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F^c/ 5/^^^/ -SOUTHEAST ASIA 

The countries of Southeast Asia are the Union of Burma, the 
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This 16-page leaflet, illustrated with a map of Southeast Asia, 
describes the land and the people, their political and economic devel- 
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Africa's Unfinished Struggle 
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East- West struggle, and the problem of expanding the rights of the 
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Vol. XLVIII, No. 1240 V B- P* '/ April 1, 1963 




BAN TREATY • Statement hy Secretary Rusk 485 


Jacob D. Beam 489 


Trezise 497 


CONGO • by Richard N. Gardner 477 



For index see inside back cover 

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1240 • Publication Tfjj 
April 1,1963 

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Washington 26, D.C. 


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iecretary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council 

Secretary Rush spoke informally hefore the 
vnnal conference of the Advertising Council 

Washington on March 12. Following is the 
xt of his renmrTx's^ together xoith an intro- 
iction iy McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant 

the President, and the transcript of a ques- 
■yn-and-answer period. 

ess release 126 dated March 13 

Although Mr. Webb [James E. Webb, Ad- 
inistrator, National Aeronautics and Space 
dministration] spoke as if one of the great 
immitments of working in outer space was 
tat we might find extraterrestrial population, 
y own thought, as I think of what confronts 
ir next speaker, is that one of our very con- 
derable advantages is the shortage of people 
i space. 

I once heard a description of tlie very great 
roblems confronting us in dealuig with a par- 
cularly recalcitrant coimtry in another con- 
aent, and a whole series of recommendations 
ere put forward. Finally, in a desperate way, 
16 chairman asked if no one had a really more 
keeping solution, and the answer which came 
■cm the back of the room was, "Yes, sir, to 
lace the entire area under 8 feet of water for 4 
linutes." (Laughter.) 

This prescription is not readily available in 
lost of the Secretary's dealings with our inter- 
ational neighbors. 

It's impossible to exaggerate the responsibil- 
ies which are carried by the Department of 
tate and, at the head of the Department of 
tate, by the Secretary. It's very difficult to 
saggerate the honor and respect in which this 
Iecretary is held by those among our friends 

and in this country who know most about the 
conduct of our foreign affairs. 

So it is for me a great pleasure to present to 
you Secretary Rusk. 


Mr. Bundy and gentlemen : It's vei-y gratify- 
ing indeed to have a chance to be with you again 
this year. I should like at the very beginning 
to express my appreciation for your "Challenge 
to Americans" campaign, which you have been 
involved with for this past year. Because im- 
plicit in this theme of your campaign is a deep- 
seated faith that the American people will in- 
deed rise to the challenge that confronts them, 
and the rest of the world, and do so with cour- 
age and good sense. 

This very interesting and, I think, remark- 
able pamphlet on this theme which you have 
published ^ points out in the most helpful way 
the practical ways and means by which the 
individual citizen can do his part to help the 
newly emerging peoples to help themselves, to 
advance human welfare through science and 
technology, to add to the constructive work of 
international cooperative efforts, combat the 
forces of totalitarianism, and give new impetus 
to our own continuing American revolution. 

I am going to make a few very infoi-mal re- 
marks before your questions and do so by com- 
menting on three or four somewhat discon- 
nected problems with which we are now 

We are indeed in a great struggle, a great 

' Challenge to Americans: The Struggle We Face and 
How To Help Win It, available upon request from The 
Advertising Council, Inc., 25 W. 45th St., New York 36, 


.PRIL 1, 1963 


struggle for freedom. But this is not a new 

Freedom was bom in courage and sacrifice. 
And it has flourished and has grown through 
commitment and dedication and effort. And 
that is no less so today than it was a hundred 
years ago, or even three hundred years ago. 

The stakes today are what they have always 
been, a struggle between those who want to erect 
a society, both national and international, 
founded broadly on the notion of consent, on 
the one side, and those who would want to im- 
pose a world of coercion, both nationally and 
intern ationally . 

In that great struggle there are not basically 
three forces, two sets of allies and neutrals. 
The great issue internationally is whether we 
shall have the kind of world sketched out in the 
United Nations Charter or whether we shall 
have a world under the structure of a world 
Communist revolution. And on that, it's a 
case of the Communist bloc against all the rest. 
And all the rest have deep feelings on it, great 
strength, and great determination. 

But this is a struggle which cannot be won 
easily or cheaply. We hear, sitting where we 
do, from time to time, questions bemg raised, 
complaints being made that somehow the free 
world, and we in this country, are not pursuing 
a policy of winning. 

Well, let me point out that if we want to win 
we do not make deep cuts in our defense budget, 
that if we want to win we do not abandon our 
foreign aid. If we want to win we support a 
rapidly expanding international trade system. 
And if we want to win we do not abandon the 
United Nations to our enemies and withdraw 
because they don't agi-ee with us 100 percent of 
the time, say, rather than 98 percent of the time. 
We don't win by quitting. And I would hope 
that those who are most insistent upon winning 
would throw their effort and their strength and 
their dedication behind the means which it takes 
to win this great struggle for freedom. 

There is no free-lunch counter here. It's not 
going to be easy ; it's not going to be cheap. It 
means dedication, sacrifice, effort, and this 
means also cash, a lot of cash for defense and 
foreign aid and for our information programs 
and all the other things that cost money in this 
great struggle. 

I'd like to make just a few comments akt 
the framework of some of the discussions ni>| 
gomg on in the North Atlantic community. 

The North Atlantic Community 

Let me set aside for the moment a discussio 
which is largely intra-European in charactlB 
as to whether the future Europe should [" 
organized, as President de Gaulle apparenir 
prefers, as a Europe of fatherlands, or whetb 
it should be organized as a highly integratl 
Europe. That question is primarily Europe, 
in character and one which is not for us 

But let me conmient rather on the trai| 
atlantic aspect of some of our recent discil 
sions, particularly those that are concerned wi| 
the participation in the control of nuclear wei 
ons, the multilateral force. 

Since World War II the United States 
inherited an enormous responsibility in 
nuclear field. No one elected us to that ro. 
no one by conscious political act voted that ^ 
should carry that responsibility. This adher 
to the role which we had to play as a nation 
developing nuclear weapons, after the tra§ 
failure of the Banich proposals back in 19^ 

Now, since 1955 and '56 and '57, a new e!' 
ment has come into the situation. Before the 
dates, for all practical purposes, the Unit 
States had an atomic monopoly of effective c 
livery systems able to deliver these weapons 
almost any part of the earth. But in the mi 
fifties the Soviet Union acquired a large a,v 
effective delivery capability against the We: 
primarily against Western Europe but al 
deeply serious as far as our own country 

Now, under those conditions of nuclei 
competition, the possibilities of a genuine m 
clear exchange, then in a special sense the li 
and death of nations became involved in thef 
nuclear decisions. In a Europe which is revil 
ing, which feels its new strength, which is b 
coming more and more involved in the grei 
policy decisions that affect the entire world, 
is entirely understandable that they then 
selves would wish to play a larger role in til 
decisions which affect their own national f utu; 

We have tried to meet that in two or thi 
different ways. In the first place, during th 




;st year we have tried to provide our NATO 

ies a great deal more essential information 

■out the nuclear problem than they had had 

■'fore — our own nuclear situation, the nuclear 

sit ion of the Soviet Union, the teclmical and 

■ llnancial and the operational problems con- 

, red with the presence and the employment 

nuclear weapons. 

I think that has been very helpful in giving 
( r friends in the alliance the basic data on 
1 lich they can think hard and seriously about 
tese questions. But we also have had the feel- 
IX from tlaem that they would like a greater 
; ire of participation in the actual decisions, in 
; 1 actual management of at least a portion 
I these forc«s. I emphasize "participation" 
] ther than "independence" because independ- 
I i^c for Europe necessarily involves independ- 
( . e for the United States, and that is not being 

But participation in the consideration of the 
licy issues involved is a very important fac- 
■• And so we have been saying to our friends 
Europe, "If you would like to change the 
wring situation with respect to determinmg 
' Icar policy, then we would be glad to have 
ur proposals." 

^ oposals for Multilateral Force 

Those proposals were not forthcoming. And 
erefore we took the next step, and we have 
id to them, "Now, here is an approach by 
lich we think you might be able to participate 
ire actively and as full equals in this nuclear 
oblem." And so we have laid out, in sketch, 
rangements for a multilateral force, which 
luld give those of our NATO allies who wish 

do so a chance to participate with us in an 
iportant nuclear force within NATO. 
Now, let me say that this process involves a 
rtain nervousness on the part of public opin- 
ns in one or another country and perhaps just 
Uttle nervousness on the part of certain gov- 
nments. Because we have been so used to 
merican leadersliip that it would normally be 
;pected that we would come out with a com- 
ete blueprmt, complete in every detail. But 
•ar in mind that the issue here is sharing that 
adership with our NATO allies. Therefore, 

would not be in keeping with the whole pur- 

pose of the exercise for us to come forward with 
a finished plan in every detail and say to them, 
"Take it or leave it." 

Secondly, here is a case where there is an 
opportunity for the most genuine consultation 
from the very inception of an idea and a joint 
and connnon construction of a possible change 
in the NATO arrangements. Now, this is not 
again too easy, because people are more accus- 
tomed to reacting to proposals than they are 
to sitting down and actually helping to con- 
struct those proposals. But this is what we 
are up to at the present time. We are saying 
to our European friends, "If you would like 
to join with us in a multilateral force in NATO, 
in which we would have mixed manning, a sea- 
borne force, and control of that force by the 
participants, here is a way we can do it. It's 
going to be costly, and here is what it would 
cost. And we would like to get your reactions 
and your comitersuggestions if you in fact are 
seriously interested in these matters." 

We are pleased that there has been expressed 
a very sti'ong interest on the part, of several 
members of NATO in pursuing these discus- 
sions further. But I want to emphasize that 
this is a common, joint effort and not a question 
in which we, the United States, are saying to 
our NATO allies, "Here is something that we 
think you must take, and this is the way it has 
got to be." 

We are saying to them, "You come in, sit 
down with us, let's work at this and see if we 
can't come out of it with a more genuine 
partnership than we have had thus far in these 
nuclear matters." 

Some Comments on Cuba 

Anticipating, perhaps, one or two of your 
questions, I'd like to make some comments on 
Cuba. (Laughter.) 

The objective of the hemisphere and of the 
United States with respect to Cuba must be — 
and it is — the return of a free Cuba to this 
hemisphere. On this the hemisphere is unani- 
mous. The foreign ministers themselves iman- 
imously have stated this as the central theme of 
hemisphere policy toward that island. 

Now, we are discovering with regard to Cuba 
that, having failed to take the steps that might 


have prevented in years past the establishment 
of a Marxist- Leninist regime in Cuba, the prob- 
lem of finding a cure is more difficult. (And let 
me say parenthetically that this factor alone 
gives highest priority to an effective and vig- 
orous Alliance for Progress program through- 
out the hemisphere, because we must anticipate 
and try to prevent these situations, because the 
cure becomes so much more difficult.) 

Well, let me remind you of some of the ele- 
ments in the policy and action which are now 
being pursued with respect to Cuba, because 
we seldom see these more or less put together 
all in one place. 

It has been made very clear that under no 
circumstances can the United States accept or 
tolerate the reintroduction of offensive weapons 
into Cuba and that, if that should occur, the 
crisis of last October would look relatively 
trivial compared to the crisis that would be 
engendered by any such fresh episode of that 

Secondly, it has been made very clear that 
the armed forces of the hemisphere, including 
our own, are made available to insure that anns 
that are now in Cuba not be used outside of 
Cuba, either in temis of organized effort or 
through piecemeal infiltration of those arms 
into other countries of the hemisphere. And 
the most diligent efforts are being made by us 
and others to insure that there is not that kind 
of surreptitious arms traffic in this hemisphere, 
a policy accepted unanimously by the OAS long 

Third, we must keep taking a look at Cuba 
to assure ourselves as well as we can about what 
is going on in that island — a surveillance w^hich 
we feel, and which we are confident, is 
thoroughly based upon the OAS structure 
and the OAS resolutions, but a surveillance 
which we believe is necessary under all the 

Fourth, to protect the free and active use of 
international waters and airspace in the gen- 
eral vicinity of Cuba and to enforce that use by 
armed force, if necessaiy. 

Then we have felt, along with many other 
of our allies, that the kind of Cuban regime 
that we have today not only is not fit to par- 
ticipate as a regime in the activities of the inter- 
American system but that, with its declaration 

of subversive and other types of war upon tl I 
hemisphere, it is not entitled to normal ec', I 
nomic or other relations with the free world. • 

And so there has been a systematic discussic 
with other governments about the restriction ( 
trade between the free world and Cuba ar 
about the restriction of sliipping between tl 
free world and Cuba. 

The statistics on both of those show a dr 
matic decline in the economic relationships b 
tween Cuba and the rest of the free world, 
think we will find that 1963 will almost STire 
result in almost complete isolation of Cul 
from the free world in such transactions. 

Then we have the contmued problem of t 
degree of penetration of the rest of the hen 
sphere coming through Cuba or leaning up( 
Cuba in terms of subversive effort, the flow 
funds, the training of individuals from oth 
countries in Cuba to be returned for nefario 
purposes back to their own country. This 
a problem which technically is difficult becau 
of the legal and constitutional problems in exii 
ence in some countries but nevertheless is 
matter of highest priority among the countrii 
particularly in the Caribbean area at the pn 
ent time, and very substantial gains are beii 
made in that respect. 

We must look forward to a time when ! 
Sovdet military elements are out of Cuba. T 
penetration of this hemisphere by Marxist-Lf 
inism is itself incompatible with the hemispht 
and its commitments. 

The presence of Soviet forces in this hen • 
sphere cannot be accepted as a part of the m 
mal situation in this hemisphere. Now, the m 
siles have gone out ; the bombers have gone oi 
Soviet forces have been moving out. 

We will have, I think, a more complete i 
porti on just what this amounts to sometii' 
after the middle of the month, because of t ■ 
recent indication from the Soviet Union tl:; 
they were taking out several thousand of th( i 
before the end of the month. But the continul 
outflow of Soviet military personnel itself mit 
be and is an object of policy. 

In other words, the actions that are bei? 
taken include, I think, the actions that can r<- 
sonably be taken under all the circumstanc, 
short of the actual lamiching of an armed ;- 



tack upon Cuba, which is not a part of our pol- 
icy at the present time. 

That is an action which is easy to tliink of 

land in a certain highly tlieoretical sense is al- 

Iways easy to employ. But this type of action 

Tinvolves costs and risks which have to be related 

not onl}- to the de^gree of the threat which exists 

in Cuba but also to problems for which we are 

n^sponsible in other parts of the world. 

Xow, tliis is about where we are. I think the 
situation in Cuba is making it clear to the Cu- 
ban people that this present course is not a 
course on which they can find a fit future for 
themselves. And it's making it veiy clear also 
to the rest of the hemisphere that Castroism 
does not hold within itself any promise for the 
{economical and social development of the peo- 
ple of this hemisphere. 

Finding Elements of Common Interest 

T would like in closing, before I come to your 
questions, to comment on one other point. That 
is that despite the tensions, despite the enor- 
mous diversity of purpose between ourselves 
and the Soviet Union, despite all of the effort 
and the struggle in which we are involved in 
this great underlying crisis about the shape of 
the world community, it is important, never- 
theless, for us to try to find elements of common 
interest with the Soviet Union in order to dis- 
cover whether bridges might not be thrown 
across, along which some elements of peace can 
be gradually built. We owe it to ourselves and 
to the human race to keep in touch on those 

For example, there are fields in which co- 
operation between us is in our common interest 
simply because we are both frail human beings 
caught in a hostile physical environment. Some 
of the great forces of nature in the field of dis- 
ease and the attacks upon food crops and 
things of that sort, where what happens in one 
part of the world is a danger to events in an- 
other part of the world — there are elements of 
common interest which might support some 
growing cooperation in these scientific and tech- 
nical medical fields. 

"We have supposed that it was possible that 
in the nuclear testing field there might be also 
a common interest recognized on both sides 

which could provide the basis for an agreement 
to end nuclear testing. Objectively considered, 
one would suppose that the Soviet Union shares 
with us the view that it would be a misfortune 
if a nuclear race shoidd go on indefuiitely and 
without limit, not only because it involves great 
burdens and billions upon billions of additional 
resources thrown into the arms race but be- 
cause over time, looking out ahead into the 
future, one sees the possibility of a chanciness, 
of unpredictability, of growing dangers, of in- 
creasing complexity, of increasing difficulty of 
just human management of weapons systems 
of such speed and sophistication, so that there 
might be a common interest on both sides in 
bringing this matter to a conclusion. 

Unfortunately I would have to report today 
that the prospects do not appear very good that 
we can move on to a nuclear test ban treaty. 
I think that, to the extent that the argument 
turns on inspection, to a certain extent the argu- 
ment is somewhat unbalanced. If you put your- 
self in the position of the Soviet Union, looking 
at the United States, from their point of view 
they do not need much international machinery 
to assure themselves that we are not testing. 
We have an open society. Information of this 
and other tj'pes is rather easy to obtain. They 
must have learned by now that we find it very 
difficult ourselves to keep secrets on such 

But they, looking at us, might well judge that 
we can get reasonable assurance out of the 
existing situation which they describe as na- 
tional systems, perhaps 98 percent open society, 
perhaps 2 percent special intelligence activities 
on their side. But, in any event, the combina- 
tion gives them reasonable assurance. 

From our point of view, looking at the Soviet 
Union, this is not possible. A closed society, 
occupymg a vast landmass in Eurasia, much of 
it sparsely populated, requires a degree of in- 
strumentation and physical presence — human 
presence — from time to time in order to check 
up on indications that tests might in fact be 
taking place. So we have to have a testing 
procedure which will give us reasonable assur- 
ance that the treaty is not being violated. 

Well now, we are at the present time hung 
up, not just on the number of inspections. We 


are hung up on all the rest of the treaty which 
specifies what kinds of inspections you would in 
fact have. We have indicated that we would be 
ready to set the number aside in order to make 
our conversations more relevant by talking 
about what it is we are trying to number, to 
get down and work out the details as to what 
kind of data would stimulate a request for an in- 
spection, how large an area would be subject 
to inspection, who would be the inspectors, how 
the inspectors would know that they were ac- 
tually on the spot designated for inspection — 
questions of that sort which are highly relevant, 
indeed crucial, to any inspection system. Be- 
cause one or two hundred inspections which 
were inadequate would not be as good as seven 
or eight inspections which were fully adequate 
in all details that make the difference. But we 
have had no indication of progress in the last 
several weeks on this matter, and I would sup- 
pose on that at the present time that the pros- 
pect for progi-ess is somewhat slow. 

Well now, I think these are comments which 
might fonn the basis for, or perhaps stimulate, 
some questions. I'd be glad to take your ques- 
tions at this time. Thank you. 


Mt. Bimdy: The Secretary will take the ques- 
tions direct. 

Q. Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary Rusk: Yes? 

Q. If the Soviets hnow that toe are not going 
to war over Cuba — we have practically told 
them that, I gather — lohat incentive is there 
for them to get their troops out? Why should 
they take them out, in other words? 

A. Well, there were some highly dangerous 
elements in the Cuba situation today tliat con- 
tinue to be there. The necessity for surveillance 
could lead to a very dangerous situation very 

Q. On their part, you mean? 

A. If there were any inten-uption with our 
surveillance, if Soviet forces in Cuba were to 
take action against Cubans, that could create 
a very dangerous situation. If there were any 


forays mounting from Cuba against neighbor- 
ing coimtries, that could create a very danger- 
ous situation. In otlier words, this is not a 
comfortable and easy situation m which we are 
at the present time. And so I would not sup 
pose that there is a stability and a certainty 
about it on either side to any extent. 

Now, if the threat is sufficiently great, the 
risks to be taken to meet that tlireat have to be 
great as well. Back in October tliere were very 
great threats in preparation against the United 
States. And the maximum risk was taken back 
in October. Let me say that the decision taken 
on October 21 and 22 ^ may in retrospect loci 
simple and easy. I can assure you that at the! 
time it was taken, at a time when you could not 
know for sure what would happen, this was bj 
no means an easy and simple decision. It was 
the gravest decision I think any President of 
the United States has made in decades. 

But if the risks are great, that is, if the threat! 
is great, the necessary steps would have to be 
taken and the risk would have to be accepted 
accordingly. We do not judge that the present 
situation requires that kind of operation at the 
present time. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have some — we knovx 
that there are some sutstantial Communist ac- 
tivities in Venezuela, Colonibia, and othen 
South American countries. Do we have an% 
assurance that there loill not he a CaMro-typ4 
leader take over some of these countries? 

A. Well, I think this is a primary necessitj 
and a primaiy objective of policy and action 
in the rest of Latin America, including those 
countries that you just mentioned, that we musf> 
take whatever steps are necessary to prevent the- 
arrival in any other country of a Marxist-Len- 
inist regime of the Castro type. There is no 
question about it; we are working very closely, 
indeed, with the authorities of the countries in 
volved to see what has to be done to assure 
that this does not happen. 

Q. Mr. Secretary? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. In the recent listing of czarist treaties, 
that were unfair to China, that just came out 

' For background, see Bulletin of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 



of Peking, was the United States involved his- 
torically in any of those agreements? 

A. I would have to check that. I'm afraid 
\-our question caught me without researcli at 
the moment. I don't believe that those particu- 
lar border treaties involved the United States. 
Rut I'd have to verify that. 

Shipping Between Cuba and Free World 

Q. Do ive currently have a quarantine or 
blockade of Cuba? And if so, what is its 


A. We do not have a quarantine of the sort 
;hat stops ships on the high seas. What is hap- 
pening is that there is a progressive and very 
sharp reduction in normal economic or shipping 
relations between Cuba and the free world. For 
example, in the month of January there were 
12 free-world ships in the Cuban trade and 
nost of those were on long-term charter to the 
soviet bloc. 

TMiat has been happening is that our friends 
ibroad, including the maritime nations, have 
:hemselves been taking action voluntarily and 
m many situations through private discussions 
'ather than through official action, because in 
jome coimtries there is an absence of law on 
the subject, to get their ships out of the Cuban 
trade. And this has been moving very rapidly, 
md I would suppose that it will continue to 
?o down in the calendar year 1963. It is now 
only a trickle. 

Q. Mr. Rush? 
A. Yes, sir? 

Q. What do you estimate it is costing the 
Soviet Union to keep the Cuban economy 
afloat and the regime too? 

A. I have seen the estimate of a million dol- 
lars a day. I tliink that minimum. I think 
as the situation in Cuba continues to deteriorate 
with the sharp drop in their sugar crop this 
year and the multiplying factor of spare-parts 
shortages and tilings of that sort, my guess is 
that this will be increasingly expensive and 
this is one of the strains which may point to 
an opportunity to get this problem solved at 
some later stage. 

Q. Mr. Secretary? 
A. Yes? 

Q. Does Cuba get its oil from any source 
other than Russia? 

A. I imderstand that there is no free- world 
oil in the Cuba trade. If there is any, it is the 
most trivial quantity. They get their oil from 
the Soviet Union at the present time. Yes, sir? 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you stated that one of the 
policies of the OAS is to prevent the flow of 
arms from Cuba — 

A. Right. 

Q. — and other people being trained in Cuba 
to act in these countries. How can we deter- 
mine there is no flow without inspection or a 

A. Well, there are occasional reports, for 
example, that ships proceeding from Cuba to 
a Latin American port to pick up a load of 
something for return to, say, Europe and even 
to the bloc, might have on board anns. Well, 
those ships are carefully inspected, and we have 
not yet found any one of them that have been 
alleged to have been carrying anns to have any 
anns on board. But it's not too difficult to 
check out that kind of report, and we check 
out all those we can possibly get. We are 
watching that vei-y carefully. 

Q. Mr. Rusk, can you envisage the structure 
of the political party that would replace Castro 
if such a thing occurred? 

A. I think one could not spell that out in 
detail. One of the difficulties is that the anti- 
Castro Cubans are themselves diversified, 
broken up into many factions, and have not 
fully pulled themselves together in a unified 
front. At the time that he visited the Cuban 
brigade in Miami the President urged them to 
do their best to get together as a solid group,^ 
but this has been very difficult for political rea- 
sons, and that I suppose one can miderstand. 

But nevertheless it would be very important 
if the anti-Castro Cubans could work toward a 
solid front, not only outside Cuba, say, in this 
country and in the rest of the hemisphere, but 

'76!(?., Jan. 21, 1963, p. 88. 

APRIL 1, 19G3 


also to provide a more dynamic leadership of 
the people still inside Cuba. You see, we have 
had already now upward of 600,000 people in 
Cuba who have indicated they want to leave. 
In terms of voting with your feet, this voting 
is very persuasive testimony about the general 
attitude of many Cubans toward the regime 

Now, about a hundred thousand of those are 
in this country. We would like to see as much 
cohesion as possible among them because in the 
future this cohesion could be very important. 

Q. Sir, could you venture a guess as to how 
long the so-called Castro regime would rerrMin 
m power? 

A. No, sir, I wouldn't want to predict that. 
(Laughter.) I would like to be able to predict 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you say that a seri- 
ous acceleration of the sabotage efforts in Latin 
America directed from, Cuba might he con- 
sidered an equivalent of military interference? 

A. Well, it depends upon the method, the de- 
gree, and the ability to demonstrate conclu- 
sively that there was the action that was stim- 
ulated out of Cuba, directed toward a particular 
country. I would think that there would come 
a point where that would be the equivalent of 
ih.Q kind of violation of the Rio Pact that would 
require additional measures against Cuba. 

Yes, sir? 

Question of "No-invasion Pledge" 

Q. Sir, on the no-invasion pledge or lack of 
a no-invasion pledge, could you clarify it? Be- 
cause amongst people there seems to be con- 
fusion as to xohether there is a no-invasion 
pledge of any type or not. Are you in a posi- 
tion to get that clear to any of tis now? Per- 
haps there is; perhaps there isn't. But wider 
certain circumstances it might change on that. 
Is there any way to clarify it so that we know? 

A. Well, I would urge you first to turn back 
at your first opportunity and read tlie Presi- 
dent's November 20th press conference on that 
point.* Let me say tliat there have been no 


* For text of a statement read by the President, see 
ibid., Dec. 10, 1962, p. 874. 

commitments made that have not been made 
public on this point. Had we been able to get 
any agreement with the Soviet Union on all of 
the qualifications of policy with respect to thei 
future, there might have been an agi'eement 
announced at the United Nations in tlie course 
of January. 

For example, we can't make a commitment 
that would cut across the Rio Treaty. We can't 
make a commitment that would cut across 
the Guantanamo Treaty. We can't make a 
coimnitment that would expose the rest of the 
hemisphere to penetration or assault or sub- 
version from Cuba. It is the present policy of 
the United States not to invade Cuba for rea- 
sons that the President and others have indi- 
cated. But this is not in a sense, and has noti 
been, any unqualified commitment without ref- 
erence to the conduct of Cuba in this hemisphere 
and Cuba's status as a threat in the hemisphere. 

President Kennedy pointed out November' 
20th that, if Cuba is determined to live at peace,, 
there could be peace in the Caribbean, buti 
Castro's speeches in early January didn't soimd 
like living at peace in the Caribbean, you see. 

So I would refer you to his press conference* 
of November 20, whicli was the most authorita- 
tive word on that, and say that nothing has been 
said privately that has not been said publiclyt 
on this point and that the basic treaty instruc- 
tions and obligations of the hemisphere remaini 

Q. Thank you. 
A. Yes, sir? 

Q. It was reported there was a guerrillaH 
movement between Mexico and. Cuba. How\ 
can you possibly start the building up of nwm-\ 
bers of trained saboteurs and guerrillas v^ho are\ 
continually reporting back to the respective\ 

A. Well, in the first place, the general pas- 
senger traffic to and from Mexico and Cuba has| 
been sharply reduced in recent weeks — the num- 
ber of flights, the actual movement of people 
and a good many of those have been people on| 
diplomatic or other business of a more formal I 
and official kind. 

But this is a troublesome question for a num-l 
ber of Latin American countries, some of whom! 



;ave constitutions that prevent them from 
nterfering with the so-called right to travel, 
md wliat has sometimes happened is that 
people from other Latin American countries 
could come to Mexico on their normal pass 
tapers from their own coimtries and get in 
ouch with an agent of Cuba somehow and get 
pecial papers on which he would find his way 
lo Cuba and then come back to Mexico, pick up 
;is normal papers, and go back home; and his 
ountry of origin could not know where he had 
•een in the process. 

Now, it's not easy to control this travel of 
adividuals because there are hundreds of 
liousands of people in travel status. So there 
re some serious technical problems involved, 
kit I think we are making some very substan- 
ial headway on it, and I think this is going to 
e a decreasing problem. 

Yes, sir? 

he Middle East 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment on the 
'tuation in the Middle East, particularly in 

'ijrla and Iraq? 

A. Well, I would prefer at the moment not 
3 offer any interpretation of what has been 
appening in Syria because it is a little^ early 
et to particularly offer any public examination 
f that situation. We have recognized the 
Syrian Government ° because it appeared to us 
hat it was in control of the situation and had 
ommitted itself to its own international obli- 
■ations, and so forth. 

I think our deepest concern at the moment in 
he Middle East is to try to get the countries of 
he Middle East to disengage themselves from 
he Yemen and to leave the Yemenis alone to 
rork out their own solution in their own 
ountry. Because there is a situation which 
ould pit these neighboring countries against 
ach other and lead to rapid escalation of vio- 
ence that could endanger the entire area. 

So we would like very much to see the neigh- 
)oring countries disengaged from the Yemen 
tnd leave the Yemenis alone. And I think that 
Tould reduce the tension considerably in the 
veeks immediately ahead. Otherwise I would 

think that we do not see in the Baghdad and 
Damascus situations any indication of explo- 
sion. It seems to be stabilizing, and there seems 
to be a prospect that things will shake down 
without too much difficulty. 

Mr. Bundy: Gentlemen, the Secretary prom- 
ised us a half hour. He has very generously 
given us 40 minutes, full measure and more. 
It's very much worth it, but I think we should 
let him go. 

U.S. Rejects Soviet Charge 

of Firing on Trawler 

Following is an exchange of notes between 
the United States and the Soviet Union regard- 
ing the alleged firing on a Soviet trawler hy 
U.S. Navy ships. 


The Department of State acknowledges the 
receipt of note No. 9 from the Embassy of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Eepublics dated 
March 12, 1963 expressing serious concern over 
a reported firing by United States Navy ships 
on a Soviet refrigerator- trawler (SRTE-9007) 
March 8, 1963 approximately 70 miles east of 
Norfolk, Virginia. A thorough investigation 
was initiated immediately upon the receipt of 
the Embassy's note with the foDowing results. 

The position given in the Embassy's note 
for the location of the Soviet vessel at the time 
of the alleged incident lies well within an estab- 
lished and recognized United States Navy 
operations area used for many years for gun- 
nery and other exercises by ships of the United 
States Na^'y. On March 8, 1963, there were 
in this operations area six United States Navy 
destroyei-s which engaged in gmanei-y exercises 
during the course of the day. The destroyer 
nearest the location of the alleged incident with- 
in the indicated time period conducted anti- 
aircraft firing practice (against a target towed 
by an airplane) in an easterly and westerly 
direction with ammunition having a maximum 

■ See p. 476. 

' DeUrered to the Soviet Embassy at Washington on 
Mar. 14 (press release 134 dated Mar. 15). 

APRIL 1, 1963 


range of seven miles while the destroyer was ten 
miles southwest of the location of the alleged 
incident. Before and during the firing prac- 
tice, clearance of the range was established in 
accordance with normal safety procedures and 
no other surface vessels were within twelve 
miles of the destroyer at the time of firing. At 
no time did this destroyer or any other United 
States naval vessel m the general area engage 
in any firing when any surface vessel or aircraft 
could be endangered. No cruisers were among 
the United States Navy vessels in the area. 

Department of State, 
Washington, March IJ^, 1963. 


UnofiBcial translation 
No. 9 

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics has the honor to state the following upon in- 
structions from the Soviet Government. 

According to information received, on March 8 of 
this year two American "Boston" class cruisers and 
a "Franks" class destroyer fired upon a Soviet refrig- 
erator trawler (SRTR-9007), which was fishing in the 
open sea. At the moment of the firing the Soviet 
trawler was located 70 miles east of Norfolk (at 
36°o3.3' North, 74°58' West). 

At 12 :15 ' the American warships fired two dummy 
shells towards the trawler from a distance of 5 miles. 
The shells fell approximately 130 meters from the 
vessel. Then at 12 :.50, approaching to a distance of 
about 1 kilometer, they fired two more dummy shells, 
which fell GO meters from the trawler. By their 
actions, the American warships created a threat to 
the safety of the Soviet trawler and its crew. 

The Soviet Government cannot regard the firing upon 
of a fishing vessel of the U.S.S.R. by ships of the Navy 
of the U.S.A. otherwise than as a crude violation of 
the generally-recognized standards of international 
law, the principles of freedom of navigation in the open 
sea, and as an undisguised arbitrary act which can 
lead to serious consequences. 

The Soviet Government protests to the Government 
of the United States of America on the occasion of the 
above actions of provocation by American warships, 
expects that those guilty will be punished, and that 
the necessary measures will also be taken for the 
barring of similar actions in the future. 

Washington, March 12, 1963. 

To the Department of State 

of the United States of America, 

U.S. Protests Soviet Planes' 
Violation of Alaskan Airspace 

Following is the text of a note delivered 
March 16 by Ambassador Foy D. Eohler a' 
Moscow to Soviet First Deputy Foreign Blinis^ 
ter Vassily Kuznetsov. 

Press release 138 dated March 16 

It has been established tliat two Soviet res 
comiaissance aircraft violated United States ai 
space over Alaska on March 15, 1963. The firs 
of these entered United States air space at 59 
52 minutes North 163° West at 0705 Z depart; 
ing at 60° 18 minutes North 166° 40 minute 
West at 0730 Z. The second entered Unit© 
States air space at 59° 50 minutes North 163° H 
minutes West at 0713 Z departmg at 61° 10 min 
utes North 165° 40 minutes West at 07342 
Both planes then flew otf in the direction of th 
Soviet Union. The United States Governmen 
protests these overflights of United States terri 
tory by Soviet aircraft and expects that th 
Soviet Government will take all necessary mi 
ures to prevent any repetition. 





• No time zone indicated — translator's note. 

U.S. Recognizes Government 
of Syrian Arab Republic 

Department Statement 

Press release 125 dated March 12 

The United States Government, taking noii 
of the affirmation by the Government of tb 
Syrian Arab Republic of its intention to hone 
its international obligations, has today [Marc 
12] decided to recognize the Government of tb 
Syrian Arab Republic and has instructed ii 
Charge d'Afl'aires in Damascus to confirm tb 
decision in writing to the Ministry of Foreigi 
Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic. 

With its recognition the United States ei 
tends its best wishes for success and prosperit: 
of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republ 
and its hojjes that the traditional ties of frieno 
ship between the American and Syrian peopl 
will be expanded and strengthened. 

It is expected that Ambassador [Ridgwal 
B.] ICnight, who is in the United States o 
consultation, will return to his post after a shoi 




depaktment of state BULUE' 


he United Nations in Crisis: Cuba and the Congo 

by Richard N. Gardner 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^ 

I don't know which group causes us the most 

rouble in Washington these days — the uncrit- 

lal admirers of the United Nations or the un- 

•itical opponents of the United Nations. 

Wlien I say uncritical admirers of the United 

ations, I mean those people who are always 

riting us to say: "Naughty boys — you have 

^passed the U.N." They want the United 

ations to do everything. 

These people remind me of the tribal chief 

ho came to the General Assembly some years 

10 to complain that the British were oppress- 

ig liim because they would not let him keep 

is 100 wives. One veteran U.N. delegate rose 

I his full dignity and said : "This is not a fit 

ibject for the United Nations. Let this man 

eep his 100 wives — and let the ravages of 

ature teach him the error of his ways !" 

The uncritical opponents of the United Na- 

I ons are those who are never satisfied, no mat- 

\\T what the U.N. does. I have in mind one 

'itic who wrote me 3 months ago to say that 

i 18 United Nations was a failure because it was 

)0 weak to deal with Tshombe [Moise Tshom- 

3, President of Katanga Province] . Now he is 

•riting to complain that the U.N. is too strong 

nd has become a "superstate." 

Like the uncritical admirers, the uncritical 

pponents of the U.N. feel under no obligation 

) base their opinions on facts. As Stephen 

ieacock said : "It's not what people don't know 

iiat causes all the trouble; it's what they do 

now that ain't so." 

We in Washington try to steer a course be- 
tween these two extremes. We look upon the 
United Nations in a hard and practical way as 
a means of promoting our national self-interest. 
This statement should not shock anyone, because 
this is the way that other countries look upon 
the United Nations — as a means of promoting 
their own national self-interest. 

The United Nations is not a substitute for na- 
tional interest but rather a place where nations 
work together to promote their national in- 
terests on those matters where they cannot get 
adequate results by acting alone. 

These general observations are familiar to 
you. Let us test them in two of the great crises 
of the last year : Cuba and the Congo. 

The Cuban Crisis 

The Cuban crisis was a particularly eloquent 
illustration of the U.N.'s threefold value to the 
United States as a place for debate, negotiation, 
and action — once the power and determination 
of the United States and its allies had been 
demonstrated in the quarantine.^ 

As a place for debate., the United Nations en- 
abled us to build support for our Cuban policy 
in the most dramatic and effective way.^ You 
will all remember what Mr. Zorin [Valerian 
A. Zorin, Soviet representative to the U.N.] said 

'Address made before the 1963 Mid-Atlantic Model 
leneral Assembly at Washin^on, D.C., on Feb. 23 
press release 99 dated Feb. 22). 

- For an address by President Kennedy and text of 
a proclamation on the interdiction of the delivery of 
offensive weapons to Cuba, see Bulletin of Nov. 12, 
1962, pp. 715 and 717. 

° For statements made in the Security Council by 
U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson on Oct. 23 and 
25, 1962, see ibid., p. 723. 

IPRIL 1, 1963 


before millions on TV— that the Soviets had no 
need to put missiles into Cuba and that the U.S. 
evidence of the missile sites was manufactured 
by the CIA. We countered by showing pic- 
tures of the missile sites in the Security Council. 
Shortly thereafter Khrushchev admitted the 
presence of the missiles and agreed to withdraw 


This public exposure of Soviet duplicity had 
a tremendous impact in building support for 
the quarantine and other aspects of our Cuban 
policy. Even though the Cuban matter was 
considered in the Security Council, it affected 
the course of the General Assembly and turned 
the general opinion of mankind in our favor 
on a number of other subjects. We could not 
have achieved this result with anything like 
such success if we had been obliged to show our 
pictures and tell our story separately in 109 
different comitries. 

As a place for negotiation, the United Na- 
tions was scarcely less important to us. The 
Secretary-General served as a useful go-between 
in negotiations between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. 

To begin with, he helped avoid an armed 
clash at sea between the Soviets and ourselves 
when he proposed that Soviet ships stay clear 
of our quarantine fleet. If the Soviets needed 
an "out," they could find it in responding to a 
U.N. appeal and not admitting publicly they 
were responding to United States power. 

As a place for action, the United Nations 
demonstrated its potential for the future. 
Khrushchev agreed to U.N. inspection on the 
spot. He could never have agreed to U.S. in- 
spection. Then Castro refused and branded 
Communist Cuba as unwilling to cooperate 
with the world peace organization. 

The fact that the United Nations was willing 
and able to perform the inspection role in Cuba 
and that this was agreed to between the United 
States and the Soviet Union had a twofold 
value : The United Nations demonstrated a po- 
tential of considerable importance for the 
future, and Castro was put in the position of 
defying not just U.S. inspection but U.N. in- 
spection, thereby lea\ang inspection to our own 



Legality of U.N. Action in the Congo 

Let us turn now from Cuba to the Congo. 
Some people still ask: Wliat is the United 
Nations doing in the Congo, and why is the 
United States supporting it ? 

To answer tliis question it is useful to recall 
the choice that confronted the United States, 
in the Congo in the summer of 1960. Ths^^ 
alternatives open to the United States were ' 
clear. ^ 

We could do nothing — in which case the 
Congo would wallow in chaos and bloodshed 
and the Soviet bloc would be free to move in to 
pick up the remains. 

We could intervene directly — and trigger a 
confrontation in the heart of Africa of the great 
powers, a confrontation which could lead to 
another "Spanish civil war" and be the prelud 
to a wider conflict. 

Or we could do what we in fact did — give 
assistance to the Congo through the United 

I think the judgment of history will be that 
the use of the United Nations in the Congo was 
the least dangerous of the three dangerous al'l 
ternatives confronting the United States ana 
the woi-ld at large in the summer of 1960. 

Most Americans recognize the merit of thesd 
arguments. Yet a number of specific questions 
about the Congo are still raised. 

Some people ask: Was the United Nationi 
action in the Congo legal ? The answer is yea 
for three reasons : 

First, the Government of the Congo askeu 
for the United Nations to come in. 

Second, the Security Council authorized th 
U.N. to go in with a mandate to maintain la^ 
and order — a mandate which was subsequent!; 
expanded into a mandate to prevent civil wai 
protect the Congo's territorial integrity, and re 
move the foreign mercenaries.^ 

Third, the military actions of the U.N. Fore 
were taken in pursuit of these mandates and i: 

It is well to remember that the recent fightinj 
which culminated in the end of the secession o: 
Katanga began on Christmas Eve, whi 

* For exchanges of messages between President Ken- 
nedy and Chairman Khrushchev, see ibid., p. 741. 

'■ For bacliground and texts of resolutions, see ihiA 
Aug. 1, I960, p. 159 ; Aug. 8, 1960, p. 221 ; Sept. 5, 19«( 
p. 384 ; Mar. 13, 1961, p. 359 ; and Dec. 25, 1961, p. 10« 



drunken Katangese soldiere attacked a U.N. 
command post. This was the cuhnination of 
a long series of harassments of the U.N. soldiers 
designed to cut them off from one another and 
from their supplies and communications. 

I think it is a generally accepted principle 
of both domestic and international law that a 
cop who is lawfully on the beat has a right to 
defend himself against attack. 

As a part of this legal question, there are 
people who ask: Isn't this intervention in the 
internal affairs of the Congo? The answer is 
no again, for at least two reasons : 

First, the Congo asked for the U.N. to come 

Second, this was not an internal matter — 
there was a clear threat to international peace 
and security because of the actual or potential 
involvement of outside powers. 

Still other people ask: Doesn't this violate 
traditional United States support for the prin- 
ciple of self-determination? The answer is no, 
for at least three reasons : 

First, there is no absolute principle of self- 
determination. We fought a civil war to deny 
it. We have recognized both at home and 
abroad the dangers of Balkanization. Sup- 
pose the mayor of a Texas tov,-n which hap- 
pened to have most of the oil in Texas decided 
to secede from the State and take the oil with 
him. I don't suppose that would be permitted 
by the people of Texas or by the people of the 
United States. The application of the principle 
of self-determination in the Congo without any 
qualification would mean the creation of some 
20 tribal states and the disintegration of the 
•whole into disorder and chaos. 

Second, even according to the standards of 
iself-deterraination, Tshombe could not pretend 
to speak for the Katanga. As you know, he 
was the leader of the Lunda tribe, one of sev- 
eral tribes in Katanga. The Lundas are a mi- 
nority in numbers and occupy less than half of 
the land area of Katanga. Tshombe is strongly 
opposed by the Baluba tribe in the north. In the 
only popular election in Katanga his party 
gained only 25 seats in a 60-seat Assembly. 
Tlie parliamentary group which supported him 
during the last 2 years was a rump parliament 
lacking full Baluba representation. We may 

also note that the United Nations forces were 
greeted with open arms when they entered 
Jadotville and Kolwezi in the heart of 
Tshombe's tribal area. 

Third, Tshombe was stopped from pleading 
the principle of self-determination when he 
agreed to accept a single Congolese state. He 
did this at the Brussels roundtable conference 
of Januai-y 1960 before the Belgians left. He 
has done it on numerous occasions since. He did 
it as recently as last fall, when he accepted the 
conciliation plan of the United Nations. 

There are people who will concede all these 
things but say: Very well, but where will this 
United Nations business stop ? Isn't the Congo 
a precedent for the U.N. going into Mississippi ? 

The answer is no again, for three reasons : 

First, we would not ask the United Nations 
to come into Mississippi. 

Second, if others insisted on bringing the 
U.N. into Mississippi, we could prevent this 
from getting the necessary votes. 

Third, by no stretch of the imagination can 
the situation in Mississippi be regarded as a 
threat to international peace and security. 

Finally, there are those who are satisfied on 
these legal and moral questions but ask: 
Wouldn't our national interest have been served 
better by supporting Tshombe ? The answer is 
no, because : 

— The Central Government under Adoula is 
moderate and pro-Western. 

— Tshombe supporters have been working 
with the leftists to destroy the Central Govern- 

— Tshombe had no support in Black Africa 
and very little anywhere else. No country has 
ever recognized Katanga separatism. 

— The secession of Katanga under Tshombe 
would have ended moderate government in the 
Congo and would have precipitated the disinte- 
gration of the country into tribal groupings 
with maximum opportunity for the Commu- 
nists to come in. 

In short, the efforts of Tshombe to set up a 
separate regime in Katanga played into the 
hands of connnunism. 

Now the military phase of the U.N. Operation 
in the Congo has passed. The phase of nation 
building has begun. A U.S. mission to the 

APRIL 1, 1963 


Congo under Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Sec- 
retary of State for International Organization 
Affairs, has just returned with proposals for 
the economic reconstruction of the Congo under 
U.N. auspices." In the economic tasks ahead 
for the Congo the United Nations can play a 
role which no single nation covild play alone 
without compromising Congolese independence 
and making the Congo a subject of cold-war 

U.S. Position on U.N. Special Fund 

The moral of this story is not that the United 
Nations is perfect. Indeed, there are a nmnber 
of things that are done at the U.N. with wliich 
we do not agree. During the last 2 weeks we 
have had a dramatic illustration of this in the 
decision of the U.N. Special Fund to proceed — 
albeit on a tentative basis — with an agricultural 
research project in Cuba. 

This project was approved by the Governing 
Council of the Special Fund in May 1961. It 
calls for an allocation of $1,157,000 from the 
Special Ftmd to assist in the expansion of an 
agricultural experimental station in Santiago 
de las Vegas. 

The United States Government did every- 
thing consistent with the U.N. Charter to oppose 
this project.' We oppose any source of aid and 
comfort to the Castro regime. We argued that 
Special Fund assistance to Cuba at this time 
could not be justified under the economic and 
teclmical criteria of the Special Fimd's charter, 
in view of the chaos in Cuban agriculture which 
has resulted from the application of Communist 
techniques and the subordination of the eco- 
nomic and social welfare of the Cuban people to 
the narrow political aims of the Castro i-egime. 

Our arguments, I am sorry to say, did not 
receive the necessaiy support in the Governing 
Council. Mr. Paul Hoffman, the Managing 
Director of the Fund, concluded that he had no 
choice but to proceed with the project on a 
tentative basis. In the next few months he 
will send several experts to determine wliether 

" For a summary of U.S. recommendations for a pro- 
gram of international assistance to the Congo, see 
p. 481. 

' For statements by Secretary Rusk and Mr. Gard- 
ner regarding the U.S. position on the project, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 11, 1963, p. 357. 

or not conditions in Cuba will permit the project 
to proceed, and it is possible that the actual 
operation of the project will not go forward 
when representatives of the Fmid have the 
opportunity to take an up-to-date reading of 
conditions on the spot. 

The Special Fund project in Cuba is an 
example of a U.N. action with which we do 
not agree. But it is well in these matters to 
keep our eyes on the big picture. The Special 
Fimd, like all U.N. economic agencies, is pro- 
hibited by its charter from making decisions on 
political groimds. The failure of other U.N. 
members to support us in our opposition to the 
Cuban project came not out of any solicitude 
for Cuba but out of the fear that stopping this 
project would jeopardize other projects to 
whicli the Soviet Union and other countries 
have objected. The Special Fund has 11 proj- 
ects, totaling $7.5 million, in Korea, Viet-Nam, 
and free China which the Soviets do not like — 
and which are being carried out today despite 
their misgivings. 

The fact is that the U.N. Special Fund has 
been a great asset to the free world through its 
efforts to promote the material basis for free 
institutions. Even on the narrowest of politi- 
cal calculations the free world has got more out 
of the Special Fund than it has put in, wliile 
the reverse is true of the Communist bloc. The 
bloc coimtries have contributed some $7 million 
to the Special Fund ; witli this project in Cuba 
added to two previous projects in Poland they 
will have received $3 million in return. If you 
add Yugoslavia, Communist contributions add 
up to $8 million, projects in Communist coun- 
tries to $6 million. Out of the 288 Special 
Fund projects so far authorized, 282 have been 
in non-Communist countries. In financial 
terms, some $248 million of the grand total of 
$254 million of Fund projects — over 97 per- 
cent — go to the non-Communist world. 

It would be tragic if our dissatisfaction with 
the project in Cuba were to destroy our support 
for the Special Fund. It would be the height 
of folly to sacrifice the 97 percent of its work 
we do like for the 3 percent we do not like. We 
do not bench a baseball player who is batting 
.970 nor fire a football coach because he loses 
1 game in 30. 




The price of participating in any political 
institution is that you caiuiot get your way all 
of the time. We cannot expect to get our way 
all of the time in the United Nations. There 
will be entries on the debit as well as on the 
credit side of the ledger. The central question 
is wliether the credits exceed the debits — 
whetlier, looking at the balance sheet as a whole, 
the institution is making a net contribution to 
our national interest. The United States Gov- 
ernment continues to believe that the answer 
to tliat question is overwhelmingly in the 

Need To Strengthen the U.N. 

Let me stress once again, however, that we 
are not entirely satisfied with the United 
Nations. We want to make it tetter. 

In specific terms, we want to : 

— Strengthen the independence of the Secre- 
tariat against the attacks of the Soviet Union, 
who have never accepted article 100 in prin- 
ciple or in practice. 

— Improve the method of financing peace- 
keeping operations and make defaulting mem- 
bers pay up.' 

— Increase the efficiency of the U.N.'s eco- 
nomic and social work, particularly through 
more effective coordination of the specialized 

— Strengthen the U.N.'s capacity to settle fu- 
ture disputes: first, through preventive diplo- 
macy to keep disputes from erupting into vio- 
lence ; and second, through peacekeeping actions 
to contain those disputes from widening into a 
global conflict. 

In this last ambition we must learn from the 
Congo experience to strengthen the U.N.'s fu- 
ture peacekeeping operations. We must 
improve the training, supply, financing, intelli- 
gence, public relations, and command and con- 
trol of U.N. military operations. 

We want to do these latter things not only 
for their own sake but as a means of promoting 
general and complete disarmament. For the 
fact is that nations will never be willing to elim- 

' For a statement released by the U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations on Mar. 6, see xbii.. Mar. 25, 1963, 
p. 44.3. 

inate or even radically reduce their arms imtil 
they have some substitute means of protecting 
their territorial integrity and defending their 
vital interests. 

In an age when the Soviet Union and the 
United States have in tlieir arsenals weapons 
each of which has tlie destructive power of all 
the bombs dropped in the Second World War, 
in an age when we face the prospect that no 
matter how many weapons one side might build 
neither side could escape unimaginable destruc- 
tion in a nuclear holocaust — in such an age there 
is no rational alternative but to develop a civi- 
lized system of collective security under the 
aegis of the United Nations. 

In Cuba, in the Congo, and elsewhere the 
United Nations has acted— in the words of a 
distinguished commentator— not as a world 
superstate but as a world public utility. If it 
did not exist, it would have to be invented. 

Summary of U.S. Recommendations 
for Program of Aid to the Congo 

In current discussions with the Government 
of the Republic of the Congo, officials of the 
United Nations, and other interested countries, 
the United States is considering the question 
of future forms of assistance to the Congo. On 
February 21 Secretary Rusk submitted to Presi- 
dent Kennedy a report on U.S. recommenda- 
tions for a program of international assistance 
to the Congo prepared by a planning group 
headed by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secre- 
tary for International Organization Affairs. 
Folloicing is a summary of the report, which 
was released by the Department on March 1 
{press release 109) . 

The Congo is a paradox: staggering prob- 
lems in tlie present, and impressive prospects in 
the future. 

The United Nations has already made a very 
great contribution to the future. There is a 
large reservoir of good will toward the United 
States, the product of our general African pol- 
icy, our support of the United Nations and the 
Central Government in Leopoldville, and our 
close working relations witli other governments 

APRIL 1, 1963 


interested in the Congo's welfare in spite of pol- 
icy dififerences from time to time. The Congo 
has maintained its independence despite efforts 
of subversion and secession. Such threats con- 
tinue, but, on balance, the Congo is going the 
way of free choice and not coercion ; we should 
not neglect the next necessary steps to help it 
stay on that course. 

As it enters the nation-building phase of its 
young life, the Republic of the Congo appears 
to face three key obstacles to progress: 

• A political system which is in the develop- 
ing stage and requires increased executive 
powers and the capability to discharge such 
responsibility ; 

• A relatively expensive military establish- 
ment that does not yet function in full response 
to the country's needs ; 

• A financial administration which collects 
too little revenue and does not yet have depend- 
able budgetary controls. 

More than on external aid, success of a na- 
tion-building effort in the Congo depends on 
developing the administrative capacity to reha- 
bilitate the national army, bring the fiscal sys- 
tem under control, and construct a political 
system featuring a strong executive. If these 
prerequisites can be met, the Congo should no 
longer require substantial outside aid in a few 
years' time, for its resources are great and its 
population relatively small. 


The relevant portions of the U Thant Plan ^ 
for national reconciliation have been largely 
fulfilled and partly bypassed by the events of 
December 1962 and January 1963. 

What is needed now is an agenda for nation- 
building in the Congo, including as one part 
the knotting of the loose ends of Katanga's 

One point of the U Thant Plan which awaits 
further action is the constitution. But a new, 
Federal Constitution for the Congo will nec- 
essarily depend on the parliamentary situation. 
Meanwhile, a de facto federalism is actually 
developing in the Congo. 

• An executive amnesty for political crimes 
has already been announced for Tshombe 

[Moise Tshombe, President of Katanga Prov- 
ince] and his colleagues : 

• The integration of the currency is well un- 
der way and can be speeded up ; 

• Parts of the Katangan gendarmerie are 
being integrated by unit or individual applica- 
tions to the ANC ; 

• Katanga's "foreign affairs" establishment 
is to be formally disestablished ; and 

• Arrangements to bring the Conakat Party 
into the Central Government are being con- 


One of the most critical tasks facing the 
Congo is to bring military expenditures under 
control and to raise the Congolese National 
Army (ANC) to a higher degree of efficiency 
and discipline. Plans already suggested for 
a multinational training program based on a 
reduced but more effective army, plus an ade- 
quate air and naval capability, offer excellent 
prospects if they can be put into effect. 

Multinational assistance to the Congolese 
Government in the military field should be co- 
ordinated imder an acceptable arrangement be- 
tween the Congolese Government, the United 
Nations and the nations concerned. This will 
permit the establisliment of a national military 
aid pattern allowing several countries to help. 
Our own assistance, if requested, would pri- 
marily take the form of logistics support. 

A civic action survey is needed to help plan 
an economic development role for the ANC 
and to consider how discharged veterans might 
best be employed. 

The Congolese Government's desire to assure 
its authority in Katanga against the day when 
the United Nations will be pulled out must be 

Tlie requirements of a training program for 
provincial and municipal police are being given 
urgent consideration. It is encouraging that 
offers of assistance have also been forthcoming 
for this task. 

United States policy favors the most rapid 
possible phase-out of the ONUC [United 

' For text, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add. 13 (annex I) 
and Corr. 1. 



Nations Operation in the Congo] Force con- 
sistent with the increasing capability of the 
Congolese Government to maintam minimum 
levels of security and insure its national integ- 
rity. It would, however, be dangerous to phase 
out the ONUC Force so rapidly as to leave an 
"internal security gap" before the adequate 
national security forces are trained, for in- 
security in the Congo would invite unaccepta- 
ble foreign intervention. 


I Domestic harmony in the Congo nation will 
' crucially depend this year on the value of the 
money in which soldiers are paid and the pro- 
vincial governments are financed. Just as you 
cannot do business without ensuring internal 
security, you cannot have gi'owth without 
soimd money. 

In spite of growing production and rising 
exports, the Congo suffers from severe inflation. 
The actual market value of Congolese currency 
is about one-fourth the legal rate. 

A well-financed, well-coordinated and well- 
staffed stabilization program including effec- 
tive budgetary procedures, spending controls, 
tax collection and differential exchange rates is 
required. Unless this is done, the Congo may 
be faced with rvmaway inflation. The addi- 
tional requirement is to obtain enough external 
I resources to maintain minimum levels of essen- 
tial imports, finance necessary expatriate tech- 
nicians, and service the external debt. 

To move toward stabilization, the Congo will 
require : 

• A strong administration in the Ministry 
of Finance and provision for this purpose of 
a substantial number of foreign technicians to 
assist in the Ministry of Finance; 

• Husbanding of military expenditures ; 

• A special effort to make the most effective 
use of the sums available for education ; 

• Assurance through foreign aid of a mini- 
mum level of essential imports. This should 
help to meet the inflation problem. 

• Launching a public works program to re- 
duce unemployment, rehabilitate the vital 
transportation network, and build constructive 
ties between the Central Government and pro- 
vincial and local governments. 

Other nations caji do much, and we should 
encourage them to do more. 

The Belgians already support 2,000 techni- 
cians, teachers, judges, and public administra- 
tors. They also will be continuing to make 
other payments, including the service on Con- 
golese debts. 

Belgian assistance in the financing of im- 
ports would be an important contribution, and 
we hope substantial assistance of this kind will 
be made available. 

We expect that the United Kingdom and the 
Federal Republic of Germany will also wish to 
participate in assisting the Congo. The eco- 
nomic development fimd of the European Eco- 
nomic Community (EEC) may provide sub- 
stantial assistance over the next few years. 

A dozen other countries are potential small 
contributors to a plan for nation-building in 
the Congo. The nation-building effort can be 
particularly stimulated by contributions from 
non-European countries. 

The United States should endeavor to : 

• Continue P.L. 480 food sales as required to 
assist the supply of food to the Congo. 

Although some direct aid will be required to 
finance imports, we can aim at putting a 
rapidly increasing portion of this aid on a loan 
basis, in view of the basically strong potential 
of the Congolese economy. Loans will be 
especially appropriate for equipment and spare 
parts in the transportation sector. 

• Continue support of the United Nations 
Congo Fund but shift the emphasis to such pri- 
ority sectors as public financing, and try to as- 
sure that other donors finance at least half of 
the fund ; 

• Secure adequate assurances about the 
spending of aid-generated local currencies 
available for economic development, public 
works and budget support, and their use in 
support of a vigorous stabilization strategy ; 

• Continue a Development Grant program 
operated under the United Nations umbrella 
and reoriented to emphasize activities directly 
in support of stabilization and internal security 



The presence in the Congo's future of several 
large contributors, and several additional 
smaller ones, requires the multilateral coordi- 
nation of bilateral efforts, both in retraining 
the ANC and in stabilizing and developing the 
Congolese economy. 

A competition of purely bilateral aid is not 
only inefficient but risks importing the Cold 
War into the Congo. A creative combination 
of bilateral aid and multilateral coordination 
is what is needed to conduct an effective, well- 
integrated program. 

The United Nations should provide the 
Central Government with direct technical aid 
in the areas of greatest national importance — 
that is, in internal security matters, tlie control 
of foreign exchange, the coordination of ex- 
ternal aid and the administration of the public 

We should lielp the United Nations to find 
additional liigh-level talent for these purposes. 

The technical work done by Specialized 
Agency teams in education, health, food and 
agriculture, manpower training, meteorology, 
telecommunications and airport management is 
useful, and generally of good quality and high 
repute. The United Nations Secretariat should 
continue to take the responsibility for the su- 
pervision and the coordination of these activi- 
ties in the field. But they should be mcreasingly 
funded after 1963 from the Special Fund, the 
Expanded Teclmical Assistance Program, or 
the Specialized Agencies' budgets themselves. 

We imderstand it is the desire of the Gov- 
ernment of the Congo that the United Nations 
should serve as general coordinator for all bi- 
lateral aid to the Congo's economic develop- 
ment. This role will involve : 

(a) providing top personnel to help the Gov- 
ernment of the Congo coordinate external aid 
from all sources for all purposes ; 

(b) reviewing each proposed bilateral pro- 
gram to make sure that it fits within a frame- 
work agreed between the Government of the 
Congo and the United Nations; and 

(c) participating directly in decisions about 
the use of some important development aid, as 
is now the case in the allocation of local cur- 
rency generated from P.L. 480 imports. 

The contributors to the reconstruction task 
in the Congo should consult on the types of aid 
needed in assuring a rational and fair distri- 
bution of the assistance effort. 

The question of the future financing of the 
United Nations peace-keeping activities in the 
Congo is being considered in the Committee of 
21 ^ and is not being treated in this paper. 

It is our hope that the maximum number of 
countries wiU find it possible to assist the Ee- 
public of the Congo as it enters the important 
nation-building phase of its development. 

Secretary Rusk To Head U.S. 
Delegation to CENTO Meeting 

The Department of State announced on 
March 13 (press release 131) that Secretary 
Rusk will head the U.S. observer delegation to 
the 11th meeting of the Ministerial Coimcil of 
the Central Treaty Organization, to be held at 
Karachi, Pakistan, April 30-May 1. En route 
the Secretary will make brief visits in Ankara 
and Tehran for talks with government leaders. 
Following the CENTO Council meeting Secre- 
taiy Rusk will pay a brief visit to New Delhi 
prior to his return to the United States. 

' For text of a General Assembly resolution on financ- 
ing peacekeeping operations, see Bulletin of Jan. 7, 
19G3, p. 37 ; for a U.S. statement of Mar. 6, see ihid.,^ 
Mar. 25, 19G3, p. 443. 



U.S. Efforts To Achieve Safeguarded Test Ban Treaty 

Statement by Secretary Busk ^ 

Mr. Chairman, I am very glad to have this 
opportunity to talk with the committee today 
ibout a most important aspect of our foreign 
policy, our long-continued effort to achieve 
agreement on a safeguarded nuclear test ban 

Since the simmier of 1958 the United States 
Government has consistently adhered to the 
eiew that a safeguarded cessation of nuclear 
(veapons testing would be in our national in- 
:erest. Periodic policy reviews in the light of 
shifting patterns of foreign policy, of changes 
:n the negotiating situation, and of teclinical 
ievelopments have always produced the same 
i«nswer: that an effective test ban treaty is in 
our national interest. 

Indeed, it is worth recalling that in 1945-46, 
Ht the very birth of the nuclear age, it was 
jlearly perceived that a nuclear arms race 
would ci-eate the greatest dangers for all man- 
kind. Consequently, President Triunan di- 
rected the most serious and diligent effort to 
prevent such a race by bringing atomic energy 
under international control. Unhappily, the 
Baruch proposals did not succeed. 

Today, I would like to discuss a nuclear test 
ban with you from the standpoint of our rela- 
tions with the Soviet bloc and with countries 
outside the bloc, including our allies. I would 
also like to discuss what I believe to be the basic 
requirements for a nuclear test ban treaty to be 
effective. For it is clear that an illusory set of 
obligations on this sensitive subject ought never 
to be entered into by the United States. 

' Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee on Mar. 11. 

In my judgment, the conclusion of an effec- 
tive nuclear test ban treaty would have three 
advantages of primary importance in our rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union. 

First, a nuclear test ban treaty would consti- 
tute a significant step in the direction of slack- 
ening the pace of the arms race. Once this step 
had been taken with satisfactory results, new 
opportimities for further steps toward turning 
the arms race downward might well be more 
within the realm of reality than at present. 
For the past 16 years during which the cold 
war has been waged we have experienced the 
effect of an almost unlimited arms race on our 
national security and on our position in relation 
to the Soviet Union in the world arena. 
Although our position has been preserved and 
Communist aggression has been effectively de- 
terred to a large extent by the buildup and 
deployment of our militxiry forces, our security 
in that position has not necessarily been im- 
proved. Indeed, our military position might 
well be more secure today if we had success- 
fully achieved agreement on a test ban treaty 
several years ago, earlier in the negotiations. 

Because of the extensive history of past 
negotiations on this particular question, the 
narrowing of the issues that has resulted from 
these negotiations, and the worldwide interest, 
I believe that this problem may be more ripe for 
solution than perhaps any other first step in the 
arms control and disarmament field. It is clear 
that unless at some point we are able to step off 
in a new direction, the upward spiral of the 
arms race will continue unabated. The pros- 
pects of such a future for both ourselves and 
the Soviet Union are not attractive. 

APRIL 1, 1963 



Second, an effective nuclear test ban treaty 
would be to the military advantage of the 
United States. At the present time we feel con- 
fident in our nuclear capabilities. We have 
today a stockpile of nuclear 'weapons which 
ranges from a few tens of tons of TNT equiva- 
lent to many megatons. These weapons are 
useful for a variety of strategic and tactical 
uses. The Soviet Union has a stockpile of its 
own. In certain areas of the spectrum of ex- 
plosive power, namely the extremely large 
yields, the Soviets have developed weapons for 
which I am informed we do not have a present 
military requirement. In other areas, namely 
in the development of intermediate and lower 
yield weapons, we believe that we have a more 
varied arsenal than the Soviet Union. The 
President and his chief national security ad- 
visers, including myself and the Secretary of 
Defense, believe it doubtful that either side 
would, through further testing, achieve major 
advances in any significant area which could be 
translated into a military advantage without 
the other side making either a similar or off- 
setting gain. 

There is one proposition which we must keep 
in mind despite confidence and understandable 
national pride: Nature does not yield up its 
secrets with political favoritism. The list of 
Nobel Prize winners in the sciences over the 
past half century shows that major break- 
throughs in knowledge come from many direc- 
tions and have little to do with national fron- 
tiers. If our present assessment of the military 
situation is correct, and I believe it is, now 
would be an opportune time from our point of 
view for the conclusion of a treaty to halt 
further nuclear weapon testing. 

The thh-d primary advantage of an effective 
nuclear test ban treaty to the United States in 
relation to the Soviet bloc is a political one. 
I have repeatedly emphasized in my public 
statements in the United States and at the 
Geneva disarmament conference, and in previ- 
ous statements before this committee, my con- 
viction that disarmament and secrecy are 
incompatible. The Soviet Union has reasons 
of its own for its penchant for secrecy. Re- 
gardless of the merits of their case, however, 
it is clear that a closed society breeds suspicion 
and distrust on the part of other nations. Such 

an atmosphere is not conducive to taking steps 
to treat the symptoms of international tensions 
or to come to grips with the causes of these 

A nuclear test ban treaty would obviously not 
lift the veil of secrecy from the Soviet Union. 
It would not even result in any substantial 
opening up of Soviet society. It could, how- 
ever, have a veiy important impact on the So- 
viet attitude toward secrecy, especially as it 
relates to problems of arms control and dis- 
armament. The carrying out of on-site inspec- 
tions on Soviet territory would provide the 
United States with not only the necessary assur- 
ance that unidentified seismic signals were not 
imdergroimd nuclear explosions but also addi- 
tional advantages. If a test ban treaty can op- 
erate effectively and in ways which demonstrate 
that the inspection connected with it does not 
jeopardize Soviet security or result in any par- 
ticular embarrassments to the Soviet Union and 
its people, then the Soviet leadership may be 
more inclined to enter into other similar agree- 
ments. The first step seems to be the most dif- 
ficult. If it can be made successfully then fur- 
ther steps in the same direction might be taken 
with less difficulty than the first. 

Therefore, in our relations with the Soviet 
Union I believe that a nuclear test ban treaty 
would have both political and military advan- 
tages. In addition, an effective nuclear test ban 
would have advantages in our relations with 
countries outside the Soviet bloc. 

Danger of Spread of Nuclear Weapons f 

Among the dangers to the United States from 
continued testing by both sides I would con- 
sider the danger of the further spread of nu- 
clear weapons to other countries of perhaps 
primary importance. Unlimited testing by 
both the United States and the Soviet Union 
would substantially increase the likelihood that 
more and more nations would seek the dubious, 
but what some might consider prestigious, dis- 
tinction of membership in the nuclear club. 
The risks to the security of the free world from 
nuclear capabilities coming within the grasp 
of governments substantially less stable than 
either the United States or the Soviet Union 
are grave indeed. 















A test ban would not of itself solve the prob- 
s of proliferation of nuclear weapons. It 

lould be recognized that at least one present 
luclear power and one power apparently bent 
developing nuclear weapons might not be 
lersuaded to subscribe to the test ban treaty 
rom the outset. However, many potential nu- 
lear powers might at this stage be induced to 
ci'cde to the treaty. 

Moreover, a nuclear test ban could lead to 
urther steps which would deal more directly 
rith the proliferation problem. I am referring 
lere to the possibilty of an agreement on the 
•ne hand by the nuclear powers not to transfer 
oiitrol of weapons or to give assistance in 
reapons development to coimtries not already 
)0ssessing them and, on the other, by the non- 
luclear powers not to produce or acquire 
lUclear weapons of their own. Another possi- 
)ility would be an agreement to halt further 
)roduction of fissionable materials for use in 
luclear weapons and to transfer agreed quan- 
ities of such materials to peaceful uses. "VVliat 
;hould be emphasized here is that while a nu- 
clear test ban by no means offers a total solu- 
ion, it would be a necessary first step. 

Wliat I have just said is, I believe, applicable 
)oth to the problem of the spread of nuclear 
veapons outside the North Atlantic alliance 
md to the problem of the development of ad- 
iitional national nuclear capabilities by NATO 
members. I believe that a nuclear test ban 
>vould be fully consistent with the possibilities 
for increased participation in the multilateral 
control of nuclear forces dedicated to NATO 
Dy our partners in the alliance. 

Problem of Fallout 

Of secondary, but nevertheless significant, 
importance is the problem of radioactive fall- 
out. In large part because of real or assumed 
dangers from fallout, nuclear testing has be- 
come a key political issue in a great many 
countries around the world. Our relations 
with those countries are sometimes adversely 
affected when our tests produce fallout outside 
our own borders. On the other hand, our ini- 
tiatives in seeking a test ban agreement have 
been well received by not only our allies but by 
the uncommitted countries. 

I have pointed out what I believe to be the 
primary advantages to the United States in an 
effective nuclear test ban treaty in terms of our 
relations with the Soviet Union and with other 
countries around the world. However, I would 
like to make it clear that I believe there may 
also be advantages to the Soviet Union in a 
nuclear test ban. 

A certain degree of mutuality of interest is 
an obvious prerequisite for any agreement. 

I have stated that an effective nuclear test ban 
would be to the military advantage of the 
United States. This should not exclude the 
possibility that the Soviet Union could at the 
same time have valid military reasons for enter- 
ing into a nuclear test ban treaty with the in- 
tention of carrying it out. The United States 
and the Soviet Union have to date apparently 
pursued somewhat different objectives in their 
testing programs. This difference in emphasis 
appears attributable to different strategic con- 
cepts, as well as teclmological considerations. 
Therefore, while we may be assured that our 
own retaliatory capability in the event of 
nuclear attack is sufficient to deter such an at- 
tack, the Soviet Union could at the same time 
believe that it has a sufficient nuclear capability 
for its own security requirements without the 
need of further testing. Similarly, the possi- 
bility of the further spread of nuclear weapons 
is a legitimate concern not only to ourselves 
but to the Soviet Union as well. 

What Makes a Test Ban Effective 

I have thus far attempted to demonstrate why 
and how an effective nuclear test ban treaty 
would serve the foreign policy interests of the 
United States. I would now like to address the 
question of what makes a nuclear test ban treaty 

Three requirements are, in my judgment, 
basic to an effective nuclear test ban treaty. 

First, the verification arrangements must 
provide an adequate deterrent to violation on 
the part of the Soviet Union. However, no 
verification system, no matter how elaborate or 
intrusive, could be foolproof. Therefore, the 
second requirement of an effective treaty is that 
the scope of any violation which might escape 
detection must not be so extensive that it would 

APRIL 1, 1963 


substantially affect the military balance. Fi- 
nally, a nuclear test ban treaty will be adhered 
to only so long as a mutuality of interest in the 
agreement persists. If the Soviet Union were 
ever to conclude that a test ban were no longer 
in its interests, we can be sure that the Soviet 
leadership would not hesitate to abrogate the 
treaty and resume testing. Therefore, an ef- 
fective test ban treaty must not leave the 
United States in a state of unpreparedness in 
the event of a Soviet change of attitude. 

In my opinion, our present test ban proposals 
meet these three requirements for an effective 

Developments In Detection 

Last week the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy held a series of illuminating hearings 
on developments in the field of detection and 
identification of nuclear explosions and their 
relationship to the nuclear test ban negotiations. 
These hearings explored in considerable depth 
the scientific and technical basis for the present 
United States position with respect to a nuclear 
test ban. The efficacy of the technical un- 
derpinning for our test ban proposals is cer- 
tainly an important factor in determining the 
overall effectiveness of a treaty based on these 
proposals. However, the effectiveness of the 
verification arrangements associated with a test 
ban do not depend entirely upon numbers or lo- 
cations of detection stations. Nor is any par- 
ticular number of on-site inspections the key 
to effectiveness. The verification arrangements 
must be considered as a totality. The effective- 
ness of the total system should be judged in the 
light of the entire geographic, technical, mili- 
tary, political, and economic environment in 
which it would operate. 

The increase in our technical ability to detect 
seismic events at long distances permits us to 
rely upon seismic stations outside the Soviet 
Union to detect underground nuclear explosions 
inside the Soviet Union. Moreover, a decrease 
by a factor of 214 in a previous estimate of the 
number of earthquakes of a given seismic mag- 
nitude occurring annually in the Soviet Union 
has enabled us to reduce the number of on-site 
inspections on Soviet territory to seven. But 
perhaps more important than a particular num- 

ber of on-site inspections in determining its 
effectiveness as a deterrent to cheating is the 
manner in which an on-site inspection would be 
carried out. Our present position with respect 
to the number of on-site inspections which 
would be acceptable to us has, therefore, been 
very clearly stated by Mr. Foster ^ in discus- 
sions with the Soviet representatives to be con- 
ditional upon further agreement on such impor- 
tant matters as the method of selecting partic- 
ular earth tremors for inspection, the size and 
composition of inspection teams, the area and 
duration of search, and logistical arrangements. 

Finally, an effort has been made to increase 
the effectiveness of our present proposals over 
previous positions by vesting control over the 
installation and operation of the detection net- 
work, and control over the carrying out of on- 
site inspections in the Soviet Union, more com- 
pletely in the hands of the United States and 
United Kingdom. This has resulted in a pro- 
posal for a simpler and more economical system. 
It would also permit us to evaluate a greater 
range of factors in determining whether the 
Soviet Union was honoring its treaty obliga- 
tions than would be the case under a treaty pro- 
viding for more complete international opera- 
tion and control of the verification system. 

I will leave to officials of the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency the discussion of the 
details of this proposal. But it is the conclusion 
of the President and his chief advisers in the 
national security area that clandestine testing 
which might escape detection, in spite of the 
verification system, would not result in develop- 
ments which would significantly alter the mili- 
tary balance. 

Finally, an annoimced national policy of 
maintaining our readiness to test will minimize 
the risks to the United States stemming from 
the possibility of Soviet abrogation of the treaty 
and an open resumption of testing. Indeed, 
such a policy would be a deterrent to abrogation 
and would reinforce the effectiveness of the 
treaty itself. 

' For a statement by William C. Foster, Director of 
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, be- 
fore the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at 
Geneva on Feb. 12, see Bulletin of Mar. 18, 1963, 
p. 398. 



In conclusion, I believe that the cessation of 
nuclear weapons tests would advance the inter- 
ests of the foreign policy of the United States, 
and that the present proposals of the United 
States for a nuclear test ban provide a sound 
basis for negotiation of an effective treaty. In 
reaching this conclusion I am aware of the risks 
involved in an undetected Soviet violation of 
the treaty or its surprise abrogation. I am also 
aware, however, of the graver risks to our 
security and the security of the free world 

implicit in a future without any multilateral re- 
straint on the development of nuclear weapons. 
In addition to the risks with and without a 
test ban which must be carefully weighed 
against each other, we should also consider the 
opportunities created by taking a step in the 
direction of controlling the arms race. I believe 
that if these new opportunities are placed in 
the scale, it will be tipped decisively in favor 
of our present proposals for a ban on the fur- 
ther testing of nuclear weapons. 

A Nuclear Test Ban and Arms Control 

by Jacob D. Beam 

Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ■ 

We sometimes think our Agency should have 
been called the Arms Control, Disarmament, 
and Test Ban Agency, since the test ban ques- 
tion seems to have been advertised much better 
than other things we do. It may seem curious 
that such a relatively small item on the dis- 
armament agenda should loom so large. The 
reason, of course, is evident: A nuclear test 
ban has for years been the number-one possi- 
bility for Soviet-United States agreement in 
the field of arms control and disarmament. 
Right now the chances for an agreement on a 
nuclear test ban are perhaps relatively brighter 
than anything else we can see on the horizon. 

This capacity it has for hovering on the 
brink of agreement has made the test ban an 
issue on which passions run liigh. On the one 
hand we hear criticism that we are losing our 
nuclear shirts in the test ban negotiations. On 
the other hand we hear that the United States 
is not doing enough to produce an agreement. 
In fact, it might be concluded that a lot of 
people in the United States have strongly 

"Address made before the Rochester Ad Club at 
Rochester, N.Y., on Feb. 28. 

held opinions, either for or against test ban, 
and that notliing anyone can say will shake 
that opinion. Despite this, I will attempt to 
tell you why two successive administrations 
have thought that a test ban is in the United 
States' national interest. 

I would like to begin by quoting a recent 
statement by Secretary of Defense [Eobert S.] 
McNamara made before the United States 
Congress : 

The expanding arsenals of nuclear weapons on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain have created an extremely 
dangerous situation not only for their possessors but 
also for the entire world. As the arms race continues 
and the weapons multiply and become more swift and 
deadly, the possibility of a global catastrophe, either 
by miscalculation or design, becomes ever more real. 

This comment by the Secretary of Defense 
states the dilemma of today's world quite 
neatly. It is a hard but a basic lesson to learn, 
and for me there is only one rational conclusion 
to draw from it. We must find a way to begin 
applying the brakes to this competition in ar- 
maments. There are great risks in disarma- 
ment. I personally, however, cannot accept the 
view that more security is to be found in one 

APRIL 1, 1963 


of Herman Kahn's mythical "doomsday ma- 
chines" — a wonderful device with which one 
could eliminate the earth in one fell swoop. 

The problems of putting a disarmament pro- 
gram into effect are stupendous. We think it 
can be done, and we are, of course, attempting 
to negotiate a general disarmament agreement 
right now with the Soviet Union at the Geneva 
disarmament conference. It would Iielp a 
great deal, however, if we could get the arms 
control and disarmament process started with 
some relatively simple first step. This is the 
significance of the nuclear test ban question. It 
is a relatively — I underscore relatively — simple 
first step which would have some quite impor- 
tant resHlts. 

It is difficult to overestimate the effect on dis- 
armament negotiations of one satisfactorily 
operating arms control agreement between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. This is 
not saying that once the ice is broken with a 
test ban agreement disarmament is just around 
the corner. It should be easier, however, to 
negotiate and put into effect other arms control 
and disarmament agreements with the Soviet 
Union if we have even one really satisfactory 
arms control agreement in effect. No one ex- 
pects the Soviets to give up overnight their 
ideal of a Communist world led by Moscow. 
Hostility between democracy and totalitarian- 
ism will be a fact of life for a long time to 
come. But there is also a mutual interest be- 
tween the Communist and the free worlds in 
seeing that a massive nuclear war does not 
occur. Within this area of mutual interest we 
hope there is room for arms control and dis- 
armament agreements. 

The situation seems to be a little like the 
4-minute mile. For years this was something 
everyone thought of as a goal but no one 
could quite make it. Finally, when Roger 
Bannister did break that mark, other runners 
found that it was not so impossible after all, 
and now a less than 4-minute mile is not 
so uncommon. This analogy can be applied 
with many reservations, of course, to the arms 
control field, and this is why we think a test 
ban may be most significant in the efl'ect it 
would have in paving the way for other arms 
control agreements. 

Problem of Proliferation 

There are other, more directly demonstrable, 
reasons for a nuclear test ban. One involves 
the effect a test ban would have in inhibiting 
the spread of nuclear weapon capabilities. 

There are only two major nuclear powers in 
the world today, the United States and the 
Soviet Union. As Walter Lippmann has put 
it, the United States possesses something like 
98 percent of the West's nuclear deterrent. Of 
course, in the Communist world, the entire 
nuclear weapon arsenal is in the hands of the 

This condition of polarity, while dangerous, 
is better than some others. It is, we think, a 
much more stable arrangement than one where 
many nations would possess the individual 
capability of exploding nuclear bombs. This 
conclusion is not the result of distrust concern- 
ing the ability of other nations to behave in a 
responsible manner. Our conclusion is based 
instead on simple mathematics. We think that 
the larger the number of governments which 
can independently control nuclear weapons, the 
greater is the possibility that nuclear weapons 
will be used in some local conflict. This, in 
turn, could escalate into all-out war involving 
the major powers. 

The image of two scorpions in a bottle was 
once coined to describe the situation in which 
the United States and the Soviet Union found 
themselves in the atomic age. This image is 
distasteful enough, but the image of 10 or 20 
scorpions inside a bottle is even worse. 

So long as nuclear power remains essentially 
polarized, Winston Churchill's hope that safety 
may be the sturdy twin of danger may still hold 
true. With a multiplication of nuclear powers 
we cannot be so hopeful. The chances of an 
irrational act, the chances of an accident, the 
chances of some small conflict escalating into an 
all-out nuclear exchange, the chances of miscal- 
culation — all of these chances would increase 
enormously. This analysis is the root of a long- 
standing American policy against the spread 
of nuclear weapon capabilities. 

We regard a nuclear test ban as one method, 
but only one method, of inhibiting the spread of 
nuclear weapon capabilities. By itself, a test 
ban wiU not prevent the spread of nuclear 



weapons. But without a test ban, all other 
efforts to limit nuclear weapon capabilities are 
likely to be futile. The question, therefore, is 
not whether a nuclear test ban is sufficient to 
stop the further spread of nuclear weapons but 
rather what other steps, in addition to a test 
ban, should be taken to inhibit the spread of 
auclear capabilities. This and previous ad- 
ministrations have given earnest attention to 
this question. One measure that would help 
would be an agreement under which nations 
possessing nuclear weapons would not trans- 
fer control of such weapons to other countries, 
ind nations not possessing nuclear weapons 
would not seek to acquire them. We hope such 
in agreement could be put into effect and the 
30oner the better. 

At this point I would like to say that our 
jffort to establish a NATO nuclear force is 
fully consistent with, and in fact complements, 
jur effort to prevent the further spread of nu- 
clear weapon capabilities. We envisage an ar- 
rangement under which the members of NATO 
would share with the United States control 
3ver the use of nuclear weapons. We would 
lot, however, transfer to any individual coun- 
:ry within NATO the ability to control nuclear 
weapons on a unilateral basis. 

It is not possible to escape the question of our 
illy, France, and of Moscow's ally. Communist 
China, when one talks about the proliferation 
problem. We are not able at this time to pre- 
dict that either France or Communist China 
will sign a test ban treaty. But neither do we 
wish at this time to abandon our effort to pre- 
vent the spread of nuclear weapons because of 
uncertainty about the future action of France 
and Communist China. This would be like 
opening the bam door to make sure that the 
horse is stolen. 

Our effort, therefore, has been, first, to come 
to an agreement with the Soviet Union and the 
United Kingdom on a nuclear test ban treaty ; 
and second, to attempt to bring all other im- 
portant nations in the world into the treaty. 

We think the treaty would be effective in 
convincing most nations that they should not 
embark upon a program of nuclear weapon ex- 
perimentation. Many governments would pre- 
fer not to construct nuclear weapons and nu- 

clear weapon delivery systems if it were a 
reasonable assumption that other nations of the 
same power status would not build nuclear 
weapons. So even if France and Communist 
China failed initially to adhere to a test ban 
treaty, we think a treaty concluded between the 
major nuclear powers would offer some advan- 
tage if it did nothing more than prevent or de- 
lay the 10 or a dozen other potential nuclear 
powers from acquiring a nuclear weapon 

One further advantage in a test ban treaty, 
and one which may be a byproduct and not a 
principal reason for a test ban treaty, is the 
effect it would have in eliminating radioactive 
fallout. All scientists are agreed that any in- 
crease in the general level of radioactivity in 
the human environment is harmful to a greater 
or lesser degree. If we can prevent a general 
increase in background radioactivity, it is in 
the interest of humanity that we do so. I think 
that this is all that need be said on this point. 

Needless to say, not everyone will assess the 
advantages of a test ban treaty in the way just 
stated. Many think the disadvantages out- 
weigh the advantages. Most of the critics of a 
test ban treaty have been responsible, and they 
deserve a responsible reply. 

Question of Verification 

One objection is that the kind of verification 
system we are discussing with the Soviet Union 
is inadequate to verify that the Soviet Union 
has indeed ended its nuclear tests. The critics 
point out that at one time the United States 
proposed 20 on-site inspections annually and 
today we are talking about a smaller number 
of inspections, and they argue that this means a 
less than effective control system. 

In response I would recall that President 
Eisenhower in 1959 inaugurated a program to 
improve the capabilities for detecting and iden- 
tifying nuclear weapon test explosions. This 
program was called Project VELA, and the 
American taxpayers, through their Congress, 
will have spent about $90 million when all of 
the appropriated funds have been used. Be- 
cause of this program, our capabilities for 
detecting and identifying nuclear explosions 
have improved over what they were in 1958. 

APRIL 1, 1963 


We once thought there would be several hun- 
dred seismic events, wliicli could not be identi- 
fied as earthqucakes, which might occur annually 
in the Soviet Union. We now know that the 
number of such imidentified events is much less 
than we originally estimated. Consequently, 
unless the number of on-site inspections we now 
ask for is also less than we originally proposed, 
we would be demanding more inspection than 
we thought necessary in 1958. This is one rea- 
son why we have been able to reduce our re- 
quests for on-site inspections. We are happy 
to call this a concession — but to scientific prog- 
ress, not to the Soviet Union. 

We have also found that our capabilities for 
identifying earthquakes at great distances are 
better than we thought they were in 1958 and 
1959. We are examining new tecliniques which 
appear to promise even better capabilities in 
the future. In short, there is every reason to 
think that our capabilities today are far better 
than we assumed them to be a few years ago 
and that these capabilities are likely to im- 
prove over the years. 

I would not like to convey the impression 
that a determined cheater could not on occa- 
sion outsmart the man who is attempting to 
catch him. It is likely that in this game of 
cops and robbers the robber, because he has by 
definition the advantage of surprise, can, if 
he goes to great lengths, occasionally fool the 
cop. If, for example, the cheater constructed 
a very large cave underground, or if he sent a 
nuclear warhead millions of miles out into 
space, he might succeed in detonating a nuclear 
bomb without being caught. 

But this kind of capability would not give 
the Soviet Union a chance to make any substan- 
tial inroads into the United States' nuclear lead. 
The chances of the Soviet Union conducting a 
series of tests which would remain undetected 
are vanisliingly small. The probability that 
the advantage to be gained from a single test 
would be sufficient to make an attempted eva- 
sion worth while is also vanishingly small. 

So we firmly believe it is fair to conclude that 
the verification system now proposed by the 
United States will, in fact, serve as an effective 
deterrent against any violation of a treaty. I 
would add, incidentally, that we now envisage 

a system which places primary reliance on our 
own very good facilities for detecting nuclear 
explosions in the Soviet Union. We would add 
to what we get from those facilities the infor- 
mation we can get from automatic seismic sta- 
tions in Soviet territory and from stations on 
the periphery of the Soviet Union. In addi- 
tion, of course, we would make use of informa- 
tion from the nationally manned stations in the 
Soviet Union. Cap this system with the right 
to make on-site inspections when we really get 
worried about an event in Soviet territory, 
and we would have workable, realistic, and 
effective machinery for monitoring a nuclear 
test ban agreement. 



Maintaining Scientific Momentum 

Other opponents of a test ban treaty argue^ii 
that the United States must maintain its sci- 
entific momentum in the nuclear weapons field] 
and that a test ban would spell the end of ouri 
weapons laboratories. This is a problem. But 
three things need to be said on this score. One 
is that the United States intends to make it a 
matter of national policy to keep its weapons 
laboratories in being after a treaty is signed. 
We expect to continue to do the maximum 
amount of work that can be done on nuclear 
weapons technology within our laboratories.! 
We expect we can maintain a capability fon 
years to come to resume testing on short notice.' 
There are many developments in the nuclean 
weapon field which can be explored in thel 

Prototypes can be designed and put on thel 
shelf for testing if a treaty should end. More-i 
over, we would expect that the peaceful nuclearl 
explosion program would continue, as it is now,l 
with explosions for engineering and scientifit 
purposes. We believe, therefore, that, givei 
the patriotism and the dedication of our sci 
entists and given a clear understanding o: 
United States policy, we could hold together 
our laboratories and even do useful work in 
order to be ready should a treaty be abrogated 
in the future. 

A second thing should be said about this prob- 
lem of scientific momentum. In our overall 
nuclear deterrent capability we rely not only 
on the nuclear warheads but importantly also 



)n the means of delivering these warheads. 
3ur nuclear deterrent can be greatly improved 
hrough further improvements in the accuracy 
if missiles. In evaluating the effectiveness of 
he weapons, there is an obvious trade-off be- 
,ween the accuracy of missiles and tlie yield 
)f the warhead : The more accurate the missile 
s. the less yield you require to do the same job. 
[n other words, we do not need to be frozen 
n our capability to improve our overall nuclear 
leterrent because a test ban is in effect. 

Another objection to a test ban treaty is that 
liere are important nuclear weapon develop- 
aents which we must have before we stop test- 
ng. There are developments, obviously, which 
ould be made in the field of nuclear weapons, 
jooking at this criticism in perspective, how- 
■ver, one sees that what we are actually talking 
bout when we talk about these predictable im- 
)rovements represents a small margin of im- 
)rovement in our present nuclear capabilities. 
They would not significantly alter our ability to 
lefend against incoming missiles. They would 
lot significantly alter our ability to build a 
ecure second-strike capability. And it is clear 
hat if we and the Soviets do continue testing, 
he Soviet Union will surely make these im- 
)rovements too. We are, we believe, ahead of 
he Soviet Union at the present time in overall 
luclear weapon teclinology. If nuclear testing 
s continued indefuiitely into the future, there is 
10 reason to suppose that the Soviet Union 
ould not ultimately equal the United States' 
.chievements in nuclear teclinology. 

This is the way of science : Nature's secrets 
:an be discovered by competent scientists re- 
gardless of their ideology. 

It would not be too surprising if someone told 
is that in 20 years we could blow up three- 
luarters of the earth with a quarter-pound 
)omb. This may be a little farfetched, but this 
s the trend and not many people would argue 
hat it is a good trend. 
Secretary Eusk said the other day - that 

. . . the purpose of a nuclear test ban would be to 
;ry to impose some ceiling on a qualitative as well as 
luantitative race which otherwise will extend into 
he future, with increasingly massive resources con- 
Tibuted to that race on both sides — the diversion of 
resources from other great tasks. . . . 

' BuiXETiN of Feb. 18, 1963, p. 235. 

This is a succinct description of one important 
purpose of a test ban. There is no comfort for 
any of us in the continuation of an arms race. 

This is, m essence, the reason why we simply 
must try to make a start toward arms control 
and disarmament. In today's world there is 
not a direct relationship between the amis we 
pile up and the safety we hope to gain from 
these arms. We must find an alternative to 
the present situation, an alternative in which 
our efforts will, in fact, improve our secur- 
ity and our well-being. We fimily believe 
that so long as man's intelligence prevails over 
his irrational instincts we will find an alterna- 
tive; otherwise we will surely pass on into the 
abyss of war in which, in the words of Pope 
Pius XII, "There will be no song of victory, 
only the inconsolable weeping of humanity, 
which in desolation will gaze upon the catastro- 
phe brought on by its own folly." 

International Coffee Agreement, 1962 

Statement by Under Secretary McGhee ^ 

My name is George C. McGhee, and I am the 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. 
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before 
you today to testify in behalf of the Inter- 
national Coffee Agreement, which President 
Kennedy transmitted to the Senate late in the 
last session for its advice and consent to ratifi- 
cation.- This agreement was signed in behalf 
of the United States on September 28, 1962, by 
Mr. W. Michael Blumenthal, the chairman of 
the United States delegation to the United 
Nations conference which negotiated the agree- 
ment.^ The agreement has the full support of 
the executive agencies, and I am here to respect- 
fully request your favorable consideration. 

In transmitting the agreement to President 
Kennedy last October 2, Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk stated that : 

' Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee on Mar. 12 (press release 127). 

- S. Ex. H. 87th Cong., 2d sess. ; for a statement by 
President Kennedy, see Bulletin of Oct. 29, 1962, 
p. 668. 

'For background, see ibid., Aug. 6, 1962, p. 234; 
Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667 ; and Feb. 11, 1963, p. 218. 

APRIL 1, 1963 


It is the Department's view that this agreement offers 
the best prospect of arresting any further decline in 
world coffee prices, thus helping to assure stability in 
foreign-exchange earnings of coffee producers in some 
35 developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin 

Mr. Chairman, the achievement of this ob- 
jective -would be of great significance. In the 
first jjlace coffee, during the past decade, was 
the single most important agricultural com- 
modity in world trade, with shipments valued 
in many years at over $2 billion. 

Secondly, coffee is the most important source 
of export earnings of Latin America and of a 
number of countries in Africa and elsewhere. 
For example, in 1961 coffee exports from 
Colombia accounted for 71 percent of all foreign 
exchange earnings. For Guatemala and El 
Salvador the corresponding figure was approxi- 
mately 60 percent. For Brazil it was 51 per- 
cent. In fact, about a quarter of the entire 
export earnings of the 15 Latin American coffee- 
exporting countries are derived from this one 
commodity. Its significance to Africa, where 
five countries obtain more than 40 percent of 
their foreign exchange earnings from this 
source, is equally great. 

Thirdly, Mr. Chainnan, this agreement is of 
great importance because in many areas of the 
world coffee is produced by small farmers. It 
is estimated that about 3 to 4 million farming 
enterprises produce coffee in 70 different coun- 
tries. The overwhelming majority of these 
farms belong to small farmers, each cultivating 
less than 5 acres of land. About half of all 
coffee is produced by farmers with 5-75 acre 
holdings. In Latin America coffee provides 
direct employment for more than 12 million 
persons, and we believe that this figure is in ex- 
cess of 20 million in the world as a whole. 

In view of the overwhelming importance of 
coffee as a foreign exchange earner, it is clear 
that the economic development of the countries 
in Latin America and Africa is directly re- 
lated to this single crop. It has been shown that 
a decrease of 1 cent per pound for green coffee 
means a decrease of about $50 million in the 
foreign exchange receipts of the Latin Ameri- 
can countries. Obviously the tremendous ef- 
fort we are making under the Alliance for 
Progress is endangered and the large sums ap- 

propriated to assist economic development are i 
canceled out to the extent that earnings from i 
the principal export commodity fluctuate i 
sharply or decrease steadily. Stability in 
foreign exchange earnings can be the firm 
foundation for our sustained efforts to help 
these countries help themselves. 


Coffee a World Trade Problem 

Coffee has long been a troublesome commod- 
ity in international trade. A number of inter- 
national meetings were held on this subject 
prior to World War II, with no results. When 
European markets were closed and prices fell 
drastically at the beginning of World War II, 
the United States in 1940 joined 14 Latin 
American countries in an inter- American cof- 
fee agreement * to assure an equitable distribu- 
tion of the United States market. That agree- 
ment expired shortly after the war. The 1950's i 
once again saw international discussions of the I 
coffee problem brought on by sharp price in- 
creases during some years and steadily declin- 
ing price levels since 1955. It was not until the i 
United States took the initiative in 1958 to set 
up a Coffee Study Group here in Washington 
that an organized effort by both producing and I 
consuming countries to develop practical solu- 
tions was possible. 

Today the coffee problem is perhaps the most 
acute example of the present difficulties in 
world commodity markets. President Ken- 
nedy recognized the importance of these prob- . 
lems to the developing countries and has ' 
pledged United States support in the search for 
adequate solutions. In March 1961, announc- 
ing the Alliance for Progress, he said : ° 

. . . the United States is ready to cooperate in seri- 
ous, case-by-case examinations of commodity market 
problems. Frequent violent changes in commodity 
prices seriously injure the economies of many Latin 
American countries, draining their resources and 
stultifying their growth. Together we must find 
Ijractical methods of bringing an end to this pattern. 

The International Coffee Agreement which 
is before you for consideration represents the 
culmination of about 2 years of effort to imple- 
ment that policy. In view of its tremendous 

' For text, see ibid., Nov. 30, 1940, p. 483. 
" Ibid., Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471. 




importance to the welfare of so many peoples, 
cotfee deserved to be first in line for a sustained 
effort to solve its problems and help assure an 
end to the constant instability and price erosion 
of recent years. 

The initiative of the United States led ulti- 
mately to the conclusion by the world's major 
producing and consuming countries that a 
world conference should be called in 1962 to 
negotiate a world coffee agreement. This was 
done at the United Nations in July-August 
1962, at a conference attended by representa- 
tives of 71 countries, 58 of which participated 
actively in the negotiations. By the closing 
date for signature — November 30, 1962 — 54 
governments had signed the agreement. This 
impressive number — a record for a commodity 
agi-eement — is the best testimony that could lie 
given to the tremendous importance producing 
and consiuning countries alike attach to mak- 
ing this agreement succeed. Eleven govern- 
ments have already ratified the agreement or 
formally signified their intention to do so. In 
view of our preponderance in the coffee trade, 
our ratification is essential before the agree- 
ment can be put into effect. 
I The objective of the agreement is to bring 
about improved marketing conditions and thus 
to create a climate in which the difficult prob- 
lems of overproduction and burdensome stocks 
may be attacked. This improvement and the 
expected growth of consumption will bring 
about a gradual increase in foreign exchange 
earnings and thereby establish a stable base 
from which to plan long-range economic de- 
velopment programs. It also means that coun- 
tries will no longer see their efforts, and sub- 
stantial amounts of our aid, quickly offset by 
falling prices for their principal foreign ex- 
change earner. 

I shall endeavor to summarize briefly the key 
features of the agreement : 

1. It provides for a system of export quotas, 
which will be adjusted quarterly to the needs 
of the market. Shipments of all coffee, in what- 
ever form, are included in the quotas. Exports 
to so-called new markets are carefully con- 
trolled and limited. 

2. Imix)rting countries like the United States 
bring their moral support and administrative 
machinery to bear on the problem to help 

assure the effectiveness of the quota system. 
Certificates of origin must accompany all 
shipments. Import statistics will be quickly 
provided and published. Imports from non- 
members will be restricted, to prevent nonco- 
operators from receiving the advantages of the 
agreement without also sharing in the burden 
of making it work. 

3. Production will be brought under conti'ol. 
Specific production targets will be assigned 
each member and a timetable adopted for its 
accomplisliment. Producing countries that do 
not cooperate will not share in increasing con- 
sumption. Importing countries will assist the 
producing countries to shift out of coffee pro- 
duction and to diversify their economies. An 
intelligent stock policy will be identified for 
each producing country. 

4. Consumers will be protected, as will the 
coffee trade. The specific price objective of the 
agreement is to assure that the general level of 
coffee prices does not decline below the general 
level of coffee prices in 1962. If the agreement 
works well coffee prices should firm up, but 
the imdesirability of sharp rises in prices is 
recognized and specific machinery provided to 
deal with it. 

5. An International Coffee Council is created 
to administer the agreement and to provide a 
multilateral forum devoted to solving problems 
affecting the world's coffee industry. 

We consider several provisions of this agree- 
ment of considerable significance in that they 
open the way for a concerted attack on the 
roots of the coffee problem. I refer to those 
provisions under which the exporting countries 
undertalvc to adjust their production of coffee 
in accordance with certain directives laid down 
by the members of the agreement. It is pro- 
vided that the Coffee Council, the administra- 
tive body of the agreement, shall develop and 
recommend production goals to each producing 

The Council establishes a timetable for the 
accomplishment of these objectives, periodi- 
cally reviews the progress being made, and has 
the authority to deny increases in quota result- 
ing from increasing consumption to any mem- 
ber who is not complying with the directives 
laid down. The Council also has the authority 

APRIL 1, 1963 


to establish a stock policy for each producer 
which will complement its recommendations 
with regard to desirable levels of production. 
We believe that if the provisions of this agree- 
ment with regard to production and stocks are 
fully implemented so that overproduction can 
be curbed and excessive stocks gradually elim- 
inated, the world's worst commodity problem 
will be on its way toward solution. 

Consumer Protection Assured 

The United States is the world's largest im- 
porter of coffee, taking about half of all the 
coffee entering world trade. Obviously we 
should not consider participation in any agree- 
ment that does not fully protect the interests 
of our consmners. Quite naturally, consumers 
want to know what the effect will be on coffee 
prices in the United States. While we expect 
the agreement to arrest the constant decline in 
coffee prices, and to maintain them no lower 
than at the general levels which prevailed in 
1962, it is neither intended nor anticipated that 
there will be substantial increases in coffee 
prices to consumers in the United States. 

There are several reasons outside tlie agree- 
ment which argue against this, including the 
tremendous stocks of coffee now held by Brazil, 
Colombia, and others, and the fact that present 
productive capacity everywhere is in excess of 
any likely demand over tlie next 5 years. 

Consumer protection against any miwar- 
ranted price increases is also assured by a num- 
ber of specific provisions in the agreement. 
Probably the most important are the provisions 
relating to the establishment and adjustment 
of export quotas. Export quotas are intended 
to control the amount of coffee that may be 
made available to the market by the producing 
countries during a given period, and thus they 
directly influence the price. The agreement 
provides that all decisions on the establishment 
and adjustment of export quotas shall be taken 
by a distributed two-thirds majority vote, 
i.e. a concurrent two-thirds majority of the im- 
porters and exporters voting separately. As 
the United States has 400 votes and would re- 
quire the support from only one other countiy 
to exercise a veto, it assures us of a powerful 
voice in decisions of the Council. 

There are two other provisions that specifi- 
cally recognize the vmdesirability of marked 
changes in coffee prices for whatever reason 
and provide for corrective action under voting 
procedures which are easier to attain than the 
standard procedure of a distributed two-thirds 

In the unlikely event that unforeseeable cir- 
cumstances might arise in the administration- 
of the agreement which would operate against 
the interests of our consumers or our coffee 
trade, the United States could always withdraw 
from the agreement. It is provided that any 
government, after September 30, 1963, may 
withdraw by giving written notice, such with- 
drawal to be effective 90 days after notification. 
It is clear, of course, that the agreement would 
collapse without our participation. 

I would add, Mr. Chairman, that the stated 
price objective of the agreement, while in our 
view realistic, is a modest one. The 1962 price 
of Brazilian coffee averaged slightly less than 
34 cents per pound, compared with 36.6 cents 
in 1960 and 48.4 cents in 1958. The decline 
in coffee prices began in 1954, when the severe 
frost damage in Brazil resulted in historic highs 
of close to 80 cents per pound. 

Mr. Chaimian, at this point I wish to say that 
the United States Government team that 
worked toward this agreement over the past 2 
years has had valuable support from the United 
States coffee industry. The National Coffee As- 
sociation, representing all major segments of 
the industry, including importers, brokers, and 
roasters, has shown unparalleled industrial 
statesmanship in coming to the conclusion some 
years ago that ruinously low coffee prices in 
Latin America and elsewhere would not be in 
their best interests or the wider interests of the 
country at large. Accordingly, they appointed 
a committee of long-time leaders in the coffee 
industi-y to work with us as part of the team. 
Their president, Mr. [Jack] McKieman, and 
the other members of the Foreign Affairs Ad- 
visory Committee of the National Coffee Asso- 
ciation, participated as our advisers in the nego- 
tiations and gave us valuable advice, assistance, 
and support. 

Should the International Coffee Agreement 
receive your approval and the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate, it would be the President's 



itention to deposit an instrument of ratifica- 
tion at the earliest possible date. We believe 
'that it is liighly desirable to maintain the mo- 
mentmu which has been generated internation- 
ally if the agreement is to be of maximum 

The obligations of the United States under 
this agreement are very few. We must restrict 
imports of coli'ee from nonparticipants, we must 
require certificates of origin on all shipments, 
and we must furnish statistics. These are vir- 
tually all the obligations we undertake. To 
allow us to carry out these obligations it will 
be necessary for us to ask the Congress for 
enabling legislation. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, participation in this 
agreement will cost the United States Treasury 
only a contribution limited to our pro rata share 
of the administrative expenses of the agreement. 
As we will have about 400 votes our share will 
be 20 percent of the administrative budget. 
There are no other financial commitments for 
the United States involved in this agreement. 

I wish to thank the committee for the atten- 
tion you have given this rather long statement. 
It is our considered judgment that participa- 
tion in the International Coffee Agreement of 
1962 is in the best national interests of the 
United States, and therefore it is recommended 
to you for favorable consideration. 

The Trade Expansion Program 

hy Philip H. Trezise 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 

The Trade Expansion Act ^ was passed last 
'October by large bipartisan majorities in the 
I Congress. It reflected, I believe, a national 
recognition that our interests in the world, both 
political and economic, required that the United 
States Government be in a position to exercise 
, leadership in world trade. 

We were confronted then — and of course we 
still are — by the development of a new trading 
entity in Europe, the Common Market, repre- 
senting the world's largest single international 
trading unit. There was then mider active con- 
sideration the association of the United King- 
dom with the Continental members of the Com- 
mon Market. If this had come to pass, the total 
economic weight of the European grouping 

1 Address made before the Second Florida World 
Trade Conference at Jacksonville, Fla., on Mar. 8 
(press release 118 dated Mar. 7). 

" For an analysis of the act, see Btjixetin of Dec. 3, 
1962, p. 847. 

would have begun to approach that of the 
United States itself. 

Leaving aside the Common Market, how- 
ever, we were also increasingly concerned about 
the trade problems of the less developed coun- 
tries. It has become more and more clear that 
the problem in Latin America and Afi'ica and 
Asia is one to be dealt with by aid and trade, 
not by aid alone. We have seen that small 
changes in prices of export crops can com- 
pletely overbalance any conceivable vokmie of 
grants and loans to some of the less developed 
countries. There is no question but that we 
must find waj^s to open markets and to increase 
the trading opportunities for the less developed 
coimtries if the problem of economic growth is 
to be solved witliin measurable time. 

Also, in considering the Trade Expansion 
Act, the Congress and the administration and, 
I believe, the American people had very much 
in mind that our relationships with Canada, 
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand were 

APRIL 1, 196 3 



linked to our trade with those countries. As 
you know, the Trade Expansion Act inchides 
the unconditional most-favored-nation clause, 
which has been a feature of our trade policy 
since the 1920's. We have consistently oper- 
ated on the premise that the expansion of trade 
would promote the prosperity and the political 
well-being of the free-world community 

Finally, it was recognized that our balance- 
of-jjayments deficit, which has existed for a 
number of years, could be reduced by an ex- 
pansion of our international trade. We nor- 
mally run a large surplus of exports over im- 
ports. It is these earnings that have kept our 
overall deficit within manageable proportions. 
It was reasoned that a general ex]:)ansion of 
trade would have the likely effect of increasing 
the size of that surplus and making our inter- 
national deficit problem considerably less 

Plans for New Round of Tariff Negotiations 

We have now had the act for about 5 months. 
During that period the British negotiations 
with the Common Market have broken down, 
and there is no indication that they will be 
resumed in the near future. 

This development obviously has changed 
somewhat the situation in which the Trade 
Expansion Act will operate. The special 
authority given to the President to negotiate 
for the elimination of tariffs in certain cate- 
gories of goods cannot as a practical matter 
be used without British membership in the 
Common Market. 

The remaining negotiating authorities in the 
act, however, remain a very substantial pack- 
age. The President is still empowered to nego- 
tiate for general tariff reductions of up to 50 
percent, and he has special negotiating powers 
with respect to very low tariffs and with re- 
spect to tariffs on certain tropical products and 
agricultural goods. The need for using these 
bargaining powers is, if anything, greater than 
ever. We cannot afford to abdicate our leader- 
ship in expanding free-world trade, for other- 
wise a drift toward the development of 
restricted trading blocs might gain great 

Work is going forward, therefore, in prepa- 
ration for a new round of tariff negotiations 
based on the Trade Expansion Act. The 
President has appointed a distinguished Amer- 
ican, former Governor and former Seci'etary 
of State Christian Herter, to direct these prep- 
arations and to carry out the negotiations.^ 

A group of technical experts, representing 
most of the trading countries of the world, 
will begin work in Geneva on the 18th of this 
month to draw up the bases for a general 
multilateral negotiation to take place early in 
1964. These experts will attempt to draw up 
the rules and procedures under which a large- 
scale tariff negotiation would take place, sub- 
ject to approval by the governments concerned. 
In May, we expect, there will be a meeting of 
senior political officials from the countries 
subscribing to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. These officials will consider 
the work of the technical experts and will come 
to a decision about the time and character of 
a tariff round. 

Meanwhile we will be preparing at home to 
carry through the domestic procedures which 
the Trade Expansion Act requires. A list of 
commodities on which tariff reductions may be 
made will be published, probably in the sum- 
mer. Public hearings will be held and deter- 
minations will be made as to what our eventual 
negotiating package will be. All this will 
involve exceedingly laborious and detailed 
work. It is expected to take the full 6 months 
provided by law. But we expect to be ready 
on our part for a major 
in 19G4. 

tariff negotiation 

Trade in Agricultural Commodities 

It is quite clear that so far as future trade 
negotiations are concerned a central and criti- 
cal problem is going to be trade in agricultural 

Wliether we like it or not, practically every 
country in the world puts agriculture into a 
special categoiy. The free market seldom is j 
allowed to operate fully. Support prices or 

' For a statement made by Mr. Herter before the 
heads of delegations to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development at Paris on Jan. 31, see 
ibid., Feb. 25, 19(33, p. 298. 



iicoine payment plans are widespread. Their 
?xistence makes it politically and economically 
iifficult to allow trade to flow normally. 

Thus we find around the world a network 
jf restrictions on international trade in a<;ricul- 
Miral commodities. These include tarift's, but 
other devices, such as quotas or even import 
jmbargoes, are often the more important means 
if protectionism. From the point of view of 
he Avorld's agricultural exporters, of which the 
United States is quantitatively the largest, a 
:rade negotiation that did not give agricultural 
rade a better chance to grow would be seriously 
ieficient in content. The job, however, ob- 
nouslj' is cut out for us, and we will do well 
o recognize its difficulties and complexities. 

In the Comnion Market our agricultural trade 
falls into three more or less distinct categories 
50 far as access is concerned. First, a very 
substantial grouping — representing 35 percent 
if our total exports to the Common Market — 
s made up of items bound on the free list, led 
ly cotton and soy beans. Second, there is the 
category where conventional tarifl' bargaining 
nay be possible and efi'ective, on such items as 
"anned fruits and tobacco and, perhaps, fruits 
ind vegetables. These tariffs in principle 
.Tould be subject to negotiation and reduction, 
ilthough on some items we would need assur- 
mces that tariff concessions would not be nulli- 
5ed in practice by the imposition of other 
restrictions. Finally, there is the group of 
igricultural goods that fall under the common 
igricultural policy proper. This group in- 
cludes among other things the grains, poultry, 
md meats. The CAP sets up for these goods 
a, complex system of minimum import prices 
and sliding fees. In its ultimata effects the 
system could be heavily or less heavily restric- 
tive on imports, depending on its operation. 

We shall have to negotiate on the CAP items 
and do so in some relationship to the general 
tariff talks. It is too early to be definitive 
about what parts of the CAP will be negotiable 
or in what ways we can best strengthen our 
trade prospects. We shall be getting clarifica- 
tion of these matters over the next few months, 
however, and certainly before the tariff negoti- 
ations proper have begun. 

I wish to touch now on the existing illeeal 

and unjustifiable restrictions which apply 
primarily to trade m agriculture. 

Restrictions Affecting U.S. Fruit Exports 

These restrictions, which tend particularly 
to affect our exports of fresh fruits and fruit 
products to the United Kingdom and the Com- 
mon Market countries, are not subject to tariff 
bargaining on our part. In fact there is an 
express prohibition in section 252 of the Trade 
Expansion Act against offering concessions for 
the purpose of getting unjustifiable import 
restrictions reduced or eliminated. We pro- 
pose rather to continue to press our case, based 
on the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, through whatever means promise to be 
most useful to get satisfactory redress. 

We have undertaken negotiations with Italy 
and France under article XXIII of the GATT. 
This article permits us, subject to the approval 
of the GATT membership, to withdraw trade 
concessions in retaliation for violations of 
GATT conxmitments. Our discussions with 
Italy have been quite productive, with France 
less so, thus far. We expect, however, to get 
a satisfactory settlement in both cases. 

The United Kingdom's restrictions on citrus 
fruits and citrus products represent a special 
Florida problem, as we are very well aware. 
I suppose that no single commercial issue 
between ourselves and the British has received 
more attention or more high-level attention on 
both sides of the Atlantic. The United King- 
dom has pointed out, as you know, that it feels 
a responsibility for protecting the West Indies 
citrus industi-y. We have been sympathetic to 
this argument, but we have not been sympa- 
thetic to a protective system which has the 
result of discriminating against the United 
States in favor of all other suppliers, including 
some that are not even members of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 

We had examined a number of possible solu- 
tions bilaterally but could not get to an under- 
standing. Then, when the U.K. began its 
negotiations for admission to the Common 
Market, we looked to the prospect that the 
British West Indies wovdd gain associate status 
and thus get a form of preferential entry for 
its citrus into the whole Common IMarket. At 

APRIL 1, 1963 


that point the West Indies problem would have 
been solved and the discriminatory treatment 
of American citras in the U.K. would have 
been eliminated. 

Now that the U.K.-EEC negotiations have 
been suspended, we have a new situation. We 
shall have to go back now to see if we cannot 
find a solution, in the first Distance, through 
bilateral discussions. As a matter of fact, we 
have had this week in Washington some pre- 
liminaiy exploration of the problem with sen- 
ior officials of the U.K. Board of Trade. 

Care Needed in Invoking Retaliatory Procedures 

Let me say a word about retaliation as a 
means for eliminating restrictions on our 
foreign trade. As you know, the Congress has 
given the President a variety of possible retalia- 
tory responses to import restrictions burdening 
our trade. There is no doubt about the feeling 
of the Congress or about the mandate it has 
given the President. 

Essentially what we have are means for 
bargaining. Like any bargaining weapons, 
they need to be used with care and skill par- 
ticularly as to timing. I suppose nobody would 
deny that, once you actually invoke a retalia- 
tory procedure, you have come to the end of 
the road so far as your hopes for improving 
your trade are concerned. This is not to say 
that we should not or will not invoke the re- 
taliatoi-y powers given to the President. For 
one thing, we may find it necessary to demon- 
strate that we are serious. But I would em- 
phasize that a general resort to retaliation is not 
something that any of us would wish to see come 
about. It would mean not trade expansion but 
trade contraction, and its effects on interna- 
tional relations generally would be most un- 

To conclude, we have a new and far-reaching 
Trade Expansion Act which gives us the means 
to undertake a new drive to expand free-world 
trade. At this early point it is not possible to 
predict what will happen under it. But the 
need for expanding trade and for strengthening 
the coromercial links between the free countries 
has never been more acute. The logic of things 
argues that strong leadership by the United 
States will be successful. 





Mr. Manning Interviewed 
on "News and Comment" 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary foi 
Public Affairs, by Howard K. Smith on the 
American Broadcasting Oompany''s television 
program ^^Howard K. Smith— News and Com\l 
inent" on March 10. 

Press release 122 dated March 8 

Howard K. Smith: There have been a great 
many protests about Government managemen 
of news lately. Do you think there is a leg'" 
mate basis for such protests? 

Mr. Manning: Well, there certainly has beer! 
a controversy in the papers, Mr. Smith. I don't |i. 
think it has been a particularly fruitful or ex 
tremely high-level controversy yet. Perhapi 
as it goes a bit more, it is going on, we mighi 
get a little clearer on what the vocabulary ii 
and whether, indeed, the words that are ber' 
used are accepted as having the same meaning 

Management of the news, for example. It' 
a question of putting— attempting to find somi 
way in this complicated world to put some ordei 
and coherence into what a national governmea 
says or what its position is. Quit© a bit of ai 
attempt is mider way, both in journalism and ii 
the Government, to arrive at this coherence. 

Q. Do you think ifs fair to say that there i 
maivagement of news? 

A. I think if the vocabulary, if the descrip 
tion of management of news is used to defirn 
this attempt to put some coherence, to make sun 
that what this Government is expressing is J 
position, is indeed the Government's position, 
what tlie United States Government is propof 
ing to do in a given circumstance is being oi 
ganized in a way that leaves no mistake, eith( 
in the minds of the American public or tl 
many other audiences to which it is directed, \ 
that sense I think we would have chaos and a 
very dangerous state of affairs without it. 

Q. Now, some people have expressed the vieu 
that the press ought to have unlimited access tc 
the information on lohich policy is based. Dc 
you believe that is an advisable policy? 

A. One might have a bit of discussion about 



liat we mean i^recisely by unlimited access, but 
the spirit of that question I think it's a very 
mple answer, yes. 

Q. Is there ever a thn^, do yoxi thinl\ when a 
n-cniment is justified in telling a falsehood to 
€ press? 

A. I don't thinlv a falsehood is necessary. 

Q. Now, we know that everyone in Govem- 
'.cnf is not of the same mind on the question of 
■liking information available. As the State 
epartment officer responsible for dealing with 
X press, could you describe some of the con- 
'4}ting viewpoints held by the different de- 

A. Yes. It is the State Department that is 
y province, as you know. But first, dealing 
ith diplomacy, everybody knows that there is 
the very nature of affairs a certain conflict 
rtween the conduct of diplomacy in the ideal 
nse and the practice of free and aggressive 
lumalism. But it's precisely this sort of con- 
foversy that this system of government was set 
to resolve, without an impairment either of 
le conduct of diplomacy or the function of a 
ree press. The fact that the conflict exists, I 
dnk, is ffoins: to be with us for a loufj time, 
ut the fact that it can be resolved without im- 
lirment. I think, has been proved by many, 
any years of a free press dealing with more 
id more complicated diplomatic and foreigii 
)licy affairs in a way that is always, and I 
link today more than ever, laying out the 
sentials of those policies or proposals to the 
ablic and to the world at large. 

Q. Why do you thinh this issue of managed 
^los has arisen? Is this administration 
'uanaging'''' news more than the past ad- 

A. Again in this sense of trying to in- 
'■oduce some order into things, this has been 
joing on — I have been a reporter for 27 years 
nd an oiBcial of the Government for only one. 

haven't experienced in my career as a jour- 
alist a situation in wliich there wasn't always 
le probability that you might have to go two 
■r three places to be sure you're getting what 
|ou are after. And I haven't experienced a 
ituation in which a given person is not going 

to put his particular tone of voice and his par- 
ticular interpretation on events. But as a re- 
porter I have always assumed, as I am sure you 
have, that it's a part of my responsibility — or 
was — to see that I got it in its right context. 
Human bemgs being human are, as I say, going 
to put their own mflection on things. But if 
this is done for the purpose again of trying to 
get the facts straight as the person in Govern- 
ment thinks they are, that is one thing. But if 
it is to be used for effecting purposes of dis- 
tortion, I think it's deplorable, and if it exists — 
and I honestly don't think it exists to any in- 
tended or important degree in this administra- 
tion — then I think it should be eliminated. 

Q. Do you think the press in Washington is 
suffering in any significant way from this sup- 
pression of information by Government? 

A. I spent a year involved — again I go back 
to my own province in the State Department, in 
which I think we produced, for a gi-oup of ex- 
perienced journalists and Foreign Service offi- 
cers, a mechanism for producing more news, 
more information, not manufacturing it but 
producing it, making it available and providing 
more access to policy officials than I have known 
to have existed in the State Department before, 
and I think this can be very fairly said of the 
Wliite House, of the Defense Department, and 
of the other areas of the executive branch. 

For example, in the course of this recent con- 
troversy after Cuba, one of the most important 
upshots of this within the State Department 
was a delineation within the Department of 
State of this question of the obligation of policy 
officers — not just information persons — the obli- 
gation of policy officers to talk directly with 
reporters, have a dialog with them. This has 
been put in writing as a part of the obligation 
of policy officials, and to my concrete knowl- 
edge it is being carried out very energetically 
as an obligation. 

Q. So you think there is more access to infor- 
mation than in the administrations? 

A. There is certainly much more than when I 
covered the State Department back after the 
war, and I'm told by many of the journalists 
who covered regularly that they feel there is 
considerable more access. 

PRTL 1, 1963 


Q. Tell me, do you think ifs possible thai. 
some parts of the press may he trying to con- 
ceal their oton inadequacies hy hlaming the 
Government for xoithholding n£wsf 

A. Well, if you heard Senator [Everett] 
Dirksen the other morning on television, when 
asked to comment on the attributes of American 
women — I might paraphrase him. I think 
American reporters are the best in the world. 
I think they are the most handsome in the 
world. I think they are the most charming 
in the world. And, really, for the most part 
they are extremely good. There are gradations 
of quality as there are in every profession, but 
we have got the best press corps and the best 
press. They have got great problems them- 
selves of management. There are as many as 
30 to 40 columns of news on foreign affairs 
carried each day on the AP alone. It ta]i:es a 
tremendous feat of management to winnow out 
what's important and get that into the 4 to 8 
columns of foreign news that are used in most 
newspapers in this country, outside of two or 
three big ones. 

Q. Why has this question of news m,an^ge- 
ment become such a conspicuous one noio? 

A. Well, as you know, it has come up time 
and again, in recent years, and even OA-er a 
longer period than that, but the origin of this 
recent controversy rose out of Cuba. There 
really isn't much controversy as I have seen it 
over this period of 5 to 7 days when the admin- 
istration, after having clearly delineated to the 
American public and to the world at large v>hat 
its policy would be in the event of Soviet place- 
ment of offensive weaponry in Cuba — there 
wasn't much argument over the necessity and, 
in fact, the success achieved by the privacy dur- 
ing that period while the Government made up 
its mind not only about the nature of this 
threat but how to face it and how to deal with 
it, before then laying out to the world at large, 
including the enemy, what it is we are going 
to do about it. 

Then there was a period after that involving 
certain movements, exchanges of very impor- 
tant diplomatic notes that had a bearing on 
whether this was going to succeed or not. 
Again this represented occasional interludes 
of the use of privacy to carry out a policy that 

had been publicly delineated and publicly ad- 
hered to and privately adliered to in every 

I thmk there is probably great agreement in 
this country that, while we are all eager to know 
everything that is going on, there are intervals 
when if we know what an elected government 
is clearly annoimcing it is intending to do, if W6H 
know the means it's going to use, we will grant 
it certain interludes in which to caiTy out those 
stated objectives. 

A working newspaperman, when worW- 
shaking events are going on, naturally wants 
to know everything he can about it. And he is [j 
quite right to try to find out. A President or 
a Cabinet officer, indeed a department of Gov- 
ernment, has got a responsibility to do sonw 
other things besides, for the success of that pol- 
icy and the avoidance of a nuclear confronta-i 
tion that might get a lot of people, or wholei 
countries, decimated. 

Q. But you said you havenH hod any pro- 
tests about keeping it private or secret in those 
intervals when the people knew what the gen- 
eral aim teas. 

A. First, there has been very little from any 
quarter over that first very tense nuclear-con- 
frontation week. The second week was also on« 
of possible nuclear confrontation. There hai 
been, and this is the origin for a lot of th( 
reportorial complaints, but these really ar( 
complaints over certain mechanical things an( 
over certain intervals of timing. I don't th 
that the case has been made for a case of pri 
ciple. that is, in which the Government has beei 
caught or can be indicted for the suppressioi 
of information vital to the democratic procei 
If this interval has been used to turn around 
policy, something that had been explained 
the public as something that had not been, the) 
I tliink there would be room for indictment.| 
This wasn't the case. 

Q. You have no objection to the mejnhers on 
the press seeing anybody in the State DepartA 

A. None at all. As a matter of fact, any^ 
one that they can arrange to see, and when 
they can't, we have got several people in tli 
Department who are always ready to help theni 



get tlie access. Every official can't see every with television commentators, with magazine 

correspondent who wants to see him. They see writers, and indeed with many people represent- 

an astonishing number, and they spend an ast on- ing relatively obscure comers of journalism, 

ishing amount of time, from the Secretary of but who nevertheless have a case for a private 

State on down, dealing with newspapermen, chance to interview a policymaking official. 


Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings^ 

Scheduled April Through June 1963 

GATT Special Group on Trade in Tropical Products Geneva Apr. 1- 

World Meteorological Organization: 4th Congress Geneva Apr. 1- 

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 35th Session New York Apr. 2- 

International Sugar Council: 13th Session London Apr. 3- 

SEATO Council of Ministers: 8th Meeting Paris Apr. 8- 

U.N. ECE Coal Committee: Rapporteurs on Utilization of Fly Ash . Geneva Apr. 8- 

U.N. Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Terri- New York Apr. 15- 


Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Panamd Apr. 16- 

ICAO Communications Division: Special Meeting To Prepare for Montreal Apr. 16- 

ITU Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference. 

Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: Geneva Apr. 17- 

9th Session. 

Intergovernmental Meeting on Tuna Conservation Panamd Apr. 18- 

U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 18th Session Geneva Apr. 18- 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: New York Apr. 22- 

Special Working Party. 

International Cotton Advisory Committee: 22d Plenary Meeting . Bangalore Apr. 23- 

NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 15th Meeting .... London Apr. 23- 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Committee on Geneva Apr. 23- 

Illicit Traffic. 

Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: Board of Di- Lima Apr. 24- 


U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission: 15th Session New York Apr. 24- 

PAHO Executive Committee: 48th Meeting Washington Apr. 25- 

lAEA International Conference on Draft Convention on Civil Lia- Vienna Apr. 29 

bility, Land-Based Facilities. 

IMCO Working Group on FaciUtation of International Travel and London Apr. 29- 

Transport: 2d Session. 

U.N. ECAFE WoiUng Party on Small-Scale Industries: 7th Ses- Bangkok Apr. 29- 


U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: New York Apr. 29- 

11th Session. 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 18th Session . . . Geneva Apr. 29- 

UNESCO Executive Board: 65th Session Paris Apr. 29- 

ITU African Broadcasting Conference Geneva Apr. 29- 

WMO Executive Committee: 15th Session Geneva Apr. 29- 

CENTO Ministerial Council: nth Meeting Karachi Apr. 30- 

U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 5th Session . . . Bangkok April 

1 Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Mar. 14, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: 
CCIR, Comity consultatif international des radio communications; CCITT, ComitS consultatif international 
telegraphique et telephonique; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia 
and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food 
and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic 
Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, 
Pan American Health Organization; PIANC, Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses; 
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organiza- 

1963 503 

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued 

Scheduled April Through June 1963 — Continued 

ILO Textiles Committee: 7th Session 

9th Pan American Highway Congress 

U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America: 10th Session . . . 

16th World Health Assembly 

16th International Film Festival 

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Industrial Development: 3d Session. 

OECD Maritime Transport Committee 

ICAO Meeting on Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Control Opera- 

GATT Ministerial Meeting 

U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: Symposium on Peak Load 

ITU CCITT/CCIR Plan Subcommittee for Development of the 
International Network in Latin America. 

NATO Ministerial Council 

IMCO Council: 8th Session 

U.N. ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the Conference on Trade 
and Development. 

2d Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference 

ILO Governing Body: 155th Session (and its committees) 

U.N. ECE Committee on Electric Power: Group of Experts for the 
Study of Hydroelectric Resources in Europe. 

IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability Problems . . . 

WHO Executive Board: 32d Session 

International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 
13th Meeting. 

U.N. Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth 
and Resources: 4th Session. 

FAO World Food Congress 

ITU Panel of Experts: 2d Meeting 

International Labor Conference: 47th Session 

U.N. ECE Housing Committee 

CENTO Economic Experts 

PIANC Permanent International Commission: Annual Meeting . 

10th International Electronic, Nuclear and Motion Picture Exposi- 

U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 11th Session . . 

13th International Film Festival 

Antarctic Treaty: Meeting of Experts on Antarctic Communica- 

ILO Governing Body: 156th Session 

IAEA Board of Governors 

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 30th Session 

Geneva May 6- 

Washington May 6- 

Mar del Plata, Argentina. May 6- 

Geneva May 7- 

Cannes May 9- 

New York May 13- 

Paris May 14- 

Montreal May 14- 

Geneva May 16- 

Venice May 20- 

Bogotd, May 20- 

Ottawa May 21- 

London May 21- 

Geneva May 21- 

Mar del Plata, Argentina. May 22- 

Geneva May 24- 

Geneva May 27- 

London May 27- 

Geneva May 28- 

Halifax May 

New York May 

Washington June 4- 

Geneva June 4- 

Geneva June 5- 

Geneva June 5- 

Ankara June 6- 

Brussels June 11- 

Rome June 15- 

Geneva June 17- 

Berlin June 21- 

Washington June 24- 

Geneva June 28- 

Vienna June 

New York June 



Curremt Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into 
force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3878. 
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, March 15, 1963. 


Convention on international civil aviation. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 
4, 1947. TIAS LTOl. 

Adherence deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, March 
14, 1963. 


Articles of agreement of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signa- 
ture at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into 
force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. 
Signature and acceptance: Ivory Coast, March 11, 

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund. Opened for signature at Washington Decem- 
ber 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. 
TIAS 1.501. 

Sir/nature and acceptance: Ivory Coast, March 11, 

Articles of agreement of the International Finance 
Corporation. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. 
Entered into force July 20, 19.56. TIAS 3620. 
Signature and acceptance: Ivory Coast, March 11, 

Articles of agreement of the International Development 
Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960. 



Entered iuto force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607. 

Siynatiires and acceptances: Burma, November 5, 
1002; Domiiiican Republic, November 16, 1962; 
Ivory Coast, March 11, 1903 ; Nepal, March 6, 1963. 

Si(!naliircs: Sierra Leoue aud Tanganyika, Septem- 
ber 10, 1962. 

Acceptances deposited: Sierra Leone, November 13, 
1902 ; Tanganyika, November 6, 1962. 

viarcotic Drugs 

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of 
the poppy plant, the production of, international and 
wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New 
York June 23, 1953. Entered into force March 8, 
1963. TIAS 5273. 
Proclaimed ly the President: March 1, 1963. 

'ostal Services 

Dniversal postal convention with tinal protocol, innex, 
regulations of execution, and provisions regarding 
airmail, with final protocol. Done at Ottawa 
October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. 
TIAS 4202. 
Ratifications deposited: Dominican Republic, 

December 28, 1962 ; Honduras, December 21, 1962 ; 

Nepal, January 2, 1963. 


Ilonvention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 

Acceptance deposited: Syrian Arab Republic, Janu- 
ary 28, 1963. 


International telecommunication convention with six 
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. 
Entered into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United 
States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4S92. 
Ratifications deposited: Kuwait, January 23, 1963;^ 
Laos, January 17, 1963. 

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the 
international telecommunication convention, 1959. 
Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into 
force May 1, 1961 ; for the United States October 23, 
1961. TIAS 4893. 

Notifications of approval: Cameroon, January 19, 
1963 ; Ivory Coast, December 28, 1962 ; = Kuwait, 
January 9, 1963 ; Paraguay, January 30, 1963. 

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed 
to the international telecommunication convention 
of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with appendixes 
and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 
1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 
Notification of approval: Kuwait, January 9, 1963. 



Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of August 7, 1962, as amended (TIAS 
5195 and 52.52). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Santiago February 14, 1963. Entered into force 
February 14, 1963. 


Treaty of friendship, establishment and navigation, 
and protocol. Signed at Luxembourg February 23, 

1962. Entered into force March 28, 1963. 
Proclaimed hy the President: March 6, 1963. 


Agreement amending the migrant labor agreement of 
August 11, 1951, as amended. EfCected by exchange 
of notes at Mexico, D.F., January 10 and February 
25, 1963. Entered into force February 25, 1963. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development aud Assistance 
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 
1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at 
Ankara February 21, 1963. Entered into force 
February 21, 1963. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of December 27, 1961 (TIAS 4920). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon March 8, 

1963. Entered into force March 8, 1963. 


' With reservation made at time of signing final 
" With a reservation. 


The Senate on March 8 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

Archibald S. Alexander to be an As.sistant Director 
of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 

Charles F. Baldwin, Ambassador to the Federation 
of Malaya, to serve concurrently and without addi- 
tional compensation as the representative of the 
United States to the 19th session of the Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East of the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations. 

Jonathan B. Bingham to he the representative of the 
United States on the Economic and Social Council of 
the United Nations. 

Edward M. Korry to be Ambassador to Ethiopia. 
( For biographic details, see Department of State press 
release 130 dated March 13. ) 

William J. Porter to be Ambassador to the Demo- 
cratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. 

Carl T. Rowan to be Ambassador to Finland. 

Dr. James Watt to be the representative of the 
United States on the Executive Board of the World 
Health Organization, to which oflSce he was appointed 
during the last recess of the Senate. 

Charles D. Withers to be Ambassador to the Re- 
public of Rwanda. (For biographic details, see De- 
partment of State press release 133 dated March 14.) 

Sidney R. Yates to be the representative of the 
United States on the Trusteeship Council of the United 

The Senate on March 11 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

Olcott H. Deming to be Ambassador to Uganda. 

APRIL 1, 1963 


William C. Doherty to be Ambassador to Jamaica. 

Donald A. Dumont to be Minister to the Kingdom 
of Burundi. 

C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., to be Ambassador to the 
Malagasy Republic. 

Outerbridge Horsey to be Ambassador to the Czeeho 
slovak Socialist Republic. 

William R. Rivkin to be Ambassador to Luxembourg. 

Horace G. Torbert, Jr., to be Ambassador to the 
Somali Republic. 


John C. Clarli as science attach^ at Cairo, United 
Arab Republic, effective March 11. (For biographic 
details, see Department of State press release 129 
dated March 13.) 


Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, except in the case of free publications, wJiich 
may be obtained from the Department of State. 

Our Southern Partners: The Story of Inter-American 
Cooperation. A survey of the political, social, eco- 
nomic development and problems, and areas of United 
States and Latin American cooperation. Pub. 7404. 
Inter- American Series 78. 59 pp. 30^. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Colombia, 
amending the agreement of October 6, 19.59, as amended. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Bogota June 20, 1962. 
Entered into force June 20, 1962. TIAS 5088. 3 pp. 

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Venezuela. 
Exchange of note-s — Signed at Caracas April 14 and 
May 28, 1962. Entered into force May 28, 1962. TIAS 

5089. 5 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with China, 
amending the agreements of April 18, 1958, and of 
June 9, 1959. August 30, 1960, and July 21, 1961, as 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Taipei June 
29, 1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962. TIAS 

5090. 5 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Venezuela, amending the agreement of 
May 17, 1962. Exchange of notes — Signed at Wash- 
ington June 18, 1962. Entered into force June 18, 1962. 
TIAS 5091. 5 pp. 50. 

Defense — Disposition of Equipment and Materials. 

Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Exchange of note.s — Signed at Bonn/Bad Godesberg 
and Bonn May 25, 1962. Entered into force May 25, 
1962. TIAS 5092. 5 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pern, 
amending the agreement of February 12, 1960, as 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Lima June 4 
and 18, 1962. Entered into force June IS, 1962. TIAS 
5093. 3 pp. 5<f. 

Antarctica— Measures in Furtherance of Principles 
and Objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. Recommen- 
dations adopted at the First Consultative Meeting un- 
der Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, at Canberra, 
July 24, 1961. Effective April 30, 1902. TIAS 5094. 
9 pp. 10<t. 

Trade. Agreement with El Salvador, terminating cer- 
tain provisions of the agreement of February I'J, 1937. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at San Salvador June 29, 
1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962. TIAS 5095. 
3 pp. 5<t. t 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: IVIarch 11-17 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington 25, 

Releases issued prior to March 11 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 99 
of February 22 ; 109 of March 1 ; 118 of March 
7 ; and 122 of March 8. 


U.S. participation in international 

Gardner : AAUN Conference of Na- 
tional Organizations. 

Recognition of Government of Syr- 
ian Arab Republic. 

Rusk : Advertising Council. 

McGhee : International Coffee 
Agreement, 1962. 

Louchheim : "Women on World 

Clark appointed science attach^, 
Cairo (biographic details). 

Korry sworn in as Ambassador to 
Ethiopia (biographic details). 

Rusk to head delegation to CENTO 

Hughes designated Director of In- 
telligence and Research (bio- 
graphic details). 

Withers sworn in as Ambassador to 
Rwanda (biographic details). 

Note to U.S.S.R. on alleged firing 
on Soviet trawler. 

Fredericks : "Problejiis and Trends 
in Education in the African 

Williams : "Democracy and the 
Emerging Nations." 

Visit of King of Morocco. 

Protest to U.S.S.R. on violation of 
Alaskan airspace by Soviet 



























tl36 3/14 



Not printed. 

Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



pril 1, 1963 


e X 

V ol. XLVIIl, No. 1240 


aternalional Coffee Agreement, 1962 (McGhee) 

'he Trade Expansion Program (Trezise) 

Igeria. Porter confirmed as Ambassador . 

tomic Energy 

Nuclear Test Ban and Arms Control (Beam) 
ei retary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council 
.S, Efforts To Achieve Safeguarded Test Ban 
Treaty (Rusk) 

lurundi. Dumont confirmed as Minister . 





■ongo (Leopoldville) 

ummary of U.S. Recommendations for Program 

of Aid to the Congo 481 

'he United Nations in Crisis : Cuba and the 

Congo (Gardner) 477 


onfirmations (Alexander, Baldwin, Bingham, 
Deming, Doherty, Dumont, Ferguson, Horsey, 
Knrry, Porter, Rivkin, Rowan, Torbert, Watt, 
Withrers, Yates) 505 

iiti'rnational Coffee Agreement, 1962 (McGhee) 493 

.S. Efforts To Achieve Safeguarded Test Ban 
Treaty (Rusk) 485 


ecretary Rusk Addre.?ses Advertising Council . 467 
'he United Nations in Crisis : Cuba and the 
Congo (Gardner) 477 

zcchoslovakia. Horsey confirmed as Ambas- 
sador 506 

department and Foreign Service 

ppointments (Clark) 506 

'onfirmations (Alexander, Baldwin, Bingham, 
Deming, Doherty, Dumont, Ferguson, Horsey, 
Korry, Porter, Rivkin, Rovran, Torbert, Watt, 
Withers, Yates) 505 


Jesander confirmed as Assistant Director, Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency .... 

i. Nuclear Test Ban and Arms Control (Beam) . 

Secretary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council . 

'.S. Efforts To Achieve Safeguarded Test Ban 
Treaty (Rusk) 

Economic Affairs. The Trade Expansion Pro- 
gram (Trezise) 

•Ethiopia. Korry confirmed as Ambassador . 

iurope. Secretary Rusk Addresses Advertis- 
ing Council 

■"inland. Rowan confirmed as Ambassador . 

•'oreign Aid. Summary of U.S. Recommenda- 
tions for Program of Aid to the Congo . . 

nternational Organizations and Conferences 
;;alendar of International Conferences and Meet- 

Secretary Rusk To Head U.S. Delegation to 

CENTO Meeting 

iVatt confirmed as U.S. Representative on WHO 
Executive Board 

Jamaica. Doherty confirmed as Ambassador . 

Luxembourg. Rivkin confirmed as Ambassa- 

Malagasy Republic. Ferguson confirmed as Am- 

Middle East. Secretary Rusk To Head U.S. 
Delegation to CENTO Meeting 












North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secre- 
tary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council . 467 

Protection of Nationals and Property. U.S. 
Protests Soviet Planes' Violation of Alaskan 

Airspace (text of note) 476 

Public Affairs. Mr. Manning Interviewed on 

"News and Comment" 500 

Publications. Recent Releases 506 

Recognition. U.S. Recognizes Government of 

Syrian Arab Republic 476 

Rwanda. Withers confirmed as Ambassador . 505 

Science. Clark appointed science attach^, 

Cairo 506 

Somali Republic. Torbert confirmed as Ambas- 
sador 506 

Syria. U.S Recognizes Government of Syrian 

Arab Republic 476 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 504 

International Coffee Agreement, 1962 (McGhee) . 493 

Uganda. Deming confirmed as Ambassador . 505 


Secretary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council . 467 
U.S. Protests Soviet Planes' Violation of Alas- 
kan Airspace (text of note) 476 

U.S. Rejects Soviet Charge of Firing on Trawler 

(exchange of notes) 475 

United Arab Republic. Clark appointed science 

attach^ 506 

United Nations 

Baldwin confirmed as U.S. Representative to 

19th session of ECAFE 505 

Bingham confirmed as U.S. Representative on 

Economic and Social Council 505 

Summary of U.S. Recommendations for Pro- 
gram of Aid to the Congo 481 

The United Nations in Crisis : Cuba and the 

Congo (Gardner) 477 

Yates confirmed as U.S. Representative on 

Trusteeship Council 505 

Name Index 

Alexander, Archibald S 505 

Baldwin, Charles F 505 

Beam, Jacob D 489 

Bingham, Jonathan B 505 

Bundy, McGeorge 467 

Clark, John C 506 

Deming. Olcott H 505 

Doherty. William C 506 

Dumont, Donald A 506 

Ferguson, C. Vaughan, Jr 506 

Gardner, Richard N 477 

Horsey, Outerbridge 506 

Korry, Edward M 505 

Manning, Robert J 500 

McGhee, George C 493 

Porter, William J 505 

Rivkin, William R 506 

Rowan, Carl T 505 

Rusk, Secretary 467, 485 

Torbert, Horace G., Jr 506 

Trezise, Philip H 497 

Watt, James 505 

Withers, Charles D 505 

Yates, Sidney R 505 


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Laos, the Federation of Malaya, the Eepublic of the Philii^pines, the 
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establishment of a new basis of relations with the former colonial 
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APR lb 

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1241V April 8, 1963 

B. P. L. 


merits by President Kennedy and Text of Declaration of 
Central America • 511 


AFRICA • by Assistant Secretary Williams 541 

PUTES • by Joseph J. Sisco 529 


Richard N. Gardner 535 


UNITED STATES • Statement by Ambassador Adlai E. 
Stevenson 522 

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appreciated. The Bclletin is Indeied In the 
Readers' Oulde to Periodical Literature 

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1241 • Publication 7i 
April 8, 1963 

The Department of State BULLETIN 
a weekly publication issued by th 
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The Presidents' Meeting at San Jose 

Tlie Presidents of Central America, Panama, and the United States met 
at San Jose, Costa Rica, March 18-20. Following is a statement regarding 
the meeting which President Kennedy read at his netcs conference at Wash- 
ington on March 21, together loith addresses and remarks he made lohile 
he was in Costa Rica and the text of the Declaration of Central America, 
approved by the Presidents on March 19. Presidents attending the meeting 
were Francisco J. Orlich of Costa Rica, Julio Adalherto Rivera of El Sal- 
vador, Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes of Guatemala, Ramon Villeda Morales 
of Hondiiras, Luis Somosa Dehayle of Nicaragua, Roherto F. ChiaH of 
Panama, and John F. Kennedy of the United States. The President-elect 
of Nicaragua, Rene Schich Gutierrez, was also present. All the Presidents 
were accompanied hy their foreign ministers. 


Last night I returned from a 3-clay meeting 
in San Jose, Costa Rica, with the Presidents 
of five Central American Republics and Pan- 
ama. Tliis was a most useful meeting. For 
the first time a President of the United States 
journeyed to Central America and conferred 
with all of the leaders of this vital area, which, 
in terms of history, geography, common inter- 
est, and common goals, is as closely allied with 
the United States as any area in the world. We 
agreed to continue our efforts under the Alli- 
ance for Progress, to build and strengthen the 
machinery for economic cooperation with and 
among the nations of Central America and 
Panama, including the creation of a unified 
economic community in Central America. And 
we also agreed on the necessity for measures 
to halt the flow of agents, money, anns, and 
propaganda from Cuba to Central America. 
; Every nation present was determined that 
we would both protect ourselves against im- 
mediate danger and go forward with the great 

APRIL 8, 1963 

work of constructing dynamic, progressive so- 
cieties, iimnime to the false promises of com- 
mmiism. This is the fourth Latin American 
country which I have visited. Here, as in all 
the others, we found a spontaneous outpouring 
of friendship and affection for the United 
States; and here, as in all the others, we saw 
impressive evidence of the work now being 
made and done lander the Alliance for Progress. 
Each trip makes it clear that Latin Ameri- 
cans, by an overwhelming majority, are ready 
to work, to sacrifice, to fight if necessary, to 
maintain their own freedom and to build soci- 
eties which serve the welfare of all their people. 
They lack only the full measure of resources 
necessary to build a hemisphere where all can 
be secure and free. They know that they bear 
the fundamental responsibility for tlieir own 
welfare and progress, but the receptions we 
have received in Costa Rica, in Mexico, in Ven- 
ezuela, and in Colombia demonstrate that they 
also know that we in the United States today 
have a deep concern for their problems, a com- 
mon dedication to their aspirations, and a f aith- 


ful commitment to help them in their efforts. 
For all these reasons, I return from San Jose 
with increased confidence that we will continue 
to live in a hemisphere of independent, firm, 
and faithful friends. 


White House press release (San Jo9i5) dated March 18 

Mr. President, I want to express my wann 
appreciation to you and to the people of Costa 
Rica for your welcome to us today. 

About 500 years ago, Christopher Columbus, 
after having discovered Costa Rica, turned 
from Panama and began his last journey home. 
He described this fourth voyage as el Alto 
Viaje, the high voyage, and I feel in a very 
real sense that this is a high voyage for all of 
us who meet today in this free and democratic 
coimtry. Our high voyage, Mr. President, is 
not to seek new lands to conquer but to make 
sure that old lands remain free. We don't seek 
gold for a few in our voyage; we seek a better 
life for all of our people. 

Mr. President, the purpose of our meeting is, 
as you have suggested, to see what our countries, 
working together — the United States and the 
countries of the isthmus — we working together 
can do for our people to make sure that, along 
with a system of political independence, hand 
in hand will go economic well-being. 

It is our responsibility in this hemisphere, in 
this isthmus, ill my own country in the 1960's, 
to demonstrate that economic prosperity is the 
handmaiden of political liberty. That is the 
responsibility of all of us. If we meet that 
responsibility, then this country and all coun- 
tries like it in this hemisphere will remain 
free. If we do not meet this responsibility, then 
their inevitable fate will be one of enslavement 
by those who already have indicated their 
desire to crush out independence in this 

So this meeting is most vital, and I want you 
to know, Mr. President, that I come here today 
not only with the Members of the Congress and 
the Secretary of State and others, but I come 
here today with 180 million fellow Americans 
who want this hemisphere to be free and who 
want this hemisphere to be an example to a 


watching world in the crucial j'ears of this cen 
tury and this decade. 

And, Mr. President, I want to express again/ 
our thanks to you. We could not feel more 
at home a thousand miles from the United 
States than here in Costa Rica. 


President Kennedy's Opening Statement, March Ig 

White House press release (San Josf) dated March 18 

I think the extraordinary statements which 
we have heard this afternoon will serve to illu- 
minate for the people of this hemisphere, and 
particularly for the people of the United States, 
the harsh and striking challenges we face in 
these Republics and in the other Republics of 
this hemisphere in attempting to improve the 
life of our people. The statements that have 
been made today I think serve as a call to ac- 
tion by all of us, north and south, to move 
ahead in these days before time passes by. 

In 18'25, a son of El Salvador and a citizen of 
Central America — Antonio Jose Canas — the 
first minister accredited by the United Prov- 
inces of Central America to the United States, 
delivered an invitation to Secretary of State 
Henry Clay. He asked him to send representa- 
tives to the first Inter-American Congress at 
Panama, a meeting at which, he said, the stiiig' 
gliug new nations of this hemisphere "mighli 
consider upon and adopt the best plan for de 
fending the states of the New World from 
foreign aggression, and . . . raise them to thaH 
elevation of wealth and power, which, froir 
their resources, they may attain." 

Today, 1.38 years later, we are gathered w 
this theater in pursuit of those same goals — tht 
preservation of our independence, the extensior 
of freedom, and the elevation of the welfare 
of our citizens to a level as high as "from oui 
resources" we can attain. And today I hav( 
come from the United States at the invitation 
of a Central America which, with Panama, if 
rapidly attaining a vmity of purpose, effort, 
and achievement which has been unloiown sinct 
the dissolution of that earliest federation. 

That early conference did not achieve all itS' 
goals. But from it flowed the dream and ere 
ation of Bolivar, and Canas, and Jose Cecilic 




le Valle of Costa Rica — the dream which be- 
came the inter-American system; and this sys- 
em has been the most successful, the most fruit- 
ful, and the most enduring of international 
)rder in the history of the world. 

We can say this because every effort to reim- 
)ose the despotisms of the Old World on the 
)eople of the New has ultimately been beaten 
)acii; because within this system 20 Republics 
lave attained the full recognition of their dig- 
lity as sovereign nations; and because this sys- 
eni has maintained an unmatched record of 
leaceful relations among its members. There 
lave been occasional conflicts to mar this rec- 
)rd. But nowhere else have nations lived as 
leighbors with so little hostility and warfare. 
Vnd today the principles of nonintervention 
md the peaceful resolution of disputes have 
)een so firmly imbedded in our tradition that 
he heroic democracy in which we meet today 
•an pursue its national goals without an armed 
'orce to guard its frontiers. In few other spots 
n the world would this be true. 

We have not attained this strength by merely 
' rying to protect wliat was already won, to 
)reserve the gains of the past, to maintain the 
fafus quo. If these were our system's goals, 
t would inevitably have crumbled as old orders 
Tumbled. Instead, it has sunaved, prospered, 
md grown — despite wars and revolutions, de- 
spite changing ideologies and changing tech- 
lologies, despite shifts in power and sliifts in 
ivealth — because it has itself been an instru- 
nent of change, profound revolutionary change 
Nhich has molded the history of this hemi- 
sphere and shaped the thinking of men seeking 
Freedom and dignity in all lands. As each 
powerful new wave of ideas and aspirations has 
5wept across our shores, the inter- American sys- 
tem has been able to translate these ideas and 
aspirations into a working reality for our peo- 
ple. In this respect it has been unique among 
efforts at world collaboration. That is why it 
has endured in the past and must endure in 
the future. 

In the first three centuries of our history the 
seeds of Western civilization and culture were 
planted here. 

In the next century we established an inter- 
American system which helped to complete and 
maintain our freedom from foreign rule. This 

freedom has often been challenged — as today 
it is challenged in Cuba. But with the help of 
dedicated and brave men — men such as those 
who drove out Maximilian or men such as those 
who prevented the Spanish reconquest in 1866, 
men such as Costa Rica's Mora, who helped to 
drive out William Walker — with such help, we 
have destroyed all efforts at foreign conquest 
in the past, as we will ultimately trimnph over 
tlie new conquerors of today. 

In the 50 years following its creation, the 
inter-American system worked to establish the 
political equality and national dignity of all 
its members, to extend political democracy, and 
to strengthen the principle that no nation 
should forcibly impose its will upon another. 
Those goals have been largely met. The equal- 
ity of sovereign states is accepted by all. In- 
ten^ention and force have been renounced. 
Machinery of peaceful settlement has been 
strengthened. Democracy rules in most of our 
lands. It will ultimately prevail over the last 
vestiges of tyranny in every land in this hemi- 

Now, in our own time, the inter-American 
system faces old foes and new challenges ; and 
it is again demonstrating the capacity for 
change which has always given it strength. The 
foes are stronger and more determined than 
ever before, and the challenges are more diffi- 
cult, more complex, and more burdensome. For 
today we are faced not merely with the protec- 
tion of new nations but with the remolding of 
ancient societies, not only with the destruction 
of political enemies but with the destruction of 
poverty, hunger, ignorance, and disease, not 
alone with the creation of national dignity but 
with the preservation of human dignity. 

To meet this enormous challenge, the peoples 
of the Americas have fashioned an Alianza- 
para el Progreso, an alliance in which all the 
American states have mobilized their resources 
and energies to secure land for the landless, 
education for those without schools, and a 
faster rate of economic growth within a society 
where all can share in the fruits of progress. 

Here in Central America we have already be- 
gun to move toward the goals of the Alianza. 

You have made enormous strides toward the 
creation of a common market of 13 million 
people. New regional institutions have been 

APRIL 8, 1963 


created; a central bank has been established; 
and centralized planning and direction are 
going ahead in education, finance, and many 
other fields. I congratulate you on your effort 
to reestablish an historic unity to meet new 
needs; and I pledge my Government's contin- 
ued assistance to that great effort. 

In addition you have begim to formulate the 
long-range economic development plans essen- 
tial to the success of the Alianza. The orga- 
nization of the Central American Joint Plan- 
ning Mission gives new impetus to planning on 
a regional development scale. 

In nearly every country represented here, 
new land-reform or tax-reform programs have 
been adopted in an effort to meet the basic 
pledges of increased social justice contained in 
the Charter of Pimta del Este ^ and demanded 
by all of our people. 

In the 2-year period beginning July 1961, 
under programs supported by the United 
States as part of its contribution to the alliance, 
almost 3,000 new classrooms will have been 
built in the nations represented here today ; al- 
most a million new books have been distributed ; 
and tomorrow we will begin to distribute more 
than 2 million more to children hungry for 
learning. Much more remains to be done. 

Some 7,600 new homes will have been built 
during this 2-year period under Alianza pro- 
grams in these nations — but much more remains 
to be done. 

Three-quarters of a million children will have 
been fed — but many are still hungry. 

Six thousand new teachers have been trained, 
as well as many thousands of agricultural work- 
ers, public-health and other public administra- 
tors. Still more are needed. 

During the last 18 months almost 3 million 
people in Central America — farmers, workers, 
children, and slum dwellers — have received 
some form of direct benefit under the Alianza, 
and almost $250 million of external resources 
have been committed in support of the alliance 
in Central America and Panama, to help 
strengthen the basic structure of the economy 
and at the same time meet the basic needs of 
the people for improved health, education, hous- 
ing, and institutions. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463. 

Finally, a revolutionary worldwide agi-ee- 
ment to stabilize the price of coffee ^ has been 
entered into which we in the United States 
are detennined to make work — to protect youi 
most vital source of export earnings. As every 
speaker here today has said, every one of these 
countries sell their agi'icultural commodities in 
a sense at wholesale, and buy their manufac 
tured goods at retail, and pay the freight both 
ways. And we are also willing to move ahead 
on agreements stabilizing the prices of other 
commodities, so that your future prosperity 
will not depend on the often destructive fluctu- 
ation of prices beyond your control. 

Tomorrow, at El Bosque, we will see with oui 
own eyes how the Alianza enters into the live? 
of citizens of Costa Rica, providing them with 
new homes in which they and their families can 
fuid decent shelter for the first time. 

We shall continue under the alliance to build 
economies more balanced and less dependent on 
one or two export commodities. To this end we 
must push forward plans for industrialization, 
greater crop diversification, stronger educa- 
tional facilities, and better utilization of 

Yet we cannot be, and I know none of us are. 
satisfied with the progress we have made. 
Peoples who have waited centuries for oppor- 
tunity and dignity cannot wait much longer. 
And unless those of us now making an effort are 
willing to redouble our efforts, imless the rich' 
are willing to use some of their riches more 
wisely, imless the privileged are willing to yield 
up tlieir privileges to the common good, unless 
the young and the educated are given opportuni- 
ties to use their education, and unless govern- 
ments are willing to dedicate themselves tire- 
lessly to the tasks of governing efficiently and; 
developing swiftly, then let us realize ourt 
Alianza will fail, and with it will fall the society 
of free nations whicli our forefathers labored to 

Unfortunately, while this new endeavor goeS' 
forward we are also confronted by one of the 
oldest of our enemies. For, at the very time 
that newly independent nations rise in the Carib- 
bean, the people of Cuba have been forcibly 
compelled to submit to a new imperialism, more 



' For background, see ihid., Apr. 1, 1963, p. 493. 


uthless, more powerful, and more deadly in its 
nn-siiit of power than any this hemisphere has 
:i\own. Just when it was hoped that Cuba was 
bout to enter upon a new era of democracy and 
Dcial justice, the Soviet Union, through its 
'uban puppets, absorbed the Cuban nation into 
is empire — and it now seeks to extend its rule 
II the shores of the continent itself. 

But other foreign powere have discovered that 
he American hemisphere is not fertile ground 
or foreign tyranny and that any eifort to 
pread such rule will meet with fierce and im- 
iolding resistance. For Americans will not 
asily yield up those freedoms which they shed 
o much blood to achieve. 

At the OAS [Organization of American 
States], at this meeting, and wherever Amer- 
cans gather to consult about the future of their 
nntinent, we will continue to strengthen the 
tructure of resistance to subversion. I am 
lopeful that at this meeting we will again in- 
rease our capacity to prevent the infiltration 
if Cuban agents, money, and propaganda. We 
vill build a wall around Cuba — not a wall of 
nortar or brick or barbed wire, but a wall of 
ledicated men detennined to protect their f ree- 
lom and sovereignty. And in this effort, as in 
ill the other necessai-y efforts, I can assure you 
lie ITnited States will play its full part and 
any its full burden. 

In 1822 Bolivar, the father of the inter- Amer- 
ran system, said this: 

United in heart, in spirit and in aims, this Continent 
. . must raise its eyes ... to peer into the centuries 
vhich lie ahead. It can then contemplate with pride 
those future generations of men, happy and free, enjoy- 
'' ng to the full the blessings that heaven bestows on this 
>arth, and recalling in their hearts the protectors and 
iberators of our day. 

ily friends and colleagues, today we meet, 
representing seven of the great Republics of 
America, united in spirit and in aims. We are 
confident of our ultimate success in protecting 
our freedom, in raising the living standards of 
our citizens, in beginning a new era of hope in 
American history. Secure in that confidence, 
we too can look forward to future centuries 
knowing that our descendants may also grate- 
fully recall in their hearts the "jirotectors and 
liberators"' of our day. 

Text of Declaration 

Press release 145 dated March 20 

Declabation of Central America 

The Presidents of the Republics of Central America 
and Panama are determined to improve the well-being 
of their peoples, and are aware that such a task de- 
mands a dynamic economic and social development pro- 
gram based on the carefully planned use of human, 
natural and financial resources. It also depends on im- 
portant changes of the economic, social and administra- 
tive structure, within the framework of the principles 
that govern our democratic institutions. They have 
met with the President of the United States of America 
in San Jos^, Costa Rica, to review the diflBculties which 
impede the achievement of these objectives as well as 
the progress thus far made in the Isthmus since the 
integration programs began and since the Alliance for 
Progress was jointly established by the Republics of 
the Hemisphere in August 1961. 

Following an analysis of the situation, the Presidents 
of the Republics of Central America, convinced that the 
best hope for the development of the region is through 
economic integration, and bearing in mind the extraor- 
dinary efforts made toward this end in tlie last decade 
and of the importance of accelerating over-all economic 
growth, pledge to their peoples : 

— To accelerate establishment of a customs union to 
perfect the functioning of the Central American Com- 
mon Market ; 

— To formulate and implement national economic and 
social development plans, coordinating them at the Cen- 
tral American level, and progressively to carry out re- 
gional planning for the various sectors of the economy ; 

— To establish a monetary union and common fiscal, 
monetary and social policies within the program of 
economic integration; 

— To cooperate in programs to improve the prices of 
primary export commodities ; 

— To complete as soon as pos.sible the reforms needed 
to achieve the objectives set forth in the Act of Bogota 
and the Charter of Puuta del Bste especially in the 
fields of agriculture, taxation, education, public admin- 
istration, and social welfare ; 

— To take the above measures with a view to achiev- 
ing the creation of a Central American Economic Com- 
munity which will establish relationships with other 
nations or regional groups having similar objectives. 

The Central American Presidents affirm that the 
economic integration movement in itself constitutes an 
effort which is laying the groundwork for regional 
planning in which sectoral plans of common Interest 
to the Isthmian Republics serve as a point of de- 
parture. Their governments have already taken meas- 
ures to coordinate national plans so that their execu- 
tion will aid rather than impede the achievement of 
the objectives of the economic integration program. 
It is intended that the first global plan for harmonious 
regional development be presented as soon as possible 
for evaluation in accordance with the procedures set 

APRII, 8, 1963 


forth in the Charter of Punta del Este. Meanwhile, 
the Central American Presidents declare their resolve 
to proceed immediately with their sectoral plans and 
with projects of interest to the Isthmus. The Presi- 
dent of the United States agrees to consider a long- 
term loan to enable the appropriate Central American 
regional organizations, principally the Central Amer- 
ican Bank for Economic Integration, to conduct eco- 
nomic feasibility surveys relative to this program of 
regional development. 

The Presidents of Central America reaffirm their 
hope that the Republic of Panama will participate 
more closely in the economic integration movement, 
and the President of Panama declares that his Govern- 
ment fully reaffirms its support of the program of Cen- 
tral American economic integration. He further de- 
clares that his Government is prepared to initiate im- 
mediate negotiations with the Governments of the gen- 
eral treaty of economic integration as a whole with a 
view to concluding a special agreement to facilitate the 
association of his country with this program. 

The President of the United States is impressed by 
the determination of the Presidents of the Central 
American Republics to move as rapidly as possible 
toward the integration of the economies of their coun- 
tries, and of their intention to formulate a regional 
economic development plan within which national 
plans would be coordinated, and he believes that the 
coordination of their respective monetary, fiscal, eco- 
nomic and social policies is a great step forward in 
the achievement of this objective as well as toward the 
achievement of the goals set forth in the Charter of 
Punta del Este. 

The President of the United States is prepared to 
offer the greatest cooperation in the preparation and 
implementation of the regional and national develop- 
ment projects of Central America and Panama and 
declares that his government will intensify its joint 
efforts with the governments and appropriate regional 
organizations in order to extend to them increased 
technical and financial assistance for this purpose 
within the frameworli of the broad regional program 
entitled "Joint Exposition of the Presidents of Central 
America" and the development plan being prepared by 

To this end he proposes a fund for Central American 
economic integration, to be made available through the 
Central American Bank for Economic Integration, to 
which the United States would make an immediate 
substantial initial contribution, to assist in carrying 
out regional development projects in accordance with 
various sectoral plans now being developed by the 
regional organizations. 

For the longer term, he also declares that as soon 
as the Central American Republics have formulated an 
over-all regional development plan, and as soon as this 
plan has been evaluated favorably in accordance with 
the procedures established in the Charter of Punta del 
E.ste, the United States will enlarge and expand its 
participation in the fund and will work with the Cen- 









tral American countries in obtaining other Free Work 
resources so that the agreed plan can be effectivelj 

The Presidents have discussed the fundamental im' 
portance to economic development of a vigorous anc 
freely-competitive private sector, and declare then 
intention of taking the necessary steps to encouragt 
private investment which is prepared to accept th« 
normal responsibilities compatible with the develop, 
ment of a modern economy. These measures include 
establishment of regional trade and promotion offlcei 
for the specific purpose of attracting private foreigr 
investment. They also agree that development banki 
or corporations should be established in each countrj 
as soon as possible to provide credit on reasonable 
terms for the growth of private industry, the Presl 
dent of the United States offering financial assistance 
to their operation. 

Concurrently they agree that economic and socia* 
conditions should be created to assure labor of ai 
improved living standard through a better distributior 
of national income. Furthermore they agree to en- 
courage and support free democratic labor organiza- 
tions as a means of contributing toward greater worker 
participation in the common effort on behalf of thei 
general welfare. 

The Presidents also agree that opportunities shouWii 
be given to the people of Central America to build andi 
purchase their homes. There exist in Central Amer- 
ica national savings and loan institutions which have 
been assisted under the Alliance for Progress, and 
others are about to be created. In order to give fur- 
ther support for these national efforts, the Presidents 
of Central America suggest that a regional home 
loan department, which would be a secondary source 
of home mortgage funds, should be created as a di- 
vision within the Central American Bank for Eco- 
nomic Integration and the President of the Uniteii 
States agrees to offer technical and financial assistance! 
to it. 

The Isthmian Presidents indicate that Central 
American institutions should be strengthened as much 
as possible to enable them to play a major role in 
training the personnel who will be needed to put into 
effect the plans for integration of the Isthmus. A 
large part of the responsibility for training will de- 
volve on the Superior Council of Central American 
Universities (CSUCA). Recognizing, moreover, that 
trained manpower at all levels is needed for economic 
development, they agree to the proposal of the Presi- 
dent of the United States to establish a multi-million 
dollar scholarship fund for vocational training in agri- 
culture and in industry for young people of outstand- 
ing ability who can not afford the normal expenses of 
such training, to which the United States will offers 
substantial financial assistance. 

The Presidents note the primary role of coffee in thei 
economies of Central America and the importance of 
the International Coffee Agreement for the achieve- 
ment of stable and remunerative prices. 







They reiterate the intention of their governments to 
ully support the agreement so that it will serve as an 
ffeotive instrument to improve the earnings of export- 
ig countries from coffee and to promote their eco- 
omic development. 

Other primary commodity problems exist and the 
sthmian Presidents will hand to President Kennedy 
tudies (in these problems. 

President Kennedy agrees he will have them re- 
iewed immediately on his return to Washington. 

The Presidents, notwithstanding the fact that pres- 
nt conditions are favorable to undertake a solution 
f the economic and social problems of the Isthmus 
lircmgh .1oint action of the countries of the area, be- 
ovc that all of them are faced with an externally pro- 
nl;i'd political problem, which by its very nature can 
n; i>ril the exercise of representative democracy and 
<i- normal development of the plans in which their 
fspective governments are engaged to attain as rapidl.v 
s possible the highest levels of economic and social 
nstiee and to bring to full realization the plans for 

entral American integration. Consequently, the Pres- 
lonts declare that in order to carry out their programs 
or social and economic betterment, it is e.ssential to 
ei II force the measures to meet subversive aggression 
riginating in the focal points of Communist agitation 
•hich Soviet imperialism may maintain in Cuba or in 
ny other place in America. 

The Presidents note that the Council of the Orga- 
ization of American States is actively engaged in 
laintaining vigilance over tbe continued intervention 
f Slno-Soviet powers in this Hemisphere as requested 
y the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Min- 
sters.' They express special interest in early com- 
letion by the Council of the OAS of the studies on 
'astro-Communist subversion in the Hemisphere, and 
articularly in early action by the Council on recom- 
lendations to the governments for counteracting those 
ctivities in these areas. 

The Presidents agree that Ministers of Government 
f the seven countries should meet as soon as possible 
o develop and put into immediate effect common 
leasures to restrict the movement of their nationals 
and from Cuba, and the flow of materiel, propa- 
;anda and funds from that country. 

This meeting will take action, among other things, 
o secure stricter travel and passport controls, includ- 
ng appropriate limitations in pas.sports and other 
ravel documents on travel to Cuba. Cooperative ar- 

angements among not only the countries meeting here 
)ut also among all OAS members will have to be sought 
o restrict more efifectlvely not only these movements 
if people for subversive purposes but also to prevent 
usofar as possible the introduction of money, propa- 
ganda, materials, and arms, arrangements for addi- 
tional sea and air surveillance and interception within 
territorial waters will be worked out with special co- 
operation from the United States. 

' Ibid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270. 

In addition to these measures, a more rapid and com- 
plete exchange of intelligence information on the move- 
ment of people, propaganda, money and arms between 
Cuba and our countries is to be developed by the Meet- 
ing of Ministers. 

The Presidents voice their deep sympathy for the 
people of Cuba, and reaffirm their conviction that 
Cuba soon will join the family of free nations. The 
Presidents recall how, in 1959, the Cuban people were 
fired Vifith the hope of a purely Cuban revolution that 
was to bring them freedom and social justice ; honest 
government and free elections ; fair sharing of goods ; 
opportunities for all ; more schools and jobs, better 
health and housing, and constructive land reform not 
collectivization of the land. In sum. a progressive re- 
public which, in the words of Marti, would be "con 
todos y para todos". The Presidents declare that they 
have no doubt that the genuine Cuban revolution will 
live again, and its betrayers will fall into the shadows 
of history, and the martyred people of the oppressed 
isle of the Caribbean will be free from foreign Com- 
munist domination, free to choose for themselves the 
kind of government they wish to have, and free to join 
their brothers of the Hemisphere in the common under- 
taking to secure for each individual the liberty, dig- 
nity, and well-being which are the objectives of all free 

Finally the Presidents solemnly reaffirm their ad- 
herence to the principles established by the Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance of Rio de Janeiro, the Charter 
of the OAS, in the Act of Bogota and in the Charter 
of Punta del Este. 

March 19, 1963 


Ei Bosque, March 19 

White House press release (San JosS) dated March 19 

We celebrate here today a great victory, and 
that is a victory for the human spirit ; for these 
houses, these medical units, tliese books, are to- 
day freeing men and women from centuries of 
bondage and poverty which has imprisoned 
their capacity, their happiness, and their fu- 
ture, and I am proud, as a citizen of the United 
States, to be here in Costa Kica taking part in 
this great effort. 

As a citizen of a sister Eepublic, as a strong 
believer in the democratic faith, we take pride 
in the democracy of this Republic and the other 
Republics of this hemisphere, but we know that 
our enjoyment of freedom is not so much a gift 
from the past as a challenge for the future, not 

APRIL, 8, 1963 


so mucli a rewai'd for old victories but a goal 
for new struggles, not so much an inheritance 
from our forefatliers as an obligation to those 
of us who follow, for democracy is never a final 
achievement. It is a call to effort, to sacrifice, 
and a willingness to live and to die in its de- 

Every generation of the Americas has shaped 
new goals for democracy to suit the demands of 
a new age. These goals for today's America are 
summed up in the words Alianza para el Pro- 
greso. They call for an end to social institu- 
tions which deny men and women the opportu- 
nity to live decent lives. They call for a better 
standard of living for all of our citizens in order 
that they may produce and live up to their capa- 
bilities. They call for an end to the remnants of 
dictatorship in this hemisphere, and they call 
for an unyielding defense against all those who 
seek to impose a new tyranny in this hemisphere. 
They call, in short, for a recognition that no 
man's job is done until every man in this 
hemisphere shares an equal opportunity to pur- 
sue his hopes as far as his capacities will carry 
him. That is the commitment of this country 
and my own, and the commitment of our sister 

It is sometimes easy for us, living in our na- 
tions' capitals, to become disheartened about 
the nature of the struggle, but it is here with you 
in this project, sharing in your achievements, 
participating in your labors, that we renew our 
faith and determination to succeed, for in this 
project hundreds of people will move into 
decent housing. By October first of this year, 
almost 8,000 people will have moved into homes 
financed under the Alliance for Progress and 
built by the labor of the people of Costa Eica, 
and in every counti-y in this hemisphere similar 
housing programs must go forward. These 
medical units which we have seen are only a few 
of the 60 which will be in operation throughout 
Central America and Panama this year. They 
will provide 4 million medical examinations a 
year, reaching almost a third of the population 
of the isthmus. In them, doctors and nurses 
will bring modem medicine to our people who 
have had no protection against disability or 
disease, entering hundreds of villages where no 
doctor has been. Approximately 8,000 people 


in Costa Rica already have received treatment! 
imder these units. 

These books we have distributed to these chil- 
dren are a token of a massive program which 
will bring more than 2 million new schoolbooks 
to the children of Central America and Pan 
ama. With these books millions of children for 
the first time will have the tools to conquer lifi 
and make something of their future. 

Education, homes, jobs, health, security — 
those are the things for which this country 
stands. Those are the things in which the 
people of the United States strongly believe. 
Those are the things which together we must 
achieve for our people, and I want to assure 
you through the Alliance for Progress we will 
stand and work shoulder to shoulder in making 
this hemisphere an example of what democracjj 
can mean. 

Viva Costa Rica! Arriba Costa Rica! 

University of Costa Rica, Marcli 20 

White House press release (San JosS) dated March 20 

I would like first to present to you my col 
leagues from the United States Congress who 
have traveled with us on this voyage of the las) 
3 days, and I would like to have them meet you 

First, I would like to present the chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, th» 
former president of the University of Arkansas 
Senator [J. W.] Fulbright. 

I would like to present the leader of the op 
position in the United States Senate, but wr 
both agree that we love Costa Rica, Senatoi 
[Bourke B.] Hickenlooper. 

The chainnan of the Senate Subcommittee oi" 
Latin America of the Senate Foreign Relation! 
Committee, formerly dean of tlie University o: 
Oregon Law School, Senator Wayne Morse. 

Congressman [Armistead I.] Selden [Jr.]I 
who is chairman of the House Committer 
on Latin America, Congressman Selden o> 

And the Republican leader of that cormnittet 
in the House of Representatives, Congressmar 
William Mailliard. 

And the United States Ambassador [Ray 
mond Telles]. 

It is a great pleasure to leave Washington 
where I am lectured to by professors, to corn* 







to Costa Rica where I can speak to students. 

I think it is appi-opriate that the first speech 
\v any United States President to any student 
ludience in Latin America should take place 
it this center of learning in a nation so dedi- 
3ated to democracy, and I am honored that you 
iiave invited me here today. 

For the past 3 days the Presidents of seven 
A.merican nations have been grappling with the 
central question which faces this country, my 
3wn country, and my hemisphere, and that is 
whether, imder a system of political liberty, 
(ve can solve the economic problems that press 
upon our people. We are embarked upon a 
[jreat adventure together, and that is the task 
if demonstrating to a watching world that free 
lien can conquer the ancient enemies of man, 
ooverty, ignorance, and himger; of protecting 
freedom against those who would destroy it; 
' )f bringing hope to those who search for hope ; 
)f extending liberty to those who lack it. 

This is an immense task, filled with difficulty 
md hardship and danger, but you have been 
liven an opportunity to shape the destiny of 
nan which has been given to no other genera- 
ion in the last 2,000 years. And as a fellow 
.American, I know that you welcome that re- 
sponsibility and that opportunity. Wliat 
Franklin Eoosevelt said to the American people 
m the 1930's I say to you now : This generation 
jf Americans, your generation of Americans, 
has a rendezvous with destiny. I am confident 
that you will meet that rendezvous, for I can re- 
member my own country when it was quite 
different from our coimtry today. It was not so 
many years ago that I was a university student 
as you are now, and at that time only 1 in every 
10 American farms was electrified, half of the 
farmers in our Southland were tenant farmers 
and sharecroppers, thousands of families in the 
Tennessee Valley had cash incomes of less than 
$100 a year, and all this in addition to a great 
depression which threw 12 million men and 
women out of work and had 20 million Ameri- 
cans on relief — that in that time I was at the 

Then, mider the leadership of Franklin 

Eoosevelt, we carried through a great New 

iDeal for the United States. One progi-am 

after another brought an end to tenant farm- 

ing in the United States, electrified nearly eveiy 
farm in our country, transformed the poverty- 
ridden Tennessee Valley into one of the richest 
agricultural and industrial areas in the United 
States. It demonstrated in those great years 
the immense power of affirmative, free govern- 
ment, the power which adds the idea of social 
responsibility to individual liberty. 

The history of your country in the last years 
has demonstrated that same quality. And if 
the task of progress with freedom is more com- 
plex, more subtle, and more difficult than the 
promise of progi-ess without freedom, we are 
imafraid of that challenge. 

We are committed to four basic principles in 
this hemisphere in the Alliance for Progress. 
The first is the right of every nation to govern 
itself, to be free from outside dictation and coer- 
cion, to mold its own economy and society in 
any fashion consistent with the will of the 

Second is the right of every individual citi- 
zen to political liberty, the right to speak his 
own views, to worship God in his own way, to 
select the government which rules him, and to 
reject it when it no longer serves the need of a 

And third is the right to social justice, the 
right of every citizen to participate in the prog- 
ress of his nation. Tliis means land for the 
landless and education for those who are de- 
nied their education today in this hemisphere. 
It means that ancient institutions which per- 
petuate privilege must give way. It means that 
rich and poor alike must bear the burden and 
the opportunity of building a nation. It will 
not be easy to achieve social justice, but free- 
dom cannot last without it. 

And the fourth principle of the alliance is 
the right of every nation to make economic 
progress with modem teclinological means. 
This is the job, it seems to me, of all of us in 
this hemisphere in this decade, all of you who 
have the oppoi-tunity to study at this university, 
and that is, as I said at the begirming, to dem- 
onstrate that we can provide a better life for 
our people imder a system of freedom, to dem- 
onstrate that it is our adversaries who must 
build walls to hold their people in, who must 
deny their people the right not only of f i-eedom 

APRIL 8, 1963 


but economic advancement as well. It is no 
accident that this year in Cuba agricultural 
production will be 25 percent below what it 
was 5 years ago. The great myth of the 1950's 
was that through a system of communism it was 
possible to produce a better life for our people — 
through a denial of jsolitical freedom we could 
provide more material advances ; but the fifties 
showed us well, in China, the Soviet Union, 
Eastern Europe, East Berlin, and Cuba, that 
when you deny political and social freedom you 
also deny the right to advance economically. 

Gracms. I want to express the thanks of all 
of us to you for having us here today. Oc- 
casionally universities are regarded as dan- 
gerous places for presidents, and we are grate- 
ful to you for your warm welcome to all of 
us on this occasion. We also want to express 
our thanks to the people of Costa Eica. Every 
one of us will go home with the most profound 
impression of what a strong, vital people caii 
accomplish, and I think that this journey to 
Costa Kica has illuminated the minds of 180 
million people of what a great opportunity and 
privilege we have to be associated together in 
our common cause. Viva Costa Rica! Arriba 
Costa Rica! Muchas gracias. 


White House press release (San Jos^) dated March 20 

I want to express my very warm appi-eci- 
ation to all of you for your kindness to all of 
us who came from North America to this con- 
ference. I think we go back greatly heartened 
and encouraged by the conversations we have 
had, by the strong feeling of friendship which 
we felt across the table, and also by the reali- 
zation that althougli we face difficult struggles 
in this hemispliere and throughout tlie world, 
we are not alone and are accompanied on this 
voyage by fast friends. 

May I say, Mr. Presidents, that we leave here 
greatly encouraged because we recognize that 
you are committed to the same objectives wliich 
so involve us all, and that is the welfare of our 
people, particularly the people of our countries 
and the people of this hemisphere. We are 
joined together by nature, by a common inherit- 
ance, a common experience, a common convic- 


tion for the future, a common hope for the fu 
ture, and I think it is a source of great strength 
to meet here in the isthmus and in the Central! 
American Republics men who are committed 
to these same objectives, the preservation of 
freedom, in this decade of decision. 

Mr. Presidents, I know that we all recognize 
that, regardless of our own efforts, in the final 
analysis it depends upon the strength of our 
people, their vitality, their energy, their will 
ingness to assume the heavy burdens for great 
results, and I think it is this part of the trip 
which has been most striking. I recognize that 
the people of Costa Rica share an inheritance 
and a histoiy with the people of the other Cen 
tral American Republics and Panama; so we 
judge them by what we have seen here in Costai 

I must say, Islr. President, I know of no more 
vital, energetic, warmliearted, vigorous, hopeful 
people than the great citizens of this great de- 
mocracy. Tlie impression that we, all of us 
from the United States carry back is of the 
hands of friendship which have been extendec 
to us and the strong feeling that, while w( 
came in a sense as strangers 3 days ago, w( 
leave tonight as friends. 

So we say goodbye and many tlianks. 

flasta luego and Vii^a Costa Rica! 

U.S. Opposes Attacks on Cuba 
by Splinter Refugee Groups 

Following is a U.S. Government statement is 
sued ly the Department of State on March li 
regarding the reported Alpha 66 attack on i 
Soviet ship and on. Soviet install-ations in Cuba 
alleged to have happened on the night of Marc) 

Press release 144 dated March 19 

The United States Government is stronglj 
opposed to hit-and-run attacks on Cuba bj 
splinter refugee groups. It has stated repeat 
edly that such raids do not weaken the grip o' 
the Communist regime on Cuba — indeed thej 
may strengthen it. Nothing we have heard oi 
the latest incident changes our judgment on this 
matter. Rather it reinforces our belief thai 
these irresponsible and ineffective forays serv( 


to increase the difficulty of dealing with the un- 
satisfactory situation which now exists in the 

The United States GoTemment is investigat- 
ing fully to determine whether any violation of 
United States law is involved. 

of our own Government within the framework 
of tlie Alliance for Progress. It would be most 
regrettable if minor and unwarranted misimder- 
standings were to interfere with the strong and 
solid cooperation between the two largest de- 
mocracies of the Western Hemisphere. 

U.S. Regrets Misinterpretation 
of Statement on Brazil 

Statement hy Acting Secretary Ball 

Fress release 143 dated March 19 

Earlier this month the Department of State 
submitted a statement ^ regarding the political 
situation in Brazil to the House Subcommittee 
( )ii Inter- American Affairs. This statement was 
released last week. Its timing has given rise to 
speculation that it was intended to influence the 
course of the current financial talks with Bra- 
zilian Finance Minister San Tiago Dantas. 
This speculation is totally gi-oundless. 

The statement was released by the subcom- 
mittee as part of its hearings. The timing was 
independently determined by the subcommittee. 
The fact that the release occurred at the time of 
the Finance Minister's visit was totally 

It is unfortunate that one sentence from the 
statement should have been toni out of context 
and misinterpreted to suggest that Commmiists 
have a substantial influence on Brazilian Gov- 
ernment policy. The statement neither says nor 
implies this, nor is this the opinion of the United 
States Government. 

As President Kennedy has repeatedly empha- 
sized, Brazil occupies a key position in the 
Western Hemisphere and in the Western World. 
It is of tlie highest importance to both countries 
that the long and valued tradition of close and 
constructive collaboration between us be main- 
tained and strengthened. The resolution of the 
difficult issue of constitutional powers on the 
basis of the popular plebiscite of January 6 
gives promise that the Brazilian Government 
will be able to press forward effectively with a 
program for economic stabilization and develop- 
ment whicli can enlist the fruitful cooperation 

Admiral Smith Appointed Supreme 
Allied Commander, Atlantic 

White House press release dated March 12 

Tlie Nortli Atlantic Council on March 12 
appointed Adm. Harold Page Smith, United 
States Navy, as Supreme Allied Commander, 
Atlantic, to succeed Adm. Kobert L. Dennison. 

The Council was informed of the contents of 
a letter ^ from the President of the United 
States to the Secretary General of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 
Chairman of the Permanent Council, in which 
the President asked the member governments 
to agree to release Admiral Dennison, who will 
be placed on the retired list of the United States 
Navy on May 1, 1963. The Council agreed 
with great regret to release Admiral Dennison 
from his assignment as Supreme Allied Com- 
mander, Atlantic, a position which he has held 
since being appointed by the Council on Feb- 
ruai-y 29, 1960. They expressed to Admiral 
Dennison, in the name of the governments rep- 
resented on the Council, lasting gratitude for 
the distinguished service rendered by him. 

At the Council's request for the nomination 
of an officer of the United States Navy for ap- 
pointment by the Council as Supreme Allied 
Commander, Atlantic, the President nominated 
Admiral Smith for consideration by the Coun- 
cil as successor to Admiral Dennison. Admiral 
Smith is now serving as Commander in Chief, 
U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. 

The Council concurred in this nomination 
and on March 12 adopted a resolution appoint- 
ing Admiral Smith as Supreme Allied Com- 
mander, Atlantic, as successor to Admiral 
Dennison with the same powers and functions. 
The appointment is to become effective on April 
30, 1963. 

' Not printed here. 

' Not printed. 

APRIL 8, 1963 


The United Nations: Its Value to the United States 

Statement hy Adlai E. Stevenson 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ' 

Mr. Chairman and members of the commit- 
tee, I welcome this opportimity to report to you 
again on the work of the United Nations. 

As you know, the United Nations is a big 
subject, one which can be approached from 
many points of view. From one point of view it 
is a symbol of the aspirations of most of human- 
ity for peace, for decency and human dignity. 
From another point of view it is an institution 
of 110 members pioneering the arts of parlia- 
mentary diplomacy on a near-universal level. 
From still another, it is a very large operating 
mechanism performing such varied activities as 
stopping a war, spraying tropical villages with 
DDT to combat malaria, and draftmg a con- 
vention on some aspect of human rights. There 
is even a point of view — albeit it is a narrow 
one — from which the United Nations appears 
to be the symbol of wicked one-worldliness, a 
sinister threat to the national sovereignty, and 
a joint convention of international do-gooders 
and bobby-soxers. 

So, like a novelist approaching some univer- 
sal theme, anyone preparing to say or write 
something about the United Nations must 
somehow come to grips with his material, de- 
tennine his point of view, decide where to 
focus — what to put in and what to leave out. 
In the process, many arbitrary choices must be 

My arbitrary choice for this occasion, which 
I hope will meet with the committee's approval, 

' Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Organization Affairs of the Senate Committee on For- 
eign Relations on Mar. 13 (U.S./U.N. press release 
4159 dated Mar. 15). 


is to focus briefly but sharply on this question : 
How and to what extant does our membership 
in the United Nations serve the foreign policy 
interests of the United States of America ? Or, 
more crudely, Mr. Chairman, what's in it for 
us? I tliink this coincides with your assign- 

I make no apology to the most sensitive sup- 
porter of the United Nations for phrasing it 
that way. After all, if the very considerable 
effort and time and money which we have in- 
vested in the United Nations has not been a 
good investment from the U.S. point of view, 
then we should say so and behave accordingly — 
as, I feel sure, every other member does. 

Test of "What's in It for Us" 

I shall try to test this question of what's 
in it for us against two criteria : first, against 
the record of the 17th General Assembly, which 
had just over 100 items on its agenda; and sec- 
ond, against the roles of the U.N. in two of 
the greatest crises of recent history — the col- 
lapse of the Congo and the discovery of Soviet 
missile bases in Cuba. These are tough tests: 
One covers a virtual compendium of the on- 
going problems which beset the modern world; 
the other raises specific issues of peace and war 
in specific areas at specific times. 

But before coming to these two tests of how 
well or how badly our membership in the U.N. 
serves the national interest, it is worth while 
to pose a prior test: Is the United Nations 
relevant to the real world of the second lialf of 
the 20th century? For if the United Nations 
does not reflect the real world, it is imlikely 
to be able to do anything useful about it. 





^Vlint then are the dominant factors that 
nake the real world what it is in tlie second 
half of the 20th centiuy ? I think we can limit 
ourselves to brief mention of five dominant 
facts of life in our tumultuous times : 

Let me say, first is the great confrontation 
.Yliich goes under the name of the East-West 
onflict or the cold war — and the nuclear arms 
■ace which is its most dangerous manifestation. 
riiis has brought into conflict two sets of ideas 
ibout the value of human dignity which can- 
lot be bridged philosophically. It also has 
)iought into conflict two great and powerful 
lations whose national differences must be 
bridged politically if either is to survive. The 
iioceedings of the United Nations consistently 
■fllcct both aspects of this so-called East- West 

The second factor dominating contemporary 
listory is the revolutionary wave of national in- 
lependence which, in an incredibly short period, 
las brought political independence to nearly 1 
)illion people, leaving less than 2 percent of 
he former colonial peoples in dependent sta- 
us — an historic convulsion which perhaps 
ifl'ered communism its greatest opportunity to 
ibsorb vast areas of the world. The United 
N^ations has itself administered a number of 
these changes from dependent to independent 
status and is deeply involved with the difficult 
md emotional final stages of liquidating the 
lid colonial system and the race problems em- 
bedded in it. 

The third factor is the so-called "revolution 
jf rising expectations," which has put a spot- 
light on the glaring gap between the material 
conditions of the rich minority and the poor 
majority among the world's peoples. Some 85 
percent of the entire staffs of the U.N. system is 
occupied with the first systematic effort at inter- 
national cooperation in the field of economic and 
social affairs — certainly one of the great phe- 
nomena of contemporary times. 

Fourth is the fantastic pace of discovery and 
invention, which romps ahead oblivious to the 
political and social consequences and which 
makes the demands for a decent life for all a 
practical proposition for the first time in his- 
toiy. The United Nations is concerned increas- 
ingly with the complex and little-understood 

problems of how to transfer effectively science 
and technology from one cultural setting to 

Fifth is the fitful emergence of a restless, 
teeming, volatile, frequently quarrelsome open 
society of nation-states — a society of enormous 
diversity of cultui'es, races, and political, ec- 
onomic, and social systems. The United Na- 
tions is, of course, the institutional center of this 
open international society — partly the cause and 
partly the result of the forces which impel an 
interdependent world into more intimate associ- 
ation on an expanding agenda of political and 
human problems. 

If these are the principal factors which mold 
our times — the cold war, the liquidation of colo- 
nialism, the pervasive demand for a better ma- 
terial way of life, the thundering impact of 
science, and the emergence of a vast, new open 
society on the international plane — then we 
must conclude that the United Nations is in- 
deed relevant to these times, that it is part and 
parcel of the contemporary scene. And being 
relevant, it is in a position to be effective. 

Let us come, then, to the question of how 
effective, from our point of view. "Wliat's in it 
for us ? How, as the most recent example, does 
the record of the I7th General Assembly stand 
the test? 

How the Assembly's Record Stands the Test 

I said a moment ago that the agenda of the 
17th General Assembly was a virtual compen- 
dium of the ongoing problems of the modern 

Listen to this list of trouble spots and sore 
spots: the Congo, the Gaza Strip, Southern 
Rhodesia, South-West Africa, the Portuguese 
African territories, Kashmir, Yemen, West New 
Guinea, and the Arab refugee camps. 

Mark this string of contentious issues : Chi- 
nese representation, North Korea, Hungary, 
colonialism, troika, and sovereignty over natural 

Consider, if you will, this list of universal 
concerns: disarmament, nuclear testing, outer 
space, world food, world trade, world science, 
and the training of manpower for economic and 
social development. 

All of these issues, in one form or another. 

APRIL 8, 1963 


came before the United Nations for some kind 
of action during the last General Assembly, 
even if each one did not appear formally on the 
Assembly's agenda. Many of them are among 
the most complex, the most intractable, the most 
ancient troubles of the human race. And many 
come to the United Nations as a court of last 
resort — because nobody else has been able to 
cope with them at all. 

Obviously the United Nations did not "solve" 
all, or even many, of these problems; but it 
worked on them. On a few it took conclusive 
action ; on some it made progress, and on others 
it did not. 

We have made full reports on the record 
of the 17th General Assembly, item by item and 
vote by vote ; I shall not take your time to re- 
peat the record. The point to be made is simply 
this: The United States view was the majority 
view in over 80 percent of the 40 key votes cast 
in committees and full Assembly. On several 
issues we abstained, and on two extreme resolu- 
tions recommending sanctions against member 
states we voted against the majority. 

This is the measure of the extent to which 
our membership in the United Nations served 
the foreign policy interests of the United States 
across the spectrum of issues represented by the 
agenda of the 17th General Assembly. 

Meanwhile the impact of the twin crises in 
the Caribbean and the Himalayas raised our 
credit— and our credibility; had the opposite 
effect on the stock of the Soviet Union; ini- 
proved Western Hemisphere solidarity; acti- 
vated the members from NATO; and gave 
pause to those who tend to equate the lona fdes 
of the United States and the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Chairman, I am not saying for one mo- 
ment that the I7th General Assembly— or any 
other meeting or organ of the United Nations- 
was the handmaiden of the Department of 
State. I am not even saying that there were no 
disappointments or no cause for apprehension ; 
for example, we expect continuing fireworks 
over the hard-core cases in the remnants of 
European empires, and we are most gravely con- 
cerned at the lack of evidence of financial re- 
sponsibility on the part of all too many mem- 
bers. But I am saying, most emphatically, that 
in no case was United States interest damaged. 






in most cases our objectives were furthered in a. 
positive fashion, and m other cases we have rea- 
son to hope for a better result on another day. 
In short, it was veiy much in our national inter- 
est to be there, paying our considerable share \ 
of the cost and exercising our considerable share 
of the leaderehip. 

Role of U.N. in Congo and Cuban Crises 

The political problems before the General As- 
sembly tend to be those anguished issues which 
have roots in the past and drag on from year 
to year — so hardy or so virulent that some 
times our best efforts succeed only in keeping 
them from going from bad to worse. 

But now I should like to discuss two crises 
which had sudden beginnings, which directly 
and immediately involved the United Nations, 
and which now seem to be ended — at least in v 
the form in which they arose. I refer to thoselfe 
most dangerous events which raised the dire 
threat of great-power confrontation — and thus jj 
of nuclear war — in the Congo and the Carib- 
bean. The point is to ask in each case whether' 
the role of the United Nations in these crises' 
served the foreign policy interests of the Unitedl 

"WHiat were our aims in the Congo affair?* 
Our aims in the Congo are the same as our aims- 
for all of tropical Africa. They are quite simple- 
to state : to help create an area of truly free audi 
independent African states, safe from external, 
aggression or subversion, working out their owni 
destinies in their own way. cooperating withi 
each other and with those who wish to help ini 
their overwhelming task of progressive mod- 
ernization. In the Congo, as elsewhere, this re- 
quires national unity and a reasonable degree of 
political stability. 

Contrasted to this, the collapse of the CongO' 
in its first week of nationhood offered these sud- 
den prospects : national disunity, political chaos, 
civil disorder, social disintegration, and ex- 
ternal penetration — prospects made to order for 
Communist exploitation. And because of this, 
the ultimate prospect for the Congo was for the 
forces of the nuclear powers to find themselves 
face to face in the heart of central Africa in the 
infancy of independence — about as messy and 
dangerous a state of affairs as one can imagine. 



The story of the struggle of the United Na- 
tions — with unflagging support from this coun- 
try — to bring order out of cliaos in the Congo 
is too well known to members of this committee 
to review it here. I am all too conscious of every 
bit and every kind of criticism that has been 
leveled against this operation ; and it has been 
of every kind — from honest doubts about the 
legal basis for U.N. action to purple propa- 
ganda and outrageous lies. I also will state 
that in this unprecedented, almost fantastic 
operation, in any historical sense, some deci- 
sions were not perfectly coordinated, some oper- 
ations were not fully efficient, some judgments 
were not later justified, and a few actions were 
not excusable. My point is neither to tabulate 
the accomplishments nor to count the mistakes. 

My point is, rather, to look at the results and 
state that, as of today, civil war has been re- 
placed by national unity, political chaos has 
i been replaced by reasonable prospects for politi- 
cal stability, total disorder has been replaced 
by order, social disintegration has been replaced 
by an evolving program for social progress, and 
the scavengers have been sent home packing. 
None of this is yet guaranteed to be permanent. 
But this is what has happened in the Congo ; 
this is what the United States wanted to happen 
in the Congo ; and it could not have happened 
under any other auspices than that of the United 
Nations, without the certainty or at least the 
risk of international war. 

It therefore is difficult — indeed it is impossi- 
ble — to avoid the conclusion that the foreign 
policy interests of the United States have been 
served well by the United Nations performance 
in the Congo crisis, and this, of course, would 
have been out of the question without our mem- 
bership and our full support. I know no way 
of putting a dollar value on the restoration of 
peace in central Africa. 

The U.N. role in the Congo was, of course, 
an extremely large operational task, by far the 
largest it has ever undertaken, involving nearly 
20,000 troops from 21 nations, supported by a 
massive airlift and by hundreds of civilian tech- 
nicians recruited through a dozen international 

The U.N. role in the Cuban crisis was entirely 
different. Actually, the United Nations had 
three roles in the Cuban crisis, two of which 

were played out while the third was frustrated 
but nonetheless useful to us. Because the naval 
quarantine of Cuba was the first dramatic move 
in that crisis, and because of the critical part 
played by the Organization of American States, 
it is easy to forget how the United Nations fitted 
into the pattern of these supercharged days 
when the world stood at the edge of the abyss 
in late October. 

You will remember, of course, that the Presi- 
dent called into play at one stroke all the avail- 
able instruments of diplomatic action — United 
States militai-y power, the Organization of 
American States, the United Nations, and an 
appeal to public opinion around the world.^ 

The first role of the United Nations was to 
serve as a world forum where the facts could be 
laid on the table. Wlaen the Security Council 
met in emergency session, I was able to present 
the United States case not only to the members 
of that Council but to all other members of the 
United Nations who crowded that tense room, 
as well as to the press and the microphones and 
the cameras which carried our story to our own 
public and to every corner of the world reached 
by the mass media of today. Our case was 
right; our case was thoroughly documented; 
and our case was vastly strengthened as it un- 
folded before the bar of world opinion in the 
Security Council of the United Nations — the 
only bar of universal public opinion there is. 
Just how much this revelation of Soviet deceit 
and recklessness shocked the innocent by- 
standers in the cold war, I can't guess. Nor, of 
course, can I estimate how much this blow to 
confidence in Russia's word and influence 
among the new nations contributed to Mr. 
Khrushchev's decision to pull out quickly and 
make the best of a bad mistake. 

The second role of the United Nations — or, 
more precisely, of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations — was that of third party to the 
issue. At a critical moment, when the nuclear 
powers seemed to be set on a collision course, 
the Secretary-General's intervention led to the 
diversion of the Soviet ships headed for Cuba 
and interception by our Navy. This was an in- 
dispensable first step. The mere existence of 

^ For background, see Bulletin of Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 

AFKIL 8, 1963 

680174 — 63- 



an impartial office which could perform such a 
service in the middle of the night at such a time 
is no small asset to the human race. 

The third role of the United Nations in the 
Cuban crisis — the one which could not be played 
out — was that of an international inspector 
ready and willing to go at once to Cuba to 
verify the removal of the missiles. As we all 
know, Castro refused a United Nations presence 
on Cuban soil ; U Thant's visit was in vain, and 
thus Castro prevented a quicker and cleaner 
liquidation of the crisis. But the fact is that at 
the height of this most dangerous period of the 
postwar world, Chairman Khrushchev agreed 
— even proposed — an international inspection 
team under United Nations auspices, a pi-oposal 
to which we could quickly agree and which be- 
came part of the formula for disengagement 
between the United States and Soviet heads of 
state.^ And Castro's refusal of U.N. inspection 
converted a quarrel between the Soviet Union 
and the United States into a defiance of the 
United Nations by Cuba. 

Finally — and I won't detain you longer on 
this subject — the United Nations also provided 
a site where Mr. [John J.] McCloy and I could 
meet with Mr. [Vassily V.] Kuznetsov and the 
Soviet negotiators for those long weeks to con- 
clude the transaction and bring about the with- 
drawal of the Soviet bombers. 

Mr. Chairman, I should not care to speculate 
on how or when the Cuban crisis might have 
been resolved — or whether it could have been 
resolved — without the United Nations. But I 
do say that the United Nations played a large 
part in a complex exercise in diplomatic action 
which averted the threat of thermonuclear war; 
and for this I think we can thank our stars. 

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests Well Served 

Now, gentlemen, we have put the record of 
the United Nations at the I7th General As- 
sembly, during the Congo crisis, and during the 
Cuban crisis to the test ; and we have seen that, 
in very large measure, the performance of the 
U.N. served well the foreign policy interests of 
the United States. There was, indeed, much 
in it for us. 

' For texts of messages exchanged between President 
Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, see ibid., p. 741. 

But I should prefer, in the end, not to read 
that record as though it were a scoreboard on 
which "victories" and "defeats" are recorded. 
I prefer to avoid the specious habit of treating 
the course of human affairs — even the massive 
conflicts in world affairs — like some sporting 
event which ends when the timekeeper blows his ' 

The real world of international politics is, as 
you know, not that simple. We are dealing 
with fitful tides of history which ebb and flow. 
We are wrestling often with problems which, 
when solved in their immediate forms, promptly 
give rise to new forms and new problems — as 
witness the case of the Congo today. 

We can, of course, say with assurance that, 
in this case or that, our policies prevailed and 
our objectives were gained. We can point to 
objective proof of ])rogi-ess here and there. We 
can show that unfriendly moves by x and y were 
defeated or diverted, and that in all of these 
cases the United Nations had a useful part to 

But to form mature judgments as to the real 
value of the United Nations to the interests of 
the United States, it seems to me that we must 
raise alternatives, that we must ask questions 
which challenge tlie imagination to say what 
might have happened if the United Nations had 
not been there at all. For example : 

Would the Communists have fared better or 
worse in their efforts to divert the independence 
movement into a Communist mold — their su- 
preme opportunity to extend power — if the 
United Nations had not existed ? 

Would the prospects of peace be better or 
worse — in Iran, in Greece, in Korea, in Kash- 
mir, in the Middle East, in the western Pacific, 
in central Africa — if there had been no United 
Nations during the past decade and a half? 

Would United States foreign policy interests, 
more recently in tlie Congo and the Caribbean, 
have been served better or worse without a 
United Nations during the past few months? 

Could the United States put its ideas, its be- 
liefs, its policies before tlie watching world 
more — or less — effectively if the United Nations 
did not exist? 

I shall not attempt to speculate on these 
rather frightening alternatives for it seems to 
me tlie questions answer themselves. 



Opportunities for U.S. in an Open Forum 

But I should like to conclude my remarks 
with a few comments about the position of 
those who favor the United Nations in principle 
but want to withdraw or restrict our support 
on those relatively few occasions when the 
United States finds itself in a minority position. 

The basic point here, of course, is that the 
United States does not own or control the 
United Nations. It is not a wing of tlie State 
Department. We are no more and no less than 
the most influential of the 110 members. If we 
were less, we would be failing to exert the in- 
fluence of freedom's leader; if we were more, 
we would destroy the effectiveness of the U.N., 
which depends precisely on the fact that it is 
not an arm of the United States or of any other 
government but a truly international organiza- 
tion — no better or worse than the agreements 
which can be reached by the controllmg majori- 
ties of its members. 

Before such agreements are reached — or not 
reached — debate and negotiation bare differ- 
i ences and reveal similarities which frequently 
lead to accommodation and compromise. And 
I would ask : Is this not the heart of the demo- 
cratic method? Is this not the parliamentary 
system in action ? Is this not our own idea of 
how we are most likely to make more wise de- 
cisions than foolish ones — how the weak are 
most likely to be protected from the strong — 
how the will of the majority and the rights of 
the minority can both find expression without 
injustice to either? 

The answer to these questions is yes. And 
if we were to pick up our marbles and go home 
whenever there is a disappointment, we would 
not only destroy the effectiveness of the U.N. 
but would abandon hope that nations can work 
out their problems most of the time by the same 
methods by which conflicting interests get re- 
solved within democratic nations and commu- 
nities. This would deny on the international 
level the principles, methods, and tecliniques 
which we swear by on the national and local 

Even faith in our kind of institutions would 
not, however, be enough to justify support for 
the United Nations if it worked against us. 
But this dilemma, happily, does not exist, and 
the record proves it. The fact is that the story 

of the last General Assembly, when the U.S. 
position was the majority position better than 
four times out of five, is the standard story of 
successive Assemblies over the past 17 years. 
The fact is that in 17 years the Soviet Union 
has never once — never once — succeeded in build- 
ing a majority for any proposition of substance 
against the opposition of the United States. 
And the fact is that in 17 years the United 
States has never felt obliged to exercise its veto 
in the Security Council to protect its interest, 
and the Soviet Union has used the veto 100 

That's the record, and there is, of course, a 
fundamental reason for it. The reason should 
be recalled frequently, for in this fact lies one 
of our greatest assets in the world today : the 
fact that the foreign policy interests of the 
United States are generally in hannony with 
the foreign policy interests of all nations which 
want to see a peaceful community of independ- 
ent states working together, by fi-ee choice, to 
improve the lot of humanity. And since the 
majority of the nations of the world share this 
goal, the majority consistently side with the 
United States — or we side with them, depending 
on your point of view — when the roll is called 
and the yeas and nays are counted. It's as 
simple as that. 

But let us take a couple of blemishes in the 
record and the performance of the U.N. and 
its members — the kind of blemishes that lead 
some of our people who favor the U.N. in prin- 
ciple to want to restrict it in practice. 

First, take a case where the United States 
could not agree with a majority of the decision- 
making group in a U.N. agency. A recent case 
was the one that you referred to in your open- 
ing statement, Mr. Chairman, of the decision 
of the United Nations Special Fund to help fi- 
nance an agricultural research project in Cuba. 
We objected to that project and still do.* Yet 
the whole story is that out of 288 projects as- 
sisted by that Fund, in the course of its exist- 
ence, we approved of 287. So we face a choice : 
Should we retaliate by withholding or limiting 
our support, for an agency which we invented, 
which has allocated 97 percent of its funds to 
nations which we ourselves are aiding, and 

' For background, see ibid., Mar. 11, 1963, p. 357. 

APRIL 8, 1963 


which represents an economical way for the 
United States to contribute to the Decade of 
Development, because in 1 instance out of 288 
instances we were unable to persuade a majority 
that our view was the correct one ? 

Let me refer also to a situation which seems 
to agitate some of our people — the fact that the 
Soviet Union does not make the voluntary con- 
tributions which it is well able to make to such 
programs as technical assistance, malaria eradi- 
cation, the World Food Program, and so forth. 
Their delinquency is deplorable but understand- 
able from their point of view. These programs 
do not serve Communist ends ; on the contrary. 
So it is hardly surprising that the Soviet Union 
makes little or no voluntary contributions to 
agencies whose work cuts straight across their 
own objectives. But should we support these 
programs less because they fail to win applause 
from the Kremlin? 

As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I rather 
suspect that the Soviet Union and other Com- 
munist coimtries will tend to participate — and 
contribute — somewhat more in the work of these 
agencies in the years to come. There is some 
evidence of that already. And I think that the 
reason is clear. Tlie policy of self-ostracism 
from the specialized agencies has not worked 
well for the Soviet Union, even though it has 
made life with them a bit easier for us. 

If this in fact happens, it will raise some day- 
to-day problems for us, but, in my view, it also 
will raise problems for them and opportunities 
for us. For while the so-called Communist 
states operate more or less closed societies at 
home, once they step out into a United Nations 
forum they enter an open society. 

In an open forum, over a period of time, ide- 
ology becomes transparent, dogma wears thin 
and becomes tiresome, and the myth of the mag- 
ical solution evaporates slowly in the free air of 
a marketplace of ideas. There is contention in 
all this; there is fnistration and the stuff of 
headlines ; there is danger that the fearful and 
the insecure will want to withdraw from the 
free interplay of conflicting ideas and concepts 
and terminology — especially if, now and again, 
things do not go exactly the way we would like 
them to. 

Yet it is we who do best in the open forum, 
for this is our natural habitat. And if we have 


the nerve to go ahead, if we have the stomach 
for the test of the open society, if we have the 
courage to build even that which is not perfect 
from our point of view, I can foresee nothing 
but a more meaningful dialog coming out of 
it, a gradual erosion of tension, and finally the 
dominance of a set of ideas which are better — 
and better able also to stand the test — than the 
Marxist ideas as revealed to his successors. 

All this would require, on our part, a degree 
of responsibility, of restraint, of maturity, and 
of political sophistication which never before 
has been demanded of a democratic public and 
its elected representatives. It will not be easy, 
and it will not be without temporary disap- 
pointments; and I, for one, have no doubt of 
the outcome — for this, too, would serve and 
serve well the foreign policy interests of the 
United States of America. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed below) mat/ be consulted at depository libraries in 
the United States. U.N. printed publications may be 
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na- 
tions, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Letter dated January 22, 1963, from the Secretary- 
General to the President of the Security Council 
transmitting a General Assembly resolution on the 
situation in Angola. S/5239. January 29, 1963. 3 

General Assembly 

Report of the Subcommittee on the Situation in An- 
gola. A/5286. November 14, 1962. 88 pp. 
United Nations Conference on Consular Relations: 
Collection of bilateral consular treaties. A/- 

CONF.2.5/4. November 12, 1962, 271 pp. 
Guide to the draft articles on consular relations 
adopted by the International Law Commission. 
A/CONF.25/0. January 8, 1963. 170 pp. 
Chapter II of the report of the International Law 
Commission covering the worii of its 13th session, 
containing the text of draft articles on consular 
relations and commentaries adopted by the Com- 
mission at that session. A/CONF.25/6. January 
8, 1963. 40 pp. 
Letter dated December 10 from the permanent repre- 
sentative of the Soviet Union to the Secretary-Gen- 
eral transmitting a letter from the North Korean 
regime and a document of the North Korean Min- 
istry of Foreign Affairs entitled "On the Criminal 
Acts Committed by the U.S. Army in Korea." A/- 
C.1/884. December 10, 1962. 33 pp. 


The United Nations Role in Political Disputes 

hy Joseph J. Sisco 

Director, Office of United Nations Political Affairs '■ 

Secretary Kusk said recently,- "We tend to 
forget so much — and so fast. Nowadays there 
are those who seem to think that . . . tlie 
United Nations is a fanciful exercise for those 
who wish to talk somewhat idly about a world 
which has not and camiot come into existence. 
In truth, a central issue of the cold war is the 
(United Nations itself — its charter, its concept 
of a decent world order, its commitment to 
ipeaceful settlement of disputes, its concern for 
himian rights, the expansion of trade, economic 
and social progress, and our deepest aspirations 
toward a disarmed and peaceful world." 

Because world order does not exist at a time 
when world interdependence has become a real- 
ity, the United Nations is not a "fanciful exer- 
cise" but an indispensable necessity. 

All of us, I believe, accept the fact that there 
are no absolute answers to the agonies and 
searchings of our time. The process of giving 
flesh to the bones of the United Nations Charter 
has been going on for 17 years, and the mil- 
lennium is obviously not just around the comer. 
This is scarcely a matter for surprise or dis- 
couragement. No more arduous task — no more 
necessary task — has ever been undertaken by 
mankind in recorded histoiy. For as President 
Kennedy has said : ^ 

. . . arms alone are not enough to keep the peace : 
it must be kept by men. Our instrument and our hope 
is the United Nations. . . . We may not always agree 

' Address made before the 13th Annual Conference of 
National Organizations, called by the American Asso- 
ciation for the United Nations at Washington, D.C., on 
Mar. 11 (press release 120 dated Mar. 8). 

' Bulletin of Mar. 18, 1963, p. 393. 

" IMd., Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159. 

with every detailed action taken by every officer of the 
United Nations, or with every voting majority. But as 
an institution it should have in the future, as it has 
had in the past since its inception, no stronger or more 
faithful member than the United States of America. 

Regrettably, an assessment of the United Na- 
tions in terms of U.S. national interests has been 
obscured or distorted by both ardent friends 
and implacable foes, by those who feel the U.N. 
does too little and those who feel it does too 

What I say here today is not intended to pro- 
vide ammunition for either enthusiastic friend 
or hard-bitten foe. My hope is that you will 
find in my words a dispassionate summing up 
of both the capacities and limitations of the 
United Nations, for above all the United Na- 
tions is a human institution reflecting both the 
strengths and weaknesses of mankind. 

Scope of the United Nations 

The scope of the United Nations today is 

In the Middle East the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency continues to feed and clothe 
over a million refugees. The United Nations 
Emergency Force patrols daily the armistice 
demarcation lines. The United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization copes with touchy in- 
cidents which could spark into broader con- 
flagrations. A representative of the Secretary- 
General, the distinguished American Dr. Ralph 
Bunche, is exploring ways to help ease relation- 
ships between the new Yemen Arab Republic 
and its neighbors. 

In the Far East the United Nations tem- 

APEIL 8, 1963 


porary executive authority is helping to assure 
peaceful transfer of West New Guinea from 
the Dutch to Indonesian administration, prior 
to arrangements being made by Indonesia and 
the U.N. for the exercise of self-determination. 
A representative of the Secretary-General is 
actively engaged in easing relations between 
Thailand and Cambodia. U.N. observers in 
Kaslimir continue to police the cease-fire lines. 

In Africa United Nations "presences" are 
important elements of stability, in addition to 
the organization's key role in the Congo. 

The United Nations has an economic com- 
mission in Europe, in Latin America, in the Far 
East, and in Africa. There are 53 resident rep- 
resentatives, prunarily in underdeveloped areas, 
providing essential technical and administra- 
tive guidance. 

The United Nations is not a substitute for 
policy. It is an organization in which the 
United States pursues its national interests 
through peaceful means. 

This is a familiar theme to you. Let us use 
this measuring rod to determine how well the 
U.S. came out in three ways: first, at the 
recently concluded I7th session of the General 
Assembly; secondly, during the Cuban crisis; 
and thirdly, in connection with the United 
Nations Operation in the Congo. 

Restraint and Reason in 17tli G.A. 

Eestraint and reason, for the most part, pre- 
vailed in the I7th General Assembly of the 
United Nations. A recently completed tabu- 
lation of the voting on 29 key issues before the 
Assembly shows that the majority coincided 
with the United States position 22 times. Of 
the total votes compiled, more than twice as 
many coincided with the U.S. vote as coincided 
with the Soviet bloc. 

For those who fear that the United States 
is being submerged within the huge voting blocs 
of the present 110-nation U.N., a brief look at 
some of the key results of the 17th Assembly 
is worth while. 

The Assembly elected U Thant Secretary- 
General for a full term. The troika never got 
out of the barn, and the Soviets were forced 
to rein in their attempt to get a veto over the 
U.N. Secretariat. 

The World Court's opinion was accepted by 
an overwhelming majority, thereby making 
payment of the Congo and Middle East peace- 
keeping expenses obligatoiy for member states. 
But we must guard against optimism. This 
was an important action but only a preliminary 
bout won ; the main decision will have to come 
at the special Assembly session on finances in 
May of this year. Collective financial responsi- 
bility — or lack of it — can mean the difference 
between an effective and ineffective United 
Nations. It can mean the difference between a 
conference-type U.N. and one with real execu- 
tive and peacekeeping capacities. "The U.S. 
position on any possible future contribution 
above our regular scale assessment for peace- 
keeping operations will be decisively influenced 
in the months ahead by the financial support 
which other members of the United Nations 
actually provide." * 

The Chinese representation vote came out 
even better than last year. 

A resolution reafiinning the United States 
position on Korean unification was again 

The Assembly asked the Secretary-General 
to establish a U.N. presence in South-West 

The Assembly once again endorsed our posi- 
tion on Himgary ; it has called upon the Secre- 
tary-General to take a hand in the matter. 

Under the general umbrella of the Decade of 
Development, the Assembly asked for a study 
of a proposed U.N. institute for training and 
research in U.N. operations, called a U.N. con- 
ference to study problems of international 
trade and development, affirmed the importance 
and the legal rights of private investment in 
developing countries, and passed a resolution 
on population which was at once liistoric in its 
recognition of the problem and moderate in its 
proposals for dealing with it. 

These results are on the plus side of the 
ledger. But we must face frankly that on 
colonial issues we frequently favored more mod- 
erate recommendations than some adopted by 
the Assembly. The preoccupation of the U.N. 
with colonialism, understandable as it may be, 

* For text of a statement released by the U.S. Mission 
to the U.N. on Mar. 6, see Hid., Mar. 25, 1963, p. 443. 



is of course also exploited by the Soviet Union. 

But it must be recognized that the basic prob- 
lems ai-ising from the breakup of old colonial 
patterns are, for the most part, ones which the 
Tnited States would have to face whether or 
not there wei'e a United Nations. The United 
States launched and has long been committed 
to the principle of self-determination. As a 
leader of the free world, it has a legitimate in- 
terest in orderly progress toward self-govern- 
ment. The fact that this progress is faster and 
less orderly in some cases than we would desire 
is perhaps inherent in the present irresistible 
drive for independence. This drive does not 
originate in the United Nations. "VVliile the ex- 
istence of the United Nations probably helps 
intensify the drive for self-determination, it 
also has provided a valuable safety valve as well 
as a restraining brake. And the existence of 
United Nations machinery has eased the pain- 
ful shift from old, established patterns with a 
minimum of disturbance and disorder in most 

The end of traditional colonialism is in sight. 
But among the problems which remain are 
some of the toughest ones. Nevertheless, the 
impact of the colonial issue can be expected to 
diminish befoi-e too long. "Wliere the West is 
able to take a position that is responsive to the 
basic objectives that the Africans and the 
Asians deem important, we can influence them 
toward moderation. 

The Cuban Crisis 

Let me turn to the Cuban crisis. 

The Cuban crisis demonstrated the utility of 
the various diplomatic instruments available to 
the United States in a crisis. Coordination of 
national action, bilateral diplomacy, regional 
arrangements, and the United Nations system 
marked the handling of the crisis throughout. 

The United Nations was important in three 
ways : as a forum for exposing Soviet duplicity 
and enlisting diplomatic support ; as an effective 
instrumentality for international conciliation 
and a defuser of the crisis; and as an in- 
stitution willing and able on short notice to 
serve as inspector to verify the removal of the 
offensive weapons and to guard against their 

President Greets Conference 
of National Organizations 

FoUoicing is the text of a letter from Presi- 
dent Kennedy to Clark M. Eichelberger, execu- 
tive director of the American Association for the 
United Nations. 

White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla.) dated 
March 16, for release March 17 

Makch 7, 1963 

Dear Mr. Eichelberger : Please extend my 
greetings and good wishes to each of the dele- 
gates to the Thirteenth Annual Conference of 
National Organizations and to the organizations 
they represent, including the American Associa- 
tion for the United Nations which is sponsoring 
this important meeting. 

It is good that you are getting a progress re- 
port on the first year of the United Nations 
Decade of Development. Few activities can 
equal in importance those which are related to 
helping men and women around the world to 
acquire the skills and organizations — of govern- 
ment and of business — which are needed not 
only to improve the standards of living but also 
to lift up the quality of life. It is the well- 
established policy of our government to aid such 
efforts, through the United Nations and through 
other appropriate channels. 

I note that the American Association for the 
United Nations is now celebrating its fortieth 
anniversary of work in behalf of organizations 
standing for hope, and decency, and the rule of 
law in the affairs of nations : at first the League 
of Nations and now the United Nations. But 
the fact that there is now wide public acceptance 
and support of the United Nations does not mean 
that your jobs of education and of provoking 
discussion are finished. Many unresolved prob- 
lems still face the United Nations. One of the 
thorniest is that of financial responsibility ; an- 
other is that of maintaining a truly international 
civil service. 

Finally, may I join you in your tribute to 
Eleanor Roosevelt? Time will not tarnish the 
luster of her legacy to us, nor will future genera- 
tions forget her tireless work and selfless devo- 
tion to the highest concept of human rights. May 
the memory of her life continue to bring inspira- 
tion to men and women in every land. 

John F. Kennedy 

Ambassador Stevenson's speeches in the Se- 
curity Council, together with the photographs 
and explanations to the delegations, presented 
incontrovertible evidence of the presence of So- 

APRIL 8, 1963 


viet offensive weapons in a dramatic and effec- 
tive way. In addition the United Nations 
provided a forum in which the American Re- 
publics could impress on the world and on the 
Secretary-General their solidarity on this issue. 
This public exposure in the United Nations 
was one factor — and I do not contend it was the 
most important factor — for what followed. 
Shortly thereafter Chairman Khrushchev ad- 
mitted the presence of offensive weapons in 
Cuba and agreed to withdraw them. 

The Secretary-General was an effective go- 
between, especially during the early days. His 
intervention on the second day of the Security 
Council debate, at the request of a large num- 
ber of United Nations representatives, helped 
defuse the crisis and led to the cooling-off 
formula under which Soviet ships stayed away 
from the interception area. This was a classic 
example of the use of the United Nations as a 
third-party instrumentality. 

The readiness of the U.N. to provide on-site 
inspection in rapid order, after Khrushchev 
had agreed, attests further to its utility in this 
crisis. This did not succeed, of course, because 
Castro would not permit U.N. inspection on 
Cuban soil, but the rejection helped to under- 
score that the dispute was not only one between 
Cuba and the Organization of American 
States but also one between Cuba and the 
United Nations. 

In short, the United Nations proved useful 
in a big-power dispute — in an issue of peace 
and war. 

The Congo Crisis 

Now I turn to the third test, the Congo. 

Today, after 2i/^ years of difficulties and 
frustrations, reasonable quiet has returned to 
the Congo. I believe the conclusion is inescap- 
able. The United Nations Operation in the 
Congo has served the national interest of the 
United States. 

It has helped to maintain a free, moderate 
government for the Congo as a whole. 

It has warded off dangers of civil war. 

It has helped avoid direct great-power inter- 
vention which could have resulted in American 
forces fighting in the Congo. 

It has ended secession from the left and from 

the right and has spiked the ambitions of the 
Communists to establish a base in the heart of 
central Africa. 

I believe history will prove that the decision 
made by the Eisenhower administration in the 
summer of 1960 and reaffirmed by President 
Kennedy subsequently to support a U.N. peace- 
keeping operation was the correct one. Surely 
those who are critical of the decision to support 
the United Nations in the Congo would not have 
preferred the direct use of American military 

Most Americans recognize the merit in these 
arguments, yet a number of specific questions 
about the Congo are still raised. 

First, as to its legality. The U.N. operation 
is and was a legal operation. The United! 
Nations was asked to come in by the Govern- 
ment of the Congo. Moreover, the military 
actions taken by the United Nations Force were' 
pursuant to the mandate laid down by the' 
Security Council. The fighting which occurred' 
this past December was initiated by the Katan 
gese; the actions taken by the United Nations 
were in self-defense and in the exercise of free- 
dom of movement throughout the Katanga. 

Moreover, the United Nations action did not 
constitute intervention in the internal affairs of 
the Congo. The situation there was clearly a 
threat to international peace and security be- 
cause of the actual or potential involvement of 
outside powers. It was in this kind of situation 
that the Government of the Congo asked for 
United Nations help. 

There are those who have felt that in the 
Congo we somehow turned our back on the 
traditional United States support for the 
principle of self-determination. This is cer- 
tainly not the case. Too few people realize 
that Tshombe [Moise Tshombe, President of 
Katanga Province] could not pretend to 
speak for all of the Katanga. As leader of 
the Lunda tribe, his main support resided in 
South Katanga. In the north he has been 
strongly opposed by the Baluba tribe. 
Tshombe's party gained only 25 in a 60-seat 
Assembly in the only popular election ever held 
in the Katanga. He received less than a 
majority in the Katanga Parliament. Support 
which he has received during the past 21/2 years 



las been from a rump parliament lacking full 
Baluba representation. 

And it is wortli repeating that Tshombe him- 
self agreed to the concept of a single Congolese 
5tate at the Brussels roundtable conference of 
January 1960. At the Kitona conference he 
did so again. In accepting tlie Thant concili- 
ation plan, he once more opted for a unified 

All of these are important facts since they 
relate to questions which are being asked fre- 
quently by Americans. 

Looking Ahead in the Congo 

But now we must look ahead to the important 
task of reconstruction and reconciliation. As 
Assistant Secretary Cleveland reported recently 
to President Kennedy, the Congo remains a 
paradox — staggering problems in the present 
and impressive prospects in the future.^ The 
United Nations can play a role which no single 
nation could play alone without compromising 
Congolese independence and making the Congo 
a subject of cold- war controversy. 

As it enters the reconstruction phase of its 
young life, the Republic of the Congo faces 
three key obstacles to progress: 

First, regrettably it still has an underde- 
veloped political system which is not yet able to 
take vigorous, executive action which will make 
itself felt throughout the territorial confines of 
the Congo. 

Secondly, it is maintaining an expensive mili- 
tary establishment which needs more training 
before it can assmne a progressively greater 
share of the problem of maintaining law and 
order in all the provinces of the Congo. In the 
absence of U.N. forces an internal security 
vacuum could result, inviting outside meddling. 

Thirdly, the Congo has a financial adminis- 
tration which collects much less revenue than 
it needs and than it could. 

More than on external aid, success in the 
reconstruction effort in the Congo depends on 
developing the administrative fiber to train the 
national army, get the fiscal system under con- 
trol, and construct a political system featuring 

° For a summary of the report, see ibid., Apr. 1, 1963, 
p. 481. 

a strong executive. If these prerequisites can 
be met, the Congo should not be a burden on its 
friends for long, because its resources are great. 

'WHiat is needed now is an agenda for recon- 
struction in the Congo, including as one part 
the tying up of the loose ends of Katanga's rein- 
tegration. The U Thant plan for peaceful re- 
integration of Katanga has been partly fulfilled 
and partly bypassed by the events of last De- 
cember and this past January. 

A de facto federalism is actually developing 
in the Congo. 

The integration of the currency, as envisaged 
in the U Thant plan, is well underway. 

The Katanga gendarmerie are being slowly 
integrated into the national Congolese army, 
but much more needs to be done. 

Katanga's "foreign affairs" establishment re- 
mains to be eliminated. 

The executive amnesty already announced for 
Tshombe and his colleagues is in effect. 

We hope a training program for the Con- 
golese armed forces under the aegis of the 
United Nations can get started at a reasonably 
early date. It should be possible to reduce the 
United Nations Force level rather quickly so 
that the financial drain on the United Nations 
can be reduced. 

Inflation is a serious problem in the Congo 
largely because governmental expenditures ex- 
ceed revenues despite the growing production 
and rising exports. For every franc taken in 
by the Central Government last year, the Gov- 
ernment spent nearly five. Nothing less than 
a well-financed, well-coordinated, and well- 
staffed stabilization program, pursued with res- 
olution and resourcefulness, will avoid the 
runaway inflation which could bring serious 
political trouble to the Congo. 

We believe other members of the United Na- 
tions, as well as ourselves, can do much. The 
Congolese Government recognizes it needs the 
assistance of a number of other coimtries. The 
presence in the Congo's future of large and 
small contributors requires the multilateral co- 
ordination of bilateral efforts, both in retain- 
ing the national army and in stabilizing the de- 
velopment of the Congolese economy. In this 
regard we believe the U.N. has an important 

APRIL 8, 1963 


This is tlie United Nations story in the Congo, 
past and future. The situation is better, but 
risks and uncertainties remain. And I like to 
think, too, that the 31-month Congo crisis may 
well have brought Africa of age. 

In July 1960 Africa was hurtling toward na- 
tional independence. Colonialism evoked deep 
stirrings. In some quarters the Soviet Union 
was regarded as a friend of Africa, or at least 
a force that could be safely used to one's ad- 
vantage. Leftist politicians like Patrice Lu- 
mumba were able to secure wide followings. 

The Congo's grim ordeal has helped to change 
some of this. It has impressed upon the Afri- 
can consciences some valuable and lasting les- 
sons which tliey are the first to acknowledge. 

The fact that unprepared independence is not 
in anyone's best interest was perhaps the most 
vivid, single lesson of the Congo. Evidence 
that this lesson was learned, at least by some 
leaders in Africa, came midway in the Congo 
experience, when Ewanda and Bunmdi achieved 
independence in circumstances quite different 
from the Congo. A U.N. presence there helped 
ease the birth pangs. 

More and more African nations are learning 
to make the distinction between colonialism, on 
the one hand, and legitimate foreign investment 
on the other. 

Efforts to proclaim a rigid U.N. deadline for 
total independence everywhere could not muster 
majority support in tlie last Assembly. 

There are also some signs at the United Na- 
tions of a new appreciation of the neocolonial- 
ism which the Soviet imperialist system and 
doctrinaire dogma represent. More and more 
Soviet colonialism is being denounced at the 
United Nations. 

Moreover, it is significant that the United 
States emerged from the Congo with solid Afri- 
can support. The United States' key role in 
unifying the Congo has by no means been over- 
looked by the Africans. Soviet refusal to sup- 
port the United Nations effort by contrast has 
also been an eye opener. 

None of this is true without exception evei-y- 
where in Africa. Communism has not thrown 
in the sponge, nor have all Africans shaken off 
the effects of past mistreatment. However, a 
decade of gi'owth has been concentrated, ad- 
mittedly painfully, into 21/^ tumultuous years. 

Report to Senate Committees 4| 

I wisli to bring to your attention a few ob- 
servations made in a report submitted recently 
to the Senate Foreign Eelations and Appropria- 
tions Committees by Senators [Albert] Gore 
and [Gordon] Allott after their participation 
at tlie 17th General Assembly as members of the 
United States delegation. The report includes 
three significant points regarding United 
States participation in the United Nations. 

In the first place, our view of the world makes it In* 
escapable that we should maintain the position "that 
the first principle of a free system is an uutrammeled 
flow of words in an open forum." . . . This tedium 
and palaver, which characterizes U.N. procedures, is 
at once its most exasperating aspect and its saving 

Secondly, the United States regards the U.N. as at 
least potentially the best available multilateral instru- 
ment for preserving the peace, not only between the 
great powers, but also in superficially less important 
areas — especially where the great powers might feel 
impelled to intervene. In keeping with this aim, our 
country also labors at the United Nations in an effort 
to damp down explosive forces which might easily in- 
volve free world members in oiien conflict with one 
another. Unfortunately, this policy often has the by- 
product of making it seem that the United States is 
heavily absorbed in essentially negative tasks, no mat- 
ter how desirable their outcome. 

Thirdly, the United States regards tlie United Na- 
tions as an educational device of great value. . . . the 
mere act of participating in the deliberations of the 
United Nations tends to educate the delegates from 
non-Western societies in concepts favoring our view 
of the world community. 

Tlie report goes on to say that 

... it is easy to assess the U.S. position as being 
far more defensive and static than is really the case. 
This is particularly true at times when the Commu- 
nist states, which by definition can accept only a 
totalitarian world community, step up their trouble- 
making and their attacks on the procedures and or- 
ganization of the United Nations. Rather than seeing 
these attacks as a measure of the success of U.S. 
policy in influencing the United Nations to reflect our 
concepts, some of our citizens appear to believe that 
the U.N. is wide open to Communist influence. 

With full recognition of the problems involved . . . 
it is nevertheless clear that there could be diminishing 
public approval for the U.N. in this country unless 
these factors are made more comprehensible to our 
citizens. This continues to be especially true with 
respect to the United Nations operation in the Congo. 

These observations are of direct interest to 
your association. 




I have one tinal thought. It might be well to 
•ecall that the Founding Fathers of our great 
lation took upon themselves the responsibility 
'or the creation of a new and independent state 
>n American soil. They did so in finn trust 
n the future and with firm belief in the basic 
lecency of man. In that spirit, they managed 
o M-eld togetlier in one nation people from 
nany nations. In its belief for freedom and in 
ts hope for world unity the Charter of the 

United Nations expresses an approach to the 
political problems of man which would have 
been well understood by men like Jefferson and 

Aristotle said that the end of politics must 
be the good of man. Man's greatest good and 
greatest present need is to establish world peace. 
Without it, the democratic enterprise — one 
might even say the human entei'prise — will be 
utterly, fatally doomed. The United Nations 
is striving to achieve such a peace. 

The United Nations Financial Crisis 

hy Richard N. Gardner 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Ajfairs ^ 

It is a singular privilege to be able to address 
;his amiual conference. I do not say this out of 
mechanical courtesy but from a deep apprecia- 
tion of the work which all of you are doing to 
promote understanding and support around the 
country for U.S. policy in the United Nations — 
work which I have had an opportunity to ad- 
mire at first hand on several occasions during 
the last year. 

My admiration for your work has grown with 
the progress of this conference. You have or- 
ganized discussions in depth on some of the 
most significant and challenging aspects of the 
work of the United Nations. You have charted 
a bold course for the United Nations in a num- 
ber of key areas — in keej^ing the peace, in pro- 
moting disarmament, in furthering cooperation 
in outer space, in guiding economic and social 
development. Yours has been a rich intellec- 
tual menu. Perhaps it is therefore appropriate 
that you have left to the end the inevitable 
question, "Wlio is going to pick up the check?" 

In treating this subject today I shall not 
speak about various long-term solutions to the 
U.N.'s financial problem — for example, the de- 
velopment of independent sources of revenue. 

Other participants in this panel may wish to 
deal with various possibilities of this kind. It 
is appropriate — it is useful — for discussions of 
the long-term problem to go forward. But 
you will recall the famous words of Lord 
Keynes: "In the long run we are all dead." 
There will not be a long run in which to seek 
bold solutions for U.N. financing unless we can 
deal with the financial crisis which faces us here 
and now. 

Therefore I propose to confine my remarks 
today to the present financial crisis of the 
United Nations and to consider in turn three 
specific questions : Wlaat has caused this finan- 
cial crisis? "Wliat progress has been made in 
coping with it ? Wliat now remains to be done ? 

Causes of U.N. Financial Crisis 

The causes of the U.N.'s financial difficulties 
are familiar to most of you. These difficulties 
do not arise from the ordinary operations which 
are paid from the U.N.'s regular budget. The 

1 Address made before the 13th Annual Conference of 
National Organizations, called by the American Asso- 
ciation for the United Nations at Washington, D.C., on 
Mar. 12 (press release 124). 

APRIL 8, 1963 


regular budget covers such items as salaries of 
members of the Secretariat, expenses of operat- 
ing the headquarters building in New York, and 
the costs of meetings and conferences. It also 
includes some of the smaller peacekeeping ex- 
penditures such as the truce supervision activi- 
ties in Palestine, Kashmir, and Korea. 

The regular budget is financed principally 
by an agi-eed scale of assessments on members, 
which is broadly based on capacity to pay. The 
U.S. contributes 32.02 percent of this amount. 
The payment record of tlie members is gener- 
ally good, and the arrears are not of disruptive 

As you know, however, the expenses for the 
Middle East and Congo operations were 
financed from the beginning from separate ac- 
counts. Taken together, these operations since 
1960 have imposed on the members of the U.N. 
expenses of about $140 million a year — about 
double the size of the regular budget. 

Because these costs were so large, opposition 
quickly developed on the part of many U.N. 
members to sharing the cost in the usual man- 
ner — that is, on the basis of the percentage 
assessments used in the regular budget. In 
order to gain approval by the General Assem- 
bly for resolutions to finance these operations 
it was necessary, beginning with the Middle 
East operation in 1956, to reduce the assess- 
ments for members less able to pay — in other 
words to assess them for peacekeeping opera- 
tions at only a fraction of the assessment they 
have to pay for the regular budget. 

Over the last few years almost 90 percent of 
the U.N. membership has secured relief from 
the regular assessment rate with respect to the 
Congo and Middle East budgets. Of the 110 
U.N. members, 42 countries have a regular 
assessment rate of .04 percent. For Congo and 
UNEF [United Nations Emergency Force] 
their assessment was reduced by 80 percent of 
their normal scale— to .008 percent. As an ex- 
ample of how this has worked out, we can look 
at the way the costs of the Congo and Middle 
East operations were shared in the first half of 
1962. Instead of being asked to pay the 
$35,900 they would have paid at the regular 
budget scale, these countries were asked to pay 
only $7,180. 

Reductions by 80 percent were also given 41^ 
additional comitries whose regular budget 
assessment rate was more than .04 percent but 
who were i-ecipients of U.N. teclmical assist- 
ance. Moreover, 4 additional coimtries re- 
ceived 50-percent reductions. Thus no less 
than 89 member governments were excused 
from 50 percent to 80 percent of their assess- 
ments to these vital peace and security opera- 

To finance these operations, notwithstand- 
ing the reduced assessments on these 89 coim- 
tries, the Secretary-General appealed for vol- 
untary contributions. Starting with the 
Middle East operation in 1957, the United 
States has made large voluntary contributions 
each year in addition to its regular scale assess- 
ment to make it possible for these operations to 
go forward. In the last several years no other 
country has made voluntary contributions of 
this kind — with the sole exception of the 
United Kingdom, which has made very small 
voluntary payments for the Middle East 
operation. With these voluntary payments 
added to our assessed share, the United States 
in recent years has been assuming an average 
of about 48 percent of the burden of the Congo 
and Middle East operations. 

This is the method of financing U.N. peace- 
keeping operations which has been in effect 
since 1957. It does not take very long to con- 
clude that this system had two imacceptable 
aspects : 

First, it placed a disproportionate share — 
nearly half — of the cost of these operations on 
the United States. 

Second, and even more important, a large 
number of U.N. members were not even meet- 
ing their obligations imder this arrangement: 

— The members of the Communist bloc 
refused to pay because they oppose peacekeep- 
ing operations in general. 

— France, Soutli Africa, the Arab countries, 
and others refused to pay for at least one of the 
operations because they did not agree with this 
peacekeeping operation in particular. 

— Others, including most of the less devel- 
oped countries, failed to pay even their reduced 
assessments and argued that they were too poor 
to do so. 



-To make matters worse, legal arguments 
ere advanced by the Commimist bloc and many 
ier coimtries to the effect that the General 
embly could not levy valid assessments for 
icekeeping operations outside the regular 
ludget and accordingly that they were under 
\o obligation to pay. 

As a result of this nonpayment of assess- 
aents, the United States was in the unaccept- 
Ible position of paying in even more than the 
18 percent of the Middle East and Congo opera- 
lions it had undertaken to pay, although of 
lurse the amounts are still due and payable by 
le defaulters. At the same time the gap 
)6tween the assessments due for the costs of the 
iwo operations and the money actually received 
Tom the membership continued to grow imtil 
t reached about $100 million by the middle of 

rogress of "Rescue Operation" 

To reduce the disproportionate U.S. share of 
T.N. peacekeeping operations, to avoid the 
imminent collapse of these operations as a result 
'of the growing deficit, and to safeguard the 
I future potential of the U.N. as a vital factor in 
maintaining peace and security, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment joined with other free-world countries 
and with the Secretary- General to search for 
ways and means of solving the U.N.'s financial 
crisis. This search produced a rescue operation 
beginning in the 16th General Assembly which 
had four major elements : 

First, one more General Assembly resolution 
for the emergency financing of the Middle East 
and Congo operations for the first 6 montlis of 
1962 by the usual combination of assessments 
and voluntary contributions. 

Second, a bond issue to finance these opera- 
tions after June 30, 1962, while a more satis- 
factory solution to the financial problem was 
worked out. 

Third, a request to the International Court 
of Justice for an advisory opinion which would 
establish a firm legal basis for the collection of 
arrearages by determining whether peacekeep- 
ing assessments constituted binding legal obli- 
gations in the same way as assessments for the 
regular budget. 

Fourth, an intensified study of better ways 
of financing U.N. peacekeeping operations in 
the future. 

Since this rescue operation was approved by 
the 16th General Assembly in December 1961, 
there has been progress on a number of fronts. 

Purchases of U.N. bonds got miderway in 
1962. The United States Congress authorized 
a loan to the United Nations to purchase bonds 
up to the amount purchased by all other coim- 
tries.- Some foreign governments, such as the 
Scandinavian coimtries, responded handsomely 
to the bond issue by purchasing amoimts far in 
excess of their regular budget percentage. And 
the 17th General Assembly in its budget author- 
ization for 1963 included an amount of 
$4,650,000 for repayment of interest and princi- 
pal of the bonds in the regular U.N. budget, in 
which the U.S. share is 32.02 percent. 

The International Court of Justice handed 
down last July a favorable advisory opinion 
which ruled that the costs incurred by the U.N. 
in the Congo and Middle East operations were 
"expenses of the organization" and that the 
assessments levied to pay for them constituted 
binding legal obligations. The General Assem- 
bly accepted this opinion on December 19, 1962, 
by a vote of 76 in favor, 17 against, and 8 

The events in the General Assembly leading 
up to the acceptance of this opinion provided 
considerable grounds for satisfaction. A num- 
ber of states, including the Soviet bloc and 
France, urged tliat the General Assembly 
should only "take note" of the Court's opinion. 
The effect of this language, as brought out in 
the debate, would have left it to the discretion 
of each state whether it considered itself bound 
to pay for the peacekeeping assessments. An 
amendment to change the wording of the res- 
olution from "accepts" to "takes note" was pro- 
posed in the Fifth Committee and defeated by 
28 votes in favor, 61 against, and 14 abstentions. 

The debate on the advisory opinion made it 
abundantly clear that the term "accepts" used 
in the General Assembly resolution meant that 

" For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 26, 1962, p. 
311, and July 23, 1962, p. 142. 

^ For background and text of resolution, see ibid., 
Jan. 7, 1963, p. 30. 

APRIL 8, 1963 


the U-N". was adoptiiig the Court's view as its 
operating rule. This means that the assess- 
ments in question have been determined to be 
binding obligations on member states and are 
therefore due and payable. If not paid, a mem- 
ber becomes subject to loss of vote in the Gen- 
eral Assembly, under article 19 of the charter, 
if its total aiTears exceed its last 2 years' assess- 
ments on all accounts. This will apply to the 
Soviet Union as of January 1, 1964, if it pays 
nothing for the Congo and UNEF between now 
and that time. 

With the question about the legality of past 
assessments out of the way, the Secretary-Gen- 
eral was at last in a position to mount an effec- 
tive campaign to collect them. A number of 
governments which had declined to pay their 
assessments for the Middle East and Congo op- 
erations announced in the wake of the General 
Assembly resolution that they would now begin 
to pay. 

The 17th General Assembly also decided to 
increase the working capital fund from $25 mil- 
lion to $40 million. Tliis action establishes a 
more rational relationship between the present 
level of the i-egular budget and the need for re- 
serves. It adds significantly to the financial ca- 
pacity and resources of the organization. 

As a further measure to put the U.N.'s 
financial house in order, the Secretary-General 
appointed as his chief financial adviser Eugene 
Black, former president of the World Bank. 
Mr. Black Mill assist the Secretaiy-General in 
dealing with the problem of arrearages as well 
as advise him generally on other aspects of the 
U.N.'s financial problem. 

Finally, the General Assembly buckled down 
to work on the future financing of peacekeeping 
operations. It set up a working group of 21 
nations, of which the U.S. is a member, to study 
and make recommendations on a cost-sharing 
formula for the future costs of these opera- 
tions.* The group is now in session and is imder 
instnictions to complete its work by March 31. 
A special session of the General Assembly has 
been called to convene on May 14 to act on its 

All tliis is on the credit side of the ledger. 

* For text of a General Assembly resolution on fi- 
nancing peacekeeping operations, see ibid., p. 37. 

but the last year has registered serious debit; 
as well. 

Although the General Assembly authorizeo 
a $200 million bond issue, only about $74 mil 
lion has been subscribed by 58 countries othej 
than the United States, despite our readiness 
to buy up to $100 million of bonds on a match- 
ing basis. Assuming that all the bonds sub- 
scribed are actually purchased, the Unitec 
States' matching purchase would bring the 
total up to only about $148 million of the $20( 
million worth of bonds that was anticipated 
Prudent financing dictates that the rest of thest 
bonds be sold — and sold quickly. 

Moreover, although many members have in- 
dicated their readiness to abide by the law 
declared by the International Court and con- 
firmed by the General Assembly, they have not 
actually paid. The Soviet bloc, which appar- 
ently does not believe in abiding by the law 
even after it has been declared, has still not paidi 
one cent toward the Middle East and Congo op- 
erations. France is still refusing to pay its past 
assessments for the Congo; indeed, it has an- 
nounced that it will not even pay that portion 
of its regular budget assessment which is nec- 
essary to pay back the principal and interest 
on the U.N". bonds. 

As a result of these and other facts, arrears 
owed to the U.N. as of January 1, 1963. 
amounted to $121 million. Twenty-five U.N. 
members have still paid nothing on their UNEF 
assessments ; 48 members have still paid nothing 
on their Congo assessments. 

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the 
United Nations is not being supported and is 
not supporting itself, when arrears have ac- 
cumulated so far and continue to increase and 
when major and minor powers continue to re- 
fuse to fulfill their legal obligations. 

If this situation long continues, public opin- 
ion in the United States will be forced to inter- 
pret these facts as a denial in practice by many 
members of the U.N. of something which all 
the members have accepted in principle: that 
peacekeeping operations are conducted in the 
interest of the well-being of the entire world 
and should be the responsibility of all the mem- 
bers of the organization. This is what we mean 
by the phrase "collective financial responsi- 



ility" — it is, or should be, the oonierstone of 
lie organization. 

lext Steps To Be Taken 

It is against this mixed record of success 
nd failure that we must now consider what 
ext steps to take in dealing with the U.N.'s 
inancial crisis. 

In discussing these next steps it will be useful 
o keep our eye on the central question. The 
)roblem currently before the Working Group 
f Twenty-one in New York is very specific; 
lamely, how to finance the Congo and Middle 

ast operations beyond June 30, which is about 
vhen the money from the bond issue runs out. 

^AHien the General Assembly meets in special 
session in Alay it will have to adopt resolutions 
fvhich will provide for the future financing of 
these two operations, at least from July 1 to 

ecember 31 — or it will have to recommend 
;heir abrupt discontinuance. This is the vei-y 
practical problem immediately before us. It 
ihould receive promjat attention and not be lost 
iight of in a search for possible general prin- 
iples to govern the financing of unknown op- 
erations which are not yet even a gleam in any 
oiember's eye. 

To put it more broadly, the United States be- 
lieves that for some time to come it would be 
•wise for the U.N. to deal with the method of 
tfijiancing of each peacekeeping operation if and 
(when that operation occurs, learning from each 
experience what might be desirable for the fu- 
ture and adjusting each solution to the pailicu- 
lar facts of each case. We believe that this 
approach is the only sensible and practical one 
to follow at this time, given the present financial 
plight of the United Nations, the present deep 
political difficulties between its members, the un- 
predictable character of any future peacekeep- 
ing opei'ations, and the virtual impossibility of 
now agreeing on any one single formula or any 
one single set of principles or criteria to govern 
unknown operations yet to be begun. 

Assuming, then, that the immediate question 
is the financing of the Middle East and Congo 
operations for the 6 months of 1963 — and that 
the answer to this question constitutes no prec- 
edent for the future — what is the answer to be ? 

In posing this question we are assuming that 

these operations must continue. Obviously the 
United States favors the most rapid possible 
reduction of the Congo force consistent with 
the increasing capability of the Congolese Gov- 
ernment to maintain minimal levels of security 
and insure its national integrity. 

At the same time it would be the height 
of "penny-wise, pound-foolishness" to reduce 
either operation so rapidly as to jeopardize all 
the substantial gains that they have brought to 
Africa and the Middle East with much sacrifice 
and effort over the past few yeare. 

Assuming there will be a cost, though some- 
what reduced, for the Congo and UNEF opera- 
tions in the last 6 months of 1963, a strong case 
can be made for financing this cost at the regu- 
lar budget scale for the following reasons : 

1. The regular budget assessment scale is 
broadly based on capacity to pay. Very sub- 
stantial adjustments in the regular assessments 
scale are made for low per capita income coun- 
tries, beyond what would be called for by com- 
parative national income figures. It is true that 
the regular budget scale involves a ceiling for 
the United States contribution. But this ceiling 
derives from a fundamental principle long ac- 
cepted by the General Assembly — that, in an 
organization of sovereign states where each na- 
tion has one vote, it is not in the intei-est of the 
organization to depend too much financially on 
any one state. 

2. The United States has been virtually alone 
in making voluntary financial contributions to 
the Congo and Middle East operations. It has 
thus been assuming an average of 48 percent of 
the burden. The financial load simply must be 
more broadly based, and the carefully worked 
out cost-sharing formula to accomplish this is 
the regular budget scale. 

3. Since the establishment of the United Na- 
tions, the United States has been by far its larg- 
est financial supporter. Its assessed contribu- 
tions have always been more than twice those 
of the second largest contributor. The pro- 
portion of its voluntary contributions has been 
even higher. It contributes 70 percent for the 
Eelief and Works Agency for Palestine refu- 
gees, over 50 percent for the Congo economic 
assistance program, 42 percent for the U.N. 
Children's Fund, and 40 percent for the Special 

APRIL 8, 1963 


Fund and the Expanded Program of Technical 

4. Quite apart from the United Nations, the 
United States is bearing a heavy load of foreign 
aid and defense burdens. Our total contribu- 
tions for economic development abroad amount 
to over $5 billion a year — more than double the 
aid total of the rest of the free world and at 
least five times the aid made available by the 
Communist bloc. 

5. The peacekeeping operations of the United 
Nations are not just a matter of interest to tlie 
great powers. The small countries have per- 
haps the greatest stake of all in their success 
and effectiveness. It is true that these countries 
are not well off, but the amounts involved are 
not substantial. For the last 6 months of 1963 
the regular assessment share of the 42 coiintries 
in the .04 percent category would amount to the 
cost of two or three large limousines or a few 
big diplomatic receptions. Is this too high a 
price to pay for keeping the peace? 

It is these I'easons — coupled with the still in- 
adequate record on the payment of past assess- 
ments — which liave led to the present U.S. posi- 
tion in the Working Group of Twenty-one.^ 
Lest there be any question, the United States 
stands ready to pay its full 32.02 percent share 
of the Congo and Middle East operations. But 
until collective financial responsibility becomes 
a fiscal practice as well as a legal theory, it 
would hardly be fair for the United States to 
pay more thaii this percentage, either through 
assessed or voluntary contributions. 

We are hopeful that a determination to get 
the U.N.'s financial house in order is beginning 
to manifest itself among the members. There 
are signs of recognition that only through a 
meaningful system of collective financial re- 
sponsibility can the organization continue to 
carry out its current tasks and future responsi- 

The hard fact of political life is this: Atti- 
tudes in the United States toward any possible 
future contribution above our regular scale as- 
sessment for peacekeeping operations will in- 
evitably depend on whether the vast majority 

° For text of a statement released by the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations on Mar. 6, see Hid., Mar. 25, 1963, 
p. 443. 

of the membership takes the necessary measure.' 
in the next several months to give tlie United 
Nations the financial support which is abso- 
lutely essential to its survival. 

"The United Nations," said U Tliant in his 
recent Johns Hopkins lecture, "does not repre- 
sent a vague ideal of universal peace and broth- 
erhood which has its appeal only to starry-eyed 
idealists and moralists. Far from it. It is 
hardheaded, enliglitened self-interest, the stake 
tliat all humanity has in peace and progress 
and, most important of all, survival that dic- 
tates the need for the United Nations as a 
practical, institutional embodiment of the needs 
of nations on a shrinking planet, as a potent and 
dynamic instrument at the service of all nations, 
east and west, north as well as south." 

If this statement of the Secretary-General 
is correct — and we most definitely believe 
that it is — tlien it is time to face the financial 

The present financial crisis of the United Na- 
tions involves the survival of the organization 
itself, for no institution can long survive if it 
cannot pay its debts and if its members are not 
willing to supply it with the funds necessary to 
continue its operations. 

The "menu" of the U.N. is substantial and 
important. The "check" is no less so. Coun- 
tries cannot expect to take the benefits of mem- 
bership in the U.N. without the burdens. 

Members Named to International 
Business Advisory Committee 

Under Secretary Ball announced on March 21 
(press release 147) the appointments of Jacob 
Blaustein and C. Daggett Harvey to serve as 
members of the Advisory Committee on Inter- 
national Business Problems. 

The Committee, chaired by Clarence B. 
Randall, will advise the Secretary of State 
and the Administrator of the Agency for Inter- 
national Development on the handling of spe- 
cific business problems confronting American 
firms abroad. The public members previously 
announced are Edwin A. Locke, Jr., and Lloyd 
N. Cutler.^ 


' BtnxETiN of Feb. 25, 1963, p. 296. 



democracy and the Emerging Nations of Africa 

by G. Mennen Williams 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ' 

Discussion of the kind of democracy prac- 
iced by African governments and the State 
Department's reaction to it was touched off by 
I, reporter's question to me in the Congo some 

weeks ago. I was asked to comment on the 
jrevalence of one-party governments in Africa. 

answered by saymg that naturally we Amer- 
icans preferred a two-party system and ob- 
lerved that scholai"s had taken some note of the 
■Rowing African practice. Since that time the 
natter has tended to be no longer academic, 
-lere, however, in this university atmosphere I 
vould like to put down a few thoughts on the 
;ubject without in any way attempting to be 
"ate.gorical or definitive on a subject which 
!ould well fill a Ph. D. thesis and on which there 
!an be shades of emphasis. 

To begin with I believe we all would agree 
hat democracy revolves around certain philo- 
sophical concepts relating to government by the 
!onsent of the governed and human dignity. 
But we would find it more difficult to be ab- 
solutely categorical on precisely what forms 
liave to be included or excluded to keep within 
1 general definition of democracy. For ex- 
ample, we all think of ancient Athens as a glo- 
rious exemplar of democracy, but we would 
have considerable difficulty today in defining as 
democratic a system based on a slave economy. 

But to be more modem, all over this country 
the debate goes on about whether each man's 
vote should be exactly equal to every other 
man's vote; or whether a system is still demo- 

' Address made at the 13th annual North Carolina 
Conference on World Affairs at the University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., on Mar. 14 (press release 

cratic where in one State a State Senator repre- 
sents about 6 million people and another Sen- 
ator represents only some tens of thousands ; or 
where in anotlier State one party often gets less 
than a majority of the popular legislative vote 
but nonetheless has a substantial majority of 
the representation in the legislature. 

Of course, some of our States virtually have 
one-party systems too. These are generally 
characterized by vigorous internal factions — a 
condition which defenders of the one-party sys- 
tem can quite properly say represents real dem- 
ocratic expression. This situation, while not 
ideal, may also be a significant test of African 
one-party systems. 

Before looking directly at African experi- 
ence, I feel it is wise to recognize that democ- 
racy is many-faceted — involving not only po- 
litical but also economic, social, and moral 
values. Superficially we often think of democ- 
racy in terms of constitutions and forms of 
government almost exclusively. In the under- 
developed parts of the world, however, I am 
confident they think more emphatically in terms 
of achieving human dignity, freedom, and an 
opportunity to enjoy a decent living — not un- 
like the imalienable rights of our Declaration 
of Independence — "Life, Liberty and the pur- 
suit of Happiness." 

Professor T. V. Smith in The Democratic 
Way of Life catches this idea well, where he 

Democracy is more than a form of government. It 
ig also a way of life, variegated and full of growth. 
Like every manifestation of vitality, democracy is 
many-dimensional. Its leeways are legion. 

At the beginning of this discussion, let me 

APRIL 8. 1963 


say that I cannot agree with all practices car- 
ried on in the name of democracy in Africn, just 
as many Africans would take vigorous excep- 
tion to certain aspects of American society. But 
many different practices do exist, some of which 
have a special validity in the African context 
and othei-s which resemble transitional steps 
that have characterized other evolving societies. 
I believe it is important t-o our understanding 
of Africa to know what Africans consider ele- 
ments of democratic societies — always keeping 
in mind that there is yet no perfect democratic 
model. African mores are part of the context 
within which our African policy must be made 
and caiTied out. And altliough we may dis- 
agree with some African practices, we can 
ignore them only at the risk of failing to com- 
prehend some of the major forces at work on 
that continent today. 

Essential Philosophical Objectives 

American democracy evolved from the dual 
tradition of Crown and town meeting. In Af- 
rica the concept of democracy also started from 
a dual tradition. Some African kingdoms had 
privileged castes which kept the majority in 
feudal detention. But other African societies 
existed for centuries in tribal structures that 
were in many ways as democratic at the grass- 
roots level as American town meetings. Af- 
rican societies also experienced colonial systems 
which until shortly before independence were 
luirepresentative of the democratic ideals ex- 
pressed by the European mother countries. In 
view of these mixed antecedents, it is not sur- 
prising that contemporary democracy in Af- 
rica has specific characteristics related to both 
precolonial and colonial African history. 

Broadly speaking, the philosophical objec- 
tives most African leaders consider essential 
to the development of democracy in Africa are 
summarized in Lincoln's phrase "government 
of the people, by the people, for the people." 

In the African context, "of the people" means 
transfer of power from alien suzeramty to in- 
digenous rule, or decolonization; "by the peo- 
ple" means government with the consent of the 
govei-ned — one man, one vote ; "for tlie people" 
means a government concerned with people hav- 
ing a decent living. 

To these objectives must be added a word ou 
the means most Africans feel feasible to achieve 
their goals — centralization of power to meet 
the tasks of building new nations. In their 
desire to attain their philosophical objectives, 
they do not always insist on, nor do they always 
deny, certain rights and checks and balances 
that we consider fundamental to democracy — 
freedom of speech and press, free enterprise, 
free labor, freedom from government control. 
Sometimes all or some of these are present; 
sometimes they are not. Just like other people, 
they sometimes recognize these values but fail 
to fully achieve them in practice. This is 
because many Africans believe the develop- 
mental problems faced by their new nations are 
so vast and urgent that these desirable Western 
values must wait imtil they have achieved their 
immediate goals of freedom and material prog- 
ress. This is not wholly unlike the tendency 
in Western democracies to curtail certain rights 
during national or local emergencies. 

"VYliile we cannot agree that basic freedoms 
need be delayed and while we are unhappy 
when they are, we can be understanding if 
complete perfection is not immediately achieved. 
This was made clear by President Kennedy in 
liis second state of the Union message, when he 
said: - 

. . . our basic goal remains the same: a peaceful 
world community of free and independent states?, free 
to choose their own future and their own system so 
long as it does not threaten the freedom of others. 
Some may choose forms and ways we would not 
choose for ourselves, but it is not for us that tliey are 

Of the three philosophical objectives I have 
indicated that Africans consider essential to 
the growth of democracy, there is the greatest 
consensus among African leaders on the first — 
the transfer of power from alien suzerainty to 
indigenous rule. All Africans believe the re- 
moval of colonial servitude is the begimiing of 
democracy. Although we may feel that Afri- 
ca's drive toward independence is progressing 
swiftly — 29 new nations in the past dozen 
years — most African leaders are impatient be- 
cause many Africans have not yet attained 

]\Iost of the transition from European to 

'' Bulletin of .Ian. 29, 1962, p. 159. 



frican rule has successfully taken place un- 
?r relatively peaceful conditions. This was 
jt true in Algeria, and the Congo erupted 
iolently after independence occurred. On the 
hole, transition to independence has been a 
ibute to African and European statesman- 
lip alike, and throughout much of the conti- 
?nt cordial xVfrican-European relations have 
?en established. There is definitely a place for 
ersons of European origin as equal citizens 

I tlie new Africa. 

Such relations are beneficial for the timely 
iccess of newly achieved independence, and 
.frican leaders realize they must rely not only 

II self-help but on help from external sources, 
e^'ertheless they wish to avoid charges of neo- 
ilonialism arising from overly close or exclu- 
ve associations with former metropoles, and 
ley feel impelled to seek associations with 
ther industrialized nations. This generally 
leans associations with the United States or 
le Communist bloc, and it is mutually pref- 
rable that such relations be with us. In all 
f these associations, however, Africans tread 
arily because to them democracy means self- 
ule and they want no relationsliips that threat- 
n exercise of their sovereign choice. 

onsent of the Governed 

The second African philosophical objective 
i government with the consent of the people. 
-^his goal is easy for us to understand. In our 
wn Constitution, for example, power flows 
rem "We the People of the United States" 
nd government is merely an instrument to 
xpress the people's will. We believe with 
^incoln that "no man is good enough to govern 
luother man without that other's consent." 

This philosophy is widespread in Africa. As 
he British authority, Thomas Hodgkin, points 
rat, most African political parties seek to 
istablish political institutions that enable the 
>eople to become, effectively, the nding class. 
These institutions, he says, include: "govern- 
ment responsible to a popularly elected as- 
sembly; universal adult suffrage, with no dis- 
crimination on grounds of race, religion, sex, or 
educational level, and no special, separate, or 
weighted representation for minorities, com- 
munities, or interests; free elections." 

Scrupulous attention to popular sovereignty 
is found througliout African political writing. 
A good example is this statement by President 
Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika : "In my opin- 
ion, the two basic essentials to democracy are 
freedom of the individual and insurance that 
the government of a countiy is freely chosen 
by the people." 

Democracy in Africa also means raising liv- 
ing standards and standards of education 
rapidly — the third African philosophical ob- 
jective in democratic development. Africans 
are anxious to overcome their age-old enemies — 
poverty, illiteracy, disease, malnutrition — and 
imless this is accomplished rapidly, democracy 
will be a hollow theory to them. 

In Africa, annual income is on the order of 
$100 per person, compared to our $2,500, and 
many Africans have no money income at all. 
Only about 10 percent of the people have 
achieved literacy, and life expectancy is low 
throughout much of the continent. Although 
Africa has more arable land than we do, it pro- 
duces only one-twentieth of the world's agri- 
cultural commodities compared to our one-sixth. 

To meet the pi'oblems posed by low produc- 
tivity, little capital, a lack of trained manpower, 
and a shortage of entrepreneurs, many African 
governments feel they must turn to some form 
of state operation for swift economic and social 
advances. They feel full-blown capitalism is 
too complex a system for underdeveloped so- 
cieties and believe state control of resources is 
necessaiy for progress. 

So-called African "socialism," however, is as 
far removed from Marxian socialism as the 
American free enterprise system is from the 
Marxian concept of capitalism. It has no in- 
dustrial proletariat upon which to build; it em- 
braces all religions without causing conflicting 
loyalties; and it is cautious in its response to 
Communist overtures. As Senegal's President 
[Leopold] Senghor puts it : "We are not 'Marx- 
ists' ... we are socialists. . . . We stand for 
a middle course, for a democratic socialism 
which goes so far as to integrate spiritual 

The emphasis on so-called "socialism" in 
African development has by no means ruled out 
interest in a domestic or foreign private sec- 

APEIL 8. 1963 


tor. Indeed, such interest appears to be gen- 
eral and growing. Even in countries which 
most strongly profess socialist beliefs, private 
investment is not only welcomed but eagerly 
sought. For example, last month in a speech 
in which he encouraged the flow of investment 
into Ghana, President [Kwame] Nkrumah 

Our ideas of socialism can coexist with private enter- 
prises. I also believe that private capital and private 
investment capital, In particular, has a recognized and 
legitimate part to play in Ghana's economic develop- 
ment. We are consistent in these ideas. I have never 
made any secret of my faith in socialist principles, but 
I have always tried to make it quite clear that Ghana's 
socialism is not incompatible with the existence and 
growth of a vigorous private sector in the economy. 

U.S. Concern Over One-Party System 

While we can find much to support in the 
philosophical objectives most Africans liold, we 
are less happy about what many of them often 
consider an emergency necessity for national de- 
velopment — strong centralization of power. 
This reasoning leads them to the conclusion that 
at present democratic results are more im- 
portant than democratic forms. In a sliglit 
majority of new African nations this means 
one-party government, altliough these systems 
are far from the monolithic structures of Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union. They allow 
considerable latitude for dissent and internal 

A strong case for one-party rule has been 
made by many articulate African spokesmen 
who assert that: the number of experienced 
leaders is too small to be divided ; mature and 
loyal opposition is rare in a new state; they 
have classless societies, and the only genuine op- 
position to African nationalist parties came 
from the former metropoles or extremists; this 
is their time of emergency, and unity is es- 
sential to achieve national goals; they need 
strong central leadership to counter such di- 
visive forces as tribalism ; their present leaders 
are revolutionary heroes and have no mass op- 
position ; the democratic processes are fulfilled 
by permitting full expression of opposing view- 
points in party councils. 

President [Sekou] Toure of Guinea puts it 
this way : 

The concerns of the state of Guinea are the concern ' 
of all the citizens of Guinea. The program of the part, i 
is discussed democratically. As long as a decision ha: 
not been taken, each one is free to say what he think 
or wishes. But when — after a long discussion in th 
Congress or Assembly — the decisions have been takei 
by a unanimous vote or by a majority, the workers anr 
the leaders are required to apply them faitlifuUy. ' 

That tliere is some free discussion withii 
party structures is borne out by Professor Im 
manuel Wallerstein of Columbia, who writes 
"There is no single-party structure in Africai 
independent states where the observer canno 
identify factions and tendencies which argui 
with each other to some extent over issues." 

In some African states, moreover, there i; 
strong opposition to the one-party concept f ron 
equally articulate Africans. Dr. [Nnamdi 
Azikiwe, the Governor General of the Federa 
tion of Nigeria, which has a multiparty govern 
ment, says: "Unless an opposition exists — as i 
'shadow cabinet' capable of replacing the gov 
ernment — democracy becomes a sham." 

And Prime Minister [A. Milton] Obote o 
Uganda, wlio sees the need for a responsible op 
position, has remarked: "We have a vigorou 
and healthy people composed of tribes whosi 
diversity, far from being a drawback, does con 
stitute a wealth of cultural heritage and wil j 
constitute a source of great strength." 

For my own part I believe a multiparty sys 
tem is the best system for democratic govern 
ment. but I recognize that we had only one part; 
for the first 8 years of our national life and evei 
as late as 1820 James Monroe was elected Presi 
dent without any opposition. The absence o: 
opposition is not unusual in countries new t< 

While we hope the one-party system in Africa 
will be a short-term, transitional arrangement 
the principal point of our concern at the moment 
is wliether these governments remain free and 
independent and give the people genuine choice 
and an opportunity for democratic expression 

Development of a Unique Way of Life 

From tliis discussion today I think what 
emerges is the fact that Africa is independently 
developing a way of life of its own. In many 
respects they seek tlie same objectives we do — 
sometimes in the same way we do, sometimes in 



.fferent. ways. Often they assign different ab- 
ilute or time priorities to the attainment of 
lese objectives. They have made real progress, 
it tliey have not achieved perfection any more 
lan any other part of the ■world has. So we 
ust continue to make a real effort to see Africa 
nough African eyes, as well as our own, if we 
lend to conduct a successful African policy, 
nd we must seek the substance and not be 
inded by tlie form. Only in this manner can 
e possibly hope to understand the phenomenon 
F African nationalism and come to grips with 
le realities of that continent for our mutual 

This does not mean, of course, that we must 

'cept the unfavorable aspects of African gov- 

-nment as desirable, inevitable, or eternal. 

here are a number of practices — some of them 

lapted from former colonial administrations — 

lat we consider undemocratic. Apartheid, 

)r example, quickly springs to mind. But there 

re others — preventive detention, summary de- 

ortation, house arrest, the outlawing of politi- 

\\ parties, violation of the principle of political 

^ylum, confiscation of foreign publications, re- 

rictions on press freedom and the right to as- 

nuble, and the practice of restricting persons 

1 their home villages. 

Although we believe these practices retard 

tie growth of democracy, many African leaders 

o not. In fact, many of them believe that these 

ovices are essential at this time to permit the 

evelopment of democratic institutions in the 

uture. Although we can understand the reali- 

ies that guide such thinking, we also feel we 

hould work toward what have come to be con- 

idered indisputable democratic values, and 

vhenever the opportunity presents itself, there- 

'oi-e, we suggest and try to help achieve the 

growth of these values. 

Finally, what do I think of the chances for 
•ontinuing democratic development in Africa? 
[ would say that the chances are good, as long 
IS we think of basic values and not simply rigid 
forms. After all, our Republic and Britain, 
Switzerland, and Athens do not all fit into the 
same mold, but who will say that democracy has 
not breathed freely in all these forms? 

As in many other parts of the world, many 
democratic values have not yet been attained. 
But, on balance, I believe Africa's future is 

hopeful, and I would like to conclude with a 
statement by Tanganyika's President Nyerere 
which expresses this hope compellingly : 

"To those who wonder if democracy can sur- 
vive in Africa, my own answer, then, would be 
that, far from its being an alien idea, democracy 
has long been familiar to the African. There 
is nothing in our traditional attitude toward 
discussion and our current dedication to human 
rights to justify the claim that democracy is 
in danger in Africa. I see exactly the opposite : 
The principles of our nationalist struggles for 
human dignity, augmented by our traditional 
attitude toward discussion, should augur well 
for democracy in Africa." 

Anniversary of Fulbright Agreement 
Observed at Manila 

The Department of State announced on 
March 22 (press release 140) that the 15th an- 
niversary of one of the earliest Fulbriglit agree- 
ments, with the Republic of the Philippines, 
would be obsen^ed at Manila March 23. It was 
the third educational exchange agreement con- 
cluded after passage of the Fulbright Act in 

President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philip- 
pines and American Ambassador William E. 
Stevenson are among the scheduled participants 
in the ceremonies. 

The ceremonies will also recall more than a 
half-century of close educational relations be- 
tween the United States and the Philippines, 
dating back to 1901, when the SS Thomas 
landed some 600 American teachers on the is- 
lands to help make primary and secondary edu- 
cation more widely available. New "Thomas- 
ites" arrived each year until the outbreak of 
World War II. Under the Fulbright program 
teachers, as well as students, professors, and 
research scholars, have been "exchanged," with 
Filipino teachers among those coming to this 
country for study and other special programs. 

Since 1948 the program has brought 748 
grantees from the Philippines to the United 
States and sent 211 American grantees to the 
Philippines. It is administered by the Bureau 
of Educational and Cultural Affairs and is un- 

APRIL 8, 1963 


der the general supervision of the Board of 
Foreign Scholarships appointed by the Presi- 
dent. The U.S. Educational Foundation in the 
Philippines, which nominates Filipinos for 
grants and makes arrangements for American 
grantees, is one of the 44 binational commis- 
sions wliich have been established under the 
act (now the Fulbright-Hays Act). 

Current Treaty Actions 



Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention 
concerning the application of that convention to the 
works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at 
Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 16, 195.5. TIAS 3324. 
Accession deposited: Finland, January 16, 1963. 

International Labor Organization 

Agreement concerning the Peace Corps program. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Geneva February 
21 and 22, 1963. Entered into force February 22, 


Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at 
Geneva September 25. 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and 
annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. En- 
tered into force for the United States March 7, 
1956. TIAS 3532. 
Acceptance deposited: France, February 14, 1963. 


Trinidad and Tobago on January 23, 1963, acknoiol- 
edged appUcahle rights and obligations of the United 
Kingdom with respect to the following: 

Protocol of rectification to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Habana March 24, 
1948. Entered into force March 24, 1948. TIAS 

Protocol modifying certain provisions of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Habana 
March 24, 1948. Entered into force April 15, 1948. 
TIAS 1763. 

Special protocol modifying article XIV of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Habana 
March 24. 1948. Entered into force April 19, 1948. 
TIAS 1764. 

Special protocol relating to article XXIV of the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at 
Habana March 24, 1948. Entered into force June 7, 
1948. TIAS 1765. 

Second protocol of rectifications to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva Sep- 
tember 14, 1948. Entered into force September 14, 
1948. TIAS 1888. 

Protocol modifying part I and article XXIX of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed 
at Geneva September 14, 1948. Entered into force 
September 24, 1952. TIAS 2744. 

Protocol modifying part II and article XXVI of th. 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed a ' 
Geneva September 14, 1948. Entered into force Dt 
cember 14, 1948. TIAS 1890. 

First protocol of modifications to the General Agree 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy Augus 
13, 1949. Entered into force September 24, 1952 
TIAS 2745. 1 1; 

Third protocol of rectifications to the General Agree 1 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy Angus 
13,1949. Entered into force October 21, 1951. TIAS ' 

Protocol modifying article XXVI of the General Agree 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy Angus 
13, 1949. Entered into force March 28, 1950. TIAS 

Protocol replacing schedule I (Australia) of the Gen 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at An 
necy August 13, 1949. Entered into force October 
21, 1951. TIAS 2394. 

Protocol replacing schedule VI (Ceylon) of the Gen 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at An 
necy August 13, 1949. Entered into force Septembe: 
24, 19.52. TIAS 2746. I 

Annecy protocol of terms of accession to the Genera 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annec; 
October 10, 1949. Entered into force for the Unitei 
States October 10. 1949. TIAS 2100. 

Fourth protocol of rectifications to the General Agree 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Apri 
3. 1950. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TlAi 

Fifth protocol of rectifications to the General Agree 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Torquay De 
cember 16, 1950. Entered into force June 30, 1953 
TIAS 2764. 

Torquay protocol to the General Agreement on Tariff: 
and Trade and schedules of tariff concessions an 
nexed thereto. Done at Torquay April 21, 1951 
Entered into force June 6, 1951. TIAS 2420. 

First protocol of rectifications and modifications ti 
texts of schedules to the General Agreement oi 
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 27 
1951. Entered into force October 21, 19.53. TIA! 

Second protocol of rectifications and modifications ti 
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tar 
iffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 8. 1952 
Entered into force February 2, 19.59. TIAS 42.50. 

Third protocol of rectifications and modifications ti 
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tar 
iffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 24, 1953 i 
Entered into force February 2, 1959. TIAS 4197. ; 


Convention of the World Meteorological Organization 
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered intf 
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. I 

Accession deposited: Uganda, March 15, 1963. I 



Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace 
Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Guatemala City December 28 and 29, 1962. Entered 
into force December 29, 1962. 


Consular convention. Signed at Tokyo March 22, 1963. 
Enters into force on 30th day following the day of 
exchange of ratifications. 



pril 8. 1963 I n d 

rica. Democracy and the Emerging Nations 

of Africa (Williams) 541 

iierican Principles. The Presidents' Meeting 

:it San Jos^ (Kennedy, text of declaration) . 511 

Iierican Republics. The Presidents' Meeting 

at San Jos6 (Kennedy, text of declaration) . 511 

;azil. U.S. Regrets Misinterpretation of State- 
ment on Brazil (BaU) 521 

|)ngo (Leopoldville) 

'le United Nations Financial Crisis (Gardner) . 535 

' le United Nations : Its Value to the United 

States (Stevenson) '. . . . 522 

11' I'nited Nations Role in Political Disputes 

(Sisco) 529 

ingress. The United Nations : Its Value to the 
United States (Stevenson) 522 


lie United Nations : Its Value to the United 
States (Stevenson) 522 

lie United Nations Role in Political Disputes 
(SLseo) 529 

.S. Opposes Attacks on Cuba by Splinter Ref- 
ugee Groups 520 

conomic Afifairs. Members Named to Inter- 
I national Business Advisory Committee . . . 540 

ducational and Cultural Afifairs. Anniversary 
of Fulbright Agreement Observed at Manila . 545 

oreign Aid. The Presidents' Meeting at San 
Jos6 (Kennedy, text of declaration) . . . 511 

liddle East. The United Nations Financial 
Crisis (Gardner) 535 

lilitary Affairs. Admiral Smith Appointed 
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic . . . 521 

Torth Atlantic Treaty Organization. Admiral 
Smith Appointed Supreme Allied Commander, 
Atlantic 521 

'hilippines. Anniversary of Fidbright Agree- 
ment Observed at Manila 545 

'residential Documents 

'resident Greets Conference of National Orga- 
nizations 531 

lie Presidents' Meeting at San Jos^ 511 

.>eaty Information. Current Treaty Actions . 546 
Jnited Nations 

Current U.N. Doeiuuents 528 

^resident Greets Conference of National Orga- 
nizations (text of letter) 531 

e X 

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1241 

The United Nations Financial Crisis (Gardner) . 535 
The United Nations: Its Value to the United 

States (Stevenson) 522 

The United Nations Role in Political Disputes 

(Sisco) 529 

Name Index 

Ball, George W 521 

Gardner, Richard N 535 

Kennedy, President 511, 531 

Sisco, Joseph J 529 

Smith, Harold Page 521 

Stevenson, Adlai B 522 

Williams, G. Mennen 541 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 18-24 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington 25, 

Releases issued prior to March 18 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 120 
of March 8; 124 of March 12; and 136 of 
March 14. 




»140 3/18 


U.S. participation in international 

Merrow appointed Special Adviser 
on Community Relations (biogra- 
phic details). 

Program for visit of King of Mo- 

Harriman : National Farmers 
Union (excerpts). 

Ball : statement on Brazil. 

Statement on hit-and-run attacks on 

Declaration of Central America. 

Consular convention with Japan. 

Blaustein and Harvey appointed 
members of Advisory Committee 
on International Business Prob- 
lems (rewrite). 

Chayes : Bar Association of St. 

Anniversary of Fulbright agree- 
ment with Philippines (rewrite). 

Program for visit of King of Mo- 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

























Washington 25, DjC. 




January 1, 1963 

This publication is a guide to treaties and other international 
agreements in force between the United States and other countries 
at the beginning of the current year. 

The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, ar- 
ranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral 
treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of 
states which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry 
into force for the United States, and citations to texts are fur- 
nished for each agreement. 

Documents affecting international copyright relations of the 
United States are listed in the appendix. 

Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the in- 
formation contained in Treaties in Force, is published weeldy in 
the Department of State Bulletin. 

Publication 7481 


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o: Snpt. of Documents 
Govt. Printing Office 
Washington 25, D.C. 

Publication 7481 


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_ copies of TREATIES IN FORCE— A List of Treaties 
and Other International Agreements of tlie United States in Force on 
January 1, 1963. 

Enclosed find: 


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Street Address: 

City, Zone, and State: 



Vol. XLVIII, No. 124^ 03 \^^'^ I April 15, 1963 

e. ^- ^' 
THE COLD WAR— A LOOK AHEAD m by W. W. Rostow, 

Counselor 551 


DONE • by Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser 562 


ment by Assistant Secretary Manning 575 



For index see inside back cover 


Vol. XLVIII, No. 1242 • Publication 7 , 
April 15, 1963 

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U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington 2B, D.C. 


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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Depabthent 
OF State Bulletin as the source will be 
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed In the 
Readers' Qulde to Periodical Literature, 

The Department of State BULLETl 
a weekly publication issued by t 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the pub 
and interested agencies of t 
Government with information 
developments in the field of forei 
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Service. The BULLETIN includes i 
lected press releases on foreign polii 
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Department, and statements and a 
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The Cold War— A Look Ahead 

hy W. W. Rostov) 

Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council ' 

From the earliest days of his administration 
lie President made it clear that we faced two 
7pes of challenges and had to deal with them 

One consisted in a series of crises which had 
i(eveloped in the post-Sputnik period — that is, 
n the period 1957-61 — in particular, the crises 
Q Laos, Viet-Nam, the Congo, Cuba, and 

The second challenge consisted not of urgent 
rises but of situations which required sustained 
onstructive action if the positive interests of 
he free world were to be advanced and degen- 
ration avoided. There was a need, for ex- 
mple, to move forward in our relations with 
, fully revived and rapidly developing Western 
Europe and Japan ; in our relations with Latin 
\jiierica, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, 
yhere a powerful desire to modernize their so- 
ieties had taken root. And there remained 
he challenge to make progress in the task of 
)ringing the nuclear arms race under control, 
n ways compatible with the security of the 
Jnited States and the free world. 

One way to characterize the last several 
nonths — perhaps the whole interval since the 
3uban crisis of last autumn — is that, to some 
sxtent, the great crises of 1961-62 have receded 
nto the background and the problems of mov- 
ng forward in the longer run enterprises of the 
free world have come nearer to the center of the 

Let me be clear: None of the crises on the 
national agenda as of January 1961 has been 

' Address made before a regional foreign policy con- 
ference at Philadelphia, Pa., on Mar. 28 (press release 


finally and satisfactorily settled. The treaty 
arrangements in Laos remain precarious, still 
violated by the continued presence in that coim- 
try of Viet Minh units under the control of 
Hanoi. The guerrilla war directed from Hanoi 
against South Viet-Nam remains dangerous 
and costly. In the Congo the unity of the coun- 
try remains to be consolidated and economic, 
social, and political momentmn to be achieved. 
West Berlin stands firm, confident, and pros- 
perous, but the threat to its future remains. 
And evidently the crisis over Cuba is not at an 
end. Nevertheless we have achieved something 
substantial in these 26 months : The momentum 
of Khrushchev's post-Sputnik offensive has been 
halted, and in the vast areas which have been 
threatened by it — Southeast Asia, Central Af- 
rica, tlie Caribbean, and Western Europe — free 
men breathe easier. 

There is no cause for complacency ; but there 
is reason for us all to understand that hard, 
dangerous, but patient efforts, backed by a radi- 
cal expansion in U.S. military power and by a 
demonstration that our European and Latin 
American alliances hold firm, have produced 
important and positive results. 

Meanwhile within the camp of our adver- 
saries the forces of history have placed on their 
agenda serious problems. From one end to the 
other of the Communist bloc, nationalism and, 
in certain quarters, the pressure of men for 
higher degrees of human freedom have weak- 
ened the tmity of the bloc. Every Communist 
party in the world is trapped in a painful de- 
bate over the issues posed in the Sino-Soviet 
dispute. Moreover, the inability of communism 
to grow food efficiently exerts a grinding pres- 

APRIL 15, 1963 


sure on Communist hopes and pretensions from 
East Germany to North Viet-Nam. 

With the drama of intense crisis somewhat 
diminished — no man can say for how long — 
the constructive tasks of the free world and of 
our relations with the Communist bloc are more 
to the forefront. 

Our broad objectives are clear and have been 
often stated by the President and the Secretary 
of State. 

We seek to build a community of independent 
nations, their governments increasingly re- 
sponsive to the consent of the governed, cooper- 
ating of their own free will in their areas of 
interdependence, settling their disputes by 
peaceful means. On the basis of this kind of 
community of free nations, we seek by every 
means at our disposal, compatible with our own 
security and that of other free nations, to bring 
the arms race under control and to move the 
nations now under Communist control toward 
acceptance of the principles of national inde- 
pendence, human freedom, international legal 
order, and peace. 

To those who work from day to day in foreign 
policy these objectives are not abstractions pro- 
duced for public occasions. They are the work- 
ing guidelines which suffuse our business, cable 
by cable, coimtry by coimtry, region by region. 

Atlantic Partnership in Nuclear Matters 

Perhaps the most basic of our creative tasks 
for the 1960's is to move forward in our rela- 
tions with Western Europe and Japan toward a 
true partnership, in which the responsibilities 
and burdens of organizing the free world and 
of dealing with the menace presented by com- 
munism will be more equitably shared. One as- 
pect of this process has been dramatized in re- 
cent months by the debate within the Atlantic 
community over the future organization of 
nuclear power. 

The problem presented to us all is how a com- 
munity of sovereign nations, boimd together by 
treaty, should organize to maintain an effective 
nuclear deterrent in a period of cold war and 
for the use of nuclear weapons sliould their use 
be required in the common interest. Tlie funda- 
mental fact that has to be faced is that the prob- 
lem cannot be solved by simply maintaining a 
monopoly of nuclear power in the hands of the 

United States. The fact is that during thf 
1950's Great Britain and France developed ^1 
capacity to produce nuclear weapons and mean; 
of delivery; and there is no teclmological rea 
son why other nations could not also achievi 
this capability. In the face of this fact whai 
are our alternatives ? 

Theoretically one could conceive of a solutior 
in which the European nations would decidi 
that, despite their scientific and teclmologica , 
capacity, they would consciously forgo the pro i 
duction, operation, and management of nuclear 
weapons and means of delivery and leave thi 
job to the United States. I believe we can asj 
siune that this is an luirealistic solution. As ] j 
say, Great Britain and France are alread3| 
launched on another path; and one can easilji 
understand why proud and free men now full] ^ 
recovered from the economic consequences 0:1 
the Second World War — men who have beei) 
threatened by Moscow over the past severa ; 
years as hostages to the Soviet medium-rangi 
ballistic missiles lined up in western Russia- 
would wish to play a larger, rather tlian ! 
smaller, role in the deterrence of nuclear attack 
They are not content, when threatened, to sai 
to Moscow : Washington will protect us. 

In short, the American nuclear monopoly wa 
broken by events and decisions in the 1950's anc 
it is unlikely to return. 

A second solution has been suggested by cer 
tain theorists on the other side of the Atlantic 
They argue that the consequences of a nuclea 
war are so great that one nation cannot rel; 
on any other nation to come to its defense in thi 
face of the danger of nuclear attack. There 
fore the only secure and dignified position fo 
a nation is to command its own nuclear capa 
bility. Among our NATO allies a certain num 
ber have the industrial and technical capacity 
to produce nuclear weapons and some kind o 
delivery system. But if we were all to accep 
this theory, wliich denies the possibility of col 
lective security arrangements in a nuclear age 
two consequences would flow. First, the allianci 
would fragment into a series of national nucleai 
capabilities, the European components of whicl 
would be inefficiently produced, unsystemat 
ically targeted, and quite unpersuasive in Mos- 
cow. Second, we would be proclaiming in the 
alliance that no effective protection could be 



iTorded to those among our allies who did not 
)inn»iind a national nuclear capability. We 
ould be inviting; Moscow, in effect, to put dip- 
•inatic and military pressure on these smaller 
iwers. one by one. in the face of a doctrine 
hicli asserted that no other nation would ra- 
iiuilly protect them. 

The acceptance of this doctrine could only 

enn the end of the North Atlantic Allianc*, 

oening the way for the fragmentation and 

]ecemeal diplomatic or military defeat of 

"'esteni Europe. 

In the light of these two extreme alternatives, 
i has been the policy of your Government, 
I ginning with the latter days of the Eisen- 
])wer administration, to look toward arrange- 
lents which would increase the effective 
rgree of partnership in nuclear matters within 
)e Atlantic community without diminishing 
le effectiveness and unity of our collective 
{:urity deterrent. This is no simple matter in 
I world where 15 nations are committed to a 
sstem of mutual defense but in wliich no uni- 
fd sovereign institutions exist. 
It has been natural for newspaper and other 
nnmentators to focus sharply on this ultimate 
1 olilem : Wliose finger will be on the trigger, 
Mi-t> finger on the safety catch? Could the 
. iropean forces fire their atomic weapons 
■"thout the agreement of the United States? 
I )uld the United States fire without the agree- 
j?nt of Europe? Could individual nations 
Uhin the alliance veto firing by others? It 
1 s been our view that these ultimate que-stions 
«uld not and should not now be settled im- 
iKliately and finally. The terms of the 
. 1 antic partnership which evolve over coming 
iDuths and years will depend on many factors, 
if'luding, in particular, how the process of 
mopean unification, now temporarily frus- 
lated, proceeds. 

It has been our view that four more im- 
:ediate courses of action should be considered 
■•gently, which would move toward Atlantic 
irtnership in nuclear matters. First, that we 
1 commit ourselves to work toward a solution 
hich would maintain the unity of the alliance, 
ith a unified nuclear deterrent at its core, 
^cond, that we devise and agree on general 
lidelines for the use of nuclear weapons in 
le face of Soviet attack. Such agreed guide- 

lines now exist within NATO. Third, that we 
take active steps to bring our Euro^jean 
partners more deeply and directly into the 
nuclear business with respect to problems of 
targeting, control, and the strategic relation- 
ship between nuclear and conventional forces. 
Measures to this end are actively under way 
within NATO. Fourth, that we provide within 
this framework for active European (and 
Canadian) participation in the operation and 
control of strategic as well as tactical nuclear 
weapons. Out of the process of shared ex- 
perience, consultation, and debate thus set in 
motion it has been our belief and our faith 
that a rational and sensible resolution of the 
control issue would emerge, acceptable to the 
peoples and parliaments of our allies and to 
our own people and the Congress. 

As you know, we have been discussing with 
certain of our European friends the possibility 
of setting up a mixed-manned multilateral 
nuclear force to be based at sea. This proposal, 
first made by Secretary [Christian A.] Herter 
at the NATO meeting of 1060,- was reaffirmed 
by President Kennedy at Ottawa in May of 
1961.^ In the autumn of 1962 an American 
technical mission, representing both the civil 
and military parts of our Government, dis- 
cussed how such a force might work with our 
NATO allies. As part of the Nassau agreement 
of December 1962,* we stated that we would 
present this concept at a high political level to 
our allies. Acting as the President's pei-sonal 
representative. Ambassador Livingston Mer- 
chant has been engaged in discussions at the 
North Atlantic Council itself and in a number 
of European capitals." As the most powerful 
member of the North Atlantic Alliance, bearing 
special responsibilities in the field of nuclear 
arms, we felt that we had a duty to lay before 
our friends a proposal which would permit an 
enlarged participation in nuclear matters with- 
in the alliance in a form which would increase 
the unity of the alliance rather than frag- 
ment it. 

^ For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1961, 
p. 39. 

' For text, see \hid., June 5, 1961, p. 839. 

' lUd.. Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43. 

°For a statement by President Kennedy, see ibiA., 
Feb. 11, 1963, p. 197. 


These discussions have already had two im- 
portant and useful effects. First, the European 
nations concerned have begun to come to grips 
with the real problems of the joint management 
of a nuclear deterrent. The discussions have 
been candid and mature. A matter which is 
bound to be the subject of heated and some- 
times siiperficial debate is now being gripped 
in high seriousness by the NATO governments. 
Second, these discussions have been conducted 
in a setting in which there is an overwhelming 
commitment within the alliance to move for- 
ward on a collective security basis. The dan- 
gers of fragmentation are now vddely under- 
stood, and there is, in Ben Franklin's old 
phrase, a growing sense that in tliis decisive 
area we must hang together or we will hang 

The transition in our relations with Europe 
from dependence to partnership — a transition 
taking place in economic, political, and military 
affairs^ — requires changes in attitude and policy 
by all the nations in the alliance. It is a com- 
plicated and delicate transition. In no field is 
it more critical than nuclear matters, for on a 
credible nuclear deterrent the security of the 
400 million human beings who live within the 
Atlantic system depends. The debates and ex- 
plorations that accompany this transition 
should not be viewed as petty squabbles or as 
evidence of disarray. They are part of a living 
constitutional debate of the first order of mag- 
nitude — a debate that must take place if ines- 
capable problems are to be solved and Europe 
move from dependence to global partnership 
within the free world. Against the background 
of NATO's success in the past 14 years there is 
every reason for lis to cany forward these ex- 
plorations and negotiations with confidence. 

Relations With the Underdeveloped Areas 

A second great constructive issue centers on 
our foreign aid programs and, more generally, 
on our relations with governments and peoples 
of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle 
East. Here again, as in our relations with 
Western Europe, it is necessary to understand 
what our national objective is and to understand 
why the track on which we are engaged is and 
must be a long-term track. 

The imderdeveloped areas within the free 
world are caught up, as we all know, in a great 
revolution. They are seeking to restructure' 
their societies in such ways as to permit them tc 
absorb and apply, for their own purposes, the 
fruits of modern science and teclmology. Si-, 
multaneously they are moved by a desire to as- 
sert more strongly their national interests and 
presence on the world scene. 

The changes through which they are passing 
in an effort to develop modem societies and tc 
develop governments which can more effectivelj 
organize and project their national interest; 
involve alteration in every dimension. Rura 
and urban life, social and political institutions 
as well as tlie economy itself, are being radically 
changed. Tliese revolutionary changes are tak 
ing place in an environment where the Commu 
nists perceive a imique and transient oppor, 
tunity to exploit the inevitable confusion anc 
to seize power from within. 

Tlie danger of nuclear war and the problen 
of its deterrence are with us every day. Al 
though the Korean war recedes into distan 
memory, the danger of an overt crossing o 
frontiers by the Commimists is still a dange 
which we must bear in mind every day ; and w 
were reminded of it again last autumn whe: 
the Chinese Communists moved down from oc 
cupied Tibet across the Indian frontiers. Bu 
the possibility which the Conununists are mot 
actively exploiting in every part of the undei 
developed world is the possibility of creatin 
the conditions which permit the kind of seizui 
of power from within which Castro accoir 
plished in Cuba at the end of 1958. 

Developments over the past 2 years give v 
grounds for hope that a combination of prever 
tive measures and constructive measures ca 
frustrate this Communist intent and yield us i 
time independent and increasingly modern na 
tions which take their place within the worl 
community as constructive members. But w 
cannot expect to see dramatic and final result 
within a sliort period; nor can we expect sue 
results unless the United States, Western Ei; 
rope, Canada, Japan, Australia, and Nei 
Zealand work together to bring about a new re 
lationship between the more developed and les 
developed parts of the free world. 



What is required basically, of course, is that 
is underdeveloped areas organize themselves 
1^ organize their human and material re- 

- irces in such ways as to produce a rate of 

-N th which outstrips their i-ate of population 

nMse. Self-help is the only sound basis for 

i liirams of external aid. Despite the evident 

. liculties and frustrations of this process, there 

t3 many hopeful signs. 

A. number of nations which 5 years ago re- 

qired U.S. assistance in the form of grants or 

art loans are now moving into a position of 

- f->ustained growth where they can support 
■iiiselves with the help of outside capital 

|anted on essentially business terms. Nations 
citaining almost half the population of the 
t derdeveloped areas have already begim to 
cmonstrate the capacity regularly to grow at a 
r:e higher than their population increase, 
ime of them may require outside assistance for 
Biny years; but growth is a powerful force, 
ad if it can be sustained by their own efforts 
1 d ours, there are decent and hardheaded pros- 
jcts that, in a measurable period of time, they 
t ) can emerge into self-supporting status. An- 
( ler group of countries, representing perhaps 
i percent of the population of the underdevel- 
( ed areas, are within a measurable distance of 
thieving regular growtli, notably if they can 
cablish reasonable political stability over the 
ixt decade. 

Others — for example, some of the new 
.frican nations — are just beginning to organize 
1e basic foundations for growth in education, 
imsport facilities, power resources, and the 
1 3t of the overhead capital for modernization. 

But most of the underdeveloped areas have 
! ready rounded the comer — or should round 
: in this decade ; for the capacity to gi'ow is the 
dtical measure of progress. 

As we look ahead, then, the prospect is that we 
iiall require from the more developed nations 
>' the free world programs of assistance to the 

iderdeveloped areas for a considerable period 
•: time; but the task is not endless nor are the 

respects hopeless. The underdeveloped areas, 

ded by their more affluent friends, are well on 

le way to making growth their normal 


In confronting this sustained challenge over 
the coming years three fundamental facts should 
be borne in mind. Fii-st, the contribution to 
the development effort being made by nations 
other than the United States is substantial and 
rising. The acceptance of the aid burden 
which, in our country, grew out of lend-lease 
and the problems of wartime reconstruction in 
Europe and Japan is spreading to the peoples 
and governments of other nations. From 1960 
to 1961, for example, aid contributed by nations 
other than the United States rose from $2 to 
$2.5 billion. We are not in this alone; and in 
this area of policy the concept of partnership is 
clearly under way. 

Second, within the less developed areas the 
tendency of governments and peoples to face 
their development problems — which must be 
faced if aid is to be effective — is increasing. 
This trend does not make headlines and is not 
easy to dramatize, but for those whose duty it 
is to follow these matters from day to day it is 
unmistakable. It is no easy matter to assess a 
nation's resources and to design a coherent de- 
velopment program in sufficient detail to guide 
policy. It is no easy matter for f ragUe govern- 
ments, presiding over turbulent political situa- 
tions, to get agreement, for example, to increase 
tax rates and to improve tax collections when 
their societies have never developed the institu- 
tions and habits and attitudes required for 
modem fiscal systems. It is no easy matter to 
train and organize the technicians required for 
effective rural development programs. It is no 
easy matter to develop in new societies the skills 
required to translate an idea in a planning paper 
into a feasibility study and the engineering blue- 
print required for a foreign loan. Neverthe- 
less this is the underlying direction within the 
imderdeveloped world, and it is the right direc- 
tion. The number of good development plans 
is increasing; tax collections, rural develop- 
ment programs, and bankable projects are 

Third, and most fundamental, we should be 
conscious that in the past decade the Commu- 
nists have held up to the peoples and govern- 
ments of the underdeveloped world a banner 
and a program. They asserted that the prob- 
lems of modernizing an underdeveloped society 

PRTL 15. 1963 


could be accomplished only by Communist 
means, by a divorce from association with the 
West, and by intimate ties to the Communist 
bloc. In one area after another and in one 
country after another they asserted the proposi- 
tion that communism was the right road for the 
peoples of tlie developing nations to follow. 

Communist efforts in the underdeveloped 
areas have by no means ceased. There is no 
weakness or opportunity that the Communists 
will not exploit. On the other hand, the unmis- 
takable feeling and trend in the imderdeveloped 
areas are toward the maintenance of their na- 
tional independence and toward the devising of 
practical and pragmatic ways to develop, which 
conf oi-m not to Communist formulas but to their 
own traditions, problems, and aspirations. 

It can never be said too often that our national 
interest in the underdeveloped areas is, simply, 
that they maintain their independence and be- 
come part of an effectively working interna- 
tional commimity. Our greatest strength is that 
the Communists cannot say this with credibility. 
If these nations maintain their independence in 
the difficult transitional process in which they 
are engaged, we will win the struggle. But to 
win this struggle requires that we maintain our 
own efforts at economic assistance ; that we make 
it easier for these nations to earn foreign ex- 
change by normal trade; and that we exhibit 
imderstanding and patience in working with 
them tlirough this revolutionary passage whose 
outcome will help determine the kind of world 
our children and grandchildren shall live in. 

I can think of no moment in the postwar years 
when it would be less appropriatei for us radi- 
cally to reduce our aid programs or to despair 
of achieving important results for the national 
interest through those programs. The facts 
suggest that this is a time to persist — and to 
persist in good heart. 

Two Kinds of Challenges 

I have cited two major examples of the kind 
of long-term challenges that we as a nation face 
in helping to bring about the kind of world we 
want. There are others. For example, the 
problem of avoiding conflict within regions of 
the free world over deeply felt issues, often 
centering on problems inherited from the 

colonial era. As a great power, we are ofteiJ 
drawn into these disputes. Some of the proud- 
est passages in American diplomacy have beer 
written in recent years in quietly using oui 
limited but real margin of influence to bring 
about peaceful resolution of such conflicts— -j 
conflicts in which the Communists have in- ' 
vested vast resources in an effort to disrupt th( 
unity and peace of the free world. 

The same kind of persistent patience is re- 
quired in the field of arms control and in those 
real but narrow areas where we can work con 
structively with the peoples of Eastern Europe 

There are moments that call for bold anc 
decisive action; for example, the Cuban crisii 
of last autumn or the decision made late in 196] | 
to throw increased U.S. military support bfri 
hind South Viet-Nam. But the great objec 
tives of foreign policy are not achieved in ! i , 
day, nor are they achieved by dramatic gim ' 
micks. They are achieved by setting a sounc 
objective and sticking with it, through thicl 
and thin, with stubborn patience and steadi 
application of energy. As a distinguishe( 
postwar Secretary of State [Dean Acheson 
once said, the task of advancing the Nation' 
interest on the world scene in a dangerous an( 
turbulent era of history, in the face of commu 
nism's implacable hostility, is like "the pain o 
earning a living." | 

Wliat I am saying essentially, then, is this 
We have been engaged in the past years in 
mixture of urgent and dramatic crises and long 
term essential constimctive tasks. An effectiv 
American policy on the world scene require 
that we deal effectively with both kinds o 
challenges. Although this administration cam 
to responsibility in the midst of multiple crise,' 
we have from the beginning accepted botl 

In an interval such as the present, when tli 
crises are not as urgent and dramatic as the; 
have recently been, it is important for all o | 
us to focus our minds and gain perspective oi 
these longer run constructive ventures. Unles 
we meet the direct challenges of communisn 
and their intrusions into the free world effec 
tively — unless we maintain the frontiers o 
freedom — there will be no free world to build 
On the other hand, if we fail to develop clea" 
and constructive goals and the durable, stub 



)om patience to pursue them day after day 
n the face of all the inevitable frustrations, the 
;oncept of a free-world community capable of 
•xeating and maintaining within itself an es- 
sential unity, an environment of progress, and 
he capacity to settle its conflicts without resort 
o force will remain a matter of rhetoric — and 
'reedom will be in jeopardy in quite as real a 
vay as it has been jeopardized by violent 

Now, if I may, a final word which I speak as 
nuch as an historian as I do as a working mem- 
)er of the Government I am proud to serve. 

It is perfectly evident to us all that this nation 
"aces many unresolved problems on the world 
scene: Cuba; the continuing net drain on our 
)alance of payments; difl'erences of conception 
ibout the Atlantic partnership. The Alliance 
for Progress has not yet acquired full forward 
nomentum. The war in South Viet-Nam is still 
mresolved. And I could, of course, extend the 
ist. As we look around us, there is evidently 
10 cause for complacency, for slackening of 
'iFort, or for assuming that danger has passed. 
Nevertheless great things have happened in 
he past 2 years and we'should be conscious of 

A mortal threat to Southeast Asia has been 
wrought under control — a threat which could 
lave shifted the balance of power not merely 
tn Asia but on the world scene; the threat in 
central Africa, which could have torn apart the 
life of that aspiring but still fragile continent, 
das been averted; the powerful psychological 
ippeal that Castro was able to project from 
Habana and the means for backing it by the 
techniques of subversion and guerrilla warfare 
to which he is committed have been radically 
reduced by his own performance in Cuba and 
by what we in this hemisphere have done to- 
gether through the OAS [Organization of 
American States]. The threat of ultimatum 
which hung over West Berlin for almost 5 years 
after Khrushchev's 1958 statement has, for the 
time at least, been withdrawn. And the whole 
of this nation, led by the President, stood as 
one in compelling the withdrawal of missiles 
from Cuba. There are few people on either 
side of the Iron Curtain who do not understand 
that, despite Soviet nuclear weapons and deliv- 

ery capabilities, we were all prepared to do 
whatever might be required to force their re- 
moval. If we were to lead the free world in 
the decade ahead, it was essential that the ques- 
tion be answered as to whether the United 
States was prepared to undertake military ac- 
tion in the face of the Soviet nuclear threat in 
defense of our vital interests and those of the 
free world. 

As nearly as history produces a straight an- 
swer to such a question, that answer was given 
not merely by the Government but by all the 
American people last autumn. 

In facing the tasks ahead and in debating 
what we should do about them in the vigorous 
style of our democracy, we should not forget 
these things we have done together in the past 
2 years. As a nation we have a right to be 
proud and confident as well as a duty to be alert 
and determined as we face what lies ahead. 

U.S. and Brazil Reach Understanding 
in Economic and Financial Talks 

Following is the text of a joint communique 
between David E. Bell., Administrator of the 
Agency for Intemut zonal Development, and 
Francisco Clementine San Tiago Dantas, Min- 
ister of Finance of the United States of Brazil, 
released hy the White House on March 25. 

White House press release dated March 25 

The Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development, Mr. 
David E. Bell, and the Brazilian Minister of 
Finance, Professor San Tiago Dantas, an- 
nounced today the conclusion of the economic 
and financial discussions with the several 
United States departments and agencies con- 
cerned whicli were initiated on March 11. They 
are agreed that with the effective collaboration 
of the United States, other friendly countries, 
international financial institutions, and private 
enterprise, in support of the self-help efforts of 
the Brazilian people, Brazil will be able to ac- 
celerate its economic and social progress on a 
basis of financial stability and within the frame- 
work of the Alliance for Progress. 

During his stay in Washington, Minister 
Dantas also held conversations with officials of 

APRIL 15, 1963 


the International Monetary Fund, the Interna- 
tional Bank for Eeconstruction and Develop- 
ment, and the Inter-American Development 
Bank. Minister Dantas stated that these con- 
versations had considerably encouraged liini as 
to the prospects for the increased collaboration 
of those institutions in helping to support 
Brazil's program of stabilization and develop- 

The understandings reached betweeii the two 
Governments are set forth in the exchange of 
letters which follows : 

Letter of March 25, 1963, from Finance Minister 
Dantas to Administrator Bell 

Mt dear Mr. Administrator: I have the 
pleasure of calling to your attention the essen- 
tial elements in the program which the Brazil- 
ian Government has deemed it appropriate to 
adopt, in order to attack, with its own means 
and resources, the problem of economic and 
social development of the Brazilian people, 
while at the same time reestablisliing monetary 

A number of major actions have already been 
taken by our Congress and by the Brazilian 
Government within the framework of the tax 
reform law of November 28, 1962, and of the 
Three- Year Plan for Economic and Social De- 
velopment. They include : 

1. The adoption of tax reforms which are 
increasing revenues by about 25 per cent, and 
which provide the foundation for important 
administrative improvements in tax collection ; 

2. The elimination of subsidies on wheat and 
petroleum products, so as to reduce the cash 
deficit of the Treasury and free resources for 
developmental purposes ; 

3. An increase in railroad freight and pas- 
senger rates, with a view to reducing operating 
deficits ; 

4. The issuance of Decree 51,814 settmg 
forth the plan of containment of budgetary 
expenditures for 1963 ; 

5. The issuance of SUMOC [Superintend- 
ency of Currency and Credit] Instruction 234 
limiting the expansion of credit to the private 
sector from the Bank of Brazil ; 

6. The issuance of SUMOC Instruction 235 
providing for priorities in the extension of 

credit by private banks, enforced through a 
penalty of increased reserve requirements ; 

7. Presentation to the Congress of a proposal 
to give SUMOC additional power to control 
the banking system and to reorganize its admin- 
istrative structure so it may adequately carry 
out the basic functions of a Central Bank ; 

8. Conversion of the specific tax on electric 
power consumption into an ad valorem tax, and 
adoption for ten years of a compulsory loan 
system related to power rates, in order to raise 
non-inflationary resources for the expansion oi 
power systems ; 

9. An appeal to the state governments, and 
their agreement, to cooperate with the national 
stabilization and development eff'ort and to im- 
prove the efficiency of their govenmiental 
operations ; 

10. Presentation to Congress of a Message 
proposing that wage increases for public em- 
ployees be fixed at 40 per cent effective in April ; 

11. An appeal to labor unions for the adop- 
tion of a wage policy based on the principk 
that wage readjustments this year should nol 
exceed actual increases in the cost of living; 

12. Agreement by business associations in th( 
clotliing, shoe and automotive parts industries 
to the adoption of a policy of voluntaiy pric( 
restraint; similar agreements are being negoti 
ated with other industries ; 

13. Presentation of a Message to Congres 
proposing the adoption of an agrarian reforn 
progi-am, with a view to assuring an improve( 
social distribution of land, creating conditioni 
for increasing agricultural productivity, anc 
reorganizing the nation's agricultural system. 

In addition, it is the intention of the Brazil 
ian Government, during the course of the com 
ing few months, to take other measures for th( 
purpose of carrying forward the development 
and stabilization program, including th( 
following : 

1. Further elaboration of the plan for reduc 
ing the Treasury's cash deficit, so as to (a) 
identify in appropriate detail the main forms oi 
government spending as among development 
operating expenses, and subsidies to tlie federal 
agencies, (b) establish a system of priorities t( 
assure that development spending will be re- 
duced as little as possible (or, if practicable 



ncreased) witliin the limits of total expendi- 
ures prescribed in said plan, and (c) improve 
he control mechanism in order to assure com- 
oliance with expenditure ceilings; 

2. Application of any excess of budgetary 
receipts over the amounts foreseen in the pro- 
Tram mainly to a reduction in the forecast is- 
suance of currency, and to some mcrease in 
expenditures for high priority investment sec- 
ors such as education and health, which have 
)een especially affected by the economy pro- 
gram. In any event, the cash deficit of the 
Treasury will be held within the limits stated 
n the Three- Year Plan of Cr.$300 billion for 
he year 1963 ; 

3. Adoption as soon as possible of further 
neasures for the progressive elimination of the 
ieficits of the railroads and the merchant 
narine, in accordance with the program already 
formulated by the Minister of Transportation 
md Public Works. This program includes 
:ate increases, limits on number of employees, 
ulimination of uneconomic railroad trackage, 
md other operational and administrative 

4. The formulation, already under way, of a 
^lrther tax reform measure to improve both 
;he social equity and the economic efficiency of 
,he incidence of taxation, to be submitted to 
Congress in time to permit legislative considera- 
;ion this year. The corporate tax provisions 
will be designed to provide added stimulus to 
productive private enterprise. At the same 
•imp., further administrative measures will be 
taken to improve the collection of taxes and to 
reduce tax evasion and tax avoidance; 

5. Maintenance of the coffee policy set forth 
in the Three- Year Plan, in order to yield a net 
surplus in the coffee account of at least Cr.$100 
billion in 1963. A definite target will be estab- 
lished as soon as the size of the crop can be 
more precisely determined; 

6. Securing additional non-inflationary re- 
sources as offsets to the budget deficit, in ac- 
cordance with the same Plan, of at least Cr.$100 
billion during the year 1963, either related to 
the import system or through other means ; 

7. Direction of exchange policy, as provided 
in the Three- Year Plan, to reduce progressively 
the balance of payments dis-equilibrimn and 

for that purpose the rate of exchange will not 
be dissociated from the trend of internal prices; 

8. Adoption of specific measures to expand 
exports, particularly of iron ore, meat, and 
manufactured goods; 

9. Adoption of measures to encourage the 
inflow of productive private investments in or- 
der to help attain the targets of the Three- Year 
Plan in relation to capital imports, creation of 
productive employment, and maintenance of a 
high rate of economic growth ; 

10. Liquidation of commercial arrears as rap- 
idly as possible, in the light of exchange availa- 
bilities, with a view to their full liquidation by 
not later than May 1964, and the prompt insti- 
tution of effective controls over importation on 
the basis of suppliers' credits so as to avoid un- 
desirable levels of medium-term indebtedness; 

11. Elaboration in greater detail, during the 
next several months, of the Three- Year Plan 
for Economic and Social development, and in 
accordance with the Charter of Pimta del Este ^ 
securing the collaboration of the Panel of Nine 
Experts, with a view to the subsequent organi- 
zation of an international consortium of credit 
institutions and governments for the support of 
the Brazilian program within the framework 
of the Alliance for Progress. This program 
will contain specific developmental objectives 
for at least the years 1964 and 1965, and will 
take into account the measures being adopted 
during 1963 toward monetary stabilization and 
to strengthen our resources for development. 

These are the actions taken and the measures 
intended by my Government, in order, within 
the framework of our national effort, to carry 
out successfully our program of development 
and stabilization, so as to ensure the economic 
and social progress of the Brazilian people. 

The conditions for the successful execution of 
that program in a relatively brief time span 
can be favorably effected by the degree of ex- 
ternal assistance which may be received from 
international financial institutions, Western 
European countries, Japan, and the United 
States, especially taking into account the esti- 
mated balance-of-payments deficits, this year 
and next, of Brazil vis-a-vis the United States 

' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463. 

APRIL, 15, 1963 


and Western Europe, respectively. These defi- 
cits, whose magnitude has been estimated and 
reviewed by our respective technical advisers, 
can be absorbed or offset by means of credit 
operations which will at the same time serve 
the purposes of growth. 

On the basis of the encouraging preliminary 
discussions which I have held in Washington 
with the Managing Director of the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, we are asking the Fund 
to negotiate a standby arrangement by June, 
and in order to achieve this purpose to send a 
mission to Brazil. In the meantime, the Fund 
has agreed to tlie deferral of the $2G.5 million 
payment obligation which would otherwise 
have been due in March. 

Continuing the discussions which I have al- 
ready initiated with representatives of other 
countries which are creditors of Brazil, we will 
seek to obtain, during the same time period, 
new resources from Europe and Japan in an 
amount of approximately $100 million, includ- 
ing reactivation of the $77 million which were 
not used under the European standby credits 
negotiated in 1961. 

It would be highly important for me to learn 
the viewpoint of your Government concerning 
the possibilities of your participation hence- 
forth in support of Brazil's program of devel- 
opment and stabilization, so that this support 
may be included in the implementation of the 
Three- Year Plan already adopted by the Bra- 
zilian Government. I am sure that such collab- 
oration, supplementing our own self-help 
efforts, together with the aforementioned coop- 
eration of other governments and international 
institutions, would make a valuable contribu- 
tion to the achievement of the objectives of social 
wellbeing and economic strength set forth in 
the Charter of Pimta del Este. 

Please accept, Mr. Administrator, the assur- 
ances of my highest esteem. 

Fkancisco Clementino San Tiago Dantas 
Minister of Finance 

Letter of Reply of March 25, 1963, from Adminis- 
trator Bell to Finance Minister Dantas 

Dear Mr. Minister: During our talks in 
Washington in the last two weeks, we have 
greatly appreciated the opportunity to be in- 



formed by you and your associates of ti >*' 
program for economic stabilization and deve 
opment of the Government of Brazil, and tl 
actions and policy decisions already taken 1 
implement that program as set forth in jov 
letter of March 25, 1963. We have bee 
deeply impressed by the way in which th 
program has been initiated and by the oppoi 
tunities it appears to present for constructii 
international cooperation within the f ramewor 
of the Alliance for Progress. 

As you have indicated, the volume of resourc* 
required by the Brazilian program as well z 
your trade and investment connections wit 
Western European coimtries and Japan rende 
it desirable to enlist the support of those coud 
tries and also of international organization 
such as the International Monetary Func 
We are accordingly glad to know that it is you 
intention to seek a standby agreement with th 
Fund during the next two months, to initial 
conversations for long-term financing with th: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Da 
velopment and the International Developmen 
Association, and to obtain financial suppon 
from other international banking institutiom 
such as the Inter-American Development Ban 
and from the principal Western European coue 
tries and Japan. In this connection, we haT' 
noted the encouraging results of your initia 
conversations with the International Monetar" 
Fund and the other international financial 

As a result of these discussions, we can no\« 
foresee a combined supply of external resource* 
from the United States, the other creditor coun 
tries, and international agencies in support o 
your program for development and stabiliza 
tion adequate to cover fully Brazil's balance-of 
payments deficit as now estimated for 1963 anc 
to make a substantial contribution toward meet 
ing the 1964 deficit. At the same time, a majo) 
portion of the credits from the United Statei 
will provide support for key elements ir 
Brazil's program for economic development 
such as roads, electric power supply, and the 
expansion of small and medium industrial 

Looking farther ahead, we warmly welcome 
your intention to detail further your three-year 


department of state bulletin 

Ian as a basis for long-term economic and se- 
al development and to seek international col- 
iboration in its support in accordance with the 
rinciples and procedures of the Charter of 
"unta del Este. The United States will be pre- 
ared to participate whole-heartedly in that 
ffort. Thus international financial coopera- 
on with Brazil can be freed from the pressures 
f intermittent balance-of-payments crises, and 
laced on the constructive basis of support for 
»ng-term economic and social progress. 

For the period through May of next year, on 
16 assumption that external financial assistance 
'ill successfully be negotiated by June 1963 
pom other sources, as foreseen in your letter, 
le United States Government will for its part 
B prepared to commit, subject to applicable 
igislation, the following financial resources, 
)talling approximately $400 million, in sup- 
ort of your program for stabilization and 

ivelopment : 

'unds to be provided immediately : 

:port-Import Bank 

further funds : 

$33.0 million 
$25.5 million 
$25.5 million 

"gency for International Develop- 

Program Support $100.0 million 

Project Loans $100.0 million 

sport-Import Bank 

Refunding of debt repayments 
falling due between June 1, 1963 
and May 31, 1964 $44.5 million 

ublic Law 480, Title I Commodity 

shipments (estimated) $70.0 million 


,$398.5 million 

Disbursements of these funds are expected to 
e phased in time as required by the program 
nd parallel with the successful implementa- 
ion of the measures described by you. In order 
) meet the immediate needs of the program 
•hile negotiations are conducted with the In- 
jrnational Monetary Fund and European 
oimtries, in addition to the postponement al- 
eady agreed of the $26.5 million due this month 
D the Fund, the United States will provide 
mmediately credits from the Export-Import 

Bank, the Agency for International Develop- 
ment (AID), and the Treasury in a total of 
$84 million. 

The funds to be provided from AID re- 
sources would come in part from appropria- 
tions already made for the Alliance for Progress 
by the United States C!ongress for the fiscal 
year 1962-63; the remainder would be subject 
to the appropriation of fimds by the Congress 
for the fiscal year 1963-64. It is expected that 
these AID funds will be made available in the 
form of loans repayable with a substantial 
period of grace and a long subsequent period 
of amortization and at minimum rates of in- 
terest. The Administration's total request for 
authorization and appropriation of funds 
makes sufficient allowance for these purposes, 
and also to provide resources for the Northeast 
Development Program and initial support for 
subsequent phases of your three-year develop- 
ment program. The funds from the Export- 
Import Bank would consist of a release of $33 
million from the conmiitment made in 1961 and 
on the terms then agreed, and $44.5 million in 
refunding of debt repayments over periods of 
seven years. The Treasury funds will be ap- 
plied immediately on an interim basis and 
would later become part of the longer-term 

In addition the United States is now con- 
sidering appropriate terms and conditions for 
the sale of wheat to Brazil under Title I of P.L. 
480 for the calendar year 1963 and would be 
prepared, subject to the requirements of exist- 
ing legislation and established procedures, to 
extend this consideration to cover calendar year 
1964 as requested by the Brazilian Government. 
The total estimated value of such an extended 
agreement would be approximately $140 

I look forward to the early completion by 
representatives of our two Governments of spe- 
cific arrangements to implement the foregoing 
understandings, parallel with the progressive 
implementation of your own program. 

David E. Bell 

iPRIL 15, 1963 


The United Nations— What It Is, What It Has Done 

hy Ahram Chayes 
Legal Adviser^ 

Law and politics go together in this country. 
For Americans the characteristic busmess of 
government is the making and enforcement of 
laws. From the Continental Congress to the 
88th more lawyers have sat in our national legis- 
lature than members of any other profession. 
Governors, Senators, Secretaries of State have, 
as often as not, been lawyers. Officers neces- 
sarily drawn from the bar — judges and prose- 
cutors — play a more direct and acknowledged 
part in political processes here than elsewhere. 
It is perhaps no more than tlie just desserts of 
a country that prides itself on having a govern- 
ment of laws and not of men to wind up with a 
government of lawyers. 

The United Nations is not a government. But 
it is a political institution. It has an organiza- 
tional structure, complete with legislative, exec- 
utive, and judicial branches. It has written 
rules and unwritten traditions. It has a con- 
stitutional history as well as a political and 
diplomatic history. 

As lawyers with a flair for politics, we have a 
special interest in the ways in which the form 
and structure of that institution shape its work. 
Many of us here tonight are old enough to re- 
member with what hopes and dreams the United 
Nations was launched in 1946. For many Amer- 
icans, especially, the adoption of the charter 
was a kind of expiation of our earlier rejection 
of the League of Nations, and their expecta- 
tions, like those of most repentant sinners, were 
correspondingly extravagant. 

' Address made before the Bar Association of St. 
Louis, the St. Louis University School of Law, and 
the Washington University School of Law at St. Louis, 
Mo., on Mar. 21 (press release 148) . 

The framers of the charter met in the shadow 
of a long, cruel war whose toll of blood and 
suffering was still vivid. The U.N. was to be 
the instrument for preventing another such 
war and at least a first step toward the uni- 
versal vision of a parliament of man. The San 
Francisco conference had the political experi- 
ence of milleimia to draw on ; but at the same 
time its vision was circumscribed by contempo- 
rary political relationships erected for the de- 
feat of Germany and Japan. Like the 
draftsmen of any great charter, they callec 
into life a being the development of which couk 
not have been foreseen completely by the mos' 
gifted of its begetters. 

The champagne was hardly dry on the bow 
however, when the United Nations began t> 
change and grow from the conception of it 
begetters. For many this was a disappointmen 
or a betrayal. But for lawyers it should hav 
been ground to realize or to hope that they hac 
created an organism, something that could liv 
and grow to play a vital role in the world' 

Security Council and General Assembly ! 

In the original conception of the organiza 
tion most of its important powers were lodgei 
in and were to be exercised by the Securit; 
Council, composed of the five powers which hai 
led the wartime alliance and six other mem 
bers elected for 2-year terms. 

The charter assigns the Security Council "pri 
mary" responsibility for the maintenance of in 
temational peace and security. The operatin, 
premise of the Council was continuing big 
power cooperation in policing the world. Thi 



premise led the framers to view the Security 
Council as the principal peacekeeping agency, 
:o give it power to make binding decisions when 
;he peace was breached or threatened, and to 
I vest in it a near monopoly on the legitimate use 
Df force. We may be permitted to doubt 
whether, even if postwar politics had vindi- 
cated the hopes of San Francisco, the Security 
Council could have fulfilled the place foreseen 
for it. In Utopia the thrust of change and the 
jlash of interest may be small enough to be 
contained by so limited a political device as 
oenevolent oligarchy. Not in the real world. 

In any event the wartime solidarity between 
:he Soviet Union and the Western Allies, al- 
ready strained at Yalta and Potsdam, quickly 
passed into history. The premise of Big Five 
unanimity was early betrayed, and the veto 
iisabled the Security Council from functioning 
iccording to the original plan. Events demon- 
strated that the Council was not a wholly via- 
3le institution. Fortunately the charter, like 
Dther living docimients, contains in the ampli- 
tude of its conception and language the ma- 
:erials for giving effect to the primary purposes 
)f the United Nations, notwithstanding the 
withering of what was intended as its most 
powerful organ. Both to insure that the orga- 
aization remained an ongoing concern and to 
secure for the increasing membership a greater 
voice in the activities of the organization, mem- 
bers have consistently invested the General As- 
sembly with greater responsibility. 

Tliey have rejected constructions which 
would make the exercise of this authority de- 
pendent upon the concurrence of the Security 
Council. And they have narrowed the 
restraints on the authority of the Assembly orig- 
inally intended to give the Security Council the 
fullest freedom of action. This development 
is recorded in actions of United Nations organs 
interpreting the charter by exercising their 
powers under it and is reaffirmed in opinions of 
the International Court of Justice. 

The General Assembly, unlike a legislature, 
can act to bind its members in only a narrow 
range of questions, mostly organizational. But 
the charter grants a sweeping jurisdiction to 
exercise those other characteristic powers of 
legislatures — the power to debate and to inquire. 
Article 10 provides that the Assembly may "dis- 

cuss any questions or any matters within the 
scope of the present Charter." It may con- 
sider the "general principles of cooperation in 
the mamtenance of international peace and se- 
curity, including the principles governing dis- 
armament and the regulation of armaments." 
And it may "discuss any questions relating to 
the maintenance of international peace and se- 
curity." On all tliese questions the Assembly 
may adopt resolutions recommending, either to 
members or the Security Council, that action be 

There are two principal limitations on the 
power of the Assembly to act: It may not in- 
tervene in matters which are "essentially with- 
in the domestic jurisdiction of any state," and 
it may not interfere with the Security Council 
when the Council is exercising its "primary re- 
sponsibility" to maintain peace and security. 
In the event, this last restriction has been given 
a narrow scope. 

The formal work of the Assembly, adopting 
resolutions, is done at plenary sessions. Most 
of the real work of the Assembly, however, is 
carried on in its seven committees of the 
whole — ^two for political affairs, two for eco- 
nomic and social affairs, one for trusteeship af- 
fairs, one for administrative and budgetary 
questions, and one, unfortunately the least ac- 
tive, for legal affairs. In addition to these com- 
mittees the Assembly has created numerous sub- 
sidiary bodies, such as the Working Group of 
Twenty-one, which is currently seeking an ac- 
ceptable method of resolving the U.N.'s finan- 
cial crisis, or the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space, with its legal and tech- 
nical subcommittees scheduled to meet shortly, 
or the Committee of Twenty- four, which reports 
to the General Assembly on colonial questions. 

In this way, the Assembly has acted through- 
out the range of its charter powers. Last year, 
for example, it considered and dealt with, 
among other things, problems arising in the 
Congo and the Gaza Strip, Southern Rhodesia, 
South-West Africa, the Portuguese African 
territories, Yemen, and West New Guinea. It 
concerned itself with colonialism, the troika, 
sovereignty over natural resources, disarma- 
ment, outer space, world science, world food, 
world trade, and the training of manpower for 
economic and social development and with the 

APRIL 15, 1963 


recurring problem of how to finance these di- 
verse enterprises. 

Many of these problems the United Nations 
has not solved. Thus, after 15 years, the ques- 
tion of Palestine refugees remains unsettled. 
Despite hundreds of meetings and reports, and 
numerous resolutions on the subject, the world 
is not disarmed. And, above all, the United 
Nations has not ended the great conflict between 
East, and West, with its continuing threat of 
omnivorous war. 

But the Assembly is not a legislature. Its 
calls for action take the form of recommenda- 
tions addressed to sovereign states. In this 
light its record is no cause for despair. For 
more than half a decade its United Nations 
Emergency Force has maintained an uneasy 
truce along the Gaza Strip. It is today over- 
seeing the passage of West New Guinea from 
Dutch to Indonesian administration, pending 
arrangements for self-determination. Along 
with the Security Council, it mounted the Con- 
go operation to bring stability out of chaos in 
central Africa against overwhelming odds. In 
Iran. Greece, Palestine, and Lebanon it has 
moved less dramatically but no less effectively 
to keep the peace. 

These peacekeeping operations, and their suc- 
cesses or failures in dealing with flaring crises, 
dominate the headline reader's view of the U.N. 
But in the broader perspective of history a dif- 
ferent part of the Assembly's activity may come 
to seem of predominant importance. Tlie trans- 
formation of former colonial territories into 
sovereign states is one of the great movements 
of our time. It meant the collapse of a long- 
standing system of world order, the sudden 
rupture of old ties, the rapid liberation of a 
billion people. The Assembly has presided over 
this liquidation of the prewar colonial empires 
and has helped bring to birth, in less than a 
generation, and without major bloodshed, al- 
most as many nations as existed in the two 
centuries preceding San Francisco. 

Peacekeeping and nation building are only 
the more dramatic items on the Assemblv's 
agenda. In countless other ways that body has 
participated in the primary business of our 
age, the business of creating a viable order of 
free states witli the means to combat the hunarer. 

the poverty, the misery that has been the ac- 
cepted lot for most of the world throughout 

Functions of the Secretary-General 

The executive functions of the organization 
are entrusted to the Secretary-General and his 
staff. The charter says little about the ofEce 
of the Secretary-General. He is "the chief ad- 
ministrative officer of the Organization"; he 
performs "such other functions" as are en- 
trusted to him by organs of the United Nations; 
he makes an annual report to the Assembly 
on the work of the United Nations; and he may 
bring to the attention of the Security Council 
any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten 
international peace and security. 

From these bare and abstract plirases the 
Secretary-General has emerged as the vital 
"third man" in international politics. Dag 
Hammarskjold saw that the moral force of his 
oiEce, its assurance of political impartiality, and 
the respect and prestige invested in the person 
of the Secretary-General as the primary repre- 
sentative of the organization could be exploited 
decisively in the settlement of international dis- 
putes. It is a tricky role, but Hammarskjold 
developed it with consimimate skill. The Con- 
go crisis, which cost him his life, was his great- 
est effort. Both the conclusion of the Congo 
operation and the Cuban crisis last fall showed 
that his successor, U Thant, is also willing and 
able to act as the "third man" at times of 

The Secretary-General also administers the 
United Nations staff. The Secretariat is com- 
posed of some 5.500 international civil servants, 
who, as with their domestic counterparts, owe 
their allegiance to their organization and are 
apolitical in theory. The conception of an inter- 
national civil service is not a new one. It was 
developed both in the League of Nations and. 
more significantly, in the International Laboi 
Organization. Like the national civil ser\aces, 
the international civil service of the U.N. haf 
not always fulfilled the neutrality of its concep- 
tion. Some countries do not permit their na- 
tionals sufhcient freedom to carry out theii 
pledge of allegiance to the international com- 
munity. Competition for representation in the 



nternational secretariat, concerns for national 
;ecurity, and international tensions have all 
ended to render the international civil service 
ess apolitical in fact than in theory. However, 
)n the whole it is fair to say there is an inde- 
jendent international civil service and a large 
)ody of men and women dedicated to the organi- 
sation they serve and prepared to carry out their 
asks in a politically impartial fashion. 

mternational Court of Justice 

The judicial arm of the United Nations is 
he International Court of Justice. Its 15 
judges are sworn to exercise their powers "im- 
jartially and conscientiously." They owe obedi- 
)nce to no nation. 

The Court has jurisdiction over all cases re- 
ferred to it by members of the United Nations 
)r parties to the Statute of the Court. In addi- 
:ion states may, by declaration filed witli the 
I'ourt, submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of 
:he Court on terms set forth in the declaration. 

Under the charter, members are obligated to 
comply with decisions of the Court. The Court 
das no bailiff. But, by and large, members have 
lived up to their obligations and given effect to 
decisions of the Court nevertheless. Although 
disappointingly few cases have been submitted 
to the Court for adjudication, it has resolved 
thorny and contentious disputes. The border 
controversy between Honduras and Nicaragua, 
which had disturbed their relations for years, 
was decided by the Court, as was a territorial 
dispute between Thailand and Cambodia involv- 
ing possession of the ancient Temple of Preah 

In addition to deciding contentious disputes 
between parties, the Court is empowered by the 
charter to give advisoiy opinions "on any legal 
question" put to it by the General Assembly, 
the Security Council, or any other organ of the 
United Nations and specialized agencies author- 
ized by the General Assembly to request advis- 
ory opinions. In practice the legal questions 
put to the Court for advisory opinions have 
involved concrete facts and actual disputes so 
that the advisoiy opinions of the Court have 
resembled the declaratory judgments of United 
States courts. In the end this may turn out to 
be the Court's most important jurisdiction, for 

APRIL 15, 1963 

imder it the Court passes on fimdamental ques- 
tions of the grant and distribution of powers 
in the charter in a way that approaches most 
nearly the familiar constitutional adjudication 
of our own Supreme Court. 

U.N. Operations Comport With U.S. Interests 

So far we have been talking about the struc- 
ture of the United Nations, the distribution and 
exercise of powers. But the question remains : 
How does it work ? More especially, do its de- 
liberations and operations comport with the in- 
terests of the United States ? More particularly 
still, what of the charge that in the U.N. we 
have constructed a kind of Frankenstein's mon- 
ster, not made of the vital stuff and interests of 
the real world and responding to the shifting 
will of an irresponsible majority of new and 
imtried nations? 

It might be thought that such an accusation 
sounds strange coming from citizens of a nation 
which a scant hundred years ago was itself new 
and untried, and whose principal contribution 
to international affairs consisted of moralistic 
pronouncements on colonialism and other evils 
of its elders and betters. But putting aside any 
question of the standing of the accusers, what 
of the merits of the charge ? 

There is no question that today's General As- 
sembly, with its more than 100 members, half of 
them or more from the new nations of the 
southern continents, is different from the body 
of 50 mostly Western nations which started 18 
years ago. There is certainly no automatic ma- 
jority ready to do American bidding, willy-nilly. 
The range of interest, outlook, and background 
is not confined by any single regional or histori- 
cal perspective. To secure general assent for 
policies in such a body requires the arts of demo- 
cratic politics — negotiation, persuasion, debate, 
compromise — above all, the art of defining one's 
own particular interest in a way that coincides 
with and forwards the felt needs and interests 
of others. American politics has taught those 
arts to its practitioners for more than a century 
and a half now; so it is not surprising that we 
are good at them. A careful examination of 
the actions of the General Assembly will show 
few, if any, instances where the Assembly took 
significant action contrary to our annoimced 


policies, much less to our fundamental interest. 

I remember Ambassador [Francis T. P.] 
Plimpton's testimony before a committee of the 
House of Representatives, conditioned by press 
comment and political oratoi-y to think of the 
United Nations in terms of imruly "Afro- 
Asian" majorities. Ambassador Plimpton ran 
through the important issues of the 16th Gen- 
eral Assembly : the Russian troika proposal, the 
replacement of Dag Hamniarskjold as Secre- 
tary-General, the question of seating Commu- 
nist China and North Korea, nuclear test ban 
resolutions, the protest against the Soviet 
Union's 50-megaton bomb test, the Tibetan and 
Hungarian resolutions, Cuban charges against 
the United States, and the plans for U.N. financ- 
ing. On all of these he showed, to the surprise 
of the committee, that the majority of the so- 
called Afro-Asian bloc voted for the United 
States position and against that of the Soviet 

A similar catalog could be made of the ques- 
tions considered by the recently ended I7th Gen- 
eral Assembly, and with the same result. 

Charter Affirms Traditional Principles 

Box scores of this kind are fun, and we like 
to keep them. The ADA and the AFL-CIO 
and the NAM and the League of Women Voters 
all produce them for each and every Congress- 
man and Senator. Even the Justices of the Su- 
preme Court are put through the statistical lit- 
mus test to see whetlier they turn up blue or 
pink. I think it was your distinguished alum- 
nus Paul Freund who characterized this pro- 
cedure as one in which the counters don't think 
and the thinkers don't count. 

For in the last analysis we recognize that 
politics and government are not like a football 
game, where the winner and the loser and the 
score can be reported in the next day's papers. 
Politics and government are a process, and the 
important questions go always to the vitality 
of the process and the soundness and integi-ity 
of the institutions by which it is carried out. 
Measuring by this more fimdamental stand- 
ard, I think we have little to fear from the 

United Nations and much to take comfort andl 
hope from. For it is an organization whose' 
structure and values are rooted in the centrali 
ideas of Western political thought. It is start- 
ling how many of the familiar precepts of high 
school civics textbooks are embodied in the 
Charter of the U.N. — separation of powers, an 
independent and impartial judiciary, an apo- 
litical career civil service, free and open debate, 
the notion of one man, one vote. 

We take these concepts for granted — they 
are the only ones we have known as a nation — 
just as we take for granted the notion that poli- 
tics is the practice of talking and voting, of 
bargaining and compromise, of drafting and 
redrafting. But these concepts are all violently 
antithetical to everything the Soviet system! 
stands for. And they have not always beeni 
taken for granted, even in the West. Theyl 
have developed out of centuries of struggle. 
Tliey are enshrined in our great charters and 
constitutions, in our laws, and in our traditions, 

The United Nations Charter affirms thesei 
principles as universal rules of action. And 
in their daily work in New York nearly 100 
nations are learning to use these principles aa 
guides and measures of effective political ac- 
tion. The new nations of the world are leani' 
ing their international politics in a parliamen- 
tary framework. They are learning diplomacy* 
and democracy at the same time and in the? 
same place. They guard jealously their sover- 
eign prerogative to participate in the process oft 
making decisions or, to put it more simply, to» 
make up their own minds and to vote as theyi 

It is, I believe, immeasurably to our advan- 
tage that this should be so. More than that, 
When we, as lawyers, who have as a profession 
been so intimately connected with the emer- 
gence of the democratic values — when we, as 
lawyers, look at the United Nations Organiza- 
tion, we may be pardoned for thinking that the 
reaffirmation and dissemination of these values 
may be its most enduring and important; 



The Refugee Problem in Laos 


In its efforts to assist the Royal Lao Govern- 
ment to achieve stability since the foi-mation of 
the Government of National Union in August 
1962, the United States Government has, at the 
request of the Royal Lao Government, con- 
tinued a program of supplying food and other 
relief material to refugee groups in various 
parts of the Kingdom. Many of these refugees 
are opposed to the Pathet Lao, one of the three 
factions within the Government of National 
Union, and the Pathet Lao have sought to pre- 
vent delivery of these relief supplies by several 
means, even including shooting down imarmed 
relief planes. 

The Pathet Lao have sought to justify these 
actions by asserting that the reUef aircraft drop 
arms and ammunition, that alleged arms drops 
originate outside Laos, and that the United 
States contract air carrier is a paramilitary or- 
ganization which violates the Geneva Accords 
of July 23, 1962, which provided international 
guarantees for the neutral status of Laos.^ 

In order to establish the falsity of the Pathet 
Lao accusations, the American Embassy at 
Vientiane released to the press on January 
25 the following statement and attached 


Protracted civil strife in Laos has given rise 
to strong emotions and deep suspicions which 
are not easily forgotten. The Government of 
National Union, under the leadership of its 
Prime Minister, His Higliness Prince Souvanna 
Phouma, was formed nearly seven months ago. 

^ For texts of a Declaration on the Neutrality of 
Laos and an accompanying protocol, see Bulletin 
of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259. 

During this period, many of these emotions have 
begun to cool, and a beginning has been made 
toward achieving the cooperation and mutual 
confidence needed to unify Laos once again. 
The United States fully supports His Highness 
Prince Souvanna Phouma and his Government 
and has manifested this support by providing 
substantial assistance for education, roads, vil- 
lage development, agriculture, and other devel- 
opment projects; and by contributing the cost 
of a large part of the Kingdom's needs for im- 
ported commodities. The United States will 
continue to do whatever possible to assist His 
Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma and his 

One of the problems facing his Government — 
and, in humanitarian terms, one of the most 
important — is that of the refugees who tempo- 
rarily require relief supplies in order to survive. 
An estimated 125,000 to 150,000 men, women, 
and children, members of the Lao, Meo, Lao- 
Thoung, and other etlinic groups, in northern, 
central, and southern Laos, have had their live- 
lihood disrupted during the fighting. Many 
thousands sought refuge in isolated mountain 
areas, defending themselves when attacked. 
Others fled to populated centers in the valleys. 
Like the other people of Laos, they wish to re- 
turn to useful lives in a peaceful and united 
Kingdom. In order to do so, they need tools and 
seeds to plant new crops, and food to sustain 
them until their harvest is sufficient once again. 
Those in the northern mountains, in the prov- 
inces of Xieng Khouang, Sam Neua, Luang 
Prabang, and Nam Tha, who constitute a ma- 
jority of the total number of refugees, pose an 
especially difficult problem. The rugged and 
roadless terrain precludes ordinary transport, 
and they must depend on air supply or face 
starvation within a few weeks. This requires a 
large and expensive operation, involving the air 

APRIL 15, 1963 


transport of about 1,500 tons of relief supplies 
per month. 

It would be expected that no one would op- 
pose a program to feed refugees until they were 
able to feed themselves. It is regrettable that 
the Pathet Lao have, in fact, appeared to seek 
to put an end to refugee relief. The Pathet 
Lao mounted extensive military operations 
against the hill people before tlie formation of 
the Government of National Union and have 
made occasional attacks since. The Pathet Lao 
have also concentrated their efforts against the 
air supply on which a majority of the refugees 
depend. The hill jieople have persistently held 
out in the areas which liave been their homes 
for generations. The Pathet Lao claim how- 
ever that these refugees are in their "zone." 
The Pathet Lao charge that the United States 
has been violating the Geneva Accords, alleg- 
ing that arms and ammunition have been 
dropped and that one of the contractors provid- 
ing air services. Air America, Inc., is a "para- 
military organization." They assert that the 
agreement signed by the Eoyal Lao Govern- 
ment and the United States Government to 
continue refugee relief was "illegal." Finally, 
the Pathet Lao have consistently fired upon 
aircraft carrying relief supplies to refugees, 
and have shot down such an aircraft. 

The United States, in cooperating with the 
Royal Lao Government to provide sustenance 
to people in need, has been the object of repeated 
accusations, misrepresentations, and calumny. 
Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to 
make the United States position entirely clear. 

Tlie United States has traditionally offered 
help to the victims of war and disaster all over 
the world. This has been true in Laos. Suc- 
cessive Lao Governments have asked the United 
States to assist their relief programs, and the 
United States has gladly provided supplies, 
ground and air transport, and technical assist- 
ance. On October 1, 1962, the Prime Minister 
wrote to the American Ambassador [Leonard 
Unger], requesting that arrangements be made 
for U.S. help to the relief program to continue 
under the Govermnent of National Union. This 
was provided for in a formal agreement signed 
on October 7, 1962, by representatives of the 
Royal Lao Government and the United States 

Government. Under this agreement, the United 
States has continued its assistance to refugees, 
and is prepared to continue to do so as long as 
there is a need. 

The United States has been glad to examine 
with the Royal Lao Government the problems 
raised by the needs of the refugees in Laos and 
to help the Royal Lao Government to continue 
to supply them with the necessities of life. The 
American Ambassador has frequently discussed 
the question of such supply with His Highness 
the Prime Minister. He has repeatedly re- 
minded the leaders of the Pathet Lao that the 
American-chartered aircraft which provide 
supplies to refugees are open to inspection at 
all times. The Ambassador has reiterated that 
the United States has fully observed its obliga- 
tions under the Geneva Accords and will con- 
tinue to do so, and that no arms or ammunition 
have been supplied in violation of the Accords. 
He has also pointed out that the air service con- 
tractors are civilian companies which in no way 
violate the Accords. 

The Ambassador has, furthermore, suggested 
adoption of means which would eliminate any 
suspicion that these are other than legitimate 
relief flights, and which would put an end to 
attacks on unarmed civilian aircraft flying 
humanitarian missions. He has made it clear 
that the United States would accept special 
markings for relief aircraft, liaison officers 
from the three factions in Laos to accompany 
the fliglits, verification by the International 
Commission for Supervision and Control, or 
any other reasonable method. Regrettably, 
the Pathet Lao leaders have as yet shown no 
interest in considering these suggestions. 

The United States is now disciissing with the 
Royal Lao Government means for placing air- 
craft at that Government's disposition. If the 
current discussions reach agreement, tliis could 
provide assistance to the Royal Lao Govern- 
ment for its general air transport needs as well 
as a method for supplying the refugees with 
the seed, tools, and food they require. It is 
sincerely hoped that, once these arrangements 
are concluded, the Pathet Lao would not con- 
tinue to seek to put an end to the refugee 



The unification of Laos is one of the princi- 
pal objectives of the Geneva Accords and of 
the Government of National Union. By virtue 
of their participation in the Government of 
National Union, and their signature of earlier 
agreements among the three factions, the Pa- 
thet Lao have declared their commitment to 
the goal of reunification. Up to the present, 
however, the Pathet Lao's actions have implied 
that they are attempting to shift the balance 
of forces in Laos in their favor by seeking to 
cut off food supplies to the isolated refugees, 
imposing their will on the hill peoples, and 
consolidating what they claim to be the Pathet 
Lao "zone." It is obvious that these actions 
are not m keeping with the objectives M-hich 
have been declared by the Government of Na- 
tional Union, and that they violate all accepted 
humanitarian principles. It is to be hoped that 
the Pathet Lao will agree to reasonable arrange- 
ments for continued relief supply, and that they 
will join whole-heartedly m the work of unify- 
ing Laos. 

Tliis is a question of simple human need. It 
is also a matter of grave importance to the Gov- 
ernment of National Union and to the Geneva 
Accords. If it is indeed the intention of the 
Pathet Lao to attempt to alter the status quo in 
their favor and to consolidate their "zone" 
rather than to work toward reunification, the 
future of the Government of National Union 
and of the Geneva Accords may be in peril. 

The attached Memorandum, "The Refugee 
Problem in Laos," provides further information 
on this subject. 


I. Scope, Nature and Causes of the Problem 

There are no precise statistics about refugees in 
Laos : basic population data are inadequate and out- 
dated, and the frequent movements of many refugees 
make it difficult to keep records. The best available 
estimates place the total number of refugees between 
125,000 and 150,000. 

Most are members of ethnic minorities, in large part 
because much of the fighting in Laos was concentrated 
in mountainous areas where the minorities predomi- 
nate. The refugee problem in Laos has frequently 
been described as one principally or exclusively con- 

cerned with the Meo, but they constitute only 50% 
to 60% of the overall total, and 60% to 65% of the 
refugees in the northern provinces of Xieng Khouang, 
Sam Neua, Nam Tha, Luang Prabang, and Sayaboury. 
The numbers of refugees belonging to each major 
ethnic group are roughly as follows : 

Meo: 65,000 to 75,000; primarily in the northern 
provinces just mentioned ; 

Lao-Thoung : About 50,000 ; in Saravane, Attopeu, 
Sam Neua, Savannakhet, Thakhek, Sayaboury, and 
Sedone provinces ; 

Ethnic Lao : 10,000 to 15,000 ; primarily in Sam Neua, 
Xieng Khouang, and Luang Prabang provinces ; 

Other ethnic groups, including Yao and Thai-Deng: 
About 5,000; in several northern provinces, e.specially 
Nam Tha and Luang Prabang. 

These people, from widely-separated parts of Laos 
and belonging to many distinct tribes and sub-groups, 
nevertheless share certain common characteristics and 
experiences. Many lived at the higher altitudes of 
Laos' many mountain ranges, using the slash-and-burn 
technique to grow dry rice and other crops on the 
hillsides. It has always been at best a difficult and 
precarious living, but they have wished to live in 
their own way on their high ridges, which they prefer 
to the climate of the lowlands. 

A large proportion of those who are now refugees in 
Laos had earlier experience with the Pathet Lao. In 
1953 and 1954, when Viet Minh units, accompanied by 
Pathet Lao troops, invaded Laos, many upland people 
defended their homes. Following the 1954 Geneva 
Accords, Pathet Lao units and guerrilla bands sought 
to influence and dominate the hill peoples in both south- 
ern and northern Laos. They employed persuasion, 
propaganda, promises, intimidation, exactions of food, 
and conscription for labor and military service. In 
some areas, especially among the southern Lao-Thoung 
living near the border with South Viet-Nam, the Pathet 
Lao established control. For the most part, and espe- 
cially in the north, the hill people came to distrust 
and dislike the Pathet Lao and Pathet Lao efforts 
simply strengthened their desire to avoid Pathet Lao 
domination. Many villages and districts formed local 
Home Defense Companies (ADC's) in order to put up 
an organized resistance against Pathet Lao pressure. 

After large-scale fighting broke out again in 1960, 
the Pathet Lao concentrated their forces and were 
joined once again by large numbers of Viet Minh. The 
Pathet Lao reestablished themselves in the area 
around Sam Neua town, moved into the Plaine des 
Jarres, and increased their activity in other areas, in- 
cluding the south. Much of this strength was directed 
against the mountain peoples, which the Pathet Lao 
sought to bring under complete control. 

Remembering their earlier treatment by the Viet 
Minh and Pathet Lao, large numbers of hill people left 
their homes and sought to reestablish themselves in or 
near Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Pakse, and smaller 
towns. A larger number defended their home areas. 

APRIL 15, 1963 


using their existing Home Defense organizations, 
locally-made muzzle-loaders, and obsolete rifles. In 
cases where resistance could not be continued, they 
withdrew deeper into the mountains to more secure 
areas. Others remained behind, decided later to flee 
Pathet Lao control, and reached the refugee areas. 
Continued defense was still necessary, however, and 
many groups moved again and again as Pathet Lao 
pressure continued. The Royal Lao Army provided 
better weapons and equipment, and the Home Defense 
organization was broadened and improved. The United 
States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), 
at the request of the Royal Lao Government, assisted 
in the equipping and training of the hill peoples' Home 
Defense units, just as it assisted other units of the 
Royal Lao Army at that time. United States advisers 
assisting these people were, along with all other United 
States military advisers, withdrawn from Laos by Oc- 
tober 7, 1962, in full compliance with the Geneva 

Pathet Lao attacks and harassment continued even 
after May 3, 1961, when the Pathet Lao declared their 
acceptance of the cease-fire. In June 1961, for example, 
the Pathet Lao attacl^ed Ban Padong, about 30 kilo- 
meters south of the Plaine des Jarres, where Home 
Defense units were protecting several thousand women 
and children. All were forced to withdraw. There 
were many other attacks on less well-known locations. 
Military pressure on the refugees in mountain areas 
has declined sharply since the formation of the Gov- 
ernment of National Union, but the refugees report 
Pathet I^ao probes, mortar bombardments, and continu- 
ing small-scale attacks. 

The Pathet Lao, who had failed to win the allegiance 
of the mountain peoples, also failed to Impose their 
will on them through military force. The upland people 
lost a number of areas to Pathet Lao attacks, but the 
Meo, Lao, and Lao-Thoung mountaineers retained con- 
trol over more than half the total area of Xieng 
Khouang province, between one-quarter and one-third 
of Sam Neua province, and other extensive areas in 
what the Pathet Lao claimed to be their "zone." The 
southern Lao-Thoung in the Bolovens Plateau area 
succeeded in sharply reducing Pathet Lao harassment 
of their villages. 

Conditions in the refugee villages vary widely. 
Morale, social cohesion, and the will to continue are 
at different levels in different villages, but officials of 
the Ministry of Social Welfare, newsmen, U.S. AID 
[Agency for International Development] technicians, 
foreign diplomats, and others who have visited refugee 
areas have been impressed by their spirit and deter 
mination. It must be borne In mind that most refugees 
suffered great losses : it is difficult to estimate the total, 
but it is believed that on the average the refugees lost, 
in addition to their houses, crops, and fields, 80% to 
90% of their cattle and pigs and 70% to 80% of their 
clothing, cooking pots, tools, and other jwssessions. 
They have managed, nevertheless, to build new homes 
and begin farming again. Groups and tribes which 
formerly regarded one another with some suspicion or 

even hostility found that they could live close together 
and work in cooperation. Thus the war has moved the 
hill peoples closer toward a sense of unity in the Lao 

The experiences of the refugees in Laos can best be 
understood by a review of the history of several refu- 
gee villages. Brief accounts of four villages, one pri- 
marily Meo, another composed of northern Lao-Thoung, 
one principally a refuge for ethnic Lao, and a fourth 
inhabited by two tribes of southern Lao-Thoung, majl 
be found in the Appendix ' to this Memorandum. These 
accounts show the sacrifices made by the refugees, and 
their efforts to live decently, building their own 
schools — where the textbooks and subjects are the same 
as in other village schools in Laos — and operating sim- 
ple dispensaries to care for the wounded and sick. 

Since the formation of the Government of National! 
Union, the refugees in the mountain areas have takeni 
advantage of the return of relatively peaceful condi- 
tions and are clearing more land for planting. Withi 
very few exceptions, they would prefer to return to 
their original villages, where they would have familiar 
surroundings and, in most cases, better land. They arei 
afraid to leave their refuges, however, until they cam 
be sure of freedom from Pathet Lao retaliation or in- 
terference. The war has led to suspicions and bitter 
memories. When free movement is permitted, andl 
military and civil integration provide a basis for con- 
fidence, it can be expected that these feelings will dissi- 
pate. Then the hUl peoples will be able to play a use- 
ful part in a unified Laos. Until this occurs, there i» 
a need to assist them in achieving self-sufficiency anffl 
to sustain them until they can support themselves. 

In the provinces of Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang, 
for example, the refugees who have been able to farm^ 
despite adverse conditions have saved enough rice-seedl 
to sow over half the area they need for cultivation. 
Requirements for cooking pots, cloth, and similar goods 
are only 25% of their initial level. It is expected that 
the quantity of rice supplied per month, now nearlyi 
1500 tons, can be reduced to 300 tons per month by the 
end of 1963. This level of 75% overall self-sufficiencyi 
in basic foodstuffs can be achieved if the refugees re- 
ceive tools, materials for making tools, and seed toi 
supplement their own stock. Using these supplies, theyi 
will be able to clear more land, sow, and harvest. Thlsi 
assumes, of course, that the refugees will not be sub- 
jected to further Pathet Lao attacks or harassment. 
Equally promising possibilities are present for thei 
refugees in the south. 

These objectives cannot be achieved overnight, andl 
until this effort is completed, the refugees will needl 
further food supplies. The need is particularly acutei 
for refugees in the northern provinces who dependl 
upon air supply. Depending upon local opportunities! 
for farming, many villages would be reduced to starva- 
tion within ten days if air supplies were suspended, 
while all isolated villages would face starvation within 
two months. 

' Not printed. 



II. The Refugee Assistance Programs of the Royal 
Lao Government and United States Help to Those 

The refugee programs of the Royal Lao Government 
have been aimed at providing support until self-suffi- 
ciency becomes possible. Specifically, this program has 
been administered by the Ministry of Social Welfare. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross, work- 
ing In conjunction with the Lao Red Cross, private 
organizations such as CARE, and a number of friendly 
governments have offered assistance which has been 
accepted by the Royal Lao Government. 

The United States Government has also been glad 
to offer assistance. It had long been meeting requests 
from successive Lao Governments for help to refugees, 
and when fighting was renewed in 1960 the need be- 
came more acute. Working closely with Social Wel- 
fare officials, the United States provided food, blankets, 
medical supplies and other needs to those who had 
suffered during the fighting in Vientiane. Similar as- 
sistance was later provided in Vang Vieng, Luang 
Prabang, Muong Kassy, Pakse, Ban Houei Sai, and 
other areas. At the request of the Royal Lao Govern- 
ment and on the basis of agreements with the Ministry 
of Social Welfare, increasing quantities of food and 
other relief supplies were provided, usually by air. to 
isolated refugees in the mountains. This assistance 
continued following the formation of the Government 
of National Union, with United States officials continu- 
ing to work with their counterparts in the Ministry of 
Social Welfare. 

On October 7, 1962, following an exchange of letters 
between the Prime Minister and the American Ambas- 
sador, a new agreement governing the program for 
assisting refugees was signed by representatives of 
the Royal Lao Government and the United States 
Government. A communique issued by the Ministry 
of Social Welfare and published on October 13, 1962, 
in Lao Presse, the official bulletin of the Information 
Ministry, described this agreement : "In conformity 
with the wishes expressed by His Highness the Prime 
Minister of the Provisional Government of National 
Union In his letter of October 1st, 1962, to His Excel- 
lency the Ambassador of the United States, an increase 
in assistance to refugees has been arranged in the form 
of an addition to the Initial program of the Social 
Welfare Ministry. This assistance consists of the pro- 
vision of imported goods, technical and administrative 
advice, or personnel qualified for the purchase, gather- 
ing, packing, and distribution of relief articles, and 
transport by air or other necessary means." The 
communique added that 3,115,800 kip (equivalent to 
about $39,000) in counterpart funds and $786,500 in 
dollars were to be provided by the United States for 
local expenses and the purchase of seeds, rice, and 
other necessary supplies. It stated that "The project 
Is administered by the Ministry of Social Welfare." 

Procedures for implementing this agreement have 
varied in accordance with problems involved in sup- 
plying different refugee groups. In many areas, re- 

quirements are met by provincial Social Welfare of- 
ficers, operating under the direction of provincial 
Governors and in consultation with regional U.S. AID 
representatives, drawing on stocks provided to the 
Ministry of Social Welfare by U.S. AID. Specific 
needs for clothing, cooking utensils, and similar items 
are certified jointly by representatives of the Ministry 
and U.S. AID and filled by the Ministry from stocks in 
its warehouses which were supplied by U.S. AID. 
Rice is provided by U.S. AID on the basis of estimated 
monthly requirements for refugee areas, which are 
drawn up on the basis of requests by refugees to U.S. 
AID and Royal Lao Government representatives. 
Where air transport is necessary, U.S. AID makes it 
available through contracts with private American 
firms, including Air America, Inc., meeting all costs 
for fuel, maintenance, and other expenses. Flight 
schedules are filed with the appropriate officials of 
the Directorate of Civil Aviation. 

Air supply to refugees is a complex and large-scale 
operation, involving 14 aircraft making over 1,000 
flights per month, carrying about 1500 tons of cargo. 
Whenever possible, cargo is landed at airstrips and 
unloaded. Rice is usually dropped free-fall, while 
medical supplies, cooking utensiLs, school materials, 
and similar items are parachuted or taken to refugee 
areas in light aircraft, which also carry out medical 
evacuation mi.ssions and transport the Social Welfare 
and U.S. AID technicians who verify requirements 
and supervise distribution. As officials of the Min- 
istry of Social Welfare have become more familiar 
with the techniques and procedures involved in the 
refugee program, the requirement for United States 
technical assistance and advice has been reduced. 

ill. The Pathet Lao Attitude Toward Refugee 

The Pathet Lao have long faced a situation which 
must cause them acute frustration and embarrassment. 
Since the early months of 1961, they have claimed 
that most of northern Laos and a wide area of the south 
contiguous to Viet-Nam constitute their "liberated 
zone." They are well aware, however, that the peoples 
of very extensive areas of the north and substantial 
parts of the southern mountains have resisted Pathet 
Lao domination ; attempts at persuasion, intimidation, 
and conquest have failed. In the north, effective Pa- 
thet Lao control has been limited to the towns, the 
areas along major roads, some of the valleys, and a 
few other areas which they seized. Realizing that the 
people in the mountains of the north, cut off from nor- 
mal transport and unable to support themselves in 
peace, depended upon air supply for their survival, the 
Pathet Lao appear to have made a deliberate effort to 
starve the hill people into submission by bringing this 
air supply to an end. 

Beginning early in 1961, the Pathet Lao alleged that 
they were engaged in a police action against "bandits" 
who had been "airdropped" by the United States into 
the "zone" claimed by the Pathet Lao. This propa- 

APRTL 15, 1963 


ganda line was also adopted in an attempt to justify 
Pathet Lao attacks on the hill people following the 
cease-fire. The Pathet Lao appeared to have forgotten 
that these people had resisted them in 1953 and 1954 
and had avoided Pathet Lao domination ever since. 
The absurdity of the "air-dropping" contention is ap- 
parent if one wonders how, and why, anyone would 
parachute 100,000 or more men, women, and children 
into the rugged mountains of northern Laos. The hill 
people were there, they freely chose to defend them- 
selves, and the Pathet Lao had to search for some way 
to explain it. 

Throughout 19G1 and 1962, however, this remained 
a frequent theme of Pathet Lao propaganda. Follow- 
ing the formation of Prince Souvanna Phouma's Gov- 
vernment, the Pathet Lao representatives sought to 
achieve the cessation of relief supplies through 
manipulation of their position in the coalition. They 
claimed that the agreement on refugee relief signed 
by the Royal Lao Government and the United States 
Government was "Illegal," although it had been worlied 
out on the basis of a request from the Prime Minister 
that refugee relief continue under the Government of 
National Union. After the fact. Pathet Lao officials 
said that the agreement was not valid because they 
had not assented to it. Propaganda from the Pathet 
Lao radio became more intense, and General Singkapo, 
Pathet Lao commander in the Plaine des Jarres area, 
told newsmen that a special effort had been made to 
emplace anti-aircraft weapons. Relief aircraft were 
fired upon frequently, and an American aircraft on a 
refugee relief mission was shot down in Nam Tha 
province on January 5, 1963, resulting in the death of 
a cargo handler. The Pathet Lao radio has since 
indicated that they would shoot down other aircraft 
whenever possible. 

The Pathet Lao have also sought to cut off supplies 
to Neutralist forces in the Plaine des Jarres area. At 
the specific request of the Prime Minister, American 
aircraft carrying rice and other foodstuffs made drops 
to Neutralist units and unloaded at the Plaine des 
Jarres airstrip. The Pathet Lao radio, quoting Gen- 
eral Singkapo, announced In November that American 
aircraft taking supplies to Neutralist forces would be 
shot down. On November 27, 1962, an aircraft loaded 
with rice was shot down while preparing to land at 
the Plaine des Jarres. Although it is reported that 
the shots were fired by members of a Neutralist unit 
who had forsworn their loyalty to the Prime Minister 
and to General Kong Le, the Pathet Lao's responsi- 
bility is clear. 

The Pathet Lao have sought to justify these attacks 
on unarmed relief flights by asserting that the aircraft 
drop arms and ammunition, that alleged arms drops 
originate outside Laos, and that Air America, Inc., is 
a paramilitary organization which violates the 
Geneva Accords. 

These accusations are entirely false. The United 
States is not introducing arms, ammunition, or other 
military supplies into Laos in violation of the Accords. 

No United States aircraft are making arms drops Inj 
violation of the Accords. All flights to destinations ini 
Laos by American-chartered aircraft, including relief 
flights, originate in Vientiane. The companies provid- 
ing air services under contract to the United States 
are entirely civilian, and their employees are not, to 
use the language of the Accords, "foreign civilians 
connected with the supply, maintenance, storing and 
utilization of war materials." 

If the Pathet Lao wish to satisfy themselves that the 
refugee program in Laos is a legitimate relief opera- 
tion, they can easily do so by inspecting the aircraft 
and their cargo. If any doubts remain, the Geneva 
Accords provide an international mechanism for veri- 
fication : the International Commission for Supervi- 
sion and Control. The Pathet Lao have not, however, 
made any official complaint about air supply to thei 



U.S. Supports Full Membership 
for Japan in OECD 

Statement hy Secretary Rusk 

Press release 155 dated March 28 

Today the members of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development asked 
the Secretary General of that organization to 
initiate discussions with the Japanese Govern- 
ment designed to bring about formal accession 
by Japan to the OECD convention. 

The United States has for some time sup- 
ported full Japanese membership in the OECD 
and welcomes this development. Jajian will 
make a valuable contribution to the major aims 
of the Organization, which are to contribute to 
the development of the world economy through 
economic growth and financial stability, to the 
expansion of world trade on a multilateral, 
nondiscriminatory basis, and to the economic 
advancement of the less developed countries. 
The potentialities for useful work by the OECD 
will be greatly enhanced. The accession of 
Japan will add to the membership of the OECD 
the only major industrial, financial, and trading 
nation not now in the Organization. 

Since its inception Japan has been a member 
of the Development Assistance Committee of 
the OECD (and its predecessor, the Develop- 
ment Assistance Group). Japan has been an 
active participant in this Committee's activities 
in promoting and coordinating economic as- 




istance to the developing countries. It ranks 
ifth among the countries contributing to such 

We look forward to the successful completion 
i the preliminary discussions between repre- 
entatives of the Japanese Government and the 
Secretary General of the OECD, which should 
ead to the formal accession of Japan at an 
arly date. 

J.S. Asks Cuba for Explanation 
if Attack on "Floridian" 


The U.S. Coast Guard has reported the re- 
ceipt of a message from the United States 
Motorship Floridian proceeding in interna- 
tional waters off the north coast of Cuba en 
TOute from San Juan, Puerto Kico, to Miami, 


The message reported that at approximately 
B:05 p.m. Washington time today two uniden- 
tified jet aircraft had fired bursts across the 
\Floridian''s bow and stem without striking the 

CINCLANT [Commander in Chief of the 
fU.S. Atlantic Forces] immediately dispatched 
their jet fighters to the area. 

The Floridian, under U.S. air escort, is now 
iproceeding toward Miami, where it is due at 

I "I a.m. Friday morning. 
Further details are expected to be available 
after the Floridian arrives in Miami. 


Press release 163 dated March 29 

The United States Government is currently 
in receipt through diplomatic channels of two 
messages ^ from the Cuban government in con- 
nection with the firing by two Cuban MIG air- 
craft in the immediate vicinity of the United 
States Motorship Floridian on the evening of 
March 28. 

In the first message the Cuban government 
said that the Cuban planes on the afternoon of 
March 28 had discovered what Cuban authori- 
ties considered to be a suspect boat flying the 
United States flag 25 miles northeast of Cayo 
Fragoso in Las Villas province. The Cuban 
government inquired of the United States Gov- 
ernment as to whether the United States flag 
was being legitimately flown by the ship in ques- 
tion. Simultaneously, a Cuban naval vessel was 
ordered to proceed to the spot to clarify the 

Upon learning of the statement issued at 9 :15 
p.m. last evening by the Department of State, 
the Cuban government in a second message in- 
dicated it presumed that the boat sighted by 
Cuban aircraft earlier in the afternoon was tlie 
same ship mentioned in the Department of State 
announcement and informed us that the Cuban 
naval vessel had turned back. 

The Cuban government in this second mes- 
sage added that the MIG's probably fired in 
error and that there had been no intention on 
the part of the Cuban government to slioot at 
the Floridian. These are the facts as they are 
now known. 

The United States today is asking the gov- 
ernment of Cuba for a full explanation of this 

United States Expresses Views 
on Military Rule in Korea 

Department Statement ^ 

The military junta's effort to continue mili- 
tai-y rule for 4 more years has created a diffi- 
cult situation in Korea. We believe that pro- 
longation of military rule could constitute a 
threat to stable and effective government, and 
we understand that this whole matter is being 
reexamined by the Korean Government. 

We hope the junta and the major political 
groups in Korea can work out together a pro- 
cedure for transition to civil government that 
will be acceptable to the nation as a whole. 

^ Released to the press by John F. King, Public 
Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Inter- American Affairs. 
' Not printed here. 

' Read to news correspondents on Mar. 25 by Lincoln 
White, Director of the Office of News. 


President Receives Clay Report 
on AID Program 

Following is the text of a letter from Presi- 
dent Kennedy to Gen. Lucius D. Clay, cluiir- 
nian of the Committee To Strengthen the Secu- 
rity of the Free World. 

White House press release dated March 23 

March 22, 1963 
Dear General Clat: I have received your 
report ^ and I want to tell you how grateful I am 
to you and the other distinguished private citi- 
zens on your Committee ^ for the time and effort 
you have devoted to preparing it. The Com- 
mittee's expression of support for properly 
administered mutual defense and development 
programs — coniing as it did after an intensive 
and searching review — is very heartening. 

I was pleased to note the Committee's recog- 
nition of the imjjrovements which have been 
made in the Foreign Assistance Program in re- 
cent years, including the increased emphasis on 
self-help, better definition of progi'am goals, 
reduction in its balance of payments impact, 
and the increased emphasis on the role of 
United States private investment. You may be 
sure that the Committee's recommendations in- 
cluding greater selectivity, stricter self-help 
standards, greater participation by the devel- 
oped countries in aid efforts and continued 
improvements in administration, will be care- 
fully applied in our continuing review of this 

I am hopeful that we will be able to develop 
widespread public awareness of — to quote your 
report — "the great value of properly conceived 
and administered foreign aid programs to the 

^ The Scope and Distri'bntion of United States Mili- 
tary and Economic Assistance Programs: Report to 
the President of the United States from The Commit- 
tee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, 
March 20, 1963; available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington 25, D.C. (price 15 cents). 

' For background, see BtniETiN of Mar. 25, 1963, 
p. 431. 

national interest of the United States and ofi 
the contribution of the foreign assistance dollar 
in such programs to the service of our nation's' 
security". Again, I want to thank you and thei 
other members of the Committee for thei 
important service which you have rendered. 

John F. Kennedy 

U.S. Accepts Recommendations 
on HaSibut Abstention 

White House Statement 

White House press release dated March 23 

The President has today [March 23] taken 
action in accordance with the North Pacific 
Fisheries Act of 1954 to accept the recommen- 
dation of the International North Pacific Fish- 
eries Commission, which, if accepted by Canada, 
Japan, and the United States, will permit the 
Japanese to fish for halibut in the eastern Ber- 
ing Sea along with the U.S. and Canadian 

In reaching tliis decision we have not only 
taken into account our international obligations 
but also the domestic factors which have come 
to our attention. We consider that this action 
advances the cause of the principle of absten- 
tion, which is at the heart of the tripartite 
fisheries treaty of 1952 ^ and which provides a 
reasonable, workable, and essential procedure 
for dealing with certain major North Pacific 
fishery problems. We are determined to work 
for the continuation of this principle and of 
the treaty hi which it is set forth. 

We are cognizant of the Commission's recent 
successful efforts to develop conservation meas- 
ures which, if accepted by the three parties to 
the tripartite treaty, will provide suitable pro- 
tection for eastern Bering Sea halibut. This 
action will not take effect imtil the Canadian 
Government takes similar action. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2786. 




Foreign Policy in tlie Open Society 

Statement by Robert J. Manning 
Assistant Secretafi^ for Public Affairs ^ 

m I welcome this hearing as an opportunity to 
air more than one side of an issue that lies as 
close to the question of democratic survival as 
any in modern times. 

The dilemma posed by the conduct of gov- 
ernmental affairs in an open society is one this 
country willingly assumed from its founding. 
We have sought and found the means to live 
with the dilemma and to prosper and grow 
without recourse to repressive practices or, so 
far as the printed press is concerned, regula- 
tory controls. The dilemma might be more 
bluntly described as a built-in conflict between 
the easier way of conducting certain important 
governmental business or delicate diplomatic 
negotiations in privacy and the right and need 
of the democratic public to know the facts and 
policies on which the national business is being 
conducted. Such a paradox exists, and it lies 
at the center of the questions before this sub- 
committee today. 

Obviously the first step toward easing and 
living with this problem is to admit that it is 
there. A second step is to admit that, while 
the American press and the American Govern- 
ment share identical devotion to the cause of 
their country and to its interests, the two do 
not — cannot — always share identical concepts 
of their functions or of their obligations to the 

^ Made before the Foreign Operations and Govern- 
ment Information Subcommittee of tlie House Com- 
mittee on Government Operations on Mar. 25 (press 
release 151). 

While one seeks to serve the public by dis- 
closure, the other may be serving a public 
need — and a public desire — by protecting a 
national policy from failure through premature 
disclosure. Indeed, the public in many in- 
stances might well find the government official 
derelict if he does not so protect it. Like pho- 
tographic film, many a diplomatic or strategic 
position can be destroyed by premature expo- 

We all know that it is difficult to strike bar- 
gains in public. Quite aside from the compli- 
cations of doing business with other govern- 
ments, what are some of the realities within 
our own democratic system? Are reporters 
to sit in the Supreme Court coimcil chamber 
when Justices are deciding their cases? The 
closed "executive session" is a frequent occur- 
rence on Capitol Hill. How many reporters 
have been covering the negotiations between 
the New York City newspaper publishers and 
the printers' iinion? Where are the reporters 
when the executive committee of U.S. Steel 
convenes? Indeed, in this hearing where are 
the cameras and microphones of the television- 
radio media ? 

There are good and long-accepted answers to 
all— or most of — these questions, but these and 
many similar realities have been obscured in the 
great fog bank of cliches raised by some of the 
press in recent months. 

This hearing arises from the subcommittee's 
concern about the public's right to know. I 

APRIL 15, 1963 


want to assure you first of all that, as a working 
newspaperman of 27 years' standing, I too am 
concerned that Americans know. Since com- 
ing to the State Department slightly less than 
a year ago, I have seen more sharply the di- 
mension of a parallel fact, the public's Tieed to 
know. Day after day we see the difficulties that 
arise because there is not enough public knowl- 
edge and understanding of the events and 
forces at work in today's labyrinth of interna- 
tional affairs. So let me assure you that to 
keep the public uninformed, or to have it ill- 
informed by an ill-informed press, does not 
serve the Government's purpose. 

I am here today without apologies. If any- 
thing, I am here to speak with pride about this 
Government's information activities. 

The business of American foreign policy is 
public business. Only a fraction of State De- 
partment business — perhaps no more than 1 
percent — is not immediately or imminently 

The State Department is as wide open as 
Yankee Stadium, and the admission is free. 
The first item handed to a new correspondent 
by the Office of News is a Departmental tele- 
phone book listing both office and home tele- 
phone numbers of Department officials. The 
top officials and policymakers of the Depart- 
ment spend at least a third of their time, and 
often more, in defining and explaining Amer- 
ican policy to the public, to Members of Con- 
gress, and, day in, day out, to newsmen. We 
like it that way, and we are going to keep it 
that way. 

If I were to express a philosophy for an in- 
formation official in government, I would not 
have to change that which served me as a re- 
porter: to find out the facts, get them into 
perspective, and, within the limitations of na- 
tional security, put them out truthfully and 
quickly. The principles are the same. 

It is obvious, however, that for the reporter 
and for the government official in this demo- 
cratic society, considerations and circmnstances 
differ. In 1851, Lord Derby, in assailing The 
Tiines of London, said : 

If the press aspires to share the influence of states- 
men, it must also share in the responsibilities of 

That can be disputed, as it was at the time by* 
Robert Lowe of The Times. He wrote : 

The first duty of the press is to obtain the earliest 
and most correct intelligence of the events of the time' 
and instantly, by disclosure of them, to make them the 
common property of the nation. . . . The press lives 
by disclosure. . . . 

He added : 

The statesman's duty is precisely the reverse. He 
cautiously guards from the public eye the informa- 
tion by which his actions and opinions are regulated; 
he reserves his judgment of passing events till the 
latest moment and then he records it in obscure or 
conventional language ; he strictly confines himself, 
if he be wise, to the practical interests of his country, 
or to those turning immediately upon it. 

From an American i)erspective, there is ex- 
treme oversimplicity in both Derby's and 
Lowe's generalities. But they serve well in 
helping to define what we are grappling with: 
namely, that there are moments when the inter- 
ests of a government serving the people and a 
press informing the people do not coincide. 
Between the enunciation of a policy and the 
actions imdertaken to carry out that policy, 
government must sometimes make a sharp dis- 
tinction. Quite properly, journalism need not 
and frequently does not make that distinction. 
It applies its mission of disclosure both to the 
rudiments of policy and to the day-by-day, even 
hour-by-hour, actions of governments in carry- 
ing out those policies. 

Government is of the public, and responsible 
directly and unequivocally to the public — the 
public as a whole, not merely to one segment, 
even that powerful segment, the press. In 
most uistances, government can serve the public 
in the field of information by the direct expe- 
dient of serving the press. Life would be sim- 
pler for us all if this were always the case. But 
it is not. 

If we Americans lived in a closed society — in 
a vast continental house, sealed tight of soimd 
and impregnable to eavesdrop and wiretajD — we 
could engage in the fullest, freest disclosure and 
discussion of all information, all facts, all the 
delicate nuts and bolts of foreign or military 
policy. Even the tightly closed society of So- 
viet Russia finds this unfeasible; it solves the 
problem by telling its people little or nothing. 




Here in the openest society, every govern- 
ment pronouncement, every expressed detail of 
a policy formulation or a negotiating position, 
every official evaluation of a political situation 
^^ or a news event flows directly to four audi- 
ences — the American public, our allies, the neu- 
tral nations, and our cold-war antagonists. 
This is a fact that may not figure large in the 
reckoning of some newsmen, but it must be very 
much in the mind of the government official. 

Rarely in foreign policy matters is there a 
direct issue of suppression versus disclosure. 
Where government and press find themselves 
in conflict, the issue is often one of timing, of 
tone of voice, or of attribution. Both sides 
usually find ways of getting aroimd such 

Some Working Principles 

You have proposed, Mr. Chairman, that these 
hearings should seek to trace some contingency 
lines of procedure for handling information in 
periods of high crisis. It is very difficult to 
conceive of specific rules and procedures that 
can be laid down in advance for the handling 
of foreign policy and politicomilitary develop- 
ments, as distinct from purely military activi- 
ties, but I know that the Department of State 
and, I am sure, the Government at large would 
welcome concrete suggestions from this sub- 

Even without specific guidelines, those deal- 
ing officially with foreign relations must work 
from certain set principles and apply them with 
flexibility to each individual set of circum- 

1. Foreign policy in the United States must 
be evolved by open public discussion of pro- 
posed policies, of the objectives of those policies, 
and, in most cases, of the means to be used to 
attain those policies. There must be ample 
candor and ample time for public and Congress 
to debate, alter, approve, or disapprove. In 
short, public policies publicly arrived at. 

2. Once a policy has been publicly enunciated 
to the full, those responsible for carrying out 
that policy may require certain interludes of 
privacy in which to get the job done. Mr. Wal- 
ter B. Potter [publisher, Culpeper Star-Ex- 

APRIL 15. 1963 

pomnt, Culpeper, Va., and director, National 
Editorial Association] in his statement to you 
Tuesday said : 

They (editors) also recognize that delicate diplo- 
matic situations sometimes require that full disclosure 
be delayed until negotiations are completed. 

It is fair to assume, I believe, that this also re- 
flects the view of other publishers, editors, and 
correspondents. In any case, it reflects a down- 
to-earth necessity. Without such interludes of 
privacy — interludes employed to carry out, not 
to alter, enunciated policies — this Government 
would find it impossible to coordinate with its 
many allies or seek honorable arrangements 
with other nations. 

In the case of Berlin, as one of many ex- 
amples, the United States has long made clear 
a policy that has been widely discussed and en- 
dorsed by the American public. Briefly, it is a 
policy that insists on continued Western mili- 
tary presence in West Berlin, continued viabil- 
ity of W^est Berlin, and guaranteed access to 
West Berlin. Wliat the public wants to know 
is (1) that this is the policy and (2) that the 
necessaiy private diplomatic interludes are be- 
ing used to achieve that policy. I cannot begin 
to measure the amount of time and energy that 
topmost officials of this administration have 
invested in seeing to it that such knowledge and 
assurance is continuously made available to the 

The other foreign policies of this Govern- 
ment meet these criteria as well. 

3. Truth is an essential. Quite aside from 
the issue of morality, falsehood is unnecessary. 
If choice did come down to holocaust or truth — 
to the "ultimate extremity" Mr. Eeston [James 
B. Reston, Washington bureau chief, the New 
York Times] mentioned in his statement to 
this subcommittee last week — I suppose many 
might accept the slogan : "better misled than 
dead" — a slogan which does not represent State 
Department policy or mine and which I fondly 
hope will not be jerked out of context. 

Tliis subcommittee is concerned with the 
practical matter of day-to-day information pol- 
icies. On this there can be no argument ; truth 
and factuality must be the touchstones. The 
obligation of the government official is to tell 
the truth or, if security dictates, to button his 


lip. I know nobody, inside or outside govern- 
ment, who disputes this. 

Getting Out the News 

I referred earlier to the openness of the De- 
partment of State and to the broad channels of 
access for reporters there. Mr. Reston has been 
so kind — and accurate — as to define this access 
as the greatest in 20 years. That's a piece of 
news that's fit to print. 

On the point of access, I am sure the subcom- 
mittee has questions about the so-called report- 
ing procedure instituted at the Department of 
State on October 31 and suspended on N'ovember 
27. You have in your files, Mr. Chairman, a 
letter explaining the circumstances and context 
of that procedure and also a copy of the circular 
distributed to officers of the Department on 
N'ovember 27 explaining the purpose of that 
procedure. I need not take the time of the 
subcommittee to repeat those details, but I 
would like the opportunity to correct some of 
the sloppy reporting and commentary growing 
out of the matter. 

The procedure was very simple, requiring 
only that officials report, after the fact, the oc- 
currence of an interview with a newsman, his 
name and paper, and the subject discussed. It 
excluded telephone interviews and all meetings 
outside the Department. It specifically did not 
require the presence of a third person — "a body 
in the room" — as Mr. Reston erroneously put it ; 
nor did it require a memorandum on the sub- 
stance of what was discussed ; nor did it require 
that advance permission for interviews be 

Perhaps I might quote briefly from that No- 
vember 27 circular its expression of the infor- 
mation pliilosophy at the Department of State : 

It Is essential both to the public and the govemment 
that there be the fullest possible dialogue between 
policy oflScials and newsmen, and ... it is the policy 
of the Department, as interpreted by the Bureau of 
Public Affairs, to encourage this dialogue, not to inhibit 
it. . . . This requires contact between policy oflBcials 
and newsmen. 

We invited correspondents to report any in- 
stances of seeming inliibition. To this day none 
has charged any. 
I might point out in this connection that in- 

vestigation shows that this is the first time in) 
the history of the Department that officers have* 
been told, on the direct authority of the Secre- 
tary of State, that direct discussion with tha 
press is a fixed part of the officers' duty. I as^i 
sure you, that obligation is daily honored in ai 
multitude of ways. 

The reporting procedure, now suspended but 
not abolished, grows out of a simple right to : 
know — the right of the Secretary of State and ; 
his public affairs advisers to know whether andi 
how this important part of the Department's 
business is being conducted. I insist on tha 
validity of this right, on the Secretary's behalfl 
and my own. 

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, a few words about then 
activities of information officers at the Depart- 
ment of State and other parts of the executive- 
branch. I have never known a time when in- 
formation officials have been so fortified witln 
intimate access to major govemment policies* 
and actions. There was a time when this func- 
tion was relegated to the late stages of policy 
decisions; the information officer was calledi 
in, fitted with a Western Union suit, and sent 
off to deliver the message. That has changed. 
It has changed because the leaders of this Gov- 
emment exercise high and healthy regard for 
the fundamental obligation to keep the public 
informed. At the Department of State it has 
been possible to assemble a team of professional 
journalists and high-ranking Foreign Service 
officers who have deep access to the facts and 
dialog of foreign policy. They are men who 
know or who, in those instances when they do 
not know, can and do put reporters in touch 
with the experts who do Imow. No newsman is 
required to seek their help or screen his own 
reporting initiative through their offices. The 
fact that one small group of 4 information 
officers handles some 500 telephone and personal 
interviews with reporters each week suggests 
the value attached to their services. 

Similarly, for individuals and for groups of 
reporters the Department provides a weekly 
stream of background interviews and ex- 
changes. The "background" technique is one 
of the most valuable devices for elucidating the 
facts and policies that might otherwise remain 
obscure until negotiations are completed. The 



•epoi'ter is the sole judge of whether he chooses 
o attend background briefings, of whether the 
nformation is printed or not printed, of 
.vhether the "baclvground" information fits the 
:)icture as he sees it. Any good reporter ap- 
proaches them caveat emptor, and that is the 
>vay it sliould be. 

i/oiume of Information 

Tlie vohime of available information is over- 
(vhelming — so overwhelming that in these days 
if many complex crises the press cannot fully 
ligest and convey all that is happening and all 
'hat has crucial meaning to the people of this 
country. That is not a criticism. It is a fact — 
one that suggests increasing obligations on 
'2;oveniment as well as on the press. As one 
5mall illustration, Mr. Chairman, the United 
States tliis week is engaged in some two dozen 
different international conferences or conclaves 
iroimd the world. The ton-ent of news de- 
veloped in this country and abroad will bury 
most of those deliberations in temporary 
obscurity. So the press and other media have 
a problem of "news management" that should 

I elicit our sympathy. 
All of us engaged in this important enter- 
prise have problems. We all are subject to 
imperfections. We face, among the press, the 
public, and the government, the continual 
challenge of achieving mutual confidence. With 
energy and good faith, we can solve the prob- 
lems as Americans have done through their 

I thank the members of this subcommittee 
for the opportunity to be here today. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

88th Congress, 1st Session 

Nominations of Christian A. Herter, William T. Gos- 
sett, and David E. Bell. Hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. January 22, 1963. 
60 pp. 

Nomination of Bill D. Moyers to be Deputy Director 
of the Peace Corps. Hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. January 23, 1963. 
23 pp. 

Fifty-First Conference of the Interparliamentary 
Union. Report of the U.S. delegation to the Con- 
ference, held at Brasilia, Brazil, October 24-NoTem- 
ber 1, 1962. S. Doc. 5. January 24, 1963. 32 pp. 

APRIL 15, 1963 

Eighteenth Report of the United States Advisory 
Commission on Information. H. Doc. 53. January 
28, 1963. 33 pp. 

Sixth Annual Report of the President on the Operation 
of the Trade Agreements Program. H. Doc. 51. Jan- 
uary 28. 1963. 102 pp. 

Events in United States-Cuban Relations. A chro- 
nology, 1957-1963, prepared by the Department of 
State for the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions. January 29, 1963. 28 pp. [Committee print.] 

Duty Treatment of Certain Bread. Report to accom- 
pany H.R. 370. H. Rept. 22. February 4, 1963. 3 pp. 

Free Importation of Wild Birds and Wild Animals. 
Report to accompany H.R. 1839. H. Rept. 25. Feb- 
ruary 4, 1963. 2 pp. 

Tem]iorary Suspension of Duties on Corkboard Insu- 
lation and on Cork Stoppers. Report to accompany 
H.R. 2053. H. Rept. 26. February 4, 1963. 2 pp. 

Tariff Treatment of Certain Electron Microscopes. 
Reiiort to accompany H.R. 2874. H. Rept. 29. Feb- 
ruary 4, 1963. 2 pp. 

The Soviet Economic Offensive in Western Europe. 
Report of the Special Study Mission to Europe com- 
prising Representatives Kelly, McDowell. Merrow, 
Frelinghuysen, and Barry of the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, pursuant to H. Res. 60. H. Rept. 

32. February 7, 1963. .36 pp. 

Marking Requirements for Articles Imported in Con- 
tainers. Report to accompany H.R. 2513. H. Rept. 

33. February 11,1963. 7 pp. 

Viet Nam and Southeast Asia. Report of Senators 
Mike Mansfield, J. Caleb Boggs, Claiborne Pell, and 
Benjamin A. Smith to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. Undated. 22 pp. [Committee print] 

Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference, 
Lagos, Nigeria, 1962. Report of the delegation ap- 
pointed to attend the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association Conference in Lagos, Nigeria, November 
9-10, 1962. Undated. 25 pp. [Committee print] 

The Seventeenth General Assembly of the United Na- 
tions. Report by Senators Albert Gore and Gordon 
AUott to the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. Febru- 
ary 1963. 39 pp. [Committee print] 

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: 
Second Annual Report to Congress, January 1, 1962- 
December 31, 1962. H. Doc. 57. February 4, 1963. 
102 pp. 

Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign 
Principals in the United States. Hearings before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Part 1. 
February 4-6, 1963. 167 pp. 

United Nations Special Fund. Hearing before a sub- 
committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee. February 18, 1963. 44 pp. 

Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemi- 
sphere. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter- 
American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee. February 18-March 6. 1963. 295 pp. 

Legislation on Foreign Relations, With Explanatory 
Notes. Collection of laws and related material pre- 
pared by officials in various departments and agencies 
of the executive branch in collaboration with the 
staffs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. March 
1963. 621 pp. [Joint committee print] 

To Proclaim Sir Winston Churchill an Honorary Citi- 
zen of the United States of America. Report to 
accompany H.R. 4374. H. Rept. 57. March 6, 1963. 
5 pp. 

Study of U.S. Foreign Policy. Report to accompany 
S. Res. 25. S. Rept. 23. March 11, 1963. 3 pp. 

Activities of Nondiplomatic Foreign Principals. Re- 
port to accompany S. Res. 26. S. Rept. 22. March 
11, 1963. 4 pp. 




Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings^ 

Adjourned During March 1963 

U.N. Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and New York Jan. 29-Mar. 3 

Budgetary Procedures. 

Meeting of the Parties to the Interim Convention on North Pacific Tokyo Feb. 18-Mar. 1 

Fur Seals. 

ICAO North Atlantic Cable Meteorological Communications Panel . Paris Feb. 18-Mar. 8 

ILO Governing Body: 154th Session Geneva Feb. 19-Mar. 8 

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations . . New York Mar. 4-8 

OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices: Paris Mar. 5 (1 day) 

Working Party I. 

Intergovernmental Meeting of Exporters of Temperate Agricultural Washington Mar. 5-7 


IMCO Working Group on Intact Stability of Ships: 1st Session. . . London Mar. 5-8 

lA-ECOSOC Committee To Study Problems Affecting Air Trans- Washington Mar. 5-8 

portation in Latin America. 

U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 19th Session . Manila Mar. 5-18 

U.N. ECE Committee on Housing: Working Party on Effective Geneva Mar. 6-7 


European Radio Frequency Agency Paris Mar. 6-8 

IMCO Working Group on Watertight Subdivision and Damage Sta- London Mar. 11-14 

bility of Passenger and Cargo Ships. 

U.N. ECE Committee on Housing: Working Party on Urban Re- Geneva Mar. 11-14 

newal and Town Planning. 

U.N. ECOSOC 4d ffoc Committee Established Under Council Reso- New York Mar. 11-20 

lution 851 (XXXII) on Coordination of Technical Assistance 


U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 17th Session. . . New York Mar. 11-29 

OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee Paris Mar. 12-14 

FAO Cocoa Study Group: 6th Session and Preparatory Working Port-of-Spain Mar. 13-30 


lA-ECOSOC Action Group on Latin American Exports of Cacao . . Washington Mar. 13-30 

OECD European Nuclear Energy Agency Paris Mar. 14-15 

OECD Trade Committee Paris Mar. 14-15 

OECD Industry Committee: General Working Party of Special Paris Mar. 18-19 

Committee for Pulp and Paper. 

U.N. ECE Coal Committee: 57th Session Geneva Mar. 18-22 

U.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles Geneva Mar. 18-22 

G ATT Subgroup on Trade in Tropical Products Geneva Mar. 18-22 

UNESCO Executive and Pledging Committee for the Preservation Paris Mar. 18-23 

of the Nubian Monuments. 

ITU Experts on Frequency Allocations London Mar. 19-21 

OECD Industry Committee: Special Committee on Nonferrous Paris Mar. 21-22 


U.N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists: 5th Session . . Manila Mar. 21-27 

IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement: 3d Session . . . London Mar. 25-29 

U.N. ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Comparisons of Systems of Geneva Mar. 25-29 

National Accounts in Use in Europe. 

U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 29th Session Geneva Mar. 25-29 

OECD Development Assistance Committee: Working Party on Paris Mar. 25-30 

Technical Cooperation. 

OECD Ministers of Science Conference: Preparatory Group . . . Paris Mar. 28 (1 day) 

' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Mar. 28, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: 
ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, 
Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation 
Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Orga- 
nization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 


n Session as of March 31, 1963 

3onference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament . Geneva. . . 

Jnited Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on Consular Rela- Vienna . . . 

[J.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 19th Session . . . Geneva . . . 
-- 'CAO Legal Subcommittee Montreal . . 

3ATT Working Party on Tarifl Reduction Geneva. . . 

:CAO Facilitation Division: 6th Meeting Mexico, D. F 

[TU Administrative Council: 18th Session Geneva. . . 

3ATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade . . . Geneva. . . 

International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 5th Session of Special Geneva. . . 
Working Group. 

[J.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Mineral Resources and Develop- 

[A-ECOSOC Special Committee on Health, Housing, and Commu- 
nity Development. 

GATT Working Party on Relations With Less Developed Countries. Geneva . 



14, 1962- 


4, 1963- 

















Bogotd Mar. 27- 

In Recess as of March 31, 1963 

GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification (recessed Dec. Geneva . 
15 until mid-1963). 

Mar. 28- 

Sept. 24, 1962- 

U.S. Restates Views on Colonialism 
and Portuguese African Territories 

Statement by Sidney R. Yates ^ 

This is my first occasion to speak at the 
TJnited Nations, and I am most mindful of the 
(great honor accorded me, both of representing 
imy country and of being associated with the 
able and distinguished members of this Com- 
mittee in their important eifort to carry out 
the instructions of the General Assembly. 

We stand at one of the crossroads of histoiy. 
In the words of the great British playwright 
Christoplier Fiy, "The frozen misery of cen- 
turies breaks, cracks, begins to move." We on 
this Committee must be more than witnesses 
to this gi"eat liistorical wave. It is our responsi- 
bility to help in some measure to channel the 
course of that flood by bringing the oppor- 
tunity toward self-determination to peoples 
seeking to make their own mark in the world. 

The cause of freedom is one witli the liis- 
tory and ideals of the United States. Engraved 

' Made in the Special Committee on the Situation 
With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples on Mar. 12 (U.S. /U.N. press release 4156). 
Mr. Yates is the U.S. representative in the Special 

upon the consciousness of all Americans is the 
faith proclaimed by the founders of our Repub- 
lic in our Declaration of Independence when it 
was stated : 

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. 
That to secure these rights. Governments are insti- 
tuted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed. 

We believe in this political ethic for our- 
selves. We believe in it for other nations. Our 
task on this Committee will be to help bring 
a peaceful end to the colonial era, to replace 
the paternalism of the past with political rela- 
tionships based on consent. 

In today's world colonialism is an anachro- 
nism whicli is rapidly disappearing. Tlie task 
of decolonization has in many cases been dif- 
ficult, but it has moved swiftly in the last dec- 
ade. The United Nations deserves great credit 
for its contribution in this respect. Under its 
auspices the peoples of many lands have made 
the transition from colonialism to proud inde- 
pendence. Tlieir representatives are members 
of this Committee, and we are delighted to be 
working with them as they and we seek to 
bring to otliers the blessings of freedom which 
they now enjoy. 

APRIL 15, 1963 


We have high hopes that constructive pro- 
posals will emanate from this Committee. We 
have high hopes that the forces of reason, jus- 
tice, law, and peace will be paramount as the 
remaining colonial areas move to self- 

This Committee can make a constructive con- 
tribution to the course of history by actively 
seeking a spirit of cooperation and pragmatism, 
by utilizing the tools of diplomacy in searching 
for practical solutions to practical questions. I 
am pleased to hear this same viewpoint widely 
expressed by other members, and it augurs well 
for our efforts. 

Above all, the Committee must avoid the 
entanglements of being dragged into the cold 
war. The problems of colonial peoples are 
already suiBciently complicated without com- 
pounding their difficulties by extraneous ideo- 
logical attacks. It is unfortimate that such a 
diversionary effort has already been made. For 
our part, we intend to avoid polemics uttered 
purely for political advantage. We want to 
deal with the problems at hand. 

It hardly seems necessary to point out to 
this body, working within the framework of the 
United Nations Charter, that the solution to the 
problem of decolonization should be sought ex- 
clusively by means envisioned in and permitted 
by the charter itself. We will cooperate with 
this Committee and with other United Nations 
bodies in an effort to assure such constructive 
and timely progress. We could not, on the 
other hand, countenance or support interven- 
tionist or expansionist aspirations or predatory 
attacks by one state against the territory of 
another in the name of self-determination. 
Faced with the possibility of such attacks, the 
United States Government would, of course, 
oppose them as being inconsistent with the pro- 
visions of the charter. 

With respect to the subject immediately be- 
fore us, like most of those who have already 
spoken we do not intend to dwell on tlie condi- 
tions within the various Portuguese African 
territories. The Committee has various docu- 
ments which treat this subject at length, and on 
the basis of these documents, other informa- 
tion of record, and its own deliberations the As- 
sembly has pronoimced itself fully in several 

I would, however, like briefly to restate the 
principles which guide our policy toward Por- 
tuguese territories. 

First, the General Assembly has found that 
the territories under consideration are non-self- 
governing territories within the meaning of 
chapter XI of the charter and are therefore sub 
ject to the provisions of that chapter. Among! 
others, an obligation exists under chapter XI 
for information to be submitted on these terri 
tories by the administering authorities. Con 
sistent with this obligation we have called uponi 
Portugal to cooperate with the United Nations 
in its proper consideration of these reports. 

Second, we believe the principle of self 
determination, the right of peoples to choose 
the terms of their political, economic, and social 
destiny, about which I have just spoken, is ap- 
plicable to the areas under consideration. We 
have continuously supported measures, since the 
initial consideration of Angola in the Security 
Council, calling for Portuguese recognition of 
this principle and for an acceleration of polit- 
ical, economic, and social advancement for all 
inhabitants of Portuguese territories toward the 
full exercise of this self-determination. We be- 
lieve Portugal should accept this principle and 
give it practical effect for the people of the 

Third, we believe the United Nations and this 
Committee should continue their efforts to pro- 
duce change and development through the cre- 
ative paths of peace, difficult though these paths 
often seem. This principle is fundamental not 
only to the charter but to the very concept of 
the United Nations. To abandon efforts to 
achieve cooperation, to abandon the means of 
diplomacy and to substitute instead methods of 
coercion, would certainly not increase the pres- 
tige of this Committee, nor would it achieve the 
desired aims. 

Fourth, from the moment this question was 
first considered in a U.N. forum we have felt 
that the U.N. could play a constructive and 
meaningful role, fruitful for the peoples of 
Portuguese territories and for the Portuguese 
people themselves. We have felt this way be- 
cause the United Nations is an organization 
dedicated both to peace and to justice. We have 
accordingly applied ourselves to searching for 
means, whether new or old, of applying the U.N. 





achinery in a constructive sense to achieve 
rogress toward peaceful and just solutions. I 
Jloubt if there is any government which has de- 
oted more effort in seeking to bring about in 
(ractice the basic objective underlying U.N. 
•esolutions on Portuguese territories — that of 
elf-determination — than the United States. 
""^ Ve have done so because of our long friendship 
vith Portugal. This motive, among others, has 
ed us to seek to persuade Portugal to modify 
ts attitudes and to cooperate with the objec- 
ives of tlie U.N. with respect to the principle 
)f self-determination. Where U.N. machinery 
las been established to deal with some aspect 
)f this principle, we have suggested ways in 
.vhich the Government of Portugal could co- 
operate with the machinery. 

We have also sought to detennine, in con- 
ultation with the Government of Portugal, 
ways in which the U.N. could play a useful and 
constructive role. In this spirit on the basis 
3f an imderstanding between the United States 
and Portugal achieved through extended high- 
level consultations, and after further broad con- 
sultations with the members of the Assembly, 
the United States proposed tliat United Nations 
representatives should be sent to the territories 
of Angola and Mozambique to report, back to 
the United Nations on conditions there.^ Por- 
tugal was prepared to cooperate with these rep- 
resentatives. This proposal, if adopted and 
carried out, would have meant that for the 
first time representatives of the United Nations 
would officially visit Portuguese territories. 
Such an event would have been and still would 
be a significant step for the peoples of Portu- 
guese territories as well as a meaningful 
and realistic U.N. effort toward a peaceful 

As members of tliis Committee know, the 
United States finally decided with regret not to 
press this proposal to a vote because of an ap- 
peal from delegations who were not prepared 
to accept the resolution without amendments 
which would have prevented its application. 

The progress which this proposal represented 
should not be abandoned. Many members of 
this Committee have already spoken in favor 

" For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 21, 1963, p. 

of devoting our efforts first and foremost to find- 
ing practical ways and means for approaching 
this problem. The general approach embodied 
in our initiative could provide one good way. 
Undoubtedly others can be devised. As we 
consider such steps, we would urge that we take 
decisions that are achievable rather than at- 
tempt ones which, while perhaps more ideal, 
are not achievable. 

Mr. Chairman, I cannot guarantee that such 
an approach would produce the results gen- 
erally desired around this table. However, re- 
newed efforts along the lines of the representa- 
tive concept or some other practical proposal 
appear to offer the best chance for progress if 
our immediate objective is to bring about co- 
operation between Portugal and the U.N. to 
lessen the tensions which could threaten inter- 
national peace and security in the area. For 
our part, we are thoroughly convinced that if 
in the face of frustration we resort to extremism, 
condemnation, or a sterile restatement of views 
on this question, or if an attempt is made to cast 
the problem as an East-West cold-war issue, 
we will not advance the peoples of Portuguese 
territories toward self-determination. I am 
sure that only by tenacious and patient per- 
severance on a realistic path toward peaceful 
settlement will we contribute significantly to 
the well-being, prosperity, and political free- 
dom of the peoples of Portuguese territories. 
To this end we pledge our sincere cooperation. 

United States To Be Host 
to World Food Congress 

The Department of State and the Depart- 
ment of Agriculture announced on April 1 
(Department of State press release 165 dated 
March 29) that American industry and govern- 
ment will join forces to serve as hosts to the 
World Food Congress at Washington June 4- 
18, 1963. The Congress is being sponsored by 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
of the United Nations and is a highlight in 
FAO's 5-year international Freedom-From- 
Hunger Campaign, which began in 1960. Ap- 
proximately 100 nations will be represented, and 
the attendance target is 1,200. The Food Con- 
gress will also mark the 20th anniversary of 


the founding of FAO at Hot Springs, Va., in 

The World Food Congress will be an orga- 
nized effort to pool existing worldwide experi- 
ence in fighting hunger and malnutrition, to 
examine ways in which food production and use 
can be improved in the developing countries, 
and to aid in economic development. The Con- 
gress will bring together for 2 weeks adminis- 
trators, scientists, and leaders in all aspects of 
agriculture, food, and economic development. 

The program calls for 8 major addresses, plus 
11 key addresses by recognized specialists. Tlie 
detailed work of the Congress will be carried out 
in four commissions : Technical ; Economic and 
Social ; Education and Eesearch ; and People's 
Involvement and Group Action. Among 
speakers invited are: Arnold J. Toynbee, Brit- 
ish historian; K. Gunnar Myrdal, Swedish 
economist; Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. 
Freeman; Paul G. Hoffman, Director of the 
United Nations Special Fund; J. Kubitschek, 
former President of Brazil ; and V. T. Krishna- 
machari. National Planning Coramisvsioner for 

United States Delegations 
to International Conferences 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

The Department of State announced on 
March 29 (press release 159) that Secretary 
Rusk would attend the eighth meeting of the 
Council of Ministers of the Soutlieast Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO) at Paris, 
April 8-10.^ 

Foreign Ministers of other SEATO member 
countries are expected to attend the meeting, 
where tliey will exchange views on the inter- 
national situation, particularly matters affect- 
ing the treaty area, as well as review the 
military and nonmilitaiy activities of the 

Tlie member countries of SEATO are 
Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. 

Director General of UNESCO 
Visits Washington 

The Department of State announced on 
March 29 (press release 162) that Rene Maheu, 
of France, the newly elected Director General 
of the United Nations Educational, Scientifio u 
and Cultural Organization, would visit Wash- 
ington April 1-3 for talks with Secretary Rusk 
and other Government officials. 

This will be Mr. Maheu's first Washington 
visit since his election by the 12th General Con- 
ference of UNESCO last November at Paris. 
His talks will include discussion of the future 
program of UNESCO and U.S. participation 
in it in the light of recommendations adopted 
by the General Conference. 


' For a list of the members of the U.S. delegation, see 
press release 159. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeofiraphed or processed documents (such as those 
listed Ijeloiv) man he consulted at depositary libraries in 
the United States. V.N. printed publications may be 
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na- 
tions, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

General Assembly 

Working Oronp on the Examination of the Adminis- 
trative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Na- 
tions. Budgetary and financial practices of the 
United Nations. A/AC.113/1. January 21, 1963. 
92 pp. 

Economic and Social Council 

Population Commission : 

Basic considerations in national programs of analysis 
of population census data as an aid to planning 
and policymaking. E/CN.9/173. November 26, 
1962. 70 pp. 

Current status of demographic studies relevant to 
economic and social development. E/CN.9/169. 
December 5, 1902. 1(> pp. 

Progress of other demographic studies. E/CN.9/171. 
December 6, 1962. 11 itp. 

Plans and arrangements for the second world popu- 
lation conference. E/CN.9/177. December 7, 
1962. 6 pp. 

The world population census program : evaluation 
and analysis of results. E/CN.9/174. December 
11. 1902. 9 pp. 

The world demographic situation with special refer- 
ence to fertility. E/CN.9/1G7. December 19, 1962. 
23 pp. 

Regional demographic activities. E/CN.9/172. De- 
cember 21, 1902. 29 pp. 

Draft standards for national programs of population 
projections as aids to development planning. 
E/CN.9/170. December 27, 1902. 33 pp. 



Activities in the field of demographic statistics, 
1961-62. E/CX.9/179. January 17, 1963. 46 pp. 

Studies relating to problems of food and agriculture. 
B/CN.9/173/Add. 1. January 29, 1963. 7 pp. 

Plans for financing the second world population con- 
ference. E/CN.9/177/Add. 1. February 7, 1963. 
9 pp. 
)eclsions taken by the Economic and Social Council at 

its 34th session with regard to the U.N. development 

decade. Communication for the Director-General of 

the International Labor Office. E/3700. November 

28, 1962. 13 pp. 


Current Actions 


automotive Traffic 

SJonvention on road traffic with annexes. Done at 
Geneva, September 19, 1949. Entered into force 
March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487. 

Accession deposited: Bulgaria (with reservations), 
February 13, 1963. 

~ iviation 

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force 
April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 
Adherence deposited: Jamaica, March 26, 1963. 


Jniversal copyright convention. Done at Geneva 
September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 
1955. TIAS 3324. 

Application to: Bermuda, North Borneo, and Zanzi- 
bar, February 4, 1963. 


Agreement for the termination of the regional agree- 
ment of January 2 and 6, 1958 (TIAS 3994) between 
India, Nepal, and the United States concerning the 
development of tran.sportation facilities in Nepal. 
Signed at Katmandu January 10, 1963. Entered 
into force January 10, 1963. 

Law of the Sea 

Optional protocol of signature concerning the compul- 
sory settlement of disputes. Done at Geneva April 
29, 1958." 
Signature: Sierra Leone, February 14, 1963. 


Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the 
international telecommunication convention, 1959. 
Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into 
force May 1, 1961 ; for the United States October 
23, 1961. TIAS 4893. 

Notification of approval: Viet-Nam, February 13, 


Pr(x;^s-verbal extending the period of validity of the 
declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 
November 18, 1960. Done at Geneva November 7, 
1962. Entered into force January 1, 1963. TIAS 

Signatures: Ghana, February 15, 1963; India, 
February 21, 1963. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace 
Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Djakarta March 8 and 14, 1963. Entered into force 
March 14, 1963. 


Agreement on the use of Norwegian ports and ter- 
ritorial waters by the NS Savannah. Signed at Oslo 
March 1, 1963. Enters into force upon an exchange 
of notes bringing the agreement into force. 

United States and Japan Sign 
Consular Convention 

Press release 146 dated March 21, for release March 22 

A consular convention between the United 
States and Japan was signed on March 22 at 
Tokyo by Edwin O. Keischauer, U.S. Ambassa- 
dor at Tokyo, and Masayoshi Ohira, Foreign 
Minister of Japan. 

The convention defines and establishes the 
duties, riglits, privileges, exemptions, and im- 
munities of consular oificers of each country in 
the territory of the other country. 

The convention is comparable in both text 
and format to the consular conventions between 
the United States and the United Kingdom 
and Ireland, signed in 1951 and 1950, respec- 
tively.^ Its provisions are similar in substance 
to those of a more concise consular convention 
signed by the United States and the Republic 
of Korea in January 1963. 

The convention will be sent to the Senate of 
the United States for advice and consent to 
ratification by the President. The convention 
will enter into force on the 30th day following 
the day on which instruments of ratification of 
the two Governments are exchanged. 

' Not in force. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2494 
and 2984. 

APRIL 15, 1963 



Secretary Endorses Recommendation 
for "Foreign" Relations" Series 

The Advisory Comm.ittee on the historical 
series entitled '■'■Foreign Relations of the United 
States" composed of Dexter Perkins, chairman, 
Clarence A. Berdahl, Leland M. Goodrich, Fred 
H. Harrington, Richard W. Leopold, Philip W. 
Thayer, and Robert R. Wilson, met at Washing- 
ton on November 2 and 3, 1962. The principal 
recommendation of the Committee was that 
henceforth the '■^Foreign Relations'''' volumes he 
published in orderly fashion 20 years behind 
currency, with no series undertahen out of 
chronological order. Following is the text of a 
letter from Secretary Rusk to Professor Perkins 
acknoivledging receipt of the Oommittee''s 

December 29, 1962 
Deak Dr. Perkins : Tliank you for your letter 
of November 19, enclosing the report on the 
"Foreign Relations" Series. I have now had 
the opportimity to read this report with some 
care, and I should like to thank you and the 
other members of the Committee for the time 
and thought that you have generously given to 
the problem. 

I think your recommendations that these vol- 
vunes be published in regular chronological order 
and be kept within twenty years of currency are 
reasonable, and I shall so inform our Historical 
OiEce. You will understand, however, that pub- 
lication of a volume may occasionally be delayed 
because of the current sensitivity of significant 
documents. I trust that such instances will be 
rare and that we can hold to a twenty-year line 
with fair regularity. 

Sincerely yours, 

Dean Rusk 

Dexter Perkins, Ph. D., 

Professor of History, Emeritus, 
316 Oxford Street, 
Rochester 7, Neto York. 

Recent Releases 

For sale ty the Superintendent of Documents, V.^ 
Oovernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.i 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docii 
ments, except in the case of free publications, ivhic 
may be obtained from the Department of State. 

Defense — Loan of Vessels. Agreement with Spaii 
amending the agreement of March 9, 1957. Exchan;; 
of notes — Signed at Madrid June 19, 1962. Entere^ 
into force June 19, 1962. TIAS 5096. 3 pp. 54. 

Education — Educational Foundation and Financing o 
Exchange Programs. Agreement with Israel. Ex 
change of notes — Signed at Tel Aviv and Jerusalen 
June 18 and 22, 1962. Entered into force June 22, 1962 
With memorandum of understanding. TIAS 5097. i: 
pp. 10<t. 

Army Mission. Agreement with Argentina amendini 
the agreement of August 2, 1960. Exchange of notes- 
Signed at Buenos Aires January 8 and Jime 7, 1962 
Entered into force June 7, 1962. TIAS 5098. 3 pp. 5^ 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 25-31 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington 25, 

Releases issued prior to March 25 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 146 
and 148 of March 21. 


Manning: House Subcommittee on 
Foreign Operations and Govern- 
ment Information. 

U.S. participation in international 

Annual honor awards ceremony. 

Loans to Argentina. 

Rusk : Japanese membership in 

Cleveland : "Reflections on the 
Pacific Community." 

Johnson : "Japan, the United 
States, and Europe." 

Rostow : "The Cold War— A Look 

Delegation to SEATO Council meet- 
ing (rewrite). 

Rowan sworn in as Ambassador to 
Finland (biographic details). 

Secretary Rusk visits U.S. Air 
Force Academy. 

UNESCO Director General visits 
Washington (rewrite). 

Firing on U.S. ship by Cuban planes. 

Williams : "The United Nations and 
the New Africa." 

World Food Congress (rewrite). 

U.S. statement on raids on Cuba. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 






























April 15, 1963 I n d 

Agriculture. United States To Be Host to World 
Food Congress 583 

Asia. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

(delegation) 584 

Atomic Energy. The Cold War — A Look Ahead 

(Rostow) 551 

Brazil. U.S. and Brazil Reach Understanding in 
Economic and Financial Talks (text of joint 
communique) 557 

Canada. U.S. Accepts Recommendations on 
Halibut Abstention 574 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 579 

Foreign Policy in the Open Society (Manning) . 575 

Cuba. U.S. Asks Cuba for Explanation of At- 
tack on "Floridian" 573 

Economic Affairs 

U.S. Accepts Recommendations on Halibut 
Abstention 574 

U.S. and Brazil Reach Understanding in Eco- 
nomic and Financial Talks (text of joint 
communique 557 

U.S. Supports Full Membership for Japan in 
OECD (Rusk) 572 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Director 
General of UNESCO Visits Washington . . 584 

Foreign Aid 

The Cold War — A Look Ahead (Rostow) . . . 551 
President Receives Clay Report on AID Pro- 
gram (Kennedy) 574 

The Refugee Problem in Laos 567 

U.S. and Brazil Reach Understanding in Eco- 
nomic and Financial Talks (text of joint 

communique) 557 

International Organizations and Conferences 
Calendar of International Conferences and 

Meetings 580 

Director General of UNESCO Visits Wash- 
ington 584 

U.S. Supports Full Membership for Japan in 

OECD (Rusk) 572 

United States To Be Host to World Food 
Congress 583 


U.S. Accepts Recommendations on Halibut 
Abstention 574 

United States and Japan Sign Consular Con- 
vention 585 


Vol. XLVIII, No. 1242 

U.S. Supports Full Membership for Japan in 

OECD (Rusk) 572 

Korea. United States Expresses Views on Mili- 
tary Rule in Korea 573 

Laos. The Refugee Problem in Laos .... 567 

Military Affairs. The Cold War— A Look Ahead 

(Rostow) 551 

Non-Self-Governing Territories. U.S. Restates 
Views on Colonialism and Portuguese African 
Territories (Yates) 581 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Cold 
War — A Look Ahead (Rostow) 551 

Portugal. U.S. Restates Views on Colonialism 

and Portuguese African Territories (Yates) . 581 

Presidential Documents. President Receives 

Clay Report on AID Program 574 

Protection of Nationals and Property. U.S. 
Asks Cuba for Explanation of Attack on 
"Floridian" 573 

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy in the Open So- 
ciety (Manning) 575 


Recent Releases 586 

Secretary Endorses Recommendation for "For- 
eign Relations" Series (Rusk) 586 

Refugees. The Refugee Problem in Laos . . . 567 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Eighth 

Meetingof Council of Ministers (delegation) . 584 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 585 

U.S. Accepts Recommendations on Halibut 

Abstention 574 

United States and Japan Sign Consular Con- 
vention 585 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 584 

The United Nations— What It Is, What It Has 

Done (Chayes) 562 

U.S. Restates Views on Colonialism and Portu- 
guese African Territories (Yates) 581 

Name Index 

BeU, David B 557 

Chayes, Abram 562 

Kennedy, President 574 

Manning, Robert J 575 

Rostow, W. W 551 

Busk, Secretary 572,586 

San Tiago Dantas, Francisco Clementino . . . 557 

Yates, Sidney R 581 



05B oec-G- 





United States 
Government Printing Office 


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January 1, 1963 

This publication is a guide to treaties and other international 
agreements in force between the United States and other countries 
at the beginning of the current year. 

The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, ar- 
ranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral 
treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of 
states which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry 
into force for the United States, and citations to texts are fur- 
nished for each agreement. 

Documents affecting international copyright relations of the 
United States are listed in the appendix. 

Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the in- 
formation contained in Treaties in Force, is published weeldy in 
the Department of State Bulletin. 

Publication 7481 


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Vol. XLVIII, No. 1243 AprU 22, 1963 

GRAMS • Message of the President to the Congress . . . 591 


Assistant Secretary Williams 602 

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT • Statement by Walter M. 

Kotschnig 625 


Assistant Secretary Cleveland 613 


Deputy Under Secretary Johnson 606 

For index see inside back cover 


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or State Bdlletin as the source will be 
appreciated. The Bulletin Is indexed hi the 
Readers' Oolde to Periodical Literature. 

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1243 • Publication 752 
April 22, 1963 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by th» 
Office of Media Services, Bureau oji 
Public Affairs, provides tlie publit' 
and interested agencies of th 
Government with information or> 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the 
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Service. The BULLETIN includes se- 
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Department, and statements and ad* 
dresses made by the President and byt 
the Secretary of State and otheti 
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special articles on various phases oj 
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iFree-World Defense and Assistance Programs 


The White House, April 2, 1963. 
To the Congress of the United States: 

"Peace hath her victories no less renowned 
than war," wrote Milton. And no peacetime 
victory in history has been as far reaching in 
its impact, nor served the cause of freedom so 
well, as the victories scored in the last 17 years 
by this Nation's mutual defense and assistance 
programs. These victories have been, in the 
main, quiet instead of dramatic. Their aim has 
been, not to gain territories for the United 
States or support in the United Nations, but 
preserve freedom and hope and to prevent 
:yranny and subversion in dozens of key na- 
tions all over the world. 

The United States today is spending 10 per- 
cent of its gross national product on programs 
primarily aimed at improving our national se- 
curity. Somewhat less than one-twelfth of this 
imount, and less than 0.7 percent of our GNP, 
»oes into the mutual assistance program: 
roughly half for economic development, and 
lalf for military and other short-term assist- 
mce. The contribution of this program to our 
national interest clearly outweighs its cost. 
The richest nation in the world would surely 
36 justified in spending less than 1 percent of 
its national income on assistance to its less 
fortunate sister nations solely as a matter of 
international responsibility; but inasmuch as 
these programs are not merely the right thing 
to do, but clearly in our national self-interest, 
a-ll criticisms should be placed in that perspec- 
tive. That our aid programs can be improved 
is not a matter of debate. But that our aid 
programs serve both our national traditions 
and our national interest is beyond all reason- 
able doubt. 

' H. D;.c. 94, 88th Cong., Ist eess. 

APRH. 2 2, 1963 

History records that our aid programs to 
Turkey and Greece were the crucial element 
that enabled Turkey to stand up against heavy- 
handed Soviet pressures, Greece to put down 
Communist aggression, and both to re-create 
stable societies and to move forward in the 
direction of economic and social growth. 

History records that the Marshall plan made 
it possible for the nations of Western Europe, 
including the United Kingdom, to recover from 
the devastation of the world's most destructive 
war, to rebuild military strength, to withstand 
the expansionist thrust of Stalinist Eussia, and 
to embark on an economic renaissance which 
has made Western Europe the second greatest 
and richest industrial complex in the world 
today — a vital center of free world strength, 
itself now contributing to the growth and 
strength of less-developed countries. 

History records that our military and eco- 
nomic assistance to nations on the frontiers of 
the Communist world — such as Iran, Pakistan, 
India, Vietnam, and free China — has enabled 
threatened peoples to stay free and independ- 
ent, when they otherwise would have either been 
overrun by aggressive Communist power or 
fallen victim of utter chaos, poverty, and 

History records that our contributions to in- 
ternational aid have been the critical factor in 
the growth of a whole family of international 
financial institutions and agencies, playing an 
ever more important role in the ceaseless war 
against want and the .straggle for growth and 

And, finally, history will record that today 
our technical assistance and development loans 
are giving hope where hope was lacking, spark- 
ing action where life was static, and stimulat- 
ing progress around the earth — simultaneously 


supporting the military security of the free 
world, helping to erect barriers against the 
crowth of communism where those barriers 
count the most, helping to build the kind of 
world community of independent, self-support- 
ing nations in which we want to live, and 
helping to serve the deep American urge to 
extend a generous hand to those working to- 
ward a better life for themselves and their 

Despite noisy opposition from the very first 
days, despite dire predictions that foreign aid 
would "bankrupt" the Eepublic, despite warn- 
ings that the Marshall plan and successor pro- 
grams were "throwing our money down a 
rathole," despite gi-eat practical difficulties and 
some mistakes and disappointments, the fact is 
that our aid programs generally and consist- 
ently have done what they were expected to 

Freedom is not on the run anywhere in the 
world — not in Europe, Asia, Africa, or Latin 
America — as it might well have been without 
U.S. aid. And we now know that freedom — 
all freedom, including our own — is diminished 
when other countries fall mider Communist 
domination, as in China in 1949, North Viet- 
nam, and the northern Provinces of Laos in 
1954, and Cuba in 1959. Freedom, all freedom, 
is threatened by the subtle, varied, and unceas- 
ing Communist efforts at subversion in Latin 
America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. 
And the prospect for freedom is also endan- 
gered or eroded in countries which see no 
hope — no hope for a better life based on eco- 
nomic progress, education, social justice, and the 
development of stable institutions. These are 
the frontiers of freedom wliich our military and 
economic aid programs seek to advance ; and in 
so doing they serve our deepest national 

This view has been held by three successive 
Presidents — Democratic and Republican alike. 

It has been endorsed by a bipartisan majority 
of nine successive Congresses. 

It has been supported for 17 years by a bi- 
partisan majority of the Ajnerican people. 

And it has only recently been reconfirmed 
by a distinguished committee of private citi- 
zens, headed by Gen. Lucius Clay and includ- 


ing Messrs. Robert Anderson, Eugene Black, 
Clifford Hardm, Robert Lovett, Edward Ma- 
son, L. F. McCollum, George Meany, Hennan 
Phleger, and Howard Rusk. Their report 
stated: "We believe these programs, properly 
conceived and implemented, to be essential to 
the security of our Nation and necessary to the 
exercise of its worldwide responsibilities." ^ |' 

There is, in short, a national consensus of 
many years standing on the vital importance of 
these programs. The principle and purpose 
of U.S. assistance to less secure and less fortu- 
nate nations are not and cannot be seriously in 

II. Present Needs 

The question now is: What about the future?( 
In the perspective of these past gains, what isi 
the dimension of present needs, what are oun 
opportunities, and what changes do we face at( 
this juncture in world history ? 

I believe it is a crucial juncture. Our world 
is near the climax of a historic convulsion. Ai 
tidal wave of national independence has nearlyi 
finished its sweep through lands which contain 
one out of every three people in the world. 
The industrial and scientific revolution if 
spreading to the far corners of the earth. And 
two irreconcilable views of the value, the rights 
and the role of the individual human being con- 
front the peoples of the world. 

In some 80 developing nations, countless larg( 
and small decisions will be made in the days 
and months and years ahead — decisions which 
taken together, will establish the economic and 
social system, determine the political leader- 
ship, shape the political practices, and mold tha 
structure of the institutions which will promota 
either consent or coercion for one-third of hu- 
manity. And these decisions will drasticallj 
affect the shape of the world in which our chil- 
dren grow to maturity. 

Afi'ica is stirring restlessly to consolidate its 
independence and to make that independence 

'The Scope and Distribution of United States MilU 
tary and Economic Assistance Programs: Report t6 
the President of the United States from The Commit* 
tee to Strengthen the Security of the Free WorW 
March 20, 196S; available from the Superintendent ol 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-: 
ton 2.5, D.C. (price 15 cents). 




neaningf ul for its people through economic and 
social development. The people of America 
lave affirmed and reaffirmed their symj^athy 
.vith these objectives. 

Free Asia is responding resolutely to the po- 
itical, economic, and military challenge of 
?ommmiist China's relentless efforts to domi- 
late the contment. 

Latin America is striving to take decisive 
teps toward effective democracy, amid the tur- 
)ulence of rapid social change and the menace 
if Communist subversion. 

The United States — the richest and most pow- 
rful of all peoples, a nation committed to the 
ndependence of nations and to a better life for 
11 peoples — can no more stand aside in this cli- 
lactic age of decision than we can withdraw 
rom the community of free nations. Our ef- 
ort is not merely symbolic. It is addressed to 
ur vital security interests. 

It is in this context that I hope the American 
eople through their representatives in Con- 
ress will consider our request this year for 
oreign aid fimds designed carefully and ex- 
licitly to meet tliese specific challenges. This 
> not a wearisome burden. It is a new chapter 
1 our involvement in a continuously vital 
:ruggle — the most challenging and construc- 
ve effort ever imdertaken by man on behalf 
f freedom and his fellow man. 

I. Objectives for Improvement 

In a changing world, our progi'ams of mutual 
efense and assistance must be kept under con- 
:ant review. My recommendations herein re- 
ect the work of the Clay Committee, the 
n'utiny undertaken by the new Administrator 
David E. Bell] of the Agency for Interna- 
onal Development, and the experience gained 
1 our first full year of administering the new 
nd improved program enacted by the Congress 
1 1961. There is fundamental agreement 
iroughout these reviews : that these assistance 
rograms are of great value to our deepest na- 
ional interest, that their basic concepts and 
rganization, as embodied in the existing legis- 
ition, are properly conceived, that progress 
as been made and is being made in translating 
liese concepts into action, but that much still 
emains to be done to improve our performance 

and make the best possible use of these pro- 

In addition, there is fundamental agreement 
in all these reviews regarduig six key recom- 
mendations for the future. 

Objective No. 1 : To apply stricter standards 
of selectivity and self -help in aiding developing 
countries. — This objective was given special at- 
tention by the Committee To Strengthen the 
Security of the Free World (the Clay report), 
which estimated that the application of such 
criteria could result in substantial savings in 
selected programs over the next 1 to 3 years. 

Considerable progress has already been made 
along these lines. Wliile the number of former 
colonies achieving independence has lengthened 
the total list of countries receiving assistance, 
80 percent of all economic assistance now goes 
to only 20 countries; and military assistance is 
even more narrowdy concentrated. The pro- 
portion of development loans, as contrasted 
with outright grants, has increased from 10 to 
60 percent. We have placed all our develop- 
ment lending on a dollar-repayable basis ; and 
this year we are increasing our efforts, as the 
Clay Committee recommended, to tailor our 
loan terms so that interest rates and maturities 
will reflect to a greater extent the differences 
in the ability of different countries to service 

In the Alliance for Progress, in particular, 
and increasingly in other aid programs, em- 
phasis is placed upon self-help and self-reform 
by the recipients themselves, using our aid as a 
catalyst for progress and not as a handout. 
Finally, in addition to emphasizing primarily 
economic rather than military assistance, wher- 
ever conditions pei-mit, we are taking a sharp 
new look at both the size and purpose of those 
local military forces which receive our assist- 
ance. Our increased stress on internal security 
and civic action in military assistance is in 
keeping with our experience that, in developing 
countries, military forces can have an impor- 
tant economic as well as protective role to play. 
For example, in Latin America, in fiscal year 
1963, military assistance funds allocated for the 
support of engineer, medical, and other civic 
action type units more than doubled. 

APRIL 22, 1063 


Objective No. 2: To achieve a redttction and 
vltimnte eVtmination of U.S. assistance hy en- 
abling natiotis to stand on their own as rap-idly 
as possible. — Both this Nation and the countries 
we help have a stake in their reaching the point 
of self-sustaining growth — the point where 
they no longer require external aid to maintain 
their independence. Our goal is not an arbi- 
trary cutoff date but the earliest possible "take- 
off" date — the date when their economies will 
have been launched with sufficient momentum 
to enable them to become self-supporting, re- 
quiring only the same normal sources of ex- 
ternal financing to meet expanding capital needs 
that this country required for many decades. 

For some, this goal is near at hand, insofar 
as economic assistance is concerned. For others, 
more time will be needed. But in all cases, 
specific programs leading to self-support should 
be set and priorities established — including 
those steps which must be taken by the recipient 
countries and all others who are willing to help 

The record clearly shows that foreign aid is 
not an endless or unchanging process. Fifteen 
years ago our assistance went almost entirely 
to the advanced countries of Europe and 
Japan — today it is directed almost entirely to 
the developing world. Ten years ago most of 
our assistance was given to shoring up military 
forces and unstable economies — today this kind 
of aid has been cut in half, and our assistance 
goes increasingly toward economic develop- 
ment. There are still, however, important cases 
where there has been no diminution in the Com- 
munist military threat, and both military and 
economic aid are still required. Such cases 
range from relatively stabilized frontiers, as in 
Korea and Turkey, to areas of active aggres- 
sion, such as Vietnam. 

Objective No. 3: To secure the increased par- 
ticipation of other indiistrialized nations in 
sharing the cost of infei'national development 
assistance. — The United States is no longer 
alone in aiding the developing countries, and 
its proportionate share of the burden is dimin- 
ishing. The flow of funds from other indus- 
trialized countries — now totaling on the order 
of $2 billion a year — is expected to continue; 
and we expect to work more closely with these 
other countries in order to make tlie most effec- 

tive use of our joint efforts. In addition, the 
international lending and technical assistance 
agencies — to which we contribute heavily— 
have expanded the schedule and scope of their 
operations; and we look forward to supple- 
menting those resources selectively in conjunc- 
tion with increased contributions from other 
nations. We will continue to work with our 
allies, urging them to increase their assistance 
efforts and to extend assistance on terms lessN^ 
burdensome to tlie developing countries. 

Objective No. ^: To lighten any adverse im- 
pact of the aid program on our oum balance 
of payments and economy. — A few years ago, 
more than half of U.S. economic aid funds were 
spent abroad, contributing to the drain on our 
dollars and gold. Of our current commitments, 
over 80 percent will be spent in the United 
States, contributing to the growth of our econ- 
omy and employment opportunities. This pro- 
portion is rising as further measures are being 
taken to this end. I might add that our balance- 
of-payments position today is being sig- 
nificantly helped by the repayment of loans 
made to European countries under the Marshall 
plan and by the Export-Import Bank. I am 
confident that in the future, as income in the 
less-developed countries rises, we will similar!} 
benefit from the loans we are now making tc 

Our economy is also being helped by the ex 
pansion of commercial exports to countries 
whose present growth and prosperity wen 
spurred by U.S. economic assistance in earliei 
years. Over the last decade, our exports tc 
Western Europe and the United Kingdom hav( 
more than doubled, and our exports to Japan 
have increased fourfold. Similarly, we can loot 
forward to a future widening of trade oppor- 
tunities in those countries whose economic de 
velopment we ?re currently assisting. 

In addition, our food-for-peace program it 
increasingly using our agricultural commodities 
to stimulate the economic growth of developins; 
nations and to assist in acliieving other U.S 
foreign policy goals. As the economies of de- 
veloping nations improve, we are encouraging 
them to shift from foreign cuiTency to cash 
sales or to dollar credit sales for these com- 



The relative burden of our assistance pro- 
ms has been steadily reduced from some 2 
ircent of our national product at the begin- 
ing of the ilarshall plan to seven-tenths of 1 
ircent today — from 11.5 percent of the Federal 
dget in 1949 to 4 percent today. 
Although these figures indicate that our aid 
|rograms cost, in relative terms, considerably 
today than they did 10 or 15 years ago, we 
continuing our etforts to improve the effec- 
iveness of these programs and increase the 
eturn on every dollar invested. Personnel, 
irocedures, and administration are being im- 
•roved. A number of field missions have been 
losed, scaled down, or merged into embassies 
ir regional offices. These efforts toward greater 
fficiency and economy are being accelerated 
mder the new Administrator. 

Objective No. 5: To continue to assist in the 
defense of countries under threat of external 
md internal Conwmmist attack. — Our military 
issistance program has been an essential element 
n keeping the boundary of Soviet and Chinese 
nilitai-y power relatively stable for over a dec- 
ide. Without its protection the substantial 
'conomic progress made by underdeveloped 
■ountries along the Sino-Soviet periphery 
.Tould hardly have been possible. As these 
countries build economic strength, they will be 
ible to assume more of the burden of their de- 
fense. But we must not assume that military 
issistance to these coimtries — or to others pri- 
marily exposed to subversive internal attack — 
can be ended in the foreseeable future. On the 
contrary, while it will be possible to reduce and 
terminate some programs, we should anticipate 
the need for new and expanded programs. 

India is a case in point. The wisdom of ear- 
lier United States aid in helping the Indian sub- 
continent's considerable and fruitful efforts to- 
ward progress and stability can hardly now be 
in question. The threat made plain by the 
'Chinese attack on India last fall may require 
additional efforts on our part to help bolster 
the security of this crucial area, assuming these 
efforts can be matched in an appropriate way by 
the efforts of India and Pakistan. 
j But overall, the magnitude of military assist- 
} ance is small in relation to our national security 
expenditures; in this fiscal year it amounts to 

about ;i percent of our defense budget. "Dollar 
for dollar," said the Clay Committee with par- 
ticular reference to the border areas, "these pro- 
grams contribute more to the security of the 
free world than corresponding expenditures in 
our defense appropriations * * *. These coun- 
tries are providing more than 2 million armed 
men ready, for the most part, for any emer- 
gency." Clearly, if this program did not exist, 
our defense budget would undoubtedly have to 
be increased substantially to provide an equiva- 
lent contribution to the free world's defense. 

Objective No. 6: To increase the role of pri- 
vate investment and other non-Federal re- 
sources in assisting developing nations. — In 
recent months important new steps have been 
taken to mobilize on behalf of this program 
the competence of a variety of nongovernmental 
organizations and individuals in this country. 
Cooperatives and savings and loan associations 
have been very active in establishing similar 
institutions abroad, particularly in Latin Amer- 
ica. Our land-grant and other universities are 
establishing better working relationships with 
our programs to assist oversea rural develop- 
ment. Already there are 37 U.S. universities 
and land-grant institutions at work in Latin 
America, for example, with a substantial in- 
crease expected during the coming year. Public 
and private leaders from the State of California 
are exploring with their counterparts in Chile 
how the talents and resources of a particular 
State can be more directly channeled toward 
assisting a particular country. Labor unions, 
foundations, trade associations, profe,'^sionaI so- 
cieties, and many others likewise possess skills 
and resources which we are drawing upon in- 
creasingly, in order to engage in a more system- 
atic and meaningful way, in this vital nation- 
building process, the whole complex of private 
and public institutions upon which our own 
national life depends. For at the heart of the 
modernization process lies the central problem 
of creating, adapting, and impro^ang the insti- 
tutions which any modern society will need. 

IV. Private Investment 

The primary new initiative in this year's pro- 
gram relates to our increased efforts to encour- 
age the investment of private capital in the 

APRIL 22, 19G3 

underdeveloped countries. Already consider- 
able progress has been made fostering U.S. pri- 
vate investment tlirough the use of investment 
guaranties — with over $900 million now out- 
standing — and by means of cost-sharing on 
investment surveys, loans of local currencies, 
and other measures provided under existing 
law. During the first half of this fiscal year 
alone, $7.7 million in local currencies have been 
loaned to private business firms. 

I believe much more should be done, however, 
both administratively through more vigorous 
action by the Agency for International Devel- 
opment, and legislatively by the Congress. Ad- 
ministratively, our ambassadors and missions 
abroad, in their negotiations with the less-de- 
veloped countries, are being directed to urge 
more forcefully the importance of making full 
use of private resources and improving the 
climate for private investment, both domestic 
and foreign. In particular, I am concerned 
that the investment guaranty pi-ogram is not 
fully operative in some countries because of the 
failure of their governments to execute the 
normal intergovernmental agreements relating 
to investment guaranties. 

In addition, the Agency for International 
Development will also strengthen and enlarge 
its own activities relating to private enter- 
prise — both its efforts to assist in the develop- 
ment of vigorous private economies in the de- 
veloping countries and its facilities for mobiliz- 
ing and assisting the capital and skills of pri- 
vate business in contributing to economic 

Ivcgislatively, I am i-ecommending the 
following : 

(a) An amendment to the Internal Revenue 
Code for a trial period to grant U.S. taxpayers 
a tax credit for new investments in developing 
countries, which should also apply to some ex- 
tent to reinvestments of their earnings in those 
countries. Such a credit, by making possible 
an increased rata of return, should substantially 
encourage additional private investment in the 
developing countries. The U.S. businessmen's 
committee for the Alliance for Progress has 
recommended the adoption of such a measure. 

(b) Amendments in the investment guaranty 
provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act de- 

signed to enlarge and clarify the guaranti 

Economic and social growth cannot be ac 
complished by governments alone. The effet 
tive participation of an enlightened U.S. busi 
nessman, especially in partnership with privat<i 
interests in the developing country, brings noi 
only liis investment but his technological aii( 
management skills into the process of develop 
ment. His successful participation in tun 
helps create that climate of confidence which i 
so critical in attracting and holding vital ex 
ternal and internal capital. We welcome an( 
encourage initiatives being taken in the privat>i p' 
sector in Latin America to accelerate indus^'^ 
trial growth and hope that similar cooperativ 
efforts will be established with other developinj 

V. The Alliance for Progress 

In a special sense, the achievements of th 
Alliance for Progress in the coming years wil 
be the measure of our determination, our ideals 
and our wisdom. Here in this hemisphere, h 
this last year, our resourcefulness as a peopl 
was challenged in the clearest terms. W 
moved at once to resist the threat of aggressiv 
nuclear weapons in Cuba, and we found th 
nations of Latin America at our side. Thej 
like ourselves, were brought to a new awarenes 
of the danger of jDermitting the poverty an 
despair of a whole people to continue long anj 
where in this continent. 

Had the needs of the people of Cuba bee 
met in the pre-Castro period — their need fo 
food, for housing, for education, for jobs, anc 
above all, for a democratic responsibility in th 
fulfillment of their own Iiopes — there wouli 
have been no Castro, no missiles in Cuba, am 
no need for Cuba's neighbors to incur the im 
mense risks of resistance to threatened aggres 
sion from that island. 

There is but one way to avoid being facei 
with similar dilermnas in the future. It is ti 
bring about in all tlie countries of Latin Amer 
ica the conditions of hope, in which the people 
of this continent will Iniow that they can shapi 
a better future for themselves, not througl 
obeying the inhumane commands of an aliei 
and cynical ideology, but through persona 



If-expression, individual judgment, and the 

•ts of responsible citizenship. 

As Americans, we have long recognized the 

itimacy of these aspirations; in recent 

fionths we have been able to see, as never before, 

lieir urgency and, I believe, the concrete means 

|)r their realization. 

In less than 2 years, the 10-year program of 
lie Alliance for Progress has become more than 
1 idea and more than a commitment of govem- 
kents. The necessary initial effort to develop 
jl^ans, to organize institutions, to test and ex- 
sriment has itself required and achieved a new 
lication — a new dedication to intelligent com- 
promise between old and new ways of life. In 
le long run, it is this effort and not the threat 
communism that will determine the fate of 
jedom in the Western Hemisphere. 
These years have not been easy ones for any 
roup in Latin America. A similar change in 
16 fundamental orientation of our own society 
rould have been no easier. The difficulty of 
18 changes to be brought about makes all the 
lore heartening the success of many nations of 
iatin America in achieving reforms which will 
lake their fundamental economic and social 
Itructures both more efficient and more 

Some striking accomplislmients, moreover, 
'ire already visible. New housing is being ex- 
panded in most countries of the region. Edu- 
cational facilities are growing rapidly. Koad 
X)nstruction, particularly in agricultural areas, 
is accelerating at a rapid pace. With U.S. 
funds, over 2 million text books are being dis- 
tributed to combat the illiteracy of nearly half 
of the 210 million people of Latin America. 
In the countries of the Alliance for Progress, 
the diets of 8 million children and mothers are 
being supplemented with U.S. Food for Peace, 
and this figure should reach nearly 16 million 
by next year. 

In trouble-ridden northeast Brazil, under an 
agreement with the State of Rio Grande do 
Norte, a program is underway to train 3,000 
teachers, build 1,000 classrooms, 10 vocational 
schools, 8 normal schools, and 4 teacher train- 
ing centers. A $30 million slum clearance proj - 
ect is imderway in Venezuela. In Bogota, 
Colombia, the site of the old airport is becom- 

ing a new city for 71,000 persons who are build- 
ing their own homes with support from the 
Social Progress Trust Fund. 

This year I received a letter from Seiior Arge- 
mil Plazas Garcia, whom I met in Bogota upon 
the dedication of an Alianza housing project. 
He writes: "Today I am living in the house 
with my 13 children, and we are very happy 
to be free of such poverty and no longer to be 
moving around like outcasts. Now we have dig- 
nity and freedom * * *. My wife, my children, 
and I are writing you this humble letter, to 
express to you the warm gratitude of such Co- 
lombian friends who now have a home in which 
they can live happily." Of even greater long- 
range importance, a number of beginnings in 
self-help and reforms are now evident. 

Since 1961, 11 Latin American countries — 
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salva- 
dor, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela — have 
made structural reforms in their tax systems. 
Twelve countries have improved their income 
tax laws and administration. 

New large-scale programs for improved land 
use and land refonn have been undertaken 
in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and two 
States in Brazil. More limited plans are being 
carried out in Chile, Colombia, Panama, Uru- 
guay, and Central America. 

Six Latin American countries — Colombia, 
Chile, Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico, and Vene- 
zuela — have submitted development programs 
to the panel of experts of the Organization of 
American States. The panel has evaluated and 
reported on the first three and will soon offer 
its views on the balance. 

Viewed against the background of decades 
of neglect — or, at most, intermittent bursts of 
attention to basic problems — the start that has 
been made is encouraging. Perhaps most sig- 
nificant of all is a change in the hearts and 
minds of the people — a growing will to develop 
their countries. We can only help Latin 
Americans to save themselves. It is for this 
reason that the increasing determination of 
the peoples of the region to build modern soci- 
eties is heartening. And it is for this reason 
that responsible leadership in Latin America 
must respond to this popular will with a greater 

APRIL 22, 1963 


sense of urgency and purpose, lest aspirations 
turn into frustrations and hope turn into de- 
spair. Pending reform legislation must be 
enacted, statutes already on the books must be 
enforced, and mechanisms for carrying out pro- 
grams must be organized and invigorated. 
These steps are not easy, as we know from 
our own experience, but they must be taken. 

Our own intention is to concenti'ate our sup- 
port in Latin America on those countries ad- 
hering to the principles established in the 
Charter of Punta del Este, and to work with 
our neighbors to indicate more precisely the 
particular policy changes, reforms and other 
self-help measures which are necessary to make 
our assistance effective and the Alliance a suc- 
cess. The Clay Committee recommendation 
that we continue to expand our efforts to en- 
courage economic integration within the region 
and the expansion of trade among the countries 
of Latin America has great merit. The deter- 
mination of the Central American Presidents 
to move boldly in this direction impressed me 
greatly during my recent meeting witli tliem 
in San Jose, Costa Kica ; ^ and the Agency for 
International Development has already estab- 
lished a regional office in Central America, is 
giving support to a regional development bank, 
and has participated in regional trade 

A beginning has been made in tlie first 2 
years of the Alliance; but the job that is still 
ahead must be tackled with continuing urgency. 
Many of the ingredients for a successful decade 
are at hand, and the fundamental course for 
the future is clear. It remains for all parties 
to the Alliance to provide the continuous will 
and effort needed to move steadily along that 

VI. This Year's Authorizing Legislation 

Translating the foregoing facts and princi- 
ples into program costs and appropriations, 
based on the application of the standards set 
forth above and affirmed by the Clay Commit- 
tee, yields the following results: 

First, upward of $200 million of economic 
assistance funds now available are expected to 
be saved and not used in the present fiscal year. 

' Bulletin of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 511. 

and upward of $100 million of these unused 
funds will remain available for lending in the 
future ; 

Second, in addition to the savings carried j 
forward into next year, close review has indi- 
cated a number of reductions that can be made 
in the original budget estimates for economic 
and military assistance without serious damage 
to the national interest. 

Together these factors permit a reduction in 
the original budget estimates from $4.9 to $4.5 
billion. This amount reflects anticipated re- 
ductions in military and economic assistance to 
a number of countries, in line with these stand- 
ards and recommendations, and unavoidable in- . 
creases to others. The principal net increasesAj 
proposed in 1964 appropriations are the follow-^ 

An additional $325 million for lending in 
Latin America — $125 million through the si 
Agency for International Development and • 
$200 million through the Social Progress Trust 
Fund, administered for the United States by . 
the Inter- American Development Bank (for :- 
which no appropriation was needed in fiscal ! 
year 1963 because a 2-year appropriation had 
been made the year before) ; 

An additional $85 million for lending else- I 
where in the world, mostly in countries such as 
India, Pakistan, and Nigeria which are meeting 
those high standards of self-help and fiscal and :, 
economic progress which permit our aid to be 
directed toward ultimate full self-support; 

An additional $80 million for military aid, 
including the increased requirements for India 
(but still far below the fiscal 1961 level) ; and 

An additional $50 million for the contingency 
fund, which provides a flexibility indispensable 
to our security. We cannot ignore the possibil- 
ity that new threats similar to those in Laos or 
Vietnam might arise in areas which now look 
calm, or that new opix>rtunities will open up to 
achieve major gains in the cause of freedom. 
Foreign aid policy can no more be static than 
foreign policy itself. 

I believe that it is necessary and desirable 
that these funds be provided by the Congress 
to meet program needs and to be available for 
program opportunities. Funds which are not 
required under the increasingly selective pro- 



Irani uiid performance standards of our assist- 
Ince programs will, as in this year, not be spent 
|r committed. 

The legislative amendments which I am for- 
Ivarding herewith * cari"y forward the basic 
Structure and intent of the Foreign Assistance 
Let of 1961, as amended. No fundamental 
Ihanges in this legislative structure now appear 
|o be required. 

One relatively minor change I am proposing 
Is for a separate authorization for the appro- 
jriation of funds to assist American schools and 
lospitals abroad. A number of these schools 
[sponsored by Americans have been most success- 
Iful in the developing countries in providing an 
Education built upon American standards. 
Tntil now some assistance has been made avail- 
able to these schools from general economic aid 
funds, but this is becoming increasingly inap- 
Dropriate. Separate authorization and appro- 
jriations would be used to help these schools 
irry out long-tenn programs to establish them- 
olves on a sounder financial footing, becoming 
'gradually independent, if at all possible, of 
U.S. Government support. 

Finally, I am requesting the Congress in this 
legislation to amend that section of the Trade 
Expansion Act which requires the denial of 
equal tariff treatment to imports from Poland 
and Yugoslavia. It is appropriate that this 
amendment should be incorporated in this bill 
since it is my conviction that trade and other 
forms of normal i-elations constitute a sounder 
basis than aid for our future relationship with 
these countries. 

VII. Conclusion 

In closing, let me again emphasize the over- 
riding importance of the efforts in which we are 

At this point in history we can look back to 
many successes in the struggle to preserve free- 
dom. Our Nation is still daily winning unseen 
victories in the fight against Communist suit- 
version in the slums and hamlets, in the hos- 
pitals and schools, and in the offices of govern- 
ments across a world bent on lifting itself. 
Two centuries of pioneering and growth must be 

telescoped into decades and even years. This 
is a field of action for which our history has 
prejDared us, to which our aspirations have 
drawn us, and into which our national interest 
moves us. 

Around the world cracks in the monolithic 
apparatus of our adversary are there for all to 
see. This, for the American people, is a time 
for vision, for patience, for work, and for wis- 
dom. For better or worse, we are the pace- 
setters. Freedom's leader cannot flag or falter, 
or another runner will set the pace. 

We have dared to label the sixties the "Dec- 
ade of Development." But it is not the elo- 
quence of our slogans, but the quality of our 
endurance, which will determine whether this 
generation of Americans deserves the leader- 
ship which history has thrust upon us. 

John F. Kennedy. 

U.S. Disclaims Responsibility 
for Attacks on Soviet Ships 

Folloiving is the teM of a U.S. note delivered 
to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 
Moscoio on April 3. 

Press release 170 dated April 3 

April 3, 1963 
By its notes of March 27 and of March 29, 
1963,' the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presented 
protests by the Soviet Government against what 
it termed "piratical attacks" on the Soviet mer- 
chant vessel "L'gov" on March 17 and the So- 
viet merchant vessel "Baku" during the night 
of March 26-27 near Cuba. The notes asserted 
that although the attacks were perpetrated by 
Cuban counter-revolutionary groups, the 
United States Government encourages such 
activities and bears full responsibility for them. 
The United States Government categorically 
i-ejects this charge. It wishes to remind the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics that immediately after the recent at- 
tacks on Soviet merchant vessels an official 
spokesman stated that the United States Gov- 

' Not printed here. 

' Not printed here. 

APRIL 22, 1963 


emment is strongly opposed to, and is in no 
way associated with, such attacks.- This posi- 
tion was furthermore clearly set forth by Presi- 
dent Kennedy in his press conference of March 
21. The United States Government is taking 
every step necessary to insure that such attacks 
are not launched, manned or equipped from 
U.S. territory. 

In taking vigorous action to prevent misuse 
of its territory, the Government of the United 
States trusts that the Government of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Kepublics will not mism- 
terpret such action as indicating any change in 
United States opposition to Soviet military in- 
volvement in Cuba. 

U.S.S.R. Accepts U.S. Proposal 
for Direct Communication Linit 

Following is the text of a U.S. Arms Control 
and. Disarmament Agency statement read to 
news correspondents on April 5 hy a Depart- 
ment of State spokesman. 

The United States welcomes the Soviet Gov- 
ernment's acceptance of the American proposal 
for improved communications between the So- 
viet Union and the United States. In order to 
reduce the risk of war occurring through failure 
of communications, the United States has 
sought to reach agreements on measures which 
would improve communications between gov- 

The specific purpose of a direct teletype link 
between the Soviet Union and the United States 
would be to have a channel available for im- 
mediate use during times of crisis. On its 
part, the United States would expect to estab- 
lish a central terminal point in Washington. 
From this terminal point, the President can 
always be reached immediately. Since there 
will be technical details to agree upon before 
the teletype link can be established, the United 
States anticipates that there will be private 
tecluiical talks with the Soviet Union on tliis 
matter in the near future. 

Cuba Expresses Regret 
in ''Fioridian" Incident 

Department Statement ^ 

In connection with the United States' demand 
for a full and prompt explanation involving 
the shooting by Cuban MIG aircraft near the 
motorship Floridian March 28, the Czech Am- 
bassador [Miloslav Ruzek] today called on the 
Department to deliver a note from the govern- 
ment of Cuba. The Cuban government stated 
that the j^ilots of its two MIG aircraft had 
arrived at the erroneous conclusion that the 
Floridkin was an enemy vessel. The Cuban 
government further stated that it had no wish 
to interfere with the U.S. or other international 
shipping in the Caribbean, that it regrets the 
incident of March 28, and that it is undertaking 
to adopt all possible measures to avoid a recur- 
rence of the incident. 

U.S. Acts To Prevent Raids 
on Cuba From U.S. Territory 

Following is the text of a joint statement 
issued hy the Department of Justice and the 
Department of State on March 30. 

Press release 169 dated March 30 

The position of the United States Govern- 
ment regarding hit-and-run attacks by Cuban 
refugee groups against Soviet ships and other 
targets in Cuba has been made perfectly clear 
by the President and the Secretary of State.^ 

These attacks are neither supported nor con- 
doned by this Government. The President has 
pointed out that they may have effects opposite 
those presumably intended by those who carry 
them out ; that is, they may strengthen the So- 
viet position in Cuba rather than weaken it, 
tighten Communist controls rather than loosen 

' For text of a U.S. statement of Mar. 19, see Bul- 
letin of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 520. 

' Read to news correspondents on Apr. 2 by Lincoln 
White, Director of the Office of News ; for background, 
see Bulletin of Apr. 15, 1963, p. 573. 

* For text of a U.S. statement of Mar. 19, see Bulle- 
tin of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 520. 



Our preliminary evidence suggests that these 

lids have not in fact been launched from the 

'rritory of the United States. However, the 

'BI and the Immigration and Naturalization 

ervice, with the cooperation of the Coast 

ruard and Customs Service, are intensifying 

leir investigations. We intend to take every 

tep necessary to insure that such raids are not 

lunched, manned, or equipped from U.S. 


A The sympathy of this Government and of the 

"American people is with those Cubans who hope 

see their countiy freed from Commmiist con- 

rol. We miderstand that these raids reflect 

he deep finistration of men who want to get 

)ack to their homeland, to a Cuba that is 


But this understanding does not mean that 
ve are prepared to see our own laws violated 
vith impunity, or to tolerate activities which 
night provoke armed reprisals, the brunt of 
which would be borne by the Armed Forces of 
ihe United States. 

King of Morocco Exchanges Views 
With President Kennedy 

His Majesty Hassan 11^ King of Morocco, 
made a state visit to the United States, March 
26-April 5. At Washington, March 27-29, he 
met loith President Kennedy and other U.S. 
Government officials. Following is the text of 
a joint communique issued on March 29 at 
the conclusion of King Hassan's visit to 

White House press release dated March 29 

His Majesty Hassan II, King of Morocco, 
has concluded today a state visit to Washing- 
ton, during which he was the guest of President 

During their stay in the capital, the King and 
his ministers met with the President and high- 
ranking officials of the United States Govern- 
ment and exchanged views on a wide range of 
subjects of mutual interest. 

King Hassan II, as head of state of an im- 
portant African country, made known his view- 

point on the aspects of the international situa- 
tion and economic development problems which 
are of interest to Morocco as well as to other 
African comitries. He expressed his country's 
particular mterest in the United States objec- 
tives in the cause of peace and liberty and in 
the increased importance which the Govern- 
ment of the United States attaches to Africa. 
The President outlined the United States views 
on the questions which divide the East and the 
West; furthermore, he expressed his country's 
desire to reach an agreement on disarmament 
and its concern arising from the dangers which 
threaten the peace and freedom of the inde- 
pendent nations of the two hemispheres. The 
President expressed his sincere interest in 
Africa and, in particular, in the establishment 
of close relations between the states of North 

The President reaffirmed the agreement 
reached at Casablanca between President Ei- 
senhower and His Majesty King Mohammed V 
on December 22, 1959,^ by which it was agreed 
that the United States forces would be with- 
drawn from Morocco before the end of 1963; 
he confirmed that the planned evacuation 
would take place as had been provided and the 
two heads of state took note of the progress 
already made in this direction. The President 
also confirmed the desire previously expressed 
by President Eisenhower to help the Moroccan 
Government, to every possible extent, to use 
these bases constructively. 

It was agreed that the various means by 
which the United States could continue to con- 
tribute in the most effective manner to the 
economic development of Morocco, within the 
framework of United States foreign policy and 
of the long friendsliip as well as the traditional 
cooperation which unite these two countries, 
would be considered through diplomatic 

His Majesty expressed the hope that the 
President and Mrs. Kennedy could visit Mo- 
rocco in the near future and the President ex- 
pressed his desire to accept this cordial 
invitation at an early opportunity. 

' For text of a joint communique, see Bulletin of 
Jan. 11, 1960, p. 57. 

APRIL 22, 1963 


The United Nations and the New Africa 

hy G. Mermen Williams 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^ 

Your evident interest in the United Nations 
is highly gratifying and encouraging. This is 
an interest that unites you with millions of 
young people throughout the world and par- 
ticularly with young Africans, who see in the 
United Nations a tangible liope both for world 
cooperation and for a better standard of living 
for the peoples of Africa. 

The relationship between Africa and the 
United Nations has grown steadily over the 
nearly 18 years since the United Nations was 
founded at San Francisco. Then, only 4 na- 
tions in Africa — Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and 
South Africa — were independent and eligible 
for U.N. membership. Today there are 33 
African members of the world body, nearly a 
third of the total U.N. membership and a larger 
number of members than in any other con- 
tinent. A part of this growth is due to the 
United Nations itself because of the direct 
role it played in the birth of seven former 
trust territories — Burundi, Cameroon, Libya, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Tanganyika, and Togo. 

The constantly growing community of Afri- 
can-U.N. relations can best be approached in 
two ways — first, in terms of the technical, social, 
and economic developments taking place on the 
African Continent under U.N. auspices; and, 
second, in terms of political activities both at 
U.N. headquarters in New York and in Africa 

Although the United Nations' technical, 
social, and economic role in Africa is not large 
when compared with current bilateral assist- 

* Address made before the 17th annual model U.N. 
conference at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, 
Wis., on Mar. 29 (press release 164). 

ance programs, it does provide important 
assistance in key areas and does it without any 
of the political associations that Africans some- 
times fear are associated with bilateral pro- 
grams. This assistance is made available either 
through U.N. technical cooperation programs — 
the U.N. regular program, the Expanded Pro- 
gram of Technical Assistance, and the Special 
Fund — or through the programs of the various 
LT.N. specialized agencies. 

The United Nations' contribution to tech- 
nical and preinvestment assistance has been 
rising steadily. At the same time an increas- 
ing amount of the U.N.'s technical cooperation 
effort is directed toward Africa. 

The U.N. regular program in 1962 amounted 
to assistance of $6.4 million in such fields as 
economic development, public administration, 
and personnel and social services. Of this 
amount, more than $2 million went into eco- 
nomic development projects, of which more 
than 75 percent went to Africa. 

The Expanded Program of Technical As- 
sistance is a source of funds for activities in 
excess of regular United Nations and special- 
ized agency appropriations and amounted to 
$71 million in 1961 and 1962. This program 
has carried out such successful activities as a 
UNESCO project in Morocco that has installed 
some 1,200 radio receivers in primary schools i 
through which 200,000 pupils are reached by 
educational broadcasts. 

The U.N. Special Fund is the largest source 
of funds for U.N. technical assistance activi- 
ties and in 1962 alone received pledges of some 
$60 million from U.N. members. By the end 
of last year the Special Fund was participating i 



II 65 African projects totaling nearly $55 mil- 
ion and had approved 11 others amounting 
o almost $14 million. 

Other assistance to Africa is provided 

hrough such U.N.-associated lending institu- 

ions as the International Bank for Keconstruc- 

ion and Development and the International 

finance Corporation. At the end of October 

1962, the International Bank had made 42 loans 

otaling $942 million in nearly 20 African coun- 

ries. These loans include such projects as the 

levelopment of iron ore in Mauritania, port 

:onstruction in Nigeria, and manganese devel- 

Dpment in Gabon. In addition, the Bank has 

organized international consultative groups 

to assist Nigeria and Tunisia in planning 

their development and external assistance 


United Nations technical assistance activities 
in Africa also are concerned with such major 
areas of need as health and education. In the 
imfwrtant field of health, the World Health 
Organization and UNICEF [U.N. Children's 
Fund] are cooperating with Etliiopia and the 
United States in a scliool for health ofBcere, 
community nurses, and sanitarians at Gondar, 
Ethiopia. WHO also recently surveyed the 
health services and sanitary conditions in the 
Portuguese-administered territories in Africa 
and helped health authorities there draw up 
plans to improve sanitary conditions. 

Education is the most critical shortage on 
that continent, and UNESCO [United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza- 
tion] is attempting to find ways to help meet 
needs in this vital field. As a first comprehen- 
sive step, UNESCO and the Economic Com- 
mission for Africa sponsored a conference on 
educational development at Addis Ababa in 
1961,2 which was attended by 34 African min- 
isters of education. This conference agreed 
that educational planning must be an integral 
part of overall economic progress and that pri- 
orities were secondary schools, revised cui-ricula, 
and trained teachers. 

This was followed last spring by a meeting 
in Paris of African ministers of education ^ at 

" Bulletin of June 12, 1961, p. 936. 
'For an article by J. Wayne Fredericks, see ibid., 
Aug. 27, 1962, p. 333. 

which it was agreed that each African country 
would try to increase investment in education 
by one-third, or from 3 to 4 percent of gross 
national product by 1965. 

Last fall, at Tananarive, Madagascar, a 
UNESCO conference on higher education con- 
tinued to study educational needs. That con- 
ference focused its attention on teacher re- 
quirements, and it recognized the desirability 
of concentrating the training of university 
undergi-aduates in Africa, rather than sending 
most of them abroad as is done now. 

These few examples, I believe, make it clear 
that the United Nations is at work in all fields 
of teclmical, social, and economic development 
in Africa — sometimes by itself, sometimes in 
cooperation with others. And I might point 
out here that the United States provides a con- 
siderable portion of the funds that make these 
development projects possible. 

Political Developments In Africa 

But the United Nations also has important 
interests in political developments in Africa, 
and these interests get far more attention than 
the quiet work of its assistance activities. It is 
to these political questions that I would like to 
turn now. 

With the admission of Algeria, Burundi, 
Rwanda, and Uganda in 1962, the U.N.'s Afri- 
can membership rose to 33 countries, and many 
Africans are serving the world body in im- 
portant capacities. 

Godfrey K. J. Amachree of Nigeria is an 
Under Secretary-General. Eobert Gardiner of 
Ghana is the officer in charge of United Na- 
tions operations in the Congo and formerly was 
Deputy Secretary-General of the U.N. Eco- 
nomic Commission for Africa. Guinea and 
the Malagasy Republic held vice-presidencies 
in the I7th General Assembly. The chairman 
of the Assembly's Political and Security Com- 
mittee is from Sudan, and the chairman of the 
special U.N. committee on colonialism is from 
Mali. Ghana and Morocco hold Security Coun- 
cil seats, Liberia is on the Trusteeship Council, 
and Ethiopia and Senegal are members of the 
Economic and Social Council. 

Although Africa has 33 votes in the U.N. 
General Assembly, those states rarely vote 

APRIL, 22, 1963 


unanimously except on relatively noncontro- 
versial issues, such as the election of U Thant 
as Secretary-General. On such non-African 
issues as Chinese refugees and representation 
of the two Koreas there is often a wide division 
of opinion among African nations. A major 
division of African votes was also seen on an 
African issue last year during the Moroccan- 
Nigerian contest for a Security Council seat. 

On most African issues at the United Na- 
tions, however, many of which are concerned 
with the southern regions of Africa — that is, 
the so-called colonial issues — there is generally 
a consensus among 32 of the African states — 
all except South Africa. This was true in the 
last General Assembly on such questions as 
apartheid, Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese 
territories, and South-West Africa, and this 
pattern undoubtedly will continue in the next 
General Assembly session. 

Our own policy toward southern Africa has 
two chief aspects, both of which square with 
United Nations policy. First, we believe in and 
support both self-determination and racial 
harmony in those territories. We consider 
these goals both just and indispensable. Sec- 
ond, we believe progress toward responsible 
self-government is essential. 

Wliile we are largely in agreement at the 
United Nations with most African nations on 
the need for an end to colonialism, we occasion- 
ally differ on the timing and means to accom- 
plish that goal. For example, it is not United 
States policy to intervene gratuitously in the 
important processes of constitutional transi- 
tion and racial accommodation which are imder- 
way in southern Africa. We appreciate that 
these are the primary responsibilities of the 
peoples and governments concerned. In some 
cases, however — where our counsel is sought or 
where our principles demand that we make 
our position clear — we readily assert our belief 
that social, economic, and political progress 
must take place without racial discrimination 
and without derogation of the full rights of any 
element of the population. 

Wlien the question of apartheid in South 
Africa comes up at the U.N., we have no hesi- 
tation in declaring our unalterable opposition 
to that policy. We in the United States think 

that apartheid is wrong and harmful. We 
oppose it from moral conviction — the same 
moral conviction that moves the vast majority 
of Americans in their determination to eradi- 
cate the unlawful vestiges of racial discrimina- 
tion which have lingered far too long in our ji 
own country. And we oppose apartheid i#| 
clear recognition of the injunctions of the U.N. ' 
Charter. ■ 

On the Southern Khodesian question, we are 
fully aware of the extremely complex issues 
to be resolved there. But we believe that 
Southern Rhodesia must move toward giving 
an opportunity to all the country's people to 
choose their own government. We would 
hope and expect to see constitutional changes 
leading to universal adult suffrage, steps end- 
ing racial discrimination, and the establislunent ' 
of a government based on majority consent 
which can develop good relations with its neigh- 
bors. We respect the great record of decoloni- 
zation that the United Kingdom has built, and 
we recognize the progress its efforts have 
brought about in Southern Rhodesia. Never- ' 
theless we respectfully urge the United King- 
dom, as we did this week at the United Nations, 
to continue its efforts and to use its special in- 
fluence to help speed self-government for all i 
people in Southern Rhodesia. : 

On the question of the Portuguese territories, 1 
we believe the principle of self-determination i 
must be applied to those territories and that 
Portugal has a continuing role to play in Africa. 
We believe that Portugal should take rapid 
steps to prepare the peoples of those areas for 
self-determination. Our policy toward the 
Portuguese African territories has been consist- 
ent for some years. We are encouraging the 
Portuguese to undertake necessary reform. 
We believe the Portuguese recognize the firm- 
ness of our policy and the need for reform in 
the African territories. You may recall that 
last year the United States proposed a visit of 
U.N. representatives to Portuguese African ter- 
ritories to collect information on conditions 
there. This arrangement was accepted by Por- 
tugal but did not come to a vote at the U.N. be- 
cause the African and Asian nations did not 
support it. Currently, however, the special 
U.N. committee on colonialism has decided that 




a new effort should be made in this direction 
and lias authorized its chairman, Ambassador 
Sori Coulibaly of Mali, to take the matter up 
again with Portugal. We continue to be hope- 
ful that rapid progress can be made in the 
Portuguese territories. 

On the question of South-West Africa, we 
[believe the administering authority — the Re- 
Ipublic of South Africa — should: (1) end 
lapartheid; (2) recognize the people's right to 
Iself-determination and proceed in that direc- 
Ition; and (3) promote the well-being and social 
progress of the people. To help speed those 
objectives the U.N. General Assembly, by a vote 
of 96 to with Portugal abstaining and South 
I Africa not voting, requested the Secretary- 
General to establish a U.N. presence and to ap- 
point a U.N. technical assistance representative 
in the territory. The South African Govern- 
ment has not yet stated its position on this 
resolution, but we believe that its acceptance of 
tliis request would constitute a useful first step 
toward resolving the South-West Africa 

U.N. Operation in the Congo 

These remarks cannot be concluded without 
a few comments on the unprecedented U.N. 
activity in Africa that has been in world head- 
lines for nearly 3 years — the U.N. Operation in 
the Congo. This operation was consistently 
supported not only by the United States but by 
most of the African members of the U.N. It 
also had the general approval of most European 
comitries as well. Over the past 33 months, 
some 34 U.N. members contributed to keeping 
U.N. troop strength in the Congo at between 
16,000 and 20,000 men. A massive airlift and 
sealif t was coordinated by the U.N., and a dozen 
international agencies provided hundreds of 
civilian technicians to help supply essential 

services to the people of the war-torn country. 

As a result of this U.N. operation, secession 
has been halted, stability is replacing chaos, and 
many nations are working together to assist in 
the Congo's future economic, technical, and so- 
cial progress. Although this does not guaran- 
tee that there will not be setbacks in the Congo, 
there is reason to believe that the coimtry can 
now move ahead with confidence to its formi- 
dable nation-building tasks. If these hopes are 
realized, both the United States and the other 
U.N. members who supported the U.N. opera- 
tion have a right to be proud of their labors. 

The U.N. had a major role in this gigantic 
task of preventing a total breakdown of peace 
and order in central Africa. And it must be 
concluded that the interests of world peace, 
the entire African Continent, and the United 
States in this critical matter have been served 
well by the presence of the United Nations in 
the Congo. 

In conclusion I want to point out one other 
facet of particular importance in the African- 
U.N. relationship — Africa's zest for U.N. activ- 
ity. The U.N. is a forum where an African 
nation has a voice equal to that of any other 
nation, where African opinion ranks with that 
of any other area of the world. Africa brings 
to the U.N. a new insistence on the dignity and 
worth of man, and a new enthusiasm for the 
belief that the U.N. really is man's best hope 
for lasting peace, and a new desire to demon- 
strate the belief that the U.N. really is an effec- 
tive organization for settling disputes and 
advancing human development. The healthy 
interchange between Africa and the U.N. has 
done much to increase the vitality of the U.N. 
in recent years, and it has renewed the spirit of 
youth in many of the older nations. For this 
we can all be glad, because it may do much to 
assure the future peace and security of all of us. 

APRIL 22, 1963 


Japan, the United States, and Europe 

iy TJ. Alexis Johnson 

Deputy Under Secretary for Political Ajfairs 


The subject of our discussion, "Japan, the 
United States, and Europe," is indeed a large 
one, but it well exemplifies the world in which 
we live. Even 10 or 15 years ago we perhaps 
could have talked of just Japan and the United 
States or the United States and Europe, but to- 
day they really must be discussed together. 

This exemplifies two important facts. The 
first fact is that the astounding energy and 
development that has taken place in Japan in 
the short period of little more than a decade 
since the treaty of peace has brought Japan to 
the place that Prime Minister [Hayato] Ikeda 
could recently truly refer to Japan as one of 
the "three pillars of the free world" — three 
sources of responsibility, leadership, and 
strength for all. 

The second fact is that we as a nation front 
on both of the world's great ocean basins — the 
Atlantic and the Pacific. In fact one of our 
States is literally in the Pacific and four of our 
other States form the greater part of its eastern 
and northern rim. I often tell my European 
friends that from this proceeds the fact that 
we will always look on the Pacific area in a 
fundamentally different way than they do even 
though we seem to have accepted their termi- 
nology — the Far East — for what from our 
vantage point is more correctly called the Far 
West or, in this day and age, might perhaps be 
called the Near West. 

' Address made before the Chicago Conference on 
Agricultural Trade With Japan, sponsored by the 
Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry and 
the United States-Japan Trade Council, at Chicago, 
111., on Mar. 28 (press release lUl dated Mar. 27). 

I fear that we have a tendency to seek to 
divide the world up into neat groupings of 
countries and to endow these groupings with 
certain exclusive characteristics. Thus, in re- 
cent years, with all of the emphasis upon At- 
lantic partnership, there has been some tendency 
to equate that grouping of nations with the 
"industrial nations." This omits Japan, which 
stands as one of the major industrial nations 
of the world and which is unique as the only 
major industrial power in Asia or, indeed, in 
the entire free world outside of North America 
and Western Europe. 

There are special, well-known reasons of his- 
tory and sentiment which cause us to emphasize 
the importance of Europe. But the fact of the 
matter is that the free world does not stand on 
the two major pillars of the United States and 
Europe but, rather, upon the three pillars of 
the United States, Europe, and Japan. 

As we stand on the threshold of tariff nego- 
tiations — made possible by our Trade Expan- 
sion Act — we can see clearly that the matters of 
greatest concern to us, the British, and the 
European Economic Community also concern 
the Pacific area, and notably Japan. If indus- 
trial tariffs are reduced, the Japanese will bene- 
fit — and make concessions too. If exports of 
tropical products from the less developed 
countries gain easier access into Western Eu- 
rope and North America, they will find greater 
markets in Japan as well. If producers of Tem- 
perate Zone agricultural products, like the 
United States and Canada, gain assurances of 
continued opportunities for export into West- 
ern Europe, Australia and New Zealand will 
benefit too. The enlargement of worldwide. 



nondiscriminatory, competitive trade — through 
removal of tariff and other obstacles — will give 
to Japan, whose survival depends on expanding 
commerce, new possibilities for growth. It will 
create a world economic environment favorable 
to an increasing volume of American exports. 
In tliis lies the primary answer to our balance- 
of-payments problems. Trade binds all to- 
gether, East and West, North and South. 

U.S. Investment in Japan 

In these days, when the great debate is open- 
ing on what has come to be called our "foreign 
aid" programs,- it is perhaps useful to look back 
on the experience with Japan. It, together with 
Europe, illustrates well that it is usually wrong 
to think of these programs in terms of unrecom- 
pensed charity. My own feeling is that, instead 
of talking of "aid," we should be talking in 
terms of investment in the future — investment 
not only for others but for ourselves as well, 
investment not only in broad political and mili- 
tary terms, important though they are in them- 
selves, but also investment in purely economic 

Our investment in the form of various types 
of economic aid of about $2 billion in Japan 
from 1946 to 1956 ($600 million of which is 
being directly repaid) should be viewed against 
the $18 billion of trade between ourselves and 
Japan in the past decade; and this trade will 
increase in the future. Of particular interest 
to you is the fact that, of the $10.3 billion of 
United States exports to Japan over the past 
10 years, about $4.4 billion has been agricul- 
tural products. Moreover, it is estimated that 
about one-quarter of United States exports of 
all kinds to Japan originate in the Midwest. 

In the countries starting from a less favora- 
ble base than Japan and Europe the return on 
our investment will, of course, normally be 
somewhat slower in being realized. However, 
there can be no doubt that there will be such a 

If we would measure power by the yardsticks 
of competence and capital — and these are the 
yardsticks of broadest relevance to the task 
which the free world faces in the decade ahead — 

^ For text of the President's message on the foreign 
aid program for 1964, see p. 591. 

we would have to place Japan very high on the 
list. Japan is first in shipbuilding, first in fish- 
ing, fourth in steel and electric power genera- 
tion, and one of the top five in cement produc- 
tion. Japan has a highly skilled labor force and 
an educational system that is continuously 
improving its quality. Management is capable, 
adventurous, and alert to economic opportunity. 

Japan is emerging as a major world power 
at a time when, as it realizes, the national power 
of a single nation is not a sufficient basis for 
action. This is the lesson we have ourselves 
learned and had reimpressed upon us with each 
new turn of events. Each nation lives and 
works in a complex web of diverse relationships 
with other nations. To act effectively requires 
concerted effort. 

The tasks confronting the free world in the 
decade ahead are truly enormous. All coun- 
tries are faced by important problems of im- 
proving the quality of life in their own socie- 
ties. Both Japan and the United States have 
their share of problems of this kind. There are 
problems of establishing more effective eco- 
nomic and political relationships between the 
developed nations. There are critical problems 
of insuring the security and independence of 
the developing countries and of promoting their 
economic and social progress. Finally, there 
are the broad problems of creating and sustain- 
ing a world environment of security within 
which these other constructive tasks can go 

The means employed will be as diverse as the 
problems to which they are addressed. If 
Japan is to achieve the secure place in the 
world to which its power entitles it ; if Japan is 
to make the contribution to solution of these 
problems which it can make — and which it rec- 
ognizes as its responsibility to make — its ties 
with other free nations will have to be further 
strengthened in a variety of ways. This is not 
something which Japan can do alone; Japan 
requires the cooperation of the other free coun- 
tries, just as they require the cooperation of 

Japan's role as a major world power can be 
considered from a variety of viewpoints. I sug- 
gest that we look at it in terms of its role as a 
major industrial power, its role as a model or 

APRIL 22, 1963 


example for developing countries, its role in 
assisting the developing countries, its role in 
world peace and security, and its special role 
the Pacific. 


Japan a Major Industrial Power 

Japan's postwar progress toward status as a 
major industrial power has come with such a 
rush that all who write or speak about it quickly 
find themselves talking in superlatives and in- 
terlarding their remarks with large quantities 
of fascinating statistics. The story of Japan's 
remarkable economic progi-ess is so well loiown 
to this group that it does not need to be devel- 
oped here in detail. However, it might be 
useful to review a few of the facts. 

Japan's rate of growth and rate of invest- 
ment are the highest in the world. Gross na- 
tional product has risen at an average annual 
rate of 9 percent during the past decade and 
recently has been increasing at a rate of 13 to 
14 percent. GNP has nearly doubled in real 
terms since 1956. Industrial production in- 
creased by 217 percent between 1953 and 1961. 
This growth has been sustained by the highest 
rate of investment in the world— a rate which 
has been running at about 30 percent of GNP. 
Many new industries have developed since the 
war, some with the teclmical and investment 
cooperation of American industry. 

This growth is the more remarkable for hav- 
ing taken place in a country with very limited 
natural resources, except that most important 
resource of all — an intelligent and diligent pop- 
ulation. Without stretching the facts too far 
it can almost be said that Japan has nothing 
to export but the labor and skills of its people. 
Never has it better been demonstrated that peo- 
ple themselves can be the most important 

Wliile there were many special factors oper- 
ating in the Japanese case which limit its gen- 
eral applicability, it is still a fascinating model 
for other industrial countries. It is a model 
of sufficient interest to have led the influential 
London Economist to examine its applicability 
to Britain and other coimtries in two long sup- 
plements last September. 

As you well know, Japan's limited natural 
resources make expanding trade an essential 

condition to continuing growth. It is less well 
appreciated that Japanese prosperity promotes 
American prosperity. After Canada, Japan is 
our most important customer. Over the past 
5 years United States exports to Japan ex- 
ceeded imports from Japan by about $1 billion 
($6.2 billion compared with $5.2 billion). Of 
the $6.2 billion of United States exports to Ja- 
pan during this period, $2.4 billion were agri- 
cultural products (including cotton, $760 
million; grains, $495 million; soybeans, $450 
million). During this 5-year period we also 
sold to Japan $1.2 billion of machinery and 
vehicles, $600 million of chemicals, $342 million 
of petroleum products, and $257 million of 
coking coal. There is now rightly much con- 
cern over the future of our large sales of agri- 
cultural products to the EEC countries. 
However, we should also not lose sight of the 
continuing importance of Japan as a market for 
our agricultural products. In fact, of course, 
that is why you are meeting here. Over the 
past 5 years our exports of these commodities 
to Japan alone have amounted to almost half 
our exports of agricultural commodities to the 
five EEC countries. 

Perspective on U.S.-Japan Trade Problems 

If Japan is to buy from us, it must also be 
able to sell to us. We are the largest market 
in the world and a particularly important mar- 
ket for the high-quality luxury and semiluxury 
goods which are an important part of Japan's 
exports. Old ideas die very slowly. There is 
still a belief in this country that the Japanese 
are able to do so well in our markets only be- 
cause theirs is a low-wage economy. This busi- 
ness of comparing labor costs is, of course, very 
difficult, and this is not the time or the place 
to enter into a debate on the subject. However, 
the practices of Japanese industry with respect 
to fringe benefits and the retention of workers 
in times of slack production or after a worker is 
no longer efficient, make it impossible to arrive 
at a picture of true labor costs solely on the 
basis of a comparison of hourly or daily base 
wages with those of the United States or Eu- 
rope. Moreover, labor is only one of the pro- 
duction costs, and the costs of both raw- 
materials and capital are high in Japan. 



When trade is as large as our trade with 
Tapan, it is highly likely that there will be 
[u-oblems. But these problems must be seen 
u perspective. A current controvei-sy over 
hat trade concerns Japanese exports to this 
•ounti-y of certain cotton textile products. 
IVhat is immediately at issue is trade of the 
i alue of a few million dollars out of a total 
trade approaching $3 billion. 

But cotton textiles happen to be a ^wlitically 
[)otent issue on both sides of the Pacific. 
Understandably, the Japanese textile industry 
is upset. There is a tendency to see the United 
States position as an indicator of restrictive 
trends in general United States trade policy. I 
can assure you and Japan that it is not. This 
administration is committed to a liberal trade 
policy and has just obtained legislation under 
which we are actively seeking general reduc- 
tions in world trade barriers, including United 
States barriers. We are also actively attempt- 
ing to solve the cotton textile problem in a man- 
ner which will provide Japan continuing access 
to our market while safeguarding the interests 
of the United States textile industry. 

Nonetheless there is, I believe, a growing un- 
derstanding in this country of the role of Japan 
as one of the major industrial powers and of 
the importance and necessity of expanding 
Japanese trade with the United States and the 
other industrial nations. There is also, I be- 
lieve, an increasing imderstanding of the im- 
portance of Japan as a major factor in world- 
wide monetary and financial operations, of 
Japan's standing as a major contributor of as- 
sistance to the developing nations. From this 
follows the need for the United States and 
Europe to facilitate active Japanese participa- 
tion in cooperative arrangements in matters of 
trade and finance, aid to less developed coun- 
tries, and the concerting of domestic economic 
policies to avoid international imbalance of 
trade and payments. 

The means by which Japan's economic rela- 
' tionships with the other industrial nations can 
be strengthened and institutionalized are sev- 
eral. We strongly support Japanese member- 
ship in the Organization for Economic Coopera- 

tion and Development (OECD) ' and expect 
that such membership will soon be arranged. 
Participation by Japan in GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations 
for reduction of trade barriers and more rapid 
liberalization by Japan of its own barriers to 
trade are of great importance. We expect 
Japan to participate fully in the multilateral 
negotiations we are now preparing for under 
the authority of the new Trade Expansion 

In general there is need on all sides for a 
wider appreciation of the importance of liberal 
trade policies. Tliis applies as much to Japan 
as it does to the United States and Europe. 
In Japan, as here and in Europe, there is still 
much high-cost, inefficient production which has 
avoided the rigors of competitive existence by 
virtue of import barriers. Adjustment of this 
situation is as important to the continued vig- 
orous growth of the Japanese economy as it is 
to the economy of any other country. 

Japan a Model for Developing Countries 

As a major industrial power which has rela- 
tively recently had to face and deal with many 
of the problems which face the developing coun- 
tries, Japan can play a powerful world role as 
an example to those countries. In agriculture 
there is certainly no comparison between Japan 
and Communist China, or any other Commu- 
nist country for that matter. Cultivated land 
per person in Japan is one-third that of Com- 
munist. China. Yet, while the people of China 
have been starving, Japan, in the face of more 
than a 10-percent increase in population over 
the past decade and with rising consumption 
standards, has increased its self-sufficiency in 
food from 80 percent to 85 percent. Rice 
yields, at 96 bushels per acre, are among the 
highest in the world — nearly twice those of 
Communist China. The record 1962 rice crop, 
the eighth consecutive bumper harvest in Ja- 
pan, is in sharp contrast to the poor harvests 
of Communist China. Japan is today self- 
sufficient in rice — an achievement believed un- 
attainable 15 years ago. 

' For a statement by Secretary Rusk, see Bulletin 
of Apr. 15, 1963, p. 572. 

APRIL 22, 1963 

We are concerned with the well-bemg of the 
Chinese people, and their suffering gives us no 
sense of satisfaction. But these comparisons 
do indicate that the Japanese have a much 
better formula for agricultural development. 

That formula includes land reform, which 
brought the natural incentives of free enter- 
prise to Japanese agriculture; the application 
of modern technology to small-scale agricul- 
ture ; and the building of an effective relation- 
ship between agriculture and industry. Today 
only 10 percent of cultivated land is tenant- 
farmed, as compared with 45 percent before 
land reform. Virtually all Japanese farm 
households have electricity. On 6 million Jap- 
anese farms there are 500,000 small tractors, 
many of which are used cooperatively. Japan 
uses as much chemical fertilizer on 13 million 
acres of cultivated land as all the remaining 
Far Eastern coimtries use on 822 million acres. 
The industrial system of Japan provides not 
only the machinery and fertilizer needed on the 
farms but also the consumer goods which serve 
to improve living conditions for the farmer. 
Many Japanese farm households today have 
washing machines, television sets, and other 
modem conveniences. 

We are not doctrinaire on the subject of the 
economic systems adopted by others, but Japan 
is an excellent example for the developing coim- 
tries of the possibilities of progress through 
private enterprise. This is a private enterprise 
system in which the Government plays an im- 
portant role in setting goals and in giving gen- 
eral guidance to the economy. It is a system 
which leaves a large sphere of freedom to the 
vigorous private entrepreneurs. The results 
have included a growth in per capita income 
from $261 in 1953 to $416 in 1961, with a 
planned target of $579 for 1970 (in 1958 prices) . 
If recent rates of growth continue, that target 
will be considerably exceeded. 

Japan is a model for the developing countries 
in certain aspects of social modernization. 
Though Japan has been an industrial country 
for many years, its social characteristics have 
basically followed traditional Asian patterns. 
Nevertheless, under the impact of occupation 
policies, urbanization, development of mass 

communications, representative govermnentJ 
and economic progress, there has been a remark- 
able growth in civil freedom and in freedom | 
from the bonds of traditional ways. Japanese! 
society has developed an increasingly modemi 
outlook. While the society is still in flux, the] 
basis has been laid for an enduring democratic] 

Japan provides useful lessons for the develop-1 
ing countries in education. Whereas in many 
of the developing countries, and in some of the 
developed countries as well, the educational sys- 
tem is poorly related to the needs of the society, 
in Japan a quite effective effort is being made to 
relate education to such needs. 

If Japan is in some important respects a 
model or example for the developing countries, 
a special burden of responsibility is placed upon 
the United States and Europe. We must 
demonstrate in our trade and other policies that 
countries which earn the right to acceptance as 
major industrial nations will be treated equally 
with other industrial nations. We must not 
through our policies weaken the attraction of 
this example by denying Japan full equality. 

Concept of Japan's Responsibilities 

As a major industrial power Japan recognizes 
that it has a responsibility to assist the develop- 
ing countries by continuing and expanding eco- 
nomic assistance — or, as I prefer to call it, in- 
vestment. It is a member of the Development 
Assistance Committee of the OECD, which is 
the principal institutional arrangement for con- 
sultation among the industrial nations on assist- 
ance matters. 

We should particularly note Japan's per- 
formance to date in assisting the developing 
countries. In absolute terms it is, in this regard, 
the fifth ranking country in the world. Both 
official and private lending have been increas- 
ing. Japan also recognizes the need to improve 
the terms of its assistance and has been taking 
steps to this end. We hope that both the in- 
crease in volume and the improvement in terms 
will continue. 

Japan, as a major industrial nation, also has 
an important role to play in world peace and 
security. It is increasingly recognizing that it 



eeds to insure the defense of its homeland 

ii-oiiffh further development of a modern, liigh- 
iKility self-defense force which will leave no 
oiibt as to its determination and ability to make 
o;gression unprofitable. In addition such a 
apability will be important in giving Japan 
hat sense of security which it requires — and 

liich any nation requires — if it is to play a 
irger part in the nonmilitary affairs of the 

Apart from the provision for its own defense 
nd provision of base facilities, Japan has 
hosen to play its role in world peace and secu- 
ity primarily through the United Nations, 
'his is a very important and honorable role for 

to play. Japan's contribution to the political, 
conomic, and social activities of the United Na- 
ions is substantial and growing. 

In view of the limitations placed by the Japa- 
lese Constitution and policy on a military role 
or itself outside Japan, Japan might view its 
ole in promoting political stability and inter- 
lational peace as being performed in increasing 
neasure through expanding assistance in the 
levelopment of the new nations. Japan's eco- 
lomic assistance has up to now tended to be di- 
rectly related to Japan's trade and raw-material 
■equirements. If Japan should increasingly 
5et its level of effort in the developing countries 
)n the basis of a broader concept of its responsi- 
bilities, I believe that it would find that it would 
wish to increase its investment in economic as- 
sistance considerably above present levels. 

Role of Japan as a Pacific Power 

I turn now, more briefly, to Japan's role as a 
Pacific power. This is a special, though very 
important, aspect of Japan's world role which 
I have discussed. Much of what I have already 
said therefore applies. Japan has a special role 
to play as the only major industrial power in 
Asia. It is an example in a special sense to the 
developing countries of Asia and has particu- 
larly important trade and aid relationships 
with Asia. 

Because it is the major industrial nation in 
Asia, an important part of the trade relation- 
sliips of the area revolve around Japan. In 
1962 Japan did 33 percent of its export trade 

and 28 percent of its import trade with free 
Asia. Expansion of this trade cannot be viewed 
as a substitute for expansion of trade with the 
United States and Europe. But such expan- 
sion is of great potential importance to both 
Japan and free Asia, for Japan is a very im- 
portant source of modern technology for the 

The entire free world has a strong interest in 
insuring the continued independence of Asian 
countries against the various Communist eilorts 
to gain control of them. But Japan has a very 
special interest in their continued independence 
and in the growth of their prosperity. Al- 
though Japan's economic assistance program is 
worldwide in scope, it is luiderstandably con- 
centrated in Asia. Thus, in 1961 about 60 per- 
cent of all official bilateral Japanese assistance 
was disbursed to Asian countries. Japan has 
engaged in various cooperative ventures with 
other Asian countries for the development of 
their resources for their mutual benefit. These 
ventures include, for example, the Orissa iron- 
ore project in India, involving Japanese assist- 
ance to the development of Indian iron-ore 
deposits and related transport facilities. 

\^^lile Japanese experience has worldwide 
application, it is a particular example for Asia. 
Thus Japanese rice-growing techniques have 
been widely adopted in Asia, and Japanese 
handicraft industiy methods are also being in- 
troduced. Japanese technology is being trans- 
ferred through technical cooperation programs. 
In 1962, 269 Japanese experts were sent abroad 
and 434 trainees were received by Japan. In 
addition more third-country training under 
United States assistance programs has been 
done in Japan than in any other country in 

Many of Japan's relations with other Asian 
nations are, like its relations with the industrial 
nations of the West, organized on a bilateral 
basis. But it also plays an important role in 
collaborating with these countries through such 
regional bodies and activities as ECAFE [U.N. 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East], the Colombo Plan, and the Asian Pro- 
ductivity Organization and through supporting 
the work of the Mekong River development 

APRIL 22, 1963 


Bilateral Relations Between U.S. and Japan 

Bilateral relations between the United States 
and Japan are a part of Japan's role as a Pacific 
power, for, as I mentioned earlier, the United 
States too is a Pacific power. I have already 
spoken at some length of our trading relation- 
ship, of particular interest to this meeting, and 
have mentioned in passing our military security 
relationship. Each of these is a vital element 
in what we have come to call the United States- 
Japan partnership, for no other word describes 
the relationship better. The third link in this 
partnership chain is the flow of people and 
ideas. Person-to-person business, intellectual, 
cultural, scientific, and just plain tourist con- 
tacts have grown by leaps and bounds. At the 
official level, members of our two Cabinets con- 
cerned with economic affairs meet together once 
a year to review our economic relations. We 
also have committees of distinguished scientific 
and cultural leaders of the two countries who 
meet periodically to recommend ways of devel- 
oping further our relations in these areas. 

At the level of the individual it is difficult to 
estimate exactly, but well over 2 million Ameri- 
cans have visited or lived in Japan since the 
war. These include government officials, mili- 
tary personnel and their dependents, techni- 
cians, businessmen, students, intellectuals, and 
increasing numbers of tourists. The Olympics 
of 1964 will bring a fresh new wave of tourists 
to Japan. Approximately 225,000 Japanese 
visitors have been to the United States in the 
period since the war. If the restrictions on ex- 
penditures by Japanese touring abroad are 
eased, as expected in the near future, these 
numbers should increase. 

The effects of these contacts on Japan have 
been considerable. They are reflected in all 
aspects of Japanese urban culture, in the role of 
Japanese women, in the greatly increased use 
of English as a second language— and even in 
the adoption of wide-scale advertising and in- 
stallment buying. Japan has had, in return, its 
impact on the United States in the area of tast« 

and of thought. It ranges from an influence 
upon American movies to a deeper and more 
lasting influence upon art and architecture. 

We and Europe must make it possible for 
Japan to play that increasing role as a major | 
nation of the world and the Pacific that it seeks 
for itself. At the official government level this 
will involve Japan's increasingly active partici- 
pation in a wide range of international organi- 
zations— knovra in the international alphabet 
UNICEF, FAO, to name only a few— and 
fmally, in plain English, the Colombo Plan. 
There should be increasingly close bilateral 
partnership relations with the United States, 
Canada, Western Europe, and with the develop- 
ing nations. The United States places a special 
value on its partnership with Japan, and we 
are confident that this partnership will also 
continue to hold a special place in Japanese 
policy. In addition there should continue to 
develop on the personal level, in the business, ^ 
academic, and scientific communities, as well ^ 
as among just plain people, thousands of formal 
and informal relationships so well exemplified 
by this meetmg today. 

Wlien I first went to Japan almost 30 years 
ago, it was a land that was still strange and 
exotic to most Americans and America was very 
remote to most Japanese. Then we were 
thrown together in the traumatic experience of 
war, in wliich our sons died by the thousands. 
Having won victory, we sought not revenge but 
what the statesmen of both of our political 
parties properly called a "peace of reconcilia- 
tion." Japan responded with statesmanship. 
Today we find our present well-being and our 
future bound together as few nations in his- 
tory — certainly as no two nations so far sepa- 
rated by distance and background. With equal 
statesmanship in the United States, Europe, 
and Japan for the future we can be confident 
that these three pillars of the free world will 
increasingly be able to withstand the stress of 
the enemies of freedom and provide the founda- 
tion on which a better world can be built for all. 






lieflections on the Pacific Community 

hy Harlan Cleveland 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ' 

I All of a sudden, it seems, we have begun to 
.Ik of a "Pacific community." And when we 
we get very close to the heart of United 
ates foreign policy. It therefore is worth 
hile, I think, to begin by putting that frame- 
ork around the subject of your conference. 
It is easy to forget that the very possibility of 
ay kind of human community at all is a rela- 
.vely recent phenomenon. For most of man's 
istory to date, he wandered in search of 
Qod — "a lonely gatherer and hunter of suste- 
lance." No earlier than 10,000 years ago — a 
lere blinking of history's eye — man first dis- 
overed how to domesticate plants and grow his 
wn food. It was an epic technological break- 
hrongh; and its social fallout was the begin- 
ling of social complexity — tiny communities of 
luman beings, beginning in the earliest "settle- 
aents" to learn to live together — by living 

The story of man since then is the emergence 
)f ever-widening communities — the clearing, 
he village, the town, the city, the city-state, the 
lation. At each stage new technology made 
possible — and stimulated — the larger commu- 

Now we already can say with comfortable 
2onfidence that, when future historians look 
back on the decades immediately following 
World War II, they will write it down that our 
present times were notable for another break- 
through — a matrix of international communi- 
ties, overlapping and interacting, the most 

' Address made at a conference on "Educational In- 
vestment in the Pacific Community" at Stanford Uni- 
versity, Palo Alto, Calif., on Mar. 29 (press release 
156 dated Mar. 28 ; as-delivered text) . 

dynamic political force of the 20th century. 
Suddenly — the historians will exclaim — the 
world was no longer made of continents and 
oceans but of communities. And the writers of 
our history will be bound to note that the na- 
tion with the closest links to most of the new 
commonwealths was the United States of 

Behind the new force lies the new technology : 
the new technology which drives groups of na- 
tions together against the threat of thermo- 
nuclear war — the new technology which drives 
nations together in history's first organized war 
against poverty and disease^ — the new technol- 
ogy which some day must drive nations to or- 
ganize international peacekeeping institutions 
as a substitute for war itself. In the age of jets, 
great oceans which once served as hostile bar- 
riers between nations become friendly inland 
lakes for communities of nations around their 
shores. And so we can begin to talk realistically 
about a Pacific community, for political trends 
cannot be far behind the technology that makes 
them possible — and necessary. 

Growth of Regional Communities 

There is no major area in the whole free 
world where impulses toward unification, inte- 
gration, or partnership among new nations are 
not at work; only in the so-called Conammiist 
world is the trend in the opposite direction. 

Tlie most spectacular of these regional devel- 
opments, of course, is in Western Europe, 
where nations that have been at war with each 
other off and on for most of the modern era are 
now finding unity; Europe, where these same 
nations are now putting together the world's 


second greatest industrial complex to serve a 
market of over 300 million prospering con- 

I hope I do not have to stress the point that 
the recent check to European integration is not 
a checkmate. Our friends the historians will 
see it^-or so we yet believe— as a bump along a 
road, a road which has some hazardous pas- 
sages but leads in a clearly marked direction. 
Today's biggest headline seems fated, like so 
many other headlines, to wind up as a quaint 
footnote in the future's books about the present. 
But the new Europe is only the most ad- 
vanced case of a movement which engulfs all 
but that reactionary world which is still strug- 
gling with the hopeless task of adapting to 
stubborn reality the theology of Marx and 

In Latin America aroused peoples are begin- 
ning to act as if they had something in common 
tesides a common background— and poverty. 
The Organization of American States, the Alli- 
ance for Progress, the widespread resentment 
of Soviet intervention in Cuba— all are symbols 
of a new sense of commimity still inadequately 
expressed in workable institutions. There are 
the beginnings of two customs unions— one in 
Central America and one— the Latin American 
Free Trade Association— consisting of the prin- 
cipal South American countries and Mexico. 
In Latin America there is a new economic mo- 
mentum, and common institutions for develop- 
ment have just been given another push in the 
Declaration of Central America.- 

Elsewhere similar unity moves are part of 
the atmosphere : 

In North Africa a Maghreb confederation is 
being talked about. 

In Southeast Asia there are impulses toward 
regional arrangements and regional programs 
for economic and social cooperation. 

In the Arab world it is hard to believe that 
the drive toward imity will not overcome the 
most bitter of divisions. 

Even in tropical Africa, where strident na- 
tionalism has been used as a jimmy to pry new 
nations out of old empires, the first institutions 
for regional integration are coming into being. 
And you have been meeting here in California 

' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 515. 

this week to explore the early outlines of a 
Pacific community. 

Several years ago Sir Oliver Franks drew a 
careful bead on this postwar trend and described 
reo-ionalism as "a halfway house at a time when 
single nations are no longer viable and the* Of 
world is not ready to become one." It would 
be hard to say it better. i { ; 

World of Pluralism and Color 

The growth of regional communities is oi 
course quite in line with the obligations anc 
opportunities of every member of the Unitec 




The U.N. Charter explicitly recognizes the 
role of regional organizations in articles 52 and 
53 and even foresees their use to help the U.N iarf: 
keep the peace in emergencies. The U.N. eco 
nomic commissions are themselves organized or 
a regional basis and spawn other regiona 
groupings, like the Mekong River project ii j 
Southeast Asia. "?• 

Regional organizations, in short, can helj noi 
reliev'e the United Nations of burdens whicl k 
otherwise might sink the universal boat we ar ■' 
all in together. ■ 

But the point I want to make here is that sup z 
port for and participation in these overlappin; lil 
communities of the free is at the doctrinal hear f 
of U.S. foreign policy. Our concept of a -\ 
emerging new system of world order depend 
heavily upon the growth and health an^ 
strength of the new commimities within th 
broader framework of the U.N. system— fo : 
they weave the fabric of order with the stronj 
yam of consent. They reflect our kind o 
world of pluralism and color— our open societ; 
pro j ected around the globe. They are the exac 
antithesis of the grey and monolithic worL 
order- the imiversal closed society— of whicl 
the Communists dream. 

Tins is why we — you and I, as Americans- 
carry around without embarrassment a whol 
pocketful of memberships and associate mem 
berships in interlocking and mutually reinforc 
ing regional organizations. The last time 
counted, which was yesterday, there were 1 
of them— 8 in our own hemisphere, 10 in Eu 
rope and Asia. For any member of this con 
f erence who can name all of them without a ref 



eiice book, the Department of State will offer 
modest prize. It will have to be modest ; the 
ongress gives us just enough money to help 
lance these organizations and none at all to 

e Dependent Territories of the Pacific 

In the Pacific we speak of "community" — 
t yet of an organization, hardly even a con- 
<'pt that any two nations on the Pacific rim 
ould define alike. But if we have yet to for- 
ulate just what brings us together, except the 
pping waters of tliis greatest and least turbu- 
nt of oceans, we Americans do share with our 
iighbors in the Near West one very special 
iterest — the bits and pieces of land and small 
roups of people scattered on that ocean's 

They are dependent territories, most of 
lem. As the great colonies of Asia and Africa 
riggle free from their colonial apron strings, 
le 50 or 60 enclaves and island groups still 
sgarded as colonial remnants around the 
orld are beginning to show up clearly on the 
orizon of the emotional debates on colonialism 
1 the U.N. and elsewhere. 
More than a dozen of these dependencies are 
1 the Pacific — including the smallest of them 
11, Pitcaim Island of mutinous memory; 146 
leople live there on 2 square miles of real estate 
rhich has been British for 124 years. The 3 
J.N. trust territories that now remain of the 
riginal 11 are all in the Pacific : tiny Nauru and 
lUge, primitive New Guinea, both administered 
n trust by Australia; and the scattering of 
ilicronesians on the old Japanese mandate, now 
he Trust Territory of the Pacific, which is en- 
rusted to us to govern under arrangements that 
■:in only be changed by the Security Council 
)f the United Nations. 

As a case study in building a Pacific com- 
nunity, let us consider for a moment the condi- 
ion and destiny of these 78,000 island people, 
speaking nine difl'erent languages and unnum- 
jered dialects, spread over an ocean expanse of 
million square miles, on 2,100 individual 
islands that aggregate hardly 687 square miles 
of dry land. 
We have left a part of our own history, and 
good deal of our lifeblood, in some of those 

scratches on the map — in Truk, where our avia- 
tors neutralized a powerful naval base, and in 
Saipan and Tinian, where the crucial land bat- 
tles of the Marianas were won. 

I am here to tell you that the administration 
in Washington is paying very special attention 
to these people on those islands. And none too 

In an era when American power and technical 
progress is felt in every corner of the free world, 
when yoxmg volunteers and middle-aged tech- 
nicians are helping every free people to build 
the institutions of modernity, none of our for- 
eign aid programs are available to the only 
foreigners who have been specifically entrusted 
ix> our care by the world commimity. 

The Peace Corps can't operate in the islands 
without new authority — the islanders aren't 
"foreign" enough. Until last month the Voice 
of America had no program for the islands; 
the citizens of the trust territory have not been 
regarded as quite "foreign" enough to qualify 
for a rating as an audience. The Soviet radio 
is not as reticent: Radio Moscow can be clearly 
heard in Japanese in many islands of the trust 

Until the administration and the Congress 
got busy last year to increase the funds for edu- 
cation in Micronesia, we were spending an 
average of $33 per child per year for elementary 
schooling. In a well-meaning but unrealistic 
attempt to protect the islanders from the shock 
of 20th-century civilization, most education has 
been in whatever vernacular happened to be 
the local language — which was nice and com- 
fortable for the parents but hardly a golden op- 
portunity for the children. In all honesty, we 
have not been equipping these people for mod- 
em living. 

The small numbers of people, and the enor- 
mous distances involved, make a decent educa- 
tional system extremely difficult to organize. 
But we can do lots better, and the United States 
Department of Interior, which administers the 
islands which the United States holds in trust 
under the United Nations Charter, is starting 
out to do just that. 

A properly American attitude toward the de- 
velopment of the Pacific islands is surely plain, 
if difficult to carry into action all at once. 
Ignorance is not bliss, we say, not even on lovely 


islands washed by the bhiest of waters and 
cooled by the gentlest of breezes. Poverty is 
not picturesque, illiteracy is not Elysian, and 
backwardness is not the road to happiness. 

As our modernization policy gathers mo- 
mentum, the somehow familiar names of these 
remote islands — the Marianas, the Marshalls, 
the Carolines — will lose their recent connotation 
of war and death and acquire a new meaning as 
symbols of life, and peace, and the self-deter- 
mination of peoples. 

A Foundation for Self-Determination 

From time to time groups of islanders have 
expressed an interest in becoming permanently 
associated with the United States. We are flat- 
tered by this interest and perhaps a little em- 
barrassed ; we are not quite sure we have entirely 
merited this admiration. In any event we feel 
these expressions of interest to be premature. 
We do want the inhabitants of Micronesia to 
exercise their inherent and inalienable right of 
self-determination. We do not think, however, 
that this choice should be made imtil these 
people have acquired a firsthand knowledge of 
both the benefits and the responsibilities of 20th- 
century civilization. 

This is indeed what we have undertaken by 
treaty to do. The Charter of the United Na- 
tions, as ratified by the Senate, describes in these 
words the aims of the trusteeship system : 

... to promote the political, economic, social, and 
educational advancement of the inhabitants of the tru-st 
territories, and their progressive development towards 
self-government or independence as may be appropri- 
ate to the particular circumstances of each territory 
and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the 
peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms 
of each trusteeship agreement. . . . 

Not racy language, that. But the meaning is 
clear : The islanders themselves will in the end 
determine their own future, and we shall see 
to it that they get the chance to learn the issues 
and exercise the choices. 

The winds of change are blowing, still some- 
times at zephyr strength, over the other island 
areas in the central and southern Pacific. What 
is to become of these bits and pieces of old 
trading empires — too small and too remote for 
meaningful nationhood, too much in the spirit 
of the times to remain old-style dependencies? 

How much real estate is necessary to make a 
nation? How many persons add up to a 
people ? 

Can anyone seriously imagine dozens, even 
hundreds, of sovereign and independent nations 
fashioned from the multiple island groupings 
of the Pacific basin, each with its own flag, its 
currency and national anthem, its independence 
day celebration, and its seat in the United Na- 
tions ? Must Pitcairn Island, for all its renown, 
choose a foreign minister from its 146 good 
people ? 

Wisely the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, in resolutions designed to liurry the 
decolonization process, has provided a consid- 
erable range of options for the exercise of the 
right of self-determination. One of the alter- 
natives recognized by the Assembly is for a 
people to combine with others ; another kind of 
self-determination is to opt for free associa- 
tion, on an agreed basis, with a metropolitan 

But this constitutional no man's land that lies 
between sovereign independence, which is now 
so fashionable, and colonial dependency, which 
is now so rightly out of fashion, needs a great 
deal more exploration by the lawyers and the 
political scientists. For if small populations 
are going to be asked to determine their future, 
they must be ofTered something better than a 
Hobson's choice between permanent dependency 
and fashionable illusion. 

In the Pacific islands, and in each of the 
major nations around the Pacific rim, a stirring 
of new thought and new action is more than 
evident. Things will be on the move, and you 
in California will have a ringside seat. If we 
think hard, and act boldly on careful plans, 
we will surely find ways of assisting the Pacific 
community in its growing interdependence with 
the rest of the world. And that's what we 
mean, isn't it, when we speak here, so late in 
the evening but so early in history, of a Pacific 
community ? 

In the Pacific, as elsewhere around the world, 
President Kennedy's words from last year's 
state of the Union message' still echo: ". . . 
our nation is commissioned by history to bei 
either an observer of freedom's failure or tha 
cause of its success." 

' Ibid., Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159. 



dvisory Commission Reports 
n Exchange Program 

Tlie Department of State announced on 
pril 5 (press release 178) that the U.S. Advis- 
ry Commission on International Educational 
nd Cultural Affairs had made a report to 
longress on March 29 pursuant to a require- 
lent of the Fulbright-Hays Act, wliich estab- 
ished the Commission and called for a "special 
tudy of the effectiveness" of past programs, 
?ith emphasis on "the activities of a reasonably 
epresentative cross-section of past recipients 
f aid." 

The Commission is headed by John W. Gard- 
ler, president of the Carnegie Corporation of 
vTew York. The other members are : 

ioy E. Larsen, chairman of the executive committee. 
Time Inc., and vice chairman of the Commission 

Valter Adams, professor of economics, Michigan State 

ames R. Fleming, publisher of Fort Wayne, Ind., 

juther H. Foster, president, Tuskegee Institute 

Theodore M. Hesburgh, president. University of 
Notre Dame 

Valter Johnson, chairman, Department of History, 
University of Chicago 

Franklin D. Murphy, chancellor. University of Cali- 
fornia at Los Angeles 

Mabel M. Smythe, principal, New Lincoln High School, 
New York, N.Y. 

The Commission's study included 3,842 pro- 
fessional interviews with returned grantees and 
distinguished citizens in 20 countries, reports 
from U.S. embassies in 26 countries, and a broad 
inquiry among leading Americans in govern- 
ment, in universities, and in foimdations and 
private exchange agencies in the United States. 

According to the Commission's findings, the 
program : 

1. Does in fact increase mutual understand- 
ing. The Commission found "impressive testi- 
mony" that increased understanding is one of 
the most outstanding results of the program. 

2. Helps to dispel among foreign visitors 
many misconceptions and ugly stereotypes about 
the American people. The program is "re- 
markably effective," the report said, "in com- 
municating a favorable impression of American 
character and customs broadly conceived." 

3. Is "outstandingly successful" in providing 
a valuable educational experience to foreign 
grantees and has a favorable effect on the ca- 
reers of the great majority. Grantees reported 
benefiting "substantially, most notably in in- 
creased knowledge in their professional field." 

4. Brings to the home countries of the gran- 
tees important benefits, including "valuable new 
ideas, skills, knowledge and attitudes." 

5. Establishes "effective and continuing chan- 
nels of communication between people in other 
comitries and the U.S." and "broadens perspec- 
tives and outlook." 

6. Effectively supports "one of the nation's 
most basic international objectives — of helping 
create and support strong, free societies able to 
work together, in mutual trust and understand- 
ing, on the grave issues of our time." 

U.S. Announces Loans 
to Argentina 

Press release 154 dated March 28 

The Government of the United States an- 
nounced on March 28 loans and other financial 
assistance wliich it will provide the Government 
of Argentina in support of a renewed standby 
agreement concluded by the International 
Monetary Fund on March 27. The IMF will 
make available $50 million througli October 
1963, which, together with the supplementary 
U.S. resources, will assist the Argentine Gov- 
ernment in carrying out a series of measures de- 
signed to strengthen its financial position, to 
which it has connnitted itself under the standby 

Tlie United States Treasury is extending for 
an additional 4 months the life of its outstand- 
ing exchange agreement, wliich was due to ex- 
pire on Jime 6, 1963. Tliis action will make 
available to Argentina during the period end- 
ing October 6, 1963, $25 million not previously 
drawn. The Agency for International Devel- 
opment will provide $20 million for balance-of- 
payments assistance. 

Subject to completion of Argentine bilateral 
accords witli European governments for re- 
funding arrangements agreed in principle in 
November 1962, the Export-Import Bank will 

APRIL 22, 1963 



on parallel terms refinance up to $92 million of 
Argentine debts to the Export-Import Bank 
and other U.S. creditors. 

U.S. interim assistance measures, imdertaken 
in collaboration with the Government of Ar- 
gentina, are in addition to the resources being 
made available to Argentina under the Alliance 
for Progress in carrying forward a program of 
economic development intended to increase 
more rapidly the economic and social well-being 
of the Argentine people. 

Development loans concluded thus far this 
year include those for housing and highway 
construction; and with respect to other projects 
advanced by the Argentine Government, due 
consideration will continue to be given to the 
goals mutually agreed upon at Pmita del Este, 
including that of maintaining appropriate 
monetary and fiscal policies which provide a 
sound basis for economic development. 

Unclaimed Property of Victims 
of Nazi Persecution 


Amendment of Executive Order 10.587 Relatimg to 
THE Administration op Section 32(h) op the Trad- 
ing WITH the Enemy Act 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Trad- 
ing with the Enemy Act, as amended (50 D.S.C. App. 
1 et seq.), and by section 301 of title 3 of the United 
States Code (65 Stat. 713), and as President of the 
United States, it is ordered that sections 1, 2 and 3 
of Executive Order No. 10587 " of January 13, 1955 
(20 F.R. 361) are amended to read as follows: 

"Section 1. The Jewish Restitution Successor Or- 
ganization, a charitable membership organization In- 
corporated under the laws of the State of New York, 
is hereby designated as successor In Interest to de- 
ceased persons in accordance with and for the purposes 
of subsection (h) of section 32 of the Trading with 
the Enemy Act, as added by the Act of August 23, 1954 
(68 Stat. 767), and amended by section 204(a) of 
Public Law 87-846, approved October 22, 1962 (76 
Stat. 1U4). 

"Sec. 2. Exclusive of the designation of the 
Jewish Restitution Successor Organization under sec- 
tion 1 of this Order and the exercise of jurisdiction 
over the claims referred to In section 3, the Foreign 
Claims Settlement Commission is hereby delegated 

and shall carry out the functions provided for in sub- 
section (h) of section 32 of the Trading with the En- 
emy Act, as amended, including the designation or 
refusal of designation of other organizations imder 
the first sentence of that subsection, the payment of 
$500,000 out of the War Claims Fund to the designated 
organization or organizations and all other powers, 
duties, authority and discretion vested in or conferred 
upon the President 

"Sec. 3. Jurisdiction over the claims filed by 
the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization with 
the Attorney General under subsection (h) of section 
32 of the Trading with the Enemy Act prior to the 
amendment thereof by section 204(a) of Public Law 
87-S46 shall remain with the Attorney General pend- 
ing the discliarge of such claims by that organization's 
acceptance of payment pursuant to subsection (h), 
as amended, or other discharge of such claims pursu- 
ant to law." 

' No. 11086 ; 28 Fed. Reg. 1833. 

'For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 14, 1955, p. 276. 

The White House, 
February 26, 1963. 

Foreign Policy Conference Held 
for Editors and Broadcasters 

The Department of State announced on April 
1 (press release 167) that it would hold a na- 
tional foreign policy conference for editors and 
broadcasters on April 22 and 23 at Washing- 
ton. Invitations have been extended by Secre- 
tary Rusk to editors and commentators of the 
daily and periodical press and the broadcasting 
industry in all 50 States and Puerto Rico. 

President Kennedy, Secretary Rusk, and 
other principal officers of the Department of 
Stat« and other Government agencies concerned 
with foreign affairs will participate. A num- 
ber of the presentations at the conference will 
be on the record. The sessions will be held in 
the West Auditorium of tlie Department of 

This will be the sixth in a series of national 
foreign policy conferences for editors and 
broadcasters. The conference program, begun 
in April 1961, is intended to assist the informa- 
tion media in making available to the American 
public the maximum possible information in 
deptli on current foreign policy issues. 




lepartment Supports Bill To Establish National Academy of Foreign Affairs 

Following are texts of statements made by 
[cting Secretary George ^V. Ball and Deputy 
Inder Secretary for Administration William 
Orrick, Jr., before the Senate Committee on 
^oreign Relations on April 4. 


'ress release 171 dated April 4 

I appear today in support of S. 865, a bill to 
►rovide for the establishment of the National 
Lcademy of Foreign Affairs.^ 

I have come here as an inadequate surrogate 
or Secretary Rusk. He was compelled to be 
,way from Washington today and has asked me 
o express his regrets to this committee. He 
las a deep personal interest in the bill before 
ou. His rich experience in the fields of edu- 
iation and of foreign affairs has convinced him 
if America's preeminent need for highly 
trained personnel to serve the objectives of our 
foreign policy. He has noted that we faced a 
•'crisis of talent." Inspired by this conviction, 
he has devoted considerable time to the consider- 
ation and development of the proposal for a 
National Academy of Foreign Affairs. 

The central concept of S. 865 is the establish- 
ment of an educational institution of high 
quality that would be an instrument of govern- 
ment yet autonomous in nature and interdepart- 
mental in scope. It would provide training in 
the diverse aspects of foreign affairs for officers 

' For texts of a letter from President Kennedy 
transmitting a bill to the Congress and a memoran- 
dum from Secretary Rusk summarizing the principal 
provisions of the proposed legislation, see Bulletin 
f.f Mar. 25, 1963, p. 427. 

not merely of the State Department but of other 
departments of the Government. 

It would be administered by a Chancellor ap- 
pointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. A Board of Regents 
would "determine policy and provide guidance 
to the Chancellor. . . ." That board would 
consist of the Secretary of State and four other 
official members, the Chancellor, and five mem- 
bers drawn from private life. 

The Academy would not provide preemploy- 
ment training such as the service academies at 
West Point or Annapolis. It would be more 
nearly comparable to our senior professional 
military colleges— although broader in scope. 
The establishment of the Academy would not 
intrude upon the work of our Army, Navy, and 
Air Force colleges nor diminish the need for 
these institutions. Neither would the Academy 
compete with public and private colleges and 
universities throughout the land. We would 
continue to rely, as in the past, on these colleges 
and universities to provide the basic education 
for individuals entering the service of the Gov- 
ernment in the field of foreign affairs. 

The purpose of the Academy is to increase 
the effectiveness of personnel already on active 
service with the United States Government. In 
this way we would improve the capacity of the 
United States to conduct relations with other 
nations under the complex conditions of a com- 
plex age. There is no better means by which 
we can advance the national interest. 


I understand that I am only the first of sev- 
eral administration witnesses who will appear 
before this committee. I shall, therefore, direct 
my remarks this morning at a single question : 


Why is it necessary or even useful to create a 
National Academy of the type we are propos- 
ine? I shall leave it to later witnesses to 
explain in some detail the organization and 
operation of the Academy and the use wliich 
other departments and agencies would make 
of it. 

Tlie men and women engaged in the conduct 
of our foreign relations must be equipped to 
meet the requirements of a world that has 
undergone — and is continuing to undergo — 
rapid and pervasive change. Much of that 
change has occurred in the brief but eventful 
period — little more than a decade and a half — 
since the end of the Second World War. 

We sometimes forget that it was only 18 years 
ago that the Iron Curtain was erected to divide 
the world into two parts — half slave, half free. 
Today we must carry on our international busi- 
ness in constant awareness of an aggressive 
Communist bloc — a bloc that has mobilized the 
resources of modern technology and the man- 
power of two vast nations within a power sys- 
tem which involves one-third of the population 
of the world. 

The adjustment to this new environment of 
threat and menace has not been easy. Prior 
to the 1950's, we Americans had no fear that 
a foreign power might impose great damage 
upon our homeland. Few foresaw that we 
would live, as President Kennedy has said, "on 
the bull's eye of Soviet missiles."^ 

Yet today we must conduct our international 
relations in the ever-present consciousness that 
a power intent on destroying the systems and 
the values by which we live possesses the ability 
to Idll millions of Americans within the inte- 
rior of our own continent — within a matter of 

The Communist powers have, however, done 
more than master the new weapons technology. 
They have devised a whole new system of ag- 
gression — the subversion of men's minds by 
subtle means of propaganda, employing the 
most sophisticated methods of communications; 
the corruption of governments ; the undermin- 
ing of political systems ; the employment of new 

' For an address by President Kennedy on Oct. 22, 
1962, on the Soviet threat to the Americas, see ibid., 
Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715. 

techniques of infiltration and espionage; the 
exploitation of weakness; systematic ten-orism 
and insurgency ; and the utilization of economic 

The combating of such tactics requires us to 
devise and employ a new set of tools for con- 
ducting our relations with governments and 
peoples. It requires us to depend not merely 
on classical diplomatic experience but on a va- 
riety of skills and disciplines drawn from areas 
of experience not previously comprehended by 
American diplomacy. 

We need a broader range of techniques and 
expertise even in our dealings within the free 
world. A quarter of a century ago our dii>lo- 
mats could concentrate the bulk of their time 
and effort on a handful of nations that enjoyed 
the same general standard of living and ad- 
hered to the same general standards of conduct 
as did America. Those nations, in turn, con- 
trolled the destinies of a large part of the world 
through vast colonial systems. 

Today those colonial systems have been large- 
ly swept away by a tidal wave of nationalism. 
This has meant the progressive withdrawal 
from world responsibilities of the great metro- 
politan powers of Europe. This process of 
withdi'awal was not always either safe or easy. 
It left dangerous power vacuums — vacuums 
into which the United States, of necessity, was 
compelled to move in order to preserve free- 
world security. 

In place of the old colonial territories, some 
60 new nations have emerged in the brief time- 
span since the end of the World War. This 
has imposed new strains on our diplomatic es- 
tablishment. Not only have we been required 
to double the scope and number of our diplo- 
matic posts around the world, but our dealings 
with those new nations have demanded a new 
dimension of skill and knowledge. 

Our responsibilities in the newly emerging 
countries have been complex and difficult. In 
some cases we have had to provide training in 
the rudimentary operations of government. We 
have had to furnish technical assistance and 
capital to assist these countries to meet the prob- 
lems of survival in a new and dangerous world. 
The problems presented have tested our re- 
sourcefulness and our ingenuity. Most of all 
they have emphasized the urgent need for com- 



etent personnel equipped with the proper 
nguages, and understanding of diverse cul- 
ires and habits, and a variety of technical 

Our relations with the newly emerging na- 
ons have called for personnel with a broader 
ickground than that required by the tradi- 
onal demands of classical diplomacy. But 
5, for that matter, have our relations even with 
ur European allies. 

In recent years we have witnessed the begin- 
ings of a transformation of Europe — the grow- 
ag pains of a new unity. Not only has this in- 
acted a new element in the power balance, but 
t has required, on our side, that we adjust to a 
ew method of dealing with certain of the ma- 

Ior nations of Europe. 
Many of the complexities that we encoimter 
oday in the conduct of international relations 
tem from our role of leader of the free world, 
^n adjusting to this role we have profoundly 
Itered our habits of thought. We have aban- 
oned our historic policy of limited involve- 

ent — of isolationism. Faced with the com- 
aon menace of aggi'essive Communist power, 

e have joined with our European friends in 
he NATO alliance. Elsewhere around the 

orld we have become either a member or ob- 
»rver in a half dozen other alliances. We have 
iiscovered — what other nations had known 
)efore — that the conduct of alliance diplomacy 

a special discipline. 

The interdependence that we have recognized 
^s an essential element in effective military de- 
fense is also the dominant fact in the economic 
relations among developed countries. It has 
compelled us to forge new instruments of coop- 
eration, such as the OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development], so 
that we may live together without injuring one 
another economically, wliile at the same time 
concerting our eif orts and resources for the per- 
fonnance of common tasks. 

Finally, we have had to learn to work within 
new international institutions that serve a wide 
spectrum of purposes — not the least important 
of which has been to assist the achieving of 
world transformations with a minimum of vio- 
lence. And the United Nations and such re- 
gional organizations as the Organization of 

American Slates have required us to master a 
new skill — the conduct of what might be called 
"legislative diplomacy." 


But all this is, of couree, well known to this 
committee. I have repeated it this morning 
only to emphasize the variety of our interna- 
tional relationships and the diversity of skills 
that we need in order to conduct our interna- 
tional affairs effectively. 

The State Department officer today must be 
far more flexible and informed than in an 
earlier and simpler time. It is no longer 
enough that he master the classical diplomacy. 
If he is to be fully effective — capable of serv- 
ing diverse needs in a variety of posts on all 
six continents — he must have at least a respect- 
able acquaintance with a wide range of disci- 
plines and techniques. At the same time, we 
have a great need for highly specialized per- 
sonnel who nevertheless understand the rela- 
tions of their specialty to the larger objectives 
of American policy. 

These objectives cannot be attained unless 
officers are, from time to time, brought up to 
date through systematic retraining. The aver- 
age class 1 Foreign Service officer today is 51 
years old. This means that he received his uni- 
versity education in the midthirties. One need 
only compare an elementary text on economics 
of that era with a text in use today to realize 
the magnitude of the efforts required to keep 
abreast of developments in that subject. 
Greater gaps exist between general scientific 
concepts of the thirties and those of today. 

Even a junior Foreign Service officer of the 
grade of class 6, with an average age of 36, must 
perform his duties in a world that has radically 
changed since he graduated from college in the 
late 1940's. 

At the moment, we are not providing suffi- 
cient retraining. We are not keeping up with 
the armed services in this regard. The average 
military officer spends approximately 12 per- 
cent of his career in formal training. The 
comparable figure for a State Department offi- 
cer is 5 percent ; for an employee of the Agency 
for International Development or of the United 
States Information Agency, it is only 2 percent. 

APRIL 22. 1963 



Yet today, the activities of the Agency for 
International Development and the United 
States Information Agency are vital elements 
in our foreign policy. International affairs are 
no longer the exclusive province of the Depart- 
ment of State. The Secretary of State is, of 
course, the President's principal adviser on 
foreign policy, and the State Department is 
the key agency in the field. Yet there are per- 
haps as many as 20 other departments or agen- 
cies that have a useful— in fact, a necessary- 
role to play. Let me mention only a few— the 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the Peace Corps, 
the old-line departments such as Defense, Com- 
merce, Treasury, Labor, and so on. Repre- 
sentatives of all of these agencies and depart- 
ments engage in activities overseas. If we are 
to have a coherent foreign policy, their person- 
nel and the personnel of the State Department 
must understand one another's problems and 
work for a common objective. 

I am convinced that the National Academy 
can be an instrument for assuring that necessary 
harmony of purpose and objective. It would 
not be established as part of the State De- 
partment. It would be an autonomous instru- 
ment of government to serve the purposes of a 
total foreign policy in which many departments 
of the Government are interested. 

For this reason, the National Academy would 
supersede the Foreign Service Institute, which 
Congress authorized in 1946. That Institute 
was created within the State Department to 
meet the training needs primarily of the For- 
eign Service. In addition to language training, 
it offers a series of courses of relatively short 
duration designed to acquaint the Department 
and the Foreign Service officers with current 
trends, developments, and problems. 

The Institute has served the Department well, 
but we have long recognized that tlie conditions 
under which it was established have drastically 
changed. Today more and more our operations 
abroad are conducted on a "country team" basis. 
Representatives of various Federal agencies 
serving at a post abroad act as a unit under the 
guidance of the ambassador. To train members 

of such country teams requires an institution 
of greater scope. Under the provisions of S. 
865, the National Academy would supei-sede the 
Institute and absorb most of the functions that i 
the Institute now performs. ^ 

V ' 

I have emphasized that the principal pur- 
pose of the Academy would be the education 
of personnel for the effective conduct of our 
foreign affairs. But the Academy would also 
provide a center of research that could draw 
freely on the foreign affairs experience of tlie 
entire Federal Government. It could thus de- 
velop a coherent body of knowledge and make 
more certain the application of consistent doc- 
trines and principles to the perplexing prob- 
lems that confront us in our international i 

In this activity the Academy would comple- 
ment the work now being done by colleges and 
universities. It would serve as a link — a two- 
way bridge— between the Government and the 
academic conununity. It would afford an op- 
portunity for scholars and research technicians 
to contribute their knowledge and insights tc 
foreign affairs. It would permit them, in turn 
to understand more clearly the nature of tlu 
problems and obstacles that daily confront th( 
men and women who initiate and carry ou 
our policies. 


The proposal embodied in S. 865 is the distil 
lation of a great deal of thought and experience 
It was based largely upon the reports of tw( 
distinguished committees.^ One is a repor 
made to the Secretary of State by the Com 
mittee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, acting un 
der the chairmanship of the distinguishec 
former Secretary of State, Mr. Christian A 
Herter. The other is a report made by 
Presidential advisory committee, under thi 
chairmanship of Dr. James A. Perkins, th( 
president-elect of Cornell University. 

These committees substantially agreed upoi 
the nature of the problem and upon the kin( 
of organization required to meet it. 

= For background, see ihid.. Dec. 24, im;2, p. 971, am 
.Tan. 14, 1963, p. 47. 



Both committees were impressed by the need 
(pr the constant renewal of skill and compe- 
ience in the conduct of our foreign policy — 
i'. need foretold many years ago by H. G. Wells, 

,-ho declared proplietically that "History is 
decoming more and more a race between educa- 

ion and catastrophe." 

. S. 865, Mr. Chairman, is a proposal that 

(hould contribute to winning that race. 


Tess release 172 duted April 4 

I appreciate the opportunity of following 
secretary Ball to explain more specifically the 
'letails of our proposal. We are convinced of 
he urgent need for new machinery to provide 
aservice, interdepartmental professional traili- 
ng to personnel of all Federal departments and 
.gencies involved in foreign affairs. We are, 
n short, proposing a new and unique institution 
or which the President reaffirmed his support 
n his press conference yesterday [April 3]. 

In essence, this is the kind of setup we 
envisage : 

A really topnotch institution to be known as 
he National Academy of Foreign Affairs. 

A place where officers who conduct our for- 
;ign affairs can get advanced training and edu- 
cation — to help them do their jobs better. This 
means an Academy where the State Department 
and other agencies involved can send officers 
from time to time during their careers to up- 
date their knowledge of new problems around 
the world and new methods of handling them. 
Some courses would be only a couple of weeks; 
others, a year. 

This Academy would not be a West Point, 
or a place from which the State Department, 
AID, USIA, or CIA would recruit new officers. 
It would not award degrees nor compete with 
the various programs offered by colleges and 

But it would undertake major research proj- 
ects in foreign affairs, based upon access to 
official records, reports, and other documents 
available only to Government employees, as w'ell 
as material from the academic community and 
other public sources. 

APRIL 22, 1963 

The Academy would be created as an autono- 
mous part of the Government — but it would be 
closely linked with the operating foreign affairs 

The training and research programs would 
not concentrate exclusively upon any particular 
phase of foreign affairs but would cover the 
waterfront as regards all aspects of national 

The Foreign Service Institute would be in- 
corporated into the National Academy — except 
for the training it now gives in subjects exclu- 
sively for State Department people. For ex- 
ample, consular operations. 

The Academy is designed to combine the ad- 
vantages of the traditional academic environ- 
ment with the advantages of direct access to 
governmental pereonnel, material, and opera- 
tions. At the same time the Academy is in- 
tended to serve as a link between the operating 
foreign affairs agencies of the Government and 
the American academic community. 

At the outset, I would like the committee to 
understand that if authorizing legislation were 
enacted during this session of Congress, the 
Academy would not be in full operation before 
fiscal 1968. Any estimates regarding numbers 
of officers or annual costs are based on long- 
range projections. Obviously, we can't expect 
this Academy to spring into being overnight. 

We recognize that with a new undertaking 
like this we must proceed with caution. We 
shall, of course, rely heavily on the Congress 
as to how, and how fast, to proceed. Moreover, 
the Chancellor and the Board of Regents will 
have major roles in the establishment of a 
definite curriculum and organization. 

With this in mind, this is how we view the 
Academy : 

Organizationally, we picture the Academy as 
having two distinct arms— training and re- 
search. The research arm would consist essen- 
tially of three basic centers : one for the study 
of the global Communist menace, including its 
theory, practices, resources, vulnerabilities, and 
techniques ; another for the study of how indus- 
trialized nations can live and work together 
for mutual benefit and security; and a third 
for the study of the underdeveloped nations and 


their problems of economic and social develop- 
ment, political evolution, and internal defense. 

As to the general tyjjes of ti-aining to be con- 
ducted — as distinct from subject matter — we 
have in mind four diiferent kinds of courses. 
First, better orientation courses for new officers 
designated by the major agencies involved in 
foreign affairs. Second, special area and lan- 
guage courses for officers concerned with the 
problems of particular countries and regions. 
This, of course, is done now at the FSI. We 
hope to do it better at the NAFA. Third, a 
series of courses for all officers, aimed at com- 
prehensive career development. Fourth, spe- 
cialized courses — as needed — to help officers of 
all these agencies face and handle crises and 
adapt to new situations that cannot easily be 
covered within the framework of the regular 

The Chancellor would be the chief operating 
executive of the Academy and responsible for 
its day-to-day management. This would cover 
the selection and assignment of faculty mem- 
bers and staff, standards of performance and 
conduct, the curriculum, designing research 
programs, and promoting cooperative relations 
with universities and other private institutions. 
The Board of Eegents would establish broad 
policies and serve as a two-way channel between 
the Academy and the operating agencies of the 
Government. This would assure that the Acad- 
emy's training and research programs are re- 
sponsive to their needs. 

We plan to build the Academy in or near 
Washington, to assure the faculty and student 
body ready access to Government officials and 

Obviously, the Academy would give high- 
priority attention to the purposes, problems, 
and techniques of waging the cold war, which, 
as Secretary Eusk has said, "is our main busi- 
ness in the State Department." We want every 
governmental officer actively engaged in foreign 
affairs to understand thoroughly the nature and 
magnitude of the global Communist menace ; its 
theory, history, doctrines, and practices. 

There would be courses about the United 
States itself — its various political, economic, so- 

cial, and cultural conditions. This might well 
include studies of congressional attitudes and' 
legislation. Certainly, every officer who repre- 
sents America abroad should know all he can 
about his own country. 

We expect that the Academy will greatly im- 
prove the coordination and efficiency of our 
policies and programs at home and abroad by 
enabling officers in different agencies to under- 
stand more clearly their relations with one an- 
other and their common purposes. 

Now, as to cost : On the basis of our presMit ' 
assumptions as to the needs for professional 
training, which contemplate that after fiscal 
year 1968 there will be approximately 700 pro- 
fessional-level officers and approximately 150 
other students — such as Fulbright scholars, 
Mundt-Smith recipients, Foreign Service Stafi 
personnel, and dependents of Government offi- 
cials — enrolled at the Academy at any one time, 
the construction and capital acquisition cost foi 
the Academy is estimated at approximatelj 
$17,500,000. If Congress adopts S. 865, th( 
annual operations and maintenance cost aftei 
fiscal year 1968 is estimated to be approximatelj 

In conclusion, let me express my belief thai 
the estimated costs of the Academy are ex 
tremely moderate if measured by potential re 
suits. The dividends reaped from investment 
in education are always intangible, but thii 
makes them no less real. During recent years 
we have made gigantic efforts to keep pace witl 
the Commiuiist bloc in total military power 
space exploration, missile development, an( 
similar matters. Because our foreign affair: 
officers constitute our "firstline troops" in thi 
cold war, and are also our nation's pioneers ii 
the continuing search for peace and freedom 
I am convinced we must be prepared to d( 
whatever is necessary to guarantee America ; 
strong corps of foreign affairs personnel fulI^ 
capable of bearing the heavy burdens of work 
leadership and equipped to protect and promoti 
America's international interests in the face o 
any possible challenge. 

I am now ready to answer any detailed ques 
tions you may have. 



.kfrican Development 

Statement hy Walter M. Kotschnig ^ 

As the sun was setting a few days ago, I 
Ksited the Stanley monument. I looked out 
pver the land, and I was overawed by the beauty 
bf what I saw, by the grandeur of the river be- 
(ow me, by the majesty of the continent which 


It is in this perspective that the importance 
jf tlie Economic Commission for Africa comes 
ito clear focus. In this Commission the gov- 
ernments and peoples of Africa have joined in a 
Dmmon effort to secure their new-found f ree- 
iom through economic and social advances. It 
lias brought you together, gentlemen, founding 
fathers of a new Africa, builders of new nations, 
guarantors of a new African miity. That is 
where the strength of this Commission lies, and 
its promise. 

For tlie third time I have the privilege of at- 
tending one of your sessions as observer for the 
United States of America. Having partici- 
pated in literally hundreds of international con- 
fei-ences, going back to the days of the League of 
Nations, I have learned to sense in the early 
life of an international body its destiny, whether 
it is fated to become an important element in the 
international community or end up as another 
debating society. We need have no fears for 
the future of this Commission. The past four 
sessions have pointed the way, and we can ex- 

' Made at the fifth session of the U.N. Economic Com- 
mission for Africa at L^opoldville, Republic of the 
Congo, on Feb. 22. Mr. Kotschnig, who is a Special 
Adviser, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 
was the U.S. observer at the session. 

pect great and lasting accomplishments from 
this and future sessions. 

It is significant and a good augury that we 
meet in this beautiful Capital of the Eepublic 
of the Congo, for it is here that the needs for 
national unity, for sound institutional struc- 
tures, and for international cooperation have 
been so recently demonstrated. We are all 
aware of the tragic difficulties which have beset 
tliis great country since its independence in 
1960. My delegation rejoices with you that 
with the integration of Katanga there has been 
heartening progress toward the resolution of 
these difficulties, and we warmly congratulate 
our distinguished hosts on their achievement. 

As one country which has supported the 
efforts of the United Nations in the Congo, my 
country takes pride in the assistance which our 
parent organization has given to this task. We 
have supported the United Nations here in the 
Congo as elsewhere because it is the servant of 
the world and not the instrument of any one 
nation or group of nations. At this point, Mr. 
Chairman, I hope I shall be allowed to pay a 
formal and warm tribute to a man who sits right 
liere in our midst, the Executive Secretary of 
our Commission, Mr. Robert Gardiner. As 
Officer in Charge of the United Nations Opera- 
tion in the Congo, he has made an outstanding 
contribution, not only to the people of the 
Congo but to the whole of Africa and to the 
peace and well-being of the world at large. He 
deserves our deep gratitude. 

The achievements here in tlie Congo are in- 
deed great. But the tasks ahead in this country 

APRIL 22, 1963 


and in most otlier parts of Africa are even more 
staggering. Just as poverty may make a 
mockery of the freedom of an individual, so the 
independence of a nation that is economically 
weak and socially backward may be placed in 
jeopardy. In its program of economic assist- 
ance the United States seeks to help build 
strength, to give reality to the idea of national 
self-reliance. And, let me add, it is determined 
to keep the cold war out of Africa. 

The needs pressing in from all sides on the 
African peoples are so tremendous and so ur- 
gent as almost to defy classification. Yet it is 
necessary to establish priorities and develop- 
ment plans responsive to these priorities in 
order to avoid needless dispersal of effort and 
to assure maximum use of scarce resources for 
optimum impact. 

The secretariat has prepared a mountain of 
documentation for this session. It is a moun- 
tain rich in ore, and we congratulate the secre- 
tariat on its achievement. From this mountain 
of documentation there emerge certain priority 
problems and needs, certain areas which call 
for early and sustained action : such as the need 
for the establishment of country plans of devel- 
opment and the creation of adequate institutions 
and the preparation of high-level person- 
nel to this end ; the exploration and exploitation 
of natural resources, including latent sources of 
energy; the development of human resources, 
basic to any kind of economic and social pro- 
gram through the improvement of health, ed- 
ucation, and training; rural development and 
industrial growth; the building up of transport 
facilities; and the promotion of trade within 
the region and beyond. 

U.S. Assistance to Africa 

It would be j>resnmptuous on my part were 
I to speak on all these subjects. Time is one 
of the scarce commodities in this session, and it 
belongs to you, not to us who have come as 
observers. There are, however, a few specific 
points I hope you will permit me to make. 

1. The United States stands ready to offer 
assistance in setting up planning organiza- 
tions to help determine development goals, 
weigh the alternatives in the use of resources 
in the jiublic and private sector, and to evaluate 

effects of legislation, taxation, and incentives on 
economic activities. At the same time we recog- 
nize the special role played by the United Na- 
tions, its regional economic commissions, and its 
resident representatives working on behalf of 
the entire U.N. system of organizations, in the 
establishment of regional and country develop- 
ment plans. 

2. Related to this, we are pleased with the I 
plans for the establishment of an African Insti- 
tute for Development and Planning sponsored 
by the Economic Commission for Africa. We 
will lend this project our strong support when 
it comes before the Governing Council of the 
Special Fund later this year. 

3. We fully concur in the judgments ex- 
pressed by so many African countries that the 
shortage of professional and skilled personnel 
is probably the most important single obstacle 
to an increase in the rate of economic growth 
in Africa. Much of American assistance offered 
bilaterally or through multilateral channels is 
aimed at overcoming present shortages. 

4. We are also very much aware of the fact 
that more than 85 percent of the Africans live 
in rural areas, hence our continuing interest in 
the promotion of agricultural improvement, in 
farm and village cooperatives. We aim to co- 
ordinate our efforts in these fields with those of 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Or- 
ganization and the International Labor Orga- 
nization. Under present conditions the main- 
tenance of a strong agricultural base in the 
economic development of most of the African 
countries is necessary not only to provide food 
for the rapidly growing population but also 
because it helps to provide a large volume of 
exports greatly needed to secure resources for 
essential imports now and not at some future 

5. The United States has been supporting 
and will continue to support power develop- 
ments important to agricultural improvement 
and essential for industrial growth. From our 
own experience at home we know that balanced 
agricultural and industrial development is the 
best, guarantee for assuring rising standards of 
living to all levels of the population. 

6. Finally, we are keenly aware of the need 
for capital assistance and we are trying to 



;ike a wortliwhile contribution through grants 

111 long-term, low-interest loans, by encour- 

ring private investment, and through our very 

hstantial participation in such great financial 

stitutions as the International Bank for Re- 

1 list ruction and Development, the Interna- 

,nial Monetary Fund, the International Fi- 

iince Corporation, and last but not least the 

iternational Development Association. 

Speaking of financial institutions, I should 

ke to add that the United States is sympa- 

letic with the objectives of the proposed Afri- 

m Development Bank. We are prepared to 

insider technical assistance, if asked, to help 

^tablish and operace the Bank. The United 

tat^s is also prepared to consider loans, pref- 

^•ably in the form of participation in specific 

rojects, when the Bank is established and 


I might add at this point that American aid 
3 Africa during the last fiscal year — in 1 year 
nd not over the past years and years to come — 
mounted to about one-half billion dollars, in- 
luding agricultural commodities and Food for 
'eace but not counting our large share in the 
id made available through the financial insti- 
utions just mentioned, through the United Na- 
ions, the Special Fund, the Expanded Program 
)f Teclinical Assistance, UNICEF, and the 
;pecialized agencies such as ILO, FAO, WHO, 
md UNESCO. Nor does this figure of one- 
lalf billion dollars include the provision of 
.American Peace Corps volunteers, of whom 
1.200 are at present serving in Africa. Con- 
sidering the large number of requests pouring 
in from all sides, their number may well double 
liy 1964. 

May I be permitted to add a little footnote 
to what was said by my distinguished neighbor 
to my left — my far left. He urged tliat no 
political strings be tied to international aid. 
We fully agree. What is more, we act accord- 
ingly. We do not insist that every dollar the 
United States contributes to the United Na- 
tions organizations for economic assistance be 
spent on American experts, on fellowships to 
be used exclusively in America, and on Amer- 
ican supplies. Unfortunately, the same cannot 
I be said of another assistance program in an- 
other currency, the unit of which is the ruble. 

In extending all this assistance the United 
States has not waited for the day when inter- 
nationally controlled disarmament will become 
effective. It is our strong hope, however — and 
we are indeed pledged to the proposition — that 
our people will be enabled to provide even more 
substantial aid on the basis of savings eventu- 
ally made available from disarmament, which 
w^e ardently desire and for which the American 
people pray. When that day of disarmament 
will come I do not know. But I do know, and 
you do know, I trust, that it is not the United 
States which has blocked the way to effective 
disarmament, beginning with a nuclear test ban. 

Increasing African Export Earnings 

Wliile the United States has taken a promi- 
nent part in cooperation with other Western 
countries in providing assistance to the develop- 
ing nations throughout the world, we are fully 
aware that by far the greater part of the for- 
eign exchange resources so vitally needed for 
the development of Africa does not come — and 
is not likely to come — from aid or other capital 
flows but from your export earnings. We also 
recognize that these export earnings at present 
are all too dependent on the prices brought on 
world markets for a few primary commodities. 
Tlie present depressed state of many primary 
commodity prices is damaging to African na- 
tions, as indeed it is to many other developing 

The longnni solution to this problem, we be- 
lieve, along with many delegations which have 
already spoken, is to lessen dependence on a 
few basic products through the development of 
a broad range of agricultural, mineral, and 
especially manufacturing exports. The expan- 
sion of domestic markets and intraregional 
trade must be an integral part of this process. 

This creation of a more balanced and diversi- 
fied range of exports, as we all know, cannot be 
accomplished overnight. In the interim — in the 
period immediately ahead — action must be 
taken to stabilize some key commodity prices at 
levels and through means which permit pri- 
mary commodity exports to contribute to, rather 
than hinder, the development effort in Africa. 
In this connection the United States has 
strongly supported the new International Coffee 

APRIL L!J, 1963 


Agreement.^ This agreement, if effectively car- 
ried out by both exporters and importers, will 
be of great importance to a number of African 
nations. My Government is also actively par- 
ticipating in preparations for negotiating a 
meaningful international cocoa agreement. My 
Government is furthermore actively and sympa- 
thetically considering proposals put forward in 
the TT.N. Commission on International Com- 
modity Trade and in the International Mone- 
tary Fund for arrangements to provide com- 
pensatory financing for short-term fluctuations 
in all export receipts. 

There are other actions designed to improve 
the trading position of the developing countries 
which the United States Government has taken 
or is contemplating. Thus we have actively 
participated in the efforts of the GATT Tropi- 
cal Products Group progi'essively to remove 
impediments to trade in key tropical products. 
Our ultimate goal is for trade in tropical prod- 
ucts to be free of import duties and restrictions. 
Under the provisions of the new U.S. trade 
legislation, my Government is empowered to 
eliminate a wide range of import duties on 
tropical products without seeking reciprocal 
concessions from producing nations, provided 
the European Economic Commimity will do 
likewise. We recognize, however, that the pro- 
gressive liberalization of tropical products trade 
must take place under conditions which do not 
jeopardize the development effort of producing 
countries inside preferential systems. 

By the same token we hope to use the author- 
ity of the Trade Expansion Act to help open up 
markets for other products of the developing 
countries and to encourage other developed 
countries to do the same. During the next 
round of tariff negotiations we would not expect 
the developing countries to give full reciprocity 
for tariff reductions by the industrialized coun- 
tries, but we would expect the maximum pos- 
sible participation by them in the negotiations. 

Just one more point on this matter of trade. 
I have just come from the first meeting of the 
Preparatory Committee for the United Nations 

' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 1, 1963, p. 


Conference on Trade and Development in New 
York. My Govermnent fully supports the hold- 
ing of this conference and trusts that it will 
achieve constructive results. The main point 
which we made in New York, and which we '■ 
will continue to make, was that the conference, j 
to be worth while, must center its attention on | 
the trade needs and problems of the developing 
coimtries and the lift which trade can give to 
their economies and social development. We I 
hope for the fullest participation of the develop- | 
ing countries. My country is not prepared to ' 
have the United Nations conference used as 
a forum for the discussion of unrelated issues 
such as may have arisen between the state- 1 
trading economies of Eastern Europe and the 
market economies of the West. There are other 
forums where such difficulties can be discussed ' 
without endangering the beneficial results for 
the developing countries which we hope will 
flow from the deliberations of the United Na- 
tions Conference on Trade and Development. 

Mr. Chairman, in my travels across the world, 
here in Africa, in far-off Asia, Latin Amer- 
ica, and elsewhere, I have seen untold misery, 
disease, poverty, and wretchedness. I have seen 
the swollen bellies of children and the shrunken 
bodies of their elders. I have seen hovels which 
defy description. I have seen the outer limits 
of the degradation of man. But I have also had 
the privilege of observing the magnificent, the 
heroic efforts of men and women throughout 
the world to set an end to all that misery, to all 
that degradation. I have met with them in this 
Commission, as in other regional commissions 
of the United Nations, and I have drawn 
strength and inspiration from their efforts. 

My Government, the American people — for 
we are a government of the people — have in 
word and action demonstrated their determina- 
tion to work as partners with men and women 
of good will everywhere in the building of a 
better world. We do not seek to strengthen the 
power of the few ; we want the welfare of the 
many. We want to live with you as brothers 
in the same mansion, a mansion as wide as the 
world, in which all of us, all our people, will 
dwell in dignity and in freedom. 





Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. 
Done lit Washington October 11, ItHT. Entered into 
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Mongolian People's Republic, 
April 4, 1963. 

Current Actions 




('uvention on the Inter- American Institute of Agricul- 
tural Sciences. Done at Washington January 15, 
1944. Entered into force November 30, 1944. 58 
Stat. 11(J9. 
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, April 3, 1963. 

lotocol of amendment to the convention on the Inter- 
American Institute of Agricultural Sciences of Jan- 
uary 15, 1944 (58 Stat. 1169). Opened for signature 
at Washington December 1, 1958.' 
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, April 3, 1963. 


iternational air services transit agreement. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for 
the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. 
Acceptance deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, April 
13, 1963. 

iplomatic Relations 

ienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961.' 

Accession deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), March 11, 


oastitution of the World Health Organization. 
Opened for signature at New York July 22, 1916. 
Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808. 
Acceptance deposited: Uganda, March 7, 1963. 


Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044. 
Acceptance deposited: Brazil, March 4, 1963. 


cladio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the 
international telecommunication convention, 1959. 
Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into 
force May 1, 1961 ; for the United States October 
23, 1961. TIAS 4893. 

Notification of approval: Switzerland, February 18, 


Declaration on provisional accession of the United 
Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. 
Entered into force January 9, 1963 ; for the United 
States May 3, 1963. 

Signatures: Belgium, December 7, 1962; Canada, 
March 7, 1963 ; France, December 13, 1962 ; Ghana, 
February 15, 1963 ; India, February 21, 1963 ; Lux- 
embourg, December 14, 1962 ; United Arab Repub- 
lic, December 10, 1962 ; United States, April 3, 1963. 

' Not in force. 

APBIL 22, 1963 


Agreement further extending the agreement for con- 
tinuation of a cooperative meteorological program of 
August 23 and 29, 1957, as amended and extended 
(TIAS 3905 and 5139). Effected by exchange of 
notes at Mexico, D.F., March 15, 1963. Entered into 
force March 15, 1963. 


Agreement amending the agreement of March 17 and 
18, 19.59 (TIAS 4224), to provide for additional in- 
vestment guaranties authorized by new United 
States legislation. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Tunis January 22 and March 6, 1963. Entered 
into force March 6, 1963. 


Emergency Preparedness Functions 
Assigned to Secretary of State 


By virtue of the authority vested in me as President 
of the United States, including authority vested in me 
by ReorganizaHon Plan No. 1 of 1958 (72 Stat. 1799), 
it is hereby ordered as follows : 

Section 1. Scope. The Secretary of State (herein- 
after referred to as the Secretary) shall prepare na- 
tional emergency plans and develop preparedness pro- 
grams designed to permit modification or expansion 
of the activities of the Department of State and of 
agencies, boards, and commissions under his jurisdic- 
tion in order to meet all conditions of national emer- 
gency, including attack upon the United States. 

Sec. 2. Functions. The Secretary shall develop poli- 
cies, plans, and procedures for carrying out his respon- 
sibilities in the conduct of the foreign relations of the 
United States under conditions of national emergency, 
including, but not limited to (1) formulation, negotia- 
tion, and implementation of contingency and post- 
emergency plans with our allies and of the intergovern- 
mental agreements and arrangements required by such 
plans; (2) formulation, negotiation, and execution of 

' No. 11087 ; 28 Fed. Reg. 1835. 


measures afifecting the relationships of the United 
States with neutral States; (3) formulation and 
execution of political strategy toward hostile or enemy 
States, including the definition of war objectives and 
the political means for achieving those objectives; (4) 
maintenance of diplomatic representation abroad ; (5) 
reporting and advising on conditions overseas which 
bear upon the national emergency ; (6) carrying out or 
proposing economic measures with respect to other 
nations, including coordination with the export control 
functions of the Secretary of Commerce; (7) mutual 
assistance activities such as ascertaining requirements 
of the civilian economies of other nations, making rec- 
ommendations to domestic resource agencies for meet- 
ing such requirements, and determining the availabil- 
ity of and making arrangements for obtaining foreign 
resources required by the United States; (8) providing 
foreign assistance. Including continuous supervision 
and general direction of authorized economic and mili- 
tary assistance programs for friendly nations and de- 
termination of the value thereof; (9) protection or 
evacuation of American citizens and nationals abroad 
and safeguarding their property ; (10) protection and/ 
or control of international organization and foreign 
diplomatic, consular, and other official personnel and 
property, or other assets, in the United States ; and 
(11) documentary control of persons seeking to enter 
or leave the United States. 

Sec. 3. Research. The Secretary and the Offic-e of 
Emergency Planning shall cooperate in research in 
areas involving the Department's responsibilities un- 
der this order. 

Sec. 4. Resources Evaluation. The Secretary shall 
provide for appropriate participation in the national 
resources evaluation program administered by the 
Office of Emergency Planning. 

Sec. 5. Functional Ouidance. The Secretary, in 
carrying out the functions assigned in this order, shall 
be guided by the following : 

(a) Interagency cooperation. The Secretary shall 
provide to all other departments and agencies foreign 
policy guidance, leadership, and coordination in the 
formulation and execution of those emergency pre- 
paredness activities which may have foreign policy 
Implications, affect foreign relations, or depend, di- 
rectly or indirectly, on the policies and capabilities of 
the Department of State. 

(b) Presidential coordination. The Director i>f the 
Office of Emergency Planning shall advise and assist 
the President in determining policy for the perform- 

ance of functions under tWs order and in coordinating 
the performance of such functions with the total na- 
tional preparedness program. 

(c) Emergency planning. Emergency plans and pro- 
grams, and emergency organization structure required 
thereby, shall be developed as an integral part of the 
continuing activities of the Department of State on 
the basis that it will have the responsibility for carry- 
ing out such programs during an emergency. The 
Secretary shall be prepared to Implement all appro- 
priate plans developed under this order. Modifica- 
tions and temporary organizational changes, based on 
emergency conditions, will be in accordance with 
policy determinationa by the President. 

Sec. 6. Emergency Actions. Nothing in this order 
shall be construed as conferring authority under Title 
III of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as 
amended, or otherwise, to put into effect any emer- 
gency plan, procedure, policy, program, or course of 
action prepared or developed pursuant to this order. 
Such authority is reserved to the President, 

Sec. 7. Redelegatio^i. The Secretary is hereby au- 
thorized to redelegate within the Department of State 
the functions hereinabove assigned to him. 

Sec. 8. Prior Actions. To the extent of any incon 
slstency between the provisions of any prior order anc 
the provisions of this order, the latter shall control 


The White House, 
February 26, 1963. 


The Senate on April 4 confirmed the nomination o* 
W. Averell Harriman to be Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs. (For biographic details, see De 
partment of State press release 182 dated April 8.) 


Chester Earl Merrow as Special Adviser on Commu 
nity Relations, Bureau of Public Affairs, effective 
March 18. (For biographic details, see Department ol 
State press release 140 dated March 18.) 



pril 22, 1963 


Vol. XLVIII, No. 1243 


_frican Development (Kotschnig) 62r> 

■Tie United Nations and the New Africa 

(Williams) 602 

irgentina. U.S. Announces Loans to Argentina 617 


onfirmations (Harriman) 630 

>epartment Supports Bill To Establish National 

Aoademy of Foreign Affairs (Ball, Orrieli) . 619 
'ree-AVorld Defense and Assistance Programs 

( text of President's foreign aid message) . . 591 


"iiha Expresses Regret in "Floridian" Incident . 600 
'.S. Acts To Prevent Raids on Cuba From U.S. 

Territory 600 

'.S. Di.sclaims Responsibility for Attacks on 

Soviet Ships (text of note) 599 

)epartmenf and Foreign Service 

.ppointments (Merrow) 630 

'onfirmations (Harriman) 630 

department Supports Bill To Establish National 
Academy of Foreign Affairs (Ball, Orriclj) 619 

emergency Preparedness Functions Assigned to 
Secretary of State ( text of Executive order) . 629 

)isarmament. U.S.S.R. Accepts U.S. Proposal 
fill- Direct Communication Link (ACDA state- 
ment) 600 

Economic Affairs 

African Development (Kotschnig) .... 025 

fa pan, the United States, and Europe (John- 
son) 606 

C.S. Announces Lonns to Argentina .... 617 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Advisory 
Commi.ssion Reiwrts on Exchange Program . 617 

Europe. .Japan, the United States, and Europe 

(.Tohn.s<in) 606 

Foreign Aid 

Free-World Defense and Assistance Programs 

(text of President's foreign aid message) . . 591 

U.S. Announces Loans to Argentina .... 617 

Germany. Unclaime<l I'ropcrt.v of Victims of 
Nazi Persecution (text of Executive order) 618 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
.\frican Development (Kotschnig) .... (525 

Japan. .Taiian, the United States, and Europe 

(.Johnson) 606 

Military Affairs. Emergency Preparedness 
Functions Assigned to Secretary of State 
(text of Executive order) 629 

Morocco. King of Morocco Exchanges Views 
With Pre.sident Kennedy (text of joint com- 
munique) 601 

Non-Self-Governing Territories. Reflections on 
the Pacific (Community (Cleveland) .... 613 

Presidential Documents 

Emergency Preparedness Functions Assigned to 
Sec-retary of State 629 

Free- World Defense and Assistance Programs . .'j91 

King of Morocco Exchanges Views With Presi- 
dent Kennedy 001 

Unclaimed Property of Victims of Nazi Persecu- 
tion 618 

Public Affairs 

Foreign Policy Conference Held for Editors and 
Broadcasters 618 

Merrow appointed Special Adviser on Commu- 
nity Relations 630 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 629 


U.S.S.R. Accepts U.S. Proposal for Direct Com- 
munication Link (ACDA statement) . . . 600 

U.S. Disclaims Besjwnsibility for Attacks on 

Soviet Ships (text of note) 599 

United Nations. The United Nations and the 

New Africa (Williams) 602 

'Same Index 

Ball, George W 619 

Cleveland, Harlan 613 

Harriman, W. Averell (530 

Hassan II 601 

Johnson, U. Alexis 606 

Kennedy, President 591, 601, 618, 629 

Kotschnig, Walter M 625 

Merrow, Chester Earl 630 

Orrick, WilUam H., Jr 023 

Williams, G. Mennen 602 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 1-7 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington 25, 

Releases issued prior to April 1 which appear 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 154 and 
156 of March 28 ; 157 of March 27 ; 164 of March 
29 ; and 169 of March 30. 

No. Date Subject 

•166 4/1 U.S. participation in International 

167 4/1 Foreign policy conference for editors 

and broadcasters (rewrite). 
tl6S 4/1 Cultural exchange with Rumania. 

170 4/3 Note to U.S.S.R. regarding attacks 

on Soviet ships. 

171 4/4 Ball : statement on National Acad- 

emy of Foreign Affairs. 

172 4/4 Orrick : statement on National Acad- 

emy of Foreign Affairs. 

*173 4/4 Rusk: interview on German tele- 

tl74 4/4 Weiss : "Readjusting United States 
Foreign Trade." 

tl75 4/5 Delegation to ECAFE study week on 
Tokaido Railway (rewrite). 

tl76 4/5 Jolinson: "The United States and 
Southeast Asia." 

tl77 4/5 Tyler: "The Effect of the Projected 
European Union on N.\TO." 
178 4/5 Advisory Commission report on ex- 
change program (rewrite). 

•180 4/6 Harriman : Marshall Plan reunion 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 





United States 
Government Printing Office 


Washington 25, D.C. 





A release in the new Foreign Affairs Outlines Series . . . 


in the 


This 19-page pamplilet contains the statement made on Febru- 
ary 18, 1963, by Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs, before the Latm American Subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. At the outset Mr. Martin 
states : 

The problem of extracontinental totalitarian powers trying to subvert 
established governments in this hemisphere is not new. During World War II 
the American Republics faced the challenge of Fascist subversion sponsored by 
the Axis Powers. Through individual and collective action they successfully 
dealt with this threat. Since 1948, in the aftermath of the Communist seizure 
of power in Czechoslovakia, the inter-American community has been dealing 
with the problem of Commimlst subversion promoted by countries of the Sino- 
Soviet bloc, now supported by Cuba. 

Mr. Martin also describes the development of communism prior 
to Castro, Communist efforts since the advent of Castro, communism 
in Latin America since 1959, steps we are taking to combat Com- 
munist subversion, steps being taken in the Organization of American 
States [OAS] to comiter Communist subversion, and the role of the 
Alliance for Progress in the Western Hemisphere's security effort. 

Publication 7509 

15 cents 

Order Form 

Supt. of Documents 
Govt. Printing OflSce 
Washington 25, D.C. 

Enclosed find: 


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order payable to 
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Vol. XLVIII, No. 1244 

AprU 29, 1963 


Deputy Under Secretary Johnson 635 


MINISTERS • Statement by Secretary Rusk and Text of 
Communique 641 


UNION ON NATO • by Assistant Secretary Tyler ... 648 


TRADE • by Leonard Weiss 652 


Secretary Rusk 664 


For index see inside back cover 



Vol. XLVIII. No. 1244 • Publication ,. 
April 29, 1963 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington 28, D.C. 


62 Issues, domestic $8.50, foreign $12.25 

Single copy, 25 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publica- 
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau 
of the Budget (January 19, 1961). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
OF State Bulletin as the source will be 
appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETi 
a weekly publication issued by t 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
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and interested agencies of t 
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Service. The BULLETIN includes 
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Department, and statements and c 
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special articles on various phases f 
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become a party and treaties of ge- 
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he United States and Southeast Asia 

&y TJ. Alexis Johnson 

Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^ 

Pj Ask the average person on the street to define 
i)utheast Asia and you will probably get as 
my different answers as the number of peo- 
e you ask. A World War II veteran will 
cely think of the China-Burma-India theater, 
id he will at least be right on Burma. A tour- 
might have visions of Thai or Bali dancers, 
id he, too, would be right on Thailand and 
donesia. Some might even mention India, 
it that would be stretching the elastic term, 
)utheast Asia, too far. Actually the term is 
snerally accepted as comprising the mainland 
minsula countries of Burma, Thailand, Ma- 
ya, Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam, plus the 
hilippines and Indonesia. 
Thus Southeast Asia, as we define it, is a 
iographic expression covering an exceedingly 
rge area of land and water. Our frequent 
id common use of the term tends to give the 
ipression that it has a certain coherence and 
lity. However, I do not think it an exagger- 
;ion to say that there is thus far less coherence 

I Southeast Asia from the standpoint of race, 
iligion, culture, and politics than in all of Eu- 
Dpe in the last century. 

Nevertheless, the nations of Southeast Asia 

II have one thing in common — they are a part 
f a huge, roughly triangular area which his- 
jrically has always been subjected to pressures 
rom at least one of the three sides by which 
. is bounded — India, China, and the sea. 

On the west there is India, which for many 
enturies had a great influence in Southeast 
Lsia, or "Further India," as it once was called. 

' Address made before the Economic Club of Detroit 
t Detroit, Mich., on Apr. 8 (press release 176 dated 

ipr. 5). 

This influence was primarily cultural, and it 
was transmitted largely through Brahminism 
and Buddhism. Indian influence extended 
through Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia and 
into Indonesia. It is evident today in religious 
and cultural forms, as well as in the written 
languages of several of these countries, which 
are based on Sanskrit. On the other hand, 
Chinese cultural influences are more in evidence 
in what is now Viet-Nam. 

Racially the Chinese have also contributed 
to the ethnic strains of Southeast Asia. In ad- 
dition China at times exerted the relentless 
pressure of a dynamic expanding empire. The 
closely related Thai, Lao, and Karen peoples 
originally inhabited the upper reaches of the 
Yangtze River in west China but migrated 
south under expanding Chinese pressure. 
Large parts of Southeast Asia as far south as 
Cambodia once acknowledged the suzerainty of 
Imperial China, paying tribute to Peiping. 
Even today there are large Chinese communi- 
ties in tlie Southeast Asian countries, where 
they play an extraordinarily important role in 
commerce and industry. 

Despite the force of these external influences 
from India and China, the countries of South- 
east Asia did not band together seeking strength 
through unity. On the contrary, like the Euro- 
pean nations, they continued their rivalries 
through debilitating wars between Burmese 
and Thai, between Thai and Cambodians, and 
between Cambodians and Vietnamese. During 
the course of these wars, extending over many 
centuries, the various countries developed in- 
tense local patriotisms which stay with them to- 
day, providing the basis for both internal 

iPEIL 29, 1963 


strength and regional weakness. We also 
might note that the colonial period served even 
to accentuate tliese divisions, with the trans- 
portation, conununications, education, and 
economy of eacli colony oriented toward its 
colonial master rather than toward its neigh- 

Tlie third, or sea frontier, runs from the In- 
dian Ocean, bending through the islands of 
Indonesia and the Philippines to the China 
Sea. Over the centuries the sea has been 
dominated by a succession of powers, each of 
which has made an important impression and 
has added to the already complex pattern of 
the region. The Arabs came by sea in the 10th 
century, carrying Islam to the Malayan Penin- 
sula and the Indonesian islands, penetrating 
north to Mindanao, the large southern island 
of the Philippines. They superimposed the 
Moslem religion upon these areas, thereby add- 
ing a new factor of difference between them 
and the Buddhist countries of continental 
Southeast Asia. Magellan came to Luzon, 
thereby paving the way for Spanish coloniza- 
tion of the Pliilippine Islands. The Portuguese 
star rose and fell rapidly, to be followed by the 
Dutch, who came into Indonesia some 300 years 
ago to build one of the largest empires in the 
East. Meanwhile the British expanded from 
India into Burma and, through the East India 
Company, moved inland and northward from 
Burma and Malaya toward Tliailand. The 
French arrived late on the scene but rapidly 
moved inland and northward from Cochin 
China, eventually reachmg the Chinese border. 
Throughout the past four centuries the power 
exerted from the sea has been predominant, 
pushing inland and northward toward the 
moim tains. 

This latter maritime period imposed upon 
the already existing political and cultural pat- 
tern a new set of differences. The Spanish, 
English, Dutch, and French languages, each 
bringing with it its own different literature 
and world outlook, were introduced into the 
different countries. Each power followed a 
distinctive policy. In the Philippines the 
United States emphasized education and inde- 
pendence. In Burma and Malaya the British 
concentrated on the development of local ad- 
ministrative structures which would serve a 

policy of decentralization and develop local 
autonomy. In Indochina much attention was 
given to culture and language under French 
guidance. In Indonesia the emphasis was on 
agriculture and the development of the coun- 
try's raw material resources. 

Special note must be taken of the role played 
by Tliailand, since Thailand alone of all the 
countries in the region has successfully main- 
tained its independence throughout its history 
Thailand was not immime to external forces,, , 
and it lias indeed absorbed many influencesi 
from India, China, and the West. It has ar 
indelible memory of historic Chinese pressure 
which forced the Thai people to the south. It 
has also coped, in recent centuries, with pres 
sure from the maritime frontier. Nevertheless 
situated as it is in the very heart of Southeast 
Asia, it has maintained a continuity and ai 
independent Asian identity which are a sourci 
of pride to its people today and a source o: 
strength in the face of the pressures which agaii 
are beginning to come from the north. 

Resurgence of Pressure From the North 

Wliat is the attraction that Southeast Asit 
has exerted for centuries on the great power 
flanking it on all sides? lYliy is it desirable 
and why is it important? First, it provide 
a lush climate, fertile soil, rich natural ret 
sources, a relatively sparse population in mosi 
areas, and room to expand. The countries o 
Southeast Asia produce rich exportable sur 
pluses such as rice, rubber, teak, corn, tin, spices 
oil, and many others. It is especially attractiv 
to Communist China, with its burgeoning popu) 
lation and its food shortages. 

Militarily and sti-ategically. Southeast Asii 
has great assets. It stands astride of east-wesi 
trade routes. It stands in a critical, strategic 
relationship not only to China and India bu 
to Australia, the western Pacific, and Japan 
Bearing in mind the implications of the recen 
Chinese attack on India, Southeast Asia take 
on an additional significance, since its domina 
tion by the Commimist powers would outflani 
the Asian subcontinent. 

Although still thinly populated for the mos 
part, the human resources of this area are con 
siderable and growing. Taken together, thi 



joples of Southeast Asia reprasent an im- 
>rtant segiiient of tlie free world and a target 
prime importance to Communist imperialism. 
There is a rhytlim to the tides of history, 
ist as the pressures on Southeast Asia have 

the past come alternately from China in 
e north, India in the west, and the maritime 
>wers along the sea, so Southeast Asia is again 
reatened by a resurgence of pressure from 
le north. But today the danger from this 
larter is multiplied a hmidredfold by the viru- 
nce of the political doctrine which now rides 
I the backs of the Chinese people. 
As my colleague Under Secretary Averell 
larriman said recently, "I don't know how you 
in distinguish between Chinese communism 
id Chinese imperialism. Chinese communism 
id all commimism is imperialist." 
lEven before World "War II, Conmiunist 
urties of varying strengths existed in all 
outheast Asian countries, from Burma to the 
nilippines. After the war the signal was 
«ven for armed Commimist-led uprisings, and 
•ese occurred in Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, 
dochina, and the Philippines. Even Thai- 
md, the one country in Southeast Asia that 
ftd not known colonial rule, was threatened. 
fy 1952 the revolts were crushed in all but 
ialaya and Indocliina. It took the British 
«id the new Malay Federation until 1958 to 
«ell Commimist guerrilla forces there. This 
ruggle, incidentally, provided valuable les- 
ns which are now being applied in Viet-Nam. 
'e also might note that, except for Japan, 
alaya is now the most prosperous country 


The efforts of some powers following World 
■"ar II to restore colonial r^ile along the pre- 
ar pattern permitted the Communists more 
fectively to wave the banner of anticolonial- 
m and, for example, through Ho Chi Minh, 
; that time largely to capture the nationalist 
ovement in Viet-Nam. 

After the Geneva Agreements of 1954 on 
idochina ^ we took the lead in the establish- 
ent of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza- 
on, an alliance of the Philippines, Thailand, 

Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, France, 
Great Britain, and ourselves, with the objec- 
tive of providing security to Southeast Asia 
through collective military action if the Com- 
munists embarked on outright military aggres- 
sion. The opening of the eighth meeting of 
mmisters of this organization was attended by 
Secretary Rusk this morning in Paris.^. 

Wliatever may be the criticisms of SEATO, 
the fact remains that, since its inception, the 
Communists have not attempted open military 
action in the area. Instead they have turned 
to the more subtle tactics of subversion and in- 
surgency, the prime example being the guer- 
rilla warfare in Viet-Nam carried on m the 
method made classic in China by Mao Tse-tmig. 
Wliex'eas the method employed by the Com- 
mimists has changed, the objective remains the 
same — destruction of the independence of the 
Southeast Asian countries one by one and re- 
turn to the days when they bore their tribute 
to Peiping. ^Vliile the armed struggle is mani- 
fest now only in Viet-Nam, it ceased in Laos 
through the settlement reached just last year 
at Geneva,^ after 14 months of negotiation. 

Implications of Struggle in Viet-Nam 

I have pointed out that Southeast Asia is 
not a homogeneous region biit rather a geo- 
graphic expression. By this same token of 
geographic interrelation, the security of the 
area is not stronger than that of its component 
countries. All of us who were at Geneva in 
1954 recognized that Commvmist domination 
of the Eed River Delta of North Viet-Nam 
would make it much more difficult to defend the 
remaining areas. This has been true. How- 
ever, for the Communists to advance any fur- 
ther in the area would render the defense prob- 
lem very much more difficult, if not well-nigh 
impossible. This is why the valiant struggle 
now being waged in South Viet-Nam has im- 
plications far beyond the borders of that trou- 
bled country. 

Our massive assistance to free Viet-Nam is 
designed to avoid just such a catastrophe. Our 

''For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: 
asic Documents, vol. I, Department of State publica- 
on 6446, p. 750. 

PRIL 29, 1963 

" See p. 641. 

' For texts of a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos 
and an accompanying protocol, see Bulletin of Aug. 
13, 1062, p. 259. 


objectives in Viet-Nam are to assist that country 
to regain its full freedom and independence and 
ability to achieve for its vigorous people that 
well-being and economic progress of which it is 
capable. Our principal objective is the same 
everywhere in Southeast Asia. We seek not to 
dictate the form of government nor to bind the 
countries of Southeast Asia into an alliance 
with us. This is a matter of their own choosing. 
Our sole concern is that they have the freedom 
to make their own choice. This objective is en- 
tirely consistent with the purposes of the free 
countries of the area. Thus we have a soimd 
basis for cooperation with them. 

This cooperation takes a number of forms. 
First is our military cooperation under SE ATO, 
which places on us certain obligations to assist 
the countries embraced by the treaty in defend- 
ing themselves against open attack. We take 
these obligations seriously and have made it 
clear that we will meet them whether or not 
other members do so. Also, importantly, we 
have the ability to back up our commitments. 

Wlien the Korean war broke out our forces 
were not battle-ready and we had to think in 
terms of months for the deployment of combat- 
ready forces from the United States. 

Today the picture has sharply changed, and 
in Southeast Asia, as well as in other areas, our 
forces are fully combat-ready and prepared for 
prompt deployment by air and sea. This 
greatly increases our ability to use our military 
forces to prevent war rather than dribble in 
forces after fighting has started. 

This was well demonstrated in Southeast 
Asia last May, when the Viet Minh and Pathet 
Lao suddenly resumed their attacks in Laos. 
Nam Tha fell on May 6, and subsequently it 
appeared they were continuing their advance 
to the Thai border. On May 13 we consulted 
with the Thai Government, and on May 15 our 
first units landed at Udorn, across the river 
from Laos.' The Communist advance stopped, 
and in July the Communists agreed to the for- 
mation of a Government of National Union in 
Laos. We have recently concluded an agj-ee- 
ment with Thailand for establishing logistic 
facilities and prepositioning equipment that 
would, in case of future necessity, permit even 

' For background, see iMd., June 4, 1962, p. 904. 

more rapid and effective deployment of Ameri 
can and other SEATO forces to that countrj 
This will still further increase the military ad 
vantage we enjoy throughout much of the are 
of secui'e and controlled access by sea in addi 
tion to our access by air. An essential ingredi 
ent of any successful defense will, of course, al 
ways be the willingness and desire of th 
people attacked vigorously to do all they ca 
in their own defense. 

With overt aggression successfully deterre( 
the threat to the area lies not so much in a 
invasion from without as in subversion and ii 
surrection from within. This was defeated i 
Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines, containe 
in Laos, but now faces South Viet-Nam in 
very acute form. Attempts to penetrate Tha 
land, particularly its northeast area borderir 
Laos, are increasing. 

This leads us to this whole question of oi 
general approach to cooperation with countrie 
not only in Southeast Asia but also elsewhei 
who are facing these problems. Each of the 
countries must have the ability to maintain i 
temal order. This means efficient police fore 
trained in the tradition of public service ai 
military forces able to supplement and suppc 
the police forces in case of necessity. Tl 
means less emphasis on exotic armament ai 
massive divisions and more emphasis on th 
equipment, training, and organization that w 
enable the military force to fulfill an interr 
security mission within the coimtry. It al 
means what is now called civic action, that 
the military force doing those things for t 
local population which it can do without sac: 
ficing its primary mission, and establishing 
sympathetic relationship with the local popul 
tion. Time does not permit me to go into t > 
details, but I can tell you that there has be 
a great change in emphasis in Washington 
these mattei-s, to the degree that I feel that o ■ 
economic and military assistance programs n i 
better directed to this real and immedi;' 

However, all of tlus is of little use if the pel • 
ical, social, and economic structure of a count' 
does not have in a minimum degree what o' 
ancestors so aptly called "the consent of tJ 
governed." This, of course, must come frd 
within, although we can encourage and prl 



rom without. This we are seeking to do, and 
: is one of the great challenges faced by our 
iplomacy. We in the Department of State 
re not unmindful of the responsibility and are 
5eking to train our personnel and so organize 
urselves as better to carry it out. 

oreign Aid, an Investment in the Future 

Our annual "great debate" is now opening 
n what has come to be known as "foreign 
id," " and Southeast Asia is already receiving 
:s share of attention. Fii-st let me say that 

have always had a personal aversion to the 
?rm "foreign aid," which inevitably carries 
•ith it the erroneous implications, first, of 
harity on our part and, second, of superiority 
nd inferiority as between ourselves and the 
eceiving coimtry. I feel it more accurate to 
peak in terms of investment — investment in 
lie future not only for the countries with which 
76 are cooperating but for our future as well. 

I believe that there are few who would deny 
hat our investment in the Marshall Plan for 
Europe and our postwar assistance to Japan 
ave already paid off as handsomely as any 
avestment in our history, not only in political 
nd military terms, important though they be 
ti themselves, but also in direct economic terms. 

Our investments in the underdeveloped areas, 
ncluding Southeast Asia, coming later and 
tarting from a less well developed base have 
inderstandably not uniformly shown as quick 
tr yet as spectacular returns as those in Europe 
nd Japan. But that does not mean that they 
,re bad or foolish investments. 

Admittedly some investments may, with the 
visdom of hindsight, appear more prudent than 
)thers, and it is important that we learn from 
)ur mistakes. This we are attempting to do, 
IS are the countries with which we are cooperat- 
ng. However, no more than in the case of 
m industrial firm which seeks for itself sus- 
:ained vigor does this mean that we cease invest- 
ing in the future. Nor does it mean that we 
must invest without return indefinitely into the 
future. Just as industrial enterprises and proj- 
3cts seek for themselves self-sustaining growth, 
30 are the coimtries of this area seeking self- 
sustaining growth and looking forward to the 

' For a statement by Secretary Rusk, see p. 664. 

time they no longer need to rely on outside re- 
sources. In this, also, our objectives and theirs 
are consistent. There can, and inevitably will, 
be differences between honest men on when this 
point can be reached. While among those who 
have recently examined the problem there are 
those who think it can be reached sooner than 
others, they all agi-ee that that time is not yet. 
Also there are cases in which, given an ideal 
world, we might not choose to make an invest- 
ment. But we are not living in an ideal world, 
and we often have to weigh how much more it 
would cost us tomorrow if we did not make a 
more modest investment today. 

U.S. Investment in Viet-Nam 

As Viet-Nam is the major recipient of our 
assistance in the area — not only financial and 
material but also our men — it is fitting that we 
shovild particularly examine our investment in 
that country. 

First let me say that I do not regard myself 
entirely as a theoretician or abstract observer 
of that situation. I was a participant in the 
1954 negotiations which led to the partition 
and French withdrawal from that unfortimate 
country. Subsequently, during my service in 
the area and on the SEATO Council for a num- 
ber of years, I became directly familiar with 
some of its problems and have visited it 
on a nimiber of occasions, most recently last 

In order to put its problems in perspective 
I think it important to look back on its recent 
past. When Viet-Nam was divided in 1954, 
after being wracked by 8 years of vicious civil 
war, there were few who would have given the 
Republic of Viet-Nam much chance of survival. 
In addition to all of its other problems, it was 
immediately inundated by about 800,000 desti- 
tute refugees from the north — about 7 percent 
of its population. But survive it did, as in 
many ways magnificently so, as pointed out in 
detail by Mr. Ball [Under Secretary George W. 
Ball] before this same audience just a year ago. 

As Mr. Ball pointed out, Viet-Nam effectively 
integrated this vast flood of refugees into its 
society; a major agrarian reform plan was car- 
ried out; in the 4 years from 1956 to 1960 the 
elementary school population was almost quad- 

4PRrL 2 9, 1963 


rupled; food production per capita was in- 
creased by 20 percent while it was falling in the 
north by 10 percent; and in general the south 
was forging aliead at a rate that would have 
been impressive even for a peaceful land. It 
was apparently this very progress, which was 
so conspicuous as to be intolerable to Hanoi, that 
brought on a major intensification of infiltra- 
tion from the north and around 1959 a stepping 
up of a carefully planned and moimted cam- 
paign directed from Hanoi. This campaign was 
openly announced from Hanoi in 1960. As i\Ir. 
Ball also stated, the response to this threat 
could not be limited to military measures, no 
matter how well conceived and conducted; 
social and economic measures were of equal im- 
portance. He also pointed out that a quick and 
spectacular victory could not be expected but 
that it would take patient application of effort 
by the Vietnamese and ourselves over a long 
period of time — in fact, over many years. 

After the passage of a year it is entirely fitting 
to ask the question "How are tilings going?" 
This question is increasingly being asked, and 
it deserves an honest and objective answer. 
However, the answer cannot be simple. I sup- 
pose people were asking the same thing in 1863 
and in 1943, too, and perhaps not getting very 
satisfying answers. But the question is even 
more difficult in a guerrilla war. There are no 
frontlines moving forward or backward that 
can be drawn on a map ; there is no clearly de- 
fined enemy territory to invade and hold ; there 
are rarely any major engagements which can 
be totted up as victories or defeats. But there 
is no doubt that we and the Vietnamese working 
together have made important progi'ess since 
the end of 1961, when we began to step up our 

To be frank, the war was being lost fast in 
the fall of 1961, when General [Maxwell D.] 
Taylor first led a mission there. Viet Cong at- 
tacks were accelerating both in numbers and 
size. In September they overran a provincial 
capital and held it overnight, long enough to be- 
head publicly the Chief of Provmce. There was 
a real threat that they might be able to "liber- 
ate" some remote area and hold it, possibly as 
the seat of a "government" which the bloc could 
recognize and aid. Transportation was so dis- 
rupted that Saigon, nomially a big rice- 


exporting port, was forced to import rice from 
the United States. 

The situation has substantially changed since 
then. Viet Cong attacks declined steadily in 
1962. They are now running at a rate consider- 
ably less than half the January 1962 average. 
No more provincial capitals have been attacked. 
Rice exports have resumed and are expected to 
be near normal this year. There are no Viet 
Cong areas immune to Government penetration. 
Perhaps even more significant is the fact that 
the Viet Cong have not escalated to larger units 
or to more conventional warfare. 

The Strategic Hamlet Program 

There are other indicators of progress — in- 
creased voluntary intelligence from the people, 
increased Viet Cong weapons losses, the fact 
that Viet Cong strongholds are being systemati- 
cally penetrated, their supplies and installations 
destroyed. But I think the most important 
reason for guarded optimism is the adoption 
by the Government of Viet-Nam of the "stra- 
tegic hamlet" program. 

The first step in setting up a strategic hamlet 
is largely militaiy. A hamlet militia is trained 
and armed and a defensive perimeter con-t 
stiiicted. The second step, however, is pure! 
political. It is the election by a secret ballot oJ' 
a hamlet council and the framing of a hamle1*| 
charter by the people's elected representatives, 

The third step is more conventional bul 
exiually nonmilitary. This is the provision oi 
Government services such as agricultural ex 
tension and low-interest agricultural loan? 
cheap fertilizer from Government-supportec 
cooperatives, new schools, and hamlet-levei 
medical aid. The aim is to give the fanner an 
economic stake which he will want to defend. 

Communist guerrilla strategy is to erode 
Govermnent support and isolate the Govern 
ment from the people by attacks, assassinations 
and threats. The guerrillas themselves are U 
live among the people like the fish in the sea. 
according to Mao Tse-tung's much-quoted 
statement. The strategic hamlet strategy is the 
opposite of this. It calls for tying the people 
to their Government by hamlet councils anel 
Government sei-vices at the hamlet level, while 
at the same time isolating the Viet Cong from 





heir sources of supplies and recruits among tlie 
eople. The aim, in short, is to get the guerrilla 
sh out of the water. 

To date about half the population — nearly 7 
lillion people — live in about 5,000 strategic 
amlets. Another 5,000 strategic hamlets must 
e organized before the program is complete 
\-en in the first, essentially military phase. 
But already the program is beginning to pay 
tf . One result is that an estimated half million 
leople previously under Viet Cong control are 
low under Government control and jirotection. 
ilorale in the coimtryside is up, and this is re- 
lected by increased voluntaiy intelligence from 
)easants to the armed forces, a sign the people 
lot only think the Government is winning but 
ire willing to take risks to help it win. Perhaps 
he most important result is the intangible knit- 
ing together of Government and people. 

Without in any way detracting from the vital 
aid heroic contribution of our advisers and lo- 
iistic support personnel, of whom 20 were killed 
3\ Viet Cong action last year, we should in all 
)f tlxis be clear about one thing. The Viet- 
namese are fighting this war — and fighting it 
valiantly. About 5,000 of them were killed last 
year. "VVliile most of these were in the armed 
forces, this total also includes village officials 
and militia, schoolteachers and malaria work- 
ers. During the same period about 30,000 cas- 
ualties of all kinds were inflicted on the Viet 

I would thus say there is reason for some op- 
timism. However, this is going to be a long, 
hard struggle. The Viet Cong remain very 
strong and very determined. There is no sign 
that the bloc is faltering in its support for the 
attack on South Viet-Nam. We are dealing 
with an enemy who is patient and comits on our 
impatience, who is willing to accept adversity 
and hopes we are not. 

But we are satisfied that we have a sound 
strategy ; progress is being made, and the Viet- 
namese have certainly demonstrated their ca- 
pacity for sacrifice and their determination to 
survive as a free people. As President Ken- 
nedy said in his state of the Union message," 
"The spearpoint of aggression has been blunted 
in South Viet-Nam." 

The President's statement justifiably has an 
optimistic ring, and I think it well for me to 
close on that note. 

I close on that note not only for South Viet- 
Nam but for Southeast Asia as a whole. How- 
ever, I would not want this to be interpreted as 
any cheap or careless optimism, for tliis would 
not be justified. Rather my optimism is based 
on the conviction that, working in free associa- 
tion with free peoples, we enjoy an advantage 
which the Communists can never hope to emu- 
late. This we are doing in Southeast Asia. I 
have no doubt that our investment is a wise one 
and that to it the American people will continue 
to give that persevering support which free- 
dom always demands of any people. 

Eighth Meeting of SEATO 
Council of Ministers 

The eighth meeting of the Council of Minis- 
ters of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
was held at Parls^ April 8-10. Following are 
texts of a statement made hy Secretary Eiisk at 
the opening session on April 8 and a communi- 
que issued at the close of the meeting on 
April 10. 


It is deeply significant that we meet in Paris 
today for deliberations concerned with the de- 
fense of freedom halfway round the globe. 
Our meeting here underscores our consciousness 
that the security and freedom of the West and 
security and freedom in the East are intimately 
interrelated. We know that the safety of us 
all requires resistance to Communist aggressive 
threats wherever they arise, whether in Asia, 
in Em-ope, or in the Western Hemisphere. 
SEATO, in drawing together nations from all 
these areas for the common defense, uniquely 
expresses our comprehension of this truth. 

The necessity for collective security is well 
established. Some of us here today have 
learned this together in the fire of two world 
wars. The Manila Pact ^ is collective security 

' Bulletin of Feb. 4, 1963, p. 159. 

^ For text of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty signed at Manila on Sept. 8, 1954, see Bulletin 
of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393. 

APRIL 29, 1063 


applied to the worldwide scope of the Commu- 
nist menace. Communist aggressors would be 
comforted by the prospect of attacking or seek- 
ing to subvert each country and each area in- 
dividually. SEATO denies them this satis- 
faction in South and Southeast Asia. The 
rapid deployment of forces by SEATO nations 
to Thailand last year underscores our readiness 
and our capability to act in the common defense. 

Major events affecting the treaty area have 
occurred since we last met. We shall be con- 
cerned with the significance of these in our dis- 
cussions here. 

In Laos the signing of the Geneva Agree- 
ments ^ has created the basis for stability, and 
a coalition government under Prime Minister 
Souvanna Phouma has been established. The 
United States fully supports the objectives of 
these agreements and has strictly complied with 
their terms. We are not satisfied, however, that 
the other side has done so, particularly the re- 
quirement that all foreign military forces be 
withdrawn. This emphasizes the importance 
of freedom for the International Control Com- 
mission to conduct effective, unhindered investi- 
gations throughout the entire Kingdom, partic- 
ularly in those parts controlled by the Pathet 
Lao, wliich are now closed to the Commission. 
Until there is cooperation in this respect and 
until the Communist-supported Pathet Lao sup- 
port the coalition government, the objectives of 
the Geneva Agreements simply cannot be fully 
realized. A tragic and deplorable series of de- 
velopments has increased tensions in the Plaine 
des Jarres. Each signatory of those agree- 
ments must, we believe, use its influence urgently 
to prevent further aggravation of the situation, 
to ease tensions, and to promote the develop- 
ment of an atmosphere of harmony in support 
of the Government of National Union. We 
must, therefore, continue to watch developments 
in Laos with the closest possible attention. 

In Viet-Nam, although the struggle has in- 
tensified since our 1961 meeting,' the Viet Cong 
drive has been blunted, and there are some 
grounds for further encouragement. We be- 
lieve that Viet-Nam has now foimd the right 
strategy for meeting the Viet Cong terrorism 

' For text, see md., Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259. 

' For background, see ibid., Apr. 17, 1961, p. 547. 

and is applying it with increasing vigor and 
success. The struggle may be protracted and 
bitter, but we have no doubt of ultimate victory. 
The protocol * to the Manila Pact is an expres- 
sion of the vital interest of the United States 
and other SEATO nations in the preservation 
of the integrity and independence of Viet-Nam. ' 
The readiness of my country and others to help 
countries to meet indirect, as well as direct. Com- 
munist aggression is illustrated by the nature 
and magnitude of our assistance to Viet-Nam. 

Since we last met, Communist subversion in 
northeast Thailand has become a real and pres- 
ent danger. The Government of Thailand has 
moved with vigor and imagination to deal with 
it. We fully realize that the sacrifices of the 
people of Thailand in this effort — and in other 
of our joint endeavors — are all a valuable part 
of worldwide resistance to communism and con- 
tribute to our safety as well as theirs. We are 
glad, therefore, to lend our support to Thai- 
land's countersubversion program, together 
with other members of this alliance, in keeping 
with our commitments under the Manila Pact. 
Thailand, a full member of SEATO, can be 
assured of our fullest determination. 

The blatant aggression of Communist China 
on the Indian border has vast and historic sig- I 
nificance. Suffice it at the moment to say that 
it revealed for the whole world Conununist 
China's readiness to turn even on those who 
have tried to be a friend and to resort to overt 
aggression whenever its expansionist aims are ^ 
thereby served. I 

Communist propaganda continues persistent- 
ly to hurl mvective and derision at our treaty 
organization. This criticism of SEATO is, in 
fact, a recognition of its success in obstructing 
Communist aggressive aims. But SEATO's 
role is broader than its military power. 
SEATO is also an expression of the determina- 
tion of Asian nations to maintain their inde- 
pendence and to increase the economic well- 
being of their people. Ultimately, these are as 
important as military defense in assuring that 
independence will be preserved. 

We value the Manila Pact, and we shall con- 
tinue to support it as the essential instrument 
through which we can participate in the coUec- 

* IMd., Sept. 20, 1954, p. 395. 



ve defense of Southeast Asia for the mutual 
enefit of the respective peoples. It is in this 
pirit that my delegation enters upon these im- 
ortant discussions in the next few days. 


ress release 1S7 dated April 11 

The SEATO Council held its eighth meeting in Paris 
rom April 8 to 10, 1963, under the chairmanship of 
(is Excellency Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, Min- 
5ter of Foreign Affairs of France. The inaugural ad- 
ress was delivered by the Prime Minister of France, 
lis Excellency Mr. Georges Pompidou. 

ijeneral Observations 

The Council held an exchange of views on the inter- 
national situation with special reference to develop- 
aents in the treaty area. It reaffirmed that the main 
im of the Manila Pact is to ensure the peaceful de- 
elopment, economic stability and national independ- 
nce of the countries within the area. The Council 
xpressed concern over the continuing and widening 
hreats to the security of such countries while reaffirm- 
ng their determination to maintain vigilance. 

The subversive campaign against Viet-Nam has been 
onsidered. The Council took note of information 
rfven by some delegations indicating that consider- 
ible progress has been achieved in the fight against 
;his subversion and that one may expect a new im- 
jrovement in the situation thanks to the efforts made 
3y the Government of Vieb-Nam who were able to stem 
rebellion. The Council hopes that Viet-Nam, with the 
support given to it, would be in a position to maintain 
its advance towards internal stability and international 

The Council reiterated its support for the cause of 
a neutral and independent Laos under a Government 
of National Union. It expressed the hope that those 
who have the responsibility in Laos and the signa- 
tories of the Geneva Accords will succeed in ensuring 
the maintenance of peace, neutrality and national tmity 
which the people of Laos so earnestly desire. 

The members of the Council took note of their agree- 
ment on a revised procedure for taking decisions with- 
in the organization which wiU improve its work and 
increase its efficiency. 

They also took note of some decisions taken since 
their last meeting by members of the organization, in 
particular the joint Thailand-United States statement 
of March 6, 1962,° and the deployment in Thailand in 
May 1962 of troops from some member countries.' 
They deemed that these facts could increase the ca- 
pability of such countries to comply with their obliga- 

' For text, see ibid., Mar. 26, 1962, p. 498. 

' For background, see ibid., June 4, 1962, p. 904. 


The Council emphasized that the development of ef- 
fective measures to prevent and counter subversion 
continues to be a major task facing the member coun- 
tries. It noted the steps taken during the past year to 
deal with this problem. 

Military Defence 

The Council affirmed its continued support for the 
principle of collective security. 

The Council noted with satisfaction that the military 
advisers and the military planning office have revised 
and refined the plans for defensive action, in the light 
of changing conditions and anticipated situations. 

The Council examined the operation of the continu- 
ing series of military exercises, and agreed that the 
body of experience gained in working together was a 
valuable asset to the alliance for any possible defensive 
action the member nations might be called upon to 
undertake in combination. 

The Council welcomed an announcement by the 
Council member for Australia of arrangements made 
by his Government with the Royal Thai Government 
for the establishment of a military rebuild 
for the major repair and maintenance in Thailand of 
Thai military and Government vehicles. 

Economic Co-operation 

The Council expressed satisfaction at the progress 
achieved by member countries in the sphere of eco- 
nomic development, and agreed that continuing adr 
vance in this field is essential to the security of the 
treaty area. 

The Council expressed approval of the various civil 
projects undertaken by the organization : 

(1) The Community Development Project, inaugu- 
rated in November of last year, in conjunction with the 
nation-wide plan of the Thai Government. This proj- 
ect is designed to decentralize the problem by setting 
up regional centres which analyze the actual conditions 
and train experts to meet the needs of the people of 
specific areas. Aid from the government and from 
other member nations can thus reach the people 

(2) Skilled labour projects in Pakistan, Thailand 
and the Philippines which are designed to provide 
training for the workers in developing societies. Two 
new schools are being opened in Pakistan early this 
year. In Thailand, 19 schools are now training some 
5,500 students in technical, electrical, electronic and 
other skills. An apprenticeship program in the Phil- 
ippines has proved successful in fitting workers for 
industrial jobs. 

(3) The Graduate School of Engineering in Bangkok. 
This advanced engineering school fills a regional need 
which has not been met by other means. Enrolment is 
open to students of various countries from the region, 
whether members of SEATO or not. 

APRIL 29, 1963 


(4) The SEATO Meteorological Telecommunications 
Project, linking Bangkok and Manila, which is sched- 
uled for completion within two years. 

Medical Research 

The Couucil noted with satisfaction the work of 
the SEATO cholera research laboratory in East Paki- 
stan, and the SEATO general medical laboratory in 
Thailand. These scientific investigatory institutions 
have been given the task of discovering means to com- 
bat disease in the treaty area, and thus to improve the 
well-lieing of the people. 

The Council welcomed the proposed establishment of 
a SEATO clinical reseai-ch centre at the school of 
graduate studies of the University of Medical Sciences 
at Bangkok. The main objective of the proposed new 
centre is to gain further knowledge concerning the 
effects of diseases ; its functions are to include pro- 
fessional training, education and research. 

Cultural Co-operation 

The Council noted the continuing cultural inter- 
change among member nations, and agreed that 
SEATO's role in this activity should be continued. 
The organization provides undergraduate scholarships, 
graduate scholarships, fellowships and professorships, 
and sponsors educational conferences. 

The Council noted with approval the recent con- 
ference which studied the equivalence of university 
credits, so that scholars may more easily transfer from 
one country to another in furtherance of their studies. 

Appointment of Secretary-General 

The Council appointed His Excellency Mr. Pote 
Sarasin for a further period of two years to terminate 
at a suitable date after the conclusion of the Council 
meeting of 1965. 


The Council expressed appreciation to the Secretary- 
General His Excellency Mr. Pote Sarasin and his 
staff for their outstanding services to the organization. 

Expression of Gratitude 

The Council expressed its gratitude to the Govern- 
ment of France for its hospitality and the excellent 
arrangements made for the conference. The meeting 
voted warm thanks to the Chairman, His Excellency 
Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville. 

Next Meeting 

The Council accepted with pleasure the invitation of 
the Government of the Philippines to hold its next 
meeting in Manila In view of the tenth anniversary in 
1964 of the signing in Manila in 1954 of the Southeast 
Asia Collective Defence Treaty. 

The Divided World of Communism 

Following is the text of an intervieio of Sec- 
retary Rusk hy NBC correspondent Elie Ahel, 
filmed for iise as part of the National Broad- 
casting Company^s special program '■'■An En- 
cyclopedia of the Divided World of Comirm- 
nism" televised on April 10. 

Press release 18S dated April 10 

Mr. Ahel: Mr. Secretary, how tmtch comfort 
can toe in tlie West take from this crack in what 
used to he called the Oomm/uni-'it monolith? 

Secretary Rusk: AVell, Mr. Abel, I tliink that 
it is important at the very beginning to realize 
that we can't be sure about what this split 
means, and for a very simple reason. I'm con- 
vinced that neither Moscow nor Peiping fully 
imderstands the full relationship between the 
two at the present time. 

We do know that there are some veiy impor- 
tant elements in the differences that are being 
exhibited now between Moscow and Peiping. 
There is an ideological conflict : how best to get 
on with the world revolution. There surely 
must be some historical differences between the 
Russians and Chinese that are involved. There 
is a contest for the leadership of the world 

I don't believe that we can afford to take com- 
fort yet. Ob^aously to the extent that the Com- 
munist movement is divided, that there is con- 
fusion among Communist parties in many 
countries, or that there are differences of tech- 
niques between these two, that is all to the good. 
But, on the other hand, both of them are com- 
mitted to the world revolution. Lord Home 
[British Foreign Secretary] pointed out that 
both of them want to overcome capitalism and 
free institutions. This is a source of danger 
because, if these two elements in the Communist 
camp enter into a rivalry as to which one of 
them can get on most rapidly with their world 
revolution, this could result in an increase of 
danger to the free world. 

So I would think that we have to be in aj 
position of watchful waiting — observe it closely, 
respond to any situation which threatens us, 
and be a little careful about taking premature 
comfort from arguments within the Communist 
world as to how best to bury us. i 



/ take it it's your feeling then, Mr. Secretary, 
luit tlw West should at tlm inoment do noth- 
iKj to try to capitalize on this quarrel? 

"Well, I think th;it it would be, difficult to find 
uajor moves that the free world could make 
vhich would advance the interests of the free 
vorld in tryino; to insert ourselves in between 
Moscow and Peiping. Because if we ourselves 
.vere to, say, increase pressures on one or the 
ither, I think that we could very likely drive 
hese two closer together again. 

You see, neither Moscow nor Peiping can 
ifford to be without the other in a direct con- 
frontation between either one of them and the 
free world. They are important to each other, 
ind that importance has not been, I think, elim- 
inated by the rivalries that are now apparent 
within the Communist world. So we have to 
be a little cautious about tliis. 

/ notice, Mr. Secretary., that the Chinese in 
fjir pmt feir days have sent trade missions hoth 
to ^Ye8t Germany and to Britain, apparently in 
itn effort to huild up their trade with those 
Western countries and in this way m-ake up 
some of the deficit thut the Russians have ini- 
pdsed on. them. Hoio would this Government 
look upon increased trade with China hy either 
of these allies? 

"Well, we have not been ourselves in favor of 
increasing trade with Connnunist China. We 
ourselves don't trade with mainland China. I 
think it is true that the drop in trade between 
mainland China and the Soviet Union and 
mainland Cliina's own requirements now stimu- 
late them to get out and see if they can't achieve 
markets and sources of supply elsewhere. 

As you know, they bought large quantities 
of grain, for example, from Canada and Aiis- 
tralia. They, I think, having less Soviet trade, 
are trying to stimulate their own trade i-ela- 
tions. I suspect they will try in Latin America 
as well in an attempt to find markets through 
which they can get the foreign exchange that 
they need to buy in markets other than the 
Communist bloc itself. I think that the free 
world ought to be very cautious about the terms 
of trade, about the types of trade in which it 
enters in trade relations with Peiping. 

You have mentioned, sir, ideology and na- 

tional history. I loonder to what extent one 
can look upon these differences as a difference 
of outlook between a comparatively rich and a 
comparatively poor Communist country, be- 
tween a country whose territorial ambitions are 
more or less satisfied and one with dissatisfied 

I think Mr. Couve de Murville [French For- 
eign Minister] pointed out there is a difference 
in the level of development of Communist 
China and the Soviet Union. This may, in- 
deed, make some difference in power and atti- 
tude. The Soviet Union lias a considerable 
stake in what it has been able to accomplish 
in the last 30 or 40 years. It has a rather 
sophisticated industry. It has a highly soj)his- 
ticated military establishment. It knows a 
great deal more about the nature of modern war 
than the Chinese Communists do. I think that 
the level of mainland Chinese underdevelop- 
ment causes the Chinese to expect vast amounts 
of help from the Soviet I^nion which the Soviet 
Union has not been able to provide to the extent 
wanted by the Chinese. 

On the other side, the Soviet Union still has 
great unfinished business in its own country, 
because it has h^d difficulty in finding the re- 
sources to do everything that it wants to do at 
the same time; for example, as between a mili- 
tary establishment and consumer needs. So 
I think that there are, quite apart from ideol- 
ogy, there are some conflicts of interest between 
Communist China and the Soviet Union which 
are a part of this present disagreement between 

/ loonder if ifs collect, as so many people 
seem to assume, that the Chinese are necessarily 
the more aggressive partner liere? Pm think- 
ing of the fact that it was the Rtissians loho 
planted some missiles about 90 miles off our 

"Well, I think it's a matter of doctrme. The 
Chinese are supporting a more primitive type 
of Communist revolution. I think their influ- 
ence in the bloc is in the direction of a more 
aggi-essive policy than that of the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Union, since the death of Stalin, has 
attempted to develop the idea of peaceful co- 
existence somewhat further than the Chinese, 
for example. 

APRIL 2 9, 190 3 


But, nevertheless, I think we ought not to 
underestimate the seriousness of purpose of the 
Soviet Union in gettuig on with the world revo- 
lution. And the most dramatic and one of the 
most dangerous moves taken since the end of 
World War II has been the secret introduc- 
tion of offensive weapons into Cuba and the 
deception that was practiced in that process. 
Perhaps that is one of the reasons why we can't 
take too much comfort out of the mere differ- 
ence of doctrine between those two capitals. 

Mr. Secretary, we've had some trouble in our 
own alliance recently. How do you explain the 
fact that Mr. Khrushchev has made no apparent 
effort to capitalize on it? 

Oh, I think Moscow understands what is, I 
think, imderstood in the West: that is, with 
respect to the central commitment of NATO — 
the great security commitment to protect 
NATO against external aggression — there are 
no differences in the alliance. 

In other words, what we have been talking 
about in NATO in the last several months, and 
in the West, has been how we move on from 
where we are to write new chapters, to add 
something to what we have. We are not talking 
about the dissolution of the basic commitments 
of the alliance. Those are strong and firm, as 
was illusti-ated in, say, October. And I think 
France, for example, is as finnly committed to 
an alliance as any other member of NATO. 
And I think Moscow understands that these are 
differences which do not affect the basic ques- 
tions involving relations between, say, NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact. 

Perhaps they understand, as you indicated in 
the case of their own alliance, that if they tried 
to fish in these waters we would pull together 
like that. 

Yes, I think that it would certainly be true 
that an increase of pressure by the Soviet Union 
would demonstrate promptly the unity of 
NATO in the face of such a threat, and I think 
they must understand that in Moscow. 

Are we in accord with our allies on this basic 
estimate of the Sino-Soviet disagreement? 

I think so, m terms of caution. I think that 
none of us feel that we understand all of the 


elements that are involved in this fully. And I 
think none of us would be willing to predict 
with any certainty how this discussion between 
Moscow and Peiping will come out. 

I think there is one important point of differ- 
ence between ourselves and some of our allies 
about how to deal with these people in the Com- 
munist bloc, and that is on the trade field. 
There are some who feel that a fat Communist 
is a peaceful Commimist. We ourselves believe 
that we ought to be careful about building up — 
particularly in strategic supplies — building up 
the strength of the Communist world until we 
can see in practice that the notion of peaceful 
coexistence means something other than getting 
on with a world revolution. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Abel. 

U.S. Calls for Action To Insure 
Restoration of Cease-Fire in Laos 

Department Statemenf^ 

Our information is that the Kong Le neutral- 
ist forces have been attacked by the pro- 
Communist Pathet Lao; and there are indica- 
tions that they (that is, the Pathet Lao) are 
supported by some Viet Minh military pei-son- 
nel. We have no detailed or late information 
on how serious the fighting is in the Plaines des 
Jarres. However, the fighting now going on 
not only appears to be a serious violation of the 
cease-fire but, if it continues, will endanger the 
implementation of the Geneva Accords^ with 
all the dire consequences that such a breakdown 
will mean for Laos. 

In these circumstances, we consider it incimi- 
bent on the cochairmen of the Geneva Accords 
and the International Control Commission to 
take prompt and effective action to stop the 
fighting which has been instigated by tlie pro- 
Communist Pathet Lao and to insure that the 
cease-fire is restored. Such action is essential 
in order to preserve the independence and neu- 
trality of Laos. 

' Read to news correspondents on Apr. 8 by Lincoln ' ' 
White, Director of the Office of News. 

° For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 13, 1962, 
p. 2.09. 


'resident Kennedy Greets Reunion 
»f Marshall Plan Employees 

FoN owing is the text of a message fromPresi- 
lent Kennedy to a 15th anniversary reunion 
iinner of em-ployees of the Economic Coopera- 
tion Admrnistration held at Washington on 
April 6. The President's message was read iy 
Paid G. Hoffman^ who was the first adminis- 
trator of the Marshall Plan. 

S'hlte House press release dated April 6 

Please convey my personal greetings to all 
ihose attending tonight's commemoration of the 
I5th anniversary of the Marshall Plan. 

The Marshall Plan succeeded because it was 
;onceived and operated on a scale commensu- 
mte with the task. It was an extraordinary 
'eply to an extraordinary challenge. All those 
iwho translated this imaginative concept into 
concrete results can look with satisfaction to- 
light on the feats they achieved and the honor 
I which they have earned. 

Now we face another extraordinary chal- 
lenge — the task of helping the awakening na- 
tions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America catch 
up with the 20th century. Here, once again, a 
halfhearted response will not do — and I take 
heart in the knowledge that many of those who 
helped to win the great victory over "hunger, 
poverty, desperation, and chaos" in Western 
Europe are still fighting a good fight for 

My very best wishes to all of you on tliis 
memorable evening. 

Bataan Day Commemorated 

Department Announcement 

Press release 184 dated April 8 

On the occasion of the 21st anniversary of the 
fall of Bataan, April 9, a joint United States- 
Philippine commemorative ceremony will take 
place at Arlington National Cemetery. At the 
Tomb of the Unknowns, wreaths will be laid by 
the Philippine Ambassador, Amelito K. Mutuc, 

on behalf of the Philippine President, Diosdado 
Macapagal, and by Capt. Tazewell T. Shepard, 
Jr., USN, Naval Aide to the President, repre- 
sentmg the President, in memory of the fallen 
defenders of Bataan and Corregidor. 

Following the ceremony at the Tomb of the 
Unknowns, the Philippine Ambassador and 
representatives of American and Philippine 
veterans organizations will lay wreaths at the 
grave of Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, com- 
mander of all American and Filipino troops in 
the Philippines at the time of Bataan's fall. 

Message From President Kennedy' 

White House press release dated April 8 

Twenty-one years have passed since Filipinos 
and Americans on Bataan struggled to the end 
with magnificent valor against overwhelming 
odds. For the courage of those brave men we 
today express our gratitude. From their heroic 
example the people of the Philippines and the 
United States drew strength to carry on the 
fight through the days that followed. Their 
sacrifice sealed our dedication to our common 
freedoms. Their spirit sustains us still. 

On this day, April 9, the people of the United 
States join the Philippine people in commemo- 
rating the heroes of Bataan and Corregidor. 

Grand Duchess Charlotte and Prince 
Jean of Luxembourg Visit U.S. 

The Department of State announced on April 
11 (press release 189) that arrangements were 
being completed for the state visit of Her Royal 
Higlmess Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxem- 
bourg and His Royal Highness Prince Jean, 
Hereditary Grand Duke, who will visit the 
United States April 29-May 4 at the invitation 
of President Kennedy. Their Royal Highnesses 
will arrive at Washington from Philadelphia 
on April 30 for a 2-day stay. 

^ Taped on Apr. 6 for broadcast by the Voice of 
America to the people of the Philippines. 

APRIL 29, 1903 


The Effect of the Projected European Union on NATO 

iy William, R. Tyler 

Assistant Secretary for European Affairs ' 

I have been asked to speak to you tonight on 
a subject which requires prophecy — always a 
risky device. Before we attempt to foresee 
what the effect of the projected European 
Union will be on NATO, let us examine the 
present situation and its background. 

You are all familiar witli the postwar history 
of our bipartisan support for European efforts 
toward unification. We have been quite prag- 
matic about this. We have adjusted our views 
on several occasions as the Europeans them- 
selves have modified theirs as to what seemed 
the best way to move forward toward their ob- 
jectives. For we have always been clear that 
the inspiration and drive for the creation of a 
new Europe must come fi'om the Europeans 
themselves and have widespread popular Euro- 
pean support if it were ever to succeed. 

I stress this because the popular notion of a 
united Europe clearly centers on the European 
Economic Community, the European Coal and 
Steel Community, and the European Atomic 
Energy Community. Although these institu- 
tions have large political implications, and in- 
deed make many basic political decisions, they 
are generally considered to be economic in 
character. But economic imification can only 
be a partial step toward the creation of a new 
Europe. We have from the beginning accepted 
the obvious fact tliat, to be successful, a united 
Europe would have to be a complete Europe. 
It would have to be united not only in the eco- 
nomic sphere but in the political and military 
spheres as well. 

' Address made before the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science at Philadelphia, Pa., on 
Apr. 5 (press release 177). 

Our support for European unity has always i ' 
taken into accoimt this basic consideration. ' 
Let me recall for you that in the early fifties this 
country gave its encouragement and support to 
the proposed European Defense Community 
and European Political Community. It was 
only after the collapse of the EDC proposal 
in 1954 that steps were taken toward the 
European Economic Community. These were 
essentially an economic approach toward the 
political goal of European unity. 

In recent years the issues of European politi- 
cal and defense cooperation have come to the 
fore again. In the summer of 1961 the Bonn 
Declaration proposed a Union of the European 
Peoples designed to take first steps forward in 
the political and defense fields. Europe has 
since then been in ferment, discussing the prob- 
lems and possibilities of such a step. The one 
thing which stands out in this intra-European 
dialog is that Europe itself is not agreed within 
itself upon how it shall proceed. The philo- 
sophic differences between federalism and con- 
federalism, nationalism and supranationalisni, 
integi-ation and cooperation are well known to 
all of you. They are being debated now, and no 
clear-cut view is likely to emerge in the near 

There is also the question of which countries 
sliall make up this projected European Union, 
and no ready answers are in sight. We are 
keenly aware of these differences, for much 
hangs on the outcome. For over a decade in 
NATO the United States has been in a position 
wliich it does not find congenial. We have a 
massive nuclear deterrent. We possess almost 
60 percent of tlie economic production and re- 




lurces of the NATO alliance; the remainder 

unevenly distributed among a number of 

rger or smaller nations. So, like it or not, the 

?eds and responsibility of leadership have, up 

> now, fallen to the United States. Political 

)nsultation, the problems of reaching accord 

id consensus with all of our partners in 

ATO, is an extremely difficult one. There 

as and is no one spokesman for Europe. 

here are spokesmen for 15 individual countries 

ho represent a significant diversity of opinion. 

I think this is why the European Economic 

ommunity has captured the imagination of so 

lany Americans. As the voice of six countries, 

le institutions of the EEC for the first time af- 

jrded a real possibility that the United States 

)uld negotiate or consult with the representa- 

ve of a single European view. Wliere the 

European Economic Community finds it possi- 

le to speak with a single voice, as in the tariff 

eld, for example, we have already found that 

lany more tilings are possible between us and 

;iat we can and must set our sights higher than 

as ever been possible in the past. 

So, as Europe itself is prepared to speak with 

larity, precision, and authority on a given is- 

ue, the nature of the relationship between us 

aust change. This change need not be adverse ; 

m the contrary, we expect that it will be a con- 

tructive change, that it will enable vis to do 

aore and greater things together not only 

,mong ourselves but in the interests of our com- 

Qon leadership position in the free world. 

itrength of NATO Alliance 

We can also expect, for the same reasons, that 
here will be constructive changes in the rela- 
ionships of the countries of tliis new Europe 
ids-a-vis the other countries in NATO. Tliis 
relationship will be slow to develop, perhaps, 
but it is inevitable that countries with common 
economic policies will have to harmonize their 
political and military policies. In the long run 
tliis circumstance is bound to provide an addi- 
tional unifying factor in NATO. 

I say "additional" because we have many uni- 
fying factors in NATO and we have the machin- 
ery provided for us to develop additional 
unifying factors. I say this with awareness that 
the public press is replete with stories pointing 

out that the alliance is in disarray, that the 
allies cannot agree on basic issues. But we 
have agreed on the basic issues. Not only have 
we agreed on them, but we are convinced that 
these basic issues are right and are important. 
"VVliat we have not always agreed on is how we 
should develop the macliineiy to support these 
issues, these aims and ideals. The part of the 
machinery that is constantly being overhauled, 
and rightly so, is the defense side of NATO. 
From the public point of view it is the side of 
NATO wliich receives the greater attention. 
There are many complicated questions involved 
which I will not attempt to go into this eve- 
ning — questions of what type of nuclear force, 
what type of control and what type of com- 
mand, how many fingers on the trigger, and so 
on. They are important questions, and the 
countries of NATO are grappling with these 
questions. How these questions are answered 
will have a gi-eat deal to do with the develop- 
ment of NATO in other fields, will condition 
the attitude of this projected European Union 
within and toward NATO. But these compli- 
cated problems must be, and will be, solved. 
The future of the Atlantic community may well 
be at stake. But the Atlantic community has 
confronted, and surmounted, other problems in 
the past. The Atlantic alliance has demon- 
strated its strength in the past. 

The strength of any alliance rests not on its 
forms, procedures, or structure but on the com- 
mitment, the integrity, and dedication of its 
members and on the ideals and goals of its 

Wliile the goals of NATO are as valid today 
as when the alliance was created, there is noth- 
ing sacrosanct about the way in which the 
alliance is organized. Indeed, the relationship 
between the military and political aspects of 
the alliance has undergone a progressive change 
since the early days. When the North Atlantic 
Treaty was signed just 14 years ago, there was 
no plan to organize an integrated military com- 
mand such as that which we now have, with 
combined headquarters, with common supply 
lines and closely coordinated defense plans. Its 
fmictions were those of a traditional alliance. 
The treaty itself is one of the most succinct and 
straightforward and unhedged of international 

APRIL 29, 1963 


documents. Its 99-word preamble proclaims 
the determination of the member governments 
"to safeguard the freedom, common heritage 
and civilization of their peoples, founded on 
the principles of democracy, individual liberty 
and the rule of law." 

The fimctions of the alliance were to insure 
maximum, pooled strength in the event of war 
and to deter a potential enemy by putting him 
on notice that if he upset the balance he would 
have to face not one enemy but the combined 
strength of all the members of the alliance. 
But at its inception NATO had little that could 
be termed a military strategy. Today it has 
a fully developed strategy. This strategy has 
evolved over the years to meet changing con- 
ditions and varying threats. The relationships 
between and among the partners have changed. 
As European countries have increased in pros- 
perity, in strength, and in confidence, they have 
increased their potential, they have strength- 
ened their role as partners. They are no longer 
dependents of the United States. The alliance 
must reflect this change and meet the interests 
and needs and the ambitions of its members. 
The form the alliance takes should be that 
which provides the best possible way of meet- 
ing these interests, needs, and ambitions. 

Political Consultation Within NATO 

The interests, needs, and ambitions of the 
15 member comitries of NATO are not, of 
course, the same. But if tlie interests, needs, 
and ambitions of the countries of the Euro- 
pean Economic Community are harmonized, 
this can only have the effect of further unifying 
the alliance. This is extremely important from 
another point of view. That is the effect this 
new European Union will have on the nonmili- 
tary aspects of NATO. 

There has been a great deal written about the 
origins of NATO and how these origins have 
supposedly conditioned the development of 
NATO. NATO was organized to meet the 
threat of Soviet encroachment. It was, and 
is, successful in that the Soviets have not ad- 
vanced further on Europe. The implication 
here is that if the threat disappears there is 
no need for NATO. Tliere is the further im- 
plication that the NATO countries hang to- 

gether in the face of this threat and that the 
countries will go their separate ways if the 
threat diminishes or is made to appear to di- 
minish. These things may have been true sev- 
eral years ago. They are not true today. 

NATO no longer has to depend on the immi- 
nence of the Soviet threat to hold together. 
Over the years a climate of confidence has de- 
veloped. This climate of confidence is due in 
great part to the political consultation wliich 
takes place within NATO. I realize that this 
term "political consultation" is a much-abused 
one, but I think that is because it is misunder- 
stood. Many take it to mean that one member 
of NATO should get the concurrence of the 
other 14 countries before embarking on any poli- 
tical or military action affecting one or more of 
the member countries or the interest of those 
coimtries. This, we all realize, is virtually im- 
possible. No parliament or congress would 
ever allow this, in any event. 

There are two types of political consultation 
which take place within NATO. One is the 
more or less formal action of one government in- 
forming its 14 NATO allies that a decision has 
been taken. This is merely a little more than 
an excliange of information. It does have 
some virtue in that the countries — and this is 
true in most cases — have been informed in ad- 
vance. There is also the slight possibility that 
particularly weighty arguments may cause the 
coimtry planning the action to change its course 

The second form of political consultation in- 
volves an intergovernmental exchange of views 
prior to any decision, that is, during the policy- 
making stage. Naturally there are difficulties 
here in that parliaments' rights cannot be en- 
croached upon. But there is more of this type « 
of consultation in NATO today than there has 
been 5 and 10 years ago. This method of politi- 
cal consultation is more likely to open the way 
to truly coordinated policies. The develop- 
ment of a European Union, with its coordi- 
nated policies, can only improve this type of 
consultation. Looked at purely from a mathe- 
matical viewpoint, it automatically reduces the 
number of parties involved — and therefore the 
potential number of points of view — by the 
number of countries in the miion. 



Irowing Consciousness of European Unity 

This political consultation is an important 
iece of machinery which the countries can 
tilize in fields other than military and political, 
'he existing structure of NATO provides the 
ramework "for this. Article 2 of the NATO 
reaty states: 

The Parties will contribute toward the further de- 
elopment of peaceful and friendly international rela- 
ions by strengthening their free institutions, by 
rlngtng about a better understanding of the princl- 
les upon which these institutions are founded, and 
y promoting conditions of stability and well-being, 
'hey will seek to eliminate conflict in their interna- 
ional economic policies and will encourage economic 
oUaboration between any or all of them. 

This article 2 of the charter provides another 
tieans through which ideals and policies can 
)e harmonized. If the member nations of 
,he North Atlantic Treaty Organization pursue 
ommon ideals and follow common policies, the 
levelopment of different concepts of military 
trategy will not occur. There will naturally 
)e problems and difficulties of a teclmical na- 
ure, but they should not present in themselves 
I serious threat to allied unity. 

This unity is not only a goal of United States 
foreign policy but also is an abiding necessity. 

This unity is a goal shared by the peoples of 
Europe — they recognize that it is vital to their 
interests as well as ours, that it is an immutable 
fact of life. 

There is movement, and forward movement, 
toward unity in these important regional orga- 
nizations. There is a growing consciousness of 

This unity can continue to flourish in the 
cooperative ventures of NATO and of the 
European Community. But in order that the 
growth should continue we must have an atmos- 
phere and feeling of security. We are bending 
every effort to strengthen that security. And 
since our security today is so dependent on nu- 
' clear weapons with their astronomical costs, we 
must have nations which are economically 
strong and prosperous. 

This prosperity in turn requires a greater 
degree of coordination of economic policy, a 
policy in which the considerations of security 
and unity will be overriding. Today, in nearly 
all sectors of the economy in Western Europe 

and in North America, business is prospering in 
this climate of security and unity. It will 
prosper further if the climate of security and 
xmity is improved. 

To these three necessary factors — of unity, 
security, and prosperity — we need to add a 
fourth : responsibility. All the member nations 
of the North Atlantic Alliance recognize their 
responsibilities to their own peoples. The con- 
duct of these countries makes this fact self- 
evident. When all of these countries arrive at 
a greater realization that responsibility to their 
own people is closely related to responsibility in 
holding together, and in strengthening, the 
Atlantic community, we will attain progress at 
a greater rate. 

The rate of progress will vary from time to 
time. There was a slowdown when the United 
Kingdom was refused entry into the European 
Community. The word "projected" in the title 
of this address, which title was assigned to me 
by your academy, represented the hope that the 
United Kingdom would be a member soon. Al- 
though we continue to consider that the acces- 
sion of Great Britain to the Treaty of Rome is 
an objective to be encouraged, we recognize that 
this accession may not come about for some time. 
So there is some slowdown in the movement 
toward European imity as a result of the rup- 
ture in January, as the six members of the Com- 
mon Market countries sort out their relationship 
with one another and as the British Government 
determines how best to establish its bona fides as 
a "good European" to the extent required better 
to qualify for entry on the Continent. Further- 
more, this pace of European unity will be af- 
fected by domestic political activities in a num- 
ber of countries. The Fanfani government in 
Italy faces an election test this month, the 
Dutch go to the polls next month, and Germany 
will be absorbed with the question of Chancellor 
Adenauer's succession for many months to come. 
The British also face the prospect of elections 
sometime in 1964. With the intensification of 
domestic political activity in these countries, 
the attention of their leaders is likely to be 
directed more toward national considerations 
than toward broader questions of European 

But with all this, we remain convinced that 
the momentum toward European integration 

APRIL 29, 1963 


will continue to increase. It is therefore im- 
portant that the American public and the Con- 
gress do not become so disenchanted or im- 
patient with recent developments as to diminish 
American support for the European unity 
movement. We should not react impetuously 
by moving toward a political or military "For- 
tress America" position. Recent events have 
slowed, but they have not stopped, the European 
drive toward integration; nor have they 
seriously impaired the degree of integi-ation 
thus far achieved through the EEC. For these 
reasons we intend to reiterate our support for 
European integration so long as the European 
imity movement is neither subverted as an in- 

strument for the hegemony of a single nation 
nor directed at the establishment of an autar- 
chic Europe wliich would work against the 
political and economic interests of the United 
States and other free-world countries. 

If we push forward in this movement, if we 
acliieve a greater harmonization of our policies 
within our regional economic and military or- 
ganizations, if we develop this sense and feeling 
of unity, security, prosperity, and responsibil- 
ity, we will have an advantage that cannot be 
overcome. At some point the Commimists will 
recognize this. This recognition may make 
possible progress toward disarmament, sta- 
bility, and peace. 

Readjusting United States Foreign Trade 

by Leonard Weiss 

Director, Office of International Trade ' 

Last year the Congress passed the most far- 
reaching piece of trade legislation since the 
original enactment of the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act in 1034. It has been considered 
as one of the most important achievements of 
the Kennedy administration to date. 

The original Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act was itself a landmark in the foreign eco- 
nomic policy of the United States. It turned 
the tide of depression-bom protectionism and 
initiated a worldwide movement for the reduc- 
tion of tariffs and other trade barriers. 

This program did noble service for over a 
quarter of a century, but like any program it be- 
gan to peter out and became inadequate to meet 
the new circumstances and challenges which had 
arisen. 'While the basic policy thrust of the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was more 

relevant than ever, the tools it provided were no 
longer sufficient for the task. A new approach 
was required. The Trade Expansion Act " was 
thus enacted to do the job. 

It is my purpose, in accordance with the re- 
quest of your chairman, to indicate the nature 
of the task ahead, the new problems to which 
U.S. trade policy must address itself, and the 
plans for meeting these problems with the help 
of the Trade Expansion Act. 

Fundamentals of U.S. Trade Policy 

Perhaps the best way to begin is to consider 
some fundamentals of U.S. trade policy. 

U.S. trade policy has been based — and still is 
today — on three essential elements : nondiscrim- 
ination, the reduction of tariffs, and the elimi- 
nation of quantitative barriers to trade. The 

' Address made before the Spring Alumni College at 
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pa., 
on Apr. 5 (press release 174 dated Apr. 4). 

' For a summary of the act, see Bulletin of Oct. 29, 
1962, p. 656 ; for an Executive order on the administra- 
tion of the act, see ibid., Feb. 4, 1963, p. 180. 



policy of nondiscrimination — of "most favored 
nation" treatment — has been consistently ap- 
plied in one form or another since the beginnings 
of the Republic. It is a policy that was written 
into the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 
1934 and has been continued in every piece of 
successor legislation since then, including the 
new Trade Expansion Act. 

The reduction of tariffs is, of course, the most 
direct expression of the old trade legislation 
as well as the new. Although the central fea- 
ture of this legislation has been the provision 
of authority to the President to negotiate on a 
reciprocal basis the reduction of tariff barriers 
to trade, it has always been recognized that the 
potential benefits from foreign tariff reductions 
must be protected through commitments assur- 
ing that our exports will be given nondiscrimi- 
natory treatment — that is, most-favored-nation 
treatment — and that they will not unnecessarily 
or unjustifiably be subjected to quantitative im- 
port restrictions. Thus there is a close inter- 
relationship among the three basic elements of 
our trade policy. 

Through the years quantitative restrictions 
have been viewed as the most undesirable of 
possible methods of limiting trade. Wliile re- 
sort to them might sometimes be necessary, they 
have always been considered as exceptional and 
temporary devices to restrain trade. Tariffs 
have been regarded as the preferable technique 
where domestic protection might be needed. 

Behind the three basic elements which I men- 
tioned lay certain political, economic, and phil- 
osophic conceptions. These policies were based 
on the notion of the desirability of maximizing 
the influence of the marketplace, and minimiz- 
ing the intervention of the government, in the 
conduct of international trade. Tliey assumed 
that an international trading system based on 
such principles would reduce international po- 
litical friction, contribute to the more efficient 
use of economic resources, encourage an increase 
in living standards, and in all these ways gen- 
erally promote the interests of a free world 

Although the three fimdamental elements of 
American trade policy have been generally ad- 
hered to through the years, they have been 
occasionally qualified to meet practical realities. 

Quantitative restrictions have been accepted for 
exceptional protective, security, and other pur- 
poses; tariff's have sometimes been raised to 
avoid serious injury to domestic industry; and 
even nondiscrimination — perhaps the most 
sacred of American policies — has on occasion 
been breached. Some of these departures from 
basic policy were of major importance. None- 
theless, the main thrust of American policy con- 
tinues on the basis of the three principles I have 
described, and, indeed, the departures from 
them have provided the flexibility and resilience 
necessary to make the policies work and to ad- 
here to the general direction they prescribe. 

There is no intention to change this general 
direction of U.S. policy. In some respects, for 
example as regards the lowering of tariffs, the 
intention is to intensify efforts along this line. 
Departures may occur, but if they do they 
should be appraised against the overall picture 
so as to avoid undue distortion as to the gen- 
eral direction of American policy. 

Program Under Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 

I should like now to sketch some aspects of 
the development of the trade program imder 
the old reciprocal trade legislation so as to as- 
sess its accomplishments and also its shortcom- 
ings and thus better understand the problems 
now faced by U.S. trade policy and the course 
this policy should take. 

There are five aspects of the old trade pro- 
gram which are particularly relevant : 

1. the authority available for tariff re- 
ductions ; 

2. the policy of avoidance of serious 

3. the selective, item-by-item type of ne- 
gotiation ; 

4. the advance from bilateral to multilat- 
eral tecliniques of negotiation ; and 

5. the internal organization of the U.S. 
Government for the conduct of the trade 

To turn to the first aspect, the original Re- 
ciprocal Trade Agreements Act, enacted on 
June 12, 1934, authorized the President to re- 
duce duties by 50 percent of the existing level. 
These duties were those of the high Smoot- 

APRIL 29, 19G3 


Hawley tariff of 1930. In 1945 the President 
received authority to reduce duties by an ad- 
ditional 50 percent of the level existing as of 
January 1, 1945. In 1955 and 1958 he obtained 
further grants of authority to reduce duties by 
another 15 percent and 20 percent, respectively. 

If the full tariff reduction authority had been 
used on an item (that is, a 50-percent reduction 
of the 1934 rate, another 50-percent reduction 
of the 1945 rate, and further 15- and 20-percent 
reductions under the 1955 and 1958 authorities) , 
the duty would have been reduced in total by 
83 percent by July 1 of this year, when the final 
stage of the reductions made under the 1958 
authority is to come into effect. Thus a duty of 
100 percent in 1934 would go down to 17 per- 
cent on July 1 of this year, and a duty of 50 
percent in 1934 (not much above the average at 
that time) would be brought down to 8i/^ 

The fact is that the decrease in U.S. tariffs 
since 1934 has been almost as dramatic as the 
figures I have just cited would indicate. As 
measured by the ratio of duties collected to the 
overall value of dutiable imports, the average 
U.S. tariff on dutiable goods has dropped from 
46.7 percent in 1934 to 12 percent in 1961. While 
a substantial part of this reduction has been the 
direct result of tariff negotiations conducted 
under the trade agreements authority, not all 
of the decrease is attributable to the program. 
A significant part of the decrease has resulted 
from the effect of price increases through the 
years on the ad valorem incidence of those du- 
ties — of which we have many — that are assessed 
on a specific basis. 

Under the old trade legislation the United 
States concluded tariff-reducing negotiations 
with 54 countries. In the case of 31 countries 
the United States negotiated two or more tariff- 
reducing agreements in the period 1934 to date. 
This is an impressive performance. 

As time went on, however, tariff reductions 
were becoming increasingly difficult to make 
on the basis of existing policies and procedures. 
Earlier reductions were to a considerable extent 
squeezing the water out of the tariff. Protec- 
tive domestic pressures grew. The policies and 
procedures for tariff reductions became, as I 
shall indicate in a moment, increasingly restric- 

tive. As a result, the authority for tariff reduc- 
tion granted in the legislation was not being 
fully used. The United States was having less 
and less to put on the negotiating table, and I 
the trade program began to sputter badly in 
later years. 

This brings us to the second important as-l 
pect of the trade program as it has thus far been 
conducted, namely, the policy of avoidance of ', 
serious injury. From the very beginnings of ( 
the program the policy of the administration, j 
both Democratic and Eepublican, has been toi 
avoid serious injury to domestic industry inj 
making tariff reductions. j 

Over the years this policy became more and I 
more refined and hardened. At first the "no* 
serious injury" policy was reflected simply in 
declarations by the administration of its inten- 
tion to avoid serious injury in making tariff 
reductions. Then, in response to expi-essions 
of concern tliat tariff reductions had already 
gone too far, an Executive order — the foreran- 
ner of the escape clause — was issued to assure 
that tariff reductions in particular cases were 
withdrawn if increased imports were causing 
or threatening injury to the domestic industry 

The critics of the program then argued that 
it was unreasonable to wait until the damage 
was done; instead the damage should be pre- 
vented in the first place. And thus was bom 
the so-called "peril point" provision, under 
which the Tariff Commission was required by 
law to establish the precise point below which 
a tariff reduction would cause serious injury. 
If a duty were reduced below this point, an 
accounting had to be made to the Congress. 
Like the perU point, the escape clause was also 
embodied in the trade agreements legislation 
by the Congress and increasingly restrictive 
standards and procedures for its application 
were developed. 

Tliis process of refining the no-serious-injury 
policy and embedding it into law under stand- 
ards and procedures designed to discourage 
tariff reductions exerted an increasingly debili- 
tating effect on the program. Tariff reductions 
became more and more difficult to make. 

As a consequence, in the last roimd of tariff 
negotiations the executive branch and the Tar- 



iff Commission, in conformity with the legis- 
lative requirements and the policies they 
reflected, so pruned the list of potential U.S. 
tariff concessions that the United States was 
able to put on the bargaining table offers of 
tariff concessions amounting to less than 20 per- 
:;ent of its imports from the comatries with 
which it was negotiating. In the case of some 
countries the United States as a result of this 
process had practically nothing to offer. The 
United States was able to conclude the negotia- 
tions only by making concessions on a substan- 
tial number of items below the rates established 
by the Tariff Commission imder the peril-point 
procedure. The concessions so granted were 
those on which the possibility of serious injury 
was judged to be unlikely or minimal. 

This experience demonstrated the bankruptcy 
3f this approach to the process of tariffmaking. 
It clearly would not be possible to mount an- 
Dther tariff negotiation on the old basis and 
procedures. The Tariff Commission itself has 
been among the first to recognize the impossibil- 
ity of predicting precisely at what point a 
tariff reduction might cause serious injury. 
Furthermore, the concept of avoidance of seri- 
ous injury was being equated with that of avoid- 
ance of any adjustment whatsoever to changed 
competitive conditions, even where such adjust- 
ment might be possible without serious injury. 
Other areas of domestic economic activity were 
not operating on the theory that adjustment was 
bad. To the contrary, the most highly adver- 
tised feature of the American way of life has 
been its dynamic character, its willingness to 
accept and respond to change, its technological 
achievement, and its receptivity to innovation. 

Now I do not mean to imply that the trade 
agreements program should have been operated, 
or should now be operated, without proper 
safeguards for the interests of American pro- 
ducers. The new Trade Expansion Act con- 
tains safeguards to provide necessary protec- 
tion. The difference is that the new safeguards, 
because they offer an incentive to improving 
productive efficiency, as I shall explain, can bet- 
ter advance the national interest at the same 
time that they permit broader use of the tariff 
reduction authority. 

Another characteristic of negotiations under 

the old trade legislation was that they were 
conducted on an item-by-item basis. The 
United States prepared its lists of offers to, and 
requests from, countries on an individual basis. 
It then bargained product by product, in the 
most minute and painstaking detail, with the 
other countries concerned. 

This procedure was most laborious and time- 
consuming. The last round of tariff negotia- 
tions took over 3 years to prepare for and com- 
plete. Other countries found it increasingly 
difficult to do business in this way. Notably the 
European Economic Community (EEC), 
which had the positions of six member countries 
to reconcile, made it clear that the only way in 
which it could practicably negotiate in the fu- 
ture was on some type of linear basis, offering 
a more or less uniform tariff reduction across 
the board and, naturally, expecting a compa- 
rable offer in return. 

Another important aspect of experience imder 
the old legislation was the advance from the 
bilateral to the multilateral technique of nego- 
tiation. The United States originally nego- 
tiated under the Eeciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act with one country at a time. To conserve 
bargaining power in each negotiation it would 
withhold concessions on items where some third 
country might be the principal beneficiary. 

This approach was an extremely slow one 
and prevented the most effective use of avail- 
able bargaining power. It prevented bringing 
to bear in a particular negotiation the benefits 
which the other country concerned might gain 
from concessions that might be granted in a 
subsequent bilateral negotiation with some third 
country. As a result the scope of the possible 
exchange of tariff concessions was reduced im- 
der the bilateral process. 

The United States broke away from this 
approach in 1947 and adopted a multilateral 
technique in the negotiations that led to the 
conclusion of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade ( GATT) . In these negotiations the 
United States bargained simultaneously with 
22 coimtries. Under this technique the United 
States paired off by means of individual nego- 
tiating teams with the other countries with 
which it was negotiating. The other countries 
did the same thing among themselves. In each 

APRIL 29, 1963 


pair of negotiations account was taken of con- 
cessions being considered in other pairs of nego- 
tiations. The concessions concluded in each 
pair of negotiations were in the end put into a 
common pot and extended to all the other coun- 
tries participating in the negotiations. Thus 
each country received concessions on commodi- 
ties not only in which it had a principal supply- 
ing interest but also in which it might have a 
secondary interest. Each country was accord- 
ingly willing to grant more concessions, and 
the total package of concessions was far greater 
than would have been possible in the isolated 
bilateral negotiations of the prewar years. 

Furthermore, the time required to conclude 
such a network of concessions was far less than 
what would have been necessary on the old 
bilateral basis. Thus in the original GATT 
negotiations of 1947 the United States con- 
cluded exchanges of tariff concessions with 22 
other comitries in less than 7 months as com- 
pared with the conclusion of bilateral agree- 
ments with 29 countries over the previous 13 

Before turning to the Trade Expansion Act, 
I should like to mention one further aspect of 
the old legislation, namely, the manner in which 
the U.S. Government organized itself to con- 
duct the trade agi'eements program. The pro- 
gram was run on an interagency basis, largely 
under the leadership of the Department of 
State. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 
required that the President seek the advice of 
the Department of State and of other agencies 
in the conduct of the program. Pursuant to 
this requirement, an interagency Trade Agree- 
ments Committee (TAG) had been established 
by Executive order. The Committee consisted 
of the Department of State, as chairman, and 
of the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, 
Treasury, Defense, Labor, and Interior, and of 
the Tariff Commission. The officials on the 
Committee were at the technical, career level. 
In 1957 the Trade Policy Committee (TPC) 
was established by Executive order. It con- 
sisted of the same agencies, except for the Tariff 
Commission, as were on the TAC. It was 
established, however, at the Cabinet level and 
was designed to provide policy guidance. This 
Committee was chaired by the Secretary of 

As I shall point out later, the Congress did 
not consider these arrangements adequate toil'' 
meet the need. ^^*' 

Trade Expansion Act of 1962 I* 

I have tried to outline some of the majoiH^ 
characteristics of the trade agreements programj^J 
as it had been conducted under legislation prioi|'' 
to the passage of the Trade Expansion Act '" 
Now I should like to examine the Trade Ex'' 
pansion Act in relation to each of these aspects!"" 
As regards the authority for tariff reductions '* 
the Trade Expansion Act made a major, and ii' " 
one respect revolutionary, step forward. Witll^' 
authority under the old act practically ex'?' 
hausted, the new act gave the President verjj ' 
substantial new powers. It authorized him U'^ 
reduce tariffs in trade agreements with any free 
world country by 50 percent of the level exist. ' 
ing July 1, 1962. jj 

Important as this power is, the act grantee * 
the President an additional type of authorit; 
never before extended in the legislation, namely - 
the authority to eliminate a duty completelj ' 
To be sure, this authority was carefully defined 
but it established a significant new principle i- 
the history of the trade program. The Presi ■ 
dent had previously been authorized to impos 
a duty where none had formerly existed, but th 
Trade Expansion Act for the first time permit 
the President to eliminate a duty completelj 

Specifically the act authorizes the Presiden 
to eliminate a duty in any of the following fou 
circumstances : 

1. He could eliminate a duty on an industria 
product in a category where the United State 
and the EEC supplied over 80 percent of free 
world exports. 

2. He could in an agreement with the EE( 
eliminate the duty on an agricultural produc 
where he determined such action would tend t 
assure the maintenance or expansion of V.i 
exports of the like product. 

3. He could eliminate the duty on a tropica 
agricultural or forestry commodity not pro 
duced in significant quantities in the Unite( 
States, provided the EEC took comparabl 
action on an essentially nondiscriminatory basis 

4. He could eliminate the duty on product 
where the rate is 5 percent or less. : 



The first authority, the so-called 80-percent 
C( "dominant supplier" authority, was so writ- 
1 as to be largely contingent on the accession 
L the United Kingdom to the European Eco- 
iimic Community. The collapse of the U.K.- 
iiC negotiations reduced this authority to 
oly a few categories. The other zero author- 
i ?s remain unimpaired. 
In toto, notwithstanding the impairment of 
t9 dominant-supplier authority, the power 
J anted to the President in the new act to re- 
c ce and eliminate duties is most impressive. 
] )r the first time since 1945 the President now 
] s major bargaining authority to use to open 
1 1 markets for American goods and to advance 
« fier American interests, including greater ac- 
( 3s to markets for the less developed countries. 
The Trade Expansion Act makes another 
: itable advance in the handling of the serious- 
jury problem. As I have indicated, under the 
J act the only thing the President could do 
deal with injury to domestic industry from 
iports was to apply new restrictions, raise 
e duty, or impose quotas pursuant to the es- 
pe clause. 

Such action was higUy imsatisfactory. It 
,iled in any fundamental way to deal with 
e problem of the domestic producer, penal- 
ed the American consumer, encouraged a mis- 
>e of domestic resources, generally impeded 
le healthy development of both the domestic 
id international economy, and created inter- 
itional friction. 

The Trade Expansion Act gives the Presi- 
3nt a new tool to deal with such problems — 
•ade adjustment assistance. It provides means 
) enable domestic firms and workers to adjust 
) foreign competition either by becoming more 
ampetitive in the same line of production or 
y moving into other fields of activity. To the 
rms it provides loans or guaranties of loans, 
ax assistance in the form of special carryback 
f operating losses, or teclinical marketing or 
'ther assistance. To the workers it provides 
eadjustment allowances in the form of unem- 
jloyment compensation, retraining of workers 
"or other types of employment, and relocation 
lUowances to assist families in moving to an 
irea where employment may be available. 
This approach to the problem of import com- 

petition is in the best American tradition and 
spirit. Instead of fighting change it accepts 
it and provides means for new advances. It 
deals with competition by meeting it, not run- 
ning away from it. It stimulates technical 
innovation and the development of new skills. 
It makes the most of our resources and provides 
higher returns to the businessman and worker 
alike. It encourages the future dynamic de- 
velopment of our economy. It promotes a 
sounder international trading system and con- 
tributes to healthier international political 

While providing a new facility for dealing 
with import competition, the act still retains 
an escape clause permitting the imposition of 
restrictions to correct problems of serious in- 
jury. The new escape clause, however, is a 
major improvement over the old one by pro- 
viding sounder standards for its application. 
Under the new act escape-clause relief is avail- 
able only when the injury relates to the industry 
as a whole, rather than merely a segment of it 
as imder the old act. Furthermore, before re- 
lief can be granted under the new escape clause, 
there must be increased imports resulting "in 
major part" from tariff concessions, and such 
increased imports must in turn be "the major 
factor" in causing or threatening the serious in- 
jury. Under the old act it was not necessary 
in order to obtain relief to show that the tariff 
concessions were the cause of the increase in 
imports or that the imports were the major 
cause of the injury. 

In line with the more realistic and construc- 
tive approach of the new act, it also eliminates 
the requirement for the Tariff Commission to 
establish peril points, that is, the points below 
which duties allegedly cannot be reduced with- 
out doing serious injury to domestic industry. 
Instead, the act spells out in detail the type of 
information which the Tariff Commission shall 
provide the President in order to inform him 
as to the probable economic effect of tariff con- 
cessions which the United States might offer 
other countries. In making a judgment on 
tariff concessions to offer, the President would 
take into account not only the information 
provided by the Tariff Commission but also 
that available within the executive branch. 

APRIL 29, 1963 


The Trade Expansion Act also envisages an 
advance in the technique for negotiating tariff 
reductions. As I noted earlier, tariff negotia- 
tions under the old legislation proceeded on a 
product-by-product basis involving the most 
protracted and exhausting type of haggling 
conceivable. Progress on this basis was no 
longer feasible. 

In requesting the new authority, tlie admin- 
istration made clear that it intended to apply 
the authority on an across-the-board basis, 
short-circuiting the individual commodity bar- 
gaining. The Congress accepted this idea in 
granting the authority. 

The precise form which the across-the-board 
technique of negotiation will take is yet to be 
worked out. It is clear, however, that it in- 
volves at least two characteristics: one, it in- 
volves the reduction of tariffs on a comprehen- 
sive basis ; two, it involves the adoption of some 
mutually agreed rules pursuant to which tariffs 
can be reduced without individual commodity 
negotiation. Any such scheme would, of 
course, have to permit exceptions as required 
by the Trade Expansion Act or as deemed ap- 
propriate after careful study by the Tariff 
Commission and the executive branch on the 
basis of information provided in public hear- 
ings and otherwise. 

The new act also envisages a continuation 
of one of the best features developed under 
the old legislation, namely, negotiations on a 
multilateral basis. As I have noted, the United 
States made a major advance in 1947 in nego- 
tiating simultaneously with many countries 
rather than with only one country at a time. 
The United States intends to continue to nego- 
tiate on this basis. 

There has been some confusion on this point 
as a result of the special emphasis which the 
United States has given to negotiations with 
the EEC. It is perfectly consistent with this 
emphasis — indeed, essential to success — to nego- 
tiate with other countries at the same time as 
the United States negotiates with the EEC. 
Concessions exchanged between the United 
States and the EEC will be added to the con- 
cessions negotiated by the other participating 
countries; each participating country will get 

the concessions made by any of them. Con- 
sistently with the most- favored-nation require- 
ment written into the Trade Expansion Act, the 
United States will extend to all free-world 
countries the concessions it makes to the EEC 
or any other country and will, in turn, receive 
comparable ti-eatment from other countries. 

Finally, the new act makes some major 
changes in the organization within the U.S. 
Government for carrying on the trade program. 
Most importantly, it establishes a Special Rep- 
resentative for Trade Negotiations. This rep- 
resentative is to be appointed by the President 
with the advice and consent of the Senate and 
will carry ambassadorial rank. He will act 
as the direct representative of the President 
and will be responsible for all negotiations 
under the act. 

The Honorable Christian A. Herter has been 
appointed to this position. As a distinguished 
former Secretary of State, Congressman, and 
Governor of Massachusetts, and as a leader in 
many public enterprises, he comes to this posi- 
tion with unique qualifications, experience, and 
capacities. Mr. William T. Gossett, a former 
vice president of the Ford Motor Comj^any and 
an eminent businessman and lawyer, has been 
appointed as deputy to Mr. Herter with the 
rank of ambassador. These two men can be 
counted on to give effective direction and im- 
petus to the conduct of the program in the best 
interests of the United States. 

The act also provides for an interagency 
committee on the Cabinet level to advise the 
President in the conduct of the program. The 
Committee, called the Trade Expansion Act 
Advisory Committee (TEAAC), is chaired by 
Governor Herter. The other members are the 
Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Inte- 
rior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. 

Under Mr. Herter's direction there are also 
being established three other committees, with 
representation from these same Government 
agencies. There is a Trade Executive Commit- 
tee (TEC), chaired by Mr. Gossett, which is at 
tlie assistant-secretary level. This Committee 
will serve as the operating arm of the program. 
It will have under it a technical-level Trade 
Staff Committee (TSC), chaired by an official 



uGovemor Herter's office and including a rep- 
rientative designated by the Chairman of the 
llriff Ck)mniission. Tlie TSC will, as its name 
i;:plies, do the necessary staff work for the 
|CC. Finally, there will be a Trade Informa- 
n Committee (TIC) to hold public hearings 
III otherwise receive views from interested 
prties as envisaged under the act. Like the 
lade Staff Committee, it will include a Tariff 
(•mraission representative. 
In addition to its participation on these latter 
1 committees, the Tariff Conmiission is given 
riny responsibilities under the act. It will 
I ovide advice to the President with respect to 
i ms put on the public list for consideration for 
J ssible concessions and tariff negotiations. It 
^ 11, as at present, make investigations and ad- 
Me the President with regard to requests for 
<;ape-clause relief. It is also called on to 
J ike investigations and certain determinations 
' th respect to applications by firms and work- 
1 3 for trade adjustment assistance. 
As regards the latter, the Secretary of Com- 
! jrce is given responsibility for administering 
ude adjustment assistance for firms and the 
'.cretary of Labor for workers. The act also 
tablishes an Adjustment Assistance Advisory 
sard ( AAAB) , consisting of the Secretary of 
jmmerce as Chairman and of the Secretaries 
the Treasury, Agriculture, Labor, Interior, 
id Health, Education, and Welfare, the Ad- 
inistrator of the Small Business Administra- 
Dn, and such other officials as the President 
iems appropriate. This Committee is to ad- 
se the President and operating agencies on the 
iministration of the trade adjustment assist- 
ice program. 

In smnmary, the Trade Expansion Act has 
)rrected some major deficiencies in the old 
rogram while retaining its better features. It 
as increased the President's authority to re- 
uce duties and given him new powers to elimi- 
ate them. It has provided additional means 
) deal with problems of import competition, 
t has foreseen new and more effective tech- 
iques of negotiation while continuing the 
aultilateral approach. It has strengthened 
he internal organization for conducting the 
; rade program. All in all, this is a substantial 

Carrying Out the Trade Expansion Act 

The next step obviously is to carry out the 
authority in the act and to negotiate the agree- 
ments it contemplates. The process will be a 
long and difficult one. It will require careful 
preparation at home and internationally. 

What we have to contend with is a very wide 
gamut of trade matters going far beyond tariffs 
alone. The development of the Common 
Market has upset long-established trading pat- 
terns and relationships at the same time as it 
has created new ones. In addition we face 
many problems which would have existed and 
which would have had to be met even if there 
were no Conamon Market. 

Trade in agriculture, for example, has always 
been a most difficult issue in international trad- 
ing relationships. The development of the 
Common Market has dramatized the issue. 
The problem, however, is an old one, and the 
time is overdue for coming to grips with it. 

In dealing with this problem we shall have 
to take a hard look at our own policies and 
practices. We can expect from others no more 
than what we can expect of ourselves. 

There is also the problem of the trade of 
less developed countries. The need of these 
countries to expand their exports and earn the 
foreign exchange to support their development 
is growing more, rather than less, acute. The 
terms of trade of these countries have been in- 
creasingly unfavorable, and the gap between 
their foreign exchange earnings and their im- 
port requirements is continuing to grow. In 
addition to this general problem there are 
special difficulties as a result of the favored 
position which some less developed countries 
have over others in access to the Common 
Market. Ways and means must be foimd to 
meet these various problems. 

There is the whole area of nontariff barriers 
to which we must give attention. The United 
States is concerned about quantitative restric- 
tions against its trade, particularly those 
applied inconsistently with international com- 
mitments. The United States is also concerned 
about other burdensome restrictions against its 
trade. The Trade Expansion Act took specific 
note of unjustifiable restrictions against Ameri- 
can commerce and directed the President to do 

iPRIL 29, 1963 


everything practicable to obtain the easing of 
such restrictions. 

Other countries are similarly concerned about 
U.S. policies and practices. They are fearful 
that the escape clause might be used to nullify 
tariff concessions which they may negotiate 
with the United States. They find that U.S. 
valuation for duty purposes of certain products 
on the basis of American selling price renders 
tariif concessions on such products meaning- 
less and are unwilling to exchange tariff con- 
cessions in this area unless the United States 
takes some steps to deal with this problem. 
They are worried about the operation of U.S. 
antidumping legislation and about increas- 
ingly restrictive application of "Buy Ameri- 
can" laws and practices. They wish matters 
such as these to be considered in the coming 

The United States is now pointing its efforts 
toward a meeting of GATT ministers to convene 
in Geneva next month.^ This meeting will con- 
sider plans for future tariff negotiations, the 
problem of trade in agriculture, and the prob- 
lem of trade of the less developed coimtries. It 
is anticipated that at tliis meeting the ministers 
will decide to hold a tariff conference some time 
in the early part of next year. It is also hojied 
that new initiatives will be provided and de- 
cisions taken to enable concrete progress to be 
made with respect to trade in agriculture and 
the trade of less developed countries. 

Need for General Movement of Liberalization 

A great new enterprise is thus in the making. 
The difficulties which lie ahead should not be 
minimized. The problems which will have to 
be solved are many and complex. They will 
raise difficult economic and political issues for 
the coimtries concerned. The differing views 
of the countries participating in this enterprise 
will have to be reconciled. 

Nothing less than a broad general movement 
of tariff and trade liberalization is required. 
The collapse of the negotiations for the acces- 
sion of the United Kingdom to the European 
Economic Community makes this need even 
more urgent. It is to be expected that the 

trading comitries of the free world, out of self- 
interest if for no other reason, will respond to 
the needs of the situation and reach construc- 
tive solutions to the problems ahead. It is to 
this task that we must now all turn. 

United States Delegations 
to International Conferences 

ECAFE Study of Tokaido Railway 

The Department of State annoimced on April 
5 (press release 175) that Laurence K. Wal- I 
rath, Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commis- 
sion, would be the U.S. i-epresentative and 
chairman of the U.S. delegation ^ at a Study 
Week of Techniques of Construction Used on 
the New Tokaido Railway Line, held at Tokyo 
April 11-18 under the sponsorship of the Gov- 
ernment of Japan and the United Nations Eco- 
nomic Commission for Asia and the Far East. 

Construction began on the new 315-mile high- 
speed railway line between Tokyo and Osaka 
3 years ago and is expected to be completed in 
1 more year. The new line will triple existing 
rail capacity between the two cities. It will 
serve some 40 million people and 70 percent of 
Japan's industry. The line, capable of han- 
dling an initial 90 trains daily each way at an 
average speed of 105 miles an hour, has many 
innovations to help solve transit problems. 

The U.S. delegation will devote special atten- i 
tion to those economic, service, and safety fea- ^ 
tures which could be incorporated into the 
planning of American railroad projects and 
transport regulations. Various Japanese rail- 
road delegations visiting the United States have 
reported a similarity of problems encountered 
in modernizing rail facilities to meet the needs 
of highly industrialized and heavily populated 
urban areas. Of particular interest to the U.S. ■ 
delegation will be the upgrading of railway 
equipment, development of containerization and , 
"piggyback" service, operation of safety ap- il 
paratus such as automatic signal and train con- 
trol equipment, and possible economic impacts 
upon competing types of transport. 

' For an announcement, see ibid., Mar. 18, 1963, p. 418. 

^ For a list of the other members of the U.S. delega- 
tion and U.S. industry representatives participating in 
the study, see Department of State press release 175. 



I.S. and Rumania Exchange Notes 
n Cultural and Other Exchanges 

ress release 16S dated April 1, for release April 2 

William A. Crawford, American Minister at 
kicliarest, and Pompiliu Macovei, Deputy 
linister of Foreign Affairs of the Kumanian 
'eople's Eepublic, representing their govem- 
lents, exchanged diplomatic notes in Buclia- 
est on April 2 which provide a frameworli for 
rranging visits and exclianges between the 
wo countries for the calendar years 1963 and 
964. Similar diplomatic notes ^ were ex- 
hanged on December 9, 1960, in Washington 
>etween representatives of both governments 
or calendar years 1961 and 1962. Letters set- 
ing forth some concrete provisions for visits 
,nd exchanges during calendar year 1963 wei'e 
ixchanged at the same time.^ On the occasion 
>f exchange of the documents, the American 
•epresentative expressed the belief that expand- 
ng cultural relations would facilitate the freer 
low of information between the two countries 
md would contribiite to a truer and better 
mderstanding between the American and 
Rumanian peoples. 

The visits and exchanges provided for in the 
exchange of notes will take place in the fields of 
graduate study, science and industry, perform- 
ing arts, sports, and tourism. The notes also 
provide for cooperation in the fields of motion 
pictures, exhibits, books and publications, 
radio, and television. 


U.S. Note 

Apeh. 2, 1963 

Sib: I have the honor to refer to the recent dis- 
cussions between representatives of the Government 
of the United States of America and the Government 
of the Rumanian People's Republic regarding the pro- 
gram of visits and exchanges in cultural, educational, 
scientific and other fields during the calendar years 
1963 and 1964. 

' For texts, see Buixetin of Dec. 26, 1960, p. 968. 
° Not printed here. 

In this connection, I wish to inform you that the 
Government of the United States approves the follow- 
ing provisions which record the understandings reached 
in the discussions : 

1. Educational Exchanges 

a. Both Parties agree to provide for the exchange 
of post-graduate students for purposes of advanced 
scholarly and scientific study between United States 
and Rumanian universities and other institutions of 
higher learning, including scientific institutes. 

b. Both Parties agree to provide for exchanges be- 
tween United States and Rimiauian universities of 
professors and instructors for lectures, language in- 
struction and study, consultations and seminars. 

2. Scientific, Technical and Industrial Exchanges 

a. Both Parties agree to encourage the development 
of exchanges in the field of science, including such 
exchanges as may be carried out between academies 
of sciences of both countries. To this end, each Party 
agrees to facilitate visits of scientists from the other 
countiy for the purpose of delivering lectures and ad- 
dresses at scientific institutes and institutions of 
higher learning. 

b. Both Parties favor the exchange of delegations 
composed of specialists and technicians who wish to 
study various aspects of technical and industrial ac- 
tivity in the other country. 

e. Each Party, through diplomatic channels or ap- 
propriate authorized organizations, and on a mutual 
basis, shall continue to invite scientists and technicians 
to participate in national scientific meetings, congresses 
and conferences as opportunities may arise. 

3. Exchanges in Performing and Creative Arts 

a. Both Parties agree to encourage and to support 
exchanges in the field of performing arts, including 
artistic, musical and theatrical groups, conductors, 
theatrical supervisory personnel and individual 

(1) Both Parties agree to facilitate the attendance 
of invitees to national musical competitions and other 
similar events with international participation which 
may be organized in each country. 

b. Both Parties agree to encourage and support ex- 
changes in the field of creative arts, including groups 
of writers, composers, artists and others, as well as 
individuals in these categories. 

4. Exchanges in Sports 

a. Each Party agrees to encourage and facilitate 
invitations from its athletic and sports organizations 
in order that athletes from one country can participate 
in athletic and sports exhibitions and contests in the 
other country. 

5. Exchanges of Books and Publications and Coopera- 
tion in the Field of Publishing 

a. Both Parties agree to encourage and to assist in 
the exchanges of books, pamphlets, periodical liter- 
ature, scholarly and scientific studies, microfilms and 

APRIL 29, 1963 


other printed and duplicated materials devoted to edu- 
cational, scientific, technical, cultural and other sub- 
jects between university, public and specialized li- 
braries and other appropriate institutions of both 

(1) Educational materials and publications may 
include university catalogues, textbooks, study pro- 
grams, curricula, syllabi, visual aids and documentary 
materials in various fields of study. 

b. Both Parties agree to use their good offices to 
encourage the sale through commercial channels of 
books and other publications in the Rumanian language 
in the United States and in the English language in the 
Rumanian People's Republic. 

c. Both Parties agree to encourage, subject to the 
consent of the authors or other parties in interest, 
the translation and publication in one country of scien- 
tific and literary works, including anthologies, diction- 
aries and other compilations, as well as scientific 
studies, reports and articles published in the other 

6. Radio and Television Exchanges 

a. Both Parties agree to assist In the exchange of 
radio and television programs between American and 
Rumanian radio and television companies and organi- 
zations. The details of these exchanges will be 
worked out between the representatives of American 
radio and television companies designated by the De- 
partment of State and Rumanian radio and television 
organizations designated by the legal authorities, or 
between the Parties. 

b. Each Party agrees to facilitate appearances, either 
recorded or in person, over radio and television by 
government officials, artists and public figures of the 
other country. 

7. Exhibits 

a. Both Parties agree to provide for showings in 
several cities of exhibits from the other country during 
each of the two years these arrangements are in effect. 

8. Cooperation in the Field of Motion Pictures 

a. Both Parties will encourage the conclusion of 
commercial contracts between American film companies 
approved by the Department of State and Rumanian 
film organizations approved by the legal authorities for 
the purchase and sale of mutually acceptable feature 

b. Both Parties will encourage the exchanges of ap- 
proved documentary and scientific films between cor- 
responding organizations and assist their distribution 
through appropriate distribution channels. 

c. Both Parties will seek to arrange annual special 
showings in their respective capitals and other cities 
of representative films to which film personalities from 
the other country may be invited to attend. 

d. Both Parties agree that all of the films exchanged, 
purchased or sold in accordance with this section will 
be released in dubbed or subtitled versions. The con- 
tents of the films will be preserved and any changes 

must be agreed to by the supplying Party. Prior to its 
distribution, the release version of each film must be 
agreed to by a representative designated by the sup- 
plying Party. 

e. The Parties favor and agree to encourage, under 
appropriate conditions, other means of cooperation In 
this field, such as the joint production of feature^ 
documentary and other films. 

9. Tourism 

a. Both Parties favor the development of tourism 
between the two countries and agree to take measures, 
on the basis of equality of opportunity, to satisfy better 
the requests of tourists to acquaint themselves with 
the way of life, work and culture of the respective* 

Specific details and programs of the above-mentioned! 
visits and exchanges will be agreed upon through 
diplomatic channels or by approved organizations. 
Except where other mutually satisfactory arrange- 
ments have been made, it is agreed that individual 
visitors and delegations will pay their own expenses 
to and in the receiving country. It is understood that 
the arrangements agreed upon do not exclude the 
possibility of additional visits and exchanges which 
may be mutually acceptable to the two Parties or which 
may be undertaken by interested United States and 
Rumanian organizations or private citizens, it being 
understood that arrangements for additional ex- 
changes, as appropriate, will be facilitated by prior 
agreement in diplomatic channels or between approved 
organizations. It is further understood that the com- 
mitments provided for above shall be subject to the 
constitutional requirements and applicable laws and 
regulations of the two countries. 

The Government of the United States of America 
takes note of the approval by the Government of the 
Rumanian People's Republic of these understandings 
as confirmed in your note of today's date. 

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest 

William A. Cbawfobd 

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 

Plenipotentiary of the United 

States of America 

His Excellency 


Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 

Rumanian Note 

April 2, 1963 

Sie: I have the honor to refer to the recent discus- 
sions between representatives of the Government of 
the Rumanian People's Republic and the Government 
of the United States of America regarding the program 
of visits and exchanges in cultural, educational, scien- 
tific and other fields during the calendar years 1963 
and 1964. 



In this connection, I wish to Inform you that the 
overnment of the Rumanian People's Republic ap- 

roves the following provisions which record the under- 

:andings reached in the discussions: 

[Here follow numbered paragraphs 1 through 9, as In the 
.S. note above.] 

Specific details and programs of the above-mentioned 
isits and exchanges will be agreed upon through dip- 
)matic channels or by approved organizations. Ex- 
spt where other mutually satisfactory arrangements 
ave been made, it is agreed that individual visitors 
nd delegations will pay their own expenses to and in 
le receiving country. It is understood that the 
rrangements agreed upon do not exclude the possi- 
ility of additional visits and exchanges which may be 
mtually acceptable to the two Parties or which may 
e undertaken by interested Rumanian and United 
tates organizations or private citizens, it being under- 
tood that arrangements for additional exchanges, as 
ppropriate. will be facilitated by prior agreement In 
Iplomatic channels or between approved organiza- 
ions. It is further understood that the commitments 
rovided for above shall be subject to the constitutional 
equirements and applicable laws and regulations of 
he two countries. 

The Government of the Rumanian People's Republic 
akes note of the approval by the Government of the 
Jnited States of America of these understandings as 
onfirmed in your note of today's date. 

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest 

POMPILia Macovei 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Rumanian People's Republic 

rhe Honorable 
.ViLLiAM A. Crawford, 

Jwvoj/ Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary 
of the United States of America. 

Two New Members Appointed 
to Advisory Committee on Arts 

The Department of State announced on April 
S (press release 185) two new appointments to 
the reconstituted Advisory Committee on the 
Arts, which gives guidance to the Department 
in the conduct of its program of sending cultural 
presentations to foreign countries. 

The new appointees are Lew Christensen, di- 
rector of the San Francisco Ballet, and Nina 

Vance, founder and managing director of the 
Alley Theater in Houston. Appointment of the 
first 4 members of the 10-member committee was 
announced on March 7.^ They are Roy E. Lar- 
sen, chairman, Warner Lawson, Peter Mennin, 
and George Seaton. 

The committee is authorized by the Ful- 
bright-Hays Act (Public Law 87-256). A 
predecessor committee was authorized by earlier 
legislation but was not accorded the broad role 
marked out for this group as a result of the 
recent reorganization of the U.S. cultural pres- 
entations program. This reorganization fol- 
lowed a request in October 1962 by Lucius D. 
Battle, Assistant Secretary for Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, for review of the program and 
recommendations for its future by the U.S. 
Advisory Commission on International Educa- 
tional and Cultural Affairs. This review ^ was 
made by Mr. Larsen, who is vice chairman of 
the Commission, and Glenn G. Wolfe, a Foreign 
Service officer who is at present director of the 
Office of Cultural Presentations. The secre- 
tariat for the Advisory Committee on the Arts 
is headed by Heath Bowman. 

World Food Congress Secretariat 
Opens Office at Wasliington 

The Department of State and the Department 
of Agriculture announced on March 29 (De- 
partment of State press release 165) that S. Y. 
Krishnaswamy, Secretary General of the World 
Food Congress, has established an international 
headquarters secretariat at the Department of 

The World Food Congress, sponsored by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, will be held at Washington 
June 4^18, on invitation of the U.S. Govern- 

' Bulletin of Mar. 25, 1062, p. 448. 

^ For background, see ibid., Jan. 14, 19G3, p. 46. 

APRIL 29, 1963 



The Foreign Aid Program 

Statement iy Secretary Rush ^ 

I appreciate the opportunity to meet once 
again with tlie committee to discuss one of our 
vital contributions to tlie security of tlie free 
world. One year ago I came here to discuss the 
President's proposals for the Foreign Assist- 
ance Act of 1962." Before taking up his pro- 
posals for the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963,^ 
I should like to touch briefly on some of the 
changes and trends in the world situation dur- 
ing the last 12 months. 

A year ago we were deeply concerned with 
crises in Laos, Vietnam, the Congo, Berlin, and 
Cuba. None of these has been finally resolved. 
But agi'eements were finally reached on the 
neutralization of Laos and a new government 
was installed. The situation there remains pre- 
carious: The Viet Minh controlled by Hanoi 
have not been completely withdrawn ; the coali- 
tion remains uneasy. But certainly one element 
which has contributed heavily to the progress 
made in Laos has been the U.S. foreign assist- 
ance program. Without our aid, the supporters 
of Laotian neutrality and freedom would un- 
doubtedly have lost. Our assistance program 
continues to provide a vital economic margin 
to those who would keep Laos independent. 

Next door the Communist guerrilla aggres- 
sion directed from Hanoi against the Republic 
of Vietnam remains dangerous. But it has 
been curbed. Generally, it may be said that the 

^ Made before the House Committee on Foreign Af- 
fairs on Apr. 5. 

= Bui-LETIN of Apr. 23, 1902. p. 659. 
» lUil., Apr. 22, 1963, p. 591. 

threat to Southeast Asia has been brought imderl 
control. Our military and economic assistance' 
progi'ams are crucial in meeting this test of 

In the Congo, much remains to be done tn 
consolidate political unity and to move forward 
socially and economically. But the country i^ 
no longer torn by secessionist movements; and 
the outlook there has measurably improved. 
U.S. assistance during the past year given 
through tlie United Nations has not only given 
the Congo its first real opportmiity for inde 
pendent life, but also has been instrumental in 
preventing a great-power confrontation. 

West Berlin stands free and prosperous ; and 
we think that everyone understands that we and 
our allies will do whatever may be necessai-y to 
keep it that way. 

The Communist thrust into the Western Hem- 
isphere by way of Cuba last autmnn took a new 
and highly dangerous turn ; the events of that 
crisis are now well known. The underlying 
crisis represented by the presence in this hemi- 
sphere of international communism is still witli 
us. But I think it may be said that among the 
results of the crisis of last October tliere has 
been a sharp decline in Castro's prestige botli 
in Cuba and elsewhere in the Western Hemi- 
sphere. The economy of Cuba continues to 

There have been other significant events in 
the past months. 

The Chinese Connnunist incursions into India 
liad iirofound eifects on Indian public opinion 



iLiid noticeable effects on the policies of the In- 
dian Government. Last fall in an hour of crisis, 
tiie Indian Government turned to us and other 
Western countries for emergency assistance. 
We responded promptly with munitions and 
^up]1lies and with air transport to deliver them 

the Northeast Frontier. More recently, at 
he invitation of the Indian Government, we 
oiiicd Great Britain, Canada, and Australia in 
.ondin<r a mission to India to study the prob- 
ems of organizing an effective air defense for 
ndia's major cities in the event of Chinese 
'diiununist air attacks. 

The Communist Chinese invasion highlights 

1 cornerstone of otu- assistance policy : that we 
iiust assist the subcontinent of South Asia in 
ts competition with Commimist China. The 
''ommunist Chinese military attack appears to 
oniirm — in a broad sense — that the Chinese 
re worried by this competition and that our 
ssistance policy combined with the forthright 
ctions of the recipients is meeting with success 
t this contest. 

Iraq has a new and stoutly independent gov- 
rnment. Other coimtries in the Middle East 
nd Africa which seemed to be flirting danger- 
usly with the Soviet bloc have been moving 
Dward a warier independence and better rela- 
ions with the "West. 

Within the Communist world, the dispute be- 
sveen Moscow and Peiping has become increas- 
igly bitter. It has infected the Commimist 
arties in most other countries. 

Trends toward diversity — and fragmenta- 
lon — are evident in the Communist movement 
enerally. Trends toward "destalinization" 
re visible in all the Eastern European Com- 
mnist states except perhaps Albania. Nation- 
lism remains a vigorous force in Eastern Eu- 
ope — a force which we need to take into full 
ccount in our own attitudes and policies. 

Communist China remains in the grip of a 
3vere economic crisis. It suffers from short- 
ges in domestic food production ; its industrial 
evelopment has lagged seriously ; many of its 
actories are idle for lack of raw materials and, 
1 some cases, spare parts. 

The Soviet Union and the bloc states also are 
aving difficulties with food production. Po- 
iind, where most of the farming is done by 

individual peasants on their own land, has had 
greater success. 

The Soviet Union needs heavy investment in 
agriculture — at the very time that its military 
and space programs have become more expen- 
sive. At the same time, the Soviet people con- 
tinue to press for better living standards; 
therefore the Soviet authorities face serious 
dilemmas in allocating their resources. 

Failures in production, especially food pro- 
duction, have cost the Communist world 
considerable prestige, esjDecially among the 
underdeveloped areas and especially in contrast 
with our own agricultural abundance. 

We had some disappointments during the 
year — the failure of Great Britain to gain ad- 
mission to the Common Mai'ket, for example. 

But all in all, I think it may be said that the 
free world has fared better than the Communist 
world during the last 12 months. This gives 
us no cause for complacency. The Soviet 
Union controls enormous resources. Our Com- 
munist adversaries remain dedicated to the 
commmiization of the world. Despite their 
differences, Moscow and Peiping remain allies. 
There is not necessarily any comfort for us in 
competition between two centers of Conmiunist 
power, each trying to prove that its method of 
"burying" us is the more efficacious. 

We cannot afford to let down. 

Foreign Aid, a Defense of Freedom 

But the record gives us groimd for quiet 
confidence that we are on the right track, that 
we have a sound strategy, and in the main are 
doing the right things to protect the security 
and increase the free world's strength — eco- 
nomically, socially, and politically, as well as 
militarily. In this great and complicated task, 
foreign aid plays diverse and indispensable 
roles. Nearly all of the visible improvements 
in the joosition and conditions of the free world 
during the past year have been due in part to 
our foreign assistance programs. 

As the members of this committee know 
well — because this committee has helped im- 
measurably to shape our aid policy — our foreign 
assistance over the years has taken many forms 
and served a variety of specific purposes. 

In the wake of the Second World War, most 

PRIL 29, 1963 


of it went into relief, rehabilitation, and repair 
of war damage. 

We extended aid to Greece and Turkey 
to stop the Stalinist drive toward the 

In the Marshall Plan we concentrated on 
assisting free Europe to recover economic and 
political health. 

For many years, military assistance has been 
a significant part of our program. 

But in recent years we have given increasing 
attention to helping the peoples of the imder- 
developed areas to move forward economically, 
socially, and politically. The wellspring of 
these development programs was the fourth 
point of President Truman's inaugural address 
in 1949,* when he announced "... a bold new 
program for making the benefits of our scien- 
tific advances and industrial progress available 
for the improvement and growth of underde- 
veloped areas." 

Many forget that the Point 4 concept was 
announced during the dark days of the Berlin 
blockade and Communist Chinese expansion on 
the Asian mainland — when aggressive bloc 
threats were directly confronting us. Then, as 
now, the relationship between economic and 
political progress and the security of the United 
States was apparent. Then, as now, it was 
clear that our aid program must provide hope 
for progress through freedom as a vital instru- 
ment of our foreign policy. 

As each new or newly awakened independent 
nation emerges into the modem world — as it 
moves forward economically and socially and 
achieves political stability— it adds to the 
strength of the community of free nations. 
The less developed nations' great thirst for 
progress provides the developed nations with a 
most demanding challenge. It provides, as 
well, the most useful focus for the restless en- 
ergies of new or reborn nations. While the 
development process is neither easily under- 
stood nor easily undertaken, it serves as a nat- 
ural scope of activity for the underprivileged 
who are concerned with improving their lot and 
eager to make their mark upon the world. 

It is in the U.S. interest, and in its proud 
humanitarian tradition, to foster the modern- 

ization process. Not to do so would simply as- 
sure that the growth of the less developed coun- 
tries will be patterned by others. 

Here lies the surest defense of freedom. 
For — let us be quite clear — the Communists 
believe the safest method of expansion open to 
them is to exploit the inevitable confusion and 
turbulence of the underdeveloped areas as they 
reach out to modernize their societies. Every- 
where they seek to take over from within as 
they did in Cuba. This is a method we must 
head off ; and foreign aid is one of our instru- 
ments for heading it off and preserving the 
independence of nations. 

The economic aid provided by the United 
States and its allies should make it possible 
to prevent conditions of stagnation and hope- 
less poverty from leading to political unrest 
and the growth of communism. It is easier 
and cheaper in the long run to prevent the 
conditions that may lead to communism than 
to reverse the system once it has become estab- 
lished. It should not be necessary to have an- 
other Cuba in Latin America or Africa to drive 
home the "ounce of prevention" lesson. 

There are additional reasons for extending 
assistance. I have noted that the Clay commit- 
tee, which studied foreign assistance in the con- 
text of national and free-world security, stated 
that the need for development assistance would 
continue "even if the cold war and all our out- 
standing political differences with the Com- 
munists were to be resolved tomorrow." ^ For 
it is, said the committee, "part of the American 
tradition to be concerned with the plight of 
those less fortunate than ourselves." And it 
is the hope of the American people to see "a 
world which is prosperous and at peace." 

Basic Guidelines for 1964 

The President has requested appropriation 
of $4,525 million to carry out our programs of 
economic and military assistance in fiscal year 

' Ihid., Jan. 30, 1949, p. 123. 

' Copies of the report The Scope and Distribution of 
Vnited States Military and Economic Assistance Pro- 
grams: Report to the President of the Vnited States 
from The Committee to Strengthen the Sccuritj/ of the 
Free World, March 20, 1963, are available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (price 15 cents). 



This request, which is some $400 million less 
han the budget estimates published in January, 
■eflects : 

— the review of our assistance programs con- 
ilucted by Mr. [David E.] Bell, new Adminis- 
rator of the Agency for International Develop- 
ment, who will be before the committee early 
ext week; 

— reconunendations of the Committee To 
■trengthen the Security of the Free World, 
haired by General [Lucius D.] Clay, who, I 
nderstand, also will be before the committee ; 

— savings resulting from withholding of 
mds programed for use in fiscal year 1963, 
at not committed to some nations because of 
ladequate performance of self-help efforts. 

Of the total request for $4.5 billion, $1,405 
illion is for the military assistance program — 
iO million more than appropriated for fiscal 
!ar 1963. $3,120 million is requested for eco- 
)mic assistance. New requirements necessi- 
te a request $500 million greater than the fiscal 
•ar 1963 appropriation. It will be of interest 
you to note that loans comprise almost 60 
trcent of the amount requested for economic 

I have included in an annex a somewhat more 
tailed discussion of the fiscal year 1964 appro- 
iation request. 

The basic goal of our foreign assistance pro- 
i am may be simply stated : To help other coun- 
1 es to maintain their independence and become 
I i-supporting. Independence and self-sus- 
itning growth are interlocking objectives, 
lime countries we have aided have already 
itiieved them. Others in many parts of the 
' )rld are now approaching them. In Western 
-irope and Japan our postwar aid provided 
1 3 margin by which these coimtries were able 
1 reach, in a relatively short period, self-sus- 
t ning growth and political independence, 
(•eece, Lebanon, Israel, Thailand, Taiwan, 
()lombia, and the Philippines, as well as other 
CLmtries, are nearing the point of self-sustain- 
i? growth. Others, we trust, will join this 
/ owing list in the nest few years. 
In the present world, independence and politi- 
( [ stability go hand in hand with reasonable 
< )nomic progress. A sound, growing economy 

provides the forward momentum and hope 
which will lessen the temptations of "quick" 
routes to progress through totalitarian-com- 
munism. Our foreign aid program has an es- 
sential role in providing development hope as 
well as capital and advice. 

From experience we have developed some 
basic guidelines for development assistance: 

Self-help is the most important single factor 
in the development process. At best, this coun- 
try can provide only a small margin of the 
capital and skills necessary to launch sound 
development. If countries are to progress — 
economically, politically, and socially — there 
must be a real commitment by the people them- 
selves to the development struggle — the difficult 
struggle against poverty, disease, inertia, illiter- 
acy, and despair. United States assistance can 
play a crucial role in the development process 
only when nations take the difficult and some- 
times politically risky reforms and fiscal and so- 
cial measures necessary for development. Self- 
help by aid recipients is equally important from 
the standpoint of the United States, because an 
imending foreign assistance program would 
mean an unending burden on our taxpayers. 
Our objective — as well as the objective of the 
aid-receiving nations — must be self-sustaining 

Selectivity, therefore, must also be a key. 
We must select those countries willing to make 
a major self-help effort. We must focus upon 
those coimtries in which our assistance will pro- 
vide the necessary margin for growth. We 
must give sufficient assistance to those selected 
countries to enable them to make headway 
toward that self-sustaining growth. It is less 
expensive for us in the long rim to provide 
enough nourishment to produce growth than 
only enough to maintain life. 

But we also must be selective from our point 
of view. Eighty percent of all economic assist- 
ance funds are concentrated in 20 countries. 
Our military assistance programs are con- 
centrated even more heavily. 

On the other hand, in almost one-half of the 
countries aided, technical assistance is perhaps 
the most important. In these countries, par- 
ticularly in Africa, there is no U.S. aid except 
for technical assistance. In such cases, our ad- 

RIL 29, 1963 


visers are carefully selected to help the country 
address one or more critical development 

Approximately 18 percent of the grant f mids 
proposed for both the development grant and 
Alliance for Progress sections of the act in fiscal 
year 1964 are earmarked for 19 comitries where 
there are no other U.S. aid activities and 16 
countries where possible development loan ac- 
tivity would not exceed $4 million. In many 
of these countries, U.S. aid missions are not re- 
quired; our teclmical assistance programs and 
personnel are supervised by one or two people 
assigned to the embassy. 

Contributions from others is another impor- 
tant criterion followed by AID in determining 
allocation of funds to individual countries. The 
United States is continuing efforts to assure in- 
creasing participation by other free nations in 
jDroviding both bilateral and multilateral as- 
sistance. Many of the countries of Western 
Europe — originally recipients of foreign aid — 
are now donors. Other free-world assistance 
to underdeveloped countries doubled between 
1956 to 1961, and the United States hopes that 
these nations will bear an increasing burden in 
the years ahead. It is important also that other 
free nations liberalize the terms of their assist- 

Improving Standards of Performance 

It is obvious that it has not always been pos- 
sible to manage our assistance programs on 
bankers' principles, although it is in this direc- 
tion we are moving. 

We have had to assist countries engaged in 
open war, such as Korea. The Republic of 
Korea had made economic progress by mid-1950 
when the Communists launched their aggres- 
sion. That war gave us a big task in relief and 

We have had to operate in countries in the 
grip of Communist guerrilla aggressions. That 
was the situation in Greece in 1947, and Laos 
and South Vietnam after the truce in the Indo- 
chinese War. It is the situation in South Viet- 
nam today. It is quite likely that the remark- 
able progress made by that country, with our 
aid, between 1955 and 1959 was an important 
factor in the decision of the North Vietnamese 

Comnumists to renew and expand their guer 
rilla activities. 

We have had to aid countries with govern 
ments which were not very efficient and not al 
of whose officials have been completely honest 
We do what we can to improve efficiency, elim 
inate corruption, and promote desirable re 
forms. But we have, and want, no satellites o 
colonies. We have to use our influence, no 
instruments of control. 

We have had to carry out our assistance pro 
grams in most countries where the cadres o 
trained administrators and teclinicians are ver 
thin indeed. In fact, by definition, a less de 
veloped country lacks enough skilled people t< 
administer its own affairs with maximun 

It is mirealistic to expect of every country a 
this time, especially when the enemies of free 
dom are ceaselessly at work to undermine prog 
ress, the standard of performance we expect i 
the United States or Western Europe. A con 
siderable j)art of our foreign assistance effort i 
directed toward providing the technical assist 
ance necessary to help establish trained, efS 
cient administrators. But the development o 
modern standards of public administratio 
takes time. 

In conflict, there is always waste. In wai 
the waste is terrific. But no sensible man cor 
demns a commander for shooting too man 
shells, provided he accomplishes his missioi 
As long as the cold war continues, we shoul 
not measure the value of our aid expenditure 
solely by the tests of bankers' loans — althougl 
Mr. Chairman, this is the direction in which w 
aim to move, and have already moved sul 

We have been trying, and will continue to trj 
to make our aid programs as efficient and effec 
tive as possible. 

During the past year and a half, AID has 
I believe, made important improvements in oi 
ganization and personnel. I am sure there wil 
be further improvements. 

I may say I have great confidence in Davii 

The special challenge and the special oppoi 
tunity of Latin America demand the continue! 
attention of all Americans. As you gentlemei 



CHOW well, the Alliance for Progress, to which 
\e are committed with other free American 
lations, is a 10-year program of economic and 
ocial progress. It is not yet 2 years old and, 
s the President stated, much of this early 
)hase has been devoted to organizing, planning, 
nd initiating. 

I shall not repeat the President's progi-ess re- 
lort on the Alliance for Progress. But I would 
ike to set forth briefly a few general observa- 
ions growing out of the events of the past year : 

1. The difficulties in regard to Cuba are a 
ontinual reminder that prevention is easier 
!i:ui cure — that, having failed in years past 
1 take the steps which might have prevented 
lie establislunent of a Marxist-Leninist regime 
1 Cuba, we had better try hard to prevent such 
evelopments in the future. 

Throughout the hemisphere I have seen evi- 
ence that this lesson of the Cuban experience 
; ever more widely appreciated. 

•2. In the last 6 months, Castro's stature in 
18 hemisphere has shrunk further. The demo- 
L-atic left has shifted rapidly away from him. 
n country after coimtry the I'esistance tends 
) be concentrated in a hard-core Communist 

3. Although in most countries the liberal dem- 
sratic elements have tended to be the most 
iithusiastic suppoi'ters of the Alliance for 
'rogress, moderates and conservatives through- 
Lit the hemisphere have been manifesting an 
icreasingly active interest. In many countries 
le alliance now has broad political support. 

4. Finally, I would recall that in the show- 
own last October, the hemisphere stood united. 
n the hour of crisis, evei-y member of the Or- 
anization of American States supported what 
ad to be done. 

So, despite all the difficulties, I feel encour- 
ged about the future of the Alliance for Prog- 
ess and hemispheric cooperation in general. 

he U.S. Role in Economic Development 

In the complex business of fostering eco- 
omic development, the United States has, I 
elieve, some special assets. 

(A) We have unparalleled educational.facil- 
;ies, especially in the fields which are essential 
economic and social development. I think 

of our facilities for training in public healtli 
and medicine. I think of that remarkable in- 
strument, the system of land-gi-ant colleges, 
which originated a century ago last year. 
Through their farm research and extension edu- 
cation, the land-grant institutions have literally 
wrought an agricultural miracle. A century 
ago one farm worker could produce enough food 
for only four or five other people, and approxi- 
mately 55 percent of our population was en- 
gaged in farming. Today each farm worker 
produces enough food for 27 people ; and only 
8 percent of our workers are engaged in farm- 
ing. Both the land-grant system and the peace- 
ful revolution in which it played a central role 
contain lessons which are widely applicable in 
other parts of the world. 

And some of our special problems such as 
the soil conservation and water development of 
our Western States are similar to those of sev- 
eral other comitries. 

(B) We also know, Mr. Chairman, from ex- 
perience in our own country how to achieve 
rapid economic development. I emphasize the 
word rapid. The rural Georgia I knew when 
I was growing up was, in our modem tech- 
nology, miderdevelojDed : It enjoyed few of the 
benefits of modem scieftce, technology, medi- 
cine, public health, or education. 

Forty years ago, hookworm and malaria were 
still among oui" serious problems in the South. 
Forty years ago»©nly two American farms in a 
hundred had electricity. Now 98 percent have 
it — and not just for electric lights but for all 
sorts of services to the farmer and his wife and 

Three decades ago, just^before the Teraiessee 
Valley Authority was created, the average per 
capita income in that area was only $168, which 
was less than half the national average even at 
that low point in the great depression. Now 
the average per capita income in the Tennessee 
Valley is about $1,500, approximately two- 
thirds of the national average. And it is still 

Anyone who examines objectively the devel- 
opment of our recently underdeveloped areas in 
our owii country, and compares it with what has 
happened in the Communist nations, must con- 
clude, I believe, that it is we who have demon- 

PRIL 29, 1963 


strated the capacity for rapid development, we 
who know the shortcut to the future. And we 
have done it without the brutality, without the 
degradation of the individual human being, 
which are characteristic to the Communist 

(C) We have the facilities — and perhaps a 
special talent — for spreading new knowledge 
and applying it in practical ways. The high 
quality of our technology is generally recog- 
nized. At one point or another, other free 
nations may equal or surpass it. And we con- 
cede the quality of Soviet technology in a few 
areas. Across the board our teclinological 
eminence is well established. And we are 
known as a people who like to do things with 
their hands, to tinker, to invent new methods 
of doing things. 

(D) "We have unrivaled experience in operat- 
ing a wide range of foreign aid i^rograms. "We 
have made mistakes. And we have learned 
from others in the field as well as from our own 
experience. Before we started there was not 
much precedent to guide us. "We have been the 
chief inventors, the leading developers, of these 
life-preserving and bodybuilding transfusions 
of economic, military, and technical strength. 

(E) Over the last 15 years, we have built up 
a corps of public servants who know at first 
hand and increasingly understand the problems 
of the less developed nations. TJntil tliey 
achieved independence, our contacts with many 
of the peoples of Asia and Africa were very 
limited. American experts on some of the new 
countries did not exist. But with the passage of 
time, with experience, with the weeding out of 
unsuitable personnel, and with the training of 
others, we have developed public servants — 
diplomats, military men, information spe- 
cialists, educators, agricultural specialists, and 
others — who know much about the various 
people of free Asia. "We are moving toward 
the same end in Africa. And we are working 
at developing public servants with wider and 
deeper understanding of the countries of the 
"Western Hemisphere. 

In learning more about other people and giv- 
ing them a helping hand, we have a fine new 
instrument in the Peace Corps. I hope that 
some of the younger graduates of the Peace 

Corps will wish to make a career in our foreign 

(F) We have important assets in the wid 
range of American associates with other peopl 
through voluntary, nongovernmental organize 
tions. These range from our Councils o 
Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy Associa 
tions, through scores of organizations t 
promote better relations with particular coun 
tries or areas, to our civic clubs, which hav 
spread to other lands. They include th 
wide-ranging overseas programs of our privat 
philanthropic foundations, our churches, an< 
other groups. They include the persona 
friendships with people in other lands formei 
by Americans who have gone abroad as teacher? 
or students, or as businessmen, or in othe 
capacities, including just as tourists. 

(G) Perhaps even more important are tb 
scores of thousands of persons from the less de 
veloped countries who have come to the Unitec 
States for education or special training o 
perhaps just to learn more about us; and manj 
more thousands who have studied under Amer 
ican teachers in universities, vocational schools 
and other training centers in their own coun 
tries. Not everyone reacts favorably to sue! 
exposures to us. But experience indicates tha 
an overwhelming majority of the persons fron 
the less developed countries who have studiec 
or visited in the United States or studied ex 
tensively under American teachers abroad take 
away a predominantly favorable impression. 

(H) Probably the most valuable asset wf 
have is confidence in our intentions. Despite 
Communist propaganda, despite the criticisms 
to which we are often subjected, and despite oc- 
casional differences and misunderstandings be- 
tween certain other free nations and ourselves, 
most of the leaders and peoples of the less de- 
veloped nations realize that our real purpose 
is what we say it is — to help these nations main- 
tain their independence and improve the lot 
of their peoples. 

This confidence in the purpose of our aid 
is interlocked with a broad confidence in our 
deepest commitments as a nation. I strongly 
disagree with those who assert that we are 
widely distrusted or hated. My experience both 
as a private citizen and as a public official leads 
me to think otherwise. Men and women 



throughout the free world — and behind the Iron 
and Bamboo Curtains — know something about 
our national history. They can quote the great 
sentences of our Declaration of Independence, 
ithe great ideas of our Founding Fathers, of Lin- 
coln, of Woodrow "Wilson, and our recent states- 
men. They know that we have fought for free- 
dom in the past and that we are dedicated to 
defending and spreading it today. Tliey want 
for themselves basically what we want and, 
in large part, have achieved for ourselves — 
not only material well-being but freedom, and 
the dignity of the individual. These ideas and 
ideals of human freedom have brought us allies, 
avowed and unavowed, throughout the world. 
The price for freedom has never been cheap. 
Building and expanding and defending free- 
dom have always required struggle, courage, 
tenacity. Often they have cost heavily in treas- 
ure — and blood. I would prefer to see freedom 
defended and built without the bloodshed if 
possible. And the dollar cost of defending 
and strengthening freedom through foreign aid 
is a small fraction of what we have to spend on 
military defense — and an infinitesimal fraction 
of the cost of a third world war. 

The free world is gaining in strength, both 
absolutely and in comparison with the Com- 
munist world. But this worldwide struggle 
between freedom and coercion is far from fin- 
ished. Our adversaries remain powerful and 
determined. They are detennined to "bury" 
us. We must carry on until freedom prevails. 
Victoi-y in this fateful contest will not go to 
the complainers, the faint of heart, and weak of 
back. We cannot win by yielding the field to 
the enemy. Retreat is the sure and quick road 
to defeat. 

There is nothing that the Communists want 
more than to see the "Yanks go home" — not only 
from Western Europe, but from the Mediter- 
ranean, South Asia, the Far East, Latin Amer- 
ica, Africa, everywhere. If we Yanks come 
home, the Communists will begin to take over. 
"Wliy any American would want to cooperate 
with that global Communist strategy is beyond 
my understanding. But that is what sharp cuts 
in our foreign aid programs would mean. 

Those who favor gutting these powerful and 
effective instruments at this juncture of his- 

tory must assume an awful responsibility. 
Their defeatist prescription should be opposed 
resolutely by all who want to push until we 
have achieved a world in which our freedom — 
and the freedom of all men — is secure. 


Fiscal Yeab 1964 Foreign Assistance Peogbam 

The President has requested appropriation of $4,525 
million to carry out our programs of economic and 
military assistance in fiscal year 1964. 

The $4,525 million requested is some $400 million 
less than the budget estimate published in January 
of this year. Downward adjustments have been made 
in the proposed fiscal year 1964 programs as a result 
of the reassessment of the program by the aid agency 
under the new Administrator and the Clay committee's 
general recommendations. Moreover, funds were re- 
ceived from prior year programs and fiscal year 1963 
funds were withheld because some nations' perform- 
ance did not fully meet our expectations and criteria. 

For the various funding categories of economic as- 
sistance, the executive branch has requested a total 
appropriation of $3,120 million. Almost 60 percent 
of this amount is planned in loans both under the 
Alliance for Progress and development loan funding 

Development Loans. $1,060 million has been re- 
quested for development loans outside Latin America. 
Development loans have become the central tool of 
U.S. development asisistance efforts. More than half 
of these funds are allocated for use in the Near East 
and South Asia in fiscal year 1964. The great pro- 
portion of this amount would help to meet require- 
ments in India and Pakistan. The appropriation re- 
quested will enable us to meet existing commitments 
to such nations as Nigeria and Tunisia, and to assist 
in the serious development efforts of other friendly 

Actual commitment of loan funds will depend on 
performance. Requirements for sound proposals and 
for broader measures of self-help must be met before 
loan transactions proceed. AID has withheld sub- 
stantial loan funds this fiscal year because these re- 
quirements were not fulfilled. If performance should 
not meet conservative expectations for fiscal year 1964, 
loan funds would be similarly withheld. 

Development Grants and Technical Cooperation. 
$257 million in appropriations is requested for fiscal 
year 1964 for development grants and technical coop- 
eration outside Latin America. These programs com- 
prise the Point 4 element of today's foreign assistance 
effort, and are the principal source of direct contact 
with the people of the emerging nations. Basically, 
development grants finance efforts to provide needed 
technical assistance to development in developing 

APRIL 29, 1963 


Techuical assistance, either used by Itself, or in care- 
ful coordination witli development loans, can provide a 
greater ultimate return, dollar for dollar, than any 
other element of the foreign aid program. 

The Agency for International Development is mak- 
ing increasing use of the resources of other Govern- 
ment agencies, and of America's universities, in pro- 
viding the high-quality talents needed for successful 
performance of these programs. 

The Alliance for Progress. $850 million is requested 
for the Alliance for Progress in fiscal year 196-1 : 

,f 550 million in AID-admini.stered development loans ; 

$100 million in AID-administered development 
grants ; 

$200 million for the Inter-American Program for 
Social Progress. 

AID-administered loans will help support the in- 
creasing momentum of the Alliance for Progress. As 
Latin American nations take more and more of the 
hard decisions called for by the Charter of Punta del 
Este,* the United States will stand ready to provide 
the critical margin of capital. 

Alliance for Progress gi'ants will be used particu- 
larly to strengthen educational institutions, rural co- 
operatives, and other local organizations as well as 
to help governments develop the sound administra- 
tive practices and reforms necessary for progress. 

Almost .'};200 million is requested for the Social Prog- 
ress Trust Fund of the Inter- American Program for 
Social Progress. These funds permit social advance 
to move forward with economic development through- 
out Latin America. The Social Progress Trust Fund's 
sound programs of land settlement, housing, sanitation, 
water supply, and higher education provide meaningful 
impact at the "grass roots" level. This year's re- 
quested appropriation would permit the Trust Fund 
to operate at the levels of the last 2 years. Almost $5 
million will be contributed for the grant program of 
the Organization of American States. 

Supporting Assistance. $435 million has been re- 
quested for supporting assistance in fiscal year 1964. 
This increase over budget estimates and over last year's 
appropriation reflects the shift of funding for the 
major part of assistance to the Congo under supporting 
assistance instead of through contributions to inter- 
national organizations. 

The major use for supporting assistance is to 
strengthen the economic position of countries mount- 
ing major defense efforts along the periphery of the 
Sino-Soviet bloc. Other supporting assistance pro- 
grams maintain economic stability in situations of 
importance to the United States, provide alternatives 
to excessive dependence on bloc aid, and permit access 
to important U.S. military bases or facilities. 

The Contingency/ Fund. $300 million is requested 
for the contingency fund in fiscal year 1964, to provide 
the U.S. with the flexibility to meet quickly certain 
unanticipated or unascertained political and security 

needs. It is hoped that substantially less than thi 
$300 million appropriation request for this fiscal yeai 
will be needed. It is anticipated that the present com 
tingency fund of $250 million will not be fully used 
but STifiicient funds must be available for the forth 
coming year to meet unanticipated emergencies oi 
only dimly foreseen situations. This year's evidenct 
of responsible use of the contingency fund is t 
strong argument for providing the funds necessary foi 

Voluntary Contributions to International Organizm 
tions. $136 million is requested for funding U.S. volum 
tary contributions to eight international programs) 
Shifting of much of the assistance program for thi 
Congo to supiwrting assistance has lowered this ren 
quest considerably below the level indicated in the 
President's budget. 

Other Requests. .$20 million is requested for an 
expanded program for American-sponsored schools and 
hospitals abroad, as well as .$2 million in local currency! 
for a children's hospital in Poland being constructed) 
under private American auspices. Finally, $60 mil- 
lion is requested for administration expenses. 

Military Assistance is the other major arm of U.S.i 
foreign assistance efforts. This program, which is lesst 
than 3 percent of the amount required to support ourT 
own Military Establishment, plays a key role in pro- 1 
tecting the security of the entire free world. The ' 
President has requested appropriation of $1,405 mil- 
lion for military assistance in fiscal year 1964. 

More than three-fourths of this military assistance 
goes to maintain the defensive capabilities and internal 
security of free nations along the Sino-Soviet periphery. 
Other uses of military 'assistance include smaller in- 
ternal security and civic action programs in Africa 
and Latin America, and to meet existing NATO com- 
mitments in Europe. 

Other. Apart from assistance requested for the 
children's hospital in Poland, no funds are being re- 
quested under this act for Poland or Yugoslavia. 
Normal trade, together with the careful use of P.L. 
480, therefore assumes major importance in support 
of our policy toward these countries. For this rea- 
son, it is requested that discretionary authority be re- 
stored to the President to continue equal tariff treat- 
ment to Poland and Yugoslavia. 


'For text, see BrLLETiN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463. 


Benjamin H. Read as Deputy Executive Secretary of 
the Department, effective April 7. (For biographic 
details, see Department of State press release 190 dated 
April 11.) 




/Urrent Actions 



onstitution of the World Health Organization. 
Opened for signature at New York July 22, l&i6. 
Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808. 
Acceptance deposited: Jamaica, March 21, 1963. 

lafety at Sea 

iternational convention for the safety of life at sea, 
1960. Done at London June 17, I960.' 
Acceptance deposited: Greece, February 13, 1963. 


eclaration on provisional accession of the Svriss Con- 
federation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. Entered 
into force January 1, 1960; for the United States 
April 29, 1960. TIAS 4461. 
Acceptance deposited: Italy, February 22, 1963. 
roc^s-verbal extending and amending declaration of 
November 22, 1958 (TIAS 4461), on provisional ac- 
ces.sion of the Swiss Confederation to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
December 8, 1961. Entered into force December 31, 
1961 ; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 

Acceptance deposited,: Italy, February 22, 1963. 
rotocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
embodying results of the 1960-61 tariff conference. 
Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. Entered into force 
for the United States December 31, 1962. TIAS 5253. 
!ii(r)uitiircs: India, February 21, 1963; United King- 
dom, February 15, 1963. 


invention of the "World Meteorological Organization. 
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into 
force March 23, 19.50. TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Cyprus, April 11, 1963. 



greement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of February 12, 1962, as amended (TIAS 
5047, 5121, and 5233) . Effected by exchange of notes 
at La Paz March 29, 1963. Entered into force March 
29, 1963. 

greement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of February 4, 1963 (TIAS 5292). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at La Paz March 29, 
1963. Entered into force March 29, 1963. 

lermany, Federal Republic of 

greement concerning the settlement of claims which 
have arisen through the nonduty use of private motor 

vehicles of members of the United States Forces in- 
sured by the Brandaris insurance company. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Bonn February 18 and 
March 14, 1963. Entered into force March 14, 1963. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of November 26, 1962 (TIAS 5225). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at New Delhi April 1, 
1963. Entered into force April 1, 1963. 


Declaration for the effective protection of trademarks. 

Signed at Luxembourg December 23 and at The 

Hague December 27, 1904. Entered into force March 

15, 1905. 34 Stat. 2868. 

Terminated: March 28, 1963 (upon entry into force 
of treaty of friendship, establishment and naviga- 


Agreement postponing termination until June 30, 1963, 
of reciprocal trade agreement of September 12, 1946, 
as amended and extended (TIAS 1601, 5000, 5194). 
Effected by exchange of notes Februarv 27 and 
March 20, 1963. Entered into force aiarch 29, 1963. 


Agreement for financing certain educational exchange 
programs. Signed at Manila March 23, 1963. En- 
tered into force March 23, 1963. 

Agreement relating to the United States Educational 
Foundation in the Philippines, as amended. Signed 
at Manila March 23, 1948. Entered into force March 
23, 1948. TIAS 17.30, 174.5, 1910, and 4138. 
Terminated: March 23, 1963 (superseded by agree- 
ment of March 23, 1963, supra). 


Arrangement relating to a program of visits and ex- 
changes in cultural, educational, scientific and other 
fields during the calendar years 1963 and 1964. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Bucharest April 2, 
1963. Entered into force April 2, 1963. 

United Kingdom 

Polaris sales agreement. Signed at Washington 
April 6, 1963. Entered into force April 6, 1963. 


' Not in force. 

Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Govemrment Printing Office, Washington, 25, B.C. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, except in the case of free publications, which 
may be obtained from the Department of State. 

Maritime Matters — Use of Greek Ports and Territorial 
Waters by the N.S. Savannah. Agreement with 
Greece. Exchange of notes — Signed at Athens April 
23 and 24, 1962. Entered into force April 24, 1962. 
TIAS 5099. 6 pp. 5^. 

Tracking Stations — Continuation and Extension of 
Cooperative Program. Agreement with Argentina. 

PRIL 29, 1963 


Exchange of notes — Signed at Buenos Aires March 16, 
1962. Entered into force March 16, 1962. TIAS 5100. 
6 pp. 5^. 

Peace Corps Program — Use of Volunteers in FAO- 
Sponsored Projects. Agreement with the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO). Exchange of let- 
ters—Signed at Rome March 23 and 29, 1962. Entered 
into force March 29, 1962. TIAS 5101. 9 pp. lO^t. 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with Canada, amending the agreement of June 
15, 1955, as amended. Signed at Washington May 25, 
1962. Entered into force July 12, 1962. TIAS 5102. 
3 pp. 5^. 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Peaceful Uses. 

Agreement with the European Atomic Energy Com- 
munity (EURATOJI), amending the additional agree- 
ment of June 11, 1960. Signed at Brussels and Wash- 
ington May 21 and 22, 1962. Entered into force July 9, 
1962. TIAS 5104. 30 pp. 150. 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with China, amending the agreement of July 18, 
1955, as amended. Signed at Washington May 31, 1962. 
Entered into force July 13, 1962. TIAS 5105. 2 pp. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Ceylon. 
Signed at Colombo July 19, 1962. Entered into force 
July 19, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5106. 
8 pp. lOt}. 

Visas — Waiver of Fees. Agreement with the Republic 
of Korea. Exchange of notes — Signed at Seoul May 25, 
1962. Entered into force May 25, 1962. TIAS 5107. 
3 pp. 50. 

Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree- 
ment with Pakistan, amending the agreement of Sep- 
tember 23, 1950, as modifie<l. Exchange of notes — 
Dated at Karachi July 29, 1960, and July 10 and No- 
vember 13, 1961. Entered into force November 13, 1961. 
TIAS 5108. 4 i)p. 50. 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with the Federal Republic of Germany on Behalf 
of Berlin, amending the agreement of June 28, 1957. 
Signed at Washington June 29. 1962. Entered into 
force July 30, 1962. With annex. TIAS 5109. 5 pp. 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with Brazil, amending the agreement of August 8, 
1955, as amended. Signed at Washington Ma.v 28, 1962. 
Entered into force July 20, 1962. TIAS .5110. 2 pp. 50. 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with Portugal, amending the agreement of July 21, 
1955, as amended. Signed at Washington May 28, 1962. 
Entered into force July 20, 1962. TIAS 5111. 2 pp. 


Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Pakistan. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Karachi May 31, 1962. 
Entered into force May 31, 1962. Operative retroac- 
tively October 28, 1961. TIAS 5113. 5 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam, 
amending the agreement of December 27. 1961, as 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Saigon July 
5, 1962. Entered into force July 5, 1962. TIAS 5114. 
3 pp. 50. 

Defense — Extension of Loan of Vessels. Agreement 
with Brazil. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washing- 
ton February 21 and Julv 11, 1962. Entered into force 
July 11, 1962. TIAS 5116. 2 pp. 50. 

Boundary Waters — Saint Lawrence Seaway Suspen- 
sion of Tolls on the Welland Canal. Agreement with 
Canada. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ottawa July 3 
and 13, 1962. Entered into force July 13, 1962. TIAS 

5117. 2 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indo- 
nesia, amending the agreement of February 19, 1962, as , 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Djakarta 
July 11, 1962. Entered into force July 11, 1962. TIAS 

5118. 2 pp. 50. 

Red Cross — Termination of Agreements and Waiver of 
Claims Concerning Field Hospital in Korea. Agree- 
ment with Sweden. Exchange of notes — Signed at 
Washington July 13 and IS, 1962. Entered into force 
July 18, 1962. TIAS 5119. 3 pp. 50. 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with the Federal Republic of Germany, amending 
the agreement of July 3. 1957. as amended. Signed at 
Washington July 5, 1962. Entered into force August 
7, 1962. TIAS 5120. 3 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia, 
amending the agreement of February 12, 1962, as 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at La Paz July 
14, 1962. Entered into force July 14, 1962. TIAS 5121. 
3 pp. 50. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 8-14 

Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce 
of News, Department of State, Washington 25, 

Releases issued prior to April 8 which appear 
in this issue of the Buixetin are Nos. 168 of 
April 1 ; 174 of April 4 ; and 175, 176, and 177 of 
April 5. 

No. Date 

*179 4/8 

181 4/8 

*182 4/8 

tlS3 4/8 

184 4/8 

185 4/8 

tl86 4/9 

187 4/11 

188 4/10 

189 4/11 

*190' 4/11 

tl91 4/12 

tl93 4/12 


U.S. participation in international 

Secretary General of World Food 
Congress opens U.S. office (re- 

Harriman sworn in as Under Secre- 
tary for Political Affairs (biogra- 
phic details). 

Ceylon credentials (rewrite). 

Bataan Day ceremony. 

ApiK)intments to Advisory Commit- 
tee on Arts (rewrite). 

Agreement with U.K. for sale of 
Polaris missiles. 

SE.\TO communique. 

Rusk : NBC interview. 

Visit of Grand Duchess of Luxem- 
bourg (rewrite). 

Read appointed Deputy Executive 
Secretary (biographic details). 

Meeker : "Observation in Space." 

Rusk : interview on "Women on the 
Move" program. 

♦ Xnt printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



pril 29, 1963 

figriculture. World Food Congress Secretariat 
Opens Office at Washington 

.sia. The United States and Southeast Asia 

'hina. Communist. The Divided World of Com- 
munism (Abel, Rusk) 

lommunism. The United States and Southeast 
Asia (Johnson) 

Congress. The Foreign Aid Program (Rusls) . 

lepartment and Foreign Service. Appoint- 
ments (Read) 

Iconomic Affairs 

:CAFE Study of Tokaido Railway 

he Effect of the Projected European Union on 

NATO (Tyler) 

eadjusting United States Foreign Trade 


ducational and Cultural Affairs 

wo New Members Appointed to Advisory Com- 
mittee on Arts 

.S. and Rumania Exchange Notes on Cultural 
and Other Exchanges (Crawford, Macovei) . 

urope. The Effect of the Projected European 
Union on NATO (Tyler) 

oreign Aid 

he Foreign Aid Program (Rusk) 

resident Kennedy Greets Reunion of Marshall 
Plan Employees 

he United States and Southeast Asia (John- 

iternational Organizations and Conferences 

:CAFE Study of Tokaido Railway 

ighth Meeting of SEATO Council of Ministers 
(Rusk, text of communique) 

Torld Food Congress Secretariat Opens Office 
at Washington 

Index Vol. XLVIII, No. 1224 

Japan. ECAFE Study of Tokaido Railway . . 660 
663 Laos. U.S. Calls for Action To Insure Restora- 
tion of Cease-Fire In Laos 646 

635 Luxembourg. Grand Duchess Charlotte and 

Prince Jean of Luxembourg Visit U.S. . . . 647 
644 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Ef- 
fect of the Projected European Union on 

635 NATO (Tyler) 648 

QQ^ Philippines. Bataan Day Commemorated 

(Kennedy) 647 

„_2 Presidential Documents 

Bataan Day Commemorated 647 

President Kennedy Greets Reunion of Marshall 

660 Plan Employees 647 

„.- Publications. Recent Releases 673 

Rumania. U.S. and Rumania Exchange Notes 
gg2 on Cultural and Other Exchanges (Crawford, 

Macovei) 661 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Eighth 
ggg Meeting of SEATO CouneU of Ministers 

(Rusk, text of communique) 641 

QQX Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 673 
U.S.S.R. The Divided World of Communism 

g^g (Abel, Rusk) 644 

Viet-Nam. The United States and Southeast 
pg, Asia (Johnson) 635 

Name Index 

Abel, Elie 644 

Crawford, William A 661 

Johnson, U. Alexis 635 

Kennedy, President 647 

660 Macovei, Pompiliu 662 

Read, Benjamin H 672 

641 Rusk, Secretary 641,644,664 

Tyler, William R " 648 

663 Weiss, Leonard 652 





United States 
Government Printing Office 


Washington 25, D.C. 





A release in the new Foreign Affairs Outlines Series . . . 


in the 


This 19-page pamplilet contains the statement made on Febru- 
ary 18, 1963, by Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs, before the Latin American Subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. At the outset Mr. Martin 
states : 

The problem of extracoatinental totalitarian powers trying to subvert 
established governments in this hemisphere is not new. During World War II 
the American Republics faced the challenge of Fascist subversion sponsored by 
the Axis Powers. Through individual and collective action they successfully 
dealt with this threat. Since 1948, in the aftermath of the Communist seizure 
of power in Czechoslovakia, the inter-American community has been dealing 
with the problem of Communist subversion promoted by countries of the Sino- 
Soviet bloc, now supported by Cuba. 

Mr. Martin also describes the development of communism prior 
to Castro, Communist efforts since the advent of Castro, communism 
in Latin America since 1959, steps we are taking to combat Com- 
munist subversion, steps being taken in the Organization of American 
States [OAS] to cotmter Communist subversion, and the role of the 
Alliance for Progress in the Western Hemisphere's security effort. 

Publication 7509 

15 cents 

Order Form 

Snpt. of Documents 
Govt. Printing Office 
Washington 25, D.C. 

Enclosed find: 


(.cash, check, or money 
order payable to 
Supt. of Docs.) 

Publication 7509 

Please send me 

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copies of Communist Subversion in the Western 


Street Address: 

City, Zone, and State: 



Vol. XLVIII, No. 1245 

May 6, 1963 


POLICY • Remarks by Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary 

Ball, and Under Secretary Harriman 679 

TION • by Assistant Secretary Martin 710 


VIEWS • by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 704 

Huston fublic Library 
Superintendent ot Documents 

iViAY 1 4 1953 


For index see inside back cover 



Vol. XLVIII, No. 1245 • Publication 1 J 
May 6, 1963 

For Bale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Wasblngton 26, D.C. 


(2 issues, domestic $8.60, foreign $12.25 

Single copy, 26 cents 

Use o( funds for printing of this publica- 
tion approved by the Director ot the Bureau 
of the Budget (January 19, 1961). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contained herein may 
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ome Current Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy 

Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, and 
Under Secretary Harriman spoke informally 
before the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors at Washington on April 18. Following 
mre transcripts of their remarks and of the 
yuestion-and-answer periods which followed. 


?ress release 202 dated April 18 

Mr. Brucker [Herbert Brucker of the Hart- 
"ord Cowrant, the presiding officer], ladies and 
gentlemen, thank you very much for your in- 
dtation. I understand that you wish me to 
)pen our discussion this afternoon with some 
)rief remarks and then take your questions. 
[ am very happy to do so. I shall be followed 
)y two of my colleagues. I hope that the three 
)f us will manage to cover the principal topics 
hat you have in mind. 

Let me say that it is not my purpose today to 
nake news but to make sense. But perhaps 
iome of you may think that that in itself is news. 

But in one important respect both you and 
ive who are in the foreign policy business have 
I common problem : how to maintain an under- 
itanding of the context withm which daily 
vents occur. The simple but fundamental aims 
ffld objectives of American policy come to be 
:aken for granted, and perhaps forgotten. But 
constant repetition invites boredom and is not 
lewsworthy. Our common problem, therefore, 
is to try to organize our thinking about a 
urbulent world, made up of 112 states with 
whom we conduct our business, a world which 
we can strongly influence but cannot control, 

MAT 6, 1963 

and a world filled with problems into wliich we 
Americans are inevitably drawn. 

But let us pause just for a moment to remind 
ourselves that the foreign policy of the Ameri- 
can people aims at a decent world order of in- 
dependent states, cooperating voluntarily across 
national frontiers on the basis of common in- 
terests, a world order in which disputes are to 
be settled by peaceful means and where conduct 
is expected to accord with the great principles 
set forth in the opening sections of the United 
Nations Charter. 

It was for this purpose that we committed 
ourselves wholeheartedly to the United Nations 
at the end of World War II, for this purpose 
that we formed alliances with more than 40 
other nations in the interest of mutual security 
and national independence, and for this purpose 
that we are deeply interested in the genuine 
independence and integrity of the so-called 
nonalined countries. 

It is the pursuit of this decent world order 
which makes up the main business of the De- 
partment of State. This is what the daily cable 
traffic is all about. This is what we are doing in 
more than a dozen international meetings being 
held somewhere in the world on every working 
day throughout the year. And it is widespread 
confidence in this basic purpose among peoples 
in other parts of the world which adds solidar- 
ity to our alliances, permits friendly relations 
with most of the nonalined, and explains the 
fact that in moments of great crisis there are 
not nearly so many neutrals as we are inclined 
to think. 

Now, it is true that our attention in the midst 
of this mass of business, most of which is dull — 
it is true that our attention is drawn at any 


given time to certain points of crisis. I shall 
not call our situation within the Atlantic alli- 
ance a crisis, but I shall leave to Mr. Ball a 
discussion of some of the details of that par- 
ticular situation. 

Points of Crisis 

For our attention, for example, today is very 
closely turned to Laos, a country about which 
it has been agreed internationally that it should 
be left free to develop an independent and neu- 
tral existence of its own. 

The problem there is that two of the so-called 
three factions in Laos have given loyal support 
to the Geneva Accords.^ The third, the Pathet 
Lao, backed up by their coconspirators in Hanoi, 
have not done so. And therefore there is a 
crisis between the neutralist government on the 
one side, supported by the former government 
forces of General Phoumi [Nosavan], and the 
Pathet Lao Communist group, on the other, to 
determine whether these Geneva Accords will 
be given full effect. 

Now, we do believe that those accords can 
meet the vital interests of all sides, that an inde- 
pendent and neutral Laos accords with the real 
requirements of the principal powers in the 
present world situation, and that it is not nec- 
essary to draw that country into one orbit or 

But, on the other hand, we cannot agree that 
it should be drawn into the Communist orbit. 
And therefore we are looking to the two cochair- 
men, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., to 
exert tl^eir maximum influence, through the 
designated international machinery, and direct 
with the parties concerned, to insure that those 
accords will in fact be carried out. For, were 
those accords to break down, then some very 
grave questions would be raised for all of us as 
to what next we ought to do in that particular 

Our attention is also riveted on Viet-Nam, a 
country which has been besieged for several 
years by subversive action and infiltration, a 
penetration seeking to upset the agreements of 

^ For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259. 

' For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: 
Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State publica- 
tion 6446, p. 750. 


1954.- We believe that it is in our national in- 
terest to do what we can to put the South Viet- 
namese in a position to win their own war. "\Y( 
believe that they themselves are determined aiu 
are fighting well. "We believe that a corner h 
being turned in that struggle, that the initiativt 
now being taken by Government forces for tht 
past several months, improved mobility anc 
transportation, improved communications, im 
proved intelligence coming from the very people 
themselves in the countryside, improvements ir 
political and social action at the village level 
the switching, the change in ratios of arms cap 
tured, of prisoners taken, of casualties inflicted 
of defections recorded — that these show thai 
important gains have been made. 

And although we cannot be confident that thi; 
problem will be wound up rapidly and easily— 
we rather think that it will be prolonged anc 
bitter and frustrating still — nevertheless, wi 
believe that the South Vietnamese are now or 
their way and that we can approach that prob 
lem with perhaps more confidence. 

In the Congo we have had a troubled an< 
vexing situation, which now seems to be movin< 
toward a solution. The recent constitution o 
the Government of the Congo, comprising ele 
ments of the major parties and major regions 
promises to offer some greater degree of unit; 
and stability. It's a country which has poten 
tially very important resources of its own 
which can be wealthy, compared to othe: 
African states, and which deserves a chance t< 
work out its own future, as originally int«ndec 
when its independence was negotiated with Bel 
gium some 3 years ago. 

I believe the events there have underlined th( 
basic wisdom of the decision made by President 
Eisenhower not to let that particular countrj 
be caught up in a bilateral engagement betweer 
the two great power blocs in the so-called cole 
war but to put that problem into the hands oi 
the United Nations, in order to keep that kinc 
of conflict out of Africa and to give the Con- 
golese a chance to work out their own future 

Turning to Cuba, it is the unanimous view oJ 
the governments of this hemisphere that the 
present Marxist-Leninist regime on that island 
is incompatible with the inter- American system 
and that our object must be to welcome a free 




Cuban people back into the inter-American 

This means, among other things, that a Soviet 
military presence in this hemisphere is not to be 
accepted as a normal state of affairs. 

Now, the actions that are now being taken 
fall into three main categories: The first in- 
volves the commitment of our Armed Forces to 
insure that Cuba does not pose a threat to the 
security of the hemisphere. This means a pro- 
hibition of the return of offensive weapons to 
Cuba, a maintenance of surveillance to assure 
ourselves and others that such an offensive capa- 
bility is not present, enforcement of the free use 
of international airspace and waters in the 
Caribbean, interdiction of arms shipments or 
other forays aimed at other coimtries, and in- 
surance that there not be a Hungarian-type 
episode in this hemisphere. 

It is sometimes overlooked that we have made 
and are making a major commitment of force to 
insure that that threat be kept within manage- 
able bounds. 

A second group of actions aims at demon- 
strating that there is no future for Cuba under 
the present regime and that the Cuban people 
cannot achieve success at home or normal rela- 
tions with their traditional friends of the free 
world imder a regime committed to implacable 
hostility toward free institutions. 

This is why trade and fiscal relations with the 
free world have been rapidly shrinking and why 
free-world ships are being steadily withdrawn 
from the Cuban trade. We are concerned at 
the present moment about an increase of free- 
world flagships in that trade, since the low point 
reached in January, and are taking up that 
question with the governments concerned. 

Tliere are indications that some of these ships 
under long-term charter to the bloc have been 
shifted to the Cuba trade and that the numbers 
are temporarily influenced by the seasonal ex- 
port of the sugar harvest. And although such 
free-world shipping in the first quarter of this 
year was about one-sixth of the numbers in- 
volved in the same quarter of last year, we are 
not content with the present situation. We do 
know, however, that the economy of Cuba is 
facing the most serious difficulties, that its sup- 
port is becoming increasingly expensive to the 

bloc, and that the promises of the early revolu- 
tion have been denied by the present and somber 

A third group of measures has to do with 
the rest of the hemisphere. They include a 
strong effort within the Alliance for Progress 
to demonstrate that rapid economic and social 
development can best be achieved through free 
institutions. They include measures, such as 
those discussed by President Kennedy with the 
Presidents of Central America and Panama,^ 
to interrupt the clandestine flow of funds and 
personnel between Cuba and other countries of 
the hemisphere. 

They include close cooperation among the 
armed forces and security agencies of the Carib- 
bean in the interest of public safety. They in- 
clude a fourfold increase in our own broadcast- 
ing to Latin America since 1960 and the vigorous 
engagement of Latin Americans themselves in 
the political and propaganda battle. 

We can say with confidence, I think, that the 
Castro revolution has been largely discredited 
as an answer to the hemisphere's problems, that 
it is more widely recognized than ever before 
that the answers to these problems lie in the 
effort of free men to improve their own lot, with 
the assistance and cooperation of the industrial- 
ized free nations. 

U.S. Policy Is Nonpartisan 

These policies and actions taken together 
make up a serious, sustained, and effective effort 
to deal with the threat of Marxist-Leninism in 
this hemisphere. They do not include an in- 
vasion of Cuba or acts of war against that is- 
land. Great risks are necessary to deal with 
great threats, and the situation remains dan- 
gerous. But I do not believe that we should, in 
the absence of a major threat to the security of 
the hemisphere, initiate armed action against 
Cuba. Nor am I aware of any desire that we 
do so among the responsible leadership of either 
political party. 

Now, on this question of bipartisanship, or 
nonpartisanship, I think it is fair to say that 
the main lines of United States policy since 
World War II have been nonpartisan in char- 

' Bulletin of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 511. 

MAT G, 1963 


acter : support for the United Nations, for our 
great alliances, for necessary actions in defense 
and mutual security assistance, for the ener- 
getic support of the interests of the United 
States and of our citizens abroad. I suppose 
it is con-ect to say that 98 percent of our busi- 
ness in the Department of State involves no 
partisan issue whatever. 

And perhaps you would be interested in hear- 
ing me comment that when I sit in executive ses- 
sions with our congressional committees to 
discuss complicated and difficult foreign policy 
questions, where it is possible not under the full 
kleig light of publicity to get into the full 
range of the complexities as well as the alterna- 
tive lines of action open, it has been my experi- 
ence in those sessions that, although there may 
be differences of view about what ought to be 
done, those differences almost never fall along 
partisan lines. Because the issues are real, they 
are complicated, they are difficult. Our pur- 
poses are matters of common agreement. But 
how to move from purpose to fact is a question 
of judgment about which there can be differ- 
ences of view. 

But it is not partisanship that marks those 
consultations between the executive and the 
legislative branch in that type of session. 

Now, bipartisanship in fact is easy and natu- 
ral under conditions of success. It was rela- 
tively simple during the great days of the crea- 
tion of the United Nations, for example, and it 
was, I think, relatively easy at the time of the 
formation of NATO and the great initiative 
that led to the Marshall Plan. And that bi- 
partisanship is necessary, and fortunately for 
our country is forthcoming, at moments of great 
national danger. 

But it is more difficult with problems which 
are complex and frustrating and uncertain. 
But even here, as in such cases as Laos and Cuba 
and the Congo, whose history did not start 
in January 1961, there is room for nonpartisan- 
ship, because both political parties clearly own 
a piece of them — are joint stockliolders in un- 
finished business. 

It is natural and proper that an administra- 
tion must accept the primary and awesome re- 
sponsibility of leadership and that the minority 
party must be in a position to criticize; other- 

wise our political system would lose its vigor 
and the people would have no sure basis for 
their sovereign judgments. But I must say, as 
I observe other political systems in other parts 
of the world, that I am often reassured by the 
fact that, in this difficult postwar world, our 
partisan debates on foreign policy in due course 
are taken over by a sense of responsibility by 
those on both sides who understand the stakes 
involved in the great worldwide struggle for 

Many Ways of Quitting in Struggle for Freedom 

I am concerned because here and there, againi 
without regard to party, there are some strident; 
voices in the land, claiming to be strongly anti- 
Communist, who would have us simply quit, toi 
abandon the field, to give up the effort. 

And there are many ways of quitting m thisi 
great struggle for freedom. If we will the end,, 
if we will the success of free institutions in at 
decent world order, we must will the means by 
which we get there. 

For example, there are those who somehow 
would not support a large and necessary na- 
tional defense budget. Now, it is true that we 
must make every possible effort to achieve some 
means of turning down the arms race. Other- 
wise the future is gloomy and foreboding and 
dangerous in the extreme. But in the absence 
of effective and reliable arrangements in dis- 
armament, it is necessary for us to look to our " 
arms. And that defense budget is large and, in 
the absence of some new development, is likely 
to become larger in the years ahead as this arms 
race moves from sophistication to sophistication, 
from expense to expense. 

And as Secretary of State, who must con- 
stantly take into account the intimate relation 
between policy and power, I feel that it is very 
important that our defense budget be given full 
and adequate support. 

I feel the same way about our space effort,. I 
had the opportunity over the past year or two 
to talk to a great many foreign ministers from 
different parts of the world, some allied, some 
neutral, about whether they think, as they look 
at the situation, it is really important for the 
United States to make a massive investment in 
the space effort, which we have been prepared 



to do. I think, with perliaps one exception out 
of several dozen, they have all said, perhaps 
with a smile of sympathy, "Yes, you people 
must undertake that, because you dare not leave 
]the exploration of outer space and all that that 
means in the hands solely of those who are op- 
posed to freedom. You dare not leave those 
secrets to be discovered by one side alone. You 
Jare not turn over to them the byproducts of 
that exploration in the fields of communication, 
miniaturization, metallurgy, systems controls, 
md all the other teclinical outputs of that enor- 
mous eifort — you cannot leave that into the 
liands of the bloc. And, since you are the only 
jnes in the free world that can do it, this is an 
jbligation of yours which you dare not shirk." 

We can quit this great struggle by with- 
holding large support for foreign aid. You 
ook at your own cities, your own counties — 
low many— one out of seven, one out of eight, 
)f the people in your neighborhoods are vet- 
erans, many of them having served in far dis- 
ant places in the last 20-25 years in defense 
)f freedom. We have a million men, approxi- 
nately, in uniform outside the continental 
Dnited States today on that gi'eat mission. We 
lave an obligation to get on with this great 
problem of building a decent free-world com- 
mmity by means other than military if we can. 
Ajid our foreign aid program is the principal 
neans by which we move in that direction. 

We have an obligation of conscience to make 
:hat program just as effective as possible, to 
jnlist as much self-help from the others as we 
:an, to have it administered with integrity and 
with clearsightedness and with imagination. 
But we cannot abandon the effort or accept deep 
luts, except with deep injury to our national 

I'm not now challenging the motives of those 
who speak about this subject. I'm talking about 
the results. For if the American presence and 
influence were withdrawn suddenly from many 
parts of the world, our national interest would 
be deeply jeopardized and we would find that 
the hundred billions wliicli we spent in foreign 
aid since about 1947 is a bargain compared to 
the almost six hundred billions that we have 
spent in defense in that same period and that 
our military expenditures would necessarily go 
up even faster. 

I have heard it said from some quarters that 
we should get out of the United Nations if they 
do not adjust to our policy 100 percent of the 
time, instead of, as it turns out, perhaps 98 per- 
cent of the time — we should bring our troops 
home from Europe or from areas affected by 
our other alliances. 

There is another way to quit : in a fit of frus- 
tration or anger or glandular reaction to toss in 
the effort in a great holocaust by a precipitate 
resort to arms, a quitting which is an abandon- 
ment of the humane requirements of the human 
spirit and which would simply result in a few 
survivors speculating upon the folly of man. 

And we can quit by being negligent about the 
great imfinished business of our own society, 
because what we are here at home has an enor- 
mous amount to do with our influence in the 
world about us. And where there are ugly 
deficiencies in our own society, to repair those 
deficiencies is a great part of this struggle for 
freedom in the most distant part of the world, 
because we are expected to be perfect in the per- 
formance of our own commitments and our 
misdeeds and our shortcomings are multiplied 
many times to our own and to other free peoples' 
discomfiture wherever it might be. 

The Underlying Issue 

And the great underlying issue of our day, 
that is whether we are to in fact succeed 
in organizing this decent world order as op- 
posed to a world of coercion — it is true that we 
have our problems, but so do those who would 
impose their system upon all the rest. We do 
note a serious disunity within the bloc, a major 
engagement of prestige and conflict of interest 
between Moscow and Peiping, as well as the 
steady growth of nationalism within the bloc, 
particularly among the Eastern European coun- 
tries. And we see their deficiencies in eco- 
nomic performance, their difficulties with their 
industrial as well as their agricultural pro- 
duction, and the discomforts which they are 
facing all the way from East Germany right 
around through to North Viet-Nam. We know 
their disappointments in Cuba and in the 
Congo, in Iraq and Syria, and in Guinea and 
Mali, where they have come into in many situ- 
ations — come upon a rugged determination on 

MAT 6, 1963 


the part of the newly independent peoples to be 
genuinely independent. 

I think that if we take a look at the present 
situation, take a look at the problems ahead, 
take a look at the problems which the other 
side has, we can be deeply confident on one point, 
and that is that the purposes which animate 
the American people in foreign policy are pur- 
poses which are deeply rooted not only in the 
nature of our own people but in the nature of 
man, and these purposes are instinctive with 
people — ordinary common people in all parts 
of the earth. And if we don't quit, if we main- 
tain the effort, if we stay at it, if we gnaw at 
these problems, if we deal with them day by 
day in the best of our own tradition, we shall 
find we shall have help, we shall have allies, 
we shall have sympathy and understanding 
from peoples in all parts of the earth. 

And on that basis I have no doubt on what 
the outcome of that great struggle for freedom 
will be. 

Now, gentlemen, I am ready for your 


Mr. Brucker: Gentlemen., the Secretary is 
ready for your questions. 

Q. Mr. Chairman, Pm Mr. Bobinson from 
Salt Lake City. We are very much concerned, 
as all A^nericans are, Mr. Rusk, aiout the pos- 
sibility of subversion from Cuba into some of 
the Latin American countries. We were just 
told a short time ago that the Navy is not in- 
specting certain small boats that travel bach 
and forth at night between Cuha and the Ameri- 
can Continent. I wonder if you might com- 
ment about that. 

A. Ai-rangements are in effect with other 
countries in the Caribbean area for surveillance 
of suspicious or unidentified traffic. Our 
armed forces on the spot do have authority to 
use searchlights and illumination in the event 
of any ships that are acting suspiciously, or 
not carrying normal identification lights, or are 
not known to be what they are. Inspection 
arrangements are laid on with countries of des- 
tination, which make it possible for us to have 

a close check on what, in fact, might be in a 
cargo of any ship moving from Cuba to any of 
the other countries. 

Mr. Brucker: Is there a further question? 

The Foreign Aid Program 

Q. Mr. Rusk, out in the provinces, the reason 
the people have such a resentment against the 
foreign aid program is when they read about 
we sent 1^8,000 cases of Metrecal to India, and 
300,000 tons of cement to India, and in the 
monsoon season it gets wet and turns into stone 
on the docks, and the sugar beet factory in 
Turkey, v'here they never even smo a sugar beet. 
Now, I think the people out in the country 
feel that a good deal of this foreign aid is 
essential, but when they read about that, it 
really roils them up. Why isn't there a hettcr 
control over this? 

A. I think it's a fair question, a fair insistence,, 
that funds that are f)ut in trust for the use of 
AID should be used with a maximum possible 
effect and efficiency. 

Now, as any of you know, the problem of 
administration is a constant battle against mis- 
take and against human failure. And there 
have been from time to time those mistakes and 
human failures. But we have tried to lay on the 
type of inspection, the type of supervision, and 
the type of postaudit, as well as preexamiiiation, 
which will give us maximum protection against 
the sort of mishap to which you refer. 

There have been instances in which funds 
have not produced the effect requested. There 
have been mistakes. And there have been fail- 
ures of performance on the part of companies 
who conti-acted to carry out particular jobs 
abroad. This is a constant battle. But we must 
not let those occasional mistakes or those occa- 
sional failures gut the entire program, because 
the performance under the entire program has 
been over the years magnificent and the dedica- 
tion and the courage and, indeed, the gallantry 
of those people who are in distant and difficult, 
sometimes dangerous, places getting on with 
this job is something to which we are all deeply 
indebted. It is a struggle, but we are fighting 
that battle all the time, and I think that you are 
entitled to insist that the highest standards be 
met in that resjard. 



Secretary Replies to Allegations on Aid Shipments 

Press release 211 dated April 19 

Follox'ing is the text of a letter from Secretary read by Herbert Brucker, editor of the Hart- 
ford Courant, before the ASNE meeting on April 20. 
The Secretary's letter concerns information on ques- 
tions he was asked at the meeting on April 18. 

Apeil 19, 1963 

Dear Mb. Brucker : One of the questions asUed 
of me at Tliurs(lay"s meeting of the American So- 
ciety of Newspaper Editors contained allegations 
of misuse or waste of foreign aid. These allega- 
tions were : 

1) That 48,000 cases of Metrecal were sent to 

2) That 300,000 tons of cement hardened on the 
docks in monsoon weather in India. 

3) That a sugar beet factory was built in Turkey 
where there were no sugar beets. 

Since I was not familiar with details of these 
charges, I commented broadly on the problems and 
objectives of a well-administered aid program. Sub- 
sequently, I asked that foreign aid records be 
checked to verify, explain or controvert the allega- 
tions. These were the findings : 

1) There is no record of any shipment of Metrecal 
to India. 

There are, however, two instances where Metrecal 
was ordered by commercial importers under com- 
modity procurement authorizations financed under 
the foreign aid program. In 1961, International 
Cooperation Administration (ICA) auditors discov- 
ered that an order for Metrecal had been placed 
under a sub-allocation of the Govern- 
ment. ICA immediately initiated action to recover 
the cost of the Metrecal on the basis that the prod- 
uct was not eligible for financing under our pro- 
gram. The product was returned to the shipper 
and an eligible product was ordered. 

A very small amount of Metrecal was shijjped to 
Cambodia in 1062 through private trade channels 
under the foreign aid commodity import program. 
The product had been erroneously identified by rep- 
resentatives of the Cambodia Government as medic- 
inal in nature. The Agency for International De- 
velopment, upon learning of the shipment, informed 
the Government of Cambodia that the product was 

ineligible and filed a claim for recovery of the funds 

2) Neither AID records nor inquiries directed to 
veteran personnel whose experience goes back many 
years reveals any instance of cement hardening on 
the docks in India. 

This charge might have been confused with the 
fact that incidents of this kind have occurred under 
the foreign aid program of the Soviet Union. We 
know of an instance where poorly packaged Soviet 
cement hardened on the docks during the monsoon 
season in Burma, and of similar cases involving So- 
viet cement in Guinea, Ghana and the Sudan. 

3) The United States has not participated in the 
financing of any sugar beet mill in Turkey. 

The question of sugar beet mills was raised during 
Congressional hearings in 1961, and the allegation 
was that the United States had built such mills in 
Iran and Indonesia. 

In Iran, the United States had, in 1955, con- 
tributed $630,000— less than one-fifth the cost- 
to construction of a sugar beet mill in Iran after sur- 
veys had demonstrated both a sugar shortage and 
favorable conditions for growing sugar beets. The 
mill was in full production in 1957 and two other 
mills have been built since, also with U.S. assistance. 

In Indonesia, the United States has not assisted 
any such project. The East Germans, liowever, 
had sent sugar beet mill engineers to Indonesia in 
1955 to build a sugar mill. Since Indonesia grows 
only sugar cane, continuing difficulties arose because 
the East German engineers had had no experience 
with sugar cane mills, and the plant did not go into 
production until 1960. 

These are the answers, to the best of my knowl- 
edge, to the questions raised by the editor who iden- 
tified himself as being from "out in the provinces." 
It does not appear, in any of the instances cited, 
that the United States or its representatives were at 

This is not to say that there have not been cases 
where Americans were guilty of error in the con- 
duet of the foreign aid programs. There have been 
mistakes and human failures, and there will be more 
despite our efforts to prevent them. 

I hope that these explanations can be passed on 
to the editor who asked the question, and to any 
others who may have been concerned about his 

Sincerely yours. 

Dean Rusk 



Q. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question? 

Mr. Brucker: Sure. 

Q. Senator Keating said at lunch — this is 
quoted from the, you know, his speech — that the 
Department of State recently played a hey role 
in hlocking Russian-language broadcasts that 
Radio Liberty had originally proposed to beam 
to Soviet personnel in Cuba. And he went on 
to say that all day the Latin American and 
Cuban broadcasts and Soviet broadcasts are 
beamed to South America, yet our country held 
back an organization that loanted to broadcast 
some Russian-language stuff to that personnel. 
Do you knoiv anything about that, Mr. 

A. Well, I believe that there is — there have 
been this week news tickers indicatmg that those 
broadcasts are going forward. 

Q. They were held up, though, wererut they? 

A. There was a problem about whether the 
United States Government itself would organize 
such broadcasts, because we did not wish to— 
want to — put the stamp of permanency on those 
Russian troops in Cuba or to take any step which 
would make them think we were going to let 
them make themselves at home there or that we 
are going to let them settle down and make 
themselves comfortable. But those broadcasts 
are going on at the present time and have been 
for, I think, about a week. 

Q. Tliank you. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have a Congressman 
out ov/r way who keeps saying that there are a 
large number of Red Chinese in Cuba, as well 
as a large number of Russians. Can you say 
with certainty that this is not so? 

A. Well, there are some Red Chinese in Cuba. 
We understand there are a number tliere, for 
example, in all fields, as agricultural tecluii- 
cians. But there is also, I think, a large pre- 
Castro Chinese community in Habana — my un- 
derstanding is several thousand — and some of 
the reports which we have received on the pres- 
ence of Chinese there check out to be references 
to the Chinese who were there earlier. Now, 
there are a substantial number of Red Chinese 
there — exactly what figure I would use, I would 

not wish to indicate, but I should think severa. 
hundred Red Chinese were in Cuba. 

Mr. Brucker: Is there a further question? 

Soviet Military Presence in Cuba 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you stated that it was tTu 
policy of the State Department not to accep\ 
the military presence of the Soviet inilitary i/n 
Cuba. You stated that, I believe, it is the polio% 
of the State Department not to accept the Soviet 
military presence in Cuba as a normal state O] 

Now, according to the public reports, Soviei 
troops have been in Cuba about 8 months now. 
I presume this is regarded as an abnorinal con- 
dition. At what point would the State Depart 
ment consider the presence of the Soviet troop> 
there to become normal rather than abnormal; 
If they are still there a year froin now, woula 
it be considered as an abnormal condition^ 

A. We have been since October doing what we 
can to keep the outtraffic of Soviet forces mov- 
ing. You recall that some weeks ago I had had 
a talk with Mr. Dobrynin [Soviet Ambassadoii 
Anatoliy Dobrynin] on the subject and thati 
several thousand additional troops did leave 
Cuba during the month of March. This is Sf 
question that it is not dead; it is not inactive.' 
We have made it very clear to the Soviet 
Union that their troops in Cuba are not accepta- 
ble in this hemisphere and that their militai7 
presence there is itself a continuing source of 
danger and that it is in the interest of every- 
body concerned that they get out. 

But to take up your particular question about 
dates — a moving from normality to abnormal- 
ity, or vice versa — I wouldn't want to speculate 
about dates. 

Mr. Brucker: Any further questions? 

Situations in Laos and South Viet-Nam 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I believe that we are set- 
ting forth an assistance effort in South Viet- 
Nam. However, in Laos toe agreed to a coali- 
tion. Would you explain the difference between 
the South Viet-Nam and the Laotian situation, 
and would you answer the question of whether 



or not you went into the coalition government in 
Lnos with a good deal of misgiving becaiose 
of the history of such agreements with tJie 

A. I think one of the principal differences is 
that Viet-Xam had been specifically divided in 
1054 between North and South and that the 
p(>netrations from the North into South Viet- 
Xam were directly contrary to an existing ar- 
rangement that had been reached and signed 
by the principal governments concerned. The 
T'nited States did not sign those accords, but it 
indicated that it would abide by them. 

Now, in the case of Laos, there was a country 
which had not been divided, where there was an 
attempt made to take over that coimtry by infil- 
tration, where it seemed to be possible to reach 
an agreement that that country should be left 
as an independent and neutral coiuitry. Well, 
there were indications that the Soviet Union did 
believe that this would be a workable arrange- 
ment, and so a decision was made to take that 
course, a political course that was initiated back 
in late 1960 or early 1961. 

There is another element, and that is that the 
South Vietnamese themselves are fighting their 
own battle, fighting well. Tliis has not, gener- 
ally speaking, been the case in Laos. And 
we have felt that if you could just get the Lao- 
tians left alone, get the foreigners out, leave 
them to their own devices, to work out their own 
future, they would be no threat or peril to any 
of their neighbors and the security of Southeast 
Asia would be reinforced by that situation. 

Xow, everything turns upon (a) what the 
Soviet Union now really thinks about the im- 
portance of the Geneva Accords and (b) what 
influence they have on the immediate situation 
on the ground. If the answer to both those 
questions is affirmative, or is positive, then I 
thinlv this thing can be worked out. But if there 
is a failure of either one of those, then I tliink 
we are in for some rough weeks and montlrs 

Q. Mr. Secretary, does your faith in foreign 
aid ever lag when you get United Nations re- 
ports that the population of Latin America is 
increasing faster than the income, so that the 
capital wealth is actually declining? 

A. Well, these are issues that, in the first 

place, can be dealt with by working at both 
sides of the ledger. I suppose that in one sense 
the most overpopulated period in our American 
history was when there were just the Indians 
here. There is an enormous productive capacity 
available in Latin America to be mobilized, to 
be organized, to help deal with a population in- 
crease, particularly in basic foodstuffs, for 

But the basic social and political decision 
about how to approach the population question 
is one which each country and each people must 
make for themselves. We do believe that these 
demographic features have to be taken fully 
into account and in a realistic social and eco- 
nomic development program, and we are doing 
a good deal to help other governments study 
their population problem as an integral part of 
their general planning process. But we don't 
believe that it is up to us to tell them what their 
answers must be or how they would deal with it 

Q. Mr, Secretary — 

Mr. Brucher: Secretary Rusk has to go 
along; so we will let it go with this one more 
question, please. 

U.S. Views on Hit-and-Run Raids on Cuba 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has ieen a good hit 
of discussion on the administration's ian on the 
hit-and-run attacks on Cuba, on Soviet ships in 
Cuban waters. There seems to be agreement 
that these raids shotdd not be mounted from 
these shores but disagreement as to whether 
they shoidd be condoned when arranged from 
other lands. Could you tell us, or indicate to tis, 
tohat is the thinking of our allies in this hemi- 
sphere and in Europe on this matter and this 
decision by the administration? 

A. Well, I would suppose that governments 
who are responsible for territories in the Carib- 
bean take the same general view that we do 
about such hit-and-run raids. We do not 
believe that these raids, such as those that have 
occurred in the past, have added significantly 
to the general effort to unseat Castro or to re- 
duce his power on the island; they do, on the 
other hand, raise very serious qviestions of armed 

MAT 6, 1963 


"VVe believe that questions of war and peace 
and the use of arms in this part of the world 
should be determined by the responsible gov- 
ernments concerned rather than by private 
groups, however much one might sympathize 
with their own motivations and their desires 
about their own country. But I would suppose, 
in answer to your particular question, that other 
governments responsible for territories in the 
Caribbean take the same view that we do on 
that particular point. 

Thank you very much, gentlemen. 


Press release 203 dated April 19 

Mr. Brucker, ladies and gentlemen: I was 
impressed a few minutes ago listening to the ex- 
change between you gentlemen and Secretary 
Rusk. I was impressed with the thought that, 
in any dialog between those of us who toil in 
the foreign policy vineyard and you gentle- 
men of the press, there is a common quality 
■uhich we have, each in our own way : We are 
each preoccupied with history. We who work 
at the business of foreign policy are concerned 
with trying to shape events which become a 
part of the history of our time, and you have 
an interest and an influence not only in the 
shaping of history but also in recording it. I 
recall the comment of the dyspeptic old Scots- 
man, Thomas Carlyle, that "histories after all 
are a kind of distilled newspaper." 

Now, I would suspect also that we share a 
common secret vice, that from time to time each 
of us attempts, again in his own way, to try to 
stand apart from the events of the day and to 
look at what is occurring — to try to single out 
the trends from the individual events, to try to 
identify and to understand the great forces that 
are at work. And I am sure you find this prob- 
lem as baffling as we do, because we live in a 
time that is very complex and it is always very 
difficult because of our participation in events to 
know what meaning or significance those events 
may have in the longer ranges of history. 

It is even more difficult, it seems, in the pres- 
ent day, when a whole new fact has been intro- 
duced into history. That fact is the fact of 
speed, the fact of a great pervasive speed of 

change which dominates this mid-20th century 
in a way unknown before. So that we are con- 
stantly confronted with events, with series of 
events, which added together may mean a 
greater change, a greater transformation in the 
world than would normally have occurred ever 
in the history as we have known it, in the history 
even as our immediate fathers and mothers may 
have known it, events that would have occurred 
only over a period of centuries. It seems to me 
that, if we look at this moment in time since the 
end of the Second World War, we can see evi- 
dences of this, because, in this period of some- 
thing less than 18 years, we have seen the trans- 
formation of the world in a way which would 
never have seemed possible in the period of the 

Some Recent Historic Events 

First of all, we have become almost accus- 
tomed to the idea of the "iron curtain," a phrase 
which was only invented in 1946, which we 
heard for the first time when a man wlio is now 
a new citizen made a speech out in Fulton, Mis- 
souri — Sir Winston Churchill. The "cold war" 
was a phrase which was not then invented ; yet 
we have come to accept it almost as a normal 
part of existence. 

I talked not very long ago to a group of uni- 
versity students. I was impressed, in talking 
with them and in trying to find out what they 
were thinking about, with the fact that in the 
whole of their lives they had never experi- 
enced any other time except the time of the cold 
war. Yet for those of us who are as old as I am, 
the cold war is something which has come fairly 
recently and it is something that, God willing, 
we may not always have to live with. 

The second great event besides the erection 
of the Iron Curtain, which made a prison for a 
third of the population of the earth — the second 
great event, fully as important, has been the 
movement from colonial status to some form of 
independence or freedom for another one-third 
of the world's population, about a billion peo- i 
pie — an event again of fantastic proportions, an 
event which could only have been conceived of 
at an earlier time as something which might 
have gradually occurred over centuries. Yet 
colonialism, which was in full effect at the end 



of the war, has now reached nearly the end of 
its existence over the world, the free part of the 

A third event, which again I thinlv will take 
its place in history as something of enormous 
significance, and which many of us tend to re- 
gard as perhaps the most constructive single 
thing which has happened in this period of the 
mid-20th centurj', has been the fact that the 
colonial powei-s of Europe have turned their 
attentions to the problems close at home and 
have succeeded in building in a very short time 
unity of a kind which the conquerors of old 
were never able to achieve. This has been done 
by the agreement of governments and the con- 
sent of peoples. It is a very remarkable 
achievement altogether. 

Interruption in Momentum Toward Unity 

Now, in the last few weeks — particularly 
since the historic event of the 14th of January,* 
a press conference which will, I think, become 
itself a major event in history — in the last few 
weeks we have heard a great deal about the 
significance of what is happening in Europe 
and what this interruption in the processes that 
are going forward in Europe may mean. I 
think that many of us, perhaps, had begun to 
tliink of the European unity as perhaps more 
nearly fully attained than has turned out. We 
forget the fact that it was only in 1955 that our 
European friends first began the negotiations 
which led to the creation of the Common Mar- 
ket. That, after all, gentlemen, is only 8 years 

Nevertheless, what did occur on the 14th of 
January has had a significance, and I would 
suppose that that significance has been simply 
this : that while what has been going forward in 
Europe over the last few years has been a move- 
ment away from a concentration on the nation- 
state, what occurred on the 14th of Januai-y 
was a reassertion of the view that the nation- 
state is the only form of organization of society 
around which the allegiance of men can be 
fully coalesced. So that we are now having 
presented a confrontation of a very interesting 

* At a press conference on Jan. 14, President Charles 
de Gaulle of France indicated that the French Gov- 
ernment was at the present time opposed to British 
membership in the European Economic Community. 

kind between the ideas of a Europe based on a 
concept of a greater unity and the ideas of the 
nation-state as the repository of the ideals of 
patriotism and as the kind of organization 
which is basically essential, which is the only 
kind that can endure over a long period. 

I think that, for myself, I feel that it is 
altogether likely, in fact I would say almost cer- 
tain, that the process of moving toward unity in 
Europe will prevail over a longer period, be- 
cause I think the historic logic which is 
impelling them is so powerful. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that we have seen in the last few weeks 
some important things take place. We have 
seen, first of all, a decision which has for the 
time being at least interfered with the applica- 
tion of the United Kingdom to become a part of 
a great new Europe. But will this be something 
which will be permanent? Whether this is a 
process that will ultimately take place, I think, 
is something that only history will answer. 

Again, if I may venture a view, I would 
believe that almost certainly the United King- 
dom will at some point play a very important 
role in the construction of the new Europe. 
That is necessary and, may I say, inevitable. 

There is another element which is involved in 
what has occurred, and that is an interruption 
in the process toward unity on the Continent 
itself, among the six members of the European 
Economic Commmiity — the Common Market, 
as we call it. After all, the movement toward 
unity in Europe has been based upon a willing- 
ness of men and the nations to sacrifice some 
particular national interest in terms of a larger 
unity. This process has required a strong faith 
in what was being done and a strong will to do 
it. It has created political complications for 
many of the leaders who have played a part 
in it, but they have nevertheless gone forward. 
Now I think for the time being there has been 
an interruption in this process. Whether this 
can be overcome quickly is something again 
which we shall have to wait and see. I would 
certainly hope, from the interest of the United 
States and from the long-range interests of the 
whole Atlantic world, that this process can be 
resumed before very long. 

Third, and tliis has been of particular interest 
to the United States, there have been called into 

MAT 6, 1963 


question the postulates upon which we have 
been proceeding with regard to the organiza- 
tion of the Atlantic world. The Atlantic world 
is a very special complex of nations, because in 
Western Europe and North America there are 
contained something like 90 percent of all the 
industrial power of the free world. It is essen- 
tial that there be a unity of purpose and an 
ability to work together. What we have wit- 
nessed within the last few weeks is some doubts 
and questions as to what kind of arrangement 
should be made between the two sides of the 
Atlantic, between Western Europe on the one 
side and the United States on the other — West- 
ern Europe responding to a sense of new-found 
strength, and the United States being con- 
fronted with the fact that Europe had indeed 
succeeded in what we had very much hoped it 
would succeed in, becoming economically 
strong, and that certainly in the nature of 
things there would have to be a reallocation of 
responsibilities and a reallocation to some ex- 
tent of the authority which goes along with the 
assumption of responsibility. 

This is something which we have recognized 
in the Atlantic partnership all along. If the 
concept means anything — and I think it means 
a great deal — it means that on each side of the 
Atlantic the component parts of this partner- 
ship, the members, will assume responsibilities 
in accordance with their abilities, and their au- 
thority — the part they play in the management 
of the partnership — will have to be adjusted to 
the kind of responsibilities that they have 

Components of the Atlantic Partnership 

Now, in spite of the fact that there has been 
an interruption in the momentum of the move- 
ment which was under way during the last few 
years — an interruption which I think will be 
temporary^there nevertheless still exist the 
same compelling forces for bringing into being 
the Atlantic partnership about which we have 
talked so much and thought so much. 

These compelling forces, it seems to me, are 
three to four in number. First of all, when 
you have within the Atlantic complex some- 
thing like 90 percent of total industrial power 
of the free world, when you have industrial 

economies as highly developed as are our in- 
dustrial economies on both sides of the Atlantic, 
you have a kind of interdependence which again 
is something almost new in the world. 

We are aware of the fact — very clearly aware 
of the fact — that our economic good health on 
this side of the Atlantic depends to a consider- 
able extent on the maintenance of economic 
good health on the other side. Our European 
friends are very well aware of the fact that 
upon the economic good health and the rate of 
growth of the U.S. will depend to a considerable 
extent their own prospei'ity. So we have been 
trying more and more, through consultation 
within the structure of a new organization 
which was created only a year and a half ago — 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development — to bring about a unity of 
policy or at least a concerting of policy which 
has eliminated or attempted to eliminate many 
of the disequilibria — the distortions — which 
have occurred in economic relations within this 
Atlantic world. 

Secondly, we have recognized that there had 
to be a pooling of effort to achieve the common 
task which we have faced, that the United 
States alone could not and should not go on 
trying all around the world to carry the great 
share of the burden, because of the fact that 
Europe was now becoming stronger and Europe 
was becoming, therefore, more competent and 
more capable. We, ourselves, had to move into 
a world system where, with the withdrawal of 
Europe before the rising tide of anticolonialism, 
power vacuums were created on almost every 
continent, and the U.S. of necessity, in order to 
provide the security and protection which the 
free world required, had to make commitments 
in those areas which it has been difficult in 
almost all cases to carry out. So I think one 
of the very big pieces of unfinished business we 
have in our relations with European countries 
is to work toward some better allocation of re- 
sponsibilities which more nearly respond to the 
competence and the capability which exist on 
the two sides of the Atlantic with the coming 
into being of an economically strong Europe. 

We have been working also toward a recog- 
nition of the developed strength of Europe by 
seeking ways and means to give our European 
friends a greater share of participation in the 



coininon nuclear defense. This has been a mat- 
tor of vei-y great concern to us, as it has to 
Europeans. At Nassau we reached some conclu- 
sions in conversation with our British allies,^ 
which are being translated into reality now, con- 
chisions for the organization of a NATO force 
in Europe which would have several compo- 
nents: a component of national forces on tlie 
part of the nuclear powers, both forces in being 
and Polaris forces on the part of the United 
States and United Kingdom which would be 
contributed at a later point; and perhaps most 
important of all, a multilateral nuclear force 
which would represent an effort, on our part, in 
consultation with our European friends, to find 
some solution for the management of nuclear 
power in a manner which would pennit the non- 
nuclear as well as the nuclear nations to partici- 
pate without resulting in or encouraging the 
proliferation of tlie national nuclear capabilities 
wliich could start us down a very dangerous 

Finally, we have recognized that, not only 
in tlie areas of economic relations or in the areas 
of common defense or in the measures which 
we have been taking to work together toward 
the provision of assistance to less developed 
nations, but also in our commercial relations, we 
should try to make a serious effort to bring about 
a greater flow of trade and therefore a more 
effective allocation of resources and conse- 
quently a higher standard of living on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 

Within the meaning of the Trade Expansion 
Act which President Kennedy sent to Congress 
last year and which the Congress passed, we are 
presently engaged in the initial steps which will 
look toward a full-fledged trade negotiation 
next year. Governor Herter [Christian A. 
Herter, Special Representative of the President 
for Trade Negotiations], as you know, is taking 
specific charge of this undertaking. 

So I will say, gentlemen, that, while these last 
few weeks have been periods when it has been 
useful, I think, for all of us to take a look at 
problems confronting us, by and large the 
world, as we see it, remains unchanged. 
After the 14th of January, we still have the 
same problems. We still have the same com- 

' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43. 

pelling reasons for trying to work out effective 
institutional arrangements under which the in- 
dustrialized powers on the two sides of the 
Atlantic can work in a common effort toward 
the protection of the free world and to assure 
the survival of the common ideals which we 

Now I will do what I can on your questions, if 
you want to start the inquisition. 


Q. What would he wrong with a Europe that 
had a very high tariff wall? Isn't this a tried 
and tested method of developing an economic 
entity? Didn't we do it? Didn't Britain repre- 
sent a sort of leak in that wall, a possible leak, 
and can't they come in later, much as our col- 
onies came in later, so that we could gain 
strength as we went along? Should we he 
afraid of this, or does that represent for us 
something that has ultimate security for us? 

A. Mr. Block, I would remind you, first, that 
we are not living in the latter part of the 18th 
century and that the United States no longer 
consists of 13 new, fledgling States, nor do the 
states of modern Europe bear very much resem- 
blance to that from an economic point of view. 
Europe represents a highly sophisticated, 
highly organized, very dynamic and efficient 
society. It is of major importance to the United 
States that we have Europe for a market, as it 
is important to Europe that they have us for a 
market. So far as the United States is con- 
cerned, we sell a great part of our agricultural 
production to Western Europe. I would say 
half of our agricultural commercial exports go 
there. I think to the six nations of the Common 
Market we sell close to $1,400,000,000 a year of 
agricultural products; plus Great Britain, it 
comes to something like $1,800,000,000. 

So far as industrial products are concerned, 
we sell 50 percent more to Europe than we buy 
from them. So, from the point of view of the 
United States, even from the point of view of 
our own rather parochial commercial interests, 
it is of vital importance that we work toward 
the liberalization of trade and the lowering of 
the external tariff of the European Common 

JlAY 6, 1963 


But it is also of great interest to them. I 
may say that -what has come out of the events 
of the past few weeks, as far as the Europeans 
are concerned, is a realization on their part that 
however the trade negotiations may turn out 
will be a very great test for the vitality of the 
European community and of the new Europe. 
It is very important that they be outward-look- 
ing, because they are going to have to play a 
major role in this world. To be outward-look- 
ing means that, as far as their economies are 
concerned, it is important that they be sub- 
jected to the competition of the world in order 
to maintain their vitality. 

It is important for political reasons that 
there not be a constant kind of economic war- 
fare between the two halves of the free world 
in which the economic power of the free world 
is contamed. I would suppose that, if we are 
going to work toward the most effective kind of 
relations with the free world- — with the Atlantic 
world, other Atlantic nations — this process will 
be greatly facilitated if we can bring about a 
higher level of trade across the Atlantic and 
with the other nations and that, therefore, from 
the point of view, first, of the specific United 
States national interest and, second, from the 
strength and health of the free world itself, I 
think it is very important that there be success 
next year as we begin the difficult task of trade 

Mr. Brucker: I have one question I would 
like to ask if it is fair. It has bothered me a Jong 
time. I understood that the m^ovement of the 
Common Market had gotten over the hump and 
was 'practically irreversible. After that, you 
had the failure of the Outer Seven — the natural 
inclination to bring the two together. What is 
it that President de Gaulle has in the tcay of 
tools or something else that has made him 
singleharuledhj able to defy his five-nation col- 
leagues plus all the rest? 

A. I would think, Mr. Brucker, that the 
movement toward a Common Market was sub- 
stantially irreversible. I see very little possi- 
bility of its being either stopped very long or 
reversed. I don't think this is going to occur. 
But, of course, this movement is based upon 
the agreement of the nations concerned. Now, 

until recently, as I suggested a moment ago, 
the movement toward a stronger and more 
united Europe had come because of the willing- 
ness of each of those nations to subordinate its 
own specific national interest in the interest of 
this larger unit. On the other hand, the French 
Government at the moment has raised a ques- 
tion as to the kind of emphasis which it is pre- 
pared to put on the nation-state as against the 
creation of a stronger Europe. This is the prob- 
lem, and since France is one of the members of 
a group whicli is conunitted to make progress 
by unanimity under the terms of the Rome 
Treaty until January 1st, 1966, when many of 
the difficult decisions can be taken by a qualified 
majority vote, for the time being at least an 
assertion of a French veto on a specific matter 
such as the admission of the United Kingdom 
means that that event will not occur so long as 
the French Government takes that view. 

Now, I don't want to create the impression 
that I think the French Government is going to 
oppose all of the measures toward a greater 
unity in Europe. I think that there has been 
some exaggeration of the position that may have 
been indicated on this. Just what position it 
will take with regard to the trade negotiation, 
with regard to the creation of a conunon agricul- 
tural policy, with regard to a number of the 
other measures which are going forward within 
Europe, I think time will tell, and I would not 
at all want to prejudge it. I think that there 
are already signs of movement again — the re- 
sumption of movement toward unity within the 
Common Market and toward getting on with 
the agenda of the Common Market. I think 
that they will go forward. But for the moment, 
on the question of the accession of the United 
Kingdom, this has been stopped at the instance 
of the French Government. Whatever posi- 
tion the Government may take on other issues , 
will remain to be seen. | 

Mr. Brucker: I think in the interest of time 
we had better stop the questioning there. 

Mr. Ball, I want to speak for the ASNE in 
thanking you most heartily for taking time out 
of a busy day and giving us an equity enlight- 
ening and incisive and confident oittlook in an- 
other part of our troubled world. We thank 




Press release 204 dated April 19 

Thank you, Mr. Brucker, for your introduc- 
tion. Considering tlie menu which you have, 
the number of people who have spoken to you, 
I will try to be brief. 

I see that you have had a good lecture on bi- 
partisanship by Kenneth Keating. You know, 
he came when I was up before the Congress for 
confirmation this last time. He was kind 
enough to come and sit beside me and say I 
was all right. I told him I was really de- 
lighted by the kind words the Republicans said 
about me ever since I stopped running for 
public office. Anyway, Kenneth Keating told 
you all he knows about Cuba; so I don't sup- 
pose you need to ask any questions on that 
subject. But I was told when you got to me 
you wanted to talk about the Sino-Soviet rift. 

If I am correct about that, I will say a few 
words about tliat and leave some time for 

Sino-Soviet Rift 

Perhaps some of you know I have been in 
the last year and a half exiled in the Far East, 
but recently I have been reprieved and I am 
back in general circulation. But this subject 
of the Soviet Union and China is one of the 
very absorbing subjects of our time and is 
worth watching. 

I said the other day that I did not think we 
were smart enough, in answer to a question, to 
exploit the diilerences between the two, and 
someone criticized me in the press for that be- 
cause I played down our truths. I don't think 
anybody can exploit the diflPerence between the 
two, but I tliink we can behave in such a way 
as not to throw the two together ; if not, we will 
come to that in the end. 

There has been rather a myth that there has 
been a monolithic international Communist 
bloc. That has never been so. If you go back 
in history in the development of the Chinese 
Communist Party, in the twenties, you will find 
that Borodin, who then represented the Comin- 
tern in China, had some rather severe differ- 
ences with Mao Tse-timg, and if my history is 
right, Mao Tse-timg was very nearly thrown 
out of the Communist Party at that time because 

he refused to accept the Marxist-Lenin concept 
that the Commimist Party of China should be 
based on the urban industrial masses. He said 
China is going to be based on peasants. In 
any event, Mao Tse-timg won out. 

Now, I i-eceived some understanding of the 
relationship between the Ki'emlin and the Chi- 
nese Commimists during the war. Some of you 
remember I was in IMoscow on and off through- 
out the war for two and a half years. I saw a 
good deal of Stalin. China was the subject of 
discussion on a good number of occasions. He 
made it very plain that he did not have too 
much confidence in Mao Tse-tung or the Com- 
munist Party in China. Once he called them 
"margarine Coromimists." About that time 
there were some Americans who were calling the 
Communists "agrarian reformists." Wliether it 
was because margarine was not an agricultural 
product, I don't know, but somehow or other 
it was mixed up in butter. There was a thought 
that Stalin was trying to pull the wool over our 
eyes. He was not at all. He was very serious, 
because what he meant by "margarine Com- 
munists" was Communists that were not real 
Communists. To Stalin a real Communist was 
a party that accepted the Kremlin as the oracle. 
At that time ]\Iao Tse-tung was not then or 
since ready to accept the Kremlin as the last 
word. That has consistently, continually, been 
an issue between them. 

Different Stages of Development 

There are several other fundamental issues. 
One is the different stages in their economic de- 
velopment. As you well know, the Soviet 
Union has made extraordinary advances in in- 
dustrial production, science, and otherwise, as 
all Communists have, and quite a failure of 
their agricultural production. It is a curious 
thing, and I hope all of you remember it, and I 
will be glad to see all of you repeat it when- 
ever you have occasion to do so. Communists 
have always failed everywhere if they applied 
Commmiist methods to food production. But 
they have been in the Soviet Union successful in 
industrial production. 

Now, Khrushchev and the present genera- 
tion of Communist leadere do not want to see 
Russia destroyed. We saw this in Cuba, and 

MAT 6, 1963 

683511—63 3 

I think it is accepted as a fact that the Kremlin 
does not want to become involved in a nuclear 
war in which there is a chance that they would 
suffer terrific damage. Wliereas you have all 
heard the stories of what Mao Tse-tung is said 
to have said about the nuclear war to be of ad- 
vantage to China. The industrial nations 
would be wiped out, and China would be left 
as the great nation. They might lose a hundred 
or two million people. I am quoting what 
others have said: "We will lose a hundred or 
two million people. We will then be the great 
nation of the world." Thei-efore, there is rea- 
son to believe that China, the Cliinese Com- 
munists, are ready to take greater risks. 

That is one of the arguments that is going on 
between Peiping and Moscow. It was couched 
at one time in the words whether war was in- 
evitable. The question was not whether it was. 
The question was whether war was desirable. 

Although the Chinese Communists do not 
have nuclear capability now, I for one will 
think it will be a much more dangerous world 
when and if they do. It will be some years 
ahead. At the same time, let us hope in the 
meantime all people in China are educated to 
the appalling condition the world will be in if 
there is a nuclear holocaust. 

Now, a third reason is the historic differences 
between China and Russia, which have existed 
through the ages. I won't try to expose my ig- 
norance in history by explaining what hap- 
pened between the two countries, but I am sure 
you are as well informed as I am. 

These are all matters — these three differences 
are all matters which it is very difficult to patch 
over. They may attempt from time to time to 
paper them over, but it does seem there are some 
fundamental differences at the present time be- 
tween the two countries, between the Communist 
parties of the two countries. 

On the other hand, I personally believe that 
there is no — I will say there is no indication as 
yet that the Soviet Union is going to repudiate 
their military commitment to China; if China 
is attacked by Japan or anyone associated with 
Japan, she will come to the aid of China. It 
is one question to have a very serious difference 
within the Communist hierarchy and another to 
face the blotting out of an important Com- 

munist country by a non-Commimist. That is 
the question which, I think we should under- 
stand, puts the differences between them in a 
different dimension. j 

Now, there is another aspect of the difference 
in their economic development in that there is 
no doubt that Cliina demanded of Eussia that 
Russia give China a great deal of assistance. 
If Russia, they said, was to be a real Com- 
munist, they would share their production with 
China until China caught up and then the Com- 
munist movement could move up together. 

Well, the Russians did not think that was a 
very good idea. As a result, Russia dumped 
China. Several years ago they ended all eco- 
nomic and technical assistance, took their ad- 
visers out of China, and trade has gone down in 
the last couple of years to one-half of what it 
was, and there seems to be a great bitterness 
among the Chinese Communists against the 
Kremlin because it deserted China just when 
China was having the disastrous economic re- 
verse, when the collapse of the "great leap for- 
ward" occurred. 

No Difference in Objectives 

Now, it is interesting, but I do want to under- 
line the fact, if I may, that there is absolutely 
no difference in their objectives. Both of them 
think that communism is the wave of the fu- 
ture. Both of them believe it is their responsi- 
bility to push commmiism. They believe, as 
has been taught them, that communism cannot 
be safe in the world unless the whole world is 
Communist. It is not a question of the objec- 
tive. It is a difference in the methods by which 
the objective is achieved. 

Khrushchev is ready to use any method, 
brinkmanship, local wars of liberation, subver- 
sion, and any other method of that type to move 
forward. Now there does seem to be a greater 
willingness on the part of China to take risks, 
for Red China to take risks, but one will have 
to see to judge. In the Soviet Union there has 
been a great difference since the end of the war, 
which I think is worth noting. I talked on a 
number of occasions with St<alin about the fu- 
ture of communism in the world. He said that 
communism would eventually dominate the 
world, because of the defects of capitalism, be- 
cause of the failures of capitalism, because they 



believed that there would be great depressions 
in which communism could move forward. 

He also believed in the Marxist thesis that 
capitalist countries would battle each other, 
have wars, and during those periods of human 
miserj^ they would be able to move forward. 
Once he said, rather colorfully, that commmiism 
would breed in the cesspool of capitalism. 

Fifteen years later, sitting in the same room, 
I saw Khrushchev in June 1954 — the same pic- 
tures on the wall — the furniture was rearranged 
a bit — Klirushchev said, "We are making such 
an enormous success of communism that other 
countries are going to have to follow our ex- 

That is an amazing change, but that is indica- 
tive of the progress, the industrial progress, 
which has been made in the Soviet Union in the 
intervening period. It does indicate why they 
have become more conservative in terms of 
facing a nuclear war. 

There is another interesting thing which 
Stalin said to me in talking of China. I asked 
him once why he agreed to this Soong treaty, 
which you will remember provided that the 
Soviet Union would support Cliiang Kai-shek's 
government, tlie Nationalist Government. I 
think they used the words "military, econom- 
ically, politically, morally, and no other govern- 
ment." I asked him why he agreed to do that. 
He said, "Well, Chiang Kai-shek is the only 
individual that we supported before, although 
we did not fully agree with his ideas. We think 
he will be the only one who will be able to unify 
the country. What is more, China will need 
vast quantities of industrial equipment which 
they will only be able to get from the West, par- 
ticularly from the United States." 

Then he said a rather interesting word. He 
said, "We" — meaning the Soviet Union — "will 
not be able to provide them." It is interesting 
that after a number of years Klirushchev and 
his group tried to supply them. They made up 
their minds they could not do so and turned 
China loose on their own resources. 

In any event I think it is fair to say that there 
are very deep-seated diiferences between Mos- 
cow and Peiping which are likely to last even 
though there may be, as I say, from time to 
time a papering over of their differences. 

But let us not get under any illusion that if 

there is a major war in which China is in- 
volved — I would be rather surprised if Khru- 
shchev and his present generation of Commu- 
nists and the Kremlin did not come to its as- 
sistance. The effect of this, of course, to the 
East is interesting in that we see in India Red 
China attacking India and the Kremlin giving 
at least lipservice support to the Indian Gov- 
ernment and a gesture in terms of military as- 
sistance. As you know, they sent them a few 
MIG's. From the militai-y standpoint it is not 
of great importance, but as a gesture it does have 

Red China and India 

^¥hJ the Chinese Reds attacked India one 
cannot fully tell, but it must be beyond the rea- 
son of settling this border dispute. They built 
a road from Sinkiang Province into Tibet, 
which is the best way to get into the west and, 
of course, part of the territory which the In- 
dians claim and which the Chinese claim. Their 
attack could not only have related to that be- 
cause they were winning the particular local 
engagement which related to that area of La- 
dakh. They can get in by road or the Indians 
get in by air or by foot. But they attacked in 
the NEFA, the Northeast Frontier Area, where 
there was no real serious difference over the 
border. Although there was technically, there 
was not a very basic difference. They must 
have had in mind the desire to destroy the image 
of India as a great country, to humiliate India, 
and to build up their own prestige, which they 
had lost to a very considerable extent by the 
collapse of the "great leap forward." 

Now they have gained those objectives. On 
the other hand I think they have been rather 
surprised at the violent reaction within India 
itself, and I think we have a right to be en- 
couraged. Nehru himself said this is not an 
attack on us nor a border dispute. It is an at- 
tack on our way of life. Others have said it is 
an attack on our existence as a nation of free- 
dom, and they look upon it, both the Govern- 
ment, Prime Minister Nehru and his colleagues, 
and the Indian people, as a long-term struggle, 
and they want to strengthen themselves in order 
to succeed in meeting it. 

The area which Red China has perhaps the 

MAT 6, 1963 


most immediate desii-e to gain control of — they 
don't indicate that they are -willing to send mili- 
tary but they are attempting to subvert ; that is 
the area in Southeast Asia, in Burma, Thailand, 
Cambodia, Viet-Nam. That is the great sur- 
plus rice producing area and is an area that, 
with greater development of their river re- 
sources, could support a veiy substantially 
larger population. I would think that you 
could see increased pressure on that ai'ea from 
time to time as the situation develops. 

Now, as I say, this difference between Moscow 
and Peiping is extremely interesting and one 
which can have a vei-y vital effect. I think we 
ought to understand some of the things we 
should not do. There are some people who 
think we should not give aid to India unless 
they break with Moscow. I think that is a very 
stujjid thing. I tliink it is pleasant to see Mr. 
Khrushchev on the horns of a dilemma between 
his friend India and his eternal brother China. 
Why should we relieve him of that embarrass- 
ment? I think that it is very much in our in- 
terest that the Soviet Union continue to give 
economic assistance to India. The Indians have 
indicated that they have no intention of being 
overrun by any outsider. They are determined 
to maintain their freedom and their own way of 
life. If the Russians want to build a steel mill 
or give some other assistance, that can offset the 
obligation the responsibility for which will 
otherwise rest upon us and our European asso- 
ciates. So that I think that we have to play 
this thing by ear as the situation develops, but 
certainly we want to avoid doing what may tend 
to bring the two together. 

For that reason I suggest that we should in 
no sense attempt to interfere with India's for- 
eign policy as it relates to Russia at the present 

Now there are various other aspects of this 
struggle. You see it in Cuba. You see it in 
almost every part of the world. One thing is 
interesting — incidentally, I imagine almost 
every one of you have read this extraordinary 
letter which the Kremlin wrote to Peiping the 
other day listing its grievances — among others 
was the grievance that Peiping was attempting 
to use racial prejudice against her. They had 
the Moshi conference in Tanganyika, where 

they did not invite the Russians or the European 
Commmiists to come but only the Afro- Asians. 
At that time they indicated that there was a 
real affinity of interest between the Negro and 
the yellow races, the nonwhite races. Moscow 
condemned Peiping for attempting to use such 
prejudice in the battle between them. 

These are very interesting developments and 
ones which we should watch with a good deal 
of care to see which way eventually it develops 
in the relations between them. In any event, 
you continue to see rather vigorous comments 
made by one against the other, and it is becom- 
ing more and more a personal issue between 
the leaders of the two groups in Peiping and 

If tliis incites any of you to any questions, I 
will be very glad to answer them as it relates to 
this problem or anything else you care to have 
me comment on. 


Mr. Brucher: We have left a Tnaximum of 5 
minutes. Do you have any questions for Mr. 

Q. Mr. Earriman, you mentioned agrarian 
reformers. I seem to recall some years ago we 
had an adviser in the State Department^ Mr. 
Lattimore, who used that term. As I recall, 
it was his suggestion that we make it a matter 
of U.S. policy that the Chinese be urged to join 
up tvith these agrarian reformers. I am just 
wondering. Is Mr. Lattimore still connected 
with our State Department? 

A. I have no idea, and I don't care to discuss 
the past. I don't know why you ask me that 
question. In some ways I rather resent it, be- 
cause we are not involved in raking over the 
past. We think about tlie future. I don't know 
wliy you inquire about that. If anybody feels 
differently about it, I am sorry, but I think 
this persecution of an individual is a thing 
(applause) we have gotten over, thank God, 
and let us not go over any of the past. The 
people who are working for the State Depart- 
ment are damn good Americans. They are just 
as good Americans as you are. (Applause.) 

Mr. Brucher: I told you we had an inde- 
pendent-minded man. 



A. I don't thiiik I am independent. I think 
I express the opinion of the majority of 

Ml'. Bintcker: I would agree with that, Mr. 

A. And I have a very liigh regard for this 
group in this room. 

Mr. Brucher: That is frobably true., too. 
Is there another question in the minute or 
two remaining? 

Q. I would like to ask you a question. Re- 
cently I was in the Far East, and I visited Indo- 
nesia. I noted the country, the corruption, and 
the fact that they are iroke and also the fact 
that they are -playing footsie with the Russians 
as well as the Chinese. How do we stand toith 

A. I wish I could give you a direct answer 
to that. I can say that Sukarno and this Indo- 
nesian Govenunent are very strong nationalists. 
They have not fought for their freedom from 
the Dutch with the idea of giving it up either 
to the Chinese or to the Russians. Now, they 
have accepted a vei-y large amount of economic 
aid and military assistance from the Soviet Un- 
ion, but they have not accepted any such assist- 
ance from China. Sukarno is playing a rather 
careful political game in his country between 
the different elements within his society, but 
at least I think we can be sure that he is 
attempting to develop Indonesia for the 

Now, he is accepting certain assistance from 
us which is relatively modest, and the military 
seem to depend upon us to a considerable extent 
for training and for certain types of equipment 
in spite of the overall equipment, large equip- 
ment, they are getting from Russia. 

Incidentally, you may have noticed, if you 
read your papers — I have to read the papers 
today, because I work for a man who reads too 
many newspapers — you probably have noticed 
that Marshal Malinovsky, the Minister of De- 
fense of the Soviet Union, has recently been in 
Indonesia, and he seems to leave in not too good 
a humor. But the future alinement of Indo- 
nesia is impossible for anybody fully to predict. 
As far as I am concerned, I think that we ought 

to accept Indonesia as she is, the fifth largest 
nation in the world, I think, with vast economic 
resources, a very low standard of living as com- 
pared to the Western countries and to some 
other Eastern countries. But we have a great 
area, if you will look at a geography, running 
from Malaya almost touching Australia, cut- 
ting across the communications between Japan 
and India and the Philippines. We have an 
enormous interest to see that country develop 
within the free world. I think those who sug- 
gest that we should abandon Indonesia are un- 
necessarily pessimistic, and to those who think, 
if there are any, that we are going to have an 
easy time ahead, I say I think we should work 
as closely with the Indonesian Government as 
they are willing to work with us, give them a 
helping hand where it is to our interest to do 
so, and watch developments and hope that the 
spirit of nationalism will be stronger than the 
effect of Communist propaganda. 

In the East, where the standard of living is 
low, desperately low— $50, $G0, $70 per capita 
per annum, against ours, whatever it is, $2,500 — 
this question of freedom does not mean a lot. 
But nationalism does. If we could understand 
that the issue is between nationalism and Chi- 
nese imperialism, rather than some ideological 
concept or economic concept, I think we would 
do better. I do believe we have a very 
strong ally in this feeling of national pride 
which comes to a nation which has just come out, 
and if we will work with them, with that feel- 
ing, and forget about some of the other ideals 
we would like to achieve, we will be more apt 
to achieve our objectives. 

Now, I am sorry to have been so long-winded 
about this, but I think there are no easy answers 
in Indonesia. I think we have a vital interest in 
the country, and I hope that we will continue 
to attempt to find a common ground with the 
Indonesian Government and the people, and 
that over the years we will be able to find that 
the people of that country come closer to our 
concepts than those of the Communists. 

What would be, I think, the most foolish 
thing in the world would be simply to say be- 
cause they don't do everything we want we will 
forget about them. Then there is no doubt they 
will fall under the domination of the Commu- 

MAT G, 1963 


nists. This is the kind of difficult situation, 
perhaps one of the most difficult, which we have 
to contend with in the world. It is not possible 
to see black and white. It is not possible to see 
exactly the course we have to follow. I hope 
that you men, if I may say so, will follow this 
type of situation with a great deal of care and 
try to get the American people to recognize that 
our long-term interest will best be served by 
standing on the sidelines at times and not neces- 
sarily applauding or condemning what may be 
going on in different countries. Thank you 
very much, gentlemen. 

Secretary Rusk Interviewed 
on GFWC Television Program 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Rush hy representatives of the 
General Federation of Women's Clubs, filmed 
on March 26 and released on April 13 for broad- 
cast by independent radio and television sta- 
tions as the first program in a series entitled 
'"'"'Women on the MoveP 

Press release 193 dated April 12, for release April 13 

Ml'. Granih: This is Theodore Granik speak- 
ing to you from the John Quincy Adams Room 
of the United States Department of State. 
Here, on this premier broadcast, to ask the dis- 
tinguished Seci'etary of State Dean Eusk the 
questions every American wants answered, are 
"Women on the Move," chosen from its more 
than 11 million members by the General Fed- 
eration of Women's Clubs, and with the Secre- 
tary of State is our moderator, Mrs. Dexter Otis 
Arnold, president of the General Federation 
of Women's Clubs. 

Mrs. Ai^old: Mr. Secretary, our panel today 
on the first program of "Women on the Move" 
consists of Mrs. J. Kenneth Bradley, who is the 
president of the Connecticut Federation of 
Women's Clubs ; and Mrs. Donald Domer, who 
is the secretary of the Ohio Federation of 
Women's Clubs; and Mrs. Fred Gast, who is 
the immediate past president of the Oi'egon 
Federation of Women's Clubs; and the chair- 
man of the International Affairs Department 

of the General Federation of Women's Clubs, 
Mrs. Joseph Paige. 

I think Mrs. Bradley is going to ask the first 

Mrs. Bradley: Mr. Secretary, in connection 
with the Cuban situation, would you define for 
us the difference between offensive and defen- 
sive ? I think that this becomes very confusing 
in the minds of the average American. 

Secretary Riish: Well, Mrs. Arnold, let me 
say first how happy I am to welcome you and 
your colleagues here to the John Quincy Adams 
Room of the Department of State. 

Well, it is true that in a certain sense any 
weapon can be offensive or defensive, depending 
on where it is and on which end of it you are. 
But insofar as a Cuban military threat to the 
hemisphere is concerned, offensive weapons are 
those which could strike significantly at the 
hemisphere or at Cuba's neighbors. 

Now, at the present time President Kennedy 
has made it utterly clear that we would not 
accept a reintroduction into Cuba of weapons 
which could strike at its neighbors, including 
the United States; that we would not permit 
any arms that are in Cuba to be used outside of 
Cuba; that we would enforce the right to use 
international airspace and international waters 
freely by ourselves and othei's; that we would 
enforce the necessity of keeping a careful watch 
over what is going on in Cuba ; that if any at- 
tempt were made to launch forays against any 
other countries, those would meet the armed 
forces of the hemisphere, including those of the 
United States. So that these are the present 
military commitments of the United States 
with respect to Cuba. 

Mrs. Paige: Then these are the acts of ag- 
gression that would provoke us to war? 

Secretary Busk: Well, I hesitate to use this 
word "war" because that is a very small word 
that encompasses a good deal. What I would say 
is that there is no question whatsoever that the 
United States will give the fullest support to 
the Eio Treaty, which guarantees the security 
of this hemisphere, and other steps which are 
necessai-y to insure that Cuba does not itself 
launch an aggression in any way against its 



The Costa Rica Conference 

Mrs. Paige: Well, would you tell us, please, 
Mv. Secretary, wliat importance you attach to 
the Costa Eica conference ? 

Secretary Busk: Yes. I think that tliere 
were three points of major importance in the 
Costa Rica conference.^ The first is that the 
very presence of the Presidents of the seven 
states represented there brought great public 
attention upon those particular countries and 
in effect moved the Central American Eepublics 
and Panama to the front of our attention as 
a nation and registered the fact that we look 
upon wliat is happening in Central America 
as of the utmost imjiortance to us, not as just 
l^art of the backyard or forgotten part of this 

Secondly, we were very much encouraged to 
see how rapidly the Central American Eepub- 
lics are moving toward economic integration. 
These are for the most part small countries with 
relatively limited populations. There are 
many things which they cannot achieve one by 
one — for example, monetary stability, questions 
of university education, the training of quali- 
fied personnel, cooperation in the development 
of superior tecliniques in agriculture, things 
of that sort, public-health measures — all can 
best be done on a regional basis in that area, 
and President Kennedy was able to give power- 
ful support to the growing sense of unity among 
the Central American Eepublics. 

And third were those measures that I have 
mentioned, about interrupting the subversive 
flow of funds and personnel from Cuba into 
these countries. I think that those were the 
result of the conference. 

I must say that the warm welcome which the 
public gave to the President itself was most 
extraordinary and, I think, one of the most ex- 
citing parts of the visit. 

Mrs. Gast: Mr. Secretary, then do you feel 
that, through our alliance and this meeting in 
Costa Eica, we are showing sufficient evidence 
of helping to show our way of life to Latin 
America, and through this aid helping these 
countries to build up their own economies? 

' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 511. 

Secretary Rush: I think that this is a matter 
in which there will always be unfinished busi- 
ness, but I think that a great deal has been 
done in the recent months — in the last year or 
two — to improve what is happening on our side 
in Latin America. For example, in 1960 we 
were engaging in only 1 hour a day of broad- 
casting to Latin America. That has now gone 
up to 13 hours a day, 9 in Spanish and 4 in 
Portuguese. That is one major area of im- 

I think also that we are making headway, al- 
though slowly, on some of the steps which have 
to be taken by the countries themselves if our 
relatively small investments in the Alliance for 
Progress are to pay off in real development. 
You see, the total Alliance for Progress in- 
volves only 2 percent of the gross national prod- 
ucts of the countries involved. The real job 
is to be done by the 98 percent of the resources 
contributed by the countries themselves to their 
own effort. That is how development comes 
about — 

Mrs. Domer: Land reform is such a — 

Secretary Rusk: — land reform, improved 
tax systems, administration, improved health 
measures — all the rest of it. So I think that 
this is moving. One of the problems — you men- 
tioned impatience. 

Mrs. Domer: Yes. 

Secretary Ru^k: One of the problems is that 
we would like for them to move fast, but we 
would like for them to move fast under demo- 
cratic processes. Now, when we look back over 
some of the controversial periods through which 
we have lived in our own country in bringing 
about the great reforms which have had so much 
to do witli our own development, we can under- 
stand tliat, in some of these countries, if they 
move democratically they have problems at 
home in getting their congresses and legisla- 
tures to take the steps that we and they both 
think will be necessary ; so it will take a little 

Mrs. Bradley: Mr. Secretary, this suggestion 
that what we need in Latin America is a good, 
sound middle class — which they don't have. 
They have the two classes, the few and the 
wealthy class, and then of course the poor class, 

MAT 6, 1963 


because the military I suppose comes closest to 
the middle class — 

Secretary Rush: I think that there is a very 
important point there, that we do see evolving 
what might be called the moderate middle class, 
but this depends upon education, it depends 
upon the gradual development of the capital 
required for such a middle class to come into 
existence, it requires opportimities for trade 
among those who would become the middle 
class, but also I think it involves some recogni- 
tion on the part of the privileged classes to 
accept the public responsibilities which wealthy 
people in our country have begun to accept more 
and more over, say, the last 50 years and, on 
the other side, the responsibility on the part 
of the so-called lower classes in recognizing 
that you cannot really lift the standard of liv- 
ing of an entire country by leveling down — you 
level up, you increase production so that those 
at the bottom themselves find that they them- 
selves are earning more through their own 

Basic Commitments of NATO Unchanged 

Mrs. Paige: Mr. Secretary, might we move to 
another part, because the General Federation's 
study program is concentrated more or less in 
our mutual security alliances and we are empha- 
sizing that particularly. Could you tell us, 
please, whether or not the new French attitude 
has changed — made or forced a basic change 
in our foreign policy? 

Secretary Rush: Well, I think that it is im- 
portant to understand what the recent discus- 
sion has been all about. Let me say at the 
beginning that it has not been about the basic 
commitments of NATO. Those conmiitments 
with respect to the security of NATO over 
against the Soviet bloc are just as simple and 
direct and firm as they have ever been. Back 
in October there was complete unity in NATO 
at that moment of great crisis, and France made 
it very clear that, if the Cuban situation re- 
sulted in general war, France would be with the 
United States — no if's, no hesitations, very 

And it is very important for Moscow to un- 
derstand that this is so, because we are not 

talking about cracks in the basement of the 
alliance. What we are talking about is how to 
build the second story, how do you write the 
next chapter, where do you go from here. Aiid 
it had been our hope and the hope of many 
people on the European side that there would 
be, first, the United Kingdom's accession to the 
Common Market, that the Treaty of Kome 
would be developed on a basis of a unified Eu- 
rope, that we and unified Europe would move 
together not only on security questions in 
NATO but in trade questions in connection with 
our Trade Expansion Act, and that there would 
evolve a imified Europe and a great Atlantic 

Now, the details of how this was to be worked 
out have been discussed, and there have been 
disagreements, as you know, but I have no doubt 
that this is the inevitable mainstream of policy 
for the West and that what we are confronted 
with is a pause, a realinement, a readjustment of 
thinking, a reconsideration of techniques; but 
the alliance itself is just as solid as it can pos- 
sibly be and is significantly stronger than it has 
ever been in the history of the alliance. For 
example, our own defense budget has grown 
about 25 percent in the last 2^/^ years. 

Mrs. Arnold: Mr. Secretary, what can you 
tell us about the Berlin situation that would be 

Secretary Rush: Well, I would have to say 
that I do not at the present time see any major 
change in the Berlin situation. This is a point 
of direct confrontation between the Soviet 
Union and the Western countries. We have the 
most vital interests at stake there. We would 
prefer to see a question of this sort resolved 
without a high crisis or without conflagration. 
But these are utterly fundamental questions ; I 
think they imderstand that in Moscow. But 
tliey are so difficult and complex that I do not 
see that we will have Berlin off of our agenda 
for some time to come. 

Mrs. Domer: They have indicated their will- 
ingness to resume the talks — whatever that 

Secretary Rush: Yes, those talks have been 
begun. Whether anything will come out of 
them, it is too early to say right now. But this 
is a problem that has been with us since 1945. 



I don't myself see any easy and automatic solu- 
tion, but it is one that we ought to try to find 
some answers to, if possible, but only on the 
basis of the full insurance of the security and 
the freedom of the people of West Berlin, of the 
American interests there. 

U.S. Relationships With Common Market 

Mrs. Gast: Mr. Secretary, what changes will 
have to be made in our tariff regulations in 
order to compete in the Common Market ? 

Secretary Rush: Well, at the present time, the 
changes that we made under the Tariff Adjust- 
ment Act, the simplification procedures, are now 
being considered by the EEC [European Eco- 
nomic Community] countries in Europe to see 
what adjustments, what concessions, are re- 
quired as a result of that procedure. 

Then, after that, Mr. Herter [Christian A. 
Herter, Special Representative of the President 
for Trade Negotiations] and his colleagues will 
be holding hearings, in which private American 
interests can come in to state their situations, 
as a result of which then we can go into the 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] negotiations next year and bargain hard 
for mutual reductions of tariffs on both sides of 
the Atlantic, so that we can have an expansion 
of trade throughout the Atlantic conunimity. 

This is a very complex procedure. It will 
take a good deal of time. We are delighted that 
Secretary Herter has been willmg to take on 
this responsibility. But my own view is that 
the result of it will be an expansion of trade and 
economic activity, both here and in Europe. 

Mrs. Bradley: Mr. Secretary, what effect did 
the Common Market crisis have on our Ameri- 
can-English relationship ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have had for a 
very long time indeed a close relation with 
Britain. Some people call it a "special" rela- 

During World War II we were the most inti- 
mate of allies and partners. We have supposed 
that, if Britain goes into the Common Market, 
that same intimacy will exist between us and 
a imified Europe. But I would not suppose 
that our close cooperation with Britain would, 
in any way, be weakened by the events of the 
past several weeks. We will continue to co- 

operate with Britain as well as our European 
allies in whatever way is possible, given the 
problems we have to deal with. 

Mrs. Domer: Back to this Common Market 
thing. Won't the Common Market affect, 
though, the United States sales of poultry and 
dairy products? I mean, hasn't this really been 
established — that these will be affected? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, when trading part- 
ners are exchanging billions of dollars in each 
direction each year, I think there will always 
be specific trading questions that will have to 
be ironed out. It is in the very nature of an 
expansive and vigorous private trading com- 
munity that this should be so. We have been 
working very hard in the past several months 
on insuring a market for American poultry in 
Europe. Now they have some problems about 
markets in this country. They are concerned 
about, for example, glass or textiles or other 
things in which some of our operations here 
feel pinched. 

But we will never be in a situation where 
there are not specific trading questions that 
have to be talked about and worked over, be- 
cause we are too expansive and explosive in our 
economies in the West ever to have a completely 
serene situation. But we do believe that the 
vast trade that even now exists between both 
sides of the Atlantic can be significantly ex- 
panded to the mutual profit of both sides. 

Aid to Viet-Nam 

Mrs. Bradley: Could we move into the Viet- 
Nam area ? 

Secretary Rush : Right. 

Mrs. Bradley: — because I think this is some- 
thing we are all terribly interested in, of course, 
as we are interested in all the other areas. 

How far do you think the United States 
should go there, Mr. Secretary, in supporting 
the buildup of the guerrilla warfare in Viet- 

Secretary Rush: I think we have to start 
from the underlying proposition that the peo- 
ples in Southeast Asia do not wish to be ab- 
sorbed either by communism or by the Chinese. 
And this means that they are particularly con- 
cerned about being absorbed by Chinese com- 

MAT 6, 1963 


We do believe that the people of South Viet- 
Nam are fighting their own battle. Our effort 
has been to put them in position to win that 
battle. Guerrilla war is one of the most diffi- 
cult, most frustrating kinds of wars to fight. 
The means are : a vanishing enemy, hard to lo- 
cate, hard to pin down. You never know ex- 
actly when a victory has been scored, because 
the total result in the immediate day-to-day 
operation is not so clearly evident. 

But we feel that an important comer has been 
turned in recent months in South Viet-Nam: 
the ratio of arms captured by one side or the 
other, of casualties inflicted, great improvement 
in intelligence resources. For example, the vil- 
lagers are now coming forward in great numbers 
to give information to the Government in a way 
that they have never done before — a very im- 
portant thing. And the village development 
program in the strategic hamlets has been mov- 
ing forward, and more and more villagers are 
able to till their crops and go about their nor- 
mal duties with a sense of security. So our 
principal purpose is to put them in a position 
to win their battle. 

Now, if the other side steps up the effort, or 
if this drags on unduly, then some very serious 
and possibly harsh decisions will have to be 
made. But we have been encouraged by what 
has been happening in the last several months. 
Mrs. Paige: Mr. Secretary, what evidence 
have we that the administration aid program 
for Southeast Asia is justified? 

Secretary Riu^h: Well, I think you would 
start, first, with the question of what the sit- 
uation would be in Southeast Asia had we not 
provided very substantial aid. I think that the 
answer would be that the world would be split 
in two by the Coimnunist bloc. 

In Southeast Asia, Indonesia would, perhaps, 
long since have become a part of that bloc. 
These are people who I do think want to be 
free and independent. They need help. And I 
think it is in our interests to provide them that 

Since 1945 the principal powers in the West 
have agreed that the security of Southeast Asia 
is vei-y important to the free world. I think 
that is the sense, not only among our own peo- 
ple but throughout the non-Communist world. 
So although the aid looks rather extensive it 

is not really large m relation to the stakes at 
issue. And I would suppose that if we can put 
those people in a position to win their fight, that 
cost to us, even large as it is, is small. 

Mrs. Domer : Would it not be possible that, if 
we encouraged and aided a little more, we might 
find the Chinese Commimists reacting more 
vigorously, too, in some of these spots ? 

Secretary Rusk : Well, I don't believe that we 
could withhold help from someone on the 
ground — on the basis that the other side might 
step up the effort. I think that would probably 
be a mistake. 

But what we ought to try to do is to find ways 
to help these people to get on with their job 
without necessarily precipitating a major strug- 
gle in tlie process. And this is what we are try- 
ing to do now in South Viet-Nam. 

Moscow-Peiping Relationship 

Mrs. Bradley : Mr. Secretary, are we expect- 
ing recognition of Red China ? 

Secretary Rush: I see no prospect of that at 
the present becoming an active question. Quite 
apart from our own attitude toward Red China, 
and its policy, and its sharp and hostile attitude, 
and even in its own discussions with Moscow at 
the present time — 

Mrs. Domer: That's what I wondered. 

Secretary Rusk: — there is not the slightest 
indication from Peiping they are interested in 
normal relations with other people, because they 
keep saying that the basis for normal relations 
is the surrender of Formosa, and we are not go- 
ing to do that. I don't see any prospect of that 
becoming a live question. 

Mrs. Domer: You are giving more or less 
serious consideration to that Sino-Soviet split. 

Secretary Rusk: This is a matter that we 
can't help but follow with the greatest possible 
interest. But I have been cautious about trying 
to interpret it, because I am not at all sure that 
either Moscow or Peiping fully understands that 
particular relationship at the present moment. 

Mrs. Bradley: Is it then just wishful thinking 
for us at the moment ? 

Secretary Rusk: Not really. What they are 
arguing is about how best to get on with the 
world revolution — their world revolution. And 
I am not sure that it is in our interests neces- 



sarily for tliem to go into competition to see 
who can move on more rapidly with the Com- 
munist world revolution. But, on the other 
hand, this difference has injected uncertainty 
and confusion in the Soviet world; and that is 
all to tlio good. 

I think we had just better watch that one out 
a little bit. I don't think there is much we can 
do to contribute to that division, because if we 
were to try to move in and exploit it in some 
way, that would tend to drive the two together 
again ; and that we don't want. 

Mrs. Arnold: Will the news continue to be 
inifortunate as far as the Geneva conference is 
concerned ? 

Secretary Rusk : Well, this is a question that 
requires, I think, just about as much patience 
and persistence as any question I know. 

When I was much younger, I was involved in 
the disarmament discussions in 1945, just after 
World War II ; we have been with it ever since. 
We can't stop the effort. But, on the other 
hand, we can't take measures of disarmament 
that are not consistent with our own security 
and tlie security of the free world. I do not 
see immediate and dramatic results coming out 
of Geneva, but nevertheless we can't abandon 
the efforts ; we have to stay with it. 

Mrs. Arnold: Mr. Secretary, what is the hope 
for peace in our time ? 

Secretary Rush: Oh, I think diplomacy has 
to work on the basis of optimism. And I per- 
sonally am deeply optimistic that, in the longer 
run, there is a real chance that these great pur- 
poses that are rooted in the nature of man will 
themselves be sustained and that we can work 
these things out by peaceful means. Because 
I don't believe there is any people (and I in- 
clude the Russian people) — I don't believe there 
is any people who wants the kind of war that 
modern war would be, if we, in fact, have war. 

Now there are some dangers. There are some 
shoals to get through: questions like Berlin, 
Southeast Asia. But if we get through those, 

over the short run, it is my belief that the type 
of world represented by the U.N. Charter has 
a very good chance of coming into being. 

Mrs. Arnold: Thank you, Secretary of State 
Dean Eusk, for allowing us to visit with you 
on this, the first broadcast of "Women on the 
Move." And I want to thank the members of 
the panel for their very penetrating and pro- 
vocative questions. 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Ceylon, 
Merenna Francis de Silva Jayaratne, presented 
his credentials to President Kennedy on April 8. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release 183 dated April 8. 

United States Extends Recognition 
to New Government of Guatemala 

Department Statement 

Press release 199 dated April 17 

The Department of State annoimced today 
[April 17] that the United States Government 
has extended recognition to the new govern- 
ment of Guatemala headed by Col. Enrique 

This action has been taken by the Govern- 
ment of the United States after having ascer- 
tained that the new government in Guatemala 
is in full control of the country and has pledged 
itself to respect Guatemala's international 

The recognition of the new government in 
Guatemala has been extended following con- 
sultation by the United States with other gov- 
ernments in this hemisphere. 

MAT 6, 1963 


Our Hemisphere: The Long and Short Views 

hy Adlai E. Stevenson 

V.S. Representative to the United Nations ' 

I am delighted to be here — even though a 
bit breatlilessly. 

Yesterday on Easter Sunday I was in the 
Cathedral of Seville in a new community called 
Europe. This morning I am in an older com- 
munity called Pan America — and on Pan 
American Day at that. These two communities 
of free and independent nations, along with 
others still aborning, represent the real wave 
of the future. And there is no better time to 
point that out than on Pan American Day. 

This is the 73d anniversary of the First Inter- 
national Conference of American States, which 
created the International Union of American 
Republics. This is the 30th anniversary of the 
good-neighbor policy ; and it is the 15th anni- 
versary of the Charter of the OAS. Less than 
2 years ago we joined in the Declaration of 
Punta del Este ^ with its exhilarating promise 
of things to come; and less than a month ago 
seven nations joined in the Declaration of Cen- 
tral America,^ heralding a hopeful trend 
toward economic integration in that region. 

Between 1890 and 19G3 there have been many 
other landmarks — bearing such names as Mon- 
tevideo, Buenos Aires, Lima, Habana, Rio de 
Janeiro, and Chapultepec — at all of which we 
moved forward toward the goal of an inter- 
American community that works like a func- 
tioning, healthy community ought to work. 

Along the way, the International Union of 
American Republics has become the Organiza- 

' Address made before the Organization of American 
States at Wastiington, D.C., Apr. 15 in observance of 
Pan American Day and Pan American WeelJ, Apr. 14- 
20 (press release 192). 

" For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 462. 

' For text, see iUd., Apr. 8, 1963, p. 515. 

tion of American States. The Council has 
acquired three dependent organs, six specialized 
organizations, and six more special agencies and 
commissions. And at long last we established, 
a few years ago, the much-needed Inter- Ameri- 
can Development Bank. So over the years we 
have erected, bit by bit, the institutional under- 
pinning of an inter- American community. 

Observations on the Cuban Crisis 

Just how effective that machinery is in time of 
peril was demonstrated to all the world last 
October. At the height of the debate during the 
first meeting of the United Nations Security 
Council on the Cuban crisis, I was passed a small 
slip of paper. It told me — and I quickly told 
the others — that the Coimcil of the Organization 
of American States, acting provisionally as the 
Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty, 
had unanimously condemned the clandestine 
and provocative installation of Soviet missile 
bases within the Western Hemisphere and was 
taking immediate action to bring about a quar- 
antine of Castro's satellite island.^ I can tell 
you that in that fleeting moment I rejoiced 
mightily in the result of our work over the past 
72 years. And so, some day in the not distant 
future, will the stricken and subjugated people 
of our sister nation in the Caribbean. 

And if I may digress for a moment here, I 
should like to say that during my recent journey 
in Europe and Morocco I received emphatic and 
universal assurances of support for the Cuban 
policy we have pursued, both during and since 
the October crisis. There is particular appreci- 
ation of the coolheaded, persevering determina- 

* For baclcground, see iMd., Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 720-740. 



tion tliat has characterized tlie response of the 
American governments to that crisis and its 

As President Kennedy has pointed out, there 
is no instant, easy sohition for communism in 
Cuba — or anywhere else, I could add. Those 
who would provoke us into extreme and reckless 
measures are not serving the best interests of 
either the United States or the solidarity of our 
hemisphere — or, for that matter, the long-suf- 
fering Cuban people, whose thirst for freedom 
Castro cannot quench. "In times like the pres- 
ent," as Abraham Lincoln once said at another 
critical moment, "men should utter nothing for 
which they would not willingly be responsible 
through time and in eternity." That is still 
good advice. 

Cuba's freedom will be restored, and when it 
is, it will be our challenging task to make sure 
that Moscow will never again succeed in con- 
verting the tyranny of a Batista into the tyran- 
ny of a Castro. And no less will it be our task 
to make sure that freedom will continue to 
flourish in this hemisphere long after Castroism 
has passed into history. 

I have one other observation to offer on the 
Cuban crisis. After our experience with it, it is 
incomprehensible to me that anyone still thinks 
of the United Nations and the OAS as alterna- 
tive instruments of security and peacekeeping. 
The coordinated and complementary use of both 
instruments was indispensable in the Cuban 
crisis, which eloquently demonstrated that the 
regional system and the universal system each 
have their separate roles in such threats to the 

Growth of the Inter-American Community 

The same point is valid with respect to eco- 
nomic and social affairs as well as to security 
affairs : The U.N. agencies and the inter- Amer- 
ican agencies work hand m glove as one pursues 
the Decade of Development and the other the 
Alliance for Progress. 

The global agencies and the regional agencies 
are no more in conflict than are the regional 
communities of nations in conflict with each 
other. And I dare say that in the years ahead 
we shall all be constructing an even wider 
Western community embracing us all. 

And why not? The new Europe can no 
more look inward than the separate nations 
which comprise it ; nor can the inter- American 
community. Already the Europeans are show- 
ing an increased interest in playmg an active 
and constructive role in the Alliance for Prog- 
ress — and an awareness of the problems posed 
by the Common Market for raw-material pro- 
ducing countries of this hemisphere. The 
interaction between these communities, once 
separated and now joined by the Atlantic 
Ocean, will continue and grow until we see the 
still wider AVestern commimity not as a dream 
but as an imperative. 

In any event, as we look back over the story 
of the growth of the inter-American com- 
munity, we can see that Simon Bolivar was 
right 137 years ago when he first wrote of his 
vision of an alliance of American states. The 
Great Liberator, of course, was to be disap- 
pointed during his own lifetime; but he took 
the long view, and history has shown how 
profoundly right he was. 

For as we look around at the postwar world, 
it is clear that the emergence of regional com- 
munities of free nations is the historic trend of 
the 20th century and a dynamic political move- 
ment. The American Republics have shown 
the way; now regionalism is highly advanced 
in Western Europe; it is stirring in Southeast 
Asia and in north and central Africa; and it 
will come to pass — if slowly — elsewhere. These 
regional communities are the structural frame- 
work of an eventual system of world order 
within the larger frame of the United Nations. 

But even while celebrating the fact of our 
community, it would not be prudent to recall 
all the virtues and forget all the faults of the 
past. This would make it seem all too easy 
when, in fact, it is extraordinarily difficult ; for 
all that holds our community together is free 
consent. And while this is the best, indeed, 
tlie only durable way to build workable com- 
munities, it also is the most difficult method of 

So it is worth mentioning in passing that in 
the process of building an inter- American com- 
munity we have tended too often to consider a 
conference as a substitute for action. We have 
been better at writing declarations than in car- 

MAY 6, 1963 


rying them out. We have been slow, at times, 
to modernize our doctrines and our institutions. 
And until the quite recent past my own country 
has not been entirely innocent of tlie charge 
that we tended to take Latin America for 
granted. And at times we have seemed to be 
rather more united in what we are against than 
what we are for. 

Not so today. I like to think that the Charter 
of Punta del Este was much more than another 
inter-American declaration of high ideals — 
much more than just another milestone in the 
unfolding stoiy of the inter-American com- 
munity. I like to think that this was the point 
at whicli we reached agreement on what we 
are for — and went forth to do something big 
about it. 

But that was 20 months ago. And now we 
hear complaints that enough has not happened, 
that progress has been too slow. 

The New Europe and the Alliance for Progress 

I was thinking of this last night as I flew 
across the Atlantic. Behind me lay a Europe 
which has some temporaiy political disabili- 
ties — some doubts, some disagreements, which 
have imposed a pause on the steady and dra- 
matic trend toward widening unity in the post- 
war European world. 

But I was in a Europe which also is prosper- 
ing as never before, which knows by far the 
highest standard of living in its histoi-y, which 
is competent, bold, and renascent; so much so 
that one wonders whether it is relevant any 
more to refer to it as the Old World, for there 
is so much that is yoimg and fresh and vital 
about it. 

Perhaps inevitably, as I flew home across the 
Atlantic, my thoughts drifted back to the 
Europe of the immediate postwar period. I 
recalled that it was on another flight over the 
Atlantic, on the way back from a frustrating 
foreign ministers meeting in Moscow in 1947, 
that General [George C] Marehall first dis- 
cussed with his staff the need for a major inter- 
national effort to help Europe get back on its 
feet after the hammer blows of history's worst 

I thought back to that Europe of 1947 — lying 
in I'uins: a Europe only partly fed, partly 

clothed, partly housed, and partly employed ; a 
Europe half-frozen in the grip of a bitter 
winter, plagued by an alarming rise in the 
tuberculosis rate, doing too much of its business 
on the black market ; a Europe struggling hope- I 
lessly to solve its economic problems, nation by 
nation, by imposing more embargoes, more 
quotas, more duties, more restrictions, more con- 
trols; a Europe in desperate need of almost 
everything and without the foreign exchange 
with whicli to buy it. 

To many it seemed that Europe was prostrate, 
deathly sick, and ready to be gathered in by 
communism — ^that eager scavenger of human 
disasters. To shortsighted people — and there 
were as many of them then as there are now — 
the situation seemed hopeless. Yet with the 
blessing of liindsight we see that it was not at 
all hopeless, that something like a miracle 

But was it really such a miracle ? What hap- 
pened is that a partnership of nations was 
formed for the great and constructive purpose 
of restoring Europe to health. The one nation 
that could afl'ord to contribute the critical mar- 
gin of external aid agreed to do so — and did. 
The rest of the partners agreed to put forth 
their maximum efforts to help themselves and to 
help each other — and did. A new international 
organization was created to perfomi an interna- 
tional job — which it did ; and from this experi- 
ence grew other international organizations 
until the institutional framework existed for a 
strong commimity of nations no longer depend- 
ent on anyone. 

What's more, a profound revolution in atti- 
tudes took place on the European side of the 
partnership. An obsolete traditionalism which 
had kept European economies stagnant in the 
years between the two World Wars broke down 
and gave way to new attitudes. The practice 
of low-volume; high-cost industrial production 
gave way to high-volume, low-cost production. 
Artificially restricted and protected markets 
gave way to an expanding, competitive mass 
market. Food production based on peasant 
farming gave way to food production based on 
modern agriculture and labor mobility. The 
concept of low wages and high jirofits gave 
way to the idea of management, labor, and con- 
sumers sharing the fruits of higher productivity. 



And restrictive trade policies gave way to lib- 
eral trade policies. 

Above all, the habit of looking inward for 
solutions yielded to the habit of looking out- 
ward beyond national frontiers. As the nations 
joined together for the purpose of recovery 
built up their common institutions — one leading 
to another — they acquired, in the words of one 
of the pioneers, the "habit of cooperation." 

All this did not happen at once, nor did it 
happen to everyone. But it happened fast 
enough — and it dominated enough of the 
thinking of management and labor and govern- 
ments alike — to add up to a revolutionary break 
with old attitudes. No wonder recovery was 
followed by renaissance; no wonder Western 
Europe is coalescing into a great mass market 
serviced by a dynamic and growing economy, 
that a new social mobility is breaking down 
the barriers of the old social structure, and that 
Western Europe is finding out what the North 
American States had discovered earlier — that 
in unity there is strength. Call it a miracle if 
you like,