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HE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
y^y^
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1240 V B- P* '/ April 1, 1963
SECRETARY RUSK ADDRESSES ADVERTISING
COUNCIL 467
U.S. EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SAFEGUARDED TEST
BAN TREATY • Statement hy Secretary Rusk 485
A NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND ARMS CONTROL • by
Jacob D. Beam 489
THE TRADE EXPANSION PROGRAM • by Philip H.
Trezise 497
THE UNITED NATIONS IN CRISIS: CUBA AND THE
CONGO • by Richard N. Gardner 477
SUMMARY OF U.S. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PROGRAM OF AID TO THE CONGO 481
For index see inside back cover
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1240 • Publication Tfjj
April 1,1963
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Washington 26, D.C.
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iecretary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council
Secretary Rush spoke informally hefore the
vnnal conference of the Advertising Council
Washington on March 12. Following is the
xt of his renmrTx's^ together xoith an intro-
iction iy McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant
the President, and the transcript of a ques-
■yn-and-answer period.
ess release 126 dated March 13
ITRODUCTION BY MR. BUNDY
Although Mr. Webb [James E. Webb, Ad-
inistrator, National Aeronautics and Space
dministration] spoke as if one of the great
immitments of working in outer space was
tat we might find extraterrestrial population,
y own thought, as I think of what confronts
ir next speaker, is that one of our very con-
derable advantages is the shortage of people
i space.
I once heard a description of tlie very great
roblems confronting us in dealuig with a par-
cularly recalcitrant coimtry in another con-
aent, and a whole series of recommendations
ere put forward. Finally, in a desperate way,
16 chairman asked if no one had a really more
keeping solution, and the answer which came
■cm the back of the room was, "Yes, sir, to
lace the entire area under 8 feet of water for 4
linutes." (Laughter.)
This prescription is not readily available in
lost of the Secretary's dealings with our inter-
ational neighbors.
It's impossible to exaggerate the responsibil-
ies which are carried by the Department of
tate and, at the head of the Department of
tate, by the Secretary. It's very difficult to
saggerate the honor and respect in which this
Iecretary is held by those among our friends
and in this country who know most about the
conduct of our foreign affairs.
So it is for me a great pleasure to present to
you Secretary Rusk.
REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK
Mr. Bundy and gentlemen : It's vei-y gratify-
ing indeed to have a chance to be with you again
this year. I should like at the very beginning
to express my appreciation for your "Challenge
to Americans" campaign, which you have been
involved with for this past year. Because im-
plicit in this theme of your campaign is a deep-
seated faith that the American people will in-
deed rise to the challenge that confronts them,
and the rest of the world, and do so with cour-
age and good sense.
This very interesting and, I think, remark-
able pamphlet on this theme which you have
published ^ points out in the most helpful way
the practical ways and means by which the
individual citizen can do his part to help the
newly emerging peoples to help themselves, to
advance human welfare through science and
technology, to add to the constructive work of
international cooperative efforts, combat the
forces of totalitarianism, and give new impetus
to our own continuing American revolution.
I am going to make a few very infoi-mal re-
marks before your questions and do so by com-
menting on three or four somewhat discon-
nected problems with which we are now
confronted.
We are indeed in a great struggle, a great
' Challenge to Americans: The Struggle We Face and
How To Help Win It, available upon request from The
Advertising Council, Inc., 25 W. 45th St., New York 36,
N.Y.
.PRIL 1, 1963
467
struggle for freedom. But this is not a new
struggle.
Freedom was bom in courage and sacrifice.
And it has flourished and has grown through
commitment and dedication and effort. And
that is no less so today than it was a hundred
years ago, or even three hundred years ago.
The stakes today are what they have always
been, a struggle between those who want to erect
a society, both national and international,
founded broadly on the notion of consent, on
the one side, and those who would want to im-
pose a world of coercion, both nationally and
intern ationally .
In that great struggle there are not basically
three forces, two sets of allies and neutrals.
The great issue internationally is whether we
shall have the kind of world sketched out in the
United Nations Charter or whether we shall
have a world under the structure of a world
Communist revolution. And on that, it's a
case of the Communist bloc against all the rest.
And all the rest have deep feelings on it, great
strength, and great determination.
But this is a struggle which cannot be won
easily or cheaply. We hear, sitting where we
do, from time to time, questions bemg raised,
complaints being made that somehow the free
world, and we in this country, are not pursuing
a policy of winning.
Well, let me point out that if we want to win
we do not make deep cuts in our defense budget,
that if we want to win we do not abandon our
foreign aid. If we want to win we support a
rapidly expanding international trade system.
And if we want to win we do not abandon the
United Nations to our enemies and withdraw
because they don't agi-ee with us 100 percent of
the time, say, rather than 98 percent of the time.
We don't win by quitting. And I would hope
that those who are most insistent upon winning
would throw their effort and their strength and
their dedication behind the means which it takes
to win this great struggle for freedom.
There is no free-lunch counter here. It's not
going to be easy ; it's not going to be cheap. It
means dedication, sacrifice, effort, and this
means also cash, a lot of cash for defense and
foreign aid and for our information programs
and all the other things that cost money in this
great struggle.
I'd like to make just a few comments akt
the framework of some of the discussions ni>|
gomg on in the North Atlantic community.
The North Atlantic Community
Let me set aside for the moment a discussio
which is largely intra-European in charactlB
as to whether the future Europe should ["
organized, as President de Gaulle apparenir
prefers, as a Europe of fatherlands, or whetb
it should be organized as a highly integratl
Europe. That question is primarily Europe,
in character and one which is not for us
decide.
But let me conmient rather on the trai|
atlantic aspect of some of our recent discil
sions, particularly those that are concerned wi|
the participation in the control of nuclear wei
ons, the multilateral force.
Since World War II the United States
inherited an enormous responsibility in
nuclear field. No one elected us to that ro.
no one by conscious political act voted that ^
should carry that responsibility. This adher
to the role which we had to play as a nation
developing nuclear weapons, after the tra§
failure of the Banich proposals back in 19^
Now, since 1955 and '56 and '57, a new e!'
ment has come into the situation. Before the
dates, for all practical purposes, the Unit
States had an atomic monopoly of effective c
livery systems able to deliver these weapons
almost any part of the earth. But in the mi
fifties the Soviet Union acquired a large a,v
effective delivery capability against the We:
primarily against Western Europe but al
deeply serious as far as our own country
concerned.
Now, under those conditions of nuclei
competition, the possibilities of a genuine m
clear exchange, then in a special sense the li
and death of nations became involved in thef
nuclear decisions. In a Europe which is revil
ing, which feels its new strength, which is b
coming more and more involved in the grei
policy decisions that affect the entire world,
is entirely understandable that they then
selves would wish to play a larger role in til
decisions which affect their own national f utu;
We have tried to meet that in two or thi
different ways. In the first place, during th
'i
468
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLEXI
;st year we have tried to provide our NATO
ies a great deal more essential information
■out the nuclear problem than they had had
■'fore — our own nuclear situation, the nuclear
sit ion of the Soviet Union, the teclmical and
■ llnancial and the operational problems con-
, red with the presence and the employment
nuclear weapons.
I think that has been very helpful in giving
( r friends in the alliance the basic data on
1 lich they can think hard and seriously about
tese questions. But we also have had the feel-
IX from tlaem that they would like a greater
; ire of participation in the actual decisions, in
; 1 actual management of at least a portion
I these forc«s. I emphasize "participation"
] ther than "independence" because independ-
I i^c for Europe necessarily involves independ-
( . e for the United States, and that is not being
nposed.
But participation in the consideration of the
licy issues involved is a very important fac-
■• And so we have been saying to our friends
Europe, "If you would like to change the
wring situation with respect to determinmg
' Icar policy, then we would be glad to have
ur proposals."
^ oposals for Multilateral Force
Those proposals were not forthcoming. And
erefore we took the next step, and we have
id to them, "Now, here is an approach by
lich we think you might be able to participate
ire actively and as full equals in this nuclear
oblem." And so we have laid out, in sketch,
rangements for a multilateral force, which
luld give those of our NATO allies who wish
do so a chance to participate with us in an
iportant nuclear force within NATO.
Now, let me say that this process involves a
rtain nervousness on the part of public opin-
ns in one or another country and perhaps just
Uttle nervousness on the part of certain gov-
nments. Because we have been so used to
merican leadersliip that it would normally be
;pected that we would come out with a com-
ete blueprmt, complete in every detail. But
•ar in mind that the issue here is sharing that
adership with our NATO allies. Therefore,
would not be in keeping with the whole pur-
pose of the exercise for us to come forward with
a finished plan in every detail and say to them,
"Take it or leave it."
Secondly, here is a case where there is an
opportunity for the most genuine consultation
from the very inception of an idea and a joint
and connnon construction of a possible change
in the NATO arrangements. Now, this is not
again too easy, because people are more accus-
tomed to reacting to proposals than they are
to sitting down and actually helping to con-
struct those proposals. But this is what we
are up to at the present time. We are saying
to our European friends, "If you would like
to join with us in a multilateral force in NATO,
in which we would have mixed manning, a sea-
borne force, and control of that force by the
participants, here is a way we can do it. It's
going to be costly, and here is what it would
cost. And we would like to get your reactions
and your comitersuggestions if you in fact are
seriously interested in these matters."
We are pleased that there has been expressed
a very sti'ong interest on the part, of several
members of NATO in pursuing these discus-
sions further. But I want to emphasize that
this is a common, joint effort and not a question
in which we, the United States, are saying to
our NATO allies, "Here is something that we
think you must take, and this is the way it has
got to be."
We are saying to them, "You come in, sit
down with us, let's work at this and see if we
can't come out of it with a more genuine
partnership than we have had thus far in these
nuclear matters."
Some Comments on Cuba
Anticipating, perhaps, one or two of your
questions, I'd like to make some comments on
Cuba. (Laughter.)
The objective of the hemisphere and of the
United States with respect to Cuba must be —
and it is — the return of a free Cuba to this
hemisphere. On this the hemisphere is unani-
mous. The foreign ministers themselves iman-
imously have stated this as the central theme of
hemisphere policy toward that island.
Now, we are discovering with regard to Cuba
that, having failed to take the steps that might
469
have prevented in years past the establishment
of a Marxist- Leninist regime in Cuba, the prob-
lem of finding a cure is more difficult. (And let
me say parenthetically that this factor alone
gives highest priority to an effective and vig-
orous Alliance for Progress program through-
out the hemisphere, because we must anticipate
and try to prevent these situations, because the
cure becomes so much more difficult.)
Well, let me remind you of some of the ele-
ments in the policy and action which are now
being pursued with respect to Cuba, because
we seldom see these more or less put together
all in one place.
It has been made very clear that under no
circumstances can the United States accept or
tolerate the reintroduction of offensive weapons
into Cuba and that, if that should occur, the
crisis of last October would look relatively
trivial compared to the crisis that would be
engendered by any such fresh episode of that
sort.
Secondly, it has been made very clear that
the armed forces of the hemisphere, including
our own, are made available to insure that anns
that are now in Cuba not be used outside of
Cuba, either in temis of organized effort or
through piecemeal infiltration of those arms
into other countries of the hemisphere. And
the most diligent efforts are being made by us
and others to insure that there is not that kind
of surreptitious arms traffic in this hemisphere,
a policy accepted unanimously by the OAS long
since.
Third, we must keep taking a look at Cuba
to assure ourselves as well as we can about what
is going on in that island — a surveillance w^hich
we feel, and which we are confident, is
thoroughly based upon the OAS structure
and the OAS resolutions, but a surveillance
which we believe is necessary under all the
circiunstances.
Fourth, to protect the free and active use of
international waters and airspace in the gen-
eral vicinity of Cuba and to enforce that use by
armed force, if necessaiy.
Then we have felt, along with many other
of our allies, that the kind of Cuban regime
that we have today not only is not fit to par-
ticipate as a regime in the activities of the inter-
American system but that, with its declaration
of subversive and other types of war upon tl I
hemisphere, it is not entitled to normal ec', I
nomic or other relations with the free world. •
And so there has been a systematic discussic
with other governments about the restriction (
trade between the free world and Cuba ar
about the restriction of sliipping between tl
free world and Cuba.
The statistics on both of those show a dr
matic decline in the economic relationships b
tween Cuba and the rest of the free world,
think we will find that 1963 will almost STire
result in almost complete isolation of Cul
from the free world in such transactions.
Then we have the contmued problem of t
degree of penetration of the rest of the hen
sphere coming through Cuba or leaning up(
Cuba in terms of subversive effort, the flow
funds, the training of individuals from oth
countries in Cuba to be returned for nefario
purposes back to their own country. This
a problem which technically is difficult becau
of the legal and constitutional problems in exii
ence in some countries but nevertheless is
matter of highest priority among the countrii
particularly in the Caribbean area at the pn
ent time, and very substantial gains are beii
made in that respect.
We must look forward to a time when !
Sovdet military elements are out of Cuba. T
penetration of this hemisphere by Marxist-Lf
inism is itself incompatible with the hemispht
and its commitments.
The presence of Soviet forces in this hen •
sphere cannot be accepted as a part of the m
mal situation in this hemisphere. Now, the m
siles have gone out ; the bombers have gone oi
Soviet forces have been moving out.
We will have, I think, a more complete i
porti on just what this amounts to sometii'
after the middle of the month, because of t ■
recent indication from the Soviet Union tl:;
they were taking out several thousand of th( i
before the end of the month. But the continul
outflow of Soviet military personnel itself mit
be and is an object of policy.
In other words, the actions that are bei?
taken include, I think, the actions that can r<-
sonably be taken under all the circumstanc,
short of the actual lamiching of an armed ;-
4:70
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETl
tack upon Cuba, which is not a part of our pol-
icy at the present time.
That is an action which is easy to tliink of
land in a certain highly tlieoretical sense is al-
Iways easy to employ. But this type of action
Tinvolves costs and risks which have to be related
not onl}- to the de^gree of the threat which exists
in Cuba but also to problems for which we are
n^sponsible in other parts of the world.
Xow, tliis is about where we are. I think the
situation in Cuba is making it clear to the Cu-
ban people that this present course is not a
course on which they can find a fit future for
themselves. And it's making it veiy clear also
to the rest of the hemisphere that Castroism
does not hold within itself any promise for the
{economical and social development of the peo-
ple of this hemisphere.
Finding Elements of Common Interest
T would like in closing, before I come to your
questions, to comment on one other point. That
is that despite the tensions, despite the enor-
mous diversity of purpose between ourselves
and the Soviet Union, despite all of the effort
and the struggle in which we are involved in
this great underlying crisis about the shape of
the world community, it is important, never-
theless, for us to try to find elements of common
interest with the Soviet Union in order to dis-
cover whether bridges might not be thrown
across, along which some elements of peace can
be gradually built. We owe it to ourselves and
to the human race to keep in touch on those
possibilities.
For example, there are fields in which co-
operation between us is in our common interest
simply because we are both frail human beings
caught in a hostile physical environment. Some
of the great forces of nature in the field of dis-
ease and the attacks upon food crops and
things of that sort, where what happens in one
part of the world is a danger to events in an-
other part of the world — there are elements of
common interest which might support some
growing cooperation in these scientific and tech-
nical medical fields.
"We have supposed that it was possible that
in the nuclear testing field there might be also
a common interest recognized on both sides
which could provide the basis for an agreement
to end nuclear testing. Objectively considered,
one would suppose that the Soviet Union shares
with us the view that it would be a misfortune
if a nuclear race shoidd go on indefuiitely and
without limit, not only because it involves great
burdens and billions upon billions of additional
resources thrown into the arms race but be-
cause over time, looking out ahead into the
future, one sees the possibility of a chanciness,
of unpredictability, of growing dangers, of in-
creasing complexity, of increasing difficulty of
just human management of weapons systems
of such speed and sophistication, so that there
might be a common interest on both sides in
bringing this matter to a conclusion.
Unfortunately I would have to report today
that the prospects do not appear very good that
we can move on to a nuclear test ban treaty.
I think that, to the extent that the argument
turns on inspection, to a certain extent the argu-
ment is somewhat unbalanced. If you put your-
self in the position of the Soviet Union, looking
at the United States, from their point of view
they do not need much international machinery
to assure themselves that we are not testing.
We have an open society. Information of this
and other tj'pes is rather easy to obtain. They
must have learned by now that we find it very
difficult ourselves to keep secrets on such
matters.
But they, looking at us, might well judge that
we can get reasonable assurance out of the
existing situation which they describe as na-
tional systems, perhaps 98 percent open society,
perhaps 2 percent special intelligence activities
on their side. But, in any event, the combina-
tion gives them reasonable assurance.
From our point of view, looking at the Soviet
Union, this is not possible. A closed society,
occupymg a vast landmass in Eurasia, much of
it sparsely populated, requires a degree of in-
strumentation and physical presence — human
presence — from time to time in order to check
up on indications that tests might in fact be
taking place. So we have to have a testing
procedure which will give us reasonable assur-
ance that the treaty is not being violated.
Well now, we are at the present time hung
up, not just on the number of inspections. We
471
are hung up on all the rest of the treaty which
specifies what kinds of inspections you would in
fact have. We have indicated that we would be
ready to set the number aside in order to make
our conversations more relevant by talking
about what it is we are trying to number, to
get down and work out the details as to what
kind of data would stimulate a request for an in-
spection, how large an area would be subject
to inspection, who would be the inspectors, how
the inspectors would know that they were ac-
tually on the spot designated for inspection —
questions of that sort which are highly relevant,
indeed crucial, to any inspection system. Be-
cause one or two hundred inspections which
were inadequate would not be as good as seven
or eight inspections which were fully adequate
in all details that make the difference. But we
have had no indication of progress in the last
several weeks on this matter, and I would sup-
pose on that at the present time that the pros-
pect for progi-ess is somewhat slow.
Well now, I think these are comments which
might fonn the basis for, or perhaps stimulate,
some questions. I'd be glad to take your ques-
tions at this time. Thank you.
QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD
Mt. Bimdy: The Secretary will take the ques-
tions direct.
Q. Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rusk: Yes?
Q. If the Soviets hnow that toe are not going
to war over Cuba — we have practically told
them that, I gather — lohat incentive is there
for them to get their troops out? Why should
they take them out, in other words?
A. Well, there were some highly dangerous
elements in the Cuba situation today tliat con-
tinue to be there. The necessity for surveillance
could lead to a very dangerous situation very
quickly.
Q. On their part, you mean?
A. If there were any inten-uption with our
surveillance, if Soviet forces in Cuba were to
take action against Cubans, that could create
a very dangerous situation. If there were any
472
forays mounting from Cuba against neighbor-
ing coimtries, that could create a very danger-
ous situation. In otlier words, this is not a
comfortable and easy situation m which we are
at the present time. And so I would not sup
pose that there is a stability and a certainty
about it on either side to any extent.
Now, if the threat is sufficiently great, the
risks to be taken to meet that tlireat have to be
great as well. Back in October tliere were very
great threats in preparation against the United
States. And the maximum risk was taken back
in October. Let me say that the decision taken
on October 21 and 22 ^ may in retrospect loci
simple and easy. I can assure you that at the!
time it was taken, at a time when you could not
know for sure what would happen, this was bj
no means an easy and simple decision. It was
the gravest decision I think any President of
the United States has made in decades.
But if the risks are great, that is, if the threat!
is great, the necessary steps would have to be
taken and the risk would have to be accepted
accordingly. We do not judge that the present
situation requires that kind of operation at the
present time.
Q. Mr. Secretary, we have some — we knovx
that there are some sutstantial Communist ac-
tivities in Venezuela, Colonibia, and othen
South American countries. Do we have an%
assurance that there loill not he a CaMro-typ4
leader take over some of these countries?
A. Well, I think this is a primary necessitj
and a primaiy objective of policy and action
in the rest of Latin America, including those
countries that you just mentioned, that we musf>
take whatever steps are necessary to prevent the-
arrival in any other country of a Marxist-Len-
inist regime of the Castro type. There is no
question about it; we are working very closely,
indeed, with the authorities of the countries in
volved to see what has to be done to assure
that this does not happen.
Q. Mr. Secretary?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In the recent listing of czarist treaties,
that were unfair to China, that just came out
' For background, see Bulletin of Nov. 12, 1962, p.
715.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN(
of Peking, was the United States involved his-
torically in any of those agreements?
A. I would have to check that. I'm afraid
\-our question caught me without researcli at
the moment. I don't believe that those particu-
lar border treaties involved the United States.
Rut I'd have to verify that.
Shipping Between Cuba and Free World
Q. Do ive currently have a quarantine or
blockade of Cuba? And if so, what is its
nature?
A. We do not have a quarantine of the sort
;hat stops ships on the high seas. What is hap-
pening is that there is a progressive and very
sharp reduction in normal economic or shipping
relations between Cuba and the free world. For
example, in the month of January there were
12 free-world ships in the Cuban trade and
nost of those were on long-term charter to the
soviet bloc.
TMiat has been happening is that our friends
ibroad, including the maritime nations, have
:hemselves been taking action voluntarily and
m many situations through private discussions
'ather than through official action, because in
jome coimtries there is an absence of law on
the subject, to get their ships out of the Cuban
trade. And this has been moving very rapidly,
md I would suppose that it will continue to
?o down in the calendar year 1963. It is now
only a trickle.
Q. Mr. Rush?
A. Yes, sir?
Q. What do you estimate it is costing the
Soviet Union to keep the Cuban economy
afloat and the regime too?
A. I have seen the estimate of a million dol-
lars a day. I tliink that minimum. I think
as the situation in Cuba continues to deteriorate
with the sharp drop in their sugar crop this
year and the multiplying factor of spare-parts
shortages and tilings of that sort, my guess is
that this will be increasingly expensive and
this is one of the strains which may point to
an opportunity to get this problem solved at
some later stage.
Q. Mr. Secretary?
A. Yes?
Q. Does Cuba get its oil from any source
other than Russia?
A. I imderstand that there is no free- world
oil in the Cuba trade. If there is any, it is the
most trivial quantity. They get their oil from
the Soviet Union at the present time. Yes, sir?
Q. Mr. Secretary, you stated that one of the
policies of the OAS is to prevent the flow of
arms from Cuba —
A. Right.
Q. — and other people being trained in Cuba
to act in these countries. How can we deter-
mine there is no flow without inspection or a
blockade?
A. Well, there are occasional reports, for
example, that ships proceeding from Cuba to
a Latin American port to pick up a load of
something for return to, say, Europe and even
to the bloc, might have on board anns. Well,
those ships are carefully inspected, and we have
not yet found any one of them that have been
alleged to have been carrying anns to have any
anns on board. But it's not too difficult to
check out that kind of report, and we check
out all those we can possibly get. We are
watching that vei-y carefully.
Q. Mr. Rusk, can you envisage the structure
of the political party that would replace Castro
if such a thing occurred?
A. I think one could not spell that out in
detail. One of the difficulties is that the anti-
Castro Cubans are themselves diversified,
broken up into many factions, and have not
fully pulled themselves together in a unified
front. At the time that he visited the Cuban
brigade in Miami the President urged them to
do their best to get together as a solid group,^
but this has been very difficult for political rea-
sons, and that I suppose one can miderstand.
But nevertheless it would be very important
if the anti-Castro Cubans could work toward a
solid front, not only outside Cuba, say, in this
country and in the rest of the hemisphere, but
'76!(?., Jan. 21, 1963, p. 88.
APRIL 1, 19G3
473
also to provide a more dynamic leadership of
the people still inside Cuba. You see, we have
had already now upward of 600,000 people in
Cuba who have indicated they want to leave.
In terms of voting with your feet, this voting
is very persuasive testimony about the general
attitude of many Cubans toward the regime
there.
Now, about a hundred thousand of those are
in this country. We would like to see as much
cohesion as possible among them because in the
future this cohesion could be very important.
Q. Sir, could you venture a guess as to how
long the so-called Castro regime would rerrMin
m power?
A. No, sir, I wouldn't want to predict that.
(Laughter.) I would like to be able to predict
it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, would you say that a seri-
ous acceleration of the sabotage efforts in Latin
America directed from, Cuba might he con-
sidered an equivalent of military interference?
A. Well, it depends upon the method, the de-
gree, and the ability to demonstrate conclu-
sively that there was the action that was stim-
ulated out of Cuba, directed toward a particular
country. I would think that there would come
a point where that would be the equivalent of
ih.Q kind of violation of the Rio Pact that would
require additional measures against Cuba.
Yes, sir?
Question of "No-invasion Pledge"
Q. Sir, on the no-invasion pledge or lack of
a no-invasion pledge, could you clarify it? Be-
cause amongst people there seems to be con-
fusion as to xohether there is a no-invasion
pledge of any type or not. Are you in a posi-
tion to get that clear to any of tis now? Per-
haps there is; perhaps there isn't. But wider
certain circumstances it might change on that.
Is there any way to clarify it so that we know?
A. Well, I would urge you first to turn back
at your first opportunity and read tlie Presi-
dent's November 20th press conference on that
point.* Let me say tliat there have been no
II
* For text of a statement read by the President, see
ibid., Dec. 10, 1962, p. 874.
commitments made that have not been made
public on this point. Had we been able to get
any agreement with the Soviet Union on all of
the qualifications of policy with respect to thei
future, there might have been an agi'eement
announced at the United Nations in tlie course
of January.
For example, we can't make a commitment
that would cut across the Rio Treaty. We can't
make a commitment that would cut across
the Guantanamo Treaty. We can't make a
coimnitment that would expose the rest of the
hemisphere to penetration or assault or sub-
version from Cuba. It is the present policy of
the United States not to invade Cuba for rea-
sons that the President and others have indi-
cated. But this is not in a sense, and has noti
been, any unqualified commitment without ref-
erence to the conduct of Cuba in this hemisphere
and Cuba's status as a threat in the hemisphere.
President Kennedy pointed out November'
20th that, if Cuba is determined to live at peace,,
there could be peace in the Caribbean, buti
Castro's speeches in early January didn't soimd
like living at peace in the Caribbean, you see.
So I would refer you to his press conference*
of November 20, whicli was the most authorita-
tive word on that, and say that nothing has been
said privately that has not been said publiclyt
on this point and that the basic treaty instruc-
tions and obligations of the hemisphere remaini
intact.
Q. Thank you.
A. Yes, sir?
Q. It was reported there was a guerrillaH
movement between Mexico and. Cuba. How\
can you possibly start the building up of nwm-\
bers of trained saboteurs and guerrillas v^ho are\
continually reporting back to the respective\
countries?
A. Well, in the first place, the general pas-
senger traffic to and from Mexico and Cuba has|
been sharply reduced in recent weeks — the num-
ber of flights, the actual movement of people
and a good many of those have been people on|
diplomatic or other business of a more formal I
and official kind.
But this is a troublesome question for a num-l
ber of Latin American countries, some of whom!
474
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETlNl
;ave constitutions that prevent them from
nterfering with the so-called right to travel,
md wliat has sometimes happened is that
people from other Latin American countries
could come to Mexico on their normal pass
tapers from their own coimtries and get in
ouch with an agent of Cuba somehow and get
pecial papers on which he would find his way
lo Cuba and then come back to Mexico, pick up
;is normal papers, and go back home; and his
ountry of origin could not know where he had
•een in the process.
Now, it's not easy to control this travel of
adividuals because there are hundreds of
liousands of people in travel status. So there
re some serious technical problems involved,
kit I think we are making some very substan-
ial headway on it, and I think this is going to
e a decreasing problem.
Yes, sir?
he Middle East
Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment on the
'tuation in the Middle East, particularly in
'ijrla and Iraq?
A. Well, I would prefer at the moment not
3 offer any interpretation of what has been
appening in Syria because it is a little^ early
et to particularly offer any public examination
f that situation. We have recognized the
Syrian Government ° because it appeared to us
hat it was in control of the situation and had
ommitted itself to its own international obli-
■ations, and so forth.
I think our deepest concern at the moment in
he Middle East is to try to get the countries of
he Middle East to disengage themselves from
he Yemen and to leave the Yemenis alone to
rork out their own solution in their own
ountry. Because there is a situation which
ould pit these neighboring countries against
ach other and lead to rapid escalation of vio-
ence that could endanger the entire area.
So we would like very much to see the neigh-
)oring countries disengaged from the Yemen
tnd leave the Yemenis alone. And I think that
Tould reduce the tension considerably in the
veeks immediately ahead. Otherwise I would
think that we do not see in the Baghdad and
Damascus situations any indication of explo-
sion. It seems to be stabilizing, and there seems
to be a prospect that things will shake down
without too much difficulty.
Mr. Bundy: Gentlemen, the Secretary prom-
ised us a half hour. He has very generously
given us 40 minutes, full measure and more.
It's very much worth it, but I think we should
let him go.
U.S. Rejects Soviet Charge
of Firing on Trawler
Following is an exchange of notes between
the United States and the Soviet Union regard-
ing the alleged firing on a Soviet trawler hy
U.S. Navy ships.
U.S. NOTE OF MARCH 14 >
The Department of State acknowledges the
receipt of note No. 9 from the Embassy of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Eepublics dated
March 12, 1963 expressing serious concern over
a reported firing by United States Navy ships
on a Soviet refrigerator- trawler (SRTE-9007)
March 8, 1963 approximately 70 miles east of
Norfolk, Virginia. A thorough investigation
was initiated immediately upon the receipt of
the Embassy's note with the foDowing results.
The position given in the Embassy's note
for the location of the Soviet vessel at the time
of the alleged incident lies well within an estab-
lished and recognized United States Navy
operations area used for many years for gun-
nery and other exercises by ships of the United
States Na^'y. On March 8, 1963, there were
in this operations area six United States Navy
destroyei-s which engaged in gmanei-y exercises
during the course of the day. The destroyer
nearest the location of the alleged incident with-
in the indicated time period conducted anti-
aircraft firing practice (against a target towed
by an airplane) in an easterly and westerly
direction with ammunition having a maximum
■ See p. 476.
' DeUrered to the Soviet Embassy at Washington on
Mar. 14 (press release 134 dated Mar. 15).
APRIL 1, 1963
475
range of seven miles while the destroyer was ten
miles southwest of the location of the alleged
incident. Before and during the firing prac-
tice, clearance of the range was established in
accordance with normal safety procedures and
no other surface vessels were within twelve
miles of the destroyer at the time of firing. At
no time did this destroyer or any other United
States naval vessel m the general area engage
in any firing when any surface vessel or aircraft
could be endangered. No cruisers were among
the United States Navy vessels in the area.
Department of State,
Washington, March IJ^, 1963.
SOVIET NOTE OF MARCH 12
UnofiBcial translation
No. 9
The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics has the honor to state the following upon in-
structions from the Soviet Government.
According to information received, on March 8 of
this year two American "Boston" class cruisers and
a "Franks" class destroyer fired upon a Soviet refrig-
erator trawler (SRTR-9007), which was fishing in the
open sea. At the moment of the firing the Soviet
trawler was located 70 miles east of Norfolk (at
36°o3.3' North, 74°58' West).
At 12 :15 ' the American warships fired two dummy
shells towards the trawler from a distance of 5 miles.
The shells fell approximately 130 meters from the
vessel. Then at 12 :.50, approaching to a distance of
about 1 kilometer, they fired two more dummy shells,
which fell GO meters from the trawler. By their
actions, the American warships created a threat to
the safety of the Soviet trawler and its crew.
The Soviet Government cannot regard the firing upon
of a fishing vessel of the U.S.S.R. by ships of the Navy
of the U.S.A. otherwise than as a crude violation of
the generally-recognized standards of international
law, the principles of freedom of navigation in the open
sea, and as an undisguised arbitrary act which can
lead to serious consequences.
The Soviet Government protests to the Government
of the United States of America on the occasion of the
above actions of provocation by American warships,
expects that those guilty will be punished, and that
the necessary measures will also be taken for the
barring of similar actions in the future.
Washington, March 12, 1963.
To the Department of State
of the United States of America,
Washington.
U.S. Protests Soviet Planes'
Violation of Alaskan Airspace
Following is the text of a note delivered
March 16 by Ambassador Foy D. Eohler a'
Moscow to Soviet First Deputy Foreign Blinis^
ter Vassily Kuznetsov.
Press release 138 dated March 16
It has been established tliat two Soviet res
comiaissance aircraft violated United States ai
space over Alaska on March 15, 1963. The firs
of these entered United States air space at 59
52 minutes North 163° West at 0705 Z depart;
ing at 60° 18 minutes North 166° 40 minute
West at 0730 Z. The second entered Unit©
States air space at 59° 50 minutes North 163° H
minutes West at 0713 Z departmg at 61° 10 min
utes North 165° 40 minutes West at 07342
Both planes then flew otf in the direction of th
Soviet Union. The United States Governmen
protests these overflights of United States terri
tory by Soviet aircraft and expects that th
Soviet Government will take all necessary mi
ures to prevent any repetition.
I
i
i
(
• No time zone indicated — translator's note.
U.S. Recognizes Government
of Syrian Arab Republic
Department Statement
Press release 125 dated March 12
The United States Government, taking noii
of the affirmation by the Government of tb
Syrian Arab Republic of its intention to hone
its international obligations, has today [Marc
12] decided to recognize the Government of tb
Syrian Arab Republic and has instructed ii
Charge d'Afl'aires in Damascus to confirm tb
decision in writing to the Ministry of Foreigi
Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic.
With its recognition the United States ei
tends its best wishes for success and prosperit:
of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republ
and its hojjes that the traditional ties of frieno
ship between the American and Syrian peopl
will be expanded and strengthened.
It is expected that Ambassador [Ridgwal
B.] ICnight, who is in the United States o
consultation, will return to his post after a shoi
leave.
f
476
depaktment of state BULUE'
f
he United Nations in Crisis: Cuba and the Congo
by Richard N. Gardner
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^
I don't know which group causes us the most
rouble in Washington these days — the uncrit-
lal admirers of the United Nations or the un-
•itical opponents of the United Nations.
Wlien I say uncritical admirers of the United
ations, I mean those people who are always
riting us to say: "Naughty boys — you have
^passed the U.N." They want the United
ations to do everything.
These people remind me of the tribal chief
ho came to the General Assembly some years
10 to complain that the British were oppress-
ig liim because they would not let him keep
is 100 wives. One veteran U.N. delegate rose
I his full dignity and said : "This is not a fit
ibject for the United Nations. Let this man
eep his 100 wives — and let the ravages of
ature teach him the error of his ways !"
The uncritical opponents of the United Na-
I ons are those who are never satisfied, no mat-
\\T what the U.N. does. I have in mind one
'itic who wrote me 3 months ago to say that
i 18 United Nations was a failure because it was
)0 weak to deal with Tshombe [Moise Tshom-
3, President of Katanga Province] . Now he is
•riting to complain that the U.N. is too strong
nd has become a "superstate."
Like the uncritical admirers, the uncritical
pponents of the U.N. feel under no obligation
) base their opinions on facts. As Stephen
ieacock said : "It's not what people don't know
iiat causes all the trouble; it's what they do
now that ain't so."
We in Washington try to steer a course be-
tween these two extremes. We look upon the
United Nations in a hard and practical way as
a means of promoting our national self-interest.
This statement should not shock anyone, because
this is the way that other countries look upon
the United Nations — as a means of promoting
their own national self-interest.
The United Nations is not a substitute for na-
tional interest but rather a place where nations
work together to promote their national in-
terests on those matters where they cannot get
adequate results by acting alone.
These general observations are familiar to
you. Let us test them in two of the great crises
of the last year : Cuba and the Congo.
The Cuban Crisis
The Cuban crisis was a particularly eloquent
illustration of the U.N.'s threefold value to the
United States as a place for debate, negotiation,
and action — once the power and determination
of the United States and its allies had been
demonstrated in the quarantine.^
As a place for debate., the United Nations en-
abled us to build support for our Cuban policy
in the most dramatic and effective way.^ You
will all remember what Mr. Zorin [Valerian
A. Zorin, Soviet representative to the U.N.] said
'Address made before the 1963 Mid-Atlantic Model
leneral Assembly at Washin^on, D.C., on Feb. 23
press release 99 dated Feb. 22).
- For an address by President Kennedy and text of
a proclamation on the interdiction of the delivery of
offensive weapons to Cuba, see Bulletin of Nov. 12,
1962, pp. 715 and 717.
° For statements made in the Security Council by
U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson on Oct. 23 and
25, 1962, see ibid., p. 723.
IPRIL 1, 1963
477
before millions on TV— that the Soviets had no
need to put missiles into Cuba and that the U.S.
evidence of the missile sites was manufactured
by the CIA. We countered by showing pic-
tures of the missile sites in the Security Council.
Shortly thereafter Khrushchev admitted the
presence of the missiles and agreed to withdraw
them.*
This public exposure of Soviet duplicity had
a tremendous impact in building support for
the quarantine and other aspects of our Cuban
policy. Even though the Cuban matter was
considered in the Security Council, it affected
the course of the General Assembly and turned
the general opinion of mankind in our favor
on a number of other subjects. We could not
have achieved this result with anything like
such success if we had been obliged to show our
pictures and tell our story separately in 109
different comitries.
As a place for negotiation, the United Na-
tions was scarcely less important to us. The
Secretary-General served as a useful go-between
in negotiations between the United States and
the Soviet Union.
To begin with, he helped avoid an armed
clash at sea between the Soviets and ourselves
when he proposed that Soviet ships stay clear
of our quarantine fleet. If the Soviets needed
an "out," they could find it in responding to a
U.N. appeal and not admitting publicly they
were responding to United States power.
As a place for action, the United Nations
demonstrated its potential for the future.
Khrushchev agreed to U.N. inspection on the
spot. He could never have agreed to U.S. in-
spection. Then Castro refused and branded
Communist Cuba as unwilling to cooperate
with the world peace organization.
The fact that the United Nations was willing
and able to perform the inspection role in Cuba
and that this was agreed to between the United
States and the Soviet Union had a twofold
value : The United Nations demonstrated a po-
tential of considerable importance for the
future, and Castro was put in the position of
defying not just U.S. inspection but U.N. in-
spection, thereby lea\ang inspection to our own
resources.
to
ii(
Legality of U.N. Action in the Congo
Let us turn now from Cuba to the Congo.
Some people still ask: Wliat is the United
Nations doing in the Congo, and why is the
United States supporting it ?
To answer tliis question it is useful to recall
the choice that confronted the United States,
in the Congo in the summer of 1960. Ths^^
alternatives open to the United States were '
clear. ^
We could do nothing — in which case the
Congo would wallow in chaos and bloodshed
and the Soviet bloc would be free to move in to
pick up the remains.
We could intervene directly — and trigger a
confrontation in the heart of Africa of the great
powers, a confrontation which could lead to
another "Spanish civil war" and be the prelud
to a wider conflict.
Or we could do what we in fact did — give
assistance to the Congo through the United
Nations.
I think the judgment of history will be that
the use of the United Nations in the Congo was
the least dangerous of the three dangerous al'l
ternatives confronting the United States ana
the woi-ld at large in the summer of 1960.
Most Americans recognize the merit of thesd
arguments. Yet a number of specific questions
about the Congo are still raised.
Some people ask: Was the United Nationi
action in the Congo legal ? The answer is yea
for three reasons :
First, the Government of the Congo askeu
for the United Nations to come in.
Second, the Security Council authorized th
U.N. to go in with a mandate to maintain la^
and order — a mandate which was subsequent!;
expanded into a mandate to prevent civil wai
protect the Congo's territorial integrity, and re
move the foreign mercenaries.^
Third, the military actions of the U.N. Fore
were taken in pursuit of these mandates and i:
self-defense.
It is well to remember that the recent fightinj
which culminated in the end of the secession o:
Katanga began on Christmas Eve, whi
* For exchanges of messages between President Ken-
nedy and Chairman Khrushchev, see ibid., p. 741.
'■ For bacliground and texts of resolutions, see ihiA
Aug. 1, I960, p. 159 ; Aug. 8, 1960, p. 221 ; Sept. 5, 19«(
p. 384 ; Mar. 13, 1961, p. 359 ; and Dec. 25, 1961, p. 10«
478
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BXTLLETE
drunken Katangese soldiere attacked a U.N.
command post. This was the cuhnination of
a long series of harassments of the U.N. soldiers
designed to cut them off from one another and
from their supplies and communications.
I think it is a generally accepted principle
of both domestic and international law that a
cop who is lawfully on the beat has a right to
defend himself against attack.
As a part of this legal question, there are
people who ask: Isn't this intervention in the
internal affairs of the Congo? The answer is
no again, for at least two reasons :
First, the Congo asked for the U.N. to come
in.
Second, this was not an internal matter —
there was a clear threat to international peace
and security because of the actual or potential
involvement of outside powers.
Still other people ask: Doesn't this violate
traditional United States support for the prin-
ciple of self-determination? The answer is no,
for at least three reasons :
First, there is no absolute principle of self-
determination. We fought a civil war to deny
it. We have recognized both at home and
abroad the dangers of Balkanization. Sup-
pose the mayor of a Texas tov,-n which hap-
pened to have most of the oil in Texas decided
to secede from the State and take the oil with
him. I don't suppose that would be permitted
by the people of Texas or by the people of the
United States. The application of the principle
of self-determination in the Congo without any
qualification would mean the creation of some
20 tribal states and the disintegration of the
•whole into disorder and chaos.
Second, even according to the standards of
iself-deterraination, Tshombe could not pretend
to speak for the Katanga. As you know, he
was the leader of the Lunda tribe, one of sev-
eral tribes in Katanga. The Lundas are a mi-
nority in numbers and occupy less than half of
the land area of Katanga. Tshombe is strongly
opposed by the Baluba tribe in the north. In the
only popular election in Katanga his party
gained only 25 seats in a 60-seat Assembly.
Tlie parliamentary group which supported him
during the last 2 years was a rump parliament
lacking full Baluba representation. We may
also note that the United Nations forces were
greeted with open arms when they entered
Jadotville and Kolwezi in the heart of
Tshombe's tribal area.
Third, Tshombe was stopped from pleading
the principle of self-determination when he
agreed to accept a single Congolese state. He
did this at the Brussels roundtable conference
of Januai-y 1960 before the Belgians left. He
has done it on numerous occasions since. He did
it as recently as last fall, when he accepted the
conciliation plan of the United Nations.
There are people who will concede all these
things but say: Very well, but where will this
United Nations business stop ? Isn't the Congo
a precedent for the U.N. going into Mississippi ?
The answer is no again, for three reasons :
First, we would not ask the United Nations
to come into Mississippi.
Second, if others insisted on bringing the
U.N. into Mississippi, we could prevent this
from getting the necessary votes.
Third, by no stretch of the imagination can
the situation in Mississippi be regarded as a
threat to international peace and security.
Finally, there are those who are satisfied on
these legal and moral questions but ask:
Wouldn't our national interest have been served
better by supporting Tshombe ? The answer is
no, because :
— The Central Government under Adoula is
moderate and pro-Western.
— Tshombe supporters have been working
with the leftists to destroy the Central Govern-
ment.
— Tshombe had no support in Black Africa
and very little anywhere else. No country has
ever recognized Katanga separatism.
— The secession of Katanga under Tshombe
would have ended moderate government in the
Congo and would have precipitated the disinte-
gration of the country into tribal groupings
with maximum opportunity for the Commu-
nists to come in.
In short, the efforts of Tshombe to set up a
separate regime in Katanga played into the
hands of connnunism.
Now the military phase of the U.N. Operation
in the Congo has passed. The phase of nation
building has begun. A U.S. mission to the
APRIL 1, 1963
479
Congo under Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Sec-
retary of State for International Organization
Affairs, has just returned with proposals for
the economic reconstruction of the Congo under
U.N. auspices." In the economic tasks ahead
for the Congo the United Nations can play a
role which no single nation covild play alone
without compromising Congolese independence
and making the Congo a subject of cold-war
controversy.
U.S. Position on U.N. Special Fund
The moral of this story is not that the United
Nations is perfect. Indeed, there are a nmnber
of things that are done at the U.N. with wliich
we do not agree. During the last 2 weeks we
have had a dramatic illustration of this in the
decision of the U.N. Special Fund to proceed —
albeit on a tentative basis — with an agricultural
research project in Cuba.
This project was approved by the Governing
Council of the Special Fund in May 1961. It
calls for an allocation of $1,157,000 from the
Special Ftmd to assist in the expansion of an
agricultural experimental station in Santiago
de las Vegas.
The United States Government did every-
thing consistent with the U.N. Charter to oppose
this project.' We oppose any source of aid and
comfort to the Castro regime. We argued that
Special Fund assistance to Cuba at this time
could not be justified under the economic and
teclmical criteria of the Special Fimd's charter,
in view of the chaos in Cuban agriculture which
has resulted from the application of Communist
techniques and the subordination of the eco-
nomic and social welfare of the Cuban people to
the narrow political aims of the Castro i-egime.
Our arguments, I am sorry to say, did not
receive the necessaiy support in the Governing
Council. Mr. Paul Hoffman, the Managing
Director of the Fund, concluded that he had no
choice but to proceed with the project on a
tentative basis. In the next few months he
will send several experts to determine wliether
" For a summary of U.S. recommendations for a pro-
gram of international assistance to the Congo, see
p. 481.
' For statements by Secretary Rusk and Mr. Gard-
ner regarding the U.S. position on the project, see
Bulletin of Mar. 11, 1963, p. 357.
or not conditions in Cuba will permit the project
to proceed, and it is possible that the actual
operation of the project will not go forward
when representatives of the Fmid have the
opportunity to take an up-to-date reading of
conditions on the spot.
The Special Fund project in Cuba is an
example of a U.N. action with which we do
not agree. But it is well in these matters to
keep our eyes on the big picture. The Special
Fimd, like all U.N. economic agencies, is pro-
hibited by its charter from making decisions on
political groimds. The failure of other U.N.
members to support us in our opposition to the
Cuban project came not out of any solicitude
for Cuba but out of the fear that stopping this
project would jeopardize other projects to
whicli the Soviet Union and other countries
have objected. The Special Fund has 11 proj-
ects, totaling $7.5 million, in Korea, Viet-Nam,
and free China which the Soviets do not like —
and which are being carried out today despite
their misgivings.
The fact is that the U.N. Special Fund has
been a great asset to the free world through its
efforts to promote the material basis for free
institutions. Even on the narrowest of politi-
cal calculations the free world has got more out
of the Special Fund than it has put in, wliile
the reverse is true of the Communist bloc. The
bloc coimtries have contributed some $7 million
to the Special Fund ; witli this project in Cuba
added to two previous projects in Poland they
will have received $3 million in return. If you
add Yugoslavia, Communist contributions add
up to $8 million, projects in Communist coun-
tries to $6 million. Out of the 288 Special
Fund projects so far authorized, 282 have been
in non-Communist countries. In financial
terms, some $248 million of the grand total of
$254 million of Fund projects — over 97 per-
cent — go to the non-Communist world.
It would be tragic if our dissatisfaction with
the project in Cuba were to destroy our support
for the Special Fund. It would be the height
of folly to sacrifice the 97 percent of its work
we do like for the 3 percent we do not like. We
do not bench a baseball player who is batting
.970 nor fire a football coach because he loses
1 game in 30.
i.
480
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The price of participating in any political
institution is that you caiuiot get your way all
of the time. We cannot expect to get our way
all of the time in the United Nations. There
will be entries on the debit as well as on the
credit side of the ledger. The central question
is wliether the credits exceed the debits —
whetlier, looking at the balance sheet as a whole,
the institution is making a net contribution to
our national interest. The United States Gov-
ernment continues to believe that the answer
to tliat question is overwhelmingly in the
affirmative.
Need To Strengthen the U.N.
Let me stress once again, however, that we
are not entirely satisfied with the United
Nations. We want to make it tetter.
In specific terms, we want to :
— Strengthen the independence of the Secre-
tariat against the attacks of the Soviet Union,
who have never accepted article 100 in prin-
ciple or in practice.
— Improve the method of financing peace-
keeping operations and make defaulting mem-
bers pay up.'
— Increase the efficiency of the U.N.'s eco-
nomic and social work, particularly through
more effective coordination of the specialized
agencies.
— Strengthen the U.N.'s capacity to settle fu-
ture disputes: first, through preventive diplo-
macy to keep disputes from erupting into vio-
lence ; and second, through peacekeeping actions
to contain those disputes from widening into a
global conflict.
In this last ambition we must learn from the
Congo experience to strengthen the U.N.'s fu-
ture peacekeeping operations. We must
improve the training, supply, financing, intelli-
gence, public relations, and command and con-
trol of U.N. military operations.
We want to do these latter things not only
for their own sake but as a means of promoting
general and complete disarmament. For the
fact is that nations will never be willing to elim-
' For a statement released by the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations on Mar. 6, see xbii.. Mar. 25, 1963,
p. 44.3.
inate or even radically reduce their arms imtil
they have some substitute means of protecting
their territorial integrity and defending their
vital interests.
In an age when the Soviet Union and the
United States have in tlieir arsenals weapons
each of which has tlie destructive power of all
the bombs dropped in the Second World War,
in an age when we face the prospect that no
matter how many weapons one side might build
neither side could escape unimaginable destruc-
tion in a nuclear holocaust — in such an age there
is no rational alternative but to develop a civi-
lized system of collective security under the
aegis of the United Nations.
In Cuba, in the Congo, and elsewhere the
United Nations has acted— in the words of a
distinguished commentator— not as a world
superstate but as a world public utility. If it
did not exist, it would have to be invented.
Summary of U.S. Recommendations
for Program of Aid to the Congo
In current discussions with the Government
of the Republic of the Congo, officials of the
United Nations, and other interested countries,
the United States is considering the question
of future forms of assistance to the Congo. On
February 21 Secretary Rusk submitted to Presi-
dent Kennedy a report on U.S. recommenda-
tions for a program of international assistance
to the Congo prepared by a planning group
headed by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secre-
tary for International Organization Affairs.
Folloicing is a summary of the report, which
was released by the Department on March 1
{press release 109) .
The Congo is a paradox: staggering prob-
lems in tlie present, and impressive prospects in
the future.
The United Nations has already made a very
great contribution to the future. There is a
large reservoir of good will toward the United
States, the product of our general African pol-
icy, our support of the United Nations and the
Central Government in Leopoldville, and our
close working relations witli other governments
APRIL 1, 1963
679357—63-
481
interested in the Congo's welfare in spite of pol-
icy dififerences from time to time. The Congo
has maintained its independence despite efforts
of subversion and secession. Such threats con-
tinue, but, on balance, the Congo is going the
way of free choice and not coercion ; we should
not neglect the next necessary steps to help it
stay on that course.
As it enters the nation-building phase of its
young life, the Republic of the Congo appears
to face three key obstacles to progress:
• A political system which is in the develop-
ing stage and requires increased executive
powers and the capability to discharge such
responsibility ;
• A relatively expensive military establish-
ment that does not yet function in full response
to the country's needs ;
• A financial administration which collects
too little revenue and does not yet have depend-
able budgetary controls.
More than on external aid, success of a na-
tion-building effort in the Congo depends on
developing the administrative capacity to reha-
bilitate the national army, bring the fiscal sys-
tem under control, and construct a political
system featuring a strong executive. If these
prerequisites can be met, the Congo should no
longer require substantial outside aid in a few
years' time, for its resources are great and its
population relatively small.
II.
The relevant portions of the U Thant Plan ^
for national reconciliation have been largely
fulfilled and partly bypassed by the events of
December 1962 and January 1963.
What is needed now is an agenda for nation-
building in the Congo, including as one part
the knotting of the loose ends of Katanga's
reintegration.
One point of the U Thant Plan which awaits
further action is the constitution. But a new,
Federal Constitution for the Congo will nec-
essarily depend on the parliamentary situation.
Meanwhile, a de facto federalism is actually
developing in the Congo.
• An executive amnesty for political crimes
has already been announced for Tshombe
[Moise Tshombe, President of Katanga Prov-
ince] and his colleagues :
• The integration of the currency is well un-
der way and can be speeded up ;
• Parts of the Katangan gendarmerie are
being integrated by unit or individual applica-
tions to the ANC ;
• Katanga's "foreign affairs" establishment
is to be formally disestablished ; and
• Arrangements to bring the Conakat Party
into the Central Government are being con-
sidered.
III.
One of the most critical tasks facing the
Congo is to bring military expenditures under
control and to raise the Congolese National
Army (ANC) to a higher degree of efficiency
and discipline. Plans already suggested for
a multinational training program based on a
reduced but more effective army, plus an ade-
quate air and naval capability, offer excellent
prospects if they can be put into effect.
Multinational assistance to the Congolese
Government in the military field should be co-
ordinated imder an acceptable arrangement be-
tween the Congolese Government, the United
Nations and the nations concerned. This will
permit the establisliment of a national military
aid pattern allowing several countries to help.
Our own assistance, if requested, would pri-
marily take the form of logistics support.
A civic action survey is needed to help plan
an economic development role for the ANC
and to consider how discharged veterans might
best be employed.
The Congolese Government's desire to assure
its authority in Katanga against the day when
the United Nations will be pulled out must be
met.
Tlie requirements of a training program for
provincial and municipal police are being given
urgent consideration. It is encouraging that
offers of assistance have also been forthcoming
for this task.
United States policy favors the most rapid
possible phase-out of the ONUC [United
' For text, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add. 13 (annex I)
and Corr. 1.
482
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULOiTIlT
Nations Operation in the Congo] Force con-
sistent with the increasing capability of the
Congolese Government to maintam minimum
levels of security and insure its national integ-
rity. It would, however, be dangerous to phase
out the ONUC Force so rapidly as to leave an
"internal security gap" before the adequate
national security forces are trained, for in-
security in the Congo would invite unaccepta-
ble foreign intervention.
IV.
I Domestic harmony in the Congo nation will
' crucially depend this year on the value of the
money in which soldiers are paid and the pro-
vincial governments are financed. Just as you
cannot do business without ensuring internal
security, you cannot have gi'owth without
soimd money.
In spite of growing production and rising
exports, the Congo suffers from severe inflation.
The actual market value of Congolese currency
is about one-fourth the legal rate.
A well-financed, well-coordinated and well-
staffed stabilization program including effec-
tive budgetary procedures, spending controls,
tax collection and differential exchange rates is
required. Unless this is done, the Congo may
be faced with rvmaway inflation. The addi-
tional requirement is to obtain enough external
I resources to maintain minimum levels of essen-
tial imports, finance necessary expatriate tech-
nicians, and service the external debt.
To move toward stabilization, the Congo will
require :
• A strong administration in the Ministry
of Finance and provision for this purpose of
a substantial number of foreign technicians to
assist in the Ministry of Finance;
• Husbanding of military expenditures ;
• A special effort to make the most effective
use of the sums available for education ;
• Assurance through foreign aid of a mini-
mum level of essential imports. This should
help to meet the inflation problem.
• Launching a public works program to re-
duce unemployment, rehabilitate the vital
transportation network, and build constructive
ties between the Central Government and pro-
vincial and local governments.
Other nations caji do much, and we should
encourage them to do more.
The Belgians already support 2,000 techni-
cians, teachers, judges, and public administra-
tors. They also will be continuing to make
other payments, including the service on Con-
golese debts.
Belgian assistance in the financing of im-
ports would be an important contribution, and
we hope substantial assistance of this kind will
be made available.
We expect that the United Kingdom and the
Federal Republic of Germany will also wish to
participate in assisting the Congo. The eco-
nomic development fimd of the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) may provide sub-
stantial assistance over the next few years.
A dozen other countries are potential small
contributors to a plan for nation-building in
the Congo. The nation-building effort can be
particularly stimulated by contributions from
non-European countries.
The United States should endeavor to :
• Continue P.L. 480 food sales as required to
assist the supply of food to the Congo.
Although some direct aid will be required to
finance imports, we can aim at putting a
rapidly increasing portion of this aid on a loan
basis, in view of the basically strong potential
of the Congolese economy. Loans will be
especially appropriate for equipment and spare
parts in the transportation sector.
• Continue support of the United Nations
Congo Fund but shift the emphasis to such pri-
ority sectors as public financing, and try to as-
sure that other donors finance at least half of
the fund ;
• Secure adequate assurances about the
spending of aid-generated local currencies
available for economic development, public
works and budget support, and their use in
support of a vigorous stabilization strategy ;
• Continue a Development Grant program
operated under the United Nations umbrella
and reoriented to emphasize activities directly
in support of stabilization and internal security
objectives.
483
VI.
The presence in the Congo's future of several
large contributors, and several additional
smaller ones, requires the multilateral coordi-
nation of bilateral efforts, both in retraining
the ANC and in stabilizing and developing the
Congolese economy.
A competition of purely bilateral aid is not
only inefficient but risks importing the Cold
War into the Congo. A creative combination
of bilateral aid and multilateral coordination
is what is needed to conduct an effective, well-
integrated program.
The United Nations should provide the
Central Government with direct technical aid
in the areas of greatest national importance —
that is, in internal security matters, tlie control
of foreign exchange, the coordination of ex-
ternal aid and the administration of the public
finances.
We should lielp the United Nations to find
additional liigh-level talent for these purposes.
The technical work done by Specialized
Agency teams in education, health, food and
agriculture, manpower training, meteorology,
telecommunications and airport management is
useful, and generally of good quality and high
repute. The United Nations Secretariat should
continue to take the responsibility for the su-
pervision and the coordination of these activi-
ties in the field. But they should be mcreasingly
funded after 1963 from the Special Fund, the
Expanded Teclmical Assistance Program, or
the Specialized Agencies' budgets themselves.
We imderstand it is the desire of the Gov-
ernment of the Congo that the United Nations
should serve as general coordinator for all bi-
lateral aid to the Congo's economic develop-
ment. This role will involve :
(a) providing top personnel to help the Gov-
ernment of the Congo coordinate external aid
from all sources for all purposes ;
(b) reviewing each proposed bilateral pro-
gram to make sure that it fits within a frame-
work agreed between the Government of the
Congo and the United Nations; and
(c) participating directly in decisions about
the use of some important development aid, as
is now the case in the allocation of local cur-
rency generated from P.L. 480 imports.
The contributors to the reconstruction task
in the Congo should consult on the types of aid
needed in assuring a rational and fair distri-
bution of the assistance effort.
The question of the future financing of the
United Nations peace-keeping activities in the
Congo is being considered in the Committee of
21 ^ and is not being treated in this paper.
It is our hope that the maximum number of
countries wiU find it possible to assist the Ee-
public of the Congo as it enters the important
nation-building phase of its development.
Secretary Rusk To Head U.S.
Delegation to CENTO Meeting
The Department of State announced on
March 13 (press release 131) that Secretary
Rusk will head the U.S. observer delegation to
the 11th meeting of the Ministerial Coimcil of
the Central Treaty Organization, to be held at
Karachi, Pakistan, April 30-May 1. En route
the Secretary will make brief visits in Ankara
and Tehran for talks with government leaders.
Following the CENTO Council meeting Secre-
taiy Rusk will pay a brief visit to New Delhi
prior to his return to the United States.
' For text of a General Assembly resolution on financ-
ing peacekeeping operations, see Bulletin of Jan. 7,
19G3, p. 37 ; for a U.S. statement of Mar. 6, see ihid.,^
Mar. 25, 19G3, p. 443.
484
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
U.S. Efforts To Achieve Safeguarded Test Ban Treaty
Statement by Secretary Busk ^
Mr. Chairman, I am very glad to have this
opportunity to talk with the committee today
ibout a most important aspect of our foreign
policy, our long-continued effort to achieve
agreement on a safeguarded nuclear test ban
treaty.
Since the simmier of 1958 the United States
Government has consistently adhered to the
eiew that a safeguarded cessation of nuclear
(veapons testing would be in our national in-
:erest. Periodic policy reviews in the light of
shifting patterns of foreign policy, of changes
:n the negotiating situation, and of teclinical
ievelopments have always produced the same
i«nswer: that an effective test ban treaty is in
our national interest.
Indeed, it is worth recalling that in 1945-46,
Ht the very birth of the nuclear age, it was
jlearly perceived that a nuclear arms race
would ci-eate the greatest dangers for all man-
kind. Consequently, President Triunan di-
rected the most serious and diligent effort to
prevent such a race by bringing atomic energy
under international control. Unhappily, the
Baruch proposals did not succeed.
Today, I would like to discuss a nuclear test
ban with you from the standpoint of our rela-
tions with the Soviet bloc and with countries
outside the bloc, including our allies. I would
also like to discuss what I believe to be the basic
requirements for a nuclear test ban treaty to be
effective. For it is clear that an illusory set of
obligations on this sensitive subject ought never
to be entered into by the United States.
' Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee on Mar. 11.
In my judgment, the conclusion of an effec-
tive nuclear test ban treaty would have three
advantages of primary importance in our rela-
tions with the Soviet Union.
First, a nuclear test ban treaty would consti-
tute a significant step in the direction of slack-
ening the pace of the arms race. Once this step
had been taken with satisfactory results, new
opportimities for further steps toward turning
the arms race downward might well be more
within the realm of reality than at present.
For the past 16 years during which the cold
war has been waged we have experienced the
effect of an almost unlimited arms race on our
national security and on our position in relation
to the Soviet Union in the world arena.
Although our position has been preserved and
Communist aggression has been effectively de-
terred to a large extent by the buildup and
deployment of our militxiry forces, our security
in that position has not necessarily been im-
proved. Indeed, our military position might
well be more secure today if we had success-
fully achieved agreement on a test ban treaty
several years ago, earlier in the negotiations.
Because of the extensive history of past
negotiations on this particular question, the
narrowing of the issues that has resulted from
these negotiations, and the worldwide interest,
I believe that this problem may be more ripe for
solution than perhaps any other first step in the
arms control and disarmament field. It is clear
that unless at some point we are able to step off
in a new direction, the upward spiral of the
arms race will continue unabated. The pros-
pects of such a future for both ourselves and
the Soviet Union are not attractive.
APRIL 1, 1963
485
f
Second, an effective nuclear test ban treaty
would be to the military advantage of the
United States. At the present time we feel con-
fident in our nuclear capabilities. We have
today a stockpile of nuclear 'weapons which
ranges from a few tens of tons of TNT equiva-
lent to many megatons. These weapons are
useful for a variety of strategic and tactical
uses. The Soviet Union has a stockpile of its
own. In certain areas of the spectrum of ex-
plosive power, namely the extremely large
yields, the Soviets have developed weapons for
which I am informed we do not have a present
military requirement. In other areas, namely
in the development of intermediate and lower
yield weapons, we believe that we have a more
varied arsenal than the Soviet Union. The
President and his chief national security ad-
visers, including myself and the Secretary of
Defense, believe it doubtful that either side
would, through further testing, achieve major
advances in any significant area which could be
translated into a military advantage without
the other side making either a similar or off-
setting gain.
There is one proposition which we must keep
in mind despite confidence and understandable
national pride: Nature does not yield up its
secrets with political favoritism. The list of
Nobel Prize winners in the sciences over the
past half century shows that major break-
throughs in knowledge come from many direc-
tions and have little to do with national fron-
tiers. If our present assessment of the military
situation is correct, and I believe it is, now
would be an opportune time from our point of
view for the conclusion of a treaty to halt
further nuclear weapon testing.
The thh-d primary advantage of an effective
nuclear test ban treaty to the United States in
relation to the Soviet bloc is a political one.
I have repeatedly emphasized in my public
statements in the United States and at the
Geneva disarmament conference, and in previ-
ous statements before this committee, my con-
viction that disarmament and secrecy are
incompatible. The Soviet Union has reasons
of its own for its penchant for secrecy. Re-
gardless of the merits of their case, however,
it is clear that a closed society breeds suspicion
and distrust on the part of other nations. Such
an atmosphere is not conducive to taking steps
to treat the symptoms of international tensions
or to come to grips with the causes of these
tensions.
A nuclear test ban treaty would obviously not
lift the veil of secrecy from the Soviet Union.
It would not even result in any substantial
opening up of Soviet society. It could, how-
ever, have a veiy important impact on the So-
viet attitude toward secrecy, especially as it
relates to problems of arms control and dis-
armament. The carrying out of on-site inspec-
tions on Soviet territory would provide the
United States with not only the necessary assur-
ance that unidentified seismic signals were not
imdergroimd nuclear explosions but also addi-
tional advantages. If a test ban treaty can op-
erate effectively and in ways which demonstrate
that the inspection connected with it does not
jeopardize Soviet security or result in any par-
ticular embarrassments to the Soviet Union and
its people, then the Soviet leadership may be
more inclined to enter into other similar agree-
ments. The first step seems to be the most dif-
ficult. If it can be made successfully then fur-
ther steps in the same direction might be taken
with less difficulty than the first.
Therefore, in our relations with the Soviet
Union I believe that a nuclear test ban treaty
would have both political and military advan-
tages. In addition, an effective nuclear test ban
would have advantages in our relations with
countries outside the Soviet bloc.
Danger of Spread of Nuclear Weapons f
Among the dangers to the United States from
continued testing by both sides I would con-
sider the danger of the further spread of nu-
clear weapons to other countries of perhaps
primary importance. Unlimited testing by
both the United States and the Soviet Union
would substantially increase the likelihood that
more and more nations would seek the dubious,
but what some might consider prestigious, dis-
tinction of membership in the nuclear club.
The risks to the security of the free world from
nuclear capabilities coming within the grasp
of governments substantially less stable than
either the United States or the Soviet Union
are grave indeed.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
A test ban would not of itself solve the prob-
s of proliferation of nuclear weapons. It
lould be recognized that at least one present
luclear power and one power apparently bent
developing nuclear weapons might not be
lersuaded to subscribe to the test ban treaty
rom the outset. However, many potential nu-
lear powers might at this stage be induced to
ci'cde to the treaty.
Moreover, a nuclear test ban could lead to
urther steps which would deal more directly
rith the proliferation problem. I am referring
lere to the possibilty of an agreement on the
•ne hand by the nuclear powers not to transfer
oiitrol of weapons or to give assistance in
reapons development to coimtries not already
)0ssessing them and, on the other, by the non-
luclear powers not to produce or acquire
lUclear weapons of their own. Another possi-
)ility would be an agreement to halt further
)roduction of fissionable materials for use in
luclear weapons and to transfer agreed quan-
ities of such materials to peaceful uses. "VVliat
;hould be emphasized here is that while a nu-
clear test ban by no means offers a total solu-
ion, it would be a necessary first step.
Wliat I have just said is, I believe, applicable
)oth to the problem of the spread of nuclear
veapons outside the North Atlantic alliance
md to the problem of the development of ad-
iitional national nuclear capabilities by NATO
members. I believe that a nuclear test ban
>vould be fully consistent with the possibilities
for increased participation in the multilateral
control of nuclear forces dedicated to NATO
Dy our partners in the alliance.
Problem of Fallout
Of secondary, but nevertheless significant,
importance is the problem of radioactive fall-
out. In large part because of real or assumed
dangers from fallout, nuclear testing has be-
come a key political issue in a great many
countries around the world. Our relations
with those countries are sometimes adversely
affected when our tests produce fallout outside
our own borders. On the other hand, our ini-
tiatives in seeking a test ban agreement have
been well received by not only our allies but by
the uncommitted countries.
I have pointed out what I believe to be the
primary advantages to the United States in an
effective nuclear test ban treaty in terms of our
relations with the Soviet Union and with other
countries around the world. However, I would
like to make it clear that I believe there may
also be advantages to the Soviet Union in a
nuclear test ban.
A certain degree of mutuality of interest is
an obvious prerequisite for any agreement.
I have stated that an effective nuclear test ban
would be to the military advantage of the
United States. This should not exclude the
possibility that the Soviet Union could at the
same time have valid military reasons for enter-
ing into a nuclear test ban treaty with the in-
tention of carrying it out. The United States
and the Soviet Union have to date apparently
pursued somewhat different objectives in their
testing programs. This difference in emphasis
appears attributable to different strategic con-
cepts, as well as teclmological considerations.
Therefore, while we may be assured that our
own retaliatory capability in the event of
nuclear attack is sufficient to deter such an at-
tack, the Soviet Union could at the same time
believe that it has a sufficient nuclear capability
for its own security requirements without the
need of further testing. Similarly, the possi-
bility of the further spread of nuclear weapons
is a legitimate concern not only to ourselves
but to the Soviet Union as well.
What Makes a Test Ban Effective
I have thus far attempted to demonstrate why
and how an effective nuclear test ban treaty
would serve the foreign policy interests of the
United States. I would now like to address the
question of what makes a nuclear test ban treaty
effective.
Three requirements are, in my judgment,
basic to an effective nuclear test ban treaty.
First, the verification arrangements must
provide an adequate deterrent to violation on
the part of the Soviet Union. However, no
verification system, no matter how elaborate or
intrusive, could be foolproof. Therefore, the
second requirement of an effective treaty is that
the scope of any violation which might escape
detection must not be so extensive that it would
APRIL 1, 1963
487
substantially affect the military balance. Fi-
nally, a nuclear test ban treaty will be adhered
to only so long as a mutuality of interest in the
agreement persists. If the Soviet Union were
ever to conclude that a test ban were no longer
in its interests, we can be sure that the Soviet
leadership would not hesitate to abrogate the
treaty and resume testing. Therefore, an ef-
fective test ban treaty must not leave the
United States in a state of unpreparedness in
the event of a Soviet change of attitude.
In my opinion, our present test ban proposals
meet these three requirements for an effective
treaty.
Developments In Detection
Last week the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy held a series of illuminating hearings
on developments in the field of detection and
identification of nuclear explosions and their
relationship to the nuclear test ban negotiations.
These hearings explored in considerable depth
the scientific and technical basis for the present
United States position with respect to a nuclear
test ban. The efficacy of the technical un-
derpinning for our test ban proposals is cer-
tainly an important factor in determining the
overall effectiveness of a treaty based on these
proposals. However, the effectiveness of the
verification arrangements associated with a test
ban do not depend entirely upon numbers or lo-
cations of detection stations. Nor is any par-
ticular number of on-site inspections the key
to effectiveness. The verification arrangements
must be considered as a totality. The effective-
ness of the total system should be judged in the
light of the entire geographic, technical, mili-
tary, political, and economic environment in
which it would operate.
The increase in our technical ability to detect
seismic events at long distances permits us to
rely upon seismic stations outside the Soviet
Union to detect underground nuclear explosions
inside the Soviet Union. Moreover, a decrease
by a factor of 214 in a previous estimate of the
number of earthquakes of a given seismic mag-
nitude occurring annually in the Soviet Union
has enabled us to reduce the number of on-site
inspections on Soviet territory to seven. But
perhaps more important than a particular num-
ber of on-site inspections in determining its
effectiveness as a deterrent to cheating is the
manner in which an on-site inspection would be
carried out. Our present position with respect
to the number of on-site inspections which
would be acceptable to us has, therefore, been
very clearly stated by Mr. Foster ^ in discus-
sions with the Soviet representatives to be con-
ditional upon further agreement on such impor-
tant matters as the method of selecting partic-
ular earth tremors for inspection, the size and
composition of inspection teams, the area and
duration of search, and logistical arrangements.
Finally, an effort has been made to increase
the effectiveness of our present proposals over
previous positions by vesting control over the
installation and operation of the detection net-
work, and control over the carrying out of on-
site inspections in the Soviet Union, more com-
pletely in the hands of the United States and
United Kingdom. This has resulted in a pro-
posal for a simpler and more economical system.
It would also permit us to evaluate a greater
range of factors in determining whether the
Soviet Union was honoring its treaty obliga-
tions than would be the case under a treaty pro-
viding for more complete international opera-
tion and control of the verification system.
I will leave to officials of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency the discussion of the
details of this proposal. But it is the conclusion
of the President and his chief advisers in the
national security area that clandestine testing
which might escape detection, in spite of the
verification system, would not result in develop-
ments which would significantly alter the mili-
tary balance.
Finally, an annoimced national policy of
maintaining our readiness to test will minimize
the risks to the United States stemming from
the possibility of Soviet abrogation of the treaty
and an open resumption of testing. Indeed,
such a policy would be a deterrent to abrogation
and would reinforce the effectiveness of the
treaty itself.
' For a statement by William C. Foster, Director of
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, be-
fore the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at
Geneva on Feb. 12, see Bulletin of Mar. 18, 1963,
p. 398.
488
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
In conclusion, I believe that the cessation of
nuclear weapons tests would advance the inter-
ests of the foreign policy of the United States,
and that the present proposals of the United
States for a nuclear test ban provide a sound
basis for negotiation of an effective treaty. In
reaching this conclusion I am aware of the risks
involved in an undetected Soviet violation of
the treaty or its surprise abrogation. I am also
aware, however, of the graver risks to our
security and the security of the free world
implicit in a future without any multilateral re-
straint on the development of nuclear weapons.
In addition to the risks with and without a
test ban which must be carefully weighed
against each other, we should also consider the
opportunities created by taking a step in the
direction of controlling the arms race. I believe
that if these new opportunities are placed in
the scale, it will be tipped decisively in favor
of our present proposals for a ban on the fur-
ther testing of nuclear weapons.
A Nuclear Test Ban and Arms Control
by Jacob D. Beam
Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ■
We sometimes think our Agency should have
been called the Arms Control, Disarmament,
and Test Ban Agency, since the test ban ques-
tion seems to have been advertised much better
than other things we do. It may seem curious
that such a relatively small item on the dis-
armament agenda should loom so large. The
reason, of course, is evident: A nuclear test
ban has for years been the number-one possi-
bility for Soviet-United States agreement in
the field of arms control and disarmament.
Right now the chances for an agreement on a
nuclear test ban are perhaps relatively brighter
than anything else we can see on the horizon.
This capacity it has for hovering on the
brink of agreement has made the test ban an
issue on which passions run liigh. On the one
hand we hear criticism that we are losing our
nuclear shirts in the test ban negotiations. On
the other hand we hear that the United States
is not doing enough to produce an agreement.
In fact, it might be concluded that a lot of
people in the United States have strongly
"Address made before the Rochester Ad Club at
Rochester, N.Y., on Feb. 28.
held opinions, either for or against test ban,
and that notliing anyone can say will shake
that opinion. Despite this, I will attempt to
tell you why two successive administrations
have thought that a test ban is in the United
States' national interest.
I would like to begin by quoting a recent
statement by Secretary of Defense [Eobert S.]
McNamara made before the United States
Congress :
The expanding arsenals of nuclear weapons on both
sides of the Iron Curtain have created an extremely
dangerous situation not only for their possessors but
also for the entire world. As the arms race continues
and the weapons multiply and become more swift and
deadly, the possibility of a global catastrophe, either
by miscalculation or design, becomes ever more real.
This comment by the Secretary of Defense
states the dilemma of today's world quite
neatly. It is a hard but a basic lesson to learn,
and for me there is only one rational conclusion
to draw from it. We must find a way to begin
applying the brakes to this competition in ar-
maments. There are great risks in disarma-
ment. I personally, however, cannot accept the
view that more security is to be found in one
APRIL 1, 1963
489
of Herman Kahn's mythical "doomsday ma-
chines" — a wonderful device with which one
could eliminate the earth in one fell swoop.
The problems of putting a disarmament pro-
gram into effect are stupendous. We think it
can be done, and we are, of course, attempting
to negotiate a general disarmament agreement
right now with the Soviet Union at the Geneva
disarmament conference. It would Iielp a
great deal, however, if we could get the arms
control and disarmament process started with
some relatively simple first step. This is the
significance of the nuclear test ban question. It
is a relatively — I underscore relatively — simple
first step which would have some quite impor-
tant resHlts.
It is difficult to overestimate the effect on dis-
armament negotiations of one satisfactorily
operating arms control agreement between the
United States and the Soviet Union. This is
not saying that once the ice is broken with a
test ban agreement disarmament is just around
the corner. It should be easier, however, to
negotiate and put into effect other arms control
and disarmament agreements with the Soviet
Union if we have even one really satisfactory
arms control agreement in effect. No one ex-
pects the Soviets to give up overnight their
ideal of a Communist world led by Moscow.
Hostility between democracy and totalitarian-
ism will be a fact of life for a long time to
come. But there is also a mutual interest be-
tween the Communist and the free worlds in
seeing that a massive nuclear war does not
occur. Within this area of mutual interest we
hope there is room for arms control and dis-
armament agreements.
The situation seems to be a little like the
4-minute mile. For years this was something
everyone thought of as a goal but no one
could quite make it. Finally, when Roger
Bannister did break that mark, other runners
found that it was not so impossible after all,
and now a less than 4-minute mile is not
so uncommon. This analogy can be applied
with many reservations, of course, to the arms
control field, and this is why we think a test
ban may be most significant in the efl'ect it
would have in paving the way for other arms
control agreements.
Problem of Proliferation
There are other, more directly demonstrable,
reasons for a nuclear test ban. One involves
the effect a test ban would have in inhibiting
the spread of nuclear weapon capabilities.
There are only two major nuclear powers in
the world today, the United States and the
Soviet Union. As Walter Lippmann has put
it, the United States possesses something like
98 percent of the West's nuclear deterrent. Of
course, in the Communist world, the entire
nuclear weapon arsenal is in the hands of the
Kremlin.
This condition of polarity, while dangerous,
is better than some others. It is, we think, a
much more stable arrangement than one where
many nations would possess the individual
capability of exploding nuclear bombs. This
conclusion is not the result of distrust concern-
ing the ability of other nations to behave in a
responsible manner. Our conclusion is based
instead on simple mathematics. We think that
the larger the number of governments which
can independently control nuclear weapons, the
greater is the possibility that nuclear weapons
will be used in some local conflict. This, in
turn, could escalate into all-out war involving
the major powers.
The image of two scorpions in a bottle was
once coined to describe the situation in which
the United States and the Soviet Union found
themselves in the atomic age. This image is
distasteful enough, but the image of 10 or 20
scorpions inside a bottle is even worse.
So long as nuclear power remains essentially
polarized, Winston Churchill's hope that safety
may be the sturdy twin of danger may still hold
true. With a multiplication of nuclear powers
we cannot be so hopeful. The chances of an
irrational act, the chances of an accident, the
chances of some small conflict escalating into an
all-out nuclear exchange, the chances of miscal-
culation — all of these chances would increase
enormously. This analysis is the root of a long-
standing American policy against the spread
of nuclear weapon capabilities.
We regard a nuclear test ban as one method,
but only one method, of inhibiting the spread of
nuclear weapon capabilities. By itself, a test
ban wiU not prevent the spread of nuclear
490
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
weapons. But without a test ban, all other
efforts to limit nuclear weapon capabilities are
likely to be futile. The question, therefore, is
not whether a nuclear test ban is sufficient to
stop the further spread of nuclear weapons but
rather what other steps, in addition to a test
ban, should be taken to inhibit the spread of
auclear capabilities. This and previous ad-
ministrations have given earnest attention to
this question. One measure that would help
would be an agreement under which nations
possessing nuclear weapons would not trans-
fer control of such weapons to other countries,
ind nations not possessing nuclear weapons
would not seek to acquire them. We hope such
in agreement could be put into effect and the
30oner the better.
At this point I would like to say that our
jffort to establish a NATO nuclear force is
fully consistent with, and in fact complements,
jur effort to prevent the further spread of nu-
clear weapon capabilities. We envisage an ar-
rangement under which the members of NATO
would share with the United States control
3ver the use of nuclear weapons. We would
lot, however, transfer to any individual coun-
:ry within NATO the ability to control nuclear
weapons on a unilateral basis.
It is not possible to escape the question of our
illy, France, and of Moscow's ally. Communist
China, when one talks about the proliferation
problem. We are not able at this time to pre-
dict that either France or Communist China
will sign a test ban treaty. But neither do we
wish at this time to abandon our effort to pre-
vent the spread of nuclear weapons because of
uncertainty about the future action of France
and Communist China. This would be like
opening the bam door to make sure that the
horse is stolen.
Our effort, therefore, has been, first, to come
to an agreement with the Soviet Union and the
United Kingdom on a nuclear test ban treaty ;
and second, to attempt to bring all other im-
portant nations in the world into the treaty.
We think the treaty would be effective in
convincing most nations that they should not
embark upon a program of nuclear weapon ex-
perimentation. Many governments would pre-
fer not to construct nuclear weapons and nu-
clear weapon delivery systems if it were a
reasonable assumption that other nations of the
same power status would not build nuclear
weapons. So even if France and Communist
China failed initially to adhere to a test ban
treaty, we think a treaty concluded between the
major nuclear powers would offer some advan-
tage if it did nothing more than prevent or de-
lay the 10 or a dozen other potential nuclear
powers from acquiring a nuclear weapon
capability.
One further advantage in a test ban treaty,
and one which may be a byproduct and not a
principal reason for a test ban treaty, is the
effect it would have in eliminating radioactive
fallout. All scientists are agreed that any in-
crease in the general level of radioactivity in
the human environment is harmful to a greater
or lesser degree. If we can prevent a general
increase in background radioactivity, it is in
the interest of humanity that we do so. I think
that this is all that need be said on this point.
Needless to say, not everyone will assess the
advantages of a test ban treaty in the way just
stated. Many think the disadvantages out-
weigh the advantages. Most of the critics of a
test ban treaty have been responsible, and they
deserve a responsible reply.
Question of Verification
One objection is that the kind of verification
system we are discussing with the Soviet Union
is inadequate to verify that the Soviet Union
has indeed ended its nuclear tests. The critics
point out that at one time the United States
proposed 20 on-site inspections annually and
today we are talking about a smaller number
of inspections, and they argue that this means a
less than effective control system.
In response I would recall that President
Eisenhower in 1959 inaugurated a program to
improve the capabilities for detecting and iden-
tifying nuclear weapon test explosions. This
program was called Project VELA, and the
American taxpayers, through their Congress,
will have spent about $90 million when all of
the appropriated funds have been used. Be-
cause of this program, our capabilities for
detecting and identifying nuclear explosions
have improved over what they were in 1958.
APRIL 1, 1963
491
We once thought there would be several hun-
dred seismic events, wliicli could not be identi-
fied as earthqucakes, which might occur annually
in the Soviet Union. We now know that the
number of such imidentified events is much less
than we originally estimated. Consequently,
unless the number of on-site inspections we now
ask for is also less than we originally proposed,
we would be demanding more inspection than
we thought necessary in 1958. This is one rea-
son why we have been able to reduce our re-
quests for on-site inspections. We are happy
to call this a concession — but to scientific prog-
ress, not to the Soviet Union.
We have also found that our capabilities for
identifying earthquakes at great distances are
better than we thought they were in 1958 and
1959. We are examining new tecliniques which
appear to promise even better capabilities in
the future. In short, there is every reason to
think that our capabilities today are far better
than we assumed them to be a few years ago
and that these capabilities are likely to im-
prove over the years.
I would not like to convey the impression
that a determined cheater could not on occa-
sion outsmart the man who is attempting to
catch him. It is likely that in this game of
cops and robbers the robber, because he has by
definition the advantage of surprise, can, if
he goes to great lengths, occasionally fool the
cop. If, for example, the cheater constructed
a very large cave underground, or if he sent a
nuclear warhead millions of miles out into
space, he might succeed in detonating a nuclear
bomb without being caught.
But this kind of capability would not give
the Soviet Union a chance to make any substan-
tial inroads into the United States' nuclear lead.
The chances of the Soviet Union conducting a
series of tests which would remain undetected
are vanisliingly small. The probability that
the advantage to be gained from a single test
would be sufficient to make an attempted eva-
sion worth while is also vanishingly small.
So we firmly believe it is fair to conclude that
the verification system now proposed by the
United States will, in fact, serve as an effective
deterrent against any violation of a treaty. I
would add, incidentally, that we now envisage
a system which places primary reliance on our
own very good facilities for detecting nuclear
explosions in the Soviet Union. We would add
to what we get from those facilities the infor-
mation we can get from automatic seismic sta-
tions in Soviet territory and from stations on
the periphery of the Soviet Union. In addi-
tion, of course, we would make use of informa-
tion from the nationally manned stations in the
Soviet Union. Cap this system with the right
to make on-site inspections when we really get
worried about an event in Soviet territory,
and we would have workable, realistic, and
effective machinery for monitoring a nuclear
test ban agreement.
i
i^ii
Maintaining Scientific Momentum
Other opponents of a test ban treaty argue^ii
that the United States must maintain its sci-
entific momentum in the nuclear weapons field]
and that a test ban would spell the end of ouri
weapons laboratories. This is a problem. But
three things need to be said on this score. One
is that the United States intends to make it a
matter of national policy to keep its weapons
laboratories in being after a treaty is signed.
We expect to continue to do the maximum
amount of work that can be done on nuclear
weapons technology within our laboratories.!
We expect we can maintain a capability fon
years to come to resume testing on short notice.'
There are many developments in the nuclean
weapon field which can be explored in thel
laboratory.
Prototypes can be designed and put on thel
shelf for testing if a treaty should end. More-i
over, we would expect that the peaceful nuclearl
explosion program would continue, as it is now,l
with explosions for engineering and scientifit
purposes. We believe, therefore, that, givei
the patriotism and the dedication of our sci
entists and given a clear understanding o:
United States policy, we could hold together
our laboratories and even do useful work in
order to be ready should a treaty be abrogated
in the future.
A second thing should be said about this prob-
lem of scientific momentum. In our overall
nuclear deterrent capability we rely not only
on the nuclear warheads but importantly also
492
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIKl
)n the means of delivering these warheads.
3ur nuclear deterrent can be greatly improved
hrough further improvements in the accuracy
if missiles. In evaluating the effectiveness of
he weapons, there is an obvious trade-off be-
,ween the accuracy of missiles and tlie yield
)f the warhead : The more accurate the missile
s. the less yield you require to do the same job.
[n other words, we do not need to be frozen
n our capability to improve our overall nuclear
leterrent because a test ban is in effect.
Another objection to a test ban treaty is that
liere are important nuclear weapon develop-
aents which we must have before we stop test-
ng. There are developments, obviously, which
ould be made in the field of nuclear weapons,
jooking at this criticism in perspective, how-
■ver, one sees that what we are actually talking
bout when we talk about these predictable im-
)rovements represents a small margin of im-
)rovement in our present nuclear capabilities.
They would not significantly alter our ability to
lefend against incoming missiles. They would
lot significantly alter our ability to build a
ecure second-strike capability. And it is clear
hat if we and the Soviets do continue testing,
he Soviet Union will surely make these im-
)rovements too. We are, we believe, ahead of
he Soviet Union at the present time in overall
luclear weapon teclinology. If nuclear testing
s continued indefuiitely into the future, there is
10 reason to suppose that the Soviet Union
ould not ultimately equal the United States'
.chievements in nuclear teclinology.
This is the way of science : Nature's secrets
:an be discovered by competent scientists re-
gardless of their ideology.
It would not be too surprising if someone told
is that in 20 years we could blow up three-
luarters of the earth with a quarter-pound
)omb. This may be a little farfetched, but this
s the trend and not many people would argue
hat it is a good trend.
Secretary Eusk said the other day - that
. . . the purpose of a nuclear test ban would be to
;ry to impose some ceiling on a qualitative as well as
luantitative race which otherwise will extend into
he future, with increasingly massive resources con-
Tibuted to that race on both sides — the diversion of
resources from other great tasks. . . .
' BuiXETiN of Feb. 18, 1963, p. 235.
This is a succinct description of one important
purpose of a test ban. There is no comfort for
any of us in the continuation of an arms race.
This is, m essence, the reason why we simply
must try to make a start toward arms control
and disarmament. In today's world there is
not a direct relationship between the amis we
pile up and the safety we hope to gain from
these arms. We must find an alternative to
the present situation, an alternative in which
our efforts will, in fact, improve our secur-
ity and our well-being. We fimily believe
that so long as man's intelligence prevails over
his irrational instincts we will find an alterna-
tive; otherwise we will surely pass on into the
abyss of war in which, in the words of Pope
Pius XII, "There will be no song of victory,
only the inconsolable weeping of humanity,
which in desolation will gaze upon the catastro-
phe brought on by its own folly."
International Coffee Agreement, 1962
Statement by Under Secretary McGhee ^
My name is George C. McGhee, and I am the
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today to testify in behalf of the Inter-
national Coffee Agreement, which President
Kennedy transmitted to the Senate late in the
last session for its advice and consent to ratifi-
cation.- This agreement was signed in behalf
of the United States on September 28, 1962, by
Mr. W. Michael Blumenthal, the chairman of
the United States delegation to the United
Nations conference which negotiated the agree-
ment.^ The agreement has the full support of
the executive agencies, and I am here to respect-
fully request your favorable consideration.
In transmitting the agreement to President
Kennedy last October 2, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk stated that :
' Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee on Mar. 12 (press release 127).
- S. Ex. H. 87th Cong., 2d sess. ; for a statement by
President Kennedy, see Bulletin of Oct. 29, 1962,
p. 668.
'For background, see ibid., Aug. 6, 1962, p. 234;
Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667 ; and Feb. 11, 1963, p. 218.
APRIL 1, 1963
493
It is the Department's view that this agreement offers
the best prospect of arresting any further decline in
world coffee prices, thus helping to assure stability in
foreign-exchange earnings of coffee producers in some
35 developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America.
Mr. Chairman, the achievement of this ob-
jective -would be of great significance. In the
first jjlace coffee, during the past decade, was
the single most important agricultural com-
modity in world trade, with shipments valued
in many years at over $2 billion.
Secondly, coffee is the most important source
of export earnings of Latin America and of a
number of countries in Africa and elsewhere.
For example, in 1961 coffee exports from
Colombia accounted for 71 percent of all foreign
exchange earnings. For Guatemala and El
Salvador the corresponding figure was approxi-
mately 60 percent. For Brazil it was 51 per-
cent. In fact, about a quarter of the entire
export earnings of the 15 Latin American coffee-
exporting countries are derived from this one
commodity. Its significance to Africa, where
five countries obtain more than 40 percent of
their foreign exchange earnings from this
source, is equally great.
Thirdly, Mr. Chainnan, this agreement is of
great importance because in many areas of the
world coffee is produced by small farmers. It
is estimated that about 3 to 4 million farming
enterprises produce coffee in 70 different coun-
tries. The overwhelming majority of these
farms belong to small farmers, each cultivating
less than 5 acres of land. About half of all
coffee is produced by farmers with 5-75 acre
holdings. In Latin America coffee provides
direct employment for more than 12 million
persons, and we believe that this figure is in ex-
cess of 20 million in the world as a whole.
In view of the overwhelming importance of
coffee as a foreign exchange earner, it is clear
that the economic development of the countries
in Latin America and Africa is directly re-
lated to this single crop. It has been shown that
a decrease of 1 cent per pound for green coffee
means a decrease of about $50 million in the
foreign exchange receipts of the Latin Ameri-
can countries. Obviously the tremendous ef-
fort we are making under the Alliance for
Progress is endangered and the large sums ap-
propriated to assist economic development are i
canceled out to the extent that earnings from i
the principal export commodity fluctuate i
sharply or decrease steadily. Stability in
foreign exchange earnings can be the firm
foundation for our sustained efforts to help
these countries help themselves.
i
Coffee a World Trade Problem
Coffee has long been a troublesome commod-
ity in international trade. A number of inter-
national meetings were held on this subject
prior to World War II, with no results. When
European markets were closed and prices fell
drastically at the beginning of World War II,
the United States in 1940 joined 14 Latin
American countries in an inter- American cof-
fee agreement * to assure an equitable distribu-
tion of the United States market. That agree-
ment expired shortly after the war. The 1950's i
once again saw international discussions of the I
coffee problem brought on by sharp price in-
creases during some years and steadily declin-
ing price levels since 1955. It was not until the i
United States took the initiative in 1958 to set
up a Coffee Study Group here in Washington
that an organized effort by both producing and I
consuming countries to develop practical solu-
tions was possible.
Today the coffee problem is perhaps the most
acute example of the present difficulties in
world commodity markets. President Ken-
nedy recognized the importance of these prob- .
lems to the developing countries and has '
pledged United States support in the search for
adequate solutions. In March 1961, announc-
ing the Alliance for Progress, he said : °
. . . the United States is ready to cooperate in seri-
ous, case-by-case examinations of commodity market
problems. Frequent violent changes in commodity
prices seriously injure the economies of many Latin
American countries, draining their resources and
stultifying their growth. Together we must find
Ijractical methods of bringing an end to this pattern.
The International Coffee Agreement which
is before you for consideration represents the
culmination of about 2 years of effort to imple-
ment that policy. In view of its tremendous
' For text, see ibid., Nov. 30, 1940, p. 483.
" Ibid., Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.
494
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I
importance to the welfare of so many peoples,
cotfee deserved to be first in line for a sustained
effort to solve its problems and help assure an
end to the constant instability and price erosion
of recent years.
The initiative of the United States led ulti-
mately to the conclusion by the world's major
producing and consuming countries that a
world conference should be called in 1962 to
negotiate a world coffee agreement. This was
done at the United Nations in July-August
1962, at a conference attended by representa-
tives of 71 countries, 58 of which participated
actively in the negotiations. By the closing
date for signature — November 30, 1962 — 54
governments had signed the agreement. This
impressive number — a record for a commodity
agi-eement — is the best testimony that could lie
given to the tremendous importance producing
and consiuning countries alike attach to mak-
ing this agreement succeed. Eleven govern-
ments have already ratified the agreement or
formally signified their intention to do so. In
view of our preponderance in the coffee trade,
our ratification is essential before the agree-
ment can be put into effect.
I The objective of the agreement is to bring
about improved marketing conditions and thus
to create a climate in which the difficult prob-
lems of overproduction and burdensome stocks
may be attacked. This improvement and the
expected growth of consumption will bring
about a gradual increase in foreign exchange
earnings and thereby establish a stable base
from which to plan long-range economic de-
velopment programs. It also means that coun-
tries will no longer see their efforts, and sub-
stantial amounts of our aid, quickly offset by
falling prices for their principal foreign ex-
change earner.
I shall endeavor to summarize briefly the key
features of the agreement :
1. It provides for a system of export quotas,
which will be adjusted quarterly to the needs
of the market. Shipments of all coffee, in what-
ever form, are included in the quotas. Exports
to so-called new markets are carefully con-
trolled and limited.
2. Imix)rting countries like the United States
bring their moral support and administrative
machinery to bear on the problem to help
assure the effectiveness of the quota system.
Certificates of origin must accompany all
shipments. Import statistics will be quickly
provided and published. Imports from non-
members will be restricted, to prevent nonco-
operators from receiving the advantages of the
agreement without also sharing in the burden
of making it work.
3. Production will be brought under conti'ol.
Specific production targets will be assigned
each member and a timetable adopted for its
accomplisliment. Producing countries that do
not cooperate will not share in increasing con-
sumption. Importing countries will assist the
producing countries to shift out of coffee pro-
duction and to diversify their economies. An
intelligent stock policy will be identified for
each producing country.
4. Consumers will be protected, as will the
coffee trade. The specific price objective of the
agreement is to assure that the general level of
coffee prices does not decline below the general
level of coffee prices in 1962. If the agreement
works well coffee prices should firm up, but
the imdesirability of sharp rises in prices is
recognized and specific machinery provided to
deal with it.
5. An International Coffee Council is created
to administer the agreement and to provide a
multilateral forum devoted to solving problems
affecting the world's coffee industry.
We consider several provisions of this agree-
ment of considerable significance in that they
open the way for a concerted attack on the
roots of the coffee problem. I refer to those
provisions under which the exporting countries
undertalvc to adjust their production of coffee
in accordance with certain directives laid down
by the members of the agreement. It is pro-
vided that the Coffee Council, the administra-
tive body of the agreement, shall develop and
recommend production goals to each producing
country.
The Council establishes a timetable for the
accomplishment of these objectives, periodi-
cally reviews the progress being made, and has
the authority to deny increases in quota result-
ing from increasing consumption to any mem-
ber who is not complying with the directives
laid down. The Council also has the authority
APRIL 1, 1963
495
to establish a stock policy for each producer
which will complement its recommendations
with regard to desirable levels of production.
We believe that if the provisions of this agree-
ment with regard to production and stocks are
fully implemented so that overproduction can
be curbed and excessive stocks gradually elim-
inated, the world's worst commodity problem
will be on its way toward solution.
Consumer Protection Assured
The United States is the world's largest im-
porter of coffee, taking about half of all the
coffee entering world trade. Obviously we
should not consider participation in any agree-
ment that does not fully protect the interests
of our consmners. Quite naturally, consumers
want to know what the effect will be on coffee
prices in the United States. While we expect
the agreement to arrest the constant decline in
coffee prices, and to maintain them no lower
than at the general levels which prevailed in
1962, it is neither intended nor anticipated that
there will be substantial increases in coffee
prices to consumers in the United States.
There are several reasons outside tlie agree-
ment which argue against this, including the
tremendous stocks of coffee now held by Brazil,
Colombia, and others, and the fact that present
productive capacity everywhere is in excess of
any likely demand over tlie next 5 years.
Consumer protection against any miwar-
ranted price increases is also assured by a num-
ber of specific provisions in the agreement.
Probably the most important are the provisions
relating to the establishment and adjustment
of export quotas. Export quotas are intended
to control the amount of coffee that may be
made available to the market by the producing
countries during a given period, and thus they
directly influence the price. The agreement
provides that all decisions on the establishment
and adjustment of export quotas shall be taken
by a distributed two-thirds majority vote,
i.e. a concurrent two-thirds majority of the im-
porters and exporters voting separately. As
the United States has 400 votes and would re-
quire the support from only one other countiy
to exercise a veto, it assures us of a powerful
voice in decisions of the Council.
There are two other provisions that specifi-
cally recognize the vmdesirability of marked
changes in coffee prices for whatever reason
and provide for corrective action under voting
procedures which are easier to attain than the
standard procedure of a distributed two-thirds
majority.
In the unlikely event that unforeseeable cir-
cumstances might arise in the administration-
of the agreement which would operate against
the interests of our consumers or our coffee
trade, the United States could always withdraw
from the agreement. It is provided that any
government, after September 30, 1963, may
withdraw by giving written notice, such with-
drawal to be effective 90 days after notification.
It is clear, of course, that the agreement would
collapse without our participation.
I would add, Mr. Chairman, that the stated
price objective of the agreement, while in our
view realistic, is a modest one. The 1962 price
of Brazilian coffee averaged slightly less than
34 cents per pound, compared with 36.6 cents
in 1960 and 48.4 cents in 1958. The decline
in coffee prices began in 1954, when the severe
frost damage in Brazil resulted in historic highs
of close to 80 cents per pound.
Mr. Chaimian, at this point I wish to say that
the United States Government team that
worked toward this agreement over the past 2
years has had valuable support from the United
States coffee industry. The National Coffee As-
sociation, representing all major segments of
the industry, including importers, brokers, and
roasters, has shown unparalleled industrial
statesmanship in coming to the conclusion some
years ago that ruinously low coffee prices in
Latin America and elsewhere would not be in
their best interests or the wider interests of the
country at large. Accordingly, they appointed
a committee of long-time leaders in the coffee
industi-y to work with us as part of the team.
Their president, Mr. [Jack] McKieman, and
the other members of the Foreign Affairs Ad-
visory Committee of the National Coffee Asso-
ciation, participated as our advisers in the nego-
tiations and gave us valuable advice, assistance,
and support.
Should the International Coffee Agreement
receive your approval and the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, it would be the President's
496
DEPARTKENT OF STATE BULUITIN
itention to deposit an instrument of ratifica-
tion at the earliest possible date. We believe
'that it is liighly desirable to maintain the mo-
mentmu which has been generated internation-
ally if the agreement is to be of maximum
ell'ectiveness.
The obligations of the United States under
this agreement are very few. We must restrict
imports of coli'ee from nonparticipants, we must
require certificates of origin on all shipments,
and we must furnish statistics. These are vir-
tually all the obligations we undertake. To
allow us to carry out these obligations it will
be necessary for us to ask the Congress for
enabling legislation.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, participation in this
agreement will cost the United States Treasury
only a contribution limited to our pro rata share
of the administrative expenses of the agreement.
As we will have about 400 votes our share will
be 20 percent of the administrative budget.
There are no other financial commitments for
the United States involved in this agreement.
I wish to thank the committee for the atten-
tion you have given this rather long statement.
It is our considered judgment that participa-
tion in the International Coffee Agreement of
1962 is in the best national interests of the
United States, and therefore it is recommended
to you for favorable consideration.
The Trade Expansion Program
hy Philip H. Trezise
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^
The Trade Expansion Act ^ was passed last
'October by large bipartisan majorities in the
I Congress. It reflected, I believe, a national
recognition that our interests in the world, both
political and economic, required that the United
States Government be in a position to exercise
, leadership in world trade.
We were confronted then — and of course we
still are — by the development of a new trading
entity in Europe, the Common Market, repre-
senting the world's largest single international
trading unit. There was then mider active con-
sideration the association of the United King-
dom with the Continental members of the Com-
mon Market. If this had come to pass, the total
economic weight of the European grouping
1 Address made before the Second Florida World
Trade Conference at Jacksonville, Fla., on Mar. 8
(press release 118 dated Mar. 7).
" For an analysis of the act, see Btjixetin of Dec. 3,
1962, p. 847.
would have begun to approach that of the
United States itself.
Leaving aside the Common Market, how-
ever, we were also increasingly concerned about
the trade problems of the less developed coun-
tries. It has become more and more clear that
the problem in Latin America and Afi'ica and
Asia is one to be dealt with by aid and trade,
not by aid alone. We have seen that small
changes in prices of export crops can com-
pletely overbalance any conceivable vokmie of
grants and loans to some of the less developed
countries. There is no question but that we
must find waj^s to open markets and to increase
the trading opportunities for the less developed
coimtries if the problem of economic growth is
to be solved witliin measurable time.
Also, in considering the Trade Expansion
Act, the Congress and the administration and,
I believe, the American people had very much
in mind that our relationships with Canada,
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand were
APRIL 1, 196 3
497
f
linked to our trade with those countries. As
you know, the Trade Expansion Act inchides
the unconditional most-favored-nation clause,
which has been a feature of our trade policy
since the 1920's. We have consistently oper-
ated on the premise that the expansion of trade
would promote the prosperity and the political
well-being of the free-world community
generally.
Finally, it was recognized that our balance-
of-jjayments deficit, which has existed for a
number of years, could be reduced by an ex-
pansion of our international trade. We nor-
mally run a large surplus of exports over im-
ports. It is these earnings that have kept our
overall deficit within manageable proportions.
It was reasoned that a general ex]:)ansion of
trade would have the likely effect of increasing
the size of that surplus and making our inter-
national deficit problem considerably less
worrisome.
Plans for New Round of Tariff Negotiations
We have now had the act for about 5 months.
During that period the British negotiations
with the Common Market have broken down,
and there is no indication that they will be
resumed in the near future.
This development obviously has changed
somewhat the situation in which the Trade
Expansion Act will operate. The special
authority given to the President to negotiate
for the elimination of tariffs in certain cate-
gories of goods cannot as a practical matter
be used without British membership in the
Common Market.
The remaining negotiating authorities in the
act, however, remain a very substantial pack-
age. The President is still empowered to nego-
tiate for general tariff reductions of up to 50
percent, and he has special negotiating powers
with respect to very low tariffs and with re-
spect to tariffs on certain tropical products and
agricultural goods. The need for using these
bargaining powers is, if anything, greater than
ever. We cannot afford to abdicate our leader-
ship in expanding free-world trade, for other-
wise a drift toward the development of
restricted trading blocs might gain great
momentum.
Work is going forward, therefore, in prepa-
ration for a new round of tariff negotiations
based on the Trade Expansion Act. The
President has appointed a distinguished Amer-
ican, former Governor and former Seci'etary
of State Christian Herter, to direct these prep-
arations and to carry out the negotiations.^
A group of technical experts, representing
most of the trading countries of the world,
will begin work in Geneva on the 18th of this
month to draw up the bases for a general
multilateral negotiation to take place early in
1964. These experts will attempt to draw up
the rules and procedures under which a large-
scale tariff negotiation would take place, sub-
ject to approval by the governments concerned.
In May, we expect, there will be a meeting of
senior political officials from the countries
subscribing to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. These officials will consider
the work of the technical experts and will come
to a decision about the time and character of
a tariff round.
Meanwhile we will be preparing at home to
carry through the domestic procedures which
the Trade Expansion Act requires. A list of
commodities on which tariff reductions may be
made will be published, probably in the sum-
mer. Public hearings will be held and deter-
minations will be made as to what our eventual
negotiating package will be. All this will
involve exceedingly laborious and detailed
work. It is expected to take the full 6 months
provided by law. But we expect to be ready
on our part for a major
in 19G4.
tariff negotiation
Trade in Agricultural Commodities
It is quite clear that so far as future trade
negotiations are concerned a central and criti-
cal problem is going to be trade in agricultural
commodities.
Wliether we like it or not, practically every
country in the world puts agriculture into a
special categoiy. The free market seldom is j
allowed to operate fully. Support prices or
' For a statement made by Mr. Herter before the
heads of delegations to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development at Paris on Jan. 31, see
ibid., Feb. 25, 19(33, p. 298.
498
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
iicoine payment plans are widespread. Their
?xistence makes it politically and economically
iifficult to allow trade to flow normally.
Thus we find around the world a network
jf restrictions on international trade in a<;ricul-
Miral commodities. These include tarift's, but
other devices, such as quotas or even import
jmbargoes, are often the more important means
if protectionism. From the point of view of
he Avorld's agricultural exporters, of which the
United States is quantitatively the largest, a
:rade negotiation that did not give agricultural
rade a better chance to grow would be seriously
ieficient in content. The job, however, ob-
nouslj' is cut out for us, and we will do well
o recognize its difficulties and complexities.
In the Comnion Market our agricultural trade
falls into three more or less distinct categories
50 far as access is concerned. First, a very
substantial grouping — representing 35 percent
if our total exports to the Common Market —
s made up of items bound on the free list, led
ly cotton and soy beans. Second, there is the
category where conventional tarifl' bargaining
nay be possible and efi'ective, on such items as
"anned fruits and tobacco and, perhaps, fruits
ind vegetables. These tariffs in principle
.Tould be subject to negotiation and reduction,
ilthough on some items we would need assur-
mces that tariff concessions would not be nulli-
5ed in practice by the imposition of other
restrictions. Finally, there is the group of
igricultural goods that fall under the common
igricultural policy proper. This group in-
cludes among other things the grains, poultry,
md meats. The CAP sets up for these goods
a, complex system of minimum import prices
and sliding fees. In its ultimata effects the
system could be heavily or less heavily restric-
tive on imports, depending on its operation.
We shall have to negotiate on the CAP items
and do so in some relationship to the general
tariff talks. It is too early to be definitive
about what parts of the CAP will be negotiable
or in what ways we can best strengthen our
trade prospects. We shall be getting clarifica-
tion of these matters over the next few months,
however, and certainly before the tariff negoti-
ations proper have begun.
I wish to touch now on the existing illeeal
and unjustifiable restrictions which apply
primarily to trade m agriculture.
Restrictions Affecting U.S. Fruit Exports
These restrictions, which tend particularly
to affect our exports of fresh fruits and fruit
products to the United Kingdom and the Com-
mon Market countries, are not subject to tariff
bargaining on our part. In fact there is an
express prohibition in section 252 of the Trade
Expansion Act against offering concessions for
the purpose of getting unjustifiable import
restrictions reduced or eliminated. We pro-
pose rather to continue to press our case, based
on the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, through whatever means promise to be
most useful to get satisfactory redress.
We have undertaken negotiations with Italy
and France under article XXIII of the GATT.
This article permits us, subject to the approval
of the GATT membership, to withdraw trade
concessions in retaliation for violations of
GATT conxmitments. Our discussions with
Italy have been quite productive, with France
less so, thus far. We expect, however, to get
a satisfactory settlement in both cases.
The United Kingdom's restrictions on citrus
fruits and citrus products represent a special
Florida problem, as we are very well aware.
I suppose that no single commercial issue
between ourselves and the British has received
more attention or more high-level attention on
both sides of the Atlantic. The United King-
dom has pointed out, as you know, that it feels
a responsibility for protecting the West Indies
citrus industi-y. We have been sympathetic to
this argument, but we have not been sympa-
thetic to a protective system which has the
result of discriminating against the United
States in favor of all other suppliers, including
some that are not even members of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
We had examined a number of possible solu-
tions bilaterally but could not get to an under-
standing. Then, when the U.K. began its
negotiations for admission to the Common
Market, we looked to the prospect that the
British West Indies wovdd gain associate status
and thus get a form of preferential entry for
its citrus into the whole Common IMarket. At
APRIL 1, 1963
499
that point the West Indies problem would have
been solved and the discriminatory treatment
of American citras in the U.K. would have
been eliminated.
Now that the U.K.-EEC negotiations have
been suspended, we have a new situation. We
shall have to go back now to see if we cannot
find a solution, in the first Distance, through
bilateral discussions. As a matter of fact, we
have had this week in Washington some pre-
liminaiy exploration of the problem with sen-
ior officials of the U.K. Board of Trade.
Care Needed in Invoking Retaliatory Procedures
Let me say a word about retaliation as a
means for eliminating restrictions on our
foreign trade. As you know, the Congress has
given the President a variety of possible retalia-
tory responses to import restrictions burdening
our trade. There is no doubt about the feeling
of the Congress or about the mandate it has
given the President.
Essentially what we have are means for
bargaining. Like any bargaining weapons,
they need to be used with care and skill par-
ticularly as to timing. I suppose nobody would
deny that, once you actually invoke a retalia-
tory procedure, you have come to the end of
the road so far as your hopes for improving
your trade are concerned. This is not to say
that we should not or will not invoke the re-
taliatoi-y powers given to the President. For
one thing, we may find it necessary to demon-
strate that we are serious. But I would em-
phasize that a general resort to retaliation is not
something that any of us would wish to see come
about. It would mean not trade expansion but
trade contraction, and its effects on interna-
tional relations generally would be most un-
fortunate.
To conclude, we have a new and far-reaching
Trade Expansion Act which gives us the means
to undertake a new drive to expand free-world
trade. At this early point it is not possible to
predict what will happen under it. But the
need for expanding trade and for strengthening
the coromercial links between the free countries
has never been more acute. The logic of things
argues that strong leadership by the United
States will be successful.
01
If
f.
gitm
II
Mr. Manning Interviewed
on "News and Comment"
Following is the transcript of an interview
Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary foi
Public Affairs, by Howard K. Smith on the
American Broadcasting Oompany''s television
program ^^Howard K. Smith— News and Com\l
inent" on March 10.
Press release 122 dated March 8
Howard K. Smith: There have been a great
many protests about Government managemen
of news lately. Do you think there is a leg'"
mate basis for such protests?
Mr. Manning: Well, there certainly has beer!
a controversy in the papers, Mr. Smith. I don't |i.
think it has been a particularly fruitful or ex
tremely high-level controversy yet. Perhapi
as it goes a bit more, it is going on, we mighi
get a little clearer on what the vocabulary ii
and whether, indeed, the words that are ber'
used are accepted as having the same meaning
Management of the news, for example. It'
a question of putting— attempting to find somi
way in this complicated world to put some ordei
and coherence into what a national governmea
says or what its position is. Quit© a bit of ai
attempt is mider way, both in journalism and ii
the Government, to arrive at this coherence.
Q. Do you think ifs fair to say that there i
maivagement of news?
A. I think if the vocabulary, if the descrip
tion of management of news is used to defirn
this attempt to put some coherence, to make sun
that what this Government is expressing is J
position, is indeed the Government's position,
what tlie United States Government is propof
ing to do in a given circumstance is being oi
ganized in a way that leaves no mistake, eith(
in the minds of the American public or tl
many other audiences to which it is directed, \
that sense I think we would have chaos and a
very dangerous state of affairs without it.
Q. Now, some people have expressed the vieu
that the press ought to have unlimited access tc
the information on lohich policy is based. Dc
you believe that is an advisable policy?
A. One might have a bit of discussion about
500
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
liat we mean i^recisely by unlimited access, but
the spirit of that question I think it's a very
mple answer, yes.
Q. Is there ever a thn^, do yoxi thinl\ when a
n-cniment is justified in telling a falsehood to
€ press?
A. I don't thinlv a falsehood is necessary.
Q. Now, we know that everyone in Govem-
'.cnf is not of the same mind on the question of
■liking information available. As the State
epartment officer responsible for dealing with
X press, could you describe some of the con-
'4}ting viewpoints held by the different de-
irttnents?
A. Yes. It is the State Department that is
y province, as you know. But first, dealing
ith diplomacy, everybody knows that there is
the very nature of affairs a certain conflict
rtween the conduct of diplomacy in the ideal
nse and the practice of free and aggressive
lumalism. But it's precisely this sort of con-
foversy that this system of government was set
to resolve, without an impairment either of
le conduct of diplomacy or the function of a
ree press. The fact that the conflict exists, I
dnk, is ffoins: to be with us for a loufj time,
ut the fact that it can be resolved without im-
lirment. I think, has been proved by many,
any years of a free press dealing with more
id more complicated diplomatic and foreigii
)licy affairs in a way that is always, and I
link today more than ever, laying out the
sentials of those policies or proposals to the
ablic and to the world at large.
Q. Why do you thinh this issue of managed
^los has arisen? Is this administration
'uanaging'''' news more than the past ad-
ministrations?
A. Again in this sense of trying to in-
'■oduce some order into things, this has been
joing on — I have been a reporter for 27 years
nd an oiBcial of the Government for only one.
haven't experienced in my career as a jour-
alist a situation in wliich there wasn't always
le probability that you might have to go two
■r three places to be sure you're getting what
|ou are after. And I haven't experienced a
ituation in which a given person is not going
to put his particular tone of voice and his par-
ticular interpretation on events. But as a re-
porter I have always assumed, as I am sure you
have, that it's a part of my responsibility — or
was — to see that I got it in its right context.
Human bemgs being human are, as I say, going
to put their own mflection on things. But if
this is done for the purpose again of trying to
get the facts straight as the person in Govern-
ment thinks they are, that is one thing. But if
it is to be used for effecting purposes of dis-
tortion, I think it's deplorable, and if it exists —
and I honestly don't think it exists to any in-
tended or important degree in this administra-
tion — then I think it should be eliminated.
Q. Do you think the press in Washington is
suffering in any significant way from this sup-
pression of information by Government?
A. I spent a year involved — again I go back
to my own province in the State Department, in
which I think we produced, for a gi-oup of ex-
perienced journalists and Foreign Service offi-
cers, a mechanism for producing more news,
more information, not manufacturing it but
producing it, making it available and providing
more access to policy officials than I have known
to have existed in the State Department before,
and I think this can be very fairly said of the
Wliite House, of the Defense Department, and
of the other areas of the executive branch.
For example, in the course of this recent con-
troversy after Cuba, one of the most important
upshots of this within the State Department
was a delineation within the Department of
State of this question of the obligation of policy
officers — not just information persons — the obli-
gation of policy officers to talk directly with
reporters, have a dialog with them. This has
been put in writing as a part of the obligation
of policy officials, and to my concrete knowl-
edge it is being carried out very energetically
as an obligation.
Q. So you think there is more access to infor-
mation than in the pa.tt administrations?
A. There is certainly much more than when I
covered the State Department back after the
war, and I'm told by many of the journalists
who covered regularly that they feel there is
considerable more access.
PRTL 1, 1963
501
Q. Tell me, do you think ifs possible thai.
some parts of the press may he trying to con-
ceal their oton inadequacies hy hlaming the
Government for xoithholding n£wsf
A. Well, if you heard Senator [Everett]
Dirksen the other morning on television, when
asked to comment on the attributes of American
women — I might paraphrase him. I think
American reporters are the best in the world.
I think they are the most handsome in the
world. I think they are the most charming
in the world. And, really, for the most part
they are extremely good. There are gradations
of quality as there are in every profession, but
we have got the best press corps and the best
press. They have got great problems them-
selves of management. There are as many as
30 to 40 columns of news on foreign affairs
carried each day on the AP alone. It ta]i:es a
tremendous feat of management to winnow out
what's important and get that into the 4 to 8
columns of foreign news that are used in most
newspapers in this country, outside of two or
three big ones.
Q. Why has this question of news m,an^ge-
ment become such a conspicuous one noio?
A. Well, as you know, it has come up time
and again, in recent years, and even OA-er a
longer period than that, but the origin of this
recent controversy rose out of Cuba. There
really isn't much controversy as I have seen it
over this period of 5 to 7 days when the admin-
istration, after having clearly delineated to the
American public and to the world at large v>hat
its policy would be in the event of Soviet place-
ment of offensive weaponry in Cuba — there
wasn't much argument over the necessity and,
in fact, the success achieved by the privacy dur-
ing that period while the Government made up
its mind not only about the nature of this
threat but how to face it and how to deal with
it, before then laying out to the world at large,
including the enemy, what it is we are going
to do about it.
Then there was a period after that involving
certain movements, exchanges of very impor-
tant diplomatic notes that had a bearing on
whether this was going to succeed or not.
Again this represented occasional interludes
of the use of privacy to carry out a policy that
had been publicly delineated and publicly ad-
hered to and privately adliered to in every
way.
I thmk there is probably great agreement in
this country that, while we are all eager to know
everything that is going on, there are intervals
when if we know what an elected government
is clearly annoimcing it is intending to do, if W6H
know the means it's going to use, we will grant
it certain interludes in which to caiTy out those
stated objectives.
A working newspaperman, when worW-
shaking events are going on, naturally wants
to know everything he can about it. And he is [j
quite right to try to find out. A President or
a Cabinet officer, indeed a department of Gov-
ernment, has got a responsibility to do sonw
other things besides, for the success of that pol-
icy and the avoidance of a nuclear confronta-i
tion that might get a lot of people, or wholei
countries, decimated.
Q. But you said you havenH hod any pro-
tests about keeping it private or secret in those
intervals when the people knew what the gen-
eral aim teas.
A. First, there has been very little from any
quarter over that first very tense nuclear-con-
frontation week. The second week was also on«
of possible nuclear confrontation. There hai
been, and this is the origin for a lot of th(
reportorial complaints, but these really ar(
complaints over certain mechanical things an(
over certain intervals of timing. I don't th
that the case has been made for a case of pri
ciple. that is, in which the Government has beei
caught or can be indicted for the suppressioi
of information vital to the democratic procei
If this interval has been used to turn around
policy, something that had been explained
the public as something that had not been, the)
I tliink there would be room for indictment.|
This wasn't the case.
Q. You have no objection to the mejnhers on
the press seeing anybody in the State DepartA
ment?
A. None at all. As a matter of fact, any^
one that they can arrange to see, and when
they can't, we have got several people in tli
Department who are always ready to help theni
502
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIlf^
get tlie access. Every official can't see every with television commentators, with magazine
correspondent who wants to see him. They see writers, and indeed with many people represent-
an astonishing number, and they spend an ast on- ing relatively obscure comers of journalism,
ishing amount of time, from the Secretary of but who nevertheless have a case for a private
State on down, dealing with newspapermen, chance to interview a policymaking official.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings^
Scheduled April Through June 1963
GATT Special Group on Trade in Tropical Products Geneva Apr. 1-
World Meteorological Organization: 4th Congress Geneva Apr. 1-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 35th Session New York Apr. 2-
International Sugar Council: 13th Session London Apr. 3-
SEATO Council of Ministers: 8th Meeting Paris Apr. 8-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee: Rapporteurs on Utilization of Fly Ash . Geneva Apr. 8-
U.N. Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Terri- New York Apr. 15-
tories.
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Panamd Apr. 16-
ICAO Communications Division: Special Meeting To Prepare for Montreal Apr. 16-
ITU Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference.
Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: Geneva Apr. 17-
9th Session.
Intergovernmental Meeting on Tuna Conservation Panamd Apr. 18-
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 18th Session Geneva Apr. 18-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: New York Apr. 22-
Special Working Party.
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 22d Plenary Meeting . Bangalore Apr. 23-
NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 15th Meeting .... London Apr. 23-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Committee on Geneva Apr. 23-
Illicit Traffic.
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: Board of Di- Lima Apr. 24-
rectors.
U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission: 15th Session New York Apr. 24-
PAHO Executive Committee: 48th Meeting Washington Apr. 25-
lAEA International Conference on Draft Convention on Civil Lia- Vienna Apr. 29
bility, Land-Based Facilities.
IMCO Working Group on FaciUtation of International Travel and London Apr. 29-
Transport: 2d Session.
U.N. ECAFE WoiUng Party on Small-Scale Industries: 7th Ses- Bangkok Apr. 29-
sion.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: New York Apr. 29-
11th Session.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 18th Session . . . Geneva Apr. 29-
UNESCO Executive Board: 65th Session Paris Apr. 29-
ITU African Broadcasting Conference Geneva Apr. 29-
WMO Executive Committee: 15th Session Geneva Apr. 29-
CENTO Ministerial Council: nth Meeting Karachi Apr. 30-
U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 5th Session . . . Bangkok April
1 Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Mar. 14, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations:
CCIR, Comity consultatif international des radio communications; CCITT, ComitS consultatif international
telegraphique et telephonique; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food
and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic
Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO,
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO,
Pan American Health Organization; PIANC, Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses;
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organiza-
tion.
1963 503
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued
Scheduled April Through June 1963 — Continued
ILO Textiles Committee: 7th Session
9th Pan American Highway Congress
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America: 10th Session . . .
16th World Health Assembly
16th International Film Festival
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Industrial Development: 3d Session.
OECD Maritime Transport Committee
ICAO Meeting on Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Control Opera-
tions.
GATT Ministerial Meeting
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: Symposium on Peak Load
Coverage.
ITU CCITT/CCIR Plan Subcommittee for Development of the
International Network in Latin America.
NATO Ministerial Council
IMCO Council: 8th Session
U.N. ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the Conference on Trade
and Development.
2d Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference
ILO Governing Body: 155th Session (and its committees)
U.N. ECE Committee on Electric Power: Group of Experts for the
Study of Hydroelectric Resources in Europe.
IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability Problems . . .
WHO Executive Board: 32d Session
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries:
13th Meeting.
U.N. Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth
and Resources: 4th Session.
FAO World Food Congress
ITU Panel of Experts: 2d Meeting
International Labor Conference: 47th Session
U.N. ECE Housing Committee
CENTO Economic Experts
PIANC Permanent International Commission: Annual Meeting .
10th International Electronic, Nuclear and Motion Picture Exposi-
tion.
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 11th Session . .
13th International Film Festival
Antarctic Treaty: Meeting of Experts on Antarctic Communica-
tions.
ILO Governing Body: 156th Session
IAEA Board of Governors
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 30th Session
Geneva May 6-
Washington May 6-
Mar del Plata, Argentina. May 6-
Geneva May 7-
Cannes May 9-
New York May 13-
Paris May 14-
Montreal May 14-
Geneva May 16-
Venice May 20-
Bogotd, May 20-
Ottawa May 21-
London May 21-
Geneva May 21-
Mar del Plata, Argentina. May 22-
Geneva May 24-
Geneva May 27-
London May 27-
Geneva May 28-
Halifax May
New York May
Washington June 4-
Geneva June 4-
Geneva June 5-
Geneva June 5-
Ankara June 6-
Brussels June 11-
Rome June 15-
Geneva June 17-
Berlin June 21-
Washington June 24-
Geneva June 28-
Vienna June
New York June
s
TREATY INFORMATION
Curremt Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into
force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3878.
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, March 15, 1963.
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April
4, 1947. TIAS LTOl.
Adherence deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, March
14, 1963.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signa-
ture at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into
force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance: Ivory Coast, March 11,
19G3.
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary
Fund. Opened for signature at Washington Decem-
ber 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945.
TIAS 1.501.
Sir/nature and acceptance: Ivory Coast, March 11,
1963.
Articles of agreement of the International Finance
Corporation. Done at Washington May 25, 1955.
Entered into force July 20, 19.56. TIAS 3620.
Signature and acceptance: Ivory Coast, March 11,
1963.
Articles of agreement of the International Development
Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960.
504
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Entered iuto force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607.
Siynatiires and acceptances: Burma, November 5,
1002; Domiiiican Republic, November 16, 1962;
Ivory Coast, March 11, 1903 ; Nepal, March 6, 1963.
Si(!naliircs: Sierra Leoue aud Tanganyika, Septem-
ber 10, 1962.
Acceptances deposited: Sierra Leone, November 13,
1902 ; Tanganyika, November 6, 1962.
viarcotic Drugs
Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of
the poppy plant, the production of, international and
wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New
York June 23, 1953. Entered into force March 8,
1963. TIAS 5273.
Proclaimed ly the President: March 1, 1963.
'ostal Services
Dniversal postal convention with tinal protocol, innex,
regulations of execution, and provisions regarding
airmail, with final protocol. Done at Ottawa
October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959.
TIAS 4202.
Ratifications deposited: Dominican Republic,
December 28, 1962 ; Honduras, December 21, 1962 ;
Nepal, January 2, 1963.
ihipping
Ilonvention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6,
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS
4044.
Acceptance deposited: Syrian Arab Republic, Janu-
ary 28, 1963.
relecommunications
International telecommunication convention with six
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959.
Entered into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United
States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4S92.
Ratifications deposited: Kuwait, January 23, 1963;^
Laos, January 17, 1963.
Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the
international telecommunication convention, 1959.
Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into
force May 1, 1961 ; for the United States October 23,
1961. TIAS 4893.
Notifications of approval: Cameroon, January 19,
1963 ; Ivory Coast, December 28, 1962 ; = Kuwait,
January 9, 1963 ; Paraguay, January 30, 1963.
Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed
to the international telecommunication convention
of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with appendixes
and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29,
1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS
4390.
Notification of approval: Kuwait, January 9, 1963.
BILATERAL
Chile
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of August 7, 1962, as amended (TIAS
5195 and 52.52). Effected by exchange of notes at
Santiago February 14, 1963. Entered into force
February 14, 1963.
Luxembourg
Treaty of friendship, establishment and navigation,
and protocol. Signed at Luxembourg February 23,
1962. Entered into force March 28, 1963.
Proclaimed hy the President: March 6, 1963.
IVIexico
Agreement amending the migrant labor agreement of
August 11, 1951, as amended. EfCected by exchange
of notes at Mexico, D.F., January 10 and February
25, 1963. Entered into force February 25, 1963.
Turkey
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development aud Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C.
1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at
Ankara February 21, 1963. Entered into force
February 21, 1963.
Viet-Nam
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of December 27, 1961 (TIAS 4920).
Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon March 8,
1963. Entered into force March 8, 1963.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
' With reservation made at time of signing final
protocol.
" With a reservation.
Confirmations
The Senate on March 8 confirmed the following
nominations :
Archibald S. Alexander to be an As.sistant Director
of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Charles F. Baldwin, Ambassador to the Federation
of Malaya, to serve concurrently and without addi-
tional compensation as the representative of the
United States to the 19th session of the Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East of the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations.
Jonathan B. Bingham to he the representative of the
United States on the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations.
Edward M. Korry to be Ambassador to Ethiopia.
( For biographic details, see Department of State press
release 130 dated March 13. )
William J. Porter to be Ambassador to the Demo-
cratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.
Carl T. Rowan to be Ambassador to Finland.
Dr. James Watt to be the representative of the
United States on the Executive Board of the World
Health Organization, to which oflSce he was appointed
during the last recess of the Senate.
Charles D. Withers to be Ambassador to the Re-
public of Rwanda. (For biographic details, see De-
partment of State press release 133 dated March 14.)
Sidney R. Yates to be the representative of the
United States on the Trusteeship Council of the United
Nations.
The Senate on March 11 confirmed the following
nominations :
Olcott H. Deming to be Ambassador to Uganda.
APRIL 1, 1963
505
William C. Doherty to be Ambassador to Jamaica.
Donald A. Dumont to be Minister to the Kingdom
of Burundi.
C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., to be Ambassador to the
Malagasy Republic.
Outerbridge Horsey to be Ambassador to the Czeeho
slovak Socialist Republic.
William R. Rivkin to be Ambassador to Luxembourg.
Horace G. Torbert, Jr., to be Ambassador to the
Somali Republic.
Appointments
John C. Clarli as science attach^ at Cairo, United
Arab Republic, effective March 11. (For biographic
details, see Department of State press release 129
dated March 13.)
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, except in the case of free publications, wJiich
may be obtained from the Department of State.
Our Southern Partners: The Story of Inter-American
Cooperation. A survey of the political, social, eco-
nomic development and problems, and areas of United
States and Latin American cooperation. Pub. 7404.
Inter- American Series 78. 59 pp. 30^.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Colombia,
amending the agreement of October 6, 19.59, as amended.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Bogota June 20, 1962.
Entered into force June 20, 1962. TIAS 5088. 3 pp.
5(J.
Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Venezuela.
Exchange of note-s — Signed at Caracas April 14 and
May 28, 1962. Entered into force May 28, 1962. TIAS
5089. 5 pp. 50.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with China,
amending the agreements of April 18, 1958, and of
June 9, 1959. August 30, 1960, and July 21, 1961, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Taipei June
29, 1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962. TIAS
5090. 5 pp. 50.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Venezuela, amending the agreement of
May 17, 1962. Exchange of notes — Signed at Wash-
ington June 18, 1962. Entered into force June 18, 1962.
TIAS 5091. 5 pp. 50.
Defense — Disposition of Equipment and Materials.
Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany.
Exchange of note.s — Signed at Bonn/Bad Godesberg
and Bonn May 25, 1962. Entered into force May 25,
1962. TIAS 5092. 5 pp. 50.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pern,
amending the agreement of February 12, 1960, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Lima June 4
and 18, 1962. Entered into force June IS, 1962. TIAS
5093. 3 pp. 5<f.
Antarctica— Measures in Furtherance of Principles
and Objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. Recommen-
dations adopted at the First Consultative Meeting un-
der Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, at Canberra,
July 24, 1961. Effective April 30, 1902. TIAS 5094.
9 pp. 10<t.
Trade. Agreement with El Salvador, terminating cer-
tain provisions of the agreement of February I'J, 1937.
Exchange of notes — Signed at San Salvador June 29,
1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962. TIAS 5095.
3 pp. 5<t. t
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: IVIarch 11-17
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25,
D.C.
Releases issued prior to March 11 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 99
of February 22 ; 109 of March 1 ; 118 of March
7 ; and 122 of March 8.
Subject
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
Gardner : AAUN Conference of Na-
tional Organizations.
Recognition of Government of Syr-
ian Arab Republic.
Rusk : Advertising Council.
McGhee : International Coffee
Agreement, 1962.
Louchheim : "Women on World
Frontiers."
Clark appointed science attach^,
Cairo (biographic details).
Korry sworn in as Ambassador to
Ethiopia (biographic details).
Rusk to head delegation to CENTO
meeting.
Hughes designated Director of In-
telligence and Research (bio-
graphic details).
Withers sworn in as Ambassador to
Rwanda (biographic details).
Note to U.S.S.R. on alleged firing
on Soviet trawler.
Fredericks : "Problejiis and Trends
in Education in the African
Nations."
Williams : "Democracy and the
Emerging Nations."
Visit of King of Morocco.
Protest to U.S.S.R. on violation of
Alaskan airspace by Soviet
planes.
No.
Date
*123
3/11
tl24
3/12
125
3/12
126
127
3/13
3/12
*12S
3/13
*129
3/13
*130
3/13
131
3/13
*132
3/13
•133
3/14
1,34
3/15
*135
3/15
tl36 3/14
•1.37
138
.3/15
3/16
Not printed.
Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
506
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
pril 1, 1963
Ind
e X
V ol. XLVIIl, No. 1240
gricultiire
aternalional Coffee Agreement, 1962 (McGhee)
'he Trade Expansion Program (Trezise)
Igeria. Porter confirmed as Ambassador .
tomic Energy
Nuclear Test Ban and Arms Control (Beam)
ei retary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council
.S, Efforts To Achieve Safeguarded Test Ban
Treaty (Rusk)
lurundi. Dumont confirmed as Minister .
493
407
505
489
467
485
505
■ongo (Leopoldville)
ummary of U.S. Recommendations for Program
of Aid to the Congo 481
'he United Nations in Crisis : Cuba and the
Congo (Gardner) 477
.Congress
onfirmations (Alexander, Baldwin, Bingham,
Deming, Doherty, Dumont, Ferguson, Horsey,
Knrry, Porter, Rivkin, Rowan, Torbert, Watt,
Withrers, Yates) 505
iiti'rnational Coffee Agreement, 1962 (McGhee) 493
.S. Efforts To Achieve Safeguarded Test Ban
Treaty (Rusk) 485
'uba
ecretary Rusk Addre.?ses Advertising Council . 467
'he United Nations in Crisis : Cuba and the
Congo (Gardner) 477
zcchoslovakia. Horsey confirmed as Ambas-
sador 506
department and Foreign Service
ppointments (Clark) 506
'onfirmations (Alexander, Baldwin, Bingham,
Deming, Doherty, Dumont, Ferguson, Horsey,
Korry, Porter, Rivkin, Rovran, Torbert, Watt,
Withers, Yates) 505
)isarmament
Jesander confirmed as Assistant Director, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency ....
i. Nuclear Test Ban and Arms Control (Beam) .
Secretary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council .
'.S. Efforts To Achieve Safeguarded Test Ban
Treaty (Rusk)
Economic Affairs. The Trade Expansion Pro-
gram (Trezise)
•Ethiopia. Korry confirmed as Ambassador .
iurope. Secretary Rusk Addresses Advertis-
ing Council
■"inland. Rowan confirmed as Ambassador .
•'oreign Aid. Summary of U.S. Recommenda-
tions for Program of Aid to the Congo . .
nternational Organizations and Conferences
;;alendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings
Secretary Rusk To Head U.S. Delegation to
CENTO Meeting
iVatt confirmed as U.S. Representative on WHO
Executive Board
Jamaica. Doherty confirmed as Ambassador .
Luxembourg. Rivkin confirmed as Ambassa-
dor
Malagasy Republic. Ferguson confirmed as Am-
bassador
Middle East. Secretary Rusk To Head U.S.
Delegation to CENTO Meeting
505
489
467
485
497
505
467
505
481
503
484
505
505
506
506
484
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secre-
tary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council . 467
Protection of Nationals and Property. U.S.
Protests Soviet Planes' Violation of Alaskan
Airspace (text of note) 476
Public Affairs. Mr. Manning Interviewed on
"News and Comment" 500
Publications. Recent Releases 506
Recognition. U.S. Recognizes Government of
Syrian Arab Republic 476
Rwanda. Withers confirmed as Ambassador . 505
Science. Clark appointed science attach^,
Cairo 506
Somali Republic. Torbert confirmed as Ambas-
sador 506
Syria. U.S Recognizes Government of Syrian
Arab Republic 476
Treaty Information
Current Actions 504
International Coffee Agreement, 1962 (McGhee) . 493
Uganda. Deming confirmed as Ambassador . 505
U.S.S.R.
Secretary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council . 467
U.S. Protests Soviet Planes' Violation of Alas-
kan Airspace (text of note) 476
U.S. Rejects Soviet Charge of Firing on Trawler
(exchange of notes) 475
United Arab Republic. Clark appointed science
attach^ 506
United Nations
Baldwin confirmed as U.S. Representative to
19th session of ECAFE 505
Bingham confirmed as U.S. Representative on
Economic and Social Council 505
Summary of U.S. Recommendations for Pro-
gram of Aid to the Congo 481
The United Nations in Crisis : Cuba and the
Congo (Gardner) 477
Yates confirmed as U.S. Representative on
Trusteeship Council 505
Name Index
Alexander, Archibald S 505
Baldwin, Charles F 505
Beam, Jacob D 489
Bingham, Jonathan B 505
Bundy, McGeorge 467
Clark, John C 506
Deming. Olcott H 505
Doherty. William C 506
Dumont, Donald A 506
Ferguson, C. Vaughan, Jr 506
Gardner, Richard N 477
Horsey, Outerbridge 506
Korry, Edward M 505
Manning, Robert J 500
McGhee, George C 493
Porter, William J 505
Rivkin, William R 506
Rowan, Carl T 505
Rusk, Secretary 467, 485
Torbert, Horace G., Jr 506
Trezise, Philip H 497
Watt, James 505
Withers, Charles D 505
Yates, Sidney R 505
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Tliis 16-page leaflet, illustrated with a map of Southeast Asia,
describes the land and the people, their political and economic devel-
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Communist pressures, and the importance of this area to the free
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Publication 7473
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A 16-page leaflet containing an address by Robert C. Good, Di-
rector, Office of Research and Analysis for African Afi^aii-s, Depart-
ment of State, in which the following issues are discussed: The
establishment of a new basis of relations with the former colonial
power; the buildmg of the new state; the creation of a new system
of states in independent Africa; the relationship of Africa to the
East-West struggle, and the problem of expanding the rights of the
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Rec'd
APR lb
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1241V April 8, 1963
B. P. L.
THE PRESIDENTS' MEETING AT SAN JOSE • State-
merits by President Kennedy and Text of Declaration of
Central America • 511
DEMOCRACY AND THE EMERGING NATIONS OF
AFRICA • by Assistant Secretary Williams 541
THE UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN POLITICAL DIS-
PUTES • by Joseph J. Sisco 529
THE UNITED NATIONS FINANCLiL CRISIS • by
Richard N. Gardner 535
THE UNITED NATIONS: ITS VALUE TO THE
UNITED STATES • Statement by Ambassador Adlai E.
Stevenson 522
For index see inside back cover
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U.S. Oovernment Printing Office
Waeblngton 26, D.C.
Price:
62 issues, domestic $8.60, foreign $12.25
Single copy, 25 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1061).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained heroin may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
or State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bclletin is Indeied In the
Readers' Oulde to Periodical Literature
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1241 • Publication 7i
April 8, 1963
The Department of State BULLETIN
a weekly publication issued by th
Office of Media Services, Bureau c
Public Affairs, provides the publ
and interested agencies of th
Government with information o
developments in the field of foreigt
relations and on the work of tk>
Department of State and the Foreigi
Service. The BULLETIN includes »
lect.ed press releases on foreign pol
issued by the Wliite House and tH
Department, and statements and a
dresses made by the President and I
the Secretary of State and othe
officers of the Department, as well
special articles on various phases
international affairs and the fuiu
tions of the Department. Infor
tion is included concerning treati
and international agreements
which the United States is or ma
become a party and treaties of gen
eral international interest.
Publications of the Departmeni
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national relations are listed currently
I
The Presidents' Meeting at San Jose
Tlie Presidents of Central America, Panama, and the United States met
at San Jose, Costa Rica, March 18-20. Following is a statement regarding
the meeting which President Kennedy read at his netcs conference at Wash-
ington on March 21, together loith addresses and remarks he made lohile
he was in Costa Rica and the text of the Declaration of Central America,
approved by the Presidents on March 19. Presidents attending the meeting
were Francisco J. Orlich of Costa Rica, Julio Adalherto Rivera of El Sal-
vador, Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes of Guatemala, Ramon Villeda Morales
of Hondiiras, Luis Somosa Dehayle of Nicaragua, Roherto F. ChiaH of
Panama, and John F. Kennedy of the United States. The President-elect
of Nicaragua, Rene Schich Gutierrez, was also present. All the Presidents
were accompanied hy their foreign ministers.
flEWS CONFERENCE, MARCH 21
Last night I returned from a 3-clay meeting
in San Jose, Costa Rica, with the Presidents
of five Central American Republics and Pan-
ama. Tliis was a most useful meeting. For
the first time a President of the United States
journeyed to Central America and conferred
with all of the leaders of this vital area, which,
in terms of history, geography, common inter-
est, and common goals, is as closely allied with
the United States as any area in the world. We
agreed to continue our efforts under the Alli-
ance for Progress, to build and strengthen the
machinery for economic cooperation with and
among the nations of Central America and
Panama, including the creation of a unified
economic community in Central America. And
we also agreed on the necessity for measures
to halt the flow of agents, money, anns, and
propaganda from Cuba to Central America.
; Every nation present was determined that
we would both protect ourselves against im-
mediate danger and go forward with the great
APRIL 8, 1963
work of constructing dynamic, progressive so-
cieties, iimnime to the false promises of com-
mmiism. This is the fourth Latin American
country which I have visited. Here, as in all
the others, we found a spontaneous outpouring
of friendship and affection for the United
States; and here, as in all the others, we saw
impressive evidence of the work now being
made and done lander the Alliance for Progress.
Each trip makes it clear that Latin Ameri-
cans, by an overwhelming majority, are ready
to work, to sacrifice, to fight if necessary, to
maintain their own freedom and to build soci-
eties which serve the welfare of all their people.
They lack only the full measure of resources
necessary to build a hemisphere where all can
be secure and free. They know that they bear
the fundamental responsibility for tlieir own
welfare and progress, but the receptions we
have received in Costa Rica, in Mexico, in Ven-
ezuela, and in Colombia demonstrate that they
also know that we in the United States today
have a deep concern for their problems, a com-
mon dedication to their aspirations, and a f aith-
511
ful commitment to help them in their efforts.
For all these reasons, I return from San Jose
with increased confidence that we will continue
to live in a hemisphere of independent, firm,
and faithful friends.
ARRIVAL STATEMENT, MARCH 18
White House press release (San Jo9i5) dated March 18
Mr. President, I want to express my wann
appreciation to you and to the people of Costa
Rica for your welcome to us today.
About 500 years ago, Christopher Columbus,
after having discovered Costa Rica, turned
from Panama and began his last journey home.
He described this fourth voyage as el Alto
Viaje, the high voyage, and I feel in a very
real sense that this is a high voyage for all of
us who meet today in this free and democratic
coimtry. Our high voyage, Mr. President, is
not to seek new lands to conquer but to make
sure that old lands remain free. We don't seek
gold for a few in our voyage; we seek a better
life for all of our people.
Mr. President, the purpose of our meeting is,
as you have suggested, to see what our countries,
working together — the United States and the
countries of the isthmus — we working together
can do for our people to make sure that, along
with a system of political independence, hand
in hand will go economic well-being.
It is our responsibility in this hemisphere, in
this isthmus, ill my own country in the 1960's,
to demonstrate that economic prosperity is the
handmaiden of political liberty. That is the
responsibility of all of us. If we meet that
responsibility, then this country and all coun-
tries like it in this hemisphere will remain
free. If we do not meet this responsibility, then
their inevitable fate will be one of enslavement
by those who already have indicated their
desire to crush out independence in this
hemisphere.
So this meeting is most vital, and I want you
to know, Mr. President, that I come here today
not only with the Members of the Congress and
the Secretary of State and others, but I come
here today with 180 million fellow Americans
who want this hemisphere to be free and who
want this hemisphere to be an example to a
512
watching world in the crucial j'ears of this cen
tury and this decade.
And, Mr. President, I want to express again/
our thanks to you. We could not feel more
at home a thousand miles from the United
States than here in Costa Rica.
PRESIDENTS' MEETING
President Kennedy's Opening Statement, March Ig
White House press release (San Josf) dated March 18
I think the extraordinary statements which
we have heard this afternoon will serve to illu-
minate for the people of this hemisphere, and
particularly for the people of the United States,
the harsh and striking challenges we face in
these Republics and in the other Republics of
this hemisphere in attempting to improve the
life of our people. The statements that have
been made today I think serve as a call to ac-
tion by all of us, north and south, to move
ahead in these days before time passes by.
In 18'25, a son of El Salvador and a citizen of
Central America — Antonio Jose Canas — the
first minister accredited by the United Prov-
inces of Central America to the United States,
delivered an invitation to Secretary of State
Henry Clay. He asked him to send representa-
tives to the first Inter-American Congress at
Panama, a meeting at which, he said, the stiiig'
gliug new nations of this hemisphere "mighli
consider upon and adopt the best plan for de
fending the states of the New World from
foreign aggression, and . . . raise them to thaH
elevation of wealth and power, which, froir
their resources, they may attain."
Today, 1.38 years later, we are gathered w
this theater in pursuit of those same goals — tht
preservation of our independence, the extensior
of freedom, and the elevation of the welfare
of our citizens to a level as high as "from oui
resources" we can attain. And today I hav(
come from the United States at the invitation
of a Central America which, with Panama, if
rapidly attaining a vmity of purpose, effort,
and achievement which has been unloiown sinct
the dissolution of that earliest federation.
That early conference did not achieve all itS'
goals. But from it flowed the dream and ere
ation of Bolivar, and Canas, and Jose Cecilic
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtrLX.ETIN
(3
i
le Valle of Costa Rica — the dream which be-
came the inter-American system; and this sys-
em has been the most successful, the most fruit-
ful, and the most enduring of international
)rder in the history of the world.
We can say this because every effort to reim-
)ose the despotisms of the Old World on the
)eople of the New has ultimately been beaten
)acii; because within this system 20 Republics
lave attained the full recognition of their dig-
lity as sovereign nations; and because this sys-
eni has maintained an unmatched record of
leaceful relations among its members. There
lave been occasional conflicts to mar this rec-
)rd. But nowhere else have nations lived as
leighbors with so little hostility and warfare.
Vnd today the principles of nonintervention
md the peaceful resolution of disputes have
)een so firmly imbedded in our tradition that
he heroic democracy in which we meet today
•an pursue its national goals without an armed
'orce to guard its frontiers. In few other spots
n the world would this be true.
We have not attained this strength by merely
' rying to protect wliat was already won, to
)reserve the gains of the past, to maintain the
fafus quo. If these were our system's goals,
t would inevitably have crumbled as old orders
Tumbled. Instead, it has sunaved, prospered,
md grown — despite wars and revolutions, de-
spite changing ideologies and changing tech-
lologies, despite shifts in power and sliifts in
ivealth — because it has itself been an instru-
nent of change, profound revolutionary change
Nhich has molded the history of this hemi-
sphere and shaped the thinking of men seeking
Freedom and dignity in all lands. As each
powerful new wave of ideas and aspirations has
5wept across our shores, the inter- American sys-
tem has been able to translate these ideas and
aspirations into a working reality for our peo-
ple. In this respect it has been unique among
efforts at world collaboration. That is why it
has endured in the past and must endure in
the future.
In the first three centuries of our history the
seeds of Western civilization and culture were
planted here.
In the next century we established an inter-
American system which helped to complete and
maintain our freedom from foreign rule. This
freedom has often been challenged — as today
it is challenged in Cuba. But with the help of
dedicated and brave men — men such as those
who drove out Maximilian or men such as those
who prevented the Spanish reconquest in 1866,
men such as Costa Rica's Mora, who helped to
drive out William Walker — with such help, we
have destroyed all efforts at foreign conquest
in the past, as we will ultimately trimnph over
tlie new conquerors of today.
In the 50 years following its creation, the
inter-American system worked to establish the
political equality and national dignity of all
its members, to extend political democracy, and
to strengthen the principle that no nation
should forcibly impose its will upon another.
Those goals have been largely met. The equal-
ity of sovereign states is accepted by all. In-
ten^ention and force have been renounced.
Machinery of peaceful settlement has been
strengthened. Democracy rules in most of our
lands. It will ultimately prevail over the last
vestiges of tyranny in every land in this hemi-
sphere.
Now, in our own time, the inter-American
system faces old foes and new challenges ; and
it is again demonstrating the capacity for
change which has always given it strength. The
foes are stronger and more determined than
ever before, and the challenges are more diffi-
cult, more complex, and more burdensome. For
today we are faced not merely with the protec-
tion of new nations but with the remolding of
ancient societies, not only with the destruction
of political enemies but with the destruction of
poverty, hunger, ignorance, and disease, not
alone with the creation of national dignity but
with the preservation of human dignity.
To meet this enormous challenge, the peoples
of the Americas have fashioned an Alianza-
para el Progreso, an alliance in which all the
American states have mobilized their resources
and energies to secure land for the landless,
education for those without schools, and a
faster rate of economic growth within a society
where all can share in the fruits of progress.
Here in Central America we have already be-
gun to move toward the goals of the Alianza.
You have made enormous strides toward the
creation of a common market of 13 million
people. New regional institutions have been
APRIL 8, 1963
513
created; a central bank has been established;
and centralized planning and direction are
going ahead in education, finance, and many
other fields. I congratulate you on your effort
to reestablish an historic unity to meet new
needs; and I pledge my Government's contin-
ued assistance to that great effort.
In addition you have begim to formulate the
long-range economic development plans essen-
tial to the success of the Alianza. The orga-
nization of the Central American Joint Plan-
ning Mission gives new impetus to planning on
a regional development scale.
In nearly every country represented here,
new land-reform or tax-reform programs have
been adopted in an effort to meet the basic
pledges of increased social justice contained in
the Charter of Pimta del Este ^ and demanded
by all of our people.
In the 2-year period beginning July 1961,
under programs supported by the United
States as part of its contribution to the alliance,
almost 3,000 new classrooms will have been
built in the nations represented here today ; al-
most a million new books have been distributed ;
and tomorrow we will begin to distribute more
than 2 million more to children hungry for
learning. Much more remains to be done.
Some 7,600 new homes will have been built
during this 2-year period under Alianza pro-
grams in these nations — but much more remains
to be done.
Three-quarters of a million children will have
been fed — but many are still hungry.
Six thousand new teachers have been trained,
as well as many thousands of agricultural work-
ers, public-health and other public administra-
tors. Still more are needed.
During the last 18 months almost 3 million
people in Central America — farmers, workers,
children, and slum dwellers — have received
some form of direct benefit under the Alianza,
and almost $250 million of external resources
have been committed in support of the alliance
in Central America and Panama, to help
strengthen the basic structure of the economy
and at the same time meet the basic needs of
the people for improved health, education, hous-
ing, and institutions.
' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.
Finally, a revolutionary worldwide agi-ee-
ment to stabilize the price of coffee ^ has been
entered into which we in the United States
are detennined to make work — to protect youi
most vital source of export earnings. As every
speaker here today has said, every one of these
countries sell their agi'icultural commodities in
a sense at wholesale, and buy their manufac
tured goods at retail, and pay the freight both
ways. And we are also willing to move ahead
on agreements stabilizing the prices of other
commodities, so that your future prosperity
will not depend on the often destructive fluctu-
ation of prices beyond your control.
Tomorrow, at El Bosque, we will see with oui
own eyes how the Alianza enters into the live?
of citizens of Costa Rica, providing them with
new homes in which they and their families can
fuid decent shelter for the first time.
We shall continue under the alliance to build
economies more balanced and less dependent on
one or two export commodities. To this end we
must push forward plans for industrialization,
greater crop diversification, stronger educa-
tional facilities, and better utilization of
resources.
Yet we cannot be, and I know none of us are.
satisfied with the progress we have made.
Peoples who have waited centuries for oppor-
tunity and dignity cannot wait much longer.
And unless those of us now making an effort are
willing to redouble our efforts, imless the rich'
are willing to use some of their riches more
wisely, imless the privileged are willing to yield
up tlieir privileges to the common good, unless
the young and the educated are given opportuni-
ties to use their education, and unless govern-
ments are willing to dedicate themselves tire-
lessly to the tasks of governing efficiently and;
developing swiftly, then let us realize ourt
Alianza will fail, and with it will fall the society
of free nations whicli our forefathers labored to
build.
Unfortunately, while this new endeavor goeS'
forward we are also confronted by one of the
oldest of our enemies. For, at the very time
that newly independent nations rise in the Carib-
bean, the people of Cuba have been forcibly
compelled to submit to a new imperialism, more
(J
514
' For background, see ihid., Apr. 1, 1963, p. 493.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
uthless, more powerful, and more deadly in its
nn-siiit of power than any this hemisphere has
:i\own. Just when it was hoped that Cuba was
bout to enter upon a new era of democracy and
Dcial justice, the Soviet Union, through its
'uban puppets, absorbed the Cuban nation into
is empire — and it now seeks to extend its rule
II the shores of the continent itself.
But other foreign powere have discovered that
he American hemisphere is not fertile ground
or foreign tyranny and that any eifort to
pread such rule will meet with fierce and im-
iolding resistance. For Americans will not
asily yield up those freedoms which they shed
o much blood to achieve.
At the OAS [Organization of American
States], at this meeting, and wherever Amer-
cans gather to consult about the future of their
nntinent, we will continue to strengthen the
tructure of resistance to subversion. I am
lopeful that at this meeting we will again in-
rease our capacity to prevent the infiltration
if Cuban agents, money, and propaganda. We
vill build a wall around Cuba — not a wall of
nortar or brick or barbed wire, but a wall of
ledicated men detennined to protect their f ree-
lom and sovereignty. And in this effort, as in
ill the other necessai-y efforts, I can assure you
lie ITnited States will play its full part and
any its full burden.
In 1822 Bolivar, the father of the inter- Amer-
ran system, said this:
United in heart, in spirit and in aims, this Continent
. . must raise its eyes ... to peer into the centuries
vhich lie ahead. It can then contemplate with pride
those future generations of men, happy and free, enjoy-
'' ng to the full the blessings that heaven bestows on this
>arth, and recalling in their hearts the protectors and
iberators of our day.
ily friends and colleagues, today we meet,
representing seven of the great Republics of
America, united in spirit and in aims. We are
confident of our ultimate success in protecting
our freedom, in raising the living standards of
our citizens, in beginning a new era of hope in
American history. Secure in that confidence,
we too can look forward to future centuries
knowing that our descendants may also grate-
fully recall in their hearts the "jirotectors and
liberators"' of our day.
Text of Declaration
Press release 145 dated March 20
Declabation of Central America
The Presidents of the Republics of Central America
and Panama are determined to improve the well-being
of their peoples, and are aware that such a task de-
mands a dynamic economic and social development pro-
gram based on the carefully planned use of human,
natural and financial resources. It also depends on im-
portant changes of the economic, social and administra-
tive structure, within the framework of the principles
that govern our democratic institutions. They have
met with the President of the United States of America
in San Jos^, Costa Rica, to review the diflBculties which
impede the achievement of these objectives as well as
the progress thus far made in the Isthmus since the
integration programs began and since the Alliance for
Progress was jointly established by the Republics of
the Hemisphere in August 1961.
Following an analysis of the situation, the Presidents
of the Republics of Central America, convinced that the
best hope for the development of the region is through
economic integration, and bearing in mind the extraor-
dinary efforts made toward this end in tlie last decade
and of the importance of accelerating over-all economic
growth, pledge to their peoples :
— To accelerate establishment of a customs union to
perfect the functioning of the Central American Com-
mon Market ;
— To formulate and implement national economic and
social development plans, coordinating them at the Cen-
tral American level, and progressively to carry out re-
gional planning for the various sectors of the economy ;
— To establish a monetary union and common fiscal,
monetary and social policies within the program of
economic integration;
— To cooperate in programs to improve the prices of
primary export commodities ;
— To complete as soon as pos.sible the reforms needed
to achieve the objectives set forth in the Act of Bogota
and the Charter of Puuta del Bste especially in the
fields of agriculture, taxation, education, public admin-
istration, and social welfare ;
— To take the above measures with a view to achiev-
ing the creation of a Central American Economic Com-
munity which will establish relationships with other
nations or regional groups having similar objectives.
The Central American Presidents affirm that the
economic integration movement in itself constitutes an
effort which is laying the groundwork for regional
planning in which sectoral plans of common Interest
to the Isthmian Republics serve as a point of de-
parture. Their governments have already taken meas-
ures to coordinate national plans so that their execu-
tion will aid rather than impede the achievement of
the objectives of the economic integration program.
It is intended that the first global plan for harmonious
regional development be presented as soon as possible
for evaluation in accordance with the procedures set
APRII, 8, 1963
515
forth in the Charter of Punta del Este. Meanwhile,
the Central American Presidents declare their resolve
to proceed immediately with their sectoral plans and
with projects of interest to the Isthmus. The Presi-
dent of the United States agrees to consider a long-
term loan to enable the appropriate Central American
regional organizations, principally the Central Amer-
ican Bank for Economic Integration, to conduct eco-
nomic feasibility surveys relative to this program of
regional development.
The Presidents of Central America reaffirm their
hope that the Republic of Panama will participate
more closely in the economic integration movement,
and the President of Panama declares that his Govern-
ment fully reaffirms its support of the program of Cen-
tral American economic integration. He further de-
clares that his Government is prepared to initiate im-
mediate negotiations with the Governments of the gen-
eral treaty of economic integration as a whole with a
view to concluding a special agreement to facilitate the
association of his country with this program.
The President of the United States is impressed by
the determination of the Presidents of the Central
American Republics to move as rapidly as possible
toward the integration of the economies of their coun-
tries, and of their intention to formulate a regional
economic development plan within which national
plans would be coordinated, and he believes that the
coordination of their respective monetary, fiscal, eco-
nomic and social policies is a great step forward in
the achievement of this objective as well as toward the
achievement of the goals set forth in the Charter of
Punta del Este.
The President of the United States is prepared to
offer the greatest cooperation in the preparation and
implementation of the regional and national develop-
ment projects of Central America and Panama and
declares that his government will intensify its joint
efforts with the governments and appropriate regional
organizations in order to extend to them increased
technical and financial assistance for this purpose
within the frameworli of the broad regional program
entitled "Joint Exposition of the Presidents of Central
America" and the development plan being prepared by
Panama.
To this end he proposes a fund for Central American
economic integration, to be made available through the
Central American Bank for Economic Integration, to
which the United States would make an immediate
substantial initial contribution, to assist in carrying
out regional development projects in accordance with
various sectoral plans now being developed by the
regional organizations.
For the longer term, he also declares that as soon
as the Central American Republics have formulated an
over-all regional development plan, and as soon as this
plan has been evaluated favorably in accordance with
the procedures established in the Charter of Punta del
E.ste, the United States will enlarge and expand its
participation in the fund and will work with the Cen-
516
V
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If
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sit
tral American countries in obtaining other Free Work
resources so that the agreed plan can be effectivelj
implemented.
The Presidents have discussed the fundamental im'
portance to economic development of a vigorous anc
freely-competitive private sector, and declare then
intention of taking the necessary steps to encouragt
private investment which is prepared to accept th«
normal responsibilities compatible with the develop,
ment of a modern economy. These measures include
establishment of regional trade and promotion offlcei
for the specific purpose of attracting private foreigr
investment. They also agree that development banki
or corporations should be established in each countrj
as soon as possible to provide credit on reasonable
terms for the growth of private industry, the Presl
dent of the United States offering financial assistance
to their operation.
Concurrently they agree that economic and socia*
conditions should be created to assure labor of ai
improved living standard through a better distributior
of national income. Furthermore they agree to en-
courage and support free democratic labor organiza-
tions as a means of contributing toward greater worker
participation in the common effort on behalf of thei
general welfare.
The Presidents also agree that opportunities shouWii
be given to the people of Central America to build andi
purchase their homes. There exist in Central Amer-
ica national savings and loan institutions which have
been assisted under the Alliance for Progress, and
others are about to be created. In order to give fur-
ther support for these national efforts, the Presidents
of Central America suggest that a regional home
loan department, which would be a secondary source
of home mortgage funds, should be created as a di-
vision within the Central American Bank for Eco-
nomic Integration and the President of the Uniteii
States agrees to offer technical and financial assistance!
to it.
The Isthmian Presidents indicate that Central
American institutions should be strengthened as much
as possible to enable them to play a major role in
training the personnel who will be needed to put into
effect the plans for integration of the Isthmus. A
large part of the responsibility for training will de-
volve on the Superior Council of Central American
Universities (CSUCA). Recognizing, moreover, that
trained manpower at all levels is needed for economic
development, they agree to the proposal of the Presi-
dent of the United States to establish a multi-million
dollar scholarship fund for vocational training in agri-
culture and in industry for young people of outstand-
ing ability who can not afford the normal expenses of
such training, to which the United States will offers
substantial financial assistance.
The Presidents note the primary role of coffee in thei
economies of Central America and the importance of
the International Coffee Agreement for the achieve-
ment of stable and remunerative prices.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
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IS:
fti
They reiterate the intention of their governments to
ully support the agreement so that it will serve as an
ffeotive instrument to improve the earnings of export-
ig countries from coffee and to promote their eco-
omic development.
Other primary commodity problems exist and the
sthmian Presidents will hand to President Kennedy
tudies (in these problems.
President Kennedy agrees he will have them re-
iewed immediately on his return to Washington.
The Presidents, notwithstanding the fact that pres-
nt conditions are favorable to undertake a solution
f the economic and social problems of the Isthmus
lircmgh .1oint action of the countries of the area, be-
ovc that all of them are faced with an externally pro-
nl;i'd political problem, which by its very nature can
n; i>ril the exercise of representative democracy and
<i- normal development of the plans in which their
fspective governments are engaged to attain as rapidl.v
s possible the highest levels of economic and social
nstiee and to bring to full realization the plans for
entral American integration. Consequently, the Pres-
lonts declare that in order to carry out their programs
or social and economic betterment, it is e.ssential to
ei II force the measures to meet subversive aggression
riginating in the focal points of Communist agitation
•hich Soviet imperialism may maintain in Cuba or in
ny other place in America.
The Presidents note that the Council of the Orga-
ization of American States is actively engaged in
laintaining vigilance over tbe continued intervention
f Slno-Soviet powers in this Hemisphere as requested
y the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Min-
sters.' They express special interest in early com-
letion by the Council of the OAS of the studies on
'astro-Communist subversion in the Hemisphere, and
articularly in early action by the Council on recom-
lendations to the governments for counteracting those
ctivities in these areas.
The Presidents agree that Ministers of Government
f the seven countries should meet as soon as possible
o develop and put into immediate effect common
leasures to restrict the movement of their nationals
and from Cuba, and the flow of materiel, propa-
;anda and funds from that country.
This meeting will take action, among other things,
o secure stricter travel and passport controls, includ-
ng appropriate limitations in pas.sports and other
ravel documents on travel to Cuba. Cooperative ar-
angements among not only the countries meeting here
)ut also among all OAS members will have to be sought
o restrict more efifectlvely not only these movements
if people for subversive purposes but also to prevent
usofar as possible the introduction of money, propa-
ganda, materials, and arms, arrangements for addi-
tional sea and air surveillance and interception within
territorial waters will be worked out with special co-
operation from the United States.
' Ibid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.
In addition to these measures, a more rapid and com-
plete exchange of intelligence information on the move-
ment of people, propaganda, money and arms between
Cuba and our countries is to be developed by the Meet-
ing of Ministers.
The Presidents voice their deep sympathy for the
people of Cuba, and reaffirm their conviction that
Cuba soon will join the family of free nations. The
Presidents recall how, in 1959, the Cuban people were
fired Vifith the hope of a purely Cuban revolution that
was to bring them freedom and social justice ; honest
government and free elections ; fair sharing of goods ;
opportunities for all ; more schools and jobs, better
health and housing, and constructive land reform not
collectivization of the land. In sum. a progressive re-
public which, in the words of Marti, would be "con
todos y para todos". The Presidents declare that they
have no doubt that the genuine Cuban revolution will
live again, and its betrayers will fall into the shadows
of history, and the martyred people of the oppressed
isle of the Caribbean will be free from foreign Com-
munist domination, free to choose for themselves the
kind of government they wish to have, and free to join
their brothers of the Hemisphere in the common under-
taking to secure for each individual the liberty, dig-
nity, and well-being which are the objectives of all free
societies.
Finally the Presidents solemnly reaffirm their ad-
herence to the principles established by the Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance of Rio de Janeiro, the Charter
of the OAS, in the Act of Bogota and in the Charter
of Punta del Este.
March 19, 1963
VISITS TO HOUSING PROJECT AND
UNIVERSITY
Ei Bosque, March 19
White House press release (San JosS) dated March 19
We celebrate here today a great victory, and
that is a victory for the human spirit ; for these
houses, these medical units, tliese books, are to-
day freeing men and women from centuries of
bondage and poverty which has imprisoned
their capacity, their happiness, and their fu-
ture, and I am proud, as a citizen of the United
States, to be here in Costa Kica taking part in
this great effort.
As a citizen of a sister Eepublic, as a strong
believer in the democratic faith, we take pride
in the democracy of this Republic and the other
Republics of this hemisphere, but we know that
our enjoyment of freedom is not so much a gift
from the past as a challenge for the future, not
APRIL, 8, 1963
517
so mucli a rewai'd for old victories but a goal
for new struggles, not so much an inheritance
from our forefatliers as an obligation to those
of us who follow, for democracy is never a final
achievement. It is a call to effort, to sacrifice,
and a willingness to live and to die in its de-
fense.
Every generation of the Americas has shaped
new goals for democracy to suit the demands of
a new age. These goals for today's America are
summed up in the words Alianza para el Pro-
greso. They call for an end to social institu-
tions which deny men and women the opportu-
nity to live decent lives. They call for a better
standard of living for all of our citizens in order
that they may produce and live up to their capa-
bilities. They call for an end to the remnants of
dictatorship in this hemisphere, and they call
for an unyielding defense against all those who
seek to impose a new tyranny in this hemisphere.
They call, in short, for a recognition that no
man's job is done until every man in this
hemisphere shares an equal opportunity to pur-
sue his hopes as far as his capacities will carry
him. That is the commitment of this country
and my own, and the commitment of our sister
Republics.
It is sometimes easy for us, living in our na-
tions' capitals, to become disheartened about
the nature of the struggle, but it is here with you
in this project, sharing in your achievements,
participating in your labors, that we renew our
faith and determination to succeed, for in this
project hundreds of people will move into
decent housing. By October first of this year,
almost 8,000 people will have moved into homes
financed under the Alliance for Progress and
built by the labor of the people of Costa Eica,
and in every counti-y in this hemisphere similar
housing programs must go forward. These
medical units which we have seen are only a few
of the 60 which will be in operation throughout
Central America and Panama this year. They
will provide 4 million medical examinations a
year, reaching almost a third of the population
of the isthmus. In them, doctors and nurses
will bring modem medicine to our people who
have had no protection against disability or
disease, entering hundreds of villages where no
doctor has been. Approximately 8,000 people
518
in Costa Rica already have received treatment!
imder these units.
These books we have distributed to these chil-
dren are a token of a massive program which
will bring more than 2 million new schoolbooks
to the children of Central America and Pan
ama. With these books millions of children for
the first time will have the tools to conquer lifi
and make something of their future.
Education, homes, jobs, health, security —
those are the things for which this country
stands. Those are the things in which the
people of the United States strongly believe.
Those are the things which together we must
achieve for our people, and I want to assure
you through the Alliance for Progress we will
stand and work shoulder to shoulder in making
this hemisphere an example of what democracjj
can mean.
Viva Costa Rica! Arriba Costa Rica!
University of Costa Rica, Marcli 20
White House press release (San JosS) dated March 20
I would like first to present to you my col
leagues from the United States Congress who
have traveled with us on this voyage of the las)
3 days, and I would like to have them meet you
First, I would like to present the chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, th»
former president of the University of Arkansas
Senator [J. W.] Fulbright.
I would like to present the leader of the op
position in the United States Senate, but wr
both agree that we love Costa Rica, Senatoi
[Bourke B.] Hickenlooper.
The chainnan of the Senate Subcommittee oi"
Latin America of the Senate Foreign Relation!
Committee, formerly dean of tlie University o:
Oregon Law School, Senator Wayne Morse.
Congressman [Armistead I.] Selden [Jr.]I
who is chairman of the House Committer
on Latin America, Congressman Selden o>
Alabama.
And the Republican leader of that cormnittet
in the House of Representatives, Congressmar
William Mailliard.
And the United States Ambassador [Ray
mond Telles].
It is a great pleasure to leave Washington
where I am lectured to by professors, to corn*
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIS
III
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m
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^1
to Costa Rica where I can speak to students.
I think it is appi-opriate that the first speech
\v any United States President to any student
ludience in Latin America should take place
it this center of learning in a nation so dedi-
3ated to democracy, and I am honored that you
iiave invited me here today.
For the past 3 days the Presidents of seven
A.merican nations have been grappling with the
central question which faces this country, my
3wn country, and my hemisphere, and that is
whether, imder a system of political liberty,
(ve can solve the economic problems that press
upon our people. We are embarked upon a
[jreat adventure together, and that is the task
if demonstrating to a watching world that free
lien can conquer the ancient enemies of man,
ooverty, ignorance, and himger; of protecting
freedom against those who would destroy it;
' )f bringing hope to those who search for hope ;
)f extending liberty to those who lack it.
This is an immense task, filled with difficulty
md hardship and danger, but you have been
liven an opportunity to shape the destiny of
nan which has been given to no other genera-
ion in the last 2,000 years. And as a fellow
.American, I know that you welcome that re-
sponsibility and that opportunity. Wliat
Franklin Eoosevelt said to the American people
m the 1930's I say to you now : This generation
jf Americans, your generation of Americans,
has a rendezvous with destiny. I am confident
that you will meet that rendezvous, for I can re-
member my own country when it was quite
different from our coimtry today. It was not so
many years ago that I was a university student
as you are now, and at that time only 1 in every
10 American farms was electrified, half of the
farmers in our Southland were tenant farmers
and sharecroppers, thousands of families in the
Tennessee Valley had cash incomes of less than
$100 a year, and all this in addition to a great
depression which threw 12 million men and
women out of work and had 20 million Ameri-
cans on relief — that in that time I was at the
university.
Then, mider the leadership of Franklin
Eoosevelt, we carried through a great New
iDeal for the United States. One progi-am
after another brought an end to tenant farm-
ing in the United States, electrified nearly eveiy
farm in our country, transformed the poverty-
ridden Tennessee Valley into one of the richest
agricultural and industrial areas in the United
States. It demonstrated in those great years
the immense power of affirmative, free govern-
ment, the power which adds the idea of social
responsibility to individual liberty.
The history of your country in the last years
has demonstrated that same quality. And if
the task of progress with freedom is more com-
plex, more subtle, and more difficult than the
promise of progi-ess without freedom, we are
imafraid of that challenge.
We are committed to four basic principles in
this hemisphere in the Alliance for Progress.
The first is the right of every nation to govern
itself, to be free from outside dictation and coer-
cion, to mold its own economy and society in
any fashion consistent with the will of the
people.
Second is the right of every individual citi-
zen to political liberty, the right to speak his
own views, to worship God in his own way, to
select the government which rules him, and to
reject it when it no longer serves the need of a
nation.
And third is the right to social justice, the
right of every citizen to participate in the prog-
ress of his nation. Tliis means land for the
landless and education for those who are de-
nied their education today in this hemisphere.
It means that ancient institutions which per-
petuate privilege must give way. It means that
rich and poor alike must bear the burden and
the opportunity of building a nation. It will
not be easy to achieve social justice, but free-
dom cannot last without it.
And the fourth principle of the alliance is
the right of every nation to make economic
progress with modem teclinological means.
This is the job, it seems to me, of all of us in
this hemisphere in this decade, all of you who
have the oppoi-tunity to study at this university,
and that is, as I said at the begirming, to dem-
onstrate that we can provide a better life for
our people imder a system of freedom, to dem-
onstrate that it is our adversaries who must
build walls to hold their people in, who must
deny their people the right not only of f i-eedom
APRIL 8, 1963
519
but economic advancement as well. It is no
accident that this year in Cuba agricultural
production will be 25 percent below what it
was 5 years ago. The great myth of the 1950's
was that through a system of communism it was
possible to produce a better life for our people —
through a denial of jsolitical freedom we could
provide more material advances ; but the fifties
showed us well, in China, the Soviet Union,
Eastern Europe, East Berlin, and Cuba, that
when you deny political and social freedom you
also deny the right to advance economically.
Gracms. I want to express the thanks of all
of us to you for having us here today. Oc-
casionally universities are regarded as dan-
gerous places for presidents, and we are grate-
ful to you for your warm welcome to all of
us on this occasion. We also want to express
our thanks to the people of Costa Eica. Every
one of us will go home with the most profound
impression of what a strong, vital people caii
accomplish, and I think that this journey to
Costa Kica has illuminated the minds of 180
million people of what a great opportunity and
privilege we have to be associated together in
our common cause. Viva Costa Rica! Arriba
Costa Rica! Muchas gracias.
DEPARTURE STATEMENT, MARCH 20
White House press release (San Jos^) dated March 20
I want to express my very warm appi-eci-
ation to all of you for your kindness to all of
us who came from North America to this con-
ference. I think we go back greatly heartened
and encouraged by the conversations we have
had, by the strong feeling of friendship which
we felt across the table, and also by the reali-
zation that althougli we face difficult struggles
in this hemispliere and throughout tlie world,
we are not alone and are accompanied on this
voyage by fast friends.
May I say, Mr. Presidents, that we leave here
greatly encouraged because we recognize that
you are committed to the same objectives wliich
so involve us all, and that is the welfare of our
people, particularly the people of our countries
and the people of this hemisphere. We are
joined together by nature, by a common inherit-
ance, a common experience, a common convic-
520
tion for the future, a common hope for the fu
ture, and I think it is a source of great strength
to meet here in the isthmus and in the Central!
American Republics men who are committed
to these same objectives, the preservation of
freedom, in this decade of decision.
Mr. Presidents, I know that we all recognize
that, regardless of our own efforts, in the final
analysis it depends upon the strength of our
people, their vitality, their energy, their will
ingness to assume the heavy burdens for great
results, and I think it is this part of the trip
which has been most striking. I recognize that
the people of Costa Rica share an inheritance
and a histoiy with the people of the other Cen
tral American Republics and Panama; so we
judge them by what we have seen here in Costai
Rica.
I must say, Islr. President, I know of no more
vital, energetic, warmliearted, vigorous, hopeful
people than the great citizens of this great de-
mocracy. Tlie impression that we, all of us
from the United States carry back is of the
hands of friendship which have been extendec
to us and the strong feeling that, while w(
came in a sense as strangers 3 days ago, w(
leave tonight as friends.
So we say goodbye and many tlianks.
flasta luego and Vii^a Costa Rica!
U.S. Opposes Attacks on Cuba
by Splinter Refugee Groups
Following is a U.S. Government statement is
sued ly the Department of State on March li
regarding the reported Alpha 66 attack on i
Soviet ship and on. Soviet install-ations in Cuba
alleged to have happened on the night of Marc)
18.
Press release 144 dated March 19
The United States Government is stronglj
opposed to hit-and-run attacks on Cuba bj
splinter refugee groups. It has stated repeat
edly that such raids do not weaken the grip o'
the Communist regime on Cuba — indeed thej
may strengthen it. Nothing we have heard oi
the latest incident changes our judgment on this
matter. Rather it reinforces our belief thai
these irresponsible and ineffective forays serv(
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
to increase the difficulty of dealing with the un-
satisfactory situation which now exists in the
Caribbean.
The United States GoTemment is investigat-
ing fully to determine whether any violation of
United States law is involved.
of our own Government within the framework
of tlie Alliance for Progress. It would be most
regrettable if minor and unwarranted misimder-
standings were to interfere with the strong and
solid cooperation between the two largest de-
mocracies of the Western Hemisphere.
U.S. Regrets Misinterpretation
of Statement on Brazil
Statement hy Acting Secretary Ball
Fress release 143 dated March 19
Earlier this month the Department of State
submitted a statement ^ regarding the political
situation in Brazil to the House Subcommittee
( )ii Inter- American Affairs. This statement was
released last week. Its timing has given rise to
speculation that it was intended to influence the
course of the current financial talks with Bra-
zilian Finance Minister San Tiago Dantas.
This speculation is totally gi-oundless.
The statement was released by the subcom-
mittee as part of its hearings. The timing was
independently determined by the subcommittee.
The fact that the release occurred at the time of
the Finance Minister's visit was totally
coincidental.
It is unfortunate that one sentence from the
statement should have been toni out of context
and misinterpreted to suggest that Commmiists
have a substantial influence on Brazilian Gov-
ernment policy. The statement neither says nor
implies this, nor is this the opinion of the United
States Government.
As President Kennedy has repeatedly empha-
sized, Brazil occupies a key position in the
Western Hemisphere and in the Western World.
It is of tlie highest importance to both countries
that the long and valued tradition of close and
constructive collaboration between us be main-
tained and strengthened. The resolution of the
difficult issue of constitutional powers on the
basis of the popular plebiscite of January 6
gives promise that the Brazilian Government
will be able to press forward effectively with a
program for economic stabilization and develop-
ment whicli can enlist the fruitful cooperation
Admiral Smith Appointed Supreme
Allied Commander, Atlantic
White House press release dated March 12
Tlie Nortli Atlantic Council on March 12
appointed Adm. Harold Page Smith, United
States Navy, as Supreme Allied Commander,
Atlantic, to succeed Adm. Kobert L. Dennison.
The Council was informed of the contents of
a letter ^ from the President of the United
States to the Secretary General of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and
Chairman of the Permanent Council, in which
the President asked the member governments
to agree to release Admiral Dennison, who will
be placed on the retired list of the United States
Navy on May 1, 1963. The Council agreed
with great regret to release Admiral Dennison
from his assignment as Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Atlantic, a position which he has held
since being appointed by the Council on Feb-
ruai-y 29, 1960. They expressed to Admiral
Dennison, in the name of the governments rep-
resented on the Council, lasting gratitude for
the distinguished service rendered by him.
At the Council's request for the nomination
of an officer of the United States Navy for ap-
pointment by the Council as Supreme Allied
Commander, Atlantic, the President nominated
Admiral Smith for consideration by the Coun-
cil as successor to Admiral Dennison. Admiral
Smith is now serving as Commander in Chief,
U.S. Naval Forces, Europe.
The Council concurred in this nomination
and on March 12 adopted a resolution appoint-
ing Admiral Smith as Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Atlantic, as successor to Admiral
Dennison with the same powers and functions.
The appointment is to become effective on April
30, 1963.
' Not printed here.
' Not printed.
APRIL 8, 1963
521
The United Nations: Its Value to the United States
Statement hy Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the United Nations '
Mr. Chairman and members of the commit-
tee, I welcome this opportimity to report to you
again on the work of the United Nations.
As you know, the United Nations is a big
subject, one which can be approached from
many points of view. From one point of view it
is a symbol of the aspirations of most of human-
ity for peace, for decency and human dignity.
From another point of view it is an institution
of 110 members pioneering the arts of parlia-
mentary diplomacy on a near-universal level.
From still another, it is a very large operating
mechanism performing such varied activities as
stopping a war, spraying tropical villages with
DDT to combat malaria, and draftmg a con-
vention on some aspect of human rights. There
is even a point of view — albeit it is a narrow
one — from which the United Nations appears
to be the symbol of wicked one-worldliness, a
sinister threat to the national sovereignty, and
a joint convention of international do-gooders
and bobby-soxers.
So, like a novelist approaching some univer-
sal theme, anyone preparing to say or write
something about the United Nations must
somehow come to grips with his material, de-
tennine his point of view, decide where to
focus — what to put in and what to leave out.
In the process, many arbitrary choices must be
made.
My arbitrary choice for this occasion, which
I hope will meet with the committee's approval,
' Made before the Subcommittee on International
Organization Affairs of the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations on Mar. 13 (U.S./U.N. press release
4159 dated Mar. 15).
522
is to focus briefly but sharply on this question :
How and to what extant does our membership
in the United Nations serve the foreign policy
interests of the United States of America ? Or,
more crudely, Mr. Chairman, what's in it for
us? I tliink this coincides with your assign-
ment.
I make no apology to the most sensitive sup-
porter of the United Nations for phrasing it
that way. After all, if the very considerable
effort and time and money which we have in-
vested in the United Nations has not been a
good investment from the U.S. point of view,
then we should say so and behave accordingly —
as, I feel sure, every other member does.
Test of "What's in It for Us"
I shall try to test this question of what's
in it for us against two criteria : first, against
the record of the 17th General Assembly, which
had just over 100 items on its agenda; and sec-
ond, against the roles of the U.N. in two of
the greatest crises of recent history — the col-
lapse of the Congo and the discovery of Soviet
missile bases in Cuba. These are tough tests:
One covers a virtual compendium of the on-
going problems which beset the modern world;
the other raises specific issues of peace and war
in specific areas at specific times.
But before coming to these two tests of how
well or how badly our membership in the U.N.
serves the national interest, it is worth while
to pose a prior test: Is the United Nations
relevant to the real world of the second lialf of
the 20th century? For if the United Nations
does not reflect the real world, it is imlikely
to be able to do anything useful about it.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtJLLETTN
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^Vlint then are the dominant factors that
nake the real world what it is in tlie second
half of the 20th centiuy ? I think we can limit
ourselves to brief mention of five dominant
facts of life in our tumultuous times :
Let me say, first is the great confrontation
.Yliich goes under the name of the East-West
onflict or the cold war — and the nuclear arms
■ace which is its most dangerous manifestation.
riiis has brought into conflict two sets of ideas
ibout the value of human dignity which can-
lot be bridged philosophically. It also has
)iought into conflict two great and powerful
lations whose national differences must be
bridged politically if either is to survive. The
iioceedings of the United Nations consistently
■fllcct both aspects of this so-called East- West
confrontation.
The second factor dominating contemporary
listory is the revolutionary wave of national in-
lependence which, in an incredibly short period,
las brought political independence to nearly 1
)illion people, leaving less than 2 percent of
he former colonial peoples in dependent sta-
us — an historic convulsion which perhaps
ifl'ered communism its greatest opportunity to
ibsorb vast areas of the world. The United
N^ations has itself administered a number of
these changes from dependent to independent
status and is deeply involved with the difficult
md emotional final stages of liquidating the
lid colonial system and the race problems em-
bedded in it.
The third factor is the so-called "revolution
jf rising expectations," which has put a spot-
light on the glaring gap between the material
conditions of the rich minority and the poor
majority among the world's peoples. Some 85
percent of the entire staffs of the U.N. system is
occupied with the first systematic effort at inter-
national cooperation in the field of economic and
social affairs — certainly one of the great phe-
nomena of contemporary times.
Fourth is the fantastic pace of discovery and
invention, which romps ahead oblivious to the
political and social consequences and which
makes the demands for a decent life for all a
practical proposition for the first time in his-
toiy. The United Nations is concerned increas-
ingly with the complex and little-understood
problems of how to transfer effectively science
and technology from one cultural setting to
another.
Fifth is the fitful emergence of a restless,
teeming, volatile, frequently quarrelsome open
society of nation-states — a society of enormous
diversity of cultui'es, races, and political, ec-
onomic, and social systems. The United Na-
tions is, of course, the institutional center of this
open international society — partly the cause and
partly the result of the forces which impel an
interdependent world into more intimate associ-
ation on an expanding agenda of political and
human problems.
If these are the principal factors which mold
our times — the cold war, the liquidation of colo-
nialism, the pervasive demand for a better ma-
terial way of life, the thundering impact of
science, and the emergence of a vast, new open
society on the international plane — then we
must conclude that the United Nations is in-
deed relevant to these times, that it is part and
parcel of the contemporary scene. And being
relevant, it is in a position to be effective.
Let us come, then, to the question of how
effective, from our point of view. "Wliat's in it
for us ? How, as the most recent example, does
the record of the I7th General Assembly stand
the test?
How the Assembly's Record Stands the Test
I said a moment ago that the agenda of the
17th General Assembly was a virtual compen-
dium of the ongoing problems of the modern
world.
Listen to this list of trouble spots and sore
spots: the Congo, the Gaza Strip, Southern
Rhodesia, South-West Africa, the Portuguese
African territories, Kashmir, Yemen, West New
Guinea, and the Arab refugee camps.
Mark this string of contentious issues : Chi-
nese representation, North Korea, Hungary,
colonialism, troika, and sovereignty over natural
resources.
Consider, if you will, this list of universal
concerns: disarmament, nuclear testing, outer
space, world food, world trade, world science,
and the training of manpower for economic and
social development.
All of these issues, in one form or another.
APRIL 8, 1963
523
came before the United Nations for some kind
of action during the last General Assembly,
even if each one did not appear formally on the
Assembly's agenda. Many of them are among
the most complex, the most intractable, the most
ancient troubles of the human race. And many
come to the United Nations as a court of last
resort — because nobody else has been able to
cope with them at all.
Obviously the United Nations did not "solve"
all, or even many, of these problems; but it
worked on them. On a few it took conclusive
action ; on some it made progress, and on others
it did not.
We have made full reports on the record
of the 17th General Assembly, item by item and
vote by vote ; I shall not take your time to re-
peat the record. The point to be made is simply
this: The United States view was the majority
view in over 80 percent of the 40 key votes cast
in committees and full Assembly. On several
issues we abstained, and on two extreme resolu-
tions recommending sanctions against member
states we voted against the majority.
This is the measure of the extent to which
our membership in the United Nations served
the foreign policy interests of the United States
across the spectrum of issues represented by the
agenda of the 17th General Assembly.
Meanwhile the impact of the twin crises in
the Caribbean and the Himalayas raised our
credit— and our credibility; had the opposite
effect on the stock of the Soviet Union; ini-
proved Western Hemisphere solidarity; acti-
vated the members from NATO; and gave
pause to those who tend to equate the lona fdes
of the United States and the Soviet Union.
Mr. Chairman, I am not saying for one mo-
ment that the I7th General Assembly— or any
other meeting or organ of the United Nations-
was the handmaiden of the Department of
State. I am not even saying that there were no
disappointments or no cause for apprehension ;
for example, we expect continuing fireworks
over the hard-core cases in the remnants of
European empires, and we are most gravely con-
cerned at the lack of evidence of financial re-
sponsibility on the part of all too many mem-
bers. But I am saying, most emphatically, that
in no case was United States interest damaged.
t
Bid
111?
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Iffl
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!i(
in most cases our objectives were furthered in a.
positive fashion, and m other cases we have rea-
son to hope for a better result on another day.
In short, it was veiy much in our national inter-
est to be there, paying our considerable share \
of the cost and exercising our considerable share
of the leaderehip.
Role of U.N. in Congo and Cuban Crises
The political problems before the General As-
sembly tend to be those anguished issues which
have roots in the past and drag on from year
to year — so hardy or so virulent that some
times our best efforts succeed only in keeping
them from going from bad to worse.
But now I should like to discuss two crises
which had sudden beginnings, which directly
and immediately involved the United Nations,
and which now seem to be ended — at least in v
the form in which they arose. I refer to thoselfe
most dangerous events which raised the dire
threat of great-power confrontation — and thus jj
of nuclear war — in the Congo and the Carib-
bean. The point is to ask in each case whether'
the role of the United Nations in these crises'
served the foreign policy interests of the Unitedl
States.
"WHiat were our aims in the Congo affair?*
Our aims in the Congo are the same as our aims-
for all of tropical Africa. They are quite simple-
to state : to help create an area of truly free audi
independent African states, safe from external,
aggression or subversion, working out their owni
destinies in their own way. cooperating withi
each other and with those who wish to help ini
their overwhelming task of progressive mod-
ernization. In the Congo, as elsewhere, this re-
quires national unity and a reasonable degree of
political stability.
Contrasted to this, the collapse of the CongO'
in its first week of nationhood offered these sud-
den prospects : national disunity, political chaos,
civil disorder, social disintegration, and ex-
ternal penetration — prospects made to order for
Communist exploitation. And because of this,
the ultimate prospect for the Congo was for the
forces of the nuclear powers to find themselves
face to face in the heart of central Africa in the
infancy of independence — about as messy and
dangerous a state of affairs as one can imagine.
524
DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN!
The story of the struggle of the United Na-
tions — with unflagging support from this coun-
try — to bring order out of cliaos in the Congo
is too well known to members of this committee
to review it here. I am all too conscious of every
bit and every kind of criticism that has been
leveled against this operation ; and it has been
of every kind — from honest doubts about the
legal basis for U.N. action to purple propa-
ganda and outrageous lies. I also will state
that in this unprecedented, almost fantastic
operation, in any historical sense, some deci-
sions were not perfectly coordinated, some oper-
ations were not fully efficient, some judgments
were not later justified, and a few actions were
not excusable. My point is neither to tabulate
the accomplishments nor to count the mistakes.
My point is, rather, to look at the results and
state that, as of today, civil war has been re-
placed by national unity, political chaos has
i been replaced by reasonable prospects for politi-
cal stability, total disorder has been replaced
by order, social disintegration has been replaced
by an evolving program for social progress, and
the scavengers have been sent home packing.
None of this is yet guaranteed to be permanent.
But this is what has happened in the Congo ;
this is what the United States wanted to happen
in the Congo ; and it could not have happened
under any other auspices than that of the United
Nations, without the certainty or at least the
risk of international war.
It therefore is difficult — indeed it is impossi-
ble — to avoid the conclusion that the foreign
policy interests of the United States have been
served well by the United Nations performance
in the Congo crisis, and this, of course, would
have been out of the question without our mem-
bership and our full support. I know no way
of putting a dollar value on the restoration of
peace in central Africa.
The U.N. role in the Congo was, of course,
an extremely large operational task, by far the
largest it has ever undertaken, involving nearly
20,000 troops from 21 nations, supported by a
massive airlift and by hundreds of civilian tech-
nicians recruited through a dozen international
agencies.
The U.N. role in the Cuban crisis was entirely
different. Actually, the United Nations had
three roles in the Cuban crisis, two of which
were played out while the third was frustrated
but nonetheless useful to us. Because the naval
quarantine of Cuba was the first dramatic move
in that crisis, and because of the critical part
played by the Organization of American States,
it is easy to forget how the United Nations fitted
into the pattern of these supercharged days
when the world stood at the edge of the abyss
in late October.
You will remember, of course, that the Presi-
dent called into play at one stroke all the avail-
able instruments of diplomatic action — United
States militai-y power, the Organization of
American States, the United Nations, and an
appeal to public opinion around the world.^
The first role of the United Nations was to
serve as a world forum where the facts could be
laid on the table. Wlaen the Security Council
met in emergency session, I was able to present
the United States case not only to the members
of that Council but to all other members of the
United Nations who crowded that tense room,
as well as to the press and the microphones and
the cameras which carried our story to our own
public and to every corner of the world reached
by the mass media of today. Our case was
right; our case was thoroughly documented;
and our case was vastly strengthened as it un-
folded before the bar of world opinion in the
Security Council of the United Nations — the
only bar of universal public opinion there is.
Just how much this revelation of Soviet deceit
and recklessness shocked the innocent by-
standers in the cold war, I can't guess. Nor, of
course, can I estimate how much this blow to
confidence in Russia's word and influence
among the new nations contributed to Mr.
Khrushchev's decision to pull out quickly and
make the best of a bad mistake.
The second role of the United Nations — or,
more precisely, of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations — was that of third party to the
issue. At a critical moment, when the nuclear
powers seemed to be set on a collision course,
the Secretary-General's intervention led to the
diversion of the Soviet ships headed for Cuba
and interception by our Navy. This was an in-
dispensable first step. The mere existence of
^ For background, see Bulletin of Nov. 12, 1962, pp.
715-740.
AFKIL 8, 1963
680174 — 63-
525
n
an impartial office which could perform such a
service in the middle of the night at such a time
is no small asset to the human race.
The third role of the United Nations in the
Cuban crisis — the one which could not be played
out — was that of an international inspector
ready and willing to go at once to Cuba to
verify the removal of the missiles. As we all
know, Castro refused a United Nations presence
on Cuban soil ; U Thant's visit was in vain, and
thus Castro prevented a quicker and cleaner
liquidation of the crisis. But the fact is that at
the height of this most dangerous period of the
postwar world, Chairman Khrushchev agreed
— even proposed — an international inspection
team under United Nations auspices, a pi-oposal
to which we could quickly agree and which be-
came part of the formula for disengagement
between the United States and Soviet heads of
state.^ And Castro's refusal of U.N. inspection
converted a quarrel between the Soviet Union
and the United States into a defiance of the
United Nations by Cuba.
Finally — and I won't detain you longer on
this subject — the United Nations also provided
a site where Mr. [John J.] McCloy and I could
meet with Mr. [Vassily V.] Kuznetsov and the
Soviet negotiators for those long weeks to con-
clude the transaction and bring about the with-
drawal of the Soviet bombers.
Mr. Chairman, I should not care to speculate
on how or when the Cuban crisis might have
been resolved — or whether it could have been
resolved — without the United Nations. But I
do say that the United Nations played a large
part in a complex exercise in diplomatic action
which averted the threat of thermonuclear war;
and for this I think we can thank our stars.
U.S. Foreign Policy Interests Well Served
Now, gentlemen, we have put the record of
the United Nations at the I7th General As-
sembly, during the Congo crisis, and during the
Cuban crisis to the test ; and we have seen that,
in very large measure, the performance of the
U.N. served well the foreign policy interests of
the United States. There was, indeed, much
in it for us.
' For texts of messages exchanged between President
Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, see ibid., p. 741.
But I should prefer, in the end, not to read
that record as though it were a scoreboard on
which "victories" and "defeats" are recorded.
I prefer to avoid the specious habit of treating
the course of human affairs — even the massive
conflicts in world affairs — like some sporting
event which ends when the timekeeper blows his '
whistle.
The real world of international politics is, as
you know, not that simple. We are dealing
with fitful tides of history which ebb and flow.
We are wrestling often with problems which,
when solved in their immediate forms, promptly
give rise to new forms and new problems — as
witness the case of the Congo today.
We can, of course, say with assurance that,
in this case or that, our policies prevailed and
our objectives were gained. We can point to
objective proof of ])rogi-ess here and there. We
can show that unfriendly moves by x and y were
defeated or diverted, and that in all of these
cases the United Nations had a useful part to
play.
But to form mature judgments as to the real
value of the United Nations to the interests of
the United States, it seems to me that we must
raise alternatives, that we must ask questions
which challenge tlie imagination to say what
might have happened if the United Nations had
not been there at all. For example :
Would the Communists have fared better or
worse in their efforts to divert the independence
movement into a Communist mold — their su-
preme opportunity to extend power — if the
United Nations had not existed ?
Would the prospects of peace be better or
worse — in Iran, in Greece, in Korea, in Kash-
mir, in the Middle East, in the western Pacific,
in central Africa — if there had been no United
Nations during the past decade and a half?
Would United States foreign policy interests,
more recently in tlie Congo and the Caribbean,
have been served better or worse without a
United Nations during the past few months?
Could the United States put its ideas, its be-
liefs, its policies before tlie watching world
more — or less — effectively if the United Nations
did not exist?
I shall not attempt to speculate on these
rather frightening alternatives for it seems to
me tlie questions answer themselves.
526
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Opportunities for U.S. in an Open Forum
But I should like to conclude my remarks
with a few comments about the position of
those who favor the United Nations in principle
but want to withdraw or restrict our support
on those relatively few occasions when the
United States finds itself in a minority position.
The basic point here, of course, is that the
United States does not own or control the
United Nations. It is not a wing of tlie State
Department. We are no more and no less than
the most influential of the 110 members. If we
were less, we would be failing to exert the in-
fluence of freedom's leader; if we were more,
we would destroy the effectiveness of the U.N.,
which depends precisely on the fact that it is
not an arm of the United States or of any other
government but a truly international organiza-
tion — no better or worse than the agreements
which can be reached by the controllmg majori-
ties of its members.
Before such agreements are reached — or not
reached — debate and negotiation bare differ-
i ences and reveal similarities which frequently
lead to accommodation and compromise. And
I would ask : Is this not the heart of the demo-
cratic method? Is this not the parliamentary
system in action ? Is this not our own idea of
how we are most likely to make more wise de-
cisions than foolish ones — how the weak are
most likely to be protected from the strong —
how the will of the majority and the rights of
the minority can both find expression without
injustice to either?
The answer to these questions is yes. And
if we were to pick up our marbles and go home
whenever there is a disappointment, we would
not only destroy the effectiveness of the U.N.
but would abandon hope that nations can work
out their problems most of the time by the same
methods by which conflicting interests get re-
solved within democratic nations and commu-
nities. This would deny on the international
level the principles, methods, and tecliniques
which we swear by on the national and local
levels.
Even faith in our kind of institutions would
not, however, be enough to justify support for
the United Nations if it worked against us.
But this dilemma, happily, does not exist, and
the record proves it. The fact is that the story
of the last General Assembly, when the U.S.
position was the majority position better than
four times out of five, is the standard story of
successive Assemblies over the past 17 years.
The fact is that in 17 years the Soviet Union
has never once — never once — succeeded in build-
ing a majority for any proposition of substance
against the opposition of the United States.
And the fact is that in 17 years the United
States has never felt obliged to exercise its veto
in the Security Council to protect its interest,
and the Soviet Union has used the veto 100
times.
That's the record, and there is, of course, a
fundamental reason for it. The reason should
be recalled frequently, for in this fact lies one
of our greatest assets in the world today : the
fact that the foreign policy interests of the
United States are generally in hannony with
the foreign policy interests of all nations which
want to see a peaceful community of independ-
ent states working together, by fi-ee choice, to
improve the lot of humanity. And since the
majority of the nations of the world share this
goal, the majority consistently side with the
United States — or we side with them, depending
on your point of view — when the roll is called
and the yeas and nays are counted. It's as
simple as that.
But let us take a couple of blemishes in the
record and the performance of the U.N. and
its members — the kind of blemishes that lead
some of our people who favor the U.N. in prin-
ciple to want to restrict it in practice.
First, take a case where the United States
could not agree with a majority of the decision-
making group in a U.N. agency. A recent case
was the one that you referred to in your open-
ing statement, Mr. Chairman, of the decision
of the United Nations Special Fund to help fi-
nance an agricultural research project in Cuba.
We objected to that project and still do.* Yet
the whole story is that out of 288 projects as-
sisted by that Fund, in the course of its exist-
ence, we approved of 287. So we face a choice :
Should we retaliate by withholding or limiting
our support, for an agency which we invented,
which has allocated 97 percent of its funds to
nations which we ourselves are aiding, and
' For background, see ibid., Mar. 11, 1963, p. 357.
APRIL 8, 1963
527
which represents an economical way for the
United States to contribute to the Decade of
Development, because in 1 instance out of 288
instances we were unable to persuade a majority
that our view was the correct one ?
Let me refer also to a situation which seems
to agitate some of our people — the fact that the
Soviet Union does not make the voluntary con-
tributions which it is well able to make to such
programs as technical assistance, malaria eradi-
cation, the World Food Program, and so forth.
Their delinquency is deplorable but understand-
able from their point of view. These programs
do not serve Communist ends ; on the contrary.
So it is hardly surprising that the Soviet Union
makes little or no voluntary contributions to
agencies whose work cuts straight across their
own objectives. But should we support these
programs less because they fail to win applause
from the Kremlin?
As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I rather
suspect that the Soviet Union and other Com-
munist coimtries will tend to participate — and
contribute — somewhat more in the work of these
agencies in the years to come. There is some
evidence of that already. And I think that the
reason is clear. Tlie policy of self-ostracism
from the specialized agencies has not worked
well for the Soviet Union, even though it has
made life with them a bit easier for us.
If this in fact happens, it will raise some day-
to-day problems for us, but, in my view, it also
will raise problems for them and opportunities
for us. For while the so-called Communist
states operate more or less closed societies at
home, once they step out into a United Nations
forum they enter an open society.
In an open forum, over a period of time, ide-
ology becomes transparent, dogma wears thin
and becomes tiresome, and the myth of the mag-
ical solution evaporates slowly in the free air of
a marketplace of ideas. There is contention in
all this; there is fnistration and the stuff of
headlines ; there is danger that the fearful and
the insecure will want to withdraw from the
free interplay of conflicting ideas and concepts
and terminology — especially if, now and again,
things do not go exactly the way we would like
them to.
Yet it is we who do best in the open forum,
for this is our natural habitat. And if we have
528
the nerve to go ahead, if we have the stomach
for the test of the open society, if we have the
courage to build even that which is not perfect
from our point of view, I can foresee nothing
but a more meaningful dialog coming out of
it, a gradual erosion of tension, and finally the
dominance of a set of ideas which are better —
and better able also to stand the test — than the
Marxist ideas as revealed to his successors.
All this would require, on our part, a degree
of responsibility, of restraint, of maturity, and
of political sophistication which never before
has been demanded of a democratic public and
its elected representatives. It will not be easy,
and it will not be without temporary disap-
pointments; and I, for one, have no doubt of
the outcome — for this, too, would serve and
serve well the foreign policy interests of the
United States of America.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed below) mat/ be consulted at depository libraries in
the United States. U.N. printed publications may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na-
tions, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Letter dated January 22, 1963, from the Secretary-
General to the President of the Security Council
transmitting a General Assembly resolution on the
situation in Angola. S/5239. January 29, 1963. 3
pp.
General Assembly
Report of the Subcommittee on the Situation in An-
gola. A/5286. November 14, 1962. 88 pp.
United Nations Conference on Consular Relations:
Collection of bilateral consular treaties. A/-
CONF.2.5/4. November 12, 1962, 271 pp.
Guide to the draft articles on consular relations
adopted by the International Law Commission.
A/CONF.25/0. January 8, 1963. 170 pp.
Chapter II of the report of the International Law
Commission covering the worii of its 13th session,
containing the text of draft articles on consular
relations and commentaries adopted by the Com-
mission at that session. A/CONF.25/6. January
8, 1963. 40 pp.
Letter dated December 10 from the permanent repre-
sentative of the Soviet Union to the Secretary-Gen-
eral transmitting a letter from the North Korean
regime and a document of the North Korean Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs entitled "On the Criminal
Acts Committed by the U.S. Army in Korea." A/-
C.1/884. December 10, 1962. 33 pp.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The United Nations Role in Political Disputes
hy Joseph J. Sisco
Director, Office of United Nations Political Affairs '■
Secretary Kusk said recently,- "We tend to
forget so much — and so fast. Nowadays there
are those who seem to think that . . . tlie
United Nations is a fanciful exercise for those
who wish to talk somewhat idly about a world
which has not and camiot come into existence.
In truth, a central issue of the cold war is the
(United Nations itself — its charter, its concept
of a decent world order, its commitment to
ipeaceful settlement of disputes, its concern for
himian rights, the expansion of trade, economic
and social progress, and our deepest aspirations
toward a disarmed and peaceful world."
Because world order does not exist at a time
when world interdependence has become a real-
ity, the United Nations is not a "fanciful exer-
cise" but an indispensable necessity.
All of us, I believe, accept the fact that there
are no absolute answers to the agonies and
searchings of our time. The process of giving
flesh to the bones of the United Nations Charter
has been going on for 17 years, and the mil-
lennium is obviously not just around the comer.
This is scarcely a matter for surprise or dis-
couragement. No more arduous task — no more
necessary task — has ever been undertaken by
mankind in recorded histoiy. For as President
Kennedy has said : ^
. . . arms alone are not enough to keep the peace :
it must be kept by men. Our instrument and our hope
is the United Nations. . . . We may not always agree
' Address made before the 13th Annual Conference of
National Organizations, called by the American Asso-
ciation for the United Nations at Washington, D.C., on
Mar. 11 (press release 120 dated Mar. 8).
' Bulletin of Mar. 18, 1963, p. 393.
" IMd., Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
with every detailed action taken by every officer of the
United Nations, or with every voting majority. But as
an institution it should have in the future, as it has
had in the past since its inception, no stronger or more
faithful member than the United States of America.
Regrettably, an assessment of the United Na-
tions in terms of U.S. national interests has been
obscured or distorted by both ardent friends
and implacable foes, by those who feel the U.N.
does too little and those who feel it does too
much.
What I say here today is not intended to pro-
vide ammunition for either enthusiastic friend
or hard-bitten foe. My hope is that you will
find in my words a dispassionate summing up
of both the capacities and limitations of the
United Nations, for above all the United Na-
tions is a human institution reflecting both the
strengths and weaknesses of mankind.
Scope of the United Nations
The scope of the United Nations today is
impressive.
In the Middle East the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency continues to feed and clothe
over a million refugees. The United Nations
Emergency Force patrols daily the armistice
demarcation lines. The United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization copes with touchy in-
cidents which could spark into broader con-
flagrations. A representative of the Secretary-
General, the distinguished American Dr. Ralph
Bunche, is exploring ways to help ease relation-
ships between the new Yemen Arab Republic
and its neighbors.
In the Far East the United Nations tem-
APEIL 8, 1963
529
porary executive authority is helping to assure
peaceful transfer of West New Guinea from
the Dutch to Indonesian administration, prior
to arrangements being made by Indonesia and
the U.N. for the exercise of self-determination.
A representative of the Secretary-General is
actively engaged in easing relations between
Thailand and Cambodia. U.N. observers in
Kaslimir continue to police the cease-fire lines.
In Africa United Nations "presences" are
important elements of stability, in addition to
the organization's key role in the Congo.
The United Nations has an economic com-
mission in Europe, in Latin America, in the Far
East, and in Africa. There are 53 resident rep-
resentatives, prunarily in underdeveloped areas,
providing essential technical and administra-
tive guidance.
The United Nations is not a substitute for
policy. It is an organization in which the
United States pursues its national interests
through peaceful means.
This is a familiar theme to you. Let us use
this measuring rod to determine how well the
U.S. came out in three ways: first, at the
recently concluded I7th session of the General
Assembly; secondly, during the Cuban crisis;
and thirdly, in connection with the United
Nations Operation in the Congo.
Restraint and Reason in 17tli G.A.
Eestraint and reason, for the most part, pre-
vailed in the I7th General Assembly of the
United Nations. A recently completed tabu-
lation of the voting on 29 key issues before the
Assembly shows that the majority coincided
with the United States position 22 times. Of
the total votes compiled, more than twice as
many coincided with the U.S. vote as coincided
with the Soviet bloc.
For those who fear that the United States
is being submerged within the huge voting blocs
of the present 110-nation U.N., a brief look at
some of the key results of the 17th Assembly
is worth while.
The Assembly elected U Thant Secretary-
General for a full term. The troika never got
out of the barn, and the Soviets were forced
to rein in their attempt to get a veto over the
U.N. Secretariat.
The World Court's opinion was accepted by
an overwhelming majority, thereby making
payment of the Congo and Middle East peace-
keeping expenses obligatoiy for member states.
But we must guard against optimism. This
was an important action but only a preliminary
bout won ; the main decision will have to come
at the special Assembly session on finances in
May of this year. Collective financial responsi-
bility — or lack of it — can mean the difference
between an effective and ineffective United
Nations. It can mean the difference between a
conference-type U.N. and one with real execu-
tive and peacekeeping capacities. "The U.S.
position on any possible future contribution
above our regular scale assessment for peace-
keeping operations will be decisively influenced
in the months ahead by the financial support
which other members of the United Nations
actually provide." *
The Chinese representation vote came out
even better than last year.
A resolution reafiinning the United States
position on Korean unification was again
adopted.
The Assembly asked the Secretary-General
to establish a U.N. presence in South-West
Africa.
The Assembly once again endorsed our posi-
tion on Himgary ; it has called upon the Secre-
tary-General to take a hand in the matter.
Under the general umbrella of the Decade of
Development, the Assembly asked for a study
of a proposed U.N. institute for training and
research in U.N. operations, called a U.N. con-
ference to study problems of international
trade and development, affirmed the importance
and the legal rights of private investment in
developing countries, and passed a resolution
on population which was at once liistoric in its
recognition of the problem and moderate in its
proposals for dealing with it.
These results are on the plus side of the
ledger. But we must face frankly that on
colonial issues we frequently favored more mod-
erate recommendations than some adopted by
the Assembly. The preoccupation of the U.N.
with colonialism, understandable as it may be,
* For text of a statement released by the U.S. Mission
to the U.N. on Mar. 6, see Hid., Mar. 25, 1963, p. 443.
530
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
is of course also exploited by the Soviet Union.
But it must be recognized that the basic prob-
lems ai-ising from the breakup of old colonial
patterns are, for the most part, ones which the
Tnited States would have to face whether or
not there wei'e a United Nations. The United
States launched and has long been committed
to the principle of self-determination. As a
leader of the free world, it has a legitimate in-
terest in orderly progress toward self-govern-
ment. The fact that this progress is faster and
less orderly in some cases than we would desire
is perhaps inherent in the present irresistible
drive for independence. This drive does not
originate in the United Nations. "VVliile the ex-
istence of the United Nations probably helps
intensify the drive for self-determination, it
also has provided a valuable safety valve as well
as a restraining brake. And the existence of
United Nations machinery has eased the pain-
ful shift from old, established patterns with a
minimum of disturbance and disorder in most
cases.
The end of traditional colonialism is in sight.
But among the problems which remain are
some of the toughest ones. Nevertheless, the
impact of the colonial issue can be expected to
diminish befoi-e too long. "Wliere the West is
able to take a position that is responsive to the
basic objectives that the Africans and the
Asians deem important, we can influence them
toward moderation.
The Cuban Crisis
Let me turn to the Cuban crisis.
The Cuban crisis demonstrated the utility of
the various diplomatic instruments available to
the United States in a crisis. Coordination of
national action, bilateral diplomacy, regional
arrangements, and the United Nations system
marked the handling of the crisis throughout.
The United Nations was important in three
ways : as a forum for exposing Soviet duplicity
and enlisting diplomatic support ; as an effective
instrumentality for international conciliation
and a defuser of the crisis; and as an in-
stitution willing and able on short notice to
serve as inspector to verify the removal of the
offensive weapons and to guard against their
reintroduction.
President Greets Conference
of National Organizations
FoUoicing is the text of a letter from Presi-
dent Kennedy to Clark M. Eichelberger, execu-
tive director of the American Association for the
United Nations.
White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla.) dated
March 16, for release March 17
Makch 7, 1963
Dear Mr. Eichelberger : Please extend my
greetings and good wishes to each of the dele-
gates to the Thirteenth Annual Conference of
National Organizations and to the organizations
they represent, including the American Associa-
tion for the United Nations which is sponsoring
this important meeting.
It is good that you are getting a progress re-
port on the first year of the United Nations
Decade of Development. Few activities can
equal in importance those which are related to
helping men and women around the world to
acquire the skills and organizations — of govern-
ment and of business — which are needed not
only to improve the standards of living but also
to lift up the quality of life. It is the well-
established policy of our government to aid such
efforts, through the United Nations and through
other appropriate channels.
I note that the American Association for the
United Nations is now celebrating its fortieth
anniversary of work in behalf of organizations
standing for hope, and decency, and the rule of
law in the affairs of nations : at first the League
of Nations and now the United Nations. But
the fact that there is now wide public acceptance
and support of the United Nations does not mean
that your jobs of education and of provoking
discussion are finished. Many unresolved prob-
lems still face the United Nations. One of the
thorniest is that of financial responsibility ; an-
other is that of maintaining a truly international
civil service.
Finally, may I join you in your tribute to
Eleanor Roosevelt? Time will not tarnish the
luster of her legacy to us, nor will future genera-
tions forget her tireless work and selfless devo-
tion to the highest concept of human rights. May
the memory of her life continue to bring inspira-
tion to men and women in every land.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy
Ambassador Stevenson's speeches in the Se-
curity Council, together with the photographs
and explanations to the delegations, presented
incontrovertible evidence of the presence of So-
APRIL 8, 1963
531
viet offensive weapons in a dramatic and effec-
tive way. In addition the United Nations
provided a forum in which the American Re-
publics could impress on the world and on the
Secretary-General their solidarity on this issue.
This public exposure in the United Nations
was one factor — and I do not contend it was the
most important factor — for what followed.
Shortly thereafter Chairman Khrushchev ad-
mitted the presence of offensive weapons in
Cuba and agreed to withdraw them.
The Secretary-General was an effective go-
between, especially during the early days. His
intervention on the second day of the Security
Council debate, at the request of a large num-
ber of United Nations representatives, helped
defuse the crisis and led to the cooling-off
formula under which Soviet ships stayed away
from the interception area. This was a classic
example of the use of the United Nations as a
third-party instrumentality.
The readiness of the U.N. to provide on-site
inspection in rapid order, after Khrushchev
had agreed, attests further to its utility in this
crisis. This did not succeed, of course, because
Castro would not permit U.N. inspection on
Cuban soil, but the rejection helped to under-
score that the dispute was not only one between
Cuba and the Organization of American
States but also one between Cuba and the
United Nations.
In short, the United Nations proved useful
in a big-power dispute — in an issue of peace
and war.
The Congo Crisis
Now I turn to the third test, the Congo.
Today, after 2i/^ years of difficulties and
frustrations, reasonable quiet has returned to
the Congo. I believe the conclusion is inescap-
able. The United Nations Operation in the
Congo has served the national interest of the
United States.
It has helped to maintain a free, moderate
government for the Congo as a whole.
It has warded off dangers of civil war.
It has helped avoid direct great-power inter-
vention which could have resulted in American
forces fighting in the Congo.
It has ended secession from the left and from
the right and has spiked the ambitions of the
Communists to establish a base in the heart of
central Africa.
I believe history will prove that the decision
made by the Eisenhower administration in the
summer of 1960 and reaffirmed by President
Kennedy subsequently to support a U.N. peace-
keeping operation was the correct one. Surely
those who are critical of the decision to support
the United Nations in the Congo would not have
preferred the direct use of American military
force.
Most Americans recognize the merit in these
arguments, yet a number of specific questions
about the Congo are still raised.
First, as to its legality. The U.N. operation
is and was a legal operation. The United!
Nations was asked to come in by the Govern-
ment of the Congo. Moreover, the military
actions taken by the United Nations Force were'
pursuant to the mandate laid down by the'
Security Council. The fighting which occurred'
this past December was initiated by the Katan
gese; the actions taken by the United Nations
were in self-defense and in the exercise of free-
dom of movement throughout the Katanga.
Moreover, the United Nations action did not
constitute intervention in the internal affairs of
the Congo. The situation there was clearly a
threat to international peace and security be-
cause of the actual or potential involvement of
outside powers. It was in this kind of situation
that the Government of the Congo asked for
United Nations help.
There are those who have felt that in the
Congo we somehow turned our back on the
traditional United States support for the
principle of self-determination. This is cer-
tainly not the case. Too few people realize
that Tshombe [Moise Tshombe, President of
Katanga Province] could not pretend to
speak for all of the Katanga. As leader of
the Lunda tribe, his main support resided in
South Katanga. In the north he has been
strongly opposed by the Baluba tribe.
Tshombe's party gained only 25 in a 60-seat
Assembly in the only popular election ever held
in the Katanga. He received less than a
majority in the Katanga Parliament. Support
which he has received during the past 21/2 years
532
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
las been from a rump parliament lacking full
Baluba representation.
And it is wortli repeating that Tshombe him-
self agreed to the concept of a single Congolese
5tate at the Brussels roundtable conference of
January 1960. At the Kitona conference he
did so again. In accepting tlie Thant concili-
ation plan, he once more opted for a unified
Congo.
All of these are important facts since they
relate to questions which are being asked fre-
quently by Americans.
Looking Ahead in the Congo
But now we must look ahead to the important
task of reconstruction and reconciliation. As
Assistant Secretary Cleveland reported recently
to President Kennedy, the Congo remains a
paradox — staggering problems in the present
and impressive prospects in the future.^ The
United Nations can play a role which no single
nation could play alone without compromising
Congolese independence and making the Congo
a subject of cold- war controversy.
As it enters the reconstruction phase of its
young life, the Republic of the Congo faces
three key obstacles to progress:
First, regrettably it still has an underde-
veloped political system which is not yet able to
take vigorous, executive action which will make
itself felt throughout the territorial confines of
the Congo.
Secondly, it is maintaining an expensive mili-
tary establishment which needs more training
before it can assmne a progressively greater
share of the problem of maintaining law and
order in all the provinces of the Congo. In the
absence of U.N. forces an internal security
vacuum could result, inviting outside meddling.
Thirdly, the Congo has a financial adminis-
tration which collects much less revenue than
it needs and than it could.
More than on external aid, success in the
reconstruction effort in the Congo depends on
developing the administrative fiber to train the
national army, get the fiscal system under con-
trol, and construct a political system featuring
° For a summary of the report, see ibid., Apr. 1, 1963,
p. 481.
a strong executive. If these prerequisites can
be met, the Congo should not be a burden on its
friends for long, because its resources are great.
'WHiat is needed now is an agenda for recon-
struction in the Congo, including as one part
the tying up of the loose ends of Katanga's rein-
tegration. The U Thant plan for peaceful re-
integration of Katanga has been partly fulfilled
and partly bypassed by the events of last De-
cember and this past January.
A de facto federalism is actually developing
in the Congo.
The integration of the currency, as envisaged
in the U Thant plan, is well underway.
The Katanga gendarmerie are being slowly
integrated into the national Congolese army,
but much more needs to be done.
Katanga's "foreign affairs" establishment re-
mains to be eliminated.
The executive amnesty already announced for
Tshombe and his colleagues is in effect.
We hope a training program for the Con-
golese armed forces under the aegis of the
United Nations can get started at a reasonably
early date. It should be possible to reduce the
United Nations Force level rather quickly so
that the financial drain on the United Nations
can be reduced.
Inflation is a serious problem in the Congo
largely because governmental expenditures ex-
ceed revenues despite the growing production
and rising exports. For every franc taken in
by the Central Government last year, the Gov-
ernment spent nearly five. Nothing less than
a well-financed, well-coordinated, and well-
staffed stabilization program, pursued with res-
olution and resourcefulness, will avoid the
runaway inflation which could bring serious
political trouble to the Congo.
We believe other members of the United Na-
tions, as well as ourselves, can do much. The
Congolese Government recognizes it needs the
assistance of a number of other coimtries. The
presence in the Congo's future of large and
small contributors requires the multilateral co-
ordination of bilateral efforts, both in retain-
ing the national army and in stabilizing the de-
velopment of the Congolese economy. In this
regard we believe the U.N. has an important
role.
APRIL 8, 1963
533
This is tlie United Nations story in the Congo,
past and future. The situation is better, but
risks and uncertainties remain. And I like to
think, too, that the 31-month Congo crisis may
well have brought Africa of age.
In July 1960 Africa was hurtling toward na-
tional independence. Colonialism evoked deep
stirrings. In some quarters the Soviet Union
was regarded as a friend of Africa, or at least
a force that could be safely used to one's ad-
vantage. Leftist politicians like Patrice Lu-
mumba were able to secure wide followings.
The Congo's grim ordeal has helped to change
some of this. It has impressed upon the Afri-
can consciences some valuable and lasting les-
sons which tliey are the first to acknowledge.
The fact that unprepared independence is not
in anyone's best interest was perhaps the most
vivid, single lesson of the Congo. Evidence
that this lesson was learned, at least by some
leaders in Africa, came midway in the Congo
experience, when Ewanda and Bunmdi achieved
independence in circumstances quite different
from the Congo. A U.N. presence there helped
ease the birth pangs.
More and more African nations are learning
to make the distinction between colonialism, on
the one hand, and legitimate foreign investment
on the other.
Efforts to proclaim a rigid U.N. deadline for
total independence everywhere could not muster
majority support in tlie last Assembly.
There are also some signs at the United Na-
tions of a new appreciation of the neocolonial-
ism which the Soviet imperialist system and
doctrinaire dogma represent. More and more
Soviet colonialism is being denounced at the
United Nations.
Moreover, it is significant that the United
States emerged from the Congo with solid Afri-
can support. The United States' key role in
unifying the Congo has by no means been over-
looked by the Africans. Soviet refusal to sup-
port the United Nations effort by contrast has
also been an eye opener.
None of this is true without exception evei-y-
where in Africa. Communism has not thrown
in the sponge, nor have all Africans shaken off
the effects of past mistreatment. However, a
decade of gi'owth has been concentrated, ad-
mittedly painfully, into 21/^ tumultuous years.
Report to Senate Committees 4|
I wisli to bring to your attention a few ob-
servations made in a report submitted recently
to the Senate Foreign Eelations and Appropria-
tions Committees by Senators [Albert] Gore
and [Gordon] Allott after their participation
at tlie 17th General Assembly as members of the
United States delegation. The report includes
three significant points regarding United
States participation in the United Nations.
In the first place, our view of the world makes it In*
escapable that we should maintain the position "that
the first principle of a free system is an uutrammeled
flow of words in an open forum." . . . This tedium
and palaver, which characterizes U.N. procedures, is
at once its most exasperating aspect and its saving
grace.
Secondly, the United States regards the U.N. as at
least potentially the best available multilateral instru-
ment for preserving the peace, not only between the
great powers, but also in superficially less important
areas — especially where the great powers might feel
impelled to intervene. In keeping with this aim, our
country also labors at the United Nations in an effort
to damp down explosive forces which might easily in-
volve free world members in oiien conflict with one
another. Unfortunately, this policy often has the by-
product of making it seem that the United States is
heavily absorbed in essentially negative tasks, no mat-
ter how desirable their outcome.
Thirdly, the United States regards tlie United Na-
tions as an educational device of great value. . . . the
mere act of participating in the deliberations of the
United Nations tends to educate the delegates from
non-Western societies in concepts favoring our view
of the world community.
Tlie report goes on to say that
... it is easy to assess the U.S. position as being
far more defensive and static than is really the case.
This is particularly true at times when the Commu-
nist states, which by definition can accept only a
totalitarian world community, step up their trouble-
making and their attacks on the procedures and or-
ganization of the United Nations. Rather than seeing
these attacks as a measure of the success of U.S.
policy in influencing the United Nations to reflect our
concepts, some of our citizens appear to believe that
the U.N. is wide open to Communist influence.
With full recognition of the problems involved . . .
it is nevertheless clear that there could be diminishing
public approval for the U.N. in this country unless
these factors are made more comprehensible to our
citizens. This continues to be especially true with
respect to the United Nations operation in the Congo.
These observations are of direct interest to
your association.
[h
534
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I have one tinal thought. It might be well to
•ecall that the Founding Fathers of our great
lation took upon themselves the responsibility
'or the creation of a new and independent state
>n American soil. They did so in finn trust
n the future and with firm belief in the basic
lecency of man. In that spirit, they managed
o M-eld togetlier in one nation people from
nany nations. In its belief for freedom and in
ts hope for world unity the Charter of the
United Nations expresses an approach to the
political problems of man which would have
been well understood by men like Jefferson and
Lincoln.
Aristotle said that the end of politics must
be the good of man. Man's greatest good and
greatest present need is to establish world peace.
Without it, the democratic enterprise — one
might even say the human entei'prise — will be
utterly, fatally doomed. The United Nations
is striving to achieve such a peace.
The United Nations Financial Crisis
hy Richard N. Gardner
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Ajfairs ^
It is a singular privilege to be able to address
;his amiual conference. I do not say this out of
mechanical courtesy but from a deep apprecia-
tion of the work which all of you are doing to
promote understanding and support around the
country for U.S. policy in the United Nations —
work which I have had an opportunity to ad-
mire at first hand on several occasions during
the last year.
My admiration for your work has grown with
the progress of this conference. You have or-
ganized discussions in depth on some of the
most significant and challenging aspects of the
work of the United Nations. You have charted
a bold course for the United Nations in a num-
ber of key areas — in keej^ing the peace, in pro-
moting disarmament, in furthering cooperation
in outer space, in guiding economic and social
development. Yours has been a rich intellec-
tual menu. Perhaps it is therefore appropriate
that you have left to the end the inevitable
question, "Wlio is going to pick up the check?"
In treating this subject today I shall not
speak about various long-term solutions to the
U.N.'s financial problem — for example, the de-
velopment of independent sources of revenue.
Other participants in this panel may wish to
deal with various possibilities of this kind. It
is appropriate — it is useful — for discussions of
the long-term problem to go forward. But
you will recall the famous words of Lord
Keynes: "In the long run we are all dead."
There will not be a long run in which to seek
bold solutions for U.N. financing unless we can
deal with the financial crisis which faces us here
and now.
Therefore I propose to confine my remarks
today to the present financial crisis of the
United Nations and to consider in turn three
specific questions : Wlaat has caused this finan-
cial crisis? "Wliat progress has been made in
coping with it ? Wliat now remains to be done ?
Causes of U.N. Financial Crisis
The causes of the U.N.'s financial difficulties
are familiar to most of you. These difficulties
do not arise from the ordinary operations which
are paid from the U.N.'s regular budget. The
1 Address made before the 13th Annual Conference of
National Organizations, called by the American Asso-
ciation for the United Nations at Washington, D.C., on
Mar. 12 (press release 124).
APRIL 8, 1963
535
regular budget covers such items as salaries of
members of the Secretariat, expenses of operat-
ing the headquarters building in New York, and
the costs of meetings and conferences. It also
includes some of the smaller peacekeeping ex-
penditures such as the truce supervision activi-
ties in Palestine, Kashmir, and Korea.
The regular budget is financed principally
by an agi-eed scale of assessments on members,
which is broadly based on capacity to pay. The
U.S. contributes 32.02 percent of this amount.
The payment record of tlie members is gener-
ally good, and the arrears are not of disruptive
dimensions.
As you know, however, the expenses for the
Middle East and Congo operations were
financed from the beginning from separate ac-
counts. Taken together, these operations since
1960 have imposed on the members of the U.N.
expenses of about $140 million a year — about
double the size of the regular budget.
Because these costs were so large, opposition
quickly developed on the part of many U.N.
members to sharing the cost in the usual man-
ner — that is, on the basis of the percentage
assessments used in the regular budget. In
order to gain approval by the General Assem-
bly for resolutions to finance these operations
it was necessary, beginning with the Middle
East operation in 1956, to reduce the assess-
ments for members less able to pay — in other
words to assess them for peacekeeping opera-
tions at only a fraction of the assessment they
have to pay for the regular budget.
Over the last few years almost 90 percent of
the U.N. membership has secured relief from
the regular assessment rate with respect to the
Congo and Middle East budgets. Of the 110
U.N. members, 42 countries have a regular
assessment rate of .04 percent. For Congo and
UNEF [United Nations Emergency Force]
their assessment was reduced by 80 percent of
their normal scale— to .008 percent. As an ex-
ample of how this has worked out, we can look
at the way the costs of the Congo and Middle
East operations were shared in the first half of
1962. Instead of being asked to pay the
$35,900 they would have paid at the regular
budget scale, these countries were asked to pay
only $7,180.
Reductions by 80 percent were also given 41^
additional comitries whose regular budget
assessment rate was more than .04 percent but
who were i-ecipients of U.N. teclmical assist-
ance. Moreover, 4 additional coimtries re-
ceived 50-percent reductions. Thus no less
than 89 member governments were excused
from 50 percent to 80 percent of their assess-
ments to these vital peace and security opera-
tions.
To finance these operations, notwithstand-
ing the reduced assessments on these 89 coim-
tries, the Secretary-General appealed for vol-
untary contributions. Starting with the
Middle East operation in 1957, the United
States has made large voluntary contributions
each year in addition to its regular scale assess-
ment to make it possible for these operations to
go forward. In the last several years no other
country has made voluntary contributions of
this kind — with the sole exception of the
United Kingdom, which has made very small
voluntary payments for the Middle East
operation. With these voluntary payments
added to our assessed share, the United States
in recent years has been assuming an average
of about 48 percent of the burden of the Congo
and Middle East operations.
This is the method of financing U.N. peace-
keeping operations which has been in effect
since 1957. It does not take very long to con-
clude that this system had two imacceptable
aspects :
First, it placed a disproportionate share —
nearly half — of the cost of these operations on
the United States.
Second, and even more important, a large
number of U.N. members were not even meet-
ing their obligations imder this arrangement:
— The members of the Communist bloc
refused to pay because they oppose peacekeep-
ing operations in general.
— France, Soutli Africa, the Arab countries,
and others refused to pay for at least one of the
operations because they did not agree with this
peacekeeping operation in particular.
— Others, including most of the less devel-
oped countries, failed to pay even their reduced
assessments and argued that they were too poor
to do so.
536
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
-To make matters worse, legal arguments
ere advanced by the Commimist bloc and many
ier coimtries to the effect that the General
embly could not levy valid assessments for
icekeeping operations outside the regular
ludget and accordingly that they were under
\o obligation to pay.
As a result of this nonpayment of assess-
aents, the United States was in the unaccept-
Ible position of paying in even more than the
18 percent of the Middle East and Congo opera-
lions it had undertaken to pay, although of
lurse the amounts are still due and payable by
le defaulters. At the same time the gap
)6tween the assessments due for the costs of the
iwo operations and the money actually received
Tom the membership continued to grow imtil
t reached about $100 million by the middle of
L962.
rogress of "Rescue Operation"
To reduce the disproportionate U.S. share of
T.N. peacekeeping operations, to avoid the
imminent collapse of these operations as a result
'of the growing deficit, and to safeguard the
I future potential of the U.N. as a vital factor in
maintaining peace and security, the U.S. Gov-
ernment joined with other free-world countries
and with the Secretary- General to search for
ways and means of solving the U.N.'s financial
crisis. This search produced a rescue operation
beginning in the 16th General Assembly which
had four major elements :
First, one more General Assembly resolution
for the emergency financing of the Middle East
and Congo operations for the first 6 montlis of
1962 by the usual combination of assessments
and voluntary contributions.
Second, a bond issue to finance these opera-
tions after June 30, 1962, while a more satis-
factory solution to the financial problem was
worked out.
Third, a request to the International Court
of Justice for an advisory opinion which would
establish a firm legal basis for the collection of
arrearages by determining whether peacekeep-
ing assessments constituted binding legal obli-
gations in the same way as assessments for the
regular budget.
Fourth, an intensified study of better ways
of financing U.N. peacekeeping operations in
the future.
Since this rescue operation was approved by
the 16th General Assembly in December 1961,
there has been progress on a number of fronts.
Purchases of U.N. bonds got miderway in
1962. The United States Congress authorized
a loan to the United Nations to purchase bonds
up to the amount purchased by all other coim-
tries.- Some foreign governments, such as the
Scandinavian coimtries, responded handsomely
to the bond issue by purchasing amoimts far in
excess of their regular budget percentage. And
the 17th General Assembly in its budget author-
ization for 1963 included an amount of
$4,650,000 for repayment of interest and princi-
pal of the bonds in the regular U.N. budget, in
which the U.S. share is 32.02 percent.
The International Court of Justice handed
down last July a favorable advisory opinion
which ruled that the costs incurred by the U.N.
in the Congo and Middle East operations were
"expenses of the organization" and that the
assessments levied to pay for them constituted
binding legal obligations. The General Assem-
bly accepted this opinion on December 19, 1962,
by a vote of 76 in favor, 17 against, and 8
abstentions.^
The events in the General Assembly leading
up to the acceptance of this opinion provided
considerable grounds for satisfaction. A num-
ber of states, including the Soviet bloc and
France, urged tliat the General Assembly
should only "take note" of the Court's opinion.
The effect of this language, as brought out in
the debate, would have left it to the discretion
of each state whether it considered itself bound
to pay for the peacekeeping assessments. An
amendment to change the wording of the res-
olution from "accepts" to "takes note" was pro-
posed in the Fifth Committee and defeated by
28 votes in favor, 61 against, and 14 abstentions.
The debate on the advisory opinion made it
abundantly clear that the term "accepts" used
in the General Assembly resolution meant that
" For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 26, 1962, p.
311, and July 23, 1962, p. 142.
^ For background and text of resolution, see ibid.,
Jan. 7, 1963, p. 30.
APRIL 8, 1963
537
the U-N". was adoptiiig the Court's view as its
operating rule. This means that the assess-
ments in question have been determined to be
binding obligations on member states and are
therefore due and payable. If not paid, a mem-
ber becomes subject to loss of vote in the Gen-
eral Assembly, under article 19 of the charter,
if its total aiTears exceed its last 2 years' assess-
ments on all accounts. This will apply to the
Soviet Union as of January 1, 1964, if it pays
nothing for the Congo and UNEF between now
and that time.
With the question about the legality of past
assessments out of the way, the Secretary-Gen-
eral was at last in a position to mount an effec-
tive campaign to collect them. A number of
governments which had declined to pay their
assessments for the Middle East and Congo op-
erations announced in the wake of the General
Assembly resolution that they would now begin
to pay.
The 17th General Assembly also decided to
increase the working capital fund from $25 mil-
lion to $40 million. Tliis action establishes a
more rational relationship between the present
level of the i-egular budget and the need for re-
serves. It adds significantly to the financial ca-
pacity and resources of the organization.
As a further measure to put the U.N.'s
financial house in order, the Secretary-General
appointed as his chief financial adviser Eugene
Black, former president of the World Bank.
Mr. Black Mill assist the Secretaiy-General in
dealing with the problem of arrearages as well
as advise him generally on other aspects of the
U.N.'s financial problem.
Finally, the General Assembly buckled down
to work on the future financing of peacekeeping
operations. It set up a working group of 21
nations, of which the U.S. is a member, to study
and make recommendations on a cost-sharing
formula for the future costs of these opera-
tions.* The group is now in session and is imder
instnictions to complete its work by March 31.
A special session of the General Assembly has
been called to convene on May 14 to act on its
recommendations.
All tliis is on the credit side of the ledger.
* For text of a General Assembly resolution on fi-
nancing peacekeeping operations, see ibid., p. 37.
but the last year has registered serious debit;
as well.
Although the General Assembly authorizeo
a $200 million bond issue, only about $74 mil
lion has been subscribed by 58 countries othej
than the United States, despite our readiness
to buy up to $100 million of bonds on a match-
ing basis. Assuming that all the bonds sub-
scribed are actually purchased, the Unitec
States' matching purchase would bring the
total up to only about $148 million of the $20(
million worth of bonds that was anticipated
Prudent financing dictates that the rest of thest
bonds be sold — and sold quickly.
Moreover, although many members have in-
dicated their readiness to abide by the law
declared by the International Court and con-
firmed by the General Assembly, they have not
actually paid. The Soviet bloc, which appar-
ently does not believe in abiding by the law
even after it has been declared, has still not paidi
one cent toward the Middle East and Congo op-
erations. France is still refusing to pay its past
assessments for the Congo; indeed, it has an-
nounced that it will not even pay that portion
of its regular budget assessment which is nec-
essary to pay back the principal and interest
on the U.N". bonds.
As a result of these and other facts, arrears
owed to the U.N. as of January 1, 1963.
amounted to $121 million. Twenty-five U.N.
members have still paid nothing on their UNEF
assessments ; 48 members have still paid nothing
on their Congo assessments.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the
United Nations is not being supported and is
not supporting itself, when arrears have ac-
cumulated so far and continue to increase and
when major and minor powers continue to re-
fuse to fulfill their legal obligations.
If this situation long continues, public opin-
ion in the United States will be forced to inter-
pret these facts as a denial in practice by many
members of the U.N. of something which all
the members have accepted in principle: that
peacekeeping operations are conducted in the
interest of the well-being of the entire world
and should be the responsibility of all the mem-
bers of the organization. This is what we mean
by the phrase "collective financial responsi-
538
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ility" — it is, or should be, the oonierstone of
lie organization.
lext Steps To Be Taken
It is against this mixed record of success
nd failure that we must now consider what
ext steps to take in dealing with the U.N.'s
inancial crisis.
In discussing these next steps it will be useful
o keep our eye on the central question. The
)roblem currently before the Working Group
f Twenty-one in New York is very specific;
lamely, how to finance the Congo and Middle
ast operations beyond June 30, which is about
vhen the money from the bond issue runs out.
^AHien the General Assembly meets in special
session in Alay it will have to adopt resolutions
fvhich will provide for the future financing of
these two operations, at least from July 1 to
ecember 31 — or it will have to recommend
;heir abrupt discontinuance. This is the vei-y
practical problem immediately before us. It
ihould receive promjat attention and not be lost
iight of in a search for possible general prin-
iples to govern the financing of unknown op-
erations which are not yet even a gleam in any
oiember's eye.
To put it more broadly, the United States be-
lieves that for some time to come it would be
•wise for the U.N. to deal with the method of
tfijiancing of each peacekeeping operation if and
(when that operation occurs, learning from each
experience what might be desirable for the fu-
ture and adjusting each solution to the pailicu-
lar facts of each case. We believe that this
approach is the only sensible and practical one
to follow at this time, given the present financial
plight of the United Nations, the present deep
political difficulties between its members, the un-
predictable character of any future peacekeep-
ing opei'ations, and the virtual impossibility of
now agreeing on any one single formula or any
one single set of principles or criteria to govern
unknown operations yet to be begun.
Assuming, then, that the immediate question
is the financing of the Middle East and Congo
operations for the 6 months of 1963 — and that
the answer to this question constitutes no prec-
edent for the future — what is the answer to be ?
In posing this question we are assuming that
these operations must continue. Obviously the
United States favors the most rapid possible
reduction of the Congo force consistent with
the increasing capability of the Congolese Gov-
ernment to maintain minimal levels of security
and insure its national integrity.
At the same time it would be the height
of "penny-wise, pound-foolishness" to reduce
either operation so rapidly as to jeopardize all
the substantial gains that they have brought to
Africa and the Middle East with much sacrifice
and effort over the past few yeare.
Assuming there will be a cost, though some-
what reduced, for the Congo and UNEF opera-
tions in the last 6 months of 1963, a strong case
can be made for financing this cost at the regu-
lar budget scale for the following reasons :
1. The regular budget assessment scale is
broadly based on capacity to pay. Very sub-
stantial adjustments in the regular assessments
scale are made for low per capita income coun-
tries, beyond what would be called for by com-
parative national income figures. It is true that
the regular budget scale involves a ceiling for
the United States contribution. But this ceiling
derives from a fundamental principle long ac-
cepted by the General Assembly — that, in an
organization of sovereign states where each na-
tion has one vote, it is not in the intei-est of the
organization to depend too much financially on
any one state.
2. The United States has been virtually alone
in making voluntary financial contributions to
the Congo and Middle East operations. It has
thus been assuming an average of 48 percent of
the burden. The financial load simply must be
more broadly based, and the carefully worked
out cost-sharing formula to accomplish this is
the regular budget scale.
3. Since the establishment of the United Na-
tions, the United States has been by far its larg-
est financial supporter. Its assessed contribu-
tions have always been more than twice those
of the second largest contributor. The pro-
portion of its voluntary contributions has been
even higher. It contributes 70 percent for the
Eelief and Works Agency for Palestine refu-
gees, over 50 percent for the Congo economic
assistance program, 42 percent for the U.N.
Children's Fund, and 40 percent for the Special
APRIL 8, 1963
539
Fund and the Expanded Program of Technical
Assistance.
4. Quite apart from the United Nations, the
United States is bearing a heavy load of foreign
aid and defense burdens. Our total contribu-
tions for economic development abroad amount
to over $5 billion a year — more than double the
aid total of the rest of the free world and at
least five times the aid made available by the
Communist bloc.
5. The peacekeeping operations of the United
Nations are not just a matter of interest to tlie
great powers. The small countries have per-
haps the greatest stake of all in their success
and effectiveness. It is true that these countries
are not well off, but the amounts involved are
not substantial. For the last 6 months of 1963
the regular assessment share of the 42 coiintries
in the .04 percent category would amount to the
cost of two or three large limousines or a few
big diplomatic receptions. Is this too high a
price to pay for keeping the peace?
It is these I'easons — coupled with the still in-
adequate record on the payment of past assess-
ments — which liave led to the present U.S. posi-
tion in the Working Group of Twenty-one.^
Lest there be any question, the United States
stands ready to pay its full 32.02 percent share
of the Congo and Middle East operations. But
until collective financial responsibility becomes
a fiscal practice as well as a legal theory, it
would hardly be fair for the United States to
pay more thaii this percentage, either through
assessed or voluntary contributions.
We are hopeful that a determination to get
the U.N.'s financial house in order is beginning
to manifest itself among the members. There
are signs of recognition that only through a
meaningful system of collective financial re-
sponsibility can the organization continue to
carry out its current tasks and future responsi-
bilities.
The hard fact of political life is this: Atti-
tudes in the United States toward any possible
future contribution above our regular scale as-
sessment for peacekeeping operations will in-
evitably depend on whether the vast majority
° For text of a statement released by the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations on Mar. 6, see Hid., Mar. 25, 1963,
p. 443.
of the membership takes the necessary measure.'
in the next several months to give tlie United
Nations the financial support which is abso-
lutely essential to its survival.
"The United Nations," said U Tliant in his
recent Johns Hopkins lecture, "does not repre-
sent a vague ideal of universal peace and broth-
erhood which has its appeal only to starry-eyed
idealists and moralists. Far from it. It is
hardheaded, enliglitened self-interest, the stake
tliat all humanity has in peace and progress
and, most important of all, survival that dic-
tates the need for the United Nations as a
practical, institutional embodiment of the needs
of nations on a shrinking planet, as a potent and
dynamic instrument at the service of all nations,
east and west, north as well as south."
If this statement of the Secretary-General
is correct — and we most definitely believe
that it is — tlien it is time to face the financial
consequences.
The present financial crisis of the United Na-
tions involves the survival of the organization
itself, for no institution can long survive if it
cannot pay its debts and if its members are not
willing to supply it with the funds necessary to
continue its operations.
The "menu" of the U.N. is substantial and
important. The "check" is no less so. Coun-
tries cannot expect to take the benefits of mem-
bership in the U.N. without the burdens.
Members Named to International
Business Advisory Committee
Under Secretary Ball announced on March 21
(press release 147) the appointments of Jacob
Blaustein and C. Daggett Harvey to serve as
members of the Advisory Committee on Inter-
national Business Problems.
The Committee, chaired by Clarence B.
Randall, will advise the Secretary of State
and the Administrator of the Agency for Inter-
national Development on the handling of spe-
cific business problems confronting American
firms abroad. The public members previously
announced are Edwin A. Locke, Jr., and Lloyd
N. Cutler.^
If
' BtnxETiN of Feb. 25, 1963, p. 296.
540
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
democracy and the Emerging Nations of Africa
by G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs '
Discussion of the kind of democracy prac-
iced by African governments and the State
Department's reaction to it was touched off by
I, reporter's question to me in the Congo some
weeks ago. I was asked to comment on the
jrevalence of one-party governments in Africa.
answered by saymg that naturally we Amer-
icans preferred a two-party system and ob-
lerved that scholai"s had taken some note of the
■Rowing African practice. Since that time the
natter has tended to be no longer academic,
-lere, however, in this university atmosphere I
vould like to put down a few thoughts on the
;ubject without in any way attempting to be
"ate.gorical or definitive on a subject which
!ould well fill a Ph. D. thesis and on which there
!an be shades of emphasis.
To begin with I believe we all would agree
hat democracy revolves around certain philo-
sophical concepts relating to government by the
!onsent of the governed and human dignity.
But we would find it more difficult to be ab-
solutely categorical on precisely what forms
liave to be included or excluded to keep within
1 general definition of democracy. For ex-
ample, we all think of ancient Athens as a glo-
rious exemplar of democracy, but we would
have considerable difficulty today in defining as
democratic a system based on a slave economy.
But to be more modem, all over this country
the debate goes on about whether each man's
vote should be exactly equal to every other
man's vote; or whether a system is still demo-
' Address made at the 13th annual North Carolina
Conference on World Affairs at the University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., on Mar. 14 (press release
136).
cratic where in one State a State Senator repre-
sents about 6 million people and another Sen-
ator represents only some tens of thousands ; or
where in anotlier State one party often gets less
than a majority of the popular legislative vote
but nonetheless has a substantial majority of
the representation in the legislature.
Of course, some of our States virtually have
one-party systems too. These are generally
characterized by vigorous internal factions — a
condition which defenders of the one-party sys-
tem can quite properly say represents real dem-
ocratic expression. This situation, while not
ideal, may also be a significant test of African
one-party systems.
Before looking directly at African experi-
ence, I feel it is wise to recognize that democ-
racy is many-faceted — involving not only po-
litical but also economic, social, and moral
values. Superficially we often think of democ-
racy in terms of constitutions and forms of
government almost exclusively. In the under-
developed parts of the world, however, I am
confident they think more emphatically in terms
of achieving human dignity, freedom, and an
opportunity to enjoy a decent living — not un-
like the imalienable rights of our Declaration
of Independence — "Life, Liberty and the pur-
suit of Happiness."
Professor T. V. Smith in The Democratic
Way of Life catches this idea well, where he
says:
Democracy is more than a form of government. It
ig also a way of life, variegated and full of growth.
Like every manifestation of vitality, democracy is
many-dimensional. Its leeways are legion.
At the beginning of this discussion, let me
APRIL 8. 1963
.541
say that I cannot agree with all practices car-
ried on in the name of democracy in Africn, just
as many Africans would take vigorous excep-
tion to certain aspects of American society. But
many different practices do exist, some of which
have a special validity in the African context
and othei-s which resemble transitional steps
that have characterized other evolving societies.
I believe it is important t-o our understanding
of Africa to know what Africans consider ele-
ments of democratic societies — always keeping
in mind that there is yet no perfect democratic
model. African mores are part of the context
within which our African policy must be made
and caiTied out. And altliough we may dis-
agree with some African practices, we can
ignore them only at the risk of failing to com-
prehend some of the major forces at work on
that continent today.
Essential Philosophical Objectives
American democracy evolved from the dual
tradition of Crown and town meeting. In Af-
rica the concept of democracy also started from
a dual tradition. Some African kingdoms had
privileged castes which kept the majority in
feudal detention. But other African societies
existed for centuries in tribal structures that
were in many ways as democratic at the grass-
roots level as American town meetings. Af-
rican societies also experienced colonial systems
which until shortly before independence were
luirepresentative of the democratic ideals ex-
pressed by the European mother countries. In
view of these mixed antecedents, it is not sur-
prising that contemporary democracy in Af-
rica has specific characteristics related to both
precolonial and colonial African history.
Broadly speaking, the philosophical objec-
tives most African leaders consider essential
to the development of democracy in Africa are
summarized in Lincoln's phrase "government
of the people, by the people, for the people."
In the African context, "of the people" means
transfer of power from alien suzeramty to in-
digenous rule, or decolonization; "by the peo-
ple" means government with the consent of the
govei-ned — one man, one vote ; "for tlie people"
means a government concerned with people hav-
ing a decent living.
To these objectives must be added a word ou
the means most Africans feel feasible to achieve
their goals — centralization of power to meet
the tasks of building new nations. In their
desire to attain their philosophical objectives,
they do not always insist on, nor do they always
deny, certain rights and checks and balances
that we consider fundamental to democracy —
freedom of speech and press, free enterprise,
free labor, freedom from government control.
Sometimes all or some of these are present;
sometimes they are not. Just like other people,
they sometimes recognize these values but fail
to fully achieve them in practice. This is
because many Africans believe the develop-
mental problems faced by their new nations are
so vast and urgent that these desirable Western
values must wait imtil they have achieved their
immediate goals of freedom and material prog-
ress. This is not wholly unlike the tendency
in Western democracies to curtail certain rights
during national or local emergencies.
"VYliile we cannot agree that basic freedoms
need be delayed and while we are unhappy
when they are, we can be understanding if
complete perfection is not immediately achieved.
This was made clear by President Kennedy in
liis second state of the Union message, when he
said: -
. . . our basic goal remains the same: a peaceful
world community of free and independent states?, free
to choose their own future and their own system so
long as it does not threaten the freedom of others.
Some may choose forms and ways we would not
choose for ourselves, but it is not for us that tliey are
choosing.
Of the three philosophical objectives I have
indicated that Africans consider essential to
the growth of democracy, there is the greatest
consensus among African leaders on the first —
the transfer of power from alien suzerainty to
indigenous rule. All Africans believe the re-
moval of colonial servitude is the begimiing of
democracy. Although we may feel that Afri-
ca's drive toward independence is progressing
swiftly — 29 new nations in the past dozen
years — most African leaders are impatient be-
cause many Africans have not yet attained
self-detemiination.
]\Iost of the transition from European to
'' Bulletin of .Ian. 29, 1962, p. 159.
542
DEPARTMEXT OF STATE BULLETIN
frican rule has successfully taken place un-
?r relatively peaceful conditions. This was
jt true in Algeria, and the Congo erupted
iolently after independence occurred. On the
hole, transition to independence has been a
ibute to African and European statesman-
lip alike, and throughout much of the conti-
?nt cordial xVfrican-European relations have
?en established. There is definitely a place for
ersons of European origin as equal citizens
I tlie new Africa.
Such relations are beneficial for the timely
iccess of newly achieved independence, and
.frican leaders realize they must rely not only
II self-help but on help from external sources,
e^'ertheless they wish to avoid charges of neo-
ilonialism arising from overly close or exclu-
ve associations with former metropoles, and
ley feel impelled to seek associations with
ther industrialized nations. This generally
leans associations with the United States or
le Communist bloc, and it is mutually pref-
rable that such relations be with us. In all
f these associations, however, Africans tread
arily because to them democracy means self-
ule and they want no relationsliips that threat-
n exercise of their sovereign choice.
onsent of the Governed
The second African philosophical objective
i government with the consent of the people.
-^his goal is easy for us to understand. In our
wn Constitution, for example, power flows
rem "We the People of the United States"
nd government is merely an instrument to
xpress the people's will. We believe with
^incoln that "no man is good enough to govern
luother man without that other's consent."
This philosophy is widespread in Africa. As
he British authority, Thomas Hodgkin, points
rat, most African political parties seek to
istablish political institutions that enable the
>eople to become, effectively, the nding class.
These institutions, he says, include: "govern-
ment responsible to a popularly elected as-
sembly; universal adult suffrage, with no dis-
crimination on grounds of race, religion, sex, or
educational level, and no special, separate, or
weighted representation for minorities, com-
munities, or interests; free elections."
Scrupulous attention to popular sovereignty
is found througliout African political writing.
A good example is this statement by President
Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika : "In my opin-
ion, the two basic essentials to democracy are
freedom of the individual and insurance that
the government of a countiy is freely chosen
by the people."
Democracy in Africa also means raising liv-
ing standards and standards of education
rapidly — the third African philosophical ob-
jective in democratic development. Africans
are anxious to overcome their age-old enemies —
poverty, illiteracy, disease, malnutrition — and
imless this is accomplished rapidly, democracy
will be a hollow theory to them.
In Africa, annual income is on the order of
$100 per person, compared to our $2,500, and
many Africans have no money income at all.
Only about 10 percent of the people have
achieved literacy, and life expectancy is low
throughout much of the continent. Although
Africa has more arable land than we do, it pro-
duces only one-twentieth of the world's agri-
cultural commodities compared to our one-sixth.
To meet the pi'oblems posed by low produc-
tivity, little capital, a lack of trained manpower,
and a shortage of entrepreneurs, many African
governments feel they must turn to some form
of state operation for swift economic and social
advances. They feel full-blown capitalism is
too complex a system for underdeveloped so-
cieties and believe state control of resources is
necessaiy for progress.
So-called African "socialism," however, is as
far removed from Marxian socialism as the
American free enterprise system is from the
Marxian concept of capitalism. It has no in-
dustrial proletariat upon which to build; it em-
braces all religions without causing conflicting
loyalties; and it is cautious in its response to
Communist overtures. As Senegal's President
[Leopold] Senghor puts it : "We are not 'Marx-
ists' ... we are socialists. . . . We stand for
a middle course, for a democratic socialism
which goes so far as to integrate spiritual
values."
The emphasis on so-called "socialism" in
African development has by no means ruled out
interest in a domestic or foreign private sec-
APEIL 8. 1963
543
tor. Indeed, such interest appears to be gen-
eral and growing. Even in countries which
most strongly profess socialist beliefs, private
investment is not only welcomed but eagerly
sought. For example, last month in a speech
in which he encouraged the flow of investment
into Ghana, President [Kwame] Nkrumah
said:
Our ideas of socialism can coexist with private enter-
prises. I also believe that private capital and private
investment capital, In particular, has a recognized and
legitimate part to play in Ghana's economic develop-
ment. We are consistent in these ideas. I have never
made any secret of my faith in socialist principles, but
I have always tried to make it quite clear that Ghana's
socialism is not incompatible with the existence and
growth of a vigorous private sector in the economy.
U.S. Concern Over One-Party System
While we can find much to support in the
philosophical objectives most Africans liold, we
are less happy about what many of them often
consider an emergency necessity for national de-
velopment — strong centralization of power.
This reasoning leads them to the conclusion that
at present democratic results are more im-
portant than democratic forms. In a sliglit
majority of new African nations this means
one-party government, altliough these systems
are far from the monolithic structures of Nazi
Germany and the Soviet Union. They allow
considerable latitude for dissent and internal
self-expression.
A strong case for one-party rule has been
made by many articulate African spokesmen
who assert that: the number of experienced
leaders is too small to be divided ; mature and
loyal opposition is rare in a new state; they
have classless societies, and the only genuine op-
position to African nationalist parties came
from the former metropoles or extremists; this
is their time of emergency, and unity is es-
sential to achieve national goals; they need
strong central leadership to counter such di-
visive forces as tribalism ; their present leaders
are revolutionary heroes and have no mass op-
position ; the democratic processes are fulfilled
by permitting full expression of opposing view-
points in party councils.
President [Sekou] Toure of Guinea puts it
this way :
The concerns of the state of Guinea are the concern '
of all the citizens of Guinea. The program of the part, i
is discussed democratically. As long as a decision ha:
not been taken, each one is free to say what he think
or wishes. But when — after a long discussion in th
Congress or Assembly — the decisions have been takei
by a unanimous vote or by a majority, the workers anr
the leaders are required to apply them faitlifuUy. '
That tliere is some free discussion withii
party structures is borne out by Professor Im
manuel Wallerstein of Columbia, who writes
"There is no single-party structure in Africai
independent states where the observer canno
identify factions and tendencies which argui
with each other to some extent over issues."
In some African states, moreover, there i;
strong opposition to the one-party concept f ron
equally articulate Africans. Dr. [Nnamdi
Azikiwe, the Governor General of the Federa
tion of Nigeria, which has a multiparty govern
ment, says: "Unless an opposition exists — as i
'shadow cabinet' capable of replacing the gov
ernment — democracy becomes a sham."
And Prime Minister [A. Milton] Obote o
Uganda, wlio sees the need for a responsible op
position, has remarked: "We have a vigorou
and healthy people composed of tribes whosi
diversity, far from being a drawback, does con
stitute a wealth of cultural heritage and wil j
constitute a source of great strength."
For my own part I believe a multiparty sys
tem is the best system for democratic govern
ment. but I recognize that we had only one part;
for the first 8 years of our national life and evei
as late as 1820 James Monroe was elected Presi
dent without any opposition. The absence o:
opposition is not unusual in countries new t<
independence.
While we hope the one-party system in Africa
will be a short-term, transitional arrangement
the principal point of our concern at the moment
is wliether these governments remain free and
independent and give the people genuine choice
and an opportunity for democratic expression
Development of a Unique Way of Life
From tliis discussion today I think what
emerges is the fact that Africa is independently
developing a way of life of its own. In many
respects they seek tlie same objectives we do —
sometimes in the same way we do, sometimes in
544
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
.fferent. ways. Often they assign different ab-
ilute or time priorities to the attainment of
lese objectives. They have made real progress,
it tliey have not achieved perfection any more
lan any other part of the ■world has. So we
ust continue to make a real effort to see Africa
nough African eyes, as well as our own, if we
lend to conduct a successful African policy,
nd we must seek the substance and not be
inded by tlie form. Only in this manner can
e possibly hope to understand the phenomenon
F African nationalism and come to grips with
le realities of that continent for our mutual
mefit.
This does not mean, of course, that we must
'cept the unfavorable aspects of African gov-
-nment as desirable, inevitable, or eternal.
here are a number of practices — some of them
lapted from former colonial administrations —
lat we consider undemocratic. Apartheid,
)r example, quickly springs to mind. But there
re others — preventive detention, summary de-
ortation, house arrest, the outlawing of politi-
\\ parties, violation of the principle of political
^ylum, confiscation of foreign publications, re-
rictions on press freedom and the right to as-
nuble, and the practice of restricting persons
1 their home villages.
Although we believe these practices retard
tie growth of democracy, many African leaders
o not. In fact, many of them believe that these
ovices are essential at this time to permit the
evelopment of democratic institutions in the
uture. Although we can understand the reali-
ies that guide such thinking, we also feel we
hould work toward what have come to be con-
idered indisputable democratic values, and
vhenever the opportunity presents itself, there-
'oi-e, we suggest and try to help achieve the
growth of these values.
Finally, what do I think of the chances for
•ontinuing democratic development in Africa?
[ would say that the chances are good, as long
IS we think of basic values and not simply rigid
forms. After all, our Republic and Britain,
Switzerland, and Athens do not all fit into the
same mold, but who will say that democracy has
not breathed freely in all these forms?
As in many other parts of the world, many
democratic values have not yet been attained.
But, on balance, I believe Africa's future is
hopeful, and I would like to conclude with a
statement by Tanganyika's President Nyerere
which expresses this hope compellingly :
"To those who wonder if democracy can sur-
vive in Africa, my own answer, then, would be
that, far from its being an alien idea, democracy
has long been familiar to the African. There
is nothing in our traditional attitude toward
discussion and our current dedication to human
rights to justify the claim that democracy is
in danger in Africa. I see exactly the opposite :
The principles of our nationalist struggles for
human dignity, augmented by our traditional
attitude toward discussion, should augur well
for democracy in Africa."
Anniversary of Fulbright Agreement
Observed at Manila
The Department of State announced on
March 22 (press release 140) that the 15th an-
niversary of one of the earliest Fulbriglit agree-
ments, with the Republic of the Philippines,
would be obsen^ed at Manila March 23. It was
the third educational exchange agreement con-
cluded after passage of the Fulbright Act in
1946.
President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philip-
pines and American Ambassador William E.
Stevenson are among the scheduled participants
in the ceremonies.
The ceremonies will also recall more than a
half-century of close educational relations be-
tween the United States and the Philippines,
dating back to 1901, when the SS Thomas
landed some 600 American teachers on the is-
lands to help make primary and secondary edu-
cation more widely available. New "Thomas-
ites" arrived each year until the outbreak of
World War II. Under the Fulbright program
teachers, as well as students, professors, and
research scholars, have been "exchanged," with
Filipino teachers among those coming to this
country for study and other special programs.
Since 1948 the program has brought 748
grantees from the Philippines to the United
States and sent 211 American grantees to the
Philippines. It is administered by the Bureau
of Educational and Cultural Affairs and is un-
APRIL 8, 1963
545
der the general supervision of the Board of
Foreign Scholarships appointed by the Presi-
dent. The U.S. Educational Foundation in the
Philippines, which nominates Filipinos for
grants and makes arrangements for American
grantees, is one of the 44 binational commis-
sions wliich have been established under the
act (now the Fulbright-Hays Act).
Current Treaty Actions
MULTILATERAL
Copyright
Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention
concerning the application of that convention to the
works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at
Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force Sep-
tember 16, 195.5. TIAS 3324.
Accession deposited: Finland, January 16, 1963.
International Labor Organization
Agreement concerning the Peace Corps program. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Geneva February
21 and 22, 1963. Entered into force February 22,
1963.
Slavery
Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at
Geneva September 25. 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and
annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. En-
tered into force for the United States March 7,
1956. TIAS 3532.
Acceptance deposited: France, February 14, 1963.
Trade
Trinidad and Tobago on January 23, 1963, acknoiol-
edged appUcahle rights and obligations of the United
Kingdom with respect to the following:
Protocol of rectification to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Habana March 24,
1948. Entered into force March 24, 1948. TIAS
1761.
Protocol modifying certain provisions of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Habana
March 24, 1948. Entered into force April 15, 1948.
TIAS 1763.
Special protocol modifying article XIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Habana
March 24. 1948. Entered into force April 19, 1948.
TIAS 1764.
Special protocol relating to article XXIV of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at
Habana March 24, 1948. Entered into force June 7,
1948. TIAS 1765.
Second protocol of rectifications to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva Sep-
tember 14, 1948. Entered into force September 14,
1948. TIAS 1888.
Protocol modifying part I and article XXIX of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed
at Geneva September 14, 1948. Entered into force
September 24, 1952. TIAS 2744.
Protocol modifying part II and article XXVI of th.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed a '
Geneva September 14, 1948. Entered into force Dt
cember 14, 1948. TIAS 1890.
First protocol of modifications to the General Agree
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy Augus
13, 1949. Entered into force September 24, 1952
TIAS 2745. 1 1;
Third protocol of rectifications to the General Agree 1
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy Angus
13,1949. Entered into force October 21, 1951. TIAS '
2393.
Protocol modifying article XXVI of the General Agree
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy Angus
13, 1949. Entered into force March 28, 1950. TIAS
2300.
Protocol replacing schedule I (Australia) of the Gen
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at An
necy August 13, 1949. Entered into force October
21, 1951. TIAS 2394.
Protocol replacing schedule VI (Ceylon) of the Gen
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at An
necy August 13, 1949. Entered into force Septembe:
24, 19.52. TIAS 2746. I
Annecy protocol of terms of accession to the Genera
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annec;
October 10, 1949. Entered into force for the Unitei
States October 10. 1949. TIAS 2100.
Fourth protocol of rectifications to the General Agree
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Apri
3. 1950. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TlAi
2747.
Fifth protocol of rectifications to the General Agree
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Torquay De
cember 16, 1950. Entered into force June 30, 1953
TIAS 2764.
Torquay protocol to the General Agreement on Tariff:
and Trade and schedules of tariff concessions an
nexed thereto. Done at Torquay April 21, 1951
Entered into force June 6, 1951. TIAS 2420.
First protocol of rectifications and modifications ti
texts of schedules to the General Agreement oi
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 27
1951. Entered into force October 21, 19.53. TIA!
2885.
Second protocol of rectifications and modifications ti
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tar
iffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 8. 1952
Entered into force February 2, 19.59. TIAS 42.50.
Third protocol of rectifications and modifications ti
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tar
iffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 24, 1953 i
Entered into force February 2, 1959. TIAS 4197. ;
Weather
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered intf
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. I
Accession deposited: Uganda, March 15, 1963. I
BILATERAL
Guatemala
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at
Guatemala City December 28 and 29, 1962. Entered
into force December 29, 1962.
Japan
Consular convention. Signed at Tokyo March 22, 1963.
Enters into force on 30th day following the day of
exchange of ratifications.
546
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULUETIN
pril 8. 1963 I n d
rica. Democracy and the Emerging Nations
of Africa (Williams) 541
iierican Principles. The Presidents' Meeting
:it San Jos^ (Kennedy, text of declaration) . 511
Iierican Republics. The Presidents' Meeting
at San Jos6 (Kennedy, text of declaration) . 511
;azil. U.S. Regrets Misinterpretation of State-
ment on Brazil (BaU) 521
|)ngo (Leopoldville)
'le United Nations Financial Crisis (Gardner) . 535
' le United Nations : Its Value to the United
States (Stevenson) '. . . . 522
11' I'nited Nations Role in Political Disputes
(Sisco) 529
ingress. The United Nations : Its Value to the
United States (Stevenson) 522
iiba
lie United Nations : Its Value to the United
States (Stevenson) 522
lie United Nations Role in Political Disputes
(SLseo) 529
.S. Opposes Attacks on Cuba by Splinter Ref-
ugee Groups 520
conomic Afifairs. Members Named to Inter-
I national Business Advisory Committee . . . 540
ducational and Cultural Afifairs. Anniversary
of Fulbright Agreement Observed at Manila . 545
oreign Aid. The Presidents' Meeting at San
Jos6 (Kennedy, text of declaration) . . . 511
liddle East. The United Nations Financial
Crisis (Gardner) 535
lilitary Affairs. Admiral Smith Appointed
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic . . . 521
Torth Atlantic Treaty Organization. Admiral
Smith Appointed Supreme Allied Commander,
Atlantic 521
'hilippines. Anniversary of Fidbright Agree-
ment Observed at Manila 545
'residential Documents
'resident Greets Conference of National Orga-
nizations 531
lie Presidents' Meeting at San Jos^ 511
.>eaty Information. Current Treaty Actions . 546
Jnited Nations
Current U.N. Doeiuuents 528
^resident Greets Conference of National Orga-
nizations (text of letter) 531
e X
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1241
The United Nations Financial Crisis (Gardner) . 535
The United Nations: Its Value to the United
States (Stevenson) 522
The United Nations Role in Political Disputes
(Sisco) 529
Name Index
Ball, George W 521
Gardner, Richard N 535
Kennedy, President 511, 531
Sisco, Joseph J 529
Smith, Harold Page 521
Stevenson, Adlai B 522
Williams, G. Mennen 541
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 18-24
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25,
D.C.
Releases issued prior to March 18 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 120
of March 8; 124 of March 12; and 136 of
March 14.
No.
*139
Date
3/18
»140 3/18
Subject
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
Merrow appointed Special Adviser
on Community Relations (biogra-
phic details).
Program for visit of King of Mo-
rocco.
Harriman : National Farmers
Union (excerpts).
Ball : statement on Brazil.
Statement on hit-and-run attacks on
Cuba.
Declaration of Central America.
Consular convention with Japan.
Blaustein and Harvey appointed
members of Advisory Committee
on International Business Prob-
lems (rewrite).
Chayes : Bar Association of St.
Louis.
Anniversary of Fulbright agree-
ment with Philippines (rewrite).
Program for visit of King of Mo-
rocco.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
*141
3/19
*142
3/19
143
144
3/19
3/19
145
tl4G
147
3/20
3/21
3/21
tl48
3/21
149
3/22
»150
3/22
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TREATIES IN FORCE . .
January 1, 1963
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Vol. XLVIII, No. 124^ 03 \^^'^ I April 15, 1963
e. ^- ^'
THE COLD WAR— A LOOK AHEAD m by W. W. Rostow,
Counselor 551
THE UNITED NATIONS— WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT HAS
DONE • by Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser 562
THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN LAOS 567
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE OPEN SOCIETY • State-
ment by Assistant Secretary Manning 575
RECORD
STATES
POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1242 • Publication 7 ,
April 15, 1963
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The Cold War— A Look Ahead
hy W. W. Rostov)
Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council '
From the earliest days of his administration
lie President made it clear that we faced two
7pes of challenges and had to deal with them
imultaneously.
One consisted in a series of crises which had
i(eveloped in the post-Sputnik period — that is,
n the period 1957-61 — in particular, the crises
Q Laos, Viet-Nam, the Congo, Cuba, and
Berlin.
The second challenge consisted not of urgent
rises but of situations which required sustained
onstructive action if the positive interests of
he free world were to be advanced and degen-
ration avoided. There was a need, for ex-
mple, to move forward in our relations with
, fully revived and rapidly developing Western
Europe and Japan ; in our relations with Latin
\jiierica, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia,
yhere a powerful desire to modernize their so-
ieties had taken root. And there remained
he challenge to make progress in the task of
)ringing the nuclear arms race under control,
n ways compatible with the security of the
Jnited States and the free world.
One way to characterize the last several
nonths — perhaps the whole interval since the
3uban crisis of last autumn — is that, to some
sxtent, the great crises of 1961-62 have receded
nto the background and the problems of mov-
ng forward in the longer run enterprises of the
free world have come nearer to the center of the
stage.
Let me be clear: None of the crises on the
national agenda as of January 1961 has been
' Address made before a regional foreign policy con-
ference at Philadelphia, Pa., on Mar. 28 (press release
158).
finally and satisfactorily settled. The treaty
arrangements in Laos remain precarious, still
violated by the continued presence in that coim-
try of Viet Minh units under the control of
Hanoi. The guerrilla war directed from Hanoi
against South Viet-Nam remains dangerous
and costly. In the Congo the unity of the coun-
try remains to be consolidated and economic,
social, and political momentmn to be achieved.
West Berlin stands firm, confident, and pros-
perous, but the threat to its future remains.
And evidently the crisis over Cuba is not at an
end. Nevertheless we have achieved something
substantial in these 26 months : The momentum
of Khrushchev's post-Sputnik offensive has been
halted, and in the vast areas which have been
threatened by it — Southeast Asia, Central Af-
rica, tlie Caribbean, and Western Europe — free
men breathe easier.
There is no cause for complacency ; but there
is reason for us all to understand that hard,
dangerous, but patient efforts, backed by a radi-
cal expansion in U.S. military power and by a
demonstration that our European and Latin
American alliances hold firm, have produced
important and positive results.
Meanwhile within the camp of our adver-
saries the forces of history have placed on their
agenda serious problems. From one end to the
other of the Communist bloc, nationalism and,
in certain quarters, the pressure of men for
higher degrees of human freedom have weak-
ened the tmity of the bloc. Every Communist
party in the world is trapped in a painful de-
bate over the issues posed in the Sino-Soviet
dispute. Moreover, the inability of communism
to grow food efficiently exerts a grinding pres-
APRIL 15, 1963
551
sure on Communist hopes and pretensions from
East Germany to North Viet-Nam.
With the drama of intense crisis somewhat
diminished — no man can say for how long —
the constructive tasks of the free world and of
our relations with the Communist bloc are more
to the forefront.
Our broad objectives are clear and have been
often stated by the President and the Secretary
of State.
We seek to build a community of independent
nations, their governments increasingly re-
sponsive to the consent of the governed, cooper-
ating of their own free will in their areas of
interdependence, settling their disputes by
peaceful means. On the basis of this kind of
community of free nations, we seek by every
means at our disposal, compatible with our own
security and that of other free nations, to bring
the arms race under control and to move the
nations now under Communist control toward
acceptance of the principles of national inde-
pendence, human freedom, international legal
order, and peace.
To those who work from day to day in foreign
policy these objectives are not abstractions pro-
duced for public occasions. They are the work-
ing guidelines which suffuse our business, cable
by cable, coimtry by coimtry, region by region.
Atlantic Partnership in Nuclear Matters
Perhaps the most basic of our creative tasks
for the 1960's is to move forward in our rela-
tions with Western Europe and Japan toward a
true partnership, in which the responsibilities
and burdens of organizing the free world and
of dealing with the menace presented by com-
munism will be more equitably shared. One as-
pect of this process has been dramatized in re-
cent months by the debate within the Atlantic
community over the future organization of
nuclear power.
The problem presented to us all is how a com-
munity of sovereign nations, boimd together by
treaty, should organize to maintain an effective
nuclear deterrent in a period of cold war and
for the use of nuclear weapons sliould their use
be required in the common interest. Tlie funda-
mental fact that has to be faced is that the prob-
lem cannot be solved by simply maintaining a
monopoly of nuclear power in the hands of the
United States. The fact is that during thf
1950's Great Britain and France developed ^1
capacity to produce nuclear weapons and mean;
of delivery; and there is no teclmological rea
son why other nations could not also achievi
this capability. In the face of this fact whai
are our alternatives ?
Theoretically one could conceive of a solutior
in which the European nations would decidi
that, despite their scientific and teclmologica ,
capacity, they would consciously forgo the pro i
duction, operation, and management of nuclear
weapons and means of delivery and leave thi
job to the United States. I believe we can asj
siune that this is an luirealistic solution. As ] j
say, Great Britain and France are alread3|
launched on another path; and one can easilji
understand why proud and free men now full] ^
recovered from the economic consequences 0:1
the Second World War — men who have beei)
threatened by Moscow over the past severa ;
years as hostages to the Soviet medium-rangi
ballistic missiles lined up in western Russia-
would wish to play a larger, rather tlian !
smaller, role in the deterrence of nuclear attack
They are not content, when threatened, to sai
to Moscow : Washington will protect us.
In short, the American nuclear monopoly wa
broken by events and decisions in the 1950's anc
it is unlikely to return.
A second solution has been suggested by cer
tain theorists on the other side of the Atlantic
They argue that the consequences of a nuclea
war are so great that one nation cannot rel;
on any other nation to come to its defense in thi
face of the danger of nuclear attack. There
fore the only secure and dignified position fo
a nation is to command its own nuclear capa
bility. Among our NATO allies a certain num
ber have the industrial and technical capacity
to produce nuclear weapons and some kind o
delivery system. But if we were all to accep
this theory, wliich denies the possibility of col
lective security arrangements in a nuclear age
two consequences would flow. First, the allianci
would fragment into a series of national nucleai
capabilities, the European components of whicl
would be inefficiently produced, unsystemat
ically targeted, and quite unpersuasive in Mos-
cow. Second, we would be proclaiming in the
alliance that no effective protection could be
552
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
iTorded to those among our allies who did not
)inn»iind a national nuclear capability. We
ould be inviting; Moscow, in effect, to put dip-
•inatic and military pressure on these smaller
iwers. one by one. in the face of a doctrine
hicli asserted that no other nation would ra-
iiuilly protect them.
The acceptance of this doctrine could only
enn the end of the North Atlantic Allianc*,
oening the way for the fragmentation and
]ecemeal diplomatic or military defeat of
"'esteni Europe.
In the light of these two extreme alternatives,
i has been the policy of your Government,
I ginning with the latter days of the Eisen-
])wer administration, to look toward arrange-
lents which would increase the effective
rgree of partnership in nuclear matters within
)e Atlantic community without diminishing
le effectiveness and unity of our collective
{:urity deterrent. This is no simple matter in
I world where 15 nations are committed to a
sstem of mutual defense but in wliich no uni-
fd sovereign institutions exist.
It has been natural for newspaper and other
nnmentators to focus sharply on this ultimate
1 olilem : Wliose finger will be on the trigger,
Mi-t> finger on the safety catch? Could the
. iropean forces fire their atomic weapons
■"thout the agreement of the United States?
I )uld the United States fire without the agree-
j?nt of Europe? Could individual nations
Uhin the alliance veto firing by others? It
1 s been our view that these ultimate que-stions
«uld not and should not now be settled im-
iKliately and finally. The terms of the
. 1 antic partnership which evolve over coming
iDuths and years will depend on many factors,
if'luding, in particular, how the process of
mopean unification, now temporarily frus-
lated, proceeds.
It has been our view that four more im-
:ediate courses of action should be considered
■•gently, which would move toward Atlantic
irtnership in nuclear matters. First, that we
1 commit ourselves to work toward a solution
hich would maintain the unity of the alliance,
ith a unified nuclear deterrent at its core,
^cond, that we devise and agree on general
lidelines for the use of nuclear weapons in
le face of Soviet attack. Such agreed guide-
lines now exist within NATO. Third, that we
take active steps to bring our Euro^jean
partners more deeply and directly into the
nuclear business with respect to problems of
targeting, control, and the strategic relation-
ship between nuclear and conventional forces.
Measures to this end are actively under way
within NATO. Fourth, that we provide within
this framework for active European (and
Canadian) participation in the operation and
control of strategic as well as tactical nuclear
weapons. Out of the process of shared ex-
perience, consultation, and debate thus set in
motion it has been our belief and our faith
that a rational and sensible resolution of the
control issue would emerge, acceptable to the
peoples and parliaments of our allies and to
our own people and the Congress.
As you know, we have been discussing with
certain of our European friends the possibility
of setting up a mixed-manned multilateral
nuclear force to be based at sea. This proposal,
first made by Secretary [Christian A.] Herter
at the NATO meeting of 1060,- was reaffirmed
by President Kennedy at Ottawa in May of
1961.^ In the autumn of 1962 an American
technical mission, representing both the civil
and military parts of our Government, dis-
cussed how such a force might work with our
NATO allies. As part of the Nassau agreement
of December 1962,* we stated that we would
present this concept at a high political level to
our allies. Acting as the President's pei-sonal
representative. Ambassador Livingston Mer-
chant has been engaged in discussions at the
North Atlantic Council itself and in a number
of European capitals." As the most powerful
member of the North Atlantic Alliance, bearing
special responsibilities in the field of nuclear
arms, we felt that we had a duty to lay before
our friends a proposal which would permit an
enlarged participation in nuclear matters with-
in the alliance in a form which would increase
the unity of the alliance rather than frag-
ment it.
^ For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1961,
p. 39.
' For text, see \hid., June 5, 1961, p. 839.
' lUd.. Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.
°For a statement by President Kennedy, see ibiA.,
Feb. 11, 1963, p. 197.
553
These discussions have already had two im-
portant and useful effects. First, the European
nations concerned have begun to come to grips
with the real problems of the joint management
of a nuclear deterrent. The discussions have
been candid and mature. A matter which is
bound to be the subject of heated and some-
times siiperficial debate is now being gripped
in high seriousness by the NATO governments.
Second, these discussions have been conducted
in a setting in which there is an overwhelming
commitment within the alliance to move for-
ward on a collective security basis. The dan-
gers of fragmentation are now vddely under-
stood, and there is, in Ben Franklin's old
phrase, a growing sense that in tliis decisive
area we must hang together or we will hang
separately.
The transition in our relations with Europe
from dependence to partnership — a transition
taking place in economic, political, and military
affairs^ — requires changes in attitude and policy
by all the nations in the alliance. It is a com-
plicated and delicate transition. In no field is
it more critical than nuclear matters, for on a
credible nuclear deterrent the security of the
400 million human beings who live within the
Atlantic system depends. The debates and ex-
plorations that accompany this transition
should not be viewed as petty squabbles or as
evidence of disarray. They are part of a living
constitutional debate of the first order of mag-
nitude — a debate that must take place if ines-
capable problems are to be solved and Europe
move from dependence to global partnership
within the free world. Against the background
of NATO's success in the past 14 years there is
every reason for lis to cany forward these ex-
plorations and negotiations with confidence.
Relations With the Underdeveloped Areas
A second great constructive issue centers on
our foreign aid programs and, more generally,
on our relations with governments and peoples
of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle
East. Here again, as in our relations with
Western Europe, it is necessary to understand
what our national objective is and to understand
why the track on which we are engaged is and
must be a long-term track.
The imderdeveloped areas within the free
world are caught up, as we all know, in a great
revolution. They are seeking to restructure'
their societies in such ways as to permit them tc
absorb and apply, for their own purposes, the
fruits of modern science and teclmology. Si-,
multaneously they are moved by a desire to as-
sert more strongly their national interests and
presence on the world scene.
The changes through which they are passing
in an effort to develop modem societies and tc
develop governments which can more effectivelj
organize and project their national interest;
involve alteration in every dimension. Rura
and urban life, social and political institutions
as well as tlie economy itself, are being radically
changed. Tliese revolutionary changes are tak
ing place in an environment where the Commu
nists perceive a imique and transient oppor,
tunity to exploit the inevitable confusion anc
to seize power from within.
Tlie danger of nuclear war and the problen
of its deterrence are with us every day. Al
though the Korean war recedes into distan
memory, the danger of an overt crossing o
frontiers by the Commimists is still a dange
which we must bear in mind every day ; and w
were reminded of it again last autumn whe:
the Chinese Communists moved down from oc
cupied Tibet across the Indian frontiers. Bu
the possibility which the Conununists are mot
actively exploiting in every part of the undei
developed world is the possibility of creatin
the conditions which permit the kind of seizui
of power from within which Castro accoir
plished in Cuba at the end of 1958.
Developments over the past 2 years give v
grounds for hope that a combination of prever
tive measures and constructive measures ca
frustrate this Communist intent and yield us i
time independent and increasingly modern na
tions which take their place within the worl
community as constructive members. But w
cannot expect to see dramatic and final result
within a sliort period; nor can we expect sue
results unless the United States, Western Ei;
rope, Canada, Japan, Australia, and Nei
Zealand work together to bring about a new re
lationship between the more developed and les
developed parts of the free world.
554
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETD
What is required basically, of course, is that
is underdeveloped areas organize themselves
1^ organize their human and material re-
- irces in such ways as to produce a rate of
-N th which outstrips their i-ate of population
nMse. Self-help is the only sound basis for
i liirams of external aid. Despite the evident
. liculties and frustrations of this process, there
t3 many hopeful signs.
A. number of nations which 5 years ago re-
qired U.S. assistance in the form of grants or
art loans are now moving into a position of
- f->ustained growth where they can support
■iiiselves with the help of outside capital
|anted on essentially business terms. Nations
citaining almost half the population of the
t derdeveloped areas have already begim to
cmonstrate the capacity regularly to grow at a
r:e higher than their population increase,
ime of them may require outside assistance for
Biny years; but growth is a powerful force,
ad if it can be sustained by their own efforts
1 d ours, there are decent and hardheaded pros-
jcts that, in a measurable period of time, they
t ) can emerge into self-supporting status. An-
( ler group of countries, representing perhaps
i percent of the population of the underdevel-
( ed areas, are within a measurable distance of
thieving regular growtli, notably if they can
cablish reasonable political stability over the
ixt decade.
Others — for example, some of the new
.frican nations — are just beginning to organize
1e basic foundations for growth in education,
imsport facilities, power resources, and the
1 3t of the overhead capital for modernization.
But most of the underdeveloped areas have
! ready rounded the comer — or should round
: in this decade ; for the capacity to gi'ow is the
dtical measure of progress.
As we look ahead, then, the prospect is that we
iiall require from the more developed nations
>' the free world programs of assistance to the
iderdeveloped areas for a considerable period
•: time; but the task is not endless nor are the
respects hopeless. The underdeveloped areas,
ded by their more affluent friends, are well on
le way to making growth their normal
mdition.
In confronting this sustained challenge over
the coming years three fundamental facts should
be borne in mind. Fii-st, the contribution to
the development effort being made by nations
other than the United States is substantial and
rising. The acceptance of the aid burden
which, in our country, grew out of lend-lease
and the problems of wartime reconstruction in
Europe and Japan is spreading to the peoples
and governments of other nations. From 1960
to 1961, for example, aid contributed by nations
other than the United States rose from $2 to
$2.5 billion. We are not in this alone; and in
this area of policy the concept of partnership is
clearly under way.
Second, within the less developed areas the
tendency of governments and peoples to face
their development problems — which must be
faced if aid is to be effective — is increasing.
This trend does not make headlines and is not
easy to dramatize, but for those whose duty it
is to follow these matters from day to day it is
unmistakable. It is no easy matter to assess a
nation's resources and to design a coherent de-
velopment program in sufficient detail to guide
policy. It is no easy matter for f ragUe govern-
ments, presiding over turbulent political situa-
tions, to get agreement, for example, to increase
tax rates and to improve tax collections when
their societies have never developed the institu-
tions and habits and attitudes required for
modem fiscal systems. It is no easy matter to
train and organize the technicians required for
effective rural development programs. It is no
easy matter to develop in new societies the skills
required to translate an idea in a planning paper
into a feasibility study and the engineering blue-
print required for a foreign loan. Neverthe-
less this is the underlying direction within the
imderdeveloped world, and it is the right direc-
tion. The number of good development plans
is increasing; tax collections, rural develop-
ment programs, and bankable projects are
expanding.
Third, and most fundamental, we should be
conscious that in the past decade the Commu-
nists have held up to the peoples and govern-
ments of the underdeveloped world a banner
and a program. They asserted that the prob-
lems of modernizing an underdeveloped society
PRTL 15. 1963
555
could be accomplished only by Communist
means, by a divorce from association with the
West, and by intimate ties to the Communist
bloc. In one area after another and in one
country after another they asserted the proposi-
tion that communism was the right road for the
peoples of tlie developing nations to follow.
Communist efforts in the underdeveloped
areas have by no means ceased. There is no
weakness or opportunity that the Communists
will not exploit. On the other hand, the unmis-
takable feeling and trend in the imderdeveloped
areas are toward the maintenance of their na-
tional independence and toward the devising of
practical and pragmatic ways to develop, which
conf oi-m not to Communist formulas but to their
own traditions, problems, and aspirations.
It can never be said too often that our national
interest in the underdeveloped areas is, simply,
that they maintain their independence and be-
come part of an effectively working interna-
tional commimity. Our greatest strength is that
the Communists cannot say this with credibility.
If these nations maintain their independence in
the difficult transitional process in which they
are engaged, we will win the struggle. But to
win this struggle requires that we maintain our
own efforts at economic assistance ; that we make
it easier for these nations to earn foreign ex-
change by normal trade; and that we exhibit
imderstanding and patience in working with
them tlirough this revolutionary passage whose
outcome will help determine the kind of world
our children and grandchildren shall live in.
I can think of no moment in the postwar years
when it would be less appropriatei for us radi-
cally to reduce our aid programs or to despair
of achieving important results for the national
interest through those programs. The facts
suggest that this is a time to persist — and to
persist in good heart.
Two Kinds of Challenges
I have cited two major examples of the kind
of long-term challenges that we as a nation face
in helping to bring about the kind of world we
want. There are others. For example, the
problem of avoiding conflict within regions of
the free world over deeply felt issues, often
centering on problems inherited from the
colonial era. As a great power, we are ofteiJ
drawn into these disputes. Some of the proud-
est passages in American diplomacy have beer
written in recent years in quietly using oui
limited but real margin of influence to bring
about peaceful resolution of such conflicts— -j
conflicts in which the Communists have in- '
vested vast resources in an effort to disrupt th(
unity and peace of the free world.
The same kind of persistent patience is re-
quired in the field of arms control and in those
real but narrow areas where we can work con
structively with the peoples of Eastern Europe
There are moments that call for bold anc
decisive action; for example, the Cuban crisii
of last autumn or the decision made late in 196] |
to throw increased U.S. military support bfri
hind South Viet-Nam. But the great objec
tives of foreign policy are not achieved in ! i ,
day, nor are they achieved by dramatic gim '
micks. They are achieved by setting a sounc
objective and sticking with it, through thicl
and thin, with stubborn patience and steadi
application of energy. As a distinguishe(
postwar Secretary of State [Dean Acheson
once said, the task of advancing the Nation'
interest on the world scene in a dangerous an(
turbulent era of history, in the face of commu
nism's implacable hostility, is like "the pain o
earning a living." |
Wliat I am saying essentially, then, is this
We have been engaged in the past years in
mixture of urgent and dramatic crises and long
term essential constimctive tasks. An effectiv
American policy on the world scene require
that we deal effectively with both kinds o
challenges. Although this administration cam
to responsibility in the midst of multiple crise,'
we have from the beginning accepted botl
challenges.
In an interval such as the present, when tli
crises are not as urgent and dramatic as the;
have recently been, it is important for all o |
us to focus our minds and gain perspective oi
these longer run constructive ventures. Unles
we meet the direct challenges of communisn
and their intrusions into the free world effec
tively — unless we maintain the frontiers o
freedom — there will be no free world to build
On the other hand, if we fail to develop clea"
and constructive goals and the durable, stub
556
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETI^
)om patience to pursue them day after day
n the face of all the inevitable frustrations, the
;oncept of a free-world community capable of
•xeating and maintaining within itself an es-
sential unity, an environment of progress, and
he capacity to settle its conflicts without resort
o force will remain a matter of rhetoric — and
'reedom will be in jeopardy in quite as real a
vay as it has been jeopardized by violent
■rises.
Now, if I may, a final word which I speak as
nuch as an historian as I do as a working mem-
)er of the Government I am proud to serve.
It is perfectly evident to us all that this nation
"aces many unresolved problems on the world
scene: Cuba; the continuing net drain on our
)alance of payments; difl'erences of conception
ibout the Atlantic partnership. The Alliance
for Progress has not yet acquired full forward
nomentum. The war in South Viet-Nam is still
mresolved. And I could, of course, extend the
ist. As we look around us, there is evidently
10 cause for complacency, for slackening of
'iFort, or for assuming that danger has passed.
Nevertheless great things have happened in
he past 2 years and we'should be conscious of
;hem.
A mortal threat to Southeast Asia has been
wrought under control — a threat which could
lave shifted the balance of power not merely
tn Asia but on the world scene; the threat in
central Africa, which could have torn apart the
life of that aspiring but still fragile continent,
das been averted; the powerful psychological
ippeal that Castro was able to project from
Habana and the means for backing it by the
techniques of subversion and guerrilla warfare
to which he is committed have been radically
reduced by his own performance in Cuba and
by what we in this hemisphere have done to-
gether through the OAS [Organization of
American States]. The threat of ultimatum
which hung over West Berlin for almost 5 years
after Khrushchev's 1958 statement has, for the
time at least, been withdrawn. And the whole
of this nation, led by the President, stood as
one in compelling the withdrawal of missiles
from Cuba. There are few people on either
side of the Iron Curtain who do not understand
that, despite Soviet nuclear weapons and deliv-
ery capabilities, we were all prepared to do
whatever might be required to force their re-
moval. If we were to lead the free world in
the decade ahead, it was essential that the ques-
tion be answered as to whether the United
States was prepared to undertake military ac-
tion in the face of the Soviet nuclear threat in
defense of our vital interests and those of the
free world.
As nearly as history produces a straight an-
swer to such a question, that answer was given
not merely by the Government but by all the
American people last autumn.
In facing the tasks ahead and in debating
what we should do about them in the vigorous
style of our democracy, we should not forget
these things we have done together in the past
2 years. As a nation we have a right to be
proud and confident as well as a duty to be alert
and determined as we face what lies ahead.
U.S. and Brazil Reach Understanding
in Economic and Financial Talks
Following is the text of a joint communique
between David E. Bell., Administrator of the
Agency for Intemut zonal Development, and
Francisco Clementine San Tiago Dantas, Min-
ister of Finance of the United States of Brazil,
released hy the White House on March 25.
White House press release dated March 25
The Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development, Mr.
David E. Bell, and the Brazilian Minister of
Finance, Professor San Tiago Dantas, an-
nounced today the conclusion of the economic
and financial discussions with the several
United States departments and agencies con-
cerned whicli were initiated on March 11. They
are agreed that with the effective collaboration
of the United States, other friendly countries,
international financial institutions, and private
enterprise, in support of the self-help efforts of
the Brazilian people, Brazil will be able to ac-
celerate its economic and social progress on a
basis of financial stability and within the frame-
work of the Alliance for Progress.
During his stay in Washington, Minister
Dantas also held conversations with officials of
APRIL 15, 1963
557
the International Monetary Fund, the Interna-
tional Bank for Eeconstruction and Develop-
ment, and the Inter-American Development
Bank. Minister Dantas stated that these con-
versations had considerably encouraged liini as
to the prospects for the increased collaboration
of those institutions in helping to support
Brazil's program of stabilization and develop-
ment.
The understandings reached betweeii the two
Governments are set forth in the exchange of
letters which follows :
Letter of March 25, 1963, from Finance Minister
Dantas to Administrator Bell
Mt dear Mr. Administrator: I have the
pleasure of calling to your attention the essen-
tial elements in the program which the Brazil-
ian Government has deemed it appropriate to
adopt, in order to attack, with its own means
and resources, the problem of economic and
social development of the Brazilian people,
while at the same time reestablisliing monetary
stability.
A number of major actions have already been
taken by our Congress and by the Brazilian
Government within the framework of the tax
reform law of November 28, 1962, and of the
Three- Year Plan for Economic and Social De-
velopment. They include :
1. The adoption of tax reforms which are
increasing revenues by about 25 per cent, and
which provide the foundation for important
administrative improvements in tax collection ;
2. The elimination of subsidies on wheat and
petroleum products, so as to reduce the cash
deficit of the Treasury and free resources for
developmental purposes ;
3. An increase in railroad freight and pas-
senger rates, with a view to reducing operating
deficits ;
4. The issuance of Decree 51,814 settmg
forth the plan of containment of budgetary
expenditures for 1963 ;
5. The issuance of SUMOC [Superintend-
ency of Currency and Credit] Instruction 234
limiting the expansion of credit to the private
sector from the Bank of Brazil ;
6. The issuance of SUMOC Instruction 235
providing for priorities in the extension of
credit by private banks, enforced through a
penalty of increased reserve requirements ;
7. Presentation to the Congress of a proposal
to give SUMOC additional power to control
the banking system and to reorganize its admin-
istrative structure so it may adequately carry
out the basic functions of a Central Bank ;
8. Conversion of the specific tax on electric
power consumption into an ad valorem tax, and
adoption for ten years of a compulsory loan
system related to power rates, in order to raise
non-inflationary resources for the expansion oi
power systems ;
9. An appeal to the state governments, and
their agreement, to cooperate with the national
stabilization and development eff'ort and to im-
prove the efficiency of their govenmiental
operations ;
10. Presentation to Congress of a Message
proposing that wage increases for public em-
ployees be fixed at 40 per cent effective in April ;
11. An appeal to labor unions for the adop-
tion of a wage policy based on the principk
that wage readjustments this year should nol
exceed actual increases in the cost of living;
12. Agreement by business associations in th(
clotliing, shoe and automotive parts industries
to the adoption of a policy of voluntaiy pric(
restraint; similar agreements are being negoti
ated with other industries ;
13. Presentation of a Message to Congres
proposing the adoption of an agrarian reforn
progi-am, with a view to assuring an improve(
social distribution of land, creating conditioni
for increasing agricultural productivity, anc
reorganizing the nation's agricultural system.
In addition, it is the intention of the Brazil
ian Government, during the course of the com
ing few months, to take other measures for th(
purpose of carrying forward the development
and stabilization program, including th(
following :
1. Further elaboration of the plan for reduc
ing the Treasury's cash deficit, so as to (a)
identify in appropriate detail the main forms oi
government spending as among development
operating expenses, and subsidies to tlie federal
agencies, (b) establish a system of priorities t(
assure that development spending will be re-
duced as little as possible (or, if practicable
558
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ncreased) witliin the limits of total expendi-
ures prescribed in said plan, and (c) improve
he control mechanism in order to assure com-
oliance with expenditure ceilings;
2. Application of any excess of budgetary
receipts over the amounts foreseen in the pro-
Tram mainly to a reduction in the forecast is-
suance of currency, and to some mcrease in
expenditures for high priority investment sec-
ors such as education and health, which have
)een especially affected by the economy pro-
gram. In any event, the cash deficit of the
Treasury will be held within the limits stated
n the Three- Year Plan of Cr.$300 billion for
he year 1963 ;
3. Adoption as soon as possible of further
neasures for the progressive elimination of the
ieficits of the railroads and the merchant
narine, in accordance with the program already
formulated by the Minister of Transportation
md Public Works. This program includes
:ate increases, limits on number of employees,
ulimination of uneconomic railroad trackage,
md other operational and administrative
mprovements;
4. The formulation, already under way, of a
^lrther tax reform measure to improve both
;he social equity and the economic efficiency of
,he incidence of taxation, to be submitted to
Congress in time to permit legislative considera-
;ion this year. The corporate tax provisions
will be designed to provide added stimulus to
productive private enterprise. At the same
•imp., further administrative measures will be
taken to improve the collection of taxes and to
reduce tax evasion and tax avoidance;
5. Maintenance of the coffee policy set forth
in the Three- Year Plan, in order to yield a net
surplus in the coffee account of at least Cr.$100
billion in 1963. A definite target will be estab-
lished as soon as the size of the crop can be
more precisely determined;
6. Securing additional non-inflationary re-
sources as offsets to the budget deficit, in ac-
cordance with the same Plan, of at least Cr.$100
billion during the year 1963, either related to
the import system or through other means ;
7. Direction of exchange policy, as provided
in the Three- Year Plan, to reduce progressively
the balance of payments dis-equilibrimn and
for that purpose the rate of exchange will not
be dissociated from the trend of internal prices;
8. Adoption of specific measures to expand
exports, particularly of iron ore, meat, and
manufactured goods;
9. Adoption of measures to encourage the
inflow of productive private investments in or-
der to help attain the targets of the Three- Year
Plan in relation to capital imports, creation of
productive employment, and maintenance of a
high rate of economic growth ;
10. Liquidation of commercial arrears as rap-
idly as possible, in the light of exchange availa-
bilities, with a view to their full liquidation by
not later than May 1964, and the prompt insti-
tution of effective controls over importation on
the basis of suppliers' credits so as to avoid un-
desirable levels of medium-term indebtedness;
11. Elaboration in greater detail, during the
next several months, of the Three- Year Plan
for Economic and Social development, and in
accordance with the Charter of Pimta del Este ^
securing the collaboration of the Panel of Nine
Experts, with a view to the subsequent organi-
zation of an international consortium of credit
institutions and governments for the support of
the Brazilian program within the framework
of the Alliance for Progress. This program
will contain specific developmental objectives
for at least the years 1964 and 1965, and will
take into account the measures being adopted
during 1963 toward monetary stabilization and
to strengthen our resources for development.
These are the actions taken and the measures
intended by my Government, in order, within
the framework of our national effort, to carry
out successfully our program of development
and stabilization, so as to ensure the economic
and social progress of the Brazilian people.
The conditions for the successful execution of
that program in a relatively brief time span
can be favorably effected by the degree of ex-
ternal assistance which may be received from
international financial institutions, Western
European countries, Japan, and the United
States, especially taking into account the esti-
mated balance-of-payments deficits, this year
and next, of Brazil vis-a-vis the United States
' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.
APRIL, 15, 1963
559
and Western Europe, respectively. These defi-
cits, whose magnitude has been estimated and
reviewed by our respective technical advisers,
can be absorbed or offset by means of credit
operations which will at the same time serve
the purposes of growth.
On the basis of the encouraging preliminary
discussions which I have held in Washington
with the Managing Director of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, we are asking the Fund
to negotiate a standby arrangement by June,
and in order to achieve this purpose to send a
mission to Brazil. In the meantime, the Fund
has agreed to tlie deferral of the $2G.5 million
payment obligation which would otherwise
have been due in March.
Continuing the discussions which I have al-
ready initiated with representatives of other
countries which are creditors of Brazil, we will
seek to obtain, during the same time period,
new resources from Europe and Japan in an
amount of approximately $100 million, includ-
ing reactivation of the $77 million which were
not used under the European standby credits
negotiated in 1961.
It would be highly important for me to learn
the viewpoint of your Government concerning
the possibilities of your participation hence-
forth in support of Brazil's program of devel-
opment and stabilization, so that this support
may be included in the implementation of the
Three- Year Plan already adopted by the Bra-
zilian Government. I am sure that such collab-
oration, supplementing our own self-help
efforts, together with the aforementioned coop-
eration of other governments and international
institutions, would make a valuable contribu-
tion to the achievement of the objectives of social
wellbeing and economic strength set forth in
the Charter of Pimta del Este.
Please accept, Mr. Administrator, the assur-
ances of my highest esteem.
Fkancisco Clementino San Tiago Dantas
Minister of Finance
Letter of Reply of March 25, 1963, from Adminis-
trator Bell to Finance Minister Dantas
Dear Mr. Minister: During our talks in
Washington in the last two weeks, we have
greatly appreciated the opportunity to be in-
il«i
i
formed by you and your associates of ti >*'
program for economic stabilization and deve
opment of the Government of Brazil, and tl
actions and policy decisions already taken 1
implement that program as set forth in jov
letter of March 25, 1963. We have bee
deeply impressed by the way in which th
program has been initiated and by the oppoi
tunities it appears to present for constructii
international cooperation within the f ramewor
of the Alliance for Progress.
As you have indicated, the volume of resourc*
required by the Brazilian program as well z
your trade and investment connections wit
Western European coimtries and Japan rende
it desirable to enlist the support of those coud
tries and also of international organization
such as the International Monetary Func
We are accordingly glad to know that it is you
intention to seek a standby agreement with th
Fund during the next two months, to initial
conversations for long-term financing with th:
International Bank for Reconstruction and Da
velopment and the International Developmen
Association, and to obtain financial suppon
from other international banking institutiom
such as the Inter-American Development Ban
and from the principal Western European coue
tries and Japan. In this connection, we haT'
noted the encouraging results of your initia
conversations with the International Monetar"
Fund and the other international financial
organizations.
As a result of these discussions, we can no\«
foresee a combined supply of external resource*
from the United States, the other creditor coun
tries, and international agencies in support o
your program for development and stabiliza
tion adequate to cover fully Brazil's balance-of
payments deficit as now estimated for 1963 anc
to make a substantial contribution toward meet
ing the 1964 deficit. At the same time, a majo)
portion of the credits from the United Statei
will provide support for key elements ir
Brazil's program for economic development
such as roads, electric power supply, and the
expansion of small and medium industrial
enterprises.
Looking farther ahead, we warmly welcome
your intention to detail further your three-year
560
department of state bulletin
Ian as a basis for long-term economic and se-
al development and to seek international col-
iboration in its support in accordance with the
rinciples and procedures of the Charter of
"unta del Este. The United States will be pre-
ared to participate whole-heartedly in that
ffort. Thus international financial coopera-
on with Brazil can be freed from the pressures
f intermittent balance-of-payments crises, and
laced on the constructive basis of support for
»ng-term economic and social progress.
For the period through May of next year, on
16 assumption that external financial assistance
'ill successfully be negotiated by June 1963
pom other sources, as foreseen in your letter,
le United States Government will for its part
B prepared to commit, subject to applicable
igislation, the following financial resources,
)talling approximately $400 million, in sup-
ort of your program for stabilization and
ivelopment :
'unds to be provided immediately :
:port-Import Bank
reasury
ID
further funds :
$33.0 million
$25.5 million
$25.5 million
"gency for International Develop-
ment
Program Support $100.0 million
Project Loans $100.0 million
sport-Import Bank
Refunding of debt repayments
falling due between June 1, 1963
and May 31, 1964 $44.5 million
ublic Law 480, Title I Commodity
shipments (estimated) $70.0 million
TOTAI,
,$398.5 million
Disbursements of these funds are expected to
e phased in time as required by the program
nd parallel with the successful implementa-
ion of the measures described by you. In order
) meet the immediate needs of the program
•hile negotiations are conducted with the In-
jrnational Monetary Fund and European
oimtries, in addition to the postponement al-
eady agreed of the $26.5 million due this month
D the Fund, the United States will provide
mmediately credits from the Export-Import
Bank, the Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID), and the Treasury in a total of
$84 million.
The funds to be provided from AID re-
sources would come in part from appropria-
tions already made for the Alliance for Progress
by the United States C!ongress for the fiscal
year 1962-63; the remainder would be subject
to the appropriation of fimds by the Congress
for the fiscal year 1963-64. It is expected that
these AID funds will be made available in the
form of loans repayable with a substantial
period of grace and a long subsequent period
of amortization and at minimum rates of in-
terest. The Administration's total request for
authorization and appropriation of funds
makes sufficient allowance for these purposes,
and also to provide resources for the Northeast
Development Program and initial support for
subsequent phases of your three-year develop-
ment program. The funds from the Export-
Import Bank would consist of a release of $33
million from the conmiitment made in 1961 and
on the terms then agreed, and $44.5 million in
refunding of debt repayments over periods of
seven years. The Treasury funds will be ap-
plied immediately on an interim basis and
would later become part of the longer-term
arrangements.
In addition the United States is now con-
sidering appropriate terms and conditions for
the sale of wheat to Brazil under Title I of P.L.
480 for the calendar year 1963 and would be
prepared, subject to the requirements of exist-
ing legislation and established procedures, to
extend this consideration to cover calendar year
1964 as requested by the Brazilian Government.
The total estimated value of such an extended
agreement would be approximately $140
million.
I look forward to the early completion by
representatives of our two Governments of spe-
cific arrangements to implement the foregoing
understandings, parallel with the progressive
implementation of your own program.
David E. Bell
iPRIL 15, 1963
561
The United Nations— What It Is, What It Has Done
hy Ahram Chayes
Legal Adviser^
Law and politics go together in this country.
For Americans the characteristic busmess of
government is the making and enforcement of
laws. From the Continental Congress to the
88th more lawyers have sat in our national legis-
lature than members of any other profession.
Governors, Senators, Secretaries of State have,
as often as not, been lawyers. Officers neces-
sarily drawn from the bar — judges and prose-
cutors — play a more direct and acknowledged
part in political processes here than elsewhere.
It is perhaps no more than tlie just desserts of
a country that prides itself on having a govern-
ment of laws and not of men to wind up with a
government of lawyers.
The United Nations is not a government. But
it is a political institution. It has an organiza-
tional structure, complete with legislative, exec-
utive, and judicial branches. It has written
rules and unwritten traditions. It has a con-
stitutional history as well as a political and
diplomatic history.
As lawyers with a flair for politics, we have a
special interest in the ways in which the form
and structure of that institution shape its work.
Many of us here tonight are old enough to re-
member with what hopes and dreams the United
Nations was launched in 1946. For many Amer-
icans, especially, the adoption of the charter
was a kind of expiation of our earlier rejection
of the League of Nations, and their expecta-
tions, like those of most repentant sinners, were
correspondingly extravagant.
' Address made before the Bar Association of St.
Louis, the St. Louis University School of Law, and
the Washington University School of Law at St. Louis,
Mo., on Mar. 21 (press release 148) .
The framers of the charter met in the shadow
of a long, cruel war whose toll of blood and
suffering was still vivid. The U.N. was to be
the instrument for preventing another such
war and at least a first step toward the uni-
versal vision of a parliament of man. The San
Francisco conference had the political experi-
ence of milleimia to draw on ; but at the same
time its vision was circumscribed by contempo-
rary political relationships erected for the de-
feat of Germany and Japan. Like the
draftsmen of any great charter, they callec
into life a being the development of which couk
not have been foreseen completely by the mos'
gifted of its begetters.
The champagne was hardly dry on the bow
however, when the United Nations began t>
change and grow from the conception of it
begetters. For many this was a disappointmen
or a betrayal. But for lawyers it should hav
been ground to realize or to hope that they hac
created an organism, something that could liv
and grow to play a vital role in the world'
affairs.
Security Council and General Assembly !
In the original conception of the organiza
tion most of its important powers were lodgei
in and were to be exercised by the Securit;
Council, composed of the five powers which hai
led the wartime alliance and six other mem
bers elected for 2-year terms.
The charter assigns the Security Council "pri
mary" responsibility for the maintenance of in
temational peace and security. The operatin,
premise of the Council was continuing big
power cooperation in policing the world. Thi
562
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJIiLETT
premise led the framers to view the Security
Council as the principal peacekeeping agency,
:o give it power to make binding decisions when
;he peace was breached or threatened, and to
I vest in it a near monopoly on the legitimate use
Df force. We may be permitted to doubt
whether, even if postwar politics had vindi-
cated the hopes of San Francisco, the Security
Council could have fulfilled the place foreseen
for it. In Utopia the thrust of change and the
jlash of interest may be small enough to be
contained by so limited a political device as
oenevolent oligarchy. Not in the real world.
In any event the wartime solidarity between
:he Soviet Union and the Western Allies, al-
ready strained at Yalta and Potsdam, quickly
passed into history. The premise of Big Five
unanimity was early betrayed, and the veto
iisabled the Security Council from functioning
iccording to the original plan. Events demon-
strated that the Council was not a wholly via-
3le institution. Fortunately the charter, like
Dther living docimients, contains in the ampli-
tude of its conception and language the ma-
:erials for giving effect to the primary purposes
)f the United Nations, notwithstanding the
withering of what was intended as its most
powerful organ. Both to insure that the orga-
aization remained an ongoing concern and to
secure for the increasing membership a greater
voice in the activities of the organization, mem-
bers have consistently invested the General As-
sembly with greater responsibility.
Tliey have rejected constructions which
would make the exercise of this authority de-
pendent upon the concurrence of the Security
Council. And they have narrowed the
restraints on the authority of the Assembly orig-
inally intended to give the Security Council the
fullest freedom of action. This development
is recorded in actions of United Nations organs
interpreting the charter by exercising their
powers under it and is reaffirmed in opinions of
the International Court of Justice.
The General Assembly, unlike a legislature,
can act to bind its members in only a narrow
range of questions, mostly organizational. But
the charter grants a sweeping jurisdiction to
exercise those other characteristic powers of
legislatures — the power to debate and to inquire.
Article 10 provides that the Assembly may "dis-
cuss any questions or any matters within the
scope of the present Charter." It may con-
sider the "general principles of cooperation in
the mamtenance of international peace and se-
curity, including the principles governing dis-
armament and the regulation of armaments."
And it may "discuss any questions relating to
the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity." On all tliese questions the Assembly
may adopt resolutions recommending, either to
members or the Security Council, that action be
taken.
There are two principal limitations on the
power of the Assembly to act: It may not in-
tervene in matters which are "essentially with-
in the domestic jurisdiction of any state," and
it may not interfere with the Security Council
when the Council is exercising its "primary re-
sponsibility" to maintain peace and security.
In the event, this last restriction has been given
a narrow scope.
The formal work of the Assembly, adopting
resolutions, is done at plenary sessions. Most
of the real work of the Assembly, however, is
carried on in its seven committees of the
whole — ^two for political affairs, two for eco-
nomic and social affairs, one for trusteeship af-
fairs, one for administrative and budgetary
questions, and one, unfortunately the least ac-
tive, for legal affairs. In addition to these com-
mittees the Assembly has created numerous sub-
sidiary bodies, such as the Working Group of
Twenty-one, which is currently seeking an ac-
ceptable method of resolving the U.N.'s finan-
cial crisis, or the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, with its legal and tech-
nical subcommittees scheduled to meet shortly,
or the Committee of Twenty- four, which reports
to the General Assembly on colonial questions.
In this way, the Assembly has acted through-
out the range of its charter powers. Last year,
for example, it considered and dealt with,
among other things, problems arising in the
Congo and the Gaza Strip, Southern Rhodesia,
South-West Africa, the Portuguese African
territories, Yemen, and West New Guinea. It
concerned itself with colonialism, the troika,
sovereignty over natural resources, disarma-
ment, outer space, world science, world food,
world trade, and the training of manpower for
economic and social development and with the
APRIL 15, 1963
563
recurring problem of how to finance these di-
verse enterprises.
Many of these problems the United Nations
has not solved. Thus, after 15 years, the ques-
tion of Palestine refugees remains unsettled.
Despite hundreds of meetings and reports, and
numerous resolutions on the subject, the world
is not disarmed. And, above all, the United
Nations has not ended the great conflict between
East, and West, with its continuing threat of
omnivorous war.
But the Assembly is not a legislature. Its
calls for action take the form of recommenda-
tions addressed to sovereign states. In this
light its record is no cause for despair. For
more than half a decade its United Nations
Emergency Force has maintained an uneasy
truce along the Gaza Strip. It is today over-
seeing the passage of West New Guinea from
Dutch to Indonesian administration, pending
arrangements for self-determination. Along
with the Security Council, it mounted the Con-
go operation to bring stability out of chaos in
central Africa against overwhelming odds. In
Iran. Greece, Palestine, and Lebanon it has
moved less dramatically but no less effectively
to keep the peace.
These peacekeeping operations, and their suc-
cesses or failures in dealing with flaring crises,
dominate the headline reader's view of the U.N.
But in the broader perspective of history a dif-
ferent part of the Assembly's activity may come
to seem of predominant importance. Tlie trans-
formation of former colonial territories into
sovereign states is one of the great movements
of our time. It meant the collapse of a long-
standing system of world order, the sudden
rupture of old ties, the rapid liberation of a
billion people. The Assembly has presided over
this liquidation of the prewar colonial empires
and has helped bring to birth, in less than a
generation, and without major bloodshed, al-
most as many nations as existed in the two
centuries preceding San Francisco.
Peacekeeping and nation building are only
the more dramatic items on the Assemblv's
agenda. In countless other ways that body has
participated in the primary business of our
age, the business of creating a viable order of
free states witli the means to combat the hunarer.
the poverty, the misery that has been the ac-
cepted lot for most of the world throughout
history.
Functions of the Secretary-General
The executive functions of the organization
are entrusted to the Secretary-General and his
staff. The charter says little about the ofEce
of the Secretary-General. He is "the chief ad-
ministrative officer of the Organization"; he
performs "such other functions" as are en-
trusted to him by organs of the United Nations;
he makes an annual report to the Assembly
on the work of the United Nations; and he may
bring to the attention of the Security Council
any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten
international peace and security.
From these bare and abstract plirases the
Secretary-General has emerged as the vital
"third man" in international politics. Dag
Hammarskjold saw that the moral force of his
oiEce, its assurance of political impartiality, and
the respect and prestige invested in the person
of the Secretary-General as the primary repre-
sentative of the organization could be exploited
decisively in the settlement of international dis-
putes. It is a tricky role, but Hammarskjold
developed it with consimimate skill. The Con-
go crisis, which cost him his life, was his great-
est effort. Both the conclusion of the Congo
operation and the Cuban crisis last fall showed
that his successor, U Thant, is also willing and
able to act as the "third man" at times of
tension.
The Secretary-General also administers the
United Nations staff. The Secretariat is com-
posed of some 5.500 international civil servants,
who, as with their domestic counterparts, owe
their allegiance to their organization and are
apolitical in theory. The conception of an inter-
national civil service is not a new one. It was
developed both in the League of Nations and.
more significantly, in the International Laboi
Organization. Like the national civil ser\aces,
the international civil service of the U.N. haf
not always fulfilled the neutrality of its concep-
tion. Some countries do not permit their na-
tionals sufhcient freedom to carry out theii
pledge of allegiance to the international com-
munity. Competition for representation in the
564
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
nternational secretariat, concerns for national
;ecurity, and international tensions have all
ended to render the international civil service
ess apolitical in fact than in theory. However,
)n the whole it is fair to say there is an inde-
jendent international civil service and a large
)ody of men and women dedicated to the organi-
sation they serve and prepared to carry out their
asks in a politically impartial fashion.
mternational Court of Justice
The judicial arm of the United Nations is
he International Court of Justice. Its 15
judges are sworn to exercise their powers "im-
jartially and conscientiously." They owe obedi-
)nce to no nation.
The Court has jurisdiction over all cases re-
ferred to it by members of the United Nations
)r parties to the Statute of the Court. In addi-
:ion states may, by declaration filed witli the
I'ourt, submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of
:he Court on terms set forth in the declaration.
Under the charter, members are obligated to
comply with decisions of the Court. The Court
das no bailiff. But, by and large, members have
lived up to their obligations and given effect to
decisions of the Court nevertheless. Although
disappointingly few cases have been submitted
to the Court for adjudication, it has resolved
thorny and contentious disputes. The border
controversy between Honduras and Nicaragua,
which had disturbed their relations for years,
was decided by the Court, as was a territorial
dispute between Thailand and Cambodia involv-
ing possession of the ancient Temple of Preah
Vihear.
In addition to deciding contentious disputes
between parties, the Court is empowered by the
charter to give advisoiy opinions "on any legal
question" put to it by the General Assembly,
the Security Council, or any other organ of the
United Nations and specialized agencies author-
ized by the General Assembly to request advis-
ory opinions. In practice the legal questions
put to the Court for advisory opinions have
involved concrete facts and actual disputes so
that the advisoiy opinions of the Court have
resembled the declaratory judgments of United
States courts. In the end this may turn out to
be the Court's most important jurisdiction, for
APRIL 15, 1963
680926—63-
imder it the Court passes on fimdamental ques-
tions of the grant and distribution of powers
in the charter in a way that approaches most
nearly the familiar constitutional adjudication
of our own Supreme Court.
U.N. Operations Comport With U.S. Interests
So far we have been talking about the struc-
ture of the United Nations, the distribution and
exercise of powers. But the question remains :
How does it work ? More especially, do its de-
liberations and operations comport with the in-
terests of the United States ? More particularly
still, what of the charge that in the U.N. we
have constructed a kind of Frankenstein's mon-
ster, not made of the vital stuff and interests of
the real world and responding to the shifting
will of an irresponsible majority of new and
imtried nations?
It might be thought that such an accusation
sounds strange coming from citizens of a nation
which a scant hundred years ago was itself new
and untried, and whose principal contribution
to international affairs consisted of moralistic
pronouncements on colonialism and other evils
of its elders and betters. But putting aside any
question of the standing of the accusers, what
of the merits of the charge ?
There is no question that today's General As-
sembly, with its more than 100 members, half of
them or more from the new nations of the
southern continents, is different from the body
of 50 mostly Western nations which started 18
years ago. There is certainly no automatic ma-
jority ready to do American bidding, willy-nilly.
The range of interest, outlook, and background
is not confined by any single regional or histori-
cal perspective. To secure general assent for
policies in such a body requires the arts of demo-
cratic politics — negotiation, persuasion, debate,
compromise — above all, the art of defining one's
own particular interest in a way that coincides
with and forwards the felt needs and interests
of others. American politics has taught those
arts to its practitioners for more than a century
and a half now; so it is not surprising that we
are good at them. A careful examination of
the actions of the General Assembly will show
few, if any, instances where the Assembly took
significant action contrary to our annoimced
565
policies, much less to our fundamental interest.
I remember Ambassador [Francis T. P.]
Plimpton's testimony before a committee of the
House of Representatives, conditioned by press
comment and political oratoi-y to think of the
United Nations in terms of imruly "Afro-
Asian" majorities. Ambassador Plimpton ran
through the important issues of the 16th Gen-
eral Assembly : the Russian troika proposal, the
replacement of Dag Hamniarskjold as Secre-
tary-General, the question of seating Commu-
nist China and North Korea, nuclear test ban
resolutions, the protest against the Soviet
Union's 50-megaton bomb test, the Tibetan and
Hungarian resolutions, Cuban charges against
the United States, and the plans for U.N. financ-
ing. On all of these he showed, to the surprise
of the committee, that the majority of the so-
called Afro-Asian bloc voted for the United
States position and against that of the Soviet
Union.
A similar catalog could be made of the ques-
tions considered by the recently ended I7th Gen-
eral Assembly, and with the same result.
Charter Affirms Traditional Principles
Box scores of this kind are fun, and we like
to keep them. The ADA and the AFL-CIO
and the NAM and the League of Women Voters
all produce them for each and every Congress-
man and Senator. Even the Justices of the Su-
preme Court are put through the statistical lit-
mus test to see whetlier they turn up blue or
pink. I think it was your distinguished alum-
nus Paul Freund who characterized this pro-
cedure as one in which the counters don't think
and the thinkers don't count.
For in the last analysis we recognize that
politics and government are not like a football
game, where the winner and the loser and the
score can be reported in the next day's papers.
Politics and government are a process, and the
important questions go always to the vitality
of the process and the soundness and integi-ity
of the institutions by which it is carried out.
Measuring by this more fimdamental stand-
ard, I think we have little to fear from the
United Nations and much to take comfort andl
hope from. For it is an organization whose'
structure and values are rooted in the centrali
ideas of Western political thought. It is start-
ling how many of the familiar precepts of high
school civics textbooks are embodied in the
Charter of the U.N. — separation of powers, an
independent and impartial judiciary, an apo-
litical career civil service, free and open debate,
the notion of one man, one vote.
We take these concepts for granted — they
are the only ones we have known as a nation —
just as we take for granted the notion that poli-
tics is the practice of talking and voting, of
bargaining and compromise, of drafting and
redrafting. But these concepts are all violently
antithetical to everything the Soviet system!
stands for. And they have not always beeni
taken for granted, even in the West. Theyl
have developed out of centuries of struggle.
Tliey are enshrined in our great charters and
constitutions, in our laws, and in our traditions,
The United Nations Charter affirms thesei
principles as universal rules of action. And
in their daily work in New York nearly 100
nations are learning to use these principles aa
guides and measures of effective political ac-
tion. The new nations of the world are leani'
ing their international politics in a parliamen-
tary framework. They are learning diplomacy*
and democracy at the same time and in the?
same place. They guard jealously their sover-
eign prerogative to participate in the process oft
making decisions or, to put it more simply, to»
make up their own minds and to vote as theyi
choose.
It is, I believe, immeasurably to our advan-
tage that this should be so. More than that,
When we, as lawyers, who have as a profession
been so intimately connected with the emer-
gence of the democratic values — when we, as
lawyers, look at the United Nations Organiza-
tion, we may be pardoned for thinking that the
reaffirmation and dissemination of these values
may be its most enduring and important;
achievement.
566
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETUT
The Refugee Problem in Laos
BACKGROUND
In its efforts to assist the Royal Lao Govern-
ment to achieve stability since the foi-mation of
the Government of National Union in August
1962, the United States Government has, at the
request of the Royal Lao Government, con-
tinued a program of supplying food and other
relief material to refugee groups in various
parts of the Kingdom. Many of these refugees
are opposed to the Pathet Lao, one of the three
factions within the Government of National
Union, and the Pathet Lao have sought to pre-
vent delivery of these relief supplies by several
means, even including shooting down imarmed
relief planes.
The Pathet Lao have sought to justify these
actions by asserting that the reUef aircraft drop
arms and ammunition, that alleged arms drops
originate outside Laos, and that the United
States contract air carrier is a paramilitary or-
ganization which violates the Geneva Accords
of July 23, 1962, which provided international
guarantees for the neutral status of Laos.^
In order to establish the falsity of the Pathet
Lao accusations, the American Embassy at
Vientiane released to the press on January
25 the following statement and attached
memorandum.
STATEMENT TO THE PRESS, VIENTIANE
Protracted civil strife in Laos has given rise
to strong emotions and deep suspicions which
are not easily forgotten. The Government of
National Union, under the leadership of its
Prime Minister, His Higliness Prince Souvanna
Phouma, was formed nearly seven months ago.
^ For texts of a Declaration on the Neutrality of
Laos and an accompanying protocol, see Bulletin
of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.
During this period, many of these emotions have
begun to cool, and a beginning has been made
toward achieving the cooperation and mutual
confidence needed to unify Laos once again.
The United States fully supports His Highness
Prince Souvanna Phouma and his Government
and has manifested this support by providing
substantial assistance for education, roads, vil-
lage development, agriculture, and other devel-
opment projects; and by contributing the cost
of a large part of the Kingdom's needs for im-
ported commodities. The United States will
continue to do whatever possible to assist His
Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma and his
Government.
One of the problems facing his Government —
and, in humanitarian terms, one of the most
important — is that of the refugees who tempo-
rarily require relief supplies in order to survive.
An estimated 125,000 to 150,000 men, women,
and children, members of the Lao, Meo, Lao-
Thoung, and other etlinic groups, in northern,
central, and southern Laos, have had their live-
lihood disrupted during the fighting. Many
thousands sought refuge in isolated mountain
areas, defending themselves when attacked.
Others fled to populated centers in the valleys.
Like the other people of Laos, they wish to re-
turn to useful lives in a peaceful and united
Kingdom. In order to do so, they need tools and
seeds to plant new crops, and food to sustain
them until their harvest is sufficient once again.
Those in the northern mountains, in the prov-
inces of Xieng Khouang, Sam Neua, Luang
Prabang, and Nam Tha, who constitute a ma-
jority of the total number of refugees, pose an
especially difficult problem. The rugged and
roadless terrain precludes ordinary transport,
and they must depend on air supply or face
starvation within a few weeks. This requires a
large and expensive operation, involving the air
APRIL 15, 1963
567
transport of about 1,500 tons of relief supplies
per month.
It would be expected that no one would op-
pose a program to feed refugees until they were
able to feed themselves. It is regrettable that
the Pathet Lao have, in fact, appeared to seek
to put an end to refugee relief. The Pathet
Lao mounted extensive military operations
against the hill people before tlie formation of
the Government of National Union and have
made occasional attacks since. The Pathet Lao
have also concentrated their efforts against the
air supply on which a majority of the refugees
depend. The hill jieople have persistently held
out in the areas which liave been their homes
for generations. The Pathet Lao claim how-
ever that these refugees are in their "zone."
The Pathet Lao charge that the United States
has been violating the Geneva Accords, alleg-
ing that arms and ammunition have been
dropped and that one of the contractors provid-
ing air services. Air America, Inc., is a "para-
military organization." They assert that the
agreement signed by the Eoyal Lao Govern-
ment and the United States Government to
continue refugee relief was "illegal." Finally,
the Pathet Lao have consistently fired upon
aircraft carrying relief supplies to refugees,
and have shot down such an aircraft.
The United States, in cooperating with the
Royal Lao Government to provide sustenance
to people in need, has been the object of repeated
accusations, misrepresentations, and calumny.
Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to
make the United States position entirely clear.
Tlie United States has traditionally offered
help to the victims of war and disaster all over
the world. This has been true in Laos. Suc-
cessive Lao Governments have asked the United
States to assist their relief programs, and the
United States has gladly provided supplies,
ground and air transport, and technical assist-
ance. On October 1, 1962, the Prime Minister
wrote to the American Ambassador [Leonard
Unger], requesting that arrangements be made
for U.S. help to the relief program to continue
under the Govermnent of National Union. This
was provided for in a formal agreement signed
on October 7, 1962, by representatives of the
Royal Lao Government and the United States
Government. Under this agreement, the United
States has continued its assistance to refugees,
and is prepared to continue to do so as long as
there is a need.
The United States has been glad to examine
with the Royal Lao Government the problems
raised by the needs of the refugees in Laos and
to help the Royal Lao Government to continue
to supply them with the necessities of life. The
American Ambassador has frequently discussed
the question of such supply with His Highness
the Prime Minister. He has repeatedly re-
minded the leaders of the Pathet Lao that the
American-chartered aircraft which provide
supplies to refugees are open to inspection at
all times. The Ambassador has reiterated that
the United States has fully observed its obliga-
tions under the Geneva Accords and will con-
tinue to do so, and that no arms or ammunition
have been supplied in violation of the Accords.
He has also pointed out that the air service con-
tractors are civilian companies which in no way
violate the Accords.
The Ambassador has, furthermore, suggested
adoption of means which would eliminate any
suspicion that these are other than legitimate
relief flights, and which would put an end to
attacks on unarmed civilian aircraft flying
humanitarian missions. He has made it clear
that the United States would accept special
markings for relief aircraft, liaison officers
from the three factions in Laos to accompany
the fliglits, verification by the International
Commission for Supervision and Control, or
any other reasonable method. Regrettably,
the Pathet Lao leaders have as yet shown no
interest in considering these suggestions.
The United States is now disciissing with the
Royal Lao Government means for placing air-
craft at that Government's disposition. If the
current discussions reach agreement, tliis could
provide assistance to the Royal Lao Govern-
ment for its general air transport needs as well
as a method for supplying the refugees with
the seed, tools, and food they require. It is
sincerely hoped that, once these arrangements
are concluded, the Pathet Lao would not con-
tinue to seek to put an end to the refugee
program.
568
DEPAETMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The unification of Laos is one of the princi-
pal objectives of the Geneva Accords and of
the Government of National Union. By virtue
of their participation in the Government of
National Union, and their signature of earlier
agreements among the three factions, the Pa-
thet Lao have declared their commitment to
the goal of reunification. Up to the present,
however, the Pathet Lao's actions have implied
that they are attempting to shift the balance
of forces in Laos in their favor by seeking to
cut off food supplies to the isolated refugees,
imposing their will on the hill peoples, and
consolidating what they claim to be the Pathet
Lao "zone." It is obvious that these actions
are not m keeping with the objectives M-hich
have been declared by the Government of Na-
tional Union, and that they violate all accepted
humanitarian principles. It is to be hoped that
the Pathet Lao will agree to reasonable arrange-
ments for continued relief supply, and that they
will join whole-heartedly m the work of unify-
ing Laos.
Tliis is a question of simple human need. It
is also a matter of grave importance to the Gov-
ernment of National Union and to the Geneva
Accords. If it is indeed the intention of the
Pathet Lao to attempt to alter the status quo in
their favor and to consolidate their "zone"
rather than to work toward reunification, the
future of the Government of National Union
and of the Geneva Accords may be in peril.
The attached Memorandum, "The Refugee
Problem in Laos," provides further information
on this subject.
TEXT OF MEMORANDUM
THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN LAOS
I. Scope, Nature and Causes of the Problem
There are no precise statistics about refugees in
Laos : basic population data are inadequate and out-
dated, and the frequent movements of many refugees
make it difficult to keep records. The best available
estimates place the total number of refugees between
125,000 and 150,000.
Most are members of ethnic minorities, in large part
because much of the fighting in Laos was concentrated
in mountainous areas where the minorities predomi-
nate. The refugee problem in Laos has frequently
been described as one principally or exclusively con-
cerned with the Meo, but they constitute only 50%
to 60% of the overall total, and 60% to 65% of the
refugees in the northern provinces of Xieng Khouang,
Sam Neua, Nam Tha, Luang Prabang, and Sayaboury.
The numbers of refugees belonging to each major
ethnic group are roughly as follows :
Meo: 65,000 to 75,000; primarily in the northern
provinces just mentioned ;
Lao-Thoung : About 50,000 ; in Saravane, Attopeu,
Sam Neua, Savannakhet, Thakhek, Sayaboury, and
Sedone provinces ;
Ethnic Lao : 10,000 to 15,000 ; primarily in Sam Neua,
Xieng Khouang, and Luang Prabang provinces ;
Other ethnic groups, including Yao and Thai-Deng:
About 5,000; in several northern provinces, e.specially
Nam Tha and Luang Prabang.
These people, from widely-separated parts of Laos
and belonging to many distinct tribes and sub-groups,
nevertheless share certain common characteristics and
experiences. Many lived at the higher altitudes of
Laos' many mountain ranges, using the slash-and-burn
technique to grow dry rice and other crops on the
hillsides. It has always been at best a difficult and
precarious living, but they have wished to live in
their own way on their high ridges, which they prefer
to the climate of the lowlands.
A large proportion of those who are now refugees in
Laos had earlier experience with the Pathet Lao. In
1953 and 1954, when Viet Minh units, accompanied by
Pathet Lao troops, invaded Laos, many upland people
defended their homes. Following the 1954 Geneva
Accords, Pathet Lao units and guerrilla bands sought
to influence and dominate the hill peoples in both south-
ern and northern Laos. They employed persuasion,
propaganda, promises, intimidation, exactions of food,
and conscription for labor and military service. In
some areas, especially among the southern Lao-Thoung
living near the border with South Viet-Nam, the Pathet
Lao established control. For the most part, and espe-
cially in the north, the hill people came to distrust
and dislike the Pathet Lao and Pathet Lao efforts
simply strengthened their desire to avoid Pathet Lao
domination. Many villages and districts formed local
Home Defense Companies (ADC's) in order to put up
an organized resistance against Pathet Lao pressure.
After large-scale fighting broke out again in 1960,
the Pathet Lao concentrated their forces and were
joined once again by large numbers of Viet Minh. The
Pathet Lao reestablished themselves in the area
around Sam Neua town, moved into the Plaine des
Jarres, and increased their activity in other areas, in-
cluding the south. Much of this strength was directed
against the mountain peoples, which the Pathet Lao
sought to bring under complete control.
Remembering their earlier treatment by the Viet
Minh and Pathet Lao, large numbers of hill people left
their homes and sought to reestablish themselves in or
near Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Pakse, and smaller
towns. A larger number defended their home areas.
APRIL 15, 1963
569
using their existing Home Defense organizations,
locally-made muzzle-loaders, and obsolete rifles. In
cases where resistance could not be continued, they
withdrew deeper into the mountains to more secure
areas. Others remained behind, decided later to flee
Pathet Lao control, and reached the refugee areas.
Continued defense was still necessary, however, and
many groups moved again and again as Pathet Lao
pressure continued. The Royal Lao Army provided
better weapons and equipment, and the Home Defense
organization was broadened and improved. The United
States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG),
at the request of the Royal Lao Government, assisted
in the equipping and training of the hill peoples' Home
Defense units, just as it assisted other units of the
Royal Lao Army at that time. United States advisers
assisting these people were, along with all other United
States military advisers, withdrawn from Laos by Oc-
tober 7, 1962, in full compliance with the Geneva
Accords.
Pathet Lao attacks and harassment continued even
after May 3, 1961, when the Pathet Lao declared their
acceptance of the cease-fire. In June 1961, for example,
the Pathet Lao attacl^ed Ban Padong, about 30 kilo-
meters south of the Plaine des Jarres, where Home
Defense units were protecting several thousand women
and children. All were forced to withdraw. There
were many other attacks on less well-known locations.
Military pressure on the refugees in mountain areas
has declined sharply since the formation of the Gov-
ernment of National Union, but the refugees report
Pathet I^ao probes, mortar bombardments, and continu-
ing small-scale attacks.
The Pathet Lao, who had failed to win the allegiance
of the mountain peoples, also failed to Impose their
will on them through military force. The upland people
lost a number of areas to Pathet Lao attacks, but the
Meo, Lao, and Lao-Thoung mountaineers retained con-
trol over more than half the total area of Xieng
Khouang province, between one-quarter and one-third
of Sam Neua province, and other extensive areas in
what the Pathet Lao claimed to be their "zone." The
southern Lao-Thoung in the Bolovens Plateau area
succeeded in sharply reducing Pathet Lao harassment
of their villages.
Conditions in the refugee villages vary widely.
Morale, social cohesion, and the will to continue are
at different levels in different villages, but officials of
the Ministry of Social Welfare, newsmen, U.S. AID
[Agency for International Development] technicians,
foreign diplomats, and others who have visited refugee
areas have been impressed by their spirit and deter
mination. It must be borne In mind that most refugees
suffered great losses : it is difficult to estimate the total,
but it is believed that on the average the refugees lost,
in addition to their houses, crops, and fields, 80% to
90% of their cattle and pigs and 70% to 80% of their
clothing, cooking pots, tools, and other jwssessions.
They have managed, nevertheless, to build new homes
and begin farming again. Groups and tribes which
formerly regarded one another with some suspicion or
even hostility found that they could live close together
and work in cooperation. Thus the war has moved the
hill peoples closer toward a sense of unity in the Lao
nation.
The experiences of the refugees in Laos can best be
understood by a review of the history of several refu-
gee villages. Brief accounts of four villages, one pri-
marily Meo, another composed of northern Lao-Thoung,
one principally a refuge for ethnic Lao, and a fourth
inhabited by two tribes of southern Lao-Thoung, majl
be found in the Appendix ' to this Memorandum. These
accounts show the sacrifices made by the refugees, and
their efforts to live decently, building their own
schools — where the textbooks and subjects are the same
as in other village schools in Laos — and operating sim-
ple dispensaries to care for the wounded and sick.
Since the formation of the Government of National!
Union, the refugees in the mountain areas have takeni
advantage of the return of relatively peaceful condi-
tions and are clearing more land for planting. Withi
very few exceptions, they would prefer to return to
their original villages, where they would have familiar
surroundings and, in most cases, better land. They arei
afraid to leave their refuges, however, until they cam
be sure of freedom from Pathet Lao retaliation or in-
terference. The war has led to suspicions and bitter
memories. When free movement is permitted, andl
military and civil integration provide a basis for con-
fidence, it can be expected that these feelings will dissi-
pate. Then the hUl peoples will be able to play a use-
ful part in a unified Laos. Until this occurs, there i»
a need to assist them in achieving self-sufficiency anffl
to sustain them until they can support themselves.
In the provinces of Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang,
for example, the refugees who have been able to farm^
despite adverse conditions have saved enough rice-seedl
to sow over half the area they need for cultivation.
Requirements for cooking pots, cloth, and similar goods
are only 25% of their initial level. It is expected that
the quantity of rice supplied per month, now nearlyi
1500 tons, can be reduced to 300 tons per month by the
end of 1963. This level of 75% overall self-sufficiencyi
in basic foodstuffs can be achieved if the refugees re-
ceive tools, materials for making tools, and seed toi
supplement their own stock. Using these supplies, theyi
will be able to clear more land, sow, and harvest. Thlsi
assumes, of course, that the refugees will not be sub-
jected to further Pathet Lao attacks or harassment.
Equally promising possibilities are present for thei
refugees in the south.
These objectives cannot be achieved overnight, andl
until this effort is completed, the refugees will needl
further food supplies. The need is particularly acutei
for refugees in the northern provinces who dependl
upon air supply. Depending upon local opportunities!
for farming, many villages would be reduced to starva-
tion within ten days if air supplies were suspended,
while all isolated villages would face starvation within
two months.
' Not printed.
570
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
II. The Refugee Assistance Programs of the Royal
Lao Government and United States Help to Those
Programs
The refugee programs of the Royal Lao Government
have been aimed at providing support until self-suffi-
ciency becomes possible. Specifically, this program has
been administered by the Ministry of Social Welfare.
The International Committee of the Red Cross, work-
ing In conjunction with the Lao Red Cross, private
organizations such as CARE, and a number of friendly
governments have offered assistance which has been
accepted by the Royal Lao Government.
The United States Government has also been glad
to offer assistance. It had long been meeting requests
from successive Lao Governments for help to refugees,
and when fighting was renewed in 1960 the need be-
came more acute. Working closely with Social Wel-
fare officials, the United States provided food, blankets,
medical supplies and other needs to those who had
suffered during the fighting in Vientiane. Similar as-
sistance was later provided in Vang Vieng, Luang
Prabang, Muong Kassy, Pakse, Ban Houei Sai, and
other areas. At the request of the Royal Lao Govern-
ment and on the basis of agreements with the Ministry
of Social Welfare, increasing quantities of food and
other relief supplies were provided, usually by air. to
isolated refugees in the mountains. This assistance
continued following the formation of the Government
of National Union, with United States officials continu-
ing to work with their counterparts in the Ministry of
Social Welfare.
On October 7, 1962, following an exchange of letters
between the Prime Minister and the American Ambas-
sador, a new agreement governing the program for
assisting refugees was signed by representatives of
the Royal Lao Government and the United States
Government. A communique issued by the Ministry
of Social Welfare and published on October 13, 1962,
in Lao Presse, the official bulletin of the Information
Ministry, described this agreement : "In conformity
with the wishes expressed by His Highness the Prime
Minister of the Provisional Government of National
Union In his letter of October 1st, 1962, to His Excel-
lency the Ambassador of the United States, an increase
in assistance to refugees has been arranged in the form
of an addition to the Initial program of the Social
Welfare Ministry. This assistance consists of the pro-
vision of imported goods, technical and administrative
advice, or personnel qualified for the purchase, gather-
ing, packing, and distribution of relief articles, and
transport by air or other necessary means." The
communique added that 3,115,800 kip (equivalent to
about $39,000) in counterpart funds and $786,500 in
dollars were to be provided by the United States for
local expenses and the purchase of seeds, rice, and
other necessary supplies. It stated that "The project
Is administered by the Ministry of Social Welfare."
Procedures for implementing this agreement have
varied in accordance with problems involved in sup-
plying different refugee groups. In many areas, re-
quirements are met by provincial Social Welfare of-
ficers, operating under the direction of provincial
Governors and in consultation with regional U.S. AID
representatives, drawing on stocks provided to the
Ministry of Social Welfare by U.S. AID. Specific
needs for clothing, cooking utensils, and similar items
are certified jointly by representatives of the Ministry
and U.S. AID and filled by the Ministry from stocks in
its warehouses which were supplied by U.S. AID.
Rice is provided by U.S. AID on the basis of estimated
monthly requirements for refugee areas, which are
drawn up on the basis of requests by refugees to U.S.
AID and Royal Lao Government representatives.
Where air transport is necessary, U.S. AID makes it
available through contracts with private American
firms, including Air America, Inc., meeting all costs
for fuel, maintenance, and other expenses. Flight
schedules are filed with the appropriate officials of
the Directorate of Civil Aviation.
Air supply to refugees is a complex and large-scale
operation, involving 14 aircraft making over 1,000
flights per month, carrying about 1500 tons of cargo.
Whenever possible, cargo is landed at airstrips and
unloaded. Rice is usually dropped free-fall, while
medical supplies, cooking utensiLs, school materials,
and similar items are parachuted or taken to refugee
areas in light aircraft, which also carry out medical
evacuation mi.ssions and transport the Social Welfare
and U.S. AID technicians who verify requirements
and supervise distribution. As officials of the Min-
istry of Social Welfare have become more familiar
with the techniques and procedures involved in the
refugee program, the requirement for United States
technical assistance and advice has been reduced.
ill. The Pathet Lao Attitude Toward Refugee
Relief
The Pathet Lao have long faced a situation which
must cause them acute frustration and embarrassment.
Since the early months of 1961, they have claimed
that most of northern Laos and a wide area of the south
contiguous to Viet-Nam constitute their "liberated
zone." They are well aware, however, that the peoples
of very extensive areas of the north and substantial
parts of the southern mountains have resisted Pathet
Lao domination ; attempts at persuasion, intimidation,
and conquest have failed. In the north, effective Pa-
thet Lao control has been limited to the towns, the
areas along major roads, some of the valleys, and a
few other areas which they seized. Realizing that the
people in the mountains of the north, cut off from nor-
mal transport and unable to support themselves in
peace, depended upon air supply for their survival, the
Pathet Lao appear to have made a deliberate effort to
starve the hill people into submission by bringing this
air supply to an end.
Beginning early in 1961, the Pathet Lao alleged that
they were engaged in a police action against "bandits"
who had been "airdropped" by the United States into
the "zone" claimed by the Pathet Lao. This propa-
APRTL 15, 1963
571
ganda line was also adopted in an attempt to justify
Pathet Lao attacks on the hill people following the
cease-fire. The Pathet Lao appeared to have forgotten
that these people had resisted them in 1953 and 1954
and had avoided Pathet Lao domination ever since.
The absurdity of the "air-dropping" contention is ap-
parent if one wonders how, and why, anyone would
parachute 100,000 or more men, women, and children
into the rugged mountains of northern Laos. The hill
people were there, they freely chose to defend them-
selves, and the Pathet Lao had to search for some way
to explain it.
Throughout 19G1 and 1962, however, this remained
a frequent theme of Pathet Lao propaganda. Follow-
ing the formation of Prince Souvanna Phouma's Gov-
vernment, the Pathet Lao representatives sought to
achieve the cessation of relief supplies through
manipulation of their position in the coalition. They
claimed that the agreement on refugee relief signed
by the Royal Lao Government and the United States
Government was "Illegal," although it had been worlied
out on the basis of a request from the Prime Minister
that refugee relief continue under the Government of
National Union. After the fact. Pathet Lao officials
said that the agreement was not valid because they
had not assented to it. Propaganda from the Pathet
Lao radio became more intense, and General Singkapo,
Pathet Lao commander in the Plaine des Jarres area,
told newsmen that a special effort had been made to
emplace anti-aircraft weapons. Relief aircraft were
fired upon frequently, and an American aircraft on a
refugee relief mission was shot down in Nam Tha
province on January 5, 1963, resulting in the death of
a cargo handler. The Pathet Lao radio has since
indicated that they would shoot down other aircraft
whenever possible.
The Pathet Lao have also sought to cut off supplies
to Neutralist forces in the Plaine des Jarres area. At
the specific request of the Prime Minister, American
aircraft carrying rice and other foodstuffs made drops
to Neutralist units and unloaded at the Plaine des
Jarres airstrip. The Pathet Lao radio, quoting Gen-
eral Singkapo, announced In November that American
aircraft taking supplies to Neutralist forces would be
shot down. On November 27, 1962, an aircraft loaded
with rice was shot down while preparing to land at
the Plaine des Jarres. Although it is reported that
the shots were fired by members of a Neutralist unit
who had forsworn their loyalty to the Prime Minister
and to General Kong Le, the Pathet Lao's responsi-
bility is clear.
The Pathet Lao have sought to justify these attacks
on unarmed relief flights by asserting that the aircraft
drop arms and ammunition, that alleged arms drops
originate outside Laos, and that Air America, Inc., is
a paramilitary organization which violates the
Geneva Accords.
These accusations are entirely false. The United
States is not introducing arms, ammunition, or other
military supplies into Laos in violation of the Accords.
No United States aircraft are making arms drops Inj
violation of the Accords. All flights to destinations ini
Laos by American-chartered aircraft, including relief
flights, originate in Vientiane. The companies provid-
ing air services under contract to the United States
are entirely civilian, and their employees are not, to
use the language of the Accords, "foreign civilians
connected with the supply, maintenance, storing and
utilization of war materials."
If the Pathet Lao wish to satisfy themselves that the
refugee program in Laos is a legitimate relief opera-
tion, they can easily do so by inspecting the aircraft
and their cargo. If any doubts remain, the Geneva
Accords provide an international mechanism for veri-
fication : the International Commission for Supervi-
sion and Control. The Pathet Lao have not, however,
made any official complaint about air supply to thei
Commission.
$11
;t4i
U.S. Supports Full Membership
for Japan in OECD
Statement hy Secretary Rusk
Press release 155 dated March 28
Today the members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development asked
the Secretary General of that organization to
initiate discussions with the Japanese Govern-
ment designed to bring about formal accession
by Japan to the OECD convention.
The United States has for some time sup-
ported full Japanese membership in the OECD
and welcomes this development. Jajian will
make a valuable contribution to the major aims
of the Organization, which are to contribute to
the development of the world economy through
economic growth and financial stability, to the
expansion of world trade on a multilateral,
nondiscriminatory basis, and to the economic
advancement of the less developed countries.
The potentialities for useful work by the OECD
will be greatly enhanced. The accession of
Japan will add to the membership of the OECD
the only major industrial, financial, and trading
nation not now in the Organization.
Since its inception Japan has been a member
of the Development Assistance Committee of
the OECD (and its predecessor, the Develop-
ment Assistance Group). Japan has been an
active participant in this Committee's activities
in promoting and coordinating economic as-
IPi
572
DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
istance to the developing countries. It ranks
ifth among the countries contributing to such
issistance.
We look forward to the successful completion
i the preliminary discussions between repre-
entatives of the Japanese Government and the
Secretary General of the OECD, which should
ead to the formal accession of Japan at an
arly date.
J.S. Asks Cuba for Explanation
if Attack on "Floridian"
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, MARCH 28 <
The U.S. Coast Guard has reported the re-
ceipt of a message from the United States
Motorship Floridian proceeding in interna-
tional waters off the north coast of Cuba en
TOute from San Juan, Puerto Kico, to Miami,
la.
The message reported that at approximately
B:05 p.m. Washington time today two uniden-
tified jet aircraft had fired bursts across the
\Floridian''s bow and stem without striking the
ehip.
CINCLANT [Commander in Chief of the
fU.S. Atlantic Forces] immediately dispatched
their jet fighters to the area.
The Floridian, under U.S. air escort, is now
iproceeding toward Miami, where it is due at
I "I a.m. Friday morning.
Further details are expected to be available
after the Floridian arrives in Miami.
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, MARCH 29
Press release 163 dated March 29
The United States Government is currently
in receipt through diplomatic channels of two
messages ^ from the Cuban government in con-
nection with the firing by two Cuban MIG air-
craft in the immediate vicinity of the United
States Motorship Floridian on the evening of
March 28.
In the first message the Cuban government
said that the Cuban planes on the afternoon of
March 28 had discovered what Cuban authori-
ties considered to be a suspect boat flying the
United States flag 25 miles northeast of Cayo
Fragoso in Las Villas province. The Cuban
government inquired of the United States Gov-
ernment as to whether the United States flag
was being legitimately flown by the ship in ques-
tion. Simultaneously, a Cuban naval vessel was
ordered to proceed to the spot to clarify the
matter.
Upon learning of the statement issued at 9 :15
p.m. last evening by the Department of State,
the Cuban government in a second message in-
dicated it presumed that the boat sighted by
Cuban aircraft earlier in the afternoon was tlie
same ship mentioned in the Department of State
announcement and informed us that the Cuban
naval vessel had turned back.
The Cuban government in this second mes-
sage added that the MIG's probably fired in
error and that there had been no intention on
the part of the Cuban government to slioot at
the Floridian. These are the facts as they are
now known.
The United States today is asking the gov-
ernment of Cuba for a full explanation of this
matter.
United States Expresses Views
on Military Rule in Korea
Department Statement ^
The military junta's effort to continue mili-
tai-y rule for 4 more years has created a diffi-
cult situation in Korea. We believe that pro-
longation of military rule could constitute a
threat to stable and effective government, and
we understand that this whole matter is being
reexamined by the Korean Government.
We hope the junta and the major political
groups in Korea can work out together a pro-
cedure for transition to civil government that
will be acceptable to the nation as a whole.
^ Released to the press by John F. King, Public
Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Inter- American Affairs.
' Not printed here.
' Read to news correspondents on Mar. 25 by Lincoln
White, Director of the Office of News.
573
President Receives Clay Report
on AID Program
Following is the text of a letter from Presi-
dent Kennedy to Gen. Lucius D. Clay, cluiir-
nian of the Committee To Strengthen the Secu-
rity of the Free World.
White House press release dated March 23
March 22, 1963
Dear General Clat: I have received your
report ^ and I want to tell you how grateful I am
to you and the other distinguished private citi-
zens on your Committee ^ for the time and effort
you have devoted to preparing it. The Com-
mittee's expression of support for properly
administered mutual defense and development
programs — coniing as it did after an intensive
and searching review — is very heartening.
I was pleased to note the Committee's recog-
nition of the imjjrovements which have been
made in the Foreign Assistance Program in re-
cent years, including the increased emphasis on
self-help, better definition of progi'am goals,
reduction in its balance of payments impact,
and the increased emphasis on the role of
United States private investment. You may be
sure that the Committee's recommendations in-
cluding greater selectivity, stricter self-help
standards, greater participation by the devel-
oped countries in aid efforts and continued
improvements in administration, will be care-
fully applied in our continuing review of this
program.
I am hopeful that we will be able to develop
widespread public awareness of — to quote your
report — "the great value of properly conceived
and administered foreign aid programs to the
^ The Scope and Distri'bntion of United States Mili-
tary and Economic Assistance Programs: Report to
the President of the United States from The Commit-
tee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World,
March 20, 1963; available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington 25, D.C. (price 15 cents).
' For background, see BtniETiN of Mar. 25, 1963,
p. 431.
national interest of the United States and ofi
the contribution of the foreign assistance dollar
in such programs to the service of our nation's'
security". Again, I want to thank you and thei
other members of the Committee for thei
important service which you have rendered.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy
U.S. Accepts Recommendations
on HaSibut Abstention
White House Statement
White House press release dated March 23
The President has today [March 23] taken
action in accordance with the North Pacific
Fisheries Act of 1954 to accept the recommen-
dation of the International North Pacific Fish-
eries Commission, which, if accepted by Canada,
Japan, and the United States, will permit the
Japanese to fish for halibut in the eastern Ber-
ing Sea along with the U.S. and Canadian
fishermen.
In reaching tliis decision we have not only
taken into account our international obligations
but also the domestic factors which have come
to our attention. We consider that this action
advances the cause of the principle of absten-
tion, which is at the heart of the tripartite
fisheries treaty of 1952 ^ and which provides a
reasonable, workable, and essential procedure
for dealing with certain major North Pacific
fishery problems. We are determined to work
for the continuation of this principle and of
the treaty hi which it is set forth.
We are cognizant of the Commission's recent
successful efforts to develop conservation meas-
ures which, if accepted by the three parties to
the tripartite treaty, will provide suitable pro-
tection for eastern Bering Sea halibut. This
action will not take effect imtil the Canadian
Government takes similar action.
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2786.
574
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
THE CONGRESS
Foreign Policy in tlie Open Society
Statement by Robert J. Manning
Assistant Secretafi^ for Public Affairs ^
m I welcome this hearing as an opportunity to
air more than one side of an issue that lies as
close to the question of democratic survival as
any in modern times.
The dilemma posed by the conduct of gov-
ernmental affairs in an open society is one this
country willingly assumed from its founding.
We have sought and found the means to live
with the dilemma and to prosper and grow
without recourse to repressive practices or, so
far as the printed press is concerned, regula-
tory controls. The dilemma might be more
bluntly described as a built-in conflict between
the easier way of conducting certain important
governmental business or delicate diplomatic
negotiations in privacy and the right and need
of the democratic public to know the facts and
policies on which the national business is being
conducted. Such a paradox exists, and it lies
at the center of the questions before this sub-
committee today.
Obviously the first step toward easing and
living with this problem is to admit that it is
there. A second step is to admit that, while
the American press and the American Govern-
ment share identical devotion to the cause of
their country and to its interests, the two do
not — cannot — always share identical concepts
of their functions or of their obligations to the
public.
^ Made before the Foreign Operations and Govern-
ment Information Subcommittee of tlie House Com-
mittee on Government Operations on Mar. 25 (press
release 151).
While one seeks to serve the public by dis-
closure, the other may be serving a public
need — and a public desire — by protecting a
national policy from failure through premature
disclosure. Indeed, the public in many in-
stances might well find the government official
derelict if he does not so protect it. Like pho-
tographic film, many a diplomatic or strategic
position can be destroyed by premature expo-
sure.
We all know that it is difficult to strike bar-
gains in public. Quite aside from the compli-
cations of doing business with other govern-
ments, what are some of the realities within
our own democratic system? Are reporters
to sit in the Supreme Court coimcil chamber
when Justices are deciding their cases? The
closed "executive session" is a frequent occur-
rence on Capitol Hill. How many reporters
have been covering the negotiations between
the New York City newspaper publishers and
the printers' iinion? Where are the reporters
when the executive committee of U.S. Steel
convenes? Indeed, in this hearing where are
the cameras and microphones of the television-
radio media ?
There are good and long-accepted answers to
all— or most of — these questions, but these and
many similar realities have been obscured in the
great fog bank of cliches raised by some of the
press in recent months.
This hearing arises from the subcommittee's
concern about the public's right to know. I
APRIL 15, 1963
575
want to assure you first of all that, as a working
newspaperman of 27 years' standing, I too am
concerned that Americans know. Since com-
ing to the State Department slightly less than
a year ago, I have seen more sharply the di-
mension of a parallel fact, the public's Tieed to
know. Day after day we see the difficulties that
arise because there is not enough public knowl-
edge and understanding of the events and
forces at work in today's labyrinth of interna-
tional affairs. So let me assure you that to
keep the public uninformed, or to have it ill-
informed by an ill-informed press, does not
serve the Government's purpose.
I am here today without apologies. If any-
thing, I am here to speak with pride about this
Government's information activities.
The business of American foreign policy is
public business. Only a fraction of State De-
partment business — perhaps no more than 1
percent — is not immediately or imminently
public.
The State Department is as wide open as
Yankee Stadium, and the admission is free.
The first item handed to a new correspondent
by the Office of News is a Departmental tele-
phone book listing both office and home tele-
phone numbers of Department officials. The
top officials and policymakers of the Depart-
ment spend at least a third of their time, and
often more, in defining and explaining Amer-
ican policy to the public, to Members of Con-
gress, and, day in, day out, to newsmen. We
like it that way, and we are going to keep it
that way.
If I were to express a philosophy for an in-
formation official in government, I would not
have to change that which served me as a re-
porter: to find out the facts, get them into
perspective, and, within the limitations of na-
tional security, put them out truthfully and
quickly. The principles are the same.
It is obvious, however, that for the reporter
and for the government official in this demo-
cratic society, considerations and circmnstances
differ. In 1851, Lord Derby, in assailing The
Tiines of London, said :
If the press aspires to share the influence of states-
men, it must also share in the responsibilities of
statesmen.
That can be disputed, as it was at the time by*
Robert Lowe of The Times. He wrote :
The first duty of the press is to obtain the earliest
and most correct intelligence of the events of the time'
and instantly, by disclosure of them, to make them the
common property of the nation. . . . The press lives
by disclosure. . . .
He added :
The statesman's duty is precisely the reverse. He
cautiously guards from the public eye the informa-
tion by which his actions and opinions are regulated;
he reserves his judgment of passing events till the
latest moment and then he records it in obscure or
conventional language ; he strictly confines himself,
if he be wise, to the practical interests of his country,
or to those turning immediately upon it.
From an American i)erspective, there is ex-
treme oversimplicity in both Derby's and
Lowe's generalities. But they serve well in
helping to define what we are grappling with:
namely, that there are moments when the inter-
ests of a government serving the people and a
press informing the people do not coincide.
Between the enunciation of a policy and the
actions imdertaken to carry out that policy,
government must sometimes make a sharp dis-
tinction. Quite properly, journalism need not
and frequently does not make that distinction.
It applies its mission of disclosure both to the
rudiments of policy and to the day-by-day, even
hour-by-hour, actions of governments in carry-
ing out those policies.
Government is of the public, and responsible
directly and unequivocally to the public — the
public as a whole, not merely to one segment,
even that powerful segment, the press. In
most uistances, government can serve the public
in the field of information by the direct expe-
dient of serving the press. Life would be sim-
pler for us all if this were always the case. But
it is not.
If we Americans lived in a closed society — in
a vast continental house, sealed tight of soimd
and impregnable to eavesdrop and wiretajD — we
could engage in the fullest, freest disclosure and
discussion of all information, all facts, all the
delicate nuts and bolts of foreign or military
policy. Even the tightly closed society of So-
viet Russia finds this unfeasible; it solves the
problem by telling its people little or nothing.
576
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
fe
Here in the openest society, every govern-
ment pronouncement, every expressed detail of
a policy formulation or a negotiating position,
every official evaluation of a political situation
^^ or a news event flows directly to four audi-
ences — the American public, our allies, the neu-
tral nations, and our cold-war antagonists.
This is a fact that may not figure large in the
reckoning of some newsmen, but it must be very
much in the mind of the government official.
Rarely in foreign policy matters is there a
direct issue of suppression versus disclosure.
Where government and press find themselves
in conflict, the issue is often one of timing, of
tone of voice, or of attribution. Both sides
usually find ways of getting aroimd such
problems.
Some Working Principles
You have proposed, Mr. Chairman, that these
hearings should seek to trace some contingency
lines of procedure for handling information in
periods of high crisis. It is very difficult to
conceive of specific rules and procedures that
can be laid down in advance for the handling
of foreign policy and politicomilitary develop-
ments, as distinct from purely military activi-
ties, but I know that the Department of State
and, I am sure, the Government at large would
welcome concrete suggestions from this sub-
committee.
Even without specific guidelines, those deal-
ing officially with foreign relations must work
from certain set principles and apply them with
flexibility to each individual set of circum-
stances.
1. Foreign policy in the United States must
be evolved by open public discussion of pro-
posed policies, of the objectives of those policies,
and, in most cases, of the means to be used to
attain those policies. There must be ample
candor and ample time for public and Congress
to debate, alter, approve, or disapprove. In
short, public policies publicly arrived at.
2. Once a policy has been publicly enunciated
to the full, those responsible for carrying out
that policy may require certain interludes of
privacy in which to get the job done. Mr. Wal-
ter B. Potter [publisher, Culpeper Star-Ex-
APRIL 15. 1963
pomnt, Culpeper, Va., and director, National
Editorial Association] in his statement to you
Tuesday said :
They (editors) also recognize that delicate diplo-
matic situations sometimes require that full disclosure
be delayed until negotiations are completed.
It is fair to assume, I believe, that this also re-
flects the view of other publishers, editors, and
correspondents. In any case, it reflects a down-
to-earth necessity. Without such interludes of
privacy — interludes employed to carry out, not
to alter, enunciated policies — this Government
would find it impossible to coordinate with its
many allies or seek honorable arrangements
with other nations.
In the case of Berlin, as one of many ex-
amples, the United States has long made clear
a policy that has been widely discussed and en-
dorsed by the American public. Briefly, it is a
policy that insists on continued Western mili-
tary presence in West Berlin, continued viabil-
ity of W^est Berlin, and guaranteed access to
West Berlin. Wliat the public wants to know
is (1) that this is the policy and (2) that the
necessaiy private diplomatic interludes are be-
ing used to achieve that policy. I cannot begin
to measure the amount of time and energy that
topmost officials of this administration have
invested in seeing to it that such knowledge and
assurance is continuously made available to the
press.
The other foreign policies of this Govern-
ment meet these criteria as well.
3. Truth is an essential. Quite aside from
the issue of morality, falsehood is unnecessary.
If choice did come down to holocaust or truth —
to the "ultimate extremity" Mr. Eeston [James
B. Reston, Washington bureau chief, the New
York Times] mentioned in his statement to
this subcommittee last week — I suppose many
might accept the slogan : "better misled than
dead" — a slogan which does not represent State
Department policy or mine and which I fondly
hope will not be jerked out of context.
Tliis subcommittee is concerned with the
practical matter of day-to-day information pol-
icies. On this there can be no argument ; truth
and factuality must be the touchstones. The
obligation of the government official is to tell
the truth or, if security dictates, to button his
577
lip. I know nobody, inside or outside govern-
ment, who disputes this.
Getting Out the News
I referred earlier to the openness of the De-
partment of State and to the broad channels of
access for reporters there. Mr. Reston has been
so kind — and accurate — as to define this access
as the greatest in 20 years. That's a piece of
news that's fit to print.
On the point of access, I am sure the subcom-
mittee has questions about the so-called report-
ing procedure instituted at the Department of
State on October 31 and suspended on N'ovember
27. You have in your files, Mr. Chairman, a
letter explaining the circumstances and context
of that procedure and also a copy of the circular
distributed to officers of the Department on
N'ovember 27 explaining the purpose of that
procedure. I need not take the time of the
subcommittee to repeat those details, but I
would like the opportunity to correct some of
the sloppy reporting and commentary growing
out of the matter.
The procedure was very simple, requiring
only that officials report, after the fact, the oc-
currence of an interview with a newsman, his
name and paper, and the subject discussed. It
excluded telephone interviews and all meetings
outside the Department. It specifically did not
require the presence of a third person — "a body
in the room" — as Mr. Reston erroneously put it ;
nor did it require a memorandum on the sub-
stance of what was discussed ; nor did it require
that advance permission for interviews be
secured.
Perhaps I might quote briefly from that No-
vember 27 circular its expression of the infor-
mation pliilosophy at the Department of State :
It Is essential both to the public and the govemment
that there be the fullest possible dialogue between
policy oflScials and newsmen, and ... it is the policy
of the Department, as interpreted by the Bureau of
Public Affairs, to encourage this dialogue, not to inhibit
it. . . . This requires contact between policy oflBcials
and newsmen.
We invited correspondents to report any in-
stances of seeming inliibition. To this day none
has charged any.
I might point out in this connection that in-
vestigation shows that this is the first time in)
the history of the Department that officers have*
been told, on the direct authority of the Secre-
tary of State, that direct discussion with tha
press is a fixed part of the officers' duty. I as^i
sure you, that obligation is daily honored in ai
multitude of ways.
The reporting procedure, now suspended but
not abolished, grows out of a simple right to :
know — the right of the Secretary of State and ;
his public affairs advisers to know whether andi
how this important part of the Department's
business is being conducted. I insist on tha
validity of this right, on the Secretary's behalfl
and my own.
Lastly, Mr. Chairman, a few words about then
activities of information officers at the Depart-
ment of State and other parts of the executive-
branch. I have never known a time when in-
formation officials have been so fortified witln
intimate access to major govemment policies*
and actions. There was a time when this func-
tion was relegated to the late stages of policy
decisions; the information officer was calledi
in, fitted with a Western Union suit, and sent
off to deliver the message. That has changed.
It has changed because the leaders of this Gov-
emment exercise high and healthy regard for
the fundamental obligation to keep the public
informed. At the Department of State it has
been possible to assemble a team of professional
journalists and high-ranking Foreign Service
officers who have deep access to the facts and
dialog of foreign policy. They are men who
know or who, in those instances when they do
not know, can and do put reporters in touch
with the experts who do Imow. No newsman is
required to seek their help or screen his own
reporting initiative through their offices. The
fact that one small group of 4 information
officers handles some 500 telephone and personal
interviews with reporters each week suggests
the value attached to their services.
Similarly, for individuals and for groups of
reporters the Department provides a weekly
stream of background interviews and ex-
changes. The "background" technique is one
of the most valuable devices for elucidating the
facts and policies that might otherwise remain
obscure until negotiations are completed. The
578
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
•epoi'ter is the sole judge of whether he chooses
o attend background briefings, of whether the
nformation is printed or not printed, of
.vhether the "baclvground" information fits the
:)icture as he sees it. Any good reporter ap-
proaches them caveat emptor, and that is the
>vay it sliould be.
i/oiume of Information
Tlie vohime of available information is over-
(vhelming — so overwhelming that in these days
if many complex crises the press cannot fully
ligest and convey all that is happening and all
'hat has crucial meaning to the people of this
country. That is not a criticism. It is a fact —
one that suggests increasing obligations on
'2;oveniment as well as on the press. As one
5mall illustration, Mr. Chairman, the United
States tliis week is engaged in some two dozen
different international conferences or conclaves
iroimd the world. The ton-ent of news de-
veloped in this country and abroad will bury
most of those deliberations in temporary
obscurity. So the press and other media have
a problem of "news management" that should
I elicit our sympathy.
All of us engaged in this important enter-
prise have problems. We all are subject to
imperfections. We face, among the press, the
public, and the government, the continual
challenge of achieving mutual confidence. With
energy and good faith, we can solve the prob-
lems as Americans have done through their
histoi-y.
I thank the members of this subcommittee
for the opportunity to be here today.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
88th Congress, 1st Session
Nominations of Christian A. Herter, William T. Gos-
sett, and David E. Bell. Hearing before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. January 22, 1963.
60 pp.
Nomination of Bill D. Moyers to be Deputy Director
of the Peace Corps. Hearing before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. January 23, 1963.
23 pp.
Fifty-First Conference of the Interparliamentary
Union. Report of the U.S. delegation to the Con-
ference, held at Brasilia, Brazil, October 24-NoTem-
ber 1, 1962. S. Doc. 5. January 24, 1963. 32 pp.
APRIL 15, 1963
Eighteenth Report of the United States Advisory
Commission on Information. H. Doc. 53. January
28, 1963. 33 pp.
Sixth Annual Report of the President on the Operation
of the Trade Agreements Program. H. Doc. 51. Jan-
uary 28. 1963. 102 pp.
Events in United States-Cuban Relations. A chro-
nology, 1957-1963, prepared by the Department of
State for the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions. January 29, 1963. 28 pp. [Committee print.]
Duty Treatment of Certain Bread. Report to accom-
pany H.R. 370. H. Rept. 22. February 4, 1963. 3 pp.
Free Importation of Wild Birds and Wild Animals.
Report to accompany H.R. 1839. H. Rept. 25. Feb-
ruary 4, 1963. 2 pp.
Tem]iorary Suspension of Duties on Corkboard Insu-
lation and on Cork Stoppers. Report to accompany
H.R. 2053. H. Rept. 26. February 4, 1963. 2 pp.
Tariff Treatment of Certain Electron Microscopes.
Reiiort to accompany H.R. 2874. H. Rept. 29. Feb-
ruary 4, 1963. 2 pp.
The Soviet Economic Offensive in Western Europe.
Report of the Special Study Mission to Europe com-
prising Representatives Kelly, McDowell. Merrow,
Frelinghuysen, and Barry of the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, pursuant to H. Res. 60. H. Rept.
32. February 7, 1963. .36 pp.
Marking Requirements for Articles Imported in Con-
tainers. Report to accompany H.R. 2513. H. Rept.
33. February 11,1963. 7 pp.
Viet Nam and Southeast Asia. Report of Senators
Mike Mansfield, J. Caleb Boggs, Claiborne Pell, and
Benjamin A. Smith to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. Undated. 22 pp. [Committee print]
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference,
Lagos, Nigeria, 1962. Report of the delegation ap-
pointed to attend the Commonwealth Parliamentary
Association Conference in Lagos, Nigeria, November
9-10, 1962. Undated. 25 pp. [Committee print]
The Seventeenth General Assembly of the United Na-
tions. Report by Senators Albert Gore and Gordon
AUott to the Committee on Foreign Relations and
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. Febru-
ary 1963. 39 pp. [Committee print]
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency:
Second Annual Report to Congress, January 1, 1962-
December 31, 1962. H. Doc. 57. February 4, 1963.
102 pp.
Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign
Principals in the United States. Hearings before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Part 1.
February 4-6, 1963. 167 pp.
United Nations Special Fund. Hearing before a sub-
committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. February 18, 1963. 44 pp.
Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-
American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee. February 18-March 6. 1963. 295 pp.
Legislation on Foreign Relations, With Explanatory
Notes. Collection of laws and related material pre-
pared by officials in various departments and agencies
of the executive branch in collaboration with the
staffs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. March
1963. 621 pp. [Joint committee print]
To Proclaim Sir Winston Churchill an Honorary Citi-
zen of the United States of America. Report to
accompany H.R. 4374. H. Rept. 57. March 6, 1963.
5 pp.
Study of U.S. Foreign Policy. Report to accompany
S. Res. 25. S. Rept. 23. March 11, 1963. 3 pp.
Activities of Nondiplomatic Foreign Principals. Re-
port to accompany S. Res. 26. S. Rept. 22. March
11, 1963. 4 pp.
579
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
(St
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings^
Adjourned During March 1963
U.N. Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and New York Jan. 29-Mar. 3
Budgetary Procedures.
Meeting of the Parties to the Interim Convention on North Pacific Tokyo Feb. 18-Mar. 1
Fur Seals.
ICAO North Atlantic Cable Meteorological Communications Panel . Paris Feb. 18-Mar. 8
ILO Governing Body: 154th Session Geneva Feb. 19-Mar. 8
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations . . New York Mar. 4-8
OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices: Paris Mar. 5 (1 day)
Working Party I.
Intergovernmental Meeting of Exporters of Temperate Agricultural Washington Mar. 5-7
Products.
IMCO Working Group on Intact Stability of Ships: 1st Session. . . London Mar. 5-8
lA-ECOSOC Committee To Study Problems Affecting Air Trans- Washington Mar. 5-8
portation in Latin America.
U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 19th Session . Manila Mar. 5-18
U.N. ECE Committee on Housing: Working Party on Effective Geneva Mar. 6-7
Demand.
European Radio Frequency Agency Paris Mar. 6-8
IMCO Working Group on Watertight Subdivision and Damage Sta- London Mar. 11-14
bility of Passenger and Cargo Ships.
U.N. ECE Committee on Housing: Working Party on Urban Re- Geneva Mar. 11-14
newal and Town Planning.
U.N. ECOSOC 4d ffoc Committee Established Under Council Reso- New York Mar. 11-20
lution 851 (XXXII) on Coordination of Technical Assistance
Activities.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 17th Session. . . New York Mar. 11-29
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee Paris Mar. 12-14
FAO Cocoa Study Group: 6th Session and Preparatory Working Port-of-Spain Mar. 13-30
Group.
lA-ECOSOC Action Group on Latin American Exports of Cacao . . Washington Mar. 13-30
OECD European Nuclear Energy Agency Paris Mar. 14-15
OECD Trade Committee Paris Mar. 14-15
OECD Industry Committee: General Working Party of Special Paris Mar. 18-19
Committee for Pulp and Paper.
U.N. ECE Coal Committee: 57th Session Geneva Mar. 18-22
U.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles Geneva Mar. 18-22
G ATT Subgroup on Trade in Tropical Products Geneva Mar. 18-22
UNESCO Executive and Pledging Committee for the Preservation Paris Mar. 18-23
of the Nubian Monuments.
ITU Experts on Frequency Allocations London Mar. 19-21
OECD Industry Committee: Special Committee on Nonferrous Paris Mar. 21-22
Metals.
U.N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists: 5th Session . . Manila Mar. 21-27
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement: 3d Session . . . London Mar. 25-29
U.N. ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Comparisons of Systems of Geneva Mar. 25-29
National Accounts in Use in Europe.
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 29th Session Geneva Mar. 25-29
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Working Party on Paris Mar. 25-30
Technical Cooperation.
OECD Ministers of Science Conference: Preparatory Group . . . Paris Mar. 28 (1 day)
' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Mar. 28, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations:
ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC,
Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation
Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Orga-
nization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
580 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETUT
n Session as of March 31, 1963
3onference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament . Geneva. . .
Jnited Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on Consular Rela- Vienna . . .
tions.
[J.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 19th Session . . . Geneva . . .
-- 'CAO Legal Subcommittee Montreal . .
3ATT Working Party on Tarifl Reduction Geneva. . .
:CAO Facilitation Division: 6th Meeting Mexico, D. F
[TU Administrative Council: 18th Session Geneva. . .
3ATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade . . . Geneva. . .
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 5th Session of Special Geneva. . .
Working Group.
[J.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Mineral Resources and Develop-
ment.
[A-ECOSOC Special Committee on Health, Housing, and Commu-
nity Development.
GATT Working Party on Relations With Less Developed Countries. Geneva .
Manila
Mar.
14, 1962-
Mar.
4, 1963-
Mar.
11-
Mar.
18-
Mar.
18-
Mar.
19-
Mar.
23-
Mar.
25-
Mar.
25-
Mar.
27-
Bogotd Mar. 27-
In Recess as of March 31, 1963
GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification (recessed Dec. Geneva .
15 until mid-1963).
Mar. 28-
Sept. 24, 1962-
U.S. Restates Views on Colonialism
and Portuguese African Territories
Statement by Sidney R. Yates ^
This is my first occasion to speak at the
TJnited Nations, and I am most mindful of the
(great honor accorded me, both of representing
imy country and of being associated with the
able and distinguished members of this Com-
mittee in their important eifort to carry out
the instructions of the General Assembly.
We stand at one of the crossroads of histoiy.
In the words of the great British playwright
Christoplier Fiy, "The frozen misery of cen-
turies breaks, cracks, begins to move." We on
this Committee must be more than witnesses
to this gi"eat liistorical wave. It is our responsi-
bility to help in some measure to channel the
course of that flood by bringing the oppor-
tunity toward self-determination to peoples
seeking to make their own mark in the world.
The cause of freedom is one witli the liis-
tory and ideals of the United States. Engraved
' Made in the Special Committee on the Situation
With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples on Mar. 12 (U.S. /U.N. press release 4156).
Mr. Yates is the U.S. representative in the Special
Committee.
upon the consciousness of all Americans is the
faith proclaimed by the founders of our Repub-
lic in our Declaration of Independence when it
was stated :
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.
That to secure these rights. Governments are insti-
tuted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.
We believe in this political ethic for our-
selves. We believe in it for other nations. Our
task on this Committee will be to help bring
a peaceful end to the colonial era, to replace
the paternalism of the past with political rela-
tionships based on consent.
In today's world colonialism is an anachro-
nism whicli is rapidly disappearing. Tlie task
of decolonization has in many cases been dif-
ficult, but it has moved swiftly in the last dec-
ade. The United Nations deserves great credit
for its contribution in this respect. Under its
auspices the peoples of many lands have made
the transition from colonialism to proud inde-
pendence. Tlieir representatives are members
of this Committee, and we are delighted to be
working with them as they and we seek to
bring to otliers the blessings of freedom which
they now enjoy.
APRIL 15, 1963
581
We have high hopes that constructive pro-
posals will emanate from this Committee. We
have high hopes that the forces of reason, jus-
tice, law, and peace will be paramount as the
remaining colonial areas move to self-
determination.
This Committee can make a constructive con-
tribution to the course of history by actively
seeking a spirit of cooperation and pragmatism,
by utilizing the tools of diplomacy in searching
for practical solutions to practical questions. I
am pleased to hear this same viewpoint widely
expressed by other members, and it augurs well
for our efforts.
Above all, the Committee must avoid the
entanglements of being dragged into the cold
war. The problems of colonial peoples are
already suiBciently complicated without com-
pounding their difficulties by extraneous ideo-
logical attacks. It is unfortimate that such a
diversionary effort has already been made. For
our part, we intend to avoid polemics uttered
purely for political advantage. We want to
deal with the problems at hand.
It hardly seems necessary to point out to
this body, working within the framework of the
United Nations Charter, that the solution to the
problem of decolonization should be sought ex-
clusively by means envisioned in and permitted
by the charter itself. We will cooperate with
this Committee and with other United Nations
bodies in an effort to assure such constructive
and timely progress. We could not, on the
other hand, countenance or support interven-
tionist or expansionist aspirations or predatory
attacks by one state against the territory of
another in the name of self-determination.
Faced with the possibility of such attacks, the
United States Government would, of course,
oppose them as being inconsistent with the pro-
visions of the charter.
With respect to the subject immediately be-
fore us, like most of those who have already
spoken we do not intend to dwell on tlie condi-
tions within the various Portuguese African
territories. The Committee has various docu-
ments which treat this subject at length, and on
the basis of these documents, other informa-
tion of record, and its own deliberations the As-
sembly has pronoimced itself fully in several
resolutions.
I would, however, like briefly to restate the
principles which guide our policy toward Por-
tuguese territories.
First, the General Assembly has found that
the territories under consideration are non-self-
governing territories within the meaning of
chapter XI of the charter and are therefore sub
ject to the provisions of that chapter. Among!
others, an obligation exists under chapter XI
for information to be submitted on these terri
tories by the administering authorities. Con
sistent with this obligation we have called uponi
Portugal to cooperate with the United Nations
in its proper consideration of these reports.
Second, we believe the principle of self
determination, the right of peoples to choose
the terms of their political, economic, and social
destiny, about which I have just spoken, is ap-
plicable to the areas under consideration. We
have continuously supported measures, since the
initial consideration of Angola in the Security
Council, calling for Portuguese recognition of
this principle and for an acceleration of polit-
ical, economic, and social advancement for all
inhabitants of Portuguese territories toward the
full exercise of this self-determination. We be-
lieve Portugal should accept this principle and
give it practical effect for the people of the
territories.
Third, we believe the United Nations and this
Committee should continue their efforts to pro-
duce change and development through the cre-
ative paths of peace, difficult though these paths
often seem. This principle is fundamental not
only to the charter but to the very concept of
the United Nations. To abandon efforts to
achieve cooperation, to abandon the means of
diplomacy and to substitute instead methods of
coercion, would certainly not increase the pres-
tige of this Committee, nor would it achieve the
desired aims.
Fourth, from the moment this question was
first considered in a U.N. forum we have felt
that the U.N. could play a constructive and
meaningful role, fruitful for the peoples of
Portuguese territories and for the Portuguese
people themselves. We have felt this way be-
cause the United Nations is an organization
dedicated both to peace and to justice. We have
accordingly applied ourselves to searching for
means, whether new or old, of applying the U.N.
to
582
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIiLETIN
'esiil)
achinery in a constructive sense to achieve
rogress toward peaceful and just solutions. I
Jloubt if there is any government which has de-
oted more effort in seeking to bring about in
(ractice the basic objective underlying U.N.
•esolutions on Portuguese territories — that of
elf-determination — than the United States.
""^ Ve have done so because of our long friendship
vith Portugal. This motive, among others, has
ed us to seek to persuade Portugal to modify
ts attitudes and to cooperate with the objec-
ives of tlie U.N. with respect to the principle
)f self-determination. Where U.N. machinery
las been established to deal with some aspect
)f this principle, we have suggested ways in
.vhich the Government of Portugal could co-
operate with the machinery.
We have also sought to detennine, in con-
ultation with the Government of Portugal,
ways in which the U.N. could play a useful and
constructive role. In this spirit on the basis
3f an imderstanding between the United States
and Portugal achieved through extended high-
level consultations, and after further broad con-
sultations with the members of the Assembly,
the United States proposed tliat United Nations
representatives should be sent to the territories
of Angola and Mozambique to report, back to
the United Nations on conditions there.^ Por-
tugal was prepared to cooperate with these rep-
resentatives. This proposal, if adopted and
carried out, would have meant that for the
first time representatives of the United Nations
would officially visit Portuguese territories.
Such an event would have been and still would
be a significant step for the peoples of Portu-
guese territories as well as a meaningful
and realistic U.N. effort toward a peaceful
settlement.
As members of tliis Committee know, the
United States finally decided with regret not to
press this proposal to a vote because of an ap-
peal from delegations who were not prepared
to accept the resolution without amendments
which would have prevented its application.
The progress which this proposal represented
should not be abandoned. Many members of
this Committee have already spoken in favor
" For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 21, 1963, p.
105.
of devoting our efforts first and foremost to find-
ing practical ways and means for approaching
this problem. The general approach embodied
in our initiative could provide one good way.
Undoubtedly others can be devised. As we
consider such steps, we would urge that we take
decisions that are achievable rather than at-
tempt ones which, while perhaps more ideal,
are not achievable.
Mr. Chairman, I cannot guarantee that such
an approach would produce the results gen-
erally desired around this table. However, re-
newed efforts along the lines of the representa-
tive concept or some other practical proposal
appear to offer the best chance for progress if
our immediate objective is to bring about co-
operation between Portugal and the U.N. to
lessen the tensions which could threaten inter-
national peace and security in the area. For
our part, we are thoroughly convinced that if
in the face of frustration we resort to extremism,
condemnation, or a sterile restatement of views
on this question, or if an attempt is made to cast
the problem as an East-West cold-war issue,
we will not advance the peoples of Portuguese
territories toward self-determination. I am
sure that only by tenacious and patient per-
severance on a realistic path toward peaceful
settlement will we contribute significantly to
the well-being, prosperity, and political free-
dom of the peoples of Portuguese territories.
To this end we pledge our sincere cooperation.
United States To Be Host
to World Food Congress
The Department of State and the Depart-
ment of Agriculture announced on April 1
(Department of State press release 165 dated
March 29) that American industry and govern-
ment will join forces to serve as hosts to the
World Food Congress at Washington June 4-
18, 1963. The Congress is being sponsored by
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
of the United Nations and is a highlight in
FAO's 5-year international Freedom-From-
Hunger Campaign, which began in 1960. Ap-
proximately 100 nations will be represented, and
the attendance target is 1,200. The Food Con-
gress will also mark the 20th anniversary of
583
the founding of FAO at Hot Springs, Va., in
1943.
The World Food Congress will be an orga-
nized effort to pool existing worldwide experi-
ence in fighting hunger and malnutrition, to
examine ways in which food production and use
can be improved in the developing countries,
and to aid in economic development. The Con-
gress will bring together for 2 weeks adminis-
trators, scientists, and leaders in all aspects of
agriculture, food, and economic development.
The program calls for 8 major addresses, plus
11 key addresses by recognized specialists. Tlie
detailed work of the Congress will be carried out
in four commissions : Technical ; Economic and
Social ; Education and Eesearch ; and People's
Involvement and Group Action. Among
speakers invited are: Arnold J. Toynbee, Brit-
ish historian; K. Gunnar Myrdal, Swedish
economist; Secretary of Agriculture Orville L.
Freeman; Paul G. Hoffman, Director of the
United Nations Special Fund; J. Kubitschek,
former President of Brazil ; and V. T. Krishna-
machari. National Planning Coramisvsioner for
India.
United States Delegations
to International Conferences
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
The Department of State announced on
March 29 (press release 159) that Secretary
Rusk would attend the eighth meeting of the
Council of Ministers of the Soutlieast Asia
Treaty Organization (SEATO) at Paris,
April 8-10.^
Foreign Ministers of other SEATO member
countries are expected to attend the meeting,
where tliey will exchange views on the inter-
national situation, particularly matters affect-
ing the treaty area, as well as review the
military and nonmilitaiy activities of the
organization.
Tlie member countries of SEATO are
Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
Director General of UNESCO
Visits Washington
The Department of State announced on
March 29 (press release 162) that Rene Maheu,
of France, the newly elected Director General
of the United Nations Educational, Scientifio u
and Cultural Organization, would visit Wash-
ington April 1-3 for talks with Secretary Rusk
and other Government officials.
This will be Mr. Maheu's first Washington
visit since his election by the 12th General Con-
ference of UNESCO last November at Paris.
His talks will include discussion of the future
program of UNESCO and U.S. participation
in it in the light of recommendations adopted
by the General Conference.
fill
' For a list of the members of the U.S. delegation, see
press release 159.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeofiraphed or processed documents (such as those
listed Ijeloiv) man he consulted at depositary libraries in
the United States. V.N. printed publications may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na-
tions, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
General Assembly
Working Oronp on the Examination of the Adminis-
trative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Na-
tions. Budgetary and financial practices of the
United Nations. A/AC.113/1. January 21, 1963.
92 pp.
Economic and Social Council
Population Commission :
Basic considerations in national programs of analysis
of population census data as an aid to planning
and policymaking. E/CN.9/173. November 26,
1962. 70 pp.
Current status of demographic studies relevant to
economic and social development. E/CN.9/169.
December 5, 1902. 1(> pp.
Progress of other demographic studies. E/CN.9/171.
December 6, 1962. 11 itp.
Plans and arrangements for the second world popu-
lation conference. E/CN.9/177. December 7,
1962. 6 pp.
The world population census program : evaluation
and analysis of results. E/CN.9/174. December
11. 1902. 9 pp.
The world demographic situation with special refer-
ence to fertility. E/CN.9/1G7. December 19, 1962.
23 pp.
Regional demographic activities. E/CN.9/172. De-
cember 21, 1902. 29 pp.
Draft standards for national programs of population
projections as aids to development planning.
E/CN.9/170. December 27, 1902. 33 pp.
584
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIII
Activities in the field of demographic statistics,
1961-62. E/CX.9/179. January 17, 1963. 46 pp.
Studies relating to problems of food and agriculture.
B/CN.9/173/Add. 1. January 29, 1963. 7 pp.
Plans for financing the second world population con-
ference. E/CN.9/177/Add. 1. February 7, 1963.
9 pp.
)eclsions taken by the Economic and Social Council at
its 34th session with regard to the U.N. development
decade. Communication for the Director-General of
the International Labor Office. E/3700. November
28, 1962. 13 pp.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
automotive Traffic
SJonvention on road traffic with annexes. Done at
Geneva, September 19, 1949. Entered into force
March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.
Accession deposited: Bulgaria (with reservations),
February 13, 1963.
~ iviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force
April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Jamaica, March 26, 1963.
Copyright
Jniversal copyright convention. Done at Geneva
September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16,
1955. TIAS 3324.
Application to: Bermuda, North Borneo, and Zanzi-
bar, February 4, 1963.
lighways
Agreement for the termination of the regional agree-
ment of January 2 and 6, 1958 (TIAS 3994) between
India, Nepal, and the United States concerning the
development of tran.sportation facilities in Nepal.
Signed at Katmandu January 10, 1963. Entered
into force January 10, 1963.
Law of the Sea
Optional protocol of signature concerning the compul-
sory settlement of disputes. Done at Geneva April
29, 1958."
Signature: Sierra Leone, February 14, 1963.
Telecommunications
Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the
international telecommunication convention, 1959.
Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into
force May 1, 1961 ; for the United States October
23, 1961. TIAS 4893.
Notification of approval: Viet-Nam, February 13,
1963.
Trade
Pr(x;^s-verbal extending the period of validity of the
declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of
November 18, 1960. Done at Geneva November 7,
1962. Entered into force January 1, 1963. TIAS
5266.
Signatures: Ghana, February 15, 1963; India,
February 21, 1963.
BILATERAL
Indonesia
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at
Djakarta March 8 and 14, 1963. Entered into force
March 14, 1963.
Norway
Agreement on the use of Norwegian ports and ter-
ritorial waters by the NS Savannah. Signed at Oslo
March 1, 1963. Enters into force upon an exchange
of notes bringing the agreement into force.
United States and Japan Sign
Consular Convention
Press release 146 dated March 21, for release March 22
A consular convention between the United
States and Japan was signed on March 22 at
Tokyo by Edwin O. Keischauer, U.S. Ambassa-
dor at Tokyo, and Masayoshi Ohira, Foreign
Minister of Japan.
The convention defines and establishes the
duties, riglits, privileges, exemptions, and im-
munities of consular oificers of each country in
the territory of the other country.
The convention is comparable in both text
and format to the consular conventions between
the United States and the United Kingdom
and Ireland, signed in 1951 and 1950, respec-
tively.^ Its provisions are similar in substance
to those of a more concise consular convention
signed by the United States and the Republic
of Korea in January 1963.
The convention will be sent to the Senate of
the United States for advice and consent to
ratification by the President. The convention
will enter into force on the 30th day following
the day on which instruments of ratification of
the two Governments are exchanged.
' Not in force.
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2494
and 2984.
APRIL 15, 1963
585
PUBLICATIONS
Secretary Endorses Recommendation
for "Foreign" Relations" Series
The Advisory Comm.ittee on the historical
series entitled '■'■Foreign Relations of the United
States" composed of Dexter Perkins, chairman,
Clarence A. Berdahl, Leland M. Goodrich, Fred
H. Harrington, Richard W. Leopold, Philip W.
Thayer, and Robert R. Wilson, met at Washing-
ton on November 2 and 3, 1962. The principal
recommendation of the Committee was that
henceforth the '■^Foreign Relations'''' volumes he
published in orderly fashion 20 years behind
currency, with no series undertahen out of
chronological order. Following is the text of a
letter from Secretary Rusk to Professor Perkins
acknoivledging receipt of the Oommittee''s
report.
December 29, 1962
Deak Dr. Perkins : Tliank you for your letter
of November 19, enclosing the report on the
"Foreign Relations" Series. I have now had
the opportimity to read this report with some
care, and I should like to thank you and the
other members of the Committee for the time
and thought that you have generously given to
the problem.
I think your recommendations that these vol-
vunes be published in regular chronological order
and be kept within twenty years of currency are
reasonable, and I shall so inform our Historical
OiEce. You will understand, however, that pub-
lication of a volume may occasionally be delayed
because of the current sensitivity of significant
documents. I trust that such instances will be
rare and that we can hold to a twenty-year line
with fair regularity.
Sincerely yours,
Dean Rusk
Dexter Perkins, Ph. D.,
Professor of History, Emeritus,
316 Oxford Street,
Rochester 7, Neto York.
Recent Releases
For sale ty the Superintendent of Documents, V.^
Oovernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.i
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docii
ments, except in the case of free publications, ivhic
may be obtained from the Department of State.
Defense — Loan of Vessels. Agreement with Spaii
amending the agreement of March 9, 1957. Exchan;;
of notes — Signed at Madrid June 19, 1962. Entere^
into force June 19, 1962. TIAS 5096. 3 pp. 54.
Education — Educational Foundation and Financing o
Exchange Programs. Agreement with Israel. Ex
change of notes — Signed at Tel Aviv and Jerusalen
June 18 and 22, 1962. Entered into force June 22, 1962
With memorandum of understanding. TIAS 5097. i:
pp. 10<t.
Army Mission. Agreement with Argentina amendini
the agreement of August 2, 1960. Exchange of notes-
Signed at Buenos Aires January 8 and Jime 7, 1962
Entered into force June 7, 1962. TIAS 5098. 3 pp. 5^
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 25-31
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25,
D.C.
Releases issued prior to March 25 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 146
and 148 of March 21.
Subject
Manning: House Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations and Govern-
ment Information.
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
Annual honor awards ceremony.
Loans to Argentina.
Rusk : Japanese membership in
OECD.
Cleveland : "Reflections on the
Pacific Community."
Johnson : "Japan, the United
States, and Europe."
Rostow : "The Cold War— A Look
Ahead."
Delegation to SEATO Council meet-
ing (rewrite).
Rowan sworn in as Ambassador to
Finland (biographic details).
Secretary Rusk visits U.S. Air
Force Academy.
UNESCO Director General visits
Washington (rewrite).
Firing on U.S. ship by Cuban planes.
Williams : "The United Nations and
the New Africa."
World Food Congress (rewrite).
U.S. statement on raids on Cuba.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
No.
Date
151
3/25
*152
3/25
*153
tl54
155
3/25
3/28
3/28
tl56
3/28
tl57
3/27
158
3/28
159
3/29
•160
3/29
*161
3/29
162
3/29
163
tl64
3/29
3/29
165
tl69
3/29
3/30
586
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
April 15, 1963 I n d
Agriculture. United States To Be Host to World
Food Congress 583
Asia. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(delegation) 584
Atomic Energy. The Cold War — A Look Ahead
(Rostow) 551
Brazil. U.S. and Brazil Reach Understanding in
Economic and Financial Talks (text of joint
communique) 557
Canada. U.S. Accepts Recommendations on
Halibut Abstention 574
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 579
Foreign Policy in the Open Society (Manning) . 575
Cuba. U.S. Asks Cuba for Explanation of At-
tack on "Floridian" 573
Economic Affairs
U.S. Accepts Recommendations on Halibut
Abstention 574
U.S. and Brazil Reach Understanding in Eco-
nomic and Financial Talks (text of joint
communique 557
U.S. Supports Full Membership for Japan in
OECD (Rusk) 572
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Director
General of UNESCO Visits Washington . . 584
Foreign Aid
The Cold War — A Look Ahead (Rostow) . . . 551
President Receives Clay Report on AID Pro-
gram (Kennedy) 574
The Refugee Problem in Laos 567
U.S. and Brazil Reach Understanding in Eco-
nomic and Financial Talks (text of joint
communique) 557
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and
Meetings 580
Director General of UNESCO Visits Wash-
ington 584
U.S. Supports Full Membership for Japan in
OECD (Rusk) 572
United States To Be Host to World Food
Congress 583
Japan
U.S. Accepts Recommendations on Halibut
Abstention 574
United States and Japan Sign Consular Con-
vention 585
ex
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1242
U.S. Supports Full Membership for Japan in
OECD (Rusk) 572
Korea. United States Expresses Views on Mili-
tary Rule in Korea 573
Laos. The Refugee Problem in Laos .... 567
Military Affairs. The Cold War— A Look Ahead
(Rostow) 551
Non-Self-Governing Territories. U.S. Restates
Views on Colonialism and Portuguese African
Territories (Yates) 581
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Cold
War — A Look Ahead (Rostow) 551
Portugal. U.S. Restates Views on Colonialism
and Portuguese African Territories (Yates) . 581
Presidential Documents. President Receives
Clay Report on AID Program 574
Protection of Nationals and Property. U.S.
Asks Cuba for Explanation of Attack on
"Floridian" 573
Public Affairs. Foreign Policy in the Open So-
ciety (Manning) 575
Publications
Recent Releases 586
Secretary Endorses Recommendation for "For-
eign Relations" Series (Rusk) 586
Refugees. The Refugee Problem in Laos . . . 567
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Eighth
Meetingof Council of Ministers (delegation) . 584
Treaty Information
Current Actions 585
U.S. Accepts Recommendations on Halibut
Abstention 574
United States and Japan Sign Consular Con-
vention 585
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 584
The United Nations— What It Is, What It Has
Done (Chayes) 562
U.S. Restates Views on Colonialism and Portu-
guese African Territories (Yates) 581
Name Index
BeU, David B 557
Chayes, Abram 562
Kennedy, President 574
Manning, Robert J 575
Rostow, W. W 551
Busk, Secretary 572,586
San Tiago Dantas, Francisco Clementino . . . 557
Yates, Sidney R 581
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
TREATIES IN FORCE
January 1, 1963
This publication is a guide to treaties and other international
agreements in force between the United States and other countries
at the beginning of the current year.
The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, ar-
ranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral
treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of
states which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry
into force for the United States, and citations to texts are fur-
nished for each agreement.
Documents affecting international copyright relations of the
United States are listed in the appendix.
Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the in-
formation contained in Treaties in Force, is published weeldy in
the Department of State Bulletin.
Publication 7481
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DEPOSITORY
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1243 AprU 22, 1963
FREE-WORLD DEFENSE AND ASSISTANCE PRO-
GRAMS • Message of the President to the Congress . . . 591
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE NEW AFRICA • by
Assistant Secretary Williams 602
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT • Statement by Walter M.
Kotschnig 625
REFLECTIONS ON THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY • by
Assistant Secretary Cleveland 613
JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND EUROPE • by
Deputy Under Secretary Johnson 606
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Qovemment Printlnp; Office
Washington M, D.O.
Price:
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Single copy, 26 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Depabtmknt
or State Bdlletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is indexed hi the
Readers' Oolde to Periodical Literature.
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1243 • Publication 752
April 22, 1963
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by th»
Office of Media Services, Bureau oji
Public Affairs, provides tlie publit'
and interested agencies of th
Government with information or>
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and thit
Department, and statements and ad*
dresses made by the President and byt
the Secretary of State and otheti
officers of the Department, as well
special articles on various phases oj
international affairs and the func*
tions of the Department. Informa*
tion is included concerning treatiet
and international agreements tc
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of tlie Department.
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently
iFree-World Defense and Assistance Programs
MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS <
The White House, April 2, 1963.
To the Congress of the United States:
"Peace hath her victories no less renowned
than war," wrote Milton. And no peacetime
victory in history has been as far reaching in
its impact, nor served the cause of freedom so
well, as the victories scored in the last 17 years
by this Nation's mutual defense and assistance
programs. These victories have been, in the
main, quiet instead of dramatic. Their aim has
been, not to gain territories for the United
States or support in the United Nations, but
preserve freedom and hope and to prevent
:yranny and subversion in dozens of key na-
tions all over the world.
The United States today is spending 10 per-
cent of its gross national product on programs
primarily aimed at improving our national se-
curity. Somewhat less than one-twelfth of this
imount, and less than 0.7 percent of our GNP,
»oes into the mutual assistance program:
roughly half for economic development, and
lalf for military and other short-term assist-
mce. The contribution of this program to our
national interest clearly outweighs its cost.
The richest nation in the world would surely
36 justified in spending less than 1 percent of
its national income on assistance to its less
fortunate sister nations solely as a matter of
international responsibility; but inasmuch as
these programs are not merely the right thing
to do, but clearly in our national self-interest,
a-ll criticisms should be placed in that perspec-
tive. That our aid programs can be improved
is not a matter of debate. But that our aid
programs serve both our national traditions
and our national interest is beyond all reason-
able doubt.
' H. D;.c. 94, 88th Cong., Ist eess.
APRH. 2 2, 1963
History records that our aid programs to
Turkey and Greece were the crucial element
that enabled Turkey to stand up against heavy-
handed Soviet pressures, Greece to put down
Communist aggression, and both to re-create
stable societies and to move forward in the
direction of economic and social growth.
History records that the Marshall plan made
it possible for the nations of Western Europe,
including the United Kingdom, to recover from
the devastation of the world's most destructive
war, to rebuild military strength, to withstand
the expansionist thrust of Stalinist Eussia, and
to embark on an economic renaissance which
has made Western Europe the second greatest
and richest industrial complex in the world
today — a vital center of free world strength,
itself now contributing to the growth and
strength of less-developed countries.
History records that our military and eco-
nomic assistance to nations on the frontiers of
the Communist world — such as Iran, Pakistan,
India, Vietnam, and free China — has enabled
threatened peoples to stay free and independ-
ent, when they otherwise would have either been
overrun by aggressive Communist power or
fallen victim of utter chaos, poverty, and
despair.
History records that our contributions to in-
ternational aid have been the critical factor in
the growth of a whole family of international
financial institutions and agencies, playing an
ever more important role in the ceaseless war
against want and the .straggle for growth and
freedom.
And, finally, history will record that today
our technical assistance and development loans
are giving hope where hope was lacking, spark-
ing action where life was static, and stimulat-
ing progress around the earth — simultaneously
591
supporting the military security of the free
world, helping to erect barriers against the
crowth of communism where those barriers
count the most, helping to build the kind of
world community of independent, self-support-
ing nations in which we want to live, and
helping to serve the deep American urge to
extend a generous hand to those working to-
ward a better life for themselves and their
children.
Despite noisy opposition from the very first
days, despite dire predictions that foreign aid
would "bankrupt" the Eepublic, despite warn-
ings that the Marshall plan and successor pro-
grams were "throwing our money down a
rathole," despite gi-eat practical difficulties and
some mistakes and disappointments, the fact is
that our aid programs generally and consist-
ently have done what they were expected to
do.
Freedom is not on the run anywhere in the
world — not in Europe, Asia, Africa, or Latin
America — as it might well have been without
U.S. aid. And we now know that freedom —
all freedom, including our own — is diminished
when other countries fall mider Communist
domination, as in China in 1949, North Viet-
nam, and the northern Provinces of Laos in
1954, and Cuba in 1959. Freedom, all freedom,
is threatened by the subtle, varied, and unceas-
ing Communist efforts at subversion in Latin
America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.
And the prospect for freedom is also endan-
gered or eroded in countries which see no
hope — no hope for a better life based on eco-
nomic progress, education, social justice, and the
development of stable institutions. These are
the frontiers of freedom wliich our military and
economic aid programs seek to advance ; and in
so doing they serve our deepest national
interest.
This view has been held by three successive
Presidents — Democratic and Republican alike.
It has been endorsed by a bipartisan majority
of nine successive Congresses.
It has been supported for 17 years by a bi-
partisan majority of the Ajnerican people.
And it has only recently been reconfirmed
by a distinguished committee of private citi-
zens, headed by Gen. Lucius Clay and includ-
592
ing Messrs. Robert Anderson, Eugene Black,
Clifford Hardm, Robert Lovett, Edward Ma-
son, L. F. McCollum, George Meany, Hennan
Phleger, and Howard Rusk. Their report
stated: "We believe these programs, properly
conceived and implemented, to be essential to
the security of our Nation and necessary to the
exercise of its worldwide responsibilities." ^ |'
There is, in short, a national consensus of
many years standing on the vital importance of
these programs. The principle and purpose
of U.S. assistance to less secure and less fortu-
nate nations are not and cannot be seriously in
doubt.
II. Present Needs
The question now is: What about the future?(
In the perspective of these past gains, what isi
the dimension of present needs, what are oun
opportunities, and what changes do we face at(
this juncture in world history ?
I believe it is a crucial juncture. Our world
is near the climax of a historic convulsion. Ai
tidal wave of national independence has nearlyi
finished its sweep through lands which contain
one out of every three people in the world.
The industrial and scientific revolution if
spreading to the far corners of the earth. And
two irreconcilable views of the value, the rights
and the role of the individual human being con-
front the peoples of the world.
In some 80 developing nations, countless larg(
and small decisions will be made in the days
and months and years ahead — decisions which
taken together, will establish the economic and
social system, determine the political leader-
ship, shape the political practices, and mold tha
structure of the institutions which will promota
either consent or coercion for one-third of hu-
manity. And these decisions will drasticallj
affect the shape of the world in which our chil-
dren grow to maturity.
Afi'ica is stirring restlessly to consolidate its
independence and to make that independence
'The Scope and Distribution of United States MilU
tary and Economic Assistance Programs: Report t6
the President of the United States from The Commit*
tee to Strengthen the Security of the Free WorW
March 20, 196S; available from the Superintendent ol
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-:
ton 2.5, D.C. (price 15 cents).
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN^
I
I
neaningf ul for its people through economic and
social development. The people of America
lave affirmed and reaffirmed their symj^athy
.vith these objectives.
Free Asia is responding resolutely to the po-
itical, economic, and military challenge of
?ommmiist China's relentless efforts to domi-
late the contment.
Latin America is striving to take decisive
teps toward effective democracy, amid the tur-
)ulence of rapid social change and the menace
if Communist subversion.
The United States — the richest and most pow-
rful of all peoples, a nation committed to the
ndependence of nations and to a better life for
11 peoples — can no more stand aside in this cli-
lactic age of decision than we can withdraw
rom the community of free nations. Our ef-
ort is not merely symbolic. It is addressed to
ur vital security interests.
It is in this context that I hope the American
eople through their representatives in Con-
ress will consider our request this year for
oreign aid fimds designed carefully and ex-
licitly to meet tliese specific challenges. This
> not a wearisome burden. It is a new chapter
1 our involvement in a continuously vital
:ruggle — the most challenging and construc-
ve effort ever imdertaken by man on behalf
f freedom and his fellow man.
I. Objectives for Improvement
In a changing world, our progi'ams of mutual
efense and assistance must be kept under con-
:ant review. My recommendations herein re-
ect the work of the Clay Committee, the
n'utiny undertaken by the new Administrator
David E. Bell] of the Agency for Interna-
onal Development, and the experience gained
1 our first full year of administering the new
nd improved program enacted by the Congress
1 1961. There is fundamental agreement
iroughout these reviews : that these assistance
rograms are of great value to our deepest na-
ional interest, that their basic concepts and
rganization, as embodied in the existing legis-
ition, are properly conceived, that progress
as been made and is being made in translating
liese concepts into action, but that much still
emains to be done to improve our performance
and make the best possible use of these pro-
grams.
In addition, there is fundamental agreement
in all these reviews regarduig six key recom-
mendations for the future.
Objective No. 1 : To apply stricter standards
of selectivity and self -help in aiding developing
countries. — This objective was given special at-
tention by the Committee To Strengthen the
Security of the Free World (the Clay report),
which estimated that the application of such
criteria could result in substantial savings in
selected programs over the next 1 to 3 years.
Considerable progress has already been made
along these lines. Wliile the number of former
colonies achieving independence has lengthened
the total list of countries receiving assistance,
80 percent of all economic assistance now goes
to only 20 countries; and military assistance is
even more narrowdy concentrated. The pro-
portion of development loans, as contrasted
with outright grants, has increased from 10 to
60 percent. We have placed all our develop-
ment lending on a dollar-repayable basis ; and
this year we are increasing our efforts, as the
Clay Committee recommended, to tailor our
loan terms so that interest rates and maturities
will reflect to a greater extent the differences
in the ability of different countries to service
debt.
In the Alliance for Progress, in particular,
and increasingly in other aid programs, em-
phasis is placed upon self-help and self-reform
by the recipients themselves, using our aid as a
catalyst for progress and not as a handout.
Finally, in addition to emphasizing primarily
economic rather than military assistance, wher-
ever conditions pei-mit, we are taking a sharp
new look at both the size and purpose of those
local military forces which receive our assist-
ance. Our increased stress on internal security
and civic action in military assistance is in
keeping with our experience that, in developing
countries, military forces can have an impor-
tant economic as well as protective role to play.
For example, in Latin America, in fiscal year
1963, military assistance funds allocated for the
support of engineer, medical, and other civic
action type units more than doubled.
APRIL 22, 1063
593
Objective No. 2: To achieve a redttction and
vltimnte eVtmination of U.S. assistance hy en-
abling natiotis to stand on their own as rap-idly
as possible. — Both this Nation and the countries
we help have a stake in their reaching the point
of self-sustaining growth — the point where
they no longer require external aid to maintain
their independence. Our goal is not an arbi-
trary cutoff date but the earliest possible "take-
off" date — the date when their economies will
have been launched with sufficient momentum
to enable them to become self-supporting, re-
quiring only the same normal sources of ex-
ternal financing to meet expanding capital needs
that this country required for many decades.
For some, this goal is near at hand, insofar
as economic assistance is concerned. For others,
more time will be needed. But in all cases,
specific programs leading to self-support should
be set and priorities established — including
those steps which must be taken by the recipient
countries and all others who are willing to help
them.
The record clearly shows that foreign aid is
not an endless or unchanging process. Fifteen
years ago our assistance went almost entirely
to the advanced countries of Europe and
Japan — today it is directed almost entirely to
the developing world. Ten years ago most of
our assistance was given to shoring up military
forces and unstable economies — today this kind
of aid has been cut in half, and our assistance
goes increasingly toward economic develop-
ment. There are still, however, important cases
where there has been no diminution in the Com-
munist military threat, and both military and
economic aid are still required. Such cases
range from relatively stabilized frontiers, as in
Korea and Turkey, to areas of active aggres-
sion, such as Vietnam.
Objective No. 3: To secure the increased par-
ticipation of other indiistrialized nations in
sharing the cost of infei'national development
assistance. — The United States is no longer
alone in aiding the developing countries, and
its proportionate share of the burden is dimin-
ishing. The flow of funds from other indus-
trialized countries — now totaling on the order
of $2 billion a year — is expected to continue;
and we expect to work more closely with these
other countries in order to make tlie most effec-
tive use of our joint efforts. In addition, the
international lending and technical assistance
agencies — to which we contribute heavily—
have expanded the schedule and scope of their
operations; and we look forward to supple-
menting those resources selectively in conjunc-
tion with increased contributions from other
nations. We will continue to work with our
allies, urging them to increase their assistance
efforts and to extend assistance on terms lessN^
burdensome to tlie developing countries.
Objective No. ^: To lighten any adverse im-
pact of the aid program on our oum balance
of payments and economy. — A few years ago,
more than half of U.S. economic aid funds were
spent abroad, contributing to the drain on our
dollars and gold. Of our current commitments,
over 80 percent will be spent in the United
States, contributing to the growth of our econ-
omy and employment opportunities. This pro-
portion is rising as further measures are being
taken to this end. I might add that our balance-
of-payments position today is being sig-
nificantly helped by the repayment of loans
made to European countries under the Marshall
plan and by the Export-Import Bank. I am
confident that in the future, as income in the
less-developed countries rises, we will similar!}
benefit from the loans we are now making tc
them.
Our economy is also being helped by the ex
pansion of commercial exports to countries
whose present growth and prosperity wen
spurred by U.S. economic assistance in earliei
years. Over the last decade, our exports tc
Western Europe and the United Kingdom hav(
more than doubled, and our exports to Japan
have increased fourfold. Similarly, we can loot
forward to a future widening of trade oppor-
tunities in those countries whose economic de
velopment we ?re currently assisting.
In addition, our food-for-peace program it
increasingly using our agricultural commodities
to stimulate the economic growth of developins;
nations and to assist in acliieving other U.S
foreign policy goals. As the economies of de-
veloping nations improve, we are encouraging
them to shift from foreign cuiTency to cash
sales or to dollar credit sales for these com-
modities.
594
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The relative burden of our assistance pro-
ms has been steadily reduced from some 2
ircent of our national product at the begin-
ing of the ilarshall plan to seven-tenths of 1
ircent today — from 11.5 percent of the Federal
dget in 1949 to 4 percent today.
Although these figures indicate that our aid
|rograms cost, in relative terms, considerably
today than they did 10 or 15 years ago, we
continuing our etforts to improve the effec-
iveness of these programs and increase the
eturn on every dollar invested. Personnel,
irocedures, and administration are being im-
•roved. A number of field missions have been
losed, scaled down, or merged into embassies
ir regional offices. These efforts toward greater
fficiency and economy are being accelerated
mder the new Administrator.
Objective No. 5: To continue to assist in the
defense of countries under threat of external
md internal Conwmmist attack. — Our military
issistance program has been an essential element
n keeping the boundary of Soviet and Chinese
nilitai-y power relatively stable for over a dec-
ide. Without its protection the substantial
'conomic progress made by underdeveloped
■ountries along the Sino-Soviet periphery
.Tould hardly have been possible. As these
countries build economic strength, they will be
ible to assume more of the burden of their de-
fense. But we must not assume that military
issistance to these coimtries — or to others pri-
marily exposed to subversive internal attack —
can be ended in the foreseeable future. On the
contrary, while it will be possible to reduce and
terminate some programs, we should anticipate
the need for new and expanded programs.
India is a case in point. The wisdom of ear-
lier United States aid in helping the Indian sub-
continent's considerable and fruitful efforts to-
ward progress and stability can hardly now be
in question. The threat made plain by the
'Chinese attack on India last fall may require
additional efforts on our part to help bolster
the security of this crucial area, assuming these
efforts can be matched in an appropriate way by
the efforts of India and Pakistan.
j But overall, the magnitude of military assist-
} ance is small in relation to our national security
expenditures; in this fiscal year it amounts to
about ;i percent of our defense budget. "Dollar
for dollar," said the Clay Committee with par-
ticular reference to the border areas, "these pro-
grams contribute more to the security of the
free world than corresponding expenditures in
our defense appropriations * * *. These coun-
tries are providing more than 2 million armed
men ready, for the most part, for any emer-
gency." Clearly, if this program did not exist,
our defense budget would undoubtedly have to
be increased substantially to provide an equiva-
lent contribution to the free world's defense.
Objective No. 6: To increase the role of pri-
vate investment and other non-Federal re-
sources in assisting developing nations. — In
recent months important new steps have been
taken to mobilize on behalf of this program
the competence of a variety of nongovernmental
organizations and individuals in this country.
Cooperatives and savings and loan associations
have been very active in establishing similar
institutions abroad, particularly in Latin Amer-
ica. Our land-grant and other universities are
establishing better working relationships with
our programs to assist oversea rural develop-
ment. Already there are 37 U.S. universities
and land-grant institutions at work in Latin
America, for example, with a substantial in-
crease expected during the coming year. Public
and private leaders from the State of California
are exploring with their counterparts in Chile
how the talents and resources of a particular
State can be more directly channeled toward
assisting a particular country. Labor unions,
foundations, trade associations, profe,'^sionaI so-
cieties, and many others likewise possess skills
and resources which we are drawing upon in-
creasingly, in order to engage in a more system-
atic and meaningful way, in this vital nation-
building process, the whole complex of private
and public institutions upon which our own
national life depends. For at the heart of the
modernization process lies the central problem
of creating, adapting, and impro^ang the insti-
tutions which any modern society will need.
IV. Private Investment
The primary new initiative in this year's pro-
gram relates to our increased efforts to encour-
age the investment of private capital in the
APRIL 22, 19G3
underdeveloped countries. Already consider-
able progress has been made fostering U.S. pri-
vate investment tlirough the use of investment
guaranties — with over $900 million now out-
standing — and by means of cost-sharing on
investment surveys, loans of local currencies,
and other measures provided under existing
law. During the first half of this fiscal year
alone, $7.7 million in local currencies have been
loaned to private business firms.
I believe much more should be done, however,
both administratively through more vigorous
action by the Agency for International Devel-
opment, and legislatively by the Congress. Ad-
ministratively, our ambassadors and missions
abroad, in their negotiations with the less-de-
veloped countries, are being directed to urge
more forcefully the importance of making full
use of private resources and improving the
climate for private investment, both domestic
and foreign. In particular, I am concerned
that the investment guaranty pi-ogram is not
fully operative in some countries because of the
failure of their governments to execute the
normal intergovernmental agreements relating
to investment guaranties.
In addition, the Agency for International
Development will also strengthen and enlarge
its own activities relating to private enter-
prise — both its efforts to assist in the develop-
ment of vigorous private economies in the de-
veloping countries and its facilities for mobiliz-
ing and assisting the capital and skills of pri-
vate business in contributing to economic
development.
Ivcgislatively, I am i-ecommending the
following :
(a) An amendment to the Internal Revenue
Code for a trial period to grant U.S. taxpayers
a tax credit for new investments in developing
countries, which should also apply to some ex-
tent to reinvestments of their earnings in those
countries. Such a credit, by making possible
an increased rata of return, should substantially
encourage additional private investment in the
developing countries. The U.S. businessmen's
committee for the Alliance for Progress has
recommended the adoption of such a measure.
(b) Amendments in the investment guaranty
provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act de-
signed to enlarge and clarify the guaranti
program.
Economic and social growth cannot be ac
complished by governments alone. The effet
tive participation of an enlightened U.S. busi
nessman, especially in partnership with privat<i
interests in the developing country, brings noi
only liis investment but his technological aii(
management skills into the process of develop
ment. His successful participation in tun
helps create that climate of confidence which i
so critical in attracting and holding vital ex
ternal and internal capital. We welcome an(
encourage initiatives being taken in the privat>i p'
sector in Latin America to accelerate indus^'^
trial growth and hope that similar cooperativ
efforts will be established with other developinj
countries.
V. The Alliance for Progress
In a special sense, the achievements of th
Alliance for Progress in the coming years wil
be the measure of our determination, our ideals
and our wisdom. Here in this hemisphere, h
this last year, our resourcefulness as a peopl
was challenged in the clearest terms. W
moved at once to resist the threat of aggressiv
nuclear weapons in Cuba, and we found th
nations of Latin America at our side. Thej
like ourselves, were brought to a new awarenes
of the danger of jDermitting the poverty an
despair of a whole people to continue long anj
where in this continent.
Had the needs of the people of Cuba bee
met in the pre-Castro period — their need fo
food, for housing, for education, for jobs, anc
above all, for a democratic responsibility in th
fulfillment of their own Iiopes — there wouli
have been no Castro, no missiles in Cuba, am
no need for Cuba's neighbors to incur the im
mense risks of resistance to threatened aggres
sion from that island.
There is but one way to avoid being facei
with similar dilermnas in the future. It is ti
bring about in all tlie countries of Latin Amer
ica the conditions of hope, in which the people
of this continent will Iniow that they can shapi
a better future for themselves, not througl
obeying the inhumane commands of an aliei
and cynical ideology, but through persona
596
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIK
If-expression, individual judgment, and the
•ts of responsible citizenship.
As Americans, we have long recognized the
itimacy of these aspirations; in recent
fionths we have been able to see, as never before,
lieir urgency and, I believe, the concrete means
|)r their realization.
In less than 2 years, the 10-year program of
lie Alliance for Progress has become more than
1 idea and more than a commitment of govem-
kents. The necessary initial effort to develop
jl^ans, to organize institutions, to test and ex-
sriment has itself required and achieved a new
lication — a new dedication to intelligent com-
promise between old and new ways of life. In
le long run, it is this effort and not the threat
communism that will determine the fate of
jedom in the Western Hemisphere.
These years have not been easy ones for any
roup in Latin America. A similar change in
16 fundamental orientation of our own society
rould have been no easier. The difficulty of
18 changes to be brought about makes all the
lore heartening the success of many nations of
iatin America in achieving reforms which will
lake their fundamental economic and social
Itructures both more efficient and more
luitable.
Some striking accomplislmients, moreover,
'ire already visible. New housing is being ex-
panded in most countries of the region. Edu-
cational facilities are growing rapidly. Koad
X)nstruction, particularly in agricultural areas,
is accelerating at a rapid pace. With U.S.
funds, over 2 million text books are being dis-
tributed to combat the illiteracy of nearly half
of the 210 million people of Latin America.
In the countries of the Alliance for Progress,
the diets of 8 million children and mothers are
being supplemented with U.S. Food for Peace,
and this figure should reach nearly 16 million
by next year.
In trouble-ridden northeast Brazil, under an
agreement with the State of Rio Grande do
Norte, a program is underway to train 3,000
teachers, build 1,000 classrooms, 10 vocational
schools, 8 normal schools, and 4 teacher train-
ing centers. A $30 million slum clearance proj -
ect is imderway in Venezuela. In Bogota,
Colombia, the site of the old airport is becom-
ing a new city for 71,000 persons who are build-
ing their own homes with support from the
Social Progress Trust Fund.
This year I received a letter from Seiior Arge-
mil Plazas Garcia, whom I met in Bogota upon
the dedication of an Alianza housing project.
He writes: "Today I am living in the house
with my 13 children, and we are very happy
to be free of such poverty and no longer to be
moving around like outcasts. Now we have dig-
nity and freedom * * *. My wife, my children,
and I are writing you this humble letter, to
express to you the warm gratitude of such Co-
lombian friends who now have a home in which
they can live happily." Of even greater long-
range importance, a number of beginnings in
self-help and reforms are now evident.
Since 1961, 11 Latin American countries —
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile,
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salva-
dor, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela — have
made structural reforms in their tax systems.
Twelve countries have improved their income
tax laws and administration.
New large-scale programs for improved land
use and land refonn have been undertaken
in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and two
States in Brazil. More limited plans are being
carried out in Chile, Colombia, Panama, Uru-
guay, and Central America.
Six Latin American countries — Colombia,
Chile, Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico, and Vene-
zuela — have submitted development programs
to the panel of experts of the Organization of
American States. The panel has evaluated and
reported on the first three and will soon offer
its views on the balance.
Viewed against the background of decades
of neglect — or, at most, intermittent bursts of
attention to basic problems — the start that has
been made is encouraging. Perhaps most sig-
nificant of all is a change in the hearts and
minds of the people — a growing will to develop
their countries. We can only help Latin
Americans to save themselves. It is for this
reason that the increasing determination of
the peoples of the region to build modern soci-
eties is heartening. And it is for this reason
that responsible leadership in Latin America
must respond to this popular will with a greater
APRIL 22, 1963
59T
sense of urgency and purpose, lest aspirations
turn into frustrations and hope turn into de-
spair. Pending reform legislation must be
enacted, statutes already on the books must be
enforced, and mechanisms for carrying out pro-
grams must be organized and invigorated.
These steps are not easy, as we know from
our own experience, but they must be taken.
Our own intention is to concenti'ate our sup-
port in Latin America on those countries ad-
hering to the principles established in the
Charter of Punta del Este, and to work with
our neighbors to indicate more precisely the
particular policy changes, reforms and other
self-help measures which are necessary to make
our assistance effective and the Alliance a suc-
cess. The Clay Committee recommendation
that we continue to expand our efforts to en-
courage economic integration within the region
and the expansion of trade among the countries
of Latin America has great merit. The deter-
mination of the Central American Presidents
to move boldly in this direction impressed me
greatly during my recent meeting witli tliem
in San Jose, Costa Kica ; ^ and the Agency for
International Development has already estab-
lished a regional office in Central America, is
giving support to a regional development bank,
and has participated in regional trade
conferences.
A beginning has been made in tlie first 2
years of the Alliance; but the job that is still
ahead must be tackled with continuing urgency.
Many of the ingredients for a successful decade
are at hand, and the fundamental course for
the future is clear. It remains for all parties
to the Alliance to provide the continuous will
and effort needed to move steadily along that
course.
VI. This Year's Authorizing Legislation
Translating the foregoing facts and princi-
ples into program costs and appropriations,
based on the application of the standards set
forth above and affirmed by the Clay Commit-
tee, yields the following results:
First, upward of $200 million of economic
assistance funds now available are expected to
be saved and not used in the present fiscal year.
' Bulletin of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 511.
and upward of $100 million of these unused
funds will remain available for lending in the
future ;
Second, in addition to the savings carried j
forward into next year, close review has indi-
cated a number of reductions that can be made
in the original budget estimates for economic
and military assistance without serious damage
to the national interest.
Together these factors permit a reduction in
the original budget estimates from $4.9 to $4.5
billion. This amount reflects anticipated re-
ductions in military and economic assistance to
a number of countries, in line with these stand-
ards and recommendations, and unavoidable in- .
creases to others. The principal net increasesAj
proposed in 1964 appropriations are the follow-^
ing:
An additional $325 million for lending in
Latin America — $125 million through the si
Agency for International Development and •
$200 million through the Social Progress Trust
Fund, administered for the United States by .
the Inter- American Development Bank (for :-
which no appropriation was needed in fiscal !
year 1963 because a 2-year appropriation had
been made the year before) ;
An additional $85 million for lending else- I
where in the world, mostly in countries such as
India, Pakistan, and Nigeria which are meeting
those high standards of self-help and fiscal and :,
economic progress which permit our aid to be
directed toward ultimate full self-support;
An additional $80 million for military aid,
including the increased requirements for India
(but still far below the fiscal 1961 level) ; and
An additional $50 million for the contingency
fund, which provides a flexibility indispensable
to our security. We cannot ignore the possibil-
ity that new threats similar to those in Laos or
Vietnam might arise in areas which now look
calm, or that new opix>rtunities will open up to
achieve major gains in the cause of freedom.
Foreign aid policy can no more be static than
foreign policy itself.
I believe that it is necessary and desirable
that these funds be provided by the Congress
to meet program needs and to be available for
program opportunities. Funds which are not
required under the increasingly selective pro-
598
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Irani uiid performance standards of our assist-
Ince programs will, as in this year, not be spent
|r committed.
The legislative amendments which I am for-
Ivarding herewith * cari"y forward the basic
Structure and intent of the Foreign Assistance
Let of 1961, as amended. No fundamental
Ihanges in this legislative structure now appear
|o be required.
One relatively minor change I am proposing
Is for a separate authorization for the appro-
jriation of funds to assist American schools and
lospitals abroad. A number of these schools
[sponsored by Americans have been most success-
Iful in the developing countries in providing an
Education built upon American standards.
Tntil now some assistance has been made avail-
able to these schools from general economic aid
funds, but this is becoming increasingly inap-
Dropriate. Separate authorization and appro-
jriations would be used to help these schools
irry out long-tenn programs to establish them-
olves on a sounder financial footing, becoming
'gradually independent, if at all possible, of
U.S. Government support.
Finally, I am requesting the Congress in this
legislation to amend that section of the Trade
Expansion Act which requires the denial of
equal tariff treatment to imports from Poland
and Yugoslavia. It is appropriate that this
amendment should be incorporated in this bill
since it is my conviction that trade and other
forms of normal i-elations constitute a sounder
basis than aid for our future relationship with
these countries.
VII. Conclusion
In closing, let me again emphasize the over-
riding importance of the efforts in which we are
engaged.
At this point in history we can look back to
many successes in the struggle to preserve free-
dom. Our Nation is still daily winning unseen
victories in the fight against Communist suit-
version in the slums and hamlets, in the hos-
pitals and schools, and in the offices of govern-
ments across a world bent on lifting itself.
Two centuries of pioneering and growth must be
telescoped into decades and even years. This
is a field of action for which our history has
prejDared us, to which our aspirations have
drawn us, and into which our national interest
moves us.
Around the world cracks in the monolithic
apparatus of our adversary are there for all to
see. This, for the American people, is a time
for vision, for patience, for work, and for wis-
dom. For better or worse, we are the pace-
setters. Freedom's leader cannot flag or falter,
or another runner will set the pace.
We have dared to label the sixties the "Dec-
ade of Development." But it is not the elo-
quence of our slogans, but the quality of our
endurance, which will determine whether this
generation of Americans deserves the leader-
ship which history has thrust upon us.
John F. Kennedy.
U.S. Disclaims Responsibility
for Attacks on Soviet Ships
Folloiving is the teM of a U.S. note delivered
to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs at
Moscoio on April 3.
Press release 170 dated April 3
April 3, 1963
By its notes of March 27 and of March 29,
1963,' the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presented
protests by the Soviet Government against what
it termed "piratical attacks" on the Soviet mer-
chant vessel "L'gov" on March 17 and the So-
viet merchant vessel "Baku" during the night
of March 26-27 near Cuba. The notes asserted
that although the attacks were perpetrated by
Cuban counter-revolutionary groups, the
United States Government encourages such
activities and bears full responsibility for them.
The United States Government categorically
i-ejects this charge. It wishes to remind the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics that immediately after the recent at-
tacks on Soviet merchant vessels an official
spokesman stated that the United States Gov-
' Not printed here.
' Not printed here.
APRIL 22, 1963
599
emment is strongly opposed to, and is in no
way associated with, such attacks.- This posi-
tion was furthermore clearly set forth by Presi-
dent Kennedy in his press conference of March
21. The United States Government is taking
every step necessary to insure that such attacks
are not launched, manned or equipped from
U.S. territory.
In taking vigorous action to prevent misuse
of its territory, the Government of the United
States trusts that the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Kepublics will not mism-
terpret such action as indicating any change in
United States opposition to Soviet military in-
volvement in Cuba.
U.S.S.R. Accepts U.S. Proposal
for Direct Communication Linit
Following is the text of a U.S. Arms Control
and. Disarmament Agency statement read to
news correspondents on April 5 hy a Depart-
ment of State spokesman.
The United States welcomes the Soviet Gov-
ernment's acceptance of the American proposal
for improved communications between the So-
viet Union and the United States. In order to
reduce the risk of war occurring through failure
of communications, the United States has
sought to reach agreements on measures which
would improve communications between gov-
ernments.
The specific purpose of a direct teletype link
between the Soviet Union and the United States
would be to have a channel available for im-
mediate use during times of crisis. On its
part, the United States would expect to estab-
lish a central terminal point in Washington.
From this terminal point, the President can
always be reached immediately. Since there
will be technical details to agree upon before
the teletype link can be established, the United
States anticipates that there will be private
tecluiical talks with the Soviet Union on tliis
matter in the near future.
Cuba Expresses Regret
in ''Fioridian" Incident
Department Statement ^
In connection with the United States' demand
for a full and prompt explanation involving
the shooting by Cuban MIG aircraft near the
motorship Floridian March 28, the Czech Am-
bassador [Miloslav Ruzek] today called on the
Department to deliver a note from the govern-
ment of Cuba. The Cuban government stated
that the j^ilots of its two MIG aircraft had
arrived at the erroneous conclusion that the
Floridkin was an enemy vessel. The Cuban
government further stated that it had no wish
to interfere with the U.S. or other international
shipping in the Caribbean, that it regrets the
incident of March 28, and that it is undertaking
to adopt all possible measures to avoid a recur-
rence of the incident.
U.S. Acts To Prevent Raids
on Cuba From U.S. Territory
Following is the text of a joint statement
issued hy the Department of Justice and the
Department of State on March 30.
Press release 169 dated March 30
The position of the United States Govern-
ment regarding hit-and-run attacks by Cuban
refugee groups against Soviet ships and other
targets in Cuba has been made perfectly clear
by the President and the Secretary of State.^
These attacks are neither supported nor con-
doned by this Government. The President has
pointed out that they may have effects opposite
those presumably intended by those who carry
them out ; that is, they may strengthen the So-
viet position in Cuba rather than weaken it,
tighten Communist controls rather than loosen
them.
' For text of a U.S. statement of Mar. 19, see Bul-
letin of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 520.
' Read to news correspondents on Apr. 2 by Lincoln
White, Director of the Office of News ; for background,
see Bulletin of Apr. 15, 1963, p. 573.
* For text of a U.S. statement of Mar. 19, see Bulle-
tin of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 520.
600
DEPARTMENT OF ST.VTE BULLETIN
Our preliminary evidence suggests that these
lids have not in fact been launched from the
'rritory of the United States. However, the
'BI and the Immigration and Naturalization
ervice, with the cooperation of the Coast
ruard and Customs Service, are intensifying
leir investigations. We intend to take every
tep necessary to insure that such raids are not
lunched, manned, or equipped from U.S.
srritory.
A The sympathy of this Government and of the
"American people is with those Cubans who hope
see their countiy freed from Commmiist con-
rol. We miderstand that these raids reflect
he deep finistration of men who want to get
)ack to their homeland, to a Cuba that is
ndependent.
But this understanding does not mean that
ve are prepared to see our own laws violated
vith impunity, or to tolerate activities which
night provoke armed reprisals, the brunt of
which would be borne by the Armed Forces of
ihe United States.
King of Morocco Exchanges Views
With President Kennedy
His Majesty Hassan 11^ King of Morocco,
made a state visit to the United States, March
26-April 5. At Washington, March 27-29, he
met loith President Kennedy and other U.S.
Government officials. Following is the text of
a joint communique issued on March 29 at
the conclusion of King Hassan's visit to
Washington.
White House press release dated March 29
His Majesty Hassan II, King of Morocco,
has concluded today a state visit to Washing-
ton, during which he was the guest of President
Kennedy.
During their stay in the capital, the King and
his ministers met with the President and high-
ranking officials of the United States Govern-
ment and exchanged views on a wide range of
subjects of mutual interest.
King Hassan II, as head of state of an im-
portant African country, made known his view-
point on the aspects of the international situa-
tion and economic development problems which
are of interest to Morocco as well as to other
African comitries. He expressed his country's
particular mterest in the United States objec-
tives in the cause of peace and liberty and in
the increased importance which the Govern-
ment of the United States attaches to Africa.
The President outlined the United States views
on the questions which divide the East and the
West; furthermore, he expressed his country's
desire to reach an agreement on disarmament
and its concern arising from the dangers which
threaten the peace and freedom of the inde-
pendent nations of the two hemispheres. The
President expressed his sincere interest in
Africa and, in particular, in the establishment
of close relations between the states of North
Africa.
The President reaffirmed the agreement
reached at Casablanca between President Ei-
senhower and His Majesty King Mohammed V
on December 22, 1959,^ by which it was agreed
that the United States forces would be with-
drawn from Morocco before the end of 1963;
he confirmed that the planned evacuation
would take place as had been provided and the
two heads of state took note of the progress
already made in this direction. The President
also confirmed the desire previously expressed
by President Eisenhower to help the Moroccan
Government, to every possible extent, to use
these bases constructively.
It was agreed that the various means by
which the United States could continue to con-
tribute in the most effective manner to the
economic development of Morocco, within the
framework of United States foreign policy and
of the long friendsliip as well as the traditional
cooperation which unite these two countries,
would be considered through diplomatic
channels.
His Majesty expressed the hope that the
President and Mrs. Kennedy could visit Mo-
rocco in the near future and the President ex-
pressed his desire to accept this cordial
invitation at an early opportunity.
' For text of a joint communique, see Bulletin of
Jan. 11, 1960, p. 57.
APRIL 22, 1963
601
The United Nations and the New Africa
hy G. Mermen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^
Your evident interest in the United Nations
is highly gratifying and encouraging. This is
an interest that unites you with millions of
young people throughout the world and par-
ticularly with young Africans, who see in the
United Nations a tangible liope both for world
cooperation and for a better standard of living
for the peoples of Africa.
The relationship between Africa and the
United Nations has grown steadily over the
nearly 18 years since the United Nations was
founded at San Francisco. Then, only 4 na-
tions in Africa — Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and
South Africa — were independent and eligible
for U.N. membership. Today there are 33
African members of the world body, nearly a
third of the total U.N. membership and a larger
number of members than in any other con-
tinent. A part of this growth is due to the
United Nations itself because of the direct
role it played in the birth of seven former
trust territories — Burundi, Cameroon, Libya,
Rwanda, Somalia, Tanganyika, and Togo.
The constantly growing community of Afri-
can-U.N. relations can best be approached in
two ways — first, in terms of the technical, social,
and economic developments taking place on the
African Continent under U.N. auspices; and,
second, in terms of political activities both at
U.N. headquarters in New York and in Africa
itself.
Although the United Nations' technical,
social, and economic role in Africa is not large
when compared with current bilateral assist-
* Address made before the 17th annual model U.N.
conference at the University of Wisconsin, Madison,
Wis., on Mar. 29 (press release 164).
ance programs, it does provide important
assistance in key areas and does it without any
of the political associations that Africans some-
times fear are associated with bilateral pro-
grams. This assistance is made available either
through U.N. technical cooperation programs —
the U.N. regular program, the Expanded Pro-
gram of Technical Assistance, and the Special
Fund — or through the programs of the various
LT.N. specialized agencies.
The United Nations' contribution to tech-
nical and preinvestment assistance has been
rising steadily. At the same time an increas-
ing amount of the U.N.'s technical cooperation
effort is directed toward Africa.
The U.N. regular program in 1962 amounted
to assistance of $6.4 million in such fields as
economic development, public administration,
and personnel and social services. Of this
amount, more than $2 million went into eco-
nomic development projects, of which more
than 75 percent went to Africa.
The Expanded Program of Technical As-
sistance is a source of funds for activities in
excess of regular United Nations and special-
ized agency appropriations and amounted to
$71 million in 1961 and 1962. This program
has carried out such successful activities as a
UNESCO project in Morocco that has installed
some 1,200 radio receivers in primary schools i
through which 200,000 pupils are reached by
educational broadcasts.
The U.N. Special Fund is the largest source
of funds for U.N. technical assistance activi-
ties and in 1962 alone received pledges of some
$60 million from U.N. members. By the end
of last year the Special Fund was participating i
602
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULX.ETIN'
II 65 African projects totaling nearly $55 mil-
ion and had approved 11 others amounting
o almost $14 million.
Other assistance to Africa is provided
hrough such U.N.-associated lending institu-
ions as the International Bank for Keconstruc-
ion and Development and the International
finance Corporation. At the end of October
1962, the International Bank had made 42 loans
otaling $942 million in nearly 20 African coun-
ries. These loans include such projects as the
levelopment of iron ore in Mauritania, port
:onstruction in Nigeria, and manganese devel-
Dpment in Gabon. In addition, the Bank has
organized international consultative groups
to assist Nigeria and Tunisia in planning
their development and external assistance
requirements.
United Nations technical assistance activities
in Africa also are concerned with such major
areas of need as health and education. In the
imfwrtant field of health, the World Health
Organization and UNICEF [U.N. Children's
Fund] are cooperating with Etliiopia and the
United States in a scliool for health ofBcere,
community nurses, and sanitarians at Gondar,
Ethiopia. WHO also recently surveyed the
health services and sanitary conditions in the
Portuguese-administered territories in Africa
and helped health authorities there draw up
plans to improve sanitary conditions.
Education is the most critical shortage on
that continent, and UNESCO [United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion] is attempting to find ways to help meet
needs in this vital field. As a first comprehen-
sive step, UNESCO and the Economic Com-
mission for Africa sponsored a conference on
educational development at Addis Ababa in
1961,2 which was attended by 34 African min-
isters of education. This conference agreed
that educational planning must be an integral
part of overall economic progress and that pri-
orities were secondary schools, revised cui-ricula,
and trained teachers.
This was followed last spring by a meeting
in Paris of African ministers of education ^ at
" Bulletin of June 12, 1961, p. 936.
'For an article by J. Wayne Fredericks, see ibid.,
Aug. 27, 1962, p. 333.
which it was agreed that each African country
would try to increase investment in education
by one-third, or from 3 to 4 percent of gross
national product by 1965.
Last fall, at Tananarive, Madagascar, a
UNESCO conference on higher education con-
tinued to study educational needs. That con-
ference focused its attention on teacher re-
quirements, and it recognized the desirability
of concentrating the training of university
undergi-aduates in Africa, rather than sending
most of them abroad as is done now.
These few examples, I believe, make it clear
that the United Nations is at work in all fields
of teclmical, social, and economic development
in Africa — sometimes by itself, sometimes in
cooperation with others. And I might point
out here that the United States provides a con-
siderable portion of the funds that make these
development projects possible.
Political Developments In Africa
But the United Nations also has important
interests in political developments in Africa,
and these interests get far more attention than
the quiet work of its assistance activities. It is
to these political questions that I would like to
turn now.
With the admission of Algeria, Burundi,
Rwanda, and Uganda in 1962, the U.N.'s Afri-
can membership rose to 33 countries, and many
Africans are serving the world body in im-
portant capacities.
Godfrey K. J. Amachree of Nigeria is an
Under Secretary-General. Eobert Gardiner of
Ghana is the officer in charge of United Na-
tions operations in the Congo and formerly was
Deputy Secretary-General of the U.N. Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa. Guinea and
the Malagasy Republic held vice-presidencies
in the I7th General Assembly. The chairman
of the Assembly's Political and Security Com-
mittee is from Sudan, and the chairman of the
special U.N. committee on colonialism is from
Mali. Ghana and Morocco hold Security Coun-
cil seats, Liberia is on the Trusteeship Council,
and Ethiopia and Senegal are members of the
Economic and Social Council.
Although Africa has 33 votes in the U.N.
General Assembly, those states rarely vote
APRIL, 22, 1963
603
unanimously except on relatively noncontro-
versial issues, such as the election of U Thant
as Secretary-General. On such non-African
issues as Chinese refugees and representation
of the two Koreas there is often a wide division
of opinion among African nations. A major
division of African votes was also seen on an
African issue last year during the Moroccan-
Nigerian contest for a Security Council seat.
On most African issues at the United Na-
tions, however, many of which are concerned
with the southern regions of Africa — that is,
the so-called colonial issues — there is generally
a consensus among 32 of the African states —
all except South Africa. This was true in the
last General Assembly on such questions as
apartheid, Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese
territories, and South-West Africa, and this
pattern undoubtedly will continue in the next
General Assembly session.
Our own policy toward southern Africa has
two chief aspects, both of which square with
United Nations policy. First, we believe in and
support both self-determination and racial
harmony in those territories. We consider
these goals both just and indispensable. Sec-
ond, we believe progress toward responsible
self-government is essential.
Wliile we are largely in agreement at the
United Nations with most African nations on
the need for an end to colonialism, we occasion-
ally differ on the timing and means to accom-
plish that goal. For example, it is not United
States policy to intervene gratuitously in the
important processes of constitutional transi-
tion and racial accommodation which are imder-
way in southern Africa. We appreciate that
these are the primary responsibilities of the
peoples and governments concerned. In some
cases, however — where our counsel is sought or
where our principles demand that we make
our position clear — we readily assert our belief
that social, economic, and political progress
must take place without racial discrimination
and without derogation of the full rights of any
element of the population.
Wlien the question of apartheid in South
Africa comes up at the U.N., we have no hesi-
tation in declaring our unalterable opposition
to that policy. We in the United States think
that apartheid is wrong and harmful. We
oppose it from moral conviction — the same
moral conviction that moves the vast majority
of Americans in their determination to eradi-
cate the unlawful vestiges of racial discrimina-
tion which have lingered far too long in our ji
own country. And we oppose apartheid i#|
clear recognition of the injunctions of the U.N. '
Charter. ■
On the Southern Khodesian question, we are
fully aware of the extremely complex issues
to be resolved there. But we believe that
Southern Rhodesia must move toward giving
an opportunity to all the country's people to
choose their own government. We would
hope and expect to see constitutional changes
leading to universal adult suffrage, steps end-
ing racial discrimination, and the establislunent '
of a government based on majority consent
which can develop good relations with its neigh-
bors. We respect the great record of decoloni-
zation that the United Kingdom has built, and
we recognize the progress its efforts have
brought about in Southern Rhodesia. Never- '
theless we respectfully urge the United King-
dom, as we did this week at the United Nations,
to continue its efforts and to use its special in-
fluence to help speed self-government for all i
people in Southern Rhodesia. :
On the question of the Portuguese territories, 1
we believe the principle of self-determination i
must be applied to those territories and that
Portugal has a continuing role to play in Africa.
We believe that Portugal should take rapid
steps to prepare the peoples of those areas for
self-determination. Our policy toward the
Portuguese African territories has been consist-
ent for some years. We are encouraging the
Portuguese to undertake necessary reform.
We believe the Portuguese recognize the firm-
ness of our policy and the need for reform in
the African territories. You may recall that
last year the United States proposed a visit of
U.N. representatives to Portuguese African ter-
ritories to collect information on conditions
there. This arrangement was accepted by Por-
tugal but did not come to a vote at the U.N. be-
cause the African and Asian nations did not
support it. Currently, however, the special
U.N. committee on colonialism has decided that
604
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I
a new effort should be made in this direction
and lias authorized its chairman, Ambassador
Sori Coulibaly of Mali, to take the matter up
again with Portugal. We continue to be hope-
ful that rapid progress can be made in the
Portuguese territories.
On the question of South-West Africa, we
[believe the administering authority — the Re-
Ipublic of South Africa — should: (1) end
lapartheid; (2) recognize the people's right to
Iself-determination and proceed in that direc-
Ition; and (3) promote the well-being and social
progress of the people. To help speed those
objectives the U.N. General Assembly, by a vote
of 96 to with Portugal abstaining and South
I Africa not voting, requested the Secretary-
General to establish a U.N. presence and to ap-
point a U.N. technical assistance representative
in the territory. The South African Govern-
ment has not yet stated its position on this
resolution, but we believe that its acceptance of
tliis request would constitute a useful first step
toward resolving the South-West Africa
question.
U.N. Operation in the Congo
These remarks cannot be concluded without
a few comments on the unprecedented U.N.
activity in Africa that has been in world head-
lines for nearly 3 years — the U.N. Operation in
the Congo. This operation was consistently
supported not only by the United States but by
most of the African members of the U.N. It
also had the general approval of most European
comitries as well. Over the past 33 months,
some 34 U.N. members contributed to keeping
U.N. troop strength in the Congo at between
16,000 and 20,000 men. A massive airlift and
sealif t was coordinated by the U.N., and a dozen
international agencies provided hundreds of
civilian technicians to help supply essential
services to the people of the war-torn country.
As a result of this U.N. operation, secession
has been halted, stability is replacing chaos, and
many nations are working together to assist in
the Congo's future economic, technical, and so-
cial progress. Although this does not guaran-
tee that there will not be setbacks in the Congo,
there is reason to believe that the coimtry can
now move ahead with confidence to its formi-
dable nation-building tasks. If these hopes are
realized, both the United States and the other
U.N. members who supported the U.N. opera-
tion have a right to be proud of their labors.
The U.N. had a major role in this gigantic
task of preventing a total breakdown of peace
and order in central Africa. And it must be
concluded that the interests of world peace,
the entire African Continent, and the United
States in this critical matter have been served
well by the presence of the United Nations in
the Congo.
In conclusion I want to point out one other
facet of particular importance in the African-
U.N. relationship — Africa's zest for U.N. activ-
ity. The U.N. is a forum where an African
nation has a voice equal to that of any other
nation, where African opinion ranks with that
of any other area of the world. Africa brings
to the U.N. a new insistence on the dignity and
worth of man, and a new enthusiasm for the
belief that the U.N. really is man's best hope
for lasting peace, and a new desire to demon-
strate the belief that the U.N. really is an effec-
tive organization for settling disputes and
advancing human development. The healthy
interchange between Africa and the U.N. has
done much to increase the vitality of the U.N.
in recent years, and it has renewed the spirit of
youth in many of the older nations. For this
we can all be glad, because it may do much to
assure the future peace and security of all of us.
APRIL 22, 1963
681885—63—
605
Japan, the United States, and Europe
iy TJ. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Ajfairs
^
The subject of our discussion, "Japan, the
United States, and Europe," is indeed a large
one, but it well exemplifies the world in which
we live. Even 10 or 15 years ago we perhaps
could have talked of just Japan and the United
States or the United States and Europe, but to-
day they really must be discussed together.
This exemplifies two important facts. The
first fact is that the astounding energy and
development that has taken place in Japan in
the short period of little more than a decade
since the treaty of peace has brought Japan to
the place that Prime Minister [Hayato] Ikeda
could recently truly refer to Japan as one of
the "three pillars of the free world" — three
sources of responsibility, leadership, and
strength for all.
The second fact is that we as a nation front
on both of the world's great ocean basins — the
Atlantic and the Pacific. In fact one of our
States is literally in the Pacific and four of our
other States form the greater part of its eastern
and northern rim. I often tell my European
friends that from this proceeds the fact that
we will always look on the Pacific area in a
fundamentally different way than they do even
though we seem to have accepted their termi-
nology — the Far East — for what from our
vantage point is more correctly called the Far
West or, in this day and age, might perhaps be
called the Near West.
' Address made before the Chicago Conference on
Agricultural Trade With Japan, sponsored by the
Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry and
the United States-Japan Trade Council, at Chicago,
111., on Mar. 28 (press release lUl dated Mar. 27).
I fear that we have a tendency to seek to
divide the world up into neat groupings of
countries and to endow these groupings with
certain exclusive characteristics. Thus, in re-
cent years, with all of the emphasis upon At-
lantic partnership, there has been some tendency
to equate that grouping of nations with the
"industrial nations." This omits Japan, which
stands as one of the major industrial nations
of the world and which is unique as the only
major industrial power in Asia or, indeed, in
the entire free world outside of North America
and Western Europe.
There are special, well-known reasons of his-
tory and sentiment which cause us to emphasize
the importance of Europe. But the fact of the
matter is that the free world does not stand on
the two major pillars of the United States and
Europe but, rather, upon the three pillars of
the United States, Europe, and Japan.
As we stand on the threshold of tariff nego-
tiations — made possible by our Trade Expan-
sion Act — we can see clearly that the matters of
greatest concern to us, the British, and the
European Economic Community also concern
the Pacific area, and notably Japan. If indus-
trial tariffs are reduced, the Japanese will bene-
fit — and make concessions too. If exports of
tropical products from the less developed
countries gain easier access into Western Eu-
rope and North America, they will find greater
markets in Japan as well. If producers of Tem-
perate Zone agricultural products, like the
United States and Canada, gain assurances of
continued opportunities for export into West-
ern Europe, Australia and New Zealand will
benefit too. The enlargement of worldwide.
606
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
nondiscriminatory, competitive trade — through
removal of tariff and other obstacles — will give
to Japan, whose survival depends on expanding
commerce, new possibilities for growth. It will
create a world economic environment favorable
to an increasing volume of American exports.
In tliis lies the primary answer to our balance-
of-payments problems. Trade binds all to-
gether, East and West, North and South.
U.S. Investment in Japan
In these days, when the great debate is open-
ing on what has come to be called our "foreign
aid" programs,- it is perhaps useful to look back
on the experience with Japan. It, together with
Europe, illustrates well that it is usually wrong
to think of these programs in terms of unrecom-
pensed charity. My own feeling is that, instead
of talking of "aid," we should be talking in
terms of investment in the future — investment
not only for others but for ourselves as well,
investment not only in broad political and mili-
tary terms, important though they are in them-
selves, but also investment in purely economic
terms.
Our investment in the form of various types
of economic aid of about $2 billion in Japan
from 1946 to 1956 ($600 million of which is
being directly repaid) should be viewed against
the $18 billion of trade between ourselves and
Japan in the past decade; and this trade will
increase in the future. Of particular interest
to you is the fact that, of the $10.3 billion of
United States exports to Japan over the past
10 years, about $4.4 billion has been agricul-
tural products. Moreover, it is estimated that
about one-quarter of United States exports of
all kinds to Japan originate in the Midwest.
In the countries starting from a less favora-
ble base than Japan and Europe the return on
our investment will, of course, normally be
somewhat slower in being realized. However,
there can be no doubt that there will be such a
return.
If we would measure power by the yardsticks
of competence and capital — and these are the
yardsticks of broadest relevance to the task
which the free world faces in the decade ahead —
^ For text of the President's message on the foreign
aid program for 1964, see p. 591.
we would have to place Japan very high on the
list. Japan is first in shipbuilding, first in fish-
ing, fourth in steel and electric power genera-
tion, and one of the top five in cement produc-
tion. Japan has a highly skilled labor force and
an educational system that is continuously
improving its quality. Management is capable,
adventurous, and alert to economic opportunity.
Japan is emerging as a major world power
at a time when, as it realizes, the national power
of a single nation is not a sufficient basis for
action. This is the lesson we have ourselves
learned and had reimpressed upon us with each
new turn of events. Each nation lives and
works in a complex web of diverse relationships
with other nations. To act effectively requires
concerted effort.
The tasks confronting the free world in the
decade ahead are truly enormous. All coun-
tries are faced by important problems of im-
proving the quality of life in their own socie-
ties. Both Japan and the United States have
their share of problems of this kind. There are
problems of establishing more effective eco-
nomic and political relationships between the
developed nations. There are critical problems
of insuring the security and independence of
the developing countries and of promoting their
economic and social progress. Finally, there
are the broad problems of creating and sustain-
ing a world environment of security within
which these other constructive tasks can go
forward.
The means employed will be as diverse as the
problems to which they are addressed. If
Japan is to achieve the secure place in the
world to which its power entitles it ; if Japan is
to make the contribution to solution of these
problems which it can make — and which it rec-
ognizes as its responsibility to make — its ties
with other free nations will have to be further
strengthened in a variety of ways. This is not
something which Japan can do alone; Japan
requires the cooperation of the other free coun-
tries, just as they require the cooperation of
Japan.
Japan's role as a major world power can be
considered from a variety of viewpoints. I sug-
gest that we look at it in terms of its role as a
major industrial power, its role as a model or
APRIL 22, 1963
607
example for developing countries, its role in
assisting the developing countries, its role in
world peace and security, and its special role
the Pacific.
in
Japan a Major Industrial Power
Japan's postwar progress toward status as a
major industrial power has come with such a
rush that all who write or speak about it quickly
find themselves talking in superlatives and in-
terlarding their remarks with large quantities
of fascinating statistics. The story of Japan's
remarkable economic progi-ess is so well loiown
to this group that it does not need to be devel-
oped here in detail. However, it might be
useful to review a few of the facts.
Japan's rate of growth and rate of invest-
ment are the highest in the world. Gross na-
tional product has risen at an average annual
rate of 9 percent during the past decade and
recently has been increasing at a rate of 13 to
14 percent. GNP has nearly doubled in real
terms since 1956. Industrial production in-
creased by 217 percent between 1953 and 1961.
This growth has been sustained by the highest
rate of investment in the world— a rate which
has been running at about 30 percent of GNP.
Many new industries have developed since the
war, some with the teclmical and investment
cooperation of American industry.
This growth is the more remarkable for hav-
ing taken place in a country with very limited
natural resources, except that most important
resource of all — an intelligent and diligent pop-
ulation. Without stretching the facts too far
it can almost be said that Japan has nothing
to export but the labor and skills of its people.
Never has it better been demonstrated that peo-
ple themselves can be the most important
resource.
Wliile there were many special factors oper-
ating in the Japanese case which limit its gen-
eral applicability, it is still a fascinating model
for other industrial countries. It is a model
of sufficient interest to have led the influential
London Economist to examine its applicability
to Britain and other coimtries in two long sup-
plements last September.
As you well know, Japan's limited natural
resources make expanding trade an essential
condition to continuing growth. It is less well
appreciated that Japanese prosperity promotes
American prosperity. After Canada, Japan is
our most important customer. Over the past
5 years United States exports to Japan ex-
ceeded imports from Japan by about $1 billion
($6.2 billion compared with $5.2 billion). Of
the $6.2 billion of United States exports to Ja-
pan during this period, $2.4 billion were agri-
cultural products (including cotton, $760
million; grains, $495 million; soybeans, $450
million). During this 5-year period we also
sold to Japan $1.2 billion of machinery and
vehicles, $600 million of chemicals, $342 million
of petroleum products, and $257 million of
coking coal. There is now rightly much con-
cern over the future of our large sales of agri-
cultural products to the EEC countries.
However, we should also not lose sight of the
continuing importance of Japan as a market for
our agricultural products. In fact, of course,
that is why you are meeting here. Over the
past 5 years our exports of these commodities
to Japan alone have amounted to almost half
our exports of agricultural commodities to the
five EEC countries.
Perspective on U.S.-Japan Trade Problems
If Japan is to buy from us, it must also be
able to sell to us. We are the largest market
in the world and a particularly important mar-
ket for the high-quality luxury and semiluxury
goods which are an important part of Japan's
exports. Old ideas die very slowly. There is
still a belief in this country that the Japanese
are able to do so well in our markets only be-
cause theirs is a low-wage economy. This busi-
ness of comparing labor costs is, of course, very
difficult, and this is not the time or the place
to enter into a debate on the subject. However,
the practices of Japanese industry with respect
to fringe benefits and the retention of workers
in times of slack production or after a worker is
no longer efficient, make it impossible to arrive
at a picture of true labor costs solely on the
basis of a comparison of hourly or daily base
wages with those of the United States or Eu-
rope. Moreover, labor is only one of the pro-
duction costs, and the costs of both raw-
materials and capital are high in Japan.
608
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
When trade is as large as our trade with
Tapan, it is highly likely that there will be
[u-oblems. But these problems must be seen
u perspective. A current controvei-sy over
hat trade concerns Japanese exports to this
•ounti-y of certain cotton textile products.
IVhat is immediately at issue is trade of the
i alue of a few million dollars out of a total
trade approaching $3 billion.
But cotton textiles happen to be a ^wlitically
[)otent issue on both sides of the Pacific.
Understandably, the Japanese textile industry
is upset. There is a tendency to see the United
States position as an indicator of restrictive
trends in general United States trade policy. I
can assure you and Japan that it is not. This
administration is committed to a liberal trade
policy and has just obtained legislation under
which we are actively seeking general reduc-
tions in world trade barriers, including United
States barriers. We are also actively attempt-
ing to solve the cotton textile problem in a man-
ner which will provide Japan continuing access
to our market while safeguarding the interests
of the United States textile industry.
Nonetheless there is, I believe, a growing un-
derstanding in this country of the role of Japan
as one of the major industrial powers and of
the importance and necessity of expanding
Japanese trade with the United States and the
other industrial nations. There is also, I be-
lieve, an increasing imderstanding of the im-
portance of Japan as a major factor in world-
wide monetary and financial operations, of
Japan's standing as a major contributor of as-
sistance to the developing nations. From this
follows the need for the United States and
Europe to facilitate active Japanese participa-
tion in cooperative arrangements in matters of
trade and finance, aid to less developed coun-
tries, and the concerting of domestic economic
policies to avoid international imbalance of
trade and payments.
The means by which Japan's economic rela-
' tionships with the other industrial nations can
be strengthened and institutionalized are sev-
eral. We strongly support Japanese member-
ship in the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) ' and expect
that such membership will soon be arranged.
Participation by Japan in GATT [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations
for reduction of trade barriers and more rapid
liberalization by Japan of its own barriers to
trade are of great importance. We expect
Japan to participate fully in the multilateral
negotiations we are now preparing for under
the authority of the new Trade Expansion
Act.
In general there is need on all sides for a
wider appreciation of the importance of liberal
trade policies. Tliis applies as much to Japan
as it does to the United States and Europe.
In Japan, as here and in Europe, there is still
much high-cost, inefficient production which has
avoided the rigors of competitive existence by
virtue of import barriers. Adjustment of this
situation is as important to the continued vig-
orous growth of the Japanese economy as it is
to the economy of any other country.
Japan a Model for Developing Countries
As a major industrial power which has rela-
tively recently had to face and deal with many
of the problems which face the developing coun-
tries, Japan can play a powerful world role as
an example to those countries. In agriculture
there is certainly no comparison between Japan
and Communist China, or any other Commu-
nist country for that matter. Cultivated land
per person in Japan is one-third that of Com-
munist. China. Yet, while the people of China
have been starving, Japan, in the face of more
than a 10-percent increase in population over
the past decade and with rising consumption
standards, has increased its self-sufficiency in
food from 80 percent to 85 percent. Rice
yields, at 96 bushels per acre, are among the
highest in the world — nearly twice those of
Communist China. The record 1962 rice crop,
the eighth consecutive bumper harvest in Ja-
pan, is in sharp contrast to the poor harvests
of Communist China. Japan is today self-
sufficient in rice — an achievement believed un-
attainable 15 years ago.
' For a statement by Secretary Rusk, see Bulletin
of Apr. 15, 1963, p. 572.
APRIL 22, 1963
We are concerned with the well-bemg of the
Chinese people, and their suffering gives us no
sense of satisfaction. But these comparisons
do indicate that the Japanese have a much
better formula for agricultural development.
That formula includes land reform, which
brought the natural incentives of free enter-
prise to Japanese agriculture; the application
of modern technology to small-scale agricul-
ture ; and the building of an effective relation-
ship between agriculture and industry. Today
only 10 percent of cultivated land is tenant-
farmed, as compared with 45 percent before
land reform. Virtually all Japanese farm
households have electricity. On 6 million Jap-
anese farms there are 500,000 small tractors,
many of which are used cooperatively. Japan
uses as much chemical fertilizer on 13 million
acres of cultivated land as all the remaining
Far Eastern coimtries use on 822 million acres.
The industrial system of Japan provides not
only the machinery and fertilizer needed on the
farms but also the consumer goods which serve
to improve living conditions for the farmer.
Many Japanese farm households today have
washing machines, television sets, and other
modem conveniences.
We are not doctrinaire on the subject of the
economic systems adopted by others, but Japan
is an excellent example for the developing coim-
tries of the possibilities of progress through
private enterprise. This is a private enterprise
system in which the Government plays an im-
portant role in setting goals and in giving gen-
eral guidance to the economy. It is a system
which leaves a large sphere of freedom to the
vigorous private entrepreneurs. The results
have included a growth in per capita income
from $261 in 1953 to $416 in 1961, with a
planned target of $579 for 1970 (in 1958 prices) .
If recent rates of growth continue, that target
will be considerably exceeded.
Japan is a model for the developing countries
in certain aspects of social modernization.
Though Japan has been an industrial country
for many years, its social characteristics have
basically followed traditional Asian patterns.
Nevertheless, under the impact of occupation
policies, urbanization, development of mass
communications, representative govermnentJ
and economic progress, there has been a remark-
able growth in civil freedom and in freedom |
from the bonds of traditional ways. Japanese!
society has developed an increasingly modemi
outlook. While the society is still in flux, the]
basis has been laid for an enduring democratic]
society.
Japan provides useful lessons for the develop-1
ing countries in education. Whereas in many
of the developing countries, and in some of the
developed countries as well, the educational sys-
tem is poorly related to the needs of the society,
in Japan a quite effective effort is being made to
relate education to such needs.
If Japan is in some important respects a
model or example for the developing countries,
a special burden of responsibility is placed upon
the United States and Europe. We must
demonstrate in our trade and other policies that
countries which earn the right to acceptance as
major industrial nations will be treated equally
with other industrial nations. We must not
through our policies weaken the attraction of
this example by denying Japan full equality.
Concept of Japan's Responsibilities
As a major industrial power Japan recognizes
that it has a responsibility to assist the develop-
ing countries by continuing and expanding eco-
nomic assistance — or, as I prefer to call it, in-
vestment. It is a member of the Development
Assistance Committee of the OECD, which is
the principal institutional arrangement for con-
sultation among the industrial nations on assist-
ance matters.
We should particularly note Japan's per-
formance to date in assisting the developing
countries. In absolute terms it is, in this regard,
the fifth ranking country in the world. Both
official and private lending have been increas-
ing. Japan also recognizes the need to improve
the terms of its assistance and has been taking
steps to this end. We hope that both the in-
crease in volume and the improvement in terms
will continue.
Japan, as a major industrial nation, also has
an important role to play in world peace and
security. It is increasingly recognizing that it
610
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
eeds to insure the defense of its homeland
ii-oiiffh further development of a modern, liigh-
iKility self-defense force which will leave no
oiibt as to its determination and ability to make
o;gression unprofitable. In addition such a
apability will be important in giving Japan
hat sense of security which it requires — and
liich any nation requires — if it is to play a
irger part in the nonmilitary affairs of the
,-orld.
Apart from the provision for its own defense
nd provision of base facilities, Japan has
hosen to play its role in world peace and secu-
ity primarily through the United Nations,
'his is a very important and honorable role for
to play. Japan's contribution to the political,
conomic, and social activities of the United Na-
ions is substantial and growing.
In view of the limitations placed by the Japa-
lese Constitution and policy on a military role
or itself outside Japan, Japan might view its
ole in promoting political stability and inter-
lational peace as being performed in increasing
neasure through expanding assistance in the
levelopment of the new nations. Japan's eco-
lomic assistance has up to now tended to be di-
rectly related to Japan's trade and raw-material
■equirements. If Japan should increasingly
5et its level of effort in the developing countries
)n the basis of a broader concept of its responsi-
bilities, I believe that it would find that it would
wish to increase its investment in economic as-
sistance considerably above present levels.
Role of Japan as a Pacific Power
I turn now, more briefly, to Japan's role as a
Pacific power. This is a special, though very
important, aspect of Japan's world role which
I have discussed. Much of what I have already
said therefore applies. Japan has a special role
to play as the only major industrial power in
Asia. It is an example in a special sense to the
developing countries of Asia and has particu-
larly important trade and aid relationships
with Asia.
Because it is the major industrial nation in
Asia, an important part of the trade relation-
sliips of the area revolve around Japan. In
1962 Japan did 33 percent of its export trade
and 28 percent of its import trade with free
Asia. Expansion of this trade cannot be viewed
as a substitute for expansion of trade with the
United States and Europe. But such expan-
sion is of great potential importance to both
Japan and free Asia, for Japan is a very im-
portant source of modern technology for the
area.
The entire free world has a strong interest in
insuring the continued independence of Asian
countries against the various Communist eilorts
to gain control of them. But Japan has a very
special interest in their continued independence
and in the growth of their prosperity. Al-
though Japan's economic assistance program is
worldwide in scope, it is luiderstandably con-
centrated in Asia. Thus, in 1961 about 60 per-
cent of all official bilateral Japanese assistance
was disbursed to Asian countries. Japan has
engaged in various cooperative ventures with
other Asian countries for the development of
their resources for their mutual benefit. These
ventures include, for example, the Orissa iron-
ore project in India, involving Japanese assist-
ance to the development of Indian iron-ore
deposits and related transport facilities.
\^^lile Japanese experience has worldwide
application, it is a particular example for Asia.
Thus Japanese rice-growing techniques have
been widely adopted in Asia, and Japanese
handicraft industiy methods are also being in-
troduced. Japanese technology is being trans-
ferred through technical cooperation programs.
In 1962, 269 Japanese experts were sent abroad
and 434 trainees were received by Japan. In
addition more third-country training under
United States assistance programs has been
done in Japan than in any other country in
Asia.
Many of Japan's relations with other Asian
nations are, like its relations with the industrial
nations of the West, organized on a bilateral
basis. But it also plays an important role in
collaborating with these countries through such
regional bodies and activities as ECAFE [U.N.
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far
East], the Colombo Plan, and the Asian Pro-
ductivity Organization and through supporting
the work of the Mekong River development
program.
APRIL 22, 1963
611
Bilateral Relations Between U.S. and Japan
Bilateral relations between the United States
and Japan are a part of Japan's role as a Pacific
power, for, as I mentioned earlier, the United
States too is a Pacific power. I have already
spoken at some length of our trading relation-
ship, of particular interest to this meeting, and
have mentioned in passing our military security
relationship. Each of these is a vital element
in what we have come to call the United States-
Japan partnership, for no other word describes
the relationship better. The third link in this
partnership chain is the flow of people and
ideas. Person-to-person business, intellectual,
cultural, scientific, and just plain tourist con-
tacts have grown by leaps and bounds. At the
official level, members of our two Cabinets con-
cerned with economic affairs meet together once
a year to review our economic relations. We
also have committees of distinguished scientific
and cultural leaders of the two countries who
meet periodically to recommend ways of devel-
oping further our relations in these areas.
At the level of the individual it is difficult to
estimate exactly, but well over 2 million Ameri-
cans have visited or lived in Japan since the
war. These include government officials, mili-
tary personnel and their dependents, techni-
cians, businessmen, students, intellectuals, and
increasing numbers of tourists. The Olympics
of 1964 will bring a fresh new wave of tourists
to Japan. Approximately 225,000 Japanese
visitors have been to the United States in the
period since the war. If the restrictions on ex-
penditures by Japanese touring abroad are
eased, as expected in the near future, these
numbers should increase.
The effects of these contacts on Japan have
been considerable. They are reflected in all
aspects of Japanese urban culture, in the role of
Japanese women, in the greatly increased use
of English as a second language— and even in
the adoption of wide-scale advertising and in-
stallment buying. Japan has had, in return, its
impact on the United States in the area of tast«
and of thought. It ranges from an influence
upon American movies to a deeper and more
lasting influence upon art and architecture.
We and Europe must make it possible for
Japan to play that increasing role as a major |
nation of the world and the Pacific that it seeks
for itself. At the official government level this
will involve Japan's increasingly active partici-
pation in a wide range of international organi-
zations— knovra in the international alphabet
lingo as GATT, OECD, ECAFE, ECOSOC,
UNICEF, FAO, to name only a few— and
fmally, in plain English, the Colombo Plan.
There should be increasingly close bilateral
partnership relations with the United States,
Canada, Western Europe, and with the develop-
ing nations. The United States places a special
value on its partnership with Japan, and we
are confident that this partnership will also
continue to hold a special place in Japanese
policy. In addition there should continue to
develop on the personal level, in the business, ^
academic, and scientific communities, as well ^
as among just plain people, thousands of formal
and informal relationships so well exemplified
by this meetmg today.
Wlien I first went to Japan almost 30 years
ago, it was a land that was still strange and
exotic to most Americans and America was very
remote to most Japanese. Then we were
thrown together in the traumatic experience of
war, in wliich our sons died by the thousands.
Having won victory, we sought not revenge but
what the statesmen of both of our political
parties properly called a "peace of reconcilia-
tion." Japan responded with statesmanship.
Today we find our present well-being and our
future bound together as few nations in his-
tory — certainly as no two nations so far sepa-
rated by distance and background. With equal
statesmanship in the United States, Europe,
and Japan for the future we can be confident
that these three pillars of the free world will
increasingly be able to withstand the stress of
the enemies of freedom and provide the founda-
tion on which a better world can be built for all.
\
tiik
io,
Sw
nil
lior
I
612
DEP.\UTMENT OF STATE BULLETIK
lieflections on the Pacific Community
hy Harlan Cleveland
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs '
I All of a sudden, it seems, we have begun to
.Ik of a "Pacific community." And when we
we get very close to the heart of United
ates foreign policy. It therefore is worth
hile, I think, to begin by putting that frame-
ork around the subject of your conference.
It is easy to forget that the very possibility of
ay kind of human community at all is a rela-
.vely recent phenomenon. For most of man's
istory to date, he wandered in search of
Qod — "a lonely gatherer and hunter of suste-
lance." No earlier than 10,000 years ago — a
lere blinking of history's eye — man first dis-
overed how to domesticate plants and grow his
wn food. It was an epic technological break-
hrongh; and its social fallout was the begin-
ling of social complexity — tiny communities of
luman beings, beginning in the earliest "settle-
aents" to learn to live together — by living
ogether.
The story of man since then is the emergence
)f ever-widening communities — the clearing,
he village, the town, the city, the city-state, the
lation. At each stage new technology made
possible — and stimulated — the larger commu-
iiity.
Now we already can say with comfortable
2onfidence that, when future historians look
back on the decades immediately following
World War II, they will write it down that our
present times were notable for another break-
through — a matrix of international communi-
ties, overlapping and interacting, the most
' Address made at a conference on "Educational In-
vestment in the Pacific Community" at Stanford Uni-
versity, Palo Alto, Calif., on Mar. 29 (press release
156 dated Mar. 28 ; as-delivered text) .
dynamic political force of the 20th century.
Suddenly — the historians will exclaim — the
world was no longer made of continents and
oceans but of communities. And the writers of
our history will be bound to note that the na-
tion with the closest links to most of the new
commonwealths was the United States of
America.
Behind the new force lies the new technology :
the new technology which drives groups of na-
tions together against the threat of thermo-
nuclear war — the new technology which drives
nations together in history's first organized war
against poverty and disease^ — the new technol-
ogy which some day must drive nations to or-
ganize international peacekeeping institutions
as a substitute for war itself. In the age of jets,
great oceans which once served as hostile bar-
riers between nations become friendly inland
lakes for communities of nations around their
shores. And so we can begin to talk realistically
about a Pacific community, for political trends
cannot be far behind the technology that makes
them possible — and necessary.
Growth of Regional Communities
There is no major area in the whole free
world where impulses toward unification, inte-
gration, or partnership among new nations are
not at work; only in the so-called Conammiist
world is the trend in the opposite direction.
Tlie most spectacular of these regional devel-
opments, of course, is in Western Europe,
where nations that have been at war with each
other off and on for most of the modern era are
now finding unity; Europe, where these same
nations are now putting together the world's
613
second greatest industrial complex to serve a
market of over 300 million prospering con-
sumers.
I hope I do not have to stress the point that
the recent check to European integration is not
a checkmate. Our friends the historians will
see it^-or so we yet believe— as a bump along a
road, a road which has some hazardous pas-
sages but leads in a clearly marked direction.
Today's biggest headline seems fated, like so
many other headlines, to wind up as a quaint
footnote in the future's books about the present.
But the new Europe is only the most ad-
vanced case of a movement which engulfs all
but that reactionary world which is still strug-
gling with the hopeless task of adapting to
stubborn reality the theology of Marx and
Lenin.
In Latin America aroused peoples are begin-
ning to act as if they had something in common
tesides a common background— and poverty.
The Organization of American States, the Alli-
ance for Progress, the widespread resentment
of Soviet intervention in Cuba— all are symbols
of a new sense of commimity still inadequately
expressed in workable institutions. There are
the beginnings of two customs unions— one in
Central America and one— the Latin American
Free Trade Association— consisting of the prin-
cipal South American countries and Mexico.
In Latin America there is a new economic mo-
mentum, and common institutions for develop-
ment have just been given another push in the
Declaration of Central America.-
Elsewhere similar unity moves are part of
the atmosphere :
In North Africa a Maghreb confederation is
being talked about.
In Southeast Asia there are impulses toward
regional arrangements and regional programs
for economic and social cooperation.
In the Arab world it is hard to believe that
the drive toward imity will not overcome the
most bitter of divisions.
Even in tropical Africa, where strident na-
tionalism has been used as a jimmy to pry new
nations out of old empires, the first institutions
for regional integration are coming into being.
And you have been meeting here in California
' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 515.
this week to explore the early outlines of a
Pacific community.
Several years ago Sir Oliver Franks drew a
careful bead on this postwar trend and described
reo-ionalism as "a halfway house at a time when
single nations are no longer viable and the* Of
world is not ready to become one." It would
be hard to say it better. i { ;
World of Pluralism and Color
The growth of regional communities is oi
course quite in line with the obligations anc
opportunities of every member of the Unitec
w
F
Nations-
The U.N. Charter explicitly recognizes the
role of regional organizations in articles 52 and
53 and even foresees their use to help the U.N iarf:
keep the peace in emergencies. The U.N. eco
nomic commissions are themselves organized or
a regional basis and spawn other regiona
groupings, like the Mekong River project ii j
Southeast Asia. "?•
Regional organizations, in short, can helj noi
reliev'e the United Nations of burdens whicl k
otherwise might sink the universal boat we ar ■'
all in together. ■
But the point I want to make here is that sup z
port for and participation in these overlappin; lil
communities of the free is at the doctrinal hear f
of U.S. foreign policy. Our concept of a -\
emerging new system of world order depend
heavily upon the growth and health an^
strength of the new commimities within th
broader framework of the U.N. system— fo :
they weave the fabric of order with the stronj
yam of consent. They reflect our kind o
world of pluralism and color— our open societ;
pro j ected around the globe. They are the exac
antithesis of the grey and monolithic worL
order- the imiversal closed society— of whicl
the Communists dream.
Tins is why we — you and I, as Americans-
carry around without embarrassment a whol
pocketful of memberships and associate mem
berships in interlocking and mutually reinforc
ing regional organizations. The last time
counted, which was yesterday, there were 1
of them— 8 in our own hemisphere, 10 in Eu
rope and Asia. For any member of this con
f erence who can name all of them without a ref
614
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIl'
eiice book, the Department of State will offer
modest prize. It will have to be modest ; the
ongress gives us just enough money to help
lance these organizations and none at all to
e Dependent Territories of the Pacific
In the Pacific we speak of "community" —
t yet of an organization, hardly even a con-
<'pt that any two nations on the Pacific rim
ould define alike. But if we have yet to for-
ulate just what brings us together, except the
pping waters of tliis greatest and least turbu-
nt of oceans, we Americans do share with our
iighbors in the Near West one very special
iterest — the bits and pieces of land and small
roups of people scattered on that ocean's
irface.
They are dependent territories, most of
lem. As the great colonies of Asia and Africa
riggle free from their colonial apron strings,
le 50 or 60 enclaves and island groups still
sgarded as colonial remnants around the
orld are beginning to show up clearly on the
orizon of the emotional debates on colonialism
1 the U.N. and elsewhere.
More than a dozen of these dependencies are
1 the Pacific — including the smallest of them
11, Pitcaim Island of mutinous memory; 146
leople live there on 2 square miles of real estate
rhich has been British for 124 years. The 3
J.N. trust territories that now remain of the
riginal 11 are all in the Pacific : tiny Nauru and
lUge, primitive New Guinea, both administered
n trust by Australia; and the scattering of
ilicronesians on the old Japanese mandate, now
he Trust Territory of the Pacific, which is en-
rusted to us to govern under arrangements that
■:in only be changed by the Security Council
)f the United Nations.
As a case study in building a Pacific com-
nunity, let us consider for a moment the condi-
ion and destiny of these 78,000 island people,
speaking nine difl'erent languages and unnum-
jered dialects, spread over an ocean expanse of
million square miles, on 2,100 individual
islands that aggregate hardly 687 square miles
of dry land.
We have left a part of our own history, and
good deal of our lifeblood, in some of those
scratches on the map — in Truk, where our avia-
tors neutralized a powerful naval base, and in
Saipan and Tinian, where the crucial land bat-
tles of the Marianas were won.
I am here to tell you that the administration
in Washington is paying very special attention
to these people on those islands. And none too
soon.
In an era when American power and technical
progress is felt in every corner of the free world,
when yoxmg volunteers and middle-aged tech-
nicians are helping every free people to build
the institutions of modernity, none of our for-
eign aid programs are available to the only
foreigners who have been specifically entrusted
ix> our care by the world commimity.
The Peace Corps can't operate in the islands
without new authority — the islanders aren't
"foreign" enough. Until last month the Voice
of America had no program for the islands;
the citizens of the trust territory have not been
regarded as quite "foreign" enough to qualify
for a rating as an audience. The Soviet radio
is not as reticent: Radio Moscow can be clearly
heard in Japanese in many islands of the trust
territory.
Until the administration and the Congress
got busy last year to increase the funds for edu-
cation in Micronesia, we were spending an
average of $33 per child per year for elementary
schooling. In a well-meaning but unrealistic
attempt to protect the islanders from the shock
of 20th-century civilization, most education has
been in whatever vernacular happened to be
the local language — which was nice and com-
fortable for the parents but hardly a golden op-
portunity for the children. In all honesty, we
have not been equipping these people for mod-
em living.
The small numbers of people, and the enor-
mous distances involved, make a decent educa-
tional system extremely difficult to organize.
But we can do lots better, and the United States
Department of Interior, which administers the
islands which the United States holds in trust
under the United Nations Charter, is starting
out to do just that.
A properly American attitude toward the de-
velopment of the Pacific islands is surely plain,
if difficult to carry into action all at once.
Ignorance is not bliss, we say, not even on lovely
615
islands washed by the bhiest of waters and
cooled by the gentlest of breezes. Poverty is
not picturesque, illiteracy is not Elysian, and
backwardness is not the road to happiness.
As our modernization policy gathers mo-
mentum, the somehow familiar names of these
remote islands — the Marianas, the Marshalls,
the Carolines — will lose their recent connotation
of war and death and acquire a new meaning as
symbols of life, and peace, and the self-deter-
mination of peoples.
A Foundation for Self-Determination
From time to time groups of islanders have
expressed an interest in becoming permanently
associated with the United States. We are flat-
tered by this interest and perhaps a little em-
barrassed ; we are not quite sure we have entirely
merited this admiration. In any event we feel
these expressions of interest to be premature.
We do want the inhabitants of Micronesia to
exercise their inherent and inalienable right of
self-determination. We do not think, however,
that this choice should be made imtil these
people have acquired a firsthand knowledge of
both the benefits and the responsibilities of 20th-
century civilization.
This is indeed what we have undertaken by
treaty to do. The Charter of the United Na-
tions, as ratified by the Senate, describes in these
words the aims of the trusteeship system :
... to promote the political, economic, social, and
educational advancement of the inhabitants of the tru-st
territories, and their progressive development towards
self-government or independence as may be appropri-
ate to the particular circumstances of each territory
and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the
peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms
of each trusteeship agreement. . . .
Not racy language, that. But the meaning is
clear : The islanders themselves will in the end
determine their own future, and we shall see
to it that they get the chance to learn the issues
and exercise the choices.
The winds of change are blowing, still some-
times at zephyr strength, over the other island
areas in the central and southern Pacific. What
is to become of these bits and pieces of old
trading empires — too small and too remote for
meaningful nationhood, too much in the spirit
of the times to remain old-style dependencies?
How much real estate is necessary to make a
nation? How many persons add up to a
people ?
Can anyone seriously imagine dozens, even
hundreds, of sovereign and independent nations
fashioned from the multiple island groupings
of the Pacific basin, each with its own flag, its
currency and national anthem, its independence
day celebration, and its seat in the United Na-
tions ? Must Pitcairn Island, for all its renown,
choose a foreign minister from its 146 good
people ?
Wisely the General Assembly of the United
Nations, in resolutions designed to liurry the
decolonization process, has provided a consid-
erable range of options for the exercise of the
right of self-determination. One of the alter-
natives recognized by the Assembly is for a
people to combine with others ; another kind of
self-determination is to opt for free associa-
tion, on an agreed basis, with a metropolitan
power.
But this constitutional no man's land that lies
between sovereign independence, which is now
so fashionable, and colonial dependency, which
is now so rightly out of fashion, needs a great
deal more exploration by the lawyers and the
political scientists. For if small populations
are going to be asked to determine their future,
they must be ofTered something better than a
Hobson's choice between permanent dependency
and fashionable illusion.
In the Pacific islands, and in each of the
major nations around the Pacific rim, a stirring
of new thought and new action is more than
evident. Things will be on the move, and you
in California will have a ringside seat. If we
think hard, and act boldly on careful plans,
we will surely find ways of assisting the Pacific
community in its growing interdependence with
the rest of the world. And that's what we
mean, isn't it, when we speak here, so late in
the evening but so early in history, of a Pacific
community ?
In the Pacific, as elsewhere around the world,
President Kennedy's words from last year's
state of the Union message' still echo: ". . .
our nation is commissioned by history to bei
either an observer of freedom's failure or tha
cause of its success."
' Ibid., Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
616
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
dvisory Commission Reports
n Exchange Program
Tlie Department of State announced on
pril 5 (press release 178) that the U.S. Advis-
ry Commission on International Educational
nd Cultural Affairs had made a report to
longress on March 29 pursuant to a require-
lent of the Fulbright-Hays Act, wliich estab-
ished the Commission and called for a "special
tudy of the effectiveness" of past programs,
?ith emphasis on "the activities of a reasonably
epresentative cross-section of past recipients
f aid."
The Commission is headed by John W. Gard-
ler, president of the Carnegie Corporation of
vTew York. The other members are :
ioy E. Larsen, chairman of the executive committee.
Time Inc., and vice chairman of the Commission
Valter Adams, professor of economics, Michigan State
University
ames R. Fleming, publisher of Fort Wayne, Ind.,
Journal-Oazette
juther H. Foster, president, Tuskegee Institute
Theodore M. Hesburgh, president. University of
Notre Dame
Valter Johnson, chairman, Department of History,
University of Chicago
Franklin D. Murphy, chancellor. University of Cali-
fornia at Los Angeles
Mabel M. Smythe, principal, New Lincoln High School,
New York, N.Y.
The Commission's study included 3,842 pro-
fessional interviews with returned grantees and
distinguished citizens in 20 countries, reports
from U.S. embassies in 26 countries, and a broad
inquiry among leading Americans in govern-
ment, in universities, and in foimdations and
private exchange agencies in the United States.
According to the Commission's findings, the
program :
1. Does in fact increase mutual understand-
ing. The Commission found "impressive testi-
mony" that increased understanding is one of
the most outstanding results of the program.
2. Helps to dispel among foreign visitors
many misconceptions and ugly stereotypes about
the American people. The program is "re-
markably effective," the report said, "in com-
municating a favorable impression of American
character and customs broadly conceived."
3. Is "outstandingly successful" in providing
a valuable educational experience to foreign
grantees and has a favorable effect on the ca-
reers of the great majority. Grantees reported
benefiting "substantially, most notably in in-
creased knowledge in their professional field."
4. Brings to the home countries of the gran-
tees important benefits, including "valuable new
ideas, skills, knowledge and attitudes."
5. Establishes "effective and continuing chan-
nels of communication between people in other
comitries and the U.S." and "broadens perspec-
tives and outlook."
6. Effectively supports "one of the nation's
most basic international objectives — of helping
create and support strong, free societies able to
work together, in mutual trust and understand-
ing, on the grave issues of our time."
U.S. Announces Loans
to Argentina
Press release 154 dated March 28
The Government of the United States an-
nounced on March 28 loans and other financial
assistance wliich it will provide the Government
of Argentina in support of a renewed standby
agreement concluded by the International
Monetary Fund on March 27. The IMF will
make available $50 million througli October
1963, which, together with the supplementary
U.S. resources, will assist the Argentine Gov-
ernment in carrying out a series of measures de-
signed to strengthen its financial position, to
which it has connnitted itself under the standby
agreement.
Tlie United States Treasury is extending for
an additional 4 months the life of its outstand-
ing exchange agreement, wliich was due to ex-
pire on Jime 6, 1963. Tliis action will make
available to Argentina during the period end-
ing October 6, 1963, $25 million not previously
drawn. The Agency for International Devel-
opment will provide $20 million for balance-of-
payments assistance.
Subject to completion of Argentine bilateral
accords witli European governments for re-
funding arrangements agreed in principle in
November 1962, the Export-Import Bank will
APRIL 22, 1963
617
m
on parallel terms refinance up to $92 million of
Argentine debts to the Export-Import Bank
and other U.S. creditors.
U.S. interim assistance measures, imdertaken
in collaboration with the Government of Ar-
gentina, are in addition to the resources being
made available to Argentina under the Alliance
for Progress in carrying forward a program of
economic development intended to increase
more rapidly the economic and social well-being
of the Argentine people.
Development loans concluded thus far this
year include those for housing and highway
construction; and with respect to other projects
advanced by the Argentine Government, due
consideration will continue to be given to the
goals mutually agreed upon at Pmita del Este,
including that of maintaining appropriate
monetary and fiscal policies which provide a
sound basis for economic development.
Unclaimed Property of Victims
of Nazi Persecution
AN EXECUTIVE ORDER'
Amendment of Executive Order 10.587 Relatimg to
THE Administration op Section 32(h) op the Trad-
ing WITH the Enemy Act
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act, as amended (50 D.S.C. App.
1 et seq.), and by section 301 of title 3 of the United
States Code (65 Stat. 713), and as President of the
United States, it is ordered that sections 1, 2 and 3
of Executive Order No. 10587 " of January 13, 1955
(20 F.R. 361) are amended to read as follows:
"Section 1. The Jewish Restitution Successor Or-
ganization, a charitable membership organization In-
corporated under the laws of the State of New York,
is hereby designated as successor In Interest to de-
ceased persons in accordance with and for the purposes
of subsection (h) of section 32 of the Trading with
the Enemy Act, as added by the Act of August 23, 1954
(68 Stat. 767), and amended by section 204(a) of
Public Law 87-846, approved October 22, 1962 (76
Stat. 1U4).
"Sec. 2. Exclusive of the designation of the
Jewish Restitution Successor Organization under sec-
tion 1 of this Order and the exercise of jurisdiction
over the claims referred to In section 3, the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission is hereby delegated
and shall carry out the functions provided for in sub-
section (h) of section 32 of the Trading with the En-
emy Act, as amended, including the designation or
refusal of designation of other organizations imder
the first sentence of that subsection, the payment of
$500,000 out of the War Claims Fund to the designated
organization or organizations and all other powers,
duties, authority and discretion vested in or conferred
upon the President
"Sec. 3. Jurisdiction over the claims filed by
the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization with
the Attorney General under subsection (h) of section
32 of the Trading with the Enemy Act prior to the
amendment thereof by section 204(a) of Public Law
87-S46 shall remain with the Attorney General pend-
ing the discliarge of such claims by that organization's
acceptance of payment pursuant to subsection (h),
as amended, or other discharge of such claims pursu-
ant to law."
' No. 11086 ; 28 Fed. Reg. 1833.
'For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 14, 1955, p. 276.
The White House,
February 26, 1963.
Foreign Policy Conference Held
for Editors and Broadcasters
The Department of State announced on April
1 (press release 167) that it would hold a na-
tional foreign policy conference for editors and
broadcasters on April 22 and 23 at Washing-
ton. Invitations have been extended by Secre-
tary Rusk to editors and commentators of the
daily and periodical press and the broadcasting
industry in all 50 States and Puerto Rico.
President Kennedy, Secretary Rusk, and
other principal officers of the Department of
Stat« and other Government agencies concerned
with foreign affairs will participate. A num-
ber of the presentations at the conference will
be on the record. The sessions will be held in
the West Auditorium of tlie Department of
State.
This will be the sixth in a series of national
foreign policy conferences for editors and
broadcasters. The conference program, begun
in April 1961, is intended to assist the informa-
tion media in making available to the American
public the maximum possible information in
deptli on current foreign policy issues.
618
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
THE CONGRESS
lepartment Supports Bill To Establish National Academy of Foreign Affairs
Following are texts of statements made by
[cting Secretary George ^V. Ball and Deputy
Inder Secretary for Administration William
Orrick, Jr., before the Senate Committee on
^oreign Relations on April 4.
TATEMENT BY MR. BALL
'ress release 171 dated April 4
I appear today in support of S. 865, a bill to
►rovide for the establishment of the National
Lcademy of Foreign Affairs.^
I have come here as an inadequate surrogate
or Secretary Rusk. He was compelled to be
,way from Washington today and has asked me
o express his regrets to this committee. He
las a deep personal interest in the bill before
ou. His rich experience in the fields of edu-
iation and of foreign affairs has convinced him
if America's preeminent need for highly
trained personnel to serve the objectives of our
foreign policy. He has noted that we faced a
•'crisis of talent." Inspired by this conviction,
he has devoted considerable time to the consider-
ation and development of the proposal for a
National Academy of Foreign Affairs.
The central concept of S. 865 is the establish-
ment of an educational institution of high
quality that would be an instrument of govern-
ment yet autonomous in nature and interdepart-
mental in scope. It would provide training in
the diverse aspects of foreign affairs for officers
' For texts of a letter from President Kennedy
transmitting a bill to the Congress and a memoran-
dum from Secretary Rusk summarizing the principal
provisions of the proposed legislation, see Bulletin
f.f Mar. 25, 1963, p. 427.
not merely of the State Department but of other
departments of the Government.
It would be administered by a Chancellor ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. A Board of Regents
would "determine policy and provide guidance
to the Chancellor. . . ." That board would
consist of the Secretary of State and four other
official members, the Chancellor, and five mem-
bers drawn from private life.
The Academy would not provide preemploy-
ment training such as the service academies at
West Point or Annapolis. It would be more
nearly comparable to our senior professional
military colleges— although broader in scope.
The establishment of the Academy would not
intrude upon the work of our Army, Navy, and
Air Force colleges nor diminish the need for
these institutions. Neither would the Academy
compete with public and private colleges and
universities throughout the land. We would
continue to rely, as in the past, on these colleges
and universities to provide the basic education
for individuals entering the service of the Gov-
ernment in the field of foreign affairs.
The purpose of the Academy is to increase
the effectiveness of personnel already on active
service with the United States Government. In
this way we would improve the capacity of the
United States to conduct relations with other
nations under the complex conditions of a com-
plex age. There is no better means by which
we can advance the national interest.
II
I understand that I am only the first of sev-
eral administration witnesses who will appear
before this committee. I shall, therefore, direct
my remarks this morning at a single question :
619
Why is it necessary or even useful to create a
National Academy of the type we are propos-
ine? I shall leave it to later witnesses to
explain in some detail the organization and
operation of the Academy and the use wliich
other departments and agencies would make
of it.
Tlie men and women engaged in the conduct
of our foreign relations must be equipped to
meet the requirements of a world that has
undergone — and is continuing to undergo —
rapid and pervasive change. Much of that
change has occurred in the brief but eventful
period — little more than a decade and a half —
since the end of the Second World War.
We sometimes forget that it was only 18 years
ago that the Iron Curtain was erected to divide
the world into two parts — half slave, half free.
Today we must carry on our international busi-
ness in constant awareness of an aggressive
Communist bloc — a bloc that has mobilized the
resources of modern technology and the man-
power of two vast nations within a power sys-
tem which involves one-third of the population
of the world.
The adjustment to this new environment of
threat and menace has not been easy. Prior
to the 1950's, we Americans had no fear that
a foreign power might impose great damage
upon our homeland. Few foresaw that we
would live, as President Kennedy has said, "on
the bull's eye of Soviet missiles."^
Yet today we must conduct our international
relations in the ever-present consciousness that
a power intent on destroying the systems and
the values by which we live possesses the ability
to Idll millions of Americans within the inte-
rior of our own continent — within a matter of
minutes.
The Communist powers have, however, done
more than master the new weapons technology.
They have devised a whole new system of ag-
gression — the subversion of men's minds by
subtle means of propaganda, employing the
most sophisticated methods of communications;
the corruption of governments ; the undermin-
ing of political systems ; the employment of new
' For an address by President Kennedy on Oct. 22,
1962, on the Soviet threat to the Americas, see ibid.,
Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.
techniques of infiltration and espionage; the
exploitation of weakness; systematic ten-orism
and insurgency ; and the utilization of economic
warfare.
The combating of such tactics requires us to
devise and employ a new set of tools for con-
ducting our relations with governments and
peoples. It requires us to depend not merely
on classical diplomatic experience but on a va-
riety of skills and disciplines drawn from areas
of experience not previously comprehended by
American diplomacy.
We need a broader range of techniques and
expertise even in our dealings within the free
world. A quarter of a century ago our dii>lo-
mats could concentrate the bulk of their time
and effort on a handful of nations that enjoyed
the same general standard of living and ad-
hered to the same general standards of conduct
as did America. Those nations, in turn, con-
trolled the destinies of a large part of the world
through vast colonial systems.
Today those colonial systems have been large-
ly swept away by a tidal wave of nationalism.
This has meant the progressive withdrawal
from world responsibilities of the great metro-
politan powers of Europe. This process of
withdi'awal was not always either safe or easy.
It left dangerous power vacuums — vacuums
into which the United States, of necessity, was
compelled to move in order to preserve free-
world security.
In place of the old colonial territories, some
60 new nations have emerged in the brief time-
span since the end of the World War. This
has imposed new strains on our diplomatic es-
tablishment. Not only have we been required
to double the scope and number of our diplo-
matic posts around the world, but our dealings
with those new nations have demanded a new
dimension of skill and knowledge.
Our responsibilities in the newly emerging
countries have been complex and difficult. In
some cases we have had to provide training in
the rudimentary operations of government. We
have had to furnish technical assistance and
capital to assist these countries to meet the prob-
lems of survival in a new and dangerous world.
The problems presented have tested our re-
sourcefulness and our ingenuity. Most of all
they have emphasized the urgent need for com-
620
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
etent personnel equipped with the proper
nguages, and understanding of diverse cul-
ires and habits, and a variety of technical
iiowledge.
Our relations with the newly emerging na-
ons have called for personnel with a broader
ickground than that required by the tradi-
onal demands of classical diplomacy. But
5, for that matter, have our relations even with
ur European allies.
In recent years we have witnessed the begin-
ings of a transformation of Europe — the grow-
ag pains of a new unity. Not only has this in-
acted a new element in the power balance, but
t has required, on our side, that we adjust to a
ew method of dealing with certain of the ma-
Ior nations of Europe.
Many of the complexities that we encoimter
oday in the conduct of international relations
tem from our role of leader of the free world,
^n adjusting to this role we have profoundly
Itered our habits of thought. We have aban-
oned our historic policy of limited involve-
ent — of isolationism. Faced with the com-
aon menace of aggi'essive Communist power,
e have joined with our European friends in
he NATO alliance. Elsewhere around the
orld we have become either a member or ob-
»rver in a half dozen other alliances. We have
iiscovered — what other nations had known
)efore — that the conduct of alliance diplomacy
a special discipline.
The interdependence that we have recognized
^s an essential element in effective military de-
fense is also the dominant fact in the economic
relations among developed countries. It has
compelled us to forge new instruments of coop-
eration, such as the OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development], so
that we may live together without injuring one
another economically, wliile at the same time
concerting our eif orts and resources for the per-
fonnance of common tasks.
Finally, we have had to learn to work within
new international institutions that serve a wide
spectrum of purposes — not the least important
of which has been to assist the achieving of
world transformations with a minimum of vio-
lence. And the United Nations and such re-
gional organizations as the Organization of
American Slates have required us to master a
new skill — the conduct of what might be called
"legislative diplomacy."
Ill
But all this is, of couree, well known to this
committee. I have repeated it this morning
only to emphasize the variety of our interna-
tional relationships and the diversity of skills
that we need in order to conduct our interna-
tional affairs effectively.
The State Department officer today must be
far more flexible and informed than in an
earlier and simpler time. It is no longer
enough that he master the classical diplomacy.
If he is to be fully effective — capable of serv-
ing diverse needs in a variety of posts on all
six continents — he must have at least a respect-
able acquaintance with a wide range of disci-
plines and techniques. At the same time, we
have a great need for highly specialized per-
sonnel who nevertheless understand the rela-
tions of their specialty to the larger objectives
of American policy.
These objectives cannot be attained unless
officers are, from time to time, brought up to
date through systematic retraining. The aver-
age class 1 Foreign Service officer today is 51
years old. This means that he received his uni-
versity education in the midthirties. One need
only compare an elementary text on economics
of that era with a text in use today to realize
the magnitude of the efforts required to keep
abreast of developments in that subject.
Greater gaps exist between general scientific
concepts of the thirties and those of today.
Even a junior Foreign Service officer of the
grade of class 6, with an average age of 36, must
perform his duties in a world that has radically
changed since he graduated from college in the
late 1940's.
At the moment, we are not providing suffi-
cient retraining. We are not keeping up with
the armed services in this regard. The average
military officer spends approximately 12 per-
cent of his career in formal training. The
comparable figure for a State Department offi-
cer is 5 percent ; for an employee of the Agency
for International Development or of the United
States Information Agency, it is only 2 percent.
APRIL 22. 1963
621
IV
Yet today, the activities of the Agency for
International Development and the United
States Information Agency are vital elements
in our foreign policy. International affairs are
no longer the exclusive province of the Depart-
ment of State. The Secretary of State is, of
course, the President's principal adviser on
foreign policy, and the State Department is
the key agency in the field. Yet there are per-
haps as many as 20 other departments or agen-
cies that have a useful— in fact, a necessary-
role to play. Let me mention only a few— the
United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Peace Corps,
the old-line departments such as Defense, Com-
merce, Treasury, Labor, and so on. Repre-
sentatives of all of these agencies and depart-
ments engage in activities overseas. If we are
to have a coherent foreign policy, their person-
nel and the personnel of the State Department
must understand one another's problems and
work for a common objective.
I am convinced that the National Academy
can be an instrument for assuring that necessary
harmony of purpose and objective. It would
not be established as part of the State De-
partment. It would be an autonomous instru-
ment of government to serve the purposes of a
total foreign policy in which many departments
of the Government are interested.
For this reason, the National Academy would
supersede the Foreign Service Institute, which
Congress authorized in 1946. That Institute
was created within the State Department to
meet the training needs primarily of the For-
eign Service. In addition to language training,
it offers a series of courses of relatively short
duration designed to acquaint the Department
and the Foreign Service officers with current
trends, developments, and problems.
The Institute has served the Department well,
but we have long recognized that tlie conditions
under which it was established have drastically
changed. Today more and more our operations
abroad are conducted on a "country team" basis.
Representatives of various Federal agencies
serving at a post abroad act as a unit under the
guidance of the ambassador. To train members
of such country teams requires an institution
of greater scope. Under the provisions of S.
865, the National Academy would supei-sede the
Institute and absorb most of the functions that i
the Institute now performs. ^
V '
I have emphasized that the principal pur-
pose of the Academy would be the education
of personnel for the effective conduct of our
foreign affairs. But the Academy would also
provide a center of research that could draw
freely on the foreign affairs experience of tlie
entire Federal Government. It could thus de-
velop a coherent body of knowledge and make
more certain the application of consistent doc-
trines and principles to the perplexing prob-
lems that confront us in our international i
affairs.
In this activity the Academy would comple-
ment the work now being done by colleges and
universities. It would serve as a link — a two-
way bridge— between the Government and the
academic conununity. It would afford an op-
portunity for scholars and research technicians
to contribute their knowledge and insights tc
foreign affairs. It would permit them, in turn
to understand more clearly the nature of tlu
problems and obstacles that daily confront th(
men and women who initiate and carry ou
our policies.
VI
The proposal embodied in S. 865 is the distil
lation of a great deal of thought and experience
It was based largely upon the reports of tw(
distinguished committees.^ One is a repor
made to the Secretary of State by the Com
mittee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, acting un
der the chairmanship of the distinguishec
former Secretary of State, Mr. Christian A
Herter. The other is a report made by
Presidential advisory committee, under thi
chairmanship of Dr. James A. Perkins, th(
president-elect of Cornell University.
These committees substantially agreed upoi
the nature of the problem and upon the kin(
of organization required to meet it.
= For background, see ihid.. Dec. 24, im;2, p. 971, am
.Tan. 14, 1963, p. 47.
(i22
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BDLLETIl
Both committees were impressed by the need
(pr the constant renewal of skill and compe-
ience in the conduct of our foreign policy —
i'. need foretold many years ago by H. G. Wells,
,-ho declared proplietically that "History is
decoming more and more a race between educa-
ion and catastrophe."
. S. 865, Mr. Chairman, is a proposal that
(hould contribute to winning that race.
TATEMENT BY MR. ORRICK
Tess release 172 duted April 4
I appreciate the opportunity of following
secretary Ball to explain more specifically the
'letails of our proposal. We are convinced of
he urgent need for new machinery to provide
aservice, interdepartmental professional traili-
ng to personnel of all Federal departments and
.gencies involved in foreign affairs. We are,
n short, proposing a new and unique institution
or which the President reaffirmed his support
n his press conference yesterday [April 3].
In essence, this is the kind of setup we
envisage :
A really topnotch institution to be known as
he National Academy of Foreign Affairs.
A place where officers who conduct our for-
;ign affairs can get advanced training and edu-
cation — to help them do their jobs better. This
means an Academy where the State Department
and other agencies involved can send officers
from time to time during their careers to up-
date their knowledge of new problems around
the world and new methods of handling them.
Some courses would be only a couple of weeks;
others, a year.
This Academy would not be a West Point,
or a place from which the State Department,
AID, USIA, or CIA would recruit new officers.
It would not award degrees nor compete with
the various programs offered by colleges and
universities.
But it would undertake major research proj-
ects in foreign affairs, based upon access to
official records, reports, and other documents
available only to Government employees, as w'ell
as material from the academic community and
other public sources.
APRIL 22, 1963
The Academy would be created as an autono-
mous part of the Government — but it would be
closely linked with the operating foreign affairs
agencies.
The training and research programs would
not concentrate exclusively upon any particular
phase of foreign affairs but would cover the
waterfront as regards all aspects of national
security.
The Foreign Service Institute would be in-
corporated into the National Academy — except
for the training it now gives in subjects exclu-
sively for State Department people. For ex-
ample, consular operations.
The Academy is designed to combine the ad-
vantages of the traditional academic environ-
ment with the advantages of direct access to
governmental pereonnel, material, and opera-
tions. At the same time the Academy is in-
tended to serve as a link between the operating
foreign affairs agencies of the Government and
the American academic community.
At the outset, I would like the committee to
understand that if authorizing legislation were
enacted during this session of Congress, the
Academy would not be in full operation before
fiscal 1968. Any estimates regarding numbers
of officers or annual costs are based on long-
range projections. Obviously, we can't expect
this Academy to spring into being overnight.
We recognize that with a new undertaking
like this we must proceed with caution. We
shall, of course, rely heavily on the Congress
as to how, and how fast, to proceed. Moreover,
the Chancellor and the Board of Regents will
have major roles in the establishment of a
definite curriculum and organization.
With this in mind, this is how we view the
Academy :
Organizationally, we picture the Academy as
having two distinct arms— training and re-
search. The research arm would consist essen-
tially of three basic centers : one for the study
of the global Communist menace, including its
theory, practices, resources, vulnerabilities, and
techniques ; another for the study of how indus-
trialized nations can live and work together
for mutual benefit and security; and a third
for the study of the underdeveloped nations and
623
their problems of economic and social develop-
ment, political evolution, and internal defense.
As to the general tyjjes of ti-aining to be con-
ducted — as distinct from subject matter — we
have in mind four diiferent kinds of courses.
First, better orientation courses for new officers
designated by the major agencies involved in
foreign affairs. Second, special area and lan-
guage courses for officers concerned with the
problems of particular countries and regions.
This, of course, is done now at the FSI. We
hope to do it better at the NAFA. Third, a
series of courses for all officers, aimed at com-
prehensive career development. Fourth, spe-
cialized courses — as needed — to help officers of
all these agencies face and handle crises and
adapt to new situations that cannot easily be
covered within the framework of the regular
courses.
The Chancellor would be the chief operating
executive of the Academy and responsible for
its day-to-day management. This would cover
the selection and assignment of faculty mem-
bers and staff, standards of performance and
conduct, the curriculum, designing research
programs, and promoting cooperative relations
with universities and other private institutions.
The Board of Eegents would establish broad
policies and serve as a two-way channel between
the Academy and the operating agencies of the
Government. This would assure that the Acad-
emy's training and research programs are re-
sponsive to their needs.
We plan to build the Academy in or near
Washington, to assure the faculty and student
body ready access to Government officials and
material.
Obviously, the Academy would give high-
priority attention to the purposes, problems,
and techniques of waging the cold war, which,
as Secretary Eusk has said, "is our main busi-
ness in the State Department." We want every
governmental officer actively engaged in foreign
affairs to understand thoroughly the nature and
magnitude of the global Communist menace ; its
theory, history, doctrines, and practices.
There would be courses about the United
States itself — its various political, economic, so-
cial, and cultural conditions. This might well
include studies of congressional attitudes and'
legislation. Certainly, every officer who repre-
sents America abroad should know all he can
about his own country.
We expect that the Academy will greatly im-
prove the coordination and efficiency of our
policies and programs at home and abroad by
enabling officers in different agencies to under-
stand more clearly their relations with one an-
other and their common purposes.
Now, as to cost : On the basis of our presMit '
assumptions as to the needs for professional
training, which contemplate that after fiscal
year 1968 there will be approximately 700 pro-
fessional-level officers and approximately 150
other students — such as Fulbright scholars,
Mundt-Smith recipients, Foreign Service Stafi
personnel, and dependents of Government offi-
cials — enrolled at the Academy at any one time,
the construction and capital acquisition cost foi
the Academy is estimated at approximatelj
$17,500,000. If Congress adopts S. 865, th(
annual operations and maintenance cost aftei
fiscal year 1968 is estimated to be approximatelj
$6,700,000.
In conclusion, let me express my belief thai
the estimated costs of the Academy are ex
tremely moderate if measured by potential re
suits. The dividends reaped from investment
in education are always intangible, but thii
makes them no less real. During recent years
we have made gigantic efforts to keep pace witl
the Commiuiist bloc in total military power
space exploration, missile development, an(
similar matters. Because our foreign affair:
officers constitute our "firstline troops" in thi
cold war, and are also our nation's pioneers ii
the continuing search for peace and freedom
I am convinced we must be prepared to d(
whatever is necessary to guarantee America ;
strong corps of foreign affairs personnel fulI^
capable of bearing the heavy burdens of work
leadership and equipped to protect and promoti
America's international interests in the face o
any possible challenge.
I am now ready to answer any detailed ques
tions you may have.
624
DEPARTMENT OF STATE B^JLLETI^
.kfrican Development
Statement hy Walter M. Kotschnig ^
As the sun was setting a few days ago, I
Ksited the Stanley monument. I looked out
pver the land, and I was overawed by the beauty
bf what I saw, by the grandeur of the river be-
(ow me, by the majesty of the continent which
Africa.
It is in this perspective that the importance
jf tlie Economic Commission for Africa comes
ito clear focus. In this Commission the gov-
ernments and peoples of Africa have joined in a
Dmmon effort to secure their new-found f ree-
iom through economic and social advances. It
lias brought you together, gentlemen, founding
fathers of a new Africa, builders of new nations,
guarantors of a new African miity. That is
where the strength of this Commission lies, and
its promise.
For tlie third time I have the privilege of at-
tending one of your sessions as observer for the
United States of America. Having partici-
pated in literally hundreds of international con-
fei-ences, going back to the days of the League of
Nations, I have learned to sense in the early
life of an international body its destiny, whether
it is fated to become an important element in the
international community or end up as another
debating society. We need have no fears for
the future of this Commission. The past four
sessions have pointed the way, and we can ex-
' Made at the fifth session of the U.N. Economic Com-
mission for Africa at L^opoldville, Republic of the
Congo, on Feb. 22. Mr. Kotschnig, who is a Special
Adviser, Bureau of International Organization Affairs,
was the U.S. observer at the session.
pect great and lasting accomplishments from
this and future sessions.
It is significant and a good augury that we
meet in this beautiful Capital of the Eepublic
of the Congo, for it is here that the needs for
national unity, for sound institutional struc-
tures, and for international cooperation have
been so recently demonstrated. We are all
aware of the tragic difficulties which have beset
tliis great country since its independence in
1960. My delegation rejoices with you that
with the integration of Katanga there has been
heartening progress toward the resolution of
these difficulties, and we warmly congratulate
our distinguished hosts on their achievement.
As one country which has supported the
efforts of the United Nations in the Congo, my
country takes pride in the assistance which our
parent organization has given to this task. We
have supported the United Nations here in the
Congo as elsewhere because it is the servant of
the world and not the instrument of any one
nation or group of nations. At this point, Mr.
Chairman, I hope I shall be allowed to pay a
formal and warm tribute to a man who sits right
liere in our midst, the Executive Secretary of
our Commission, Mr. Robert Gardiner. As
Officer in Charge of the United Nations Opera-
tion in the Congo, he has made an outstanding
contribution, not only to the people of the
Congo but to the whole of Africa and to the
peace and well-being of the world at large. He
deserves our deep gratitude.
The achievements here in tlie Congo are in-
deed great. But the tasks ahead in this country
APRIL 22, 1963
625
and in most otlier parts of Africa are even more
staggering. Just as poverty may make a
mockery of the freedom of an individual, so the
independence of a nation that is economically
weak and socially backward may be placed in
jeopardy. In its program of economic assist-
ance the United States seeks to help build
strength, to give reality to the idea of national
self-reliance. And, let me add, it is determined
to keep the cold war out of Africa.
The needs pressing in from all sides on the
African peoples are so tremendous and so ur-
gent as almost to defy classification. Yet it is
necessary to establish priorities and develop-
ment plans responsive to these priorities in
order to avoid needless dispersal of effort and
to assure maximum use of scarce resources for
optimum impact.
The secretariat has prepared a mountain of
documentation for this session. It is a moun-
tain rich in ore, and we congratulate the secre-
tariat on its achievement. From this mountain
of documentation there emerge certain priority
problems and needs, certain areas which call
for early and sustained action : such as the need
for the establishment of country plans of devel-
opment and the creation of adequate institutions
and the preparation of high-level person-
nel to this end ; the exploration and exploitation
of natural resources, including latent sources of
energy; the development of human resources,
basic to any kind of economic and social pro-
gram through the improvement of health, ed-
ucation, and training; rural development and
industrial growth; the building up of transport
facilities; and the promotion of trade within
the region and beyond.
U.S. Assistance to Africa
It would be j>resnmptuous on my part were
I to speak on all these subjects. Time is one
of the scarce commodities in this session, and it
belongs to you, not to us who have come as
observers. There are, however, a few specific
points I hope you will permit me to make.
1. The United States stands ready to offer
assistance in setting up planning organiza-
tions to help determine development goals,
weigh the alternatives in the use of resources
in the jiublic and private sector, and to evaluate
effects of legislation, taxation, and incentives on
economic activities. At the same time we recog-
nize the special role played by the United Na-
tions, its regional economic commissions, and its
resident representatives working on behalf of
the entire U.N. system of organizations, in the
establishment of regional and country develop-
ment plans.
2. Related to this, we are pleased with the I
plans for the establishment of an African Insti-
tute for Development and Planning sponsored
by the Economic Commission for Africa. We
will lend this project our strong support when
it comes before the Governing Council of the
Special Fund later this year.
3. We fully concur in the judgments ex-
pressed by so many African countries that the
shortage of professional and skilled personnel
is probably the most important single obstacle
to an increase in the rate of economic growth
in Africa. Much of American assistance offered
bilaterally or through multilateral channels is
aimed at overcoming present shortages.
4. We are also very much aware of the fact
that more than 85 percent of the Africans live
in rural areas, hence our continuing interest in
the promotion of agricultural improvement, in
farm and village cooperatives. We aim to co-
ordinate our efforts in these fields with those of
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization and the International Labor Orga-
nization. Under present conditions the main-
tenance of a strong agricultural base in the
economic development of most of the African
countries is necessary not only to provide food
for the rapidly growing population but also
because it helps to provide a large volume of
exports greatly needed to secure resources for
essential imports now and not at some future
time.
5. The United States has been supporting
and will continue to support power develop-
ments important to agricultural improvement
and essential for industrial growth. From our
own experience at home we know that balanced
agricultural and industrial development is the
best, guarantee for assuring rising standards of
living to all levels of the population.
6. Finally, we are keenly aware of the need
for capital assistance and we are trying to
G26
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
;ike a wortliwhile contribution through grants
111 long-term, low-interest loans, by encour-
ring private investment, and through our very
hstantial participation in such great financial
stitutions as the International Bank for Re-
1 list ruction and Development, the Interna-
,nial Monetary Fund, the International Fi-
iince Corporation, and last but not least the
iternational Development Association.
Speaking of financial institutions, I should
ke to add that the United States is sympa-
letic with the objectives of the proposed Afri-
m Development Bank. We are prepared to
insider technical assistance, if asked, to help
^tablish and operace the Bank. The United
tat^s is also prepared to consider loans, pref-
^•ably in the form of participation in specific
rojects, when the Bank is established and
perating.
I might add at this point that American aid
3 Africa during the last fiscal year — in 1 year
nd not over the past years and years to come —
mounted to about one-half billion dollars, in-
luding agricultural commodities and Food for
'eace but not counting our large share in the
id made available through the financial insti-
utions just mentioned, through the United Na-
ions, the Special Fund, the Expanded Program
)f Teclinical Assistance, UNICEF, and the
;pecialized agencies such as ILO, FAO, WHO,
md UNESCO. Nor does this figure of one-
lalf billion dollars include the provision of
.American Peace Corps volunteers, of whom
1.200 are at present serving in Africa. Con-
sidering the large number of requests pouring
in from all sides, their number may well double
liy 1964.
May I be permitted to add a little footnote
to what was said by my distinguished neighbor
to my left — my far left. He urged tliat no
political strings be tied to international aid.
We fully agree. What is more, we act accord-
ingly. We do not insist that every dollar the
United States contributes to the United Na-
tions organizations for economic assistance be
spent on American experts, on fellowships to
be used exclusively in America, and on Amer-
ican supplies. Unfortunately, the same cannot
I be said of another assistance program in an-
other currency, the unit of which is the ruble.
In extending all this assistance the United
States has not waited for the day when inter-
nationally controlled disarmament will become
effective. It is our strong hope, however — and
we are indeed pledged to the proposition — that
our people will be enabled to provide even more
substantial aid on the basis of savings eventu-
ally made available from disarmament, which
w^e ardently desire and for which the American
people pray. When that day of disarmament
will come I do not know. But I do know, and
you do know, I trust, that it is not the United
States which has blocked the way to effective
disarmament, beginning with a nuclear test ban.
Increasing African Export Earnings
Wliile the United States has taken a promi-
nent part in cooperation with other Western
countries in providing assistance to the develop-
ing nations throughout the world, we are fully
aware that by far the greater part of the for-
eign exchange resources so vitally needed for
the development of Africa does not come — and
is not likely to come — from aid or other capital
flows but from your export earnings. We also
recognize that these export earnings at present
are all too dependent on the prices brought on
world markets for a few primary commodities.
Tlie present depressed state of many primary
commodity prices is damaging to African na-
tions, as indeed it is to many other developing
nations.
The longnni solution to this problem, we be-
lieve, along with many delegations which have
already spoken, is to lessen dependence on a
few basic products through the development of
a broad range of agricultural, mineral, and
especially manufacturing exports. The expan-
sion of domestic markets and intraregional
trade must be an integral part of this process.
This creation of a more balanced and diversi-
fied range of exports, as we all know, cannot be
accomplished overnight. In the interim — in the
period immediately ahead — action must be
taken to stabilize some key commodity prices at
levels and through means which permit pri-
mary commodity exports to contribute to, rather
than hinder, the development effort in Africa.
In this connection the United States has
strongly supported the new International Coffee
APRIL L!J, 1963
627
Agreement.^ This agreement, if effectively car-
ried out by both exporters and importers, will
be of great importance to a number of African
nations. My Government is also actively par-
ticipating in preparations for negotiating a
meaningful international cocoa agreement. My
Government is furthermore actively and sympa-
thetically considering proposals put forward in
the TT.N. Commission on International Com-
modity Trade and in the International Mone-
tary Fund for arrangements to provide com-
pensatory financing for short-term fluctuations
in all export receipts.
There are other actions designed to improve
the trading position of the developing countries
which the United States Government has taken
or is contemplating. Thus we have actively
participated in the efforts of the GATT Tropi-
cal Products Group progi'essively to remove
impediments to trade in key tropical products.
Our ultimate goal is for trade in tropical prod-
ucts to be free of import duties and restrictions.
Under the provisions of the new U.S. trade
legislation, my Government is empowered to
eliminate a wide range of import duties on
tropical products without seeking reciprocal
concessions from producing nations, provided
the European Economic Commimity will do
likewise. We recognize, however, that the pro-
gressive liberalization of tropical products trade
must take place under conditions which do not
jeopardize the development effort of producing
countries inside preferential systems.
By the same token we hope to use the author-
ity of the Trade Expansion Act to help open up
markets for other products of the developing
countries and to encourage other developed
countries to do the same. During the next
round of tariff negotiations we would not expect
the developing countries to give full reciprocity
for tariff reductions by the industrialized coun-
tries, but we would expect the maximum pos-
sible participation by them in the negotiations.
Just one more point on this matter of trade.
I have just come from the first meeting of the
Preparatory Committee for the United Nations
' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 1, 1963, p.
493.
Conference on Trade and Development in New
York. My Govermnent fully supports the hold-
ing of this conference and trusts that it will
achieve constructive results. The main point
which we made in New York, and which we '■
will continue to make, was that the conference, j
to be worth while, must center its attention on |
the trade needs and problems of the developing
coimtries and the lift which trade can give to
their economies and social development. We I
hope for the fullest participation of the develop- |
ing countries. My country is not prepared to '
have the United Nations conference used as
a forum for the discussion of unrelated issues
such as may have arisen between the state- 1
trading economies of Eastern Europe and the
market economies of the West. There are other
forums where such difficulties can be discussed '
without endangering the beneficial results for
the developing countries which we hope will
flow from the deliberations of the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development.
Mr. Chairman, in my travels across the world,
here in Africa, in far-off Asia, Latin Amer-
ica, and elsewhere, I have seen untold misery,
disease, poverty, and wretchedness. I have seen
the swollen bellies of children and the shrunken
bodies of their elders. I have seen hovels which
defy description. I have seen the outer limits
of the degradation of man. But I have also had
the privilege of observing the magnificent, the
heroic efforts of men and women throughout
the world to set an end to all that misery, to all
that degradation. I have met with them in this
Commission, as in other regional commissions
of the United Nations, and I have drawn
strength and inspiration from their efforts.
My Government, the American people — for
we are a government of the people — have in
word and action demonstrated their determina-
tion to work as partners with men and women
of good will everywhere in the building of a
better world. We do not seek to strengthen the
power of the few ; we want the welfare of the
many. We want to live with you as brothers
in the same mansion, a mansion as wide as the
world, in which all of us, all our people, will
dwell in dignity and in freedom.
628
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BDIXETIBT
TREATY INFORMATION
Weather
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.
Done lit Washington October 11, ItHT. Entered into
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Mongolian People's Republic,
April 4, 1963.
Current Actions
BILATERAL
MULTILATERAL
Ariculture
('uvention on the Inter- American Institute of Agricul-
tural Sciences. Done at Washington January 15,
1944. Entered into force November 30, 1944. 58
Stat. 11(J9.
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, April 3, 1963.
lotocol of amendment to the convention on the Inter-
American Institute of Agricultural Sciences of Jan-
uary 15, 1944 (58 Stat. 1169). Opened for signature
at Washington December 1, 1958.'
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, April 3, 1963.
i/iation
iternational air services transit agreement. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for
the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.
Acceptance deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, April
13, 1963.
iplomatic Relations
ienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961.'
Accession deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), March 11,
1963.
lealth
oastitution of the World Health Organization.
Opened for signature at New York July 22, 1916.
Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808.
Acceptance deposited: Uganda, March 7, 1963.
shipping
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6,
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Brazil, March 4, 1963.
relecommunications
cladio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the
international telecommunication convention, 1959.
Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into
force May 1, 1961 ; for the United States October
23, 1961. TIAS 4893.
Notification of approval: Switzerland, February 18,
1963.
Trade
Declaration on provisional accession of the United
Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962.
Entered into force January 9, 1963 ; for the United
States May 3, 1963.
Signatures: Belgium, December 7, 1962; Canada,
March 7, 1963 ; France, December 13, 1962 ; Ghana,
February 15, 1963 ; India, February 21, 1963 ; Lux-
embourg, December 14, 1962 ; United Arab Repub-
lic, December 10, 1962 ; United States, April 3, 1963.
' Not in force.
APBIL 22, 1963
Mexico
Agreement further extending the agreement for con-
tinuation of a cooperative meteorological program of
August 23 and 29, 1957, as amended and extended
(TIAS 3905 and 5139). Effected by exchange of
notes at Mexico, D.F., March 15, 1963. Entered into
force March 15, 1963.
Tunisia
Agreement amending the agreement of March 17 and
18, 19.59 (TIAS 4224), to provide for additional in-
vestment guaranties authorized by new United
States legislation. Effected by exchange of notes
at Tunis January 22 and March 6, 1963. Entered
into force March 6, 1963.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Emergency Preparedness Functions
Assigned to Secretary of State
AN EXECUTIVE ORDER'
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President
of the United States, including authority vested in me
by ReorganizaHon Plan No. 1 of 1958 (72 Stat. 1799),
it is hereby ordered as follows :
Section 1. Scope. The Secretary of State (herein-
after referred to as the Secretary) shall prepare na-
tional emergency plans and develop preparedness pro-
grams designed to permit modification or expansion
of the activities of the Department of State and of
agencies, boards, and commissions under his jurisdic-
tion in order to meet all conditions of national emer-
gency, including attack upon the United States.
Sec. 2. Functions. The Secretary shall develop poli-
cies, plans, and procedures for carrying out his respon-
sibilities in the conduct of the foreign relations of the
United States under conditions of national emergency,
including, but not limited to (1) formulation, negotia-
tion, and implementation of contingency and post-
emergency plans with our allies and of the intergovern-
mental agreements and arrangements required by such
plans; (2) formulation, negotiation, and execution of
' No. 11087 ; 28 Fed. Reg. 1835.
629
measures afifecting the relationships of the United
States with neutral States; (3) formulation and
execution of political strategy toward hostile or enemy
States, including the definition of war objectives and
the political means for achieving those objectives; (4)
maintenance of diplomatic representation abroad ; (5)
reporting and advising on conditions overseas which
bear upon the national emergency ; (6) carrying out or
proposing economic measures with respect to other
nations, including coordination with the export control
functions of the Secretary of Commerce; (7) mutual
assistance activities such as ascertaining requirements
of the civilian economies of other nations, making rec-
ommendations to domestic resource agencies for meet-
ing such requirements, and determining the availabil-
ity of and making arrangements for obtaining foreign
resources required by the United States; (8) providing
foreign assistance. Including continuous supervision
and general direction of authorized economic and mili-
tary assistance programs for friendly nations and de-
termination of the value thereof; (9) protection or
evacuation of American citizens and nationals abroad
and safeguarding their property ; (10) protection and/
or control of international organization and foreign
diplomatic, consular, and other official personnel and
property, or other assets, in the United States ; and
(11) documentary control of persons seeking to enter
or leave the United States.
Sec. 3. Research. The Secretary and the Offic-e of
Emergency Planning shall cooperate in research in
areas involving the Department's responsibilities un-
der this order.
Sec. 4. Resources Evaluation. The Secretary shall
provide for appropriate participation in the national
resources evaluation program administered by the
Office of Emergency Planning.
Sec. 5. Functional Ouidance. The Secretary, in
carrying out the functions assigned in this order, shall
be guided by the following :
(a) Interagency cooperation. The Secretary shall
provide to all other departments and agencies foreign
policy guidance, leadership, and coordination in the
formulation and execution of those emergency pre-
paredness activities which may have foreign policy
Implications, affect foreign relations, or depend, di-
rectly or indirectly, on the policies and capabilities of
the Department of State.
(b) Presidential coordination. The Director i>f the
Office of Emergency Planning shall advise and assist
the President in determining policy for the perform-
ance of functions under tWs order and in coordinating
the performance of such functions with the total na-
tional preparedness program.
(c) Emergency planning. Emergency plans and pro-
grams, and emergency organization structure required
thereby, shall be developed as an integral part of the
continuing activities of the Department of State on
the basis that it will have the responsibility for carry-
ing out such programs during an emergency. The
Secretary shall be prepared to Implement all appro-
priate plans developed under this order. Modifica-
tions and temporary organizational changes, based on
emergency conditions, will be in accordance with
policy determinationa by the President.
Sec. 6. Emergency Actions. Nothing in this order
shall be construed as conferring authority under Title
III of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as
amended, or otherwise, to put into effect any emer-
gency plan, procedure, policy, program, or course of
action prepared or developed pursuant to this order.
Such authority is reserved to the President,
Sec. 7. Redelegatio^i. The Secretary is hereby au-
thorized to redelegate within the Department of State
the functions hereinabove assigned to him.
Sec. 8. Prior Actions. To the extent of any incon
slstency between the provisions of any prior order anc
the provisions of this order, the latter shall control
/ilj£^
The White House,
February 26, 1963.
Confirmations
The Senate on April 4 confirmed the nomination o*
W. Averell Harriman to be Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs. (For biographic details, see De
partment of State press release 182 dated April 8.)
Appointments
Chester Earl Merrow as Special Adviser on Commu
nity Relations, Bureau of Public Affairs, effective
March 18. (For biographic details, see Department ol
State press release 140 dated March 18.)
630
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN
pril 22, 1963
Index
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1243
frica
_frican Development (Kotschnig) 62r>
■Tie United Nations and the New Africa
(Williams) 602
irgentina. U.S. Announces Loans to Argentina 617
Congress
onfirmations (Harriman) 630
>epartment Supports Bill To Establish National
Aoademy of Foreign Affairs (Ball, Orrieli) . 619
'ree-AVorld Defense and Assistance Programs
( text of President's foreign aid message) . . 591
"uba
"iiha Expresses Regret in "Floridian" Incident . 600
'.S. Acts To Prevent Raids on Cuba From U.S.
Territory 600
'.S. Di.sclaims Responsibility for Attacks on
Soviet Ships (text of note) 599
)epartmenf and Foreign Service
.ppointments (Merrow) 630
'onfirmations (Harriman) 630
department Supports Bill To Establish National
Academy of Foreign Affairs (Ball, Orriclj) 619
emergency Preparedness Functions Assigned to
Secretary of State ( text of Executive order) . 629
)isarmament. U.S.S.R. Accepts U.S. Proposal
fill- Direct Communication Link (ACDA state-
ment) 600
Economic Affairs
African Development (Kotschnig) .... 025
fa pan, the United States, and Europe (John-
son) 606
C.S. Announces Lonns to Argentina .... 617
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Advisory
Commi.ssion Reiwrts on Exchange Program . 617
Europe. .Japan, the United States, and Europe
(.Tohn.s<in) 606
Foreign Aid
Free-World Defense and Assistance Programs
(text of President's foreign aid message) . . 591
U.S. Announces Loans to Argentina .... 617
Germany. Unclaime<l I'ropcrt.v of Victims of
Nazi Persecution (text of Executive order) 618
International Organizations and Conferences.
.\frican Development (Kotschnig) .... (525
Japan. .Taiian, the United States, and Europe
(.Johnson) 606
Military Affairs. Emergency Preparedness
Functions Assigned to Secretary of State
(text of Executive order) 629
Morocco. King of Morocco Exchanges Views
With Pre.sident Kennedy (text of joint com-
munique) 601
Non-Self-Governing Territories. Reflections on
the Pacific (Community (Cleveland) .... 613
Presidential Documents
Emergency Preparedness Functions Assigned to
Sec-retary of State 629
Free- World Defense and Assistance Programs . .'j91
King of Morocco Exchanges Views With Presi-
dent Kennedy 001
Unclaimed Property of Victims of Nazi Persecu-
tion 618
Public Affairs
Foreign Policy Conference Held for Editors and
Broadcasters 618
Merrow appointed Special Adviser on Commu-
nity Relations 630
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 629
U.S.S.R.
U.S.S.R. Accepts U.S. Proposal for Direct Com-
munication Link (ACDA statement) . . . 600
U.S. Disclaims Besjwnsibility for Attacks on
Soviet Ships (text of note) 599
United Nations. The United Nations and the
New Africa (Williams) 602
'Same Index
Ball, George W 619
Cleveland, Harlan 613
Harriman, W. Averell (530
Hassan II 601
Johnson, U. Alexis 606
Kennedy, President 591, 601, 618, 629
Kotschnig, Walter M 625
Merrow, Chester Earl 630
Orrick, WilUam H., Jr 023
Williams, G. Mennen 602
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 1-7
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25,
D.C.
Releases issued prior to April 1 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 154 and
156 of March 28 ; 157 of March 27 ; 164 of March
29 ; and 169 of March 30.
No. Date Subject
•166 4/1 U.S. participation in International
conferences.
167 4/1 Foreign policy conference for editors
and broadcasters (rewrite).
tl6S 4/1 Cultural exchange with Rumania.
170 4/3 Note to U.S.S.R. regarding attacks
on Soviet ships.
171 4/4 Ball : statement on National Acad-
emy of Foreign Affairs.
172 4/4 Orrick : statement on National Acad-
emy of Foreign Affairs.
*173 4/4 Rusk: interview on German tele-
vision.
tl74 4/4 Weiss : "Readjusting United States
Foreign Trade."
tl75 4/5 Delegation to ECAFE study week on
Tokaido Railway (rewrite).
tl76 4/5 Jolinson: "The United States and
Southeast Asia."
tl77 4/5 Tyler: "The Effect of the Projected
European Union on N.\TO."
178 4/5 Advisory Commission report on ex-
change program (rewrite).
•180 4/6 Harriman : Marshall Plan reunion
(excerpts).
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
the
Department
of
State
United States
Government Printing Office
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Washington 25, D.C.
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE. $300
(GPOl
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
A release in the new Foreign Affairs Outlines Series . . .
COMMUNIST SUBVERSION
in the
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
This 19-page pamplilet contains the statement made on Febru-
ary 18, 1963, by Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs, before the Latm American Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. At the outset Mr. Martin
states :
The problem of extracontinental totalitarian powers trying to subvert
established governments in this hemisphere is not new. During World War II
the American Republics faced the challenge of Fascist subversion sponsored by
the Axis Powers. Through individual and collective action they successfully
dealt with this threat. Since 1948, in the aftermath of the Communist seizure
of power in Czechoslovakia, the inter-American community has been dealing
with the problem of Commimlst subversion promoted by countries of the Sino-
Soviet bloc, now supported by Cuba.
Mr. Martin also describes the development of communism prior
to Castro, Communist efforts since the advent of Castro, communism
in Latin America since 1959, steps we are taking to combat Com-
munist subversion, steps being taken in the Organization of American
States [OAS] to comiter Communist subversion, and the role of the
Alliance for Progress in the Western Hemisphere's security effort.
Publication 7509
15 cents
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HE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
9 ^\_ ^^ ^-^
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m
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Sii*a'
s^^^-
lAL
LY RECORD
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1244
AprU 29, 1963
THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHEAST ASIA • by
Deputy Under Secretary Johnson 635
EIGHTH MEETING OF SEATO COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS • Statement by Secretary Rusk and Text of
Communique 641
THE EFFECT OF THE PROJECTED EUROPEAN
UNION ON NATO • by Assistant Secretary Tyler ... 648
READJUSTING UNITED STATES FOREIGN
TRADE • by Leonard Weiss 652
THE FOREIGN AID PROGRAM • Statementby
Secretary Rusk 664
£D STATES
IBN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
1
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVIII. No. 1244 • Publication ,.
April 29, 1963
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 28, D.C.
Price:
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Use of funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
OF State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETi
a weekly publication issued by t
Office of Media Services, Bureau
Public Affairs, provides the put
and interested agencies of t
Government with information
developments in the field of forei
relations and on the work of I
Department of State and the Forei
Service. The BULLETIN includes
lected press releases on foreign poll .
issued by tlie White House and t ■
Department, and statements and c
dresses made by the President and ■
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officers of the Department, as well i
special articles on various phases f
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tions of the Department. Inforw
tion is included concerning treat i
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which the United States is or m'
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Publications of the Departmei,
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he United States and Southeast Asia
&y TJ. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^
Pj Ask the average person on the street to define
i)utheast Asia and you will probably get as
my different answers as the number of peo-
e you ask. A World War II veteran will
cely think of the China-Burma-India theater,
id he will at least be right on Burma. A tour-
might have visions of Thai or Bali dancers,
id he, too, would be right on Thailand and
donesia. Some might even mention India,
it that would be stretching the elastic term,
)utheast Asia, too far. Actually the term is
snerally accepted as comprising the mainland
minsula countries of Burma, Thailand, Ma-
ya, Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam, plus the
hilippines and Indonesia.
Thus Southeast Asia, as we define it, is a
iographic expression covering an exceedingly
rge area of land and water. Our frequent
id common use of the term tends to give the
ipression that it has a certain coherence and
lity. However, I do not think it an exagger-
;ion to say that there is thus far less coherence
I Southeast Asia from the standpoint of race,
iligion, culture, and politics than in all of Eu-
Dpe in the last century.
Nevertheless, the nations of Southeast Asia
II have one thing in common — they are a part
f a huge, roughly triangular area which his-
jrically has always been subjected to pressures
rom at least one of the three sides by which
. is bounded — India, China, and the sea.
On the west there is India, which for many
enturies had a great influence in Southeast
Lsia, or "Further India," as it once was called.
' Address made before the Economic Club of Detroit
t Detroit, Mich., on Apr. 8 (press release 176 dated
ipr. 5).
This influence was primarily cultural, and it
was transmitted largely through Brahminism
and Buddhism. Indian influence extended
through Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia and
into Indonesia. It is evident today in religious
and cultural forms, as well as in the written
languages of several of these countries, which
are based on Sanskrit. On the other hand,
Chinese cultural influences are more in evidence
in what is now Viet-Nam.
Racially the Chinese have also contributed
to the ethnic strains of Southeast Asia. In ad-
dition China at times exerted the relentless
pressure of a dynamic expanding empire. The
closely related Thai, Lao, and Karen peoples
originally inhabited the upper reaches of the
Yangtze River in west China but migrated
south under expanding Chinese pressure.
Large parts of Southeast Asia as far south as
Cambodia once acknowledged the suzerainty of
Imperial China, paying tribute to Peiping.
Even today there are large Chinese communi-
ties in tlie Southeast Asian countries, where
they play an extraordinarily important role in
commerce and industry.
Despite the force of these external influences
from India and China, the countries of South-
east Asia did not band together seeking strength
through unity. On the contrary, like the Euro-
pean nations, they continued their rivalries
through debilitating wars between Burmese
and Thai, between Thai and Cambodians, and
between Cambodians and Vietnamese. During
the course of these wars, extending over many
centuries, the various countries developed in-
tense local patriotisms which stay with them to-
day, providing the basis for both internal
iPEIL 29, 1963
635
strength and regional weakness. We also
might note that the colonial period served even
to accentuate tliese divisions, with the trans-
portation, conununications, education, and
economy of eacli colony oriented toward its
colonial master rather than toward its neigh-
bors.
Tlie third, or sea frontier, runs from the In-
dian Ocean, bending through the islands of
Indonesia and the Philippines to the China
Sea. Over the centuries the sea has been
dominated by a succession of powers, each of
which has made an important impression and
has added to the already complex pattern of
the region. The Arabs came by sea in the 10th
century, carrying Islam to the Malayan Penin-
sula and the Indonesian islands, penetrating
north to Mindanao, the large southern island
of the Philippines. They superimposed the
Moslem religion upon these areas, thereby add-
ing a new factor of difference between them
and the Buddhist countries of continental
Southeast Asia. Magellan came to Luzon,
thereby paving the way for Spanish coloniza-
tion of the Pliilippine Islands. The Portuguese
star rose and fell rapidly, to be followed by the
Dutch, who came into Indonesia some 300 years
ago to build one of the largest empires in the
East. Meanwhile the British expanded from
India into Burma and, through the East India
Company, moved inland and northward from
Burma and Malaya toward Tliailand. The
French arrived late on the scene but rapidly
moved inland and northward from Cochin
China, eventually reachmg the Chinese border.
Throughout the past four centuries the power
exerted from the sea has been predominant,
pushing inland and northward toward the
moim tains.
This latter maritime period imposed upon
the already existing political and cultural pat-
tern a new set of differences. The Spanish,
English, Dutch, and French languages, each
bringing with it its own different literature
and world outlook, were introduced into the
different countries. Each power followed a
distinctive policy. In the Philippines the
United States emphasized education and inde-
pendence. In Burma and Malaya the British
concentrated on the development of local ad-
ministrative structures which would serve a
policy of decentralization and develop local
autonomy. In Indochina much attention was
given to culture and language under French
guidance. In Indonesia the emphasis was on
agriculture and the development of the coun-
try's raw material resources.
Special note must be taken of the role played
by Tliailand, since Thailand alone of all the
countries in the region has successfully main-
tained its independence throughout its history
Thailand was not immime to external forces,, ,
and it lias indeed absorbed many influencesi
from India, China, and the West. It has ar
indelible memory of historic Chinese pressure
which forced the Thai people to the south. It
has also coped, in recent centuries, with pres
sure from the maritime frontier. Nevertheless
situated as it is in the very heart of Southeast
Asia, it has maintained a continuity and ai
independent Asian identity which are a sourci
of pride to its people today and a source o:
strength in the face of the pressures which agaii
are beginning to come from the north.
Resurgence of Pressure From the North
Wliat is the attraction that Southeast Asit
has exerted for centuries on the great power
flanking it on all sides? lYliy is it desirable
and why is it important? First, it provide
a lush climate, fertile soil, rich natural ret
sources, a relatively sparse population in mosi
areas, and room to expand. The countries o
Southeast Asia produce rich exportable sur
pluses such as rice, rubber, teak, corn, tin, spices
oil, and many others. It is especially attractiv
to Communist China, with its burgeoning popu)
lation and its food shortages.
Militarily and sti-ategically. Southeast Asii
has great assets. It stands astride of east-wesi
trade routes. It stands in a critical, strategic
relationship not only to China and India bu
to Australia, the western Pacific, and Japan
Bearing in mind the implications of the recen
Chinese attack on India, Southeast Asia take
on an additional significance, since its domina
tion by the Commimist powers would outflani
the Asian subcontinent.
Although still thinly populated for the mos
part, the human resources of this area are con
siderable and growing. Taken together, thi
636
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETI>
joples of Southeast Asia reprasent an im-
>rtant segiiient of tlie free world and a target
prime importance to Communist imperialism.
There is a rhytlim to the tides of history,
ist as the pressures on Southeast Asia have
the past come alternately from China in
e north, India in the west, and the maritime
>wers along the sea, so Southeast Asia is again
reatened by a resurgence of pressure from
le north. But today the danger from this
larter is multiplied a hmidredfold by the viru-
nce of the political doctrine which now rides
I the backs of the Chinese people.
As my colleague Under Secretary Averell
larriman said recently, "I don't know how you
in distinguish between Chinese communism
id Chinese imperialism. Chinese communism
id all commimism is imperialist."
lEven before World "War II, Conmiunist
urties of varying strengths existed in all
outheast Asian countries, from Burma to the
nilippines. After the war the signal was
«ven for armed Commimist-led uprisings, and
•ese occurred in Burma, Indonesia, Malaya,
dochina, and the Philippines. Even Thai-
md, the one country in Southeast Asia that
ftd not known colonial rule, was threatened.
fy 1952 the revolts were crushed in all but
ialaya and Indocliina. It took the British
«id the new Malay Federation until 1958 to
«ell Commimist guerrilla forces there. This
ruggle, incidentally, provided valuable les-
ns which are now being applied in Viet-Nam.
'e also might note that, except for Japan,
alaya is now the most prosperous country
Asia.
The efforts of some powers following World
■"ar II to restore colonial r^ile along the pre-
ar pattern permitted the Communists more
fectively to wave the banner of anticolonial-
m and, for example, through Ho Chi Minh,
; that time largely to capture the nationalist
ovement in Viet-Nam.
After the Geneva Agreements of 1954 on
idochina ^ we took the lead in the establish-
ent of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-
on, an alliance of the Philippines, Thailand,
Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, France,
Great Britain, and ourselves, with the objec-
tive of providing security to Southeast Asia
through collective military action if the Com-
munists embarked on outright military aggres-
sion. The opening of the eighth meeting of
mmisters of this organization was attended by
Secretary Rusk this morning in Paris.^.
Wliatever may be the criticisms of SEATO,
the fact remains that, since its inception, the
Communists have not attempted open military
action in the area. Instead they have turned
to the more subtle tactics of subversion and in-
surgency, the prime example being the guer-
rilla warfare in Viet-Nam carried on m the
method made classic in China by Mao Tse-tmig.
Wliex'eas the method employed by the Com-
mimists has changed, the objective remains the
same — destruction of the independence of the
Southeast Asian countries one by one and re-
turn to the days when they bore their tribute
to Peiping. ^Vliile the armed struggle is mani-
fest now only in Viet-Nam, it ceased in Laos
through the settlement reached just last year
at Geneva,^ after 14 months of negotiation.
Implications of Struggle in Viet-Nam
I have pointed out that Southeast Asia is
not a homogeneous region biit rather a geo-
graphic expression. By this same token of
geographic interrelation, the security of the
area is not stronger than that of its component
countries. All of us who were at Geneva in
1954 recognized that Commvmist domination
of the Eed River Delta of North Viet-Nam
would make it much more difficult to defend the
remaining areas. This has been true. How-
ever, for the Communists to advance any fur-
ther in the area would render the defense prob-
lem very much more difficult, if not well-nigh
impossible. This is why the valiant struggle
now being waged in South Viet-Nam has im-
plications far beyond the borders of that trou-
bled country.
Our massive assistance to free Viet-Nam is
designed to avoid just such a catastrophe. Our
''For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955:
asic Documents, vol. I, Department of State publica-
on 6446, p. 750.
PRIL 29, 1963
" See p. 641.
' For texts of a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos
and an accompanying protocol, see Bulletin of Aug.
13, 1062, p. 259.
637
objectives in Viet-Nam are to assist that country
to regain its full freedom and independence and
ability to achieve for its vigorous people that
well-being and economic progress of which it is
capable. Our principal objective is the same
everywhere in Southeast Asia. We seek not to
dictate the form of government nor to bind the
countries of Southeast Asia into an alliance
with us. This is a matter of their own choosing.
Our sole concern is that they have the freedom
to make their own choice. This objective is en-
tirely consistent with the purposes of the free
countries of the area. Thus we have a soimd
basis for cooperation with them.
This cooperation takes a number of forms.
First is our military cooperation under SE ATO,
which places on us certain obligations to assist
the countries embraced by the treaty in defend-
ing themselves against open attack. We take
these obligations seriously and have made it
clear that we will meet them whether or not
other members do so. Also, importantly, we
have the ability to back up our commitments.
Wlien the Korean war broke out our forces
were not battle-ready and we had to think in
terms of months for the deployment of combat-
ready forces from the United States.
Today the picture has sharply changed, and
in Southeast Asia, as well as in other areas, our
forces are fully combat-ready and prepared for
prompt deployment by air and sea. This
greatly increases our ability to use our military
forces to prevent war rather than dribble in
forces after fighting has started.
This was well demonstrated in Southeast
Asia last May, when the Viet Minh and Pathet
Lao suddenly resumed their attacks in Laos.
Nam Tha fell on May 6, and subsequently it
appeared they were continuing their advance
to the Thai border. On May 13 we consulted
with the Thai Government, and on May 15 our
first units landed at Udorn, across the river
from Laos.' The Communist advance stopped,
and in July the Communists agreed to the for-
mation of a Government of National Union in
Laos. We have recently concluded an agj-ee-
ment with Thailand for establishing logistic
facilities and prepositioning equipment that
would, in case of future necessity, permit even
' For background, see iMd., June 4, 1962, p. 904.
more rapid and effective deployment of Ameri
can and other SEATO forces to that countrj
This will still further increase the military ad
vantage we enjoy throughout much of the are
of secui'e and controlled access by sea in addi
tion to our access by air. An essential ingredi
ent of any successful defense will, of course, al
ways be the willingness and desire of th
people attacked vigorously to do all they ca
in their own defense.
With overt aggression successfully deterre(
the threat to the area lies not so much in a
invasion from without as in subversion and ii
surrection from within. This was defeated i
Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines, containe
in Laos, but now faces South Viet-Nam in
very acute form. Attempts to penetrate Tha
land, particularly its northeast area borderir
Laos, are increasing.
This leads us to this whole question of oi
general approach to cooperation with countrie
not only in Southeast Asia but also elsewhei
who are facing these problems. Each of the
countries must have the ability to maintain i
temal order. This means efficient police fore
trained in the tradition of public service ai
military forces able to supplement and suppc
the police forces in case of necessity. Tl
means less emphasis on exotic armament ai
massive divisions and more emphasis on th
equipment, training, and organization that w
enable the military force to fulfill an interr
security mission within the coimtry. It al
means what is now called civic action, that
the military force doing those things for t
local population which it can do without sac:
ficing its primary mission, and establishing
sympathetic relationship with the local popul
tion. Time does not permit me to go into t >
details, but I can tell you that there has be
a great change in emphasis in Washington
these mattei-s, to the degree that I feel that o ■
economic and military assistance programs n i
better directed to this real and immedi;'
threat.
However, all of tlus is of little use if the pel •
ical, social, and economic structure of a count'
does not have in a minimum degree what o'
ancestors so aptly called "the consent of tJ
governed." This, of course, must come frd
within, although we can encourage and prl
638
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLET f
rom without. This we are seeking to do, and
: is one of the great challenges faced by our
iplomacy. We in the Department of State
re not unmindful of the responsibility and are
5eking to train our personnel and so organize
urselves as better to carry it out.
oreign Aid, an Investment in the Future
Our annual "great debate" is now opening
n what has come to be known as "foreign
id," " and Southeast Asia is already receiving
:s share of attention. Fii-st let me say that
have always had a personal aversion to the
?rm "foreign aid," which inevitably carries
•ith it the erroneous implications, first, of
harity on our part and, second, of superiority
nd inferiority as between ourselves and the
eceiving coimtry. I feel it more accurate to
peak in terms of investment — investment in
lie future not only for the countries with which
76 are cooperating but for our future as well.
I believe that there are few who would deny
hat our investment in the Marshall Plan for
Europe and our postwar assistance to Japan
ave already paid off as handsomely as any
avestment in our history, not only in political
nd military terms, important though they be
ti themselves, but also in direct economic terms.
Our investments in the underdeveloped areas,
ncluding Southeast Asia, coming later and
tarting from a less well developed base have
inderstandably not uniformly shown as quick
tr yet as spectacular returns as those in Europe
nd Japan. But that does not mean that they
,re bad or foolish investments.
Admittedly some investments may, with the
visdom of hindsight, appear more prudent than
)thers, and it is important that we learn from
)ur mistakes. This we are attempting to do,
IS are the countries with which we are cooperat-
ng. However, no more than in the case of
m industrial firm which seeks for itself sus-
:ained vigor does this mean that we cease invest-
ing in the future. Nor does it mean that we
must invest without return indefinitely into the
future. Just as industrial enterprises and proj-
3cts seek for themselves self-sustaining growth,
30 are the coimtries of this area seeking self-
sustaining growth and looking forward to the
' For a statement by Secretary Rusk, see p. 664.
time they no longer need to rely on outside re-
sources. In this, also, our objectives and theirs
are consistent. There can, and inevitably will,
be differences between honest men on when this
point can be reached. While among those who
have recently examined the problem there are
those who think it can be reached sooner than
others, they all agi-ee that that time is not yet.
Also there are cases in which, given an ideal
world, we might not choose to make an invest-
ment. But we are not living in an ideal world,
and we often have to weigh how much more it
would cost us tomorrow if we did not make a
more modest investment today.
U.S. Investment in Viet-Nam
As Viet-Nam is the major recipient of our
assistance in the area — not only financial and
material but also our men — it is fitting that we
shovild particularly examine our investment in
that country.
First let me say that I do not regard myself
entirely as a theoretician or abstract observer
of that situation. I was a participant in the
1954 negotiations which led to the partition
and French withdrawal from that unfortimate
country. Subsequently, during my service in
the area and on the SEATO Council for a num-
ber of years, I became directly familiar with
some of its problems and have visited it
on a nimiber of occasions, most recently last
December.
In order to put its problems in perspective
I think it important to look back on its recent
past. When Viet-Nam was divided in 1954,
after being wracked by 8 years of vicious civil
war, there were few who would have given the
Republic of Viet-Nam much chance of survival.
In addition to all of its other problems, it was
immediately inundated by about 800,000 desti-
tute refugees from the north — about 7 percent
of its population. But survive it did, as in
many ways magnificently so, as pointed out in
detail by Mr. Ball [Under Secretary George W.
Ball] before this same audience just a year ago.
As Mr. Ball pointed out, Viet-Nam effectively
integrated this vast flood of refugees into its
society; a major agrarian reform plan was car-
ried out; in the 4 years from 1956 to 1960 the
elementary school population was almost quad-
4PRrL 2 9, 1963
639
rupled; food production per capita was in-
creased by 20 percent while it was falling in the
north by 10 percent; and in general the south
was forging aliead at a rate that would have
been impressive even for a peaceful land. It
was apparently this very progress, which was
so conspicuous as to be intolerable to Hanoi, that
brought on a major intensification of infiltra-
tion from the north and around 1959 a stepping
up of a carefully planned and moimted cam-
paign directed from Hanoi. This campaign was
openly announced from Hanoi in 1960. As i\Ir.
Ball also stated, the response to this threat
could not be limited to military measures, no
matter how well conceived and conducted;
social and economic measures were of equal im-
portance. He also pointed out that a quick and
spectacular victory could not be expected but
that it would take patient application of effort
by the Vietnamese and ourselves over a long
period of time — in fact, over many years.
After the passage of a year it is entirely fitting
to ask the question "How are tilings going?"
This question is increasingly being asked, and
it deserves an honest and objective answer.
However, the answer cannot be simple. I sup-
pose people were asking the same thing in 1863
and in 1943, too, and perhaps not getting very
satisfying answers. But the question is even
more difficult in a guerrilla war. There are no
frontlines moving forward or backward that
can be drawn on a map ; there is no clearly de-
fined enemy territory to invade and hold ; there
are rarely any major engagements which can
be totted up as victories or defeats. But there
is no doubt that we and the Vietnamese working
together have made important progi'ess since
the end of 1961, when we began to step up our
assistance.
To be frank, the war was being lost fast in
the fall of 1961, when General [Maxwell D.]
Taylor first led a mission there. Viet Cong at-
tacks were accelerating both in numbers and
size. In September they overran a provincial
capital and held it overnight, long enough to be-
head publicly the Chief of Provmce. There was
a real threat that they might be able to "liber-
ate" some remote area and hold it, possibly as
the seat of a "government" which the bloc could
recognize and aid. Transportation was so dis-
rupted that Saigon, nomially a big rice-
640
exporting port, was forced to import rice from
the United States.
The situation has substantially changed since
then. Viet Cong attacks declined steadily in
1962. They are now running at a rate consider-
ably less than half the January 1962 average.
No more provincial capitals have been attacked.
Rice exports have resumed and are expected to
be near normal this year. There are no Viet
Cong areas immune to Government penetration.
Perhaps even more significant is the fact that
the Viet Cong have not escalated to larger units
or to more conventional warfare.
The Strategic Hamlet Program
There are other indicators of progress — in-
creased voluntary intelligence from the people,
increased Viet Cong weapons losses, the fact
that Viet Cong strongholds are being systemati-
cally penetrated, their supplies and installations
destroyed. But I think the most important
reason for guarded optimism is the adoption
by the Government of Viet-Nam of the "stra-
tegic hamlet" program.
The first step in setting up a strategic hamlet
is largely militaiy. A hamlet militia is trained
and armed and a defensive perimeter con-t
stiiicted. The second step, however, is pure!
political. It is the election by a secret ballot oJ'
a hamlet council and the framing of a hamle1*|
charter by the people's elected representatives,
The third step is more conventional bul
exiually nonmilitary. This is the provision oi
Government services such as agricultural ex
tension and low-interest agricultural loan?
cheap fertilizer from Government-supportec
cooperatives, new schools, and hamlet-levei
medical aid. The aim is to give the fanner an
economic stake which he will want to defend.
Communist guerrilla strategy is to erode
Govermnent support and isolate the Govern
ment from the people by attacks, assassinations
and threats. The guerrillas themselves are U
live among the people like the fish in the sea.
according to Mao Tse-tung's much-quoted
statement. The strategic hamlet strategy is the
opposite of this. It calls for tying the people
to their Government by hamlet councils anel
Government sei-vices at the hamlet level, while
at the same time isolating the Viet Cong from
id
I
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLE'
;tii«
heir sources of supplies and recruits among tlie
eople. The aim, in short, is to get the guerrilla
sh out of the water.
To date about half the population — nearly 7
lillion people — live in about 5,000 strategic
amlets. Another 5,000 strategic hamlets must
e organized before the program is complete
\-en in the first, essentially military phase.
But already the program is beginning to pay
tf . One result is that an estimated half million
leople previously under Viet Cong control are
low under Government control and jirotection.
ilorale in the coimtryside is up, and this is re-
lected by increased voluntaiy intelligence from
)easants to the armed forces, a sign the people
lot only think the Government is winning but
ire willing to take risks to help it win. Perhaps
he most important result is the intangible knit-
ing together of Government and people.
Without in any way detracting from the vital
aid heroic contribution of our advisers and lo-
iistic support personnel, of whom 20 were killed
3\ Viet Cong action last year, we should in all
)f tlxis be clear about one thing. The Viet-
namese are fighting this war — and fighting it
valiantly. About 5,000 of them were killed last
year. "VVliile most of these were in the armed
forces, this total also includes village officials
and militia, schoolteachers and malaria work-
ers. During the same period about 30,000 cas-
ualties of all kinds were inflicted on the Viet
Cong.
I would thus say there is reason for some op-
timism. However, this is going to be a long,
hard struggle. The Viet Cong remain very
strong and very determined. There is no sign
that the bloc is faltering in its support for the
attack on South Viet-Nam. We are dealing
with an enemy who is patient and comits on our
impatience, who is willing to accept adversity
and hopes we are not.
But we are satisfied that we have a sound
strategy ; progress is being made, and the Viet-
namese have certainly demonstrated their ca-
pacity for sacrifice and their determination to
survive as a free people. As President Ken-
nedy said in his state of the Union message,"
"The spearpoint of aggression has been blunted
in South Viet-Nam."
The President's statement justifiably has an
optimistic ring, and I think it well for me to
close on that note.
I close on that note not only for South Viet-
Nam but for Southeast Asia as a whole. How-
ever, I would not want this to be interpreted as
any cheap or careless optimism, for tliis would
not be justified. Rather my optimism is based
on the conviction that, working in free associa-
tion with free peoples, we enjoy an advantage
which the Communists can never hope to emu-
late. This we are doing in Southeast Asia. I
have no doubt that our investment is a wise one
and that to it the American people will continue
to give that persevering support which free-
dom always demands of any people.
Eighth Meeting of SEATO
Council of Ministers
The eighth meeting of the Council of Minis-
ters of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
was held at Parls^ April 8-10. Following are
texts of a statement made hy Secretary Eiisk at
the opening session on April 8 and a communi-
que issued at the close of the meeting on
April 10.
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK
It is deeply significant that we meet in Paris
today for deliberations concerned with the de-
fense of freedom halfway round the globe.
Our meeting here underscores our consciousness
that the security and freedom of the West and
security and freedom in the East are intimately
interrelated. We know that the safety of us
all requires resistance to Communist aggressive
threats wherever they arise, whether in Asia,
in Em-ope, or in the Western Hemisphere.
SEATO, in drawing together nations from all
these areas for the common defense, uniquely
expresses our comprehension of this truth.
The necessity for collective security is well
established. Some of us here today have
learned this together in the fire of two world
wars. The Manila Pact ^ is collective security
' Bulletin of Feb. 4, 1963, p. 159.
^ For text of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty signed at Manila on Sept. 8, 1954, see Bulletin
of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.
APRIL 29, 1063
641
applied to the worldwide scope of the Commu-
nist menace. Communist aggressors would be
comforted by the prospect of attacking or seek-
ing to subvert each country and each area in-
dividually. SEATO denies them this satis-
faction in South and Southeast Asia. The
rapid deployment of forces by SEATO nations
to Thailand last year underscores our readiness
and our capability to act in the common defense.
Major events affecting the treaty area have
occurred since we last met. We shall be con-
cerned with the significance of these in our dis-
cussions here.
In Laos the signing of the Geneva Agree-
ments ^ has created the basis for stability, and
a coalition government under Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma has been established. The
United States fully supports the objectives of
these agreements and has strictly complied with
their terms. We are not satisfied, however, that
the other side has done so, particularly the re-
quirement that all foreign military forces be
withdrawn. This emphasizes the importance
of freedom for the International Control Com-
mission to conduct effective, unhindered investi-
gations throughout the entire Kingdom, partic-
ularly in those parts controlled by the Pathet
Lao, wliich are now closed to the Commission.
Until there is cooperation in this respect and
until the Communist-supported Pathet Lao sup-
port the coalition government, the objectives of
the Geneva Agreements simply cannot be fully
realized. A tragic and deplorable series of de-
velopments has increased tensions in the Plaine
des Jarres. Each signatory of those agree-
ments must, we believe, use its influence urgently
to prevent further aggravation of the situation,
to ease tensions, and to promote the develop-
ment of an atmosphere of harmony in support
of the Government of National Union. We
must, therefore, continue to watch developments
in Laos with the closest possible attention.
In Viet-Nam, although the struggle has in-
tensified since our 1961 meeting,' the Viet Cong
drive has been blunted, and there are some
grounds for further encouragement. We be-
lieve that Viet-Nam has now foimd the right
strategy for meeting the Viet Cong terrorism
' For text, see md., Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.
' For background, see ibid., Apr. 17, 1961, p. 547.
and is applying it with increasing vigor and
success. The struggle may be protracted and
bitter, but we have no doubt of ultimate victory.
The protocol * to the Manila Pact is an expres-
sion of the vital interest of the United States
and other SEATO nations in the preservation
of the integrity and independence of Viet-Nam. '
The readiness of my country and others to help
countries to meet indirect, as well as direct. Com-
munist aggression is illustrated by the nature
and magnitude of our assistance to Viet-Nam.
Since we last met, Communist subversion in
northeast Thailand has become a real and pres-
ent danger. The Government of Thailand has
moved with vigor and imagination to deal with
it. We fully realize that the sacrifices of the
people of Thailand in this effort — and in other
of our joint endeavors — are all a valuable part
of worldwide resistance to communism and con-
tribute to our safety as well as theirs. We are
glad, therefore, to lend our support to Thai-
land's countersubversion program, together
with other members of this alliance, in keeping
with our commitments under the Manila Pact.
Thailand, a full member of SEATO, can be
assured of our fullest determination.
The blatant aggression of Communist China
on the Indian border has vast and historic sig- I
nificance. Suffice it at the moment to say that
it revealed for the whole world Conununist
China's readiness to turn even on those who
have tried to be a friend and to resort to overt
aggression whenever its expansionist aims are ^
thereby served. I
Communist propaganda continues persistent-
ly to hurl mvective and derision at our treaty
organization. This criticism of SEATO is, in
fact, a recognition of its success in obstructing
Communist aggressive aims. But SEATO's
role is broader than its military power.
SEATO is also an expression of the determina-
tion of Asian nations to maintain their inde-
pendence and to increase the economic well-
being of their people. Ultimately, these are as
important as military defense in assuring that
independence will be preserved.
We value the Manila Pact, and we shall con-
tinue to support it as the essential instrument
through which we can participate in the coUec-
* IMd., Sept. 20, 1954, p. 395.
642
DEPARTKENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ve defense of Southeast Asia for the mutual
enefit of the respective peoples. It is in this
pirit that my delegation enters upon these im-
ortant discussions in the next few days.
lEXT OF COMMUNIQUE
ress release 1S7 dated April 11
The SEATO Council held its eighth meeting in Paris
rom April 8 to 10, 1963, under the chairmanship of
(is Excellency Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, Min-
5ter of Foreign Affairs of France. The inaugural ad-
ress was delivered by the Prime Minister of France,
lis Excellency Mr. Georges Pompidou.
ijeneral Observations
The Council held an exchange of views on the inter-
national situation with special reference to develop-
aents in the treaty area. It reaffirmed that the main
im of the Manila Pact is to ensure the peaceful de-
elopment, economic stability and national independ-
nce of the countries within the area. The Council
xpressed concern over the continuing and widening
hreats to the security of such countries while reaffirm-
ng their determination to maintain vigilance.
The subversive campaign against Viet-Nam has been
onsidered. The Council took note of information
rfven by some delegations indicating that consider-
ible progress has been achieved in the fight against
;his subversion and that one may expect a new im-
jrovement in the situation thanks to the efforts made
3y the Government of Vieb-Nam who were able to stem
rebellion. The Council hopes that Viet-Nam, with the
support given to it, would be in a position to maintain
its advance towards internal stability and international
security.
The Council reiterated its support for the cause of
a neutral and independent Laos under a Government
of National Union. It expressed the hope that those
who have the responsibility in Laos and al.so the signa-
tories of the Geneva Accords will succeed in ensuring
the maintenance of peace, neutrality and national tmity
which the people of Laos so earnestly desire.
The members of the Council took note of their agree-
ment on a revised procedure for taking decisions with-
in the organization which wiU improve its work and
increase its efficiency.
They also took note of some decisions taken since
their last meeting by members of the organization, in
particular the joint Thailand-United States statement
of March 6, 1962,° and the deployment in Thailand in
May 1962 of troops from some member countries.'
They deemed that these facts could increase the ca-
pability of such countries to comply with their obliga-
tions.
' For text, see ibid., Mar. 26, 1962, p. 498.
' For background, see ibid., June 4, 1962, p. 904.
Counter-subversion
The Council emphasized that the development of ef-
fective measures to prevent and counter subversion
continues to be a major task facing the member coun-
tries. It noted the steps taken during the past year to
deal with this problem.
Military Defence
The Council affirmed its continued support for the
principle of collective security.
The Council noted with satisfaction that the military
advisers and the military planning office have revised
and refined the plans for defensive action, in the light
of changing conditions and anticipated situations.
The Council examined the operation of the continu-
ing series of military exercises, and agreed that the
body of experience gained in working together was a
valuable asset to the alliance for any possible defensive
action the member nations might be called upon to
undertake in combination.
The Council welcomed an announcement by the
Council member for Australia of arrangements made
by his Government with the Royal Thai Government
for the establishment of a military rebuild work.shop
for the major repair and maintenance in Thailand of
Thai military and Government vehicles.
Economic Co-operation
The Council expressed satisfaction at the progress
achieved by member countries in the sphere of eco-
nomic development, and agreed that continuing adr
vance in this field is essential to the security of the
treaty area.
The Council expressed approval of the various civil
projects undertaken by the organization :
(1) The Community Development Project, inaugu-
rated in November of last year, in conjunction with the
nation-wide plan of the Thai Government. This proj-
ect is designed to decentralize the problem by setting
up regional centres which analyze the actual conditions
and train experts to meet the needs of the people of
specific areas. Aid from the government and from
other member nations can thus reach the people
directly.
(2) Skilled labour projects in Pakistan, Thailand
and the Philippines which are designed to provide
training for the workers in developing societies. Two
new schools are being opened in Pakistan early this
year. In Thailand, 19 schools are now training some
5,500 students in technical, electrical, electronic and
other skills. An apprenticeship program in the Phil-
ippines has proved successful in fitting workers for
industrial jobs.
(3) The Graduate School of Engineering in Bangkok.
This advanced engineering school fills a regional need
which has not been met by other means. Enrolment is
open to students of various countries from the region,
whether members of SEATO or not.
APRIL 29, 1963
643
(4) The SEATO Meteorological Telecommunications
Project, linking Bangkok and Manila, which is sched-
uled for completion within two years.
Medical Research
The Couucil noted with satisfaction the work of
the SEATO cholera research laboratory in East Paki-
stan, and the SEATO general medical laboratory in
Thailand. These scientific investigatory institutions
have been given the task of discovering means to com-
bat disease in the treaty area, and thus to improve the
well-lieing of the people.
The Council welcomed the proposed establishment of
a SEATO clinical reseai-ch centre at the school of
graduate studies of the University of Medical Sciences
at Bangkok. The main objective of the proposed new
centre is to gain further knowledge concerning the
effects of diseases ; its functions are to include pro-
fessional training, education and research.
Cultural Co-operation
The Council noted the continuing cultural inter-
change among member nations, and agreed that
SEATO's role in this activity should be continued.
The organization provides undergraduate scholarships,
graduate scholarships, fellowships and professorships,
and sponsors educational conferences.
The Council noted with approval the recent con-
ference which studied the equivalence of university
credits, so that scholars may more easily transfer from
one country to another in furtherance of their studies.
Appointment of Secretary-General
The Council appointed His Excellency Mr. Pote
Sarasin for a further period of two years to terminate
at a suitable date after the conclusion of the Council
meeting of 1965.
Secretariat-General
The Council expressed appreciation to the Secretary-
General His Excellency Mr. Pote Sarasin and his
staff for their outstanding services to the organization.
Expression of Gratitude
The Council expressed its gratitude to the Govern-
ment of France for its hospitality and the excellent
arrangements made for the conference. The meeting
voted warm thanks to the Chairman, His Excellency
Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville.
Next Meeting
The Council accepted with pleasure the invitation of
the Government of the Philippines to hold its next
meeting in Manila In view of the tenth anniversary in
1964 of the signing in Manila in 1954 of the Southeast
Asia Collective Defence Treaty.
The Divided World of Communism
Following is the text of an intervieio of Sec-
retary Rusk hy NBC correspondent Elie Ahel,
filmed for iise as part of the National Broad-
casting Company^s special program '■'■An En-
cyclopedia of the Divided World of Comirm-
nism" televised on April 10.
Press release 18S dated April 10
Mr. Ahel: Mr. Secretary, how tmtch comfort
can toe in tlie West take from this crack in what
used to he called the Oomm/uni-'it monolith?
Secretary Rusk: AVell, Mr. Abel, I tliink that
it is important at the very beginning to realize
that we can't be sure about what this split
means, and for a very simple reason. I'm con-
vinced that neither Moscow nor Peiping fully
imderstands the full relationship between the
two at the present time.
We do know that there are some veiy impor-
tant elements in the differences that are being
exhibited now between Moscow and Peiping.
There is an ideological conflict : how best to get
on with the world revolution. There surely
must be some historical differences between the
Russians and Chinese that are involved. There
is a contest for the leadership of the world
revolution.
I don't believe that we can afford to take com-
fort yet. Ob^aously to the extent that the Com-
munist movement is divided, that there is con-
fusion among Communist parties in many
countries, or that there are differences of tech-
niques between these two, that is all to the good.
But, on the other hand, both of them are com-
mitted to the world revolution. Lord Home
[British Foreign Secretary] pointed out that
both of them want to overcome capitalism and
free institutions. This is a source of danger
because, if these two elements in the Communist
camp enter into a rivalry as to which one of
them can get on most rapidly with their world
revolution, this could result in an increase of
danger to the free world.
So I would think that we have to be in aj
position of watchful waiting — observe it closely,
respond to any situation which threatens us,
and be a little careful about taking premature
comfort from arguments within the Communist
world as to how best to bury us. i
644
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
/ take it it's your feeling then, Mr. Secretary,
luit tlw West should at tlm inoment do noth-
iKj to try to capitalize on this quarrel?
"Well, I think th;it it would be, difficult to find
uajor moves that the free world could make
vhich would advance the interests of the free
vorld in tryino; to insert ourselves in between
Moscow and Peiping. Because if we ourselves
.vere to, say, increase pressures on one or the
ither, I think that we could very likely drive
hese two closer together again.
You see, neither Moscow nor Peiping can
ifford to be without the other in a direct con-
frontation between either one of them and the
free world. They are important to each other,
ind that importance has not been, I think, elim-
inated by the rivalries that are now apparent
within the Communist world. So we have to
be a little cautious about tliis.
/ notice, Mr. Secretary., that the Chinese in
fjir pmt feir days have sent trade missions hoth
to ^Ye8t Germany and to Britain, apparently in
itn effort to huild up their trade with those
Western countries and in this way m-ake up
some of the deficit thut the Russians have ini-
pdsed on. them. Hoio would this Government
look upon increased trade with China hy either
of these allies?
"Well, we have not been ourselves in favor of
increasing trade with Connnunist China. We
ourselves don't trade with mainland China. I
think it is true that the drop in trade between
mainland China and the Soviet Union and
mainland Cliina's own requirements now stimu-
late them to get out and see if they can't achieve
markets and sources of supply elsewhere.
As you know, they bought large quantities
of grain, for example, from Canada and Aiis-
tralia. They, I think, having less Soviet trade,
are trying to stimulate their own trade i-ela-
tions. I suspect they will try in Latin America
as well in an attempt to find markets through
which they can get the foreign exchange that
they need to buy in markets other than the
Communist bloc itself. I think that the free
world ought to be very cautious about the terms
of trade, about the types of trade in which it
enters in trade relations with Peiping.
You have mentioned, sir, ideology and na-
tional history. I loonder to what extent one
can look upon these differences as a difference
of outlook between a comparatively rich and a
comparatively poor Communist country, be-
tween a country whose territorial ambitions are
more or less satisfied and one with dissatisfied
ainbitions.
I think Mr. Couve de Murville [French For-
eign Minister] pointed out there is a difference
in the level of development of Communist
China and the Soviet Union. This may, in-
deed, make some difference in power and atti-
tude. The Soviet Union lias a considerable
stake in what it has been able to accomplish
in the last 30 or 40 years. It has a rather
sophisticated industry. It has a highly soj)his-
ticated military establishment. It knows a
great deal more about the nature of modern war
than the Chinese Communists do. I think that
the level of mainland Chinese underdevelop-
ment causes the Chinese to expect vast amounts
of help from the Soviet I^nion which the Soviet
Union has not been able to provide to the extent
wanted by the Chinese.
On the other side, the Soviet Union still has
great unfinished business in its own country,
because it has h^d difficulty in finding the re-
sources to do everything that it wants to do at
the same time; for example, as between a mili-
tary establishment and consumer needs. So
I think that there are, quite apart from ideol-
ogy, there are some conflicts of interest between
Communist China and the Soviet Union which
are a part of this present disagreement between
them.
/ loonder if ifs collect, as so many people
seem to assume, that the Chinese are necessarily
the more aggressive partner liere? Pm think-
ing of the fact that it was the Rtissians loho
planted some missiles about 90 miles off our
shore.
"Well, I think it's a matter of doctrme. The
Chinese are supporting a more primitive type
of Communist revolution. I think their influ-
ence in the bloc is in the direction of a more
aggi-essive policy than that of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union, since the death of Stalin, has
attempted to develop the idea of peaceful co-
existence somewhat further than the Chinese,
for example.
APRIL 2 9, 190 3
645
But, nevertheless, I think we ought not to
underestimate the seriousness of purpose of the
Soviet Union in gettuig on with the world revo-
lution. And the most dramatic and one of the
most dangerous moves taken since the end of
World War II has been the secret introduc-
tion of offensive weapons into Cuba and the
deception that was practiced in that process.
Perhaps that is one of the reasons why we can't
take too much comfort out of the mere differ-
ence of doctrine between those two capitals.
Mr. Secretary, we've had some trouble in our
own alliance recently. How do you explain the
fact that Mr. Khrushchev has made no apparent
effort to capitalize on it?
Oh, I think Moscow understands what is, I
think, imderstood in the West: that is, with
respect to the central commitment of NATO —
the great security commitment to protect
NATO against external aggression — there are
no differences in the alliance.
In other words, what we have been talking
about in NATO in the last several months, and
in the West, has been how we move on from
where we are to write new chapters, to add
something to what we have. We are not talking
about the dissolution of the basic commitments
of the alliance. Those are strong and firm, as
was illusti-ated in, say, October. And I think
France, for example, is as finnly committed to
an alliance as any other member of NATO.
And I think Moscow understands that these are
differences which do not affect the basic ques-
tions involving relations between, say, NATO
and the Warsaw Pact.
Perhaps they understand, as you indicated in
the case of their own alliance, that if they tried
to fish in these waters we would pull together
like that.
Yes, I think that it would certainly be true
that an increase of pressure by the Soviet Union
would demonstrate promptly the unity of
NATO in the face of such a threat, and I think
they must understand that in Moscow.
Are we in accord with our allies on this basic
estimate of the Sino-Soviet disagreement?
I think so, m terms of caution. I think that
none of us feel that we understand all of the
646
elements that are involved in this fully. And I
think none of us would be willing to predict
with any certainty how this discussion between
Moscow and Peiping will come out.
I think there is one important point of differ-
ence between ourselves and some of our allies
about how to deal with these people in the Com-
munist bloc, and that is on the trade field.
There are some who feel that a fat Communist
is a peaceful Commimist. We ourselves believe
that we ought to be careful about building up —
particularly in strategic supplies — building up
the strength of the Communist world until we
can see in practice that the notion of peaceful
coexistence means something other than getting
on with a world revolution.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Abel.
U.S. Calls for Action To Insure
Restoration of Cease-Fire in Laos
Department Statemenf^
Our information is that the Kong Le neutral-
ist forces have been attacked by the pro-
Communist Pathet Lao; and there are indica-
tions that they (that is, the Pathet Lao) are
supported by some Viet Minh military pei-son-
nel. We have no detailed or late information
on how serious the fighting is in the Plaines des
Jarres. However, the fighting now going on
not only appears to be a serious violation of the
cease-fire but, if it continues, will endanger the
implementation of the Geneva Accords^ with
all the dire consequences that such a breakdown
will mean for Laos.
In these circumstances, we consider it incimi-
bent on the cochairmen of the Geneva Accords
and the International Control Commission to
take prompt and effective action to stop the
fighting which has been instigated by tlie pro-
Communist Pathet Lao and to insure that the
cease-fire is restored. Such action is essential
in order to preserve the independence and neu-
trality of Laos.
' Read to news correspondents on Apr. 8 by Lincoln ' '
White, Director of the Office of News.
° For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 13, 1962,
p. 2.09.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
'resident Kennedy Greets Reunion
»f Marshall Plan Employees
FoN owing is the text of a message fromPresi-
lent Kennedy to a 15th anniversary reunion
iinner of em-ployees of the Economic Coopera-
tion Admrnistration held at Washington on
April 6. The President's message was read iy
Paid G. Hoffman^ who was the first adminis-
trator of the Marshall Plan.
S'hlte House press release dated April 6
Please convey my personal greetings to all
ihose attending tonight's commemoration of the
I5th anniversary of the Marshall Plan.
The Marshall Plan succeeded because it was
;onceived and operated on a scale commensu-
mte with the task. It was an extraordinary
'eply to an extraordinary challenge. All those
iwho translated this imaginative concept into
concrete results can look with satisfaction to-
light on the feats they achieved and the honor
I which they have earned.
Now we face another extraordinary chal-
lenge — the task of helping the awakening na-
tions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America catch
up with the 20th century. Here, once again, a
halfhearted response will not do — and I take
heart in the knowledge that many of those who
helped to win the great victory over "hunger,
poverty, desperation, and chaos" in Western
Europe are still fighting a good fight for
freedom.
My very best wishes to all of you on tliis
memorable evening.
Bataan Day Commemorated
Department Announcement
Press release 184 dated April 8
On the occasion of the 21st anniversary of the
fall of Bataan, April 9, a joint United States-
Philippine commemorative ceremony will take
place at Arlington National Cemetery. At the
Tomb of the Unknowns, wreaths will be laid by
the Philippine Ambassador, Amelito K. Mutuc,
on behalf of the Philippine President, Diosdado
Macapagal, and by Capt. Tazewell T. Shepard,
Jr., USN, Naval Aide to the President, repre-
sentmg the President, in memory of the fallen
defenders of Bataan and Corregidor.
Following the ceremony at the Tomb of the
Unknowns, the Philippine Ambassador and
representatives of American and Philippine
veterans organizations will lay wreaths at the
grave of Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, com-
mander of all American and Filipino troops in
the Philippines at the time of Bataan's fall.
Message From President Kennedy'
White House press release dated April 8
Twenty-one years have passed since Filipinos
and Americans on Bataan struggled to the end
with magnificent valor against overwhelming
odds. For the courage of those brave men we
today express our gratitude. From their heroic
example the people of the Philippines and the
United States drew strength to carry on the
fight through the days that followed. Their
sacrifice sealed our dedication to our common
freedoms. Their spirit sustains us still.
On this day, April 9, the people of the United
States join the Philippine people in commemo-
rating the heroes of Bataan and Corregidor.
Grand Duchess Charlotte and Prince
Jean of Luxembourg Visit U.S.
The Department of State announced on April
11 (press release 189) that arrangements were
being completed for the state visit of Her Royal
Higlmess Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxem-
bourg and His Royal Highness Prince Jean,
Hereditary Grand Duke, who will visit the
United States April 29-May 4 at the invitation
of President Kennedy. Their Royal Highnesses
will arrive at Washington from Philadelphia
on April 30 for a 2-day stay.
^ Taped on Apr. 6 for broadcast by the Voice of
America to the people of the Philippines.
APRIL 29, 1903
647
The Effect of the Projected European Union on NATO
iy William, R. Tyler
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs '
I have been asked to speak to you tonight on
a subject which requires prophecy — always a
risky device. Before we attempt to foresee
what the effect of the projected European
Union will be on NATO, let us examine the
present situation and its background.
You are all familiar witli the postwar history
of our bipartisan support for European efforts
toward unification. We have been quite prag-
matic about this. We have adjusted our views
on several occasions as the Europeans them-
selves have modified theirs as to what seemed
the best way to move forward toward their ob-
jectives. For we have always been clear that
the inspiration and drive for the creation of a
new Europe must come fi'om the Europeans
themselves and have widespread popular Euro-
pean support if it were ever to succeed.
I stress this because the popular notion of a
united Europe clearly centers on the European
Economic Community, the European Coal and
Steel Community, and the European Atomic
Energy Community. Although these institu-
tions have large political implications, and in-
deed make many basic political decisions, they
are generally considered to be economic in
character. But economic imification can only
be a partial step toward the creation of a new
Europe. We have from the beginning accepted
the obvious fact tliat, to be successful, a united
Europe would have to be a complete Europe.
It would have to be united not only in the eco-
nomic sphere but in the political and military
spheres as well.
' Address made before the American Academy of
Political and Social Science at Philadelphia, Pa., on
Apr. 5 (press release 177).
Our support for European unity has always i '
taken into accoimt this basic consideration. '
Let me recall for you that in the early fifties this
country gave its encouragement and support to
the proposed European Defense Community
and European Political Community. It was
only after the collapse of the EDC proposal
in 1954 that steps were taken toward the
European Economic Community. These were
essentially an economic approach toward the
political goal of European unity.
In recent years the issues of European politi-
cal and defense cooperation have come to the
fore again. In the summer of 1961 the Bonn
Declaration proposed a Union of the European
Peoples designed to take first steps forward in
the political and defense fields. Europe has
since then been in ferment, discussing the prob-
lems and possibilities of such a step. The one
thing which stands out in this intra-European
dialog is that Europe itself is not agreed within
itself upon how it shall proceed. The philo-
sophic differences between federalism and con-
federalism, nationalism and supranationalisni,
integi-ation and cooperation are well known to
all of you. They are being debated now, and no
clear-cut view is likely to emerge in the near
future.
There is also the question of which countries
sliall make up this projected European Union,
and no ready answers are in sight. We are
keenly aware of these differences, for much
hangs on the outcome. For over a decade in
NATO the United States has been in a position
wliich it does not find congenial. We have a
massive nuclear deterrent. We possess almost
60 percent of tlie economic production and re-
I
648
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
lurces of the NATO alliance; the remainder
unevenly distributed among a number of
rger or smaller nations. So, like it or not, the
?eds and responsibility of leadership have, up
> now, fallen to the United States. Political
)nsultation, the problems of reaching accord
id consensus with all of our partners in
ATO, is an extremely difficult one. There
as and is no one spokesman for Europe.
here are spokesmen for 15 individual countries
ho represent a significant diversity of opinion.
I think this is why the European Economic
ommunity has captured the imagination of so
lany Americans. As the voice of six countries,
le institutions of the EEC for the first time af-
jrded a real possibility that the United States
)uld negotiate or consult with the representa-
ve of a single European view. Wliere the
European Economic Community finds it possi-
le to speak with a single voice, as in the tariff
eld, for example, we have already found that
lany more tilings are possible between us and
;iat we can and must set our sights higher than
as ever been possible in the past.
So, as Europe itself is prepared to speak with
larity, precision, and authority on a given is-
ue, the nature of the relationship between us
aust change. This change need not be adverse ;
m the contrary, we expect that it will be a con-
tructive change, that it will enable vis to do
aore and greater things together not only
,mong ourselves but in the interests of our com-
Qon leadership position in the free world.
itrength of NATO Alliance
We can also expect, for the same reasons, that
here will be constructive changes in the rela-
ionships of the countries of tliis new Europe
ids-a-vis the other countries in NATO. Tliis
relationship will be slow to develop, perhaps,
but it is inevitable that countries with common
economic policies will have to harmonize their
political and military policies. In the long run
tliis circumstance is bound to provide an addi-
tional unifying factor in NATO.
I say "additional" because we have many uni-
fying factors in NATO and we have the machin-
ery provided for us to develop additional
unifying factors. I say this with awareness that
the public press is replete with stories pointing
out that the alliance is in disarray, that the
allies cannot agree on basic issues. But we
have agreed on the basic issues. Not only have
we agreed on them, but we are convinced that
these basic issues are right and are important.
"VVliat we have not always agreed on is how we
should develop the macliineiy to support these
issues, these aims and ideals. The part of the
machinery that is constantly being overhauled,
and rightly so, is the defense side of NATO.
From the public point of view it is the side of
NATO wliich receives the greater attention.
There are many complicated questions involved
which I will not attempt to go into this eve-
ning — questions of what type of nuclear force,
what type of control and what type of com-
mand, how many fingers on the trigger, and so
on. They are important questions, and the
countries of NATO are grappling with these
questions. How these questions are answered
will have a gi-eat deal to do with the develop-
ment of NATO in other fields, will condition
the attitude of this projected European Union
within and toward NATO. But these compli-
cated problems must be, and will be, solved.
The future of the Atlantic community may well
be at stake. But the Atlantic community has
confronted, and surmounted, other problems in
the past. The Atlantic alliance has demon-
strated its strength in the past.
The strength of any alliance rests not on its
forms, procedures, or structure but on the com-
mitment, the integrity, and dedication of its
members and on the ideals and goals of its
members.
Wliile the goals of NATO are as valid today
as when the alliance was created, there is noth-
ing sacrosanct about the way in which the
alliance is organized. Indeed, the relationship
between the military and political aspects of
the alliance has undergone a progressive change
since the early days. When the North Atlantic
Treaty was signed just 14 years ago, there was
no plan to organize an integrated military com-
mand such as that which we now have, with
combined headquarters, with common supply
lines and closely coordinated defense plans. Its
fmictions were those of a traditional alliance.
The treaty itself is one of the most succinct and
straightforward and unhedged of international
APRIL 29, 1963
682733—63-
649
documents. Its 99-word preamble proclaims
the determination of the member governments
"to safeguard the freedom, common heritage
and civilization of their peoples, founded on
the principles of democracy, individual liberty
and the rule of law."
The fimctions of the alliance were to insure
maximum, pooled strength in the event of war
and to deter a potential enemy by putting him
on notice that if he upset the balance he would
have to face not one enemy but the combined
strength of all the members of the alliance.
But at its inception NATO had little that could
be termed a military strategy. Today it has
a fully developed strategy. This strategy has
evolved over the years to meet changing con-
ditions and varying threats. The relationships
between and among the partners have changed.
As European countries have increased in pros-
perity, in strength, and in confidence, they have
increased their potential, they have strength-
ened their role as partners. They are no longer
dependents of the United States. The alliance
must reflect this change and meet the interests
and needs and the ambitions of its members.
The form the alliance takes should be that
which provides the best possible way of meet-
ing these interests, needs, and ambitions.
Political Consultation Within NATO
The interests, needs, and ambitions of the
15 member comitries of NATO are not, of
course, the same. But if tlie interests, needs,
and ambitions of the countries of the Euro-
pean Economic Community are harmonized,
this can only have the effect of further unifying
the alliance. This is extremely important from
another point of view. That is the effect this
new European Union will have on the nonmili-
tary aspects of NATO.
There has been a great deal written about the
origins of NATO and how these origins have
supposedly conditioned the development of
NATO. NATO was organized to meet the
threat of Soviet encroachment. It was, and
is, successful in that the Soviets have not ad-
vanced further on Europe. The implication
here is that if the threat disappears there is
no need for NATO. Tliere is the further im-
plication that the NATO countries hang to-
gether in the face of this threat and that the
countries will go their separate ways if the
threat diminishes or is made to appear to di-
minish. These things may have been true sev-
eral years ago. They are not true today.
NATO no longer has to depend on the immi-
nence of the Soviet threat to hold together.
Over the years a climate of confidence has de-
veloped. This climate of confidence is due in
great part to the political consultation wliich
takes place within NATO. I realize that this
term "political consultation" is a much-abused
one, but I think that is because it is misunder-
stood. Many take it to mean that one member
of NATO should get the concurrence of the
other 14 countries before embarking on any poli-
tical or military action affecting one or more of
the member countries or the interest of those
coimtries. This, we all realize, is virtually im-
possible. No parliament or congress would
ever allow this, in any event.
There are two types of political consultation
which take place within NATO. One is the
more or less formal action of one government in-
forming its 14 NATO allies that a decision has
been taken. This is merely a little more than
an excliange of information. It does have
some virtue in that the countries — and this is
true in most cases — have been informed in ad-
vance. There is also the slight possibility that
particularly weighty arguments may cause the
coimtry planning the action to change its course
somewhat.
The second form of political consultation in-
volves an intergovernmental exchange of views
prior to any decision, that is, during the policy-
making stage. Naturally there are difficulties
here in that parliaments' rights cannot be en-
croached upon. But there is more of this type «
of consultation in NATO today than there has
been 5 and 10 years ago. This method of politi-
cal consultation is more likely to open the way
to truly coordinated policies. The develop-
ment of a European Union, with its coordi-
nated policies, can only improve this type of
consultation. Looked at purely from a mathe-
matical viewpoint, it automatically reduces the
number of parties involved — and therefore the
potential number of points of view — by the
number of countries in the miion.
650
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Irowing Consciousness of European Unity
This political consultation is an important
iece of machinery which the countries can
tilize in fields other than military and political,
'he existing structure of NATO provides the
ramework "for this. Article 2 of the NATO
reaty states:
The Parties will contribute toward the further de-
elopment of peaceful and friendly international rela-
ions by strengthening their free institutions, by
rlngtng about a better understanding of the princl-
les upon which these institutions are founded, and
y promoting conditions of stability and well-being,
'hey will seek to eliminate conflict in their interna-
ional economic policies and will encourage economic
oUaboration between any or all of them.
This article 2 of the charter provides another
tieans through which ideals and policies can
)e harmonized. If the member nations of
,he North Atlantic Treaty Organization pursue
ommon ideals and follow common policies, the
levelopment of different concepts of military
trategy will not occur. There will naturally
)e problems and difficulties of a teclmical na-
ure, but they should not present in themselves
I serious threat to allied unity.
This unity is not only a goal of United States
foreign policy but also is an abiding necessity.
This unity is a goal shared by the peoples of
Europe — they recognize that it is vital to their
interests as well as ours, that it is an immutable
fact of life.
There is movement, and forward movement,
toward unity in these important regional orga-
nizations. There is a growing consciousness of
unity.
This unity can continue to flourish in the
cooperative ventures of NATO and of the
European Community. But in order that the
growth should continue we must have an atmos-
phere and feeling of security. We are bending
every effort to strengthen that security. And
since our security today is so dependent on nu-
' clear weapons with their astronomical costs, we
must have nations which are economically
strong and prosperous.
This prosperity in turn requires a greater
degree of coordination of economic policy, a
policy in which the considerations of security
and unity will be overriding. Today, in nearly
all sectors of the economy in Western Europe
and in North America, business is prospering in
this climate of security and unity. It will
prosper further if the climate of security and
xmity is improved.
To these three necessary factors — of unity,
security, and prosperity — we need to add a
fourth : responsibility. All the member nations
of the North Atlantic Alliance recognize their
responsibilities to their own peoples. The con-
duct of these countries makes this fact self-
evident. When all of these countries arrive at
a greater realization that responsibility to their
own people is closely related to responsibility in
holding together, and in strengthening, the
Atlantic community, we will attain progress at
a greater rate.
The rate of progress will vary from time to
time. There was a slowdown when the United
Kingdom was refused entry into the European
Community. The word "projected" in the title
of this address, which title was assigned to me
by your academy, represented the hope that the
United Kingdom would be a member soon. Al-
though we continue to consider that the acces-
sion of Great Britain to the Treaty of Rome is
an objective to be encouraged, we recognize that
this accession may not come about for some time.
So there is some slowdown in the movement
toward European imity as a result of the rup-
ture in January, as the six members of the Com-
mon Market countries sort out their relationship
with one another and as the British Government
determines how best to establish its bona fides as
a "good European" to the extent required better
to qualify for entry on the Continent. Further-
more, this pace of European unity will be af-
fected by domestic political activities in a num-
ber of countries. The Fanfani government in
Italy faces an election test this month, the
Dutch go to the polls next month, and Germany
will be absorbed with the question of Chancellor
Adenauer's succession for many months to come.
The British also face the prospect of elections
sometime in 1964. With the intensification of
domestic political activity in these countries,
the attention of their leaders is likely to be
directed more toward national considerations
than toward broader questions of European
unification.
But with all this, we remain convinced that
the momentum toward European integration
APRIL 29, 1963
651
will continue to increase. It is therefore im-
portant that the American public and the Con-
gress do not become so disenchanted or im-
patient with recent developments as to diminish
American support for the European unity
movement. We should not react impetuously
by moving toward a political or military "For-
tress America" position. Recent events have
slowed, but they have not stopped, the European
drive toward integration; nor have they
seriously impaired the degree of integi-ation
thus far achieved through the EEC. For these
reasons we intend to reiterate our support for
European integration so long as the European
imity movement is neither subverted as an in-
strument for the hegemony of a single nation
nor directed at the establishment of an autar-
chic Europe wliich would work against the
political and economic interests of the United
States and other free-world countries.
If we push forward in this movement, if we
acliieve a greater harmonization of our policies
within our regional economic and military or-
ganizations, if we develop this sense and feeling
of unity, security, prosperity, and responsibil-
ity, we will have an advantage that cannot be
overcome. At some point the Commimists will
recognize this. This recognition may make
possible progress toward disarmament, sta-
bility, and peace.
Readjusting United States Foreign Trade
by Leonard Weiss
Director, Office of International Trade '
Last year the Congress passed the most far-
reaching piece of trade legislation since the
original enactment of the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act in 1034. It has been considered
as one of the most important achievements of
the Kennedy administration to date.
The original Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act was itself a landmark in the foreign eco-
nomic policy of the United States. It turned
the tide of depression-bom protectionism and
initiated a worldwide movement for the reduc-
tion of tariffs and other trade barriers.
This program did noble service for over a
quarter of a century, but like any program it be-
gan to peter out and became inadequate to meet
the new circumstances and challenges which had
arisen. 'While the basic policy thrust of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was more
relevant than ever, the tools it provided were no
longer sufficient for the task. A new approach
was required. The Trade Expansion Act " was
thus enacted to do the job.
It is my purpose, in accordance with the re-
quest of your chairman, to indicate the nature
of the task ahead, the new problems to which
U.S. trade policy must address itself, and the
plans for meeting these problems with the help
of the Trade Expansion Act.
Fundamentals of U.S. Trade Policy
Perhaps the best way to begin is to consider
some fundamentals of U.S. trade policy.
U.S. trade policy has been based — and still is
today — on three essential elements : nondiscrim-
ination, the reduction of tariffs, and the elimi-
nation of quantitative barriers to trade. The
' Address made before the Spring Alumni College at
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pa.,
on Apr. 5 (press release 174 dated Apr. 4).
' For a summary of the act, see Bulletin of Oct. 29,
1962, p. 656 ; for an Executive order on the administra-
tion of the act, see ibid., Feb. 4, 1963, p. 180.
652
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
policy of nondiscrimination — of "most favored
nation" treatment — has been consistently ap-
plied in one form or another since the beginnings
of the Republic. It is a policy that was written
into the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in
1934 and has been continued in every piece of
successor legislation since then, including the
new Trade Expansion Act.
The reduction of tariffs is, of course, the most
direct expression of the old trade legislation
as well as the new. Although the central fea-
ture of this legislation has been the provision
of authority to the President to negotiate on a
reciprocal basis the reduction of tariff barriers
to trade, it has always been recognized that the
potential benefits from foreign tariff reductions
must be protected through commitments assur-
ing that our exports will be given nondiscrimi-
natory treatment — that is, most-favored-nation
treatment — and that they will not unnecessarily
or unjustifiably be subjected to quantitative im-
port restrictions. Thus there is a close inter-
relationship among the three basic elements of
our trade policy.
Through the years quantitative restrictions
have been viewed as the most undesirable of
possible methods of limiting trade. Wliile re-
sort to them might sometimes be necessary, they
have always been considered as exceptional and
temporary devices to restrain trade. Tariffs
have been regarded as the preferable technique
where domestic protection might be needed.
Behind the three basic elements which I men-
tioned lay certain political, economic, and phil-
osophic conceptions. These policies were based
on the notion of the desirability of maximizing
the influence of the marketplace, and minimiz-
ing the intervention of the government, in the
conduct of international trade. Tliey assumed
that an international trading system based on
such principles would reduce international po-
litical friction, contribute to the more efficient
use of economic resources, encourage an increase
in living standards, and in all these ways gen-
erally promote the interests of a free world
commimity.
Although the three fimdamental elements of
American trade policy have been generally ad-
hered to through the years, they have been
occasionally qualified to meet practical realities.
Quantitative restrictions have been accepted for
exceptional protective, security, and other pur-
poses; tariff's have sometimes been raised to
avoid serious injury to domestic industry; and
even nondiscrimination — perhaps the most
sacred of American policies — has on occasion
been breached. Some of these departures from
basic policy were of major importance. None-
theless, the main thrust of American policy con-
tinues on the basis of the three principles I have
described, and, indeed, the departures from
them have provided the flexibility and resilience
necessary to make the policies work and to ad-
here to the general direction they prescribe.
There is no intention to change this general
direction of U.S. policy. In some respects, for
example as regards the lowering of tariffs, the
intention is to intensify efforts along this line.
Departures may occur, but if they do they
should be appraised against the overall picture
so as to avoid undue distortion as to the gen-
eral direction of American policy.
Program Under Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
I should like now to sketch some aspects of
the development of the trade program imder
the old reciprocal trade legislation so as to as-
sess its accomplishments and also its shortcom-
ings and thus better understand the problems
now faced by U.S. trade policy and the course
this policy should take.
There are five aspects of the old trade pro-
gram which are particularly relevant :
1. the authority available for tariff re-
ductions ;
2. the policy of avoidance of serious
injury;
3. the selective, item-by-item type of ne-
gotiation ;
4. the advance from bilateral to multilat-
eral tecliniques of negotiation ; and
5. the internal organization of the U.S.
Government for the conduct of the trade
program.
To turn to the first aspect, the original Re-
ciprocal Trade Agreements Act, enacted on
June 12, 1934, authorized the President to re-
duce duties by 50 percent of the existing level.
These duties were those of the high Smoot-
APRIL 29, 19G3
653
Hawley tariff of 1930. In 1945 the President
received authority to reduce duties by an ad-
ditional 50 percent of the level existing as of
January 1, 1945. In 1955 and 1958 he obtained
further grants of authority to reduce duties by
another 15 percent and 20 percent, respectively.
If the full tariff reduction authority had been
used on an item (that is, a 50-percent reduction
of the 1934 rate, another 50-percent reduction
of the 1945 rate, and further 15- and 20-percent
reductions under the 1955 and 1958 authorities) ,
the duty would have been reduced in total by
83 percent by July 1 of this year, when the final
stage of the reductions made under the 1958
authority is to come into effect. Thus a duty of
100 percent in 1934 would go down to 17 per-
cent on July 1 of this year, and a duty of 50
percent in 1934 (not much above the average at
that time) would be brought down to 8i/^
percent.
The fact is that the decrease in U.S. tariffs
since 1934 has been almost as dramatic as the
figures I have just cited would indicate. As
measured by the ratio of duties collected to the
overall value of dutiable imports, the average
U.S. tariff on dutiable goods has dropped from
46.7 percent in 1934 to 12 percent in 1961. While
a substantial part of this reduction has been the
direct result of tariff negotiations conducted
under the trade agreements authority, not all
of the decrease is attributable to the program.
A significant part of the decrease has resulted
from the effect of price increases through the
years on the ad valorem incidence of those du-
ties — of which we have many — that are assessed
on a specific basis.
Under the old trade legislation the United
States concluded tariff-reducing negotiations
with 54 countries. In the case of 31 countries
the United States negotiated two or more tariff-
reducing agreements in the period 1934 to date.
This is an impressive performance.
As time went on, however, tariff reductions
were becoming increasingly difficult to make
on the basis of existing policies and procedures.
Earlier reductions were to a considerable extent
squeezing the water out of the tariff. Protec-
tive domestic pressures grew. The policies and
procedures for tariff reductions became, as I
shall indicate in a moment, increasingly restric-
tive. As a result, the authority for tariff reduc-
tion granted in the legislation was not being
fully used. The United States was having less
and less to put on the negotiating table, and I
the trade program began to sputter badly in
later years.
This brings us to the second important as-l
pect of the trade program as it has thus far been
conducted, namely, the policy of avoidance of ',
serious injury. From the very beginnings of (
the program the policy of the administration, j
both Democratic and Eepublican, has been toi
avoid serious injury to domestic industry inj
making tariff reductions. j
Over the years this policy became more and I
more refined and hardened. At first the "no*
serious injury" policy was reflected simply in
declarations by the administration of its inten-
tion to avoid serious injury in making tariff
reductions. Then, in response to expi-essions
of concern tliat tariff reductions had already
gone too far, an Executive order — the foreran-
ner of the escape clause — was issued to assure
that tariff reductions in particular cases were
withdrawn if increased imports were causing
or threatening injury to the domestic industry
concerned.
The critics of the program then argued that
it was unreasonable to wait until the damage
was done; instead the damage should be pre-
vented in the first place. And thus was bom
the so-called "peril point" provision, under
which the Tariff Commission was required by
law to establish the precise point below which
a tariff reduction would cause serious injury.
If a duty were reduced below this point, an
accounting had to be made to the Congress.
Like the perU point, the escape clause was also
embodied in the trade agreements legislation
by the Congress and increasingly restrictive
standards and procedures for its application
were developed.
Tliis process of refining the no-serious-injury
policy and embedding it into law under stand-
ards and procedures designed to discourage
tariff reductions exerted an increasingly debili-
tating effect on the program. Tariff reductions
became more and more difficult to make.
As a consequence, in the last roimd of tariff
negotiations the executive branch and the Tar-
654
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
iff Commission, in conformity with the legis-
lative requirements and the policies they
reflected, so pruned the list of potential U.S.
tariff concessions that the United States was
able to put on the bargaining table offers of
tariff concessions amounting to less than 20 per-
:;ent of its imports from the comatries with
which it was negotiating. In the case of some
countries the United States as a result of this
process had practically nothing to offer. The
United States was able to conclude the negotia-
tions only by making concessions on a substan-
tial number of items below the rates established
by the Tariff Commission imder the peril-point
procedure. The concessions so granted were
those on which the possibility of serious injury
was judged to be unlikely or minimal.
This experience demonstrated the bankruptcy
3f this approach to the process of tariffmaking.
It clearly would not be possible to mount an-
Dther tariff negotiation on the old basis and
procedures. The Tariff Commission itself has
been among the first to recognize the impossibil-
ity of predicting precisely at what point a
tariff reduction might cause serious injury.
Furthermore, the concept of avoidance of seri-
ous injury was being equated with that of avoid-
ance of any adjustment whatsoever to changed
competitive conditions, even where such adjust-
ment might be possible without serious injury.
Other areas of domestic economic activity were
not operating on the theory that adjustment was
bad. To the contrary, the most highly adver-
tised feature of the American way of life has
been its dynamic character, its willingness to
accept and respond to change, its technological
achievement, and its receptivity to innovation.
Now I do not mean to imply that the trade
agreements program should have been operated,
or should now be operated, without proper
safeguards for the interests of American pro-
ducers. The new Trade Expansion Act con-
tains safeguards to provide necessary protec-
tion. The difference is that the new safeguards,
because they offer an incentive to improving
productive efficiency, as I shall explain, can bet-
ter advance the national interest at the same
time that they permit broader use of the tariff
reduction authority.
Another characteristic of negotiations under
the old trade legislation was that they were
conducted on an item-by-item basis. The
United States prepared its lists of offers to, and
requests from, countries on an individual basis.
It then bargained product by product, in the
most minute and painstaking detail, with the
other countries concerned.
This procedure was most laborious and time-
consuming. The last round of tariff negotia-
tions took over 3 years to prepare for and com-
plete. Other countries found it increasingly
difficult to do business in this way. Notably the
European Economic Community (EEC),
which had the positions of six member countries
to reconcile, made it clear that the only way in
which it could practicably negotiate in the fu-
ture was on some type of linear basis, offering
a more or less uniform tariff reduction across
the board and, naturally, expecting a compa-
rable offer in return.
Another important aspect of experience imder
the old legislation was the advance from the
bilateral to the multilateral technique of nego-
tiation. The United States originally nego-
tiated under the Eeciprocal Trade Agreements
Act with one country at a time. To conserve
bargaining power in each negotiation it would
withhold concessions on items where some third
country might be the principal beneficiary.
This approach was an extremely slow one
and prevented the most effective use of avail-
able bargaining power. It prevented bringing
to bear in a particular negotiation the benefits
which the other country concerned might gain
from concessions that might be granted in a
subsequent bilateral negotiation with some third
country. As a result the scope of the possible
exchange of tariff concessions was reduced im-
der the bilateral process.
The United States broke away from this
approach in 1947 and adopted a multilateral
technique in the negotiations that led to the
conclusion of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ( GATT) . In these negotiations the
United States bargained simultaneously with
22 coimtries. Under this technique the United
States paired off by means of individual nego-
tiating teams with the other countries with
which it was negotiating. The other countries
did the same thing among themselves. In each
APRIL 29, 1963
655
pair of negotiations account was taken of con-
cessions being considered in other pairs of nego-
tiations. The concessions concluded in each
pair of negotiations were in the end put into a
common pot and extended to all the other coun-
tries participating in the negotiations. Thus
each country received concessions on commodi-
ties not only in which it had a principal supply-
ing interest but also in which it might have a
secondary interest. Each country was accord-
ingly willing to grant more concessions, and
the total package of concessions was far greater
than would have been possible in the isolated
bilateral negotiations of the prewar years.
Furthermore, the time required to conclude
such a network of concessions was far less than
what would have been necessary on the old
bilateral basis. Thus in the original GATT
negotiations of 1947 the United States con-
cluded exchanges of tariff concessions with 22
other comitries in less than 7 months as com-
pared with the conclusion of bilateral agree-
ments with 29 countries over the previous 13
years.
Before turning to the Trade Expansion Act,
I should like to mention one further aspect of
the old legislation, namely, the manner in which
the U.S. Government organized itself to con-
duct the trade agi'eements program. The pro-
gram was run on an interagency basis, largely
under the leadership of the Department of
State. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
required that the President seek the advice of
the Department of State and of other agencies
in the conduct of the program. Pursuant to
this requirement, an interagency Trade Agree-
ments Committee (TAG) had been established
by Executive order. The Committee consisted
of the Department of State, as chairman, and
of the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture,
Treasury, Defense, Labor, and Interior, and of
the Tariff Commission. The officials on the
Committee were at the technical, career level.
In 1957 the Trade Policy Committee (TPC)
was established by Executive order. It con-
sisted of the same agencies, except for the Tariff
Commission, as were on the TAC. It was
established, however, at the Cabinet level and
was designed to provide policy guidance. This
Committee was chaired by the Secretary of
Commerce.
As I shall point out later, the Congress did
not consider these arrangements adequate toil''
meet the need. ^^*'
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 I*
I have tried to outline some of the majoiH^
characteristics of the trade agreements programj^J
as it had been conducted under legislation prioi|''
to the passage of the Trade Expansion Act '"
Now I should like to examine the Trade Ex''
pansion Act in relation to each of these aspects!""
As regards the authority for tariff reductions '*
the Trade Expansion Act made a major, and ii' "
one respect revolutionary, step forward. Witll^'
authority under the old act practically ex'?'
hausted, the new act gave the President verjj '
substantial new powers. It authorized him U'^
reduce tariffs in trade agreements with any free
world country by 50 percent of the level exist. '
ing July 1, 1962. jj
Important as this power is, the act grantee *
the President an additional type of authorit;
never before extended in the legislation, namely -
the authority to eliminate a duty completelj '
To be sure, this authority was carefully defined
but it established a significant new principle i-
the history of the trade program. The Presi ■
dent had previously been authorized to impos
a duty where none had formerly existed, but th
Trade Expansion Act for the first time permit
the President to eliminate a duty completelj
Specifically the act authorizes the Presiden
to eliminate a duty in any of the following fou
circumstances :
1. He could eliminate a duty on an industria
product in a category where the United State
and the EEC supplied over 80 percent of free
world exports.
2. He could in an agreement with the EE(
eliminate the duty on an agricultural produc
where he determined such action would tend t
assure the maintenance or expansion of V.i
exports of the like product.
3. He could eliminate the duty on a tropica
agricultural or forestry commodity not pro
duced in significant quantities in the Unite(
States, provided the EEC took comparabl
action on an essentially nondiscriminatory basis
4. He could eliminate the duty on product
where the rate is 5 percent or less. :
656
DEPARTKENT OF STATE BULLETII
The first authority, the so-called 80-percent
C( "dominant supplier" authority, was so writ-
1 as to be largely contingent on the accession
L the United Kingdom to the European Eco-
iimic Community. The collapse of the U.K.-
iiC negotiations reduced this authority to
oly a few categories. The other zero author-
i ?s remain unimpaired.
In toto, notwithstanding the impairment of
t9 dominant-supplier authority, the power
J anted to the President in the new act to re-
c ce and eliminate duties is most impressive.
] )r the first time since 1945 the President now
] s major bargaining authority to use to open
1 1 markets for American goods and to advance
« fier American interests, including greater ac-
( 3s to markets for the less developed countries.
The Trade Expansion Act makes another
: itable advance in the handling of the serious-
jury problem. As I have indicated, under the
J act the only thing the President could do
deal with injury to domestic industry from
iports was to apply new restrictions, raise
e duty, or impose quotas pursuant to the es-
pe clause.
Such action was higUy imsatisfactory. It
,iled in any fundamental way to deal with
e problem of the domestic producer, penal-
ed the American consumer, encouraged a mis-
>e of domestic resources, generally impeded
le healthy development of both the domestic
id international economy, and created inter-
itional friction.
The Trade Expansion Act gives the Presi-
3nt a new tool to deal with such problems —
•ade adjustment assistance. It provides means
) enable domestic firms and workers to adjust
) foreign competition either by becoming more
ampetitive in the same line of production or
y moving into other fields of activity. To the
rms it provides loans or guaranties of loans,
ax assistance in the form of special carryback
f operating losses, or teclinical marketing or
'ther assistance. To the workers it provides
eadjustment allowances in the form of unem-
jloyment compensation, retraining of workers
"or other types of employment, and relocation
lUowances to assist families in moving to an
irea where employment may be available.
This approach to the problem of import com-
petition is in the best American tradition and
spirit. Instead of fighting change it accepts
it and provides means for new advances. It
deals with competition by meeting it, not run-
ning away from it. It stimulates technical
innovation and the development of new skills.
It makes the most of our resources and provides
higher returns to the businessman and worker
alike. It encourages the future dynamic de-
velopment of our economy. It promotes a
sounder international trading system and con-
tributes to healthier international political
relations.
While providing a new facility for dealing
with import competition, the act still retains
an escape clause permitting the imposition of
restrictions to correct problems of serious in-
jury. The new escape clause, however, is a
major improvement over the old one by pro-
viding sounder standards for its application.
Under the new act escape-clause relief is avail-
able only when the injury relates to the industry
as a whole, rather than merely a segment of it
as imder the old act. Furthermore, before re-
lief can be granted under the new escape clause,
there must be increased imports resulting "in
major part" from tariff concessions, and such
increased imports must in turn be "the major
factor" in causing or threatening the serious in-
jury. Under the old act it was not necessary
in order to obtain relief to show that the tariff
concessions were the cause of the increase in
imports or that the imports were the major
cause of the injury.
In line with the more realistic and construc-
tive approach of the new act, it also eliminates
the requirement for the Tariff Commission to
establish peril points, that is, the points below
which duties allegedly cannot be reduced with-
out doing serious injury to domestic industry.
Instead, the act spells out in detail the type of
information which the Tariff Commission shall
provide the President in order to inform him
as to the probable economic effect of tariff con-
cessions which the United States might offer
other countries. In making a judgment on
tariff concessions to offer, the President would
take into account not only the information
provided by the Tariff Commission but also
that available within the executive branch.
APRIL 29, 1963
657
The Trade Expansion Act also envisages an
advance in the technique for negotiating tariff
reductions. As I noted earlier, tariff negotia-
tions under the old legislation proceeded on a
product-by-product basis involving the most
protracted and exhausting type of haggling
conceivable. Progress on this basis was no
longer feasible.
In requesting the new authority, tlie admin-
istration made clear that it intended to apply
the authority on an across-the-board basis,
short-circuiting the individual commodity bar-
gaining. The Congress accepted this idea in
granting the authority.
The precise form which the across-the-board
technique of negotiation will take is yet to be
worked out. It is clear, however, that it in-
volves at least two characteristics: one, it in-
volves the reduction of tariffs on a comprehen-
sive basis ; two, it involves the adoption of some
mutually agreed rules pursuant to which tariffs
can be reduced without individual commodity
negotiation. Any such scheme would, of
course, have to permit exceptions as required
by the Trade Expansion Act or as deemed ap-
propriate after careful study by the Tariff
Commission and the executive branch on the
basis of information provided in public hear-
ings and otherwise.
The new act also envisages a continuation
of one of the best features developed under
the old legislation, namely, negotiations on a
multilateral basis. As I have noted, the United
States made a major advance in 1947 in nego-
tiating simultaneously with many countries
rather than with only one country at a time.
The United States intends to continue to nego-
tiate on this basis.
There has been some confusion on this point
as a result of the special emphasis which the
United States has given to negotiations with
the EEC. It is perfectly consistent with this
emphasis — indeed, essential to success — to nego-
tiate with other countries at the same time as
the United States negotiates with the EEC.
Concessions exchanged between the United
States and the EEC will be added to the con-
cessions negotiated by the other participating
countries; each participating country will get
the concessions made by any of them. Con-
sistently with the most- favored-nation require-
ment written into the Trade Expansion Act, the
United States will extend to all free-world
countries the concessions it makes to the EEC
or any other country and will, in turn, receive
comparable ti-eatment from other countries.
Finally, the new act makes some major
changes in the organization within the U.S.
Government for carrying on the trade program.
Most importantly, it establishes a Special Rep-
resentative for Trade Negotiations. This rep-
resentative is to be appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate and
will carry ambassadorial rank. He will act
as the direct representative of the President
and will be responsible for all negotiations
under the act.
The Honorable Christian A. Herter has been
appointed to this position. As a distinguished
former Secretary of State, Congressman, and
Governor of Massachusetts, and as a leader in
many public enterprises, he comes to this posi-
tion with unique qualifications, experience, and
capacities. Mr. William T. Gossett, a former
vice president of the Ford Motor Comj^any and
an eminent businessman and lawyer, has been
appointed as deputy to Mr. Herter with the
rank of ambassador. These two men can be
counted on to give effective direction and im-
petus to the conduct of the program in the best
interests of the United States.
The act also provides for an interagency
committee on the Cabinet level to advise the
President in the conduct of the program. The
Committee, called the Trade Expansion Act
Advisory Committee (TEAAC), is chaired by
Governor Herter. The other members are the
Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Inte-
rior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.
Under Mr. Herter's direction there are also
being established three other committees, with
representation from these same Government
agencies. There is a Trade Executive Commit-
tee (TEC), chaired by Mr. Gossett, which is at
tlie assistant-secretary level. This Committee
will serve as the operating arm of the program.
It will have under it a technical-level Trade
Staff Committee (TSC), chaired by an official
658
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
uGovemor Herter's office and including a rep-
rientative designated by the Chairman of the
llriff Ck)mniission. Tlie TSC will, as its name
i;:plies, do the necessary staff work for the
|CC. Finally, there will be a Trade Informa-
n Committee (TIC) to hold public hearings
III otherwise receive views from interested
prties as envisaged under the act. Like the
lade Staff Committee, it will include a Tariff
(•mraission representative.
In addition to its participation on these latter
1 committees, the Tariff Conmiission is given
riny responsibilities under the act. It will
I ovide advice to the President with respect to
i ms put on the public list for consideration for
J ssible concessions and tariff negotiations. It
^ 11, as at present, make investigations and ad-
Me the President with regard to requests for
<;ape-clause relief. It is also called on to
J ike investigations and certain determinations
' th respect to applications by firms and work-
1 3 for trade adjustment assistance.
As regards the latter, the Secretary of Com-
! jrce is given responsibility for administering
ude adjustment assistance for firms and the
'.cretary of Labor for workers. The act also
tablishes an Adjustment Assistance Advisory
sard ( AAAB) , consisting of the Secretary of
jmmerce as Chairman and of the Secretaries
the Treasury, Agriculture, Labor, Interior,
id Health, Education, and Welfare, the Ad-
inistrator of the Small Business Administra-
Dn, and such other officials as the President
iems appropriate. This Committee is to ad-
se the President and operating agencies on the
iministration of the trade adjustment assist-
ice program.
In smnmary, the Trade Expansion Act has
)rrected some major deficiencies in the old
rogram while retaining its better features. It
as increased the President's authority to re-
uce duties and given him new powers to elimi-
ate them. It has provided additional means
) deal with problems of import competition,
t has foreseen new and more effective tech-
iques of negotiation while continuing the
aultilateral approach. It has strengthened
he internal organization for conducting the
; rade program. All in all, this is a substantial
achievement.
Carrying Out the Trade Expansion Act
The next step obviously is to carry out the
authority in the act and to negotiate the agree-
ments it contemplates. The process will be a
long and difficult one. It will require careful
preparation at home and internationally.
What we have to contend with is a very wide
gamut of trade matters going far beyond tariffs
alone. The development of the Common
Market has upset long-established trading pat-
terns and relationships at the same time as it
has created new ones. In addition we face
many problems which would have existed and
which would have had to be met even if there
were no Conamon Market.
Trade in agriculture, for example, has always
been a most difficult issue in international trad-
ing relationships. The development of the
Common Market has dramatized the issue.
The problem, however, is an old one, and the
time is overdue for coming to grips with it.
In dealing with this problem we shall have
to take a hard look at our own policies and
practices. We can expect from others no more
than what we can expect of ourselves.
There is also the problem of the trade of
less developed countries. The need of these
countries to expand their exports and earn the
foreign exchange to support their development
is growing more, rather than less, acute. The
terms of trade of these countries have been in-
creasingly unfavorable, and the gap between
their foreign exchange earnings and their im-
port requirements is continuing to grow. In
addition to this general problem there are
special difficulties as a result of the favored
position which some less developed countries
have over others in access to the Common
Market. Ways and means must be foimd to
meet these various problems.
There is the whole area of nontariff barriers
to which we must give attention. The United
States is concerned about quantitative restric-
tions against its trade, particularly those
applied inconsistently with international com-
mitments. The United States is also concerned
about other burdensome restrictions against its
trade. The Trade Expansion Act took specific
note of unjustifiable restrictions against Ameri-
can commerce and directed the President to do
iPRIL 29, 1963
659
everything practicable to obtain the easing of
such restrictions.
Other countries are similarly concerned about
U.S. policies and practices. They are fearful
that the escape clause might be used to nullify
tariff concessions which they may negotiate
with the United States. They find that U.S.
valuation for duty purposes of certain products
on the basis of American selling price renders
tariif concessions on such products meaning-
less and are unwilling to exchange tariff con-
cessions in this area unless the United States
takes some steps to deal with this problem.
They are worried about the operation of U.S.
antidumping legislation and about increas-
ingly restrictive application of "Buy Ameri-
can" laws and practices. They wish matters
such as these to be considered in the coming
negotiations.
The United States is now pointing its efforts
toward a meeting of GATT ministers to convene
in Geneva next month.^ This meeting will con-
sider plans for future tariff negotiations, the
problem of trade in agriculture, and the prob-
lem of trade of the less developed coimtries. It
is anticipated that at tliis meeting the ministers
will decide to hold a tariff conference some time
in the early part of next year. It is also hojied
that new initiatives will be provided and de-
cisions taken to enable concrete progress to be
made with respect to trade in agriculture and
the trade of less developed countries.
Need for General Movement of Liberalization
A great new enterprise is thus in the making.
The difficulties which lie ahead should not be
minimized. The problems which will have to
be solved are many and complex. They will
raise difficult economic and political issues for
the coimtries concerned. The differing views
of the countries participating in this enterprise
will have to be reconciled.
Nothing less than a broad general movement
of tariff and trade liberalization is required.
The collapse of the negotiations for the acces-
sion of the United Kingdom to the European
Economic Community makes this need even
more urgent. It is to be expected that the
trading comitries of the free world, out of self-
interest if for no other reason, will respond to
the needs of the situation and reach construc-
tive solutions to the problems ahead. It is to
this task that we must now all turn.
United States Delegations
to International Conferences
ECAFE Study of Tokaido Railway
The Department of State annoimced on April
5 (press release 175) that Laurence K. Wal- I
rath, Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, would be the U.S. i-epresentative and
chairman of the U.S. delegation ^ at a Study
Week of Techniques of Construction Used on
the New Tokaido Railway Line, held at Tokyo
April 11-18 under the sponsorship of the Gov-
ernment of Japan and the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Asia and the Far East.
Construction began on the new 315-mile high-
speed railway line between Tokyo and Osaka
3 years ago and is expected to be completed in
1 more year. The new line will triple existing
rail capacity between the two cities. It will
serve some 40 million people and 70 percent of
Japan's industry. The line, capable of han-
dling an initial 90 trains daily each way at an
average speed of 105 miles an hour, has many
innovations to help solve transit problems.
The U.S. delegation will devote special atten- i
tion to those economic, service, and safety fea- ^
tures which could be incorporated into the
planning of American railroad projects and
transport regulations. Various Japanese rail-
road delegations visiting the United States have
reported a similarity of problems encountered
in modernizing rail facilities to meet the needs
of highly industrialized and heavily populated
urban areas. Of particular interest to the U.S. ■
delegation will be the upgrading of railway
equipment, development of containerization and ,
"piggyback" service, operation of safety ap- il
paratus such as automatic signal and train con-
trol equipment, and possible economic impacts
upon competing types of transport.
' For an announcement, see ibid., Mar. 18, 1963, p. 418.
^ For a list of the other members of the U.S. delega-
tion and U.S. industry representatives participating in
the study, see Department of State press release 175.
660
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIK
I.S. and Rumania Exchange Notes
n Cultural and Other Exchanges
ress release 16S dated April 1, for release April 2
•EPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
William A. Crawford, American Minister at
kicliarest, and Pompiliu Macovei, Deputy
linister of Foreign Affairs of the Kumanian
'eople's Eepublic, representing their govem-
lents, exchanged diplomatic notes in Buclia-
est on April 2 which provide a frameworli for
rranging visits and exclianges between the
wo countries for the calendar years 1963 and
964. Similar diplomatic notes ^ were ex-
hanged on December 9, 1960, in Washington
>etween representatives of both governments
or calendar years 1961 and 1962. Letters set-
ing forth some concrete provisions for visits
,nd exchanges during calendar year 1963 wei'e
ixchanged at the same time.^ On the occasion
>f exchange of the documents, the American
•epresentative expressed the belief that expand-
ng cultural relations would facilitate the freer
low of information between the two countries
md would contribiite to a truer and better
mderstanding between the American and
Rumanian peoples.
The visits and exchanges provided for in the
exchange of notes will take place in the fields of
graduate study, science and industry, perform-
ing arts, sports, and tourism. The notes also
provide for cooperation in the fields of motion
pictures, exhibits, books and publications,
radio, and television.
EXCHANGE OF NOTES
U.S. Note
Apeh. 2, 1963
Sib: I have the honor to refer to the recent dis-
cussions between representatives of the Government
of the United States of America and the Government
of the Rumanian People's Republic regarding the pro-
gram of visits and exchanges in cultural, educational,
scientific and other fields during the calendar years
1963 and 1964.
' For texts, see Buixetin of Dec. 26, 1960, p. 968.
° Not printed here.
In this connection, I wish to inform you that the
Government of the United States approves the follow-
ing provisions which record the understandings reached
in the discussions :
1. Educational Exchanges
a. Both Parties agree to provide for the exchange
of post-graduate students for purposes of advanced
scholarly and scientific study between United States
and Rumanian universities and other institutions of
higher learning, including scientific institutes.
b. Both Parties agree to provide for exchanges be-
tween United States and Rimiauian universities of
professors and instructors for lectures, language in-
struction and study, consultations and seminars.
2. Scientific, Technical and Industrial Exchanges
a. Both Parties agree to encourage the development
of exchanges in the field of science, including such
exchanges as may be carried out between academies
of sciences of both countries. To this end, each Party
agrees to facilitate visits of scientists from the other
countiy for the purpose of delivering lectures and ad-
dresses at scientific institutes and institutions of
higher learning.
b. Both Parties favor the exchange of delegations
composed of specialists and technicians who wish to
study various aspects of technical and industrial ac-
tivity in the other country.
e. Each Party, through diplomatic channels or ap-
propriate authorized organizations, and on a mutual
basis, shall continue to invite scientists and technicians
to participate in national scientific meetings, congresses
and conferences as opportunities may arise.
3. Exchanges in Performing and Creative Arts
a. Both Parties agree to encourage and to support
exchanges in the field of performing arts, including
artistic, musical and theatrical groups, conductors,
theatrical supervisory personnel and individual
artists.
(1) Both Parties agree to facilitate the attendance
of invitees to national musical competitions and other
similar events with international participation which
may be organized in each country.
b. Both Parties agree to encourage and support ex-
changes in the field of creative arts, including groups
of writers, composers, artists and others, as well as
individuals in these categories.
4. Exchanges in Sports
a. Each Party agrees to encourage and facilitate
invitations from its athletic and sports organizations
in order that athletes from one country can participate
in athletic and sports exhibitions and contests in the
other country.
5. Exchanges of Books and Publications and Coopera-
tion in the Field of Publishing
a. Both Parties agree to encourage and to assist in
the exchanges of books, pamphlets, periodical liter-
ature, scholarly and scientific studies, microfilms and
APRIL 29, 1963
661
other printed and duplicated materials devoted to edu-
cational, scientific, technical, cultural and other sub-
jects between university, public and specialized li-
braries and other appropriate institutions of both
countries.
(1) Educational materials and publications may
include university catalogues, textbooks, study pro-
grams, curricula, syllabi, visual aids and documentary
materials in various fields of study.
b. Both Parties agree to use their good offices to
encourage the sale through commercial channels of
books and other publications in the Rumanian language
in the United States and in the English language in the
Rumanian People's Republic.
c. Both Parties agree to encourage, subject to the
consent of the authors or other parties in interest,
the translation and publication in one country of scien-
tific and literary works, including anthologies, diction-
aries and other compilations, as well as scientific
studies, reports and articles published in the other
country.
6. Radio and Television Exchanges
a. Both Parties agree to assist In the exchange of
radio and television programs between American and
Rumanian radio and television companies and organi-
zations. The details of these exchanges will be
worked out between the representatives of American
radio and television companies designated by the De-
partment of State and Rumanian radio and television
organizations designated by the legal authorities, or
between the Parties.
b. Each Party agrees to facilitate appearances, either
recorded or in person, over radio and television by
government officials, artists and public figures of the
other country.
7. Exhibits
a. Both Parties agree to provide for showings in
several cities of exhibits from the other country during
each of the two years these arrangements are in effect.
8. Cooperation in the Field of Motion Pictures
a. Both Parties will encourage the conclusion of
commercial contracts between American film companies
approved by the Department of State and Rumanian
film organizations approved by the legal authorities for
the purchase and sale of mutually acceptable feature
films.
b. Both Parties will encourage the exchanges of ap-
proved documentary and scientific films between cor-
responding organizations and assist their distribution
through appropriate distribution channels.
c. Both Parties will seek to arrange annual special
showings in their respective capitals and other cities
of representative films to which film personalities from
the other country may be invited to attend.
d. Both Parties agree that all of the films exchanged,
purchased or sold in accordance with this section will
be released in dubbed or subtitled versions. The con-
tents of the films will be preserved and any changes
must be agreed to by the supplying Party. Prior to its
distribution, the release version of each film must be
agreed to by a representative designated by the sup-
plying Party.
e. The Parties favor and agree to encourage, under
appropriate conditions, other means of cooperation In
this field, such as the joint production of feature^
documentary and other films.
9. Tourism
a. Both Parties favor the development of tourism
between the two countries and agree to take measures,
on the basis of equality of opportunity, to satisfy better
the requests of tourists to acquaint themselves with
the way of life, work and culture of the respective*
peoples.
Specific details and programs of the above-mentioned!
visits and exchanges will be agreed upon through
diplomatic channels or by approved organizations.
Except where other mutually satisfactory arrange-
ments have been made, it is agreed that individual
visitors and delegations will pay their own expenses
to and in the receiving country. It is understood that
the arrangements agreed upon do not exclude the
possibility of additional visits and exchanges which
may be mutually acceptable to the two Parties or which
may be undertaken by interested United States and
Rumanian organizations or private citizens, it being
understood that arrangements for additional ex-
changes, as appropriate, will be facilitated by prior
agreement in diplomatic channels or between approved
organizations. It is further understood that the com-
mitments provided for above shall be subject to the
constitutional requirements and applicable laws and
regulations of the two countries.
The Government of the United States of America
takes note of the approval by the Government of the
Rumanian People's Republic of these understandings
as confirmed in your note of today's date.
Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest
consideration.
William A. Cbawfobd
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of the United
States of America
His Excellency
POMPBLIU MaCOVET,
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Bucharest.
Rumanian Note
April 2, 1963
Sie: I have the honor to refer to the recent discus-
sions between representatives of the Government of
the Rumanian People's Republic and the Government
of the United States of America regarding the program
of visits and exchanges in cultural, educational, scien-
tific and other fields during the calendar years 1963
and 1964.
662
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJIXlETIN
In this connection, I wish to Inform you that the
overnment of the Rumanian People's Republic ap-
roves the following provisions which record the under-
:andings reached in the discussions:
[Here follow numbered paragraphs 1 through 9, as In the
.S. note above.]
Specific details and programs of the above-mentioned
isits and exchanges will be agreed upon through dip-
)matic channels or by approved organizations. Ex-
spt where other mutually satisfactory arrangements
ave been made, it is agreed that individual visitors
nd delegations will pay their own expenses to and in
le receiving country. It is understood that the
rrangements agreed upon do not exclude the possi-
ility of additional visits and exchanges which may be
mtually acceptable to the two Parties or which may
e undertaken by interested Rumanian and United
tates organizations or private citizens, it being under-
tood that arrangements for additional exchanges, as
ppropriate. will be facilitated by prior agreement In
Iplomatic channels or between approved organiza-
ions. It is further understood that the commitments
rovided for above shall be subject to the constitutional
equirements and applicable laws and regulations of
he two countries.
The Government of the Rumanian People's Republic
akes note of the approval by the Government of the
Jnited States of America of these understandings as
onfirmed in your note of today's date.
Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest
onsideration.
POMPILia Macovei
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Rumanian People's Republic
rhe Honorable
.ViLLiAM A. Crawford,
Jwvoj/ Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America.
Two New Members Appointed
to Advisory Committee on Arts
The Department of State announced on April
S (press release 185) two new appointments to
the reconstituted Advisory Committee on the
Arts, which gives guidance to the Department
in the conduct of its program of sending cultural
presentations to foreign countries.
The new appointees are Lew Christensen, di-
rector of the San Francisco Ballet, and Nina
Vance, founder and managing director of the
Alley Theater in Houston. Appointment of the
first 4 members of the 10-member committee was
announced on March 7.^ They are Roy E. Lar-
sen, chairman, Warner Lawson, Peter Mennin,
and George Seaton.
The committee is authorized by the Ful-
bright-Hays Act (Public Law 87-256). A
predecessor committee was authorized by earlier
legislation but was not accorded the broad role
marked out for this group as a result of the
recent reorganization of the U.S. cultural pres-
entations program. This reorganization fol-
lowed a request in October 1962 by Lucius D.
Battle, Assistant Secretary for Educational and
Cultural Affairs, for review of the program and
recommendations for its future by the U.S.
Advisory Commission on International Educa-
tional and Cultural Affairs. This review ^ was
made by Mr. Larsen, who is vice chairman of
the Commission, and Glenn G. Wolfe, a Foreign
Service officer who is at present director of the
Office of Cultural Presentations. The secre-
tariat for the Advisory Committee on the Arts
is headed by Heath Bowman.
World Food Congress Secretariat
Opens Office at Wasliington
The Department of State and the Department
of Agriculture announced on March 29 (De-
partment of State press release 165) that S. Y.
Krishnaswamy, Secretary General of the World
Food Congress, has established an international
headquarters secretariat at the Department of
State.
The World Food Congress, sponsored by the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, will be held at Washington
June 4^18, on invitation of the U.S. Govern-
ment.
' Bulletin of Mar. 25, 1062, p. 448.
^ For background, see ibid., Jan. 14, 19G3, p. 46.
APRIL 29, 1963
663
THE CONGRESS
The Foreign Aid Program
Statement iy Secretary Rush ^
I appreciate the opportunity to meet once
again with tlie committee to discuss one of our
vital contributions to tlie security of tlie free
world. One year ago I came here to discuss the
President's proposals for the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1962." Before taking up his pro-
posals for the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963,^
I should like to touch briefly on some of the
changes and trends in the world situation dur-
ing the last 12 months.
A year ago we were deeply concerned with
crises in Laos, Vietnam, the Congo, Berlin, and
Cuba. None of these has been finally resolved.
But agi'eements were finally reached on the
neutralization of Laos and a new government
was installed. The situation there remains pre-
carious: The Viet Minh controlled by Hanoi
have not been completely withdrawn ; the coali-
tion remains uneasy. But certainly one element
which has contributed heavily to the progress
made in Laos has been the U.S. foreign assist-
ance program. Without our aid, the supporters
of Laotian neutrality and freedom would un-
doubtedly have lost. Our assistance program
continues to provide a vital economic margin
to those who would keep Laos independent.
Next door the Communist guerrilla aggres-
sion directed from Hanoi against the Republic
of Vietnam remains dangerous. But it has
been curbed. Generally, it may be said that the
^ Made before the House Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs on Apr. 5.
= Bui-LETIN of Apr. 23, 1902. p. 659.
» lUil., Apr. 22, 1963, p. 591.
threat to Southeast Asia has been brought imderl
control. Our military and economic assistance'
progi'ams are crucial in meeting this test of
strength.
In the Congo, much remains to be done tn
consolidate political unity and to move forward
socially and economically. But the country i^
no longer torn by secessionist movements; and
the outlook there has measurably improved.
U.S. assistance during the past year given
through tlie United Nations has not only given
the Congo its first real opportmiity for inde
pendent life, but also has been instrumental in
preventing a great-power confrontation.
West Berlin stands free and prosperous ; and
we think that everyone understands that we and
our allies will do whatever may be necessai-y to
keep it that way.
The Communist thrust into the Western Hem-
isphere by way of Cuba last autmnn took a new
and highly dangerous turn ; the events of that
crisis are now well known. The underlying
crisis represented by the presence in this hemi-
sphere of international communism is still witli
us. But I think it may be said that among the
results of the crisis of last October tliere has
been a sharp decline in Castro's prestige botli
in Cuba and elsewhere in the Western Hemi-
sphere. The economy of Cuba continues to
disintegrate.
There have been other significant events in
the past months.
The Chinese Connnunist incursions into India
liad iirofound eifects on Indian public opinion
664
DEPARTMENT OF ST.VTE BULLETIN
iLiid noticeable effects on the policies of the In-
dian Government. Last fall in an hour of crisis,
tiie Indian Government turned to us and other
Western countries for emergency assistance.
We responded promptly with munitions and
^up]1lies and with air transport to deliver them
the Northeast Frontier. More recently, at
he invitation of the Indian Government, we
oiiicd Great Britain, Canada, and Australia in
.ondin<r a mission to India to study the prob-
ems of organizing an effective air defense for
ndia's major cities in the event of Chinese
'diiununist air attacks.
The Communist Chinese invasion highlights
1 cornerstone of otu- assistance policy : that we
iiust assist the subcontinent of South Asia in
ts competition with Commimist China. The
''ommunist Chinese military attack appears to
oniirm — in a broad sense — that the Chinese
re worried by this competition and that our
ssistance policy combined with the forthright
ctions of the recipients is meeting with success
t this contest.
Iraq has a new and stoutly independent gov-
rnment. Other coimtries in the Middle East
nd Africa which seemed to be flirting danger-
usly with the Soviet bloc have been moving
Dward a warier independence and better rela-
ions with the "West.
Within the Communist world, the dispute be-
sveen Moscow and Peiping has become increas-
igly bitter. It has infected the Commimist
arties in most other countries.
Trends toward diversity — and fragmenta-
lon — are evident in the Communist movement
enerally. Trends toward "destalinization"
re visible in all the Eastern European Com-
mnist states except perhaps Albania. Nation-
lism remains a vigorous force in Eastern Eu-
ope — a force which we need to take into full
ccount in our own attitudes and policies.
Communist China remains in the grip of a
3vere economic crisis. It suffers from short-
ges in domestic food production ; its industrial
evelopment has lagged seriously ; many of its
actories are idle for lack of raw materials and,
1 some cases, spare parts.
The Soviet Union and the bloc states also are
aving difficulties with food production. Po-
iind, where most of the farming is done by
individual peasants on their own land, has had
greater success.
The Soviet Union needs heavy investment in
agriculture — at the very time that its military
and space programs have become more expen-
sive. At the same time, the Soviet people con-
tinue to press for better living standards;
therefore the Soviet authorities face serious
dilemmas in allocating their resources.
Failures in production, especially food pro-
duction, have cost the Communist world
considerable prestige, esjDecially among the
underdeveloped areas and especially in contrast
with our own agricultural abundance.
We had some disappointments during the
year — the failure of Great Britain to gain ad-
mission to the Common Mai'ket, for example.
But all in all, I think it may be said that the
free world has fared better than the Communist
world during the last 12 months. This gives
us no cause for complacency. The Soviet
Union controls enormous resources. Our Com-
munist adversaries remain dedicated to the
commmiization of the world. Despite their
differences, Moscow and Peiping remain allies.
There is not necessarily any comfort for us in
competition between two centers of Conmiunist
power, each trying to prove that its method of
"burying" us is the more efficacious.
We cannot afford to let down.
Foreign Aid, a Defense of Freedom
But the record gives us groimd for quiet
confidence that we are on the right track, that
we have a sound strategy, and in the main are
doing the right things to protect the security
and increase the free world's strength — eco-
nomically, socially, and politically, as well as
militarily. In this great and complicated task,
foreign aid plays diverse and indispensable
roles. Nearly all of the visible improvements
in the joosition and conditions of the free world
during the past year have been due in part to
our foreign assistance programs.
As the members of this committee know
well — because this committee has helped im-
measurably to shape our aid policy — our foreign
assistance over the years has taken many forms
and served a variety of specific purposes.
In the wake of the Second World War, most
PRIL 29, 1963
665
of it went into relief, rehabilitation, and repair
of war damage.
We extended aid to Greece and Turkey
to stop the Stalinist drive toward the
Mediterranean.
In the Marshall Plan we concentrated on
assisting free Europe to recover economic and
political health.
For many years, military assistance has been
a significant part of our program.
But in recent years we have given increasing
attention to helping the peoples of the imder-
developed areas to move forward economically,
socially, and politically. The wellspring of
these development programs was the fourth
point of President Truman's inaugural address
in 1949,* when he announced "... a bold new
program for making the benefits of our scien-
tific advances and industrial progress available
for the improvement and growth of underde-
veloped areas."
Many forget that the Point 4 concept was
announced during the dark days of the Berlin
blockade and Communist Chinese expansion on
the Asian mainland — when aggressive bloc
threats were directly confronting us. Then, as
now, the relationship between economic and
political progress and the security of the United
States was apparent. Then, as now, it was
clear that our aid program must provide hope
for progress through freedom as a vital instru-
ment of our foreign policy.
As each new or newly awakened independent
nation emerges into the modem world — as it
moves forward economically and socially and
achieves political stability— it adds to the
strength of the community of free nations.
The less developed nations' great thirst for
progress provides the developed nations with a
most demanding challenge. It provides, as
well, the most useful focus for the restless en-
ergies of new or reborn nations. While the
development process is neither easily under-
stood nor easily undertaken, it serves as a nat-
ural scope of activity for the underprivileged
who are concerned with improving their lot and
eager to make their mark upon the world.
It is in the U.S. interest, and in its proud
humanitarian tradition, to foster the modern-
ization process. Not to do so would simply as-
sure that the growth of the less developed coun-
tries will be patterned by others.
Here lies the surest defense of freedom.
For — let us be quite clear — the Communists
believe the safest method of expansion open to
them is to exploit the inevitable confusion and
turbulence of the underdeveloped areas as they
reach out to modernize their societies. Every-
where they seek to take over from within as
they did in Cuba. This is a method we must
head off ; and foreign aid is one of our instru-
ments for heading it off and preserving the
independence of nations.
The economic aid provided by the United
States and its allies should make it possible
to prevent conditions of stagnation and hope-
less poverty from leading to political unrest
and the growth of communism. It is easier
and cheaper in the long run to prevent the
conditions that may lead to communism than
to reverse the system once it has become estab-
lished. It should not be necessary to have an-
other Cuba in Latin America or Africa to drive
home the "ounce of prevention" lesson.
There are additional reasons for extending
assistance. I have noted that the Clay commit-
tee, which studied foreign assistance in the con-
text of national and free-world security, stated
that the need for development assistance would
continue "even if the cold war and all our out-
standing political differences with the Com-
munists were to be resolved tomorrow." ^ For
it is, said the committee, "part of the American
tradition to be concerned with the plight of
those less fortunate than ourselves." And it
is the hope of the American people to see "a
world which is prosperous and at peace."
Basic Guidelines for 1964
The President has requested appropriation
of $4,525 million to carry out our programs of
economic and military assistance in fiscal year
1964.
' Ihid., Jan. 30, 1949, p. 123.
' Copies of the report The Scope and Distribution of
Vnited States Military and Economic Assistance Pro-
grams: Report to the President of the Vnited States
from The Committee to Strengthen the Sccuritj/ of the
Free World, March 20, 1963, are available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (price 15 cents).
666
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
This request, which is some $400 million less
han the budget estimates published in January,
■eflects :
— the review of our assistance programs con-
ilucted by Mr. [David E.] Bell, new Adminis-
rator of the Agency for International Develop-
ment, who will be before the committee early
ext week;
— reconunendations of the Committee To
■trengthen the Security of the Free World,
haired by General [Lucius D.] Clay, who, I
nderstand, also will be before the committee ;
nd
— savings resulting from withholding of
mds programed for use in fiscal year 1963,
at not committed to some nations because of
ladequate performance of self-help efforts.
Of the total request for $4.5 billion, $1,405
illion is for the military assistance program —
iO million more than appropriated for fiscal
!ar 1963. $3,120 million is requested for eco-
)mic assistance. New requirements necessi-
te a request $500 million greater than the fiscal
•ar 1963 appropriation. It will be of interest
you to note that loans comprise almost 60
trcent of the amount requested for economic
sistance.
I have included in an annex a somewhat more
tailed discussion of the fiscal year 1964 appro-
iation request.
The basic goal of our foreign assistance pro-
i am may be simply stated : To help other coun-
1 es to maintain their independence and become
I i-supporting. Independence and self-sus-
itning growth are interlocking objectives,
lime countries we have aided have already
itiieved them. Others in many parts of the
' )rld are now approaching them. In Western
-irope and Japan our postwar aid provided
1 3 margin by which these coimtries were able
1 reach, in a relatively short period, self-sus-
t ning growth and political independence,
(•eece, Lebanon, Israel, Thailand, Taiwan,
()lombia, and the Philippines, as well as other
CLmtries, are nearing the point of self-sustain-
i? growth. Others, we trust, will join this
/ owing list in the nest few years.
In the present world, independence and politi-
( [ stability go hand in hand with reasonable
< )nomic progress. A sound, growing economy
provides the forward momentum and hope
which will lessen the temptations of "quick"
routes to progress through totalitarian-com-
munism. Our foreign aid program has an es-
sential role in providing development hope as
well as capital and advice.
From experience we have developed some
basic guidelines for development assistance:
Self-help is the most important single factor
in the development process. At best, this coun-
try can provide only a small margin of the
capital and skills necessary to launch sound
development. If countries are to progress —
economically, politically, and socially — there
must be a real commitment by the people them-
selves to the development struggle — the difficult
struggle against poverty, disease, inertia, illiter-
acy, and despair. United States assistance can
play a crucial role in the development process
only when nations take the difficult and some-
times politically risky reforms and fiscal and so-
cial measures necessary for development. Self-
help by aid recipients is equally important from
the standpoint of the United States, because an
imending foreign assistance program would
mean an unending burden on our taxpayers.
Our objective — as well as the objective of the
aid-receiving nations — must be self-sustaining
growth.
Selectivity, therefore, must also be a key.
We must select those countries willing to make
a major self-help effort. We must focus upon
those coimtries in which our assistance will pro-
vide the necessary margin for growth. We
must give sufficient assistance to those selected
countries to enable them to make headway
toward that self-sustaining growth. It is less
expensive for us in the long rim to provide
enough nourishment to produce growth than
only enough to maintain life.
But we also must be selective from our point
of view. Eighty percent of all economic assist-
ance funds are concentrated in 20 countries.
Our military assistance programs are con-
centrated even more heavily.
On the other hand, in almost one-half of the
countries aided, technical assistance is perhaps
the most important. In these countries, par-
ticularly in Africa, there is no U.S. aid except
for technical assistance. In such cases, our ad-
RIL 29, 1963
667
visers are carefully selected to help the country
address one or more critical development
problems.
Approximately 18 percent of the grant f mids
proposed for both the development grant and
Alliance for Progress sections of the act in fiscal
year 1964 are earmarked for 19 comitries where
there are no other U.S. aid activities and 16
countries where possible development loan ac-
tivity would not exceed $4 million. In many
of these countries, U.S. aid missions are not re-
quired; our teclmical assistance programs and
personnel are supervised by one or two people
assigned to the embassy.
Contributions from others is another impor-
tant criterion followed by AID in determining
allocation of funds to individual countries. The
United States is continuing efforts to assure in-
creasing participation by other free nations in
jDroviding both bilateral and multilateral as-
sistance. Many of the countries of Western
Europe — originally recipients of foreign aid —
are now donors. Other free-world assistance
to underdeveloped countries doubled between
1956 to 1961, and the United States hopes that
these nations will bear an increasing burden in
the years ahead. It is important also that other
free nations liberalize the terms of their assist-
ance.
Improving Standards of Performance
It is obvious that it has not always been pos-
sible to manage our assistance programs on
bankers' principles, although it is in this direc-
tion we are moving.
We have had to assist countries engaged in
open war, such as Korea. The Republic of
Korea had made economic progress by mid-1950
when the Communists launched their aggres-
sion. That war gave us a big task in relief and
reconstruction.
We have had to operate in countries in the
grip of Communist guerrilla aggressions. That
was the situation in Greece in 1947, and Laos
and South Vietnam after the truce in the Indo-
chinese War. It is the situation in South Viet-
nam today. It is quite likely that the remark-
able progress made by that country, with our
aid, between 1955 and 1959 was an important
factor in the decision of the North Vietnamese
Comnumists to renew and expand their guer
rilla activities.
We have had to aid countries with govern
ments which were not very efficient and not al
of whose officials have been completely honest
We do what we can to improve efficiency, elim
inate corruption, and promote desirable re
forms. But we have, and want, no satellites o
colonies. We have to use our influence, no
instruments of control.
We have had to carry out our assistance pro
grams in most countries where the cadres o
trained administrators and teclinicians are ver
thin indeed. In fact, by definition, a less de
veloped country lacks enough skilled people t<
administer its own affairs with maximun
efficiency.
It is mirealistic to expect of every country a
this time, especially when the enemies of free
dom are ceaselessly at work to undermine prog
ress, the standard of performance we expect i
the United States or Western Europe. A con
siderable j)art of our foreign assistance effort i
directed toward providing the technical assist
ance necessary to help establish trained, efS
cient administrators. But the development o
modern standards of public administratio
takes time.
In conflict, there is always waste. In wai
the waste is terrific. But no sensible man cor
demns a commander for shooting too man
shells, provided he accomplishes his missioi
As long as the cold war continues, we shoul
not measure the value of our aid expenditure
solely by the tests of bankers' loans — althougl
Mr. Chairman, this is the direction in which w
aim to move, and have already moved sul
stantially.
We have been trying, and will continue to trj
to make our aid programs as efficient and effec
tive as possible.
During the past year and a half, AID has
I believe, made important improvements in oi
ganization and personnel. I am sure there wil
be further improvements.
I may say I have great confidence in Davii
Bell.
The special challenge and the special oppoi
tunity of Latin America demand the continue!
attention of all Americans. As you gentlemei
668
DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BXILLETI>
CHOW well, the Alliance for Progress, to which
\e are committed with other free American
lations, is a 10-year program of economic and
ocial progress. It is not yet 2 years old and,
s the President stated, much of this early
)hase has been devoted to organizing, planning,
nd initiating.
I shall not repeat the President's progi-ess re-
lort on the Alliance for Progress. But I would
ike to set forth briefly a few general observa-
ions growing out of the events of the past year :
1. The difficulties in regard to Cuba are a
ontinual reminder that prevention is easier
!i:ui cure — that, having failed in years past
1 take the steps which might have prevented
lie establislunent of a Marxist-Leninist regime
1 Cuba, we had better try hard to prevent such
evelopments in the future.
Throughout the hemisphere I have seen evi-
ence that this lesson of the Cuban experience
; ever more widely appreciated.
•2. In the last 6 months, Castro's stature in
18 hemisphere has shrunk further. The demo-
L-atic left has shifted rapidly away from him.
n country after coimtry the I'esistance tends
) be concentrated in a hard-core Communist
pparatus.
3. Although in most countries the liberal dem-
sratic elements have tended to be the most
iithusiastic suppoi'ters of the Alliance for
'rogress, moderates and conservatives through-
Lit the hemisphere have been manifesting an
icreasingly active interest. In many countries
le alliance now has broad political support.
4. Finally, I would recall that in the show-
own last October, the hemisphere stood united.
n the hour of crisis, evei-y member of the Or-
anization of American States supported what
ad to be done.
So, despite all the difficulties, I feel encour-
ged about the future of the Alliance for Prog-
ess and hemispheric cooperation in general.
he U.S. Role in Economic Development
In the complex business of fostering eco-
omic development, the United States has, I
elieve, some special assets.
(A) We have unparalleled educational.facil-
;ies, especially in the fields which are essential
economic and social development. I think
of our facilities for training in public healtli
and medicine. I think of that remarkable in-
strument, the system of land-gi-ant colleges,
which originated a century ago last year.
Through their farm research and extension edu-
cation, the land-grant institutions have literally
wrought an agricultural miracle. A century
ago one farm worker could produce enough food
for only four or five other people, and approxi-
mately 55 percent of our population was en-
gaged in farming. Today each farm worker
produces enough food for 27 people ; and only
8 percent of our workers are engaged in farm-
ing. Both the land-grant system and the peace-
ful revolution in which it played a central role
contain lessons which are widely applicable in
other parts of the world.
And some of our special problems such as
the soil conservation and water development of
our Western States are similar to those of sev-
eral other comitries.
(B) We also know, Mr. Chairman, from ex-
perience in our own country how to achieve
rapid economic development. I emphasize the
word rapid. The rural Georgia I knew when
I was growing up was, in our modem tech-
nology, miderdevelojDed : It enjoyed few of the
benefits of modem scieftce, technology, medi-
cine, public health, or education.
Forty years ago, hookworm and malaria were
still among oui" serious problems in the South.
Forty years ago»©nly two American farms in a
hundred had electricity. Now 98 percent have
it — and not just for electric lights but for all
sorts of services to the farmer and his wife and
family.
Three decades ago, just^before the Teraiessee
Valley Authority was created, the average per
capita income in that area was only $168, which
was less than half the national average even at
that low point in the great depression. Now
the average per capita income in the Tennessee
Valley is about $1,500, approximately two-
thirds of the national average. And it is still
growing.
Anyone who examines objectively the devel-
opment of our recently underdeveloped areas in
our owii country, and compares it with what has
happened in the Communist nations, must con-
clude, I believe, that it is we who have demon-
PRIL 29, 1963
669
strated the capacity for rapid development, we
who know the shortcut to the future. And we
have done it without the brutality, without the
degradation of the individual human being,
which are characteristic to the Communist
system.
(C) We have the facilities — and perhaps a
special talent — for spreading new knowledge
and applying it in practical ways. The high
quality of our technology is generally recog-
nized. At one point or another, other free
nations may equal or surpass it. And we con-
cede the quality of Soviet technology in a few
areas. Across the board our teclinological
eminence is well established. And we are
known as a people who like to do things with
their hands, to tinker, to invent new methods
of doing things.
(D) "We have unrivaled experience in operat-
ing a wide range of foreign aid i^rograms. "We
have made mistakes. And we have learned
from others in the field as well as from our own
experience. Before we started there was not
much precedent to guide us. "We have been the
chief inventors, the leading developers, of these
life-preserving and bodybuilding transfusions
of economic, military, and technical strength.
(E) Over the last 15 years, we have built up
a corps of public servants who know at first
hand and increasingly understand the problems
of the less developed nations. TJntil tliey
achieved independence, our contacts with many
of the peoples of Asia and Africa were very
limited. American experts on some of the new
countries did not exist. But with the passage of
time, with experience, with the weeding out of
unsuitable personnel, and with the training of
others, we have developed public servants —
diplomats, military men, information spe-
cialists, educators, agricultural specialists, and
others — who know much about the various
people of free Asia. "We are moving toward
the same end in Africa. And we are working
at developing public servants with wider and
deeper understanding of the countries of the
"Western Hemisphere.
In learning more about other people and giv-
ing them a helping hand, we have a fine new
instrument in the Peace Corps. I hope that
some of the younger graduates of the Peace
Corps will wish to make a career in our foreign
services.
(F) We have important assets in the wid
range of American associates with other peopl
through voluntary, nongovernmental organize
tions. These range from our Councils o
Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy Associa
tions, through scores of organizations t
promote better relations with particular coun
tries or areas, to our civic clubs, which hav
spread to other lands. They include th
wide-ranging overseas programs of our privat
philanthropic foundations, our churches, an<
other groups. They include the persona
friendships with people in other lands formei
by Americans who have gone abroad as teacher?
or students, or as businessmen, or in othe
capacities, including just as tourists.
(G) Perhaps even more important are tb
scores of thousands of persons from the less de
veloped countries who have come to the Unitec
States for education or special training o
perhaps just to learn more about us; and manj
more thousands who have studied under Amer
ican teachers in universities, vocational schools
and other training centers in their own coun
tries. Not everyone reacts favorably to sue!
exposures to us. But experience indicates tha
an overwhelming majority of the persons fron
the less developed countries who have studiec
or visited in the United States or studied ex
tensively under American teachers abroad take
away a predominantly favorable impression.
(H) Probably the most valuable asset wf
have is confidence in our intentions. Despite
Communist propaganda, despite the criticisms
to which we are often subjected, and despite oc-
casional differences and misunderstandings be-
tween certain other free nations and ourselves,
most of the leaders and peoples of the less de-
veloped nations realize that our real purpose
is what we say it is — to help these nations main-
tain their independence and improve the lot
of their peoples.
This confidence in the purpose of our aid
is interlocked with a broad confidence in our
deepest commitments as a nation. I strongly
disagree with those who assert that we are
widely distrusted or hated. My experience both
as a private citizen and as a public official leads
me to think otherwise. Men and women
670
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BITLLETIN
throughout the free world — and behind the Iron
and Bamboo Curtains — know something about
our national history. They can quote the great
sentences of our Declaration of Independence,
ithe great ideas of our Founding Fathers, of Lin-
coln, of Woodrow "Wilson, and our recent states-
men. They know that we have fought for free-
dom in the past and that we are dedicated to
defending and spreading it today. Tliey want
for themselves basically what we want and,
in large part, have achieved for ourselves —
not only material well-being but freedom, and
the dignity of the individual. These ideas and
ideals of human freedom have brought us allies,
avowed and unavowed, throughout the world.
The price for freedom has never been cheap.
Building and expanding and defending free-
dom have always required struggle, courage,
tenacity. Often they have cost heavily in treas-
ure — and blood. I would prefer to see freedom
defended and built without the bloodshed if
possible. And the dollar cost of defending
and strengthening freedom through foreign aid
is a small fraction of what we have to spend on
military defense — and an infinitesimal fraction
of the cost of a third world war.
The free world is gaining in strength, both
absolutely and in comparison with the Com-
munist world. But this worldwide struggle
between freedom and coercion is far from fin-
ished. Our adversaries remain powerful and
determined. They are detennined to "bury"
us. We must carry on until freedom prevails.
Victoi-y in this fateful contest will not go to
the complainers, the faint of heart, and weak of
back. We cannot win by yielding the field to
the enemy. Retreat is the sure and quick road
to defeat.
There is nothing that the Communists want
more than to see the "Yanks go home" — not only
from Western Europe, but from the Mediter-
ranean, South Asia, the Far East, Latin Amer-
ica, Africa, everywhere. If we Yanks come
home, the Communists will begin to take over.
"Wliy any American would want to cooperate
with that global Communist strategy is beyond
my understanding. But that is what sharp cuts
in our foreign aid programs would mean.
Those who favor gutting these powerful and
effective instruments at this juncture of his-
tory must assume an awful responsibility.
Their defeatist prescription should be opposed
resolutely by all who want to push until we
have achieved a world in which our freedom —
and the freedom of all men — is secure.
ANNEX
Fiscal Yeab 1964 Foreign Assistance Peogbam
The President has requested appropriation of $4,525
million to carry out our programs of economic and
military assistance in fiscal year 1964.
The $4,525 million requested is some $400 million
less than the budget estimate published in January
of this year. Downward adjustments have been made
in the proposed fiscal year 1964 programs as a result
of the reassessment of the program by the aid agency
under the new Administrator and the Clay committee's
general recommendations. Moreover, funds were re-
ceived from prior year programs and fiscal year 1963
funds were withheld because some nations' perform-
ance did not fully meet our expectations and criteria.
For the various funding categories of economic as-
sistance, the executive branch has requested a total
appropriation of $3,120 million. Almost 60 percent
of this amount is planned in loans both under the
Alliance for Progress and development loan funding
categories.
Development Loans. $1,060 million has been re-
quested for development loans outside Latin America.
Development loans have become the central tool of
U.S. development asisistance efforts. More than half
of these funds are allocated for use in the Near East
and South Asia in fiscal year 1964. The great pro-
portion of this amount would help to meet require-
ments in India and Pakistan. The appropriation re-
quested will enable us to meet existing commitments
to such nations as Nigeria and Tunisia, and to assist
in the serious development efforts of other friendly
nations.
Actual commitment of loan funds will depend on
performance. Requirements for sound proposals and
for broader measures of self-help must be met before
loan transactions proceed. AID has withheld sub-
stantial loan funds this fiscal year because these re-
quirements were not fulfilled. If performance should
not meet conservative expectations for fiscal year 1964,
loan funds would be similarly withheld.
Development Grants and Technical Cooperation.
$257 million in appropriations is requested for fiscal
year 1964 for development grants and technical coop-
eration outside Latin America. These programs com-
prise the Point 4 element of today's foreign assistance
effort, and are the principal source of direct contact
with the people of the emerging nations. Basically,
development grants finance efforts to provide needed
technical assistance to development in developing
countries.
APRIL 29, 1963
671
Techuical assistance, either used by Itself, or in care-
ful coordination witli development loans, can provide a
greater ultimate return, dollar for dollar, than any
other element of the foreign aid program.
The Agency for International Development is mak-
ing increasing use of the resources of other Govern-
ment agencies, and of America's universities, in pro-
viding the high-quality talents needed for successful
performance of these programs.
The Alliance for Progress. $850 million is requested
for the Alliance for Progress in fiscal year 196-1 :
,f 550 million in AID-admini.stered development loans ;
$100 million in AID-administered development
grants ;
$200 million for the Inter-American Program for
Social Progress.
AID-administered loans will help support the in-
creasing momentum of the Alliance for Progress. As
Latin American nations take more and more of the
hard decisions called for by the Charter of Punta del
Este,* the United States will stand ready to provide
the critical margin of capital.
Alliance for Progress gi'ants will be used particu-
larly to strengthen educational institutions, rural co-
operatives, and other local organizations as well as
to help governments develop the sound administra-
tive practices and reforms necessary for progress.
Almost .'};200 million is requested for the Social Prog-
ress Trust Fund of the Inter- American Program for
Social Progress. These funds permit social advance
to move forward with economic development through-
out Latin America. The Social Progress Trust Fund's
sound programs of land settlement, housing, sanitation,
water supply, and higher education provide meaningful
impact at the "grass roots" level. This year's re-
quested appropriation would permit the Trust Fund
to operate at the levels of the last 2 years. Almost $5
million will be contributed for the grant program of
the Organization of American States.
Supporting Assistance. $435 million has been re-
quested for supporting assistance in fiscal year 1964.
This increase over budget estimates and over last year's
appropriation reflects the shift of funding for the
major part of assistance to the Congo under supporting
assistance instead of through contributions to inter-
national organizations.
The major use for supporting assistance is to
strengthen the economic position of countries mount-
ing major defense efforts along the periphery of the
Sino-Soviet bloc. Other supporting assistance pro-
grams maintain economic stability in situations of
importance to the United States, provide alternatives
to excessive dependence on bloc aid, and permit access
to important U.S. military bases or facilities.
The Contingency/ Fund. $300 million is requested
for the contingency fund in fiscal year 1964, to provide
the U.S. with the flexibility to meet quickly certain
unanticipated or unascertained political and security
needs. It is hoped that substantially less than thi
$300 million appropriation request for this fiscal yeai
will be needed. It is anticipated that the present com
tingency fund of $250 million will not be fully used
but STifiicient funds must be available for the forth
coming year to meet unanticipated emergencies oi
only dimly foreseen situations. This year's evidenct
of responsible use of the contingency fund is t
strong argument for providing the funds necessary foi
flexibility.
Voluntary Contributions to International Organizm
tions. $136 million is requested for funding U.S. volum
tary contributions to eight international programs)
Shifting of much of the assistance program for thi
Congo to supiwrting assistance has lowered this ren
quest considerably below the level indicated in the
President's budget.
Other Requests. .$20 million is requested for an
expanded program for American-sponsored schools and
hospitals abroad, as well as .$2 million in local currency!
for a children's hospital in Poland being constructed)
under private American auspices. Finally, $60 mil-
lion is requested for administration expenses.
Military Assistance is the other major arm of U.S.i
foreign assistance efforts. This program, which is lesst
than 3 percent of the amount required to support ourT
own Military Establishment, plays a key role in pro- 1
tecting the security of the entire free world. The '
President has requested appropriation of $1,405 mil-
lion for military assistance in fiscal year 1964.
More than three-fourths of this military assistance
goes to maintain the defensive capabilities and internal
security of free nations along the Sino-Soviet periphery.
Other uses of military 'assistance include smaller in-
ternal security and civic action programs in Africa
and Latin America, and to meet existing NATO com-
mitments in Europe.
Other. Apart from assistance requested for the
children's hospital in Poland, no funds are being re-
quested under this act for Poland or Yugoslavia.
Normal trade, together with the careful use of P.L.
480, therefore assumes major importance in support
of our policy toward these countries. For this rea-
son, it is requested that discretionary authority be re-
stored to the President to continue equal tariff treat-
ment to Poland and Yugoslavia.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
'For text, see BrLLETiN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.
Appointments
Benjamin H. Read as Deputy Executive Secretary of
the Department, effective April 7. (For biographic
details, see Department of State press release 190 dated
April 11.)
672
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
TREATY INFORMATION
/Urrent Actions
MULTILATERAL
lealth
onstitution of the World Health Organization.
Opened for signature at New York July 22, l&i6.
Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808.
Acceptance deposited: Jamaica, March 21, 1963.
lafety at Sea
iternational convention for the safety of life at sea,
1960. Done at London June 17, I960.'
Acceptance deposited: Greece, February 13, 1963.
rade
eclaration on provisional accession of the Svriss Con-
federation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. Entered
into force January 1, 1960; for the United States
April 29, 1960. TIAS 4461.
Acceptance deposited: Italy, February 22, 1963.
roc^s-verbal extending and amending declaration of
November 22, 1958 (TIAS 4461), on provisional ac-
ces.sion of the Swiss Confederation to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
December 8, 1961. Entered into force December 31,
1961 ; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS
4957.
Acceptance deposited,: Italy, February 22, 1963.
rotocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
embodying results of the 1960-61 tariff conference.
Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. Entered into force
for the United States December 31, 1962. TIAS 5253.
!ii(r)uitiircs: India, February 21, 1963; United King-
dom, February 15, 1963.
'eather
invention of the "World Meteorological Organization.
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into
force March 23, 19.50. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Cyprus, April 11, 1963.
BILATERAL
Olivia
greement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of February 12, 1962, as amended (TIAS
5047, 5121, and 5233) . Effected by exchange of notes
at La Paz March 29, 1963. Entered into force March
29, 1963.
greement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of February 4, 1963 (TIAS 5292). Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at La Paz March 29,
1963. Entered into force March 29, 1963.
lermany, Federal Republic of
greement concerning the settlement of claims which
have arisen through the nonduty use of private motor
vehicles of members of the United States Forces in-
sured by the Brandaris insurance company. Effected
by exchange of letters at Bonn February 18 and
March 14, 1963. Entered into force March 14, 1963.
India
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of November 26, 1962 (TIAS 5225). Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at New Delhi April 1,
1963. Entered into force April 1, 1963.
Luxembourg
Declaration for the effective protection of trademarks.
Signed at Luxembourg December 23 and at The
Hague December 27, 1904. Entered into force March
15, 1905. 34 Stat. 2868.
Terminated: March 28, 1963 (upon entry into force
of treaty of friendship, establishment and naviga-
tion).
Paraguay
Agreement postponing termination until June 30, 1963,
of reciprocal trade agreement of September 12, 1946,
as amended and extended (TIAS 1601, 5000, 5194).
Effected by exchange of notes Februarv 27 and
March 20, 1963. Entered into force aiarch 29, 1963.
Philippines
Agreement for financing certain educational exchange
programs. Signed at Manila March 23, 1963. En-
tered into force March 23, 1963.
Agreement relating to the United States Educational
Foundation in the Philippines, as amended. Signed
at Manila March 23, 1948. Entered into force March
23, 1948. TIAS 17.30, 174.5, 1910, and 4138.
Terminated: March 23, 1963 (superseded by agree-
ment of March 23, 1963, supra).
Rumania
Arrangement relating to a program of visits and ex-
changes in cultural, educational, scientific and other
fields during the calendar years 1963 and 1964. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Bucharest April 2,
1963. Entered into force April 2, 1963.
United Kingdom
Polaris sales agreement. Signed at Washington
April 6, 1963. Entered into force April 6, 1963.
PUBLICATIONS
' Not in force.
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Govemrment Printing Office, Washington, 25, B.C.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, except in the case of free publications, which
may be obtained from the Department of State.
Maritime Matters — Use of Greek Ports and Territorial
Waters by the N.S. Savannah. Agreement with
Greece. Exchange of notes — Signed at Athens April
23 and 24, 1962. Entered into force April 24, 1962.
TIAS 5099. 6 pp. 5^.
Tracking Stations — Continuation and Extension of
Cooperative Program. Agreement with Argentina.
PRIL 29, 1963
673
Exchange of notes — Signed at Buenos Aires March 16,
1962. Entered into force March 16, 1962. TIAS 5100.
6 pp. 5^.
Peace Corps Program — Use of Volunteers in FAO-
Sponsored Projects. Agreement with the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO). Exchange of let-
ters—Signed at Rome March 23 and 29, 1962. Entered
into force March 29, 1962. TIAS 5101. 9 pp. lO^t.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Canada, amending the agreement of June
15, 1955, as amended. Signed at Washington May 25,
1962. Entered into force July 12, 1962. TIAS 5102.
3 pp. 5^.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Peaceful Uses.
Agreement with the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (EURATOJI), amending the additional agree-
ment of June 11, 1960. Signed at Brussels and Wash-
ington May 21 and 22, 1962. Entered into force July 9,
1962. TIAS 5104. 30 pp. 150.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with China, amending the agreement of July 18,
1955, as amended. Signed at Washington May 31, 1962.
Entered into force July 13, 1962. TIAS 5105. 2 pp.
5<t.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Ceylon.
Signed at Colombo July 19, 1962. Entered into force
July 19, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5106.
8 pp. lOt}.
Visas — Waiver of Fees. Agreement with the Republic
of Korea. Exchange of notes — Signed at Seoul May 25,
1962. Entered into force May 25, 1962. TIAS 5107.
3 pp. 50.
Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree-
ment with Pakistan, amending the agreement of Sep-
tember 23, 1950, as modifie<l. Exchange of notes —
Dated at Karachi July 29, 1960, and July 10 and No-
vember 13, 1961. Entered into force November 13, 1961.
TIAS 5108. 4 i)p. 50.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with the Federal Republic of Germany on Behalf
of Berlin, amending the agreement of June 28, 1957.
Signed at Washington June 29. 1962. Entered into
force July 30, 1962. With annex. TIAS 5109. 5 pp.
50.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Brazil, amending the agreement of August 8,
1955, as amended. Signed at Washington Ma.v 28, 1962.
Entered into force July 20, 1962. TIAS .5110. 2 pp. 50.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Portugal, amending the agreement of July 21,
1955, as amended. Signed at Washington May 28, 1962.
Entered into force July 20, 1962. TIAS 5111. 2 pp.
50.
Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Pakistan.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Karachi May 31, 1962.
Entered into force May 31, 1962. Operative retroac-
tively October 28, 1961. TIAS 5113. 5 pp. 50.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam,
amending the agreement of December 27. 1961, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Saigon July
5, 1962. Entered into force July 5, 1962. TIAS 5114.
3 pp. 50.
Defense — Extension of Loan of Vessels. Agreement
with Brazil. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washing-
ton February 21 and Julv 11, 1962. Entered into force
July 11, 1962. TIAS 5116. 2 pp. 50.
Boundary Waters — Saint Lawrence Seaway Suspen-
sion of Tolls on the Welland Canal. Agreement with
Canada. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ottawa July 3
and 13, 1962. Entered into force July 13, 1962. TIAS
5117. 2 pp. 50.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indo-
nesia, amending the agreement of February 19, 1962, as ,
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Djakarta
July 11, 1962. Entered into force July 11, 1962. TIAS
5118. 2 pp. 50.
Red Cross — Termination of Agreements and Waiver of
Claims Concerning Field Hospital in Korea. Agree-
ment with Sweden. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Washington July 13 and IS, 1962. Entered into force
July 18, 1962. TIAS 5119. 3 pp. 50.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with the Federal Republic of Germany, amending
the agreement of July 3. 1957. as amended. Signed at
Washington July 5, 1962. Entered into force August
7, 1962. TIAS 5120. 3 pp. 50.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia,
amending the agreement of February 12, 1962, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at La Paz July
14, 1962. Entered into force July 14, 1962. TIAS 5121.
3 pp. 50.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 8-14
Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce
of News, Department of State, Washington 25,
D.C.
Releases issued prior to April 8 which appear
in this issue of the Buixetin are Nos. 168 of
April 1 ; 174 of April 4 ; and 175, 176, and 177 of
April 5.
No. Date
*179 4/8
181 4/8
*182 4/8
tlS3 4/8
184 4/8
185 4/8
tl86 4/9
187 4/11
188 4/10
189 4/11
*190' 4/11
tl91 4/12
tl93 4/12
Subject
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
Secretary General of World Food
Congress opens U.S. office (re-
write).
Harriman sworn in as Under Secre-
tary for Political Affairs (biogra-
phic details).
Ceylon credentials (rewrite).
Bataan Day ceremony.
ApiK)intments to Advisory Commit-
tee on Arts (rewrite).
Agreement with U.K. for sale of
Polaris missiles.
SE.\TO communique.
Rusk : NBC interview.
Visit of Grand Duchess of Luxem-
bourg (rewrite).
Read appointed Deputy Executive
Secretary (biographic details).
Meeker : "Observation in Space."
Rusk : interview on "Women on the
Move" program.
♦ Xnt printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
674
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
pril 29, 1963
figriculture. World Food Congress Secretariat
Opens Office at Washington
.sia. The United States and Southeast Asia
(Johnson)
'hina. Communist. The Divided World of Com-
munism (Abel, Rusk)
lommunism. The United States and Southeast
Asia (Johnson)
Congress. The Foreign Aid Program (Rusls) .
lepartment and Foreign Service. Appoint-
ments (Read)
Iconomic Affairs
:CAFE Study of Tokaido Railway
he Effect of the Projected European Union on
NATO (Tyler)
eadjusting United States Foreign Trade
(Weiss)
ducational and Cultural Affairs
wo New Members Appointed to Advisory Com-
mittee on Arts
.S. and Rumania Exchange Notes on Cultural
and Other Exchanges (Crawford, Macovei) .
urope. The Effect of the Projected European
Union on NATO (Tyler)
oreign Aid
he Foreign Aid Program (Rusk)
resident Kennedy Greets Reunion of Marshall
Plan Employees
he United States and Southeast Asia (John-
son)
iternational Organizations and Conferences
:CAFE Study of Tokaido Railway
ighth Meeting of SEATO Council of Ministers
(Rusk, text of communique)
Torld Food Congress Secretariat Opens Office
at Washington
Index Vol. XLVIII, No. 1224
Japan. ECAFE Study of Tokaido Railway . . 660
663 Laos. U.S. Calls for Action To Insure Restora-
tion of Cease-Fire In Laos 646
635 Luxembourg. Grand Duchess Charlotte and
Prince Jean of Luxembourg Visit U.S. . . . 647
644 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Ef-
fect of the Projected European Union on
635 NATO (Tyler) 648
QQ^ Philippines. Bataan Day Commemorated
(Kennedy) 647
„_2 Presidential Documents
Bataan Day Commemorated 647
President Kennedy Greets Reunion of Marshall
660 Plan Employees 647
„.- Publications. Recent Releases 673
Rumania. U.S. and Rumania Exchange Notes
gg2 on Cultural and Other Exchanges (Crawford,
Macovei) 661
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Eighth
ggg Meeting of SEATO CouneU of Ministers
(Rusk, text of communique) 641
QQX Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 673
U.S.S.R. The Divided World of Communism
g^g (Abel, Rusk) 644
Viet-Nam. The United States and Southeast
pg, Asia (Johnson) 635
Name Index
fi47
Abel, Elie 644
Crawford, William A 661
Johnson, U. Alexis 635
Kennedy, President 647
660 Macovei, Pompiliu 662
Read, Benjamin H 672
641 Rusk, Secretary 641,644,664
Tyler, William R " 648
663 Weiss, Leonard 652
the
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United States
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
A release in the new Foreign Affairs Outlines Series . . .
COMMUNIST SUBVERSION
in the
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
This 19-page pamplilet contains the statement made on Febru-
ary 18, 1963, by Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs, before the Latin American Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. At the outset Mr. Martin
states :
The problem of extracoatinental totalitarian powers trying to subvert
established governments in this hemisphere is not new. During World War II
the American Republics faced the challenge of Fascist subversion sponsored by
the Axis Powers. Through individual and collective action they successfully
dealt with this threat. Since 1948, in the aftermath of the Communist seizure
of power in Czechoslovakia, the inter-American community has been dealing
with the problem of Communist subversion promoted by countries of the Sino-
Soviet bloc, now supported by Cuba.
Mr. Martin also describes the development of communism prior
to Castro, Communist efforts since the advent of Castro, communism
in Latin America since 1959, steps we are taking to combat Com-
munist subversion, steps being taken in the Organization of American
States [OAS] to cotmter Communist subversion, and the role of the
Alliance for Progress in the Western Hemisphere's security effort.
Publication 7509
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Vol. XLVIII, No. 1245
May 6, 1963
SOME CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY • Remarks by Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary
Ball, and Under Secretary Harriman 679
INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF
SELF-DETERMINATION AND NONINTERVEN-
TION • by Assistant Secretary Martin 710
OUR HEMISPHERE: THE LONG AND SHORT
VIEWS • by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 704
Huston fublic Library
Superintendent ot Documents
iViAY 1 4 1953
DEPOSITORY
For index see inside back cover
E DEF^RTM
F STATE
Vol. XLVIII, No. 1245 • Publication 1 J
May 6, 1963
For Bale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Wasblngton 26, D.C.
Pkice:
(2 issues, domestic $8.60, foreign $12.25
Single copy, 26 cents
Use o( funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director ot the Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
OF State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is indexed In the
Headers' Qulde to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BVLLETt
a weekly publication issued by t»
Office of Media Services, Bureau
Public Affairs, provides the pubn
and interested agencies of tU
Government with information ii
developments in the field of forei/i
relations and on the work of t,
Department of State and the Foreii
Service. The BULLETIN includes i
lected press releases on foreign polin
issued by the White House and ti
Department, and statements and at
dresses made by the President and i
the Secretary of State and oth
officers of the Department, as well
special articles on various phases
international affairs and the fun
tions of the Department. Infornu
tion is included concerning treati
and international agreements
which the United States is or nu
become a party and treaties of get
eral international interest.
Publications of the Departmen
United Nations documents, and legi
lative material in the field of inte
national relations are listed current!
"s
ome Current Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy
Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, and
Under Secretary Harriman spoke informally
before the American Society of Newspaper
Editors at Washington on April 18. Following
mre transcripts of their remarks and of the
yuestion-and-answer periods which followed.
■REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK
?ress release 202 dated April 18
Mr. Brucker [Herbert Brucker of the Hart-
"ord Cowrant, the presiding officer], ladies and
gentlemen, thank you very much for your in-
dtation. I understand that you wish me to
)pen our discussion this afternoon with some
)rief remarks and then take your questions.
[ am very happy to do so. I shall be followed
)y two of my colleagues. I hope that the three
)f us will manage to cover the principal topics
hat you have in mind.
Let me say that it is not my purpose today to
nake news but to make sense. But perhaps
iome of you may think that that in itself is news.
(Laughter.)
But in one important respect both you and
ive who are in the foreign policy business have
I common problem : how to maintain an under-
itanding of the context withm which daily
vents occur. The simple but fundamental aims
ffld objectives of American policy come to be
:aken for granted, and perhaps forgotten. But
constant repetition invites boredom and is not
lewsworthy. Our common problem, therefore,
is to try to organize our thinking about a
urbulent world, made up of 112 states with
whom we conduct our business, a world which
we can strongly influence but cannot control,
MAT 6, 1963
and a world filled with problems into wliich we
Americans are inevitably drawn.
But let us pause just for a moment to remind
ourselves that the foreign policy of the Ameri-
can people aims at a decent world order of in-
dependent states, cooperating voluntarily across
national frontiers on the basis of common in-
terests, a world order in which disputes are to
be settled by peaceful means and where conduct
is expected to accord with the great principles
set forth in the opening sections of the United
Nations Charter.
It was for this purpose that we committed
ourselves wholeheartedly to the United Nations
at the end of World War II, for this purpose
that we formed alliances with more than 40
other nations in the interest of mutual security
and national independence, and for this purpose
that we are deeply interested in the genuine
independence and integrity of the so-called
nonalined countries.
It is the pursuit of this decent world order
which makes up the main business of the De-
partment of State. This is what the daily cable
traffic is all about. This is what we are doing in
more than a dozen international meetings being
held somewhere in the world on every working
day throughout the year. And it is widespread
confidence in this basic purpose among peoples
in other parts of the world which adds solidar-
ity to our alliances, permits friendly relations
with most of the nonalined, and explains the
fact that in moments of great crisis there are
not nearly so many neutrals as we are inclined
to think.
Now, it is true that our attention in the midst
of this mass of business, most of which is dull —
it is true that our attention is drawn at any
679
given time to certain points of crisis. I shall
not call our situation within the Atlantic alli-
ance a crisis, but I shall leave to Mr. Ball a
discussion of some of the details of that par-
ticular situation.
Points of Crisis
For our attention, for example, today is very
closely turned to Laos, a country about which
it has been agreed internationally that it should
be left free to develop an independent and neu-
tral existence of its own.
The problem there is that two of the so-called
three factions in Laos have given loyal support
to the Geneva Accords.^ The third, the Pathet
Lao, backed up by their coconspirators in Hanoi,
have not done so. And therefore there is a
crisis between the neutralist government on the
one side, supported by the former government
forces of General Phoumi [Nosavan], and the
Pathet Lao Communist group, on the other, to
determine whether these Geneva Accords will
be given full effect.
Now, we do believe that those accords can
meet the vital interests of all sides, that an inde-
pendent and neutral Laos accords with the real
requirements of the principal powers in the
present world situation, and that it is not nec-
essary to draw that country into one orbit or
another.
But, on the other hand, we cannot agree that
it should be drawn into the Communist orbit.
And therefore we are looking to the two cochair-
men, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., to
exert tl^eir maximum influence, through the
designated international machinery, and direct
with the parties concerned, to insure that those
accords will in fact be carried out. For, were
those accords to break down, then some very
grave questions would be raised for all of us as
to what next we ought to do in that particular
situation.
Our attention is also riveted on Viet-Nam, a
country which has been besieged for several
years by subversive action and infiltration, a
penetration seeking to upset the agreements of
^ For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.
' For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955:
Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State publica-
tion 6446, p. 750.
680
1954.- We believe that it is in our national in-
terest to do what we can to put the South Viet-
namese in a position to win their own war. "\Y(
believe that they themselves are determined aiu
are fighting well. "We believe that a corner h
being turned in that struggle, that the initiativt
now being taken by Government forces for tht
past several months, improved mobility anc
transportation, improved communications, im
proved intelligence coming from the very people
themselves in the countryside, improvements ir
political and social action at the village level
the switching, the change in ratios of arms cap
tured, of prisoners taken, of casualties inflicted
of defections recorded — that these show thai
important gains have been made.
And although we cannot be confident that thi;
problem will be wound up rapidly and easily—
we rather think that it will be prolonged anc
bitter and frustrating still — nevertheless, wi
believe that the South Vietnamese are now or
their way and that we can approach that prob
lem with perhaps more confidence.
In the Congo we have had a troubled an<
vexing situation, which now seems to be movin<
toward a solution. The recent constitution o
the Government of the Congo, comprising ele
ments of the major parties and major regions
promises to offer some greater degree of unit;
and stability. It's a country which has poten
tially very important resources of its own
which can be wealthy, compared to othe:
African states, and which deserves a chance t<
work out its own future, as originally int«ndec
when its independence was negotiated with Bel
gium some 3 years ago.
I believe the events there have underlined th(
basic wisdom of the decision made by President
Eisenhower not to let that particular countrj
be caught up in a bilateral engagement betweer
the two great power blocs in the so-called cole
war but to put that problem into the hands oi
the United Nations, in order to keep that kinc
of conflict out of Africa and to give the Con-
golese a chance to work out their own future
Turning to Cuba, it is the unanimous view oJ
the governments of this hemisphere that the
present Marxist-Leninist regime on that island
is incompatible with the inter- American system
and that our object must be to welcome a free
i
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTILLETIN
i
Cuban people back into the inter-American
community.
This means, among other things, that a Soviet
military presence in this hemisphere is not to be
accepted as a normal state of affairs.
Now, the actions that are now being taken
fall into three main categories: The first in-
volves the commitment of our Armed Forces to
insure that Cuba does not pose a threat to the
security of the hemisphere. This means a pro-
hibition of the return of offensive weapons to
Cuba, a maintenance of surveillance to assure
ourselves and others that such an offensive capa-
bility is not present, enforcement of the free use
of international airspace and waters in the
Caribbean, interdiction of arms shipments or
other forays aimed at other coimtries, and in-
surance that there not be a Hungarian-type
episode in this hemisphere.
It is sometimes overlooked that we have made
and are making a major commitment of force to
insure that that threat be kept within manage-
able bounds.
A second group of actions aims at demon-
strating that there is no future for Cuba under
the present regime and that the Cuban people
cannot achieve success at home or normal rela-
tions with their traditional friends of the free
world imder a regime committed to implacable
hostility toward free institutions.
This is why trade and fiscal relations with the
free world have been rapidly shrinking and why
free-world ships are being steadily withdrawn
from the Cuban trade. We are concerned at
the present moment about an increase of free-
world flagships in that trade, since the low point
reached in January, and are taking up that
question with the governments concerned.
Tliere are indications that some of these ships
under long-term charter to the bloc have been
shifted to the Cuba trade and that the numbers
are temporarily influenced by the seasonal ex-
port of the sugar harvest. And although such
free-world shipping in the first quarter of this
year was about one-sixth of the numbers in-
volved in the same quarter of last year, we are
not content with the present situation. We do
know, however, that the economy of Cuba is
facing the most serious difficulties, that its sup-
port is becoming increasingly expensive to the
bloc, and that the promises of the early revolu-
tion have been denied by the present and somber
reality.
A third group of measures has to do with
the rest of the hemisphere. They include a
strong effort within the Alliance for Progress
to demonstrate that rapid economic and social
development can best be achieved through free
institutions. They include measures, such as
those discussed by President Kennedy with the
Presidents of Central America and Panama,^
to interrupt the clandestine flow of funds and
personnel between Cuba and other countries of
the hemisphere.
They include close cooperation among the
armed forces and security agencies of the Carib-
bean in the interest of public safety. They in-
clude a fourfold increase in our own broadcast-
ing to Latin America since 1960 and the vigorous
engagement of Latin Americans themselves in
the political and propaganda battle.
We can say with confidence, I think, that the
Castro revolution has been largely discredited
as an answer to the hemisphere's problems, that
it is more widely recognized than ever before
that the answers to these problems lie in the
effort of free men to improve their own lot, with
the assistance and cooperation of the industrial-
ized free nations.
U.S. Policy Is Nonpartisan
These policies and actions taken together
make up a serious, sustained, and effective effort
to deal with the threat of Marxist-Leninism in
this hemisphere. They do not include an in-
vasion of Cuba or acts of war against that is-
land. Great risks are necessary to deal with
great threats, and the situation remains dan-
gerous. But I do not believe that we should, in
the absence of a major threat to the security of
the hemisphere, initiate armed action against
Cuba. Nor am I aware of any desire that we
do so among the responsible leadership of either
political party.
Now, on this question of bipartisanship, or
nonpartisanship, I think it is fair to say that
the main lines of United States policy since
World War II have been nonpartisan in char-
' Bulletin of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 511.
MAT G, 1963
681
acter : support for the United Nations, for our
great alliances, for necessary actions in defense
and mutual security assistance, for the ener-
getic support of the interests of the United
States and of our citizens abroad. I suppose
it is con-ect to say that 98 percent of our busi-
ness in the Department of State involves no
partisan issue whatever.
And perhaps you would be interested in hear-
ing me comment that when I sit in executive ses-
sions with our congressional committees to
discuss complicated and difficult foreign policy
questions, where it is possible not under the full
kleig light of publicity to get into the full
range of the complexities as well as the alterna-
tive lines of action open, it has been my experi-
ence in those sessions that, although there may
be differences of view about what ought to be
done, those differences almost never fall along
partisan lines. Because the issues are real, they
are complicated, they are difficult. Our pur-
poses are matters of common agreement. But
how to move from purpose to fact is a question
of judgment about which there can be differ-
ences of view.
But it is not partisanship that marks those
consultations between the executive and the
legislative branch in that type of session.
Now, bipartisanship in fact is easy and natu-
ral under conditions of success. It was rela-
tively simple during the great days of the crea-
tion of the United Nations, for example, and it
was, I think, relatively easy at the time of the
formation of NATO and the great initiative
that led to the Marshall Plan. And that bi-
partisanship is necessary, and fortunately for
our country is forthcoming, at moments of great
national danger.
But it is more difficult with problems which
are complex and frustrating and uncertain.
But even here, as in such cases as Laos and Cuba
and the Congo, whose history did not start
in January 1961, there is room for nonpartisan-
ship, because both political parties clearly own
a piece of them — are joint stockliolders in un-
finished business.
It is natural and proper that an administra-
tion must accept the primary and awesome re-
sponsibility of leadership and that the minority
party must be in a position to criticize; other-
wise our political system would lose its vigor
and the people would have no sure basis for
their sovereign judgments. But I must say, as
I observe other political systems in other parts
of the world, that I am often reassured by the
fact that, in this difficult postwar world, our
partisan debates on foreign policy in due course
are taken over by a sense of responsibility by
those on both sides who understand the stakes
involved in the great worldwide struggle for
freedom.
Many Ways of Quitting in Struggle for Freedom
I am concerned because here and there, againi
without regard to party, there are some strident;
voices in the land, claiming to be strongly anti-
Communist, who would have us simply quit, toi
abandon the field, to give up the effort.
And there are many ways of quitting m thisi
great struggle for freedom. If we will the end,,
if we will the success of free institutions in at
decent world order, we must will the means by
which we get there.
For example, there are those who somehow
would not support a large and necessary na-
tional defense budget. Now, it is true that we
must make every possible effort to achieve some
means of turning down the arms race. Other-
wise the future is gloomy and foreboding and
dangerous in the extreme. But in the absence
of effective and reliable arrangements in dis-
armament, it is necessary for us to look to our "
arms. And that defense budget is large and, in
the absence of some new development, is likely
to become larger in the years ahead as this arms
race moves from sophistication to sophistication,
from expense to expense.
And as Secretary of State, who must con-
stantly take into account the intimate relation
between policy and power, I feel that it is very
important that our defense budget be given full
and adequate support.
I feel the same way about our space effort,. I
had the opportunity over the past year or two
to talk to a great many foreign ministers from
different parts of the world, some allied, some
neutral, about whether they think, as they look
at the situation, it is really important for the
United States to make a massive investment in
the space effort, which we have been prepared
682
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
to do. I think, with perliaps one exception out
of several dozen, they have all said, perhaps
with a smile of sympathy, "Yes, you people
must undertake that, because you dare not leave
]the exploration of outer space and all that that
means in the hands solely of those who are op-
posed to freedom. You dare not leave those
secrets to be discovered by one side alone. You
Jare not turn over to them the byproducts of
that exploration in the fields of communication,
miniaturization, metallurgy, systems controls,
md all the other teclinical outputs of that enor-
mous eifort — you cannot leave that into the
liands of the bloc. And, since you are the only
jnes in the free world that can do it, this is an
jbligation of yours which you dare not shirk."
We can quit this great struggle by with-
holding large support for foreign aid. You
ook at your own cities, your own counties —
low many— one out of seven, one out of eight,
)f the people in your neighborhoods are vet-
erans, many of them having served in far dis-
ant places in the last 20-25 years in defense
)f freedom. We have a million men, approxi-
nately, in uniform outside the continental
Dnited States today on that gi'eat mission. We
lave an obligation to get on with this great
problem of building a decent free-world com-
mmity by means other than military if we can.
Ajid our foreign aid program is the principal
neans by which we move in that direction.
We have an obligation of conscience to make
:hat program just as effective as possible, to
jnlist as much self-help from the others as we
:an, to have it administered with integrity and
with clearsightedness and with imagination.
But we cannot abandon the effort or accept deep
luts, except with deep injury to our national
interest.
I'm not now challenging the motives of those
who speak about this subject. I'm talking about
the results. For if the American presence and
influence were withdrawn suddenly from many
parts of the world, our national interest would
be deeply jeopardized and we would find that
the hundred billions wliicli we spent in foreign
aid since about 1947 is a bargain compared to
the almost six hundred billions that we have
spent in defense in that same period and that
our military expenditures would necessarily go
up even faster.
I have heard it said from some quarters that
we should get out of the United Nations if they
do not adjust to our policy 100 percent of the
time, instead of, as it turns out, perhaps 98 per-
cent of the time — we should bring our troops
home from Europe or from areas affected by
our other alliances.
There is another way to quit : in a fit of frus-
tration or anger or glandular reaction to toss in
the effort in a great holocaust by a precipitate
resort to arms, a quitting which is an abandon-
ment of the humane requirements of the human
spirit and which would simply result in a few
survivors speculating upon the folly of man.
And we can quit by being negligent about the
great imfinished business of our own society,
because what we are here at home has an enor-
mous amount to do with our influence in the
world about us. And where there are ugly
deficiencies in our own society, to repair those
deficiencies is a great part of this struggle for
freedom in the most distant part of the world,
because we are expected to be perfect in the per-
formance of our own commitments and our
misdeeds and our shortcomings are multiplied
many times to our own and to other free peoples'
discomfiture wherever it might be.
The Underlying Issue
And the great underlying issue of our day,
that is whether we are to in fact succeed
in organizing this decent world order as op-
posed to a world of coercion — it is true that we
have our problems, but so do those who would
impose their system upon all the rest. We do
note a serious disunity within the bloc, a major
engagement of prestige and conflict of interest
between Moscow and Peiping, as well as the
steady growth of nationalism within the bloc,
particularly among the Eastern European coun-
tries. And we see their deficiencies in eco-
nomic performance, their difficulties with their
industrial as well as their agricultural pro-
duction, and the discomforts which they are
facing all the way from East Germany right
around through to North Viet-Nam. We know
their disappointments in Cuba and in the
Congo, in Iraq and Syria, and in Guinea and
Mali, where they have come into in many situ-
ations — come upon a rugged determination on
MAT 6, 1963
683
the part of the newly independent peoples to be
genuinely independent.
I think that if we take a look at the present
situation, take a look at the problems ahead,
take a look at the problems which the other
side has, we can be deeply confident on one point,
and that is that the purposes which animate
the American people in foreign policy are pur-
poses which are deeply rooted not only in the
nature of our own people but in the nature of
man, and these purposes are instinctive with
people — ordinary common people in all parts
of the earth. And if we don't quit, if we main-
tain the effort, if we stay at it, if we gnaw at
these problems, if we deal with them day by
day in the best of our own tradition, we shall
find we shall have help, we shall have allies,
we shall have sympathy and understanding
from peoples in all parts of the earth.
And on that basis I have no doubt on what
the outcome of that great struggle for freedom
will be.
Now, gentlemen, I am ready for your
questions.
QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD
Mr. Brucker: Gentlemen., the Secretary is
ready for your questions.
Q. Mr. Chairman, Pm Mr. Bobinson from
Salt Lake City. We are very much concerned,
as all A^nericans are, Mr. Rusk, aiout the pos-
sibility of subversion from Cuba into some of
the Latin American countries. We were just
told a short time ago that the Navy is not in-
specting certain small boats that travel bach
and forth at night between Cuha and the Ameri-
can Continent. I wonder if you might com-
ment about that.
A. Ai-rangements are in effect with other
countries in the Caribbean area for surveillance
of suspicious or unidentified traffic. Our
armed forces on the spot do have authority to
use searchlights and illumination in the event
of any ships that are acting suspiciously, or
not carrying normal identification lights, or are
not known to be what they are. Inspection
arrangements are laid on with countries of des-
tination, which make it possible for us to have
a close check on what, in fact, might be in a
cargo of any ship moving from Cuba to any of
the other countries.
Mr. Brucker: Is there a further question?
The Foreign Aid Program
Q. Mr. Rusk, out in the provinces, the reason
the people have such a resentment against the
foreign aid program is when they read about
we sent 1^8,000 cases of Metrecal to India, and
300,000 tons of cement to India, and in the
monsoon season it gets wet and turns into stone
on the docks, and the sugar beet factory in
Turkey, v'here they never even smo a sugar beet.
Now, I think the people out in the country
feel that a good deal of this foreign aid is
essential, but when they read about that, it
really roils them up. Why isn't there a hettcr
control over this?
A. I think it's a fair question, a fair insistence,,
that funds that are f)ut in trust for the use of
AID should be used with a maximum possible
effect and efficiency.
Now, as any of you know, the problem of
administration is a constant battle against mis-
take and against human failure. And there
have been from time to time those mistakes and
human failures. But we have tried to lay on the
type of inspection, the type of supervision, and
the type of postaudit, as well as preexamiiiation,
which will give us maximum protection against
the sort of mishap to which you refer.
There have been instances in which funds
have not produced the effect requested. There
have been mistakes. And there have been fail-
ures of performance on the part of companies
who conti-acted to carry out particular jobs
abroad. This is a constant battle. But we must
not let those occasional mistakes or those occa-
sional failures gut the entire program, because
the performance under the entire program has
been over the years magnificent and the dedica-
tion and the courage and, indeed, the gallantry
of those people who are in distant and difficult,
sometimes dangerous, places getting on with
this job is something to which we are all deeply
indebted. It is a struggle, but we are fighting
that battle all the time, and I think that you are
entitled to insist that the highest standards be
met in that resjard.
684
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN
Secretary Replies to Allegations on Aid Shipments
Press release 211 dated April 19
Follox'ing is the text of a letter from Secretary
Ru.sk read by Herbert Brucker, editor of the Hart-
ford Courant, before the ASNE meeting on April 20.
The Secretary's letter concerns information on ques-
tions he was asked at the meeting on April 18.
Apeil 19, 1963
Dear Mb. Brucker : One of the questions asUed
of me at Tliurs(lay"s meeting of the American So-
ciety of Newspaper Editors contained allegations
of misuse or waste of foreign aid. These allega-
tions were :
1) That 48,000 cases of Metrecal were sent to
India.
2) That 300,000 tons of cement hardened on the
docks in monsoon weather in India.
3) That a sugar beet factory was built in Turkey
where there were no sugar beets.
Since I was not familiar with details of these
charges, I commented broadly on the problems and
objectives of a well-administered aid program. Sub-
sequently, I asked that foreign aid records be
checked to verify, explain or controvert the allega-
tions. These were the findings :
1) There is no record of any shipment of Metrecal
to India.
There are, however, two instances where Metrecal
was ordered by commercial importers under com-
modity procurement authorizations financed under
the foreign aid program. In 1961, International
Cooperation Administration (ICA) auditors discov-
ered that an order for Metrecal had been placed
under a sub-allocation of the Vietname.se Govern-
ment. ICA immediately initiated action to recover
the cost of the Metrecal on the basis that the prod-
uct was not eligible for financing under our pro-
gram. The product was returned to the shipper
and an eligible product was ordered.
A very small amount of Metrecal was shijjped to
Cambodia in 1062 through private trade channels
under the foreign aid commodity import program.
The product had been erroneously identified by rep-
resentatives of the Cambodia Government as medic-
inal in nature. The Agency for International De-
velopment, upon learning of the shipment, informed
the Government of Cambodia that the product was
ineligible and filed a claim for recovery of the funds
involved.
2) Neither AID records nor inquiries directed to
veteran personnel whose experience goes back many
years reveals any instance of cement hardening on
the docks in India.
This charge might have been confused with the
fact that incidents of this kind have occurred under
the foreign aid program of the Soviet Union. We
know of an instance where poorly packaged Soviet
cement hardened on the docks during the monsoon
season in Burma, and of similar cases involving So-
viet cement in Guinea, Ghana and the Sudan.
3) The United States has not participated in the
financing of any sugar beet mill in Turkey.
The question of sugar beet mills was raised during
Congressional hearings in 1961, and the allegation
was that the United States had built such mills in
Iran and Indonesia.
In Iran, the United States had, in 1955, con-
tributed $630,000— less than one-fifth the cost-
to construction of a sugar beet mill in Iran after sur-
veys had demonstrated both a sugar shortage and
favorable conditions for growing sugar beets. The
mill was in full production in 1957 and two other
mills have been built since, also with U.S. assistance.
In Indonesia, the United States has not assisted
any such project. The East Germans, liowever,
had sent sugar beet mill engineers to Indonesia in
1955 to build a sugar mill. Since Indonesia grows
only sugar cane, continuing difficulties arose because
the East German engineers had had no experience
with sugar cane mills, and the plant did not go into
production until 1960.
These are the answers, to the best of my knowl-
edge, to the questions raised by the editor who iden-
tified himself as being from "out in the provinces."
It does not appear, in any of the instances cited,
that the United States or its representatives were at
fault.
This is not to say that there have not been cases
where Americans were guilty of error in the con-
duet of the foreign aid programs. There have been
mistakes and human failures, and there will be more
despite our efforts to prevent them.
I hope that these explanations can be passed on
to the editor who asked the question, and to any
others who may have been concerned about his
allegations.
Sincerely yours.
Dean Rusk
MAT
685
Q. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question?
Mr. Brucker: Sure.
Q. Senator Keating said at lunch — this is
quoted from the, you know, his speech — that the
Department of State recently played a hey role
in hlocking Russian-language broadcasts that
Radio Liberty had originally proposed to beam
to Soviet personnel in Cuba. And he went on
to say that all day the Latin American and
Cuban broadcasts and Soviet broadcasts are
beamed to South America, yet our country held
back an organization that loanted to broadcast
some Russian-language stuff to that personnel.
Do you knoiv anything about that, Mr.
Secretary?
A. Well, I believe that there is — there have
been this week news tickers indicatmg that those
broadcasts are going forward.
Q. They were held up, though, wererut they?
A. There was a problem about whether the
United States Government itself would organize
such broadcasts, because we did not wish to—
want to — put the stamp of permanency on those
Russian troops in Cuba or to take any step which
would make them think we were going to let
them make themselves at home there or that we
are going to let them settle down and make
themselves comfortable. But those broadcasts
are going on at the present time and have been
for, I think, about a week.
Q. Tliank you.
Q. Mr. Secretary, we have a Congressman
out ov/r way who keeps saying that there are a
large number of Red Chinese in Cuba, as well
as a large number of Russians. Can you say
with certainty that this is not so?
A. Well, there are some Red Chinese in Cuba.
We understand there are a number tliere, for
example, in all fields, as agricultural tecluii-
cians. But there is also, I think, a large pre-
Castro Chinese community in Habana — my un-
derstanding is several thousand — and some of
the reports which we have received on the pres-
ence of Chinese there check out to be references
to the Chinese who were there earlier. Now,
there are a substantial number of Red Chinese
there — exactly what figure I would use, I would
not wish to indicate, but I should think severa.
hundred Red Chinese were in Cuba.
Mr. Brucker: Is there a further question?
Soviet Military Presence in Cuba
Q. Mr. Secretary, you stated that it was tTu
policy of the State Department not to accep\
the military presence of the Soviet inilitary i/n
Cuba. You stated that, I believe, it is the polio%
of the State Department not to accept the Soviet
military presence in Cuba as a normal state O]
affairs.
Now, according to the public reports, Soviei
troops have been in Cuba about 8 months now.
I presume this is regarded as an abnorinal con-
dition. At what point would the State Depart
ment consider the presence of the Soviet troop>
there to become normal rather than abnormal;
If they are still there a year froin now, woula
it be considered as an abnormal condition^
{Laughter.)
A. We have been since October doing what we
can to keep the outtraffic of Soviet forces mov-
ing. You recall that some weeks ago I had had
a talk with Mr. Dobrynin [Soviet Ambassadoii
Anatoliy Dobrynin] on the subject and thati
several thousand additional troops did leave
Cuba during the month of March. This is Sf
question that it is not dead; it is not inactive.'
We have made it very clear to the Soviet
Union that their troops in Cuba are not accepta-
ble in this hemisphere and that their militai7
presence there is itself a continuing source of
danger and that it is in the interest of every-
body concerned that they get out.
But to take up your particular question about
dates — a moving from normality to abnormal-
ity, or vice versa — I wouldn't want to speculate
about dates.
Mr. Brucker: Any further questions?
Situations in Laos and South Viet-Nam
Q. Mr. Secretary, I believe that we are set-
ting forth an assistance effort in South Viet-
Nam. However, in Laos toe agreed to a coali-
tion. Would you explain the difference between
the South Viet-Nam and the Laotian situation,
and would you answer the question of whether
686
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
or not you went into the coalition government in
Lnos with a good deal of misgiving becaiose
of the history of such agreements with tJie
Communists?
A. I think one of the principal differences is
that Viet-Xam had been specifically divided in
1054 between North and South and that the
p(>netrations from the North into South Viet-
Xam were directly contrary to an existing ar-
rangement that had been reached and signed
by the principal governments concerned. The
T'nited States did not sign those accords, but it
indicated that it would abide by them.
Now, in the case of Laos, there was a country
which had not been divided, where there was an
attempt made to take over that coimtry by infil-
tration, where it seemed to be possible to reach
an agreement that that country should be left
as an independent and neutral coiuitry. Well,
there were indications that the Soviet Union did
believe that this would be a workable arrange-
ment, and so a decision was made to take that
course, a political course that was initiated back
in late 1960 or early 1961.
There is another element, and that is that the
South Vietnamese themselves are fighting their
own battle, fighting well. Tliis has not, gener-
ally speaking, been the case in Laos. And
we have felt that if you could just get the Lao-
tians left alone, get the foreigners out, leave
them to their own devices, to work out their own
future, they would be no threat or peril to any
of their neighbors and the security of Southeast
Asia would be reinforced by that situation.
Xow, everything turns upon (a) what the
Soviet Union now really thinks about the im-
portance of the Geneva Accords and (b) what
influence they have on the immediate situation
on the ground. If the answer to both those
questions is affirmative, or is positive, then I
thinlv this thing can be worked out. But if there
is a failure of either one of those, then I tliink
we are in for some rough weeks and montlrs
ahead.
Q. Mr. Secretary, does your faith in foreign
aid ever lag when you get United Nations re-
ports that the population of Latin America is
increasing faster than the income, so that the
capital wealth is actually declining?
A. Well, these are issues that, in the first
place, can be dealt with by working at both
sides of the ledger. I suppose that in one sense
the most overpopulated period in our American
history was when there were just the Indians
here. There is an enormous productive capacity
available in Latin America to be mobilized, to
be organized, to help deal with a population in-
crease, particularly in basic foodstuffs, for
example.
But the basic social and political decision
about how to approach the population question
is one which each country and each people must
make for themselves. We do believe that these
demographic features have to be taken fully
into account and in a realistic social and eco-
nomic development program, and we are doing
a good deal to help other governments study
their population problem as an integral part of
their general planning process. But we don't
believe that it is up to us to tell them what their
answers must be or how they would deal with it
themselves.
Q. Mr, Secretary —
Mr. Brucher: Secretary Rusk has to go
along; so we will let it go with this one more
question, please.
U.S. Views on Hit-and-Run Raids on Cuba
Q. Mr. Secretary, there has ieen a good hit
of discussion on the administration's ian on the
hit-and-run attacks on Cuba, on Soviet ships in
Cuban waters. There seems to be agreement
that these raids shotdd not be mounted from
these shores but disagreement as to whether
they shoidd be condoned when arranged from
other lands. Could you tell us, or indicate to tis,
tohat is the thinking of our allies in this hemi-
sphere and in Europe on this matter and this
decision by the administration?
A. Well, I would suppose that governments
who are responsible for territories in the Carib-
bean take the same general view that we do
about such hit-and-run raids. We do not
believe that these raids, such as those that have
occurred in the past, have added significantly
to the general effort to unseat Castro or to re-
duce his power on the island; they do, on the
other hand, raise very serious qviestions of armed
action.
MAT 6, 1963
687
"VVe believe that questions of war and peace
and the use of arms in this part of the world
should be determined by the responsible gov-
ernments concerned rather than by private
groups, however much one might sympathize
with their own motivations and their desires
about their own country. But I would suppose,
in answer to your particular question, that other
governments responsible for territories in the
Caribbean take the same view that we do on
that particular point.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
REMARKS BY MR. BALL
Press release 203 dated April 19
Mr. Brucker, ladies and gentlemen: I was
impressed a few minutes ago listening to the ex-
change between you gentlemen and Secretary
Rusk. I was impressed with the thought that,
in any dialog between those of us who toil in
the foreign policy vineyard and you gentle-
men of the press, there is a common quality
■uhich we have, each in our own way : We are
each preoccupied with history. We who work
at the business of foreign policy are concerned
with trying to shape events which become a
part of the history of our time, and you have
an interest and an influence not only in the
shaping of history but also in recording it. I
recall the comment of the dyspeptic old Scots-
man, Thomas Carlyle, that "histories after all
are a kind of distilled newspaper."
Now, I would suspect also that we share a
common secret vice, that from time to time each
of us attempts, again in his own way, to try to
stand apart from the events of the day and to
look at what is occurring — to try to single out
the trends from the individual events, to try to
identify and to understand the great forces that
are at work. And I am sure you find this prob-
lem as baffling as we do, because we live in a
time that is very complex and it is always very
difficult because of our participation in events to
know what meaning or significance those events
may have in the longer ranges of history.
It is even more difficult, it seems, in the pres-
ent day, when a whole new fact has been intro-
duced into history. That fact is the fact of
speed, the fact of a great pervasive speed of
change which dominates this mid-20th century
in a way unknown before. So that we are con-
stantly confronted with events, with series of
events, which added together may mean a
greater change, a greater transformation in the
world than would normally have occurred ever
in the history as we have known it, in the history
even as our immediate fathers and mothers may
have known it, events that would have occurred
only over a period of centuries. It seems to me
that, if we look at this moment in time since the
end of the Second World War, we can see evi-
dences of this, because, in this period of some-
thing less than 18 years, we have seen the trans-
formation of the world in a way which would
never have seemed possible in the period of the
thirties.
Some Recent Historic Events
First of all, we have become almost accus-
tomed to the idea of the "iron curtain," a phrase
which was only invented in 1946, which we
heard for the first time when a man wlio is now
a new citizen made a speech out in Fulton, Mis-
souri — Sir Winston Churchill. The "cold war"
was a phrase which was not then invented ; yet
we have come to accept it almost as a normal
part of existence.
I talked not very long ago to a group of uni-
versity students. I was impressed, in talking
with them and in trying to find out what they
were thinking about, with the fact that in the
whole of their lives they had never experi-
enced any other time except the time of the cold
war. Yet for those of us who are as old as I am,
the cold war is something which has come fairly
recently and it is something that, God willing,
we may not always have to live with.
The second great event besides the erection
of the Iron Curtain, which made a prison for a
third of the population of the earth — the second
great event, fully as important, has been the
movement from colonial status to some form of
independence or freedom for another one-third
of the world's population, about a billion peo- i
pie — an event again of fantastic proportions, an
event which could only have been conceived of
at an earlier time as something which might
have gradually occurred over centuries. Yet
colonialism, which was in full effect at the end
688
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtJXLETIN'
of the war, has now reached nearly the end of
its existence over the world, the free part of the
world.
A third event, which again I thinlv will take
its place in history as something of enormous
significance, and which many of us tend to re-
gard as perhaps the most constructive single
thing which has happened in this period of the
mid-20th centurj', has been the fact that the
colonial powei-s of Europe have turned their
attentions to the problems close at home and
have succeeded in building in a very short time
unity of a kind which the conquerors of old
were never able to achieve. This has been done
by the agreement of governments and the con-
sent of peoples. It is a very remarkable
achievement altogether.
Interruption in Momentum Toward Unity
Now, in the last few weeks — particularly
since the historic event of the 14th of January,*
a press conference which will, I think, become
itself a major event in history — in the last few
weeks we have heard a great deal about the
significance of what is happening in Europe
and what this interruption in the processes that
are going forward in Europe may mean. I
think that many of us, perhaps, had begun to
tliink of the European unity as perhaps more
nearly fully attained than has turned out. We
forget the fact that it was only in 1955 that our
European friends first began the negotiations
which led to the creation of the Common Mar-
ket. That, after all, gentlemen, is only 8 years
ago.
Nevertheless, what did occur on the 14th of
January has had a significance, and I would
suppose that that significance has been simply
this : that while what has been going forward in
Europe over the last few years has been a move-
ment away from a concentration on the nation-
state, what occurred on the 14th of Januai-y
was a reassertion of the view that the nation-
state is the only form of organization of society
around which the allegiance of men can be
fully coalesced. So that we are now having
presented a confrontation of a very interesting
* At a press conference on Jan. 14, President Charles
de Gaulle of France indicated that the French Gov-
ernment was at the present time opposed to British
membership in the European Economic Community.
kind between the ideas of a Europe based on a
concept of a greater unity and the ideas of the
nation-state as the repository of the ideals of
patriotism and as the kind of organization
which is basically essential, which is the only
kind that can endure over a long period.
I think that, for myself, I feel that it is
altogether likely, in fact I would say almost cer-
tain, that the process of moving toward unity in
Europe will prevail over a longer period, be-
cause I think the historic logic which is
impelling them is so powerful. Nevertheless,
it is clear that we have seen in the last few weeks
some important things take place. We have
seen, first of all, a decision which has for the
time being at least interfered with the applica-
tion of the United Kingdom to become a part of
a great new Europe. But will this be something
which will be permanent? Whether this is a
process that will ultimately take place, I think,
is something that only history will answer.
Again, if I may venture a view, I would
believe that almost certainly the United King-
dom will at some point play a very important
role in the construction of the new Europe.
That is necessary and, may I say, inevitable.
There is another element which is involved in
what has occurred, and that is an interruption
in the process toward unity on the Continent
itself, among the six members of the European
Economic Commmiity — the Common Market,
as we call it. After all, the movement toward
unity in Europe has been based upon a willing-
ness of men and the nations to sacrifice some
particular national interest in terms of a larger
unity. This process has required a strong faith
in what was being done and a strong will to do
it. It has created political complications for
many of the leaders who have played a part
in it, but they have nevertheless gone forward.
Now I think for the time being there has been
an interruption in this process. Whether this
can be overcome quickly is something again
which we shall have to wait and see. I would
certainly hope, from the interest of the United
States and from the long-range interests of the
whole Atlantic world, that this process can be
resumed before very long.
Third, and tliis has been of particular interest
to the United States, there have been called into
MAT 6, 1963
689
question the postulates upon which we have
been proceeding with regard to the organiza-
tion of the Atlantic world. The Atlantic world
is a very special complex of nations, because in
Western Europe and North America there are
contained something like 90 percent of all the
industrial power of the free world. It is essen-
tial that there be a unity of purpose and an
ability to work together. What we have wit-
nessed within the last few weeks is some doubts
and questions as to what kind of arrangement
should be made between the two sides of the
Atlantic, between Western Europe on the one
side and the United States on the other — West-
ern Europe responding to a sense of new-found
strength, and the United States being con-
fronted with the fact that Europe had indeed
succeeded in what we had very much hoped it
would succeed in, becoming economically
strong, and that certainly in the nature of
things there would have to be a reallocation of
responsibilities and a reallocation to some ex-
tent of the authority which goes along with the
assumption of responsibility.
This is something which we have recognized
in the Atlantic partnership all along. If the
concept means anything — and I think it means
a great deal — it means that on each side of the
Atlantic the component parts of this partner-
ship, the members, will assume responsibilities
in accordance with their abilities, and their au-
thority — the part they play in the management
of the partnership — will have to be adjusted to
the kind of responsibilities that they have
assumed.
Components of the Atlantic Partnership
Now, in spite of the fact that there has been
an interruption in the momentum of the move-
ment which was under way during the last few
years — an interruption which I think will be
temporary^there nevertheless still exist the
same compelling forces for bringing into being
the Atlantic partnership about which we have
talked so much and thought so much.
These compelling forces, it seems to me, are
three to four in number. First of all, when
you have within the Atlantic complex some-
thing like 90 percent of total industrial power
of the free world, when you have industrial
economies as highly developed as are our in-
dustrial economies on both sides of the Atlantic,
you have a kind of interdependence which again
is something almost new in the world.
We are aware of the fact — very clearly aware
of the fact — that our economic good health on
this side of the Atlantic depends to a consider-
able extent on the maintenance of economic
good health on the other side. Our European
friends are very well aware of the fact that
upon the economic good health and the rate of
growth of the U.S. will depend to a considerable
extent their own prospei'ity. So we have been
trying more and more, through consultation
within the structure of a new organization
which was created only a year and a half ago —
the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development — to bring about a unity of
policy or at least a concerting of policy which
has eliminated or attempted to eliminate many
of the disequilibria — the distortions — which
have occurred in economic relations within this
Atlantic world.
Secondly, we have recognized that there had
to be a pooling of effort to achieve the common
task which we have faced, that the United
States alone could not and should not go on
trying all around the world to carry the great
share of the burden, because of the fact that
Europe was now becoming stronger and Europe
was becoming, therefore, more competent and
more capable. We, ourselves, had to move into
a world system where, with the withdrawal of
Europe before the rising tide of anticolonialism,
power vacuums were created on almost every
continent, and the U.S. of necessity, in order to
provide the security and protection which the
free world required, had to make commitments
in those areas which it has been difficult in
almost all cases to carry out. So I think one
of the very big pieces of unfinished business we
have in our relations with European countries
is to work toward some better allocation of re-
sponsibilities which more nearly respond to the
competence and the capability which exist on
the two sides of the Atlantic with the coming
into being of an economically strong Europe.
We have been working also toward a recog-
nition of the developed strength of Europe by
seeking ways and means to give our European
friends a greater share of participation in the
690
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
coininon nuclear defense. This has been a mat-
tor of vei-y great concern to us, as it has to
Europeans. At Nassau we reached some conclu-
sions in conversation with our British allies,^
which are being translated into reality now, con-
chisions for the organization of a NATO force
in Europe which would have several compo-
nents: a component of national forces on tlie
part of the nuclear powers, both forces in being
and Polaris forces on the part of the United
States and United Kingdom which would be
contributed at a later point; and perhaps most
important of all, a multilateral nuclear force
which would represent an effort, on our part, in
consultation with our European friends, to find
some solution for the management of nuclear
power in a manner which would pennit the non-
nuclear as well as the nuclear nations to partici-
pate without resulting in or encouraging the
proliferation of tlie national nuclear capabilities
wliich could start us down a very dangerous
road.
Finally, we have recognized that, not only
in tlie areas of economic relations or in the areas
of common defense or in the measures which
we have been taking to work together toward
the provision of assistance to less developed
nations, but also in our commercial relations, we
should try to make a serious effort to bring about
a greater flow of trade and therefore a more
effective allocation of resources and conse-
quently a higher standard of living on both
sides of the Atlantic.
Within the meaning of the Trade Expansion
Act which President Kennedy sent to Congress
last year and which the Congress passed, we are
presently engaged in the initial steps which will
look toward a full-fledged trade negotiation
next year. Governor Herter [Christian A.
Herter, Special Representative of the President
for Trade Negotiations], as you know, is taking
specific charge of this undertaking.
So I will say, gentlemen, that, while these last
few weeks have been periods when it has been
useful, I think, for all of us to take a look at
problems confronting us, by and large the
world, as we see it, remains unchanged.
After the 14th of January, we still have the
same problems. We still have the same com-
' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.
pelling reasons for trying to work out effective
institutional arrangements under which the in-
dustrialized powers on the two sides of the
Atlantic can work in a common effort toward
the protection of the free world and to assure
the survival of the common ideals which we
share.
Now I will do what I can on your questions, if
you want to start the inquisition.
QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD
Q. What would he wrong with a Europe that
had a very high tariff wall? Isn't this a tried
and tested method of developing an economic
entity? Didn't we do it? Didn't Britain repre-
sent a sort of leak in that wall, a possible leak,
and can't they come in later, much as our col-
onies came in later, so that we could gain
strength as we went along? Should we he
afraid of this, or does that represent for us
something that has ultimate security for us?
A. Mr. Block, I would remind you, first, that
we are not living in the latter part of the 18th
century and that the United States no longer
consists of 13 new, fledgling States, nor do the
states of modern Europe bear very much resem-
blance to that from an economic point of view.
Europe represents a highly sophisticated,
highly organized, very dynamic and efficient
society. It is of major importance to the United
States that we have Europe for a market, as it
is important to Europe that they have us for a
market. So far as the United States is con-
cerned, we sell a great part of our agricultural
production to Western Europe. I would say
half of our agricultural commercial exports go
there. I think to the six nations of the Common
Market we sell close to $1,400,000,000 a year of
agricultural products; plus Great Britain, it
comes to something like $1,800,000,000.
So far as industrial products are concerned,
we sell 50 percent more to Europe than we buy
from them. So, from the point of view of the
United States, even from the point of view of
our own rather parochial commercial interests,
it is of vital importance that we work toward
the liberalization of trade and the lowering of
the external tariff of the European Common
Market.
JlAY 6, 1963
691
But it is also of great interest to them. I
may say that -what has come out of the events
of the past few weeks, as far as the Europeans
are concerned, is a realization on their part that
however the trade negotiations may turn out
will be a very great test for the vitality of the
European community and of the new Europe.
It is very important that they be outward-look-
ing, because they are going to have to play a
major role in this world. To be outward-look-
ing means that, as far as their economies are
concerned, it is important that they be sub-
jected to the competition of the world in order
to maintain their vitality.
It is important for political reasons that
there not be a constant kind of economic war-
fare between the two halves of the free world
in which the economic power of the free world
is contamed. I would suppose that, if we are
going to work toward the most effective kind of
relations with the free world- — with the Atlantic
world, other Atlantic nations — this process will
be greatly facilitated if we can bring about a
higher level of trade across the Atlantic and
with the other nations and that, therefore, from
the point of view, first, of the specific United
States national interest and, second, from the
strength and health of the free world itself, I
think it is very important that there be success
next year as we begin the difficult task of trade
negotiation.
Mr. Brucker: I have one question I would
like to ask if it is fair. It has bothered me a Jong
time. I understood that the m^ovement of the
Common Market had gotten over the hump and
was 'practically irreversible. After that, you
had the failure of the Outer Seven — the natural
inclination to bring the two together. What is
it that President de Gaulle has in the tcay of
tools or something else that has made him
singleharuledhj able to defy his five-nation col-
leagues plus all the rest?
A. I would think, Mr. Brucker, that the
movement toward a Common Market was sub-
stantially irreversible. I see very little possi-
bility of its being either stopped very long or
reversed. I don't think this is going to occur.
But, of course, this movement is based upon
the agreement of the nations concerned. Now,
until recently, as I suggested a moment ago,
the movement toward a stronger and more
united Europe had come because of the willing-
ness of each of those nations to subordinate its
own specific national interest in the interest of
this larger unit. On the other hand, the French
Government at the moment has raised a ques-
tion as to the kind of emphasis which it is pre-
pared to put on the nation-state as against the
creation of a stronger Europe. This is the prob-
lem, and since France is one of the members of
a group whicli is conunitted to make progress
by unanimity under the terms of the Rome
Treaty until January 1st, 1966, when many of
the difficult decisions can be taken by a qualified
majority vote, for the time being at least an
assertion of a French veto on a specific matter
such as the admission of the United Kingdom
means that that event will not occur so long as
the French Government takes that view.
Now, I don't want to create the impression
that I think the French Government is going to
oppose all of the measures toward a greater
unity in Europe. I think that there has been
some exaggeration of the position that may have
been indicated on this. Just what position it
will take with regard to the trade negotiation,
with regard to the creation of a conunon agricul-
tural policy, with regard to a number of the
other measures which are going forward within
Europe, I think time will tell, and I would not
at all want to prejudge it. I think that there
are already signs of movement again — the re-
sumption of movement toward unity within the
Common Market and toward getting on with
the agenda of the Common Market. I think
that they will go forward. But for the moment,
on the question of the accession of the United
Kingdom, this has been stopped at the instance
of the French Government. Whatever posi-
tion the Government may take on other issues ,
will remain to be seen. |
Mr. Brucker: I think in the interest of time
we had better stop the questioning there.
Mr. Ball, I want to speak for the ASNE in
thanking you most heartily for taking time out
of a busy day and giving us an equity enlight-
ening and incisive and confident oittlook in an-
other part of our troubled world. We thank
you.
692
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
REMARKS BY MR. HARRIMAN
Press release 204 dated April 19
Thank you, Mr. Brucker, for your introduc-
tion. Considering tlie menu which you have,
the number of people who have spoken to you,
I will try to be brief.
I see that you have had a good lecture on bi-
partisanship by Kenneth Keating. You know,
he came when I was up before the Congress for
confirmation this last time. He was kind
enough to come and sit beside me and say I
was all right. I told him I was really de-
lighted by the kind words the Republicans said
about me ever since I stopped running for
public office. Anyway, Kenneth Keating told
you all he knows about Cuba; so I don't sup-
pose you need to ask any questions on that
subject. But I was told when you got to me
you wanted to talk about the Sino-Soviet rift.
If I am correct about that, I will say a few
words about tliat and leave some time for
questions.
Sino-Soviet Rift
Perhaps some of you know I have been in
the last year and a half exiled in the Far East,
but recently I have been reprieved and I am
back in general circulation. But this subject
of the Soviet Union and China is one of the
very absorbing subjects of our time and is
worth watching.
I said the other day that I did not think we
were smart enough, in answer to a question, to
exploit the diilerences between the two, and
someone criticized me in the press for that be-
cause I played down our truths. I don't think
anybody can exploit the diflPerence between the
two, but I tliink we can behave in such a way
as not to throw the two together ; if not, we will
come to that in the end.
There has been rather a myth that there has
been a monolithic international Communist
bloc. That has never been so. If you go back
in history in the development of the Chinese
Communist Party, in the twenties, you will find
that Borodin, who then represented the Comin-
tern in China, had some rather severe differ-
ences with Mao Tse-timg, and if my history is
right, Mao Tse-timg was very nearly thrown
out of the Communist Party at that time because
he refused to accept the Marxist-Lenin concept
that the Commimist Party of China should be
based on the urban industrial masses. He said
China is going to be based on peasants. In
any event, Mao Tse-timg won out.
Now, I i-eceived some understanding of the
relationship between the Ki'emlin and the Chi-
nese Commimists during the war. Some of you
remember I was in IMoscow on and off through-
out the war for two and a half years. I saw a
good deal of Stalin. China was the subject of
discussion on a good number of occasions. He
made it very plain that he did not have too
much confidence in Mao Tse-tung or the Com-
munist Party in China. Once he called them
"margarine Coromimists." About that time
there were some Americans who were calling the
Communists "agrarian reformists." Wliether it
was because margarine was not an agricultural
product, I don't know, but somehow or other
it was mixed up in butter. There was a thought
that Stalin was trying to pull the wool over our
eyes. He was not at all. He was very serious,
because what he meant by "margarine Com-
munists" was Communists that were not real
Communists. To Stalin a real Communist was
a party that accepted the Kremlin as the oracle.
At that time ]\Iao Tse-tung was not then or
since ready to accept the Kremlin as the last
word. That has consistently, continually, been
an issue between them.
Different Stages of Development
There are several other fundamental issues.
One is the different stages in their economic de-
velopment. As you well know, the Soviet
Union has made extraordinary advances in in-
dustrial production, science, and otherwise, as
all Communists have, and quite a failure of
their agricultural production. It is a curious
thing, and I hope all of you remember it, and I
will be glad to see all of you repeat it when-
ever you have occasion to do so. Communists
have always failed everywhere if they applied
Commmiist methods to food production. But
they have been in the Soviet Union successful in
industrial production.
Now, Khrushchev and the present genera-
tion of Communist leadere do not want to see
Russia destroyed. We saw this in Cuba, and
MAT 6, 1963
683511—63 3
I think it is accepted as a fact that the Kremlin
does not want to become involved in a nuclear
war in which there is a chance that they would
suffer terrific damage. Wliereas you have all
heard the stories of what Mao Tse-tung is said
to have said about the nuclear war to be of ad-
vantage to China. The industrial nations
would be wiped out, and China would be left
as the great nation. They might lose a hundred
or two million people. I am quoting what
others have said: "We will lose a hundred or
two million people. We will then be the great
nation of the world." Thei-efore, there is rea-
son to believe that China, the Cliinese Com-
munists, are ready to take greater risks.
That is one of the arguments that is going on
between Peiping and Moscow. It was couched
at one time in the words whether war was in-
evitable. The question was not whether it was.
The question was whether war was desirable.
Although the Chinese Communists do not
have nuclear capability now, I for one will
think it will be a much more dangerous world
when and if they do. It will be some years
ahead. At the same time, let us hope in the
meantime all people in China are educated to
the appalling condition the world will be in if
there is a nuclear holocaust.
Now, a third reason is the historic differences
between China and Russia, which have existed
through the ages. I won't try to expose my ig-
norance in history by explaining what hap-
pened between the two countries, but I am sure
you are as well informed as I am.
These are all matters — these three differences
are all matters which it is very difficult to patch
over. They may attempt from time to time to
paper them over, but it does seem there are some
fundamental differences at the present time be-
tween the two countries, between the Communist
parties of the two countries.
On the other hand, I personally believe that
there is no — I will say there is no indication as
yet that the Soviet Union is going to repudiate
their military commitment to China; if China
is attacked by Japan or anyone associated with
Japan, she will come to the aid of China. It
is one question to have a very serious difference
within the Communist hierarchy and another to
face the blotting out of an important Com-
munist country by a non-Commimist. That is
the question which, I think we should under-
stand, puts the differences between them in a
different dimension. j
Now, there is another aspect of the difference
in their economic development in that there is
no doubt that Cliina demanded of Eussia that
Russia give China a great deal of assistance.
If Russia, they said, was to be a real Com-
munist, they would share their production with
China until China caught up and then the Com-
munist movement could move up together.
Well, the Russians did not think that was a
very good idea. As a result, Russia dumped
China. Several years ago they ended all eco-
nomic and technical assistance, took their ad-
visers out of China, and trade has gone down in
the last couple of years to one-half of what it
was, and there seems to be a great bitterness
among the Chinese Communists against the
Kremlin because it deserted China just when
China was having the disastrous economic re-
verse, when the collapse of the "great leap for-
ward" occurred.
No Difference in Objectives
Now, it is interesting, but I do want to under-
line the fact, if I may, that there is absolutely
no difference in their objectives. Both of them
think that communism is the wave of the fu-
ture. Both of them believe it is their responsi-
bility to push commmiism. They believe, as
has been taught them, that communism cannot
be safe in the world unless the whole world is
Communist. It is not a question of the objec-
tive. It is a difference in the methods by which
the objective is achieved.
Khrushchev is ready to use any method,
brinkmanship, local wars of liberation, subver-
sion, and any other method of that type to move
forward. Now there does seem to be a greater
willingness on the part of China to take risks,
for Red China to take risks, but one will have
to see to judge. In the Soviet Union there has
been a great difference since the end of the war,
which I think is worth noting. I talked on a
number of occasions with St<alin about the fu-
ture of communism in the world. He said that
communism would eventually dominate the
world, because of the defects of capitalism, be-
cause of the failures of capitalism, because they
694
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
believed that there would be great depressions
in which communism could move forward.
He also believed in the Marxist thesis that
capitalist countries would battle each other,
have wars, and during those periods of human
miserj^ they would be able to move forward.
Once he said, rather colorfully, that commmiism
would breed in the cesspool of capitalism.
Fifteen years later, sitting in the same room,
I saw Khrushchev in June 1954 — the same pic-
tures on the wall — the furniture was rearranged
a bit — Klirushchev said, "We are making such
an enormous success of communism that other
countries are going to have to follow our ex-
ample."
That is an amazing change, but that is indica-
tive of the progress, the industrial progress,
which has been made in the Soviet Union in the
intervening period. It does indicate why they
have become more conservative in terms of
facing a nuclear war.
There is another interesting thing which
Stalin said to me in talking of China. I asked
him once why he agreed to this Soong treaty,
which you will remember provided that the
Soviet Union would support Cliiang Kai-shek's
government, tlie Nationalist Government. I
think they used the words "military, econom-
ically, politically, morally, and no other govern-
ment." I asked him why he agreed to do that.
He said, "Well, Chiang Kai-shek is the only
individual that we supported before, although
we did not fully agree with his ideas. We think
he will be the only one who will be able to unify
the country. What is more, China will need
vast quantities of industrial equipment which
they will only be able to get from the West, par-
ticularly from the United States."
Then he said a rather interesting word. He
said, "We" — meaning the Soviet Union — "will
not be able to provide them." It is interesting
that after a number of years Klirushchev and
his group tried to supply them. They made up
their minds they could not do so and turned
China loose on their own resources.
In any event I think it is fair to say that there
are very deep-seated diiferences between Mos-
cow and Peiping which are likely to last even
though there may be, as I say, from time to
time a papering over of their differences.
But let us not get under any illusion that if
there is a major war in which China is in-
volved — I would be rather surprised if Khru-
shchev and his present generation of Commu-
nists and the Kremlin did not come to its as-
sistance. The effect of this, of course, to the
East is interesting in that we see in India Red
China attacking India and the Kremlin giving
at least lipservice support to the Indian Gov-
ernment and a gesture in terms of military as-
sistance. As you know, they sent them a few
MIG's. From the militai-y standpoint it is not
of great importance, but as a gesture it does have
significance.
Red China and India
^¥hJ the Chinese Reds attacked India one
cannot fully tell, but it must be beyond the rea-
son of settling this border dispute. They built
a road from Sinkiang Province into Tibet,
which is the best way to get into the west and,
of course, part of the territory which the In-
dians claim and which the Chinese claim. Their
attack could not only have related to that be-
cause they were winning the particular local
engagement which related to that area of La-
dakh. They can get in by road or the Indians
get in by air or by foot. But they attacked in
the NEFA, the Northeast Frontier Area, where
there was no real serious difference over the
border. Although there was technically, there
was not a very basic difference. They must
have had in mind the desire to destroy the image
of India as a great country, to humiliate India,
and to build up their own prestige, which they
had lost to a very considerable extent by the
collapse of the "great leap forward."
Now they have gained those objectives. On
the other hand I think they have been rather
surprised at the violent reaction within India
itself, and I think we have a right to be en-
couraged. Nehru himself said this is not an
attack on us nor a border dispute. It is an at-
tack on our way of life. Others have said it is
an attack on our existence as a nation of free-
dom, and they look upon it, both the Govern-
ment, Prime Minister Nehru and his colleagues,
and the Indian people, as a long-term struggle,
and they want to strengthen themselves in order
to succeed in meeting it.
The area which Red China has perhaps the
MAT 6, 1963
695
most immediate desii-e to gain control of — they
don't indicate that they are -willing to send mili-
tary but they are attempting to subvert ; that is
the area in Southeast Asia, in Burma, Thailand,
Cambodia, Viet-Nam. That is the great sur-
plus rice producing area and is an area that,
with greater development of their river re-
sources, could support a veiy substantially
larger population. I would think that you
could see increased pressure on that ai'ea from
time to time as the situation develops.
Now, as I say, this difference between Moscow
and Peiping is extremely interesting and one
which can have a vei-y vital effect. I think we
ought to understand some of the things we
should not do. There are some people who
think we should not give aid to India unless
they break with Moscow. I think that is a very
stujjid thing. I tliink it is pleasant to see Mr.
Khrushchev on the horns of a dilemma between
his friend India and his eternal brother China.
Why should we relieve him of that embarrass-
ment? I think that it is very much in our in-
terest that the Soviet Union continue to give
economic assistance to India. The Indians have
indicated that they have no intention of being
overrun by any outsider. They are determined
to maintain their freedom and their own way of
life. If the Russians want to build a steel mill
or give some other assistance, that can offset the
obligation the responsibility for which will
otherwise rest upon us and our European asso-
ciates. So that I think that we have to play
this thing by ear as the situation develops, but
certainly we want to avoid doing what may tend
to bring the two together.
For that reason I suggest that we should in
no sense attempt to interfere with India's for-
eign policy as it relates to Russia at the present
time.
Now there are various other aspects of this
struggle. You see it in Cuba. You see it in
almost every part of the world. One thing is
interesting — incidentally, I imagine almost
every one of you have read this extraordinary
letter which the Kremlin wrote to Peiping the
other day listing its grievances — among others
was the grievance that Peiping was attempting
to use racial prejudice against her. They had
the Moshi conference in Tanganyika, where
they did not invite the Russians or the European
Commmiists to come but only the Afro- Asians.
At that time they indicated that there was a
real affinity of interest between the Negro and
the yellow races, the nonwhite races. Moscow
condemned Peiping for attempting to use such
prejudice in the battle between them.
These are very interesting developments and
ones which we should watch with a good deal
of care to see which way eventually it develops
in the relations between them. In any event,
you continue to see rather vigorous comments
made by one against the other, and it is becom-
ing more and more a personal issue between
the leaders of the two groups in Peiping and
Moscow.
If tliis incites any of you to any questions, I
will be very glad to answer them as it relates to
this problem or anything else you care to have
me comment on.
QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD
Mr. Brucher: We have left a Tnaximum of 5
minutes. Do you have any questions for Mr.
Harrimanf
Q. Mr. Earriman, you mentioned agrarian
reformers. I seem to recall some years ago we
had an adviser in the State Department^ Mr.
Lattimore, who used that term. As I recall,
it was his suggestion that we make it a matter
of U.S. policy that the Chinese be urged to join
up tvith these agrarian reformers. I am just
wondering. Is Mr. Lattimore still connected
with our State Department?
A. I have no idea, and I don't care to discuss
the past. I don't know why you ask me that
question. In some ways I rather resent it, be-
cause we are not involved in raking over the
past. We think about tlie future. I don't know
wliy you inquire about that. If anybody feels
differently about it, I am sorry, but I think
this persecution of an individual is a thing
(applause) we have gotten over, thank God,
and let us not go over any of the past. The
people who are working for the State Depart-
ment are damn good Americans. They are just
as good Americans as you are. (Applause.)
Mr. Brucher: I told you we had an inde-
pendent-minded man.
696
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
A. I don't thiiik I am independent. I think
I express the opinion of the majority of
Americans.
Ml'. Bintcker: I would agree with that, Mr.
Harrlman.
A. And I have a very liigh regard for this
group in this room.
Mr. Brucher: That is frobably true., too.
Is there another question in the minute or
two remaining?
Q. I would like to ask you a question. Re-
cently I was in the Far East, and I visited Indo-
nesia. I noted the country, the corruption, and
the fact that they are iroke and also the fact
that they are -playing footsie with the Russians
as well as the Chinese. How do we stand toith
Sukarno?
A. I wish I could give you a direct answer
to that. I can say that Sukarno and this Indo-
nesian Govenunent are very strong nationalists.
They have not fought for their freedom from
the Dutch with the idea of giving it up either
to the Chinese or to the Russians. Now, they
have accepted a vei-y large amount of economic
aid and military assistance from the Soviet Un-
ion, but they have not accepted any such assist-
ance from China. Sukarno is playing a rather
careful political game in his country between
the different elements within his society, but
at least I think we can be sure that he is
attempting to develop Indonesia for the
Indonesians.
Now, he is accepting certain assistance from
us which is relatively modest, and the military
seem to depend upon us to a considerable extent
for training and for certain types of equipment
in spite of the overall equipment, large equip-
ment, they are getting from Russia.
Incidentally, you may have noticed, if you
read your papers — I have to read the papers
today, because I work for a man who reads too
many newspapers — you probably have noticed
that Marshal Malinovsky, the Minister of De-
fense of the Soviet Union, has recently been in
Indonesia, and he seems to leave in not too good
a humor. But the future alinement of Indo-
nesia is impossible for anybody fully to predict.
As far as I am concerned, I think that we ought
to accept Indonesia as she is, the fifth largest
nation in the world, I think, with vast economic
resources, a very low standard of living as com-
pared to the Western countries and to some
other Eastern countries. But we have a great
area, if you will look at a geography, running
from Malaya almost touching Australia, cut-
ting across the communications between Japan
and India and the Philippines. We have an
enormous interest to see that country develop
within the free world. I think those who sug-
gest that we should abandon Indonesia are un-
necessarily pessimistic, and to those who think,
if there are any, that we are going to have an
easy time ahead, I say I think we should work
as closely with the Indonesian Government as
they are willing to work with us, give them a
helping hand where it is to our interest to do
so, and watch developments and hope that the
spirit of nationalism will be stronger than the
effect of Communist propaganda.
In the East, where the standard of living is
low, desperately low— $50, $G0, $70 per capita
per annum, against ours, whatever it is, $2,500 —
this question of freedom does not mean a lot.
But nationalism does. If we could understand
that the issue is between nationalism and Chi-
nese imperialism, rather than some ideological
concept or economic concept, I think we would
do better. I do believe we have a very
strong ally in this feeling of national pride
which comes to a nation which has just come out,
and if we will work with them, with that feel-
ing, and forget about some of the other ideals
we would like to achieve, we will be more apt
to achieve our objectives.
Now, I am sorry to have been so long-winded
about this, but I think there are no easy answers
in Indonesia. I think we have a vital interest in
the country, and I hope that we will continue
to attempt to find a common ground with the
Indonesian Government and the people, and
that over the years we will be able to find that
the people of that country come closer to our
concepts than those of the Communists.
What would be, I think, the most foolish
thing in the world would be simply to say be-
cause they don't do everything we want we will
forget about them. Then there is no doubt they
will fall under the domination of the Commu-
MAT G, 1963
697
nists. This is the kind of difficult situation,
perhaps one of the most difficult, which we have
to contend with in the world. It is not possible
to see black and white. It is not possible to see
exactly the course we have to follow. I hope
that you men, if I may say so, will follow this
type of situation with a great deal of care and
try to get the American people to recognize that
our long-term interest will best be served by
standing on the sidelines at times and not neces-
sarily applauding or condemning what may be
going on in different countries. Thank you
very much, gentlemen.
Secretary Rusk Interviewed
on GFWC Television Program
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rush hy representatives of the
General Federation of Women's Clubs, filmed
on March 26 and released on April 13 for broad-
cast by independent radio and television sta-
tions as the first program in a series entitled
'"'"'Women on the MoveP
Press release 193 dated April 12, for release April 13
Ml'. Granih: This is Theodore Granik speak-
ing to you from the John Quincy Adams Room
of the United States Department of State.
Here, on this premier broadcast, to ask the dis-
tinguished Seci'etary of State Dean Eusk the
questions every American wants answered, are
"Women on the Move," chosen from its more
than 11 million members by the General Fed-
eration of Women's Clubs, and with the Secre-
tary of State is our moderator, Mrs. Dexter Otis
Arnold, president of the General Federation
of Women's Clubs.
Mrs. Ai^old: Mr. Secretary, our panel today
on the first program of "Women on the Move"
consists of Mrs. J. Kenneth Bradley, who is the
president of the Connecticut Federation of
Women's Clubs ; and Mrs. Donald Domer, who
is the secretary of the Ohio Federation of
Women's Clubs; and Mrs. Fred Gast, who is
the immediate past president of the Oi'egon
Federation of Women's Clubs; and the chair-
man of the International Affairs Department
of the General Federation of Women's Clubs,
Mrs. Joseph Paige.
I think Mrs. Bradley is going to ask the first
question.
Mrs. Bradley: Mr. Secretary, in connection
with the Cuban situation, would you define for
us the difference between offensive and defen-
sive ? I think that this becomes very confusing
in the minds of the average American.
Secretary Riish: Well, Mrs. Arnold, let me
say first how happy I am to welcome you and
your colleagues here to the John Quincy Adams
Room of the Department of State.
Well, it is true that in a certain sense any
weapon can be offensive or defensive, depending
on where it is and on which end of it you are.
But insofar as a Cuban military threat to the
hemisphere is concerned, offensive weapons are
those which could strike significantly at the
hemisphere or at Cuba's neighbors.
Now, at the present time President Kennedy
has made it utterly clear that we would not
accept a reintroduction into Cuba of weapons
which could strike at its neighbors, including
the United States; that we would not permit
any arms that are in Cuba to be used outside of
Cuba; that we would enforce the right to use
international airspace and international waters
freely by ourselves and othei's; that we would
enforce the necessity of keeping a careful watch
over what is going on in Cuba ; that if any at-
tempt were made to launch forays against any
other countries, those would meet the armed
forces of the hemisphere, including those of the
United States. So that these are the present
military commitments of the United States
with respect to Cuba.
Mrs. Paige: Then these are the acts of ag-
gression that would provoke us to war?
Secretary Busk: Well, I hesitate to use this
word "war" because that is a very small word
that encompasses a good deal. What I would say
is that there is no question whatsoever that the
United States will give the fullest support to
the Eio Treaty, which guarantees the security
of this hemisphere, and other steps which are
necessai-y to insure that Cuba does not itself
launch an aggression in any way against its
neighbors.
698
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The Costa Rica Conference
Mrs. Paige: Well, would you tell us, please,
Mv. Secretary, wliat importance you attach to
the Costa Eica conference ?
Secretary Busk: Yes. I think that tliere
were three points of major importance in the
Costa Rica conference.^ The first is that the
very presence of the Presidents of the seven
states represented there brought great public
attention upon those particular countries and
in effect moved the Central American Eepublics
and Panama to the front of our attention as
a nation and registered the fact that we look
upon wliat is happening in Central America
as of the utmost imjiortance to us, not as just
l^art of the backyard or forgotten part of this
hemisphere.
Secondly, we were very much encouraged to
see how rapidly the Central American Eepub-
lics are moving toward economic integration.
These are for the most part small countries with
relatively limited populations. There are
many things which they cannot achieve one by
one — for example, monetary stability, questions
of university education, the training of quali-
fied personnel, cooperation in the development
of superior tecliniques in agriculture, things
of that sort, public-health measures — all can
best be done on a regional basis in that area,
and President Kennedy was able to give power-
ful support to the growing sense of unity among
the Central American Eepublics.
And third were those measures that I have
mentioned, about interrupting the subversive
flow of funds and personnel from Cuba into
these countries. I think that those were the
result of the conference.
I must say that the warm welcome which the
public gave to the President itself was most
extraordinary and, I think, one of the most ex-
citing parts of the visit.
Mrs. Gast: Mr. Secretary, then do you feel
that, through our alliance and this meeting in
Costa Eica, we are showing sufficient evidence
of helping to show our way of life to Latin
America, and through this aid helping these
countries to build up their own economies?
' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 511.
Secretary Rush: I think that this is a matter
in which there will always be unfinished busi-
ness, but I think that a great deal has been
done in the recent months — in the last year or
two — to improve what is happening on our side
in Latin America. For example, in 1960 we
were engaging in only 1 hour a day of broad-
casting to Latin America. That has now gone
up to 13 hours a day, 9 in Spanish and 4 in
Portuguese. That is one major area of im-
provement.
I think also that we are making headway, al-
though slowly, on some of the steps which have
to be taken by the countries themselves if our
relatively small investments in the Alliance for
Progress are to pay off in real development.
You see, the total Alliance for Progress in-
volves only 2 percent of the gross national prod-
ucts of the countries involved. The real job
is to be done by the 98 percent of the resources
contributed by the countries themselves to their
own effort. That is how development comes
about —
Mrs. Domer: Land reform is such a —
Secretary Rusk: — land reform, improved
tax systems, administration, improved health
measures — all the rest of it. So I think that
this is moving. One of the problems — you men-
tioned impatience.
Mrs. Domer: Yes.
Secretary Ru^k: One of the problems is that
we would like for them to move fast, but we
would like for them to move fast under demo-
cratic processes. Now, when we look back over
some of the controversial periods through which
we have lived in our own country in bringing
about the great reforms which have had so much
to do witli our own development, we can under-
stand tliat, in some of these countries, if they
move democratically they have problems at
home in getting their congresses and legisla-
tures to take the steps that we and they both
think will be necessary ; so it will take a little
time.
Mrs. Bradley: Mr. Secretary, this suggestion
that what we need in Latin America is a good,
sound middle class — which they don't have.
They have the two classes, the few and the
wealthy class, and then of course the poor class,
MAT 6, 1963
699
because the military I suppose comes closest to
the middle class —
Secretary Rush: I think that there is a very
important point there, that we do see evolving
what might be called the moderate middle class,
but this depends upon education, it depends
upon the gradual development of the capital
required for such a middle class to come into
existence, it requires opportimities for trade
among those who would become the middle
class, but also I think it involves some recogni-
tion on the part of the privileged classes to
accept the public responsibilities which wealthy
people in our country have begun to accept more
and more over, say, the last 50 years and, on
the other side, the responsibility on the part
of the so-called lower classes in recognizing
that you cannot really lift the standard of liv-
ing of an entire country by leveling down — you
level up, you increase production so that those
at the bottom themselves find that they them-
selves are earning more through their own
production.
Basic Commitments of NATO Unchanged
Mrs. Paige: Mr. Secretary, might we move to
another part, because the General Federation's
study program is concentrated more or less in
our mutual security alliances and we are empha-
sizing that particularly. Could you tell us,
please, whether or not the new French attitude
has changed — made or forced a basic change
in our foreign policy?
Secretary Rush: Well, I think that it is im-
portant to understand what the recent discus-
sion has been all about. Let me say at the
beginning that it has not been about the basic
commitments of NATO. Those conmiitments
with respect to the security of NATO over
against the Soviet bloc are just as simple and
direct and firm as they have ever been. Back
in October there was complete unity in NATO
at that moment of great crisis, and France made
it very clear that, if the Cuban situation re-
sulted in general war, France would be with the
United States — no if's, no hesitations, very
simple.
And it is very important for Moscow to un-
derstand that this is so, because we are not
talking about cracks in the basement of the
alliance. What we are talking about is how to
build the second story, how do you write the
next chapter, where do you go from here. Aiid
it had been our hope and the hope of many
people on the European side that there would
be, first, the United Kingdom's accession to the
Common Market, that the Treaty of Kome
would be developed on a basis of a unified Eu-
rope, that we and unified Europe would move
together not only on security questions in
NATO but in trade questions in connection with
our Trade Expansion Act, and that there would
evolve a imified Europe and a great Atlantic
partnership.
Now, the details of how this was to be worked
out have been discussed, and there have been
disagreements, as you know, but I have no doubt
that this is the inevitable mainstream of policy
for the West and that what we are confronted
with is a pause, a realinement, a readjustment of
thinking, a reconsideration of techniques; but
the alliance itself is just as solid as it can pos-
sibly be and is significantly stronger than it has
ever been in the history of the alliance. For
example, our own defense budget has grown
about 25 percent in the last 2^/^ years.
Mrs. Arnold: Mr. Secretary, what can you
tell us about the Berlin situation that would be
comforting?
Secretary Rush: Well, I would have to say
that I do not at the present time see any major
change in the Berlin situation. This is a point
of direct confrontation between the Soviet
Union and the Western countries. We have the
most vital interests at stake there. We would
prefer to see a question of this sort resolved
without a high crisis or without conflagration.
But these are utterly fundamental questions ; I
think they imderstand that in Moscow. But
tliey are so difficult and complex that I do not
see that we will have Berlin off of our agenda
for some time to come.
Mrs. Domer: They have indicated their will-
ingness to resume the talks — whatever that
means.
Secretary Rush: Yes, those talks have been
begun. Whether anything will come out of
them, it is too early to say right now. But this
is a problem that has been with us since 1945.
700
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I don't myself see any easy and automatic solu-
tion, but it is one that we ought to try to find
some answers to, if possible, but only on the
basis of the full insurance of the security and
the freedom of the people of West Berlin, of the
American interests there.
U.S. Relationships With Common Market
Mrs. Gast: Mr. Secretary, what changes will
have to be made in our tariff regulations in
order to compete in the Common Market ?
Secretary Rush: Well, at the present time, the
changes that we made under the Tariff Adjust-
ment Act, the simplification procedures, are now
being considered by the EEC [European Eco-
nomic Community] countries in Europe to see
what adjustments, what concessions, are re-
quired as a result of that procedure.
Then, after that, Mr. Herter [Christian A.
Herter, Special Representative of the President
for Trade Negotiations] and his colleagues will
be holding hearings, in which private American
interests can come in to state their situations,
as a result of which then we can go into the
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade] negotiations next year and bargain hard
for mutual reductions of tariffs on both sides of
the Atlantic, so that we can have an expansion
of trade throughout the Atlantic conunimity.
This is a very complex procedure. It will
take a good deal of time. We are delighted that
Secretary Herter has been willmg to take on
this responsibility. But my own view is that
the result of it will be an expansion of trade and
economic activity, both here and in Europe.
Mrs. Bradley: Mr. Secretary, what effect did
the Common Market crisis have on our Ameri-
can-English relationship ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we have had for a
very long time indeed a close relation with
Britain. Some people call it a "special" rela-
tionship.
During World War II we were the most inti-
mate of allies and partners. We have supposed
that, if Britain goes into the Common Market,
that same intimacy will exist between us and
a imified Europe. But I would not suppose
that our close cooperation with Britain would,
in any way, be weakened by the events of the
past several weeks. We will continue to co-
operate with Britain as well as our European
allies in whatever way is possible, given the
problems we have to deal with.
Mrs. Domer: Back to this Common Market
thing. Won't the Common Market affect,
though, the United States sales of poultry and
dairy products? I mean, hasn't this really been
established — that these will be affected?
Secretary Rusk: Well, when trading part-
ners are exchanging billions of dollars in each
direction each year, I think there will always
be specific trading questions that will have to
be ironed out. It is in the very nature of an
expansive and vigorous private trading com-
munity that this should be so. We have been
working very hard in the past several months
on insuring a market for American poultry in
Europe. Now they have some problems about
markets in this country. They are concerned
about, for example, glass or textiles or other
things in which some of our operations here
feel pinched.
But we will never be in a situation where
there are not specific trading questions that
have to be talked about and worked over, be-
cause we are too expansive and explosive in our
economies in the West ever to have a completely
serene situation. But we do believe that the
vast trade that even now exists between both
sides of the Atlantic can be significantly ex-
panded to the mutual profit of both sides.
Aid to Viet-Nam
Mrs. Bradley: Could we move into the Viet-
Nam area ?
Secretary Rush : Right.
Mrs. Bradley: — because I think this is some-
thing we are all terribly interested in, of course,
as we are interested in all the other areas.
How far do you think the United States
should go there, Mr. Secretary, in supporting
the buildup of the guerrilla warfare in Viet-
Nam?
Secretary Rush: I think we have to start
from the underlying proposition that the peo-
ples in Southeast Asia do not wish to be ab-
sorbed either by communism or by the Chinese.
And this means that they are particularly con-
cerned about being absorbed by Chinese com-
munism.
MAT 6, 1963
701
We do believe that the people of South Viet-
Nam are fighting their own battle. Our effort
has been to put them in position to win that
battle. Guerrilla war is one of the most diffi-
cult, most frustrating kinds of wars to fight.
The means are : a vanishing enemy, hard to lo-
cate, hard to pin down. You never know ex-
actly when a victory has been scored, because
the total result in the immediate day-to-day
operation is not so clearly evident.
But we feel that an important comer has been
turned in recent months in South Viet-Nam:
the ratio of arms captured by one side or the
other, of casualties inflicted, great improvement
in intelligence resources. For example, the vil-
lagers are now coming forward in great numbers
to give information to the Government in a way
that they have never done before — a very im-
portant thing. And the village development
program in the strategic hamlets has been mov-
ing forward, and more and more villagers are
able to till their crops and go about their nor-
mal duties with a sense of security. So our
principal purpose is to put them in a position
to win their battle.
Now, if the other side steps up the effort, or
if this drags on unduly, then some very serious
and possibly harsh decisions will have to be
made. But we have been encouraged by what
has been happening in the last several months.
Mrs. Paige: Mr. Secretary, what evidence
have we that the administration aid program
for Southeast Asia is justified?
Secretary Riu^h: Well, I think you would
start, first, with the question of what the sit-
uation would be in Southeast Asia had we not
provided very substantial aid. I think that the
answer would be that the world would be split
in two by the Coimnunist bloc.
In Southeast Asia, Indonesia would, perhaps,
long since have become a part of that bloc.
These are people who I do think want to be
free and independent. They need help. And I
think it is in our interests to provide them that
help.
Since 1945 the principal powers in the West
have agreed that the security of Southeast Asia
is vei-y important to the free world. I think
that is the sense, not only among our own peo-
ple but throughout the non-Communist world.
So although the aid looks rather extensive it
is not really large m relation to the stakes at
issue. And I would suppose that if we can put
those people in a position to win their fight, that
cost to us, even large as it is, is small.
Mrs. Domer : Would it not be possible that, if
we encouraged and aided a little more, we might
find the Chinese Commimists reacting more
vigorously, too, in some of these spots ?
Secretary Rusk : Well, I don't believe that we
could withhold help from someone on the
ground — on the basis that the other side might
step up the effort. I think that would probably
be a mistake.
But what we ought to try to do is to find ways
to help these people to get on with their job
without necessarily precipitating a major strug-
gle in tlie process. And this is what we are try-
ing to do now in South Viet-Nam.
Moscow-Peiping Relationship
Mrs. Bradley : Mr. Secretary, are we expect-
ing recognition of Red China ?
Secretary Rush: I see no prospect of that at
the present becoming an active question. Quite
apart from our own attitude toward Red China,
and its policy, and its sharp and hostile attitude,
and even in its own discussions with Moscow at
the present time —
Mrs. Domer: That's what I wondered.
Secretary Rusk: — there is not the slightest
indication from Peiping they are interested in
normal relations with other people, because they
keep saying that the basis for normal relations
is the surrender of Formosa, and we are not go-
ing to do that. I don't see any prospect of that
becoming a live question.
Mrs. Domer: You are giving more or less
serious consideration to that Sino-Soviet split.
Secretary Rusk: This is a matter that we
can't help but follow with the greatest possible
interest. But I have been cautious about trying
to interpret it, because I am not at all sure that
either Moscow or Peiping fully understands that
particular relationship at the present moment.
Mrs. Bradley: Is it then just wishful thinking
for us at the moment ?
Secretary Rusk: Not really. What they are
arguing is about how best to get on with the
world revolution — their world revolution. And
I am not sure that it is in our interests neces-
702
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN
sarily for tliem to go into competition to see
who can move on more rapidly with the Com-
munist world revolution. But, on the other
hand, this difference has injected uncertainty
and confusion in the Soviet world; and that is
all to tlio good.
I think we had just better watch that one out
a little bit. I don't think there is much we can
do to contribute to that division, because if we
were to try to move in and exploit it in some
way, that would tend to drive the two together
again ; and that we don't want.
Mrs. Arnold: Will the news continue to be
inifortunate as far as the Geneva conference is
concerned ?
Secretary Rusk : Well, this is a question that
requires, I think, just about as much patience
and persistence as any question I know.
When I was much younger, I was involved in
the disarmament discussions in 1945, just after
World War II ; we have been with it ever since.
We can't stop the effort. But, on the other
hand, we can't take measures of disarmament
that are not consistent with our own security
and tlie security of the free world. I do not
see immediate and dramatic results coming out
of Geneva, but nevertheless we can't abandon
the efforts ; we have to stay with it.
Mrs. Arnold: Mr. Secretary, what is the hope
for peace in our time ?
Secretary Rush: Oh, I think diplomacy has
to work on the basis of optimism. And I per-
sonally am deeply optimistic that, in the longer
run, there is a real chance that these great pur-
poses that are rooted in the nature of man will
themselves be sustained and that we can work
these things out by peaceful means. Because
I don't believe there is any people (and I in-
clude the Russian people) — I don't believe there
is any people who wants the kind of war that
modern war would be, if we, in fact, have war.
Now there are some dangers. There are some
shoals to get through: questions like Berlin,
Southeast Asia. But if we get through those,
over the short run, it is my belief that the type
of world represented by the U.N. Charter has
a very good chance of coming into being.
Mrs. Arnold: Thank you, Secretary of State
Dean Eusk, for allowing us to visit with you
on this, the first broadcast of "Women on the
Move." And I want to thank the members of
the panel for their very penetrating and pro-
vocative questions.
Letters of Credence
Ceylon
The newly appointed Ambassador of Ceylon,
Merenna Francis de Silva Jayaratne, presented
his credentials to President Kennedy on April 8.
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release 183 dated April 8.
United States Extends Recognition
to New Government of Guatemala
Department Statement
Press release 199 dated April 17
The Department of State annoimced today
[April 17] that the United States Government
has extended recognition to the new govern-
ment of Guatemala headed by Col. Enrique
Peralta.
This action has been taken by the Govern-
ment of the United States after having ascer-
tained that the new government in Guatemala
is in full control of the country and has pledged
itself to respect Guatemala's international
obligations.
The recognition of the new government in
Guatemala has been extended following con-
sultation by the United States with other gov-
ernments in this hemisphere.
MAT 6, 1963
703
Our Hemisphere: The Long and Short Views
hy Adlai E. Stevenson
V.S. Representative to the United Nations '
I am delighted to be here — even though a
bit breatlilessly.
Yesterday on Easter Sunday I was in the
Cathedral of Seville in a new community called
Europe. This morning I am in an older com-
munity called Pan America — and on Pan
American Day at that. These two communities
of free and independent nations, along with
others still aborning, represent the real wave
of the future. And there is no better time to
point that out than on Pan American Day.
This is the 73d anniversary of the First Inter-
national Conference of American States, which
created the International Union of American
Republics. This is the 30th anniversary of the
good-neighbor policy ; and it is the 15th anni-
versary of the Charter of the OAS. Less than
2 years ago we joined in the Declaration of
Punta del Este ^ with its exhilarating promise
of things to come; and less than a month ago
seven nations joined in the Declaration of Cen-
tral America,^ heralding a hopeful trend
toward economic integration in that region.
Between 1890 and 19G3 there have been many
other landmarks — bearing such names as Mon-
tevideo, Buenos Aires, Lima, Habana, Rio de
Janeiro, and Chapultepec — at all of which we
moved forward toward the goal of an inter-
American community that works like a func-
tioning, healthy community ought to work.
Along the way, the International Union of
American Republics has become the Organiza-
' Address made before the Organization of American
States at Wastiington, D.C., Apr. 15 in observance of
Pan American Day and Pan American WeelJ, Apr. 14-
20 (press release 192).
" For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 462.
' For text, see iUd., Apr. 8, 1963, p. 515.
tion of American States. The Council has
acquired three dependent organs, six specialized
organizations, and six more special agencies and
commissions. And at long last we established,
a few years ago, the much-needed Inter- Ameri-
can Development Bank. So over the years we
have erected, bit by bit, the institutional under-
pinning of an inter- American community.
Observations on the Cuban Crisis
Just how effective that machinery is in time of
peril was demonstrated to all the world last
October. At the height of the debate during the
first meeting of the United Nations Security
Council on the Cuban crisis, I was passed a small
slip of paper. It told me — and I quickly told
the others — that the Coimcil of the Organization
of American States, acting provisionally as the
Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty,
had unanimously condemned the clandestine
and provocative installation of Soviet missile
bases within the Western Hemisphere and was
taking immediate action to bring about a quar-
antine of Castro's satellite island.^ I can tell
you that in that fleeting moment I rejoiced
mightily in the result of our work over the past
72 years. And so, some day in the not distant
future, will the stricken and subjugated people
of our sister nation in the Caribbean.
And if I may digress for a moment here, I
should like to say that during my recent journey
in Europe and Morocco I received emphatic and
universal assurances of support for the Cuban
policy we have pursued, both during and since
the October crisis. There is particular appreci-
ation of the coolheaded, persevering determina-
* For baclcground, see iMd., Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 720-740.
704
DEPARTSrENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tion tliat has characterized tlie response of the
American governments to that crisis and its
aftermath.
As President Kennedy has pointed out, there
is no instant, easy sohition for communism in
Cuba — or anywhere else, I could add. Those
who would provoke us into extreme and reckless
measures are not serving the best interests of
either the United States or the solidarity of our
hemisphere — or, for that matter, the long-suf-
fering Cuban people, whose thirst for freedom
Castro cannot quench. "In times like the pres-
ent," as Abraham Lincoln once said at another
critical moment, "men should utter nothing for
which they would not willingly be responsible
through time and in eternity." That is still
good advice.
Cuba's freedom will be restored, and when it
is, it will be our challenging task to make sure
that Moscow will never again succeed in con-
verting the tyranny of a Batista into the tyran-
ny of a Castro. And no less will it be our task
to make sure that freedom will continue to
flourish in this hemisphere long after Castroism
has passed into history.
I have one other observation to offer on the
Cuban crisis. After our experience with it, it is
incomprehensible to me that anyone still thinks
of the United Nations and the OAS as alterna-
tive instruments of security and peacekeeping.
The coordinated and complementary use of both
instruments was indispensable in the Cuban
crisis, which eloquently demonstrated that the
regional system and the universal system each
have their separate roles in such threats to the
peace.
Growth of the Inter-American Community
The same point is valid with respect to eco-
nomic and social affairs as well as to security
affairs : The U.N. agencies and the inter- Amer-
ican agencies work hand m glove as one pursues
the Decade of Development and the other the
Alliance for Progress.
The global agencies and the regional agencies
are no more in conflict than are the regional
communities of nations in conflict with each
other. And I dare say that in the years ahead
we shall all be constructing an even wider
Western community embracing us all.
And why not? The new Europe can no
more look inward than the separate nations
which comprise it ; nor can the inter- American
community. Already the Europeans are show-
ing an increased interest in playmg an active
and constructive role in the Alliance for Prog-
ress — and an awareness of the problems posed
by the Common Market for raw-material pro-
ducing countries of this hemisphere. The
interaction between these communities, once
separated and now joined by the Atlantic
Ocean, will continue and grow until we see the
still wider AVestern commimity not as a dream
but as an imperative.
In any event, as we look back over the story
of the growth of the inter-American com-
munity, we can see that Simon Bolivar was
right 137 years ago when he first wrote of his
vision of an alliance of American states. The
Great Liberator, of course, was to be disap-
pointed during his own lifetime; but he took
the long view, and history has shown how
profoundly right he was.
For as we look around at the postwar world,
it is clear that the emergence of regional com-
munities of free nations is the historic trend of
the 20th century and a dynamic political move-
ment. The American Republics have shown
the way; now regionalism is highly advanced
in Western Europe; it is stirring in Southeast
Asia and in north and central Africa; and it
will come to pass — if slowly — elsewhere. These
regional communities are the structural frame-
work of an eventual system of world order
within the larger frame of the United Nations.
But even while celebrating the fact of our
community, it would not be prudent to recall
all the virtues and forget all the faults of the
past. This would make it seem all too easy
when, in fact, it is extraordinarily difficult ; for
all that holds our community together is free
consent. And while this is the best, indeed,
tlie only durable way to build workable com-
munities, it also is the most difficult method of
construction.
So it is worth mentioning in passing that in
the process of building an inter- American com-
munity we have tended too often to consider a
conference as a substitute for action. We have
been better at writing declarations than in car-
MAY 6, 1963
705
rying them out. We have been slow, at times,
to modernize our doctrines and our institutions.
And until the quite recent past my own country
has not been entirely innocent of tlie charge
that we tended to take Latin America for
granted. And at times we have seemed to be
rather more united in what we are against than
what we are for.
Not so today. I like to think that the Charter
of Punta del Este was much more than another
inter-American declaration of high ideals —
much more than just another milestone in the
unfolding stoiy of the inter-American com-
munity. I like to think that this was the point
at whicli we reached agreement on what we
are for — and went forth to do something big
about it.
But that was 20 months ago. And now we
hear complaints that enough has not happened,
that progress has been too slow.
The New Europe and the Alliance for Progress
I was thinking of this last night as I flew
across the Atlantic. Behind me lay a Europe
which has some temporaiy political disabili-
ties — some doubts, some disagreements, which
have imposed a pause on the steady and dra-
matic trend toward widening unity in the post-
war European world.
But I was in a Europe which also is prosper-
ing as never before, which knows by far the
highest standard of living in its histoi-y, which
is competent, bold, and renascent; so much so
that one wonders whether it is relevant any
more to refer to it as the Old World, for there
is so much that is yoimg and fresh and vital
about it.
Perhaps inevitably, as I flew home across the
Atlantic, my thoughts drifted back to the
Europe of the immediate postwar period. I
recalled that it was on another flight over the
Atlantic, on the way back from a frustrating
foreign ministers meeting in Moscow in 1947,
that General [George C] Marehall first dis-
cussed with his staff the need for a major inter-
national effort to help Europe get back on its
feet after the hammer blows of history's worst
war.
I thought back to that Europe of 1947 — lying
in I'uins: a Europe only partly fed, partly
clothed, partly housed, and partly employed ; a
Europe half-frozen in the grip of a bitter
winter, plagued by an alarming rise in the
tuberculosis rate, doing too much of its business
on the black market ; a Europe struggling hope- I
lessly to solve its economic problems, nation by
nation, by imposing more embargoes, more
quotas, more duties, more restrictions, more con-
trols; a Europe in desperate need of almost
everything and without the foreign exchange
with whicli to buy it.
To many it seemed that Europe was prostrate,
deathly sick, and ready to be gathered in by
communism — ^that eager scavenger of human
disasters. To shortsighted people — and there
were as many of them then as there are now —
the situation seemed hopeless. Yet with the
blessing of liindsight we see that it was not at
all hopeless, that something like a miracle
occurred.
But was it really such a miracle ? What hap-
pened is that a partnership of nations was
formed for the great and constructive purpose
of restoring Europe to health. The one nation
that could afl'ord to contribute the critical mar-
gin of external aid agreed to do so — and did.
The rest of the partners agreed to put forth
their maximum efforts to help themselves and to
help each other — and did. A new international
organization was created to perfomi an interna-
tional job — which it did ; and from this experi-
ence grew other international organizations
until the institutional framework existed for a
strong commimity of nations no longer depend-
ent on anyone.
What's more, a profound revolution in atti-
tudes took place on the European side of the
partnership. An obsolete traditionalism which
had kept European economies stagnant in the
years between the two World Wars broke down
and gave way to new attitudes. The practice
of low-volume; high-cost industrial production
gave way to high-volume, low-cost production.
Artificially restricted and protected markets
gave way to an expanding, competitive mass
market. Food production based on peasant
farming gave way to food production based on
modern agriculture and labor mobility. The
concept of low wages and high jirofits gave
way to the idea of management, labor, and con-
sumers sharing the fruits of higher productivity.
706
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
And restrictive trade policies gave way to lib-
eral trade policies.
Above all, the habit of looking inward for
solutions yielded to the habit of looking out-
ward beyond national frontiers. As the nations
joined together for the purpose of recovery
built up their common institutions — one leading
to another — they acquired, in the words of one
of the pioneers, the "habit of cooperation."
All this did not happen at once, nor did it
happen to everyone. But it happened fast
enough — and it dominated enough of the
thinking of management and labor and govern-
ments alike — to add up to a revolutionary break
with old attitudes. No wonder recovery was
followed by renaissance; no wonder Western
Europe is coalescing into a great mass market
serviced by a dynamic and growing economy,
that a new social mobility is breaking down
the barriers of the old social structure, and that
Western Europe is finding out what the North
American States had discovered earlier — that
in unity there is strength. Call it a miracle if
you like, but it was a mamnade miracle — in-
spired by high purpose, guided by liberal prin-
ciples, and carried out by hard work.
I am not here to tell you on Pan American
Day that Latin America's problems are just
like Europe's problems a decade and a half
ago — for they are vastly different; nor that
North Atlantic solutions are necessarily inter-
American solutions — for we must devise our
own solutions.
But I aTYh suggesting that common enterprise
calls for common institutions, that a function-
ing community functions through the machin-
ery it has built to service the community. I
am suggesting, too, that in Western Europe an
objectively hopeless situation was converted
into a great success story by the application of
physical resources, human energy, international
organization, and modern ideas.
And I think there may be an analogy in this :
The pessimistic view of European prospects in
1947 turned out to be wrong, and I am confident
that the pessimistic view of inter-American
prospects eventually will turn out to be just as
wrong.
This brings us up against the question of how
to look at the Alliance for Progress. From
what vantage point do we survey and assess the
state of our progress? Is it more revealing to
take the short view or the long view, the im-
patient or the patient ? My own answer is that
we need both points of view — and at one and
the same time.
In the long view of history, the growth of
the inter-American system, though it is the
oldest international political organization in
the world, represents a sudden and dramatic
surge forward, an historical phenomenon of the
very first order, a breakthrough in the tech-
nology of social organization. Within less
than two centuries of gaining national inde-
pendence — a mere moment in the long history
of man — we have recognized the interdepend-
ence of nations and begun to learn to live
together and work together in a larger com-
munity — to the vast benefit of all.
And not just passively either. For we have,
in truth, just joined together in a true Alliance
for Progress. We have conxmitted ourselves
deeply and formally to a common crusade
against the root cause of political mirest, which
is human want and social injustice. We are en-
gaged in nothing less than a massive fight for
decent conditions of life for every last man,
woman, and child in the whole hemisphere —
a project which, a short time ago, would have
been rightly considered a cruel hoax upon all of
us.
Equal Parts of Vision and Realism Needed
So, in history's long view, this moment in time
is one of forward momentum at a dizzy pace.
But in the short view, is it yet fast enough for
1963?
Sudden knowledge that poverty no longer is
the natural condition for most of mankind has
as suddenly banished fatalism and apathy as
props for an outmoded social system: Impa-
tience is the order of the day for the millions of
dispossessed.
At the same time, groups of ruthless men,
organized in tiny but disciplined cells and armed
with false answers to fair questions, work des-
perately to turn impatience into chaos, unrest
into violence; for violence is the order of the
day for Communist agitators in our midst and
off our shores.
■MAY 6, 1963
707
Meanwhile, democratic governments are
caught dangerously in the squeeze between the
enormity and complexity of their commitments,
on the one hand, and justified impatience,
fanned by antidemocratic enemies, on the other.
Add to this the ossified traditionalism which
tugs at the brake on social change, and you have
a fair sketch of our predicament and peril.
Under the circumstances it seems to me to be
a matter of some importance for us to somehow
embrace both the long view, which reveals the
dramatic progress of our times, and the short
view, which insists that tomorrow is too late to
deal with the hunger of today. Somehow it
seems to me that we must learn to see both the
forest and the trees — and simultaneously ; that
we must act in urgency but think in perspective ;
that we must acquire a vision which is neither
myopic nor hyperopic. And this must be done
not by compromising the long and short views
but by bringing both within our field of vision.
I am trying to say, I suppose, that we must
learn to look upon our progress for what it is
but never to be satisfied with it — whatever it
is. And this will demand a point of view con-
cocted from equal parts of vision and of realism.
Such a viewpoint would show us that de-
velopment should be orderly and therefore
planned — ^but we can start at once on elements
that would be part of any sensible plan; that
sound development programs are essential —
but worse than useless unless they are turned
quickly from paper to projects in being; that a
land reform law cannot be expected to increase
the very next harvest — but not many more har-
vests can be expected unless such a law is passed
in the first place and then carried out.
Such a viewpoint would inform us that large
progress is the sum of many small actions ; that
frustrations are predictable — and so are break-
throughs; that we can manage somehow to wait
for the payoff — if there is momentum today,
sustained tomorrow.
Such a viewpoint would make clear that 20
months is not a very long time to organize and
plan and set things in motion — but that time is
nonetheless short, and we are in a hurry.
If we can just learn to see the woods and trees
simultaneously, we will recognize both that the
Alliance for Progress is part of a great progres-
sive trend in himian affairs and that its future
course will be a year-to-year story of some goals
made and others missed — ^some hopes dashed
and others fulfilled.
If we maintain both our pressure and our
perspective, we shall see, above all, that our
direction is profoundly right and the imperative
is to keep going, whatever the obstacles and the
shortfalls may be next month or next year.
"We Must Be inventive and Adaptable"
I would enter only one reservation. If we are
to make haste, we must be inventive and adapta-
ble in our plans, our programs, and our institu-
tional arrangements; for as I said once before,
after a trip to Latin America, development is
learning by doing.
Yet I have no doubt about our capacity to \
experiment and create new forms of partnership
to further and hasten the Alliance for Progress.
Even now we await with considerable expecta-
tion the advice of the two eminent statesmen ^
who have been studying the adequacy of
existing inter- American machinery for admin-
istering the Alliance for Progress.
And I think we already can detect a new and
exciting dimension of our partnership. It lies
in the involvement and commitment of an ex-
panding sector of our private society in the com-
mon task of creating that medley of institutions
upon which any modern society depends. Our
land-grant colleges and universities, our co-
operatives, our credit unions and trade unions,
our voluntary agencies, and others are now
being drawn increasingly into the job. Soon
we expect to launch a novel and challenging ex-
periment: a new kind of partnership between
Chile and the State of California. If
this movement succeeds — this matching up of
opposite-number institutions in joint institu-
tion-building ventures — then an alliance which
was made among governments will grow into a
deeper alliance among people. And tliis is the
ultimate dimension of the international com-
munity and the ultimate strength of our system.
Now I know there has been justified hand-
wringing lately over abrupt changes in govem-
° Juscelino Kubitschek, former President of Brazil,
and Alberto Lleras Oamargo, former President Off
Colombia.
708
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ment in Latin America. Frankly, there have
been setbacks, here and there, to the electoral
process. But one can be concerned over this —
and its effect on democracy — without becoming
discouraged. Just as economic advance, as
represented by the Alliance for Progress, cannot
be measured on a short-term basis, so political
advance must be seen in the perspective of time.
And in that perspective I suppose it is valid
to ask whether democracy can prevail at all
in the great upheaval of our epoch. Certainly
it has met with formidable challenges all over
the world from Fascist, Nazi, and Communist
authoritarians, and from a variety of dictator-
ships.
But the important thing is that it has sur-
vived as succeeding brands of dictatorships
come and go. And today even the most absolute
of the absolutists masquerade as democrats;
even tlie military and quasi-military dictator-
ships claim to manage the public business in the
name of democracy. And mark you, all of them
say that authoritarianism is only a necessary
transition to democracy.
Why ? Because democracy is the most popu-
lar form of government yet devised ; because, as
Jeffei-son said, it is the "only form of govern-
ment which is not eternally at open or secret
war with the rights of mankind."
I have, therefore, no doubt that democracy
will withstand the wild winds wherever they
blow— if, and I repeat ?'/, we who are its custo-
dians fight continually to defend its principles
and just as continually adapt its methods to
the changing needs of our changing times.
So I am persuaded that, if we have the sta-
bility and the maturity and the endurance to
see our Alliance for Progress through setbacks
and triumph, through good days and bad, Latin
America at the end of this decade will be well
down the road which Western Europe took a
decade or so ago. And those who are faint-
hearted about Latin America today will be as
wrong as those who were fainthearted about
the Europe that once lay prostrate in the ruins
of World War II. Miracles will not just hap-
pen to us ; but miracles have been made by men
before — and will be again.
This is my hope, my belief, and my prediction
for this Pan American Day, 1963.
Department Replies to Statements
by Dr. Miro Cardona
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, APRIL 15
Press release 195 dated April 15
The statement which the Department of State
made on April 9, 1963,^ said, in part, that we
shared with Dr. [Jose] Miro Cardona "the aim
of restoring freedom to the Cuban people."
Tliat continues to be the aim and purpose of
the United States. Let there be no doubt on
that central point.
Now a statement has been published purport-
ing to be the reasons given by Dr. Miro Cardona
for his decision to resign as chairman of the
Cuban Revolutionary Council. The statement
seeks to discredit several individuals in the Gov-
ernment and to question the good faith and in-
tegrity of them, as individuals, and of the
United States Government in dealing with the
Cuban Revolutionary Council.
While appreciating the urgent desire of the
Cuban exiles to return to a free and independent
Cuba at the earliest possible date — a desire
which is fully shared by the people and the
Government of the United States — the Depart-
ment considers this statement a gross distortion
of recent history and of this Government's
policy with respect to the elimination of Castro
communism from this hemisphere.
The statement of Dr. Miro Cardona as it
relates to conversations with the President and
others in the Government is highly inaccurate
and distorted. The Government is in possession
of memoranda of conversations detailing the
discussions between the President and other
United States officials and Dr. Miro Cardona on
all occasions, and a review of these memoranda
of conversations indicates that Dr. Miro Car-
dona's recollection of the events does not coin-
cide with the record of the talks as made at the
time they took place.
The United States Government, under exist-
ing conditions, is not prepared to enter into
"alliances" or undertakings that would essen-
tially give exile leaders authority to determine
United States policies and plans regarding
Cuba, or that would promise at least $50 million
' Not printed.
MAY 6, 1963
709
to permit exile leaders to recruit an army and
wage a war, the unforeseeable consequences of
which would almost certainly have to be borne
ultimately by United States Armed Forces, or
that wouJd engage the United States now to
wage a war. All of these commitments were
demanded by Dr. Miro Cardona.
The United States cannot coexist with a
Soviet satellite in this hemisphere. This does
not mean we can permit publicized expeditions
which have no tangible effect on the future
status of Cuba, which are in clear violation of
United States law, and which are followed by
higlily colored press conferences.
The Department will wish to continue con-
sulting with leaders of the Cuban exile com-
munity concerning suitable methods for achiev-
ing our common objectives. In determining
these methods, policies of the Government in the
field of foreign affairs, particularly those which
carry the risk of war, will continue to be deter-
mined by the Government and the people of the
United States.
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, APRIL 18
Press release 208 dated April 18
Concerning the statement made public today
by Dr. Miro Cardona, the Department of State
reiterates its comment of April 15. Dr. Miro
Cardona's version of his conversations is a dis-
tortion.
To repeat, this Government shares with Cu-
bans and others in the hemisphere the desire for
a return of freedom to Cuba, but the issue of
war or peace in this hemisphere is one to be de-
cided by the governments of the hemisphere
and by their peoples.
Interdependence and the Principles of Self-Determination
and Nonintervention
hy Edwin M. Martin
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Ajfairs ^
Today we celebrate the 73d anniversary of
the founding of the inter-American system.
The date — April 14, 1890 — is taken from the
day on which the 18 governments participating
in the First International Conference of Ameri-
can States approved the establishment of the
International Union of American Republics.
The purpose of the association as then conceived
was limited to "the prompt collection and dis-
tribution of commercial information," a func-
tion to be discharged through the Commercial
Bureau of the American Eepublics, comprised
of 10 people.
As we look back over almost three-quarters
' Address made before the Pan American Society
of the United States at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 16
(press release 196, revised).
of a century of development, we see how greatly
our regional system has expanded both as to
size and function. The evolution also shows
how flexible the system has been in adapting it-
self to the needs of the member governments
and the changing currents of international
affairs.
We can likewise point to another important
fact: An expanding community of mutual in-
terests gives our regional grouping unique
character and strength. This community of
interest has two facets. One is our interde-
pendence as member states of the inter- Ameri-
can system rooted in geography, history, and
tradition. The other is the interdependence of
the objectives we pursue. For example, we
know that we cannot forge ahead in strengthen-
710
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
nng the practice of representative democracy
"without corresponding progress in economic
:development and social justice, and vice versa.
The range of our common interests is never
static, but constantly increasing, developing,
land drawing us into a closer interdependence.
This process of interdependence has come into
sharp focus within recent years as we gi-apple
with the problems of economic and social de-
velopment under the Alliance for Progress and
at the same time deal with the rising threat
of Castro CommuiTist subversion.
In the short time at my disposal I want to
focus on one area of our hemispheric relations
where I see the need — and I hasten to add the
promise — of change to meet the challenge of
our times. I refer specifically to necessary ad-
justments in traditional attitudes toward the
principles of self-determination and noninter-
vention. These adjustments are necessary to
place the hemisphere in the strongest position
:o move forward with its tasks of promoting
material welfare and strengthening represent-
ative democracy, while at the same time repel-
ling the attacks of hostile forces at both ex-
tremes of the political spectrum.
I want to make clear that I am not advocating
iny basic alteration of these concepts which we
fully endorse. Rather what is sought is a mod-
ification of governmental attitudes regarding
how they should be interpreted and applied to
serve the best interests of the inter-American
community in these critical times.
In a speech before the Council of the Organi-
zation of American States last year, the Presi-
dent of Panama noted that in the application
of tlie two principles the hemisphere ran the
risk of "drifting toward a new formula of eyes
shut and hands of'' resulting m an "almost com-
plete indifference to the fate of brother peoples
who, within their own national boundaries, are
deprived by force of all chance of self-deter-
mination, and for whom the principle of non-
intervention, carried to its most extreme inter-
pretation, becomes a miiversal condemnation to
live forever subject to the oppression that in-
curably affects them." He went on to say that
"it is necessary carefully to review these con-
cepts in order to find clear definitions for them
1 that, while reaffirming their primary philosoph-
ical bases, would not close the door to possible
collective measures intended to assure all the
peoples of the Americas, within their own
bomidaries, of their freedom, their right to
control their own destiny, and their right to
reestablish, when they have been deprived of it
by force, the rule of representative democracy,
which is the essence of the American regional
system."
Two Great Challenges
The hemisphere today confronts two great
challenges. One is to bring about, within a
democratic framework, the economic develop-
ment and social reform necessaiy to provide a
better way of life for millions of restless, under-
privileged persons. The second is to defend and
perfect our democratic institutions against the
attempts of Castro commimism to undermine
and destroy them.
These challenges are closely interrelated. It
is an obvious fact that commmiism breeds on
economic and social discontent. It is equally
evident that the most effective long-term de-
fense of democratic institutions is to raise the
levels of education and material well-being of
the population at large wliile efforts are con-
tinued to promote greater respect for human
riglits and observance of constitutional pro-
cedures. And finally it is becoming increas-
ingly clear that it is free people imder demo-
cratic governments who are most rapidly in-
creasing their material well-being.
Our interdependence in the economic and
social fields is fully recognized and increasingly
practiced. It is the underlying premise of the
Alliance for Progress. Govermnents do not
hesitate to discuss their domestic problems with
other countries, bilaterally and in multilateral
forums, and seek assistance from abroad. They
prepare national plans for review and approval
by international panels of experts and interna-
tional lending institutions. They invite tech-
nicians from other countries to work with them
in improving governmental procedures and
services in a wide area of economic and social
activities. Increasingly, producer and con-
sumer countries are entering into commodity
agreements regulating such internal matters as
levels of production and price. There is gi'ow-
MAY 6, 1963
Yll
ing recognition of the importance of common
tariff and customs arrangements as an aid to
national economic development programs.
These few examples serve to demonstrate how
the American governments have come to real-
ize that their national welfare in economic and
social matters is intimately linked with the wel-
fare of the community as a whole. In the
process they have not permitted dogmatic inter-
pretations of self-determination and noninter-
vention to distract them from seeking a better
way of life for their peoples.
in the political-security fields, the American
governments have not achieved the same level
of recognition of their interdependence. But
the trend is encouraging. The obstacles are
deeply rooted in history. While the circum-
stances which gave rise to Latin American em-
phasis on the concepts of self-determination and
nonintervention are no longer present, national
attitudes embodying those concepts, forged in
another era, remain and are slow to change.
Two main problems confront the inter- Amer-
ican community in the political-security field,
making necessary a reassessment of these atti-
tudes. One is the danger of indirect aggression
in the form of Communist subversion currently
aided by the present regime in Cuba. The sec-
ond is insuring that the efforts toward economic
and social development are accompanied by a
more effective exercise of representative democ-
racy. Recognizing the interrelation between
material progress, social justice, and political
stability, we should find it disturbing indeed
to see a retrogression in the practice of democ-
racy at the time that the hemisphere is making
real advances on the economic and social fronts.
With respect to the problem of Cuba and of
Communist subversion, a great deal of progress
has been made during the past 18 months. The
turning point was the Eighth Meeting of For-
eign Ministers in Punta del Este, which tackled
both questions.^
On Cuba the foreign ministers decided to ex-
clude the Castro regime from further partici-
pation in the various bodies of the inter- Amer-
ican system and to provide for economic sanc-
tions against it. As interesting and important
as the measures taken is the premise on which
' BuuJiTlN of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.
the action was based. This was that the internal
system of govermnent adopted by the Castro
regime — the Marxist-Leninist system — was and
is incompatible with the principles and ob-
jectives of the inter- American system and that
any member of the OAS which accepts that
form of government excludes itself from the
Organization.
I want to point out that this action was taken
under the Rio Treaty and is in full conformity
with it and with article 19 of the Charter of
the OAS, which pi-ovides that collective meas-
ures taken for the maintenance of peace and
security in the hemisphere do not constitute a
violation of the principles of nonintervention
and inviolability of national territory.
On the threat of Communist subversion the
foreign ministers made clear that, in order to
deal effectively with the threat, individual and
collective action was necessary. To this end
they prescribed in Resolution II of that meeting
three measures. First, they directed the Coun-
cil of the OAS to maintain all necessary vigi-
lance against acts of aggression, subversion, or
other dangers to peace and security resulting
from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet
powers in the hemisphere and to make recom-
mendations to the governments for dealing with
such acts. Second, to advise the Council in the
maintenance of this vigilance, and the govern-
ments should they also desire, they authorized
a Special Consultative Committee on Security.
This Committee has been operating effectively
for a year, assisting the Dominican Republic on
one occasion and more recently the Council of
the OAS. And third, the foreign ministers
urged the member governments to take appro-
priate steps for their individual or collective
self-defense and to cooperate as necessary to
strengthen their capacity to counteract the
threats arising from the continued intervention
of Sino-Soviet powers. This recommendation
clearly was intended to cover the furnishing of
material and training assistance to member
governments to strengthen their internal
security capabilities in anticipation of resort to
violence by subversive elements. This type of
help we are providing to many Latin American
countries today. It also covers the provision,
upon request, of military forces to maintain
712
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
surveillance against threatened aggression from
abroad or otherwise to help a government
threatened by a Communist takeover. Cer-
tainly the United States, and I am sure many
other members of the inter- American system,
are prepared to respond to any such call for
help in preserving the peace and security of the
hemisphere, as more than half of them did
during the missile crisis last fall.
A New Sense of Urgency
Events since the Pimta del Este meeting — •
the Cuban arms buildup, the missile crisis,
Castro's open encouragement of violence — have
served to give a new sense of urgency for action
to counteract Communist subversion in the
hemisphere. This is reflected in the attention
being paid by governments to improving their
security forces and keeping closer watch over
Commiuiist subversive elements as well as work-
ing out cooperative arrangements with other
governments.
Since the meeting of OAS foreign ministers
early last October ' a committee of the Council
of the OAS has been studying three important
aspects of Communist subversion : use of Cuba
as a base for training in subversive activities, the
flow of Communist propaganda, and the trans-
fer of funds for Communist subversive pur-
poses. This report has now been virtually
completed, and I expect it will be presented to
the Council this week. Meanwhile, seven of the
American governments — the five Central Amer-
ican countries, Panama, and the United States —
have moved ahead in a cooperative effort to bol-
ster their defenses against Castro Commvmist
subversion. Pursuant to a decision reached at
the San Jose Meeting of Presidents last month,'*
high-level representatives with primary respon-
sibility in the security field from these seven
countries met in Managua just a few days ago
and agreed on a series of specific, practical steps
to deal with Communist subversive activities.^
Central to the recommendations contained in the
OAS study, as well as in the Managua decisions,
is recognition that, while individual action is
the first line of defense, cooperation among
states is indispensable if individual measures
are to achieve maximum effectiveness.
From this brief summary I think it is fair to
conclude that the Communist threat in this
hemisphere has given the American govern-
ments a new appreciation of their interdepend-
ence in political mattei-s. It has brought a
further recognition that the principle of non-
intervention cannot be permitted to serve as a
cloak behind which a member state or domestic
subversive forces can threaten the peace and
security of the continent or of individual coun-
tries by associating with and receiving aid from
hostile extracontinental powers and serving as
their beachhead. And it has been demonstrated
that an effective means for fighting Communist
intervention is to confront it with the collective
action of the inter- American community.
The mutuality of interest in promoting repre-
sentative democracy in this hemisphere is
widely accepted as a general proposition not
only for its own sake but in recognition of the
fact that a strong democracy is the best defense
against communism. However, appropriate
collective action to promote its observance re-
mains a sensitive issue for some governments,
which fear it would undermine the principles of
self-determination and nonintervention.
I believe such fears to be imfounded. If
goveriiments accept the fact that political prob-
lems are interlocked with economic problems
and it is impossible to solve the latter without
finding an adequate solution to the former, and
that progress must be made on both fronts to
defeat international communism, I think they
should be as concerned about the practice of
democracy as about the levels of public educa-
tion, health, industrialization, and world trade.
By the same token, if the inter- American com-
munity can discuss and make recommendations
on how to improve economic and social condi-
tions, it should be able under proper circum-
stances to consider the conditions of the demo-
cratic process of the hemisphere and the means
for improving it. Efforts at this have been
made at recent inter-American conferences,
particularly the Fifth Meeting of Foreign
Ministers in 1959.^ The decisions reached at
' Ibid., Oct. 22, 1962, p. 598.
' Ibid.. Apr. 8, 19G3, p. 511.
' See p. 719.
' Bulletin of Aug. 31, 1959, p. 299, and Sept. 7, 1959,
p. 342.
MAT 6, 1963
713
these meetings, however, have not gone beyond
general exhoilations and provision for studies.
They have not entered into an analysis of specific
problems impeding fuller exercise of the demo-
cratic process and how the community might
work together to resolve them.
In my opinion our interdependence makes it
important that we in this hemisphere put to one
side traditional attitudes which are obstacles to
promoting representative democracy. We must
recognize that failure of the democratic process
in any one of the member states is a matter of
concern to the entire commimity, that interrup-
tions of democratic and constitutional govern-
ments in one country inevitably encourage anti-
democratic elements elsewhere.
We need to give the principle of self-deter-
mination its true and vital meaning: freedom
for the people periodically to decide through
elections who their leaders should be and the
policies they should follow. It has been said
that we should not concern ourselves with
changing the present regime in Cuba for that
would violate the principle of self-determina-
tion. Until that regime is ready to seek the
sanction of a free election, as Castro often prom-
ised to do in tlie early days, it has no claim for
the protection of this great principle. And we
should come to the realization that the active
pursuit of M'ays for improving the quality of
democracy in our respective countries does not
constitute a violation of the principles of non-
intervention.
Promotion of Representative Democracy
While we wait for hemispheric opinion to
crystallize around a more positive approach to
the promotion of the exercise of representative
democracy, we can derive satisfaction over some
of the progress being made in this direction. I
would mention these examples :
1. The increasingly categorical reafRrmatioii
of respect for human rights and the exercise of
representative democracy emanating from
recent inter-American meetings not only in con-
nection with the Cuban situation but with re-
gard to problems arising in our own hemisphere.
In this connection I would mention specifically
tlie paragraph in the declaration ^ accompany-
' For text, see iUd., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 462.
ing the Charter of Punta del Este establishing
the Alliance for Progress which reads :
This Alliance is established on the basic principle
that free men working through the institution of rep-
resentative democracy can best satisfy man's aspira-
tions, including those for work, home and land, health
and schools. No system can guarantee true progress
unless it affirms the dignity of the individual which
is the foundation of our civilization.
2. The active and vigorous role being played
by the Inter- American Commission on Human
Rights in the promotion of respect for human
rights.
3. The example set by the Dominican Eepub-
lic in making use of services provided by the
OAS in its difficult transition from dictatorship
to democratic govermnent.
4. The increasing use being made by govern-
ments in inviting outside observers selected
from panels furnished by the OAS to witness
elections.
5. The growing manifestations of concern by
governments when forcible and unconstitutional
seizures of power take place in one of our
countries.
6. The fact that the American governments
have agreed to consider the general problem of
the effective exercise of representative democ-
racy at the Eleventh Inter-American Confer-
ence when it is held.
Wliile these achievements m 
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