoke to
the U.N. in 1961, that on the underlying issue^
whether we are to have the kind of world laid
out in the U.N. Charter or whether we are to
have a world Communist revolutionary kind
FEBRTJART 11, 1963
203
of world — most of the nations of the world are
on the side of the U.N. and the cause of free-
dom. I think this past year has shown a de-
crease in what has been called neutralism,
because on that underlying issue there are only
two forces, those who want the U.N. kind of
world and those who are trying to tear it down.
So I think there are many reasons for encour-
agement, but of course we always have un-
finished business on our agenda.
Mr. Agronshy: Would you say — it's a sweep-
ing generalization, I'm afraid, but I'd like to
ask the question — would you say that the
chances for peace are better this year than they
were last year?
Secretary Rusk: I think the chances are
somewhat better, Martin. And the Secretary
of State is always reluctant to be too optimistic,
but I think they are better becaiise I think in
1962 the world has seen peace hang by a very
slender thread that was drawn tautly. And I
think the world has had a chance to see and
think specifically and realistically about the
consequences if that thread should break. I
think that has injected a note of sobriety and
caution in dealing with great and dangerous
issues, which itself is an encouraging sign of
prospects for peace.
The Cuban Crisis
Mr. Agronshy: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if
we could address ourselves to some personal,
and I think extraordinai-y, dramatic aspects of
that moment when, as you say, the thread might
have been broken. I think we all accept this
fact that at the climactic point of the Cuban
crisis our country stood on the brink of war.
I wonder if you could look back at those dan-
gerous moments and tell us something about the
human aspects of it, your own feelings, those
of the President, if it would not be a violation
of your privileged conversations with the
President.
Secretary Rusk: Well, there are many as-
pects of that moment in October when things
were so tightly drawn and so dangerous that
one can never forget. I will never forget, for
example, the calm and the sobriety with which
President Kennedy handled that matter.' In-
deed, I think he was the calmest man in town
during that period, despite the fact that he was
carrying that awesome and lonely ultimate
responsibility.
But I think also it illustrated the great diffi-
culty of bridging this great gap of ideology
between the Soviet bloc and the free world, to
get words to mean the same thing to each other,
to establish credibility, because, had the Soviet
side read and thought about and Ijelieved what
the President had said in his press conferences
in September, this crisis might not have de-
veloped in the way that it did.
I think it illustrated the utmost importance
of the unity of the alliances. I think the fact
that the OAS and the NATO allies rallied
unanimously, iimnediately, in that situation
was itself a very great contribution to peace, be-
cause this must have made an important im-
pression in ]\Ioscow. But I think also that one
would have to say that it is important that we
work at these vital issues, that defense of vital
issues by peaceful means in a nuclear world is
the greatest responsibility the statesmen have
these days, and I tliink that we all have come
away from that experience encouraged but
sober and detenmined to keep at it.
Communist Unity on Fundamental Issues
Mr. Agronxky : Mr. Secretary, the foreign
policy of the President and yourself actually
matters tremendously in determining the fate
of our coimtry and the free world, but there
are great historic changes which we haven't
brought about and yet which had an enormous
effect on us. For example, the split between
Russia and Communist China, which has been
demonstrated so vividly and so dramatically in
this Communist Congress meeting in East Ber-
lin. I wonder, sir — it's something that all of
us are wondering about — how would you define
the meaning of the split in two senses, in the
Communist world and to ourselves?
Secretary Rii.'^k: Well, I don't want to ap-
pear as an expert on that split because I'm not
sure that either Moscow or Peiping fully under-
stands the nature of the split or the relation-
ships between the two parts of the Communist
° For President Kennedy's address to the Nation on
the Soviet threat to the Americas, see ifeid., Nov. 12,
1962, p. 715.
204
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
world. This is a matter of major and perhaps
liistorical importance.
But, on the other hand, we ought to ap-
proacli it with some caution, because this is a
difference basically of technique, not of funda-
mental purpose. Just last week Mr. Khi'u-
shchev, in East Germany, was once again talk-
ing about burying us. This is a debate about
liow best to get on with the Communist world
revolution, and mixed up in it is a debate about
who is the authentic and genuine leader of the
Conununist world. So, although this discus-
sion has thrown confusion into the Communist
world and from that point of view is favorable
to us, I think we have to be careful about sup-
posing that the basic unity of the Communist
world has been split on any direct confrontation
with the free world. That time has not yet
come. Whether it will come or not will be of
some importance.
But, meanwhile, I think that we can under-
stand that there are headaches in that Commu-
nist world and that out of it may come an
uncertainty and, indeed, a weakness which may
be a contribution to the cause of peace.
Mr. Agronshy: Mr. Secretary, you reflect
really what the President said in his state of
the Union message, and I would like to induce
you to go a bit further with it. He said that
the Soviet-Chinese disagreement is over means
not ends, which is substantially what you have
just said. He since said that a dispute over
how to best bury the free world — those are
the words that he used — is no grounds for West-
ern rejoicing. Could you carry that a step fur-
j tlier in terms of his meaning and yours?
Secretary Rusk: Well, for example, if Pei-
ping is determined to pursue a more militant
and aggressive policy through the use of force
than perhaps, say, the Soviet Union would be
willing to or want to in a particular situation,
and if Peiping succeeds in imposing its policj'
in a particular situation, where the Soviet Un-
ion itself is compelled eventually to back up
Peiping, then this can be an adverse develop-
ment as far as we are concerned.
I think the growing influence of Peiping, for
example, in North Korea and North Viet-Nam
are instances where dangers could grow because
of this debate between Moscow and Peiping.
But, again, these two great Communist coun-
FEBRUART 11, 1963
tries have an underlying interest from their
side, from their point of view, in unity with
each other on the most fundamental issues. I
don't believe that common interest has yet been
fractured.
France and the North Atlantic Community
Mr. Dowm: Martin, I'd like to ask you —
and Secretary Rusk, if I might — there is a
lot of talk about the Sino-Soviet division and
what that means. Whvit about the cracks that
are increasingly visible in our own grand alli-
ance? France's President de Gaulle has re-
jected the Polaris missiles, for example, and
the NATO nuclear force which Prime Minister
Macmillan accepted at Nassau.* De Gaulle
said France will continue to go it alone to be-
come a nuclear power. What I wonder is what
this means to NATO. How can it function in
the case of France's rejection ?
Secretary Rusk: Hugh, I think it's impor-
tant first for us to identify what you call the
cracks. Wliat is not involved in this present
discussion is the basic commitment of the mem-
bers of the NATO alliance to each other in time
of danger, in time of pressure from outside,
particularly from the Communist bloc. This
was di'amatically demonstrated as late as late
October of this year, when NATO closed ranks
immediately because of the threat in Cuba.
And this includes President de Gaulle. No one
was more simple and direct and stanch in
that crisis than President de Gaulle, in full
recognition of the possible developments that
could come out of that Cuban situation.
Now, what we are talking about here in this
great North Atlantic community and in Europe
is how we write the next chapter, how we build
the next story. And this involves very lively
comment, differences of interest among the
member governments, and it's going to take
time to work out a number of these questions.
It is ti'ue that President de Gaulle has thrown
an obstacle in front of the Common Market
negotiations. I wouldn't want to get into de-
* For texts of a joint communique and a statement
on nuclear defense systems issued at Nassau on Dec.
21 at the close of talks between President Kennedy and
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of the United King-
dom, see ibid., Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.
205
tail on that because Cliancellor Adenauer and
he are meeting today. The five, the other mem-
bers of the Six = are meeting with the United
Kingdom today. The talks will be resumed
on January 28th.
But this present episode of discussion and
difference of view, frankly, will not change —
in my judgment will not change one elemen-
tary fact, and that is that Europe and the North
Atlantic are and must be moving toward grow-
ing unity and growing strength because the
elementary facts of the present world situation
make it necessary, and this has been the entire
course of development since 1945.
Now, the reconciliation between Gennany
and France is a matter of greatest historical
importance. It will be a great thing in history
for us to be able to say, after several hundred
years, that world wars will not start because
of differences within the Western European
community. This is a great thing. But it is
also a great thing to see that that cooperation
is within the framework of a unified Europe
and an increasingly intimate North Atlantic
community which itself has a network of spe-
cial relationsliips with nations in all parts of
the world, because here lies the prospect for the
eventual success of the free world and the safety
of the free world against any threats from the
outside.
Mr. Agron.fhy : Well, you feel then, sir, that
President de Gaulle's stubbornness and pride in
this instance, both in insisting on developing an
independent nuclear force for France and in his
resistance to British entry into the Common
Market, is not a major division in our grand
alliance?
Secretary Rusk: No, I think that the Com-
mon Market discussions do represent a very
serious difference and that it would be impor-
tant for us to find the right answers to that.
We have ourselves stayed out of those negotia-
tions, despite the fact that we have a great in-
terest in the result, becaiise these are matters —
the Common Market arrangements are mat-
ters which intimately affect the daily lives of
every citizen in the countries involved. And
these are primarily matters for him to work out
on the other side.
But on the NATO multilateral force matter,
when President de Gaulle said that he did not
expect that France would participate, that does
not mean that the NATO multilateral force
will not go forward, and promptly, with those
members of the alliance who wish to go for-
ward with it.
Mr. Agronsky : And it will be effective with-
out France?
Secretary Busk/ And will be effective with-
out France.
Peace in Caribbean Depends on Cuban Behavior
Mr. Agronsky: You are reported, sir, to
have told a closed-door meeting of the Senate
Foreign Relations Conamittee last week that
there no longer exists even a possibility of a
U.S. no-invasion pledge on Cuba. And you
said the reason was the obvious one, that we
have not gotten agreement for on-the-site
inspection in Cuba to verify Soviet missile
removal.
Now, Mr. Secretary, do such missiles still
exist in Cuba, as some members of the U.S. Sen-
ate seem to think they do ? And does our with-
holding of this no-invasion pledge mean that
we contemplate some day having to invade
Cuba?
Secretary Rtisk: Well, the President said in
his November 20th press conference that we are
confident that the missiles which we knew were
there have been removed.'^ Now, in this world
it is impossible to give 100 percent, absolute
assurance on a matter of that sort unless there
is effective on-site inspection and detailed ex-
amination of the island, because it's a problem
of proving the negative.
But I think on the question of the so-called —
of the no-invasion pledge, I remind you that
the Soviet Union and the United States had a
series of talks over the last 2 months at the
United Nations. They were not able to agree,
as they reported to the Secretary-General, on
all the points at issue, although they reported
that some progress had been made.'
° The six members of the European Common Market
are Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
" Bulletin of Deo. 10, 1962, p. 874.
' For text of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. letter to Secretary-
General U Thant, see iUd., Jan. 28, 1963, p. 153.
206
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULiiETIN
Now, the situation on that point is relatively
simple. It was not the purpose or the intention
of the United States to invade Cuba, with the
enormous loss of life that would incur, except
in defense of the hemisphere, except on a major
security issue which required it. The intro-
duction of offensive missiles was such a threat.
The basic treaty arrangements of the hemi-
spliere continue intact, the Kio Treaty and the
rest of them.
Now, the question of peace in the Caribbean
is largely a question of the behavior of Cuba.
The President has said that, if Cuba does not
become a base for aggression, he will not initi-
ate or [jermit aggression in the Caribbean.'
But tliis also means, as he said, that we will not
abandon other measures directed to insuring
that Cuba not be a source of infection for the
rest of the hemisphere.
The attitude of the rest of the hemisphere,
expressed at Pimta del Este," is that the inva-
sion of this hemisphere by a Marxist-Leninist
regime is imacceptable to the hemisphere.
Mr. AgroTishy : Then our feeling is that there
are other methods or alternatives of force to
getting Castroism and Marxism and Leninism
out of Cuba.
Secretary Rusk: Well, there are other meas-
ures that are used and will be used. For ex-
ample, there has been a very sharp reduction
in shipping and trade between the free world
and Cuba.
Mr. Agronshy: Thank you very much, Mr.
Secretary. I wish we could go on examining
the state of the world. It has been a fascinating
experience to hear your observations, sir.
President Kennedy Welcomes
End of Katanga Secession
Statement hy the President
White House press release dated January 21
The end of secession announced by the pro-
vincial regime in Katanga and confirmed by
the peaceful entry of United Nations forces
into Kolwezi today [January 21] is warmly
'Ibid., Dec. 10, 1962, p. 874.
' For background, see ihid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.
welcomed by the United States and all who
are concerned with the future of the Congo
and the whole of Africa. This secession has
been a serious source of contention and an ob-
stacle to progress in the Congo for the past
21/2 yeai-s.
The United States objective m the Congo is
neither more nor less than the establishment
of conditions under which the Congolese peo-
ple themselves can peacefully work out their
own future. This was impossible as long as
the territorial integrity of the nation was chal-
lenged by secessions, with consequent political
instability and a standing invitation to inter-
vention by the great powers.
The previous administration determined
wisely that the United States goal could best
be pursued through the United Nations; and
the present administration has supported vig-
orously the United Nations' efforts to bring
about peaceful reunification in the Congo for
the past 2 years. Under incredibly difficult
circumstances and often against heavy odds,
the United Nations has carried through suc-
cessfully its most complex and difficult peace-
keeping mission on behalf of the world
community.
At this favorable turn of events in the Congo,
the American people are deeply indebted to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
to his predecessor who gave Ms life in the quest
for peace in that troubled country, and to those
member nations which have loyally supported
the United Nations' efforts in the Congo
throughout this crisis. The steadfast coopera-
tion with the United Nations provided by the
Government of Belgium, a country with close
historical ties with the Congo, has been of spe-
cial value in bringing about a peaceful con-
clusion to the crisis. The United Nations will
continue to have an important role to play in
helping the Congo with the great task of mod-
ernization, which is the most pressing goal of
the leaders and people of that nation. To this
task we will give our full support.
The Congolese leaders face a tremendous
challenge in healing the wounds of conflict, re-
storing a partially disrupted economy, and
building a strong and viable federal nation.
This is a venture calling upon the f uU energies
FEBRTTAET 11, 1963
207
and talents of all the Congolese peojDle. I am
confident that President [Joseph] Kasavubu,
Prime Minister [Cyrille] Adoula, and the other
Congolese leaders, who have contributed so
greatly to a solution of the crisis, will continue
to move in a spirit of true cooperation to work
out permanent constitutional and other neces-
sary political and economic arrangements. The
people of the Congo now have a unique oppor-
tunity to rally behind their national and provin-
cial leadership in a combined effort for unity
and progress.
Developing Africa's Human and Material Resources
Ijy G. Mermen WilliaTns
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^
The achievements recorded in 82 years
of experience in vocational education have
earned for the Organization for Rehabili-
tation Through Training a worldwide repu-
tation for ability and solid accomplishment.
ORT's work is not just a philosophical con-
cept for me ; it is a reality. I have visited one
of the ORT schools in Israel. I can see in my
mind's eye very clearly young boys applying
themselves earnestly, eagerly, and even with
excitement to the task of learning a trade.
These young men knew they had a great oppor-
tunity and were eagerly and happily making
the most of it.
As I travel throughout Africa, I am often
impressed by the fact that many efforts are
being made to improve or supply primary or
secondary education, and even university educa-
tion. But all too often the idea of training the
artisans, the technicians, and the skilled work-
ers needed to make new societies work is miss-
ing. I say all too often because I have seen few
vocational and technical schools in Africa. But
in those few I have witnessed the intense appli-
cation of the young students and have learned
of the ready market for their services.
'Address made before the national conference of the
American Organization for Rehabilitation Through
Training at New York, N.Y., on Jan. 20 (press release
41 dated Jan. 21).
ORT has a great challenge to bring together
the unmet demands for middle schools and the
otherwise wasted talents of young people the
world over.
One aspect of ORT's work of particular in-
terest to me is the emphasis ORT places on
human values and human development. This
factor is crucially important in these years
which have been termed by President Kennedy
and U.N. Secretary-General U Thant the
United Nations Decade of Development.
In calling for a Decade of Development,
President Kennedy said : ^
. . . the United Nations' existing efforts in promot-
ing economic growth can be expanded and coordinated.
Regional surveys and training institutes can now pool
the talents of many. New research, technical assist-
ance, and pilot projects can unlock the wealth of less
developed lands and untapped waters. And develop-
ment can become a cooperative and not a competitive
enterprise, to enable all nations, however diverse in
their systems and beliefs, to become in fact as well as
in law free and equal nations.
Implicit in this statement, which looks for-
ward to the advancement of peoples of all races,
creeds, and geograpliical locations, is a con-
sideration for the dignity and individuality of
the billions of human beings who will partici-
pate in such an advance. Without such human
' Bulletin of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.
208
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
consideration, a Decade of Development would
be of little value, especially among the peoples
of the new and emerging nations of Africa.
ORT Programs in Africa
ORT is exceptionally well prepared to under-
take African tasks in this decade. Beginning
in 19-19, OET drew upon its European experi-
ence to establish programs among the Jewish
commmaities in North and South Africa. In
the past year ORT has embarked on a new type
of endeavor in cooperation with the United
States Government. Following a U.S.-spon-
sored ORT survey of eight African countries,
ORT now is undertaking vocational educa-
tional programs among Africans of many faiths
in the young nations of Guinea and Mali.
These programs, which started last fall under
contract with the Agency for International De-
veloimient, are mutually beneficial. They
serve the interests of the United States, the
recipient countries, and ORT alike. In these
programs you can give expression to the power-
ful motivating force of your traditional belief
in hiunan miiversality, and through them you
can express your belief that it is morally right
to help peoples who have newly emerged sover-
eign into the world and who need assistance in
developing into modern societies.
In Guinea the ORT program encompasses
such fields as precision and electrical mechanics,
telecommunications, and technical drawing.
The Mali program includes science, architec-
tural design, and secretarial training. These
are challenging and important responsibilities
for ORT, and I am pleased to say that these
two programs are progressing rapidly and well.
International Assistance to African States
International assistance to African states is a
vital need during this Decade of Development,
and many foreign coimtries are responding to
these needs. Such f onner metropolitan powers
as France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom
are making very substantial contributions to the
growth and development of various African
countries. The efforts of other countries, in-
cludmg important contributions by Gennany,
Italy, and Japan, are also proving to be of
major assistance. All of these countries are
members of the Development Assistance Com-
mittee of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, which has as one
of its principal tasks the achievement of better
coordination of aid programs.
Much assistance also is channeled through
multilateral organizations, such as the Common
Market Development Fund, whose efforts reach
into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and
the United Nations and its specialized agencies.
Beyond these governmental efforts, many pri-
vate groups — business, religious, agricultural,
labor, philanthropical — are assisting in this
mighty effort.
Israel's Aid Programs
One particularly interesting effort to assist
the new nations of Africa has come from Israel,
itself a new nation. Israel has developed tech-
niques and institutions which are adaptable to
Africa's requirements. Its exjDerience with
planning and cooperative development is
attractive to the Africans. It has specialized in
small-scale technical assistance programs and
has an abundant supply of people with tech-
nical skills not readily available in other
new nations. And, of particular importance,
Israel's work is not tied to the efforts of any of
the larger powers, who sometimes are charged
with neocolonialism by the ardently independ-
ent Africans.
One of Israel's most recent steps — the signing
of an agi'icultural assistance agi-eement with
the Congo just last month — is a particularly
useful omen at this time when political strife
seems to be ending in the Congo. It is a good
hinge on which to turn our attention to the
future of that great Central African nation.
The time has come to begin the next phase in
the Congo — that of helping that nation become
the strong, viable country it has the capacity
to be.
Congo Development an Urgent Task
The Congo is a very large covmtry, almost
exactly the size of the United States east of the
Mississippi. The hiunan development of its
14 million people is the most urgent task before
its Government and those nations which are
truly concerned with its growth.
FEBRUARY 11, 1963
673598—63 3
209
It is a rich countiy with many natural re-
sources. The Congo is extraordinarily wealthy
in minerals. It has approximately 10 percent
of the world's tin reserves ; it produces 8 percent
of the world's copper, 60 percent of the world's
cobalt, 65 percent of the world's industrial dia-
monds. It also has very substantial amounts of
such uncommon minerals as tantalite and ger-
manium, which are needed for specialized elec-
tronic and space applications.
The Congo has great potential for agricul-
tural production. It will be able to produce most
of its own food requirements and has in the past
produced important export crops of coffee, qui-
nine, rubber, palm products, and cotton. It is
blessed with one of the very best natural trans-
portation systems in the world — the Congo
River basin system. The Belgians did a great
deal to develop harbors, railroads, and airfields.
In some areas there has been considerable hy-
droelectric development.
In the years inunediately ahead, however,
before the Congo's full potential is realized,
there will be a very real need for foreign assist-
ance. Even with the reintegration of Katan-
ga's riches into the country, there will still be
a serious shortage of foreign exchange and the
Congo will continue to be faced with grave
financial and budgetary difficulties. There will
also be a need for technical assistance to help
the Congolese administer their vast country
and to train them in technical fields. I would
think that a corps of 3,000 to 4,000 foreign tech-
nicians, actually working in the Congo, is
needed during the next few years.
As economic development takes place, there
also wiU be a need for $80 million to $100 mil-
lion annually for at least the next 2 or 3 years
to cover the Congo's extensive requirements. I
would expect the United States to participate
in meeting these financial needs.
U.S. Aid to the Congo
At the present time U.S. aid to the Congo is
being provided at a rate of approximately $61.5
million annually. Of this amount, $30 million
is used to finance imports of U.S. goods into the
Congo, $25 million is used for foodstuffs under
Public Law 480, $3.5 million is for bilateral
teclmical assistance grants, and $3 million is to
support U.N. civilian operations in the Congo. ]
All of these progi'ams, I might point out, are
handled either through the United Nations
Operation in the Congo or in consonance with
U.N. programs there.
Other friendly nations — Belgium, Italy, Ger-
many, Israel, Switzerland, and the European
Economic Community — are cuiTently assisting
the Congo, and we would hope that such efforts
will be continued and even expanded in the
future.
As soon as the political climate in the Congo
is stabilized, I would think that substantial pri-
vate investment also can be anticipated. The
Congo not only has large supplies of raw ma-
terials but a sizable market for foreign commod-
ities as well. In October the United States
and the Congo signed an investment guaranty
agreement to protect American investments in
the Congo, and several American firms recently
have been to Leopoldville to examine the
Congo's progress and reconstruction efforts.
Steps Toward Reconstruction
An immediate, short-term concern in the
Congo today is to feed hungry people disrupted
by internal strife in North Katanga and to re-
construct the damage recently caused by the
Katanga gendarmerie. The United States,
through the United Nations, is attempting to
alleviate both problems.
We anticipate that under P.L. 480 agree-
ments already signed or about to be negotiated,
and under special famine relief programs,
American food aid to the Congo this year will
approach $30 million. The bulk of this food
will be handled through sales for local cur-
rency, under title I of P.L. 480, and 90 percent
of this currency will be used for development
purposes in the Congo.
One serious problem at the moment is that
the Atlantic and gulf coasts dock strike will
disrupt needed food shipments to the Congo.
Unless this strike is resolved in the very near
future, it could adversely affect the well-being
of thousands of Congolese and, indeed, the
delicate political balance in that country.
The extent of physical damage in the Congo
by the Katangese resort to force fortunately
has been limited by the competent operations
210
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTILLETIN
of the ITnited Nations, but there is enoupjh
(hiniage to require immediate steps toward
reconstmction.
In Katanga, the Union Miniere du Ilant-
Katanga should be back to rehitively full op-
eration in a very short time. Tlie water which
began to flood the Kipushi mine after tlie
Katanga gendarmerie destroyed powerlines in
the area has been pumped out. The great
Lubumbashi smelter in Elisabethville is about
to i-eopen. Its operations at Kipushi already
have resumed, the damage at Jadotville was
minor, and we are hopeful that the Katangese
will do no damage at Kolwezi, in view of Mr.
[Moise] Tshombe's promises.
The damage that has occurred has been prin-
cipally in the field of transportation and
electrical supply. Bridging materials are espe-
cially needed in South Katanga, and I under-
stand the United Nations is seeking to effect
repairs with the well-known Bailey bridging
that many of you have seen used elsewhere.
The skilled engineers and work gangs of
Union Miniere are, I understand, rapidly re-
pairing the damage done to powerlines and
transformers.
These are the tasks that must be undertaken
next in the Congo. The curtain has fallen on
the first phase of Congo independence, and we
are now entering a new and much more im-
portant phase. We must now turn ever-
increasing attention to the development of that
country's resources, both material and human.
This is the kind of problem that ORT has
faced many times in its history, and I feel sure
the United States can count on your sym-
pathetic understanding and support during this
critical period. If the same kind of imder-
standing and support is brought to bear on
Congo rehabilitation problems by substantial
numbers of other people in this countiy and
abroad, it might be possible — by the end of this
Decade of Development — to help the Congo
transform itself from a recipient nation to a
countiy contributing to the development of
other states.
Such a prospect is a tempting challenge to
all people to help the Congo get on with the
enormous tasks it faces in the years immediately
ahead.
U.S. and Argentina Reaffirm
Traditional Ties
Carlos Manuel Miin/z, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship of tJie Argentine Repub-
lic, visited at Washington January 20-24 at
the invitation of Secretary Rush. The Foreign
Minister talhed with the Secretary on January
21 and with other officers of the Department
January 21 and 22. On January 22 he also
called on President Kennedy and addressed
the Council of the Organization of American
States. The Foreign Minister made a courtesy
call on Secretary of Agriculture Orville L.
Freeman on January 23 and on January 21^ met
with Dr. Felipe Herrera, President of the
Inter-American Development Bank. Follow-
ing is the text of a joint statement by Secretary
Rusk and Dr. Munis released hy the Depart-
ment of State on January 24.
Press release 51 dated January 24
The Secretary of State of the United States
of America, Mr. Dean Rusk, and the Minister
of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Argen-
tine Republic, Don Carlos Manuel Muniz, have
completed conversations in which they have
discussed at length, in an atmosphere of the
fullest cordiality and frankness, the relations
between the two countries and other interna-
tional matters.
Following these conversations they agreed to
make the following statement :
The present international political situation
suggests the need for strengthening even more
the traditional ties of friendship between the
United States of America and the Argentine
Republic. The menace posed to the Free
World by the activities of international com-
munism in the Americas requires their mutual
cooperation to cope with it vigorously in all
fields.
Both governments reiterate their faith in the
representative republican form of government
as the only one compatible with the liberty and
dignity of the individual. They are convinced
of the need to promote by all available means
the economic and social development of the
countries of the Hemisphere to insure the well
being of their citizens, to raise the standards
FEBRUARY 11, 1963
211
of living of their peoples and thereby to help
preserve the spiritual and material values of the
Free "World to which they belong.
Conscious of the efforts which the Govern-
ment of Argentina is making to guarantee the
representative republican system and to resolve
the economic and social problems of its coun-
try in a moment of profound significance for
its future, the Government of the United States
expresses its firm decision to support those
efforts by such means as may be possible.
The recent international events which placed
the peace of the Americas in grave danger also
provided evidence of the manner in which both
governments, responsive in each case to the
will of their peoples, proved able to act jomtly
against the aggressive intentions of an alien ide-
ology in order to preserve a way of life com-
mon to them and rooted in the history of the
Americas.
Their identity of pui-pose was demonstrated
by their cooperation during the Cuban Quaran-
tine in which Argentina was the first member
state under the OAS resolution of October 23,
1962,^ to join with the United States in offering
and subsequently sending naval and air units.
Both governments were in agreement that the
rapid response of the American Republics to
extra-hemispheric intervention presented a
promising environment for collective efforts to
strengthen and invigorate the inter- American
system not only to augment their mutual secu-
rity but, also, to enhance inter- American soli-
darity within the framework of democratic
institutions, individual liberty and social and
economic justice.
Both countries judge that one of the most
effective means of laying the foundation for
the future prosperity of the Americas is the
Alliance for Progress, an initiative of the Gov-
ernment of the United States fully shared by
the free Governments of Latin America. The
Alliance for Progress is not only a vast effort
seeking the material betterment of the peoples
of the Americas, but is even more fundamen-
tally a means of defending the principles basic
to the democratic ideals that inspire them.
The execution of the Alliance requires under-
standing of the crucial period through which
' For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 722.
the Americas are passing, as well as recognition
that needs may vary from area to area and
countiy to country. Its fundamental principle
should be the placing in motion of national
self-help measures, tlie indispensable factor in
authentic economic and social development.
To this end, the Alliance structure should
urgently accelerate realization of concrete plans
in the economic, social and cultural fields.
Both governments consider that under the
Alliance for Progress efforts should be made to
overcome the obstacles that impede full realiza-
tion of its objectives in order to enter fully into
a stage of positive and concrete accomplish-
ments and reach the goals that miderlie the pro-
gram. The Government of the United States
recognizes the efforts being made by Argentina
to develop specific economic and social develop-
ment projects and reiterates its intention to co-
operate witli the Government of Argentina in
carrying out within the shortest time possible
those projects regarding which agreement has
been or may be reached.
Both governments expressed their deep
interest in contributing to the resolution of the
problems confronting exporters of temperate
zone agricultural products, with particular
reference to the potential impact of the Euro-
pean Economic Community on exports of meats
and grains to the Commimity. It was agreed
that the two coimtries would propose to the
other exporting countries discussions, in the
near future, on common problems related to
these exports.
The two governments also agreed to the im-
portance of seeking means to facilitate an equi-
librium in the Argentine balance of trade,
considering fiindamentally the problem of
Argentine exports.
Mutual satisfaction was expressed that care-
ful technical explorations and studies by ex-
perts of their respective countries have produced
satisfactory arrangements under which bulk-
cooked meat from certain meat processing
establishments in Argentina will, in accordance
with regulations of the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture, be permitted entiy into
the United States without need for further
cooking. These arrangements are part of a
long-range bilateral research program which
will be continued.
212
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Tlie Governments of the United States of
America and of the Argentine Eepublic, bear-
ing in mind the ideals that are common to them
and which are intrinsic to their respective na-
tional goals, reaffirm their intentions to give
timi and effective expression to their friendship,
to their policies of international cooperation
and tlieir determination to preserve by all
means at their disposition the integrity of West-
ern civilization for the benefit of the Hemi-
sphere and the Free World.
President To Meet Chiefs of Central
American States and Panama
White House press release dated January 24
The White House announced on January 24
that President Kennedy will meet with the
Presidents of the countries of Central America
and Panama at San Jose, Costa Rica, on March
18, 19, and 20.
The visit is in response to an invitation ex-
tended several months ago to President Ken-
nedy to join in a meeting of the six chiefs of
state of the isthmian region.
The Presidents are expected to review mat-
ters of common interest, including advances be-
ing made and problems being encountered imder
the Alliance for Progress, particularly with re-
spect to the movement toward the economic
integration of the region.
The five Central American Republics asso-
ciated themselves several years ago in the Or-
ganization of Central American States and have
more recently concluded a series of economic
integration treaties which include provisions
for creation of a Central American Common
Market by 1965. Panama, while not a mem-
ber, has been invited to participate in the inte-
gration movement.
Since the San Jose meeting is not a state visit
but is in the nature of a working conference,
Mrs. Kennedy will not accompany the Presi-
dent on the trip.
The six Presidents with whom President
Kennedy will meet in San Jose are :
President Francisco Orlich of Costa Rica
President Mi^el Ydigoras of Guatemala
President Julio A. Rivera of El Salvador
President Ram6n Villeda of Honduras
President Luis Somoza of Nicaragua
President Roberto F. Cliiari of Panama
The futui-e President-elect of Nicaragua,
scheduled to be chosen in February 3 elections
and inaugurated May 1, is also expected to
attend.
United States Ambassadors
Meet at San Salvador
Press release 44 dated January 21
The Department of State amioimced on Jan-
uary 21 that the six Ambassadors of the United
States in Central America and Panama will
meet at San Salvador January 28-31 to discuss
problems of regional interest with officials of
the Department of State and the Agency for
International Development.
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- Ameri-
can Affairs Edwin M. Martin and Teodoro
Moscoso, U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for
Progress, will head the group of Washmgton
officials wliich will attend the meeting; U.S.
AID mission directors for each of the six coun-
tries will also be present, as well as representa-
tives of the AID regional office at Guatemala
City.
This meeting will also discuss plans for
President Kennedy's forthcoming meeting with
the Presidents of the six countries at San Jose,
Costa Rica.
FEBRUAKT 11, 1963
213
I
Roads to International Understanding
ly Mrs. Catherine D. Norrell
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs ^
I would like to share with you today some
first impressions of my new official home, the
State Department's Bureau of Educational
and Cultural Affairs, ily remarks will be
brief, informal, and— how shall I put it? —
tentative. To meet my new responsibilities I
have been — and still am — "doing my home-
work." I have read and studied the legisla-
tion under which we operate and a considerable
mass of brochures, surveys, and other informa-
tive material on the farflung program I have
joined. But after so short an exposure to a
complex operation, I need not say that I still
regard it with an open and inquiring mind.
For some time to come, I shall be forming new
views and doubtless revising old ones. It is in
a spirit of something like discovery, then, that
I should like to look with you this morning at
a subject of concern to all of us.
One of the characteristics about international
education and cultural exchange that I have
Roticed, and which I believe is growing, is that
the United States' efforts in this field have
earned widespread acceptance and, in some
quarters, genuine acclaim. Those most famil-
iar with the several American programs often
describe international education and cultural
affairs as one of the major elements in U.S.
foreign policy. The more friendly commenta-
tors are sometimes moved to compare our efforts
with the multibillion-dollar defense and eco-
nomic aid programs. Our work, they say, is a
powerful force for peace and international
development.
As for my new-found colleagues in the bu-
reau, they are even more enthusiastic, for they
' Address made before the Washington Club at Wash-
ington, D.C., on Jan. 15 (press release 27).
share a deep and dedicated conviction that our
international exchange programs are fully as
important to U.S. foreign policy as the military
and economic sectors of that policy.
This may seem an overdrawn comparison in
speaking of an element that operates on an
annual budget of less than $50 million, employs
about 375 persons, and occupies a relatively
modest share of the floorspace in the vast
building at 21st and Virginia. Fifty million
dollars, by the way, wouldn't pay for a single
Polaris submarine.
However, ours is not an arm of policy which
may be judged by its cost, nor should it be.
The budgetary aspects of our educational and
cultural endeavors are not a workable measure
of their importance. Rather it is in scope,
effectiveness, and potential that the true value
of our programs lies. On these grounds the
high appraisals of our friends both in and out
of Govermnent are justified.
At the close of my remarks I should like to
consider the conti'ibution of our activities to
our overall foreign policy. Firet, however, let
us see just what those activities are.
The Exchange Program
Basically we are in the import-export busi-
ness. Our commodity is people. We send
Americans abroad — professors, teachers, re-
searchers, students, performing artists, and
athletes. They carry the best of American edu-
cation and culture to more than 120 countries
and territories and bring back knowledge and
experience that enhance their professional com-
petence and enrich our national life.
Similarly we bring to the United States peo-
214
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
pie of other lands, again ■with benefit to both
(lieii- countries and our own. This part of our
woi-k — tlie import feature — is tlie larger part
of the two-way traffic. Last year, for instance,
about 5,000 of the 7,000 grantees were for-
eigners. Two-thirds of our foreign grantees
are students, but it is interesting to note that
these represent less than one-tenth of the total
studying in the United States. The others have
come on grants from imiversities or fomida-
tions, at their own expense, or on grants from
their governments. Incidentally, students ad-
mitted on Government grants are usually at the
graduate level.
Another important categoiy of foreign grant-
ees is that of the leaders and specialists, of
whom about 1,200 are brought in each year.
These visitors are generally key figures in the
nations they represent. They come from such
fields as journalism, labor, education, women's
affairs, and government. They are chosen
either for their national importance or for their
standing in their field of specialization. You
might call them our VIV's — "very important
visitors."
These grantees spend from 2 to 6 months in
the United States. From this experience they
take back ideas and knowledge which can pro-
foimdly influence the welfare of their own coun-
tries. At tlie same time they can do much to
affect the way their fellow citizens feel toward
the United States.
The range of comiterpart relations for these
guests — the people they meet and talk to — is as
broad as the careers represented. They may in-
clude Supreme Court justices, editors and pub-
lishers, labor leaders, government officials,
university presidents, leaders of women's or-
ganizations and of the creative arts.
From their visits here the foreign leaders
gain new insights into American life and insti-
tutions. One such grantee recently was a
leader in women's activities in the Kepublic of
Togo — and also Assistant Director of the Minis-
try of Finance and Economic Affairs. She ob-
served women at work in a variety of fields, in
schools and welfare institutions and civic ac-
tivities, among others. Her visit was concen-
trated largely in small tovms and rural areas,
since Togo is predominantly agricultural. Be-
fore leaving, she spoke of the "sense of soli-
darity" women have in America toward civic
work and of her desire to encourage this sense
in her own people.
The excellent cooperation of private individ-
uals and organizations is an important factor
in the rich and varied experience of foreign
grantees. An example of this was the visit of
two newspaper editors from India to Kansas.
They went to Emporia, where the late William
Allen White had made the Emporia Gazette a
bellwether of American smalltown life and
thought. W. L. "White, who succeeded his fa-
ther as editor and publisher, reported the
visitors' experience in an article in the Reader's
Digest, in which he described the "close views"
they had of "an average American small town —
not rich, and not poor."
Cultural Presentations
Another aspect of the bureau's activity is the
cultural presentations program, under which
American performing artists in the theater,
music, and the dance are sent on tours abroad.
The attractions range from symphony orches-
tras to jazz bands, from an individual character
actor like Hal Holbrook to an entire theatrical
repertory company. Both professional and
amateur performers have an important role in
this demonstration of the cultural interests and
achievements of the American people.
This program also embraces overseas tours by
athletes and athletic teams, which have an in-
creasingly strong impact on our "image" over-
seas, especially in the countries that have
recently emerged into independent nationhood.
You may have seen the cultural presentations
program mentioned in the newspapers recently.
This was in connection with a special survey
of the program made at the request of my
chief, Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary
of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs.
In order to strengthen the good points of the
program and correct some of the difficulties that
have beset it, Mr. Battle asked the U.S. Advis-
ory Commission on International Educational
and Cultural Affairs to make a thorough study
and offer recommendations. The Commis-
sion's report ^ was submitted recently, and some
^ For background, see Bitlletin of Jan. 14, 1963, p. 46.
FEBRUAKT 11, 1963
215
of its recommendations liave already been acted
upon.
There are many other facets to the operation
of the bureau I have just joined. For exam-
ple, we give financial support to American-
sponsored schools in some 32 countries. We
assist certain American colleges and imiversi-
ties in what are known as "jimior year abroad"
projects. We give grants-in-aid to some pri-
vate organizations like the 4-H Clubs, the
American Field Service, and the Experiment in
International Living to help them in their
youth exchange activities.
One whole unit of the bureau deals with the
visa problems and the myriad other details con-
nected with the foreign students in this country,
whether they are here under our program or
not. Another office does a remarkable job of
progi'aming nearly 2,000 American and for-
eign leaders who travel each year at their own
or other nongovernmental expense.
Cooperation With UNESCO
In addition we work with international or-
ganizations such as UNESCO — the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization. UNESCO performs a variety
of vital tasks in educational planning and
development, scientific cooperation in such
fields as oceanography and hydrology (the
science of water), and cultural activities to
make the art and music of member states better
known in other parts of the world.
UNESCO offers to us a wonderful opportu-
nity for leadership since this world organiza-
tion can be a powerful voice for our ideals and
concepts. The recently concluded General
Conference of UNESCO in Paris, where the
United States delegation was led by Mr. Bat-
tle,' showed that the United States is playing
an active role in UNESCO and one, inciden-
tally, in which the American public can partici-
pate through the U.S. Commission for
UNESCO.
Another responsibility of Mr. Battle's is the
coordination of exchange-of-persons programs
carried out by all Government agencies — and
' For text of an address made by Mr. Battle before
the General Conference on Nov. 13, see ibid., Dec. 17,
1962, p. 935.
more than 20 such agencies are operating in
this field!
Speaking of sister agencies, it is interesting
to note that our work overseas is carried out by
employees of the United States Information
Agency, the public affairs officers and, to a
greater degree, the cultural affairs officers
assigned to our embassies and other missions.
The legislative authority for the entire
spread of our activity is in the Mutual Educa-
tional and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961,
commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act.
This codified and enlarged the authorities con-
tained in previous legislation such as the Ful-
bright and Smith-Mundt Acts.
I hope I have not oversimplified a complex
and fascinating operation by trying to tell you
in a comparatively short time about who we
are, and what we do, and how, and by what
authority.
In closing I should like to return, as I said
I would, to the "why" of educational and cul-
tural affairs. Private enterprise, traditionally
and properly, does by far the greatest amount
of work in this important field. "V\niy is our
Government in it at all ? This is a fair ques-
tion. And this is the way I think it should
be answered.
Relation of Program to Foreign Policy
U.S. Government programs in the field of
educational and cultural affairs offer a unique
addition to our conventional tools in carrying
on America's relations with other peoples.
They have an important political role to play
in the total national effort.
These programs provide no ready cure-alls
for complicated international problems, whose
solutions must continue to be pursued with per-
sistence and common sense in their own terms.
But exchanges do help to create an atmosphere
in which political differences can be worked
out. They provide opportunities for individu-
als to gain firsthand impressions of the United
States.
Under these programs thousands of foreign-
ers each year — friendly, neutral, unfriendly —
have a significant personal experience within
our society. This leads to wider understanding
of the real nature of our people, our way of
216
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
life, our motivations and ideals, and of the
trreat varietj' of successfully operating institu-
tions in which American values are incorpo-
I3:ated.
Many of these visitoi-s are influential and
articulate leaders in tlieir own societies; most
others are on their way to becoming the leaders
of tomorrow. What they see and experience
here, what they take away with them, good or
bad, will be of concern to us as a nation in the
future. It is to our interest to make their ex-
perience as profitable as possible.
Exchanges are not a one-way street. Thej'
help the United States directly and immedi-
ately. Americans are daily learning from
foreigners in our midst — students, lecturers,
professors, leaders of public opinion — what
other people are like, what their problems and
preoccupations are, how they think, and how
they react to situations of various kinds. Such
understanding by our people is indispensable
for informed decisions on U.S. foreign rela-
tions and intelligent support of national policy.
Americans going abi'oad to study, carry on
research, lecture, or perform bring back with
them increased knowledge and understanding
of other peoples. As teachers, professors,
scientists, teclmicians, lecturers, these Ameri-
cans add each day to the total competence of
the United States to deal with tlie variety of
bewildering problems forced on us as the leader
of the free world.
I would like to say something here of an-
other kind of benefit that comes from sending
Americans abroad. I attended a fascinating
meeting in the State Department the other day
when Miss Martha Graham, our celebrated ex-
ponent of the contemporary dance, reported on
the tour she and her company just completed
in the Near East and Europe. They danced,
among other places, in cities behind the Iron
Curtain. After the performances, dancers,
artists, and other citizens of the host country
crowded around the troupe and plied them with
questions. And the questions were significant.
These people asked : "Are you free to work out
your own choreography ?" "Does your Govern-
ment tell you what you should do?" "You are
supported by the Government, aren't you?"
Through all the questions — and, of course,
tlirough the Americans' answers — ran this
tlieme of freedom. It was as if a door had been
opened and clean winds from the free world
were sweeping through. I don't think we can
measure — but I know we must never underesti-
mate— the effect of having our message carried
in this way, both onstage and off.
Our students are being better trained today
to confront international questions than they
were a generation ago because their teachers
and professors have become better qualified by
experience abroad and have seen at first hand
the problems they discuss.
Foreign languages, an important key to in-
ternational understanding, are better taught to-
day because more teachers have studied foreign
languages where they are spoken. Graduate
study abroad deepens the competence of such
students.
Many of the experts on the Far East, South
Asia, Latin America, the Arab world, Africa,
critically needed in our schools and universities,
in American business, and in the Government,
are products of exchange programs. Tlieir
competence and that of others who each year
are added to their number may well make the
difference between success and failure for our
country in working out solutions to problems
that beset us aroimd the world. We cannot
have too many such experts.
Educational and cultural exchanges have to
do with people, with individuals contacting and
affecting the attitudes of other individuals in
a constant exchange of impressions. But they
also have to do with ideas. If our democratic
values are to survive in this explosive century,
it will be because individual people have be-
come convinced that these are true values and
have carried their convictions to others. The
most persuasive experience our society can
offer is personal contact with our ideals and
institutions as students or visitors here, or with
xVmerican teachers, scholars, professors, and
artists abroad. I am profoundly convinced
that exchange programs contribute to the
spread of American ideas and ideals with a
force far out of proportion to their size and
costs.
FEBRUARY 11, 1963
217
The World Coffee Agreement and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy
hy W. Michael BluTnenthal
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^
It is difficult to think of any other annual
convention that has the drawing power of tliis
meeting. Not only are all sections of the
United States well represented by industry
leaders, but this convention annually takes on
more and more of an international character.
I see many distinguished representatives of
coffee producmg countries here today, from
Latin America and from Africa. Even some
of the consuming coimtries are repi'esented.
This demonstrates better than words just how
inseparable national coffee problems are from
international coffee problems — that what hap-
pens in one country is of interest and concern
to all other countries.
Last year I talked to you in some detail about
the prospects for negotiating a new world cof-
fee agreement under United Nations auspices
and about the role of the United States in this
effort. I assured you that everything possible
would be done to safeguard the legitimate in-
terests of U.S. coffee trade.
In the course of the year the projected agree-
ment became a reality. Today I would like to
tell you about this new agreement, how it was
negotiated, what the principal provisions are,
which of these are likely to be of particular in-
terest to you, and what in the view of the United
States Government the significance of the agree-
ment is.
I hope that as you listen to me this time you
will not feel like the patient confronting the
doctor who had performed an operation on him
and presented his bill. The patient looked first
'Address made before the National CoEEee Associa-
tion at Boca Raton, Fla., on Jan. 14 (press release 10,
revised, dated Jan. 11).
218
at the bill and then at the doctor, commenting,
"No wonder you fellows wore masks." Wliat-
ever you may think of the agreement, I am re-
assured by the thought that we kept you fully
informed about the progress of our work and
that, hopefully, you will not complain that we
were hiding behind masks.
It is difficult to believe that a full year has
gone by since I addressed you from this plat-
form and surveyed the prospects for 1962. I
spoke then at some length about our ideas for
a free-world foreign economic policy made up
of several interrelated parts and stressed the
leading role which the United States would have
to play in this regard. I said that we had in
mind a consistent fabric of trade and aid meas-
ures to help move the free world forward: on
the one hand, by lowering trade barriers and
thus spurring the economies of the advanced
nations while offering urgently needed market
outlets, under reasonable conditions, for the
raw materials and processed goods of the less
developed countries ; on the other hand, by pro-
viding coordinated economic assistance to those
nations in Latin America, Africa, and Asia
seriously intent on economic and social reform
and development for the betterment of the
standards of living of their people.
I explained that President Kennedy was
moving in a variety of ways to enable the
United States to meet its responsibilities of
initiative and leadersliip in the achievement of
these objectives. The Trade Expansion Act of
1962 was just being submitted to the second
session of the 87th Congress. The Charter of
Punta del Este,= officially setting in motion the
' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 19G1, p. 463.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJIiLETni
Alliance for Progress, had been signed less than
6 months previously. A new United States
coninioditj^ policy to assure, in concert with
other nations, the establishment of more stable
markets for the raw material exports of the less
developed countries had only recently begun,
lu fact, my passing references — in case you may
liave forgotten them — to the projected United
Xations coffee agreement emphasized the fact
I that this was the first major effort to translate
our new commodity policy into a specific
progi'am.
It has, indeed, been a full year for those of us
in Washington who participated in the imple-
mentation of the President's i^rogram. 1962 is
now liistory, and all of you know the record.
In many ways it has been an extraordinary year
and one from which on balance we can take some
satisfaction. The United States and the free
world gained in strength and in spirit and dem-
onstrated, for all to see, the superiority of free
democratic institutions over the Communist
way of life. We showed our confidence in the
future and our determination to defend our in-
stitutions and our legitimate interests. Mean-
while, the Communists, split by ever-widening
ideological conflict, had to cope with economic
setbacks and political failures.
Without question, the single most significant
event of the year was the confrontation between
the United States and the Soviet Union over
Cuba^ and the successful demonstration by
President Kennedy that the United States is
prepared to defend its vital interests and that
the free world, including all the members of the
Organization of American States, is solidly
united with us in our stand against the ceaseless
efforts of the Communists to intimidate, sub-
vert, and subjugate free democratic peoples
wherever possible.
New U.S. Trade Legislation
On the international economic front, 1962
was a year of some outstanding successes and
one which, although there were also a few dis-
appointments, saw the United States and the
free world move forward resolutely on several
vital fronts.
The new trade legislation * I spoke of a year
ago is now a reality, reflecting overwhelming
congi-essional approval of President Kennedy's
bold approach to meet new world trade condi-
tions, as the European Common Market gathers
strength and the economic growth of the less
developed countries proceeds. A year ago no
one could have predicted the degree of support
which the country and the Congress would give
to the President's trade proposals. Our friends
in Europe and elsewhere have been deeply im-
pressed by this dramatic United States initia-
tive. You who are intimately associated with
world trade know that this Trade Expansion
Act is equal, if not greater, in importance and
potential significance to the passage of Presi-
dent Roosevelt's firet reciprocal trade act of
1934, which reversed the high-tariff policy of
Smoot-Hawley days.
In 1963 and 1964 it will be the task of the
administration to devise a program permitting
optimum use of the new powers which the Con-
gress has granted to the President. TJie im-
portance which President Kennedy attaches to
this program is perhaps best illustrated by his
appointment of a man of the stature of former
Secretai-y of State Christian Herter as his chief
trade negotiator,' charged with forging a new
trade program — one, we are confident, that will
greatly benefit the United States and our trad-
ing partners of the free world.
Alliance for Progress
The Alliance for Progress in Latin America
received in 1962 perhaps as much publicity for
its presumed failures as for its successes. The
problems of Latin America are staggering, and
perhaps those who thought that, with the sign-
ing of the Punta del Este charter, progress
would be rapid and immediate were somewhat
too optimistic. Perhaps the framing of the
program for one decade without sufficient em-
phasis of the fact that considerably more time
will be required for lasting improvements was
one reason for this optimism. Yet I venture
to say that for the alliance 1962 has also been
a good year. No one who attended the first
' For background, see ibid., Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 715-746.
* For an article by Leonard Weiss on the Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962, see ibid., Dee. 3, 1962, p. 847.
= Ibid., p. 846.
FEBRUAEY 11, 1963
219
review conference of the alliance,' in Mexico
City last October, can have failed to be im-
pressed by the growing realization of the Latin
American countries of the task that faces them
and, above all, by their determination to get the
job done.
Of course, not all countries are making
equally great efforts in reform and self-help,
and we have learned that we must concentrate
our assistance where evidence of real progress
is discernible. Lack of financial resources, high
illiteracy rates, inadequate social, political, and
economic institutions, and the dependence on a
few export commodities for foreign exchange
are all parts of the staggering problem which
faces Latin America. Progi-ess is bound to be
slow, and the need for patience is great. But
as one watches the strides forward in countries
like Colombia, as one takes note of tlie first
truly democratic election in the Dominican Re-
public in more than three decades, or as one
examines the far-reaching tax and other re-
forms in countries like El Salvador, one can see
the signs of real progress.
In implementing our policy of international
cooperation aimed at solving world commodity
problems, we believe that no event was more
important in 1962 tlian the successful negotia-
tion at the United Nations of a truly compre-
hensive world coffee agreement. In view of the
importance of coffee to so many Latin American
countries there is much to support the view of
some observers that the negotiation of this
agreement was one of the real accomplishments
and most hopeful developments for the Alliance
for Progress in the course of 1962.
Negotiating the Coffee Agreement
Fifty-eight coimtries met at the United Na-
tions in New York and actively participated
in the negotiations.'' Seven weeks later we
emerged — in a state of exhaustion, but with an
international coft'ee agreement of which we can
truly be proud. It was not easy, as the mem-
bers of your Foreign Affairs Committee can
* For an evaluation by the lA-ECOSOC Ministerial
Representatives, see ibid., Dec. 10, 1962, p. 897.
' For background, see ibid., Aug. 6, 1962, p. 234, and
Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667.
tell you. There were many anxious moments,
deadlocks, roadblocks, and crises. Given the
importance of trade in coffee, the large number
of countries involved, and the sacrifices all were
called upon to make, it is a miracle that we suc-
ceeded so well and produced a pact which I was
proud to sign for the United States on Septem-
ber 28, 1962.
I wish, at this point, to say that the United
States Government team that negotiated this
agreement would not have succeeded at all with-
out the strong support from the National
Coffee Association. Your Foreign Affairs
Committee stayed with us to the end, and each
member gave generously of his time and ex-
perience in the coffee business to help protect
the interest of the United States and the coffee
world. The teamwork was wonderful. I do
want to take the time now to thank all mem-
bers of the association for providing this kind
of help. We all owe a particular debt of grati-
tude to Jack McKiernan, Austin O'Brien,
George Eobbins, Ed Abom, Reuben Hills,
Arthur Anisansel, Peter Folger, and Sam
Israel for their unfailing kindness, good fellow-
ship, hard work, and devotion to our common
task. The National Coffee Association has good
cause to be proud of its Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee, and we are deeply aiDpreciative for your
support.
You, whose livelihood is intimately tied up
with coffee, followed these negotiations closely,
and I am sure all of you are acquainted with
the general provisions of the agreement. I shall
therefore not speak about these in detail but
will summarize only the key features of the
agreement.
1. It provides for a system of export quotas,
which will be adjusted quarterly to the needs
of the market. Shipments of all coffee, in what-
ever form, are included in the quotas. Exports
to so-called new markets, so troublesome in the
past, are carefully controlled and limited.
2. Importing countries bring their moral
support and administrative machinery to bear
on the problem to help assure the effectiveness
of the quota system. Certificates of origin
must accompany all shipments. Import statis-
tics will be quickly provided and published.
Imports from nonmembers will be restricted, to
220
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIiLETIN
Jpr
a
ttfcrevent noncooperators from getting a free ride
ti on tlie agreement.
3. Production will be brought under control.
Specific production targets will be assigned each
aic member and a specific timetable adopted for its
fj accomplishment. Producing countries that do
■c Qot cooperate will not share in increasing con-
sumption. Importing countries will assist the
producing countries to shift out of coffee pro-
duction and to diversify their economies. An
intelligent stock policy will be identified for
each producing country.
4. Consumers will be protected, as will the
coffee trade. The specific price objective of the
agreement is to assure that the general level
of coffee prices does not decline below the gen-
eral level of such prices in 1962. If the agree-
ment works well, coffee prices should firm up,
but the imdesirability of sharp rises in prices
is recognized and specific machinery provided
to deal with it.
5. An International Coffee Council is created
to administer the agreement and to provide a
ti'uly international workshop devoted to solv-
ing problems affecting the world's coffee in-
dustry.
The agreement was signed by 54 governments
by Xovember -30, the last day for signature.
This is a record for an international commod-
ity agreement. We have now entered the rati-
fication phase, and already 8 governments have
deposited instruments of ratification or notices
of mtentions to do so. President Kennedy has
sent the agreement to the Senate of the United
States and has asked for its advice and consent
to ratification.^ "We are hopeful that favorable
action will be taken at an early date.
I should like, in a moment, to tell you our
view of the significance of this agreement and
what the prospects for the future of coffee trade
are likely to be under it. Before doing so, how-
ever, let me emphasize that we tried throughout
the negotiations to be ever mindful of what you
wanted accomplished and how you wanted it
done. In June of 1961 your Foreign Affairs
Committee presented us with six key rec-
ommendations concerning any future coffee
* S. Ex. H (87th Cong., 2d sess.) ; for a statement by-
President Kennedy, see Bttixetin of Oct. 29, 1962, p.
668.
agreement. In May of 1962 your committee
amplified its 6 recommendations by giving us
10 additional points for consideration and guid-
ance.
We studied the implications of thase 10
points very carefully. We never lost sight of
them during the 7 weeks of give-and-take nego-
tiations. We believe we accomplished substan-
tially all you asked us to do to safeguard U.S.
trade interests and to produce a workable coffee
agreement. You will find it a very interesting
exercise to review them and match them up
with the provisions in the long-term agreement.
I am surprised we were able to accomplish
this much, for there were many days when the
complicated U.X. negotiating machinery halt-
ed completely. Jack ilcKiernan and the other
industry people present have j^robably told you
some of the painful and humorous things that
we encoimtered. In fighting to protect our
large bloc of votes — wliich our friends were
eagerly trying to whittle down — our principal
support came from a surprising and unex-
pected quarter: the Russian delegation. For
me, the most amusing moment came at 4:00
a.m. one morning when I was still rushing
around the smoke-filled rooms of the U.X. try-
ing to break a deadlock. Two other members
of the U.S. team were holding on to my coat-
tails, begging me to maintain the dignity of
my office. I think I replied that if I had any
dignity, I would be home in bed.
Significance of the Agreement
What, then, is the significance of this agree-
ment? The first important point to remember
is the fact that it was negotiated at all. A
successful negotiation calling for sacrifice and
compromise by all is no easy task for any com-
modity, and particularly not for one like coffee,
which is beset by so many problems and is of
such importance to so many countries. If you
bear in mind that 58 countries were involved,
a successful negotiation, even after 7 weeks, is
a minor miracle. In our view the importance
of this success lies in the fact that it demon-
strates that commodity agreements can be nego-
tiated, even for a difficult commodity and under
complicated circumstances. It proves that
nations can work together on commodity prob-
FEBRUART 11, 1963
221
lems. Of course it remains to be seen whether
they can also cooperate to make the agreement
work. That is something I shall have more to
say about in a moment.
The second point of significance, in our view,
is that a mechanism now exists which prevents
some producing nations from gaining unfair
advantages on others and which evenly spreads
the burden among the producing and consum-
ing countries of pi'oviding for orderly markets.
If the agreement is properly administered, fail-
ure to join or attempts at circumvention will
no longer pay off. By adjusting the supply of
coffee entering the world marketplace to the
level of world needs, stability and adequate
earnings for the producing countries can be
assured.
Third, there is also great significance in the
fact tliat, if the agreement works, powerful
pressures on the producing coimtries will have
been set in motion to induce them to take
measures to cut back unwanted production.
Now that a country can no longer export more
than its quota, there is no point in continuing
unwanted coffee production. Tlie importance
of this factor for the economic development of
many coimtries should not be underrated. It
could help promote economic diversification and
lessen the reliance on the export earnings of a
single commodity. In time we hope it can
lighten the load of excess production and stocks
which many countries have had to bear. Inci-
dentally this is where the importance of coordi-
nating economic development and trade poli-
cies is clearly illustrated. The United States
has made clear its readiness to give most sym-
pathetic consideration to support sound proj-
ects in the producing countries, projects
designed to lessen their reliance on coffee and
to enable them to comply with the provisions
of the new agreement.
Fourth, we believe that the significance of
this agreement also lies in the fact that a solu-
tion was found which in no way sacrifices the
interests of the consuming coimtries. The spe-
cific provisions of the agreement give every
assurance that the consumer is adequately pro-
tected against price-gouging. Tlie prophets of
doom and gloom notwithstanding, no sharp and
sudden rises in coffee have taken place or are
likely to occur. In fact coffee remains today's
biggest bargain for the housewife in the United
States and Europe.
Making the Agreement Work
Although we can take much satisfaction from
what was achieved in 1962, we should be mind-
ful that the main task is still ahead of us. The
coffee agreement, with its 60 pages and annexes,
is, after all, just so many pieces of paper,
closely couched in legal language. We have
produced an agreement, but we have only begun
to attack the roots of the coft'ee problem. The
basic instability of the industry still exists and
will exist until the agreement is fully imple-
mented. Since we left New York last Septem-
ber with the agreement in our pockets, I have
detected a tendency on the part of some of our
foi'eign friends to relax — as if the conclusion
of the agreement were synonymous with the
solution of the problem. We have not solved
the coffee problem, and it will be many long
years of hard work, sacrifice, cooperation, and
understanding before we do.
What has changed is that a mechanism exists
for the first time which is capable of pro\nding
a solution. But we must keep our eye on the
ball. It is the implementation of the agree-
ment which is the hard part — and the truly
essential element to success. A year from to-
day we must be able to look back and see some'
solid effort and accomplishment in putting the
provisions of the agreement into force — in
making the agreement a living, viable, construc-
tive force in world coffee affairs. In short,
we need to see a system of export quotas in force
which are recognized by the market as meeting
legitimate ne^ds of consumers but not provid-
ing that small additional amount whicli de-
presses prices and sharply decreases the foreign
exchange earnings which are so important to
our coffee producing friends. We need to see
a new spirit — a new attitude — toward scrupu-
lous observance of export quotas. A new and
brighter year can be here for the coffee pro-
ducing countries, but they must see that for a
common endeavor to be successful there must
be no imcommon members. It sounds trite to
say that the agreement will be no stronger than
its weakest or most reluctant member, but this,
222
DEPAKTMEXT OF STATE BULLETIN
"^i
"yimfortunately, is the trutli. The action of the
"«^ ioffee market over the past few years is all the
(vidence I need to cite.
The coffee problem ^Yill only be solved when
Jiese facts are realized. There are, after all,
mly two ways for preventing price declines and
nsuring adequate levels of income to the pro-
iucing countries. One is to set up a system of
)referential prices and quantities between cer-
ain producing and consuming countries. This
liscredited method, which is inherently dis-
;riminatoiy, has been rejected, and the United
States is firmly opposed to it. The only other
way is to take the road of international cooper-
ition among all producing and consuming
ountries, adjusting on a nondiscriminatory
basis total world production to foreseeable de-
mand i^lus reasonable stocks and in this way
assuring adequate incomes for the producers
and fair prices to the consumers.
The United States will do its part and exert
2very effort to use the mechanism effectively
and to make the agreement work. We hope
and are confident tliat other countries, pro-
ducers and consumers alike, will do the same.
But let there be no misunderstanding: If any
important producing country now tries to go
it alone or to circumvent not only the letter but
also the spirit of the agreement, no one will
.gain but all will lose.
If any country now attempts to gain special
advantages at the expense of others, the latter
will surely react adversely and the agreement,
if it is ratified at all, would be likely to founder
quickly on the rocks of dissension. By the
same token, if any country now attempts to
gain special advantages in a way which harms
those trade groups who have traditionally dealt
in this field and who, in the United States,
through your association, took a most states-
manlike attitude in support of the agreement,
then it is only natural that suspicion and re-
sentment would arise and that this could not
but harm the chances of putting the agreement
into effect or of operating it successfully. Now
is the time for all producing and consuming
countries to stand together and to concentrate
their energies on making the agreement work
in the same cooperative spirit with which it
was negotiated last August.
I am confident, Mr. Chairman, that the new
international coffee agreement will be ratified
by the United States and by the other principal
consuming and producing countries. I am sure
that the overwhelming importance of the new
agreement to the many countries dependent on
coffee will result in its acceptance and imple-
mentation. I believe that 2 or 3 years from now
we will be able to see clearly that the necessary
worldwide cooperation has been obtained and
that the agreement is a constructive force in
the world coffee economy.
These are the tasks for the coming year, and
we are confident that we can achieve our
objectives.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me once again
express my sincere thanks for the help, under-
standing, and support the National Coffee
Association has given me and my colleagues
during the past year. As an industry, there is
no finer example of cooperation, and I am sure
our foreign friends realize and appreciate that
they would not be standing on the threshold of
a great opportunity if it were not for the con-
structive approach you have taken to their
problem.
Civil Aviation Consultations
With U.A.R. Reopened
Press release 47 dated January 22
Delegations of the United Arab Eepublic and
the United States reopened civil aviation con-
sultations at Cairo on January 21. Discus-
sions had been recessed at Washington in June
1962. The delegations are discussing various
air transport problems in accordance with the
bilateral air transport agreement of 1946.^
The U.S. delegation is headed by Henry
T. Snowdon, Chief, Aviation Division, Depart-
ment of State. The chairman of the United
Arab Republic delegation is Gen. Ahmad Ab-
del-Hamid Seif, Director General of Civil Avi-
ation. Ministry of War.
FEBRUARY 11, 1963
' 61 Stat. 3825 ; Treaties and Other International Acts
Series 3884.
223
THE CONGRESS
The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year
Ending June 30, 1964 (Excerpts)^
PART 1. THE BUDGET MESSAGE OF THE
PRESIDENT
To the Congress of tlie United States :
International affairs and finance. — ^We are
steadfast in our determination to promote the
security of the free world, not only through our
commitment to join in the defense of freedom,
but also through our pledge to contribute to the
economic and social development of less priv-
ileged, independent peoples. The attack on
India by Communist China, and Vietnam's
continuing struggle against massive armed sub-
version supported from without, are current
reminders of the need and importance of our
assistance. The increasing pace of moderniza-
tion and the mounting efforts at reform and
self-help in many nations merit our suj^port
and encouragement.
I am convinced that the budgetary amounts
proposed are essential to meet our commitments
and achieve our purposes. The basic objective
of these international military and economic
expenditures is to serve the security interests
of the United States. Because these programs
are often addressed to complex problems in dis-
tant lands, their contribution to our security
^n. Doc. 15, Part 1, S8th Cong., 1st sess. ; trans-
mitted on Jan. 17. Reprinted here are the sections
on international affairs and finance from parts 1 and 4
of the 440-page volume entitled The Budget of the
United States Government, 1964, for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington 25, D.C. ($1.50).
224
objectives is not always directly apparent, but
it is nonetheless vital. And because the prob-
lems we encounter are grave and complex, they
present us with a constant challenge to improve
content, administrative efficiency, and overall
effectiveness.
, Fundamental to our efforts is recognition
that we are dealing with a combination of mili-
tary, political, and economic measures which
must be complementary and reinforcing. Our
overseas military assistance program is vital to
assure the continued survival of independent
states so situated that they are prime targets
for open aggression or subversion. "VVliile direct
military assistance greatly enhances the ability
of these less developed countries to defend
themselves and thus contributes to the peace
and security of the free world, their contribu-
tion depends ultimately upon the strength of
their economic and social structures. The eco-
nomic and social development process is long
and arduous, primarily dependent upon the ef-
forts of the less developed nations themselves.
We must assist and accelerate this process by
providing critical increments of material and
human resources wliich, along with measures
of self-help and reform, will ultimately spell
success for these efforts.
Exi>enditures in fiscal year 1064 for military
and economic assistance, combined, are esti-
mated at $3,750 million, $100 million less than
in the current year. In providing these stmis,
we will be highly selective, stressing projects
and programs crucial to the rapid develop-
ment of countries which are important to the
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
iiaintenance of free world security and which
lemonstrate willins^ness and ability to marshal
lieir own resources effectively.
Of special concern are the Latin American
\epublics, with whom we have joined in tlie
Vlliance for Progress. As our neighbor to the
^outh undertake far-reaching economic and so-
cial reforms, we are pledged to provide a criti-
cal margin of resources necessary for the
ichievement of our common goals. In the fiscal
vear 196i I am recommending a program which
will provide a total of over $1 billion for these
countries through the Agency for International
Development, the Inter- American Development
Bank, the Export -Impoi-t Bank, and the Food
for Peace program. We shall also be accord-
ing priority in this area to the highly successful
program of the Peace Corps.
We are not alone in seeing the relationship
between free world security and rapid economic
and social development. Other free world
countries, particularly the European countries
and Japan, are increasing their overseas pro-
grams, and we will contmue to encourage these
nations to increase them further in both size
and scope. Similarly, we must support and
encourage development programs carried out
under international auspices. Negotiations are
now underway for replenishing and enlarging
the resources of the International Development
Association. After these negotiations are com-
pleted, I expect to ask the Congress to authorize
U.S. agreement, thereby enabling the operations
of this important international organization to
be continued and expanded. I also expect to
request an authorization for the United States
to join in providing additional resources for
the Inter- American Development Bank.
The authority of the Export-Import Bank
to exercise its functions expires on June 30,
1963. I shall shortly propose legislation to ex-
tend the life of the Bank for five years and to
increase its resources by $2 billion, so that its
significant contribution to the expansion of our
foreign trade can continue. Without a further
increase in the Bank's resources, the legislation
will also increase by $1 billion the Bank's au-
thorization for the highly successful programs
of guarantees and insurance of exporter credits.
PART 4. THE FEDERAL PROGRAM BY FUNC-
TION
International Affairs and Finance
The nonmilitary international activities of
the United States Government are closely inter-
related with our national security strategy and
fulfill various purposes vital to world peace and
stability. Their aim is to enhance our national
security by fostering closer and mutually bene-
ficial relationships with other nations, by help-
ing the less developed areas of the world in their
efforts to improve the lives of their people, by
providing the world community with informa-
tion about this country and its objectives, by
participating in cultural and educational inter-
changes, and by increasing world trade.
Expenditures in the administrative budget
for international affairs and finance are esti-
mated to decline by $195 million in fiscal year
1964. Tliis reduction results from expected de-
creases in net expenditures of the Export-Im-
port Bank and the Department of State, which
more than offset estimated increases, mainly for
the economic programs of the Agency for Inter-
national Development. Total payments to the
public in 1964 for international programs are
estimated to rise by $276 million, however, as
a result of increased expenditures by the alien
property and war claims trust funds and smaller
net cash repayments to the Treasury by inter-
national financial institutions in exchange for
non-interest-bearing notes.
A continued high level of new obligational
authority will be required to support the world-
wide responsibilities of the United States. The
$4.5 billion requested for 1964 is $0.8 billion
more than the current estimate for 1963, exclud-
ing the special nonrecurring 1963 authoriza-
tions of $2 billion for loans to the International
Monetary Fund, already enacted, and of $2 bil-
lion now being requested for the Export-Import
Bank.
Agency for International Development. —
The major portion of our total economic and
financial programs in developing nations is pro-
vided through the Agency for International
Development. In working with these nations,
this country is making a material contribution
FEBRU^VKT 11, 190 3
225
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND FINANCE
{Fiscal years. In millions]
Payments to the public
Recom-
mended
Program or agency
1962
actual
1963
estimate
1964
estimate
new obli-
gational
authority
lor 1964
Administrative Budget
Funds:
Economic and finan-
cial programs:
Agency for Inter-
national De-
velopment:
Development
$347
272
155
618
445
$625
244
280
500
451
$704
270
401
420
506
$1, 248
Development
grants -
277
Alliance for
Progress
Supporting
assistance
Contingencies
and other
900
397
643
Subtotal
International
financial institu-
tions
1,836
172
11
101
242
9
148
48
245
1
3
1
2, 100
122
47
-224
195
22
161
56
367
5
3
21
2,300
112
80
-647
246
26
177
59
274
12
3
37
3,465
112
Peace Corps
Export-Import
Bank
108
Food for Peace
(Public Law 480,
title II)
215
Other -
28
Foreign information
and exchange
activities:
U.S. Information
Agency
217
Department of
State
63
Conduct of foreign
affairs :
Department of
State
286
U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament
Agency
15
Tariff Commission..
Foreign Claims
Settlement Com-
mission
3
2
Subtotal, adminis-
trative budget..
2,817
2,874
2, 679
> 4, 514
Trust Funds .. ..
15
47
123
1 59
Adjustment for net cash
withdrawals by inter-
national financial
institutions; intragov-
ernmental and other
transactions (deduct). _
341
454
58
Total -
2,492
2,467
2,743
' Compares with new obligational authority for 1962
and 1963, as follows:
Administrative budget funds: 1962, $3,373 million;
1963, $7,701 million.
Trust funds: 1962, $6 million; 1963, $37 million.
to a stable and peaceful future by helping to
alleviate the extreme poverty and social unrest
which beset millions of people. Expenditures
in 1964 for the economic activities of AID are
estimated to be $200 million greater than in
1963, with the principal increase for the AI
liance for Progress and a decrease in supporting
assistance. Efforts will be continued and in-
tensified to encourage other developed countries
of the free world to increase further their assist-
ance to the developing nations.
In allocating economic development funds,
continued emphasis is being given to the formu-
lation of long-range plans and programs for ift
each country as guides for channeling resources to
into those efforts which will yield the greatest
benefits. Economic and social development can
not depend simply on aid from outside, but
must rest primarily on efforts within the coun-
tries involved. Continuing stress is, therefore,
being placed on encouraging recipient countries
to support development plans and programs
through self-help measures, such as fiscal and
agrarian reform, even when such measures in-
volve short-run difficulties.
The following table summarizes the foreign
assistance program. The military portion of
this program was discussed in connection with
our national defense effort earlier in this section
of the budget.
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
[Fiscal years. In millions]
Program
Military . ,
Economic.
Total
Expenditures
1962
actual
Bl,390
1,836
3, 226
1963
estimate
$1, 750
2, 100
3,850
1964
estimate
$1, 4.50
2,300
3,750
Recom-
mended
new obli-
gational
authority
for 1964
$1, 480
3,465
' 4,945
' Compares with new obligational authority of $3,915
million enacted for 1962 and $3,929 million enacted for
1963.
Dexielofment loans and grants. — Long-term
loans repayable in dollars at very low rates of
interest constitute the most important single
method by which the United States helps devel-
oping countries. Expenditures for such loans
are expected to increase by $79 million in 1964,
mainly as a result of commitments made in
prior years.
226
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Irif
Long-term loans are the mainstay of our de-
elopment effort. However, it is also necessary
io make grants to help improve human skills by
creating or strengthening training and other
[institutions so that people in developing coun-
:ries can use their resources more effectively.
To this end, expenditures of $270 million will
36 made in 1964 for develojjment grants.
These grants will be used primarily to foster
the advancement of education, health, and
other technical skills.
Alliance for Progress. — Not quite a year and
a half has elapsed since the formal inauguration
of the Alliance for Progress, a cooperative effort
to expedite social and economic development in
Latin America. The rate at which U.S. re-
sources are made available for this effort must,
of course, take into account progress made in
the Latin American countries, particularly in
the areas of national planning and economic
and social refonns.
The measures to achieve such progress are
essential to the success of the Alliance. It is
expected that their rate of execution will permit
the United States to provide more than $1 bil-
lion to Latin America m 1964 in total loans and
grants from AID, U.S. funds administered by
the Inter-American Development Bank, the
Export-Import Bank, and the Food for Peace
program. To this end, the budget provides for
a proposed increase of $100 million in the pres-
ent $600 million authorization for Alliance for
Progress funds for 1964, to permit additional
loaiLS and grants. An appropriation of $200
million is also requested to replenish the Social
Progress Trust Fund administered by the Inter-
American Development Bank, which is expected
to be fully committed during fiscal year 1963.
Other AID programs. — Expenditures for
supporting assistance are estimated to decline
by $80 million in 1964 as a higher proportion of
the economic activities of AID is channelled
through development loans and grants. How-
ever, supporting assistance continues to be
made available to countries which need help to
maintain economic and political stability, sup-
port extraordinary defense forces, and preserve
economic independence. Such aid is also some-
times granted in connection with U.S. bases
overseas.
The United States plans to continue to par-
ticipate in 1964 in a number of international
efforts which receive substantial support, in the
form of voluntary contributions. These in-
clude such programs as the United Nations
Special Fund and Technical Assistance pro-
gram. United Nations ojDerations in the Congo,
and the Indus Basin development program ad-
ministered by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development.
Other economic and finmicial programs. —
Additional funds are needed in order for the
Export-Import Bank to continue filling its im-
portant role of financing U.S. exports, many of
which go to underdeveloped areas. Accord-
ingly, this budget assumes prompt enactment in
1963 of a requested increase of $2 billion in the
Bank's resources. This amount should be ade-
quate to cover requirements for several years to
come. During the past 3'ear, an increasing
volume of loans has been guaranteed under new
export financing programs providing both
credit and political risk coverage. It is antici-
pated that these successful programs will con-
tinue to expand in the future. The net
expenditures of the Bank are estimated to de-
cline substantially in 1964, largely as a result of
increased receipts from the planned sale of
loans to private investors and from increased
repayments of outstanding loans.
This budget provides $62 million for the
fourth installment on our subscrii^tion to the
International Development Association and for
legislation to authorize a payment of $50 mil-
lion as the U.S. share in 1964 of an increase —
now being negotiated — in the resources of the
Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-
American Development Bank.
Subject to negotiations with other member
countries, the Congress will also h& asked to
authorize participation by the United States in
enlarging the capital of the International De-
velopment Association and the ordinary re-
sources of the Inter-American Development
Bank, in order to continue the important work
of these institutions in providing loans and
technical assistance to developing nations.
In recognition of the gi'owing overseas de-
mand for the services of Peace Corps volunteers,
the number of volunteers to be financed in 1964
is expected to increase from 9,000 to 13,000.
FEBRU.\RY 11, 196.!
227
Most of the new volunteers will be sent to Latin
America and Africa.
Grants of surplus agricultural commodities
under the Food for Peace pi'ogram are dis-
tributed for disaster relief and are also made
available to support economic development
projects. The program provides bread and
milk to millions of school children around the
world and makes possible more adequate diets
for workers on development projects.
Foreign information and exchange activi-
ties.— The 1964 recommendations in this budget
will enable the U.S. Information Agency sig-
nificantly to expand and improve its television
and radio programing, its motion picture ac-
tivities, and its book translation progi-ams in
order to reach larger audiences abroad, particu-
larly among students and other young people.
Increased efforts will be devoted to activities
in Latin America and Africa, where eight new
branch posts and eight reading rooms are
planned for 1964. Further modernization and
expansion of Voice of America radio facilities
in several areas are also planned, and assistance
will be provided for American participation in
the international art exhibit in Sao Paulo,
Brazil, in December 1963.
The Department of State is continuing to
expand and improve its educational and cul-
tural exchange activities under the Mutual Ed-
ucational and Cultural Exchange Act enacted
in 1961. New international exchange agree-
ments are being negotiated to reflect the
broadened activities authorized by the act. Ex-
changes of persons will be increased in 1964,
especially with Latin America and Africa.
Conduct of foreign affairs. — A reduction in
the total expenditures of the Department of
State is estimated in fiscal year 1964, primarily
because of a nonrecurring loan to the United
Nations made in 1963. Within the total, in-
creases are requested to strengthen the Foreign
Service, including provision for acquisition and
construction of necessary oflice and housing
facilities, for which authorizing legislation is
being requested. To heighten the competence
of Americans who will serve abroad as well
as to expand our knowledge in critical areas
of international relations, legislation is being
recommended to authorize the early establish-
'^ Ujoi
ment of a National Academy of Foreign Affairs,
In addition, active consideration is being given
to the report of the Committee on Foreign Af
fairs Personnel which recommends significant
measures to strengthen our overseas services.
Amomits are included in the budget to payli
the costs of U.S. membershii? in the United!
Nations, the Organization of American States,
and other international organizations having'
programs promoting economic development,,
social progress, and political stability. Provi-
sion is also made to meet our share of the cost
of multilateral peace and security operations
carried out by the United Nations.
The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, currently in its first full fiscal year
of operation, will expand its staff and its con-
tract research program in 1964. Emphasis
will continue to be given to tecluiical research
and to the formulation and representation of
U.S. positions at international meetings. To
replace the present limitation of $10 million
on the funds which can be spent by the Agency, 1 1
indefinite authorization is being sought and an |pp
appropriation of $15 million is requested in this
budget for 1964.
m
B
m
m
9
n
30
^
K
Economic Report of the President:
Balance of Payments
Following is the 'port'ion of the Economic Re-
port of the President^ tohich deals with the
international hdlance of payments {pages
xix-xx) .
Price stability has extra importance today
because of our need to eliminate the continuing
deficit in the international balance of payments.
During the past 2 years we have cut the over-all
deficit, from nearly $4 billion in 1960 to about
$2 billion in 1962. But we cannot relax our
efforts to reduce the payments deficit still fur-
ther. One important force working strongly
in our favor is our excellent record of price
^ H. Doc. 28, 88th Cong., 1st sess. ; transmitted on
Jan. 21. The Economic Report of the President, to-
gether with the annual report of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers, is for sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington 25, D.C. ($1.25).
228
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tability. Since 1959, while U.S. wholesale
>rices liave been unchanged, those in every
lajor competing country (except Canada)
lave risen appreciably. Our ability to compete
D foreign markets — and in our own — has ac-
ordingly improved.
We shall continue to reduce the overseas bur-
len of our essential defense and economic assist-
,nce progi'ams, without weakening their effec-
' iveness — both by reducing the foreign exchange
osts of these programs and by urging other
ndustrial nations to assume a fairer share of
he burden of free world defense and develop-
nent assistance.
But the area in which our greatest eifort must
low be concentrated is one in which Govern-
nent can provide only leadership and oppor-
unity; private business must produce the
'esults. Our commercial trade surplus — the
ixcess of our exports of goods and services over
mports — must rise substantially to assure that
ve will reach balance-of-payments equilibrium
■vithin a reasonable period.
Under our new Trade Expansion Act, we are
>repared to make the best bargains for Ameri-
!an business that have been possible in many
?^ears. We intend to use the authority of that
ict to maximum advantage to the end that our
igricultural and industrial products have more
iberal access to other markets — particularly
:hose of the European Economic Community.
With improved Export-Import Bank facili-
ies and the new Foreign Credit Insurance
Association, our exporters now have export
financing comparable to that of our major com-
petitors. As an important part of our program
to increase exports, I have proposed a sharp
step-up in the export expansion program of the
Department of Commerce. Funds have been
recommended both to strengthen our overseas
marketing programs and to increase the Depart-
ment's efforts in the promotion of an expanded
interest in export opportunities among Ameri-
can firms.
In the meantime, we have made and will con-
tinue to make important progress in increasing
the resistance of the international monetaiy
system to speculative attack. The strength
and the stability of the payments system have
been consolidated during the past year through
international cooperation. That cooperation
FEBRUAKT 11, 1963
successfully met rigorous tests in 1962 — when a
major decline occurred in the stock markets of
the world ; when the Canadian dollar withstood
a run in June; and when the establishment of
Soviet bases in Cuba threatened the world.
Through direct cooperation with other coun-
tries, the United States engaged in substantial
operations in the forward markets for other
currencies and held varying amounts of other
currencies in its own reserves ; the Federal Ke-
serve engaged in a wide circle of swap arrange-
ments for obtaining other currencies; and the
Treasury initiated a program of borrowings
denominated in foreign currencies. And with
the appro\al by Congress of the necessai-y ena-
bling legislation, the United States joined other
major countries in strengthening the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund as an effective bulwark
to the payments system.
With responsible and energetic public and
private policies, and continued alertness to any
new dangei-s, we can move now to revitalize our
domestic economy without fear of inflation or
unmanageable international financial prob-
lems— indeed, in the long run, a healthy balance
of payments position depends on a healthy
economy. As the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development has emphatically
stated in recent months, a prosperous American
economy and a sound balance of payments posi-
tion are not alternatives between which we must
choose; rather, expansionary action to bol-
ster our domestic growth — with due vigilance
against inflation — will solidify confidence in
the dollar.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
87th Congress, 2d Session
Visa Procedures of Department of State. Hearings
before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Ad-
ministration of the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee. January 9-May 16, 1962. 571 pp.
Foreign Service Annuities. Hearing before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on S. 1010 and S. 1011.
September 14, 1962. 34 pp.
Factors Affecting the United States Balance of Pay-
ments. Compilation of studies prepared for the
Subcommittee on International Exchange and Pay-
ments of the Joint Economic Committee. 561 pp.
[Joint Committee print.]
229
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Geneva convention relative to protection of civiliai
persons in time of war.
Dated at Geneva AufjTist 12, 1JM9. Entered int(
force October 21, 1950 ; for tlie United States Feb
ruary 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365
respectively.
Ratification deposited: Ireland, September 27, 1962
Accessions deposited: Cyprus, May 23, 1962 (sub
ject to ratification in the way provided for b;
article 169 of the Constitution of the Republic o
Cyprus) ; Federation of Malaya, August 24, 1962
Notification given that it considers itself hound
Mauritania, October 27, 1962.
Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Done at New Yorlj October 26, 1956. Entered into
force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873.
Ratification deposited: Uruguay, January 22, 1963.
Aviation
Convention on the international recognition of rights
in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered
into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847.
Adherence deposited: Niger, December 27, 1962.
Bills of Lading
International convention for unification of certain
rules relating to bills of lading, and protocol of sig-
nature. Dated at Brussels August 25, 1924.
Entered into force June 2, 1931 ; for the United
States December 29, 1937. 51 Stat. 233.
Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Tanganyika, December 3, 1962.
Copyright
Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva Sep-
tember 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16,
1955. TIAS 3.324.
Ratification deposited: Finland, January 16, 1963.
Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention con-
cerning the application of that convention to the
wor]£s of certain international organizations. Done
at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force
September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.
Ratification deposited: Finland, January 16, 1963.
Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention con-
cerning the effective date of instruments of ratifica-
tion or acceptance of or accession to that convention.
Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into
force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324.
Ratification deposited: Finland, January 16, 1963.
Trade
Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade embodying results of the 1960-61 tariff con-
ference. Doae at Geneva July 16, 1962. Entered
into force for the United States December 31, 1962.
TIAS 5253
Signatures: Belgiimi, France, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, and European Economic Community,
December 1.3, 1962 ; Federal Republic of Germany
(subject to ratification), December 21, 1962.
Ratifications deposited: Sweden, December 27, 1962;
Switzerland, December 28, 1962.
War
Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners
of war :
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded and sick in armed forces in the field ;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed
forces at sea :
230
BILATERAL
China
Agreement amending the agricultural commoditie:
agreement of August 31, 1962 (TIAS 5151). Ef
fected by exchange of notes at Taipei January IE
1963. Entered into force January 15, 1963.
Ecuador
Agreement relating to reciprocal nonimmigrant visas
Effected by exchange of notes at Quito Decembe
11, 1962, and January 7, 1963. Entered into fore
January 7, 1963.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 21-27
Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce
of News, Department of State, Washington 25,
D.C.
Releases issued prior to January 21 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 19 of
January 11 ; 27 of January 15 ; and 43 of Janu-
ary 20.
No. Date Subject
41 1/21 Williams : National Conference of
American O.R.T. Federation.
*42 1/21 U.S. participation in international
conferences.
44 1/21 U.S. Ambassadors in Central Amer-
ica and Panama meet in El
Salvador.
45
1/21
Rusk : interview on "Today" pro-
gram.
*46
1/21
Jones: U.S.-Peru relations (ex-
cerpts).
47
1/22
Aviation talks with United Arab
Republic.
48
1/23
Ball : remarks on Jean Monnet.
*49
1/23
Rusk : death of Mohammed All of
Pakistan.
t50
1/23
Foreign policy conference at San
Francisco, February 14.
51
1/24
Joint statement by Secretary Rusk
and Argentine Foreign Minister
Mufiiz. 1
t52
1/25
Williams : UAW "U.N. Appointment"
conference.
t53
1/25
U.S.-Malaya cultural exchange agree-
ment.
ited.
*Not prii
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
f
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BIJTJ,ETI>
february 11, 1963
Ind
ex
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1233
.frica. Developing Africa's Human and Ma-
terial Resources ("Williams) 208
'ifunerican Republics
resident To Meet Chiefs of Central American
Stiites and Panama 213
Jnited States Ambassadors Meet at San
Salvador 213
te World Coffee Agreement and U.S. Foreign
Economic Policy (Blumenthal) 218
irgentina. U.S. and Argentina Reaffirm Tradi-
tional Ties (Mufiiz, Rusk) 211
Uomic Energy
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on NBC's "Today"
Program 202
J.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Views on Nuclear
Test Ban (Kennedy, Khrushchev) .... 198
iviation. Civil Aviation Consultations With
U.A.R. Reopened 223
]hina. Communist. Secretary Rusk Inter-
viewed on NBC's "Today" Program . . . 202
I!ongo (Leopoldville)
Developing Africa's Human and Material Re-
sources (Williams) 208
'resident Kennedy Welcomes End of Katanga
Secession 207
i^ongress
Che Budget of the United States Grovemment for
the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1964 (Ex-
cerpts). 224
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 229
ilconomic Report of the President : Balance of
Payments 228
3uba. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on NBC's
"Today" Program 202
Department and Foreign Service. United
States Ambassadors Meet at San Salvador . 213
Disarmament
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on NBC's "Today"
Program 202
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Views on Nuclear
Test Ban (Kennedy, Khrushchev) .... 198
Economic AfiFairs
The Budget of the United States Government for
the Fiscal Tear Ending June 30, 1964 (Ex-
cerpts) 224
Developing Africa's Human and Material Re-
sources (Williams) 208
Economic Report of the President: Balance of
Payments 228
President To Meet Chiefs of Central American
States and Panama 213
The World Coffee Agreement and U.S. Foreign
Economic Policy (Blumenthal) 218
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Roads to
International Understanding (Norrell) . . 214
Europe
Jean Monnet Honored as "Mr. Europe" (Ball,
Kennedy) 195
The Realities Underlying the Atlantic Alliance
(Kennedy) 197
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on NBC's "Today"
Program 202
Foreign Aid
The Budget of the United States Government
for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1964
(Excerpts) 224
Developing Africa's Hiunan and Material Re-
sources (Williams) 208
President To Meet Chiefs of Central American
States and Panama 213
United States Ambassadors Meet at San
Salvador 213
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Principals
Named for Negotiations on NATO Multilateral
Force (Kennedy) 19'7
Presidential Documents
The Budget of the United States Government for
the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1964 (Ex-
cerpts) 224
Economic Report of the President: Balance of
Payments 228
Jean Monnet Honored as "Mr. Europe" . . . 195
President Kennedy Welcomes End of Katanga
Secession 207
Principals Named for Negotiations on NATO
Multilateral Force 197
The Realities Underlying the Atlantic Alliance . 197
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Views on Nuclear
Test Ban 198
Treaty Information
Civil Aviation Consultations With U.A.R.
Reopened 223
Current Actions 230
U.S.SJI.
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on NBC's "Today"
Program 202
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Views on Nuclear
Test Ban (Kennedy, Khrushchev) .... 198
United Arab Republic. Civil Aviation Consul-
tations With U.A.R. Reopened 223
Name Index
Agronsky, Martin 202
Ball, George W 195
Blumenthal, W. Michael 218
Downs, Hugh 202
Kennedy. President . . . 195, 197, 198, 207, 224, 228
Khrushchev, Nikita S 198
Monnet, Jean 195
Muniz, Carlos Manuel 211
Norrell, Mrs. Catherine D 214
Rusk, Secretary 202,211
Williams, G. Mennen 208
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LY RECORD
^^1^^
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1234 February 18, 1963
SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF
FEBRUARY 1 235
SECRETARY RUSK APPEARS ON "MEET THE
PRESS" 244
THE BASIS OF U.S. POLICY IN AFRICA • by Assistant
Secretary Williams •• 251
ROLE OF THE SPECIAL FUND IN THE U.N. DEVEL-
OPMENT DECADE •Statementby Jonathan B.Bingham . 258
;d states
ign policy
I
For index see inside back cover
_, ;.turi fublic Library
Superintendent ot Uocumenta
MAK 1 1963
DEPOSmORYj
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XL VIII, No. 1234 • Publication 749«
February 18, 1963
Pot sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 26, D.C.
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a Issnea, domestic $8.60, foreign $13.26
Single copy, 26 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 18, 1961).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Dkpaetment
OF State Bullktdi as the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed In the
KesdeiB' Quide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of February 1
?ress release 65 dated February 2
Secretary Rusk: I wish to make a brief state-
ment at the beginning on the criticism we have
received from friends in Canada on account of
the press statement issued on January 30.^
There is a strong tradition of fair play in both
3ur countries, and our friendsliip is too close
for a misunderstanding of this sort. I wish to
say to all Canadians that we regi-et it if any
words of ours have been so plirased as to give
offense, but the need to make some clarifying
statement arose from a situation not of our
making.
It became necessary as the result of state-
ments made in the course of debate in Ottawa
last week. Without notice to us — and we un-
derstand how this can happen in the heat of
debate — there was a disclosure then of confi-
dential exchanges between our two Govern-
ments, and a number of arguments were put
forward by various speakers which appeared to
offer new interpretations of the policies of the
United States.
As a result, a nimiber of questions were raised
with our Government by Canadian and Ameri-
can reporters, by Members of our Congress, and
by ordinary citizens. It became clear that we
should have to give some account of our own
views. This question, after all, is one which
involves the legitimate concerns of both our
peoples. Our common effort for the defense of
North America and our partnership in NATO
necessarily involve us all. Yet we were well
aware of the fact that these issues are politically
very sensitive in Canada, and we did not wish
to engage in discussion at a level which would
seem to imply criticism of any individual or
group from any leading officer of our Govern-
ment. Neither did we believe that a diplo-
matic protest was appropriate. Such a pro-
test indeed might have been called interference
" See p. 243.
in the liglit of the political context in which the
initial disclosure of our talks had occurred.
So we determined on a simple statement of
the facts as we understand tliem. I have al-
ready expressed my regret if our tone was
wrong, but I believe the facts of the position as
we understand them were fairly set out, and
certainly if the statement contains any errors,
we shall be prompt to correct them.
It should be clear to all North Americans
that of course all final decisions about Canada's
role in our common defense are for Canada to
make, and we in the United States know only
too well that decisions about nuclear defense
are particularly testing and painful. We shall
always respect the clear decisions of Canada
and adapt our policies as well as we can to those
decisions, and we shall continue to believe that
in the long run the friendship of our two
peoples, which we value so highly, not only
permits but requires open and clear explana-
tions on great common problems.
Soviet Suspension of Test Ban Talks
I should also like to comment informally on
the suspension of the nuclear test discussions ^
pendmg the return to the Geneva conference in
about 10 days' time.
It is always difficult to understand what is in
the mind of the other side in a discussion of this
sort, and I am sure that there will be consider-
able speculation as to why the Soviet Union
suspended the present discussions. I am in-
clined to believe that if there is a simple and
sufficient answer, we should concentrate on that,
even though there could be other factors in the
situation.
The basic position of the Soviet Union seems
' For a statement of Jan. 31 by William C. Foster,
Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, see p. 236.
FEBRUAKT 18, 1963
235
Suspension of Test Ban Talks
statement iy William C. Foster '
Consequent on the excbange of letters between
President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev
with respect to a nuclear test ban,° private ex-
ploratory talks have been taking place since
January 14 in New Yorlc and Washington among
the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. These talks
were terminated today at the sngsestion of the
Soviet representatives.
The Soviet Union has rji-oposed that the negoti-
ations now be returned to the IS-Nation Di.'^arma-
ment Committee in Geneva. The United States
believes that negotiations on this subject must
be continued and will, therefore, give priority
attention to efforts to achieve a nuclear test ban
treaty when the 18-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee resumes its deliberations ou February 12.
' Released to the press at New York and Wash-
ington on Jan. 31. Mr. Foster is Director of the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
'For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 11, 196.3, p. lOS.
to be that national systems, so-called, are ade-
quate to determine whether snrreptitioiis imder-
grottnd tests are in fact being carried out. Now
from the point of view of the Soviet Union,
thinking about the possibility of imderground
tests in the United States, this may well be so,
because the open nature of our society, the enor-
mous difficulty which we would have in con-
ducting secret undergroimd tests, and the ready
availability of information may give them
confidence that, if there is a test lian treaty,
they would know if we in fact were conducting
tests.
But our situation is different, because we are
concerned about the possibility of secret tests
in a vast area, much of it sparsely jDopulated,
inhabited by a closed society, where the ordi-
nary means of information about what is going
on in the country are simply not available.
Therefore to us the idea of on-site ins])?ction is
not simply a political question involving the
acceptance of on-site inspection in principle but
is the practical problem of establishing ar-
rangements which in fact do pro^-ide assurance
that agreements are being complied with.
From this point of view the two or three
on-site inspections .suggested by the Soviet
Union ^ are not enough. We ourselves do not
have instruments at the present time which
could make those two or three on-site inspections
enough. If the Soviet Union has such instru-
ments— and they may have — but if they have
such instruments, they have not agreed to the
urgent invitations of both the United States
and United Kingdom to come forward with the
technical means which might take the place of
on-site inspections.
So, in summary, we have on the one side a
rejection of tlie practical necessity and utility
of on-site in,spections and on the other side a
fundamental need to have assurance that in
fact such agreements would be carried out.
From this point of view the recent discus-
sions have not in perhaps the most proper sense
been called negotiations. It was our hope and
expectation that the acceptance of the principle
of on-site inspection by the Soviet Union in
December might have opened the way for ne-
gotiations in the genuine sense of that word.
But the general impression is that the Soviet
offer of two or three on-site inspections has
been ou a take-it-or-leave-it basis. So we re-
turn to Geneva to se« whether we can make
any further progress in this field. We hope so.
But at tlie present time we cannot hold out
great expectation that this matter can be re-
solved promptly.
Now, gentlemen, I am ready for your
questions.
Realities of Western Policy Unaffected
Q. Mr. tSccretary, I would like to say, before
ashing questions, that we are glad to see you
in this room, again. We hope as the new year
goes on this may get to he more of a haiit.
I ivomler if you could give us your assessment
of vjhere toe stand, in the split with General de
Gaulle over European policy?
A. Well, I think we are in a period now,
after the breakdown of the discussions in Brus-
sels,'* in which the governments, particularly
those directly involved in those discussions, will
' For an exchange of letters between President
Kennedy and Cliairman Khrushchev, see Buli.etin of f
Feb. 11, 1963, p. 108.
* For a Department statement of Jan. 30, see p. 237.
236
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
> reassessing the situation to see how we can
' .11 get on with the great tasks in front of the
■Vest.
In the most immediate sense the Brussels
alks had to do with the U.K. membership in
he Economic Comnmnity. They do involve
mportant questions of trade, but they were
lot the only framework within which Western
mity is being pursued. NATO has some im-
jortant questions in front of it — such ques-
ions as the multilateral force. The OECD
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] has been moving vigorously for
lie coordination of fiscal and trade policies,
[ts development assistance group has been
vvorking diligently on tlie coordination of
Western aid to underdeveloped countries.
ilr. [Christian A.] Herter has had his first
exploratory trip to Brussels to talk to the Com-
nission of the EEC and to Geneva to talk with
GrATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade] and to Paris to talk with the OECD,
m preparation for the rounds of negotiations
that we see ahead of us in connection with our
own Trade Expansion Act. So there is a mo-
ment of pause on certain aspects of the Western
effort. But the total Western North Atlantic
effort is related to the necessities of the situation
which arise from the pressures against the free
world bemg applied from the Soviet Union.
These discussions that we have been having
in the West do not themselves basically affect
the harsh realities on which Western policy has
been based in this postwar period nor do they
basically affect the promise of the future, and
so, although there will be a period of pause and
reconsideration of alternatives in the weeks
ahead on certain aspects of the effort, the great
lines of policy of the West in Europe and in
North America will go forward.
Q. Mr. Secretary, did the original Canadian
press statement come to the attention of the
President iefore it was made puhlic? There
are two versions; that is why I ash you that
question.
A. The President did not see that statement.
Q. Thanh you, sir.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that the
test ban talhs in New Yorh have heen sus-
Breakdown in Negotiations
for U.K. Membership in EEC
Department Statement *
The United States considers the breakdown
in the negotiations for British membership in
the Euroiiean Eeoaomic Community as most un-
fortunate. We do not believe, however, that the
present difficulties can do more than delay the
movement toward a strong and united Europe
worliinj? in effective partnership with the United
States for the solution of mutual problems.
For our part, we will continue to pursue pol-
icies which derive from the hard realities of the
situation, which have not been changed by recent
events in Brussels. These policies include the
strengthening of NATO, the creation of a multi-
lateral nuclear defense force, and the liberaliza-
tion of trade.
Most Europeans recognize with us that the
defense of the free world is indivisible, that the
Atlantic community is economically interdepend-
ent, and that we and Europe share joint responsi-
bilities in the rest of the world.
* Read to news correspondents on Jan. 30 by
Lincoln White, Director, Office of News.
fended, what is the state of the United States
decision^ to sitspend further undergrovmd nu-
clear tests in Nevada while the test talhs are
going on?
A. It is my understanding that the President
is issuing instructions that the preparations for
that test be resumed.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what would the U.S. re-
gard as a sufficiently fractical arrangement to
contribute effectively to North American de-
fense?
A. Well, I think that my remarks this morn-
ing are sufficient for today. These are matters
which have been discus.sed with the Canadian
Government in private talks, and I would sup-
pose that these private talks would be resumed.
Soviet Military Presence In Cuba
Q. Mr. Secretary, as there was last August
and September, there is some feeling now that
the Government of our country may be umd&r-
° For statement of Jan. 26 by President Kennedy,
see p. 238.
FEBRUARY 18, 1963
237
U.S. Postpones Underground
Nuclear Tests in Nevada
statement by President Kennedy'^
During the present discussions in Washington
and New York on the nuclear test ban treaty
among the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
and the United States," I have asked the Atomic
Energy Commission to postpone underground
shots in Nevada. We are maintaining the capa-
bility and readiness to resume our test program
at any time. We have no intention of again ac-
cepting an indefinite moratorium on testing, and
if it is clear we cannot achieve a workable
agreement we will act accordingly.
' Read to news correspondents on Jan. 26
by Pierre Salinger, White House Press Secretary.
' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 11,
1963, p. 198.
estimating the military strength of Cxiba. You
may have noticed certain comments on the Hill
in that regard. I wonder if you could tell us
what your own estimate of the situation is?
A. The information tltat we have on that has
been made public. I believe the Department of
Defense issued a statement yesterday on cer-
tain aspects of it. There is a significant Soviet
military presence in Cuba which is of great con-
cern to the United States, but I do not believe
that there has been a recent significant buildup
of any major proportions. I think the Depart-
ment of Defense statement took care of that
particular point, but the continued presence of
Soviet military personnel in Cuba is something
which this entire hemispliere must be concerned
about.
Situation in Viet-Nam
Q. Mr. Secretary., a recent report from Viet-
Nam indicates that the U.S. efforts to help the
Vietnamese may not he going along as well as
they should. What is your impression of that
report?
A. I think in a situation such as we have in
Viet-Nam at any one time there are going to
be both pluses and minuses in the situation.
There is no more difficult, disagreeable, and
frustrating type of operation than those that
238
are required to deal with guerrilla action sup-
ported from outside of a country, such as we
find in that country. You may have seen some
comments that Admiral [Hari-y D.] Felt made
after a recent trip there.
There are some definitely encouraging ele-
ments. The ratio of casualties between Govern-
ment and Viet Cong forces, the ratio of arms
captured or lost between the two sides, the
steady extension of the strategic-hamlet pro-
gram, the increasingly effective work of the
montagnards along the border areas — all those
indicate some turning in the situation.
But let me say quite frankly that we have not
been satisfied with the opportunities given to
the press in Viet-Nam for full and candid cov-
erage of the situation there, and we are discus-
sing this matter from time to time and most
urgently with the Government of Viet-Nam.
We can fully understand the difficulties faced
by press representatives there and would like to
see those dealt with as rapidly as possible, be-
cause under those conditions it is not easy to
get a balanced picture of the situation.
We hope that there could be some improve-
ment, not only in the situation in Viet-Nam
but in the availability of information about it
in Viet-Nam to representatives of the press.
Soviet Position on Nuclear Testing
Q. Mr. Secretary^ you mentioned in your
opening statement on nuclear testing that there
could have been other factors in the Soviet de-
cision to hreak off the talks at the present time.
Do you think that perhaps the Soviet Union
might he trying to exploit the split in the West-
ern alliance caused hy General de Gaulle''s
policy?
A. Well, quite frankly, I don't have any
strong views on that particular point, because
that is reading something into the mind of the
other side which cannot be determined spe-
cifically from their course of action.
I would think that 95 percent of the problem
relates to the central issues to which I just re-
ferred. For example, on this question of what
each side needs in nuclear testing, given the dif-
ference in our two positions, the Soviets may
look ujjon on-site inspection as unnecessary to
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN
hem and therefore a unilateral concession to
IS, if you put yourself in their position. I
rould think that the nuclear test ban problem
^ one in which I think both sides would like
o see progress. I do think that the other side
las a real interest — that is, objectively consid-
red, they liave a stake in bringing this type
)f arms race to a halt. But, as is not unusual
n such circumstances, the conditions and terms
ipon whicli agreement can be reached may
ihow a very wide gap. But it seems to me the
simple explanation is sufficient to explain prac-
ically everything that has happened thus far.
Q. Mr. Secretary., do you think the split is
omething the Soviets covld exploit?
A. I don't believe that on underlying secu-
ty matters there is a split which is subject to
ploitation by the Soviet Union.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what would he the effects
1/ a nuclear test ban now, since both the United
States and Soviet Union are fully equipped with
all this stock of atomic weapons and there is
no indication that either France or Red China,
vill abstain from further tests?
A. Well, I think that the purpose of a nu-
clear test ban would be to try to impose some
coiling on a qualitative as well as quantitative
race which otherwise will extend into the future,
with increasingly massive resources contributed
to that race on both sides — the diversion of re-
sources from other great tasks — and that, even
tliough there is a large arsenal on both sides
of the Iron Curtain, there would be some ad-
vantages if this race could be at least stopped
where it is.
Now if such an agreement could be accom-
plished, it would be up to the signatories — if
all countries did not accede, it would be up to
the signatories to decide for themselves what
the result would be for them if anyone else
started testing. That is written into the draft
treaty itself. But we have felt that it was
important to find out whether we and the Brit-
ish and the Soviet Union could take the first
step in agreeing on a test ban and then take up
other questions as we get to them.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been some spec-
ulation, as you know, that Ambassador \_Foy
D.'] Kohler might be bringing bach with him
a Saviet proposal to reopen the Berlin dialog.
Has he done so?
A. He had the usual going-away talk with
Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
A. Gromyko] when he came back for consulta-
tion. They covered a number of points, but
there is nothing that arose in that that calls
for any comment from me today.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on the nuclear test ban,
could you say that these talks the last 3 weeks
have produced no progress, no fonoard move-
nfient?
A. I think the forward movement has been,
if any, minuscule, but that in itself does not
mean that the talks themselves were not worth
having. I think that it did permit the two
sides to give their points of view in consider-
able detail so that although I would report sub-
stantially no progress — and I mean it is very
difficult to find any progress — that doesn't mean
that it wasn't worth having the talks.
Aid to Yugoslavia
Q. Mr. Secretary, the executive department
ha~s always based its requests on Capital Hill for
aid to Yugoslavia and for most-favored-nation
treatment of that nation on the argument that
this would help Yugoslavia maintain its inde-
pendence of Moscow. Now President Tito has
just 7nade a speech saying that this attitude is
a form of flattery which should be alien to them
and the main line of their foreign policy should
emanate from Moscow. In view of his attitude,
is it still intended that the President will ask
the Congress to extend m,ost-favored-nation
treatment to Yugoslavia?
A. Wliat the President wishes on that subject
is the flexibility that he feels the President needs
in dealing with our relations with countries in a
special position such as Yugoslavia or, indeed,
with Poland. We of course have seen — studied
— recent statements by Mr. Tito. Some of those
statements appear to reflect a rapprochement or
easing of relations between Yugoslavia and the
Socialist bloc, as they call it. Other statements
indicate that that type of rapprochement does
not cut across, and is not intended to cut across,
the maintenance of good relations with coun-
FEBRUARY 18, 1963
239
tries in other parts of the world and with differ-
ent political systems.
We welcome these later statements, because
we do believe that the independence of Yugo-
slavia is important, and we should like to have
the authority under our legislation to proceed
as the situation permits.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the nuclear test han will
stop fallout and perhaps prevent greater effi-
ciency in developing destructive capabilities of
H-borribs, but will it in fact stop an arms race
and buildup of delivery vehicles on both sides?
In other loords, will it be meanvngful in dis-
armament, really?
A. Well, from the point of view of the total
arms establishments of the two sides, there is
no question but that a nuclear test ban is only
one step, and more of a preventive step for the
future than a disarmament step for the present.
However, we have felt that if it were possible
to get a nuclear test ban agreement, this miglit
open the way for additional steps in the field of
what might be called disarmament proper, be-
cause, as I have already indicated, one of the
elements in a nuclear test ban would be the es-
tablislunent, for example, of machinery to
provide assurance about what is happening in
connection with the agreement. That would be
a very large step forward and might open the
way for some more significant measures in the
field of actual disarmament — so that it is quite
true that test ban treaties themselves would
not reduce the arms establislmfient of the two
sides.
Ceylon Negotiating Expropriation Compensation
Q. Mr. Secretary, a new amendment to the
foreign aid act required the suspension of aid to
countries that do not take adequate steps to com-
pensate American companies whose property
has been expropriated. The deadline expired
on February 1 in Ceylon. Are you continuing
aid there?
A. The most recent information from Ceylon
is that there are now serious and, I think, prom-
ising negotiations with the companies in process,
and we are therefore temporarily suspending
the action that would be required under legisla-
tion, pending the outcome of these immediate
consultations. You see, our object in a situa-
tion of this sort is not to have on the one side an
expropriation of American investments witliout
the compensation required by international law,
and on the other side not to be required to sus-
pend our aid program. The object is to see that
both are accomplished in a positive fashion.
We do hope that these present negotiations will
quickly disclose whether or not an agreement is
possible.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there seems to be quite a
lot of optimism, among certain circles in Argen-
tina— military circles — that on account of For-
eign Minister {^Carlos Manuel^ Muniz' visit
here, they tvill get substantial American 7nili-
tary aid. Is there any reason for them to be-
lieve that?
A. I would not wish to comment on that be-
cause there were discussions during the Foreign
Minister's meeting here of different types of
aid, but I would think I had better refer you
back to your Argentine sources on that."
Hemisphere Attitude Toward Cuba
Q. Mr. Secretary, Latin American govern-
ments were advised more than a month ago that
a high-level reappraisal of our long-range
Cuban policy was v/nderway and that they
would be advised of its results. Could you tell
us in what stage the reappraisal is?
A. Yes. Those reassessments have been go-
ing on. We have sought the cooperation of
other governments in the hemisphere to find out
what, in fact, is happening in the hemisphere
in relation to the Cuban problem and in con-
nection with such things as the movement of
funds or the movement of agents from Cuba
into other countries of the hemisphere, and also
discussing with them the policy questions of
how we might proceed on that question.
I would say, for example, that on the matter
of free-world shipping to Cuba as a part of the
problem of the economic isolation of Cuba there
has been a substantial change m the situation.
For example, last July there were in the general
ver
V
irf
«
" For text of a joint statement between Secretary
Rusk and Foreign Minister Muiiiz released on Jan. 24,
see Bulletin of Feb. 11, 1963, p. 211.
240
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUUiETIN
rder of 90 free- world sliips in tlie Cuban trade.
think in January there was something less
lian 15, and most or a good many of those
trere on long-term charter from free-world
lag countries to bloc enterprises. So there
re points at which the attitude of the hemi-
phere and the free world toward Cuba has
leen taking a very practical effect.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any indication
rom the electronics industry or others as to
•ohen sufficient equijyment might he available
o make tioo or three on-site inspections
ufficient?
A. No. We ourselves do not have, and do
lot see any early prospect of having, instru-
mentation which would clearly distinguish be-
ween, say, underground nuclear explosions and
!ertain types of earthquakes. It is true that
.ve learned a great deal during the Vela tests
ibout how we might, in fact, detect seismic
events and got some improvement in our ability
to distinguish between earthquakes and under-
ground tests, but we do not see in the immediate
prospect the technical capability of doing this
job without actual on-site inspection.
Again, I repeat that if the Soviet Union
has such a capability — and a country which put
two astronauts within a few miles of each
other in outer space may have such capability
as far as we know— we have not seen the instru-
ments, and we have not seen any technical
demonstration of that capacity.
Q. Mr. Secretary, does the post-Brussels
thinking include any proposal to add political
functions to the existing Western European
union?
A. I have heard that suggestion come from
across the Atlantic, but I don't believe that has
come up for any intergovernmental conversa-
tions at this point. I am not aware of it.
Q. Sir, at the point of adjournment from
Geneva there was some speculation that there
might he more hope retuoming on peripheral
issues, apart from the test han, such as the com-
munication hetween Moscow and Washington.
Do you have any hope that this may turn out
to he the area of advance when you go hack to
Geneva?
A. Our recent discussions have concentrated
on the nuclear test issue and have not gotten
into some of these other questions. But we
would hope that it would be possible to take
hold of one or more of these central and im-
portant issues and not simply get so far off on
the periphery that any agreement there would
be of no real consequence. A nuclear test ban
agreement would be a matter of real
importance.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on the matter of aid to
Ceylon, how long are we willing to wait to find
out whether or not these discussions with the
companies are going to hear fruit?
A. Well, there is no exact time limit in terms
of days, but this is something on which an as-
sessment will be made as we move from day
to day on the negotiations themselves.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you have m.entioned that
the President has issued an order or is about
to issue an order that ^^ preparations^^ for tests
he resumed. Is this an intermediate step from
the status quo ante January 27th [^dth] when
he made this?
A. No, I said it was my understanding that
the President was directing that the prepara-
tions for the test be resumed, and I don't know
that I can or should elaborate that at this point.
Nuclear Testing by Other Countries
Q. Mr. Secretary, pursuing an earlier ques-
tion, can you tell us whether the question of
French and Chinese nuclear testing was dis-
cussed at all with the Russians and, if so, in
what context?
A. I think that in all of these discussions
over the years on this matter the Soviets on
their side said that they would hope and ex-
pect that France would sign such an agreement,
and we ourselves have expressed our own con-
cern that any other country, such as China,
might initiate nuclear testing, so that this has
been a subject that has been a part of the dis-
cussions from the beginning.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there are those in the past
week who have sought to portray the policies
that the French are following in Europe as for-
FEBRUART 18, 1963
241
ward and liberal looking- Would you share
that view?
A. Well, I don't want to embrace adjectives
or the reverse adjectives in a situation of this
sort. I just don't think that I could comment
on that. I think that the attitude of th& other
Europeans on these matters has been fully ex-
pressed, and we will just wait and see what
happens in the next few weeks.
NATO Discussions
Q. In vieio of the recent statements on the
withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from some
NATO countries, I wonder whether you could
possibly tell us how quickly will the phasing
out he accomplished and how soon will the de-
ployment of Polaris submarines take place?
A. This will be accomplished as quickly as
the arrangements can be made. This is a part
of a modernization progi'am that affects a num-
ber of weapons in the NATO system, both con-
ventional and nuclear, but the exact dates on
those have not been clearly set. This is a mat-
ter of consultation among the governments and
will be discussed of course in the NATO
Council.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you have referred to im-
portant questions before NATO. Secretary
[of Defense Robert S.'\ McNamara referred
yesterday to the possibility of changes in
NATO. Are both of you referring only to the
questions of the multilateral force, or are you
also contemplating some political changes with-
in the NATO structure on the partnership
question?
A. Well, these are questions that might be-
come linked in connection with the multilateral
force. One of the problems to be worked out,
of course, with such a force will be the question
of political direction and command — questions
of that sort. But this is something that will
develop in the course of discussions that are go-
ing on in NATO, and on that I could not be
very precise at this point.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on the question of the ex-
pression of regret which you seem to convey
abo^it the tone of the note, or the statement, on
the Canadian nuclear situation, has this been
conveyed to the Canadian Government?
A. It is being conveyed to the Canadian
Government.
1
Q. Mr. Secretary, on the matter of the nu
clear test talks and your comment that you
understand the President is issuing new instruc-
tions on resuming the tests, lohat are the time
factors involved? The first we knew of this
breakoff was last night around 6 o''clock — or
6:30 — whatever it was. Had the United States
Oovemm^nt known for some days that these
talks might end about this time?
A. No. We did not know at the meeting
yesterday that the Soviet Union would wish
to move from the discussions here back to Ge-
neva. It was of course clear in the course of
the talks that no real progress was being made
and that this could happen at any time, but the
actual discussions yesterday were the first clear
indication that they wanted to move these talks
back to Geneva. So that the other question
you mentioned, our own testing, is a matter that
came up overnight.
Q. Mr. Secretary, when the German Bv/ndes-
tag tackles this treaty with the French, what
can they do to make us happy?
A. I would not want to get into it quite in
those terms. We, on the one side, as everyone
has known since 1945, have looked toward the
reconciliation of Germany and France as a
part of the great historical development in this
postwar period in Europe. We feel that this
is in itself important, and important as a part
of the general European and North Atlantic
unity. This is our general view, and how this
is applied to a particular situation I would not
want to specify at this point.
U.S. Watching Situation in Cuba Carefully
Q. Mr. Secretary, back on the subject of
Cuba — the Russians have about 16,000 mili-
tary personnel there, some of them in combat
units, building barracks, and training. Have
you any indications from, the Russians whether
they intend to keep these people there or even-
tually get them out?
A. No clear indication. There had been,
earlier, as the President indicated in his No-
242
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
'tljj
irisl
ember 20 press conference/ that some of these
orces would be leaving in due course, and there
ras no precise time limit on that. But the
( p luilding of barracks indicates that "due course"
itnti 3 perhaps not very fast; so -we are watching
'■ liu, hat situation very carefully.
Ith We do not have a schedule. We have not
l~f lad a schedule given to us or offered to us by
'itatt ^^ other side. We therefore must be con-
tJK( lemed about who stays where.
Q. If they dig hu sir, icould that come under
%€ purview of the President's warning that this
'joovM not he tolerated?
A. I think that is one of the matters that
t ol would have to be very seriously considered. If
it is clear that this substantial military presence
is there and that Cuba is itself going to be used
as a base for further interference in the hemi-
sphere, then of course this can get to be a very
serious question again.
Q. Have we been prodding the Russians try-
ing to get them to move a little faster in getting
these military units out?
A. I think there is no misunderstanding
whatever on their side about what our view of
this is.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Assistant Secretary [for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Phil-
lips^ Talbot ?ms gone to the Indian subcontinent
to try and ease the Indian-Pakistan discussions
and bring them, together on Kashmir. Does
he ha/ve any new formula that the U.S. has in
mind that could help this problem be solved?
A. No, we have not presented a U.S. formula
to the parties in this particular dispute. Sec-
retary Talbot did go out for a combination of
reasons, one of them to take a message from
the President on the opening of Roosevelt
House, the Ambassador's residence in Delhi.
And of course while he is there he has been
talking with senior officials about the immedi-
ate issues in the area, including Kashmir and
the defense problem and other questions, but I
think there is no real development on that.
The Press: Thank you, sir.
' For text of a statement by President Kennedy, see
iJ>id., Bee. 10, 1962, p. 874.
U.S. and Canadian Negotiations
Regarding Nuclear Weapons
Department Statement
Press release 50 dated January 80
The Department has received a number of in-
quiries concerning the disclosure during a re-
cent debate in the Canadian House of Commons
regarding negotiations over the past 2 or 3
months between the United States and Cana-
dian Governments relating to nuclear weapons
for Canadian armed forces.
In 1958 the Canadian Government decided to
adopt the BOMARC-B weapons systems. Ac-
cordingly two BOMARC-B squadrons were de-
ployed to Canada where they would serve the
double purpose of protecting Montreal and
Toronto as well as the U.S. deterrent force.
The BOMARC-B was not designed to carry
any conventional warhead. The matter of
making available a nuclear warhead for it and
for other nuclear-capable weapons systems ac-
quired by Canada has been the subject of incon-
clusive discussions between the two Govern-
ments. The installation of the two BOMARC-
B batteries in Canada without nuclear warheads
was completed in 1962.
In addition to the BOMARC-B, a similar
problem exists with respect to the modern super-
sonic jet interceptor with which the Royal
Canadian Air Force has been provided. With-
out nuclear air defense warheads, they operate
at far less than their full potential effectiveness.
Shortly after the Cuban crisis in October
1962, the Canadian Government proposed con-
fidential discussions concerning circumstances
under which there might be provision of nu-
clear weapons for Canadian armed forces in
Canada and Europe. These discussions have
been exploratory in nature ; the Canadian Gov-
ernment has not as yet proposed any arrange-
ment sufficiently practical to contribute effec-
tively to North American defense.
The discussions between the two Governments
have also involved possible arrangements for
the provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian
NATO forces in Europe, similar to the arrange-
ments which the United States has made with
many of our other NATO allies.
During the debate in the House of Commons
FEBRUARY 18, 1963
243
II
various references were made to recent discus-
sions at Nassau. The agi'eements made at
Nassau have been fully published.^ They raise
no question of the appropriateness of nuclear
weapons for Canadian forces in fulfilling their
NATO or NORAD [North American Air De-
fense Command] obligations.
Eeference was also made in the debate to the
need of NATO for increased conventional
forces. A flexible and balanced defense requires
increased conventional forces, but conventional
forces are not an alternative to effective NATO
or NORAD defense arrangements using
nuclear-capable weapons systems. NORAD is
' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.
designed to defend the North American Conti-
nent agamst air attack. The Soviet bomber
fleet will remain at least throughout this decade
a significant element in the Soviet strike force.
An effective continental defense against this
common threat is necessary.
The provision of nuclear weapons to Cana-
dian forces would not mvolve an expansion of
independent nuclear capability, or an increase
in the "nuclear club." As in the case of other
allies, custody of U.S. nuclear weapons would
remain with the United States. Joint control
fully consistent with national sovereignty can
be worked out to cover the use of such weapons
by Canadian forces.
Secretary Rusk Appears on "Meet the Press"
Following is the transcnpt of an interview
ivith Secretary Rush on the National Broadcast-
ing Com-pany''s radio and television fvogram
'•'■Meet the Press''' on January 27. Memhers of
the panel were Elie Abel, NBC News; Stewart
Hensley, United Press International; James
Reston, New York Times; and Lawrence E.
Spivak, permanent panel member. Ned Broohs
was moderator of the program.
Press release 55 dated January 28
Mr. Broohs : This is Ned Brooks, inviting you
to "Meet the Press." Our guest today on "Meet
the Press" is the Secretary of State, Sir. Dean
Rusk. His book, entitled The Winds of Free-
dom,^ will be published tomorrow.
We will start the questions now with Law-
rence E. Spivak, permanent member of the
"Meet the Press" panel.
B'fr. Spivah: Mr. Secretaiy, there is growing
concern in the United States again about Soviet
nulitary power in Cuba. Can you give the
^ The Winds of Freedom, Selectio^u from the
Speeches and Statements of Secretary of State Deart
Rusk, January 19G1-August 1962, Beacon Press, Bos-
ton, Mass. (.$4.95).
American people any assurance that there are
no nuclear warheads in Cuba today ?
Secretary Rusk : We do not believe that there
are nuclear warheads in Cuba today, but of
course this is the problem of proving the nega-
tive. This is one of the reasons why we were
so anxious to establish detailed on-site inspec-
tion in Cuba, and this we have not been able to
do.
Mr. Spivak: Is it not true that the MIG
fighters — I think you have said that you have
some assurance that there are no missiles in
Cuba.
Secretary Rush : That is correct.
Mr. Spivah: But isn't it true that a MIG can
carry a nuclear warhead and can carry it 700
miles into the United States ?
Secretary Rush: It is true that the MIG
fighter, just as some of our fighters, can in fact
carry nuclear warheads. These fighters have
been coming into Cuba for many months. It
has been our judgment that they have been
consistent with a defensive capability on that
island.
Mr. Spivah: Mr. Secretary, I have heard re-
244
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
lorts that Russian aviators liave been flying
\IIG"s in Cuba in maneuvers. Are any of those
ceports true, as far as you know ?
Secretary Rush: Yes, there have been Rus-
sians flying those MIG's, as well as Russians
training Cubans to fly others.
Soviet Military Presence in Cuba
Mr. Sp/'vak: You have said that we in this
hemisphere could not accept as a normal situa-
tion any Soviet military presence in Cuba.
Now according to reports there are some 15,000
to 17,000 troops — Russian troops and teclmi-
cians — in Cuba. Now, Mr. Khrushchev can re-
move those, although he may not be able to
force Mr. Castro to have on-site inspection.
Wliy hasn't he removed those ?
Secretary Rusk: The Soviet military aid pro-
gram and buildup in Cuba started last July.
That reached a crescendo, of course, with the
missiles and the bombers which were dealt with
in October and early NoA'ember.- There re-
mains a substantial Soviet military presence in
Cuba.
As the President indicated in his November 20
press conference,^ there had been some in-
dication from the Soviet Union that those
forces that were tliere for the servicing and pro-
tection of those missiles would be removed in
due course.
We have seen some outtrafiic of Soviet mili-
tary personnel in recent weeks, but we are very
much interested in the continuation of that out-
traffic.
There are in Cuba at the present time, for ex-
ample, four relatively small Soviet combat
groups, heavily armed, whose presence there is,
I think, a matter of some real concern. But
the underlying factor is that this hemisphere,
including the United States, does not look upon
a Soviet military presence in Cuba as a nomial
condition. It must be our policy, as indicated
at Punta del Este in January * that the penetra-
tion of this hemisphere by a Marxist-Leninist
regime, backed fi'om the outside, is unaccept-
' For background, see Bulletin of Nov. 12, 1962, pp.
715-74.5, and Nov. 19, 1962, p. 762.
' Ibid., Dec. 10, 1962, p. 874.
' For background, see ibid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.
able in the hemisphere so that as a matter of
policy we must, I think, anticipate that these
forces would be removed and that Cuba some-
day will rejoin the hemisphere as a loyal part
of it.
Mr. SpivaJc: Well, Mr. Secretary, I don't
quite understand this thing. Have the Rus-
sians indicated to us in any way at the present
time that they are going to remove those
troops? We were prepared to go to nuclear
war if necessai-y in order to get offensive mis-
siles out. Now what are we doing about the
troops ? Are we just sitting back and allowing
them to take the initiative in getting rid of them
when and if they want to ?
Secretary Rusk : While the missiles were go-
uig out, we said relatively little about the
bombers, as you will recall. Wlien the missiles
got out we gave a lot of attention to the
bombers, and they were removed.
Now this Soviet military installation there- -
the surface-to-air missiles, the antiair missiles —
these combat forces are a matter of concern,
and, as I have indicated, we have had some in-
dication from the Soviet Union that these
forces, at least portions of them, will be re-
moved in due course.
So long as there is a Soviet military presence
in Cuba then this is an abnormal situation
which will have to be a matter of great concern
to the hemisphere and to the United States.
Mr. Spivak: INIr. Secretary, what do you
mean by "due course," and what do they mean
by "due course"? It has been several months
now that those troops have been there and sev-
eral months now since we were prepared to take
the risk of all-out war. Are we doing nothing
at all to take them out ?
Secretary Rusk: The critical stage was
reached when there were in Cuba massive of-
fensive capabilities represented by these mis-
siles and bombei-s. That we have gotten over,
so far as we can tell.
The next stage is to find ways and means of
reducing the continued Soviet presence and the
continued propaganda and other threats to this
hemisphere.
Mr. Spivak : Well, all Mr. Khrushchev has to
do to get them out is to say "get out" to them.
Is there anything else he has to do ?
FEBRUARY 18, 1963
245
Secretary Rusk: Tliat is correct; and when
he said "in due course," we of course are very
much interested in this time factor. The fact
that they have been moving out over the last
several weeks is a matter of some interest to us.
So long as the outtraiEc continues, then that is
a gain, but we are interested in whether that
outtraffic will now continue.
Mr. Brooks: We will be back with "Meet the
Press" and more questions for our guest, Secre-
tary of State Dean Eusk, but first this mes-
sage. {Announcement.) Now, resuming our
interview, our guest today is the Secretary of
State, Mr. Dean Rusk. You have just met
Lawrence E. Spivak, permanent member of the
panel. Our other reporters today are James
Reston of the New York Tiines, Stewart Hens-
ley of United Press International, and Elie
Abel of NBC News. We will continue the
questions now with Mr. Reston.
The "Grand Design" for an Atlantic Community
Mr. Reston: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to turn
to this important meeting in Brussels tomorrow
of the Common Market countries on British
entry into the Common Market. Will there be
a communication from the President or fi-om
this Government to Chancellor Adenauer be-
fore that meeting in answer to his last letter to
the President?
Secretary Rusk: I would think there would
not be. There has been very close consultation
between us and all governments in Europe di-
rectly affected by this meeting, but I would not
anticipate an actual letter from the President
to Chancellor Adenauer.
Mr. Reston: You will remember some time
ago there was considerable criticism by the
Democratic Party of the Republicans when Mr.
Dulles was in the State Department at the time
that the EDC collapsed — the European Defense
Community — and the charge at that time was
that we were not prepared with an alternate
policy. Now do we have an alternate policy if
Britain is denied entry into the Common
Market?
Secretary Rusk: Well, Mr. Reston, there is
a very important meeting tomorrow in Brussels,
as you indicated. I don't want either to pre-
judice or prejudge that meeting. The imme-
246
diate question before the Six ' is whether and
how to proceed with discussions with the United
Kingdom on entry into the Common Market.
Now obviously this is not just a question of
the entry of the United Kingdom. It does
affect the "grand design" of what kind of
Europe we are to have in the years ahead —
what kind of an Atlantic commimity — and so
I think it is worth our identifying the central
elements in that design. The first has been an
increasingly cohesive and unified Europe. The
second element has been increasingly intimate
relationsliips between that Europe and North
America. And the third has been a strengthen-
ing and improvement of relations between these
great coiuitries of the North Atlantic and
countries in other parts of the world, who have
been multiplying by the dozens in recent years.
Now this grand design came about by the
recognition on both sides of the Atlantic, after
World War II, that the underlying facts of
our situation required cohesion in Europe,
intimacy across the Atlantic, strength of tlus
great Atlantic community, and leadership
throughout the I'est of the world. This worked
its way through the Marshall Plan, through
NATO, the adliesion of Turkey and Greece to
NATO, the admission of Germany to NATO.
I think the strength of this great movement is
reflected in the fact that, when the European
Defense Commimity was rejected by the French
Parliament in 1954, immediately the coimtries
of this great community, at that time under the
initiative of Great Britain, moved at once to
bring Germany into NATO and to build the
great strength of NATO which exists at the
present time.
Tliis grand design is compelled by the
necessities of our situation, as well as by the
promise of the future, and I do not believe that
these present discussions — discussions which are
made possible by the strength of NATO, to
which the United States has made such a mas-
sive contribution — I do not believe that these
present discussions will set that grand design
off track.
Mr. Reston: When you ran into the kind of
' The six members of tie European Common Market
are Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN I
rouble, tliough, we got with President de
iaulle about the grand design — challenging
he whole thing — was there any communication
ictween this government and De Gaulle after
he press conference ?
Secretary Rusk: There have been dis-
jussions, but this is a matter in which there has
lot been direct, personal discussion with
President de Gaulle on the part of our
President. But we do keep in touch.
Basis of American Presence in Europe
Mr. Hensley: Mr. Secretary, of course your
■'grand design" has run into Mr. de Gaulle's
'grand design," and dealing with him has been
described by some people as trying to tip over
(|a statue that is bolted to the ground.
In view of the fact that his policy seems to
any to be based on diminishing or eliminating
the U.S. presence on the Continent, keeping
(Britain from having any sort of a role in the
new European unity, is it possible that he
might, in the creation or seeking to create his
third force, turn to Moscow and make the sort
of a pact he made with them just after the war,
which he acknowledged was made to give him
a lever against Germany?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think it is pre-
mature to try to judge in great detail exactly
what his ideas about the future might be. We
did get a good deal of information from his
press conference about some of those ideas. But
I think that the rest of Europe has some ideas
on these subjects and indeed a great many
people in France itself.
You see, the American presence in Europe
was a return to Europe after World War II.
We had no allies after World War II except
those that were formed to light Germany and
Japan. After a peace treaty with Germany, it
was expected that we would come home.
Now several things happened. Stalin turned
to pressures against Western Europe. He dis-
regarded the peace treaties that had been made
affecting the coimtries of Eastern Europe — the
seizure of Czechoslovakia, the guerrilla action
against Greece, the Berlin blockade. And all of
these things required the West to give new at-
tention to the defense requirements of the West.
This is why the Marshall Plan and NATO came
into existence.
Now the American presence there has been
based upon some very elementaiy notions. The
one is that the United States cannot be secure
unless Western Europe is secure. The other is
that the defense of Western Europe requires
the participation of the United States — that the
defense of these two great areas, given the situa-
tion on the other side of the Iron Curtain, is in
fact indivisible. Now these are the hard facts
of the present-day situation, and I don't see how
we can get around them in the present
discussion.
Mr. Hensley: Another harsh fact, of course,
is Chancellor Adenauer's position, and I am
wondermg whether you are satisfied that he has
done all he could or should to influence
De Gaulle, particularly on the Common Market
question.
Secretary Rusk : Chancellor Adenauer, one of
the greatest of Europeans, has been working
for years in two directions which have been
welcomed in the United States and for which
he has had our full support. The one has been
working toward a unified Europe and the other
toward reconciliation between Germany and
France. Both of these would be great historic
developments. After all, we ourselves have
been in two world wars which started in fights
within Western Europe, and if, after several
centuries, we can say that will no longer happen,
this is a very great thing for us. So we hope
very much that Chancellor Adenauer will not
be faced with a situation in which he will have
to choose between his own two great objectives :
the unity of Europe and reconciliation with
France.
Modernization Program Througliout NATO
Mr. Abel: Mr. Secretary, both the Turkish
and Italian Governments have announced in
the past few days that our obsolete Jupiter mis-
siles are being removed from their territories
and won't be replaced on their territories. In-
stead we will send Polaris submarines into the
Mediterranean. Doesn't this give Khrushchev
what he was asking for at the time of the Cuban
crisis ?
Secretary Rusk: No, because this is a part of
the modernization program throughout NATO,
FEBRUAHY 18, 1963
247
including the weapons system of the United
States. We have been at that for some time.
We have discussed this problem in NATO long
before the Cuban crisis and with the govern-
ments concerned. This affects Polaris, it affects
the missiles in Britain wliich are being phased
out, it affects the availability of the Polaris
submarine. It has to do with improvements in
short-range missiles, in aircraft, in conventional
weapons. It is a part of the necessary modern-
ization program of the entire Western
armament.
Mr. Abel: How soon does this switch begin?
I am wondering, because it seems to me there is
a psychological effect in having amiounced that
these Jupiter missiles are obsolete.
Secretary Rush: I think they wUl occur in
phase with the arrival of the Polaris submarines
on station.
Mr. Brooks: Time is running short. If you
will keep your questions short, I am sure the
Secretary will do likewise with his answers.
Mr. Abel: May I go ahead?
Mr. Brooks: Yes.
No Alternative to Main Lines of Western Policy
Mr. Abel: Mr. Secretary, you seemed to put
off for the moment any reappraisal. I am not
asking you to agonize, but even any reappraisal
of American policy as a result of this De
Gaulle stand. Is this because you believe Mr.
de Gaulle can be brought aroimd to a more co-
operative attitude; or is there some other
motivation ?
Secretary Rusk: No, I think when we try to
think about alternatives to the grand design of
the West as it has evolved since World War II,
we can only ask the question : Wliat is happen-
ing on the other side of the Iron Curtain ? What
is the problem over there ?
If some day the Soviet Union — and we see no
present signs of it — should turn its energies to
the unfinished tasks of its own people, if we
could make some real headway in disarmament
which we hope can be possible, then it is con-
ceivable that alternatives would become open to
us. But so long as we have the present factual
situation and the confrontation of power in the
world, and the purposes of the Soviet Union, I
don't see any alternative to the main lines of
Western policy in these past few years.
Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, in fact can the
Atlantic alliance flourish without greater co-
operation from General de Gaulle?
Secretary Rusk: Just as we have never our-
selves wanted to dominate Europe, because we
did not want to and the Europeans did not
want us to, I am quite sure that Europe does
not wish to be dominated by any particular
comitry. So that it seems to me that this great
Western community has been moving on, de-
spite the fact that at one time or another one
country or another has had different views on
a particular aspect of it. I think this move-
ment is required by the historical situation;
it is supported by the wishes of the peoples
concerned throughout both continents, and
therefore I think we can expect the general
movement to continue.
Mr. Spivak : Mr. Secretary, do you mind an-
swering my question ? Do you think the Atlantic
alliance can flourish without greater coopera-
tion from General de Gaulle?
Secretary Rusk: If you are talking about the
alliance in militaiy terms, let me say —
Mr. Spivak: You know what I am talking
about, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rusk: I don't believe the alliance
has been stronger or more imified on the ele-
mentary problems of security than it has been
in these past several months, this past year, or
today. Now there is no question about the at-
titude of the alliance if confronted with a chal-
lenge from the Soviet Union, and so I would
not be, today, too much concerned on that point.
Mr. Spivak: But can it flourish without his
full cooperation? Greater cooperation than he
is now giving us ?
Secretary Ru.'ik: On these elementary secu-
rity commitments there is no question about
Pi-esident de Gaulle's stand.
Mr. Reston: What were you implying in your
remarks about the Soviet Union in answer to
Elie Abel's question?
Secretary Rusk: What I was saying there
was that unless tliere is a major change — and we
do not see such a major change in the making
in the foreseeable future — I do not see any
major alternative to the lines of policy pursued
by tlie West in building up the unity of
248
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Europe, the intimacy of the North Atlantic, and
the strength of the NATO alliance.
Mr. Reston: Are we not in a difficult position
on this whole argiunent with Europe in the
sense that we are constantly asking them to do
things to unify and give up sovereignty that we
are not prepared to do ourselves?
Secretary Rusk: I don't think so, because
after all these are ideas developed primarily
in Europe. This is a European notion, a Euro-
pean consciousness, a European requirement
and necessity, if you like.
We are not driving and pressing Europe to
do something which we think Europe doesn't
want to do; but what we are prepared to do,
as President Kennedy indicated in his July 4
speech," is to join with a unified Europe for —
in a great Atlantic community, with its own
relations strong across the Atlantic, outward-
looking to the rest of the world, as a great
citadel of freedom throughout the world.
Emergency Military Aid to India
Mr. IlensJey: Mr. Secretary, turning to an-
other area, the United States rushed some emer-
gency military aid to India after the Eed
Chinese attacks. I am wondering if you could
tell us how deep and how expensive is our emer-
gency commitment and how much have you
made in the way of a long-range commitment to
Nehru?
Secretary Rusk: The emergency commitment
is relatively modest in terms of major defense
budgets — I think in the general nature of per-
haps $60 million on our side, matched by an
equal amount from others. This is primarily
for infanti"y equipment, for mountain warfare.
Other aid is a matter of future discussion and
study. It has been announced that we are send-
ing out a team with the United Kingdom, Can-
ada, and Australia to look at the air defense
situation in India.' Of course this will depend
somewhat on the further development of the
situation.
Mr. Hensley : What about these reports that
Nehru has asked for possible intervention of
the U.S. Air Force if he gets into real trouble ?
At the same time in Moscow his representatives
say that the Eussian MIG's will be coming
through any day, the aircraft factory started,
aiul so fortli. I would think you M-ould want
to take a pretty deep look at this situation
before you got too involved in a long-range
commitment.
Secretary Rusk: I think a deep look is the
purpose of the visit of these four countries'
delegations on this air defense mission that is
now on the way out there.
Mr. Abel: If China should be able to explode
a crude nuclear device in a cou23le of years —
of course it would be many years before she
had a sophisticated delivery system — but the
mere possession or explosion of this would
have a powerful force of nuclear blackmail in
Southeast Asia, wouldn't it, Mr. Secretary?
How could we meet that ?
Secretary Rusk: I thinlv the psychological
and political effect of the achievement of a nu-
clear weapon by Red China would be very se-
vere. It would not for many, many years
affect the general strategic balance in the world,
but there is no question that this would have a
serious and negative effect. This is one of the
reasons why we are very much interested in
such a thing as a nuclear test ban, for example,
or agreement which might serve to limit the
transfer of weapons from one nation to
another.
This is a serious problem — the possible devel-
opment of a nuclear power on mainland China.
Policing of Ban on Nuclear Tests
Mr. Aiel: On the test ban, sir, since you
mentioned it, the Russians in the past day or
two have been telling their own people they
have made about all the concessions they are
going to make — meaning two or three inspec-
" Bulletin of July 23, 1962, p. 131.
' On Jan. 23 Lincoln White, Director of the OfiBce of
News, read the following statement to news corre-
spondents :
"A joint Commonwealth/United States Air Defense
Mission is leaving London for India on January 29 at
the invitation of the Indian Government to examine
with the Indian Air Force the problems and techni-
cal requirements involved in organizing an effective
air defense against the possibility of any further
Chinese aggression. The team will be led by Air Com-
modore C. J. Mount, RAF ; Brig. Gen. James B. Tip-
ton, USAF; and Group Capt. G. B. Murray, RCAF.
Australia will also be represented on the mission."
FEBRUARY 18, 1963
674251—63 3
249
■
tions a year. In view of this attitude after just
2 weeks of talk, liave you any hope at all of
reachin<^ the kind of agreement that our Con-
gress would ratify?
Secretary Ritsk: I think the main lines of the
discussion have already been laid out in the
publication of the exchange of letters between
the President and Mr. Khrushchev.^ The
number of on-site inspections is an important
matter. It is not on our side just a question
of a political gesture. We need an effective
operational means for determining whether in
fact agreements are being lived up to, par-
ticularly in that vast closed area in the heart
of the Eurasian landmass. We do think that
this exchange of letters opened the way for
some serious negotiations — serious discussion —
because on-site inspections were accepted in
principle. Those discussions are now going on
and will continue next week. We hope they
can come to a conclusion, but I want to point
out that on our side we must have effective ar-
rangements. Two or three on-site inspections
are not enough. And a great many other things
would have to be done to be sui"e that we know
where we are in the policing of a test ban.
Mr. Abel: Quite a few people in Congress,
sir, seem to be not at all persuaded that even 8
or 10 inspections are enough, and there is some
gnimbling about the President's decision to sus-
pend these tests underground in Nevada.^
Is there a time limit attached to that susjien-
sion, or do we hold off indefinitely ?
Secretary Rusk : This is a temporary suspen-
sion of a particular t«st during these talks.
After all, the tests were delayed for quite a
period through an electricians' strike, and we
thought if a little further delay would make
it possible to find out whether it is possible
to get a test ban that this would be worth while.
Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, we have been
tricked and cheated and lied to by the Russians
before on several occasions — on testing, for ex-
ample, and in Cuba. Supposing we did get
inspection, what would that mean? Couldn't
they trick us once again ?
' For texts, see Bulletin of Feb. 11, 1963, p. 198.
' See p. 238.
Secretary Rusk: Well, this is a matter for the
tecluiicians and the military experts to deter-
mine as to what is required. We have had con-
siderable improvement in our means of
detection in the last 2 years, for example, in
connection with our Vela tests. The Soviets
claim that they have instriunents which are
fully effective in scrutinizing tests. If they
have them, we don't have them —
Mr. B looks: IMr. Secretary, I am going to
have to interrupt at this point. I see that our
time is up. Thank you very much. Secretary
Rusk, for being with us.
Assistant Secretary Williams
Makes 3-Week Trip to Africa
The Department of State announced on Jan-
uai-y 29 (press release 57) that G. Mennen Wil-
liams, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
would depart Washington Febiiiary 1 on a 3-
week trip to Algeria, Nigeria, the Republic of
Congo (I^opoldville), Southern Rhodesia,
Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and the United
Arab Republic. He will be accompanied by
Mrs. Williams and will return to Wasliington
on February 23.
This will be Mr. Williams' first visit to Al-
geria. There and in each of the other countries
on his intinerary he will discuss aspects of
U.S. African policy with government and polit-
ical leaders. He will consult with members of
U.S. embassies and consulates and hopes to
meet with American busmessmen and other
U.S. citizens living in the countries he will
visit.
U.S. and Yemen Raise Diplomatic
Missions to Embassy Status
Press release 64 dated February 1
Tlie United States Government and the Gov-
ernment of the Yemen Arab Republic agreed on
February 1, 1963, to raise the level of their
diplomatic missions in Taiz and Wa,shington,
respectively, from legation to embassy.
250
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The Basis of U.S. Policy in Africa
hy G. Men-nen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs '
The UAW disagrees with Karl Marx on
many things. Marx saw the worker and society
as the machinery for production. The UAW
sees the worker as a whole man. This I know
from many years of experience and close con-
tact with the labor movement in Michigan.
For years now, communities throughout the
country gratefully have taken for gi'anted
labor's participation in local charitable and
civic activity. Your participation in the body
politic is equally recognizetl and valued. At
Lansing, our State capital, I enjoyed meeting
each year with the UAW local leadership to
discuss State problems of every kind.
Today we meet not at a State capital to
discuss domestic problems — jobs, schools, roads,
hospitals — ^but we meet at the U.N.'s world
capital to consider foreign affairs. A skeptic
might ask what the man in the shop and this
meeting have in common — isn't this a long way
from grievances and collective bargaining?
You in the labor movement, I know, yield
to no one in your concern for workers' con-
ditions and pay. But you also are concerned
about the whole man and the concepts of free-
dom, dignity, security for the United States,
and peace for your children and grandchildren.
When Khrushchev said "we will bury you"
and "your children will be Communist," no one
knew what he was taUving about better than
the union men and women of America. You
have direct experience with vain Communist
attempts to penetrate and subvert the free
^ Address made before the Uaited Automobile, Air-
craft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
"U.N. Appointment" conference at New York, N.Y., on
Jan. 25 (press release 52).
union movement in America. In my work I also
see Communist efforts at penetration and see
them fail. I am sure it is not strange, then,
that you and I should be talking together about
foreign affairs.
In no small measure foreign affairs are con-
cerned with the determination of the American
people to maintain and strengthen their free
way of life and to protect it by encouraging
others to enjoy a similar kind of free life.
Wliat's more, foreign affairs are not too far
from what you as unionists and I as Governor
of a State in the heartland of America knew
and grew up with.
As I go about Africa, my understanding of
the aspirations of people for jobs, education,
and decent health institutions, for roads and
for all of the thmgs that we include in a better
life serves me well. These matters are the
breath of life and everyday concern of the
leaders of the newly emerging nations of
Africa — not a few of whom have been union
leaders like yourselves, incidentally. In a word,
we are on the same wavelength, talking about
the concerns of people, which, of course, are
pretty much the same the world over. Thus
all of the things you and I have talked about
in various parts of the country are quite
apropos of foreign affairs. Obviously our do-
mestic concerns do not include every situation
encountered in foreign affairs, but they do open
a doorway to understanding many foreign
policy problems.
There are two related ideas that form the
basis of much of U.S. foreign policy. We our-
selves want freedom and a better life. At the
same time we want to help other people enjoy
FEBRUART 18, 1963
251
these things, because we believe that by helping
them we help protect freedom and a better life
for ourselves and our children.
The first point is that the basis for and key
to our foreign policy is the well-being of our
citizens and the security of the United States.
We are determined to maintain our free way of
life, and we shape our policies to effectuate that
end. This is not to say that our sole reliance
is on military strength, because that is not the
case. Military strength is important; but
building a free world through helping other
people meet their desires for freedom and a
better life is also important, and it protects our
own freedom and our own search for a better
life.
Insuring Free Choice for African Peoples
The second point I want to make is that our
policy in Africa is based on our desire to help
develop and insure true freedom and independ-
ence in the countries of Africa and to help the
peoples of Africa satisfy their legitimate aspira-
tions. As the President has said in many ways,
what we want for Africa is what the Africans
want for themselves. We can say tliis une-
quivocally because we have faith that whenever
people have free choice of alternative courses
they will choose the path of freedom.
Given free choice, African nations and the
United States will work toward the same basic
objectives. This means that our free society
will become more and more impermeable to
Communist penetration, because communism
demands subservience not only to its ideology
but to the dominance of Moscow or Peiping.
These two aspects of foreign policy are basic
to the maintenance of the security of the United
States. They underscore our belief that in
Africa and elsewhere the promotion of freedom
and true independence reinforces our own free-
dom and security. These two fundamentals ap-
pear in almost every facet of our foreign
policy.
In our African policy, they can be sum-
marized in these three points:
1. The United States stands for self-de-
termination in Africa.
2. American policy stands for recognition of
the dignity of Africa's peoples and nations.
3. United States policy in Africa stands for
sympathetic understanding of, and an effort to
help fulfill, the desire of the African peoples for
a better life — economically, politically, and
socially.
The United States, both in the United Na-
tions and in its actions in Africa, has backed
up its policy to promote self-determination in
Africa in many ways. Eather than developing
what I hope is for all of us a self-evident fact,
I will merely quote the following statement by
President Kennedy,^ which our policy has
sought to reinforce in every way possible:
. . . our basic goal remains the same : a peaceful
world community of free and independent states, free
to choose their own future and their own system so
long as it does not threaten the freedom of others.
In addition to political freedom, Africans,
like all other people around the world, want
equality of treatment and recognition of their
national and individual dignity. This is a
major concern in a world in which Africans feel
color bars are being removed too slowly. The
elimination of discrimination is a particularly
urgent task for all of us here in America, as
you are well aware.
Africans also are anxious to improve their
standards of living. Africa has been blessed
with many important resources, but its people
are not yet enjoying the full benefits of this
bounty. For example, annual per capita in-
come in tropical Africa is only $89, and it is
only $132 for Africa as a whole. Wlien you
consider that the UAW annual improvement
factor is $125 or more, I think you can ap-
preciate why Africans are concerned with liv-
ing standards and you can understand why
they want to move rapidly against their
ancient enemies — poverty, ignorance, illness,
and malnutrition.
The politics of Africa, like the politics of
every country, is based on the satisfaction of
the aspirations of the people. In Africa the
reality of this axiom is starkly apparent.
With the tremendous needs of the people of
Africa and their lack of ti'ained human re-
sources, the gap between aspirations and ful-
• Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
252
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTTLLETIN
tillnient is great, the perils of frustration are
always present, and the race between
satisfaction and revolution or chaos is a keen
one.
Foreign Aid
Foreign aid is a vital part of this race to
satisfy human needs. It is also a powerful
forc« for stability because, without at least the
partial satisfaction of needs and the expectation
of future satisfactions, eruption of discord and
upheaval is all too possible. Ajid we all know
how discord and upheaval create opportunities
for Communist intervention which can be
thwarted only at gi-eat cost. We have already
seen enough Communist activity throughout
the world to know that if we wish to avoid
laying Africa open to subversion and infiltra-
tion by communism, we must help meet legiti-
mate African aspirations in a forthright man-
ner. If we do not, communism in Africa could
be a serious threat to peace and security.
One way to head off such a challenge to
American security is to see that our aid pro-
gi-ams in Africa and elsewhere serve not only
as outlets for American generosity and our in-
stinctive desire to help other people help them-
selves but also as a hardheaded method of
assuring the freedom and future security of
the United States.
You in the UAW understand the scope of the
challenge before us better than most groups
in America. Walter Reuther has spoken of
how "those of us who believe in this kind of
commitment must work with more dedication
and more determination for the purpose of
getting into motion the total dedicated effort
reciuired to win the struggle for peace."
Certainly, in Africa such a dedicated effort
is needed, and we in Washington are counting
on the continued efforts of the UAW for as-
sistance in the sti^ggle. You have been in the
vanguard of support for all the positive in-
ternational actions this Government has taken
in recent years, and we are grateful for that
support.
But the next few years are particularly im-
portant in Africa. We must be alert to the
many challenges they will offer. Our real task
in Africa is to develop ways to respond to the
newly emerging countries of that continent in
a sjiirit of true friendship and brotherhood, in
a spirit of mutual interest and mutual effort —
out of which come mutual benefits. This spirit
of partnership is familiar to each member of
UAW, and I am glad we can count on your
helj) as we carry out our African responsibil'
ities in the future.
U.S. Congratulates Nyasaland
on Achieving Seif-Government
Following are the texts of messages from
Chester Bowles, the Presidenfs S-pecial Repre-
sentative and Adviser on African, Asian, and
Latin American Affairs, and Assistant Secre-
tary G. Mennen Williams to Hastings Kaniuzu
Banda, Leader of the Majority Party, Minister
of Natural Resources and Services, and Minister
of Local Government, on the occasion of the
achievement of self-govemm,ent hy the British
Protectorate of Nyasaland on February 1.
Mr. Bowles to Dr. Banda
Press release 62 dated January 31
January 30, 1963
Dear Dr. Banda : I want to express not only
the best wishes of my Government but also
my deep personal pleasure at Nyasaland's at-
tainment of self-government.
I recall with great satisfaction my visit to
your nation and my rewarding talks with you
last autumn. You have our warm support for
your efforts on behalf of the welfare of the
Malawi people.
Warmest regards,
Chester Bowles
Assistant Secretary Williams to Dr. Banda
Press release 63 dated January 31
January 30, 1963
Dear Dr. Banda : Your achievement of self-
government for Nyasaland arouses the admira-
tion of all who wish Africa well. Please accept
our heartiest congratulations.
G. Mennen Williams
FEBRUARY 18, 1963
25S
Foreign Policy Conference
To Be Held at San Francisco
Press release 50 dated January 23
The World Affairs Council of Northern Cali-
fornia in cooperation with the Department of
State is planning a foreign policy background
conference at San Francisco on February 14.
Eepresentatives of the press, radio, and tele-
vision, and nongovernmental organizations
concerned with foreign policy from northern
California are being invited to attend.
David E. Bell, Administrator, Agency for In-
ternational Development, will give an on-the-
record luncheon address. In addition to Mr.
Bell, Department of State officials participating
in the conference will include : Kobert J. Man-
ning, Assistant Secretai-y for Public Affaii-s;
"William H. Brubeck, Special Assistant to the
Secretary and Executive Secretary of the De-
partment; J. Kobert Schaetzel, Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs; Mrs. Katie
Louchheim, Deputy Assistant Secret aiy for
Public Affairs; Herbert. K. May, Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs;
J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for African Affairs ; and James P. Grant,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affaire.
Foreign Representatives' Tax Returns
Available to Senate Committee
AN EXECUTIVE ORDER'
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section
55 ( a ) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended
(53 Stat. 29, 54 Stat. 1008; 26 U.S.C. (1952 Ed.)
55(a) ), and by section 6103(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (68A Stat. 753; 26 U.S.C. 6103(a) ), it is
hereby ordered that any income, excess-profits, estate,
or gift tax return for the years 1950 to 1962, inclusive,
shall, during the period ending on June 30, 1963, be
open to inspection by the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof,
in connection with its study, pursuant to Senate Resolu-
tion 362, 87th Congress, agreed to July 12, 1962, of all
nondiplomatie activities of representatives of foreign
governments, and their contractors and agents, in
promoting the interests of those governments, and the
extent to which such representatives attempt to
influence the policies of the United States and affect
the national interest. Such inspection shall be in
accordance and upon compliance with the rules and
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the
Treasury in Treasury Decisions 0132 and 6133, relating
to the inspection of returns by committees of the
Congress, approved by the President on May 3, 1955.
This order shall be effective upon its filing for
publication in the Fedebal Register.
/(LJ L^
The White House,
January 29, 1963
President Calls for Public Support
of Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign
Following is the text of a letter from. Presi-
dent Kennedy to Jcrnies G. Patton, president of
the American Freedom from Hunger Founda-
tion, together with the text of a proclanuition
designating the weeh of March 17-23 as Na-
tional Freedom From Hunger Week.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO MR. PATTON
White House press release dated January 23
January 22, 1963
Dear Jim : I am gratified at the efforts you
and other distmguished citizens who serve as
trustees of the American Freedom from Hunger
Foimdation have made to provide leadership
for American citizens to participate in the
worldwide Freedom from Hunger Campaign of
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations.
United States participation in the Interna-
tional Freedom from Hunger Campaign ^ will
be highlighted by two related events in 1963.
National Freedom from Hunger Week will be
observed March 17-23 and the United States
will be host to the World Food Congress in
Washington, D.C., June 4-18. By Act of Con-
gress in Public Law 87-841, the United States
was authorized to invite the World Food Con-
' No. 11080 ; 28 Fed. Reg. 903.
^ For background, see Buixetin of Jan. 18, 1960, p.
94 ; July 18, 1960, p. 117 ; Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1020 ; Jan. 22,
1962, p. 150; Oct. 8, 1962, p. 534; and Nov. 12, 1962,
p. 752.
254
DEPARTMENT 01" STATE BULLETIN
aress of the FAO to meet in this country, and
the invitation was issued by the Secretary of
11 Agriculture in November of last year.
In order to carry out its responsibilities as
host nation to the World Food Congress, our
Government will need the active support and
participation of private citizens, business and
voluntary grouj^s and government agencies.
The meeting is expected to be attended by dele-
gates from over a hundred nations and marks
the half way point in the FAO's International
Freedom from Hunger Campaign.
To coordinate government participation in
this work and to furnish cooperation with the
citizens' host committee, I am establishing an
interdepartmental committee, under the chair-
manship of Secretary of Agi'iculture Orville
L. Freeman.
I look to the American Freedom from Hun-
ger Foundation to provide active citizen leader-
ship and, to that end, I ask that the trustees of
the Foundation serve as a National Citizens'
Host Committee for the World Food Congress.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy
Mr. James G. Patton, President
American Freedom from Hunger Foundation
700 Jackson Place, NW
Washington, D.G.
PROCLAMATION 3514'
National Freedom from Hunger Week
Wheeeas the United States, as a member of the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
tions, is participating with nearly one hundred other
countries of the world in the FAO international
Freedom-from-Hunger Campaign ; and
Whereas the American Freedom from Hunger
Foundation has been established to provide citizen
leadership for the campaign in the United States ; and
Whereas the Congress of the United States, by Pub-
lic Law 87-841, approved October 18, 1962, has author-
ized this Nation, in furtherance of the international
Freedom-from-Hunger Campaign, to be host to the
World Food Congress from June 4 to 18, 1963 ; and
Whereas the farmers of this Nation have produced
an abundance of food for our own people and for shar-
ing with others ; and
Whereas the people of the United States, in sharing
our national abundance through their generous support
of overseas assistance programs of religious organiza-
tions, voluntary agencies, and i)rivate groups and foun-
dations, and through Pood For Peace and other gov-
ernmental programs, have demonstrated their concern
with the prol)Iem of hunger and malnutrition through-
out the world ; and
Whereas there is a need for a rededication of men's
minds and hearts to the inspiring possibilities of work-
ing together to free the world from hunger :
Now, therefore, I, John F. Kennedy, President of
the United States of America, do hereby designate the
week of March 17 through March 23, 1963, as National
Freedom from Hunger Week.
I ask the American Freedom from Hunger Founda-
tion to take national leadership in planning appropri-
ate observance of this week ; and I urge American citi-
zens in all walks of life to participate in the observance
of National Freedom from Hunger Week.
I also ask that all Government departments and
agencies which have official responsibilities in the field
of food, nutrition, and international relations take
appropriate steps to observe, and to cooperate with
private groups in observing, National Freedom from
Hunger Week.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America
to be aflBsed.
Done at the City of Washington this twenty-second
day of January in the year of our Lord nine-
[seal] teen hundred and sixty-three, and of the In-
dependence of the United States of America
the one hundred and eighty-seventh.
/(LJ L^
By the President :
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.
President Designates Functions
Under Refugee Assistance Act
AN EXECUTIVE ORDER'
Administration of the Migration and Refugee
Assistance Act of 1962
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (76
Stat. 121-124; hereinafter referred to as the Act), and
as President of the United States, it is ordered as
follows :
Section 1. Department of State, (a) The Secre-
tary of State is hereby designated to perform the
following :
' 28 Fed. Reg. 677.
' No. 11077 ; 28 Fed. Reg. 629.
FEBRUARY 18, 1963
255
(1) The functions provided for in Sections 2(a)
and 2(b) (1) of the Act.
(2) The functions provided for in Section 2(b) (2)
of the Act, exclusive of so much thereof as is assigned
or reserved by the provisions of Section 2(1) of this
order.
(3) In connection with functions under the Act as-
signed to the Secretary of State, the functions provided
for in Sections 3(a), 4(b), and 5(a) of the Act.
(b) The Secretary of State shall from time to time
furnish the President documents appropriate for the
discharge by the President of his responsibilities under
Section 2(d) of the Act. To the extent that they
relate to functions performed by the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare under the provisions
of this order, such documents shall be prepared in
collaboration with the latter Secretary.
(c) With due regard for other relevant considera-
tions (including the interests of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, and of any other
executive agencies which may be concerned), the Sec-
retary of State shall assume the leadership and pro-
vide the guidance for assuring that programs author-
ized under the Act best serve the foreign policy
objectives of the United States.
Sec. 2. Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, (a) The Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare is hereby designated to perform the following :
(1) The functions provided for in Section 2(b) (2)
of the Act to the extent that they are in respect of
assistance to Cuban refugee students in the United
States who are in need of loans to attend institutions
of higher education, exclusive, however, of the designa-
tions and determinations provided for in that section,
which designations and determinations are reserved
to the President.
(2) The functions provided for in Sections 2(b)
(3) to2(b) (6), inclusive, of the Act.
(3) In connection with functions under the Act as-
signed to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, the functions provided for in Sections 3(a), 4(b),
and 5(a) (6) of the Act and, except in resi>ect of For-
eign Service personnel, the functions provided for in
Section 5(a) (1) of the Act.
Sec. 3. Redelegation. (a) The Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
may each redelegate any of his functions under this
order to any of his subordinates.
(b) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare may each assign to
the head of any executive department or to the head
of any other agency of the executive branch of the
Government, with the consent of the head of the de-
partment or agency concerned, the performance of any
function of the Secretary under this order whenever
he deems that such action would be advantageous to
the Government.
Sec. 4. Waivers, (a) In accordance with Section
3(b) of the Act, it is hereby determined that it is in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act that the func-
tions authorized under the Act may be performed (by
any department or agency of the Government author-
ized to perform those functions) without regard to the
following-specified provisions of law :
(1) The Act of March 26, 1934, c. 90, 48 Stat. 500,
as amended (15 U.S.G. 616a) (shipment of certain
exports in United States vessels).
(2) Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as
amended (31 U.S.G. 529) (advance of funds).
(3) Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as
amended (41 U.S.G. 5) (competitive bids).
(4) Section 3710 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.G.
8) (opening of bids).
(5) Section 2 of the Act of March 3, 1933, c. 212,
47 Stat. 1.520 (41 U.S.G. 10a) (Buy American Act).
(6) Section 3735 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.G.
13) (contracts limited to one year) .
(7) Sections 302-305 of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949 (June 30, 1949,
c. 288, 63 Stat. 393 et seq.), as amended (41 U.S.G.
252-255) (competitive bids; negotiated contracts;
advances).
(8) Section 901(a) of the Merchant Marine Act,
1936 (June 29. 19.30, c. 858, 49 Stat. 2015, as amended;
46 U.S.G. 1241(a)) (official travel overseas of United
States officers and employees, and transportation of
their personal effects, on ships registered under the
laws of the United States).
(b) It is directed (1) that all waivers of statutes
and limitations of authority effected by the foregoing
provisions of this section shall be utilized in a prudent
manner and as sparingly as may be practical, and
(2) that suitable steps shall be taken by the adminis-
trative agencies concerned to insure that result, in-
eluding, as may be appropriate, the imposition of ad-
ministrative limitations in lieu of waived statutory
requirements and limitations of authority.
Sec. 5. Definition. As used in this order, the word
"function" or "functions" includes any executive duty,
obligation, power, authority, responsibility, right, privi-
lege, discretion, or activity.
Sec. C. Saving provisions. Except to the extent that
they may be inconsistent with law or with this order,
all determinations, authorizations, regulations, orders,
contracts, agreements and other actions is.sued, under-
talien, or entered into with respect to any function
affected by this order and not revoked, superseded, or
otherwise made inapplicable before the date of this
order, shall continue in full force and effect until
amended, modified, or terminated by appropriate
authority.
Sec. 7. Effective date. The provisions of this order
shall be effective as of July 1, 1962.
//Z, J L.yU\
The White House,
January 22, 1963.
256
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
'
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of Interrsational Conferences and Meetings^
Adjourned During January 1963
ICAO Informal Air Traffic Services Meeting on the Piarco
Flight Information Region Control Area.
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement: 2d Ses-
sion.
ITU CCIR Study Group V (Tropospheric Propagation):
Working Party.
U.N. ECAFE Committee for the Coordination of Investiga-
tions of the Lower Mekong Basin: 19th Session (plenary) .
U.N. Ad Hoc Meeting on Tungsten
U.N. EGA Meeting of Experts on Housing Problems . . .
IMCO Assembly and Council: Extraordinary Sessions . . .
NATO Industrial Planning Committee
U.N. Special Fund: 9th Session of Governing Council . . .
ICAO Panel on Holding Procedures: 1st Meeting
lA-ECOSOC Group on Latin American Exports of Bananas .
GATT Council of Representatives
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 6th Session
U.N. ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the Conference
on Trade.
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III
(Balance of Payments).
OECD Agriculture Policy Working Party and Agriculture
Committee.
OECD Committee for Scientific Research
Bridgetown, Barbados .... Jan. 7-10
London Jan. 7-11
London Jan. 7-11
Laos Jan. 8-14
New York Jan. 8-9
Addis Ababa Jan. 9-18
London Jan. 10 (1 day)
Paris Jan. 14-15
New York Jan. 14-21
Montreal Jan. 14-25
Washington Jan. 15-23
Geneva Jan. 16 (1 day)
Geneva Jan. 21-25
London Jan. 22-25
New York Jan. 22-31
Paris Jan. 23-24
Paris Jan. 23-24
Paris Jan. 23-25
In Session as of January 31, 1963
WHO Standing Committee on Administration and Finance . Geneva Jan. 8-
WHO Executive Board: 31st Session Geneva Jan. 8-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 15th Ses- New York Jan. 14-
sion of Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities.
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Geneva Jan. 16-
10th Plenary Assembly.
U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radia- Geneva Jan. 21-
tion: 12th Session.
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Housing, Building and New York Jan. 21-
Planning.
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: 6th Session Bangkok Jan. 28-
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel . . Paris Jan. 29-
U.N. Working Group of Twenty-one New York Jan. 29-
Caribbean Organization: Seminar on Planning Techniques . San Juan, Puerto Rico .... Jan. 30-
In Recess as of January 31, 1963
Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarma-
ment (recessed Dec. 21 until Feb. 12, 1963).
GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification (recessed
Dec. 15 until March 1963).
Geneva Mar. 14-
Geneva Sept. 24-
1 Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Jan. 31, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations:
CCIR, Comity consultatif international des radio communications; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE,
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic
and Social Council; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic
and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; WHO, World Health
Organization.
FEBKUAEY 18, 1963
257
Role of the Special Fund in the U.N. Development Decade
Statement by Jonathan B. Bingham ^
In the 4 years since the establishment of the
Special Fund we have se«n the expanding efforts
of mankind to engineer an escape from poverty
increasingly reflected in the work of the United
Nations. We have seen further diversification
of the U.N.'s development activities through the
establishment, among other things, of the Com-
mittee for Industrial Development, the Center
for Industrial Development, the Committee on
Housing, Building and Planning, the World
Food Program, the U.N. Planning and Projec-
tions Center, the IBRD [International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development] Develop-
ment Advisory Service, and the Conference on
Science and Teclinology. We have witnessed
the success of the International Development
Association, whose members are currently con-
sidering a major increase in its initial $1 billion
capital. We have seen the demands for prac-
tical assistance from the specialized agencies
and regional commissions gi'ow apace. And
the General Assembly has designated the 1960's
as the United Nations Development Decade.
One of the principal tasks of this U.N. Devel-
opment Decade is to maximize the special ad-
vantages of the U.N. system as administrator of
technical assistance and training progi'ams in
the developing areas. First for those countries
new to the complex arts of self-government,
then for those determined to bring about as
rapidly as possible a steady improvement in
their economic growth, and finally to the ulti-
' Made before the Governing Council of the U.N.
Special Fund ou Jan. 14 (U.S./U.N. press release
4140). Mr. Bingham, who is U.S. Representative on
the U.N. Economic and Social Council, represented
the United States at the 9th session of the Governing
Council, which convened at New York, N.Y., on Jan. 14.
mate goal of self-sustaining growth throughout
the world, tlie U.N. system is dedicated not just
to providing help but to setting standards
whereby men and nations can mobilize their
own resources to conquer poverty within the
framework of the human rights set forth in the
U.N. Charter. It is our success in this task, as
the Managing Director of the Special Fund
[Paul Hoffman] recently observed, which more
than any other will establish the degree of real
progress achieved in the 20th century.
Against this background let us look at the
Special Fund — its present and its future. No
development agency within the U.N. family is
better placed to translate into effective practice
the great promise of the U.N. Development
Decade. The Special Fund provides a central
source of development energy for the special-
ized agencies of the U.N. which can help them
carry their activities further toward full im-
plementation and toward increased production
in member coimtries. It enables these agencies
to deal with projects at a more developed and
realistic stage, and larger in size and cost, than
those of the past. At the same time, by relating
operations more closely to the national priori-
ties and needs for economic development in each
recipient country and to national plans and pro-
grams, it can help both coimtries and agencies
to make more rapid advances toward reaching
their common objective: more rapid progress
in economic and social development.
In saying that no U.N. development agency
can do more than the Special Fund to realize
the promise of the U.N. Development Decade
we must admit tliat the Special Fund has yet to
realize its full potential. My Government has
previously expressed its dissatisfaction at the
258
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
rate of implementation of Special Fund proj-
ects. Although we are pleased that the last
year has seen progress in cutting the time lag,
we still feel that faster implementation is neces-
sary. We continue to be disappointed at the
failure of other contributing nations to equal
our willingness to reach the Special Fund's
minimum and modest financial targets. We
would hope that in the near future more of the
seed capital planted by the Special Fund would
bring forth investment capital.
However, we think the Special Fund's record
in its first 4 years compares favorably with the
record of any other U.N. development agency in
its initial years. And it mu«t be recognized
that the Special Fund's mission, and its pre-
scribed methods of operation, are exacting, re-
quiring as they do not only the coordination
of the work of many kinds of entities, including
international agencies and national govern-
ments, but also the continual breaking of new
ground in this still novel business of preinvest-
ment studies.
Dual Role of Special Fund
Let us look for a moment at this dual role of
the Special Fund as coordinator and pioneer.
The Special Fund and the ETAP [Expanded
Program of Technical Assistance] provide an
opportunity for conscious and deliberate efforts
to bring more coherence, cooperation, and bal-
ance into the work of the U.N. family of agen-
cies. By using the specialized agencies as exe-
cuting agents, by enhancing the role of the resi-
dent representatives, by encouraging and
assisting the various elements of the U.N. sys-
tem to concentrate more of their time and talent
on immediate development problems, the work
of the U.N. system can be related more directly
to the development plans and strategy of each
recipient country. Thus, these two central
organs of the U.N. can help provide a service
of great value which is not reflected in the audi-
tor's balance sheets. It is a service which my
Goverimient believes has received far too little
attention in the deliberations in the U.N.
We live today in an age when the affirmation
of sovereignty is a "felt need" not only of na-
tions but often of bureaucracies too — even of
the dedicated bureaucracies of the U.N. system.
Nobody likes to see himself as a satellite. And
to a large extent this is as it should be, even in
the arenas of international cooperation. After
all, each of the needs of mankind, whether it
be health, education, food and agriculture, the
special needs of children, or science — each
needs strong and articulate advocates to make
sure that in the competition for scarce re-
sources no particular need is unduly neglected.
At the same time resources are, scarce — hu-
man resources no less than material and finan-
cial resources. A prerequisite for a future
less torn with tension and less preoccupied with
poverty depends more and more on the efficiency
and the effectiveness with which we use our
scarce resources, human and otherwise. Advo-
cacy of particular needs alone can do no more
than highlight the hard choices we must make.
Coordinating Allocation of Scarce Resources
In its role as a coordinator, the Special Fund
performs the indispensable service of trying to
convert advocacy within the U.N. system into
an efficient allocation of scarce resources — one
which takes account of the overall needs of a
particular country. This is what occurs, or
should occur, in the use of the specialized agen-
cies as executing agents for Special Fund proj-
ects. This does not mean any interference
with the technical activities of the various
specialized agencies within their field of com-
petence ; it does mean that decisions on the size
and scope of the operations of each agency must
be made in the light of the total needs and re-
sources of each country. If the record of
implementation of Special Fund projects is not
what it should be, it is in part a reflection of the
very difficult problems which still remain to be
overcome before we reach the ideal where the
U.N. system of development agencies operates
as an efficient servant of soundly conceived
national development plans.
In the common effort to achieve this same
goal, my Government also regards as important
the work of the Ad Hoc Committee of Eight,
now Ten, established by ECOSOC [Economic
and Social Council] in 1961.
In the governing bodies and assemblies of the
specialized agencies, also, my Government has
been urging that regular programs be redi-
FEBRUART 18. 1963
259
rected in the direction of operational develop-
ment projects compatible with and complemen-
tary to those financed by the Special Fund and
ETAP. We have urged, and will continue to
urge, that a greater proportion of staff and
budget be devoted to such projects, and to this
end we have campaigned against wholesale
budget increases which are not related to such a
redirection.
With limited budgets and, particularly,
limited administrative budgets, the specialized
agencies are, perhaps understandably, reluctant
to spend their own money executing the projects
of "another agency," even though a common ob-
jective is sought. With this fact in mind, we
welcome the intention of tlie Managing Director
to make an evaluation of the overhead costs of
the specialized agencies as executing agents for
Special Fund projects. If the study indicates
that more of the overhead costs should be fi-
nanced by the Special Fund, my Government
would, of course, support actions to make that
assistance available.
However, the Special Fund cannot allow it-
self to become merely a supplementary source
of finance for the specialized agencies. On the
contrary, in its coordinating role the Special
Fund must continue to take the lead in setting
standards for the executing agents in project
preparation, in choosing among competing
projects on the basis of development priorities,
and in prompt and effective implementation.
Not all of the specialized agencies which are
today executing Special Fund projects were
established with development uppermost in
mind. It is still all too common among some
of these agencies to employ the technique of
holding meetings or convening conferences to
further their objectives rather than the difBcult,
more practical techniques of development pro-
graming and of project preparation. Here the
Special Fimd must show the way by insisting
on projects which are related to the overall de-
velopment plans and targets of the developing
countries, by insisting on some order of priority,
by insisting on prompt and effective implemen-
tation, and by evaluating projects during im-
plementation. In the Special Fund, as well
as in the Expanded Program of Technical As-
sistance, evaluation of performance on a con-
tinuing objective basis should become an
integral part of the operations.
Tliis problem of coordination and standard
setting is as important as it is difficult.
My Government believes that one or two of
the specialized agencies, which now have the
most Special Fund projects for implemen-
tation, may need time to digest their assigned
tasks before more projects are added. Time
is needed to develop the techniques of adminis-
tration whicli efficient implementation of Spe-
cial Fund projects requires. Time is needed
to slow the bureaucratic momentmns of the past
in order that new momentums may be built up
around the really urgent, high-priority develop-
ment needs of the present.
The specialized agencies should always be
the major executing agents for Special Fund
projects, but to press forward the projects
urgently required by the developing countries
the Special Fund should not be barred from
looking elsewhere for implementation of its
work if tlie capacity of the specialized agencies
appears to be temporarily strained. Perhaps
more use could be made of subcontracts; per-
haps public or private executing agents outside
the U.N. system should be employed tem-
porarily in order to maintain and improve the
pace of Special Fund activity. My Govern-
ment does not believe that recourse to these
devices would weaken the role of the Special
Fund in its relationships with the specialized
agencies. On the contrary, in the search for
more efficient and effective standards of imple-
mentation we should welcome a variety of ex-
perience out of which can come greater
effectiveness within the U.N. system itself.
A Pioneer in Creating Investment Opportunities
The Special Fund is not, of course, just, a co-
ordinating mechanism ; it is first and foremost a
pioneer in the business of creating investment
opportunities. Its major role is to use its re-
sources and resourcefulness to attract the re-
sources and resourcefulness of others into new
development fields. And the record is not
without some significant successes in this
regard.
For example, the feasibility studies now be-
ing financed by the World Bank in considerable
260
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN
Kiliime grew out of the early Special Fund
ju-ojects. This does not represent duplication
Imt a veiy efficient new use of World Bank re-
sources. It is right that the Bank, rather than
the Special Fund, should undertake those pre-
investment studies which are directly linked to
lie kinds of loans which the Bank ordinarily
iiuikes. Where the Bank is willing to under-
take preinvestment studies, it should be encour-
aged to do so. It frees the Special Fund to
concentrate more of its limited resources on
those investment areas and in those areas of the
world where there is a great demand but where
as yet no effective work of this kind has been
undertaken.
My Government of course looks to the cen-
tral U.N. financing agencies — i.e. the Special
Fund and ETAP — for the major needed in-
creases in funds for technical assistance and
preinvestment work in the U.N. Development
Decade. At the same time we would hope that
other specialized agencies would follow the lead
of the World Bank and use a greater portion of
their regular funds for operational develop-
ment programs within their field of expertise.
At the recent biennial conference of UNESCO,
for example, my Government urged that agency
to concentrate more time and talent on its pri-
mary role of education and within that area
to concentrate more on projects and operational
programs directly related to the educational
needs of the developing countries."
There are severe limits to what the Special
Fund can do in the field of education, and it
cei-tainly should not be expected that the Spe-
cial Fund mibalance its program by dispropor-
tionate investments in such vast areas of need
as general education. Wliat the Special Fimd
can do — and is doing — is to assist in the build-
hig of a corps of skilled administrators and
trained workers through such means as national
and regional training institutes. This must
be done in many places as a prerequisite to in-
vestment activity. But the continuing respon-
sibility for developing effective techniques of
assistance in the field of general education lies
with UNESCO.
So far as direct preinvestment projects are
concerned we hope that opportunities are not
being missed by the Special Fund through an
excessive concentration on projects which, in
essence, deal with general economic develop-
ment. After all, it is capital investment from
public and private sources that will create the
resources for greater efforts in the fields now
receiving Special Fund assistance. In fact if
we go to the guiding principles contained in the
resolution creating the Special Fund,'' we find
that it was
. . . envisaged as a constructive advance in United
Nations assistance to the less developed countries
which should be of immediate significance in accelerat-
ing their economic development by, inter alia, facilitat-
ing new capital investments of all types by creating
conditions which would make such investments either
feasible or more effective.
Resolution 1240 (XIII) went on to say:
Projects shall be undertaken which will lead to early
results and have the widest possible impact in advanc-
ing the economic, social or technical development of
the country or countries concerned, in particular by
facilitating new capital investment.
I think that these words show that the Gen-
eral Assembly did not have in mind merely
an extension of the work of the Expanded Pro-
gram of Technical Assistance when it estab-
lished the Special Fund. It was formed rather
to provide a bridge between the kinds of techni-
cal assistance which deal with the general eco-
nomic development of a country and those which
deal with or lead to capital investment. In this
connection we hope to see a further development
through the establishment and use of a Special
Fund financial advisory service, which would
be in a position, on completion of a successful
preinvestment study, to suggest promising
sources of capital to governments requesting it.
Aiding Industrialization of Low-Income Countries
The best way to illustrate the great potential
of the Special Fund in the future is to mention
a few areas where there is a great need to create
specific opportunities for investment. The
newly independent countries of Africa often
have need for outside help in identifying areas
' For a statement by Assistant Secretary Lucius D.
Battle before the UNESCO General Conference at
Paris on Nov. 13, see Bulletin of Dec. 17, 1962, p. 935.
'For text of Resolution 1240 (XIII), see ihid., Nov.
3. 1958, p. 709.
FEBRTTABT 18, 1963
261
which can productively absorb and utilize cap-
ital, but it has been difficult for the World Bank
and IDA to extend assistance on any significant
scale to those countries because of the lack of
suitable development projects. My Govern-
ment suo:gests that the Special Fund and the
executing agencies give special attention to the
types of projects in that area which might pave
the way for World Bank and IDA assistance.
Tlie importance of industrialization for de-
veloping nations is today broadly accepted.
The Managing Director reported to the Com-
mittee for Industrial Development last March
that virtually every project approved by the
Governing Council has some bearing on indus-
trial development and that over 40 percent of
total approved costs were for projects intended
to assist directly and specifically the industriali-
zation of low-income countries. Yet we fiLnd
a concentration of effort on training, educa-
tion, and research, with very few projects
leading directly to investments in industry.
Our analysis shows a decline of emphasis on
industrialization, dropping to 30 percent of the
total at the last session and under 20 percent
for the program recommended at this session.
In consultation with the Commissioner for
Technical Assistance and the Commissioner for
Industrial Development, the Managing Direc-
tor may wish to explore the possibility of
Special Fund assistance in surveys of industrial
potential or feasibility studies of industrial
estates and similar undertakings. We are con-
fident that the newly created Committee for
Industrial Development and the Center for In-
dustrial Development will greatly assist the
Special Fund, and the other TT.N. technical as-
sistance operations as well, in identifying proj-
ects in the field of industry.
Committee on Housing, Building and Planning
Considering the broad range of Special Fund
activities, and the modesty of its resources, it
is not surprising that some activities tend to get
neglected. But it seems that housing, in par-
ticular, has received too little attention. The
grievous inadequacy of rural and urban housing
around the world, which is susceptible to im-
provement through known housing techniques,
led to the creation of the Committee on Hous-
ing, Building and Planning. Furthermore thei
Secretary-General has pointed out in his report
entitled Housing, Building and Planning in the
Development Decade (Document E/C.6/2,
paragraphs 12 and 13) that:
Generally up to 75 per cent of total fixed capital
investment, in developing and advanced countries
alike, takes the form of building and construction.
The pace and size of development programmes is,
therefore, heavily influenced by the availability of
building resources in materials, labotir, management
and equipment. The cost of development programmes —
thus very often their feasibility and viability — is
determined in large measure by the efBciency and pro-
ductivity of the construction and building-materials
industries.
If total fixed capital investment is 15 per cent of
gross national product and if about two-thirds of this
investment is building and construction (or 10 per cent
of gross national product), a reduction in building
costs of 10 per cent will amount to an additional 1
per cent of gross national product available for
investment. . . .
The potential for great return from limited
preinvestment seed capital is thus very great.
We are sure that the Special Fund will co-
operate fully with the new committee in its
efforts to strengthen U.N. programs in these
fields.
U.S. Urges Increased Contributions
It is perhaps all too easy to suggest things
for the Special Fund to do, and these sugges-
tions and recommendations are made in the
full realization that the Managing Director has
very limited resources at his command. My
Government does hope, however, that in choos-
ing among its many opportunities the Special
Fund will keep alive that f resliness of approach,
that quality of innovation, which so character-
ize the long and distinguished career of the
Managing Director in the business of develop-
ment.
Meanwhile the most obvious way in which
the Special Fimd can be strengthened to meet
the needs of the developing countries is, of
course, to give it the funds to do the job. Meet-
ings and words cannot do this; additional
resources are necessary if the Special Fund is
to succeed. Once again it is necessary to ex-
press our disappointment that the minimum
goal of $100 million in contributions by member
states has not been met. In my country cam-
262
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
:
aigns for vohmtai-y contributions often carry
he slogan "give until it hurts." Considering
he need, the goal here is a modest one, and it
' wouldn't even "hurt" many countries to increase
heir contributions. My Government strongly
irges that member countries make sure that this
joal is met in 1963.
In closing I wish to express the deep sense
>f appreciation which my Government feels for
M l;he work of the Managing Director, his able
Btaff, and the executing agencies in making the
Special Fund a symbol of what can be ac-
complished through international cooperation.
Through their efforts, the Special Fund has not
only assisted the developing countries but has
Jj also contributed to the growing realization that
vital common objectives can be and are being
successfully achieved through the medium of the
United Nations.
'U.S. Warns of Castro Declaration
of War on Hemisphere
Folio wing is the text of a U.S. note delivered
on January 30 to Juan Bautista de Lavalle.,
Chairman of the Special Committee To Con-
sider Resolutions 11. 1 and VIII of the Eighth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs^^ and read before the Special Com-
mittee on that date.
January 30, 1963
No. 83
ExcELLENCT : I refer to note No. 52 ^ from the
United States Delegation, dated December 14,
1962, transmitting excerpts of speeches by two
high Cuban Government officials containing
statements openly advocating violence to over-
throw established governments in other Amer-
ican Republics. In the same communication it
was noted that these statements would be of
immediate interest to the governments as a
clear indication of the continuing intervention-
'For background and texts of resolutions adopted
by tbe Eighth Meeting of Consultation at Punta del
Este, Uruguay, on Jan. 31, 1962, see Bulletin of Feb.
19, 1962, p. 270.
" Not printed here.
ist purposes of the Castro regime and as a pos-
sible sign of the direction in wliich that regime
might be expected to channel its subversive
activity.
On January 16, 1963, Prime Minister Fidel
Castro in a speech at the closing session of the
Congress of Women of the Americas made a
major policy statement, further defining the
Cuban Government's position of encouragement
and support for armed insurrection in other
countries of the hemisphere. The statement
constitutes a declaration of war against the
hemisphere. Given in the context of the pres-
ent dispute between Moscow and Peiping over
the strategy and tactics whicli international
commmiism should follow in its pureuit of
world domination, the statement has added
significance since Castro clearly advocates the
path of violence. There follows the text of
the principal sections of what he had to say
on this subject:
We must think about how to change that situation
[i.e. social and economic conditions in Latin America).
There are persons who are experts on figures, but
what is needed are experts on changing the situation,
experts on leading peoples on revolutions. That is
the art of the revolutionaries, the art that must be
learned and developed. How to bring the masses to
the struggle?
It is the masses who make history, but for them to
make history, the masses must be taken to the battle.
That is the duty of leaders and the revolutionary or-
ganizations : to make the masses march, to latmch the
masses into battle. That is what they did in Algeria.
And that is what the patriots are doing in South
Vietnam. They have sent the mas.ses into battle with
correct methods, correct tactics, and they have brought
the greatest amount of the masses into the battle.
That is what we did. The four, five, six, or seven
of us who one day were separated did not conquer
power. It was the movement of the masses that the
struggle against the tyranny unleashed, which culmi-
nated in the victory of the people. . . . Those are the
historic truths. And we believe that we at least have
the right to speak about our historic truths without
some long-distance theoreticians telling us what hap-
pened here without having ever come here. One does
not have to whisper about those things, nor must one
say them in low tones. They must be said in a loud
voice so that they will be heard, really heard.
And let the peoples hear them, because those false
interpretations of history tend to create that con-
formism that also suits imperialism ; it tends to create
that resignation and reformism and that policy of
waiting for the Greek calends to make revolutions.
Those false interpretations of history do not conform
FEBRUARY 18, 1963
263
i
with the situation of the majority of the Latin Ameri-
can countries, where objective conditions exist — and
the imperialists have clearly seen that objective con-
ditions do exist — but where subjective conditions are
missing. Those subjective conditions must be created,
and they are created by historic truth, not by falsifica-
tion of history.
Those subjective conditions are not created by say-
ing that there was a peaceful transition in Cuba.
(One of the delegates shouts something about
cowards — Ed.) It is not a matter of cowards, but of
confused, of mistaken views. We do not deny the
possibility of peaceful transition, but we are still
awaiting the first case. But we do not deny it, be-
cause we are not dogmatists, and we under-
stand the ceaseless change of historic conditions and
circumstances.
We do not deny it but we do say that there was no
peaceful transition ; and we do protest against an at-
tempt to use the case of Cuba to confuse the revolution-
aries of other countries where the objective conditions
for the revolution exist and where they can do the
same thing Cuba did. It is logical that imperialist
theoreticians try to prevent revolutions, the imperial-
ists slander the Cul)an revolution, sow lies, say the
worst horrors, create fear of revolutions among the
people. But let no one from a revolutionary position
attempt to create conformism or fear of revolutions.
That is absurd. Let the imperialist theoreticians
preach conformism. Let the revolutionary theoreti-
cians preach revolution without fear.
That is wliat we think. That was what we said in
the Declaration of Havana, which, in some fraternal
countries, received from some revolutionary organiza-
tions the honors of a desk drawer when it should
have received the just publicity it deserved. It would
be like locking up everything you have discussed here.
Of course, if we do not want the masses to learn
about it, we must put it in a drawer. But if we tell
the masses what the situation is, they must also be
told what the road is. We must bring them to the
struggle, because that road is much easier in many
Latin American countries than it was in Cuba.
I want to make it clear, so that the theoreticians
will not get angry, that we are not making an ir-
responsible generalization. I want to make it clear
that we know that each country has its specific condi-
tions, and that is why we do not generalize. But we
say the majority. We know there are exceptions.
We know there are countries in which those objective
conditions do not exist. But they exist in the ma-
jority of the Latin American countries. That is our
opinion. To say it here is a duty, because we hope
that in 40 years we will not meet as today — the grand-
daughters of our federated women with your grand-
daughters— to discuss the same problems.
A tape recording of the full speech as it was
broadcast over Habana radio facilities to the
Americas at 0451 GMT on January 16, 1963 is
enclosed.
In the opinion of the United States Govern-
ment the repeated emphasis placed by high offi-
cials of the Castro regime on violence to
overthrow established governments, coupled
with recent outcroppings of sabotage, terrorism
and other forms of subversive activity in sev-
eral American Republics makes it increasingly
important that the governments and the appro-
priate organs of the OAS redouble their
vigilance against Castro-communist subversion.
Liljewise it becomes of major importance that
the member governments develop their capac-
ity of counteracting this threat through
individual and cooperative measures.
Because of the importance of the subject mat-
ter, I am again taking the liberty of sending a
copy of this note to the Chairman of the Council
of the Organization with the request that he
make it available to the members of the Coimcil.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance
of my highest consideration.
deLesseps S. Morrison
Arnlxhssador
Representative of the United States of America
on the
Council of the Organization of A^nerican States
Enclosure :
Tape recording of Fidel Castro's January 16, 1963 speech.
United States Delegations
to Internationa! Conferences
Preparatory Committee for U.N. Conference on
Trade and Development
The Department of State announced on Jan-
uai-y 18 (press release 37) that Isaiah Frank,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Af-
fairs, had been named U.S. representative to the
Preparatory Committee for the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, which
holds its first meeting at New York January 22
to 31. Walter Kotschnig, Special Assistant to
the Assistant Secretary of State for Interna-
tional Organization Affairs, will serve as alter-
nate representative.
The Economic and Social Coimcil of the
United Nations decided last July to convene a
United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment in response to the efforts of the less
264
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
leveloped countries to gain consideration for
-lie full range of their trade problems in a com-
jreliensive United Nations forum. The Gen-
ii^ sral Assembly later spelled out in some detail
;he trade problems of principal concern to the
ess developed countries and recommended that
;he conference be held not later than early 1964.
The United States supported the calling of a
;arefully prepared conference focused on the
rade problems of the developing countries as
outlined in the ECOSOC and General Assem-
bly resolutions. Among the problems to be
considered for discussion at the conference are :
trends and developments in the trade of the
developing countries; methods of expanding
the export earnings of these countries; stabili-
zation of commodity markets and foreign ex-
change receipts; the relationship to trade
development planning and programing ; and the
scope and organization of international activi-
ties bearing on the trade of these countries.
Thirty countries are represented on the Pre-
paratory Committee, including the 18 members
of the Economic and Social Comicil, which will
make the final decision on the date of the con-
ference at its July meeting. A further meeting
of the Committee will be held in the late spring
to prepare I'ecormnendations for the ECOSOC
meeting.
Countries members of the Preparatory Com-
mittee are:
Argentina
Madagascar
Australia
New Zealand
Austria
Nigeria
Brazil
Pakistan
Canada
Peru
Colombia
Poland
Czechoslovakia
Senegal
Denmark
Tunisia
El Salvador
Union of Soviet
Ethiopia
Socialist Republics
France
United Arab Republic
India
United Kingdom
Italy
United States
Japan
Uruguay
Jordan
Yugoslavia
Lebanon
Other members of the U.S. delegation to the
Preparatory Committee are :
Senior Adviser
Seymour M. Finger, U.S. Mission to the United Nations,
New York, N.Y.
AdiHsers
Clarence EUui, Assistant Director, Bureau of Inter-
national Commerce, Department of Commerce
Virginia McClung, Office of International Resources,
Department of State
Sidney Weintraub, Office of International Trade Policy,
Department of State
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and Malaya Sign
Culturai Excliange Agreement
Press release 53 dated January 25, for release January 27
A cultural agreement between tlie United
States and the Federation of Malaya was signed
on January 27 at Kuala Lumpur by Ambas-
sador Charles F. Baldwin and Capt. Abdul
Hamid Khan bin Haji Sakhawat Ali Khan,
J.M.N., J.P., Minister of Education for the
Federation of Malaya. Malaya is the 44th
country to enter into a cultural exchange agree-
ment with the United States since passage of
the original Fulbright Act in 1946.
The agreement provides for the organization
of a binational commission to plan and adminis-
ter a Fulbright- Hays progi-am in Malaya and
will lead to an enlarged interchange of profes-
sors, teachers, and students between the two
countries. In previous years, from 1950
through 1962, grants were awarded to 272
Malayans for visits to the United States and to
30 Americans to go to Malaya for educational
and cultural purposes. In addition about 55
American specialists visited Malaya on tours
which included other countries in the area.
Initially the program will be a modest one.
At full strength it is expected to level off at
$200,000 a year for the 5 years provided for in
the present agreement. The program will be
funded by foreign currencies available to the
United States.
In a congratulatory message to the cosigna-
tors, Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of
State for Educational and Cultural Affairs,
stated :
FEBRUARY 18. 1063
265
"The experience of more than fifteen years
of Fulbright Programs is so marked by success
that one may safely predict that the program
which the Government of Malaya and the
United States are now about to undertake will
achieve the highest goals. In the years that lie
ahead the people of Malaya and the people of
the United States will reap a rich harvest of
peace, progress and mutual understanding
from the seeds we are sowing today."
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873).
Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.
Acceptance deposited: Spain, January 31, 1963.
Entered into force: January 31, 1963.
Law of the Sea
Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29,
1958. Entered Into force September 30, 1962. TIAS
5200.
Ratification deposited: Nepal, December 28, 1962.
Accession deposited: Central African Republic, Oc-
tober 15, 1962.
Property
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels De-
cember 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The
Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934,
and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon
October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4,
1962. TIAS 4931.
Ratifications deposited: Cuba and Switzerland, Jan-
uary 17, 1963.
Slavery
Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at
Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and
annex. Done at New Tork December 7, 1953. En-
tered into force for the United States March 7, 1956.
TIAS 3532.
Acceptance deposited: Belgium, December 13, 1962.
Trade
Procte-verbal extending period of validity of declara-
tion on provisional accession of Argentina to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of Novem-
ber 18, 1960. Done at Geneva November 7, 1962.
Signatures: Argentina, November 20, 1962 ; United
States, December 18, 1962.
Entered into force: December 31, 1962.
Protocol for accession of Cambodia to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
April 6, 1062.'
Ratification deposited: Sweden, December 27, 1962.
Protocol for accession of Israel to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6,
1962. Entered into force July 5, 1962.
Signatures: Sweden (subject to ratification), April
IS, 1962 ; Turkey, November 27, 1962.
Ratification deposited: Sweden, December 27, 1962.
266
BILATERAL
Norway
Agreement extending for five years the loan of the ves-
sel under the agreement of April 17 and May 8, 1958
(TIAS 4064) . Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo
November 16, 1962, and January 14, 1963. Entered
into force January 14, 1963.
Philippines
Agreement for the relinquishment of the United States
naval radio transmitting facility at Bagobantay,
Quezon City. Effected by exchange of notes at
Manila December 31, 1962, and January 11, 1963.
Entered into force January 15, 1963.
Trinidad and Tobago
Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected
by exchange of notes at Port-of-Spain January 8
and 15, 1963. Entered into force January 15, 1963.
United Kingdom
Agreement providing for a meteorological research pro-
gram (including Project HARP) in Barbados. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Bridgetown January
7 and 15, 1963. Entered into force January 15,
1963.
' Not in force.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 28-February 3
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25,
D.C.
Releases issued prior to January 28 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 37 of
January 18 ; 50 of January 23 ; and 52 and 53 of
January 25.
No. Date Subject
t54 1/28 Defense production experts visit
India.
55 1/28 Rusk : interview on "Meet the Press."
*56 1/2S U.S. participation in international
conferences.
57 1/29 Itinerary for Williams' visit to Africa
(rewrite).
t58 1/29 Rusk : remarks at Goddard Simce
Flight Center.
59 1/30 U.S.-Canadian negotiations regard-
ing nuclear weapons,
too 2/1 Agricultural commodities agreement
with Poland.
♦61 1/31 Cultural exchange (school adminis-
ti-ators visit Europe).
62 1/31 Bowles : Nyasaland self-government.
63 1/31 Williams : Nyasaland self-govern-
ment.
64 2/1 U.S. and Yemen raise missions to em-
bassy status.
65 2/2 Rusk : news conference of Febru-
ary 1.
*68 2/2 Delaney appointed Coordinator of In-
ternational Labor Affairs (bio-
graphic details).
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Butxetin.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ebruary 18, 1963
Index
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1234
Williams Makes 3-Week
ifrica
it«ssistant Secretary
lie Trip to Africa 250
il :he Basis of U.S. Policy in Africa (Williams) . 251
Agriculture. President Calls for Public Support
of Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign (texts of
letter and proclamation) 254
American Republics. U.S. Warns of Castro Dec-
laration of War on Hemisphere (text of note) . 263
Uomic Energy
Secretary Rusk Appears on "Jleet tie Press" . . 244
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Febru-
ary l" 235
Suspension of Test Ban Talks (Foster) ... 236
LJ.S. and Canadian Negotiations Regarding
Nuclear Weapons 243
U.S. Postpones Underground Nuclear Tests in
Nevada (Kennedy) 238
Canada
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Febru-
ary 1 235
U.S. and Canadian Negotiations Regarding
Nuclear Weapons 243
Ceylon. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
February 1 235
Communism. U.S. Warns of Castro Declara-
tion of War on Hemisphere (text of note) . . 263
Congress. Foreign Representatiyes' Tax Re-
turns Available to Senate Committee (text of
Executive order) 2.54
Cuba
Secretary Rusk Appears on "Meet the Press" . 244
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Febru-
ary 1 235
U.S. Warns of Castro Declaration of War on
Hemisphere (text of note) 263
Department and Foreign Service. U.S. and
Yemen Raise Diplomatic Missions to Embassy
Status 250
Disarmament
Secretary Rusk Appears on "Meet the Press" . 244
Suspension of Test Ban Talks (Foster) ... 236
Economic Affairs
Breakdown in Negotiations for U.K. Member-
ship in EEC 237
Foreign Representatives' Tax Returns Available
to Senate Committee (text of Executive
order) 254
Preparatory Committee for U.N. Conference on
Trade and Development (delegation) . . . 264
Role of the Special Fimd in the U.N. Develop-
ment Decade (Bingham) 258
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Febru-
ary 1 235
Educational and Cultural Affairs. United States
and Malaya Sign Cultural Exchange Agree-
ment 265
Europe
Breakdown in Negotiations for U.K. Member-
ship in EEC 237
Secretary Rusk Appears on "Meet the Press" . 244
Foreign Aid
The Basis of U.S. Policy in Africa (Williams) . 251
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Febru-
ary 1 235
India. Secretary Rusk Appears on "Meet the
Press" 244
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 257
President Calls for Public Support of Freedom-
From-Hunger Campaign (texts of letter and
proclamation) 254
Malaya. United States and Malaya Sign Cul-
tural Exchange Agreement 265
Military Affairs
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Febru-
ary 1 235
U.S. and Canadian Negotiations Regarding Nu-
clear Weapons 243
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Secretary Kusk Appears on "ilet't tlie Press" . 244
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Febru-
ary 1 235
Nyasaland. U.S. Congratulates Nyasaland on
Achieving Self-Go verument (Bowles, Wil-
liams) 253
Presidential Documents
Foreign Representatives' Tax Returns Available
to Senate Committee 2.54
President Calls for Public Support of Freedom-
From-Hunger Campaign 254
President Designates Functions Under Refugee
Assistance Act 255
U.S. Postpones Underground Nuclear Tests in
Nevada 238
Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference To Be
Held at San Francisco 254
Refugees. President Designates Functions
Under Refugee Assistance Act (text of Exec-
utive order) 255
Treaty Information
Current Actions 266
United States and Malaya Sign Cultural Ex-
change Agreement 2(55
U.S.S.R.
Secretary Rusk Appears on "Meet the Press" . 244
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Febru-
ary 1 235
Suspension of Test Ban Talks (Foster) . . . 236
United Kingdom
Breakdown in Negotiations for U.K. Member-
ship in EEC 237
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Febru-
ary 1 235
United Nations
Preparatory Committee for U.N. Conference on
Trade and Development (delegation) . . . 204
Role of the Special Fund in the U.N. Develop-
ment Decade (Bingham) 258
Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of February 1 235
Yemen. U.S. and Yemen Raise Diplomatic Mis-
sions to Embassy Status 250
Yugoslavia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of February 1 235
Name Index
Abel, Elie 244
Bingham, Jonathan B 258
Bowles, Chester 253
Brooks, Ned 244
Foster, William C 236
Henslev, Stewart 244
Kennedy, President 238, 254, 255
Morrison, deLesseps S 263
Reston, James 244
Rusk, Secretary 235, 244
Spivak, Lawrence E 244
Williams, G. Mennen 250, 251, 253
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^7
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1235
February 25, 1963
RED CHINA AND THE U.S.S.R. • Television Briefing by
Secretary Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant
Secretary Harriman, and Roger Hilsman, Director of Intel-
ligence and Research 271
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE OECD • Statement
by Christian A. Herter 298
TERMS OF TRADE AND THE BRAZILIAN BALANCE
OF PAYMENTS • by Ambassador Lincoln Gordon . . 284
For index see inside back cover
I
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1235 • Publication 7498
February 25, 1963
For sale by the SuperlDtendent ol Documents
U.S. Qoverament Printing Office
Washington 26, D.C.
Price:
62 issues, domestic $8.60, Joreign $12.25
Single copy, 26 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
or State BDiiEtm as the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is indexed In the
Readers' Qulde to Periodical Literature.
Boston Public Library,
Superintendent of Document*
mR 1 ^ 1963
DEPOSITORY
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the IFfitte House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
wfiich the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
<Red China and the U.S.S.R.
Following is the transcript ^ of a television program '■''State Department
Briefing: Red China and the U.S.S.R.^'' produced cooperatively hy the De-
partment and National Educational Television and first hroadcast an Fehru-
ary 11 hy the NET netioorh. On this program four officers of the Depart-
m-ent of State discuss U.S. foreign policy toith regard to relatione between
Communist Chinn and the Soviet Union and answer questions posed hy a
group of nongovernmental participants.
Tahing part in the discussion were Dean Rusk, Secretary of State/ U.
Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political A fairs; W. Aver ell
Harriman, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs; Roger Hilsman,
Director of Intelligence and Research; KurtL. London, director. Institute of
Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University; William C. Johnstone,
consultant to the Rand Corporation and professor of Asian studies, Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Warren Unna, Asian
correspondent for the Washington Post; Mrs. Lorraine B. Torres, staff
associate, American Association of University Women; Herhert Stein, di-
rector of research, Committee for Economic Developunent; Frank, CBrien,
staff memher. Committee for Economic Development; Randolph Carr,
foumder andme?nher, Asia Research Center; and Conrad F. Morrow, student,
George Washington University. John L. Steele, chief, Time-Life Washing-
ton Bureau, was moderator.
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Steele: Welcome to another State De-
partment briefing. I am John Steele, chief of
the Time-Life "Washing-ton Bureau. In a mo-
ment you and I will join a group of distin-
guished State Department officers in a briefing
on the vital question of currently troubled re-
lations between Communist China and the
Soviet Union. The men we shall join are — all
of them — experts in their field. It is their busi-
ness fii'st to study and appraise the developing
' Press release 71 dated Feb. 8, as revised ; also
available as Department of State publication 7497,
wbich may be purchased from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington 25, D.C. (price 25 cents).
relationships between the two giants of the
Commmiist world. And thereafter they help
formulate recommendations which, through the
Secretary of State, go to the President for con-
sideration in the making of our world policies.
The Soviet Union and Eed China, acting
together and in miison, woidd represent an
extremely powerful combination. Together
these two countries occupy more tlian one-fifth
of the land surface of the globe. Their popu-
lations constitute nearly one-third of all the
people on this planet. The British geographer
Mackinder once prophesied that possession of
this Eurasian heartland would confer such
power that it could lead to world domination.
Whether or not this is true, it is obvious that a
close alliance of Red China and the Soviet
FEBRUARY 25, 1693
271
Union is a combination with an enormous eco-
nomic, political, and military potential. For
this reason, the state of that alliance is a matter
of vei-y gi-eat concern to us all, and to the entire
free world as well. It is a matter receiving
the closest of Government scrutiny today.
In recent weeks and months not only the so-
called "demonologists" who specialize in the
subject but all of us have become aware that
the two great Communist powers are not speak-
ing with one voice. Peiping sneers at the West
as a "paper tiger," and Moscow snaps back that
the paper tiger has "nuclear teeth." The
Chinese denounce the Soviets for being, as they
say, "timid as mice," while Khrushchev de-
plores Chinese policy as "madness," leading to
thermonuclear world war. From all appear-
ances, a great debate is taking place behind the
Iron and the Bamboo Curtains — a debate wliich
could have momentous implications for the fu-
ture of the Communist bloc, and indeed for the
future peace of the world.
To piece together for us the essential facts
in this half-hidden debate and to give us their
interpretation of it, we will be privileged today
to hear the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who
will be speaking to us later in the program ; the
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, U. Alexis Jolmson ; the Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Far Eastern Affairs,
W. Averell Harriman ; and the Director of In-
telligence and Research for the Department of
State, Roger Hilsman.
We are also pleased to have with us a number
of distinguished citizens from outside Govern-
ment, including some well-known students of
Commimist affairs. We will be hearing from
some of them following the briefing.
the dispute has a long history. As long ago as
the 13th century, you'll remember, the Mongols
overran the first Russian state, and they occu-
pied it for 200 years. Later, Russia m its turn
expanded eastward; and this continued in
modem times after the Communist revolution
in Moscow.
But when the Russian expansion reached
areas under Chinese influence, it was halted,
and has even been forced to retreat — especially
since the Chinese Communists took power. For
example, Russia extended its influence and ac-
quired some special rights in Manchuria in the
late 19th century, when it constructed a railway
to the Pacific. But the Chinese Communists
insisted on ending this situation at the time of
their first agi'eement with the Soviets in 1950.
Outer Mongolia has been another bone of
contention. It was once a Chinese province,
but the Soviets engineered its independence in
the 1920's. Since the war, however, Chinese
influence in Outer Mongolia has been rising.
China and Mongolia have concluded a number
of political and economic agreements, includ-
ing a much heralded border agreement and ar-
rangements for thousands of Chinese laborers
to go to Mongolia to work. The Russians for
their part have poured more aid per capita into
Outer Mongolia than into any other country in
the world.
The border between Russia and China has
also been an issue, and Chou En-lai, the Chi-
nese Communist Premier, has mentioned this
publicly. There have been intensified efforts on
both sides of that border in recent years to de-
velop population centers along it, although this
may be motivated in each country by economic
considerations, as the Governments claim.
HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE CONFLICT
Mr. Steele: Mr. Hilsman, all the thousands of
bits and pieces of information which our Gov-
ernment can collect on this subject, from all
over the world, flow into the State Depart-
ment's Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
which you head. Would you sort out for us the
facts which you think are essential to this
story?
Mr. Hilsman: Well, Mr. Steele, to begin with.
Disagreement on international Policy
But even though all these matters have dis-
turbed Sino-Soviet relations, the real de-
terioration began in 1958. Until that year the
Moscow-Peiping alliance functioned pretty
much as everyone expected it to. Soviet mili-
tary aid was forthcoming for Mao Tse-tung's
armies. Soviet economic aid laid some indus-
trial foundations for Chinese development.
The emphasis was on "socialist unity," on
strengthening the Communist camp and pro-
272
DEPAETltENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN'
inoting the vrorld revolution. Policy differences
were quietly settled behind the scenes.
But from 1958 on, Chinese attitudes on in-
ternational matters began to conflict very
siiiiiificantly with Soviet policy. At first the
C^hinese criticisms of Khrushchev's policies
were camouflaged in the form of attacks on
Yugoslavia and on Tito, whom the Chinese
consider a renegade Commimist. But in April
1960 an article entitled "Long Live Leninism"
appeared in the Chinese Communist journal.
Red Flag. This article was the beginning of a
massive Chinese propaganda attack on three
basic principles of international Communist
policy as proclaimed from Moscow.
These three principles that Peiping rejected
were, first, the concept of peaceful coexistence
with the free world ; second, the idea that war
with the free world was not inevitable; and,
third, the belief that the so-called transition to
socialism in the capitalist countries could be
achieved by peaceful means.
In attacking these doctrines — these Soviet
doctrines — the Chinese in effect were accusing
Khrushchev of betraying the revolution. They
still didn't denounce him by name ; but in pri-
vate they did name names. The whole world,
Communist and free, understood. The Soviets
for their part immediately lashed back, and the
conflict was out in the open. It has been gath-
ering force ever since.
Evidences of Serious Dispute
Just a vei-y abbreviated sketch of the events
since that time shows that this is no paper
quarrel.
In August 1960, with the Chinese economy on
the brink of collapse, the Soviet Union with-
draws all its technicians from China. Then the
Kremlin summons representatives of 81 Com-
mimist parties throughout the world to a great
so-called "unity" conference at Moscow. In-
stead of unity, the meeting jiroduces a bitter
dispute between tlie Soviet and Chinese camps,
virtually splitting the Commimist movement
wide open. Albanian delegates, supporting
China, walk out.
In 1961 the Soviets begin to withdraw their
aid technicians from Albania; Albania retal-
iates by kicking out the ones remaining. China
signs an aid agreement with Albania, in effect
taking over the Soviet position there. Soviet
submarines are withdrawn from their Albanian
base at Valona and do not return. At the 22d
Communist Party Congress in Moscow, IQiru-
shchev denounces the Albanian leaders. Chou
En-lai rebukes Ivlirushchev for this and walks
out of the conference, staying in Moscow just
long enough to lay a wreath, pointedly, at
Stalin's tomb. Shortly thereafter the Soviets
remove Stalin's body from its place of honor
beside Lenin and scratch his name off the mau-
soleum in Red Square. After further angry
exchanges, the Soviet Union breaks off all dip-
lomatic relations with Albania.
In 1962 a summit meeting of the Council for
Economic Mutual Assistance — this is the Com-
munist international organization — is held at
Moscow. Albania, although a member of the
Council, is not invited to attend. The Council
charter is revised to allow admission of Asian
members, and Outer Mongolia — a member of
the Soviet camp — is admitted to membership.
Commmiist China either is not admitted or re-
fuses to join. Soviet President Brezhnev visits
Yugoslavia; and Tito, hated by the Cliinese, is
an honored guest in Moscow, where he even
addresses the Supreme Soviet. Peiping calls
the Soviet withdrawal of missiles and bombers
from Cuba "a Munich, pure and simple."
Chinese armies invade Indian territory, wMle
the Soviets continue economic and even some
military assistance to India.
In recent weeks, as you know, the exchange
of abuse between the two Communist powers
has reached still greater intensity.
Some Significant Facts
Now any assessment of these facts obviously
has to be provisional, when events are moving
as swiftly as they are now. I won't try to pre-
dict the future, but I think a few facts are
particularly significant.
First., the Chinese Communists have flatly re-
pudiated Soviet authority over themselves and
the rest of the Communist camp. The mono-
lithic character of the Communist movement,
perhaps its greatest source of strength, has dis-
appeared, at least for the time being.
Second, this controversy has spread far be-
FEBRUARY 25, 1963
273
yoiid the Soviet and Chinese borders. All of
the Communist parties of Asian countries, ex-
cept those of Ceylon, India, and Outer Mon-
golia, are supporting China or at least have
tried to stay neutral and avoid taking sides
with Moscow. Many other Communist parties
are sharply divided.
Third, Albania has defied Moscow and has
been supported not only by Peiping but by a
number of other Communist parties.
And fourth, the Soviets have used great eco-
nomic pressure against the Chinese in an effort
to bring them into line, and this effort has
failed. Soviet aid to China has been com-
jDletely terminated. Chinese goods no longer
receive sj^ecial treatment on tlie Soviet market,
and trade between the two countries has
dropped off drastically, as you see on this chart
here.^ (I should say that trade in oil, which is
very important to the Chinese Communists, is
still going on.) But that is quite a difference.
In fact, the Chinese are even being required
to ship $200 million worth of scarce goods to
the Soviets each year in repayment of past
debts — at a time when the Chinese economy is
strained to the limit. The Chinese used to
speak of building a "socialist" society in a mere
few years; now they speak in terms of decades.
Against facts like these it is difficult to be-
lieve that the Sino-Soviet bloc can soon recover
the kind of unity it has had in the past.
Mr. Steele : Thank you, Mr. Hilsman.
You suggest that it will be difficult for the
Sino-Soviet bloc to recover its former unity.
But does the possibility still remain that even
without this philosophic unity these two powers
may be able to work together militarily per-
haps against the free world ?
Mr. Hilsman: Well, there are factors press-
ing them together, and you must remember that
there is still the Sino-Soviet military alliance
which guarantees Russian support for Com-
munist China in the event of attack; and in
1958 Ivliruslichev informally, at least, in a let-
ter seemed to expand on that to include any
kind of attack. So I think you have to keep
these defensive obligations in mind when you
consider how far this break will go and whether
' Sino-Soviet trade dropijed from $2,055 million in
19.39 to $918 million in 1961.
it will still pei-mit them to cooperate militarily
if attacked.
Mr. Steele: Premier Khrushchev also re-
cently suggested that his country and Commu-
nist China downplay their differences. I think
it was done in East Berlin — he called for what
amounted to a public truce. Do you anticipate
any such development?
Mr. Hilsman: "Well, the Communist Chinese
rather promptly rejected this offer, and the
volume of polemics from the Chinese side has
certainly been very high. In fact the Chinese
are distributing pamphlets on their position
throughout the world to other Communist par-
ties in nine languages, including Esperanto.
SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES
Mr. Steele: Mr. Harriman, your present re-
sponsibilities lie primarily in the Far East, but
you were also our Ambassador to the Soviet
Union during World War II, when Stalin was
still vei-y much alive. Wliat do you think is
at the root of the Soviet difficulties with their
Chinese allies?
Mr. Harriman: Well, Mr. Steele, I think you
must understand that the competition or con-
flict between Russia and China — the Communist
parties in tlie Soviet Union and China — goes
back a long way.
I found in numerous talks with Stalin that he
did not liave much confidence in Mao Tse-tung.
When I reported to Washington that he called
the Cliinese "margarine Communists," some
people laughed; they were confusing Stalin's
statement with those of certain unrealistic ob-
servers who talked of Cliinese communism as
an "agrarian reform movement." Of course,
what Stalin had in mind was that the Chinese
Communists were not real Communists. To
Stalin, the only real Communists were those
who would accept domination by tlie Kremlin.
Now today this issue is out in the o]}e\\.
Secondly, there is a major Sino-Soviet dif-
ference, not in the ultimate objective but as to
the method of achieving that objective. Both
IMoscow and Peiping are determined that com-
munism shall sweep the world, but there is a
deep difference between them concerning the
methods to be employed.
274
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIXETIN
Now tliat tlie Soviet Union has achieved re-
markable industrial and scientific progi'ess, the
Kremlin leadei-s have become much more cau-
tious. They do not want everything that they
have built to be devastated by nuclear war.
Commimist China, however, has a great deal
less to lose.
The Chinese Communists are not only in a
more backward state of development, but they
have failed in their attempt to catch up, with
the collapse of the so-called "great leap for-
ward." The mainland Chinese people have
been living on an inadequate diet for the last
se\eral years. Many industrial plants are
closed down due to the failure of their agricul-
ture to produce the needed raw materials and,
of course, to their inability to import. The
Chinese Beds are incensed at the Kremlin
leaders because the Kremlin has turned its back
on them in tliis situation, as Mr. Hilsman
described.
It is natural that Khrushchev should be pur-
suing his policy which he calls "peaceful co-
existence," using all means to penetrate and
subvert free countries, to encourage local "wars
of liberation," but shying away from nuclear
conflict, as he proved in the case of Cuba.
Now Communist Cliina, however, as we see
in the ruthless attack on India, is more mili-
tarily aggressive.
"When Stalin's postwar plans to take over
Western Europe were frustrated by that great
coojjerative effort of the Marshall Plan, Stalin
turned his attentions toward the Far East and
concentrated there his ambitions. Arming the
North Koreans, he thought he could get con-
trol over the whole of Korea, thus strengthening
the Soviet position on the Pacific. When this
attack was thrown back, he retreated and left
to the Chinese Communists the defense of
North Korea against the United Nations
counterattack.
Chinese Attack on India
Now there appears to be rivalry for position.
The Chinese Communists have attacked India,
while the Soviet Union is still friendly to India
and continues to give her economic assistance
as well asMIG-21 aircraft.
The Chinese Communist objectives in India
appear to be not only to protect their newly
built road through Ladakh from Sinkiang
Province to Tibet but also to humiliate India
and explode the concept that India is a great
nation on which other Asian comitries can de-
pend. Nehru and in fact all the Indians I met
when I was in New Delhi last November recog-
nize that the Red Chinese aggression is a long-
term threat to their "way of life," as Nehru
has put it, or their "survival in freedom," as
others have stated. The Red Chinese hope to
destroy the image of India's success as a free
and independent nation and thereby weaken
resistance in Southeast Asia and open it up for
further Communist subversion and aggression.
Rivalry in Soutlieast Asia
The miderpopulated areas of Burma, Thai-
land, Cambodia, Laos, and South Viet-Nam
not only have a surplus of rice but could sup-
port a much larger population and then grow
even greater surpluses for export.
It is not yet clear, however, whether the So-
viet Union will want a Commimist Chinese
takeover of Southeast Asia. There appears to
be a conflict between them for influence with
the North Vietnamese Communists. Further-
more, the Soviet Union has been supporting
Indonesia with massive military and economic
assistance. Indonesian leaders have indicated
concern over Red Chinese expansionism.
Now no one can be sure where the conflict
between Moscow and Peiping will lead. So far
there is no indication that the Soviet Union
will abrogate her military alliance with Red
China. But now that the monolithic struc-
ture of international coimnmiism has been pub-
licly shattered, the historic rivalries between
Russia and China should tend to aggravate the
conflict.
Mr. Steele: Thank you very much, Mr.
Harriman.
There have been many reports, some recent,
that Communist China soon will achieve
nuclear capability. Wliat will this mean to the
Russians and to the West ?
Mr. Harriman: Well, Mr. Steele, first I think
we should make clear there may be an explo-
sion of a nuclear device in China within the
next year or two, but that is quite different from
FEBRUARY 25, 1963
275
developing a large arsenal of weapons with
nuclear warheads. That may take many years.
But when it does come, it certainly will make
the world a far more dangerous place even
than it is today, that is, assuming that the
leaders of Red China at that time have the same
attitude they have today. I would think that
the Soviet Union is already concerned over
that matter, and it may liave some bearing on
their present attitude and the reasons why they
seem to want to keep China's development slow.
India and the Soviet Union
Mr. Steele : There has been considerable sen-
timent expressed in congressional quarters
along the lines that our military assistance to
India should be predicated upon India's out-
right abandonment of its nonalined policy in
favor of an open, outright defense alliance with
ourselves. Do you think such suggestions have
any merit ?
Mr. Harriman: Well, I wouldn't think that
it would be desirable for India to break her rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, for instance.
Nehru and the Indian Government have indi-
cated that they are in for a struggle with Red
China, but they are still maintaining friendly
relations with the Soviet Union. Now they
are giving — the Soviet Union is still giving
economic and some military assistance, and I
think it is not a bad place for Mr. Khrushchev
to be. He is hanging on the horns of a di-
lemma between what he calls his "friend,"
India, and his ally, China. If India would
break with the Soviet Union, it would tend to
bring the two countries together.
Mr. Steele : The two countries — -
Mr. Harriman: — of China and the Soviet
Union.
Mr. Steele: Well, you mentioned military aid
to India. Can you give us some idea of the scope
of our present military assistance ?
Mr. Harriman: Yes, our present military
program is an emergency program of about $60
million, and the British and other members of
the Commonwealth are contributing an equal
amount. It is for arming mountain divisions to
help them resist another attack if it comes.
Mr. Steele: Do you expect a marked increase
in this aid ?
Mr. Harriman: That hasn't been — they
haven't asked for it. That is a matter for
analysis and consideration. There is an air
mission that is studying the air requirements,
but no decision has been made beyond this one.
Mr. Steele: Wliat about the scope of Soviet
assistance — military assistance — to India?
Mr. Harriman: Economic assistance is very
real, but the military assistance is purely token
assistance. They are delivering, I think, half
a dozen MIG's they have promised. There has
been talk that some years from now they will
help them develop a factory to build MIG's.
Wliether that will come off or not, it is too early
to judge.
Mr. Steele: Hardly substantial in the mili-
tary field.
Mr. Harriman: Not substantial, no; they are
not of any significance at all, but they are
rather important, I think, in riling Peiping. I
should think they must be very annoyed.
CHINA AND THE NATURE OF COMMUNISM
Mr. Steele: Mr. Johnson, you have served a
good many years in the Far East, including
China, and behind the Iron Curtain as well.
Wliat light can you throw on all this for us,
and what does it mean to us ?
Mr. Johnson: In part, Mr. Steele, I think the
answer is to be foimd, first, in the historical
background and nature of China as a country
and, secondly, in the basic nature of commu-
nism itself.
It is not by accident that China called itself
the "Middle Kingdom." The Chinese character
used to write its name still today is the char-
acter for "middle" or "center."
Now all peoples at some stage have thought
of themselves as the center of the world, around
which everything else revolves. Most of them
have more or less gotten over it when they
found that it hardly fitted the facts. How-
ever, through the thousands of years of Chinese
history down into the last centuiy, the Chinese
have probably had less reason to question the
fact than any other people. It was only in the
last century that China began to have any rela-
tionship with the outside world on a basis other
than as a suzerain and vassal. Doors were shut
276
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
foi
air
jto any relationship of equality with other states.
The doore to the outside world have now
again been shut, and there is today no major
people or group of leaders who are in the true
sense more ignorant of what is going on in the
outside world than those in Peiping. Sur-
rounded by a population greater than that of
the Soviet Union, the United States, and all the
countries of Western Europe combined, they are
smugly sitting in Peiping disdaining the rest of
the world, except insofar as they look forward
to its again being brought under Chinese
suzerainty, with envoys again bearing tribute
to Peiping.
Now while they are having their economic
difficulties, as has been pointed out — and these
difficulties are serious indeed — I see no sign that
tliis has shaken the smugness of their rulers or
their goal of a Communist empire with the
"Middle Kingdom" at its center.
Importance of Central Control
Now this leads to the second point, that is,
the basic nature of communism itself. All of
us who have lived under the Communist system
are impressed with the fact that, since it lacks
the automatic controls of our economy and
society, communism requires firm and unques-
tioning control from a central point of all
means of production, including most impor-
tantly the human resource, that is, people.
It is not just that Communist leaders are evil
people hungry for power that requires tliem to
control the lives of those under their rule ; it is
an imperative of the system that they do so. It
is equally clear that, to operate such a system,
there cannot be several directors but only one
central direction. Now this is just as true of
relations between Communist states as it is
witliin such states.
Until the rise of Peiping, Moscow was on
every count the dominant Communist power,
and except for Yugoslavia, all other Communist
states and parties miquestioningly accepted
Kremlin direction. But given the psychology
of the Chinese leaders, it was inevitable that
Peiping eventually would challenge and refuse
to accept Kremlin domination.
All of us recognized that this time would
probably come, but I think that it has come and
is develoi)ing considerably faster than many of
us thought likely. It did not seem rational that
Peiping would cut itself off so soon from the
Soviet technical and capital assistance which it
so badly needs, but the fact remains that it has
done so.
Competing Centers of Power
Now this does not mean that either the Soviet
Union or Communist China is going to be any
less "Communist" than they have been in the
past. Nor does it mean that commimism is
going to present fewer dangers to us. In fact,
the greater belligerence of the Chinese Com-
munists, unrestrained by Soviet caution, may
present greater dangers, particularly in the
areas around China's borders. We have already
seen this demonstrated in the Chinese attack on
India.
However, it does mean that communism is
changing, and our responses to it must be tai-
lored to meet the changing situation. It means
that communism will no longer be a single,
monolithic movement, directed from Moscow
and serving solely the Soviet national interests.
There will now be in the movement competing
centers of power, with stresses and strains that
are already evident in every Communist party
in the world.
During the almost 4 years that I was negoti-
ating with the Chinese Communists at Geneva,
between 1954 and 1958, what I found most
annoying and fnistrating was their supreme
self-confidence that they need make no conces-
sions of any kind and that if they just waited
lone enouffh we would be forced to make all the
concessions to them.
And it is very hard to arrive at any under-
standing with people who officially call you "the
most ferocious enemy of the people of the
world" and who believe that your destruction
by war is inevitable.
Revolutionary Force of Nationalism
My own view is that the incompatibility of
commimism not only with the aspirations of
individuals but also with the aspirations of
nations is clearly coming to the surface.
In addition to communism, the great revolu-
tionary force of this century has been national-
FEBRUARY 25, 1963
277
ism. Just in the 17 short years since the end of
the Second World War, 46 new free states have
been formed and more are in the process. Each
of these states is fiercely jealous of its na-
tional independence and does not want to be
dominated by anyone.
None of them has chosen communism for
itself. I think that each of them is increasingly
recognizing that communism is incompatible
with the maintenance of its independence and
that the United States, on the other hand, rep-
resents no threat to its independence. They
recognize that we truly mean what we say when
we state our policy as being that of fostering
the development of a world of peaceful, inde-
pendent, and economically prosperous states.
Thus we have come to terms with the nation-
alism of this century. Commimism has not
been able to do so, and cannot do so and still
remain the communism that we have known.
My own conviction is that, when the history of
this century is written, nationalism will have
proved to be a more powerful revolutionary
force than communism, and this gives me
confidence for the future.
Effect Upon East-West Relations
Mr. Steele: Thank you, Mr. Jolinson. I
would like to ask you whether the current diffi-
culty between Red China and Moscow makes
more likely an easing of tensions between
Russia and the West, including ourselves.
Mr. Johnson: I think it is difficult to gener-
alize too broadly in this. However, it is likely
that there will develop certain common interests
between ourselves and the Soviet Union in the
light of this. For example, we have mentioned
the probable Soviet interest in seeing that
China does not develop a nuclear capability.
We have a similar interest.
It may also be that the Soviet Union does not
look with favor upon Chinese expansionism
into Southeast Asia. If so, there may be a basis
for understanding with the Soviet Union on
that.
Whether the failure of the Soviets in the last
few weeks to exacerbate the tensions in Berlin
or to indicate that they are going to bring the
Berlin situation to a crisis is due to their rela-
tions with the Chinese Communists, or whether
it is due to our firmness with respect to Berlin,
it is difficult to say. It is probably a combi-
nation of both.
Mr. Steele: In this connection, are there any
diplomatic steps or new policies which the
United States could consider undertaking in
order to exploit this Sino-Soviet trouble?
Mr. Johnson: There, Mr. Steele, I think we
should be very careful not to appear to be
interfering in what is a family quarrel. We all
know that there is nothing that unites members
of a family quicker than having outsiders in-
tervene. So I think that we must be very, very
careful.
However, I do think that where there are
common interests developed between ourselves
and the Soviet Union, such as, for example,
regarding the development of nuclear power in
China, I think we should be prepared to
negotiate with the Soviet Union.
Mr. Steele: There have been some sugges-
tions, from time to time, that since Khrushchev
sounds a little softer on the matter of nuclear
war than do the Red Chinese, we had better
strengthen his hand lest he be kicked out or
thrown out and replaced by a hardliner of the
Chinese Communist school. "WHiat do you
think of this line of thinking?
Mr. Johnson: Well, it seems to me Khru-
shchev has shown considerable ability to take
care of himself through tlie years, and I doubt
that he needs our help or that he would ask for
our help. However, I do think that where we
have a common interest with Khrushchev,
where we are able to reach an agreement
that is in our interest, I think we should be
prepared to negotiate with him.
I am sure that your question does not imply
that we should make concessions to Khrushchev
that would not be in our interest, simply in
order to maintain him in power.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Steele: That concludes the briefing. We
turn now to our very distinguished audience
and, to begin with, to four special guests whom
we have invited because of their particular in-
terest and background in this subject. These
are:
278
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Professor Kurt L. London, director of the
Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies at George
Washington University;
Dr. William C. Johnstone, professor of
Asian studies at the Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies;
Mr. Warren Unna, a foreign affairs corre-
spondent of the Washington Post, who recently
visited Southeast Asia ; and
Mrs. Lorraine B. Torres, staff associate of the
American Association of University Women
and a one-time Asian affairs specialist in the
State Department's intelligence bureau herself.
"Wlao would like to begin? Dr. London.
Clarification of Terms
Dr. London: In view of the frequent use of
such terms as confllcf, split, ireak, when dis-
cussing Sino-Soviet relations, should we not
first of all clarify the meaning of these terms
when we consider that relations between Com-
munist states are really taking place on two
levels, party and state? With Albania, for in-
stance, there is a complete break both in party
and state relations. In the case of Yugoslavia,
we only have the break in party affairs.
Wliat are we talking of in the Sino-Soviet
relations? Is it an ideological split, a meth-
odological split? Is it an unofficial break?
Is it just a dialectical argument ?
Mr. Steele: Governor Harriman, would you
like to answer that ?
Mr. Harri'man: Well, you have covered a
great deal of territory. But I think there is no
such thing as a break so far. There has been
a real conflict and real competition, as has been
described.
I don't think there will be a break unless
there is a repudiation of the military agree-
ment between the two countries. That will
indicate that both ideologically and practically
the party and the two nations will have severed
their attempts to work together. Now I am
not suggesting that that will happen.
Mr. Hilsinan: Another factor of this is the
oil export from the Soviet Union to Communist
China. Communist China needs that oil ; and
when you see that stop, that will be another
milestone toward that break.
Mr. Harriman: — if you see it stop.
Nationalist China
Mr. Untui: Secretary Johnson, there lias
been a great deal of confusion in this coun-
try as to United States policy regarding Chiang
Kai-shek and Nationalist China. What is Na-
tionalist China harassment of the Chinese
mainland doing to Sino-Soviet relations today,
and wliat does the United States relationship
with Chiang do to exacerbate this?
Mr. Johnson: I don't know whether our re-
lations with Chiang and Taiwan are having
much effect on this relationship. Of course,
insofar as the Chinese Communists feel them-
selves threatened, they may be more belligerent.
I think also that the Soviet Union would prob-
ably not be content to see Communist China
disappear as a Communist country. Of course,
at least in tlie nominal sense of the term, the
Soviet Union would have the hope that there
might be some change in leadership that might
bring it back closer together in its relationship
with Moscow.
Differences on Policy Toward West
Mr. Steele: Do any of the other briefers
want to comment on Mr. Unna's question ? Do
we have another question? Yes, Mrs. Torres.
Mrs. Torres: One longstanding difference
between these two Communist parties has not
been specifically mentioned yet, and that is the
Soviet policy, condoned by Lenin, of support-
ing non-Communist nationalist movements at
least temporarily. The Chinese Communists
have bitter memories of the application of this
policy when in the 1920's they were ordered to
work within the Kuomintang and for their
pain suffered two military defeats in Shanghai
and along the Wuchan.
Is the application of this policy still a major
difference between these two Communist
parties, particularly in relation to India ? Mr.
Johnson ?
Mr. Johnson: Yes, I think that it is. I
think, in general, the Soviet Union remains
much more willing to work with so-called neu-
tralist non-Communist states than do the Chi-
nese. This, of course, has been one of the
sources of conflict between them.
Peiping has, in effect, been saying to the So-
viet Union, "Why do you give so much help
FEBRUARY 25, 1963
279
to these fuzzy neutralists like India when we,
your good friends and Communist comrades,
need more help than India does?" I thinli this
is going to continue to be a source of diiference
between them.
Mr. Harriman: Of course there is no differ-
ence in the objective. The Soviets want to use
these countries, believing they can undermine
them- — these non-Communist countries — and
eventually take them over for commmiism.
Mr. Hilsman: This, again, is a question of
method. I think you are quite right. This
dispute is about ideology, about the organiza-
tion of the Commimist bloc, where the power
shall lie, but it is also about policy toward the
West, differences in view about policy toward
the West and about policy toward the neutrals
and the underdeveloped world. They are all
facets of the same dispute.
Basic Concepts of Communism
Mr. Steele : Do we have other questions from
our audience ? Yes, Dr. Johnstone.
Dr. Johnstone : Mr. Johnson, on the question
of nationalism on which you spoke, is it really
a struggle between nations or is it a struggle
between the leadership of the Communist
movement ?
Mr. Johnson : I think there are two elements
in it. I think there is the personal element
between the Commuiiist leaders, but I think
the imderlying factor is a struggle on the basis
of national interest — that is, the Soviet Union
is struggling for its national interest, and
China is struggling for its national interest;
and this is the underlying factor in the rela-
tionships between them. And this is going to
remain, I think.
Mr. Steele : Yes, Mr. Unna.
Mr. Unna : Mr. Hilsman, some people in this
country may wonder about the idea of a Sino-
Soviet rift being particularly to the interest
of the United States. Does this present some
problems some of us might not suspect existed ?
Mr. Hilsman: Well, I certainly think that
those people who think that a break between the
Chinese and the Russians is going to solve all
of our problems ought to be a little bit more
cautious. It is certainly going to be a changed
world, but either in the long run or in the short
rmi it might not be all to the good for us.
You might have two aggressive Communist-
bloc activities going on at the same time which
would complicate it more. On the other hand,
a highly unified bloc is a source of great power.
So I think the answer is mixed. It very much
depends upon how the thing goes.
I think Governor Harriman might have
sometliing to say on this too.
Mr. Harriman: Well, I think you have said
it quite well.
Mr. Steele: Do we have other questions?
Yes, the gentleman in the second row, and will
you give us your name, please?
Mr. Stein: I am Herbert Stein. I wonder
whether we should attach any significance to the
ideological content of the debate between the
Soviet Union and China. Or is this just a kind
of campaign oratory which only means that one
party is in and that the other party is out and
that they would not behave differently from
each other if they each faced the same real
power situation ?
Mr. Harriman: If I may take that — each
side uses the dogma to defend what it wants
to do. But for some time I think it has been a
fact that there has been a pragmatic approach
to dogma to use it for the particular purposes
that the leaders of each country had at that
time.
But don't let's forget that underlying all of
this is the basic concept of Communist dictator-
ship, and these are really very fine points that
are being argued about so heatedly.
Viet-Nam and the Sino-Soviet Dispute
Mr. Steele: Dr. Johnstone.
Dr. Johnstone: In the relationsliip of Ho Chi
Minh relative to the Sino-Soviet debate, how
much longer are the Cliinese Conmiunists going
to let him pretend, at least, to play ball with
Moscow? And to the extent that we have to
step up our assistance to the Republic of Viet-
Nam, how much longer are the Chinese Commu-
nists going to permit us to do that without
intervening ?
Mr. Harriman: Well, you asked two different
questions. On the first point, it looks as though
Ho Chi Minh is trying to play both ends
280
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
against the middle. He wants to get Russian
supiwrt; the Viet Minh do not wish to have
the Chinese overrun them. You might say that
their hearts are in Moscow, but their stomachs
are in China.
Possible Repercussions in the West
Mr. Steele : I think there was a gentleman in
the — Yes. Will you give us your name, sir?
Mr. O^Brien: Frank O'Brien of the Commit-
tee for Economic Development. The break or
dispute we are talking about here today in the
Communist world is so big that it is bound to
have repercussions also outside of the Commu-
nist world, and I would like to ask Governor
Harriman if these are now becoming apparent.
For instance, President de Gaulle of France
speaks of the possibility of an alliance between
continental "Western Europe and Russia, and he
wants to diminish American influence in con-
tinental Western Europe. Do you see in this an
encouragement to De Gaulle arising from this
dispute in the Commmiist world ?
Mr. Harr'tman: I think, as you put your
question, there are some facts which I would
have to question. Back in 1943 De Gaulle
thought there might be an alliance between
France and the Soviet Union, but he has long
since dropped that idea. He has recently indi-
cated that it would be desirable to expand trade
between Western Europe and the Soviet Union.
He has also indicated that Europe should
stand on its own feet and not be dependent upon
the United States. Actually, we would like to
see Europe stand on its own feet.
But at the present time, unfortunately,
Europe needs the United States — certainly
military — assistance to resist Soviet Union
aggression, should it come.
Mr. Steele: Yes, in the back row, a gentle-
man.
Mr. Carr: My name is Randolph Carr. I
would like to ask Mr. Hilsman if he foresees,
during the remainder of the sixties, the Soviet
Union moving toward the Chinese position with
regard to taking the offensive in the imder-
developed areas of the world.
Mr. nUsman: No, I wouldn't think so. There
are endless possibilities as you go further and
further into the future — circumstances change
or their tactics will change with it. Certainly
the Soviet Union is flexible with this. But I
thinlc they have lived longer in the wide world
than the Chinese Communists have.
I think, having possessed nuclear weapons,
having faced the crisis of Cuba, that they un-
derstand the dangers in the world, and I think
that their policies are going to be more sophisti-
cated. I think they still have the same objec-
tives that the Commimists have always had, but
I think they are more subtle and sophisticated
in their application and I think part of it is
their attitude toward these underdeveloped
countries.
Mr. Steele: Does anybody else want to com-
ment on that?
Mr. Johnson: No, I think that covers it in
every respect.
Communism and Indonesia
Mr. Steele: Mr. Unna.
Mr. Unna: Concentrating on the giants,
there sometimes is a tendency to neglect some
of the almost-giants. Now Indonesia is the
world's fifth largest nation, and she has a very
large Commimist Party. The Prime Minister
of Malaya, Timku Abdul Rahman, is very
fearful that Indochina's Conmavmist Party is
pushing Indonesia into interfering with his in-
terests in forming a Federation of Malaysia.
How does this reflect on Sino-Soviet rela-
tions? Is this something the Soviet Union
would not want to see tampered with ? Is this
something China would be egging Indochina
on? What would Indonesia's response be?
Mr. Harriman: That is on my area at the
present time. Certainly nationalism, as Mr.
Johnson has pointed out, is the strongest emo-
tion of Sukarno and the Indonesian people as
a whole. Now there are influences other than
the Communist Party at work in the army, and
other parties that are strongly for Indonesian
independence from any communism. There are
some of them that are strongly opposed to
Chinese aggression and for Chinese commu-
nism, whereas they are getting substantial
support — as I have said — from both military
and economic assistance from Russia.
Their thrust in West New Guinea was a
nationalist thrust, not a Communist thrust, and
FEBRUARY 25, 1963
281
it is too early to say what the future of Indo-
nesia will hold. We hope that Indonesia will
remain an independent country; and I agree
with what Mr. Jolinson said, that the force of
nationalism, probably in the case of Indonesia
as well as other countries, will be stronger than
the subversive force of communism.
Mr. Steele : Mrs. Torres.
Mrs. Torres: Mr. Hilsman, why did the
Cliinese allow their differences to become so
public in the i)eriod from 1958 to 1960, which
was a very bad period for them economically ?
Mr. Hilsman: This is one of the great puzzles
of the whole dispute. I think, though, that we
perhaps ought not to be looking too much for
hidden things. I remember the Macaulay quote
about how they spent endless days and nights
searching for the hidden motives beliind what
were only simple blunders.
I think you also must remember that a dis-
pute like this within a bloc of the nature of the
Communist bloc has a dynamism of its own, and
once it starts to roll, it begins to roll. I don't
really think you ought to try to read too much
into the precise date that the quaiTel became
public. The elements of it have been there a
long time.
Polycentric vs. Monocentric Communism
Mr. Steele : Dr. London.
Dr. London: Is it really necessary that com-
munism must be monocentric to be really dan-
gerous ? If we have a polycentric development
in communism, could that not give us just as
much trouble, particularly if you have two
world centers in the future, perhaps, of com-
munism^Moscow and Peiping ?
Mr. Hilsman: That is what I meant to say
when I was replying to Mr. Unna's question.
It doesn't necessarily turn out good for us.
Mr. Johnson: No. I think we all agree on
that. But the point I was making was that a
polycentric coimnunism is a different kind of
communism than a monocentric communism,
and correspondingly you've got to deal with it
in a different way than you do a monocentric
one.
Mr. Steele: Questions? Yes, the gentleman
in the front row, and give us your name, will
you please?
282
Mr. Morrow: I am Conrad ]\Iorrow. Mr.
Johnson, do you feel Communist China is more
willing to accept a nuclear war, or is this just a
propaganda bluff on their part ?
Mr. Johnson: I think, as Mr. Hilsman said.
Communist China probably does not yet under- '
stand the full realities of a nuclear war to the
degree that the Soviet Union does. The Soviet
Union has lived through and with this nuclear
development, as we have, and both the Soviet
Union and the United States appreciate this.
At the present moment I think the answer is
yes; not understanding nuclear war and the
possibilities of it, I think Communist China —
Mr. Hihrrmn: Nuclear explosions have to be
seen to be believed.
Mr. Steele : Dr. Johnstone.
Dr. Johnstone: Mr. Hilsman, could I ask
you a question back on the Viet-Nam situation ?
Do you think that, to the degi-ee to which we
succeed in our objectives in Viet-Nam, there is
going to come a point at which the Chinese
Communists will not want to let us succeed and
may therefore act in a much more vigorous
way than they have up to date?
Mr. HUsnrnn: If you are suggesting that, if
the Viet Cong appears to be losing the guerrilla
war in South Viet-Nam, the Chinese will feel
it necessai-y to enter massively, I would say no,
they will not.
I think they would like to win, but winning
in South Viet-Nam, which is on the free- world
side of the Iron Curtain, is not the same thing
as losing on some center of Chinese Communist
power or having a center of Chinese Conmiu-
nist power threatened.
I think it is perfectly clear, from what the
Chinese Communists say and the way they
behave, that although they are aggressive and
sometimes reckless, they do have a sense of the
consequences of a major war in the Pacific and
don't think they can afford it.
Dr. Johnstons: Would they be more likely,
therefore, to push into India again on that
score, for that reason ?
Mr. Hilsman: Well, you are jumping from
one set of circumstances to another that is quite
different.
Mr. Steele : I believe that this is all the time
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
kat we have for questions, and we are very
grateful for the panel's interest and our audi-
■iice's interest.
CONCLUSION
And now I am sure we would all like to hear
the views on this subject of the Secretaiy of
State, Dean Kusk. Secretaiy Rusk.
Secretary Busk: Ladies and gentlemen, this
is the briefing room of our State Department
Operations Center. Day and night, informa-
tion pours into this center from all over the
world, including up to 1,000 telegraphic dis-
patches evei-y 2-i hours. Responsible officers are
on duty around the clock, and others meet here
continually to be briefed and to work out plans.
Surely this makes us one of the busiest Foreign
Offices anywhere in the world.
All of this intense activity is directed essen-
tially to our maua business: the advancement
of American interests in our foreign relations
and the worldwide struggle for freedom and
peace. Daily, sometimes hourly, we ask our-
selves : "\^niat does this particular development
mean to the United States and to the rest of the
free world? Does it endanger our interests?
If so, are we taking the right action to protect
them ? What more can be done ?
'Wlien we consider current Sino-Soviet rela-
tions, involving as they do this vast area at the
center of the Eurasian landmass, we ask our-
selves the same questions. Only history can
give the final answers, and we must constantly
reevaluate our working conclusions. But at
this moment I think we can sum up these con-
clusions under two headings — a warning and a
note of encouragement.
The warning must be directed against wish-
ful thuiking. Both principal Commimist
powers are committed to a Communist world
system, to the destruction of freedom. The
chief arguments between them are over how
best to "bury" us — that is, over method. That
gives us no reason to relax our guard. The
Commimist threats to freedom are still serious.
Indeed, in some areas they may increase in the
months ahead.
Our task is to continue resolutely on tlie path
wo have chosen — maintaining and strengthen-
ing our defenses and building a free world,
while striving, through negotiation, to reduce
the areas of conflict.
At the same time I think we can find in this
debate among the Communists an important
confirmation of a truth we have long recog-
nized. That is — to correct Karl Marx — that it
is communism, not modern democracy, which
contains within itself the seeds of its own decay.
This is cause for encouragement about the
future of freedom, for confidence that if we
persevere, if we do not grow weary and falter,
we can move toward a rule of law and a world
community truly at peace.
U.S. Defense Production Experts
Go to India for Consultations
Press release 54 dated January 28
At the Government of India's request, the
U.S. Government is sending a team of defense
production experts to India early in February
to consult with the Indian authorities on
India's program of expansion of its defense
production capabilities to meet its increased
requirements. It is expected that the team will
remain in India for a few weeks.
U.S. Will Not Ship Aid Cargoes
on Vessels Engaged in Cuban Trade
White House press release dated February 6
The Wliite House annoimced on February 6
that steps have been taken to assure that United
States Government-financed cargoes are not
shipped from the United States on foreign-flag
vessels engaging in trade with Cuba. The con-
cerned departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment have been directed not to permit shipment
of any such cargoes on vessels that have called
at a Cuban port since January 1, 1963, miless
the owner of such a ship gives satisfactory as-
surances that no ship under his control will
thenceforth be employed in the Cuban trade.
FEBRUARY 25, 1963
283
Terms of Trade and the Brazilian Balance of Payments
by Lincoln Gordon
Ambassador to Brazil ^
I was naturally greatly honored to be asked
to meet with this distinguished group and to
discuss some aspects of Brazilian-American
economic relations. Ever since I began sev-
eral years ago to study the Brazilian economy,
I have developed a very high regard for the
quality of tlie studies imdertaken by the Na-
tional Economic Council and for the notable
contribution of this body in providing objective
advice on national economic problems.
I did have some trouble in deciding what to
discuss in my talk, not for lack of material but
because of its overabundance. Brazilian-Amer-
ican economic relationships are large and are
important for both nations. Trade between
us is, of course, a very much higher proportion
of your total than it is of ours, but Brazil is
sixth in rank among the sources of United
States imports ; we value this trade and hope it
can be expanded in the mutual interest of both
coimtries. There are substantial North Ameri-
can private investments here, especially in the
newer manufacturing industries, and these also
we believe are playing a notable and construc-
tive part in Brazilian economic development.
In our efforts to assist that development
through the Alliance for Progi'ess, we have
placed high hopes on collaboration with Brazil
as the giant of Latin America, with the process
of industrialization and healthy structural
change already underway and an enviable rec-
ord of growtli in recent years in spite of serious
regional and functional imbalances and an in-
creasingly painful rate of inflation.
Having made the Alliance for Progi-ess the
major theme of my previous public speeches in
Brazil, most of them now republished in the
small book called 0 Progresso pela Alianga,
and having discussed the special problems of
the Northeast only a week ago in Sao Paulo, I
thought that I would concentrate today on the
much discussed, but often badly misunderstood,
question of Brazil's terms of trade and related
aspects of the balance of payments. I do want
first, however, to say a few words about some
aspects of American aid to Brazil, taking into
account a note released by the Brazilian Em-
bassy in Washington and given to the press
here on January 23.^ "Written with the laud-
able objective of dispelling some exaggerations
and misunderstandings in American circles on
this siibject, I fear that this note may be gen-
erating other and equally serious misunder-
standings here.
On reading this note, I could not help being
reminded of a famous article in the Correio da
Manhd by my good friend Ambassador Eoberto
Campos, published before he took charge of the
Brazilian Embassy in Washington, on the trials
of being a diplomat. He described with pun-
gency and hiunor the schizophrenia involved in
having to defend abroad policies and positions
that one criticizes at home, and vice versa. In
these days of instant communication and effi-
cient journalism, however, and in countries like
both of ours, which enjoy a free press, it is im-
possible to insulate our statements, mainly in-
tended for an audience in one country, from the
attention of the other. In this situation the
' Address made before the National Economic Coun-
cil at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on Jan. 29.
" Not printed here.
284
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETTN
only safe rule is to state our positions objec-
tively and to avoid overstating points for the
sake of emphasis.
It is in this spirit, ratlier than one of intellec-
t ual or diplomatic polemics, that I want to cor-
rect some of the misconceptions which may be
created by last week's note of the Brazilian Em-
bassy in Washington. I was happy to see this
same spirit reflected in a full-page interview of
Ambassador Campos in the Trihwrm de Im-
pvensa last Saturday.
American Aid to Brazil
At the start the Embassy note suggests that
aid should be measured in terms of disburse-
ments rather than commitments and that the
return flow of amortization and interest pay-
ments should be deducted from the gross figures
in order to measure the net transfer of resources
from the American to the Brazilian economy.
This points calls for two observations :
(a) Since the United States Government fol-
lows the practice of honoring its commitments,
the difference between commitments and actual
disbursements is simply a matter of the time
period required for the aid project to be carx'ied
out. In some cases, such as shipments of wheat,
this takes a few months ; in others, such as loans
for steel mills or electric power plants, it may
be spread over 2 years or even longer, while
the project is bemg built. It is hard to under-
stand why the Embassy attaches significance to
the distinction.
(b) Measuring the net transfer of resources
by deducting amortization and interest pay-
ments from gross loans is misleading and is
also bad economics. It totally disregards the
advantage to the borrowing country (and, in
strictly economic terms, the disadvantage to
the lending countiy) of the possession of the
resources during the period of the loan. But
this is the very essence of investment and the
key to development. Let me illustrate.
Following the Embassy's reasoning, $1 bil-
lion loaned by the Export-Import Bank, and
fully repaid over 20 years, including a 3-year
grace period at the beginning while the proj-
ects are imder construction, and with interest
at the conventional international rate of say
5 percent, represents no net transfer of re-
sources to the Brazilian economy. Indeed, by
tlie end of the period, if interest payments are
atlded to the repayments of principal, the net
transfer is apparently from Brazil to the United
States ! But this disregards the fact that dur-
ing the period of the loan those resources are
being used in Brazil and not in the United
States. As every economist and every business-
man knows, the use of those funds in Brazil for
20 yeai-s makes possible the building of steel
mills, power plants, or other productive invest-
ments with a return to the Brazilian economy
far in excess of the interest charges involved.
The 3-year development plan published by
the Brazilian Government last month bases its
projections on a marguial capital-output ratio
of 2.65, which is said to be in line with recent
experience in this counti-y. The meaning of
this ratio is that 265 units of additional capi-
tal investment in the Brazilian economy will,
on the average, make possible an addition of
100 units per year to the total annual output
of this country. On that basis $1 billion
loaned by the Export-Import Bank and in-
vested in projects of average yield for the Bra-
zilian economy would add $375 million per
year to Brazil's gross national product. As-
siuning a 20-year loan, with a 3-year gi'ace
period during the construction of the project
and an mterest rate of 5 percent on the amounts
of the loan outstanding, then by the end of the
20 years the Brazilian economy will have en-
joyed a total additional national output of
$6,375 million (17 years times $375 million per
year) , as a result of the investment, while pay-
ing total interest charges of $575 million.
Someone with no miderstanding of either
economics or business might say : This is all
very well, but at the end of the 20 years the
United States has back its original $1 billion
plus $575 million in interest ; has it not gained
as well? The answer, of course, is that the
same billion dollars invested in the United
States would also have returned much more
additional output than the interest charges in-
volved. Since the American economy is more
heavily capitalized than the Brazilian, the
marginal capital-output ratio is higher — per-
haps 4.5 instead of 2.65. Over 17 years this
would mean $3.8 billion of additional output
FEBRUARY 25, 19 63
675152—63 3
285
forgone as a result of the transfer of the invest -
able resources to another country.
If the Brazilian Embassy had been making
the point that in any one year the effect of new
loans on the balance of payments of both Bra-
zil and the United States is partially offset by
amortization payments on old loans, I -would
of course agree. But interest charges, which
result from the loan, should not be tlirown into
this reckoning without also throwing in the
other effects of the loan on the current balance
of payments. These include the effects of the
investment on replacing imports or expanding
exports. If this calculation were made for all
loans and investments in the postwar period —
as it has been made by GEIA [GrujDo Executivo
da Indiistria Automobilistica] in the case of the
automotive industry — it would be found that
the net effects of both public and private for-
eign investments have been very favorable for
the Brazilian balance of payments. They have
also played a most important role in the process
of structural transformation, well described in
the 3-year plan, which has permitted the Bra-
zilian economy to grow at an annual rate of
6 to 7 percent per year without a major increase
in its volume of imports.
Burden of Foreign Loans on U.S. Taxpayers
If I may turn now to another point, the Bra-
zilian Embassy's note proceeds to suggest that
since the Export-Import Bank secures its funds
through the sale of Treasury bills to American
investors, foreign loans made by that Bank im-
pose no burden on the taxpayer. This is a very
dubious argument. Like the Brazilian Treas-
ury, the United States Treasury meets its finan-
cial obligations through a combination of tax
resources and borrowing, seeking to borrow
from the public only through noninflationaiy
means. If it were not borrowing to make for-
eign loans, the same resources would be avail-
able to meet other public expenditures or to
reduce taxes. The fact that the specific source
of Treasury funds applied to Export-Import
Bank loans happens to come from public bor-
rowings rather than taxes is irrelevant.
The Embassy note goes on to argue that, be-
cause of the deterioration in the terms of trade
of Brazil, American taxpayers and consumers
have been gaining in real terms in the last few
years in an amomit equal to or greater than
all the postwar aid. This argument combines
the above-mentioned error in the concept of
the net value of aid with a calculation on terms
of trade arbitrarily based on the period
1950-53, when Brazilian export prices were un-
usually high. This question of the terms of
trade is the major topic that I will be discussing
in detail this afternoon. Suffice it to say at this
point that, had the Embassy chosen to use as
its base the 3 years 1947 to 1949 instead of the
years of the Korean war, it would have arrived
at the opposite conclusion.
The Embassy note also makes a great deal
of the fact that the aid was for the most part
conditioned on the purchase of goods and serv-
ices from the United States. This is not unnat-
ural and does not detract from the value of the
aid. Indeed, unless international aid results in
a flow of real resources from the supplying to
the receiving countiy, it cannot be aid at all.
Sometimes the flow of goods and services is
triangular rather than direct. But in basic
economic terms any useful aid must be reflected
in a transfer of real resources.
The Embassy note also appears to argue that
the American economy benefited from the uti-
lization of excess capacity in export industries.
This argument might cany some weight if the
American economy had been suffering from
chronic depression since the war, which it has
not. But it is equally arguable that similar in-
vestment expenditures within the United States
would have been equally useful in providing
immediate markets for American industry and
more useful for the American economy over the
long terra in producing a net increment to the
American gross national product.
Uses of American Aid
Finally it is argued that the aid was well used
by Brazil, since this country was not squander-
ing foreign exchange on unnecessary imports,
and it has maintained a very satisfactory rate
of growth all through the postwar period. On
tliis point I am generally in agreement. Most
of the aid from the United States in the post-
war years, along with private investment, has
been well used by Brazil and has contributed
286
DEPAETIIENT OF STATE BULLETIN
substantially to the unusually good record of
recent Brazilian economic gro\yth. This is the
fact which refutes the widely spread cliches
about the so-called "process of spoliation" in
our economic relationships.
At the same time we should recognize that
there have been some disappointments on our
side, as well as yours, in connection with aid.
The major disappointments have been with
respect to aid specifically designed to help Bra-
zilian programs to reduce inflation and to im-
prove the balance of payments. Even here the
concern in American circles does not arise from
alleged misuse of the aid. It arises, rather,
fi'om the absence of effective complementary
Brazilian policies in the budgetary, monetary,
and foreign exchange policy fields which would
achieve the central purposes agreed on from
time to time between the two Governments.
Tlais includes not only the failure in recent
years to reduce the rate of inflation but also the
adoption of some policies whicli positively dis-
courage the inflow of foreign private invest-
ment and of other policies which discourage
the development of the Brazilian export
potential.
As I said before, intellectual polemics do not
appear to me a constructive basis on which to
deal with the sei-ious problems of Brazilian-
American cooperation in the common interests
of our two countries. I believe that much more
rewarding results will flow from a joint exami-
nation, in a cool and objective manner, of the
problems both of aid and of trade, with a view
not to recriminations but to constructive
solutions.
Theories of Terms of Trade
One of those problems constitutes my central
topic this afternoon, namely the terms of inter-
national trade as they affect the Brazilian bal-
ance of payments. Until recent years the con-
cept of the terms of trade was scarcely known
outside of professional economic circles. It
was simply a useful index to measure trends in
international price relations, which might sei-ve
in turn as a guide to nations seeking to reshape
their patterns of foreign trade.
There have long been conflicting general the-
ories about inherent long-range trends in the
terms of trade. One old thcoiy, now discred-
ited, held that agricultural prices were bound
to improve in relation to industrial prices be-
cause an increasing world population on a
limited surface of arable land would be con-
stantly bidding up food prices, whereas indus-
trial output was indefinitely expansible. This
disregarded the effects of tecluiological advance
in agriculture, which have increased produc-
tivity even more rapidly than in industry, at
least in the free world. For some years the
ECLA [U.N. Economic Commission for Latin
America] secretariat was arguing the contrary
thesis, namely that the long-term trend was
necessarily unfavorable to agriculture, but this
argument was based largely on 19th-century
British data which did not allow for reductions
in shipping costs or for inherent difficulties in
any long-term measurement of comparative
prices for manufactured goods. The nature of
industrial products changes completely from
decade to decade as new inventions are made,
and they are also subject to constant improve-
ments in quality. As a result most serious
scholars today are very skeptical as to the valid-
ity of any long-term generalizations about in-
herent trends in the terms of trade.
In current discussions of economic policy,
however, especially in Brazil in recent months,
there has developed a tendency to attribute
present difficulties in the balance of payments
primarily to the deterioration in the terms of
trade since the early 1950's. Sometimes this
tendency takes a mild form, such as the state-
ment in the new Brazilian 3-year plan that, if
export prices in 1960 had been the same as in
1955, the volume of exports in 1960 would have
earned $373 million more, while if 1954 prices
were taken as a base, the difference would have
been $852 million. You will recall the analo-
gous statement in the note of the Brazilian Em-
bassy I discussed earlier this afternoon.
In less professional circles these price changes
are described as part of a so-called "process of
spoliation" that the Brazilian economy is sup-
posed to be suffering at the hands of the indus-
trialized countries, especially the United
States. I heard not long ago a television ad-
dress in which the speaker, who is not an econo-
mist, talked about Brazil producing 5 million
FEBRUAET 25, 1963
287
tons of merchandise to give away free to the
riclier countries of the world. In the most
extreme nonscientific references to this subject,
it is implied that the prices of Brazilian exports
have fallen because of some conspiracy among
the industrialized nations, led by the United
States, and that Brazil would positively benefit
by cutting off trade with the United States
entirely.
This idea of a conspiracy to depress the terms
of trade of Brazil or other Latin American
countries is not, of course, shared in responsible
quarters concerned with the foreign economic
policy of the developing countries. On the con-
traiy, they are well aware that competition
among the industrialized nations for sales of
industrial equipment and other manufactured
goods is keener than ever, applying not only to
price but also to quality and to tenns of sale.
Nevertheless there is an increasing tendency,
reflected in various official and unofficial inter-
national meetings, to try to find some means of
protecting the terms of trade of the less devel-
oped countrias.
This movement is divided into two parts.
The first part is focused on the clearly desir-
able objective of reducing short- and medium-
term price fluctuations in foreign trade. Such
fluctuations have a notoriously bad effect on
both monetary stability and orderly develop-
ment in those luiderdeveloped countries heavily
dependent on foreign trade. The second, and
more dubious, proposal is that the industrial
countries in some sense "owe" the primary pro-
ducing countries a given level of terms of trade
(usually taking as a base an exceptionally
favorable historical period) and that, if this is
not provided through the market, there should
be established a compensation fund to make u;>
the difference, even if the primary producing
countries continue indefinitely to place on the
world market commodities for which world de-
mand is weak. This kind of proposal seems to
me neither reasonable nor desirable.
There are certainly serious problems in con-
nection with the foreign trade of underdevel-
oped countries which deserve serious treatment
and the collaboration of industrialized coun-
tries in finding solutions. But those solutions
camiot take the form of permanent subsidies
for the production of goods which world con-
sumers do not desire.
Unfortunately much of the current discus-
sion of the terms of trade is misleading, often
oblivious of facts, and generally not pointed in
the direction of constructive solutions. This is
especially surprising in Brazil, where the avail-
able resources and the stage of economic de-
velopment already reached open the way for
solutions which could be pursued to great ad-
vantage and without enormous difficulties. I
should like later on to suggest some of these
for your consideration.
Brazil's Terms of Trade
First, however, it seems to me important to
inject light, in place of heat, on the facts con-
cerning Brazil's terms of trade. For this pur-
pose I have distributed two tables, with figures
going back to 1920 and using 19G2 as a base.
There is nothing special about 1920 ; I have gone
back that far simply to give a long span of
years for consideration. From Table A it will
be noted that, in 31 of the 42 years, Brazil's
terms of trade were worse than at present, while
they were better in only 11. Against the high
figure of 168 in 1954, there are the low figures
of 42 in 1920 and 47 in 1940. Over the whole
decade of the 1920's the tenns of trade aver-
aged 32 percent worse than at present; in the
1930's 40 percent worse ; in the 1940's, again 32
percent worse; and only in the 1950's were they
better, averaging for the decade 27 percent
higher than last year.
Unless there is some valid reason for using
1950-53, or 1954, or 1955 as a base for com-
parison, any statement about Brazil's "losses"
in potential export earnings from those years
is simply ingenuous. One might just as well
talk about the "gains" since the 1940's and about
free presents being made to Brazil by the
richer countries in the form of trade, as well as
in aid, during all the 12 years beginning in
1950.
In this connection I should like to quote a
few sentences from the brilliant recent work of
a Mexican economist. Dr. Victor L. Urquidi,
T'lahUklad Econdmica de America Latina. He
says :
The custom of computing what Latin America "loses"
every time the prices fall does not appear to be a
28R
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
useful aual.vtiral method, since what oue "fails to
gaiu" is not always "lost" and an economic analysis
would have to include estimates of the effect which
having maintained the previous prices at a higher
level would have had on the volumes of production and
export. The damage caused by the fluctuations in
export prices is registered not only when they fall but
also when they rise too much and provoke inflationary
disturbances or create incentives to ijroductiou which
later will not be justified.
The Record on Coffee
It follows that any useful consideration of
the problems of the terms of trade has to go
behind this simple economic indicator to see
^vhat accounts for its fluctuations and what
might be done about it. In the case of Brazil,
where 40 to 60 percent of exports all through
this 40-year period have consisted of coffee, the
obvious place to search for explanations is in
the record of coffee. For this purpose I have
prepared Table B, which gives for the same
period since 1020 the average coffee price for
each year in New York, an index of the pur-
chasing power of a bag of coffee made by com-
binuag these prices with the United States index
of wholesale prices, and figures on world and
Brazilian exports of coffee. You will note the
major and obvious influence of coffee prices on
the overall Brazilian terms of trade.
This table suggests at once how unreasonable
it is to regard the early 1950's as "normal" for
Brazilian export prices. The history is well
known. Coffee prices shot up from 1949 to
1950 because of the liquidation of stocks which
had been held for 20 years. Then the Korean
war helped to keep prices high. When that
war ended, there came the great Parana frost,
magnified by heavy speculation in the coffee
market, which brought average prices for 1954
to the unheard of level of almost 80 cents per
pound. Since that time, although coffee prices
have almost steadily declined, stocks have once
again been accumulated in vast quantities, cre-
ating a continuing downward pressure on the
market.
To anyone seriously concerned with the wel-
fare of the Brazilian economy and the problem
of the Brazilian balance of payments, however,
the shocking aspect of Table B is to be found
in the last column, showing Brazil's proportion
of world coffee exports. In 1920 Brazil ac-
TABLE A
Brazilian Term op Trade Index, 1920-62
(.Base: I96i=100)
Year
Indox
Year
Index
Year
Index
Year
Indcx
1920- _-
42
1930__
58
1940..
47
1950-
139
1921___
33
1931.-
59
1941--
57
1951..
138
1922.__
55
1932..
76
1942..
68
1952..
120
1923-.
57
1933.-
69
1943..
70
1953..
123
1924___
78
1934..
72
1944..
70
1954- .
168
1925.__
83
1935..
53
1945..
68
1955.-
130
1926__.
81
1936..
57
1946--
72
1956..
122
1927___
72
1937..
56
1947..
76
1957..
118
1928--.
90
1938..
48
1948-.
71
1958..
115
1929_.-
84
1939- -
52
1949--
85
1959- .
1960--
1961..
1962--
98
104
103
100
January 27, 1963
Sources: Years prior to 1947, HClio Schlittler Silva, "Indices de Precos
no Comfrcio Exterior do Brasil," Revista BrasUeira de Economia, Juno
1952, p. 73. Years 1947-1960, liiUo Schlittler Silva, "Comfrcio Exterior
do Brasil e Desenvolvimento Economico," Revista BTasiteira de Ciindas
Sociais, March 1962, p. 133. Years 1961 and 1962, IMF, International
Financial Statistics.
Average index by decades:
1920-29 = 68
1930-39 = 60
1940-49 = 68
1950-59=127
counted for almost two-thirds of the world mar-
ket; today it holds less than 40 percent. Nor
is there any prospect of regaining its former
share.
If this record suggests anything about "free
presents," it is that coffee policy in this century
has been making free presents of a once mainly
Brazilian market to your competitors in Africa,
the Far East, and other countries of Latin
America.
Is there some absolute sense in which it might
be said that coffee prices today are "too low" ?
If we view the market simply as economists,
we should have to reply "No" to this question.
Even at present prices, not only is more coffee
being produced currently than the world con-
sumes, but new coffee trees are being planted in
many regions of Africa, Southeast Asia, and
Latin America. This is true even in Brazil,
despite the withholding of a large share of the
receipts through dollar-retention quotas.
Even though present coffee prices are higher
than an equilibrium world market level, how-
ever, there may be good reasons of international
FEBRUARY
1961
289
policy for trying to prevent their further fall
or to bring about a moderate increase. Coffee
is a prime example of a very special class of
commodity. It is produced exclusively in less
developed countries, and demand for it is rela-
tively inelastic, i.e. consumption is little affected
by price changes, either up or down, within
quite wide limits. As you know, the United
States places no taxes or tariff duties on coffee.
Coffee is as much our national beverage as it is
TABLE B
Prices and Trade in Coffee and Brazilian Terms of Trade, 1920-62
Price of Santos
4 in New York
(cents per
pound)
U.S. wholesale
price index
(1962=100)
Purcbasing
power of coffee
(1962=100)
Brazilian
terms of
trade index
(1962=100)
Worid
coffee exports
(millions of
Brazilian
coffee exports
(millions of
bags)
Brazilian
share of world
exports
(percent)
1920.
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925.
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931,
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
18. 1
10 0
14. 2
14. 5
21. 3
24. 2
22. 1
18.4
23.0
21.7
13. 1
8.7
10 6
9.2
11. 2
8.9
9. 4
10 9
7.6
7.3
7. 1
11. 1
13.4
13.4
13.4
13.4
23. 1
26.7
22. 3
31.7
50 5
54. 2
54.0
58.0
78.9
57. 1
58. 1
56. 9
48.3
36.9
36. 6
36. 2
34. 1
84
53
53
55
54
56
55
52
53
52
47
40
35
30
41
44
44
47
43
42
43
48
54
56
57
58
66
81
88
83
87
96
94
92
93
93
96
99
100
100
100
100
100
63
55
79
77
116
125
119
104
128
122
81
64
88
75
80
60
62
68
52
51
53
68
73
70
69
67
102
96
74
112
171
165
169
184
250
180
177
169
141
107
106
104
100
42
33
55
57
78
83
81
72
90
84
58
59
76
69
72
53
57
56
48
52
47
57
68
70
70
68
72
76
71
85
139
138
120
123
168
130
122
118
115
98
104
103
100
18. 1
19. 7
20 4
22. 2
23.0
21. 7
22.9
24. 3
24. 2
23.9
25.9
27. 9
22. 7
26.4
25.3
27.2
27.6
25. 1
30 2
29. 1
22. 6
19. 5
16. 8
21.0
25. 1
27.6
29.4
28. 7
32. 2
34.2
29.2
31. 8
32. 1
34.7
28.9
33.7
38.4
36. 1
36.5
42. 6
43. 1
43.7
11.5
12.4
12.7
14.5
14. 2
13. 5
13. 8
15. 1
13. 9
14.3
15.3
17.8
12.0
15.5
14. 1
15.3
14. 2
12. 1
17.2
16.7
12. 1
11. 1
7.3
10 1
13. 6
14. 2
15. 6
14.7
17.5
19.4
14. 8
16. 4
15.8
15. 6
10 9
13. 7
16. 8
14. 3
12.9
17.7
16. 8
17.0
16. 8
January 27, 1963
290
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTTLLETIN
yours. Some of the European Common Market
countries do place very heavy taxes on coffee,
in addition to tariffs discriminating in favor of
Africa, vrith the result that the price to the
consumer is extremely high, and a change in
these policies ■would offer one important oppor-
tunity for substantial market expansion. But
fhe major need under present conditions is to
stabilize the world coffee market and to take
vigorous action to reduce the overproduction
and the excess stocks which are a constant threat
of total price collapse.
International CoKee Agreement
This is, of course, the purpose of the recently
negotiated world coffee agreement,^ which is
now being considered for ratification in vari-
ous signatory countries, including the Senate
of the United States. I earnestly hope that
nothing will be done to jeopardize the prospects
of ratification, which is of greater interest to
Brazil than to any other smgle countiy. From
both the political and technical viewpoints the
world coffee agreement is a great advance on
any international commodity agreements hith-
erto negotiated. It is a f arsighted act of inter-
national economic statesmanship by producing
and consuming countries alike. For those who
persist in regarding Brazilian-American eco-
nomic relationships as based on a "process of
spoliation," it may be well to recall that, if
narrow economic interests were the only guide
to American public policy, we would have had
no mterest in participating in this accord. In
fact, its successful negotiation was made pos-
sible only by close collaboration between our
two countries, respectively the largest producer
and the largest consumer of coffee.
The list of other commodities which might
be effectively handled through parallel interna-
tional agreements is not long. Cocoa and sugar
might conceivably qualify, and there may be a
few others. There is a different class of com-
modities— also of great interest to underdevel-
oped countries, although not directly of
concern to Brazil — where international cooper-
ation may be called for to reduce price fluctua-
^For text, see S. Ex. H, S7th Cong., 2d sess. ; for
background, see Bulletin of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667, and
Feb. 11, 1963, p. 218.
tions which arise more from changes on the
demand side than from long-term tendencies
toward overproduction. The nonferrous met-
als are an important part of this group. I have
personally always felt that the device of buffer
stocks, so far applied only in the case of tin
and there on a relatively small scale, would be
the best solution. Alternatively, some kind of
compensatory fund, designed to average out
over several years short-term fluctuations in
prices of these and other commodities, may
prove useful. This idea is under active discus-
sion in various international bodies. The prob-
lem of ironing out short-term fluctuations,
however, should not be confused with the prob-
lem of a long-term decline in a country's terms
of trade.
Problem of Expanding Export Earnings
In the case of Brazil there has not really been
any long-term decline in the terms of trade, as
my tables clearly show. But there is a problem
of expanding export earnings. This seems to
me the serious problem, to which serious
thought should be addressed. At the recent
international conference of economists on infla-
tion and development held here in Rio de
Janeiro, this problem was the subject of a
pungent and highly relevant comment by the
world-famous Jamaican economist, Professor
W. Arthur Lewis, to which I should like to call
your attention. Speaking of the problem of
maintaining balance-of-iiayments equilibrium
during a period of rapid development and
growth, Professor Lewis said:
Adjustment can be made either by increasing the
propensity to export or by reducing the propensity to
import. Particularly puzzling are those cries which
seem to be founded on the belief that it is particularly
diflBcult to expand exports because the world is buying
fewer and fewer exports. The opposite is true. World
trade has never grown faster. Between 1950 and 1960
the quantum of world trade in primary products in-
creased at an average rate of 6 percent per annum, and
the quantum of world trade in manufactures by more
than 7 percent per annum. The terms of trade for
primary products could not retain the heights to which
they were raised by the speculative fever of the
Korean war and the heavy American stockpiling in
the early fifties ; nevertheless the average terms of
trade for the decade of the 1950's were better than for
any previous decade in all the preceding hundred
years. I do not know whether it is in fact true that in
FEBRUARY 25, 1963
291
the 1950's, Latin America had difficulty in keeping her
exports growing at the same rate as national income ;
but if this was so, it cannot possibly have been due to
failure of world demand to grow adequately, since the
quantum of world trade was growing by about 7 per-
cent per annum throughout the 1950's. Taking the
continent as a whole, rather than individual countries,
failure on this score can only have been a failure of
effort.
Now, of course, all of us here know that in
fact Latin America has been having trouble m
keeping lier exports growing. In the last 10
years they have not risen at anything like the
rate of total expansion m world trade. The
traditional commodity pattern of Latin Ameri-
can exports has been concentrated in items with
relatively stagnant world demand. But is it
necessary to be bound by the traditional
structure ?
In the Brazilian case in particular, where
such immense resourcefulness has been found
in developmg new industries for the domestic
market, some to replace imports and others to
meet new types of demand, have tliere not been
opportimities for diversifying exports which
would have added to the nation's earnings of
foreign exchange and at the same time im-
j)roved the terms of trade ? The best long-term
answer to the problem of the tenns of trade —
indeed, I might say, the only possible long-term
answer — is to produce and sell items in strong
demand whose prices are consequently stable
or rising.
In the London Economist of last September 1
and 8, there were two extraordinarily interest-
ing series of special articles describing and
analyzing the economic miracle of Japan during
the past decade in maintaining the highest
growth rate in the world and overcoming an
apparently insuperable balance-of-i)ayments
problem. One cardinal element in achieving
this miracle was the constant search for new
exjiort products, a search sedulously fostered
by the governmental planning authorities and
then used as guidance for the remarkably dy-
namic private enterprise of Japan. As a result
of this policy, the pattern of Japanese exports
has been transformed away from the traditional
fields of textiles and cheap toys to shipbuilding,
electrical and electronic products, and other
new manufactures within tlie range of Japanese
production capacity and in strong world
demand.
Possibilities for New Export Products
Wltat would a similar policy have done for
Brazil ? Let me suggest three possibilities.
The most obvious case is iron ore. In the
decade from 1950 to 1960 alone, while world
exports of coffee increased by only 85 percent,
world exports of iron ore increased from 41 to
151 million tons, almost fourfold. Prices were
correspondingly firm, with an upward tendency
in recent years. Brazil possesses the greatest
deposits of high-grade iron ore in the world.
Nevertheless, during the 1950's while Canadian
exports were rising from 2 million to 17 million
tons and Venezuelan from nothing to 19 million
tons, Brazilian exports rose only from 1 to 5
million tons.
The Progixima de Metas of President Kubi-
tschek envisaged an iron ore exjwrt target of
30 million tons a year by the mid-1960*s, and
I understand that this could be done without
excessive investment in new transportation
facilities and with no sacrifice whatever of do-
mestic needs. Achievement of this target would
mean an increase in Brazil's earnings of foreign
exchange by more than $200 million a year.
Secondly, consider the case of meat. In this
case world exports have about doubled since
1950, amounting to 3 million metric tons in
1961. Brazil's share in this market was only
50,000 tons, less than 2 percent. In contrast
with coffee, meat prices have risen substantially
since the mid-1950's. I am told that a system-
atic effort in livestock development and export
marketing, again without any sacrifice what-
ever to domestic consumption, could within a
few years produce foreign exchange earnings
of at least $250 million per year.
Finally, there is the rapidly increasing po-
tential for Brazilian exports of manufactured
goods. In this field a moderate acquaintance
with the export-licensing system employed by
the Brazilian authorities makes one wonder if
it was not designed positively to hamper, rather
than encourage, exports. This is in striking
contrast to the European or Japanese policies
of the postwar period, which have made such
phenomenal gains for their balance of pay-
292
l)Er.\nTJIHNT OF STATE BTJLLKTIN
ments. A policy of stimulating exports would
require the maintenance of realistic foreign ex-
change rates, on a continuous basis, avoiding
arbitrary fluctuations in the profitability of ex-
ports. Further measures might include exemp-
tions from consumption and sales taxes and pos-
sibly govermnental credit facilities for export
financing. The mcentives must be designed to
cultivate systematic expoi"t-mindedness, includ-
ing efl^ective marketing on a long-range basis,
in place of the occasional sale of a few items
not easily salable at home. The other member
coimtries of LAFTA [Latin American Free
Trade Association] would of course be the firet
normal destinations of substantial Bi-azilian ex-
ports of manufactured goods, but they need not
be limited to this regional gi'ouping.
In this field the prospects for success depend
heavily on the application of modern tech-
nology and the efficiency with which industry is
managed. These factors, in turn, will be
greatly affected by the treatment given to for-
eign direct investment and to technical assist-
ance provided from foreign industrial research
and development. The subject of foreign pri-
vate investment in Brazilian development is
much too large to embark on this afternoon. I
should like, however, to stress its importance
not only to the continued rapid industrializa-
tion of Brazil for supplying the domestic mar-
ket but also to the realization of an export po-
tential for which this country has by far the
most promising base in Latm America.
I am amazed when I sometimes hear Brazil-
ians say that, now that this country has an auto-
motive and machine tool and chemical and
electrical industry, foreign private investment
is no longer needed. The degree of industriali-
zation achieved by Brazil since the war has been
very impressive, but surely the process has
merely begun. Not only are the industrial en-
terprises of North America, Western Europe,
and Japan spending enormous sums each year
in scientific and teclmical research and develop-
ment of new products ; they have all established
reciprocal arrangements for investment, patent
licensing, and exchange of teclmical assistance
in order to keep up with the pace of contem-
porary teclmological advance. For Brazil to
cut off its access to tliese sources of moderniza-
tion would be a tragic setback to the jDrospects
of continued economic growth. Indeed I would
surmise that an important contributing element
in the high growth rate of the last decade, and
the high productivity of new capital investment
in Brazil in recent years, has been the recep-
tivity to foreign investment and technique dur-
ing those years. This impression is confinned
by even a casual visit, such as the one I made
last week, to some of the industrial establish-
ments in Sao Paulo and Campinas.
Payments Problem and Multilateral
Cooperation
To revert to the problem of the balance of
payments, the three categories of greatly ex-
panded exports I have mentioned above should
be able in a few years to improve Brazilian ex-
ports by as much as $500 to $700 million a year.
If Brazil can count at the same time on inter-
national cooperation in stabilizing the market
for coffee and a few other primary conunodities,
and taking into account a continuing process
of import substitution, the problem of the Bra-
zilian balance of payments should become not
merely soluble but easy, leaving ample room for
expanded imports of newer forms of equipment
and for raw materials and other primary prod-
ucts not available within the country. With
rational policies, in short, the problem of
Brazil's balance of payments in the mediiun and
long term appears far less difficult than that of
most of the underdeveloped countries of the
world.
One of the cardinal objectives of aid through
the Alliance for Progress is to assist in financ-
ing the needed investments to promote these
export- earning and import-substituting al-
terations in the structure of the Brazilian econ-
omy. As the Marshall Plan experience made
clear, aid is not a substitute for trade but under
certain circumstances aid is required to bring
about the structural changes which will make
healthy and durable trade possible. Tliis, I be-
lieve, is the philosophy wliich should guide us
in working together on these interlinked aspects
of international economic relations, not only bi-
laterally but in the larger context of inter-
American and worldwide collaboration.
FEBRTJART 25, 1963
293
International Cooperation
in Space Science
Remarhs hy Secretary Rush ^
On touring the Goddard Space Flight Cen-
ter, many of us may share the reaction of the
legendary frontiersman Daniel Boone, when he
was asked if he had ever been lost. He replied,
"No, I can't rightly say that I've ever been
lost, but I was bewildered once for 3 days."
Man is by nature inquisitive. The challenge
of the imknown stimulates him to explore.
And of all man's exiieriences none is more grati-
fying than discovery. To explore the frontiers
of science, medicine, the miiverse, to uncover
the secrets of nature and to harness them for
man's betterment — these can be life's most ex-
citing and rewarding achievements.
Histoiy is filled with the chronicles of men
whose quest for knowledge has led to results
that are deeply imprmted on the daily lives of
all of us- The early voyages of Vasco da Gama,
of Columbus, of Magellan, opened a new epoch
in human affairs. Explorations in the world
of medicine by Pasteur, Fleming, Banting, and
many others have vastly improved the well-
being of men. New discoveries along the
whole range of scientific frontiers are contin-
ually transforming our lives. Each new discov-
ery opens further vistas for exploration, and
each seems to accelerate the pace of advance.
I reflect that Peary reached the North Pole
as recently as 1909 — the same year in which
Bleriot made the first flight across the English
Channel — and that Amimdsen reached the
South Pole as recently as 1911, the year after
Glenn Cm-tiss won a prize of $10,000 for flymg
nonstop all the way from Albany, New York,
to New York City, a distance of 137 miles.
And now — already — we are seriously en-
gaged in exploi'ing the moon, the planets, and
the universe.
Most of the exploration of the surface of the
earth was accomplished by small groups of men
using relatively simple apparatus. Explorers
1 Made at the Goddard Space Flight Center at Green-
belt, Md., on Jan. 31 (press release 58 dated Jan. 29)
on the fifth anniversary of the U.S. tracking network.
in times past were often out of sight and even
out of mind for long periods of time. And the
record of what they saw and learned was often
subject to the errors of human impression and
recall.
Today we have the means of keeping in con-
stant and almost instant touch with our ex-
plorers, whetlier human or mechanical. We
can register an astronaut's every physical action
and reaction and in some instances advise and
assist him in adjusting to circumstances. We
can record accurately and instantly his obser-
vations, as multiplied by the instrumentation at
his command. And, of course, we can do the
same for our umnanned explorers. We can
correct the course of a satellite millions of miles
away. "Wliile men were needed to man the tiny
Santa Marm of Christopher Columbus, we to-
day can send mechanical Santa Marias before
man himself essays the journey.
We do not wish to disi^atch manned or un-
manned space missions without doing every-
thing possible to insure their success. To
insure both the safety and the fruitful exploita-
tion of the voyage, we must remain in communi-
cation with the space traveler. Today we pause
to pay tribute to those who have helped us to
fulfill the canons of humanity and the obliga-
tions of science. We express our gratitude to
the 16 nations whose representatives have joined
us today — 16 nations in which are located the
27 tracking facilities of our peaceful space pro-
gram. We are proud of the association. This
program is a partnership in peace. We think
we are creating a heritage for those who follow
us in the coming generations in a great explora-
tion for peaceful purposes.
Science has never recognized mamnade
boundaries. The continued development of
science must always rest on an international
base, for nature does not play favorites. We
17 nations have embarked on a cooperative ef-
fort to expand the knowledge of man to an un-
precedented extent. We are doing it in the full
glare of light. The world watches us in our
successes and our failures. And the whole
world will benefit from our discoveries. We
seek to publish all the knowledge we uncover.
We are making it available to the world scien-
tific community. In this effort we 17 regard
294
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
urselves as agents and trustees for all the in-
Abitants of this little speck of dust in the
Diverse.
In the 5 years since we began our cooperative
racking program, tlie pace of discovery has
teen breathtaking. We are developing a better
nderstanding of the atmospheric and space
)henomena which may afl'ect our lives. No one
an doubt the benefits of such knowledge to the
ntemational commmiity, nor the benefits of
nany of its byproducts :
— miniature batteries ;
— ceramics resistant to shock and extreme
leat;
— electronic devices to measure body tempera-
;ure and to overcome skipped heartbeats or
leart failure;
— infrared cameras, drills ;
— and the innumerable inventions to come.
And what a future lies ahead for commimica-
tions by satellites and weather prediction by
satellites !
We hope to send spacecraft to many parts of
our miiverse. We wish to pursue our goals in
an atmosphere of international cooperation.
We wish outer space reserved for peaceful
activities.
The United States has on other occasions
' enunciated its aims in outer space. I should like
to repeat them :
We believe outer space should be free for use
by all nations consistent with the principles of
the United Nations Charter and international
law generally.
We must improve and extend the regime of
law on earth as it applies to man's activities in
space.
We must pro\ade for the identification of
rights and the peaceful settlement of disputes
concerning space activities.
The useful application of space technology,
such as connnunication and meteorological sat-
ellites, should be available to all nations needing
it and able to make use of it.
Opportunities to participate in space activi-
ties should be open to all countries able and
willing to cooperate constructively.
The placing in orbit of weapons of mass de-
struction should be prohibited.
United Nations Resolution No. 1721 of De-
cember 19G1 embodies nuniy of these princi-
ples. The United States will continue to be
guided by these principles in our relations with
the international community.
Today the community for tracking embraces
17 nations. Tomorrow it probably will be
joined by additional nations. The United
States will welcome broadened participation in
its peaceful space efforts. Together we have
molded an example in international cooperation
dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge which we
hope will be emulated in other fields.
As we progress in pursuit of universal knowl-
edge, we shall probably have to consider modi-
fications to our present tracking network in
order to meet the ever-changing demands of
teclmology. But wherever and whenever we
cooperate in scientific satellite tracking ar-
rangements, we shall seek to adhere to our prac-
tice that the laiowledge obtained shall belong
to the world scientific community.
We express our pride in what has been
achieved together. We look forward to fur-
ther cooperation. The rewards already reaped
are immense. The promise of the future is
boundless.
President Proclaims U.S. Tariff
Concessions to Japan and Spain
The White Hoiise announced on Februaiy 1
that the President had on that day signed a
proclamation ^ givmg effect on February 1, 1963,
to the first stage of the U.S. tariff concessions
provided for in the agreement signed with
Japan,^ containing concessions compensatory
for U.S. escape-clause action increasing duties
on carpets and glass under the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade.
The proclamation also gives effect to the first
stage of U.S. concessions in the agreement
' For text of Proclamation 3517, see 28 Fed. Reg.
1195.
° For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 21, 1963,
p. 108.
FEBRUARY 2 5, 1963
295
signed with Spain ^ pending the accession of
that country to GATT, and in three agreements
rectifying the U.S. schedules to the protocol
embodying results of the 1960-Gl tariff
conference.*
The proclamation also proclaims two subsidi-
ary agreements not containing new tariff con-
cessions and gives effect to modifications of
United States GATT schedules negotiated
several years ago.
Advisory Committee on International
Business Problems Established
The Department of State announced on Feb-
ruary 4 (press release 67) the establislinient of
an Advisory Committee on International Busi-
ness Problems and the appointment of Clarence
B. Eandall, former chairman of the board of
Inland Steel, as chairman. The two other mem-
bers of the Committee are Edwin A. Locke, Jr.,
and Lloyd N. Cutler.
The Committee will advise the Secretary of
State and the Administrator of the Agency for
International Development on the handling of
specific business problems confronting Ameri-
can firms abroad. It will give particular atten-
tion to the application of the Hickenlooper
amendment, section 620(e) of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1962, which calls for the termi-
nation of assistance to countries nationalizing
or expropriating U.S.-owned property unless
"appropriate steps" are taken to meet its obli-
gations under international law.
The Committee will meet periodically to re-
view the handling by the Department and its
missions abroad of specific business complaints
submitted by American business in connection
with their overseas operations. In its review
the Committee will be assisted by Under Secre-
tary for Political Affairs George McGhee, AID
Assistant Administrator for Development Fi-
° For background, see ibid., Jan. 28, 196.3, p. 146.
*For background, see iliid., Feb. 4, 1962, p. 182; for
texts of the agreements with Japan and Spain, ex-
changes of letters regarding the three rectification
agreements, and schedules of U.S. concessions, see
Department of State press release 24 dated Jan. 14.
nance and Private Enterprise Seymour Peyser,
and Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Do-
mestic and International Business Jack N.
Behrman. Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser to
the Department of State, will act as counsel to
the Committee. Other officers of the Depart-
ment of State, the Agency for International
Development, and, when appropriate, other
agencies of the Government will be called upon
to provide information concerning each case
for review by the Committee.
Allan J. Bobbins, Special Assistant for In-
ternational Business in the Office of the Under
Secretary of State, will serve as executive sec-
i-etary of the Committee and will be respon-
sible for implementing the Committee's
recommendations, after approval by the Secre-
tary of State and the Administrator of the
Agency for International Development. Other
members of the Committee may be appointed
later.
President Appoints New Members
to Board of Foreign Scholarships
The White House announced on February 1
that the President had on that day appointed
three new members of the Board of Foreign
Scholarships and reappointed a member to a
new term.
The new appointees are Robert B. Brode,
professor of physics at the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley ; Francis Keppel, U.S. Com-
missioner of Education ; and A. Curtis "Wilgiis,
director of the School of Inter-American
Studies and professor of Hispanic-American
history, University of Florida. Frederick E.
Terman, vice president and provost, Stanford
University, was reappointed.
Dr. Brode replaces Robert G. Storey, presi-
dent of the Southwestern Legal Center, to serve
to September 1965; Commissioner Keppel re-
places former U.S. Commissioner of Education
Sterling McMurrin, to serve to September
1964; and Dr. Wilgus replaces John O. Riedl,
professor of philosophy, Marquette University,
to serve to September 1964. Dr. Terman's new
term runs to September 1965.
29G
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
;
The Board of Foreign Scholarships super-
ises the educational exchange programs ad-
oinistered by the Department of State under
lie Fulbright-IIays Act. Its responsibilities
nclude the selection of students, teachers, and
miversity facidty members, both in this coun-
,ry and abroad, to receive exchange grants.
The other members of the Board are :
Fohn M. Stalnaker, president of the National Merit
Scholarship Corporation, chairman
3scar Handlin, Winthrop Professor of History, Har-
vard University, vice chairman
rohn N. Andrews, assistant director. Vocational Reha-
bilitation and Education Service, Veterans' Admin-
istration
John Hope Franklin, professor of history, Brooklyn
College, and 1962-63 William Pitt Professor of
American History and Institutions, Cambridge
University
Mrs. Ella T. Grasso, Secretary, State of Connecticut
Daniel W. Hofgren, of New York, student representa-
tive
A. Wesley Roehm, chairman, Department of History,
Oak Park-River Forest Township High School, Oak
Park, 111.
Francis X. Sutton, program associate. Ford Foun-
dation
Civil Aviation Talks Concluded
With United Arab Republic
Press release 69 dated February 4
Delegations of the United States and the
United Arab Kepublic held civil aviation con-
sultations at Cairo from January 21 through
February 4, 1963. The consultations were
held pursuant to the bilateral air transport
agreement of 1946 and concluded to the mutual
satisfaction of both parties.
Agreement was reached on an ad referendum
basis to replace the basic 1946 agreement with
a more modern version and to describe routes
for the oiDeration of a U.A.R.-designated car-
rier between the United Arab Republic and the
United States.
The chairman of the United Arab Republic
delegation was Gen. Ahmad Abdel-IIamid Seif,
Director General of the Civil Aviation Depart-
ment, Ministry of War. Among the members
of the U.S. delegation were Henry T. Snow-
don, Chief, Aviation Division, Department of
State, chairman; and "\^^litney Gillilland,
Member of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Law Day, U.S.A.— 1963
A PROCLAMATION'
The story of man's advance from savagery to civi-
lization is the story of reason and morality displacing
brutal force. While law is reason systematized, it is
more than reason alone. A great justice of our Su-
preme Court said long ago, "The law is the witness
and external deposit of our moral life. Its history
is the history of the moral development of the race."
In a time when all men are properly concerned lest
nations, forgetting law, reason, and moral existence,
turn to mutual destruction, we have all the more need
to work for a day when law may govern nations as it
does men within nations; when systematized reason
may bring us a confident future; when the moral de-
velopment of the human race may assure us a peaceful
and law-abiding world.
In ICKJl the Congress by joint resolution wisely
designated as "Law Day, U.S.A." the first day of each
May. Thus, "Law Day, U.S.A." becomes the signifi-
cant answer to Communism's May Day demonstrations,
and calls on our people to rededicate themselves to
ideals of equality and justice in their relations with
one another and to the same ideals in relations with
other nations.
Now, THEBia-ORE, I, JoHN F. Kennedt, President of
the United States of America, to support and emphasize
this congressional resolution, do hereby request the
people of our country to observe the first day of May,
1963, with such ceremonies and observances as will
suitably signalize this great aspiration. I urge that
civic and service organizations, schools, public bodies,
and the media of information join in this educational
observance, and further call upon all oflBcials to display
the nation's flag on public buildings on that day in
token of our dedication to government under law.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America
to be afiixed.
Done at the City of Washington this twenty-fifth
day of January in the year of our Lord nine-
[seal] teen hundred and sixty-three, and of the In-
dependence of the United States of America
the one hundred and eighty-seventh.
ffLJ L^
By the President :
Dean Rusk,
Hecrctary of State.
' No. 3515 ; 28 Fed. Reg. 817.
FEBRUARY 25, 1963
297
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Trade Negotiations and the OECD
Statement hy Christian A. Herter
Special Representative of the President for Trade Negotiations ^
It is a pleasure for me to meet personally with
the heads of the OECD delegations. I have
fond recollections of the 10th anniversary cere-
monies in this building at which I had the honor
of representing the United States. I am par-
ticularly happy to be back in these surromid-
ings because they evoke many memories of
European and transatlantic cooperation and
what this cooperation has been able to achieve.
As you know, it was my good fortune to play
a small part in the work which created the
OEEC [Organization for European Economic
Cooperation] and helped Europe on the way to
its remarkable recovery from the war. In the
early days of the European Recovery Program,
as a member of the House of Representatives, I
had the honor of serving as vice chairman and
later as acting chairman of the special commit-
tee of the House created to study Europe's
needs for assistance from the United States and
the impact of such assistance on our domestic
economy.
Since those days I have continued to follow
closely the development of economic coopera-
tion in the broader framework of the Atlantic
community. I am delighted to observe that this
organization — established after the success of
the recovery program in Europe to carry for-
ward new, important tasks of cooperative en-
deavor— is a thriving, vigorous institution
dedicated to discussion and action over the
whole range of our economic relationsliips.
Now, as you know, I have just come from
Brussels and Geneva,^ where I had an oppor-
tunity to talk with members of the Common
Market Commission and with GATT [General
Agi-eement on Tariffs and Trade] officials and
representatives. The basic purpose of tliese
visits and my trip to Paris is to make or renew
the acquaintance of some of those with whom
I shall be working in my new responsibilities.
My intention has been to explore witli them the
more important elements of the task which
lies ahead, if we are to bring to a successful
conclusion the trade negotiations envisaged by
the Trade Expansion Act. ^ I must emphasize
at the outset that we in the United States Gov-
ernment are only beginning to formulate our
ideas on many of the problems involved and
that we look forward to additional discussions,
both bilateral and in the appropriate multi-
lateral forums, as our thinking on these mat-
ters develops.
Toward Greater Cooperation
The history of the postwar years is in large
part the history of close and fruitful economic
cooperation among our countries. The next
stage in the evolution of this cooperation must
be bold and vigorous action to lower drastically
the tariffs and other trade barriers which con-
' Made before the heads of delegations to the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development at
Paris on Jan. 31.
' For an announcement of Mr. Herter's trip, see Bul-
letin of Feb. 4, 1963, p. 180.
' For an analysis of the act, see ibid., Dec. 3, 1962,
p. 847.
298
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJI-.LETIN
tiuue to be interposed between tlie economies of
tlie advanced nations and which hamper the
irrowth of tlie developing countries.
This is, of course, the basic objective of the
Trade Expansion Act— the most far-reachino;
single piece of trade legislation ever approved
by the American Congress. Adoption of this
act underlines tlie deep awareness of the Ameri-
can people of the vital importance to peace and
security of ever closer economic relations among
the countries of the free world.
This is reflected in one of the stated purposes
of the act, "to strengthen economic relations
with foreign countries through the develop-
ment of open and nondiscriminatory trading in
the free world." The act reflects as well an
awareness of the fact that it is the advanced
and economically strong countries which hold
the key to the achievement of this objective.
The American people are determined to join in
the partnership of cooperative effort which is
essential to this purpose.
Kegardless of the setbacks that it may meet
now and then, I am confident that the develop-
ment of this partnership represents the true
course of the history of our countries. I am
convinced that the stream of powerful and con-
structive forces, which has carried us so far
from the difficult days of the early postwar
period, will not be stemmed. To try to do so
would be to try to turn an irresistible tide.
In the field of trade our immediate task is to
determine and agree upon the precise arrange-
ments, cooperatively arrived at, which will be
required if we are to turn a new page in the
postwar story of the reduction of trade barriers.
The negotiations which are in pi'ospect will not
be easy; there will inevitably be some hard
bargaining ahead. But we must not allow
narrow interest to obscure the greatness of the
enterprise on which we are about to embark. If
this enterprise is to succeed, we must establish
at the very outset a sense of common purpose, of
large mutual undertaking — a conspiracy, if you
will — to defeat the many small diversions and
obstructions which, if not overcome, can pre-
vent great accomplishment. For the essential
logic of our joint enterprise is that, by sei-ving
the broader and larger interests, our national
interests will thereby be served as well ; whereas,
if we seek to serve our national interests,
narrowly conceived, we will neither succeed
in satisfying these nor in reaching the larger
goals to which we all subscribe.
Main Elements of Proposed Negotiations
What are the main elements, as we see them
— and I emphasize once more that our views
are still preliminary— of the proposed trade
negotiations?
To begin with I believe that it is now widely
recognized that the last round of tariff negotia-
tions made it clear that the traditional pi-oduct-
by-product approach, useful as it has been in the
past, is no longer a satisfactoiy method of
achieving meaningful tariff reductions on a
broad front. Under present conditions the
linear approach to tariff cuts would appear to
be the only practicable method of assuring
significant results. Thus in principle the United
States envisages proceeding in this fashion, al-
though we have not yet been able to examine
fully all the implications of the linear approach.
In thinking about these implications, one
point does stand out clearly : The effectiveness
of the linear approach itself can be largely nul-
lified if the specific commodity exceptions from
the rule of uniform tariff reduction become
nimierous. It is therefore important that the
developed countries participating in the nego-
tiations do their utmost to keep the list of
exceptions to a minimum.
An important aspect of the job before us is
the fui+her reduction of nontariff barriers to
trade, particularly the elimination of protective
quotas. True, important progress has been
made in this field, due in no small part to the
efforts made in the OECD and its predecessor
organization, as well as in GATT. But the re-
strictions that remain are still numerous
enough to frustrate a significant area of interna-
tional trade. They will have to be examined
and taken into account in any trade negotia-
tions. If the potential benefits of substantial
tariff reductions are to be realized, these must
be accompanied by effective action to deal with
those quotas that still remain.
So far as other types of nontariff obstacles
are concerned, we are prepared to join with
other countries in identifying and examining
FEBRUARY 25, 1963
299
both our own procedures and practices and
those of other advanced countries which have
a restrictive effect on the flow of trade. I note
that the OECD has already initiated a variety
of studies and consuhations in this field. It
may well be that the major contribution which
this organization can make is in the identifica-
tion of problem areas of this kind and the de-
velopment of agi'eed methods for dealing with
them.
I have also heard the view expressed from
several sources that substantial tariff reductions
must be accompanied by efforts to harmonize
other aspects of commercial policy, such as ex-
port aids and antidumping provisions, and,
even beyond purely commercial policy, to har-
monize economic policy generally. As regards
the former, we not only have no objection to
joining in consultations on these matters but
we have already taken the initiative in the
OECD to consult on specific antidumping ac-
tions now before the United States Govern-
ment. We are prepared to expand this activity,
although there are problems of conf oi-mity with
our existing legislation which would have to
be carefully studied.
As for the latter point — the harmonization
of general economic policy — we have actively
participated in the work of economic policy
coordination in the OECD and will continue to
do so. We believe that the OECD can continue
to provide an adequate framework for the ex-
amination and resolution of problems that may
arise in this field.
The trade negotiations which we have in
mmd cannot be limited to industrial goods.
The exports of the United States, like those of
some other countries, depend heavily on markets
for agricultural commodities, especially in the
European Economic Conununity. It may well
be that for certain agricultural commodities
the arrangements to be negotiated will be dif-
ferent from those applicable to manufactured
goods or to other agricultural commodities.
They may, for example, take the fonn of world-
wide commodity agreements. But the funda-
mental fact remains that, while some difficult
problems are involved, both agricultural and
nonagricultural commodities must be dealt with
together.
The prospective tariff negotiations will, of
course, be conducted through the GATT, and
the tariff reductions achieved will be generalized
in accordance with the most-favored-nation
clause. Thus the trade of the whole free world
will benefit. How much it will benefit depends
in good measure upon how many of the prod-
ucts of interest to the less developed countries
can be covei-ed in the negotiations, including
manufactured products of which they may be
potential future suppliere. Broad and gener-
ous action by the industrialized members of the
OECD looking to the inclusion of as many as
possible of such items would be in line with the
GATT ministerial declaration of November
1961 ■' and with the resolution ° on trade and aid
adopted by the OECD at its last ministerial
meeting.
Tlie fortlicoming United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development, the implications
of which the OECD already has under exam-
ination, makes it imperative that the trade
negotiations help establish a new and healthy
trade relationship wnth the less developed
countries. To accomplish this it will probably
be necessary to give the less developed countries
special consideration from the standpoint of
reciprocity. There are, of course, many tech-
nical problems to be resolved in giving effect to
this principle.
New Approach to Readjustment Problems
I am, of course, aware that in the past the
escape-clause provisions of our trade legislation
have been widely regarded as inconsistent with
the generally liberal approach of the United
States to commercial policy and that a number
of specific decisions to withdraw tariff conces-
sions has caused difficulty to some of our
suppliers. As you know, imder previous legis-
lation, when an American industry was found
to be suffering serious injury that could be at-
tributed to increased imports resulting from
tariff concessions, the only form of relief pro-
vided was a restoration of higher tariffs or
import restrictions.
' For text of a communique, see ibid., Dec. 18, 1961,
p. 1018.
"For text, see ibid., Dec. 24, 1962, p. 980.
300
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
This is no longer the case. The Trade Ex-
ansion Act provides a new approach to the
roblems of readjustment created by increased
ports. Under the act the response to such
iroblenis can take the form of domestic adjust-
ent rather than trade restriction. Industries
ding difficuhies in adjusting to lower tariffs
be given various types of financial and tax
id to enable them to shift to new lines of pro-
duction. "Workers can be helped by retraining
d other means. In those instances where
strictive action may be taken, it may be only
"or a limited period. In short, the President
low has a great deal more flexibility than he has
)ver had in offering alternatives to American
irms hard pressed by import competition.
Moreover, we would be willing to examine
Einy suggestions from other governments for
more effective consultation on problems which
may arise in this field.
Mr. Chaii-man, we in the United States Gov-
ernment desire to make the fullest possible use
of the authorities to reduce trade barriers given
to the President in the Trade Expansion Act.
Whether we can do so is not solely a matter
of our own choosing. It depends in large part
on the extent to which the economically de-
veloped countries of the free world are prepared
to participate in this effort. I am, accordingly,
Iglad to note that the Trade Committee of this
organization has already emphasized the impor-
tance of the fullest possible participation by
OECD countries.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would wel-
come any comments or questions that delega-
tions may wish to raise with respect to the
points I have been discussing or on related mat-
ters. In particular I would welcome any ideas
on the contribution wliich the OECD might
make to this challenging task before us.
International Bank Issues
6-IVIonth Financial Statement
The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development reported on February 4 that
its reserves had risen by $55.6 million in the first
6 months of the current financial year to a total
of $755 million.
The additions to reserves in the 6-month
period ending December 31, 1962, are made up
of net earnings of $40.2 million, which were
placed m the supplemental reserve against
losses on loans and guarantees, and loan com-
missions of $15.4 million, which were credited
to the special reserve. On December 31 the
supplemental reserve totaled $515.9 million and
the special reserve was $239.1 million.
Gross income, exclusive of loan commissions,
was $100.4 million. Expenses totaled $60.2 mil-
lion and included $51.9 million for interest on
the Bank's funded debt, bond issuance, and
other fuiancial expenses.
During the period the Bank made 12 loans
totaling $163.7 million — in Finland, Israel,
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan (2 loans), Panama,
Philippines, Tliailand (2 loans) , Uiiiguay, and
Yugoslavia. This brought the total number of
loans to 333 in 61 countries and raised the gross
total of loans signed to $6,836.5 million. By
December 31, as a result of cancellations, ex-
change adjustments, repayments, and sales of
loans, the portion of loans signed still retained
by the Bank had been reduced to $4,681.1
million.
On December 31 the outstanding funded debt
of the Bank was $2,537.9 million, reflecting a
net increase of $17.1 million in the past 6
months. During the period there was a gross
increase in borrowings of $124 million. This
consisted of a Netherlands guilder i^ublic bond
issue in the amount of f.40 million (US$11 mil-
lion equivalent) ; a public offering of $5 million
of U.S. dollar bonds in Austria; the private
placement of an issue of $100 million of U.S.
dollar bonds ; a placement of $5 million of U.S.
dollar notes with the central bank of Austria ;
and the delivery of $3 million of bonds which
had been subject to delayed delivery arrange-
ments. The funded debt was decreased by
$106.9 million as a result of the maturing of $100
million of bonds and smking fund and purchase
fund transactions amoimting to $6.9 million.
During the first 6 months of the fiscal year,
Kuwait, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tan-
ganyika, and Togo became members of the
Bank with subscriptions aggregating $178.3
million. The subscribed capital of the Bank
amounted to $20,663.1 million on December 31,
1962.
rEBRtTARY 25, 1963
301
President Expresses Hope for Success
of U.N. Science Conference
Tlve United Nations Conference on ihe Ap-
plication of Science and Technology for the
Benefit of the Less Developed Areas convened
at Geneva on February ^. Following is a state-
ment by President Kennedy released on Jan-
uary 25 after his meeting tvith members of the
U.S. delegation, together ^vith a message from
the President which was read at the opening
session iy Walsh BIcDermott, chairman of the
U.S. delegation.^
STATEMENT OF JANUARY 25
White House press release dated January 25
This morning I have met with Dr. Walsh
McDermott, cliairman of the United States dele-
gation to the United Nations Conference on
the Application of Science and Teclmology for
the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas, and
with the members of his delegation. At this
meeting I conveyed two main thoughts to Dr.
McDermott and his colleagues.
First, my close personal interest in the suc-
cess of this conference. It is in line with the
resolution establishing a United Nations Dec-
ade of Development — proposed by the United
States and adopted unanimously by the 16th
General Assembly of the United Nations. It is
the first major international effort to focus on
the very complex problem of how best to adapt
and transfer some of the huge inventory of
technology accumulated over the years in the
industrialized world to the immediate problems
of the newly developing countries.
There are no pat solutions to this problem.
Our delegation therefore will approach the eco-
nomic and social problems of growth in the full
spirit of scientific inquiry. Yet there is no
reason why developing nations have to make
the same mistakes made by the nations which
industrialized early — no reason why our great
body of advanced teclmology should not be
brought to bear so the newly developing nations
' For a statement by Secretary Rusk and an an-
nouncement of the names of the U.S. representatives,
see Bulletin of Feb. 4, 1963, p. 188.
can leapfrog interim stages in the process of
modernization.
Second, I wanted to express my deep appre-
ciation for the outstanding cooperation and
contributions of the private scientific commu-
nity of the United States in preparing for this
conference. At least 300 scientists, technicians,
and development experts in private life have
taken part in these preparations — by mobilizing
scientific talent, by preparing conference pa-
pers, and by serving as consultants. Approxi-
mately 60 of these leaders from a dozen major
fields of activity will go to Geneva, along with
some 40 representatives of the technical and
development agencies of government, as mem-
bers or advisers to our distinguished delegation.
This is a splendid example of public-private
collaboration in support of a major goal of our
foreign policy. I sincerely hope that this fore-
casts a progressively deeper involvement, not
only of the scientific community but of other
elements in our society, in the most constructive
task of our age — ^lielping the other two-thirds of
the world to provide quickly the material basis
of a decent life for all.
I am grateful to all who have contributed
generously of their time and talents to this
project; and I have asked Dr. McDermott to
convey my warm thanks to them.
MESSAGE TO OPENING SESSION
I am delighted to have an opportunity to
address my greetings to the chairman and offi-
cers of this historic conference, and to all the
delegations participating in it. Your labors
may well prove to be a milestone in the United
Nations Decade of Development.
The United States delegation comes to
Geneva to learn, to share experience, and to
probe jointly with the other delegations the
great opportunity which we all share to seize
upon the technological achievements of the
industrialized world and reshape them for the
benefit of the newly developing nations.
We come to this task with a sense of humil-
ity; for we know that this is a complex and
sophisticated problem requiring the most inti-
mate international cooperation, the blending of
many branches of knowledge, the study of a
302
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ijreat variety of practical experiences, and the
intellectual discipline of the open mind.
But we also come to this task with a firm
conviction that rapid and even radical progress
can result if we join forces with vigor. We
come with enthusiasm for a task that is the
most constructive undertaking of this or any
other age. And we come with a restless sense
of urgency to get on quickly with a job that can
mean so much to so many of the peoples of our
interdependent world.
I salute all members of the United Nations
staff — beginning with the Secretary-General —
who have worked to bring about this pioneering
event and all the scholars and officials who now
share responsibility to prove once again that
there is more to be gained in this world by
cooperation than by aloofness and hostility.
I congratuate you and wish you all possible
success.
TREATY INFORMATION
Agricultural Commodities Agreement
Signed With Poland
ginning January 2, 1973, the Polish Govern-
ment will repurchase for dollars at the rate of
$1,720,000 annually such zlotys as have not been
used.
Poland has also undertaken, as a part of this
agreement, to purchase with its own resources
from the United States an additional 200,000
tons of feed grains and an additional 46,000
bales of cotton. These purchases are over and
above the amounts to be purchased for the zloty
equivalent of $51.6 million mentioned above.
This agreement represents a further step of
this Government to meet Polish needs by sales
of agricultural commodities. Since 1957 simi-
lar agreements mider Public Law 480 have pro-
vided for a total of $477.3 million in such sales
to Poland, including the sales agreement signed
on February 1. A total of $61 million in cred-
it has also been extended to Poland between
1957 and 1959 through the Export-Import
Bank, which has been used primarily for the
purchase of equipment and materials, agricul-
tural conmiodities, and poliomyelitis vaccine.
Shipments of these items have contributed di-
rectly to an improvement in Polish diets and
medical care, and they have been accepted by
the Polish people as material evidence of the
continuing interest and friendship of the United
States for Poland.
TEXT OF AGREEMENT
Press release 60 dated February 1
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
An agreement was concluded at Washington
on Febniary 1 by the United States and Poland
which provides for the sale to Poland of agri-
cultural commodities having a total export
market value of $51.6 million, including certain
ocean transportation costs. Under the provi-
sions of the Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance Act (Public Law 480) Poland
will purchase surplus agricultural commodities,
including wheat, cotton, and tobacco.
As provided in the act payment will be in
local currency (Polish zlotys). This currency
will be deposited to the credit of the United
States and will be available for use by the U.S.
Government. The agreement provides that be-
AOEICULTURAL COMMODITIES AgEEEMENT BETWEEN THE
Government of the United States of America and
THE Government of the Polish People's Republic
Under Title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop-
ment AND Assistance Act, as Amended
The Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Polish People's Republic;
Recognizing the desirability of expanding trade in
agricultural commodities between their two countries
in a manner which would not displace usual market-
ings of the United States of America in these commodi-
ties or unduly disrupt world prices of agricultural
commodities ;
Considering that the purchase for zlotys of agricul-
tural commodities produced in the United States of
America will assist in achieving such an expansion
of trade;
Desiring to set forth the understandings which will
govern the sales, as specified below, of agricultural
commodities to Poland pursuant to Title I of the Agri-
cultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, as
FEBRUARY 25, 1963
303
amended (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and the
measures which the two Governments will take in-
dividually and collectively in furthering the expansion
of trade in such commodities ;
Have agreed as follows :
Articde I
Sales for Zlotys
1. Subject to issuance by the Government of the
United States of America and acceptance by the Gov-
ernment of the Polish People's Republic of purchase
authorizations and to tie availability of commodities
under the Act at the time of exportation, the Govern-
ment of the United States of America undertakes to
finance the sales for zlotys to purchasers authorized
by the Government of the Polish People's Republic of
the following agricultural commodities in the amounts
indicated :
Export Market Value
Commoditv {Millions)
Wheat $38.1
Cotton 7.1
Tobacco (leaf) 2.6
Ocean Transportation (est.) 3.8
Total
$51.6
2. Applications for purchase authorizations will
be made within 90 calendar days of the effective date
of this Agreement, except that applications for pur-
chase authorizations for any additional commodities
or amounts of commodities provided for in any amend-
ment to this Agreement will be made within 90 days
of the effective date of such amendment. Purchase
authorizations will be issued promptly and will in-
clude provisions relating to the sale and delivery of
commodities, the time and circumstances of deposit
of the zlotys accruing from such sale, and other rele-
vant matters.
3. The financing, sale and delivery of commodities
under this Agreement may be terminated by either
Government if that Government determines that be-
cause of changed conditions the continuation of
such financing, sale or delivery is unnecessary or
undesirable.
Article II
Uses of Zlotys
1. The two Governments agree that the zlotys
accruing to the Government of the United States of
America as a consequence of the sales made pursuant
to this Agreement will be used by the Government of
the United States of America, in accordance with Sec-
tion 104 of the Act, to help develop new markets for
United States agricultural commodities under subsec-
tion (a) thereof; to finance the purchase of goods or
services for other countries under subsection (d)
thereof ; to pay United States obligations under sub-
section (f) thereof; to finance educational exchange
activities under subsection (h) thereof; to finance the
translation, publication and distribution of books and
periodicals under subsection (i) thereof; and for other
expenditures by the Government of the United States]
of America under subsections (J), (k), (1), (m), (n),
(q),and (r) thereof.
2. The zlotys accruing under this Agreement shall
be expended by the Government of the United States of
America, for the purposes stated in paragraph 1 of this
Article, in such manner and order of priority as the
Government of the United States of America shall
determine. It is understood that, with respect to the
purchase of goods or services for other countries, the
types, quantities and prices will be subject to negotia-
tion between the two Governments.
Article III
Deposit of Zlotys
1. The amount of zlotys to be deposited to the ac-
count of the Government of the United States of
America shall be the equivalent of the dollar sales
value of the commodities and ocean transportation
costs reimbursed or financed by the Government of the
United States of America (except exce.ss costs resulting
from the requirement that United States fiag vessels
be used) converted into zlotys, as follows:
(a) at the rate for dollar exchange applicable to
commercial import transactions on the dates
of dollar disbursements by the United States,
provided that a unitary exchange rate applying
to all foreign exchange transactions is main-
tained by the Government of the Polish
People's Republic, or
( b ) if more than one legal rate for foreign exchange
transactions exists, at the highest of any rate
of exchange (i.e., the largest number of zlotys
per US dollar) established by the Government
of the Polish People's Republic, or any agency
thereof, prevailing on the dates of dollar dis-
bursement by the Government of the United
States of America.
2. In the event that a subsequent agricultural com-
modities agreement or agreements should be signed by
the two Governments under the Act, any refunds of
zlotys which may be due or become due under this
Agreement more than two years from the effective date
of this Agreement would be made by the Government
of the United States of America from funds available
from the most recent agricultural commodities agree-
ment in effect at the time of the refund.
3. The two Governments agree that the following
procedure shall apply with respect to the zlotys deposit-
ed to the account of the Government of the United
States of America under this Agreement.
(a) On the date of the deposit of such zlotys to
the account of the United States they shall, at
the same rate of exchange at which they were
deposited, be converted and transferred to a
special dollar denominated account to the
credit of the United States Government in the
National Bank of Poland.
304
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
(b) Withdrawals in zlotys from such special dollar
denominated account by the United States for
uses referred to in Article II of this Agreement
other than the purchase of goods or services for
other countries shall be paid by the National
Banli of Poland at the highest of any rate of
exchange (i.a, the largest number of zlotys
per US dollar) established by the Government
of the Polish People's Republic, or any agency
thereof, prevailing on the date of the with-
drawal, provided that if such rate is more ap-
preciated than the rate at which zlotys were
deposited under paragraph 1 of this Article,
the rate in paragraph 1 shall apply.
(c) Payment for purchases of goods or services for
other countries referred to in Article II of this
Agreement shall be made by reducing the
balance in the dollar denominated account by
an amount equal to the dollar prices of such
purchases agreed upon by the two Governments.
(d) If any unused balance remains in such special
dollar denominated account on and after
January 2, 1973, the Government of the Polish
People's Republic agrees that, if the United
States Government shall so elect, the National
Bank of Poland will sell to the Government of
the United States the sum of $1,720,000 in
dollar exchange annually, beginning January 2,
1973, and on each succeeding January 2, such
dollar exchange to be paid for by reducing the
balance in the doUar denominated account by
the same amount.
Aeticle IV
General Undertakings
1. The Government of the Polish People's Republic
will take all possible measures to prevent the resale or
transshipment to other countries or the use for other
than domestic purposes (except where such resale,
transshipment or use is specifically approved by the
Government of the United States of America) of the
agricultural commodities purchased pursuant to the
provisions of this Agreement and to assure that the
purchase of such commodities does not result in in-
creased availability of these or like commodities for
export to other countries.
2. The two Governments will take reasonable pre-
cautions to assure that all sales or purchases of agri-
cultural commodities made pursuant to this Agree-
ment wiU not displace usual marketings of the United
States of America in these commodities or unduly dis-
rupt world prices of agricultural commodities.
3. The Government of the Polish People's Republic
will furnish upon request of the Government of the
United States of America, information on the progress
of the program, particularly with respect to the ar-
rival and condition of commodities and the un-
derstandings regarding commercial imports, and
information relating to exports of the same or like
commodities.
Aeticle V
Consultation
The two Governments will, upon the request of
either of them, consult regarding any matter relating
to the application of this Agreement or to the opera-
tion of arrangements carried out pursuant to this
Agreement.
Abticle VI
Entry Into Force
The Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.
In witness whereof, the respective representatives,
duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the pres-
ent Agreement.
Done in duplicate at Washington in the English and
PoUsh languages this first day of February, 1963.
For the Government of For the Government of
the United States of the Polish People's
America : Republic :
Tadetusz Ltchowski
Philip H. Teezise
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Antarctica
Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty.
Adopted at the Second Consultative Meeting at Bue-
nos Aires July 28, 1962. Enters Into force upon ap-
proval of all the parties whose representatives were
entitled to participate in that meeting.
Approvals: Argentina, September 11, 1962; Austra-
lia, October 18, 1962 ; Belgium, December 13, 1962 ;
Chile, October 17, 1962 ; France, November 8, 1962 ;
Japan, November 16, 1962 ; New Zealand, Novem-
ber 1, 1962; Norway, January 11, 1963; South
Africa, November 15, 1962 ; Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, October 4, 1962 ; United King-
dom, November 30, 1962; United States, Decem-
ber 4, 1962.
Entered into force: January 11, 1963.
Health
Constitution of the World Health Organization.
Opened for signature at New York July 22, 1946.
Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808.
Acceptance deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, Janu-
ary 3, 1963.
Law of the Sea
Convention on fishing and conservation of living re-
sources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29,
1958."
Ratification deposited: Colombia, January 3, 1963.
Slavery
Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25,
1926, as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force
' Not in force.
FEBKUAKY 25, 1963
305
March 9, 1927 ; for the United States March 21, 1929.
46 Stat. 2183.
Accession deposited: Nepal, January 7, 1963.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with .six
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. En-
tered into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United
States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
RaUfioation deposited: Cuba, December 12, 1962.
Accessions deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), Janu-
ary 26, 1963 ; Panama, December 6, 1962 ; Rwanda,
December 12, 1962.
Extension to: Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Brit-
ish Guiana, British Honduras, Antigua, Montser-
rat. St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla, British
Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent, Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos Is-
lands, January 1, 1963.
Trade
Protocol for the accession of Portugal to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
April 6, 1962. Entered into force May 6, 1962 ; for
the United States, July 1, 1962. TIAS 5248.
Signature: Turkey, November 27, 1962.
Rntification deposited: Sweden, December 27, 1962.
Proc&s-verbal extending period of validity of the dec-
laration on provisional accession of Argentina to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of No-
vember 18, 1960 (TIAS 5184). Done at Geneva
November 7, 1962. Entered into force December 31,
1962.
Signatures: Argentina, November 20, 1962 ; Austria
(subject to ratification), January 4, 1963; Bel-
giimi, December 7, 1962 ; Canada, December 19,
1962 ; Chile, December 21, 1962 ; South Africa, No-
vember 16, 1962 ; United Kingdom, December 21,
1962.
Weatlier
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accessions deposited: Rwanda, February 4, 1963;
Trinidad and Tobago, February 1, 1963.
Wheat
International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signa-
ture at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962.
Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts
III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS
5115.
Application to: Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony,
and St. Vincent, February 5, 1963.
BILATERAL
China
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of November 19, 1962 (TIAS 5219). Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Taipei January 24,
1963. Entered into force January 24, 1963.
Ethiopia
Agreement concerning aerial photography and map-
ping within the Empire of Ethiopia. Signed at
Addis Ababa January 2.5, 1963. Entered into force
January 25, 1963.
Israel
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of May 3, 1962, as amended ( TIAS .5004
and 5180). Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington January 26 and February 1, 1963. Entered
into force February 1, 1963.
Poland
Agreement relating to the reciprocal waiver of visa
fees for performing artists. Effected by exchange of
notes at Warsaw December 17, 1962, and January
21, 1963. Entered into force January 21, 1963.
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 4.55; 7 U.S.C.
1701-1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at
Washington February 1, 1963. Entered into force
February 1, 1963.
Sudan
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amendetl (68 Stat. 4.55; 7 U.S.C.
1701-1709). Signed at Khartoum January 31, 1963.
Entered into force January 31, 1963.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 4-10
Press releases may be obtained from the OflBce
of News, Department of State, Washington 25,
D.C.
Releases issued prior to February 4 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 54
of January 28; .58 of January 29; and 60 of
February 1.
No. Date Subject
*66 2/4 U.S. participation in international
conferences.
67 2/4 Advisory Committee on International
Business Problems (rewrite).
69 2/4 Air talks with U.A.R. concluded.
*70 2/8 Plank appointed director. Office of Re-
search and Analysis for American
Reimblics, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (biographic details).
71 2/8 Transcript of "State Department
Briefing : Red China and the
U.S.S.R." (revised).
t73 2/9 Chayes: Moorhead State College.
174 2/9 Schaetzel : "Tides of Change."
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
306
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
'ebruary 25, 1963
Index
Vol. XLVllI, No. 1235
Agriculture. Agricultural Commodities Agree-
ment Signed With Poland (text of agreement) . 303
American Republics. Law Day, U.S.A. — 1963
I, text of proclamation) 297
\viation. Civil Aviation Talks Concluded With
United Arab Republic 297
Brazil. Terms of Trade and the Brazilian Bal-
ance of Payments (Gordon) 284
China, Communist. Red China and the U.S.S.R.
(transcript of television program) .... 271
Communism. Red China and the U.S.S.R.
(transcript of television program) .... 271
Cuba. U.S. Will Not Ship Aid Cargoes on
Vessels Engaged in Cuban Trade 283
Department and Foreign Service. Advisory
Committee on International Business Prob-
lems Established 296
Economic Affairs
Advisory Committee on International Business
Problems Established 296
International Bank Issues 6-Month Financial
Statement 301
President Proclaims U.S. Tariff Concessions to
Japan and Spain 295
Terms of Trade and the Brazilian Balance of
Payments (Gordon) 284
Trade Negotiations and the OECD (Herter) . 298
U.S. Will Not Ship Aid Cargoes on Vessels En-
gaged in Cuban Trade 283
Educational and Cultural Affairs. President Ap-
points New Members to Board of Foreign
Scholarships 296
Europe. Trade Negotiations and the OECD
(Herter) 298
Foreign Aid. U.S. Will Not Ship Aid Cargoes on
Vessels Engaged in Cuban Trade 283
India. U.S. Defense Production Experts Go to
India for Consultations 283
International Organizations and Conferences
International Bank Issues 6-Month Financial
Statement 301
Trade Negotiations and the OECD (Herter) . 298
Japan. President Proclaims U.S. Tariff Con-
cessions to Japan and Spain 295
Military Affairs. U.S. Defense Production Ex-
perts Go to India for Consultations .... 283
Poland. Agricultural Commodities Agreement
Signed With Poland (text of agreement) . . 303
Presidential Documents
Law Day, U.S.A.— 1963 297
President Expresses Hope for Success of U.N.
Science Conference 302
Science
International Cooperation in Space Science
(Rusk) 294
President Expresses Hope for Success of U.N.
Science Conference 302
Spain. President Proclaims U.S. Tariff Con-
cessions to Japan and Spain 295
Treaty Information
Agricultural Commodities Agreement Signed
With Poland (text of agreement) .... 303
Civil Aviation Talks Concluded With United
Arab Republic 297
Current Actions 305
U.S.S.R. Red China and the U.S.S.R. (tran-
script of television program) 271
United Arab Republic Civil Aviation Talks
Concluded With United Arab Republic ... 297
United Nations. President Expresses Hojje for
Success of U.N. Science Conference .... 302
Name Index
Carr, Randolph 271
Gordon, Lincoln 284
Harriman, W. Averell 271
Herter, ChrisUan A 298
Hilsman, Roger 271
Johnson, U. Alexis 271
Johnstone, William C 271
Kennedy, President 297,302
London, Kurt L 271
Morrow, Conrad P 271
O'Brien, Frank 271
Rusk, Secretary 271, 294
Steele, John L 271
Stein, Herbert 271
Torres, Mrs. Lorraine B 271
Unna, Warren 271
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16 7
aSife,
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1236
March 4, 1963
THE ROAD AHEAD • Address by Secretary Rusk 311
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND AMERICAN FOR-
EIGN POLICY • by Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser . . . 318
TIDES OF CHANGE • by J. Robert Schaetzel 322
GEOGRAPHIC TERMINOLOGY OF EUROPE • Article
by G. Etsel Pearcy 330
Y RECORD
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'he Road Ahead
Address by Secretary Ruak '
It is a pleasure and privilege to speak to this
stingiiislied audience at the conclusion of this
gional foreign policy conference. We in the
epartment of State are grateful to you, the co-
•onsors. Organizations such as yours serve
le Nation by helping to inform the American
iblic on issues of critical concern to every
tizen.
We in tlie Department understand that for-
gn policy has its impact upon every home and
ery community and that our efforts are aimed
your safety and well-being. Therefore noth-
)g is more important in a free society than the
Dportunity for give-and-take between the citi-
»n and his government. Our thanks go to Mr.
(obert Minckler and Mr. Walter Coombs of
6 World Affairs Council; to Mr. Theodore
Iraun, Mr. Elden Smith, and Mr. William B.
iller of Town Hall ; and to Mr. George Getty,
"lairman of the citizens' committee for the
onference.
Two years ago last week I held my first news
onference as Secretary of State. The tran-
ript^ shows that I was asked a great many
uestions about Cuba. I was also asked .seardi-
ig questions about the Congo, Southeast Asia,
lerlin, the strengthening of NATO, our foreign
id program in Latin America and elsewhere,
isarmament, and the resumption of talks with
ne Soviet Union about a nuclear test ban.
From a mere listing of the topics one might
• Made tjfefore a regional foreign policy conference at
/)s Angeles, Calif., on Feb. 1.3 (press release 78 dated
'eb. 12. for relea.se Feb. 1.3). The conference was
onducted by the Department of .State with the co-
poDsorship of the Ix>s Angeles World Affairs Council
D cooperation with Town Hall.
• Bulletin of Feb. 27, 1961, p. 296.
assume that the world has changed little in 2
years. But all of us know — certainly we wliose
daily business is the foreign policy of the United
States know — that is not the case. These 2
years have been packed with both crisis and
forward movement.
Where do we stand today in our relations
witli that world beyond our borders which we
can influence but not control ? How stands the
great struggle for freedom which is the basic
commitment of ourselves, our 42 allies, and most
of the unalined world?
A Secretary of State cannot indulge in easy
optimism. We shall continue to have in front
of us a heaping plate of problems, becau.se
change is the con.stant for our generation. Dur-
ing l')(j?> national elections or other nonviolent
changes in government are expected to occur
in some 33 nations. And we, as other free
peoples, are locked in a world struggle with
dangerous adversaries?. There remains the
necessity to remain alert and to su.stain our ef-
fort, but there are also reasons for a measure
of confidence and satisfaction.
Situation in Southeast Asia
In Southeast Asia in I'jCA both Laos and
.South Viet-Nam were gravely threatened by
Communist guerrilla ofren.sive3 supplied and
directed from North Viet-Nam. A Soviet air-
lift was transporting arms directly to Laotian
rebels. At Vienna, in June 1961, President
Kennedy and Chairman Khrushcliev agreed
that Laos should become an independent, neu-
tral nation.* Agreements signed at Geneva last
' For text of a Joint U.S.-U.8.8.B. commoiilqtie, gee
ibUL, Jtine 26, 1961, p. 999.
I«AECH 4, 1963
511
July * and the formation of a Lao Government
of National Union provided a basis on which
the armed conflict could be ended and the coun-
try imified.
In accordance with the Geneva agreements
we withdrew our personnel training the Lao
Ai-my and have given our support to Prince
Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister of the
coalition government. However, we are not
convinced that the agreements are being loyally
supported by the Pathet Lao and the regime in
Hanoi. The Viet Minli still have military
cadres in Laos, and the Pathet Lao have ob-
structed the Prime Minister's attempt to effect
a national reconciliation.
The Geneva agreements created an opportu-
nity for the landlocked people of Laos to be left
alone to work out their own future without out-
side interference. We shall continue to bend
all our efforts to assure that the Geneva agree-
ments are enforced. For what could be a satis-
factory solution will remain precarious and old
dangers revived if solemn pledges are not fully
observed.
In South Viet-Nam, where the Communist
aggression attained very serious dimensions in
1961, we took decisive action to help Viet-Nam
defend itself. The momentum of the Commu-
nist drive has been stopped. Complete victory
for South Viet-Nam is not just around the
corner, but the guerrillas are losing ground and
the number of guerrilla attacks has declined
significantly. Major deficiencies in training,
intelligence, and mobility have been repaired;
government forces have the initiative and are
using it with growing effect.
Both the Vietnamese and we recognize that
this is a political and social struggle as well as
a military conflict. The Government of South
Viet-Nam is pushing programs designed both
to improve rural life and to provide better pro-
tection against Communist assaults and terror
tactics. We are confident that they are on the
right track and that, with our help, the brave
and capable people of South Viet-Nam will pre-
serve their independence and steadily eradicate
the Communist infestation.
* For texts of a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos
and an accompanying protocol, see ihid., Aug. 13, 1962,
p. 259.
In the Congo President Kennedy decided th;
our national interest would best be served I
giving full effect to President Eisenhower's d
cision to support the United Nations in a di
termined effort to restore order and tranquillil
in the face of outside interference. There hai
been many difficulties along the way, from tl
very moment of independence in July 196i
But the Congolese have frustrated Communi
designs on their country, and the several sece
sionist movements, of which Katanga was or
and a Communist-leaning regime in Stanley
ville another, have been unsuccessful. Tl
Congo is still faced with serious problems, bi<
the foundations have been laid for economi
recovery and political stability in this potei
tially rich country in the heart of Africa.
In Europe, West Berlin continues to thri'V
in freedom. We believe that the Soviet leaden
imderstand that when President Kennedy sai
we had vital interests there, he meant it — thsl
we and our allies are prepared to do whatever
may be necessary to protect the freedom of tha
city.
Soviet Military Elements in Cuba
Turning to Cuba, President Kennedy sai'
again at his press conference last week [Febrt.
ary 7] that we are reasonably certain that tbi
offensive weapons deployed there vmder :
blanket of secrecy have now been removed. W
cannot, of course, be absolutely certain tha
none remains, in the absence of on-the-spot in
spection. But we do not believe that forces hot
in Cuba represent a serious military threat h
the security of this country or of our neighbors
Much of the information on which this judg
ment is based was set forth in detail last weel
by Secretary of Defense [Robert S.] Mc
Namara. In the background is the fact whicl
both sides fully understand — that the armed
forces of the United States and its neighbors in
the hemisphere will insure that arms in Cuba
will not be used outside Cuba.
At the same time certain Soviet troops re-
main in Cuba. As we have said before, we in
the Western Hemisphere cannot accept as nor-
mal any Soviet military presence in this hemi-
sphere. The authorities in Moscow and Ha-
bana must recognize that Soviet military
312
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
. 'inents in Cuba do not insure the peace of
( iba but poison the atmosphere and increase
1 0 dancers. Tlie sooner this source of poten-
til trouble is eliminated, the better for every-
( 0 concerned.
Cuba will not become a base for offensive
)ilitary operations against other countries of
tis hemisphere for the simple reason that it
1 11 not be permitted to play that role. Com-
lunist subversion in Latin America, whether
( nnected with Cuba or not, is being met by the
dividual and joint actions of the American
! \tes. The continuing economic, psychological,
id political isolation of the Cuban regime not
idy protects others from this source of infec-
3n but brings home to the people of Cuba that
■ ere is no future along the Marxist-Leninist
u-ith.
Binmunism and the Hemisphere
Having failed in the fifties to prevent the
rtablishment of a Communist regime in Cuba,
e United States and its hemispheric partners
DW face the more clifBcult problem of finding a
are. The hemisphere is unanimous that the
resent regime in Cuba is incompatible with
(16 inter-American system and that the policy
t the hemisphere must be directed toward the
sturn of a free Cuba to the American family
If nations. Precise steps to give effect to this
(olicy must take into realistic account all the
laments involved ; there are no easy and cheap
olutions in a nuclear age. Great risks must be
iccepted to meet great threats, but issues affect-
Hg the life and death of nations must be treat-
id with the sober responsibility exhibited by
"resident Kennedy last fall.
Apart from the crisis over offensive weapons
ast October,' the most important development
vith regard to Cuba has been the decline of
IJastro as a symbol of the popular demand for
iconomic and social reform. Tlie betrayal of
;he Cuban revolution to Communist imperi-
ilism has made its indelible mark on Latin
Ajnerica, and those who aspire to change want
aone of the Castro brand. Commmiism now
benefits from the harsh conditions of life in the
hemisphere, conditions wliich the Alliance for
° For background, see ihid., Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.
Progress was designed to improve as a free
alternative to the Castro brand of revolution.
Throughout the world communism itself has
been losing its appeal as more and more people
have come to understand its true nature and
objectives. Its inefficiency is underscored by
the chronic food shortages in the Communist
empires. Its failures as a system of society are
dramatized by the fact that it has to string
barbed wire and build walls to keep its own
people in. ]
International communism is no longer a sin-
gle, coordinated world movement. The leaders
of its two main branches are quarreling among
themselves. We should not draw too much com-
fort from that quarrel, for it is over methods,
not objectives. Both sides are intent on destroy-
ing us; both are determined to impose their
system on all the people of the earth. But the
rift subtracts from the strength as well as the
luster of the Communist movement. Through-
out the Communist world we see the forces of
nationalism at ■work. And increasingly in the
Soviet Union, as well as in Eastern Europe, we
see pressures of human beings for more personal
freedom.
Allocation of Responsibility in Free World
There are other reasons to believe that the
cause of freedom has made gains in the last two
years. The military defenses of the free world
have been strengthened. Economically and
socially, many of the underdeveloped nations
are malcing encouraging progress. The more
advanced nations have acliieved new levels of
well-being.
There are, however, some further steps that
must be taken by the free world and especially
by the Atlantic world. One of the first is to
bring about a better allocation of responsibility.
Begimiing in 1947, while withdrawing before
the advance of the anticolonialist wave that
swept the earth during this postwar time, the
European nations left partial vacuums of
power and responsibility which the United
States, of necessity, had to enter. Now the
European powers have become strong. It is
only right and proper that they should again
play a leading role in world affairs — a role
based on principles of equality and mutual self-
MARCH 4, 1963
313
respect as a substitute for earlier colonial
arrangements.
We cannot expect our European friends to
assume responsibilities on a world basis unless
they also share along with us in decisions of
policy and strategy on a world basis. All this
we have recognized in shaping the policies of
the Kennedy administration — policies which
are in turn applications and extension of a con-
sistent line of policy pursued by the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations.
By the North Atlantic Treaty the United
States is committed to the defense of the fron-
tiers of freedom in Europe. We undertook
that commitment because it is a vital American
interest that Western Europe, with its rich re-
sources in people and skills and knowledge, not
fall into the hands of hostile or potentially hos-
tile powers. Twice in this century we have
fought major wars to prevent that from hap-
pening. And after the Second World War,
when the Communists made plain their active
ambition to take over Western Europe, we
moved to thwart them. The simple facts of
Soviet military strength required us to deploy
American forces in Western Europe for our
mutual defense.
We have sought, all along, that Europe
should become strong and united, not merely for
the greater economic well-being of its peoples
but so that it might also play the role of equal
partner with us in carrying out the gi'eat tasks
that history has imposed upon the economically
advanced nations. For us, the revival of
Europe has not been a cause for envy but an
object of policy. For we cannot ignore the fact
that in the North Atlantic world — Western
Europe and North America — there is concen-
trated 90 percent of all free-world industrial
strength as well as the great bulk of the free
world's technical skill and knowledge.
This concentration gives rise to certain prop-
ositions which seem to me self-evident :
The frst is that Europe and North America
must carry the great burden of defense against
the aggressive ambitions of the Communist bloc.
We must defend one another and the balance of
the free world as well. In short, in an age of
nuclear warfare, the defense of the free world
is indivisible.
iiar
lit.
itt
lom
i?
The second proposition is that, in the modei
industrial age, tlie economies of the great indu d
trial areas of the North Atlantic are interd
pendent. We see a visual demonstration <
this interdependence in our present balance-o
payments deficit. That deficit — persistent an
troublesome as it is — is the mirror image of tl
surpluses in tlie balance of accounts of certai
major European countries. In view of this ii
terdependence it is imperative that we and ov
European friends work together, to the greate!
degree possible, to achieve harmony in oi
domestic economic policies and to improve tb „
flow of goods among our countries.
Thinly it seems to me essential that we m«
bilize our common resources to assist the ufl ^
derdeveloped countries in improving thei) .a
living standards, thus making possible political |j
stability. _ ^ 'j,
We have believed that the Atlantic partner)
ship could attain even greater reality and effeci
tiveness to the extent that Europe became mor»
and more united and could thus speak with :
strong and consistent voice on a widening rang
of problems. AVe were, therefore, gratified u
July 1961 when the United Kingdom Govern
ment made the decision to apply for member |j
ship in the three European communities — tb-jj
Common Market, EURATOM, and the Coa
and Steel Community. Not only would this en
able the British to contribute their remarkablii'
political abilities to the building of effective
European unity, but the very fact of Britain's
membership would be a contribution to the co-
hesion of tlie West.
Within the past month, as we all know, this
step toward the expansion of European unity
has been halted — for the time being at least —
by the veto of the French Government.
I should be less than candid if I did not admit
that this interruption in the process of unity has
been a disappointment. But it has not, as some
commentators have dramatically asserted, left
our Atlantic policy in shambles. On the con-
trary, the main lines of that policy have become
more than ever valid and urgent. For it is
essential — at the time when there is disarray
within the Communist bloc — that we achieve
that unity of purpose and effort in the free
world which will enable us to take advantage of
314
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ny opportunities of change or movement in
Jorld political relationships.
rengthening the Atlantic Partnership
To that end we are determined to press on
ward the strengtiiening of our Atlantic rela-
ons along lines which have been clearly laid
ut — lines that not only meet our own needs but,
am confident, respond to the aspiration and
ishes of the great bulk of the European peo-
le. These lines of policy take account of the
act that the nations of Europe, feeling eco-
omically strong, will wish to play a role in
orld affairs commensurate with that new-
found strength.
"We understand the desire of our NATO allies
o have a part in their own nuclear defense. For
hat reason we have for some time been discus-
ing witli them the possibilities of a multilateral
luclear force within NATO. Great Britain
igreed to support such proposals at the Nassau
sonference between President Kennedy and
Prime Minister Macmillan.^ Serious dis-
cussions have been undertaken within the
NATO Council and with certain of the Euro-
pean governments. Already Chancellor Ade-
mauer has expressed the desire of the Federal
[Republic of Germany to participate in such a
tforce. Wlien Prime Minister Fanfani of Italy
Tvas in "Washington recently, he made it clear
Ithat the Italian Government also wished to work
with us in the development of a force of this
kind.'
In this manner not only the nuclear but non-
nuclear powers can play their full part in the
development of a nuclear defense for Europe.
And this can be achieved without that prolifera-
tion of national nuclear deterrents that might
not only increase the dangers to the world but
diminish the chances of ultimately bringing
these dreadful weapons under some effective in-
ternational control.
At the same time we must continue to consult
with our European friends not only on economic
matters through the OECD — the Organization
' For text of a joint communique and a statement on
nuclear defense systems issued at Nassau on Dec. 21,
see ibid., Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.
' For text of a joint communique released at Wash-
ington on Jan. 17, see ibid., Feb. 4, 1963, p. 164.4
for Economic Cooperation and Development — ■
but also on a greater and greater number of
world problems. "We are working with Great
Britain and the Commonwealth on the task of
assisting India to defend itself against Chinese
Communist aggression. "We worked in close
consultation with the Governments of Belgium
and the United Kingdom in trying to find a so-
lution for the problem of the Congo. Through
the Development Assistance Committee of the
OECD we are working actively with the Euro-
pean nations in coordinating our efforts to help
the less developed peoples of the world.
This process must go forward. More effec-
tive mechanisms of consultation must be devel-
oped. More and more we and a strong Europe
must share together the problems of responsi-
bility and decision if we are to be able to utilize
our common strength for the common purposes
of the Atlantic partnership.
In this process I see a greater and greater role
for Japan — another great and rapidly growing
industrial power — which is beginning to join
more and more with Europe and North America
in these vast common enterprises.
Expansion of Trade
Among these enterprises, of course, we must
not neglect the expansion of trade. It was
with this objective in mind that President Ken-
nedy last year obtained from Congress a major
grant of powers under the Trade Expansion
Act. These powers we intend to use vigorously
in the interests of our country and the free
world. One of our most distinguished states-
men. Christian A. Herter, has, as you know,
undertaken this responsibility as the President's
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.'
In these negotiations the United States Gov-
ernment will continue to follow the principles
that we have pursued for 30 years— of working
toward nondiscriminatory trade and granting
trade concessions on a most-favored-nation
basis. During the past few weeks we have aU
heard suggestions that the United States might
join a new trade grouping, might create a kind
of residual trading bloc of the industrial na-
' For a statement made by Mr. Herter on Jan. 31, see
ibid., Feb. 25, 1963, p. 298.
MARCH 4, 1963
315
tions not members of the European Common
Market. This would not, in my view, be sound
policy. If we are true to our leadership role, we
should work not for discrimination but for the
expansion of a free flow of trade throughout
the free world.
I look forward, throughout the next few
years, to great progress toward the building of
a strong Atlantic partnership. The tides are
running in this direction. The tides of Euro-
pean imity and Atlantic cohesion have been
strong enough to carry us through crises in the
past — for example, the failure of the plan for a
European Defense Community in 19.54 and the
Suez crisis of 1956. These tides continue to run
strongly.
In the Atlantic community we have a long
agenda of vital problems in front of us. Our
task is to move forward on these steadily,
learning as we go, keeping the faith that the
tragic lessons of the last half century, as well
as the hopeful lessons of our common achieve-
ments since 1945, have been well learned.
Likewise, in the world as a whole we shall
continue to work toward our great goal — in
President Kennedy's words: ". . . a peaceftil
world community of free and independent
states, free to choose their own future and their
own system so long as it does not threaten the
freedom of others." "
This goal and the Communist goal are in-
compatible. We shall persevere in this world-
wide struggle until freedom prevails. We move
into the future not only with resolution but with
measured confidence.
United States Recognizes
Government of Iraq
Department Statement
Press release 72 dated February 11
The United States Government, taking note
of the reaffirmation by the Government of the
Republic of Iraq of its intention to honor its
international obligations, has today [February
11] decided to recognize the Government of
Iraq and has instructed its Charge d'Affaires in
'Ihid., Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
^
Baghdad to confirm this decision in writing to
the Alinistry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Iraq. I
With its recognition, the United States ex-!
tends its best wishes for success and prosperity
of the Government of Iraq and its hopes that
the traditional ties of friendship between the
American and Iraqi peoples will be expanded
and strengthened.
Shah of Iran Congratulated
on Results of Referendum
Following is an exchange of messages hetween
President Kennedy and Mohammad Reza Shah
Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran.
White House press release dated February 13
President Kennedy to Shah of Iran
January 29, 1963
His Imperial IVIajesty the Shahanshah of
Iran:
Congratulations on your victory in the his-
toric referendum on Saturday [January 26].
Vice President Johnson, following lus visit to
Iran last August,^ told me of the warm recep-
tion accorded him by your people and their
determination to advance and modernize on a
broad front. It is therefore all tlie more grati-
fying to learn that a vast majority has sup-
ported your leadership in a clear and open
expression of their will. This demonstration
of support should renew your confidence in
the rightness of your course and strengthen
your resolve to lead Iran to fm-ther achieve-
ments in the struggle to better the lot of your
l^eople.
John F. Kennedy
Shah of Iran to President Kennedy
January 31, 1963
The President of the United States of
America :
Many thanks for your kind congratulations.
The result of the referendum does indeed reflect
' For an announcement, see Buixetin of Aug. 27,
1962, p. 320.
316
department of state bulletin
:
he wholehearted approval of my fundamental
eforms by the well-nigh unanimous vote of the
(eople of Iran. It has increased the faith I
lave always had in their power of discrimina-
ion and their support of my determination to
■aise their standard of life.
Although we pride ourselves on our glorious
)ast history, we are especially looking to the
iiture trying to march abreast of the most free
d hajDpy progressive nations of the world. I
ow that in the implementation of our social
,nd economic development we can count on the
ympathy of our American friends.
With liigh esteem,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
Pan American Day
and Pan American Week, 1963
A PROCLAMATION^
Whereas April 14, 1963, will mark the seventy-third
anniversary of the inter-American system established
by the American Republics and by them designated as
the Organization of American States ; and
Wheeeas the United States of America is, and has
been from the beginning, an integral part of this orga-
nization of free Republics of the Western Hemisphere,
whose collective interdependence maintains and
strengthens their individual independence; and
Wheeeas these Republics are now actively allied in
an unparalleled cooperative effort to achieve individual-
ly and collectively the economic growth and social prog-
ress which will open to the citizens of this Hemisphere
frontiers of opportunity beyond any yet known to
mankind ; and
Wheeeas the United States of America has supported
consistently and uninterruptedly in our hemisphere re-
lationships the basic ideal of freedom with order
through which the American Republics achieved their
independence and on which their progress is firmly
based :
Now, thekefdee, I, John F. Kennedy, President of
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Sun-
day, April 14, 1963, as Pan American Day, and the week
from April 14 through April 20, 1963, as Pan American
Week ; and I call upon the Governors of the fifty States
of the Union, the Governor of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and the Governors of all other areas
under the United States flag to issue similar proclama-
tions.
In the interest of inter-American friendship and
solidarity, I urge all United States citizens and in-
terested organizations to contribute enthusiastically,
by words and works, toward making Pan American
Day and Pan American Week occasion for rejoicing
that our free Republics during the past year have
strongly reafBrmed the will for freedom and the de-
termination to stand together in its defense, and a
resolute intent to create in this hemisphere, through
our Alliance for Progress, an invigorating environment
of hope, confidence, and achievement.
In witness wheeeof, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America
to be aflixed.
Done at the City of Washington this eleventh day of
February in the year of our Lord nineteen hun-
[seal] dred and sixty-three, and of the Independence
of the United States of America the one hun-
dred and eighty-seventh.
By the President :
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.
///Li ^/{ww-^
' No. 3519 ; 28 Fed. Reg. 1403.
Letters of Credence
RwaTida
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Rwanda, Lazare Mpakaniye, pre-
sented his credentials to President Kennedy on
February 14. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see Depart-
ment of State press release 84 dated February
14.
Venezuela
The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re-
public of Venezuela, Enrique Tejera Paris, pre-
sented liis credentials to President Kennedy on
February 15. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see Depart-
ment of State press release 85 dated Febru-
ary 15.
MARCH 4, 1963
317
European Integration and American Foreign PoSicy
hy Abram Chayes
Legal Adviser ^
On Au^st 30, 1954, the French Assembly
rejected the European Defense Community
treaty. I was not then in the Government.
But a close friend of mine on the Policy Plan-
ning Staff in the State Department had been
intimately associated with the several years of
activity that had been devoted, on both sides of
the Atlantic, to the development of that treaty.
He is by no means an unintelligent or imper-
ceptive man. But he solemnly assured me then
that the cause of European unity and Western
defense had received a blow from which it
could never recover.
All of us, both in Government and out — even
in sheltered academic groves like these — live
bemused by the daily headlines. We find it
hard to believe that an event like General de
Gaulle's January 14th press conference, which
today seems to dominate the landscape of inter-
national politics, will, in the not too long run,
be reduced to a footnote of history. As in
1954, there is plenty of viewing with darkest
alarm. So sober a voice as Walter Lippmann
told us only the other day that "General de
Gaulle has shattered the postwar structure of
United States foreign policy."
With deference to the common hullabaloo,
that statement and others like it seem to me
extreme. Policies that are soundly based on
the real facts and forces at work in a situation
cannot be "shattered" by a single act of a single
man. And United States policy toward the
development of Europe is so based.
' Address made at Moorhead State College, Moorhead,
Minn., on Feb. 9 duress release 73).
American policy since the war has sought
the growth and integration of Europe — in po- L
litical energy, in military power, in economic^
wealth. We have sought these ends not pri-J
marily out of any particular generosity of!
spirit — although there are many who have been
caught by the vision of a broader common-
wealth. Rather, we have seen that this is the
only way to mobilize the immense resources of
Europe and bring them to bear on the tasks of
defending the free world and building the
southern continents. We have hoped that a
united Europe would undertake these tasks in a
partnership with us that would reflect our com-
mon history and our common fate. We have
always recognized that with progress toward
European unity would come increased responsi-
bility and its concomitant, increased authority.
These policies, taken together, have been
called the "grand design." President Kennedy
had occasion to remark only last Thursday
[February 7] that, far from being shattered,
they continue to be the policies of the United
States. And so they should be.
General de Gaulle did not change any of the
basic realities on which these policies are based.
Non-Communist Europe in the aggregate con-
tinues to be a major center of potential power.
It has a gross national product of more than
$345 billion and a population of more than 340
million. It is the only considerable source of
capital for investment in development outside
our own country. But modern economic tech-
nology continues to require an arena much
larger than the European nation-state if it is to
318
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
perate efficiently and sustain prosperity. And
lodern military technology insistently prods
s with the l^nowledge that an attack on one is
11 attack on all and that defense is indivisible.
These are the facts of the situation. They
ave impelled us to adopt the policies we have
ollowed since the war — and they still do.
Of course, France is a fact in the situation
00. France lies, physically, athwart the en-
ranceway to Europe and, culturally, at the
cart of it. Neither political nor military nor
lyiiiomic integration is possible without her.
'^rance is ruled by a great man who knows what
e wants. But both the man and his country
re subject to the same ineluctable forces that
re working on us. "Wliose will prevails in
he end will depend on which one of us better
lerceives and more skillfully uses the under-
ying forces at work.
he Marshall Plan and NATO
American policy toward Europe has, since
he war, pursued the goal of integration and
mification in a variety of forms and through
, variety of instrumentalities.
In the immediate postwar phase, economic
econstruction was the critically indicated
oute. The two wars, which had brought the
Jnited States to the center of the world scene,
eft Western Europe shattered and devastated.
The lands from which many of our ancestors
•ame, the source of our culture and traditions,
he center of much of the strength which we
.vould need to summon in the years ahead lay
:n Europe. Europe was exhausted in man-
oower, in equipment, in energy, in morale.
V^irtually its whole industrial plant had to be
rebuilt, including not only the machines and
factories themselves but the ports, railroads,
power systems, and communications that sup-
port a great industrial complex. A scattered
labor force had to be reassembled, retrained,
and instilled with new hope. All this had to
be done at a time when the very necessities of
life were hard to obtain, when much of the ma-
terials and machinery had to be imported from
abroad, and when the international monetary
picture was dominated by a seemingly un-
bridgeable and perpetual dollar gap.
Our response was the Marshall Plan, a $15
billion investment in European redevelopment.
The two guiding themes of that effort were uni-
fication and partnership. The Marshall Plan
legislation expressly provided that the program
was to be administered so as to promote the
unity of Western Europe. And, in actual op-
eration, the United States did not dictate
where and how the funds were to be applied.
A European organization, the OEEC [Organi-
zation for European Economic Cooperation],
was created. It was composed of the states
participating in the Marshall Plan. Its func-
tion was to plan the most effective application
of the assistance we made available and to
police its performance.
The Marshall Plan and later developments
have resulted in the economic rebirth of Eu-
rope. But the needs of AVestern defense were
too insistent to be deferred until the recovery of
Europe was complete. In 1947 Communist
guerrillas were knocking with mounting
strength on the northern borders of Greece.
In 1948 came the Communist takeover in
Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade. The
likelihood of a Communist victory in the Ital-
ian elections seemed so real that we in this
country embarked on an enormous letterwrit-
ing campaign to friends and relatives in Italy
in an attempt to stave it off. France seemed
only a little less vulnerable. The heart of
Western Europe seemed to lie open before the
Communist threat.
After the initial phases of the INfarshall
Plan, the principal field for the expression of
the basic U.S. policy toward Europe was in
military defense. The principal achievement
was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
an unprecedented peacetime defensive alliance,
with joint command and staff and forces from
15 nations at its disposal. As a member of the
organization, the United States, for the first
time in peacetime, stationed substantial forces —
400,000 troops — in Europe. This participation
in NATO reflects that knowledge that even our
great power cannot alone defend the heartland
of the free world. The alliance remains a
bulwark of that defense.
Concentration on the defense requirements of
Europe, and particularly on the problem of a
MARCH 4, 1963
319
German contribution to those requirements, led,
beyond NATO, to work on the European De-
fense Community. When that collapsed in
1954, the main thrust toward European inte-
gration turned back into economic channels.
The Coal and Steel Community — "the first ex-
pression," in Jean Monnet's words, "of the Eu-
rope that is being born"— had already been
formed in 1950. Within 3 short years after
the failure of the EDC, two other such expres-
sions had been added: EURATOM, and the
historymaking Common Market [European
Economic Community].
The European Economic Community
The Common Market is one of the most
phenomenal developments of modem times.
As most of you know, it contemplates the eco-
nomic unification — and to a large extent the
political integration — of the six nations of
Western Europe — France, West Germany,
Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg.
The Treaty of Rome provides in the first
instance for the removal of tariffs, quotas, and
other barriers to trade within the Community
by gradual stages and for a uniform external
tariff between the Community and the rest of
the world. It is to act as a unit in negotiating
an external commercial policy with others. The
Community proposes to abolish restrictions on
the movement of services, labor, capital, and
business enterprises within its borders. It has
provided a method for colonies and associated
territories to link themselves to the common
market; established unifonn restrictions on
private cartels; provided for a common agri-
cultural policy within the Commimity ; created
an investment bank for Europe and a develop-
ment bank for associated overseas territories;
equalized many labor standards; and estab-
lished the means to assist workers who may be
dislocated by trade liberalization in retraining,
resettling, and otherwise. As I said, what is
contemplated approaches thoroughgoing eco-
nomic unification.
In the short years since its formation the
accomplishments of the Community have meas-
ured up to the prospectus. Trade among the
member states has increased 73 percent since
1958. In this same period trade between the
Common Market countries and the rest of the
world has increased 27 percent and the gross
national product of the member states has risen
24 percent. Without further acceleration in
scheduling, it is planned that all internal tariff
barriers between members will be removed by
January 1, 1967, to be replaced by a conunon
external tariff schedule. In fact, so vital has
been this institutional development that, even
if it had been less welcome, it would have called
forth far-reaching responses here as well as
elsewhere in the world.
There has always been a dual possibilitj
implicit in the growth of the EEC. The Euro-
pean market could turn in on itself. There is
as a matter of fact, considerable incentive foi
it to keep its external tariff high and concen-
trate on expanding to meet internal demand
European industry is booming. Europear
wages are rising much faster proportionatelj
than our own and, with them, consumption anc
living standards. More cars, washing machines
TV sets, refrigerators are being sold to Euro
peans each year, and the trend will continui
in the future. The European market for thest
consumer durable goods is only about 15 to 2!
percent saturated, in contrast to our own, whicl
may be in the 90 percent range. Europeai
consumption standards are just about where
ours were in the 1920's. It would not be at al
irrational for the Community to adopt tradi
policies to maintain this vast potential as thi
private preserve of its own businessmen anc
farmers. And indeed some such ideas may con
tribute to the line of policy General de Gaulh
has pursued.
British Negotiations on Common IVIari<et
The alternative is that the Common Marked
should turn outward and join with ourselves*
the British, and others in a general liberaliza-
tion of trade patterns throughout the world)
In different ways both our own response to thd
Ti"eaty of Rome and that of the United King"
dom were designed to encourage this more opefl
and liberal response. The British, by applyi
for membership, sought to expand the area oil
the Common Market itself. The United State
through the Trade Expansion Act of 196S
320
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN
:)ught to i^rovide the President with the bar-
aining authority necessary to bring down the
ommon external tarilf wall around the Common
larket.
So things stood, say, in mid-December, at the
ime of the NATO ministerial meeting, hardly
weeks ago.^ British negotiations for entry
nto the Market were technically very compli-
ated, but they were progressing and no one
bought the technical issues incapable of reso-
iition. France was bargaining hard, but on
nost issues she had the support of the Commis-
ion, the impartial govenimg authority of the
Community, and this attested her hona fides.
General de Gaulle persisted in his announced
letermination to achieve an independent French
uiclear deterrent. But this did not seem fea-
iible on economic, technological, or strategic
rrounds. (It still does not.) France in a
lumber of other ways was indicating her disin-
clination to cooperate in the collective organi-
sations and agencies through which much of
United States and free- world policy must be
instrumented. But these irritants were muted
in the general rallying-roimd after Cuba.
Since that time, two events, Nassau and the
De Gaulle press conference have — not shattered
the structure of our policy but once again al-
tered the framework and format within which
it must operate.
The veto on Britain's entry into the Common
Market brought to an end a period of almost
a decade of rapid progress toward ever-widen-
ing economic integration in Europe, a period
when economic integration provided the main
vehicle for movement toward political unity.
The end of that period cannot, of course, mean
the end of the effort to assure the adoption of
liberal, outward-looking trade and economic
policies by the EEC. The President has al-
ready indicated that he intends to use the still
formidable powers granted in the Trade Ex-
pansion Act to this end. Talk of an effort to
unite the Five agamst France within the EEC
is, I think, misdirected. It will not change Gen-
eral de Gaulle's mind. And it would risk the
continuing viability of the EEC, which remains
the single most important venture in EuropeaJi
integration that is extant to date.
NATO Multilateral Force
If, at Brussels, France closed one channel for
the continuing dialog on the "grand design,"
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Mac-
millan at Nassau ^ were opening another. For
a long time it has been clear that the control
and management of nuclear power within the
alliance has been the focus of a growing con-
cern. This has been a highly complicated prob-
lem reflecting an intricate blend of political,
psychological, and strategic factors. As the
President said, the issues involved gain their
significance because they touch upon sov-
ereignty itself. The United States has for some
time been taking steps to meet this concern of
our allies, beginning with the offer in December
1960 ^ to assign United States nuclear subma-
rmes, under United States manning and con-
trol, to NATO.
Nassau, especially in the light of the subse-
quent events, turned this common concern as to
nuclear matters into a new vehicle for pressing
forward with the work of European integration
and Atlantic partnership. Tliis is accomplished
partly by the immediate creation of a NATO
nuclear force to wliich British and American
Polaris submarines will ultimately be assigned,
to be withdrawn only when supreme national
interest requires it. It will be seen that the
command, control, targeting, and deployment
of this force through NATO will require co-
operation of a much more intimate kind than we
have ever had before.
But the Nassau communique looks forward to
a still more significant innovation. It calls for
the creation of a truly multilateral force ia
which all NATO countries ready to share the
burdens can participate fully in ownership,
manning, and control. The President has re-
asserted his determination that the arrange-
ments for this force are not to be simply a
facade for American control. And in the same
breath he underscored the profound implica-
' For text of a communique of Dec. 15, 1962, see
Bulletin of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 9.
' For texts of a joint communique and a statement
on nuclear defense systems issued at Nassau on Dec. 21,
1962, see ihid., Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.
* For background, see ihid., Jan. 9, 1961, p. 39.
MAECH 4, 1963
321
tions which the creation of such a force would
have for tiie political integration of Europe and
for the terms of its partnership with us. The
next months, and perhaps years, will need to
be devoted to exploring these implications and
to working them out in practice. To do so will
require a creative vision as broad as was needed
for the establisliment of the EEC and NATO
itself.
Continuing U.S. Partnership With Europe
I do not claim that Nassau and Brussels sim-
ply reverse the shift from the military to tlie
economic arena that occurred when the EDC
treaty was rejected in 1954. In a volume con-
cerning an earlier and abortive attempt at Eu-
ropean unity — the Congress of Vienna — the
historian Harold Nicolson wrote that "we can
learn little from history unless we first realize
that she does not, in fact, repeat herself." Per-
haps this is true. At least it points to the hard
fact that in this day we rarely get a second
chance at any tiling.
Viewed broadly, I think it is also true that
Europe has advanced with striking speed to-
ward economic, political, and military unity.
These developments have been consistently sup-
ported, through administrations of both parties,
by the Government of the United States. There
have been, and there will be in the future, set-
backs and defeats, both major and minor. But
there is no reason to regret or to abandon the
"grand design." In the long run, I think, the
new Europe that we have seen emerging will
continue to grow in the direction already staked
out. Its necessary progress in cohesion and in-
tegration will take forms with which we can and
should continue in fruitful partnership.
Tides of Change
hy J. Robert Schaetzel
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs ^
Is there a place for the individual in modern
society? "Was George Orwell right in the large,
but only wrong in the small ? Perhaps we don't
have to wait until 1984, but sometime in the
1960's we all become "no-think" cogs in a po-
litical machine beyond our control. Are the
affluent society and conspicuous consumption
the conscious first choice of the individual?
Or is he driven to this individual purpose
through frustration and impotence over his in-
ability to make a mark on our vast and compli-
cated society ?
Shortly before his death Bernard De Voto
' Address made at Pomona College, Claremont, Caltf.,
on Feb. 12 (press release 74 dated Feb. 9).
wrote an essay about "they." It was a simple
theme, but it cut to the heart of the bovine in
modern life. De Voto noted that "they" let the
slums develop; "they" let his beloved New Eng-
land coast become a neon-lit honky-tonk ; "they"
should do something about one public disgrace
after another. "They," in short, is the other
fellow, the system, city hall — everyone but the
complainant. If one were to pictorial ize this
state of affairs, the image produced would be
one of millions of people, each of whom is
pointing the finger of responsibility at someone
else.
But the question remains : What can one man
do — if anything? Is it remotely possible for
democracy to work if individual uninterest be-
322
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
oines contagious? Nothing could be more
ubversive to American life than the with-
liawal into our own personal dolce vita of the
ortunate and the educated — and this means
oil. If we dislike the manifestations of
jiocial interests in our local, State, and Federal
ociety; if we find some of our elected repre-
entatives inadequate to their trust; if the civil
lervant is mediocre — postman or diplomat —
his situation will change only in the face of in-
lividual interest and action. And this again
neans you. It is one of the tragic ironies of
)ur age that we live at a moment of infinite
langer — where within 30 minutes an exchange
)f ballistic missiles could leave 200 millions
iead — and of infinite opportunity for the fruit-
ful development of society. Yet this is a mo-
ment when both the threat and opportunity
seem obscured in a fog of popular detachment
from public affairs.
Last fall one of the PTA organizations in
•Washington ran a confidential survey of opinion
among 700 students in one of our local junior
high schools. The results were gratifying in
the maturity shown, the respect and under-
istanding toward associates — and even toward
parents! — seriousness of purpose, personal and
icollective morals. There was one disappointing
exception: the goal of life. This group of
steady youngsters wrote off to the tune of 90
percent any interest in applying their energies
to solving the great problems that confront
mankind.
On this point one can do no better than turn
to Pericles. "We do not say that a man who
takes no interest in politics minds his own busi-
ness. We say he has no business here at all."
Jean Monnet's Vision of Free-World Unity
I wish, however, to deal with this set of ques-
tions, not in terms of abstract political theory
or exhortation but by talking about one man.
On January 23, in New York, some 1,500
Americans gathered at the Waldorf Astoria to
honor Jean Monnet, who that night received
the 1962 Freedom House Award. Wliy should
this Frenchman be honored by a personal mes-
sage from President Kennedy, eulogized by
former Secretary of State Christian Herter and
by Under Secretary Ball of the State Depart-
ment ? - The plaque he received read : "To
Jean Monnet. A statesman of vision who
widened the horizons of free world unity."
It is both what he has done and how he has
done it that is relevant to my thesis : the thesis
that a man can atfect substantially, dramati-
cally, and constructively the course of human
events.
In his 74 years this man of France and citizen
of the world conceived the idea of combined
shipping and procurement in World War I that
enabled the Allies to overcome the near fatal
onslaught of submarine warfare; Monnet
served as Deputy Secretary-General of the
League of Nations; he reorganized the Krueger
match trust in Sweden, the Chinese railways,
and Polish currency; during the Second World
War he was in charge of the Anglo-French
supply mission in Washington; he proposed to
Churchill the latter's historic statement, during
tlie bh\ck days of the war, when Sir AVinston
offered Fiance unification with England; he
suggested to Roosevelt the idea of the "arsenal
of democracy" and the concept that led to the
lend-lease program.
This is a man who has never held elective
office. Until recently he has been a man known
only to few albeit the influential few; to others,
an honored name in brandies.
Genius of the Monnet Approach
With ideas, singleness of purpose, pragma-
tism, and optimism Monnet has set Europe
down the path of unity. This has been the
dream of centuries: a united Europe. It was
achieved partially under Charlemagne, at-
tempted by force, first by Napoleon and then by
Hitler, but became a tangible fact by democratic
means through the imagination and efforts of
this man.
In 1950 Monnet advanced the idea that there
should be a pooling of coal and steel production
among the six countries on the Continent — •
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and Luxembourg. The European Coal
" For text of a message from President Kennedy and
remarks by Under Secretary Ball, see Bulletin of
Feb. 11, 1963, p. 195.
MARCH 4, 1963
323
and Steel Community, which came into being
in 1952, was the decisive step in Franco-German
reconciliation. ISIerely 5 years after the end of
the bloodiest of conflicts a process was started
that has eliminated the source of centuries of
European warfare: the hostility of these two
Continental nations.
The genius of the Monnet approach is that
it tackled the classical European problem of
disunity by getting at a single and manageable
functional field — coal and steel — where working
together would be to the benefit of each of the
six participating countries. To this basic idea
was added the development of new institutions :
an executive body, the High Authority ; a kind
of senate, which represented the six participat-
ing governments ; a supreme court ; and a par-
liamentary assembly. In addition the six na-
tions, by accepting a treaty without terminal
date, created a new, organic European link.
There are many things that might be said
about this initiative of Monnet. "Wliile he was
the author of the basic memorandum, it was
the French Foreign Mmister, Robert Schuman,
who revealed the plan and received public
credit — and Monnet insists to tliis day that
Schuman was the originator of the proposal.
Behind this story lies a central element in
Monnet's life — and an important part of his
genius. It is the results that count, not the
credit. This moral can be summed up in an
observation Monnet recalls that his friend
Dwight Morrow made. "There are two kinds
of people in the world : those who want to &e
something and those who want to do something.
There's less competition among the second."
Monnet is without a peer as a doer.
New European Perspective
The European integration movement created
a new European perspective. It has provided
a release from the neurosis of Europe, from the
memories of failure and defeat. The creative-
ness of building the new Europe has brought
into being a new man : a "European."
This new man is to be found today working as
a European civil servant for one of the commu-
nity institutions, as a journalist in Paris, as a
lawyer representing clients before the Common
Market in Brussels. This new breed of man has
almost but not quite forgotten the great pessi-
mism and hopelessness of 1939 and is convinced
that a new Europe can be created, that old prob-
lems can be solved by common action. These
people — this generation of men and women in
their thirties and early forties — have not lost the
loyalty to their native countries. But they have
acquired an additional purpose, which is a com-
mitment to the unity of Europe.
Principles of European Unity
The excitement and momentum of the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community led quickly to
a further French initiative in 1951 : the proposal
for a European Defense Community and, re-
lated to it, a European Political Community.
These ideas, however, turned out to be ahead of
their time. While ratified by five of the six par-
liaments, the project fovmdered in the French
Assembly in August 1954. Many Europeans
were convinced that the hope of a united Europe
died that August.
It was here that determination in the face of
disaster produced progress. Monnet out of de-
feat produced a new European proposal : the
idea of a European Common Market and of a
European Atomic Energy Community.
Launched formally at Messina in 1955, by 1958
in Rome the treaties were signed.
Simple but profoundly important principles
lie behind this step-by -step process of European
unity — ideas envisioned by one man and shared
by many :
First, unification in the economic field creates
a vast new market and the benefits of the econo-
mies of scale. In the process European energies
are mobilized far greater in strength than the
sum of the parts.
Second, through unity the internecine Euro-
pean wars of a thousand years can be brought to
an end.
Third, the European community is the organic
means of tying Germany to the West.
Problems of the West
The United States has given clear and unwav-
ering support for 15 years to these European
ideas and developments. A Europe united
means a Europe self-confident and able to play
its full role as a partner with the United States.
324
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
A united Europe musters over 200 million people
and a gross national product two-thirds that of
the United States. Working together Europe
and the United States can deal effectively with
the crucial problems and responsibilities of
Western civilization. What are these problems ?
First, defense.
NATO is the great and successful experiment
in alliances. No multilatei-al alliance has held
together in peacetime so long. NATO has
grown and adjusted to changes in the nature of
the Commimist threat and to the rapid develop-
ment of military teclinology. It has shown res-
olution and strength in the face of crises in
Berlin and Cuba. The alliance sees increasingly
that there is no separate European theater, no
separate American theater, but rather that a
general war would be just that. A strong and
united Europe will be better able to carry its
equitable share of the burden of our common
defense within NATO.
Second, the economic growth and prosperity
of the Atlantic.
One of the principal and inescapable
characteristics of modern society is that we are
all inextricably bound together. Our compli-
cated, advanced industrial economies enforce
and reinforce one another, as they can frustrate
and harm each other. For example, there can
be no independent American international
financial system or a separate British, French,
or Swiss system. There can be only a single,
free- world financial system backing up an ever-
increasing volume of international trade. The
task of the Atlantic partnership is to recognize
this conomon interest and the hard fact that we
must work together if we are to prosper in-
dividually. This is not a romantic notion but
one rooted in the very nature of modern
economics.
Third, the growth and stability of the less
developed regions of the world.
Eapidly rising populations and expectations
are the lot of the countries of the Southern
Hemisphere. From 1952 to 1960 the increase
of per capita income in the United States was
$800 ; in Europe $300 ; but in the less developed
countries $1 per year. This sluggish economic
environment is vulnerable to the constant prob-
ing of Soviet and Communist Chinese efforts to
find weak points, to exploit poverty and hope-
lessness. Only the Atlantic nations and Japan
have the resources to provide adequate
amounts of private and public capital, as well
as markets, for these developing nations. To-
gether we and Europe can meet these require-
ments. However, if the advanced nations
separate and fail to cooperate in this endeavor,
then real doubts arise as to whether there can
be tolerable rates of economic growth and the
political stability so important to our own
security.
U.S. Policy on Atlantic Partnership
This vision of an Atlantic relationship of
equals, tied together by common interests and
the sharing of common purposes, has been called
into question. Does the breakdown of 18
months of negotiations between the United
Kingdom and the six nations of the Common
Market imply the end of the dream?
It would be folly to suggest that the sus-
pension of negotiations on January 29 in
Brussels was other than a most serious setback
to Europe and to the idea of an Atlantic part-
nership. The first question — and one that must
be answered in Europe — is whether the cause
of European imity will lose momentum and the
good will among the members of the Com-
munity indispensable to further progress.
The answer to the second question — the vi-
tality of the Atlantic partnership — must be
sought on both sides of the Atlantic. It is al-
ways hard to assess with assurance the motives
of others — what is tactical and what is basic na-
tional purpose. It is also difficult to predict the
probable actions of other nations. Certainly
we hold no special brief for our own clair-
voyance. But we can be certain of what we, as
a nation, believe and what we intend to do. We
readily admit that some of our policies may be
incomplete; some may be objectionable to cer-
tain members of the alliance. It is, however, an
important part of the strength of the Atlantic
relationship that we have the means and the
habit of discussing these questions and airing
our differences.
A nimiber of important questions have been
raised recently in Europe, not only about the
validity of the Monnet concept of European
MARCH 4, 1963
676091—63—
325
unity but especially of the goal of Atlantic
partnership. I would like to attempt to answer
several of those questions.
First, it has been charged that America is in-
tent on furtheruig its postwar dominance over
Western Europe. The trade expansion pro-
gram is represented, in this connection, as an
American effort to penetrate further the Euro-
pean economy.
If dominance were our national purpose, why
would three American administrations have
consistently supported European unity? In-
deed, why would we have invested $45 billion
in European recovery and so welcomed the
growth and prosperity of Europe? Rather
than follow the classic path of power states to
divide and dominate, we elected to encourage
the notion of an Atlantic relationship of equals.
And we have always appreciated that it was
primarily a European responsibility to orga-
nize the new Europe with which we could work
in harmony and to constructive purpose. The
development of this united Europe has been
Monnet's abiding purpose.
As for the Trade Expansion Act, we of course
seek further access in the European market but
are ready to pay for this by allowing reciprocal
access into the American market. Beyond this
cross-Atlantic purpose and mutual advantage
we are convinced — as many Europeans are simi-
larly convinced — that there is the important
mutual Atlantic objective of opening further the
great European and American markets to the
goods of the rest of the free world.
Second, we hear the suspicion aired that
America is engaged in secret negotiations with
the Russians, and if United States interests so
dictate, we will conclude agreements with the
U.S.S.R. inimical to the interests of Europe.
It has been Soviet purpose to sow doubt and
suspicion and to attempt to split the Western
alliance on such questions as European security,
Berlin, and disarmament. However, we must
never cease to seek solutions to these problems;
but no solution can be considered which would
be at the expense of any free-world state. With
these principles in mind, we have reported reg-
ularly, promptly, and conscientiously to our
allies all of the conversations which we have had
with the Soviets on these critical issues. The
premise of our policy has been that there can be
no tenable or satisf actoi-y arrangements reached
between the United States and the Soviet Union
that are not equally satisfactory to our Western
European allies.
Third, the suggestion has been advanced that
in time of crisis, where American cities might
be saved by the sacrifice of Europe, the United
States might flinch from protecting Europe
with its nuclear power.
But the heart of our policy is to assure the
defense of America through the defense of
Europe; that is the meaning of the North i
Atlantic Treaty commitment. We have 400,000
troops in Europe today to protect the critical
common interest we have in European security.
Any American withdrawal from Europe would
mean nothing more than sacrifice of a vital ele-
ment of our own national security.
Fourth, we are charged with arrogance to-
ward Europe, an indifference to European
sensitivity shown by highhanded, independent
American action.
I suppose with nations, as with people, actions
are often taken and statements made with pri-
mary attention to one's own frame of reference
rather than to the impact on others. As for
independent action, it is the United States that
has taken the lead in pressing for greater politi-
cal consultation within NATO. We have urged
the advantages of candid economic dialog with-
in the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development and extensive political dis-
cussion within the North Atlantic Council. We
are ready to discuss any subject and to respond
to any criticism of our political, military, or
economic policies or actions.
Fifth, it is argued that we are against the
proliferation of national nuclear forces, not be-
cause of principle but in order to preserve our
strategic nuclear monopoly.
We are opposed to the spread of national
nuclear forces. The greater the number of na-
tional forces the greater the risk of a nuclear
war started by accident or miscalculation. But
we recognize fully that the historical accident
of our nuclear monopoly, which to a large extent
still persists, gives us no natural right to dispose
of the nuclear destiny of the Western alliance in
our own interest. On the contrary, we are quite
aware that our allies must increasingly share in
a NATO nuclear responsibility which gives ex-
326
DEPAETMENT OF STATE BTTLLEnN
pression to our common interest in survival.
That is why we have deployed battlefield and
tactical nuclear weapons widely in Europe, in
accordance with NATO plans and with the par-
icipation of Allied forces to the extent per-
Imitted by United States law.
Moreover — and perhaps more important in
the end — we have recently proposed the crea-
tion of a NATO multilateral nuclear force to
meet the legitimate interests of the Europeans
in sharing responsibility for strategic deter-
rence. Germany and Italy, as well as other
members of the alliance, are actively interested
in developing such a force. It is our hope that
through collective effort in this as in other fields
of NATO defense we can continue to strengthen
the alliance as a bulwark of the emerging
Atlantic partnership.
It is our conviction that behind these Atlantic
policies lies a dynamic sense of history with new
and clearly conceived common purposes. The
image of an inward-looking, autarkic Europe,
suspicious of both America on the one hand and
Eastern Europe on the other, is profoundly at
odds with the realities of our world and the pre-
vailing beliefs of the Europeans. Nor do I
anticipate that Americans or Europeans will
cast aside the vision of Atlantic partnership out
of petty impulses of frustration or spite.
Twenty Years of Western Progress
Unfortunately historical evidence all runs to
the dour conclusion that man's evolution is not
expected to proceed smoothly. Monnet's ex-
perience has demonstrated the value and im-
portance of steadiness of purpose in the presence
of difficulty and challenge. In addition to the
long view we should be aware of and impressed
by the incredible progress that has been made
by the West over the last 20 years. Western
achievement includes the large steps toward
European unity, the success of NATO and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. In short our progress is infinite-
ly more impressive than our setbacks.
Certainly contemplation of the American
scene should bring home the need for patience
and perspective. A war was fought in this
country 100 years ago to settle the issue of Fed-
eral as against State authority and the related
question of the equality of American citizens,
without reference to race, color, or creed. Yet
the stubborn resistance of Mississippi — State
and imiversity — today indicates that acceptance
of fact comes hard. But because acceptance
comes hard does not improve the merits of the
Mississippi case against the Nation or call into
doubt the legal and moral judgment held by the
overwhelming majority of this country.
To press the analogy, the task we have — as do
our collaborators in Europe — is to look again at
our premises for a united Europe and for the
Atlantic partnership and to test these premises
against the questions that have been recently
raised. If the premises stand up against the
challenge, as I have no doubt they will, then the
problem is not to fall away from our views in
the face of these obstacles but to put renewed
effort into the construction of the European and
Atlantic relationship.
World Influence of European Unity
What has been Moimet's reaction to this
challenge ? I must go back and make a point on
the man. Monnet is uniquely creative — he does
not speak against people; his instinct is for
positive action for its own sake, not as a means
of countering a man or an idea. His impatience
is visible when it is suggested that the mo-
mentum of European unity derives from fear of
the Soviet Union. He insists that the unity of
Europe and the Atlantic is a necessity and a
good imto itself — with or without Soviet
hostility. The pertinence of these Western de-
velopments to the present threat posed by the
Soviet bloc is that the success of owr endeavors
is the most effective way to bring about changes
in the Communist world. As Monnet would
say, "They will change in the face of facts."
In sura, one dedicated man — Monnet — has
changed the course of our history. He has
proven in our time what a man with an idea can
do. Many years ago he was referred to by his
longtime associate. General de Gaulle, as that
"inspirator." It is an ambiguous word. But to
thousands of Europeans — officials in Brussels,
Luxembourg, and in the capitals of Europe,
and in our own country — the word means a
selfless, determined man with a vision of the
future and a practical way of getting there. He
MARCH 4, 1963
327
has indeed been the great "inspirator" of this
century.
It would be hard to overstate tlie influence on
the world of the realizable goal of European
unity. It has captured the imagmation of tliis
country. The waves of its influence reach to
Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Perhaps the
effect we appreciate the least is that we, too,
are being changed by these ideas — ^by European
unity and a relationship of equals across the
Atlantic. None of this change comes easily or
is accepted without resistance. For tlie mo-
ment it seems as though both European unity
and our drive for an Atlantic partnership have
been blocked.
I would conclude by recalling the critical
moment at which Monnet received his Freedom
House Award. Chancellor Adenauer and Gen-
eral de Gaulle had just met in Paris; the nego-
tiations between the United Kingdom and the
Common Market were in suspense. The view
was advanced by many that Monnet's grand
dream had been shattered. But Monnet, both
in public and private, retains his stubborn,
cautious optimism. In giving the Freedom
House Award to Monnet, Mr. Ball recalled a
story we have all heard many times from Mon-
net. It is the tale of an Arab prince who, in
time of trouble, went out into the desert in his
search for wisdom. He returned with tliis
motto :
"May God bless even my enemies,
For they too are a means to my end."
U.A.R. Bans Ownership of Farm
Lands by Foreign Nationals
Press release 79 dated February 13
The following is for the information of any
United States citizens who may own agricul-
tural land in the United Arab Republic.
The Department of State has been informed
by the American Embassy at Cairo that the text
of a decree banning ownership of agricultural
lands by foreign nationals in the United Arab
Republic was published on February 2, 1963.
It is reported that the decree, which became
effective on January 19, 1963, allows foreign
nationals or their legal agents to register their
holdmgs with the General Organization for
Agrarian Reform. It is further reported that
the decree states that unless all foreign holdings
are registered with the General Organization
for Agrarian Reform prior to February 19,
1963, tlie owners may become subject to criminal
prosecution, including confiscation of the
property. jp
U.S. Suspends Aid to Ceylon
The Agency for International Development
announced on February 8 that the U.S. economic
and teclmical assistance program for Ceylon lias
been suspended.
The suspension action was taken ih accord-
ance with provisions of section 620(e) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. This section
provides that if a comitry receiving U.S. aid
nationalizes or takes over the property of an
American citizen or company and fails, witliin
6 months of enactment of the legislation on
August 1, 1962, to take appropriate steps to pro-
vide equitable and speedy compensation as
provided by international law, the U.S. Govern-
ment must suspend assistance extended to that
comitry under the Foreign Assistance Act.
The Government of Ceylon issued a series of
official notices last April, May, and June
nationalizing 83 gasoline stations and other
properties belonging to two American oU com-
panies— Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., and Cal-
tex Ceylon Limited — by vesting these proper-
ties in the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. The
Government of Ceylon has not denied its obli-
gation to pay compensation and has in fact
given repeated assurances to this effect. How-
ever, the actions taken by the Government of
Ceylon are not regarded by the U.S. Govern-
ment as "appropriate steps" because they do not
insure the prompt payment of compensation
representing the full value of the property as
required by international law.
During the past several months the U.S. Em-
bassy has discussed with the Government of
Ceylon actions which, in the opinion of the U.S.
Government, would constitute appropriate steps
fulfilling the requirements of international law.
328
DEPARTIMENT OF STATE BTJI^LETIN
The Government of the United States was pre-
iaared to consider a negotiated settlement of the
ilaims of the oil companies, the submission of
ihese claims to arbitration, or any other alter-
ftiative plan which the Government of Ceylon
Ijivished to advance, provided there was adequate
•issurance that the payment of compensation
(.Tould meet the standards of international law.
?[n the absence of progress toward a settlement
^meeting these standards, the Government of
j;he United States is required by law to suspend
bid to Cevlon.
First Meeting Held by Advisory
Committee on Aid Program
White House press release dated January 29
The Committee To Strengthen the Security
of the Free World, appointed by the President
in December ^ to review the U.S. foreign assist-
ance program in the light of U.S. national se-
curity interests, completed its first meeting on
January 28. The 5-day meeting, under the
chairmanship of Gen. Lucius D. Clay, consid-
ered the military assistance program, the
Alliance for Progress, and aid programs for
Africa, the Near East, the Far East, South
Asia, and Europe. Also studied were AID pri-
vate enterprise programs, aid efforts of other
countries, the proportionate burden of economic
aid and defense expenditures carried by U.S.
allies, the work of international aid agencies,
including U.N. organizations, and the Food-
for-Peace Program.
Tentative conclusions concerning the U.S.
foreign aid program were made by the com-
mittee in a number of areas, after hearing the
testimony and the questioning of witnesses ap-
pearing jointly from the State Department, the
Agency for International Development, the
Department of Defense, and other agencies con-
cerned. No public report of the committee's
deliberations will be made, however, until the
group reports to the President in mid-March.
The committee will meet again at Washing-
ton for 5 days from February 21 through 25,
1 Bulletin of Dec. 31, 1962, p. lOOT.
to examine the aid program further, hear de-
bate on its tentative propositions, and read its
final conclusions. Meanwhile a number of re-
ports are being prepared on matters raised in
the course of testimony before the conunittee at
the meeting just concluded. Individual mem-
bers also will pursue subject areas of special in-
terest to them in the interim.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
87th Congress, 2d Session
International Agreements for Cooperation. Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Agreements for Co-
operation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
on the proposed agreement with Belgium for mutual
defense purposes and proposed agreements with
EURATOM and various countries for peaceful uses
of atomic energy. June 25, 1962. 87 pp.
Attempts of Pro-Castro Forces To Pervert the
American Press. Hearing before the Subcommittee
To Investigate the Administration of the Internal
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. July
19, 1962. 116 pp.
Export of Strategic Materials to the U.S.S.R. and
Other Soviet Bloc Countries. Hearings before the
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of
the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Se-
curity Laws of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary. Parts 3 and 4. October 26, 1962. 44
and 6 pp., respectively.
88th Congress, 1st Session
Trade Agreement Negotiated With the United King-
dom and an Agreement Negotiated With Japan.
Message from the President. H. Doc. 34. Janu-
ary 10, 1963. 8 pp.
The State of the Union. Address of the President
delivered before a joint session of the Senate and
the House of Representatives. H. Doc. 1. January
14, 1963. 11 pp.
Study of Foreign Policy. Report to accompany S. Res.
25. S. Rept. 1. January 15, 1963. 3 pp.
Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of For-
eign Principals. Report to accompany S. Res. 26.
S. Rept. 2. January 15, 1963. 3 pp.
The Budget of the U.S. Government for the Fiscal
Year Ending June 30, 1964. The budget message of
the President and other data on the President's
budgetary recommendations. H. Doc. 15, part 1.
January 17, 1963. 440 pp.
Economic Report of the President, together with the
Annual Report of the Council of Economic Ad-
visers. H. Doc. 28. January 21, 1963. xxviii, 268
pp.
Comparative Wage Costs and Trade Advantage : The
European Economic Community, Great Britain, and
the United States. Report by the chairman of House
Committee on Education and Labor. January 1963.
103 pp. [Committee print.)
MARCH 4, 1963
329
Geographic Terminology of Europe
iy G. Etzel Pearcy
Of all the continents Europe offers the great-
est array of regional terminology. To Ameri-
cans, who througli generations of close cnltural
association have been deeply conscious of trans-
atlantic place names, this terminology has a
special meaning. In fact, American history
springs from European history, and both are
fields in which the subject matter is undeniably
dependent upon identification of place as well
as time. Such terms as "British kings" and
"Balkan wars" run the gamut of curricula in
the United States from elementary grades to
postgraduate seminars. And since most Ameri-
cans trace their lineage to one or more Euro-
pean countries, they have a natural sympathy
for the particular areas in question.
Often the past assumes grandiose propor-
tions of glory with the result that certain names,
if heard frequently enough, appear resplendent
in retrospect. Some go back to ancient times,
as Etruria, Macedonia, and Sparta; others, like
Aragon, Burgundy, and Saxony, conjure up
visions of castle-dwelling nobility clothed in
rich purple, of armored soldiers battling with
lances glittering in the sun. Vassals of serf-
• Dr. Pearcy is the Geographer of the
Department of State. This is the fifth in
a series of articles which he has loritten for
the Bulletin on the nomenclature of geo-
graphic regions. For his articles on the
Middle East., Latin America, Asia, and
Africa, see Bulletin of March 23, 1959, p.
IfiT; September lit, 1959, p. 38^; Febru-
ary 1, 19G0, p. lJf8; and December 26, 1960,
p. 959.
dom, a somewhat sturdy group despite their
lowly status, figure strongly in the fairy tales
with which American children become familiar
at an early age. (Mother Goose is strictly
feudal in its underlying philosophy.)
Readers of contemporary fiction find May-
fair and the Left Bank matching Westchester
and Hollywood Hills as settings, while the
French Riviera, the Swiss Alps, and the Lake
District of England are as commonplace as
our Gulf Coast, Colorado Rockies, and Finger
Lakes. Notwitlistanding the familiar ring of
so many European place names, Americans
often find themselves at a loss to pinpoint them
with any geographical precision.
Aside from academic and literary interests,
modern-day associations in the worlds of gov-
ernment and business focus strongly upon the
geographic nomenclature of Europe. New re-
lationships in a fast-changing world bring to
light not only new regional names but new uses
for existing names. It becomes increasingly
necessary to refer to European regions which
cut across international boundaries or encom-
pass more than a single country. The word
"Benelux," for example, is of fairly recent coin-
age; "Norden" is a geographical innovation for
identifying the countries of Northern Europe;
and "the Balkans," though a well-known term
in good standing, belongs to an area that is
traversed by the Iron Curtain and so rarely fits
into modem parlance.
From the dark postwar days of the Marshall
Plan, interests in Europe have fanned out into
a myriad of political, military, economic, and
cultural avenues, spearheaded by such organi-
zations as NATO, SHAPE, OECD, ECSC,
and GATT. And now the Common Market
330
DEPABTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
looms before us sis a harbinger of new relation-
ships on the European scene. Add to these as-
sociations the enormous flow of tourist travel
across the Atlantic, and one can appreciate how
complex must be the communications involved
in labeling and identifying places in Europe,
whether they be small cities, divisions within
a counti'y, or large regions encompassing a seg-
ment of the continent.
Definite places, as cities and countries, re-
main more or less constant, but the regional
concept with its potential for flexibility may at
times challenge the ingenuity of those who
most need to know something of the current
picture in Europe. Thus, practical applica-
tion of geographic terms rejuvenates and ex-
pands the oldtime ritual of memorizing names
and facts — but does so in a constructive and
realistic manner.
Continental Confines
That Europe may be considered a continent
requires evidence beyond that of land and water
relationships. A glance at the map will show
that the configuration of the European coast-
line does not adhere to the conventional concept
that large bodies of land make up continents.
Kather, Eurasia comprises one single landmass,
with Europe no more than its highly irregular
■western protrusion. Not without logic do
geographers speak of Europe as a "peninsula
of peninsulas."
One must therefore look to factors other than
physical to justify a continental concept for
Europe. Within the confines of the area itself
may be found valid premises. For centuries
the European section of Eurasia represented
the known part of the world as chronicled by
Western scholars. Also, there can be no doubt
that culturally Europe stands out sharply as an
important block among the world's major re-
gions. These considerations alone have proved
to be so strong that they warrant classification
of Europe as a continent quite independent of
any physical shortcomings.
Apart from scattered islands Europe may be
clearly delineated on the north, west, and south.
Islands in the Mediterranean contribute some
problems, though by association and political
affiliation the majority of them fall into the
realm of Europe regardless of geographical lo-
cation. Only those Mediterranean islands
fringing the coasts of Africa and Asia fail to
come under the aegis of Europe; Cyprus is the
one notable exception.
To the east no particular physical basis exists
for marking out a boundary line between Eu-
rope and Asia. Until a few centuries ago the
concept of Europe faded into the vast, vague
reaches of Asia and required no identification.
As late as the 18th century the division between
the two continents was usually regarded as the
Don River, but since that time the Uial Moun-
tains have generally been accepted as the
eastern limit of Europe.* South of these
mountains, the perimeter of Asia pushes
sharply west and south in a rough arc to reach
the shores of the Black and Aegean Seas, some
35 degrees of longitude west of the axis of the
Urals. Most maps do not show the Europe-
Asia boundary, probably for the reason that it
cuts through a national state.
IVIajor Divisions of Europe
German geographers have methodically
divided Europe into neat segments. Some com-
partmentalism suggests a classical approach to
breaking the continent down into distinct
regions :
Nord-Europe (Northern Europe) : Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, Sweden
West-Europe (Western Europe) : British Isles, France
Siid-Europe (Southern Europe) : Albania, Bulgaria,
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Tugoslavia
Mittel-Europe (Central Europe) : Austria, Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, Switzerland
Ost-Europc (Eastern Europe) : Soviet Union
This academic divisioning, worthy though it
may be, has never been accepted by American
geographers, nor does it prove practical in the
modern version of the majority of broad Euro-
pean regions involving terms that employ com-
pass directions. For example, the German
classification has no provision for Northwest
Europe. Further, the American concept of
^ Contrary to what might be expected, the gradients
over the crest of the Urals are gentle and do not con-
stitute a sharp physical feature lending itself to bound-
ary demarcation.
MARCH 4, 1963
331
i
Western Europe goes far beyond the German
one, which is restricted to the British Isles and
France.
We tend to utilize compass-oriented terms in
identifying broad segments of Europe without
regard to fitting them into any definite pattern
of component parts. We use them in such a
flexible way that the areas we call Western
Europe, Northwestern Europe, Southern
Europe, and so forth, can and usually do over-
lap one another. Thus a point on the Ehine
River in West Germany would likely fall int/5
Northwestern Europe as well as Western
Europe and could be included in Central
Europe. Except for excluding Italy, Portugal,
and Spain, Northwest Europe generally con-
forms to the general concept of Western
Europe. Southern Europe does not correspond
to the southern lialf of the continent but rather
is based on the three peninsulas jutting into the
Mediterranean: Iberian, Italian, and Balkan.
In fact, this portion of the continent may also
be identified as Mediterranean Europe.
The most common broad regionalization of
Europe runs from west to east, dividing the con-
tinent into two zones, Western Europe and
Eastern Europe. Formerly a three-way divi-
sion which foimd imiversal favor distinguished
western, central, and eastern parts of the conti-
nent, but with the establishment of the Iron
Curtain the practicability of Central Europe as
a region waned except in a historical sense.
One recalls wide use of the term "Central
Powers" during the First World War as an
adaptation of Central Europe.
No sharp line separates Western from East-
em Europe, but a cleavage tends to follow one
of two patterns : (1) Western Europe including,
from north to south, Sweden, West Germany,
Austria, Italy, and all countries to the west ; (2)
all of Europe not in the Soviet bloc. In a politi-
cal sense even Finland, Greece, and Yugoslavia
may be considered as Western Europe, the latter
because its communism is not Soviet style. The
accompanying map illustrates some of the more
common of these direction-oriented divisions as
popularly used by Americans.
In a highly specialized sense Europe may be
divided into two uneven parts by the English
Channel: the British Isles and the Continent
(always with a capital "C"). To speak of con-
tinental Europe as "the Continent" is some-
what analogous to ref eiTing to the United States
as "the States." In common practice one em-
ploys these terms from outside the area in ques-
tion, as when going to "the Continent" or ask-
ing how things are in "the States." Quite ob-
viously, the British are in a position to capital-
ize upon use of "the Continent" in relation to
their transchannel interests. In a somewhat
different vein, the terms "Continent" and "Con-
tinental"— when referring to mainland Europe
in this special geographic sense — have also as-
sumed cultural connotations, usually implying
taste and sophistication.
Regional Names
The complex coastal configuration of Europe,
as well as sharp relief features on the land,
fosters the use of regional nomenclature over
the continent. Penmsulas, coastal stretches, is-
land groups, mountainous areas, and lowlands
all lend themselves to specific regional names.
Those of major importance frequently cut
across international boundaries and may con-
veniently encompass groups of countries. In
fact, the presence of 32 national states on the
continent justifies the grouping of countries by
broad geograpliical regions.
On tlie other hand, lack of precision in de-
lineation, variance in usage from countiy to
country (or from language to language), an
ever-changing political pattern, and the exist-
ence of alternate names may at times throw up
a screen of confusion and detract from the good
use to which this particular type of place name
may be put. Despite a few gray areas, however,
the following names and series of names are
firmly associated with physical and/or political
segments of Europe.
The British Isles
In a scramble somewhat resembling a word
game one encounters the terms British Isles,
United Kingdom, Great Britain, England,
British Commonwealth, Britain, Scotland,
Wales, Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Eire.
Each of these names has its own specific mean-
ing, and in precise writing and speaking it may
seldom be interchanged for another. For ex-
332
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
1
ample, United Kingdom and England, along
with Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, re-
late to political entities, while British Common-
wealth implies a number of political entities.
British Isles and Great Britain are geographic
terms to designate islands, irrespective of sov-
ereignty. In turn, Britain may be used sym-
bolically to indicate British power or authority,
as also may London in some instances.
Ireland may refer either to the island of that
name or the country (the island minus North-
ern Ireland). By context one can usually de-
termine the area under consideration, or the
long form, Kepublic of Ireland, may be used
to indicate the sovereign state. Eire is no
longer used to any degree, though it is the
Gaelic term for Ireland and properly desig-
nates the country in one of the two official
languages.
Scandinavia
In a narrow sense Norway and Sweden com-
prise the Scandinavian countries, for they are
coextensive with the Scandinavian Peninsula.
By popular usage, however, Denmark is in-
cluded, having affinities with its two northern
neighbors in tradition, language, religion, and
other cultural factors. For example, SAS, the
Scandinavian airline, operates with Danish as
well as Norwegian and Swedish capital. Wlien
Finland is associated with the Scandinavian
countries as a region the term "Fenno-Scandi-
navia" may be employed. Another concept,
relatively new in the United States, encompasses
the five countries of Northern Europe (Den-
mark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden)
under the name of "Norden," which in itself
means "the North" — hence northern Europe.
The Balkans
"The Balkans," an informal term for the
Balkan countries or states, associates itself with
the Balkan Peninsula. By strict geographical
definition the area would include Greece, Tur-
key in Europe, Albania, most of Bulgaria, and
southern Yugoslavia. In common practice all
of Yugoslavia is usually included in the term,
and Rumania is sometimes considered a Balkan
country. Here indeed does one encounter sub-
jective judgment in the delineation of a geo-
graphic region. One source of flexibility lies
in the merging of the Balkan Peninsula wit!
the Danube Basin. The latter, too, forms a|
natural region that provides a bloc name, i.e.!
the "Danubian countries." Since the drain-
age basin of the Danube occupies part of the!
Balkan Peninsula there is uncontrollably an'
overlap in both territory and name.
The Danubian Countries
Eather than referring in areal extent to the
Danube Basin, the term "Danubian countries"
generally includes, with one exception, those
countries through or along which the river
flows. In downstream sequence they are : West
Germany (Bavaria in particular), Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Ru-
mania, and Bulgaria. The Soviet Union, al-
though it touches one of the mouths of the
Danube, at Izmail, is not usually regarded as
a Danubian country. By examining a map of
Europe one can see that West Germany and
Czechoslovakia cannot claim to belong to the
regime of the Danube to the same degree as the
five remaining states; only a relatively small
fraction of their territories falls within the
drainage pattern of the big river.
The Baltic States
Because of political complications the term
"Baltic" as applied regionally does not neces-
sarily correspond to the literal interpretation
of the geographic area implied. Broadly
speaking, the Baltic states comprise those ad-
jacent to the Baltic Sea and its associated bodies
of water, the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of
Finland. The old Hanseatic League definitely
linked up with Baltic waters although it was
not fully restricted to their shores. Poland,
especially, qualifies as a Baltic state, for its
only water outlet lies through the Baltic Sea.
Sweden, on the other hand, offers weaker quali-
fications in light of its more or less direct con-
tact with the North Sea through the Kattegat
and Skagerrak. Russia has long been con-
cerned with the Baltic, though one usually
speaks of the "Baltic region" of that country
rather than of its being a Baltic state in a lit-
eral sense. More narrowly, the term "Baltic
states" refers to the three countries of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania. Even though they
834
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
iirrently fall under Soviet administration, tlie
Jnited States does not recognize them as part
[)f the so\'ereign territory of the Soviet Union.
"he Iherlan Peninsula
Spain and Portugal, occupying the Iberian
eninsula, logically make up a region which
tilizes the name of the geograpliic region at
land: Iberia, with Iberian or Ibero as adjec-
ives. One may note, for example, that the
(IjJSpanisli national airline is named Iberia. Here
s a region on the European mainland which
oincides with the political structure. The
loundary between Spain and France closely
bllows a theoretical line marking the juncture
if the peninsula to the main body of the con-
inent. The tiny country of Andorra, when
laced in a regional category, usually falls into
,hat of Spain rather than France since its high
ugged terrain is more accessible from the
south. At the opposite extreme of the penin-
lula the British colony of Gibraltar also must
be included in the region.
\Benelux
The term "Benelux" is relatively new, having
been derived in 1947 from the names of the
(three countries which at that time initiated seri-
lous economic cooperation : Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and Luxembourg. The low elevation of
Belgium and the Netherlands can be recog-
nized in the expression "Low Countries," a
name which applies to the area minus Luxem-
bourg.
'Regions Within Countries
Thus far attention has been focused upon
regions encompassing groups of countries. By
descending in scale to regions limited to areas
within national boundaries a virtual flood of
names surges to the fore.^ Centuries of stirring
"Along with regions completely contained within a
country's borders must be included a certain number
which are international in character only because of
the shifting of international boundaries in the past to
intersect them, or by virtue of well-defined physical
features enveloping parts of more than a single coun-
try. For example, Rumania and the Soviet Union
share Moldavia — or, optionally, there is a Moldavia
In each of the two countries. The Jura lies both in
France and Switzerland.
history and deep-rooted tradition find expres-
sion in areas no larger than single valleys or
limited hilly belts. The names spring from
many sources but commonly refer to some
rather obvious aspect of the physical or cultural
environment. Mountains and mountainous
areas, rivers and their valleys, and maritime
features furnish a wealth of names. Cultural
features cover even a wider range, in some cases
harking back to medieval and ancient times
and the royal lines of the day. However, the
distinction between physical and cultural names
cannot always be readily discerned. For ex-
ample, a province may have originally taken its
name from a physical feature and later a ruling
family may have adopted the same name. Thus
with the passing of time a physical name by
metamorphosis acquires a cultural concept.
Eegional nomenclature by its very complexity
often defies precise classification. Neverthe-
less it is possible to recognize certain group-
ings of names which fit into a rather nebulous
time-space pattern. Most European countries
have a series of names inherited from the feudal
era when great numbers of petty kingdoms or
realms of authority based on armed might
formed a mosaic over the continent. Each such
quasi-political entity, even though ill-defined as
to area, carried with it a name which often con-
tinued in usage as a province or other internal
administrative division of a larger autonomous
state. Today, as the map of Europe will prove,
many of these names either remain as civil ad-
ministrative areas or are retained to designate
historical regions despite the decline of any
official authority they may have held at one
time. A few examples of names currently
popular and in wide use suggest that this se-
quence through centuries of history was not
uncommon :
France: Burgundy, Languedoc, Savoy
Germany: Bavaria, Saxony, Westphalia
Italy: Calabria, Lombardy, Tuscany
Spain: Andalusia, Asturias, Galicia
Balkan area: Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace
Other names of this ilk, though readily recog-
nizable in history books and on historical maps,
did not survive and no longer apply :
Aquitania
Gaul
Illyricum
Mercia
Prussia
Thessaly
MARCH 4, 1963
335
Localized Names
By delving into national practices one finds
regions which appear almost like compartments
but are arranged without regard to symmetry.
Although accepted as quite natural by the local
inhabitants of European countries, such a com-
plicated array of names may seem strange to
Americans. In France, for example, individ-
uals normally identify themselves by the region
fi-om which they come ("Je suis de Bretagne")
as Americans do by States ("Kansas is my
State"). Wlien strictly local names are used
they may be quite confusing to all but the
initiated. Following are several less well
known regions in the south-central part of
France, each incorporating areas of at least
several hundred square miles:
Plaine de la Limagne: Valley of the Allier near Vichy
Causse de Limogne: Limestone area near Cahors
Plateau du Limousin: Area around Limoges
Lomngne: Piedmont areas along the Garonne near
Toulouse
Almost any Frenchman knows that Bresse is
the plains area on the east side of the valley of
the Saone, north of Lyon. Plump cliickens
from tliis region appear on French menus,
much as Maryland fried chicken appears on our
bills of fare. In the alpine section, Gresivau-
dan is well known as the flat valley of the Isere
Eiver upstream from Grenoble, though it is
scarcely 20 miles long and no wider than 3
miles.
In the same way the English freely indulge
in such terms as Herts, Hamps, and Wilts,
short for Hertford, Hampshire, and Wiltsliire.
A British film, "Gog and Magog," meant noth-
ing to Americans for it was named after the Gog
Magog Hills in "West Suffolk. New Forest,
the Fens, South Downs, and the Lake District
are names dear to the heart of most Londoners,
for they represent choice spots for a holiday in
the English countryside.
Without doubt Europeans find themselves in
a position to utilize regional names more than
do Americans. The United States has had not
only a shorter history but relatively few
sovereignties have been involved whereby a ricl^
politicogeographic nomenclature could be de-
veloped. However, the custom of applying
straight physical terms to areas is freely prac-
ticed on both sides of the Atlantic. Americans
can match Alps with Eockies, Rhine River
valley with Columbia River valley, Bohemian
Plateau with Adirondacks, and Sierra Nevada
(Spain) with Sierra Nevada (California).
Despite the widespread popularity of old re-
gional names in Europe, the governing echelons
in many instances foimd them unsatisfactory as
civil administrative divisions. As a result most
countries are chopped up into artificially cre-
ated areas wliich may or may not adliere in
part to former jurisdictional limits. Authority
delegated to the newer divisions usually lies
somewhere between that of the individual States
and counties of the United States. States
{Lander) in West Gennany, provinces in Italy
and Spain, and departments in France and i
Greece make up first-order civil divisions of
their respective coimtries. France's 89 depart-
ments replaced some 40 old provinces. For con-
venience of administration each of the newer-l
political subdivisions averages around 2,500
square miles in area; the old provinces were of
all sizes. It is interesting to note that 65 of
the departments draw their names from rivers
flowing through them and another 14 from
mountains or other relief features within their
borders.
Water Bodies
Tlie highly irregular configuration of Eu-
rope's coastline gives much of the continent a
marine setting. Even the landlocked countries
lie relatively close to water and have transpor-
tation facilities giving direct egress to major
sea lanes. As a consequence the many water
bodies penetrating the European perimeter have
produced a system of nomenclature in some
ways a counterpart to that on land. However,
one special problem persists, that of water-area
names superimposed or overlapping one over
the other.
Tlie featureless surface of water prevents dis-
tinguishing any regional delineation other than
the shorelines of mainland or islands, a dis-
advantage not found on land. For example,
the Gulf of Genoa is a part of the Ligurian
Sea, which in turn is a part of the Mediterra-
nean Sea. Also, where does the North Sea end
and the Atlantic Ocean begin, or does the
former encompass the latter ?
336
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Although most water bodies peripheral to
urope cannot be precisely bounded, their
lines are well-lcnown and — allowing for a lit-
e flexibility — accepted terms of location.
t'ten their implications extend beyond the
liter areas themselves, to identify land lying
Ijacent: Adriatic Coast, Baltic countries,
mian islands, French Riviera (Mediterranean
ea). Of special significance are strategic
aterways which carry names with a weight
ir in excess of their size, in some instances de-
oting geopolitical importance of centuries-long
anding: Strait of Gibraltar, Skagerrak, Kat-
'gat, English Channel, Dardanelles.
Jands
Closely associated with European bodies of
ater, myriads of islands demand identification
y name, both individually (except for unim-
ortant islets and rocks jutting out of the sea)
ml as groups. Along the coast of Norway,
orth of the Arctic Circle, there are said to be
20,000 islands and islets — enough for a two-
olume gazetteer of their own if all had
ames ! Islands in great numbers also abound
Isewhere off the coasts of Europe though they
lo not show up well on wall or atlas maps of
he continent. For example, most Americans
ire unaware of island regions such as the Spor-
ides in the Aegean Sea, the great Southwestern
\.rchipelago of Finland, or the Outer Hebrides
)f Scotland. The larger, relatively isolated
slands tend to impress them, as Corsica, Crete,
he Isle of Man, and Jersey.
.anguage
Diversity of languages in the European poly-
clot offers us no serious handicap to the use of
regional teiins. Most important regions either
have English names or have become accepted
in the foreign tongue. In practice only a very
small percentage of non-English, Latin-
alphabet names of geographical places have
translations. As a result the native spellings
are employed in English as if they were Eng-
lish. Thus, while German Phalz translates to
Palatinate, the smaller Taunus retains its Ger-
man spelling when used in English. (In re-
verse, one might see Nord-Karolhia in a German
atlas, but the Sand Hills of Nebraska would
remain as such.)
The problem of translations, when they are
used, becomes all the more simple because in
most cases the differences between languages
are slight and the names are readily recogniza-
ble from one language to another. For exam-
ple, few people should encounter difficulty in
ascertaining that Venezia is Venice, Toscana is
Tuscany, and the Ost-Alpen are the Eastern
Alps. Many names convert from language to
language with even less word modification, as
Normandie translates to Normandy and Na-
varre to Navarra.
Wlien international boundaries traverse re-
gions, place names in more than one language
are not imcommon, as Tirol (in Austria) and
Tirolo (in Italy). (In the United States the
name is conventionally spelled Tyrol, but the
official Board on Geographic Names decision
is Tirol.) One physical region, the Valley of
the Danube, occupies parts of seven countries.
In German the Danube is called the Donau, in
Czechoslovak the Dunaj, in Hungarian the
Duna, in Serbo-Croatian (Yugoslavia) and
Bulgarian the Dunau, in Rumanian the Dv/n-
area^ and in Russian the Dunai. French spell-
ing of the river conforms to the English, but
the Spanish and Italians call it the Danubio.
In Switzerland, with its four languages, any
given region may have one, two, three, or four
spellings. For example, Vaud, a canton in the
French part of the country, becomes Waadt
when used by the German-speaking Swiss.
Four major European languages have non-
Latin alphabets, requiring transliteration into
English rather than translation: Bulgarian,
Greek, Russian, and Serbo-Croatian. Between
these tongues and those with Latin alphabets
no appreciable similarity exists ; so the English
term for any region is synthetic and subject to
change only in relation to variance in systems
of transliteration.
Europe in the Department's Regional Bureaus
All of Europe except Greece and Turkey in
Europe falls into the Bureau of European Af-
fairs in the organizational arrangements of the
Department of State. But the bureau's respon-
sibilities do not stop at the continental limits.
MAECH 4, 1963
337
for also included are Canada, Greenland, that
part of the Soviet Union in Asia, the Guianas
on the mainland of South America, and a few
scattered islands in the Atlantic and Caribbean.
Prior to mid-summer 1962 Algeria, Jamaica,
and Trinidad and Tobago also belonged to the
bureau, but with the emergence of these tliree
entities as independent states they were trans-
ferred to other bureaus in accordance with their
geographical location.
Within the Bureau of European Affairs the
overall area breaks down fivefold into offices.
Most heterogeneous is the Office of Western
European Affairs, covering Austria, Belgium,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland, and the
aforementioned scattered islands. Territorial
giants are the Office of Soviet Affairs (includ-
ing Siberia) and the Office of British Common-
wealth and Northern European Affairs (in-
cluding Canada). Actually, members of the
British Commonwealth other than the United
Kingdom itself and Canada lie within the juris-
diction of other regional bureaus. The Office
of German Affairs concentrates solely on West
Germany, while the Office of Eastern European
Affairs encompasses the Soviet satellites to-
gether with Yugoslavia. In addition this office
includes the states of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania and their diplomats in exile.
It is obvious that knowing something about
the regions of Europe means far more than run-
ning through an exercise in academic geog-
raphy, enumerating names of mountains anc
plateaus, or otherwise burdening ourselves bj
memorizing disconnected facts about places
Regional names tell much about a land and iti
people, for they represent highpoints of tli
physical environment and the history which hi
transpired over it. Each word denotes somi
feature or combination of features that has
emerged as an acceptable term and has survived
the passing of time. Beyond its generic mean-
ing any regional term may have acquired a
traditional pattern of concepts which relates to
an entire sequence of history as well as a seg-
ment of the landscape. Lombardy (Italian:
Lomhardhx), for example, was named for the
Lombards, a Teutonic tribe which invaded Italy
14 centuries ago and settled in the Po Valley.
Later it became an official administrative divi-
sion and was firmly associated with the land-
scape and peoples of the central part of
nortliern Italy, with Milan as the nucleus.
A similar importance may, of course, be
attached to regions anywhere in the world, but
in Europe especially are these names signifi-
cant to Americans. Here the Western World
finds a focal point for its historical develop-
ment, its cultural attainments, and its economic
accomplishments. Thus many of the regional
names of Europe which we may take for
granted, or resist because we find them confus-
ing, actually make up part of several disciplines
essential to understanding and appreciating a
part of the world of particular interest and con-
cern to us.
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings^
Scheduled March Through May 1963
Universal Postal Union: 15th Conjrress (undetermined) .... Mar. 1-
U N. International Conference on Consular Privilpges Vienna Mar. 4-
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations .... New York Mar. 4-
lAEA Symposium on the Application of Radioisotopes in Hydrology . Tokyo Mar. 5-
IMCO Working Group on Intact Stability of Ships: 1st Session . . . London Mar. 5-
U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 19th Session . Manila Mar. 5-
IMCO Working Group on Watertight Subdivision and Damage Stability London Mar. 11-
of Passenirer and Cargo Ships.
U.N. ECE Working Party on Urban Renewal and Town Planning Aspects Geneva Mar. 11-
of Housing.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 17th Session . . . . New York M.ar. 11-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 19th Session Geneva Mar. 11-
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee Paris Mar. 12-
338
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
AO General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean: 7th Session . . IVTadrid Mar. 12-
J.N. ECE Coal Committee, Coal Trade Subcommittee, and Working Geneva Mar. 18-
Party on I'roductivity.
J.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Veliicles Geneva Mar. 18-
[CAO Legal Subcommittee Montreal Mar. 18-
TU Administrative Council: 18th Session Geneva Mar. 23-
!MCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement: 3d Session .... London Mar. 25-
J.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Rapporteurs on Com- Geneva Mar. 25-
parisons of Systems of National Accounts in Use in Europe.
nternational Lead and Zinc Study Group: Special Working Group . . Geneva Mar. 25-
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 29th Session Geneva Mar. 28-
CAO Facilitation Division: 6th Session Mexico, D.F March
World Meteorological Organization: 4th Congress Geneva Apr. 1-
louth Pacific Commission: Regional Seminar on Education Noumea Apr. 1-
.N. Economic and Social Council: 35th Session New York Apr. 2-
.N. ECE Coal Committee: Rapporteurs on UtiUzation of Fly Ash . . Geneva Apr. 8-
.N. Committee on Information From Non-Sclf-Governing Territories . New York Apr. 15-
nternational Cotton Advisory Committee: 22d Plenary Meeting . . . New Dellii Apr. 16-
CAO Communications Division: Special Meeting To Prepare for ITU Montreal Apr. 16-
Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference.
Executive Committee for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: Geneva Apr. 17-
9th Session.
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 18th Session Geneva Apr. 18-
NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 15th Meeting London Apr. 22-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Spe- New York Apr. 22-
cial Working Party.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Committee on Illicit Geneva Apr. 23-
Traffic.
PAHO Executive Committee: 48th Meeting Washington Apr. 25-
lAEA International Conference on Draft Convention on Civil Liability, Vienna Apr. 29-
Land-Based Facilities.
IMCO Working Group on Facilitation of International Travel and London Apr. 29-
Transport: 2d Session.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Uth New York Apr. 29-
Session.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 18th Session Geneva Apr. 29-
UNESCO E.xecutive Board: 65th Session Paris Apr. 29-
CENTO Ministerial Council: 11th Meeting Karachi Apr. 30-
WMO Executive Committee: 15th Session Geneva April
WMO Executive Committee: Extraordinary Session Geneva April
U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission: 15th Session New York April
U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 5th Session Bangkok April
Bureau of UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission . . Rio de Janeiro .... April
GATT Ministerial Meeting Geneva April
ILO Textiles Committee: 7th Session Geneva May 6-
9th Pan American Highway Congress Washington May 6-
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America: 10th Session Buenos Aires May 6-
16th World Health Assembly Geneva May 7-
16th International Film Festival Cannes May 9-
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Industrial Development: 3d Session . . New York May 13-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris May 14—
U.N. ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the Conference on Trade New York May 14-
and Development.
ICAO Meeting on Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Control Operations . New York May 14-
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: Symposium on Peak Load Venice May 20-
Coverage.
IMCO Council: 8th Session London May 21-
ILO Governing Body: 155th Session (and its committees) Geneva May 24-
IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability Problems London May 27-
WHO Executive Board: 32d Session Geneva May 28-
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 13th Halifax May
Meeting.
Inter-Araerican Tropical Tuna Commission Bogota May
U.N. Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and New York May
Resources: 4th Session.
' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Feb. 13, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations:
CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO,
International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American
Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.
1963 339
President Greets Resumption
of Geneva Disarmament Talks
Statement iy President Kennedy ^
We look with hope to the work whicli begins
in Geneva as the 18-nation disarmament meet-
ings resume. Agreement does not lie within
easy reacli. The difficulties in reaching such an
agreement can only be resolved if all parties
face them m a spirit of willingness to negoti-
ate— if there is a genuine spirit of cooperation,
coupled witli a firm resolve to reverse the pres-
ent dangerous trend of the arms race. The
prospects of agreement on a test ban treaty now
seem somewhat more encouraging than before
because of the acceptance by the Soviet Union
of tlie principle of on-site inspection,- but very
important questions remain to be worked out.
We must seelc an agreement that will serve the
world's real interests by deserving, and promot-
ing, confidence and trust among the nations.
The United States also believes that measures
to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalcu-
lation, or failure of communication should be
pressed with energy.^ Discussions to date have
indicated a mutual interest in specific risk-of-
war measures. This suggests that now may be
the time actively to pursue these matters.
It is clear then that the conference has before
it new opportunities for serious negotiation.
And if agreements here could be coupled with
further measures designed to contain the nu-
clear threat, then the more ambitious task of
developing a broad-range progi'am for general
and complete disarmament would surely pro-
ceed in an atmosphere of greater international
confidence, stability, and security.
' Read by William C. Foster, Director of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, at the open-
ing session of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on Feb. 12
(White House press release).
' For an exchange of letters between President Ken-
nedy and Chairman Khrushchev, see Bulletin of Feb.
11, 1!)G3, p. 198.
' For text of a U.S. working paper submitted to the
conference on Dec. 12, see iMd., Dec. 31, 1962, p. 1019.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as thot
listed ielow) may be consulted at depository libraries i\
the United States. V.X. printed publications may be
chased from the Sales Section of the United Natv
United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
General Assembly
Question of Hungary. Letter dated September 25, 1
from Sir Leslie Munro, United Nations Special Repi
sentative on the question of Hungary, transmitting
fourth report to the President of the General Assembl
A/5236, September 25, 1962, 11 pp.; statement by
representative of Hungary concerning the report,
closed with a letter dated September 28 to the Preslder
of the General Assembly, A/5245, September 29, 196:
3 pp.
Dissemination of Information on the United Nations i
the Non-Self-Governing Territories. Report of the Sec
retary-General, A/.5244. September 28, 1962. 9 pp.
Racial Discrimination in Non-Self-Governing Territorief
Report of the Secretary-General. Ay5249. October i
19G2. 28 pp.
Letters to the Acting Secretary-General concerning oti
Jects launched into orbit or beyond ; from the U.S. Rep
resentative dated October 1 and 23, A /AC. 10.5/1 NF. 17
October 3, 1962, 2 pp., and A/AC.105/INF.19, October 24
1962, 2 pp. ; from the U.S.S.R. Representative dated Oe
tober 19, 1962, A/AC.105/INF.18, October 22, 1962, 3 pp
Report of the Special Committee on the Situation Witl
Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration oi
the Grantinir of Independence to Colonial Countries an(
Peoples, covering the period from February 20 to Sep
tember 19, 1962. A/.5238. October 8, 1962. 550 pp.
The Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and Thermo
Nuclear Tests. Letter dated October 11, 1962, fron
the U.S. Representative to the Acting Secretary-Genera
enclosing two memorandums related to the issue o;
nuclear testing. A/C.1/873. October 12, 1962. 13 pp
Letters concerning Cuba addressed to the Secretary
General from the representatives of Costa Rica, thi
United States, and Cuba. A/5260, October 16, 19<12, 1
pp.; A/5261, October 16, 1962, 6 pp.; A/5266, Octobei
22, 1962, 8 pp. ; A/5271, October 29, 1962, 2 pp.
Economic Development of Under-developed Countries.
International flow of long-term capital and official do-
nations, 1959-l!Xil. Report of the Secretary-General.
A/519.5, October 17, 1962, 87 pp.; A/5195/Corr. 1, No-
vember 5, 1962, 1 p. I
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Infor- 1
mation relating to outer space activities supplied by
governments on a voluntary basis in accordance with
General Assembly Resolution 1721 B (XVI). Excerpts
from replies received from 36 member states. A/
AC.:05/7. October 30, 1962. 76 pp.
United Nations Emergency Force : Cost Estimates for the
Maintenance of the Force During the Period 1 January
to 31 December 1963. 14th report of the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
A/5274. November 2, 1962. 3 pp.
Question of General and Complete Disarmament: Report
of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on
Disarmament. Letter dated November 9 from the U.S.
Representative to the Acting Secretary-General trans-
mitting the text of the Outline of Basic Provisions of
a Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarma-
ment, submitted to the Committee on April 18, as well
as two amendments to the outline. A/C.1/875. No-
vember 9, 1962. 39 pp.
340
depart:,iext of state bulletin
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
\viation
Convention for uniflcation of certain rules relating to
the precautionary attachment of aircraft. Done at
Eome May 29, 1933. Entered into force January 12,
1937.^
Accessions deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), August
9, 1962; Mauritania, August 4, 1962.
Convention on the international recognition of rights in
aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered
into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847.
Ratification deposited: Denmark, January 18, 1963.
Cultural Relations
Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization. Concluded at Lon-
don November 16, 1945. Entered into force for the
United States November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.
Signatures and acceptances: Burundi, November 16,
1962 ; Jamaica, November 7, 1962 ; Mongolian
People's Republic, November 1, 1962 ; Rwanda, No-
vember 7, 1962 ; Trinidad and Tobago, November 2,
1962 ; Uganda, November 9, 1962.
Law of the Sea
Convention on the territorial sea and contiguous zone ; '
Convention on fishing and conservation of living re-
sources of the high seas ; '
Convention on the continental shelf ; '
Optional protocol of signature concerning compulsory
settlement of disputes.^
Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.
Ratification deposited: Portugal, January 8, 1963.
Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April
29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962.
TIAS 5200.
Ratification deposited: Portugal, January 8, 1963.
Narcotics
I'rotocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of
the poppy plant, the production of, international and
vrholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New
York June 23, 1953.
Ratification deposited: Greece, February 6, 1963.
Enters into force: March 8, 1963.
Paclflc Settlement
Convention for the pacific settlement of international
disputes (Permanent Court of Arbitration). Signed
at The Hague July 29, 1899. Entered into force Sep-
tember 4, 1900. 32 Stat. 1779.
Adherence deposited: Honduras, December 1, 1961.
Notifications received that they consider themselves
bound: Byelorussian S.S.R. (with a statement),
June 4, 1962; Cameroon, August 1, 1961; Congo
(Leopoldville), March 25, 1961; Ukrainian S.S.R.
(with a statement), April 4, 1962; Upper Volta,
August 30, 1961.
' Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.
Convention for the pacific settlement of international
disputes (Permanent Court of Arbitration). Signed
at The Hague October 18, 1907. Entered into force
January 26, 1910. 36 Stat. 2199.
Adherences deposited: Honduras, December 1, 1961;
Israel, April 18, 1962.
Notifications received that they consider themselves
bound: Byelorussian S.S.R. (with a statement),
June 4, 1962; Cameroon, August 1, 1961; Congo
(L4opoIdvilIe), March 25, 1961; Ukrainian S.S.R.
(with a statement), April 4, 1962; Upper Volta,
August 30, 1961.
Trade
Italy on December IS, 1962, accepted the following in-
struments pursuant to acceptance of protocol to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade embodying
results of 1960-61 tariff conference:
Protocol relating to negotiations for establishment
of new schedule III — Brazil — to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
December 31, 1958.''
Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18,
1959.^
Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17,
1959.''
Trinidad and Tobago on January 17, 196S, acknowl-
edged applicable rights and obligations of the United
Kingdom with respect to the following:
Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications
to annexes and texts of schedules to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
March 7, 1955. Entered into force January 23,
1959. TIAS 4186.
Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3,
1955.'
Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11,
1957.^=
Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications
to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30,
1957.'
Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18,
1959.'
Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17,
1959.'
BILATERAL
Bolivia
Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended ( 68 Stat. 454 ; 73 Stat. 610 ;
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736). Signed at La Paz February 4,
1963. Entered into force February 4, 1963.
Cyprus
Agreement for the waiver of fingerprint requirements
for nonimmigrant visa applicants. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Nicosia July 11, 1962, and January
11, 1963. Entered into force January 11, 1963.
MARCH 4, 1963
341
S|
France
Compromis of arbitration pursuant to article X of the
air transport agreement of Marcli 27, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1679, 210G, 2257, 2258, 4336). Signed
at Paris January 22, 1963. Entered into force Jan-
uary 22, 1963.
Iceland
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 10.54, as amended (6S Stat. 4.55; 7 U.S.C.
1701-1709), with memorandum of understanding.
Signed at Reykjavik February 6, 1963. Entered into
force February 6, 1963.
India
Agreement providing for a grant for the acquisition
of nuclear training and re.search equipment and ma-
terials. Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi
January 4 and February 1, 1963. Entered into force
February 1, 1963.
Iran
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1054, as amended (68 Stat. 4.55; 7 U.S.C.
1701-1709), with exchanges of notes of October 15
and December 30, 1962, and February 3, 1963. Signed
at Tehran October 15, 1962. Entered into force
October 1.5, 1962.
Japan
Agreement concerning the reciprocal acceptance of
certificates of airworthiness for imported aircr.nft.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Febru-
ary 1, 1963. Entered into force February 1, 1903.
Netherlands
Agreement on public liability for damage caused by
the NS ^nvntinah, with annex. Signed at The
Hague February 6, 1963. Enters into force on the
date on which each Government receives from the
other written notification that it has complied with
all statutory and constitutional requirements for
entry into force.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Establishment of Office of International
Finance and Economic Analysis
Foreign Affairs Manual Circular 98K dated January 7
1. Purpose
This circular establishes within the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Affairs an Office of International Finance and
Economic Analysis (OFE) and provides for related
organizational changes in that Bureau. These changes
are effective as of January 1, 1963.
2. Functions of the Office of International Finance and
Economic Analysis
a. Formulates and advises on policies relating to
international financial matters.
b. Prepares studies and advises on the interrelation-
ship of economic development in the United States and
in other countries.
c. Serves as the focal point within the Bureau for
consideration of foreign economic policy aspects of
United States economic development programs.
d. Studies and advises on problems of international
private investment (except for treaty negotiations)
not directly connected with developing countries.
e. Advises on lend-lease and surplus property
problems.
3. Related Organizational Changes
a. The International Finance Division (FN), for-
merly in the Office of International Trade and Finance
(OTF), is abolished. Its functions are transferred to
the Office of International Finance and Economic
Analysis (OFE).
b. The Office of International Trade and Finance
(OTF) is redesignated the Office of International
Trade. Its symbol is OT.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 11-17
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of N
ews, Department of State, Washing-
ton 25, D.C
Ueleases
issued prior to February 11 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 73
and 74 of February 9.
No. Date
Subject
72 2/11
Recognition of Government of Iraq.
*75 2/11
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
t7G 2/11
Ball: Interview on "Lssues and
Answers."
*77 2/11
Visit of Giuseppe Saragat.
78 2/12
P.u.sk : "The Road Ahead."
79 2/13
U.A.R. decree im foreign owner.ship
of agricultural land.
*80 2/12
Progranj for visit of President of
Venezuela.
*81 2/12
Program for visit of Giuseppe
S;iragat.
*S2 2/13
Program for visit of King of Laos.
♦83 2/14
Bowles: "Emancipation: the Record
and the Challenge."
84 2/14
Rwanda credentiais (rewrite).
85 2/15
Venezuela credentials (rewrite).
*86 2/15
Bowles : "Democracy and Develop-
ment in Latin America" (ex-
cerpts).
♦87 2/15
Program for visit of President of
Venezuela.
t89 2/16
Talks to implement Nassau agree-
ment,
ited.
*Not pri
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
842
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
arch 4, 1963
nerican Republics. Pan American Day and
Pan American Weeli, 1963 (text of proclama-
tion)
tomic Energy. President Greets Resumption
of Geneva Disarmament Talljs
lylon. U.S. Suspends Aid to Ceylon . . .
iDimunism. Tlie Road Aliead (Ruslf) . . .
ingress. Congressional Documents Relating to
Foreign Policy
[ba. The Road Ahead (Rusk)
epartment and Foreign Service. Establish-
ment of Office of International Finance and
Economic Analysis
isarmament. President Greets Resumption of
Geneva Disarmament Taliss
conomic Affairs
Istablishment of Office of International Finance
and Economic Analysis
uropean Integration and American Foreign
Policy (Chayes)
ides of Change (Schaetzel)
lurope
Curopean Integration and American Foreign
Policy (Chayes)
feographic Terminology of Europe (Pearcy) .
he Road Ahead (Rusk)
'ides of Change (Schaetzel)
''oreign Aid
first Meeting Held by Advisory Committee on
Aid Program
U.S. Suspends Aid to Ceylon
eography. Geographic Terminology of Europe
(Pearcy)
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and
Meetings
President Greets Resumption of Geneva Disar-
mament Talks
Iran. Shah of Iran Congratulated on Results of
Referendum (Kennedy, Shah of Iran) . . .
Index
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1236
317
340
328
311
329
311
342
340
342
318
322
318
330
311
322
329
328
330
338
340
316
Iraq. United States Recognizes Government of
Iraq 316
Laos. The Road Ahead (Rusk) 311
Military Affairs. First Meeting Held by Ad-
visory Committee on Aid Program .... 329
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
European Integration and American Foreign
Policy (Chayes) 318
Tides of Change (Schaetzel) 322
Presidential Documents
Pan American Day and Pan American Week,
1963 317
President Greets Resumption of Geneva Disar-
mament Talks 340
Shah of Iran Congratulated on Results of Ref-
erendum 316
Protection of Nationals and Property. U.A.R.
Bans Ownership of Farm Lands by Foreign
Nationals 328
Recognition. United States Recognizes Govern-
ment of Iraq 316
Rwanda. Letters of Credence (Mpakaniye) . . 317
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 341
United Arab Republic. U.A.R. Bans Ownership
of Farm Lands by Foreign Nationals . , . 328
United Nations. Current U.N. Documents . . 340
Venezuela. Letters of Credence (Tejera Paris) . 317
Viet-Nam. The Road Ahead (Rusk) .... 311
'Name Index
Chayes, Abram 318
Kennedy, President 316,317,340
Mpakaniye, Lazare 317
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah 316
Pearcy, G. Etzel 330
Rusk, Secretary 311
Schaetzel, J. Robert 322
Tejera Paris, Enrique 317
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5c ^
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1237 March 1]|, 1963 ^^ ^^
COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE • Statement by Assistant Secretary
Martin ^*'
SECRETARY RUSK HOLDS PRESS AND RADIO
NEWS BRIEFING AT LOS ANGELES 361
UNDER SECRETARY BALL INTERVIEWED ON
"ISSUES AND ANSWERS" 369
U.S. POSITION ON U.N. SPECIAL FUND PROJECT
IN CUBA • Statements by Secretary Rusk and Ricliard
N. Gardner 3^7
For index See inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1237 • Publication 750
March 11, 1963
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
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Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
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lected press releases on foreign policy,
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national relations are listed currently.
(ommunist Subversion in tlie Western Hemispiiere
Statement hy Edwin M. Martin
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Ajfairs'^
I welcome this opportunity to appear before
is subcommittee to testify on the important
Itroblem of Communist subversion in the hemi-
phere. In recent months public attention has
acused to such a degree on the Soviets' arms
uildup in Cuba that it has tended to over-
h a d o w Communist subversive activities
hroughout Latin America, aided in many ways
'y Cuba and other bloc countries.
Tlie problem of extracontinental totalitarian
)owers trying to subvert established govern-
iients in this hemisphere is not new. During
fVorld War II the American Eepublics faced
he challenge of Fascist subversion sponsored
)y the Axis Powers. Through individual and
;ollective action they successfully dealt with this
threat. Since 1948, in the aftermath of the
ZJomniunist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia,
:he inter- American conunimity has been dealing
with the problem of Cominmiist subversion pro-
moted by countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc, now
. supported by Cuba.
II mention this at the outset to point out that
the American governments were confronting
this issue long before there was a Communist
Cuba, and I expect they will be doing so after
Cuba is free again.
DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNISM PRIOR TO
CASTRO
The establishment of the Communist parties
in Latin America has taken place in at least five
waves or phases. During the first of these,
from 1918 to 1922, parties were formed in the
five countries where the industrial revolution
had made the most headway and where the
labor movement had begun to acquire national
Editor's Note: Because of the length of this
statement it has been necessary to print it in
two parts. The final portion will appear in the
Bulletin of March 18, 1963.
prominence. While the five original Com-
munist parties were building on socialist or
anarchist foundations during the 1920's, en-
tirely new Communist and Communist-oriented
groups were emerging in a majority of the other
Latin American Eepublics. In each case, the
Communist organizations in the second wave
had to contend with more serious obstacles than
their predecessors had initially faced. These
handicaps included the almost complete absence
of labor organizations, little or no tradition of
radical political movements, and suppression of
opposition groups by regimes that were either
highly authoritarian or outright dictatorships.
At the Sixth Congress in 1928, the Comintern
adopted the line that Soviet historians have
since identified with the so-called "third period"
of the Communist International. This line
called for Communists everywhere to declare
themselves as such, to cease cooperation with
"bourgeois" and "leftist reformist" elements,
and to establish purely Communist organiza-
tions which should strive to foment and seize
the leadership of proletarian revolutions. Re-
percussions were felt in every phase of Commu-
nist activities in Latin America. With respect
to their political apparatus, the Comintern di-
rectives made it clear that in countries where
Communists operated within other parties every
eifort should be made to convert these parties to
full-fledged Communist organizations. During
' Made before the Latin American Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Feb. 18.
MAKCH 11, 1963
347
^
1929-31, three new parties were also organized,
bringing the number of countries with Com-
munist parties to 17.
The fourth wave of Communist organiza-
tional activity in Latin America, from the mid-
1930's to the mid-1940's, can be subdivided into
three periods, each corresponding to a distinct
episode in the annals of the international Com-
munist movement. These were the periods of
the Popular Front, which had begun in Latin
America by 1935, the Hitler-Stalin pact, from
August 1939 to June 1941, and the remaining
years of the Second World War. During these
same years, half a dozen parties abandoned the
Communist label without changing their polit-
ical orientation, while Coimnmiist parties were
also established in the remaining three Latin
American countries which did not already have
them.
The fifth and current phase deserves a fuller
treatment, includLug a discussion of Soviet bloc
activities, of some real importance for the first
time.
Soviet Bloc Offensive in Latin America in the
1950's
During this postwar and pre-Castro period,
Soviet relations with Latin America, which
seemed to be entering a period of expansion in
the aftermath of World War II, were cut back
sharply from 1947 to 1952 as one country after
another suspended relations with the Soviets at
the same time that they were taking strong
measures against the local Communist parties.
Soviet operations in the area entered on the
present period of expansion beginning in 1953
with overtures to the Peron government for
increased trade. The post-1953 Soviet offensive
in the area was part of a worldwide operation
keyed to the underdeveloped countries and
spearheaded by trade and aid programs. As of
December 31, 1958, the European Communist
bloc countries had 20-odd trade and payments
agreements with five Latin American countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, and
Mexico) . One or more of the bloc governments
at this time had resident diplomatic missions
in these same Latin American coimtries and
also in Bolivia. Soviet bloc trade with Latin
America rose from $70 million in 1953, only
0.6 percent of Latin America's trade with the'
world, to $275 million in 1958, or 1.7 percent'
of Latin American trade. The peak was'
reached in 1955, reflecting trade with Argentina'
under the Peron regime — $340 million, or 2.5i
percent of Latin American trade. During the
period 1955-57, 14 Latin American countries
were visited by bloc trade missions, and 7 of
these covmtries sent missions to the bloc. In
addition, during the 1950's travel between Latin
America and the bloc reached a fairly highl
level, and bloc radio broadcasts allotted more]'
and more time to Latin American audiences.
But the Soviets failed to gain any secure foot-
hold throuirh their diplomatic and economic
offensive in tliese years. Wliat apparent trade
successes they acliieved were based on the need
of various Latin American countries to sell sur-
plus raw materials and their willingness to take
Soviet goods in exchange. In Argentina and
Uruguay, the main theaters of Soviet operation
during this period, the Soviets made no lasting
political gains. In general, this first phase of
Soviet operations in the area was primarily one
of probing for opportimities.
Latin American Communist Parties in the 1950
The only outstanding success of the postwar
period before the Castro takeover was in Guate-
mala in the period 1950-54, where the Commu-
nists came to dominate the Arbenz government
and establish effective control over the country's
labor and peasant organizations. As the So-
viets' power and status reached new high levels
in the late 1950's, the Communist leadership in
Latin America gained new confidence, but the
area was still isolated from the centers of inter-
national communism and the local parties were
unable to translate this growth of Soviet power
into greater capabilities for influence and pene-
tration in the national societies of Latin Amer-
ica. The membership strength of the Com-
munist parties and their ability to influence the
political system was largely confined to their
continued hold in labor organizations and
among intellectual and student groups. Sel-
dom were they able to make common cause
with non-Communist parties commanding a
mass following. They, therefore, generally
remained on the defensive.
iiiefi
nsii
348
DBPAETMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
As of the end of 1958 just before Castro
(ized power in Cuba, it appeared that the cli-
ite for Communist activities in Latin America
■as improving. The swollen, ill-paid urban
opulations seemed to offer an especially prom-
ijj iing field for radical agitation of all kinds.
Reacting to periods of dictatorial rule in various
ountries, leftist party leaders, students, jour-
alists, and other intellectuals were voicing an
Qsistent, but uncritical, demand for the exten-
ion of liberties that promised to remove from
he Communist parties the legal impediments
Jaced in their way by more conservative gov-
irnments of the past. The Communists, by
heir energetic denunciations of economic and
locial injustice, were in the eyes of many of the
luperficially educated intellectuals and leaders
if the left proving themselves the true cham-
lions of democracy.
In terms of Communist Party membership,
.e Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, Cuban, and
enezuelan parties represented in 1958 all but
small part of the total, or about 215,000 of an
imated 250,000 party members in the area.
ese parties had sizable nonparty followings
d substantial influence among other political
cups in their countries.
■^COMMUNIST EFFORTS SINCE THE ADVENT OF
CASTRO
Since 1959 the general pattern of Commimist
subversion in the hemisphere shows a continua-
tion, though on a much stepped-up scale, of the
tactics of infiltration, popular-front action, and
insurgency, but with a marked shift toward
more violence. Local groups have greatly bene-
fited from the receipt of far more outside help,
especially from Cuba, than heretofore. Tills
has coincided with the advent of Castro and the
sharpenmg of differences between Moscow and
Peiping on the tactics to be followed in pressing
forward the Communist campaign of world
domination. The Soviets imdoubtedly regard
Latin America as an area offering unusual pos-
sibilities, but they themselves have been cautious
in their tactics, except where special opportu-
nities have developed, as in the case of Cuba.
On the other hand, there is no evidence that
they have in any way restrained Cuba or local
Commmiist parties from violence of many
forms.
The Strategy and Tactics of the Castro Regime
The strategy of the Castro regime from the
beginning, despite all the disclaimers, has re-
mained one of exporting its revolution — of
converting the Andes into the Sierra Maestra
of the Americas, as Castro stated in 1960. Li
its tactics the Castro regime has been change-
able. During the first 6 months of 1959 in the
flush of victory it sponsored armed expeditions
against several Caribbean countries. None of
these was successful. They served only to
arouse suspicions and generate action by the
OAS [Organization of American States].
Castro then shifted tactics, following a more
subtle, indirect approach. The Cuban efforts
have been channeled in four main directions :
1. the formation of front organizations in the
United States and the Latin American coun-
tries in the form of friendship societies or
committees for the defense of the Cuban
revolution.
2. an intensive propaganda campaign using
printed materials, news services provided by
Prensa Latina, and newly constructed, powerf id
radio facilities.
3. covert material support, largely financial,
to subversive groups.
4. indoctrmation and training of hundreds of
Latin Americans in Cuba, including training in
sabotage, terrorism, and guerrilla tactics.
I believe some specific examples of activities
in these four categories would be of interest to
members of the subcommittee.
On the formation of front organizations, we
do not have to go far afield. All of you are fa-
miliar with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee
and its pro-Castro activities in this country. I
would like to read the following excerpt from
the annual report for the fiscal year 1961 of the
FBI:
The Fair Play for Cuba Committee Is one of the main
outlets in this country for pro-Castro propaganda.
Many of its members are United States nationals. This
Bureau during the 1961 fiscal year determined that
certain funds used by the Committee to pay for a news-
paper advertisement had come from a Cuban official
assigned to the United Nations, a fact later admitted
MARCH 11, 1963
349
m
by a Committee member in testimony before a congres-
sional committee. FBI investigations also have shown
that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee has been
heavily infiltrated by the Communist Party and the
Socialist Workers Party, and that these Parties have
actually organized some chapters of the Committee.
Similar groups have been established in prac-
tically every other country of the hemisphere,
such as the Legion of Voliuiteers for the De-
fense of Cuba in Peru, the Movement for Sol-
idarity With and Defense of the Cuban Revo-
lution in Chile, the Society of Friends of Cuba
in Brazil, and the Society of Friends of the
Cuban Revolution in Costa Rica, to name only a
few. Their f miction has been to propagandize
and whip up enthusiasm for the Castro regime
and repetitions of its revolution through rallies,
demonstrations, propaganda, and all the para-
phernalia of Oommimist- front groups.
As part of its propaganda campaign, the
Cuban Government uses its news service Agen-
da Prensa Latma to spread its distortion of
news events throughout the world. There are
four Prensa Latina offices in Latin America.
These offices serve not only as news gathering
centers for the Cuban propaganda network, but
as a means of contact with subversive groups
throughout the hemisphere.
The Cuban Government places great empha-
sis on radio propaganda to further its subver-
sive ends. It beams to the United States two
English-language programs, "Radio Free
Dixie" and "The Friendly Voice of Cuba,"
intended particularly to arouse racial antag-
onisms in Negro audiences.
Radio Habana is the chief propaganda vehi-
cle of the Cuban Government for other coun-
tries. In May of 1961, Radio Habana produced
a modest 42 hours a week for Europe and the
Americas. Now it puts out some 188 hours a
week, with almost 60 percent of that time devot-
ed to Spanish-language broadcasts to the Amer-
icas. In good part, these broadcasts contain
the usual virulent attacks against specific demo-
cratic governments and their leading person-
ages, such as President Betancourt, and call on
listeners to follow the Cuban example of revo-
lution. Radio Habana also makes its facilities
available to such Cuba-based groups as the
Dominican Liberation Movement, the Peruvian
Anti-Imperialist Struggle Movement, and the
ivtlf
iltlf
itolo
J til
jieri
tl
Guatemalan Information Committee, to broad'
cast systematic and hostile propaganda
designed to bring about the downfall of thij
governments in those countries.
To estimate the amount of Cuban printec
material that is smuggled into the other coun
tries of the hemisphere is impossible. But we
can point to a few glaring examples where thej
have been caught redhanded. Last October ir
Chile, a large crate, weighing 1,800 pounds andl
sent by the Cuban Government to its Embassy
at Santiago, was documented as "samples oi
Cuban products and cultural and commercial '
material." Upon being opened by Chilean
authorities, the packages foimd inside the boar'
contained Cuban propaganda addressed to vari-l"
ous Chileans who a few months before had visit-|*.
ed Cuba. The Chilean Government addressed "
a stern protest to the Cuban Embassy in the
face of this outrageous effort to introduce Cas-
tro propaganda into Chile surreptitiously. '
Similarly, in Mexico in February 1962, Mexi- •
can customs authorities seized a large quantity "*
of Castro Communist propaganda that the
Cuban Minister of Education, Armando Hart
Davalos, brought with liim to Mexico and
tried to introduce into the country during an
official visit.
Another form of support of subversive activi-
ties— and one which is difficult to trace — is the
furnishing of funds to subversive groups. Cas-
tro reportedly donated recently $15,000 to a
violent, extremist group in Colombia called the
United Front for Revolutionary Action. The
Cuban Government has also given financial aid
to the leftist subversive activities of the pro-
Castro Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean
Youth (URJE), which has been involved in
guerrilla activities in Ecuador. Tlie Quito
radio on January 29 broadcast a letter sent to
them by Pablo Paez, a young member of URJE
who had recently been expelled from the
group, in which he publicly acknowledged that
two other individuals of the group, whom he
named, made several trips to Cuba and returned
with money for the support of the Ecuadorean
guerrilla movement. One of these same indi-
viduals, he said, also received funds directly
from the Cuban Embassy at Quito.
It is estimated that between 1,000 and 1,500
persons from other Latin American countries
350
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
•aveled to Cuba in 1962 for ideological indoc-
ile "ination or guerrilla warfare training. Most
f these trainees are young, mostly in their
sens or twenties. Ostensibly in Cuba to pursue
ormal studies of agricultural, industrial, or
ther teclmiques, students also receive heavy
OSes of indoctrination in Castro Communist
eti ieology and guerrilla warfare. Returning
oung men from Cuba have stated that they
;o through simulated offensive and defensive
;uerrilla exercises, are taught how to survive
a the jungles, are given map and weapons
nstruction, as well as other training every good
errilla should have. They are also told how
penetrate student, labor, and other groups
their own countries. Venezuelans seem to be
e most numerous national group among these
rainees, and we do not consider it sheer
incidence that Venezuela's democratic gov-
ent and the Venezuelan people are being
iubjected most heavily to the terrorist and
errilla activities of the Castro Communists
that coimtry.
In the aftermath of the Cuban crisis, the
astro regime has shifted the emphasis of its
lampaign in Lkatin America to one of open en-
i(couragement of terror as a principal weapon, a
imove dictated by the loss of popular support
las a result of the crisis and the futility of con-
Itinuing popular-front, mass-movement tactics.
Violence has been tlie only refuge of the very
small minority tliroughout history.
On November 21, 1962, in a speech closing
the so-called "Week of Solidarity With the
Venezuelan People," Cuban Minister of Edu-
cation Armando Hart said that it had become
evident that "in Latin America the conquest
of revolutionary power has to be achieved nec-
essarily— at least in a great number of the coun-
tries— through class struggle carried to the level
of armed insurrection by the proletariat and
peasant classes." A week later, in an interview
with the Habana correspondent of the London
Daily Worker, Cuban Minister of Industries
Ernesto Guevara is quoted as saying :
The Cuban revolution has shown that in conditions
of imi)erialist domination such as exist in Latin
America, there is no solution but armed struggle.
Castro himself on January 16 of this year stated
that "what is needed [in Latin America] are
experts on changing the situation, experts on
leading peoples in revolutions." Criticizing
those who shrink from violence, he said let the
imperialist theoreticians preach conformism,
but let the revolutionary theoreticians preach
revolution without fear.
Significantly, the "old" Commimists have re-
cently also picked up this theme. Veteran
Communist Party leader Carlos Rafael Rod-
riguez, now President of the Cuban Agrarian
Reform Institute, in a speech on January 23
said:
Following the example of David, they are realizing
in time, that revolution is the road — revolution which
represents the definite change from the decayed struc-
tures which imperialism maintains in our America:
revolution, which means the expulsion of imperialist
and monopolistic wealth, supported by the traitor lati-
fundists and by the cowardly, timid representatives
of a bourgeoisie which feels the blows of imperialism
without trying to divert them to realize that this rev-
olution is possible, that this revolution is achievable,
that this revolution may have different roads for
achievement but that there is only one road on which
it can advance with confidence : the determination to
struggle, to resist, to fight.
Another veteran Cormnunist, Bias Roca, on
January 24 praised the Venezuelan terrorists,
saboteurs, and guerrillas for their activities dur-
ing the missile crisis, calling this "proletarian
internationalism" and promising, "We shall
continue to give our support, each day in
greater proportions, to the Venezuelan people."
Earlier Fidel Castro himself in a speech mark-
ing the fourth anniversary of the Cuban revolu-
tion had this to say about the tactics of violence
in Venezuela during the missile crisis :
. . . the Venezuelan people struggled and gave ex-
traordinary evidence of revolutionary spirit, led by the
glorious Communist Party of Venezuela and by the
valiant militants of the Leftist Revolutionary Move-
ment. The imperialists were given evidence of what
revolutionary solidarity is, and active solidarity of
revolutionaries who do not sit in their doorways to
wait for the corpse of their enemy to pass by, of revo-
lutionaries who understand that the duty of all revo-
lutionaries is to create the revolution.
These statements are a clear indication of
the continuing interventionist piu-poses of the
Castro regime and point to tlie direction in
wliich we can expect it to channel its subversive
activity in the hemisjahere in the months to
come.
MARCH 11, 1963
351
Soviet Bloc Efforts in Latin America Since 1959
Over the past 3 years, e.fforts by the Soviet
bloc countries, other than through Cuba, to es-
tabhsh further their presence in Latin America
and promote the fortunes of local Communist
parties have not generally met with any out-
standing successes. Only the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and
Brazil and the promise of increased trade be-
tween them may be said to represent a clear plus
for the bloc. Otherwise, diplomatic relations
continue to be maintained with the same few
countries in Latin America as before (Cuba,
Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico) and no sig-
nificant expansion of trade has taken place.
One may cite as a clear setback the case of Ar-
gentina, where little use has been made of the
$100 million credit extended by the U.S.S.E. in
1957 (because of the unavailability or inade-
quacy of merchandise) and where the Soviet
and other bloc embassies have been forced to re-
duce the size of their staffs at Argentine
demand.
Tliey have succeeded in attracting more stu-
dents and other persons for training and indoc-
trination of all kinds. Attempts on the part
of the bloc to introduce propaganda into the
various Latin American countries contmue to
have varying degrees of success. Some gov-
ernments (e.g. Mexico, Uniguay) seem lately to
have tightened control over the importation of
such materials, but the amounts distributed in
certain countries remain a most disturbing fact.
Implications of the Sino-Soviet Quarrel in Latin
America
To date the Latin American Communist
parties seem to have been reluctant either to
admit the existence of basic differences between
the U.S.S.R. and Communist Cliina or to take
sides even when the differences are admitted.
Castro has clearly played both sides while ap-
pealing for a reconciliation. One might sug-
gest that his heart is in Peiping but his stomadi
is in Moscow.
Castro's tactics in winning power in Cuba
have nevertheless provoked among those parties
sharp discussion very similar in its subject
352
matter to the discourse between the Soviets anc
the Chinese Commimists. Principally involvet
is the question of the right strategy to the sue
cessful conquest of political power. In vir
tually all Latin American Communist move
ments there is a deep division of opinion as t(
whether to take the violent path to power— !i
similar to that allegedly followed by th( *'
Chinese and the Cubans — or the slower, "uniteci
front" path of alliance with leftist forces which
is called the via pacifica. In general, the So-
viets appear to favor the latter course of action
as one surer of success in the long run and less
liable to result in debilitating defeat for Com-
munist forces. However, the Soviet attitude
toward the violent path, which involves in most
cases the use of a guerrilla movement, is
shrouded in ambivalence.
The Chinese Communists on the other hand
are urging this path on the Latin American .
Commmiist movement through all the avenues-Ji
open to them. There is a coincidence of stra-
tegic views between much Latin American dis-
sident Communist thinking and that of the
Chinese Communists. Our evidence suggests
that the older Communist leaders in the area
tend to favor the Moscow viewpoint, while the
younger, hotter headed elements in the Conmiu-
nist movement find themselves leanmg toward
the Cuban- Chinese Communist strategy. As
time brings less and less prospects of success via
the "peaceful path" there seems good reason to
thmk that more and more Latin American
Commimists will incline toward violent over-
throw as their only possible means to gain
power. This does not necessarily mean capture
of the Latin American parties by the Chinese;
they do not appear to have the capability to
provide the necessary material support.
It would appear that on balance the Soviet
and Cuban images and effectiveness, as distin-
guished from those of local parties, have suf-
fered a setback, largely a ? a result of the crisis
of October 1962, but also from the increasingly
disorienting effects of the Sino-Soviet quarrel.
Conditions in certain areas of Latin America,
however, continue to be conducive to the growth
of Communist influence and consequently to
penetration by Soviet bloc states and parties.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BXJLLETIN
itsii ^lie lack of spectacular successes in recent years
rolr hould not be taken as a sign that either external
les] >r internal Communist forces in Latin America
J Tj lave given up their attempts to overturn the
jiidj ixisting order or are unable to do so.
^(!- tALANCE SHEET ON COMMUNISM IN LATIN
tl AMERICA SINCE 1959
nitj
;j^. So far I have been talking primarily about
, ^ ictivities or influences brouglit to bear by the
,,. Soviet bloc and Cuba on Latin America. But
, the Commimist parties there have a life and
, ' force of their own and are not wholly depend-
ent on outside nourisliment or guidance by any
means. Their strength and activities are mat-
* ters of major interest and must now be analyzed
in some detail.
The Communist apparatus in Latin America
made significant progi-ess during 1959, 1960, and
1961 and came to have greater self-confidence
and optimism than at any time since the end of
the war. Rather than in terms of membership
or electoral success, this progress appeared in
better linkage with the international Com-
munist movement, partly through Cuba, and in
the improved atmosphere for operations in
many countries. Especially during 1959 and
early 1960, this was closely related to the appeal
of the Cuban revolution. Even after disillu-
siomnent with Castro began to set in among
many Latin American leftists, Cuba provided
an important regional headquarters which con-
tinued to provide valuable support and services
to the Latin American Commimists.
During this 3-year period the Communists
made headway in finding indigenous leftist and
nationalist groups disposed to make common
cause with them. Up until 1962 they made sig-
nificant gains among students and intellectuals
and to a lesser degree in urban trade unions.
With heavy bloc support, propaganda activities
were sustained at a higher level than ever
before.
Although 1962 was one of the most active and
eventful years in the history of the Latin
American Communist movement, it closed with
little if any net overall further gain for the
Gommunist parties in terms of numbers or in-
fluence. In fact in some coimtries there were
some at least temporary losses. The highlights
of a yearend balance sheet look something like
this:
In the climate of change and crisis that pre-
vailed during 1962, the non-Communist forces
of the revolutionary left rather than the Com-
miuiist parties themselves appeared to be the
main gainers. Tlie Communists had little to
show in terms of gains in party membership or
vote following, and internal factionalism
increased sharply, in part because many old-
line leaders responded only feebly to their
opportunities. Nevertheless in an overall situa-
tion not unfavorable to revolutionary appeals,
the Communists in 1962 were pursuing vigor-
ously with some success all tlu-ee of their stand-
ard tactical lines, adapted to the local situations
in wliich each seemed to otfer most promise of
success : infiltration, popular fronts, and terror.
Infiltration succeeded best in Brazil. Com-
munist-backed candidates in the October 1962
elections, while they did not fare exceptionally
well in the comitry as a whole, won important
victories in certain key states. On the other
hand the outstanding division in a Communist
party in Latin America during 1962 took place
in Brazil where the Communist Party (PCB)
was confronted by an organized rival party.
Luiz Carlos Prestes has for the last 8 years led
the PCB on a "soft" line and concentrated upon
the quest for legality. During 1961 leftist dis-
sidents, led by three ex-members of the PCB
presidium and five other former central com-
mittee members, accused Prestes and his asso-
ciates of revisionism and lightist deviation.
Expelled as divisionists, the dissidents orga-
nized early in 1962, taking the name Commu-
nist Party of Brazil and claiming to be the
legitimate PCB. Dedicated i-evolutionaries
who are convinced that they will come to lead
the Commimist movement in Brazil, the dissi-
dents, who so far are relatively small in mun-
ber, have actively sought recognition from
other Communist parties and the Castro regime.
Unlike the Prestes PCB, they are actively pre-
paring for guerrilla warfare.
The peaceful, popular-front road to power
has been followed by the Commimist movement
in Chile more faithfully than by any other
party. The well-established Chilean Commu-
MARCH 11, 1963
353
nist Party (PCCh) had good reason for this
policy because its prospects for coming to power
through success at tlie polls by popular-front
groups to which it belongs remain considerably
brigliter than those of any other Latin Ameri-
can Communist party. Allied for years with
the Socialist Party and other leftist elements
in tlie Popular Action Front (FRAP), which
narrowly missed electing its Socialist candidate
president in 1958, the PCCh obtained nearly 12
percent of the vote in the March 1961 congres-
sional elections. With their eyes fixed upon the
1964 presidential elections, again with a Social-
ist candidate, the Chilean Commimists give top
priority to maintaining the FRAP and avoid-
ing any actions which might jeopardize the
legal status which the PCCh regained in 1958.
Even so, during the past year ideological and
tactical differences between the Communists
and the Socialists became more evident than in
the past, and strains within the FRAP became
acute. At the same time voices within the
PCCh advocated developing guerrilla capabili-
ties against the eventuality that force might be
used to keep the Communists from enjoying the
fruits of electoral victory. Thus the PCCh, like
most other Latin American Communist parties,
is confronting the choice between the peaceful
road and violent revolution or guerrilla war-
fare and tries to make its choice in the light of
relative prospects for success. The ambiva-
lence in many parties stems from disagreement
among party leaders over just this point.
The choice of violent action showed most
dramatically in Venezuela, but also in Peru and
to some extent in Brazil. I will discuss this
increasingly important trend more fully later
on.
In Bolivia the orthodox Communist Party
(PCB) so far sees its road to power through
continued successful infiltration of the left sec-
tor of the National Revolutionary Movement
(MNR). The Guatemalan Labor (Commimist)
Party (PGT) has officially adopted a policy
of preparing for any form of struggle. In El
Salvador the party undertook some guerrilla
training on a minor scale during 1962. In Ecua-
dor there has been a shift in tactics following
the diplomatic break with Cuba in April. It
became apparent that further gains through
peaceful political means were unlikely, and at
the Seventh Ecuadorean Communist Party
(PCE) Congress strong sentiment in favor of
early violent revolution became part of the offi'
cial PCE line.
In Mexico the Communist movement was al
ready fragmented. Dissension over activism
was only one of the divisive factors which
worked during 1962 to split the Communist
movement in Mexico into half a dozen feud-
ing factions, none of major consequence.
On the labor front in Latin America there
were few major changes in the political orien-
tation of the leadership in 1962. Those which
took place were mixed in character with gains
for democratic trade vmionism somewhat out-
weighing losses. On the positive side, we note
the failure of the Communist unions to fonn
a "neutralist" Latin American Confederation
of Workers in Chile in September 1962. We
may also cite the elimination of Communist in-
fluence from important unions in Venezuela
and Mexico, d&fections from Communist-con-
trolled union organizations in Bolivia, the
launching of a democratic national confedera-
tion of labor in Ecuador, and the emergence of
a strong anti-Communist federation as the
dominant factor in Dominican labor.
The appeal of communism for Latin Ameri-
can university students as a shortcut to the
solution of all problems seems on balance to
have declined during the year. In several im-
portant universities a reaction appears to have
set in, reflecting disillusionment with Com-
munist excesses at home and abroad by extreme
leftists, foi-merly disposed to accept Communist
views and actions uncritically, and greater
activity and unity by the non-Communists,
everywhere the great majority numerically.
For example, in Mexico a liberal-moderate slate
was elected in the November student elections
at the huge National University, which has been
a prime Communist target ever since the Com-
munist Party found it could not capture the
labor movement. For the first time in recent
history, the Communist candidate was defeated
in student elections at Mexico City's important
National Polytechnic Institute. The Com-
munist Party was reported to be "extremely
unhappy" over these developments. At the
University of Buenos Aires almost half of the
y
id
nl:
354
DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
'oinmunist-dominated "Refonnist" student or-
anization defected to form the "Independent
veformists," depriving Communists of their
laim to be sole champions of reform. As a
esult of this split, the moderate "Humanists"
ron three of the five student seats on the Uni-
ersity Council. In the University of Cordoba,
Argentina, the moderate student organization
ripled in size in 6 years to more than 6,000,
\-hile the leftist Reformists split almost exactly
n half, as in Buenos Aires, and maintained a
tatic combined membership of about 4,000 over
he same period. In Colombia, progressive
]latholic groups have won strong followings in
provincial university centers, especially in Bar-
•anquilla, Medellin, and Santander. In Chile
ill the major student federations are now con-
rolled by the Christian Democrats. On the
)ther hand most of the Peruvian student groups
ire dominated by Communist-supported groups.
A-mong both student and faculty groups some
J real gains have been made in Venezuela.
^Increased Trend Toward Violence
As I noted earlier, there is a marked trend
toward violence in certain areas in Latin Amer-
ica, reflecting Cuban urging as well as the ne-
cessities of local movements which find them-
selves more and more isolated. Nowhere is
it more evident than in Venezuela where, since
January of last year, the Communists have
made a determined, but unsuccessful, effort to
overthrow the Betancourt government. During
1962, under Communist leadership, the terrorist
and guerrilla units were reorganized into the
Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) .
In the interior they have attempted to estab-
lish guerrilla bands with not much success,
, largely because of the vigilance of the Ven-
ezuelan armed forces and the cooperation of
the rural population in whose welfare President
Betancourt has taken so much interest. In the
cities — especially Caracas — they are waging a
campaign of sabotage and terrorism. Home-
made pipe bombs are placed about the city ; hit-
and-run raids have been perpetrated in which
houses and sometimes policemen are shot at
with submachine guns from speeding cars. At-
tempts have been made, some successfully, to
bum warehouses of foreign enterprises. In
these activities, police and law enforcement of-
ficials have been killed or wounded and by-
standers have been frequently wounded in cross-
fire or by bomb fragments. Foreign-owned oil
installations in the interior have been constant
targets. The extremists carried out their most
spectacular act of sabotage in October 1962
when they blew up four strategic transformer
stations belonging to the Standard Oil of New
Jersey Lake Maracaibo complex. Testimony
taken by the Venezuelan Government from two
of the saboteurs who were captured clearly
demonstrates that it was done on orders of the
Communist Party in Maracaibo. And this
week we had the spectacular boat highjacking
by several Communists, a publicity stunt, pure
and simple.
Throughout this campaign the democratic
government of President Betancourt has dem-
onstrated determination and an ability to deal
with the situation. Press accounts have per-
haps given outsiders an exaggerated impression
of the Caracas scene, where life goes on pretty
calmly. I am reminded of the popular impres-
sion of Chicago in the early thirties, an im-
pression greatly exaggerated, for I lived there
and like millions of others never came close
to a shooting.
In Pei"u we have another dramatic example
of the increasing tempo of Communist-inspired
subversion and violence. For the past several
months, in an agricultural area of the Andean
Department of Cuzco, Communist agitators,
many of whom were trained in Cuba, have been
able to foment an armed peasant dissident
movement that has been responsible for the
forceful seizure of lands, armed attacks, and
considerable bloodshed. Last December, Castro
Commmiist agitators subverted a strike at the
smelter of the American-owned Cerro Corpo-
ration at La Oroya in the central Andes, seized
control of the installation, and caused about
$4 million worth of damage. Early in January,
following a strike that had been settled between
the management and the legitimate trade union
leaders. Communist agitators persuaded work-
ers on two Peruvian-owned sugar plantations,
near Chiclayo on the north coast, to damage in-
stallations and fire cane fields — about a million
dollars of damage in all. These were the most
MARCH 11, 1963
355
dramatic cases, but there were many other cases
of Castro Communist-fomented incidents by
workers, peasants, and students.
In the face of this growing pattern of Com-
munist-inspired violence and subversion, the
Peruvian Government on January 5 cracked
down on the Communists and Castroists, ar-
resting about a thousand of them. The Govern-
ment announced at the same time the discovery
of a Castro Communist plot, masterminded
from abroad, of which these incidents were
only the first steps in what was to be an increas-
ing rhythm of disorder, terrorism, and revolu-
tionary activity. After screening those ar-
rested, the authorities have announced that they
plan to bring to trial 212 persons.
In Brazil there have been periodic instances
of violence in the Northeast during the past year
or so, several of which have been directly or
indirectly linked to the Peasant Leagues led by
Francisco Juliao. Communist involvement in
this activity has been indicated. Among other
things local police officials discovered a large
number of pamphlet translations of "Che"
Guevara's booklet on guerrilla warfare.
Persistent reports of smuggling and stock-
ing of arms have also been received. In one
recent instance, a cache of arms was reportedly
seized at Dianopolis in a remote region of the
State of Goias and some 26 persons arrested
for alleged subversive activity. In another in-
stance, Rio de Janeiro police arrested one Clo-
domir Santos do Morais, a lawyer for the
Peasant Leagues, while he was transporting a
clandestine shipment of arms from Rio to the
interior. Morais was also in possession of the
calling card of a Soviet diplomat assigned to
Brazil — which card reportedly bore an inscrip-
tion from the diplomat to Juliao. Finally,
there is the well-publicized instance of the doc-
uments found in the crashed Varig airliner
outside Lima — documents which are said to con-
tain detailed reports of activities in Brazil to
give guerrilla training in connection with
peasant violence. The dociunents reportedly
reveal that these activities, although relatively
small scale and inefficiently executed, received
the help and guidance of Cuba.
In Colombia we witness a continuation of the
violence which has plagued that country for a
decade. I mention this only to point out that
this violence is not primarily Communist-
inspired or -directed, although there is reason
to believe they are attempting to take advan-
tage of the situation. Violence in Colombia
is banditry rather than insurgency.
To he continued.
U.S. Demands Cuba Explain
Attack on Fishing Vessel
Following is the text of a U.S. note deliv-
ered to the Cuban government on February 21
by the Swiss Embassy at Habana.
Press release 98 dated February 22
At approximately 5 : 35 p.m. February 20,
1963, two MIG military aircraft having Cuban
markings, one cari-ying the number 38 on its
fuselage, deliberately fired upon a disabled pri-
vate United States shrimp boat named the Ala,
at coordinates 24 degrees 03 minutes North, 80
degrees 20 minutes West. This location is in
the Florida Straits about sixty nautical miles
from the nearest point on the Cuban mainland.
Upon arrival of six United States Navy air-
craft at the scene of the attack, these two Cuban
military aircraft as well as other Cuban MIG
military aircraft that had subsequently joined
them departed toward the South. The United
States destroyer Kretchmer was dispatched and
rescued the Ala's two United States citizen
crewmen.
The Government of the United States pro-
tests this unprovoked and willful attack on the
high seas upon an unarmed and disabled pri-
vate United States fishing vessel and upon
United States citizens by Cuban military air-
craft. This flagrant and deliberate violation
of international law warrants prompt and un-
equivocal explanation from the Cuban Gov-
ernment.
The Government of Cuba is informed that
the Government of the United States will take
those measures necessary to protect the life and
property of its nationals on the high seas
against such attacks.
356
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTILLETIN
U.S. Position on U.N. Special Fund Project in Cuba
STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY RUSK,
FEBRUARY 13
~ First Statement ■
The United States regrets that the U.N.
Special Fund and the Food and Agriculture
Organization have determined to proceed even
on a tentative basis with the project to assist the
expansion of an agricultural research station in
Cuba. When the project was approved by the
Governing Council of the Special Fund in May
1961, the United States clearly expressed its
view that conditions in Cuba ruled out such as-
sistance. Developments in Cuba since May
1961, such as public declarations by Cuban offi-
cials attributing the chaotic agi'icultural situa-
tion in Cuba to gross governmental mismanage-
ment and workers' apathy, have confirmed the
validity of our original objection. In addition,
the massive influx of Communist technicians
late last year raises the question as to the prior-
ity need of more technicians in Cuba.
The United States has reiterated its opposi-
tion on many occasions and believes the validity
of its objections will be documented by events.
The persistent policy of hostility toward its
neighbors pursued by the Cuban government,
and its support for subversion throughout the
hemisphere, preclude establishment of those
normal cooperative relations necessary for the
implementation of a United Nations project.
Second Statement '
This case has been in front of the Special
Fund now for I think almost 2 years. It in-
volves a research program spread out over a
period of years, looking eventually toward the
diversification of agriculture of Cuba. Our
representatives in the Special Fimd have op-
posed this particular project from the begin-
ning. We have not had the board of some 18
nations — we have not had the necessary votes to
defeat this particular project. But I think you
ought to imderstand why this could be so.
Wlien the Special Fimd was first set up several
years ago, it was on the basis that it would act
on purely technical grounds and that it would
not consider political objections to actions to be
taken.
Now, in our case, this had opened the way for
Special Fund aid to a number of countries, such
as South Korea, Nationalist China, South Viet-
Nam, Israel, against whom formidable political
opposition could be mobilized in a body which
would require, I think it was, a three-fourths
vote.'
Now here's a case in Cuba where we strongly
object on political grounds, quite frankly, be-
cause of the aggressive attitude which Cuba has
taken toward its own neighbors in the hemi-
sphere, as well as on teclmical grounds because
we do not see in Cuba the conditions which
would make this kind of research project pro-
ductive. The governing board of the Special
Fund decided otherwise, and the Director of the
Fund has no real choice, I think, but to do what
the board of directors instructed him to do.
But my guess is that there is still a consider-
able time gap between what may be decided now
and the operation of this particular project in
' Read to news correspondents at Washington, D.C.,
by Lincoln White, Director of the Ofl3ce of News.
' Made during a question-and-answer period following
an address by the Secretary at a regional foreign policy
briefing conference at Los Angeles in reply to the
question : "The United Nations Fund has made a loan
to Cuba. Does the U.S. endorse the use of U.N. funds
for this purpose?" For text of the Secretary's address,
see Bulletin of Mar. 4, 1963, p. 311.
• The Secretary intended to say two-thirds.
MARCH 11, 1963
357
Cuba, because it is by no means clear that the
situation in Cuba can in fact let this project go
forward.
STATEMENT BY RICHARD N. GARDNER,
FEBRUARY 18 «
I am here today at your invitation to discuss
the United Nations Special Fund project in
Santiago de las Vegas, Cuba. In order to un-
derstand that project, it may be useful to recall
a bit of background.
The Special Fund, as you know, was estab-
lished by the United Nations at the initiative
of the United States. The U.S. proposal for
a Special Fund was presented originally in 1957
by Congressman Walter Judd, who was serv-
ing as one of the U.S. delegates to the 12th
session of the General Assembly. A resolution
embodying the U.S. proposal in all its essential
aspects was unanimously adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly on December 14, 1957.^*
In 1958, in his letter of transmittal^ accom-
panying the annual report by the President to
the Congress on U.S. participation in the U.N.,
President Eisenliower wrote :
Economic development was the subject of one of the
outstanding United Nations achievements of 1958 — the
establishment by the General Assembly of the Special
Fund, originally proposed by the United States.
The establishment of the Special Fund is thus a
significant step forward in the perennial efforts of
the United Nations to relieve hunger, disease and ig-
norance. I am especially gratified that it begins its
life under the able guidance of Paul G. Hoffman of
the United States, its first Managing Director.
The General Assembly Resolution 1240
(XIII) establishing the Special Fund^ pro-
vides that assistance by the Fmid "shall not be
a means of foreign economic and political inter-
ference in the internal affairs of the country
. . . concerned and shall not be accompanied
by any conditions of a political nature."
1
' Made before the Subcommittee on International
Organizations of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. Mr. Gardner is Deputy Assistant Secretary
for International Organization Affairs.
^ For background and text of Resolution 1219 (XII),
see Bulletin of Jan. 13, 1958, p. 57.
' For text, see iUd., Aug. 24, 1959, p. 287.
' For text, see ibid., Nov. 3, 1958, p. 709.
358
This provision embodies a principle of alii
United Nations economic assistance which hasi
been supported by the United States through
the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Ken-
nedy administrations. It has assured the in-
tegrity of the Special Fund in a number of
cases, such as a project for the Republic of
China approved over Soviet objections and a.
project for Israel approved over the objections i
of an Arab coimtry.
The Special Fund makes grants for "pre-
investment" jirojects in less developed countries.
These projects are of three kinds : resource sur-
veys and feasibility studies; manpower train-
ing; and research designed to promote better
use of local resources, better marketing, higher
productivity, and improved management. All
these are called "preinvestment" projects be-
cause they are designed to provide the "seed
money" to confirm and enlarge the possibilities
for public and private investment.
How the Fund Operates
The Special Fund is directed by a Governing
Council composed of the representatives of 18
states, half from the developed countries, half
from the less developed countries. I have here
a table ^ showing the composition of the Coimcil
in May 1961 (when the project in Cuba was
approved) and at present which I should like
to have included in the record at the end of my
statement. The Governing Council normally
meets twice a year and exercises the immediate
policy control over the operations of the Special
Fund, including approval of projects.
The Managing Director of the Special Fund,
Paul Hoffman, has the responsibility for the
operation of the Fmid with the sole authority
to recommend to the Governing Council proj-
ects submitted by govermnents.
Since the Special Fund began operations on
January 1, 1959, the Governing Council has
approved 288 projects costing the Fund $253,-
928,400. A further $335 million in local sup-
port comes from the recipient governments.
The Special Fund is financed by voluntary
contributions. Tlie United States contributes
40 percent of the total actually contributed to
the Fund, not counting the local resources made
inil
' Not printed here.
DEPABTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
livailable for projects by recipient governments.
In other words, for every $2 put up by the
Jnited States, other contributors put up $3 and
the recipient countries put up some $6 worth of
leir own resources.
ackground of Cuban Project
The Special Fmid project in Cuba was ap-
""• proved by tlie Governing Comicil in May 1961.
, This project, for which the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization is the executing agency, calls
for an allocation of $1,157,000 from the Special
Fund (including $114,500 which will be paid by
Cuba in cash) to assist in the expansion of an
agricultural experimental station in Santiago
de las Vegas, Cuba. $763,500 of the $1,157,000
is for experts ; $50,000 for fellowships ; $200,000
for equipment; $45,600 for miscellaneous ex-
penses; and $98,500 for the overhead cost of
FAO.
The research work involved here is to con-
centrate on livestock production, soil classifica-
tion, conservation, and crop diversification.
The project is intended to last for 5 years, and
the Cuban government is to make available as
a counterpart contribution of personnel, serv-
ices, land, and buildings, the equivalent of
$1,878,000. No U.S. dollars, personnel, mate-
rials, or services will be used in the project.
The United States opposed this project when
it was put up for approval in May 1961 ; we
have reiterated our opposition on several occa-
sions since; we are still opposed. Our policy
toward Cuba involves opposition to any source
of aid and comfort to the present regime. We
pursue this policy in the United Nations and
elsewhere by all means available to us.
You will be familiar now with the details of
our objections to this project, objections which
we believe are justified by the technical, eco-
nomic, and organizational criteria of the U.N.
Special Fund — the flight of qualified personnel
from Cuba ; the wanton slaughter of cattle and
misuse of other agi-icultural resources; the in-
flux of Communist technicians dedicated to im-
posing on Cuba the tried and c^e.sproven theories
of Communist agi'iculture; the statements of
Cuban government officials themselves attesting
to the chaos in the Cuban coimtryside and the
lethargy among the Cuban farmers. I have
with me the statement made by our representa-
tive [Philip M. Klutznick] in the Governing
Council in May 1961 expressing our opposition
to the project on these and other grounds, and I
should like to place that in the record at the
conclusion of my statement.^
These objections, in our view, add up to a
very important principle : We believed in May
of 1961 and we believe now that the Cuban gov-
ernment has so STibordinated the economic and
social welfare of the Cuban people to the nar-
row political aims of the present leadership
that the minimum standards of efficiency and
effectiveness which must guide the implementa-
tion of cooperative development projects —
whether within the U.N. system or without —
cannot possibly be met.
Separation of Technical and Political
The basis of international cooperation under
the United Nations in the field of development
must rest on some reasonable separation of
teclmical considerations and political considera-
tions. However, the United States did not
introduce political considerations into this mat-
ter; the Cuban government did. The Cuban
government deliberately set out to erase the line
between teclmical doctrine and political doc-
trine in the field of agriculture. While the
charter of the Special Fund provides that aid
may not be accompanied by conditions of a po-
litical nature, an obligation cleai-ly exists to take
account of all circumstances, including political,
wliich affect the economic feasibility of the
project under consideration.
One of our problems has been the opinion of
many members of the U.N. that we are attach-
ing more importance to this project than it
deserves : a few thousand dollars of laboratory
equipment, some books and visual aid equip-
ment, a few fellowships and experts in such
fields as plant pathology, grasslands manage-
ment, and horticulture are not going to affect
the economy of Cuba for at least 5 years. But
the principle is one on which we must insist —
and will continue to insist in the case of this
project and any others of a similar nature which
may come up for consideration in the future.
The necessary one-third of the votes to block
the project when it was first considered in 1961
MARCH 11, 1963
359
was not forthcoming; the necessary two-thirds
vote which would have subsequently forced a
reconsideration was also absent. This lack of
support did not stem from any consideration
for Cuba, but rather from fears that if this
project were stopped it might jeopardize other
projects of close concern to some members. It
should be remembered that the Special Firnd
has 11 projects totaling $7.5 million in Korea,
Taiwan, and Viet-Nam which the Soviets do
not support — and which are being carried out
today over their misgivings.
Since the Governing Council authorized the
Cuban project, Paul Hoffman, as Managing
Director of the Fund, lias no real choice but
to do what his board of directors instructed
him to do. Our guess is that there is still a
considerable time gap between Mr. Hoffman's
decision to go forward with the preliminary
phase of the project, subject to a review of its
feasibility, and the actual operation of the proj-
ect in Cuba because it is by no means clear that
the situation in Cuba will, in fact, allow the
project to go forward.
Excellent Record of Special Fund
I believe that our stand in this matter will
be salutary in the long rim. Meanwhile I hope
the excellent record of the Special Fund, from
our point of view, over the past few years will
not be eclipsed in the public mind by this single
action. The Special Fund has been a great
asset for the free world through its efforts to
promote the material basis for free institutions.
Even on the narrowest of political calculations
the free world has got more out of the Special
Fmid than it has put in, while the reverse is
ti"ue of the Communist bloc. The bloc coun-
tries have contributed some $7 million to the
Special Fund; with this project in Cuba added
to two previous projects in Poland they will
have received $3 million in return. If you add
Yugoslavia, Communist contributions add up
to $8 million, projects in Communist countries
to $6 million. Out of the 288 Special Fund
projects so far authorized, 282 have been in non-
Communist countries. In financial terms, some
^
$248 million of the grand total of $254 million
of Fund projects — over 97 percent — ^go to the
non-Conununist world.
I also hope this project in Cuba will notjl
obscure the great usefulness of the United I ijjcfj
Nations to the U.S. national interest in promot-
ing peace and freedom in recent years. In the
Congo the U.N. played a vital role in thwarting
Communist penetration and restoring law and
order. In the Cuban crisis the United Nations-
proved of unique value to the free world as a
forum to expose the Communist conspiracy and!
as a center of negotiation to remove Soviet
offensive weapons once the power and deter-
mination of the U.S. and its allies had been
demonstrated in the quarantine. And when
Cuba rejected on-site inspection by the U.N.,
this helped to put an international label of out-
law on the Castro regime.
Letters of Credence
Chile
The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re-
public of Chile, Sergio Gutierrez-Olivos, pre-
sented his credentials to President Kennedy on
February 21. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see Depart-
ment of State press release 94 dated February
21.
Guinea
The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re-
public of Guinea, Karim Bangoura, presented
his credentials to President Kennedy on Feb-
ruary 21. For texts of the Ambassador's re-
marks and the President's reply, see Department
of State press release 95 dated February 21.
Switzerland
The newly appointed Ambassador of Switzer-
land, Alfred Zelmder, presented his credentials
to President Kennedy on February 21. For
texts of tlie Ambassador's remarks and the Pres-
ident's reply, see Department of State press
release 96 dated February 21.
360
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Secretary Rusk Holds Press and Radio News Briefing at Los Angeles
Secretary Rush^ who was in Los Angeles on
ehruary 13 for a regional foreign policy con-
ference, held a press and radio news briefing
at the Biltmore Hotel that day. Following a
brief introduction by Robert J. Manning, As-
™ distant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, the
briefing proceeded as follows.
Press release 90 dated February 18
Secretary Rusk : I do want to express my ap-
preciation to the Los Angeles World Affairs
Council, to Town Hall, and to a number of dis-
tinguished citizens here who have made the re-
gional conference which we have been holding
possible. I'm looking forward to the closing
meeting this evening.^
I will have to say to you that I have been
away from "both tickers and cables for about
24 hours and there may be one or two points
on which I am not quite up to date, but I will
be glad to have yom- questions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you would ex-
plain to lis why it is seemingly proper for us
to have missile bases in Turkey and Italy but
improper for the Soviet Government to have
them in Cuba.
A. Well, the military establishment of
NATO is directly related to the military
establishment of the Soviet Union. Now, back
in 1946, we had no allies, except those that
were formed to defeat Germany and Japan.
And those alliances were expected to disappear.
Now, the pressures by the Soviet Union into
the free world against Western Europe in such
areas as Greece, the seizure of Czechoslovakia,
the Berlin blockade — all these pressures alerted
the free world to the fact that they must or-
' For text of an address made by Secretary Rusk at
the regional conference that evening, see BtJUJErrN of
Mar. 4, 1963, p. 311.
ganize themselves for their own defense. This
gave birth to NATO.
Now, the military problem of NATO is di-
rectly related to the military establishment of
the Soviet Union. So that the question of bases
has to do with what is on the other side. The
Soviet Union has bases that are looking down
the throat of Western Europe and other neigh-
bors, and if those areas are to be protected it
means that armed force must be available in
those areas. So there is no connection between
the necessity for NATO bases in NATO and
the intrusion of missile bases into this hemi-
sphere.
The Question of Cuba
Q. Mr. Secretary, about Cuba, is the political
criticism, the current criticism concemimg Cuba,
actually forcing a change of administration
policy?
A. Well, I think that the type of discus-
sion not only is inevitable but important, but
I don't believe that the main lines of policy
can be affected by the day-to-day debate that
goes on. The Cuban story is a long story, and
there is plenty of room in it for all sorts of
partisan debate. It goes back many years.
But this is not the point these days. We, the
United States, have a serious problem with re-
spect to Cuba. Now, we can look back tlirough
two administrations and find that other steps
might have been taken or that something might
have been done differently that might have
made that situation different than it is today.
But this is something in which we are all in-
volved.
Now, the Cuban question poses a problem
for the United States, its allies in the hemi-
sphere, its allies in NATO. As far as the hemi-
sphere is concerned, there is, I think, today
MAKCH 11, 1963
677069—63 3
861
more than ever, a deep realization of what Cuba
means to the hemisphere. Tliis solidarity and
unanimity of the hemisphere with respect to
missiles last fall = is a clear indication of tliis.
The action being taken in the various countries
of the hemisphere, both individually and joint-
ly, to move in on any kind of subversive activi-
ties that come out of Cuba is another sign of
this concern.
The isolation of Cuba that is growing, eco-
nomically, psychologically, politically, is part
of the general campaign to make it clear that
Cuba is not going to be permitted to be a base
for aggression in this hemisphere, that Castro-
ism is not an answer to the understandable
demands of the people of the hemisphere for
economic and social advancement, and that this
intrusion of this hemisphere from outside can-
not be accepted by the hemisphere as an object
of policy.
Q. But is the criticism, domestically in the
United States — is it forcing a speedup or
change in administration policy?
A. No, because the administration itself is
as much concerned about Cuba as anybody else
in the coimtry. This is the important point.
And we—
Q. Mr. Rush—
A. — and we imdertook — President Kennedy
undertook — the gravest decisions last October
because of the large risk that was suddenly
appearing in the buildup in Cuba. This is not
something on which there is a proper partisan
difference on the object. The question is what
is the wisest to do and how can the result be
accomplished in a world that is full of danger.
Q. Mr. Secretary —
A. Yes?
Q. Wliafs your comment to the criticisTU
that we have lost the initiative that we had last
October vis-a-vis Russia in the Gubam, situa-
tion?
A. The outtraffic from Cuba is the important
thing. Last October missiles moved out, bomb-
ers moved out, some Soviet military forces
' For text of an OAS resolution of Oct. 23, see i&i(f.,
Nov. 12, 1962, p. 722.
moved out. We want to see additional Soviet
forces move out because, as I will indicate in
my remarks this evening, the presence of those
forces there cannot provide safety for Cub:
They create danger for Cuba and in tliis hemi-
sphere so long as they are there. We would liki
to see that outtrafEc continue, and we shall be
watching very carefidly the next few weeks
to see whether in fact they will continue.
Solid Foundation of Western Alliance
Q. Mr. Rush—
A. Yes?
Q. J amies Reston inahes a very strange
remarh in his colimnn today; he says, '"''The .
President is in trouble now, not because his |
major foreign policies have failed but because '.
they are succeeding.'''' He says tliat fear in
the Western Alliance has abated and without
fear a tohole new set of problems lias arisen
requiring new policies and neio criticisms.
Would you convment on that, sir?
A. Well, I think that in the longest range
sense the presence of an immediate and over-
riding common danger is a great unifying fac-
tor in the world. Now, I do think that after
the October crisis it was evident that tlie other
side had entered into a period of sobriety, that
the danger did not appear to be so intense.
Therefore we could afford to perhaps argue
among ourselves a little more. Let me illustrate
that point another way. I have been impressed
with the fact that on two critical decisions that
I knew about, participated in — the Korean deci-
sion in 1950 and the Cuban decision of last
October — that at the moment of danger there
is not nearly so much neutralism in the world
as one would suppose, that nations all over the
world do basically understand what this coun-
try is all about. They understand the differ-
ence between what this countiy is all about and
what the Soviet Union is after. And in
moments of crisis they wish us well. This
appeared in Korea; it appeared in October.
Now, when the danger has passed, then they
can return to a more — from their point of view
— -a more normal state of affairs. But I think
it is true that this discussion we are having in
the West about not whether the alliance is
cracking — there is no crack in the alliance — as
aim
ttjtls
362
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ate as October we had the clear evidence of the
Qost solid foundation there, and if the other
ide made the mistake of supposing there were
"'' :racks in the alliance, it would be the mistake
>f their lives.
But what we are doing is trying to decide how
fou write the next chapter, and all along, from
:he birth of NATO itself, the admission of
jrreece and Turkey and Germany, the discussion
)f the European Defense Community, when we
alk about liow to build tlxe next chapter, diifer-
inces among sovereign states appear and we
lave a great deal of discussion about it.
But these are going to be dissolved, and there
is no problem about the unity of the alliance in
". I the face of the threat in the Soviet Union.
Q. Sir, are you concerned at all over the con-
tinuing barrage of criticisms hy the Repiiblicans
over the Cuban policies of the administration?
Does this alarm you in any sense?
A. Oh, I think that we regularly and, shall I
■say, during the week of the Lincoln Day
speeches we are going to have some vigorous
'discussion in this country. We ought to have,
and every 2 years and every 4 years we have a
great debate in this comitry. Now, I think if
I were deeply concerned about the factor of
debate I should not be in my present post. But
what's important is that the main lines of Amer-
ican foreign policy, since 1945, have been
worked out on a bipartisan basis, both in the
Executive and in cooperation between members
of both parties in the Congress. We have a
good many Eepublicans working with us in the
present administration and in the Congress.
You remember in the 80th Congress every re-
port that came out of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee during the 80th Congi-ess came
out unanimously under the chairmanship of
Senator Vandenberg. From the foreign policy
point of view that was one of the creative Con-
gresses in our history, and on the domestic
policy people of that day had some other things
to say about the 80th Congress, but basically it is
bipartisan.
Q. Do you anticipate another period of ten-
sion such as loe experienced last October, and
do you think the world is ready to fcu;e this all
over again?
A. The situation, such as that in Cuba — and
there would be situations in other parts of the
world — is full of danger. I must say that one
does not plan to go through that kind of ex-
perience often. But there are dangers there,
and these dangers will have to be faced if they
materialize and they become a threat to the
peace of the world or to the security of the
United States.
But I would not want to predict exactly in
what way and in what fomi or when this kind
of situation may occur. We would hope, as we
always do, that the vital interest of the United
States can be protected by peaceful means.
That is the basic objective and has and must be
for any rational government in the modern
world.
Q. Do you mean puhlic sentiment is ready for
another crisis such as last fall?
A. Well, these are matters that go to the life
and death of nations. I think that this too has
to be taken into account in public discussion and
in what you call public sentiment. And these
are matters, I think, on which the role of the
President is crucial, and it's a lonely and awful
role that the President has to fill in these great
decisions of war and peace. And I would think
that the demonstration of his resoluteness last
October would be a matter of great comfort to
Americans and that they could understand that
if he felt that this country were in danger he
would act accordingly.
Administration of Foreign Aid
Q. Mr. Secretary, you/r foreign aid director,
David Bell, said today that there would he some
neio tough lines in administering foreign aid
programs. I wonder if you could describe
exactly what tough lines the administration has
in rrdnd.
A. Well, one has to be a little careful because
when we talk to our own people there are at
least three other audiences listening in — our
allies, the unalined countries, and the Soviet
bloc. But I believe myself that foreign aid, a
substantial foreign aid program, is vital to the
security and the well-being of our own country.
But I also believe that in good conscience we
have to be in a position to go to our own people
MARCH 11, 1963
363
and tell them why we are asking them to come
up with taxes to support a foreign aid bill and
to assure them that it is in fact being used for
the purposes for which the funds are provided.
Now, there are people abroad who think that
there is some mountain of gold out here in the
West out of which we can shovel out foreign
aid. It hasn't really bitten into them that we
get foreign aid money out of the taxpayers and
these include every citizen in the country.
Therefore we talk about tMs with the repre-
sentatives of the foreign countries all the time.
We can't go to our own people and ask them for
taxes for foreign aid to provide capital invest-
ments for their coimtries if their own capital is
going off to Europe or for a safe haven some-
where. We can't tax corporations at the
present time 52 percent to provide funds if their
corporations are not taxed at all or taxed 5 or
6 percent. We have got to have the basis on
which we can build.
Let's illustrate it as in the case of the Alliance
for Progress. Our total effort in the Alliance
for Progress will amount — at best will
amount — to no more than about 2 percent of the
gross national product of the countries of the
hemisphere. Now, obviously what happens to
the 98 percent will make all the difference and
what happens to the 98 percent will determine
whether the 2 percent will be of any use or not.
Therefore, when we talk about the mobiliza-
tion of local capital, sensible tax programs, a
climate that permits private investment, land
reform, education, public liealth, these things,
we are talking about how that 98 percent of
effort on their side can prepare the base to
which our 2 percent can add the marginal incre-
ments that miglit make the difference between
forward movement and the relative stagnation.
Q. In other words, sir, are you saying that
you are going to lop off some of the free riders
if they donH start to do their share P
A. Well, we have been lopping off in partic-
ular cases a number of so-called projects. We,
for obvious reasons, don't want to give wide
publicity to it because what we are tiying to do
is to achieve the result not just to crack a wliip.
Now, we have had a recent situation in which
we have temporarily — we hope temporarily —
suspended aid in the case of Ceylon because of
364
their attitude on private investment and com-
pensation for private investment.^ That has
ceased.
Now, our object here is not to stop foreign aid.
Our object is that private investment be per-
mitted to do what it can do and that foreign aid
be permitted to do what it can do. It's re-
grettable that this kind of situation develops.
But our foreign aid program can't succeed
unless there is a major opportunity for private
investment, both from the country that is being !
aided and from abroad, to make itself felt.
But when you come back to the simple sug-
gestion I made at the beginning, we do have to
be in a position, in good conscience, to go to our
own people and say, "We are asking you for
taxes for foreign aid for the following purposes,
and we are going to do evei-ything that we can
to insure that these funds achieve the purpose
for which they are intended."
That means elimination of waste; it means
the elimination of corruption ; it means getting
maximum effort by the local countries ; it means
a great many things. So Mr. Bell is moving
into what I think many people would call a
tougher line because, after 17 years of foreign
aid, incidents do occur, specific cases occur, that
throw doubt upon the entire foreign aid effort.
The War in Viet-Nam
Q. Mr. Secretary?
A. Yes, sir?
Q. Do we in effect have a '"''no win''^ policy in
South Viet-Nam, and if so, is this policy-gning
to he clmnged?
A. I would think that the last phrase that
could be used to characterize a policy in Viet-
Nam is "no win." During the past 12 to 18
months, there has been a reorganization of the
armed forces. There has been an organization
of intelligence which was never there before, an
enormous increase in the mobility of the forces,
an initiative being taken by the government
forces, a reversal of the ratios of casualties, a re-
versal in the ratio of arms captured by one side
from the other, a steady expansion of the areas
that were clearly under the control of the gov-
ernment, and I think a turning of the corner.
' lUa., Mar. 4, 1963, p. 328.
DEPARTSIENT OF STATE BULLETIN
'^ Our policy there is not that we put in dough-
"« K)ys to do eveiy bit of the job ourselves but
hat we do what we can to put the Vietnamese
ijii n a position to win their war, and they are
Pfi )eginmng to win it. It's going to be a long and
iJi iough and frustrating and mean war, as any
5 n juerrilla operation of that sort has been in the
'"(6 jast, whether in Greece or in Malaya.
« But there is no — I think it would do some
fss 10,000 or 11,000 men out there a disservice to
^ think this was a "no win" policy. They are
working with great gallantry and under great
difficulties. Aiid the Vietnamese are too.
eii
Q. Will the American soldiers be used in any
other capacities than they are being used at
5J, present?
A. We believe in the increase of the training
and effectiveness and mobility and capacity of
the Vietnamese forces that this is a problem
that so far, unless there is escalation from the
other side, this is a problem that can be handled
by the forces now in being.
Q. Mr. Secretary?
A. Yes?
Q. Would you coimnent for us in defining
what you jnean by the presence of Russian
troops posing a danger to Cuba itself? What
does that mean? And., secondly^ would you
care to say whether or not present Republican
criticism of the Govemmenfs Cuban policy
constitutes a breach of our traditional biparti-
san foreign policy?
A. Well, I thmk that, where Soviet forces
are in Cuba, this catches Cuba up into world-
wide considerations, worldwide confrontations,
which expose Cuba to that overriding confron-
tation between the Soviet Union and the free
world. I would think that Cuba would be
safer without Soviet troops than with them.
Q. You mean safer from the United States?
A. Safer in every respect, in every respect.
Q. Mr. Secretary, is the current quarrel be-
tween Russia and China good news to the West?
A. We have been very cautious about inter-
preting this split as good news. Basically the
objectives of the two sides remain the same.
They both want to bury us. There are some
MARCH 11, 1963
differences of approach, teclinique, doctrine.
There is a struggle for leadership between
Peiping and Moscow. But I think we have to
assume, for all practical purposes, that Peiping
and Moscow do depend upon each other in the
event of a major confrontation with the free
world. And I have not seen anything in this
split yet that rims counter to that.
Now, they will have — I gather that the most
recent reports are that they are expressing great
friendship toward each other in the last day or
two in connection with recent anniversaries.
But I think we just have to wait and see. There
is confusion among Communist parties in many
countries. There are some strains within the
bloc. All this is to the good. But I think we
would be guilty of a great deal of wishful think-
ing if we assume this present situation has
relieved us of many of our problems.
Flow of Information
Q. Mr. Secretary, does the Government have
criteria or does it improvise judgments with
reference to xchen a crisis requires further re-
straint of news sources and the flow of inforrfia-
tion? Are there criteria that may be made
public so we understand this process of news
management better, or is this a matter of
improvised judgment as situations develop?
A. Well, I don't know of any period except
those 5 or 6 days during the Cuban crisis be-
tween the Monday, the 15th, and Monday, the
22d of October, when we deliberately withheld
important information, because it was vitally
important that, when that information was re-
leased, the action to be taken in connection with
that information be annoimced at the same time.
There are a lot of reasons for that, but we felt
that they were very important.
In the fii'st instance, we wanted to be abso-
lutely certain that we had hard information and
the coverage of the island during that week was
complete, and we felt that when President Ken-
nedy spoke on October 22d * he did have full
and complete information about the situation
on the island.
Now, as far as the rest of it is concerned, the
secrets are almost literally nonexistent. We
' For text, see ibid., Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.
365
have a very capable and active and professional
press corps in Washington, who not only know
how to dig out information but also who Imow
what's going 011 without having to ask an of-
ficer of government at every stage because he
can read events and read what's said by various
governments and put all these things together.
There are a few technical secrets that are not
disclosed. And from day to day or week to
week, there are intergovernmental talks, private
in nature, which are not fully exposed because
to do so would frustrate the very purpose of the
talks. But policy and action in this countiy are
not secret. Tliey are public. So that I think
that, with the exception of those 6 or 7 days
there in October, this question of management
of news does not apply to the Department of
State.
Now I won't go into the question of how dif-
ficult it is to keep a secret even if you wanted
to. So I think the press is pretty well serviced.
West New Guinea
Q. The Government of Malaya today an-
nounced a military huildup in the activities of
the Indonesians. In the light of the U.S. po-
sition in the settlement of the West Irian
dispute., I wonder how you would characterise
recent Indonesian activities in North Borneo
and whether this gives you any cause to regret
our participation in the "West Irian dispute.
A. I think if those who are to take part in the
Malaysia Federation do so on a basis of consent,
as is now the case, and on the basis of arrange-
ments which are within their own jurisdiction
and control, that if anyone on the outside at-
tempts by force or threat of force to interfere
with those, this would create a very serious
problem.
Now, the West New Guinea thing, I think, is
a rather different question because there had
been hanging over since 1949 a dispute between
Indonesia and the Netherlands about West
New Guinea. There had been an original
agreement at the time of the independence of
Indonesia to negotiate that question — that is the
question of the independence of West New
Guinea during the following year. Those
negotiations never really took place seriouslj)
and never produced any result, but there was
a genuine dispute there about West New Guinea
and I think the settlement that was reaches
represented the real national policies of both
parties to that dispute. But I think the Ma-
laysian situation would be quite different.
Q. Mr. Rush, you mentioned not much pui-
licity in connection with lopping off certaiii
foreign aid projects. Is that because the De-
partment doesnH loant it to he publicized, on
because the Washington reporters donH aski
or what?
A. No, a part of it is based upon administra
tive decisions about whether a particular proj
ect is paying off. Therefore you simpl;
withdraw it. But you don't make a great to-d
about it because there are other things going o:
that are paying off and should be followed.
Q. Would that be managed news then? I,
you stop a program and don't —
A. No. For example, I don't believe that it'i
up to us. For example, if we withdraw a ma:
for incompetence, I don't think it's up to us t
announce that to everybody, that we are with-
drawing this particular aid official for incom-
petence. No one else in the country does that
when they fire somebody for incompetence. Our
Government is somewhat different, but I just
don't think it's a responsible way to conduct
public business.
Now, reporters do get into those situations
abroad and at home and a good deal of this is
known, but tliis is not a case of managed news.
It's just that it's a part of the normal operation
of government. A thousand cables go out of the
Department of State every day, and I would
suppose that 980 of those don't make up news.
Q. Mr. Rush, can the problem of British en-
try into the Common Marhet be solved as long
'IS De Gaulle remains President of France?
A. Well, I suppose that, if France continues
to take the view that Britain is not ripe for
membership in the Common Market, in a tech-
nical sense France can stop the membership of
Britain into the Common Market. But there
are vast and important trade relationships be-
ltd'
\0
iNI
lit
366
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
jFcen Britain and Europe, between ourselves
nd both of them. There are great political
orces aiming toward the miity of Europe and
he cohesion of the North Atlantic. I think all
se great movements will go forward. I
on't think that those will be lield up or stopped
y what has happened in the last month or so.
'
onduct of Foreign Policy
Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a comment
hat within yowr Department you don't have
IS much singular injiu^nce on American foreign
jolicy a^ did your jyredecessor. How do you
feel about the exercise of the actual foreign
wlicy being carried out by a number of men?
Do you believe it should take in a number of
people, or would it be easier to implement it if
f< were more singular?
A. The primary responsibility for the con-
iuct of foreign policy rests with the President.
And I feel that very strongly, and this is as it
must be and should be. The Department of
State is the President's principal arm in carry-
ing out foreign policy and is the one which
normally and usually recommends the action to
be taken in foreign policy questions.
Now, I think what is overlooked in some of
this chitchat that one hears around cocktail
parties around Washington is the enormous
mass of business that goes on in the Department
of State. I mentioned a thousand cables a day
going out, all signed by me, a thousand coming
in every day, 600 U.S. mailbags of mail going
out every day from the Department of State —
110 governments. That means that every year
for as far as you can see into the future there
will be 20 or 25 changes of government some-
where in the world and about half of those will
represent a crisis, because there are no built-in
constitutional peaceful ways of transferring
power from one hand to another in many of
these countries.
This is a business of a million passports a
year— $20 billion of trade. This is the stuff
and substance of foreign policy. And there is
no question about the role of the Department of
State and its dedicated activity in conducting
foreign policy. I'm not, I must say, I'm not
concerned about some of tliis chitchat.
MARCH 11, 196 3
Negotiations for Test Ban Treaty
Q. Mr. Secretary, are you as optimistic about
the possibility of a test ban treaty as you were
a month ago?
A. "Well, that would draw from me a con-
fession as to how optimistic I was a month ago.
There was some prospect that, when the Soviet
Union accepted the ])rinciple of on-site inspec-
tion, a way might be opened for negotiations
leading to a test ban treaty. We had a series of
discussions on that in New York and Washing-
ton.= Those were called off, and the discussions
are now moved to Geneva. I would like to
refer you to the transcript of my last press con-
ference in Washington ° on this point, because
it's rather a long story.
But we cannot ourselves become engaged in a
test ban treaty wliich depends upon trust or
faith. In this sense the argument between us
and the Soviet Union is somewhat one-sided,
because from their point of view they don't
need a lot of inspections in the United States.
We are an open society. We would find it very
difficult to test in secret. They have means of
finding out whether we test in secret. So that
they are willing to rely upon what they call
national means of detection, which means 98
percent the fact that we are an open society and
their friends and they can move around pretty
freely in this country. We can't do this in this
vast area in the Eurasian landmass that is closed
generally to free travel, much of it miinhabited,
where things can go on in secret.
So we need the mechanisms of assurance.
One of the reasons we have confidence in a lot
of our arrangements is that there are tecliniques
for being sure that you can have confidence.
We have bank examiners, for example. Now, if
we have adequate arrangements for relying
upon a combination of people and instruments
to assure us that underground tests are not be-
ing carried on, then we can have a test ban
treaty and perhaps gradually over time some
element of confidence can be built upon those
arrangements. Confidence cannot be built upon
blind faith or trust in this stage of our relations
with the Soviet Union. So this is the argument.
° For background, see iiid., Feb. 11, 1963, p. 198, and
Feb. 18, 1963, p. 236.
" For text, see ibid., Feb. 18, 1963, p. 235.
367
They seem to feel that, by accepting on-site
inspections in principle, they have given us
a political concession that ought to make us
happy. But this is not the point. Wliat we
need is some basis for assuring ourselves and
the rest of the world tliat tests are not being
conducted, and this depends upon tlie technical
arrangements that are possible to give you as-
surance that such tests do not occur. Otherwise
there would be recurring waves of suspicion
rolling around the rest of the world that would
be unmanageable and would eat into the possi-
bilities of any decent relationships between the
Soviet Union and the rest.
I have time, I'm afraid, for just one or two
more questions.
Q. May I get one in, please?
A. Yes.
Q. I want to talk about Mr. de Gaulle. Are
we going to oppose, are we going to fight him,
or are toe going to accept his plan for Europe?
A. Well, I don't think we have in front of us
any plan for Europe —
Q. Ohviously he wants to rule Europe.
A. — and we certaiuly are not engaged in any
pointed and personal controversy with Presi-
dent de Gaulle. Wliat we intend to do is pro-
ceed on course as far as we are concerned with
France and other European countries. On most
questions there will be cooperation. There will
be some questions on which there is a difference.
We will consult our friends across the Atlantic
about how best to proceed on those questions
in which there is a difference. But this is not
something that splits evei-ybody wide open and
apart from each other. There are too many op-
portunities, and necessities, for cooperation to
put it on that basis.
Now, we have had some disagreements and
some disappointments about the Common Mar-
ket discussions. We shouldn't gloss those over.
But there are a lot of other things that are also
in this picture, and overhanging them is what's
going on beyond the Iron Curtain. And the
important thing is that the free world remain
united on those issues, and on those issues I
think the free world is united.
368
Q. Mr. Rush, the Republican spokesmen con
tinue, sir, to imply that Robert Kennedy spolt
with a forked tongue when he said the Presiden
could not have called off air strikes at the Bay o
Pigs because no strikes had been ordered. Now
you were privy to decisions taken by the Na
tional Security Council. Whafs the straigh
of this?
A. Oh, I think that you left out some adjec *
tives there. The Attorney General referred t(
U.S. air strikes. Also, I think there must havi
been some impression around in some quarters
looking at some of the comments, that somehow i,
the Attorney General was trying to claim somt
partisan advantage in this. I don't know ol'
any member of the administration who has
claimed any partisan advantage from the Baj
of Pigs.
Thank you.
Q. Thank you, sir.
U.S. and U.K. Hold Further Talks
To Implement Nassau Agreement
Department Statement
Press release 89 dated February 16
In furtherance of the agreement reached ai
Nassau on December 21 between the Presideni
and the Prime Minister ,i officials of the Unite
States and the United Kingdom are continuing
the process of consultation and negotiation
looking toward the full implementation of the
agreement reached at Nassau.
Initial conversations have been held in both
Washington and London, and further talks are
now scheduled for Washington starting Mon-
day, February 18, 1963.
It is expected that the present talks will cover
various aspects of the agreement, particularly
those of immediate bilateral interest such as
the sale of Polaris missiles to the British Gov-
ernment and the initial assignment of forces
to NATO by both Governments.
^ For texts of a joint communique and a statement
on nuclear defense systems, see Bulletin of Jan. 14,
1963, p. 43.
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of
hate for European Affairs, will represent the
I{.S. Government. Jolm McNaughton, Gen-
|al Counsel of the Department of Defense, will
'e as his deputy. Representatives from the
tomic Energy Commission will also partici-
ite in the meetings. The United Kingdom
|ill be represented by Denis A. Greenhill,
lister of the British Embassy.
The talks are expected to last about a week.
fnder Secretary Ball Interviewed
''Issues and Answers"
Following is the transcript of an interview
nth Under Secretary Ball on the American
Woadcasting Comiiany^s radio and tel^ision
rogram '•''Issues and Answers'''' on February 10.
ress release 76 dated February 11
The Announcer: From Washington, "Issues
nd Answers" brings you the Under Secretary
if State, the Honorable George W. Ball.
Secretary Ball, here are the issues.
Do we believe Premier Khrushchev's claim
hat Soviet troops are in Cuba only to train
Cubans ?
How can we save the Western alliance ?
Will we solve our crisis with Canada?
Now for the answers to the issues from Under
Secretary of State George W. Ball. Here to
interview Secretary Ball are ABC commentator
Edward P. Morgan, and with the first question,
ABC State Department correspondent John
Scali.
New'Government in Iraq
Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, welcome to "Issues
and Answers."
Let's start off with a question wliich is in the
headlines only a few hours. There are reports
that there is still fighting going on in Baghdad
between Iraqi rebels and the diehard supporters
of Premier Qasim. What do we know about
what is going on ? Have the rebels really won
this fight?
Mr. Ball: Well, of course we are getting re-
ports by the hour and almost by the minute.
The indications so far are that the fight is prob-
ably pretty close to over, that the new govern-
ment is establishing order, that it will probably
be able to survive and to establish itself effec-
tively. It is always difficult to make these judg-
ments at an early state. It has many problems,
but I think there is a very good chance that it
will be an effective government of Iraq.^
Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, from what we can
gather, did President Nasser of the U.A.R.
[United Arab Republic] inspire or support this
revolt ?
Mr. Ball: No, that doesn't appear to be the
situation. I would suppose that this govern-
ment is likely to be friendly to President Nas-
ser, but the indications are that this is a nation-
alist government inspired by nationalist senti-
ments. It springs from the support of the
Ba'ath Party, and while it is friendly and prob-
ably will be friendly to the U.A.R., I wouldn't
think one would regard it as a U.A.R.-inspired
government.
Mr. Morgan: Realizing we can't make hard
projections so early, nevertheless this may mean
a new realinement of forces in the Far East.
How do you see that, and how do you see it
affecting our important ally, Israel?
Mr. Ball: All the appearances would suggest
that this is an anti-Communist government,
that the Communists are very unhappy with
what has now taken place. Premier Qasim's
government, as you know, had been moving
from neutralism more and more toward com-
munism. This would appear to be a movement
back in the other direction. So to the extent
that it is a nationalist government, that it is an
anti-Communist government, to the extent that
it will be able to keep order within the country,
these are all good omens. I would hope also
that it will not have aggressive intentions.
There are no indications that it will.
Putting Cuba in Perspective
Mr. Morgan : We still have a persistent head-
line situation in another part of the world.
You may be fed up with it at this point, but it
"For text of a Department statement of Feb. 11 on
U.S. recognition of the Government of Iraq, see Bulle-
tin of Mar. 4, 1963, p. 316.
MAKCH 11, 1963
369
comes out — Cuba. And developments today, as
I understand it from looking at the wire, sur-
round a charge or a demand by Senator [Hugh]
Scott, a Republican from Pennsylvania, that
we get the Soviet troops out of Cuba, and a
reply by the other Senator from Pennsylvania,
Senator [Joseph S.] Clark, a Democrat, an
administration sujjporter, that if we attempted
to deliver on Mr. Scott's demands it would get
us into World War III. Do you have any
comment from your spot?
Mr. Ball: You know I think it is time that we
really tried to get this Cuban problem in some
perspective. The President has been very clear
on the situation in Cuba. Again and again he
has stated the views and the position of the
administration.
Tlie Secretary of Defense, Mr. [Eobert S.]
McNamara, in 2 hours on television the other
night [February 6] went as far as he could to
give the full facts, as they are known, to the
American people. He went even further than
many of our people in the intelligence commu-
nity would have liked to have seen him go be-
cause of the possible compromise of some intel-
ligence mechanisms.
Now I don't think that the American people
need be concerned about the resolution or the
determination of the President of the United
States to defend the national interests, the vital
interests, of this coimtry when he has hard facts
which indicate they are seriously in danger. I
would have supposed we got over that last Oc-
tober, and I must say I think it is a little bit
extraordinary that we keep on hectoring one
another over this Cuban problem. The facts
are on the table. They have been told as com-
pletely as they could have been told. The
President of the United States couldn't be
clearer. The determination of the President of
the United States has been made manifest in a
way which seems to me goes beyond all possi-
bility of challenge. Now why can't we leave it
that way and behave in a mature way ?
If anyone gets any evidence that there is some
offensive buildup in Cuba, or the presence of
offensive weapons, or some change in the mili-
tary situation, the Defense Department is ready
to receive that evidence, to subject it to the crit-
ical test of the whole inteUigence community,
itics ] f'
r
Deii
and to evaluate it and give it some informe(
judgment as to whether it makes any sense o:
not. But all these voluntary intelligence gath
erers who would rather make speeches thai
turn the information over to the Govemmeniii p
where it could be seriously considered — I don''
think they serve the national interests verj
well.
Mr. Morgan: Do you see a tinge of politics
here?
Mr. Ball: You know I am in the State
partment, and we never make conaments or
anytliing having to do with poUtics.
Mr. Soali: Mr. Secretary, much of the cur-
rent debate centers around the continued pres-
ence in Cuba, as you well know, of the 17,000-
odd Soviet troops. Did Mr. Rusk get anj
encouraging word from Ambassador [Anatolij
F.] Dobrynin when he discussed tliis with him
yesterday ?
Mr. Ball: Secretary Rusk did talk with
Ambassador Dobrynin about this problem,
This is a matter of some continuing communica-
tions between ourselves and the Soviet Govern-
ment. We will see how things develop.
Mr. Scali: Do we believe Premier Khru-
shchev when he says, as he did to the Canadian
publisher Mr. [Roy] Thomson yesterday in
Moscow, that Soviet troops and personnel are
in Cuba only for the purpose of training Cubans
in the use of advanced Soviet weapons?
Mr. Ball: Well, I thought President Ken-
nedy in liis last press conference [February 7]
stated veiy fully our own appraisal of the sit-
uation, and I don't think there is any purpose
to be served by my trying to amplify it.
Mr. Morgan: Secretary Ball, still on this
subject, reporters and sometimes diplomats look
better in liindsight than in foresight. Would
you say in all candor that it would have been
better for the administration, instead of wait-
ing until it was, as you put it, "hectored" by an
opposition to put out this 2 hours of intelligence
last week with Secretary McNamara — it would
have been better voluntarily to have done it
weeks or months ago?
Mr. Ball: You know we have tried to be as
candid and as open with the American people
on this issue as the national interests allowed.
The decision by the President to have Secretary
370
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
C9
iflUlK
■Ids
"'"'H !cNamara make the demonstration to the
merican people wliich he made last week was
le which was not taken easily because, as I
,y, it went beyond what we would have liked
have done from the point of view of preserv-
g intact our whole intelligence-gathering
jparatus. But I am not at all sure that there
much that could have been done before this.
Politi jTe have, as I say, at all times tried to tell the
lets as we saw them.
Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, the continued
resence of Soviet troops in Cuba, of course,
a matter of concern for the entire hemisphere.
*ci ]!ould you tell us whether there are any plans
pn 3 go to the Organization of American States
?,i 0 get the other American Republics to go on
t ai he record again speaking unitedly in demand-
itoli Qg the withdrawal of these Soviet forces?
1 lii Mr. Ball: Well, you know the resolutions that
?ere passed by the Organization of American
wit states in October ^ were very clear so far as the
Jen uestion of offensive weapons was concerned,
m md we are in constant communication with the
m jovernments of the member states of the Or-
ganization of American States. We will see
luj low it develops. I think now is perhaps an
jj, accasion when we ought to stop talking so much
, j ibout this and let the situation be watched as it
is being watched on a day-by-day basis — but let
it develop.
The State Department and Public Support
Mr. Morgan: Mr. Secretary, I would like to
open up another line for a minute. Tlie State
Department historically is an orphan, almost,
in terms of public support or support within the
Government. You don't have many constitu-
ents. But rarely has there been a time, I think,
when the State Department has been so criti-
cally examined in the press, and perhaps within
the administration in some respects, than it is
now. It is being blamed, or members of it are
being blamed, for the Skybolt hassle with Brit-
ain, to a degree, Mr. de Gaulle's negative atti-
tude toward Britain in particular, and us in
general vis-a-vis Europe.
We have a situation with Canada that has
caused critics to say that the State Department
^ For text of a resolution adopted by the OAS Council
on Oct. 23, see iUd.., Nov. 12, 1962, p. 722.
was very hasty in ventilating this trouble with
the Diefenbaker government, and also the effec-
tiveness of people like Secretary Rusk and your-
self as Under Secretary has also been ques-
tioned.
Wliat is the reason for this, and do you think
that the press is remiss, itself, in any of this?
Mr. Ball: You know, I wouldn't like to chal-
lenge your qualifications as a historian —
Mr. Morgan: I am not pretending to be.
Mr. Ball: — but to say this criticism is greater
than it has ever been may, I think, somewhat
overstate the situation. It is characteristic of
Foreign Offices around the world for some of
the reasons you state — they don't have constitu-
ents— ^to be subject to a good deal of criticism.
At the moment we live in a period when inter-
national affairs mean more to us than they have
ever meant before because they mean life or
death for the whole civilization of which we
are a part. And I think people are very pre-
occupied with them and the issues are more
complex and there are more nations to deal with
and there are more responsibilities which the
United States has assiuned throughout the
world. It is a very good thing that the Ameri-
can people are concerned with how well their
State Department is doing because it is so vital
to them.
I can only say this, that I am not a career
diplomat, myself. I came into the State De-
partment from outside. Most of my career has
been in private life. I have never met a more
dedicated or more competent body of men than
the men I have encountered in the State Depart-
ment. I am enonnously impressed with it. I
am enormously impressed by the way they go on
year after year, serving their country in very
difficult and complicated endeavors and, being
subjected to this criticism, not being more un-
happy about it.
I don't think the criticism is important until
it reaches the point where it may hurt our con-
duct of foreign policy. I don't think it has
reached that point.
Now there are obvious reasons why there can
be differences of view about how these very
complex and difficult affairs are worked out.
And if people differ, that is fine. And if the
State Department can serve any purpose by
MARCH 11, 1963
371
being the focus of some of this attention and
difference of view, that is all right — until the
point, as I say, where it does actually interfere
with the conduct of foreign policy; and I don't
think it has reached that point.
Mr. Morgan: You are tempting us to infer
though that the press has been somewhat irre-
sponsible in making charges up to now.
Mr. Ball: I wouldn't want to say the press
has been irresponsible, but I think to the extent
that there can be discussion with the respon-
sible people in the Department on some of these
issues before they become major sensational
news stories, why so much the better; and we
are working as diligently as we can with, I
think, some very able press people of our own
to try to develop the kind of working relation-
ship with the press that will help the American
people understand these problems.
Mr. Morgan: Do you think, in hindsight
again, the handling of the trouble with Canada
over atomic weapons was indiscreet ? '
Mr. Ball: I think perhaps we are at a point
right now where the Canadian people are en-
gaged in the kind of democratic exercise which
we indulge in ourselves every 4 years and we'd
better let them sort their own affairs out by
themselves in their own manner, and I am sure
they will do it in a way that meets all the
requirements of the feelings of the Canadian
people.
Confidence in an Atlantic Partnership
Mr. Scali: Mr. Ball, let's examine one of
these issues in just a little more detail: You
have been among the administration spokes-
men who have expressed confidence that the
Atlantic partnership would be formed with
Western Europe, including Britain, despite
General de Gaulle. Are you as confident today ?
Mr. Ball: Yes, I am perfectly confident that
we will be able to make progress over a period
of time in working out an effective partner-
ship with our European allies. This seems to
me to be compelled by the very facts of the
situation^the nature of the forces that con-
front one another in the world and the alloca-
tion of those forces.
We and the Europeans share a commoi W-
danger. At the present time Europe canno ritk
defend itself by itself. If we are to defend our
selves it is essential that Europe also be ded
fended. There is an indivisibility in the defenai
of the free world therefore. At the same timii
there is a great degree of economic interdei i41
pendence among these great nations in tin
North Atlantic world, and we have to worS) at
together in order to be prosperous ourselves*
Their prosperity and our prosperity are hingew
together. So that the very facts of the situation
compel a partnership, and I think it will 1»
worked out.
Mr. Scali: Yet General de Gaulle doesn'i
seem to be backing up in his "grand design.'|
How do we propose to overcome his opposition!!
Mr. Ball: Well, again, General de Gaulle hi
a somewhat different view as to how Weste
Europe should be organized from the view thi
we hold. General de Gaulle has a somewhal
different view, I think, of Atlantic relationshi
than the view we hold. On most of the greai^
issues of the world I would assume that we are
in general agreement with General de Gaullei
We both share the sense of the common dangen;
the danger from the East. We both recognize!
I think, the realities of modern defense, and 1
think that, while there may be differences oi
view here and there down the road, what the
United States must do of necessity is to continue
to work toward policies which seem to us to be
indispensable in order to bring about the abilityrt
to mobilize the resources of the Atlantic world
for our common purposes, because our common
purposes are the purposes which I am sure are
shared in the views and opinions of most Euro-
peans as well as the United States.
Mr. Scali: For example, are you confident
that, despite General de Gaulle's opposition, a
NATO nuclear deterrent can be formed in a
fair amount of time which will be truly effec-
tive?
Mr. Ball: We have, as you know, when we
reached an agreement with the British at Nas-
sau * on putting forward actively the idea of a
'For background, see iUA., Feb. 18, 1963, pp. 235
and 243.
* For texts of a joint communique and a statement
released by President Kennedy and Prime Minister
Macmillan at Nassau on Dec. 21, see ihid., Jan. 14, 1963,
p. 43.
372
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
A.TO nuclear force, one of the components
^ ith which would be a NATO multilateral
roe. I think great progress has been made
ward bruiging this about.
We have the agreement — in fact, I should say
""' 16 enthusiastic agreement — of the Federal Ke-
^'^ iiblic of Germany to work with us on this mat-
Wlien Premier [Amintore] Fanfani was
' "I are from Italy, he hidicated the great desire of
■*'' le Italian Government to see brought into be-
n
: this multilateral force.^ I think this holds
reat promise for the future.
uropean Resurgence
Mr. Morgan: Mr. Secretary, despite what you
ay, I wonder if the nub of the problem with
ur allies — assmning as I think we must that
he alliance is in something of disarray, due to
he developments of the last 4 or 5 weeks — isn't
he nub of the problem a very human thing?
sn't the nub of the problem the feeling on the
)art of our allies, notably the French and some-
vhat the Canadians and perhaps to a lesser
legree some of the others, the statement that we
ire asking them — particularly in the control of
luclear weapons, and in other things too — to
five up sovereignty which we ourselves as
Americans are not prepared to give up ?
Mr. Ball: I don't think that really states the
issue properly, Mr. Morgan. After the war,
during this process when the nations of the
world were shedding their colonies, Europe
effectively withdrew from responsibility for a
great part of the free world. The Europeans
pulled back on themselves — not voluntarily to
a considerable extent, but involuntarily — be-
cause of development of this great wave of anti-
colonialism. They busied themselves with the
problem at home of creating a great and strong
Europe, a Europe with a greater unity than
they had ever known before. Tliey have done
this with enormous effectiveness.
Now Europe is feeling strong. The Euro-
pean people are feeling prosperous; they have
an economic strength which they have never
had before. Quite naturally they are interested
in playing a greater role in the world, and we
are interested in having them play that role.
They are interested, as any self-respecting
people are, in feeling that they have a signifi-
cant participation in their own defense, and this
is why we have put forward this multilateral
nuclear force which will give the nonatomic
powers as well as the atomic powers a role to
play in the nuclear defense of the free world.
Now we are in a situation where the techno-
logical development of nuclear weaponry has
tended to outrun the institutional arrangements
that we have to manage it; so necessarily we
have to tackle a very complex problem of how
this is worked out. We are tackling this
through NATO with our European friends.^
I am confident we are going to come out with
something that is effective, that is real, that is
going to be significant in the totality of the de-
fense of the free world, and that will give the
European people the feeling which I think they
are entitled to have that they are playing their
part.
Mr. Morgan: That is impressive and con-
vincing as far as it goes, but how in the world
do you answer this argument that De Gaulle
and to a lesser extent Dief enbaker make, to wit,
that we don't want to tie ourselves to the tail
of the American kite defensively when the
Americans might get themselves into a nuclear
war with Russia over an issue that doesn't inter-
est us — to wit, Cuba, or — although it is not in
the news at the moment — Quemoy and Matsu,
or "Lower Slobovia," as far as that goes.
Mr. Ball: I think there are really two an-
swers. First that the defense of the free world
is really indivisible. You can't say you are
going to defend one piece of it and not defend
another, when you are talking in terms of
nuclear defense. I can't believe that, if we have
a major nuclear war, certain little pieces of the
free world can say, "We are exempt, and we
have no part in it." I think that automatically
they become a part of it.
Now as to the problem of nations acting for
reasons which are not shared by other nations,
here I can only say we are working very hard
at trying to perfect the instrumentalities for
consultation and for the development of a kind
' Ihid., Feb. 4, 1963, p. 164.
MARCH 11, 1963
" For a statement by President Kennedy announcing
the names of those who will conduct negotiations for
the United States, see ihid., Feb. 11, 1963, p. 197.
373
of overall world strategy in a way which will
permit all of the nations that can make effec-
tive contributions to have a share in developing
great strategic plans — in developing — in help-
ing to make the decisions all over the world.
This is the problem of bringing Europe back
into world responsibility, a responsibility from
which it largely withdrew during this period
when it was shedding its colonies and it with-
drew in itself.
Now Europe must come back in and play
its part in world responsibility, and this is one
of the meanings of the Atlantic partnership.
This is what we are talking about.
Franco-German Pact
Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, as part of the
changing landscape. General de Gaulle and
Chancellor Adenauer have just signed an un-
precedented friendship pact which appears to
unite West Germany and France like never
before. Do we have any apprehensions or ob-
jections either to the nature, the provisions,
or the timing of this agreement?
Mr. Ball: Well, of course we have seen a
Franco-German agreement as fundamental to
the unity of Europe and this has long been a
thesis of American policy, so that to the extent
that Germany and France are able to compose
their age-old differences, this is a fine thing.
We had hoped that this would be within the
framework of a larger European unity, and I
wouldn't suggest that it may not be.
I think that we can only hope that the effect
of this will be to enable France and Germany
to work together and to work toward a greater
total European unity, and for that, with the
total European unity, to work effectively in
our Atlantic arrangements with North America.
This seems to us to be indispensable.
Now you ask me how we envisage this par-
ticular agreement. I think that the agreement
itself simply calls for working relations between
France and Germany, and if it is carried out
in the spirit I suggest, I tliink it could be very
useful. I think that so long as the nations are
committed to NATO, are committed to Atlan-
tic arrangements, the nations which are mem-
bers of it, why the agreement itself we certainly
could take no exception to.
Mr. Scali: Has any consideration been givfflljLl
in the Department, or an analysis made, of whai( jti
this new pact does to West Germany's prion ili(
obligations to the rest of its allies, for exampleJl
Mr. Ball: No, I wouldn't suppose there iji
anything in the language of the agreemenlf
wliich impairs those obligations, and I knoTij
Chancellor Adenauer made clear the other daj|
their commitments to NATO and the fact the^
intended to carry them out to the fullest, anei|
he looked toward the full support and coopera
tion of the United States in helping to defenc
and work with Europe.
I think the effectiveness of the agreement anc
the utility of the agreement will depend upor
the manner in which it is carried out, and 1
think of course it must be accompanied by j
determination on the part of the countries thai
are members to work within NATO and t(
work toward a more effective Atlantic arrange
ment.
Mr. Scali: Doesn't the timing disturb you a
all, Mr. Secretai-y?
Mr. Ball: Well, I think the timing was prob
ably accidental. The fact is that tliis is a mat
ter which has been under discussion for somi
time between France and Germany, and one cai
put two events together and read a meaning
into them; but I think as far as Chancelloi
Adenauer is concerned this represented a kinc
of life ambition of his to see close Franco-Ger
man relationships, and I would hope this woulc
be administered and carried out in a way tc
contribute to a larger unity.
Mr. Morgan: To approach Mr. Scali's ques-
tion from a slightly different angle. Secretary
Ball, wouldn't we be pretty much dismayed
about this agreement if efforts to get Britain
into the Common Market utterly failed? In
other words, wouldn't that agreement then be-
come a rigid Bonn-Paris axis in a very narrow
way that would preclude, really, the flexible,
fluid working of the alliance?
Mr. Ball: It isn't a very rigid agreement, if
you have seen the language of it. It is a very
general arrangement for cooperation in certain
areas. Again it really depends on how it is
carried out. And as for the question of what
relationship Great Britain may have toward the
Continental powers, this is something I think
374
DEPAETMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ir
e have really got to wait and see. The British
ave said that they want to maintain that re-
Jitionship. Five of the six members of the
n " ommunity have said that. I would certainly
ipe that a close relationship can be established.
h
, uclear Test Ban Talks
ier(
((ij Mt. Scali: Mr. Secretary, if we can turn
^. uickly to another issue: Nuclear test talks are
)out to resume in Geneva and the Soviets have
:eated some sort of consternation by walking
ut of the New York talks a few days ago.^ Do
T& see any signs now that the Soviets are ready
or the serious kind of negotiations we believe
ecessary in order to reach agreement ?
Mr. Ball: It is very hard to predict, Mr.
cali. We can always hope. Mr. Foster [Wil-
liam C. Foster, Director, U.S. Arms Control
jj,_.nd Disarmament Agency] is going back, as
^ou say, to Geneva to start negotiations again
.his week. There has been a fairly — what
night be a significant development within the
ast few weeks of the Soviet agreeing to the
irinciple of on-site inspection.*
Now there still remains a difference as to the
iimiber of inspections, as you know, and some
other detailed arrangements under the agree-
ment, but we must continue to negotiate, to
keep working toward such an agreement as one
step toward trying to end this arms race.
Mr. Morgan: We have only got, as Mr. Scali
indicated, actually a matter of less than a min-
ute left, and it is hardly fair to bring up a com-
pletely alien topic, but, quickly, how do you feel
in the State Department about the Senate For-
eign Eelations Committee investigation of
agents of foreign governments?
Mr. Ball: Well, I told the committee I think
it is a fine thing and I think there is real doubt
as to whether the present Foreign Agents Reg-
istration Act in exactly its present form is really
adequate for the new set of problems which
confront the country as a result of the emer-
gence of a great many new nations and of a
change in the whole structure of relationships.
I hope they will look into it very deeply, and
certainly as far as the Department of State is
' For background, see ihid., Feb. 18, 1963, p. 236.
^Ihid., Feb. 11, 1963, p. 198.
concerned we are prepared to work with them
to the fullest in —
Mr. Morgan: You don't think that the com-
mittee is taking a sharper view of the necessity
for regulation than you are?
Mr. Ball: I don't think so. My own feeling
is that there have been undoubtedly abuses of
this and there may be more and^ —
Mr. Morgan: Thank you very much, Secre-
tary Ball, for appearing with us on "Issues and
Answers" this afternoon.
U.S. Exploring Ways To Help
African Students Leaving Bulgaria
Department Statement
Press release 93 dated February 20
The Department of State is sympathetic to
the situation of those African students in Bul-
garia who have found conditions there so diffi-
cult as to impel them to leave and seek an educa-
tion elsewhere.
The Department is consulting with Western
European and other governments, and the
African states involved, in an effort to develop
ways of assisting African students who have
left Bulgaria, although it recognizes that the
growing exodus of students from the Eastern
bloc is primarily a problem for the students'
own countries.
The United States is prepared to cooperate
with other countries in assisting with travel,
subsistence, and placement of African students
from Bulgaria who are qualified to pursue their
studies in the West.
U.S. Executive Directors of Bank
and Fund Confirmed by Senate
The Senate on February 19 confirmed the
nominations of John C. Bullitt to be U.S. Exec-
utive Director of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development for a term of
2 yeai-s and William B. Dale to be U.S. Execu-
tive Director of the International Monetary
Fund for a term of 2 years, to which offices they
were appointed during the last recess of the
Senate.
MARCH 11, 1963
375
i
Senate Confirms Appointments
of Mr. Herter and IVlr. Gossett
The Senate on Februai-y 19 confirmed the
nommations of Christian A. Herter to be
Special Eepresentative for Trade Negotiations,
with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary, to wliich office he was
appointed during the last recess of the Senate,'
and William T. Gossett to be Deputy Special
Eepresentative for Trade Negotiations, with the
rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleni-
potentiary.
President Makes Finding on Duty
on Brooms Made of Broomcorn
White House press release dated February 15
The President has reviewed and considered
the I'eport, findings, and conclusions of the
Tariff Commission which resulted from the
Commission's investigation of the differences in
costs of production of brooms made of broom-
corn in the United States and in the principal
competing counti-y. Mexico was selected by the
Commission as the principal competing coun-
try for the purposes of the investigation. This
report was prepared pursuant to the provisions
of section 336 of title III of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended.
The President concluded that the Commis-
sion's report does not show need for the duty
on brooms made of broomcorn to be applied
on the basis of the "American selling price."
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
87th Congress, 2d Session
Kenewed Geneva Disarmament Negotiations. Hear-
ings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations. July 25 and August 2, 1962.
64 pp.
U.S. Communist Party Assistance to Foreign Com-
munist Governments (Medical Aid to Cuba Commit-
tee and Friends of British Guiana). Hearings
before the House Committee on Un-American Activi-
•^
ties. Part 1, November 14, 1962, 113 pp.; Part
November 14 and 15, 1962, 195 pp. and index.
Cuban Refugee Problem. Hearings before the Sm
committee To Investigate Problems Connected Wit
Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Committee c
the Judiciary. Part 2. December 3 and 4, 196;
95 pp.
Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power. Hearings,
gather with compilation of studies prepared for
Joint Economic Committee pursuant to Sec. 5 (a III
of Public Law 304 (79th Cong.). December 10 an
11, 1962. 18.^ pp.
Outlook for U.S. Balance of Payments. Hearings b
fore the Subcommittee on International Exchanj
and Payments of the Joint Economic Committ<
pursuant to Sec. 5(a) of Public Law 304 (79t
Cong. ) . December 12-14, 1962. 264 pp.
U.S. Payments Policies Consistent With Domestic O'
jectives of Maximum Employment and Growth. R
port of the Subcommittee on International Exchanj
and Payments to the Joint Economic Committe
with individual views. December 26, 1962. 11 p
[Joint Committee print]
Small Business Problems Created by Petroleum In
ports. Report of the House Select Committee o
Small Business (with additional views) pursuai
to H. Res. 46. H. Rept. 2567. January 3, 196
36 pp.
Opportunities for Small Business in Foreign Trad
Report of the House Select Committee on Sma
Business pursuant to H. Res. 46. H. Rept. 256
January 3, 1963. 22 pp.
88th Congress, 1st Session
Administration of National Security. Basic Issue
A study submitted by the Subcommittee on Nation;
Security Staffing and Operations to the Senate Cor
mittee on Government Operations. January 1
1963. 20 pp. [Committee print]
Berlin in a Changing Europe. Report of Senate
Mansfield, Boggs, Pell, and Smith to the Sena
Committee on Foreign Relations. January 22, 196
25 pp. [Committee print]
Economic Policies and Programs in Middle Americ
A report to the Subcommittee on Inter-America
Economic Relationships of the Joint Economic Coe
mittee by Representative Martha W. Griffiths. Jai
uary 15, 1963. 31 pp. [Joint Committee print]
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
'■ For background, see Buixetin of Dec. 3, 1962, p. 846.
376
Confirmations
The Senate on February 19 confirmed the foUowini
nominations :
David Elliott Bell to be Administrator of the Agene;
for International Development, to which office he wa;
appointed during the last recess of the Senate.
J. Wesley Jones to be Ambassador to Peru.
Bin D. Moyers to be Deputy Director of the Peaci
Corps.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETI>
.,
nc(
MULTILATERAL
omic Energy
uendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873).
Done at Vienna October 4, 1961. Entered into force
January 31, 1963.
Proclaimed by the President of the United States:
February 6, 1963.
iitomotive Traffic
(t I iistoms convention on the temporary importation of
private road vehicles. Done at New Torli June 4,
1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957.
TIAS 3943.
Accession deposited: Tanganyika, Xovember 28, 1962.
U inance
rticles of agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signa-
ture at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into
force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance: Jamaica, February
21, 1963.
Jticles of agreement of the International Monetary
Fund. Opened for signature at Washington Decem-
ber 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945.
TIAS 1501.
Signature and acceptance: Jamaica, February 21,
1963.
ie ilavery
Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25,
192G, as amended (TIAS 3.532). Entered into force
March 9, 1927 ; for the United States March 21, 1929.
46 Stat. 2183.
Accession deposited: Tanganyika, November 28,
1962.
Trade
Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade embodying results of the 1960-61 tariff con-
ference. Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. Entered into
force for the United States December 31, 1962.
Acceptance deposited: Denmark, January 11, 1963.
Trinidad and Tobago on January 17, 1963, acknowl-
edged applicable rights and obligations of the United
Kingdom icith respect to the following:
Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.'
Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done
at Geneva Jlarch 10, 1955. Entered into force
October 7, 1957. TIAS 3930.
Protocol of organizational amendments to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
March 10, 1955.'
' Not in force.
Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation,
with annex. Opened for signature at Geneva
March 10. 19.55.'
Protocol of rectification to French text of the General
Agreement on TaritTs and Trade. Done at Geneva
June 15, 1955. Entered into force October 24, 1956.
TIAS 3677.
Proc^s-verbal of rectification concerning protocol
amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX. proto-
col amending preamble and parts II and III, and
protocol of organizational amendments to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva December 3, 1955. Section B entered into
force October 7, 1957.
Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva May 23, 1956. Entered into force for the
United States June 30, 19.56. TIAS 3591.
Declaration on provisional accession of Swiss Con-
federation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 19.58. Enter-
ed into force January 1, 1960 ; for the United States
April 29, 1960. TIAS 4461.
Procfes-verbal extending and amending declaration on
provisional accession of Swiss Confederation to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra.
Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into
force December 31. 1961 ; for the United States Janu-
ary 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.
Protocol relating to negotiations for establishment of
new schedule III — Brazil — to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Decem-
ber 31, 1958.'
Declaration on relations between contracting parties
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and
the Government of the Polish People's Republic.
Done at Tokyo November 9, 1959. Entered into force
November 16, 1960. TIAS 4649.
Declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force May
21, 1960; for the United States June 15, 1960.
TIAS 4498.
Proc^s-verbal extending declaration on provisional
accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, supra. Done at Geneva Decem-
ber 9, 1961. Entered into force January 8, 1962.
TIAS 4958.
Declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done
at Geneva November 18, 1960. Entered into force
October 14, 1962. TIAS 5184.
Protocol for accession of Israel to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6,
1962. Entered into force July 5, 1962. TIAS 5249.
BILATERAL
Australia
Agreement amending the agreement of February 26,
1960 (TIAS 4435), providing for the continued
operation in Australia of tracking stations estab-
lished during the International Geophysical Tear
and the establishment of tracking facilities for Proj-
ect Mercury and deep space probes. Effected by
exchange of notes at Canberra January 9 and Febru-
ary 11, 1963. Entered into force February 11, 1963.
Central African Republic
Agreement relating to economic, technical, and related
assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangui
February 10, 1963. Entered into force February 10,
1963.
MARCH 11, 1963
377
Malaya
Agreement for financing certain educational exchange
programs. Signed at Kuala Lumpur January 28,
1963. Entered into force January 28, 1963.
Philippines
Agreement relating to the deposit rate for pesos under
the agricultural commodities agreement of Novem-
ber 24, 1961 (TIAS 4902). Effected by exchange of
notes at Manila August 14 and September 5, 1962.
Entered into force September 5, 1962.
Ryukyu Islands
Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 4.54; 73 Stat. 610;
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736). Signed at Naha January 22,
1963, and at Washington February 6, 1963. Entered
into force February 6, 1963.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale ty the Superintendent of Documents, V.S.
Oovernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, except in the case of free publications, which
may he obtained from the Department of State.
The Subcontinent of South Asia: Afghanistan, Ceylon,
India, Nepal, Pakistan. (Revised.) Background
pamphlet describing the geographic, social, economic,
and political structure of each country, their relations
with the United States, and their place within the
broad context of South Asian and world affairs. Pub.
7410. Near and Middle Eastern Series 69. 76 pp. 45<?.
The Biographic Register— 1963. Annual issue contain-
ing biographic information on personnel of the De-
partment and Foreign Service and other agencies
participating in the field of foreign affairs revised as
of June 30, 1962. Pub. 7426. Department and Foreign
Service Series 108. 507 pp. $2.50.
Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy. Transcript, with
minor editorial changes, of a TV program on which
six top officials spelled out what foreign policy is,
how it works and the goals it is designed to achieve.
Pub. 7432. General Foreign Policy Series 183. 37 pp.
200.
Educational and Cultural Diplomacy, 1961. A report
on the Department's educational and cultural exchange
program. Pub. 7437. International Information and
Cultural Series 82. 69 pp. 300.
A Historical Summary of United States-Korean Rela-
tions. Narrative summary and chronology of impor-
tant developments from 1834 to 1962 based on Depart-
ment records and U.N. published documents. Pub.
7446. Far Eastern Series 115. 138 pp. 400.
The U.S. Response to Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba.
Radio-TV report of President Kennedy to the people
from the White House on October 22, 1962. Pub. 7449.
Inter-American Series 80. 12 pp. 100.
Developments in the Cuban Situation : Questions an
Answers. Foreign affairs outline based on a Depar
ment of Defense publication prepared in cooperatio
with the Department of State for the use of Militar
Services personnel. Pub. 7454. Inter-American S(
ries 81. 8 pp. 50.
Changing Patterns in World Afifairs. An intervie'
with Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Transcript, wit
minor editorial changes, of TV program of Novembe
28 "CBS Reports: An Hour With the Secretary c
State." Pub. 7464, General Foreign Policy Series 18"
29 pp. 150.
Education— Educational Foundation and Financing e
Exchange Programs. Agreement with Denmarl
Exchange of notes — Signed at Copenhagen May 21
1962. Entered into force May 28, 1962. TIAS 506(
13 pp. 10^'.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Braz
signed at Brasilia March 15, 1962. Entered into fon
March 15, 1962. With exchanges of notes. TIAS 506
20 pp. 15<f.
Agricultural Trade. Agreement with Brazil — Signe
at Washington April 19, 1962. Entered into force Apr
19, 1962. TIAS 5062. 5 pp. 5(#.
Defense — Weapons Production Program. Agreemei
with the United Kingdom. Exchange of notes — Signe
at London June 29, 1962. Entered into force June 2)
1962. TIAS 5087. 5 pp. 50.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 18-24
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25,
D.C.
Releases issued prior to February 18 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 76
of February 11 and 89 of February 16.
Subject
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
Rusk : news briefing at Los Angeles,
February 13.
Amendments to program for visit
of President of Venezuela.
Program for visit of King of Laos.
African students in Bulgaria.
Chile credentials (rewrite).
Guinea credentials (rewrite).
Switzerland credentials (rewrite).
Cieplinski appointed Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary (biographic de-
tails).
Note to Cuba on shrimp boat attack.
Gardner: "The United Nations in
Crisis : Cuba and the Congo."
Rusk : Cincinnati Council on World
Affairs (revised).
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
No.
Date
*88
2/18
90
2/18
*91
2/18
*92
93
94
95
96
•97
2/19
2/20
2/21
2/21
2/21
2/21
98
t99
2/22
2/22
tioo
2/22
378
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETTN:
arch 11, 1963
In d
e X
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1237
rica. U.S. Exploring Ways To Help African
Students Leaving Bulgaria 375
nerican Republics. Communist Subversion in
the Western Hemisphere (Martin) .... 347
i omic Energy
[•cretary Rusk Holds Press and Radio News
Briefing at Los Angeles 361
lider Secretary Ball Intervievs'ed on "Issues
and Answers" 369
Jilgaria. U.S. Exploring Ways To Help African
Students Leaving Bulgaria 375
lile. Letters of Credence (Gutierrez-Olivos) . 360
ommunism. Communist Subversion in the
jj^^ Western Hemisphere (Martin) 347
it mgress
SSJ )mmunist Subversion in the Western Hemi-
sphere (Martin)
mfirmations (Bell, Jones, Moyers) ....
S'f jngressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy
jnate Confirms Appointments of Mr. Herter and
Mr. Gossett
.S. Executive Directors of Bank and Fund Con-
firmed by Senate
.S. Position on U.N. Special Fund Project in
Cuba (Gardner, Rusk)
uba
ommunist Subversion in the Western Hemi-
sphere (Martin)
ecretary Rusk Holds Press and Radio News
Briefing at Los Angeles
Inder Secretary Ball Interviewed on "Issues
and Answers"
r.S. Demands Cuba Explain Attack on Fishing
Vessel (text of note)
J.S. Position on U.N. Special Fund Project in
Cuba (Gardner, Rusk)
)epartment and Foreign Service. Confirma-
tions (Bell, Jones, Moyers)
Dconomic Affairs
'resident Makes Finding on Duty on Brooms
Made of Broomcorn
Senate Confirms Appointments of Mr. Herter
and Mr. Gossett
J.S. Executive Directors of Bank and Fund Con-
firmed by Senate
U.S. Position on U.N. Special Fund Project in
Cuba (Gardner, Rusk)
Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S. Explor-
ing Ways To Help African Students Leaving
Bulgaria
347
376
376
376
375
357
347
361
369
356
357
376
376
376
375
357
375
Europe. Under Secretary Ball Interviewed on
"Issues and Answers" 369
Foreign Aid
Bell confirmed as Administrator of AID . . . 376
Moyers confirmed as Deputy Director, Peace
Corps 376
Secretary Rusk Holds Press and Radio News
Briefing at Los Angeles 361
France. Under Secretary Ball Interviewed on
"Issues and Answers" 369
Germany. Under Secretary Ball Interviewed on
"Issues and Answers" 369
Guinea. Letters of Credence (Bangoura) . . 360
International Organizations and Conferences.
U.S. Executive Directors of Bank and Fund
Confirmed by Senate 375
Iraq. Under Secretary Ball Interviewed on
"Issues and Answers" 369
Military Affairs. U.S. and U.K. Hold Further
Talks To Implement Nassau Agreement . . 368
Peru. Jones confirmed as Ambassador . . . 376
Protection of Nationals and Property. U.S. De-
mands Cuba Explain Attack on Pishing Ves-
sel (text of note) 356
Publications. Recent Releases 378
Switzerland. Letters of Credence (Zehnder) . 360
Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 377
United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. Hold Further
Talks To Implement Nassau Agreement . . 368
United Nations. U.S. Position on U.N. Special
Fund Project in Cuba (Gardner, Rusk) . . 357
Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk Holds Press and
Radio News Briefing at Los Angeles . . . 361
Name Index
Ball, George W 369
Bangoura, Karim 360
Bell, David Elliott 376
Bullitt, John C 375
Dale, William B 375
Gardner, Richard N 358
Gossett, William T 376
Gutierrez-Olivos, Sergio 360
Herter, Christian A 376
Jones, J. Wesley 376
Martin, Edwin M 347
Morgan, Edward P 369
Moyers, Bill D 376
Rusk, Secretary 357, 361
Scali, John 369
Zehnder, Alfred 360
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RED CHINA
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State
This 35-page pamplilet is a transcript of the television
program "State Department Brieftng: Red China and the
U.S.S.R." which was first broadcast on February 11, 1963, by
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Chief, Washington Bxireau of Time-Life, Inc., acted as mod-
erator and the following four top officers of the Department
of State discussed this important subject and answered ques-
tions posed by a group of distinguished nongovernmental
participants :
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
U. Alexis Jolonson, Deputy Under Secretary for Po-
litical Affairs
W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary for Far
Eastern Affairs
Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research
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'^ r «i^ ^
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1238
March 18, 1963
SECURITY AND FREEDOM: A FREE- WORLD RE-
SPONSIBILITY • Address hy Secretary Rusk 383
THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIGHT FOR
FREEDOM • Address by Secretary Rusk 393
THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN ISSUE • Statement by William
C. Foster 398
COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE WESTERN HEM-
ISPHERE^Continued • Statement by Assistant
Secretary Martin 404
■,ii:,ton Public Library
...iijcunttndent of Documents
,;kR 1 1963
depository
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of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Depietukni
OF State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed In the
Headers' Qulde to Periodical Literature.
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1238 • Publication 751
March 18, 1963
w
Tlie Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
internatioTuil affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
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national relations are listed currently.
}
lecurity and Freedom: A Free-World Responsibility
Address hy Secretary Rusk ^
We are engaged in a great struggle for free-
om. This was the case long before we as a
eople were deeply aware of it. Between the
wo world wars we abstained from a decisive
ole in the course of events which deeply affect
ur own safety and prosperity. We were not
a those days fully alive to the fact that our
lower to influence those events cast upon us a
esponsibility which we could neglect only at
ur peril. The responsibility for the aggres-
lions which led to World War II rests wholly
rith those who perpetrated them. Neverthe-
ess, it is worth sober reflection that we our-
lelves did not join with other like-minded na-
tions to help prevent the aggressions which led
o that great conflagration.
Let me say, in a State which has contributed
p-ery much gallantry in the last 20 years to our
struggles in every continent, that we are deeply
understanding in the Department of State that
foreign policy touches every hearth and every
home in the country. It is sometimes said that
the Department of State has no constituency.
This is possibly because it is so large. Because
what happens in our relations with the rest of
the world makes a difference to every citizen,
every home, and every community in the coun-
try. We are not dealing with abstractions.
We are dealing with the safety and the well-
being of an entire people.
Now, since World War II, the American
people have reached some basic decisions, on a
bipartisan basis, which derive from a more real-
istic understanding of the responsibility which
^ Made before the Texas Daily Newspaper Associa-
tion at Houston, Tex., on Feb. 26 (press release 105,
revised).
goes with power. We have responded to the
effort and sacrifice required to join with others
to sustain freedom and to build a decent world
order. It is a struggle which is worldwide and
involves both allies and those not formally
alined who are nevertheless determined to be
independent. It is worldwide because if the
borders, the peripheries, the distant places, be-
gin to be rolled up, the dangers approach closer
and closer to the center. And the strength for
the struggle for freedom comes not just from
the strength of a few major allies but comes
from the combination of all those who are un-
willing to accept the Communist world revolu-
tion as the future architectural pattern for the
world community.
Our own security therefore requires that we
not ignore the worldwide nature of the struggle.
And, further, it is a struggle which is ex-
tremely complex. It is not a simple test of mili-
tary or industrial strength, and it cannot be won
by military means alone. Complex: 110 na-
tions with whom we have relations ; 33 of those
will be changing governments or having elec-
tions in the year 1963. We shall have about 25
changes in government every year for as long
as we can look into the future. And 10 or a
dozen of those will be crises because there will
be no peaceful constitutional means for passing
power from one hand to the other.
Now, in this complex world, the primary
purpose of our Armed Forces — by far the most
foiTnidable armed forces in our own or in the
world's history — is to deter those who would
use force to expand the world of coercion at the
cost of the world of free choice. We need pow-
erful, balanced, and flexible forces for the great
MARCH 18, 1963
383
variety of tasks with which we might be faced.
And in addition we need an entire battery of
other powerful and flexible instruments — eco-
nomic, financial, teclinical, psychological.
A third simple fact about this struggle is
that it is not just between Washmgton and
Moscow or between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact. It involves all countries who are deter-
mined to sustain their independence and to
work on a basis of cooperation with other na-
tions through agreed rules of conduct to achieve
common objectives. And finally, the free
world, without the United States, lacks the
strength to hold Communist expansion in check
and to build the vital societies which will be
impervious to penetration or subversion as well
as direct assault.
Free- World Defensive Alliances
So these salient facts have led, in this post-
war period, to the formation of a series of de-
fensive alliances within the free world. These
were not planned, j'ou will remember, as a part
of our best hopes for the postwar world but
came into existence when it became clear that
Joseph Stalin was not going to meet his obliga-
tions under the charter and to work on a basis
of great-power unity to preserve the peace and
the genuine independence of nations.
The first of these alliances was the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
signed at Rio de Janeiro in September 1947. It
was a logical extension of the inter- American
system which had been developing for two gen-
erations. And the Rio Treaty carried out the
intent of the Act of Chapultepec of 1945.
The North Atlantic Alliance came into being
in 1949 as a direct result of the harsh pressures
of the Soviet Union against and toward West-
ern Europe. The 12 original members of
NATO were joined by Turkey and Greece in
1952 and by the Federal Republic of Germany
in 1955.
Communist aggression in Korea and in
Southeast Asia led to the creation of additional
alliances : a mutual defense pact with the Phil-
ippines in 1951 ; ANZUS, which bovmd us with
Australia and New Zealand in the same year;
mutual defense arrangements with Korea,
Japan, and the Republic of China. The South-
ic
U
east Asia Treaty, signed at Manila in 195i
added Pakistan and Thailand to those witt
whom we were already alined.
In the Middle East, a defensive agreement (ifo?
Turkey and Pakistan in 1954 was followed b
the Baghdad Pact, which became the Centri
Treaty Organization in 1958. We are nulu
members of the pact itself but are closely ass(»
ciated with it, and in 1959 we signed bilaten
military assistance agreements with each of th
regional members — Iran, Pakistan, and Turke;
Thus we belong to four multinational all
ances, work closely with a fifth, and have
number of bilateral mutual security arrange |ii
ments with others. Altogether we have 42 al
lies, with standing forces of men in miiform o
more than 6 millions, who face a common threa
within the framework of a common commit
ment to support and sustain the kind of worL
community described in the United Nation
Charter. These alliances are defensive in pur \^
pose and have no roots in ambition or appetit «
with respect to other peoples. And these alii
ances have been the object of a major effort b;
the American people since 1947. Eighty-fiv
percent of the economic and military assistance
which we have committed in this postwar worh
has gone to those who have been allied with us
But I must add that the great struggle fo
freedom includes many who are not formall;
alined but whose commitment to their own free
dom and independence is clear and firm. Oi
the underlying issue of freedom and nationa
independence, there are not three broad groups
the Communists, the free world, and those wh(
don't care, but two — those who are seeking t(
sustain freedom and those who are trying tc
destroy or "bury" it, as the expression now is
This gi'ouping into two is underlined at mo-
ments of crisis, whether in Korea in 1950 or in
Cuba in October 1962, in which the issue of
freedom is clear, for then it is discovered that
there is much less neutralism than one might
have supposed.
Let me conunent on three matters affecting
certain of these alliances.
For 15 years tliree successive American ad-
ministrations have pursued an Atlantic policy
built around two major goals:
First, to create an effective Atlantic partner-
384
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
lip between Europe and the United States.
riiy i In the most national sense because we
urselves cannot be secure unless Western Eu-
ipe is secure, and because Western Europe
mnot be secure against the threats which
ley face unless there is full United States
articipation.
And during this period, secondly, we have
■ied to support, the movement toward greater
of( luropean unity, vitality, and strength.
irti This policy has achieved more substantial
nd rapid results over the last decade and a
alf than any of us who were associated with
,s beginnings could have dared to hope for.
liiturope has been rebuilt, is growing at a most
mi npressive rate, and has created a flourishing
ire conomic community. Effective instruments of
Mii 'ansatlantic partnership liave been built up
ver the years in NATO and in the OECD
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
)evelopment] ; the enhanced security and pros-
)e:!i lerity of the Atlantic area testify to the suc-
ess of the common defense and economic pro-
jII
nl [rams which they have mounted.
ID flultitateral Nuclear Force
Now we have always known that a major test
'"' if this European and Atlantic policy would
ome in dealing with such issues as the nuclear
II
[ ■ [uestion. Indeed, the very success of these com-
"^ non North American and European policies of
he postwar period might well have hastened
'" he posing of some of these far-reaching politi-
'P* 'al questions, since a Europe reviving in
"' strength and confidence could be expected to
I" vish to play, for example, a substantial nuclear
:ti-ole.
'S If Europe should wish to play such a role
no- here are, broadly speaking, three alternative
ii (vays of responding :
ol First: The United States could seek to re-
nt tain all its strategic nuclear power in its own
fill lands, while offering the European countries
an opportunity to associate themselves with that
n." power through agreed guidelines on use and
targeting, et cetera.
This is, generally speaking, the approach
NATO has been following up to date. During
the past 2 years we have gone to considerable
lengths to insure that our NATO allies have
MARCH 18, 1963
full facts about the nuclear situation in order
that they might have a deeper undei-standing
of the problems involved and take part in more
realistic consultations about them. But present
arrangements may not fully meet European re-
quirements. If not, we are prepared to discuss
the ways and means of going further.
The second alternative would be for the
United States to help European countries to
obtain national nuclear establishments of their
own.
There are several reasons why we should not
encourage the development of independent na-
tional nuclear establishments. Not only would
the scattering of nuclear capabilities increase
the risk of war by accident or miscalculation,
but each addition to the list of nuclear powers
will make more complicated and difficult the
possible negotiation of effective international
control arrangements — which we tried to ac-
complish as early as 1945 and 1946 — arrange-
ments which we must obtain sooner or later if
we are to avoid a spiraling mutual arms race
into infinity, avoid the ultimate disaster of nu-
clear incineration. In addition there is a good
military reason for discouraging proliferation.
The nuclear defense of the West is by its nature
indivisible, and there must be unity of strategy
and direction.
The third alternative is to organize a multi-
lateral program, in which the European coun-
tries and the United States could share on a
basis of equality. Such a jirogram would re-
spond to European aspiration in greater meas-
ure than the first alternative and yet avoid the
divisive political effects of the second ; that is,
proliferation. This is, therefore, the road
whicli the United States now favors.
Ambassador [Livingston] ]\Ierchant is now
in Europe to explore whether our allies wish
to go down this road.^ Let me emphasize that
our own attitude will depend in large part upon
the attitude of our allies. We are prepared to
discuss with them important changes in present
arrangements, but we are not pressing an Ameri-
can plan upon them. For here is an occasion
for the most genuine consultation, befitting an
alliance of great nations.
° For a statement by President Kennedy, see Bulle-
tin of Feb. 11, 1963, p. 197.
385
If the nations that have indicated inter-
est— notably Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the
United Kingdom — now wish to act, the United
States will be prepared to join them. We are
confident that a program can be developed
which makes military and political sense for
the United States, and for NATO, which will
aiford the European comitries an opportunity
to share seriously in the nuclear deterrent, and
which will reinforce — rather than weaken — our
continuing efforts to promote European integra-
tion and Atlantic partnership.
Some very sober questions are involved in the
discussion of nuclear arrangements in the al-
liance. For something has happened since the
middle fifties wliich in a sense has transformed
the danger and the urgency and the seriousness
of these matters. And that is the development
by the Soviet Union of a massive nuclear strike
capability against the West. And therefore
the nature of the confrontation involves the
safety of the entire Northern Hemisphere. And
when we get to the point of confronting great
dangers with great risks, we shall be talking
about the life and death of nations, an expe-
rience which we have already had to a consid-
erable extent.
The inter-American system is now being
challenged by the penetration of Cuba by
Marxist-Leninism and by subversive threats
against Latin America. Having failed in the
fifties to prevent the betrayal of the Cuban peo-
ple to communism by their own false prophets,
the LTnited States and its hemispheric allies now
face the more difficult task of finding a cure.
Fortimately there is unanimity in the hemi-
sphere on the most crucial matters. A Marxist-
Leninist regime is incompatible with the com-
mitments of the hemisphere and with the obli-
gations of Cuba itself as a state. Cuba will not
be permitted to use any of its arms outside
Cuba. A Soviet military presence on that is-
land cannot be accepted. Attempts to stimulate
subversive action in other countries are being
met by the individual and joint action of the
members of the inter- American system. Castro
is learning that the path upon which he has
embarked has no futui'e for himself or the
Cuban people, except a future of increasing
misery and frustration, while the remainder of
A
&
'1
1
tlie hemisphere is clear that their own well-j at
being can best be achieved through free instill
tutions and the vigorous pursuit of economic
and social development as free men. The hemiJ k
sphere is, again, unanimous that the object musS
be to return the Cuban people, under free leadl
ership, to their rightful place in the American! itl
family. And policies and actions, taken bj
many countries throughout the free world, art
being directed to that necessary result. II
it
Battery of Means Needed To Win
I said earlier that the struggle for freedom
will require a variety of means. And I would
urge you to think soberly about what is needed
to win that struggle. The struggle for free-
dom has never been itself free or cheap or safe
It has required effort, resources, sacrifice of un-
limited capacity. And I would suggest there-
fore that in this struggle for freedom we shal
need a battery of means :
First, a formidable defense establishmeni
which, in the absence of significant disarma-
ment, will impose increasing burdens. If there
is therefoi'e anyone who wishes to win this
struggle for freedom and slash our defenst
budget, I would urge you to ponder, to pondei
about the kind of world in which we now live
We shall need a substantial and effective for
eign assistance program, now costing less thar
10 percent of our military requirements and lesM
than 1 jDercent of our gross national product
If by aid we can assist countries to be inde-
pendent and free, and do tlirough peaceful
means wliat we might eventually have to try
to do by military means, the aid is a fraction
of the effort required. We accept an obligation
to do our best, to run it efficiently, to admin-
ister it wisely, to elicit maximum effort by
those who receive the aid. But the program is
vital in this great struggle.
We shall need a vigorous expansion of for-
eign trade.
We shall need continuing increases in the
total effort of our allies in the free world. And
a mnnber of them are already moving up en-
couragingly, both in defense budgets and in
their own external aid actions.
We shall need strong support for those inter-
386
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
itional agencies, sucli as the United Nations,
here the underlying issues of freedom are
arified between tlie Communist world and all
e rest. If you occasionally feel a sense of
ustration about the debates in the United
ations, let me urge j'ou not to abandon the
^'Jeld to the opposition, not to quit just because
'"^e find ourselves with the majority, say, only
percent of the time instead of 100 percent
f the time. Because in that forum these is-
aes are clarified, and national objectives are ex-
osed, and what we are all about becomes
nown, and confidence is built through a
:nowledge of what we are trying to accom-
lish.
We shall need a determined effort in space
nd other advanced technologies in order that
ree men sustain their lead in scientific
nowledge and technical capacities.
I have had a chance to discuss this space
rogram from two points of view. I sit on the
pace Council under the stimulating leadership
f Vice President Lyndon Johnson, a great
'exan. But also, in my conversations with
aany foreign ministers, I have asked them
[uite informally, "Do you, Mr. Minister — as
rou look at the situation from the point of view
)f your own country — do you believe that it is
lecessary for the United States possibly to
ipend tens of billions of dollars to assert and
lustain a leadership in space?"
I suppose I have asked that of 45 or 50 of
Jiem. And all but one of them have said — I
Lhink somewhat regretfully — "I hate to have to
say this to you, but you have got to do it. You
have got to do it, because free men dare not
leave this frontier exposed to the other side,
and this effort has to be made. And you are
the only ones who can really make it on the
scale that is required."
We shall need an enlarged information pro-
gram to confront falsehood with truth in every
continent. Do you realize that in 1960 we were
broadcasting only 1 hour a daj' to Latin Amer-
ica? Ed Murrow [Edward R. Murrow, Di-
rector, U.S. Information Agency] tells me that
he has been able to build that up now to a total
of 13 hours a day, 9 in Spanish, 4 in Portu-
guese— but only a fraction in those days of the
broadcasts of the other side, right in our own
backyard. These efforts will require money
and people and dedication and imagination.
And of course we must have a steady
strengthening of our own society here at home
as a vibrant example of what free men can
accomplish.
Finding Elements of Common Interest
Now, it's going to be necessary in this nu-
clear age, as human beings concerned about the
future of the race, to keep open the possibility
that some elements of common interest can be
found to bridge the gap between the world of
coercion and the world of freedom. Otherwise
the prospects for the race become very gloomy
indeed.
I think if a man from Mars were to drop in
and have a look at the situation, he could find
certain elements of common interest, objec-
tively considered. One, the avoidance of a
nuclear holocaust, if possible. Secondly, coop-
eration in such new ventures as outer space,
where prestige and security considerations have
not become deeply rooted, where enoiTnous ex-
pense is involved, and where cooperation could
be beneficial to both sides — perhaps most im-
portant of all, cooperation based upon the
recognition that man himself looks out upon a
hostile environment, filled with enemies of the
human race, who respect no national frontiers,
who play no political favorites, who under-
stand no ideologies, but drop their disease upon
free and Communist alike, or attack tlie food
crops of both with nists or potato blight, or
wliatever might be involved.
Now, these attempts to find some element of
understanding across this great chasm, I must
testify, have been very difficult indeed. Be-
cause it's hard just to find the words that some-
how mean the same thing to both sides, because
the very language itself has become distorted
in these great discussions.
But the effort has to be made, because we
cannot — and they cannot — accept responsibility
for the gloomy future if that effort at least not
be tried.
I'd like to close by saying that we have 42
allies. We have a great many unalined
friends, who stand closely with us in moments
of peril. There is great strength in the alli-
MARCH 18, 1963
387
™
ances — military, economic, and otherwise.
But I believe that the greatest strength of all
comes from the deepest commitments of the
American people to their own humane and de-
cent purposes. Because these things are un-
derstood by other ordinary men and women
riglit around the globe. It means that we have
to spend very little time, really, trying to ex-
plain to other people what the American people
are all about.
Drawing, as we have, upon a great European
tradition of freedom, these conmiitments are
shared and liave their roots in human nature
itself. And I have no doubt that, if we are
prepared to pay the price for the struggle, if
we are prepared to give ourselves the tools for
the victory, not only will this great struggle be
won, but we shall have allies that we do not
now suspect and we shall have the strength and
the encouragement which comes from those who
wish us well, because they understand that
these humane commitments of Western civiliza-
tion are their own, in which they too would like
to share in security and freedom.
Secretary Rusk Holds Press and Radio News Briefing at Houston
Follovnng is the transcrij)t of a press and ra-
dio news briefing held hy Secretary Rusk at
Houston, Texas, on February 26 preceding his
address before the Texas Daily Newspaper As-
sociation.^
Press release 107 dated February 27
Secretary Busk: I have no prepared state-
ment. Since time is short let's start with your
questions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what steps are being taken
to prevent aggression or subversion in this hemi-
sphere from Cuba?
A. The hemisphere has made it very clear
that it will not accept any armed aggi-ession
out of Cuba; so that point is very clear to all
sides.
The question of other steps with regard to
Cuba involves a lot of action by a great many
governments, both in the hemisphere and out-
side, to underline that Cuba must not become a
source of infection for the hemisphere, to un-
derline that Castro and Castroism will not be
accepted as a part of the hemispheric system,
that Marxist-Leninism must be eliminated from
this liemisphere, that normal relations between
the regime in Cuba and its neighbors cannot
be expected. The reduction, for example, in
' See p. .383.
shipping and trade has been going on to such
a point that both shipping and trade with the
free world during 1963 will be the smallest
fraction of what it had been, and it will be of
insignificant importance. Both individual and
joint action in the hemisphere by governments
with respect to subversive threats is now being
taken.
We are, of course, as the President has indi-
cated, very much interested in the continued
outmo\'ement of these Soviet forces. In Oc-
tober and November the missiles and bombers
were removed ; certain equipment was removed
at that time. It has been indicated that several
thousand additional Soviet forces will be re-
moved between now and the middle of March.
So we are watching all that Mith very great
concern.
But this presence in the hemisphere cannot
be accepted as a matter of policy by the hemi-
sphere, and st«ps will be taken to underline that
and to give it force and effect.
Q. Does this mean, then, with Castro trying
to export his revolution to some other Latin
American, countries, if toe know that arms are
coming from Cuba directly to support these
clarulestine revolutions, the U.S. and the OAS
[Organization of American States^ will take
action?
388
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I A. Action will be taken to interrupt and in-
;ercept that kind of movement. Yes.
Q. Mr. Secretary, will you clarify for us
<johat the orders are now to the Air Force re-
qardhxg another shooting incident on the
hrimp boat, for instance?
A. "Well, those orders were of course issued
>y the Defense Department, and the statement
was made by the Defense Department on that
ubject. They have orders to protect American
shipping in international waters against at-
acks, and they, I am sure, will press that with
[vigor.
Q. Mr. Secretary, it is announced now or ad-
\mitted now hy the administration that four
Americans were hilled in the abortive Bay of
Pigs invasion. Why wa.s this information only
brought out at this time? Why not in advance?
A. Well, quite frankly, I was not aware of
these four cases, and I asked to get information
on that when I left Washington. But I have
not as yet had it; so I think I had perhaps
better leave those comments to Washington
at this time.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you thi/nh the current
stalemate in the Geneva disarmament confer-
ence will ever be settled, and if so, will it be set-
tled by further concessions by the United
States?
A. The pi'ospect there is not very encourag-
ing, because what we have to have on oxw side
is an effective test ban treaty, with built-in in-
spection systems, so that there is genuine assur-
ance that the treaty is not being violated.
Now, the technical capacity to get that assur-
ance has improved over the last several years
by all sorts of means, including the instrumen-
tation that can be developed on the basis of the
Vela tests. But there are other sources of in-
formation that add a good deal to our knowl-
edge.
We so far have not seen any desire on the part
of the Soviet Union to accept a genuine inspec-
tion sj^stem. Let me point out that on this
matter to a certain extent this is an unequal
argument, because the Soviet Union from their
point of view doesn't need an inspection sys-
tem for the United States. They can have a
high degree of reliance on the open nature of
our society and the kind of information that
is normally available in a society like ours.
We don't have that about the Soviet Union.
It's a vast area of the Eurasian landmass, much
of it sparsely populated, where tests could go
on within this closed society without outside
knowledge.
They claim that national systems are ade-
quate for this purpose. We don't have na-
tional systems that are adequate for that pur-
pose with regard to underground testing.
We have said, "If you have instruments that
will do this job, bring the instruments forward,
let us take a look at them, because what we want
is assurance. If you have something we don't
have, let's take a look." They have been un-
willing to discuss it on a scientific and technical
basis.
So I would say that at the present time, un-
fortunately, the prospects are not very good.
Multilateral Nuclear Force
Q. Mr. Secretary?
A. Yes.
Q. In your text you mention a nuclear force
as an alternate to the present situation in ivhich
Europeans, with attachments to the United
States, would share on the basis of equality.
Coidd you elaborate a. little bit on the tnechanics
of decisionmahing and this business of aii equal-
ity force — xohether we would lose some of our
decisionmaking ?
A. Well, in that we are not talking — in that
respect we are talking about that particular
component called a "multilateral force." The
participants would have to decide among them-
selves how a decision to fire would be made.
This would not itself affect the general nuclear
establishment of the United States overall.
But these are matters which are now being
discussed with our allies. This is a point where
our own view about what might be possible
would be very much affected by the attitude of
our allies, because we have grown up in the last
17 years to be accustomed to the existing situa-
tion, which involves very heavy responsibility
on the part of the President of the United
States.
MARCH 18, 1963
389
Now, no one elected us to that position. This
resulted from the way in which nuclear weap-
ons developed during and after World War II.
Now, if the allies in Europe wish to suggest
any amendments, then we would be perfectly
glad to look at what their suggestions would
be with respect to such a thing as a multilateral
force. So there are a number of these details
that have not yet been answered, won't be
answered, can't be answered until we see what
our allies think about it.
By the way, may I make just a conmrient
about the piece of paper that was distributed ?
This will bear a reasonable resemblance to what
I expect to say toniglit. But I will depai-t from
it quite freely. So please don't feel let down if
I don't say exactly what is on that piece of
paper. And I will say some additional things
at the time.
Q. Mr. Eusk, on that same subject, President
de Gaulle ha,s emphatically rejected the idea
of this NATO nuclear force. In the speech
that you may ie ready to scrap, I think before
that you implied, sir, that the United States
was ready to go ahead without France. Now, a
minute ago, you said that they would have the
problem of making the. decision of when to fire.
Would the NATO allies, including the
United States, make this decision without
France, if the occasion arose?
A. First, I did not intimate I was going to
scrap tlie notes I passed out. I just said that
would not be an exact replica of what I planned
to say.
Secondly, President de Gaulle has said thus
far that France does not plan to join the multi-
lateral force. He has not said that he will op-
pose it if the other members of NATO wish to
organize such a force. And I think that the
question of how the alliance makes the decision
to go to war is a question of overriding impor-
tance, because tliis means nothing less than that.
And I think in such decisions France would
indeed play a very important part.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you say to those
critics who say that tlie administration hadn't
been vigorous enough in demanding the re-
moval of Soviet forces from Cuba?
A. Well, I think this is a matter which has
I
inn
to be worked out with full recognition, not onlj^
of the objectives in view but of tlie means to be «
used in getting them out.
These are very serious and dangerous mat-
ters. Tlie President last October met a very
dire threat with tlie most vigorous action. T
situation was filled with danger at that poini
I think one of our objectives must be to pro'
tect our vital interests by peaceful means, if 1
possible, rather than through a mutual confla-
gration. But that does not mean that we shall
not work continuously at tlie protection of our
vital interests, and if great dangers occur agaia
they will be met with whatever is necessary, j
Sino-Soviet Split
Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your appraisal o,
the split between Russia and Red China?
A. Well, I have always been rather cautious
about drawing conclusions from that split,
partly because I am not at all sure that either
Moscow or Peiping fully understands what that
split is all about and how far it will go.
As you know, there have been some reports in
recent days that the Soviets and the Cliinese
might be having some discussions to see what
miglit be done about their own relations.
The argument between the two seems to be
very far-reaching, going to such ultimate ques-
tions as the leadership of the Communist bloc
and the basic methods and techniques by which
— through which to push the world revolution.
I think the differences are serious, but I don't
believe they have come to a point wliere there is
a split in the bloc that could in itself benefit the
free world by a fractioning of the Communist
forces against which we are arrayed.
Q. Mr. Secretary, we have heard reports that
the President already had your successor picked
out. Do you have any plans to l-eave the Cabi-
net? (Laughter.)
A. Well, any Cabinet officer serves at the
pleasure of the President, the same having con-
sented (Laughter.), and that is a matter, of
course, that is entirely in tlie hands of the Presi-
dent. Tliere has been no discussion of tliat,
and I have no plans.
Q. Mr. Secretary, does the United States
390
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
'Wave any definite program for ridding Cuba of
ommunism^~and Castro?
A. Yes, I have already talked about six or
ight elements in that program. I don't think
hat I need to repeat those here. But perhaps
n the course of the next 2 or 3 weeks there will
)e enough debate on the subject to clarify it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what about talks with the
Turkish Government on the new missiles and
he replacement icith the Polaris submarines?
A. We have had a very good and cooperative
reaction, because this is a part of a moderniza-
;ion program that has been going on for some
;ime in a variety of ways.
This affects not only the Jupiters and Po-
aris, for example, but — and in Turkey — but it
effects missiles in other countries, both tactical
and airborne. It affects aircraft. It affects
conventional weapons. This is something that
has been on the way for a long time and has
leen discussed with tlie Turkish Government
about 2 years ago. So this I think comes as
no surprise to anyone, and the Turkish
overnment has been very cooperative.
Q. Mr. Rusk., have you seen the film ^'■Ka-
tanga, the Untold Story'''' that is showing just
now in tJie hall?
A. No, I haven't.
■film.. You would en-
would be enlightened.
Q. Ifs a striking
joy seeing it. Toti
{Laughter.)
A. Well, I think that there will be a good
many shows about Katanga some day.
The Western Alliance
Q. Is Mr. de Gaulle encouraging us to with-
draw some of our troops, and are we likely to
reduce them soon?
A. No, he is not encouraging us to do so, and
as a matter of fact I think it's quite clear that
President de Gaulle recognizes that the Atlan-
tic alliance, that is, the connection between the
United States and Western Europe, is vitally
important for the defense of the West, and he
was not in any way indicating that that alliance
should be broken up. Because the alliance was
formed for the purpose of confronting the
threat from the East. That threat continues,
and the defense of Western Europe and the
United States are therefore linked in such a
way as not to permit them to be separated or
broken.
Q. What has this country, sir, accomplished
in the way of building up foreign relations to
overcome some of the good will that we
have recently apparently lost to some other
countries — France, Canada, for example?
A. Well, I think the alliance, the Western
policy, will continue to move forward.
What happened in Europe was a decision on
the part of France not to go forward in the first
part of this year with the British membersliip
in the Common Market.
Now, one can read a lot of things into that,
but my own guess is that that is not going to
change the mainstream of Western policy,
either in the eyes of Europeans or in the eyes of
North Americans, and that this mainstream of
policy may continue. It may take certain dif-
ferent forms on particular questions, in, par-
ticularly, the economic field, but on defense
matters, on trade across the Atlantic, relations
between the West and the underdeveloped
world, I think there is no shock that will be
significant.
Q. Since our American fliers in Viet-Nam,
have been given permission now to shoot before
they are shot at, does this indicate any change
in our position with regard to that little war?
A. I think the situation there remains that
we are trying to give maximum support to the
forces of South Viet-Nam to put them in a
position to win their war. That has involved
logistics support, a higher degree of mobility,
and that means the protection of our own forces
in the event of an attack.
There has been some shooting; there will be
shooting. But the basic struggle there is be-
tween the South Vietnamese and the Viet
Cong, with a lot of help from the United
States.
And we are encouraged to believe that some
corners are being turned there and some signs
of steady improvement.
Q. Mr. Secretary?
A. Yes.
MARCH 18, 1963
391
Q. I read this morning that President Ken-
nedy would outline his policy toward Cuba at
the meeting of the Central American States in
Costa Rica in about a month. Do you have
any idea of what this policy outline would be?
A. Well, again, we have been talking about
a good many elements in it, but he will discuss
this very important — perhaps the most im-
portant of all questions — with the Central
American Republics. But when they get
through talking about it, I am sure they will
put out a statement at the time.
Gentlemen, I am sorry that the time is close
here, but I am afraid — maybe one or two more
questions.
Q. You said, a few moments ago that the
United States would use armed forces if neces-
sary to Tceep Cuha. from going outside its bound-
aries. Do you mean in case of an attack only
we would use armed forces?
A. I didn't say anything about the situation
other than the question which was put to me,
which was what would we do if anns were sent
out from Cuba against other countries in this
hemisphere. Sure, we would intei-rupt it — take
whatever steps were necessary.
Q. Any country in this hemisphere?
A. That is right.
Q. Mr. RuJik, do you approve of Liherian.?
and Indonesians participating in Exercise
Water Moccasin? Do you consider those our
allies?
A. You have caught me on this.
Q. Exercise Water Moccasin is a military
exercise taking place on March 1st., in Georgia.
One hundred and twenty-four countries are
represented.
A. You have caught me out on this one. I
have never heard of Water Moccasin.
Q. Everybody is talking about it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, we have seemed to have a
policy of containment of convmunism. Do you
think we will become more aggressive and try
to sell democracy in an aggressive way, rather
than just trying to contain communism?
A. "Wlien you look at the growth in strength
of the free world since, say, 1948, '49, and '50,
after the main war damages began to be repair-
ed, you look at the determined effort on the part
of the nev.'ly independent countries to maintain
their independence, I think there is no doubt
that the strength of the free world has been
mounting rapidly in relation to the Conununist
bloc, particularly when you compare what has
been happening in the free world and what has
been happening within the bloc, from East
Germany all the way around to North
Viet-Nam.
I think the struggle is going to go for quite |
a long time, but I think there is no question as to 1]
the direction in which it has been moving, will
continue to move in that way. L
Q. Mr. Secretary, are there any differences
within the Western alliance that could not be
healed immediately if Mr. Khrushchev said
''boo''?
A. Oh, I think the pressure from outside isi
always an occasion for putting other and lessem
questions aside. I have used this method of ex-
plaining it from time to time. We are not at
the present time in the West talking about
cracks in the basement of the alliance. Nothing
which has been said or done by President de
Gaulle or anyone else weakens in any way those
utterly fundamental commitments in the event
of aggression against NATO, for example, from 11
the East. President de Gaulle's immediate re-
action in the Cuban crisis of last October was
complete, clear, and very firm.
Wliat we have been talking about is how do
you write the next chapter, how do you build
the next story?
The hope had been that Britain would join
the Common Market, perhaps two or three
others would join the Common Market, Europe
would be moving i-apidly toward unity, we with
our Ti-ade Expansion Act would be able to
discuss with that Europe a vigorous trade ex-
pansion across the Atlantic. Meanwhile, in
NxVTO, we would go ahead with the develop-
ment of greater joint effort there, not only in
matters of command and control but on matters
of the additional resources that we feel are
needed by the alliance.
Well, now, when you decide what to do next,
remember the questions that came up at the
time of the formation of NATO, or the admis-
392
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ion of Greece or Turkey, or the admission of
lirermany, or the discussions accompanying the
I European Defense Community proposals.
Tliere was a good deal of ferment and dis-
But
sion, differences of view in the matter,
liese do not so to the root of the matter in the
sense that they don't go to the mutual commit-
ments we have taken for our mutual security.
So I am not concerned about this. I think Mos-
cow understands this just as well as we do in the
West.
Tliank vou verv much, gentlemen.
rhe United Nations in the Fight for Freedom
Address hy Secretanj Rusk '
I am happy to take part in this conference on
'oreigu affairs. It is a great pleasure to meet a
lumber of old friends — many of them veterans
)f public service along the Potomac — and a
special pleasui'e to be introduced by my onetime
joUeague Karl Bendetsen.
I should like, first, to bring you a greeting
from President Kennedy :
The Cincinnati Council on World Affairs, the Uni-
versity of Cincinnati, and Xavier University are to be
commended for organizing this Ninth Annual Confer-
ence on International Affairs. The subject of your
conference, "Victory in the Cold War — What Is It and
How Can We Gain It?", is of central importance to
us all. I heartily subscribe to the statement of your
conference chairman, Mr. Bendetsen, that "we need
public opinion which is intelligently informed and re-
sponsible— a citizenry committed to the sustained effort
required for victory." I would add that we in govern-
ment have no monopoly on wisdom. Conferences such
as yours can help in developing sound national poli-
cies. My warmest greetings and thanks go to all of
you who are participating in this effort.
I would underline two pomts. The first is
that by victory m the cold war we do not mean
the victory of one nation or one people over
others, but a victory for freedom. We are not
talking about an imperium ATnericanum. The
' Made before the Ninth Annual Conference on Inter-
national Affairs, at Cincinnati, Ohio, on Feb. 22 (press
release 100, revised).
second — closely related to the first — is that by
"we" we mean not just 185 million American
citizens of the United States but all men and
women throughout the woi'ld who share our
basic aspirations.
On Washington's Birthday we can talk about
the meaning of a worldwide victory for free-
dom— and the means for its achievement. For
enlarging the area of freedom has been the
business of this country since tlie First Conti-
nental Congress chose Washington as Com-
mander in Chief. It was Washington who said,
in his first inaugural, that
. . . the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and
the destiny of the republican model of government are
justly considered, perhaps, as deeply, as finally, staked
on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the Amer-
ican people.
Washington and his contemporaries clearly
regarded free choice as good not just for some
3 million persons, chiefly of British descent, liv-
ing on the eastern fringes of North America.
The ideas underlying the American experiment
in freedom were not to be just for Americans
but for "all men"- — the very words used in the
Declaration of Indejiendence.
We Americans do many things about this con-
viction of ours that freedom must prevail. To-
night I should like to talk about what we do in
and through the United Nations.
MARCH 18, 19 63
393
U.S. Commitment to the United Nations
Now I am aware of the fact that some of you
have already slumped back a bit to be bored.
But take care, for you have chosen "Victory in
the Cold War" as your central theme for dis-
cussion. Among other things, the cold war is a
sustained and cynical effort by the Communist
world to destroy the world of the United Na-
tions Charter and to substitute their own world
revolution in its place. We tend to forget so
much — and so fast. Nowadays there are those
who seem to think that cold war talk is "real-
istic" talk, ha^^ng little to do with the United
Nations — that the United Nations is a fanciful
exercise for those who wish to talk somewhat
idly about a world which has not and cannot
come into existence. In truth, a central issue
of the cold war is the United Nations itself —
its charter, its concept of a decent world order,
its commitment to the peaceful settlement of
disputes, its concern for human rights, the ex-
pansion of trade, economic and social progress,
our deepest aspirations toward a disarmed and
peaceful world.
Have you forgotten that in July 1945 our
Senate consented to the ratification of the
United Nations Charter by a vote of 89 to 2?
It was a serious and solemn act and was recog-
nized as such at the time, particularly by those
of us who were wearing the uniform at that
time. It represented long and sober thought
about our national purposes in our relations
with other peoples, about our abstention from
full responsibility between the two World
Wars, about the tens of millions lost in World
War II. The charter opens — have you read
it? — with a short statement of what can accu-
rately be called the long-range foreign policy
of the American people — and of most other
ordinary people in other countries. The action
of the Senate responded to the words of Theo-
dore Roosevelt decades before : "The question is
not whether America shall play a great part in
the affairs of the world, but whether she shall
play it well or ill."
Our commitment to the United Nations was
not empty phrasing. We threw ourselves into
its beginnings with all our energy and resources.
We set about the binding up of the wounds of
war. We demobilized our Armed Forces and
reduced our defense budget to less than $10
billion. A strenuous effort was made to put
atomic energy under international control and
to abolish nuclear weapons. The alliances
formed to fight World War II were expected to
vanish. New alliances aimed at anyone else
were not at that time contemplated.
"VAHiat went wrong? The cold war was bom.
Joseph Stalin, even before the guns were silent,
set about to prevent the United Nations system
from succeeding; one nation returned to its
dogma of unlimited appetite and ambition.
Wartime agreements about the countries of
Eastern Europe were bruslaed aside. Pressures
were applied against Iran, Greece, and Turkey.
Occupation arrangements in Germany were ig-
nored, and Berlin was soon subjected to block-
ade. Czechoslovakia was seized by a coup
engineered from the outside. The shadow of
the Red Army lent support to Communist par-
ties and agents througliout Western Europe.
Participation in the Marshall Plan was rejected.
Aggression was unleashed in Korea. Tlie walk-
out and the veto underlined an attitude of con-
tempt for the United Nations itself. The cold
war is not a bilateral controversy between
Washington and Moscow but an offensive by the
Communist bloc against all the rest.
In his address to the United Nations General
Assembly in September 1961, President
Kennedy said,^
In this hall there are not three forces, but two.
One Is composed of those who are trying to build the
kind of world described in articles 1 and 2 of the
charter. The other, seeking a far different world,
would undermine this Organization in the process.
I am profoundly convinced that this is the
essential issue in this period of world history
through which we are living. Man is in the
process of deciding whether we shall build a
decent world order, resting upon the consent of
peoples and governments, or become subjected
to forces of coercion and tyranny. I am equally
convinced that the overwhelming majority of
peoples and governments are committed to the
promise of the charter. This is made manifest
at moments of crisis, such as the one which arose
in Korea in June 1950 and the one in Cuba in
October 1962. It was discovered anew when
' Bulletin of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.
394
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
troika" was proposed to cripple the United Na-
ions itself, a pi-oposal rejected almost unani-
iiously, except for those who made it. As one
s ho spent 5 years in imiform in World "War II,
3 one who has some comprehension of the al-
iiost unimaginable differences between World
Xav II and any third world war, I am deeply
mumitted to the realistic necessity of making
lie United Nations system work.
iome Important Aspects of U.N. Function
I suspect that most of us Americans know
oth too much and too little about the United
ations : too much to give it the continuing at-
tention it deserves, too little to understand
eeply its vital importance in the conduct of our
breign relations. Time does not permit more
than the briefest allusions to the more impor-
ant aspects of its function.
The United Nations provides the elementary
structure for international arrangements which
,re simple, practical necessities in the daily
ork of the modern world. Were it to disap-
lear today, it would have to be rebuilt
tomorrow.
It provides a busy, if informal, diplomatic
center where governments can be in regular
touch with each other about a wide range of
bilateral problems, an opportunity especially
important for those who do not have worldwide
diplomatic representation in capitals.
It is a school for understanding — the under-
standing which reaches beyond a sense of pass-
ing amiability and establishes its roots in a
more accurate knowledge of nations who are
otherwise strangers to each other.
It affords the smaller countries — the bulk of
its membersliip — their primary chance to influ-
ence the course of events as well as the princi-
pal protection of their security m a somewhat
turbulent world.
It can extend types of assistance to newly
independent and developing countries too sensi-
tive to be handled on a bilateral basis. Through
such agencies as the World Bank it can orga-
nize and coordinate aid provided to individual
countries by combinations of national effort.
It serves as the custodian of prestige at mo-
ments of crisis, providing a pause for reflection
and sober thought and machinery for the peace-
ful settlement of disputes before the fire becomes
universal.
It provides a "United Nations presence" in
certain areas of tension and danger, an inter-
national safeguard against the violence whicli
might escalate rapidly into war.
It fosters the steady growth of law — the law
which enlarges our area of freedom by reduc-
ing, tlirough predictable conduct, the chances
of harsh collisions as sovereign states pursue
their eccentric orbits.
It keeps before us the constant reminders of
the unfinished business of the human race:
peace, safety, human dignity, prosperity — and
the freedom which is our own most basic com-
mitment.
Of course the United Nations has problems
whicli need attention. It is a political institu-
tion, within which 110 members are pursuing
their national interests as they see them. We
do — we in the United States — and so do 109
others. It is impressive to see the extent to
which common interests evolve, but this is not
always the result. Looking ahead, it seems to
me that there are at least two problems which
need further attention.
The first is the role of debate in the peaceful
settlement of disputes. Tlie drafters of the
charter wisely looked upon debate as a drastic
remedy. Article 33 states :
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, concilia-
tion, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of
their own choice.
We have made certain suggestions on this
point: for example, with respect to the more
liberal use of a rapporteur, in an effort to ex-
plore quietly the possibilities of settlement
without the inflammatory effect of acrimonious
debate. We are pleased to know that other
members are thinking about the same problem
and an improvement in procedures to increase
the chances for constructive results.
A second problem which is getting intensive
attention is that of financial responsibility
within the United Nations system. The United
Nations is called upon to bear very heavy re-
sponsibilities; this costs money and there is no
MARCH 18, 1963
395
other source for it than its members. We be-
lieve that when decisions are taken the mat-
ter of costs should be a part of the decision,
that votes should be cast with this resjaonsibil-
ity in mind, and that costs should be shared
equitably among all the membership. A large
step was taken during 1962 toward financial
responsibility; the World Court held that as-
sessments by the General Assembly for peace-
keeping activities in the Near East and the
Congo were obligatory upon members, a judg-
ment subsequently approved by a large major-
ity of the Assembly itself.^
The U.N. in the Congo
I suppose that no United Nations responsi-
bility has raised more searching questions or
has been more difficult for the United Nations
itself than those activities in the Congo since
July 1960. The severity of the test has made
the present prospects of a successful conclusion
all the more gratifying. One difficulty is our
short memory, forgetfulness about the origins
of the problem and the issues involved in it.
The Congo problem in its present form
started in the years 1957-60 with rapidly in-
creasing insistence by the Congolese themselves
upon their own independence. The Congo, an
area more than one-third as large as the United
States and with more than 13 million people,
pressed for independence before it had devel-
oped a structure of indigenous administration,
before it had any significant experience in elec-
tions or in managing a constitutional system.
However, a roimdtable conference was con-
vened in Brussels in early 1960 at which more
than 20 Congolese political groups were repre-
sented and which included all of the leaders
whose names have become familiar to us:
Kasavubu, Lumumba, Gizenga, Tshombe, Ka-
lonji, and others. They agreed on a basis for
independence, more particularly on the idea of
a miified Congo. Elections were held on that
basis throughout the coimtry for both the Cen-
tral and Provincial governments. Independ-
ence came on July 1, 1960, under a basic law
passed by the Belgian Parliament but subject of
course to amendment by the new state itself.
Immediately upon independence, the fragile
nation descended into chaos. Its troops re-
belled, and law and order disappeared. Belgium
sent certain of its own forces back to the Congo
to offer some measure of protection to the large
nmnber of its own nationals livmg there. The
Central Congolese Government thereupon is-
sued three requests for military assistance in-
cluding troops : one to the United Nations, one
to the United States, and one to the Soviet
Union. These were the alternatives with which
President Eisenhower was confronted in July
1960. He wisely decided to support the request
to the United Nations and to give that orga-
nization our backing to prevent the Congo from,
becoming a major threat to the peace of Africa
and perhaps to the world through a direct con-
frontation there between the great powers. An
emergency meeting of the United Nations Se-
curity Coimcil told Dag Hammarskjold, the
Secretary-General, to organize a peacekeeping
mission.* The first troops, a Tunisian force,
arrived in less than 24 hours. Before long the
United Nations with United States help had a
force of 20,000, contriljuted by approximately
20 countries, backed up by one of the largest
continuous airlifts in the recent decade.
This was not an intervention by the United
Nations in the internal affairs of a single coun-
try ; it was a response to the f onnal invitation
of the government of the country itself to assist
it to eliminate chaos and to prevent imwanted
intrusion into its affairs from the outside.
Several months later the Kennedy adminis-
tration took a careful look at Congo policy and
decided to give full and effective support to the
earlier decision to back the United Nations.
The road has been rocky, but the effort has been
more than justified in the event.
In the 31 months since July 1960, three seces-
sions have been set back — Communists in the
north in Stanleyville, diamond smugglers in
Kasai, the Katanga mining area in the south.
No one of these secessions was based upon a
mandate, either by law or by the expressed will
of the peoples concerned. The United Nations
has supported the arrangements agreed to by
the Congolese themselves and has sought to
create the conditions under which peaceful set-
'lUd., Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246, and Jan. 7, 1963, p. 30.
•76i(i., Aug. 1,1960, p. 159.
396
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
elements could be reached without outside in-
;erference. A moderate anti-Coinunmist gov-
jmment has been in business now for more than
I year, and the United Nations Force has suc-
ceeded in its mission to preserve the "terri-
:orial integrity and political independence" of
he Congo.
The United Nations has brought in teachers,
Dhysicians, and half a hvmdred other techni-
jians to get the Congolese economy — wliich has
. I fabulous potential if it can be allowed to
i'ivork — going again. Its service has been
[narked by as much gallantry on the civilian
side as it has been marked by gallantry and
discretion on the political side.
But let us, before we concern ourselves about
the details of these particular weeks, remember
what the alternatives were, what the objectives
have been, what the prospectives are, and real-
ize that in this process the United Nations has
been severely tested and has every chance to
make good on its basic commitments.
The Struggle for Freedom Will Prevail
We in tlie United States, on this matter of
the cold war, will continue to try to build
the strength — political, economic, and social
strength as well as the military strength — of
tlie free world, and we will continue this strug-
gle for freedom and defend our vital interests
because they are indeed vital to the survival of
freedom. May I say with complete candor, in
order that I may not be misunderstood, that,
if there is anyone here who wants victory in the
cold war and wants to slash our defense budget,
I don't know what jou are talking about. If
there is anyone here who wants victory in the
cold war and is imwilling to spend less than
one-tenth of our defense budget in foreign aid,
I don't know what you are talking about. If
there is anyone who wants victory in the cold
war and is unwilling to back the rapid expan-
sion of trade within the free world, surely you
do not understand the sinews of strength among
the nations of the free world. And if there is
anyone here who wants victory in the cold war
and wants us to withdraw from the United Na-
tions or fail to support it, then let me say doTi'f
quit. There are many ways of quitting, of
abandoning the field to the enemy, and there
is no surer way than to withdraw our support
in pique or frustration because we find our-
selves in great majorities in the United Nations
only 98 percent of the time instead of 100 per-
cent of the time.
And if there is anyone — and one can sympa-
thize with the frustrations of this turbulent
world in which we live — if there is anyone who
wishes to precipitate the issues to settle tomor-
row every question in front of us through a
great conflagration, if necessary, let me say that
we cannot let our glands take over from our
intelligence. For the underlying reason is this :
Freedom is rooted in human nature. Freedom
is a result of a discourse which has been going
on for two thousand years among men of many
countries, many races, about the political con-
sequences of the nature of man. These aspira-
tions are a part of our own heritage. It is
no accident that articles 1 and 2 of the Charter
of the United Nations are so congenial to the
long-range foreign policy of the American
people because they came out of a tradition of
which we are a part.
We are strong with our arms, strong enough
so tliat Mr. Marshal Malinovsky's speech today
can be discounted for what it was worth. We are
strong in our arms ; we are strong in our econ-
omy. Wliei-e we are strongest of all is in these
shared commitments we have with people in
every country in every continent. At times of
great testing, as I have indicated earlier, we
know where the sympathies of the ordinary
people of the world are because they under-
stand that we have no national purposes which
we are trying to impose upon them, that the
strength of this giant is a strength committed
to decent objectives, and that the freedom of
our people means to us the freedom of those
other people — tliat the commitments of the
charter apply to us as well as to them, that we
and they continually spin the infinity of threads
which bind peace together, and that tliese pow-
erful conmion interests make allies of us all
in times of great testing.
I have no doubt about how this thing we call
the cold war is going to come out because we
are talking about human beings, we are talking
about people, and I think we know a good deal
MARCH 18, 1963
677589—63 3
397
about their commitments — their commitments
in decency- — and those commitments we sliare,
and on those commitments we have allies.
Whether midei" alliances or not, we have allies
with people right around this globe. We will
win tills cold war because it is a war directed
by tyraimy against all the rest, and the great
majority is stiiiggling for freedom. That
struggle will surely prevail.
The Nuclear Test Ban Issue
Statement hy William C. Foster
Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency '
It is an honor and a pleasure to find myself
at this table today as the representative of the
United States in the company of so many dis-
tinguished delegates from other countries. I
am occupying a place which has been familiar
to you for the past many months as that of Am-
bassador [Arthur H.] Dean, and he has asked
me to tell you, his colleagues and friends, that he
is sorry not to be rejoining you. Even though
personal circumstances have made it impossible
for liim to continue liis work here, he retains
an active interest in this field as a consultant
to our Government, and he remains convinced
of the absolute necessity for progress in the
disarmament field.
This is a conviction which I share to the full.
It explains the very existence of the United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
and the efforts of my Government to reach
meaningful agreements. Some tilings have al-
ready been accomplished in Geneva in clearing
the path toward mutually acceptable under-
standings, but the bulk of our work lies ahead.
That fact impels us to apply ourselves to our
task with renewed vigor in the coming weeks.
The President of the United States has
stressed the importance of our efforts here in
a statement issued today. It reads as follows :
[For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 4, 1963, p. 340.]
As far as my delegation is concerned, we
recognize that all aspects of disarmament are
398
crucial, starting from our dedication to the ulti-
mate objective of general and complete disarma-
ment ^ and proceeding through all of the many
lesser measures which could bring significant
relief to a tense world caught up in an un-
wanted armaments race.
Possibility of Progress on Three Proposals
Accordingly, our efforts here should, we be-
lieve, be directed systematically toward the
achievement of progi-ess on the whole range of
possibilities that lie before us — those on the
agenda of the plenary, those in the province of
the Committee of the Wliole, and those before
the test ban subcommittee.
In the plenai-y we are in midstream in con-
sideration of the agenda already adopted by
the conference. Kt the conclusion of our open-
ing statements here, we are prepared to resume
consideration of items 5(b) and5(c).^ In con-
\
' Made at the 96th plenary meeting of the Conference
of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at
Geneva on Feb. 12.
' For text of a U.S. outline of basic provisions on
general and complete disarmament, see Bulletin of
May 7, 1902, p. 747.
'Item 5(b) pertains to disarmament measures con-
cerning nuclear-weapons delivery vehicles; item 5(c)
pertains to disarmament measures concerning conven-
tional weapons.
DEPARTSIENT OF STATE BULLETIN
lection with these items we hope that the Soviet
Jnioii, after the period of study allowed by the
•ecess, will be able to provide helpful clarifica-
ions of Mr. Gromj-ko's rather general proposal
)ut forward in New York last September.''
The United States also hopes that in the com-
ng weeks we can make rapid progress on meas-
to reduce the risk of war. As the
ielegations here Iniow, there appears to exist a
considerable area of agreement in this field,
iertain measures here are common to both the
hited States and the Soviet plans. Specif-
cally, they are: improved communications,
;change of military missions, and advance
otification of major military movements.
In order to facilitate consideration of this
uestion the United States, just jjrior to our
recess, submitted a working paper on this sub-
ject.° In view of the inclusion of such measures
in both the Soviet and United States plans, we
should not have to spend our time discussing
their value but rather should concentrate on
the modalities of how to put such measures into
effect.
I hope that it will be possible both in the co-
chairmen's meetings and in the Committee of the
Whole to deal with the opportunities presented
by the present area of accord in a realistic
fashion. Our purpose in this regard is the
achievement of specific agreements in the very
near future. The United States is prepared to
hold the necessary discussions of technical mat-
ters as soon as we can reach general agreement
on the substantive aspects of tlie three pro-
posals.
At this moment, however, we feel that one
particular question merits the preponderance
of our immediate attention. I refer of course
to the problem of concluding a treaty for the
cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.**
I believe that there is some reason to hope
that a test ban agreement may be on the way.
* Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, speak-
ing before the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 21, 1962,
expressed Soviet willingness to consider permitting
retention of a small number of certain types of nuclear-
weapons delivery vehicles into the second stage of
disarmament.
° For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 31, 1962, p. 1019.
' For texts of U.S.-U.K. di-aft treaties, see ibid., Sept.
IT, 1962, pp. 411 and 415.
For it does seem to us that the basic ingre-
dient of success — a desire for agreement by both
nuclear sides — may now exist. Certainly it
does on our side.
The year and a half of seeking to re-create a
common basis of negotiation, let us hope, is
over. Our debates can now stand on the plat-
form built in the exchange of letters between
President Keimedy and Chairman Khrushchev.'
We can proceed to enlarge the area of agree-
ment defined by that exchange.
In the view of the United States Govern-
ment this task is one of the most urgent assign-
ments this Committee has. Serious and con-
centrated negotiations are now called for.
Propaganda has no place in this effort.
I think it would promote progress in these
talks if we could all secure a more or less com-
mon understanding of the kind of verification
system which is now the subject of negotiations.
Although not yet precisely defined, this verifica-
tion system is substantially different from the
kinds of systems this Committee was discussing
before tlie recess. This is the central fact of
the exchange of letters between President Ken-
nedy and Chairman Khrushchev. It is a fact
wliich has been obscured by a debate over mun-
bers; it is a fact, nonetheless, which is far
broader than the present much-jiublicized in-
spection-quota controversy.
Essential Features of Verification System
Since both sides now seem to be talking about
the same basic kind of verification system, I
shall take a few minutes to describe its essential
features.
First, the system now mider discussion is
premised on the use of nationally owned and
operated detection networks. These national
stations would submit data regularly and in a
uniform mamier to an international data col-
lection center. At the recent New York-
Washmgton meetings ^ the United States and
the Soviet Union exchanged preliminary lists
of seismograph stations from which the data-
gathering arm of the verification system might
be selected. Such selected stations in each
other's territory would form the basic network,
'/6i(?., Feb. 11, 1963, p. 198.
' Ibid., Jan. 28, 1963, p. 127, and Feb. 18, 1963, p. 236.
MAKCH 18, 1963
and the United States has given the Soviet
Union a general description of the type of in-
struments used at the United States' stations.
The second element of the new verification
system involves the use of automatically re-
cording seismograph stations. Such stations
could supplement the data collected by national
stations and could help to a degree in detecting,
locating, and identifymg seismic events, thus
improving the capabilities of the verification
system.
At the private meetings which took place
during the recess, the United States suggested
10 sites in U.S. territory whei'e automatic re-
corders might be located. The U.S. delegation
furnished information on the average seismic
noise levels at these sites. The Soviet Union
accepted one of these U.S. sites, declined the
other nine, and requested two others in their
place. The United States said that it did not
object to these two alternative sites and gave
the Soviet Union noise-level data for the two
sites as well.
Within Soviet territory the United States
specified 10 general areas where automatic re-
corders might well be located. These areas
correspond to known areas of high seismicity in
the Soviet Union. The United States asked
the Soviet Union to designate specific sites for
automatic stations within these 10 areas to be
recommended by the Soviet Government on the
basis of its knowledge of the noise-level and
other local factors. The areas specified by the
United States include the areas of the three
sites suggested by the Soviet Union, but the
United States did not accept the Soviet conten-
tion that there need only be three such auto-
matic stations.
Later on in the private talks the United
States suggested that its requirements might be
met with seven automatic recorders if satis-
factory assurances could be obtained concerning
the characteristics of the Soviet national seis-
mograph network. There was no reciprocal
response by the Soviet Union, which continued
to state that the three sites specified in Cliair-
man Khrushchev's letter of January 7 would be
sufficient and that no additional sites could be
contemplated. Noise-level data for the three
400
Soviet-suggested sites were produced by the
Soviet Union at the last session of the private
talks.
The third element of the new verification
system involves on-site inspections. We are un-
able, however, to report the extent of areas of
agreement on this subject. We have had no
response from the Soviet Union to our specific
suggestions about basic features of this element
of the verification system. For the moment,
therefore, this Conmiittee will simply have to
take note of the fact that the on-site inspection
quota concept, first advanced officially by the
Soviet Government in 1959 and then repudiated
by it in 19G1, has once again been accepted by i
the Soviet Government. At the private talks in
New York and Washington the United States
explained its views on appropriate general j
conditions under which on-site mspections
should take place. We inquired whether the
Soviet Union foresaw any serious difficulties ia t
negotiating an agreement along lines envisaged
by the United States. We received no answer.
Up to this point, Mr. Chairman, I doubt that
the Soviet representative would dispute very
much of what I have said. To summarize : The
important thing is that we have a new premise
for negotiations. We are now talking about a
verification system based on national mamied
detection stations, automatic seismic stations,
and a quota of on-site inspections. In private
talks we progressed in some details beyond the
points covered m the exchange of letters be-
tween President Kennedy and Chairman
Khrushchev. Essentially, however, we did not
succeed, in the private talks, in enlarging sub-
stantially the area of agreement acliieved in the
exchange of letters. This is the immediate task
before us. ,
•
Soviet Inflexibility in Private Talks
The fact that last month's conversations did
not achieve their objective can be explained, it
seems to us, by one basic reason. This is that
the Soviet representatives were willing to talk
about only a vei-y few of the matters still unre-
solved. Even on those few points, they were
not ready to consider President Kennedy's sug-
gestions to Chairman Ivhrushchev that the
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
far-reaching AVestern moves of the past 4 years
to accommodate the Soviet Union be matched
by some equivalent Soviet advance. In other
words, tlie Soviet delegation only wanted to
speak about its own number of unmanned
seismic stations and about its own annual nmn-
ber of inspections, as set forth in Chairman
Khrushchev's letters of December 19th and
January 7th last. They insisted that the
United Kingdom and United States had no
choice but to accept the Soviet figures in each
case, that is, three unmanned stations and two
to three inspections. The Western representa-
tives, on the other hand, made known the flexi-
bility of their position in a number of ways.
For example, at the outset of the talks we of
the West said that, on the basis of our present
information, we considered 10 unmanned sta-
tions each, in the U.S. and U.S.S.R., to be
necessary to supplement the national network
of existing detection stations. At the last
meeting on January 31st, however, as I have
just pointed out, we did state that seven such
unmanned stations might be sufficient, if the
Soviet Union would furnish us with satisfactory
data about the capabilities of its national net-
work and if it would reconfirm its offer of last
summer to build new manned national stations
where necessary to augment the system.
Smiilarly, based on our best information, up
to 10 annual inspections seem to us to be tech-
nically essential. Nonetheless, we stated clearly
that we would reevaluate this conclusion if the
Soviet delegation could give us the scientific
information which they claim to have and which
might, if correct, substantially reduce the resid-
ual number of unidentified seismic events in a
normal year. We then outlined United States
views on the general procedures under which
the United States contemplated that on-site in-
spections would be carried out. We requested
Soviet comments but received no answer despite
repeated requests. We were told only that the
discussion of such details would be premature
until the Western Powers accepted the Soviet
position of three annual inspections and three
unmanned stations.
The justification which has been offered to
us by Soviet representatives for their demands
has been that the Soviet Union is not now
interested in bargaining. They say that they
have just made a major move forward to meet
the Western position by agreeing to on-site in-
spections and that this demonstrates how much
the U.S.S.R. desires a test ban treaty. They
add, moreover, that, since haggling over de-
tails would prevent rapid conclusion of a treaty,
the Soviet Union decided to put all of its cards
on the table right away. Thus the Soviet fig-
ures are not a first offer, subject to bargaining,
but the final Soviet position.
We have expressed our concern at this Soviet
negotiating approach. After all. President
Kennedy's letter of December 28, 1962, made
it clear that he regarded the Soviet offer of
two to three inspections per year to be insuffi-
cient. In the face of this belief of the head of
our Government, we have not been able to under-
stand why the Soviet Government decided to
enter into private talks in January miless it
was ready to exercise some negotiating
flexibility.
U.S.-U.K. Position
And, I may say, some flexibility is still essen-
tial in Geneva if an agreement is to be made
possible. After all, in line with tecluiical ad-
vances we have reduced our proposal of Febru-
ary 1960 from 20 inspections per year, first to
a sliding scale in May 1961 of between 12 and
20 inspections per year and now to 8 to 10 in-
spections annually. In spite of Soviet accept-
ance in 1960, and repudiation in 1961, of 15
international control posts on Soviet territory,
we have agreed now to rely on national seismic
stations, supplemented by 7 to 10 automatic
seismic stations.
The United States and United Kingdom dele-
gations have thus shown that they can be flexi-
ble within the rock-bottom limits imposed by
the present state of scientific knowledge in seis-
mology. However, we must know the param-
eters of the problem with which we are grap-
pling. We must see in clear detail how many
seismic events the proposed worldwide system
will be likely to detect and identify so that we
will have some idea of how many residual uni-
dentified events will be eligible for inspection.
We cannot accept any nmnber of inspections in
the amiual quota which does not allow the in-
MARCH 18, 1963
401
spection of a reasonable proportion of such
events. We must also ask about the general out-
line of provisions to be adopted to determine
how on-site inspections will work in practice
before we can commit ourselves to any fixed
number of automatic recording stations and on-
site inspections.
The Soviet Union has implied that the United
Kingdom and tlie United States wish to put
off the conclusion of a test ban through a discus-
sion of teclinical detail. We agree that much
of the technical detail of a test ban agreement
can be left to the treaty drafters. But there are
a nmnber of important features of an inspection
arrangement which are not mere details at all
but which are essential to insui-e the effective-
ness of inspections as a deterrent and as a con-
tribution to the confidence of both sides.
It would be of little use to agi-ee upon a num-
ber of inspections, however acceptable to both
sides, if the arrangements for them were so un-
clear that any party being inspected were given
the means to keep those inspections from being
carried out in an efficient and meaningful man-
ner. We are convinced that agreement on a
quota number cannot be reached on a sensible
and tecluiically justified basis unless we, at the
same time, know the major characteristics of tlie
inspection process, such as :
(1) The nationality of inspection teams;
(2) The criteria whicli would make an event
eligible for inspection ;
(3) The extent of the area to be inspected;
and
(4) The arrangements by which events would
be chosen for inspection.
The answers to these questions can be cnicial
in determining whether 10 inspections, for ex-
ample, will be necessary or, indeed, whether
any number, however large, would have any
significance. All of our specific proposals on
these issues are on the table or have been made
clear to the Soviet delegation. Thus far the
Soviet delegation lias refused to comment on
them.
We agree with the Soviet Union that the con-
clusion of a test ban treaty is a political act and,
indeed, an act of the highest importance. We
reject the Soviet contention, however, that the
provisions for the control system can also be de-
cided solely on a political basis, without regard
for objective scientific considerations. We
must, therefore, continue to be guided by our
best understanding of the current technical situ-
ation, and this will inevitably prescribe for us
the outer bounds of any possible agreement.
Need To Clarify Fundamental Questions
It is for these reasons that we must so
strongly urge our Soviet colleagues to abandon
their attitude of "take it or leave it"; it is time
for tliem to come down to hard facts, to the basic
requirements of the control system which they
are now proposing. We do not by any means
call for a discussion of secondary or subsidiary
issues but are asking for clarification and care-
ful negotiation of some of the fundamental
questions of a test ban.
All of the issues I have mentioned are crucial
matters. We say that they all have a bearing
on the determination of the answer to one of the
two quantitative questions which the U.S.S.R.
is ready to put on our agenda, namely, the an-
nual number of inspections. We feel that we
cannot decide on this point in a vacuum, and
the same is tnie for the question of the number
and location of unmanned seismic stations.
Those are the issues which face us and which
the Soviet delegation alone can answer. This
is why we look to the Soviet delegation to an-
swer the fundamental questions which we have
posed. This is why we are convinced that the
key to progress in our woi'k still rests primarily
in the hands of Minister [Vassily V.] Kuz-
netsov. Ambassador [Semyon K.] Tsarapkin,
and their colleagues.
It is the hope of the U.S. delegation that this
session of our conference will be noted not for
its debates but for its specific accomplislmients.
We will do the world little good if all we pro-
duce is records for historians. Let us rather
produce agreements. The U.S. delegation is
here to do business.
402
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
U.S. Affirms Willingness To Work
for Test Ban Agreement
hy
■
es
Folloxoing is the text of a statement hy the
U.S. Anns Control and Disarmament Agency
read to neivs correspondents on Fein/ary 22,
by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of
ews, Department of State.
The Soviet Union's apparent rejection of any
urtlier negotiations witliin the three-power
,est ban subcommittee is a discouraging devel-
opment. This unfortunate decision brings into
sharp focus the central issue in these negotia-
tions: It is whether the Soviet Union is now
prepared to reach a fair and sound agreement
to halt nuclear weapons testing for all time.
Last December the Soviet Union stated it was
prepared to accept, once again, two or three on-
site inspections annually.^ This, coupled with
its acceptance earlier of the use of three auto-
matic seismic stations, seemed to be an encour-
aging development. However, as this Govern-
ment made plain, it considered the actual
Soviet numbers in both cases to be inadequate.
In informal and formal discussions since that
time, the Soviet Government has not changed its
position. Tliat position appears to boil down
to this: Either accept the stated figures or
there will be no agreement.
We have made it clear that we cannot accept
these figures. The United States is directing
its efforts to working out a sound and reliable
agreement. We are prepared to negotiate on
all elements of the necessaiy verification system
and it is the system as a whole which must be
reliable. We regret the unwillingness of the
Soviet Union to discuss this wider range of
questions.
On the matter of on-site inspection spe-
cifically, the position of the United States is
that 8 to 10 on-site inspections is a reasonable
range for inclusion in a treaty. Eecently, Mr.
William C. Foster, on instructions, indicated
to the Soviet Union representatives that, if
there was a clear understanding of the set of
principles governing on-site inspection proce-
1 BuixETiN of Feb. 11, 1963, p. 198.
dures which would insure that each on-site in-
spection was meaningful, the U.S. was willing
to consider possible acceptance of seven on-site
inspections.
The United States has been, and remains,
ready and willing to strive to overcome the
present difficulties that stand in the way of
agreement. What is needed now is a similar
willingness on the part of the Soviet Union.
Mr. Foster returned to Washington for con-
sultation last Thursday [February 14]. He
will return to Geneva this weekend to continue
negotiations on this issue in an effort to fur-
ther advance toward the conclusion of an effec-
tive agreement.
U.S. and Luxembourg Exchange
Ratifications of FEN Treaty
Press release 110 dated February 28
Instruments of ratification of the treaty of
friendsliip, establisliment and navigation be-
tween the United States and the Grand Duchy
of Luxembourg were exchanged on February
28. The exchange was made by Secretary Rusk
and the Luxembourg Ambassador, Georges
Heisbourg, at a brief fonnal ceremony. This
action completes the procedures required for
bringing the treaty into force. By its tenns the
treaty will enter into force on Alarch 28, 1 month
after the exchange of ratifications.
The treaty, which was signed at Luxembourg
on Februaiy 23, 1962,^ has been approved by
the United States Senate and the Luxembourg
Parliament. It is the first treaty of its type
that has ever been concluded between the two
countries.
The new treaty is one of a series of over 20
such treaties that have been negotiated by the
United States in recent years. Its principal
purpose is to provide a comprehensive legal
basis, framed in modern terms and responsive
to modern conditions, for the further growth of
general economic and other relations between
the two countries.
^ Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 437. For a statement
of Sept. 7, 1962, by Philip H. Trezise, see ihid., Sept.
24, 1962, p. 467.
MARCH 18, 1963
403
THE CONGRESS
Communist Subversion in the Western Hemispliere — Continued
Statement hy Edwin M. Martin
Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs ^
STEPS WE ARE TAKING TO COMBAT COM-
MUNIST SUBVERSION
In the face of the Communist subversive of-
fensive in the hemisphere, there arises the ques-
tion of what the U.S. and the other American
Republics are doing to meet it. Success in com-
bating this offensive -will, of course, depend
greatly on the will and ability of all the Ameri-
can governments to act and to coordinate their
efforts with each other. It is important to keep
in mind that what we are concerned with are
problems and situations which exist in 19 inde-
pendent, sovereign nations, as properly jealous
of their independence as we are. Although we
are interdependent and allied by geography,
common origins, and the regional security sys-
tem of the OAS [Organization of American
States], we are all also firmly committed in
inter- American treaties to the principle of non-
intervention in each other's internaJ affairs.
Indeed, the violation of this principle by the
Soviet and Castro-directed Communists creates
the problem we are talking about.
From this it is evident that, so far as the
U.S. is concerned, neither the problem nor the
remedies are entirely within our control. It
means that the steps the U.S. takes must be
in fidl agreement, free cooperation, and part-
' Made before the Latin American Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Feb. 18.
For the first portion of this statement, see Butlletin of
Mar. 11, 1963, p. 347.
nership with our Latin American allies. While
promoting increasing cooperation, the U.S.,
in all its efforts, continues to respect the prin-
ciple of sovereign independence. We cannot
and will not ourselves, in combating violation
of this principle by others, destroy the very
principle we are trying to preserve.
We are channeling our direct attack on the
problem of Communist subversion in two direc-
tions. One is to isolate Cuba from the hemi-
sphere and discredit the image of the Cuban
revolution in the hemisphere. The other is to
improve the internal secxirity capabilities of
the countries concerned.
Even more important over the long term will
be the achievement of our goals under the Alli-
ance for Progress, a partnership of 20 countries
of the inter- American system.
Interagency Program Coordination
A number of U.S. agencies are engaged in
implementing programs designed to assist the
governments of Latin America to deal with
this insidious threat. Their individual activi-
ties are carried on as a part of an integrated
U.S. effort to strengthen country internal se-
curity capabilities and to promote somid polit-
ical, economic, and social structures through
democratic processes. Each of the representa-
tives of the other agencies at this hearing will
be able to furnish you in more detail informa-
tion about their efforts and the achievement
of these objectives.
404
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
lim-l
Coordination of all of these activities takes
lace in the weekly meetings of the Latin
nierican Policy Committee. In these meet-
igs, senior policy officials of all the concerned
lencies meet with me to discuss their pro-
ranis on the basis of prepared staff papers.
ie examine in some detail the activities of
ich of the agencies in the area at each weekly
leeting and agree on programs for periods
1 the future ranging from 6 months to a num-
er of 3'ears, depending on our ability to fore-
'e what is needed.
If the conclusions of the Latin American
'olicy Committee are such as to require higher
'vel decisions, they are promptly submitted
1 higher authority for review and approval,
iicludinir, where appropriate, the President.
These policy and progi-am decisions are then
arried out as an integrated effort by the coun-
ry team in the field and by day-to-day dialog
letween the country desk officers of the various
igencies here in Washington.
Between meetings there is, of course, continu-
ng and frequent informal contact at all levels
petween the concerned agencies.
activities To Weaken and Discredit the Cuban
legime
Wliile subversion has been, as we have seen, a
ong-term effort, its strength is unquestionably
iffected by the position, prestige, and stability
if Castro and his regime in Cuba. We have
ad a considerable measure of success from our
sfforts to isolate Cuba and discredit the Castro
'ovemment. In this regard, the missile crisis
proved to be of inestimable value in unmasking
the Castro regime, previously regarded by
many as a model for a new Latin American-type
revolution, as just one more tool of Moscow.
The ineptitude of Cuban leaders, coupled with
the success of our efforts to deprive Cuba of
access to the industrialized markets of the free
world, has brought about serious economic de-
terioration in the island.
In the political field a major reduction in the
influence of fidelismo in the hemisphere has been
achieved. Tlie Castro government has been
suspended from participation in the OAS.
Fifteen American Eepublics no longer have
diplomatic relations with Cuba. Last October
during the missile crisis the American Repub-
lics achieved complete hemispheric solidarity on
OAS action to protect the peace and security
of the continent.^ As a result of economic de-
terioration, Soviet domination, and political
ostracism, the Cuban example has become in-
creasingly less attractive to Latin American
peoples.
The facts about what Castro has done to Cuba
and its people need only to be known in order to
convince. Our copy is readymade for us, but
it must be gotten to the millions in every Latin
American country, nearly half of them illit-
erate. USIA [U.S. Information Agency] is
waging a battle for men's minds in telling this
story of the betrayal of the Cuban revolution
and what conditions in Cuba and other Com-
munist countries are like today. Through
radio, press, books, television, and films, this
message is being carried daily to the Latin
American public. To cite a few examples : (a)
4,500 hours of USIA-fumished radio programs
are being broadcast over some 1,500 Latin Amer-
ican stations per week; (b) some 10,000 words
of news and commentary are being sent daily
via teletype to all Latin American posts to be
made available to the local press; and (c) a
weekly 15-minute videotaped show is being tele-
vised regulai'ly in 42 cities of 18 Latin Ameri-
can countries, with an estimated 10 million
viewers.
In addition to tliis mass approach, USIA has
greatly expanded its efforts to make contact
witli special groups such as labor, student
bodies, and intellectual and cultural elite who
are the priority targets of the Communist
efforts. The Department of Defense is also
making anti-Castro and anti-Communist ma-
terial available to the armed forces in these
countries for use in troop information and edu-
cation programs.
A gage of the success of our efforts to dis-
credit and isolate the Cuban regime is to be
found in the inability of the extreme left to
organize anti- American public demonstrations
of any significant proportions during the criti-
cal days of the missile crisis. One is reminded
of the oft-repeated boast of the regime of how
the hemisphere would rise in defense of Cuba
"^ For background, see iiM., Nov. 12, 1962, p. 720.
MARCH 18, 1963
405
if measures were taken against it. The record
shows otherwise. Only in Bolivia and Uru-
guay were popular demonstrations of any size
mounted and only in Venezuela were there any
effective sabotage efforts. Minor protest meet-
ings, student marches, and bombings were
reported from other countries, but were re-
garded even by the Commimists themselves as
failures in terms of generating popular opposi-
tion to the action of the United States.
In Colombia it appeared that the immediate
reaction of the Communist Party and other
extremists was defensive, and, rather than
attempting to organize demonstrations, they
avoided hostile action. In Chile there were
only small, limited demonstrations, despite
much propaganda and planning action by the
extreme left during the preceding months
calling for demonstrations and strikes if the
United States were to act against Cuba.
Pro-Cuban elements in Ecuador made a
major, though somewhat uncoordinated, effort
to protest United States and OAS actions.
These efforts were almost totally unsuccessful.
Despite vitriolic attacks by extreme leftist pub-
lications and the exhortations of party leaders,
there were only minor demonstrations in
Guayaquil and Quito. In Peru, front organi-
zations organized anti-United States rallies.
Other than one at the University of lea, which
degenerated into a bloody brawl, these rallies
were notable for the small attendance.
In Montevideo, Uruguay, a Communist-
organized demonstration was attended by some
7,000 students and workers. The demonstra-
tion was peaceful and broke up after a few
anti-United States speeches. The organizers
considered the demonstration disappointing.
The Central of Uruguayan Workers twice failed
in efforts to stage demonstrations.
In Bolivia, the pro-Castro demonstrators
were met by an equal number of pro-United
States demonstrators who did not hesitate to
clash with the extreme left mobs.
In Mexico and the Dominican Republic there
were only minor demonstrations. In Brazil,
Haiti, Costa Eica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Nicaragua, Panama, Honduras, and Paraguay
there were no demonstrations.
This was not a record of which Habana or
i
Moscow, let alone Peiping, could be very proud.
But we would be unwise to count on this as a
permanent decline in influence and relax our
vigilance.
United States Internal Security Programs
United States internal security programs, it
should be made clear at the outset, are only
undertaken at the request of the Latin Ameri-
can governments and can only be a modest addi-
tion to their own efforts. They and their peo-
ples must decide what to do and do it, must
sometimes kill and be killed, for this is a battle'
to tlie death.
Whereas the problem for the United States
in strengthening Latin American cooperation
toward hemispheric security had, until the ad-
vent of the Castro movement, been largely one
of developing the capability of the Latin
American countries to make a contribution to
collective defense, the primary problem has now
become the maintenance of internal law and
order against Communist-inspired violence.
It became apparent in 1960, with the avowed
intention of the Castro regime to promote the
overthrow of Latin American governments by
indirect aggression and subversion, that the
security of nearly every government in the
hemisphere would be jeopardized, in vaiying
degrees.
In anticipation that many countries would be
confronted with Communist-inspired disorders,
terrorism, sabotage, and possibly guerrilla
operations, a careful and intensive assessment
was made by the United States, in coop-
eration with the countries, of the potential
security threat to each country, with the view to
the immediate development and implementation
of United States militai-y assistance and train-
ing programs reoriented to this new danger.
Where critical deficiencies in the capability of
local security forces were found, we thus were
able to respond rapidly to requests to provide
appropriate materiel, training, and services
under our military assistance and public safety
programs to make up such deficiencies.
This assistance is being provided for the con-
trol of Commimist-inspired civil disturbances,
for vigilance and control of movements of sub-
versives and arms inside those countries and
406
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
cross their borders, and for the maintenance of
bservation and patrol of rural areas for detec-
on and dispersion of guerrilla movements.
During the past 2 years increased emphasis
as been placed on training selected Latin
jjnerican militaiy personnel in riot control,
bunterguerrilla operations and tactics, intelli-
ence and counterintelligence, public informa-
ion, psychological warfare, counterinsurgency,
nd other subjects which will contribute to the
laintenance of public order and the support of
onstitutional governments. These courses are
:iven at United States military schools at Fort
Tulick, Canal Zone, and at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina.
In assessing the internal security situation in
-latin America, we found that the civil police
orces in many of the countries wanted assist-
.nce in police administration, training, and
iperational techniques and particularly re-
[uired greater mobility and more adequate sys-
ems of communications, largely related to riot
lontrol and other threats to public order.
Consequently, the public safety program, which
s an integral part of the AID [Agency for In-
emational Development] program, is designed
0 meet these requests.
In this connection, a regional Inter- American
Police Academy was established last year in the
Canal Zone, to which we invite selected mem-
oers of Latin American civil police forces for
training in organization, administration, riot
control, records, and investigations.
Closely allied to and an integral part of our
internal security programs are civic action pro-
grams which are designed to contribute to eco-
nomic and social development and to establish
a better rapport between the forces of order and
the civilian population. If the Latin American
military and public safety forces are to win
popular support for the measures that may be
necessary to curb such violence, they must estab-
lish themselves in the public mind as a construc-
tive, economically responsible element in the
national life.
In essence, our programs are designed to assist
the Latin American countries to develop the
capability to insure the stability and internal
security which are necessary for cari-ying the
Alliance for Progress forward.
STEPS BEING TAKEN IN THE OAS TO COUN-
TER COMMUNIST SUBVERSION
As I noted at the outset, the struggle against
extracontinental subversion is not a new experi-
ence for the inter- American system. The prob-
lem arose during World War II with the activi-
ties of Axis agents. To help the governments
deal with it, the Third Meeting of Foreign Min-
isters (Rio de Janeiro, 1942) established the
Emergency Advisory Committee for Political
Defense.' This Committee functioned until the
end of the war, rendering a most useful service
to the inter- American conmiunity by assisting
the member governments to identify centers of
Axis propaganda, espionage, and subversive ac-
tivities and to develop suitable control measures.
The danger of international communism has
been a topic of discussion and action in major
inter- American forums from the outset of the
cold war. Beginning with the Ninth Inter-
American Conference in 1948 to the present,
the OAS has demonstrated a steadily growing
preoccupation over this threat and readiness to
assist the governments to deal with it.
I shall not attempt in this presentation to
trace the history of OAS action against the
subversive activities of international commu-
nism. A good resume is contained in the
Initial General Report of the Special Consult-
ative Committee on Security (SCCS), a copy
of which was given to your staff last week.
At Punta del Este last year the Foreign
Ministers verified, to use the wording of Reso-
lution I,* "that the subversive offensive of com-
munist governments, their agents and the or-
ganizations which they control, has increased
in intensity."
Concerning this offensive they said:
The purpose of this offensive is the destruction of
democratic institutions and the establishment of totali-
tarian dictatorships at the service of extracontinental
powers. The outstanding facts in this intensified
offensive are the declarations set forth in official docu-
ments of the directing bodies of the international com-
munist movement, that one of its principal objectives
is the establishment of communist regimes in the un-
derdeveloped countries and in Latin America ; and the
existence of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba
' For text of Resolution XVII of the Final Act, see
ibid., Feb. 7, 1&42, p. 128.
* For text, see Hid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 278.
MARCH 18, 1963
407
which is publicly aligned with the doctrine and for-
eign policy of the communist powers.
I want to note tliat this assessment was unani-
mously approved, with the sole exception of
the Cuban delegation.
Based on this finding the Foreign Ministers
established OAS procedures for assisting the
governments to meet the challenge. They di-
rected the Council of the OAS : °
... to maintain all necessary vigilance, for the pur-
pose of warning against any acts of aggression, subver-
sion, or other clangers to peace and security, or the
preparation of such acts, resulting from the continued
intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in this hemisphere,
and to make recommendations to the governments of
the member states with regard thereto.
At the same time they made provision for the
establishment of the SCCS, composed of ex-
perts on security matters, to advise the Coun-
cil and the member governments, upon request,
on technical problems in this field.
The SCCS was organized last spring and has
formally met in three series of sessions since
that time : to prepare an initial general report
on Connnmiist subversive activities, to advise
the Dominican Government on how to deal with
Communist subversion, and to assist in the
preparation of studies on subversion for the
Council. The Council meanwhile has estab-
lished a special committee of its own, composed
of governmental representatives, to carry out
its vigilance responsibilities.* Both groups in
recent weeks have been working together on
special studies requested by the Foreign Minis-
ters at their informal meeting in Washington
last October 2-3.
At this informal meeting of Foreign Minis-
ters, considerable time was devoted to the
problem of subversion, as is reflected in the
communique issued at the end of the meeting.^
The Foreign Ministers found that at the pres-
ent juncture the most urgent of the problems
confronting the hemisphere was "the Sino-
Soviet intervention in Cuba as an attempt to
convert the island into an armed base for Com-
I
munist penetration of the Americas and su]
version of the democratic institutions." They
expressed the desire that in the ideological
struggle against communism "the resources and
methods inherent in the democratic system
should be mobilized to bring the peojiles to real-
ize fully the diilerence between totalitarianism
and democracy." They also agreed "that it is
necessary for the countries, in accordance with
their laws and constitutional precepts, to in-
tensify measures to prevent agents and groups
of international communism from carrying on
their activities of a subversive nature." In this
connection they asked that studies be made in
the three areas where Cuba appeared to be con-
centrating its effort: the transfer of funds to
other American Republics for subversive pur-
poses, the flow of subversive propaganda, and
the utilization of Cuba as a base for training
in subversive activities. I have earlier de-
scribed in some detail the scope of Cuban ac-
tivities in these fields. The SCCS has just
completed its preliminar}'^ study of these tliree
topics, setting forth its conclusions and making
specific recommendations for individual and
cooperative action by governments.
The Council's Special Committee received the
report in Spanish last Monday. After it has
been translated and circulated among all the
members of the Council, the United States hopes
it will be made public.^ The Special Commit-
tee is scheduled to meet this afternoon to con-
sider this point.
I should add that the SCCS report is a tech-
nical study prepared by experts acting in their
individual capacity. It is to be used by the
Special Committee composed of governmental
representatives in the preparation of a report
to the Council setting forth recommendations
for measures which governments may wish to
adopt to strengthen their capacity to counter
' IMi}., p. 279.
' For text of a U.S. note regarding Cuban subversive
activity, addressed to the Special Committee To Con-
sider Resolutions II.l and VIII of the Eighth Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, see
ibid., Feb. 18, 1963, p. 263.
' For text, see ibid., Oct. 22, 1962, p. 598.
* A report entitled "Paper Prepared at the Request
of the Council Committee Entrusted With the Study of
the Transfer of Funds to the American Republics for
Subversive Purposes, the Flow of Subversive Prop-
aganda and the Utilization of Cuba as a Base for
Training in Subversive Techniques" was made public
on Feb. 22 by the OAS. A limited number of copies
are available upon request from the Special Consulta-
tive Committee on Security, Pan American Union,
Washington 6, D.C.
408
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
iibversive activities in these three fields.
I also want to mention the fact that the Inter-
Vnierioan Defense Board has established
.n Inter-American Defense College which be-
lan its first course for senior officers from the
irmed forces of the various American Kepublics
n October 1962." Tlie college is located at Fort
^[cXair. The purpose of the college is to con-
luct courses of study on the inter-American
■,ystem and the military, economic, political, and
ocial factors that are essential components to
lie defense of our free societies.
'roblems of Control of Subversive Action
Before leaving this aspect of the problem I
.voukl like to say something about the difficulties
n curbing subversive activities. Tlie very na-
ure of clandestine action makes it difficult to
leal with. In free societies where subversive
■lements take advantage of the safeguards of
:lemocratic processes and where governments
feel themselves inhibited by respect for consti-
tutional norms, the problem is even more com-
[)licated. Add to this the lack of adequate
iilministrative machinery and internal security
capabilities which exists in many Latin Amer-
ican countries, and you can see the dimensions
of the problem. For example, coastlines are
extensive and thinly populated and frontiers for
the most part run through rugged terrain diffi-
cult to patrol. Effective control of clandestine
shipments of arms and men becomes a most
difficult task iinder these conditions. Besides,
there are plenty of arms available in most coun-
tries for a price and no need for special efforts
to ship them in. The ease with which money
can be transmitted poses a serious problem
even for governments with the most elaborate
security machinery. Propaganda which comes
over the radio can be jammed but only at great
expense and effort and even then without com-
plete success. The control of the entry and
departure of travelers and surveillance while
they are in the country is another task requiring
large numbers of trained personnel and sub-
stantial funds. I mention this solely to give you
'•' For an address by Secretary Riis-k made on the oc-
i:i<ion of the presentation of the facilities at Fort
MfNair for use by the Inter-American Defense College,
sio BuxLETiN of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 642.
some idea of what we and our sister Republics
are up against in trying to develop our capacity
to deal with the problem of subversion through
individual and collective effort.
At the same time I don't want to leave the
impression we have given up. The training
in Cuba of party members is a particularly im-
portant contribution about which it should be
possible to do something. A number of sug-
gestions are made on this matter in the recent
sees report. While the actions must be taken
by our Latin American associates, we will cer-
tainly wish to be helpful in any way we can.
ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IN
THE HEMISPHERE'S SECURITY EFFORT
So far I have talked about U.S. and OAS
programs to deal directly with the subversive
effort. It would be a mistake to close without
a few words on the Alliance for Progress.
In the critical last week of October, when
we confronted the Soviet Union bluntly and
directly over the missiles in Cuba, the Finance
Ministers of the 20 member countries of the
Alliance for Progress met in Mexico City.^"
President Kennedy sent a message to that con-
ference which established the clear and direct
relationship of their work to our and the hemi-
sphere's security. He said to the alliance
conferees :
Your meeting is a vital reminder that the central
task of this generation of Americans is not merely
the avoidance of conflict. It is the construction of a
new community of American nations in which all our
citizens can live not only free from fear but full of
hope. . . . Just as the unyielding determination of
today is essential if we are to realize the future prom-
ise of the Alliance for Progress, the future success of
the Alliance for Progress will be the final vindication
of the resolute course we are taking today.
The alliance was not undertaken as a response
to Castro. But I do not think there is any
doubt that the threat of Castroism gave us a
sense of urgency about the economic and social
underdevelopment of Latin America and the
resultant political tensions and dangers that
we did not have before. We have engaged in
'° For text of an evaluation of the alliance by the
ministerial representatives of the Inter-American Eco-
nomic and Social Council, see iliid., Dec. 10, 1962, p. 897.
MARCH 18, 1963
409
this program because it is right and because
it is in our national interest to live in a world
of independent and secure countries. By do-
ing so, however, we also seek to provide for
Latin America a democratic alternative to Cas-
tro communism, reflecting another statement by
President Kennedy — if peaceful evolution
proves impossible, violent revolutions will be
inevitable.
Theoi-etically, we could put vast amounts of
arms and riot equipment into Latin American
hands today to stamp out rebellion and to shoot
down the Communist leaders and followers.
But in whose hands would we put these arms ?
How can we be sure that the riot quellers of
today will not be tlie rioters tomorrow ? TVliat
good are arms and security controls in a per-
manently imstable society?
In practice, we are providing aid to our sis-
ter Republics in public safety and anti-
subversion efforts, conscious of the fact that
these eiforts are meaningful only in the frame-
work of a longer term program. That pro-
gram is the alliance. We are helping our sister
Republics to maintain order and strengthen
democratic institutions so the fruits of the alli-
ance may have a chance to ripen. Some of them
ripen fast — schools, health centers, pure-water
systems, low-income homes, school feeding,
farm-to-market roads. Others take time to
produce results: new industries, road and rail
networks, modernized agricultural economies.
We do the first kind, again, to make possible the
second kind. Wliat we aim at is, over the next
10 years, to develop skills, attitudes, and mate-
rial foundations on the basis of which Latin
America can go forward to self-sustaining
growth. "\^niat we aim at, simultaneously, is the
production of sufficient evidence for a large
enough number of people that our way works
so as to deter them from following the false
but alluring promises of the Castroites and
Communists.
Are we succeeding? We cannot yet answer
this question with certainty. Wliat we do know
is that we are getting under the Castroites' and
the Communists' skin. The Alliance for Prog-
ress is a constant object of their scorn and their
attacks. If that be a measure of the threat
it poses to their goals, then we have reason to
be hopeful about its appeal to the peoples i\
Latin America and its chances of success,
me quote just a few examples.
Peiping Radio on August 25th last yei
quoted the Mexican Communist organizatii
which calls itself the National Liberate
Movement as follows: "The Alliance fi
Progress is nothing but a hoax which coi
not deceive the people." It goes on to sa_^
"Nobody can arrest the advance of histor;
whether by violence or threat, propaganda (
the 20 billion dollars, a United States promii
connected with the Alliance for Progre
program."
Cuban Communist leader Bias Roca in a
article in Cuba Socialista in May of last ye;
mentioned the alliance no less than six times i
two Images. He says the alliance "gives no ad'
quate or effective answer to the cry of the pei
pies of Latin America." The reason for thi
says the Cuban Communist chief, is that it wi
not, and I quote again, "liberate Latin Americ
from Yankee rule, but . . . strengthen it
The burden of his article, translated into plai
language, is that the alliance would create
satisfactory and healthy relationship betwee
the United States and Latin America and tin
must be fought like poison by the Communist
Castro's hope for the defeat of the allianc
was expressed in an interview with some Wes
ern reporters on June 1st, when he said that tl
American economy cannot afford the allianc
He said, hopefully no doubt, and I quote froi
a Reutei-s dispatch in the New York Times
"They [the Americans] have neither the gol
reserves nor the organization nor the men t
make it work."
We do not need to concern ourselves too muc
with challenges thrown out by Fidel Castrc
The challenge we face is self-imposed, not onl;
by us in the United States but by all 20 allianc
members. It is to end hunger, disease, am
illiteracy in Latin America, to make these Re
publics a better place to live for their people anc
thus to make the hemisphere a better place h
live for the United States. And it is a poin
to remember that Castro, Khrushchev, and Mac
Tse-tung would rejoice if we gave up on thi
premise of the Alliance for Progress. Thei
are right, of course, in being concerned aboui
410
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETI^
he alliance, not only for the long-term future,
ut more immediately. For one factor in the
uanimous ag-reement in the hemisphere on
liat to do about the missiles and in the failure
f the Communist program of protests was the
e\y hope of peaceful change brought by the
Uiance and the new view of the U.S. resulting
rom our leadership in this effort.
We see the alliance as much more than a pro-
rara of economic and social progi-ess. We see
as a political and ideological program as well,
t']iending for its success as much on the de-
elopment of Latin America's human resources,
he reshaping of public and leadership attitudes
nd institutions as on the building of roads,
actories, and hospitals.
The Charter of Punta del Este '^ calls for
iiore than a collection of separate projects paid
or by American public funds. It envisages
he modernization of society throughout Latin
America. This includes the harnessing of the
ntensive craving for a national renaissance to
he constructive goals set forth in the charter.
t means the development of wise and respon-
ible political leadership, the broadening of
)pportunities for the increasingly frustrated
ind impatient young generation, particularly in
ho universities, and the channeling of vast
ntellectual and physical energies into the pur-
uiit of national strength and independence in
'aeh member country of the alliance.
The building of a stronger and broader eco-
lomic base must go hand in hand with the de-
.elopment of an open and vigorous society in
\vhich there is room at the top and near the top
for all those whose talents and dedication entitle
hem to play a more meaningful and self-fulfill-
uig role in the conduct of their nations' affairs.
If Latin America succeeds in this quest, if its
youth finds the opportunity to plot solutions in-
^toad of revolutions, to demonstrate results in-
stead of just demonstrating, the deatli Iniell will
have sounded for the pessimism and the nihil-
ism that are Castro's most valuable assets.
The pursuit of these objectives also entails a
new dimension for our own Latin American
]iolicy and the resetting of sights on the part of
all Americans, official and private, active in the
For text, see ibid., Sept. 11, 1961. p. 463.
region and in hemisphere affairs. This reori-
entation of our own attitudes is not an intellec-
tual exercise. It is a requirement for the suc-
cessful conduct of our new Latin American pol-
icy. Our own destiny is inextricably bound up
with the development of a hemisphere-wide re-
newal which is long overdue. The alternative
is a series of convulsions whose consequences
cannot be foreseen but which are more likely to
serve the objectives of our adversaries than the
interests of Latin America and the United
States.
In this sense, the x\lliance for Progress is a
policy of both national and hemispheric secu-
rity which, regardless of the frustrations and
disappointments we may experience, must be
pursued steadfastly until the common goal is
achieved.
CONCLUSIONS
In concluding this presentation I want to
draw a few tentative conclusions, tentative be-
cause we are dealing with unusually unpredict-
able forces :
1. The peoples and governments of the Amer-
icas face a serious problem in Communist sub-
version. Assessments of the degree of danger
to particular countries will vary, though no
country now seems likely to succumb in the fore-
seeable future. No one can deny, however, that
it is a real and continuing problem as far as the
peace and security of the hemisphere as a whole
is concerned. Further, we cannot disregard the
fact that terror and violence create conditions
which make it far more difficult for public or
private enterprise to achieve the economic and
social progress essential to the ultimate defeat
of subversion by the success of the Alliance for
Progress.
2. During the months ahead we may well
witness a step-up of the tactics of violence as
the Communists, impatient to score successes to
recoup their prestige in Cuba and in the hemi-
sphere, resort to terrorism, sabotage, and guer-
rilla activities in an attempt to get publicity,
unseat governments, and seize power.
3. The nature of subversive action places the
primary responsibility on each country to adopt
necessary legislation, establish required admin-
MARCH 18, 1963
411
istrative machinery, and develop sufficient in-
ternal security forces to meet any situation
which may arise. But such formal steps are
not enough. Will and skill and courage are
also required. And ultimately governments can
only succeed if by their policies for promoting
political, economic, and social development
they are able to command the active support of
the great majority of their peoples.
4. It is no less true, however, that the effec-
tiveness of the measures taken individually can
be measurably increased or decreased by the de-
gree to which the governments, including the
United States, cooperate with one another, bi-
laterally or in larger groups like the OAS, shar-
ing resources, experience, and intelligence.
5. Without being complacent, we in the
United States can derive certain satisfaction
that as a result of actions of the United States
and other American governments, working indi-
vidually and collectively, some headway is being
made to reduce the influence and capabilities of
Cuba and the bloc and in controlling local sub-
versive activities of all kinds in each countiy.
Current United States actions may be summa-
rized as reducing the appeal and capabilities of
the Cuban regime, spreading knowledge of wliat
a Castro Communist regime does for a people's
freedom and well-being, providing equipment
and training to Latin American military and
police forces to deal with riots and guerrilla
actions, working through the OAS to stimulate
individual and collective action on the problem,
and through the Alliance for Progi-ess helping
our partners attack the basic discontent on
which subversion feeds.
6. The activities of all U.S. agencies must
continue to be vigorous and be closely integrated
into a single program which, in turn, is appro-
priately related to the particular problems and
programs of each country on the one hand, and
the OAS on the other.
7. Further deterioration of the prestige and
influence of the present regime in Cuba, and its
eventual replacement by a government freely
chosen by the Cuban people, will contribute
materially to reducing the threat but will not
eliminate it. To do this, we must all work con-
tinuously on many fronts, positive and nega-
tive, individually and together, until the
strength of our free democratic system to mee
the highest needs and aspirations of the people;
is unmistakably proven to all and the Alliano
for Progress has achieved its goals.
Implications for U.S. of Breakdowi
in U.K.-EEC Negotiations
Following is the text of a letter from Unde
Secretary Ball to Senator Paul H. Douglas.
February 15, 1963
Dear Senator Douglas: Secretary DUloij
has called my attention to the transcript of hi
testimony before the Joint Economic Conunil
tee on January 31. In the course of his colloqu
with the Committee several members expresse
an interest in the Administration's appraisal o
the implications for United States foreign ec(
nomic policy of the breakdown in negotiation
between the United Kingdom and the EEC.
The significance of this event can best I
appraised in relation to other trends and eveni
involved in the evolution of United States po
icy toward Europe.
I
It is generally recognized that the progre:
of Europe toward unity has been among tl
most constructive and promising achievemen
of the post-war period. Through the creatic
and development of the European Econom
Community, Europe has moved a long wa
toward economic integration. That goal, hov
ever, is far from full attainment and man
difficult problems remain.
The United States has consistently encou;
aged the nations of Europe toward greatt
unity. Both the Legislative and Executi^
Branch of our Government have pro\ided th
encouragement — by word and by action. "W
regard greater European unity as essential pr
marily for political reasons — although, over tli
long run, the United States should also benef
economically from the contribution of the Con
mon Market to a higher level of Europea
economic activity.
A imited Europe would eliminate the frii
tions and jealousies that have been the cauf
412
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETi:
if so many past conflicts — conflicts that on two
ccasions have embroiled the whole world in
atastrophe. IMoreover, a unified Europe could
ffecti\ely mobilize the common strength of the
European people. It should thus be able to
)lay the role of equal partner witli the United
■States, carrying its full share of the common
esponsibilities imposed by history on the eco-
lomically-advanced peoples of the Free World.
II
The basis for such a partnership is hard eco-
lomic fact. In the North Atlantic Woi-ld —
Vestern Europe and North America — there is
oncentrated 907c of all Free World industrial
trengtli as well as the great bulk of the Free
Yorld's technical skill and knowledge. This
ombined resource must be put to the defense
nd advancement of the Free World.
Combined action is particularly important
n three areas :
First, Europe and North America must join
n a common defense against the aggressive am-
otions of the Communist Bloc. The defense
)f Europe is vital to the United States as well
.s to Europe itself. It is a costly task; the
trowth of European .strength permits Europe
o make an increasing contribution to it.
Second, the national economies of the nations
■oinprising the great industrial complex of the
sTorth Atlantic are interdependent. This is
)ecoming increasingly evident. A slow-down
n growth rates in Europe could adversely af-
"ect our own growth rate, while an American
•ecession would have serious repercussion in
Europe. Our balance of payments deficit is,
o a large extent, the mirror image of balance
)f payments surpluses of certain major Euro-
pean countries. If one nation or area adopts
restrictive commercial policies, those policies
will find reflection in compensatory or retalia-
tory actions by its trading partners.
I The recognition of this economic interde-
pendence has led us to seek new means to coordi-
nate and harmonize our domestic economic poli-
pies. Substantial progress toward this end has
been achieved through the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development.
Much further progress is required.
Third, the major industrialized areas of the
Free World — the Atlantic nations — must com-
mit large amounts of money, equipment and
skill to assist the less-developed countries in
raising their standards of living, if political
stability is to be achieved and the dangers of
subversion reduced. The effective utilization
of Free World resources for this purpose re-
quires a high degree of coordination of effort.
We are beginning to achieve that coordination
through the Development Assistance Commit-
tee of the OECD.
Fourth, if the resources of the Free World
are to be efficiently utilized obstacles to the free
flow of international trade must be reduced and
trade expanded under conditions where the
forces of comjiarative advantage can fully oper-
ate. This means that American goods must
have greater access to the European markets
while we must provide greater access for Euro-
pean goods to our own markets. Just as in other
fields, benefits and obligations must be recip-
rocal.
Ill
During the past few years United States
policy has been increasingly based on the belief
that these common tasks could best be achieved
by the pursuit of two parallel lines of action — ■
the attainment by Europe of a greater unity so
that the European nations may act on a widen-
ing subject matter through common institutions
and the attainment of a high degree of Atlantic
cooperation through institutional arrangements
designed for that purpose.
We have also felt that the effectiveness of our
European partner would be greatly enhanced
if a imified Europe were expanded to include
the United Kingdom. We were, therefore,
gratified when the United Kingdom Govern-
ment decided to apply for membership in the
European Economic Community. We recog-
nized at that time, as we do now, that the or-
ganization of Europe was a problem for the
Europeans, and that it involved grave national
decisions for the participating nations. We
have not, therefore, sought to influence these
decisions but at the same time — since we have
been repeatedly asked by our European friends
— we have been frank in stating that, in our
view, the accession of the United Kingdom to
MARCH IS, 1963
413
the Rome Treaty would contribute to the eco-
nomic strength and political cohesion of Europe
and thus advance the prospects for a full and
effective Atlantic Partnership.
During the course of the negotiations for the
accession of Great Britain to the EEC, the
United States Government was repeatedly as-
sured by the Six, including the French Gov-
ernment, that none of the parties had any po-
litical objection to United Kingdom member-
Bhip in the EEC. We recognized at the same
time that the negotiations involved complex
technical and economic problems — and there
was always the possibility that these problems
might not be solved to the satisfaction of all
parties. We, therefore, recognized the possi-
bility— although not the probability — that these
negotiations would break down.
The veto of the French Government ter-
minating the negotiations occurred at a time
when the technical and economic problems were
well on their way to solution. This has been
made clear by the statements issued by the Com-
mission of the Eui-opean Economic Community.
In our opinion, the action of the French Gov-
ernment must be regarded as motivated pri-
marily by political reasons.
It is still too early to know with precision
what the French Government's veto may imply
for future French policy. It seems clear
enough, however, that this action has not
changed the underlying facts that have dictated
the need for greater European unity or effec-
tive Atlantic cooperation. We believe, also,
that these facts are generally understood by the
great body of European opinion.
They can be briefly summarized :
1. Europe cannot defend itself today by its
own efforts; its defense reSts heavily upon the
overwhelming nuclear strength of the United
States.
2. The nuclear defense of the Free World is
indivisible.
3. The great industrial economies of the
North Atlantic countries are to a high degree
interdependent.
4. To reap the full economic benefits of this
interdependence requires a free flow of trade.
5. The urgent needs of the newly developed
nations require effective common effort on the
part of the major industrialized powers of tli
Free World.
The existence of these facts, it seems to us
determines the broad policy lines that w
intend to pursue.
First, we shall continue to encourage the de
velopment of European imity and to expres
the hope that arrangements may ultimately b'
made for the accession of Great Britain to ful
membership in the EEC. Eecent events hav'
demonstrated a substantial body of Europeai
opinion in favor of Britain's participation in i
uniting Europe and the British Governmen
has made known its own desire that the Unite(
Kingdom should play a full role in thi
development.
But while we continue to regard the ultimati
accession of Great Britain to the Rome Treats
as an objective to be encouraged, we recognizi
that it is imlikely to occur for some time
Meanwhile, recent events do not appear to hav(
destroyed the vitality of the strong Europeai
drive toward unity nor seriously impaired th
value of the integration so far achievec
through the EEC. Obviously, it is in the inter
ests of the whole Free World that the EE(
develop in an outward-looking manner am
that it not acquire autarchic characteristics-
We propose to use our influence to this end.
Second, we shall seek to advance the arrange
ments for close economic cooperation with Eu
rope through the OECD. AVe shall also con
tinue to develop close cooperation in the mone
tary field through the IMF, the Conunittee o:
Ten,^ and Working Party Three of the OECD
Third, we shall continue to work toward th(
strengthening of NATO and the development
of adequate conventional forces in Europe. We
see dangers in the proliferation of national nu-
clear deterrents but we recognize the desire ol
Europeans to play a full role in their own
nuclear defense. We have, therefore, proposed
the creation of a multilateral nuclear force,
within NATO, and we reached agreement with
the British Government at Nassau - for the
mutual support of such a force. Ambassador
^ For background on the Committee of Ten, see Bul-
letin of Jan. 29, 19G2, p. 187, and Nov. 19, 1962, p. 795.
= Ibid.. Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.
414
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
"
iviiigston Merchant is going to Europe next
eek for exploratory discussions.
Fourth, we intend to utilize to the fullest the
swers granted to the President under the
rade Expansion Act in order to improve ac-
)ss to the European Common Market as well
i other major world markets for products of
nited States farms and factories. Governor
'erter intends to press liberalization of trade
i rapidly as possible.^
Since General de Gaulle's press conference
I January 14, suggestions have been put for-
ward for the United States to join in special
3mmercial relations with one or another group
f nations to form a trading bloc competitive
dth the Euroi^ean Common Market. We do
ot believe that this would be sound policy.
'or thirty years, the United States has con-
istently adhered to the most-favored-nation
irinciple and to the expansion of trade on a
ondiscriminatory basis. For us to enter into
referential trading relations with any nation
r nations would mean discrimination against
,11 other nations. Such a policy would be in-
onsistent with our position as the leader of the
""ree World.
You and Congressman [Henry S.] Reuss
lave raised the question of the adequacy of
he powers provided by the Trade Expansion
let if it should develop that the UK does not
jecome a member of the EEC prior to the open-
ng of the Kennedy round of negotiations.
You have introduced legislation that would so
imend the Act that the scope of the so-called
predominant supplier" clause would be unaf-
ected by the failure of the UK-EEC negotia-
ions. The Administration's position with
•espect to this proposed legislation was stated
For text of a statement made by Christian A.
Herter before the heads of delegations to the OECD
at Paris on Jan. 31, see ibid., Feb. 25, 1963, p. 298. Mr.
Herter is the Special Representative of the President
for Trade Negotiations.
by the President at his press conference of
February 7 when he said :
No, we hadn't planned to ask the Congress, because
we do have the power, under the Trade Expansion
bill, to reduce all other tariffs by 50 per cent, which is
a substantial authority. We lack the zero authority.
On the other hand, it is going to take some months
before these negotiations move ahead. It is possible
there may be some reconsideration of the British ap-
plication. I would be responsive and in favor of
legislation of the kind that you described. It is not
essential, but it would be available, and if the Con-
gress shows any dispositions to favor it, I would
support it.
Fifth, we propose to continue to develop
techniques to improve the cooperation of the
major industrialized powers in providing as-
sistance to the less-developed countries. This
does not mean the abandonment of national
programs of assistance but rather their more
effective coordination. At the same time, we
shall try to assure a greater contribution to
this common effort on the part of the European
countries.
The broad lines I have described suggest
the general directions of our policy. These
policy goals have been and will continue to be
pui'sued through a variety of instrumentalities
and in a variety of forms. The veto of British
accession to the EEC is not an insuperable
obstacle to those policies. In 1954, the French
Assembly turned down the European Defense
Community Treaty, but the next few years were
years of unprecedented jarogress towards Euro-
pean integration along other lines. The basic
soundness of US policy was not affected.
So today we have sought to chart a course
that corresjDonds to the requirements of United
States interest — to pursue a positive line of
policy rather than merely to react to, or to
follow, the policies of other Governments.
This seems to us the only posture befitting the
leading nation of the Free World.
Sincerely yours,
George W. Bali.
MARCH 18, 1963
415
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and IVleetings
Adjourned During February 1963
WHO Standing Committee on Administration and Finance .
WHO Executive Board: 31st Session
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) :
10th Plenary Assembly.
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Housing, Building and Plan-
ning: 1st Session.
U.N. KCAFE Committee on Trade: 6th Session
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel . .
Caribbean Organization: Seminar on Planning Techniques .
PAHC Technical Committee of Experts on Financing . . .
U.N. ECA Standing Committee on Social Welfare and Com-
munity Development: 2d Meeting.
U.N. ECOSOC Population Commission: 12th Session . . .
U.N. Conference on the Application of Science and Tech-
nology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas.
ITU CCIR Plan Subcommittee for Asia
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Interim
Meeting.
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources:
15th Session.
IMCO Working Group on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods
by Sea.
PAHC Technical Committee of Experts on Planning and
Routing of Highways.
ICAO Panel on Origin-and-Destination Statistics: 5th Meet-
Geneva Jan. 8-Feb. 1
Geneva Jan. 8-Feb. 1
Geneva Jan. 16-Feb. 15
Bangkok Jan. 21-Feb. 1
ing.
Inter- American Commission of Women: Executive Com-
mittee.
OECD Turkish Consortium
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee
NATO Science Committee
FAO Consultative Subcommittee on the Economic Aspects of
Rice: 7th Session.
lA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Agricultural Develop-
ment and Agrarian Reform.
lA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Fiscal and Financial
Policies.
lA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Industrial Development
and Financing of the Private Sector.
lA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Planning and Project
Formulation.
OECD Energy Committee: Working Party
PAHC Technical Committee of E.xperts on Terminology . .
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II
(Economic Growth).
IAEA Board of Governors
IMCO Subcommittee on the International Code of Signals .
GATT Council of Representatives
NATO Food and Agriculture Planning Committee ....
Bangkok Jan.
Paris Jan.
San Juan Jan.
Caracas Feb.
L^opoldville Feb.
New York Feb.
Geneva Feb.
Geneva Feb.
Tokyo Feb.
Bangkok Feb.
London Feb.
Rio de Janeiro Feb.
Montreal Feb.
Washington Feb.
Paris Feb.
Paris Feb.
Paris Feb.
Tokyo Feb.
Buenos Aires Feb.
Buenos Aire.s Feb.
Buenos Aires Feb.
Buenos Aires Feb.
28-Feb. 5
29-Feb. 1
30-Feb. 7
4-8
4-10
4-15
4-20
Paris ....
Buenos Aires
Paris ....
Vienna .
London
Geneva .
Paris . .
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
5-14
5-15
8-18
11-15
11-15
11-23
12 (1 day)
14-15
14-15
14-15
14-10
15-23
15-23
15-23
15-23
18 (1 day)
18-22
19-20
19-22
19-22
19-23
20-22
' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Feb. 28, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations:
CCIR, Comit6 consultatif international des radio communications; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE.
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agri-
culture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy
.\gency; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; IBE, International Bureau of Education;
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consviltative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North At-
lantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHC, Pan Amer-
ican Highway Congre.ss; U.N., United Nations; WHO, World Health Organization.
416
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN!
X. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: New York Feb. 25 (1 day)
Organizational Meeting.
' Xb Fisheries Committee Paris Feb. 25-26
X ECOSOC Special Committee on Coordination .... New York Feb. 25-27
:i; Executive Committee: 40th Meeting Geneva Feb. 26-27
oCD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III Paris Feb. 26-27
(Balance of Payments) .
•,SCD Economic Policy Committee Paris Feb. 27-28
IICO Working Group on Financial Regulations London Feb. 28 (1 day)
li Session as of February 28, 1963
fcnference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarma-
ment.
X . Working Group of Twenty-one
rcting of the Parties to the Interim Convention on North
Pacific Fur Seals.
'.\() North Atlantic Cable Meteorological Communications
Panel.
X . Economic Commission for Africa L^opoldville Feb. 18-
j;i) Governing Body: 154th Session Geneva Feb. 19-
Geneva March 14, 1962-
New York Jan. 29-
Tokyo Feb. 18-
Paris Feb. 18-
li Recess as of February 28, 1963
t.\TT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification (recessed Geneva Sept. 24, 1962-
Dec. 15 until mid-1963).
IIATO Secretary General Stikker
"isits United States
The Department of State amiounced on
'ebruary 25 (press release 101) that Dirk U.
tikker, Secretary General of the North Atlan-
c Treaty Organization, would visit the United
itates the week of March 3 on a working trip.
)uring his stay he will meet with President
Kennedy and with officials of the Department
f State and the Department of Defense in
Tashington and will also visit Adm. Robert
jee Dennison, Supreme Allied Commander,
tlantic (S ACL ANT) at Norfolk.
Villard L. Thorp Elected Chairman,
>evelopment Assistance Committee
President Kennedy annoimced on Febru-
.ry 15 ("VVlaite House press release dated Febru-
iry 15) that the Development Assistance Com-
nittee of the Organization for Economic
Uooperation and Development has elected "VVil-
ard L. Thorp as chairman of the Committee.
Professor Thorp, who is now director of the
tferrill Center for Economics at Amlierst Col-
ege, served as Assistant Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs from 1946 to 1952. He was
nominated by President Kennedy for the DAC
post in response to a request by the Committee
that the United States put forward a candidate.
Professor Thorp succeeds James W. Eiddle-
berger, who served as the first chairman.
The DAC, a principal committee of the
OECD with primary responsibilities for the
more effective mobilization and coordination of
aid to the developing countries, is the successor
organization to the Development Assistance
Group (DAG), which was established in Janu-
ary 1960.^ The membership of DAC includes
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portu-
gal, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and the European Economic Community. Ma-
jor objectives of the Comjnittee are to increase
the flow of development assistance to the less
developed nations; to improve the terms on
which such assistance is extended; to promote
an equitable sharing of the burden of aid ; and
to coordinate the aid policies and programs of
the contributing countries. A priority topic on
its current agenda is consideration of policies on
terms of aid.
1 Bulletin of Feb. 1, 1960, p. 139.
MARCH 18, 1963
417
GATT Contracting Parties To Hold
Ministerial Meeting in IVIay
Press release 103 dated February 25
A ministerial meeting of tlie Contracting
Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade has been called by the GATT Conn-
cil to convene at Geneva, Switzerland, from
May 16 to 21 to consider the major issues now
facing the international trading cormnimity.
One of the principal purposes of the meeting
is to decide on the scliedule for general trade
negotiations. Under the authority of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the United
States will be prepared to participate in such
negotiations by early 1964. Christian A. Her-
ter, Sjjecial Kepresentative for Trade Negotia-
tions, is expected to represent the United States
at the ministerial meeting.
In the context of plans for the trade negotia-
tions, ministers will consider directions for the
effective liberalization and expansion of trade
in both primary and manufactured products.
They will consider in particular arrangements
for the reduction or elimination of tariff and
other barriers to trade, measures for access to
markets for agricultural and other primary
products, and ways to expand the trade of
developing countries to further their economic
development.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with six
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. En-
tered into force January 1, 1961; for the United
States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
Ratifications deposited: Ethiopia, Federal Republic
of Germany including Berlin, Italy, December 28,5
1962 ; Jordan, Portugal, January 14, 1963.
Accessions deposited: Burundi, February 16, 1963; f *
Jamaica, February 18, 1963.
Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the in- '
ternational telecommunication convention, 1959.
Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into
force May 1, 1961 ; for the United States October 23,
1961. TIAS 489.3.
Notifications of approval: Congo (Brazzaville), De-
cember 7, 1962 ; Ethiopia, France, December 28,
1962.
BILATERAL
Canada
Agreement amending the agreement of May 5, 1961
(TIAS 4806), governing the coordination of pilotage
services on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence RiverJiSl
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oeto^w
ber 23, 1962, and February 21, 1963. Entered into ' !
force February 21, 1963.
Japan
Agreement relating to the payment by Japan of the
first and second installments under the agreement o:
January 9, 1962 (TIAS 5154), regarding the settle
ment of postwar economic assistance. Effected bj
exchange of notes at Tokyo February 19, 1963
Entered into force February 19, 1963.
Korea
Understanding relating to the waiver of the restrlc
tions contained in paragraph 4 of the memorandun
of interpretation and understanding of the agree
ment for the disposal of excess property of October ]
1959 (TIAS 4328). Effected by exchange of notei
at Seoul February 1, 1963. Entered into force Febi
ruary 1, 1963.
Agreement for the loan of two naval vessels to Korea-i
Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul December 14
1962, and February 11, 1963. Entered into (ore
February 11, 1963.
Luxembourg
Treaty of friendship, establishment and navigatioE
and protocol. Signed at Luxembourg February 2f.
1962.
Ratifications exchanged: February 28, 1963.
Enters into force: March 28, 1963.
Netherlands
Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigatior
Signed at The Hague, March 27, 1956. Entered int>,
force December 5, 1957. TIAS 3942.
Application to: Surinam, February 10, 1963.
Pakistan
Agreement for the loan of a vessel to Pakistar
Effected by exchange of notes at Karachi January 1.'
and 16, 1963. Entered into force January 16, 196c
;s
418
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtJLLETIl^
larch 18, 1963
Index
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1238
/nerican Republics
(•mmunist Subversion in the Western Hemi-
sphere— Continued (Martin) 404
tcurity and Freedom : A Free- World Responsi-
bility (Rusk) 383
^omic Energy
^le Nuclear Test Ban Issue (Foster) . . . 398
fcretary Rusk Holds Press and Radio News
Briefliig at Houston (Rusk) 388
IS. Affirms Willingness To Work for Test Ban
Agreement 403
<)mmunism
«)mmunist Subversion in the Western Hemi-
sphere— ContiniteA (Martin) 404
Security and Freedom: A Free- World Respon-
sibility (Rusk) 383
Tie United Nations in the Fight for Freedom
(Rusk) 393
(mgo (Leopoldville). The United Nations in the
Fight for Freedom (Rusk) 393
iDngress
ommunist Subversion in the Western Hemi-
sphere— Continued (Martin) 404
uplieations for U.S. of Breakdown in U.K.-
EEC Negotiations (Ball) 412
uba
ommunLst Subversion in the Western Hemi-
.'sphere — Continued (Martin) 404
." .retary Rusk Holds Press and Radio News
Briefing at Houston (Rusk) 388
isarmament
he Nuclear Test Ban Issue (Foster) .... 398
.S. Affirms Willingness To Work for Test Ban
Agreement 403
Iconomic Affairs
ATT Contracting Parties To Hold Ministerial
Meeting in May 418
Qiplieations for U.S. of Breakdown in U.K.-
EEC Negotiations (Ball) 412
I.S. and Luxembourg Exchange Ratifications
of FEN Treaty 403
nilard L. Thorp Elected Chairman, Develop-
ment Assistance Committee 417
Europe
mplications for U.S. of Breakdown in U.K.-
EEC Negotiations (Ball) 412
Secretary Rusk Holds Press and Radio News
Briefing at Houston (Rusk) 388
Security and Freedom : A Free-World Responsi-
bility (Rusk) 383
-"oreign Aid. Security and Freedom : A Free-
World Responsibility (Rusk) 383
nternational Organizations and Conferences
:;alendar of International Conferences and
Meetings 416
3ATT Contracting Parties To Hold Ministerial
Meeting in May 418
The Nuclear Test Ban Issue (Foster) .... 398
Security and Freedom : A Free- World Respon-
sibility (Rusk) 383
U.S. Affirms Willingness To Work for Test Ban
Agreement 403
Willard L. Thorp Elected Chairman, Develop-
ment Assistance Committee 417
Luxembourg. U.S. and Luxembourg Exchange
Ratifications of FEN Treaty 403
Military Affairs. Security and Freedom : A
Free- World Responsibility (Rusk) 383
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO
Secretary General Stikker Visits United
States 417
Treaty Information
Current Actions 418
U.S. and Luxembourg Exchange Ratifications
of FEN Treaty 403
Turkey. Secretary Rusk Holds Press and Radio
News Briefing at Houston (Rusk) .... 388
U.S.S.R.
The Nuclear Test Ban Issue (Foster) . . . 398
Secretary Rusk Holds Press and Radio News
Briefing at Houston (Rusk) 388
U.S. Affirms Willingness To Work for Test Ban
Agreement 403
United Kingdom. Implications for U.S. of
Breakdown in U.K.-EEC Negotiations (Ball) . 412
United Nations. The United Nations in the
Fight for Freedom (Rusk) 393
Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk Holds Press and
Radio News Briefing at Houston (Rusk) . . 388
Index
Ball, George W 412
Foster, William C 398
Martin, Edwin M 404
Rusk, Secretary 383,388,393
Thorp, Willard L 417
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 25-IViarch 3
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25,
D.C.
Release issued prior to February 25 which
appears in this issue of the Buixetin is No. 100
(revised) of February 22.
Subject
NATO Secretary General visits
Washington (rewrite).
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
GATT ministerial meeting.
Rowan : University of Minnesota.
Rusk: Texas Daily Newspaper As-
sociation, Houston, Tex. (re-
vised).
Johnson: "The Rising Afro-Asian
Nations."
Rusk : radio and news briefing,
Houston, Tex.
State-Defense joint statement on
visit of German Defense Minister.
Summary of U.S. recommendations
for Congo program.
Exchange of ratifications on FEN
treaty with Luxembourg.
U.N. conference on consular rela-
tions (rewrite).
Lee: Centennial Conference of
California Teachers Association.
Williams: "The Emerging Nations
of Africa."
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
No.
Date
101
2/25
•102
2/25
103
*104
105
2/25
2/26
2/26
tl06
2/27
107
2/27
tios
2/27
tl09
3/1
110
2/28
till
3/1
tll2
3/1
tll3
3/1
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING 0FFICE:19eS
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RED CHINA
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U.S.S.R.
This 35-page pamphlet is a transcript of the television
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U.S.S.E." which was first broadcast on February 11, 1963, by
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Chief, Washington Bureau of Time-Life, Inc., acted as mod-
erator and the following four top officers of the Department
of State discussed this important subject and answered ques-
tions posed by a group of distinguished nongovernmental
participants :
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
U. Alexis Jolinson, Deputy Under Secretary for Po-
litical Affairs
W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary for Far
Eastern Affairs
Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research
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Vi RECORD
Rec'd
WAR So I'K-
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1239 ^ / March 25, 1963
B. P. L.
THE RISING AFRO-ASIAN NATIONS • by Deputy
Under Secretary Johnson 449
THE EMERGING NATIONS OF AFRICA • by /Assistant
Secretary Williams 457
SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF
MARCH 8 432
EDUCATION FOR THE NEW DIPLOMACY • by
Robert E.Lee 423
PRESIDENT TRANSMITS PROPOSAL FOR ACADEMY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 427
D STATES
GN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTrVIENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1239 • Publication 751
March 25, 1963
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a weekly publication issued by th
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become a party and treaties of geti
eral international interest.
Publications of the Departmeru
United Nations documents, and IcgU
lative material in the field of intef
national relations are listed currentU
iducation for the New Diplomacy
by Robert E. Lee
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations ^
Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, inem-
ers of the California Teachers Association:
thought it might be a good idea to talk to
tiis experienced and outstanding group of edu-
ators today about education — that is, discuss
ome of the problems of education and training
or tlie new diplomacy of the second half of this
ntury.
Education is not a field in which I have any
larticular expertise, beyond the impressions
yone inevitably gets from having occupied
ilassroom seats at a number of schools and col-
eges. But education for foreign affaii-s is a
subject about which all of us in the State De-
artment hear a great deal. And it is a subject
n which Congress, quite properly, is keenly
nterested. A gi'eat many bills designed to
mprove training for foreign affairs are intro-
iuced in the House and Senate every year.
ily credentials for talking with you about edu-
sation, therefore, are based on many hours spent
listening to congressional questions, complaints,
ind suggestions regarding the training of the
State Department's Foreign Service officers.
As a former newspaperman, I used to indulge
in some of this criticism myself — and offer some
unsolicited curbstone advice.
Adequate preparation for foreign affairs is a
matter of great concern not only in the State
Department and in Congress but also, as you
well know, in the academic community. The
days are long gone when a successful envoy or
ir^'his first secretary could consider himself well
equipped for diplomacy with simply a bache-
lor's degree from Harvard or Princeton, a fair
command of French, and a good tailor. This,
of course, is no longer the case — if indeed it
ever was.
As the United States assumes broader and
heavier responsibilities in a world increasingly
complex and always perilously near the tinder-
box of war, the men and women who conduct
its foreign relations need far more extensive
schooling than has ever been the case before.
New teclmiques of research and operation must
be developed, new personal skills must be
taught and refined, new tools of diplomacy must
be forged — and in many cases invented.
For today the United States and the rest of
the free world are locked in a massive strutrgle
for survival against an aggressive Commmiist
system that already embraces one-third of the
earth's territory and population. It goes with-
out saying that it is very much in our national
interest to help other free nations remain free.
We must apply wliatever hiunan and material
resources ai-e necessary to help the newly emerg-
ing nations develop democratic societies and
institutions and strong and viable economies.
Our struggle against the Communist bloc in-
volves far more than a massive military con-
frontation. It involves constant resistance to
communism's extensive variety of nonmilitary
weapons and techniques — political maneuvers,
economic blandishment and pressures, propa-
ganda, espionage, subversion, terrorism,
insurgency.
We are confronted by a multitude of revolu-
tions: the headlong acceleration of physical
science and teclinology; the ever-present and
many-pronged tlireat of Communist expansion ;
the emergence of some 60 newly independent
nations; the continuing sliift in world trading
patterns ; our own increasing reliance upon for-
eign markets and sources of supply; the em-
phasis upon multilateral diplomacy through
the United Nations and several regional organi-
* Address made before the centennial conference of
the California Teachers Association at San Francisco,
Calif., on Mar. 2 (press release 112 dated Mar. 1).
I MAECH 25, 1963
423
zations; and the fierce demand for rapid eco-
nomic and social growth throughout the lesser
developed regions of the earth. In addition
there is the complex problem of active United
States participation in a series of alliances
embracing more than 40 countries.
The effect of all these developments has been
to make obsolete many of the traditional prin-
ciples and practices of yesterday. This strug-
gle is not a gentlemen's quarrel — nor is the
gentlemanly art of old-fashioned diplomacy
suitable as a weapon. The resources of many
Federal agencies are needed — the State Depart-
ment's Foreign Service corps, to be sure, but
also the manpower and ingenuity of the armed
services, the U. S. Information Agency, the
Agency for International Development,
the Labor Department, the Commerce Depart-
ment, and so on. Today more than a score of
Federal departments and agencies have repre-
sentatives abroad who play a role in foreign
relations, who are actively engaged in the strug-
gle to beat communism in its varied forms, to
keep free nations free and thus bolster our own
security.
Let me cite some figures to indicate what's
been happening around the world. When the
United Nations was founded here in San Fran-
cisco, it had 51 member nations. Now it has
110. In 1940, at the dawn of World War II,
our Embassy in London had a total of 46 Amer-
ican employees ; today it has 139. Our Embassy
in Tokyo has grown from 24 to 159 in these 23
years. Our Embassy in Saigon, where we are
actively advising and assisting anti-Communist
military forces in a hot war, has a personnel list
totaling 305 ; in 1940, when Indochina was still
a French colony, we had a 3-man staff in Sai-
gon. In Leopoldville there was a single consul
in 1940 ; now there are 57 persons in the U.S.
Embassy.
These dramatic numerical increases have not
resulted from diplomatic f eatherbedding ;
rather, they stem from the need for expert atten-
tion to many fields that once were considered
wholly unrelated to diplomacy. In Jordan, for
example, two-thirds of all employees at the U.S.
Embassy are involved in the administration of
our AID program, an instrument of foreign
policy undreamed of in 1940.
Their duties overseas have thrust American
representatives into all sorts of operations that
would have appalled the striped-pants boys of
the last generation — everything from village
water-supply problems in Asiatic countries to
paramilitary operations against Conamunist-
inspired insurgency in Latin America.
This ever-widening scope of our foreign rela-
tions underscores the interdepartmental nature .
of the work that must be done. The facts of I
life in 1963 call for closely coordinated team
opei-ations overseas and carefully integrated
training in Washington.
National Academy of Foreign Affairs Proposed
How, then, are we preparing our diplomats,
our AID managers, our labor and commercial
attaches, our USIA publicists, for the chal-
lenges of the new diplomacy ? Eight now, it's
a piecemeal operation. The State Department
does have its Foreign Service Institute,
which does a brilliant job teacliing some 60 lan-
guages— from Amharic to Yoruba. Also it
offers courses and seminars in such subjects as
Communist strategy and how to counter Red-
inspired insurgency, and area studies for officers
and their wives about to go overseas. But ex-
cept for occasional lectures by experts from the
college campuses, the faculty is recruited large-
ly from the Foreign Service. The Institute is
physically located in a building in which the De
partment rents space. There is no librarj
worthy of the name nor, in fact, even a comfort-
able room in which to read and study privately
And there's nothing remotely resembling a re
search center. Meanwhile other department;
and agencies have developed their own training
systems — but on the same piecemeal and stop _
gap basis. |
Last year President Kennedy took steps to d(
something about this problem. The end resul
was the President's proposal to Congress o
February 11 for a National Academy of Foreig
Affairs.- The National Academy plan is basei
on the recommendations of two distinguishei
groups of educators and public servants — on
headed by Dr. James A. Perkins of the Carne
gie Corporation, president-elect of Cornell Uni
' See p. 427.
424
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETi:
ersity, the other by former Secretary of State
''hristian A. Herter. I might add that a
rominent Californian, Professor Frederick C.
losher of the University of California, served
s staff director of Mr. Herter's committee.
The Herter group came up with some inter-
sting statistics in its report to the Secretary of
itate last December. (It also coined the
ihrase "the new diplomacy," which I have
■orrowed for purposes of this talk.) The
ommittee found what it called "a serious
eficit" in training afforded officers in the agen-
ies having to do with foreign affairs. This
ras demonstrated by the proportion of training
tme, excluding language studies, to full officer
ime. The committee reported that in the U.S.
nformation Agency this now amounts to only
lightly more than 2 percent. The proportion
5 about the same in the AID agency. Among
"oreign Service officers and Foreign Service
eservists in the State Department it is about 5
•ercent. However, the proportion of training
ime in the military services is 12 percent. The
lerter committee suggested that 1 year in 10,
r double what it is now in the State Depart-
lent, should be devoted to education exclusive
•f language training.
The bill proposed by the President is being
ponsored by Senator Stuart Symington of
ilissouri, with the bipartisan support of Sena-
or Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts and
ome 20 other Senators, including your own
.senator Clair Engle. A number of members
)f the House of Representatives also have intro-
luced the administration bill.
What the Academy Would Not Do
At the heart of the proposed legislation lies
he President's determination to provide the
Dest possible professional-level training, on an
interdepartmental basis, for officers of tlie Gov-
smment involved with foreign affairs. But be-
fore I tell you specifically what the National
Academy of Foreign Affairs is designed to do,
let me try to make clear what it is not designed
to do.
J It would not — and I can't emphasize this too
, 'strongly — it would not be a West Point for
Foreign Service officers. The State Depart-
ment has consistently opposed proposals to give
Foreign Service officers undergraduate train-
ing along the lines of the service academies.
The Department firmly believes that the col-
leges and universities are without any question
the best available source of young talent for
the Foreign Service. For years we have been
trying to erase the image of the American dip-
lomat as a product of an Ivy League college
with a family background of wealth and social
standing. This has never been an entirely ac-
curate description, but it has been true enough
that efforts have been made to correct the situa-
tion.
Were all junior Foreign Service officers
drawn from a single State Department acad-
emy, uniformity of thought and narrowness of
outlook would almost surely result. Moreover,
students would be removed from the main-
stream of American life and experience. We
are trying to break the old mold, not construct
a new one. I hardly need mention to this or-
ganization the importance of recruiting young
men and young women from such institutions
as the great colleges and universities of Cali-
fornia, with their rich and varied courses of
study, their wide range of research facilities,
their diversity of intellectual and social experi-
ence, and their outstanding faculties.
Another thing the National Academy is not
designed to do is supersede the military war
colleges. These higUy specialized institutions
would remain intact, continuing to serve their
extremely useful functions.
Nor would the National Academy seek to
compete in any way with private colleges and
universities — except perhaps in the recruitment
of high-caliber faculty members. Rather, it
would encourage private institutions to con-
tinue their independent research and training
programs. And the national administration
would continue to call upon these institutions
to provide specialized training that may not
be available at the National Academy. The
chancellor, who will be the chief executive of
the Academy if Congress approves the project,
would be specifically charged with fostering
outside researcli and training programs to com-
plement those of the Academy. The intention
is that the Academy serve as a channel through
which the knowledge, opinions, experiments,
[I'ImARCH 25, 1963
425
and ideas of the whole academic world may be
brought to bear on the Government's foreign
policies and programs.
In this connection let me quote from the re-
port Dr. Perkins' panel made to President
Kennedy :
The research program [of the National Academy]
should make no attempt to compete with the sort of
fundamental research on foreign societies which Is
increasingly being conducted in academic institutions
throughout the country. There is, however, a kind of
research on the relations between those societies and
the U.S. which is currently underemphasized in the
academic world because it requires close contact with
U.S. Government operations of a sort difficult or impos-
sible to organize from a university campus. Oppor-
tunities which the National Academy could offer for
this sort of policy oriented research should help attract
some of our best minds to the Academy faculty.
How the Academy Would Operate
What the National Academy will do, we
hope, is serve all Federal departments and agen-
cies engaged in the conduct of foreign affairs,
with the aim of improving the effectiveness of
their individual operations and the coordination
of the American effort as a whole, here and
overseas.
The legislation that President Kennedy has
asked Congress to enact provides for a board of
regents to detemiine overall policy for the
Academy and give guidance to the chancellor.
The board would consist of the Secretary of
State as chairman, the chancellor, four other
senior officers of the Govermnent who hold
Presidential appointments, and five members
appointed from private life by the President.
All would be confirmed by the Senate.
In addition to their policy guidance responsi-
bilities, the regents would be authorized to es-
tablish visiting committees and call in advisers
for consultation.
Tlie chancellor, as operating head of the
Academy, would be armed with full authority
to correlate the Academy's training, education,
and research with the activities of other Gov-
ernment agencies and with the programs of
private institutions such as colleges and uni-
versities. Unlike the present Foreign Service
Institute, which belongs to the State Depart-
ment, the Academy would be a completely
autonomous agency of the Government. It
426
would take over most of the present fimctions
of the Institute, which would then cease to exist.
However, the State Department and the other
agencies concerned would continue to be re-
sponsible for their own in-house, subprofes-
sional training.
Although all of the planning is not yet com^
plet«d, it is expected that when in full opera^
tion the Academy would have at any one timei
some 1,200 or so students assigned from thei
State Department, the Defense Department,
USIA, and the other Govermnent agencies withi
foreign affairs responsibilities. The facultyi
would consist, hopefully, of distinguished!
scholars in various fields, serving on a fuU-timet
basis, and other professors who might choose
to use their sabbatical year teaching or engag
rng in research at the Academy. Officials ol
the State Department and other Government
agencies would be assigned on a short-termi
basis to lecture and teach courses in their areaai
of sjiecial competence.
The Academy would be located in the Wash'
ington area so that the faculty and student
could have ready access to the libraries, file*
and other materials within the administration
The faculty and students of the Academe
would be able to observe and analyze the opera
tions of all Federal agencies and to learn from
and discuss concrete problems with, their offi'
cials. The Academy's governmental statu;
would permit its curriculum to be quickly up
dated to fit the changing needs and prioritiei
of the international scene and to include botl
comprehensive and highly specialized course!
as needed. Finally, the Academy's mixing o>
personnel having direct and varied experiences
within a scholarly atmosphere, should produci
a cross- fertilization of knowledge and ideas oi
immense benefit to the entire Government.
The curriculmn camiot be described in detai
until the Congress passes the legislation and thi
chancellor and board of regents develop suitabl
courses of study. Probably, though, many o
tine same courses now given at the Foreign Serv
ice Institute would be offered at the Academj
These would include, of course, the language an(
area training courses, probably some form o
the present 6-week seminar in counterinsur
gency, and something like the year-long senio
seminar for top-level officials.
DEPAETMENT OF STATE BULLETD
k
In more general terms the curriculiuu would
include extensive training in several particular
areas :
— The history, theory, strategy, and tactics of
the international Communist movement, and
the most effective means of counteracting the
diverse types of Communist pressure.
— Intensive courses of broad area training
including the languages, politics, culture, his-
tory, economics, sociology, and religious back-
ground of critical regions of the world.
— The multiple interests of the United States
m its relations with other nations, the various
devices employed by Government to protect and
jromote American interests, and the means of
ichieving coordination and balance among the
gpecialized goals and activities of these various
igencies.
— Research and training in the practical
nethods by which the less developed nations
nay be assisted in their efforts to achieve stable
governments, self-sustaining economic ad-
vancement, social justice, and free political
nstitutions.
— The complex political, economic, military,
md cultural relationships between the U.S. and
ts partners of the advanced, industrial world —
ncluding the purposes, mechanics, and prob-
ems of our alliance system ; common endeavors
;o achieve financial stability and accelerated
iconomic growth; problems and opportimities
m commerce and investment; joint military
programs ; and similar matters.
Courses would vary in length, probably rang-
ing from 2 weeks to a year. The intention is
that the Foreign Service corps and other mili-
tary and civilian officers of the Government
would return to the Academy from time to time
during their careers to expand their expertise
with additional studies.
Now, what I have outlined may not be the
ideal solution of the massive training problem
that exists. Many thoughtful members of
Congress in fact already have indicated dis-
agreement with aspects of the administration
proposal and have submitted bills attacking the
problem from different directions. I think I
' can safely say, however, that there is a distinct
consensus in Wasliington that something has to
be done — and soon.
In closing, let me quote a few words from
President Kennedy's letter to Congress when
he sent the administration plan to Capitol Hill
last month :
"Today we live in a new world — a world
marked by the continuing threat of communism,
by the emergence of new nations seeking politi-
cal independence and economic growth, and by
the obligations we have assumed to help free
peoples maintain their freedom. . . . And the
hopes for progress and freedom in much of the
world rest in great part on the American con-
tribution.
"This new situation demands men and women
capable of informed and forceful action every-
where within the economic, political and social
spectrum of our concern. ... It calls for new
proficiency in the analysis of current problems,
new skill in the formulation of policy, new
effectiveness in the coordination and execution
of decision, new understanding of the tactics of
communism and the strategy of freedom, and
new preparation for the multitude of tasks
which await our government personnel every-
where in the world."
President Transmits Proposal
for Academy of Foreign Affairs
Following is the text of a letter from Presi-
dent Kennedy to Lyndon B. Johnson, President
of the Senate, transmitting a hill for establish-
ment of a National Academy of Foreign Affairs,
together with a m^nfwrandum from Secretary
Rusk to the President sum/marising the princi-
pal provisions of the proposed legislation. An
identical letter was sent on the same day to John
W. McGormach, Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY
White House press release dated February H
Februakt 11, 1963
Dear Mr . PREsmENT : I am transmitting
herewith for the consideration of the Congress
a bill ^ to provide for the establisliment of the
' Not printed here ; for text, see H.R. 3668.
MARCH 25, 19G3
427
National Academy of Foreign Affairs, together
with a memorandum summarizing and discuss-
ing the principal provisions of the proposed
legislation.
In the last quarter-century, there has been a
dramatic change in the role and responsibilities
of the United States in world affairs. Before
the Second World War, our commitments to
the world outside our own hemisphere were
limited. Our role was characteristically that
of observer, not of participant. Our represent-
atives abroad concentrated on reporting events
rather than on working to change their course.
We had no major programs of foreign assistance
or overseas information or cultural exchange.
Today we live in a new world — a world
marked by the continuing threat of communism,
by the emergence of new nations seeking politi-
cal independence and economic growth, and by
the obligations we have assumed to help free
peoples maintain their freedom. To meet the
challenges of this new world, we have enor-
mously expanded and diversified our overseas
commitments, operations and activities.
These operations involve virtually every de-
partment and agency of our government.
Nearly a million Americans are serving our
nation beyond our national frontiers. And the
hopes for progress and freedom in much of the
world rest in great part on the American con-
tribution.
This new situation demands men and women
capable of informed and forceful action every-
where within the economic, political and social
spectrum of our concern. It requires these men
and women to apply their specialized skills and
experience to many diverse problems and activ-
ities, and at the same time to maintain an es-
sential unity of purpose and action so that all
these operations can be coordinated into a har-
monious whole. It therefore demands a new
approach to the training and education of men
and women for service overseas. It calls for
new proficiency in the analysis of current prob-
lems, new skill in the formulation of policy, new
effectiveness in the coordination and execution
of decision, new understanding of the tactics of
communism and the strategy of freedom, and
new preparation for the multitude of tasks
which await our government personnel every-
where in the world.
428
The various Federal departments and agen-
cies have already made extensive efforts to de-
velop programs to equip their personnel for
these new challenges. But a piecemeal, depart-
ment-by-department approach is no longer
adequate. A new institution is urgently needed
to provide leadership for those efforts — to as-
sure vigorous and comprehensive programs of
training, education and research for the
personnel of all departments.
Tlie proposed National Academy of Foreign
Affairs is based on recommendations made by
two distinguished groups of educators and pub-
lic servants.^ Autonomous in nature and inter-
departmental in scope, the Academy would be
designed to pi'ovide our foreign affairs person-
nel with the fundamental knowledge and im-
derstanding which is indispensable to serving j
our nation effectively in today's complex world.
It is not intended in any way to supersede or toti
compete with the notable work now carried on
in our colleges and universities. The central
burden of basic education in foreign affairs
must, of course, remain in non-governmental
hands. Unlike the present Foreign Service In-
stitute, the Academy will not be oriented pri-
marily to the work of the Department of Stat*
alone, but will be the nucleus of Government-
wide training and research in international
matters. Therefore, the proposed legislatior
calls for the repeal of earlier legislation estab-
lishing the Foreign Service Institute and foi
the transfer of appropriate facilities of the
Institute to the Academy. The Department oi
State will retain authority to provide special-
ized in-service training of a routine character
on subjects of exclusive interest to its own
personnel, as will other Federal agencies.
Nor would the Academy detract from the ™
valuable contribution being made by our senior
professional military schools. Finally, it would
not propagate any single doctrine or philoso-
phy about the conduct of foreign affairs. Such
an institution can serve the cause of freedom
only as it embodies the spirit of freedom, and it
can fulfill its mission only by meeting the
best standards of intellectual excellence and
academic freedom.
■a,
titt
ten
' For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 24, 1962, p»
971, and Jan. 14, 1963, p. 47.
DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETZN'
The Academy is intended to enable faculty
ind students of the highest quality to focus our
'ollective experience and knowledge on the is-
.ues most vital to the advancement of our na-
ional purpose. With the full backing of the
government and academic community, it will, it
s hoped, attract the essential leadership that
vill make it a great center of training, educa-
ion and research in foreign affairs.
I earnestly hope that the CJongress will give
larly and favorable consideration to this
)roposed legislation.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy
yiEMORANDUM FROM SECRETARY RUSK
5ubjt:ct: Bill to provide for the establishment
of the National Academy of Foreign
Affairs
During recent years, the need for advanced
irofessional training, education, and research
Q the vast and intricate field of American
oreign affairs has become increasingly evident,
loth to the Federal agencies directly concerned
,nd to outside political and academic leaders,
strenuous efforts have been made to meet this
leed by the expansion and improvement of exist-
ng facilities, but the weight of evidence makes
t clear that piecemeal measures will no longer
■ufBce and that a wholly new approach is
leeded.
The importance of a new approach to foreign
iffairs training, education and research was
lighlighted in the Report of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs Personnel, chaired by former
Secretary of State Christian Herter. It was
ilso the subject of a recent report to you sub-
nitted by a special Presidential Advisory Panel
)f academic leaders, chaired by Dr. James A.
Perkins. The legislation now being proposed
is based primarily upon the findings and
recommendations of the latter report, although
it has taken account of ideas and suggestions
from many other sources, including various
legislative proposals put forward by members
;0f the Congress in past years.
The most significant features of the proposed
legislation are the following:
1. Enactment of the legislation will manifest
a clear and firm commitment by the Congress
and the Executive Branch to make training,
education and research in foreign affairs a more
effective and integrated instrument of American
foreign policy.
2. The program of the proposed Academy
will encompass the entire range of foreign
affairs and thereby serve the totality of Amer-
ican interests. Thus, while the methods of
resisting commimist expansion — direct and in-
direct— must be given great emphasis, this sub-
ject obviously cannot be treated in isolation. It
must be closely linked with various interrelated
purposes and activities of U.S. foreign policy,
such as the economic and social advancement of
the less-developed countries, the preservation of
our regional alliances, and the promotion of
American commercial ties with other nations.
In other words, the proposed legislation recog-
nizes that American foreign policy has many
specialized and interlocking components, and
contemplates a training and research program
that will embrace all these components and
clarify the relationship among them.
3. In the broadest sense, the program of
the new Academy may be expected to better
meet our needs in three major areas: (a) the
analysis, compilation and distribution of the
products of the best thinking developed in gov-
ernmental and private research institutions;
(b) the study and evaluation of past and pres-
ent U.S. operating experience in various fields
of foreign affairs (especially in new or ex-
panded program areas) ; and (c) the training
and education of professional staffs responsible
for formulating, supervising and conducting
foreign affairs activities.
4. As the Academy's program is designed to
cover all significant aspects of foreign affairs,
so it must meet the needs of all U.S. depart-
ments and agencies actively involved in foreign
relations. The Academy, which would replace
the Foreign Service Institute, would be the
focal point of efforts to provide training, educa-
tion and research in subjects affecting the con-
duct of our international programs on a Gov-
ernment-wide basis. Existing law providing
for the Foreign Service Institute would be re-
placed and the transfer of certain of its facil-
MARCH 25, 1963
429
ities to the Academy would be authorized. The
Department of State, like other Federal
agencies, would continue to possess the author-
ity to provide specialized training needed by its
own personnel. Wlien the Academy is in
operation, it will be the principal source of pro-
fessional training and education for personnel
of tlie State Department, the USIA [U.S.
Information Agency] and AID [Agency for
International Development], as well as a sup-
plemental source of training for more than 20
other Federal agencies.
5. The proposed legislation establishes the
Academy as a separate institution, with inde-
pendent and ample facilities for furnishing ad-
vanced training and education to foreign af-
fairs personnel throughout the Government, for
initiating and conducting useful research and
for performing other tasks assigned to it. For
example, the Academy, under the direction of
a Chancellor appointed by the President, will
choose its own faculty members, develop its
own curriculimi, collect and organize pertinent
materials from Governmental agencies and out-
side sources, design and carry out its research
programs, and take the initiative in fostering
supplementary research by private institutions.
At the same time, the operations of the
Academy will be subject to basic policy guid-
ance provided by a Board of Regents, chaired
by the Secretary of State and consisting of four
other high Federal officials and five prominent
private citizens designated by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
These arrangements will establish an appropri-
ate linkage between the work of the Academy
and that of the operating agencies of the Gov-
ernment and thereby ensure that the training
and research undertaken by the Academy will
not be conducted in an "ivoi-y tower" atmos-
phere but will be genuinely geared to the con-
crete needs of the agencies actually engaged in
international operations. This linkage will also
enable the Academy and the operating agencies
to work out mutually satisfactory procedures
to permit the faculty, students and research
workers of the Academy to gain access to
pertinent classified materials while maintaining
appropriate security safeguards.
6. The proposed legislation gives the Chan-
430
cellor administrative authorities and responsi-
bilities similar to those normally possessed by
heads of major private educational institutions.
If the Academy is to be successful, it must
attract personnel of tlie highest quality, must
be able to achieve and maintain rigorous aca-
demic standards, mu|t have optimum flexibil-
ity to adjust its activities to ever-changing
requirements, and must have access to equip-
ment, property, services and other resources
comparable to those available in leading uni-
versities.
7. Wliile the research, education and train-
ing conducted by the Academy will primarily i
be for officers of the Federal Government, the
proposed legislation will permit private Amer-
ican citizens, and even foreign nationals, to m
receive training at the Academy where such]
training is deemed to be in the national inter-
est. The criteria for screening and selecting
such trainees, and the security restrictions to bei
applied to them, will be developed by the Chan-
cellor under the guidance of the Board of!
Regents.
8. The proposed Academy will not in any*
sense compete with the activities of established
colleges and universities, but rather will serve
as a channel through which the knowledge
opinions, experiments and ideas of the wholft
academic world may be used more effectively
in the Government's foreign affairs programs"
Thus, the Academy will not attempt to dupli-
cate the basic courses provided by colleges anc
universities. Instead it will develop new pro-
grams of training and research designed to syn-
thesize these diverse educational resources, plus
the knowledge and experience within the Gov-
ernment itself, and focus them upon the con-
crete problems of foreign affairs. Similarly
the Academy will continue to look to privat<
colleges, universities and foundations for assist-
ance and cooperation in many phases of ad
vanced research and training and will hav(
authority to contract for such services wher(
necessary.
9. The proposed legislation provides that thd
National Academy will be physically located ii
or near the District of Columbia. Wliile then
miglit be certain values in seeking a more dis-
tant location, these are clearly outweighed bj
the advantages of a location close to the head
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
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quarters of the various departments and agen-
cies engaged in the actual conduct of foreign
a tl'aii-s. Such a location will permit the faculty,
students and research workers to gain ready
access to experienced lecturers and advisers, tx)
consult with appropriate officials in the Execu-
tive Branch and the Congress, to observe actual
Governmental operations, and to obtain perti-
nent documents from Governmental libraries
and files.
10. In view of the ever-changing tides and
cross-currents of international relations, and
the changing plans, programs and emphasis of
the various depai-tments and agencies responsi-
ble for the conduct of foreign affairs, a detailed
and defined curriculum at this time would be
LHirealistic. However, it is expected that the
Academy will place emphasis upon training,
education, and research in such matters as:
(a) the methods of formulating the goals of
U.S. foreign policy in the light of American
institutions and values and the means by which
policies to achieve these goals are developed
vnd executed, including coordination of the
work of the different U.S. agencies, both at
lome and abroad; (b) commimist liistory, the-
Dry, strategy, tactics and resources — military
ind non-military — and the methods of detect-
ing and counteracting communist efforts to
dominate, penetrate and subvert free societies
md institutions; (c) political, social, economic
md cultural evolutions and conditions in criti-
:al areas of the world; (d) the problems of
social and economic advancement in the less-
developed areas, and the means of coping with
5uch problems; and (e) the structure, activities,
relationships and implications of international
organizations.
Early enactment of this legislation will be a
major step forward in bringing more fully to
bear the resources of the Government and the
Nation on the challenges and problems of for-
eign affairs confronting us in these turbulent
times.
Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Second IVEeeting Held by Advisory
Committee on Aid Program
Wblte HoQse press release dated March 1
The Committee To Strengtlien the Security of
the Free World, appointed by the President to
review U.S. foreign assistance programs in the
light of U.S. and free-world security interests,
completed its second series of meetings on Feb-
ruary 27.^ The 3-day meeting, under the chair-
manship of Gen. Lucius D. Clay, heard a series
of witnesses from the Department of State, the
Agency for International Development, the De-
partment of Defense, and other agencies.
The committee held sessions on U.S. economic
and military assistance programs in the Far
East, Latin America, South Asia, the Near
East, Africa, and Europe. The final day was
devoted to discussions with Secretary of State
Dean Eusk, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNa-
mara, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Treasury
Douglas Dillon, and AID Administrator David
Bell.
Also heard earlier in the meeting were wit-
nesses from several private organizations re-
questing an opportunity to appear before the
committee. These groups were the Interna-
tional Economic Policy Association, headed by
Dr. N. R. Danielian, the Business Council for
International Understanding, led by Chairman
Fred Foy, and the Citizens Foreign Aid Com-
mittee, a group which has been critical of U.S.
foreign assistance programs.
The committee will meet again in early
March to agree on its report to the President,
which is expected by mid-March and will be
made public thereafter.
In addition to its chairman, General Clay, the
committee is composed of Robert B. Anderson,
Eugene R. Black, Clifford Hardin, Robert A.
Lovett, Edward S. Mason, L. F. McCollum,
George Meany, Herman Phleger, and Howard
A. Rusk.
^ For background, see Buixetin of Dec. 31, 1962, p.
1007, and Mar. 4, 1963, p. 329.
MARCH 25, 1963
431
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 8
Press release 121 dated March 8
Secretary Rusk : I have no opening statement
today —
Q. Mr. Secretary — {Laughter.)
A. But—
Q. We don't want you to he at a loss for
something to say.
A. I just wanted to comment, in view of [As-
sociated Press correspondent] John High-
tower's cordial invitation at our last press con-
ference/ I thought I would come back before
an undue delay. So, John, do you have the firet
question ?
Q. Yes, sir. On Fehruary 18 the Soviet Gov-
ernment sent word it intended to withdraw sev-
eral thousand troops from Cuba. Can you tell
us wlmt the state of that withdrawal is and
what the prospects are?
A. Movements are under way. The indica-
tion was that several thousand would be taken
out by the middle of March. We are, of course,
watching that withdrawal with very great in-
terest. And we will make an assessment as to
- — somewhat later, about exactly what this with-
drawal amounts to. But I would not today
want to get into the box score of running figures
on how the situation stands at this moment.
Q. Could you tell us what you mean, sir, when
you say '■''movements are under way"? Do you
nfiean movements within the island to embarka-
tion points?
A. No. I think there have been movements
also actually on ships leaving the island.
Working Out a Satisfactory Inspection System
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy has been hearing testimony on
the ability of the system proposed by the United
States to detect tests. Yesterday scientists
' BuixETiN of Feb. 18, 1963, p. 23.5.
agreed that the Soviet Union could conduct a
series of tests thai would not even be detected.
There was disagreement among those scientists
about what the ceiling was below which that
senes could be conducted. Yet the President
told us at his press conference on Wednesday
[March 6'] that he would not accept such a
treaty. Tliere seems to be a conflict here. Could
you help us resolve it?
A. Well, in the first place, scientific judg-
ments do vary on capabilities, and scientists do
also make a political judgment about the de-
gree of risk involved. But let me say on that
subject, first, that the question of the number
of on-site inspections is a highly theoretical
question until after we know what we are talk-
ing about. In other words, we do not yet have
in our discussions in Geneva any satisfactory
answer to the question "the number of what?''
Two or three hmidred unsatisfactory tests or
inspections are not as significant as seven or
eight effective inspections. Now, we would like
to get down to the details of working out a saf>
isfactory inspection system. These would in-
clude such things as the arrangements to pro-
vide the data on which judgments can be made
as to whether or not an inspection is called for.
It would involve agreement on the areas to be
inspected, the size of the area, for example. It
involves the composition of the inspection teams.
It would involve arrangements to insure that
the inspection team is actually at the location
which it is requested to inspect. It would in-
volve a great many details which have not been
worked out.
Now, we would like to see these details — the
fine print — worked out so that we know what
we are talking about when we talk about num-
bers of inspections. Now, it is entirely possible^
that very small-scale tests could occur. But i '
series of tests which would raise security ques-
tions could be, we believe, adequately dealt witl .
with the kind of inspection system that we have
432
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
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an mind. But we have not yet had any response
■trom the other side in terms of working out an
ictual inspection system which could do the
ob.
Q. From which scientists are you getting ad-
lice, sir? Both Dr. [Carl F.] Rortvaey and Br.
Jack P.] Ruirw, said yesterday that the —
A. We are getting advice from a great many
liflferent scientists.
Q. WovZd that include Dr. Romney and Dr.
^uina?
A. Yea, their views have been taken into
.ccount in this discussion.
tisks of Continued Arms Race
Q. Mr. Secretary^ do you agree with Senator
John (9.] Pastore that there is no foolproof
ystem of detection and that any arrangement
hat is accepted will inevitably involve some
isk?
A. Well, there is a measure of risk in any sys-
em. I mean, for example, the treaty would
lave to determine the level of energy release
fhich would be acceptable as a part of normal
aboratory work on matters, say, connected with
he peaceful development of atomic energy.
?here would be some margins of risk, but let me
loint out that there are major risks in any direc-
ion here if the arms race continues. Unless we
an find some way to bring a stop to this qualita-
ive arms race, the prospect is that there not only
Till be increasing billions of dollars applied to
uclear testing but that the arms race will be-
ome increasingly unpredictable and uncertain.
Now, this was foreseen as early as 1945, when,
t the very beginning of the nuclear age, Presi-
[ent Truman made a determined effort to bring
tuclear energy under international control and
o eliminate a nuclear anns race, through the
3aruch proposals — an intensive and dedicated
iffort made in those years. Both the Eisen-
lower and the Kennedy administrations made a
udgment that it was in the interest of the
Jnited States, and indeed of all mankind, to
)ring this nuclear testing business to an end,
,f possible, and to try to find some way to im-
pose a ceiling on the qualitative arms race in
vhich we are now engaged.
There are major risks involved if this race
goes on. Therefore we have no choice between
a situation in which there are no risks and a
situation in which there are very great risks.
There are some risks in any direction —
Q. Mr. Secretary —
A. — but those involved in a continued race
are very great indeed.
Q. Mr. Seo^etary, have you any word as to
when the exploratory Amerlcan-Russiam talks
on Berlin will resume, and could you tell us if
you foresee any better prospects than there have
been in the past?
A. We have no further word on that. We ex-
pect to hear in due course from the Soviet
Union. Mr. Kohler [U.S. Ambassador Foy D.
Kohler] has reported on that, after his return
to Moscow. Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] has been out of
the coimtry for the immediate past, and that
may have some influence on it. But we have
had no further word on it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the discussion of a nuclear
test ban possibility seeins to suggest an immi-
nent event here, as something likely to happen
very soon or in the near future. Could you
give us your evaluation of the prospects of
such a treaty now, in view of the Soviet
attitude?
A. No, I would not put that interpretation
on recent events. As a matter of fact, I think
we would have to say that at present the pros-
pect for a nuclear test ban is not good, because
there has been an unwillingness on the part of
the other side to sit down and talk seriously
about the details, the fine print, the arrange-
ments, as well as the numbers, of inspections,
which would be critical to an effective test ban.
So that I would not mterpret what has been
going on lately as being pregnant with the pos-
sibility of an early success.
Q. Mr. Secretary, sir —
A. Yes.
Q. Noto that the West Oerman Defense
Minister [Kai Uwe von HasseT] ^ has put on
' See p. 444.
MARCH 25, 1963
433
the record some of the suggestions for the cost
of the multilateral nuclear force that we are
proposing — suggesting — for NATO, could you
expand for us, sir, on the American views on
the cost and the nature of the operation of
the system?
A. Well, we are now in a period of intensive
consultation with our allies on this multilateral
force. Let me tiy to put tliis in a little bit
of perspective, if I might.
We are here trying to respond to the ex-
pressed interest of our friends in Europe in
taking a larger part in the decisionmakmg
processes affecting nuclear matters. I tliink
this has been greatly stimulated since 1955, '56,
'57, when the Soviets themselves acquired a
massive nuclear delivery capability against the
West — Western Europe and tliis country.
Now, here is a situation where we are our-
selves trying to explore what it is the Euro-
peans really have in mind. This is not a
question on which American leadership, as it
is frequently expressed, should be measured in
terms of whether an American plan, complete
in every detail, is being put forward for ac-
ceptance in every detail by om- friends. Be-
cause the whole point of the exercise is to find
a way to share that leadership with others,
particularly in Western Europe.
We want to find out in detail on dozens of
specific questions what our allies think about
it. Now we have made during the past year
a very strong effort to provide our allies with
a great deal of information in the nuclear
field — technical, operational, financial. After
Nassau ' we felt that it was appropriate for us
to indicate at least one of the ways in which
we could proceed on a multilateral force. And
Ambassador [Livingston] Merchant is now ex-
ploring the outlines of that kind of a proposal
with our allies.* But we hope and expect that
our allies will themselves come back and tell us
what they think about the entire range of
these questions.
3 For text of a joint communique and statement on
nuclear defense systems issued at Nassau on Dec. 21,
1962, by President Kennedy and British Prime Minis-
ter Harold Macmillan, see Bxtlletin of Jan. 14, 1963,
p. 43.
* For background, see iUd., Feb. 11, 1963, p. 197.
434
Now, it is true that this nuclear club is an
expensive club. Tliis nuclear business is a very
expensive business. We ourselves are com-
mitting in the order of $15 billion a year to
this effort. We think that our European
colleagues Imow that this is expensive. There
are costs involved. And so we are talking with
them about the cost of a multilateral force.
These are not small costs, and they will be
considering these in relation to their other
necessary expenditures, in relation to their
other demands upon them. But this is a ques-
tion wliich is under discussion.
We will be as responsive as possible to the
views of our allies. There are many questions
on which we ourselves will not come to a final
view about our own opinion imtil we know
what our allies tliink about it. But we are
in that stage, Mr. Marder [Murray Marder,
Washington Posti . I wouldn't want to go be-
yond it today.
Q. But, Mr. Secretary, to return to the point
of my original question, sir —
A. Yes. '
Q. Is the Defense Minister correct in saying
that the proposed cost of the force would he in
the range of $500 million a year over 10 years —
$500 million a year over a 10-year period?
A. I would think that is an order of magni-
tude which is realistic, but I think those are
not the exact figures in terms of both the ini-
tial cost and maintenance cost over a period,
but those are close enough to give us a realistic
chance to think about it.
Visit of Brazilian Finance Minister
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Finance Minister of
Brazil is coming here next week, I think, to
begin negotiations or discussions with this Gov-
ernment on fi.nancial cooperation. He is the
same gentleman, I understand, who was some-
thing of a torjnentor to our delegation at Punta
del Este because of his position on the Cuban
situation; and also some of their financial prac-
tices in Brazil are not quite what we under-
stand up here. I wonder if the situation haz
changed to vihere you feel his visit here can be
of some benefit at this time?
A. Yes. First, let me say, as far as Puntai
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETDf'i
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del Este is concerned, that since I was the head
of our delegation there, I had a great deal to
do with Mr. Santiago Dantas, that I did not
consider him a tonnentor at Punta del Este.
There was a high degree of solidarity there
about attitudes toward the Cuban problem and
Marxist-Leninism in this hemisphere. There
was a difference of view on particularly one
paragraph of one resolution. But, in any
jvent, let us, as far as the present situation is
concerned — we have been talking intensively
with the Brazilian Government about their eco-
lomic situation. They are themselves taking
I variety of steps to bring their economic situa-
:ion into a more stable situation, open up a pos-
jibility for an investment from the outside that
rt-ill help them in their position, discussions with
he International Monetary Fund and other in-
stitutions. We look forward to the Finance
Minister's visit here because we tliink that there
s a real prospect that a substantial improve-
nent in that situation can be brought about.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Prime Minister of
Canada made some reference to continuing ne-
gotiations on a nuclear agreennent with the
United States to provide warheads for Cana-
iian troops. Can you tell us whether those
legotiaticms are continuing and ichat stage they
ire in?
A. I believe the reference was made north of
:he border —
Q. Could we please Imve the question here?
A. Beg pardon?
Q. Could we please have the question? We
Jould not hear.
A. Perhaps you would repeat the question.
Q. Tlie PriTne Minister of Canada has rrvade
wme references during the election campaign to
the continuation of negotiations, that is, hard
and fast negotiations, to obtain United States
warheads for Canadian troops. I have asked
the Secretary wJiat state these negotiations are
in.
A. Well, those negotiations, as indicated
from north of the border, are continuing inter-
mittently, and we expect that these discussions
will go forward.
Situation in Arab States
Q. Mr. Secretary, dunng this past 6 months
the regimes in Iraq, Yemen, and now Syria
have changed, and each time there is immediate
afflliation with the ZJ.A.R. — at least, a friendly
spirit. In view of this do you have some con-
cern for the longevity of the regimes in Saudi
Arabia and in Jordan?
A. Let me say, first, on the most recent devel-
opment in Syria, we have only fragmentary
reports, and I would not wish to make any
judgment on exactly what that might mean.
We do have information that so far as we can
tell the Americans in that comitry are safe and
that the situation does not affect them. We
ourselves believe that relations among the Arab
states ought to be worked out on the basis of
consent, on the basis of voluntary cooperation
in the normal way.
We of course are concerned about the inde-
pendence of these Arab states and their freedom
from external penetration. We hope, for ex-
ample, that the Yemen people will be left alone
to decide their own future and have been work-
ing in that direction. But we do not ourselves
object to the close cooperation among the Arab
states on the basis of friendly cooperation
among states and in ways which do not counter
the normal obligations of states in the interna-
tional commtuiity. We are very much inter-
ested in the independence and the security of
our friends in Jordan and Saudi Arabia and
will be very much alert to any threats against
them.
Trend in Viet-Nam Encouraging
Q. Mr. Secretary, in South Viet-Nam, Gen-
eral Paul Harkins in an interview recently men-
tioned the fact that 1963 would most likely be
the year of decision. He also said in the course
of that that the Viet Cong appeared to be sup-
plied by their own efforts with homemade weap-
ons rather than from abroad. Would you give
us your view of this and wJiat the situation
might be there?
A. It appears that we are turning an impor-
tant corner in South Viet-Nam in relation to
this Viet Cong effort. The ratio of arms cap-
tured by one side or the other has shifted dra-
MARCH 25, 1963
435
matically in favor of the Government troops.
Defections from the Viet Cong have grown
rapidly. We have been greatly encouraged by
the fact tliat the villagers in the countryside are
coming forward voluntarily to provide infor-
mation of great assistance to the Government in
locating the Viet Cong and their activities.
The Viet Cong incidents have dropped to ap-
proximately half of what they were on a month-
ly level during 1962. The Government forces
clearly have the initiative in most areas of the
country. The montagnards, the mountain peo-
ple of central Viet- Nam, are being of increas-
ingly greater assistance to the Government
forces in patrolling and in assuring the security
of their own area. We are encouraged by the
progress but at the same time recognize that
this kind of warfare is bitter and mean and is
likely to extend for some time. The problem
is by no means over, but we are encouraged by
the trend that we have seen in the last several
weeks and months.
Q. Mr. Secretary., the last time you met with
us, you mentioned that this Govemmerd was
trying to use its influence in South Viet-Nam, to
get a more useful., rational press policy so that
the American people could hnow what was go-
ing on more accurately. How are we doing in
that effort?
A. There has been some improvement, Mr.
Abel [Elie Abel, NBC News], but I think that
there is still more to be done. We ourselves
have tried to be more helpful directly with
members of the press in the briefing problem
out there; and I would think that there has
been some improvement, but not yet wholly
satisfactory.
Equitable Sharing of U.N. Peacekeeping Costs
Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could clar-
ify our intentions on our contributions for
peacekeeping activities of the United Nations f °
Mr. [Francis T. P.] Plimpton seemed to indi-
cate the other day that if these nations paid
their arrears xoe m,ight continue to pay more
than the 32 percent, which is our standard
share; that we might continue to pay the 80
' For a statement issued by the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations on Mar. 6, see p. 443.
436
percent that we have been paying for many of
the underdeveloped nations. Is that the right
construction?
A. Well, we feel —
Q. Would you repeat the comment, please?
A. Yes. Would you ask your question some-
what more loudly, please ?
Q. Yes. The question was ichat our inten-
tions are with respect to contributions to the
peacekeeping activities of the United Nations.
Mr. Plimpton seemed to suggest that, if the
other nations paid their arrears and continued
to meet their assessments, we might continue
to pay -more than our standard share of 32 per-
cent— as much as the 80 percent we have been
paying for many underdeveloped nations. Is
that right?
A. Well, we have not been paying 80 percent
of the peacekeeping costs.
Q. Yes. But for m,any of the underdevel-
oped nations we have been paying aibout 80
percent of the cost.
A. In the past there have been some reduc-
tions in their share of the contribution.
We are now engaged in an effort — have been
for some time — to stabilize the finances of the
United Nations and to increase the sense of
responsibility among all members for the finan-
cial burdens of the U.N. The United States,
since 1945, has taken a very heavy share of that
burden. We believe that the entire member-
ship ought now to come in and take a fair
share of these great financial necessities of
the U.N.
I thinli we made a major step this past year
in following the decision of the International
Court of Justice, approved by more than 70
votes in the General Assembly, in the direction
of financial responsibility.^
Now we feel that all members ought to take
their regular share in these costs. It is true
that the smaller countries are not themselves
well off, but it is also true that their proportion-
ate contribution is very small indeed. And
they themselves have perhaps the greatest stake
of all in the success and the effectiveness of
• Bulletin of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 30.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
U.N. peacekeeping operations. So we would
like very much to get a general understanding
that the normal ratios of contribution are basic
to the peacekeepmg operation.
Now, if tlie U.N. financial house is in good
order, tlien there are various ways in which we
can contribute to situations such as in the
Congo, economic assistance, some of the serv-
ices that we are able to provide — which might
go beyond our actual stated percentage. But
we ought to start from an appropriate and
equitable allocation of costs throughout the
membership. We believe that the United
Nations should make, and indeed it is making,
intensive effort to collect the arrearages in all
of its budgets. So that we are not luider the
necessity of bailing out a membership which
has itself a great stake in the success of the
U.N.
Coordination of Central American Efforts
Q. Mr. Secretary, ivould you say that the idea
of a Central Artierican political federatioii toill
get any fublic encouragement froin the United
States in the coming meeting of Presidents in
San Jose, Costa Rica? '
A. Well, we have been vei-y much interested,
and I might say sympathetically interested, in
the various moves that have been taken in Cen-
tral America to draw together and to coordi-
nate their efforts in a variety of fields.
The prospect is that the Central American
Common Market will come into full operation
within the inmiediate few years ahead. We
have noticed, with great encouragement, the
discussions that are going on among the uni-
versities of Central America to work out a
rationalized program of higher education for
those countries.
Now the development of the Central Ameri-
can countries, through the Alliance for Prog-
ress, will be a matter of high priority in the
discussions to be held in Costa Rica, and we
believe that this can best be accomplished
througli the maximiun degree of contribution
among the countries concerned. So that I
would say that a Central American contribu-
' For an announcement of the meeting, see ibid., Feb.
11, 1963, p. 213.
tion is something that we would welcome, at
the pace at which it is acceptable to the Central
Americans themselves. And they can count on
us for full support in the efforts they take in
that direction.
Q. Mr. Secretary f
A. Yes?
Q. Former Ambassador [Ellsxoorth 7".]
Bunker has been sent to the Middle East to
help to try to arrange a disengagement in
Yemen. I have two questions: (1) Is he plan-
ning to meet %oith the Royalist forces during
his mission; and (S) How close is his mission
tied in toith the Bunche mission of the United
Nations?
A. It is true that Ambassador Bunker is in
Saudi Arabia to discuss a variety of questions
with that Government, including the situation
in the Yemen. I would not want to go into the
details of those discussions. His presence there
is contemporary with Mr. Ralph Bunche's mis-
sion, but it is not organically a part of the same
effort. Mr. Bunche is out representing the
United Nations. On your specific question
about meeting with the Royalists, I don't have
an answer to that question.
Recent Developments in the Congo
Q. Mr. Secretary, some reports from, the
Congo recently, especially from the British
press, have suggested tluit the country is drift-
ing toward a new chaos and disorder, especially
in Katanga, now that the Indian and Tunisian
troops are due to be withdrawn. Does this
Government have continuing plans for trying
to hold the line there?
A. Well, on the one side, we would like to
see the United Nations forces reduced as
rapidly as is consistent with the security of the
country and the original mission of the U.N.
in going in there. On the other side, we do
understand that until the process of political
unity has proceeded further there are risks
involved in precipitate reduction of those
forces. Naturally the governments who have
forces in the Congo would like to get them back
home as soon as possible. This involves a bal-
ance of judgment about what the situation can
afford at a particular time.
MARCH 2 5, 1963
67S385— 63 3
437
I must say that I feel that the situation gen-
erally is encouraging and that U.N. forces can
be reduced in the weelvs immediately ahead.
But this will, also, be related to the speed in
which the Congolese forces of the Central Gov-
ernment, as well as the local Katangese
police forces, can be put in position or reorgan-
ized to take care of the basic security situation
of thecountiy.
Q. Mr. Secretary —
A. — There is no precise answer because it
depends a little on how the situation develops.
Q. Mr. Secretary?
A. Yes ? I think there is a question over here.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been quite a bit
of discussion on the Hill about bipartisan ap-
proach to foreign policy — whether there is am/
bipartisan approach now. If there isn't, who
violated it? Can you give liS your ideas of bi-
partisan policy — lohether you are satisfied with
the existing policy today?
A. Well, I think the main lines of American
foreign policy since 1945 have been firmly
rooted in a bipartisan approach to our relations
with the rest of the world. The great U.N. ef-
fort, the construction of our 42 allies — the al-
liances involving 42 allies — our foreign aid
program — these great streams of American
policy have been basically bipartisan in
character.
Now, there will be margins of difference and
controversy around the edges of these great
issues of policy, but I have not, for example,
seen any indication with respect to, say, a
hundred elements of foreign policy as you look
at them around the world that there is partisan
conflict over more than a very small number.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could I go bach to Cuba
for a moment?
A. All right.
Q. Pm not clear from your — / understand
necessary — general comments on the present
situation there whether you feel it is physically
possible for the Soviets in the week remaining
before their deadline to withdraw several
thousand troops from Cuba. Can you tell us
whether there are in position ships that wfll
tnake that loithdrawaZ possible within that
time?
A. Yes, ships have been moving into Cuba in
the past 2 weeks. I imderstand that more are
on the way which would make that possible.
It is not a logistic problem of shipping, as I
understand it.
Problems of Public Information
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you share the view that
too many people are saying too mu^h about
Cuba?
A. Well, I think we have indicated some con-
cern about the necessity for making public
some aspects of our intelligence-collecting pro-
cedures. I think there is a good deal of wisdom
in some of the remarks made by Congressman
[George H.] Mahon the other day about how
much we disclose to the rest of the world in con-
nection with the necessity for keeping our own
people well and accurately informed about some
of these matters. Since 1945, since Joseph
Stalin returned to the cold war at the end of the
fighting in Europe, there has been a great
struggle between that system and the free
world. Some of this struggle involves some
pretty mean kinds of fighting in dark back
alleys. The only satisfaction one can gather
from that kind of activity is from the gallantry
of those from many coimtries who have had to
take part in it on behalf of freedom.
Now it is not always possible or in our
interest to make all these things public. The
main directions of policy and the principal ob-
jectives we have in view and the main actions
we take with respect to them are fully known
because this country in the main has to act in
public and does act in public. But there are
some serious problems involved as to how far we
go in giving to the other side information which
the other side would find extremely valuable in
the details and the actual conduct of policy.
Q. Mr. Secretary, during the past month
there was under \oay within the administration
a review of the effect on the main lines of the
position expressed by French President de
Gaulle. President Kennedy and you have said
on a number of occasions that the main lines of
American policy rem,ain unchanged. How-
438
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ever, apart from that, are there any modifica-
tions at all that the administration contem,plates
to deal with the existing situation while con-
tinuing on those main lines?
A. I think, as we move ahead in our discus-
sions in NATO on the military establisliment in
NATO, the prospects for multilateral and
multinational arrangements in the nuclear field,
the continued buildup of the conventional
forces, that we do expect to get on with the
central task of NATO in the security field.
On the trade front, it is true that the failure
of the negotiations for the admission of the
U.K. into the EEC [European Economic Com-
munity] have aifected the prospect for our trade
expansion program to a degree because some
of the provisions of the act are modified by the
failure of the U.K. to become a member of the
EEC. But we expect those negotiations to con-
tinue. There is a working group of GATT
meeting this month. There will be a ministerial
meeting in May in GATT to determine how
to lay on the negotiations for another round of
negotiations for trade expansion. So we are
getting on with that program.
At the same time we continue to step up our
consultation in NATO on policy questions af-
fecting not only the European scene but other
parts of the world. And I think that is going
ahead. I would not think that there is any
major and dramatic new direction of policy in
which we ought to embark at this time because
of the events of the last 2 months.
Aid to India
Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask a question?
A. Yes.
Q. You said that two military missions have
gone to India and are now on their way home.
I suppose they are stopping at London. But
this process will evidently take many months —
and reports to Congress and all the legislation
involved. In the meantime, sir, there is appre-
hension in India that the attack on India might
recur. Could you kindly tell us, sir, if you are
committed to giving us additional aid in such a
new emergency? Secondly, sir, may I ask,
would such aid be conditional on the Indo-
Pakistan negotiations succeeding?
A. Well, in the first place, the military assist-
ance to India, which was agreed between the
President and Prime Minister Macmillan at
Nassau, is now going forward, going forward
rapidly. The military missions that you re-
ferred to — the one on air defense ^ I think is
now in London preparing its report. President
Kennedy has indicated on more than one occa-
sion our very great interest in the security of
India. And I tliink that it can be assumed that
we will not be negligent in the situation that
you mentioned.
As far as the relation between these problems
and the Kashmir talks is concerned, just let me
say that we do believe that it is very important
to the security of the entire subcontinent that
India and Pakistan resolve the problems be-
tween them, so that they can present a solid
front to any aggression against the subconti-
nent. I would not in any sense qualify our aid
purposes by this word "condition." But I
would think that, from the point of view of the
two countries in the subcontinent, a condition
for the security of the subcontinent is agree-
ment between themselves.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in your judgment that you
can still pick up a series of nuclear tests in tlie
Soviet Union despite what the scientists have
testified on Capitol Hill, are you taking into ac-
count the possibility that intelligence and other
sources of information may he used? And if so,
how are you going to use this, since the present
treaty makes one of the criteria for the use of
an on-site inspection the precise location of an
event?
A. Well, any international system of inspec-
tion would be strongly reinforced by what are
called national detection capabilities. And this
would involve on both sides a great variety of
means through which one gets information
about what's going on in one country or another.
I would not think that there would be any
conflict of evidence or conflict of information
between national and international systems.
They would be mutually reinforcing and sup-
porting. And I would not think there would
be any difficulty of the sort that you mentioned.
' For background, see ibid., Feb. 18, 1963, p. 249,
footnote 7.
439
Secretary Appears on "Washington
Reports to the People"
Folloiving is the transcript of an interview of
Secretary Rush on February £8 hy Harry W.
Flannery, AFL-CIO, for Iroadcast on March 7
on the radio program '■'■Washington Reports
to the People.''''
Press release 117 dated March 7
Mr. Flannery: "Washington Reports to the
People."
Secretary Rusk: The nations of this hemi-
sphei-e are deeply preoccupied with the issues
surrounding Cuba, first, to insure that Cuba
does not become a source of infection for ag-
gression in this hemisphere and, secondly, to
get on witli the great economic and social de-
velopment of the hemisphere imder free insti-
tutions.
Mr. Flannery: That was Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, intei^viewed this week in his con-
ference room in the Department of State here
in Washington, D.C. Your reporter, Harry W.
Flannery, for this radio station and the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor and Congress of In-
dustrial Organizations.
Mr. Secretary, Cuba has become a political
issue. Do you think foreign affairs should be
bipartisan, and if they should be, how can this
be accomplished?
Secretary Rusk: Mr. Flannery, I think the
main lines of American foreign policy since
World War II have been bipart isan. Our great
effort in the United Nations, our great alli-
ances, our foreign aid program — all of the ef-
forts requiring great national sacrifice and ac-
tion have been handled on a bipartisan basis.
Now, from time to time, as you will recall,
we did debate foreign policy matters, and some-
times these are debated on a partisan basis.
That, I think, is normal in our political sys-
tem. I think every 2 years, and certainly every
4 years, these matters will be examined in a
very lively fashion. But I think in the main
how we see ourselves in relation to the rest of
the world will continue to be on a bipartisan
basis.
Mr. Flannery: Mr. Secretary, while he was
in this country, Venezuelan President Betan-
court ^ suggested a blockade of Cuba so far as
travel back and forth to Latin America is con-
cerned. Shouldn't such a project be handled
by the Organization of American States, and
don't you think it advisable because of Lathi
American students trained in Cuba for under-
ground activities, including sabotage in their
own countries ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I agree with Presi-
dent Betancourt that efforts should be made to
reduce the number of persons who may be go-
mg to Cuba, to get their training and methods
of subversion and perhaps even guerrilla war-
fare which they will then take back to their own
countries. And, as j'ou know. President Betan-
court has had a great deal of experience in his
own country with subversive activities of this
type. When he was here he and President
Kennedy discussed this problem, and we, of
course, have pledged the full support of the
United States to Venezuela in resisting such
activities in their own country and also full
support to the work of the Organization of
American States.
Now, there are a number of measures in this
field involving internal security regulations,
passport controls, travel control, which have to
be handled on a national basis because of na-
tional sovereignty considerations, because of
constitutional and legal questions. But at-
tempts to stimulate subversive action in other
countries are being met by the joint actions
of the United States and the other American Re-
publics through consultation and coordinated
action talked out and arranged in the Organiza-
tion of American States.
The OAS has been studying most intensively
various aspects of the problem, such as the
travel of students, the transfer of funds from
Cuba to the other American Republics for sub-
versive purposes, and the flow of subversive
propaganda from Cuba, the use of Cuba as a
training base for training in subversive tech-
niques. There are two special committees of
the OAS operating in this field: the Special
Consultative Committee on Security and a
special committee of the Council itself. And we
are working very closely with both of these OAS
activities.
' See p. 44.'i.
440
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Only last week Assistant Secretary Martin
made a very important statement before the
Latin American Subcommittee of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on the subject of
Communist subversion in the Western Hemi-
sphere.- Now, this report has a great deal of
practical information in it, and I would recom-
mend it to anyone who wants to know more
about this problem and what we are doing in
this hemisphere to meet it.
Economic Situation in Cuba
Mr. Flamiery: President Betancourt, Mr.
Secretary, also proposed encouragement of anti-
Castro forces in Cuba. Just how much public
support does Fidel Castro have in Cuba, and
are the majority of the people behind him?
Wliat is the economic situation ?
Secretary Rusk: I understand that in Mexico
President Betancourt said that in his opinion
the situation in Cuba could not go on much
longer the way it is. He lived there, you know,
for 3 years, and he says the basic factor is the
desire of the Cuban people for freedom and he
doesn't think they will put up with tyranny
much longer. There are many others who know
Cuba, of course, more intimately than I do, who
have come to the same conclusion.
Now, we have no way of measuring this pub-
lic sentiment with complete accuracy, because
they haven't had elections, for example, in Cuba
since the pi-esent regime took over early in 1959.
But there is evidence of great and growing dis-
content on that island. The fact that a couple
of hundreds of thousands of Cubans have given
up all their material possessions and left Cuba
to seek freedom abroad since the beginning of
this present regime would indicate that Cuba
is not a satisfactory place in which to live now
and the Cuban people do not feel that they are
well off. Our information is that several hun-
dred thousands of these Cubans have indicated
their desire to leave the comitry if possible.
The economic situation is grim. Cuba's
trade with the free- world countries has fallen
off as much as 90 percent since the beginning
of 1961. At the same time the regime has mis-
managed their agricultural practices so that
from a relatively prosperous economy, one of
the most prosperous economies in the hemi-
sphere, Cuba's has dropped to a typical Com-
munist satellite economy of the sort that we
have seen in East Germany, North Viet-Nam,
and other places. So we think that they are
finding this present course is not the course for
the future.
Mr. Flannery: Do you foresee, Mr. Secretary,
the eventual overthrow of Castro in Cuba ?
Secretary Rusk: There is no question what-
ever in my mind that the Cuban people will
again be free. But we cannot be precise today
about just how and when this will come about.
We can certainly know though that the posi-
tion, prestige, and stability of Castro and his
regime in Cuba have been greatly diminished.
We have had a considerable measure of suc-
cess from efforts to isolate Cuba and to discredit
the Castro government. The missile crisis of
last October proved to be of great value in un-
masking the Castro regime. At one time there
were a good many people in the United States
and many elsewhere in the hemisphere who
regarded Castro and his regime as a model for
a new Latin American-type revolution. The
missile crisis, as well as the betrayal of that rev-
olution to Moscow by Castro himself, made it
clear that the Castro regime is just one more
tool of Moscow. The ineptitude of Cuban lead-
ers, coupled with the successive efforts to de-
prive Cuba of access to the industrialized
markets of the free world, has brought alx)ut
a very serious deterioration on the island.
And in the political field a major reduction
and influence of plelkmo in the Western Hemi-
sphere has been achieved. The Castro govern-
ment has been suspended from participation
in the OAS. Fifteen American Kepublics no
longer have diplomatic relations with Cuba.
Last October, during the missile crisis, the
American Republics achieved complete hemi-
spheric solidarity with a unanimous vote on the
OAS action to protect the peace and security
of the continent.'
Now, all these things don't mean that Castro
is about to be overthrown today or tomorrow.
° For text, see Buixetin of Mar. 11, 1963, p. 347, and
Mar. 18, 1963, p. 4(H.
• lUi.., Nov. 12, 1962, p. 720.
MARCH 25, 1963
441
But it does serve to lessen his strength and in-
crease his weaknesses. And
that eventually he will go.
I have no doubt
The Congo
Mr. Flannery: To move to another part of
the world, Mr. Secretary, the United Nations
has been criticized for its armed means of
settling the Katanga problems in the Congo.
Wliat's your reaction to these critics ?
Secretary Riisk: Well, I think the story has
to begin with the choices which were presented
to President Eisenhower in July 1960 at a time
when chaos in the Congo led the Govei-nment
of the Congo to ask the United Nations, the
United States, and the Soviet Union separately
for military assistance. President Eisenhower
wisely made the decision to support the request
of the United Nations. So that it was the
Government of the Congo that asked the United
Nations to come in, and the Security Council
authorized the U.N. to go in with a mandate to
maintain law and order,** partly because the
absence of law and order opened the way for the
Congo to become a great cockpit of interna-
tional strife — transformed it into a genuine
threat to the peace because of the dangers of in-
tervention from the outside.
Now, tliese secessionist movements in the
Congo have never had a mandate from anyone.
The leaders of the Congo themselves at a round-
table conference in Belgium agreed to a unified
Congo as a basis for independence. You have
had the Communist-backed secession in Stanley-
ville, in eastern Congo. You have had secession
in the Ivasai. You have had a secessionist move-
ment in Katanga. But none of these were ever
backed by the peoples concerned. There was
never a mandate for this. And certainly the
great Baluba people in the Katanga, half the
population of that Province, would never have
been content with secession.
As far as the military actions of the U.N.
forces were concerned, they were taken in
pursuit of Security Council mandates, tliem-
selves undertaken at the request of the Congo-
lese Government, and included the self-defense
of the U.N. forces themselves.
This latest fighting last December, remember,
* Ibul., Aug. 1, 19G0, p. 159.
442
occurred on Christmas Eve, when what ap-
peared to be drunken Katangese soldiers at-
tacked a U.N. command post, and after a pro-
tracted period of attempting to arrange a cease-
fire, in which Mr. Tshombe himself tried to get
his own troops to cease fire, the U.N. soldiers
finally had to take command of the situation
and restore order. And this was the culmina-
tion of a long series of harassment of U.N.
forces in a design to cut them off from one'
another and their supplies and communications
and to prevent their free movement throughout
the Congo.
So we believe that this unfortunate, trouble-
some story of the Congo is now beginning
to come to an end and come to a peaceful end
and an end whicli will be based upon the con-
stitutional consent of the Congolese people
themselves.
The Atlantic AIEiance
Mr. Flannery: Mr. Secretary, France's veto
of British entry into the Common Market has
caused concern here that the United States' as-
sociation with the Common Market also will be
hindered and that the strength of the NATO
alliance will be impaired. What do you think,
Mr. Secretary ?
Secretary Rush: Well, I don't believe that the
basic strength of the NATO alliance is involved
in these present disagreements. There are some
temporary differences of opinion that exist
today among some of our European allies, but
I think the vast majority of them are fully
aware of the necessity in today's world of con-
tinued close ties across the Atlantic with the
United States and Canada.
I think they realize, as do we, that the defense
of Europe and North America is indivisible and
that economically our prosperity and growth
are closely linked. They know that we both
have a vital stake in assisting the less developed
countries of the world and our assistance can
be of maximmn value only if we coordinate our
efforts, and they see, as we do, that the key to
our ability to maintain our economic strength
so that we can accomplish the tasks in which we
have a mutual interest on both sides of the At-
lantic is an increasing in the flow of trade be-
tween us.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
So we plan to continue our support of the uni-
fication movement in Europe, and we hope that
eventually Great Britain will become a mem-
ber of the Common Market, will continue to
move forward in economic and financial trade
and aid cooperation, and NATO will remain tlie
backbone of our military defense and will be
strengthened to perform its function better.
There has been a growing strength in NATO
both in conventional forces and in nuclear forces
in the last year or two. And we would like to
give our European allies, if they want it, a
greater voice in their own nuclear defense, and
we have proposed therefore the creation of a
multilateral nuclear force. And then, of course,
this year and next year we will be moving along
vigorously on the trade front, using the
authority granted by Congress in the Trade Ex-
pansion Act. So we see not only the necessity
for the continuation of the great stream of
Western policy, but we also believe that it will
go forward despite some of these temporary dis-
agreements that have occurred.
Mr. Flannel^: Thank you, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, for this exclusive interview for
this radio station and the AFL-CIO. Mr. Rusk
was interviewed in his conference room in the
Department of State here in Washington, D.C.
Your reporter, Harry W. Flannery, invites
you to be with us next week at this same time
when we again discuss major issues before the
Nation and Congress in this public service pro-
gram, "Washington Reports to the People."
fu
.S. states Position on Financing
of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations
Following is a statement released hy the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations on March 6
( U.S./U.N. press release 1^153) .
Questions have been asked concerning the
position taken by the United States in the
Working Group of Twenty-one on the matter of
financing United Nations peacekeeping opera-
tions.^ The United States delegation must, of
course, respect tlie fact tliat tlie proceedings of
the Working Group are closed. However, the
^ For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 30.
general position the United States is taking on
this subject is the following :
The United States considers the continuance
of United Nations peacekeeping operations in
the Middle East and on a reduced level in the
Congo to be important to the United States
and the entire world. For this reason, since
1957, the United States has made large volim-
tary contributions each year to the financing of
these operations in addition to its regular scale
assessments. While a number of states have
recognized their membership responsibilities
toward these operations by providing troops
and services and paying their assessments,
many others have not. As a result, the United
Nations' financial situation has deteriorated
and, despite the recent bond issue, remains very
serious. This is a matter of great concern to
the United States, which believes that a
prompt and general recognition and implemen-
tation of the principle of collective financial
responsibility is necessarj'. The U.S. position
on any possible future contribution above our
regiilar scale assessment for peacekeeping oper-
ations will l)e decisively influenced in the
months ahead by the financial support which
other members of the United Nations actually
provide.
Foreign Policy Conference
To Be Held at Philadelphia
Press release 119 dated March 6
The Department of State, with the coopera-
tion of the World Affairs Council of Philadel-
phia, will hold its next regional foreign policy
conference at Philadelphia on March 28. Rep-
resentatives of the press, radio, television, and
nongovernmental organizations concerned with
foreign policy, and community and business
leaders from Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania are being invited to partici-
pate.
This will be the tenth in the series of regional
conferences which began in July 1961 at San
Francisco and Denver. Tlie purpose of these
regional meetings is to provide an opportunity
for senior Government officials who carry re-
sponsibility for foreign policy to meet with com-
MARCII 25, 19G3
M3
munity leaders, media representatives, and
other interested persons to explore in deptli and
exchange views on matters of current import
in world affairs.
Officials of the Government pai'ticipating in
the conference will be W. W. Rostow, Counselor
of the Department of State and Chairman of
the Policy Planning Council ; Robert J. Man-
ning, Assistant Secretaiy of State for Public
Affairs; Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary
of State for International Organization Af-
fairs ; Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter- American Affairs; Mrs. Katie
Louchheim, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Public Affairs; J. Robert Scliaetzel,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for At-
lantic Affairs; and William P. Bundy, Deputy
Assistant Secretaiy of Defense for Interna-
tional Security Affairs.
Discussions Held at WasFiington
With German Defense IVSinister
Folloioing is the text of a joint statement of
the Departments of State and Defense regard-
ing the visit to Washington, February 25-28, of
Kai Vwe von Uassel, Minister of Defense of
the Federal Rejniblic of Germany.
Press release 108 dated February 27
The Minister of Defense of the Federal Re-
public of Germany, Kai Uwe von Hassel, today
[February 27] completed 3 days of meetings
with United States officials, including a call on
the President, discussions with Secretary Rusk,
Secretary McNamara, and other officials of the
Departments of State and Defense. Included
also was a visit with Secretary McNamara to
Headquarters of the Strategic Air Command at
Omaha.
Minister von Hassel's visit came just 7 weeks
after he assumed his present position and fol-
lows the visit to Bonn earlier this month of
Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpat-
ric. This exchange of visits emphasizes the im-
portance both countries place on maintaining
and strengthening the close working relation-
ships which have developed between them.
Minister von Hassel's visit provided an excel-
lent opportunity for an informal exchange of
views on a variety of subjects of mutual inter-
est, including NATO strategy, the proposed
multilateral sea-based MRBM force, and U.S.-
FRG cooperative logistics arrangements. The
discussions were aimed primarily at giving the
Minister the opportunity to meet and become
acquainted with United States officials, and no
major policy decisions were sought.
Minister von Hassel and Secretai'y of State
Rusk discussed in general a broad range of
Atlantic policy matters. The Secretary reit-
erated the importance which the United States
attaches to both Atlantic partnership and
NATO, and Minister von Hassel affirmed the
Federal Republic's wholehearted support of
botli concepts. Topics discussed included the
proposed multilateral sea-based MRBM force,
the Franco-German treaty of friendship, and
German purchases of defense materials in the;
United States.
Secretary Rusk noted certain other curreiil
problems, such as Laos and Cuba, with whicl
the United States is presently concerned.
Minister von Hassel and Secretary Mc'
Namara agreed that a strong NATO is essentia
to the defense of both Europe and NortI
America, and their talks were devoted large!)
to ways and means of strengthening the al'
liance. The discussions covered the proposed*
NATO nuclear force including the multilateraii
force, questions of NATO strategy, and thei
progress of the German defense effort.
In the Department of State, Minister voi
Hassel also talked with Under Secretary Bal
and Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Tyler and discussed the proposed multilatera'
nuclear sea-based MRBM force with senior of-
ficials, including Chairman of the Policy Plan-
ning Council, Counselor Walt W. Rostow, and
Admiral Claude Ricketts, Vice Chief of Nava'
Operations. The Minister indicated that ho
was looking forward to an opportunity to dis-
cuss this subject furtlier with Ambassador Mer-
chant ^ and his team when they arrive in Bonn
next week.
' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 11, 1963,;
p. 197.
444
DEPART3IENT OF STATE BULLETIN !■•
ilinister von Hassel met separately with
>eputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric to con-
nue their discussions of U.S.-FEG cooperative
'^istics, which began earlier in Bonn. The
erman Defense Minister stated that the Fed-
■al Eepublic will continue, as in the past, to
lake major purchases of military equipment,
ipplies, and services from the United States,
hese purchases have been largely responsible
)r offsetting United States defense expendi-
ires in Germany. These discussions included
lans for German pilot training in the United
tates, the provision of procurement services,
tilization of United States maintenance facili-
es in Germany, and joint United States-
erman research and development activities.
Minister von Hassel will depart on Thursday
lorning [February 28] for a tour of the United
tates Military Academy at West Point and
ill proceed to New York in the afternoon.
[e plans to return to Gennany on March 2.
.S. and Venezuela Take Firm Stand
gainst Communist Threats
Romulo Betancourt, President of the Repuh-
'c of Venezuela, made an official visit at Wash-
igton Fehru-ary 19-21. Following is the text
f the exchange of greetings between President
^.ennedy and President Betancourt upon the
Uteres arrival at the White House on Fehru-
ry 19, together loith a joint communique re-
'.ased at the close of their talks on February
0.
XCHANGE OF GREETINGS
rhlte House press release dated February 19
'resident Kennedy
Mr. President, it is a great pleasure to wel-
ome you and Madame Betancourt to Washing-
on and especially here at the Wliite House,
kirs. Kennedy and I remember with great
pleasure your generous welcome to us and the
velcome of the people of your country, not only
n the city of Caracas but also in the country-
fiide where we visited one of the housing proj-
x!ts which have been the center of your interest
and which have meant so much to your country-
men.
I take particular pleasure in welcoming you
to this country. You represent all that we
admire in a political leader. Your liberal
leadership of your covmtry, j'our persistent de-
termination to make a better life for your
people, your long fight for democratic leader-
ship not only in your own country but in the
entire area of the Caribbean, your companion-
ship with other liberal progressive leaders of
this hemisphere — all these have made you, for
us, a symbol of what we wish for our own
country and for our sister Republics.
And the same reasons have made you the
great enemy of the Communists in this hemi-
sphere. It is no accident that you and your
country have been marked number-one in their
efforts to eliminate you and what you stand for
and the progress that you represent. If we can
demonstrate in this hemisphere that through
democratic means, through progressive means,
we can solve the problems of this hemisphere
then, of course, this battle will be won.
It is to that central task that you have ad-
dressed yourself not only during the years of
your presidency but during the long years of
your exile and in your political work through-
out your life. So, Mr. President, you come at
a time most opportune. We value your counsel.
We value our association with you in these
critical days in the hemisphere.
And we stand with Venezuela, we stand with
you, in the fight for freedom during these
great days of the sixties. So, ]\Ir. President,
you are a welcome guest. We are honored at
your presence and are particularly glad to have
with you the members of your family. We
want you to know that, in welcoming you, we
hold out the hand of friendship to the people
of Venezuela.
President Betancourt
President Kennedy, Mrs. Kennedy, it is
indeed with a great deal of pleasure that my
wife, my daughter, and I, the members of the
Cabinet of the Venezuelan Central Govern-
ment that have accompanied me here, come on
this visit of friendship to the Capital of the
United States of America.
VIARCH 25, 1963
445
Thus we are reciprocating the visit that you,
Mr. President, together with Mrs. Kennedy,
paid to our country in December of 1961.^ On
that occasion the people of Venezuela showed,
as other peoples of Latin America have shown
and will show, that when they are spoken to in
a spirit of democracy and freedom and with an
understanding of the need to strive for economic
cooperation which will lead to a raising of the
social standards of living of our people, the
peoples of Latin America, and my own country
included, will receive whoever issues these
words with a great sense of friendship.
As you say, on the occasion of your visit to
our country, Mr. President, thousands of men
and women lined the streets of Caracas to re-
ceive you, as well as the streets of other cities
that you honored with your visit and the coim-
tryside that you also touched. And this, Mr.
President, was an expression of friendship from
the people of Venezuela to the President of the
United States and to his wife.
I feel deeply moved in coming back to Wash-
ington after so many years of absence. Four
of those years have been spent as President of
my country. I almost thought that from the
helicopter I caught a glimpse of the small house
that I lived in on Belt Road here in Washing-
ton, where I spent three of my exiled years.
Those years that we spent here in Washing-
ton in that house gave us great o])portunity to
share a great deal of friendship with the demo-
cratic people of the United States and to be
the object of their very warm hospitality. I
come here, Mr. President, with my advisers to
discuss, as a friend and ally, with the President
of the United States and his advisers, the prob-
lems that affect our two countries and the prob-
lems that affect the economy of Venezuela.
I have not come here to ask for any contribu-
tions from the American taxpayer, but I have
come here to discuss the problems wliich affect
the economy of my country. And I feel cer-
tain that the United States Government, repre-
sented by President Kennedy and his advisers,
will be receptive to any possible solutions that
might be mutually favorable to our two
countries.
I also have come here to di.scuss with Presi-
' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 15, 1962, p. 89.
446
dent Kennedy other problems that affect our
two countries in the field of mternational policy,
especially the problems created coming out of
the Caribbean and extending to the whole hem-
isphere, the problems created by Soviet in-
filtration in this area and, therefore, in the
hemisphere.
Not only myself and j'ourself, Mr. President,
but many governments of Latin America are
dedicated, together with their friends in the
free world, to the defense of the values of our
civilization, the democratic and Christian val-
ues that inspire all of us. And we are all
striving toward this great task, to create and
maintain a life devoted to democracy and free-
dom for our peoples.
Thank you very much, Mr. President. It
is a great pleasure to be welcomed by you here
in Washington.
TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE
White House press release dated February 20
The President of the United States of Amer-
ica and the President of the Republic oil
Venezuela in the past two days discussed devel-
opments in the Western Hemisphere which in-
^'olve two countries whose friendship, nurtured
in the youth of our Republic by Francisco det
Miranda, Simon Bolivar, George Washington..
Thomas Jefferson and Henry Clay, today stands'
as a .symbol of the successful effort in our coun-
tries to satisfy man's aspirations for a betteF
life with dignity and freedom.
The two Presidents considered carefully the
ways in which Venezuela and the United States^
could most effectively further the objectives
of the Alliance for Progress. They considered!!
also tlie gravity of the situation created by
establishment in Cuba of an alien, anti-demo-
cratic stronghold from whicli emanate threatsi
to the independence and sovereignty of each of
the free American Republics.
The two Presidents look to the Organization,
of American States to use all means within itS'
power to ensure the continuity of the demo-
cratic process in the Member States; and they
urge the Member States for their part tO'
strengthen inter-American friendship, solidar-
ity, and security by giving full, active, andi
immediate support to programs of the Organi-
DEPAKTMEXT OP STATE BULLETIN
irl
n
iil
1
Jii
it
k
m
i
it ion of American States for the social and
■onoinic development of the Hemisphere.
It was noted that great advances had been
uide in Alliance for Progi'ess social and eco-
jmic reforms in the Republic of Venezuela
luler tlie enlightened leadershii) of the Betan-
ourt Government. The President of the
nited States pledged tlie full support of liis
nuitry to tlie Republic of Venezuela in resist-
ig tlie all-out campaign of the international
ommunists, aided especially by their Cuban
lies, to overthrow the constitutional Govem-
[cnt of President Betancourt.
The two Presidents reviewed the development
f Venezuela's oil exports to the United States
nee the inception of the Mandatory Import
rogram. They noted that a strong position
f Venezuela in the world petroleum market is
mdamental to the social and economic develop-
vent of Venezuela.
They recognized that the United States has
>en Venezuela's largest market and are confi-
ent that it will continue to be so on an expand-
ig scale. They also recognized that Venezuela
as been an essential and consistent supplier of
etroleum to the United States and to tlie free
oi'ld in times of peace and in periods of
nergency.
The two Presidents concluded that Vene-
lela's position in the United States petroleiun
larket is therefore a matter of continuing con-
3rn to both governments and that Venezuela's
ital interest will be recognized in the adminis-
ration of the United States oil import pro-
ram. They agreed that there should be peri-
dic exchanges of information and views, at a
echnical level, with the goal of reaching a bet-
er understanding on problems pertaining to the
il trade between the two countries.
They also agreed that the United States
.^ould review in advance with Venezuela such
ubstantive changes in the oil import program
s the United States may contemplate in the
uture.
The Presidents agreed that a strong and
lealthy petroleum industry is essential to Vene-
uela's prosperity, to the achievement of the
roals set by the Alliance for Progress and for
he security of the Hemisphere as a whole.
In conclusion, the two Presidents expressed
heir gratification at the opportunity thus
afforded them to confer together in person, thus
continuing a direct interchange initiated at
Caracas in 1961. Their meeting at Washington
has been one more demonstration of solidarity
in dealing with disruptive forces that assail the
freedom and the peace of this Hemisphere. The
two Presidents affirmed cooperative efforts for
making the possibility and the opportunity of
progress available to all the American peoples;
and they reaffirmed energetically, as Chiefs of
State and as citizens, their mutual, inalterable
respect for civil rights and human dignity.
King of Laos Visits Washington,
Talks With President Kennedy
His Majesty Sri Savang Vatthana, King of
Laos, visited the United States February 21-27.
He was at WasJmigton Fehnmry 25-27 for talks
with President Kennedy and other officials of
the U.S. Government. Folloioing is the text
of a joint communique issued at the close of his
meeting ^oith the President on February 27.
White House press release dated February 27
His Majesty Sri Savang Vatthana, King of
Laos, has conferred with the President on recent
developments in Laos, particularly the imple-
mentation of the Geneva Accords,^ and on the
future of Lao- American relations.
His Majesty warmly thanked the President
for United States efforts in bringing the Geneva
negotiations on Laos to a successful conclusion.
His Majesty also expressed his gratification that
the United States has given its full support to
the Government of National Union under
Prince Souvanna Phouma, and that it will con-
tinue faithfully to adhere to its engagements
under the Geneva Agreements. The United
States policy in Laos, His Majesty said, was a
significant manifestation of the President's con-
tinuing efforts to help bring peace, freedom,
and dignity to all peoples. In discussing the
future. His Majesty stressed his desire for unity,
peace, and independence for his people and re-
iterated the determination of his country to sup-
port the Geneva Agreements.
^For background, see Buixetin of Aug. 13, 1962,
p. 259.
VIARCII 25, 19G3
447
Recalling the agreement that he and Prime
Minister Khrushchev made in Vienna in June
1961 2 for the mutual support of a neutral and
independent Laos under a government chosen by
the Lao themselves, and of international agree-
ments for insuring that neutrality and inde-
pendence, the President reaffirmed the United
States policy of fulfilling its obligations under
the Geneva Agreements and supporting the
Government of National Union. The President
spoke of his earnest hope that this policy would
enable the Lao people to achieve their aspira-
tion for peace, dignity, and freedom, and
specifically cited the large United States eco-
nomic assistance program as evidence of the de-
termination of the United States Government
to help the Lao people achieve these objectives.
Respect for Lao neutrality, independence, and
sovereignty, the President said, is the continuing
basis for United States policy toward the Royal
Lao Government.
First Four Members Appointed
to Advisory Committee on Arts
The Department of State announced on
March 7 (press release 115) the appointment of
the first four members of the reconstituted Ad-
visory Conmaittee on the Arts to give guidance
to the Department in its program of sending
cultural presentations to other countries.^
One of the four appointees, Roy E. Larsen,
chairman of the Executive Committee of Time,
Inc., and vice chairman of the U.S. Advisory
Commission on International Educational and
Cultural Affairs, was designated to serve as
chairman of the Advisory Committee on the
Arts. The other appointees announced are
Warner Larson, dean of music, Howard Uni-
versity ; Peter Mennin, composer and president
of the Juilliard School of Music; and George
Seaton, motion picture writer, producer, and
director and wmner of two awards of the
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences.
The committee will have 10 members, each
appointed for a 3-year term.
' Ibid., June 26, 1961, p. 999.
' For background, see Buixetin of Jan. 14, 1963, p. 46.
The committee and the Department will be
assisted by several panels of experts, each con-
cerned with a particular field of the performing
arts and each evaluating and recommending
performers within its field. With this assist-
ance, the committee will (1) provide guidance
and assistance to the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs on types of attractions that
would be most effective in meeting specific ob-
jectives of the cultural presentations program in
various areas of the world, and (2) provide
guidance and counsel on other governmental in-
ternational activities concerned with the arts.
HE To Assist in Aiding African
Students Who Left Bulgaria
Department Statement ^
The Department of State has initiated discus-
sions with the Institute of International Educa-
tion for handling offers of scholarships and
other assistance from American educational in-
stitutions, private organizations, and individ-
uals for African students who have left Bul-
garia and wish to continue their studies in the
United States. This is a further step witliin
the framework of the program announced by
the Department last week.=
The Institute has agreed to serve as a central
point for receiving and administering such as-
sistance. The Institute now plans to send a
i-epresentative to Europe next week to make an
on-the-spot review of the qualifications of the
African students. The next step would involve
matching qualified students against available
public and private assistance and consultation
with the African governments concerned.
A private, nonprofit organization with head-'
quarters in New York, the 44-year-old Institute'
of International Education maintains close
working relationships with organizations in
Western Europe and elsewhere around the
world concerned with educational exchange.
Since 1941 the Institute has assisted the De-
partment in administering student exchange'
programs.
448
' Read to news correspondents on Mar. 1 by Lincoliu
White. Director of the Office of News.
= Botletin of Mar. 11, 1963, p. 375.
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIK»
The Rising Afro-Asian Nations
hy U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are en-
dowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and
the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed. That whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these ends,
it is the Right of the People to alter or to abol-
ish it, and to institute new Government, laying
.its foundation on such principles and organiz-
ing its powers in such foim, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness."
Today, as in 1776, these are the most revolu-
tionary and fundamental words on the theory
of government that have ever been said. They
are the inescapable prelude to the subject that
I have been asked to discuss tonight — "The
Rising Afro-Asian Nations" — for there is no
nation among them that has not directly or in-
directly been impelled by those words. They
will live long after "Workers of the world,
unite — you have nothing to lose but your
chains" has disappeared into the limbo of
history.
I might begin by saying that, while I accepted
the title suggested for this discussion, I perhaps
acted hastily for it implies a unity to the sub-
ject that is simply not there, and the nations
that we are discussing would probably be the
first to agree. There is, of coui-se, the difficulty
with the word "rising." If it is used in the
' Address made before the Harvard-Radcliffe Inter-
national Relations Council at Cambridge, Mass., on
Feb. 27 (press release 106).
strict economic sense it presents difficulties. If
the term is used in the sense of their internal
political structure the same is true. However,
I do agree that they are definitely "rising" in
the sense of their growing numbers and increas-
ing importance in international affairs. At the
same time, the term "rising" could, I suppose,
be used as a synonym for "developing" so as to
exclude a relatively developed country such as
Japan. However, this seems to me a difilcult
distinction to apply.
Wlien I came into the Department of State
in 1935, our Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
dealt with three independent countries — Japan,
China, and Thailand. In South Asia there was
only one independent state — Afghanistan — and
in Africa four— Ethiopia, Liberia, the Union
of South Africa, and Egypt. In the Near East
there were only five. Today, in these same
areas, there are 61 — plus Australia and New
Zealand.
The other difficulty with the subject is that
the hyphenated term "Afro-Asian" suggests a
continuing unity or common point of view
which has little reality except, in a very limited
sense, in the context of votes in the United
Nations, usually on what they consider colonial
issues.
Racially there is tremendous diversity in Asia
and Africa. There is certainly little racial
identification between, say, a Japanese and a
Congolese or, say, between a Burmese and an
Algerian. There are, of course, equally deep
differences of culture, religion, and language
which extend not only between the main areas
but also within those areas.
Economically they range from a country like
MARCH 25, 1963
449
Japan with a per capita income of over $400 a
year, or Malaya with about $300 a year, to some
of the states of Africa with a tenth of that.
However, without trying further to argue the
title of this talk and without being too precise,
I suppose that the term "rising Afro- Asian na-
tions" is generally taken for the most part to
mean those newly independent, imderdeveloped
states in Asia, the Near East, and Africa. In
spite of their dissimilarities, there is one thing
all of them have in common — a fierce desire to
defend and maintain their independence.
The Tide of Extreme Nationalism
While the tide of extreme nationalism has for
the most part been receding in the Western
World, it has been rising in the Afro-Asian
world and is now close to the flood. It is my
own conviction that, when the 21st century
writes the history of this century, nationalism
will have proven to be a far more revolutionary
force than communism. The words I quoted
from our Declaration of Independence have
played a major part in this because they come
closer to expressing what one might call a uni-
versal truth in this field than any words yet
penned. Those words are still valid as far as
we are concerned, not only for ourselves but for
all peoples. This has been most recently ex-
pressed by the President when he said, in his
second state of the Union message : ^
. . . our basic goal remains tlie same: a peaceful
world community of free and independent states, free
to choose their own future ... so long as it does not
threaten the freedom of others We can welcome di-
versity— the Communists cannot. For we offer a world
of choice — they offer a world of coercion. And . . .
freedom, not coercion, is the wave of the future.
In worrying about the aberrations these states
sometimes present to us — by their votes in the
United Nations, the turmoil in and between
them that often is accompanying their develop-
ment, and their occasionally imreasonable de-
mands of us, as well as the irritating things
they sometimes say about us— the overriding
fact that we must keep in mind is that our pol-
icies and our interests are well served if these
states are truly independent, that is, that they
BULUTTiN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
not serve as the tools of a power hostile to us.
Our quarrel with Cuba is not over the social,
economic, or even political system that it desires
to adopt for itself but rather the fact that it has
become the tool for the introduction into this
hemisphere of a system dedicated to the destruc-
tion of the independence of the states of the
hemisphere.
Marx and his descendants have, of course,
been proven to be just about as poor prophets
on every count as any group in history. Their
theory as far as the colonial powers were con-
cerned was that, on the one hand, if the colonial
empires were liquidated, they would be impov-
erished, fall into economic depression, and war
among themselves. As far as the former colo-
nies were concerned, the Marxian theory was
that independence was but a halfway stage
toward embracing the Communist system, of
course under the leadership of Moscow.
We have thus had these two conflicting and
opposing theories on the future of what we are
this evening calling the Afro-Asian world.
Our theory is that these countries could be in-
dependent, serving no master but themselves —
and the Communist theory that they would in-
evitably fall within the Communist orbit. I
want to examine with you the results thus far,
the problems ahead, and the outlook for the
future.
With respect to the former European colonial
powers, divesting themselves of their colonies
has not resulted in any economic retrogression
or strife among them, but rather has coincided
with the gi-eatest degree of prosperity and unity
in Europe's history.
With respect to the former colonies, exclud-
ing North Viet-Nam and North Korea, which
were at the outset occupied by Communist mili-
tary force, 46 countries have thus far become
independent in the 17 short years since the end
of the Second World War. Wliile in many of
these countries "socialism" is a "good" word and
"capitalism" is a "bad" word associated with
colonialism, and while the leaders of these coun-
tries say they are pursuing "socialist" policies,
in actual practice they are seeking to devise
institutions that will meet their own needs.
This pragmatism is as it should be. Many
cheerfully seek help from both the Soviets and
450
DEl'AnXMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
the West. The Soviets invest vast sums in one
country only to have its leader outlaw the Com-
munist Party. "We help another country sup-
port its fragile economy only to have its leader
go to Peiping and say the most outrageous
things about us. The Soviets give great quan-
tities of military equipment to another country
only to have the military forces turn around
and stage an anti-Commimist coup. So it goes.
However, through it all runs the one clear
thread that I have previously mentioned — the
fierce nationalism and desire to maintain the
independence of all of these coimtries. Thus
none of these 46 new countries have up to now
chosen communism for themselves. I am con-
fident that they will never freely do so because
they increasingly recognize that to do so means
the loss of their independence to Moscow.
Cuba has, of course, underlined this lesson.
The External Problems
However, if these countries are to develop as
we and they hope and foresee, they will con-
tinue, at least for our time, to have enormous
problems. These problems are, of course, both
of an internal and external character.
As far as the external problems are concerned,
the power of our nuclear deterrent and the nu-
clear strategic superiority that we enjoy over
the Soviet Union gives them confidence that
they will not wake up some morning to find that
we have been overwhelmed by the Soviet Union
and that they are alone in a Communist world.
Our ability quickly to move our great and grow-
ing conventional military strength to any part
of the world also gives them confidence that in
case of necessity we could quickly come to their
help. We, of course, cannot be the policeman
of the world, and as far as local situations are
concerned, the processes of peaceful settlement,
including the use of the United Nations, must
play their part. In addition to the channels
of diplomacy through the United Nations,
armed forces carrying out United Nations mis-
sions are playing their part in keeping the peace
in the Gaza Strip, the Congo, and West New
Guinea.
Thus the external problems appear to be man-
ageable. It is the internal problems that loom
largest for most of these countries and which
MAKCH 25, 1963
are most likely to determine their success or
failure. It is difficult to generalize about these
internal problems because, here again, the coun-
tries are so very different. Some, such as Cam-
bodia, are relatively small and are formed of a
homogenous race and with a compact territory.
Others, such as India, are large in population
and area and have a wide diversity of races,
languages, and sectional interests. Our history
gives us some small appreciation of the prob-
lem such a country faces. Some, particularly
the former British possessions, were left the
heritage of a trained and efficient administra-
tive service, and others entered on independence
with literally not enough college graduates of
any kind to count on the fingers of a single
hand. Some, such as Indonesia, are blessed
with an abimdance of natural resources, and
others have only what their farmers can scrab-
ble from an unfriendly soil. Some, such as the
Philippines, have a literacy rate of 75 percent
or better, while there are others which have a
rate of probably not more than 2 percent or
3 percent.
Building Stable Governments
However varied in kind and degree, the in-
ternal problems of these countries do have cer-
tain common characteristics. I would list the
first of these as "government" in its broad
sense.
Wlien we look back on our own history we
realize how fortunate we indeed were in the
wisdom of our leaders at that time and the herit-
age which was ours. This business of govern-
ment is complicated, and there are no easy
formulae capable of universal application. It
is a field in which I am convinced that we should
not permit ourselves to be misled by outward
forms and slogans. It is an area in which each
people's own particular genius must develop
those forms that are best suited to them. There
is only one essential element — and it is elo-
quently expressed in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence— "the consent of the governed." This
consent can be expressed in many different
ways, and forms do not guarantee its presence.
There are countries with all the outward forms
of parliamentary democracy in which rule is
tyrannical, corrupt, and, even to any casual ob-
451
server, "the consent of the governed" is abnost
entirely absent. Then there are countries which
do not liave the outward forms of representative
government but in fact are ably administered
to the satisfaction of the great majority of those
governed. Pure democratic majority rule is,
of course, not entirely the answer, as our own
system recognizes. In some countries and cul-
tures, accustomed to arriving at decisions by
consensus, the very concept of majority deci-
sions is abhorrent.
Because of their associations and education
during their colonial periods, most of these
countries have adopted European forms of gov-
ernment, at least in outward form. This is
usually some form of parliamentary govern-
ment with the administration directly responsi-
ble to a parliament, in contrast with our system
of the separation of powers. My own thesis is
that the parliamentary form of government is
particularly difficult to operate and usually has
not operated well outside of a highly sophisti-
cated political environment with certain definite
characteristics, such as a strictly limited num-
ber of political parties. These conditions are
usually not present in these new countries, and
many are thus seeking forms better suited to
their own needs. Perhaps some will arrive at a
form closer to our own, or perhaps develop
unique forms. This should not bother us. The
job is simply to devise a government that can
govern effectively. "Without such a govern-
ment other problems are not soluble.
There is not too much that we, the United
States, can do in this process except to make
our experience freely available, counsel where
we are satisfied that we can indeed give wise
counsel, and be patient and understanding.
Defense Against Internal Threats
Related to this problem of goveniment, but
an area where we can definitely be helpful, is
the area of what I call "internal defense."
The problem of most of these countries is how
they avoid having themselves taken over from
the inside by Communist subversion, and in
some cases insurgency, while they are going
through the inevitable stresses and strains of
establishing and modernizing themselves. Tliis
452
is a problem to which we have in the past prob-
ably not paid sufficient attention.
Cuba, of course, showed well how a small
band of determined men could capture and turn
to their purposes a popular revolution against
an unpopular dictatorship. Greece, Malaya,
and the Philippines showed the dangers of Com-
munist insurgency, and that the answer did not |
lie in massed conventional military force. A
large irrigation project is of little use if guer-
rillas are going to prevent the farmers from
bringing their product to market. A cruiser
or a squadron of supersonic fighters may look
fine at a review but are of little utility in a
Communist-inspired street riot, where a small
well-trained and -equipped police riot squad
may be much more meaningful.
There is, of course, nothing new in all of
this. However, this administration in Wash-
ington has better recognized the problem and
has quietly done some reorganization so as to
meet it better. Of course, it is not primarily
our problem, but rather that of each of the
countries involved. Their problem varies
widely from the very acute situation in South
Viet-Nam to virtually no problem of this kind
in some of the African countries. '^H
Wliat we can do is always limited by the
desires of the coimtry itself. This is not the
kind of thing that can effectively be dealt with
by outsiders except insofar as they are able to
offer advice and assist in training, equipment,
and economic resources. There must first be
the will within the country itself.
Essentials of U.S. Approach
The essential of our own approach to these
situations is a coordinated social, information,
economic, and military program to which we
can contribute. It means removing the justi-
fied causes of discontent and not just suppress-
ing the manifestations of discontent. In an
information program it may mean less direct
information about the United States and more
emphasis on helping a local government estab-
lish effective communication with its own
people. In the economic field it may mean
helping the local authorities in building a road
that will give access to a remote and disturbed
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN
area or, as in Viet-Nam, helpmg the govern-
ment resettle a threatened population into de-
fended villages. In another area, for example
Thailand, it means assisting the border police
with medical supplies and training so as to
bring some basic medical care to remote hill
tribes. In most cases a basic part of the
economic program is assisting in the develop-
ment of a police force tramed in modern
concepts of public service. With resiDect to
Latin America this has meant, in addition to our
other programs, the establisliment last year in
the Canal Zone of an advanced police academy
for all the countries of the area.'
In the military field it means less emphasis
upon divisions, tanks, and sophisticated jet
fighters and more upon companies, squads, and
platoons, mobile and armed to deal with internal
situations beyond the ability of the police.
It also means what is called "civic action."
This is simply using the skills, equipment, and
organization of the military forces in essentially
civilian projects for the dual purpose of meet-
ing a need that will not be met in any other way
and at the same time establishing an under-
standing relationship between the local popula-
tion and the military forces. Civic action can
encompass almost anything that you can
imagine from building a local schoolhouse or
road to dressing a cut on a child's finger.
As in our own country when West Point was
our primary source of engineers, in many of
these countries the military forces constitute a
primary source of the same skills so badly
needed elsewhere in the country. Our own
Army Corps of Engineers played a major role
in opening up and developing this country — in
fact, it still plays a large role. Military per-
sonnel in these countries can do the same.
One of the previous difficulties with our
assistance to civic-action projects abroad was
that many of them fell between the routine
responsibilities of those in charge of military
and economic assistance and thus were the re-
sponsibility of neither. These difficulties have
now been overcome, and during the past 18
months we have been able to assist in establish-
ing civic-action programs in some 12 additional
countries.
" Ibid., May 21, 1962, p. 847.
This, in brief outline, is what we are seeking
to do to assist these countries in defending them-
selves from these internal threats to their
stability. It is a program that takes much care
in its handling, for it impinges upon the delicate
provmce of another country's internal affairs.
However, on our part, we are learning how
better to be of help, and the countries with
which we are cooperating are learning that our
objectives are compatible with their own
objectives.
Question of Economic Assistance
This brings us to the broad question of
economic assistance. With a government able
to govern, and having the capability of main-
taming internal order, how does a country go
about developing itself and what can and
should our role be ? There has been no lack of
thought or literature on this subject, and I
make no profession of being a student or theore-
tician in this field. However, out of some ex-
perience abroad in various countries with
various forms of political and economic organi-
zation, I would like to make a few personal
observations.
First, in all the theory on the subject we
cannot lose sight of the fact that the most
important resource of all is the human resource;
witliout it allelse is of no avail. This, of
course, leads us off into the deep realms of pliil-
osophic speculation on why people are as they
are and certain national or racial groupings
show one characteristic at one stage in history,
while another grouping shows another set of
characteristics. Wliy was it that in some 30
short years at the end of the last century Japan,
with the sparsest kind of natural resources, rose
from a feudal hermit state entirely lacking the
modern industrial arts to a first-class land and
sea power, while China sank into a morass of
disintegration? I would not even attempt to
give the answer because I have never heard any-
thing approaching a satisfactory explanation.
However, it is undeniable that throughout
the underdeveloped Afro-Asian world there is
in varying degrees a desire on the part of most
people to improve their lot. With modem com-
munications and means of information, people
MARCH 25, 1963
453
are realizing that there are horizons different
from those to which they have been accnstomed.
In some cases these desires are found deep with-
in a people ; in other cases they seem, thus far, to
be confined to a relatively small group of intel-
lectuals and government officials. In some of
the latter cases I fear that national prestige and
personal power may be all too much the pre-
dominant motive. However, tliis failing is not
confined to the Afro- Asian coimtries. To the
degree that the population of a country really
wants to do sometliing about it, it can, with
varying degrees of difficulty, improve its lot.
However, it is the people of the country that
have t« do it. Foreign assistance and invest-
ment, no matter how generous, can at the best
make up only a marginal factor. The impulse,
the will, the greater part of the resources must
come from within a countiy itself. For ex-
ample, even the $20 billion of outside resources
contemplated for the Alliance for Progress for
Latin America over a lO-year period would
make up less than 5 percent of the gross
national product of the receiving countries.
—I used"to tell my foreign audiences that a
substantial degree of development was not "pie
in the sky" for their grandchildren but in most
cases something attainable in a reasonable
period of time by proper application. Wliile
I do not fancy myself an old man, I told them
of my childliood in a midwestem State when
our situation was not far different from that of
the interior of many an underdeveloped country
today. Outside of cities there was not a mile of
surfaced road in the State; a doctor was a half-
day's journey away by horse and buggy unless
the roads were closed by snow and a doctor could
not be reached ; plumbing, running water, elec-
tricity, and central heat were unknown, and
school consisted of a single room with one
teacher for all the grades. This, of course, was
not unique but common for the rural America
of that time. We have come a long way in the
intervening years^ and, while we enjoyed cer-
tain natural advantages, with the additional
knowledge and experience now available there
may be others who can perhaps travel the road
even faster.
Accumulating Capital for Development
I am sure that I need not tell this audience
tliat no matter what the system — free enterprise,
socialism, or communism — capital for develop-
ment can only be accumulated out of savings
from current production. It can be done by
incentives or it can be done by coercion. It can
be made attractive and possible for people to
save, or, as Stalin did when he launched his
industrialization campaign in the late 1920's,
you can squeeze out the capital by starving 10
million peasants to death.
As most of these countries are primarily agri-
cultural, their own capital must in large part
initially be accumulated out of improved and
more productive agriculture. It is here that
a comparison between the Commimist system
and a free enterprise system becomes most
pertinent.
Tliere is no country that has successfully ap-
plied the Communist system to agriculture, and
the imposition of the system has always been
accompanied by a sharp fall in agricultural
production. This is an important and basic
fact. As we know, even in the Soviet Union
about one-half of the population is still engaged
in agriculture — that is, one-half of the people
have to work to feed themselves and tlie other
half. In the United States 12 percent of the
population raise enough not only to feed them-
selves and the other 88 percent of the popula-
tion but also produce an embarrassing surplus
beyond this. We know that after Yugoslavia
and Poland abandoned communism in agricul-
ture their production rose sliarply. However,
Asian experience is perhaps more pertinent to
the problems of the Afro-Asian countries.
While non-Commimist Asia has generally been
raising its gross as well as its per capita food
production, food production in Communist
Asia lias shaii^ly declined. Even after aban-
doning the more extreme forms of its communes,
per capita food production in Communist China
is still today probably below what it was before'
Worid War II.
One of the great myths that the Communists
attempted and still attempt to perpetrate is
that, while there may be a certain loss of politi-
454
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
cal freedom under the system, it was the road
to quick development. This myth is now very
faded indeed. The plienomenal growth of
Japan and West Germany after tlie war far
outstrips the most inflated Commimist daims.
However, China was to be the great example for
the underdeveloped countries.
AVlien I last took up a post in Southeast Asia
in 1958, Communist China had just annoimced
its "great leap forward." I think it fair to say
that a shiver of fear swept through the free
countries of the area, for if China were even
reasonably successful in carrying out its gran-
diose plans no country could hope to resist the
inevitable pressure to go and do likewise.
However, by the time I left 2 years ago, the pic-
ture of a great surge of economic expansion by
Communist China had greatly faded, and it
has continued to fade. Much the same is true
of North Viet-Nam and North Korea. All
three have encountered severe food difficulties,
which — though in part diie to unfavorable crop
weather — have stemmed primarily from a doc-
trinaire, overrigid organization of agriculture
that has destroyed peasant production incen-
tives. Moreover, the a'owth of industry in
Commimist China and North Korea proved to
be poorly planned and seriously imbalanced,
leading to a sharp setback in Commimist China
and to stagnation in North Korea. In North
Viet-Nam the lack of technically trained per-
sonnel and sound industrial organization have
frustrated industrial development.
One important aspect of the great dispute
between the Soviet Union and Communist
China is that China is demanding that, in good
theoretical Communist fashion, the Soviet
Union should share its wealth with China until
they are on an equal economic level and thus
"march forward together." Klirushchev has
made it clear that he is not having any part of
what he calls this "shirt-tail communism." As
you know, not only is the Soviet Union not
giving China enough to catch up but has cut off
economic assistance, withdrawn its technicians,
and is demanding that China pay up its past
debts.
Another aspect of that dispute is that, al-
though it supports the principle of what it calls
"wars of liberation," such as the guerrilla war
in South Viet-Nam, in general the Soviet party
counsels gradualism for Communists in the un-
derdeveloped areas. It particularly warns
against precipitate haste in attempting to seize
power. However, it does approve the use of
force to overthrow governments in the under-
developed countries considered too closely
attached to the West and the installation of
"national front" regimes more inclined to coop-
eration with the Soviet Union.
For its part Peiping counsels more militancy
by local Commimist parties and spurs them to
seize power by force, disdaining the gradualism
of the Soviet approach. Of course, the objec-
tive remains the same — the argument is simply
over how best to accomplish it.
Cooperating for Common Objectives
To get back to our own role Ln the economic
development of these countries. As we have
noted, it can only add a marginal increment to
what the country itself is willing and able to
accomplish for itself. This increment can,
however, be of the greatest importance. Ideally
it can act as the catalyst to spur the country's
own efforts or supply the missing element with-
out which a country's own efforts would be un-
availing. Thus I prefer to think of these
programs in terms of cooperating for certain
common objectives rather than in terms of as-
sistance or aid with their inevitable connota-
tions of superiority and inferiority. I prefer
to stress the "international development" as-
pects of the Agency for International Develop-
ment rather than its initials, which spell AID.
I do this not out of concern for the susceptibili-
ties of our friends in the developing countries
but because I feel that it represents the facts.
As I also used to tell my foreign audiences, our
cooperation with them was not based on the
shifting sands of generous impulses or senti-
mentality but rather on the bedrock of national
self-interest. As their national self-interest
coincided with ours we had a sound basis for
cooperation.
However, this is not a job which we can or
want to do alone. We have no desire or need
for positions of special influence. Our interests
MARCH 25, 1963
455
are truly served if these countries are able to
stand on their own feet and be truly independ-
ent. This is a common interest of all the free
economically advanced countries, and they have
recognized this fact. Better to coordinate and
supplement each other's efforts, various mech-
anisms are being employed. One of the earliest
was, of course, the IBRD, or so-called World
Bank, in which we invest heavily, and these
investments have paid well in the results
accomplished.
The IBRD has also served as a focal point
for the consortia of countries and institutions
that have pooled their efforts in such major
development areas as India and Pakistan. The
members of these consortia decide among them-
selves how much of these countries' require-
ments each of them can handle. The 11
members of the India consortium have pledged
external assistance in the amoimt of $2,365 mil-
lion for the first 2 years of India's third 5-year
plan (i.e. for the period from April 1, 1961, to
March 31, 1963), and the seven members of the
Pakistan consortium have pledged $945 million
for the second 2 years of Pakistan's second 5-
year plan (i.e. for the period from July 1, 1961,
to June 30, 1963). Most of this assistance will
be in the form of medium- and long-term loans
for capital equipment and other essential
imports.
One of the most important and useful devices
is the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) of the OECD [Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development], which
serves as a forum for the coordination of eco-
nomic cooperation efforts in the underdevel-
oped countries. The coimtries of Western
Europe have assumed a larger and larger role,
and during 1960 and 1961 total net official and
private financial resources flowing to develop-
ing countries amounted to $3.2 billion and $3.6
billion, respectively. For example, on a per
capita basis France is investing more in the
developing countries than the United States.
This is primarily in the UAM [African and
Malagasy Union] countries of Africa, but this
is all to the good.
Including its reparations accounts, Japan's
net assistance (official and private) to the de-
veloping countries amounted to $259.3 million
in 1960 and $376.1 million in 1961.
In the recent period there have been a num-
ber of dissonant voices, both from Europe and
about Europe, which have tended to obscure
one of the really great accomplishments after
World War II. At the end of the war Europe
seemed completely vulnerable to Communist
domination; Stalin made it clear that it was
the Communists' intention to take over Europe;
they used various methods trying to accom-
plish this. However, by the timely introduction
of United States economic aid, the Marshall
Plan, and the timely introduction of military
support by the United States, Western Europe
was preserved from the grip of communism.
The main thing about the European scene is
that, having been preserved, the countries of
free Europe have gone on and are now well off.
Thus, having failed in Europe, the Communists
have turned their eyes increasingly toward the
east and south, to the rising or developing Afro-
Asian states. But I have a clear conviction that
these rising Afro- Asian countries have a future
as independent natiojj-states. With the same
determination that we showed in Europe, we
can proceed to assist them to foil the Commu-
nist reach. It will take a little more patience,
a little more skill, than was the case in Europe;
but the spirit and the kind of help are the
same.
In the case of Africa and Asia, on the other
hand, the United States is not working alone.
The free countries are engaged in a great com-
plementary effort having the same objective —
to cooperate with the underdeveloped Afro-
Asian countries in maintaining their inde-
pendence and developing, each in its own way,
their economy and their standards of liveli-
hood. Without exception, this is what each of
these countries is seeking for itself. Working
with them, I am sure that we will continue to
move closer to the goal of what the President
so well called "a peaceful world community of
free and independent states." This is not a
futile reaching toward the stars, but something
attainable by men of good will.
456
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I
The Emerging Nations of Africa
by G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs '
The theme of your festival, "The Emerging
Nations," is a particularly good setting for re-
marks on modern Africa. Certainly no other
continent nor any other era in history has
launched so many new nations onto the world
stage at the same time. A little more than a
decade ago Africa claimed only 4 independent
states — Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South
Africa. Today there are 33 African states, and
of that number 24 are less than 5 years old.
Obviously this rapid emergence of new Afri-
can governments has required the United States
to give serious thought to its relations with
these young nations. Instead of dealing with
Africa as an appendage of Europe, as was done
for many years, we have had to develop a com-
pletely new formula for African-American
relations. The broad lines of this redefinition
of our African policy were spelled out by Presi-
dent Kennedy in his second state of the Union
message, when he said : "
. . . our basic goal remains the same: a peaceful
world community of free and independent states, free
to choose their own future and their own system so
long as it does not threaten the freedom of others.
In translating this fundamental idea into an
African policy we are attempting to achieve
three main objectives.
First, we want to help Africa evolve stable
and independent nations able to make their own
unique contributions to the entire world com-
mimity.
Second, we want to help the governments of
^Address made before the 16th International Festival
of Wilmington College, Wilmington, Ohio, on Mar. 2
(press release 113 dated Mar. 1 ) .
' BuixETiN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
ICARCH 25, 1963
Africa achieve their legitimate aspirations for a
better life for their people.
Third, we want to help the peoples of Africa
develop societies and institutions in harmony
with their own beliefs and cultures.
These United States objectives in Africa
readily combine our national self-interest with
our historical humanitarian outlook toward
peoples less favored materially than ourselves.
This is why we can say^ — and sincerely mean —
that what we want for Africa is what the Afri-
cans want for themselves.
Our African policy is further helped by the
fact that mutually beneficial African-European
relations have been maintained throughout
much of Africa. We believe that Africa's de-
velopment can best be hastened within a frame-
work of cordial relationships between Africa
on the one hand and the free world led by
Europe and the United States on the other.
We are well aware that Europe's contribu-
tions to Africa have been greater than our own,
and we look to Europe to continue to play a
dominant role in African assistance. Neverthe-
less, it is a political fact of life in Africa that
African governments feel impelled to develop
associations in addition to those with Europe in
order to feel truly independent. This could
mean turning either to the United States or to
the Communist bloc. Clearly, we believe that
Africa's association with America rather than
with the Soviets is the better way to enhance the
development of societies of free choice in
Africa. And we have a positive program to
encourage such development.
Let me make clear, however, that Africans
are not relying solely on external assistance.
457
On my recent trip I saw many examples of the
tremendous energy Africans are putting into
the economic and social development of their
nations and the great sacrifices they are making
to meet tlieir many needs. This has led to a
broad stream of progi-ess throughout the conti-
nent. Too infrequently do we take note of the
Africans' strong desire to plan, to work, and to
sacrifice to attain their aspirations, and I would
like to mention a few examples I observed on
my recent trip.
In Algeria I found an energetic yoimg gov-
ernment and people determined to move ahead
rapidly. The Algerians have developed a
strong sense of unity in the face of great difficul-
ties, and they are working hard to reconstruct
their war-ravaged country. Security and order
have generally been restored, and a substantial
number of Algerians have been reemployed.
Essential public services have largely been re-
stored, and schools are filled with eager young
Algerians anxious to learn.
Nevertheless, there still is not enough agricul-
tural and industrial employment in the country.
Algeria needs both foreign capital and assist-
ance. France is the principal source of assist-
ance and undoubtedly will continue to play the
major role in Algeria's development. Because
of the magnitude of the task, however, we ex-
pect to supplement French aid.
Much of our current assistance goes into food-
relief activities, but we hope to shift our efforts
from relief to providing food as payment to
men working on rural improvement projects.
We have begun discussions with Algerian offi-
cials on ways to develop a rural rehabilitation
program, and we hope that such a program can
be worked out in the next 2 months.
It was my privilege to tour one U.S.-support-
ed reforestation progi-am in eastern Algeria last
month. This program not only provides work
for thousands of men but will eventually form
the base for a substantial hnnber industry and
enrich surrounding farmlands. The workers
receive U.S. food provided under Public Law
480 as partial payment for their labors, while
the Algerian Government provides the cash
portion of their wages. This jointly undertaken
program answers a critical current need and
at the same time channels manpower into proj-
ects that promise rich benefits for the future.
458
In Nigeria I saw much evidence of the desire
of government and people to use their own
resources in developing their country. Nigeria
has drawn up a 6-year, $3 billion development
plan, of which $1.8 billion will be in the public
sector and $1.2 billion in the private sector.
Nigeria hopes to provide 50 percent of total in-
vestment from internal Nigerian resources and
expects to finance the remaining 50 percent
from public foreign aid and private foreign
investment.
Thanks to Nigeria's economic efficiency and
its provision of opportimities and incentives, the
comitry's gross national product has risen at
an average annual rate of 3.8 percent since 1950.
Nigeria also has demonstrated a high capacity
to absorb capital usefully.
The Nigerians are taking a number of self-
help measures to speed this progress. One
major steja has been a decision to rely on foreign
aid to cover no more than half the capital ex-
penditures of any development project. This
decision will require close attention to the elimi-
nation of nonessential expenditures, and it has
led to a vigorous search for new sources of
domestic revenue.
Understandably, considerable outside help
also is needed to fulfill this ambitious plan. The
United States has been much impressed with
Nigeria's efforts to help itself, however, and we*
have committed ourselves to a long-range loan
program to pro\ade project aid in the magni-
tude of $225 million over the next 6 years.
We had frank discussions with Nigerian offi-
cials on ways to get this program moving
swiftly and smoothly, and I think we will begin
to see considerable forward movement in the
very near future. I would also hope for a rise
in private American investment in Nigeria, now
that an investment guaranty agreement has
been signed. Certainly, on the basis of what
I have seen in Nigeria, I would urge American
investors to take their eai'liest opportunity to
investigate the many business possibilities that
a growing Nigeria offers.
These few examples give you some idea of
the dynamism and the desire to develop self-
help measures that exist throughout much of
the African Continent. But it will take self-
help in combination with outside assistance to
maintain this momentum.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIlfl
We hope to help maintain this forward prog-
ress, and we expect that Europe will do its best
to strengthen its efforts to assist Africa. If
foreign assistance does not come from the free
world, Africans will be forced to turn to the
Communist world — and this would be detri-
mental to all of us.
The United States and African nations share
a desire for peace, freedom, and growth. It is
in our national interest, therefore, to do all we
can to help Africa develop free and independ-
ent states committed to political, social, and
economic progress. Each such country that
emerges in Africa strengthens the world of free
choice and enhances our nation's prospects for
peace, freedom, and growth. And, even more
importantly, such a develojiment will be a major
contribution to the security and welfare of gen-
erations to come — those whose lives will be
linked even more closely than ours with the
fortunes of peoples beyond our shores.
Colonialism and the Decade
of Development
hy Jonathan B. Bingham ^
The vitality of the United Nations as an insti-
tution and its significance for the United States
are attested to by great meetings such as this
one. I congratulate those who have organized
this Mid- Atlantic Model General Assembly, and
I congratulate all of you who are seizing the
opportunity to take part in it. By coming here
and participating, you are demonstrating a
greater awareness of the realities of the world
we live in than is shown by some of our pseudo-
realists who seem to consider it a mark of polit-
ical virility to belittle the importance of the
United Nations.
The hard fact is that, in this year 1963, the
United Nations is involved in one way or an-
other in practically every phase of the foreign
relations of our country, and this is so to an
' Address made before the 1963 Mid-Atlantic Model
General Assembly at Washington, D.C., on Feb. 21
(U.S./U.N. press release 4150 dated Feb. 20). Mr.
Bingham was U.S. representative-designate on the U.N.
Economic and Social Council ; his appointment was
confirmed by the Senate on Mar. 8.
rtfl MARCH 25, 1963
even greater degree of the foreign relations of
the many new nations that have appeared on the
world scene since 1945. The United Nations
today is simply an essential part of the machin-
ery of international relations. Those polemi-
cists who urge that the United States ought to
pull out of the United Nations might just as
reasonably be urging that we should close up
all our embassies and consulates in. foreign
lands.
Of the four topics you have chosen for this
conference, I should like to speak about two —
colonialism and the Decade of Development—
because it is in these areas that my own experi-
ence has been concentrated.
It is a curious phenomenon that the General
Assembly of the United Nations has become
more and more actively involved in the proces-
ses of decolonization in recent years, just at the
time when the pace of decolonization was
being greatly stepped up and an unprecedented
number of former dependent territories were,
in fact, achieving independence. One reason
for this has been the understandable desire of
the peoples of former dependent territories to
help their brothers still subject to foreign domi-
nation to achieve freedom also.
The principal focus among the Afro-Asian
nations at present is upon Africa — the Portu-
guese territories, the few remaining British ter-
ritories, and the territory of South-West Af-
rica, which was handed to South Africa as a
mandate after World War I and which South
Africa has steadfastly refused to transform into
a trust teiTitory.
In dealing with the various problems of colo-
nialism, the basic and overriding principle for
the United States — which after all itself started
the anticolonialist parade — is that the peoples
of dependent territories are entitled to self-
determination. The corollary is that, if they
choose nationliood, they should be launched
under conditions giving them the maximum
chance of survival and progress as free nations.
It is well to bear in mind, however, that self-
determination does not necessarily mean separa-
tion from the parent country. In our own case,
for example, Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico
were all considered as non-self-governing ter-
ritories under article 73 of the charter at the end
459
of World War II. Alaska and Hawaii both
chose to become States in our Union and were
so accepted by tlie Congress. Puerto Rico chose
a different status, that of a self-governing com-
monwealth in free association with the United
States. In U.N. jargon, all three have exer-
cised self-determination and have achieved the
status of full self-government. Similarly, in
the case of the British Cameroons, a former
trust territory under British administration, the
people of that territory were given a choice by
the United Nations General Assembly of join-
ing Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroon.
They were not given the opportunity of choos-
ing separate independence but were considered
as having the opportunity of "achieving their
independence" by joining one of the neighbor-
ing states. The northern part of the territory
chose to join Nigeria, and the southern part
chose to join Cameroon.
For many of the 50-odd non-self-governing
territories that remain in that status, especially
those composed of small islands or groups of
islands, it may well be that, even for the long
run, the inhabitants will prefer some form of
free association rather than separate independ-
ence. We know, for example, that in the case
of our own three remaining non-self-governing
territories, Guam, American Samoa, and the
Virgin Islands, there is no sentiment whatso-
ever in favor of separate independence ; the uni-
versal desire is for continued close association
with the United States, under conditions of in-
creased self-government.
In trying to decide what our attitude will be
on the often difficult colonial questions which
are presented to the General Assembly, and also
to the Trusteeship Council and the recently
created Committee on Colonialism, we focus
most of all on the two principles I have men-
tioned, that is, on the right of self-determina-
tion and the importance of viability for any
emerging state. We have tended to favor those
resolutions and recommendations which seemed
to us to offer concrete possibilities of progress
in these directions and by the same token have
not favored resolutions which appeared un-
likely to achieve any forward motion.
Wi\en one mentions the principle of self-
determination, the question is often raised:
460
What about Katanga? Why were the Ka-
tangese denied the principle of self-determina-
tion ? The answer is twofold : First of all, it is
not practical to grant self-determination to the
people of a small part of a country. In the case
of the Congo, all nations of the United Nations
without exception were agreed that Katanga
should continue to be an integral part of the
Congo, as it long had been, and that the Congo,
with its 15 million people, could not itself sur-
vive as a viable nation unless the dispropor-
tionately wealthy Katanga Province, compris-
ing 500,000 people, remained as an integral part
of it. (We Americans might recall that we in
effect denied to our own Southern States in the
Civil War the right of self-determination ; the
overriding principle in that case also was the
essentiality of maintaining the Union.)
A second important factor in the case of Ka-
tanga is that it was never clear that the majority
of the people of Katanga wished to be separated
from the Congo. Indeed, events of recent weeks
have cast serious doubt on the depth and ex-
tent of the people's loyalty to Mr. Tshombe
[Moise Tshombe], President of Katanga Prov-
ince. Opinion in Katanga was certainly
divided, and there is no evidence to indicate
that Tshombe was entitled to speak for all the
people of this Province.
Incidentally, if one looks back at the state
of chaos that prevailed in the Congo in the fall
of 1960 and the spring of 1961, what the United
Nations has accomplished there is almost a
miracle. In my judgment, the United Nations
Congo operation, both on the military and on
the civilian side, in spite of all the vicious and
unfounded attacks that have been made upon it,
will go down in history as a milestone in man-
kind's efforts to solve difficult international
problems through the actions of an international
organization. It was a task which we could not
have done ourselves, and which the Atlantic
alliance could not have done, without the most
grievous risk of a bitter East-West conflict in
the area. Yet, as a result of the United Na-
tions operations in the Congo, the Soviet bloc
has suffered a series of reversals in that crucial
part of Africa.
To talk of the U.N. Development Decade
brings us in a sense to a consideration of the
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
other side of the coin from the question of
:.oloniaIism — that is, to the question of nation
building after independence. Thus in propos-
ing the concept of the United Nations Develop-
ment Decade to the General Assembly in
September 1961, President Kennedy said : ^
. . . Political sovereignty is but a mockery without
he means of meeting poverty and illiteracy and dis-
ease. Self-determination is but a slogan if the future
iolds no hope.
The President went on to say :
That is why my nation, which has freely shared its
;apital and its technology to help others help them-
ielves, now proposes officially designating this decade
)f the 1960's as the United Nations Decade of Develop-
nent. Under the framework of that resolution, the
United Nations' existing efforts In promoting economic
growth can be expanded and coordinated. Regional
surveys and training institutes can now pool the talents
)f many. New research, technical assistance, and pilot
jrojects can unlock the wealth of less developed lands
ind untapped waters. And development can become
I cooperative and not a competitive enterprise, to en-
ible all nations, however diverse in their systems and
beliefs, to become in fact as well as in law both free
md equal nations.
One of the major events of the Development
Decade recently took place in Geneva. This
was the United Nations Conference on the Ap-
plication of Science and Technology for the
Benefit of the Less Developed Areas.' I was
privileged to attend as a member of the U.S.
delegation and as a vice president of the
conference.
For this historic conference, some 1,200 scien-
tists and teclmicians gathered from all over the
world. They came, agreeing on the hypothesis
that mankind now knows enough through the
developments that have been made in science
and teclinology to solve the economic and social
problems of the world, if that knowledge can
only be brought to bear and transferred to those
who need to put it to use. In some 1,800 papers
that were prepared for the conference and some
80 sessions on different phases of the subject,
these men and women discussed, not the question
whether this transfer of knowledge can be ef-
fectuated, but the question how it can be effectu-
ated and what the specifics of the process shoidd
be.
' For text, see Bitlletin of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.
J ' For background, see ibid., Feb. 4, 1963, p. 188, and
Feb. 25, 1963, p. 302.
The conference was not expected to adopt any
resolutions or recommendations, but its work
will undoubtedly be followed up in many ways —
both through more effective operations in the
developing nations themselves, through more
intensive activities on the part of the United
Nations family of development agencies, and
perhaps through some changes in the organiza-
tional structure of that set of agencies so that
a better job can be done. We must try to develop
the most effective machinery possible, both
multilateral and bilateral, so as to make fully
available to the developing areas the knowledge
and techniques of the modem world.
The gap that exists between the standard of
living in the developed countries and in the less
developed is a major threat to the equilibrium
of the world. And imfortunately that gap is
widening rather than narrowing, as the devel-
oped countries have the potentialities for rapid
growth, whereas many of the less developed
countries are barely able to keep abreast of
population increases. The objective of the De-
velopment Decade is to give new impetus to the
process of growth in the developing countries.
It is not only what concrete progress can be
achieved within the next few years that is im-
portant, but perhaps even more essential is the
widespread establishment of a conviction among
the peofjles of these areas that progress is possi-
ble and practical without the surrender of basic
freedoms.
United States Delegations
to International Conferences
U.N. Conference on Consular Relations
The Department of State announced on
March 1 (press release 111) that Warde M.
Cameron, Assistant Legal Adviser for Admin-
istration and Foreign Service, would serve as
U.S. representative to the United Nations
Conference on Consular Relations convening
at Vienna, Austria, on March 4,
This conference of plenipotentiaries will
consider the International Law Commission's
draft articles on consular relations and nego-
tiate one or more conventions on the subject,
MARCH 25, 1963
461
which would establish a single set of interna-
tional rules governing consular customs and
practices.
The conference is similar to the United Na-
tions Plenipotentiary Conference on Diplo-
matic Intercourse and Immunities held at
Vienna in 1961, which resulted in the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, now
signed by 63 states.
The U.N. General Assembly has invited all
its member states to send delegates to the con-
ference, which is expected to be in session until
April 19.1
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. V.N. printed publications may
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Reports from the officer-ln-charge of the United Nations
Operation in the Congo to the Secretary-General on
developments relating to the application of the Secu-
rity Council resolutions of February 21 and Novem-
ber 24, 1961. S/50.53/Add. 12/ Add. 2, November 20,
1962, 1 p. ; S/5053/Add. 13, November 26, 1962, 195
pp.; S/5053/Add. 13/Add. 1, November 28, 1962, 3
pp. ; S/.50.J3/Add. 13/Corr. 1, November 29, 1962, 4
pp.; S/.50.j3/Add. 14, January 11, 1963, 95 pp.;
S/50.53/Add. 14/Corr. 1, January 17, 1963, 1 p.;
S/5053/Add. 15, January 30, 1963, 38 pp.
Report by the Secretary-General on the implementation
of the Security Council resolutions of July 14, 1960
and February 21 and November 24, 1961, concerning
the Congo. S/5240, February 4, 1963, 18 pp.;
S/5240/Add. 1, February 8, 1963, 1 p.
Letters and note verbale concerning the Cuban crisis.
S/5206, November 13, 1962, 4 pp. ; S/5208, November
21, 1962, 13 pp. ; S/o210, November 26, 1962, 6 pp. ;
S/5217, December 17, 1962, 8 pp. ; S/5227, January 7,
1963, 1 p. ; S/.5228, January 7, 1963, 6 pp. ; S/.5229,
January 9, 1963, 1 p. ; S/5230, January 9, 1963, 1 p. ;
S/5231, January 9, 1963, 1 p.
Letter dated December 18, 1962, from the Secretary-
General to the President of the Security Council con-
cerning difficulties between Cambodia and Thailand.
S/5220. December 18, 1962. 3 pp.
Letter dated January 14, 1963, from the Secretary-
General to the President of the Security Council
transmitting a General Assembly resolution on
apartheid in South Africa. S/5235. January 16,
1963. 4 pp.
Decisions taken and resolutions adopted by the Secu-
rity Council during the year 1962. S/INF/17.
February 11, 1963. 11 pp.
' For the names of the members of the U.S. delega-
tion, see press release 111 dated Mar. 1.
462
Current Treaty Actions
MULTILATERAL
Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at sea,
1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. '
Acceptance deposited: Spain, January 22, 1963.
Weather Stations
Amendment of annex II-A of the agreement of Febru-
ary 25, 1954 (TIAS 3186), on North Atlantic Ocean
Stations. Approved at Montreal December 14, 1962.
Entered into force December 14, 1962.
Wheat
International vcheat agreement, 1962. Open for sig-
nature at Washington April 19 through Mav 15,
1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I
and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II.
TIAS 5115.
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands (for the King-
dom in Europe, Surinam, and the Netherlands
Antilles), March 5, 1963.
BILATERAL
Israel
Agreement amending the agreement of August 7 and
8, 1952, as amended (TIAS 2686, 3892), so as to pro-
vide for the extension to Israel of investment guar-
anties authorized by new United States legislation.
Effected by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv February
5 and 20, 1962. Entered into force February 25,
1962.
' Not in force.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 4-10
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25,
D.C.
Releases issued prior to March 4 which appear
in this issue of the Bitlletin are Nos. 106 and
108 of February 27 and 111, 112, and 113 of
March 1.
ap-
No. Date Subject
*114 3/4 Death of George G. Riddiford.
115 3/7 Advisory Committee on Arts
pointed (rewrite).
*116 3/4 U.S. participation in international
conferences.
117 3/7 Rusk : interview on "Washington
Reports to the People."
tllS 3/7 Trezise: "The Trade Expansion
Program."
119 3/6 Regional foreign policy conference,
Philadelphia.
tl20 3/8 Sisco: "The United Nations Role in
Political Disputes."
121 3/8 Rusk : news conference of March 8.
tl22 3/8 Manning : interview on "Howard K.
Smith — News and Comment."
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the BrnxETiw.
DEPARTMENT OF STATB BULLETIN'
March 25, 1963
Ind
ex
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1239
Vfrica
The Emerging Nations of Africa (Williams) . . 457
[IK To Assist in Aiding African Students Who
Left Bulgaria 448
riie Rising Afro- Asian Nations (Johnson) . . 449
American Republics. Secretary Rusk's News
Conference of March 8 432
Asia. The Rising Afro- Asian Nations (John-
son 449
Atomic Energy. Secretary Rusk's News Con-
ference of March 8 432
Brazil. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
March 8 432
Bulgaria. HE To Assist in Aiding African
Students Who Left Bulgaria 448
Communism. The Rising Afro-Asian Nations
(Johnson) 449
Congo (Leopoldville)
St'iretary Appears on "Washington Reports to
the People" 440
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 8 . 432
Congress. President Transmits Proposal for
Academy of Foreign Affairs 427
Cuba
Secretary Appears on "Washington Reports to
the People" 440
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 8 . 432
Department and Foreign Service
Education for the New Diplomacy (Lee) . . . 423
President Transmits Proposal for Academy of
Foreign Affairs 427
Disarmament. Secretary Rusk's News Confer-
ence of March 8 432
Economic Affairs. Colonialism and the Decade
of Development (Bingham) 459
Educational and Cultural AiTairs
First Four Members Appointed to Advisory
Committee on Arts 448
HE To Assist in Aiding African Students Who
Left Bulgaria 448
Europe. Secretary Appears on "Washington Re-
ports to the People" 440
Foreign Aid
The Emerging Nations of Africa (Williams) . . 457
The Rising Afro-Asian Nations (Johnson) . . 449
Second Meeting Held by Advisory Committee on
Aid Program 431
Germany. Discussions Held at Washington
With German Defense Minister 444
India. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
March 8 432
International Organizations and Conferences.
U.N. Conference on Consular Relations (dele-
gation) 461
Laos. King of Laos Visits Washington, Talks
With President Kennedy (text of com-
munique) 447
Middle East. Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of March 8 432
Military Affairs
Discussions Held at Washington With German
Defense Minister 444
Second Meeting Held by Advisory Committee on
Aid Program 431
Non-Self-Governing Territories. Colonialism
and the Decade of Development (Bingham) . 459
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Discussions Held at Washington With German
Defense Minister 444
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 8 . 432
Presidential Documents
King of Laos Visits Washington, Talks With
President Kennedy 447
President Transmits Proposal for Academy of
Foreign Affairs 427
U.S. and Venezuela Take Firm Stand Against
Communist Threats 445
Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference To
Be Held at Philadelphia 443
Treaty Information. Current Treaty Actions . 462
United Nations
Colonialism and the Decade of Development
(Bingham) 459
Current U.N. Documents 462
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 8 . 432
U.S. States Position on Financing of U.N. Peace-
keeping Operations 443
Venezuela. U.S. and Venezuela Take Firm
Stand Against Communist Threats (Betan-
court, Kennedy, text of communique) . . . 445
Name Index
Betaueourt, Romulo 445
Bingham, Jonathan B 459
Flannery, Harry W 440
Johnson, U. Alexis 449
Kennedy, President 427, 445, 447
Lee, Robert E 423
Rusk, Secretary 427,432,440
Savang Vatthana 447
Williams, G. Mermen 457
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